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A CITIZENS' ARMY: THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CANADIAN MILITIA, 1904 TO 1914

by William Beahen

Thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA
OTTAWA, CANADA, 1979

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Abbreviations

AMC - Army Medical Corps
BL - Breech-loading
CAA - Canadian Artillery Association
CAPC - Canadian Army Pay Corps
CASC - Canadian Army Service Corps
CDC - Colonial Defence Committee
CDQ - Canadian Defence Quarterly
CFA - Canadian Field Artillery
CGA - Canadian Garrison Artillery
CGS - Chief of the General Staff
CID - Committee of Imperial Defence
CMG - Canadian Military Gazette
CMI - Canadian Military Institute
CO - Colonial Office, or Commanding Officer
COC - Canadian Ordnance Corps
COTC - Canadian Officers Training Corps
CPASC - Canadian Permanent Army Service Corps
DGMI - Directory General of Military Intelligence
DGMS - Director General of Medical Services
DMD - Department of Militia and Defence
DND - Department of National Defence
DPW - Department of Public Works
DRA - Dominion Rifle Association
FB - Frederick Borden
GG - Governor-General
GOC - General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia
GSO - General Staff Officer
HQ - Headquarters
IGS - Imperial General Staff
JAG - Judge Advocate General
KR & O - King's Regulations and Orders
MG - Manuscript Group
MGO - Militia General Order
MO - Militia Order
NPAM - Non-Permanent Active Militia
OC - Officer Commanding
PAC - Public Archives of Canada
PAMC - Permanent Army Medical Corps
PANS - Public Archives of Nova Scotia
pdr. - pounder
PF - Permanent Force
QF - Quick-firing
QML - Quarterly Militia List
RCA - Royal Canadian Artillery
RCD - Royal Canadian Dragoons
RCE - Royal Canadian Engineers
RCFA - Royal Canadian Field Artillery
RCGA - Royal Canadian Garrison Artillery
RCHA - Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
RCMI - Royal Canadian Mounted Infantry
RCR - Royal Canadian Regiment
RG - Record Group
RMC - Royal Military College
RNWMP - Royal North-West Mounted Police
SP - Sessional Paper
WCTU - Women's Christian Temperance Union
WO - War Office
INTRODUCTION

During the decade previous to the First World War the Canadian government assumed responsibility for the country's land defence and expanded its military forces to meet this task. Precipitating this new arrangement was the decision by the British government to withdraw the remaining garrisons of the British force which had guarded Canada from the United States. Canadians seemed receptive to accepting responsibility for national defence buoyed up as they were by their pride in Canadian military achievement in South Africa. Canadian military authorities then set out to change what had been an auxiliary force of the British army into a self-sufficient citizens' army which could withstand invasion from the U.S.

During this period both the Laurier and Borden governments increased support for the military. The Permanent Force of regular soldiers tripled in size, and the Non-Permanent Active Militia of part-time volunteers more than doubled. New corps and services were added to the militia and training made more practical. The government encouraged growth of paramilitary groups like cadet corps which could provide the militia with partially trained members on a continuing basis and rifle associations whose members could be pressed into service in war. Increased budgets also meant considerable purchases of arms, stores and facilities for the military.
While the military in Canada was essentially a defence force it was also an institution with social and economic significance. Men joined the militia in search of social recognition as officers and for refuge or diversion in the ranks. Paramilitary groups attracted men who sought an alternative or additional expression of their military enthusiasm other than the militia. Many of these were French Canadians who found the militia discriminated against the use of their language and customs. The increased budgets for matériel and facilities spent largely in Canada as a matter of policy allowed for considerable patronage.

Until Confederation, the British North American provinces were defended by the British army. British forces were required to repulse invasion from the United States in the American Revolutionary War and in the War of 1812. An auxiliary force of Canadian volunteers was formed which saw intermittent service in war and in internal disorder. But since the War of 1812 Canadians have exaggerated the accomplishments of the volunteer force over those of the British army giving rise to the "militia myth" of Canadian history.¹

By Confederation in 1867 the British were seeking to reduce their imperial defence commitments by withdrawing troops from the colonies. At the same time the new Dominion wished to have more control over its own military force; hence the Militia Act of 1868 was passed, which laid the basis for greater Canadian responsibility for defence. The Act provided for an Active Militia force of 40,000 volunteers
who would train on a part-time basis, to be supported by the Reserve Militia, a paper force of men liable for military service. Although the Active Militia was still only an auxiliary force, its formation allowed the British to withdraw most of their troops from Canada by 1871.

After a brief initial period of enthusiasm the government lost interest in the development of a militia force, and thirty years of stagnation began. Training for the Active Militia was supposed to be conducted for a few days annually in camps for units in rural areas and at local armouries for those in the cities. In practice government parsimony made training infrequent. The number of men joining the militia declined, and the arms and equipment became worn and outmoded. The Canadian government was more interested in economic development and continued to depend on Great Britain for protection in the ultimate emergency of invasion by a foreign power.

Still there were some gains for the military in Canada. In 1876, the Royal Military College was founded to educate officers for militia and imperial service. A government-run cartridge factory was established in Quebec in 1882. The next year the government formed the permanent corps of the Active Militia, a small band of regular soldiers to instruct the part-time volunteers and to garrison fortifications. Some degree of public enthusiasm for the militia was maintained by its role in quashing the Northwest Rebellion in 1885.
Military enthusiasm and the "militia myth" were revived once more by the participation of Canadian contingents in the South African War. Then too the turn of the century saw a great mood of optimism about Canada's economic future. There was a feeling that Canada was about to take her place as one of the nations of the world. In view of this nationalistic upsurge it was natural that Canada assume the burden of national defence from Great Britain. 1904 was the critical year. That year the British decided to withdraw entirely from North America, and Frederick Borden caused to be enacted a new Militia law which laid the basis for a Canadian-controlled citizens' army committed to home defence.

The 1868 Militia Act created no more than a modest auxiliary for the British regular garrison which really defended Canada. Borden's Militia Act created a national army, commanded by Canadians and standing on its own in North America. 3

In the next ten years the Canadian government and people strove to meet this commitment until the First World War brought a different destiny.

There have been of late a number of scholarly works dealing with the militia before the First World War. 4 Desmond Morton's Ministers and Generals traces the development of the force from 1868 to 1904 by delineating the characters and accomplishments of its General Officers Commanding and the responsible cabinet ministers. 5 His biography of General Otter gives further insight on the militia up to the First World War. 6 Three graduate theses have also contributed to the historical literature on the force. Carman Miller's
The Public Life of Sir Frederick Borden records and analyses that Minister's efforts to upgrade the militia between 1896 and 1911. Ron Haycock's Sir Sam Hughes: His Public Career is also helpful in penetrating the attitudes towards the military held by that complex man. Also useful is Jean-Yves Gravel's Les Voltigeurs de Québec dans la Milice Canadienne (1862-1898) which studies one/regiment as a social institution. While all these works have influenced the contents of this thesis none has dealt directly with the entire militia force. This thesis attempts to explain the purpose and to describe the nature of the militia in a decade of growth previous to the First World War.

A man who has contributed much to our understanding of the Canadian military is Richard A. Preston. His scholarly Canada and "Imperial Defense" is a learned treatise on Canada's place in the defence posture of the British empire from 1867 to 1919. Preston's Defence of the Undefended Border is an attempt to assess the war plans of Great Britain, Canada and the United States from Confederation until the Second World War. Unfortunately in doing so, Preston concludes incorrectly that planning for war in Europe rather than for defence from the United States was the main reason for the advances in the Canadian military in the decade before the First World War. This thesis will show that the prime purpose of the citizens' army was to fend off invasion from the United States. Suspicion of the United States drove the Canadian government to build a force to defend against in-
vasion. Other duties like overseas participation in imperial wars and settling internal disorder were very much secondary considerations.

This dissertation will also discuss the Canadian militia as a social and economic institution. It will explain why men joined the regular and the part-time forces and what social conditions and experiences they found there. It will also touch on paramilitary groups which supported the militia. A description will be given of the "Buy Canadian" programme by which the government armed, outfitted and housed its militia. In a small way political and personal patronage will be assessed, but the complete tale demands a separate study.

Because Canada was a colony and Great Britain held overall responsibility for imperial defence, the British government was consulted on military matters. The Governor-General referred defence issues to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in charge of the Colonial Office. Since 1885, the Colonial Office was served by the Colonial Defence Committee which included army and navy officers and which offered guidance to Canada and other colonies on defence. But the failure of British forces in the South African War resulted in institutional changes within the British government. From 1903, matters concerning defence of the colonies were referred to the newly formed Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) chaired by the British Prime Minister. Sessions of the CID were attended by cabinet ministers including the Secretary
of State for War, heading the War Office (Army), and the First Sea Lord, in charge of the Admiralty (Navy). The Colonial Defence Committee became an advisory sub-committee of the CID. This change occurred just when the Canadian government was making crucial alterations to military policy with which this British cabinet committee was forced to deal.

Private papers, public documents and a military journal were the primary sources for this dissertation. The papers of the Prime Ministers and the Governors-General, and the British public records, all at the Public Archives of Canada, showed the progress of Canada towards the establishment of a self-contained home defence force. The Frederick Borden Papers at the Public Archives of Nova Scotia offered an extensive account of the administration by that Minister of the Department of Militia and Defence. Unfortunately, no such body of papers exists for his successor, Sam Hughes. The House of Commons Debates were invaluable not only for their pronouncements of military policy but for specific information often given on the military forces. Most useful in tracing the development of the military were the Annual Reports of the Department of Militia and Defence. The most rewarding volumes in the departmental papers were the Minutes of the meetings of Militia Council. The Canadian Military Gazette, a fortnightly publication in the period 1904 to 1914, was a mine of information on the militia as a social institution.

Secondary works are numerous but those contemporary to the period examined were often difficult to find. The
Directorate of History of the Department of National Defence holds some of these volumes as well as some valuable unpublished manuscripts. Many others are in that department's library in Ottawa and the reading room of the Royal Canadian Military Institute in Toronto. Unfortunately, neither of these two repositories is open to the general public. Extraordinarily stringent security regulations keep the National Defence library collection nearly inaccessible to the scholar who is not a public servant. The Military Institute, although a private club, is much more willing to share its library resources through special arrangement.

A brief description of the topics considered in the seven chapters of the thesis might be useful to the reader. The first chapter examines the circumstances surrounding the assumption by Canada of responsibility for national defence. Chapter two deals with the purpose of the militia, explaining that the citizens' army was required for several military and police roles. The third chapter considers the administrations of the two Ministers of Militia and Defence, Frederick Borden and Sam Hughes, and the parts played by several military advisers. The fourth and fifth chapters explain the nature and development of the permanent and non-permanent militia forces respectively. Chapter six deals with the efforts made to upgrade the arms and equipment of the militia and the use of patronage in this process. The final chapter examines the various paramilitary groups and the support which they afforded the militia.
End Notes - Introduction


4 A more complete survey of the historical literature on the Canadian military between 1867 and 1914 is contained in Appendix D. But even there no attempt is made to comment on the numerous regimental histories. These are listed in the bibliography.

5 D. Morton, *Ministers and Generals*.


CHAPTER I - THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
CANADIAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR
NATIONAL DEFENCE

In 1904, the Canadian government accepted for the first
time full responsibility for national defence. The govern-
ment decided to pass new legislation to eliminate British
control of the militia and bind the force more closely to
defence of the country's borders. Coincident with this change
to Canadian military law came a change in attitude by the
British government towards its defence obligations in North
America. Challenged by the growing strength of European
rivals, Britain wished to avoid any situation that might lead
to war against the United States. As a result, the last re-
main ing garrisons were withdrawn, and Canada was left alone
to defend her own borders. Finally, the catalyst of this act
was the gross interference in Canada's political affairs by
a British officer.

Since the South African War Laurier's government had
begun to move towards Canadian control of the militia\(^1\) and
greater restrictions on the Canadian militia's responsibility
for imperial defence.\(^2\) Canada had been divided over sending
contingents to South Africa with the French opposing and the
English supporting this commitment. General Hutton, the
British General Officer Commanding the militia, exacerbated
the crisis by scheming to commit the force to serve in South
Africa before the government had reached a decision. An
angry Laurier considered dismissing Hutton and replacing him
with a Canadian.\(^3\) Then at the 1902 Imperial Conference,
Laurier refused to make any new commitments for Canada to imperial defence. The next step would be a redefinition of the Militia Act of 1866 which in its final form was to provide the legal framework for a Canadian controlled citizens' defence force. Paradoxically the government's determination to accomplish this task was strengthened by the unremitting opposition to Canadian control by Lord Dundonald, the British officer who commanded the militia.

When Major-General Dundonald arrived in Canada in July 1902 to become General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia, he assumed a post which had provided many pitfalls for British officers in the past. Most of his predecessors had, in one way or another, fallen from the graces of their Canadian political masters during their tenures as GOCs. But Lord Dundonald seemed more suited than most for this post. He had served in the previous year as a member of the Yeomanry Re-Organization Committee in Great Britain and had developed an interest in the potential of volunteer citizen soldiers. The offer of the GOC appointment in Canada would afford him the opportunity to reorganize the militia to increase its defence capability. In recommending Lord Dundonald for the job, the Governor-General, Lord Minto, described him to Laurier, "I do not know him well - but I know him to be able and to have had a very distinguished career. He used to appear to me rather quiet and reserved - not undesirable qualities possibly!" But it wasn't long before Minto was regretting
a recommendation that was to damage imperial relations.

Lord Dundonald was determined to forge the Canadian militia into a defence force capable of withstanding invasion from the United States. The system he drew up revolved around training a sizeable nucleus of militia officers and men which could be expanded in an emergency by addition of large numbers of men with some knowledge of rifles and drill. By making limited military drill compulsory for boys, he hoped to stimulate a cadet movement that would provide personnel for the militia.  

After barely six months in Canada, Lord Dundonald presented to the Minister of Militia and Defence, Frederick Borden, his criticism of the militia and his plans for reform in a lengthy second part to his annual report for 1902. He called for extensive improvements in training facilities and methods, conditions of service, organization and arms and equipment.  

Alarmed by the possibility of political repercussions, Borden informed Dundonald that Part II would not be published with the rest of the report because it propounded a defence scheme which ought to remain secret.  

The GOC countered by making public the existence of Part II of the report, and the government was soon beset by demands in the House of Commons and from the press for its publication. The Canadian government was able to weather the controversy over the withholding of Lord Dundonald's report, but the GOC soon moved the issue to a new and more significant arena.
In March 1903, without the knowledge of the Canadian government, Dundonald sent a copy of both parts of his 1902 report and further criticism of Canadian defences to Col. E.A. Altham of the War Office in Great Britain. Col. Altham forwarded this material to the Director General of Military Intelligence indicating that he was most distressed because these revelations showed that Canada was totally unprepared to defend herself against the United States. Asked for an explanation by British officials, the Canadians responded that they had instituted some reforms and were planning more. However, this reply was countered by a secret communication from Minto to Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, which labelled it "misleading" and denigrated Canadian efforts to effect proposed changes.

Dundonald's charges by now had caused considerable concern among British military authorities and at the Colonial Office. The Colonial Defence Committee doubted that the militia could defend the fortress at Halifax or the borders of Canada. The Commander-in-Chief of the British Army regretted the unsatisfactory state of the Canadian defences.

Dundonald's stridently expressed concern about the state of the militia was shared more quietly by his Minister. Frederick Borden (cousin of R.L. Borden and also from Nova Scotia) was chosen Minister of Militia and Defence in 1896 and proved himself a capable administrator. A medical doctor by training, he also devoted himself quite successfully to business with a wide variety of financial interests.
Although he had taken little part in defence debates in Parliament during his seventeen years in opposition, Borden, a militia officer, was to show much concern about the future of the force. Because the prime minister had little personal interest in military matters, they were left almost entirely to Borden. Laurier once confessed his "absolute ignorance of military matters" and admitted his considerable dependence on the advice of his Minister of Militia and Defence. Borden was personally committed to improve the militia.

The most significant reform Borden planned at this time was that of the Militia Act itself. Early in 1903, the minister solicited from his District Officers Commanding their recommendations for amendments to the Act. As well a committee of militia officers headed by Col. W.D. Otter and Col. Henry Smith spent weeks working on a rough draft of the bill in Ottawa. The GOC and several members of headquarters staff also contributed their suggestions. By March 1903, Borden was able to tell the House of Commons that the new Militia Bill would be introduced "probably not later than next week." But this prediction was quite inaccurate. The bill was not to be introduced into Parliament for another year and even then underwent important changes before receiving Royal Assent. The bill was delayed because the Governor-General, Lord Minto, alarmed by the increased powers over the militia it gave the Canadian Minister, attempted to have the British government persuade the
Canadians to modify their intentions.

As Viscount Melgund, Minto had served as military secretary to an earlier Canadian Governor-General, Lord Lansdowne, in the mid-1880s. During this period he had organized the expedition of voyageurs to serve with British troops in the Sudan, campaigned with General Middleton in quelling the rebellion in the Northwest and served as chairman of a commission which reported on Canadian and British defence sharing arrangements. He was named Governor-General in 1898. As an imperialist he consistently encouraged Canadian politicians to think of imperial defence responsibilities. Since the South African war he had become more concerned about the French Canadian antagonism against imperial service overseas. He also feared that the justifiable pride many Canadians took in Canadian exploits in the Boer war could lead paradoxically to a weakening of imperial ties. Public sentiment even in English Canada seemed to favour Canadian control of military affairs. Specifically he had noted widespread resentment among members of the militia against imperial officers and support for the appointment of a Canadian militia officer to the post of General Officer Commanding. Undoubtedly aware of Borden's intentions, Minto believed that Lord Dundonald's misconduct had hardened the resolve of the Canadian government to have a Canadian GOC. His worst fears were realized when Borden presented him with a copy of the new Militia Bill.
The Governor-General was adamantly opposed to the provisions affecting imperial defence. He wrote Borden that he was particularly worried about the section which would allow a Canadian militia officer to serve as General Officer Commanding. Public opinion might force the appointment of an unqualified Canadian and place defence efficiency in jeopardy. He suggested that Canadian officers would gain more if a new imperial command was created in Canada. The Halifax and Esquimalt commands could be joined with the militia organization under a British officer. Then Canadian militia officers would fill important posts in the imperial garrisons. His other major complaint was that the Act failed to delegate clearly the King's authority as Commander-in-Chief of the militia to the Governor-General.26

Minto cabled his objections to Chamberlain27 and suggested that the British government arrange a conference with Canadian officials before the latter introduced "any radical changes in the Militia Act."28 A Colonial Office official warned Chamberlain that the loss of the exclusive right of Imperial officers to command the Canadian militia could undermine imperial co-operation. This change might allow the militia to develop its own characteristics to a point that would spoil the uniformity of the empire's forces in organization, arms and equipment, adversely affecting coordination of either Canada's contribution to imperial defence or British assistance to Canada if invaded. He feared too that the GOC post might be given to a Canadian without the practical ex-
perience afforded by imperial service. Chamberlain asked the Canadian government to defer revision of the act until Borden had conferred in England with the Secretary of State for War and the Commander-in-Chief of the British army. The Cabinet accepted this proposal, as matters relating to the defence of the empire were constitutionally the concern of the British government.

The problem for British military planners in considering the defence of Canada was that the rise of the United States as a mighty military power coincided with the awareness in Great Britain that her own much vaunted strength had been found wanting in the South African War. In 1851 and on several subsequent occasions Britain had promised Canada full military aid in case of invasion from the United States, provided the Canadians themselves made adequate preparations for self-defence. The maintenance of the imperial fortresses at Halifax and Esquimalt by British troops were continuing visible signs of Britain's commitment to Canada. Understandably, the British government was worried about its military position in North America. It wished to preserve American friendship and avoid a war in which a British victory was doubtful. The Admiralty in particular had already turned its attention towards the challenge of European naval rivals and refused to guarantee the defence of Canada or a dominant presence in the western North Atlantic. The War Office was not quite so ready to accede to the military superiority of the United States in North America but was frustrated
in its planning by the Admiralty's refusal to agree to provide the essential naval support. In groping for a solution to this perplexing problem British military and colonial officials were able to agree on one important point; Canada should be assuming much more responsibility for her own defence.

To aid Chamberlain prepare for the coming Conference with Borden, Minto provided background information about the sentiment in Canada towards defence obligations. Popular feeling in Canada now ran against overseas contributions of money or men for imperial purposes.

The whole tendency of Canadian public opinion is towards the maintenance of its own army, possibly of its own navy, with a blind belief in the genius of its officers. Under such conditions it appears to me that the only reasonable course is to consider the force of Canada as constituting the garrison of the Dominion, for the defence of that part of the Empire to which it belongs, Minto went on to say, however, that the Dominion government could not be trusted to defend Canada adequately without imperial supervision and should not be given responsibility for Halifax and Esquimalt. He suggested stationing an Imperial Lieutenant-General in Ottawa to command the Canadian militia and the imperial fortresses. Then, to recognize Canadian national feeling and to appease Canadian officers who still carried resentment about lack of advancement during the South African war, imperial staff positions in Canada could be opened to Canadians.
In September 1903, to strengthen his case, Minto forwarded to Chamberlain a "secret" memorandum on the Canadian military prepared by Lord Dundonald which insisted on British control of the Canadian militia and defence. Under no circumstances should an imperial officer be replaced by a Canadian to command the militia. Only an imperial commander could manage Canadian defence effectively and avoid being a pawn of a Minister of Militia and Defence. Lord Dundonald was extreme in his opinions; Minto himself was more moderate. The Governor-General was prepared to accept a Canadian GOC if supervised by a resident Imperial General Officer.

Meanwhile in response to a request by Chamberlain the CDC produced a secret report on defence which recognized the need for concessions to the Canadian desire for change but asserted imperial military interests. The committee disapproved of the provision to allow a Canadian officer to command the militia. Committee members believed that such a move would endanger the efficiency of the militia and the security of the empire. The CDC recommended that a Canadian officer might command the militia in peacetime if an Imperial Lieutenant-General at Halifax were permitted to inspect the militia, advise on training and take command of British and militia forces in time of war. Should the Canadian government oppose this plan, the committee suggested that it be arranged for an imperial officer to inspect the militia periodically. The committee hoped that the Canadians might continue to appoint a British officer as GOC until her own officers gained more staff education and experience.
Not all the British government agencies concerned with Canadian defence agreed with the Colonial Defence Committee's recommendations. The Committee for Imperial Defence accepted in principle the idea of a Canadian GOC and would offer the assistance of two experienced British officers. It concluded that "the responsibility for the efficiency of the Canadian force would in this case rest entirely with the Canadian government." 41

Finally, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, A. Lyttleton, and the Secretary of State for War, H.O. Arnold-Foster, agreed on a common approach to the impending meeting with Borden. They decided to support Canadian eligibility for the GOC post but to attempt to limit the consequences by suggesting that a British officer continue in the position until a Canadian in the British army, not the Canadian militia, was qualified to assume the command. If Borden refused this compromise, they would suggest that one or more British regular officers serve on the staff of the new Canadian GOC. In addition the two Secretaries of State agreed that some Canadian militia officers should serve as general staff officers in the British Army, promising Canadian officers should attend the British staff college, British and Canadian officers should be interchanged more often and an imperial officer should periodically inspect the Canadian militia and report to both the British and Canadian governments. The two men agreed not to decide on the future of the Halifax and Esquimalt garrisons at this time. 42
Almost on the eve of the conference in London with Borden, British Prime Minister Balfour was contemplating what was characterized as "revolution in our relations with Canada on this whole question of defence". Since 1851, British policy had involved a guarantee to assist in the defence of Canada if the Canadian government maintained its militia force properly. Now Balfour leaned towards dropping this policy, placing the entire responsibility for the command and efficiency of the militia with Canada. This revision of policy stopped short of an explicit statement of the termination of the British pledge to assist Canada in case of attack.\(^{43}\)

Borden met with representatives of the British government at the Committee of Imperial Defence on 11 December 1903.\(^{44}\) There he achieved acceptance of his Militia Bill but not without agreeing to conditions and making promises of contributions towards imperial defence. The key point was that the Canadian government could appoint a militia officer as GOC, but an imperial officer would command joint Canadian and British forces in case of war in North America. The troublesome problem of the automatic seniority accorded to British regular officers over their Canadian militia counterparts was solved by agreeing to equal treatment in recognition of rank and seniority. Borden in return also indicated willingness to raise a regiment of infantry for service in India and stated that his government wished to take over responsibility for defence of the naval bases at Halifax and Esquimalt. The British also offered to reserve two
places at Staff College each year for Canadian officers who might later serve with the British Army. Borden, however, was unable to keep his promises. After returning to Canada he was forced to write to the Colonial Office asking that references to a Canadian regiment for India and the takeover of Halifax and Esquimalt be stricken from the record. His explanation was that he had been commissioned by government to discuss only the changes in the Militia Act and officer education at that meeting and that he exceeded his authority in assuming these obligations for Canada. However, Borden assured the British Colonial Office that the intention of the Canadian government to relieve the British of defence responsibility for Halifax and Esquimalt remained constant and might be arranged at another time.

In the end very little came of this attempt by the British government to influence the future course of Canadian defence policy. The key points of Canadian control had been conceded apparently in return for increased Canadian participation in imperial defence. But the promises proved meaningless, and yet the Canadians were to have their new Militia Act. After this, British officials made little further effort to influence the amending process of the bill. Only the Governor-General was to continue to argue against amendments which seemed to weaken the imperial connection.

On 17 March 1904, Borden introduced a Militia Bill into Parliament to make the force stronger and more Canadian. In
his preliminary speech the minister said that the old act had become unwieldy and troublesome and drawing up a new bill was more practical than piecemeal amendment of the existing legislation. In referring to the highlights of the new bill, he made no attempt to explain the overall significance of the changes.47 No doubt Borden's understatement of his case was part of his political strategy of making the bill more acceptable to the House by emphasizing its similarity to the existing law.48 In fact, the bill was to lay the basis for important new departures in military policy, the organization of diverse military elements into a more cohesive institution and the reduction of the Canadian force's dependence on Great Britain for commanding officers.

The Militia Bill provided for the continuation of most of the existing elements of the force, but renewed them in structure and purpose. Within the Active Militia both the permanent and non-permanent corps received attention. The units designated for continuous service were now formally referred to as the Permanent Force (PF), the total strength of which was raised from 1000 to 2000. This was not to be a standing army meant to defend Canada in time of war but a corps that would instruct the non-permanent force of part-time volunteers. A secondary role for the Permanent Force was to garrison Canada's fortifications.49 The growth of the non-permanent militia was to be encouraged with better pay50 and its efficiency increased by lengthening the period
of annual drill. While the Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM) might still be liable for service for the unpopular aid to the civil power, the Permanent Force was to perform this duty whenever possible. In the old act there was mention of a Reserve Militia of all the men in Canada eligible for military service and not already members of the Active Militia. Now this force in name only was to be transformed into a real body of men, not training but at least sustained by regulations. Outdated references to a naval militia were eliminated.

The Bill also strengthened two existing elements of the Canadian military, rifle associations and cadet corps. The 1886 Act had provided for allowing rifle associations, but had defined no role for its members. This Bill placed such associations under more direct control of the government and required all members to serve in the militia in case of emergency. A broad provision for the support of cadet corps in the old Act was replaced by a concise definition of their organization: they were placed under the authority of militia district commanders although were exempt from active service in the case of a levee-en-masse.

More controversial were the proposed changes in the militia law which emphasized its Canadian command. For the first time the requirement that the General Officer Commanding the militia be from the British regular army was dropped, opening the post to a senior Canadian militia officer. Moreover, the section in the 1886 Act which allowed the British
commander at Halifax to command the militia in time of war or insurrection was omitted. Remaining was the perogative of the Crown to appoint a British officer to command when the militia and regular forces serve together in war, but it was not clear if this would be done on the advice of the British or Canadian cabinet. Also left out of the new Bill was the automatic seniority accorded to a British officer serving in Canada over all Canadian militia officers of the same rank whatever the dates of the respective commissions.

Whereas previously the Active Militia had been subject to the King's Regulations and Orders for the British Army, when on active service it was now to be for the most part under Canadian regulations.

The new Bill would change the defence role of the militia significantly. The old regulation had left open not only the possibility of the militia being ordered to perform overseas imperial service, but also that the order might come directly from imperial authorities. This was rectified in the new Bill. The militia could be called out only for the defence of Canada, whether in this country or beyond the borders. And the authority to call out the militia in an emergency lay with the Canadian cabinet.

This new bill introduced several important changes to the Canadian military. The Permanent Force was formally identified by name and defined clearly by function. The Non-Permanent militia was encouraged to grow in size and efficiency. The paramilitary groups were placed in a more
regulated support role to the militia. The military could now be led by a Canadian militia officer and would be governed by Canadian regulations. This military force was now firmly committed to the role of home defence.

For the most part the Conservatives in the House of Commons took a positive approach to the Militia Bill, but there was considerable dispute over changes involving imperial matters. Conservative imperialists took exception to the fact that the GOC was no longer necessarily to be a British Officer. Sam Hughes, the chief military critic for the Conservatives, objected strenuously to the removal of this connecting link between the Canadian Militia and the British army. He contended that it was desirable to have a British officer command the militia because his career was less dependent on the good will of the Minister of Militia and Defence, making him less vulnerable to political manipulation. The Conservatives also objected to limiting the active service duty of the militia to the defence of Canada, seeing it as a threat to imperial unity. Frederick Borden denied that the old Act permitted a Canadian militia force to serve overseas in an imperial war and claimed that there was no change in the meaning of the law, just a clarification. The minister did mollify imperialists by suggesting that, as in the South African war, Canada could send volunteers overseas to serve with British forces in imperial conflicts.
Borden had not only to argue his case for legislative change in Parliament but also in Government House. Lord Minto remained a formidable adversary to what he perceived as weakening the imperial tie. Just before introduction of the Militia Bill to Parliament, Borden had conceded to Minto the continued reference to the King as Commander-in-Chief, with his authority to be exercised by the Governor-General as his representative. However, Minto's victory was qualified because, as Bourassa noticed, where the previous bill had often referred to the authority of the King over the militia, the new Bill usually referred to the powers of the Governor-General-in-Council. Minto asked Borden about the use of these terms, and the latter replied that while there was no constitutional difference in the change of terms the use of Governor-General-in-Council in place of His Majesty was more proper.

On the very day the Militia Bill was to be introduced into the House of Commons, Laurier and Borden received more protests from Lord Minto. He insisted that the Canadian government had accepted certain conditions to gain British approval for the changes it wished to make in the Act. The opening of the GOC post to a Canadian had been qualified by the right of a senior British army General to assume command of regular and militia forces in North America in time of war. Here Minto was correct, but then less accurately he claimed that the government had agreed to recognize the seniority of regular over militia officers; in fact it had been agreed
that there would be equal treatment.\footnote{Laurier, however, refused to delay the introduction of the bill and to acknowledge an obligation to any British conditions.} \footnote{A compromise was reached the next day when Borden promised to include a new article in the Second Reading of the bill allowing a senior British General to command regulars and militia in war. Although Minto interpreted this concession to mean that the Imperial government would appoint the commander, Borden was careful to ascribe the right of appointment to the more constitutionally ambiguous "His Majesty." On the complicated question of relative ranks of regular and militia officers, Minto could only exact from Borden that the problem would be dealt with later in regulations rather than in the Militia Act.}

In arguing the precedent issue, Minto was probing a sore point for many Canadian military men. The practice of British regular officers taking precedence over Canadian militia officers had long galled some of the latter and stemmed from three sources. First, the Canadian Militia Act of 1886 stated that a British officer serving in Canada was automatically senior to all Canadian militia officers of the same rank.\footnote{Second, it was usual for the Canadian government to entice a good British officer to accept a post in Canada by offering him a promotion with his militia commission. Third, by King's Regulations and Orders (KR&O) for the British Army, to which the Canadian militia had been subject until 1904, British officers were accorded seniority over Canadian}
militia officers of the same rank when the two forces were on active service together. Some Canadian officers had considered such regulations insults to their competence and Sam Hughes once had refused to obey an order from a British officer with the same rank.

In a 21 March 1904 letter to the Colonial Secretary, Minto expressed alarm that the Militia Bill removed the precedence of British officers serving with the militia. This warning was heeded by the British Colonial and War Offices. The Colonial Secretary was worried that the concession to Canada could erode the position of regular officers in auxiliary forces in Great Britain and throughout the empire. The War Office agreed that the rule of seniority of the regular officer should be maintained. The British military authorities finally proposed a new arrangement with Canada that would achieve mutual recognition of commissions and protect the seniority of professional officers over militia officers. However, the new Canadian regulations continued to give the Canadian government the formal authority to determine the rank and seniority of British regular officers serving in the militia.

In June 1904, Borden, in amending the Militia Bill, introduced his most daring innovation, a militia council under the control of the minister. Strangely it was Lord Minto, in his anxiety to stave off the appointment of a Canadian Officer as General Officer Commanding the militia, who unwittingly provided Borden with this method of bringing
the militia even more firmly under Canadian control. In England the War Office Reconstitution Committee (better known as the Esher Committee) appointed to examine the structure of the War Office in the wake of the heavy criticism heaped upon the military establishment after the Boer war, had recently made its report. The committee had recommended that the War Office be run by an Army Council made up of military and civilian members. Minto seized upon this idea early in 1904 as a means of preserving some imperial control of the Canadian militia. He asked Major-General Sir Charles Parsons, the commander of British troops in Halifax, to adapt the Esher committee recommendations to military command and administration in Canada. Parsons drew up a complicated system which created four military authorities in Canada; an Imperial officer acting as an Inspector-General, a Defence Council chaired by the Governor-General with the Minister of Militia as a member, and two General Officers Commanding - one of the militia and the other of British regulars. Minto later described the plan as crude and containing aspects which were unworkable, but he thought it could be modified to maintain imperial supervision over the Canadian militia through British officers in the posts of Chief of the General Staff and Inspector-General with the latter reporting to the Governor-General. Minto had presented Parsons' organization plan to Borden on 26 March 1904, and the Minister declared himself favourably impressed.
However, Borden saw a chance to eliminate the post of GOC which had always been such a thorn in the side of the government. He decided to set up a militia council consisting of four military and two civilian members acting as a committee to advise the Minister. The Council would have no command function, that being decentralized to the military districts. The principal member of Council and the Minister's first advisor was to be the Chief of the General Staff (CGS). This position for the time being would be filled by a British officer, but the rest of Council would be made up of Canadians. Another imperial officer would function outside the Council as Inspector-General, but he would report to the Minister and so would not be the independent overseer that Minto had envisaged.

On 11 June 1904, Borden introduced to the House of Commons amendments to his Militia Bill to provide for the formation of a Militia Council. Borden argued that the GOC system had been a failure from the beginning because the imperial officers failed to recognize the authority of the responsible minister and because there was no continuity of policy. Now the Minister and his council would administer the militia together, and there would be no potential conflict of authority. Though the command would be decentralized to the District Officers Commanding, a GOC would assume overall command in an emergency. The government retained the right to appoint a Canadian militia officer to central command of the militia in such circumstances. Not surprisingly opposition members
claimed that the Act gave too much power to the minister and made him a dictator in military matters.

The British government's response to Borden's plan for a Militia Council was a weary acquiescence. The reaction of the War Office was to let the Canadians work out their own military system. The Secretary of State for War, Mr. Arnold-Foster, considered the situation unsatisfactory because the Canadian government refused to delegate a responsible role to the British authorities in improving militia efficiency. He concluded that "the less we interfere and the more completely we leave them to their own resources, the better."\(^86\)

Officially the War Office gave much the same opinion on this matter in a letter to the Colonial Office. Its Army Council had no real objection to Borden's plan except that the Inspector-General should not be the Halifax commander because of the problems involved in his trying to serve two masters, the British and Canadian governments. The War Office emphasized that Canada was primarily responsible for her own defence in wartime and so should decide its own military system. If the Canadian government required any advice, assistance or expert personnel, the Army Council would cooperate.\(^87\) The Colonial Secretary cabled a synopsis of this decision to Minto later in June.\(^88\) In effect the Canadian government with the amended act had taken control of the militia.

While Borden planned the reorganization of his department, the current occupant of the General Officer Commanding
post, Lord Dundonald, rankled under this assault on his office. Dundonald considered that his position as GOC carried exactly the same powers over the militia as that of the Commander-in-Chief over the British army. To his mind he had sole responsibility for the military branch and any qualification of that responsibility by the Minister of Militia and Defence or his Deputy-Minister constituted political interference. Dundonald believed that, beginning with the censuring of his 1902 report, Borden had subjected him to a number of unwarranted obstructions to his duty. But the GOC later admitted to Lord Minto that these incidents were comparatively minor and revealed the real reason for his public confrontation with the government which came to be known as the Dundonald incident:

the action of His Majesty's Government in throwing open the chief command here to a Canadian Officer was most reprehensible and the cause of much that had occurred. His (Dundonald's) own strong opposition to Borden's suggested organization of a Militia Council in the place of the present system of a GOC having to a great extent brought about the friction which had occurred, and that he believed a deliberate intention had existed to get rid of him.

But it was not on this larger question that Dundonald decided to challenge the government but on political interference with militia appointments.

On 9 June 1904, Dundonald, speaking at a banquet attended by the militia officers of the Montreal District, announced that political partisanship had influenced officer appointments to a cavalry regiment in the Eastern Townships. He
accused the Minister of Agriculture, Sidney Fisher, who represented the Eastern Townships in cabinet, of preventing the appointment of a Dr. Wilfred Pickel to the newly formed 13th Scottish Light Dragoons because he was a Conservative. He claimed to act not out of any self-interest but to protect the militia from partisan politics. The next day the Montreal Gazette carried a full account of the speech. 

Dundonald followed up his advantage of first blow by providing Sam Hughes with a memorandum detailing the Pickel affair which allowed the Conservative defence critic to press the attack in the House of Commons on 10 June. It was revealed that the Commanding Officer of the regiment, Lt.-Col. J.W. Smart, had chosen several prominent Conservatives as officers for the new regiment, including Dr. Pickel, mayor of Sweetsburg. Throughout the organizational period, Sidney Fisher had continually interfered with Smart's selections, delaying the formation of the regiment until it was questionable whether it would be able to participate in the summer training camp. Dundonald had become involved late in May when he drew up what he considered a final list of officers for the regiment. Borden delayed approval and then left for Nova Scotia, while Fisher remained in Ottawa as Acting Minister of Militia and Defence. Fisher demanded that Lt. Col. Smart withdraw Dr. Pickel's application, and Fisher then struck Pickel's name from the list which was passed on to cabinet. For Dundonald this was the final straw, and he resolved to reveal this political corruption for the good of the militia. 
In reply, Sidney Fisher claimed he acted only in the interests of the militia. He explained that Lt. Col. Smart was from Montreal and did not know the people of the Eastern Townships. As a result a Conservative senator from the area, George Baker, was able to influence Smart to recommend several of his relatives for officer appointments. Learning of this, Fisher tried to thwart the obvious intention of turning this unit into a political enclave of Conservatives who had little interest in military matters. He contacted Smart and helped him to select more suitable candidates, even recommending in one case a Conservative whom he felt would make a good officer. Laurier then rose to defend his cabinet colleague and to condemn Dundonald's public attack on the government he served. He complimented General Dundonald on his fine ancestry and his military credentials, but caused a stir by referring to him as a "foreigner." He corrected himself, explaining that he meant stranger, but this did not prevent subsequent press and opposition attacks upon him for lack of loyalty to the British empire.

Meanwhile Laurier had been moving towards dismissing Dundonald from his GOC post. After reports had reached the Prime Minister of Dundonald's speech, he warned Minto: "Should Lord Dundonald have been guilty of such an indiscretion to use a mild term I am inclined to believe that 'his usefulness will be gone'." Then after the General's use of Hughes to continue his assault in Parliament, Laurier told Minto he was more convinced than ever about dismissal.
Borden advised Dundonald on 13 June to cancel his plan to inspect a militia camp in London, Ontario, but the latter refused. And on 14 June, Dundonald received a telegram in London from Borden informing him that he had been relieved of his position as General Officer Commanding.

The Canadian cabinet, in its 14 June order dismissing Lord Dundonald, based its decision on his indefensible violation of his duty towards the government.

For an official to make a public attack upon Ministers of the Government under which he serves is a proceeding so totally at variance with the principles which must necessarily obtain in the administration of military as well as civil affairs but it cannot with propriety be overlooked. It is impossible to do otherwise than characterize the speech of Lord Dundonald as a grave act of indiscretion and insubordination.

The dismissal of Dundonald brought the Laurier government into conflict with the Governor-General. Minto signed the Order-in-Council with reluctance because, while he agreed that Dundonald's actions were reprehensible, he felt that Fisher's sins were more serious. Minto expressed his views in a 15 June memorandum to Privy Council signed by his military secretary, Major F.S. Maude. Minto acknowledged that Dundonald was wrong to challenge the authority of the government and recognized fully the control of the military by the responsible minister. However, he maintained that Fisher's actions were subversive to good government when, instead of protecting the public interest, he preferred to pursue personal and political ends to the detriment of the military administration. Laurier took Minto's criticism
very seriously, and, when he called upon him on 17 June 1904, he asked the Governor-General whether he intended to dismiss the government. Minto denied any such idea and asked that the document be regarded as a personal expression of opinion which was not to form part of the public record. 102

The Dundonald incident continued as the subject of hot political controversy in the next two weeks. The General remained in Canada after his dismissal, making inflammatory public speeches against the government. 103 News of Dundonald's unseemly conduct drew a swift response from the War Office forbidding him to participate in public political meetings and ordering him to report without delay to the Adjutant-General of the British army. 104 The General set sail from Quebec on 29 July but not before giving Minto the impression that he had originally intended to conduct a major campaign against the government. "He used very strong language as regards Borden, and especially as to Sir Wilfrid Laurier whom he said he hated, and wished to do him all the harm he could." 105 Both the Liberals and Conservatives accused each other of trying to turn the Dundonald incident into a political issue in an election year. 106 Whatever the truth, the results of the election on 3 November 1904 brought no significant change: the Liberals returned to power, having taken six more seats away from the Conservatives.

Perhaps the most important effect of the Dundonald confrontation was that it confirmed for the Liberal government that it had been correct in deciding to take control of Canada's
military affairs. After the cabinet had dismissed the GOC, Minto suggested to Laurier that for imperial reasons he should not appear brusque in this action, but soften the blow with references to Dundonald's valuable services to Canada. 107 He enclosed a draft telegram which he proposed to send to the Colonial Secretary, explaining that the Canadian government regretted having to dismiss the General and that it appreciated not only his efforts to better the militia but also the care exercised by the British government to supply Canada with an efficient GOC. 108 Laurier, however, edited these fawning phrases from the cable. He also added a terse criticism of the Colonial Office: "Neither can I commend the success of His Majesty's government in selecting officers to command the Militia. If they had done it on purpose, they could not have created a more prolific source of friction between Canada & the Imperial authorities." 109 Minto was dismayed by Laurier's attitude, considering it "the most ominous factor in the proceedings." 110 Laurier had shown throughout this affair that his government meant to control its defence force and would no longer tolerate the meddling of a British officer nor submit to the opinions of an imperially-minded Governor-General.

The final step in the Canadian assumption of responsibility for national defence came with the takeover of the imperial fortresses at Halifax and Esquimalt. This decision was made more as a result of British pressure than Canadian initiative. As late as March 1904, the Canadians showed
reluctance to take up this expensive burden immediately. However, the impatient Committee of Imperial Defence decided on 20 April that the transfer should take place. Minto himself opposed this final act of British withdrawal from North America. In the last few years Canada had been growing more conscious of her own strength, and the turnover of the fortresses might encourage her towards independence instead of greater participation in the empire. Minto was convinced that the militia was not efficient enough to defend Halifax and Esquimalt and that if the Canadian government took on this responsibility "they would in the main be activated by the political capital to be made from the appearance of wishing to encourage the popular idea of a Canadian nationality." Despite Minto's protests the CID decided to propose the withdrawal of the infantry garrisons from Halifax and Esquimalt. It had concluded that without the full strength of the British navy in the western North Atlantic, Halifax could not be defended in case of war with the United States. Thus there was nothing to be lost in passing the defence responsibility for Halifax and Esquimalt to Canada. The Committee did recommend that British artillery and engineer units should remain at Halifax to defend the dockyard and "in order that the British uniform should not be withdrawn from Canada." For a time the British officials were uncertain about approaching the Canadian government with the news that they would no longer defend the imperial fortresses. Such a suggestion
might invite questions about Great Britain's military capacity. The unease was alleviated when Minto told the Colonial Defence Committee that Laurier had expressed his government's willingness to take on the defence responsibility for Halifax and Esquimalt.115

First warnings of the British intention to withdraw came to Canada through the newspapers. On 29 November, the Globe, of Toronto carried a story from London that the British government planned to withdraw its infantry battalion from Halifax and substitute local defence forces.116 A few weeks later the Admiralty made public its intention to withdraw from Halifax and Esquimalt. In an editorial the Globe responded by stating that Canada should lift the burden of defence of Halifax and Esquimalt from the British taxpayer and garrison the forts with Canadian regulars. The editorial concluded: "National self-respect demands that the Canadian people shall not be indebted to the home Government for the maintenance of any soldier on the soil of Canada. Self-government must be accompanied by self-support."117

The Colonial Office seized upon the Toronto Globe's support of the takeover to bring the matter to the attention of the Canadian government. The Colonial Secretary telegraphed to Lord Grey, the new Governor-General of Canada, the following: "Toronto 'Globe' is reported as advocating withdrawal of all British troops from Canada & substitution of Dominion troops. Please ascertain to what extent your Minister concur in this."118
Once this defence matter came under the serious scrutiny of the Canadian government, it was resolved fairly quickly. When Laurier returned from a holiday in California, the new Governor-General, Lord Grey, brought this question to his attention and was told cabinet would decide. On 28 December, Frederick Borden indicated, at a banquet held in his honour by Toronto militia officers, that Canada would take over the forts. He referred his audience to the memorandum on defence that the Canadian government presented to the 1902 Colonial Conference and repeated a promise "to the effect that the Canadian Government and the Canadian people are prepared to relieve the British taxpayers of every dollar of taxation with reference to the protection of Canadian territory, at least in time of peace." After considering the cost of maintaining two permanent garrisons, the Cabinet decided on 19 January 1905, to offer to relieve the British government of the responsibility for defence of Halifax and Esquimalt.

In its formal communication to the British government, cabinet characterized its takeover offer as a significant assumption of responsibility for self-defence by a self-governing colony. The Canadian Ministers recalled that at the 1902 Colonial Conference they had refused to contribute to the upkeep of the Imperial army and navy. But at the same time the Canadian representatives at that meeting had "acknowledged the propriety of the Dominion, as it advanced in population and wealth, making more liberal provision for
the purposes of self defence, and they stated verbally the willingness of the Government of Canada to assume the responsibility of garrisoning Halifax and Esquimalt and to this extent relieving the Imperial Government of the cost of protecting the Dominion. They now deem it expedient to renew this offer on a more formal and precise manner. The government indicated that it meant to assume complete garrison duty at the fortresses, and so ultimately all British troops including the artillery and engineers were to be replaced. The process of Canadian takeover was complicated, but was virtually complete by 1906, except for the handing over of the dockyard facilities which took place in 1910. The last British units left Canada in the summer of 1906, under the command of Major Gen. Sir Charles Parsons. Cabinet then declared: "His departure from the country marks the assumption by Canada of complete control of, and responsibility for the military defence of the Dominion." The takeover of Halifax by Canada occasioned further consideration of the relative ranks of British and Canadian officers because there was in the process close cooperation between the two forces. The Colonial Office suggested a common commission system recognizing the equality of British Army and Canadian permanent officers, and similarly of part-time militia officers of the two countries. The Canadian government accepted the proposal with reservations because the seniority of both British regular and Canadian permanent militia officers over non-permanent militia officers would
cause dissatisfaction in that force. But the difficulties involved in the changeover of garrisons at Halifax seem to have helped the Militia department accept this arrangement.

Yet despite the agreement of both Canada and Great Britain, the above system proved impossible to implement. After lengthy study, British legal advisors and a committee of military officers discovered that Canada and Great Britain were already too distinct constitutionally for any common system of commissions to be adopted. Questions, such as whether the King could issue commissions to Canadian officers and what military law would apply in the common commission system, proved too difficult to resolve. Borden discussed the next step with British authorities in a meeting in London in 1907, and it was decided to continue the old system of each force issuing temporary commissions to exchanged officers. With this failure to create a common commission system, the Canadian government was rid of the obligation to accord automatic seniority to regular officers serving with the militia. This eased the grievance among militia officers that they were treated as backward colonials when they considered themselves at least as capable as their British counterparts.

The passing of the Militia Act of 1904 asserted Canada's control of her militia and responsibility for defence of her borders. Several factors were coincident in leading the Canadian government to take this step. Successful participation of Canadians in the South African War had
evoked in many of their countrymen feelings of martial pride which supported a national defence role for the militia. Challenged by European rivals Britain was unwilling to diffuse her military strength in defence of Canada, and in fact she sought assistance from her largest dominion. Rather than participate in overseas imperial wars, the government of Canada preferred to assume from the British full responsibility for defence of her own borders. In doing so, the government also removed command and control of the Canadian military from the British. Although constitutionally responsible for defence of the empire, Great Britain was unwilling to press for control of Canadian military policy, especially as it would mean preparing for the contingency of war with the United States.\textsuperscript{131} Now the Canadians must work out a plan to counter the American menace which had been recently demonstrated in the Alaskan boundary dispute.
Endnotes - Chapter I

1 Minto's memorandum recording conversation with Laurier, 30 January 1900, Minto Papers, MG 27, II, B I, V. 18, p. 61.

2 PAC, Minto's memo of conversation with Laurier, 19 March 1902, Minto Papers, MG 27, II, B I, V. 2, pp. 2-4.

3 PAC, Secret Memorandum, No 306M of Colonial Defence Committee (CDC), MG 13, W0032, V. 1918, B 3092, p. 12.


6 Morton, Ministers and Generals.


8 PAC, Minto to Laurier, 5 February 1902, Laurier Papers, MG 26G, C 791, pp. 62459-64.


10 Department of Militia and Defence, Annual Report, 1902. Part II, RG 24, V. 1855, file 67. (Hereafter these reports referred to as DMD Annual Reports).

11 PANS, Borden to Dundonald, 21 February 1903, F. Borden Papers, MG 2, V. 106. (Hereafter referred to as B3 Papers).

12 Morton, Ministers and Generals, p. 180; Canadian Military Gazette, 5 May 1903, B. 11. (This journal hereafter referred to as CMG).

13 PAC, Dundonald to Altham, 6 March 1903, RG 24, V. 1855, file 67.

14 PAC, Altham to DGMI, MG 13, WO 32, V. 1418, B 3092, p. 22.

15 PAC, Minto the Chamberlain, 25 April 1903, MG 11, CO 42, V. 892, B 2217, pp. 555-56.

16 PAC, CDC memo No. 306M, 28 July 1903, MG 13, WO 32, V. 1418, B 3092.

18 C. Miller, The Public Life of Sir Frederick Borden, pp. 53-54.


20 PAC, RG 24, V. 6565, file H.Q., 1064-1.

21 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 22 March 1904, pp. 258-59 (Hereafter referred to as Debates).

22 Ibid., 30 March 1903, p. 669.

23 Morton, Ministers and Generals, pp. 72 and 80-81.

24 PAC, Minto to War Office, Governor-General Records, RG 7, G 21, file 399; Vol. II, 1904-06. (Hereafter referred to as G.G. records).


26 PAC, Minto to F. Borden, 13 April 1907, MG 11, CO 42, V. 895, B. 2220, PP. 90-92.

27 PAC, Minto to Chamberlain, 13 April 1903, GG Records, RG 7, G 21, file 270, V. 1, pt. I., 1903-12.

28 PAC, Minto to Chamberlain, 13 April 1903, MG 11, CO 42, V. 892, B 2217.

29 PAC, Unsigned notation, 16 April 1903, MG 11, CO 42, V. 892, B 2217, pp. 487-89.

30 PAC, Chamberlain to Minto, 20 April 1903, Laurier Papers, MG 26G, C 1171, p. 215622.

31 Debates, 8 October 1903, p. 13405.

32 PAC, Memo entitled "Canadian Defence". Cmannéy to Lyttelton, 8 December 1903, MG 11, CO 42, V. 892, B 2218, p. 328; Stacey, Canada and the British Army, pp. 79-81.


34 Preston, Canada and "Imperial Defense", p. 342.
Minto said that while Borden was pleased with his admission to the CID there was a good deal of disapproval in the Canadian cabinet. In April 1904, Borden made a speech to the Dominion Rifle Association in which he denied that he was a member of the CID saying that he had only been called in to consult with that body on defence matters. Minto had no doubt that Borden was obliged to say this to silence cabinet objections. The Governor-General believed this was done to pander elements in Quebec. Minto to Col. Sir G. Clarke, 25 April 1904, (marked "Private"), PAC, Minto Papers, MG 27, II, B 1, V. 12, p. 180.
47 Debates, 17 March 1904, pp. 205-08.

48 PANS, Borden to Otter, 19 March 1903, PB Papers, MG 2, V. 106.


50 1904 Bill, Sections 21, 64 and 65.

51 1904 Bill, Section 63.

52 1904 Bill, Section 36.

53 1886 Act, Section 12.

54 1904 Bill, Section 21.

55 1886 Act, Section 76.

56 1904 Bill, Sections 71 and 72.

57 1886 Act, Section 77.

58 1904 Bill, Sections 73, 74, 75 and 19.

59 1904 Bill, Section 41; 1886 Act, Section 79 (3).

60 1886 Act, Section 50.

61 1886 Act, Section 82.

62 1904 Bill, Section 79.


64 1904 Bill, Section 77.

65 Debates, 22 March 1904, pp. 296-98.


67 Ibid., 11 July 1904, p. 6381.


69 PAC, Minto to Laurier, 17 March 1904, Laurier Papers, MG 26G, V. 309, pp. 83470-84.

71  PAC, Minto to Laurier, 18 March 1904, Laurier Papers, MG 26G, C 809, pp. 83533-36.

72  PAC, Borden to Minto, 19 March 1904, Minto Papers, MG 27, II, B I, V. 9, Pt. 2, p. 59.

73  1886 Act, Section 50.

74  1900 to 1901, WO 32, V. 815, B 3088, pp. 8-113.


76  PAC, Minto to Lyttelton, 21 March 1904, GG Records, RG 7, G 21, file 270, V. 1, Pt. 1, 1903-12.


The Colonial Office seems to have made this proposal in June 1904, to the Canadian government but received no significant response. PAC, Draft letter C.O. to Minto, 23 June 1904, MG 11, CO 42, V. 899, B 2224, pp. 196-97.

79  Ibid., King's Regulations and Orders For the Militia of Canada, 1904, in Supplement to The Canada Gazette, 29 October 1904. (Hereafter referred to as K.R.&O.).

80  PAC, C. Parsons to Minto, 16 March 1904, Minto Papers, MG 27, II, B I, V. 13, pp. 48-49.

81  PAC, Minto to Lyttelton, 11 April 1907, GG Records, RG 7, G 21, file 270, V., Pt. 1, 1903-12.

82  PAC, Borden to Minto, 26 March 1904, Minto Papers, MG 27, B I, V. 8, p. 155.

83  PANS, Borden to Col. T.D.B. Evans, 12 April 1904, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 110.

84  PAC, Borden to Minto, 15 April 1904, GG Records, RG 7, G 21, file 270, V. 1, Pt. 1, 1903-12.

85  Ibid., Minto to Lyttelton, 19 April 1904.
86 PAC, Arnold-Foster minute, 23 May 1904, MG 13, WO.32 V. 1418, B 3093, p. 657.

87 PAC, E.W. Ward to C.O., 3 June 1904, MG 11, CO.42, V. 899, B 224, p. 249.


90 CMG, 28 June 1904, pp. 11-12.

91 PAC, Minto's memorandum of conversation with Lord Dundonald, 25 June 1904, Minto Papers, MG 27, II, B I, V. 3, p. 36.

92 Dundonald, My Army Life, pp. 261-63.

93 Debates, 10 June 1904, pp. 4596-4603, and 23 June 1904, pp. 5374-86.

94 Ibid., 10 June 1904, pp. 4581-4620.

95 PAC, Laurier to Minto, 9 June 1904, Laurier Papers, MG 26G, C 812, pp. 86571-75.

96 PAC, Laurier to Minto, 11 June 1904, MG 11, CO.532, V. 491, B 3239, p. 5.

97 PAC, Borden to Dundonald and reply same day, 13 June 1904, RG 24, V. 6528, H.Q. 511-12.

98 Ibid., Borden to Dundonald, 14 June 1904.

99 Order in Council, 14 June 1904, in Sessional Paper No. 113, 1904, V. 38, No. 13, p. 3. (Hereafter Sessional Papers referred to as SP.)

100 PAC, three notes Minto to Laurier, 14 June 1904, Laurier Papers, MG 26G, C 812, pp. 86764-80.

101 Ibid., F.S. Maude to Privy Council, 15 June 1904, C 824, pp. 99725c to e.


103 CMG, 26 July 1904, pp. 6 and 9-11.

105 PAC, Minto's memorandum of conversation with Dundonald, 25 June 1904, Minto Papers, MG 27, II, B I, V. 3, pp. 36-37.
106 Debates, 20 July 1904, pp. 7084-7171.
107 PAC, Minto to Laurier, 15 June 1904, MG 11, C0 42, V. 896, B 221, p. 694.
109 Ibid., Laurier to Minto, 15 June 1904, p. 144.
110 Ibid., Minto to Unknown, V. 21, p. 79.
111 See pp. 21-22.
112 PAC, Minto to Lyttelton, 18 June 1904, MG 11, C0 42, V. 896, B 2221, pp. 704-10.
113 PAC, Minutes of CID Meeting No. 48, 8 July 1904, MG 16, Cabinet 2, CID Meetings, V. 1, 1902-05, B 3820, p. 93.
114 PAC, Ommanny to Lyttelton, 1 December 1904, MG 11, C0 42, V. 899, B 224, p. 340.
115 PAC, Minutes of CID Meeting No. 61, 9 December 1904, MG 16, Cabinet 2, CID Meetings, V. 1, 1902-05.
116 The Globe, 29 November 1904.
117 Ibid., 8 December 1904.
119 Ibid., Grey to Lyttelton, 29 December 1904.
120 The Evening Journal, Ottawa, 29 December 1904.
122 Ibid., Laurier to Grey, 20 January 1905, pp. 27-29.

126 Ibid., Lyttelton to Minto, 7 July 1905, file 251, V. 1, 1900-34.

127 PAC, Minutes of Militia Council Meeting, 13 July 1905, pp. 8-10, RG 9, II, A2, Vs. 24-34. (Hereafter referred to as Minutes).

128 PAC, Pinault to Grey for C.O., 2 December 1905, GG Records, RG 7, G 21, file 251, V. 1, 1900-34.

129 PAC, 1905-1907, MG 13, WO 32, V. 1418, B 3093, pp. 40-75; and 8 March 1907, and 11 April 1907, MG 11, CO 42, V. 917, B 2239.

130 Ibid., Minutes of Informal Conference, 30 April 1907, pp. 244-5.

131 See Appendix F - A Note on the Imperial General Staff.
CHAPTER II - THE CITIZENS' ARMY: PURPOSE AND POSTURE

By the end of 1904, the Canadian government had assumed responsibility for national defence and was preparing the military to prevent invasion from the United States. The British navy would protect Canadians from invasion from overseas, but Canada had to make her own preparations against her powerful and sometimes hostile neighbour with whom she shared a common border. In addition, it was necessary to assist the empire in case of real emergency and to prevent internal disorder. These secondary purposes could be met from existing military resources. But to counter the danger of invasion, Frederick Borden and his advisers designed a citizens' army of volunteers which would exist only in potential until called to war.

Though far from being a militarist, Wilfrid Laurier believed that Canada should be able to defend herself. The Liberal Prime Minister tended to disapprove of military expenditures and to avoid imperial defence commitments.\(^1\) He had declared to Parliament in 1902: "It would be the most suicidal policy that could be devised for Canada to enter into the vortex in which the nations of Europe, England included, are engaged at the present time, and which compels them to maintain great military armaments."\(^2\) Canada should devote her energies to development and not squander them on armaments. Yet he believed that Canada must improve its militia and look after her own defences: "The question of defence is one which cannot be altogether overlooked. It is the penalty
of becoming a nation which all nations have to bear and which, in course of time, I hope they may dispense with.  

At the same time, Laurier's nationalist attitude towards the military question did not prevent him from assuring imperialists that Canada would participate in defence of the empire in an hour of great need.  

This broad policy satisfied most Canadians and was difficult for the Conservatives to attack effectively at least until the navy question cropped up in 1910.

In 1904, when Canada took over responsibility for her land defences, virtually the only major concern for military planners was an invasion from the United States. Lord Dundonald claimed that, in 1902, Laurier had advised him not to take the militia seriously because the Monroe doctrine was sufficient protection for Canada.  

This statement has been used by historians to show how little concern Laurier and Canadians generally showed about the possibility of invasion from the United States. As Charles Stacey put it in referring to Laurier's remark:

It is clear that the important improvement effected in the Canadian forces in these early years of the twentieth century had little to do with the American menace,...by this period most people who considered those problems thought of them primarily in terms of a European war.

Stacey's analysis owes too much to hindsight in light of the events of 1914-1918. It should be remembered that the account of Dundonald's conversation with Laurier originated with the general himself who had declared his hatred for the Prime Minister and his desire to do him harm.  

In fact, Laurier
was particularly worried about the possibility of American aggression clearly demonstrated by President Roosevelt's threat to use troops to seize and hold territory claimed by both countries in the Alaskan boundary dispute. In December 1903, Laurier spoke to the Governor-General, Lord Minto, about protecting Canada from further threats from the U.S. He proposed that Great Britain contact France about purchasing St. Pierre and Miquelon and Denmark to buy Greenland. If she failed in this endeavour, Britain should seek guarantees that these territories would not be ceded to the United States. In a memorandum to the Governor-General Laurier noted:

'It has long been apparent to those who have noted the trend of events in the United States that the most popular policy in the Republic is the extension of its territory. The area at the present day is about eight times greater than that of the 13 colonies whose independence was recognized in the year 1782, and Canadians cannot forget that no inconsiderable portion of the northern part of the United States west of the Great Lakes originally formed part of Canada as ceded by France to Great Britain.

The public men and the press of the United States do not hesitate to foreshadow the time when this Dominion will form part of the Union. They seem to regard that event as the natural destiny of Canada.'

Shortly thereafter Laurier declared to Minto that not only was the U.S. policy of expansion dangerous to Canada but also that the Americans had designs on Newfoundland. He proposed that the colony should be brought into Confederation.

In these instances Laurier was reacting to the unfavourable Alaskan settlement, but the Liberal government remained suspicious even after that issue had cooled. In June 1908, Borden warned Laurier that the U.S. planned to establish a new military body, the National Guard, giving the American...
government the capacity to concentrate in a short time a large army at any point on the Canadian border. The only course for Canada was to perfect her own defence organization. The next year he warned Laurier about increased military activity in the United States close to the Canadian border. Laurier saw the account of the activity in a Detroit newspaper which reported that 5000 U.S. troops and ten war vessels were to conduct joint exercises in Ohio. He insisted that James Bryce, the British ambassador to Washington, protest to the American government. The next year George Foster, a Conservative member of parliament, brought to the government's attention the sizeable naval force which the U.S. now had in service on the Great Lakes. Though the Rush-Bagot Convention of 1817 limited the American presence on the Lakes to three war vessels no larger than 100 tons each carrying no more than one 18 pdr. gun, Foster maintained that there were now ten U.S. gunboats on the Lakes totalling 8,000 tons each carrying many guns. Thus the U.S. would automatically dominate the Great Lakes if war should break out between the two nations.

The previous year the Canadian government had referred this violation of Rush-Bagot to the British military authorities. Because it excluded war with the U.S. from its plans the CDC would recommend only that a British naval officer be loaned to Canada to advise on the Great Lakes situation. Laurier had also asked James Bryce to speak to U.S. President Taft about the matter. Bryce informed Laurier that the President and the Secretary of State were sympathetic to the attitude
of the Canadian government and that there would be less trouble in the future.\textsuperscript{18}

However, Bryce proved to be wrong. In March 1910, the U.S. Congress called for modification of the Rush-Bagot treaty so that warships constructed at U.S. shipyards on the Great Lakes could pass unarmed through the St. Lawrence waterway to the ocean where it could be outfitted for naval service.\textsuperscript{19} Bryce explained that American shipyard interests on the Lakes were behind this resolution, and he advised the Canadian government to accept modification, or risk the U.S. denouncing the treaty altogether.\textsuperscript{20} Laurier responded by instructing that Bryce take a hard line on this question; in no circumstances should these shipyards be allowed to build warships for ocean service.\textsuperscript{21} The Canadian government stood by this decision after the Conservatives came to power, and the Americans were forced to abandon their attempts at modification.\textsuperscript{22}

The Canadian military intelligence concentrated on the United States. In 1903, Lord Dundonald created an Intelligence Branch at Militia Headquarters which began to produce a monthly secret intelligence diary prepared from magazines and newspapers, for the information of limited number of senior militia officers and civilian departmental officials.\textsuperscript{23} These clearly show that the main concern of the intelligence section was potentially hostile American activity. Its November report contained 23 pages of data on the U.S. army and navy and only 6 pages about the military of other foreign powers.\textsuperscript{24} The March 1911 Diary contained an assessment of recent mobilization exercises held by U.S. forces:
...it was stated in the New York Evening Post of 9th March, that the New York Division of State Troops was ready to move at six hours notice, complete in arms, uniform, clothing, tentage and field equipment. This is a significant warning for Canada of the readiness of State troops for active service, since it must be remembered that the Organized Militia of the State of New York alone comprises nearly a complete division of 16,000 all ranks. It is unlikely, however, that any other State Organization could boast of a similar state of preparedness. 25

The diary also kept its readers informed about the insidious danger of the increased number of American settlers throughout the Canadian west. 26 Monitoring American periodicals in 1913, the intelligence section even found that annexation sentiment was still to be found in a military magazine. 27 This concentration on the American threat persisted even in the face of the growing German menace after 1909. Reports on the U.S. military predominated in the diaries up to the outbreak of war in 1914.

To ensure adequate preparation for possible attack from the U.S., the Intelligence directorate collected maps, surveys and other information on border areas of Canada and her neighbour. The Corps of Guides of the Active Militia channelled information from various localities for collation. 28 In addition, the Mapping Section of the Intelligence Branch conducted surveys and produced topographical maps of frontier areas and other points. Representatives of the War Office and the Canadian Militia consulted on the production of a comprehensive military survey in 1905. 29 This led to the dispatch of survey teams to the border areas with the personnel wearing civilian clothes because the wearing of uniform would present
certain inconveniences. Alerted to this operation by the Colonial Office, the British Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs sought assurances from the War Office that the teams did not mean to survey secretly parts of the U.S. The War Office replied that there was no intent to violate American territory, but asked the Foreign Office not to inform the U.S. government that such work was in progress" because it is not generally desirable to communicate the details of defensive preparations to a Foreign Power."30 This survey assisted in the production of maps showing parts of the U.S. border territory in minute detail.31

Headquarters staff officers also acquired information on the organization and capability of the U.S. armed forces. When large scale U.S. manoeuvres took place near Toledo, Ohio, in 1909, the Chief of General Staff, General Otter, attempted to arrange through the Governor-General's office that intelligence from the British military attaché in Washington be forwarded directly to Ottawa. He was also granted permission by the Militia Council to detail an officer to watch the manoeuvres.32 However, the following year General Otter advised that it was dangerous to send a Canadian officer as an observer to American army manoeuvres because the U.S. government might then request permission for its officers to view Canadian training.33

In March 1911, the military authorities hoped to send the Director of Military Operations, Colonel Paley, as an observer to U.S. manoeuvres in Texas so that in case the threatened war between the U.S. and Mexico broke out,
Canada would have a man on the scene. Paley missed these manoeuvres, but did attend other exercises in May of the same year. In 1912, the U.S. planned a large-scale manoeuvre of 20,000 regulars and militia in a simulated attack on New York City. It was decided that Lt. Col. E.A. Cruickshank, the District Officer Commanding Military District No. 13 (consisting of Alberta and Saskatchewan), pose as a Canadian officer on leave in the United States who wanted to observe the exercise unofficially out of personal interest. Cruickshank was advised to wear plain clothes and take care to maintain his cover story. This officer attended the training that summer and produced a lengthy report which won him plaudits from Militia Headquarters and the War Office. To maintain secrecy the militia department requested the Auditor General not to reveal the purpose of this trip in his annual report.

In November 1913, Major Gordon-Hall of Militia Headquarters' Staff produced a report entitled "The Defence of Canada against the U.S." In it he pointed out that so far Canada's defence planning had centred on the repulse of an American attempt to capture Montreal and Quebec City. But another possibility was the invasion of western Canada. He provided details about American troop concentrations in western states and complained about the paucity of Canadian military resources on the prairies. Acting on this report Maj. General Gwatkin, now Chief of the General Staff, tried but failed to convince Militia Council to strengthen the western military by creating a separate military district for the province of Saskatchewan.
The Canadian government expended a considerable effort to protect its sea-ports from American attack. The defence of Halifax illustrates how seriously the Canadian authorities took this matter. The Revised Halifax Defence Scheme of 1903, prepared by British regular officers of the Halifax garrison, clearly states that the standard of fortress defence must be successful resistance of American attack by land and sea.

British military planners regarded Halifax as important not only as an imperial naval port but also as a terminus of the Canadian Pacific and Intercolonial railways and as the guardian of the Cape Breton coalfields. When the British withdrew their garrison, Canadian militia staff officers performed the periodic revisions of the Halifax Defence Scheme and submitted them to the Colonial Defence Committee for advice and criticism.

Encouraged by British authorities the Canadian government continued to plan the defence of Halifax from U.S. attack. In 1910, the infantry garrison was more numerous than during the time when the imperial troops were stationed there.

Responding to Canadian interest, in 1911, the CDC pointed out that the Americans were then capable of attacking Halifax with an army of 10,000 to 15,000 men shortly after the outbreak of war. This increased threat caused the new Prime Minister R.L. Borden to agree to grant almost $200,000 for improvement of Halifax defences.

The defences of the city of Quebec were also upgraded. British and Canadian military planners considered Quebec important as a base for naval operations on the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes and because it contained an arsenal.
and drydock facilities. Little was done to protect Quebec until 1903 when Lord Duneldon worked out a scheme of artillery defence against attack by cruisers. Artillery was to be mounted in the Citadel and at No. 1 Fort Levis and a new battery constructed at Pointe Martinière, Levis. It was also proposed to rebuild the walls of the city to guard against land attack by the United States.

Over the next decade considerable efforts were made to improve the protection of Quebec. The Quebec Citadel was repaired, and work was done on the construction of artillery fortresses to command the river approaches to Quebec. At Pointe Martinière emplacements were prepared for the artillery batteries which were to consist of two 7.5" and two 12 pounder guns. Some work was also initiated on fortification at Beaumont, and artillery was purchased from England to supply the armament. By 1913, Quebec was seen as extremely important in defending against U.S. invasion by land or by water. If necessary Quebec would be the disembarkation point for British troops during the summer. And the completion of the Grand Pacific Trunk Pacific railway to Quebec would allow dispatch of these troops to Ontario and the west without passing through strategically vulnerable Montreal.

The major purpose of the military institution in Canada was the defence of her borders against the United States. This had been so since the militia acted as an auxiliary force to the British army in North America and remained so after the Laurier government strengthened control over the Canadian militia and assumed responsibility for home defence. But
this is not to say that the Canadian government thought in military terms when resolving difficulties with the United States. After the settlement of the Alaskan boundary dispute, the Canadian and American governments established a good working relationship which resulted in the clearing up of a number of areas of long-term conflict. Laurier was prone to stress the century of peace between the two nations, and, in 1910, his Minister of Labour, William Lyon Mackenzie King, suggested publicly an international celebration of the centenary. But the United States still carried a big stick and Canada was forced to provide for her own preservation.

A secondary purpose for the Canadian military institution was to prepare volunteers for despatch overseas if the Canadian government decided to contribute a force to assist the mother country in an imperial war. The success of the colonial contingents in South Africa caused Great Britain to encourage the dominions to make formal commitments to imperial military service overseas. This policy did not suit Canada. Laurier preferred to make broad assurances that Canada would aid the mother country if Britain were seriously threatened. At the 1902 Imperial Conference Laurier rejected the British government's proposal that Canada contribute to a special Imperial military reserve. The Canadians were more receptive at the 1907 conference to suggestions that the military forces within the empire should aim for greater uniformity and closer communications. Still, Borden reminded that gathering that the Militia Act gave his government authority to provide for the defence of Canada only and that Parliament would decide in each case when it might be desirable to despatch a force
Then, the naval rivalry between Britain and Germany raised the spectre of the mother country in trouble requiring assistance from the colonies. On 26 January 1909, the Canadian Military Gazette considered the consequences for Canada of the possible war between Great Britain and Germany. It dismissed fears that Canadian cooperation in peacetime imperial defence projects would lead to being liable to serve anywhere at the whim of the British government. Yet if Britain went to war, Canada would assist in a manner determined by her own government. The paper was certain that Canada need not worry about being invaded by Germany, but warned that such a European war would not be without cost to Canada. She would lose sons in overseas contingents, suffer internal complications because of the presence of German immigrants and face opposition to participation from French Canadians led by Henri Bourassa.

The growing tensions in Europe also began to affect military planning. Staff officers at Canadian militia headquarters began to provide for the despatch of contingents to assist the British army in an overseas war as early as 1910. On 8 January of that year, a committee formed to consider problems of mobilization in case of U.S. invasion also considered the structure of an overseas contingent at its first meeting. The committee recommended that should a Canadian force be sent overseas to assist Britain it should conform in structure to the British army. This suggestion was approved by Militia Council with Borden presiding at the meeting.

When Sir John French, British Inspector-General of Imperial Forces, reported on the Canadian militia in 1910, he referred to
the despatch of contingents to assist in imperial defence. Before the inspection Borden had indicated to French that he wanted an analysis of the militia's preparedness to defend Canada, maintain internal order and send contingents abroad. French acknowledged that Canada's first military responsibility was defence of her own borders, and it was by that standard of the militia's capacity that it should be judged. If the military was able to defend Canada against invasion, it should be ready to send forces overseas or to maintain internal order. 57

On 3 October 1911, a secret memorandum, "Relating to a Scheme for the Mobilization of a Canadian Contingent for General Service Overseas", was distributed to top military commanders. 58 This document was issued probably without the knowledge of the Canadian government. 59 It constituted a plan to form a force of one infantry division and one mounted brigade composed of designated units from each division (i.e. military area) in Canada. The plan would be activated "At a time when Great Britain is at war, the Dominion Government decides to mobilize a Canadian contingent for general service overseas." 60 This memorandum is not comparable in scope to mobilization plans prepared by European countries during the First World War period. Rather it was a ten-page document containing an outline of the projected organization of the force and information about procedures to be followed when mobilization was ordered. Division Commanders were to provide headquarters with recommendations of officers fit for command and sites suitable for recruiting and assembly. There was to
be no recruiting of officers or men until mobilization was actually ordered, and then service was to be entirely voluntary. The size of the force was to be about 25,000, its largest part coming from the east but with the mounted brigade made up mostly of western men.

Several revisions to the plan were made over the course of the next few months with an important change being made to the units to be provided by 5th Division in Quebec. Col. O. Pelletier of the 5th Division observed that because of "local conditions and sentiments" his area probably could not furnish two infantry battalions as planned and that one battalion was more realistic. "The paucity of keen and qualified officers and the conditions of life amongst the French-speaking population of this Province, would scarcely justify any expectations of organizing more than one Infantry unit." As a result, the infantry levy on Quebec for the overseas contingent was reduced and that on Ontario increased. Sets of Mobilization Regulations were printed and issued by Headquarters containing instructions on procedures in case of general or partial mobilization but with no specific mention of an overseas contingent.

After the Conservative victory in 1911, Sam Hughes, the Conservative military critic, was appointed Minister of Militia and Defence. Apparently he was not then told of the overseas mobilization scheme and discovered its existence by accident two years later. However, when war came in August 1914, Hughes chose another method of mobilization. The orderly scheme
was replaced by a more spectacular personal call to arms directed by Hughes to every unit commander in the country. As a result a great deal of confusion occurred in the assembly of the first division at the newly established assembly point, Camp Valcartier. Historians have generally observed that this confusion could have been avoided had the original mobilization plan been adhered to. As G.W.L. Nicholson put it:

Indeed, once the confusion caused by the first dramatic 'call-to-arms' subsided, most of the volunteers joined through existing militia units in virtually the manner prescribed by the pre-war scheme. 65

This observation doubtless contains some truth, but must be balanced with the knowledge that the scheme was primarily organizational and procedural, and much improvisation would still have been necessary to operate it satisfactorily.

The dramatic call to arms at the outbreak of war was characteristic of Hughes. For years he had trumpeted his belief in military training and imperial unity in the House of Commons. Raised in Ontario by Ulster Protestant parents proud of a family military tradition and fiercely loyal to Britain, Sam Hughes joined the militia at an early age. He rose to the command of his regiment and in 1892 was elected to Parliament in a by-election in North Victoria. 66 He quickly established himself as a military expert and a major spokesman for the Conservative party on imperial affairs. 67 Hughes consistently urged in and out of Parliament that the British empire should be a more closely knit political federation made stronger by unified military forces. 68 He actively demonstrated his
principle by serving with the British army in the South African War. Then at the onset of the Dreadnought crisis, Hughes delivered stern warning about the German menace to the empire.69

Hughes supported imperial federation because it would give Canada a greater role in world affairs. To him the empire offered Canada her destiny of developing to supercede Britain as the leader of the British nations. He was critical of the British military with its officer caste system and mercenaries in the ranks. Canada's system of volunteers was far superior and could prove itself so in any conflict.70 Hughes believed too that Canada should be primarily responsible for her own defence, and he once devised a scheme of defence which involved attacking the United States.71 And anxious as he was to ship Canadians overseas to prove themselves superior to all military rivals, he did not support British government schemes for imperial defence centralization which failed to accord to Canada a voice in the empire's councils.72 This attitude remained after Hughes became Minister of Militia and Defence in 1911 until the outbreak of war brought him the long-sought opportunity to demonstrate the military prowess of peerless Canadians.

In 1913, the Canadian militia was examined by General Sir Ian Hamilton, Inspector General of Overseas Forces, and his report was a clarion call for Canada's assistance in imperial defence. Hamilton said that new and dangerous forces were stirring in the world and that for the sake of her children Canada must share the empire's military burden. The General
agreed that Canada's first duty was toward home defence, but he claimed that to limit herself to this was a sign of arrested development. Instead Canada must pledge to help the empire and must ready her forces for the great struggle which may come. This report so shocked and dismayed officials at the Colonial Office who feared an outcry from Canadian nationalists that they asked Hughes to edit out the extreme statements on imperial unity before publication. But Hughes had no such qualms, and the offending passages remained in the published text.

Hamilton's report brought no change to defence policy, but the threatening war with Germany did encourage the Canadian government to take one concrete preparatory step in 1914. Following the British example the Militia Department assisted the government in compiling a War Book dealing with preparations for war in areas of more concern to civil rather than military authorities. The job was completed in the summer of 1914, just in time to be implemented upon the outbreak of the First World War. The Governor-General praised the value of the War Book in providing machinery for the transition from peace to war. "Questions such as the creation of the Censorship, the detention of shipping and similar points, had been thought out, and the necessary Orders-in-Council had been drafted and only awaited approval." The First World War brought to a head the crucial question of whether the Canadian government could require of citizens military service outside of the country. On August 1, Canada
assured Great Britain of her willingness to supply a sizeable force to participate in the impending struggle, but pointed out
the legal impediment to such action:

Under section sixty-nine of Canadian Militia Act the active militia can only be placed on active service beyond Canada for the defence thereof. It has been suggested that regiments might enlist as Imperial troops for a stated period, Canadian Government undertaking to make all necessary financial provision for their equipment, pay and maintenance. 78

By August 7, the British government had accepted the Canadian offer of assistance. 79 So it was arranged that the first contingent was despatched overseas not as a body of Canadian militia but as Canadian volunteers serving as British regular soldiers. 80 When Hughes was asked in Parliament whether the volunteer system was to be continued if more contingents were sent or would the militia be sent in a body, he replied:

So far as my own personal views are concerned, I am absolutely opposed to anything that is not voluntary in every sense, and I do not read in the law that I have any authority to ask Parliament to allow troops other than volunteers to leave the country. 81

By 1917, the demand for reinforcements caused the Conservative government to change this position. In introducing the Military Service Bill, R. Borden contended that the Militia Act of 1868 and the revised Act of 1904 allowed the despatch of troops overseas to defend Canada because Canada was threatened by the German menace. 82 Laurier was quick to contradict this interpretation asserting that compulsory service had always been restricted to use in repelling invasion, a principle that the Conservatives had themselves recognized in 1914. 83
Since Confederation the Canadian militia had been employed in an 'Aid to Civil Power' role which usually meant a police action to control public disturbances sparked by religious conflicts or industrial disputes.\(^84\) It is perhaps surprising that of 90 instances of troops being so used between 1867 and 1904, only five were in connection with humanitarian efforts such as assisting recovery from fires or storms.\(^85\) The period between 1900 and 1913 was marked by an increase of trade union activity resulting in more frequent strikes, and on 21 occasions the militia were called out to maintain order among the strikers.\(^86\) The wisdom of using the Non-Permanent Active Militia against their fellow citizens began to be called into question by businessmen, politicians and union leaders.

In 1903, before the passage of the Militia Act, Henry Pellatt, the Toronto financier, twice privately warned his friend Frederick Borden of the dangers of pressing volunteer militiamen into service in industrial disputes. He said the militia recruiting in Toronto had been hurt by the use of local regiments in a Toronto Street Railway strike; union men already in the militia might refuse to take up arms against their comrades in an impending strike of the Toronto Street Railway, or worse still might support the strikers. The permanent corps should be detailed for this duty to avoid breakdown in order.\(^87\) In a second letter Pellatt pointed out that it was hardship for both the volunteers and their employers when the NPAM was called out to prevent disorder. The militiamen were forced to accept less pay for military duty than they
received at their regular jobs, and their employers experienced disruption of their businesses. Toronto employers were reluctant to hire militiamen and, in fact, one wholesaler was reducing the number of volunteers in his employ. Pellatt considered that if the Permanent Force were used all these ill effects would disappear. 88

Similar observations were also made to Frederick Borden by his political colleagues. A.T. Thompson, Liberal M.P. for Haldimand and a militia officer, stated in the House of Commons that the NPAM should not be used to protect property in strikes. Young men joined the militia not to be policemen but to be soldiers, and some workers risked losing their jobs when called out in aid to civil power because their employers would not tolerate a prolonged absence. It was also unfair to expect a worker to control strikers who might well be his friends, and Thompson believed the Permanent Force should be used in these cases. 89 Then on the eve of the introduction of the new Militia Bill in 1904, Borden received a representation in the same vein from union leaders through the Minister of Labour, William Mulock. 90

Borden sought to resolve this issue by making riot control the more particular responsibility of the Permanent Force. The revised Bill of 1904 laid down that the Permanent Force should be called out for this duty if available, and only if the regulars could not be brought into action should recourse be had to the NPAM. 91 Sam Hughes was not satisfied that this change went far enough because in certain areas there were
no Permanent Force units and the part-time militia would be forced to continue to act in aid to civil power. It appears that this change in the law did achieve some limited success in increasing the use of the Permanent Force for military interventions in civil disorders, but NPAM men were still used in the majority of strikes and disorders.

Reference to past abuses when the militia had been called out unnecessarily led to more stringent regulations defining when municipal and judicial authorities had the right to requisition military assistance. The Canadian Military Gazette hoped that the stricter provision for call-out of the militia would prevent its use by the business community to protect its selfish interests and so lower cost to taxpayers and avoid the growth in Canada of the antagonism between labour and militia which existed in the U.S. In the new Act the federal government and not the militia commander was responsible for recovering costs from municipalities, and the pay and allowances of militia on this duty were increased. Borden and Hughes agreed that it was necessary that municipalities should pay for military assistance to prevent officials from ordering aid too readily.

Despite the good intentions of political leaders and the pious hopes of military publicists it seems that in several important strikes the militia was used as the tool of business. In July 1904, while the Militia Bill was passing through Parliament, the militia was called into Sydney, N.S. to keep order in a strike of steel-workers brought on by a reduction in wages. There is a strong suspicion that this intervention
was not so much in the public interest as it was to assist
the Dominion Iron and Steel Works. In Buckingham, P.Q.,
in 1906, owners of a saw mill refused to negotiate with
their striking employees, and when violence erupted the
militia was called in. Trouble arose again in 1909–1910
in Cape Breton when coal miners went on strike in a union
recognition dispute. The Mayor of Glace Bay refused a
request from the company to call in troops believing that he
could control the situation locally. The company then enlisted
the aid of a Sydney judge who provided the necessary requis-
tion. The subsequent presence of troops very likely prevented
violence between rival unions but also supported the company
which was engaged in ruthless strike-breaking activities.
Very shortly the strike was broken and the company was in full
production.

The question of the use of troops as strike-breakers
came up in Parliament in 1911. The Minister of Labour,
W.L. MacKenzie King revealed to the House of Commons that
George Taylor, Conservative M.P. for Leeds and president of
a coal mining company, had sent letters to the Labour De-
partment suggesting that troops be sent in to break a strike
of coal miners at his mine by providing protection for imported
labour. He had suggested further that the Labour Act be
amended to ban strikes. King contended that Taylor wished
the militia to help mine-owners fight labour. Taylor
retorted that such action would be consistent with the govern-
ment's intervention in the recent Nova Scotian miners strikes.
King denied that the government had despatched troops to
Nova Scotia; the mine-owners themselves had called out the militia. Borden was compelled to correct his colleague explaining that it was not the mine-owners who brought out the troops directly but rather local authorities after study of complaints. 102

In 1913, a very serious and bitter strike took place in Mackenzie and Mann's Dunsmuir coal mines on Vancouver Island which in the end involved about 900 NPAM men because there were insufficient PF forces in the area. 103 The use of Chinese and Japanese strike breakers had so infuriated the striking workers that violence became widespread. At one point the town of Nanaimo had been seized by the strikers resulting in arson, looting and loss of life. The militia was called in to regulate the affair and spent almost one year escorting the strike-breaking workers to and from the mines. 104 The prolonged duty of these volunteers for meagre pay caused much hardship on their families, 105 and apparently at one point the government considered but rejected the idea of assigning the duty on a continuous basis to permanent troops. The Chief of the General Staff, Gen. W.G. Gwatkin described this idea as follows:

In effect this is a proposal to employ regular troops on permanent police duty for the protection of capital and the intimidation of Labour: so at least it is likely to be construed by a large section of the people. 106

The blatant use of militia in an anti-strike role did not attract organized workers to military service. Governor-General Earl Grey unconsciously referred to the dilemma of conflicting
interests for a trade unionist in the militia when he remarked that militia was designed to protect the wealth of "the captains of industry and the kings of commerce." Undoubtedly many labour men perceived the militia's role in strikes as protecting the wealth of capitalists from the just demands for fair wages from his workers. Feeling sometimes ran strongly against the militia. In one incident a militia man was driven from his boarding house by former friends who belonged to a union because he had served during the Buckingham strike. The predicament of those labourers who did join the militia was demonstrated by the Grand Trunk railway strike in the Brockville area in 1910. When two companies of the 44th Regiment were called out, it was found that strikers were included in the ranks. The use of the militia in the coal miners' strike on Vancouver Island, in 1913, so incensed the Brandon Trades and Labour Council that it presented a resolution to the Trades and Labour Congress meeting in Montreal opposing the practice of union men joining the militia. The motion was defeated, but it alarmed the Canadian Military Gazette that class conflict should involve the militia; it suggested that the Non-Permanent Active Militia be dis-associated entirely from strike duty, leaving it to the Dominion Police supplemented by the Permanent Force. General Otter made a very wise assessment of the role of the militia in aid to civil power when he wrote, "No more disagreeable or onerous duty can be entailed upon soldiers than aid to civil power, nor in which more patience, intelligence and firmness are required from both officers and men."
The Canadian government and politicians intended that the militia would perform several different roles. Most important was the defence of the country against invasion from the United States. But there was also the possibility that Canada would assist Great Britain militarily in time of great need, and the spectre of German aggression forced more attention to this problem in the latter half of this ten year period. Moreover, the Active Militia was required to act in aid to the civil power usually in connection with industrial disputes. These roles were growing with the greater responsibilities of a self-governing dominion, and the Canadian political and military authorities were challenged to develop a military force capable of meeting these commitments.

The primary task of meeting invasion from the United States was the real concern of military planners. Secondary objectives for the force had been met in the past; labour disputes had been policed and contingents dispatched to South Africa. But the answer found to the central military challenge was one particularly suited to Canadians suspicious of regular armies and proud of the traditions of irregular volunteers. The country would be defended by a largely paper force, a citizens' army of volunteers more posture than reality in peacetime, which would mobilize rapidly to meet any threat.

The idea for such a force emerged during the early years of Frederick Borden's administration due to a combination of circumstances. Prior to 1896, the identifiable military
groups in Canada had consisted of a much neglected militia acting as an auxiliary force to the British army and several poor paramilitary organizations. The British were pressing for Canada to take over more responsibility for her own defence. In fact a British/Canada Defence Committee, in 1898, prepared a complete scheme for defence of Canada against the United States which was based on Canadian militia units being created on mobilization because they had not previously existed.\[112\] This was not the most practical plan, but a new complexion was put on it by Canadian participation in the South African War. Here the concept was proven that volunteers without real military training could rally to the flag effectively in an emergency.

The British army had been embarrassed by its ineffectiveness against Boer sharpshooters, but Canadians thought that their volunteer contingents had done well compared to regular soldiers.\[113\] Some military men, like Sam Hughes, asserted that the Canadian system of a citizens' militia was superior to a standing army.\[114\] Others claimed that properly armed and equipped, the Canadian militia would be second to no other volunteer force in the world.\[115\] Basically, there was a general confidence in volunteer military forces, a feeling that men who could shoot a rifle did not need much military training provided the framework of an army was maintained.\[116\] Regular soldiers of standing armies like Britain's were regarded as low-bred mercenaries whose greater training still could not make them the equal in battle of patriotic citizens with some
military experience volunteering to serve in an emergency. Such attitudes profoundly affected the way Frederick Borden shaped the military institution.

On 8 October 1903, Borden explained to the House of Commons a plan for an enlarged and improved Canadian defence force. Borden referred to his plan as a "skeleton scheme" of military organization which eschewed the concept of a standing army and depended upon the service of part-time volunteers. Based on a plan originally proposed by Lord Dundonald, 100,000 men would be made ready for military service if required, but only about 40% of that figure would undergo annual military training. The remaining 60% would commit themselves to serve with the militia in wartime and would not drill, but would simply train in rifle-shooting. Then when an emergency arose these men could be incorporated into the militia to flesh out the trained skeleton. Borden described this system as being in the best tradition of Canadian volunteer service:

As to the flesh and blood; as to the plastic material, the 60 per cent that we propose to utilize to fill out this skeleton, and make it strong and stalwart and able to defend; I can point with confidence to the evidence that has been given by the militiamen of former days; the men who engaged in putting down the two Northwest rebellions; the men who volunteered for South Africa and won glory for their country; the men who were second to none in heroism; the men who never turned their backs upon the foe—[Some hon. Members] Hear, hear. [The hon. Minister of Militia and Defence] I have unbounded confidence in the capacity of these men, if we give them an opportunity of learning how to use a rifle, that they will fill
up the ranks, and provide the flesh and blood, 
the plastic material that round out this skeleton and make an army fit for duty whenever it 
is required. 118

Over the next decade the militia administration would 
work very hard to make the citizens' army concept work. 
Attempts were made to improve militia training to create 
an effective nucleus. Many forms of paramilitary activity, 
such as rifle associations and cadet corps, were stimulated to 
provide reserves with some smattering of useful experience. 
Meanwhile at militia headquarters in Ottawa, plans and 
organizational changes were made which would facilitate 
turning a posture into a field army to meet invasion.

General Mobilization was the term given to fielding the 
citizens' army in war, and planning for it began in earnest 
in 1905. That year an experienced British officer, Lt. 
Col. Willoughby Gwatkin, began work with militia headquarters 
staff to produce tables of organization for an army 200,000 
men strong to meet invasion from the United States. 119 
The scheme, completed in 1906, called for an army to be raised 
in case of invasion consisting of five field forces to defend 
the frontier from south-western Ontario to the Maritimes. 120 
No formal plans were made to defend the more sparsely 
populated west. This plan was refined in 1908, with Eastern 
Canada now to be defended by three larger field forces. 121

When British General Sir John French inspected the 
Canadian militia in 1910 he made a recommendation for re- 
organization which profoundly affected mobilization planning.
After the elimination of the G.O.C. post in 1904 command of the militia had been decentralized to officers commanding various regions of the country. Mobilization planning then required these commanders to disrupt the peacetime organization based on geography and form balanced forces ready to take the field of battle. French pointed out that this complicated the mobilization process and suggested that peacetime organizations conform to that of the field army which would meet an invasion. The recommendation was accepted and implemented. The militia units in eastern Canada, which represented the bulk of the force, were regrouped into six divisions. A Mobilization Committee at militia headquarters, in 1912 and 1913, produced secret tables for mobilization which organized these divisions and the military districts in western Canada into a field army which could more quickly respond to attack. This plan required 150,000 men to take the field immediately with another 100,000 to be readied as reserves.

Thus, for the decade before the First World War Canadian military planning for defence against invasion was based on adopting a posture rather than organizing an existing force. Such a policy was well suited to the Canadian situation. The perceived threat of invasion from the United States required a developing nation to find a military response which was both adequate and financially supportable. This latter factor forced Frederick Borden in his own words "to 'cut our garment',
so to speak, 'according to our cloth'. So the policy of a citizens' army was adopted which appealed to the Canadian bias for amateur soldiers and based on the South African experience seemed to bear some chance of success. But even the limited goal of a citizens' army required of the government some encouragement to the development of the militia and its support organizations. This was accomplished at the hands of the ministers of the militia department and their generals in the ten years preceding World War.
Endnotes - Chapter 2


2 Debates, 15 April 1902, pp. 2741-42.


5 Dundonald, My Army Life, p. 191.

6 C.P. Stacey, Military Problems of Canada, Toronto, 1940, p. 68.

7 See Chapter I, p. 36.


9 PAC, Two memoranda, Laurier to Minto, 3 December 1903, MG 11, CO 42, V. 893, B 2218, p. 322.

10 PAC, 13 December 1903, Minto Papers, MG 27, II, B I, V. 2, pp. 65-66.

11 PAC, Minto to Lyttelton, 31 December 1903, CO 42, V. 893, B 2218, p. 403.

12 PANS, Borden to Laurier, 8 June 1908, F.B. Papers, MG 2, V. 123.


14 Ibid., Borden to Laurier, (marked "Private"), 5 April 1909, C 875, pp. 154398-401.

15 Ibid., Laurier to Borden, 6 April 1909.


17 Debates, 1 December 1909, pp. 791-800.


21 Ibid., Grey to Bryce, 11 March 1910, p. 2618.

22 Preston, The Defence of the Undefended Border, pp. 185-86.

23 PAC, Dundonald to Altham, 6 March 1903, RG 24, V. 1855, file 67, Pt. A. p. 3.

24 PAC, 3 December 1903, GG Records, RG 7, G 21, file 48689, V. 1, 1904-05.

25 PAC, Intelligence Diary, March 1911, MG 11, CO 42, V. 947, B 2873, pp. 304-55.

26 Ibid., September 1912, V. 960, B 2882, p. 373.

27 Ibid., January 1913, V. 968, B 2948, p. 195.

28 CMG, 19 May 1903, pp. 13-14.

29 Minutes, 28 November 1905, p. 9-10.


31 Minutes, 20 November 1905, p. 7.

32 Minutes, 18 March 1909, p. 12.

33 Minutes, 12 April 1910, p. 4.

34 PAC, RG 24, V. 2505, HQC 1171.

35 Ibid., V. 2507, HQC 1309.

36 Ibid., V. 2509, HQC 1432.

37 PAC, file entitled "Defence of the Provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba from aggression from the south" in RG 24, V. 2509, HQC 1432.

38 PAC, RG 24, V. 2320, HQS 66, V. 1.


41 Minutes, 13 March 1912, pp. 5-6.


43 Minutes, 6 December 1904, pp. 21-22.


45 Minutes, 12 June 1906, p. 4.


47 PAC, C. Mackenzie to M.G.O., 7 March 1913, RG 24, V. 2271, HQS 13, V. 1.


49 Debates, 29 March 1909, p. 3504.

50 Ibid., 6 June 1914, pp. 4961-62.

51 Brown and Cook, Canada..., p. 44.

52 Preston, Canada and "Imperial Defense", pp. 283-430.

53 S.P. 58, V. 43, No. 18, 1907-08, p. 100.

54 CMG, 26 January 1909, p. 57.

55 PAC, CGS to Militia Council, (marked "secret"), 8 January 1910, RG 24, V. 2498, HQS 1050, V. 1-3.

56 Minutes, 14 January 1910, p. 5.


58 PAC, RG 24, V. 4263, MD 2-C-2-4.

59 The memorandum on overseas mobilization may have been issued without the proper authority of the government by a British officer, Major-General Colin Mackenzie, then serving in Canada as Chief of the General Staff. These instructions dated 1 October 1911 were distributed to commanding officers at a time when the militia department lacked its usual
political control. On 28 September the defeated Borden took his leave of his Militia Council and not until 10 October did Hughes become the new Minister. The covering letter to this memorandum opened with the assertion that it came "By direction of the Minister in Militia Council." This authoritative statement was not quite as significant as it sounds as it had much earlier been approved by Militia Council as a stock phrase to be used in papers addressed to ranking officers in districts by senior Headquarters officers. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that in a later conflict with Mackenzie, Hughes complained to the Prime Minister that the CGS took an important decision without consulting him and promulgated it with the phrase "by order of the Minister in Militia Council" leading its recipients to conclude incorrectly that it had ministerial approval. Certainly in the mobilization matter the phrase would seem to imply that the scheme had been authorized by the Minister after consultation with his council; yet other records do not support this conclusion. Mackenzie went on to instruct the recipients of this memorandum on the need for secrecy:

At the present time, the knowledge of its existence might lead to false inferences and cause much mischief and I am therefore to request that you will take special precautions to keep its contents secret, and that you will discuss them with nobody except (if you think fit) one member of your staff.

It is not possible to state the case more strongly than this because this interpretation contradicts past historians who believed that Borden knew of the plan. These historians may have had access to a key Militia and Defence department file which is no longer extant. Mackenzie's memorandum C 1209 of 1 October 1911, on mobilization of an overseas contingent formed part of subject file in Militia Headquarters which cannot now be found and was probably destroyed. Cummins, an army historian, had access to this file in 1921 and he accepted Mackenzie's later contention that Frederick Borden had approved of the planning, although he does not cite very persuasive evidence. Major Cummins and his staff prepared another account of the scheme in the 1930's, which came to be included in A.F. Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces in Great War, 1914-1918.

In this version while it is acknowledged that Sam Hughes accused Mackenzie of keeping this plan a secret from him, it notes Mackenzie's denial and puts the contradiction
down to a misunderstanding. Meanwhile Duguid's book states without a hint of qualification that Frederick Borden approved of the plan, and later historians have accepted this judgment. However, the only corroborating evidence given by Cummins and staff to support Mackenzie's statement that Borden knew of the plan seems to have come from Gwatkin. Gwatkin apparently said that when he arrived in 1911 he was instructed to begin work on the scheme by Mackenzie with the approval of the Minister. Then when the scheme was issued it was with Borden's knowledge and approval. It is impossible for this author to deny outright this account when the basic evidence no longer exists. However, circumstantial evidence forces consideration of the thesis that Gwatkin may have been mistaken about Borden's approval, and that Mackenzie acted on his own authority. D.C. Gordon, in The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense, 1870-1914, refers to Borden's presumed approval of the overseas contingent planning in this way:

"Perhaps nothing in his entire career in office is more surprising than this last business. Borden had stood shoulder to shoulder with Sir Wilfrid Laurier over the years in championing Canadian control of its military establishment against intruding imperialist forces." 10

Gordon goes on to explain this abrupt deviation in terms of the growing German menace.

Sources for Endnote 59

1 PAC, RG 24, V. 4263, MD 2-C-2-4.


3 PAC, 1913 undated and unaddressed memorandum from S. Hughes, R. Borden Papers, MG 26, V. 8 C 240, OC 55, p. 4.

4 PAC, Mackenzie to GOC 2nd Division, 3 October 1911, RG 24, V. 4263, MD 2-C-2-4.

5 PAC, RG 24, V. 1810, GAQ 1-4.

6 PAC, RG 24, V. 1850, GAQ 13-39.

8 PAC, RG 24, V. 1850, GAQ 13-35.
9 PAC, RG 24, V. 1810, GAQ 1-4.
60 PAC, Memo, C 1209, 1 October 1911, p. 1, RG 24, V. 4263, MD 2-C-2-4.
61 PAC, Col. O. Pelletier to Secretary of Militia Council, 9 October 1911, V. 4521, S 1016.
62 PAC, Mackenzie to GOC 2nd Division, 4 December 1911, RG 24, V. 4263, MD 2-C-2-4.
63 PAC, RG 24, V. 4521, S 1016.
64 Duguid, Official History, V. 1, Appendices, p. 13.
See also: Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 310; and, Morton, The Canadian General, p. 323.
67 Debates, 22 May 1908, p. 9029.
68 On three occasions Hughes introduced motions in the House of Commons to the effect that Canada should approve imperial federation and led lengthy debates on the subject. Debates: 13 March 1905, pp. 2334-2411; 11 February 1907, pp. 2840-2903; 13 May 1909, pp. 6417-6447.
69 Debates, 13 May 1909, pp. 6426 and 6444.
70 Debates, 11 February 1907, p. 2855.
71 Preston, The Defence of the Undefended Border, p. 59.
72 Debates, 11 February 1907, p. 2846.
74 PAC, 22 September 1913, MG 11, CO 42, V. 976, B 2955, p. 1201.
75 PAC, Harcourt to Col. J. Seeley, 30 September 1913, MG 11, CO 42, V. 976, B 2955, p. 145.
PAC, RG 24, V. 1853, file 151, pp. 1-4.

PAC, Connaught to Harcourt, September 1914, MG 11, C0 42, V. 981, B 3097, p. 73.

PAC, Connaught to Harcourt, 1 August 1914, R. Borden Papers, MG 26M, OC series C. 252, file 189.

Ibid., Harcourt to Connaught, 7 August 1914.

Ibid., Harcourt to Connaught, 9 August 1914, and Duguid, Official History ..., V. 1, Appendices, pp. 36-38.

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Debates, 18 June 1917, p. 2392.


J.J.B. Pariseau, Disorders, Strikes and Disasters: Military Aid to the Civil Power in Canada, 1867-1933, M.A. Thesis, University of Ottawa, 1974, p. 44.


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Ibid., Pellatt to Borden, 8 May 1903, p. 10301/F2.

Debates, 30 June 1903, pp. 5711-12.

PANS, Borden to Mulock, 12 March 1904, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 109.

1904 Militia Bill, Section 36.

Ibid., 22 March 1904, p. 273.

Pariseau, Disorders ..., pp. 83-86. Statistics regarding use of forces in strikes and civil disturbances 1904 to 1914:

- Exclusively Permanent Force - 7 occasions
- Exclusively Non-Permanent - 4 occasions
- Combination of two forces - 8 occasions*

*(although in three instances the force was almost entirely composed of NPAM,)*
Statistics regarding the use of forces in strikes and civil disturbances 1898 to 1904:

Exclusively Permanent Force - 1 occasion.
Exclusively Non-Permanent Force - 7 occasions.
Combination of two forces - 4 occasions.
*(although in two instances the force was almost entirely composed of NPAM.)*

94 1904 Militia Act, Section 82.
95 CMG, 9 August 1904, p. 8.
96 1904 Militia Act, Section 82.
97 Ibid., Section 86.
100 Ibid., pp. 43-46.
103 Pariseau, Disorders ..., p. 50.
105 PAC, August-September 1913, R. Borden Papers, MG 26H, RLB series, C 306, file 244.
106 PAC, Gwatkin to M.S., 30 October 1913, Gwatkin Papers, MG 30, G 13, file 4.
107 CMG, 10 March 1908, p. 6.
108 CMG, 23 October 1906, p. 5.
110 CMG, 14 October 1913, pp. 5-6.
112 PAC, 1898 Report of Defence Committee, RG 24, V. 1855, file 73.


CMG, 7 April 1903, p. 9.

CMG, 7 July 1903, p. 9.

Debates, 8 October 1903, pp. 13379-13405.

Debates, pp. 13402-03.


PAC, 16 August 1906, Lake to OCs High Commands, RG 24, V. 2432, HQC-484-V. 1-3.

Ibid., 1 August 1908, Lake to OCs High Commands.

Minutes, 7-8 February 1905; and CMG, 25 April 1905.


Minutes, 14 December 1910, p. 2.

PAC, RG 24, V. 2433, HQC 484-A, V. 1.

PANS, Borden to Dundonald, 29 August 1903, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 108.
CHAPTER III - THE MINISTERS AND THEIR GENERALS

The Militia Act of 1904 ushered in a new era of control of Canada's military force. Swept aside was the institutional ambiguity inherent in the previous system where the responsibilities of the General Officer Commanding to command the militia collided with the authority of the Minister of Militia and Defence to administer his department. The minister now had full control over the military and was advised by a group of senior officers and civilian officials known as the Militia Council. Frederick Borden made adroit use of this body to support his efforts to improve the military when opposition arose in Parliament or in Cabinet. He also prudently curried the favour of the vocal Sam Hughes who as Conservative military critic could have been a powerful enemy. When Hughes took the militia portfolio in 1911, he brought to his duties a disdain for professional soldiers. As a result he clashed with his principal military adviser forcing his resignation and he downgraded the role of the Militia Council in decision-making. Yet Hughes did continue Borden's work of improving the militia.

The Militia Council which Borden created to assist him was similar in structure to the Army Council which ran the British War Office. In addition to the responsible minister both councils included in their numbers four military officers and two civil servants as voting members. To follow more closely the British structure, Borden created two new senior positions at headquarters, Chief of General Staff and Master General of the Ordnance. As in Britain these officers and the
Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General would form the military component of the Council.

In Parliament Borden claimed that the Canadian government was just following the lead of the War Office as it had done in the past. But one important difference between Army and Militia Councils which Borden did not stress concerned authority. The considerable power previously exercised by the Secretary of State for War and the Commander-in-Chief of the army was given to the British Army Council with the Secretary as its head. Moreover, the Army Council had the authority to exercise its power even if the Secretary of State for War was not present at the deliberations. In Canada the power was concentrated in the hands of the Minister with Militia Council having the right only to advise him on policy. This distinction was quickly noted by the Conservatives who were concerned that the Minister could manipulate the military for politically partisan purposes. But the history of clashes between ministers and generals justified this assertion of civilian control.

Borden wanted an experienced and loyal officer to assist him as Chief of the General Staff and principal military adviser, and for this key position in Militia Council he picked Colonel Percy Lake, a British officer with strong Canadian connections whom he knew and trusted. Lake was the son of a British officer who had served several years in Canada and married a Quebec woman who became Percy's mother. Lacking private means Percy had entered the British army through
competition rather than purchase and had earned promotion through good service which included five years in Canada in the post of Quarter-master General of the Canadian militia. Borden had been favourably impressed with this hardworking officer when he had served in Canada, and the two had already discussed militia reform when the minister visited London in 1902 and 1903.

Even before introducing to Parliament the Militia Act amendment to provide for a Militia Council, Borden had Governor-General Lord Minto request the British government to loan Lake to Canada to become Chief of the General Staff. Lake came in 1904, originally to stay only six months to help set up the Militia Council administration. In the end he served six years as Borden's chief military adviser. In marked contrast to most of the General Officers Commanding who had preceded him as the senior military officer in the administration, Lake recognized the authority of his political masters and co-operated with his minister to reform the militia.

Borden met with Lake and his other top advisers in the forum of the Militia Council for the first time on 28 November 1904. General Lake was the first military member of the council and was to advise the Minister on military policy, defence of Canada and organization of militia forces for active service. Colonel H.B. Vidal, the Adjutant-General, was the second military member, and he supervised militia organization in peacetime. Colonel D.A. Macdonald, as Quarter-master-General, was the third military member, and he was concerned with aspects
of the transport and supply service. Colonel W.H. Cotton, the Master-General of Ordnance, was the fourth military member responsible for arms, ammunition, technical training, fortification and military buildings. L.F. Pinault, the Deputy Minister, was a civilian member of council responsible for the interior economy of the department, intra-government communications, administration of contracts and real estate. In addition, when the minister was absent from council the deputy was to direct proceedings in his place. J.W. Borden, the minister's cousin and Robert Borden's brother, was the departmental accountant and finance member of Council charged with the preparation of estimates and supervision of expenditures. The Chief Clerk of the department, E.F. Jarvis, would attend Council meetings, draft agendas and maintain a record of proceedings and decisions, but was not to play an active part in deliberations.

The procedures established for Militia Council meetings allowed all members to express themselves freely, but gave full regard to the Minister's authority. The Council was to meet at least once a fortnight at the call of the Minister. Items could be contributed in advance to the agenda by the members of Council, but no unscheduled business could be brought up at meetings. Members were free to dissent from decisions taken and have this recorded in the minutes. But the final decision on policy rested with the Minister. Deliberations and proceedings of the council were to be kept secret.
Not long after the establishment of Militia Council, Borden made it clear to its members that he expected them to establish and to maintain a good public image for the department. On 6 June 1905, Borden proposed the expansion of the Permanent Force to provide personnel for Halifax and Esquimalt garrisons and for new training depots. Opposition spokesmen attacked Borden for expanding the Permanent Force at the expense of the NPAM and forced the minister to admit that there had been a limited reduction of the training establishments of the volunteer force that year. The next day a very upset Borden warned his Council members to do better jobs claiming that they had evaded their responsibilities. In particular he chastised the Adjutant-General, Col. Vidal, who out of carelessness had allowed the NPAM establishment to fall. He warned that he and the Council had enemies which he implied was due to bitterness remaining over Dundonald's dismissal. A few days later the Opposition charged that the increase of the Permanent Force constituted the beginning of a standing army. Again Borden communicated his anxiety to Council. He now required its members to follow Parliamentary debates on military matters closely and assist him in explaining policy to the House. Consequently the military members of Council prepared a memorandum which explained the role of the P.F., but also described the attention being paid to the expansion of the NPAM for Borden to lay before Parliament. In a private letter General Lake explained the way the Militia Council supported its minister's political image...
and still managed the military effectively:

the wise thing for the military authorities to do is to make matters as easy as possible for the political head of the Department from a parliamentary point of view.

The political head must theoretically have absolute control, being a responsible Minister, and this should always be ascribed him in public, but in practice, the administration of the forces and the expenditure of most of the military votes, can be presented by regulations made under the authority of the law (which of course removes the expenditure largely from personal control); and the Minister will probably be only too glad to avoid responsibility by sheltering himself under the regulations. 18

Lake also praised the Militia Council as an efficient administrative and policy group respected by the politicians:

'The existence of a 'Militia Council' such as we have helps the responsible Minister greatly. He divides the duties of the Department between the various members of the Council, and gives each a fairly free hand. All big questions of policy get fully discussed from all sides in his presence. He can play off his Council against politicians who want him to do jobs.

His Council strengthens his hand considerably too in the Cabinet when he lays his proposals before his colleagues. 19

The effectiveness of the Militia Council was challenged several times in the decade before the First World War as the growth of the military and its budget drew criticism from within and without the government. 20

The Finance Department reviewed all departmental budget estimates before submitting them to cabinet and to Parliament for formal approval, and the militia department sometimes had to fight to protect expenditures. This happened with regard
to the 1906-07 estimates when the Finance Minister, W.S. Fielding, and his Deputy, J.M. Courtney, included the militia department in a general programme of government austerity.

In November 1905, the Finance member, J.W. Borden, informed Militia Council that the Minister of Finance had issued a circular letter requiring departments to reduce expenditures for the 1906-1907 fiscal year to the level of 1903-04.

After discussion Frederick Borden resolved to tell the Finance Minister that this was not possible. The militia estimates could not be reduced because regulations prescribed higher rates of pay for both the non-permanent and permanent forces, and agreements had been made to maintain the fortresses at Halifax and Esquimalt and to upgrade military arms and equipment.

The struggle over government financial austerity then moved to the Cabinet with Borden insisting to both Laurier and Fielding that the estimates for his department be approved as proposed. Citing promises made to Great Britain and to the Canadian Parliament, he said the militia must continue to rearm and become more efficient to meet its responsibilities. He refused to accept Fielding's contention that departmental estimates must be cut to provide funds for the transcontinental railway. He also reacted strongly to the Finance Minister's observation that militia expenditures were more likely to attract criticism when government economy was so obviously needed. Borden retorted that criticism of the military seem to emanate entirely from his own colleagues while
the general public approved of his programme of development. Finally Fielding agreed to present its estimates to cabinet as originally drafted. A comparison between expenditures made on the militia in 1903-04 and those made in 1906-07 is not precise because the period of the fiscal year changed at this time. Nevertheless, in 1906-07 the government spent $4,347,320 in nine months as compared to the 1903-04 figure of $3,551,941 for a full year. The next year the Royal Commission on the Civil Service set up by the Laurier government condemned the policy, personnel and procedures of the Department of Militia and Defence. It claimed changes in administration originating with the new Militia Act of 1904 encouraged wastefulness and inefficiency in the department. The Militia Council had been given too much power resulting in an unnecessary expansion of staff at headquarters with a general decline in efficiency. Moreover, defence expenditures had risen because the department ineffectively controlled the granting of contracts and failed to keep proper accounts of its stores.

Not surprisingly Borden in the House rejected the criticism as ill-founded. The Commission had made only a cursory examination of the workings of his department. He accused the Commission chairman, J.M. Courtney, of bearing prejudice against the department formed when he had unsuccessfully challenged militia budgets as Deputy-Minister of Finance. He ridiculed the suggestion that the Militia Council represented
some form of unbridled militarism which squandered Canada's wealth. Rather, the Militia Council, which was well subordinated to the Minister, had been of great assistance in developing a militia force which was increasingly more capable of meeting its expanded defence responsibilities. As for wasteful spending, clearly the Commission was unaware of the stringent procedures used in the purchase and protection of matériel and supplies.

Although opposition members grumbled about waste and patronage in the militia department, there was no real support for the Commission's contention that the system of administration, itself had gone awry in 1904. The strongest point of the critics was that the growth in permanent military staff was disproportionate to the body of the force itself. Borden claimed that the total number of officers at headquarters and in regional commands had risen only from thirty-two in 1893 to fifty-two in 1908. However an opposition critic revealed that, in 1896, there was only eight officers on staff at militia headquarters earning a total of $16,300, but now there were 23 officers with salaries totalling $73,245. In the end the Commission's criticism, only weakly backed by the opposition, brought no substantial change to the militia department's policy or procedures.

However, Borden's record of victory over government opponents to increased militia expenditures suffered a minor reverse in 1908. That year the Cabinet demanded retrenchment within the militia department citing a temporary downturn in the country's economy. The Militia Council vainly looked for
ways of saving money in the purchase of arms and equipment and the maintenance of the Permanent Force. Borden approached Laurier with documents prepared by his military advisers justifying his expenditures particularly those on weaponry. The response of the government was to order a cut in defence department estimates of $1,000,000 leaving it to Militia Council to perform the surgery. In the absence of the Minister, the Council decided in an atmosphere of gloom to save the bulk of the money through the elimination of that year's annual training for the rural corps.

Informed of these proceedings while in London, England, Borden quickly protested to the Prime Minister. The only feasible way to save a lot of money was to eliminate the camps for the country corps, a measure that was neither fair to the militia nor wise politically. The funds spent by the department on summer camps represented almost the only money which reached the rural constituencies which had given Laurier considerable support in the last election. Moreover, obviously the record of his administration was at stake on this issue. In the end a compromise was reached between the Finance department and the Militia Council; the rural regiments would train but with reduced establishments and often at local headquarters instead of district camps. In 1909-10, the number of militiamen trained from rural corps dropped by about one-third. Once more Borden and his Militia Council had saved the militia programme from drastic cuts in budget.
Borden's task of administering his department was made considerably lighter by the co-operation he received from the opposition in the House of Commons. In fact, discussion in Parliament of the militia estimates were remarkably devoid of political partisanship, perhaps because the Conservatives supported Borden's basic policy of growth and development of the military. But Henri Bourassa characterized somewhat differently the phenomenon of the Conservatives' receptivity to government military policy. He declared that the Liberals were turning away from their traditional policy of peace and development and were following the dictates of Tory jingos on military matters.  

Most important in the cooperation Borden received from the Conservatives was the positive attitude of Sam Hughes. Hughes genuinely believed that Borden was doing a good job and even compared him favourably with his predecessors in the portfolio both Conservative and Liberal. But Hughes's attitude also contained a large measure of self-interest. A man of astonishing vanity who constantly sought recognition of his military genius, Hughes went so far as to badger the British government to award him a Victoria Cross. This weakness Borden exploited well.

Borden shrewdly involved Hughes within the periphery of the administration of military policy to ensure the continuation of his support. In 1901, when the Militia Department was investigating the potential of the Ross rifle as a military weapon, Hughes was appointed to a committee to test the arm.
Hughes was convinced of the rifle's value, and from then on Borden's decision to purchase the Ross was defended in Parliament and out by the energetic Colonel. Borden also gratified Hughes by creating for him the unpaid position of Railway Intelligence Officer on his headquarters staff dating from 19 November 1903. And just before the minister introduced his new Militia Bill in the House of Commons, he sent a copy of it to Hughes and proposed a conference to discuss it. Then when the bill went to the House Hughes voiced criticisms but did little to obstruct its passage. It is true that there was a temporary breach between the two over the Dun-donald affair. But even then Hughes heaped his scorn on the Minister of Agriculture, Sydney Fisher, intimating that Borden although he was not entirely blameless had been victimized by the intrigues of his colleagues.

Hughes also received assistance from Borden and Laurier for his request to the British government for recognition of his service in the Boer War. The British government was not kindly disposed in this matter because Hughes had had a bitter public dispute with the General Officer Commanding the Canadian militia, General Hutton, over his right to raise a force to serve in South Africa. Later when Hughes secured a post with the British forces in South Africa he had publicly criticized General Hutton in both South Africa and Canada. The Governor-General, Lord Minto, brought this indiscretion to the attention of the appropriate British authorities, and Hughes had been sent home. The Colonel's version of this
event was that he had returned to Canada of his own will. In demanding the Victoria Cross, Hughes claimed it had been twice promised to him by his commander, General Sir Charles Warren. Hughes's insistence upon recognition worried Colonial Office officials because he was a powerful voice in the House of Commons on military matters. Consulted on the problem in 1903, Lord Minto steadfastly refused to recommend that a special case be made to satisfy Hughes. At this point Borden intervened temporarily placating Hughes apparently with false assurances of Minto's good will in the matter. But the matter arose again in 1908 when Hughes wrote directly to Laurier to complain that Minto's promises that he would receive justice in his claim had failed to materialize. Laurier contacted Lord Haldane at the War Office and had Hughes's name inserted in the British Army List as having been mentioned in despatches from South Africa. In 1909, Borden again approached British officials about rewarding Hughes more substantially but without success. The intervention of Borden and Laurier on his behalf did not entirely satisfy Hughes, but did make him more friendly towards the Liberals.

One of Borden's grander blandishments towards Hughes came in 1911, when the minister invited his chief opposition critic to accompany him to England "in order that I might have the benefit of your advice concerning military matters which may come under consideration at the Imperial Conference with special reference to the Canadian Active Militia." Some Liberals were concerned when the press revealed that on the
eve of his departure Hughes had ostentatiously referred to himself as "military adviser to the Imperial conference."

Obviously here he was magnifying his role, but he went to the conference at Borden's request and with Laurier's approval. Shortly after their return from England Borden favoured Hughes once more by raising him to the rank of full Colonel from Lieutenant-Colonel though he lacked qualifications prescribed by regulation.

Borden also exercised care in the handling of other Conservatives. Having learned a lesson from the Dundonald-Fisher conflict he told his Militia Council that District Officers Commanding should consult with local Members of Parliament and other prominent citizens of both parties to determine likely officer candidates. He also granted the rank of Honorary Colonel to two former Conservative Ministers of Militia and Defence, Mackenzie Bowell and David Tisdale. Borden's reputation for non-partisanship was reinforced by his fairness in awarding to Conservative officers prized places in ceremonial contingents sent to England on imperial occasions.

In September 1911, the Liberal government was beaten in the election and Borden, himself a defeated candidate, left the Department of Militia and Defence which he had administered well for fifteen years. Since the establishment of the Militia Council in 1904, Borden had been particularly successful in running his department. Having firmly established the principle of civilian control, he was wise enough to use the expertise of his professional officers. This he
did not only to improve the militia but also to counter
criticism in Parliament and within the government. In these
tasks Borden was ably assisted by the members of his Militia
Council most notably by General Lake to whom the minister
felt much credit was due for the progress of the militia. 56
But in truth more was probably accomplished through Borden's
quiet manipulation.

Frederick Borden's successor as Minister, Sam Hughes, had
no such record of silent efficiency. While Hughes was the
Conservative party's military critic his outspoken manner and
maverick behaviour had not endeared him to many of the party
faithful. He was a man who held his convictions so deeply
and so consistently as to press them beyond the acceptable
limits of obstinacy. R.L. Borden gave the portfolio to
Hughes only after the latter had vigorously campaigned for
his appointment and had assured the new Prime Minister that he
would exercise more restraint in act and word in the future. 57
Frederick Borden had recommended Hughes to his cousin although
admitting privately to General Lake that he wished Lake's
brother, Richard, Conservative MP from Saskatchewan who had
been defeated in 1911, could have followed him in the post. 58

Unfortunately, Hughes, by military philosophy, ambition
and temperament was destined to undermine the spirit of co-
operation within the militia department ushered in by Borden
with the Militia Council. Sam Hughes was a most enthusiastic
proponent of the Canadian militia ideal. He had fundamental
faith in the superiority of an adequately armed and trained
militia force over regular soldiers. This belief was confirmed by his taste of war in South Africa. His bitter dispute with General Hutton and his experiences in South Africa had left him suspicious of British officers many of whom he felt combined sycophancy to superiors with superciliousness to inferiors. Antipathy towards professional soldiers extended to the Canadian Permanent Force whose officers he contended imitated British army methods.59 Regarding himself as one of the most accomplished products of the volunteer militia system, Hughes sought not only political control but military command. He was temperamentally unable to leave this function to the professional officers.

Most vigorously opposed to Hughes's ambition and philosophy was Major-General Colin J. Mackenzie, his Chief of the General Staff and principal military adviser. Nearing fifty years of age, General Mackenzie had spent thirty years as an officer in the British army serving widely throughout the empire. He had risen to the rank of Major-General (temp.) in the British Army commanding a brigade at Aldershot before agreeing to the Canadian CGS appointment in 1910. Mackenzie's prime concern was to create a more professional Permanent Force capable of providing adequate instruction for what he regarded as the poorly trained, ill-disciplined part-time soldiers. A forceful man, Mackenzie was to become quite abrasive in his dealings with the energetic and opinionated Hughes. The result was a throwback to the confrontations of Ministers and General Officers Commanding and a decline in the importance of the Militia Council.
The first restrained clash between the military philosophies of Hughes and Mackenzie came at a conference in Ottawa in November 1911 called by Hughes in the belief that others than professional staff officers should have a voice in Canada's military affairs. To the gathering he invited leading militia officers and prominent citizens with an interest in the military. In opening the proceedings, Hughes reiterated one of his old themes, the right of free speech in the militia. The minister observed that every officer and man in the volunteer force had the right to speak his mind completely even to criticize his superiors when he is not on duty.\textsuperscript{60} When General Mackenzie came to address the assembled he chose to contradict Hughes. He declared that discipline was essential for military efficiency and that militia officers should exercise discretion whether in or out of uniform. If militia officers lectured their superiors five minutes after taking off their uniforms "the whole of the militia organization will come tumbling about our ears like a pack of cards."\textsuperscript{61}

Later in the conference Hughes argued with Mackenzie and other permanent officers on a similar issue. This disagreement ensued when Hughes suggested the loosening of regulations concerning the eligibility of privates in the NPAM to attend schools of instruction to obtain certification as officers. Several PF officers protested that such a change would lower standards of competency among officers. Mackenzie likened the current system to the situation in schools where men must obtain lower degrees before going on to higher education. \textsuperscript{62}
Relations between Mackenzie and Hughes reached a crisis point in February 1912, over Mackenzie's responsibility as CGS to train the militia. The disagreement occurred over the value of establishing local Provisional Schools to train officers and NCO's who were not free to attend the Royal Schools of Instruction operated by the Permanent Force. Mackenzie opposed the Provisional Schools system of instruction contending that it was not as efficient as Royal Schools because proper facilities and even the opportunities for concentrated training were lacking. Hughes became angry when the CGS deliberately ignored his specific instruction to set up a Provisional School at Sudbury. In response Mackenzie asserted that he alone could decide on forms of training.63 Hughes explained to Mackenzie in a moderately toned letter that as responsible minister he had the right to be advised of the General's actions and to make suggestions about the militia. He expressed disappointment that Mackenzie had not been cooperative since Hughes took over the department while the other military advisers had adjusted well to the change.64 In his reply Mackenzie acknowledged Hughes's general responsibility for the department, but asserted that his post carried the right of deciding on forms of training. If Hughes had no confidence in him or if his duties were to change, he would resign.65 Hughes chose to interpret this letter as conciliatory,66 but wrote to R. Borden detailing the incident and complaining that Mackenzie seemed to think he had independent authority and had adopted a negative
attitude towards the minister. Hughes attributed Mackenzie's faults partly to his regular officer training. 67

In July, the matter of Provisional schools again provoked a bitter indictment from Mackenzie about Hughes's administration. The Minister had written to Mackenzie quite politely that on a recent inspection of militia camps he had noted that many NPAM officers commanding units from companies to divisions displayed a deplorable lack of training and initiative. He suggested as a remedy the extension of the system of Provisional Schools. Mackenzie was to consider the matter and they would meet to discuss various solutions. Mackenzie drafted a response in what must have been a state of barely controlled rage laying all blame for the militia's ills upon Hughes. 68 He said that camp training consisted of little more than teaching men to drill without bumping into each other and initiating them in the duties they must carry out in war. Then he intimated that Hughes's insistence on Provisional Schools showed that he was satisfied to settle for the same superficial training for officers and NCOs. He claimed that Hughes had no respect for the P.F. and had allowed it to decline. The best solution to poor officers in the NPAM was to remove the incompetent, but the minister showed little inclination to do this. Instead Hughes constantly usurped the authority of the headquarters staff and regional commanders weakening their initiative.
Since your advent into office you have completely changed the system at Militia Headquarters in that you are exercising executive command as well as administrative control. You issue executive orders direct from your office on various matters intimately affecting different military branches at Headquarters. This is not in accordance with the military constitution of the country as laid down in the Militia Act. I mention the fact but do not presume to comment on it. I have been at Militia Headquarters long enough to be able to observe the results of this change of system. One result is that the heads of the military branches of the department are ceasing to carry on their work on their own initiative and responsibility. Nor does the matter end here. Commanders of Divisions and Districts are exercising little initiative and accept no responsibility they can avoid.

Mackenzie added that the militia force suffered badly from lack of discipline and complained that Hughes's views on the freedom of expression of militia officers would be supported by no experienced European officer. There is no indication in the record that Hughes received this extraordinary diatribe, but it clearly shows how bitterly Mackenzie resented his minister.

Another continuing issue between Hughes and Mackenzie concerned the proposed promotion of the former from colonel to major-general. In 1912, the Militia Act and regulations were amended allowing for the first time promotion of militia officers to the rank of major-general as recognition of service of special merit such as membership in the Militia Council. Soon the Adjutant-General's office was considering Hughes for such a promotion. Mackenzie believed that this suggestion came from Hughes, and he vigorously opposed it. Since he served on the Council not in a military capacity but
as its civil head, this qualification should not count. That the minister happened to be a senior colonel should not be allowed to blur the distinction between civil and military authority. But the fact remained that Hughes could interpret regulations in his favour to allow the promotion.

In July 1912, R.A. Macdonald, a military member of Militia Council and a newly promoted major-general, wrote to the Prime Minister concerning Hughes. He claimed that Hughes had refused the urgings of Militia Council members that he allow his own promotion. Macdonald's suggestion was that R.L. Borden himself might arrange a way to reward his minister with the much deserved elevation. 71 A second more formal entreaty was directed to Borden by the "Canadian Members of Militia Council" (rather pointedly leaving out Mackenzie) setting forth Hughes's qualifications for promotion and stating "that no one is better qualified than he not only to fill the position of Minister of Militia but to direct and administer a large military force and to discharge the duties which usually devolve upon a general officer." 72 Macdonald followed up with another letter and a personal visit to Borden. 73 It is likely that Hughes was behind these requests, and he may have been aiming to combine the functions of political administrator and military commander. In his post as Chief of the General Staff Mackenzie was only the minister's adviser with no indisputable claim to command the militia in an emergency.

At this point Mackenzie took it upon himself to inform the Governor-General of Hughes's pretensions. He said that
Hughes seemed determined to pervert the intent of recent Militia Act amendments to secure for himself the quite undeserved rank of major-general. The Governor-General wrote to the Prime Minister with the information supplied by Mackenzie without identifying his source declaring his complete opposition to Hughes's promotion which he regarded as a dangerous concentration of civil and military authority. The very next day, perhaps by coincidence but more probably because he had learned of the Governor-General's letter and guessed his informant, Hughes chose to lecture forcefully to his Militia Council on breaches of the constitutional line of communication to the Governor-General, which was only through the minister. The next month, April 1913, Mackenzie tendered his resignation when Hughes cancelled Permanent Force training at Petawawa without even telling the CGS.

Mackenzie's resignation touched off a round of bitter accusations between himself and Hughes which like previous minister and general wrangles contained some truth on both sides. In a letter to the Prime Minister explaining the reasons for his quitting, Mackenzie complained that Hughes reserved for himself all responsibility for not only civil but military affairs acting more like a commander-in-chief than a government minister. This situation was made worse by the fact that Hughes was just an amateur soldier who did not have the expertise to direct militia development. After citing the incident which was the immediate cause of the general's resignation, Hughes's cancellation of Permanent Force training at Petawawa
without consulting the Chief of the General Staff or Militia Council, Mackenzie went on to list other instances of Hughes's arbitrary behaviour. He accused Hughes of slighting the Permanent Force and appointing unsuitable officers to staff and command positions without consulting the CGS or Council. For example, he referred to Col. Edward Morrison's appointment to the post of Director of Artillery without having to pass the usual P.F. exams. Ordinarily such matters might have been decided in the Militia Council, but Hughes had subverted this body. 77

Meanwhile, Hughes was also writing to Borden a letter going over much the same ground covered by Mackenzie. In this version Mackenzie was portrayed as arrogant and uncooperative in his approach to the minister and contemptuous of the volunteer force he was to help administer. Since the first days of his ministry, Hughes had encouraged all members of Militia Council to come to his office to discuss military matters freely, and all but Mackenzie had complied in exemplary manner. In contrast, the Chief of the General Staff hardly ever deigned to consult his minister. When General Lake held this post, he regarded it as his duty to accept the policy directives of his political superior and mould them into practical measures. Mackenzie on the other hand never accepted Hughes's suggestions, or assisted him in any way to realize his military policy. In the matter of Lt. Col. Morrison's appointment, Mackenzie tried to enforce petty
technicalities about junior grade examinations upon an officer who had an excellent war record in South Africa, had been especially commended by General French and who was preparing to take superior examinations to upgrade his qualifications. Hughes believed that Mackenzie had allowed the prejudice of a professional officer towards the militia to rule his judgment.78

Another issue between Hughes and Mackenzie arose after the latter's resignation when Hughes discovered that Mackenzie had authorized military planners to devise a mobilization scheme to ready a contingent to send overseas in case of an imperial war. Hughes claimed that Mackenzie had never told him of the plan though the two had discussed the possible need for a contingent on many occasions. Mackenzie denied this accusation stating that he had told Hughes of his plans.79 It seems quite possible given General Mackenzie's feelings about the limited responsibility of a military commander to his political superior that he alone initiated the work on an overseas mobilization scheme.

It is unfortunate that Mackenzie and Hughes transformed the cooperative spirit of the previous administration into one of confrontation and suspicion. No doubt the new Minister dismayed his chief military adviser with his bombastic praise of the volunteer militia ideal and his denigration of the professional training and discipline which were foremost among Mackenzie's military values. And even friends of Hughes confirmed that he failed to delegate responsibility to his subordinates.80 Frustrated, Mackenzie like previous officers
serving as GOCs, came to believe that for the good of the Canadian military he must defy the responsible minister. This stand had been untenable in the past and was even more so under the revised Militia Act of 1904 whereby the senior military officer had been clearly subordinated to the minister. In reference to the general's stubborn refusal to respect his minister's wishes concerning the extension of the system of Provisional Schools, Hughes succinctly described Mackenzie's general failure to recognize civilian authority. "The Minister conceived it to be the General's duty first, to talk the matter over with him and after consultation, if the Minister were unconvinced still, to adapt himself to the Minister's wishes. In no instance was this done." 81 But Hughes too was guilty of failing to recognize the limitations of his role as minister at times appearing to want to revive for himself the office of General Officer Commanding.

Mackenzie's resignation caused no public controversy. It happened that the Governor-General was in England and that a Liberal, Sir Charles Fitzpatrick, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, was acting in his place. Fitzpatrick, probably with partisan glee, immediately leaped to Mackenzie's defence. Declaring that things were rotten in the militia department, he asserted that Hughes not Mackenzie should have been dismissed. 82 Borden refused to criticize his minister in the affair, but he did force Hughes to accept Mackenzie's resignation gracefully without further escalation of the dispute. 83 Borden even tried to protect Mackenzie's
career by writing confidentially a most sympathetic note of explanation to General Sir John French now Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The conflict between Mackenzie and Hughes was "chiefly due to an extreme divergence in temperament which made sympathetic cooperation almost impossible. General Mackenzie was thoroughly desirous of performing his duty as he understood it." 84

But Mackenzie was not the only professional soldier with no use for Sam Hughes. The Governor-General, the Duke of Connaught, himself an officer of the British army, considered his military judgement more sound than that of Hughes and said so. On 10 February 1913, he wrote to his predecessor Lord Grey that the Canadian militia was the worst force in the empire and that he had recommended solutions to Borden with the request that they be put before Cabinet. Hughes he regarded as an impossible egotist without the sense to consult his cabinet or his able Chief of the General Staff. 85 By December 1913, Connaught complained to Borden that Hughes was an autocrat, refusing all counsel but his own. Imperial officers were very discouraged by Hughes's treatment, and it was unlikely that other good British officers would accept posts in Canada. The Governor-General enclosed newspaper reports of some of the minister's misdeeds and asked Borden to consider the harm this man was doing to his government. 86 The Prime Minister's reply was quite cool insisting that Hughes's administration had earned commendation from many sources. 87
However, Hughes earned more criticism than commendation in the House of Commons aimed at him by both Liberals and Conservatives as was the Parliamentary tradition of non-partisanship in militia debates. The Liberals were virulent in criticizing the size of the military budget; their chief defence critic, F.B. Carvell, spoke of the alarming growth of militarism in Canada. Carvell contended the appropriations for an increased permanent staff in Hughes's first budget had reached unreasonable proportions and were draining the public purse. Hughes, who had simply introduced the budget as already prepared by his Liberal predecessor, expressed his surprise that Carvell now could criticize so strongly while for years he "sat dumb as an oyster." while the military grew under his own party. Attacks on the rising estimates for Militia and Defence reached their peak on 1 June 1914, with several speakers making the point that military expenditures were a complete waste because Canada had no enemy to fear. Hugh Guthrie, the Conservative MP from Wellington South, Ontario, and later a Minister of Militia himself, put it as follows:

There is no danger in sight; why, then, raise the militia of this country to the enormous figure of between 75,000 and 80,000 men. There is no reason for it; there is no emergency in sight, and there will be none in our day and generation. The militia of this country is maintained, I believe, to keep peace and order within our bounds and to defend from attack from the outside.

The increase in the size of the militia budget was indeed significant. In the previous year, 1913-14, over $11,000,000
had been spent on the militia out of a total government expenditure of $184,000,000. This was almost double the percentage of the federal budget expended on the militia ten years previous.

This increase did not go unnoticed within the government when the 1914-15 estimates were being prepared. In a memorandum on the operation of government expenditures in recent years, the Deputy Minister of Finance pointed out the enormous increase in militia costs. Since 1903-04, the estimates had increased more than four-fold, a rate of growth in controllable expenditures larger than any other department. He noted that the largest increase had been granted the department which offered the least service to the country. This concern about defence expenditures was probably passed on to Hughes who in turn warned Militia Council that he would not defend before cabinet any part of the 1914-15 estimates that he considered not absolutely necessary. In consequence Council re-examined the estimates and ordered reductions.

Nevertheless, in early January 1914, the Minister of Finance, W.T. White, felt compelled to alert the Prime Minister to the considerable increase in militia estimates for 1914-15. Not only did the estimates for the Militia and Defence department exceed $11,000,000, but the Public Works department projected spending about $3,000,000 for construction of armouries, a figure which only represented costs during this fiscal year, and not total cost of construction. He recommended a close examination of these estimates. Incensed by a public
statement by Hughes about his plans to increase military spending, the Minister of Labour, F.W. Crothers, registered a very strong protest with Borden. He was dismayed that public revenue was dissipated on "frills and feathers" while important areas like agriculture and technical education were neglected. Crothers claimed that the majority of cabinet agreed with him and he personally was not willing to tolerate this situation any longer. 95 Despite this opposition within cabinet the projected expenditures on the military for 1914-15, as presented to Parliament before the outbreak of war, totalled over $14,000,000. 96

While Hughes followed Frederick Borden's practice of expanding militia budgets, he did make important changes in the administrative controls. Not only did he frequently fail to consult the Chief of the General Staff on training and appointments, but he chose also to downgrade the role of the Militia Council. In 1912 and 1913, meetings of the Council became less and less frequent and in 1914 probably ceased altogether. 97 Instead of professional soldiers Hughes chose to consult interested amateurs such as attended his military conferences in 1911 and 1913. And perhaps not accidentally this left Hughes in the limelight as prime mover in militia affairs.

Frederick Borden designed a Canadian system of control of the militia to supplant the equivocal presence of British political and military authority in the office of General Officer Commanding. Imitative as the Militia Council system
was of the British system and though it continued to be
staffed by British officers, now clearly it was under ministerial
control. But Borden was a successful minister not just
because of this important reform but because his genius
of cooperation and manipulation kept the machine working
smoothly and criticism at a minimum.

It is more difficult to judge Hughes's administration
on just less than three pre-war years. Certainly Hughes
disrupted the cooperative atmosphere within the militia
department by acting the part of military commander as well
as political administrator. But at the same time he did
increase the military budget in substantial support of the
citizens' army he passionately loved. And in partial de-
fence of his practice of minding only his own counsel,
he was not well served by a chief military adviser who
was more ready to match egos than toil patiently in the
public service.
Endnotes - Chapter 3


2 1904 Militia Act, Sections 31, 35 and 36.

3 Debates, 2 August 1904, p. 8172.


5 Debates, 2 August 1904, pp. 8155-56.

6 PAC, Notes on *History of MD 111*, RG 24, V. 1884, AHS 48.

7 Cummins, "Lieutenant General Sir Percy Lake ...." 

8 PAC, Minto to Lyttelton, 9 July 1904, GG Records, RG 7, G 21, file 270, V. 1, Pt. 1, 1903-12.

9 DMD Annual Report, 1910-11, pp. 46-47.

10 Minutes, 28 November 1904, p. 2.

11 Minutes, 28 November 1904, pp. 2-5.

12 Minutes, 30 November 1904, p. 20.

13 Debates, 6 June 1905, pp. 6984-7000.

14 Minutes, 7 June 1905, p. 7.


16 Minutes, 13 June 1905, pp. 7-8.

17 SP 130, 1905, and Debates, 10 July 1905, p. 9117.

18 PAC, Lake to Aston, 20 October 1908, MG 11, C0 42, V. 929, B 2248, p. 68.

19 Ibid., p. 70.

20 See appendix B for table of growth of militia department expenditures.

21 Minutes, 16 November 1905, pp. 5-6.


23 Ibid., Borden to Laurier, 18 December 1905, pp. 104411-14.
24 Ibid., Fielding to Borden, 12 February 1906, C 832, pp. 107271-73.
26 Ibid., Fielding to Borden, 18 February 1906, p. 107270.
27 DMD Annual Report, 1907-08, pp. 168-85.
28 Debates, 11 July 1905, p. 9180.
29 Debates, 9 July 1908, pp. 12505-47.
30 Minutes, 11 November 1908, pp. 3-4.
31 PANS, Borden to Laurier, 19 November 1908, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 124, pp. 915-20; and, PAC, Laurier Papers, MG 26G, C 869, pp. 147928-52.
32 Minutes, 24 December 1908, pp. 5-7.
33 Borden to Laurier, 12 January 1909, Laurier Papers, MG 26G, C 871, pp. 150298-301.
34 DMD Annual Report, 1909-10, pp. 102-03.
35 Debates, 11 July 1904, pp. 6445-46.
36 Debates, 5 May 1898, p. 4936-37.
38 See Chapter 6, p. 273-81.
39 Canada. Department of Militia and Defence. Quarterly Militia List, Ottawa, January 1904, p. 4. (Hereafter referred to as QML).
40 PANS, Borden to S. Hughes, 7 March 1904, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 109.
41 Debates, 10 June 1904, p. 4589.
42 PAC, Secretary of State for War to Lord Roberts, 9 June 1900, GG Records, RG 7, G 21, file 265, V. 1, 1899-1913.
43 PAC, S. Hughes to Governor-General, 20 December 1912, R. Borden Papers, MG 26H, OCA series, C 296, file 162A.
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CHAPTER IV - BUILDING THE PERMANENT FORCE

Since 1871, Canada had maintained a force of permanently embodied militia. What came to be the Permanent Force originally consisted of two artillery batteries intended to garrison the fortresses and maintain the ordnance left behind as the British withdrew from Canada. But it was soon realized that this regular force could perform an equally important function for the Canadian military by providing instruction and training to gunners from part-time militia units. The batteries were organized into schools as were elements of cavalry and infantry when they were added to the permanent militia in 1883.¹

In the beginning there was little cohesion to the three combatant arms of the permanent corps, the artillery, cavalry and infantry. Organization by schools meant that small units of each arm were placed in different localities to guide training and to act as garrisons. At first there was no regimental organization, and companies of infantry and garrison artillery, batteries of field artillery and squadrons of cavalry existed as separate military establishments. This was not only a detriment to uniformity and sense of identity within these arms, but hindered their efficiency as training corps.² In 1883, the artillery units were organized into a regiment, and a decade later regiments of cavalry and infantry followed suit. By the turn of the century the permanent militia consisted of three regiments: the Royal Canadian Artillery (made up of the Royal Canadian Field Artillery and the Royal Canadian Garrison Artillery), the Royal Canadian Dragoons (cavalry), and the
Royal Canadian Regiment (infantry). The example of the Boer armed horsemen in the South African War led to the formation of a fourth regiment in 1901, the Royal Canadian Mounted Infantry. 3

Frederick Borden's plan to create a self-sufficient citizens' army of part-time volunteers resulted in an expansion of the permanent militia and its designation as the Permanent Force. Essentially the role of the force remained the same, but greater demands were put on it. In addition to garrison duties at the inland fortifications and stations, the regular force had to man the former imperial bases at Halifax and Esquimalt. Similarly, an expansion of the size of the part-time volunteer militia required a consequent growth of the permanent units charged with their instruction. And not only did the combatant arms provide more of the same training, but new support units had to be created to develop and communicate to the NPAM the auxiliary services which an army requires to be self-sufficient.

The growth of the Permanent Force in this period was slow and painful because the attendant circumstances were not favourable. There was considerable hostility in Canada towards professional soldiers, and this was shared by many politicians including Sam Hughes. Conditions of service and pay were insufficiently attractive to encourage young men to pursue careers either in the officer cadres or the other ranks of permanent corps. Although the standards for qualification of professional officers were raised, political patronage remained a factor in granting commissions and promotions. By the out-
break of the First World War the Permanent Force was fulfilling the responsibilities originally laid down for it by military authorities but with neither the strength nor the proficiency intended.

After the South African War Borden heeded the oft preferred advice of his General Officers Commanding to create a more balanced military force in Canada. Headquarters staff was reorganized and expanded to further the formation and growth of intelligence, signalling, supply and transport, medical and engineer services within the Non-Permanent Active Militia. The Permanent Force received similar attention. In 1903 and 1904, four new corps, all with support functions, were added to the regular service. This expansion, along with an intended growth of the combatant arms to provide more instruction, led to an increase in the establishment of the Permanent Force from 1,000 to 2,000 in the new Militia Act in 1904. The next year, with the planned acquisition of the bases at Halifax and Esquimalt, Militia Council recommended another increase in establishment to 5,000 to provide garrisons and a greater capability for instruction.

In June 1905, Borden introduced in the House of Commons an amendment to the Militia Act to raise the manpower ceiling of the Permanent Force to 5,000. Borden explained that the force was to be extended from Atlantic to Pacific in a string of local stations or depots "which will form the nucleus of an effective militia which will afford instruction to all the militia." Quoting from a memorandum prepared by General
Lake, the minister said that general defence purposes determined the distribution of the depots along with the instructional needs of the NPAM and the garrison responsibilities at the defended ports of Halifax, Esquimalt and Quebec. Placement of units for reasons of defence put cavalry squadrons at St. Johns, P.Q., and Fredericton, N.B., because of the long frontiers in the two provinces and in the west to maintain order among the large number of aliens peopling the prairies. This amendment was passed on 11 July 1905.

Borden's plan for the enlargement of the permanent corps for the greater good of the militia as a whole was not one destined to be fully realized. A relatively large growth in organization is difficult particularly when hampered, as this was, by political considerations, tight budgets and problems with recruiting. But the force did expand from about 900 in 1904 to a maximum strength of just over 3,000 before the First World War. A look at the various components of the permanently embodied militia shows the limited patterns of development.

In examining the growth of the different arms of the Permanent Force one is somewhat frustrated by the absence of exact standards of comparison with established norms in size and organization. In a general sense the Canadians followed the British example in military organization, but the situations in the two countries were so different as to make comparisons not very rewarding. In Great Britain an infantry regiment might have one or more standard battalions, each made up of
eight companies of about 100 men at war strength. Already there are a number of variables, increased by existence of variously named part-time militia forces in Great Britain. In Canada there was only one regular infantry battalion, the Royal Canadian Regiment, which in 1903 had five companies, but by 1905 had grown to ten. The same situation existed in the cavalry. The standard size of a cavalry regiment in Britain was four squadrons, but in Canada in the pre-war decade the permanent cavalry regiments had two squadrons each. There is really no purpose in judging the form of Canadian regimental establishments against that of the mother country because their functions were different. In Britain the organization was based on the principle that the units must serve together in time of war. In the Canadian Permanent Force the first task of the units was to man instructional depots, and for most of the regiments the only time they would be together was at theoretically annual training camps. Although the numbers fluctuated it may help to give the size of the establishments of the basic units of Canadian Permanent Force combatant arms in 1908:

- Company of infantry: 80
- Squadron of cavalry: 90
- Battery of horse artillery: 113

A company of garrison artillery could be estimated as about the same as that of a battery.

In considering the expansion of the cavalry Borden
planned to create another depot in the west. The Royal Canadian Mounted Rifle Regiment already had a station at Winnipeg, but the regiment consisted of a single squadron. In 1903, it was intended to create a new cavalry regiment further west bearing the name Lord Strathconas after the Canadian battalion which had distinguished itself in South Africa. Delays abounded, caused, according to Borden, by the failure of western Liberals to agree upon which community should receive the benefit of a permanent station and by lack of funds. In 1910, it was decided to resolve the situation by creating a second squadron for the station at Winnipeg and renaming the regiment Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians). No other depot was created in the west. The total strength allowed for both squadrons was 139 officers and men.

The eastern branch of the permanent cavalry, the Royal Canadian Dragoons, increased in size during this period if not in organization. The regiment, consisting of two squadrons, grew from 90 officers and men in 1904, to 205 in 1914. The squadrons had both been based in Toronto, but in 1906, one was switched to St. Johns, P.Q. because of the importance of training cavalry in the Eastern Townships. Generally, reports by the Inspector-General of the Royal Canadian Dragoons were favourable with compliments paid to the physique and intelligence of the men and the excellent standard of their mounts.

The Royal Canadian Field Artillery experienced several important changes in this period. Organizationally it remained
basically the same, made up of two batteries of several guns each and forming a brigade when stationed or serving together. But in 1905, the gunners were given horses to ride and the regiment was re-designated the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery. Though the batteries were already armed with the 12 pounder breech-loading guns used by the Royal Horse Artillery, the men had to acquire horsemanship and learn new drill. Their progress was hampered somewhat by the separation of the two units when "B" battery was transferred from Kingston to Toronto in 1906, where it remained for two years before rejoining "A" Battery at its original station. In 1910, the RCHA took to the countryside in February for three days to perform one of the rare instances of winter training in the militia. After inspecting the regiment that summer Sir. John French remarked that the RCHA's degree of efficiency "has caused me considerable astonishment." Relative to other PF regiments, the strength of the RCHA increased only slightly during this decade, from 168 officers and men in 1904, to 221 in 1914, and its efficiency can be accounted for at least in part by its stability in establishment.

The Royal Canadian Garrison Artillery was required to accommodate the greatest expansion of the combatant corps due to the takeover of Halifax and Esquimalt. In 1904, this regiment consisted of two companies with a total strength of 167 stationed at Quebec. In 1905, the organization was altered to provide for five companies, two to be assigned to Quebec, two to Halifax and the remaining one to Esquimalt. Companies
Nos. 1 and 2 moved from Quebec to Halifax in December to assume responsibility for coast defence, and No. 5 went to Esquimalt the following year. The RCGA was able to expand so rapidly because many of the British Artillerymen chose to join the Canadian service when their regiments left for home. Then in 1907, Lt. Col. W.G. Gwatkin organized the recruitment of 200 more former Royal Artillerymen in Britain itself.\textsuperscript{33}

Despite the initial success in recruiting a complement, it proved a difficult matter to maintain a satisfactory artillery force at the coastal fortresses. The Esquimalt garrison had the smallest number of artillery troops at less than a 100-man establishment because of the slight value placed on the station by imperial authorities.\textsuperscript{34} Service in such a tiny force removed from an urban centre was not popular with the men, and the Officer Commanding the RCGA contingent at Esquimalt complained to Headquarters that the strength of his detachment was so low that he was forced to shut down part of the fortress works.\textsuperscript{35} Another problem with the British Columbia base was that the high wages paid to civilian labour in the vicinity made service life less attractive. As a result men were shifted from the eastern stations to Esquimalt to bolster the ranks.\textsuperscript{36} Possibly as a result of this, by 1911, the coast defence companies at Halifax were only at three-quarters strength, the same as at Esquimalt. Only at Quebec where there was a heavy battery as well as a coast defence unit was there close to an authorized complement.\textsuperscript{37} Even with the manpower shortage inspection reports consistently showed the RCGA efficient in its own training and in instruction of the NPAM artillery.
The infantry component of the Permanent Force, the Royal Canadian Regiment, doubled in organization and in strength between 1904 and 1914, principally to provide a garrison force for Halifax. The number of companies was expanded from five to ten in 1905, and by 1906 were located at the following regimental depots: the first six at Halifax; No. 7 at Quebec; No. 8 at Fredericton; No. 9 at Toronto; and No. 10 at London. General W. D. Otter noted in 1912 that the Halifax companies of the RCR were efficient but the smaller depots failed to match that standard. In 1914, the strength of the RCR was just under 800, although three years earlier it had stood close to 1,000. In this period a disproportionate number of the desertions and charges for misconduct came from the RCR. In the absence of a more immediate cause, perhaps because no specialized skills were demanded of its ranks as was the case in other arms the men felt less pride in their duties. Special arrangements were made on several occasions to bring former British soldiers to Canada to bolster the complement of the RCR.

The formation of a permanent corps of engineers in 1903 proved timely as the demand for engineering services grew with the increase in the size and the expansion of the duties of the Permanent Force. The primary responsibility of the Royal Canadian Engineers was for construction and maintenance related to camps, armories, depots and fortifications across Canada. The establishment of a central camp at Petawawa and the assumption of the maintenance of defence works at Esquimalt and Halifax as well as at Quebec demanded much of the attention of the
engineers. Gradual development of the corps occurred so that by 1911 companies were located at Halifax and Esquimalt as well as station detachments at Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, Toronto, London, Winnipeg and Ottawa. 44 The strength of the RCE grew from 16 in 1904, to 297 in 1914, but despite diligent efforts the regiment could not handle all the duties assigned to it. It was a major task for the corps to perform the engineering tasks set for it and at the same time train and assimilate its new personnel. 45 So while a school of engineering was established in Halifax in 1907, the RCE had little capacity to train the NPAM branch as had been intended. 46

Another corps of professionals which suffered from an excess of responsibilities was the Permanent Army Medical Corps. Upon the formation of the PAMC in 1904, its ranks quickly began to fill, and by 1906 the Director General of Medical Services, Col. E. Fiset, was able to declare that the establishment of 100 all ranks was close to completion. 47 It then became the basis of almost annual complaint by the DGMS that he could not handle the multitude of medical duties with that level of personnel.

The Permanent Army Medical Corps has now various functions to perform: not only to look after the sick of the Permanent Force, but also to act in an instructional capacity to the Active Militia; to care for and issue medical stores; to assume the direction of all methods of sanitation in garrisons or in camps; and the officers have to be ready to take up the important administrative posts when required. The personnel is much too small for all this work. 48

The Militia Council considered that the PAMC was strong enough only to maintain the hospitals and supervise the sanitation of
the camps. The corps had to run eight hospitals for the care of the sick of the permanent corps, the Canadian naval service and Royal Military College. The instructional role was rationalized somewhat in 1913 with the establishment of a Central Army Medical School in Ottawa, supported by divisional and district army medical schools collocated with the hospitals. Here instruction and training was offered to medical officers and support personnel from the NPAM. Despite the strong appeals from the DGMS the strength of the PAMC remained at 100 all ranks on 31 March 1914. Attached to the PAMC were the only women in the Permanent Force, five nursing sisters serving in garrison hospitals.

The largest of the departmental corps of the Permanent Force, the Canadian Ordnance Corps, had the most difficulty fulfilling its responsibilities. The corps was formed in 1903 by absorbing the civilian employees of the stores branch of the Militia and Defence Department into the Permanent Force, and in 1904 its strength stood at 75 officers and men. It was responsible for equipping both the permanent and non-permanent corps of the militia. By 1909, the Militia Council realized that many former civilians from the old stores branch were failing to assimilate properly into military life, and as they were now NCO’s they were occupying positions more suitably held by well-qualified young soldiers. Council decided to pension off the worst cases and reassign others as civilian employees of the corps. By this time the corps was organized into twelve depots stretching coast to coast and including the
only PF detachment within the boundaries of the two new prairie provinces, at Calgary. The size of the COC had increased to 249 by 1911. Inspecting the corps the next year General Otter found that it was inefficient and that many personnel lacked proper zeal for their duties. There was also a deplorable lack of storehouses for the equipment and quarters for corps personnel, weakening the entire system of supply. Again in 1913, Otter judged that these defects remained and would only be eradicated through time and money. In 1914, the size of the corps had climbed slightly to 283 all ranks.

While the Canadian Ordnance Corps was responsible for equipment, the permanent section of the Canadian Army Service Corps took care of food and transportation. Organized in 1903, the unit became the Canadian Permanent Army Service Corps in 1906, with an establishment of 100. Beginning with a small detachment at Kingston, the CPASC soon assumed full responsibility for the Permanent Force garrisons at Halifax, Esquimalt and Quebec. In 1908, the corps began taking up its instructional duties with a school for its own officers and men at Halifax. Instructors were sent to the militia camps in 1910, and the next year schools were opened up for NPAM at Halifax, Kingston and Toronto. The corps had also taken on responsibility for the catering at Royal Military College when the civilian contractor tried to squeeze the militia department for more profit. In 1912, the beginning of a new era was signalled for the corps's transport section when trucks and drivers were acquired for a new mechanical
transport branch. The corps had expanded its number of detachments to eight by 1914, with additional depots at Toronto, London, Ottawa, Montreal and Winnipeg and the withdrawal of the Esquimalt unit. The total strength of the corps was 138 all ranks in 1914. This rapid development of the CPASC did impair its efficiency by employing personnel lacking sufficient background in their work. This situation was rectified somewhat by importing, in 1912, five British army service corps instructors to bolster the training of the Canadian corps.

Several smaller components of the Permanent Force were also organized within this decade. A Corps of Military Staff Clerks was established, in 1905, to handle increased office work, and by 1914 it numbered four officers, eight Warrant officers and sixty-nine NCO's and men. In December 1905, the Canadian Army Pay Corps was organized which Lake claimed was justified by the assumption of the charge of Halifax garrison alone but which also would act as a nucleus for an expanded service in wartime. The CAPC numbered 53 all ranks in 1914. The formation of a Canadian Permanent Army Veterinary Corps was authorized in 1910, but by 31 March 1914, its strength was only eight all ranks. Probably as a reflection of Sam Hughes's faith in rifle-shooting the Canadian School of Musketry Corps was created in 1914, though the school itself had existed since 1900, and had a small staff.

At the beginning of this period Canada's Permanent Force was weak in numbers and almost entirely made up of combatant arms. The political and military leaders had a plan to build this force so that it could more effectively meet its responsi-
bilities of maintaining fortifications and instructing the non-permanent militia. To a certain extent expansion was forced upon the military because of the acquisition of the Halifax and Esquimalt bases. But beyond this was the determined effort made to broaden the self-sufficiency and the instructional capability of the Permanent Force by organizing a whole range of corps affording support service.

The results of the efforts at expansion were a qualified success. The pattern of growth of the combatant arms was uneven with slumps suggesting an inability to maintain the interest of recruits. None of the corps rated consistently capable of performing all its duties efficiently, but this was to be an unexpected result of a decade of growth. Geographically there was very little change in the way the Permanent Force was stationed in Canada with the exception of Halifax which came to have almost 1300 permanent corpsmen. In contrast, rhetoric about expansion to the west had resulted in only one new permanent depot at Calgary in addition to the existing stations at Esquimalt and Winnipeg. In terms of numbers an increase from 1000 to 3000 over ten years may not seem significant, but considering the public and political hostility the force faced and its difficulties in recruitment, it was an accomplishment.

A basic reason for the slow growth of the Permanent Force was the hostility in Canada towards the concept of a regular army. Lord Dundonald explained that he was forced to design a citizens' army for Canada because it was the only generally
acceptable way of providing a defence against invasion for the country. "It need hardly be said that a professional or standing army was out of the question. Canada could not tolerate either the cost of the thing or the thing itself." But cost was not crucial in the issue. After all, departmental expenditures for Militia and Defence quadrupled over this decade without provoking any sustained outcry. But the mere suspicion of increased emphasis on the Permanent Force brought warnings of militarism from politicians and editorial pages. There was almost universal agreement that the volunteer militia was a Canadian tradition with its mettle proven by combat. In contrast to the authoritarian nature of a standing army, the militia was regarded as an egalitarian body appropriate for a young democracy. The Permanent Force was at best a haven for loungers and at worst a threat to constitutional rule.

Frederick Borden was a firm advocate of the volunteer system of part-time soldiers for the defence of Canada and would justify the existence of a Permanent Force only in terms of its instructional and garrison roles. Accused by the press and by opposition members of moving towards a regular army with his expansion of the Permanent Force establishment in 1905, Borden replied:

What I wish to say at the outset is that there is no intention whatever to take any steps towards the establishment of a standing army; there is no intention to depart in the slightest degree from the policy which was adopted by this country shortly after Confederation and which has been followed ever since, of providing depots of a permanent force for the purpose chiefly of educating the active militia of the country, upon which we would almost exclusively rely for defence.
The takeover of Halifax and Esquimalt necessitated an increase in the PF to provide garrisons for the fortresses, but represented no change in the role of the force.

But even in its instructional role the Permanent Force aroused hostility from some Canadians. Officers of the NPAM attending schools of instruction complained in 1905 that they were treated with discourtesy by Permanent Force Officers. The Canadian Military Gazette scolded the regulars calling them "young snobs" and reminding them that their corps existed to serve the volunteers. 78 Militia Council made the reminder more official with the despatch of a memorandum on the subject to all PF units. The memo constituted a warning to all officers that instruction of the NPAM was their primary responsibility and that the success of courses of instruction would be a measure of the officers' efficiency. The PF officers must welcome their volunteer comrades into the depots with respect and hospitality and so set an example for their NCO's and men. 79

Clearly the Permanent Force members were not to act as an elite group within the military.

A gentleman described as an experienced member of the militia and bearing the nom-de-plume "Canadian Scout" echoed in satiric poetry the often heard criticism that the PF harboured louts with political influence. He said that the depots had been described as a:

"Home for Incurables."

Every fond father who has a son, a helpless failure at everything he has undertaken, gets on to some political friends and steers him into the instructional corps of Canada. 80
Then to the shame of the militia this incompetent sooner or later reaches an important post in the Permanent Force:

We might slightly alter Kipling's 'Islanders' and slip into poetry on the subject and sing as follows:

Unspanked by their careful Fathers
and spoiled at their Mothers' knees.
Long did they wait in quiet, and long
lie down at ease.
And they said of toil 'What is it? for work we can't of course.
But Daddy will pull the wires and we'll go in the Permanent Force.
And there in the idle mess room, we'll thrive in the life of the free,
As we demonstrate to Canada what her soldiers ought to be.' 81

The announcement of budget restrictions on the annual training of the NPAM in 1909, brought unfavourable response in newspaper editorials criticizing the money squandered on the Permanent Force. The Ottawa Citizen, under the editorship of E.W.B. Morrison, a militia officer and long declared enemy of standing armies, denounced the government's military priorities. Referring to the unblemished combat record of the part-time militia from the War of 1812 to the South African conflict, the editorial declared that Canadians had amply demonstrated their prowess on the battlefield as volunteers:

It is not necessary to argue that they would be as good as regulars after a comparatively brief training in the field; but the common sense of the taxpayers of this Dominion, plus the knowledge of that record, is more than sufficient to tell them that 100,000 citizen soldiers would be a far better asset than 4,000 or 5,000 of the best drilled regulars that ever polished buttons. These estimates mark the first serious encroachment of the standing army idea upon the militia force of Canada. 82

The Toronto Telegram echoed these sentiments contending that money wasted on the Permanent Force would be better put to use
teaching the part-time militia to shoot straight.83

Surprisingly even the voice of government policy, the Toronto Globe, took a dim view of reducing spending on annual drill while continuing support of the permanent staff and force. The Globe observed that this was support of that feature of the defence system "to which the term 'militarism' is more appropriately applied."84 After Borden explained and defended his budget in Parliament the Globe was even more critical of his military priorities. The editorial referred to the accomplishments of the Boers who fought without a lot of organized support services. While not advocating the eradication of the Permanent Force, the paper advised Borden to pay more attention to the part-time militia and less to the "military frills and trappings that in the day of trial are not worth a blast of powder."85

In his days as an Opposition member of Parliament Sam Hughes was as tireless a proponent of the part-time militia as he was a critic of the permanent corps. He would cite the history of warfare from the American revolution to the Boer war to demonstrate the superiority of citizens' armies over trained standing armies.86 The permanent corps had a place in the Canadian military system, but its size should be restricted to the minimum necessary to carry out its instructional and garrison duties. Hughes did advocate better pay and pensions for the Permanent Force to encourage qualified men to remain in the service. But professional soldiers were not fit to take to the battlefield because of the lazy life they led in the barracks, and the fighting should be left to the NPAM.87
Hughes was concerned not only that the Permanent Force violated the principle of citizen armies but that its social climate was inimical to a free society. He accused its officers of imitating the methods of the British army to the detriment of the Canadian militia. The ordinary soldiers of the permanent corps are "treated as children, not as men." by the officers. Hughes revealed to the House of Commons that privates of the corps were being forced to act as officers' servants at the School of Musketry. This situation he regarded as anti-democratic and a prime example of the "prison discipline" which was practised in the permanently embodied militia.

Hughes reported that British elitist customs were being introduced into the military school by permanent corps officers. He outlined the petty persecution the officer instructors meted out to their students, including elaborate mess routines with penalties for errors. The officers in charge of these schools "should be taught also that their chief function is to educate those attending the schools along military lines, and not along social or other lines."

When Hughes became Minister of Militia he, of course, brought with him his antipathy towards the permanent corps. He made a practice of appointing non-permanent militia officers to permanent staff and command positions ahead of aspiring professional officers, and on one occasion he cancelled summer training for the force at Camp Petawawa.

Then in December 1913, Hughes informed Militia Council that he intended to keep down the strength of the Royal Canadian
Engineers and the Canadian Permanent Army Service Corps because he was not convinced of the value of these corps. Six months later the minister told the House of Commons that he would reduce the size of the Permanent Force because he wanted a training corps not a standing army, and so the unnecessarily large RCE and CPASC would be cut back.

Hughes was not afraid to voice his low opinion of the Permanent Force to its officers. In July 1913, Hughes held a dinner in Halifax for the garrison officers to meet General Sir Ian Hamilton then on his inspection tour of the Canadian militia. A confirmed temperance advocate, Hughes ordered that no liquor was to be consumed at the banquet. Angered by several officers who chose to ignore the order, Hughes vented his personal feelings about the Permanent Force. In the future there would be no room for idleness and inefficiency in the force, and its officers would be promoted on their ability not by seniority. The Permanent Force was designed to instruct the part-time militia, and any officer who did not sympathize with the NPAM and actively seek its betterment would be removed. Referring to Mr. A.H. Mackay, who was in attendance and was a patron of the cadet and physical education movements for youth, Hughes said that man "had done more real good for the militia force of Canada than any member of the Permanent Force in the Dominion."

The Home Rule crisis in Great Britain in 1914, no doubt justified for Hughes his suspicion that standing armies were a constitutional danger and a potential instrument for a
tyranical government to thwart the will of the people.
Descended from Ulstermen and himself a prominent Canadian Orangeman, Hughes had been reported in the *Montreal Star* as giving surreptitious encouragement to Canadians to volunteer for service in Edward Carson's paramilitary group in Ulster opposing Home Rule. In reply to a remark in the House of Commons on 7 May 1914, about his support for the rebellious Ulstermen, Hughes declared that it was no concern of the Minister of Militia and Defence what Canadian militiamen did when not on duty. That same day Hughes again declared his intention to reduce the size of the Permanent Force and made oblique reference to the possible use of the British army to suppress Orangemen in Ulster:

> The danger to the country is from the permanent end of the military forces, not the non-permanent end. In the permanent service men are taken out of continuous employment, they are taken from the other services of the country and they become a special and privileged class while the great majority of the people are untrained...With a permanent army, in a time of crisis in the nation's history, there is a danger, unless the officers and men are constitutionally trained, of the officers and men obeying the mandate of some oligarchic government, autocratic Upper House, or Divine Right rulers. 97

The minister went on to say that he had drastically reduced expenditures on training permanent officers in England and had financed the trip of a group of predominantly non-permanent militia officers to observe the British, French and Swiss Army manoeuvres.
Hughes claimed that the part-time militia members deserved the opportunity to learn more than the permanent.

Given the climate of hostility in Canada towards the Permanent Force, it is not surprising that there was difficulty in recruiting and keeping good men for its officer cadre and the other ranks. A career as an officer demanded some dedication from an individual to obtain the proper training and education, and the rewards were not high. In the lower ranks the situation was worse with poor pay and living conditions attracting few Canadians. Canadian military authorities recognized these problems, but were thwarted in solving them by the limited human and financial resources available.

One chronic problem during this decade of growth was finding enough qualified men to take commissions in the Permanent Force. Royal Military College graduated many such men after a three year course in military subjects and engineering, but they were not required to accept a PF commission and only a minority did so. Some young men from prominent families sought fulfillment in the career of a professional military officer, but not enough had the credentials to fill posts requiring technical expertise or experience. Throughout the period the militia department was forced to avail itself of the services of well-trained British Army Officers. And even though there was an evident determination among the military authorities to insist on proper qualifications for officers, patronage and influence continued to play a part in appointments and promotion.
Ironically, Royal Military College graduated enough officer cadets with proper education to ensure the orderly expansion of the Permanent Force, but they did not have to accept commissions. When RMC was established in 1874 there was no Permanent Force, only two permanently embodied artillery batteries. The object of the college was to turn out engineers with military training who would aid the development of the country and be available for service in case of a national emergency. Those who chose to follow a military career usually entered the British army where there were opportunities for service and promotion rather than the slowly developing Permanent Force in Canada. In fact, by 1894, out of 363 cadets who had entered RMC since its inception 84 had joined the imperial service and only ten had accepted commissions in the Canadian Permanent Corps. 98

With the expansion of the Permanent Force in the pre-war decade there were more officer commissions and more opportunities for promotion to attract RMC graduates. Borden declared his intention to keep these men in Canada, 99 and in 1905 he offered a commission to all graduating cadets. By 1907, Borden was able to declare with satisfaction that 60 RMC graduates held permanent commissions in the Canadian militia. 100 But in spite of Borden's best efforts sufficient numbers of graduates would not volunteer for service in the Permanent Force. During the four years from 1911 to 1914, RMC graduated 123 cadets, and for the same period 127 commissions were opened up in the PF. Yet only 23 of the graduates accepted these commissions. 101
In discussing this situation Richard Preston in his study of RMC speculated on why Borden did not change regulations requiring RMC graduates to join the Permanent Force. He considered that several factors played a part in this: the popular belief that by accepting British army commissions the cadets were maintaining the imperial connection; other Canadians wanted a chance at PF commissions and politicians wanted the patronage involved in doling them out; parents were not prepared to exchange a son's future for a free education. But then he isolated the most important reason:

Another and perhaps greater obstacle was that RMC served the purposes of those Canadians who were prepared to accept a responsibility to train for defence but who did not think it necessary to serve until there was an emergency. Professional military service seemed out of line with Canada's interests and Canada's needs. It was thought that in peacetime military service should not prevent young men from following civilian careers. 102

This was part of the feeling of hostility which existed in Canada towards the Permanent Force.

For those other than RMC graduates there were a number of other credentials acceptable for a commission in the combatant arms of the Permanent Force. Anyone who had attended RMC and received a Certificate of Military Qualification showing he had completed the military part of the studies was eligible even though he did not graduate. Also former officers of the British army or of the Canadian force in South Africa qualified if their service was long enough and in the latter case if successful in a literary examination and recommended by their former commanding officers. But the most common route to
permanent commission was by taking a course in military subjects for several months called a Long Course. An experienced non-permanent militia officer was qualified to take this course. However, others could be attached to the Permanent Force for no longer than 18 months in which time they had to obtain the Long Course certificate to have their commissions confirmed. 103

The door to a PF officer's career in the combatant corps for the untutored or untried was through the Long Course, and militia authorities attempted control of the quality of men allowed to enroll in it. From 1907, all applicants for PF commissions who had not qualified for post-secondary education had to pass a literary examination before being allowed to take the Long Course. This examination tested candidates on mathematics, history, geography, English and the basics of French. 104 This proved to be a formidable obstacle for officer candidates as 23 of the 34 who tried the test between 1907 and 1914 failed. 105 Because of the demand for officers created by the expansion of the permanent services, the Militia Council was forced to make exceptions to the literary exam standard. In some cases NPAM officers served in the PF for two or three years without being able to pass the literary exam, and, in one instance, a former British army officer who had repeatedly failed the exam was given a commission anyway. 106

The object of the Long Course was to prepare the candidate for a commission in a few months by giving him a brief exposure to the skills and the duties of the combatant arm he
had chosen and a rapid education in military subjects. Until 1912, the aspirant spent three months at the Royal School of Instruction for his branch of the service and three months at Royal Military College. In 1912, 1913, the regulations were stiffened, requiring candidates to receive their service training at a Royal School before proceeding to RMC for an extended Long Course of seven months. This upgrading of requirements suggests that the military authorities were not entirely satisfied with the grade of officer this form of training produced. There is no record of how many officers accepted commissions through Long Course training, but they must have been in the majority.

Obtaining a commission in the departmental corps was not as difficult as it was in the combatant arms. Here the militia department sought simply the combination of military experience and expertise in the particular branch of the service in which the commission was sought. It was not necessary to follow the Long Course to become an officer. Appointments were made at the discretion of the Minister in Militia Council, and various tables of qualification and examination were promulgated during this period.

Arrangements were also made to prepare men from universities to accept commissions on graduation. This plan brought Permanent Force officers on to campuses to give lectures on military subjects to undergraduates who were considering a military career. The idea originated with Dr. W. Peterson, Principal of McGill University, who in 1906 recommended that the
militia department fostered the martial aspirations of university students by offering a certain number of commissions each year to graduates such as the War Office did in Britain. Militia Council was enthusiastic about the idea, and in 1908 a course of military studies was instituted at McGill which was to complement regular undergraduate programmes with the possibility of a commission in the Canadian Permanent Force or the British Regular Army held out as a reward. The course was a success (A.G.L. McNaughton, later prominent soldier, scientist and statesman was one of the first graduates), and talks were initiated with several other universities to extend the scheme. The department envisaged the formation of a Canadian Officers Training Corps (COTC) similar to that which had been recently formed in England which would provide officers for both the PF and the NPAM. Most universities contacted were very interested in the idea, but drove hard bargains on the conditions for allowing the innovation. As a result the first COTC corps was not formed until late 1912 at McGill followed by Laval, in 1914, which rather spectacularly organized 450 students into five companies compared to the two companies at McGill. The other universities did not organize their contingents before the outbreak of war although arrangements were in an advanced stage.

A most important source of officers for the expanded Permanent Force was the British army. In 1905, when the imperial fortresses were being taken over, Borden obtained the temporary services of a number of British officers. The
Canadian force lacked enough officers with the training needed to manage the Halifax establishment, and experienced British officers were acquired for the period of transition. But these officers had to be assimilated into the military structure without offending Canadian national pride or harming the seniority of PF officers. Borden also adjusted the pay schedules and pension plan of the regular force in the hopes of attracting British officers to join the Canadian militia permanently. In January 1906, the Toronto Globe complained that the Militia Council was importing British officers to fill all the important posts. Borden was compelled to explain to Laurier that this was only temporary. Most of the officers were to have only two year sojourns in Canada filling positions for which no Canadian officers were qualified. They did not represent a threat to the careers of Canadians.

Later in the House of Commons Borden put the number of officers borrowed for two year terms at 12 to 15 and said only one imperial officer, a Canadian and RMC graduate, had joined the Canadian service.

But the employment of British officers in Canada was not limited to administering the imperial fortresses. Experienced British officers were needed at headquarters staff, at RMC and to supervise training and education for the district and division command levels. The militia department also continued to make up deficiencies in the establishments of Permanent Force regiments by borrowing the services of British officers. In January 1913, Militia Council was informed that
"since 1906 a total of 70 officers, including officers at that time on loan, have served in Canada." 122

The presence of British officers in Canada continued to cause controversy throughout this period. A correspondent for the Canadian Military Gazette commented that the employment of British in the Permanent Force would soon drive all Canadians out of the service:

'Thirty-eight 'Imperial' officers is a big number in such a small army as we have in Canada, and any addition to this number will lead many to suspect that there is a motive other than 'efficiency' in their importation. I am British to the core, but there is something in my throat which prevents me from swallowing everything, because it bears the brand 'imported'. And there are others. 123

So Borden was cautious about bringing in British officers to fill positions which were within the reasonable expectations of Canadians. The British commander at Halifax, Major-General Sir Charles Parsons, lobbied for a post "in some capacity in Canada but dare not reckon on it as the Canadians are so eager to run their own show entirely." 124 Borden agreed that the ire of senior Canadian officers would be raised by the appointment of the English officer to a high military post. 125

But the resentment continued. In 1913, the Canadian Military Gazette commented that the employment of from 25 to 40 British officers in the Canadian militia interfered with the pay and promotion of Canadians making a career in the Permanent Force. 126

Although some British officers came to Canada the most important British influence on the command of the Permanent Force was on standards of military training and education
for officers. Taking advantage of Britain's anxiety to stimulate imperial defence solidarity, Canadian officers were sent to study at various institutions for military education in the mother country. Of the officers who attempted to qualify for admission to Staff College, Camberley, under the arrangement made between Frederick Borden and the imperial authorities in 1903, only a few actually graduated, but at least ambitious young officers set themselves higher goals of achievement than previously. Furthermore the department dispatched Permanent Force officers to English programmes in ordnance, gunnery, engineering and physical training. More important, the Permanent Force officers of the combatant corps were compelled to pass the same examination for promotion as officers in the imperial service. The papers for these tests were provided and marked by the War Office. General Lake liked this regulation because the good officers could pass without difficulty, and the poor ones were forced to leave. He commented that "few measures have done more real good than this and we have almost completely defeated the political 'pull' nominees." While Lake's enthusiasm for the reform is justified, he should perhaps have put more emphasis on the "almost" in the above statement.

Political influence and patronage was an accepted part of political life in Canada in this era although its most flagrant examples were decried by the party not in power. In 1901, Borden himself explained to a favour-seeker that in the patronage system of the federal Liberal party the Liberal MP
or the defeated government candidate controlled appointments for his constituency. This kind of party politics had brought trouble in the past to the militia because the General Officers Commanding objected to favour counting more than merit. Borden had more than a taste of the problems patronage can cause with the Dundonald incident.

In 1905, Borden informed Militia Council that he intended to eradicate patronage in the Permanent Force. He had received letters from political friends seeking special favours, and he wished to warn PF officers that they would only do themselves harm through these unofficial approaches. The Militia Council issued an order reminding officers that it was an offence to deviate from official channels in communicating with headquarters. For the most part Borden was successful in minimizing the effect of political patronage on permanent appointments, but he was unable to achieve total success. Demands for favours from political friends caused Borden to complain that "my life is made miserable". Also the official patronage system was still to be reckoned with. In one case Borden revealed that opposition by a defeated Liberal candidate was a factor militating against the appointment of a qualified man to a permanent commission with the medical staff.

A good example of political pressure forcing Borden to employ patronage concerned Captain J.A. Benyon of the Permanent Force. Benyon resigned his commission in 1905 because he had not been granted leave. Two years later he decided he
wished to be reappointed as the District Staff Adjutant in Quebec. Borden privately informed Benyon that this was not possible because the post had already been filled. But the young officer brought his political friends into operation, and Borden began to receive the importunities. One telegram supporting the appointment was signed by F. Langelier, former Quebec MP and then a judge, A. Turgeon and L.A. Taschereau, both cabinet ministers in the Quebec government. Another came from Senator Jules Tessier. When Laurier approached him on the man's behalf, Borden complained that Benyon after receiving the benefits of an extensive training in England had resigned in a pique just when he was needed the most. Benyon did not get the Quebec post, but he was appointed to the staff of the Maritime Provinces Command. This appointment came only after all military members of Militia Council in a most unusual move recorded their dissent from the decision. Their judgment was vindicated the next year when Benyon's appointment was cancelled because he failed a required qualification course and because his commander reported "that he performed no work in the interest of the militia, took no initiative in anything and appeared to consider self of more importance than all else".

Borden himself was not above helping personal friends achieve in the Permanent Force. On a number of occasions the minister helped political and personal cronies and their sons to gain commissions or promotions. However, all these men possessed at least minimum qualifications and did their duty.
efficiently. One such man that Borden helped throughout his career was J. Lyons Biggar, at one time a Liberal Party functionary and a sometime business associate of the minister. Biggar received a permanent commission in 1901, and was appointed Director of Transport and Supply at Headquarters in 1904, in which capacity he served ably. With Borden's help Biggar rose to the rank of Colonel in 1911, without passing the required examination.

There is evidence that patronage continued when the Conservatives took over in 1911. Sam Hughes appointed E.W.B. Morrison, an experienced militia officer and an old ally of his, to be Director of Artillery without requiring him to pass the necessary examinations. Also the general patronage system of the Conservative party certainly involved the militia department. Instructions were issued by the Prime Minister's Office governing the dispensing of patronage in Halifax. The Officer Commanding there, Colonel Rutherford, was not to fill vacancies without first consulting local party officials.

Patronage and political influence in appointments are not salutary factors in a military administration. The danger is present that an incompetent might abuse his considerable authority to mistreat those under his orders. But employed as it was in this decade with an eye to merit as well as favour, it probably was a minor problem in the Permanent Force.

A greater problem lay in attracting capable men to serve as regular officers with a low level of pay and benefits. In 1910, a new lieutenant of a Combatant corps received $2.25 per
diem in ordinary pay. This would be raised after four years to $2.50 and after eight to $2.75. When promoted to captain the man received $3.00 per day. This is about the level of a tradesman's wages at the turn of the century and substantially less than a businessman expected to make. Moreover, upon his appointment the lieutenant was required to purchase his own uniforms and accoutrements at an approximate cost of $450.00, and he could expect to spend about $40.00 per month at required mess functions. The basic amenities of accommodation, food, fuel and medical care were provided free. Officers of the rank of captain or above could marry and were entitled to received married quarters or where none were available a suitable allowance. By 1908, the privilege to marry was extended to subalterns, but they were to pay their own housing costs. A contributory pension plan had been set up by the department in 1902, but in some circumstances its benefits were minimal. For instance, when Major-General Cotton died in 1914 on the eve of his retirement, his widow was eligible to receive only $500 per year from the pension fund. The lower level of pay was bound to have some serious consequences on a regular officer cadre in a country where there were few private incomes. In 1910, the Canadian Military Gazette attributed the shortage of officers in the Royal Canadian Regiment to low pay. 

As a consequence of their financial plight some permanent officers developed the habit of living beyond their means and went into debt. In 1909, Militia Council devised new
regulations concerning officers who failed to meet their financial obligations which included dismissal from the service after sufficient warning to set their affairs in order.\textsuperscript{153} But one of Canada's senior permanent staff officers, Colonel W.D. Gorden, persisted over a period of several years in failing to meet his debts despite strictures from Militia Council\textsuperscript{154} and a personal appeal from Borden without being dismissed.\textsuperscript{155}

A social institution which was a sustaining factor in the lives of many PF officers but the downfall of others was the officers' mess. All officers were required to belong to the mess, and unmarried officers were dining members. Such establishments existed not only to feed and entertain their members but to continue traditions and establish esprit de corps.\textsuperscript{156} Messes were set up at the expense of the government and received from it annual maintenance allowances,\textsuperscript{157} but after that its affairs were run by a committee of regimental officers which levied fees upon members. Unfortunately in this milieu there existed occasion for the abuse of alcohol, and more than one career came to grief for this reason.\textsuperscript{158}

One way or another the military authorities managed to attract enough young men to permanent commissions to allow the expansion of the militia in this period. Some of these were characterized as 'stripling youths from socially advantaged families who aped the British caste system of regular service.'\textsuperscript{159} Certainly there was a real shortage in qualified and experienced Canadian officers who were capable of occupying the upper positions.\textsuperscript{160} Had the climate of public opinion supported the
concept of requiring graduates of RMC to take permanent commissions the militia would have been the better for it.

While some avidly sought permanent commissions there was little or nothing to attract Canadians to join the lower ranks of the force. The pay was poor and the conditions of barracks life far from amenable or even healthy. As a result many of the other ranks were former British soldiers recruited in Canada, imported from England or transferred from the Halifax and Esquimalt garrisons at the takeover. Presumably these men were already inured to the hardships of army life. Most Canadians who joined were "snowbirds" seeking shelter in the winter and deserting when spring brought warmth and opportunities for better employment. 161 In fact, desertion was the most chronic problem plaguing the militia. For instance, in 1904, about 20 percent of the PF simply left. The figure was never that high again in the next decade, but not until 1914 did it dip below ten percent. 162

Poor pay was an important reason why the Permanent Force failed to hold soldiers. Up to 1904, a private in the Permanent Force earned forty cents per diem, exactly the same rate as when the permanent corps was instituted in 1870 and in spite of significant increases in outside wages and costs of living. 163 But in passing the new Militia Act, Borden increased the pay of the PF. 164 Privates and gunners now earned fifty cents a day upon enlistment for three years service and received slight increases upon re-engagement to a ceiling of sixty-five cents after six years. A sergeant-major was raised from $1.25 per
day to $1.50 and could look forward to a ceiling of $2.00 after six years. The Adjutant-General, Col. H.B. Vidal, claimed that this increase made a Canadian private the highest paid soldier in the world. Yet in 1906, while only 27 men left the Permanent Force having completed their tours of duty, 348 deserted from a force of 2267 officers and men. The desertions were characterized by the Inspector-General, Brig.-General Lord Aylmer, as "out of all proportion to the establishments." One reflection of the real problem was expressed by the private in the Royal Canadian Regiment who petitioned for a free discharge from the force claiming that his pay was insufficient to support his wife and two children and stating that he had an opportunity for more profitable employment. Militia Council turned down this request fearing a precedent for similar applications. In its Annual report in 1907, Militia Council did acknowledge that it was very difficult to maintain the authorized establishment at Esquimalt because the high pay for civilian labour made it impossible to recruit in the area. General Lake said that high pay outside the PF was a principal cause for desertion, an opinion shared by the Canadian Military Gazette. General Otter also believed that men were not attracted to the army because of the abundance of employment which existed in the country.

In July 1907, a Board of officers was appointed to inquire into pay and it reported the following year. Basic pay and allowance raises were recommended in some cases, and the report advocated basing pay on proficiency.
approved a new pay scale in 1911 which awarded achievers. Pay increases were more closely tied to increased efficiency with the basic or regimental pay either unchanged or slightly lower than previously.\textsuperscript{174} To gain small additional raises of the per diem rate the men would have to remain in the force and prove their skills required by their particular branch of the service. A private of the cavalry, for instance, received 50c. upon appointment, but was eligible after two years' service to earn either five or ten cents per day extra depending on his proficiency in musketry and signalling.\textsuperscript{175} These pay changes were introduced in 1912. In the same year men who served in western Canada were given an increased bonus\textsuperscript{176} to prevent desertion to the highly paid civilian jobs in that area.\textsuperscript{177}

Meagre though the pay was, it was the chief incentive for those who did join the PF, and delays in issuance created much concern such as occurred in 1908 because of a delay by Parliament in passage of supplementary estimates. General Lake was afraid that failure to pay the men on schedule "might lead to many unpleasant incidents."\textsuperscript{178} R.L. Borden called attention to a press report from Halifax which claimed that the only thing preventing real trouble among the unpaid garrison there was the issuance of scrip for use in canteens.\textsuperscript{179} Frederick Borden appealed to Laurier for release of funds for the Permanent Force "as you can't control soldiers unless you pay them."\textsuperscript{180}

Recruiting advertisements for the Permanent Force stressed
that men could expect certain benefits besides pay, including a free kit, medical attention and a pension plan. However, upon joining men were liable to find these attractions had limitations. Free kit included the uniform from boots to winter cap, and provision was made for regular replacement. More personal items like underwear, shaving utensils and uniform grooming items were also given the new recruit, but he was expected to replace them himself. 181 Unfortunately the high desertion rate caused a rapid depletion of stores, and the Militia Council decided that as a remedy only part of the promised kit would be issued in the first three months. 182 This order was maintained despite the fact that men were not given the full uniform needed for all duties nor even a change of underwear. 183

However, this was not the only cause for complaint by the men. Because they were not provided with a special summer weight uniform, they were compelled to wear heavy material in the extreme heat of summer camps. 184 Again because only one overcoat was issued, a soldier might be forced to wear to the theatre the same garment in which he had cleaned out stables all week long. 185 The men were entitled to both free medical care and hospitalization. But if married, wives and families usually were given only medical care when sick 186 except in the case of infectious diseases when hospitalization was also allowed. 187 Moreover, when men contracted tuberculosis they were discharged from the service as medically unfit rather than have the government pay for the extended period of care
necessary for recovery.\textsuperscript{188} Soldiers who did become "incapacitated through infirmity of mind and body" were entitled to retire with a pension if they had fifteen years of service. Those who retained health and sanity could leave after twenty years rewarded with a pension of between 30c. and $1.40 per day, varying according to rank and length of service.\textsuperscript{189} A Pension Claims Board was established in 1905 which heard special appeals for compensation from men injured or rendered ill while on duty.\textsuperscript{190}

One benefit of Permanent Force service seems to have been the food. The daily ration was a balanced combination of meat, vegetables, bread and condiments in apparently sufficient quantities.\textsuperscript{191} There was little change in the ration schedule over this decade except for specification of fresh instead of evaporated vegetables. Few complaints were registered at headquarters about meals except in the case of Halifax where the men were dissatisfied with the quality of some of the items being supplied. This was resolved by allowing the soldiers to arrange with the contractor to receive equivalent food or a compensatory allowance under the supervision of the quartermaster.\textsuperscript{192} Perhaps the real drawback of the ration schedule was the lack of variety of the items supplied. The weekly meat ration prescribed five issues of beef and two of mutton, but in some stations only beef was dispensed.\textsuperscript{193}

Free barrack accommodation was supposed to be an advantage of military life yet the living conditions at several stations were admitted even by militia department officials to be
appalling. The worst barracks situation existed in Kingston, the depot of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery. The Militia Council believed that the extraordinarily high desertion rate of forty-one per cent in 1905 was due in part to the "exceedingly bad and uncomfortable condition of Tête-du-Pont barracks." The Director-General of Medical Services inspected the station in 1907, and his reaction was that "the buildings and situation have every undesirable point and no desirable ones." He reported that a main sewer outlet for Kingston was located immediately in front of the barracks, and the sluggish water there kept the filth in the vicinity of the dock. The whole site was too small with no recreation grounds and located in an undesirable part of the town. Also "the building at present used for the hospital is entirely unfitted for such a purpose and no soldier who is really sick should be placed in it." These are among the conditions which caused a correspondent of the Canadian Military Gazette in Kingston to wonder not why the PF had so many desertions but why so many remained in the force. The addition of new stables and an infirmary was some help, but by 1914, the Inspector General reported that "The Tête-du-Pont Barracks, Kingston, is beyond further repair and is unfit for occupation." The situation in Kingston was far from unique, and indeed a few years previously General Lake delivered a searing indictment of PF housing:

There is no one station, with the possible exception of Esquimalt where the barracks are up to the standard of modern requirements while the barracks at Kingston, Toronto, St. Jean and
Quebec, are distinctly discreditable to the Dominion. They are old and out of date, often out of repair, the men are unhealthily crowded at the two former places, the drainage is faulty and the medical officers of the Department have frequently brought to notice the serious sanitary risks which are run. The troops do their best to keep their quarters clean and sanitary, but the Department cannot afford grave risks while it allows the present state of affairs to continue. 200

There was no significant improvement in this situation before the outbreak of the war except in the case of Toronto. The Liberal government made plans to replace Stanley Barracks 201 which were carried through by the Conservatives with work under way by 1914. 202

The Permanent Force was not a particularly healthy body of men with the two most common afflictions being influenza and venereal diseases. For example, in 1906, 231 cases of venereal diseases were treated out of the 2,267 men force. 203

When Lt. Col. G.C. Jones took over as Director-General of Medical Services in 1906, he vowed to promote health through better hygiene. He initiated lectures and written material on infectious diseases and the importance of personal hygiene. 204 He also set up the Central Military Laboratory of Hygiene in Ottawa which did useful work on the analysis of water and pathological specimens. 205 These changes were slow to take effect. In 1908, there were 2,241 admissions to hospital for treatment out of a force 2,820 men strong. 206 But by 1913, the Militia Council was sufficiently informed about the problem of water pollution to be warning the city officials of Halifax and Quebec about problems with their water supplies. 207 These methods enjoyed some success with
the rate of admissions dropping below fifty per cent of peak figures in the last few years before the war.

To avoid complications of accommodation and the possibility of additional financial burdens, military authorities preferred the men of the Permanent Force to be unmarried. Applicants to join the force were required to be single. Once in the militia some permissions were granted to marry but only up to a percentage of the total strength. For instance, in 1911, the level of marriages allowed in the combatant corps was eight per cent of the rank and file, 30 per cent of the sergeants and 75 per cent of NCOs above the rank of sergeants. In the departmental corps where many of the other ranks were privately lodged for lack of barracks, the rule was loosened to allow 50 per cent of sergeants and 30 per cent of rank and file to marry. The general rule was modified again in 1912, allowing all NCOs above the rank of sergeant to marry.

The amusement of soldiers at the various depots was usually fostered by their Regimental Institute which provided articles for sale at good prices and arranged for recreation. The institute was supervised by a committee of officers which worked in co-operation with a sub-committee of NCOs and men. Within the regiment there was supposed to exist a canteen for sale of liquor, a coffee-shop, a grocery store, a recreation room and a reading room. The militia department paid a small annual grant for the maintenance of the institute and the men themselves paid the rest. Despite the pressure from temperance groups during this period the PF kept its "wet" canteens.
Organized activities for the men outside of the regiment were rare, but occasionally a Church group would provide wholesome entertainment complete with singing and non-alcoholic refreshments.\textsuperscript{212}

Because of the small size of permanent corps establishments, service at most stations did entail hard work,\textsuperscript{213} but there were attempts made to provide diversions for the men. After the central camp was set up at Petawawa, facilities were provided for troops in their off-duty hours. The militia department donated a small sum for the purchase of river boats and games to amuse the men.\textsuperscript{214} McGill University offered to set up a library at the camp\textsuperscript{215} and in 1911, Militia Council decided to allow motion pictures to be shown to troops training there.\textsuperscript{216} Barracks life too was not bereft of amusement. Christmas 1906 was reported to be quite a festive occasion at the Kingston depot. The barracks were decorated with paper, evergreens and flags, and turkeys were given to every married man, and one was prepared and distributed to every four bachelors. Passes for leave were granted quite freely, and for those remaining in barracks a special dinner was arranged without the usual boring speeches to the delight of the other ranks.\textsuperscript{217} That same year the Christmas season at the Quebec garrison was celebrated with a week of sporting competitions capped off with a dance at the barracks on New Year's Eve.\textsuperscript{218} The next year, in Toronto, the Warrant Officers and sergeants of the permanent corps stationed there co-operated with their counterparts of the NPAM units to hold levees in their messes on New Year's Day.\textsuperscript{219}
At the request of the officer commanding MD No. 10, the militia department agreed to help defray the costs of men at the Winnipeg station who wished to join the YMCA to use the gymnasium and swimming pool. Militia Council also decided to encourage men to improve their education through incentive bonuses to those who attended evening classes and by setting up technical courses taught by non-commissioned officers.

But not all the diversions which occurred within barrack walls were of a legal nature. In 1909, there was an upswing in petty larceny among the various units at Kingston, and a corporal was sentenced to penitentiary for a burglary committed in town. More serious trouble occurred at Wolseley Barracks in London in 1908, when a private shot and killed a non-commissioned officer apparently in reaction to having been disciplined. The man, Gunner Moir, then escaped heavily armed and managed to elude police for some time before being captured and committed to an insane asylum. Usually soldiers were committed to civil jails for their offences, but in the case of the Halifax garrison a military prison was maintained at Melville Island. Militia Council decided in 1906 to close this prison to cut down costs, but the decision was reversed a short time later when the Halifax commander explained the situation at the local jail. "It was pointed out by Sir Charles Parsons, in favour of maintaining the military prison, that in the Halifax local jail a considerable number of coloured persons were confined, and recently there was a danger of trouble in consequence of one of the men having been temporarily placed in a police cell with a coloured prisoner."
In reviewing the problem of desertion in 1907, the Adjutant-General, Col. F.L. Lessard, emphasized a number of aspects of military life which discouraged Permanent Force men. Besides the drudgery of the work and the poor accommodation, soldiers were not happy about their relationships with their officers who seemed to lack all sympathy for and interest in their men.227 A correspondent for the Canadian Military Gazette, contended that it was the selfish use of authority by officers which drove many Canadians to desert from the force. He said that many officers used men to perform personal chores for them with never a kind word in return, and this "the enlisted Canadian detests."228 And in spite of the occasional rhetoric used by politicians about every private in the PF carrying a marshal's baton in his knapsack,229 Lessard acknowledged that members of the other ranks were given little opportunity to cross the line to officers. An obviously informed observer noted that the Canadian service followed the tradition of the British Army of appointing stripling youths with social position to PF commissions instead of availing themselves of the experience of senior NCOs.230 Borden was himself willing to admit privately that there was a prejudice in the force against the promotion of "rankers" to the officer cadre, and this often blocked the progress of competent men.231 In recommending a sergeant for a commission Borden said: "I happen to know something about Hobkirk's family and should think that the usual objection to what is known as a Ranker would not exist to the same extent in his case as in the case of the ordinary Thomas Atkins."232
The expansion of the authorized establishment of the Permanent Force from 1,000 to 5,000 in 1904-05 precipitated an increase in recruiting activity. In March 1905, the militia department sent out several recruiting sergeants to tour eastern Canada in search of men. One sergeant showed particular initiative when he visited Londonderry, N.S., where he had heard the mines had just closed down, and he was successful in obtaining some good men. In addition to these roving NCOs, recruiting sergeants were placed permanently at Toronto and Montreal and were given bonuses for each man they brought into the force. Initially there was some success with a total of 417 men joining the force by May 1905, having been recruited in forty-six Ontario communities and in a smaller number of towns and cities in Quebec and the Maritimes. Some Permanent Force officers with understrength commands planned to recruit from the non-permanent active militia at summer camps on the theory that the militia-men temporarily buoyed up by military spirit would view soldiering as a glamorous life. The militia department made little attempt to seek recruits through the public press, considering that recruiting sergeants received sufficient bonuses to advertise themselves if necessary. However, the department did advertise regularly in the Canadian Military Gazette. But, by June 1906, Borden was prepared to admit that his recruiting programme was not going as well as he had hoped:
I am bound to say, however, that very serious difficulty exists in recruiting. There are such demands for labour in Canada and such high wages paid that although we have increased the pay of the service more than fifty per cent in the last two years, the pay we offer is no temptation, unless to a man who has some taste for soldiering, and it is very difficult to get men to join the permanent force. 240

The department had already begun to fill the ranks of the PF with ex-soldiers of the British Army, and this was a practice which grew in the years following.

When the Canadian government took over the responsibility for defence of Halifax and Esquimalt, it received permission to transfer volunteers from the British Army garrisons to the Canadian Permanent Force. The militia department made special efforts to attract such volunteers increasing the pay schedule in certain corps. 241 and providing that those who transferred would count their British service towards Canadian rates of pay and pensions. 242 By June 1906, 230 men below the officer rank had come over to the PF from the former imperial garrisons. 243 And besides those recruited at Halifax and Esquimalt military authorities found that many of the men enlisting in the PF in other parts of Canada had been soldiers in the British Army. 244

The militia department did not limit its recruiting of British soldiers to Canada, but also imported them from the mother country. The re-organization of the British Army after the Boer War worked in Canada's favour. Regular service regiments were disbanded causing experienced soldiers to seek employment. Lt. Col. Gwatkin went to England and recruited
from among these men. On 20 January 1907, Gwatkin arrived in Halifax with 156 volunteers from the disbanded Manchester regiment to serve in the Royal Canadian Regiment. General Lake inspected the recruits and reported "that the men were young and of medium height, exceedingly intelligent looking and of strong physique and their bearing impressed him favourably." Gwatkin turned around immediately and returned to England to pick up a further draft of 200 artillerymen who were anxious to join the Canadian service. This group arrived in Canada on 3 March 1907, and drew high praise from Col. C.W. Drury, C.O. of the Maritime Provinces, for their fine physique and moral character.

In the next few years the reduction of the British army meant that many ex-servicemen were in dire straits because of unemployment, and Lord Dundonald joined with others to promote emigration to the colonies. The Naval and Military Emigration League was formed in London for this purpose, and an emissary was despatched to Canada in 1910 to ascertain what opportunities could be provided for these destitute men and their families. Approached by the War Office the Militia Council agreed to take more ex-soldiers into the Permanent Force providing them with ten dollars towards their transportation. Emigration was to be arranged through the Canadian immigration authorities in London. There is no record as to whether or not this arrangement brought out any recruits, but after Hughes took over the department a more formal system was established. The Canadian government opened
150 vacancies in the permanent corps to British ex-soldiers and agreed to provide transportation for the men but not their families. The assistance of the Naval and Military Emigration League was solicited, and as a result 70 men were brought out in 1912 and preparations made to absorb 80 more in 1913.\textsuperscript{254}

One problem which occurred in relation to the taking on strength of these ex-regulars was that some of them were members of the Special Reserve in Great Britain and owed service to the mother country in time of war. In numerous exchanges between the two governments it was established and reiterated that in case of war the Canadian government would co-operate in sending these men back to serve with the British forces.\textsuperscript{255} When the First World War broke out the Canadian and British governments arranged to despatch all reservists living in Canada to Britain.\textsuperscript{256} Despite all this the War Office had cause to complain later that year that reservists in the Canadian Permanent Force had not been released as agreed.\textsuperscript{257}

Owing in part to the drafts of ex-soldiers but also to the reluctance of Canadians to accept conditions in the PF, Borden estimated that only 20 per cent of the NCOs and men of the permanent corps were Canadians as opposed to 90 per cent of the officers.\textsuperscript{258} In 1913, the militia department reported that of the 2,518 NCOs and men in Permanent Force only 568 were born in Canada while 1878 were born in the British Isles.\textsuperscript{259}
For the most part the Permanent Force fulfilled its role of manning Canada's fortifications. The principal fortress at Halifax had a larger infantry garrison in 1910 than when it was defended by British troops. At Quebec City, the fortifications were improved and defended. Only at Esquimalt was the garrison dangerously weak. Little was done to rectify the situation because the government viewed Esquimalt as of little strategic importance.  

Military policy also dictated that the Permanent Force was responsible for the instruction of the NPAM. In practice this meant providing a basic military education for officers and non-commissioned officers of the volunteer force. The backbone of the system consisted of the Permanent Force stations where Royal Schools of Instruction offered to the different branches of the service a variety of courses needed by soldiers from a potential NCO to an officer of field rank. The most important of these was the Short Course of about three months taken by most NPAM officers and NCOs to attain confirmation of their provisional appointment or to seek promotion. However, there was a perennial problem in the militia with officers and NCOs who were unable to spare up to three months from their regular employment to attend the Short Courses. As a result, there was also available a Special Course of seven days held concurrently with the last week of the Short Course, allowing officers and NCOs to obtain the examinations for their certificates after this abbreviated period, providing they had studied the course material at home in their own time. There
were also Provisional Schools held from time to time in locales other than the Royal Schools, for officers and NCOs of the infantry and cavalry who wished to try the examinations for their certificates after about six weeks of instruction, mainly at night from Permanent Force officers and Sergeant Instructors. The system was rather makeshift, designed pragmatically to avoid the problem of un instructed provisionally appointed officers and NCOs running the volunteer force. Its shortcomings were many and well recognized, ranging from too few PF instructors trying to work out of too limited quarters, to the uneven level of advancement of the graduates of the various courses. 261

By 1910, Militia Council reported that it was dissatisfied with the number of officers in the NPAM who were un qualified. 262 When General Mackenzie took over as Chief of Staff, he attempted to reform the system by having all officers and NCOs pass through the Royal Schools for shortened six week courses. To help the men prepare for the course he planned to create an Instructional Cadre of NCOs from the Permanent Force who would be available to NPAM unit headquarters across Canada. This system would strengthen the Royal Schools and almost eliminate the less effective Provisional Schools. 263

Mackenzie's plan was adopted by Militia Council during the ministry of Frederick Borden, but by the time it was implemented Sam Hughes had taken over, and he had different ideas about instruction. As previewed, the new organization came into effect on 1 January 1912, with the shortened courses
and Instructional Cadre of infantry and cavalry PF sergeants. It soon became apparent, however, that Sam Hughes had no intention of letting the system function as designed. In March of that year F.B. Carvell, Liberal military critic, rose in the House of Commons to speak on the education of the NPAM officers. He argued that the Royal Schools concept still favoured the idle rich who could afford time to spend at distant depots and discriminated against the best sort of industrious young men with little leisure. He was afraid that the Provisional School idea which was designed to rectify this situation was being undermined by some officers at headquarters. In response, Hughes agreed with Carvell in his objectives and told him he was using the Instructional Cadre to bring instruction to local depots. 264

Less than a month after Hughes's statement to the Commons Mackenzie revealed to Militia Council in a forceful manner how Hughes was using the new system. Instead of eliminating Provisional Schools the Minister was authorizing them almost on request, and they were proliferating with no regard to cost or the damage they were causing to the Royal Schools. Personnel were being dragged away from their duties at the permanent schools to staff the provisional. Mackenzie warned that at stake was the standard of professional competence of the officers of the NPAM and ultimately the very efficiency of the volunteer force itself. This issue of provisional schools contributed heavily to the bitter dispute between Mackenzie and Hughes which resulted in the former's resignation in 1913. 265
By this time too problems had been encountered with the shorter courses at the Royal Schools because officers were attending with insufficient preliminary preparation, and the failure rate was higher. 266 After the departure of Mackenzie, Provisional Schools continued to proliferate, with 74 being held in the year ending 31 March 1914, attended by 615 officers and 1614 NCOs. 267 As a result, by the outbreak of war the Non-Permanent Active Militia was still being led by many officers and NCOs who themselves lacked thorough military instruction.

Neither Frederick Borden nor Sam Hughes wanted a standing army for Canada. Supported by public opinion both ministers aimed at creating a self-sufficient citizens' army of part-time volunteers. But it was necessary to expand the Permanent Force to increase its instructional capability and to garrison newly acquired imperial bases.

The Permanent Force grew slowly during this decade, partly because of popular hostility. But the force was also beset with difficulties in attracting and retaining qualified officers and capable men. Pay and conditions of service were not good. But despite these evident problems real accomplishments were achieved. The principal advance was in the creation of support service corps which offered instruction to the part-time militia. Then the three-fold increase in strength of the Permanent Force, mainly in the combatant corps, meant that there were more resources available to fulfill instruction and garrison duties.
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82. Ottawa Citizen, 10 February 1909, p. 10.
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CHAPTER V - THE NON-PERMANENT ACTIVE MILITIA

There was no essential change made in the nature of the Non-Permanent Active Militia before the First World War but rather an attempt to expand it and make it complete in arms and services. Improvements were made to training to increase its capability to fight. Besides being a military organization the NPAM was a social institution centred on summer camps and armouries. Its appeal was much stronger for English than French Canadians.

The form of the NPAM in the pre-war period resembled closely the organization which emerged from Confederation. The Militia Act of 1868 defined two categories of membership in the Militia, the Active and Reserve. The Active Militia was composed of up to 40,000 volunteers for part-time military training. Then the Reserve Militia was simply a paper force of all men eligible to be called to serve in time of emergency but who did no training. Later, after a permanently embodied component of the Active Militia was established, the part-time volunteers became known as the Non-Permanent Active Militia.¹

To administer the volunteer corps authorized by the 1868 Act, the country was divided into nine military districts. Within each district there were corps of the three main combatant arms, the infantry, cavalry and artillery. These arms in turn were organizationally divided. For instance, the infantry arm was composed of regiments, all having only one battalion. Each battalion was given a recruiting area within the military
district which was sub-divided among the battalion's four to eight companies. The strength of a company varied considerably depending upon the establishment set by headquarters and on the number of men a commander would enroll. For example, in 1874, the establishment for a company was 42 but less than that may have volunteered for training. For training purposes in summer camps units of the different arms were liable to be grouped together into larger formations such as brigades or divisions to form a more balanced force.²

After an initial period of organization governments did little to ensure proper development and training for the NPAM. Despite expansion of the country to the west the NPAM remained concentrated in eastern Canada, consisting mostly of infantry with smaller components of cavalry and artillery and too few support services. There also grew a distinction between rural and city corps beyond the accident of their recruiting areas: Men of rural corps trained at summer camps of between eight and twelve days, getting mostly practical exercises but not called out every year. City corps drilled annually but in the evenings and on weekends at local headquarters practising ceremonial drill instead of learning to fight.³

Nevertheless, by 1904, most Canadians were convinced that the Non-Permanent Active Militia was a superior system of military service. This conviction originated with the War of 1812, which Canadians believed was won largely by local volunteers. Then at the turn of the century this faith was confirmed by the success of the Boer irregulars in the South African War
and was bolstered by an emerging nationalism. The part-time volunteer corps would continue to form the basis upon which to build in time of war, but first its weaknesses had to be eradicated. In 1903, Borden announced his plan to revamp the defence force. The Non-Permanent Active Militia would be the skeleton of a large military force to be fleshed out in war by other volunteers who could fire a rifle. This was the concept of a citizens' army of volunteers which was superior to standing armies.

To achieve his goal Borden had to ensure that his Non-Permanent Active Militia skeleton was properly assembled to receive a body in an emergency. The minister prepared the NPAM for larger military groupings, first by re-organizing it into higher commands composed of military districts, and then later by forming divisions as the basis for a field army. The NPAM expanded in size in this period and became better balanced in its arms and approached self-sufficiency in support services. Improvements in training were also aimed at, with some qualified success.

During the period 1904 to 1914, there was a significant growth in the numbers of Non-Permanent Active Militia trained each year. Borden had estimated that between 50 and 60 thousand trained militia were needed to form the skeleton for this 100,000 men line of defence. In 1903, just over 25,000 had trained, but these figures climbed over the next decade until in the last complete training period before the war 54,318 men turned out. Plans to organize this nucleus into an army to defend the country against invasion also made progress.
In 1904, the organization of the Non-Permanent Active Militia was not much different from when it originated. There were twelve military districts, ten in the east, one at Winnipeg and another at Victoria. There were 85 battalions of infantry, 16 regiments of cavalry and 48 batteries of artillery in total. Along with a handful of engineer companies and support units, these arms were distributed unevenly among the military districts with the great preponderance being in Ontario. There was as yet no pretence of grouping the different arms into higher command formations which were suitable to take the field.

This picture changed considerably by 1914. The overall strength of the militia had grown to 103 infantry battalions, 36 cavalry regiments, 61 artillery batteries and many support units. Ten military districts in the east had disappeared to be replaced by six divisions. The six divisions were organized into a field army to serve in time of war with troops to be added from the Reserve Militia. Also forming part of the field army were corps from the three military districts in the west with headquarters at Winnipeg, Calgary and Victoria. While most of the strength was still in Ontario, the NPAM had grown considerably in the west.

In 1905, because of the militia's weakness in the west Borden gave that region priority in the establishment of new corps, and the results were dramatic. For instance, in Saskatchewan where previous to 1905 there had not been a single military unit, by 1914 there were 4 infantry battalions, 4 cavalry regiments and corps of artillery and support troops.
Overall from 1904 to 1914, the infantry increased in the west from 3 battalions to 18, the cavalry from 1 regiment to 15, with a similar growth in support troops. This increase can be compared to the east where in the same period only three new infantry battalions and four cavalry regiments were organized.\textsuperscript{14}

The intention of the ministers of militia and their military advisers during this period was to transform the NPAM from an auxiliary force of the British army into a self-sufficient citizens' army. To do this they tried to produce strong and efficient combatant arms adequately sustained by newly created support services. To judge the success of this attempt it is necessary to examine each branch of the NPAM. The militia was also traditionally divided between rural and city corps and for a complete assessment it is necessary to deal with their particular strengths and weaknesses.

The size of the infantry component of the NPAM was relatively satisfactory by the end of this decade. The infantry grew from 85 to 103 battalions between 1904 and 1914, and was the only arm of the service with enough units organized to meet the requirements for mobilization of a field army in case of invasion.\textsuperscript{15} What did concern military authorities was the effectiveness of the infantry.

When he was GOC, Lord Dundonald emphasized the basics of military training especially rifle-shooting. He considered that while the militia might not be able to equal a standing army in discipline and most aspects of training, it could learn to shoot as well.\textsuperscript{16} This judgment was accepted in Canada because
the Boers seemed to have proven to the world what damage could be done by well-armed sharpshooters without intensive military training. Sam Hughes claimed that if the young men of Canada were trained to shoot they would make it very hazardous for any enemy who tried to cross the frontier. So instruction in the use of rifles came to have priority in the training of the entire militia but with a special imperative in the case of the infantry, the primary combatant arm.

In order to entice NPAM men to concern themselves with shooting, their daily pay was based partially on rifle range qualification. In 1904, a regulation change was made to the pay structure giving recompense for merit and seniority in service, referred to as efficiency pay. The next year the Inspector-General, Lord Aylmer, suggested that the payment for efficiency depend upon a man's performance on the rifle range. The Council agreed, and, in 1906, the pay structure was changed again combining the seniority and efficiency standards. A militiaman would receive 50 cents per day and if he met the musketry requirement another 20 to 50 cents per day depending on length of service. Then, in 1909, the seniority requirement was dropped making rifle shooting the sole standard for extra pay. This was in effect until 1912 when the regulation was altered giving men a flat 15 cents per diem for qualifying at the range.

Combined with this incentive of extra pay the military authorities tried to ensure that proper instruction and adequate
facilities were made available for militia members. A place was made on the establishment of each regiment of infantry for a qualified musketry instructor. More time was set aside at the annual camps for shooting instruction and practice. A building programme of rifle ranges was initiated with the aim of making these facilities available to every corps in Canada. In addition, the department disseminated large numbers of technical aids such as shooting gallery machines and miniature ranges to assist in teaching the basics of shooting in drill halls and armouries. Militia Council approved the issue of more ammunition to the NPAM to permit more practice with the infantry getting more than twice the number of rounds per man than the cavalry and six times more than the other arms.

The concentration on shooting made many more men familiar with the handling of their weapons but cannot be said to have produced a legion of marksmen. Failure here was due to the chronic problems which plagued the militia, lack of time for training and the high turnover of its members. General Otter reported in 1913 that he could not see a general advance in the proficiency of militia shooters because each year a high percentage of new recruits turned out for training and received only a minimum of instruction. The ones who really benefited from the increase in instruction and facilities were the smaller number who took their obligation of three years service more seriously.

Besides the practical stress on shooting, infantry drill was revised to permit more attention to the movements necessary
to control men in battle rather than to direct a ceremonial parade. Lord Dundonald produced a new drill for the militia which emphasized simple movements. Work at training camps concentrated on elementary drill to be practised at the company level rather than in larger formations. The perpetual weakness of the city corps had been too much time spent on ceremonial drill. Some of this was eradicated by pressure from headquarters to perform practical work and by more opportunity to train at summer camps. 28

The attempts to upgrade the efficiency of the infantry were only a qualified success at best. Of the 101 battalions which trained in 1913, General Otter rated only 28 as in good shape and 48 as fair. The other 25 ranked lower in his estimation. 29

The cavalry arm of the NPAM changed its military role considerably in the decade before the First World War. Previously, the cavalry had been equipped and trained to act in the traditional role of shock troop to break through enemy defences. Weight, momentum and the slash of the sword was expected to achieve success. But again the example of the Boers underscored the advantages of converting the cavalry to the new role of mounted riflemen. Moreover, modern warfare with its battlefield obstacles, increased accuracy and long range of weapons had made the shock tactic obsolete. The mobility of horsemen was used now to conduct reconnaissance and to bring firepower to bear at crucial points in a battle. Lord Dundonald initiated this change in roles for the NPAM cavalry in 1902, declaring that the rifle and not the sword was to be the principal weapon. 30
The cavalry units experienced some problems adjusting to the change of roles, complicated by problems with equipment and mounts. There was new stress placed in training to practice of reconnaissance and rifle-shooting which were conducted satisfactorily. But the provision of a rifle proved a handicap to men unaccustomed to handling the weapon on horseback. Lack of proper equipment to carry the arm and poor saddlery also caused problems. Moreover, many men were forced to rent poor quality horses for training because of low pay allowed for a mount and the poor indemnity rate for injuries. These problems seem to have been overcome more successfully in the west where men were more familiar with horsemanship.

There was significant growth in the number of cavalry regiments in the NPAM, more than doubling from 16 to 36 between 1904 and 1914. Most of this growth occurred in the west where 14 new regiments were created. In 1911, the cavalry regiments were grouped into brigades with the institution of divisional organization. By 1914, there were seven such brigades, four in the east and three in the west.

The cavalry rated fairly high in efficiency perhaps because it was considered glamorous and attracted a better quality of men. Overall, of 37 cavalry regiments which trained in 1913, General Otter rated 20 as good. The efficiency of the cavalry regiments was particularly important in the prairie provinces where, by 1914, they were more numerous than infantry battalions. Inspecting the western cavalry in 1913, General Sir Ian Hamilton of the British army remarked that it filled the main
function of defending the west against "any invader, White, Esquimaux or whoever he may be." 38

The NPAM artillery was divided into two branches, field and garrison. The Canadian Field Artillery (CFA) was composed of batteries of light guns intended to support the advance of the infantry. The Canadian Garrison Artillery (CGA) was made up of heavier guns meant to defend or assault prepared positions. Though both branches underwent reorganization during this period, and in the case of the former considerable growth as well, they managed to maintain a good efficiency rating. 39

In the period 1904 to 1914, the Canadian Field Artillery grew in strength from 17 to 41 batteries and was grouped into larger formations. 40 The seventeen batteries in 1904 were made up of four guns each, and five of these batteries in Ontario were grouped into two brigades training to act together in war. In 1905, Militia Council authorized the organization of eight new batteries and the grouping of the entire field artillery into ten brigades. These brigades were made up of two batteries each except the Second and Fourth Brigades which had three batteries each. Each brigade was supported by an ammunition column, a unit designated to supply the guns with shells. 41 Then between 1912 and 1914, a total of fifteen new batteries were authorized for the field artillery bringing about four new brigades.

During this period the field artillery was almost entirely re-armed. In 1904, the batteries used the obsolete 12 pounder guns. By 1914, most of the brigades were armed with the 18
pounder QF (Quick Firing) field gun which had been recently adopted by the British army. But several independent batteries in the west were given the lighter 13 pounder used by the horse artillery which normally supported cavalry advances. Only one C.F.A. brigade was detailed for howitzers and it lacked modern ordnance.42

The Canadian Garrison Artillery did not experience the same growth as the field artillery, but it did undergo major restructuring completed by 1912. With divisional organization the garrison artillery companies were more clearly identified by their military role. Four categories were devised for the six existing regiments: heavy artillery, moveable armament, coast defence and siege companies. Rearmament also occurred in the CGA with the introduction of the 60 pounder Breech Loader.43

Most observers commented positively on the efficiency of the NPAM artillery which seems to have been a product of personnel and training. General Lake considered the field artillery the best arm of the service and was quite positive in his evaluation of the garrison artillery.44 Borden felt that "The class of men who join the artillery...is decidedly above, or at least, of as high standard as those of any other branch."45 General Hamilton inspected the artillery in 1913, and he confirmed this judgment praising the efficiency of the artillery which he attributed to its capacity to attract good men.46 But the artillerymen did enjoy certain advantages in training. In 1905, the Militia department met the request of the Canadian Artillery Association that the artillery be allowed to train 16 days each year instead of the usual 12.47 That same year the department
opened its large central camp at Petawawa, and the artillery corps began the practice of spending at least part of their annual training there. Facilities at the camp were ideal for gunnery.

Perhaps the only serious problem with the artillery arm was its small size. Despite the increase in the number of batteries over this period a glance at the tables for the field army to be mobilized in the event of invasion confirms that numerous artillery corps were lacking, spoiling the ideal of a balanced force. 48

The Canadian Engineers of the NPAM were supposed to train and develop to support a military force with technical skills varying from preparation of camp sites to telegraphy. But paradoxically the engineers growth was hindered by demands for their skills and for those of their Permanent Force counterparts, the Royal Canadians Engineers. Although the engineering branch of the NPAM had originated as early as 1878, by 1904 there were only four companies in existence and no growth occurred for the next six years. 49 The problem was that when these companies went to camp, they were put to work setting up, maintaining and striking the camp site. This was good practice in the pioneer skills of the corps, but left no time to develop other technical skills. 50 Furthermore, the Royal Canadian Engineers of the permanent corps had only been organized in 1903, and in the first years were too busy with their own tasks, including maintenance of the newly acquired Halifax and Esquimalt fortresses, to instruct the non-permanent branch. 51
Additions to the engineering corps did not begin until 1910, when a fifth field company was formed. At the same time came authorization of telephone and telegraph detachments to complement each of the five field companies and for smaller field troops to support cavalry brigades. By 1914, the corps had grown to nine field companies, eight telegraph detachments, four field troops and one wireless detachment. Though the engineering corps had more than doubled in a few years, it still fell short of militia needs. Divisional organization required two field companies, two telegraph detachments and a headquarters unit for each of the six divisions, and one field company for Military District No. 11. Also each of the seven mounted brigades required a field troop and a wireless detachment.

Although organized quite rapidly reports on the progress of the engineers were encouraging. The combined training of all arms which took place at Petawawa in 1913 was of great benefit to the engineers with wireless courses being successfully introduced. By 1914, the units were reported as greatly improved.

When the Signalling Corps was set up in late 1903, it was different from other militia organizations in that it had no embodied permanent or non-permanent units. It was rather a system of diffusing skills in various forms of signalling (principally visual) throughout the militia. It worked under the supervision of Signalling Officers in each Military District.
These instructors trained men from both the PF and NPAM, who in turn passed on their knowledge to others in courses held at Royal Schools, local headquarters and summer camps. Within a few years a permanent staff was developed for the Signalling Corps, and, in 1912, a school was set up at Camp Petawawa. In 1913, over 1200 militia signallers were inspected and over 500 certificates of qualification issued.

The corps was reorganized in 1913, and renamed the Canadian Signal Corps. Reorganization was designed to suit the divisional structure, and for the first time NPAM units were formed. The idea was to have a signal company supporting each division and a troop for each cavalry brigade. This reorganization was still in an incipient stage at the outbreak of the First World War, but the service had a total establishment of 18 officers and 276 men.

Authorized in 1901, the Canadian Army Service Corps numbered eight companies by 1904, and was responsible for transport and supply of the NPAM. Expansion of the CASC progressed between 1905 and 1912, with the authorization of ten more companies for a pre-war maximum total of 19 companies, five in the west and fourteen in the east. Upon the assumption of a divisional structure for the militia in 1911, the projected future requirement for CASC units was considerable. Each of the six divisions in the east was to have a Divisional Train, a transport and supply support element, made up of a Headquarters and four CASC companies. The seven Mounted Brigades were also to be provided with one army service corps company each.
The main task set for the CASC was to perform supply duties in the summer camps and so provide services for the rest of the militia while gaining practical experience. In 1902, Captain J. G. Langton, an infantry officer of the Lorne Rifles, spoke to the Canadian Military Institute, a militia officers' club in Toronto, on the problem of providing food for men in camp. He complained about the quantity and quality of rations provided to the troops, claiming it was necessary for regiments to buy extra food with small subsidies provided by local town councils. The next year Captain Langton was chosen to command the Toronto Company of the CASC, and in applauding his appointment the Canadian Military Gazette hoped that the Army Service Corps might improve the food situation because "the militia in the past have been fed disgracefully." The corps was not long in proving itself equal to its task. In 1905, the Gazette assessed the food at camps as greatly improved because the CASC units had refused to accept inferior goods from contractors and by this financial penalty had smartened up shoddy suppliers. The Corps also began to bake bread, butcher meat and provide local transport at camps. Ultimate praise came in 1907, when the Gazette said that before the CASC was organized camp rations were extremely crude but now they were good and plentiful:

"Why is it that today with the soldier's wage as inferior to the labor wage as it was in time of the half dollar a day pay, we find our regiments going out in even better strength than formerly and with decidedly a better lot of men? It is because the C.A.S.C. has so improved the comforts and conveniences of the men that the last hardship has been removed and only the real pleasures and advantages remain."
The greatest challenge for the fledgling service came in 1908, when with its counterpart from the Permanent Force, it performed the supply and transport duties for 14,000 troops concentrated at Quebec for that city's Tercentenary Celebrations. All duties were performed quite creditably including the baking of bread and the arrangements for railway transportation. 68

Though doctors had long been attached to militia corps there was no organized medical service until 1899, when the Canadian Army Medical Department was formed. The new department was divided into two distinct branches, the Militia Army Medical Staff Service and the Regimental Medical Service. The former was composed of an officer cadre of doctors assisted by enlisted personnel who would man field hospitals and stretcher bearer companies to service an army in the field. The Regimental Medical Service was made up of a doctor in each corps supported by a stretcher bearer section. 69 These sections would remove wounded to the rear for treatment by the medical field units. 70

The militia medical services continued to grow and be reorganized until the war. In 1904, the Militia Army Medical Staff Service became the Militia Army Medical Corps (AMC) consisting of nine bearer companies and eight field hospitals. 71 Then in 1906, the bearer companies and field hospitals were eliminated and the personnel from these units were used to start sixteen field ambulances which combined the functions of their predecessors. 72 By 1914, the AMC had grown to 21 field ambulances with six of these designated to support mounted brigades.
and 15 providing services for divisional troops. This left the AMC only six field ambulances short of meeting the full medical requirements for the divisional structure. The field units usually trained at annual camp, and when General Hamilton inspected them in 1913, he found them well ahead of the other branches in preparedness for war.  

Other areas of the medical service were not so strong. The Regimental Medical Services never did become a viable arm of the department. For the sake of uniformity of the staff system Militia Council decided in 1909 to phase out direct appointments of doctors to militia corps. Future appointments to the post of regimental medical officer would be for limited periods and would be made from the staff list of AMC, but doctors already in these positions would not be disturbed. The stretcher bearer sections of the regiments experienced slow growth and poor training due primarily to the failure of regimental Commanding Officers to take their necessity seriously, and, in 1912, General Otter declared that "the experiment appears to have been a failure." The militia also lacked adequate hospital facilities.  

A Corps of Guides was established by the militia department in 1903, to gather maps and information about Canada which might be useful in time of invasion. The corps was made up of NPAM officers across the country who submitted information on their particular regions to be collated at militia headquarters. At first no NCOs or other ranks were appointed as Guides, although regulations allowed it. Upon divisional reorgan-
ization in 1911, the officers were grouped into nine detachments, one for each division and district.\textsuperscript{80}

In 1912, a new dimension was added to the corps to create a combatant arm which could support an army in the field.\textsuperscript{81} Three mounted companies of Guides were authorized admitting other ranks to the corps for the first time.\textsuperscript{82} The organization of the Corps of Guides in 1914 comprised, in addition to the nine detachments, six mounted companies one for each of the divisions in eastern Canada.\textsuperscript{83}

There were three other auxiliary services of the NPAM organized in this period: the Canadian Army Veterinary Corps in 1910; the Canadian Postal Corps in 1911; and the Canadian Ordnance Corps in 1912. While these arms added to the self-sufficiency of the militia, they were not significant influences on its development during this period.

The development of the Non-Permanent Active Militia in this period was due primarily to its attractions as a social institution. Pay was not the only recompense offered by the NPAM. Officers and men were drawn to it by the opportunity for display in parades and exercises and by the diversions available at camps and armouries. Militia service provided for the other ranks opportunities for sport and recreation as well as the glamour of wearing a uniform in the service of the King. For officers, besides the glamour, there was the power of command and the social distinction of military leadership. Acceptability of this behavior was assured by the popular notion that militia service was a personal sacrifice made in
the interests of community, country and empire. Unfortunately, diversion in some cases detracted from effective training. And for French Canadians the social appeal was diminished by the refusal of authorities to permit cultural assertions which were a matter of course for Anglo-Saxons.

In presenting a picture of the NPAM as a social organization this study examines the social circumstances of service in the militia based on reports of its training and activities. No record exists of the class, occupation or social affinities of the militiamen making scientific analysis impossible. However, there are some general observations which can be made about the social caste of officers of the NPAM.

In 1902, the Montreal Herald editorialized about the Canadian militia officer saying that he "is useful to his regiment because he has the means to spend and the will to spend it: the regiment is useful to him because the paths towards social distinction are smoothed for the Militia Officer." 84 Lt. Col. W. N. Ponton, a Belleville militia officer, was outraged by this view contending that he and his fellow officers "have thought that we were really performing some small part of our civic duty of public service as citizens, not merely (sic) in our personal wearing of the uniform, but also in our instruction given to others and our endeavour to keep alive the needed spirit of zealous service." 85 These statements may be more paradoxical than contradictory. The ethic of noblesse oblige had its own expression in the NPAM of Canada.
H. H. McLean, Liberal M.P. from New Brunswick, described the militia officer as, "a man of affairs. He had to be a man of position in the district or town in which he lives. He is a man whose time is valuable...The class of men you have as officers are the backbone of the militia and they have some pride in their personal appearance." In fact, McLean might well have been describing himself. A very successful lawyer and businessman in St. John, N.B., McLean had been in the militia since the Fenian raids, had commanded an infantry battalion and brigade and had been prominently involved with a number of ceremonial occasions, including command of the Canadian militia contingent to the coronation of King George V. Associated military interests included presidency of the New Brunswick Rifle Association and membership in the Canadian Council of the British Red Cross Society.

Lt. Col. Ponton also matched McLean's description of a militia officer. Like McLean, he was a lawyer and businessman, had commanded a militia battalion, expressed a particular interest in rifle-shooting and was the vice-president for Ontario of the Canadian Branch of the British Red Cross Association. Having been educated at Upper Canada College and the University of Toronto, Ponton remained active in support of these institutions in later life. He was also a prominent Freemason.

This was the type of substantial citizen who added the plumes of military leadership to his credentials of success in
private enterprise and public service. Certainly not all militia officers were as prominent and successful as these men, but the example was there and no doubt the desire to emulate. This interest in militia may have been too much a social expression because officers who did not bother to upgrade their military qualifications were a chronic problem.\textsuperscript{89}

To probe further into the militia as a social organization it is necessary to differentiate between two groups of soldiers, those who trained at annual camps and those who trained at local headquarters. The former group consisted mostly of rural corps of infantry although units from all the other branches were required also to attend camp. Of those who trained at local headquarters, the majority were city corps of infantry. But each year some units raised in urban areas from the other branches trained at their headquarters in addition to, or instead of, going to camp.\textsuperscript{90}

There was no organizational growth of the rural corps of infantry during this period, but there was considerable increase in the numbers of men receiving annual training. Although there were several infantry battalions created in the west, this was balanced by the disappearance of inefficient eastern battalions. So that, in 1914, there were 56 rural battalions\textsuperscript{91} of infantry, exactly the same number as in 1905.\textsuperscript{92} The practice of requiring all rural corps to train at camp each year was resumed in 1904, after a period of about thirty years in which partial call-outs were the norm. From 1903 to 1914, the number of men attending summer camps for
the full training period rose from over 13,000 to over 31,000, the majority in both cases being from rural corps of infantry.\textsuperscript{93}

Maintaining continuity of service was the central problem of rural corps. Over the decades when summer camps were an irregular occurrence for rural corps the obligation for enlisted men to attend if the unit was called out lost its meaning. Though the men were always required to sign up for a three year period, the local company captain really only expected service for the current year for which a camp was scheduled. Then in another two or three years when the summer arrived for his corps to train again, the captain would begin to enlist his company anew. This system seemed eminently suited to rural districts, where the vagaries of agricultural life dissuaded farmers from committing themselves for more than a year in advance.\textsuperscript{94} However, this was not particularly desirable from the viewpoint of military efficiency. Without the continuity of at least three years training there was little chance of any man reaching competence as a soldier.

In 1906, at Borden's insistence, Militia Council moved to enforce the obligation of service. Commanding officers of rural corps were required to submit their service rolls in advance to militia headquarters and were prohibited from making any last minute enlistsments.\textsuperscript{95} In theory, this would allow the department to guard against unsuitable types being gathered up at the last minute and provide a record which could be checked for continuity of service.\textsuperscript{96} This move brought protests from militia commanders that the regulation hindered
recruitment of their best men. The Canadian Military Gazette explained that while the village loafer was always able to commit himself in advance the industrious farmer could not tell until a few days before if he could get away. Such pressure compelled the department to modify the service roll regulation to allow, for instance, a company commander of infantry to submit a list of 110 men from which he would bring only 39 to camp. This was simply recognition that continuity of service was not an issue which could be resolved in the short term. The truth is that while most rural battalions of infantry were supported by a faithful cadre of officers, sometimes with the help of a small number of NCOs and men, the majority of the personnel attended camp in the expectation of a lark or for the pay and seldom became dedicated militiamen. This is true to a lesser degree for the other arms of the service which trained at camp, because they seemed to attract men more interested in a soldier's life.

To encourage good men to go to camp, conditions had to be made attractive. In 1908, General Lake observed that "you must pay men well; but you can do a good deal by making them really comfortable when in camp; feeding them well, giving them interesting and practical work, which they feel is useful, nursing them well when sick, making prompt payments, etc. etc." At this point Lake had good reason to be satisfied that he had correctly adjudged and satisfied the wants of the militiamen because in 1908 about 85% of the militia establishment authorized to train had turned out. But this percentage
was not to be equalled again before the war. In 1909, because of government austerity rural corps training was cut back in the numbers allowed from each corps and in the size of camps.\textsuperscript{101} The austerity programme affected the militia only in 1909, but that same year changes in pay and liquor regulations were made with more lasting effects.

The pay for the NPAM had been raised in 1904 with a good effect on the rural militia. Previous to 1904, a private in the non-permanent militia had received a flat 50 cents per day for annual training. Thereafter, a private earned a basic 50 cents per day plus up to one dollar in total depending on the length of his service and his general efficiency.\textsuperscript{102} Though this brought a militiaman earning the maximum only up to the daily wage of an unskilled labourer,\textsuperscript{103} the raise was hailed as a great advance. The \textit{Canadian Military Gazette} believed that the increased pay had succeeded in reviving the rural corps.\textsuperscript{104} The \textit{Gazette} was far less enthusiastic about the change in pay regulations in 1909.

Beginning in 1909, length of service was dropped as a condition for receipt of extra pay in the cavalry and infantry, and the money was awarded strictly for proficiency in shooting. To the \textit{Canadian Military Gazette} this change represented a breach in contract by the militia department. Men signed on for three years in expectation of receiving extra pay in due course, and now it was risked upon a good day at the rifle range where all sorts of variables were present. The journal predicted that militiamen would quit in protest.\textsuperscript{105} The next year training camps were not well attended with over 10,000 staying home of
the 38,000 eligible to train. The military journal attributed this failure to the pay arrangements. General Lake acknowledged that the numbers at some training camps were lower than expected, but he refused to link this directly with the musketry standard for efficiency. Only the cavalry and infantry were affected by this criterion, and Lake noted a falling off in attendance in all branches. He preferred to blame the problem generally on the demand for labour in the country, and the movement of young men to the northwest.

Continued decline in the ability of militia camps to attract good men became Sam Hughes’s problem in 1911. That summer there had been an even more serious drop in attendance at camps with the total dropping to around 25,000, although now even more men were eligible for camp than the previous year. A Conservative M.P., H. B. Morphy, related to the House of Commons that the issue of the Ross rifle to the London camp in 1910 caused many men to quit the militia. The arm was unfamiliar to the men, and many had failed to qualify at the ranges for the extra pay giving rise to a rumour which spread throughout western Ontario that the government had deliberately tried to trick the men out of their pay. The new minister moved quickly to rectify the situation announcing in March 1912 new pay schedules. There was a flat increase in the basic pay from 50 to 75 cents per diem with an extra 25 cents per diem for efficiency pay. Of the extra 25 cents only 15 cents was for marksmanship in the cavalry and infantry while 10 cents was for more than one year’s militia experience.
The effectiveness of this measure was limited. The real decline in numbers was halted, and in the subsequent pre-war training seasons there were substantial increases in those turning out for camps. However, the parallel rise in the numbers of men authorized to train accelerated at a greater rate than those actually training in camps. In fact, during the 1912 season only 65% of the rural corps turned out for camp, less than the usual average. The Canadian Military Gazette noted an upswing in the camp figures in the summer of 1914, but observed that most of the men were the unemployed from the cities seeking temporary refuge in rural regiments and with no intention of continuing in the militia. The rate of pay was still too low to attract men from the farmer class.

Coincidental with the pay problem came trouble over liquor in camps. Regulations had long forbidden the sale of liquor in camps of instruction including wine or malt liquors. However, this rule was construed by militia officers not to apply to the sale of beer, and canteens carrying this commodity were usually found in camps. In addition, officer and NCO messes customarily kept all sorts of liquor available for their members, and men were able to purchase the stronger liquors outside and carry it to camp. In 1908, temperance groups mounted a public campaign to abolish liquor in camps and received some timely support from the police. The Methodist Church endorsed a resolution threatening to discourage enlistments in the militia unless prohibition was imposed on camps. Well publicized
pressure was also exerted on the minister of militia by the Women's Christian Temperance Union, the Lord's Day Alliance, the Dominion Alliance and the Ontario Prohibitory Alliance. That same year police raided messes at Barriefield and London, seizing liquor and charging members with various violations of the liquor act.\textsuperscript{115}

When the matter was discussed in the House of Commons, J. A. Robb, Liberal M.P. for Huntington, complained that many good people from his part of the country refused to allow their sons to join the militia because of the presence of wet canteens at camps:

I submit to the Minister of Militia that the first thing necessary to encourage young men and especially farmers' sons to identify themselves with the militia, is to abolish the canteen at the drills because no mother who has a respect for her son, will permit that boy to go to the annual drills when she knows that the most he will learn will be to smoke cigarettes, drink whiskey and mingle with the worst elements of the community.\textsuperscript{116}

H. W. Edwards, Conservative member for Kingston, related that on his visits to the militia camp at Kingston the previous year he had witnessed disgraceful exhibitions of drunkenness and brawling. Borden abjectly explained that the regulations were difficult to enforce.\textsuperscript{117}

This pressure finally led to action by the militia department to eliminate alcohol from the camps. In April 1909, a deputation from the Dominion Alliance met with Militia Council and reached a compromise agreement on liquor in the militia. Council explained that an effective ban was being placed on the sale of all spirits in camp canteens and messes
of the NPAM and that the co-operation of civil police would be welcomed. In return the deputation agreed to turn a blind eye to liquor consumption in the canteens and messes of the Permanent Force, possibly feeling that regular soldiers were beyond reclamation.\footnote{118} To Borden this policy meant that "no liquor is to be brought into camp by anyone."

It is difficult to assess the exact impact of the regulations on the militia, but some dissatisfaction existed. General Lake heard grumbling about prohibition at militia camps in 1910, and made a personal statement supporting the restoration of orderly beer canteens.\footnote{120} The Canadian Military Gazette supported the move towards dry canteens, but it also carried stories indicating that there had been some adverse results of the ban. A correspondent from the Barrie field camp claimed that there was a general absence of men from training, their places being taken by teenage boys. And far from preventing drinking, the lack of beer in camps drove the men to seek solace at bars in Kingston in the evenings with a great number of unseemly incidents involving soldiers in the city and on the road back to camp.\footnote{121} The correspondent from the London camp also reported discontent over the beer ban.\footnote{122} It is certainly possible that the removal of one of the chief attractions at militia camp contributed to the decline in the number expected to train in 1910.

Sam Hughes, himself a firm temperance man, continued the efforts of his predecessor to clear liquor out of the camps.
He served notice that liquor was not to be brought to camp and that each officer would be held personally responsible to see that this order was carried out. His mettle was tested in June 1914 when a considerable cache of beer was uncovered at the Camp Petawawa officers' mess of 6th Field Battery of London. Col. E. W. B. Morrison, the inspecting officer, relieved the senior officer of command of the battery and turned it over to a subordinate. Resignations in protest by several battery officers followed, and a private appeal was made on their behalf to the Prime Minister explaining that these officers were Conservative party stalwarts. R. L. Borden asked Hughes to investigate the matter, but his minister refused on the grounds that he knew all the facts in the matter and that these officers had been found out by their open boasting about their defiance of liquor regulations. The Canadian Military Gazette praised Hughes's rigid enforcement of the liquor ban. "He has gone far to remove the prejudice of mothers and temperance fathers against allowing their boys to go to camp, and for this the whole force thanks him." 

Camps offered many other social attractions to the volunteers besides, and instead of, alcohol. Descriptions of camp life are replete with details of sports, entertainments, spontaneous group singing and banquets. After Divine Service on Sunday where hymns with military themes were prescribed the men were free for a day of relaxation. There was considerable social intercourse with the nearby towns. Soldiers spent evenings and Sundays there, and local citizens
reciprocated with picnic visits to the camp to observe the militia at work and play. Attention and admiration from civilians was surely not the least of the rewards for the part-time soldiers. To counter the seamier temptations of drink and smoke the YMCA worked at camps providing dry canteens, writing rooms and sport in addition to first class evangelists and choirs. The WCTU was supportive also. At the Aldershot, N.S., camp the ladies erected a permanent building affording the men a comfortable place to lounge and serving them free coffee and inexpensive food. The militia department did its part by improving rations and medical services. So while twelve days at camp was not quite a paid holiday, it represented a welcome change from routine labour for most men.

The value of militia camps is not to be judged by social amenities but by the training accomplished. One great problem was that the time allowed for training at camps was too short. Of the twelve days set aside only nine were actually used for training. Two were used up travelling, setting up and striking camp, and Sunday was a holiday. The time restriction nagged at and frustrated the professional officers who sought to make the NPAM efficient. Yet the solution generally recommended of increasing the length of training was made difficult by considerations of cost and disruption of employment practices. A concession was made to the technical difficulties of artillery drill in 1905, by extending the length of that arm's annual training to 16 days. This privilege of extended training
was offered to other arms of the militia from 1912 to 1914, but was exercised mainly by city corps wishing to supplement headquarters drill with a few days at camp.\textsuperscript{130} The rural corps of infantry remained limited to 12 days.

Given the short duration of camps militia authorities attempted to pare training objectives down to essentials. Beginning in 1905, headquarters set down guidelines for camp commanders on areas of training to emphasize.\textsuperscript{131} The aim was to reduce ceremony and concentrate on basic drill and field work. The principal combatant arms, infantry, cavalry and artillery, were to learn to employ their weapons against an enemy, and the other arms to support this effort.

Practice in field work, rifle-shooting, artillery firing and manoeuvres required space and special facilities, and the existing camp grounds were quite inadequate. Fortunately the new central camp at Petawawa, Ont., was opened in 1905, and it proved invaluable in meeting militia needs over the next decade. Efforts by the militia department to establish new larger district camps got bogged down in a morass of patronage and austerity during the Laurier era. Hughes also made plans to provide the militia with adequate training camps, but they did not come to fruition before the war.\textsuperscript{132}

Camp training did not turn militia units into an efficient fighting force ready to wage war, but when General French inspected the camps in 1911, he was impressed with the practical work being done:
The difference between the training efficiency and elasticity of battalions, which have been accustomed to attend these camps and those city battalions which have not had these advantages is very marked, although the appearance, setting up of the men and the ceremonial movements of the latter may lead to an entirely erroneous opinion being formed as to their equal if not superior, value as fighting corps. 133

When General French denigrated the value of the ceremonial drill of the city corps his remarks were directed to the central problem of these units. Training in armouries and drill halls had become reduced to perfunctory learning of ceremonial movements to impress onlookers at parades. The struggle by military authorities to turn the corps towards efficient training brought some success. But many of the city corps were just military clubs sponsored by wealthy patrons and gratifying members with various social diversions.

No doubt a product of the increasing urbanization of Canada, the number of city corps of infantry grew from 29 to 46 during this decade. 134 Most of the new units were located in the fast developing urban areas of the west, but several were also established in eastern cities. In contrast, the number of rural corps of infantry did not increase during this period. The number of men training at local headquarters almost doubled from over 12,000 in 1903, to about 23,000 in 1914, the majority in both cases being from city corps. 135

The 12 days of training for the city corps usually consisted of ceremonial drill in the armoury supplemented sometimes by an annual field day which pitted rival units against each other.
in a sham battle. Some rifle practice was carried out either in miniature ranges at the armoury or at regular rifle ranges if they were located conveniently nearby. City corps members often claimed that they performed more than the twelve days of training for which they received pay, but usually this calculation included days spent at local parades or on holiday excursions. Furthermore, a day's drill was only about three hours long, and most were held in the evenings and on Saturday afternoons in the spring and early summer. This left the regiment free for social events the rest of the year. General Lake was quite critical of this approach to training. Ceremonial drill was no substitute for practical work in the field, and he was frankly suspicious that some of the corps did not perform even the required twelve days training.

Early in 1909, Militia Council redefined the training programme for the city corps of infantry to emphasize musketry and practice in basic tactical manoeuvres instead of ceremony. Inspectors were to be assigned to check that the training was being carried out as specified. There were to be no more vague claims of the number of drills performed, but roll-books were to be kept as records. More rigorous definition was given to kinds and duration of drills acceptable as training periods. At least eight of the twelve days of training were to be spent on drill or manoeuvre, restricting the number of parades which could be counted. Recruits were to perform ten days of voluntary drill for which they received no pay.

General French recommended very strongly in his 1911 report on the militia that the city corps receive camp training.
I understand that these city corps seldom or never, attend camp, as it is alleged that the men cannot be spared from their civil employment.

I cannot agree with this custom and strongly recommend that it should cease.

In an irregular force nothing can compensate for the advantages gained by concentrating the troops in these annual camps. 140

This was not a new suggestion. Since Lord Dundonald's time city infantry regiments were authorized to spend several days at camp occasionally, and General Lake was on record supporting expansion of this policy. 141 This time General Mackenzie persuaded Sam Hughes to allow the city corps to train in camp for up to five days beyond the usual training period. 142

The announcement that the city corps would receive training in camp elicited the favour of the Canadian Military Gazette along with the prudent warning that selfish employers would refuse to hire part-time soldiers. 143 At first there were signs that this might not be true. Some enlightened employers actively supported the militia, such as Ogilvie Flour Mill in Montreal, which in 1909 granted an extra week's holidays to any man joining a militia corps. 144 Militia officers in Hamilton were pledged the co-operation of eight hundred commercial and industrial leaders. 145 In Toronto, militia officers persuaded the Canadian Manufacturers' Association to recommend to local employers that they demonstrate their patriotism by allowing men leave to attend camp. Yet when training began in the summer of 1912, it became clear that the programme was in trouble. From all the camps came reports that while most of the city corps turned out, they
were very weak in numbers. The invariable explanation of commanders was that employers refused to risk disruption of their enterprises by allowing leave for military training.\textsuperscript{146} Only about half of the city corps militiamen were in camp in 1912, and this average did not improve in the next two summers.\textsuperscript{147} By the end of 1913, Militia Council decided "that it was almost impracticable to train City Corps in camp.\textsuperscript{148}

The measures taken by the militia and defence department to force practical training upon the city corps were not unqualified successes, but the point was brought home that more than ceremonial drill was needed. A militia member commented in 1909, that the city corps of Toronto were looking forward to their annual Thanksgiving Day sham battle that year.

In all ranks there is the desire to show the people who foot the bill that the militia are not afraid of hard work and that they are able and willing to do a hard day's work when it is required of them. Militiamen generally are tired out with hearing the gibe that they are 'only playing at soldiers'. \textsuperscript{149}

The next year General Lake took some of the edge off his criticism of city corps saying that there had been more attention to field work in the 1909 training, and many corps had conducted tactical exercise days without pay.\textsuperscript{150} The reputation that city corps members wished to live down was that their battalions were simply military clubs for display and entertainment.\textsuperscript{151} But this was a judgment that could not be escaped so long as wealthy and common men alike sought diversion in plush armouries and on holiday excursions.
Several regiments in eastern cities enjoyed the patronage of wealthy gentlemen with penchants for military trappings but none in such fine style as the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada in Toronto under Henry Mill Pellatt. As an historian of the Queen's Own put it, Pellatt's name "became practically synonymous" with that of the regiment during the pre-war period. Pellatt had been an officer in the QORs since 1879, and rose to its command in 1901, whence began an unprecedented round of social triumphs. Pellatt was very well connected with the militia department being deeply involved in financial speculation in league with Frederick Borden and acting as investment counsellor to General Otter. In 1906, Pellatt was knighted and the QORs were allowed to become the first regiment in Canada to form two battalions. The following year Pellatt was made a full colonel. Several senior militia officers felt Pellatt was unduly favoured by these military honours and resigned in protest. Pellatt sought not only personal recognition but prominence for his regiment. In 1902, the regimental band was sent to England at Pellatt's expense to lead the Canadian contingent in the coronation parade of King Edward VII. In 1904, the entire regiment 716 strong was transported to Buffalo for a weekend spent with a U.S. National Guard regiment. This feat was topped in 1906, when Pellatt led 890 men of the Queen's Own to New York City to perform in a military tournament held at Madison Square Gardens. But these events were mere preliminaries to later social achievements.
The fiftieth anniversary of the Queen's Own Rifles was in 1910, and its commanding officer went to great lengths to see that it was celebrated in style. A reunion was held for the regiment stretching over a week in June with ex-members attending a smoker and Church parade to a strength of about 2,000. A garden party for 10,000 was held on the Saturday:

Eight men dressed as 'Beefeaters'—costumes they would later wear at the pageant—acted as an escort to Sir Henry and Lady Pellatt. The guests were received under a scarlet and white canopy. The bands of the Queen's Own, The Royal Grenadiers and the 48th Highlanders played; 400 school children sang patriotic airs; and later some 30 Indian braves performed a war dance. This was followed by a ceremony that made Sir Henry a chief of the Six Nations Indians. Glorious weather prevailed; the affair was a complete success. 159

But even more spectacular was the historical pageant which was staged four times during the week. Over 1500 costumed men, women and children acted parts in a play which stressed glorious events in the military history of Canada, and the total audience was estimated at 75,000. 160

Later that summer Pellatt carried the anniversary celebration one step further by taking over 600 men of the regiment to England to participate in the autumn manoeuvres at Aldershot. At Sir Henry's request Governor-General Earl Grey had arranged this with the British government to the reported delight of the King, the Prince of Wales and the Secretary of State for War, who saw in the occasion an affirmation of imperial solidarity. 161 The blessing of the militia department had followed quickly. 162 The visit was a great success, and the King cabled Laurier that QORs had performed creditably at the manoeuvres which boded well for the future.
of the Imperial Army. Only a few carping critics had dared to characterize the visit as a holiday.

Sir Henry Pellatt’s record of sponsorship of his regiment was unequalled, but there were wealthy gentlemen in Montreal anxious to finance military corps. Canada’s second two battalion regiment, the 5th Regiment, Royal Highlanders of Canada, in Montreal, enjoyed the attentions of a number of prominent patrons. Sir H. Montagu Allan, of Allan steamships, hosted annual picnics for the 5th Royal Scots either at his Beaconsfield estates or at his city home, Ravenscrag, on Mont Royal. In 1911, Allan became Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of the regiment, and to mark the occasion he bore the cost of complete uniforms for its band. During this period an Honorary Members’ mess was established for the regiment with prominent citizens including Lord Strathcona and Lord Mount Stephen being invited to join. The group was "a closely knit exclusive little club within the Regimental structure", and it lived up to expectations of generous donations. In 1912, in order to receive properly a planned visit by the Governor-General, the Duke of Connaught, these sponsors completely outfitted the mess with new furniture and a complete collection of crystal, china and cutlery embossed with the regimental crest. One of the two French Canadian city corps, the 65e Regiment Carabiniers Mont-Royal of Montreal, was financially supported by Sir Rodolphe Forget, banker and financier, who became Honorary Colonel of the regiment in 1910.
Forget not only provided money for the well-appointed regimental armory but also received the regiment on different occasions at his Saint-Tréné estate. In Ottawa, J. W. Woods and J. R. Booth sponsored regiments. Perhaps the largest property holder in the city, Woods owned the building in which the militia department was housed and was a militia supplier. He also enjoyed a remarkable career in the elite Governor-General's Foot Guards. Joining the regiment as lieutenant in 1906, Woods became a captain the following year and spent the winter of 1909-10 in England attached to the Coldstream Guards. Upon his return the incumbent commanding officer of the GGFGs announced his early retirement, and all other senior officers stepped aside to allow Woods to assume command with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. Woods was also part of a financial consortium which included Frederick Borden and Henry Pellatt. Nevertheless, when Woods contemplated duplicating Pellatt's feat and taking the GGFGs to England, the latter complained bitterly to Borden. The minister soothed Pellatt with the promise that he would not allow this in the near future. J. R. Booth, the Ottawa lumber king, patronized the 43rd regiment of that city. In 1909, the officers of the regiment presented Booth with an oak and cut glass cabinet in gratitude for his donations to the regimental fund and his generosity in placing his private railway car at the disposal of the officers.

Frederick Borden began the practice of appointing Honorary Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels to militia regiments which he
described as "of the greatest advantage to the Militia to be able to enlist the interest and sympathy of gentlemen of position and wealth by connecting them to Regiments in the manner indicated." Over the years, Borden appointed a whole series of politicians, former militia officers and prominent capitalists to posts as Honorary Lieutenant-Colonels. For the most part he restricted appointments as Honorary Colonels to the Governors-General, members of the Royal Family and those military officers who had distinguished themselves in service to the Crown. However, R. Forget did manage to become an Honorary Colonel without any of the specified qualifications. Sam Hughes continued the policy of honorary appointments to regiments and even created a new category of honorary staff officers.

In the cities regiments were social and recreational clubs supported not only by wealthy officers but also by the men who donated their militia pay to company or regimental funds. Activities usually centred around the armouries and drill halls where facilities from gaming rooms to gymnasiums were available for diversion, and committees were organized to plan social and sporting events. The following account of winter months at the armoury of a Hamilton regiment is typical of most city corps:

The usual lull following the wind up of the fall parades and extending until after the Christmas season will make the Old Drill Hall rather a tame spot for a few weeks. There will be sufficient doing after that, however, to make the winter months pass pleasantly. Some of the companies have ambitious
plans for jolly little social evenings, theatre parties and so on. The annual company meetings and the probable organization of an indoor league (baseball) will carry the boys well into the early spring. 177

The Governor-General's Foot Guards of Ottawa were enthusiastic euchre players, and a lengthy regimentsal tournament kept these militiamen together at the armoury during the winter. 178 In Montreal, the 4th Field Coy. of Canadian Engineers organized many social activities, and the corps had no trouble attracting applications for membership from men working at the nearby Grand Trunk Railway shops and factories. The engineers' armoury was well equipped with billiard and pool tables, bowling alleys, reading rooms and a gymnasium, all of which were in constant use. 179 To defray expenses of a regiment an armoury became upon occasion the public entertainment centre, as in Quebec in 1907 when the Queen's Own Canadian Hussars put on an extravaganza involving 400 participants entitled "Japanese Honeymoon". 180 Liquor of course played a part in regimental life with canteens for the men and messes for the NCOs and officers, but this was curtailed towards the middle of this period by temperance sentiment and departmental regulations. 181

Besides just constituting another attraction for men to join the militia, the rationale for a well-equipped armoury was that it uplifted the men physically and morally. G. P. Graham, the former Minister of Railways and Canals, reported to the House of Commons in 1913, that the militiamen in his home town of Brockville spent a great deal of time at sport
in the local armoury which kept them out of mischief while improving their conditioning. F. B. Carvell, a Liberal M.P. and former militia officer, did not share this rosy view of the virtues of the armoury after his experience with one in Woodstock, N.B. "We were going to have Y.M.C.A. meetings there and all those great and elevating influences that make men better, morally and physically. And what have we got? We have a storeroom, we have a place where the boys can go in and have a good time, drink some booze and play poker."

The principal reason that city corps had an unhealthy predilection for ceremonial drill was that as military clubs they wanted to perform well at parades. Annual Church parades provided the occasion for most city regiments to show off their military appearance to their fellow citizens. On a Sunday in the spring or fall one or more of the city corps, complete with flags flying and regimental bands playing, would march from the armoury to the place of worship through city streets thronged with cheering spectators. A somewhat restrained description of one such event in Toronto follows:

The spring church parade of the garrison took place on Sunday afternoon the 14th inst. and as usual was well attended. The parade showed a total of 2,706 of all ranks on parade, and although this number has been exceeded on former occasions, yet the parade was the best uniformed and smartest in every way that has yet been held...It is estimated that fully 100,000 people turned out to view the parade and so jammed were the street crossings that not even the police could clear the way. 184
Another annual event which was most popular among city corps was the holiday excursion. Each year, or every other year, many of the regiments arranged to spend a week-end out of town participating in some military ceremony. Usually this took the form of reciprocal visits between Canadian regiments and U.S. units or paramilitary groups. Officially this practice was frowned upon by the militia department but not strictly forbidden unless some support was sought from public funds.\footnote{A correspondent in Ottawa explained in 1906 in the \textit{Canadian Military Gazette} that militiamen looked upon these outings "as a partial reward for faithful attendance at drills."} That year the Governor-General's Foot Guards would visit New York on Labour Day, but the 43rd Duke of Cornwall's Own Rifles were considering a more modest holiday because of the expenses incurred by a tour to Boston the preceding summer. These excursions were frequently justified by their proponents on the grounds that their popularity attracted recruits to the militia. However, a Toronto-based writer for the \textit{Canadian Military Gazette} rejected this argument with the observation that the type of man this activity brought in, the regiment was better off without. He complained that all these trips were marred by men getting too drunk to turn out for parade, and he recommended that the excursions be cancelled.\footnote{In some cases city regiments did not take advantage of opportunities to spend their holidays on the trips.} In the last three summers of training before the war when Hughes campaigned hard for city troops to go to camp the number of excursions did seem to decline.
With city corps acting as social clubs as well as military corps there was occasionally conflict between the two roles. After all when social committees determined future regimental activities the purely military hierarchy of authority was in danger of being subverted, especially in the militia whose members are essentially uniformed civilians. An example during this period which illustrates the point is the mass insubordination of members of the Governor-General's Foot Guards in 1905. The Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Roper, troubled by a shortage of officers, recommended without consulting his junior officers that the regiment be reorganized forming four companies from eight but with no reduction in the strength of the other ranks. When his officers learned of this step they contended that Roper had promised to discuss all regimental matters with the officers' committee before acting, and a number resigned in protest. Not to be outdone the NCOs and men decided to register their opposition to Lt. Col. Roper's recommendation by refusing to take part in a regular Friday night drill. When the matter came to the attention of Borden his concern was to defuse the situation, and he informed the officers that they would be allowed to withdraw their resignations. The military members of Militia Council were more concerned about the failure of officers to support their commander, but more pragmatic considerations won out and Lt. Col. Roper agreed to resign instead. If this had been a regular army regiment an episode of this kind would have been regarded far more seriously, but a city militia corps was a much different entity.
One reason that the city corps were so comfortably housed in their armouries was that the government put patronage over military considerations in erecting buildings. Borden believed that the greatest need in the militia was for small, inexpensive armouries for the rural corps. But the responsibility for construction of military buildings belonged to the Department of Public Works (DPW) which ignored Borden and built monuments to government largesse. As Borden put it:

A large building is to be constructed in a certain ambitious town, and influences of all kinds are brought to bear to induce the government and the minister to make a handsome and pretentious building; and very often I think twenty-five per cent, thirty and sometimes fifty per cent more money is expended on those buildings than needs to be expended having regards to the requirements of the militia. I would like to see cheaper buildings and more of them, it would answer the needs of the militia very much better. 192

Examples of DPW's patronage dispensing are not hard to find. In 1905, despite advice to the contrary from Borden, Militia Council and an inter-departmental committee of Public Works and militia officials, DPW began construction of $200,000 drill hall in Hamilton complete with bowling lanes and indoor baseball. 193 That same year, acting alone, the Department of Public Works decided to build an armoury in Woodstock, Ontario, large enough to accommodate an eight company city regiment. 194 Not only was this building begun without proper consultation with the militia department, but its construction brought about the demise of a rural battalion in the area that military authorities were anxious to save. 195 Then in 1909, DPW spent $227,000 on drill halls, most of the money going to the larger
buildings including the final expenditures for a luxurious armoury in Guelph, a town which did not even have a city corps. A partial solution to this problem was to have the Department of Militia and Defence assigned the sole responsibility to build small armoury sheds for the rural corps. Borden argued in cabinet for this course and by 1910 had succeeded at least in having DFW recognize the need for modest rural armouries. Finally, in 1911, the militia department was assigned the responsibility for all buildings costing up to $15,000 from an annual budget of $100,000. The potential effect of this change was not realized because a few months later the Liberal government was swept from power, but one wonders if the militia department could have remained pristine in its intention to spend only on small armouries. In the period when Borden so often deplored DFW’s squandering of funds on palatial buildings he had allowed his department to do the same thing. In 1905, Militia Council agreed to spend $15,000 towards a $25,000 armoury for the 5th Royal Scots of Montreal with the regiment paying the rest. Then caught in a trap of escalating costs, the department ended up paying $59,000 of a total of $100,000. Other Montreal regiments gained similar cost sharing arrangements. A new drill hall for the 65th Carabiniers was opened in 1910, at a cost of $50,000 to the department and $74,599.25 to the regiment. In 1908, Militia Council agreed to provide $30,000 for an armoury for the 1st Prince of Wales Own Fusiliers. When this new building was finally opened in 1914 for the re-organized regiment, now named the Canadian
Grenadier Guards, the militia department had produced $100,000 compared to $70,000 from private sources. 204

Despite the conflicts and patronage involved in drill halls' construction there was considerable advancement made in the area during the Liberal regime. A total of 48 armouries or drill halls were erected by the Department of Public Works between 1896 and 1911. Of that figure 44 were put up after the outbreak of the South African War with 32 of them being built between 1904 and 1914. 205 Most of these buildings were located to service rural battalions, but they did not meet the established need for large numbers of small company shelters. At the end of the Liberal regime General Otter commented that while most city corps were provided with drill halls almost all rural corps lacked suitable housing. 206

Sam Hughes brought to the new government a great enthusiasm for building military structures. To the dismay of the Minister of Finance 207 he doubled and redoubled the combined estimates for drill halls and armouries of the Public Works and Militia Departments until by 1913-14 the figure was $1,889,000. 208 Hughes was much more successful than Borden in assuming responsibility for drill hall construction for his department. During the three years before the outbreak of war the militia department put up fifty-seven drill halls and armouries while the Department of Public Works built ten. For the rural corps he built not the small company armouries his predecessor had planned but larger buildings which the agricultural communities could be proud of and which contained facilities for indoor drill. "The great thing in my mind, is
the hall for drilling in and not the offices for sitting and smoking in. The drill halls were not to be used exclusively by the militia but were to service cadet corps and boy scouts, and provide shelter for local groups sponsoring exhibitions or entertainments. Hughes encouraged local cost sharing by demanding that municipalities interested in acquiring a drill hall donate the building site; previously the Liberal administration had only suggested sites be locally provided. The Department of Public Works continued to handle the construction of drill halls in the cities including the impressive Winnipeg armoury which cost over one-half million dollars.

From Confederation to the outbreak of the First World War, the problem of encouraging French Canadians to participate in the militia was not well handled by the Canadian government. Given the example throughout most of the period of the British regulars in Canada, the Non-Permanent Active Militia took on the traditions and trappings of the British army. The French language had no official status within the militia, and communication, command and instruction were largely in English. Occasional attempts to make volunteer service more appealing to French Canadians through greater recognition of the French language or suggestions that uniforms of the Papal Zouave pattern be allowed brought few results. Even a proposal that French Canadian rural corps be allowed to adopt British khaki uniforms to set them apart from the coloured dress used by other battalions was turned down by Militia Council, yet when active service was required the government wanted at least symbolic representation from French Canada. Hence, French
Canadians participated in the Red River expedition, the suppression of the Northwest Rebellion, the Yukon Field Force, and the South African contingents.\textsuperscript{212}

French Canadians did not display the same amount of interest in militia service as their English speaking brethren. In 1904, French Canadian units consisted of 16 infantry battalions, 1 Field battery and 1 garrison regiment of artillery and an engineer company. Throughout Canada there were 85 battalions of infantry and 16 regiments of cavalry.\textsuperscript{213} Over the next ten years there was little change in the size of the French Canadian component of the NFAM. In terms of contribution to the main combatant arms, French Canada provided one less regiment of infantry and one more battery of field artillery, although there was a limited growth of support services. There was also one squadron of the Alberta Mounted Rifles which was made up entirely of French Canadians.\textsuperscript{214} In 1909, Frederick Borden estimated that of the 4,270 officers in the Active Militia (including the Permanent Force) only 570 were French-speaking.\textsuperscript{215}

Not only were there fewer militia corps in French Canada, but of those which did exist a significant proportion were in poor condition. In 1911, General Otter reported to Militia Council that there were 16 infantry battalions in the dominion so inefficient that disbandment was a distinct possibility. Of these 16, six were French-Canadian.\textsuperscript{216} Later in the year when the militia in eastern Canada was reorganized into divisions the Fifth Division was created with headquarters at Quebec City containing most of the French Canadian corps which had previously been grouped in Military District No. 7. This was done at the
recommendation of General Lake to preserve the sentiment attached to the collectivity and despite the fact that this division was far weaker and more badly balanced in arms than the others. In 1913, Militia Council agreed that the Fifth Division was practically moribund and was in fact a division "in name only."

French Canadian consciousness of defence responsibility and military tradition was in relation to service to Canada only. Sir E. P. Taché had epitomized the French Canadian attitude towards military responsibility in 1846, with his ringing declaration that "the last cannon which is shot on this continent in defence of Great Britain is fired by the hand of a French Canadian." Armand Lavergne, nationaliste and militia officer, articulated similar sentiments in the pre-war period. In the wake of the Dundonald incident he mocked the dismissed GOC's final warning to Canadians with the observation that if English Canadians were able to keep both hands on the Union Jack, they owed this to the French who saved the flag in 1776 and 1812. In 1910, Captain Lavergne dared to enter the den of military imperialists, the Canadian Military Institute in Toronto, to speak to its members on "National Defence as Viewed by French Canadians." Lavergne told his audience that French Canadians were as ready then as in 1776 and 1812 to perform their first duty of citizenship, the defence of British Canada:

Now if we look at the facts, our most possible enemy is the United States, and we have a frontier bordering hers of some 3,000 miles, all practically unprotected. Surely we should
exert our energies in the defence of this frontier before spending money on ships for the defence of Great Britain. 223

French Canadians would never agree with English Canadian militia officers that service was owed to Great Britain. In 1911, when General Mackenzie sent out to division commanders his secret mobilization plans for an overseas contingent, he received a reply from the O.C. of the Fifth Division that he could supply only one battalion to the overseas force instead of the two required, because of "local conditions and sentiment." 224 There were a few officers in the Permanent Force who carried on the tradition of service to the Empire of military families stretching back to the French regime, 225 but such men were the exception. French Canadian militia units in the pre-war period tended to commemorate victories like Chateauguay leaving the Paardeburg dinners to the English. So it was that in 1910, the 9th Voltigeurs regiment of Quebec City attended a solemn benediction Church service to honour the anniversary of the regiment's participation in the suppression of the Northwest Rebellion. 226

The marking of an important anniversary by attendance at a Church service was particularly appropriate because there was in French Canada a strong connection between the Church and the militia. A typical military mass is described below:

Prenons par exemple, la mess militaire que les Voltigeurs ont organisée, en 1888, à la chapelle des Soeurs de la Charité. Près des ministres et députées, le maire, les officiers d'état-major, etc. Tout le bataillon s'est rendu à la chapelle en défilé, la fanfare en tête; les officiers portent la grande tenue.

Les Voltigeurs ont soigneusement décoré la chapelle
au-dessus du maître autel resplendit la devise du
regiment et des drapeaux contournent les colonnes.
On a placé un peu partout des panoplies de
baionnettes et des faisceaux de carabines. C'est
l'aumônier du bataillon, servi par deux officiers,
qui chante la messe. Toute l'assistance répond
avec des accompagnements d'orgue, de fanfare
et de violons. Une garde d'honneur entoure
l'autel et présente les armes durant l'Evangile
et le Benedicamus; à l'élevation, c'est un
salut général avec une sonnerie de clairons
et un roulement de tambours à la communion,
le célébrant distribue du pain bénit. Les fruits
de la quête, faite par des jeunes filles escortées
d'officiers vont à l'orphelinat. Et selon une
ancienne coutume, le gâteau placé dans le chœur
sera distribué aux orphelins. À la fin, les
troupes retournent au Manège en parade. 227

Scenes like this could stir the martial blood of anyone, and
in Quebec the blessing of the Church on the militia was of
some consequence.

The ritual and rhetoric of a special relationship between
the Church and the militia remained prevalent in French Canada
in the pre-war decade. At a military mass in Quebec City
in 1908, the pastor of the Church preached a "short but force-
ful sermon... on the duties of a soldier to his Church and
country." 228 By custom the feast of Corpus Christi in June,
was the occasion for special celebration by the French
Canadian militia. When at camp in 1905, the 4th Chasseurs
Canadiens obtained permission for the regimental band to lead
the parish procession on Corpus Christi day in the nearby town
of Lévis. 229 The 65th Carabiniers of Montreal had a special
tradition dating back many years of parading fully armed in
the large Corpus Christi day parade in Montreal. This was against
regulations because side-arms were the correct weapons for a
Church parade, but Borden, like his predecessors, overlooked
the minor breach. What minister could object to the tradition which heightened the popularity of militia service in French Canada?

Sam Hughes, a member of the Orange order, was suspicious of too close a connection between the Catholic Church and the militia. While still in opposition, Hughes spoke in Parliament to the question of whether the militia in Quebec should be allowed to provide an escort for the Papal Legate. He contended that this would only cause religious strife in a country already divided on religion. After becoming minister Hughes was slow to move on this issue, but in the summer of 1914 he met the problem with full force. On 8 May 1914, L. P. Pelletier, the Postmaster-General, brought to the attention of the Prime Minister that Mgr. Begin, Archbishop of Quebec, would be returning to Canada from Rome on June 20, after his elevation to Cardinal. A group in Quebec city was planning a large reception for the new ecclesiastical prince of French Canada, and it was requesting participation by the government to include the provision of a mounted escort of militia and a military band. Robert Borden received advice on this matter from two members of Cabinet, Sir George Perley and Sam Hughes, both of whom were absolutely opposed to allowing a military escort. Hughes noted that when the Bishop of London visited Canada a few years previously no official notice was taken of him, and he could not see why anything should be done for Cardinal Begin:
It...would cause most serious disaffection throughout the country were any official recognition to be paid any churchman of any denomination...Such in brief is my view, and the view held by the vast majority of the people of Canada. He is an officer only of one church out of many in this country, and my doctrine regarding churches is, they should confine themselves each to his own sphere of action. 231

To strengthen his case Hughes enclosed a letter from H. C. King, the Secretary of Harmony Loyal Orange Lodge No. 1689 of Kenora, Ont. Mr. King recommended that all holders of public and judicial offices and members of the military be warned not to attend this reception in their official capacity on pain of losing their posts. As a final ominous note King reminded Borden that this same principle should apply to the upcoming Corpus Christi day celebrations. In the end the Prime Minister accorded limited recognition of the Begin reception, but ruled out a military escort. 232

The Corpus Christi celebration issue followed hard on the heels of the question of Begin's reception. On 28 May 1914, Cabinet approved a change in militia regulation dealing with attendance at church services. Previously regulations had stated simply that soldiers attending church services while on active service or at camp should wear side arms. Now it was specified that militia units attending any religious gathering were to wear side arms and were forbidden to carry rifles, or draw swords or bayonets. Hughes followed this up with a personal note to Col. J. T. Ostell, commander of the 65th Carabiniers, almost on the eve of the Corpus Christi day celebrations reminding him that side arms only
were to be allowed at religious services and that a violation of this rule would risk much dissension in Canada. This decision evoked great protest from the province of Quebec, but Hughes remained firm. La Presse noted in an editorial that the ancient and revered custom in French Canada of soldiers saluting with arms the Holy Sacrament must now come to an end due to the fanaticism of the Orangemen and Hughes. It is hard to escape the harsh judgment that Hughes acted on his prejudices to terminate the special relationship of mutual support between the militia and the Church in French Canada, a most unfortunate aim on the eve of war. The mentality of people supporting such a move was reflected by a Methodist minister from Eganville, Ont., and Deputy Grand Chaplain of the Orange Lodge, who wrote to congratulate Hughes on his success in banning rifles from Corpus Christi processions:

Our present government under the excellent leadership of our honoured premier, Sir R. L. Borden, I believe has the fullest confidence of every loyal protestant and orangeman in the Dominion of Canada, and I sincerely believe our great protestant heritage was never better protected than under our present government. May God preserve them from all conspirators and enemies of progress and prosperity.

This letter Hughes forwarded to the prime minister, and it is no credit to Borden that he preserved it for posterity.

The status of the French language in the militia did not advance much during this period. Frederick Borden showed concern about the problem, and he made some attempts to have drill instructors available for Quebec regiments who were competent in the French language and also bilingual staff officers for Military District No. 7. The department
published translations of regulations, orders and handbooks for the militia although often not until long after the English versions.

The few concessions given on the language question did not erase the difficulties encountered by a French-speaking Canadian who wished to serve in the militia. In 1909, a French Canadian officer submitted a simple requisition for military stores in French to the Quebec command headquarters, only to have the document altered by some officious staff officer who crossed out all the French words substituting English translations. The fact that simple French terms could not even be used in the most basic documents made a very bad impression on a French-speaking officer. A letter of complaint written in French by the Commanding Officer of the regiment was brought to the attention of Militia Headquarters in Ottawa in a translated version. The Deputy Minister, Col. E. Fiset, and the Adjutant-General, Col. Lessard, were both sympathetic, but they confirmed that English had to be used in this case as Equipment Regulations had not yet been translated into French. Then at Camp Levis a militia officer from a French Canadian regiment was found guilty of some misconduct and criticized by a superior officer causing the offender to tender his resignation. The former officer attempted to explain the incident to the camp commander, Brig. Gen. L. Buchan, who refused to hear him except in English. Local newspapers were incensed about this treatment.
Sam Hughes did not have much sympathy for French language rights, an attitude he displayed at the military conference of 1911, when Canon Dauth, a military enthusiast from Laval University, asked permission to address the gathering in his mother tongue. In introducing the cleric Sam said:

We have also with us a gentleman from the Province of Quebec, who, I regret to say, did not feel himself sufficiently versed in the English language to speak to us in that tongue. I would be delighted if the gentleman from Laval would address us even though it be in the French language.

And yet a correspondent for the Canadian Military Gazette was moved to wonder, not "in any spirit of fault finding", why no French Canadian militia officers spoke at the 1911 conference when their English Canadian counterparts were so vocal in discussions. But even in Hughes's time the militia department continued to produce French translations of handbooks and regulations, albeit still after long delays.

While French Canadian militiamen received little official support for their military traditions and sentiments, in English Canada strong ties were established between the NPAM and the British army. As R. A. Preston has pointed out in Canada and "Imperial Defense", Canadian politicians resisted formal commitments to imperial defence centralization substituting sentimental statements of solidarity in time of crisis. As early as 1900, the Governor-General, Lord Minto, predicted to the War Office that a guarantee of military assistance would never be obtained from Canada, and he suggested that a system of affiliating Canadian militia battalions with British
regular army regiments would achieve the same results. He said that if such links were established with possibly some occasional interchange of officers and men that even with no obligation to serve when war broke out the Canadian militia-men would flock eagerly to the ranks of the British regiments:

But people are so peculiar here that if there was anything resembling a military obligation for them to do so they would resent it. On the other hand they would be immensely flattered at seeing their battalions in the Army List as attached to distinguished line regiments. 244

Lord Dundonald supported Minto's concept of regimental affiliation, 245 and during his tenure as General Officer Commanding the practice was begun. In November 1903, the 48th Regiment (Highlanders) of Hamilton applied to the British government to become the sister regiment to the Gordon Highlanders of the British regular army, and consent was granted. This arrangement led to invitation being issued to the 48th by the Gordon Highlanders with War Office approval to send a small detachment of officers and men to England in the fall of 1908 to train with that regiment at the Aldershot manoeuvres. The War Office volunteered to pay the expenses of the detachment, and after gaining the consent of Militia Council 246 the visit took place as planned. 247 By 1909, three other Canadian regiments had applied and received permission to affiliate with British army regiments. 248

In 1909, the Colonial Defence Committee established guidelines for these regimental affiliations. Careful of colonial sensibilities about defence commitments, the CDC noted that it was not likely that "the connection created by
the establishment of alliances between regiments of the military forces of the self-governing Dominions and regiments of the Regular Army or Territorial Force of the United Kingdom can be much more than titular and sentimental. The Committee desired that future affiliations would take place between units of the same arm, preferably between regiments having some special bond as in ethnic tradition or war service, and should lay the basis for exchanges of officers and men for training purposes. In general this memorandum just confirmed existing practices, and for the most part they were observed in connections made over the next few years. Between 1910 and 1914, 22 NPAM regiments and one PF corps became affiliated with units in the United Kingdom. Some of the regiments strengthened their British connections by securing the appointment of members of the Royal Family, former governors-general or British military leaders to posts of honourary colonels of the units.

The affiliation of Canadian NPAM and regular British army regiments held only sentimental significance, and links between the part-time forces achieved no more. With the formation of a part-time volunteer regiment in England in 1902, called the King's Colonial Imperial Yeomanry, came attempts to bind more closely the militia forces of the colonies and the mother country. The regiment's commander and its Honourary Colonel, the Prince of Wales, aimed at links of training which would further imperial military co-operation. Canada agreed to affiliation between the regiment and a NPAM unit in New Brunswick, but there were no exchanges of personnel as the British had hoped. Borden termed it a paper agreement.
saying that anything more was impossible because the Militia Act limited service to Canada except by special arrangement as in the South African War. 253

Besides the legal difficulty, emerging Canadian nationalism made aiming at more than sentimental attachment unrealistic. Illustrative of this is the case of the Grenadier Guards. In 1912, the Prince of Wales' Fusiliers of Montreal in a state of disarray was to be reorganized with the name and uniform of the prestigious Grenadier Guards of Great Britain. Hughes acted without the authorization of the King which was needed when taking the name of a regiment of his Household Brigade. The Governor-General, the Duke of Connaught, was duly wrathful at Hughes's presumption, 254 but faced with an irretrievable situation he recommended to the Colonial Office that the new name, The First Regiment, Grenadier Guards of Canada, be sanctioned. 255 Unfortunately the King refused to designate the regiment as "Guards" because the title implied a special responsibility for the protection of his person and authorized instead "The Royal Grenadiers of Canada". 256 Connaught faced a dilemma. In his estimate to revoke the "Guards" designation now, after the regiment had been recruited and its name published, would not only detrimentally affect the corps, but would be viewed with disfavour by Canadians generally. He could only resubmit the matter to the King with a weak pretence of compromise proposing that the name be altered slightly to "The First Regiment Canadian Grenadier Guards". 257 His Majesty was left little alternative but to agree. 258 It seems that for the colony ebullient with national pride the King's
favour was too important to be left to the whim of the monarch.

Essentially the Non-Permanent Active Militia was the same from Confederation to the First World War. Each year volunteers gathered at urban drill halls and rural camps for a few days of drill and military exercises. Organized primarily on paper such a force was hardly an adequate response to a perceived need for a defence of Canada. Nevertheless, some accidental but important improvements were made to the NPAM in the immediate pre-war period.

Spurred by a sense of responsibility of an autonomous nation, the government sought to create of the NPAM the framework for a self-sufficient citizens' army. The force was expanded across the country in all arms, and support services created and fostered. Many more men were put into training which was made more practical and more efficient. Divisional organization was instituted to prepare for the mobilization of a field army in case of invasion. By 1914, the NPAM was much better prepared as a base to build towards the ideal of a citizens' army.

Yet significant weaknesses remained. There was still a high turnover of men at training each year minimizing the effect of practical instruction. With officers more interested in social distinction than military efficiency, qualified leadership was lacking. French Canadians felt alienated from the service by lack of recognition of their language and cultural traditions. The field army was a paper organization lacking full complement in all arms except infantry. In sum,
the NPAM was insufficiently prepared to defend the country from the aggression of a large well-trained military force. General Lake's assessment of the non-permanent militia in 1909 stands true for the entire period:

All that can be safely said is that during the past season, the Force in general has made appreciable progress towards efficiency and readiness for the field. That it is not at present really efficient or ready for war is a mere truism. It is quite impossible for any force with only 12 days training in the year to be either efficient or ready to take the field.

This is not surprising because the NPAM was not principally a war machine to its members but a social organization. Officers joined the force for the social distinction and men for the social diversion. The camps and armouries provided men with sports and entertainment as well as wages. In public appearances the volunteers received the admiration of civilians in a period when military service was a cause for pride.
Endnotes - Chapter 5


2 Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, pp. 262-5.


4 See Chapter 2, pp. 79-82.

5 Figures used are from RG 24, V. 1853, file 48, and are generally confirmed by other reliable sources.


7 QML, January 1904, pp. 4-9.

8 DND Historical Section, The Defence Forces..., p. 24.

9 PAC, Mobilization Tables, Canadian Field Army, RG 24, V. 1855, file 70.

10 QML, September 1914, pp. 11-32.

11 Minutes, 14 March 1905, p. 3.

12 The only exception were units temporarily organized to put down the Northwest Rebellion and disbanded afterwards.

13 PAC, Notes on the History of MD #13, RG 24, V. 1884, AHS-49.

14 QMLs, 1904 to 1914.

15 PAC, Mobilization Tables, Canadian Field Army, 1913, RG 24, V. 1855, file 70.


18 DMD Annual Report, 1905, p. 49.

19 Minutes, 14 August 1906, p. 9.

20 DMD Annual Report, 1912-13, p. 89.

21 Ibid., 1906, p. 40.

22 CMG, 29 May 1906, p. 5.

23 DMD Annual Report, 1911-12, p. 88.
Debates, 4 December 1907, p. 191. By 1907, 450 of these shooting galley machines had been purchased for $112,349.50 from the Ontario Sub-target Gun Company founded in 1904 by a financial promoter, J.H. Jewell. The company was investigated by the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee in 1907-08 to determine whether there was any conflict of interest involved in militia department purchases from the firm. It turned out that some close friends and business associates of Frederick Borden held stock in the firm, sometimes without paying for it. Named as stockholders were: C.L. Panet, Borden's private secretary; F.O. Lewis, H.M. Pellatt and J.M. Woods, business connections; and H.H. Wickwire, a political crony from Kentville, N.S. Borden himself was tied to several members of this group when evidence was produced that J.H. Jewell had served them a writ for a repayment of a $9000 loan. Appearing before the committee, Panet could not recall the circumstances of the writ. Borden testified that the loan had nothing to do with the Ontario Sub-target Gun Co., and he did not know whatever became of legal proceedings with regard to the writ. No wrongdoing was ever proven with regard to these transactions.

Journal of the House of Commons, Canada, Appendices, V. 42, 1906-07 and V. 43, 1907-08.

25 DMD Annual Report, 1907-08, p. 4.
26 Minutes, 15 November 1911, p. 6.
28 Ibid., 1908-09, pp. 69-71. See this chapter, pp. 223-26.
29 Ibid., 1912-13, p. 103.
30 MO 208, 12 September 1902. 17 September.
31 DMD Annual Report, 1907-08, p. 60.
32 Ibid., 1908-09, p. 67.
33 Debates, 19 March 1912, pp. 5484-7.
35 QMLs, 1911 to 1914.
37 Ibid., 1912-13, p. 103.
40 DND Historical Section, The Defence Forces..., pp. 14 and 24.

41 Minutes, 14 February 1905, pp. 3-6; and MGO 124, June 1905; and QML, 1905.

42 Nicholson; The Gunners of Canada, V.1, pp. 179-81.

43 Ibid., pp. 181-2.


45 CMG, 12 March 1907, p. 10.


47 Canadian Artillery Association Annual Report, 1905; p. 63.

48 PAC, RG 24, V. 1855, file 70.

49 QMLs, 1904 to 1910.

50 DMD Annual Report, 1908-09, pp. 61 and 69.

51 See Chapter 4, pp. 135-136.

52 MGO 38, 1 April 1910.

53 QML, September 1914; and Kerry and McDill, The History of... Royal Canadian Engineers, p. 49.


55 Ibid., 1913-14, pp. 11-12.


57 MGO 58, 1907.

58 DMD Annual Report, 1913-14, p. 15.

59 PAC, RG 24, V. 1853, file 46, pp. 1-5.

60 Warren, Wait for the Waggon, pp. 30-8.

61 Warren lists only eighteen organized CASC companies in the pre-war period, but, in fact, a nineteenth was organized in Regina in 1913. The numbers are confusing because there was no No. 13 Company, CASC.

62 QML, September 1914.

64 CMG, 17 February 1903, p. 12.
66 CMG, 9 April 1907, pp. 5-6.
67 DMD Annual Report, 1908-09, p. 71.
69 MGO 62, June 1899.
70 CMG, 9 August 1904, p. 22.
71 MGO 98, July 1904.
72 DMD Annual Report, 1906, p. 44.
73 QML, September, 1914.
75 Minutes, 18 March 1909, p. 8.
76 DMD Annual Report, 1911-12, p. 103.
77 Ibid., 1908-09, p. 39.
78 MGO 61, 1 April 1903.
79 DMD Annual Report, 1905, p. 43.
80 MGO 43, April 1911.
81 MGO 55, April 1913.
82 DMD Annual Report, 1912-13, p. 87.
83 QML, September 1914.
84 Montreal Herald, 4 September 1902.
85 PAC, Ponton to Editor of CMG, 13 September 1902, Ponton Papers, MG 30, E 5, V. 14.
86 Debates, 27 May 1913, pp. 11061-2.
88 Ibid., p. 909.
In examining the militia as a social organization the major distinction is between rural corps of infantry who attended summer camp and city corps of infantry who generally trained at local headquarters. Units from other arms whether raised in rural or urban areas usually attended summer camps, but sometimes trained at their local headquarters. Many factors determined where units of these arms trained each year, such as the size of the militia budget, the training programme devised and the organizational state of each corps. So, while remarks concerning the social circumstances of camp life and the attractions of urban armouries are applied to the infantry particularly, they can be postulated for units from other arms.

OML, September 1914.

MGO 136, June 1905.

PAC, RG 24, V. 1853, file 48.

CMG, 11 April 1905, p. 6.

Minutes, 27 February 1906, p. 4.

Debates, 4 May 1906, pp. 2625-6.


CMG, 26 June 1906, p. 6.

MO 40, 18 February 1907; MO 77, 4 April 1907; and MO 48, 27 February 1908.

PAC, Lake to Aston, 20 October 1908, MG 11, CO 42, V. 929, B 2248, p. 69.


Debates, 30 May 1904, pp. 3755-57.

Bliss, A Canadian Millionaire, p. 3.

CMG, 12 July 1904, p. 9.

CMG, 13 July 1909, p. 5.

CMG, 25 April 1911, p. 5.

DMD Annual Report, 1910-11, pp. 84-5.

Debates, 14 March 1912, pp. 5533-5.

Debates, 19 March 1912, pp. 5452-64.

DMD Annual Report, 1912-13, p. 3.
Militia Council approved the following hymns for the services:

"(a) All people that on earth do dwell.
(b) O God our help in ages past.
(c) Fight the good fight with all thy might.
(d) Onward Christian Soldiers.
(e) The Son of God goes forth to war."

Minutes, 25 November 1905, p. 4.
131 Ibid., 1905, pp. 10-11.

132 Hughes's speech to the Canadian Artillery Association, CAA Annual Report, 1913, pp. 71-2.


134 MGO 136, June 1905; and, OML, September 1914.

135 PAC, RG 24, V. 1853, file 48.

136 Minutes, 1 September 1908, pp. 3-4.

137 DMD Annual Report, 1908-09, pp. 69-71.


139 MGO 15, February 1909, amended by MGO 57, May 1909.


141 DMD Annual Report, 1908-09, p. 70.

142 Minutes, 24 January 1912, p. 3.

143 CMG, 23 January 1912, p. 5.

144 CMG, 22 June 1909, p. 8.

145 Hughes's 1913 speech to CAA, p. 106.

146 CMG, 11 and 25 June, 1912.

147 PAC, RG 24, V. 1853, file 48.

148 Minutes, 16 December 1913, p. 4.

149 CMG, 28 September 1909, p. 9.


151 CMG, 23 February 1909, p. 10.


153 Many references in FB Papers at the PANS to financial association of Borden and H.M. Pellatt. See for example, C. Panet to Sir A. Caron, 27 December 1906, MG 2, V. 214.


156 Minutes, 28 June 1907, p. 11.
157 Minutes, 25 October 1907, p. 17 and 11 May 1909, p. 5; and CMG, 22 October 1907, p. 11.
158 Barnard, The Queen's Own Rifles, pp. 81-3.
159 Ibid., pp. 87-8.
160 Ibid., pp. 89-91.
162 Minutes, 26 October 1909, p. 6.
164 CMG, 8 February 1910, p. 11.
165 P.P. Hutchison, Canada's Black Watch, 1862-1962, Montreal, 1962, p. 50.
166 Ibid., pp. 43-54.
169 CMG, 11 October 1910, p. 16.
170 PANS, Borden to J.W. Woods, 8 February 1908, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 164, p. 11997/FI.
172 CMG, 12 January 1909.
173 PANS, Borden to R.F. Sutherland, 8 August 1904, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 111.
174 Minutes, 23 October 1907, pp. 9-10.
175 PAC, Intelligence Diaries for Canadian Militia, August 1912, MG 11, CO 42, V. 960, B 2882, pp. 295-6.
178 CMG, 27 December 1908, p. 11.
179 CMG, 14 September 1909, p. 12.
180 CMG, 12 February 1907, p. 10.
181 CMG, 23 May 1911, pp. 10-11.
182 Debates, 27 May 1913, p. 11070.
183 Debates, 1 June 1914, p. 4624.
184 CMG, 23 May 1911, p. 7.
185 Minutes, 11 April 1905, pp. 3-4.
186 CMG, 8 May 1906, p. 12.
188 CMG, 26 June 1906, p. 10, and 10 July 1906, p. 5.
189 CMG, 23 May 1905, p. 6.
190 Minutes: 23 May 1905, p. 3; 7 June 1905, pp. 6-7; and 13 February 1906, p. 7.
191 Debates: 27 March 1908, p. 5740; and, May 1908, pp. 7685-6.
192 Debates, (unrevised), 3 April 1907, p. 5864.
193 Minutes, 7 March 1905, p. 7.
194 Minutes, 25 July 1905, p. 5.
195 Minutes: 1 April 1905, pp. 4-5; 27 April 1905, p. 3; 16 November 1905, p. 15.
196 PAC, Hughes to R. Borden, 1914, R. Borden Papers, MG 26H, RLB series, C 309, file 414.
197 CMG, 9 May 1911, p. 13.
198 Minutes, 22 December 1909, pp. 4-5.
199 Debates, 9 December 1910, pp. 1021 and 1029.
200 Minutes, 11 April 1905, p. 5.
201 Hutchison, Canada's Black Watch, pp. 40-53.
203 Minutes, 30 January 1908, p. 7.
These figures compiled from the Annual Reports of the Department of Public Works, 1903 to 1914, and from PAC, RG 24, V. 6569, HQ 1148-1, V. 1.

DMD Annual Report, 1911-12, p. 106.

PAC, White to R. Borden, 5 January 1914, R. Borden Papers, RLB series, C 309, file 414.

Ibid., Hughes to R. Borden, 1914, file 414.

Debates, 1 June 1914, p. 4615.

Debates, 24 January 1912, p. 1816.

Minutes, 28 December 1905, p. 3.


QML, September 1914; and Minutes, 15 March 1910, p. 4.

PANS, Borden to Deputy Minister, 13 March 1909, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 125.

Minutes, 21 February 1911, p. 9.


QML, September 1914.

Minutes, 4 February 1913, p. 4.


Debates, 1 August 1904, p. 8095.


Ibid., p. 100.

PAC, OC Fifth Division to Secretary, Militia Council, 9 October 1911, RG 24, V. 4521, S 1016.

B. Sulte, Historie de la Milice Canadienne-Francaise, 1760-1897, Montreal, 1897.

CMG, 26 April 1910, p. 10.

J.Y. Gravel, L'Armée an Québec, un portrait social (1768-1900), Montreal, 1974, pp. 103-4.
CMG, 9 June 1908, p. 10.

CMG, 8 August 1905, p. 17.

PAC, T. Chase Casgrain to R. Borden, 4 June 1914, R. Borden Papers, MG 26H, OC series, C 252, file 190.

Ibid., Hughes to R. Borden, OCA series, C 296, file 155A.

Ibid., various letters.

Ibid., various letters, OC series, C 252, file 190.

La Presse, 8 June 1914, p. 8.

PAC, John Puttenham to Hughes, R. Borden Papers, MG 26H, OC series, C 252, file 190.

Minutes, 30 May 1905, p. 4.

DMD Annual Reports, 1904 to 1914.


PAC, RG 24, V. 5882, HQ 7-91-15.


CMG, 12 December 1911, p. 9.

PAC, MG 11, CO 42, V. 959, B 2881, pp. 213 and 216.

PAC, Minto to St. John Broderick, 19 November 1900, GG Records, RG 7, G 21, file 399, V. II, 1904-06.

Dundonald, My Army Life, p. 216-19.

Minutes, 24 June 1905, p. 7.

CMG, 8 September 1908, p. 9.


Ibid.

Ibid., No French Canadian regiments affiliated with British units.
251 QML, September 1911.
252 Minutes, 8 January 1907, p. 3.
253 PANS, Borden to W.S. Fielding, 10 August 1908, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 124, pp. 440-1.
256 Ibid., B 2955, pp. 94-5.
257 Ibid., 971, B 2950, pp. 141-2.
258 Ibid., V. 986, B 3101, p. 6.
259 DMD Annual Report, 1908-09, p. 77.
CHAPTER VI - ARMS, OUTFITS AND PATRONAGE

Maintaining a military force in peacetime and preparing it for eventual war involves more than plans, organization and training. Needed also are arms, uniforms and equipment for men in the permanently embodied units and those training part-time, as well as reserve stocks to support expansion of the service in war. The Canadian government recognized this responsibility more clearly in the decade before the First World War and spent more money to fulfill it. The evidence suggests that in doing so both the Liberals and Conservatives took partisan opportunity to dispense patronage.

Before the turn of the century the government paid insufficient attention to the material resources needed for the Canadian militia's capability to wage war. Although annual expenditures on the militia more than tripled from under $1,000,000 in 1867, to about $3,600,000 in 1903, this was not enough to keep the militia properly armed, clothed and equipped. The artillery grew obsolete. Modern rifles were too few, and there were no facilities in Canada to manufacture additional stocks. The Dominion Arsenal, a government installation started in 1882, produced ammunition but not enough to supply the militia. Threadbare clothing became the norm for rural corps while the pretentious costumes of the wealthier city corps mocked the concept of uniformity of dress. Little attention was paid to provision of transport adequate for war service. The result was that in military emergencies, such as the Northwest Rebellion and the South African War, the government was
required to scramble to obtain supplies (sometimes unsuitable) from any available source. In 1895, when war between Great Britain and the United States seemed likely over Venezuela, the government hastily dispatched an officer to England to buy rifles and artillery for the ill-armed militia.²

It was evident to both parties that this kind of response to a military emergency was inadequate. Borden had planned since becoming minister to update militia matériel, and after the South African War he was able to begin a sensible purchasing programme. His first concern was that the soldiers would have sufficient modern weapons to defend the country and gave priority to obtaining rifles and artillery. Spending on clothing and equipment stocks were significantly increased although with less urgency on the theory that much of this could be improvised in an emergency. When Hughes took over the ministry, he maintained the direction and momentum of the programme. In 1903, the militia department expended about $3,600,000, while in 1913, it spent about the same just on arms, clothes and equipment from a total of over $12,000,000.³

An important aspect of Borden's plan to outfit the defence forces properly was his aim to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of military supplies for Canada. He believed that Canada must be able to carry on a defensive war alone against any invader should the sea link with Great Britain be broken.⁴ Borden had already learned from his experience in the South African War when a British firm refused to sell rifles to Canada because the War Office had priority in supply. The result was the founding of the Ross Rifle Company in Quebec.⁵ All of
the artillery and much of the explosives came from Great Britain because Canada lacked a manufacturing capability in such areas. To rectify this the minister encouraged British concerns to locate branch plants in Canada to supply ordnance and to supplement the production of the Dominion Arsenal. Borden succeeded in convincing only one British firm to open a subsidiary in Canada. 6 The government procured most of the clothing and equipment used by the militia in Canada, 7 and this practice was adhered to even when some stores cost up to 40% more than in England. 8 Very little military supplies of any kind were bought in the United States.

Closely connected to the "Buy Canadian" policy was the political patronage system. 9 It was generally understood that the party forming the government would show preference to their supporters in granting contracts where goods and services were offered at fair market prices. 10 But the militia department under both the Liberals and Conservatives employed methods of granting contracts which subverted normal market forces. Patronage lists of political supporters were maintained from which contractors were invited to submit tenders or simply offered contracts at a stated rate of recompense. 11 Also once a contract was signed with a "friend," its scope and duration could be extended by the department as long as the prices remained the same. There were many multi-year contracts signed during this period which reaped large rewards for the firms involved. Both parties subscribed to the system on the grounds that such arrangements encouraged manufacturers to tool for production of military goods. 12 But it must be suspected that
in these arrangements there was a coincidence of economic encouragement and political expediency.

Considerable advances were made towards providing the militia with modern matériel but not in sufficient quantity nor quality to provide for the rapid expansion of the force in war. New weapons were provided to the Permanent Force and the Non-Permanent Active Militia, but the rifles proved unsuitable for service conditions. Purchase of uniforms and equipment were accelerated, but reserve stocks were being established too slowly. Only limited success was achieved with attempts to increase shell and cartridge production in Canada. In provision of horses and transport, the measures taken were wholly inadequate. Thus, when world war broke out, Canada was still ill-prepared to field a force properly armed, clothed and equipped. 13

Although the Canadian artillery corps had been rearmed in the 1890s, new ordnance was again required by the turn of the century. The principal weapon of the field artillery before the South African War was the 12 pounder breech-loading gun. Used in South Africa, this piece was found to be not highly satisfactory, lacking range, speed of operation and weight of shot. By 1903, Borden had decided that not only the field guns but the garrison artillery were inadequate and should be entirely replaced. 14

It was a happy coincidence for the Canadian militia that in 1903, when Frederick Borden made his decision to rearm the Canadian artillery, the British arms industry had just developed two new guns. The failure of any one armament concern in Britain to develop a quick-firing (QF) artillery piece equal to.
new guns being produced in France and Germany, had caused the British government to take a hand in the situation. Under the aegis of the War Office Equipment Committee, the arms manufacturers came together to co-operate in the design of a QF 13-pounder gun for the horse artillery and a QF 18-pounder for the field artillery. These new weapons proved their value at trials held in 1903, and both were adopted by the British government. The 18-pounder came to be the standard field piece used by British and Canadian forces in the First World War and earned an excellent reputation. 15

Between 1903 and 1912, the Department of Militia and Defence placed orders for artillery with Vickers-Maxim Limited of Great Britain which totalled about $4,000,000. The greatest part of the contracts was for 18-pounder field guns numbering 136. Also purchased were: twenty-four 13-pounder horse artillery pieces; twenty-four 4.5-inch howitzers (on General French's suggestion that these would be particularly useful in defending the heavily wooded Eastern Canada) 16 and some heavy and coast defence guns. All of this ordnance was delivered to Canada by the outbreak of war. 17

This acquisition of arms was not only a great advantage to the Canadian artillery, but also helped the British army in the First World War. Before the war all permanent and non-permanent militia artillery units were re-armed with modern weapons. This was still a far cry from what the generals thought was necessary to support a field army in case of invasion, for example, a 1908 report considered that three hundred and twelve 18-pounder guns were necessary for this purpose. 18 However, when
the First World War broke out the first contingent set sail from Quebec with its artillery component fully armed and equipped and carrying an extra 42 field guns to turn over to the British forces for their use. At the time of the declaration of war, Canada had two other contracts outstanding with Vickers-Maxim for about $1,000,000 in ordnance not yet delivered. To help the common cause, Canada acceded to a British request that as it became available it be sent directly to the British army.

In all, Canada ordered about $5,000,000 worth of artillery in the decade before the First World War, all from Vickers-Maxim Ltd. of England. In explaining why the government dealt exclusively with Vickers-Maxim, Borden stated that he and his officers were entirely satisfied with the arms provided. There was also the hope that steady business would entice Vickers to open a Canadian factory. These explanations are perfectly acceptable, but some circumstances surrounding the contracts create suspicion of patronage. Vickers-Maxim's agent in Canada who negotiated the contracts with the militia department was F. O. Lewis, a banker and hardware merchant from Montreal. Lewis was not only a friend of Borden, but was involved in his business affairs including his cold storage company and a mining syndicate.

The awarding of a $1,000,000 contract to Vickers-Maxim in 1912, had some particularly strange circumstances. When Sam Hughes took office in 1911, he attempted to open a planned artillery purchase to competitive tenders. Informed of developments by Lewis, Borden visited Hughes and persuaded him that while no contract had been signed a moral commitment
had been made to Vickers for this order. On the strength of this advice, Hughes allowed the order to go to Vickers though his departmental officials knew nothing of such a commitment.

Despite Borden's "Buy Canadian" policy, very little money was spent on artillery in Canada, apparently because there were no foundries with the facilities and expertise to produce the gun pieces. One firm, however, did make gun carriages and limbers for the ordnance brought from Great Britain. The Ottawa Car Company operated on multi-year contracts from the militia department producing a variety of vehicular equipment. These contracts were among the largest granted by the department amounting to over $100,000 annually on several occasions between 1904 and 1914. Borden explained that this company benefited from the department's continuing patronage because it had incurred expenses installing machinery to produce for the military. However, Borden once described Thomas Ahearn the president of the company as enjoying "the distinction of being a personal friend of Sir Wilfrid Laurier as well as myself and other members of the cabinet." Despite such highly placed Liberal connections, the Ottawa Car Company continued to receive militia business after 1911, probably because they did good work.

The Ross rifle has been described as one of the "most unfortunate expressions" of the movement in Canada towards military autonomy which occurred during the Laurier administration. Such a judgment might be considered too mild considering the grave failure of this rifle to perform adequately on the battlefields of France. But hindsight can distort perceptions, and it is important to understand the circumstances under which the
Ross became Canada's military rifle. Borden was aware since before the Boer War that a great weakness in Canada's defence capability was the lack of a secure supply of rifles.\textsuperscript{34} He had attempted without success to arrange for an English concern, Birmingham Small Arms, to open a factory in Canada to produce the Lee-Enfield rifle.\textsuperscript{35} Then, in 1901, came an offer from a Scottish lord and industrialist to manufacture a new military rifle in Canada.

Sir Charles Ross, the ninth Baronet of Balnagoun, was a man with considerable inherited wealth augmented by the fruits of his own good investments, and he could afford to indulge his two interests of sport hunting and inventing. Combining the two in 1897, Ross patented a sport rifle and set up a factory in Hartford, Connecticut, to produce the arm. This rifle had a trial as a military arm when Sir Charles took it with him on service in South Africa. After the war, Ross learned that Canada was seeking a secure source of military rifles, and he proposed to Borden that he convert his rifle for military usage and supply the militia from a Canadian factory.\textsuperscript{36} Borden was impressed by the offer, and he set up a board of officers headed by Col. W. D. Otter to investigate the weapon.

The Ross rifle was pitted against the Lee-Enfield in trials before the officers' committee held at Quebec City in August 1901, and the results are controversial. Twelve tests were conducted with the rifles faring equally well in ten of them, but when the Ross was tried for endurance and for capacity to withstand an excessive charge, it failed badly. Ross explained
away these faults as due to the type of cartridge used. In general the committee reported favourably; any minor flaws in the rifle could be ironed out later if it was adopted as the Canadian service arm.  

In his biography of General Otter, Desmond Morton speculated that as most of the committee members were amateur riflemen they approved the Ross rifle because it was an excellent target rifle. But Morton was puzzled by Otter's endorsement, feeling that as an experienced soldier he should have had better judgment. He concluded that the man destined to be the first Canadian general must have bowed to political expediency on this occasion and lived to rue the decision. This seems too hard a verdict. Another interpretation is that the committee members, including Otter, were aware that the Ross was an imperfect weapon, but considered that defects could be eliminated as the rifle went through a developmental phase in production and that a secure source of rifles was of paramount importance. This rationale infused the attitude of adherents towards the Ross later as more problems were encountered and may very well explain the committee's initial enthusiasm. Moreover, the rifle's potential as a sharpshooter's weapon must have made it seem ideal to a military establishment conditioned by the Boer War and preparing for the eventualty of war against the United States.  

Over the next several years, Otter continued to be involved in the process of improving the rifle without displaying any underlying want of confidence in the Ross. In fact, in 1906, when the officers' committee was reconvened under Otter to examine the Ross Mark II, it reported to Militia
Council "no hesitation in saying that the changes which have been made in the Mark I and embodied in the Mark II rifle are decided improvements and finds that this rifle is an excellent arm." Disillusionment with the Ross undoubtedly came to Otter later, but there is no indication that he was prescient enough to know in 1901 that the rifle must fail.

In March 1902, the Canadian government entered into a contract with Sir Charles Ross which made him the exclusive supplier of rifles to the militia department. The agreement was entered into without the prior knowledge of the General Officer Commanding the militia and the War Office, and both soon voiced disapproval. The former, General O'Grady-Haly, considered it a precipitous step to replace the Lee-Enfield with a weapon which demonstrated weaknesses which could prove serious. The War Office had refused even to look at the Ross in October 1901, but when news of the Canadian contract reached England, the British army musketry school at Hythe conducted hurried tests of a carbine version of the Ross rifle and declared it unsatisfactory. Soon thereafter, the British government communicated its displeasure to the Canadians that the ideal of a uniform pattern of arms for the empire had been violated.

M. Ommanneny of the Colonial Office clearly expressed the chagrin of the British when he noted on the correspondence file "It is a pity that they have chosen this particular way of showing their independence...The rifle is not only not of interchangeable parts with ours but is reported by Hythe to be distinctly inferior." Nevertheless Borden defended the Ross rifle at the 1902 Conference as a superior arm to the Lee-
Enfield and was ever alert in the future to stress the importance of local manufacture of arms.

Sir Charles Ross set up a factory at Quebec on the Plains of Abraham in 1903, and began manufacture of his rifle. Almost from the beginning the militia department was unhappy with the lack of speed and the poor standards of production at the Quebec plant. Ross himself proved to be a difficult man with whom to deal. He tried to deny access to his factory to department inspectors on grounds that he needed to protect the secrecy of his patent. Then, in 1904, Ross made a concerted effort to promote a new contract with the Royal North-West Mounted Police, despite repeated instructions from Borden that the supply of rifles to other government agencies would be done through his department. Clearly exasperated, the minister warned Ross again, on 16 May 1904, to cease casting about for new government business. "In view of the very great need of this country at the present point, and prospectively, in the matter of rifles do you not think it would be better to devote yourself exclusively to the carrying out of the terms of your contract with this Department." The enterprising Ross then came up with a proposal that he might arrange for the manufacture of artillery in Canada and once again was warned by Borden to stick to his business of making rifles. Not until the summer of 1905 were any of the Ross rifles ready for delivery, and Col. W. H. Cotton, the Master General of Ordnance, went to Quebec to inspect them. To his disappointment he found that rifles presented to him as final products were not properly finished and refused to fire on occasion. Borden was distressed
by this news and considered that the government might have
to take over the factory. 48

Deliveries of the Ross rifles to the government began in
1905, and first distribution was made to the RNWMP and the
Department of Marine and Fisheries. Rectifying evident defects
in the arm meant that the rifles were already identified as
Mark I and Mark II, and still more problems became evident.
Militia Council delayed issuing the new rifles to the militia
until 1906, hoping to perfect the weapon. 49 Then, usage in
training soon showed that the rifle was not yet up to service
standards. At a 14 July meeting of Militia Council, a greatly
alarmed General Lake reported that he had just returned from a
tour of the Maritime provinces where he had heard many complaints
about the Ross rifle. Militia officers were able to show him
a great many defects in the rifles issued to their units, and
at Sussex camp several serious accidents had occurred. Col.
W. H. Cotton related that he had received a report of similar
happenings in Ontario. 50 Militia Council decided to suspend
acceptance of further shipments until a more effective form
of inspection could be established. 51 The suspension of
deliveries lasted one month, until the rifle company agreed
to allow department inspectors free access to the factory. 52

The poor performance of the first rifles issued soon had
political repercussions for the government. Early in 1907,
the Conservatives, led by Lt. Col. A. N. Worthington, opened up
a vigorous campaign against the Ross rifle which was to continue
in the House of Commons for the next three years. Worthington,
Conservative M.P. for Sherbrooke, was a doctor and Principal Medical Officer of the Quebec Command. During his military career he had commanded a NPAM regiment and had served with the artillery in South Africa. Thoroughly familiar with things military and well supplied with confidential information from an unknown source on the defects of the Ross rifle, Worthington made things very uncomfortable for Borden.

The Conservatives emphasized that the Ross rifle had proven itself technically inferior to the Lee-Enfield and yet was purchased by the government at much greater cost. Worthington claimed that the rifle was undependable in the field. The bolt mechanism was faulty, having a tendency to fall out when carried in service conditions, and in one serious incident a piece of a bolt assembly blew back in the face of a RNWMP sergeant, blinding him in one eye. The breech of the rifle burst occasionally when fired, and in one case the death of a militiaman was the result. The rifle was reported to jam frequently when it was overheated and so was useless when rapid fire was required. The list of minor defects was seemingly endless, as were the stories of accidents and near accidents which were claimed to have occurred in militia training camps. Worthington also criticized the Ross contract as "one of the most ridiculous and unbusinesslike contracts ever entered into by any businesslike government and a totally one-sided affair." Not only was Charles Ross given special advantages like a 99-year lease on the site of his plant for $1 and the right to import material and machinery without paying duty, but he had a guaranteed market for his product, advance
payments and no penalties for failing to meet delivery schedules. In contradiction to the argument that correctable defects and favourable contracts were justifiable to make Canada self-sufficient in rifle production, Worthington revealed that important parts were being imported from the United States because they were not available in Canada. 56

Borden responded to the criticism of the rifle by minimizing the difficulties experienced and emphasizing the value of the new national arm. The basic defence used was that the Ross was sound in structure and design and that while some defects were to be expected in any new rifle, they would be eliminated promptly. 57 A great deal of technical information was presented to explain why the Ross was superior to the Lee-Enfield and other service rifles, which accounted for its higher cost. Reports of accidents were challenged as exaggerated, 58 and statistics were compiled to show that the Ross had no greater failure rate than other rifles. 59 Borden maintained that it was important for Canada to end her dependency on Great Britain for arms and ammunition, even if it meant that temporarily some minor parts must be imported from the United States. Self-sufficiency in arms production was in sight, but progress was made one step at a time. 60 The minister dismissed the charge that the government had given Ross a highly advantageous contract by submitting figures which showed that Ross's own capital covered all the overhead and part of the production costs. In the seventh year of the contract, Ross had yet to make a penny in profit, and, in fact, his debits ran to hundreds of thousands of dollars. 61
Strangely, Borden's burden of defending the Ross rifle from its detractors in the Commons was eased for him by the help of Sam Hughes. Though he was the Conservative's chief military critic, Hughes had been a passionate supporter of the Ross rifle since 1901, when he served on the original committee which recommended its adoption. Once Hughes made up his mind, he was not easily persuaded to change it. He rose frequently in the Commons during this period echoing Borden's arguments and providing evidence of his own that the Ross rifle was a sound weapon. On one occasion he became so incensed with the criticisms of his fellow Conservatives that he intimated they were agents of rival rifle companies. To stray this far from party solidarity was unusual, but Hughes, and many others, believed that important military matters should be debated apart from considerations of partisan politics.

Outside of the Commons the government took steps to shore up confidence in the Ross rifle. Appearing before a meeting of the Dominion Rifle Association on 27 February 1907, General Lake, claiming status as a disinterested observer of the Ross debate because he had had little to do with contracting for or testing the weapon, declared himself satisfied that the rifle was basically sound. In October 1907, Borden authorized the formation of a board, headed by Sam Hughes with three senior militia officers as members, to investigate the Ross rifle. On Christmas Eve of that year, the board's preliminary report was presented to Militia Council to the effect that the rifle "is in its present form a serviceable weapon", but enumerated a series of improvements needed to render it "more nearly
a perfect arm." 67 Two other committees were formed in the next year and a half, both under the direction of Sam Hughes, to test the Ross rifle and suggest improvements. 68 The service they performed was useful, but Borden refused to release the findings to the public, claiming reasons of security. 69

With the Ross rifle under strong attack in 1907 and 1908, it seems that despite Borden's unwavering support in public for the rifle and the company that produced it, he did consider other alternatives. The minister discussed with Vickers-Maxim the possibility of that firm buying the Ross rifle company. 70 He also communicated again with Birmingham Small Arms trying to interest them in locating a factory in Canada to produce rifles. 71 These efforts were not successful, and so Borden considered nationalizing the rifle factory or adopting a new rifle. In late 1907, Borden told Laurier that, while he and his military advisers agreed that the Ross was a fit weapon for service, important defects were still being discovered in recent deliveries. He suggested that it might be necessary for the government to take over the factory and so control the development and production of the rifle as the governments of England and the United States did for their small arms. Laurier was not in favour of this alternative, but did not rule it out altogether. 72 In March 1909, the minister warned Ross's lawyer that if the War Office adopted a new service rifle superior to the Ross, the Canadian government might require the Ross company to produce that weapon in Canada. 73

The Ross rifle began to acquire new respectability in 1909, which lasted through the next five years. Recognition finally
came to the weapon for its accuracy as a target rifle when it was used for the first time by the Canadian team at the British empire's rifle match at Bisley, England. In the 1909 meet, and in succeeding years, the Canadians fared far better than ever before, bringing home several highly valued trophies. The British National Rifle Association which organized the Bisley match unwittingly added to the new esteem the Ross rifle enjoyed among Canadians by continued attempts to ban the Ross from the competition, on the suspicion that such a fine target rifle was not intended for general issue to troops in the field. 74 When General French inspected the Canadian militia in 1910, he was reported to have told one corps that the men must take special care with their rifle training to take full advantage of their "splendid weapon of unsurpassed range and power." 75

Suddenly the Ross rifle's detractors were few in number. A. N. Worthington does not appear to have attended the third session of the 26th Parliament in 1910-1911, and perhaps in consequence not a voice was raised in criticism of the Ross. He was not a candidate in the 1911 election and so did not vie for the Militia and Defence portfolio when the Conservatives won. In asserting his claim to the post, Hughes defended his conduct on the Ross issue. He explained that the Conservative party had never taken an official position on the Ross and that in any case the rifle was now of accepted value. 76 Then A. L. Macdonald, Liberal M.P. for Picton, N.S., and a future Minister of National Defence, spoke in the Commons quoting an article in the British Pall Mall Gazette
which praised the Ross rifle in comparison to the new British service rifle:

There is a general feeling among the musketry experts of the army that the manufacture of the new rifle should be 'hung up' until it has been further tested, especially in comparison with the Ross rifle of Canada. This is regarded by many well qualified to judge as the very finest all-round small-arms weapon that has ever been evolved, and surprise is expressed upon all hands that the military authorities should seek further for a rifle for our troops, or, with such a rifle already in existence should proceed to manufacture an admittedly inferior weapon. 77

When Sam Hughes dared to go further with the statement that the Ross rifle was recognized the world over as the best military rifle in existence, no one in the House disagreed.

By the outbreak of war in 1914, 112,000 Ross rifles had been delivered to the militia department, most of which were distributed to the militia, rifle associations and cadet corps. So many modifications had been made to the rifle in the course of its development that by 1912 there were nine models. The Ross Mark III carried overseas by the first Canadian contingent was the most advanced, but was still designed for performance on a target range. Canadian troops complained continuously about the weight of the rifle, the length of the barrel and that it jammed in battle. Finally, the Canadian corps adopted the British Lee-Enfield rifle in 1916. Unfortunately, despite its proven strength as a target rifle, the Ross was not properly adapted for service conditions. 78

The complexity of the story of the rifle's development almost defies attempts to explain adequately its ultimate failure as a military arm. The Ross was adopted originally to
meet the real need for a military rifle made in Canada and with the awareness that development was needed to correct defects. Then, with its success as a target rifle, the goal of producing a hardy service weapon became secondary to the gratification of national pride. Perhaps blanket responsibility can be assigned to the entrepreneur, the politician and the amateur soldiers in Canada who were all so pleased that the Ross rifle could win the King's Prize at Bisley that they neglected to insist that it provide advantages for more myopic foot-soldiers who must carry it in battle.

One reason that the government stood by the Ross rifle was probably economic, though this was not emphasized in debate. The policy of 'Buy Canadian' for arms and supplies was based soundly on the objective of reaching military self-sufficiency. But surely it was considered better to spend in Canada rather than in Great Britain the several millions of dollars needed to re-arm the militia with rifles. The development of the Ross rifle was the only real opportunity to do this offered to the government. No evidence of patronage for personal or political gain was found in the transactions over the Ross.

Another explanation for the readiness of military authorities to accept the Ross rifle was that they were preparing the militia to fight a sharpshooters' war. Since the South African War when hidden Boer guerrillas picked apart advancing imperial forces, Canadian military training had stressed the importance of accuracy of fire. The whole concept of a citizens' army of partly trained volunteers fending off invasion from the United States was based on the principle that these
men could shoot straight. The Ross rifle was the ideal arm for such a war but not for the unconceived of mass attacks of the First World War. More proof for the adage that the military prepares for the last war not the next one.

The only facility manufacturing ammunition in Canada for the militia was the government-owned Dominion Arsenal. Founded in 1882, this was the first military arsenal in any self-governing British colony. In the decade before the First World War the Arsenal expanded in size and rate of production. Expenditures on its operation increased from about $150,000 in 1903, to about $360,000 in 1913. The factory produced mostly .303 calibre ammunition for the Lee-Enfield and Ross rifles. Sufficient quantities of the small arms ammunition were produced to supply the annual needs of the militia, the rifle associations and cadet corps but not enough to build up necessary reserves. Artillery shells were also produced for 12-pounders, and with the rearmament of the field artillery the factory retooled to produce a small proportion of the ammunition required for QF 18-pounder guns. Ammunition for other artillery pieces had to be ordered from Great Britain.

During Borden's tenure of office, there were a few complaints about the quality of ammunition made at the factory. A large number of hangfires were experienced at the Dominion Rifle Association meet of 1899, and the government ammunition was blamed. In 1904, again at a D.R.A. meet, the cartridges were found to vary considerably in size and possibly in charge, and the winner of the competition, an Australian, had taken the precaution to measure every cartridge he used with a gauge,
discarding the irregular ones. In 1907, the commanding officer of a militia unit complained that his men had been issued with unreliable ammunition from the arsenal. In each case the charges were investigated by the superintendent of the arsenal, Lt. Col. F.M. Gaudet, who found the complaints unfounded.

When Sam Hughes became Minister of Militia, the operations of the Dominion Arsenal came in for more critical attention. In September 1912, the arsenal discovered it was without cordite powder for its shells, when it was supposed to have a reserve supply sufficient for six months. More was ordered, but was not delivered until March 1913. In the meantime, the factory continued to produce and stockpile shells without charges. When the cordite arrived, and the charges were added, tests indicated that a large quantity of the .303 ammunition was defective.

The Directory of Artillery, Col. E.W.B. Morrison, went to Quebec to investigate the situation. He reported that all of the small arm ammunition produced in the previous six months was defective and that he was suspicious of other stocks. Furthermore, he discovered that of the 7,000 rounds of 18-pounder artillery shells manufactured over the past several years, not a single round had yet been fired. A test he then ordered indicated that these shells were also defective. In describing the situation to the Prime Minister, Hughes said that Morrison's investigation:

proves what many of us have known for years, that the ammunition is not, and never has been properly made. That the Officers in charge are incompetent, and that it is, and has been, a menace to the riflemen of Canada to use the ammunition. As I suggested to you, some days ago,
I think the matter is serious enough, is important enough and is costly enough involving as it does one million five hundred thousand dollars ($1,500,000) worth of Small Arms ammunition, and very many rounds of eighteen pounder gun ammunition to guarantee a most thorough enquiry. 88

Such an enquiry took place in June of that year, conducted by British army officers specially despatched to Canada for the purpose, Colonel Sir H.W.W. Barlow and Captain G. Ogilvie, both of Woolwich Arsenal in England. In their report to the Master General of Ordnance, the British experts found that much of the ammunition that had been produced by the plant was indeed faulty, but they were not so quick to assign responsibility to the managers as had been Hughes. They considered that both the supervisory staff and the labourers were sufficiently competent to perform their duties adequately and that the machinery was in fair condition. In fact, the factory was then running smoothly, and the shells being manufactured were up to required standards. Where the problem had existed in the past was in the system of inspection. Lack of attention to quality control had meant that standards of production had slipped, and large amounts of defective ammunition had been approved for use. The report found that all ammunition made before February 1908, should be condemned, although much of the small arms stock from more recent years could be salvaged with proper inspection and repair. However, the quality of the QF 18-pounder shells was very doubtful. 89

The publication of an account of the plant's problems came in the Montreal Gazette on 28 July 1913, under the title "Revelations in Quebec Arsenal" and caused some alarm among
the Liberals. The Liberals. Frederick Borden feared that the press would turn the matter into an attack on his administration of the department. He told Laurier that this was "newspaper gossip" instigated by the former journalist Col. Morrison and that nothing had been amiss at the factory during the Liberal regime. Nevertheless, Borden wrote to Hughes asking to see the report on the investigation. In his reply, Hughes implied that Borden had tolerated inefficiency for political reasons:

You knew, and I knew, that the arsenal was rotten then, but I presume you found it impossible to do much in fact when I began an inquiry into the thing, I found similar pressure from the Tory end utilized but I did not give one continental. I would rather sacrifice an ornamental superintendent any time than have the head (sic) blown off several riflemen on the ranges.

Borden retorted by asserting that not only was he unaware of any mismanagement at the arsenal but that no pressure had ever been put on him to overlook misdeeds.

However, in consequence of the munitions scandal, there was a shake-up at the Dominion Arsenal. The Superintendent, Col. F.M. Gaudet, was replaced in 1913 by Major F. D. Lafferty, a Permanent Force artillery officer, assisted by Major G. Ogilvie of the British inquiry team, now inspector at the arsenal. Summarizing the outcome Hughes told the House of Commons that 12 million rounds of .303 ammunition and 7,000 QF 18-pounder artillery shells were condemned. Such figures are significant when it is realized that the militia department had on hand only a total of 55 million .303 cartridges and 71,000 QF 18-pounder shells to supply the defence forces in time of war. And General Hamilton had estimated that
almost another 145 million .303 cartridges and 173,000 QF 18-pounder shells were needed to complete the reserve stocks for a field army.  

Although the report by the English inspectors in 1913 had expressed confidence in the managers of the Dominion Arsenal, Hughes was convinced that Gaudet was responsible for the factory's problems. Several years later in recalling the situation to R. L. Borden, Hughes claimed that he had persisted in cleaning up the operation despite appeals from Conservative and French-Canadian friends of Gaudet.  

There is no hard evidence that Gaudet enjoyed any special treatment when Borden ran the department. But Borden himself had been accused in a convincing fashion of involving the Dominion Arsenal in personal patronage. His son-in-law, L. S. Macoun, an investment broker and manufacturers' agent, enjoyed unusually favourable treatment in sales he made of metals and machinery to the arsenal. Nothing illegal was ever proven, but over the years Macoun was most successful in many other dealings with the factory.  

The pre-war decade was a period of transition for military uniforms, and the militia department was not very successful at meeting the challenge. After the South African War, the British Army switched from coloured dress to khaki uniforms, and the Canadians followed suit within a short time despite protests from traditionalists. This change and the growth of the militia brought demands for clothing which even a substantial increase in expenditure was not able to meet and also maintain sufficient stocks in reserve for mobilization. Still,
substantial contracts were granted to several manufacturers sometimes with the circumstances suggesting patronage.

The introduction of khaki service dress by Canadian military authorities in 1903 did not find immediate favour with many in the militia. The soldiers were attached to their traditional colourful uniforms, such as the green of the rifle battalions, the scarlet of the cavalry and the blue of the artillery. Protests were made to the militia department and in the press to the effect that the replacement of historical dress with modern uniforms would undermine the esprit de corps of militia units and discourage membership in the militia. The government retreated in the face of the opposition, and, in October 1903, a radical modification of the uniform policy was made. Rural corps were not to be issued with the service dress in peacetime, but were to return to coloured serge. There was no specific reference to the permanent and city corps in the General Order, but in practice issues of the khaki uniforms were restricted.

Despite this setback Borden still considered that it was desirable to replace the range of elaborate British dress in the Canadian militia with a simple Canadian uniform. As he explained to the House of Commons: "I do not know why in the world we should stick to these old uniforms, which of course have a history in England...but which so far as we are concerned are useless importations." The minister expressed the same sentiment to Militia Council in one of its early meetings when discussion came round to the practice of the NPAM regiments imitating the fancy costumes of elite British regiments.
G. W. Fowler, a Conservative M.P. from New Brunswick, and a retired militia officer, supported Borden's view on a Canadian uniform, arguing in Parliament that as a democratic country Canada should not perpetuate the rigid class barriers established in British dress patterns. In Canada, the private is often as elevated in social station as his officers, and only minor distinctions in dress should indicate differences in military rank. A correspondent to the Canadian Military Gazette identified only as "Canadian Scout" went to the great pains to illustrate how impractical and uncomfortable the British uniforms were when worn in training or in the field. The counter argument, which carried some force, was that showy uniforms attracted strong martial men to the militia who when fighting began would lay aside the display dress for more practical garb.

Aware that the sensitive uniform problem carried with it the seeds of discord, the militia department moved slowly to bring it to resolution. The rural corps were promised a simple set of clothing to wear at summer camps, and at first blue jean overall suits were issued. Militia Council decided in 1909 that jean suits would be unsuitable if war demanded rapid expansion of the militia, and the special camp issue was changed to khaki shirts and trousers. The change became popular among militiamen because the lightweight dress was found to be comfortable in hot weather and still smart in appearance. Council then began to extend the issue of khaki clothing to the Permanent Force and city corps, and, by 1913, it was the standard issue for the entire militia.
There were, however, only a relatively small number of complete uniforms actually distributed before the war.\textsuperscript{116}

The annual expenditure on clothing for the militia increased from about $600,000 in 1903, to about $1,000,000 in 1913,\textsuperscript{117} almost all of it spent in Canada. Nevertheless, clothing was in very short supply throughout this period. The most important factor in the shortage was that the size of the militia more than doubled in the decade. Moreover, it was difficult to build up reserves of clothing in case of war when demands were constantly made for replacements for worn items. Then, a setback occurred in 1909 when a serious fire in a storage building in Ottawa destroyed about $150,000 worth of clothing and stores.\textsuperscript{118}

By 1912, reserves in clothing were actually more scarce than they had been five years previously. General mobilization to meet an invasion would immediately require a vast expansion of the militia. As things stood, clothing would have to be almost entirely improvised upon mobilization with civilian dress being allowed by necessity.\textsuperscript{119} In fact, the shortages of clothing were so acute by 1914, that when war broke out there were difficulties dressing the men volunteering for the first contingent overseas. Stocks were inadequate, and the MPAM had never been issued with boots or personal articles such as underwear. Not only did uniforms have to be sewn, but the very cloth had first to be woven. The manufacturers responded well to the crisis, especially since almost $2,500,000 in contracts were signed for clothing in the first six weeks.\textsuperscript{120}
Many of these contractors had been accustomed to manufacture military clothing by the continued patronage of the militia department in the pre-war period. From 1887 to 1896, the department had granted three year contracts to firms, justifying this unusual procedure by stating that making military clothing required specialised machinery and expertise. Borden cancelled this arrangement when he became minister, granting contracts year by year, but, by 1899, he dealt mainly with two companies, W. E. Sanford of Hamilton and Mark Workman of Montreal. In 1904, Borden decided that three year contracts were advantageous to both parties and granted these to the Sanford and Workman firms.\textsuperscript{121}

There is always the possibility of political or personal patronage in granting government contracts on a continuing basis, especially such lucrative ones as those to Sanford and Workman, amounting to tens and hundreds of thousands of dollars annually.\textsuperscript{122} But evidence of patronage is often lacking or tenuous. W. E. Sanford was a Senator appointed by the Conservative government who supplied the militia before and after the Laurier period.\textsuperscript{123} Mark Workman of Montreal, on the other hand, became a major militia supplier under the Liberals and, in at least 1912, was connected with Borden and the Deputy Minister of the Militia department in an investment syndicate.\textsuperscript{124} J. B. Laliberté of Quebec, a Liberal, regularly supplied clothing to the militia, often without tenders being called, until 1911, when the Conservatives came to power.\textsuperscript{125} Geo. Slater of Montreal and Wm. Scully of Toronto were substantial contractors to the department under both Borden and
Hughes; the former was a Conservative, and the politics of the latter are unknown.

When Sam Hughes took over the department he continued the basic contract system, but altered some arrangements possibly for political reasons. Sanford and Workman continued as the major military clothing manufacturers, but instead of supplying their own cloth, it was bought by the department. This allowed Hughes to patronize the Rosamond Woollen Co. of Almonte, whose President was the son of a former Conservative M.P., and the Trent Valley Woollen Mill of Campbellford, represented in business by a Conservative party member. Paton Manufacturing Company of Sherbrooke, P.Q., also was added to the patronage list after the Conservative victory and, in 1913, became the militia's fourth largest supplier with a contract for cloth of almost $150,000.

As in the case of clothing, the growth of the militia and plans to outfit a field army in time of war brought increased demands for equipment. There was a great variety of military equipment needed from personal items to camp gear to transport. To meet these requirements, expenditures on equipment more than doubled during this period. Most of this gear was bought in Canada, often from firms continually patronized by the militia department. But the government failed to establish proper reserves of equipment, forcing improvisation at the beginning of the First World War.

Although annual expenditures on equipment rose from about $500,000 in 1903, to about $1,250,000 ten years later, equipment was still in short supply. The militia had doubled in size,
and this increased demand frustrated attempts to establish reserve stocks to support mobilization in an emergency. 132 Thus, when war broke out, the militia department requisitioned all kinds of gear from cutlery to wagons. Over $2,000,000 was spent in six weeks just to ready the first wave of volunteers. 133

The government might be accused of lacking foresight in not preparing equipment stocks in advance for an emergency, but at least some manufacturers were prepared because of continual government patronage. Under both Borden and Hughes, the militia department bought equipment, as it did clothing, by granting multi-year contracts or buying material at set prices on a continuing basis without competitive tenders. This system was used in order to encourage manufacturers to produce specialised military equipment with the prospect of long-term sales. 134

Several of the largest suppliers of equipment to the militia department benefitted from continuous patronage, and some may have had personal or political connections with the government. 135 The Ottawa Car Company supplied wagons and other vehicles to the militia department at costs ranging from tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars annually. The President of the company, T. Ahearn, was a friend of Laurier, Borden and other Liberal cabinet members. 136 J. W. Woods of Ottawa, supplied tents and other equipment to the department in value amounting to tens of thousands of dollars annually. Woods was a member of an investment syndicate with Borden in 1912. 137 Adams Bros. of Toronto,
and Messrs. Lamontagne and Co. of Montreal, supplied saddlery and other equipment, both on three year contracts bringing in tens of thousands of dollars annually. Ahearn and Woods continued to receive the same level of business from the Conservative government, probably because they were in unique positions to supply goods of the kind and in the quantities needed. Adams Bros. lost all their military business and Lamontagne's was drastically reduced upon the change of government, possibly for political reasons. One new supplier under the Hughes administration was Thomas Birkett, a former Conservative M.P. from Ottawa. 138

Although almost all equipment was bought in Canada, a small proportion each year came from England. This tended to be specialized technical items or sundry stores available through the War Office. 139 But in one case, that of personal harness equipment for carrying gear, the British web harness proved superior to the Canadian Oliver pattern and so was imported.

The Oliver pattern pack harness was purchased by the militia department in 1897 as a Canadian product, invented and manufactured in the country and soon became despised by the soldiers who had to carry it. 140 The Canadians serving in the South African contingents suffered severely from this ill-conceived piece of work. Basically a set of leather harness, the straps and buckles proved stiff and sharp-edged making the equipment difficult to wrestle with and causing abrasions to the skin. An ammunition pouch which hung over the stomach bothered the men when on the march and was difficult to get at when they lay in a prone position in action. 141 Despite its bad reputation,
Oliver equipment continued to be issued after the South African War, but many corps left it in store during training rather than put up with the discomfort and inconvenience it caused. Militia Council was aware of the shortcomings of the Oliver equipment, and, in 1909, the Quartermaster-General brought to its attention the existence of a greatly improved alternative. The British Army had just adopted a new pattern of web equipment after two years of extensive testing. Council decided to order 100 sets of the web to be tested by the militia and to cease purchasing the Oliver. Actually, 2,000 sets of Mills Burrow Web equipment were bought and issued to the Permanent Force where they proved superior to the Oliver. In 1911, Council decided to buy 5,000 more sets of equipment in England and to seek a way to have future orders manufactured in Canada. The next year the department began to issue the web to the NPAM, occasioning a general appreciation of the improvement and final curses on the Oliver. Unfortunately the relief was premature. The great demand for equipment in the First World War meant that many Canadian soldiers once more had to endure the Oliver equipment in service conditions.

A much greater weakness in the material fabric of the Canadian military was the lack of transport. Although the Permanent Force was supplied annually with quantities of wagons and horses, there were not nearly enough of either to support defence forces in case of invasion. Late in 1903, the militia department implemented a system of horse and vehicle registration which it hoped would ensure that transport would be available.
when mobilization was ordered. District Officers Commanding were to arrange for private citizens to enrol horses and wagons needed to support the corps within his area. The citizen would guarantee to make his horses and vehicles available to the militia for rent or sale in time of emergency; in return he would receive an annual fee of $1.00 per horse, 50c. per wagon and 50c. per driver, to be paid each year by an inspecting officer. The department laid down the number of horses and wagons needed for each district. The scheme was implemented only in eastern Canada where it seemed to work except in Quebec, where it was a complete failure for reasons not explained.146

When General Mackenzie took over as Chief of the General Staff, he ordered that the registration system be reviewed again to see if it really met the mobilization needs of the militia. On 1 August 1911, Militia Council studied a departmental brief on the subject which clearly showed that the system was inadequate. 957 wagons and 1844 horses had been voluntarily registered with the militia throughout Canada, while the study showed that in horses alone the immediate requirements for the mobilization of the divisions and mounted brigades would amount to 44,541. Faced with this reality, Council decided to save the almost $3,000 paid out annually by cancelling the registration system and depending on impressment in time of emergency.147 Over the next several years considerable efforts were made by headquarters and divisional officers charged with transport responsibility to conduct a survey of Canada, for transport resources in private hands, but no complete picture
was arrived at. As for motorized transport, the militia department was only beginning to make use of trucks and cars by 1914. As a result when war came, there was a scramble to purchase all manner of vehicles and 8,000 horses to send overseas with the first contingent.

The militia department under both Borden and Hughes attempted to provide the Canadian militia with modern matériel, but fell short of this objective in several important respects. The purchase of the Ross rifle, excellent on a target range but unsuited for service, was indeed a mistake but one explainable by the lesson learned from the Boer War and by the perceived necessity for a Canadian-produced weapon. Not enough was done by military authorities to build up reserves in clothing and equipment; this lack of urgency is understandable since the militia was preparing to repel an invasion at some unknown future point, rather than imminent war in Europe. Patronage favouring personal and political friends made the granting of some militia contracts unjust, but it is not clear that this was to the great detriment of public interest.

On the other hand, some very positive steps were taken to ready the militia for modern war. Enough new artillery was acquired to rearm the active militia and so introduce to many soldiers the guns they would use in the First World War. Flaws in the system of production at the Dominion Arsenal were corrected and manufacture begun of shells for the new artillery. A new practical service dress was introduced. Continued patronage and a rise in expenditure encouraged Canadian manufacturers to gear
for production of military clothing and equipment. So although there was an unseemly scramble to ready the first Canadian contingent for overseas service, some important preparations had, in fact, been made to support a war machine.
Endnotes - Chapter 6

1 Debates, 8 October 1903, pp. 13381-82.

2 Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, pp. 251-87.

3 Auditor-General's Report, 1913-14, Section P. See Appendix B for a table of militia department expenditures, 1903-1913.

4 Debates, 18 July 1908, p. 13561.

5 PAC, RG 24, V. 1853, file 45, pp. 1-3.

6 By 1911 the Scottish firm Nobel's was operating in Montreal as the Canadian Explosives Company. DMD Annual Report, 1911-12, p. 29.

7 Debates, 10 July 1905, pp. 9123-24.

8 Minutes, 26 July 1911, p. 8.

9 A complete assessment of the methods and effects of government patronage in this, or any other, period in Canadian history, remains to be done. Such a task is bound to be mammoth comprising as it would an examination of the contract systems used by all government departments and including compilation of statistics on expenditures and tracing political connections. Even then, it would be doubtful if the conclusive evidence garnered would outweigh the suppositions made. One way to approach the problem would be to select one department, like the Militia and Defence, and make it the sole object for a thorough analysis of its finances for a limited period, say that one minister's administration.

In the course of this research, it was discovered that expenditures on military supplies were made with the aim of reconciling honest and effective financial management with the benefits of patronage. A system was in place granting contracts to an individual or company which submitted the best offer of goods and services at the lowest price. This system was often used but seemingly as often modified or ignored.

Several variations of the tender system were used for large contracts such as those for arms, equipment and clothing examined in the body of this thesis. The most direct and seemingly fair method was by public advertisement, in a competition open to all. But this was far from foolproof, because there was no firm guideline concerning what constituted sufficient public notice. Furthermore, when the sealed tenders were opened and examined, political as well as financial advantages could be weighed. Also, the system
of tenders was modified on occasion to allow granting of contracts without public advertisement and for terms longer than one year. The reason given for such practices was that companies needed continuity of business to make production for military purposes economically viable. But as is seen in this thesis the Liberals and Conservatives in some cases had different ideas concerning what firms should benefit from such arrangements.

But it is in smaller contracts such as those for food and provisions for permanent stations and summer training camps where greater liberties were taken with the system of tenders. Patronage lists were drawn up by Members of Parliament and party officials for areas in which the department made local purchases. Sometimes these lists were used to guide the department in selecting individuals or firms to be privately invited to submit tenders or even to accept contracts without competition. The rationale given by officials was that these contracts were often too small to warrant the trouble and expense of advertising for tenders. But even here, there are contradictions. In many cases the public-tender system was used, even when contracts were small. Patronage lists do not seem to exist for all areas, and where they did exist, they were not always employed. Militia contracts for this period number in the thousands, and sorting through them and looking for collateral evidence of political connection was quite beyond the scope of this thesis. It might, however, be worth a separate study. A considerable body of documents exists in departmental records and private papers, but the material is not complete. For this reason conclusions reached are likely to be tentative.

10 Debates (unrevised edition); 3 April 1907, pp. 5883-84.

11 PAC, RG 9, II, D I: V. 106, H.W. Brown, Director of Contracts, DMD, to A.D. Crosby, former Conservative MP for Halifax, 4 December 1911; and V. 105, Dir. of Contracts, to Wm. Price former Conservative MP for Quebec West, 21 October 1911.

These references are to letters which illustrate the employment of patronage in granting contracts and to the devising of patronage lists.

12 Debates: 25 April 1904, p. 1878; and, 26 March 1906, pp. 577-78.

13 See Appendix C for details on shortages.

14 Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, V. 1, pp. 133 and 159; and, Debates, 8 October 1903, p. 13384.


17 Most information on these purchases found in, PAC, RG 24, V. 6299, 48-1-33, V. 1.


20 PAC, RG 24, V. 5899, 46-1-37, V. 1, DMD Memorandum on status of Vickers account, 8 February 1922.

21 PANS, Borden to A.T. Dawson, 2 September 1908, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 78, pp. 177-78.

22 PAC, Fiset to Lord Strathcona, 22 November 1913, RG 24, V. 5899, 46-1-37, V. 1.


24 For examples see PANS, FB Papers: Borden to Lewis, 24 and 28 January 1907, MG 2, V. 74; and various letters, V. 182, folders 2 and 5. See also endnote 24, Chapter 5, for connection between Lewis and Borden in the dealings of the Ontario Sub-target Gun Company.

25 PAC, Hughes to Fiset, 16 December 1911, RG 24, V. 5899, HQ 46-1-82, V. 1.

26 PANS, Lewis to Borden in FB Papers, MG 2: V. 179, 5 December 1911, p. 15570/F3; V. 179, 21 December 1911, p. 15570/F3; V. 179, 29 December 1911, p. 15640/F3; V. 180, 9 January 1912, p. 15702/F1.

27 Ibid., Borden to Lewis, 23 January 1912, p. 15702/F1.

28 PAC, Hughes to R. Borden, 5 March 1912, R. Borden Papers, MG 26H, OC series, C 247, file 141.

29 Debates, 10 July 1905, pp. 9123-24.

30 Auditor-General's Reports, 1904 to 1914.

31 Debates, 25 April 1904, p. 1878.

32 PANS, Borden to Lewis, 12 March 1909, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 78, pp. 848-49.

33 Miller, The Public Life..., p. 249.

34 Debates, 14 January 1907, pp. 1403-9.

35 PANS, FB Papers, MG 2, Borden to Lewis: 8 December 1901, V. 81, p. 517; and, February 1903, V. 106, p. 449.


37 Duguid, Official History..., Appendix, pp. 75-77.

39 Minutes, 13 June 1906, p. 9.

40 Another contract was signed in 1908 making the Ross Rifle Co. the supplier of bayonets for the Canadian militia. Debates, 11 May 1908, p. 8442.

41 Duguid, *Official History...*, Appendix, pp. 77-78.

42 PAC, Note by Ommanny, 4 March 1903, MG 11, CO 42, V. 895, B 2219, p. 7.

43 Preston, *Canada and "Imperial Defense"*, p. 294.

44 PAC, Privy Council Minute, 11 January 1911, forwarded to Grey at CO, GG Records, RG.7, G 21, file 343, V. 3(a), 1911.

45 PANS, Borden to W. Nesbitt, 30 July 1903, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 108, p. 7.

46 Ibid., Borden to Ross, 16 May 1904, V. 110, p. 647.

47 Ibid., Borden to Ross, 4 July 1904, V. 111, p. 190.

48 Minutes, 3 July 1905, p. 9.

49 Minutes; 30 January 1906, pp. 5-6; and, 29 May 1906, p. 7.

50 Minutes, 14 July 1906, pp. 3-5.

51 Minutes, 17 July 1906, pp. 7-9.

52 Minutes, 17 August 1906, p. 10.

53 Debates (unrevised), 3 April 1907, pp. 5890-3.

54 Debates (unrevised), 14 January 1907, pp. 1399-1426.

55 Debates, 21 May 1908, p. 8915.

56 Ibid., p. 8909.

57 Debates (unrevised), 14 January 1907, pp. 1403-09.

58 Debates (unrevised), 26 February 1907, pp. 3732-802.


60 Debates, 18 July 1908, p. 13561.

61 Debates, 21 May 1908, p. 8919.
62 Debates, 6 February 1907, pp. 3732-802.
63 Debates (unrevised), 3 April 1907, pp. 5887 and 5895.
64 Ibid., p. 5888.
65 CMG, 12 March 1907, pp. 7-8.
66 MO 228(1), 3 October 1907.
67 Minutes, 24 December 1907, pp. 4-5.
68 Minutes, 4 February 1908, p. 10; 23 February 1909; pp. 4-5; and, 22 March 1910, p. 4.
70 PANS, Borden to Lewis, 3 December 1907, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 75, pp. 730-1.
71 PANS, Borden to Nesbitt, 29 March 1907, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 74, p. 948, and Borden to K.R. Dans of Birmingham Small Arms, 30 March 1908, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 123, pp. 89-90.
73 PANS, Borden to Nesbitt, 1 March 1909, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 125, pp. 776-7.
74 Minutes, 22 March 1910, p. 7.
76 Hughes to R. Borden, 27 September 1911, R. Borden Papers, MG 26H, RLB series, C 333, file 2993.
77 Debates, 26 February 1912, p. 3737.
78 Duguid, Official History..., Appendix, pp. 82-99.
79 Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, p. 248.
81 Auditor-General's Reports, 1903 and 1913.
83 DMD Annual Report, 1908-09, p. 17.
84 The Dominion Arsenal at Quebec, Quebec, 1947, p. 35.
Gaudet himself continued on a lengthy and productive military career. He was the first commander of the Twenty-Second battalion in the First World War, managed a British munitions plant between wars and after the outbreak of the Second World War advised the Canadian government on the expansion of the munitions industry. (The Dominion Arsenal at Quebec, pp. 39-40.)
107 CMG, 28 August 1906, p. 7.
108 CMG, 25 August 1908, p. 5.
109 MGO (special), 21 October 1903.
110 Minutes, 16 February 1909, p. 8.
111 Debates, 20 July 1911, p. 9781.
112 CMG, 28 June 1910, p. 9.
113 Minutes, 15 December 1909, p. 8.
114 Minutes, 28 November 1911, p. 4.
115 Minutes, 28 January 1913, pp. 3-4.
117 Auditor-General's Reports, 1903-1913.
118 Debates, 24 November 1909, p. 386.
119 Minutes, 28 May 1912, p. 5.
120 Duguid, Official History..., Appendix, pp. 70-73.
121 Minutes, 23 May 1905, pp. 7-9.
122 Auditor-General's Reports, 1903-1913.
123 W.M. Cochrane, The Canadian Album, V. 1, Brantford, 1891, p. 74.
124 PANS, Various letters, FB Papers, MG 2, Folders 2 and 5.
127 Debates, 6 June 1914, p. 5005.
130 Ibid., Dir. of Contracts to O.C., Fourth Division, 19 December 1911.
131 Auditor-General's Report, 1913.

133 Duguid, Official History..., Appendix, p. 73.


135 Facts and figures of the following contracts are drawn from the Reports of the Auditor-General, 1903 to 1913.

136 See this Chapter, p. 272.

137 PANS, various letters, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 182, Folders 2 and 5.

138 Johnson, The Canadian Directory..., p. 44.

139 Duguid, Official History..., Appendix, p. 72.


141 CMG, 25 February 1906, p. 10.

142 CMG, 28 August 1906, p. 7.

143 Minutes, 21 May 1909, pp. 10-11.

144 Minutes, 23 March 1911, pp. 5-6.

145 CMG, 11 June 1912, p. 8.


147 PAC, RG 24, V. 1853, file 52, pp. 1-7.

148 PAC, RG 24, V. 4255, MD-1-1-8-1.

149 Duguid, Official History..., Appendix 106, pp. 70-73; and, Brown and Cook, Canada 1896-1921, p. 214.
CHAPTER VII- PARAMILITARY SUPPORT
GROUPS OF THE CANADIAN MILITARY

In the decade before the First World War there occurred not only growth in the militia but also in paramilitary activity in Canada. Previous to this period there had existed a number of paramilitary organizations like rifle associations, cadet corps and militia officer organizations. Strongly supported by relatively small numbers of enthusiasts, these organizations had attracted neither the interest of Canadians preoccupied with daily concerns nor of the Department of Militia and Defence struggling with a limited budget. Then, after the South African War, the existing paramilitary organizations enjoyed unprecedented expansion, and new ones were created. In part this growth was due to a new enthusiasm for military adventure stemming from Canadian participation in the war against the Boers. More concretely, these paramilitary groups were encouraged by financial assistance from the militia department which saw these groups as a feeder system for a national army. But these groups were more than simply national manifestations of a warrior impulse, but reflected a common belief that military training would produce a better citizenry.

The imperialist movement was most influential in fostering public support for paramilitary activities. Carl Berger's fine work on imperialism has shown that militarism played an important part in this pugnacious form of Canadian nationalism.
Particularly after the testing of Canadian manhood in South Africa, military strength was seen as one way for Canada to press her right to stand among the foremost nations of the world. Militarist organizations like the Canadian Defence League popularized this view which won support from imperialist and moralist organizations like the I.O.D.E. and the W.C.T.U. Preached as part of the imperialist idea was that Canada's first military responsibility was defence against the United States. L.S. Amery, prominent imperial publicist, told the Canadian Military Institute in 1910 that:

...important as is the part the Canadian Navy may yet play in Imperial Defence, important as it is that her permanent military establishment shall be in close contact with the British regular forces, THE REALLY PRESSING AND SUPREME QUESTION FOR CANADA TO CONSIDER IS THE ORGANIZATION OF HER CITIZEN FORCES FOR THE DEFENCE OF HER LAND FRONTIER, a frontier larger than that possessed by any other nation in the world. 2

The citizen army mentioned by Amery depended very much on paramilitary groups. Acting on the advice of his professional military officers, Frederick Borden had in late 1903 announced his intention to protect Canada from invasion with a large citizens' army which would draw upon paramilitary groups like the rifle associations for most of its members. 3 Borden and his successor as minister, Sam Hughes, believed strongly that volunteers who could use a rifle and had some military training would constitute the bulwark of this country's defence. Both men were energetic in stimulating the growth of paramilitary activity in Canada before the First World War.
Like the militia, paramilitary groups were conceived of as performing a social as well as a military function in Canada. Military enthusiasts held that exposure to military drill and discipline, particularly among the youth, would produce a healthy and law-abiding citizenry. Paramilitary organizations were also valuable manifestations of patriotism and would help in assimilating foreign immigrants. In French Canada paramilitary groups were much more popular than the militia because the government allowed them to develop more freely as expressions of culture and heritage.

Clubs made up of rifle enthusiasts taking part in shooting competitions existed in Canada through the latter decades of the nineteenth century. There were two kinds of clubs: military, whose members were also in the militia; and civilian, whose members did not have the time or the interest to perform militia training. As the clubs developed they were grouped into provincial associations and since 1869, nationally into the Dominion Rifle Association.

Until the decade before the First World War, these rifle clubs were supported by the government, but had no formal place in the Canadian military. In the early years the Department of Militia and Defence encouraged their continuation as a helpful form of paramilitary training of the citizenry who might some day be required to defend Canada. The department made grants of money to the provincial associations, and the D.R.A. supplied the local clubs with some rifles and gave ammunition to their members. Since the South African War Borden was convinced that more should be done to foster the development of these clubs. In 1903, Borden
announced his intention to develop a citizen army which would bring members of the civilian rifle associations into the militia in case of invasion. By the new Militia Act of 1904, members of the rifle clubs supported by the government were required to serve in the militia in case of emergency. Borden and then Hughes encouraged the growth of these organizations over the next decade and rifle-shooting became a very popular activity in Canada.

The main encouragement offered by the government to the development of the rifle club movement was the construction of new rifle ranges. Early in his administration Borden had upgraded the priority for the construction of rifle ranges and by 1905 his department was spending $100,000 per year for these facilities. As he explained to the Dominion Rifle Association, Borden's aim was to have a range within commuting distance of every rifle club in Canada, although he was concentrating first on providing them near the urban centres. By the time Sam Hughes took over as defence minister there were a total of 50 rifle ranges in Canada, of which 40 were in good condition, but there remained an acknowledged need for many more. Despite a raise in expenditure in his department for ranges, Sam Hughes refused to promise full facilities for every locality with a rifle club because of the prohibitive cost and substituted instead the alternative of a miniature range for practice shooting. But at the instigation of Hughes the government also built the Connaught range near Ottawa at a cost of about $600,000, its elaborate facilities designed for Dominion Rifle Association competitions.
Apart from the provision of ranges, government support of the rifle clubs did not increase much during the period. Members of military rifle associations were given 200 rounds of ammunition each per year for practice, and as militia soldiers each had use of a rifle. The department granted 100 rounds each to members of the civilian clubs and also made available a rifle for every four members. The militia department would not increase the grants because of the need to upgrade the armament of the militia. However, the department did make available the Ross rifle to civilian shooters as their Lee-Enfields wore out and also provided them with a number of arcade rifle machines for practice indoors during the winter. Government grants of money to the rifle organizations approximately doubled in this period but then so did their number of members. To encourage competition among civilian riflemen the militia department issued silver salvers to each association to be used as prizes.

Despite the limited encouragement offered to the rifle associations by the government, there was considerable growth in the organization. In 1903, the military associations had a total of 11,830, while the civilian associations counted 11,105. These numbers grew in succeeding years until in 1911, military associations had 19,583 members while civilian associations counted 28,045. Then just before the war the numbers in civilian associations declined while the military continued to grow, the figures standing in 1914 at 23,884 and 24,903 respectively. Within ten years then both the military and civilian associations doubled in numbers, quite a respectable indication of the growth of interest in paramilitary
activities in Canada. However, since only the civilian associations provided additional reserves for the militia, such growth fell far short of Borden's expectation of sufficient men to support his citizens' army.

Considering the general increase of interest in things military and paramilitary in Canada during this decade, the relative decline in size of the civilian rifle associations just before the war is paradoxical. Desmond Morton, while not noting this decline in the numbers of rifle club members, has suggested that there was a decline in the spirit of militarism in Canada in the year before the First World War. This thesis is difficult to accept in the light of the considerable increases in the size of the militia and cadets during the same period. It seems more likely that the civilian rifle clubs declined in numbers because many members joined the militia.

One aspect of the rifle club movement of particular interest was its acceptance by French Canadians. For although growth in the movement was general throughout the country, the remarkable fact is that French Canadians who were reluctant to join the militia did not display the same antipathy towards rifle clubs even though faced with a pledge of military service in case of war. Early in 1905, when some new rifle clubs were being organized, the Canadian Military Gazette reported with surprise that several were French Canadian in Quebec. The Gazette was pleased by this display of martial interests even if French Canadians still remained outside the formal militia because of objections to imperial
wars and British uniforms. The key to the interest of some French Canadians in the rifle clubs may very well be contained in the Gazette’s observation about British uniforms. In at least one case French Canadians wishing to continue the tradition of Papal Zouaves contingents which Quebec sent to Rome in 1870-71, formed themselves into rifle clubs and received support from militia department. Another French Canadian group which received permission from the militia department to form a rifle association was described by its president as follows:

"Les Chausseurs de Salaberry" tel est le nom d’une garde militaire qui vient d’être fondée à St. Sauveur de Québec sous la direction des Révérends Pères Oblats. Les membres de cette garde sont des jeunes gens triés sur le volet et qui désirent d’abord servir leur ville en participant à ses démonstrations religieuses et nationale, en attendant qu’ils aient l’occasion de servir leur pays....Je connais ces jeunes gens et je suis convaincu qu’ils sauront, au besoin, se montrer de braves et loyaux soldats.

The militia department offered support somewhat reluctantly and only in a few instances to groups manifesting such a blatant departure from the British military tradition. But controls were not strict on rifle clubs, and probably many other French Canadians were able to use these paramilitary groups to express ceremonially the traditional connections between the Church and the army.

The Dominion Rifle Association occupied a prominent place in the Canadian military at this time. Each year the D.R.A. held a shooting meet which attracted the best marksmen from the member rifle clubs. Interest in the match grew during this period until shortly before the war when over
seven hundred men participated. The D.R.A. also arranged Canadian participation in the imperial match at Bisley, England, and the U.S. sponsored international competition for the Palma trophy. A Canadian won the top prize at Bisley in 1904, and the Canadian team the Palma trophy in 1913, both victories sparking national interest and self-congratulation. In 1911, there was particular rejoicing when a Canadian firing a Ross rifle became the first person to win the two most important trophies at Bisley in the same year. Several important political figures with military connections headed the Dominion Rifle Association in this period. Col. J. M. Gibson of the NPAM, an Ontario cabinet minister and later Lieutenant-Governor of the province, retired as president of the D.R.A. in 1907 to be replaced for a time by Sam Hughes. As the Minister of Militia and Defence was traditionally named Honourary President, Hughes in turn succeeded Borden at this post in 1912.

Like the rifle associations the cadet movement in Canada, although it also had a history dating back several decades, really only became important in numbers in the decade before the First World War. The movement had started in Canada during the 1860s following the example of the formation of such corps in England and given the threat of American invasion during the Civil War. Male youths in schools were organized into drill associations and put into uniforms. After Confederation cadet units or corps and their instructors were promised arms and military manuals by the government in the Militia Act of 1868. Not until 1879 were
regulations issued setting up a system for organizing and supplying cadet corps attached to educational institutions.\textsuperscript{35} But frustrated by a small budget, the militia department could do little to live up to its promises of support. The cadet movement failed to develop despite its espousal by educational authorities like James L. Hughes, Sam Hughes’s brother and Chief Inspector for Toronto’s Public School Board.\textsuperscript{36} In Ontario there was some development after 1898 when the government of George Ross began to cooperate with the Militia department in forming, training and arming school cadet corps.\textsuperscript{37} Finally, after the Boer war, Borden, on the advice of his General Officers Commanding, decided to realize the potential of the movement to train youths for later service in the militia.

Borden explained to the House of Commons in his important speech on military policy of 8 October 1903,\textsuperscript{38} that the militia must look to cadet corps to provide the material for its leadership and its ranks in the future. He repeated the oft-made observation that boys were able to learn military skills much more quickly than adults and promised to foster the development of youth training. In 1903, the minister for the first time allowed cadet instructors to hold militia rank and added cadet units to the militia lists giving them official recognition.\textsuperscript{39} Corps were to be organized in connection with schools or as independent units.\textsuperscript{40} The Militia Act of 1904 confirmed these new arrangements and that the cadets would be under no special obligation to serve in war.\textsuperscript{41} Over the next several years the government en-
couraged the formation of new cadet corps with more liberal provision of rifles, ammunition and arcade rifle practice machines.\textsuperscript{42} New units were added each year until by 1908 there were 145 corps numbering 9,000 boys.\textsuperscript{43} This was an increase of 41 corps in four years.\textsuperscript{44} By this time Borden was initiating a much broader scheme for youth training which appealed to Canadians because it provided minors with exercise, discipline and patriotism as well as military training.\textsuperscript{45}

In 1905, the minister explained to the House of Commons that he wanted to establish for Canada a better system of providing military training to youths connected with the schools. There were precedents for such a system in England and Australia and in the latter country a formula had been arrived at after consultation between the federal and state governments. Borden wanted to act in cooperation with provincial governments because of their responsibility for education and he was in the process of contacting them. Progress on this matter was slow, but by the spring of 1907 Borden had met with either the Premier or Minister of Education of every province and had received general agreement that some form of physical training for all children both male and female was desirable as well as military drill for older boys.\textsuperscript{46} But that year Borden was able to reach a concrete agreement only with the province of Nova Scotia, and both physical and military training was introduced in that province's school system in September 1908, which would result in the formation of cadet corps.\textsuperscript{47}
While in England in 1908, Borden sought the aid of Lord Strathcona, Canada's High Commissioner, in furthering his scheme to train schoolchildren. Strathcona was a wealthy imperialist with a taste for the military and was already a benefactor of the Y.M.C.A. The idea appealed to him, and by early the next year he agreed to provide $250,000 to a trust fund to support school training. His letter (prepared for his signature by the militia department) underlined the military nature of the plan. It read in part:

While I attach the highest importance to the advantages of physical training and elementary drill for all children of both sexes, I am particularly anxious that the special value of military drill, including rifle shooting for boys capable of using rifles should be constantly borne in mind. My object is not only to help to improve the physical and intellectual capabilities of the children by inculcating habits of alertness, orderliness and prompt obedience, but also to bring up the boys to patriotism and to a realization that the first duty of a free citizen is to be prepared to defend his country. The Dominion at the present time, and for many years to come can hardly hope to be able to give so long a period of training to her military forces as by itself would suffice to make them efficient soldiers, but, if all boys had acquired a fair acquaintance while at school with simple military drill and rifle shooting, the degree of efficiency which could be reached in the otherwise short period which can be devoted to military training of the Dominion forces, would, in my opinion, be enormously enhanced.

Using this private fund (which Borden succeeded in naming "Lord Strathcona's Trust" over the repeated objections of the peer in question) and some public revenue, Borden was ready early in 1909 to launch his campaign in earnest. In March of that year the minister explained his plan to the House of Commons. All teachers male and female graduating from the provincial normal schools would be re-
quired to take a course and hold a certificate in physical training. All male graduating teachers would also be encouraged to hold a certificate in military training. Then at the elementary schools boys and girls would receive compulsory physical training in their early years to be followed by voluntary military training for the boys as they reached the upper levels of grade school and entered high school. Male teachers involved in military training would hold commissions in the militia and form cadet corps for which they would receive a per capita stipend as a reward. Instruction at the normal schools and later inspection of the cadet corps would be provided by the Permanent Force.  

The scheme which Borden was offering was slow to be taken up by the provinces, possibly because they were concerned that this radical change in curriculum would be unpopular. Ontario was the second (after Nova Scotia) to accept the proposal without modification in February 1910 and was followed shortly by New Brunswick. The government of Prince Edward Island delayed because of objections to putting guns in the hands of children and difficulties envisaged in training ladies in physical education. Manitoba objected that the province was not in favour of compulsory military training, and Borden clarified that the cadet corps were strictly voluntary. In Quebec, the Protestant School Board was enthusiastic about the project, but its Roman Catholic counterpart gave only qualified approval. It was not until 1911 that Borden could inform Lord Strathcona that all provinces were participating in the plan.
that time rising costs had caused Lord Strathcona to double his original contribution to $500,000.\textsuperscript{58}

The training programme was thus in place when Sam Hughes took over the militia department in 1911, and the new minister lost little time in adding incentives to cadet corps development. Sam’s brother James had long promoted military drill and cadet corps connected to the public schools in Toronto where he was Chief Inspector, and the minister lacked none of his brother’s enthusiasm for putting boys in uniform.\textsuperscript{59} Sam Hughes lowered the age of eligibility of cadets for free issues of ammunition from 15 to 14 and allowed any cadet who could load a rifle to procure issues of shooting gallery ammunition.\textsuperscript{60} A bonus was issued annually to each cadet corps to assist in the purchase and maintenance of uniforms.\textsuperscript{61} Signalling equipment was made a standard issue to all cadet corps,\textsuperscript{62} and bayonets were given out in some cases.\textsuperscript{63} Then in his most important achievement for the cadets, Hughes in 1912 put through Parliament an amendment to the Militia Act which allowed him to send cadets to special summer training camps separated from the militia.\textsuperscript{64} The co-operation of the clergy of all denominations and the Daughters of the Empire and the Children of the Empire was invited to help assure that these camps were fit and proper places for young men.\textsuperscript{65}

The encouragement given to the cadet corps movement during these few years resulted in spectacular growth. In 1910, the corps had grown to a total of 15,000 boys. By March 1913, the cadet corps had increased to a total of
30,300 cadets, a 35% increase from the same time the previous year, and over 7,000 cadets had attended camps the previous July to learn rifle shooting, signalling and first aid. By May 1914, the total strength of the cadet movement had risen to 44,680; over 12,000 teachers and cadet instructors had been issued with certificates of competence and 251 militia officers were involved in its development. The effort put into youth training in this period paid off for the government handsomely in the First World War when 44,306 cadets or former cadets served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Of this total, 3,978 died and 25 received Victoria Crosses.

The cadet corps were most popular in the Province of Quebec. In fact, in 1914, over one-third of the cadets in the country were concentrated in Quebec causing Sam Hughes to marvel:

In the province of Quebec, that everybody is afraid to touch with a pair of tongs, we have 16,320 cadets trained in the secondary schools, and colleges and senior primary schools. I, a fire-eating Orangeman, inspected 4,800 French-Canadian boys in the city of Montreal and there were 160 priests there also. The boys are a credit to any country.

In the city of Quebec alone, where there was not one cadet in 1908, by 1911 there were 650 including 250 from the Quebec Seminary.

The cadet movement did not succeed in Quebec because it was something novel but rather because it was a fulfillment of a tradition. Cadet training was another manifestation of the association made in French Canada between
military service in defence of Canada and the Church.\textsuperscript{72} The Quebec Seminary had a military tradition back to the Ancien Regime and the students had defended Canada from attack in the American Revolutionary War and the War of 1812.\textsuperscript{73} Other cadet corps had long existed in Quebec in association with classical colleges.\textsuperscript{74} In 1879, five classical colleges in that province had organized cadet corps after the militia department had indicated it would support the cadet movement.\textsuperscript{75} But this enthusiasm in Quebec for military training of youth did not extend to a propensity to send off sons to fight overseas wars. It has been estimated that in the First World War only 12\% of the cadets who served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force came from Quebec, and some of these would be English Canadians.\textsuperscript{76}

Another youth organization with paramilitary overtones which began in Canada in this period was the Boy Scouts. When Lord Baden-Powell founded the movement in England in 1908, it was not intended to be a distinct organization, but was rather to superimpose direction in practical fieldwork upon existing youth groups like the cadet corps.\textsuperscript{77} It was in this spirit that the Militia Council regarded the idea in 1909, and decided to purchase copies of the scouting guides for distribution to cadet corps. Borden believed in the early stages that the enthusiasm for scouting could be harnessed to the cadet corps and enhance the latter's popularity.\textsuperscript{78} This proved difficult. As in England, scouting spread rapidly in Canada and scout patrols sprang up with an identity of their own. Although scouting with
its emphasis on fieldwork and woodlore was essentially different from the cadet movement which stressed military drill and shooting, they both had paramilitary order and trappings and could be viewed as rivals.

Borden and his principal military adviser, General Otter, had a difference of opinion over whether to regard scouting as a threat or a benefit to the cadet corps. The Governor-General, Lord Grey, became Canada's Chief Scout, and in 1910 he asked General Otter, then Chief of the General Staff, to accept the presidency of that organization's Dominion Council. Otter viewed the movement quite positively telling Militia Council that the idea was to restrict the Boy Scout organization to younger boys thus creating a natural progression from scouting to cadet corps and finally the militia. But Borden feared that the popularity of scouting was endangering the growth of cadet corps in the schools. Indeed already the scouting organization had declined to join formally the cadet movement. On Borden's advice, Otter turned down the position preferred by the Governor-General.

Despite Borden's fears, military men continued to take an interest in scouting. Of the 29 men who formed the Dominion Council in 1910, 21 were prominent NPAM officers as were both the Dominion Commissioner and the Dominion Secretary. Local organizations also became permeated with military men, and as a result scouts began to participate in military activities. The first scoutmaster in Quebec City was a NPAM lieutenant, and in the summer of
1910 he took his troop on a week's camping trip along with the local cadet corps. The same year in western Ontario the boy scouts participated in the Thanksgiving Day Sham Battle along with the cadets and the militia. In Saskatchewan, Lt. Col. R. J. Gwynne of the 16th Light Horse held a ten day cadet camp in 1911 to which he invited two troops of scouts. There the youngsters were initiated in military discipline and rifle-shooting, and the Colonel managed also to persuade two scoutmasters to join the militia. He reported also that the cadets considered themselves far superior to the scouts whom they teased as being afraid to be real soldiers. An edition of the Canadian Military Gazette shared something of the sentiment of the cadets feeling that as useful as the scouting movement was, its members would "never form that foundation for a good citizen soldiery which the cadets properly multiplied and developed will afford."

Another voluntary paramilitary association which supported the Canadian militia was the Canadian Artillery Association (C.A.A.). This organization had been in existence since 1876 as the Dominion of Canada Artillery Association, the new name being adopted in 1904. Officially, the object of the association was "the development of gunnery skill and the dissemination of artillery knowledge throughout the Dominion of Canada, with a view to the attainment of the greatest possible efficiency by the field and garrison artillery." Its members were mostly militia artillery officers. To attain its object the C.A.A. acted in two
principal ways. First, it sponsored competitions among artillery units and stimulated professional study of the science of gunnery by artillerists. Second, it acted as a lobby group to advance the needs of its branch of the service to the militia department. In both areas the association was remarkably successful.

Supported by a government grant of several thousand dollars per year the C.A.A. did much to advance the proficiency of the NPAM artillery. Perhaps the most effective device used by the C.A.A. to encourage artillerymen in their training was the efficiency contest it sponsored each year. The association sent out inspecting officers to rate the performance of every battery in the service. Those who received the highest points were rewarded not just with laurels of success but also with substantial cash prizes. In 1904, the C.A.A. began the publication of an annual journal entitled Canadian Artillerists containing original articles and reprints from other journals with reference to artillery matters. Also the organization purchased journals and books of interest for circulation among its members. Two competitions which took place during this period between artillery teams put together by the C.A.A. and teams from a similar organization in Great Britain, the National Artillery Association, heightened the interest of gunners in their work and on both occasions the Canadian team was superior.

The Canadian Artillery Association also dealt directly with the government to gain improvements in the artillery.
Annual meetings of the organization were often the occasions for important policy discussions with headquarters officers, such as in 1905 when the Master General of Ordnance, Colonel Cotton, made public the planned reorganization of the Canadian artillery. Drawing from the views of its members, the Council of the C.A.A. each year sent to Militia Council a series of recommendations on how to improve the artillery. In this way the artillery training period was extended to 16 days from 12 days.

The C.A.A. was the first officers' association, but the military enthusiasm of the decade before the First World War saw the formation of such organizations in other arms of the service. Facilitating this process was the convenient gathering in Ottawa of militia officers and politicians occasioned by the annual meeting in the same week of the C.A.A. and D.R.A. In 1906, the Association of Officers of the Medical Corps was formed and soon began meeting in Ottawa at the same time as the C.A.A. and D.R.A. In 1907, officers of the Corps of Guides, although not yet forming an association, decided to meet in Ottawa during the same period to present papers on military subjects. The Canadian Military Gazette found it significant that these groups chose the same place and time for their meetings and in 1908 labelled the annual occurrence military week. The journal considered the choice of the last week in February for the gathering appropriate because it was coincidental with the Canadian victory of Paardeberg in the South African War. The idea took hold, and as more officers'
associations were formed they began to participate in what became virtually a convention of military enthusiasts. 96

Several new associations of military officers were formed between 1910 and 1914 headed by prominent military officers. The Corps of Guides founded a formal organization in 1910 called The Guides Association of Canada, and General Otter was elected president. That same week officers of the Canadian Army Service Corps gathered in Ottawa, formed an association and elected as president Lt. Col. J. L. Biggar, then Director of Transport and Supply at headquarters. This association followed the example of the Guides in presenting learned papers but also passed a series of resolutions on how to ameliorate its branch of the service. 97 In May 1910, cavalry officers attending a special course for senior officers at Stanley Barracks in Toronto founded a Canadian Cavalry Association electing as president the South African war hero Lt. Col. R. E. Turner, V.C., then commanding a cavalry brigade in the Eastern Townships. 98 In February 1911, the Cavalry Association gathered for the first time during military week. The executive reported to its members that during the summer it had gathered views from officers attending camps on changes needed to better the cavalry and had forwarded a series of resolutions to Militia Council which had met with mixed success. 99 In 1912, the Canadian Engineers followed the trend organizing The Military Engineers of Canada association during military week in Ottawa. A group of Ontario infantry officers formed the Second Divisional Officers' Association in 1911 101 which met
during military week. But attempts to create a national body of infantry officers failed in the pre-war period, although a central committee was organized for this purpose in 1913 under the presidency of Col. Sir Henry Pellatt.

In the few years before the war, the officers' associations were active voicing opinion of military policy, creating social bonds among members and fostering professional development. There was increased consciousness among the militia officers that they could influence military policy by speaking through their associations. This type of participatory democracy within the military establishment was attractive to Sam Hughes, and he responded by holding the military conferences in 1911 and 1913, in the course of which officers contributed their views individually and through their organizations. Subjects up for discussion ranged from the adequacy of militia pay levels to the efficiency of military training for youths. The officers' associations also had a useful social function. In the view of the Canadian Military Gazette this was their most important role because the gatherings during military week strengthened greatly that ever elusive factor within the military, esprit de corps. With regard to professional development each organization tried to advance the knowledge of member officers through the presentation at annual meetings of papers concerning its branch of the militia.

The Association of Medical Officers was probably most active in professional development which led to additional voluntary medical support for the militia. In 1913, at
their annual convention during military week, the main dis-
cussion concerned the mundane yet vital topic "Marching and
the Soldier's Foot." Not content simply to work within
the boundaries of their own small group, Canadian military
doctors participated in meetings and conventions of the
Army and Navy Section of the British Medical Association,
the Naval and Military Section of the International Congress
of Medicine and the Association of Military Surgeons of the
United States. Within Canada, the military doctors organized
a section of Military Hygiene of the Canadian Public Health
Association and participated in the work of the Canadian
Medical Association to the point of even demonstrating to
its members the application of military medicine at a summer
camp. In 1911, cooperation between the military medical
establishment and St. John Ambulance Society and the Cana-
dian Red Cross evolved into a scheme whereby the latter two
organizations would provide voluntary aid detachments to the
militia in time of war.

Indirect, but nevertheless real, was the support given
to the military establishment by women's groups during this
period. To aid their cause for prohibition the Women's
Christian Temperance Union provided militia units with
healthful and respectable diversions in and out of camp.
The Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire also fav-
ocured the militia even to the point of organizing local
chapters in connection with regiments, a type of women's
auxiliary. When Sam Hughes held his Second Military
Conference in 1913, he invited representatives from numerous
women's groups including National Council of Women, Daughters of the Empire, the Soldiers' Wives' Association, Women's Canadian Historical Association, and Women's Christian Temperance Union. Despite the jokes which were apparently bandied about concerning "Col. Sam's Amazons", the women were said to have contributed creditably to discussion at the conference. The representative from the National Council of Women felt strongly that much had been done at the conference to counter women's traditional dread of their men joining the militia and that she intended to spread her support for cadets and militia throughout her organization.

A Montreal suffragette, Agnes Chesley, argued sometime later that women owed support to the militia and that this did not equate to love of war as the military gave men discipline and patriotism.

Support of the militia by women was welcomed, but active participation was forbidden under both Borden and Hughes, even though the latter spoke occasionally at least half-seriously of girls being given military training. One cavalry regiment commander in Saskatchewan, Lt. Col. R. J. Gwynne took upon his own initiative in 1909 to organize girls into first aid detachments, in some cases mounted, for his cadet corps. However, when he tried to obtain official approval of his scheme he was flatly refused by headquarters in Ottawa. Ladies in Quebec, Halifax and Toronto organized rifles clubs and in the latter case sought official recognition and assistance from the militia department which was not forthcoming. The redoubtable Colonel S.B. Steele,
whose military and N.W.M.P. exploits made him almost legendary in Canada, argued in 1913 for a national organization of girl cadets which would not only assist the military but benefit the members with physical and mental activity. The idea was turned down, the Director of Medical Services, Col. Jones, remarking that older girls could join the St. John Ambulance or some such organization and younger girls should stay at home. The military enthusiasm of the pre-war decade was not strong enough to overturn the stereotype of woman as homemaker.

There also existed in Canada at this time several private clubs for military officers, performing a social function and with some pretending to aim towards professional development. The Canadian Military Institute in Toronto, and the Military Institute in Montreal, were of this genre, and in 1910 a third institute was organized in imitation at Winnipeg. The Royal Military College Club of Canada was, and is, made up of alumni of the college who continued in association for mutual benefit to forward the interest of their alma mater and to keep up with the evolution of military thinking. The Garrison Club of Quebec City was a most prestigious social organization with a military tone, but laid no claim to fostering military studies. All of these associations were active during this decade, but from the Canadian Military Institute of Toronto there emanated a movement which may be the most extreme expression of militarism in the history of Canada, The Canadian Defence League.
The Canadian Military Institute was founded in Toronto in 1890 to serve as a club for military officers and ex-officers, offering social activities as well as an intellectual approach to military affairs which included the annual publication of selected papers. In 1905, the club had about 350 members, mostly from Ontario, and was ambitiously engaged in building a fine new building. 121 In that year the institute elected a new president, Lt. Col. W. H. Merritt, son of the man who built the Welland Canal. Merritt was a military enthusiast who, in 1905, took the trouble to travel to Switzerland to view that country's militia on manoeuvres. That voyage occasioned the germination in Merritt's mind of a plan to promote universal military service in Canada, an issue of great relevance at that time in western Europe, England and the dominions. 122

On 2 April 1909, Lt. Col. Merritt made public his plan for universal compulsory service for Canada in a lengthy address to the members of the Canadian Military Institute. Coining the term "Patriotic Military Service", the title of his speech, he explained and praised the military system of Switzerland whereby all young men undergo militia training of an intensive yet part-time nature and suggested that a form of this system be adopted by the Canadian government. The benefits were evident. Not only would compulsory service strengthen the physical and moral fibre of Canadian youth and ensure assimilation of immigrants, but would safeguard Canada from invasion and make her a strong force within the British empire. The type of compulsory military
service envisaged, was training for boys in drill, rifle-shooting and physical education in the schools up to the age of 18. This was to be followed by four years in the militia, consisting of three months training the first year and up to sixteen days in succeeding years. Implied in the speech and pointedly stated in the subsequent discussion was the great need for Canada to prepare to defend herself against the powerful and menacing United States.123

Merritt’s speech inspired action, and the following month a meeting was held in Toronto, presided over by the Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario, Colonel the Honourable J. M. Gibson, which resulted in the founding of the Canadian Defence League. The first object of the league was "To maintain Canadian nationality and keep the British connection". Apart from this patriotic enthusiasm the league was pledged to propagandize in an apolitical fashion for the adoption of universal military training in Canada and to cooperate with the existing system of youth training in the schools. The movement never attracted great numbers of people at least to formal membership (only 800 in 1912), but did receive the support of many prominent Canadians mainly in Toronto but also in other parts of Canada. The Patron of the association was Lord Strathcona and listed among the Honourary Presidents were Rev. A. Carman, D.D., General Superintendent of the Methodist Church of Canada, Sir James Whitney, Premier of Ontario, Hon. F. Osler, President of General Trusts Corporation and Hon. P. Landry, Speaker of the Senate. The working executive was headed by Lt. Col.
Merritt as president supported by an array of senior military officers. The movement also won the approval of Toronto educationalists including James Hughes and a number of professors from the University of Toronto. In 1911, the league sponsored a series of lectures at the University of Toronto for the students on military subjects. To carry on the publicity campaign, a periodical Canadian Field was begun in 1911 (renamed the next year Canadian Defence), and a booklet was published in 1913 for free distribution across the country.

As Carl Berger has indicated, the Canadian Defence League did attract the participation of imperialists with rhetoric of imperial solidarity; the spectre of American aggression loomed large in the rationale of Patriotic Military Service. The Canadian Field took a firm stand on the need to prepare for American invasion. In an editorial the journal of the Canadian Defence League pronounced the planned celebration of a century of peace between the United States and Canada as a sham, providing as evidence those Canadians who bear the scars of Fenian bullets. Warning that the U.S. was a hostile nation greedy for her neighbour's natural resources, the editorial urged against participation in the Centenary which would only indicate weakness of resolve. On another occasion the journal revealed that the United States was known to have plans to convert the many steel-clad vessels in the Great Lakes into warships for the invasion of Canada. Colonel Merritt as president of the league attempted to impress on Prime Minister Robert Borden
the importance of implementing universal service to provide enough men to defend the lengthy border. He urged that a special commission be initiated to report on the Swiss military system and advised that the defence of Canada must be considered apart from the defence of the empire as a whole.130

This question of compulsory military service was well aired in military circles in the several years immediately preceding the war. Brought up at the 1911 military conference, universal service had its advocates, but also those who warned that it would not be acceptable to all Canadians.131 Supporters of the movement had increased by the 1913 conference, but were still outnumbered by those who felt that the cadet movement would ultimately provide sufficient manpower for the militia.132 The Canadian Military Gazette wavered on the question. The journal flirted with the prospect from time to time but admitting candidly that compulsory service had very little public support stopped short of advocating it.133 General Otter offered a form of compromise in 1914 when he declared for compulsory military training in the schools and universities, winning the approval of the Gazette.134

Though there was no more ardent promoter of military service, Sam Hughes had all his life sung the praises of the volunteer ideal, and he resisted the notion of compulsion. The Conservative minister kept his faith that Canadians were anxious to do their military duty and not only pointed to the growing cadet movement as proof, but made extravagant
claims that only budgetary restrictions prevented his en-
rolling in the militia 50,000 to 75,000 more military en-
thusiasts. Adverse comparisons to the military systems
of other countries using compulsion did not impress Hughes
as he felt that Canadian militia units could hold their own
with the best forces in the world.

The Canadian Defence League turned out to be a short-
lived phenomenon, virtually collapsing in the year before
the First World War. The immediate cause of the organ-
ization's downfall was its failure to resolve some finan-
cial difficulties. The root cause was that the idea of
compulsory military training appealed only to very few
Canadians. Military and paramilitary enthusiasm in Canada
was based firmly on the notion of volunteer service as an
expression of manhood and patriotism. Compulsory service
was a foreign concept at this time and did not transfer
well to Canada.

Another manifestation of civilian interest in military
activity in Canada was the importation of a British para-
military organization, the Legion of Frontiersmen. The
group was founded in England in 1905 with the aim of producing
a paramilitary support group for the army of men skilled in
field intelligence and with trades useful to the military.
The intent was to enroll discharged veterans of imperial
service with experience in the field. Permission was
granted by British authorities for members to wear uniforms
and bear arms. A Canadian Dominion Commissioner for the
legion requested similar recognition from the Militia Council
and received it in 1908 on the condition that the group not interfere in any way with militia recruitment. There is little detail on the group's activities in Canada, but the first chapter was opened in Hamilton, Ontario in 1911. There, apparently, membership was not restricted to veterans and frontiersmen, but was open to all men. A simple military-type uniform was prescribed, and the group declared its intent to support the militia in any emergency. Other branches of the legion sprang up in the west at Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Vancouver, Calgary and Nelson, B.C., and gained recognition by the militia department as civilian rifle associations.

There were many paramilitary activities in the decade before the First World War in Canada. About 100,000 boys and men were enrolled in rifle associations and cadet corps. Many more received a flavour of military activity through the physical training in schools or in the boy scouts. Military enthusiasts banded together in officers' associations, private clubs and lobby groups promoting the military ideal. Paramilitary organizations even found favour among French Canadians who were suspicious of the trappings and commitment of regular military service. Although women were not admitted to direct participation in paramilitary activity, their support was readily accepted.

Essentially this paramilitary activity was an expression of nationalism. Canadians entered the twentieth century with great optimism about the future place of their country in the world, and military fanfare accompanied the turn of
the century. Canadian troops, in the public mind, had performed well in the South African war. By 1904, the Canadian government was assuming control of national defence within the empire as a responsible dominion and encouraging its citizens to share the burden through military or paramilitary service. Also drill and discipline were considered most desirable for youth who learned to subjugate individuality to the regulation of society. Such attitudes were soon to be challenged, but probably sustained many Canadians through the grim reality of the First World War.
Endnotes - Chapter 7.


3 See Chapter 2, pp. 54-63.


5 PAC, RG 24, V. 150, HQ 9879-2, V. 1, p. 79, J.L. Hughes at Military Conference, 1911.

6 Debates, 29 May 1903, pp. 3767-73. The military rifle clubs also belonged concurrently to the Canadian Rifle League.

7 Debates, 11 March 1901, pp. 1281-86; and Canadian Annual Review, 1902, p. 191.

8 Debates, 8 October 1903, p. 13385.

9 Canada, Laws and Statutes, 1904, 4 Edward VII, 1904. An Act Respecting the Militia of Canada, Sections 63 and 64.

10 CMG, 14 March 1905, p. 10.

11 DMD Annual Report, 1911-12, pp. 107-09.

12 CMG, 12 March 1912, p. 8.

13 Debates, 6 June 1914, p. 5022. No doubt the purchase of lands and building of facilities for these ranges was also a useful way of distributing patronage in many areas. But no evidence was uncovered of political or personal advantage determining the selection of sites.

14 Minutes, 11 February 1910, p. 4.

15 Ibid., 1 August 1911, p. 13.

16 Ibid., 10 January 1907, p. 4.

17 Figures of $38,000 in 1903 and $79,505 in 1914 include grants to the Canadian Artillery Association and to military bands. See DMD Annual Reports.
18 Minutes, 28 April 1908, pp. 3-4.
19 DMD Annual Report, 1903, p. 35.
20 Ibid., 1910-11, pp. 11-12.
22 Morton, "The Cadet Movement...", p. 66.
23 See Chapter 5, p. 194.
24 CMG, 31 January 1905, p. 5.
25 Debates, 8 February 1911, p. 3219, and 20 April 1911, p. 7340.
27 Minutes, 23 May 1905, p. 9, and 27 September 1907, pp. 7-8.
28 See Chapter 5, pp. 239-252.
29 CMG, 29 September 1913, p. 7.
30 CMG, 23 August 1904, p. 11, and 9 September 1913, p. 5.
31 Debates, 24 July 1911, pp. 9996-98.
32 CMG, 12 March 1907, p. 7.
33 CMG, 12 March 1912, p. 7.
35 PAC, RG 24, V. 1851, file 7.
36 Morton, "The Cadet Movement...", pp. 56-60.
37 Ibid., p. 59, and, PAC, RG 24, V. 1851, file 7.
38 Debates, 8 October 1903, pp. 3404-05.
39 DMD Annual Report, 1903, p. 38.
40 PAC, RG 9, II, B 2, V. 58, GO 163, 1903.
41 Militia Act, 1904, paras 65 to 68.
42 Minutes, 10 January 1907, p. 4, and 5 March 1907, p. 8.
43 DMD Annual Report, 1907-08, p. 16.
44 QML, April 1904, after index.
45 Debates, 10 July 1905, p. 9119.
46 Ibid., (unrevised), 2 April 1907, p. 5783.
47 DMD Annual Report, 1908-09, p. 15.
48 Minutes, 27 January 1909, p. 4.
49 PANS, 3 February 1909; FB. Papers, MG 2, V. 125, pp. 396-7.
50 Strathcona to Borden, 13 March 1909, quoted in 24 March 1909, Minutes, p. 7.
52 Debates, 9 March 1909, pp. 2252-4.
55 Minutes, 14 January 1910, p. 9.
57 Ibid., Borden to Strathcona, 28 June 1911, V. 177, p. 14856/F1.
58 CMG, 10 October 1911, p. 5.
59 Morton, "The Cadet Movement...", pp. 58 and 64.
60 Minutes, 19 December 1911, p. 5.
61 CMG, 6 March 1912, p. 3.
62 CMG, 28 May 1912, p. 6.
63 CMG, 10 April 1912, p. 6.
64 Debates, 26 March 1912, p. 6062.
65 CMG, 11 March 1913, pp. 6-7.
67 Debates, 7 May 1914, p. 3403-10.
68 PAC, RG 24, V. 1851, file 7.
69 Debates, 7 May 1914, p. 3402.
70 Official Account of Military Conference, 17 November 1911, p. 54.
71 CMG, 26 April 1910, p. 11.
72 Canon Dauth at 1911 Military Conference, Official Account, pp. 58-59; and see Chapter 5, p. 248.
73 CMG, 28 May 1912, p. 7.
74 Debates, 1 June 1914, p. 4592.
75 Morton, "The Cadet Movement...", p. 58.
76 PAC, RG 24, V. 1851; file 7.
77 PAC; Library Pamphlet, Canadian Boy Scout, 1910, p. 5.
79 Minutes, 26 April 1910, p. 7.
80 DMD Annual Report, 1909-10, p. 22.
81 PANS, Borden to Otter, 9 May 1910, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 130, pp. 189-90.
82 Pamphlet, Canadian Boy Scout, p. 3.
83 CMG, 26 July 1910, pp. 1213.
84 CMG, 11 October 1910, p. 15.
85 PANS, Unidentified correspondent, probably Lt. Col. R.J. Gwynne, to u/i General, 30 July 1911, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 177, p. 14978/F1.
86 CMG, 22 August 1911, p. 5.
87 C.A.A. Annual Report, 1904, p. 9.
89 CMG, 13 March 1906, pp. 13-4.
91 CMG, 28 February 1905, p. 10.
92 CMG, 14 March 1905, p. 11.
93 A similar association had existed briefly in 1892, but had quickly dissolved when the GOC forbade it to meet because it had had the audacity to forward recommendations on improving the medical service.
94 CMG, 10 March 1908, p. 7.
95 CMG, 11 February 1908, p. 7.
96 CMG, 9 March 1909, p. 5.
97 CMG, 8 March 1910, pp. 8-9.
98 CMG, 24 May 1910, p. 8.
99 CMG, 14 March 1911, pp. 10-11.
100 CMG, 26 March 1912, p. 18.
101 CMG, 8 August 1911, p. 5.
103 CMG, 11 March 1913, p. 9.
104 CMG, 23 April 1912, p. 5.
106 CMG, 26 December 1911, p. 5.
108 Ibid., 1911-12, p. 57.
109 Ibid., 1913-14, pp. 60-1.
110 CMG, 14 July 1908, p. 9. See Chapter 5, p. 221.
111 CMG, 13 April 1909, p. 16.
112 CMG, 11 March 1913, p. 5.
113 CMG, 25 March 1913, p. 6.
114 CMG, 14 October 1913, pp. 6-8.
115 Debates, 11 July 1905, p. 9192.
116 Gwynne also trained boy scouts. See same chapter, p. 325.
117 Minutes, 22 March 1910, p. 3.
118 PAC, RG 24, V. 26, HQ. 2-20-14.
119 Minutes, 8 March 1910, pp. 7-8.
120 The RMC Club of Canada Proceedings, 1908, p. 377.
121 CMG, 24 October 1905, p. 6.
122 W. H. Merritt, Canada and National Service, Toronto, 1917, pp. V-VII.
125 CMI Transactions, 1909, p. 45.
126 Canadian Annual Review, 1911, p. 352.
128 The Canadian Field, November 1910, pp. 3-4, found in PAC, Fotheringham Papers, MG 30, G 5, V. 5, file 25.
129 Ibid., December 1910, pp. 4-5.
130 PAC, Merritt to R. Borden, 29 July 1912, R. Borden Papers, MG 26H, OCA series, C 288, file 211 A.
131 Official Account of Military Conference, 18 November 1911, p. 123.
132 CMG, 11 March 1913, pp. 5 and 7.
133 CMG, 28 January 1913, pp. 5-6.
134 CMG, 27 January 1914, p. 5.
135 CMG, 22 July 1913, p. 9, and, Canadian Annual Review, 1913, p. 216.
136 Debates, 27 May 1913, p. 11049.
137 PAC, Fotheringham Papers, MG 30, G 5, V. 5, File 25.
138 Minutes, 23 October 1907, pp. 10-11, and 16 February 1908, p. 4.

139 CMG, 28 February 1911, p. 8.

140 QML, September 1914, pp. 604-07.
CONCLUSION

The Canadian military grew considerably in the ten years before the First World War. In the previous three decades the military in Canada had stagnated, the victim of government neglect. This changed due to an increase in government support and public interest, with the number of men participating in some form of military activity more than doubling. Not only did the principal defence organization, the Non-Permanent Active Militia, expand but so did the Permanent Force which trained the volunteers and garrisoned fortifications. To support the militia, paramilitary organizations also blossomed which would feed their members into the militia in peace or in war. This growth in size was accompanied by a considerable increase in expenditure to provide the military with better arms, clothing, equipment and facilities.

The most important single reason for this growth was the climate of ebullient nationalism flavoured with a spirit of military adventurism which existed in Canada. Canadians entered the twentieth century acutely aware of their country's potential greatness. New vigour was injected into an existing pride in a militia volunteer force by a perceived glorious record of service in South Africa. Coincidentally, Great Britain was forced by dangers in Europe to withdraw its remaining military forces from North America, leaving Canada to defend herself. Finally, Canadians were ready to face their primary military responsibility, defence of the country against their traditional and only threat, the United States.
Canadian historians have unanimously attributed the pre-war increase of military activity in Canada to preparation for the European conflict. Richard Preston has produced a lengthy historical study of Canadian defence policy which concludes that in this period Canada gave less and less thought to war against the United States and more to participation in imperial defence. His arguments seem persuasive. Great Britain was coming to terms with the United States as a world power. Outstanding issues between Canada and the United States were being amicably resolved, and a spirit of cooperation was developing. Most English Canadians were prepared to support the empire with military aid. Preliminary measures were taken in Great Britain and Canada to standardize the forces in organization, arms and equipment, in case they might serve together in time of war.\textsuperscript{1} Preston concludes that these factors were signs of a "strategic revolution"\textsuperscript{2}, whereby Canada and the United States lost their concern about their common border and began preparing for war in Europe. This thesis is tempting, but does not fit with Canada's military posture during this period.

The truth is that Preston places the reconciliation of Canada and the United States a decade too early. He dismisses too easily evidence that he himself presents that there was a legacy of resentment and suspicion of the United States in Canada, caused by the near war of 1895 over Venezuela and the unfavourable settlement in 1903 of the Alaskan boundary dispute. Furthermore, issues like U.S. warships on the Great Lakes and fisheries disputes continued to raise the spectre of American aggression.
in the minds of Canadians. Preston unfairly characterizes Charles Cahan's warning to prepare for invasion from the U.S. as a deception aimed at readying the militia for an overseas war. In fact, most of Cahan's fellow imperialists shared the belief that Canada's first duty to the empire was self-defence against the United States. But most importantly, Preston ignores the evidence of Canadian military organization and planning in identifying the enemy.

For many years the British government had been urging the Canadian government to take a larger share in the responsibility for defence against the United States. Finally, after the South African war, the Canadian government chose to assume the burden of home defence, rather than to commit forces to imperial service overseas. Then, for the next decade, the Department of Militia and Defence worked to build a force capable of withstanding invasion from the United States. This is evident from the intelligence and defence planning conducted to support general mobilization. Only later in the decade, as the menace of Germany grew more evident, was some scant attention given to planning for the dispatch of a Canadian contingent overseas.

To meet the responsibility for national defence, military and civil authorities designed a force uniquely suited to Canadian tradition and resources. Canadians had long been proud of the military record of their part-time militia, a pride reinforced by distinguished service of the Canadian contingents in the South African war. Moreover, the military lesson of that conflict seemed to confirm that citizen volunteers with minimal training
could defeat professional mercenaries. Given this tradition and limited resources to commit to defence, the Canadian government developed the concept of a citizens' army to protect this country. Military and paramilitary training was encouraged for male citizens to ready them to take their places in a field army which would be mobilized if Canada were invaded. The Non-Permanent Active Militia would form the nucleus of the organization of this army, and its strength would be provided by the determination of the volunteers.

The Canadian military was not just a defensive force, it was a social institution attracting men for diverse reasons. Commissions in the permanent and non-permanent militia were often sought by men who were less interested in obtaining proper qualifications than in the social recognition which came with rank. Men, mostly immigrants from the British Isles, joined the ranks of the Permanent Force usually as a temporary refuge and left or deserted for better prospects. The Non-Permanent Active Militia attracted English Canadians who sought change and amusement at camps and armouries. Paramilitary organizations also fulfilled the desire of many for display and diversion, particularly French Canadians who sought to express their martial tradition.

To develop a self-sufficient military force in Canada the government encouraged the local manufacture of arms, supplies and facilities. Greatly increased expenditures were made in Canada, stimulating production of almost everything except artillery which still came from England. While it was economically advisable to spend in Canada, some of the practices connected with granting contracts were open to abuse. Political and personal
friends of the government were able to secure lucrative contracts without competition. And though a great deal of money was spent to house militia units, many ostentatious buildings were erected more as monuments to government benefice than to meet the real needs of the military. Perhaps the greatest mistake was an honest one, the choice of the Ross rifle as the national arm. A sharpshooter's rifle, the Ross might have served to keep invading Americans at bay, but was unsuitable for the mass attacks of an unforeseen European war.

Canada is, and was, a pluralistic society, and the spirit of nationalism and military enthusiasm which affected many Canadians during the period was not shared by all. This growth of the military in Canada met opposition from some farmer groups who suspected that it was a manifestation of jingoism and from organized labour which resented the military's interference in strikes. Peace societies were organized which sought resolution to world problems through conciliation rather than contests of military might. Committees were even formed to celebrate the century of peace with the United States despite historical evidence of border incursions and hostility. Most French Canadians stood warily apart from service in the militia, alienated by its use of the English language and British traditions and afraid of being required to fight an imperial war. Such sentiments may have impaired, but did not block, the increase of military activity.

Much of the credit for the growth of the military can be attributed to one man, Frederick Borden. Acting on the advice of his professional officers, Borden as Minister of Militia and Defence organized the military into a potential citizens' army of
Canadians willing to defend their country. He removed control over the militia from the British and created a Militia Council responsible to the minister to supervise its development. He oversaw the growth of the Permanent Force in size and in variety of services and committed them to replacement of the British soldiers on this soil. Similarly, he expanded the Non-Permanent Active Militia and offered its members continuity of training and concentration on basic military skills. He raised the role of the rifle associations to a primary support group of the militia in case of war. Borden also brought into existence a scheme of physical and military training for youth resulting in the rapid expansion of the cadet movement, the nursery of the military. To achieve all this and to provide adequate arms, stores and facilities, Borden fought for and won expanded budgets for his department. His accomplishment was remarkable compared to the past government neglect.

Borden's success in developing the military owes a debt to Sam Hughes. Long a supporter of expansion of the volunteer military organizations, Hughes was an important ally in the opposition ranks helping to forward the programme. Then, when he became Minister of Militia and Defence himself, Hughes maintained the direction and momentum of development. Only in his extreme suspicion of the Permanent Force did Hughes differ essentially from his predecessor concerning military policy.

Although one can describe the growth and development of the military, it is more difficult to judge the significance of this expansion. Professional officers worked hard during this period to upgrade the efficiency of the military with improved organization, arms, and equipment, better training and education,
and preparations for general mobilization. And strong was the faith of Canadians that if a good organization plan existed for a defence force and there were plenty of modern arms available, Canadian volunteers would more than make up for their lack of experience with their courage. As it turned out, military planning in this decade was for the wrong war, and the theoretical citizens' army against invasion was never put to the ultimate test. To turn the military institution around to face a war in Europe, military planners had to start almost at the beginning again in organization and training. But perhaps what facilitated this difficult task was the willingness of many Canadians to fight, in part the result of a pre-war decade of military conditioning.
Endnotes – Conclusion

1 Preston, The Defence of the Undefended Border, pp. 149-211.

2 Ibid., p. 209.

3 G.M. Wrong to the Editor, The Spectator (London), 17 November 1906, pp. 783-84.

4 CMG, 27 December 1910, pp. 5-6; Canadian Annual Review, 1913, p. 29.

5 CMG, 26 October 1909, pp. 5-6; Canadian Annual Review, 1913, p. 745; PANS, King to Borden, 10 June 1914, FB Papers, MG 2, V. 188, p. 18203/F1.

6 Canadian Annual Review, 1914, pp. 132-42.
APPENDIX A

Desertions and discharges by purchase from the Permanent Force.

Figures taken from the Annual Reports of the Department of Militia and Defence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>P.F. strength</th>
<th>Desertions</th>
<th>Discharges by Purchase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>2058</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>2267</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 months ending</td>
<td>2737</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 1907</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year ending</td>
<td>2820</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 1908</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year ending</td>
<td>2588</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 1909</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year ending</td>
<td>2844</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 1910</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year ending</td>
<td>3069</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 1911</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year ending</td>
<td>3118</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 1912</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year ending</td>
<td>2900</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 1913</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year ending</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 1914</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B

Total Expenditure for the Department of Militia and Defence, 1903-1913

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>$3,603,714.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>$4,012,742.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>$5,664,192.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>$4,377,309.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>$6,871,397.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>$6,578,574.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>$6,166,658.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>$7,067,723.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>$7,794,671.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>$10,342,779.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>$12,082,310.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures are taken from the Reports of the Auditor-General for the appropriate fiscal years. Before 1906, the fiscal year ran from July to June and after that from April to March. The figure given for 1906 is, therefore, only for the nine months 1 June 1906 to 31 March 1907 and does not represent a reduction in the level of expenditures. A figure is not given for 1914 because war appropriation makes it meaningless for the purpose of this study.
## APPENDIX C

Number of Principal Articles Held by Canadian Militia in 1913 Compared to Numbers Required for General Mobilization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Total requirements</th>
<th>Total on hand</th>
<th>Required to complete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(13-pdr. QF)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns, (18-pdr.)</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(heavy artillery)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzers</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>102,362</td>
<td>97,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13-pdr. QF)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(18-pdr. QF)</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(heavy artillery)</td>
<td>244,000</td>
<td>71,000</td>
<td>173,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(howitzer, QF)</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(small arm QF)</td>
<td>200,000,000</td>
<td>55,200,707</td>
<td>144,799,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackets, drab</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>7,800</td>
<td>192,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trousers, drab</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>138,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caps, drab</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>192,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatcoats, drab</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>46,400</td>
<td>103,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloaks</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>22,700</td>
<td>37,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breeches</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>32,500</td>
<td>27,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leggings, prs.</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>64,000</td>
<td>86,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web, or valise, equipment sets</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>114,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water bottles</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>61,000</td>
<td>139,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mess tins</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>145,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandoliers</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>12,200</td>
<td>37,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implements, entrenching</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saddlery, sets</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallets, prs.</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>17,800</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckets, rifle</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>10,300</td>
<td>9,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kettles, camp</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>11,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Picketing gear, sets</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sheets, ground</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>103,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farriers' tools, sets</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saddlers' tools, sets</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forges, field</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blankets</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>91,000</td>
<td>59,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wire cutters</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4,980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table is drawn from General Hamilton, Report on the Military Institutions of Canada, Ottawa, 1913, p. 38.
APPENDIX D

A Note on Secondary Sources

The historical literature on the Canadian militia between 1867 and 1914 is extensive including numerous regimental histories. Moreover, some of the most useful works are not well known and others are not published.

In a way George T. Denison exemplifies the successful Canadian NPAM officer in the Pre-First World War era, and his autobiographical *Soldiering in Canada*\(^1\) provides a first hand account of the early evolution of the volunteer force. Denison was for several decades almost a stock military character on the Canadian political stage, ever ready to battle with politicians on issues of import armed with what he considered the military virtues of loyalty, honour and forthrightness. Lacking the advantages of much formal education in military service, Denison by dint of self-instruction produced an excellent work entitled *The History of the Cavalry*\(^2\) which won a prize from the Czar of Russia and was translated into Russian and German. In *Soldiering in Canada* Denison describes segments of the militia in various stages of development and in the recounting gives a revealing picture of a Canadian gentleman who seeks social recognition through the militia. His imperial enthusiasm is decidedly linked with his military adventurism, and his pride in the Canadian military is ever sensitive to pretensions of superiority emanating from British officers.

Indicative of rising public enthusiasm for military activity in Canada in the period immediately preceding the First
World War, there were a number of works published tracing the history of the Canadian militia. Ernest J. Chambers (at various stages in his career, journalist, senior militia officer, prominent parliamentary functionary and senior civil servant) included in his numerous publications ten books on the Canadian militia. Most of these were regimental or unit histories of an organizational nature, but two deserve specific mention: The Canadian Militia: A History of the Origin and Development of the Force accomplished what the title claims from the British Conquest to the beginning of the twentieth century; and, The Origins and Services of the Prince of Wales Regiment: a Brief History of the Militia of French Canada and of the Canadian Militia is a partially successful attempt to explain French Canadian service in the Canadian military. C.P. Hamilton, a Toronto journalist and a war correspondent during the South African War, wrote the military section in A. Shortt and A. Doughty, Canada and its Provinces, which was a combination of conscientious tracing of organizational development with proud attention to glorious accomplishments in battle. Shortly before the war Charles Robinson, a Canadian retired from a successful career in the British Army, wrote Canada and Canadian Defence which pointed out that the rationale for Canadian military preparedness rested on the historical continuance of the American menace. Then, in the course of the First World War, a series on Canadian participation in the conflict was started with the first volume tracing Canada's previous military history with heavy emphasis on glorious episodes; E.J. Chambers and Lawrence J. Burpee, the prominent scholar and civil servant, were the chief contributors.
Before the war there were also several excellent works in French on the Canadian militia. Gaston Labat, who had been born in France and served in the French army before emigrating to Canada to become a journalist, put together two books on Canadian participation in imperial wars. These volumes deserve recognition not for historical analysis but for conveying a sense of the part played by seigneurial and ecclesiastical traditions in the military duty French Canadians owed their country. This cultural tradition was given explanation and amplification in *Histoire de la Milice Canadienne - francaise, 1760-1897* by Benjamin Sulte, a French Canadian historian and an official of the Militia and Defence Department. Countering the cultural inclination of these works was *Les Milices - francaises et angleises au Canada, 1627-1900* by a French observer, G.N. Tricoche, who described the organization and operation of the militia force with great attention to detail.

Since the First World War most of the scholarly treatments of the history of the Canadian militia have been produced by individuals associated with the Directorate of History of the Department of National Defence. During the period between the world wars most of the directorate's efforts went into preparing material for A.P. Duquid's *Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-19*. Only one narrative and one appendix volume of a planned series appeared before the Second World War brought an end to the project. Though the published volumes dealt primarily with the
the first year of war, information supplied on the pre-war condition of the Canadian militia is useful. Also in the between war period another member of the staff of the Directorate of History, J.F. Cummins, compiled a lengthy narrative history on the development and exploits of the Canadian militia. Though this excellent work was never published it is available to researchers.12

After the Second World War Charles Stacey was appointed to direct the historical section at the Department of National Defence, and his scholarship set a new standard for the writing of Canadian military history. Though Stacey has not yet devoted himself directly to a study of the Canadian Militia between Confederation and the First World War, many of his numerous works provide essential insights into the politics and organization of the Canadian military, especially An Introduction to the Study of Military History for a Canadian Student and, The Undefended Border: The Myth and the Reality.13 Two of Stacey's colleagues at the Directorate of History, G.F.G. Stanley and D.J. Goodspeed, have distinguished themselves as historians and made significant contributions to the story of the Canadian militia. Stanley's Canada's Soldiers14 is a survey history of the Canadian militia derived principally from secondary sources and research conducted by others. This book owes a great debt to the work of J.F. Cummins, whose contribution is referred to in its preface. D.J. Goodspeed produced a survey history of the armed forces from 1867 to 1967.15 Also based largely on secondary sources, Goodspeed's book is valuable in placing the
Canadian militia within the context of the overall development
of the nation's defence forces.

Richard A. Preston, for many years professor of history
at Royal Military College, has produced several works of
great value on the Canadian militia. Chief among these is
Canada and "Imperial Defense", covering the years 1867 to 1919,
which details the relationship between imperial defence planning
and the development of the Canadian militia. The evidence pre-
presented by Preston tends to support the idea that the growth of
military activity in Canada was directly caused by the spectre
of a European war. Also important is Preston's Canada's RMC, the
story of the Royal Military College's role in providing edu-
cated leadership for the Canadian militia. Preston has also
produced a useful study of defence planning in North America
which does, however, fail to assess properly the role of the
Canadian militia in the decade before the First World War.

A 1959 graduate of RMC and a Rhodes Scholar who later
served under Stacey at the Directorate of History, Desmond
Morton has brought fresh new light to bear on the Canadian
militia within the last few years. Though never rejecting
the traditional assumptions of Canadian military historians
that the duty for military service fell on all Canadian
men and honour lay in its fulfillment, Morton's introduction
of social criteria to his work has placed some qualifications
on this premise. He points out that French Canadians were
never able to feel comfortable with an institution which ex-
cluded their tongue and their traditions. Further he contends
that the co-operation between the government and the private
economic sector resulted in the occasional use of the Canadian militia to stifle valid social and class protest. He implies that membership in, or alienation from, the militia was often more dependent on social factors than on the presence or absence of honour in an individual's character. Morton's *Ministers and Generals* traces the history of the Canadian militia from 1868 to 1904, using the office of the General Officer Commanding as a focal point. His *The Canadian General*, on W.D. Otter, is the only major published biography of a pre-First World War Canadian militia officer.

Recently three dissertations have given fresh views of the Canadian militia. Carman Miller's M.A. thesis concerned the political career of Sir Frederick Borden and gave an interesting biographical slant to the era of militia reform before the First World War. His observations were later condensed into an article for the *Canadian Historical Review*. Ron Haycock's treatment of Sam Hughes is a valuable companion piece, describing this man's military and political career. A recent thesis dealing with one militia regiment is Jean-Yves Gravel's *Les Voltigeurs de Québec dans la Milice Canadienne (1862-1896)* which explains the military tradition of French Canada. Gravel's work presents also a picture of the militia as a social institution manifesting the interests and values of its members.
Endnotes - Appendix D

4 E.J. Chambers, *The Origins and Services of the Prince of Wales Regiment*, Montreal, 1897.
12 PAC, RG 24, V.S 1850 to 1855.


APPENDIX E - AN OUTLINE OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION

The organization of the Canadian militia conformed in most respects in this period to that of the British army. To assist the reader in understanding this structure an outline of the British army organization is provided. But it should be cautioned that many elements of the Canadian militia in this era of growth and development varied in their conformity to this standard organization. In fact, the militia force with its many disparate components was inconsistent even in its own internal structure. For this reason the model and not the real organization must serve as a guide.¹

Infantry

Four sections to a company of about 120 men. Eight companies to a battalion. Two battalions to a brigade.

Cavalry

Four troops to a squadron of about 150 men. Three to four squadrons to a regiment. Three regiments to a brigade.

Artillery

Two guns to a section. Three sections to a battery of about 150 men. Three batteries to a brigade.

Engineers

A field company of about 150 men served with the infantry. A field troop of about 40 men served with the cavalry.

Administrative Services & Departmental Corps

Various units responsible for auxiliary services such as transport, food, ammunition, communication and medical services.

A field army such as was to defend Canada against invasion was organized into divisions. A division consisted principally of two or more brigades of infantry supported by elements of the other arms.
Endnotes - Appendix E

1 This outline is derived from information in H.J. Foster, Organization: How Armies are Formed for War, London, 1911, pp. 18-31.

2 An infantry regiment is not a tactical unit, but can group two or more battalions to express a distinctive military tradition.
Appendix F - A Note on the Imperial General Staff

After 1904, British military authorities made one more concerted attempt to exert some control over Canadian and other colonial forces. An Imperial General Staff was created, controlled by the British army high command, which was to include in lower positions key staff officers in the colonial forces. Initially the Canadian government was receptive to this idea because it seemed to ensure the professional calibre of Canadian headquarters staff officers. However, the arrangement quickly broke down when Canadian politicians realized that qualifications for the Imperial General Staff excluded top-rankigg Canadians from membership.

In 1904, Borden innocently helped lay the groundwork for the Imperial General Staff system by insisting on the British standard of training for Canadian headquarters staff. He told the House of Commons that appointments to headquarters staff would follow the British practice of being for limited periods so that officers' experience would be balanced with service in the field. Further, Borden intended within a few years to require every officer at headquarters to have been educated at the British Staff College at Camberley and hoped to arrange an officer exchange system with Great Britain. It was agreed between the British and Canadian governments in 1905 that Canadian militia officers who passed through Camberley might be employed on the army staff in India or England. In return the British Army staff Council would supply Imperial staff officers to Canada on a quid pro quo basis.

This cooperation became more formalized at the 1907 Imperial Conference when the dominions and the Mother country agreed to organize an Imperial General Staff to advise the forces of the empire on defence. This meant a linking of the Canadian and British General Staffs through exchange of officers. Laurier and Borden accepted this step only on the clear understanding that it represented no surrender of control of the Canadian military to the War Office. Five important staff officer posts in Canada were designated as belonging to the Imperial General Staff. Incumbents could be Canadian or British officers but must possess staff college qualifications and eight years of service.

This agreement did not stand long after the delegates' return to Canada. A protest came from Borden's own deputy minister, E.J. Piset, that under the terms established these important staff posts were not open to Canadian officers who had not had the opportunity to attend staff college. Borden compromised by agreeing to appoint less qualified Canadians to the posts which
while these officers served would not form part of the Imperial General Staff. Then the following year a Canadian, Brig. Gen. W.W.D. Otter, was appointed to the key Chief of the Canadian General Staff position. Otter, though an officer with an excellent reputation throughout the empire, did not possess Staff College qualification and was not accepted by the British as a member of the Imperial General Staff.

The plans for a unified highly qualified group of officers to advise the entire empire never got past the theory stage. The Imperial General Staff was legitimately conceived at the 1907 conference but as C.P. Stacey observed it "was destined to be virtually stillborn, though the British government's senior army adviser carried the imposing title of Chief of the Imperial General Staff until 1964." The Canadian Government failed to live up to the agreement because to maintain credibility in the militia system it had to reward senior officers with the important staff posts whatever their lack of professional education. And caution about commitment to this centralizing body of imperial defence was an underlying cause of the Canadian attitude.
Endnotes. Appendix E

1 Debates, 12 July 1904, p. 6528.
2 DMD Annual Report, 1905, p. 22.
3 PAC, Lyttelton to Grey, 17 April 1905, GG Records, RG 7; G 21, file 270, V. 1, Pt. 1, 1903-12.
4 Ibid., Lyttelton to Grey, 26 August 1905, Pt. 4(a), 1905-37.
5 Proceedings of the Imperial Conference of 1907, SP 58, 1907-08, pp. 94-128.
6 PAC, Minutes of Informal Conference, 30 April 1907, GG Records, RG 7, G 21, file 251, V. 1, 1900-34.
7 Minutes, 11 June 1907, pp. 4-5.
8 Minutes, 13 June 1907, p. 3.
9 PAC, Army Order 263, October 1909, in RG 24, V. 6607, H.Q. 6890.
10 C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 1867-1921, V. 1, Toronto, 1977, p. 82.
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