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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RECEU
JOHN HENRY NEWMAN,

DISCOURSES ON THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF UNIVERSITY EDUCATION, 1852,

INTRODUCTION AND ANNOTATION

VOLUME I

by

Patricia Anne Toal

A Doctoral Thesis
presented to the Faculty of Arts
Department of English, University of Ottawa
as partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

October, 1978
Ottawa, Canada

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"THE AGE TO COME"

AND JOY THE AGE TO COME WILL THINK WITH ME:

'TIS THE OLD HISTORY—TRUTH WITHOUT A HOME,

DESPISED AND SLAIN, THEN RISING FROM THE TOMB.¹

CURRICULUM VITAE

for

Patricia Anne-Steal

Bachelor of Arts, the University of Toronto

Master of Arts, the University of Ottawa
PREFACE TO THE THESIS

The Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education, Addressed to the Catholics of Dublin, by John Henry Newman (Dublin: James Duffy, 1852) is the text for the Introduction and Annotation that is the subject of this thesis. The Discourses were a projected series of lectures on university education requested of Newman by Archbishop Paul Cullen for the purpose of launching the proposed Catholic University of Ireland.

The first five lectures were given on successive Mondays, beginning at three o'clock on the afternoon of May 10, 1852, in the New Assembly Rooms ¹ of the Rotunda Hospital in Dublin. Newman wrote as follows about the audience attending the first lecture: "Mr. Duffy, whom I met in the train to Kingstown after it, said he had never seen so literary an assemblage; all the intellect, almost, of Dublin were there. There were thirteen Trinity Fellows etc., eight Jesuits, a great many clergy, and most intense attention." ² The lectures were published "in fortnightly pamphlets, the first five shortly after delivery, the

¹ The Assembly Rooms of the Rotunda were the scene of all the fashionable gatherings, musical entertainments and public meetings of Dublin in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Newman's first lecture was given in the Concert Room and the last three lectures, in the larger Exhibition Room. Fergal McGrath, Newman's University: Idea and Reality (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1951), pp. 153-154.

PREFACE TO THE THESIS

second five, ¹ with a Preface and Appendix, in the autumn of that year, 1852. They were then bound into a volume which is dated 'In Fest. Praesent. B.V.M. (November 21st) 1852,' the publisher being James Duffy of Dublin. A pencilled note in Newman's hand on the fly-leaf of one of his copies gives the actual date of publication as 'Feb. 2nd (Feast of the Purification of the B.V.M.) 1853.' ² This was the first edition, entitled: Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education Addressed to the Catholics of Dublin. This thesis is based on the material of the ten lectures that comprised the first edition, with the Preface and the Appendix.

The second edition (the first English one) was published in 1859 by Longman Green, Longman and Roberts, London. It was entitled, On the Scope and Nature of University Education. According to the "Advertisement" to the Second edition, dated November 9, 1859, Newman states that "he has removed from the text much temporary, collateral, or superfluous matter, and has thus reduced it to the size of his two other volumes on University Teaching,..." ³ The major changes in the 1852 edition were made for the 1859 edition. Several paragraphs were omitted.

¹ The second five Discourses were not delivered in lecture form, as Newman returned to England June 9 for the June 21 Achilli libel trial and did not resume his lectures.

² Fergal McGrath, Newman's University, p. 154.


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throughout the Discourses, particularly in Discourses I, VI, and VIII; the first and second Discourses were fused into one; Discourse V and the Appendix were omitted altogether. The one important change in the 1873 edition from the 1859 version was the restoring of Discourses I and II to their 1852 status of two discourses. However, Discourse V and the Appendix were again omitted from the 1873 edition. Henry Tristram states that Newman kept Discourse V "in reserve for a projected volume of essays."¹ (See below, Discourse V, 152.12–153.15, for further comments on the omission of Discourse V).

In 1858 Newman had published a volume of his lectures given on various occasions while he was rector of the Catholic University of Ireland. Some of these had been printed in the Catholic University Gazette, a university paper that Newman edited weekly during 1854–55. The volume was entitled, Lectures and Essays on University Subjects Addressed to the Members of the Catholic University. To the final edition of his discourses Newman added the Lectures and Essays on University Subjects to form Part II of a volume entitled The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated.

Newman's other writings on educational subjects while he was actually rector of the Catholic University of Ireland, 1854 to 1858, were printed in Volume III of Historical Sketches in the collected works of Newman by Longmans in 1897–98. In 1952, Dr. Michael Tierney,

PREFACE TO THE THESIS

president of University College, Dublin, the academic heir of Newman's Catholic University of Ireland, edited the material of Historical Sketches Volume III with introduction and notes in a volume entitled, University Sketches, published by Browne and Nolan, Dublin. The Idea of a University, Parts I and II, and Historical Sketches, Volume III, represent Newman's writing on university subjects during the seven years exactly of his campaign in Ireland from November 12, 1851 to November 12, 1858.

The purposes of this research on Newman's Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education have been as follows: first, to present the 1852 text of the ten Discourses, with the Preface and the Appendix as they were published in the first edition by James Duffy, Dublin; secondly, to provide an Introduction to the 1852 text that depicts Newman, the scholar and educator, with emphasis on the sources of and influences on the educational ideas that he presented to his Dublin audience; thirdly, to include annotation following the 1852 text containing critical commentary on the ideas, bibliographical sources, and prose style of the ten Discourses on university education, the Preface and the Appendix.

The fact that there has not been to date an annotated edition of the Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education, Dublin, 1852, the first edition of a work that is known widely as the Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated, makes this research an important and necessary contribution to Newman scholarship. The first
Preface to the Thesis

edition of Newman's Discourses on... University Education is important in
that it expresses his ideas on education just seven years after he had entered the Catholic Church and had resigned his Oriel Fellowship at
Oxford. Understandably Newman was eager to be associated once more with
university life. He began the writing of the Discourses with all the
enthusiasm and hopefulness that a new project inspires. There was the
vision before him of a new Oxford, \(^1\) this time imbued with the spirit of
Catholicism, set in an Ireland, associated in his mind with centuries of
learning and culture, flourishing amid the strength and stability of an
ancient religion. Newman expressed his ideas on education most
sincerely and openly in the Discourses with a feeling of security and
hope that this time his insights into the very real danger to intellec-
tual culture of the rising tide of Liberalism would be understood and
accepted and that a bulwark against infidelity would be established in
the proposed university. Therefore, the first edition expresses
Newman's educational ideals in their original form at the time when he
was involved with the planning of a new university. They were in a
sense the ideals of a founding father on the establishment of a new
institution of learning and delivered at the outset, much as the ideals
of the respective founders were expressed and incorporated into the
statutes of the various colleges of Oxford in their early beginnings.

It is thought that the omissions in the texts of the second
and third editions are sufficiently numerous and extensive to obscure in

\(^1\) J. H. Newman "Letter to Mrs. William Froude, October 14,
some respects Newman's original ideas. No attempt in this thesis has been made to note the word for word differences in the text, but rather such omissions as are considered to have fractured the continuity of thought pattern and unity of tone have been noted in the annotation. The omissions seem to follow a certain pattern. What can be gleaned from Newman's few words concerning his reasons for editing the Discourse in 1859 is a certain disillusionment about his not having made his ideas sufficiently clear to be accepted. The "Advertisement" to the second edition states that "he has in this new edition attempted in some respects to remedy what he feels to be their imperfection...with advantage, as he conceives, both to the force, and to the clearness of his argument." ¹ Newman's view expressed in Discourse V that Theology was not the form of the other sciences and that the primary aim of a university was the cultivation of the intellect seemed all but unintelligible, if not alarming, to certain members of the Irish audience, particularly the Irish clergy. ² Newman attempted to explain his ideas in clearer terms in three versions of an introduction he wrote for Discourse VI. (The first version has been included in the annotation). It may have been the realization that the ideas were very clear indeed, but not acceptable that prompted Newman to direct Duffy not


² See below, Discourse V, 152.12; 153.15; 153.26-29.
to include the introduction to Discourse VI and again prompted himself to omit the entire Discourse V from subsequent editions.

Several other omissions concern the words "Mixed Education," "Protestant," "Catholic" in phrase or in paragraph. Such omissions indicate that Newman was deleting the temporal material that related the Discourses to the Mixed Education, Queen's Colleges controversy. Archbishop Cullen had told Newman that he "would be rendering good service to religion in Ireland" if he addressed the Catholics of Dublin on the subject of university education. Thus Newman was enjoined to draw out differences and to speak about religion in education. For example, there is a section in Discourse I, 11.5 to 16.21 in which Newman discusses the Mixed Education—the historical reason for the lectures and the establishment of the university in Dublin. The temporal situation may have seemed to Newman superfluous for the general circulation of the work, but without the historical moorings of the Mixed Education issue and the important metaphor on 11.7-12 which gives direction to the discourses, the reader of the later editions feels adrift amid countless allusions to the contemporary situation. Such was the experience of the present writer during a research on the 1873 edition undertaken previously. Thus the necessity for reading Newman's ideas on education in their whole and original form. The important omissions from the 1852 text have been annotated throughout; however,

the purpose of the thesis has been to see the first edition of the Discourses as a whole, not to emphasize the changes in the later editions. Newman wrote in Discourse V "that to teach half of any whole is really to teach no part of it" (155.19-20), and again "that intellectual principles combine, not by a process of physical accumulation, but in unity of idea" (158.8-9). Regardless of the reasons Newman may have had for editing, it is the first edition, the Discourses of 1852, that express Newman's educational principles "in unity of idea" (158.8-9).

The 1873 edition, the Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated, has been edited in recent years by several writer-scholars, among them the following: the Charles Frederick Harrold edition (Longmans, 1947, 1955) and the Martin J. Swaylic edition (Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1960) both of which contain an introduction and notes; the latter has the more extensive notes in Part I; whereas, the Harrold edition contains a reprint of the original Discourse V; the G. N. Shuster edition (Image Books, 1959) contains only an introduction; the French edition, entitled, L'Idée D'Université Définie et Expliquée, traduction de Edmond Robillard et Maurice LaBelle, Introduction et Notes de Edmond Robillard (Desclée de Brouwer, 1968) is based on the 1873 edition, with the original Discourse V reprinted in an appendix; there is an edition by I. T. Ker (Oxford Press, 1976) that has to date not been available for examination. For other editions of the 1873 text, see the Bibliography, Primary Sources, Sections B and D,

Among the theses directly related to the first edition, the Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education, is a Doctoral thesis by Sister Kevin Kavanagh, the University of Cincinnati, 1943, entitled A Textual and Critical Study of Newman's Idea of a
University, Part I, that contains a lengthy introduction (dealing generally with the three editions and Newman's idea of liberal education) of one hundred and five pages to an appendix of over three hundred pages in which the 1852, 1859 and 1923 (1873) editions have been collated without critical commentary. Two Doctoral theses of historical and background interest are those by A. C. Bedford, The Idea of a Liberal Education: A Contribution to the History of Thought and Opinion in the Nineteenth Century, 1957 and F. V. LaFerriere, A Documentary History of J. H. Newman's Rectorship of the Catholic University of Ireland, 1851-1856, 1968.

The present thesis has the form of an explanation of the text with an Introduction containing such biographical and explanatory material as will form a suitable introduction to Newman and the Discourses. Since the thesis is not a critical evaluation of Newman's educational ideals, nor a comparison of Newman's ideals with those of the present, but an attempt to determine Newman's meaning accurately from the text and related passages in his other works, the references, wherever possible, are to Newman's other numerous writings or to works that he has mentioned in the Discourses. The over-all aim of this study has been to present the first edition of Newman's Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education as worthy of careful study and appreciation even though other editors have based their studies on the 1873 edition, the Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated, as Newman's final word on education.

Unless otherwise indicated, references to Newman's works are to
the uniform Longman's edition, 1898 to 1901. The notation in the
annotation refers to page numbers and line numbers; for example,
10.8-12 would refer to page 10, lines 8 to 12.

Acknowledging indebtedness for assistance great and small is a
weighty, but joyous task; therefore, heartfelt and sincere appreciation
is offered to all of the following: Maria Immaculata, Sedes Sapientiae;
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Library, Trent University, Peterborough; the Sigmund Samuel Library, the
University of Toronto and the College Libraries, in particular St.
Michael's and Trinity Colleges; the Library of the Mediaeval Institute,
St. Michael's College, University of Toronto; Yale University and
Columbia University Libraries for duplicated material and microfilms;
the Reverend Kenneth F. Jimmo, C.Ss.R., S.T.L. for translating and
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ADDENDUM

As noted in the Preface to the Thesis (See above, p. XI), the present writer was unable to secure a copy of I. T. Ker’s Oxford Edition of J. H. Newman’s Idea of a University before the submission of this thesis. However, now that Ker’s edition has become available, it would seem necessary to make the following observations:

I. T. Ker’s work is an edition of the 1889 text, which is not significantly different from Newman’s final revision made for the 1873 edition. Ker follows Martin J. Svaglic’s annotation form although there is much more detail than Svaglic includes in his Editor’s Notes to his Holt Rhinehart and Winston edition (1960). Additional detail in the Ker edition comprises cross-references to Newman’s other writings, references to Newman criticism, and commentary, much as the present writer has included for the 1852 edition, the text for this thesis. As a further addition to Svaglic, Ker has annotated the "Occasional Lectures and Essays" that comprise Part II of the Idea of a University.

Finally, Ker also gives annotation for the original Discourse V, which is an excerpt from the 1852 text, included in the Ker edition as Appendix I. The Annotation here for example contains much detail that is interesting and informative, but not necessarily pertinent to the context; consequently, the detail of Ker’s annotation does not always illuminate Newman’s ideas. For example, note the difference in the annotation of "St. Januarius" in Ker and in the present thesis (Ker, p. 666, Note, 421.18; See below 139.2-17). Ker gives the identification of details as well as a reference to two other occasions when Newman
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ADDENDUM

mentioned St. Januarius; but there is no relating of the information to the context of Discourse V. On the other hand, in 139.2-17 of the thesis, the reference to St. Januarius is noted as being part of a sentence in a quotation from Macaulay, not Newman. Therefore, what Newman has said on other occasions about St. Januarius is not pertinent to this context. The reference to St. Januarius in the Macaulay quotation is an aspect of Macaulay's argument for mixed education. Of course not all of Ker's annotations are so unrelated to context as the preceding example, but the general tendency of Ker's notes is to include many details that are not necessarily relevant.

Newman argues in these very Discourses that unrelated information does not form the mind. Details that form "no symmetrical and consistent picture" (216.3-4) are like the threads of a tapestry, varied and coloured, but seen as it were, on the wrong side, tell no story (216.5-6). In this context also, see Newman's remarks about those who "have read so much more than they have reflected" (223. 23-24). Note also Newman's comparison of a well-stored mind to a bookseller's shop; "it is of great value to others, even when not to the owner" (226.6-7).

In contrast, the annotation and commentary in this thesis has the disciplined and purposeful aim of relating details to the context by using the information gained to illuminate Newman's meaning. This process is what Newman described as "Thought or Reason exercised upon Knowledge, or what may be called Philosophy" (220.7-9). Thus the Explanation of the Text form of the thesis is really an embodiment of
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ADDENDUM

Newman's ideas.

The foregoing method of annotation and commentary has revealed insights into Newman's thought that Ker does not seem to have attained. In particular, see below, 138.9-27; 144.26-145.2; 152.12-153.15; and 154.3-28. It would seem, therefore, that Ker's mixing and matching of sections from the 1852 edition with the 1889 (1873) edition cannot be defended on intellectual grounds since Ker has discovered little that is important from the original Discourse V. Also the Appendix to the first edition has been merely reprinted in Ker's Appendix II, without annotation or commentary, although Ker, on occasion does refer to the Appendix in his Editor's Notes. Simply placing Discourse V and the Appendix (1852) in material juxtaposition with the 1889 (1873) edition is a large printing assignment that results in little or no intellectual formation of the reader. Newman's fears of biographers (See below, p. 7) might well have been extended to editors who display so little real comprehension of what Newman meant by the integrity of Knowledge as to think to lift out of the 1852 context Discourse V and the Appendix and make them appear meaningful in the 1889 (1873) context by their mere physical presence. These sections belong where they are in this thesis in their original context. The Appendix has been carefully annotated as a result of consulting Newman's original sources. The Commentary in the Appendix is a valuable source of enlightenment on particular ideas discussed in the Discourses. The Latin and French translations made for the Appendix were apparently a
necessary contribution to the understanding of Newman in that no one but
the present author has made use of the material on the Architectonic
science contained in the Appendix, (See below 401.34-.403.11).

Appendix III of the Ker edition indicates the changes in the
text beginning with the 1852 edition. Section 2 of the Introduction,
"The History of the Text" is a commentary on the changes in the text
through the three main editions. These sections are of academic interest
to the textual scholars. As noted in the Preface to this thesis Sister
Kevin Kavanaugh wrote a thesis entitled, A Textual and Critical Study of
Newman's Idea of a University for the University of Cincinnati (1943)
that contained a lengthy introduction and the collation of the 1852,
1859, and 1873 editions. But of course Ker's work may well be more
comprehensive and may well contain new material that has come to light
more recently.

Section 1 of Ker's Introduction, "The Background of The Idea
of a University" contains many references to the writing and delivery
of the 1852 Discourses that are the same as the quotations used in
Section III, of this thesis, "My Campaign in Ireland." (See Ker pp. XVI-
XVIII, in particular). However, the choices of the same quotations by
Ker and the present writer can be explained by the fact that both have
been limited to the same sources, principally Newman's Letters and
Diaries and his "Memorandum about the Catholic University,"
Autobiographical Writings. However, Ker's dwelling on these details
would lead the reader to think that the text to follow would be the 1852
edition, whereas what actually follows is the 1889 (1873) edition.

Many of the difficulties drawn out at great length by quotations from Culler and Svaiglic are not difficulties when the ideas of the Discourses are seen in their original context, in the 1852 edition. As was stated in the Preface to the Thesis (See below p. X), the present author had previously undertaken a study of the 1873 edition (M.A. Thesis, University of Ottawa). During that study extensive use was made of both Culler and Svaiglic, as the thinking of these men is confined to the 1873 in spite of at least the former's awareness of the Original Discourse V. It is only when the material is "thought through, and thought out" (224.26-27) in its original context that the meaning becomes clear and the apparent contradictions that Culler makes so much of (See Chapter 12, The Imperial Intellect) melt away.

Ker quotes from Culler and Svaiglic, (See Ker, liv, lvi, lvii) but does not resolve the problems posed by these authors, perhaps since he too is thinking in terms of the 1873 (1889) edition: the edition that does not really explain Newman's ideas clearly. Herein lies the very reason for undertaking such an intensive and comprehensive study of Newman's first edition. During the study of the 1873 edition the present author became aware of ideas that did not follow logically from one point to another. Rather than consider the discrepancies contradictions as did Culler, or "the author's [Newman's] changing point
of view" as does Ker (xlix), the possibility of there being significant omissions in the 1873 text presented itself; consequently, the present author was delighted that there was an original unedited edition, and determined to make that edition the basis of a study of Newman's educational thought. The result was the present two volume thesis based on the first edition of Newman's Discourses.

Finally Ker's perspective seems to include the historical, the textual arrangements, and the Newman criticism, but omits the consideration of Newman's work as Literature. The Introduction to this thesis, Section V is a discussion of the literary merits of the Discourses based on Newman's own definition of Literature and his acknowledged master of style, Cicero. Also, throughout the annotation and commentary on the Discourses there has been an emphasis on how Newman expressed his ideas as well as the ideas themselves. Newman's rhetorical method of controversy and his use of contrasting metaphors as the language of Literature have been one of the important contributions of this thesis to Newman scholarship. The other important contributions are Section III of the Introduction and the Annotation of the Appendix. All three of these Sections are totally original to the present author.

In summary, Ker's edition of The Idea of a University provides neither new material nor insights for the present author, although it may be a source book of information and Newman criticism for some. However, it is to be hoped that such catch phrases as "Newman is keenly aware of the danger of exaggerating the importance both of the university and of a
liberal education" (xlvi) or "But the most remarkable and dramatic shift of perspective in the Discourses..." are not understood as accurate evaluations of Newman. Furthermore Ker's discussion of the portrait of the gentleman (1-li) leaves the subject considerably more involved than he found it. Finally, the really regrettable point about Ker's edition is the possible confusion in the minds of the uninitiated readers about the actual edition Ker is editing. The excerpts from the 1852 edition and the first part of the Introduction contribute to this possible confusion, as does the apparent view of Ker that the integrity of Newman's texts need not be respected, but can be rearranged according to Ker's views.
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PART I
INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN AND THE

DISCOURSES ON THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF

UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

The opening section of the Introduction is a brief biographical sketch that gives the important events of Newman's life, particularly as they relate to the circumstances surrounding his writings. Such a sketch provides an intellectual and historical perspective from which to view Newman's Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education. Also, in order to appreciate the symphonic qualities of Newman's writing in the Discourses on...University Education, it is necessary to isolate the various themes and their origin in Newman's life and writings—especially the theme of his battle against Liberalism—as a preparation for viewing the 1852 Discourses, a major expression of his life-long contest with the forces of unbelief. In addition to suggesting the intellectual and historical milieu and announcing the major theme, the first section of the introduction gives glimpses of the characteristics, personal and intellectual, of the man who wrote the Discourses on...

University Education, with a particular emphasis on Newman's role as a controversialist. Such an insight into the person, Newman, is necessary for the understanding of his writings in that Newman "is ever present
INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS

Himself in all he has to say." ¹ As a controversialist, Newman is, throughout his writings, contending with the principles and ideas held in the minds of his readers: "They find that Newman has an incomparable power, a kind of rare natural charisma, of gradually bringing to life in the minds of other people a way of thinking,... "² Although Newman's way of thinking about University education is the particular province of the introduction, and indeed of the entire thesis, it can be maintained with Edward Sillam that "we can no more understand the philosophy without Newman, than we can understand Newman without his philosophy." ³ Therefore, it is felt that the biographical and literary details of Newman's life form, not only a necessary preparation for, but also an integral part of his way of thinking.

Part II of the Introduction deals with the various influences—home, school, university, friends—that helped to form Newman, the man and his ideas. Part III, Newman's Campaign in Ireland, describes the immediate circumstances of the establishment of the Catholic University of Ireland as they were the occasion of Newman's composing and delivering the Discourses on... University Education. Part IV discusses Newman's ideals of university education. Lastly, Part V evaluates the literary merits of the Discourses on... University Education.

² Ibid., p. 1.
³ Ibid., p. 3.
INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS

Chapter I

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, THE SCHOLAR AND EDUCATOR

John Henry Newman wrote in 1864 the following estimate of his own character and career:

Whatever judgment my readers may eventually form of me from these pages, I am confident that they will believe me in what I shall say in the course of them. I have no misgiving at all, that they will be ungenerous or harsh towards a man who has been so long before the eyes of the world; who has so many to speak of him from personal knowledge; whose natural impulse it has ever been to speak out; who has ever spoken too much rather than too little; who would have saved himself many a scrape, if he had been wise enough to hold his tongue; who has ever been fair to the doctrine and arguments of his opponents; who has never slurred over facts and reasonings which told against himself; who has never given his name or authority to proofs which he thought unsound, or to testimony which he did not think at least plausible; who has never shrunk from confessing a fault when he felt that he had committed one; who has ever consulted for others more than for himself; who has given up much that he loved and prized and could have retained, but that he loved honesty better than name, and Truth better than dear friends. ...¹

The foregoing quotation expresses Newman's view in retrospect of his own career, character, and conduct in controversy, particularly in the years during which he had been, as he says, "before the eyes of the world."

Certainly from the time Newman became the "living soul and inspiring

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genius" 1 of the Oxford Movement in 1833 at the age of thirty-two until 1864 when he wrote the foregoing personal estimate in the introduction to the first edition of his Apologia Pro Vita Sua, he had been a noted figure in the Oxford educational and religious world. The esteem in which Newman was held increased with the years, particularly after 1864, until his death on August 11, 1890 in his ninetieth year. In the last years of Newman's life, Lord Coleridge described him as "'that great man who still survives at Birmingham in venerable age, but with undimmed mental eye and unabated force of genius, a Roman Cardinal in title, but the light and guide of multitudes of grateful hearts outside his own communion and beyond the limit of these small islands'." 2 On hearing of Newman's death, Pope Leo XIII, who had elevated Newman to the Sacred College of Cardinals, sent the following words of praise in his message of condolence: "I need hardly tell you that His Holiness was...deeply grieved at the announcement of the departure of a man who, by his learning, his writings, and his singular piety, gave great splendour to the Sacred College." 3 Cardinal Manning said in the eulogy of Cardinal Newman delivered at a solemn Requiem held at the Brompton Oratory in London a few days after Newman's funeral that "we have lost our greatest


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witness to the Faith, ... ." 1 Father Henry Tristram comments that
Newman is "a witness who has survived his own death, and still lives,
because, whenever he wrote, he kept in view, not so much the rank and
file among his own contemporaries, but, to use his own words, 'active
minds and the generation to come'." 2 Now, eighty-eight years after his
death, the influence of the man who was Fellow and Tutor of Oriel
College, Oxford; Leader of the Tractarians; Rector of the University
of Ireland; and Cardinal of the Catholic Church "still speaks to a
listening world from the pages of his mighty books." 3

Newman disliked and feared biographical accounts of himself.
It is possible he looked forward with apprehension to being
misrepresented and misunderstood after his death as he had been so often
during his lifetime. He wrote in 1874, "Had I my will no Memoir should
be written of me, except such a thin running notice as would suffice to
hold together a series of letters." 4 Concerning his own method of
editing J. H. Froude's Remains, he said in 1866, "'Contemporary letters
are facts, and as such they reveal the true life of a man'." 5 In a


2 J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings, ed. Henry Tristram


4 J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings, p. 23.

5 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
memorandum written on October 22, 1876, Newman makes clear that his papers will afford means of refuting errors about him "whether as correcting facts, or explaining my views and my motives." ¹ "His quarrel with biographers in general was that they 'varnish, they assign motives, they interpret Lord Burleigh's nods.'" ² He stated emphatically, "I don't want a panegyric written of me, which would be sickening, but a real fair downright account of me according to the best ability and judgment of the writer." ³ In accordance with Newman's directions the following brief biographical sketch, which concentrates on Newman's writings, proposes to be "a real fair downright account... according to the best ability and judgment of the writer"—an account taken, whenever possible, from Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman During his Life in the English Church with a Brief Autobiography, edited by Anne Mozley, 2 Vols. (1891), Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman, edited C. S. Dessain, Vols. 11-31, John Henry Newman: Autobiographical Writings, edited by Henry Tristram, and John Henry Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua.

John Henry Newman was born in Old Broad Street in the City of London on February 21, 1801 and was baptized in the Church of St. Bennet (Benet) Fink on April 9 of the same year. His father, John Newman, whose

² Ibid., p. 22.
³ Ibid., p. 24.
family came from Cambridgeshire, was a banker with the firm of Ramsbottom, Newman and Company. His mother was of a French Huguenot family named Fourdrinier which left France for England on the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. John Henry was the eldest of six children, three boys—John Henry, Charles, Francis—and three girls—Harriett, Jemima, and Mary.

"On the first of May, 1808, when he was seven years old, he was sent to a school of 200 boys, increasing to 300, at Ealing, near London, under the care of the Revd. George Nicholas, M.A. of Wadham College. As a child, he was of a studious turn, and of a quick apprehension; and Dr. Nicholas, to whom he became greatly attached, was accustomed to say, that no boy had run through the school, from the bottom to the top, so rapidly as John Newman."

From Ealing School, Newman went straight to Oxford, being entered at Trinity College on December 14, 1816, when he was as yet two months short of sixteen. On May 18, 1818 when Newman was just seventeen he gained one of the Trinity Scholarships, then lately thrown open to University competition. The scholarship of £60 a year was tenable for nine years. Trinity College, Oxford, described by Dr. Nicholas, Newman's former school master, as a "most gentlemanlike College" is described by Newman in one of his letters as follows: "If anyone wishes to study

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1 Newman, Autobiographical Writings, p. 29.

2 Ibid., p. 130.
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much, I believe there can be no College that will encourage him more than Trinity. It is wishing to rise in the University, and is rising fast. The scholarships were formerly open only to the members of the College; last year, for the first time, they were thrown open to the whole University. In discipline it has become one of the strictest of Colleges.¹ However, on the occasion of his final B.A. examinations in November, 1820 in which he was reading for honours in both mathematics and classics Newman suffered, in his own words, an utter breakdown, and a seeming extinction of his prospects of a University career. "When the class list came out, his name did not appear at all on the Mathematical side of the Paper, and in Classics it was found in the lower division of the second class of honours, which at that time went by the contemptuous title of the 'Under-the-line,' there being as yet no third and fourth classes."² Many reasons were advanced for what Newman termed his failure in the schools; that is, his failure to obtain high honours: he was twenty; whereas, the usual age for taking the B.A. degree examinations was twenty-two; he had been insufficiently drilled in Latin and Greek; Trinity had not yet supplied public examiners for the schools and therefore the tutors did not know what reading and preparation would be in their pupils' favour; high hopes were entertained by many for Newman's success; and finally Newman himself

¹ Newman, Autobiographical Writings, p. 35.
² Ibid., p. 47.
admitted his own preoccupation with subjects not designed to bring him honours in the schools: "...I damaged and thwarted the real progress of my mind by dabbling in studies and occupations, good in themselves, but out of place. I attended lectures in geology and mineralogy; I studied manuals and tried experiments in chemistry; I wrote a poem, and I commenced a periodical." ¹ Regardless of the number of reasons, Newman was never really able to satisfy himself as to how his long and assiduous toil had done him so little justice on the occasion of his degree examination.

Nevertheless, Newman, who had never accepted his failure in the schools as the measure of his intellectual ability, stood for and won the coveted Oriel Fellowship on the twelfth of April, 1822—a day that he said was the turning point of his life and of all days most memorable. "It raised him from obscurity and need to competency and reputation. He never wished anything better or higher than, in the words of the epitaph, 'to live and die a fellow or Oriel'." ²

Newman's election as Fellow of Oriel in 1822 marks the beginning of his public career at Oxford—a career which lasted until his resignation from the Oriel fellowship on October 3, 1845. His writing career began soon after his election to the Oriel Fellowship. In 1822 Richard Whately asked Newman to cast his (Whately's) "Analytical

¹ Newman, Autobiographical Writings, p. 52.

² Ibid., p. 63.
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Dialogues" on logic into the shape of a synthetical Treatise. The book, Elements of Logic, was published four years later in 1826. In the Preface, Whately acknowledged the fact that Newman had composed a considerable portion of the work. In 1823 Newman drew up an argument for the strict observance of the Christian Sabbath from the writings of St. Chrysostom and other Fathers. In the spring of 1824 Whately asked Newman to write the article on Cicero for the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana, an article that was republished as "Marcus Tullius Cicero," Historical Sketches, Vol. I, 1672. Newman's 1825 article "The Miracles of Scripture," written for the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana, was republished, 1870 in Two Essays on Miracles. The essay "Apollonius of Tyana," written for the same publication, was reprinted in Historical Sketches, Vol. I, 1672. During this period, 1822-1827, Newman contributed articles to various publications: an essay on Aristotle for the London Review; a review of "Duncan's Travels" in the British Review, May, 1824; and an article on "Cooper's Crisis and Robinson's Acts" in the Theological Review, June, 1825. In 1827 Newman drew up a defence of Infant Baptism from the patristical testimonies furnished him.

1 Newman, Autobiographical Writings, p. 67.


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by Wall's well known Treatise. 1

Simultaneous with his writing ventures was the progress of Newman's academical and ecclesiastical career. After being ordained deacon on June 13, 1824 by Dr. Legge, Bishop of Oxford, Newman was offered the curacy of St. Clement's Church, Oxford assisting the aged incumbent, the Reverend John Gutch, Registrar of the University. During his two years as curate of St. Clement's, he established a school for the poor and raised between £5,000 and £6,000 towards the building of a new church. 2 On May 29, 1825, Newman was ordained to the Anglican priesthood. After the death of Dr. Elmsley, Whately was appointed to the Headship of St. Alban's Hall. Newman wrote in a letter of March 29, 1825: "He has done me the honour of appointing me Vice-Principal. This will not be a great addition to my income—perhaps 50 l. a year; but it is a post of considerable authority and responsibility. I am Dean, Tutor, Bursar, and all—in his absence, indeed, Principal." 3

In his Autobiographical Writings Newman gives the following summary of his career from 1826 to 1832: "In 1826,...Mr. Newman was appointed one of the public Tutors of Oriel College, resigning the Vice-

1 J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings, p. 83.


3 J. H. Newman, Letters and Correspondence, ed. A. Mozley, p. 84.
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Principalship of Alban Hall and the curacy of St. Clement's. In 1827 he was appointed by Dr. Howley, the then Bishop of London, one of the Preachers at Whitehall. In 1827-28 he held the University office of Public Examiner in classics for the B.A. degree and for the honour list attached to the examination. In 1828, on Mr. Hawkins becoming Provost of Oriel he was presented by his college to the Vicarage of St. Mary's, the University Church. In 1830 he served as Propróctor. In 1831, 1832 he was one of the University Select Preachers. This may be called his public career."¹ About this period, particularly after his appointment as Vicar of St. Mary's, Newman writes as follows: "It was to me like the feeling of spring weather after winter; and, if I may so speak, I came out of my shell; I remained out of it till 1841."²

Newman's first sermon was preached on June 23, 1824 in Mr. Walter Mayer's parish at Warton. However, the sermons that made him famous as a preacher were delivered before his parochial congregations of St. Clement's, and particularly St. Mary's, after his appointment as Vicar in 1828. These parish sermons, preached between January 23, 1825 and April 30, 1843 were published at intervals between 1834 and 1843. W. J. Copeland, Rector of Farnham, Essex, republished these Anglican sermons in eight volumes under the title of Parochial and Plain Sermons, 1868, comprising the first volumes in a uniform edition of Newman's

¹ J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings, p. 86.
² J. H. Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 16.
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works published from 1868 to 1881. The Parochial and Plain Sermons, as befits sermons delivered to the flock of his parish, were written in what C. F. Harrold describes as a "calm, coldly chaste, Anglican style... ideally suited to Newman's purposes, the 'troubling' of men into religion, the uncovering of their subtle vices and hypocrisies and self-deceptions." ¹ Newman quotes from one of those sermons "The Religion of the Day," Vol. I in the Appendix to the Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education.

The Oxford University Sermons, comprising sermons preached from July 2, 1826 to February 2, 1843, was subtitled, Sermons Chiefly on the Theory of Religious Belief Preached before the University. These were especially commissioned sermons, many of them delivered in Newman's turn as select preacher of the university. Unlike the Parochial and Plain Sermons, which were written for the mixed group of a congregation, the Oxford University Sermons were addressed to the academical audience of Oxford University heads, tutors, and students. "In my University Sermons there is a series of discussions upon the subject of Faith and Reason; these... were the tentative commencement of a grave and necessary work, viz. an inquiry into the ultimate basis of religious faith prior to the distinction into Creeds." ² The Oxford University Sermons, published in


² J. H. Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 75.
1843, were Newman's first onslaught against the forces of unbelief which he later defined in the Apologia as "liberalism." 1 Wilfred Ward quotes from a note written in the last year of Newman's life: "'Very early in life I was troubled with the prospect of an intellectual movement against religion, so special as to have a claim upon the attention of all educated Christians'." 2 Several of the Oxford University Sermons are a preparation for and at times an elaboration on the ideas in the Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education, particularly the sermons, "Personal Influence, a Means of Propagating Truth" and "Wisdom as Contrasted with Faith and Bigotry." It was the countering of this "intellectual movement against religion" that was the absorbing interest of Newman's life and the motivating force of his writings from the Oxford University Sermons (1826-1843) to the Grammar of Assent (1870).

Sermons on Subjects of the Day, published November 25, 1843, comprised Newman's last sermons preached as an Anglican, including his final farewell, 'The Parting of Friends,' preached in September, 1843. About the sermons in this volume Newman wrote as follows: "They are not purely ethical or doctrinal. They were for the most part caused by


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circumstances of the day or of the moment, and they belong to various years. [1832-1843] ... Many of them are engaged on one subject, viz. in viewing the Church in its relation to the world. By the world was meant, the existing body of human society, whether Catholics, Protestants, Greeks, or Mahometans, as being ruled by principles, maxims, and instincts of their own, that is, of an unregenerate nature, whatever their supernatural privileges might be, ... On the other hand, by Church I meant, in common with all writers connected with the Tract Movement, the whole of Christendom, from the Apostles' time till now, whatever their later divisions into Latin, Greek, and Anglican ... I mean ... the whole Church as one body: ... "1 Thus Newman explains what he means by the world and the Church, particularly in the most famous sermon in the volume—"Wisdom and Innocence"—the sermon that Charles Kingsley chose as the text for the accusations that resulted in Newman's writing the Apologia Pro Vita Sua in 1864. Of Newman's ten volumes of sermons preached while he was an Anglican, the Oxford University Sermons and Sermons on Subjects of the Day 2 are expressions of his battle against "the forces of unbelief" which he saw invading the Anglican Church and therefore these sermons belong to Newman's Tractarian writings.

Newman's career as a controversialist began while he was at the

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2 See the Appendix to Sermons on Subjects of the Day for a list of the dates, preached and published, of these sermons and those in the eight volumes of Parochial and Plain Sermons.
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height of his influence as Tutor of Oriel College and the year after he had been appointed Vicar of St. Mary's. Sir Robert Peel, who was member of Parliament for Oxford, decided to give his support to the Catholic Emancipation Bill in the 1829 election platform. Newman campaigned vigorously against Peel, in that he felt that Peel's views had become tainted with "liberalism" and therefore were not representative of the views of the members of Oxford University who had first elected Peel to Parliament. Newman describes the situation in these words: "Mr. Peel, the representative of the University in Parliament, had declared in favour of the Catholic claims, had resigned his seat, and then, changing apparently his purpose, had offered himself for re-election. The Provost [Hawkins] took his side, the four tutors [Newman, Froude, Wilberforce, and Dornford] were against him. In the eyes of the latter, his re-election was far more than a question of political expediency; it was a moral, an academical, an ecclesiastical nay a religious question; at least it grew to be such with them." ¹

Newman was to oppose Peel on two subsequent occasions, once in the "Tamworth Reading Room" letters to the Times in 1841 and again in 1852 in the sense that his Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education were an implicit criticism of Peel's Queen's Colleges established in Ireland after 1845. As a result of his

¹ J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings, p. 97.
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opposition to Peel, and his vigorous and successful campaign in behalf of Robert Inglis as the member for Oxford, Newman incurred the opposition particularly of Richard Whately and Provost Hawkins—Oxford members with liberal tendencies.

The divergence of view with Provost Hawkins over liberalism in the political arena merged very soon with a domestic and personal quarrel between Hawkins and his tutors that amounted to a battle over the principle of "liberalism" in the academic field concerning the role of the tutor in Oriel College education. Newman's idea that the role of the college tutor was not only secular, but pastoral in character was based partly on the traditional conception of the Oxford tutor and partly on Newman's own serious view of his joint role as teacher and minister. When he was ordained deacon in June, 1824 he felt overwhelmed with the thought that he would be answerable always for the souls placed under his care. On the evening before he was appointed tutor of Oriel in 1826 he wrote of his duties as tutor: "May I engage in them, remembering that I am a minister of Christ, and I have a commission to preach the Gospel, remembering the worth of souls, and that I shall have to answer for the opportunities given me of benefiting those who are under my care." ¹ Newman felt that, "unless he could make his educational engagements a

fulfilment of his ordination vow, he could have no part in them,... "1

Newman's plan for the reforming of Oriel's tutor system was as follows:

"Instead of a tutor's merely lecturing a few times a week on certain
classical texts to a group of college undergraduates—the customary
practice—he should take upon himself the obligation of the direct
religious training of the undergraduates assigned to him, and, at the
same time, see to their secular instruction in a detailed and personal
way. This twofold aspect of the tutor's task seemed to Newman closer to
the ideal established in the university statutes, more in harmony with
the religious character of the university and with the clerical status
of the tutors themselves, and more beneficial to the development of the
students' mind." 2 O'Connell suggests that Newman "saw, however hazily,
the possibility of creating at Oriel the ideal of the Christian
university, mixing together Keble's lofty religious sentiments ["ideas"
would be preferable], the Copleston-Whately tradition of dialectical
learning, and his own unique gift of communication." 3 Hawkins disagreed
with the tutors' plans to take primary responsibility for their own
students in both tutorial classes and lectures. Consequently, he
assigned them no more students after 1830. As the students Newman was
tutoring had graduated by 1832, he ceased to be a college tutor after

1 J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings, p. 103.

2 Marvin O'Connell, The Oxford Conspirators (London: Collier-

3 Ibid., p. 114.
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June, 1832, although he retained his Oriel Fellowship—a position tenable for life.

In June of 1832 when Newman was formally disengaged from College duties he stated that his health had suffered from the labour involved in the composition of his first book, The Arians of the Fourth Century, which was ready for the press in July, 1832, but not published until 1834. This book had grown out of a suggestion in 1830 by Hugh Rose that Newman write a History of the Principal Councils as a contribution to a Theological Library. Newman had been reading the Fathers of the Church beginning with St. Ignatius and St. Justin since the Long Vacation of 1828. His volumes begun by Pusey were completed in 1831 with a magnificent set of thirty-six volumes, gifts from his friends and pupils. ¹ "They are so fine in their outsides as to put my former ones to shame, and the editions are the best. Altogether, I am now set up in the patristical line, should I be blessed with health and ability to make use of them." ² The chronological reading of the fathers led immediately to the composition of the Arians of the Fourth Century and ultimately to the Tractarian movement and its personal consequences for Newman. However, the immediate effect on his thinking was Newman's beginning to consider


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"that Antiquity was the true exponent of the doctrines of Christianity and the basis of the Church of England." ¹ In turn, he said he began to feel dismay at the prospects of his own church, "anger and scorn at her do-nothing perplexity. I thought that if Liberalism once got a footing within her, it was sure of the victory in the event. ...I ever kept before me that there was something greater than the Established Church, and that that was the Church Catholic and Apostolic, set up from the beginning, of which she was but the local presence and the organ. She was nothing, unless she was this. She must be dealt with strongly, or she would be lost. There was need of a second reformation." ²

In December of 1832 Newman left on a voyage to Southern Europe and the Mediterranean with Hurrell Froude and Hurrell's father. While they were in Italy, the Bill for the Suppression of the Irish Sees was in progress—a bill that disclosed clearly the union of Church and State or Erastianism which Newman considered, with Froude, "if not the parent, the serviceable and sufficient tool of liberalism." ³ He states that "It was the success of the Liberal cause which fretted me inwardly." ⁴ It was in Rome that Newman and Hurrell began the verses for the Lyra

¹ J. H. Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 27.
² Ibid., pp. 32-33.
³ Ibid., p. 40.
⁴ Ibid., p. 34.
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Apostolica, which consisted of poems first contributed to the British Magazine by Newman and his Tractarian friends, Hurrell Froude, John Keble, J. W. Bowden, Robert Wilberforce, and Isaac Williams, and then published in 1836. Newman's contributions to the Lyra Apostolica were republished in 1868 as Verses on Various Occasions, a volume which contains Newman's poems dated from 1818 to 1870. Newman states that "the motto [for the Lyra Apostolica] shows the feeling of both Froude and myself at the time: ...Froude chose the words which Achilles, on returning to the battle, says, 'You shall know the difference, now that I am back again'." 1 "The motto expresses the spirit of the poems. They were a call to battle, rallying the disordered forces of the Church, a summons to all valorous hearts to take part in a campaign which is nothing short of the setting up of the kingdom of God upon earth." 2 About the second reformation that it was their growing purpose to effect, Newman realized that such a great change as the Anglican Church required would be the work of a few. He wrote as follows: "...the thought came upon me that deliverance is wrought, not by the many but by the few, not by bodies but by persons." 3 This idea that change is wrought by a few individuals is important to Newman's personal influence theme—a major idea in his

1 Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 35.


3 Ibid., p. 35.
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educational theory. As he states in the Apologia, "Living movements do not come of Committees." ¹ He himself felt he had a mission. As he lay ill of the fever in Sicily he kept repeating to himself, "I shall not die for I have not sinned against light, I have not sinned against light." ² "...I think God has work for me yet." ³ He was another step on his journey of giving up "much that he loved and prized and could have retained, but that he loved honesty better than name, and Truth better than dear friends." ⁴

It was while Newman was on his way home from Sicily that he wrote the lines "Lead kindly Light," which, he modestly says, "have since become well known." ⁵ In Newman's own words, he "was aching to get home." ⁶ He describes the event that he considered the beginning of the Oxford Movement as follows: "The following Sunday, July 14th, Mr. Keble preached the Assize Sermon in the University Pulpit. It was published under the title of 'National Apostasy'. I have ever considered and kept the day, as the start of the religious movement of 1833." ⁷ Henry


² Ibid., p. 35.


⁴ See above the opening paragraph of the Introduction to the Thesis.

⁵ J. H. Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 36.

⁶ Ibid., p. 36.

⁷ Ibid., p. 36.
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Tristram comments as follows: "Thus Newman, without thought of self, resigned the credit to another. But by others an earlier date has been assigned as the birthday of the Movement,--January 22nd, 1832, the day on which, in his turn as Select Preacher, he [Newman] delivered the sermon, 'Personal Influence, the Means of Propagating Truth.' These two views are not irreconcilable with each other: Newman's sermon was an appeal for volunteers in the spiritual combat; Keble's a call to action in the political crisis that seemed to menace the Church of England. It was only after the Whig Government had furnished the occasion by its Bill for the suppression of the Irish Sees, as Newman terms it, that the Movement began to take shape and to gather momentum." 1

Newman in the Apologia states that, "Universities are the natural centres of intellectual movements." 2 Thus the impetus for the Oxford Movement came from two members of Oriel College, Oxford--Newman himself and John Keble. Newman cites the principal members of the Movement as: "Mr. Keble, Hurrell Froude,...Mr. William Palmer of Dublin and Worcester College,...Mr. Arthur Perceval, and Mr. Hugh Rose." 3 The latter, a Cambridge man, began a periodical in 1832 entitled the British Magazine "to unite Churchmen together, and to make a front against


3 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
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the coming danger" of political and ecclesiastical Liberalism. The informal meetings at Oriel between Hurrell Froude, William Palmer, and Isaac Williams at the beginning of the Long Vacation in 1833 were probably the inspiration of Keble's "National Apostasy" sermon. Newman, according to Middleton, took part in these deliberations as soon as he returned from Sicily. Eleven days after Keble's sermon, a Conference assembled at Hadleigh, where Hugh James Rose was Rector. Other members of the Conference were the Reverend William Palmer, graduate of the University of Dublin and a liturgical scholar, and Reverend Arthur Perceval of Oriel, Rector of East Horsley and Chaplain to the King, and Richard Hurrell Froude. Neither Keble nor Newman was present. There was agreement on the necessity for fighting for the doctrine of Apostolical Succession and for the integrity of the Prayer Book, as well as on the necessity for circulating some publications to enlighten people as to the principles of the Church of England. As a result of the Hadleigh Conference an address was sent to the Archbishop of Canterbury signed by 7,000 clergy followed by another address signed by 230,000 of the laity. "The spiritual revival for which many devout Churchmen were longing and praying needed one master stroke and one

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1 Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 38.
3 Ibid., p. 63.
4 Ibid., p. 85.
master mind to give it impetus for a movement which should be of lasting benefit to the Church. That master stroke was the Tracts for the Times, and that master mind was the mind of John Henry Newman.\(^1\) Newman, very much aware of "the force of personal influence...[as] essential to any true success in the stand which had to be made against Liberalism"\(^2\) and convinced that no great work was done by a system or a committee states that, "I...had out of my own head begun the Tracts;..."\(^3\) Newman also commenced a series of letters (six in all, five of which were published) to the Record newspaper on such subjects as "Church Reform," the "Revival of Church Discipline," and "Scripture Proof."\(^4\) Newman writes of his feeling at this time: "...I had the consciousness that I was employed in that work which I had been dreaming about, and which I felt to be so momentous and inspiring. I had a supreme confidence in our cause; we were upholding that primitive Christianity which was delivered for all time by the early teachers of the Church, and which was registered and attested in the Anglican formularies and by the Anglican divines. That ancient religion had well nigh faded away out of the land, through the political changes of the last 150 years, and it must be restored. It would be a second Reformation: - a better reformation, for it would be a


\(^3\) Ibid., p. 42.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 43.
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return not to the sixteenth century, but to the seventeenth: 1 in other words, a return to the great Anglican theological writers, the Caroline Divines and Butler. According to Bouyer, Newman sought in the Caroline Divines "an orientation and an inspiration. But, rather than to the Caroline Divines themselves, he would have recourse to those whom they had always acknowledged as their authorities—in other words, to the Fathers,..." 2 Newman had begun to study the Fathers in the long vacation of 1828; that study formed his preparation for the writing of the Arians of the Fourth Century; he would re-open his studies of the early writings of the Church at a later date.

Mention should be made of the man who was a devoted friend of Newman and whose joining the Tractarians somewhat changed the character of the Movement which came to be designated by some as Puseyism and its members Puseyites. Edward Bouverie Pusey, Canon of Christ Church and Professor of Hebrew in the University of Oxford, Newman describes as follows: "a man of large designs; he had a hopeful, sanguine mind; he had no fear of others; he was haunted by no intellectual perplexities." Dr. Pusey showed an interest in the Oxford Movement in 1833 when he contributed a tract on fasting, but only fully became associated in the Movement in 1835 and 1836 with his Tracts on Baptism and his great

1 Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, pp. 44-45.

2 Louis Bouyer, Newman: His Life and Spirituality, p. 162.

3 J. H. Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 64.
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The project for the translation of the Fathers of which Newman's part was the translation of St. Athanasius. Under Pusey's influence and example, Newman states that he set about "larger and more careful works in defense of the principles of the Movement..." By 1835, Newman had written such studies of the early Church as "Primitive Christianity," published in Historical Sketches, Vol. I, 1872 and several essays on the early Fathers for the British Magazine, published as the "Church of the Fathers" (1840), and reprinted in Historical Sketches, Vol. II, 1872.

Two situations occurred in 1836 to necessitate Newman's delineating clearly his position in the Anglican Church: First, Dr.

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1 E. B. Pusey initiated the plan for a Library of the Fathers, the first volume of which appeared in 1838. He associated Newman and Keble with himself as joint editors. "The Library of the Fathers was published fitfully over a period of forty-seven years. By the time the last volume appeared, in 1883, Pusey had been dead three years, Keble almost twenty, and Newman had become an aged Roman Catholic cardinal. The series comprised forty-eight volumes and brought to the English reading public the works of thirteen ancient Christian writers. The bias shared by both Newman and Pusey for the fourth century was reflected in the fact that of the total, thirty-three volumes were devoted to writings by SS. John Chrysostom, Augustine and Athanasius. The squad of editors and translators who laboured on the Library included scholars from two generations. But no one worked harder or more faithfully than did Charles Marriott of Oriel... The Library,..., survived all the vicissitudes which the Movement suffered; it stands as a permanent monument to the transfigured band of men who wanted more than anything else that modern Christendom might be patterned faithfully to its ancient foundations." Marvin O'Connell, The Oxford Conspirators, pp. 272-273.

2 J. H. Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sue, p. 65.
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Hampden, Fellow of Oriel since 1814 and Principal of St. Mary's Hall, "suddenly took the position that the age-long custom of requiring matriculating students at Oxford to subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion should be abandoned; and he advocated this change in the rule for the express purpose of allowing Dissenters and non-believers of all kinds to enter the University." ¹ In the ensuing storm of protest, it was remembered that Hampden's 1832-1833 Bampton Lectures had cast doubt on the authority of the Creeds, particularly in the statement that "'all creeds and formularies, however incidentally useful, are in their nature the inventions of a mistaken and corrupt philosophy, and invasions of Christian liberty'." ² Hampden's liberalism could not be clearer. Little wonder that Hampden numbered among his supporters two of the old Oriel Neotics, Edward Hawkins and Thomas Arnold—all three were liberals, politically and theologically. The Tractarians were joined by the Evangelicals in protesting the next step—the appointment of Dr. Hampden as Professor of Divinity—a step that constituted an open support by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Prime Minister of the principles of liberalism in religion. Newman's pamphlet on the "Elucidations of Dr. Hampden's Teaching," as well as two pamphlets by Pusey, assisted the movement for Hampden's censure, but the ensuing restrictions on Hampden's


² Ibid., p. 67.
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authority were only temporary and he eventually even became a bishop.

The second occurrence was a course of lectures on Roman Catholic Doctrine and Practice by Monsignor Nicholas Wiseman—lectures that were regarded as an attack on Tractarianism. \(^1\) It was becoming increasingly clear that the Anglican position as opposed to the Protestant on the one hand and the Roman position on the other must be defined. Newman had written in January, 1836 Tract 71, "On the Controversy with the Romans" \(^2\) (republished in Via Media, Vol. II, 1877), which Newman states was "written as if discussing the differences of the Churches with a view to a reconciliation between them." \(^3\) In order to state the position of Anglicanism as regards Liberal Protestantism on the one hand and Romanism on the other, Newman decided on a series of lectures in an appendage of St. Mary's Church, Adam de Brome Chapel, the site of the tomb of Oriel's founder. The first series of lectures were entitled, The Prophetical Office of the Church viewed relatively to Romanism and Popular Protestantism (republished as the Via Media, Vol. I, 1877). Like so many of Newman's writings these lectures had their roots in controversy; in this instance, "in the controversial correspondence [in the 1830's] with a learned French Abbé,


\(^2\) For a list of Newman's contributions to the Tracts for the Times, see J. Moody, John Henry Newman, p. 341.

\(^3\) J. H. Newman Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 67.
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M. Jager, about the respective claims of Roman and Anglican Catholicism. About his Prophetical Office Newman comments as follows: "It attempts to trace out the rudimental lines on which Christian faith and teaching proceed, and to use them as means of determining the relation of the Roman and Anglican system to each other." 2 These lectures on The Prophetical Office brought out the fact that Newman considered the Anglican Church as the reformed church that had revived the Catholic and Apostolic Church, the Church of Tradition, in all its purity and therefore was a separate entity rejecting Roman Catholicism on the one hand, and Protestant Dissent on the other. 3 Newman further describes the Prophetical Office as "an attempt at commencing a system of theology on the Anglican idea, and based upon Anglican authorities." 4 He states the necessity for him of such an attempt: "I felt then, and all along felt, that there was an intellectual cowardice in not finding a basis in reason for my belief, and a moral cowardice in now avowing that basis. I should have felt myself less than a man, if I did not bring it out whatever it was." 5 Newman's love of honesty and Truth impelled him to


2 J. H. Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 66.


5 Ibid., p. 68.
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search for a basis in reason for the Anglican faith.

The second series of lectures delivered in the Adam de Brome Chapel, published as Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification, 1838 also grew out of a particular controversy. "The Christian Observer, an Evangelical magazine, had bitterly attacked Pusey's Tracts on Baptism (Numbers Sixty-seven, Sixty-eight, and Sixty-nine) and had directed the most scathing sarcasm at Pusey himself." 1 Newman wrote in April, 1836 that he considered Pusey a saint and thus promised, "I shall battle for him when his treatise is attacked, and by whosoever." 2 Newman's estrangement from Charles Golightly and from Samuel Wilberforce began when they spoke out publicly against Pusey's views on Baptism. 3 In two letters to the Christian Observer, Newman defended Pusey's Tract, but the suppression of some points in the second letter made Newman decide to write a full-length treatise on justification. "...it was aimed at the Lutheran dictum that justification by faith only was the cardinal doctrine of Christianity. ...In this Volume again, I express my desire to build up a system of theology out of the Anglican divines, and imply

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1 Marvin O'Connell, The Oxford Conspirators, p. 262.
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that my dissertation was a tentative Inquiry."¹ Thus in Tract 71, in the Prophetic Office, the Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification, as well as in two earlier Tracts 38 and 41, Newman was attempting to restore the Anglican Church to the sound doctrinal basis that he considered it had possessed in the days of the Caroline Divines and thus save it from the liberalism of the Broad Church, the sentimentalism of the Evangelicals as well as the possible implication of identification with Romanism.

In 1838 in conjunction with John Keble, Newman edited the first two volumes of the Remains of Richard Hurrell Froude, who had died in 1836. The result was that Froude's Remains revealed clearly the doctrinal tack the Tractarians were pursuing. Froude had referred to the Sixteenth Century Réformation as "'a limb badly set,' needing to 'be broken again to be righted'."² "Ollard says, 'anything more indiscreet, from a party point of view, has never been done.' ...From that day Froude's Remains have supplied ammunition for every critic of the Oxford Movement."³ The publication of Froude's Remains provides one instance of Newman's natural impulse to speak out. In this instance he would indeed "have saved himself many a scrape, if he had been wise enough to hold his

¹ J. H. Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, pp. 74-75.
³ Ibid., pp. 36-37."
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tongue."¹ From this time, their opponents were looking for "Popish" tendencies in the writings of the Tractarians. Dr. Godfrey Faussett, Professor of Divinity lost little time in preaching a sermon before the University on the "Revival of Popery," the main target of which was Froude's Remains and indirectly the teaching of the Tractarians.² The publication of Newman's reply "A Letter to the Rev. Godfrey Faussett, D.D., Margaret Professor of Divinity, on Certain Points of Faith and Practice," (reprinted by Newman with notes and some omissions in Via Media, II, 1885) is an admirable statement of the Tractarian position, in which he maintains the descent of Anglicanism from such Seventeenth Century Divines as Hooker, Andrewes, Laud, Bramhall, Taylor, Thorndike, Bull, Ken and others.³

At this time, Newman wrote an important article, "Prospects of the Anglican Church" (the original title was "The State of Religious Parties") for the British Critic, April, 1839 (republished in Essays, Critical and Historical, Vol. I, 1871), which was a summary of the history of the Tractarian effort so far in which he relates the Movement to other currents of thought in his day, including the Romantic, represented by Scott, Coleridge, Southey, and Wordsworth.

¹ See Paragraph I of the Introduction.


³ Ibid., p. 137.
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Newman referred to this article as "the last words which I ever wrote as an Anglican to Anglicans. It may now be read as my parting address and valediction, made to my friends. I little knew it at the time." 1

From 1839 to 1841 Newman suffered several blows to his Via Media theory and thus to his confidence in the Anglican Church. First, his return in June of 1839 to the study of the early heresies, particularly Monophysitism and Eutychianism, led him to the realization that the Via Media in the Anglican Church was but the reflection of the position of the Monophysites of the fifth century. "I saw my face in that mirror, and I was a Monophysite. The Church of the 'Via Media' was in the position of the Oriental communion, Rome was, where she now is; and the Protestants were the Eutychians." 2

Secondly, Dr. Wiseman's article in the Dublin Review of August, 1839 on the "Anglican Claim" concerned the Donatists with an application to Anglicanism. 3 The Donatists, like the Anglicans, had seceded from Rome and remained, in Gibbon's words, in 'memorable schism' in Africa for above three hundred years." 4 But the words of St. Augustine quoted by Wiseman Newman found to be not only a criticism of the

1 J. H. Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 97.
2 Ibid., p. 118.
3 Ibid., p. 120.
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Donatists, but also of his own Church of the Via Media—"Securus
Judicat orbis terrarum," 'the whole world judges right'—i.e., the
universal sense of the whole Church must be right against one local
body." ¹ Newman wrote in the Apologia: "By those great words of the
ancient Father interpreting and summing up the long and varied course of
ecclesiastical history, the theory of the 'Via Media' was absolutely
pulverized." ² In reply to the Wiseman's article, Newman wrote "On the
Catholicity of the English Church" in January, 1840 for the British
Critic (republised in Essays, Critical and Historical, Vol. 2, 1871)—
an article in which he maintained for the Anglican Church the Apostoli-
cal succession and the grace of the sacraments. His comment is as
follows: "I seem to myself almost to have shot my last arrow in the
Article on the English Catholicity." ³ Newman writes that about this
time he "began to wish for union between the Anglican Church and Rome,
if, and when, it was possible; and I did what I could to gain weekly
prayers for that object." ⁴ Again Newman writes about the possibility of
a union of the Anglican with what he refers to as "the continental
Churches": "And though we may not live to see that day, at least we are
bound to pray for it; we are bound to pray for our brethren that they

² J. H. Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 121.
³ Ibid., p. 139.
⁴ Ibid., p. 126.
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and we may be led together into the pure light of the gospel, and be one as we once were one." 1

Thirdly, still pursuing the subject of the Catholicity of the Anglican Church, Newman turned to a consideration of the Thirty-Nine Articles. He states that "Anglicanism claimed to hold, that the Church of England was nothing else than a continuation in this country, (as the Church of Rome might be in France or Spain,) of that one Church of which in old times Athanasius and Augustine were members. But, if so, the doctrine must be the same; the doctrine of the Old Church must live and speak in Anglican formularies, in the 39 Articles;" 2 Therefore, Newman maintained in Tract XC, the Articles were not directed against Catholic doctrines, but against the popular abuses of them. "Thus in maintaining that the Articles were tolerant of a Catholic or even Roman interpretation, 3 Newman was attempting "to remove all such obstacles as lay in the way of holding the Apostolic and Catholic character of the Anglican teaching." 4 The storm of protest in Oxford and the country personages that greeted Newman's Tract XC, published February 27, 1841, indicated that the Anglican Church was more Protestant in the nineteenth

1 Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 131.

2 Ibid., p.134.


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century than it had been in the century of the Caroline Divines. In other words, the very purpose for which Newman and the Tractarians had undertaken the renewal in the Anglican Church—that of strengthening the Church doctrinally and spiritually to enable it to withstand the liberalism of the day\textsuperscript{1}—was not being fulfilled. Newman's fear "that if liberalism once got a footing within her, it was sure of victory in the event"\textsuperscript{2} was being realized. Newman's bishop asked that he discontinue the Tracts. In a series of letters to Bishop Bagot and Dr. Jeft—letters now published in the \textit{Via Media}, Vol. II—Newman attempted to explain Tract XC and to reassert his loyalty to the Church of England, but to no avail; the publication of the Tracts ceased; Newman was branded as a traitor to the establishment; his claim to Apostolic Succession for the Anglican Church was denied.

The final blow to Newman's confidence in his church came with the decision of the Anglican Church to establish a bishopric in Jerusalem to which all the Protestant sects, including Prussian Lutheran—Calvinists, converted Jews—in short all sects who were residing in Jerusalem and willing to place themselves under the authority of the Anglican Bishop would be subject. Such a miscellaneous flock would not be asked to subscribe to any definite creed. "The Anglican Church, having made it impossible for him to preach traditional doctrine

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Newman, \textit{Apologia Pro Vita Sua}, p. 108.
\item \textsuperscript{2} Ibid., p. 32.
\end{itemize}
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in her name [with the condemnation of Tract XC], now [with the establishment of the Jerusalem Bishopric] made it equally impossible for him to recognize in her hierarchy and sacraments any connection with the rites and ordinances of Apostolic times." ¹

Newman began a slow removal from the field of battle. In the Spring of 1840, he began to spend more time at Littlemore, a parish that belonged to St. Mary's at a distance of three or four miles, where he had, in 1836, built a church. Here he ministered to the poor, accompanied the children's hymn singing on his violin, and taught them a weekly catechism class that attracted parents and children from Oxford.

However, Newman never stayed out of the public eye for very long. In January, 1841, while he was writing Tract XC, his old foe, Sir Robert Peel entered the arena of liberalism, this time in praise of education as a means of raising the morals of the nation—a theory he proposed in an address on the occasion of the opening of a library in Tamworth. In February of 1841, Newman by invitation of the editor wrote a series of seven letters in The Times, signed "Catholicus" in which he held up to ridicule the idea that was becoming fashionable with the progress of science—the idea that education without religion had the means of making man morally better. The furor produced by these letters to The Times (reprinted as "The Tamworth Reading Room," Discussions and

¹ Louis Bouyer, Newman: His Life and Spirituality, p. 216.
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Arguments) was but a squall compared with the hurricane that greeted the reception of Tract XC on February 21, 1841.

In the Spring of 1841, as the result of the reception of Tract XC, Newman stated in a letter to the Bishop of Oxford the fact that he had given up his place in the Movement. "I could not hold office in its service, if I were not allowed to hold the Catholic sense of the Articles."¹ He had relinquished in July, 1840 the editorship of the British Critic, held since 1838, a publication that was in the last days of the Movement, one of the most important public platforms of the Tractarians. By the summer of 1841 Newman began to reside at Littlemore. There he drew around him a number of young followers. Notable among them were J. A. Froude, Mark Pattison, Ambrose St. John, J. D. Dalgairns, and William Lockhart, who collaborated in planning and writing a series entitled, Lives of the English Saints in 1842 which were edited by Newman in 1843. On February 2, 1843 Newman preached for the last time before the University; on September 18, 1843, he resigned his living of St. Mary's; and on September 25 of the same year he preached his last sermon as an Anglican at Littlemore, the sermon "The Parting of Friends," an eloquent plea for remembrance in the hearts of those he had called friends and a faithful remembrance in their prayers. It was a sermon that left many in his audience in tears.

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During the next two years from 1843 to 1845 Newman continued to live a kind of monastic life of prayer and fasting at Littlemore, living as he says in "lay communion, remaining an Anglican. I could not go to Rome, while I thought what I did of the devotions she sanctioned to the Blessed Virgin and the Saints." ¹ Newman needed no further change of opinion, but rather "clearness and firmness of intellectual conviction." ² He therefore began to study the development of Christian Doctrine with a view to determining what indestructible element preserved Rome in the continuity of development from the Ancient Church of the Fathers. ³ Newman at Littlemore in connection with his publication of selections from the works of St. Athanasius had re-opened his inquiries into the Arian controversy. What he found that had escaped his notice during the writing of the Arians was a further image of his own times: "The Arians were the Protestants, Rome stood where she had always stood, while the Anglicans were the semi-Arians." ⁴ Newman's last sermon, preached before the University on February 2, 1843, was entitled "The Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine." In this sermon Newman applies Thomas Scott's Maxim, "Growth the only evidence of life." The works that formed a preparation for this sermon were a

¹ Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 192.


³ Ibid., p. 45.

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series of papers Newman wrote between 1833 and 1836, later collected under the title of "Primitive Christianity" and published in Historical Sketches, Vol. I. "In these papers, he canvassed the opinions of St. Ambrose, of Vincent of Lerins, of Apollinaris, and of Jovinian, as to the notes of a true Church." ¹ In another paper "Home Thoughts Abroad," published in the spring of 1836 and republished in Discussions and Arguments as "How to Accomplish It," Newman explains the so-called "corruptions" and "additions" made to the early faith by Catholicism as "the necessary developments of the elements of Gospel Truth, which could not be introduced throughout the Church except gradually." ²

Beginning at the end of 1844 Newman began to write his great Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. It became increasingly clear to him that Roman Christianity was a continuation or growth from primitive Christianity, a characteristic he had been claiming for Anglicanism, and it was this growth that explained the fact that he had observed on considering the Monophysites, Eutychian, and Arian heresies; namely, that Rome stood in regard to those heresies as she in Newman's day stood towards Protestantism and Anglicanism. The principle of growth must explain what he observed as the permanence amid change that

² Ibid., p. 67.
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was characteristic of Roman Catholicism. "Development is a process of incorporation, in which a vital principle is at work, conserving the old and developing the new through a continuous organic growth." 1 Newman explains the "Theory of Development of Doctrine" as follows: "...from the nature of the human mind, time is necessary for the full comprehension and perfection of great ideas; and that the highest and most wonderful truths, though communicated to the world once for all by inspired teachers, could not be comprehended all at once by the recipients, but, as being received and transmitted by minds not inspired and through media which were human, have required longer time and deeper thought for their full elucidation. This may be called the 'Theory of Development of Doctrine;'..." 2

The first public formulation of Newman's theory of development was his last university sermon "The Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine" preached February 2, 1843, "Oriel's foundation feast of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin Mary, on the text: 'And Mary kept all these things and pondered them in her heart' [Luke 2:19]. She was the pattern of all Christians who ponder the mysteries

1 Harrold, John Henry Newman, p. 75.

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of the divine revelation in Christ.  

The immediate steps by which Newman severed his connections with Oxford and the Anglican Church were as follows: On September 18, 1845, Newman, residing at Littlemore, resigned his living of St. Mary's Oxford, which he had held since February 2, 1828. On September 25, he preached his last sermon as an Anglican in the Littlemore church, "The Parting of Friends," published in *Sermons Bearing Upon Subjects of the Day* (1859). On October 3, 1845, Newman resigned his Fellowship of Oriel College, Oxford, the coveted position he had held since April 12, 1822, a position that represented one of the few material successes during his lifetime. To his sister Jemima, Newman wrote on October 8, 1845, these words: "This night Father Dominic [Barberi] the Passionist, sleeps here. He does not know of my intention, but I shall ask him to receive me into what I believe to be the One Fold of the Redeemer." 

The evening of the next day, October 9, 1845, Newman was received in the Catholic Church. On October 11, 1845 Jemima wrote to Newman, grief-stricken and prophetic words: "Dear John, when you spoke in the name of our Church your exhortations were all powerful, your voice seemed the voice of an angel, you touched a chord in all our hearts— you seemed to know our very hearts. Since your new views have gained the ascendancy

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how great the change!... Now I do not mean to say your influence will not be very great. Your talents, experience, and depth of mind must make your words powerful; but you will not influence the same class of minds that you have in times past." ¹ A year later Newman wrote from Milan, "This day I have been a year in the Catholic Church—and everyday I bless Him who led me into it more and more. I have come from clouds and darkness into light,..." ²

In his Memorandum for Mr. Henry J. Morgan Quebec Canada, October 25, 1863, Newman wrote the following about his life between 1845 and 1851: "In 1846 [February 22, the day after Newman's forty-fifth birthday] I left Littlemore for St. Mary's College, Oscott, at the wish of Dr. Wiseman, then Rector of that College and Coadjutor Bishop of the District in which I found myself on my conversion. Late in the year I went to Rome [September 7, 1846], where I was ordained Priest [May 30, 1847], remaining there through the whole of 1847. In February 1848 I founded the English Congregation of the Oratory at Maryvale, a country house four or five miles from Birmingham, which the Bishop of the District had given to me, and collected members." ³ In his diary


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for Tuesday 1 February, Newman recorded that he had founded the English Congregation of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri on the eve of the Feast of the Purification, February 2, 1848 at Maryvale: "Began with solemn Vespers, then admitted 9 members (5 fathers, 1 novice, 3 lay brothers) thus setting up the Congregation." A year later to the day, February 2, 1849 the Chapel of the Oratory in Birmingham was opened. It was the Birmingham Oratory that was to be Newman's home for the rest of his life.

"A little later [May 31, 1849] I founded the London Oratory, sending to it some of the members of the Birmingham house, the chief of whom was Revd F. W. Faber, who ultimately became head of the London Oratory."

"In 1850, just before the trouble occasioned by what was popularly called 'the Popish Aggression,' I delivered a set of Lectures in the London Oratory in consequence of which the Pope sent me a Doctor's diploma." These lectures, entitled, Lectures on Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Submitting to the Catholic Church, for which Newman was awarded a Doctorate of Divinity, honoris causa, were addressed to the party of the Tractarian Movement. The opening lecture was delivered at the London Oratory on May 9, 1850; the remaining lectures were continued twice a week on Thursdays and Fridays until

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July 5. 1/"...and in 1851 another series, The Present Position of Catholics in England, in Birmingham, in which I made charges against Dr. Achilli, a Dominican friar, who had become a convert to the Protestant faith, which involved me in an action for libel. As I had to bring my witnesses from Italy, the expenses were very serious, approaching £9000 to £10000, which I was able to meet by the generosity of Catholics in all parts of the world. ...there were contributions made in North and South America, in Italy, Germany, Holland, Malta, and other places. The cause came on in June 1852, and I lost it, and was sentenced to a fine of £100. The Judges, however, took care to signify their opinion of Achilli's guilt, though I had not been able to bring sufficient legal proofs for everything that I had said. The public took the same view." 2 To all and each one all over the world who took him and his sufferings of the Achilli Trial to heart Newman gave the tribute of those deserving salvation as recorded in Matthew 25:35: "Hospes eram, et collegistis Me," "I was a stranger and you brought me within." This tribute to his benefactors was the first line of the dedication to them inscribed in the Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education: "In Grateful Never-dying Remembrance of his most Friends and Benefactors,...who, by Their Resolute Prayers and Penance,...and by their Munificent Alms, Have Broken for Him the Stress of a Great


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Anxiety, These Discourses, offered to our Lady and St. Philip on its Rise, Composed Under Its Pressure, Finished on the Eve of Its Termination, Are Respectfully and Affectionately Inscribed." The generosity of his benefactors left Newman enough money to pay the fine and expenses of the Trial as well as to build the university church of the University of Ireland on St. Stephen's Green, Dublin.
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Chapter II

THE EDUCATION THAT MADE THE MAN

The previous section presented Newman, the man and his reputation, as the Dublin audience saw him in May, 1852. Chapter II deals with the various influences—home, school, university, friends—that helped to form Newman, the man and his ideas. On the occasion of the opening of the Catholic University in Dublin, November, 1854—an occasion that marked the official beginning of the great project the Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education had helped to initiate two years before—Newman expressed an idea basic to the thought of the Discourses and one which can be taken as the theme of his own personal development:

...there is an education necessary and desirable over and above that which may be called professional. Professions differ and what is an education for one is not an education for another; but there is one kind of education which all should have in common, and which is distinct from the education which is given to fit each for his profession. It is the education which made the man: it does not make physicians, surgeons, or engineers, or soldiers, or bankers, or merchants, but it makes men. It is that education which enables the man to adorn the place, instead of the place adorning the man. And this is the education for which you especially come to the University—it is to be made men.¹

Although the foregoing words apply specifically to a university education, the education to which Newman refers undoubtedly has its

¹From Newman's Inaugural Address to the students of the Catholic University of Ireland, quoted in My Campaign in Ireland, p. 315.
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roots in that obtained at home and in school, as well as in the university. It therefore, will be the purpose of Section II to trace the influences "which made the man" in Newman's family circle; his boyhood school, Ealing; and Oxford University. Since for Newman education meant individual, personal growth and change which was effected primarily and essentially by the impact of one mind, one personality on another, the personal influences in the foregoing three spheres and their effects on Newman's intellectual and personal development will be stressed in this section. It is therefore the purpose of Section II to show operating in Newman's own background an idea basic to his educational thought; it is only through the influence of one individual on another that any real change—the essence of education for Newman—takes place in the mind and personality of the other. For Newman, the medium, unless it be a human one, is not the message.

John Henry Newman was born at 80 Old Broad Street in the City of London, on February 21, 1801. The entry in the Baptismal Register of the Church of St. Benet Fink reads as follows: "John Henry, son of John Newman and Jemima his wife, was baptized April 9, 1801, by Robert Wells Curate'." ¹ John Henry, the eldest of six children—John Henry, Charles, Harriett, Francis, Jemima, and Mary—grew to maturity in a family circle that was loving, cultured, and religious.

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The family circumstances seem to have been comfortable and even prosperous, at least until John Henry was the age of fifteen. Before the second child Charles was born, Mr. Newman was sufficiently prosperous to move his family to 17 Southampton Street in the fashionable Bloomsbury Square district of London. Their country retreat was another large Georgian home, Grey Court House at Ham, near Richmond. Newman seems to have spent his summers at Ham until he was seven. Then too, the Newmans owned Vine Cottage, a knight's hill Green, Norwood where Grandma Newman and Aunt Betsy lived—a setting often referred to in Harriett Newman's story for children, Family Adventures—and where the Newman children seemed to have spent many summer holidays.

John Newman, a banker whose name appears as a partner in various firms from 1794 to 1816, came from "a family of small landed proprietors in Cambridgeshire and had an hereditary taste for music, of which he had a practical and scientific knowledge, together with much general culture". 1 Francis Newman recalled his father saying, "I do not pretend to be a religious man, I am a man of the world." Francis describes his father as "an unpretending, firm-minded Englishman, who had learned his morality more from Shakespeare than from the Bible." 2 Tom Mozley further describes John Newman as follows: "John Newman was

1 Tom Mozley, Reminiscences, chiefly of Oriel College and the Oxford Movement, p. 11.

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an enthusiast in his way, and he bestowed some labours of calculation upon the various popular schemes of the day, such as that for making England independent of foreign timber, by planting all our waste lands. He was a Freemason, and had a high standing in the craft; he was also a member of the Beef Steak Club." 1

The combination of the loving father and the man of business already looking out for his son's progress and proud of John Henry's ability to read at the age of five is evident in the following letter:

My Dear John Henry:

This is the first letter your Papa ever wrote to his son. I request you will read it to your Mamma and Charles that when he sees how well you can read writing, he will be very desirous of minding his book that he may also be able to do the same. But you will observe that you must learn something new every day, or you will no longer be called a clever boy.

I, therefore, hope that by next Thursday you will have got your Multiplication Table by heart and have also begun to learn your Pence Table. I mean to examine you as to your Multiplication Table and if I find you improve I intend after a time to buy a nice Copy Book and teach you to write. 2

His father's injunction that "he must learn something new every day," the learning tasks he assigned to little John Henry, and the promise of

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1 T. Mozley, Reminiscences, p. 12.

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gaining the further privilege of being taught to write, set the tone of
diligent application to learning and the gaining of knowledge as an
earned privilege which was to characterize Newman's long life of
 scholarly pursuits.

That the incentive John Newman gave his son to conquer ever
new fields of knowledge bore fruit is evident from the careful records
John Henry kept of the dates on which he began new subjects and the
progress he had made; for example, "On May 11, 1810 he began Latin
prosody and got into Ovid a fortnight later. On November 16 he began
Virgil and started doing Latin verses the next February and themes in
March." ¹ Newman began the study of Greek on May 25, 1810, the study of
the violin in 1811, and French in 1814. His progress on the violin was
so rapid that his father promised him a new Cremona. Tom Mozley records
that "he very early mastered music as a science, and attained such a
proficiency on the violin that, had he not become a Doctor of the Church,
he would have been a Paganini." ² John Newman seems to have given his
son the man of the world's desire for getting on in his particular field
as well as the idea that each new area of knowledge acquired made way for
the privilege of gaining more knowledge and that the whole process of
education was a delightful one of ever new conquests to be gained in the

¹ A. D. Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 2.

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world of learning by diligent application to the task at hand. Little wonder that Dr. Nicholas, the headmaster of Ealing, "was accustomed to say, that no boy had run through the school, from bottom to top, so rapidly as John Newman." 1

Newman's mother, Jemima Fourdrinier, came from a family of French huguenots who had settled in England after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The Fourdriniers had become "wealthy paper manufacturers, ...solid London merchants of the Thackeray type. They had their shop and town residence at 72 Lombard Street; business premises and warehouses across the street in Sherbourne Lane; a country residence at Stratford Grove, and eleven personal servants, gardener, coachman, cuise, and horses, family paintings, a library, a wine-cellar, fine plate and glass." 2 Mrs. Newman had a dowry of £5000 which she seems to have been careful business woman enough to preserve through the family financial crises after 1810 so that she could leave £1000 to each of her children. "In a family picture of the Fourdriniers, Mrs. Newman, as a young girl, stands by her father, gay and graceful, with dark ringlets and a French air, recalling her ancestry. ...Her letters show her as affectionate and lively, engrossed in her little domestic world. John Henry remembered her agitation when she missed her husband on a journey.

1 J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings, edited by Henry Tristram, p. 29.

INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS

to Brighton; she was lost without him. She was a sensible woman, but not a managing dominant type." 1

Mrs. Newman's fine tastes and cultured manners are reflected in so many ways in John Henry even as a child. His sensitive awareness of beauty, and of people's feelings, as well as the significance of places and their associations are all evident in the following recollection contained in a letter to his sister Jemima in 1861. "I have lately been to see our house at Æam, which we had before you were born--where I was when you were born--and whence I sent my mother and my father the present of a broom-flower on your birth. I looked at the windows of the room where I lay abed with candles in the windows in illumination for the victory of Trafalger." 2 Sean O'Faolain writes that "John never forgot how he stared at them, lying in bed, watching their gleam melting circles of mist on the frosty glass." 3 Newman's finely tempered awareness of the significance of places and things was evident all his life; for example, one of his first impressions of Trinity College, Oxford was the yellow snapdragon that grew along the wall. Years later he said that he had always thought of them as


2 Maisie Ward, Young Mr. Newman, p. 2.

3 Sean O'Faolain, Newman's Way, p. 16.
significance of his life-long residency in his university. Thence came the sensitive awareness of meanings and distinctions which characterize Newman the poet and the philosopher.

Newman's introductions to the world of imaginative writing seems to have been through his mother's guidance. He recalled the scene of a small child of five sitting between his mother and aunt listening attentively to his mother's reading of Scott's *Lay of the Last Minstrel* and his own recitation of rhymes and poems on his fourth and sixth birthdays. His highly sensitive imagination caused him to mingle the world of literature and his own world. He wrote in the *Apologia* that his mind was accustomed to run on dreams and talismans and that he used to hope that the Arabian Knights were true. In the early summer mornings at Ealing before the others were awake he used to read the novels of Sir Walter Scott and Mrs. Radcliffe. He early transferred this highly developed imagination to the writing of short skits and plays for his younger brothers and sisters to perform on holidays and special occasions.

Maisie Ward has collected the following from Newman's diaries: "There was a 'mock drama' of sort in 1812 and a 'satire on the Prince Regent.' For a burlesque opera in 1815 he composed music as well as words. A separate note records that for 'our home Christmas play' on January 10, 1815, Mr. Newman contributed a prologue. Probably this play was not the same as the opera. There were many plays and the energies of all the family were thrown into them."¹ John Henry's family circle seem to have

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¹ Maisie Ward, *Young Mr. Newman*, p. 11
INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS

provided him ample opportunity to develop his talent for writing and the qualities of spokesman and leader that were to become so evident in his adult life.

John Henry's religious training seems to have been more practical than theoretical. That there was loving, but firm discipline and character training is evident from the following incident: "Jemima once told Anne Mozley, her sister-in-law and John's first biographer, of an early tussle with authority in which he (John Henry) lost the day. 'You see John,' said his mother, 'you did not get your own way.' - 'No,' said John, 'but I tried very hard!'" 1 Since John Henry's parents were "both musical, fond of plays, of dancing, of reading and of conversation," 2 it is likely that their religion could best be termed moderate Anglicanism such as Harriett describes in Family Adventures: "Attendance at church twice on Sunday, respect for the Prayer Book, daily Bible reading and recitation of the psalms are the ideal." 3 About his own early religious training, John Henry records in the Apologia, "I was brought up from a child to take great delight in reading the Bible; but I had no formed religious convictions till I was fifteen. Of course I had a perfect knowledge of my Catechism." 4

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2 Ibid., p. 7.


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The honesty, integrity, and sturdy hopefulness with which the Newmans met the financial disaster of Mr. Newman's banking firm's closing its doors in March 1816 is further evidence of their religion as providing a solid, practical basis for living. Mrs. Newman wrote as follows to her sister-in-law (Aunt Betsy) who was keeping the children: "Your dear Brother and I have enjoyed some rest and feel ourselves rather recruited and I trust shall be able to bear up under all trials we have to go through if I should be blest with the realising one ardent wish, to make up things quietly, so as no one may be injured, and we retain our name unsullied, all sacrifices will be trifling. ...I feel confident the trial although severe will prove for our permanent good and increase our happiness. ...What shall I say to you in thanks for your kindness and comfort you yield me, in protecting my dear children and persevering in their education in my absence with my dear John, whom of course I shall not leave while things are any ways unsettled...." ¹

The family ability to endure reverses of fortune with courage and dignity is evident in the way John Henry met the unfortunate results of his B.A. examinations at Trinity College, Oxford in 1820. Even his letter home after the event has the same tone of responsible endurance of honourable defeat and calm hopefulness for better days as did his mother's letter about a different kind of defeat. John Henry writes,

¹ Maisie Ward, Young Mr. Newman, pp. 18-19.
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"I have done everything I could to attain my object; I have spared no labour, and my reputation in my college is as solid as before, if not so splendid. If a man falls in battle after a display of bravery, he is honoured as a hero; ought not the same glory to attend him who falls in the field of literary conflict?" ¹ Although eager for John Henry's progress his parents accepted his low grades with patient cheerfulness."

"The only sorrow we feel," they said, "is for the keeness of your feelings." ² In a subsequent letter dated December 3, 1820, John Henry further remarks: "A man has just left me, and his last words were, 'Well, Newman, I would rather have your philosophy than the high honours to which you have been aspiring'." ³

For that philosophy which was to be for him a mainstay during the many reverses that he would suffer throughout his long life, Newman was indebted to the personal influence and example of his family. It is evident from the foregoing account that Newman's mind and character received the basic impression and direction that was to remain with him always from his parents: there was the business man's solid application to necessary tasks—the learning of his tables; then his Greek and Latin at school viewed as a succession of accomplishments; then the encouragement of cultural pursuits—the development of his musical

² Ibid., p. 41.
³ Ibid., p. 41.
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talent, the reading of contemporary literature, the composing of skits and plays—all more or less as recreational applications of his more serious subjects; then the living of a religion based on the Bible and the Prayer Book that provided the necessary strength and endurance in time of trouble and was in good times a source of joy. The personal influences of Newman's loving, cultured, and religious home provided the solid basis of all his subsequent education.

Ealing School, which Newman attended from the time he was seven until he was fifteen, was a private school kept by the Reverend George Nicholas, P.C.L., of Wadham College, Oxford. Tom Mozley writes of Ealing that it was "said to be the best preparatory school in the country. There were 300 boys there, and many of them became distinguished in various ways." ¹ Anne Mozley records, "Ealing school at that date had a great name. It was conducted on Eton lines; everybody sent his sons there; they got on." ² Although on a par with Eton and Winchester, Ealing was not a public school. There is a particular significance as far as the kind of education Newman received in the fact that he was not a product of the English public school. First, the emphasis at Ealing was on the development of the individual's talents to a high degree rather than the concentration on the classics in order that the boys

² A. Mozley, Letters and Correspondence, p. 15.
would give the school acclaim by their classical prowess when they went up to the university. Then too, the curriculum at Ealing comprised subjects of general culture in addition to what Maewell termed the permanent subjects of classics and mathematics: There was French, dancing, music, fencing, and drilling. Although there is evidence of opportunity to participate in school athletics, Newman does not seem to have suffered the disapprobation of his school fellows for his lack of interest in athletics. Rather the mild, kind, and cultured Dr. Nicholas shared and encouraged Newman's interest in music even inviting him to hear music with him in his rooms after he found little John Henry and a schoolmate listening outside his door during one of his musical evenings. As Meriol Trevor observes, "Thus his music was encouraged both at home and at school, something very unusual in those days." \(^1\)

At Ealing John Henry's talent for writing began to merge with his leadership qualities and therefore took a declamatory turn. "At the age of fourteen he wrote two periodicals called the Spy and the Anti-Spy papers written against each other, and ran for about six months. These it appears were followed by The Portfolio, written by a club of senior boys, nicknamed the Spy Club. This periodical ran through twenty numbers, from November 1815 to the following May. There was also The Beholder, which to quote Newman's words 'was all my own writing.' ...As to the Spy Club, Francis gives it the dignified name of an 'Order', and says that these were degrees in it marked by badges of different colours.

\(^1\) M. Trevor, Newman, p. 11.
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John was, of course, 'Grand Master.' The 'Order', according to Francis, was wrapt in secrecy, and came to an untimely end owing to the opposition of the uninitiated.  

Thus it was that Newman was not formed into a preconceived public school mold but allowed to develop his talent for music, writing, dramatics, speaking, and leadership which seemed to be a recreation for the mind after the rigors of the thorough drilling in mathematics and classics which formed the solid core of the curriculum. But recounts Tom Mozley, "John H. Newman used to be sensible of having lost something by not being a public-school man. He regarded with admiration and a generous kind of envy the facile and elegant construing which a man of very ordinary talents would bring with him from the sixth form of any public school." 

Newman's own estimate of his schooling was that he had been better prepared in mathematics and not so well in classics as compared with the other boys who went up to Oxford when he did. At the time Newman won the Oriel fellowship, Copleston indirectly paid Newman's previous education a compliment when he said that Newman's election was a stroke against what he called "the quackery of the schools. Every election to a fellowship which tends to discourage the narrow and almost the technical routine of public examinations, I consider as an important

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triumph. You remember Newman himself was an example. He was not even a good classical scholar, yet in mind and power of composition, and in taste and knowledge, he was decidedly superior to some competitors who were a class above him in the schools." ¹ Newman's education at Ealing had not prepared him for the narrow routine of examinations but it had "made the man." On the basis of his "mind and power of composition, taste and knowledge" he was chosen for one of the most coveted honours in the university—a fellow of Oriel.

¹ A. Mozley, Letters and Correspondence, Vol. 1, p. 65.
Chapter III
THE CAMPAIGN IN IRELAND

Newman's connection with the University of Ireland began on April 15, 1851, the date of a letter from Dr. Paul Cullen, Archbishop of Armagh, consulting Newman about a University that was to be founded for Catholics in Ireland. "...he wrote to ask me to advise on the best way of setting about it, and wished me to deliver a set of Lectures in Dublin against Mixed Education." Dr. Cullen informed Newman that the collecting of funds for the new university had been very successful; then he added: "I suppose the first thing to be done is to select a fit and proper superior. In this matter your advice would be of the greatest importance. Would you be able to recommend us any one that would give a character to the undertaking. He shall also have to appoint a vice president and professors. Would you be so kind as to give us any suggestions you may think useful in this business...It is now time to make some effort to have at least one college for the higher branches of science and litterature [sic]. ...Should you have any intention of coming to Ireland this season, your presence at the meeting of our committee in Dublin would be most useful. Indeed if you could spare time to give us a few lectures on education, you would be rendering good service to religion in Ireland..." Newman answered

1 J. H. Newman, "Memorandum about my Connection with the Catholic University, Nov. 25, 1870," Autobiographical Writings, p. 280.

these requests at great length in a letter dated April 28, 1851.

On July 18, 1851, Dr. Cullen dined at the Oratory on his return from a meeting in London with Hope, Manning, Monsell, and others. "In the conversation he had with me, he proposed to me to be President (Rector) of the proposed University, I replying that, should I be able to serve the undertaking in any way, I should be glad to do so, but I thought that for this end it would be sufficient if I was Prefect of Studies. I believe, too, that I felt such an office as the latter would commit me less to an institution which had its seat in another country, and which on that account threatened, if I had the highest post in it, to embarrass my duties to the Birmingham Oratory. ...

"However, I did not at once pledge myself, either to be Rector or Prefect of studies; but became one of a subcommittee of three, appointed by the Thurler's University committee, the other two being Dr. Leahy and Mr. Myles O'Reilly, with Mr. Allins as Secretary. This Committee was charged with the duty of reporting on the best mode of commencing, on the course of Studies." 1 "When Leahy and O'Reilly met Newman on 27 Aug. they brought with them a list of questions, which Newman revised slightly, and sent to various Catholics who were authorities on University education, Mr. de Ram of Louvain, Dr. Wollinger, Dr. Jerrard, Dr. John O'Hanlon of Maynooth, and others." 2

1 J. H. Newman, "Memorandum...University," Autobiographical Writings, p. 281.

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The work of the subcommittee resulted in The Thurles Report, "the Report of the Sub-Committee on the Organization of the University," ...printed in Campaign, pp. 77-87. It formed the basis of the University as actually constituted." 1

The "Letter of the Congregation of Propaganda, October 9, 1847" gave direction as follows: "...the Sacred Congregation thinks it would be an immense advantage if the bishops were to unite to set up in Ireland a Catholic University on the lines of the one that the Bishops of Belgium have founded at Louvain." 2 Thus the University of Louvain was the immediate pattern for the new university in Dublin. However, Louvain had in common with Oxford, the medieval ideal "in which the lower faculty of arts led on to the three higher faculties of theology, law and medicine, and so covered the whole field of human knowledge." 3 The Thurles Report provided that "the University was ultimately to possess all the four faculties of arts, medicine, law and theology, but, as only the faculty of arts could be founded at once, the subcommittee confined itself to that faculty alone.

"The faculty of Arts was to be divided into (1) letters, (2) science. The branches of study included in it were to be: In the

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3 Fergal McGrath, Newman's University, p. 115.
INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS

division of letters: Latin; Greek; and the Semitic and modern languages; history, ancient and modern, both national and ecclesiastical; archaeology, Christian and profane; English literature and criticism.

In the division of science: logic, metaphysics, ethics, including economy and politics; philosophy of religion; mathematics; natural philosophy; chemistry; natural history; mineralogy and geology, etc., etc.

"Subsidiary to the faculty of arts should be organized a school of engineering.

"The last provision, and the far-seeing indication given by the words 'etc., etc.' that the scope of the physical sciences could be definitely enlarged, strike a note of reality... In the essays, Newman is concerned to stress the necessity of liberal education as the foundation of education. In this first Report he reveals the complete edifice, which can only be undertaken when the foundation is secure.

"The organization of the University into faculties involved the creation of a professoriate, and here Newman parted company sharply from Oxford. Though the professors at Oxford at that day were, in many cases, men of acknowledged intellectual eminence, their lectures had ceased to count in the teaching system, and they possessed no legislative or administrative functions... The Irish Report gave to the professors a definite status and definite legislative and administrative powers.
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"III. Government.

"6. The Professors of each faculty shall elect annually, out of their own body, by a plurality of votes, their Dean and Secretary.

"7. The Deans shall convene and preside over the Sessional meetings of their respective Faculties. In these meetings, the professors will discuss the interests of their Faculty, and draw up the Sessional Programme of Studies. This Programme must be submitted to the approbation of the Rector.

"8. The Deans of the Faculties, with the Vice-Rector, will form the Rectorial Council, to be assembled by the Rector when he deems it necessary.

"9. The Academic Senate shall consist of the Rector, the Vice-Rector, the Secretary of the University, the Professors of the respective Faculties, and at the end of ten years from the establishment of the University, of such a number of Graduates annually appointed by the Graduates of their respective Faculties, as shall not exceed one-fourth of the whole body.'

"The general provisions for government were as follows:

"1. Following the Encyclical Letter of the Belgian Bishops for erecting the University of Louvain, . . . we recommend that the government of the University be committed to a Rector nominated during the first ten years by the Episcopal Body, and revocable by them.

"2. The Vice-Rector shall be nominated in a similar manner.

"3. There shall be Deans of Discipline, a Secretary, a Bursar, and other officers, appointed by the Rector, and revocable by him, subject to the approval of the Archbishops.
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"IV. Powers and Duties of the Governing Body.

"1. The Rector is authorized to take all measures which the interest of the University may require. He regulates the courses of studies and duties of Professors and with the advice of the Vice-Rector and Dean of Discipline, forms Rules of Internal Discipline. He summons and presides over the Rectorial Council and Senate. He is to make annually a detailed report to the Episcopal body upon the state of the University.

"2. The Vice-Rector will assist the Rector in the discharge of ordinary business, and will replace him provisionally in case of absence, sickness or death. He will conform in all things to the instructions of the Rector. . . .

"4. As all Academic instruction must be in harmony with the Principles of the Catholic Religion, the Professors will be bound not only not to teach anything contrary to religion, but to take advantage of the occasion the subjects they treat of may offer, to point out that Religion is the basis of Science, and to inculcate the love of Religion and its duties.'

"In two important, though secondary recommendations, the Report followed the Oxford model, namely in providing that the students should be 'interns, so far as circumstances permit,' and that the tutorial system should be, at least partially, adopted. The latter recommendation is contained in a Postscript to the Report, which commences by stressing the view already agreed on by Newman and Dr. Cullen, that in an 'untried and unformed' body, a 'working, rather than
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a theoretical constitution' was required. It was proposed, therefore, that a strictly limited number of professors should be appointed at once, on the understanding that they should be prepared to assist one another, and even undertake tutorial functions."  

At several points the Report provides for the growth and the consequent change that would ensure a living institution—an ideal that echoes one of Newman's so-called proverbs throughout his life: "Growth the only evidence of life." There is allowance for growth in the science division of the Report as well as the prospect of a school of engineering. The importance to be given to modern science in the University of Ireland is evidence of a growth in perspective from the classical-mathematical base of Newman's own Oxford education. In 1855 Newman, as Rector, purchased the buildings that had housed one of the smaller private medical schools of Dublin in order that he might establish a Medical School, which, with good fortune, increased steadily in popularity over the years. Aubrey Gwynn wrote that "our modern Faculty of Medicine in University College, Dublin, has always been proud of its uninterrupted descent from the small school opened by Newman in 1855."  

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1 Fergal McGrath, Newman's University, pp. 116-118.

2 J. H. Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 5.

INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS

Growth is evident also in the provision that the professors at their sessional meetings were to draw up the Sessional Programme of Studies and submit it for approval to the Rector. The curriculum was not to be necessarily fixed and eventually stagnant as was the situation in Oxford that provided a basis for the criticisms of the Edinburgh Review. Furthermore, the Academic Senate was to have an annual representation after ten years of Graduates of respective Faculties, not to exceed one-fourth of the whole body. This provision was one that would give the graduates, largely laity, an ever increasing influence in the university and would also provide for a constant association and communication between the university and the society which supported it and eventually in turn derived the benefit from the university.

Although the Thurles Report gave the Professors legislative and administrative responsibilities and a definite place in the education of the students as the Oxford University Commission had proposed, Newman retained his view of the importance of both the Professors and Tutors in education. In a Postscript to the Thurles Report there are the following observations: "It will be observed that we propose to blend at this commencement the Professorial and Tutorial systems. The same person will in fact act as one and the other. The two systems have each advantages, which may perhaps thus be united. For their application depends much on the subject matter; for instance, the Physical Sciences require a Professor, the Languages a Tutor. Again, a Professor is required to set forth the objects and limits of a Science, and to give a preliminary view upon it, to those who have not thought on it, ... On the other hand, the
work of a Professor is not sufficient by itself to form the pupil. The
catechetical form of instruction and the closeness of work in a small
class are needed besides. Without these, even supposing the Professor
to be a man of genius and to interest his hearers, the acquirements
carried away from him will often be very superficial. No doubt,
whenever the mind is really interested, it is also led in some degree to
exert itself, and there is fruit, but if this is trusted to, the result
will be undisciplined and unexercised minds, with few notions, on which
they are able to show off, but without any judgment or any solid powers.
So that the principal making of men must be by the Tutorial system." 1

Newman reserved the choice of Lecturers and Tutors to himself
and also the decision as to when, in the progress of the university,
Professors should be chosen. His letter to Archbishop Cullen, October
11, 1851 indicated that he thought of Professors as men of eminence "who
would have a right to exert a distinct and personal influence on the
management of things." 2 For example, he said that if he had to choose
a Professor of History that he would "make an attempt to get so
distinguished a man, as Dr. Dollinger...[or] Dr. Jerrard in
Classics." 3 Newman did appoint Eugene O'Curry (1796-1862) as
Professor of Archaeology and Irish History in 1854 and had
his first lectures to the university. Lectures on the

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1 "Postscript to The Thurles Report," quoted in Fergal
McGrath, Newman's University, pp. 120-121.

2 J. H. Newman, "Letter to Archbishop Cullen, October 11,

3 Ibid., p. 303.
INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS

Manuscript Materials of Ancient Irish History, printed at the expense of the university. 1 The tutors, on the other hand, needed to be men who shared Newman's view of the importance of the tutor in the formation of the students' minds.

In one of the essays published in the "Catholic University Gazette" in 1854, a publication Newman began as a forum for ideas about university education, Newman writes as follows: "The University is for the Professor, and the College for the Tutor; the University is for the philosophical discourse, the eloquent sermon, or the well contested disputation; and the College for the catechetical lecture. The university is for theology, law, and medicine, for natural history, for physical science, and for the sciences generally and their promulgation; the College is for the formation of character, intellectual and moral, for the cultivation of the mind, for the improvement of the individual, for the study of literature, for the classics, and those rudimental sciences which strengthen and sharpen the intellect." 2 "The Professorial system fulfills the strict idea of a University, and is sufficient for its 'being,' but it is not sufficient for its 'well-being.'

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1 Fergal McGrath, Newman's University, p. 321.

INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS

Colleges constitute the 'integrity' of a University." About the new university, Newman wrote to Archbishop Cullen as follows: "I should begin with very few Professors and tutors, enlarging the number according to the need; but I should like a good large sum for 'exhibitions' and 'prizes,' which would diminish the expence [sic] to the deserving students and create a sort of model set of men, who would form the nucleus of a good tradition." The "good tradition" would form what Newman in Discourse VII referred to as "a self-perpetuating tradition, or a 'genius loci'... which haunts the home where it has been born, and which imbues and forms, more or less, and one by one, every individual who is successively brought under its shadow" (Discourse VII, 235.20-25).

In the Introduction written to precede Discourse VI (See below page 582), Newman wrote that to secure the religious character and the morals of the members of the university, there should be within its precincts, Societies, Halls, Colleges and Monastic Establishments.

1 "By the 'integrity' of anything is meant a gift superadded to its nature, without which that nature is indeed complete, and can act, and fulfil its end, but does not find itself, if I may use the expression, in easy circumstances." J. H. Newman, "Professors and Tutors," Historical Sketches, Vol. III, p. 180.


During Newman's Rectorship two residences were opened. Augrey Gwynn describes them as the centre of a "good tradition" which Newman so valued as an essential of university education:

During his years of active work as fellow and tutor of Oriel College at Oxford, Newman had been noted for his belief in the moral and intellectual value of the tutorial system, as it had developed in the two older English Universities; and in the quality of education that could be given in residential Universities such as Oxford and Cambridge, as compared with the less highly organised life of modern Universities such as London or the more recent provincial Universities of England. In Dublin the older University commonly known as Trinity College, had been founded from the first as a residential University; its first fellows and professors had come for the most part from Cambridge. It was inevitable that Newman should do everything in his power to promote this type of close supervision and personal intercourse which he had known in Oxford; and he himself lived as Rector in a house in Harcourt Street, [St. Mary's] with a few select students as his immediate pupils. For the most part these select students were of English parentage; but the central building of the University's life, now known as Newman House and still the centre of student life in our College, but known to many more familiarly as '86' St. Stephen's Green, [St. Patrick's] was planned to house a group of young Irish students, under the immediate supervision of Newman's close friend and Irish adviser, D. B. Dunne. That tradition of a small select body of students, many of them prominent in the student-life of the College, was maintained at '86' throughout the whole period of the University's life, from 1854 to 1909. Many of the first professors and lecturers of the new National University were men who had enjoyed this privilege of residence at '86' in their student-days; and they were thus unusually well qualified to pass on to a younger and more restless generation a tradition of University life that went straight back to the days of Newman's rectorship. 1

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1 Aubrey Gwynn, "Newman as the First Rector of the Catholic University of Ireland, Cardinal Newman-Studien; 3, pp. 104-105.
INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS

Thus it is evident that The Thurles Report, the blueprint for the Catholic University of Ireland, included the best features of Newman's Oxford, but modified the less desirable elements that had occasioned the criticisms of the Edinburgh Reviewers and the Oxford University Commissioners.

"The University Committee, which had been appointed by the Synod of Thurles, and consisted of certain Bishops and laymen, had deferred,...their decision upon the Report of the Subcommittee of Three till November; at their meeting in that month, amongst other things, they passed the following Resolution:-

"November 12, 1851. His Grace the Primate (Dr. Cullen) in the Chair. Resolved that the Very Revd. John Henry Newman, D.D. be requested to allow himself to be named the first President of the Catholic University of Ireland, and that his appointment to that office be hereby fixed, subject only to that gentleman’s acceptance of the same. (signed John, Archbishop of Tuam)."

"Dr. Cooper, I suppose as Secretary to the University Committee wrote to me as follows:

"I had the honour to propose you. The Very Revd. Dr. O'Brien of Waterford seconded. It was spoken to in terms of warmest approbation by Dr. MacHale amongst others, and passed not only unanimously, but with an acclaim not loud, but most cordial."

"Dr. Cullen wrote to me as follows, 'I trust you will accept the burden which we are so desirous to place on you. I trust we shall do every thing to conduct matters as you will desire. I will send you tomorrow,
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or the day after, a copy of the Fundamental Rules which we adopted for the regulation of the University. They are precisely those you agreed to in your Report from Thurles, that the "Summum Imperium" should be in the Bishops, but that the President should have the entire acting discretion. I will write to Dr. Cooper to send you a copy."¹

Newman accepted the appointment as President of the Catholic University made on November 12, 1851. His letter to Archbishop Cullen indicates gratitude as well as the full realization of the responsibilities he was assuming: "The news of my appointment conveyed to me by Dr. Cooper, and now your Grace's letter of this morning have affected me with a great deal of pleasure and gratitude in spite of the anxiety which the responsibilities I am entering on occasion. Unless I have the prayers and good advice of those who have thought me worthy of so high a post, I shall have no hope of acquitting myself well—but I am encouraged by the thought, that so great an undertaking, suggested and sanctioned by the Holy See, and commenced with such deliberation by the Hierarchy of Ireland is not destined to come to nothing. Would there be any way of putting the University under the patronage of our Blessed Lady, for it would be most desirable?"²

Approximately one month before he was appointed Rector Newman wrote to Mrs. William Froude about the university as follows: "I


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I suppose in a few days I shall know what is decided on in Ireland about the University. It is a most daring attempt but first it is a religious one, next it has the Pope's blessing on it. Curious it will be if Oxford is imported into Ireland, not in its members only, but in its principles, methods, ways, and arguments. The battle there will be what it was in Oxford 20 years ago. ...while I found my tools breaking under me in Oxford,...I am renewing the struggle in Dublin, with the Catholic Church to support me." ¹ This letter indicates an enthusiasm for joining forces against his old foe "Liberalism" in religion and education. The battle against Liberalism in Oxford was lost with Hawkins over the pastoral view of the tutorship and with Hampden and the Dissenters over the admission of Dissenters to Oxford because Newman did not have the means or "tools," as he terms it, of a church with decided principles to support him. He rejoices that there is now a renewed opportunity of vanquishing the enemy "Liberalism" and thus halting the advancing tide of infidelity by establishing a centre of learning and of faith in the Catholic University of Ireland. It would be narrow to assume as Timothy Corcoran has done ² that Newman intended to import Oxford into Ireland in the literal form that existed in Newman's day. Corcoran seemed to have been totally unaware of Newman's disagreements with some aspects of Oxford education in the nineteenth century.


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century. By the phrase "in its members," in the foregoing letter, Newman indicates that he hoped for tutors from Oxford graduates to share his views of education. The words "its principles and methods" refer essentially, first, to the unity of secular and religious knowledge as the basis of education in opposition to the principle of mixed education and secondly, to the importance of the tutorial system in the cultivation of mind and the formation of character. The Reverend Corcoran seems to have understood by the phrase "imported into Ireland" a literal resurgence of Oxford Liberal Education in Ireland; whereas, Newman meant exactly what he said: "'I am renewing the struggle [against Liberalism in education] in Dublin, with the Catholic Church to support me.'" It was the spirit of Oxford that retained, however tarnished, the mediaeval ideal of the unity of knowledge and the importance of religion in that concept that Newman wanted to import into Ireland.

Newman's reasons for accepting "the burden which we are so desirous to place on you" ¹ were academic, religious, and philosophical. A recent critic of Newman, Vincent Alan McClelland, imputes to Newman motives of personal ambition in the Irish Campaign unwarranted by Newman's own testimony. McClelland writes that "Psychologically,..., he [Newman] needed the distinction which the University would provide. In one effort he hoped to regain the public position he had occupied before

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1845, and the infinite care which he lavished on the University Discourses is sufficient evidence of his eagerness."¹ Surely McClelland writes only of his own view, which in this instance, is based on insufficient evidence from Newman's own writings. In the "Journal 1859-1879,"² Newman quoted from his own sermon "The Secret Power of Divine Grace" these words to those of his own day who seemed to have a determined opposition to him and the design of misinterpreting his motives: "They think we mean to spend our devotion upon a human cause, and that we toil for an object of human ambition. They think that we should acknowledge, if cross-examined, that our ultimate purpose was the success of persons and parties, to whom we were bound in honour, or by interest, or by gratitude; and that, if we looked to objects above the world or beyond the grave, we did so with very secondary aims and faint perceptions. They fancy, as the largest concession of their liberality, that we are working from the desire, generous, but still human, of the praise of earthy superiors, and that, after all, in some way or other, we are living on the breath, and basking in the smile, of man."³ That Newman did not act from motives of human ambition or the desire for the prestige of the Rectorship is evident from his expressed desire to serve the undertaking in any way that he could (see above page 66), and from his not

committing himself to accepting the Rectorship immediately. Ultimately, it was Newman's friends and Oratorians who insisted that he accept. Furthermore, Newman’s lack of worldly ambition is evident in his writings at different times in his life. The following passage is noteworthy: "It has been my 'lifelong' prayer, and Thou hast granted it, that I should be set aside in this world. Now then let me make it once again. O Lord, bless what I write and prosper it—let it do much good, let it have much success; but let no praise come to me on that account in my lifetime."¹ In the Apologia Pro Vita Sua Newman described himself as one "who has given up much that he loved and prized and could have retained, but that he loved honesty better than name, and Truth better than dear friends. ..." (see above p. 5).

Newman's academic reasons for accepting the rectorship are evident from the following quotations: Newman wrote in "The Journal 1859-1879" of his life's work that "from first to last, education, in this large sense of the word has been my line. ..."² By "this large sense" Newman comprehended the aim of "improving the condition, the status, of the Catholic body, by a careful survey of their argumentative basis, of their position relatively to the philosophy and the character of the day, by giving them juster views, by enlarging and refining their minds, in one word, by education, ..."³ Newman was criticized after

² Ibid., p. 259.
³ Ibid., p. 259.
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his conversion for not attempting to influence others to follow him: "To me conversions were not the first thing, but the edification of Catholics. ...And when I have given as my true opinion, that I am afraid to make hasty converts of educated men, lest they should not have counted the cost, and should have difficulties after they have entered the Church, I do but imply the same thing, that the Church must be prepared for converts, as well as converts prepared for the Church." 1 Education in the "large sense of the word"—education of the entire Catholic body, clergy and laity, was necessary in Newman's view. Newman wrote in a sermon that he delivered in the University Church, Dublin, in the Spring of 1856 a sentence that embodies his educational ideal: "I want the intellectual layman to be religious, and the devout ecclesiastic to be intellectual." 2 "He believed that his role in the Church lay primarily in broadening the minds of Catholics and in improving their status in the community, by a re-examination of the Catholic position relative to the intellectual developments and new discoveries of the age. Such a 'levelling up' process, as he called it, would facilitate dialogue with the non-Catholic world." 3 It was the university


community that Newman saw as the centre of "edification, cultivation of mind, growth of reason" 1 that would in turn influence its members "to dispense on all sides...the royal light of Truth, and exert an august moral influence upon the world." 2

Newman's additional reason for accepting his academic appointment and of pursuing the establishment of the Catholic University of Ireland with enthusiasm concerned the condition of religious knowledge in the Catholic Church. In the first months after he had become a Catholic, Cardinal Wiseman suggested to Newman the possibility of opening a School of Theology by way of reviving Theological studies in England. While Newman was in Rome for study and ordination 1846-1847, he was shocked to find that the study to which he had devoted himself for years—the study of Catholic tradition, the Fathers, and the great Scholastics—was all but unknown in Rome. The Church in 1847 was not ready for its illustrious convert. While in Rome, he grew "increasingly confident of the cogency of [his] general views on Faith and Reason which had gradually taken shape in his mind, and which were indeed the source from which the Essay [on Development] itself had sprung. If he had anything to bring by way of offering to the Church, it was surely a presentation of the views by which he himself had been led into her fold


2 Ibid., p. 389.
and many another with him. The more he devoted himself to the study of Catholic tradition, the Fathers, and the great Scholastics, the more convinced was he of the soundness of that chain of reasoning which had brought him at last to the One True Church. All that it needed to make it a suitable handbook for theologians teaching in the Church's name was to be corrected on a few points of detail. It was in order to get these corrections made and to secure authoritative approval of his work, as a whole, and then to get some definite mission assigned him, that he had come to Rome." 1 To his surprise he found his Essay on Development quoted in unfavourable contexts, criticized in part, and himself under suspicion for his references to St. Thomas and Aristotle. 2 In a letter to J. P. Dalgairns, November 22, 1846 Newman writes as follows:

"Hope told me we should find very little theology here, and a talk we had yesterday with one of the Jesuit fathers here shows we shall find little philosophy. It arose from our talking of the Greek studies of the Propaganda and asking whether the youths learned Aristotle. 'Of no—he said—Aristotle is in no favor here—no, not in Rome:—not St. Thomas. I have read Aristotle and St. Thos, and owe a great deal to them, but they are out of favor here and throughout Italy. St. Thomas is a great saint—people don't dare to speak against him—they profess to reverence him, but put him aside.' I asked what philosophy they "did" adopt. He said "none." 'Odds and ends—whatever seems to them best—like St. Clement's Stromata. They have no philosophy. "Facts" are the great things, and nothing else. Exegesis, but not doctrine.' He went on to say that many privately were sorry for this, many Jesuits, he said; but no one dared oppose the fashion." 3

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1 Louis Bouyer, Newman, His Life and Spirituality, p. 262.
2 Ibid., p. 264.
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In the same letter, Newman recounts his discussions with Perrone on Catholic Tradition. In his disillusionment Newman wrote that "All this shows how little they have of a view" (a quality of mind cultivated by Newman's idea of a Liberal Education). In the same letter, dated November 23, Newman states that "From what I hear today, I fear theology such must for a time be laid on the shelf, at Maryvale, and we must take to printing practical sermons. The Theologians of the Roman College, who are said to sway the theology of Rome are introducing 'bits' (without having seen the whole book) 'bits' of my Essay into their lectures to dissent from. This seems very absurd. I will not raise controversy in the Church, and it would ill become a neo Catholic to be introducing views...and though it will not only be a triumph to such as Palmer, but I fear throw back such as hope, I think I shall be content to let the matter rest for years before I write again. The worst is that I am cut off from controversy against infidels.

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1 Giovanni Perrone (1794-1876) was Professor of Dogmatic Theology at the Roman College, 1824-30, 1834-48. Letters and Diaries, Vol. XI, pp. 351-352. C. S. Jessop notes that although Perrope at first did not understand Newman, they did come closer in agreement later in 1847 and that he defended Newman at Rome in 1867.


3 William Palmer (1803-1885) of Worcester College Oxford and one of the Tractarians, had criticized Newman's Essay as identical with rationalism.

4 James Robert Hope (1812-1873), married grand-daughter of Sir Walter Scott, thus after 1853, he was Hope-Scott. A lawyer for the Tractarians, he became a Catholic in 1861.
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altogether." 1 Newman recognized and regretted the lack of freedom in the Church that would enable controversialists to fight infidelity. Later in his university essay "Christianity and Scientific Investigation" Newman was to write that "great minás need [the] elbow-room" 2 that the university should provide. Bouyer compliments Newman for his "mental poise." "Not for a moment did it occur to him to entertain any doubts about the Church he had joined; still less to rebel. ... The truths that Newman had acquired at so heavy a cost, the principles he had re-discovered or unearthed—these would of themselves prevail. Truth would win through in the long run." 3

In another respect too, he viewed the university as a means of assembling and setting in order the resources of Catholicism, spiritual and intellectual. It would be in the university that there could be collisions of theological and philosophical thought. In an atmosphere of deep learning and free discussion Truth would find a home. Newman thought that the task "to which all Catholics would turn their minds if they were clearly aware of the signs of the times...was, first to recognize and enter into the difficulties that beset the modern mind in regard to the acceptance of religious belief, and next to provide a


3 Louis Bouyer, Newman, His Life and Spirituality, p. 265.
solution of them. ... It was the very fact that his own faith was so firmly rooted that made him feel so strongly that the Church ought not to disregard the problems of the age. Drawing forth both new and old from the treasure-house of eternal truth, her office it was to provide such positive solutions as would reconcile and bring to her fold all those multitudes that stood apart. The failure of people to recognize religious truth is not always due to their lack of spiritual vision, but rather the fault of its guardians too confident, too satisfied with the thought of what they themselves possess, to turn and boldly confront the crying problems of the hour."

The university was in Newman's mind the logical centre for confronting the problems of the hour. To that end he wrote these words:

What I desiderate in Catholics is the gift of bringing out what religion is;...I want a laity, not arrogant, not rash in speech, not disputatious, but men who know their religion, who enter into it, who know just where they stand, who know what they hold, and what they do not, who know their creed so well, that they can give an account of it, who know so much of history that they can defend it. I want an intelligent, well-instructed laity;...I wish you to enlarge your knowledge, to cultivate your reason, to get an insight into the relation of truth to truth, to learn to view things as they are, to understand how faith and reason stand to each other, what are the bases and principles of Catholicism,... You ought to be able to bring out what you feel and what you mean, as well as to feel and mean it; to expose to the comprehension of others the fictions and fallacies of your opponents; and to explain the charges brought against the Church, to the

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satisfaction, not, indeed, of bigots, but of men of sense, of whatever cast of opinion. And one immediate effect of your being able to do all this will be your gaining that proper confidence in self which is so necessary for you. You will then not even have the temptation to rely on others, to court political parties or particular men; they will rather have to court you.  

Thus Newman saw the great need for education of the whole Catholic body—the kind of education that trained the mind to grapple with the problems of the hour. Newman's sister Jemima had warned him in 1845, "...you will not influence the same class of minds that you have in times past." (See above, p. 46). He was indeed a missionary in a foreign land. It was with a missionary's zeal for Truth and personal self-sacrifice that he set about the establishment of the Catholic University of Ireland.

On September 16, 1851 Newman wrote to Cullen accepting the Archbishop's proposal to deliver a series of lectures as a public gesture towards beginning the university: "As to your Grace's proposal, I will readily accede to it—but I consider I ought to know better than I do the state of public opinion and knowledge in Ireland on the subject of education, and your own ideas what Lectures ought to be about, in order to be useful. I do not see I could do them well, unless I did them with a good deal of thought. But, as a first condition, I should like to have the 'definite' subjects to be treated of from your Grace."  

Cullen replied as follows on September 20: "What we want in Ireland is to

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persuade the people that education should be religious. The whole
tendency of our new systems is to make it believed that education may be
so conducted as to have nothing at all to do with religion. Moral
philosophy, law, history are proposed to be taught in this way. The
project is in itself absurd and impossible, but it is necessary to
instruct us a little upon the matter. To do so however I suppose the
whole question of education should be reviewed--The subjects or some of
the subjects might be the advantages of educating the people and the
sort of education they ought to receive--Mixed education--Examination of
the education given to Catholics in Trinity College and its effects--
education in the Queen's Colleges, or education without any religion--
The sort of education which Catholics ought to seek for--

1 In the material of the Discourses Newman did attempt to examine "the whole
question of education" with a view of explaining why the whole of
education should not be "so conducted as to have nothing at all to do
with religion." What he did not do was "to persuade the people that
education should be religious" nor did he join in battle with Trinity
College or the Queen's College over their education and its effects on
Catholics. Newman did not involve himself in local controversy, but
kept to the broad lines and principles of his subject.

Vincent McClelland, in the passage previously quoted, (See
above, pp. 80-81) wrote that Newman lavished infinite care on the,

1 Paul Cullen, "Note 2, Letter to Newman, September 20, 1851,"
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Discourses with a view to satisfying some personal ambition. Aside from the fact that Newman always pursued any task at hand with as much care as possible, the disturbing circumstances amid which he wrote the Discourses most certainly precluded the "lavishing of infinite care" on their writing. On December 31, 1851 Newman wrote to Cullen: "...you may rely on it I do not 'forget' the Lectures—but alas! with my present most troublesome affair [the Achilli Trial] hanging over me and constantly making calls on me, how shall I find time? Everything looks very gloomy just now.

"The trial is to come on in the middle of February...—and then by the 1st of March I could come to Dublin to deliver the Lectures—...." ¹

However, the trial did not occur until June 21, 1852. Newman notes in his diary for April 10, 1852: "Finished my first three university discourses" ² all this time thinking that he might have to leave them for prison. In a letter to Robert Ormsby ³ April 14, 1852, Newman indicated the suffering and uncertainty of view from lack of knowledge of his audience that plagued him in the composition of the Discourses: "My immediate cause of writing to you is this—my lectures have taken me

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³ Robert Ormsby (1820-1889) was Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford in 1843. He became a Catholic in 1847. Ormsby assisted Lucas in editing the Tablet. In 1854 Newman appointed him professor of Greek and Latin at the Catholic University. In 1882 he was elected Fellow of the Royal University of Ireland. He was author of the Memoirs of James Robert Hope-Scott, 1884. Letters and Diaries, Vol. XII, p. 436.
more trouble than anyone could by a stretch of imagination conceive. I have written almost reams of paper, finished, set aside—then taken them up again, and plucked them—and so on. The Truth is, I have the utmost difficulty of writing to people I do not know,...

"...I have no security to myself that the lectures will not be, from beginning to end, a failure from my not knowing my audience." ¹ It will be remembered that Dr. Cullen did not answer Newman's request for knowledge about "the state of public opinion and knowledge in Ireland on the subject of education" (See above, p. 89). Newman's letter acknowledging the receipt of the subjects again stated that "...and I ought to know something of the state of feeling of my audience before I actually do anything." ² For this information Newman finally turned to lay people such as Robert Ornsby.

Ornsby replied to Newman's letter of April 14, 1852 with the following description of Dublin society as composed of the clergy, society properly so called, the citizen class, the poor. "There is no traditional knowledge of matters perfectly familiar in English society even among those who do pretend to learning. ...Trinity College has given no impress whatever to the Catholics I have met who were educated there. Others have been brought up at Clongowes. The education there,


as in other Catholic Colleges, has evidently been framed to meet the cry for useful knowledge, and the largest part of the time seems divided among subjects such as natural philosophy, mechanics, declamation etc. The Greek and Latin is correct as far as it goes, but narrow and limited to such a degree that it can in no way form the mind as those studies do in the Protestant schools and universities. Hence the society that results from such an education is totally without the whole set of ideas familiar to Oxford and England generally. 'They don't feel the deficiencies that would strike English society; the same words, 'education,' 'university,' and the like, don't convey to their minds the same ideas that they convey to ours.'³ Newman's emphasis in the Discourses on the definition of a university and on the kind of education that would form the mind rather than on an immediately useful education would seem to owe something to Ormsby's directives.

Furthermore, Ormsby informed Newman that "without their knowing it, and perhaps sometimes where they do, the general mind of Catholic society is deeply imbued with Protestant ideas. ...In society I fancy a good deal of new Protestant literature is read--Carlyle and the like. But they read it without 'feeling' that it is hostile to the faith, and this is what I am attempting to give you an idea of. I believe this insensibility to be caused by the long habit of conciliating the Protestants by softening their faith and pretending liberality. It

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has ended in their losing the traditional spirit, but at the same time, not acquiring whatever intellectual advantages the Protestants seem to possess. 1 Ornsby has been describing what he terms "the general vague liberalism of Catholic society." 2

Here was one more unsettling revelation to Newman about the condition of religion in the Catholic Church: first, there had been the state of Theological studies among the Roman clergy that Newman had personal cause to note when he was in Rome in 1846-1847; next, there was, according to Ornsby, surprisingly little of the traditional Catholic spirit among a people that Newman had considered to be the bastion of the Catholic Faith. It was becoming clear that the Catholic mind was neither cultivated nor formed to the point where it could have "a clear conscious view of its own opinions and judgments [nor was it able], to go right to the point, to disentangle a skein of thought, to detect what is sophistical" (Discourse VII, 286.11-16). The kind of education needed for English speaking Catholics was a solid education in the basic principles of all knowledge that included both secular and religious knowledge in order to effect "a discipline in accuracy of mind. ...It is this haziness of intellectual vision which is the malady of all classes of men by nature, of those who read and write and


2 Ibid., p. 146.
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empose, quite as well as of those who cannot,—of all who have not had a really good education."¹ That "really good education" would seem to require more emphasis on the study of religious knowledge than had been characteristic of Oxford undergraduate education in which the clergymen tutors, the framework of religious ceremonies to accompany the important academic functions, and the study of particular books of the Bible from the literary, historical, and linguistic points of view, "gave a religious colouring to all studies,"² which gave a perspective, or "a centre and an aim" (Discourse V, 144.23-24) from which to view knowledge in all its aspects.

Concerning the teaching of religious knowledge in the university curriculum Newman did not intend "that Theology proper should be taught to the youthful aspirant for University honours."³ Rather he stated as follows: "I would treat the subject of Religion in the School of Philosophy and Letters simply as a branch of knowledge. If the University student is bound to have a knowledge of history generally, he is bound to have inclusively a knowledge of sacred history as well as profane; if he ought to be well instructed in Ancient Literature,


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Biblical Literature comes under that general description as well as Classical; if he knows the Philosophy of men, he will not be extravagant from his general subject, if he cultivate also that Philosophy which is divine. And as a student is not necessarily superficial, though he has not studied all the classical poets, or all Aristotle's philosophy, so he need not be dangerously superficial, if he has but a parallel knowledge of Religion." ¹ Some idea of what Newman means in the discourses by the unity of knowledge, at least in a practical sense, can be noted from the foregoing quotation in which History generally and sacred history; Ancient Literature and Biblical Literature are aspects of history or literature respectively and should be taught in conjunction. Thus Religious knowledge keeps its place amid other subjects in the curriculum and the students' minds. Furthermore, Newman states that this general religious knowledge is valuable in general dialogue with those of different beliefs: "If a Catholic youth mixes with educated Protestants of his own age, he will find them conversant with the outlines and the characteristics of sacred and ecclesiastical history as well as profane: it is desirable that he should be on a par with them, and able to keep up a conversation with them." ²

² Ibid., p. 375.
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Newman opposed "Ward's 1 proposal that the Classics should be in great measure superseded, and that one chief instrument of a layman's education should be theological and patristic reading. ...instead of regarding the whole of education as directly and logically ministering to the inculcation of Christian principles, he [Newman] treated intellectual cultivation...as an end in itself, and to be pursued as such in University training." 2 It is interesting to note that Newman on the same grounds opposed Dr. Cullen's first proposal for lecture subjects; namely, that Newman should show the Dublin audience that education should be religious. (See above, pp. 89-90).

Newman thought that cultivated minds were more powerful weapons against the advancing tide of Liberalism than the teaching of Theology itself. "To meet the apprehended danger, I would exclude the teaching 'in extenso' of pure dogma from the secular schools, and content myself with enforcing such a broad knowledge of doctrinal subjects as is contained in the catechisms of the Church, or the actual writings of her laity. I would have students apply their minds to such religious topics as laymen actually do treat, and are thought praiseworthy in treating." 3

1 William George Ward (1812-1882) was the extremist Tractarian whose Ideal of the Christian Church was condemned by the Oxford Convocation in 1845. He became a Catholic in 1845 and taught at St. Edmund's Ware. From 1863-1878 he was editor of the Dublin Review, the organ of extreme ultramontanism. Letters and Diaries, Vol. XI, p. 359.


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Newman was concerned to treat theology in its secular aspect as it related to the history, the literature, and the philosophy of Christianity. His purpose in advocating theological studies for laymen was the formation of a basis for discussion with Protestants who do know the doctrines and arguments of their religion. "I should desire, then, to encourage in our students an intelligent apprehension of the relations, as I may call them, between the Church and Society at large; for instance, the difference between the Church and a religious sect; the respective prerogatives of the Church and the civil power; what the Church claims of necessity, what it cannot dispense with, what it can; what it can grant, what it cannot." ¹ Not only would the mind be formed by access to the unity of knowledge, but the judgment would be able to evaluate current social and religious ideas from the standpoint of basic religious knowledge.

Newman left England May 7 for Dublin. He had written, it would seem from his letters, the best part of four lectures. In a letter to Henry Wilberforce about the point of view adopted, he wrote these words: "...I am going to treat my subject, merely as a matter of philosophy, not of Catholic duty." ² Newman viewed his commission in the Discourses as that of presenting the philosophy of university education; therefore he did not intend to confine his subject to the


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contemporary problem of mixed education, nor did he intend to discuss
what is thought of today as Catholic education, but rather the
philosophy of education as that philosophy is recognized in the minds of
those of different religious beliefs and racial origins who share "a
tradition of culture and ethics, founded on the study of human letters"
as Christopher Dawson defines "humanism." 1  In an article remarkable
for its distorted viewpoint and half-truths, P. A. Dale writes that
"It [Newman's Idea... is] from beginning to end primarily a defense-
first in intellectual and then in moral terms—of religious exclusiveness
and Church control of university education." 2  A glance at Newman's
first Discourse indicates that not only is he not advocating "religious
exclusiveness," he is not dealing with university education from the
point of view of religion at all. "...in thus speaking of human
philosophy, I have intimated the mode in which I propose to handle my
subject altogether. Observe, then, Gentlemen, I have no intention of
bringing into the argument the authority of the Church at all; but I
shall consider the question simply on the grounds of human reason and
human wisdom" (Discourse I, 17.27-18.4). Also, during the time he was
composing the Discourses, Newman wrote of his intentions as follows:
"...I am going to treat the whole subject, not on the assumption of
Catholicism, but in the way of reasoning, and as men of all religions


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may do [may treat it]." 1 What has been termed Newman's "world-wide" 2 view was the very characteristic that contributed largely to making him suspect in ecclesiastical circles in his own day and even afterwards.

As to the second allegation that Newman was defending "Church control of university education," there is considerable evidence to support the fact that Newman's aim in the Discourses was quite the opposite. He wrote in one of the Introductions that he proposed to include before Discourse VI the following: "A University is not 'ipso facto' a Church Institution,... A University has no direct call to make men Catholic or religious, for that is the previous and contemporaneous office of the Church. Men are Catholics 'before' they are students of a University. ... But he is speaking here of the 'direct end' of a University [as distinct from the Church]. This end is 'Knowledge,' in a large sense of the word, or cultivation of mind, as such." 3 In a paper referred to as "Father Joseph [Gordon's] Objections" there is the following paraphrase of Newman's viewpoint in the Discourses: "The object then of a University, the 'scope of a University' p. 181 is to impart liberal knowledge or a 'gentleman's knowledge' [p. 180-181] 'it makes not the Christian, not the Catholic,


2 Principal Shanly, Studies in Poetry and Philosophy, quoted in My Campaign in Ireland, p. 278.

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but the Gentleman,' ly5. And this is not one of the things I have to say, one of the ends I aim at 'it is the issue, if it be not the drift, of all that I have been saying in my preceding discourse--.' 1

Not only do Newman's lectures give no suggestion of "Church control of University education," they essentially do not concern Religion. Father John Gordon, 2 one of Newman's own Oratory at Birmingham objected as follows: "It seems to me that Religion is too absolutely and in such a very unqualified way excluded by this statement of the end of a University—I feel inclined to maintain against it, and as if I were opposing it, that the object of a Catholic University must be to make men good Catholics—it must assume Catholic truths, their reality and importance, and use Catholic truths and instruments to mould the character of its subjects—it cannot forget for a moment that they have souls and are to be educated for God, and it grates upon my ear and feelings to say so exclusively that the object of a Catholic University entirely excludes the idea of making men Catholics or making Catholics good Catholics!" 3 Newlan answered these objections in the sections of the "Introduction to Discourse VI" that were quoted previously (p. 100).


2 John Joseph Gordon (1811-1853) of Trinity College, Cambridge became a Catholic in 1847 and an oratorian in 1848. He assisted Newman in collecting witnesses for the Achilli Trial.

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Dr. David Moriarty, 1 whom Newman said he had made the censor of his lectures also criticized the idea in Discourse VI although he assured Newman that he [Moriarty] had no knowledge of fact in the matter: "I therefore thought, but without having ever examined the subject, that a University was charged with the morals as well as with the mind of a youth—that she was bound 'in solidum' for him, that she was bound to see the work done in some way or other and either per se or per alium." 2 But in his answer to Moriarty he stressed: "I do not think that a University has to do with morals, ... as it has to do with faith (under the name of knowledge)—nor do I think the Church on the whole employs a University for morals, (except as teaching them, but that comes under faith—) but I think she uses small bodies in the Universities, Colleges, halls, etc. etc. as the preservative of morals, more naturally." 3 Also, Newman saw that the word "religious" was causing difficulties in interpretation of his lectures: "I wish to vanish (in 'correct' speaking) the word 'religious' as ambiguous—and to speak of 'faith' and 'morals.' The University takes care of faith in the

1 David Moriarty (1814-1877) was President of All Hallows College, Drumcondra, Dublin and in 1856 was made Bishop of Kerry. He was one of Newman's close friends in Ireland.


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fullest sense—the College morals. I am speaking of them on the whole, and in the abstract." ¹ By taking care of Faith Newman understood that "the office of Catholic University is to teach faith, and of Colleges to protect morals. I avoid the word 'religious' as ambiguous and vague. 'Faith' and 'morals' are more ecclesiastical terms." ² Moriarty anticipated criticisms from different sources in the following comment about Discourses VI and VII: "The naked thesis might startle both the ascetic and the utilitarian, but all difficulties vanish in the working out of the subject. ..." ³

Newman delivered the lectures on successive Mondays from May 10 to June 7. On May 11, 1852 he wrote that "You are all expecting news, and I have no one to be my trumpeter. ... The lecture I suppose, thanks to our dear Lady has been a hit; and now I am beginning to be anxious lest the others should not duly follow up the blow." The Exhibition Room in the Rotunda "holds, say, 400—and was nearly full. ... All the intellect of Dublin were there. ... When I say that Dear Molyneux was much pleased, I mean to express that I did not offend Dr. Murray’s friends. Surgeon O’Reilly, who is representative perhaps of a class of


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...and who on Saturday had been half arguing with me against the University, said, when the Lecture was ended, that 'the days of mixed education were numbered.'

"The Lectures are to be in extenso in the Tablet— and I am going to publish them at 5/6 a piece—and then I think I shall have a library edition afterwards. Dr. Moriarty, whom I made censor beforehand, ... seemed pleased with the Lecture—and spoke of its prudence, and said it went with the Queen's College party just as far as was possible.

"I was heard most distinctly, or rather my voice so filled the room and I had such perfect command of it, ... The room will be fuller next week, ... My one object here is that of hastening on these University matters. Three new and stronger Rescripts about them have just come from Rome." 3 It would seem from the letter that of the three classes represented everyone was pleased, and Newman had managed to insult no one.

However, before lecture two Newman suffered severe misgivings about his material and method. "I have 'just' discovered how I ought to have written my lectures—what would have been the true rhetoric—and how I have plunged into a maze of metaphysics, from which I may be

1 Only lecture one was published in the Tablet, XIII (5 May, 1852), pp. 307-9. Letters and Diaries, XV, p. 84.

2 Two of the Rescripts are printed—Campaign, pp. IXXVII--Ixxx, and pp. IXXXIV--IxxXV. Letters and Diaries, XV, p. 84.

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unable to heave myself. When this broke on me, I half thought of lecturing extempore quite a different lecture—but I am not equal to it.' The Postscript: "Lecture just over—brass band playing good part of the time. H. W. [Wilberforce] liked it." 2 According to Dessain's note the second lecture was given in the Concert Room at the Rotunda.

About lecture three, there is just a short note under "Monday 24 May my third Discourse in the Rotunda left directly afterwards for H. W. [Wilberforce] at Kingstown embarked for England crossed at night." 3 In a letter to Miss Giberne, Newman notes his own fatigue and want of strength: "I trust I am doing good in Ireland, but really it is like drawing my blood—so much am I pulled down." 4 There is scarcely a letter that does not mention the anxieties of the Achilli Trial. To Charles Newsham, after discussing the fact that his opponents are attempting to bribe and intimidate witnesses, Newman writes about his Discourses: "I am in the midst of my Irish lectures and they try me more than anything I ever did—I mean, the thinking them out. They are

1 The brass band was playing for a charity bazaar in the Exhibition Room, the room Newman had had for his first lecture. Letters and Diaries, Vol. XV, p. 91.


3 Letters and Diaries, Vol. XV, p. 91.

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seriously hurting my health—Pray for me,... ." 1

A note in the Diary "Monday 31 May 1852 my fourth discourse in the Rotunda" is followed by a line in a letter to F. S. Bowles: "My lecture [the fourth] went off well yesterday—the room full—people seemed pleased." Under June 2, Newman adds that "My lectures, I am thankful to say, are telling." 2 The Freeman's Journal for June 1 stated that "The spacious salon adjoining the round room was thronged!" 3 It would seem that the lectures were increasingly successful.

Before the lectures Newman seemed to suffer extremely. The Thursday before delivering Discourse V, he wrote to Ambrose St. John: "...but I am worried beyond measure about my lectures. Here is the third Thursday I have been quite overthrown by the difficulty." 4 To Miss Giberne on the day of the lecture Newman wrote these words: "I am just going to deliver Number 5, and no one but myself knows how sadly I am overworked. My health still holds up, which is a great mercy." 5 On


3 Quoted in McGrath, Newman's University, p. 154.


the following day he wrote from 15 Harcourt Street, Dublin a phrase that describes the constant travelling that he did at this time: "I am on the wing for Birmingham." 1

The first five lectures had been delivered to the Dublin audience. In spite of criticisms that Newman had included too many ideas in discourse I which if developed, Newman concurred, would make the whole volume, and his own misgivings about discourse II, John Gordon wrote that "it is to be considered that you are 'writing' for the world and for posterity, though speaking to an audience." 2 Newman himself seemed satisfied with the first five. He wrote to Henry Manning from Dublin June 8: "I have been prospered here in my lectures beyond my most sanguine expectations, or rather beyond my most anxious efforts and pains—for I have had anxiety and work beyond belief in writing them, expectations none. ... But my mind has been on my 'work'; no one can tell how it has worn me down but myself." 3 Newman had given the plan of his lectures to Ormsby in April as follows: "The three will be on 1—the position of the question. 2. Theology as a branch of knowledge. 3 Bearing of theology on other branches of knowledge. After these I shall go on to give a normal idea of a University." 4

1 Letters and Diaries, Vol. XV, p. 97.
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It would seem that the remaining lectures VI to X were to deal with "a normal idea of a University."

The Achilli Trial took place from June 21 to 25, 1852, but the Judgment was deferred until November 22, 1852 at which time there was an application for a new trial. That application was refused. The final verdict was handed down January 31, 1853. In a letter to Sister Imelda Poole, Newman wrote that he had been fined £100. "I had a most horrible jobation from Coleridge, of which the theme was 'deterioration of converts.' I had been everything good when I was a Protestant—but I had fallen since I was a Catholic. They would not let me speak." 1

In spite of the "jobation" he thought it necessary to give Newman. Sir John Taylor Coleridge recorded this impression of Newman, quoted here as a description of Newman about the time he delivered the Discourses: "But I was overpowered.' The immense crowd, the anxious and critical audience, his slender figure, and strange mysterious cloudy face. After all the speeches of Counsel he desired to say a few words. Oh! What a sweet musical, almost unearthly voice it was, so unlike any other we had heard". 2

The composition of the Discourses and the preliminary plans for the Dublin University had followed very nearly the course of the


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Achilli Trial. Newman had been asked to deliver the lectures in the Spring of 1851, had written the first five in the winter and spring of 1852, and delivered the first five lectures in the spring of 1852 just before the trial. All through the summer and autumn of 1852 Newman was writing Discourses VI to X for the press. He wrote to the members of the Oratory after the first lecture that he had been accused of a breach of good faith and of being anti-Irish because he had complied with Lucas’s wish and allowed his lectures to be published in the Tablet.

"You will accuse me of all manner of crimes, when you learn that I have 'given away' my first edition of 2500 copies (of 12 lectures) to Duffy the Publisher: ... I 'literally' have given Duffy the edition. They are to be published at /6." ¹ "There is no record that Duffy ever thought fit to give Newman anything, but the lectures were nicely printed in octavo, each one about a week after delivery." ²

It would seem from the Tablet that Newman was but intermitting his Discourses and would return to Ireland to continue his lectures. But anxiety and fatigue plagued Newman. His letter to Charles Newsham on June 15, 1852 contains this paragraph: "As to my Lectures, they have cost me, no one knows how much thought and anxiety—and again and again I stopped, utterly unable to get on with my subject, and nothing but the intercession of the Blessed Virgin kept me up to my work. At length I


² A. D. Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 148.
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have intermitted the course, merely because I could not proceed to my satisfaction. For three days I sat at my desk nearly from morning to night, and put aside as worthless at night what I had been doing all day. Then I gave it up, and came here [Birmingham]—hoping that I shall be strengthened to begin again. ...I am sure you will remember me in this as in other matters; and gain for me the light of Divine Grace, that I may say what is profitable and true, and nothing else."  

There is certainly no suggestion of personal ambition in the foregoing last line, but only sincerity of purpose. Newsham had written the following words of encouragement to Newman June 14—words that were prophetic in their import: "'Go on, My Dear Newman. Providence is making use of you for great ends—ends much beyond the reach of your own view, and extending much beyond the short period of your own life. Your invaluable writings will speak to thousands long after your tongue is silent, and your humble soul is in a better place—in God's eternal rest'."  

Newman did complete ten of the twelve lectures he had projected. "During the late summer and early autumn of this year [1852] Newman was engaged in preparing for the press the last five of the Discourses, which appeared in the form of pamphlets every fortnight. He brought the work to a conclusion on November 21 with a Preface and an Appendix of 'illustrations of the main principles laid down' in the

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Discourses, which were published in a single pamphlet." 1 The work of ten Discourses, a Preface and an Appendix was "published complete in [February] 1853." 2

The reasons Newman did not deliver the second five discourses can only be conjectured. Essentially, there was the emotional fatigue of the Achill Trial, the frequent trips to Ireland, and the mental stress of composing the Discourses. Newman seemed disinclined to add the stress of controversy he had encountered over his Discourse VI, which maintained that the end of a Catholic University or any university considered in the abstract and its idea is a liberal education. He wrote in July: "And I have to go to Ireland next week—and these Lectures lie like a tremendous load on me. I cannot suspend them, they will fidget me till they are done. I am out on the ocean with them, out of sight of land, with nothing but the stars, 3 and I so dread controversy. ... I can have no peace till I get to the end of my 10th Lecture, and I am in my 7th." 4 That he thought of sometime in the future delivering the second five Discourses as lectures is evident from

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1 Fergal McGrath, Newman's University, p. 174.

2 J. H. Newman, Autobiographical Writings, p. 50.

3 See Discourse X, 334.12-15; 26-28 for the completion of this navigation metaphor.

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the rhetorical use of "Gentlemen" to address his audience found in the Discourses whenever Newman wanted to emphasize an idea.

Newman seemed very much pleased with the Discourses when he had completed them. He wrote to Henry Wilberforce from Abbotsford, the home of the Hope-Scotts: "My two most perfect works, artistically, are my two last—the former of them [Catholicism in England] put me to less trouble than any I ever wrote—the latter [University Education] to the greatest of all." ¹ He sent copies to important officials and to his own Bishop Ullathorne. By February 24, 1853 he could write with satisfaction: "I hear my new volume [the Discourses] is selling well. 150 copies have gone to Australia." ²

The preceding paragraphs concerned Newman's Campaign in Ireland essentially as the details were related to the composition and presentation of the Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education, the scope of this thesis. Therefore, what follows is a brief sketch outlining what Newman's Campaign in Ireland did accomplish.

Newman was summoned to Ireland by a resolution passed in the University Committee, October 21, 1853. On March 20, 1854, a Papal Brief was issued instructing the Irish Bishops to meet within three months, under


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the presidency of Archbishop Cullen in order to set up the Catholic University. They did meet May 18, approved the Statutes of the University, formally recognized Newman as Rector and appointed Rev. Patrick Leahy as Vice Rector. 1 Newman was officially installed as Rector of the Catholic University of Ireland on Pentecost Sunday, June 4, 1854 in the Pro-Cathedral in Dublin. At the High Mass, after which Newman took the oaths of office as Rector, "the Archbishop of Dublin [Cullen] preached a very impressive sermon." 2 In June also Newman began the Catholic University Gazette which contained information about the university and articles of his own about university subjects, later published in The Idea of a University and Historical Sketches, Vol. III.

The Catholic University of Ireland opened its doors in the Arts Faculty, November 3, 1854. "Newman had collected a brilliant team of professors 3 who gave inaugural lectures in successive weeks, Newman leading off on 9 November with the lecture on 'Christianity and Letters. ...Towards the end of the term the number of undergraduates rose to twenty-seven, and when Spring Term began they numbered sixty." 4 In his Inaugural lecture Newman informed the students of the School of Philosophy and Letters 'that the studies which that Faculty embraces are almost the

1 Letters and Diaries, Vol. XVI, p. xvi.


3 See Appendix 2, Letters and Diaries, Vol. XVI, pp. 562-563, for the names of the Professors in the Arts Faculty. See also Letters and Diaries, Vol. XVII, Appendix 2 for the University Officers, 1856-57, pp. 557-558.

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direct subject-matter and the staple of the mental exercises proper to a university.

"...in spite of the special historical connection of University Institutions with the Sciences of Theology, Law, and Medicine, a University, after all, should be formally based (as it really is), and should emphatically live in, the Faculty of Arts." ¹

Newman’s address to the students of the Arts Faculty at the "soirée" that he held on Sunday, November 5, 1854 in University House, 86 St. Stephen's Green set the tone of the University as one of worldwide perspective and individual growth. "The idea of a University was, that it was a place of education to which people resorted from all quarters. They would here meet with men of various conditions, and from various places, and would add to each other's knowledge by that means." ²

This view of a university as a congregation of bright youth for the purpose of learning and study is reminiscent of a passage in Discourse VII: "When a multitude of young persons, keen, and open-hearted, sympathetic, and observant,...come together and freely mix..., they are sure to learn one from another, even if there be no one to teach them; the conversation of all is a series of lectures to each, and they gain for themselves new ideas and views, fresh matter of thought, and distinct principles for judging and acting, day by day" (Discourse VII, 234.12-20)


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reminded them that they were no longer boys, but verging on manhood.
Children must be governed to a great extent by fear. That was no longer
the case with them. They were, to a certain extent, their own masters,
the guardians of themselves. The authorities believed them to be
intelligent youths, and would repose confidence in them, and believe
their word, and they hoped to be met by a similar spirit of confidence.
He alluded to the Romans putting on their 'toga virilis,' and quoted the
beautiful passage of St. Paul about putting aside childish things.
...they should now feel that manhood had arrived, and they must
endeavour to show a manliness of mind. They must begin well, and there
would reign over the whole place a 'genius loci,' a good general
character and spirit." 1 The discipline and organization was to foster
a growth of responsibility from within the individual rather than rest
on the imposition of authority from without—a perspective at opposite
poles from Archbishop Cullen's authoritarian view.

Newman ended his address with a reference that would remind
his young listeners that they were part of the beginning of a spirit and
tradition that would form the "genius loci" of their university: "They
would look back with great pleasure if they lived to be old, to St.
Malachi's day, 1854, on which they had taken part in the founding of the
University,...and the fewness of the numbers with which they began would
happily contrast with the magnitude to which in the course of years it

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1 R. Ormsby, "The Autumn Term, 1854," Letters and Diaries,
Vol. XVI, p. 564.
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will have arrived."¹ Newman ended with the quoting of Henry V's speech before the battle of Agincourt to the valiant few who were to begin battle that day:

"From this day to the ending of the world,
But we in it shall be remembered;
We few, we happy few, we band of brothers.

Henry V, Act. IV, Sc. III

So Newman viewed these first students. He reported to Miss Giberne that "the youths are a very nice looking set of fellows."²

In keeping with a view Newman stated in his Development of Christian Doctrine that "an idea not only modifies, but is modified, or at least influenced, by the state of things in which it is carried out, and is dependent in various ways on the circumstances which surround it."³ Newman tried to modify his educational ideal to suit the needs of the Irish without sacrificing essentials—"the formation of the mind by a definite and substantial curriculum, taught by those who possess academic excellence and a common tradition, guided by others who resided with and influenced the growth, both mental and spiritual, of the youths under their care. Since the circumstances of most Irish youths necessitated early professional training, Newman enabled them to complete a two year course in the Faculty of Arts for the degree of Scholar, after which they would be eligible to enter one of the other faculties


or continue in Philosophy and Letters, where after two years of study they would be awarded an Academical Licence that was equivalent to a B. A. degree. This degree might be gained with a grade of Satisfactory or Meritorious, which corresponded to the Oxford Pass or Honours degree. Culler comments that "The establishment of an entrance examination, the provision that all students should begin their year in November ('if they came at any other time, they would lose so much of the year'), the emphasis on 'subjects' at the expense of classical 'books,' the frequent examinations, and the provision for extended study after the Bachelor's degree are all changes which Newman would gladly have made in the Oxford system had he been able." 

The Medical School which grew from the particular needs of the Irish community, opened on November 3, 1855 with Dr. Ellis's Inaugural Lecture at the Cecilia Street School. The Medical Faculty was "under the auspices of the university with a qualified staff of Catholic practitioners and forty-three students. None of these students had been through the two years' course in arts and they were not regular members of the University, but Newman...tried to give them some of the benefits of collegiate life by opening a medical lodging house where they

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1 See A. D. Culler, The Imperial Intellect, pp. 160-161 for a description of the subjects studied for the Scholar's and Academical Licence degrees.

2 Ibid., p. 162.

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could find rooms that were...free from the dangers of "unsupervised lodging. From the very first the school itself was one of the most complete of any in the United Kingdom outside of London, and in the following years Newman was able to add to its facilities a distinguished medical library of five thousand volumes, acquired from Germany, and to fit up a first-rate chemical laboratory which was also to serve the needs of the school of science. As a result, in the autumn of 1856 the school was formally recognized by the official medical bodies of Ireland, and it continued to flourish until it was finally absorbed into the National University in 1908."  

Although the Faculty of Arts and the Faculty of Medicine were the most permanently successful, Newman made plans in 1855 for a Faculty of Theology at the direction of Archbishop Cullen. Dr. Edmund O'Reilly was the Professor of Theology. Although contrary to Cullen's expectations, the lectures do not seem to have been well attended. Cullen suggested that "there are several young priests, and some friars anxious to assist at lectures in theology. It should not however be an elementary class of theology, but lectures on the most important points. The lectures also should not be too frequent—twice a week would suffice." However, in spite of Cullen's eagerness to establish a Theological School, he failed.

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1 A. D. Culler, The Imperial Intellect, pp. 159-160. See also Letters and Diaries, Vol. XVII, p. 491 and Vol. XVIII, p. 572.

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to answer Newman's letter about providing for a chair of Canon Law, ¹ which would have given the school the necessary prestige to attract students. Three years later, October 24, 1858 O'Reilly wrote to Newman to ask if his classes should continue as his students were too few in number for a respectable Theological Class in a University. ² Thus the School of Theology was not as successful as the other two faculties of Arts and Medicine. Aubrey Gwynn writing in the 1950's noted that "The absence of a Faculty of Theology, a defect which is directly due to the influence of English Nonconformist voters in the Liberal Government of 1908, has been largely overcome by the close and friendly relations which have always been maintained between our professors and lecturers in University College, Dublin, and the great Theological Faculty of St. Patrick's College, Maynooth,...which lies some twenty miles from Dublin." ³ Thus Newman's Faculty of Theology was realized in a practical way in the years to come.

Newman's awareness of the educational needs of Irish society was once more evident in his establishing the Evening Classes for the

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² Letters and Diaries, Vol. XVI, p. 545.

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adults of Dublin. Newman wrote in a letter to Disraeli that "above 100 young men of Dublin, who are engaged in business during the day, attend with great interest and regularity the evening lectures of the Professors of Philosophy and Letters,..." 1 The Catholic University was a pioneer in the sphere of University Extension Lectures, which were not begun in England until 1873." 2 The stock criticisms of Newman that he failed to grasp the elements of the Irish situation, that he was importing Oxford to Ireland, that his ideal of liberal education was limited to the financially independent, well-bred man of leisure; in other words, the English gentleman 3 are thoroughly contradicted by Newman's opening the Extension School in the Catholic University of Ireland, for which there was certainly no precedent at Oxford. These evening classes were for those without the leisure and financial independence to attend the day classes. In his recognition of the need to educate this class of Dubliners he showed himself not only aware of the Irish financial and educational situation, but also of the necessity for including different classes within his educational ideal.

Newman's Inaugural lecture, "Discipline of Mind" was his gracious welcome to the Evening Classes: "I can truly say that I thought of you before you thought of the University; perhaps I may say,


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long before;—for it was previously to our commencing that great work, which is now so fully before the public, it was when I first came over here to make preparations for it, that I had to encounter the serious objection of wise and good men. 1 'There is no class of persons in Ireland who 'need' a University;' and again, 'Whom will you get to belong to it? who will fill its lecture-rooms? ...without denying their knowledge of the state of Ireland, or their sagacity, I made answer, 'We will give lectures in the evening, we will fill our classes with the young men of Dublin'." 2

Newman always had in mind that the establishment of the university was for the laity. He therefore seemed delighted with the prospect of educating a considerable number of young people through the Evening Classes. He told them: "'You' are born for Ireland; and, in your advancement, Ireland is advanced;--in your advancement in what is good, and what is true, in knowledge, in learning, in cultivation of mind, in enlightened attachment to your religion, in good name and respectability and social influence, I am contemplating the honour and renown, the literary and scientific aggrandisement, the increase of political power, of the Island of the Saints." 3 Furthermore, Newman outlined the importance of the educated layman: "Gentlemen, I do not

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1 John Curtis (1794-1885), the Provincial of the Irish Jesuits, said these words on the occasion of Newman's visit, February 8, 1854. Letters and Diaries; Vol. XVI, pp. 37-38.


3 Ibid., p. 482.
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expect those who, like you, are employed in your secular callings,...to come forward as champions of the faith; but I think that incalculable benefits may ensue to the Catholic cause,...if a body of men in your station of life shall be found in the great towns of Ireland, not disputatious, contentious, loquacious, presumptuous,..., but gravely and solidly educated in Catholic knowledge, intelligent, acute, versed in their religion, sensitive of its beauty and majesty, alive to the arguments in its behalf, and aware both of its difficulties and of the mode of treating them. And the first step in attaining this desirable end is that you should submit yourselves to a curriculum of studies,...yet my own reason for rejoicing in the establishment of your classes is the same as that which led me to take part in the establishment of the University itself, viz., the wish; by increasing the intellectual force of Ireland, to strengthen the defences, in a day of great danger, of the Christian religion." ¹

Newman was aware that a university supported by the community (another difference from Oxford) had an obligation to contact that community at large and answer the questions, "What has the University done? What is the University doing?" In order to fulfil this obligation, Newman initiated a "new scientific and literary periodical, the 'Atlantis'." ² Newman explained that the "Atlantis" "aims at

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installing the University among our recognized oracles of intellectual activity and it claims for it a European position. ...It implies that the University is already prepared for a trial of strength in the open field of literature and science. ...What the Professors are at present doing on the very scene of their labours, the schools they are bringing into shape, the students they are collecting, the minds they are forming, the plans of education they are systematizing, and the traditions they are establishing, cannot be seen or valued except on the spot. ...Their learned labours, recorded in the 'Atlantis,' will be the summary sovereign demonstration that their University both is alive and is thriving, in spite of all that is conjectured to the contrary.  

The aim of the "Atlantis" as outlined by the "Prospectus" is as follows: "The object of the work, which these lines are intended to introduce to the public, is to serve principally as the repository and memorial of such investigations in Literature and Science, as are made by the members of the new Catholic University of Ireland. It is natural that men whose occupations are of an intellectual nature, should be led to record the speculations or conclusions in which their labours have issued; and that, having taken this step, they should consider it even as a duty which they owe to society to communicate to others what they have thought it worth while to record. A periodical publication is the obvious mode of fulfilling that duty. ...

"The work will be published half-yearly, on the first of January and the first of July. Each number will be divided into three portions,

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devoted respectively to Literature, Science, and Notices, Literary or Scientific, the number of pages in each portion varying with number." ¹ The first number was published in January, 1858. It contained Newman's "The Mission of the Benedictine Order." ² Surely a periodical, the purpose of which was to keep the Catholic University of Ireland in the mind of the academic world as well as serve as a record of the studies and achievement of its Professors has the ring of the competitive twentieth century—many ages removed from the settled and complacent ways of ancient Oxford.

However, Newman retained from the Oxford tradition what he found had been most valuable in the formation of the students and had contributed most to the unity of academic life; namely, the idea of a university church. The church of St. Mary's Oxford of which he himself had been pastor from 1828 to 1845, had been the centre of the religious life of the university community. Newman wanted to establish a similar university church in Dublin, but Archbishop Cullen saw no necessity for one as he gave Newman permission to hold ceremonies in the neighbouring parish church. However, Newman's idea of the spirit of Catholicity pervading the life of a catholic university and contributing to the "genius loci" of the place necessitated a university church. With funds remaining from the Achilli affair, and the advice of John Hungerford Pollen "an architect with original ideas on church decoration, and of


² Letters and Diaries, Vol. XVIII, p. 112.
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whom he thought so highly as to appoint him professor of Fine Arts. Newman built the very beautiful church on St. Stephen's Green which stands today as the most tangible memorial of his sojourn in Ireland. ...

"...Newman decided on a church which would combine the order and symmetry of the ancient basilicas, so uniquely answering to liturgical needs, with the further advantage that it would be possible to make use of the labour and material locally available. What he wanted to find in the church, and in the manner of its decoration, was that impression of joy and triumph which seems to emanate from Byzantine mosaics, and, in its general atmosphere, that effect of serenity and light which, in his eyes, was far more representative of the Christian spirit than the dim shadows of Gothic.

"Beneath a renaissance dome and amber-tinted windows, frescoes representing the Virgin, 'Sedes Sapientiae,' enthroned amid the Saints, were enshrined in settings of Ireland's many-coloured marble." ¹

Newman succeeded in establishing a church that continued to be the centre of university life. Aubrey Gwynn writes that the Church is now "far too small for the three thousand seven hundred students who make up our present student population; but which has been the scene of many impressive academic ceremonies. Here in this half-Byzantine church, which Newman planned himself to the grief and disappointment of Pugin and his friends of the Gothic revival, students have met, with

¹ Louis Bouyer, Newman, his Life and Spirituality, p. 312.
their professors, for the annual Mass of the Holy Ghost, and for the annual commemoration of the dead that has become a welcome feature of our academic life. The pulpit from which so many priests and prelates have preached to our students is the pulpit from which Newman preached some of the most famous of his Catholic sermons; and a well-conceived bust of Newman is there as a reminder to all of what we in Dublin owe to the English convert and priest who gave us so much, and who would gladly have given more." ¹ The description of the opening ceremonies for the University Church is contained in Appendix I, *Letters and Diaries*, Vol. XVII, pp. 555-556.

Newman resigned as Rector of the Catholic University of Ireland on November 12, 1858, seven years to the day that he had accepted the office. His reason was essentially the continual obstruction which he endured from Archbishop Cullen who was the dominant member of the episcopal committee and therefore the one with whom Newman had to deal in the practical matters of the university. Archbishop Cullen was Newman's "man of one idea," (Appendix, 406.9-11) the characteristic of one who lacked a liberal education. The view of Abbot Butler was "that Dr. Cullen and the Irish Bishops, not having had themselves a University education, did not properly understand what it was, and with one or two exceptions, did not really want such a University as Newman had in mind, their idea was a glorified Seminary for the laity." ² Cullen in


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particular seemed to be a 'man of fear. He feared that Newman would usurp his authority and take the university beyond his control. "He [Cullen] had hoped...that he had found a splendid horse to do his work against the Queen's Colleges, but now he began to regard it as a Pegasus with wings and beyond his control. He saw fire coming from his nostrils; and while its feet nervously pawed the ground, Cullen stood by in dread of some new and unexpected flight into a medium beyond his reach or understanding." ¹

When Cardinal Wiseman, supported by important English laity, recommended at Rome that Newman should be made bishop in order that he would have the authority to fulfil his role as Rector of the university, Cullen lost no time in secretly petitioning Rome to delay indefinitely the consecration of Newman. Although Newman and his supporters waited daily for confirmation of his new honour, Rome remained silent and Newman was never made bishop. Newman never inquired the reason for his not being consecrated a bishop, but the reason lay in the letters of opposition that Cullen sent to Rome. In a letter dated February 18, 1854, Cullen wrote to Dr. Kirby, Rector of the Irish College in Rome and agent of the Irish bishops, that it would not be prudent to make Dr. Newman a bishop for the present. ²

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Towards the end of October Cullen wrote to Tobias Kirby, a letter which he passed on to Propaganda, where it was endorsed by Propaganda as having arrived 4 November 1855—The last paragraph of the letter was as follows:

...With regard to the university, we have done nothing. For more than three months Father Newman has been in England, and has left a convert Englishman called Scratton here to take his place. To the Vice-Rector he gave no instructions. I have not therefore been able to find out how things stand, but they don't seem to me to be going in a way that can be defended. The continued absence of the Rector cannot be approved. Then the expenses have been very large, and furthermore the discipline introduced is unsuitable, certainly to this country. The young men are allowed to go out at all hours, to smoke etc., and there has not been any fixed time for study. All this makes it clear that Father Newman does not give enough attention to details. I hope that when he returns from England, it will be possible to induce him to introduce a better system. It is true we shall always have the difficulty that 'nemo potest duobus dominis servire', and Father Newman cannot be excepted. He cannot spend a great part of the year in England, and govern a university here. I hope that they won't make him a bishop in Rome until he has properly arranged all the affairs of the university.

The first complaint concerning Newman's absence was not justified in that Newman had taken the Rectorship with the clear understanding that he would be absent to attend to matters in Birmingham as superior of the Oratory there. Newman wrote in his Memorandum that "This was the main cause of my leaving then, that I could not give to the University that continuous preference which Dr. Cullen wished." ² Newman wrote about

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the Vice-Rector, Dr. Leahy as follows: "I always got on well with him..., but, as to his presence in the University, he was hardly there at all. First he was at Thurles; then he was PP of Cashel and Vicar General;...The Vice Rector by the Statutes had care of the discipline of the place--this was all thrown on me". 1 The unkind remark about Scratton is refuted in Note 3, Letters and Diaries, XVI, p. 551. The meaningless criticism that Newman did not give enough attention to details and the aspersion cast by the reference "nemo potest duobus dominis servire" all were to thoroughly spread discredit against Newman in order to make emphatic the hope that Newman would not be made bishop in Rome.

"That Newman and Cullen differed on the question of discipline is evident from Cullen's description that "the young men are allowed to go out at all hours, to smoke etc., and there has not been any fixed time for study." Cullen's criticism of discipline indicates the difference in perspective between Newman's idea of a university and Cullen's of a seminary. In a letter dated August 31, 1858, Cullen again complained about discipline: "Father Newman kept a kind of boarding school for a dozen young men in his own house, and some of these went to dances and kept horses for hunting". 2 Newman had outlined his idea of discipline as one of encouraging self-discipline and the assumption by

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1 Letters and Diaries, Vol. XVI, p. 551.

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the students of responsibility for their own conduct in his "Report for the Year 1854-55":

'In proposing rules on this subject, I shall begin with laying down, first, as a guiding principle, what I believe to be the truth, that the young for the most part cannot be driven, but, on the other hand, are open to persuasion and to the influence of kindness and personal attachment; and that, in consequence, they are to be kept straight by indirect contrivances rather than by authoritative enactments and naked prohibitions. And a second consideration of great importance is, that these youths will certainly be their own masters before many years have passed, as they were certainly school-boys not many months ago. ... We could not do worse than to continue the discipline of school and college into the University, and to let the great world, which is to follow upon it, be the first stage on which the young are set at liberty to follow their own bent. ...' 1

Newman saw the university as the last stage of preparation before these young men assumed their responsibilities in the world. Cullen's view was that the students were to be protected from the world as their best safeguard against its evils. But Newman said in the Discourses:

"To-day a pupil, tomorrow a member of the great world. ..." (Discourse X, 360.11-12). "If then a University is a direct preparation for this world, let it be what it professes. It is not a Convent, it is not a Seminary; it is a place to fit men of the world for the world. We cannot possibly keep them from plunging into the world, with all its ways and principles and maxims, when their time comes; but we can prepare them against what is inevitable; and it is not the way to learn to swim in troubled waters, never to have gone into

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them" (Discourse X, 359.23-360.2). Surely Newman's idea of discipline was realistic and practical as well as a factor in the formation of the individual character that would be a permanent possession.

There is an undercurrent of nationalism in some of Dr. Cullen's remarks about Englishmen and Newman in the early letters, but the later letters sent to Propaganda, dated August 31, 1858, January 15, 1859, and November 11, 1859 express open hostility based on what Cullen describes as Newman's Oxford practices and his employing Englishmen as professors. Others had anticipated racial strife which Newman did not fear. One such was Dr. von Dollinger. In a reply to Newman's letter of December 15, 1853 asking him to give a series of lectures in 1854-55 on Ecclesiastical History in Dublin, Dr. Dollinger, although declining the invitation, sent Newman his best wishes: "'May God bless your efforts, I cannot express the joy it gave me when I read that you had accepted the task, for which an equally competent man could not be found in all England and Ireland!'" However, he warned that the founding of the Catholic University of Ireland, "'if the old antipathy between the Anglosaxon and the Celtic race doth not frustrate it, will be an invaluable benefit to the Catholic Cause.'"

1 "...the Rector was English, the vice-Rector was Irish; of the regular professors, nine were Irish, one English and of all offices, Irish held sixteen to English six. Scotland, Germany, and Italy held one each." There is no foundation in fact for Cullen's criticism or for similar allegations years later that Newman brought over a "Shoal of English professors." W. F. P. Stockley, Newman...Ireland, p. 63.

2 Johann Joseph Ignaz von Dollinger (1799-1890) was a professor of Church History at Munich.


4 Ibid., p. 225.
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It would seem as though that "old antipathy" was causing division between Newman and Cullen, although the Archbishop had referred to Newman in his Pastoral of August 1852 as "one of the most accomplished scholars and profound divines of the age in which we live". 1 It was a tragedy of human misunderstanding that two men the work of whose lives was based on the opposition to liberalism would not have found a basis for cooperation in that similarity. Cullen feared only political liberalism. It was therefore his purpose to make the university an island of catholicity in a world pervaded by political radicals. What he abhorred was the thought that young catholics would attend the Queen's Colleges and become the political liberals he associated with the Young Irelanders. Therefore when Newman was casting about for professors, Cullen enjoined Newman to have nothing to do with those who had been Young Irelanders. Newman saw that these men comprised those of academic merit in Ireland. Furthermore, Newman's opposition was to liberalism in religion. His means of fighting it was the education in particular, of the catholic laity, to fight the battle of liberalism in religion in the world at large. Cullen had utterly no idea of the battle of the intellect that Newman foresaw the necessity to make preparation to encounter. Thus when Newman was friendly with those of the laity of whom Cullen disapproved Cullen became cold to Newman: "But a cause of offence to Dr. Cullen,...was my countenance of those whom he considered young Irelanders, and generally nationalists—and to these he added a very different party, the friends of Lucas, up to the Archbishop of Tuam. I never of course would give up Lucas (editor of

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the Tablet) as a friend. I differed from him, but I thought him an honest good man—Dr. Cullen's treatment of him at Rome is too painful for me to talk of. As soon as the Archbishop thought I was on what may be called speaking terms with him, he grew cold towards me, then warned me against him, and I of course would not be warned.

"But again there was a knot of men who in 1848 had been quasi rebels—they were clever men and had cooled down most of them. I did not care much for their political opinions—Dr. Moriarty introduced them to me, and I made them Professors. They are the ablest men who had belonged to the University—such as Professor O'Curry—and Professor Sullivan. I can never be sorry for asking their assistance—not to take them would have been preposterous—There you had good men, Irishmen, did Dr. Cullen wish Irish? had he not warned me against English and Scotch?

"He, however, seems to have been in a great alarm, what was coming next. I saw a great deal of Mr. Pigot,¹ ...he talked like a republican—but he was full of views and a clever man. I had a thought of giving [him] a law Professorship—or I did. Dr. Cullen brought down with him to me, an excellent man the Archbishop of Halifax, Dr. Walsh?, to dissuade me by telling me things against Mr Pigot. I have forgotten every word he said. It made no impression on me—I dared say he had said and done a number of wild things—he was a fanatic even then—but I

¹ "John Edward Pigot (1822–71), son of Chief Baron Pigot was called to the Irish Bar in 1845. He was a young Irishman and one of the poets of the movement, author of 'Up for the Green.' Newman wanted him as Professor of Practical Law. It was not, however, possible to establish the Faculty of Law. Pigot was a friend of Eugene O'Curry and collaborated with him." Letters and Diaries, Vol. XVI, p. 623.
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did not see that therefore I should separate myself from him. But Dr. Cullen always compared young Ireland to young Italy—and with the most intense expression of words and countenance assured me they never came right—never—he knew them from his experience of Rome.¹

Newman's view of the importance of the laity was a source of friction between himself and Cullen. "But what I think was the real serious cause of distance, jealousy, distrust, and disapproval, as regards me and my doings, what [was?] the desire I had to make the laity a substantive power in the University. Here I was reprehensible in two respects.

"First, I wished the gentry whose sons were to be taught by us to have the financial matters of the institution in their hands. The trustees of the property must, I knew, be ecclesiastics—but what I felt about was the expenditure. And in two ways—I thought that they had a right to the management of the current accounts, because else these accounts would not be kept in order at all—there would be no auditing—and no knowledge what was spent—it would be, as I expressed it, in my first report, like putting one's hands into a bag—All the time I was there I in vain repeatedly assailed Dr. Cullen on the necessity of a Finance Committee—and this was a great source of suspicion, of irritation to him. It made me indignant to find how little there seemed to be of responsibility in the expenditure. I did not choose to act in this way—it was laying me,

a foreigner, open to imputations—years afterwards the question might arise, how had I spent the money—but it was contrary to the tradition and taste of the Irish ecclesiastics—and I am told that this shun-day habit has gone on [to] this day—and that sums, no one knows how great have been squandered away (I was told in one matter £10,000 with nothing to show for it) and no account drawn up or record taken of it.

"I believe[d] laymen would put an end to this and therefore I wished the account to be in lay hands: Moreover I thought that such an arrangement would conciliate the laity and would interest them in the University more than anything else. They were treated like good little boys—were told to shut their eyes and open their mouths, and take what we give [sic] to them—and this they did not relish." 1 In the foregoing quotation from the "Memorandum" Newman expressed apprehension that the finances not being entrusted to a lay financial committee would somehow eventually reflect adversely on himself. His fears unknown to himself were realized. Archbishop Cullen, in a letter to Propaganda, dated November 11, 1859, thoroughly discredited Newman. Cullen peevishly complained that if Archbishop Mchale had wanted to assist the university "He would have put himself forward as the defender of economy in the management of public money, and he would have condemned the expenses incurred by Father Newman, which cannot in fact be altogether defended." 2 This letter was sent a year after Newman had

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resigned the Rectorship and had therefore not had any connection with
the university for a year.

Although Newman stated that his reasons for separating himself
from the university were broader than any of a personal nature he wrote
as follows: "I was very much offended with Dr. Cullen. I could not act
because I could not get him to say yes or no to questions which I asked
him, and if I acted without asking, then I displeased him.

"I begged him to substitute persons for himself to whom I might go,...
but I got no answer beyond that of an incomprehensible silence. I could
not go on in such a state of things, and therefore I confess that my
relations towards Dr. Cullen had much to do with my leaving." ¹ In a
letter to Patrick Leahy, October 16, 1857, Newman gave an example of
Cullen's "incomprehensible silence": "As to Dr. Cullen, I cannot get
him to give me any answer at all. He neither acts himself, nor will let
me act. It is as long ago as last March, that I asked His Grace to let
me put Mr. Arnold² in the Professorship of English Literature—he
declined, (Dr. Dixon assenting,) alleging the expense. There was 'no'
expense, as I told him, for Mr. Arnold would take the place of Mr.
McCarthy—still he would not give me leave. Thus business is at a stand
still. So it has been about the appointments at the Hospitals.... but
he keeps a dead silence,..." ³ Newman in a letter to Monsell said

² Thomas Arnold, Jr. (1823-1900), brother of Matthew Arnold,
was received into the Church in 1856. He became professor at University
of Ireland from 1856 to 1862, then taught at Newman's Oratory School in
Birmingham, and finally was elected Fellow of the Royal University of
³ J. H. Newman, "Letter to Archbishop Leahy, October 16,
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about Dr. Cullen's obstructionist's policies: "He has been, and is, ruining us. He will do nothing, let us do nothing: he will give no answers to questions, or imply he grants and then pull you up when you have acted. He is perfectly impracticable." ¹

In spite of a campaign aimed at misrepresenting and discrediting Newman at Rome, as well as a policy of silence in the face of Newman's communications, Archbishop Cullen seems to have been well aware of Newman's valuable contribution to the university. Again, in spite of his not co-operating with Newman, Cullen wrote in a letter signed by three archbishops to the Fathers of the Oratory requesting Newman to continue as Rector: The letter reads in part as follows:

"Sensible of the great services which Dr. Newman has rendered to the cause of Catholic Education and of Catholicity, not only by the prestige of his distinguished name, but also by the able and zealous manner in which he has discharged the duties of Rector of our Catholic University, we are as anxious now to perpetuate those services to our rising University as we were at first to secure them. And in expressing this our earnest desire, we but give expression to the wishes of the Bishops, Clergy, and People, of Ireland.

"...in it's [sic] present infant state, the connection of Dr. Newman with the University is undeniably a very great gain, as his separation from it would be a loss the magnitude of which it would not be easy to estimate.

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"We hope, therefore, Reverend Fathers, that you will forgo...having your Father Superior at home..., leaving him to pursue the high vocation, to which not only does he appear to have been specially called the day he was named Rector of the Catholic University, but for which, as it seems to us, Providence had been preparing him long years before he became a child of the Catholic Church." 1 The letter was signed by three Archbishops, Cullen, Dixon, and Leahy.

The following year when Newman's resignation was imminent the Professors of the Catholic University sent Newman the following address signed by a large number of Professors. The address expressed the hope Newman would "deeply feel the completeness of a mission. You have been singularly marked by the hand of God for a special vocation. We allow it cannot but be a trying one, as all divided vocations must be; but we earnestly hope that you will not leave this mission till it be accomplished; and in this hope it is our firm belief the whole country would join, were this the occasion of giving popular utterance to its high sense of your merits." 2 Of the tributes given to Newman in this address, the following seems to be the most noteworthy: "The task of laying the foundations of this important structure was confided to you by the Holy See and by the Episcopate of Ireland, as one peculiarly

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qualified for this great trust, than which it is not too much to say that none greater appears in the history of the Church since the days of Bede and Alcuin."  

In answer to Newman's letter of resignation November 12, 1858 2 sent to the Archbishops, Joseph Dixon, Archbishop of Armagh, replied as follows: "I shall ever consider it one of the greatest honours of my life to have been permitted to co-operate with you—little as that co-operation was—in that great work. For it is in many respects a great work, although it has not attained all that development which its friends desired for it; and none more ardently than its Rector, as there was none, who laboured more strenuously than he, to give it that development. I shall ever indeed remember with affectionate gratitude the kindness which on all occasions I have received at your hands." 3 That Newman enjoyed the respect of the majority of the clergy and laity is evident from many letters.

By 1858 it became evident that it was then necessary to have a Charter for the university in order that the degrees have official recognition. To this purpose, Newman and the Professors addressed a letter July 19, 1858 to the Right Honorable Benjamin Disraeli, M. P. requesting a Charter for the Catholic University of Ireland, citing the

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precedent of a Charter having been recently granted by the Government to
the Roman Catholic University of Quebec. This letter is an excellent
summary of the view of education living in the University of Ireland at
that time and of what Newman had accomplished as Rector of the
University. The letter reads in part as follows:

"It [The Catholic University of Ireland] has been founded, and is
supported, by the Heads of our Church, on the conviction, that cul-
tivation of mind is at once a protection to religion, and a momentous social
and political benefit; and that the widest pursuit of scientific and
historical truth never can interfere with even the most zealous
acceptance of Revelation;—a conviction, of which both they and their
flocks have given practical evidence, by the large sums, amounting to
many thousand pounds, which, under their sanction, have been collected,
and are annually collected, in Ireland, in furtherance of their object.
Indeed, we much question, whether, in any other part of the world, a
voluntary effort can be pointed out, so considerable as this, which has
now been made for some years, and by the humbler classes of the
community, for the encouragement of those literary and scientific
studies which constitute University Education.

"We further beg to submit to your consideration, that our University
embraces the Five Faculties of Theology, Law, Medicine, Philosophy and
Letters, and Science, of which four are in active operation; that the
Medical Faculty is in possession of a large Medical House, containing
under its roof theatres, laboratory, and dissecting rooms; that the
same Faculty is in possession of a library of 5000 well selected
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volumes, many of them of great rarity, and in seven languages; that
during the present Session it has had 80 students in lecture, with a
prospect of increase, as time proceeds, and that it has commenced a
system of lodging houses for their accommodation; that the Faculties of
Philosophy and Letters, and of Science, support a periodical for the
advancement of the subjects which they respectively profess, which is
gradually obtaining for them the recognition and correspondence of
learned bodies in Great Britain, the Continent, and the United States;
that above 100 young men of Dublin, who are engaged in business during
the day attend with great interest and regularity the evening lectures
of the Professors of Philosophy and Letters, who at the same time are
lecturing the matriculated students, distributed into four Collegiate
Establishments, in the higher classics, in the Antiquities of Egypt and
Palestine, in English and foreign literature and Modern History, in
Irish Archaeology, in Logic, Metaphysics and Mathematics; and that, on
the whole, the University has had as many as 249 Students in its various
classes during the present Session." 1

Aside from his opening the 1858 term on November 3, the
requesting of a Charter was Newman's last important official act for the
Catholic University of Ireland before his resignation on November 12,
1858. He wrote in his "Memorandum" that there was a third reason for
his resignation, though not a primary influence: "It was the fact,

1 The Rector and Professor of the University of Ireland,
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which had by this time become so plain, that English Catholics felt no interest at all in the University scheme and had no intention to make use of it, should it get into shape. I had gone to Ireland on the express understanding that it was an English as well as an Irish University, and the Irish had done all in their power to make it an Irish University and nothing else. And further, I say, the English Catholics had given it up. It had begun a very little time, when Dr. Ullathorne told me, as if a matter in which he acquiesced, that 'the English gentlemen would never send their sons to it.' ...what came home clearly to me was, that I was spending my life in the service of those who had not the claim upon me which my own countrymen had: that, in the decline of life, I was throwing myself out of that sphere of action and those connexions which I had been forming for myself so many years. All work is good, but what special claim had a University exclusively Irish upon my time?"

Regardless of Newman's disappointment that the Catholic University of Ireland did not become a Louvain for the Catholics of the English speaking world, he had accomplished the establishment of the Faculty of Arts and Medicine on solid bases, the Faculties of Theology and of Science (another difference from Oxford) had professors assigned, but few students. Newman was contemplating employing professors for a projected Law Faculty. Had he remained as Rector these would have had

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the opportunity of growth into full-fledged faculties. Also, with Newman as Rector, lending his own name and character as emblematic of academic excellence; it is very possible that the Government would have granted the University of Ireland a Charter. ¹ To George A. Denison Newman wrote as follows: "We have been for some years attempting a University in Dublin with considerable promise of success. The time has now come, when we think we may fairly ask Government for a charter; and I suppose it is only a matter of time as to when we get it. ...If we had a charter, I do not doubt that in process of time we should make our University in Dublin as attractive to Catholic youths, as Trinity can be, or even Oxford." ²

However, that the University of Ireland did not attain the measure of immediate success that its commencement forecast was due in large measure to the fact of a house divided against itself. First, there was the opposition between Dr. Cullen and the nationalist group of ecclesiastics led by the Archbishop of Tuam, John MacHale. Monsell wrote "about the difficulty of interesting the Irish bishops and clergy in the University 'as long as Dr. Cullen is considered to be the sole external director of its movements and policy'." ³ Also, in Ireland


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there seemed to be a great gulf between the clergy and the educated laity. "The prelates," Newman said, 'regard an intellectual man as being on the road to perdition;' and a seminary or convent type of education was far more in keeping with Catholic tradition as it was then understood, than an institution...run not merely by converts, but—what was worse—by convert laymen." ¹ Newman's article "On Consulting the Faithful," written for the July, 1859 issue of The Rambler contains the following view on the necessity of co-operation between the clergy and the laity. Newman thought that the fulness of the Church was not manifested in the priests alone, "but only in the conspiroatio of priests and faithful laity." ² Both sides must make concessions: "The laity must consent to be educated, and not resent the suggestion as an insult; but they must be educated in a special way, so that intellectual and spiritual growth took place at the same time and in the same place: the same spots and the same individuals must be at once oracles of philosophy and shrines of devotion.

"But concessions must be made by the clergy. ³ They must cease to practise a sort of spiritual apartheid and consent to work with the laity, and to find, for example, in a Catholic University 'a middle station where clergy and laity can meet, so as to learn to understand


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and yield to each other, and from which, as from a common ground, they may act in union upon an age which is running headlong into infidelity." 1 The foregoing excerpt from the Rambler article with its plea that a Catholic University be "a middle station where clergy and laity can meet" and from where they can act in union against the forces of liberalism that were carrying the age "headlong into infidelity" is Newman's view of the conditions necessary for the continued existence and growth of a Catholic University.

One instance that gave a clear indication that the Catholic University of Ireland was not fulfilling the role of a middle station for clergy and laity was the application for a Charter. William Monsell, M.P. for Limerick wrote to Newman confidentially on 8 May, 1858: "I received this morning with some surprise a letter from Dr. Cullen requesting me on his own part and on that of Drs. Dixon and Leahy to apply for a charter for the Catholic University to Lord Derby. I of course must do as they desire me, tho I am puzzled to know how to approach his Lordship." 2 Cullen had not informed Newman, who only knew of the application for a Charter from Monsell's confidential letter of May 8. Thus on July 29, 1858 the Rector and Professors sent their letter 3 to Disraeli requesting a charter for the university. It was not

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until July 20, 1858 that Cullen wrote to Newman explaining his request for a charter: "I took it for granted when writing to Mr. Monsell that it was to the Bishops the Charter was to be granted, and at their request." 1 Cullen explained that he only wrote to Newman now "lest any unpleasant complication should arise, or that there should appear to be any opposition between the Bishops and Professors, or that the object of their petitions should be different." 2 Cullen seemed unaware that any petition not signed by all the Bishops as well as the Rector and the Professors would appear to the English Parliament to be coming from a house divided against itself and thereby lacking in the strength and promise of durability worthy of a charter. In the same letter Cullen reiterated his purpose of maintaining control of the university in the hands of the Church, specifically his own hands: "I merely suggest that as the Bishops founded the University, their opinion should be heard as to the terms of the Charter before anything final be decided on." 3 William Kirby Sullivan wrote to Newman the following about the request for a Charter presented by the Rector and Professors: "There cannot be the slightest doubt that every bishop and priest in Ireland would be glad we got a charter,—nothing could do us more service. But there is not the slightest hope that the Bishops will ever combine to get one.


3 Ibid., p. 419.
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The only chance that remains is the step you have so judiciously taken. ¹

However, the time had come for Newman to leave the Rectorship and return to the Oratory in Birmingham. He knew that his mission would be at an end when he had but laid the foundations of the university. Newman wrote to Mrs. J. W. Bowden in 1855 this observation: "We are getting on with the university as well as we possibly can. It is swimming against the stream, to move at all—still we are in motion. The great point is to 'set up' things—that we are doing. ...It will be years before the system takes root, but my work will be ended when I have made a beginning." ² Newman wrote in a letter to Ormsby a year after his resignation his own estimate of his campaign in Ireland: "Don't fancy I feel annoyance at my plans being put aside. ...The great thing was to 'set up' and then leave the direction of things to the currents which would determine it. (See above, p. 116 for the reference to Newman's Development of Christian Doctrine).

"It does not prove that what I have written and planned will not take effect sometime and somewhere, because it does not at once. ...When I am gone, something may come of what I have done at Dublin. And, since I hope I did what I did, not for the sake of man, not for the sake of the

¹ William K. Sullivan, "Letter to Newman, July 20, 1858," Letters and Diaries, Vol. XVIII, Note 2, p. 421. W. K. Sullivan (1821-1890) was Professor of Chemistry at the Catholic University from 1856-1873. He had been a Young Irishman. In 1858 he acted as editor of the Atlantis.

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Irish Hierarchy, not even for the Pope's praise, but for the sake of God's Church and God's glory, I have nothing to regret, and nothing to desire, different from what it is. \(^1\) It is to be hoped that the generation has come in which what Newman has written and planned will take effect.

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Chapter IV

THE IDEA OF A LIBERAL EDUCATION

The plan of the university lectures Newman outlined to Robert Ormsby in April, 1852 in these words: "The three will be on 1. the position of the question. 2. Theology as a branch of knowledge. 3. Bearing of theology on other branches of knowledge. After these I shall go on to give a normal idea of a University" (See above, p. 107).

This plan established the core ideas basic to the ten discourses that comprise the Discourses on the Scope and Nature of a University Education. Discourse I, the Introduction, establishes the position of the question. Discourse II maintains that Theology is a branch of knowledge. Discourses III, IV, and V develop aspects of the third subject, the bearing of theology on other branches of knowledge. The "normal idea of a university" is discussed in Discourses VI, VII, and VIII. The relation of religion and the Church, respectively, to the Idea of a Liberal Education are the subjects of the last two Discourses, IX and X. All together, the ten discourses are "preliminary, being directed to the investigation of the object and subject-matter of the Education which a University professes to impart" (Discourse X, 336.16-18).

From the guidelines given to Newman by Archbishop Cullen as directives for the Dublin lectures, Newman selected the following for emphasis: "The whole tendency of our new systems is to make it believed that education may be so conducted as to have nothing at all to do with religion. ...I suppose the whole question of education should be
reviewed--The subjects...might be the advantages of educating the people and the sort of education they ought to receive--Mixed Education--" (See above p. 90). By way of establishing the position of the question, the aim of Discourse I, Newman states in the introductory Discourse, "that the main principle on which I shall have to proceed is this—that education must not be disjoined from Religion, or that Mixed Schools, as they are called, in which teachers and scholars are of different religious creeds, none of which, of course, enter into the matter of instruction, are constructed on a false idea" (Discourse I, 12.12-18). That new systems of education, specifically the Mixed Education policy of the Queen's Colleges in Ireland, based on the theory that education, in Dr. Cullen's words, may be so conducted as to have nothing at all to do with religion, are constructed on a false idea will be Newman's argument throughout the discourses.

Newman begins his argument by stating that those who profess a particular creed have made that creed a basis of their education. As an example, he states "that every sect of Protestants, which has retained the idea of religious truth and the necessity of faith, which has any dogma to profess and any dogma to lose, makes that dogma the basis of its Education, secular as well as religious, and is jealous of those attempts to establish schools of a purely secular character, which the inconvenience of religious differences urges upon politicians of the day" (Discourse I, 12.19-27). There is implicit the idea that education by its very nature, must be based on definite principles if it is to
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have a comprehensive meaning and thus a formative power. Newman concludes that "Men who profess a religion, if left to themselves, make religious and secular education one" (15.2-4).

The three groups of opponents to the foregoing idea are these: "first, they are those for the most part who have no creed or dogma whatever to defend, to sacrifice, to surrender, to compromise, to hold back, or to 'mix,' when they call out for Mixed Education" (Discourse I, 13.8-12). Lord Brougham and Lord Macaulay are specifically mentioned in the following discourses as being among those who view religion as irrelevant to Education. His vigorous campaign in the 1830's for the admission of Dissenters to the established universities places Sir William Hamilton with this group.

The second group are those of "benevolent tempers and business-like minds, who think that all who are called Christians do in fact agree together in essentials, though they will not allow it; and who, in consequence, call on all parties in educating their youth for the world to eliminate differences, which are certainly prejudicial, as soon as they are proved to be immaterial" (Discourse I, 13.13-19). This second group comprised the nineteenth century liberals or Broad Churchmen. The Oriel Noetics, in the first part of the century, particularly Thomas Arnold, R.D. Hampden, and Richard Whately belonged to this group. The next generation of educators represented by men like Sir Kay-Shuttleworth and then Matthew Arnold expressed the ideas of this group in mid-nineteenth century education. Religion became for this
school of educators a means of impressing on the mind the beautiful ideas of saints and sages, teaching it the poetry of devotion, the music of well-ordered affections, and the luxury of doing good (53.27-54.3).

In the third group, Newman numbers the politicians; namely, Sir Robert Peel in England and Lord Clarendon in Ireland who were responsible for establishing the Queen's Colleges in Ireland on the theory of Mixed Education as a means of providing state-supported education to the general population. Newman comments that "it is not surprising that statesmen, with a thousand conflicting claims and interests to satisfy, should fondly aim at a forfeited privilege of Catholic times, when they would have had at least one distraction the less in the simplicity of National Education" (Discourse I, 13.22-27). This group puts aside religious principles for purposes of political expediency. All three groups proceed on the assumption that the remnants of the Christian tradition will regulate the conduct of society while the progressive nineteenth century proceeds with the really important matters at hand, whatever they may be.

Finally, in Discourse I by way of establishing the position of the question Newman states his point of view in these discourses. He will pursue his argument on the basis of "human philosophy... I have no intention of bringing into the argument the authority of the Church at all; but I shall consider the question simply on the grounds of human reason and human wisdom" (Discourse I, 17.27-18.4). Newman said that the mode in which he proposed to handle his subject (17.28-29) was that of human philosophy. Thus, his inquiry was directed to "what a
University is, what is its aim, what its nature, what its bearings" (335.20-21) and not "to the duties of the Church towards a University, nor the characteristics of a University which is Catholic" (335.17-19). Newman intended these discourses to be a preliminary inquiry about the nature and scope of university education as such.

Newman argues in Discourse II that Theology is a branch of knowledge. He pursues his argument by tracing the historical and philosophical origins of his opponents, the Latitudinarians, who hold the view that religion is not knowledge (13.4-16.7) and therefore it is unnecessary to reserve a place for Religion in the University curriculum. Religion is rather a matter of the private judgment of the individual to be determined by his personal tastes, feelings, and inclinations rather than an objective body of truth. It is Newman's purpose in Discourse II to prove that Theology, far from being a matter of Private Judgment, is a body of objective truth.

Newman's argument is based on the premiss that Theology is a science (39.16-17) and also on the premiss that "A University, as the name implies, is the seat of Universal knowledge" (39.7-8). Therefore Theology has a claim to be included in this body of universal knowledge. Newman describes his opponents' attempts to separate secular from religious knowledge as follows: "In word indeed, and in idea, it is easy enough to divide Knowledge into human and divine, secular and religious, and lay down that we will address ourselves to one without interfering with the other, but it is impossible in fact" (45.14-18). Newman warns that "You will soon break up into fragments
the whole circle of secular knowledge, if you begin the mutilation with divine" (45.25-27).

Newman outlines the origin of the Liberal view as follows:
"The religious world, as it is styled, holds, generally speaking, that religion consists—not in knowledge, but in feeling or sentiment. The old Catholic notion; which still lingers in the Established Church, was,—that Faith was an intellectual act, its object truth and its result knowledge; ...but in proportion as the Lutheran leaven spread, it became fashionable to say that Faith was but a feeling, an emotion, an affection, an appetency, not an act of the intellect;" (47.8-19).

Newman traces the origins of Latitudinarianism to Luther, the Puritans, and Wesley: "A theory or philosophy which began with Luther, the Puritans, and Wesley, has been taken up by that large and influential body which goes by the name of Liberal or Latitudinarian" (49-50):
"that Religion was based, not on argument, but on taste and sentiment, that nothing was objective, everything subjective, in doctrine" (48.16-19).

Lord Brougham was the nineteenth century exponent of this view. It was Lord Brougham "who,...has had a share, as much as any one alive, in effecting the public recognition in these Islands of the principle of Mixed Education (50.18-22). Brougham said "'that man shall no more render account to man for his belief, over which he has himself no control'" (51.7-9). For Brougham, religious ideas are "truly imaginations, idiosyncracies, accidents of the individual"; they do not represent external, object Truth (51.15-16).
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Newman laments that Brougham's Principles of 1825 resound on all sides with ever growing confidence and success by 1852. Newman quotes the Minutes of the Committee of Council in Education for 1848-50: One of His Majesty's inspectors places religion under the heading of the inculcation of "sentiment" with poetry and music. The inspector was an illustration of the liberal school which holds the view that "Religion is not knowledge, has nothing whatever to do with knowledge, and is excluded from a University course of instruction, not simply because the exclusion cannot be helped, from political or social obstacles, but because it has no business there at all, because it is to be considered a mere taste, sentiment, opinion, and nothing more?" (53.10-17). The inspector says, "'According to the classification proposed, the 'essential idea' of all religious education will consist in the direct cultivation of the 'feelings'" (53.19-22). Newman comments, "Here is Lutheranism sublimated into philosophy" (53.22-23). Newman points out that those who adopt "the philosophy of the day" (55.5) such as the inspector "are not conscious unbelievers, or open scoffers" (55.6); "they consider knowledge, as regards the creature, is illimitable, but impossible or hopeless as regards the Creator" (55.17-20).

Newman finds that both Dr. Maltby in his address to London University and Lord Brougham in his "Discourse of the objects, advantages, and pleasures of Science" admit "a basis of truth in the doctrines of religion" (58.12-13). However, it is noteworthy that both come to religion from the study of human science. "When I find Religious Education treated as the cultivation of sentiment [the School
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Inspector] and Religious Belief as the accidental hue or posture of the mind [Brougham], I am...reminded of...such philosophers as Hume" (63.27-64.4). Hume "would not hesitate to deny that there is any distinct science or philosophy possible concerning the Supreme Being;" since every single thing we know of Him is this or that or the other phenomenon, material or moral, which already falls under this or that natural science. In him [Hume] then it would be only consistent to drop Theology in a course of University Education" (65.13-20). But Brougham is inconsistent in that he suggests that "the phenomena of the material world are insufficient for the full exhibition of the Divine Attributes" (65.26-28). Newman argues that this supplemental process is a science. Newman has pushed Brougham and Maltby to the logical conclusion of their ideas--into the camp of Hume where they feel uncomfortable. Newman has shown them to be anything but scientific in the following through of their ideas to a logical conclusion. Newman's conclusion is as follows: Religious doctrine is knowledge,...Mixed Education, at least in a University, is simply unphilosophical" (66.13-16). Unless a theory or intellectual position, such as that adopted by the Latitudinarians on the subject of religion in education has been viewed in its origins, its development, and its logical conclusions as Newman has done in Discourse II, conclusions on the subject are likely to be based on insufficient material. There is thus lacking the comprehensive view of the subject that Newman terms philosophical. Thus Newman terms Brougham's inadequate thinking through of the Mixed Education Question unphilosophical.
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Discourses III, IV, and V concern developing aspects of the third subject in Newman's plan; namely, the bearing of theology on other branches of knowledge. In Discourse I Newman said that Mixed Education was based on a false idea (12.12-18). That false idea he explained in Discourse II as the attempt to divide knowledge into secular and religious. Such an attempt he said was possible in word or idea, but not in fact (45.14-18). Then Newman warned in one of the key sentences in the Discourses that "You will soon break up into fragments the whole circle of secular knowledge, if you begin the mutilation with divine" (45.25-27). The Latitudinarians have begun that mutilation as discussed in Discourse II by removing religion from the realm of knowledge and relegating it to the province of sentiment of interest only to particular individuals. Thereafter, Newman's opponents can argue that "Theology and human science are two things, not one, ... Separate subjects should be treated separately. ... We do not pretend to lecture on Theology, and you have no claim to pronounce upon Science" (68.9-21). As a result, the argument is pursued that secular science only is of sufficient importance and, general use to be the concern of the public schools; whereas, religion, as the concern of only some individuals, "should be permitted in 'private,' wherever a sufficient number of persons is found to desire it. Such persons may have it all their own way, when they are by themselves, so that they do not attempt to disturb a comprehensive system of instruction; acceptable and useful to all, by the intrusion of opinions peculiar to their own minds" (68, 27-69.4). The foregoing is the Liberal view of the proponents of Mixed
Education with which Newman opens Discourse III.

Newman's argument in Discourse III refutes the idea that "Theology and human science are two things" (68.9-10). He begins by maintaining the unity of knowledge: "All that exists, as contemplated by the human mind, forms one large system or complex fact, ... all taken together form one integral object, so there are no natural or real limits between part and part; ... from the internal mysteries of the Divine Essence down to our own sensations and consciousness,... " (69. 20-70.6). The subject-matter of our knowledge must be divided into sciences only because the human mind like a short-sighted reader can view but a portion at a time: "... the human mind cannot take in this whole vast fact at a single glance, or gain possession of it at once" (70.11-13). "These various partial views or abstractions by means of which the mind looks out upon its object, are called sciences,..." (70. 23-25). "... sciences are the results of mental processes about one and the same subject matter, viewed under various aspects,... . Viewed all together, they become the nearest approximation to a representation or subjective reflection of the objective truth, possible to the human mind, which advances towards the accurate apprehension of that object, in proportion to the number of sciences it has mastered" (72.12-26).

Since the sciences are partial views of one integral subject matter, "no science is complete in itself, when viewed as an instrument of attaining the knowledge of facts; [Newman has said] that every science, for this purpose, subserves the rest; and, in consequence, that the systematic omission of any one science from the catalogue,
prejudices the accuracy and completeness of our knowledge altogether, and that, in proportion to its importance" (78.25-79.2).

Newman argues that the omission of Theology prejudices the accuracy and completeness of knowledge acquired by means of the other sciences because the subject matter of Theology, God, is related to and involves all knowledge "in the intellectual, moral, social, and political world" (94.26-27). For example, "Man, with his motives and works,... is from Him. Agriculture, medicine, and the arts of life, are His gifts. Society, laws, government, He is their sanction (94.27-95.2). The course of events, the revolution of empires, the rise and fall of states,... the great outlines and the issues of human affairs, are from His dispositions (95.7-12). Anticipations or reminiscences of His glory haunt the mind of the self-sufficient sage, and of the pagan devotee; His writing is upon the wall, whether of the Indian fane, or of the porticoes of Greece (96.6-10). He is with the heathen dramatist in his denunciation of injustice and tyranny, and his auguries of divine vengeance upon crime (96.22-24). All that is good, all that is true, all that is beautiful, all that is beneficent, be it great or small, be it perfect or fragmentary, natural as well as supernatural, moral as well as material, comes from Him" (96.28-97.2).

Newman concludes that Theology touches upon all the sciences at one point or another. It is noteworthy that Newman is not speaking of organized religion here, but rather of all that relates to the Creator down through the ages. All creation is His; therefore the knowledge of God is related in some way to any and all subjects that might comprise
a university curriculum. The Latitudinarians attempt to teach only secular knowledge in the university; but Newman states "to withdraw Theology from the public schools, is to impair the completeness and to invalidate the trustworthiness of all that is actually taught in them" (100,20-23).

In summary, Newman's thought in Discourse III on the Bearing of Theology on other branches of knowledge is as follows: all knowledge is a unity; each science is a partial view; therefore no one science gives a comprehensive view of all truth, nor is each science the ultimate view even in its own province. Each science needs the light other sciences can give to its findings. Theology as one of the sciences also requires the illumination shed by the other sciences. Thus if a study of truth is set up on the basis of the purposeful omission of any one source of possible enlightenment, especially one so all inclusive as Theology, the accuracy and trustworthiness of each individual science will be impaired. Thus Newman concludes that "Religious Truth is not only a portion, but a condition of general knowledge" (101,12-13); that is, Religion Truth is a very "condition" of acquiring the comprehensive view resulting from "general knowledge".

Discourse IV continues the subject of the bearing of Theology on other branches of Knowledge. Newman stated in Discourse III that withdrawing Theology from the public schools invalidates the trustworthiness of all that is taught in them (100,20-23). He summarizes the argument of Discourse III as follows: "In it I said, that, in order to have possession of truth at all, we must have the whole truth; that no one science, no two sciences, no one family of sciences, may, not even
all secular science, is the whole truth; that revealed truth enters to
a very great extent, into the province of science, philosophy, and
literature, and that to put it on one side, in compliment to secular
science, is simply, under colour of a compliment, to do science a great
damage" (104.17-25).

The "great damage" Newman sees in the omission of Theology is
not only the neglect of that subject itself, but also the attempt by
other subjects to take over the territory of Theology: "They would be
sure to teach wrongly, what they had no mission to teach at all" (106.
20-21). As an illustration, Newman quotes from the Inaugural Lecture
delivered by Nassau Senior, the first Professor of Political Economy at
Oxford. Newman states that "it is his [Senior's] object to recommend
the science of wealth, by claiming for it an 'ethical' quality, viz., by
extolling it as the road to virtue and happiness, whatever Scripture and
holy men may say to the contrary" (125.7-11). Whereas, Newman maintains
that the science of wealth "must give rules for gaining wealth, and can
do nothing more" (122.17-19). Newman concludes that "a science which
exceeds its limits, falls into error" (106.27-28). Finally, the refusal
to recognize Theological truth in a course of Universal Knowledge is
"not only the loss of Theology, it is the perversion of the other
sciences. What it unjustly forfeits, others unjustly seize" (111.17-
19).

Newman continues by explaining how it is that the sciences
which exceed their own limits fall into error. "The intellect of
man...energizes as well as his eye or ear, and perceives in sights and
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sounds something beyond them. ...this habit of 'viewing,' as it may be called, the objects which sense conveys to the mind, of throwing them into a system, and uniting and stamping them with one form" (107.17-108.7), may be defined as Science or Philosophy (108.2-3). "...The busy mind will ever be viewing" (109.8-9) whether or not it has "sufficient data for pronouncing" (108.26). "Hence the misconceptions of character, hence the false impressions and reports of words or deeds, which are the rule, rather than the exception in the world at large. ...What happens to the ignorant and notheaded, will take place in the case of every

c in the cultivation of one science, do not have the right to generalize on the basis of their own pursuit (109.18-21). Those who do, Newman terms bigots, or men of one idea or one science. "Hence it is that we have the principles of utility, ...of progress, ...of [some of the] material sciences, ...exalted into leading ideas and keys, if not of all knowledge, at least of many things more than belong to them,—principles, all of them true to a certain point, yet all degenerating into error and quackery, because they are carried to excess, at a point where they require interpretation and restraint from other quarters,..." (110.10-20).

Newman gives examples from the Fine Arts, Comparative Anatomy, History, and Political Economy to depict wherein these areas of knowledge are in error when they proceed without taking into account knowledge from the science of Theology. Those who have devoted
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themselves to one particular subject of thought are not necessarily conscious enemies of Revealed Religion, but become so "simply because they have made their own science, whatever it is, ...not Theology, the centre of all truth, and view every part or the chief parts of knowledge as if developed from it, and to be tested and determined by its principles" (118.6-11). It would seem from the phrase "their own science...not Theology, the centre of all Truth" (118.7-9) that Newman considers Theology to be the centre of the circle of sciences just as the Creator can be thought of as the centre of His Creation; yet Theology does belong to the circle of sciences and as such is subject to the rules the other sciences must follow; that is, the material of Theology can be amplified and corroborated by the other sciences wherever its subject matter contacts that of related sciences.

Newman quotes Lord Bacon concerning the necessity for a higher science that gives the over all view: "'neither is it possible to discover the more remote and deeper parts of any science, if you stand upon the level of the science, and ascend not to a higher science'" (126.16-19). That higher science Newman calls "that Architectonic Science or Philosophy, whatever it be, which is itself the arbiter of all truth, and which disposes of the claims and arranges the places of all the departments of knowledge, which man is able to master" (126.23-27). Newman makes clearer his idea of the Architectonic Science with reference to D. J. Morhof's Polyhistor: "'There is a "summit" in our minds,..., by which we are able,..., to embrace many things at once,... Thus there emerges in it what we may call the "architectonicon," "master
"planner," or from the teachings of the Stoics the "hegeomicon," "directive faculty," which penetrates all things as if by a royal spirit and like a thunderbolt, and illuminates it all with a certain light... Whoever has distinct ideas of things in his mind, mastered however and not confused, must increase by them, and not diminish, that "cripicon," "critical faculty," which results from the conciliation of all the parts" (See below, the Appendix 401.34-403.11). The Architectonic science as a "summit" in our minds has the characteristics of a "master planner," a "directive faculty," and a "critical faculty," all the result of relating and conciliating all subjects in their respective places in the circle of knowledge.

The hostility between Secular Sciences and Theology, "when it occurs, is coincident with an evident deflection or exorbitance of Science from its proper course; and...this exorbitance is sure to take place, almost from the necessity of the case, if Theology be not present to defend its own boundaries and to hinder it" (133.13-18). When the sciences do exceed their boundaries and pronounce on matters that belong to Theology Newman states that "These are the enunciations, not of Science, but of Private Judgment; and Private Judgment infects every science which it touches with a hostility to Theology..." (134.7-10).

In summary, Discourse IV discusses the following aspect of the bearing of Theology on other branches of knowledge: Theology must be present to defend its own boundaries; if not, the other sciences take its place; they teach wrongly what they have no mission to teach;
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thus they fall into error themselves. The guide that prevents sciences from exceeding their boundaries is the Architectonic Science or Philosophy. Sciences pursued on the basis of Private Judgment; that is, on the basis of the individual's judgment, not guided by the Architectonic Science exceed their own borders, impair the accuracy of their own conclusions, and eventually lead to an apparent hostility between Secular Sciences and Theology.

Discourse V is the last in the series of Discourses, II to V, dealing with the bearing of Theology on other branches of knowledge. Throughout Discourses II to V, Newman has been unfolding the history and viewpoints peculiar to Mixed Education, defined in this instance as, education based on the deliberate separation of Secular and Religious Knowledge. In Discourse V Newman attempts to clear up certain misconceptions about the nature of a university and the scope of its curriculum that help perpetuate the idea that there is or should be "a divorce between Religious and Secular Knowledge" (136.17-18). In the process he joins battle with his old foes the groups of Liberals in education mentioned initially in Discourse I, and a new, and at first sight, unlikely foe. Both of these foes threaten to undermine the idea of "an intellectual grasp of things" (143.28-29) or "Philosophy" (144.2) that Newman sees as the scope of a university education. Both threaten to extinguish "the majestic vision of the Middle Age, which grew steadily to perfection in the course of centuries; the University of Paris, or Bologna, or Oxford, has almost gone out in night" (142.21).
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It is that "majestic vision of the Middle Age" (142.22) in which the studies of a university are based on "the idea of unity" (142.29) because they all concern one and the same subject-matter—God and His Creation—that Newman wants to make clearly visible in the nineteenth-century University of Ireland.

The foes of this "majestic vision" are first the Latitudinarians represented in Discourse V by Lord Macaulay, who "steadily contemplates the idea of a University without Religion" (137.4-5) in an article entitled, "Thoughts on the Advancement of Academical Education in England," The Edinburgh Review (February 1826). Macaulay argues from hypothetical instances that such subjects as surgery, languages, music, and dancing are pursued successfully, without reference to religion, just as are subjects at London University. But Newman states that the foregoing subjects do not comprise "the very idea of a University" (139.23) in that they are practical pursuits that do not have anything to do with Philosophy (139.21-22); that is, these practical subjects do not foster "this mental formation" (144.3-4) that enables the mind to attain "an intellectual grasp of things" (143.28-29) which Newman describes as "a science of sciences" (144.14-15)—"the true notion of the scope of a University" (144.15-16). This "science of sciences" (144.14-15) or "Philosophy" (144.2) is the "form" (144.28) that gives unity to "the various pursuits and objects, on which the intellect is employed" (144.26-28); and, is thus the life-giving principle that enables the mind to attain and to use the qualities of the "summit" in our minds or the
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Architectonic Science (see above pp. 163-164). In contrast, Macaulay's university is described as "a sort of bazaar,..., in which wares of all kinds are heaped together for sale in stalls independent of each other" (139.24-26). The result of a multiplicity of subjects not unified and made meaningful by "an intellectual principle" (143.16) Newman describes as "an accumulation from without, not the growth of a principle from within" (142.16-18).

A second misconception hostile to Newman's idea of education is the view that Theology is or should be the form or soul of a Liberal Education. The tendency to view all subjects from the point of view of Theology was characteristic of a group of English converts who adopted the New Ultramontanism. ¹ Notable among this group was William George Ward. ² Newman opposed Ward's proposal that the Classics should be in great measure superseded, and that one chief instrument of a layman's education should be theological and patristic reading." ³

¹ Ultramontanism originated with François Fénelon (1651-1715) who emphasized Papal authority in opposition to the nationalistic views characteristic of the Gallicanism among the French clergy. The New or Modern Ultramontanism was the religious expression of the Catholic Revival in France that began in the early years of the nineteenth century as a reaction against the Liberalism of the French Revolution. The assertion of Papal authority as a symbol of the unity and permanence of Christendom was the essential characteristic of the movement, which divided into two groups as the century progressed; the Imperial group of Veuillot and Abbé Gaume became known as Ultramontane and the Constitutional group of Lacordaire and Montalembert came to be called the Liberal Catholic Party. Wilfrid Ward, William George Ward and the Catholic Revival (London: Macmillan and Co., 1893), Chapter V, pp. 82-129.

² William George Ward (1812-1882) was editor of the Dublin Review from 1863 to 1878.

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Also, Newman "refused to hold with Mr. Ward that the man of science should constantly test his conclusions by their agreement with prevalent theological opinion. The harmony between secular science and theology is not always at once apparent. Each has its own methods and principles which are reliable in themselves; and to be over ready to condemn a line of opinion in science, because its harmony with theological conclusions is not yet explained, is to destroy the possibility of scientific advance. ...Let the investigation proceed, and it works its way out of error into truth. Balk it by over-rigid theological censorship, and you may kill the error, but you lose the truth to which the inquiry was leading."¹ As Newman states in Discourse V, "Theology is one branch of knowledge, and Secular Sciences are other branches. ...it does not interfere with the real freedom of any secular science in its own particular department" (152.26-153.1).

In a letter to Ward, Newman wrote that he questioned "whether theological knowledge 'in extenso' is the best remedy against the dangers of Liberalism."² Newman's Discourses are his answer to the best remedy against Liberalism; namely, the cultivated intellects of countless numbers who have gained possession of "that large Philosophy,


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which embraces and locates truth of every kind, and every method of attaining it" (153.13-15). That "large Philosophy" can be obtained only when the mind has available to it "all knowledge whatever" (153.11); "Not Science only, not Literature only, not Theology only," (153.7-8) but all knowledge must be "taken into account in a University" (153.11-12); therefore Theology is, Newman argues, one of the sciences; "the highest indeed, and widest" (152.28), but still one of the sciences in the university curriculum.

A third misconception with which Newman deals in Discourse V is the expedience of teaching "General Religion" (154.27) as a means of circumventing the problem of religious education in a mixed educational system. It was Thomas Arnold's idea to unite Christians (except the Baptists and the Catholics) under the giant umbrella of General Religion. Newman describes such a compromise as follows: "by introducing a certain portion, and nothing beyond it; and by a certain portion they mean just as much as they suppose Catholics and Protestants to hold in common" (154.5-9). But Newman answers "that the same considerations which are decisive against the exclusion of Religion from Education, are decisive also against its generalization or mutilation,... General Religion is in fact no Religion at all" (154.23-28). Newman explains his reasoning as follows: "...I assert that, as all branches of knowledge are one whole, so, much more, is each particular branch a whole in itself; that each is one science, as all are one philosophy, and that to teach half of any whole is really to teach no part of it.
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(155.16-20). Thus, since General Religion is but a portion of the whole, it is, according to Newman's argument of the unity of knowledge, no Religion whatever.

In summary, Discourse V comprises Newman's arguments against the views of three groups, all of which mistake the true nature of university education: first, there are the Liberals, represented by Macaulay, who presents subjects that are really just recreations and accomplishments as an argument for considering Theology unnecessary, even out of place, in a university curriculum. Secondly, there are the Ultramontanes who would give Theology and patristic reading a place of prime importance in the education of the laity and relegate secular subjects, particularly the sciences, to a less important place. The Liberals and the Ultramontanes were opposite extremes. Neither saw a university education from the point of view of the unity of knowledge that Newman maintains is a necessity for the cultivation of the mind. The third group would effect a compromise with the introduction of some Religious instruction into the curriculum; whatever would be acceptable to all. Newman points out that the No-Theology proponents and the General Religion advocates really do hold similar views. "...to teach half of any whole is really to teach no part of it. Men understand this in matters of the world, it is only when Religion is in question, that they forget it" (155.19-22).
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Newman states that those of sincere mind and charitable outlook view those who differ from them in religion as follows: "Their delight is to think that he holds what they hold, only not enough; and that he is right as far as he goes. Such persons are very slow to believe that a scheme of general education, which puts Religion more or less aside, does 'ipso facto' part company with Religion; ... In short they are of that school of thought, which will not admit that half a truth is an error, and nine-tenths of a truth no better; ...and that intellectual principles combine, not by a process of physical accumulation, but in unity of idea" (157.25-158.9).

Finally, there are three points about Theology that should be made clear. First, there is a difference between Theology and Religion. Theology Newman views as a speculative science concerned with the intellectual study of God and His Laws; whereas Religion is a practical science concerned with the training of the will to right conduct and the formation of character. That any intellectual pursuits concerning matters of faith required study or that the laity should be concerned with other than the practice of religion was a new idea to Newman's audience. Also, that Newman contemplated the intellectual rather than the moral formation of his students as the end of a university was a thoroughly disconcerting idea to some of those who heard him.

Secondly, Newman did not expect every student to study Theology, nor did he think that the science should be pursued in the depth and breadth suitable to the theologians. But what he did have in
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mind was that the students should pursue their particular studies in the intellectual climate where Theology had been and was being studied. What Newman has been arguing against in Discourses II to V is the deliberate exclusion of the Theological dimension from university education. Both London University and the Queen's Colleges were established on the basis of the omission of the Theological dimension—a dimension Newman has argued as necessary for the seeing of knowledge as a unity and therefore of acquiring that Architectonic Science or Philosophy that is the end of a university.

Thirdly, as important as Theology was to Newman's idea of a university, it was not the form of a university education; nor did it interfere with the other sciences in their respective fields. That all subjects were not to be directed towards and guided by Religion was another quite alarming aspect of Newman's thought as far as the Irish clergy in his audience were concerned. In these three points concerning Theology may lie the reasons for Newman's omitting Discourse V from all the editions after the first. The possible basis for the omission was Newman's theory of "Economy"1 as outlined in the Arians and in the Appendix to the Apologia. That theory is in brief, the idea that what is not likely to be understood accurately might better be reserved for a time when the minds of the hearers would be better prepared for the

reception of what, in the first instance, were novel or unacceptable ideas. The Mixed education advocates Brougham, Macaulay, and Peel did not see the real necessity for Theology in the curriculum and the Irish University world misinterpreted Newman's plea for Theology in the unity of knowledge scheme. Hopefully now Discourse V can be reinstated and understood.

Newman said "after these [first Discourses on Theology and Knowledge] I shall go on to give a normal idea of a University" (See above, p. 149). Discourse VI begins Newman's discussion of a normal idea of a University. Newman considers Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge as the scope of a University (170.13; 181.1-2). Liberal Knowledge "consists in a comprehensive view of truth in all its branches, of the relations of science to science, of their mutual bearings, and their respective values" (170.21-24). Liberal Knowledge "is capable of being its own end" (170.17) in that it is directed towards nothing beyond the individual, but rather satisfies a need of his nature for knowledge that will complete and perfect his nature.

"Liberal" as applied to "liberal" knowledge or "liberal" arts, or "liberal" education is, Newman points out, "the special characteristic or property of a University and of a gentleman" (175.3-6). Liberal is the opposite to servile in the sense that servile concerns "bodily labour, mechanical employment, ..., in which the mind has little or no part" (175.9-10); whereas, "liberal knowledge and liberal pursuits are such as belong to the mind, not to the body" (175.16-18). Furthermore, Liberal Knowledge is not "informed... by any end" (177.1); that is,
it is not directed towards or shaped or formed towards any art; therefore, it is the opposite to Useful Knowledge, which is directed towards the mechanical, the particular, and the external (182.20-22).

The reason that Liberal Knowledge is an end in itself is that it is the means by which the mind achieves its perfection. Newman describes the process as follows: "Knowledge [Liberal Knowledge] is called by the name of Science or Philosophy, when it is acted upon, informed, or, if I may use a strong figure, impregnated by Reason. Reason is the principle of that intrinsic fecundity of Knowledge, which, to those who possess it, is its especial value,...." (181.22-27). In this "scientific or...philosophical process" (183.19-20) the intellect "grasps what it perceives through the senses; ...takes a view of things; ...sees more than the senses convey; reasons upon what it sees, and while it sees; ...invests it with an idea" (183.10-14). Knowledge as such is a good and a power (182.7); "it may resolve itself into an art, and terminate in a mechanical process" (182.8-9), in which case it is called Useful Knowledge, or "it also may fall back upon reason, and resolved itself into philosophy" (182.10-11); then it is called Liberal Knowledge.

The real worth and dignity of Liberal Knowledge "is this germ within it of a scientific or philosophical process" (183.19-20). The life of ideas in the mind Newman has described as follows: "When an idea,..., is of a nature to arrest and possess the mind, it may be said
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to have life, that is, to live in the mind which is its recipient." ¹ The result is that a Liberal Education "implies an action upon our mental nature, and the formation of a mental character; it is something individual and permanent,..." (187.22-24). Thus there is a growth, development, and refinement of intellect that Newman describes as "the cultivation of the intellect, as such" (197.6). A Liberal Education therefore effects in the mind "its own perfection" (197.8), a perfection that is its own beauty and the fulfilment of its own nature. Newman describes that perfection of intellect as "an acquired illumination,... a habit, a personal possession, and an inward endowment" (187.8-10).

A Liberal Education has a temporal object, the cultivation of the intellect, which is distinct from the cultivation of virtue. "I insist upon it, that it is as real a mistake to implicate it [Liberal Knowledge] with virtue or religion, as with the arts" (195.11-13). Newman insists that a "Liberal Education makes not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman" (196.1-3). He further notes that the qualities of "a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and courteous bearing... may attach to the man of the world, to the profligate, to the heartless,—pleasant, alas, and attractive as he seems when decked out in them" (196.4-14), but when this perfection of intellect is the characteristic of the heroes of Christianity it serves an eternal as well as temporal

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purpose: "We attain to heaven by using this world well, though it is to pass away; we perfect our nature, not by undoing it, but by adding to it what is more than nature, and directing it towards aims higher than its own" (199.12-16). There is implied an important idea in Newman; namely, that nature must be prepared for grace. The more our natures are perfected in this world, the more ready they are for the illumination of eternal glory.

In Discourse VII Newman contrasts mental acquirements with philosophical knowledge. Mental acquirements refers to the gathering and storing of information much as a child collects facts or a seafaring man visits different countries and sees many lands and various people, or an antiquarian collects and stores information without relating details or making any judgment on or evaluation of various pieces of information. To these types of people the "intellect is little more than an instrument for taking in facts, or a receptacle for storing them" (205.23-24). Acquirement or "mere or material knowledge" (205.2) has the following characteristics: it is knowledge that has been passively received into the mind; it is composed of unrelated information; it is undigested knowledge, so to speak, in that it is information that the mind has not compared with knowledge it already has and thereby made that knowledge its own; or to appropriate Newman's phrase, acquirement is knowledge that has not been realized to the mind (202.14-15).

In contrast philosophical knowledge or enlargement of mind
"consists not merely in the passive reception into the mind of a number of ideas..., but in the mind's energetic and simultaneous action upon and towards and among those new ideas,... It is the action of a formative power, reducing to order and meaning the matter of our acquirements; it is a digestion of what we receive, into the substance of our previous state of thought; a comparison of ideas one with another, as they come before the mind, and a systematizing of them. We feel our minds to be growing and expanding 'then', when we not only learn, but refer what we learn to what we know already" (213.12-29).

The foregoing is Newman's description of true enlargement of mind, "which is the power of viewing many things at once as one whole, of referring them severally to their true place in the universal system, of understanding their respective values, and determining their mutual dependence. Thus is that form of Universal Knowledge, set up in the individual intellect and constitutes its perfection" (217.3-10). This "power of viewing many things at once as one whole" (217.3-4) of comparing, judging, and systematizing becomes a "habit of the intellect" (202.3), a permanent possession, a "real illumination" (217.10-11). This "intellectual excellence" (202.19) is analogous to health of body and virtue of soul. It is the "business of a University to make this intellectual culture its direct scope" (202.29-203.1).

Based on the contrast between mere acquirement and philosophical knowledge, Newman proceeds "to the exposure of various mistakes which at the present day,..., beset the subject of University
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Education" (220.11-13). First there are those authors and commentators who are as pointless as they are inexhaustible, ... who, breaking up their subject into details, destroy its life, and defraud us of the whole by their anxiety about the parts!" (221.14-25). The result is that they leave their "subject pretty much as [they] found it" (223.11-13). "...they can neither state what their adversaries really hold, nor know well what they hold themselves, when they have so little sense of what may be called the structure of knowledge, ..." (223.25-28).

"...knowledge of theirs is unworthy of the name, which they have not thought through, and thought out" (224.25-27). Their writing is "the consequence of reading for reading's sake. It is acquirement without philosophy" (224.13-14).

Then there is the error of basing the university curriculum on mere acquirement instead of on philosophy; consequently, the students' memories are loaded with a mass of undigested knowledge (226.18-19) so "that nothing has properly been learned at all. It has been the error of distracting and enfeebling the mind by an unmeaning profusion of subjects; of implying that a smattering in a dozen branches of study was not shallowness, which it really is, but enlargement; of considering an acquaintance with the learned names of things and persons, ... and attendance on eloquent lectures, ... and the sight of the experiments of a platform and the specimens of a museum, that all this was not dissipation of mind, but progress" (226.21-227.4). The unmeaning profusion of subjects passively acquired precludes the
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comparison and judgment required for enlargement of mind. There is lacking also other requisites for philosophical knowledge--system, orderly progression, and diligent application in order that knowledge be "thought through and thought out" (224.26-27). "All things are to be learned at once, not first one thing, then another, not one well, but many badly. Learning is to be without exertion, without attention, without toil; without grounding, without advance, without finishing" (227.4-8).

Furthermore, recreations and accomplishments can be mistaken for education. "Stuffing birds or playing stringed instruments is an elegant pastime, and a resource to the idle, but they are not education; they do not form or cultivate the intellect" (231.25-28). They are mere acquirements. Newman stressed this point in Discourse V.

As well, the lack of wholeness and continuity is evident in the teaching organization of a university the aim of which is mere acquirement rather than philosophical knowledge. Newman maintains that the cultivation of the intellect "never will issue from the most strenuous efforts of a set of teachers, with no mutual sympathies and no inter-communion, of a set of examiners with no opinions they dare profess, and with no common principles, who are teaching or questioning a set of youths who do not know them, and do not know each other, on a large set of subjects, different in kind, and connected by no wide philosophy, three times a week, or three times a year, or once in three years, in chill lecture rooms or on a pompous anniversary" (236.14-24).

In the foregoing system there is lack of continuity, of unity, of...
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personal influence from individual teacher to individual student. Thus there can be no growth, enlargement, nor illumination of the students' minds.

Newman is indeed prophetic in his description of the curriculum and the teaching of a university with its roots in Lord Brougham's philosophy of acquirement. The authors and commentators studied, the composition and organization of the curriculum, and the teaching methods all lack the unity of philosophical knowledge and the purposeful direction to the cultivation of the students' minds. Newman concludes his argument against mere acquirement as the aim of a university education with these words: "self-education in any shape, in the most restricted sense, is preferable to a system of teaching, which, professing so much, really does so little for the mind" (237.4-7).

Discourse VIII discusses philosophical knowledge as an intellectual habit; then outlines the ultimate usefulness of that intellectual habit. "Truth of whatever kind is the proper object of the intellect; its cultivation then lies in fitting it to apprehend and contemplate truth" (241.5-8). We do not discern truth intuitively, but rather "by the joint application and concentration upon it of many faculties and exercises of mind. Such a union and concert of the intellectual powers, such an enlargement and development, such a comprehensiveness, is necessarily a matter of training" (241.15-242.2). Newman points out that this training is not obtained by reading many books, nor witnessing many experiments, nor attending many lectures (242.5-8). These are mere acquirement. Rather the "mental eye" (242.11)
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which grasps things as they are (242.12-13) is a power which "is the result of a scientific formation of mind" (242.20). That formation "is the work of discipline and habit" (242.27). The discipline is for the mind's own sake, "for the perception of its own proper object," (243.3-4) truth. The discipline and habit results in "an acquired faculty of judgment, of clear-sightedness, of sagacity, of wisdom, of philosophical reach of mind, and of intellectual self-possession and repose," (242.21-23), qualities that result from a Liberal Education, but "do not come of mere acquirement" (242.24).

Newman insists that this process of training the intellect toward its own highest culture and helping all students towards it according to their various capacities is the business of a University (243.14-17). The real and ultimate usefulness of a Liberal Education Newman outlines as follows: Newman maintains that health of intellect is as desirable for its own sake as is health of body: "if a healthy body is a good in itself, why is not a healthy intellect? and if a college of Physicians is a useful institution, because it contemplates bodily health, why is not an Academical Body, though it were simply and solely engaged in imparting vigour and beauty and grasp to the intellectual portion of our nature?" (251.22-28).

John Locke and the Edinburgh Reviewers both maintain that the only useful education is that which prepares a person for his profession. On the other hand, Newman insists that just as the body is sacrificed to some manual or other toil, so may the intellect be
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sacrificed to some specific profession. "I do not call 'this' the culture of the intellect" (255.18-19). Nor does Newman consider "Professional or Scientific knowledge as the sufficient end of a University Education" (256.23-24), but he does not "imply that the University does not teach Law or Medicine. What indeed can it teach at all, if it does not teach something in particular? It teaches 'all' knowledge by teaching all 'branches' of knowledge..." (256.29-257.4).

Newman states that the real use of a University education to the individual is that "general culture of mind is the best aid to professional and scientific study, and educated men can do what illiterate cannot; and the man who has learned to think and to reason and to compare and to discriminate and to analyse, who has refined his taste, and formed his judgment, and sharpened his mental vision, will not indeed at once be a lawyer, ...or a physician, ..., but he will be placed in that state of intellect in which he can take up any one of the sciences or callings..., with an ease, a grace, a versatility, and a success, to which another is a stranger" (256.4-18).

General culture of mind as the aim of a University education is particularly useful to the Professor of Law or Medicine for the following reason: "...out of a University he is in danger of being absorbed and narrowed by his pursuit, and of giving Lectures which are the Lectures of nothing more than a lawyer, physician...; whereas in a University he will just know where he and his science stand, he has come to it, as it were, from a height, he has taken a survey of all knowledge.
he is kept from extravagance by the very rivalry of other studies, he
has gained from them a special illumination and largeness of mind and
freedom and self-possession, and he treats his own in consequence with
a philosophy and a resource, which belongs, not to the study itself, but
to his liberal education" (257.7-20).

Newman quotes various authorities in the Oxford educational
world of his day in his argument for the ultimate usefulness of a
Liberal Education. Edward Copleston states that intellectual culture
"is the education of the man, not of the lawyer, antiquarian or chemist;
...[it] saves him from narrowness, and pedantry, both in society and
amid the duties of his profession" (263.1-5). Copleston insists that
"the end of direct Liberal Education is the good of the individual, and
not that of the community" (263.12-14). About one whose life and
training is devoted entirely to one employment, Copleston writes that as
such a one "contributes more effectually to the accumulation of
national wealth, he becomes himself more and more degraded as a rational
being. In proportion as his sphere of action is narrowed, his mental
powers and habits become contracted; and he resembles a subordinate
part of some powerful machinery, useful in its place, but insignificant
and worthless out of it..." (264.14-21).

Another Oxford man John Davison states that a man should not
be usurped by his profession (270.2) in that "he is not always upon
duty. ...As a friend, as a companion, as a citizen at large; in the
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connexions of domestic life; he has a sphere of action, revolving,..., within the sphere of his profession, but not clashing with it; in which if he can show none of the advantages of an improved understanding, whatever may be his skill or proficiency in the other, he is no more than an ill-educated man" (270.16-271.2).

Newman has been arguing in Discourse VIII against the principle of Utility as the basis of University Education, a principle which results in the view "that the young men who come for education are not the supreme and real end of a University, but the advancement of science" (247.14-17). On the other hand, when the intellectual culture of those who come for education is the end of a University, the individual whose intellect is cultivated to its perfection is a benefit to his own professional and domestic life as well as to society at large. Newman argues that "nothing is excellent, beautiful, perfect, desirable for its own sake, but it overflows, and spreads the likeness of itself all around itself" (254.5-8). In this sense, "if a liberal education be good, it must necessarily be useful too" (254.22-23).

Newman concludes these arguments by saying that "that training of the intellect, which is best for the individual himself, best enables him to discharge his duties to society. ...If then a practical end must be assigned to a University course, I say it is that of training good members of society. Its art is the art of social life, and its end is fitness for the world" (285.6-18).
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The previous three discourses (VI, VII, VIII) have discussed philosophical knowledge, first as an end in itself for the perfection of the individual's intellect; then in relation to fact finding and information compiling as an idea of education; and thirdly, in relation to professional training. Newman has shown that fact finding rather than being an end in itself is really just the basic preliminary to provide the material of intellectual cultivation. In turn mental culture should precede professional training just "as health ought to precede labour of body" (255.28). It is the scope and nature of a university to provide as Newman showed "a philosophical contemplation of the field of knowledge as a whole, leading, ..., to an understanding of its separate departments, ...might in consequence be rightly called an illumination; also, it was rightly called an enlargement of mind, because it was a distinct location of things one with another, ...; while it was moreover its proper cultivation...because it secured to the intellect the sight of things as they are, or of truth, in opposition to fancy, opinion, and theory, ...because it presupposed and involved the perfection of its various powers" (290.4-17). Finally what is a good in itself, necessarily is "the source of benefits to society" (290.25-26).

Discourse IX discusses the bearing of intellectual culture on Religion. Newman defines Religion as follows: "when I speak of Religion...I am contemplating Catholicism as a system of pastoral instruction and moral duty; and I have to do with its doctrines only as they are subservient to its direction of the conscience and the
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conduct" (294.23-27). Newman outlines the "momentous benefit which the philosopher is likely to confer on the pastors of the Church" (295.22-23). That benefit is the improving and strengthening of nature so that it is not so disposed to "that fearful subjection to sense which is its ordinary state" (295.26-27). As "nothing can act beyond its own nature" (296.12), "we need a...remedy, which we can make our own, the object of some legitimate faculty,..., which is capable of resting on the mind, and taking up its familiar lodging with it, and engrossing it,....

Here then I think is the important aid, which intellectual cultivation furnishes to us in rescuing the victims of passion and self-will" (297.13-23). It should be noted here that there is a fine distinction between Newman's advocating intellectual culture and the claims made for knowledge as acquirement by Lord Brougham and Sir Robert Peel. Whereas Newman claims that intellectual culture improves nature and tends to dispose it against "the besetting power of sensuality" (297.18-19), Brougham and Peel consider intellectual employments as distractions from the evils of human nature and therefore a means that will lead directly and even inevitably to virtue. "Such are the instruments, by which an age of advanced civilization combats moral disorders, which Reason as well as Revelation denounces" (302.7-9). These influences which intellectual culture exerts upon our moral nature are upon the type of Christianity "manifesting themselves in veracity, probity, equity, fairness, gentleness, benevolence, and amiableness" (302.14-16), but noble and beautiful as they are in appearance, they can exist apart from
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the religious principle, faith. "The radical difference indeed of this mental culture from genuine religion, in spite of its seeming relation-
ship" (303.16-18) is actually the point of discussion in Discourse IX.

Mental culture counterfeits genuine religion in these ways; Fear of transgressing God's law, becomes shame and self-reproach
"directed and limited to our mere sense of what is fitting and becoming"
(304.17). The result is that "conscience becomes what is called a moral sense; the command of duty is a sort of taste; sin is not an offence against God, but against human nature" (304.23-26). Conscience is "but the dictate of their own minds and nothing more; it is because they do not look out of themselves, because they do not look through and beyond their own minds to their Maker, but are engrossed in notions of what is due to themselves, to their own dignity and their own consistency.
Their conscience has become a mere self-respect" (305.6-12). The object of these specimens of spurious religion "is to paint a smooth and perfect surface.... When they do wrong, they feel, not contrition, of which God is the object, but remorse, and a sense of degradation" (305.18-22). Thus the pattern-men of philosophical virtue from the Emperor Julian, the apostate from Christian Truth, to Lord Shaftesbury are the epitome of "godless intellectualism" (310.14).

The phrase "'vice lost half its evil by losing all its grossness'[is] an apt illustration of the ethical temperament of a civilized age" (317.2-6). Whatever is vulgar or whatever disgusts becomes the only crime. "Drinking and swearing, squalid poverty,
improvidence, laziness, slovenly disorder, make up the idea of
profligacy: poets may say any thing, however wicked, with impunity;
works of genius may be read without danger or shame, whatever their
principles; fashion, celebrity, the beautiful, the heroic, will suffice
to force any evil upon the community. ...the 'prestige' of rank, and
the resources of wealth, are a screen, an instrument, and an apology for
vice and irreligion. ...the very refinement of Philosophy, which began
by repelling sensuality, ends by excusing it" (317.10-24).

Newman summarizes his discussion of the Religion of
Civilization in his definition of a gentleman (327.29-330.16). Newman
begins that definition with the phrase "it is almost the definition of a
gentleman" (327.28-29). The gentleman "seems like a disciple of
Christianity" (330.28-29) "even when he is not a Christian" (330.18).
The qualities that Newman has described "are some of the lineaments of
the ethical character, which the cultivated intellect will form, apart
from the religious principle" (331.7-9). They are the qualities of a
St. Francis de Sales or they may be the limits of the virtue of a
Shaftesbury or a Gibbon (331.13-15). The product of civilization has a
counterfeit culture in that he lacks the theological supernatural
dimension that would give genuine depth and quality to the lineaments of
civilization. It is the Christian gentleman who is the genuine product
of a Liberal Education.
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Newman states in the opening paragraph of Discourse X that he has attempted in these discourses "to follow out a line of thought, more familiar to Protestants just now than to Catholics, upon Catholic grounds. I declared my intention, when I opened the subject, of treating it as a philosophical and practical, rather than as a theological question, with an appeal to common-sense, not to ecclesiastical rules" (333.8-14).

Quoting from Discourse I Newman states that "the main principle on which I should have to proceed in the controversy to which I was addressing myself, was this, that Education must not be disjoined from Religion, or that Mixed Schools are constructed on a false idea" (336.23-27). Newman states that his first step in developing the main principle of the controversy over Mixed Schools was to determine "what is meant by University Education" (336.28-29). To this inquiry Newman has confined his ten discourses. He constructed his subject around the proposition that a University disjoined from Religion "is both unphilosophical and impracticable, supposing, that is, by University is meant a place of education in general knowledge" (337.15-17).

"A reason for calling such an idea unphilosophical was drawn out in the former half of these Discourses [I-V]; and a reason for calling it impracticable has been suggested in the latter [VI-X]" (337.18-21).

The following is Newman's summary of the nature and scope of
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the discourses on university education:

My inquiry has borne a preliminary character, not as to the duties of the Church towards a University, nor the characteristics of a University which is Catholic, but as to what a University is what is its aim; what its nature, what its bearings. I have accordingly laid down first, that all branches of knowledge are, at least implicitly, its subject matter [Discourse II]; that these branches are not isolated and independent one of another, but form-together a whole or system [Discourse III]; that they run into each other and complete each other, and that, in proportion to our knowledge of them as a whole, is the exactness and trustworthiness of our knowledge of them separately [Discourse IV]; that the process of imparting knowledge to the intellect in this philosophical way, is its true culture [Discourse V]; that this culture is a good in itself; that that knowledge which is both its instrument and result, is called Liberal Knowledge; that such culture and such knowledge may fitly be sought for their own sake [Discourse VI-VII]; that they are, however, in addition, of great secular utility, as constituting the best and highest formation of the intellect for social and political life [Discourse VIII]; and lastly, that, considered in a religious aspect, they concur with Christianity in a certain way, and then diverge from it; and consequently prove in the event, sometimes its serviceable ally, sometimes from their very resemblance to it, an insidious and dangerous foe [Discourse IX]. (Discourse X, pp. 335-336).

The subject of Discourse X is the duties of the Church towards Liberal Knowledge. Newman states that a University by its very nature is "directed to social, national, temporal objects" (339.22-23). Since it is a living and energizing body, it has "some one formal and definite ethical character" (339.26-27) to imprint on its professors and students. It is in the formation of this ethical character that "the Church breathes her own pure and unearthy spirit into it, and fashions and moulds its organization, and watches over its teaching, and knits together its pupils, and superintends its action" (339.13-17).

Without the spirit and guiding presence of the Church,
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"Liberal Knowledge has a special tendency, ..., when cultivated by beings such as we are, to impress us with a mere philosophical theory of life and conduct, in the place of Revelation" (340.8-12). "This then is the tendency of that Liberal Education, of which a University is the school, viz., to view Revealed Religion from an aspect of its own,—to fuse and recast it,—to tune it, as it were, to a difference key, and to reset its harmonies, ...; and all under the notion, conscious or unconscious, that the human intellect, self-educated and self-supported, is more true and perfect in its ideas and judgments, than that of Prophets and Apostles,..." (341.6-16).

Newman states that there "are two injuries, which Revelation is likely to sustain at the hands of the Masters of human reason, unless the Church, ..., protects the sacred treasure... The first is a simple ignoring of Theological Truth altogether, under the pretence of not recognizing differences of religious opinion; ...[Discourses I-VIII]. The second, ..., is a recognition indeed of Catholicism, but... an adulteration of its spirit. These two successively have constituted the subject of these Discourses--" (342.29-343.12). These two injuries Newman discusses with reference to the subject-matter of instruction.

The university curriculum comprises three great subject areas "on which Human Reason employs itself:— God, Nature and Man: ...: the book of nature is called Science, the book of man is called Literature. Literature and Science, ..., nearly constitute the subject matter of Liberal Education; and, while Science is made to subserve the former of
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the two injuries, which Revealed Truth sustains,—its exclusion, Literature subserves the latter—its corruption" (343.18-344.1). Newman discusses Revelation and the influence of Revealed Truth on Science and Literature respectively.

About Physical Science he states that "there always has been a sort of jealousy and hostility between Religion and physical philosophers" (344.8-10). The reason for the hostility is that Theology and Science differ "in drift, in method of proof, and in subject-matter" (352.28-353.1). The Theologian in his "inquiry into final causes for the moment passes over the existence of nature" (347.10-11) and the physical philosopher in his experiments upon natural phenomena "passes over for the moment the existence of God" (347.12); thus each one is engaged in the study of different areas of the fields of knowledge.

Also, there is "the difference of method, by which truths are gained in theology and in physical science. Induction is the instrument of Physics, and deduction only is the instrument of Theology. ...Revelation is all in all in doctrine; the Apostles its sole depository, the inferential method its sole instrument, and ecclesiastical authority its sole sanction. The Divine Voice has spoken once for all, and the only question is about its meaning" (348.10-28). In contrast the inductive method that originated with the school of Bacon begins the search for truth in things material and sensible (350.1). "They scorn any process of inquiry not founded on experiment" (350.2-3). The result of this conflict in method between the Theologians and the Physical Scientists
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is evident in the spirit of nineteenth century Liberalism. The Scientists cannot deal with Theology by the inductive method; "they cannot master it, and so they simply outlaw it and ignore it. Catholicism, forsooth, 'confines the intellect', because it holds that God's intellect is greater than theirs, and what He has done, man cannot improve." (350.10-14). But Newman states that the scientists have found a religion they can deal with; namely, liberal protestantism, the nineteenth century expression of the leaven of Lutheranism, which has actually adopted the inductive method of the scientists as its principle of inquiry into Scripture. "It takes the sacred text as a large collection of phenomena, from which, by an inductive process, each individual Christian may arrive at just those religious conclusions which approve themselves to his own judgment" (350.20-24). Thus Newman has described the origin of Private Judgment.

Theology and Physical Science differ also in subject-matter. The subject-matter of "the physical sciences, astronomy, Chemistry, and the rest" (351.2-4) concerns the Heavens and the Earth; whereas "Revelation has reference to circumstances which did not arise till after...the introduction of moral evil into the world" (351.6-10). There is a conflict between the theology which Physical Science suggests called Natural Theology (352.18) and Sacred Theology. The physical world shows forth the power, wisdom, and goodness of God, but not His mercy, nor "the economy of human redemption, and but partially...the moral law and moral goodness" (351.20-22). Newman quotes Lord Bacon with whom the inductive method originated: "'Sacred theology,' says
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Lord Bacon, "must be drawn from the words and the oracles of God: not from the light of nature or the dictates of reason" (351.22-25). Bacon, it would seem, realized that the theology which physical science suggests is but a partial view. Newman concludes that "if a University cannot fulfil its name and office without the recognition of Revealed Truth, she [the Church] must be there to see that it is a 'bona fide' recognition, sincerely made and consistently acted on" (353.14-17); that is, to see that Theology is not ignored for the physical sciences, nor reduced to the Private Judgment of individuals, nor restricted to those attributes of God knowable from the physical sciences.

"The other main constituent portion of the subject-matter of Liberal Education" (353.20-21) is Literature. "Literature stands related to Man, as Science stands to Nature; it is his history. Man is composed of body and soul; he thinks and he acts; he has appetites, passions, affections, motives, designs; ...; he is formed for society, and society multiplies and diversifies in endless combinations his personal characteristics, moral and intellectual. All this constitutes his life; of all this Literature is the expression; so that Literature is in some sort to him what autobiography is to the individual; it is his Life and Remains" (353.22-354.5). Newman emphasizes that Literature represents the natural man, the unregenerate man and therefore is the expression of his sin "whether he be heathen or Christian" (355.5). University Education "implies an extended range of reading, which has to deal with standard works of genius, or what are called the 'classics' of"
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a language: and I say, from the nature of the case, if Literature is to
be made a study of human nature, you cannot have a Christian Literature.
It is a contradiction in terms to attempt a sinless Literature of sinful
man" (356.3-9). "If then by Literature is meant the manifestation of
human nature in language, you will seek for it in vain except in the
world" (359.8-10).

Human Literature must not be omitted from Education. "For why
do we educate, except to prepare for the world... If then a University
is a direct preparation for this world, let it be what it professes. It
is not a Convent, it is not a Seminary; it is a place to fit men of the
world for the world. We cannot possibly keep them from plunging into
the world, with all its ways and principles and maxims, when their time
comes; but we can prepare them against what is inevitable; and it is
not the way to learn to swim in troubled waters, never to have gone into
them (359.16-360.2).

In summary, the Book of God in relation to the Book of Nature
and the Book of Man is ammissible to error unless the Church pervades
all with its spirit of truth. Newman has illustrated that The Book of
God, Theology, can be ignored or adulterated by the method and view of
the Physical Scientists. In reverse the Book of Man, Literature, can be
confined to a partial view and misrepresented by an over zealous attempt
to represent only regenerate man. Newman says, "Nay, beware of showing
grace and its work at such disadvantage, as to make the few whom it has
thoroughly influenced compete in intellect with the vast multitude who
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either have it not, or use it not. The elect are few to choose out of, and the world is inexhaustible" (357.15-20). Newman summarizes the role of the Church in the University as that of the arbiter of Truth whatever that may be: "Let her do for Literature in one way, what she does for Science in another; each has its imperfection, and she supplies it for each. She fears no knowledge, but she purifies all; she represses no element of our nature, but cultivates the whole" (361.15-19).

Newman closes the Discourses with the depiction of his patron St. Philip Neri who was the epitome of all the qualities that Newman has been extolling as befitting a man of Liberal Education who has attained to heaven by using this world well (199.12-13).
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Chapter V

THE LITERARY STYLE OF THE DISCOURSES...ON UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

The ideal means of presenting ideas to others was for Newman "the ancient method, of oral instruction, of present communication between man and man." ¹ "The general principles of any study you may learn by books at home; but the detail, the colour, the tone, the air, the life which makes it live in us, you must catch all these from those in whom it lives already." ² "...if we wish to become exact and fully furnished in any subject of teaching which is diversified and complicated, we must consult the living man and listen to his living voice." ³ Fortunate were those privileged in May and June of 1852 to listen to Newman's living voice. They were able to consult one who was the living exponent of the Liberal Education he was extolling. Newman was the Christian gentleman, the scholar, and the man of God that he was so earnestly depicting to his Dublin audience. No one could present the Idea of a Liberal Education more clearly than one in whom it lived already.

The cultivation of mind and comprehensive view characteristic of the man of Liberal Education are evident in these commentaries that depict the kind of mind the Dublin audience would encounter. James

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² Ibid., p. 9.
³ Ibid., p. 8.
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Anthony Froude, an Oxford undergraduate in Newman's Oxford tutor days, wrote that "Newman's mind was world-wide. He was interested in everything which was going on in science, in politics, in literature. Nothing was too large for him, nothing too trivial, if it threw light upon the central question, what man really was, and what was his destiny." ¹ Principal Shairp wrote of Newman's mind these words:

"There was learning and refinement, there was genius, not indeed of a philosopher, but of a noble and original thinker, and unequalled edge of dialectic, and these all glorified by the imagination of a poet. Then there was the utter unworldliness, the setting at naught of all things which men most prize, the tastelessness of soul, which was ready to essay the impossible." ²

Newman's appearance and voice were notable aspects of his influential presence. "His appearance was striking. He was above the middle height, slight and spare. His head was large, his face remarkably like that of Julius Caesar. The forehead, the shape of the ears and nose, were almost the same. I have often thought of the resemblance, and believed that it extended to the temperament. In both


there was an original force of character which refused to be moulded by circumstances, which was to make its own way, and become a power in the world; a clearness of intellectual perception, a disdain for conventionalities, a temper imperious and wilful; but along with it a most attaching gentleness, sweetness, singleness of heart and purpose. Both were formed by nature to command others, both had the faculty of attracting to themselves the passionate devotion of their friends and followers."

Principal Shairp writes of the "silver intonation" of Newman's voice: "When he began to preach, a stranger was not likely to be much struck, especially if he had been accustomed to pulpit-oratory of the Boanerges sort. ... The delivery had a peculiarity which it took a new hearer some time to get over. Each separate sentence, or at least short paragraph, was spoken rapidly, but with great clearness of intonation; and then at its close there was a pause, lasting for nearly half a minute; then another rapidly but clearly spoken sentence, followed by another pause. It took some time to get over this, but, that once done, the wonderful charm began to dawn on you. The look and bearing of the preacher were as of one who dwelt apart, who, though he knew his age well, did not live in it. From the seclusion of study, and abstinence, and prayer, from habitual dwelling in the unseen, he seemed to come forth...to speak to others of the things he had seen and known. ... To

call these sermons eloquent would be no word for them; high poems they
erather were, as of an inspired singer, or the outpourings as of a
prophet, rapt yet self-possessed. And the tone of voice...once you grew
accustomed to it, sounded like a fine strain of unearthly music.
Through the stillness of that high Gothic building the words fell on the
ear like the measured drippings of water in some vast dim cave. After
hearing these sermons...you would be harder than most men, if you did
not feel more than ever ashamed of coarseness, selfishness, worldliness,
if you did not feel the things of faith brought closer to the soul."¹

Sir Francis Doyle writes of Newman's "mesmeric influence" as a
speaker: "That great man's extraordinary genius drew all those within
his sphere, like a magnet, to attach themselves to him and his
doctrines. ...He always began as if he had determined to set forth his
ideas of the truth in the plainest and simplest language--language, as
men say, 'intelligible to the meanest understanding.' But his ardent
zeal and fine poetical imagination were not thus to be controlled. As I
hung upon his words, it seemed to me as if I could trace behind his will
and pressing, so to speak, against it, a rush of thought and feelings
which he kept struggling to hold back, but in the end they were generally
too strong for him, and poured themselves out in a torrent of eloquence
all the more impetuous from their having been so long repressed. Even

¹ Principal Shairp, Studies in Poetry and Philosophy, My
Campaign, pp. 10-13.
when his efforts of self-restraint were more successful, those very efforts gave a life and colour to his style which riveted the attention of all within reach of his voice...." ¹ The foregoing three excerpts from the writing of those who heard Newman speak express what Newman himself wrote in his essay on Literature: "...speech, and therefore literature, which is its permanent record, is essentially a personal work. ...And since the thoughts and reasonings of an author have..., a personal character, no wonder that his style is not only the image of his subject, but of his mind." ² It was the mind of one who embodied the Liberal Education he would depict that the Dublin audience would contact in Newman.

Newman wrote that "by Letters or Literature is meant the expression of thought in language, where by 'thought' I mean the ideas, feelings, views, reasonings, and other operations of the human mind. ...A great author,...is one who has something to say and knows how to say it. ...He is master of the two-fold Logos, the thought and the word, distinct, but inseparable from each other. ...he has but one aim...to give forth what he has within him; and from his very earnestness it comes to pass that, whatever be the splendour of his diction or the harmony of his periods, he has with him the charm of an

¹ Sir Francis Doyle, Reminiscences, quoted in My Campaign in Ireland, pp. 18-19.

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incommunicable simplicity. Whatever be his subject, high or low, he treats it suitably and for its own sake.¹

What Newman had to say, he cast into a form suitable to controversy, a kind of extended debate between himself and his opponents as the best means of presenting his own views on education in contrast with those held by his opponents. Newman's view of education is that since all knowledge is a unity, the student's mind must have available to it, recognize, and assimilate that unity of subject-matter in order to achieve the mental cultivation that is the mark of a Liberal Education. Newman debated now with one, now with the other of his two opponents, who held the liberal-utilitarian view and the ultramontane view, respectively. In the former view Newman joins battle with a particular opponent, Lord Brougham, who as the villain of mixed education, is ridiculed with an irony that is as suave as it is deadly. Newman states that he will appeal in support of the description of Liberal or Latitudinarian education "to a statesman, but not merely so, to no mere politician, no trader in places, or votes, or the stock market, but to a philosopher, to an orator, to one whose profession, whose aim has ever been to cultivate the fair, the noble, and the generous" (50.9-15). The allusion in the first part of this balanced description to Brougham's questionable tactics as a statesman and a politician serves to make humorously ridiculous the otherwise

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complimentary terms "philosopher", "orator", "the fair, the noble, and the generous."

Newman's description of the product of Brougham's education is a forceful and straightforward criticism. "I will tell you gentleman, what has been the practical error of the last twenty years...the victims in one way or other of this most preposterous and pernicious of delusions" (226.16–227.19). The strong verbs and participles such as "distracting and enfeebling the mind;" the contrasting phrases, "a smattering in a dozen branches of study was not shallowness, which it really is, but enlargement" express an indignation that is cumulative to anger that so many have become victims of "this most preposterous and pernicious of delusions" in place of real education.

Newman's second opponents were all but invisible. That was well, because they were mainly Archbishop Cullen at whose request Newman was delivering these discourses and the majority of the Irish clergy whose support Newman needed and whom Newman was confident of winning if they but heard him to the end. To those whose view of education was essentially religious, Newman first sounds his theme of opposition in Discourse V when he states that "Far indeed am I from having intended to convey the notion, ...that Theology stands to other knowledge as the soul to the body; or that other sciences are but its instruments and appendages, ..." (152.17–21). Then he continues, confident that his audience will see the reasonableness of his thinking and fairness of his viewpoint: "This would be, I conceive, to commit the very error, in the
instance of Theology, which I am charging other sciences, at the present
day, of committing against it" (152.23-26).

Newman makes good his ground in Discourse VI when he states
that the aim of Liberal Knowledge and therefore of a University Education
is "the cultivation of the intellect, as such" (197.6). "...I insist
upon it, that it is as real a mistake to implicate it [Liberal Knowledge]
with virtue or religion, as with the arts" (195.11-13). Since Newman is
under the grave necessity of having to persuade Dr. Cullen and associa-
tes of his view that the end of university education is the cultivation
of the intellect, he assembles in Discourse VI an impressive array of
classical and historical references from Aristotle to Cicero, Seneca,
and Vergil, to Francis Bacon as reinforcements. By Discourse X Newman
is sure that he has made convincing his view that the aim of a Liberal
Education is intellectual cultivation in preparation for living in this
world. In two balanced sentences of short, definite clauses, he makes
emphatic his view that "If then a University is a direct preparation for
this world, let it be what it professes. It is not a Convent, it is not
a Seminary; it is a place to fit men of the world for the world" (359.
23-26).

Newman's style of controversy differs with the opponent. For
the former, Brougham and the liberal-utilitarian mixed education group,
Newman has but scorn and ridicule, not indeed for its own sake, but
because he feels so deeply the ruinous effects of their education on the
minds of students whom he describes as victims of a system that is for
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the immediate good of the community, rather than for the student's own personal development. For his second opponents, Dr. Cullen and the Irish University Committee, Newman has respect, but does not compromise his educational principles in order to recommend himself to them. Rather he adopts a tone of reasoned persuasion that he hopes will gradually recommend his educational viewpoint without making it too obvious at the outset that he differs from Dr. Cullen's view of a university as a kind of seminary for the laity. In the closing debates of the work, Discourses IX and X, the arguments of the two opponents are drawn together in the contrast between the pattern men of the religion of civilization, Emperor Julian and Edward Gibbon and the gentleman-saint, Philip Neri. The former are examples of the ethical character, which the cultivated intellect will form, apart from religious principle" (331.7-9), of "a polished outside, with hollowness within." 1 The latter, St. Philip Neri, is Newman's ideal product of the education he has been so earnestly presenting—one of those who are "at once oracles of philosophy and shrines of devotion" 2 surely a worthy object of the university to be established.

Newman wrote that "the only master of style I have ever had...is Cicero. I think I owe a great deal to him, and as far as I


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know to no one else." 1 The following rules for the orator engaged in controversy may well have been Newman's pattern: "...before we speak on the point at issue, we must begin by winning the favourable attention of an audience; then we must state the facts of the case, then determine the point at issue, then establish the charge we are bringing, then refute the arguments of our opponents; and finally in our peroration amplify and emphasize all that can be said on our side of the case, and weaken and invalidate the points which tell for the opposite side." 2

In Discourse I Newman sought to win the favourable attention of his audience first by presenting his ideas as his own convictions:
"The views to which I have referred have grown into my whole system of thought, ...were my profession at that early period of my life, ...; my sense of their truth has been increased with the experience of every year since I have been brought within its [the Church's] pale" (7.10-26). Also his qualifications are adequate to address them: Newman alludes to his Oxford association and the educational controversies that he witnessed there (5.8-14). Then too the authority under which he speaks is the highest: "It is my happiness in a matter of Christian duty, ..., to be guided simply by the decision and recommendation of the Holy See,


the judge and finisher of all controversies" (19.12-17). Finally, Newman appeals to his Irish audience by three means, their love of their religion, their ancient fame as scholars, and their pride as Irishmen, when he reminds them that Ireland was once a famed seat of learning from which learning spread to the Saxons. Newman pictures for his audience the prospect of England and Ireland again uniting in founding a centre of learning that would radiate the union of secular and religious knowledge to other countries of the world.

Newman states the facts of the case when he outlines the main principle of the Discourses: "Education must not be disjoined from Religion" (12.14). He also sets forth his point of view that the principles he will maintain "on the subject of a Liberal Education...do not simply come of theology...; they have no special connection with Revelation...; they are dictated by that human prudence and wisdom which is attainable where grace is quite away, and recognized by simple common sense...; and, therefore, though true, and just, and good in themselves, ...they argue nothing whatever for the sanctity or faith of those who maintain them" (8.14-29).

It is in Discourse II that Newman determines one of the main points at issue; namely, that the politicians, Sir Robert Peel for one,
would find it more convenient "could he but contrive to educate apart from religion...excluding one and all professions of faith from the national system" (37.23-27). The charge that Newman brings against his opponents is this: "You will soon break up into fragments the whole circle of secular knowledge, if you begin the mutilation with divine" (45.25-27). Newman begins the refuting of his opponents' arguments first by isolating the basis of the difference between his view and theirs. That difference is that religion for his opponents is not knowledge, but sentiment; whereas for Newman, religion or Faith, as he prefers, is "an intellectual act, its object truth, and its result knowledge" (47.13-14).

Newman's method of refutation involves revealing his opponent in the extreme disadvantage of being ignorant of his own position. Newman begins by ridiculing Brougham and thus rousing audience opposition to him. Then Newman comes round his subject from a different tack in his references to the School Inspector as holding with great sincerity the development of Brougham's view of twenty-five years earlier that "the 'essential idea' of all religious education will consist in the direct cultivation of the 'feelings'" (53.20-22). Here is one who is not a conscious unbeliever or open scoffer (55.6); the audience shares Newman's attitude expressed in these words: "I have no wish to hurt the feelings of a gentleman, who is but exerting himself zealously in the discharge of anxious duties" (53.4-6). Then in support of his view that his opponents do not understand the full import of their position, Newman refers as testimony to Dr. Maltby's speech on the laying of the
cornerstone of London University—a speech that addresses the Deity and refers to human science as leading to Divine Truth. Newman reveals the irony of recognizing that there is such a thing as Truth in the province of Religion (56.14–15), yet omitting that truth from the curriculum. Newman returns again to Brougham with a quotation from his "Discourse of the objects, advantages, and pleasures of science" to reveal Brougham as holding the position of God as the Great Architect of Nature about Whom we learn from the sciences (57.20–23). Newman concludes his argument by showing Brougham and the mixed education advocates as holding a position very much like that of Hume's. Yet Brougham states that "the phenomena of the material world are insufficient for the full exhibition of the Divine Attributes" (65.26–28). Brougham implies that a supplemental process is necessary to complete and harmonize their evidence. Newman concludes that "If God is more than Nature, Theology claims a place among the sciences... Mixed Education, at least in a University, is simply unphilosophical" (66.3–15). Newman has refuted his opponents' argument that religion is not knowledge by using their own words as testimony and by associating them with the unbeliever Hume, and finally by revealing that they do admit that "religious doctrine is knowledge" (66.13). Newman thus weakened and invalidated the points which tell for the opposite side.

Newman's method, just described, of refuting his opponents and bringing his audience, as it were, along with him until they acquiesce in his viewpoint resembles somewhat his description of how Reason gains
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knowledge: "The mind ranges to and fro, and spreads out, and advances forward with a quickness which has become a proverb, and a subtlety and versatility which baffle investigation. It passes on from point to point, gaining one by some indication; another on a probability; then availing itself of an association; then falling back on some received law; next seizing on testimony; then committing itself to some popular impression, or some inward instinct, or some obscure memory; and thus it makes progress not unlike a climberer on a steep cliff who, by quick eye, prompt hand, and firm foot, ascends how he knows not himself, by personal endowments and by practice, rather than by rule, ..."  

What takes place in the minds of the audience as they gradually come to see Newman's point of view is what Newman has termed Implicit Reason or the Illative Sei'se, described as reasoning that "'drifts silently into an overwhelming cumulus of proof, and, when our start is true, brings us on to a true result'."  

An article in the Rambler contains the following comment on Newman's style: "Dr. Newman treats a philosophical subject from the point of view of a poet,—with poetical intuition, not with scientific system. ...It consists of 'discourses;' it is not therefore a 'treatise;' and though the details of the subject will be found to be

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pretty well exhausted, they do not follow on one another as the
questions and articles in a scholastic treatise; the book is a whole,
not mechanically, by articulation of parts, but morally from the unity
of the pervading idea which is its 'form'." 1 Newman's description of
the way in which we assimilate knowledge and come to an understanding is
really an accurate depiction of the way in which he presents his ideas
on education: "...with all its capabilities, the human mind cannot take
in this whole vast fact at a single glance, or gain possession of it at
once. Like a short-sighted reader, its eye pores closely, and travels
slowly, over the awful volume which lies open for its inspection. Or
again, as we deal with some huge structure of many parts and sides, the
mind goes round about it, noting down, first one thing, then another, as
it may, and viewing it under different aspects, by way of making
progress towards mastering the whole. So by degrees and by circuitous
advances does it rise aloft and subject to itself that universe into
which it has been born " (70.10-22). Thus Newman has chosen the
"poetical and literary method" 2 of making a synthesis of various
aspects of his subjects which he builds by comparison, contrast, example
and analogy to a whole which is the pervading idea or form of the work.

Thus "we are presented with a succession of views [of Newman's
idea of a university] from different points, exhibited to us in examples

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1 "Dr. Newman's Style and Method of Argument," The Rambler
(June 1853), p. 495.

2 Ibid., p. 487.
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and analogies, which are as it were variously-coloured media through which to observe it." ¹ Newman sets forth his idea in the Preface: "The view taken of a University in the Discourses..., is of the following kind:—that it is a place of 'teaching' universal 'knowledge'. This implies that its object is, on the one hand, intellectual, not moral; and, on the other, that it is the diffusion and extension of knowledge, rather than the advancement" (V. 1-8). The unity and relationship of the sciences Newman expresses in the image of unity: "a University is the home, it is the mansion-house, of the goodly family of the Sciences, sisters all, and sisterly in their mutual dispositions" (140.4-6). Newman views the same image from the point of view of the formation of the minds of the individual students when he writes that "A University is, according to the usual designation, an Alma Mater, knowing her children one by one, ..." (232.17-19).

The contrasting images Newman develops throughout the Discourses. In contrast to the unity, growth, and formation characteristic of a home, there is the utilitarian idea of a university as a "bazaar, or pantechinon" (139.24) where the wares are for sale in stalls independent of each other, purchased as commodity for a useful purpose. Such a university becomes "a mint, or treadmill" (232.20) where copies are turned out to specifications by a meaningless round of activities

¹ "Dr. Newman's Style and Method of Argument," p. 489.
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and subjects. The result of such an education is described by comparing the College gates to the "entrance into...Babel" (237.10). The Biblical reference to the tower of Babel in which each one's activities were carried on without reference to or understanding of anyone else's pursuits aptly describes a university as an accumulation of subjects without a central purpose. By implication its fate will be that of the Tower of Babel.

Another aspect of the unity theme is what Newman describes as "the organic character...of the various branches of knowledge" (167.2-4). However, the tree metaphor with its Biblical allusion expresses in one context the benefits of Bacon's Philosophy of Utility as far as adding the comforts of life: "Almost day by day have we fresh and fresh shoots, and buds, and blossoms, which are to ripen into fruit, on the magical tree of Knowledge which he planted,...(193.1-4). When Newman uses this image again it is in the context that the mind can be deceived by its acquiring various kinds of knowledge and thus have only an impression of mental enlargement: "...who will deny that the fruit of the tree of knowledge or what the mind takes for knowledge, has made it one of the gods, with a sense of expansion and elevation--an intoxication in reality,..." (212.4-7). The image of "the tapestry of human life" seen "on the wrong side, and it tells no story" (216.5-6) describes the meaningless profession of sights, sounds, and colours that are mental acquirements without "drift or relation...like the shifting scenes of a show, which leave the spectator where he was" (216.14-17).
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These images show by contrast the effect on the mind when the organic character of knowledge is lacking.

Thus by a series of images Newman weaves the pervading idea of education as a unity of subject-matter, the mind's assimilation of which is its own perfection and that very mental cultivation is the aim of a university. Newman's reference to Aristotle's sketch of the magnanimous man applies well to Newman himself: "...his voice is deep, his motions slow, and his stature commanding. In like manner, the elocution of a great intellect is great. His language expresses, not only his great thoughts, but his great self." ¹

The five sections of the Introduction have been a preparation for the understanding and appreciation of the Discourses. Section I has presented Newman as Scholar and Educator, has sounded the theme of Newman's life-long battle against Liberalism of which the Discourses are an important expression, and has given an insight into the personal and intellectual characteristic of Newman, in particular his role as a controversialist. The various influences that helped to form Newman, the man and his ideas have been discussed in Section II. The events that occasioned the Discourses as well as the progress of the university under Newman's direction as Rector have been the subject of Section III. Section IV has summarized Newman's ideas of a Liberal Education. Lastly, Section V has discussed the Discourses as Literature with reference to the unity of presentation, the structure, and the imagery.

PART II

ANNOTATION OF THE DISCOURSES ON THE SCOPE
AND NATURE OF UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

Chapter VI

PREFACE TO THE DISCOURSES

The Preface is a valuable supplement that gives direction and perspective to the main themes and viewpoints developed in the Discourses. It emphasizes certain important ideas that are only implied in the text and refers to other ideas related to Newman's subject and the contemporary educational scene which are not discussed in the Discourses.

Dated November 21, 1852, the day before Newman was summoned into court on November 22 for sentencing in the Achilli Trial, the Preface would seem to have been the last section Newman wrote for the Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education. He designated the Preface another supplement, the Appendix apparently having been the first supplement written. Both were in the printer's hands prior to November 30, 1852, having been written after the Discourses had been completed in the fall of 1852. See below 371.1-4 and 371.4-5 for the circumstances surrounding the completion of Newman's Discourses on University Education.

In the Preface Newman states the purpose and aims of the Discourses (XXiii.15-17), as well as selects for emphasis the idea of a university he presented to his Dublin audience (V.3-VI.8). The Preface makes clearer than do the Discourses Newman's viewpoint on certain subjects; for example, his words about "the gentleman" in VII.8-12 and
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IX.15-17 put in the correct perspective his depiction of the gentleman in Discourse IX, 327.28 - 330.16—a portrait often read as an excerpt and therefore misunderstood. An idea that is expressed at some length in the Preface, but that is contained only by implication in the lectures is the compelling necessity for the education of the Catholic laity, (XV.5-XVII.10)—an aim that was at the base of Newman's enthusiasm for the establishment of the University of Ireland and is the strong purpose that runs through the Discourses like a motif, directing, unifying, and completing all he has to say about university education. However, it is only in the Preface that Newman gives a concise, but very important summary (XXIII.17 - XXV.5) of "the true 'mode' of educating" (XXIII.14) and thereby of implementing the "'aims' and 'principles' of Education" (XXIII.17) that are under consideration in the Discourses. Lastly, the Preface presents Newman's viewpoint on such contemporary problems related to his subject as the influence of periodical literature (XXV.15-XXIX.11) and the distinction between Academies and Universities (X.21-XII.13)—topics that give a drift of contemporary importance to the Discourses, but which are not discussed therein.

The Preface can be read as an introduction to the Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education and again as an overview—as it would seem the Preface was for Newman. The style is different from that of the Discourses; whereas, the Discourses are smoothly rhetorical, repetitious for emphasis or oratorical effect, frequently metaphorical; the Preface is direct, concentrated in
thought and reference, and contemporary in perspective. This important second supplement fulfills the following requirement: lest the reader misunderstand, the Preface gives the main direction and some of the implications of the Discourses that follow.

V. 3-4 Newman defines a University as "a place of 'teaching' universal 'knowledge';" that is, a University makes available to its students all the various areas of learning known to the contemporary world; or, at least a university, to merit the name, will not be established on the principle of deliberately omitting any field of knowledge from the curriculum. See the Appendix, 375.31 - 376.2 and 379.24-26 for an elaboration of this point. See Discourse II, 39.18-40.1 for Newman's proposition based on this definition of a University.

V. 4-8 "...its object is,...the advancement." Here Newman states his position with regard to two misconceptions about the object of a university. He states first that the object of a university is "intellectual, not moral" (V.5-6). Two groups, usually opponents, held that the object of a university was moral in that a university education would and should result in the improvement in moral character: Archbishop Paul Cullen considered the university a kind of seminary for the laity. See Discourse X, 359.23-26 for Newman's positive opposition to Cullen's viewpoint. The second group, represented by such important nineteenth century figures as Sir Robert Peel and Lord Brougham, considered the object of a university to be moral in that they identified knowledge and virtue. Newman wrote the "Tamworth Reading
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Room" (1841), Discussions and Arguments to refute this viewpoint. See Discourse VI, 195.9 – 196.27 for Newman's statement opposing the position that the direct end of a university is to make men better.

Secondly, Newman maintains that the object of a university "is the diffusion and extension of knowledge, rather than the advancement." See the Appendix 371.8-10 for the statement that the "direct scope of a University" is "the education of the intellect, or the diffusion of knowledge" rather than the progress of knowledge. Newman states that "there are other institutions, far more suited to act as instruments of stimulating philosophical inquiry and extending the boundaries of our knowledge than a University" (X.26-XI.1). These institutions "are the literary and scientific Academies, ..." (XI.1-2). See also, XI.2-XIV.6.

V.15 - VI.4 "...it cannot fulfill... the Church is necessary for its 'integrity'." Newman uses the word "integrity," from integritas, in its theological sense of the university's needing the Church's assistance for its soundness, completeness, and wholeness. See Discourse X for what Newman means here by "integrity": 336.25-27; 337.13-17; 337.22 – 338.7.

VI.16-18 "...there is nothing novel...been pursuing,..." Newman states that "there is nothing novel or singular in the argument" (VI.16-17) that in essence a university "is a place of 'teaching' universal 'knowledge'" (V.3-4). Section II of the Appendix to the
Discourses, contains thirteen definitions of a University from various authors who lived in different times, which indicate there is indeed nothing "novel or singular" in the view that a university is a "School of Universal Learning." See below 381.25 - 383.33. Furthermore, for Newman the spirit of the Oxford of his youth was the embodiment of the main principles set forth in the Discourses.

VI.19 - VII.2 "...for the very circumstance...simply opposed." Those from whom Newman "happened in the first instance to learn" the main principles presented in the Discourses belonged respectively to the Evangelicals, the Oxford Necotics, and the Tractarians all of which issued in schools to which Newman says, "I should be simply opposed" (VII.2). Newman therefore fears false notions on the part of his present audience about his educational principles because of his having gained them among schools to which he is now in general opposed.

VII.8-12 "...an academical system...that antiquated variety of human nature and remnant of feudalism, called 'a gentleman.'" Newman wants to dispel the idea that the education he is advocating will have as its objective, or be limited to the English gentleman landowner figure—a type certainly unpopular with his Irish audience. The "gentleman", in the eighteenth century Shaftesbury sense of the word (Discourse IX, 327.28-331.9), may be a desirable effect of a liberal education, but its objective is the cultivation of the mind (Discourse VIII, 286.2-287.14), a prerequisite, Newman insists, for the
successful pursuit of any of the professions (Discourse VIII, 277.6-17),
but especially for the fulfilment of one's personal role in life
(Discourse VIII, 270.14-271.2).

VII.15-16 "...to Catholics...addressed..." This statement is
a reference to the fact that Newman addressed these lectures at Dr.
Cullen's request to the Catholics of Dublin, in particular although, not
exclusively, in order to persuade the Catholic laity to support the
projected Catholic University of Ireland.

VII.19-21 "...the reason contemplated by the Holy See, in
recommending...to the Irish Church the establishment of a Catholic
University:" See the Introduction for a discussion of the papal
rescripts that suggested to the Catholic bishops of Ireland the
establishment of a university.

VII.24-25 "Vid. Huber's..." The reference is to V. A. Huber,
The English Universities, abridged and translated in two volumes by
Newman's brother Francis Newman. ¹ In the context to which Newman
refers, Huber, writing in 1839, describes "that antiquated variety of
human nature...called 'a Gentleman'" (VII.11-12) as follows: "The
English Universities,..., content themselves with producing the first
and most distinctive flower of national life, 'a well-educated

¹ V. A. Huber, The English Universities, abridged and
Gentleman. '...The race of English Gentlemen certainly presents, or rather did present, an appearance of manly vigor and form, not elsewhere to be found among an equal number of persons. No other nation produces the stock; and in England itself it has already been much deteriorated." ¹ See 372.14-27 and 372.28-373.10 for other references to Huber.

VII.22 – VIII.2 "Has the Supreme Pontiff...for the sake of the Sciences,...or rather of the Students,...?" A series of rhetorical questions (VIII.2-21) enquiring whether the Supreme Pontiff suggested a university for the advancement of science, or for religion only, or for the students gives emphasis to the statement that "...his first and chief and direct object is, not science, art, professional skill, literature, the discovery of knowledge, but some benefit or other, by means of literature and science, to his own children;...their exercise and growth in certain habits, moral or intellectual" (IX.10-19). The argument from autocracy—that of the Supreme Pontiff—reinforces one of Newman's main ideas in the Discourses; namely, that the direct object of a university is the cultivation of the students' intellects, not the advancement of science, nor the promotion of moral improvement.

IX.15-17 "...not indeed their formation on any narrow or fantastic type, as, for instance, that of an 'English Gentleman' may be called,..." The Preface and the Appendix were written after the first

five discourses had been delivered to a Dublin audience in the spring of 1852 and the second five had been written in the latter part of 1852. This mention of "English Gentleman" indicates Newman's sensitivity to the Irish aversion to the "English Gentleman" as the traditional product of a liberal education. The reference to the "English Gentleman" as one instance of a "narrow or fantastic type" (IX.15-16) as well, anticipates the tone of Newman's definition of the gentleman in Discourse IX, 327.28-331.9. See also, XVII.10 - XVIII.6 for the idea that the development of "the gentleman" is but the ornamental effect, not the object of a liberal education.

IX.21-23 "...he is able to say with St. Paul, 'Non judicavi me scire aliquid inter vos, nisi Jesum Christum, et hunc crucifixum'." The aim of the successor of the Apostles in suggesting to the Irish Hierarchy the establishment of a University is the effecting of "some benefit or other by means of literature and science to his own children;...their exercise and growth in certain habits moral or intellectual" (IX.13-19). Newman's allusion to the words of St. Paul to the Corinthians—"For I resolved to know naught among you save Jesus Christ, and him crucified" (I Cor. 2:2)—emphasizes that the Pope's suggestion comes to the Irish as St. Paul went to the people of Corinth "proclaiming to you the witness of God... ...and my discourse and my preaching were not set forth in captivating words of 'wisdom,' but with plain evidence of the Spirit and of power, that your faith might not rest on the wisdom of men, but on the power of God" (I Cor. 2:1-5). In
other words, the benefit of the university is not that of human wisdom only, but rather the Spirit of wisdom and the power of God brought to man through Christ crucified.

IX.23 - X.16 "Just as a commander...active members of society" Newman sees the Papacy in its establishment of a university in the role of a commander who "wishes to have tall and well-formed and vigorous soldiers" (IX.24-X.1). Similarly, the concrete and real object of a university with regard to its students is "the object of training them to fill their respective posts in life better, and making them more intelligent, capable, active member of society" (X.13-16).

X.21 - XII.13 "...there are other institutions,...'grande distinction'." Here Newman distinguishes between the universities and the academies; the academies, especially those mentioned, (XI.7-20) "primarily contemplate[s] science itself, and not students" (XI.21-22); whereas, the primary concern of the university is its students.

XI.7-20 Newman uses the word academy here to mean an informal group of learned men who gather together for the purpose of reading papers, holding discussions, and publishing findings.

XI.7-8 The Royal Society of London for Improving Natural Knowledge was founded officially in 1660 by a group of Oxford professors interested in the New or Experimental Philosophy. The Royal Society, the oldest scientific society in England, holds weekly meetings at which there are discussions of papers presented. The publication of the Royal
Society, Philosophical Transactions, began in 1664. Since the time of Charles the Second, the Royal Society has been consulted by the government for advice in connection with scientific undertakings of national importance. Furthermore, the Society administers for the government an annual grant for the promotion of scientific research and the assistance of scientific publications.

XI.9 Ashmolean Society was named from the building erected at Oxford in the seventeenth century to house the collection of antiquities and natural curiosities bequeathed by Elias Ashmole.

XI.11-12 The British Association for the Advancement of Science was founded in 1831 at York, England. The annual meetings featured various programs dealing with all fields of scientific knowledge and research except the medical sciences. One of their projects was the support of the new Observatory and another the establishment of the standard for the unit of electrical resistance, the ohm. The association publishes the Advancement of Science quarterly. The faults Newman refers to in XI.15-17 are suggested in a letter to Henry Wilberforce dated September 17, 1847. Newman notes in that letter that the British Association has just met at Oxford. He considers the fact an ominous one in that he remarks, "If met there in 1832 and just before the attempt to throw the University open to dissenters."

XI.18 The Antiquarian Society was founded in 1572 by Bishop Matthew Parker, Sir Robert Cotton, William Camden and others for the preservation of natural antiquities. Papers read at its meeting are preserved in the Cottonian library and were printed by Thomas Hearne in 1720 under the title *A Collection of Curious Discourses*. The Society of Antiquaries, abolished in 1604, was reconstituted in 1717.

XI.18-9 Royal Academy of Fine Arts. The Royal Academy of Arts in London was founded in 1768 for the purpose of cultivating and improving the Arts of painting, sculpture and architecture. One of the most important functions of the Royal Academy was the instruction of students in the schools of painting, sculpture, and architecture established by the academy.

XI.24 - XII.13 "...no less an authority than Cardinal Gerdil...'grand distinction'." Cardinal Gerdil states that the universities were established for students who wished to develop themselves, by means of the study of the sciences; whereas, the academies were for the development of the sciences. But he also notes the state of co-operation which existed between the universities and académies in Italy in that the universities have given members to the academies and the academies have supplied professors of distinction for the universities. Newman is quoting from Giacinto Sigismondo Cardinal Gerdil, "Reglements, et Statuts Proposes Pour L'Etablissement D'Une Académie Des Sciences," *Opere Edite et Inedito* (Roma, Dalle Stampe di V.)

XII.17-23 "To discover and to teach are distinct functions; they are also distinct gifts, and are not commonly found united in the same person. He too who spends his day in dispensing his existing knowledge to all comers, is unlikely to have either leisure or energy to acquire new." These statements indicate why Newman thought it necessary to separate teaching and research in the two institutions of the University and the Academy. They also follow from a main idea of Newman's that the main function of the university is to teach its students, not to preoccupy itself with research and the advancement of science. The division of labour between the university and the academy is not stated in the discourses, but taken for granted as basic to Newman's arguments. See XIV.12-15 "...to make them something or other 'is' its great object, and not simply to protect the interests and advance the dominion of Science."

XIII.1 - XIV.6 "...common sense...the natural home for experiment and speculation is retirement." To further explain that "to discover and to teach are distinct functions" (XII.17-18) Newman notes below in XIII.8-XIV.2 that the great researchers and discoverers of history have sought seclusion and quiet and have therefore "shunned the lecture room and the public school" (XIII.7-8).
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XIII.8-9 "Pythagoras...cave." Pythagoras of Samos (c.582-497 B.C.) was the founder of a philosophic society of a religious, scientific, and political character which held the reins of government in several cities of Magna Graecia (Southern Italy), but the Pythagorean School in Kroton was destroyed in an uprising c.497 B.C. Mathematics, music, and astronomy owe much to the studies of Pythagoras and his school. For Pythagoras the dignity of science consisted in its purely speculative and disinterested character. He held that in life there are three classes of men: some work for honour, others for profit, a few for truth alone; they are the philosophers. ¹

XIII.9-11 "Thales...princes." Thales (624 B.C.-c.545 B.C.) Thales is regarded as the forefather of the Seven Wise Men of ancient Greek philosophy. He appears as the embodiment of the remote and contemplative sage who tumbles headlong into a well while gazing at the stars of heaven. Among the accomplishments of Thales in his combined roles of merchant, statesman, engineer, mathematician, and astronomer were the developing of Egyptian land-surveying methods into a deductive science of geometry, and the predicting of a total eclipse of the sun in 585 B.C. ²


XIII.12-13 "Plato...Academus." When Plato (427-347 B.C.) was twenty years old he became a pupil of Socrates. The following description may well apply to scenes of Plato's eight years of discipleship under Socrates: "In one of the most charming passages in his works Plato brings before us his master, Socrates, fleeing from the bustle and uproar of the city in the company of a young friend. The two hasten to pass the gate, choose themselves a cool resting-place, and there, reclining on a gentle slope of turf under the leafy awning of a spreading plane, begin that exchange of thought and discourse which makes up the dialogue 'Phædrus'." 

Disillusioned with Athenian politics as a result of the death of Socrates, Plato abandoned the idea of a political career. After extensive travels, he returned to Athens where in 387 B.C. he founded his famous school in Athens called the Academy from the groves or gardens of Academus in which it was situated. In keeping with Newman's idea that speculation and discovery are best pursued in retirement from the concerns of everyday life, the Academy, probably the scene of much of his writing, was, for Plato, a refuge from the political life of Athens as well as from the several journeys he made to Italy and Syracuse in Sicily to further the education of Dionysius II.

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1 Theodor Comperz, Greek Thinkers, Vol. II, p. 269.

XIII.13-14 "Aristotle...him." Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) was born in Stagira, a Greek colony of Thrace. In his eighteenth year he went to Athens and entered the Academy of Plato, remaining there about twenty years, until the death of his master. About the year 335 B.C. Aristotle opened a school in Athens in the gardens dedicated to Apollo Lyceios. The school was hence called the Lyceum and also the Peripatetic School, probably from Aristotle's habit of teaching and conversing with his pupils while walking along the paths of the garden. Aristotle, whom Plato surnamed "The Intellekt," edited some one thousand books comprising all the knowledge of his day. The greater part of his works have been lost, but the part preserved was published for the first time by Andronicus of Rhodes about the middle of the last century before Christ. Aristotle was the type of true philosopher who, not allowing himself to be distracted by practical and political motives, lived entirely engrossed in his speculations. ¹

XIII.14-15 "Friar Bacon...Isis." Roger Bacon (c.1220-c.1292) was an English philosopher and scientist, who lectured in Aristotle at the University of Paris until his return to Oxford about 1247. From 1247 to 1257, possibly the period of isolated study to which Newman refers, Bacon devoted himself to the study of languages, mathematics, optics, alchemy, and astronomy. After 1257, he entered the Franciscan

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Order of Friars Minor. His great desire was to see composed a vast encyclopaedia of all the known sciences which would require many collaborators supported by an endowed institute. He himself wrote the Opus majus, the Opus minus, and the Opus tertium. Another shorter period of isolation was his imprisonment between 1277 and 1279 for certain suspected aspects of his teaching. He also wrote the Communia naturalium, the Communia mathematica, and the Compendium philosophiae. 1

XIII.15-17 "Newton...reason." Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) graduated from Trinity College, Cambridge in 1665. After two years of intense study at his birthplace, Woolsthorpe during which he studied the problem of gravitation, discovered the integral calculus, and the binomial theorem, he was elected a Fellow of Trinity in 1667 and became Lucasian professor of mathematics in 1669. In 1687 he published his famous work, Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica, commonly known as Newton's Principia. 2

XIII.17-19 "The great discoveries...in Universities." As an example of Newman's statement, none of the following noted scientists were fellows of a college in either of the great universities of Oxford or Cambridge: Robert Boyle (1627-1691), known as the father of modern


chemistry; Henry Cavendish (1731–1810), English chemist and physicist; and Joseph Priestley, English chemist. All three were elected, at one time during their scientific careers, fellows of the Royal Society and delivered papers on their discoveries at meetings of the Royal Society. Priestley was also elected Associate of the French Academy of Sciences.

XIII.19-22 "Observatories...no moral connection with them."
The following facts on British observatories that were built during Newman's memory bear out his statement that observatories are more often situated outside than inside universities or at any rate are without moral connection with universities:" "An observatory on Calton hill, founded by a private association, the Edinburgh Astronomical institution, in 1816, was taken over by the crown as a royal observatory in 1834... Cambridge university observatory was founded in 1820.... The Radcliffe observatory at Oxford was originally in the charge of the Savilian professor of astronomy but this arrangement lapsed and the offices of professor and Radcliffe observer became distinct about 1839. ...An observatory was established at Liverpool mainly for the time service of the port in 1838, and at Glasgow a small observatory attached to the university,..., was enlarged and transferred to a new sit in 1836." 1

XIII.22-23 "Porson...classes." Richard Porson (1759-1806) was

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an English classical scholar, fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge and Professor of Greek at Cambridge from 1792. Although Porson served the true purpose of his chair by advancing the knowledge of his subject principally by editing the Greek texts of Euripides and Aeschylus, Porson did not lecture in Greek because of an indolence in regard to everything except private study. ¹

XIII.23-24 "Elmsley...country." Peter Elmsley (1773-1825) was an English classical scholar educated at Winchester and Christ Church, Oxford. He left the university without a fellowship, but with a reputation for great learning. He took orders and was presented in 1798 with the living of Little Wokesley in Essex, which he held until his death. In 1823 he was appointed Camden Professor of Ancient History at Oxford and Principal of St. Alban's Hall. Although considered the best ecclesiastical scholar in England in his time, Elmsley is best known for his critical work on the Greek tragedians, Sophocles and Euripides. Having spent many years in quiet scholarly pursuits, Elmsley was actively engaged in Oxford life only his last years from 1823-1825. ²

XIII.24 – XIV.6 "I do not say...Socrates,...Lord Bacon...retirement." Newman has been illustrating that the great thinkers down


² Ibid., Vol. 6, pp. 728-729.
through the ages from Pythagorus to Elmsley (XIII.8-24) have spent at least certain periods of their lives in quiet study and scholarly writing in order to prove his view that "the natural home for experiment and speculation is retirement" (XIV.5-6). He cites Socrates (469-399 B. C.) and Lord Bacon (1561-1626) whose scholarly lives were pursued while involved in "external engagements" (XIV.4) as exceptions. Socrates, who fought in at least three campaigns of the Peloponnesian Wars and distinguished himself for bravery, is described in Plato's Symposium as being subject to prolonged periods of abstraction, one lasting the whole of a day and night—and that on a military campaign. Scholars have interpreted these prolonged periods of abstraction as due to intense mental concentration on some problem. ¹ Sir Francis Bacon entered parliament in 1584 and became Lord Chancellor in 1618. The majority of the Essays, The Advancement of Learning (1605), and the Novum Organum (1620), the latter two section of his ambitious Instauratio Magna, were all written while Bacon pursued his efficient and unscrupulous career as a politician. Newman's argument is that some scholars, such as Socrates and Bacon can pursue deep thought while engaged in a busy public life, but they are the exception.

XIV.18-23 "...whether I have formed a probable conception of

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the 'sort of benefit'...establishment of a University," The Papal
Rescripts enjoining the bishops to establish a university contained no
definite philosophy of education. What Newman is writing here is his
own cherished ideals made more emphatic by the rhetorical device of
argument from authority.

XV.5 - XVI.19 "Certainly it does not seem rash to
pronounce,...in a Catholic form." Newman is interpreting the "sort of
benefit" intended by the Holy See in the establishing of a Catholic
University; "Whereas Protestants have great advantages of education in
the schools, colleges, and universities of the United Kingdom, our
ecclesiastical rulers have it in purpose, that Catholics should enjoy
the like advantages, whatever they are, to the full" (XV.6 -11). See
the Introduction for a discussion of Newman's main educational
objective, the education of the laity, and for the fact that Dr. Cullen,
for one ecclesiastical ruler, had no such thoughts of an educated laity
in Newman's sense of the term.

It is only in the Preface that Newman mentions specifically
the need for a comparable level of education to be available for
Catholics. In this connection he points out that it is the desire "to
be on a level with Protestants in discipline and refinement of
intellect" (XVI.9-10) that leads the Catholic youth to have "recourse to
Protestant Universities to obtain what they cannot find at home" (XVI.
10-12), and not some kind of youthful rebellion as was Dr. Cullen's
attitude towards those who wished to attend the Queen's Colleges.

XVI.20-22 "What are these advantages?...the culture of the intellect." See Discourse VI, 187.28 - 188.1; 197.3-28. These advantages Newman outlines in XVII.15-22 as "the force, the steadiness, the comprehensiveness and the flexibility of intellect, the command over our own powers, the instinctive just estimate of things as they pass before us,...this is real cultivation of mind;..."

XVIII.3-8 "...a liberal education...brings the mind into form for the mind is like the body." Newman parallels the training of the intellect to the training of the body required for health and fitness. See Preface, IX.24 - X.1; Discourse VII, 218.20 - 219.2; 219.17 - 220.3. See also Discourse VII, 233.1-10; 242.28 - 243.17. See Discourse VIII, 251.18-28 in which Newman states that a healthy intellect is, like a healthy body, a good in itself.

XVIII.1-2 "the Poet wrote, that 'Ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes, Emollit mores'." The poet is Ovid, Ep. ex Ponto, II, 9.47: "A careful study of the liberal arts refines the manners." The quotation corroborates Newman's view of "the gentleman" as the effect of a liberal education.

XVIII.11-20 "Mistaking animal spirits...no grasp of consequences." In these lines Newman is describing the character and mind of youth that needs to be brought into form.
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XIX.6 - XX.3 "That they simply... no greater calamity for a good cause than that they should get hold of it." These lines describe the "intellectual infirmities (XX.5) of adults whose intellects have suffered from a lack of intellectual training and culture. See Discourse VIII 242.10-19.

XX.3-18 "It is very plain... of their religion." Newman states that his "delineation of intellectual infirmities" (XX.5) (See XIX.1-XX.3) is drawn from "Protestantism and Protestants" (XX.6). What Newman means by Protestantism throughout the Discourses is what he refers to as "the leaven of Lutheranism;" that is, the religion of Luther as it spread and gave rise specifically to the Elizabethan Church in England. In the Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England (1851), Newman defined Protestantism as follows: "...when I use the word Protestant, I do not mean thereby all who are not Catholics, but distinctly the disciples of the Elizabethan Tradition." ¹ There is following this definition a passage that is particularly applicable to the Discourses in that it expresses a stringent criticism of the effect of liberalism on educational thought:

Such an one cannot afford to be fair; he cannot be fair if he tries. He is ignorant, and he goes on to be unjust. He has always viewed things in one light, and he cannot

adapt himself to any other; he cannot throw himself into the ideas of other men, fix upon the principles on which those ideas depend, and then set himself to ascertain how those principles differ, or whether they differ at all, from those which he acts upon himself; and, like a man who has been for a long while in one position, he is cramped and disabled, and has a difficulty and pain, more than we can well conceive, in stretching his limbs, straightening them, and moving them freely.

This narrow and one-sided condition of the Protestant intellect might be illustrated in various ways. For instance, as regards the subject of education. It has lately been forcibly shown, that, the point which the Catholic Church is maintaining against the British Government in Ireland, as respects the Queen's Colleges for the education of the middle and upper classes, is precisely that which Protestantism maintains and successfully maintains, against that same Government in England; viz., that secular instruction should not be separated from religious. The Catholics of Ireland are asserting the very same principle as the Protestants of England; however, the Minister does not feel the logical force of the fact; and the same persons who think it so tolerable to indulge Protestantism in the one country, are irritated and incensed at a Catholic people for asking to be similarly indulged in the other. But how is it that intelligent men, who can ascend in their minds from the fall of an apple to the revolution of a comet, who can apply their economical and political inductions from English affairs to the amelioration of Italy and Spain, how is it, that, when they come to a question of religion, they are suddenly incapable of understanding that what is reasonable and defensible in one country, is not utterly preposterous and paradoxical in another? What is true under one degree of longitude, is true under another. You have a right indeed to say that Catholicism itself is not true; but you have no right, for it is bad logic, to be surprised that
those who think it true act consistently with that supposition; you do not well to be angry with those who resist a policy in Ireland, which your own friends and supporters cordially detest and triumphantly withstand in England. 1

The foregoing quotation explains the critical tone in XX.3-18

The Discourses, lectures delivered to a mixed audience, express criticism in an equally plain, but in a more urbane and polished manner than the forthright tone of this section in the Preface and of the parallel passage quoted from the Present Position of Catholics.

Furthermore, the circumstances under which the Preface was written, explained in 371.1-4 and 371.4-5, will help to account for the particular tone. It is noteworthy that when Newman made his final revision of the Discourses in 1873 removing what he termed "contemporary and collateral material" he revised this section to read as follows: "It is very plain..., I am drawing, not from Catholics, but from the world at large; I am referring to an evil which is forced upon us in every railway carriage..., an evil, however, to which Catholics are not less exposed than the rest of mankind." 2

From XX.9 – XXII.0"Nay, it is wonderful,...a positive gain" was omitted in the 1873 edition.

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XXI.11 - XXII.3 "When the intellect...science or profession."
An intellect properly trained and formed has "a connected view or grasp
of things"—an intellectual quality Newman refers to several times in
the discourse; for example, Discourse V, 143.29; 144.6-7.

These lines continue the metaphor of the training of the
intellect for its own particular fitness in the statement that such
training will in some "develop habits of business.... In others it will
elicit the talent of philosophical speculation.... In all it will be a
faculty of entering with comparative ease into any subject of thought,
and of taking up with aptitude any science or profession" (XXI.18 -

XXII.20-23 "Some one,...call 'viewiness'," Here is an
example of Newman's method of convincing: He raises the objection of
"spurious philosophism" which shows itself in "viewiness"—an opinion
which might be raised by an opponent—just at the time when a reader is
inclined to object; then proceeds to demolish the objection: Newman
points out that although "these Discourses are directed simply to the
consideration of the 'aims' and 'principles' of Education" (XXIII.15-17),
he will here in the Preface "consider the true 'mode' of educating"
(XXIII.13-14). The paragraph, "Suffice it then...superficial
intellects" (XXIII.17-XXV.5), is the only practical description in the
Discourses that Newman gives of the method he would employ to acquire
the intellectual training that he advocates throughout the Discourses.
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Contrary to possible objections of a method based on "brilliant general views" (XXIII.6), Newman shows in XXIII.17-XXV.5 that his method is based on the careful study of particular subjects in order "to prevent a passive reception of images and ideas which may else pass out of the mind as soon as they have entered it" (XXIV.17-20). See Newman's essay, "Elementary Studies," The Idea of a University, Part II, pp. 247-285 as an elaboration on this "mode of educating."

Rather it is the contributors to periodical literature who are called upon to produce "nutshell truths for the breakfast table" (XXVI.9-10) that Newman can accuse of being "full of 'views'" (XXV.10).

XXV.13-15 "...to have a view...Personal advent to the Cholera or Mesmerism." The following were familiar topics for discussion in Newman's day: The Personal Advent refers to the second and personal coming of Christ that would usher in the millennium or thousand-year reign of the just, which an Adventist group began proclaiming in 1831. The Asiatic cholera arose in India in 1817 and spread throughout the world, reaching England in 1831. Mesmerism refers to the system of healing developed by Frans Anton Mesmer (1734-1815), an Austrian physician who believed that a force called "animal magnetism" permeated the world and, emanating from his hands, enabled him to effect many cures.

XXV.15 - XXIX.11"This is owing...the age which admires them." This discussion of periodical literature points out that such writing,
"broken into small wholes, and demanded punctually to an hour, involves this extempore philosophy" (XXVI.11-13) that is the antithesis of "a connected view or grasp of things" (XXI.12-13). Furthermore, lamentably, "the authority, which in former times was lodged in Universities, now resides in a very great measure in that literary world" (XXVIII.20-22). See Discourse VII, 230.15 - 231.16, for Newmán's view of the superficiality of knowledge presented in periodical literature.

XXVI.1 "...Wellington, Peel..." Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, Chancellor of the University of Oxford and Tory Prime Minister from 1828-1830 and Sir Robert Peel, Member of Parliament for the University of Oxford and Tory Prime Minister from 1834-1835 and 1841-1846, the occasion of Newmán's "Tamworth Reading Room" and the one who authorized the establishment of the Queen's Colleges in Ireland were men very often the subject of periodical literature in Newmán's day.

XXVI.13-15"Almost all the Ramblers," says Boswell of Johnson, 'were written...was printing'." See Boswell's Life of Johnson, ed. G. B. Hill (6 vols., Oxford, 1887), III, 42.

XXVII.10-12 "It is a sort of repetition of the 'Quid novi?' of the Areopagus,...answer." "What is new?" was the cry of those who gathered on the hill north west of the Acropolis, a gathering place for those Athenians eager to learn the latest trends in thought.

XXVII.12-14 "Men must be found,...'de omni scibili,'" Newman
Preface to the Discourses

compares the periodical writers to the Athenian Sophists, who were supposed to have made their province "de omni scibili," "all things knowable." Superficiality and spurious knowledge, characteristics of the Sophists, apply by similarity to the writers of periodical literature.

XXVII.15-16 "'Grammaticus...novit'." From Juvenal, Satires, III, 76-77. Juvenal, writing towards the end of the 1st century A.D., complains in Satire III that "artibus honestis nullus in urbe" (III.21-22); there is no place for honest endeavour in the city of Rome in that the versatile Greeks are supplanting the Romans with their claim to be masters of all arts. Juvenal writes about the Greeks as follows in the two lines preceding those Newman quoted:

A Protean tribe, one knows not what to call,
That shifts to every form and shines in all (III,74-75)

Then follow the lines Newman quoted:

A philologist, a rhetorician, a geometer,
a painter, a wrestling-master,
An augurer, a rope-dancer, a doctor,
a magician, he knows all things" (III,76-77).

Juvenal considered the Greeks who took "all things knowable" as their province to be one of the corrupting influences of Rome. By means of this literary allusion to Juvenal Newman is casting an aspersion on those journalists whose superficiality misleads a ready, but unwary audience with "nutshell truths for the breakfast table" (XXVI.9-10).

XXIX.2-11 "It increases...a very large portion of its writers are anonymous, for irresponsible power never can be anything but
a great evil...conformity in ethical character to the age which admires them." Newman is noting that the periodical press, with its wide influence for public education, is a largely anonymous press and consequently an irresponsible power that need not account for the truth of its principles nor the depth of its knowledge. Therefore, the need for a responsible educating body, such as the university being established in Ireland, is very apparent.

As an overview, the Preface has outlined the main themes of the Discourses to follow; namely, that the end of a university is intellectual, not moral, although the Church is necessary for the integrity of the university. Secondly, the scope of a university is the diffusion and extension of knowledge in the education of the individual intellect, not the advancement or progress of knowledge for the community. The latter aim belongs to the literary and scientific academies.

The intellectual aim of a university education is the cultivation of mind that is a preparation for one's personal role in life as an individual and also as an "intelligent, capable, active member of society" (X.15-16). That cultivation, Newman describes as bringing "the mind into form" (XVIII.7), making it intellectually fit much as the body is trained for physical fitness.

The following ideas are explicit only in the Preface: first, that the university is concerned primarily with the education of its
students, not with the advancement of science. Also, that the faculties of teaching and research are not usually found in the same person at the same period of his life. Absence from the active life of teaching is necessary for a period of research and study in quiet and seclusion. Secondly, the Preface specifically mentions Newman's main aim in establishing the Catholic University of Ireland; namely, the education of a Catholic laity to a level of culture and achievement comparable with that of the Oxford, Cambridge graduates. Lastly, Newman regrets the transference of authority in knowledge from the university, the ancient seats of learning, to the periodical press, an anonymous and thus irresponsible power not based on the philosophical truth of their principles, but on their popularity and conformity in ethical character to their own age (XXIX.2-11). Rather, Newman would prefer that authority remained with those whose intellects have been "trained and found to have a connected view or grasp of things...visible in good sense, sobriety of thought, reasonableness, condour, self-command, and steadiness of view" (XXI.11-18). Those whose minds have been cultivated will have "a faculty of entering with comparative ease into any subject of thought, and of taking up with aptitude any science or profession" (XXI.29-XXII.3), will, in other words, have received a Liberal Education.
ANNOTATION OF THE DISCOURSES

Chapter VII

DISCOURSE I. AN INTRODUCTION

Newman addressed Lecture I to a Dublin audience on Monday, May 10, 1852. His opening lecture has the following purposes: first to present his credentials as one who is able to speak and to command respect concerning the subject of education. The references to the controversies and reforms of his Oxford days not only remind the audience of Newman's own familiarity with educational problems, but also provide a background for discussing the main subject in Discourse I, and the four Discourses to follow, the inadvisability of separating Secular and Religious Education. Newman makes clear to his audience that he is not presenting his opposition to Mixed Education of his own accord, but rather is speaking under the authority and "the auspices of the Apostolic See" (29.19-20). Lastly, Newman attempts to carry his audience with him in his enthusiasm for the bright future of the new university. The depiction, in the closing paragraphs of this first lecture, of the scholarly past of both England and Ireland serves to bring vividly to the minds of his audience the prospects of again uniting these two nations in founding a centre of learning—the University of Ireland—that will radiate the union of Secular and Religious knowledge to many peoples.
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3.1-7 "...a question...so much interest and elicited so much discussion at the present day...University education,...such high ability and wide experience...in both countries,..." Primarily, Newman's reference is to the following situations that influenced education in England and in Ireland at the time of his delivering the Discourses on...University Education: As a result of a memorial signed by members of Oxford and Cambridge as well as by Fellows of the Royal Society, "in 1850 two Royal Commissions were appointed to inquire into Oxford and Cambridge respectively, as the result of an agitation for reform culminating in a resolution moved in the House of Commons. The commissioners were instructed 'to inquire into the state, discipline, studies, and revenues' of the University and Colleges. They reported on the 27th of April, 1852, and the 30th of August, 1852, respectively."

The first part of the Royal Commission Report was presented just two weeks before Newman delivered his first Discourse.

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2 Contrary to Fergal McGrath's supposition (Newman's University: Idea and Reality, p. 135) that it was most likely Newman had read the Commission Report, it would seem from Newman's correspondence that he had not read the Report, not at least during the time of his writing the Discourses: Newman's letter to William Monsell, May 29, 1852 (Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman, ed. C. S. Dessain and V. F. Blehl, Vol. XV, p. 92) expresses Newman's understanding that Monsell was to lend him the Report. By February, 1853, Newman apparently still had not received the Report from Monsell, as he wrote in a postscript to his letter of February 3, 1853 to Henry Wilberforce: "...I want you to send me at once by Post the copy of the Oxford Parliamentary Commission which Monsell sent for me to your House" (Letters and Diaries, Vol. XV, p. 281).
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The Prime Minister of England, Lord John Russell, who had commissioned the Report in spite of protests from University and state officials, named the following as commissioners for the University of Oxford: Dr. Samuel Hines, Bishop of Norwich and a close associate of Archbishop Whately, was appointed Chairman; Dr. Francis Jeune, Head of Pembroke College, was a known advocate of reform; Dr. H. C. Tait, a Glasgow graduate familiar with the professorial system, had been don at Balliol College, Oxford and was later to be Archbishop of Canterbury (1869-1882); H. G. Liddell was Dean of Christ Church; Baden Powell and George Johnson were University mathematics Professors; John Dampier; A. P. Stanley of Balliol, later author of the Life of Arnold and Dean of Westminster (1864-1881), was named Secretary; and Goldwin Smith his assistant. Newman's designating such personages as the Commissioners as having "such high ability and wide experience" (3.5-6) is not without a touch of subtle irony as they were an illustrious sampling of his own foes—the Liberals in Church, State, and University—in the face of whose importance and wisdom, Newman states that he will, nevertheless, "still venture to ask permission to continue the discussion" (3.9-10) of University Education. C. E. Mallet expresses the Tory—High Church opinion of the choice of commissioners as follows: "The character and temper of the Commissioners were beyond reproach. But their opinions were beyond disguising, and it was not only Tractarians and mediaevalists who viewed their nomination with alarm. To Oxford Tories it seemed almost intolerable that men notoriously Liberal in politics and, it
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might be thought, Latitudinarian in religion, should be called in by the Government to meddle where for generations the Church and her authority had ruled, to desecrate the University...of Wolsey and Laud." 1 "The pages of the [Oxford Commission Report] reflect the persistent war upon English higher education which, from the early days of the Edinburgh Review to the date of the inquiry and beyond, was waged by the friends of educational liberalism and utilitarianism and by the Radical party in general." 2

As a result of the 1852 Oxford Commission Report, which led to the Oxford University Act of 1854, the aims, principles, and methods of Oxford education began to change. Prior to 1852, under the direction of clergyman of the Established Church, Oxford education had become a gentleman's education that was a discipline of mind and character in preparation for holding influential positions in Church, University, and State. The recommendation of the Commissioners that "What is needed is to place the best education within the reach of all qualified to receive it;..." 3 was to change the face of Oxford education almost completely.


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The essential change, from which all others followed, evident in the very appointing of a Royal Commission, was that Oxford education would move from a Church organized to a State influenced education.

The four recommendations that concern Newman's ideas on education are as follows: Education was to be regarded as the process of acquiring knowledge: "What is needed is to make the University a great seat of learning." 1 To do so, it was necessary to add greatly to the studies pursued at the University; consequently, the Literae Humaneores Course would now no longer be a compulsory preparation for further studies. The study of Latin and Greek should end at Moderations (the second set of university examinations, Reponsions being the first) at which time, those who wished, could prepare for their future professions by entering one of the following new schools: theology; mental philosophy and philology; jurisprudence, history, and political economy; mathematics and science. 2 The latter two schools were intended as a preparation for the professions of Law and Medicine respectively. The commissioners had found that the training for Law at Oxford was most unsatisfactory and that Oxford had all but ceased to

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1 Maclure, Educational Documents, p. 67.

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have a School of Medicine. In Newman's day as an undergraduate at Oxford, there were four honours schools: Literae Humaniiores; mathematics and physics treated mathematically; natural science; law and modern history. To attain honours a candidate must pass in Literae Humaniiores and one other school. As a result of the Commission Report the Literae Humaniiores School would no longer have its eminence as a prerequisite, but would be optional among the other final schools. Furthermore, the recommendations had the effect of increasing the prestige of mathematics and science.

In addition to the suggested reorganization of the curriculum, the Commissioners, taking the example of Universities in Scotland and all over Europe, recommended that the professors be increased in numbers and that they should contribute in a more effective way to what was termed real education, by which was meant an education that would make Oxford a preparation for professional life. The increase in the number of students would make the professors' contribution to education more real than nominal as it had been in the past. "The purpose of the professor with his large audience was to communicate knowledge, more particularly

1 C. E. Mallet, A History of the University of Oxford, p. 308.


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a knowledge of modern science and learning, 'useful knowledge' as many advocates of the system regarded it." ¹ With the lessening of the role of the clergyman-tutor, the traditionalists would see the secularization of education and the replacing of mental discipline with the communication of knowledge as the aim of education.

The fourth recommendation concerned the students and the expenses of residence in the university for a degree. The Commissioners advised that the poor students be "admitted to the University without being forced to join any college or hall, as of old. ...[Such] young men might be supplied with all that is necessary, on very moderate terms in private lodging houses..." ² The recommendation "that students should be allowed to become members of the University without becoming members of a College or Hall, ...was the direct parent of the Non-Collegiate system, though it did not take practical shape till...1868." ³ Although a practical expedient for accommodating the possible increase in the numbers and kinds of students, the non-collegiate system would tend to decrease and perhaps eliminate the personal influence of the college tutor that had been a traditional part of Oxford education and would


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therefore complete the secularization of education.

The Report of the Oxford Commission comprised recommendations that were but the summation of proposals discussed from the time that the Edinburgh Review had attacked Oxford's classical curriculum in the first decade of the nineteenth century. R. L. Edgeworth's Essays on Professional Education had advocated education as a preparation for professional life; London University, established in 1826 on the principles of Lord Brougham, and the liberals, was based on the lecture-method of instruction; Sir William Hamilton's two articles in the Edinburgh Review in 1834-35 concerned the Right of Dissenters to Admission to the Universities; William Whewell's work Of a Liberal Education, published in 1849, strongly argued for the place of mathematics as the best means to achieve the discipline of the mind. The Report, a summary of nearly half a century's discussions, was an expression of the liberalism in education that Newman had fought in his Oxford days. (The Admission of Dissenters Controversy was to be resolved in 1854 when the Oxford Education Act abolished religious tests for matriculation and the B. A. degree.\footnote{\textit{C. E. Mallet, A History of the University of Oxford, Vol. III, p. 325.}} As Newman saw Oxford falling to his old foe, he was eager to renew the fight in Dublin where he thought he would have more success against what he recognized as the
forces of unbelief at work in the trends to secularize and modernize the universities. Consequently, Newman's *Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education* are an answer to the attempt to modernize the curriculum by replacing the training of the mind, the product of liberal education, with the kind of training that is a direct preparation for a professional career. His insistence on Theology as an integral part of the university's studies was, among other purposes, an attempt to forestall the secularization trend in the curriculum that was basic to several of the recommendations in the Report.

As well, as regards Ireland, the words, "excited so much interest and elicited so much discussion at the present day" (3.2-3) refer to the controversy over the Queen's Colleges, established in Ireland in 1845 by Sir Robert Peel, then Prime Minister of England and Newman's old liberalism foe of the Tamworth Reading Room controversy. The Irish Bishops and laity were sharply divided in their attitudes to the Queen's Colleges and the resultant problem of Mixed Education—the education in common of students holding different religious beliefs. Dr. Cullen, who thought of a university as a kind of lay seminary, and Dr. McHale, who was opposed to any educational institution not thoroughly Irish in idea and organization, were both opposed to the Queen's Colleges. On the other hand, the late Dr. Murray's followers were in favour of supporting the Colleges modelled on London University, the main principle of which was the omission of all religious knowledge from the curriculum in order
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to satisfy the educational demands of a pluralist society; furthermore, the lecture-method by the professors was to be the sole means of instruction in the Queen's Colleges. Thus, the modernization and particularly the secularization of education in the newly established Queen's Colleges in Ireland posed the same threat to all that was involved in Newman's idea of a Liberal Education as did the proposals in 1852 Report of the Royal Commission on Oxford University.

3. 11-13 "...the subject of Liberal Education, and of the principles on which it must be conducted, has ever had a hold upon my mind;" It is on a strong personal conviction and real knowledge that Newman bases the discussion of "Liberal Education, and of the principles on which it must be conducted" that forms the subject of the ten Discourses to follow. The principles of a Liberal Education that Newman presents in the ten Discourses are an expression of what his own education at Ealing School and Trinity College, Oxford meant to him as well as of the educational principles he had formulated and practised during his years as tutor and Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford.

3. 14-15 "...I have lived the greater part of my life in a place..." Newman had first become a member of the University of Oxford when he was matriculated at Trinity College, Oxford in December, 1816 at the age of fifteen. He remained a member of his beloved University until his resignation from the Oriel Fellowship in 1845 at the age of
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forty-four—a total of twenty-nine years. At the time of writing the Discourses, Newman was fifty-one.

3.15 - 4.3 "... all that time... series of controversies... own people and with strangers, ... measures experimental or definitive, bearing upon it." This is a topic sentence for 4.3-5.7: "About fifty years... the University was the representative."

4.3-21 "About fifty years since,... a philosophical form." In 1636 Archbishop Laud, Chancellor of the University of Oxford, had Oxford's Statutes revised and recorded in a document known as the "Laudian Code." But during the eighteenth century the Laudian Statutes, especially those concerning examinations, became increasingly only empty formalities. The historian Edward Gibbon described his fourteen months at Magdalen College, Oxford beginning in 1752 as "the fourteen months the most idle and unprofitable of my whole life." 1 About the indolence of the tutors and professors and the superficiality of their instruction he writes as follows: "From the toil of reading, or thinking, or writing, they had absolved their conscience; and the first shoots of learning and ingenuity withered on the ground, without yielding any fruits to the owners or the public." 2

2 Ibid., p. 27.
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Vicesimus Knox, a Fellow of St. John's College and himself a dedicated tutor, was among the many who criticized the examination procedure. In an anonymous pamphlet entitled, "On Some Parts of the Discipline in our English Universities," published in 1778, Knox humorously described the customary manner in which B.A. examinations were conducted before 1800: "Every candidate is obliged to be examined in the whole circle of the sciences by three masters of arts, 'of his own choice.' The examination is to be held in one of the public schools, and to continue from nine o'clock till eleven. The masters take a most solemn oath, that they will examine properly and impartially. Dreadful as all this appears, there is always found to be more of appearance in it than reality; for the greatest dunce usually gets his 'testimonium' signed with as much ease and credit as the finest genius. ...The poor young man to be examined in the sciences often knows no more of them than his bedmaker, and the masters who examine are sometimes equally unacquainted with such mysteries. But 'schemes,' as they are called, or little books, containing forty or fifty questions on each science, are handed down, from age to age, from one to another. The candidate to be examined employs three or four days in learning these by heart, and the examiners, having done the same before him..., know what questions to ask, and so all goes on smoothly... The statutes next require, that he should translate familiar English phrases into Latin. And now is the time when the masters shew their wit and jocularity. Droll questions are put on any subject, and the puzzled candidate furnishes diversion by his
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awkward embarrassment. ...This familiarity, however, only takes place when the examiners are pot-companions of the candidate, which indeed is usually the case... 1

Vicesimus Knox was among the many whose criticisms resulted in the rousing of Oxford to the "responsibilities which its profession and its station involved" (4.8-9). Consequently, beginning with the election of John Eveleigh as Provost of Oriel in 1781, "an heterogeneous and an independent body of men" (4.10-11), led by Eveleigh and including Cyril Jackson, elected Dean of Christ Church in 1785 and John Parsons, elected Master of Balliol in 1798, set about a work of reformation within their own colleges that soon affected the entire university and resulted in the passing in Congregation of the New Examination Statute in 1800. The measures "definitive" (4.2) concerned the following guidelines for examinations: "The examiners were sworn to take their duties very seriously, to set aside all fear or favour, to give no testimonial to an unworthy candidate and to refuse none to a worthy. ...The old familiar subjects, grammar, rhetoric and logic, the old sciences and philosophies, still held the field. ...Humane Littérature and at least three of the best Greek-and Roman writers were required for every degree. The elements of Religion and the Doctrinal Articles of 1562 were not less

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necessary." 1 The measures "experimental" (4.2) were an Honours Examination established in 1802, which was, until 1830, part of the Pass Examination, but of wider scope and greater difficulty. In 1803 the Statute was again remodelled as follows: four examiners were substituted for six; certain periods of the year were established for examinations; and the definition of Humane Literature was expanded. In 1807 the examination for Masters was discontinued; and a School of Mathematics and Physics, separate from the Literae Humaniores School, was established. In 1808 Responsions, in the modern sense, was established: It was an examination in Greek, Latin, logic, and geometry to be passed in the second year. 2

The "ungenerous and jealous criticisms" (4.16-17) with which these "initial efforts...were met from without" (4.14-15) refers to the series of attacks, beginning in 1808, on Oxford education by the Edinburgh Review. The leaders of the attack were John Playfair, Professor of Natural Philosophy at Edinburgh; Richard Payne Knight, a wealthy collector of Greek and Roman bronzes and coins; and Sydney Smith, an M.A. of New College, Oxford and by turns, clergyman, farmer, and popular lecturer. There is a certain amount of rhetoric in behalf of Oxford in Newman's statement that "as often happens in such cases" (4.15-16)

2 Ibid., pp. 168-169.
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(4.15-16), just as Oxford was setting its own house in order, it was met from without by criticisms that were "at that very moment beginning to be unjust" (4.17-18). Actually, the reforms at Oxford concerned the improvement of the Literae Humaniores 1 School. Even the subjects of the recently established (1807) School of Mathematics and Physics were classical in the sense of comprising the geometry of Euclid and the physics of Aristotle. Sydney Smith's attack in the Edinburgh Review, XXIX, October, 1809, was a criticism of the exclusiveness, not the inefficiency, of Oxford's classical curriculum. The controversy which was waged with the Reviewers by two Oriel Fellows, Edward Copleston and John Davison did express the views of the Oxford defenders in "a philosophical form" (4.21) in that Copleston's Replies to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review, 1810 and Davison's reviews in the Quarterly Review, August, 1810 and October, 1811, were all dissertations on the values of Oxford's classical studies. However, Newman's designating the Reviewers' criticisms as "ungenerous and jealous" (4.16-17) underlines the fact that their attack on Oxford had as its purpose not merely educational reform, but actually the shaking of the prestige of the old universities which were Tory strongholds and the promoting of a new type

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of university man.  

4.21-26 "The course of beneficial change...of which the University is composed." Several reforms concerning classical studies were made through the years, the most noteworthy being the following: In 1825 a new Statute introduced further changes. To prevent undue labour for the examiners, separate examiners were assigned for the two Schools, six for Literae Humaniores, three for Mathematics and Science. In 1830 the Honours Examination was separated from the Pass Examination. The School of Literae Humaniores was to include more than the classics—ancient history, rhetoric, and poetry, moral and political philosophy. The changes allowed the ancient writers to be illustrated by modern works.  

Thus the reforms that were "the result of individual energy" (4.23) in the person of John Eveleigh, Provost of Oriel (1781-1814), whom Mark Pattison refers to as the "chief promoter"  

of the Examination Act of 1800 and the reformed system to follow, were "taken up and carried out" (4.25) by the other colleges in the University.

4.27 "This was the first stage of the controversy." The


3 Ibid., p. 183.
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Oxford Defenders won, for a time, the first stage of the controversy that had been initiated by the Edinburgh Review, in that Oxford's curriculum remained predominantly classical and its instruction tutorial until the changes brought down in the Oxford University Act of 1854. Since Newman discusses the Edinburgh Review controversy in detail in Discourse VIII, further commentary will be reserved for the annotation of Discourse VIII.

4.27 - 5.7 "Years passed away...the University was the representative." The second stage of a controversy Adamson refers to as two converging lines of the same attack was a "political contest:" (4.29) waged by "political adversaries" (4.28); that is, by the members of the reformed (1832) Parliament, who concentrated their struggle on removing the academical disabilities of Non-Conformists. The "political contest" (4.29), to which Newman refers, was the controversy of 1834-1835 over allowing Dissenters to register in and graduate from the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, the two strongholds of the Anglican Church, the security of whose position was maintained by the injunction that the teaching faculty and administration be in orders and that the student body subscribe to religious tests. In Oxford the students were required to subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles on

1 John Adamson, English Education, p. 81.
2 Ibid., p. 81.
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matriculation and again before taking their degree. The latter subscription only was required at Cambridge. The result was that a large segment of the population, including Catholics, Jews, and Dissenters, were excluded from the two great universities of England. The movement of reform, which began in 1828 with the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, continued with the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829, and the Reform Bill of 1832, gave the Dissenters courage to petition for what they considered the redress of their grievances.

The movement for change, as in the first stage of the controversy, came from the liberal group, both within the university and without. The second stage of the controversy began in March, 1834 when sixty-three liberal members of the Cambridge Senate presented a petition to the House of Commons and the House of Lords respectively for the abolition of all religious tests. On April 21, 1834, G. W. Wood, a Dissenter and a member of the House of Commons, brought in a bill which would make it "lawful for all His Majesty's subjects to enter and matriculate in the universities of England and to receive and enjoy all degrees in learning conferred therein (degrees in divinity alone excepted) without being required to subscribe to any Articles of Religion, or to make any declaration of religious opinions respecting particular modes of Faith and Worship,..." 1

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A pamphlet warfare ensued to which Newman's only direct contributions were letters to the British Magazine and the London Standard. In the former contribution, Newman underlined the basically religious nature of Oxford education and therefore the dilemma involved in attempting to "conduct a religious body on the basis of two different religious principles. We can be Anglican or Dissenter, we cannot be both at once." ¹ The resistance to the Bill, organized within Oxford by Newman, Pusey, and William Sewell, Fellow of Exeter, resulted in The "Declaration of Professors, Deans, and Tutors" of April 24, 1834, signed by a four to one majority of the Oxford community and presented to both Houses of Parliament as expressing the official view of the university. The "Declaration" maintained "'that the University of Oxford has always considered Religion to be the foundation of all education; ...that the admission of persons who dissent from the Church of England...would raise up and continue a spirit of controversy which is at present unknown; and would tend to reduce Religion to an empty and unmeaning name, or to supplant it by scepticism and infidelity'." ² The "Declaration" was one of the many pamphlets that "did but afford fuller


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development and more exact delineation to the principles of which the University was the representative" (5.4-7). The result was that the Wood's Bill passed the House of Commons in July, 1834, but was defeated in the House of Lords.

However, the Admission of Dissenters' controversy was not yet resolved. The enemy within, in the person of R. D. Hampden, Principal of St. Mary's Hall, Oxford, published in August, 1834 a pamphlet entitled, Observations on Religious Dissent in which he maintained "that Christians differ very little in their acceptance of revelation but very largely in the conclusions they draw from it. 'It is chiefly the introduction of human opinion into the matter of Revelation that occasions a difference of professions,' and we should remember that 'no conclusions of human reasoning, however correctly deduced, however logically sound, are properly religious truths.' ...Thus he sees no objection to the admission of Dissenters, from whom we do not 'really differ,' and would urge the removal of all tests,..." 1 Hampden's position was that of Liberalism, one of the tenets of which Newman defined as, "No theological doctrine is any thing more than an opinion which happens to be held by bodies of men." 2 Furthermore, Hampden

1 A. Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 109.

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seemed to hold that the human mind was unable to know religious truth. He sent a copy of his pamphlet to Newman who replied as follows: "The kindness which has led to your presenting me with your pamphlet encourages me to hope that you will forgive me, if I take the opportunity it affords to express to you my very sincere and deep regret that it has been published. ...I feel an aversion to the principles it professes, as...tending to formal Socinianism. ...And I also lament that,...the first step has been taken towards an interruption of that peace and mutual good understanding which has prevailed so long in this place; and which, if ever seriously disturbed, will be succeeded by dissensions the more intractable,..." ¹ The editor's note remarks that "This letter was the beginning of hostilities in the University;" ² that is, hostilities within the university between Hampden and the liberals on the one hand and Newman and the Tractarians on the other.

In order to prevent Parliamentary action on the Admission of Dissenters, the Heads of Houses proposed that subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles on matriculation be replaced by a simple Declaration of Conformity to the Church of England, on which was based the discipline


² Ibid., p. 69.
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and worship of the University. Another pamphlet warfare ensued in the Spring of 1835 in which Newman directed the pamphleteering of his friends and edited with a preface a collection of their short works on Hampden, subscription, and related topics.¹ The defenders of subscription were successful in defeating the proposal to dilute subscription to a declaration. On May 20, 1835, Convocation rejected the recommendation of the Heads of Houses by a vote of 459 to 57.² As with the first stage of the controversy, the Oxford defenders had won, at least for a time. However, "The Oxford University Bill of 1854 abolished tests for matriculation and for the B.A. degree, but retained those for the master's degree, for a vote in Convocation, and for admission to fellowships. In 1871 the University Tests Act removed all tests except those for theological degrees and professorships."³

5.7 For the 1873 edition of the Discourses Newman added at this point the following paragraph:

In the former of these two controversies the charge brought against its studies was their remoteness from the occupations

² Ibid., p. 185.
³ A. Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect, note 39, pp. 296 – 297.
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and duties of life, to which they are the formal introduction, or, in other words, their inutility; in the latter, it was their connexion with a particular form of belief, or, in other words, their religious exclusiveness.

This summary paragraph is important in that the ten Discourses are Newman's answer to the two controversies. Essentially, Discourses II to V deal with the principles that are basic to the question of "religious exclusiveness;" Discourses VI to VIII discuss the problem of "inutility as it is related to the educational theories Newman outlines.

5.8-9 "Living...so long as a witness, though hardly as an actor,...intellectual conflict..." Newman was not involved in the first series of controversies, as he entered Oxford in 1816. As for the second series, Newman may not have been an actor, but he did some efficient directing and prompting from the wings. Culler speculates that Newman may have written the 1834 "Declaration of Professors, Deans, and Tutors" and indeed did mail "copies in large numbers and attended to a heavy correspondence on the subject." It was Newman who had urged Henry Wilberforce to write the pamphlet "The Foundation of the Faith Assailed in Oxford," subsequently edited by Newman in a collection of pamphlets related to the Admission of Dissenters' controversy.

1 Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 104.

2 Ibid., pp. 104-105.
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Furthermore, Newman, all through April and May of 1835, wrote urging absent members to come to Oxford for the Convocation vote of May 20, 1835. Rhetorically, in the Discourses Newman seems to want to emphasize his role in the Dissenters' Controversy as observer rather than participant perhaps to maintain the detachment required for the philosophical viewpoint.

5.10-14 "...views of University Education,...not without value to a Catholic, and less familiar to him,...deserve to be" refers to the fact that Oxford education was based fundamentally on the principles of Anglicanism generally accepted by faculty and students. Also, undergraduate education at Oxford was in the hands of tutors who were Anglican clergymen. When Newman emphasized the role of the tutor as pastoral as well as academic he was following Dr. Copleston's view of the importance to the student's education of the tutor's personal guidance in all aspects of the student's moral and academic development. That Oxford's traditional view of education was an education based exclusively on the doctrines and practices of one religion; namely, Anglicanism, was a view that Newman intended to make familiar to his Irish audience, particularly for the implications that view held in the establishment of the Catholic University of Ireland.

5.14-16 "...an argument...may be serviceable...that great cause...so especially interested,..." The "argument" to which Newman refers was the controversy over whether Oxford would remain an
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exclusively Anglican institution with its education organized around and based on the Anglican formularies and worship, or whether, as would be the result of throwing open the doors to the Dissenters, the education at Oxford would undergo a gradual secularization in aim and organization. The central argument put forward by Newman and his supporters in the 1834–35 Dissenters’ Controversy—"the University of Oxford has always considered Religion to be the foundation of all education"—(See above, 4.27–5.7) may be, Newman suggests, serviceable to the great cause of establishing a Catholic University of Ireland in that Oxford education, so much revered, provided a precedent for a university education based exclusively on the doctrine and practices of one religion.

§.16–18 "...to me personally it will afford satisfaction of a peculiar kind;" The following paragraph from Newman’s letter dated October 14, 1851 to Mrs. William Froude elaborates on his anticipation that the establishment of the University of Ireland will afford him a kind of personal satisfaction for the reasons outlined in the letter:

I suppose in a few days I shall know what is decided on in Ireland about the University. It is a most daring attempt but first it is a religious one, next it has the Pope’s blessing on it. Curious it will be if Oxford is imported into Ireland, not in its members only, but in its principles, methods, ways, and arguments. The battle there will be what it was in Oxford 20 years ago. Curious too that there I shall be opposed to the Whigs, having Lord Clarendon instead of Lord Melbourne—that Whately will be then in
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propria persona—and that while I found
my tools breaking under me in Oxford, for
Protestantism is not susceptible of so
high a temper, I am renewing the struggle
in Dublin, with the Catholic Church to
support me. It is very wonderful—Keble,
Pusey, Maurice, Sewell, etc. who have been
able to do so little against Liberalism in
Oxford, will be renewing the fight, alas,
not in their persons, in Ireland.

Although the Tractarians in the 1834–35 Dissenters' Controversy had
succeeded in keeping Oxford a totally Anglican university, the liberal
forces from within the university resulted in Newman's losing one means
after another of stemming the tide of infidelity that he saw gathering
momentum throughout the university: Newman ceased to be tutor of Oriel
in 1832. In 1834 R. D. Hampden was preferred to Newman for the
Professorship of Moral Philosophy. In 1836 Newman's name was among
nine submitted to Lord Melbourne for the Professorship of Divinity, a key
position involving the duties of selecting preachers, presiding over

1 J. H. Newman, The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman,
edited by C. S. Dessain and V. F. Blehl (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons
Ltd., 1963), XIV, pp. 389–390. The following footnote is from the
foregoing volume, page 390: "George Villiers, fourth Earl of Clarendon
(1800–70), Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland 1847–52, was a strong supporter of
the Queen's Colleges, which the Catholic University was intended to
supplant. Lord Melbourne was Prime Minister during most of the
Tractarian period, and appointed R. D. Hampden Regius Professor of
Divinity at Oxford in 1836. Whately, enemy of the Tractarians then, was
now one of the chief supporters of mixed education in Ireland, which
would, he hoped, be a solvent for Catholic beliefs."

2 J. H. Newman, Letters and Correspondence, ed. A. Mozley,
p. 25.
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Divinity examinations, and censuring those in the university suspected of unorthodoxy. "The episcopal Noetics [Archbishop Whately of Dublin and Bishop Copleston] lost no time in advising the Prime Minister to reject these recommendations and to present Hampden to the post instead."¹ In 1841, Newman's Tract-Ninety was censured in the letter of the Four Tutors,² one of whom was the liberal tutor of Balliol, A. C. Tait, later a member of the Oxford University Commission of 1852. The eventual result of the censure was a request from Bishop Bagot of Oxford that the Tracts be discontinued. Without the tutorship, a professorship, or the freedom to write and circulate the Tracts, little wonder Newman said in his letter of 1851, "I found my tools breaking under me at Oxford," as he saw the means at hand for rooting out liberalism in Oxford education disintegrating one by one; therefore, understandably, the opportunity to "renew the struggle in Dublin" with what he thought was every prospect of success since he said he would have there "the Catholic Church to support [him]," did afford Newman "satisfaction of a peculiar kind" (5.17-18).

5.18-22 "...it has been my lot...in theological discussions...natural turn of my mind...about to open,..." Newman's part in


² Ibid., p. 329.
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Theological discussions is essentially his share in the writing, organizing, and editing of the Tracts for the Times as well as such individual writings as "Elucidations of Dr. Hampden's Theological Statements," in which he showed the utter lack of logic in appointing a man of Hampden's mind to the chair of Divinity in a centre of Anglican studies; yet, Newman maintained that the delineation of educational theory was more suitable to the natural turn of his mind than was theological disputation. Newman wants to stress the fact that although he may be associated in the minds of his audience with the theological disputations of his Tractarian days, he is now dealing with an educational, not a theological subject and therefore one to which his mind and background are eminently suited.

5.28 - 6.13 The paragraph beginning, "What must be..." and the sentence ending, "...justification in so doing," Newman omitted from the 1873 edition. These sentences contain reference to the fact that the philosophy of Oxford's education, which Newman makes the basis of his thought in the Discourses, was as he states 6.6-7, "Catholic in its ultimate source." i.e. had its source in the Laudian Statutes that were Pre-Elizabethan Oxford in spirit. He therefore feels justified in using Oxford education as a model of education that was based on definite doctrine and consequently was a mode of education generally accepted in the university communities from their earliest times. In that Oxford education was not a mixed education, the precedent of its eminence for centuries was an argument against the mixed education views embodied in
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the Queen's Colleges. Therefore, it is the philosophy of Oxford education that will lend to his argument "that moral persuasiveness which attends on tried and sustained conviction" 6.21-22.

6.9-12 "...to the views of men...reasons,..." Some of the men to whom Newman refers are Dr. Copleston, John Davison, and Dr. Edward Pusey—men whose educational ideals Newman admired regardless of the fact that they did not share his later conversion to Catholicism.

7.10-12 "The views...part of myself." When Newman states that his views on education "have grown into my whole system of thought, and are,...part of myself," he refers to such situations as his own education at Ealing and Trinity College, Oxford in which the personal influence of his masters was the means to the cultivation of his mind and the development of his character; to his association with the members of Oriel College; to his own experience as tutor from 1826 to 1831 during which the importance of the role of the tutor became explicit knowledge to him; and finally, to the educational implications of the Oxford Movement.

7.12-26 "Many changes...no variation...of opinion,...within its pale." Newman's mind had undergone the following changes in religious conviction: from the moderate Anglicanism of his childhood, to the Evangelicalism of his Ealing days and the early years at Oxford (7.18-21); to the incipient Liberalism resulting from his Oxford
association with the Oriel Noetics; to the conservatism of his Tractarian days (7.21-24); and finally, to his conversion to Catholicism in 1845; but his educational principles were his "profession at that early period" of his life and remained constant to his time of speaking. He states that "my sense of their truth has been increased with the experience of every year since I have been brought within its [the Catholic Church's] pale" (7.24-26).

7.22 "...as I was introduced to the records of Christian Antiquity," refers to the studies Newman made in the early church history; for example, he notes in his introduction to Fleury's Ecclesiastical History, the influence on him in 1816 of Joseph Milner 1 "whose history of the church contained long extracts from the writings of St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, and others of the Fathers. These extracts thrilled the youthful reader, and without doubt gave him a love for patristic literature which did not pass away, and first called his attention to the Catholic doctrine contained therein." 2 Also, Newman notes in the Apologia that before he had written his essay on Scripture

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1 Joseph Milner (1744-1797) was an Anglican Divine of the Evangelical School, who wrote a History of the Church of Christ.

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Miracles in 1825-6, he "had read Middleton 1 on the Miracles of the early Church, and had imbibed a' portion of his 'spirit." 2 In 1828 Newman began "reading the Fathers chronologically beginning with St. Ignatius and St. Justin. Two years later, with the urging of Hugh James Rose, he accepted a request to write a history of the great Church Councils for a 'Theological Library'." 3 His research on the Council of Nicaea took him back to the Ante-Nicene history and the Church of Alexandria. The result was the publication of The Arians of the Fourth Century, 1834. The study of the Fathers and its literary expression in the writing of the Arians was a preparation of mind for Newman's part in that Anglo-Catholic Movement known as the Tractarian Movement.

As well, in 1836 Newman and a group of the students at Oxford began translations for a compilation of a Library of the Fathers. 4 In the summer of 1841, Newman began his translation of St. Athanasius for

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4 A "Library of the Fathers" was discussed at length in the "Introduction to the Thesis."
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This Library. As a result of his fresh study of St. Athanasius and the Arian controversy, he suffered the first of the three blows that demolished the Via Media. He wrote in the Apologia: "...I saw clearly, that in the history of Arianism, the pure Arians were the Protestants, the semi-Arians were the Anglicans, and that Rome now was what it was then. The truth lay, not with the Via Media, but in what was called 'the Extreme party'." ¹ The last Oxford University Sermon "The Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine," 1843 and An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, 1845 were the final works resulting from his studies in Antiquity. The latter was Newman's last work written while he was a member of the Anglican Church. Thus, as Newman's insight into Christian Antiquity deepened, so did he progress towards Catholicism and to the conviction of the truth of his educational principles.

The following passages on pages 8 and 9 have been omitted from the 1873 edition:

8.2-12 "In proposing...to give to it."

9.1-15 "...they may...and my teachers."

9.16-22 "...the true philosophy...by ourselves."

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9.24-26 "accounts for...within her fold."

All these sections emphasize the fact that Newman is basing his educational ideals on those of the Oxford of his day and that even though it was an Anglican institution and the occasion of the Discourses was the establishment of a Catholic institution; nevertheless, he feels justified in the basis of his educational ideas in that "they are founded on truths in the natural order" (9.23-24), in that "they do not simply come of theology...; they are dictated by that human prudence and wisdom which is attainable where grace is quite away, ..." (8.17-23). Furthermore, Newman states that he intends to deal with the educational question, "as I really believe it to be, as one of philosophy, practical wisdom, good sense, not of theology;" (9.10-12). Therefore, "the true philosophy of Education [may] be held by Protestants, and at a given time, or in a given place, be taught by them to Catholics,..." (9.16-18). These passages present a seldom emphasized viewpoint of Newman's; that is, that the principles of a Liberal Education "arise out of the nature of the case" (8.21), are "founded on truths in the natural order" (9.23-24) and are therefore not bound to a theology. The omission of these sentences from the 1873 edition tends to obscure the source of Newman's educational ideals, and in particular the fact that Newman in Discourse 1 is building a strong case against Mixed Education by using Oxford Education as the basis of his argument from precedent and tradition in behalf of Liberal Education.
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9.27 - 11.12 "Where the sun shines bright,...wiser than the children of light." In this section, by means of metaphor and Biblical allusion, Newman makes clear why he maintains that Anglican Oxford has "investigated and ascertained the main principles, the necessary conditions of education, better than some among ourselves" (11.16-19).

9.26 - 10.25 "Where the sun shines bright,...in the confidence of faith and hope." The metaphor of "the science of calefaction and ventilation" being practised in the north and neglected in the south where in a warm and sunny climate there is only an occasional need for it emphasizes the idea that in "the science of Education" (10.7-8) Protestants, living as it were farther from the sunshine of Divine illumination rely solely on human resources: "'Knowledge is' their 'power' and nothing else." (10.11-12). Whereas Catholics tend to rely on the fact that "the Almighty Father takes care of us" (10.15-16) to the neglect, or only the occasional use, in Newman's viewpoint, of human knowledge. He reminds his listeners of an idea that he will mention again: "...but we sometimes forget that we shall please Him best, and get most from Him, when we use what we have in nature to the utmost at the same time that we look out for what is beyond nature in the confidence of faith and hope" (10.21-25). The foregoing statement is the basis of Newman's educational ideal—the cultivation of the mind to the best of the individual's capacity while at the same time giving the principles of religion their proper place as the basis and guide of that
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development. Nowhere has Newman better expressed this very ideal than in the sermon, "Intellect, the Instrument of Religious Training": "I want the intellectual layman to be religious, and the devout ecclesiastic to be intellectual." 1

10.14-15 "funes ceciderunt mihi in praecaris." We have a goodly inheritance." The reference is to Psalm 15:6: "For me the measuring lines have fallen on pleasant sites;" fair to me indeed is my inheritance." The psalmist draws the contrast between the Israelites for whom the worship of the true God is their best inheritance and the idolaters, who he says, "multiply their sorrows who court other gods" (Psalm 15:4). Newman is emphasizing the position of privilege of those to whom the Lord has given his constant care as contrasted with those who must rely only on knowledge for their power.

11.5 - 16.21 "We leave God...in such an admission" has been omitted from the 1873 edition. This section may have been one of the deleted sections to which Newman referred when he wrote that he edited the later editions of the Discourses "removing 'much contemporary collateral, or superfluous matter',..." 2 In this instance, the materials

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removed were references to the contemporary discussion of the Mixed Education problem in Ireland and the Dissenters' Controversy of recent memory in England. But as the former of these problems was an integral part of Newman's going to Ireland to deliver the Discourses, the solution to the latter was an important foundation stone for the ideals presented in this Discourse; therefore, this section in its original context is important for a full understanding of Discourse I, the Introduction to the ten Discourses. Furthermore, the important Biblical metaphor of the wisdom of the serpent and the innocence of the dove (11. 7-9) serves as a key to Newman's educational ideal that may well be overlooked without this important passage.

11.7 - 11.12 "We cultivate..."...wiser than the children of light". Newman's Sermon XX, "Wisdom and Innocence," preached on February 19, 1843 and published in Sermons on Subjects of the Day was based on the text of Matt. X.16: "Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves; be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves." ¹ In this sermon, Newman defines the worldly wisdom associated with the serpent as "'prudence and skill'." ² Further, he states that Christ chose the serpent "as the pattern of wisdom for His followers...as


² Ibid., p. 296.
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if it were our bounden duty to rival the wicked in endowments of mind, and excel them in their exercise...; then, knowing how dangerous such wisdom is, especially in times of temptation, if a severe conscientiousness is not awake, he added 'and harmless as doves'.\footnote{1} In 11.7-9 of Discourse I, the same biblical theme is particularly applicable to the full use of human wisdom that Newman sees as characteristic of Protestant Oxford education; whereas, Catholics, in their tendency not to use human wisdom to its fullest, are erring on the side of cultivating "the innocence of the dove" and are therefore deserving of the Lord's rebuke, "the children of this world were in their generation wiser than the children of light" (11.10-12).

The biblical metaphor emphasizing the necessity for the cultivation in combination of the wisdom of the serpent and the innocence of the dove can be seen as an expression of Newman's educational ideal in the Discourses. In the sermon "Wisdom and Innocence," Newman wrote that "harmlessness [is] the corrective of wisdom, securing it against the corruption of craft and deceit,..."\footnote{2} "By innocence, or harmlessness, is meant simplicity in act, purity in motive, honesty in aim; acting conscientiously and religiously, according to the matter in hand, without

\footnote{1}{Newman, "Wisdom and Innocence," p. 297.}

\footnote{2}{Ibid., p. 298.}
caring for consequences or appearances; doing what appears one's duty, and being obedient for obedience' sake, and saving the event to God." 1 As a Liberal Education can be said to cultivate worldly wisdom, religion in fostering those dispositions Newman defines as "innocence or harmlessness," becomes a corrective and safeguard of wisdom from the corruption to which it is prone. It is noteworthy that when Christ sent forth his followers "as Sheep in the midst of wolves" his injunction was that they be armed with both wisdom and innocence. Thus, Newman's idea of university education involves the combination of both worldly wisdom and religion for the development of those who must be at one and the same time men of the world and soldiers of Christ.

11.14-19 "...Protestants may have discerned...better than some among ourselves." Newman is referring to the fact that Anglican Oxford had ascertained the necessary condition of education; namely, "that Education must not be disjoined from Religion." (12.13-14). The 1834-35 Dissenters' Controversy at Oxford was fought and won over this very issue.

11.24 - 12.7 "The Protestant communions...be distinct and absolute." Newman, it would seem, includes the Anglican Church, in this instance, in his phrase "Protestant communions." As a rule, apart from the use of the term "Protestant" in 11.13 - 16.21, Newman designated the

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Dissenters only as "Protestant:" that is, those communions which had had their origin in the Lutheran spirit. Newman's Tract 71 states that "the English Church, as such, is not Protestant, only politically, that is externally, or so far as it has been made an establishment, and subjected to national and foreign influences." Doctrinally, Newman placed Anglicanism halfway to Rome and Liberalism halfway to Atheism; hence, Newman's statement in these lines that the closer a communion to Catholicism, the clearer its enunciation of the principle of Christianity as the principle of all education. The Anglicans, and particularly the Tractarians, who like the Catholics held the importance of the church dogmas and grace through the sacraments, fought sincerely for the preservation of Anglicanism as the principle of Oxford education in 1834-1835.

Newman concludes this section with an important idea to which he gives very little emphasis; namely, that the conclusion to which his argument should be brought is that since Anglicans are closer to Catholicism than other sects and since they have determined the basic principle of education correctly; then, "in Catholicism itself the

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recognition of that principle would, in its seats of education, be
distinct and absolute." (12.5-7). The fact that that recognition was not
"distinct and absolute" (12.7) was the very reason Newman was in Ireland
to deliver these lectures to the Irish Catholics, many of whom were
tending towards a religious Liberalism that was the counterpart of the
position held by Hampden and his followers in the 1834-35 Dissenters'
Controversy at Oxford.

12.12-18 "...that the main principle...on a false idea."
This sentence expresses two related ideas that are important foundation
stones in Newman's educational theory; namely, first, the main
principle, "that Education must not be disjoined from Religion" (12.13-
14) and secondly, "that Mixed Schools...are constructed on a false idea"
(12.15-18); that is, the idea that the other branches of knowledge can
be taught apart from and while ignoring religious knowledge without
jeopardy to either secular or religious knowledge is a false idea. In
the "Tamworth Reading Room" letters to the Times (1841), Newman stated
— the main principle of education as follows:

"Christianity and nothing short of it, must be made the
element and principle of all education. Where it is laid as the first
stone, and acknowledged as the governing spirit, it will take up into
itself, assimilate, and give a character to literature and to science.
Where Revealed Truth has given the aim and direction to Knowledge,
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Knowledge of all kinds will minister to Revealed Truth." 1

Since it was Newman's purpose in coming to Ireland to place this main principle of education before the minds of His Irish Audience and to explain why Mixed Schools, in which teachers and students are of different creeds, are based on a false idea; this section, omitted from the 1873 edition, expresses ideas essential to the full understanding of Discourses II to V in particular and all ten Discourses in general.

12.20-27 "...every sect of Protestants,...politicians of the day." The sects of Protestants to which Newman refers as having "retained the idea of religious truth and the necessity of faith" (12.20-21), he mentions again in 15.21-22 as the "Anglican, Wesleyan, Calvinistic, or so-called Evangelical." R. W. Church recounts concerning the Dissenters' Controversy, in which R. D. Hampden's religious Liberalism and his appointment as Regius Professor of Divinity were opposed by the majority in Oxford, that "all in the University at this time, except a small minority, were of one mind, Heads of Houses and country parsons, Evangelicals and High Churchmen—all who felt that the grounds of a definite belief were seriously threatened by Dr. Hampden's speculations. All were angry at the appointment; all were agreed that

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something ought to be done to hinder the mischief of it. In this matter Mr. Newman and his friends were absolutely at one with everybody round them, with those who were soon to be their implacable opponents." ¹ Church's view corroborates Newman's statement that the various sects of Protestants were united in their support of a definite belief as the basic principle of education.

13.4 - 16.7 "I know...would be found to rest." This section, a major part of a section (pp. 11-16) Newman omitted from the subsequent editions, is, according to McGrath, a "vague and passing allusion" ² to Sir William Hamilton's 1834-1835 attack in the Edinburgh Review. ³ on the Universities' denominational education. Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856), a Scottish Barrister and Professor of Civil History (1821) and Logic and Metaphysics (1836) at the University of Edinburgh, was, through his articles in the Edinburgh Review, a key figure in the Dissenters' Controversy during the 1830's. Hamilton argued that religion at Oxford did not form an essential part of the instruction in the

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Faculty of Arts in that religious instruction was scanty and superficial
and therefore the only change needed for the admission of Dissenters
would be to omit the Thirty-Nine Articles as a subject for examination. 1

Hamilton may well have been one of those cited by Newman "who think that
all who are called Christians do in fact agree together in
essentials,...; and who,...call on all parties in educating their youth
for the world to eliminate differences,..." (13.13-18), which were, in
Hamilton's view of Oxford education, immaterial; consequently, in his
opinion refusing the Dissenters an Oxford education was indeed
prejudicial (13.18-19).

Sir William Hamilton, educated at Glasgow, Edinburgh, and
Balliol College, Oxford, can be numbered among those who Newman says
"have no creed or dogma whatever to defend, to sacrifice, to surrender,
to compromise, to hold back, or to 'mix,' when they call out for Mixed
Education" (13.9-12). This Latitudinarian view of religion Newman
defined in Tract 85 as follows: "that every man's view of Revealed
Religion is acceptable to God, if he acts up to it; that no one's view
is in itself better than another, or at least that we cannot tell which
is better. All that we have to do then is to act consistently with what
we hold, and to value others if they act consistently with what they

1 Sir Wm. Hamilton, "Admission of Dissenters to the
Universities," Edinburgh Review, Vol. LX, No. CXXi (October, 1834),
pp. 220-221.
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hold; that to be consistent constitutes sincerity." 1

This "undoctrinal liberalism" 2 was expressed in Thomas
Arnold's view of religion and of education as follows: "what was
essential to Christianity was a personal devotion to Christ which
exhibited itself in manly and honourable conduct." 3 Arnold of Rugby,
was another of those who have "no creed or dogma...to 'mix,' when they
call out for Mixed Education" (13.9-12). In 1833, Dr. Arnold (1795-
1842) published his long pamphlet entitled Principles of Church Reform.
As a solution to what he considered the permanent dilemma of religious
disagreements afflicting the Christian community, Arnold proposed a
"'thoroughly united, thoroughly Christian' church, which would 'allow
great varieties of opinion, and of ceremonies, and of forms of worship
according to the various knowledge and habits and temples of its members
while it truly held one common faith, and trusted in one common saviour,
and worshipped one common God.' Arnold thought that only Quakers,
Unitarians and Roman Catholics would be left outside his great umbrella,
and even they might be prompted to give up their silly notions if

1 J. H. Newman, "Holy Scripture in its Relation to the


3 Ibid., p. 78.
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confronted with a genuinely national Church. ¹ For Sir William Hamilton, the Oriel Poetics—among whom were numbered R. D. Hampden and Dr. Arnold—and indeed for all adherents of the Broad Church, religious differences were really immaterial in that they were based not on dogma and creed, but on opinion and a variety of practices; consequently, there was no reason why Oxford education should remain denominational to the exclusion of the Dissenters. The basic principle of education for the Broad Church was not Christianity based on dogma and creed, but rather a vague kind of Christianity the essential tenet of which was the kind of high moral enthusiasm that Arnold proclaimed at Rugby.

13.19-22 "It is not surprising...public concern." The "clear-sighted persons" refer to the Tractarians who fought against the admission of Dissenters and the appointment of R. D. Hampden as Regius Professor of Divinity in that they saw clearly that both events would be the undermining of a definite belief as the basis of education at Oxford and thereby the substitution of private judgment ² in a matter of public concern—education.

13.22-27 "It is not surprising...National Education." Sir Robert Peel Prime Minister of England in 1845, one such statesman, "with

¹ O'Connell, The Oxford Conspirators, p. 78.

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a thousand conflicting claims and interests to satisfy" (13.23-24),
decided to solve the problem of a university education in Ireland for
sects other than Anglicans by establishing in Belfast, Cork, and Galway
the Queen's Colleges. These were to provide undenominational education
for a mixed student body comprising mainly Roman Catholics and
Presbyterians, who were excluded, on equal terms, from the Anglican
institution of Trinity College, Dublin. Provisions were made at the
Queen's Colleges for a strictly non-sectarian education. "No religious
tests were to be imposed either at entrance or on admission to degrees,
no religious instruction was to be given except what might be provided
by the various religious bodies at their own expense, no religious
considerations were to weigh in the appointment or dismissal of
officials." ¹ Yet the English Tory government, while proposing
scrupulously to eliminate any sectarian tinge from the new Irish
foundations, ² decided to maintain the ancient character of Trinity
College, Dublin as an Anglican University.

13.27 ² 14.21 "...I can conceive the most consistent men,...,
it is administered." From the context it would seem that Newman is
referring to certain Protestants who believed in their own system of
doctrine as the basis of their own denominational education, but

¹ Fergal McGrath, Newman's University, p. 43.
² Ibid., p. 43.
motivated by the view that "expedience is often one form of necessity" (14.4-5), they felt obliged to offer a system of Mixed Education to the Irish which they would not advocate in their own schools and universities. Two such English statesmen were Stanley, afterwards the Earl of Derby and Sir Robert Peel. In 1839 Lord John Russell's government proposed on the suggestion of Dr. Kay-Shuttleworth to establish in England "a State Training College, in which, on the Irish model, general religious training would be given by the professors, and special religious training left to the ministers of the various denominations," ¹ Stanley, the Chief Secretary for Ireland and "the foster-father of undenominational education in Ireland" ² spoke in Parliament as follows: he said that

he was not contending for the absolute control of the Church over education, but that education, whether of members of the Church or of Dissenters, was not a thing apart from religion. But it was a thing necessarily combined with religion, and necessarily dependent on religion—a thing of which religious doctrine and religious faith must be made the grounds and motives.

...Religion should be interwoven with all systems of education, controlling and regulating the whole minds and habits and principles of the persons receiving instruction. ³

¹ Fergal McGrath, Newman's University, p. 41.
² Ibid., p. 41.
³ Ibid.; pp. 41-42.
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The storm of protest which came from the Anglican community over this proposal for "a system of education which should be religious but not denominational," ¹ resulted in the project's being abandoned. Stanley—one among many—had voiced Newman's basic principle of education; yet Stanley implemented a scheme of undenominational National Education in Ireland begun in 1832, under the expediency of providing as he wrote in a letter of 1831, "a combined Literary and a separate Religious Education...from which should be banished even the suspicion of proselytism," ² in order to satisfy the respective educational needs of children from Anglican, Catholic, and Presbyterian homes.

In 1845, during the Queen's Colleges' controversy, Sir Robert Peel considered "that circumstances in Ireland made the undenominational system unavoidable. 'I admit,' said Peel, 'that I think the system we propose inapplicable to England and Scotland; but, if we are to have academical institutions in Ireland, I see no other mode of securing that advantage but by the establishment of some such system as this. I justify it by the peculiar and unfortunate character of the religious differences which there exist.'" ³ It was, therefore, a matter of


² Ibid., p. 29.

³ Ibid., p. 59.
political expediency, rather than personal conviction that motivated such English statesmen as Stanley and Peel to implement systems of undenominational education in Ireland.

14.4-14 "Necessity has no law...if we could" is the only paragraph included in the 1873 edition of pages 11 to 16 in the 1852 edition. This paragraph is actually more suited to its original context in the 1852 edition where Newman is dealing with the subject of Mixed Education. The sentence immediately preceding this paragraph in the 1852 edition expresses the idea that even those most attached to their own doctrine still under "the stress of necessity or the recommendations of expedience" (14.3.4) consent "to schemes of Education from which Religion is altogether or almost excluded" (14.1.2). Thus the sentence beginning "Necessity has no law..." follows logically from the preceding thought concerning Mixed Education. However, in the 1873 edition the preceding sentence concerns the union of Theology and the secular sciences—a sentence which does not lead logically and necessarily to the section beginning "Necessity has no law..." Even the sentences following this excerpt, although they do clarify the meaning to some extent, do not justify its inclusion in the 1873 context. Here is an instance in which Newman's original thought is fragmented by
his editing of the 1852 text for subsequent editions.

14.22 - 15.4 "Protestants...secular Education one."

Newman's argument in pp. 13-14 is summarized in the following sentence: "Men who profess a religion, if left to themselves, make religious and secular Education one" (15.2-4). A point of view that underlies Discourse I is that denominational education, far from being a desire peculiar to Catholics, is actually strongly adhered to by all Protestant sects which hold a definite system of belief: only those Protestants, such as Hampden or Arnold, who "have no special attachment to the dogmas which are compromised" (14.26-27), or those such as Stanley and Peel who "when they find it impossible,...to carry out their attachment to them in practice, [such as in Ireland] without prejudicial consequences greater than those which that comprehension involves" (14.28 - 15.2) are they "both advocates and promoters of Mixed Education" (14.23).

15.4-15 "Where,...shall we find...with each other." Newman is emphasizing that Anglicans, regardless of whether they belong to the High Church or Low Church party are advocates of denominational education who, therefore, oppose "efforts of politicians to fuse their respective systems of Education with those either of Catholics or of sectaries" (15.11-13). The Dissenters' Controversy was an instance in which the two old parties, the Tory High Church and the Whig Low Church joined forces against the Liberals led by Hampden and Arnold who were supported by such
other Oriel noetics as Whately and Hawkins. Concerning the university vote in 1835 over the necessity of subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles, O'Connell comments as follows: "It was now the Anglican liberals—what one day would be called the Broad Church—ranged against an unlikely alliance of Tories, Tractarians and Evangelicals." 1

The Low Churchmen held that the Bible, as interpreted by private judgment, was their sole Rule of Faith. For them Christianity came to its purest form in the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century, led by the great reformers, Luther and Calvin. Evangelicalism inspired by the Wesleyan revival, was a growing characteristic of the Low Church. On the other hand, the High Church sought its origins in the Church of Antiquity and considered itself in agreement with Archbishop Laud and the Anglican Divines of the seventeenth century. 2 The Tractarians who sought to revive the Anglo-Catholic Traditions of the High Church, particularly that of the authority of the Ancient Church, were usually opposed to the private judgment interpreters of the Bible—the Low Churchmen, but the fact the Low Church members supported the Tractarians on the occasion of the vote over subscription lends weight to Newman's argument that regardless of even fundamental differences, all the Anglican sects that retained a definite belief held the necessity of


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maintaining religion as the basis of education.

15.16-28 "...we all know into what various persuasions the English constituency is divided...Anglican, Wesleyan, Calvinistic, or so-called Evangelical...religious Education." "Anglican" refers specifically to the High Church in which there were two groups; namely, the Orthodox or Conservative and, after 1833, the Anglo-Catholic or Tractarian. For example, as a member of the landed gentry, John Keble belonged to the former group; but as an advocate of church renewal through a return to the ancient traditions of the Church, Keble was also a Tractarian. Newman belonged specifically to the latter group. It was the Tractarians in particular who fought in the 1834-35 Dissenters' Controversy to keep Oxford Anglican. Also as regards elementary education, even in the National Schools of "The National Society for promoting the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church throughout England and Wales" the religious teaching was Anglicanism as expressed by the Catechism and the Book of Common Prayer.¹

On the other hand, the "Wesleyan, Calvinistic, or so-called Evangelical" persuasions were all, at least in their beginnings, Anglican Low Church. Over and above the different "argumentative basis" (16.5) on which each sect held the necessity for religion in education, the Evangelicals of the Low Church supported the Tractarians in the

¹ J. W. Adamson, English Education, p. 25.
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Dissenters' Controversy—the battle to keep a definite belief as the basis of Oxford education. O'Connell notes that the Evangelicals "achieved what Wesley had failed to achieve, the rescue of the Established Church from the indifferentism and rationalism which had disfigured her through most of the eighteenth century." In that the Tractarians were waging a like battle against "indifferentism and rationalism," in the Church of England although in the intellectual rather than social field, they held common ground with and had the support of the Evangelicals in the subscription vote. Therefore, until the time of the 1852 Royal Commission Report, the "various persuasions" of Anglicanism had been "resolute and successful in preventing the national separation of secular and religious Education" (15.26-28).

However, the "argumentative basis" (16.5), for religion in education held by the various sects was indeed different. John Wesley (1703-1791), Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford and an Anglican clergyman to the end of his life, established Sunday Schools in his parishes for children of poor families. But for Wesley, secular learning was to serve religion. "Methodism's stress on a personal religion founded on the Bible implied certain intellectual requirements: the individual must be taught to read and understand and search the inspired Scriptures if he was to be able to make them a personal possession and so achieve

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1 Marvin O'Connell, The Oxford Conspirators, p. 46.
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salvation." Since secular subjects were taught only indirectly in Methodist Sunday Schools, the chief benefit of these schools was moral rather than intellectual. "Wesley claimed that they restrained children from vice and taught them good manners." 2

As a further indication that the Wesleyans were among those persuasions which made their belief the basis for their education, it is worth noting that Wesley built a day school at Kingswood for the sons of his preachers which proved to be the forerunner of many Methodist Colleges. Also, the other three schools founded by Wesley "in London, Bristol, and Newcastle were but the forerunner of the great number of day schools which made Methodism in the last century rank with the Church of England as the greatest force for popular education in England. In 1841 a Committee on Education was set up and its duties outlined. Schools were to have the Authorized Version Bible and the Wesleyan Catechism. The Christian Psalmody and the Wesleyan Hymn Book were used. On the other hand, sectarianism was to be avoided, and children of all denominations admitted. Each school was to be under the care of a local Commission, but every teacher had to be a Wesleyan and be recommended by


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his Superintendent Minister." Edwards summarizes Wesley's contribution as follows: "No one in Georgian England did more than Wesley to foster...the growth [of popular education]. It has been aptly said that he was the 'best gatherer and scatterer of useful knowledge' in that century." Furthermore, H. C. Barnard notes that "the democratic organization of Methodism, with its local preachers and lay administrators, helped to train up among the workers a generation which later was to take a lead in the struggle for political reform. ...in chapel life workingmen first learnt to speak and to organize, to persuade and to trust, their fellows. Much effort that soon afterwards went into political, trade-union, and co-operative activities was then devoted to the chapel community." Adult education became a necessity. Adult Sunday Schools, Night Schools, and the Mechanics Institutes, as well as the distribution of useful knowledge in printed form to a labouring population (of which more will be said in connection with a later Discourse) were all the outgrowth of the particular kind of education that had its basis in Methodism.

The following summary of the characteristics of Methodist education are noteworthy as providing a contrast with Newman's idea:

1 Edwards, John Wesley, p. 143.

2 Ibid., pp. 135-136.

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Initially, Methodist education was for a religious purpose, that of learning the Scripture which would in turn promote moral improvement; later, particularly applicable to adult education, the learning of wholly secular subjects had as their motive the obtaining of immediately useful knowledge, for the work-a-day world; and lastly, the religion taught in Methodist day schools was of a non-sectarian nature and therefore children of all denominations could be admitted.

The centre of Evangelicalism within the Church of England was Clapham near London. There William Wilberforce settled with his family in 1797 and became the leader of a group known as the Clapham Sect—a community organized around long devotions and hardwork whose members devoted their wealth to missionary zeal on behalf of their fellowmen. The main tenet of Evangelicalism was the intimate, personal relation between God and the individual soul. Consequently, the Clapham Sect founded such associations for the spread of Christianity to individuals as the Church Missionary Society (1797) and the British and Foreign Bible Society (1804); they maintained schools, savings banks and village libraries. Their great social project was the abolition of the slave trade (1833). ¹ Thus Evangelical education was motivated towards the doing of good works for the social betterment of mankind, not towards the training of the individual's mind.

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It is interesting to note that according to Adamson, the Clapham Sect supported the educational system of Andrew Bell (1753-1832) and Joseph Lancaster (1778-1838)—a monitory system that resulted in the mechanical character of the teaching in their schools. "'The grand principle of Dr. Bell's system,'... 'is the division of labour applied to intellectual purposes. ...The principle in schools "and manufactories" is the same." 1 Also, Adamson notes that "The friends of Lancaster organized themselves in 1808 into a committee which became in 1814, 'The British and Foreign School Society.' The 'British Schools' supervised and supported by this Society confined their religious instruction to Bible-reading and to what Lancaster called 'general Christian principles,' but which is now known as undenominationalism, the preference of Dissent and the Radical party..." 2 The Wesleyans and Evangelicals did indeed develop an education based on their view of Christianity.


2 Ibid., p. 25.
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The foregoing annotation of 15.16-28 serves two purposes: first, it gives references to elaborate on Newman's viewpoint that the Protestant sects which do profess a definite system of belief—Anglican, Wesleyan, and Evangelical—make that system the basis of their education. Therefore, Irish Catholics should realize that in establishing the Catholic University of Ireland, they are following a precedent zealously fostered in Protestant England by certain sects at all levels of education.

Secondly, an effect of the information thus assembled is the presentation of a brief account of English Protestant elementary education as it laid the foundation in the first half of the nineteenth century for the following three principles of education that had their origins in Methodism and Evangelicalism; namely, the emphasis on useful knowledge; education motivated by the moral improvement, in the sense of improved conduct, of the individual and society; and an education based on a religion, which tended to be diluted to general Christian principles.

It was these three principles that had found expression in
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varying degrees at the University level in London University (established in 1828); and indeed the very principles that Newman found himself vigorously opposing in the 1852 Discourses: In Discourses II to V Newman presents arguments for an education that includes Theology as an intellectual preparation for a religion based on a definite dogma and creed rather than a diluted kind of general Christianity "that clear-sighted persons" (13.20) saw leading inevitably to religious indifferentism. Discourses VI to VIII express the idea that an education motivated solely by the immediately useful is one that provides so little for the mind and character of the individual person and is, therefore, correctly speaking, no education at all. Thirdly, an education for the moral and thence the social improvement of the individual and society in so far as conduct or outward appearances are concerned, Newman argues in Discourses IX and X becomes an education based not on Christianity, but on the Religion of Philosophy, a kind of counterfeit Christianity.

15.28 - 16.7 "This concurrence,...would be found to rest."

What Newman has been explaining throughout this important section (11.5-16.21) which he omitted from the 1873 edition is that Mixed Education has not been acceptable and is not acceptable in 1852 to those who have any definite doctrine to profess, be they Protestant or Catholic. At the time of the controversy over admitting Dissenters to Oxford, Mixed Education was not acceptable to those sects of Protestants—Anglican, Wesleyan, and Evangelical—who professed a definite belief as the basis
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of education; nor, Newman implies, should Mixed Education be acceptable to Irish Catholics whose belief is certainly based on definite doctrinal principles; therefore, Catholics should find an example in and take a precedent for their own denominational education in the English Protestant abhorrence of Mixed Education.

16.21 - 17.26 "The Church has ever appealed...'cuique in sua arte credendum.'...necessary for herself." In this section the name mentioned place rhetorical emphasis on the idea that the Catholic Church has ever, in the plentitude of her divine illumination, made use of whatever truth or wisdom she has found in" (17.20-22) the teachings and writings of "heretical scholars, critics, and antiquarians" (16.28-29).

16.25-26 "'Cuique in sua arte credendum'.' "'Each man is to be trusted in his own special art'.'" Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I, 3, 1094 b states as follows: "Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge." The quotation serves as the theme of 16.21 - 17.26: specialists in particular areas of human wisdom should be listened to and accepted in regard to the area of knowledge in which they are learned even though they may be "unbelievers and pagans" (16.26-27) as regards their religious beliefs.

16.29 - 17.1 "She has worded her theological teaching in the phraseology of Aristotle;..." In the lecture "Christianity and Scientific Investigation," Newman elaborates on the fact that St.
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Thomas in his theology made use of the ideas and terms of Aristotle's philosophy: in "the classical period of the schoolmen...it was the Dominican and Franciscan doctors, the greatest of them being St. Thomas, who in those medieval Universities fought the battle of Revelation with the weapons of heathenism. It was no matter whose the weapon was; truth was truth all the world over. With the jawbone of an ass, with the skeleton philosophy of pagan Greece, did the Samson of the schools put to flight his thousand Philistines. ...the early Fathers [had] shown an extreme aversion to the great heathen philosopher now named, Aristotle. ...Aristotle was a word of offence; at length St. Thomas made him a hewer of wood and drawer of water to the Church. A strong slave he is; and the Church herself has given her sanction to the use in Theology of the ideas and terms of his philosophy." ¹

17.2-4 "Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, Origen, Eusebius, and Apollinaris." These early Church figures have in common the fact that although each one was declared heretical in some aspect of his teaching, he nevertheless supplied material for primitive exegetics. These instances from early Church history are references for Newman's argument that the Church has even made use of human learning and wisdom in whomever she found it.

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17.2 Aquila (117-138), Symmachus (193-211), and Theodotion (c.180) had in common the fact that each one made a translation of the Old Testament from Hebrew into Greek and that all three were Ebionites or Jewish Christians whose strict observance of the Mosaic Law and their retaining the Jewish idea of the Messiah led them to the heretical rejection of the Virgin Birth of Christ. Eusebius states that the translations of both Theodotion and Aquila interprete the Hebrew texts to mean that Christ was mere man and the son of Joseph. 1 Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that their authors were "heretical scholars" (16.28), each translation had its particular merits for subsequent Biblical scholars: Aquila's was an accurate, if too literal, translation of the Hebrew text, a veritable scholar's handbook; Symmachus' version combined accuracy with a more readable literary style; and Theodotion's translation--actually a correction of the Septuagint 2 --proved to be so valuable to Origen that he made free use of it in revising the Septuagint version for his Hexapla; in fact, Origen retained the whole

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2 The Septuagint was a Greek version of the Hebrew Old Testament made between 285 and 150 B.C. by seventy-two (hence the name "Septuagint") learned Jews (six from each tribe) from Jerusalem for the famous library at Alexandria. The Septuagint was the Bible of the Greek-speaking world at the time when Christianity spread over it and it was, therefore, in that form that the Gentile Christians received the Old Testament. Dictionary of the Bible, ed. James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963), pp. 347-349.
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of Theodotion's Book of Daniel. All three translations became part of Origēn's Hexapla which formed the basis of biblical scholarship for exegetes such as St. Jerome, who states that he had used the original copy preserved in Origēn's library at Caesarea.

17.2 Origēn (c.185-c.254) was an Alexandrian Biblical critic whose monumental contribution to exegesis was the Hexapla (sixfold), an elaborate edition of the Old Testament (begun c.231; finished c.245) which exhibited in parallel columns the Hebrew Text, a transliteration of it in Greek letters, the versions of Aquila, of Symmachus, of the Septuagint, and of Theodotion. Origēn's purpose in collating the extant versions of the Old Testament was to furnish adequate means for the reconstruction of the original text of the Septuagint which was exceedingly corrupt. Even though St. Jerome (c.342-420) condemned Origēn's view of the Trinity, the human soul, and life after death,

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1 Eusebius, "Church History," Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, p. 262. (Valuable also for the editors' notes on the three translators Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion.)


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Jerome studied Origen's Hexapla in preparation for his Latin version of the Old Testament based on the Greek versions and the Hebrew Text. 1 (Jerome's Vulgate (Old and New Testament) was completed c. 404.)

17.2 Eusebius (c.260–c.340), Bishop of Caesarea, earned the title of "Father of Church History" 2 for his celebrated Ecclesiastical History. Eusebius' contributions to exegesis were several transcriptions, before 307 with the collaboration of Pamphilus, of Origen's Septuagint containing marginal scholia which gave inter alia a selection of readings from the remaining versions of the Hexapla. In later years at the request of the Emperor, Eusebius was asked to prepare fifty copies of the Scriptures for use in the new Constantinopolitan churches. Some of these produced under Eusebius' supervision may be among our extant manuscripts. 3 Nevertheless, many of the Fathers, especially Jerome, as well as the Second Council of Nicaea accused Eusebius of holding the Arian heresy. Eusebius, who certainly had a sympathy with and a leaning towards Arianism, held the Divinity of


2 Ibid., p. 59.

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Christ; yet was convinced of his subordination to the Father. 1 Newman refers to Eusebius as a Semi-Arian. 2

17.3 Apollinaris (Apollinarius), "the Younger" (c.310-c.390) was the son of Apollinaris "the Elder" in conjunction with whom he reconstructed the Scripture on the classical models. According to Newman's description, "during the reign of Julian, when the Christian schools were shut up, and the Christian youth were debarred from the use of the classics [A.D. 362], the two Apollinares, father and son, exerted themselves to supply the inconvenience thence resulting from their own resources. They wrote heroical pieces, odes; tragedies and dialogues, after the style of Homer and Plato, and other standard authors, upon Christian subjects;" 3 Concerning Apollinaris "the Younger" as an exegete Newman states that "his expositions on Scripture were the most numerous of his works; he especially excelled in eliciting and illustrating its sacred meaning, and he had sufficient acquaintance with the Hebrew to enable him to translate or comment on the

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original texts"^1^ particularly on Proverbs, Ezekiel, Isaiah, and the
Epistle to the Romans. However, Apollinaris was considered the
initiator of a Christological heresy called after him, Apollinarianism,
which "denied that our Lord was perfect man, that He had a 'rational'
soul in addition to His Divine Nature."^2^ Newman explains that
"Apollinaris, after a life of laborious service in the cause of religion,
did but suffer himself to teach that the Divine Intelligence in our Lord
superseded the necessity of His having any other, any human intellect."^3^

The significance for the context of Newman's citing the last
three scholars—Origen, Eusebius, and Apollinaris—is that their writings
"supplied materials for primitive exegetics" (17.4) as did those of
Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, even though at certain times in their
lives their writings were condemned as heretical. Analogously, Newman
establishes the view that Anglicans, considered somewhat heterodox by
Catholics, nevertheless, can provide principles of education which are a
reminder to Catholics that "Christianity, and nothing short of it, must

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^2^ J. H. Newman, "The Heresy of Apollinaris," Tracts Theological

^3^ J. H. Newman, "What Says the History of Apollinaris?"
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be made the basis of education."

17.4-13 "St. Cyprian...and Paley." The references in this
section make particular Newman's idea that truth is truth wherever it is
found in that they illustrate the idea that the orthodox learn from, or
profit from association with, the works of the heterodox.

17.4-5 "St. Cyprian called Tertullian his master;" St.
Cyprian (c.200-258) like Tertullian (160-240) was born a pagan, received
an excellent training in rhetoric, and practised law in the city of
Carthage. 1 Tertullian, converted to Christianity c.195 and ordained a
priest, was the first of the Fathers of the West to write apologetic,
theological, and ascetic works in Latin as the language of speculative
Christian writings rather than in Greek. 2 St. Jerome writes as follows
of Tertullian's influence on Cyprian: "The Blessed Cyprian takes
Tertullian for his master, as his writings prove: yet, delighted as he
is with the ability of this learned and zealous writer, he does not join
him in following Montanus and Maximilla." 3 Tertullian in spite of his
importance as the first Latin interpreter of Christian thought in the

1 Frank P. Cassidy, Molders of the Medieval Mind, pp. 102-103.

2 Ibid., pp. 105-106.

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West joined the sect of the Montanists; whereas, Cyprian, who is said to have read a part of Tertullian's works every day became Bishop of Carthage, a brilliant Latin writer, and author of De Catholicae Ecclesiae unitate, and finally a martyr for the faith in 258.

17.5-7 "Bossuet, in modern times, complimented the labours of the Anglican Bull;" Jacques Bénigne Bossuet (1627-1704), a French Catholic theologian and controversialist, one of the greatest pulpit orators in history, and the bishop of Meaux from 1681, published, among his many works an Exposition sur la doctrine catholique sur les matières de controverse (1671) and a Discours sur l'histoire universelle (1681). George Bull (1634-1710), a staunch English High Anglican Churchman, a graduate of Exeter College, Oxford and Bishop of St. David's, published in 1685 his celebrated treatise, Defence of the Nicene Faith in which he maintained in opposition to the Jesuit Petavius that the teaching of the pre-Nicene Fathers on the Trinity completely agreed

1 F. P. Cassidy, Holders of the Medieval Mind, p. 106.

2 The Montanists, originating in Phrygia about 172, were founded by Montanus who was assisted in his apostolate by two women Maximilla and Priscilla. The sect was characterized by moral austerity, a belief in the advent of the Holy Spirit incarnate in the person of Montanus, and the impending second advent of Christ. F. P. Cassidy, Holders of the Medieval Mind, p. 103.

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with that of orthodox theologians of Nicene and post-Nicene times. Newman writes that the French Church transmitted to Bull, through Bossuet, "the congratulations of the whole clergy of France assembled at St. Germain's [Synod of 1686], for the service he had rendered to the Church Catholic," \(^1\) in his "defence of the Creed of Nicaea,..." \(^2\)

17.7-9 "the Benedictine editors...and Severidge." The French Benedictines of Saint-Maur whose members edited volumes of the Fathers in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries were, according to Newman, familiar with the seventeenth century studies of the Fathers made by the English and Irish Anglican theologians Fell, Ussher, Pearson, and Severidge. The Benedictine Congregation of Saint-Maur, founded in 1621, was a unique phenomenon in the whole history of literature and erudition: it was the realisation of a large and permanent corporation of learned men working in common through successive generations \(^3\) in all departments of knowledge, not only in the


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history of France and of the Church, but also in classical literature, Hebrew, the arts, geography, and the natural sciences. The great period of research and publication of the Haurists, whose chief house was Saint-Germain-des-Prés in Paris, was between 1640 and 1789. Among the many able scholars of the order who edited works of the early Church for publication were Luc d’Achery (see below, the "Appendix," 378.17-25), who published the Epistle of Barnabas in 1645, the first early Greek text edited by a member of the order for publication; Jean Labillón, whose era St. Augustine, the first of the Latin Fathers to be published, was issued in eleven volumes between 1679 and 1700; and Bernard Montfaucon, who edited the Greek Fathers dealing especially with Athanasius, Origen, and St. John Chrysostom between 1698 and 1741.\(^1\) The Opera of Gregory Nazianzen was begun by Prudence Maran in 1788. The order, dispersed during the French Revolution, was restored in 1837 at the Abbey of Solesmes near Cambrai. One of the members, Jean-Baptiste Pitra published the Spicilegium Solesmense, a collection of unpublished writings of the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers in four volumes published between 1852 and 1858.\(^2\) (See below, the "Appendix" 392.34 - 395.20 and 395.21 - 396.7 for Newman’s reference to another Haurist contribution to


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learning.

17.8 John Fell (1625-1686), Dean of Christ Church, Oxford and bishop of Oxford was known to be one of the staunchest opponents of popery, yet Fell had the Bodleian MSS. of St. Augustine's works collated for the use of the Benedictines of Paris who were preparing a new edition (see above, 17.7-9). Fell's own great critical edition of the works of St. Cyprian (Oxford 1682) is his most remarkable publication. 1

17.8 James Ussher (1581-1656), educated at Trinity College, Dublin, was appointed the first professor of Divinity there in 1607 and was made Vice-Chancellor of Trinity College in 1614 and 1617. Appointed Anglican Archbishop of Armagh, Ussher was a scholar and historian of vast learning whose systematic reading of the Fathers after 1599 was the background for his distinguishing the seven genuine from the later spurious letters of St. Ignatius of Antioch. 2

17.8 John Pearson (1613-1686), Bishop of Chester, was educated at Eton and Queen's College, Cambridge. The notes to the Text of his Exposition of the Creed (1659) reflect his remarkable knowledge, especially of the Christian Fathers. Newman commends Pearson "for a

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2 Ibid., Vol. XX, pp. 64-72.
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powerful argument in behalf of the Apostolical origin of Episcopacy." 1 Also, Pearson's Vindiciae Epistolae S. Ignatii (1672) is an elaborate defence of the authenticity of the Epistles of St. Ignatius. In 1682 Pearson prefixed the: "Annales" to Bishop Fell's edition of St. Cyprian.

17.9 William Beveridge (1637-1708), bishop of St. Asaph, was educated at St. John's College, Cambridge. In 1672 he published at Oxford his great collection of apostolic canons and decrees of the councils received by the Greek Church, together with the canonical epistles of the Fathers. These two huge folios of Greek and Latin are a monumental evidence of the compiler's erudition. 2

17.9-11 "Pope Benedict XIV. cites...the works of Protestants without reserve,..." Pope Benedict XIV (1675-1758), Pope from 1740, held a doctorate in law and theology from the University of Rome. An able scholar, he was a patron of learning, the arts, and sciences. Benedict was, as well, an exemplary administrator whose prudence and ability were respected in the courts of Europe, Protestant as well as


3 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 447.
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Catholic. In addition to his writings on beatification and canonization, Diocesan Synods, and the Sacrifice of the Mass, his own Bulls, collected in Bullarium Benedicti XIV, frequently embodied scientific disquisitions. His interest in literature and science led to his correspondence with many scholars and men of letters whose religious opinions differed from his own. For example, Benedict's correspondence with Voltaire, caused no little criticism in ecclesiastical circles. ¹ (See below, the "Appendix," 376.23-377.3, for a further reference to Benedict the Fourteenth.)

17.11 "...the late French collection of Christian Apologists..." Newman is referring to Demonstrations évangéiques, ed. M. l'abbé Frédéric Édouard Chassay and published by M. l'abbé Jacques Paul Migne (Paris: Petit-Montrouge, 1842-1853) in eighteen volumes. Volume IV contains Locke and Burnet; Volume VII, Tillotson; and Volume XIV, Paley. The reference to a French collection of Christian Apologists containing the writings of the Protestant writers Locke, Burnet, Tillotson, and Paley is the last in a series of illustrations, beginning with Aristotle and coming down the centuries to the nineteenth, that Newman cites to illustrate the fact that he can make reference to the Oxford ideal of education while being

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confident that he is within the tradition of the Church who has ever
"made use of whatever truth or wisdom she found in their [those external
to her pale] teaching or their measures" (17.21-23).

17.12 John Locke (1632-1704), the "father of classical
British empiricism," ¹ was educated at Westminster School and Christ
Church, Oxford, where he was made lecturer in Greek in 1660, and later
Reader in rhetoric and Censor of Moral Philosophy. As a friend of Sir
Robert Boyle, Locke became interested in chemistry and physics, and also
pursued studies in medicine, obtaining his medical degree in 1674.

Locke's principal work is his Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690),
a work to which Newman frequently refers in the Discourses. His Some
Thoughts concerning Education (1693) was a series of letters to a friend
concerning giving his son a gentleman's education. ² Copleston gives
this estimate of Locke: "He was an empiricist, in the sense that he
believed that all the material of our knowledge is supplied by sense-
perception and introspection. But he was not an empiricist in the sense
that he thought that we can know only sense-presentations. ...He was a
rationalist in the sense that he believed in bringing all opinions and

¹ Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 4 (New

² Ibid., Vol. 5, pp. 76-78.
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beliefs before the tribunal of reason.... But he was not a rationalist in the sense of one who denies spiritual reality or the supernatural order or the possibility of divine revelation of truths which, while not contrary to reason, are above reason, in the sense that they cannot be discovered by reason alone and may not be fully understandable even when revealed." ¹ Newman wrote that although he found himself the opponent of Locke's views on occasion, he had a high "respect both for the character and the ability of Locke, for his manly simplicity of mind and his outspoken candour, and there is so much in his remarks upon reasoning and proof in which I fully concur,..." ²

17.12 Gilbert Burnet (1643-1715), professor of Divinity at Glasgow University from 1669 to 1674, was made Bishop of Salisbury in 1689. A staunch Whig in politics and a latitudinarian in theology, he endeavoured to carry through plans which would allow of the incorporation of the Nonconformists into the Church of England. He was also a voluminous author and a determined political controversialist. His most noteworthy writings were his History of the Reformation in England (3 vols., 1679-1714), Exposition of the XXXIX Articles (1699),

¹ Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 5, p. 79.

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and his History of My Own Times (2 vols., 1723-34). 1

17.13 John Tillotson (1630-1694), educated at Clare Hall, Cambridge, he became Archbishop of Canterbury. He wished to be rid of the Athanasian Creed and held Zwinglian doctrines about the Eucharist. His policy was dictated by hatred of the Roman Catholic Church and a desire to include all Protestant dissenters other than Unitarians in the Church of England. A famous preacher, he was a pattern on which the eighteenth century divines modelled their sermons. 2

17.3 William Paley (1743-1805) was educated at Christ's College, Cambridge where his unusual abilities, especially in mathematics, attracted much attention. His first book, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785), was at once adopted at Cambridge as a standard textbook. In 1794 appeared the first edition of the famous View of the Evidences of Christianity which presented an external and somewhat mechanical view of revelation. His last book, Natural Theology (1802), covers in more thorough fashion parts of the same groundwork as the Evidences. Although he became fellow and tutor of his college, Christ's College, Cambridge, the latitudinarianism of his younger days is


2 Ibid., Vol. XIX, pp. 872-878.
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said to have debarred him from high ecclesiastical preferment which usually fell to men of his abilities. 1

Newman's view is that regardless of the fact that Locke, Burnet, Tillotson, and Paley were English and latitudinarian in religious tendencies, their inclusion in the French volumes of Christian Apologists was a recognition of their contribution to apologetic writings.

17.1-13 All the names in this section and their historical and ecclesiastical allusions Newman uses as historical proof of that fact that in "borrowing the views of certain Protestant schools" (17.14-15), especially that of the Oxford system, his view is in keeping with the policy of the Church, who has ever "in the plenitude of her divine illumination, made use of whatever truth or wisdom she has found in their teaching or their measures..." (17.20-23). Furthermore, Newman, in suggesting that "some of her children [the Church's] are likely to profit from external suggestions or lessons" (17.24-25), is intimating "the mode in which he proposes to handle his subject." (17.26-29); that is he has "no intention of bringing into the argument the authority of the Church at all; but [he will] consider the question simply on the grounds of human reason and human wisdom" (18.1-4). Newman is suggesting, therefore, that the principles of education he is proposing, far from

being the exclusive ideal of the Church are actually an ideal that has been and can be the product of human reason and human wisdom—has been embraced by other denominations and can be by the Catholic Church.

18.7-19.3 "...in particular cases...system of Mixed Education in the schools called National." Here Newman gives two examples of Mixed Education, one ancient, the other modern, which he admits are not abstractedly the best, and are "no pattern and precedent for others" (18.10-11).

18.11 - 19.3 "...in the early ages the Church sanctioned her children...the heathen schools...Pagan lecture halls." Writing of the early Christian Fathers and their patience in the face "of imperial encroachments on ecclesiastical rights," Newman states as follows: "How contented or resigned are they to avail themselves of such education as the state provided for their use; sending their children to the pagan schools, before they have teachers of their own, and, even when at length they have them, adopting the 'curriculum' of studies which those pagan schools had devised!" Also with reference to the state of society and education at the time of the rise of Charlemagne Newman


2 Ibid., pp. 437-438.
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writes as follows: "Up to the point at which a change was imperative, its institutions were suffered to remain just as they had been in paganism; Christianized just so far as to enable them to work Christian-wise, however cumbersomely or circuitously. And as to the system of education in particular, I suppose the primary, or, as they may be better called, the grammar schools, as far as they were not private speculations, were from first to last in the hands of the State; state-institutions, first of pagan, then of Mixed Education. ...She [the church] for the most part confined herself to the education of the clergy, and their ecclesiastical education; the laity and secular learning seem to have been still, more or less, in the charge of the State;—not, however, as if this were the best way of doing things, as the attempts I have spoken of bore testimony, but, because she found things in a certain state, and used them as best she could." 1

18.20 The footnote reference is to the doctoral dissertation for the Faculté de Lettres de Paris of M. L'Abbe Jean Philippe Auguste Lalanne, Influence des Pères de l'Eglise sur l'éducation publique pendant les cinq premiers siècles de l'ère Chrétienne (Paris: Sagnier et Bray, 1850) cited as a reference for the fact that saintly Bishops and authoritative Doctors had been educated in their adolescence in Pagan

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lecture halls (18.18-20).

18.21 - 19.3 "...at this very time, and in this very country, ...schools called national." The reference is to a system of Mixed Education in Ireland at the elementary level founded in 1831. Fergal McGrath describes the scheme as follows: "In 1828 the findings of the Royal Commission were submitted to a Select Committee on the House of Commons, which drew up a scheme for National Education, the main feature of which was that pupils of all denominations were to be united 'for the purpose of instructing them in the general subjects of moral and literary knowledge,' whilst facilities were to be provided 'for their religious instruction separately'."^1

"Protestant State Ecclesiastics" (18.25-26), such as the Protestant Archbishop of Dublin, were "enthusiastic supporters of the National System..."^2 Since Whately had been one of the Oriel Néotics of Newman's Oxford days, he was liberal or latitudinarian in religious tendencies and therefore could not "be supposed to be very sensitive about doctrinal truth" (18.26-27). Actually, it was "Whately's conviction that mixed education and, in particular, common religious teaching, would

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^2 Ibid., p. 36.
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prove a solvent to Catholic beliefs." 1

However, the bishops "showed by their actions their
willingness to make the best of the system. Dr. Murray, Archbishop of
Dublin, agreed to act as one of the commissioners, and National Schools
were shortly established under Catholic or mixed patronage all over the
country..." 2

19.12-16 "It is my happiness...to be guided simply by the
decision and recommendation of the Holy See...." Newman is reinforcing
his argument for the Oxford ideal by an appeal to authority that is also
an appeal to tradition: The medieval universities were established by
a Papal Bull which gave the university legal status. Similarly, the
Papal Rescripts to the Irish Bishops were, in 1852, an official
injunction that a university should be established. Furthermore, the
idea that the Catholic University of Ireland was being founded under
Papal authority suggested grounds for hope that the enterprise here
being launched would be successful: the following excerpt from "Moral
of that Characteristic of the Popes: Pius the Ninth" expresses
confidence in a project supported by "the Ark of God":

1 McGrath, Newman's University, pp. 37-38.

2 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
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When I consider what an eye the Sovereign Pontiffs have for the future; and what an independence in policy and vigour in action have been the characteristics of their present representative; ...and then, that the Holy Father has definitely put his finger upon Ireland, and selected her soil as the seat of a great Catholic University, to spread religion, science, and learning, wherever the English language is spoken; ...I care not what others think, I care not what others do, God has no need of men, oppose who will, shrink who will, I know and cannot doubt that a great work is begun. It is no great imprudence to commit oneself to a guidance which never yet has failed; nor is it surely irrational or fanatical to believe, that whatever difficulties or disappointments, reverses or delays, may be our lot in the prosecution of the work, its ultimate success is certain, even though it seems at first to fail,... 1

19.27-29 "appear before you,...not prior to the decision of Rome..., but after it. ...He has sanctioned at this time a particular measure... ." Again for rhetorical emphasis Newman stresses the role of the Papacy in the establishment of the Catholic University of Ireland. Actually, the Irish bishops had come to consider Mixed Education, which

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had been tolerated as a temporary measure, an increasingly intolerable situation as "it appeared that some members of the administering board, including Archbishop Whately, were using it as an instrument of proselytism." 1 Unable to agree among themselves, the Irish Bishops referred the matter to Rome and received in 1841 a cautious and indecisive answer. 2 The answer to the Bishops' request for Papal judgment, which was all but ignored until the consecration of Pius IX in 1846, was "embodied in the Rescript which finally was released by the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda on October 9, 1847. 'Grave danger to the Catholic faith,' said the Rescript may be feared from the Queen's Colleges, and it admonished the Irish prelates 'to take no part in them'". 3 A Second Rescript on October 11, 1848 confirmed the position taken in Rescript I. After the Queen's Colleges at Belfast, Cork, and Galway had opened their doors in 1849, a Third Rescript in April 1850 "prohibited the clergy from holding any office in the colleges and laid on the bishops the obligation of discouraging their subjects from entering." 4

19.29 The "distinguished persons" refers to the Irish Bishops,

1 A. D. Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p.126.

2 F. McGrath, The Consecration of Learning, p.35.

3 A. D. Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p.127.

4 Ibid., p.128.
principally Dr. Cullen who had been Rector of the Irish College in Rome until in 1849 he replaced Dr. Crolly as Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of all Ireland.

20.1 "...honoured me with a share of their work" refers not only to Dr. Cullen's invitation to deliver the Discourses, but also to the Papal Brief which sanctioned Newman's appointment as Rector of the new university. "On April 15, 1851, Dr. Cullen wrote to Newman about plans for the new university and asked his advice on the selection of a superior, a vice-president, and professors." ¹ On July 8, 1851 Cullen visited the oratory and asked Newman formally to be Rector. Newman accepted on July 23 with the proviso "to do as much work for the University as possible with 'as little absence as possible' from this place." ²

20.8-9 "...questions which have been determined without me and before me" refers to the decisions of the Synod of Irish Bishops convoked at Thurles on August 22, 1850 in order to implement the directions of the Rescripts, both First and Second of which had suggested the establishment of a Catholic University.

20.10-11 Newman's statement in the "Tamworth Reading Room"

² Ibid., p. 316.
letters is a clear expression of the "great principle" he had found implicit in Oxford education and that he sought to make the basis of the new Catholic University of Ireland. In 1841 Newman had written as follows: "Christianity, and nothing short of it, must be made the element and principle of all education. Where it has been laid as the first stone, and acknowledged as the governing spirit, it will take up into itself, assimilate, and give a character to literature and science. Where Revealed Truth has given the aim and direction to Knowledge, Knowledge of all kinds will minister to Revealed Truth." 1

20.12-15 "...the cause...of my selection, and the ground of my acquiescence," That Newman was the proponent of the "great principle" basic to Oxford education was surely an important reason for his acquiescence, but the cause of his selection, if such can be inferred from the words of Dr. Cullen's invitation, seemed to be that the committee were interested, not in Newman's former affiliations with the University of Oxford, but with the fact that he was an important public figure who had recently become a Catholic and his name would lend prestige to the establishment of an institution whose purpose Dr. Cullen saw as primarily religious.

20.17-21.2 "As the royal matron...failed to secure at home!"

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Newman makes apt rhetorical use of the Moses story in Exodus: 2 as a means of drawing together the two themes of this Introductory Discourse: first, the truths basic to the Oxford system of education; and secondly, the authority of the church in commanding the establishment of a university which Newman sees will resemble Oxford in its religious exclusiveness and, he hopes, in a like tradition of scholarship available to Catholics. The simile makes the "royal matron" who adopts the foreign child, the Hebrew Moses, and then commits him to the care of his natural mother analogous to the Irish Clergy's adopting Oxford educational principles and then selecting himself as the one to take charge of and put into practice ideas that "were intimately mine by the workings of my own mind, and the philosophy of human schools."
The last sentence of the extended simile is particularly appropriate in that it emphasizes the reason the project of the University of Ireland was particularly dear to Newman's own heart. Like Moses', natural mother whose "jealous artifices" had failed to make secure her child's life at home, Newman had been unable to preserve the important aspects of the Oxford system while he was member of his beloved university; however, now that "the suggestions of reason" have been "honoured with a royal adoption" he hopes to see his "offspring" grow to maturity in a foreign land.
expressed in smooth-flowing prose cumulative in its effect of disarming
tension by anticipating objections (23.9-27), sympathizing with
misgivings (23.27-24.9), giving the audience credit for their under-
standing of the problem (24.20-25.2), and returning to the fact that
must, in the orator's and his audience's view, end all argument—"After
all, Peter has spoken" (25.21).

25.22 26.5 The eulogy of the Vicar of Christ in these lines
is made particularly effective by the use of the figure of speech in
which Peter is made to stand for all his successors. In this memorable
piece of rhetoric Newman uses all the oratorical resources of repetition
balanced, and parallel constructions in order to emphasize the power and
influence of tradition represented in "the Chair of the Apostles."

26.6-27 This paragraph was omitted from the 1873 edition. It
continues the eulogy of "Peter", but adds little of importance except
that the opening sentence reaffirms Newman's purpose as rhetorical. He
seems to be emphasizing the importance of the Papacy lest he lose the
sympathy of his audience with a too early and too emphatic stress on his
own real interest—the Oxford system with its religious basis, but its
secular curriculum.

26.28 - 28.7 This section was retained in the 1873 edition.
Although Newman assures his audience that these "are not words of
rhetoric,...but of history," he brings all his oratorical resources
into this effective section.
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27.12 "The sophist" seems to be used as an approbrius term here meaning a sceptic in matters of religion and ethics or one of a body of pseudo-intellectuals who were skilful debaters, but were thought to be lacking in ability or originality of philosophical thought.

27.15-16 "...and Peter went out..." refers to the action of Leo I, called the Great (Pope 440-461), who when Attila invaded Italy in 452 and threatened Rome, went to meet him, with two important civil functionaries, and so impressed Attila that he withdrew his armies to beyond the Danube. Newman describes Pope Leo's encounters with the Barbarian leaders as follows: "...when Attila was advancing against the city, the bishop of Rome of the day, St. Leo, formed one of a deputation of three, who went out to meet him, and was successful in arresting his purpose. A few years afterwards, Genseric, the most savage of the barbarian conquerors, appeared before the defenceless city. The same fearless prelate went out to meet him at the head of his clergy, and though he did not avail to save the city from pillage, yet he gained a promise that the unsurging multitude should be spared, the buildings protected from fire, and the captives from torture. Thus from Goth, Hun and Vandal, did the Christian Church shield the guilty city in which she dwelt. What a wonderful rule of God's providence is herein displayed, which occurs daily! the Church sanctifies yet suffers with the world, sharing its sufferings yet lightening them."

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28.1 "Joseph of Germany and his confederates..." Joseph II 1741-1790 was the son of Maria Theresa and Francis I. After the death of Mariâ Theresa in 1780 Joseph proceeded to attempt to realize his ideal of a paternal despotism. Among changes he made were the secularization of church lands and the reduction of the religious orders and the clergy to complete submission to the lay state. His anti-clerical innovations which induced Pope Pius VI to pay him a visit in July, 1782, as well as his interference with ancient custom, caused unrest in the hereditary lands of the empire. Shortly before his death, Joseph, worn-out and broken-hearted, recognized that his servants could not or would not carry out his plans. On January 30, 1790, he formally withdrew all his reforms, and he died on February 20, 1790. It would seem that the Pope's triumph over Joseph of Germany was a delayed rather than immediate one, since, on the occasion of the Pope's visit in 1782, Joseph was polite, but refused to be influenced.

28.2 "Napoleon...and his dependent kings..." refers to Napoleon I 1769-1821. On December 2, 1804 at Notre Dame in Paris, Pope Pius VII crowned Napoleon Bonaparte Emperor of the French. Napoleon made his brother Joseph King of Naples and later gave him the throne of Charles IV of Spain, making Murat, who had married Caroline Bonaparte, King of Naples. His brother Louis he made King of Holland. A series of actions embroiled him with the Pope and embittered the Catholic world. Napoleon's army had occupied the Papal States and by 1811 Rome was but
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the capital of the department of the Tiber. The Pope had been deported to Savona and was about to be imprisoned at Fontainebleau. In turn, Napoleon was excommunicated. Only in his humiliating demand for asylum from the British government after his military defeat at Waterloo and his consequent rejection by the French Chamber was there occasion for triumph. Even more than did Joseph of Germany, Napoleon had the Papacy well in his power during the height of his military and political achievements.

But Newman makes rhetorical use of the humiliating defeats of both these rulers—defeats that would remain foremost in the minds of his listeners and therefore could be termed, for oratorical emphasis, triumphs of the papacy. Of course Newman is reasoning from the point of view that interference with ecclesiastical property, authority, and persons led to the alienation of followers and the consequent eventual defeat of both Joseph II and Napoleon I.

28.4-7 "What grey hairs...everlasting Arms?" In this composite Biblical metaphor with its many associations, Newman brings to an emphatic conclusion his words of praise for and confidence in the Papacy. In the metaphor Judah stands for the Papacy. Jacob's blessing on his son Judah (Gen. 49:8-10) gave him power over his brethren and his enemies ("your hand shall be on the neck of your enemies; your father's sons shall bow down before you"); as well, gave Judah power to conquer ("Judah is a lion's whelp") and power to rule ("The sceptre shall not
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depart from Judah, nor the ruler's staff from between his feet until he comes to whom it belongs "). This power, conferred on Judah and symbolized by the sceptre, was passed on to the leaders of the tribe of Judah, through to King David and to Christ ("to whom it belongs""). Newman implies a like power conferred by Christ on his Church through Peter and his successors. That the power is renewed through the ages is emphasized by reference to such Biblical quotations as Isaiah's prophecy 40:31 "but they who wait for the Lord shall renew their strength, they shall mount up with wings like eagles;" also in Psalm 103, David's hymn of praise, "Bless the Lord, 0 my soul" in which he praises the goodness of the Lord "who satisfied you with good as long as you live so that your youth is renewed like the eagles." As Moses in his blessing on the children of Israel ("the eternal God is your dwelling place, and underneath are the everlasting arms..." Deut. 33:27) praised the Lord who had given Israel victory and security in the bounteous land, so Newman expresses by analogy his confidence that the Papal blessing on their undertaking will result in a secure victory for their plans of establishing a Catholic University in Ireland.

29.2-16. "The institution...self-destructive luxuriance." Newman now reminds his listeners that the Pope "has ever been the foster-father of secular knowledge" and that "he has been as tender of the welfare and interests of human science as he is loyal to the divine truth...". The Church's "collision...with the schools of Antioch and
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Alexandria... Berlin..." was but an early encounter between the Church and the secular world. Newman writes that the early Church's struggle against Arianism was "nothing less than one passage in the history of the perpetual conflict, which ever has been waged, and which ever will be waged, between the Church and the secular power..." 1 He seems to see the present struggle to establish a Catholic University in Ireland as opposed to the English government's establishment of the Queen's Colleges as the latest campaign in the "perpetual conflict... between the Church and the secular power." As an experienced combatant in this "perpetual conflict," the Church "cannot be wanting in experience what to do now, and when to do it" as regards the establishment of a seat of learning.

The schools referred to in 29:6-7 seem to have in common the fact that they were originally esteemed centres of learning, which because of an overemphasis on a particular aspect of theology, became centres of certain heretical teaching. For example, the school of Antioch, because of its tendency towards the Aristotelian and the historical, emphasized the humanity of Christ. As a result, Antioch became the source of the Arian heresy. 2 Conversely, the extreme


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emphasis on the Divinity of Christ at the school of Alexandria led to
Monophysitism whose adherents refused to believe in any true humanity of
Christ, holding that His highest human faculties were replaced by the
Divine Nature, so that he could neither be tempted nor suffer. The
Church's successfully combating the secular power both in overcoming the
heresies in the ancient schools and in attempting to combat the modern
heresy of liberalism in education by the establishment of a Catholic
University in Ireland is emphasized by the metaphor of husbandry (29.14-
16) which brings to a close this important section, 28:13 - 29:16,
 omitted from the 1873 edition: the Pope as the "foster-father of
 secular knowledge" has always "pruned away its self-destructive
 luxuriance." In that the next three Discourses will present Newman's
idea of the necessity for Theology as an integrating and regulating
factor in the secular curriculum, the foregoing metaphor of the
spiritual guiding and keeping healthy, preventing the secular from
running riot in "self-destructive luxuriance" is opportunely placed
 near the end of this introductory Discourse.

29:17 - 33:21 (end of Discourse 1) In this closing section

1 J. H. Newman, The Development of Christian Doctrine,
Part II, Chapter VI (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1899), pp. 207-
273. Here Newman discusses the schools at Antioch, Alexandria, and
Edessa. It is noteworthy that the schools at Edessa emphasized both
 secular and theological knowledge.
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Newman turns to the common intellectual and ecclesiastical history shared by himself and his listeners—the English and the Irish. He makes this appeal for two reasons: first, to allay the opposition his audience might have to the kind of education they associated with what was to the Irish the hated English gentleman; and secondly, to suggest to the minds of his listeners by analogy with the past a secret hope of his own; namely, that the Catholic University of Ireland would become an educational centre of Oxford standard for Catholics from all parts of the world, but particularly from England and Ireland. Thus the educational excellence that belonged to these islands in the past would manifest itself in the living present: "He of old time, made us one by making us joint teachers of the nations; and now, surely, he is giving us a like mission,..." (33.18-29).

29.22-25 "I cannot forget...civilization." Newman is re-emphasizing his previous theme of the role of the papacy in both religious and secular knowledge, as well as the "joint commission given in past ages by the popes to both English and Irish monks (names are mentioned in the following lines) to teach at home and then "to convert and illuminate in turn the pagan continent" (29.28).

30.1 "...the glorious St. Patrick" is, rhetorically opportune in that Newman is evoking patriotism in order that his audience be more receptive to the idea of the common heritage of English and Irish expressed in 31.16-20. St. Patrick (c.389-c.461) was born in a village
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in Britain or Gaul. First taken by raiders as a slave to Ireland, he later was sent to Ireland in 431 or 432 to assist Palladius and was, on the latter's death, consecrated bishop. He established numerous churches and some religious communities. He founded the Cathedral Church of Armagh, which became the educational and administrative centre of the Irish church. ¹ He encouraged the study of Latin and tried to raise the general standards of scholarship. He gained toleration for Christianity and converted several members of the royal family from Druidism.

30.18 St. Augustine of Canterbury (d.604 or 605), called the "Apostle of the English," was consecrated the first Archbishop of Canterbury. In 596 he was dispatched by St. Gregory the Great, then Pope, to refound the Church in England. He established the abbey and the school of Saint Peter and Saint Paul at Canterbury, a school which, by the time of St. Aldhelm, had grown to be a magnificent example of spiritual and secular education, "a centre of erudition which attracted to its lectures and conferences students flocking in crowds from Britain, from Ireland, from continental Europe." ²

30.29 Theodore of Tarsus (c.602–690), an Asiatic Greek

¹ John Healey, "The Schools of Armagh," Ireland's Saints and Scholars, pp. 91-105.

² Eleanor S. Duckett, Anglo-Saxon Saints and Scholars (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1967, p. 33.)
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educated at Tarsus and Athens, was sent to England by Pope Vitalian, who consecrated him Archbishop of Canterbury in 668. During Theodore's time, Hadrian was abbot of the school at Canterbury founded by Augustine, a school which grew in reputation as a place of learning for Saxon youths. Theodore organized the government of the English Church into dioceses and unified the Church under the See of Canterbury—an organization ratified in the Synods at Hertford in 673 and Hatfield in 680, summoned by Theodore. 1

31.1 Adrian [St. Hadrian, the African] (d.707) learned in Greek and Latin, sacred literature, and an expert in Church law, he accompanied Theodore to England. In 671 Hadrian became abbot of the monastery of Saint Peter and Saint Paul and master of the school at Canterbury. It was under Hadrian's guidance that at the school of Canterbury "secular study was held in regard, as the valuable handmaid of spiritual wisdom. Professors and students alike without scruple read eagerly in the writings of classical Greece and Rome that they might better interpret and understand doctrine for the soul." 2

The foregoing—Patrick, Augustine, Theodore, and Hadrian—had some or all of the following in common: they were dispatched by the Pope; they were competent representatives of the learning of the day,

1 Duckett, Anglo-Saxon Saints and Scholars, pp. 81-82.

2 Ibid., p. 33.
both secular and religious who had brought learning and holiness to a foreign people; they were responsible for the establishment of monasteries and for schools which were the centres not only of religion, but also of the most esteemed and advanced secular learning of the time; the institutions established by them inspired a like tradition of goodness and education in the native population (names are mentioned 31.1-31.22) and saw that tradition prospered and spread throughout England and Ireland. Newman, by analogy is expressing his hopes that since the historical situation is analogous so will be the future success of the University of Ireland in spreading the best that is represented by the combination of religious and secular learning in the nineteenth century England and Ireland.

31.1 Bennett [St. Benedict Biscop] (c.628-689) was a Benedictine monk of noble Northumbrian birth who founded the monastery of St. Peter at Wearmouth and St. Paul at Jarrow. An enthusiast for learning and art, he brought back from his six journeys to Rome many paintings, relics and manuscripts. He was an advocate of the Roman liturgical service. He is said to have introduced into England churches built of stone with glass windows. The life of St. Benedict, who became the patron of the English Benedictines, was written by the Venerable Bede. ¹

¹ Eleanor S. Duckett, Anglo-Saxon Saints and Scholars, pp. 218-238.
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31.13 St. Wilfrid (634-709), Bishop of York, was educated 648-652 at Lindisfarne, by the Celtic monks under Bishop Aidan Abbot of Lindisfarne, but broke with the Celtic training of his life at home and under Aidan when he went to study at Canterbury and Rome. At the Synod of Whitby (664), he was largely responsible for the victory of the Roman party in the question of dating Easter. He succeeded in bringing England into closer touch with Rome and in replacing Celtic usages in the North of England by Roman liturgy, and Celtic by Benedictine monasticism.

31.13 St. John of Beverley (d.721), Bishop of York, was a monk at St. Hilda's Abbey at Whitby, who became founder of the Abbey at Beverley. He was a diligent scholar and teacher. As well, his reputation for sanctity, established during his lifetime, increased after his death.

31.14 St. Bede (c.673-735), called "the Venerable", was a biblical scholar and Father of English History. At the age of seven he entered the monastery of Wearmouth under the rule of St. Benedict Bishop. He devoted his life to the study of scripture, to teaching, and to

1 Eleanor S. Duckett, Anglo-Saxon Saints and Scholars, pp. 121-124.

2 Ibid., p. 213.

3 Ibid., pp. 193-4.
writing. He became famous for his learning during his life. His
Ecclesiastical History of the English People (731) is the primary source
for early English history. 1 Bede was pronounced Doctor of the Church
by Leo XIII in 1899.

Sts. Benedict, Wilfrid, John, and Bede represent the Anglo-
Saxon tradition. Now Newman turns to the Celtic heritage associated
with the monasteries of Lindisfarne, Melrose, and Malmesbury.

31.12 "...'which,'...the historian, 'he most affected'." The
historian referred to is Hugh Paulinus de Cressy (1605-1674). He was an
English Benedictine Monk and author of The Church History of Britanny
or England, from the Beginning of Christianity to the Norman conquest
volume one of which was published in 1668. See Bibl. Dict. of Eng.
Catholics, J. Gillow.

31.21-22 In 635 a small company of Celtic monks led by St.
Aidan came from Iona and established a monastery on the island of
Lindisfarne which became a missionary centre and an episcopal see with
Aidan as the first bishop. Lindisfarne was an Irish foundation in an
English kingdom. A number of churches were founded from Edinburgh to
the Humber and beyond by the Irish Monks of Lindisfarne. At Lindisfarne

1 Peter H. Blair, An Introduction to Anglo-Saxon England,
pp. 322-325.
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St. Aidan taught the Christian practices of the Celtic Church to a
group of twelve English boys who were to be the future ecclesiastical
leaders of their people, among whom was Wilfrid, future Bishop of York ¹
(See above 31.3).

31.22-24 St. Cuthbert (c.634-687), probably a Northumbrian by
birth, became a monk at the Monastery of Melrose, a monastery north of
the Tweed, in 651. Cuthbert, prior of Lindisfarne at the time when
Wilfrid was made Bishop of York, improved the discipline at the
monastery of Lindisfarne. Cuthbert, whose episcopacy was marked by
great missionary zeal, was considered the most illustrious heir of the
Celtic learning at Lindisfarne. His remains were taken with the monks
from Lindisfarne in 875 to Durham whence they fled to escape the Danish
attacks from the east. Bede wrote two Lives of Cuthbert, one in verse
and one in prose. ²

St. Æata was abbot of Melrose and Lindisfarne, then Bishop of
the Bernicians and afterwards of Hexham, also the seat of a monastery. ³

31.25-6 Malmesbury, the seat of a Benedictine abbey, traces

¹ E. S. Duckett, Anglo-Saxon Saints and Scholars, pp. 106-110.
² P. H. Blair, Introduction to Anglo-Saxon England, pp. 45-46,
  85, 134, 321.
³ Ibid., p. 138.
its origin to the Scottish or Irish monk Maeldulf [Maelduib] who founded a school there c.635. Maelduib's school grew, "a community of young men, living under his patient discipline in rough walled huts around the wooden chapel to which day by day he called them to prayer. ¹ Maelduib was "'scholar as well as monk'." ² His school developed into a monastery under his pupil St. Aldhelm who became its first abbot and ruled for thirty years.

32.1 St. Aldhelm (d.709) "From the books at Malmesbury, many of them of Irish origin, and at Canterbury, Aldhelm acquired a range of learning hardly less than that of his great contemporary Bede." ³ He was a poet and a musician whose school at Malmesbury was for the West what Jarrow and the school of York were for the North.

32.4 St. Egbert (d.729) was a Northumbrian monk of Lindisfarne who crossed to Ireland in search of learning and sanctity at the monastery of Rathmelsigi. "Exiled with so many others from his native country for the sake of study in Ireland, home of sanctity and scholarship, Egbert had been seized by a desire to preach the gospel

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¹ E. S. Duckett, Anglo-Saxon Saints and Scholars, p. 181.
² Ibid., p. 19.
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among the German tribes beyond the sea". 1 Unable to fulfil his own wish to preach in Frisia, he assembled a band of missionaries, among them St. Willibrord, who reached Frisia about 690. From 716 until his death Egbert led a life of great devotion at Iona where he persuaded the Celtic monks to observe the Roman method of calculating the date of Easter. 2

32.5 St. Willibrord (658-739), a Northumbrian, received his education first at Wilfrid's monastery at Ripon and then, like so many others of the time, went to Ireland to finish his education. As did Egbert, Willibrord went to the Irish monastery of Rathmasigic where he remained for twelve years and where he was ordained. Soon after Willibrord and his companions arrived in Frisia in 690, Willibrord set out for Rome to secure papal blessing for the enterprise. Two of his company, Black Hewald and White Hewald (32.8), ventured into Saxon country and both were killed. Willibrord, who became known as the Apostle of the Frisians, was consecrated Archbishop of Frisia in 695. He founded a monastery at Echternach in what is now Luxembourg which "became one of the main centre of Anglo-Saxon missionary activities on the Continent and became also the centre of a small school of illuminators. The most famous of their products is the manuscript which

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1 E. S. Duckett, Anglo-Saxon Saints and Scholars, p. 343.

2 Ibid., pp. 32, 3 - 44.
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is now known as the 'Echternach Gospels'.

32.5 Frisons [Frisians] were a people inhabiting the northern part of what is now the Netherlands, west from the River Weser along the North Sea.

32.27 The Archiepiscopal school of York. In 735 St. Egbert (not the same person as mentioned in 32.4) became Archbishop of York. He established at York a school to which the sons of noblemen were attracted. "He did promote learning throughout the north of England; and in founding the Cathedral School of York he sowed seed of rich harvest for Europe." This school attained its highest degree of intellectual achievement in the second half of the eighth century even succeeding to the intellectual distinction formerly held by Bede's Jarrow. The library at York was famed in the eighth century as one of the greatest libraries of its day in western Europe.

32.29 Alcuin (c.735-804) was educated at the Cathedral School of York whose fame attracted scholars both from the continent and from Ireland. Alcuin became master of the school at York shortly before he left Northumbria in 782 to become adviser in religious and educational matters to Charlemagne. Being Egbert's greatest pupil, he

2 Eleanor S. Duckett, Anglo-Saxon Saints and Scholars, p. 332.
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"carried the tradition of learning which he had inherited through Egypt from Bede to the court of Charlemagne"¹ where he played an important part in the revival of theological and philosophical studies among the Franks.²

33.4 Charlemagne (c.742-814) was the first Emperor from 800 of the Holy Roman Empire. In addition to his conquests and wars abroad Charlemagne brought consistency, reform, and uniformity into government at home. His encouragement of ecclesiastical reform and patronage of letters have earned for his reign the title of the Carolingian Renaissance. His patronage of scholars who formed the Palace School did much to stimulate learning. Through ecclesiastico-civil councils he was instrumental in restoration of the hierarchy and of Church discipline, the unity of the liturgy, the definition of doctrine, and the encouragement of education.³

33.10-11 University of Paris dates from the twelfth century when Peter Lombard taught at the Catholic School of Notre-Dame. It was

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¹ P. H. Blair, An Introduction to Anglo-Saxon England, pp. 166, 328.
² Ibid., p. 328.
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styled Universitas Magistrorum in 1207. The University of Paris received statutes from Innocent III in 1215. Between 1218-1225 there developed the so-called nations: Gallicani, Normanni, Picardi, and Angli and soon afterwards four faculties of theology, law, medicine, and arts. Masters and pupils lived in colleges, the most famous being the Sorbonne; religious lived in the houses of their orders [the Dominicans for example] called "studia generalia". In the thirteenth century, the University of Paris was the centre of Scholasticism. The ancient university was abolished in the revolution of 1789. The new university was established in 1806 with the faculties of arts, medicine, and law. Theology was reserved for the Institute Catholique.¹

Discourse I has sounded the main theme of the Discourses: "Education must not be disjoined from Religion, or that Mixed Schools, as they are called, in which teachers and scholars are of different religious creeds, none of which, of course, enter into the matter of instruction, are constructed on a false idea"(12.14-18). It will be Newman's purpose in the following Discourses to explain the view that Mixed Schools are constructed on a false idea.

Secondly, Newman has stated his point of view: "...in speaking of human philosophy, I have intimated the mode in which I

¹ Frances R. Drane, Christian Schools and Scholars, pp. 362-363.
propose to handle my subject altogether. Observe, then, Gentlemen, I have no intention of bringing into the argument the authority of the Church at all; but I shall consider the question simply on the grounds of human reason and human wisdom" (17.27-18.4). Newman has stated clearly in this passage that his method of procedure will be the full use of human reason and human wisdom so that all whose minds have been formed by a Liberal Education will be able to admit the cogency of his arguments.

Newman limits his subject when he states that "I confine myself to the subject of University Education" (19.5-6). But more particularly his subject is the feasibility and real necessity of conducting University education "here and now, on a theological principle, or that youths of different religions can, in matter of fact, be educated apart from each other (23.18-21). His purpose will be to convince the Irish that it is possible for them to aim at a preferable kind of university education "beyond a University of Mixed Instruction" (23.25).

Finally, as the mediaeval universities were founded under the patronage of the Holy See, so Newman sees the University of Ireland established by the same authority. His own mission in the founding he describes in these words: "It is my happiness in a matter of Christian duty, ...to be guided simply by the decision and recommendation of the Holy See, the Judge and finisher of all
controversies. "My sole aspiration—and I cannot have a higher
under the heavens—is to be the servant of the Vicar of Christ" (19, 12–
27).
ANNOTATION OF THE DISCOURSES

Chapter VIII

DISCOURSE II. THEOLOGY A BRANCH OF KNOWLEDGE

Newman opens Discourse II by outlining the philosophical basis for the view that the study of Religion can be omitted from a university. It is the Latitudinarian view (See above, 13.4-16.7) that Religion is not knowledge and therefore that it is unnecessary to reserve a place for Religion among the subjects if a university curriculum. But, Newman argues that even those who profess the liberalistic view as regards religion in education do consider that something definite can be known about the Deity; consequently, he concludes that the omitting of Theology from the university is simply unphilosophical.

35.1-7 "Great as are the secular benefits...refuse to admit." The "philosopher of the day" (35.2) refers to the nineteenth century liberal. As a descendant of "les philosophes,"¹ the Eighteenth Century Rationalists of the Age of Enlightenment, the "philosopher of the day" was convinced that the progress of humanity would come about by

¹ "les philosophes" were men of letters, or men of science or mathematics, who took a gentleman's interest in matters philosophical. Since their emphasis was on human reason as the sole means to truth in all matters and since they did not think within, or construct, philosophical systems, they can be considered men of science rather than philosophers. See Theodore Besterman, Voltaire (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1969), p. 296.
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the use of reason. 1 Although Newman concedes the "secular benefits" (35.1) and the stimulation of "the activity of the intellect" (35.7-8) 2 resulting from the liberal movement, he commences here in the opening lines of Discourse II his illustration of the deleterious effects, specifically for education, of "the theory of Private Judgment" (35.3-4). 3 That theory, in its misuse, included the right and assumed "the ability of each individual to determine for himself what is false and what is true in Christianity. ...the individual was responsible for the accuracy of his own religious convictions, and...each Christian [was] bound to accept only those doctrines which he could prove and communicate." 4 Newman saw this nineteenth century attitude towards

1 T. Besterman, Voltaire, p. 369.

2 In his 1879 Biglietto speech Newman made clear that although his life long struggle had been against liberalism in religion, he recognized the benefits achieved in the social and political orders by the Liberal movement: "...there is much in the liberalistic theory which is good and true; for example, not to say more, the precepts of justice, truthfulness, sobriety, self-command, benevolence, which...are among its laws of society. It is not till we find that this array of principles is intended to supersede, to block out religion, that we pronounce it to be evil." J. H. Newman, The Philosophical Notebook, ed. Edward Sillia, Vol. 1, p. 59.

3 It should be noted that "Newman's advocacy of private judgment in matters of personal duty and theological investigation should not be isolated from his distrust of its suitability for questions of doctrine. The correct use of private judgment in his view presumed an act of submission to dogma which was and is highly uncongenial to what may loosely be called the liberal mind." Thomas Vargish, Newman: the Contemplation of Mind (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1970), p.87.

4 Thomas Vargish, Newman: the Contemplation of Mind, p. 88. (Also, see below, 42.10).
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Private Judgment in religion as a tenet of the liberalism of the age, which he defined in the Apologia as "...the mistake of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it, and of claiming to determine on intrinsic grounds the truth and nature of propositions which rest for their reception simply on the external authority of the Divine Word." ¹

"The Liberal spirit in society treats religion not as a body of objective truth, but as the means by which individuals define themselves and their place in the universe. Religion thus becomes not the glorification of God but the satisfaction of needs which vary with individuals." ² Thus as religion, for the nineteenth century liberal, was a matter for the private judgement of the individual to be determined by his personal tastes, feelings, and inclinations, rather than an objective body of truth, the advocates of Mixed Education could readily assign religion to the personal life of the individual and argue that religious truth had no place among the objective body of scientific truth that they would say should exclusively comprise the university curriculum. ³ It is Newman's purpose in Discourse II to prove that


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Theology, far from being a matter of private judgment, is a body of objective truth and is therefore a branch of knowledge worthy of being included among the studies at a university.

35.1 - 39.6 "Great as...with University Education" is a section omitted from the 1873 edition. The ideas in this section are essential in that they relate Newman's address to the situation uppermost in the minds of his Irish listeners; namely, the "mixed education" issue; also, they explain for the contemporary reader what for Newman is the logical inconsistency and even personal dishonesty involved in the political expediency of omitting Theology from the university.

35.3-7 "...the theory of Private Judgment...not without its political drawbacks, which the statesman...refuse to admit." The statesman referred to specifically is Sir Robert Peel, (1788-1850) Prime Minister of England 1834-1835 and 1841-1846 whose "predilections for Protestantism" (35.6) were evident in his Tamworth Reading room address in 1841 where he showed himself to be "not a little enamoured of

1 "Protestantism" refers to the belief of those sects, Lutheran or Calvinistic in origin, whose religion is based on the private interpretation of the Bible and whose members are therefore advocates of private judgment. Sir Robert Peel, a product of Harrow and Christ Church, Oxford, was High Anglican in religious background. It was, therefore, contrary to Peel's religious beliefs to be an advocate of either private judgment or its educational expression—mixed education. (See below, 42.3).
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the liberal belief in the new religion of secular enlightenment which was to supplant the traditional creeds... "¹ But Newman points out that attractive as Peel might find the liberal philosophy, he found its principal religious tenet—the theory of Private Judgement—a political inconvenience with regard to the higher education issue in Ireland: The Anglicans, the Catholics, and the Presbyterians were all exercising their individual rights of private judgment when they demanded university education based on their respective beliefs.

35.11-17 "This inconvenience... interminable search after it."

Men of letters such as Voltaire and Diderot in France; Lessing in Germany; Macaulay, John Stuart Mill, and Lord Brougham in England were apostles of progress through reason. The kind of interminable search for truth of the rationalist-liberal mind described in the sentence, "the good of man consists, not in the possession of truth, but in an interminable search after it" (35.16-17), requires a freedom in the use of human reason that finds expression in religion as "the theory of Private Judgment" (35.3-4)—a theory, dear to the principles of the liberal-minded man of letters, but one that proves inconvenient to such a practical man of affairs as the English Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel, a statesman faced with the problem of religion in the National Education

¹ Fergal McGrath, Newman's University: Idea and Reality, p. 77.
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of Ireland.

36.22 - 38.11 "...the great question of National Education...
they shall have 'none'." It was politically expedient that Peel
reconcile "the education of the people at large" (36.25) with "the
religious sentiments, which Private Judgment presupposes and fosters"
(36.25-26). In order to do so, he decided on the exclusion of "one and
all professions of faith from the national system" (37.26-27) of
university education. The result was the establishment of what are
called "Mixed Schools" based on the separation of secular instruction
from religious (37.29-38.2).

About the establishment of nondenominational higher education
in Ireland Fergal McGrath writes as follows: "On May 9th, 1845, the
Bill for the establishment of the Queen's Colleges was introduced into
Parliament by Sir James Graham, Secretary of State for the Home
Department. The three colleges were to be situated in Belfast, Cork and
either Limerick or Galway, and it was intimated that they would probably
be later united by the foundation of a new university. ...The
appointment of officials and professors was to rest with the Crown.
Provisions were made to secure the strictly non-sectarian character of
the institution. No religious tests were to be imposed either at
entrance or on admission to degrees, no religious instruction was to be
given except what might be provided by the various religious bodies at
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their own expense, no religious topics were to be introduced into the classrooms, and no religious considerations were to weigh in the appointment of dismissal of officials."

It is evident from Sir James's following remarks about Trinity College, Dublin that the nondenominational education to be offered by the Queen's Colleges in Ireland was contrary to the personal convictions of Peel and his English statesmen-colleagues who had acquiesced in the establishment of mixed education as a matter of political expediency: "Neither policy, nor equity, nor justice, will admit of any interference with Trinity College, Dublin as it is now founded, and as it now exists. That College is an entirely Protestant foundation. It was founded originally by Queen Elizabeth, and was founded avowedly for Protestant purposes, which purposes have from that time to the present been steadily maintained."

Evidently, what the Anglican establishment reserved for itself, it was not willing to extend to the Irish Catholics and Presbyterians.

However, the compromise intended to quiet dissension met with disapproval in all sectors: The High Anglicans disapproved of the lack

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1 Fergal McGrath, Newman's University, p. 43. McGrath's reference is to Hansard, 3rd series, Vol. 80, pp. 356 seq.

2 Ibid., p. 43.
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of provision for official religious instruction: the spokesman for the Low Church, Sir Robert Inglis, denounced the Queen's Colleges as "a gigantic scheme of godless education"; 1 O'Connell, equally opposed to the "Godless Colleges," 2 suggested that Trinity College remain Anglican, the college at Belfast be assigned to the Presbyterians, and those at Cork and Galway be reserved for the Catholics—a proposal for denominational education that was uncongenial to the liberal mind. The Young Ireland Party approved of the undenominational character of the colleges as a means of uniting young Ireland, but they disapproved of a national system of university education that would be subservient to the State. 3

38.24 - 39.2 "My business is...judgment upon it." Since the Discourses concern the aims and principles of education, Newman's argument is not with "the mere statesman" (38.25) who follows the popular mind, but with those whose philosophy is influencing educational thought in 1852; namely, the philosophers of the day "who profess to regulate their public conduct by principle and logic" (38.25-27). It is Newman's expressed intention to submit the principle of mixed education

1 McGrath, Newman's University, p. 44.

2 Ibid., p. 44.

3 Ibid., p. 44.
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in the university to "a philosophical analysis" (38.28-29) in order to
determine whether or not omitting religious knowledge from the
university curriculum will or will not stand the test of logic.

39.3 - 40.17 "Now, entering upon my subject, ... all sorts of
knowledge whatever." Newman's "philosophical analysis" (38.28-29) of
mixed education can be expressed in syllogistic form as follows:

A
A University... is the seat of
universal knowledge (39.7-8)

B
Assume that Theology is a
science and, (39.16-17) if in
a certain University, so called,
the subject of religion is
excluded (39.21-22)

C₁
Either, The province of
Religion is very barren of
real knowledge (39.23-24)

or

In such a University one special
and important branch of knowledge
is omitted (39.25-26)

C₂
Either, Little or nothing is known
about the Supreme Being (39.28-29)

or
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That his seat of learning calls
itself what it is not (40.1)

The conclusion of the "philosophical analysis" is that either the advocates of a University that excludes Religion are in agreement with the rationalist view "that the province of Religion is very barren of real knowledge" (39.22-24) and "that little or nothing is known about the Supreme Being" (39.28-29); or they would have to admit, if they were submitting their educational policy to logical inquiry, that an important branch of knowledge had been indeed omitted from the Queen's Colleges and therefore according to the definition of a university, the Queen's Colleges were not and could not become constituents in an institute of higher learning designated by the title university.

A further conclusion is that those religious parties willing to enter into the compromise "involved in the establishment of a University which makes no religious profession" (40.5-6) imply that their own respective religious opinions are not knowledge (40.8-10). Furthermore, if they believed their private views on religion to be true (40.11-13), they would not insult their beliefs by omitting the teaching of them from an institution that professes by its very name to teach universal knowledge—a university (40.13-17). Newman has forced his Liberal opponents to examine their own opinions and face the real basis for their actions.
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Although Newman assumes the premiss that "Theology is a science, and an important one" (39.16-17), his oratorical strategy does not rely on any great extent for its effectiveness on bringing his opponents to accept the premiss that theology is a science. ¹ This view Newman's Latitudinarian opponents would not accept in that they reduced religion to beliefs held in common by all men and were intent on the banishment of all theology. ² Newman's argument against mixed education depends to some extent for its effectiveness on the premiss that "a University, as the name implies, is the seat of universal knowledge" (39.7-8). The word "universal" refers to the generally recognized bodies of knowledge of the time. In Section II of the Appendix to the Discourses, Newman has assembled an impressive array of references through the centuries to prove that the definition of a university as "the seat of universal knowledge" (39.7-8) has been the generally accepted view of a university in different countries at various times in history (383.5-33). Consequently, in establishing the Queen's Colleges on the basis of omitting Theology, the liberals were not consistent with the historical


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definition of a university. However, Newman's tactical strategy depends principally on his catching his opponent in a logical inconsistency that becomes a discrepancy between belief and action. He has argued the mixed education advocates into the position of considering religion barren of real knowledge. Then, Newman proceeds to show in the remaining section of Discourse II that they actually do consider religion to be an area of important knowledge; consequently, their action of omitting Theology from the university curriculum is inconsistent with their recognition of the importance of religious matters. Newman proceeds to defeat his opponents on their own ground of logical thinking and reasoned conduct.

41.17 - 42.16 "...if men of various religious denominations... is compromised or disparaged." Newman reveals his opponents' inconsistency not only in the matter, but also in the method of their argument. Those who prize reasoned thinking, Newman finds not thinking logically in that they seem ignorant of the nature of a valid compromise: Newman states that a compromise is possible only if the differences surrendered are minor and there is "no sacrifice of the main object in view" (41.12-13). The dissemination of evangelical tracts and the circulating of the Protestant Bible as projects by men of various religious denominations are examples of compromises that involve a common acceptance of the Lutheran doctrines of Justification by faith alone without good works and the belief in the principle of Private
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Judgment, respectively. Private Judgment refers to the private interpretation of the Bible by individuals as the sole basis of religious belief. Therefore, tracts recommending the merit of good works or the Athanasian Creed could not be circulated with the said Bible without disparaging the doctrine of Justification by faith and the principle of Private Judgment respectively and thereby invalidating the compromise which was the very life of the project.

41.19 "...'evangelical' tracts,...". The word "evangelical" in quotation marks indicates an approximate use of the word to refer to kinds of missionary publications that have as their object the promoting of the particular beliefs of Protestantism such as, reliance on the fundamental doctrines of the Gospel and salvation by faith, not by works, held by the Low Church Party in the Church of England.

41.24-25 "...the Lutheran doctrine of Justification." "...the Lutheran Doctrine [of Justification] means that man is forgiven and accepted [and saved] by God simply in response to faith and in no sense because he has discharged a debt, or in some way earned pardon, by any form of good works or penance." ¹

42.3 "...the religion of Protestants." "...by Protestant [is] meant Lutheran, Calvinistic, and thirdly that dry anti-evangelical

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doctrine, which was dominant in the Church of England during the last century and is best designated by the name of Arminianism,¹ a term which refers in general to a modified form of strict Calvinism introduced into England during the reign of Charles I. ²

42.6–7 "...the Athanasian Creed..." Newman notes that the "Athanasian Creed," properly called the Hymn "Quicunque," can be referred to as a "creed" because it contains what is necessary for salvation, but that "there can be but one rudimental and catechetical formula, and that is the Creed, Apostolic or Nicene."³ The important point for the discussion is that the Athanasian Creed is a statement of faith not found in the Bible, but rather is a semi-liturgical document written between 381 and 428 and attributed to St. Ambrose. It expounds the doctrines of the Trinity and of the Incarnation. Also, since the Athanasian Creed is prefaced and concluded with the assertion that belief in the truths it asserts is necessary to salvation, ⁴ the


"Quicunque" is, therefore, a repudiation of the principle of Private Judgment.

42.10 "...the principle of Private Judgment,..." Newman's definition from his *Via Media* is as follows: "By the right of Private Judgment in matters of religious belief and practice, is ordinarily meant the prerogative, considered to belong to each individual Christian, of ascertaining and deciding for himself from Scripture what is Gospel truth, and what is not. This is the principle maintained in theory, as a sort of sacred possession or palladium by Protestantism of this day."¹ Newman explains in a following passage in the *Via Media* that Protestantism in basing its religion only on the private judgment of Holy Scripture is disregarding such other means given to us by which we can form our judgment as the existing Church, Tradition, and Antiquity.²

A summary of 41.17 - 42.16 is as follows: The compromises based on the doctrine of Justification and the principle of Private Judgment that are the life of the dissemination of evangelical tracts and the circulating of the Protestant Bible illustrate the necessity, maintained by Newman, of not disparaging the essential purpose and basis

² Ibid., p. 131.
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for which an organization has been established. Newman is proving by analogy his main idea in this discourse; namely, that those who come together to found a university do so with "the one object of advancing Universal Knowledge" (42.19-20) and therefore cannot sacrifice their main object "Knowledge itself" (42.22-23) whatever private views must be sacrificed in the compromise. Consequently, in order to maintain the integrity of the university, its main purpose as "the seat of universal knowledge" (39.7-8) should not be compromised by the omission of Theology.

42.22-23 "Knowledge itself." Newman states that knowledge becomes science, or philosophy, when it is informed and impregnated by reason. 1 It is "Knowledge or Science" (43.5-6) that Newman states cannot be sacrificed when a group of persons come forward with the purpose of advancing Universal Knowledge by establishing a university.

43.6 - 44.2 "Thus no one...Malthusian theory...Newtonian theory...such a University cannot coexist." Both "the Malthusian theory" and "the Newtonian theory" are examples of widely held scientific theories that their proponents would consider necessary bodies of knowledge to be included in a university curriculum.

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43.6-0 "...no one... the Malthusian theory... in a seat of learning... ignorance not to be a Malthusian." Thomas R. Malthus (1776-1834) was a fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge and after 1805, professor of modern history and political economy in the East India Company's college at Haileybury. Malthus' *Essay on Population* (1798), an expression of economic liberalism, promulgated the theory that there is a natural tendency for the population to increase at a geometric rate. Food production will grow less rapidly being governed by the law of diminishing returns. The result will be increasing misery, pestilence, and war which will increase the death rate to match the birth rate and hold population stable, but the preventive checks of moral restraint and postponement of marriage will reduce the need for the positive checks of famine, war, and disease. 1

The economic liberals, who believed that individual self-interest was the motive force of economic life, were the heirs of eighteenth-century economic thought which reached its culmination in the laissez-faire doctrines of Adam Smith, a Scottish professor, who published *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* in 1776. The economic liberals believed that economic life was guided by supposedly natural laws, such as the Malthusian theory of population.

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Man could not prevent, though he might impede, the operation of such laws. All man-made restrictions should be removed to allow the laws to work automatically. ¹ As a representative of economic liberalism, Malthus would be among those designated by Newman in the opening lines of Discourse II as "the philosopher of the day" (35.1-2).

43.10 "...the Newtonian theory,..." Sir Isaac Newton, professor of mathematics at Cambridge, published his Law of Gravitation in his Principia Mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy) in 1687. Newton's theory that "Every particle of matter in the universe attracts every other particle with a force varying inversely with the square of the distance between them and directly with the product of their masses" ² was a universal law; subsequently, in sciences other than physics, men sought to find similarly simple and basic mathematical laws. Soon in history, psychology, economics, political science, and religion people were searching for Newtonian laws. ³ In Newman's metaphor mathematics began to usurp the territory of the other sciences. The result was that,

¹ C. J. H. Hayes, History of Europe, p. 790.
² Ibid., p. 652.
³ Ibid., p. 652.
influenced by Newtonianism, there developed a view of philosophy which is essentially materialistic; that is, which tried to explain everything in the universe in terms of matter and motion, and of forces which could be detected by the human senses. In the province of religion there developed a body of religious thought called deism whose adherents tried to elaborate a natural religion based on reason and on those beliefs that seemed common to all the different religions of mankind. By the eighteenth century many thinkers were in a general agreement as to the essential points of a "natural" and "rational" deist religion. These points could be summed up under three headings: there is a God; He demands righteous living of men; He rewards and punishes men in a life after death. Most of the advanced thinkers of the eighteenth century were deists. ¹ Their descendants, the nineteenth-century religious liberals, were, as well as the economic liberals, those whose representative members Newman designated as "the philosopher of the day" (35.1-2).

Newman argues that those who consider the Malthusian theory and the Newtonian theory to be proved true in "the same sense as the existence of the sun and moon is true" (43.11-12) would surely not insult their knowledge by omitting these theories from the university curriculum. Similarly, if knowledge of the Supreme Being is omitted

¹ Hayes, History of Europe, p. 652.
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from a particular university, then every individual who advocates that
Institution "holds that nothing is known for certain about the Supreme
Being" (43.17-18). On the other hand, if "something considerable is
known about the Supreme Being, whether from Reason or Revelation" (43.
21-22) then a foremost science has been omitted. Newman confronts his
opponents with a hard conclusion; namely, "such an institution cannot
be what it professes if there be a God" (43.28-29); and with final
emphasis, he asserts that "...God and such a University cannot coexist"
(44.1-2). But the English liberals certainly did believe in God;
furthermore, many of the eighteenth-century enlightenment thinkers,
including Voltaire, were deists, who considered that the existence of
God could be proved by reason. Therefore, both the deists and their
heirs, the nineteenth-century liberals, would admit that something
considerable can be and is known about the Supreme Being. The omission
of that knowledge from the University is, therefore, indefensible.
Newman has routed his "mixed education" opponents by revealing an
inconsistency between their beliefs and their actions as well as a lack
of logic in their thinking.

43.21-23 "...that something...Supreme Being,...from Reason or
Revelation,... ." Newman defines "revelation" as "...the voice of God
to man,... ."¹ He further states that Christianity and Judaism were

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the two "direct communications between man and his Maker from time
immemorial down to this day..." 1 "Reason" Newman defines as
"...properly understood any process or act of mind, by which, from
knowing one thing, it advances on to know another." 2 In Discourse II,
he postulates that "if...it turns out that something considerable is
known about the Supreme Being, whether from Reason [by the Deists] or
Revelation [by Jews and Christians], then the Institution in question
[a university founded on the principle of omitting Theology] professes
every science, and leaves out the foremost of them" (43.20-25).

44.15 - 45.27 "I cannot so construct...with the divine."

Having established that Religious Knowledge has claim "to be regarded as
an accession to the stock of general knowledge existing in the world"
(43.19-20), Newman proceeds to examine on what grounds the science of
Religion could be excluded from the "idea of University Knowledge" (44.
20): by the evidence of our senses? by testimony? by abstract
reasoning? He concludes as follows: "Is not the being of a God
reported to us by testimony, handed down by history, inferred by an
inductive process, brought home to us by metaphysical necessity, urged
on us by the suggestions of our conscience? It is a truth in the


natural order, as well as the supernatural" (44.23-28). Furthermore, Newman argues that Theology is related in an important way to every other branch of knowledge: "Admit a God, ¹ and you introduce among the subjects of your knowledge, a fact encompassing, closing in upon, absorbing, every other fact conceivable. How can we investigate any part of any order of knowledge, and stop short of that which enters into every order?" (45.7-12). Consequently, Newman warns that "you will soon break up into fragments the whole circle of secular knowledge if you begin the mutilation with divine" (45.25-27): If divine truth is extracted from the whole body of truth designated as University Knowledge, the structure of secular knowledge will be so fragmented that the relation between the different orders of human truths will be no longer evident.

45.28 - 46.1 "I have been speaking...Natural Theology;... Revelation." "Natural Theology" (45.28) is that knowledge about God and the Divine order which man's reason can acquire without the aid of Revelation: "The science or knowledge of God which we can attain naturally by the unassisted powers of reason, and which enables us to know God, by means of creatures, as the author of the natural order...is

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known as...natural theology.¹ (See below, Discourse X, 352.16-20).²

46.1 "Revelation" (See above, 43.21-23) is the communication of God to men by which God has informed men about Himself. It is this knowledge of God, unattainable naturally by the unassisted powers of reason, from which our reason, enlightened by faith, draws the implicit conclusions of supernatural theology or simply theology.³

Newman has been basing his argument for the interconnection of all knowledge—secular and divine—on truths in the natural order. He states that his argument is even stronger when he includes the truths of Revelation.

46.1-14 "Let the doctrine...the animal frame." These lines contain examples of theological truths based on Revelation that also furnish material for, or are related to, the material of other sciences.


² The term "Natural Theology" as used in Discourse II designates for Newman a legitimate exercise of human reason, but the same term used with reference to the modern science of Natural Theology that bases the Argument of Design on the material laws of the universe, Newman views with disfavour especially when Natural Theology is made to supersede Theology. See "Christianity and Physical Science," Idea of a University, pp. 449-450; "Dispositions for Faith," Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, p. 74 for two of Newman's criticisms of Natural Theology in the latter sense.

³ Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 93.
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46.1 "...the doctrine of the Incarnation..." The Incarnation, a great truth of Revelation, Newman defines as follows: "When the Eternal Word decreed to come on earth,...He came to be a man like any of us, to take a human soul and body, and to make them His own...;...He 'was made flesh'. He attached to Himself a manhood, and became as really and truly man as He was God, so that henceforth He was both God and man, or, in other words, He was One Person in two natures, divine and human. This is a mystery so marvellous, so difficult, that faith alone firmly receives it;..." ¹ Furthermore, Newman states that it is the doctrine of the Incarnation that is the foundation of the Church: "It is the Incarnation of the Son of God rather than any doctrine drawn from a partial view of Scripture (however true and momentous it may be) which is the article of a standing or a falling Church." ²

As well as belonging to the subject matter of theology, the doctrine of the Incarnation enters into other orders of knowledge; namely, history, as a fact in the natural order of human events; and that supreme department of metaphysics known as Natural Theology (see


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above, 45.28-46.1), in that the Incarnation concerns the being of God made Man.

46.3-7 "Let it be true...of a needle?" That there are Angels is a point of knowledge, Newman maintains, "in the same sense as the naturalist's asseveration, that there are myriads of living things on the point of a needle" (46.5-7). Both points of knowledge concern the world invisible to the eye. However, that there are Angels is a truth of Revelation (Matt., 13:10); on the other hand, that there are "myriads of living things on the point of a needle" is a scientist's affirmation. The truth of Revelation, Newman suggests, can as surely be accepted as knowledge as the statement of the natural scientist. One such nineteenth century naturalist who made a statement pertinent to Newman's remark in 46.5-7 was Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895), the scientific investigator, lecturer, and professor in the Royal College of Surgeons who wrote in his essay "On the Physical Basis of Life" that in contrast to the great Finner Whale, the hugest of beasts that live, there were "invisible animalcules—mere gelatinous specks, multitudes of which could, in fact, dance upon the point of a needle with the same ease as the angels of the Schoolmen could, in imagination." ¹ (Needless to say,

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Huxley's view, that only the empirical sciences present knowledge, is in contrast to Newman's.

46.7-9 "That the Earth...amid its depths;" The condition of the earth in future--"the Earth is to be burned by fire" (46.7) is the subject of Biblical Revelation in 2 Peter, 3:10. That the earth in the past was the home of huge monsters is the subject of Biblical record in Psalm 103 (104):25-26. Also, concerning the huge monsters of the depths Newman may have had in mind the lectures of the geologist William Buckland which he attended with great interest during his early years at Oxford. Newman's entry in his "Early Journals" under June 5, 1821 is significant for 46.8-9:

Buckland has just noticed in his geological lecture the extra-ordinary fact, that, among all the hosts of animals which are found and are proved to have existed prior to 6000 years ago, 'not one' is there which would be at all serviceable to man; 'but' that directly you get within that period, horses, bulls, goats, deer, asses &c are at once discovered. How strong a presumptive proof from the face of nature of what the Bible asserts to be the case.

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In the foregoing instance Newman draws the conclusion that the findings of empirical science corroborate the knowledge from Revelation. But what he actually thought of Professor Buckland's geology lectures he wrote as follows: "...the science is so in its infancy that no regular system is formed. Hence the lectures are rather an enumeration of facts from which probabilities are deduced, than a consistent and luminous theory of certainties, illustrated by occasional examples. It is, however, most entertaining, and opens an amazing field to imagination and to poetry." ¹ Newman's view of the empirical sciences in 1821 helps to explain his implicit view throughout 46.1-14 that the truths of Revelation are as surely knowledge as the truths of history or the empirical sciences, if not more so.

46.9-11 "...that Antichrist is to come...Emperor of Rome;" That the Antichrist is to come is, Newman maintains, as unqualified a heading to a chapter of history related in Biblical prophecy (I John, 2:18 and I John, 4:3) as is the historical fact that there did exist Emperors of Rome named Claudius Caesar Drusus Germanicus Nero, Roman Emperor, 54-68 A.D. and Flavius Claudius Julianus, Roman Emperor, 361-363 A.D., who were considered pre-figures of Antichrist. Julian, the Apostate Emperor, "furnishes us with another approximation to the

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predicted Antichrist,... " As well, "some Christians of primitive ages of the Church believed that Nero was Antichrist." Thus the chapter of past history that relates the times of the pre-figures of Antichrist is not more surely knowledge, Newman maintains, than the revelation of the times of the Antichrist yet to be.

46.11-14 "...that a divine influence...the animal frame."
The subject-matter of volition is mysterious whether in the province of ethics as regards the Divine influence on the will--"With wisdom and knowledge he [God] fills them" (Sirach, 17:6)--or in the province of psychology which studies the "effect of volition on the animal frame" (46.13-14).

The foregoing instances (46.1-14) in illustrating that the matter of Revelation is related in some way to other branches of knowledge are Newman's answer to his question, "How can we investigate any part of any order of Knowledge, and stop short of that which [Divine Knowledge] enters into every order" (45.10-12)? Newman concludes that "in word indeed, and in idea, it is easy enough to divide Knowledge into human and divine, secular and religious, and to lay down that we will


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address ourselves to the one without interfering with the other; but it is impossible in fact" (45.14-18). Therefore, since it is impossible in fact to divide human and divine knowledge, all the various provinces of Knowledge, including Theology should be included in a university curriculum—a fact that can hardly be gainsaid by the philosophical mind that believes "religious facts to be true" (46.16) and that professes "to be teaching all the while 'de omni scibili', 'all things knowable'" (46.18-19).

46.19 "...'de omni scibili'..." "...'about everything knowable'..." is an approximation (no difference in meaning) to the phrase—"de omni re scibili"—written by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola in his Latin Oration on the Dignity of Man (Oration de hominis dignitate, 1466). Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494) was an Italian philosopher, scholar, and Renaissance humanist who hoped "by a discipline of the reason and the will to make Man kingly, even angelic..." 1 By 'the dignity of man,' Pico della Mirandola meant the high nobility of disciplined reason and imagination, human nature redeemed by Christ, the uplifting of the truly human person through an exercise of soul and mind." 2 In order to effect the discipline of


2 Ibid., p. XVII.
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reason and will, the philosophical mind, will be concerned "de omni re scibili"; that is, will wish to "become acquainted with all schools." As Pico wrote in the significant passage in his Oration on the Dignity of Man, "...I have so trained myself that, committed to the teachings of no one man, I have ranged through all the masters of philosophy, examined all their works, become acquainted with all schools. ...For it was a rule among the ancients, in the case of all writers, never to leave unread any commentaries which might be available. Aristotle especially observed this rule so carefully that Plato called him:...

'the reader.' It is certainly a mark of excessive narrowness of mind to enclose oneself within one Porch or Academy; nor can anyone reasonable attach himself to one school or philosophe, unless he has previously become familiar with them all. In addition there is in each school some distinctive characteristic which it does not share with any other." 1

The reference to the Renaissance humanists' ideal of human progress by learning "de omni scibili," as expressed by Giovanni Pico, emphasizes Newman's opposition to that "excessive narrowness of mind" that encloses itself within secular knowledge while omitting Theology. Also, the reference gives Newman another opportunity of pointing out the

1 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man, pp. 43-44.
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discrepancy between belief and practice in his mixed education
opponents. He questions how it is possible for the philosophical mind
(the cultivated mind of one who has the philosophical habit) to believe
religious facts, then put them aside, while at the same time profess to
be teaching the ideal of the perfectability of Man through knowledge
"about everything knowable." Newman states that the only conclusion for
intellects that are "clear, logical, and consistent" (47.2) is that
those who consent to put aside religious truth do "not think that
anything is known or can be known for certain, about the origin of the
world or the end of man" (46.27-29).

46.27 - 50.7 "He does not think...which would be simply
unmeaning." Newman depicts in this section the view of religion that
"has been taken up by that large and influential body [in the Anglican
Church] which goes by the name of Liberal or Latitudinarian" (49.29 -
50.1).

R. W. Church describes the three characteristic forms of the
Church of England Christianity in the first thirty years of the
nineteenth century as follows: First, the Orthodox Churchmen inherited
the traditions of a learned and sober Anglicanism, claiming as the
authorities for its theology the great line of English divines from
Hooker to Waterland,...--preaching, without passion or excitement,
scholarlike, careful, wise, often vigorously reasoned discourses on the
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capital points of faith and morals. Some outstanding members at Oxford were Dr. Routh, Bishop Lloyd, and Dr. Pusey; and at Cambridge, Mr. Hugh James Rose and Dr. Hook.

The second group were the Evangelicals who were inheritors not of Anglican traditions, but of those which had grown up among the zealous clergymen and laymen who had sympathized with the great Methodist revival, and whose theology and life had been profoundly affected by it. The religious ideas of the Evangelicals had been formed and governed by such teachers as Hervey, Romaine, Fletcher, Newton, Thomas Scott, and Joseph Milner. Preached in the pulpits of fashionable chapels, this religion proved to be no more exacting than its "High and Dry" rival. It gave a gentle stimulus to tempers which required to be excited by novelty. It recommended itself by gifts of flowery words or high-pitched rhetoric (See 48.19-21 for Newman's description) to those who expected "some" demands to be made on them, so that these demands were not too strict. But Evangelicals such as Howard and Elizabeth Fry exposed the brutalities of prisons; Clarkson and Wilberforce overthrew the slave trade and ultimately slavery itself. Evangelicalism created great Missionary Societies and gave motive to countless philanthropic schemes. What it failed in was the education and development of character; and this was the result of the increasing meagreness of its writing and preaching. R. W. Church notes that both the High Church in its worst aspects and the Evangelical party, eventually, came to be on
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very easy terms with the world.

The third group were the independent thinkers who came to be called the Liberal School of Theology. They comprised the Oriel Noetics —Whately, Copleston, Hawkins, Milman, Blanco White, Hampden and Thomas Arnold. There was a certain drift towards Dissent. Under the leading of Whately, questions were asked about what was supposed to be beyond dispute with both Churchmen and Evangelicals. Current phrases, the keynotes of many a sermon, were fearlessly taken to pieces. Men were challenged to examine the meaning of words. They were cautioned or ridiculed as the case may be, on the score of "confusion of thought" and "inaccuracy of mind"; they were convicted of great logical sins; and bad theories began to make their appearance about religious principles and teaching. 1

In the following lines Newman depicts the characteristic notes of Evangelicalism which holds "that religion consists, not in knowledge, but in feeling or sentiment[;]...that Faith [is] but a feeling, an emotion, an affection, an appetency, not an act of the intellect; ..." (47.9-19). In place of "a straight forward acceptance of revealed truth" (48.6-7), as expressed in the Anglican Prayer Book, in the form of "the Creed, among other memorials of Antiquity" (47.22-23), the

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Evangelicals substituted, in Newman's description, "a dreamy and sickly state of soul; ... an effort after religion conversation; ... a facility of detailing what men called experiences; ... a constrained gravity of demeanour and an unnatural tone of voice" (48.7-12). Thus Religion consisted not in intellectual exercise, but rather "in the affections, in the imagination, in inward persuasions and consolations, in pleasurable sensations, sudden changes, and sublime fancies" (48.23-26). Nevertheless, Religion was deemed "useful, venerable, beautiful, the sanction of order, the stay of government, the curb of self-will and self-indulgence, which the laws cannot reach" (49.7-9), and therefore Religion should be maintained to "supply... the wants of human nature" (48.27-28), but not at all because Religion is "an external fact and work of God" (48.28).

Since Religion for the Evangelicals concerned the imagination and emotions rather than the intellect, the Liberal School considered "that Religion was based on custom, on prejudice, on law, on education, on habit, on loyalty, on feudalism, on enlightened expedience, on many, many things, but not at all on Reason; ..." (49.14-17). The Liberal or Latitudinarian School whose habit was to call all matters, including Religion, into question, gradually relegated Religion to the Evangelical realm of sentiment and emotion, to be deemed useful and venerable, but not at all the province of the intellectual. Thus Newman saw the Liberal view gradually resulting in the establishment of schools and
universities that gave less and less place to Religion among the academic subjects. For those whose religious tendencies were evangelical and whose Theology was Liberal it was "unreasonable of course to demand for Religion a chair in a University,..." (50.2-4).

47.5-9 "Protestantism...original idea...Evangelical movement...last century." Here Newman is stressing the fact that neither Protestantism (sixteenth-century Lutheranism) nor Evangelicalism (the nineteenth century descendant of Lutheranism) viewed faith as "an act of the intellect" (47.19), but "as the Lutheran leaven [religion of feeling rather than of intellect] spread " (47.16-17), Faith became for the nineteenth-century Evangelicals "a feeling, an emotion..." (47.18).

The result was that Religion to the many "was based, not on argument, but on taste and sentiment, that nothing was objective, every thing subjective, in doctrine" (48.17-19). (See also 48.19-26) "...faith, according to the Reformed view, ought never to be confused with intellectual assent. Faith rather meant the acceptance of Christ as one's personal saviour, the acceptance of the fact that the Son of God has died for me as an individual, and in so doing has left me free of the debts of sin and punishment which were (and are) my natural deserts. This, said the Protestant (whether Lutheran or Calvinist or any other variety), is what the Biblical revelation is all about." 1 Newman is.

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setting forth the historical basis for the contemporary movement against
Theology in the university.

47.3-11 'The religious world...feeling or sentiment.' The
Evangelical party in the Church of England was styled the religious
party. In the Lectures on Justification, Newman describes the
Evangelical movement as follows: "...a system of doctrine has risen up
during the last three centuries, in which faith or spiritual-mindedness
is contemplated and rested on as the end of religion instead of Christ.
I do not mean to say that Christ is not mentioned as the Author of all
good, but that stress is laid rather on the believing than on the
Object of belief, on the comfort and persuasiveness of the doctrine
rather than on the doctrine itself. And in this way religion is made
to consist in contemplating ourselves instead of Christ;..." 2

47.11-14 'The old Catholic notion...its result knowledge.'
A discussion between Charles and Freeborn in Loss and Gain expresses the
difference between 'the old Catholic notion,..., that Faith was an
intellectual act,...' (47.11-13) and the Evangelical idea of justifying
faith being seated in the emotions: Giving his version of faith, the

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2 J. H. Newman, Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification
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Evangelical Freeborn says, "'first,' it is evident that it is not mere belief in facts, in the being of a God, or in the historical event that Christ has come and gone, nor is it the submission of the reason to mysteries; nor, again, is it that sort of trust which is required for exercising the gift of miracles. Nor is it knowledge and acceptance of the contents of the Bible. I say, it is not knowledge, it is not assent of the intellect, it is not historical faith, it is not dead faith: true justifying faith is none of these—it is seated in the heart and affections". 1

47.14-16: "...the Anglican Prayer Book...definite 'credenda',...definite 'agenda':" Newman claims that Anglicanism was based on a definite "credenda" (prescription for belief) and a definite "agenda" (directions for the celebration of the liturgy); that is, a definite creed and canon. As an example of "agenda", Chapter IV in The First Book of Common Prayer of Edward VI contains, "The Introits, Collects, Epistles, and Gospels, to be used at the Celebration of the Lord's Supper and holy Communion throughout the year..." The "credenda" of Chapter VIII gives directions for the conferring of Confirmation and as well, "A Catechism, that is to say, An Instruction to be learned of

every child, before he be brought to be confirmed of the Bishop."  

47.16-22 "...in proportion as the Lutheran leaven spread,... its connexion with Truth and Knowledge more and more either forgotten or denied." In An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, Newman traces the progress of Lutheranism from its founder through the development of various characteristics such as the supremacy of private judgment; the so-called religion of the heart, in place of dogmatic correctness; the rationalism of those who professed to prove all the orthodox doctrines, by a process of reasoning, from premises level with the reason; the disproving of the authority of Scripture, and finally the philosophical Pietism which, Newman says, "appears to be the state of Lutheranism at present, whether we view it in the philosophy of Kant, in the open infidelity of Strauss, or in the religious professions of the new Evangelical Church of Prussia." Furthermore, Newman notes that "Lutheranism has by this time [1840's] become in most places almost simple heresy or infidelity; it has terminated, if it has even yet reached its limit, in a denial both of the Canon and the Creed, nay, of many principles of morals."  

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3 Ibid., p. 198.
47.22-28 "The Prayer Book...spiritual renovation." The disparagement of both Canon and Creed, the leaven of Lutheranism, which Newman deplores as the source of the view that Religion is not knowledge, is evident, for example, in the Latitudinarianism of Thomas Arnold's Principles of Church Reform. Arnold writes that no specific belief is required of those who sincerely join in community prayers framed to promote the least possible disagreement among the participants: "The real question is, "Arnold writes, 'not what theoretical articles a man will or will not subscribe to, but what essential parts of Christian worship he is unable to use. Now the addressing Christ in the language of prayer and praise, is an essential part of Christian worship. Every Christian would feel his devotions incomplete, if this formed no part of them. This, therefore, cannot be sacrificed; but we are by no means bound to inquire, whether all who pray to Christ entertain exactly the same ideas of his nature. I believe that Arianism involves in it some very erroneous notions as to the object of religious worship; but if an Arian will join in our worship of Christ, and will call him Lord and God, there is neither wisdom nor charity in insisting that he shall explain what he means by these terms;..."

49.18-26 "It is true, 'Rational' Religion...rational views

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of the next world. "The Lutheran leaven" (47.16-17) of private judgment and consequent dethroning of authority gave rise to "the rationalism of those who profess to prove all orthodox doctrines, by a process of reasoning, from premisses level with reason" (see above, 47.16-22), a view which found expression in England as early as the writings of Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648) regarded as the predecessor of the eighteenth century deists. Herbert's interests lay "in defending the rationality of religion and of a religious outlook..."

Concerning revelation, Herbert "insisted that alleged revelation must be judged at the bar of reason." 2 As well in seventeenth-century England, John Locke (1632-1704) and the Cambridge Platonists 3 "held in common towards religion a spirit of cool rationality, an anti-dogmatism, an opposition to enthusiasm [Calvinism] and to blind traditionalism [Roman Catholicism] as well; and also the desire to preserve Christianity while adjusting it to the rational, scientific temper." 4

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2 Ibid., p. 63.

3 The Cambridge Platonists were a group of men "all associated with the University of Cambridge. Benjamin Whichcot (1609-83), John Smith (1616-52), Ralph Cudworth (1617-88), Nathaniel Culverwel (c.1618-c.1651), and Peter Sterry (1613-72) were all graduates of Emmanuel College while Henry More (1614-87) was a graduate of Christ's College. Some of them were also Fellows of their college; and all were Anglican clergymen. Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 5, Part I, p. 63.

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The eighteenth-century deists 1 "tended to reduce Christianity to a purely natural religion, discarding the idea of a unique revelation and trying to find the rational essence at the heart of different historical religions. They had in common a belief in God,...together with a disbelief in any unique revelation and supernatural scheme of salvation,... ...they were rationalists who believed in God. ...reason, and reason alone, [excluding authority and tradition] was the judge of truth in religion as elsewhere." 2 Newman states in his Development of Christian Doctrine that rationalism in religion "developed in Wolf, 3 who professed to prove all the orthodox doctrines, by a process of reasoning, from premisses level with reason."

1 The important English Deists were John Toland (1670-1722), Matthew Tindal (c.1656-1733), William Wollaston (1659-1724), Thomas Chubb (1679-1747), Anthony Collins (1676-1729), Thomas Woolston (1669-1733), and Henry St. John; Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751). Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 5, Part I, pp. 174-175.


3 "Wolf" in the quotation from Newman's Development of Christian Doctrine refers to Christian Wolff (1679-1754), Rector of the University of Halle, the centre and citadel of Pietism. Wolff, a scientist and philosopher, set out to demonstrate religious truths, including mysteries and miracles, as though they were so many theorems, a task which he began in 1723 with the publication of his Philosophical Thoughts on God, the World, and the Human Soul. One of the most influential of the early rationalists, he considered that natural religion alone is logical and demonstrable, and from it, therefore, one must derive revelation. Henry Daniel-Rops, The Church in the Eighteenth Century, trans. J. Warrington (London: J. M. Dent & Sons. Ltd., 1964), p. 57.

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The foregoing representatives of rational religion have in common an emphasis on the moral aspect of religion. One of Herbert's five fundamental truths of natural religion was "that a moral life has always been the principal part of divine worship." The Cambridge Platonists found the essence of Christianity in the moral life. For the Deists that essence consisted principally in the ethical teaching of Christianity. The result is a emphasis on the ethical, moral aspect of religion to the detriment of the intellectual and spiritual, aspects of religion. Thus Newman knew the necessity of stressing in his university curriculum the intellectual aspect of religion in the study of Theology and the spiritual or personal growth in holiness fostered by the colleges instead of the ethical, legalistic emphasis that religion tends to adopt as the only aspect with which the rationalists can adequately deal.

49.27-50.7 "You see,..., how a theory or philosophy, which began with Luther, the Puritans, and Wesley,..., Liberal or Latitudinarian...would be simply unmeaning." In these lines, Newman is tracing the idea that religion is not knowledge, not based on reason,


2 Ibid., p. 65.

3 Ibid., p. 175.
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but on feeling and emotion, from Luther, to the English Puritans and Wesley, to the Latitudinarians of his own day, who therefore saw no necessity for Theology in a university.

49.28 "Martin Luther" (1483-1546) studied at the University of Erfurt where the school of philosophy was Nominalist. ¹ Owen Chadwick notes the following about Luther: "As a pupil of the Nominalists, and a student of Augustine and the Fathers, he shared in that contemptuous attitude to Aristotelian schoolmen so characteristic of the age. Luther was no humanist." ²

According to Philip Hughes, Luther's "devotional life was subjective... His knowledge of theology was superficial... His only guides were the scholastics of the decay, Nominalist in tendency,

¹ For the "nominalist' school... universals have no existence except as names or ideas with which nothing in reality corresponds; for instance, there is nothing in the reality of human nature which is equally present in Peter, Paul, and John. This position amounts to sheer negation of the possibility of intellectual knowledge, and reduces science to a figment of the mind. The most typical representatives of this school are, in antiquity the sophists and the skeptics, in modern times the leading English philosophers, William of Occam in the fourteenth century, Hobbes and Locke in the seventeenth, Berkeley and Hume in the eighteenth, John Stuart Mill and Spencer in the nineteenth. It may be added that the majority of 'modern' philosophers (that is to say, of those who ignore or oppose the scholastic tradition) are more or less deeply, and more or less consciously imbued with nominalism." Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 119-120.

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and, in fact, convinced of the impossibility of any synthesis of reason and faith." ¹ It is not surprising that Luther himself wrote as follows: "I am quite sure that the Church will never be reformed unless we get rid of canon law, scholastic theology, philosophy, and logic as they are studied today, and put something else in their place." ² That something else was Luther's understanding of the word faith. Luther seemed obsessed with sin to the point of morbidity and even despair. For Luther "the human heart is too vicious to save itself, forgiveness is a gift, it cannot be won." ³

Hence Luther marks the beginning of a trend in the Religious world to dethrone the Christian intellect in its search for Theological truth. Instead, there is the trend to exalt the emotions as the individual passively rests on the reassuring feeling of salvation as long as he has faith in Christ's merits as the instrument of atonement for his sins. This dethroning of the intellect in matters of religion and its corollary that religion is not knowledge, but sentiment or emotion, is an aspect of the leaven of Lutheranism (47.16-17) that found expression in the view that since religion was not knowledge there was, therefore, no necessity for the inclusion of religion in the universitiea

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² Owen Chadwick, The Reformation, p. 46.

³ Ibid., p. 46.
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49.28 "The Puritans" of mid-seventeenth-century England were Calvinist in Theology, but preferred to remain the reforming faction within the Church of England to separation from that body. The Orthodox Anglicans gave a greater role to human reason than did the Puritans who emphasized evangelical piety, the personal influence of the Spirit, and therefore personal, individual religious experience. ¹ The Puritans repudiated authority in the form of the Anglican Prayer Book and the Episcopacy. ² The "Lutheran leaven" is expressed once more in the Puritan tendency to make religion a personal response, rather than an intellectual commitment.

49.28 "[John] Wesley" (1703-1791), with his brother Charles, was the founder of Methodism, a preaching movement that was one expression of the Evangelical Revival in the Church of England during the eighteenth century. Early Methodists were expected to be Anglicans and encouraged to attend all the services of the Church, but by 1784 Methodism had become a separatist movement. ³ Wesley had been influenced by a sect of Moravians whose intense personal religion


impressed him. "In theology [Methodists] were divided, some being Calvinists, who believed in the predestination of the elect, while others believed equally firmly in free will and salvation open to all who accepted Christ (Arminian, as was Wesley)." ¹ Methodism judged human virtue by its social value: "a relentless, active, selfless Christian life became the Methodist ideal. Thrift, abstinence, hard work, and concentration were the essential virtues of those seeking salvation and those saved. The puritan ideal was reborn shorn of its political radicalism... There was nothing intellectual about Methodism; the rational attitude, the most fashionable intellectual attitude of the day, was absolutely absent." ² In fact, the Methodists were not particularly interested in scholarship, which they regarded with some suspicion as endangering true religion." ³ There was [in Methodism] an ant-intellectual, philistine quality which attracted the dispossessed but was dangerous for society." ⁴ Near the end of his life Wesley realized that the sect he had brought into being had become one in which the form of religion remained, but the spirit was vanishing away: "The Methodists

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in every place grew diligent and frugal; consequently they increase in goods. Hence they proportionally increase in pride, in anger, in the desire of the flesh, the desire of the eyes and the pride of life. So, although the form of religion remains, the spirit is swiftly vanishing away. 1 Thus the "Lutheran leaven" (47.16-17), set in the sixteenth century, that made of religion an individual personal feeling of goodness and salvation, had risen through Puritanism in the seventeenth century, Methodism in the eighteenth to liberalism in the nineteenth century.

49.29 - 50.1 "...that large and influential body which goes by the name of liberal or latitudinarian." The latitudinarian body in the Anglican Church was a school that included most of the leading theologians in England from John Tillotson (1630-1694) to William Paley (1743-1805). 2 Newman defines Latitudinarianism—a view he saw as having gained ground in his day—in these words: "that every man's view of Revealed Religion is acceptable to God, if he acts up to it; that no one view is in itself better than another, or at least that we cannot


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tell which is better. All that we have to do then is to act consistently with what we hold, and to value others if they act consistently with what they hold; that to be consistent constitutes sincerity; that where there is this evident sincerity, it is no matter whether we profess to be Romanists or Protestants, ...Calvinists or Arminians, Anglicans or Dissenters, ...Wesleyans or Socinians." ¹ The Latitudinarians prized a broad toleration with all the Protestant Churches and thus a unity based on "a hearty zeal for spreading the knowledge of the Gospel." ²

G. R. Cragg describes the widespread influence of the Latitudinarian clerics in the Church of England as follows: "...all over England the grandeur of Christianity were reduced to the modest proportion of prudential ethics. 'This plainness and simplicity of the Gospel' often degenerated into superficiality, and the rationalised version of the faith had dangerous affinities with legalism. It is surprising how many elements in Christianity the Latitudinarians ignored. Because they consistently minimised the power of evil, they felt little need to stress salvation. They had no conception of the Church as a divine society, and consequently laid little emphasis upon its worship


² G. R. Cragg, Reason and Authority in the Eighteenth Century, p. 61.
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and traditions. The sacraments played a modest and utilitarian role in their scheme, and mysteries were an embarrassment which was best avoided. They had little to say about the Incarnation and the Atonement, and almost nothing about Christ as Mediator. These doctrines represented, of course, precisely the theological complexities which seemed to the eighteenth century to have obscured the simple essentials of the Gospel.¹

The Latitudinarians "claimed to be the true successors of the Reformation."² The "Lutheran leaven" (47.16-17) is evident in their lack of emphasis on tradition and the sacraments, in their preference for the simplicity of the Gospel, and in their insistence on the essential role of moral obligation. However, the Latitudinarians were also products of the age of Newton and Locke in their emphasis on reason. They spoke of reason as that faculty which links man with God and provides the means by which we can discover the divine nature and come to know God as he is. For the Latitudinarians, reason was "that brightest and most glorious ray of the divine and the perfection of human nature."³

¹ G. R. Cragg, Reason and Authority in the Eighteenth Century, p. 60.
³ Gerald R. Cragg, Reason and Authority in the Eighteenth Century, p. 47.
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The following authors are examples of the gradual trend to supplant reliance on the tradition and the authority of the Early Church with the utmost confidence and faith in human reason: John Locke "insisted that the traditions both of the philosophers and of the churchmen must be set aside. Neither in speculation nor in belief should the past control the present. He turned to new sources of certainty. In philosophy he found his starting-place in experience. In religion he turned to the Bible [See the preface to Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity, 1695], but he proposed to treat the Bible like any other book. Indeed, he insisted that religion itself must be approached in the same spirit as any other subject;"¹ that is, with confidence in the power of human reason. Conyers Middleton published in 1748, A Free Inquiry into the miraculous powers which are supposed to have subsisted in the Christian Church from earliest age, through several successive centuries in an attempt to discredit the authority of the primitive church; with the result that, his work pulled from under the Anglican Church the entire Protestant tradition of the Fathers. ² The search for a reasoned defence of Revelation culminated in William Paley's Evidences of Christianity (1794).

¹ Owen Chadwick, From Bossuet to Newman, pp. 75-76.
² G. R. Cragg, Reason and Authority in the Eighteenth Century, p. 3.
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In the nineteenth century the rationalism of the Latitudinarians merged with the sentimentalism of the Evangelicals to form the liberal churchman of Newman's day. In 1835, "in a postscript to Tract LXXIII, he [Newman] had observed the spread of Schleiermacher's influence, in the revival of 'religious feeling,' which was producing the 'spurious Christianity' of Liberalism. Schleiermacher's identification of religion with 'the feeling of absolute dependence on God' suggested that 'the Christian Revelation was intended only to stir the affections and soothe the heart.' 'Such a doctrine dispensed with creeds as impediments to religious growth, stumbling-blocks to the reason, and shackles to the affections, it could also suggest,..., that the Christian dispensation 'contains nothing which is unintelligible to the intellect.' Thus Newman sees in Liberalism the paradoxical union of rationalism and sentimentalism,..." 1

Friedrick Daniel Schleiermacher (1768-1834), who set the climate of theological opinion for nineteenth and early twentieth century Protestant liberal theology, was head of the theological faculty in the University of Berlin from 1810 to 1834. Schleiermacher's distinction of religion from knowledge and conduct makes his thought and influence significant in the present context of the discussion of theology as an

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important area of knowledge in the university. Schleiermacher's view of the separation of faith and reason sprang from his contention that "religion is a unique activity of the human spirit, which consists neither in arguments, proofs, and ideas, nor in being morally upright and worshipping God in specific ways... It is simply the most perfect development of the affective side of the life of man; ...his chief historical significance lies in the fact that he attempted to show that the context of the Christian faith is somehow the original property of the human mind evolved from its own deepest nature and not brought in from outside through a mechanical transmission of information from God. ...Religion, according to Schleiermacher is a universal tendency of mind...It is natural, and the human spirit is not fully developed until it becomes religious." ¹ Schleiermacher's insistence upon the autonomy of religious experience presented an alternative to orthodoxy that was more suited to the modes of thinking, the intellectual currents of a critical and scientific age. ²

According to Owen Chadwick, by the nineteenth century the "reformed continental Protestantism now seemed to be abandoning the

² Ibid., p. 307.
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Christian faith as it had always been understood; ...But how had this happened? There could only be one answer—rationalism must have been implicit in the teaching of Luther and the original reformers. Though it was difficult to fit Luther into the Category of 'rationalist', the solution was found in the surprising theory that Luther had taught the free right of private judgment, and that right of private judgment leads inevitably to the prevailing rationalism. ...To gain a hearing in Germany for a new system of theology it must be shown to be consistent with the theology of Luther and the German Reformation; ...and therefore theologians like Schleiermacher claimed that their theology was indeed the logical outcome of Lutheran thought."¹

The liberals or latitudinarians—Broad Churchmen as they came to be called in the nineteenth century—were, therefore, the contemporary expression of the leaven of Lutheranism—a development that had its roots in the irreconcilability of reason and faith inherent in thought from Luther to Schleiermacher. The Lutheran leaven found expression in the nineteenth century view that religion belongs to the affective side of man's life, not the intellectual; and therefore, in Newman's words, "it is as unreasonable of course to demand for Religion a chair in a University, as to demand one for fine feeling..." (50.2-4).

¹ Owen Chadwick, From Bossuet to Newman, pp. 115 - 116.
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50.8-22 "Now in support...a statesman,...Mixed Education."

One of the leading members of that large and influential group of
liberals (49.29-50.1) was Henry Peter Lord Brougham (1778-1868), the
opportunist politician whom Newman so devastatingly ridicules with fine,
knife-edge irony as a philosopher and orator "whose aim has ever been to
cultivate the fair, the noble, and the generous" (50.12-14). Newman
evokes audience agreement with his view of Brougham by several well-
placed hits, among them being that Brougham was "no trader in places, or
votes, or the stock-market" (50.10-11). The reference is to one of
Brougham's attempts to secure for himself a seat in the House of Commons;
on this occasion, the seat for Westminster by unseating the incumbent
Lord Cochrane, himself a blatant Radical, who had been indicted in a
sensational stock-exchange scandal. Brougham had been assured of the
Whig nomination in return for signing a pledge drawn up by the
Benthamite Radicals Francis Place and James Mill to the effect that he,
Brougham, would support Parliamentary reform in line with Radical
thinking when elected. However, the acquitted Cochrane was re-elected
for Westminster and Brougham retreated in defeat.¹ The ironic
reference to this well-known story would no doubt evoke appreciative
chuckles from Newman's audience.

Lord Brougham was, throughout his long career, a vociferous advocate of many causes, among them being the abolition of the slave-trade and slavery, popular education, and the 1832 reform bill. Brougham, Francis Jeffrey, Francis Horner, and Sydneý Smith were the founders of the Edinburgh Review in 1802, a liberal periodical to which Brougham contributed reviews of brutal invective which "helped him to do some of his best work, notably in the destruction of great abuses, and inevitably made for him his worst enemies." ¹ To many it seemed that the causes Brougham advocated were motivated by his ambitious desire for position and public support rather than the result of personal conviction. Marvin O'Connell refers to him as "the versatile and impetuous Henry Brougham" whose "outspoken liberalism sounded, even to his close friends, more opportunistic than genuine." ²

Politically and socially, Brougham associated with the Philosophical Radicals. He was a member of Jeremy Bentham's small circle of friends, but did not agree with Bentham's theorizing except in law reform where he became "Bentham's representative in action." ³ John Stuart Mill said that his father "James Mill was the good genius by the

¹ Chester W. New, The Life of Henry Brougham to 1830, p. 10.
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side of Brougham in most of what he did for the public, either on education, law reform, or any other subject. 1

As far as religion was concerned, Brougham maintained that he was not a Dissenter, although he did sympathize with the religion of William Allen the Quaker and Wilberforce and his Evangelical colleagues. 2 In one of Brougham's electoral speeches, intended to recommend himself to the support of the Anglican clergy, he claimed, "I am a Church of England man; ...[although] I am an advocate of unbounded toleration." 3

As a liberal, Brougham advocated equality in religion; his view was towards a "practical Christianity" 4 that made him a natural supporter of Mixed Education. Newman states that Brougham "has had a share, as much as any one alive, in effecting the public recognition in these Islands of the principle of Mixed Education" (50.19-22). It was Brougham who began the movement for public support for the Lancastrian schools, among the few educational institutions for the education of the poor in the early nineteenth century. It was in the pages of the

1 Chester W. New, The Life of Henry Brougham to 1830, p. 155.
2 Ibid., p. 155.
3 Ibid., p. 186.
4 Ibid., p. 154.
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Edinburgh Review in the article the "Education of the Poor," November, 1811 that Brougham launched the movement. He proceeded by first organizing the Lancastrian schools into a system in 1810, then under the title of the British and Foreign School Society in 1814. By 1816 he had succeeded in obtaining permission to form a parliamentary Education Committee with himself as chairman and writer of its first report. As a result of the work of the Education Committee under Brougham, parliamentary funds were first allocated in 1820 to the building of schools for education of the poor, but it was not until 1833 that regular grants were given to these schools.

The principle of Mixed Education had been well established in the Lancastrian Schools. Lancaster himself "emphasized the value of children of different denominations being brought together in one school. . . . he attempted to teach 'general Christianity' in a manner that would be offensive to none." ¹ It was Brougham who recommended public funds for the National School Society which was founded by the Anglicans as the British and Foreign School Society had been largely Dissenter inspired. "Very early in its history a number of the National Society Schools were thrown open to the children of Dissenters; it [the National School Society] exempted them

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from attendance at hours when the tenets of the Church of England were taught, ... and established the rule that while all children in their schools should attend places of worship on Sunday, children of Dissenters might attend the Dissenting Chapels. Brougham cordially welcomed this liberal practice in the rival organization and frequently emphasized it.1 Thus Brougham's general Christianity was basic to the two early societies for the education of the poor. For Brougham, Mixed Education was the means to achieving his object of the universality of education with a view to effecting the Benthamite ideal of the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

Brougham's pamphlet "Practical Observations on the Education of The People" became the Bible of the Mechanics' Institute Movement; it was an elaboration of Brougham's article for the Edinburgh Review, October, 1824, extolling the benefits of the diffusion of scientific knowledge among the poorer classes of the adult population.2 The High Churchmen disagreed with Brougham's view that to include religion in the times of religious strife would be to wreck the whole enterprise.3

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1 Chester W. New, The Life of Henry Brougham to 1830, p. 208.
2 Ibid., pp. 336-337.
3 Ibid., p. 334.
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London University was another of Brougham's educational projects for which he made a strong appeal in the pages of the Edinburgh Review; in this instance, the August, 1825 number. London University was established as a general secular university supported financially by wealthy Dissenters, Catholics, and Jews. In 1828 Brougham defended the principle of Mixed Education in the face of opposition from High Anglicans and Evangelicals. He opposed a course of lectures in London University concerning the Evidences of Christianity on the grounds that there was so much disagreement as to what Christianity was: "It was not because they disregarded religion or religious education that the Council had omitted theological lectureships, but because they deemed the subject too important to be approached lightly or inconsiderably. Their object was to leave the religious instruction of the students to their parents and clergymen." ¹

It is clear from this brief outline of Brougham's pursuit of education for all, that the principle of Mixed Education had its roots in the utilitarian philosophy of Bentham and Mill. Chester New notes that Bentham, Mill and Brougham had frequent talks on education, each influencing the other; also according to New there is a similarity of principles of education between Bentham's Chrestomathia (1815) and those

¹ Chester W. New, The Life of Henry Brougham to 1830, p. 379.
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put into operation in London University. With Brougham, who was a lawyer and a politician, not a clergyman, education took on a very different character from the church-directed education of the previous centuries. The aims became secular, with only a token Christianity remaining to give a colour of respectability. Instead of single schools in particular centres operated by school masters of individual personality, aims, and character, schools under Brougham's direction were organized into a system that became nation-wide under the slogan of "schools for all." The characteristics of our modern public school system are to be found in the aims and organization of Brougham's educational projects in the first third of the nineteenth century.

50.22-25 "This able person,...a speech or discourse, on occasion of a public solemnity;" The reference is to Brougham's "Inaugural Discourse on Being Installed Lord Rector of the University of Glasgow," April 6, 1825. In this address Brougham's mind was filled with plans for the Mechanics' Institutes, the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, and a London University— all to embody the principles of unhampered liberty of mind for men of all classes.

1 Chester W. Nèw, The Life of Henry Brougham to 1830, p. 303.
2 The expression "Schools for all" was coined by James Mill in an essay of the same title.
3 Chester W. Nèw, The Life of Henry Brougham to 1830, p. 347.
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50.28 - 51.12 "As men...height of his stature!" The quotation is from Brougham's "Inaugural Discourse on Being Installed Lord Rector of the University of Glasgow," Works of Henry Lord Brougham, Vol. VII (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1872), pp. 139-140. In the context of these quoted sentences Brougham is expressing the hope that the spread of knowledge (scientific knowledge) even among the working classes will be the "forerunner of liberality and enlightened toleration" (139). This sentence follows those quoted by Newman: "Henceforth, treating with entire respect those who conscientiously differ from ourselves, the only practical effect of the difference will be, to make us enlighten the ignorance on one side or the other from which it springs...to the end that the only kind of unanimity may be produced which is desirable among rational beings—the agreement proceeding from full conviction after the freest discussion" (140). Brougham's plan for religious toleration is based first on the idea that "the diffusion of knowledge" (141) results in "the virtuous habits which are its legitimate offspring" (110) among them being toleration; secondly, those who differ from ourselves should be tolerated since religion is a matter of the individual's conscience and Private Judgment.

In the interests of toleration of religious differences, Brougham maintains that a man is not accountable for his religious beliefs in that they are peculiar to him, an aspect of his nature (51.7-12); in other words, religion is not the concern of reason, but rather
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belongs to the "idiosyncracies, accidents of the individual" (51.15-16). Consciously or not, Brougham's view of religion is an expression of Schleiermacher's liberal theology; that is, religion belongs to the affective side of man's nature, not the intellectual aspect. The "Leaven of Lutheranism" (47.16-17) is evident again in the lack of synthesis between reason and faith in Brougham's thinking.

51.22 - 53.17 "What Mr. Brougham...and nothing more?" The Committee of Council on Education was formed in 1839 with Sir James Kay-Shuttleworth (1804-1877) as its first secretary. "His tenure at the 'Committee of Council' extended from 1839 to 1849 during which period he was the moving spirit. He has been called 'the founder of English popular education'." Dr. Kay-Shuttleworth had in common with Lord Brougham the following: They were both graduates of Edinburgh University: Kay-Shuttleworth graduated in medicine and Brougham in law; Kay-Shuttleworth was a Nonconformist, specifically a Baptist; Brougham had Dissenters' leanings; both were concerned with the necessity of educating the poor. It was Brougham who had proposed in 1837 that the government establish a permanent department to advance education. The result was the Committee of Council on Education formed in 1839 which became first a Ministry of Education for the distribution of grants;

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then, a policy and curriculum committee. "The Minutes of the Committee of Council on Education were published among the Parliamentary Papers, but were also more conveniently issued separately in octavo (32 volumes, London: 1841-1869). [It is the second volume of this series to which Newman refers in 52.2.] They cover, primarily, the appointment of inspectors, the instructions given them, correspondence with the Church and school societies, and the growth of the system of grants in aid... They contain also... the reports of the inspectors, often of the highest value as documents both of general social history, and of local history, including reports on special schools, ...on which inspectors Allen, Moseley, [Temple, Tremenheere, Fletcher] and Brookfield report at length between 1844 and 1854." 1

R. R. W. Lingen, a Balliol 2 man, was Kay-Shuttleworth's successor from 1849 in the office of secretary to the Committee of Council. 3 Lingen was an advocate of unsectarian education. 4

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2 Balliol College, Oxford graduated many liberals who became noted figures in the nineteenth century from Dr. Thomas Arnold, to A. C. Tait, Benjamin Jowett, and Hastings Rashdall to name only a few.


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Inspectors' reports, specifically the one referred to here, reflect the philosophy of education of the committee and its secretaries, Kay-Shuttleworth and R. A. W. Lingen; namely, that "Religion is not knowledge,...and is excluded from a University course of instruction,...because it has no business there at all, because it is to be considered a mere taste, sentiment, opinion, and nothing more?" (53.10-17).

53.19-22 "'According...the 'essential idea' of all religious education will consist in the direct cultivation of the 'feelings' " Newman comments that "here is Lutheranism sublimated into philosophy" (53.22-23). The "Leaven of Lutheranism" (47.16-17) that made of religion sentiment and thereby separated religion from intellectual pursuits has become the philosophy of the Committee of Council on Education and therefore has influenced the form of the curriculum as expressed in the Minutes for 1848-1850. Religion for this Liberal-dominated Committee of Council belongs to the realm of sentiment. It is interesting to note that Matthew Arnold, who was appointed one of Her Majesty's Inspectors in 1851 shared the opinion concerning religion of his colleagues in the Education Ministry: In "God and the Bible" he wrote these words: "For the power of Christianity has been in the immense emotion which it has excited; in its engaging, for the government of man's conduct, the mighty forces of love, reverence, gratitude, hope, pity, and awe,—all the host of allies which Wordsworth
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includes under the one name of imagination... Also Arnold wrote in "The Study of Poetry," "...and most of what now passes with us for religion and philosophy will be replaced by poetry." These quotations succinctly express the liberal attitude with its roots in the leaven of Lutheranism: religion is not knowledge, but sentiment; as a result, the place of theology as an intellectual pursuit, is usurped by poetry with its appeal to the imagination and emotions.

54.6-7 "The soul...'Grace...dignity and love'." The poetry quotation is from John Milton, Paradise Lost, Book VIII: 488-489. The reference is to Eve in the beauty of innocence in the Garden of Eden before her temptation and fall from grace. The "poetry of devotion" (54.1) was to have an efficacious effect for the improvement of the reader. The province of religion for the liberal was reduced to that of morality. According to Arnold and the Liberal School, the best examples of well-ordered affections and right conduct for emulation were to be found in great literature.

54.16-20 "'In the diverse schools,...losing sight of the moral and religious sentiment it is intended to draw forth'." The quotation is a second reference to the Inspector's Report in the
"Minutes of the Committee of Council on Education for the years 1848-50" (51.25-26). Newman states that he is taking the minutes for 1848-50 as a "specimen of the philosophy of the day, as adopted by those who are not conscious unbelievers, or open scoffers" (55.4-6). The writer of the Report states that "it has ever appeared 'perfectly indifferent,' as to the results, what precise method or instrumentality may be adopted (54.20-21) for religious instruction just so that the method is not "the basis of an intellectual exercise" (54.23-25) while the "moral and religious sentiment it is intended to draw forth" (54.26-29)—the real purpose of the religious instruction in the opinion of the writer, is lost. Instead of the aim of religious instruction being truth, the object of the intellect; that aim seems to be the drawing forth of "moral and religious sentiment!" (54.28). Newman concludes that the philosophy of the day reduces religious knowledge to morality and religious sentiment "because they consider knowledge, as regards the creature, is illimitable, but impossible or hopeless as regards the Creator" (55.17-20).

55.22 - 56.15 "...for the school in question...a distinct recognition...Truth in the province of Religion." In this section Newman reveals an inconsistency between his liberal opponents' recognition that there is "Truth in the province of Religion" (56.15) and their having established London University as an institution of higher education with a total absence of religious or theological studies. Evidence that the
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liberal school recognized religious Truth, Newman found in the Prayer offered by Edward Maltby, (1770-1859) afterwards Bishop of Durham, on April 30, 1827 at the laying of the corner-stone for London University, an occasion that marked the formal inauguration of "the principle of Mixed Education" (55.27-28) in England. Maltby, a noted liberal clergyman stated in his Prayer that contemplation and study of God's creation "'exercise at once the mind in pursuit of human science, and lead it onwards to 'Divine Truth'" (56.12-13). Yet there was being laid the corner-stone of a university that was to exclude "Divine Truth" from its curriculum.

56.22-57.3 "...the recognition of the Being and certain attributes of the Deity,...noble and gifted person...'the highest...contemplation of science'." Newman resumes the tone of sarcastic irony reserved for Lord Brougham: That "noble and gifted person [with a] genius, versatile and multiform" (56.23-25) is the author of "Discourses of the objects, advantages, and pleasures of science" (56.28-29). This essay of Brougum's was the introductory treatise to the Library of Useful Knowledge—a series which comprised sixpenny books published from March 1827 twice a month under the auspices of the Society for the

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Diffusion of useful knowledge, another of Brougham's projects.

57.5 - 58.6 "We are raised by them,...cannot even comprehend." The quotation is from Lord Brougham's "Discourse of the Objects, Pleasures, and Advantages of Science," Works of Henry Brougham, Vol. VII, p. 370.

Newman's quotations from the speeches of Haldane and Brougham illustrate that "the partizans of mixed education," (58.19-20) in their conceding "that human science leads to belief in a Supreme Being (58.20-21) are actually admitting "a basis of truth in the doctrines of Religion" (58.12-13). Yet the liberals have established London University in 1826 and have established the Queen's Colleges in Ireland in 1846 on the very principle of omitting truth in the doctrines of religion from the curricula.

58.18 - 62.21 "When I am told...human science leads to belief in a Supreme Being,...province of opinion." Newman questions whether belief in God, the Supreme Being, has the same meaning to "the partizans of Mixed Education" (58.19-20) as that belief has for Catholics, the first race of Protestants, and the followers of Mohammed (570-632, an Arabian religious leader and author of the Koran). In other words does belief in God, for the liberals, contain a theology in itself (58.29-59.1) as it does for all Theists; that is, for all those who believe in one God, the Creator and Supreme Ruler of everything.
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On one side of the controversy, the teaching of Monotheism (the doctrine that there is but one God) is that "God is an Individual, Self-dependent, All-perfect, Unchangeable Being" (59.4-5) who is eternal, Omnipotent, Omniscient, Omnipresent, and Omnipotent. In contrast with the other or liberal side of the controversy, Newman makes the point that God is "independent of the appointments which he has made" (59.13-14) and that He "has relations of his own towards the subject matter of each particular science" (59.16-18) in the book of knowledge. Newman concludes, again in contrast with the liberal view, that God "necessarily becomes the subject matter of a science, far wider and more noble than any of those which are included in the circle of secular education" (59.24-26).

On the other side of the controversy about the meaning of the word God, Newman expresses doubts "that the spirit of the age means by the Supreme Being what Catholics mean" (60.19-21). A series of "if" clauses expresses Newman's sceptical attitude towards the real nature of his liberal opponents' belief in a Supreme Being and their meaning of the word God. If the liberal view of God as a being "who has contrived the world and keeps it in order, who acts in it, but only in a way of general Providence, who acts towards us but only through...laws of Nature" (61.9)..."then belief in a God is no more than an acknowledgment of existing, sensible powers and phenomena..."(61.21-23). "...then will I confess that there is no specific science about God, that theology is but
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a name, and a protest in its behalf an hypocrisy" (62.2-5).

The view here expressed that our knowledge of God is limited to our knowledge of the universe and that God himself is encompassed by the universe and restricted by the laws of the universe is the view of the eighteenth century Deists. For them, "the primacy of reason implied the unquestioned authority of natural religion. ... [Matthew] Tindal, mixing his metaphors in his enthusiasm, declared that 'the light of nature' is 'the voice of God himself'; ... The Deists believed in a God who was the first cause of this ingeniously contrived universe. Nature, they argue, is perfect; so is the religion which is based on it. Tindal [praised] the attractions of natural religion. Its importance is as great as its inherent beauty. ... 'The religion of nature', Tindal assures us, 'consists in observing those things which our reason, by considering the nature of God and man, and the relation we stand in to him and to one another, demonstrates to be our duty'." ¹ In this view, God is "but coincident with the laws of the universe," (62.5-6). Religion is reduced to a pious reflection on God "which the pageant of experiment or abstract reasoning passes by" (62.10-11), expressed in "a poetry of thought or an ornament of language" (62.12-13). Theology in this view has no "influence upon philosophy or sciences, of which it is

¹ Gerald R. Cragg, Reason and Authority in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 80-81.
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rather the parasitical production" (62.13-15). The conclusion is that God and Theology do not have the same meaning in the mouths of the liberal proponents for mixed education as they do for monotheists. Newman concludes that "such ideas of Religion seem to be short of Monotheism (63.13-14). ...I do not see much difference between saying that there is no God, and implying that nothing definite can for certain be known about him" (63.24-27). Newman sees the liberals as mounting religious terms that are empty of real religious sense; for example, the statement: "the heathens used to say 'God wills,' when they meant 'Fate'" (60.27-28).

62.28 "...Natural Theology...." The view of natural theology that Newman has been describing during the course of his argument (61.5-63.12) is expressed in the thought of William Paley (1743-1805) whose Natural Theology, or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity Collected from the Appearances of Nature (1802) expressed the idea that the evidence of design everywhere in nature pointed to the necessity of an intelligent Creator. ¹ Newman defines this view of Natural Theology as "a science which avails itself of the phenomena and laws of the material universe, as exhibited by that school, as a means of establishing the existence of Design in their construction, and thereby

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the fact of a Creator and Preserver." ¹ he criticizes, in the same essay, Natural Theology as a half truth which teaches only three attributes or God and deals not at all with the elements of Christianity. In the sermon, "The Religion of the Day," Newman is harsh in his description of the effect on thinking of Natural Theology. He refers to it as "the creed of shallow men in every age, who reason little and feel not at all, and who think themselves enlightened and philosophical;

...[it is] the peculiar religion of a civilized age." ²

64.3-4 "...such philosophers as Hume." David Hume (1711-1776), was a British philosopher, historian, and political economist. Writing in the empiricist tradition of John Locke and George Berkeley, Hume wrote the following important works: The Treatise on Human Nature (1738-40), An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1746), and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (printed 1779). Newman's reference is specifically to the second work.

64.26 - 65.12 "'Allowing...such imaginary virtues'." Quoted from David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section XI, "Of a Particular Providence and a Future State," in The Philosophical


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A. W. Benn states that "the two greatest names in the history of rationalism, [are] Voltaire, and Hume. ...No other assailants have so successfully applied reason to the destruction of religious belief. ...[Hume] theoretically put an end to dogmatism." ¹ "...most persons, when they felt bound to give a reason for believing in the existence of a personal God, have assumed that there must be an intelligent cause of the world. Now, to those who accept Hume's analysis of causation such an assumption is fallacious. Our only guide is experience, and experience only tells us that within the world every change is preceded by another change. As to the world itself, we know and can know nothing about a time when it did not exist; we have therefore no right to dogmatise about the mode of its production. But when Hume is writing about natural religion, he accepts, without analysis the ordinary notion of causation, insisting only on a rigid adherence to experience in its application. Applying this principle to theology, he argues that, granting the world to have been created by a designing intelligence, we are not justified in ascribing any intentions to its creator other than what are actually realised in the visible constitution of things". ²


² Ibid., p. 168.
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In Hume's words granting "the gods to be the authors of the existence or order of the universe, it follows that they possess that precise degree of power, intelligence and benevolence, which appears in their workmanship" (34.27-35.1). Therefore for Hume our knowledge of God is limited by our knowledge of His creation. Consequently, a thorough study of the material world will yield whatever can be known of the creator. Thus Hume is for Newman the most recent in a line of rationalists who can dispense with Theology as a subject separate from the knowledge of the material world. Thus it is consistent with Hume's philosophy not to assign a place for Theology in the University curriculum.

Discourse II has developed the theme that Mixed Education is based on a false idea. Newman has countered arguments for Mixed Education from political, religious, and philosophical opponents. The political compromise Newman has described in these words: "He [the politician] sees then that all would go easy, could he but contrive to educate apart from religion, not compromising indeed his own private religious persuasion, whatever it happens to be, but excluding one and all professions of faith from the national system" (37.22-27).
Newman's answer in substance is that a university is the seat of universal knowledge; Theology is knowledge; therefore, it is false logic to omit Theology.

However, the root cause of the opposition to Theology in the
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University is Religious and Philosophical. Newman notes that "as the Lutheran leaven spread, it became fashionable to say that Faith was but a feeling, an emotion, "an affection, an appetency, not an act of the intellect;" (47.16-19). Newman answers that "the old Catholic notion, which still lingers in the Established Church, was, that Faith was an intellectual act, its object truth, and its result knowledge" (47.11-14). Furthermore, the word God to all Theists contains a Theology in itself (58.29-59.1) and "necessarily becomes the subject matter of a science, far wider and more noble than any of those which are included in the circle of secular education" (59.24-26).

The opposition from philosophical quarters came from the proponents of Natural Theology, specifically Hume. In their view God is but coincident with the laws of the universe (62.5-6). Therefore, we know only about God what we can learn from the secular sciences (61.23-29); thus, only the secular sciences are necessary in the university curriculum; mixed education is a practical measure; why not adopt it for the general population. Newman concedes that if the foregoing is really the view of the Mixed Education proponents, then a protest in behalf of Theology is in vain. But Newman had found an inconsistency—Brougham and Maltby in their various inaugural addresses do admit that there is religious truth; consequently, Newman has revealed his opponents as holding an illogical position. Newman's conclusion is that "Religious doctrine is knowledge, in as full a sense as Newton's doctrine is knowledge. Mixed Education, at least in a University, is
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simply unphilosophical" (66.13-16).
DISCOURSE III. THE BEARING OF THEOLOGY ON OTHER BRANCHES OF KNOWLEDGE

In Discourse II Newman argued for the view that "religious doctrine is knowledge" (66.7-8) and therefore that "Mixed Education, at least in a University, is simply unphilosophical" (66.15-16). Newman states in the closing paragraph of Discourse II that he will show in Discourse III that the omission of Theology from "the list of recognized sciences, is not only indefensible in itself, but prejudicial to all the rest" (66.19-21).

The reason that the omission of Theology is prejudicial to the other sciences Newman explains as follows: the mind "advances towards the apprehension" of truth, "in proportion to the number of sciences it has mastered; ...when certain sciences are wanting," (specifically, Théologie) the mind "has but a defective apprehension, in proportion to the value of the sciences which are thus wanting, and the importance of the field on which they are employed" (72.28-73.2). Both the cause and the effect of this "defective apprehension," Newman describes as follows: "as regards the devotees of any science, or family of sciences, to the exclusion of others; they necessarily become bigots and quacks, scorning all principles and reported facts, which do not belong to their own pursuit, and thinking to effect everything without aid from any other quarter" (76.14-19). Discourse III opens with a particular instance of those who have become "bigots and quacks": "men
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of great intellect...whose mental life is concentrated and hidden in their chosen pursuit, and who have neither eyes or ears for anything which does not immediately bear upon it..." (67.1-7) are examples of the kind of mental preoccupation that is the subject of this discourse. These are the men who have so concentrated on the pursuit of their own science or point of view that they lack the view which would enable them to see the interrelation between all the sciences and their mutual dependence one upon the other.

68.9-21 "Theology and human science are two things, not one,... '...you leave no claim to pronounce upon Science'." The separation of Theology and secular science is a liberal view based first on the notion that Theology is not knowledge as dealt with in Discourse II and secondly on the nineteenth century economic principle of the division of labour as a means of progress in every area: "As division of labour, so division of thought is the only means of successful application" (68.16-18). Newman proceeds to prove that the foregoing nineteenth century economic principle of the "division of labour" (68.16) as a principle of success is wrongly applied to the philosophical problem of the nature of knowledge in the university lecture room. The submitting of a philosophical subject to the guidance of an economic principle is in itself an example of the "defective apprehension" (72.28) which results from being "devotees of any science, [specifically, political economy], or family of sciences, to the exclusion of others;..." (76.14-16).
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68.18-21 "'Let us...pronounce upon Science!' is an example of the view of the philosopher of the day—the exponent of the liberal view—whom Newman takes as his general opponent.

Lord Macaulay, "the perfect spokesman for the practical secular center of English opinion" 1 was a representative philosopher of the day. Macaulay was in agreement with the principles of London University particularly "the exclusion of religion from what to him was an essentially nonreligious activity." 2 He agreed with the establishment of the Queen's Colleges. Drawing a parallel between the situation in Ireland and that in Scotland, he writes that "in a country in which a large proportion of those who require a liberal education are dissenters from the Established Church, it is desirable that there should be schools without theological tests." 3 Furthermore, as regards the religious beliefs of the professors, Macaulay writes that "it was quite unnecessary to institute an inquisition into the religious opinion of people whose business was merely to teach secular knowledge." 4

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4 Ibid., p. 166.
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Macaulay gave his stand on the question Newman is discussing; namely, the separation of secular and religious knowledge in the university as follows: In an account of the debate on theological tests in Scottish universities Macaulay wrote that "We were told...that secular knowledge, unaccompanied by a sound religious faith, and unsanctified by religious feeling, was not only useless, but positively noxious...I say that the proposition which they have so confidently laid down,...will appear, as soon as it is applied to the real concerns of life, to be too monstrous, too ludicrous, for grave refutation." ¹ Furthermore, Macaulay assumes the prevalent view in this essay that if secular knowledge were accompanied by a sound religious faith the accuracy, depth, and breadth of the secular knowledge would as a consequence be put in serious jeopardy. Macaulay's idea of progress, therefore, involved the separation of the secular and the religious. He would as a consequence be one of Newman's arch opponents on the mixed education question.

68.22 "...a sort of compromise." To a compromise based on the principle of the division of labour which would teach secular knowledge in the university lecture room, and remand "religious knowledge to the parish priest, the catechism, and the parlour" (69.8-9) Newman will give a philosophical answer in the paragraphs that follow:

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68.26 - 69.4 "...that it should remain...their own minds."
The contrast in the words "public" and "private" (68.27-28) refers to the difference between any organized school system where students are taught in a class as opposed to a group of individuals coming together for their own personal instruction in a subject that interests them; namely, religion. The contrast emphasizes the fact that religion has been removed from the realm of general knowledge necessary to all to that of peculiar interest to some individuals.

69.16 - 71.2 These paragraphs introduce Newman's theory of knowledge which forms a rebuttal of the current "division of labour" (68.16) principle as applied to knowledge and education. Newman stresses the unity of knowledge and the fact that the various sciences are integral and correlative parts of the whole. (See above, Discourse II, the "circle of knowledge" metaphor (45.25-27). Although not expressly stated here Newman's thought is based on the following ideas stated elsewhere. The unity of knowledge is an expression of the unity characteristic of the Creator and manifested in His creation. In the sermon, "Order, the Witness and Instrument of Unity," Newman wrote that "all the works of God are founded on unity, for they are founded on Himself, who is the most awfully simple and transcendent of possible unities. He is emphatically One; and whereas He is also multiform in His attributes and His acts, as they present themselves to our minds, it..."
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follows that order and harmony must be of His very essence."¹ In the sermon, "The Second Spring" Newman revealed a principle of unity and order basic to the changes characteristic of the material world. He writes that "We have familiar experience of the order, the constancy, the perpetual renovation of the material world which surrounds us. ...It is bound together by a law of permanence, it is set up in unity; and, though it is ever dying, it is ever coming to life again."² Similarly, as regards knowledge in Discourse III, Newman reveals that there is a basic unity of knowledge in that the various sciences "embrace respectively larger and smaller portions of the field of knowledge" (70.25-26).

The reason, according to Newman, that knowledge is usually thought of in terms of the individual sciences, and the basic unity therefore not recognized, is that "the human mind cannot take in this whole vast fact at a single glance, or gain possession of it at once" (70.11-13). The mind, in its attempt to master the various sciences one by one, Newman compares to a short-sighted reader whose sight is dim and whose vision is thereby necessarily restricted, or to one who goes slowly around a huge structure "viewing it under different aspects, by


way of making progress towards mastering the whole" (70.18-20). By analogy, so the mind "by degrees and by circuitous advances does it rise aloft and subject to itself that universe into which it has been born" (70.20-22).

70.23 - 71.27. "These various partial views...communicate it readily to others." Newman defines the individual sciences as the "partial views or abstractions by which the mind looks out upon its objects" (70.23-24) truth. Since the sciences are abstractions they are concerned with the relations of things rather than with things themselves (71.10-12); therefore, "they never tell us all that can be said about a thing" (71.15-16). "...inasmuch as sciences are forms of knowledge, they enable the intellect to master and increase it [knowledge]; and, inasmuch as they are instruments, to communicate it readily to others" (71.25-27).

71.22 "...philosophy..." for Newman, is knowledge organized into a system. See Discourse VII p. 202 in which he speaks of philosophy as the "perfection or virtue of the intellect." Also, Discourse VII pp. 213-214 where philosophy is said to involve "a connected view of old and new, past and present, far and near, and which has an insight into the influence of all these one on another, without which there is no whole and no centre" (214). See also "Wisdom as Contrasted with Faith and with Bigotry" (1841), Oxford University Sermons, p. 287.
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71.27-28 "they proceed on the principle of a division of labour,..." Newman points out that although the study of the individual sciences necessarily proceeds on "the principle of the division of labour" that division "is an abstraction, not a literal separation" (71. 29); for as Newman explains, "then sciences are the results of mental processes about one and the same subject matter, viewed under various aspects" (72.12-14) and "viewed all together, they become the nearest approximation to a...subjective reflection of the objective truth, possible to the human mind" (72.21-24). In other words, the mind proceeds towards that unity characteristic of the Creator and His creation "in proportion to the number of sciences [and their value] it has mastered" (72.25-26) in its conquest of the oneness of truth.

However according to the economic theory of such men as Adam Smith (1723-1790) who wrote The Wealth of Nations (1776), the principle of a division of labour was a literal separation for the purpose of profit. Smith wrote, "The division of labour,...so far as it can be introduced, occasions, in every art, a proportionable increase of the productive powers of labour." \(^1\) And again, expressing the economist's dream of increasing the amount and distribution of wealth, he writes that "It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different

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arts, in consequence of the division of labour, which occasions, in a
well-governed society, that universal opulence which extends itself to
the lowest ranks of the people."  

Basic to Newman's thought is the idea that when the economic
principle of a division of labour is applied to the teaching and the
study of the individual sciences in a university curriculum the result
is a disunity and a consequent narrowing of the mind to the viewpoint of
a particular specialization—a process that impedes the mind in its
conquest of truth.

74.20-23 "Did we proceed...to accomplish." The reference is
to Sir Isaac Newton, "Axioms or Laws of Motion," Law I, 2 Mathematical
Principles of Natural Philosophy. Newton's explanation of Law I that
"Projectiles continue in their motions, so far as they are not retarded
by the resistance of the air,..." has particular relevance to Newman's
context. Newman argues that if "resistance be made the subject of
scientific analysis,...then we shall have a new science, assisting, and
to a certain point completing,...the science of projection." (74.24-27).

1 Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 4.

2 "Every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform
motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by
forces impressed upon it." Sir Isaac Newton, Mathematical Principles
of Natural Philosophy, ed. Florian Cajori (Berkeley, California:
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The reference to Newton's First Law of Motion is an instance of Newman's argument that "as regards the whole circle of sciences, one corrects another for purposes of fact" (75.2-1).

75.6-24 "... the Newtonian philosophy... the admission of certain metaphysical postulates,... the sphere of fact." In the Preface to the First Edition of his Mathematical Principles, Newton defines his philosophy as follows: "for the whole burden of philosophy seems to consist in this--from the phenomena of motions to investigate the forces of nature, and then from these forces to demonstrate the other phenomena." ¹ In other words, "Science, for him [Newton] consisted in laws, formulated mathematically when possible, which are inferred from phenomena, which state how things act and which are empirically verified by consequences derived from them." ²

Newman makes reference to various aspects of Newton's natural philosophy that require "the admission of certain metaphysical postulates" (75.7-8) such as "that the true explanation of phenomena is that which assigns them to the fewest causes" (75.9-10); "that there is such a thing as cause and effect at all, that order implies causation,..." (75.11-12). Newman's reference is to Newton's "Rules of

¹ Sir Isaac Newton, "Preface to the First Edition," Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, pp. XVII-XVIII.

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Reasoning in Philosophy," Rules I and II that describe the uniformity and simplicity observable in phenomena. Concerning these two rules of reasoning, "...Newton seems to have thought that Nature observes simplicity and uniformity because it has been so created by God, and this may suggest that the first two rules have for him a Metaphysical basis." 2

Also in Opticks Newton indicates a metaphysical as well as theological basis for phenomena: "Whereas the main Business of natural Philosophy is to argue from Phenomena without feigning Hypotheses, and to deduce Causes from Effects, till we come to the very first Cause, which certainly is not mechanical. ...does it not appear from Phenomena that there is a Being incorporeal, living, intelligent, omnipresent, who in infinite Space, ...sees the things themselves intimately, and thoroughly perceives them, and comprehends them wholly by their immediate presence to himself: ...And though every true Step made in this Philosophy brings us not immediately to the Knowledge of the first Cause, yet it brings us nearer to it, and on that account is

1 Rule I, "We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances." Rule II, "Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes." Sir Isaac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, Book III, p. 398.

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to be highly valued." 1

The significance of the references to Newton as an illustration of Newman's argument that the whole circle of sciences correct one another for purposes of fact (75.2-4) can be stated thus: Newton, who hoped "that in the long run all natural phenomena might prove to be explicable in terms of mathematical mechanics;" 2 nevertheless, acknowledged the metaphysical and theological basis of phenomena in regarding the ultimate causality to be God, the source of "that Order and Beauty which we see in the World." 3

75.14 "that the theory of the Occasionists is false." Instead of admitting a sequence of cause and effect according to natural laws as did Newton, the Occasionists, notably, Nicholas de Malebranche (1638-1715) thought that "the only cause is God, who produces all effects, whether in matter or in spirits. Created beings are not secondary causes,..., but simple occasions for the direct intervention of God." 4 "When I experience the desire to move my arm, [according to the Occasionists] it is a movement or action of God,

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3 Sir Isaac Newton, Opticks, p. 369.

4 Carmin Mascia, A History of Philosophy, p. 308.
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acting on the occasion of that desire, which effectively moves the arm, and not I or my desire. But this is but an instance or example of the general process of motion in the world. All motion is the action of God."¹ Newton's philosophy is contrary to the Occasionists' theory in that Newton argued from cause to effect until he admitted the first and ultimate cause in God.

75.26 "...the theory of gravitation..." A general statement of Sir Isaac Newton's Universal Law of Gravitation is as follows: "Two bodies mutually attract one another in direct proportion to the product of their masses and in inverse proportion to the square of their distance apart."² See also Newton's Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, Rule III of "Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy," Bk. III, p. 399; Also Proposition VI, Theorem VI, Corollary II, Bk. III, p. 493 for reference to the theory of gravitation. See below, Discourse X, 349: 22-27 for a further reference to Newton's Law of Gravitation.

76.5 "...the phenomenon of capillary attraction" in physics is the peculiar action by which the surface of a liquid rises where it is in contact with a solid (as in a capillary tube). Newton recognized


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this phenomena in a letter to Robert Boyle, February 28, 1678 in which Newton writes of "an ethereal substance" as the possible cause of the phenomena "of filtration and of the rising of water in small glass pipes above the surface of the stagnating water they are dipped into."¹ The phenomena, due to molecular attraction, produces an effect contrary to that of gravitation. Newman is illustrating that the laws of one science (Newman attributes capillary attraction to chemistry) can contradict the laws of another science regardless of how widespread is the applicability of any law such as is that of the law of gravitation. See Newman's explanation, 75.25-76.8. Since Newton deals with both these aspects of the motion of bodies, Newman's differentiating is rhetorical.

73.3 - 76.14 All these examples are cited as proof of Newman's point of view that the sciences are all interrelated and mutually corrective. He concludes this aspect of his argument by mentioning a theme that he will later develop; namely, that one science will tend to be substituted for an omitted science, unless all sciences are seen in their respective positions in the field of knowledge.

76.21 "...political economy, or intellectual enlightenment... cried up as a panacea against vice...misery." Such an error is the result of the reasoning Newman is countering in this discourse. He deals

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more fully with the particular error in Discourse VI and also in "The Tamworth Reading Room," Discussions and Arguments.

76.26-79.2 "...consider...Induction...proportion to its importance." Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was the formulator of the inductive method of discovering truth, founded upon empirical observation, analysis of observed data, inference resulting in hypotheses, and verification of hypotheses through continued observation and experiment. As the "instrument of physical discovery" (76.28), Induction is, according to Newman, "surely open to error" (77.11): In that the conclusions of Induction are based on arguments from the some or the many, not from the all (77.10); the laws thus formulated, therefore, have general, not universal (77.24) applicability. Newman explains how it is that the conclusions arrived at by Induction are general only and thus open to error: "for, when engaged in the accumulation of instances, which are to subserve the elucidation of some particular science, it may have its path crossed at any moment by the decisions of other sciences with reference to the remaining instances which it has not yet compressed in its investigation" (77.11-17). The result is that some particular instances not taken into account in the process of Induction may modify the conclusion so that the general law does not apply (77.24-29) under certain circumstances. Newman recounts an instance from history in which the laws of physics determining the course of the river Euphrates were not applicable as they were set aside
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in favour of human volition in the form of politics and strategies (78.9): The incident referred to is recorded in the History of Herodotus I, 190-191. ¹ According to Herodotus, Cyrus, the Great (600 B.C.-529 B.C.), founder of the Persian Empire, during the final capture of the city of Babylon 538 B.C., changed the course of the Euphrates River, enabling his army to enter the city by the bed of the river. The irrigation works already in existence by which the waters were turned through sluices into canals may have been nearly sufficient for Cyrus' purpose. The illustration indicates, as Newman explains, that the lecturer in physics must take into account "the historical fact, ...the volition and the agency of man" (78.11-13) in order to avoid "the fallacy of experimental science, when narrowed to some single department, instead of expanding into all" (78.17-19). Thus Newman criticizes the Inductive method in that it tends to make what is generally true for one science a universal truth. Summing up his argument he states emphatically as follows: "I lay it down that, no science is complete in itself, when viewed as an instrument of attaining the knowledge of facts; that every science, for this purpose, subserves the rest; and, in consequence, that the systematic omission of any one science from the catalogue [especially Theology], prejudices the accuracy and completeness of our knowledge altogether, and that, in proportion to its

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importance" (78.24-79.2).

79.3 - 80.8 "Not even Theology itself,...'dispense with us'.'
Here Newman begins the theme of theology as one of the sciences.
Regardless of the Divine origin and the certainty of its truths, Newman
emphasizes that "not even Theology do I exclude from the law to which
every mental exercise is subject, viz., from that imperfection, which
ever must attend the abstract, when it would determine the concrete"
(79.3-9). Theology requires the other sciences for its interpretations
in the concrete; for example, Newman states that theology's
"interpretations of prophecy are directly affected by the issues of
history, its comments upon Scripture by the conclusions of the
astronomer and the geologist,..."(79.14-17).

Conversely, the other sciences need the science of Theology,
"for it bears upon all truth" (80.2). Newman answers the philosopher of
the day who would disregard Theology in the university curriculum,
"when Newton can dispense with the metaphysician, then may you dispense
with us" (80.6-8). See the text (75.6-9) for the mention of the
metaphysical basis of Newton's Philosophy.

79.10 "...Natural Religion" is "the actual state of religious
belief of pious men in the heathen world,..." 1 See also pp. 17-23 in

1 J. H. Newman, "The Influence of Natural and Revealed
Religion Respectively," Oxford University Sermons (London: Longmans,
Green, and Co., 1900), p. 18.
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"The Influence of Natural and Revealed Religion Respectively." See "Natural Religion," A Grammar of Assent. As well as the law of conscience, the sense of sin, the presentiment of judgment and an after life, prayer and sacrifice being characteristics of Natural Religion, Newman stresses the following two ideas: "The Religion of Nature has not been a deduction of reason, or the joint, voluntary manifesto of a multitude meeting together and pledging themselves to each other, ... but it has been a tradition or an interposition vouchsafed to a people from above." ¹ Secondly, "that system of natural beliefs and sentiments, which, though true and divine, is still possible to us independently of Revelation, and is a preparation for it." ²

Natural Religion in this discourse seems to be used in the sense of the religion of "sense and reason" that Newman mentions in the notes to his sermon "Faith," May 15, 1859: "Natural religion is from God, sight and reason are from God. They are good as far as they go. They do for this world, but they never can get us to heaven. Now the great bulk of mankind live merely by sight and reason; their religion is natural religion." ³

² Ibid., p. 408.
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79.27 "Religious Truth" is for Newman the Truth of the Gospel listened to and put into practice. 1

80.4-5 "...a philosopher of the day..." Newman is not referring to a particular philosopher of the day, but is rather using the phrase as a rhetorical means of setting forth contemporary thinking in order that he can refute that thinking.

80.15 "The great philosopher of antiquity..." is Aristotle (384 B.C. - 321 B.C.), born at Stageirus on the Gulf of Strymon, but lived half his life in Athens. His father was physician to King Amyntas II of Macedon. At the age of seventeen Aristotle went to Athens and became a pupil of Plato. He was a member of the academy for twenty years until the founder's death when he became tutor to crown prince Alexander of Macedon. In 336 B.C. he established the Lyceum in Athens, instituted a sort of collegiate life, established a large library and a museum of natural history. His extant works are three treatises on moral science: the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Magna Moralia.

80.18-19 "...and the mind...of man!" is a quotation from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics BK. III, 3. Aristotle is discussing that to which the inductive method should be applied: "We deliberate about

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things that are in our power and can be done. For nature, necessity, and chance are thought to be causes, and also reason and everything that depends on man. Now every class of men deliberates about the things that can be done by their own efforts." ¹ Newman's point of argument is that even the great pagan philosopher of antiquity Aristotle, recognized the difference between "eternal things" about which there could be no deliberation and "human affairs," those things which can be brought about by our own efforts and are therefore, in the terminology of Aristotle, subject to deliberation. See Discourse I, 16.25-26.

81.14 - 86.11 Newman is paralleling the omission of God and Theology from the University curriculum with the omission of Man and his mind from all discussion in a university curriculum simply because there is not agreement. Example is added to example until in the logic of the argument such a course of action as omitting a subject that has a relation to every other subject becomes an absurdity.

83.15 Newman is mockingly referring to the quotations from Brougham and Maltby. See above Discourse II, 55.22 - 56.15, or 57.5 - 58.6.

85.12-14 "Was... her?" See Bacon's "The New Organon," The Works of Francis Bacon, Vol. 4, ed. J. Spedding, R. Ellis, D. Heath, London, 1858, p. 47. This reference was omitted from the 1873 edition.

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85.15-27 "...the Lecturer...whole fabric of material civilization...from the constructive powers of physical elements and physical laws. ...the most admired dome of Palladio or Sir Christopher ...happy principle of the arch." The hypothetical Lecturer maintains that that material civilization is based solely on physical elements and laws such as the "principle of the arch" (85.27), which is basic to "the most admired dome" (85.29), characteristic of the architectural designs of Andrea Palladio (1508-1580) or Sir Christopher Wren (1632-1723).

Andrea Palladio was an Italian stonemason and sculptor who constructed his buildings according to his theories set forth in his Quattro Libri dell' Architettura. Translated into English by G. Richards in 1663 and G. Leoni in 1715, the Four Books of Architecture appealed to the civilized taste and the polite learning of the Eighteenth Century English Georgian gentry, who found the simplicity, reasonableness, and universal intelligibility of Neo-Palladian classicism suitable to the newly dominant Whig aristocracy. 1 Palladio, who designed town and country houses more often than churches, was part of the Renaissance movement towards secular architecture. The Palladian country mansions with slender Ionic porticoes and central dome blended landscape and building, as dependent on each other, for the first time in Western architecture. 2

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Sir Christopher Wren was appointed Savilian professor of Astronomy at Oxford in 1661; he was one of the founders, with Robert Boyle, of the Royal Society in 1660. 1 As a mathematician, he was highly regarded by Sir Isaac Newton. His mathematical knowledge served him well in his designs for over fifty-three London churches with their characteristic towers and domes. Wren is most famous for his design of St. Paul's Cathedral after the fire of 1666 with its remarkable triple dome, completed when Sir Christopher was seventy-seven. 2

86.14-16 "...arguing from the works of God, which Paley has done, which Hume has protested against." William Paley (1743-1805) wrote Natural Theology (1802) in which he argued from the evidence of design in the universe to the existence of the Designer. See Chapter 24, "Of the Natural Attributes of the Deity" and Chapter 26, "Of the Goodness of the Deity" in Paley's Natural Theology.


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is one of reasoning from effect to cause. He contends that we "can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities but what are exactly suffered to produce the effect" (112). "The present scene of things, which is so full of ill and disorder" (113) does not, according to Hume, argue to a cause that has omnipotence, wisdom, or goodness—characteristics Paley claims for the Deity. Paley's Natural Theology does not answer arguments Hume raised a quarter of a century earlier.

86.17-19 "I am not...design." The Argument from Design on which Paley bases his proof for the existence and attributes of God is the subject of his Natural Theology. See also Newman's essay, "Christianity and Physical Science," Idea, Part II, Sections 9 and 10, and particularly pp. 336-39 in which he discusses Natural or Physical Theology as an attempt to determine the doctrines of Theology by means of physical phenomena. In this essay, Newman criticizes Natural Theology, in Paley's sense of the term, as a product of induction that results in "a particular aspect of the whole truth" in that it omits for example, "the elements of Christianity" and "the moral attributes of the Creator" (341). Newman states that "...this so-called science tends, if it occupies the mind, to dispose it against Christianity" (341).

Similarly, in Discourse III, Newman is arguing against a university curriculum that omits Theology on the grounds that a particular professor in "his considering his own study to be the key of everything that takes place on the face of the earth" (86.28-29) would be
committing a similar error. Newman concludes, "...it would not be his science which is untrue, but his so-called knowledge which was unreal" (87.2-3).

87.6-7 Shakespeare's Hamlet, I, 5, 166-67. Hamlet, having just communicated with the ghost of his father, admonishes Horatio that there exists in heaven and earth more than is encompassed by Horatio's philosophy; that is, his natural philosophy or science. In other words, there is a world outside the physical that is no less real and influential than the physical reality. The Hamlet quotation, which Newman omitted in the 1873 edition, is a means of emphasizing that the professor "who had suppressed in physical lectures the idea of volition" (86.22-23); that is, had failed to take into account that which he did not see, but which was nevertheless part of the nature of man, would be giving "a one-sided, a radically false view of things" (86.24-25). Such a professor would be "betraying a want of philosophical depth" (87.12-13); consequently, he would be "no longer a teacher of liberal knowledge, but a narrow-minded bigot" (87.14-16).

88.10 "Ne sutor ultra crepidam," "The cobbler should not judge beyond the shoe." The source of the quotation is as follows: The story, found in Pliny, Natural History XXXV, 85, tells of a great painter Apelles admonishing a shoemaker who had criticized Apelles's painting. 1 Newman's reference to the cobbler proverb illustrates that a professor

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who attributes a particular phenomenon to a simply "physical cause, to
the exclusion of a divine" (88.7-8) "is making his particular craft
usurp and occupy the universe" (88.11-12). He should, like the cobbler,
keep within the boundary of his own subject and not seek to apply the
principle of his particular science to matters beyond his own knowledge.

88.13-23 is an important summary of several pages.

89.2-19 is a summary of the first part of the argument in
Discourse III.

89.21 - 90.2 "...now comes my second, which is its
application...whole system of knowledge." Newman secondly sets about
inquiring whether or not the omission of the science of Theology will
"destroy the equilibrium of the whole system of Knowledge" (90.1-2).

90.12-18 "Neither...fall into the fashion of the day, of
identifying Natural Theology with Physical...Physical Theology...no
science at all,...a series of places or polemical remarks upon the
physical world viewed religiously,...." Newman seems to understand by
"natural" all that concerns man and society; that is, all that is of
"human nature", not just the physical universe, the concern of the
physical scientist. What he is emphasizing is the difference between
"natural" confined to the physical universe, rather than "natural" as
applied to man and society. See the reference in note 86.17-19 above.

90.20-21 "...Dr. Butler..." refers to Joseph Butler (1692-
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1752, Bishop of Durham and author of the *Analogy of Religion* (1736). Butler believed that nature and revelation are complementary; that is, by studying nature we will find confirmation for the revealed doctrines of Christianity. Newman in the *Apologia* (p. 113, p. 108; PS.I, pp. 18-20; US. p. 31, p. 5) acknowledged his debt to Butler's *Analogy* on the probability and the sacramentalism of nature. The *Analogy* served as a retaliation against deistic writers who were attacking traditional Theology and was widely accepted as the most solid defense of revealed religion during the eighteenth century.

90.21-27 "Not in the third place...body politic." Newman refers in general to Paley's *A View of the Evidences of Christianity* (1794). In "Christianity and Physical Science" Newman criticizes this "most jejune study" (90.14-15). 1 Paley's view is an historical one, limited to "the ordinary maxims of historical credibility." 2

91.21-22 "...this invisible Agent...no sense a soul...analogy of human nature..." The basis of Paley's *Natural Theology* is an analogy from human nature to the Divine nature. See Newman's "Christianity and Physical Science," *Idea,* pp. 342, for a reference to the idea "soul of the world." Paley was the guiding light of the "evidential school" of

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2 Ibid., p. 430.
rationalist theologians who were very influential in the Church of England especially at Oxford during the nineteenth century and against whose ideas the leaders of the Oxford Movement reacted. Eighteenth century rationalism led to Latitudinarianism, the thought that Newman is contending against throughout the discourses.

91.10-14 "...by Theology...science of God put into system...geology" is Newman's definition of Theology. In a Grammar of Assent, Newman defines the science of Theology as "the exercise of the intellect upon the 'credenda' of revelation. ...the Catholic intellect makes a survey and a catalogue of the doctrines contained in the 'depositum' of revelation, as committed to the Church's keeping; it locates, adjusts, defines them each, and brings them together into a whole. Moreover, it takes particular aspects or portions of them; it analyzes them, whether into first principles really such, or into hypotheses of an illustrative character."¹ The disavowal of error in the form of disproving "the ever-germinating forms of heresy"² also has a place in theological science.

91.18 - 93.5 "...behind the veil of the visible universe, there is an invisible, intelligent Being,...a judgment to come." This is


² Ibid., p. 148.
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Newman's definition of the Supreme Being who forms the subject-matter of Theology. The description is a compilation of traditional Christian belief, infused with Newman's own devotional faith and expressed in the language of literature.

93.6 - 97.2 Newman illustrates that Theology is inextricably part of all knowledge because God is the Creator of all beings: "What science will not find one part or other of its province traversed by its path?" (97.17-18).

96.14 - 97.2 "He condescends...comes from Him." As an expression of the theme that God is part of all His creation and therefore that the knowledge of God is inextricably involved in all knowledge, Newman cites some instances of Divine wisdom and guidance speaking through pagan media. Herein God "makes His own fiat the substitute for [the] sorceries" (96.16-17) of imposture:

96.17-18 "He speaks amid the incantations of Balaam,... ." Balaam was a Mesopotamian diviner or auger endowed with the gift of prophecy. (See Numbers, 22-24.) St. Jerome's commentary on this passage is pertinent to Newman's context: "Balaam was hired by the Moabite king to immobilize Israel and render her powerless to resist. ...it is not necessary to hold that the pagan diviner was a worshiper of the true God. The sacred writer was teaching the reader that Balaam was completely dependent on the all-powerful God of Israel. His control of
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events extended beyond the borders of Israel; the will of Yahweh and not the spoken word of any prophet was the decisive factor. ...It was futile to exercise the diviner's art against the people of God. Even the pagan seer was completely in God's hands and could utter only what he was allowed to utter." ¹ But instead of pronouncing an oracle that would bring disaster on the Israelites, Balaam, because the spirit of God came upon him (Numbers, 24:2) and endowed him with a special charism, prophesied the conquests of King David in his prediction that a star shall advance from Jacob, and a staff shall rise from Israel (Numbers, 24:17-18). Some of the fathers have interpreted this passage as a messianic prophecy. ² The significance for Newman's context is that God chose the augurer Balaam to speak Divine commands and prophecies in favour of the Israelites and thus overwhelmed the Moabite king with his own mischief.

96.18-19 "...raises Samuel's spirit in the witch's cavern,...

In 1 Samuel 28:3-25 Saul, faced by the army of the Philistines and unable to learn the will of God by the casting of lots, consulted the medium or witch at Endor, who raised up for Saul, at his own request the spirit of Samuel. From the spirit of Samuel, Saul learned that he had displeased


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the Lord because he had disobeyed His command. The spirit of Samuel prophesied Saul's defeat at the hands of the Philistines and his imminent death. ¹ In spite of the fact that witchcraft and necromancy were forbidden in Israel, it was by means of the Witch of Endor that Saul learned the reason for God's anger and the nature of the punishment of God that he would suffer.

96.19-20 "...prophesies of the Messias by the tongue of the Sibyl,..." The ancient Sibyls (prophetesses) of Greek and Roman mythology were thought to be inspired women who were believed to reveal the decrees of the gods. "Now Sibyls, according to many writers, have arisen in different times and places, to the number of ten. There was first the Chaldean, or rather the Persian Sibyl whose proper name is Sambethe [or Sabba]. She was of the family of the most blessed Noah,... The third was 'the Delphian born at Delphi,... The tenth was the Tiburtine, named Albunea." ²

Justin Martyr's comments are pertinent to Newman's context. Newman's reference to the fact that the Sibyls predicted the Messiah and the details of his life and death are further evidence that God speaks through all creation, and times, and instruments. Justin writes


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as follows: "You may very easily learn the true religion, in some part at least, from the ancient Sibyl, who teaches you through her oracles by a certain powerful inspiration things which seem to be near to the teaching of the prophets." ¹ Justin continued with a reference to Plato in his Phaedrus writing with admiration of the Sibyl at Cumae (fifth sibyl). Plato wrote of the Sibyl's prophecy: "We might truly name as divine those whom we call prophets. Not least should we say that they are divine and profoundly inspired and possessed of God when they truly speak of many and great matters, knowing nothing of the things of which they speak." ²

The following is an example of the messianic prophecies: Book I of the Sibylline Oracles contains a remarkable prophecy of the life, death, miracles, and healing of Christ in Sections 387-468: The passage that prophesies the Advent of Christ and His mission begins thus:

Then also shall a child of the great God come, clothed in flesh, to men, and fashioned like mortals in the earth; and he doth bear Four vowels, and two consonants in him Are twice announced;...
And he shall fulfill God's law, not destroy, Bearing his very image, and all things Shall teach

² Ibid., pp. 272-273.
³ Ibid., pp. 29-30.
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The following is a remarkable foretelling of Christ's crucifixion and resurrection:

And bear the crown of thorns, and they shall pierce His side with reeds,...
When he shall to the house of Hader go Proclaiming resurrection to the dead
But when in three days he shall come again Unto the light, and show his form to men
And teach all things, ascending in the clouds unto the house of heaven shall he go
Leaving the world a Gospel convenient (452-463) ¹

96.20-22 Python is the Greek name given to the mythological serpent which lived at Pytho beneath Mt. Parnassus and guarded the Delphic oracle. Apollo slew it, but the name was applied to anyone who prophesied under the inspiration of Apollo. Luke in Acts 16:16-24 records how Paul met and subsequently exorcized a young woman who possessed such a spirit of divination or python spirit. ² It is important to note for Newman's context that although her oracular speech was inspired by a demonic power, she said about Paul, "These men are servants of the Most High God, who proclaim to you the way of salvation" (Acts 16:17).

The significance of these references (96.14-97.2) is that not

¹ The Sibylline Oracles, p. 32.
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only organized religion, be it that of Jews or Christians, but also the prophetesses and philosophers, the dramatists, and poets of ancient times; in short, all nations and times bespeak the Creator whenever and however He wishes to communicate His will to His people. Newman is illustrating for the mixed education advocates the lack of fidelity to reality in attempting to ignore Theology while retaining other areas of knowledge in the University curriculum. The subject-matter of Theology has been involved in some way in all knowledge from ancient times to the present.

97.5-6 "...the doctrine of a particular Providence..." Among Newman's many references to this doctrine, the sermon, "A Particular Providence As Revealed in the Gospel," Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol. III, expresses most beautifully the idea of God's particular and solicitous care for each individual. See pp. 124-125. The reference to "particular Providence" in Chapter X pp. 402-3 of A Grammar of Assent and the sermon "Waiting for Christ," Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vol. VI, p. 248 expresses the idea of the latter; namely, "that in spite of world's evil, after all, He is in it and speaks through it, though not loudly."

98.1-2 "Theism or Monotheism" Theism denotes a philosophical system which accepts a transcendent and personal God who not only created, but also preserves and governs the world, the contingency of
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which does not exclude miracles and the exercise of human freedom. Theism is the view of the world common to all orthodox Christian philosophers, and in less perfect form, also required by the Jewish and Mohammedan religions. It was relegated to the background by eighteenth century Deism and nineteenth century Hegelianism and materialism.

Monotheism is the belief in one personal and transcendent God as opposed to polytheism and pantheism. Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism are the three great monotheistic religions.

98.19-20 "...the sudden birth of a crisis, as the Lutheran or Wesleyan doctrine." Martin Luther (1483-1546) experienced the "Turmerlebnis" or "Tower Experience" between 1512 and 1515. The experience took the form of "a particular moment of illumination when studying the Epistle to the Romans in his little tower room; it was at this moment,...that the 'gate to Paradise' had opened to him for the first time and he had seen Christ in the clearest light. Only then did he believe that he had found the key: faith, not as a human act, but as the grace of God," ¹ in other words, the faith alone that justifies without works, which was a belief destined to become the cornerstone of Lutheranism.

Also, "in 1517 Luther emerged from the timelessness of his

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cell to enter history. At about mid-day on 31 October, tradition tells us, he nailed his ninety-five theses on the practice of indulgences to the door of the Schlosskirche at Wittenberg.\(^1\) This action produced a crisis the ensuing conflict of which led to Luther's break with the Roman Catholic Church and the founding of Lutheranism.

John Wesley (1703–1791) founded Methodism as a result of a similar moment of illumination that marked a turning point in his life. Before Wesley went to the meeting of the religious society in Aldersgate Street on the 24 of May, 1738, he opened his Bible and read as follows: "'Thou art not far from the kingdom of God.' He went unwillingly...in a state of spiritual expectancy, elation queerly combined with depression, and there in his own familiar words, as one was reading Luther's preface to the 'Epistle to the Romans' 'About a quarter before nine, while he was describing the change which God works in the heart through faith in Christ, I felt my heart strangely warmed, I felt I did trust in Christ, Christ alone for salvation; And an assurance was given me that He had taken away 'my' sins even 'mine,' and saved 'me' from the law of sin and death.'\(^2\)"

Newman is pointing out that Theology is not the result of a

\(^1\) Richard Friedenthal, Luther, p. 127.

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sudden flash of inspiration such as that experienced by Luther or Wesley, nor a system of philosophy founded on some particular view such as that of Descartes or Plato that caused a change in the current of philosophy. Whoever philosophizes begins with Theology "and introduces it, when he will, without any apology" (99.7-8).

98.21-22 "...the development of some uprising philosophy, as the Cartesian or Platonic." Rene Descartes (1596-1650) based his philosophical reasonings upon the principles and methods of mathematics. The beginning of his philosophy was his own self-consciousness—Cogito, ergo sum. He concluded that in experience as in mathematics whatever is clearly and distinctly conceived; that is, whatever can be conceived as part of a logical and coherent whole, is true. Descartes' thought and method led to the subjective idealism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.

Plato (427-347 B.C.), a Greek philosopher, native of Athens and pupil of Socrates, established the Academy in 387 which lasted until its dissolution by Justinian in A.D. 529. He finished the Republic, his supreme creation, about 375 B.C. Widely influential during the Hellenistic Age, Plato had an impact on later Judaism, especially the Book of Wisdom, as well as on The Third Century thought, recast as New Platonism by Plotinus (205-270). There was an interweaving of Platonism with Christian thought by Clement of Alexandria and Origin. St. Augustine was influenced by Platonic doctrines. Boethius was one medium among others by which Platonic thought reached the mediaeval church.
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The Renaissance led to a revival of interest in Plato. During the sixteenth century there was a steady stream of Platonic influence on religion in England, specifically on John Fisher, Thomas More, and Richard Hooker. The seventeenth century Cambridge Platonists urged the return of Christian theology to Platonic philosophy with its inwariness of morality and religion as the best antidote to Calvinism and the secularism of Hobbes. Some English theologians of the nineteenth century—B. Jowett, F. D. Maurice, C. Kingsley—were strongly Platonic.

99.8-10 "Bacon...Butler." Newman refers to the following English writers who have introduced theology into their philosophizing without apology:

Francis Bacon (1561-1626) studied at Cambridge, was admitted to the bar in 1582 and entered parliament in 1584. He became Lord Chancellor of England in 1618. His principal work is Instauratio Magna Scientiarum (The Great Restoration of Learning), which was intended to embrace the entire field of knowledge, both theoretical and practical. But only the first and second parts were completed: De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum (Of the Proficience and Advancement of Learning), and Novum Organum Scientiarum (New Organ of Learning). Bacon was the formulator of the inductive method as a means of establishing man's power over nature, but he retained traditional metaphysics as regards
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the spirituality of the human soul and the existence of God. 1

Newman's commendation of Bacon's attitude towards religion is as follows: "Bacon was too intellectually great to hate or to contemn the Catholic faith; and he deserves by his writings to be called the most orthodox of Protestant philosophers." 2

Richard Hooker (1554-1600) was an Anglican clergyman who became an apostle for the Church of England as was his teacher John Jewel, Bishop of Salisbury. Jewel had defended Anglicanism against Roman criticism as Hooker was to defend the Church of England against the attacks of the Puritans. Hooker lived at the time when the official policy of the Church of England and the state was that of a "Via Media" between Rome and Geneva. 3 "Hooker set himself to provide Anglicanism with a philosophical and logical basis which he did in his book Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. ...Hooker refutes the puritan argument that Scripture is the only test of what is correct, and defends the Church's right to make her own laws so long as they are not contrary to Scripture." 4 He defended the Scriptures plus the law of nature.

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1 C. Mascia, A History of Philosophy, pp. 326-328.


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divinely given, but discoverable by human reason, against the Puritan
tendency to rest all authority upon the Bible.

Jeremy Taylor (1613-1667) was one of the Caroline Divines, the
successors of Jewel and Hooker in the seventeenth century. He was fellow
of All Souls, Oxford and later in life, Bishop of Down and Connor in
Ireland. He wrote two practical handbooks for the use of the laity
entitled Holy Living and Holy Dying and a treatise on moral theology
called Ductor Dubitantium. 1 The Caroline Divines by personal sanctity,
scholarship, and dedication to the Anglican Church as a "Via Media" gave
the Church "that sense of self-confidence and inner strength which
enabled it to rise again after the disasters of the Civil War and the
Commonwealth." 2 (See also Discourse VII for further reference to
J. Taylor). Jeremy Taylor belonged to "the old school of Caroline
Divines, interested mainly in patristics and the Early Church, and
searching always for precedents for the kind of church life and worship
which they loved." 3

Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688), one of the most distinguished of
the Cambridge Platonists, was Regius Professor of Hebrew and Master of

1 John R. H. Moorman, A History of the Church in England,
   pp. 235-236.

2 Ibid., pp. 233-234.

3 Ibid., p. 254.
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Christ's College, Cambridge. His chief work, The True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678), argued that the only real source of knowledge is the Christian religion. The roots of the Cambridge Platonists lay in Puritanism. "Like the Christian philosophers of Alexandria in the third century they set themselves to find a harmony between philosophy and religion;...Their appeal was to Reason,...; and by Reason they meant the philosophical approach to truth but sanctified by God. Their favourite text was the phrase in Proverbs: 'The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord', for they believed that Truth is revealed to man by Reason, man's mind illuminated by God." ¹

John Locke (1632-1704), an English philosopher, was educated at Westminster and Christ Church, Oxford. Locke's thought was a combination of Christian rationalism and empiricism, the substance of which was contained in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). "He believed that truth was to be discovered by reason and by effort; but he was convinced philosophy led inevitably to faith. 'We more certainly know that there is a God', he said, 'than that there is anything else without us.'" ² In the Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures (1695) Locke adopted a scientific and scholarly approach


² Ibid., p. 256.
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to the study of the Bible: "We must look into the drift of the
discourse, 'he wrote, 'observe the coherence and connection of the parts,
and see how it is consistent with itself, and other parts of Scripture,
if we will conceive it right'."

Thinking that centuries of
theological controversy had obscured the essential faith, Locke concluded
that the true faith was simple and must issue in morality and the good
life. "Locke's Christian faith therefore rested upon three essentials—
Reason, Simplicity, and Morality..." 2

Sir Isaac Newton, (1642-1727), graduate of Trinity College,
Cambridge, Professor of mathematics and Member of Parliament for
Cambridge University, was the most eminent physicist of his day. His
Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687) gave expression to
his religious convictions. Belief in God for Newton rests chiefly on
"the orderliness of nature and of God". 3 He acknowledges the Divine
transcendence, omnipotence, and perfection, and combats the pantheistic
idea of a world soul. God is the Supreme Being with complete authority
over the material universe as well as over human souls, who owe him
absolute submission. Newton denied the doctrine of the Trinity on the

1 John R. H. Hoorman, A History of the Church in England,
p. 256.

2 Ibid., pp. 256-257.

3 Ibid., p. 256.
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ground that such belief was inaccessible to reason. With Newton, "there was as yet no breach between science and religion." ¹

Samuel Clarke (1675-1729) was educated at Caius College, Cambridge, and afterwards became Rector of S. James Piccadilly and Chaplain-in-ordinary to the King. ² Clarke delivered the Boyle Lectures in 1704-5 in defense of rational theology. The lectures were published with the title A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God, the Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation. The Trinitarian controversy in the Anglican Church began with the publication of Clarke's Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity in 1712, a work in which he denied the orthodox teaching of the creeds and thereby brought upon himself charges of Arianism. ³

George Berkeley (1685-1753), an Irishman educated at Trinity College, Dublin, became Bishop of Cloyne. As a philosopher Berkeley was a Platonist opposed to the stern logic of Aristotelianism. Material objects, in Berkeley's view, continue to exist when not perceived by us solely because they are objects of the thought of God. His Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher (1732) was a philosophical argument in favour

² Ibid., p. 275.
³ Ibid., pp. 275-276.
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of the Christian faith in the form of an argument between Deists and Christians. ¹

Joseph Butler (1692-1752), Bishop of Durham, wrote the *Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature* (1736). It was the most famous of the anti-Deistical works. "Butler accepts all that reason has to say about God but then goes on to the necessity of revelation. At a time when many believed that the Christian faith had been proved fictitious, Butler set forth again the fundamentals of Christian hope and pleaded for greater application to the Christian way of life." ²

The nine foregoing names comprise a brief history of the progress of Anglicanism in England from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century. All the scholars mentioned give great importance to human reason, but all acknowledge the place of God in the scheme of human knowledge. Newman's point of argument is that these intellectuals, some of the greatest names among English authors, were very much concerned with Theology in their writings; thus Theological studies have been the subject of the best English scholars and their writings for centuries; yet the nineteenth century has decided to ignore the subject of Theology

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in its newly established universities.

99.13-16 Newman pairs men who are "most opposed, in creed or
cast of mind" (99.12-13) to illustrate his contention that Theology "has
been received by minds the most various, and in systems of religion the
most hostile to each other" (98.25-27):

Addison and Johnson: Joseph Addison (1672-1719), Oxford M. A.
and fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford was a spokesman for the Whig
mercantilism and writer of simple, elegant periodical essays of popular
moralizing on contemporary subjects for The Spectator and The Tatler.
The great success of these essays lay in their "infinite variety; in the
light and fanciful touches allowed in the writing; and, above all, in
the humour and delicate irony with which the various foibles of society
were hit off." 1

In contrast Samuel Johnson (1709-1784) driven by poverty from
Pembroke College, Oxford before taking a degree, later became a Doctor of
Laws and one of the great conservatives of the eighteenth century.
Unlike Addison, who referred to himself as a Lover of mankind whose
heart overflowed with pleasure at the sight of a prosperous and happy
Multitude, Johnson was a devout though despondent Christian who

1 George S. Marr, The Periodical Essayists of the Eighteenth
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considered that religion is the only source of whatever happiness we have and is also the power which makes every good institution valid and efficacious. Addison and Johnson were contrasts not only in personality and cast of mind, but also as periodical essayists. Dr. Johnson's long series of papers in the Rambler were tinged with his own melancholy, sad outlook on life. "The majority of the papers deal with moral reflections on life, the fleeting nature of happiness, the regulation of the thoughts, the proper means of repressing over much sorrow, and the necessity of attending to the duties of common life." 1

Newman writes about Johnson that "the special title of moralist in English Literature is accorded by the public voice to Johnson, whose bias towards Catholicity is well known." 2

Shakespeare and Milton. William Shakespeare (1564-1616), actor, poet, and playwright, master of comedy and tragedy is usually associated with Catholicism. Newman writes that "there is in Shakespeare: neither contempt of religion nor scepticism, and he upholds the broad laws of moral and divine truth with the consistency and severity of an Aeschylus, Sophocles, or Pindar. There is no mistaking in his works on which side lies the right; Satan is not made a hero, nor


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Cain a victim, but pride is pride and vice is vice and, whatever indulgence he may allow himself in light thoughts or unseemly words yet his admiration is reserved for sanctity and truth." 1

The humanism of Shakespeare's tone and outlook is in contrast with the stern, moralizing Puritanism of John Milton (1608-1674) who undertook to "justify the ways of God to man" and to show the cause of evil and injustice in the world in his Paradise Lost (1667). However, Newman criticizes Milton for making Allegory real. He states that "the theological language of Paradise Lost, which, as far as the very words go, is conformable both to Scripture and the writings of the early Fathers, but becomes offensive as being dwelt upon as if it were literal not figurative. It is scriptural to say that the Son went forth from the Father to create the worlds; but when this is made the basis of a scene or a pageant, it borders on Arianism." 2

Lord Herbert and Baxter. Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648) was a member of one of the great families of the Welsh border. As a philosopher, he wrote De Veritate, the first purely metaphysical work written by an Englishman. In his religious writings, principally the two


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tracts, "Religio Laici" and "Ad Sacerdotes de Religione Laici," his maintaining five innate ideas common to all religions (which became the "Five Articles" of the English Deists), and his denial of revelation made him a forerunner of English deism. Also, Lord Herbert's writings "aroused the interest of men in a 'religion of nature' unencumbered by creeds, formularies, and priesthood. The idea, fitting in so well with the growth of scientific thought and the love of Reason, was taken up by a number of thinkers later in the seventeenth century." 1

Richard Baxter (1615-1691) was a Puritan divine who sided with parliament in the civil war. Being twice imprisoned as a Non-Conformist, he suffered for his convictions with courage and dignity. Baxter wrote the devotional classic, The Saints' Everlasting Rest (1650). His writing was characterized by moderate nonconformity and plain speaking. Baxter was one of a delegation of Puritans to the Anglican Bishops in 1661 seeking to have certain customs the Puritans found obnoxious deleted from the Book of Common Prayer. 2 Richard Baxter, in More Reason for the Christian Religion (1672), sought to refute Lord Herbert's objections to revelation.

The foregoing three groups of essayists, poets, and

2 Ibid., pp. 250, 261.
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philosophers, further emphasize Newman's point about the pervading influence of religion on the thought of great writers even of opposite castes of mind.

99.16-21 "...the systems of Atheism or Pantheism, as sciences...to compare with that of Monotheism?" Atheism is a system of belief that "denies that there is any God at all." 1 (Newman describes in A Grammar of Assent how it is possible that a person gradually may subside into infidelity and eventually into Atheism). 2 Deism wore the face of pantheism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. "Deism...though it assumed the Christian mask, was pantheistic and unitarian. It ignored the revelation of God in Christ and was content with a religion based upon the study of nature interpreted by reason." 3 Newman describes the pantheistic spirit (which identified God and Nature) as "the religion of beauty, imagination, and philosophy, without constraint moral or intellectual, a religion speculative and self-indulgent. Pantheism, indeed, is the great deceit which awaits the Age to come." 4 A Monotheist

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for Newman is one who has a direct apprehension of the doctrine of the
Being of a God. ¹ Newman is arguing, that the various forms of Atheism,
of which Pantheism is one, have not had the influence in the literature
of nations as had Monotheism which can be found in the literature of
Greece and Rome, of Judea and the East, even in that of schismatical
Russia (99.21-26). Newman's argument for the recognition of religious
truth in the universities is one from history. He maintains that "this
ancient, this far-spreading philosophy" (100.8-9) must be "distinctly
accepted or distinctly repudiated" (100.5-6), but certainly not ignored.

100.20-23 "...to withdraw Theology from the public schools, is
to impair the completeness and to invalidate the trustworthiness of all
that is actually taught in them" is the logical conclusion of Newman's
argument in this discourse.

100.24-25 "But I have been insisting simply on Natural
Theology..." By "Natural Theology" Newman means the science of
Theology "as human reason may attain to it" (101.2). Newman states that
he wants to carry along with him those who are not Catholics (100.25-26).
This statement is a key one in the interpretation of Newman's educational
thought: For Newman the idea that "Religion Truth is not only a portion,

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but a condition of general knowledge" (101.12-13) has universal application for all those who, through the acquiring of knowledge, are seeking for Truth.

101.13-19 "To blot it out,...principal part." Newman punctuates his thought in Discourse III with the three metaphors in this section--unravelling the web, taking the spring from the year, omitting the principal part of a drama--all express the incompleteness and consequent lack of meaning involved in the omission of Theology from a University Education.

In summary, Newman has been arguing in Discourse III for the unity of the sciences in that "they all relate to one and the same integral subject matter" (89.5-6)--God and His Creation (69.28-70.9). But individual sciences concern hypotheses and principles true in the abstract, but "not wholly trustworthy in the concrete" (89.8); and therefore, each science needs."the support and guarantee of its sister sciences...if we would obtain the exactest knowledge possible of things as they are,..." (89.10-14).

In pursuing his argument for the unity of the sciences, Newman has deplored the fact that the economic principle of the division of labour has been misapplied to other sciences; with the result that each science is thought of as being pursued without considering its relationship to other sciences. From this point of view, there is a
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separation between Theology and human science (68.9-10); with the result that, secular knowledge only is thought appropriate for the University Lecture Room; whereas religious knowledge is remanded to private instruction (69.7-9). Newman's answer is that although the sciences must proceed on the principle of the division of labour, that division is an abstraction, not a literal separation into parts (71.27-72.1). Viewed all together the sciences "become the nearest approximation to a representation or subjective reflexion of the objective truth, possible to the human mind..." (72.21-24).

The physical sciences in particular, in Newman's view, are open to error if viewed exclusively because of the nature of Induction "the instrument of physical discovery" (76.28). The main principle of Induction is this: "that what in our investigation is ever tending to be universal, may be considered universal. We assume that general proposition to be true, which is ever getting more and more like truth..." (77.4-8). Newman concludes that a law formulated as a result of inductive reasoning is true for the particular science using it; that is, the law expresses a general, but not a universal truth.

The second part of Discourse III deals with the systematic and purposeful omission of one science, specifically Theology. In proportion to the breadth, depth, and order of importance of the science omitted from consideration is the resulting view prejudicial and fragmented. "...for its loss is a positive privation of an influence
which exerts itself in the correction and completion of the rest (89.18-19). After examining the order, depth, and field of Theology, Newman concludes as a result of a series of evidences from history that if there is any subject of thought "which cannot be passed over in a scheme of universal instruction without involving a positive denial of its truth" (100.6-8); it is Theology.

Newman's final conclusion in Discourse III is as follows:
"...if the various branches of knowledge, which are the matter of teaching in a University, so hang together, that none can be neglected without prejudice to the perfection of the rest, and if Theology be a branch of knowledge, of wide reception, of philosophical structure, of unutterable importance, and of supreme influence,...to withdraw Theology from the public schools, is to impair the completeness and to invalidate the trustworthiness of all that is actually taught in them." (100.13-23)
ANNOTATION OF THE DISCOURSES

Chapter X

DISCOURSE IV. THE BEARING OF OTHER BRANCHES OF KNOWLEDGE ON THEOLOGY

Newman noted in his diary that he had delivered Lecture IV on Monday, May 31, 1852 in the Rotunda. ¹ His subject that particular Monday was a variation on the theme, developed in Discourse III, of the necessity for Theology in order to maintain the unity of knowledge in the university curriculum. Those opponents determined to fracture that unity and maintain a diversity of centres so deplored by Newman argued that there must be "some real contrariety between human science and revelation" (103.5-6). since religious men seem to "feel instinctively, ..., that knowledge is their born enemy, and that its progress will be certain to destroy, if it is not arrested, all that they hold venerable and dear" (103.11-15). On the contrary, Newman argues in Discourse IV that the "supposed opposition between secular science and divine" (104.13-14) is a result of certain misconceptions about knowledge and the human mind. Finally, Newman identifies the advocates of Mixed Education as the real source of the unfounded view that there is hostility between Secular Science and Theology.

103.1-6 "Nothing is more common...science and Revelation.

Newman opens Discourse IV with the rhetorical device of stating the

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opponent's point of view in order to more clearly and accurately refute that viewpoint. In this instance the refutation takes the form of pointing out a mistaken assumption on his opponents' part; namely, that because "religious men, especially Catholics, [are opposed] to the separation of Secular Education from Religion, ...that there is some real contrariety between human science and Revelation" (103.2-5). The answer Newman will make throughout the Discourse is that far from there being contrariety between Secular Science and Religion, rather the situation is as follows: "the various branches of science are intimately connected with each other, and form one whole, which whole is impaired, and to an extent which it is difficult to limit, by any considerable omission of knowledge, of whatever kind,..." (104.29-105.5). Thus the separation of Religion from Secular Knowledge in Education amounts to the omission of an important department of knowledge—an omission that impairs the validity of all the knowledge retained.

104.13 - 105.28 "Now, as far as this objection...not knowledge, but ignorance." Newman refutes his opponents' assumption that "there is some real contrariety between human science and Revelation" (103.5-6) in part first, by summarizing the thought of Discourse III, as follows: "...in order to have possession of truth at all, we must have the whole truth; that no one science,...not even all secular science, is the whole truth; that revealed truth enters...into the province of science, philosophy, and literature, and that to put it
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on one side, ...is simply, under colour of a compliment, to do science a great damage" (104.17-25). Then he brings his argument to a conclusion with the emphatic and irrefutable sentence: "It is not then that Catholics are afraid of human knowledge, but that they are proud of divine knowledge, and that they think the omission of any kind of knowledge whatever,...not knowledge, but ignorance" (105.24-26). Thus Newman introduces what will be "a further view of the relation of secular knowledge to divine" (106.2-3).

106.4 "...the circle of knowledge..." metaphor is basic to the thought of Discourses II to V: See Discourse II, 45.25-27; Discourse III, 69.16-71.3; and Discourse V, 144.22-24. Newman argues throughout these Discourses for the importance of Theology and its essential relation to the secular sciences. In one of the University Sketches "Christianity and Physical Science" Newman elaborates on the relation between these two fields of knowledge—the natural and the supernatural—as follows: "These two great circles of knowledge, ...intersect; first as far as supernatural knowledge includes truths and facts of the natural world, and secondly, as far as truths and facts of the natural world are on the other hand data for inferences about the supernatural. Still, allowing this interference to the full, it will be found, on the whole, that the two worlds and the two kinds of knowledge respectively are separated off from each other; and that, therefore, as being separate, they cannot on the whole contradict each
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other." 1 Herein is Newman's answer to the main problem discussed in Discourse IV; that is, the antagonism which is popularly supposed to exist between Secular Science and Theology. One may have the fullest knowledge possible either of the natural or of supernatural circles of knowledge, but have only an elementary knowledge of the other vast field of knowledge and therefore be quite unequal to forming any accurate judgments in the unfamiliar field. Newman's conclusion that such antagonism does not really exist he explains as follows: "If, then, Theology be the philosophy of the supernatural world and Science the philosophy of the natural, Theology and Science, whether in their respective ideas, or again in their own actual fields, on the whole are incommunicable, incapable of collision, and needing, at most to be connected never to be reconciled." 2 (See the "Appendix," Section 4, 396.8-12; 396.31-32; 398.29-33 for reference to the circle of knowledge idea).

106.3-21 "I observe then, ...no mission to teach at all."

Hitherto, Newman has been stating his perspective in this Discourse and summarizing Discourse III as a means of leading into "a further view of the relation of secular knowledge to divine" (106.2-3). "The circle of


2 Ibid., p. 431.
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knowledge" metaphor ("the other sciences close up" 106.6) here merges with that of the usurping states' metaphor ("its territory would soon disappear, under a treaty of partition..." 106.9-10). The metaphor of other states encroaching on the territory of Theology if the latter is not occupying its own territory (See also 107.4-10) will be central to the thought of Discourses IV and V (See 111.19). Newman objects to other subjects' usurping the territory of Theology on the grounds that "they would be sure to teach wrongly, what they had no mission to teach at all" (106.20-21) and "that any secular science cultivated exclusively, may become dangerous to Religion" (107.2-3) in that "it is encroaching on territory not its own, and undertaking problems which it has no instruments to solve" (107.8-10).

106.22-28 "The enemies of Catholicism...falls into error."

The reference to the collision between Science and Theology in the Galileo controversy is an illustration of Newman's main point in section 106.3-21: "They would be sure to teach wrongly, what they had no mission to teach at all." In this instance, it was the Theologians who had no mission to pronounce on scientific matters. Newman reminds the opponents of Theology that their emphasis on the usurpation of Science by Theology in the Galileo instance will serve to make them aware "that a science [Secular Science as well as Theology] which exceeds its limits, falls into error" (106.27-28). Newman has made skilful use of one of his opponents' stock criticisms in order to
remind them that the principle (106.20-21) is equally applicable in the
instance of science resurfing the territory of theology by completely
taking over that territory in the university curriculum.

107.12 - 108.7 "One of the first acts of the human mind... stamping them with one form." Newman delineates in this section how it is in the nature and operation of the human mind that one science can encroach on the territory of another: The human mind is distinguished by its ability to synthesize the material of the senses into a meaningful pattern; in other words, it is the nature of the human mind to philosophise (108.2)—to view, to cast into a system, and to stamp with a form. In An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, Newman states that "we allow nothing to stand by itself: we compare, contrast, abstract, generalize, connect, adjust, classify;" 1 thus the human mind carries on the process of development in ideas. One of the University Sermons further describes the mental process of organizing and making meaningful: "Philosophy, then, is reason exercised upon knowledge; or the knowledge not merely of things in general, but of things in their relations to one another. It is the power of referring every thing to its true place in the universal system,... ." 2 In addition, Newman


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continues his definition of Philosophy with a statement that is particularly relevant to this discourse: "It [Philosophy] never views any part of the extended subject—matter of knowledge, without recollecting that it is but a part, or without the associations which spring from this recollection. It makes every thing lead to every thing else; it communicates the image of the whole body to every separate member, till the whole becomes in imagination like a spirit, every where pervading and penetrating its component parts, and giving them their one definite meaning." "...in the mind of a philosopher, the elements of the physical and moral world, sciences, arts, pursuits, ranks, offices, events, opinion, individualities, are all viewed, not in themselves, but as relative terms, suggesting a multitude of correlatives, and gradually by successive combinations, converging one and all to their true centre." ¹ But one who lacks the comprehensive view of the philosopher, nevertheless, "will ever be viewing. We cannot do without a view and we put up with an illusion, when we cannot get a true one" (109.9-11).

109.2-11 "Hence the misconceptions...when we cannot get a true one." The results of the mind's tendency to philosophise are that "the busy mind will ever be viewing" (109.8-9); first, in everyday events, "hence the misconceptions of character,...the false impressions and reports of words or deeds...;" and secondly, in "matter of research

¹ Newman, "Wisdom...and Bigotry," p. 291.
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and speculation" (109.12-13), a man "whose life lies in the cultivation
of one science" (109.18) becomes "a man of one idea" (110.7); "hence...
the principles of utility,...of progress, [are] exalted into leading
ideas and keys,...principles,...true to a certain point; (See also,
111.22-24) yet all degenerating into error and quackery,...at a point
where they require interpretation and restraint from other quarters,..."
(110.10-20).

The "restraint from other quarters" (110.19-20) is the theme
of Discourses IV - VII; namely, the necessity for an over-all view or
a philosophical habit that will enable the mind to view in the proper
perspective all the sciences in their respective places on the field of
knowledge. See 126.24-25 in which Newman refers to "that Architectonic
Science of Philosophy " that disposes of all in correct order, and thus
prevents the encroachment and usurpation of intellectual territory that
characterizes the "man of one idea" (110.7)..."a man of one science"
(110.8) or the bigot.

110.25 - 111.13 "The Advancement of Learning." For this
quotation see Bacon's The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. W. A. Wright
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, MDCCC. BK I, Section 7), pp. 40 - 41. The
quotation from Bacon illustrates that "the man of one idea...of one
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science" (110.7-8) views all from the perspective of his own science and thus "'give[s] all things else a tincture according to [it] utterly untrue and improper..." (110.29-111.1). As Newman concludes, such a narrow view results "not only [in] the loss of Theology, [but also in] the perversion of other sciences" (111.17-18).

111.26-27 ". . . they persuade the world of what is false by urging upon them what is true" is Newman's rhetorically balanced expression of an aspect of his main idea: When one science, to use Newman's metaphor, unjustly seizes the territory of another science, although that science's principles be true; nevertheless, "when out of its place, perverted, or carried to excess" (111.23-24), will not be true. As Newman frequently maintains, a partial truth is not a truth at all, but actually an error.

112.1-2 ". . . friends...no wish to oppose Religion, and are not conscious they are doing so;" Their unwitting opposition is the result of "a refusal to recognize theological truth..." (111.16). Newman gives a variation on his usurpation metaphor when he writes that the fine arts "unless restrained with a firm hand, instead of being servants, will aim at becoming principals" (112.11-13).

112.5 - 117.11 "As to friends, ...a present heresy." Hitherto Newman has been discussing the "open enemies" to theological truth—particular philosophies and especially, political economy. Now he turns to the "friends"—The Fine Arts of...
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Painting, Sculpture, Architecture, and Music. These friends can, according to Newman, by pursuing the aims and methods of their own art without regard to theological truth, unintentionally run counter to Religion. In this passage Newman is not only arguing for Theology in its essential place in the university curriculum, but also, indirectly, subtly suggesting to the minds of his Dublin audience that in allowing the establishment of a university without theology they too, although claiming to be friends, are actually enemies to theological truth.

113.17-18 "Religion must exist itself that the world might... not gain an advantage over it" expresses the encroachment metaphor that Newman develops with reference to painting. He warns that the putting aside of theological truth will result in the Christian subjects for art being "supplanted by a sort of pagan mythology in the guise of sacred names,...nothing which subserved the cause of Religion, nothing...which did not...minister to corrupt nature and the powers of darkness" (113.25-114.3). Newman's forecast is accurate in that some present-day ecclesiastical art seems to bear out his warning. Here is just some evidence that Newman is a contemporary thinker whose insights are even more appropriate to our times than to his own in that what he then foresaw has now become an actuality.

114.16-18 "...that Religion must be...on the defensive...[lest]...a potent enchantment will steal over it" refers again to the usurping metaphor; this time with reference to music. "A potent
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...enchantment will steal over it" expresses the effect of music on the listener, but also is in keeping with an aspect of the encroachment metaphor that expresses the subversive subtly with which religious truth can be overcome and displaced by the "elements of beauty and grandeur" (115.12) of music "unless Religion is strong on its own ground, and reminds" (115.24-25) the musician that he must "aim at the glory, not of his own gift, but of the Great Giver" (115.28-29).

115.11-14 "...starting from...rapturous combinations." In its aptness and depth of insight into the power the musician commands to awaken "beauty and grandeur" in sound, the description is a reminder that Newman himself was an accomplished violinist.

116.1-5 François de Salignac de la Mothe Fénelon (1651-1715) was a French educator, theologian, and archbishop of Cambrai who wrote Télémagne, a series of texts based on the search of Ulysses' son for his father and designed to meet the different stages in the intellectual and moral development of his royal pupil, the grandson and heir of Louis XIV.

George Berkeley (1685-1753) Anglican bishop and philosopher, educated at Trinity College, Dublin, sought a remedy against skepticism, materialism, atheism, and waning influence of religion. He wrote The Principles of Human Knowledge (1710).

As different in background and purpose as these writers were,
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they both preferred the Grecian to the Gothic architecture since the Grecian was simple and natural. Berkeley states the distinction between the Grecian and the Gothic as "the latter being fantastical, and for the most part founded neither in nature nor in reason, in necessity nor use, the appearance of which accounts for all the beauty, grace, and ornament of the other." ¹ Fénelon writes that "un edifice grec n'a aucun ornament qui ne serve qu'a orner l'ouvrage;...tout est simple, tout est mesure, tout est borne à l'usage; on n'y voit ni hardiesse ni caprice qui impose aux yeux; les proportions sont si justes, ...tout est borne a contenter la vraic raison." ² Fénelon adds that the "architectes gothiques" flatter themselves that they have surpassed "par leur vain raffinement, en simplicité grecque." ³

The preference for the simplicity of Grecian architecture rather than the "fantastical" Gothic style, expressed by authors who differ in background and usually in thought, Fénelon and Berkeley, lends emphasis and support to Newman's argument that the fine arts should minister to religion. Here is an effectively used variation of one of


³ Ibid., p.259-260.
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Newman's rhetorical devices; that is, the quoting of an instance in which an author with whom he usually differs actually agrees with his viewpoint and thereby adds weight to his argument.

However, that Newman himself preferred the Gothic is evident from his beautifully expressed appreciation of that style (116.9-17). See also Loss and Cain, Chapter XVI, p.285. In the debate between classical and Gothic, Campbell says, "Give Gothic an ascendancy; be respectful towards classical." But, p.306, Chapter XVIII expresses the limitations of Gothic: "There are two things which Gothic cannot show—the line or forest of round polished columns, and the graceful dome, circling above one's head like the blue heaven itself."

116.4 "...the Gothic style..." generally signifies the style of architecture that developed from Romanesque during the twelfth century and became general in Europe, particularly in Northern France, by the mid thirteenth century. Eighteenth-century writers associated Gothic and its specific feature, the pointed arch, with the picturesque, but found in it also an inspiration toward the sublime and the infinite. The following too may be what Newman means when he states that "no other architecture, now used for sacred purposes, seems to have an idea in it..." (116.14-15): In Gothic art there is a vivid expression of a renewed humanity, liberated from anxiety and free to express beauty, vitality, joy of life, while remaining within the bounds of traditional medieval culture. A new naturalism is the most obvious distinguishing...
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mark of Gothic culture. The human element permeates everything, like a
new hope, and is destined to take on an ever greater importance during
the Renaissance.

116.20-27 "It is surely...the Renaissance...excesses in
literature and art, so the revival of an almost forgotten architecture...
in our country, in France, and in Germany, may...run away with us into
this or that error..." Newman fears that as the Gothic of the Middle
Ages heralded the humanism and naturalism of the Renaissance, so the
revival of Gothic may be accompanied by a new humanism—a new emphasis
on human reason and freedom that may "run away with us into this or that
error, unless we keep watch over its course" (116.27-28).

116.24 - 117.3 "...so a revival of an almost forgotten
architecture,...extinct nationalism." The revival of Gothic, begun in
the eighteenth century, received new impetus from the romantic movement.
The nineteenth century leader of the revival in England, A.W.N. Pugin
(1812-1850), with Charles Barry, designed the first buildings of the
On the continent, Eugene E. Viollet-le-Duc (1814-1879) led the French
Gothic revival with his design for the restoration of medieval
architecture in churches and monuments. In Germany, Karl Friedrich
Schinkel (1781-1841) designed the monument to Queen Louise, 1810 and the
Werdersche church in Berlin, 1824-30, the earliest Gothic revival design
in Europe. John Ruskin (1819-1900) in "The Revival of Gothic," The
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Stones of Venice, Vol. I, 1851, expressed an appreciation of Gothic as giving freedom for the expression of the individual workman's artistic imagination.

In this discourse Newman's idea is that architecture as one of the fine arts should serve, not prejudice the cause of religion. In an article written for the British Critic between 1837 and 1842, entitled, "The Anglo-American Church" Newman deplores the dissociation of church architecture from the unity and growth themes of the Gospel: "Instead of viewing the Gospel system as a living growth, like 'some tall palm,' beautiful as being at once one and many, we build it up course by course, as we spread our layers of brick and mortar. Our architecture at the present day is a type, or rather an effect, of our state of mind. The lines of our buildings do not flow on, nor their arms expand, and return into themselves, as being the expansion of one whole idea, but we seem to be ever congratulating ourselves that we have got so far, and to be asking 'What shall we do next?'—range rising above range, and pile placed aside of pile, without even the merit of being excrescences. And we make up for want of meaning in the whole by stress and earnestness in the parts, we lavish decorations on bit by bit, till what was at first unmeaning, ends by being self-contradictory." 1 See also Newman's "Feasting in Captivity," Sermons Bearing on Subjects of the Day, p.393.

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for a similarly pertinent comment on church architecture of Newman's Dublin University church.

The foregoing quotation, although it pertains specifically to architecture, expresses two ideas basic to the discourses: first, the idea expressed in "a living growth, like 'some tall palm,' beautiful as being at once one and many" is the very vertical growth and unity that is basic to Newman's educational thought; secondly, the linear accumulation, without meaning or "whole idea" as expressed in "we build it up course by course, as we spread our layers of brick and mortar" is the principle basic to the science of wealth and progress or Political Economy, the criticism of which is an undercurrent throughout Discourses II to V. Symbolically, the science of "brick and mortar" as opposed to the "living growth, like 'some tall palm' beautiful as being at once one and many" applies well in the unity of Newman's thought to the principles of Political Economy as they pose a threat to Newman's educational ideal. The significance of drawing a parallel between this quotation on architecture and the material of the discourses will be seen more clearly with reference to the thought of Discourse V.

119.12 - 120.6 "...will remember...eminent as a professional man in London...so treated the subject of Comparative Anatomy, as to seem to deny the immateriality of the soul...no right to give the law...to the science of Theology?" Newman refers to William Lawrence, professor of anatomy in the College of Surgeons who published his Lectures on
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Comparative Anatomy, Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural History of Man in 1848. See A. Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect, pp. 248 and 312 for details of "the trouble which came upon" Lawrence as a result of his lectures and publications. Lawrence's lectures which began in 1816, were attacked by John Abernethy, a celebrated physician, and then by many others in books and pamphlets for more than a decade.

120.7-25 "A living dignitary of the Established Church wrote a History of the Jews... he took an external view of it... attracted him by its speciousness." Henry Hart Milman published a History of the Jews in 1829. Culler writes that Milman was "an Anglican clergyman of the school of Arnold who was trying to apply the critical method of Barthold Neibuhr to the history of the chosen people. ... the minimizing of the Old Testament miracles" 1 was, according to Culler, what caused the greatest scandal.

Newman wrote in a letter to S. L. Pope, October 28, 1830, the following about Milman: "It seems to me that the great evil of Milman's work lies not in the matter of the history, but in the profane spirit in which it is written. In most of his positions I agree with him—but abhor the irreverent scoffing Gibbon-like tone of the composition!" 2

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1 A. Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 249.

2 Ibid., p. 249.
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In the same letter Newman added a statement particularly relevant to Discourse IV. "It seems to me he undertook it in a hasty thoughtless irreverent spirit, and not understanding whither his principles would carry him. Some persons think he did it to conciliate unbelievers--this may be. Yet, judging from the work, I should say it was the fruit of a supercilious liberalistic spirit, which liked to be (what it thought) philosophical and above the world--and to appear so--to show that a clergyman could take an enlarged view of things, and yet be a firm believer".¹

In 1852 Newman is suggesting to his Irish audience that they too in accepting the Queen's Colleges are trying, as did Milman, to take "an enlarged view of things," and yet be firm believers, but neither do they know whither their acquiescence will carry them.

In 1840 Milman published a History of Christianity Under the Empire. Newman's review of the book, published in the British Critic, XXIX (January, 1841) and reprinted in Newman's Essays, Critical and Historical (1890), II, 186-248 contains statements particularly relevant to the material of Discourse IV. For example, in his review, "Milman's View of Christianity," Newman writes that "it is impossible then to mistake the satisfaction which he [Milman] feels in adopting the external view of Christianity, and the sort of contempt... in which he

¹ Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 313.
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holds theological science."  

1 See 190.10-12 in Discourse IV. Newman further states about Milman: he displays "the earthly side of the Gospel...from a notion of its being philosophical to do so. ...He imagines that it argues a large, liberal, enlightened understanding, to be able to generalize religions, and, without denying the divinity of Christianity, to resolve it into its family likeness to all others."  

2 Newman sees Milman writing in accordance with "a certain class of writers (followers of Hume and Bentham we suppose)...[who] go so far as to assert that it is "impossible that an enquiring and reasoning age should receive these supernatural facts as historical verities."  

3 However, it is in the following quotation from Newman's review of Milman, that Newman clearly shows Milman's writing as an example of liberalism in religion which it is Newman's purpose in Discourses II - V to combat: It is this passage that explains why Newman insists on Theology as a science in the university curriculum. "What tenet of Christianity will escape proscription, if the principle is once admitted, that a sufficient account is given of an opinion, and a sufficient ground for making light of it, as soon as it is historically referred to some human origin? What will be our Christianity? What shall we have to

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2 Ibid., p. 237.

3 Ibid., p. 246-247.
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believe? What will be left to us?...Will the Gospel be a substance? Will Revelation have done more than introduce a quality into our moral life world, not anything that can be contemplated by itself, obeyed and perpetuated? This we do believe to be the end of the speculations, of which Mr. Milman's volumes at least serve as an illustration. If we indulge them, Christianity will melt away in our hands like snow; we shall be unbelievers before we suspect we are."

The foregoing sentence, which emphasizes the insidiousness of the foci of unbelief, is the theme basic to the encroachment metaphor in Discourse IV. Here Newman sees Milman as "simply betrayed into a false step by the treacherous fascination of what is called the Philosophy of History" (120.17-19). Milman is an example of the man of one idea who interprets, in this case the history of Christianity, in keeping with his own narrow viewpoint: "the earthly side of the Gospel" (See above p. 120.7-25).

Newman continues in the same review with a passage which makes explicit the reasoning basic to his argument for Theology's place in the university curriculum: "With a sigh we shall suddenly detect the real state of the case. We shall look on Christianity, not as a religion, but as a past event which exerted a great influence on the course of the world, when it happened, and gave a tone and direction to religion, government, philosophy, literature, manners; an idea that developed itself in various directions strongly, which was indeed from the first

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Materialized into a system or a church, and is still upheld as such by numbers, but by an error; a great boon to the world, bestowed by the Giver of all good, as the discovery of printing may be, or the steam-engine, but as incapable of continuity, except in its effects, as the shock of an earthquake, or the impulsive force which commenced the motions of the planets." ¹ The preceding passage, which depicts the secularization of Christianity describes more clearly than any in the discourses the direction taken by those who, like Milman, hold "theological science" in contempt, and would therefore have no place for Theology in the University curriculum.

120.27 - 130.3 "Political Economy is the science...theirs is the kingdom of God". Newman has given examples of a medical man and an historian whose "exclusive line of study has led him, whether he will or no, to run counter to the principles of Religion..." (119.4-6). This section deals with the Political Economist, "a fashionable philosopher just now" (124.1) as another instance of one who tends to view all knowledge from the principles and point of view of his own science. Throughout, Newman quotes from "the Inaugural Lecture upon it [Political Economy] delivered in the University in question, by its first Professor" (124.26-27). The reference is to the Inaugural Lecture of Nassau Senior, (1790-1864) first Professor of Political Economy in the University of

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Oxford. 1 Newman's copy of Senior's lecture, entitled An Introductory Lecture on Political Economy, delivered before the University of Oxford, on the 6th of December 1826, is preserved at the Birmingham Oratory. 2

Following out the usurpation metaphor that is the basis of this discourse Newman shows that ethics has indeed been sent into banishment and its territory taken over by the new science of political economy in that the object of Senior's lecture, according to Newman, is "to recommend the science of wealth, by claiming for it an 'ethical' quality, Viz., by extolling it as the road to virtue and happiness..." (125.7-10). Further, Newman quotes Senior as follows: "...the pursuit of wealth, that is, the endeavour to accumulate the means of future subsistence and enjoyment, is, to the mass of mankind, the great source of 'moral' improvement." (127.14-18). Now, Newman's viewpoint is that "Political Economy must not be allowed to give judgment in its own favour, but must come before a higher tribunal" (127.6-8). That tribunal is what Newman refers to in the following quotation as "that Architectonic Science of Philosophy:" "...the question of its [Political Economy's] 'rank' belongs to that Architectonic Science or Philosophy, whatever it be, which is itself the arbiter of all truth, and which disposes of the claims and arranges the places of all the departments of knowledge, which man is able to

1 A. Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect, pp. 250, 251.
2 Ibid., p. 313 n. 23.
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mastery" (126.22-27). In this context, Newman mentions "that Architectonic Science or Philosophy" (126.23-24) as a tribunal of each science's place and a means thereby of preventing one science's encroaching on the territory of another. See Discourse VII, pp. 202-203, for the development of Newman's use of "Architectonic Science."

Newman notes about Senior's lecture: "Nor did it occasion any excitement whatever on the part of the academical or the religious public..." (124.20-22). Implied in Newman's noting the fact is the suggestion that neither the academical nor the religious public were aware of the presence of an insidious foe. Such an interpretation is in keeping with the usurpation metaphor as well as with Newman's underlying purpose of opening the eyes of his Irish audience to, and putting them on their guard for, the real nature of contemporary thought.

It is important to note that Newman deals with the man of medicine, of history, and of political science in chronological order. Appropriately so, in that Lawrence's lectures in 1816, which dealt with the science of anatomy so as to deny the immateriality of the soul, were readily recognized as a threat to Theology, but by 1848, no one but Newman seemed to realize that Senior's lectures, which claimed an ethical quality for political science, were endangering the very existence of Theology by seeking to replace religion by science. By 1848 England had become Arnold's England and no one objected. The territory of Theology had been usurped by science and all seemed oblivious to the take over.
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122.4-7 St. Jerome (Eusebius Sophronius Hieronymus) (c.347-C.420) was one of the four great doctors of the Western Church and the most learned of the Latin Fathers. He was baptized in 366 and ordained in 378 or 379. He undertook the revision of the text of the Latin Bible
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on the basis of the Greek New Testament and the Septuagint in order to put an end to the marked divergences in the current Western texts. The Vulgate, the official Roman Catholic text of the Bible, is based on St. Jerome's translation. St. Jerome is noted for his knowledge of Hebrew as well as for his acquaintance with Greek and Latin literature both pagan and Christian. His writing has a poetical elegance, an incisive wit, and a successful aiming at rhetorical effect. A parallel reference to the one in this discourse can be found in "Letter IV," translated in St. Jerome, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers (Vol. VI ed. H. Wace and P. Schaff, Oxford, 1893) p. 15.

122.7-9 St. Leo, the Great, Pope 440-461, considered the greatest administrator of the ancient Church, amalgamated ecclesiastical procedures with Roman law. He asserted the universal episcopate of the Roman Bishop; held that all bishops were equal in episcopacy, but guided by Peter in the person of Peter's successor; and acknowledged the universal priesthood of the faithful presided over by Christ, whom the Bishop of Rome represents. In his battle with current heresies, Leo prosecuted the Manichees and condemned the Monophysites. For the reference cited here see Migne's Patrologia Latina, Sermon LX, Vol. LIV, p. 345.

Newman has cited several passages from Scripture as well as from three of the most illustrious of the ancient Fathers of the Church—Chrysostom, Jerome, Leo—to counter the argument of the
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Political Economist; namely, "that the pursuit of wealth, ... is,... to the mass of mankind, the great source of 'moral' improvement!" (127.14-18), by showing that no lesser authorities than Scripture and the Fathers assert that "the love of money, 'is the root of all evils'." (121.9-10). See I Tim. 6:10.

129.2-4 "Lay not up... thy heart also!" and 129.7-9 "Lay up to yourselves... nor steal". See St. Matthew 6:19.

129.28 - 130.2 "...pursuit of gain... 'root of all evils'". See I Timothy 6:10.

130.2-3 "'Poor... Kingdom of God'". See St. Matthew 5:3.

The Scriptural quotations on pages 121, 129, and 130, serve to prove Newman's contention that contrary to Senior's claim, the accumulation of wealth is not, "'to the mass of mankind, the great source of moral improvement'" (127.16-18). Newman does concede that "the orderly habits which attend upon the hot pursuit of gain, not only may effect an external decency, but may at least shelter the soul from the temptations of vice" (127.23-25), but he insists that as the "science of wealth" (122.17) Political Economy "must give rules for gaining wealth, and can do nothing more" (122.17-19). That Political Economy "has no right to determine that wealth is at any rate to be sought, or that it is the way to be virtuous and the price of happiness; I say this is to pass the bounds of his science,..." (123.5-8).

126.14-27 "It is an objection,... man is able to master." The
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quotation from Lord Bacon within this section, "no perfect...to a
higher science" is from Bacon's Advancement of Learning, Book I, p. 40.
Lord Bacon's remark that it is necessary to ascend '"to a higher
science" to which he gives the name "philosophia prima" in order '"to
discover the more remote and deeper parts of any science"' (126.17-19)
is applicable in this context to Nassau Senior's claim that Political
Economy is conducive to virtue. With Bacon, Newman maintains that any
judgment on the claims of a particular science such as Political Economy
must come from a higher science. Newman assigns the name of
"Architectonic Science or Philosophy" (126.23-24) to that science "which
is itself the arbiter of all truth, and which disposes of the claims and
arranges the places of all the departments of knowledge, which man is
able to master" (126.24-27).

131.4-132.3 "...the not unfrequent perversion...of
antiquarian and historical research, ...are silent about it." Edward
Gibbon (1737-1794) was educated at Westminster and Magdalen College,
Oxford. He published his History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman
Empire in six volumes between 1776 and 1788. Gibbon's mastery of style
did not save him from the attacks of the pamphleteers who gave
expression to the storm of controversy provoked by Gibbon's treating all
supernatural considerations with bitter irony and ridicule. But when
accused of falsifying evidence, he made a devastating reply in A
Vindication of Some Passages in the XVth and XVIth Chapters of the
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Roman Empire. He attributed the decline in the empire to an abandoning of those ideals of political and intellectual freedom that he found in classical literature. His remark, "I have described the triumph of barbarism and religion" reveals his view of the causes of the decay of the Graeco-Roman world. His main purpose was to establish the principle that religion must be treated as a phenomena of human experience. It is interesting and in keeping with Newman's theme of the insidiousness of secular usurpation that in the eighteenth century Gibbon's "perversion of antiquarian and historical research" (131.5-6) was at least recognized, although criticized mainly by those who feared that his skepticism would shake the existing establishment; but, in the nineteenth century Gibbon was hailed as a champion by militant agnostics. (See below, Discourse IX, 308.8-10, for relevant material on Gibbon) Also see the "Appendix," pp. 396, 404-6 for further references to Gibbon.

Here 131.7-25 Newman criticizes Gibbon for his treatment of history from a wholly secular point of view "as if no part of theological teaching were true." (131.15-16). However, that Newman had read and admired Gibbon's style is evident from the fact that he had written when he was seventeen "an analysis of Thucydides in Gibbon's style." ¹ Newman writes that the precision, grace, and copiousness so characteristic of Gibbon was imitated by many students of the language

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to such an extent that Newman thought he could trace Gibbon's "vigorous condensation and peculiar rhythm at every turn in the literature of the present day." 1

That Newman valued Gibbon as literature while being fully mindful of the apostasy of his views is evident from the fact that he would have included Gibbon in the history curriculum of the Irish University had not Dr. Cullen objected. 2 Newman's reasoning was as follows: "We may feel great repugnance to Milton or Gibbon as men; we may most seriously protest against the spirit which ever lives, and the tendency which ever operates, in every page of their writings; but they are, an integral portion of English Literature; we cannot extinguish them; we cannot deny their power; ...They are great English authors each breathing hatred to the Catholic Church in his own way, each a proud and rebellious creature of God, each gifted with incomparable gifts." 3 The foregoing quotation gives an example of an important Newman characteristic; namely, the ability to appreciate greatness wherever he founded, even in his opponents. His breadth of vision as an educationist is also evident in the preceding passage. It is a breadth that far exceeded that of Cullen and the educators of his own day.

2 H. D. Cullen, pp. 262-3.
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132.1 Lucius Annaeus Seneca (c.4 B.C.—A.D. 65), one of the most important Latin writers of the 1st century A.D., was a Roman moralist, statesman, satirist, and tragedian, whose writings included a collection of Dialogues, a set of Epistulæ Morales, Naturales Quæstiones, a treatise on natural phenomena widely read in the Middle Ages, and nine Tragedies on mythological themes concerned with the rhetorical display of intense emotion. His writings represent Stoicism at its best and have been much studied by Christian apologists for the similarities and contrasts of their moral teaching with the Gospel Ethics. To the Latin Fathers, Seneca was a salutary castigator of vice and to the Renaissance writers a model for drama and a supreme moral teacher.

132.1 Pliny, the Elder (Gaius Plinius Secundus) (A.D. 23/24—79) was the Roman author of the celebrated Natural History in Thirty-Seven Books, a work which afforded Pliny an opportunity to expound his own philosophic creed, a modified Stoicism. His view of nature was pantheistic.

132.1 Plutarch (c.46—after 119), Greek biographer and miscellaneous writer, who, from the 16th until the early 19th century, was among the most popular of classical authors, influenced the origins and development of the essay, biography, history. From his Lives was derived the accepted image of the great historical figures of Greece and Rome. Sir Thomas North's translation of Plutarch's Lives was Shakespeare's source for his Roman plays as well as an influence on the development of his concept of the tragic hero. Plutarch's Moralia—sixty essays on ethical, religious, political, and literary topics— Influenced
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the 1612 edition of Bacon's essays.

131.2 Mishnah (Heb. "instruction") is the authoritative collection of the Jewish Oral Law and the basis of the Palestinian and Babylonian versions of the Talmud. Tradition attributes its compilation to Judah ha-Nasi (135-c.220). Mishnah, with the Talmud and Scriptures, is an essential part of Jewish education. The authority of the Mishnah rests on the view that the Oral Law was given to Moses on Sinai at the same time as the Written Law and so is of Divine Origin. In a wider sense the word "Mishnah" was used of the teaching and learning of the tradition and then of tradition itself.

Mishnah is countering Gibbon's argument in 131.26-29 by noting that the omission of Christianity by writers of widespread influence and importance (132.2-3) is not in itself an argument against the existence of Christianity.

132.4 Transubstantiation is, in the theology of the Eucharist, the conversion of the whole substance of the bread and wine into the whole substance of the Body and Blood of Christ only the accidents (appearances of bread and wine) remaining.

132.4 Arians were followers of Arius who first propounded early in the 4th century the belief known as Arianism. According to Newman, "the fundamental tenet of Arianism was, that the Son of God was a creature, not born of the Father, but, in the scientific language of
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the times, made "out of nothing." It followed that He only possessed a super-angelic nature, being made at God's good pleasure before the worlds, before time, after the pattern of the attribute Logos or Wisdom, as existing in the Divine Mind, gifted with the illumination of it, and in consequence called after it the Word and the Wisdom, may inheriting the title itself of God; and at length united to a human body, in the place of its soul, in the person of Jesus Christ. ¹

The controversy initiated by this teaching was condemned by the Council of Nicæa A.D. 325. At the Second Ecumenical Council, which met at Constantinople in 381, Arianism was proscribed and a statement of faith, the Nicene Creed, was approved.

132.22-24 John Horne Tooke (1736-1812), educated at Westminster and St. John's College, Oxford, was an English radical supporter of the movement for parliamentary reform and a philologist. With his book, The Diversions of Purley (1786)(1805), Tooke was among the first to regard languages as historical developments instead of fixed structures.

132.26-28 Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), educated at Westminster and Queen's College, Oxford, was the English utilitarian philosopher,

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economist, and theoretical jurist who became one of the principal
influences on the reforming thought of the nineteenth century. The
great work on which he was engaged for years, An Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), outlined his principle of
utility, the two sovereign motives of pleasure and pain, as well as the
principle that the object of all legislation must be the "greatest
happiness of the greatest number." In 1823 Bentham helped to found the
Westminster Review to spread the principles of philosophic radicalism.

Newman's reference in Discourse IV is to Bentham's Rationale of Judicial
Evidence (1827), compiled from Bentham's notes by J. S. Mill. See in
particular Mk. I, Chapter XI, Section 7, "Operation of the religious
sanction for and against correctness and completeness in testimony,"
pp. 279-2.

The following paragraph taken from Section 7 may well be the
one to which Newman specifically refers when he charges Bentham with
making "a treatise on Judicial Proofs a covert attack upon the miracles
of Revelation" (132.26-28): "Though the text of the sacred writings,...
remains the same, or nearly the same, the interpretation put upon it
varies from age to age; and, in each age, it is by the interpretation
put upon it in that age, that the effectual direction taken in that age
by the religious sanction--the practical effect produced by it, is
determined. The age in which the text of the sacred writings was first
committed to writings, was not, in the instance of any of the book-
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religions, an age in which any such qualities as those of precision, accuracy, and particularity of explanation belonged in any considerable degree to the public mind. To reduce the precept to a state adapted to practice, it has become more and more the custom to fill up from the precepts of the moral sanction, the reputed deficiencies manifested in these particulars by the religious sanction."

The foregoing passage from Bentham is an illustration of the "Private Judgment" that Newman mentions in 134.7-10 and is also an example of the kind of thought basic to nineteenth-century liberalism, or as Newman calls it in his essay of the same name, "A Form of Infidelity of the Day," The Idea of a University, Part II, pp. 389-391 in particular.


133.27 - 3134.7 "For example,...make men virtuous." These quotations refer to Milman, Gibbon, Lawrence, and Senior, respectively, as mentioned in Newman's preceding paragraphs.

134.7-10 "These are enunciations...of Private Judgment...attaches to no science whatever." Newman points out that when scientists view their particular fields of knowledge without reference to other

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134.15-16 "...the Pentateuch..." is a title among Biblical scholars for the five books of "Moses," "Genesis," "Exodus," "Leviticus," "Numbers," and "Deuteronomy."

134.23 Pierre Simon de Laplace, (1749-1827) was a French mathematician and astronomer. Among his contributions to astronomy are his discoveries of the mathematical explanation of the "great inequality" in the motions of Jupiter and Saturn (1784). Another major work is his theory of the motions of Jupiter's Galilean satellites (1788-92). Four volumes of his Traité de Mécanique céleste were published from 1799 to 1805 and Volume V, in 1825. This work is a systematic treatment of the entire field of celestial mechanics of the time and is ranked next to Newton's Principia as an outstanding classic on the subject. It was the review of Volume IV in the Edinburgh Review that sparked the Edinburgh Review controversy with Oxford University over the value of the classics in university education.

134.23 George Louis Le Clerc de Buffon (1707-1788) was a
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French writer and scientist. In 1739 Buffon was appointed Keeper of the Jardin du Roi and its adjoining museum, where utilizing a research grant from Louis XIV, he collected data for his forty-four volume *Histoire Naturelle*, a work that exerted extensive influence on the scientific world. His *Histoire* expressed the idea of nature as a whole, all of whose forces intertwine and whose manifestations stand in mutual causal connection. Buffon's basic evolutionary ideas, which preceded those of Lamarck and Darwin, dissatisfied French theologians, although Buffon held no animosity toward religion and recognized man's spiritual as well as biological nature. Buffon's writings represent the first attempt at anthropology in the modern sense.

134.23 Alexander (Friedrich Heinrich) Humboldt (1769-1859) was a German naturalist and traveller and the first exponent of the classical period of physical geography and biogeography. He is best known for his work on the oceanic current off the west coast of South America. A younger brother of the philologist, Wilhelm von Humboldt, he was said to be, next to Napoleon, the most famous man in Europe. His *Kosmos*, the first two volumes of which were published between 1845 and 1847, volumes III and IV, between 1850 and 1858, and volume V in 1862, conveyed not only a graphic description, but also an imaginative conception of the physical world. The foregoing scientists—the most illustrious mathematician—astronomer, anthropologist, and geographer, respectively, of the day—are examples of those who, without intended
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...animosity, pursue their own sciences with such exclusive concentration as to ignore the place of other sciences, especially Theology, on the field of knowledge.

Newman added two paragraphs as a conclusion in the 1873 edition. The following excerpt from those paragraphs forms a suitable summary of Newman's argument in Discourse IV: "I have argued in its [Theology's] behalf, first, from the consideration that, whereas it is the very profession of a University to teach all sciences, on this account it cannot exclude Theology without being untrue to its profession. Next, I have said that, all sciences being connected together, and having bearings one on another, it is impossible to teach them all thoroughly, unless they all are taken into account, and Theology among them. Moreover, I have insisted on the important influence, which Theology in matter of fact does and must exercise over a great variety of sciences, completing and correcting them; so that, granting it to be a real science occupied upon truth, it cannot be omitted without great prejudice to the teaching of the rest. And lastly, I have urged that, supposing Theology be not taught, its province will not simply be neglected, but will be actually usurped by other sciences, which will teach, without warrant, conclusions of their own in a subject-matter which needs its own proper principles for its due formation and disposition." ¹

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In a letter to F. S. Bowles the day after delivering Lecture IV, June 1, 1852, Newman wrote the following about his fourth discourse: "My lecture went off well yesterday—the room full—people seemed pleased.' The subject was the supposed antagonism between Secular Science and Theology—a misconception that was beginning to occupy the minds of intellectuals in Newman's day, but has become a widespread and influential view in the present day.

Newman's summary is the following: "...the hostility in question, when it occurs, is coincident with an evident deflection or exorbitance of Science from its proper cause; and this exorbitance is sure to take place, almost from the necessity of the case, if Theology be not present to defend its own boundaries and to hinder it. The human mind cannot keep from speculating and systematising; and if Theology is not allowed to occupy its own territory, adjacent sciences, nay sciences which are quite foreign to Theology, will take possession of it." (133.12-22). Newman cited the example of the medical doctor Lawrence, exceeding the bounds of his science, Anatomy and encroaching on the territory of Theology when he treated his subject "as to seem to deny the immateriality of the soul" (119.17-18). The historian Milman and the political economist Nassau Senior were guilty of similar excursions beyond the boundaries of their own sciences. Edward Gibbon progressed a step further in denying there was such a province of knowledge as Religious Truth.

The cause of other sciences occupying the territory of
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Theology and the consequent hostility is the spirit of Private Judgment based on the individual authority to interpret and to admit just what the individual chooses to see and nothing more. ¹ Newman states that "Private Judgment infects every science which it touches with a hostility to Theology,..." (134. 8-10) in that such a spirit results in the "worshipping [of] creatures 'instead' of the Creator as the source of good." ² But there would be no hostility if all sciences submitted to the tribunal of the Architectonic Science or Philosophy (126.23-24) "which disposes of the claims and arranges the places of all the departments of knowledge, which man is able to master" (126.26-28).

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ANNOTATION OF THE DISCOURSES

Chapter XI

DISCOURSE V. GENERAL KNOWLEDGE VIEWED AS ONE PHILOSOPHY

Discourse V, the last of the discourses to be spoken, was delivered in Dublin, June 7, 1852, but was omitted from all the editions after the first, the 1852 edition. In the "Advertisement" printed before the Preface in the 1859 edition, Newman states that "he has in this new Edition attempted in some respects to remedy what he feels to be their [the Discourses'] imperfection. He has removed from the text much temporary, collateral, or superfluous matter,...with advantage, as he conceives, both to the force and to the clearness of his argument." 1 Discourse V is the most extensive omission from the 1859 edition and subsequent editions. The "temporary" material included in Discourse V is the specific reference to London University and Newman's commentary on Macaulay's Edinburgh Review article in defence of London University. Without this material, it is difficult to understand fully from the other discourses the kind of education Newman is opposing. Newman seemed to consider his specific references to London University, and by comparison the Queen's Colleges in Ireland, to be superfluous, but they do not prove so for the contemporary reader, who requires the "temporary" material in order to gain a complete understanding of Newman's ideas.

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Other material too, Newman seemed to consider "collateral, or superfluous." For example, it is in Discourse V that Newman clearly states that Theology, being one of the sciences, is not the form or the soul of the other sciences, but rather that form is "philosophy" or the "science of sciences". However, even though the terms "form," "philosophy," "science of sciences" are mentioned in subsequent discourses, it is Discourse V that contains the original reference which is necessary for the complete understanding of these terms in Discourses VI to X.

Newman may have considered the concrete examples in Discourse V to be superfluous, but for the present-day reader they serve to illuminate Newman's ideas. For example: in Discourse V Newman draws a contrast between two kinds of universities: London University, and by similarity, the Irish Queen's Colleges, on the one hand; and his own ideal, embodied, as he has previously explained, in the University of Oxford and hopefully in the forthcoming University of Ireland. The contrast illustrates one of Newman's essential principles in the Discourses: a liberal education does not consist of "a mere fortuitous heap of acquisitions and accomplishments" (141.7-8); it is not "an accumulation from without" (142.16-17), but rather "the growth of a principle from within" (142.17-18). Such an intellectual growth in the individual is possible only if the mind can reflect the unity inherent in the circle of sciences and thereby obtain "a philosophical
comprehensiveness" (142.25-26) or "an intellectual grasp of things" (143.28-29), which Newman has termed "the Architectonic science or Philosophy" (126.23-24). That "intellectual grasp" is not possible when one science--especially "one so important in the catalogue as Theology" (136.9-10)--is omitted.

Discourse V is, therefore, necessary to the comprehensive view of Newman's educational thought and equally essential as a summation of a series of five discourses dealing with the importance of Theology as a speculative science in the university curriculum.

135.1-4 "It is a prevalent notion just now, that religious opinion does not enter,...into the treatment of scientific or literary subjects." Discourse V is a rebuttal of the view that religious knowledge is not an intrinsic part of the university curriculum and that therefore in an institution of higher learning there should be "a divorce between Religious and Secular Knowledge" (136.17-18).

136.1-4 "...a positive disunion...between Theology and Secular science,...not actually united;...not to be at peace is to be at war" is Newman's introduction to his most emphatic variation on the "circle of sciences" metaphor: "The assemblage of Sciences, which together make up Universal Knowledge, is not an accidental or a
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varying heap of acquisitions, but a system, and may be said to be 'in equilibrio,' \(^1\) as long as all its portions are secured to it. [The definition of "equilibrium" illustrates clearly the relationship of mutual assistance and respect prevailing in a stable system where all the sciences have and maintain their respective fields.] Take away one of them, and that one so important in the catalogue as Theology, and disorder and ruin at once ensue" (136.9-11). Here Newman brings the thought as well as the language of the previous discourses to a conclusion by stressing that the Sciences that make up Universal Knowledge are not "a varying heap of acquisitions, but a system" (136.6-8) which will fall to "disorder and ruin" (136.10) if all the sciences, including theology, are not secured in their respective positions.

The "Circle of sciences" metaphor merges with "the usurpation"

\(^1\) "in equilibrio" refers to a state of adjustment between or among opposing or divergent elements; for example, in physics, fluids in a stable system pressing equally and easily yielding to each other, soon restore the equilibrium. Newton's Third Law of Motion states as follows: "To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction." Sir Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles, trans. Andrew Motte, Rev. Florian Cajori (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1960), p. 13.
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metaphor when Newman writes, that "there is no middle state between an 'equilibrium' and chaotic confusion; one science is ever pressing upon another unless kept in check, and the only guarantee of Truth is the cultivation of them all" (136.11-15).

136.15 "...such is the office of a university" to be an "imperial intellect" ¹ to keep "the assemblage of Sciences" (136.4-5) "in equilibrio" (136.7-8) and thereby prevent the "disorder and ruin" (136.10) that would follow the routing of Truth.

136.18-23 "Let us see...twenty-five years ago in the defence...formidable Institution...basis of such a separation." 'The "formidable institution" (136.20) referred to is London University, the brain-child of Thomas Campbell, the Scottish poet (1777-1844), who made two visits to the newly founded University of Bonn (1818) in the summer and autumn of 1820. "...he appears to have conceived at that time, the idea of a university for London which should reproduce the educational aims, scope and professorial organization of the German model with which his own Glasgow education predisposed him to sympathize. ...finally [he] made [his idea] public in a letter to The Times (9 February 1825), thus coming into touch with Henry Peter Lord Brougham (1778-1868) [See Discourses II, VI, VII, IX for further references to Brougham] and the

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group of thinkers who were anxious for the general diffusion of knowledge and a radical change in English educational institutions. The nonconformist bodies of London, whose members were virtually shut out from the older universities, heartily welcomed the scheme, and they were joined by churchmen who desired to see in the metropolis, a university devoted to modern studies and free from the expense entailed by residence colleges. ...Campbell feared it would be necessary to provide two theological chairs, one for Church and one for dissent: but Brougham succeeded in eliminating divinity from the scheme. [See Newman's statement that London university was established on the basis of "a divorce between Religious and Secular Knowledge" (136.17-18)]. The Duke of Sussex laid the foundation-stone of the building in Gower street early in 1827 and, on 2 October, 1828 lectures began to some 300 students.¹

Newman's ironic repetition of "formidable" (136.20,22) emphasizes the idea, expressed by the term "paradox or paralogism" (136.21-22): namely, that Newman does not consider London University a university in any real sense. To apply the name university to an institution set up on the basis of the omission of Religious Knowledge is, for Newman, a contradiction in terms, an absurdity, of which the founders of London University seem totally oblivious. (See above, 50.28-51.12.

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Discourse II, 39.18-40.1).

Edward Copleston (1786-1867), Provost of Oriel College, Oxford and great champion of Oxford's traditional education, (See Discourse VIII, 261.4-267.9) wrote a reply to Campbell's plan for London University in the Quarterly Review for December, 1825, entitled "Letter to Mr. Brougham on the Subject of a London University, together with Suggestions respecting the Plan by T. Campbell," pp. 257-275. Copleston's letter, from which Newman quotes in the "Appendix," Section 5.6, pp. 398.28-399.13, sets forth a similar view to that of Newman's; namely, that the term "university" is really not applicable to the London institution since it lacks a character that can form its members and since it has omitted such an important province of education as religion. Copleston writes as follows:

If the name of University be coveted, as likely to give dignity to the plan, as well as promote its prosperity,...it must often tend to mislead those who are acquainted only with the constitution of an English university: for in several of the most essential characters of such a body it is wholly wanting. There is, in fact, no 'character' that can properly be said to belong to it: no predominant cast of features or complexion: nothing which can be expected to form the manners, the morals, or the religious opinions of its members--points which are most indispensable to complete the idea of a generous education.

A weightier objection still remains against the assumed title of education, in the omission of that large and diversified and all important province of it, religion. It is not enough to say that in this respect the students will be
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as well off as they were before; that all the churches and conventicles of London are open to them; that this is an affair between each individual and his own conscience.... But the absence of that whole chapter is another lamentable blank in a work pretending to so complete a title. 1

In Copleston's second paragraph there is implicit the idea that the founders of London University are not distinguishing between the practice of religion and Religious knowledge as a part of all knowledge. The latter idea Copleston expresses in the part of his letter quoted by Newman in "the Appendix." See pp. 398.8-399.13. Thus the view that Religious Knowledge or Theology is an integral part of all knowledge, far from being initiated by Newman, was held as a matter of course by such illustrious men of Oxford as Edward Copleston and indeed his predecessors for the generations to Archbishop Laud and even to the founders of that great university.

135.23-26 "The natural, as well as the special, champion of the University of London, and of the principle which it represented, was a celebrated Review,..." The reference is to the Edinburgh Review, (1802-1929) founded in 1802 by the liberal-minded critics of Oxford's classical curriculum and religious exclusiveness, the Rev. Sidney Smith,

1 Edward Copleston, "Letter to Mr. Brougham on the Subject of a London University, together with Suggestions respecting the Plan of T. Campbell," the Quarterly Review, XXXIII, No. LXV (December, 1825), 270-1
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John Playfair, and Francis Horner. (See Discourse I, 4.16-5.18; Discourse VIII, 219.14-225.16). The new journal launched a reasoned attack on the manifold problems presented by changing economic conditions; it devoted notable amount of space to practical and theoretical sciences; and it became an instrument of political enlightenment and social reform. Almost half of the Review from 1802 to 1824 was written by Lord Brougham, Francis Jeffrey, and Sydney Smith. Macaulay was a regular and forciful contributor between 1830-1845. Political economy articles were written by Malthus, J. R. McCulloch, James Mill, and Nassau Senior. ¹

Since the Review's criticism of Oxford and Cambridge education prepared the climate for the founding of London University, the Edinburgh Review can therefore be termed the "natural, as well as the special champion of the then University of London, and of the principle [a divorce between Religious and Secular Knowledge] which it represented," (136.23-25).

136.28 - 137.9 "In this publication...one or two simple illustrations." The article was entitled, "Thoughts on the Advancement of Academical Education in England, 1826" published in the Edinburgh Review, LXXXVI (February, 1826), 315-341. The "Reviewer" was

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allegedly Lord Macaulay (1800-1859). (See Discourses VI, 196.13-14 and X, 316.20-21. for Newman's references to Macaulay's essay, "Lord Bacon"). Macaulay proceeds to dispose of the protests that "'echoed and re-echoed, An University without religion'" (137.7-8) not by philosophical argument as did Copleston's Quarterly Review article, but by "one or two simple illustrations" (137.9).

137.10 - 138.27 "Writing, as he does,...the art of calligraphy." Rhetorically, Newman portrays his view of the absurdity of Macaulay's matter and method of argument in his mock apology to his audience for interrupting "the equable flow of our discussion with unseasonable mirth" (137.16-17) with his quotation of two examples from the Reviewer's article.

137.20 - 138.9 "'Take the case,... Is it in the local situation that the mischief lies?" The quotation is from page 319 of the Edinburgh Review article by Macaulay (See above 136.28-137.9). The Reviewer asks how the student of surgery, who takes a variety of subjects from different professors and sees to his religious observances as he thinks best, differs from the student of London University who follows a like programme of studies. "Our surgeon, it is true, will have to run over half London in search of his instructors; and the other will find

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1 The Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals, 1824-1900, Vol I, p. 467 article 1134, lists Macaulay as the probable author, with Henry Brougham as a questionable second choice as the author.
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all the lecture-rooms which he attends standing conveniently together, at the end of Gower Street. Is it in the local situation that the mischief lies?" The implication in the reviewer's last question is that the objection to London University is not one of principle, but of location. Even Newman on occasion refers to London University as "Gower Street" with the current contemptuous inference of its location in the poorer district of London without the residence facilities of the older universities. London University was a walk-in-off-the-street university, as it were, rather than a campus-residence university such as Newman will depict in his "mansion-house" metaphor. (See below, section 139.24 - 140.6)

138.9-27 "Such is the argument: need I point out the fallacy?...art of calligraphy." Newman's argument indicates that his objection to London University is one of principle, not one of location. With his usual clear insight into differences, Newman answers the reviewer's argument by pointing out that "a surgical operation is not a branch of knowledge...it is a grave practical matter" (138.11-15). In 1826, when Macaulay wrote this article for the Edinburgh Review, the young man, the student of surgery, would be an apprentice doctor attending lectures at one of the large charity hospitals in London, possibly Guy's Hospital or St. Thomas's Hospital, since the young student

1 Sir James Mountford, British Universities, p. 23.
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is thought of as attending lectures by Sir Astley Paston Cooper (1768-1841), (137.27) who was connected with both hospitals and who published his Dislocations and Fractures of the Joints in 1822. ¹

According to the legislation of 1833 at Oxford, the candidate for a Bachelorship of Medicine had first to take a Bachelorship of Arts. The university then provided the theory in such subjects as anatomy, pathology, chemistry and botany, as well as the ancient writers Hippocrates and Galen. Then the practical part was the responsibility of medical schools of certain large hospitals—schools that gradually affiliated with particular universities as the century progressed. The medical student was required to show that he had attended the treatment of diseases as well as lectures at some hospital of repute in order to take his examinations for the Bachelor of Medicine. ² Thus, Newman was merely pointing out the accepted educational practice as regards medical students when he said that surgery, the business of the medical schools in the hospitals, was a grave practical matter, not an aspect of education. Furthermore, the young medical student would apparently have had the kind of liberal education Newman deems the particular province of a university at either Oxford or Cambridge before he embarked on his


medical career and therefore his practical pursuits were in no way comparable to those studies of an undergraduate at London University.

If the young student of surgery wished to attend the political economy lectures of John Ramsay McCulloch (1789-1864) (137.25), he would in effect be taking a disattente's interest in a subject McCulloch had made popular by lectures and discussion classes he had given at both Edinburgh and London. Possibly those referred to were the Ricardo Memorial Lectures he delivered in London in 1824. McCulloch's accepting the chair of political economy at London University in 1828, 1 is an indication of the kind of university London University would become—one in which popular subjects to attract the public would be an accepted part of the curriculum. (See Newman's "pantechnicon metaphor" describing London University, below, 139.24-140.6).

Similarly, French lectures in the Hamiltonian (138.22) method 2 would provide instructive entertainment since Hamilton's interlinear translations enabled one to progress rapidly in the reading of a language without the intermediary stage of grammar. The reader of

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1 D N B, Vol. XII, p. 463.

2 James Hamilton (1769-1829) was the author of the Hamiltonian system of teaching languages. The Rev. Sydney Smith wrote an article, "Hamilton's Method of Teaching Languages," for the Edinburgh Review, 44 (June, 1826), 47-69 in which he extolled the Hamiltonian method as giving the majority of readers all they require—a facility in acquiring meaning and an opportunity to become scholars of the language later if they wished.
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Hamilton's interlinear translations gains the matter expressed in another language, but does not assimilate the form or idiom of the other language and therefore the reader gains nothing permanent for his own mind; in other words, acquires no cultivation of his mind in language arts.

In Newmans view, pursuing grave practical skills such as surgery, attending popular lectures in Political Economy, or reading masters in other languages through interlineary translations do not rise to the idea of a University, are not training for the mind to enable it to acquire "the science of sciences"; therefore the attempt to justify the kind of pantechnicon curriculum of London University by analogy with the acquiring of the practical skill in surgery needed by a young medical student as well as with his other incidental intellectual pursuits was to Newman nothing short of ludicrous. Little wonder, Newman concludes, that those who consider the fostering of "trials of skill or of memory" (138.24) as the purpose of a university "can safely dispense with Theology for their perfection" (138.24-25).

139.2-17 "'Have none...new University?" The second quotation from Macaulay's Edinburgh Review article is from page 318. Newman labels this example "more infelicitous still, in proportion as it is more insulting to our view of the subject" (139.1-2)—insulting primarily in the sense that the example draws the analogy between a daughter taught by private tutors of different nationalities and beliefs
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in order to justify students’ being instructed by professors of different persuasions at London University. "The music master, a good Protestant" (139.6) in this context refers to either a liberal Anglican or a dissenter. "The dancing master, a French philosopher" (139.7-8) refers to one with little formal religious persuasion, who may even be an agnostic; "The Italian master, a believer in the blood of St. Januarius" (139.8-9) is a Roman Catholic who believes in the miracle of the liquification of the blood of St. Januarius, the Patron Saint of Naples. The examples are obviously practical skills, which do not cultivate the intellect in the sense of giving it the "science of sciences." Newman asks the question, "...is it not puerile to imply that music, or dancing, or lessons in Italian, have anything to do with Philosophy?" (139.20-22). Consequently, those writers such as Macaulay who would claim that instruction in a variety of subjects is the whole of a university "do not rise to the very idea of a university" (139.23). In other words, they would leave the learning process at its first level—that of instruction in facts and the training of skills—rather than ascending from the initial level of instruction to the speculative level of contemplating the unity of all knowledge within a system—a view Newman has termed the "Science of Sciences" or "Philosophy." (See Newman’s reference to Bacon’s metaphor illustrating the necessity of

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viewing from a height rather than on the same level in order that the mind can take the over-all view that results in understanding. Discourse IV, 47.20-25).

139.24 - 140.6 "They consider it a sort of bazaar, or pantechnicon, ... a University ... is the mansion-house, of the goodly family of the Sciences, ... in their mutual dispositions." The two kinds of universities represented by London and Oxford are effectively contrasted by the metaphors of the "pantechnicon" (139.24) or the "hotel and lodging house" (139.28) and the "mansion-house" (140.4). The lack of an integral relation between the variety of subjects in the London University curriculum is made clear by the comparison of the University and its curriculum with the merchandise of a bazaar "in which wares of all kinds are heaped together for sale in stalls independent of each other" (139.24-26). Furthermore, the metaphor is apt in that the "bazaar or pantechnicon" emphasizes the commodity aspect of an education which was to be, above all, useful for economic or professional reasons. The "hotel or lodging house" metaphor suggests a similar lack of integration and central principle, but as well, an impersonality and self-interest among professors and students, as there is among merchants who come and go "according to the season, each of them strange to each, and about its own work or pleasure" (140.1-3). Both metaphors--the pantechnicon and the hotel--express the utility aspect of education that was the hallmark of the London University and the Queen's Colleges, as well as the fact that the philosophy basic to...
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these institutions was Adam Smith's economic principle of the division of labour (See above Discourse III, 67.1-68.21; See below Discourse VI, 169.8-15; Discourse VIII, 254.22-266.15) and Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian philosophy of achieving the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

In contrast, Newman's Oxford ideal is that of a university as a "mansion-house" (140.4)—a comparison in which the relationship of the Sciences is emphasized by viewing them as members of "a goodly family," (140.5). The harmony and mutual assistance characteristic of members of a family, with their respective places and responsibilities within their own home, Newman expresses by "the Sciences, sisters all, and sisterly in their mutual dispositions" (140.5-6). The "pantechnicon" metaphor expresses the strife for power associated with economic progress among unrelated individuals, but the "mansion-house" (140.4) of the Sciences is the residence of Knowledge within a system, characterized by growth and development based on mutual understanding and assistance.

The metaphors of "pantechnicon" and "mansion-house" in Discourse V are central to all the discourses: the comparisons throughout the discourses can be thought of as being drawn together into these two contrasting metaphors that depict, on the one hand the kind of

1 A. Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 222.

2 Ibid., pp. 223 - 224.
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university Newman was contending against in his lectures (the pantechnicon), and on the other, his own Oxford ideal (the Mansion-house) which he hoped to see re-established in Dublin.

140.14-18 "It seems,...that the human mind is ever seeking to systematise its knowledge...a science comprehensive of all sciences."
(See above Discourse IV, 126.23-24 for the reference to "Architectonic Science or Philosophy," the legitimate "science comprehensive of all sciences" (140.17-18).

140.26-29 "We see the intellect...moving straight against its own conceits and falsities...at once." It is the nature of the human mind to systematize. Regardless of the "conceits and falsities" of the theory "that Liberal Education...should be a mere fortuitous heap of acquisitions and accomplishments" (141.6-8), "nature is too strong for art. She bursts violently and dangerously through the artificial trammels laid upon her, and exercises her just rights wrongly, since she cannot rightly" (141.9-12). Newman is saying that the theory behind the pantechnicon university is contrary to the operation of the human mind which is ever trying "to find a science comprehensive of all sciences" (140.17-18), but failing to do so "starts with whatever knowledge or science it happens to have, and makes that knowledge serve as a rule or measure of the universe...." (140.19-22). As a result, in the pantechnicon university, "usurpers and tyrants [subjects that take over the territory of other subjects] are the successors to legitimate rulers
sent into exile" (141.12-14); that is, to that "science of sciences" (169.16), Newman calls "Philosophy".

141.20-21 "From the many voices crying 'Order' and 'Silence,' noise and tumult follow" depicts the chaos that results from assigning to "this or that science" (141.15) a role "beyond its powers" (141.16), that of being "a science comprehensive of all sciences" (140.17-18).

141.25 - 142.2 "...the works of the age are not the development of definite principle...obliged to sacrifice a good deal to everyone else." The consequence of not maintaining the unity of knowledge, according to Newman, is that "the works of the age" (141.25-26) are not based on principles from which they can grow and develop, but rather are organized by boards and committees of men motivated by the economic principles of compromise and gain. The result is that whatever they design, specifically an educational system, is merely "an accumulation from without, not the growth of a principle from within" (142.16-18).

142.21 "Motley's the only wear" is a reference to the fool's or court jester's coat of many colours made by Jacques in Shakespeare's As You Like It (II.VII.34). The analogy between the fool's coat of many colours and the notion of a University as a sort of bazaar or hotel emphasizes the absurdity of a curriculum that is "showy, self-sufficient, and changeable" (142.20-21).

142.21-28 "The majestic vision of the Middle Age...cannot make
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out why." The "philosophical comprehensiveness" and "orderly expansiveness" of the universities in the Middle Ages is in contrast with the bazaar university Newman has been describing—a type of institution that has lost "the idea of unity" (142.29).

143.3 "...corona operis,..." means literally "the top or crown of the work," which in this context is a crown in the sense of an unnecessary addition or ornament that can be discarded without impairing the meaning of what remains; whereas the head is that which unifies and directs and therefore gives life and meaning to the whole.

143.4-8 "They seem...disadvantages" The mutilated insects and the empty shells of insects "eaten out by parasitical enemies" (143.6-7) are a clear metaphorical introduction to the following sentences that portray a university of buildings, lectures, and people that is but an empty shell, a dead and mutilated "specimen[s] of animated nature" (143.5) rather than a living entity infused with "an intellectual principle, expanding into a consistent harmonious whole" (143.16-17). Newman here anticipates the "form" and "soul" themes to come.

143.8-19 "They think...as the Reviewer says,...a University...lose time in such reveries." The "Reviewer" is Lord Macaulay the author of the article, previously referred to (136.28-137.9) in the Edinburgh Review, LXXVI (February, 1826); 319 in which Macaulay describes some practical details about the shell construction
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of London University. However, a collection of buildings, Newman maintains, requires a form, an intellectual principle to give it life or as Copleston says a "character" that can properly be said to belong to it" (See above, 136.18-23). Buildings, staff, and lecture-rooms require "an intellectual principle, expanding into a consistent harmonious whole, in short, Mind,..." in order to be a University. When a University does have an intellectual principle to give it unity and character as an harmonious whole, it is said to possess what Newman refers to as a "genius loci" (See Discourse VII, 235.18-25).

143.20 - 145.2 "Our way,...is very different...materials on which it is impressed." These paragraphs, by emphasizing the contrast with the "pantechnicon" (139.24) university, give the essence of Newman's idea of a university. He makes clear that his idea of education is "founded in man's nature and the necessity of things" (143.21-22). Newman is referring here to the fact he has previously stressed; namely, that it is of the nature of man's mind to systematize his knowledge, and therefore to make use of the faculty he calls "an intellectual grasp of things" (143.28-29) or "Philosophy" (144.2). Newman defines "Science," an exercise of the faculty of "Philosophy," as "knowledge which has undergone a process of intellectual digestion. It is the grasp of many things brought together in one" (144.5-7). Such an intellectual grasp of the many as one, Newman terms "a science of sciences" (144.14-15). The possibility of acquiring the "science of sciences" is "the true scope of
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...a University" (144.15-16)--a possibility that can only be achieved if there is "order and precedence and harmony in the branches of knowledge" (144.17-19). That order and harmony is the result when "we form and fix the sciences in a circle and system, and give them a centre and an aim" (144.22-24). Thus is prevented the chaos that would be the result of allowing the sciences to "wander up and down in a sort of helpless confusion" (144.24-25). The chaos theme is sounded effectively here in the implied metaphor of the sciences as compared to persons who have no place, no home, and as well, no purpose in a larger system beyond their own aims: hence they wander in "helpless confusion." The theme of chaos is a continuation of the warning sounded in the "pantechnicon" 139.20 metaphor, and the "usurpers and tyrants" metaphor, (141.12-24). The "centre and an aim" (144.24) is, in Newman's use of "scholastic language," (144.26) "a form" (144.28): in other words, a living principle that gives purpose, direction, and individuality to "the various pursuits and objects on which the intellect is employed" (144.26-28). That form or soul with regard to the "circle and system" (144.23) of the sciences seems to be, from Newman's context, "the grasp of many things brought together in one" (144.6-7); that is, the "Science of Sciences", or "Philosophy."

There is much effective writing in these paragraphs in which Newman brings together his themes and metaphors so very succinctly, but he never attains a better defeat of his opponents than in 144.9-14 when...
he states that his thinking is in keeping with the "scientific genius" (144.13) of the age when he takes further its inductive process, on which it prides itself, by viewing the particular sciences "as one and giving them an idea" (144.11). He is really using the inductive method of the experimental sciences in order to counter his opponents' argument of the autonomy of the individual sciences. Taking the sciences all together and giving them an idea, a form that Newman terms "a science of sciences" (144.14-15) is, according to Newman, "but an extension and perfection, in an age which prides itself upon its scientific genius, of that very process by which science exists at all" (144.11-14).

144.26 - 145.2 "...we give...the peculiarity of a form, that it gathers up in one, and draws off from everything else, the materials on which it is impressed." Newman reiterates his definition of "form" in 148.14-16. Maritain expresses Aristotle's definition of "form" as follows: "...there exists in everything an intelligible and immaterial element, which Aristotle calls 'form,' in virtue of which it possesses a specific nature or essence. But this principle is not separate from things; it inheres in them as one of the factors which constitute their substance." ¹ In this sense "Philosophy" (144.2) or "a science of sciences" (144.14-15) is the "form" of Liberal Knowledge. It

¹ J. Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 63.
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is only after one has acquired "a science of sciences" (144.14-15), which seems to correspond in Newman's thought to an intellectual habit, that one is said to have the mental cultivation and enlargement that is the fruit of a Liberal Education. In order to acquire "Philosophy" (144.2) or "a science of sciences" (144.14-15) the mind must have available to its comprehension Truth in its various aspects. Newman has been arguing in Discourses I to V "that all knowledge is one, that each division of it can only be studied fully in relation to the others, and that therefore the omission of theology from any curriculum falsifies the content of the other subjects contained in it." ¹ As Newman explained in Discourse I: "All that exists, as contemplated by the human mind, forms one large system or complex fact, and this of course resolves itself into an indefinite number of particular facts, which, as being portions of a whole, have countless relations of every kind, one towards another." (Discourse I, p. 69). The mind's assimilation of the relationships between the sciences would seem to be an essential aspect of acquiring "a science of sciences" (144.14-15), which in turn effects in the mind the intellectual cultivation and enlargement that Newman describes as: "...the action of a formative power, reducing to order and meaning the matter of our acquirements; it is a making the objects of our knowledge subjectively our own, or, to use a familiar word, it is

¹ Fergal McGrath, *Newman's University*, pp. 163-164.
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a digestion of what we receive, into the substance of our previous state of thought;" (Discourse VII, p. 213). It is the process of assimilating the matter and form of particular sciences so thoroughly that one sees not only the boundary lines of the particular sciences studied, but also their relationship to that wider field of knowledge occupied by the other sciences, as well as the mind's relating knowledge to what it already knows that is the basis of the philosophical habit of mind Newman terms a Liberal Education.

145.14 - 148.13 "...we all understand... It was life, it is death." Newman cites "Worship," the essence of a religious ceremonial, as a familiar illustration of the scholastic term "form" 1 (144.28). All the various aspects of a religious ceremony—the participants, the music, the flowers, and the vestments—are all "blended together indivisibly, and sealed with the image of unity, by reason of the one idea of worship,... Take away that idea, and...the whole pageant becomes a mummer" (146.21-26). By an implied analogy, a similar fate awaits the education given in a university whose professors and students pursue their respective subjects without reference to the one idea or the "form" of education which gives "life, and force, and an

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harmonious understanding, and an individuality to many things at once,..." (147.9-11). Just as worship, "the lifting up of the heart to God, is the living principle [the form] of this solemnity" (147.14-15); so the mind's acquiring "Philosophy" (144.2) or "a science of sciences" (144.14-15) is the living principle or form of a university education. Without the "form" in a religious ceremony, an education, or a human frame there is no unity, only "an aggregate of matter, accidentally holding together, soon to be dissolved. ...It was life, it is death" (148.9-13). Now Newman brings the chaos-destruction theme to an emphatic conclusion: Not only is there chaos in the university without the living principle, the form of education, which is "a science of sciences" (144.14-15) or "Philosophy" (144.2); but, just as the animal frame becomes a corpse when its living principle is no longer present, the lack of a living principle in education sounds the death knell for Knowledge, for Truth in all its aspects.

146.14-16 "...the candles...'Apis Mater' (as the Church beautifully sings),...bee fashions." Newman's reference is to the "Exsultet," the blessing of the Paschal Candle in the Easter vigil ceremonies, usually sung by a Deacon. It is the pre-Vatican II version of the "Exsultet," remarkable for its lyric beauty and symbolism, that expresses the "Apis Mater" metaphor as follows: "...holy Church renders [sacrifice] to Thee [God the Father] by the hands of Thy ministers in the solemn offering of this wax candle, made out of the work of bees.
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...For it [the flame] is nourished by the melting wax, which the mother bee ["Apis Mater" 146.14-15] produced for the substance of this precious light."  

148.17 – 151.24 This section presents the important idea that what is superficially and abstractly similar may be essentially and concretely different. Newman expresses this foregoing idea by drawing an analogy between men and brute on the one hand and the two kinds of universities on the other. He states that superficially "a human skeleton may resemble that of some species of brutes, but the presence of the soul in man makes him differ from those animals, not in degree, but in kind" (148.24-27). Similarly, "two universities...may almost concur in the lecture-papers they put out and their prospectus for the year; that is, in their skeleton,...and yet, viewed as living and working institutions,...may be simply antagonistic" (151.18-24).

149.7-16 "...a doctrine laid down by the Angelical Doctor,...no action is indifferent; 2 ...they are not at all indifferent.

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2 According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, First Part of the Second Part, Q.18, Art 9. Obj: 3: "Therefore every word is either good or evil. For the same reason, every other act is either good or evil. Therefore no individual act is indifferent." Answer: "...every human act that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or evil." Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Vol. I, edited and annotated, with introduction by Anton C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1945), p. 329.
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as referrible to this or that whole,...as done by this or that person." The statement that no action is indifferent with reference to the individual person or to the whole of which it is a part is the answer to the main objection of Discourse V; that is, the "prevalent notion...that religious opinjon does not enter,...into the treatment of scientific or literary subjects" (135.1-4); similarly, "how [could] it matter to the pupil, who it was taught him such indifferent subjects as logic, antiquities, or poetry, so that they be taught him" (151.27-29). Newman's answer is in substance as follows: In the university, a living and working institution made particular as a body infused with a living principle "no subject of teaching is really indifferent in fact" (152.1-2); that is, in the concrete relationship of a curriculum, "because it takes a colour from the whole system to which it belongs, and has one character when received in that system and another viewed out of it" (152.2-5). Consequently, neither can a professor pursue his own subject with an absorption that denies its relationship to other subjects. As Newman explains, "according as a teacher is under the influence, or in the service of this system or that, so does the drift, or at least the practical effect of his teaching vary" (152.5-8). What Newman is implying from the context of this discourse is that according as a teacher possess or does not possess "a science of sciences" (144.14-15), according as he exercises the faculty of "Philosophy" (144.2) in viewing his own subject with relation to the other subjects in the circle of the science "so does the drift, or at least the practical effect of his
teaching vary" (152.7-8).

152.9-11 "Arcesilas...classics." The following are examples of the fact that although different teachers instruct in the same subject such as logic, with its fixed principles; or poetry, with its acknowledged masters, the practical effect of the teaching varies according as the teacher is under the influence of a particular system of thought. The teaching of logic by Arcesilas (315-241 B.C.) and by Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) respectively would vary in drift in that Arcesilas was a sceptic who denied that anything could be known for certain. Equally strong reasons could be adduced, according to Arcesilas, for either side of any question. His denial of the human intellect's ability to attain truth is reflected in his essential doctrines of the "epoche" or suspension of judgment and the "eulogon" or the reasonable as a criterion of choice; whereas, Aristotle's entire philosophy was based on the intellect's ability to attain certitude in knowledge. Logic for Arcesilas was the science of controversy. He would agree with the view that logic was one of the sciences in the threefold Stoic division of philosophy into logic, physics, and ethics; whereas for Aristotle and the later Peripatetics logic, rather than being a science in its own right, was the instrument of philosophy which

should be learned first since it taught the method to be observed if one is to acquire science; Consequently, the teaching of logic by Arcesilas and by Aristotle would differ in drift and practical effect.

Similarly, Aristotle would not teach poetry as would Plato in that the corporeal universe for Aristotle is the object not of mere opinion, which can be expressed only by myth and allegory, as it was for Plato; but is rather the object of scientific knowledge.

152.12 - 153.15 "...I am claiming for Theology...truth of every kind,...method of attaining it." This section is the most important in all the Discourses for explaining Newman's view of Theology in the University. These lines clarify the fact that Newman does not view the secular sciences from the point of view of Theology and thus he is not committing "the very error, in the instance of Theology, with which [he is] charging other sciences,...of committing against it." (152.23-26). In other words he does not consider Theology as a "science of sciences" (144.14-15); that is, "the grasp of many things brought together in one," (144.6-7). Thus Newman is not allowing Theology to


2 Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 63.
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usurp the territory of the other sciences. He states that he is "claiming for Theology nothing singular or special, or which is not partaken by other sciences in their measure" (152.12-14).

Newman clearly states that he does not consider Theology the "form" (144.28) 1 of the secular sciences; nor does he intend to convey the notion "that Theology stands to other knowledge as the soul to the body; or that other sciences are but its instruments and appendages,..." (152.19-21).

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1 "the form or soul." Newman's definition of "form" in Discourse V is as follows: "It is the peculiarity of a form, that it gathers up in one, and draws off from everything else, the materials in which it is impressed" (144.28-145.2). "[The form] stands towards the separate elements which it uses as the soul is to the body. It is the presence of the soul which gives unity to the various materials which make up the human frame" (147.18-22). (See St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Q. 76, Art. 1.). Aristotle's idea of form as explained by Maritain is as follows: The form is "an active principle, which is so to speak, the living idea or soul of the thing, and which determines the purely passive first matter, somewhat as the form imposed upon it by the sculptor determines the clay, constituting with it one single thing actually existent, one single corporeal substance which owes to it...its specific nature, and its existence, somewhat as the form imposed by the sculptor makes a statue what it is." (Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 124-125). Such is the accidental form which would correspond to the form of a university in its corporeal existence; however, the internal or substantial form of a liberal education becomes the living principle in the intellects of those who have received a liberal education. To this living principle Newman has given the name of "Philosophy" or the "science of sciences." Corresponding to the idea of form, this living principle is a formative power giving order, unity, meaning, and reality to the matter (knowledge) with which the intellect deals. The intellect's acquiring this living principle is the fruit of a Liberal Education, as Newman defines it. (See Discourse IX, 289.12-290.3).
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The idea that Theology was not the form of the other sciences was somewhat disconcerting to certain ecclesiastical members of the audience, who apparently had foremost in mind the relation of the university to the religious practice and moral training of the students. Dr. Moriarty, one of Newman's advocates in Ireland, wrote to Newman July 21, 1852 as follows: "'I thought that a University was charged with the morals as well as the mind of a youth'." 1 Newman's reply contained the statement: "'I do not think that a University has to do with morals'." 2 Newman states in the "Preface" to the Discourses that the University he envisages is "a University in its 'essence', and independently of its relation to the Church" ("Preface," p. V).

Newman wrote in his "Memorandum: the Catholic University" some years later about his connection with the University of Ireland as follows: "And again the Pope exhorts the Bishops to make 'divina nostra religio 'tamquam anima' totius litterarum institutionis' in the University; that is, 'the form'. 'Omnes disciplinae' are to go forward in the most 'strict league' with religion, that is, with the assumption of Catholic doctrine in their 'intrinsic' treatment: and the Professors are directly to mould 'totis viribus,' 'the youth to piety and virtue, and to ground them in literature and science in conformity

1 Fergal McGrath, Newman's University, p. 171.

2 Ibid., pp. 172-173.
with the Church's teaching.' I wrote on a different idea in my 'Discourses on University Education' in 1852, vid. especially the original 5th Discourse." ¹

The "different idea" Newman wrote about in Discourse V is that the aim of a university, in its essence, is the cultivation of the intellect. Although Newman emphasizes several times in the following discourses the idea that the cultivation of the intellect, the aim of the university, is distinct from the cultivation of virtue, the province of the Church, (See, for example, Discourse VI, 198.16-26), it is in Discourse V that he explains the intellectual basis for his view; namely, that Theology is not the form of the other sciences, but rather is one of the speculative sciences. As such, Theology does not rule and direct the other sciences in their own fields of knowledge. ² Newman states in Discourse V that "Theology is one branch of knowledge, and Secular Sciences are other branches. Theology...does not interfere with the real freedom of any secular science in its own particular department" (152.26-153.1). Therefore, in Newman's idea of a university, all disciplines do not "go forward in the most 'strict


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league' with religion, that is, with the assumption of Catholic doctrine in their 'intrinsic' treatment." Newman explains the autonomy of each science in Discourse V as follows: "...as all branches of knowledge are one whole, so, much more, is each particular branch a whole in itself" (155.16-18). Newman's idea that in a university, all the sciences should not be taught with the view of "Catholic doctrine in their 'intrinsic' treatment" differed from that of the Papal Rescripts sent to the Irish Bishops and differed from that of Archbishop Cullen as well as the Irish clergy. This difference, so clearly stated in Discourse V, may have constituted the major reason for the omission of Discourse V from subsequent editions after the first. It was not that Newman was retreating from his position on the place of Theology in the circle of sciences that caused him to omit Discourse V, but rather that he may have sought to avoid opposition until such time as his ideas were acceptable. (The Principle of Reserve is discussed in the Introduction to the Thesis). Discourses IX and X explain the relation of the university to religion and to the Church.

However, the omission of Discourse V in the 1859 and 1873 editions obscures Newman's "different idea"; with the result that, contemporary readers think Newman was advocating a University in which the secular sciences were "to go forward in the most 'strict league' with religion, ...;" whereas, Newman made a distinction between the teaching of theology as a speculative science (an essential part of
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liberal knowledge) and the fostering of the virtues which constitute religion in practice. 1 Newman wrote in the first draft of an "Introduction" originally intended to precede Discourse VI the following: "A University has no direct call to 'make' men Catholics or religious, for that is the previous and contemporaneous office of the Church" 2 As he emphasized in the same "Introduction," the end of a University is "'Knowledge,' in a large sense of the word, or cultivation of mind, as such." 3

In a second draft of the "Introduction" Newman dealt with the practice of religion as follows: "Morals, then, it [the University] contemplates only indirectly and in a general way,... For morals the Church employs Colleges, halls, Seminaries, Monasteries, etc., in the University." 4 Thus, although Newman differentiated the aim of a university and the aim of the Church; both aims, the cultivation of the intellect and the cultivation of virtue were to be united in the growth and development of one and the same individual person. In a sermon preached in the University Church, Dublin, 1856, Newman said this: "I

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1 Fergal McGrath, Newman's University, p. 166.
2 Ibid., p. 169.
3 Ibid., p. 169.
4 Ibid., p. 171.
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wish the intellect to range with the utmost freedom, and religion to enjoy an equal freedom, but what I am stipulating for is that they should be found in one and the same place, and exemplified in the same persons. ...I wish the same spots and the same individuals to be at once oracles of philosophy and shrines of devotion. ...I want the same roof to contain both the intellectual and moral discipline. ...I want the intellectual layman to be religious, and the devout ecclesiastic to be intellectual. ...and may [we] excel in intellect as we excel in virtue." 1 The essentials of Newman's idea of a university are expressed in the foregoing paragraph, but these ideas would not be clearly delineated until the end of the series of discourses. The original Discourse V is the hub of the discourses. It unites and at the same time shows the relationship between the two main ideas of the discourses: namely, the place of theology as one of the speculative sciences in the circle of knowledge and the essential aim of the university as the cultivation of the intellect.

153.26-29 "It would be plausible to call theology the 'external' form of the philosophical system,...vid. Bellarm. 'de Justif.,'...could not have been 'one' of them." By "external form" is

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...apparently meant the governing spirit, "as charity has been said to be of living faith" (153.27). Newman's reference is to the Disputationes de controversiæ Christianæ fidei, in four volumes, (1581-1593) by Robert Francis Cardinal Bellarmine, S.J. (1542-1621). ¹ "De Justificatione" is one of the treatises in Volume IV of the Disputationes, a work in which Bellarmine attempted to embrace the whole field of human knowledge and incorporate it into Theology. In so doing, the famous Roman Catholic controversialist and professor of Theology at the University of Louvain, was expressing the accepted view of the Church in his day concerning the relation of secular knowledge and Theology—a view echoed in the nineteenth century Papal Descripts to the Irish clergy concerning the University of Ireland; namely, that the whole of human knowledge should proceed "with the assumption of Catholic doctrine in [its] 'intrinsic' treatment" (See above, 152.12—153.15).

But Newman wrote on a different idea; namely, that Theology does not stand to the other sciences as the soul to the body (152.19-20). Newman objects that if Theology were called "the 'external' form of the philosophical system" (153.26-27), Theology then could not be one (153.29) of the sciences. Newman is determined to maintain "the internal

sympathy which exists between all branches of knowledge whatever" (153.3-4) and to point out "the danger resulting to knowledge itself by a disunion between" (153.4-6) the branches of knowledge. Therefore, if the unity of knowledge is to preserved Theology must be maintained in its place in the circle of sciences. Those who would remove Theology from its place among the sciences to make Theology "the 'external' form of the philosophical system" (153.26-27) are destroying the unity of knowledge just as are those who think to ignore theology altogether in the philosophical system.

153.18-19 "...one prevalent misconception..." is that the problem of religion in education can be solved by teaching only what is common to various religions--what Newman refers to as "general religion" (157.3) or "natural religion (157.3-4)." Newman terms the problem "another form of the fallacy which I have been exposing" (153.21-22) in that it is an aspect of considering the sciences as a heap of acquisitions (139.25-26) rather than integral sections of a circle and system, or to use Newman's analogy in Discourse V, as parts of a human frame, infused with the living principle of form or soul.

153.25 - 154.2 "As there are many...Religion should not be introduced...Education,...." One of the many Liberal thinkers was Lord
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Macaulay who could sincerely write in defense of London University 1 as
that university's principles were exactly his own; in particular, "the
exclusion of religion from what to him was an essentially nonreligious
activity,..." 2 In Macaulay's view, all that was required to remove
the cause of social disturbances and cure all moral aberrations was
sound state supported public education. Referring to the havoc wreaked
by mob riots, Macaulay asks in a speech on "Education," delivered to the
House of Commons, April 19, 1847: "Could such things have been done in
a country in which the mind of the labourer had been opened by education
in which he had been taught to find pleasure in the exercise of his
intellect,..." 3 Newman's argument against knowledge leading to
virtue will be found in the "Tamworth Reading Room" letters and
Discourse VI.

154.3-28 "...so there are many...compromise...just as much as
they suppose...hold in common. ...gain nothing by disputing...no
Religion at all." According to Lord Macaulay, Sir Thomas Acland (1809-

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1 See above the "London University," allegedly Macaulay's
article for the Edinburgh Review.

2 Thomas B. Macaulay, Thomas Babington Macaulay: Selected
Writings, ed. John Clive and Thomas Pinney (Chicago: University of

3 T. B. Macaulay, The Works of Lord Macaulay: Speeches, Poems,
and Miscellaneous Writings (London: Longmans, Green, and Company;
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1898), Secretary for the Home Department, during the debate about the appointment of professors to the Godless Colleges in Ireland "would merely have required the professors to declare their general belief in the divine authority of the Old and New Testaments." ¹ Macaulay's own opinion about religion and education is expressed in his comment that he agreed with the Lord of the Treasury's opposition to Acland's suggestion: The Lord of the Treasury "told us that it was quite unnecessary to institute an inquisition into the religious opinions of people whose business was merely to teach secular knowledge, and that it was absurd to imagine that any man of learning would disgrace and ruin himself by preaching infidelity from the Greek chair or Mathematical chair." ²

Discourse V is Newman's answer to "a prevalent notion [Macaulay's view is representative] just now, that religious opinion does not enter, as a matter of necessity, in any considerable measure, into the treatment of scientific or literary subjects" (135.1-4). Newman answers "that a positive disunion takes place between Theology and Secular Science, whenever they are not actually united. ...one science is ever pressing upon another, unless kept in check; and the


² Ibid., p. 166.
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only guarantee of Truth is the cultivation of them all" (136.1-15).
Also as far as the professor is concerned, Newman maintains that "no
subject of teaching is really indifferent in fact.... According then
as a teacher is under the influence; or in the service, of this system
or that, so does the drift, or at least the practical effect of his
teaching vary" (152.1-5).

Sir Thomas Acland's suggestion was a proposal of expedience
for the immediate solution to the problem of the denomination of the
professors in the Queen's Colleges, but it was Thomas Arnold of Rugby,
the leading Liberal educator in the early years of the nineteenth
century, who thought that the only means of dissolving the differences
between Christians and making Christian principles the basis of
political and social actions was the uniting of various forms of church
government and religious opinion in the National Church. Since religion
for Arnold was a matter of practice the aim of which was the instilling
of acceptable standards of conduct, differences in theory were merely
divisive factors to be obviated by general agreement on certain
essentials. Arnold writes in his Principles of Church Reform (1833) as
follows:

The real question is, not what
theoretical articles a man will or
will not subscribe to, but what
essential parts of Christian
worship he is unable to use. Now,
the addressing Christ in the
language of prayer and praise, is
an essential part of Christian
worship. Every Christian would feel his devotions incomplete, if this formed no part of them. This, therefore, cannot be sacrificed; but we are by no means bound to inquire, whether all who pray to Christ entertain exactly the same ideas of his nature. I believe that Arianism involves in it some very erroneous notions...; but if an Arian will join in our worship of Christ, and will call him Lord and God, there is neither wisdom nor charity in insisting that he explain what he means by these terms;...

"It seems to have been the boast hitherto of the several sects of Christians, to invent formulae both of worship and of creeds,... which should force a man to differ from them, however gladly he would have remained in their communion. ...may we think that the true problem to be solved in the composition of all articles and creeds and prayers for public use, is no other than this: how to frame them so as to provoke the least possible disagreement, without sacrificing, in our own practical worship, the expression of such feelings as are essential to our own edification. ...There is a choice between entire agreement with a very few, or general agreement with many, or agreement in some particular points with all." ¹

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Arnold's reduction of Christianity to a practical worship diluted enough to suit anyone and everyone provoked from Newman the incisive inquiry, "But is Dr. Arnold a Christian?" 1 Arnold's towering moral earnestness no doubt led him to consider himself the most exemplary of Christians, but when he published his "Principles of Church Reform" in 1833, he perhaps did not foresee himself as the exponent of the very liberal philosophy that made feasible the non-denominational education offered at the Queen's Colleges in 1852. Arnold had, nevertheless, uttered the philosophical cornerstone of mixed education when he wrote that he himself had one great principle: "to insist strongly on the differences between Christian and non-Christian, and to sink into nothing the differences between Christian and Christian." 2 This aim "to sink into nothing the differences between Christian and Christian" is exactly the credo of the Queen's Colleges. Newman's answer to this so-called "General Religion" is as follows: "...the same considerations which are decisive against the exclusion of Religion from Education, are decisive also against its generalization or mutilation,... General Religion is in fact no Religion at all" (154.23-28).

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155.6 - 156.25 "This is the answer...no part in it." Newman argues that General Religion is no religion at all in that "Catholics and Protestants, viewed as bodies, hold nothing in common in religion" (155.3-5). Applying a basic argument of the Discourses--"as all branches of knowledge are one whole, so much more, is each particular branch a whole in itself" (155.16-18)--Newman maintains that each religion is a whole in itself and "to teach half of any whole is really to teach no part of it" (155.19-20). Although it may seem that a particular tenet is held in common by different religions, actually a tenet belongs to the whole of Anglicanism or to the whole of Catholicism and has its meaning within the context of the whole body of doctrine of each religion respectively. Newman cites the Incarnation as an example of a doctrine that has one meaning within the context of Anglicanism and has further ramifications within the body of Catholic doctrine. Not to admit the doctrine in its full significance is to deal with only a half truth which, according to Newman, is no truth whatever.

157.8 - 158.9 "...to aim at establishing National Colleges...common doctrines...unity of idea." Newman points out that the expedient of establishing National Colleges on the basis of common doctrines is an absurdity in that doctrines are common only "as far as the words go, they are not the same as living and breathing facts," (157.10-12) in the minds of those who hold the entire doctrine of different religious
persuasions. (See the reference to the insect specimens in 143.4-8 and the skeletons of man and brute in the anatomical school 151.20-24).

Furthermore, Newman emphasizes, those who differ in religion differ in principle not in degree. He, therefore, disagrees with the viewpoint that those who differ in religion "hold what [another] hold[s], only not enough; and that [another who differs] is right as far as he goes" (157.26-27). But Newman states that "intellectual principles combine, not by a process of physical accumulation, but in unity of idea" (158.8-9). Thomas Arnold's objective of creating a National Church based on the "physical accumulation" (158.9) of a few opinions held in common is expressed in his "Principles of Church Reform" as follows: "Two individuals might possibly agree in three hundred articles of religion, but as they add to their own numbers, they must diminish that of their articles,..." 1 in order that there can be "agreement in some particular points with all" 2 under Arnold's giant umbrella called a National Church. But rather, Newman maintains that ideas grow and develop from correct premises to a "unity of idea" (158.9) to which the intellect can assent as a truth. Therefore, "a scheme of general education, which puts Religion more or less aside,

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1 Thomas Arnold, "Principles of Church Reform," Miscellaneous Works, p. 287.

2 Ibid., p. 286.
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does 'ipso facto' part company with Religion" (157.28-158.2). The Liberal school of thought which argues that the only fault of such a scheme "is the accident that it is not so religious as it might be" (158.3-4) does "not admit that half a truth is an error, and nine-tenths of a truth no better" (158.5-6). Thus a scheme of National Colleges based on the principle of common doctrines does really "part company with Religion" (158.1-2). As a result, such a scheme lacks the "unity of idea" (158.9) that is truth and therefore does not have the comprehensive view that is Newman's requisite for a liberal education.

The foregoing section 153.15 to 158.9 is the only section in the Discourses in which Newman's central argument for the unity of knowledge as the basis of a liberal education is brought to bear with clarity and emphasis on the current problem of mixed or general education in the Queen's Colleges of Ireland.

158.16 "However, there is no misconception...supported by facts" Newman conciliates opposition in his audience by conceding that "in a certain sense what they say is true and is supported by facts" (153.15-16). The allaying of opposition at this point is rhetorically opportune in that the way is now clear for a definite restatement at the end of the discourse of the principles Newman had been advocating throughout.

158.16 - 165.21 "It is true too,...they cannot be reformed."
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The argument is this section is that there are exceptions to the rule where the individual is concerned, but not in the case of "bodies, institutions, and systems of which he is the specimen" (165.19-20). Newman states that "it is not safe to argue from individuals to institutions" (158.25-26), nor to fancy that "men would be better than their systems" (164.16-17). Concerning "bodies of men, political or religious,...if we would be safe, we must look to their principles, not to this or that individual, whom they can put forward for an occasion. Half the evil that happens in public affairs arises from the mistake of measuring parties, not by their history and by their position, but by their accidental manifestations of the moment, the place, or the person" (162.20-29). Newman argues that it is possible that individual Catholic youths could be educated in Mixed Colleges, such as the Queen's Colleges, "and yet may come out of them as good Catholics as they went in" (158.18-19). Then too, "Protestants are to be found who, as far as they profess Catholic doctrine, do truly hold it, in the same sense as that in which a Catholic holds it" (158.20-23); but, "the case of individuals is one thing, of bodies or institutions another" (158.24-25).

Throughout Discourses II to V Newman has been measuring Mixed Education by its historical origin in the philosophy of the French philosophers as that philosophy found expression in the Liberal philosophy of such men as Lord Thomas B. Macaulay, Thomas Arnold, and Lord Brougham, the principal advocates of London University. Newman has
been drawing forth their educational principles with particular reference to their position on religion in the university. Newman, it would seem, considers the Irish in danger of judging the Queen's Colleges, "not by their history and by their position, but by the accidental manifestations of the moment,..." (162.27-29). Bishop Murray and his followers who were in favour of Peel's Queen's Colleges as a practical means of solving the problem of higher education for Catholics in Ireland and the majority in Newman's audience who saw little need for the kind of university Newman was advocating had in common little if any understanding of the principles, the history, the real position of the Queen's Colleges.

159.6 - 160.8 "Thus one school or party comes out of another;...what it has merely inherited." The references in this section serve to illustrate the idea that during the course of his progress or development an individual can show himself an exception to the general trend or principles of his group.

159.9 "...and good comes from Nazareth." The reference is to Christ as a Nazarene: "And Nathanael said to him, 'Can anything good come out of Nazareth?' Philip said to him, 'Come and See!'" St. John 1:46.

159.10-20 "...distinct as orthodoxy is from heresy,...though ideas are individual." The names in these lines associated with the Early Church illustrate the idea that "the most Catholic Fathers and the worst of heresiarchs belong to the same teaching, or the same
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ecclesiastical party" (159.11-13).

159.13 "St. Chrysostom...Diodorus and Theodore." St. John Chrysostom (c.347-407) (See above, Discourse IV, 121.29-122.3) was Bishop of Constantinople and a Doctor of the Church who studied theology at Antioch under Diodorus [Diodore] (d.c. 390), Bishop of Tarsus. A fellow pupil was Theodore of Mopsuestia (c.350-428) who was called "...the father of Nestorianism. Diodore was its grandfather." 1 Newman writes of Chrysostom and the heterodox Diodorus and Theodore as follows:

"As to Chrysostom, not only was he in close relations with the once semi-Arian Cathedra of Antioch,..., but as his writings otherwise show, he came under the teaching of the celebrated Antiochene School, celebrated, that is at once for its method of Scripture criticism, and (orthodox as it was itself) for the successive outbreaks of heresy among its members,.... The famous Theodore, and Diodorus, of the same school, who, though not heretics themselves, have a bad name in the Church, were Diodorus the master, and Theodore the fellow-pupil, of St. Chrysostom." 2

In the Christological controversies, the Antiochene School emphasized the humanity of Christ, with a tendency towards the belief of


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a loose union of the Divine and human natures in Christ; consequently, Newman's term of heterodox for Diodorus and Theodore refers to the fact that some of their doctrines were accepted and some were not; whereas, St. Chrysostom was accounted the orthodox theologian of the Antiochene School.

159.15-17 "Eutyches, Dioscorus,...St. Cyril of Alexandria."

Eutyches (c.378-454) was a heresiarch of the Alexandrian School, who emphasized the Divinity of Christ in that he declared Christ had only one nature, His humanity having been absorbed by His Divinity. Eutyches denied that the manhood of Christ was consubstantial with ours, a view which went far towards rendering our redemption through Him impossible. In other words, Eutyches maintained that there were two natures before, but only one, the Divine, after the Union in the Incarnate Christ. At the Council of Chalcedon in 451 he was deposed from his position as archimandrite of a large monastery at Constantinople and exiled.

Dioscorus (d.454) succeeded St. Cyril as Patriarch of Alexandria in 444, but when Eutyches began to attract attention with his Christological doctrines, Dioscorus gave him his support; consequently, when Eutychianism was condemned at the Council of Chalcedon in 451,

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Dioscorus was deposed, excommunicated, and banished by the civil authorities. 1

St. Cyril (d. 444) was Patriarch of Alexandria and contender against the Nestorian heresy. He was the most brilliant representative of the Alexandrian theological tradition. He put into systematic form the classical Greek doctrines of the Trinity and the Person of Christ. His writings are marked by precision in exposition, accuracy in thought, and skill in reasoning, though they lack elegance in style. 2

Newman is giving a further illustration of his rhetorical point that truth may survive and even flourish in the company of error when he notes that Eutyches, Dioscorus, and Cyril all belonged to the Alexandrian tradition, but the former two were considered heresiarchs; whereas Cyril was that school's most illustrious theologian.

159.23-25 "Thus Aristotle...Peter Abelard." Although Aristotle was Plato's disciple for twenty years, he became a formidable critic of Plato's idealism, which he refuted so powerfully that he effectively demolished a system which places the substance of things outside themselves. In so doing, Aristotle definitively secured the

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1 J. G. Davies, The Early Christian Church, p. 240.

2 Ibid., p. 222.
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attainment of reality by the human intellect and thus began the body of
universal human philosophy. 1 The "Master of Sentences" Peter Lombard
(d.1160) was author of the Book of Sentences, which served as a learned
work to all the students in Theology down to the sixteenth century. He
was a pupil of Peter Abelard (1079-1142), who was condemned at the
Council of Sens in 1140. 2 These references illustrate the idea that
"some of the greatest names in many various departments of excellence...
have come out of schools of a very different character from their
own" (159.20-23).

159.27 - 160.8 "...the earlier musical compositions...what it
has merely inherited." Beethoven in music and Sir Robert Peel in
politics are developments that proceeded by "unlearning their first
education" (160.3-4).

159.26 - 160.1 "I have read...Beethoven...on the type of
Hayden...his own." Ludwig Van Beethoven (1770-1827) modelled his early
compositions on the happy melodies of Franz Joseph Hayden (1732-1809),
with whom Beethoven had studied harmony. Although Beethoven's First
Symphony (1800) is reminiscent of Hayden, there are decided touches of
originality and independence in his aim to express the joys and sorrows

1 Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, trans. E. I.

2 J. H. Newman, L'Idée D'Université, traduction de Edmond
Robillard et Maurice Labelle (Les Éditions Desclee de Brouwer, 1968),
p. 155.
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of humanity by his own variations and innovations in form. With the Third Symphony (1804), Beethoven had finished his apprenticeship. From that time he was his own master. 2

160.1-8 "The case...lamented Sir Robert Peel, (1788-1850)...merely inherited." Newman refers to the "lamented Sir Robert Peel" (recently deceased) as a politician who was but unlearning his first education from 1828 when he made the about-face stand in support of Catholic Emancipation until 1845 when he authorized the establishment of the Queen's Colleges in Ireland. These incidents, in Newman's view, indicate a growing commitment to liberalism as being more congenial to Peel's mind than the High Anglicanism that was his inherited view in his early years. 3

All these examples from St. Chrysostom to Sir Robert Peel (159.13-160.8) are rhetorical means of anticipating an objection Newman senses in his audience; namely, that surely some good education could

1 Sigmund Spaeth, Great Symphonies (New York: Garden City Publishing Co., Inc., 1936), pp. 61-77.


result and has resulted from mixed education. Implicitly Newman's answer is that in exceptional cases the development, for good or ill, is in a different direction and of a contrary character from the school of its origin, but these are the exceptions. Newman observes that "half the evil that happens in public affairs arises from the mistake of measuring parties, not by their history,...but by their accidental manifestation of the moment, the place, the person" (162.25-29). Newman is implying that the problem of mixed education should not be determined on the accidental exceptions but on the history of the movement and its principles: It is the critical revelation of the history and principles basic to the theory of mixed education that Newman has been attempting throughout Discourses II to V.

162.29 - 163.14 "Who would say,...the Evangelical Church of Prussia...an episcopal see at Jerusalem,...a religious aspect." Newman writes in his Apologia as follows: "...it had long been a desire with the Prussian Court to introduce Episcopacy into the new Evangelical Religion, which was intended in that country to embrace both the Lutheran and Calvinistic bodies. ...[Even though as Newman states the Prussian Church had no "real affinities to Catholicism" (163.2), it wanted to establish a hierarchy in Jerusalem] by appointing and consecrating a Bishop for Jerusalem. Jerusalem, it would seem, was considered a safe place for the experiment. ...if it succeeded, it gave
Protestantism a 'status' in the East,...  

Baron C. J. Bunsen (1791-1860), the special envoy to England of Frederick William IV, was the Prussian supporter of the plan. "It was strongly supported in England by the future Lord Shaftesbury and the Evangelicals, who saw it as countering the Roman tendencies of the Oxford Movement. It received the support of Palmerston; of Archbishop Howley of Canterbury and Bishop Blomfield of London; and of liberals like Thomas Arnold, who [with his idea of "'common doctrines'" (163.7)] hailed the plan as an endorsement of his own ideas for church reform."  

The Jerusalem Bishopric, "the third blow, which finally shattered [Newman's] faith in the Anglican Church,"  is cited here by Newman as an instance of the folly of not measuring parties by their history and by their principles and consequently of attempting to join two religious bodies as unlike as the Prussian Evangelical Church and the Church of England in a common ecclesiastical project—the establishment of a common bishopric. As well as being a logical absurdity, the project proved to be eventually an historical failure: The plan, which had  


2 Ibid., "Note," p. 549.  

3 Ibid., p. 133.
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become law by an Act of Parliament, October 5, 1841, was abandoned in
1886 when the King of Prussia, in his turn, failed to appoint a bishop to
fill the see.

By analogy, the attempt to found an educational institution
(the Queen's Colleges) on the basis of political expediency and "'common
doctrines'" (163.7) and call the process mixed education is, in Newman's
view, similarly doomed to eventual failure. Mixed education, which
necessitates the union of two such dissimilar philosophies as
Liberalism and Catholicism, is, like the Jerusalem Bishopric, a logical
absurdity. Newman comments that men "may be very little aware themselves
now far they are removed from Catholicism;...they may admire its
doctrines, they may think it uncharitable in us not to meet them half-
way. All the while, they may have nothing whatever of that form, idea,
type of Catholicism.... Such are the liberal philosophers and writers,
who are considered by the multitude to be one with me, when alas! they
have neither part nor lot with the Catholic Church" (163.26-164.9).
Thus the mixed education project would, in Newman's view, be as
unsuccessful as the attempt to unite the Prussian and Anglican Churches
in the common ecclesiastical project of the Jerusalem Bishopric.

164.14-17 "This is why...better than their systems." Newman
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refers to the surprise that greeted "the late outburst against" ¹ (164.15-16) the Catholic community as an illustration of the fact that the multitude little understand that there are real differences between liberal-Protestantism and Catholicism, nor do they seem aware that individuals' opposition, particularly in a crisis, is in accord with their own deeply held principles regardless of superficial agreement in times of quiet. "The late outburst" (164.15) was the expression of the latent fires of prejudice smouldering deeply beneath the banked coals of religious strife in the three centuries after the Reformation.

Apparently, there was needed but the spark of Cardinal Wiseman's 1850 proclamation of the restoration of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in England to fan the coals into a raging inferno of fear and hate sending forth burning embers of "Papal Aggression" crackling over the whole of English society.

¹64.17-25 "This why...in times past and present,...
Pearson, or Bull, or Beveridge,...the most Catholic of their doctrines are not Catholic in them." The "Times past" (164.16) refers to the age of Pearson, Bull, and Beveridge. The "times...present" (164.16) is a

¹ In his Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1899), pp. 76-77, Newman vividly describes the gathering momentum of Anti-Catholic feeling as a result of Dr. Wiseman's proclamation. These lectures were a series delivered by Newman to the members of the London Oratory in 1851 examining the phenomenon of Protestant prejudice towards the Catholic community.
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reference to Newman's close associates in the Oxford Movement who remained in the Anglican Church; namely, John Keble (1792-1866), "a true child of the Caroline Divines and disciple of Hooker"; Richard Hurrell Froude (1803-1836); and Edward Bouverie Pusey (1800-1882). All three of the "times past" (164.18) names have been annotated in Discourse I: John Pearson (1613-1686) (See above, I, 17.8); George Bull (1634-1710) (See above, I, 17.5-7); William Beveridge (1637-1708) (See above, I, 17.9). Newman grants that the Established Church and the universities of the nation "do but oppose themselves to sectarianism, free-thinking, infidelity, and lawlessness. They are her [the Catholic Church's] natural, though they may be her covert, allies... To the divines, to whom they have given birth, our country is indebted for Apologies in behalf of various of the great doctrines of the faith: to Bull for a defence of the Creed of Nicaea,...; to Pearson for a powerful argument in behalf of the Apostolical origin of Episcopacy,..."

Yet Newman's view is that such learned men in the Anglican Establishment

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as the Caroline Divines and their successors "seem to come nearest to us [and yet] such men are formed on a different type from the Catholic, and the most Catholic of their doctrines are not Catholic in them" (164.20-25). For example, The Caroline Divines aimed at an Anglicanism that would be a Via Media between the extremes of the Roman Church with its accretions of the Middle Ages and the Calvinists and Lutherans,—who had separated from Catholic tradition and had magnified certain doctrines out of all proportion."¹ Further more, the Caroline Divines attempted "to recover the simplicity and purity of primitive Christianity".² Newman concludes that "in vain are the most ecclesiastical thoughts,...the most fraternal sentiments, if they are not an integral part of that intellectual and moral form, which is ultimately from divine grace, and of which faith, not carnal wisdom, is the characteristic" (164.25-165.2).

"The sentiments of the patrons of a divorce between Religious and Secular Knowledge" (136.16-18) are "that religious opinion does not enter, as a matter of necessity in any considerable measure, into the treatment of scientific or literary subjects" (135.1-4). The bases of this view are principally two: first, there is a misconception


² Ibid., p. 234.
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about the nature of knowledge or philosophy. After outlining several examples, Newman concludes that the practise of surgery, or the learning of a language or a skill such as dancing are not knowledge, but grave, in the case of surgery, practical matters, and as such have no necessary connection with Religious Knowledge.

Secondly, there is a misconception in the minds of his opponents about the nature of a university: "They consider it a sort of bazaar, or pantechnicon, in which wares of all kinds are heaped together for sale in stalls independent of each other; ...or an hotel or lodging house, where all professions and classes are at liberty to congregate,..." (139.24-29). Whereas, Newman, in a variation on his circle of sciences metaphor, states that a university rightly viewed "is the home, it is the mansion-house, of the goodly family of the Sciences, sisters all, and sisterly in their mutual dispositions" (140.4-6).

Newman's answer to the two foregoing misconceptions is that a university is not primarily concerned with the development of practical skills, nor is it a mere meeting place of different sciences, rather its true scope is the development of the faculty of an intellectual grasp of things (143.28-29). "We form and fix the Sciences in a circle and system, and give them a centre and an aim.... ...we give the various pursuits and objects, on which the intellect is employed, a 'form';" (144.22-28). Since knowledge is a unity, "no
subject of teaching is really indifferent in fact,...because it takes a colour from the whole system to which it belongs,.... According then as a teacher is under the influence, or in the service of this system or that, so does the drift, or at least the practical effect of his teaching vary." (152.1-8).

Newman states in Discourse V a very important aspect about Theology that he does not clarify elsewhere in the Discourses: Theology does not "stand to other knowledge as the soul to the body; or that other sciences are but its instruments and appendages,.... This would be, I conceive, to commit the very error, in the instance of Theology, which I am charging other sciences,...of committing against it... Theology is one branch of knowledge, and Secular Sciences are other branches. Theology is the highest indeed, and widest, but it does not interfere with the real freedom of any secular science in its own particular department" (152.19-153.1). In the foregoing insight Newman was ahead of his contemporary ecclesiastics of the mid-nineteenth century.

In the second part of Discourse V Newman discusses a compromise on the Mixed Education issue; that is, the introduction of "a certain portion, and nothing beyond it; and by a certain portion they mean just as much as they suppose Catholics and Protestants to hold in common." (154.5-9). Newman's answer is that "General Religion is in fact no Religion at all" (154.27-28). Why? "As all branches of knowledge are one whole, so, much more, is each particular branch a
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whole in itself; ... to teach half of any whole is really to teach no part of it" (155.16-20).
JOHN HENRY NEWMAN,

DISCOURSES ON THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF UNIVERSITY EDUCATION, 1852,

INTRODUCTION AND ANNOTATION

VOLUME II

by

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ANNOTATION OF THE DISCOURSES

Chapter XII

DISCOURSE VI. PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE ITS OWN END

Discourse VI is the first of a series of five discourses written in the summer and autumn of 1852, but not delivered as lectures to a Dublin audience as were the first five. Discourses VI, VII, and VIII concern Liberal Knowledge, that culture of the intellect which is the primary concern of the university.

Newman wrote the following introduction to Discourse VI, although he later instructed the printer not to include it. The Introduction, the first of three versions, may have been written in response to criticism of Newman’s view, expressed in Discourse V, concerning the relation of Theology to Secular Knowledge, and his evident lack of emphasis on the question of the university’s role in the moral improvement of its students.

INTRODUCTION

As misconception may arise with regard to some of the points treated of in the following pages, in consequence of the impossibility of introducing at once all the safeguards and explanations which they would respectively require, the Author would observe,
1. That he does not profess to treat here of the 'indirect effects' of University education.
2. These are religious.
3. He proposes to treat of them in their place.
4. But he is speaking here of the direct end of a University, [as distinct from the Church].
5. This end is 'Knowledge', in a large sense of the word, or cultivation of mind, as such.
6. The direct end of a University is Knowledge, in the same way, that the direct end of Trade is wealth.
7. As men may be religious without wealth, so they may be religious without knowledge.
8. As wealth does not make men religious, neither does knowledge.
9. As an hospital, as such, does not make men religious, neither does a University, as such.
10. Knowledge, and a University, the seat of knowledge, are goods or not goods according to their use.
11. A University is not 'ipso facto' a Church Institution, and a good, even though it teaches Catholic Theology, as the Spanish Inquisition was an Institution of the State, not of the Church, yet had Catholic theologians at its head.
12. A University has no direct call to 'make' men Catholics or religious, for that is the previous and contemporaneous office of the Church.
13. Men are Catholics 'before' they are students of a University.
14. As the Church uses hospitals religiously, so she uses Universities, viz. that, having given her children faith, she may add mental culture.
15. As in Trades, in Almshouses, and in hospitals, she aims, not simply at wealth, or at temporal welfare, or at bodily health, but at the wealth of an immortal being, the temporal welfare of an immortal being, the bodily health of an immortal being, so in and by a University, she contemplates, not simply mental culture, which is the object of a University, but the mental culture of an immortal being.
16. While she uses a University for knowledge, on the other hand, to secure its religious character and for the morals of its members, she has ever adopted together with it, and within its precincts, Societies, [Seminaries], Halls, Colleges and Monastic Establishments.¹

The foregoing Introduction makes clear that the direct end of a University, as distinct from the Church, is knowledge, in a large sense of the word, or cultivation of mind, as such. The religious character and morals of the university members will be secured in

¹ Quoted in Fergal McGrath, Newman's University: Idea and Reality, pp. 169-170.
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Seminaries, Halls, and Colleges, within the university's precincts.

The particular province of Discourse VI is the defining of Liberal or Philosophical knowledge as that knowledge resulting from "an intellectual grasp of things" (143.28-29) or "Philosophy" (144.2). Such resulting knowledge Newman terms "Science" (144.2) which he defines as "knowledge which has undergone a process of intellectual digestion. It is the grasp of many things brought together in one" (144.5-7). That the intellectual grasp of the many in one, a good in itself, is worthy of pursuit for its own end or purpose is the viewpoint that Newman proves in Discourse VI.

167.1 - 168.26 "It must not be supposed...but of our poverty." This paragraph, omitted in the 1873 edition, relates the "organic theme" of Discourse V to Discourse VI where the theme is developed in the "tree metaphor" of the sciences as "various branches of knowledge" (167.2-4). See above 145.14 - 148.13. In Discourse V Newman used the analogy of the human frame infused with the living principle of "form" or soul compared to the university infused with the "form" of an idea: that of educating from the viewpoint of a "science of sciences" (144.14-15).

The opening paragraphs is also a summary of some of the main ideas stated previously. The various sciences that occupy the field of knowledge converge to a philosophical whole both from the active sympathy that exists between them and the nature of the human mind to systematise the resource of beings, who know for the most part, not by intuition, but by reasoning (168.20-22).
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168.22-26 "...that large philosophical survey of things, which I have set down as the scope of University Education, is necessary to us, as well as beautiful, and a monument, not only of our power but of our poverty;" that is, a monument of our intellectual power to systematise, to reason to "that large philosophical survey of things" (168.22-23), as well as a monument of our poverty in not grasping the whole by intuition, but in proceeding by means of a series of partial views to the "master view of things" (169.7). Also, see text, 171.27 - 172.3.

169.6-7 "...how are we the better for this master view of things,..." is the question Newman will specifically answer in Discourses VI and VII.

169.16-22 "...what is the Art of this science of sciences? What is the fruit of such a philosophy? ...what are we proposing to effect, what inducements do we hold out to the Catholic community, when we set about the enterprise of founding a University?" These queries serve the rhetorical purpose of formulating the questions now in the minds of the audience as well as indicating that the following Discourses will seek to answer questions: what is the end of philosophical knowledge and why should "such a philosophy" (169.17) be the scope of the university proposed to the Catholic community of Dublin in 1852.

169.23 - 170.9 "This is...my conclusion" is an omitted paragraph that elaborates on the necessity for an answer to the questions
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in the foregoing paragraph.

170.10 Previous to this point, the material of the two editions—1853 and 1873—differed, with the exception of the paragraph 168.7—169.22. Newman added five paragraphs at the beginning of what is Discourse V in the 1873 edition in order, perhaps as he thought, to compensate for the omission of the original Discourse V and to form a bridge between the Discourses I to IV and V to IX, in the 1873 edition.

The following are two important points made in these paragraphs, from the 1873 edition, which do not take the place of the Discourse V in the 1853 edition, but they do elaborate on the ideas of that discourse: The first point is a comparison. Newman is commenting on his unity-of-knowledge theme that was his argument for the necessity of Theology in the University curriculum: "There is no science but tells a different tale, when received as a portion of a whole..." (75.22–24). Then Newman gives an illustration that makes clear the idea, presented in the 1853 Discourse V; namely, that the drift and meaning of a subject varies according to the context in which it is introduced: "In the combination of colours, very different effects are produced by a difference in their selection and juxtaposition; red, green, and white,

1 Quotations from the five additional paragraphs in the 1873 edition are from the M. J. Svaglic edition of the Idea of a University.
change their shades, according to the contrast to which they are submitted. And, in like manner, the drift and meaning of a branch of knowledge varies with the company in which it is introduced to the student: (75.26-32).

The second important point shows the relationship between the two themes basic to the discourses; namely, the necessity for Theology there—the point of the first illustration—and the Science of Sciences or Philosophy theme. Concerning the students Newman writes, "...though they cannot pursue every subject which is open to them they will be the gainers by living among those and under those who represent the whole circle" (76.13-20). The student "profits by an intellectual tradition, which is independent of particular teachers, which guides him in his choice of subjects, and duly interprets from him those which he chooses. He apprehends the great outlines of knowledge, the principles on which it rests, the scale of its parts, its lights and its shades, its great points and its little, as he otherwise cannot apprehend them. Hence it is that his education is called "Liberal" (76.29-36). Here Newman has described the kind of education he calls "Liberal"; that is, the education that is the result of acquiring "this master view of things" which he has termed the "Science of Sciences" or "Philosophy". When such a view has been acquired "a habit of mind is formed which lasts through life, of which the attributes are freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, and wisdom; or what in a former Discourse [III] [See above
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Discourse III, pp. 38.31] I have ventured to call a philosophical habit" (76.36-39). Newman has answered his query, "what is the fruit of such a philosophy?" (Discourse VI, 169.16-17). He writes, "This then I would assign as the special fruit of the education furnished at a University, as contrasted with other places of teaching or modes of teaching" (76.39-77.3).

170.12-24 "...what is the end of a Liberal or University Education...their respective values." These lines make clear that for Newman in these Discourses a University Education means a Liberal Education; that is, an education that has as its purpose the acquiring of "that special Philosophy" (170.20-21) which consists "in a comprehensive view of truth in all its branches..." (170.21-22). Newman emphasizes, as he did in Discourse V, that it is the nature of the human mind to tend towards the acquisition of "a comprehensive view of truth" (170.22), which he terms in this Discourse "Liberal Knowledge or Philosophical Knowledge" (170.13); and therefore, the acquiring of such knowledge is the satisfying of an intellectual need that is a sufficient end in itself.

170.24-28 "What the worth..., compared with other objects..., I do not profess here to discuss;" See below, the Appendix (399.16-400.9) for Vives' commentary on the relative importance of intellectual excellence as compared to "the conveniences and comforts of life,..." (170.27).

171.10 "...the common judgment of philosophers..." Cicero in the De Officiis defines philosophy as "the love of wisdom. The ancient philosophers call it the knowledge of all things human and divine and the
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causes which lie behind them." ¹ Thus Cicero may be the source of
Newman's particular use of the term "Philosophy: to mean "a master view
of things." ²

171.15-21 "I am but saying..., by a 'selection from the
records...acquisition of knowledge'." The quotation in this section is
from the Introduction to the Pursuit of Knowledge Under Difficulties
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1847), p. 9, a work in two volumes
(1830-31) by George Lillie Craik (1798-1866), who was one of the writers
for the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge—an organization
whose aims and principles were in direct opposition to those laid down
by Newman in the present Discourses. (See above, Discourse II·Brougham
and the Society, pp. 50.8-22).

The subtle defeat of an arch-opponent is rhetorically
effective in that Newman is using a quotation from Craik to prove the
very point of the discourse; the tendency of the mind to acquire know-
ledge: "...the most unpertinent circumstances have been unable to
conquer an ardent desire for the acquisition of knowledge" (171.19-21).
Such a rhetorical device—in which the opponent's words are used to prove
one's own argument—leaves the adversary in the position of muting
truths in spite of himself, reveals his position as one of half-truth
half-error, and altogether unsettles the foundations of his arguments.

171.25 - 172.6 "...we are satisfying a direct need of our
nature...nor subserve any direct end." Liberal Knowledge is necessary
not only as satisfying the need of the intellect to systematise, but also

¹ Cicero, De Officiis, II. II.5, ed. John Higginbotham (London:
Faber and Faber, 1967), p. 100.
as a means of helping the intellect to reach its perfection, and is therefore "valuable for what its very presence in us does for us by a sort of opus operatum,..." (172.3-5).

172.7 Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.) was a Roman statesman, orator, and philosopher, who died by proscription during the regime of the First Triumvirate. Cicero's De Officiis is the source of Newman's quotation 172.10 to 174.4. In the essay "Marcus Tullius Cicero" Newman writes that Cicero unfolds in the treatise De Officiis (44 B.C.), addressed to his son on practical ethics, "the principles of morals, according to the views of the older schools, particularly of the Stoics. It is written in three books, with great perspicuity and elegance of style; the first book [from which Newman quotes] treats of the 'honestum,' or 'virtue,' the second of the 'utile,' or 'expedience,' and the third adjusts the claims of the two, when they happen to interfere with each other."¹ Cicero's De Oratore (55 B.C.) discussed the relation of philosophy and rhetoric and presented the ideal of the great man in whom both were united.

The most pertinent aspect of Cicero's thought to Newman's Liberal Education ideal is the union of philosophy with rhetoric. Carneades had prepared the way for such a union when he made philosophy

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a contest between opinions. This union of rhetoric and philosophy gave Cicero the materials for the construction of his humanistic ideal: Philosophy and the specialized disciplines supply knowledge and rhetorical persuasion makes it effective. Commitment to the union of eloquence and knowledge led Cicero to the view that if the statesman-philosopher is to speak persuasively on all subjects, he must have knowledge of all subjects. Cicero advocated a liberal education as the best approximation. An important part of liberal education for Cicero was the study of philosophy.

172.7-9 "...Cicero, in enumerating the various heads of mental excellence...first of them." Cicero writes in Book I of the De Officiis as follows: "But all that is morally right rises from some one of four sources: it is concerned either (1) with the full perception and intelligent development of the true;..."¹ This is the first "mental excellence" to which Newman refers. Newman's interpretation is that Cicero makes the "pursuit of knowledge for its own sake" (172.8-9) the first excellence. The other three are as follows: "...or (2) with the conservation of organized society, with rendering to every man his due, and with the faithful discharge of obligations assumed; or (3) with the greatness and strength of a noble and invincible spirit; or (4) with the orderliness and moderation of

everything that is said and done wherein consist temperance and self-control."  

In the following two excerpts from *De Officiis*, there is stressed that the search after truth is a condition of our self-esteem and our happiness:

172.10-14 "'This pertains...a disgrace'."  
172.20-24 "'the search for truth...our happiness'."  

Cicero begins this section with the statement: "Above all, the search after truth and its eager pursuit are peculiar to man" (*De Officiis*, I, IV, 13, p.15). That it is of the nature of the human mind to want to acquire a comprehensive view of truth is Newman's view as well. Cicero's idea is that the pursuit of knowledge is the next accomplishment after tending to the practical details of existence; that is, "'after we escape from necessary cares'" (172.21), and that the pursuit of truth is "'a condition of our happiness'" (172.23-24).

173.12-14 "'free from...and to learn'."  

Newman is quoting Cicero as his authority to prove that Liberal Knowledge is a pursuit separate from necessary duties and cares and following "after our physical and political needs are supplied" (173.10-11). Cicero himself studied and wrote philosophy after

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1 Cicero, *De Officiis*, p. 17.

2 Ibid., I. VI. 16, p. 19.

3 Ibid., I. IV. 13, p. 15.

4 Ibid., I. IV. 13, p. 15.
his political life as a Roman senator had come to an end, but Newman's point to be developed is that Liberal Knowledge has an end in itself and is therefore separate from the aims and purposes of professional knowledge.

173.14-19 "Nor does he contemplate...bearing upon social life altogether,..." 1 Cicero, "expressly denies its bearing [the bearing of knowledge] upon social life altogether" (173.18-19) in the sense that he maintains, first, that the search for truth is the tendency of the mind after it has been freed from the practical details of existence; and secondly, that "the investigation of truth" (173.24) is to be pursued only during intermissions, as they occur, "from public occupations" (173.25)--those of orator and politician for Cicero.

Furthermore, to allow the pursuit of truth to direct one from the active life would be, according to Cicero "a transgression of duty" (173.26).

Newman's idea differs from Cicero's in that Liberal Knowledge is for Newman a necessary preliminary to professional life, rather than a pleasant pursuit to be indulged in when time from public duties permitted. See Discourse VII pp. 262-263. What Newman is striving to counter by quoting Cicero as an authority is "the Baconian philosophy" (173.20-21) in its nineteenth century form; that is, Knowledge should be cultivated to serve the directly useful purpose of economic or professional advancement. What Newman abstracts from Cicero for the

1 Cicero, De Officiis, I. VI. p. 19.
foregoing purpose is that the pursuit of truth is a tendency of the mind whenever it is freed from practical considerations, and consequently, by its very nature, that search is separate from the details of social life. In other words, Newman and Cicero agree on the separateness of the pursuit of truth from any immediate reference to social life, but that separateness is considered from different points of view. Newman only agrees that Liberal Studies are pursued primarily for the benefit of the individual and only subsequently and indirectly to the benefit of society.

173.23 - 174.2 "'All these methods...of our own.'" ¹ In this quotation Newman reads Cicero's word "artes" as "methods," whereas other translators give "subjects" or "professions"--a translation that refers in Cicero's foregoing sentences to the subjects of astronomy, geometry, logic, or jurisprudence. Newman's point in quoting is simply to show that for Cicero these subjects--conceived with "'the investigation of truth'" (173.24)--are separate "'from public occupations'" (173.25).

174.6-7 "...the elder Cato..." Marcus Porcius Cato (234-149 B.C.) was a Roman statesman, surnamed "The Censor" or "The elder," "whose opposition to Greek literature was founded solely on political considerations." ² He was the first Latin prose writer of any importance and the first author of a history of Rome in Latin--the Origines, written in seven books. See below 174.8-11.

174.8-11 "...when Carneades and his companions...eloquent

¹ Cicero, De Officiis, I. VI. p. 19.
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expositions of it." Carneades (214-129 B.C.) was, at the time of the incident mentioned here, a leader of the Academic Skeptics and head of Plato's Academy in Athens. Carneades, with Diogenes, the Stoic, and Critolaus, the Peripatetic, came to Rome about 155 B.C. on a mission to convince Rome to exempt Athens from a fine that had been imposed. At this time Carneades illustrated the logic of his Skepticism by delivering his two famous orations, one praising justice and proving its foundations in natural law; the other, with equal persuasiveness, praising injustice and reducing it to the notion of utility. This arguing on both sides of the question expressed Carneades' attitude of epoche or suspending judgment characteristic of Academic Skepticism originated at the Academy by Arcesilaus (See above Discourse V, 152.9-11). This non-committal attitude was rooted in Carneades' denial that there existed any certain knowledge, either of the senses or of the intellect, but in order to answer the Stoics' criticism that the epoche, or suspension of judgment doctrine of the New Academy paralyzed human thought, Carneades proclaimed his doctrine of probability; that is, the doctrine that in action we do not need dogmatic, objective truth; all that is needed is probable understanding.

Cato, who was a Stoic and "a fit representative" (174.11) of the practical Romans, quickly dismissed the Greek Skeptic Carneades and his companions "...fearing lest the [Roman] youth...should prefer the glory of speaking well before that of arms and doing well." ² Cato's


 utilitarian viewpoint is in opposition to that of Cicero whom Newman has been presenting as one to whom "the idea of benefiting society by means of 'the pursuits of science and knowledge' did not enter at all into the motives which he would assign for their cultivation" (174.3-5).

Rhetorically, Newman is arguing for Liberal Education on the historical authority of Cicero, who, as a philosopher, belonged to the New Academy, as opposed to utilitarian educational thought, represented by Cato who "...knew...little of what is meant by refinement or enlargement of mind... he despised what he had never felt" (174.18-21). Implicitly, Newman makes Cato, and ancient Rome who banished Carneades and his companions, the representatives of Hellenic culture—the humanistic ideal of eloquence and philosophic disputation—analagous to the utilitarian thinker of his own day in England and Ireland who would banish from their universities the heir of hellenic culture—Liberal Education—and replace it by Cato's ideal of "doing well."

Newman mentions the incident of Carneades' dismissal from Rome in his essay "Marcus Tullius Cicero," Historical Sketches, Vol. I, p.260 where he describes the political and professional practicality of the Romans as opposed to the inclination for philosophical investigation and disputation among the Athenians.

175.12 "...the poet speaks," The poet is Agathon (b.c. 445 B.C.), an Athenian tragic poet, whose innovations as a dramatist are
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mentioned by Aristotle in his Poetics. Agathon was the first Greek dramatist to write a play about imaginary characters instead of taking them from mythology. He was also the first to compose lyrics as pure choral interludes instead of comment on the dramatic situation. His words Newman quotes in Greek are "Art loves chance and chance loves art."

Newman takes his reference from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, VI. 4, in a passage where Aristotle is explaining that both chance and art are concerned with "making," but art "is essentially a reasoned state of capacity to make" and involves "a true course of reasoning." Newman is using the distinction between chance and art to differentiate "servile work" and "liberal pursuits." (175.8-17) In the 1873 edition, Newman uses "hazard" for "chance" and "empiric" for "quack."

Since "empiric" means that which is based on observation and experiment, rather than on theory, the idea that "servile work" involves less of the mind--less of "philosophy"--than does "liberal knowledge" is made clear.

176.7-8 "...the palaestra" was the name applied by the ancient Greeks to the part of the gymnasium where the "athletae," the competitors in public games, were trained in wrestling and boxing.

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176.8 "...the Olympic games" began in 776 B.C. They were held at four-year intervals until A.D. 394 when they were abolished after Greece had lost its independence. The winners became national heroes whose feats of skill and courage were recorded by poets and writers of the time. The gracefulness and sportsmanship of the contestants and the method of winning were esteemed equally with the victory itself. Since these games had for their purpose the development of the person, Newman would term them "liberal."

176.10-13 "In Xenophon...accomplishments of a gentleman."

Xenophon (C. 430 B.C. - after 355 B.C.) was a pupil of Socrates, a distinguished soldier, a historian, an essayist, a sportsman, and a lover of the country. He represents a type of country gentleman greatly admired in English life. His Anabasis (Upcountry March) is the story of his going to Asia to seek his fortune and of his becoming a professional soldier in Cyrus' army. The Cyropaedia (The Education of Cyrus), completed c. 365 B.C., is a historical novel with a moral and political purpose describing the boyhood and training of Cyrus the Great, as well as his whole career; thus it is the story of the founding of the Persian Empire. Intwoven in the historical narrative are Xenophon's maturest thoughts on government and on the education of the ideal ruler trained to rule as a benevolent despot over his admiring subjects.

Newman's reference to the Cyropaedia is to Book I. C.2, 6-9 where both riding and speaking the truth are described as ways the "Persians
endeavoured to improve their citizens." ¹ Since speaking the truth in disputations was a means of training the mind and building the character, and the riding in the chase, a means of acquiring courage and skills that later made the Persians competent soldiers in battle—their life's work—these accomplishments are in keeping with Newman's definition of "liberal." See below 176.7 – 177.3.

176.13-16 "War...another subject." Newman seems to be referring to the profession of war as being liberal in the sense of the training required for developing a particular type of man—the professional soldier and leader of the Cyrus type. See below 176.7 – 177.3.

176.20 "Manly games...are,...accounted liberal" in the sense that their immediate purpose is the development or growth to his highest perfection of the individual.

176.77 – 177.3 "...that alone is liberal knowledge...refuses to be informed...by any end, or absorbed into any art, in order to present itself to our contemplation." Newman defines "liberal knowledge" as that which we think of as primarily, intrinsically not directed to or pursued for an end or purpose beyond itself. He makes clear his idea by illustrating that a pursuit can be considered liberal or professional

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according to its aim or purpose: "If, for instance, Theology, instead of being cultivated as a contemplation, be limited to the purposes of the pulpit or be represented by the catechism, it loses, not its usefulness, not its divine character, not its meritoriousness,...but the particular attribute which I am illustrating,..." (177.20-26). In other words, Theology, Newman considers liberal if it is cultivated as a contemplation, but "useful" (178.8-9), if it is cultivated for the purpose of preaching or teaching. Similarly, with reference to 176.13-16 above, Newman would consider the growth and development involved in the education of a career soldier, liberal, in that its end is an intrinsic one—the cultivation of the individual; but as soon as that training becomes the preparation for the heroic role of the battlefield soldier, the training is a professional one.

The important point about Newman's definition of "liberal knowledge" is that it is knowledge the immediate purpose of which is the cultivation of the person; its remote use is the fitting of the person for accomplishing whatever is his life's task. Liberal knowledge does for the mind what exercise and good nutrition do for the body and virtue does for the soul; that is, achieves health and well-being as a basis for accomplishment.

Fergal McGrath, in The Consecration of Learning makes this distinction between the remote and immediately useful—an important insight into Newman's idea of liberal knowledge. He writes, "Some
education is immediately useful, that is, it imparts to the mind
knowledge which is capable of being used for the immediate betterment of
the human race. But some education is not immediately useful. The
knowledge it imparts cannot be immediately used for the betterment of
the human race. However, it is ultimately useful, because it gives to
the mind certain qualities which enable it to use better whatever
immediately useful knowledge it may gain, either previously, concurrently
or subsequently."  

178.5 "...the Baconian Philosophy,..." see above Discourse X,
350.9-29.

178.16-21 "...words of the great Philosopher...beyond the
use." The reference is to Aristotle's Rhetorica, BK. I. 5, 1361 a.
Writing of possessions Aristotle says, "The useful kinds are those that
are productive, the gentlemanly kinds are those that provide enjoyment.
By 'productive' I mean those from which we get our income; by 'enjoyable
those from which we get nothing worth mentioning except the use of
them."  

2 The "gentlemanly kinds" of possessions stresses the idea of
leisure, freedom from the necessity for 'productive' pursuits that is
basic to Newman's idea of a liberal education.

1 Fergal McGrath, The Consecration of Learning (New York:

(Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1924)
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180.13-14 "The palaestra may seem a liberal exercise to Lycurgus, and illiberal to Seneca..." Lycurgus, according to Plutarch, was the legendary ninth century B.C. law giver and formulator of the Spartan constitution. Lycurgus, whom Plutarch says, his people saw as distinguished from his subjects by his quality of mind, is said to have reclaimed Sparta from a condition of disorder and demoralization by the thorough discipline of its people. Rather than reducing his laws to writing, he considered that the laws most important to "public welfare, being imprinted on the hearts of their youth by a good discipline, would be sure to remain; and would find a stronger security,...in the principles of action formed in them by their best law giver, education." 1

There is implied here an idea so very important to Newman's idea of a university education: namely, that education effects a growth, a change in the person and that he then becomes the living exponent, the very embodiment of the principles of his education. This idea of change and development is the core idea of Newman's concept of education.

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With reference to the palaestra and physical education, Lycurgus "ordered the maidens to exercise themselves with wrestling, running, throwing the quoit, and casting the dart"¹ so that they themselves would be strong and their children healthy. The well-being of the body and of the race as the purpose of these exercises would make them liberal pursuits in Newman's definition.

180.1¼ "...Seneca..." Lucius Annaeus Seneca (c.4 B.C.-A.D. 65) was the most important public and literary figure at Rome in the age of Nero. His significance is that he revived the subject of philosophy in Latin literature, spiritualized and humanized Stoicism, and became the exponent of a new style, that exploited the short sentence, rhetoric and declamation. See below p. 190.15 for further details of Seneca.

In his "On Liberal and Vocational Studies," LXXXVIII, Epistulae Morales, Seneca states that he would debar from liberal studies such exercises as wrestling and the skills to "hurl a spear, to wield a pike, to guide a horse, and to handle weapons"² since he did not see these exercises as a means of improving the person. He writes as follows: "For what good does it do us...to beat many opponents in wrestling or boxing, and then find that we ourselves are beaten by anger."³

¹ Plutarch, Lives..., p. 39.
³ Ibid., p. 361.
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In this essay, "On Liberal and Vocational Studies," Seneca makes two points that are essential aspects of Newman's thought: first, liberal studies are so called "because they are studies worthy of a free-born gentleman," in contrast to studies which "are profit-bringing occupations." ¹ He continues, "But there is only one really liberal study,—that which gives a man his liberty. It is the study of wisdom, and that is lofty, brave and great-souled." ²

Secondly, Seneca makes clear that liberal studies do not "profess or aim at a knowledge" ³ that will make men good. Newman maintains in this discourse and in the "Tamworth Reading Room" that knowledge is one thing; virtue is another. Seneca says, "we educate our children in the liberal studies...not because they can bestow virtue, but because they prepare the soul for the reception of virtue....liberal arts do not conduct the soul all the way to virtue, but merely set it going in that direction." ⁴ This very idea forms the basis of Newman's discussion of the relation between education and religion—the university and the church—in Discourse IX.

180.14-16 "coach-driving...in Elis,...in England." Elis was

¹ Seneca, Epistulae Morales, p. 349.
² Ibid., p. 349.
³ Ibid., p. 349.
⁴ Ibid., p. 361.
an ancient Greek state, with its chief city of the same name, in the north-west corner of the Peloponnese, famous for the excellence of its horses. The Olympic games, celebrated from 776 B.C. in Olympia, the sanctuary sacred to Zeus, brought much distinction to the Eleans. On the second day of the five-day Olympic festival the chariot and horse races were held. The chief athletic events were held on the fourth day--foot-racing in the morning and wrestling and boxing in the afternoon. That these were "liberal" pursuits is evident from the fact that the winners received as a sign of their achievements the coveted laurel wreath from the nearby grove about the temple of Zeus. See above 176.8, the Olympic Games.

180.16-18 "music...despicable in the eyes of certain moderns,...highest place with Aristotle and Plato,..." John Locke, a representative modern, on the one hand, and Aristotle and Plato, on the other, represent the essential conflict depicted in this discourse; namely, that between useful and liberal education. John Locke writes the following about music in education: "But it wastes so much of a young man's time, to gain but a moderate skill in it,...the time and pains allotted to serious improvements should be employed about things of most use and consequence, and that too in the methods the most easy and short that could be at any rate obtained." 1 In the eyes of Locke, music was

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...undesirable in that he noted few esteemed for excellency in music; and furthermore, music was not even desirable as a recreation, since it required too much study to attain the necessary skill—a study he thought would impede the delight he considered a requisite for recreation.

In contrast, Aristotle considered the study of music as valuable for the intellectual enjoyment it afforded in leisure. He cites Homer as considering music as "being one of the ways in which it is thought a free man should pass his leisure." 1

Aristotle gives music an important place as a source of relaxation, recreation, pleasure, and therefore happiness. But he says it also has a nobler influence: music has a power of forming the character. "Since then music is a pleasure, and virtue consists in rejoicing and loving and hating aright, there is clearly nothing which we are so much concerned to acquire and to cultivate as the power of forming right judgements, and of taking delight in good dispositions and noble actions. Rhythm and melody supply imitations of anger and gentleness, and also of courage and temperance, and of all the qualities contrary to these, and of all other qualities of character, which hardly fall short of the actual affections, as we know from our own experience, for in listening to such strains our souls undergo a change." 2 Clearly, for

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2 Ibid., VIII. 5. 1340a.
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Aristotle music, considered as a preparation for leisure, as an influence on the formation of character, is a liberal study for the individual's self-improvement. For further details on Aristotle's view of the place of music in education see the "Politica" VIII. 3. 1337b - 7. 1342b.

Similarly, Plato considers music most influential to effect the improvement of the person: He writes, "that education in music is most sovereign, because more than anything else rhythm and harmony find their way to the inmost soul and take strongest hold upon it, bringing with them and imparting grace, if one is rightly trained, and otherwise the contrary. And further, because omissions and the failure of beauty in things badly made or grown would be most quickly perceived by one who was properly educated in music, and so, feeling distaste rightly, he would praise beautiful things and take delight in them and receive them into his soul, to foster its growth and become himself beautiful and good."

179.19 - 180.26 Summary. In these lines Newman has been presenting the word "liberal" as expressing "a specific idea, which ever has been, and ever will be while the nature of man is the same,..." (179. 20-22). In order to emphasize the importance of "liberal," he ranks "liberal" with those concepts that are "illustrated by a continuous

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historical tradition" (179.26-27) such as the dogmas of faith and with
archetypal ideas such as Beauty, Goodness, or Moral Virtue.

Further, to counter those opponents who would ignore the
validity and importance of the concept "liberal," with reference to
knowledge and education, Newman refers to several contrasting historical
examples--Lycurgus to Plato--that illustrate "there have indeed been
differences of opinion from time to time, as to what pursuits and what
arts came under that idea, but such differences are but an additional
evidence of its reality" (179.28 - 180.3). The very fact that "liberal"

is a contentious idea proves Newman's point of its being an idea that
"must have a substance in it, which has maintained its ground amid these
conflicts and changes, which has ever served as 'a standard to measure
things..." (180.3-6).

180.28 - 181.2 "...when I speak...liberal knowledge, or a
gentlemen's knowledge...the scope of a University." Newman's references
to Cicero, Xenophon, Seneca, and Aristotle in this discourse all contain
the idea that liberal knowledge is that knowledge able to be acquired by
the freeman or the gentleman whose position in society sets him at
liberty from "servile work" to pursue his own mental and character
formation. See Aristotle, Politica, VIII. 3. 1338a, for the distinction
between knowledge which is liberal or noble and therefore valued for its
own sake and knowledge which is useful in business and therefore
knowledge necessary for the sake of other things.
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181.3-7 "...this acquisition...Science;" That liberal
knowledge consists in "that systematising, or taking general views of all
departments of thought, or what I called Philosophy, or...Science;" (181.
13-19) is Newman's audition to the ancients' concept of "liberal" studies
which he has been giving by brief references to the historical tradition
of the concept "liberal". The ancients thought of liberal knowledge as
that which we must study merely with a view to leisure spent in
intellectual activity; 1 whereas, for Newman, Liberal Knowledge is a
science—knowledge in a system—for the purpose of the cultivation of the
intellect, a preparing of the intellect for growth. This preparation of
the mind was, for Newman, a prerequisite for professional training (182.
1-4): "It [Liberal knowledge] prepares him to fill any post with credit"
(Discourse VIII, 286.17-18). Newman thought the ability to use leisure
well an effect rather than an objective of liberal knowledge; his mind
"has resources for its happiness at home when he cannot go abroad..."
(Discourse VIII, 287.5-6). Newman cited the ancients in order to prove
the importance of the concept "liberal" as a preparation for the
development of his ideal of liberal education—the Oxford educational
ideal that will be the subject of the next discourse.

181.14-19 "You may recollect,...a Science of sciences;"
is a valuable summary sentence omitted from the 1873 edition.

181.21-29 "Philosophy...to itself:" These lines give Newman's

1 Aristotle, Politea, VIII. 3. 1338a.
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definition of "knowledge". He states that knowledge becomes science or Philosophy when it is "informed, or,...impregnated by Reason" (181.24-25). In other words, when knowledge is made meaningful by Reason, that is, when it is systematised into "general views" (181.16), it becomes "Science or Philosophy" (181.23). The sentence, "Reason is the principle of that intrinsic fecundity of knowledge" (181.25-26) is an essential aspect of Newman's idea of liberal knowledge. Reason is the mind's own means by which knowledge lives and develops into a meaningful over-all view and therefore "to those who possess it, is its especial value" (181.27) and consequently needs no "end to rest upon external to itself" (181.29). These sentences, more than any others in the Discourses, explain why liberal knowledge is an end in itself, and why its acquisition is in keeping with the nature of the mind and is, therefore, a need of the mind.

182.6-26 "I know well...for fulfilling it." Here Newman clearly differentiates Liberal and Useful Knowledge and therefore makes clear the difference in aim of the two methods of Education: "the one aspires to be philosophical, the other to be mechanical; the one rises towards ideas, the other is exhausted upon what is particular and external" (182.19-22).

183.9-14 "When I speak of Knowledge,...invests it with an idea." Newman's definition of "knowledge" is as follows: "When I speak of Knowledge, I mean something intellectual,...which reasons upon what it sees, and while it sees; which invests it with an idea" (183.9-14).

183.15 "...an enthymeme" is a reasoning in which some part of
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the grounds for the conclusion, (i.e. one or other of the premises), is suppressed in the statement. According to Aristotle, the enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities which corresponds in the special field of rhetoric, to syllogism in purely intellectual or scientific matter. Newman is emphasizing that the acquisition of knowledge is of the nature of "a scientific or a philosophical process" (183.19-20).

183.23-24 "Not to know...the state of children; to have mapped out...the boast of Philosophy." This sentence is a statement of a theme of the discourse: the mechanical, the "particular and external" (182.22) is the concern "of slaves or children" (183.23); whereas, the freeman or gentleman is at liberty to acquire the Knowledge "which takes a view of things" (183.11-12), Knowledge which is power to map out the Universe. This sentence is an appropriate introduction to the "nunc cognosco in partem" theme of the following section, 183.25 - 187.2.

183.25 - 187.2 "Felix qui...nothing beyond." This section, omitted in the 1873 edition, makes clear the analogy that Knowledge is to Philosophy or Liberal Knowledge in the natural order as Faith is to Divine Wisdom in the supernatural order: the one is a preparation for, a means to, the other. See in particular, 186.25-29. Drawing an analogy between liberal knowledge and Divine Wisdom emphasizes a particular characteristic of liberal knowledge: the contemplation of truth for its own sake. This section also anticipates the material of Discourse X, the Relation between Liberal Knowledge and Religion.
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183.25-27 Latin quotation:

Happy the one who is able to know the
causes of things,
And also every danger, and inexorable
destiny, Who casts underfoot, the
greedy and rumbling Acheron

Vergil, Georgics, II, 490-492.

The Latin quotation stresses the theme of 182.22-24 and 183.25 - 187.2:
Knowledge viewed as Philosophy is power in this life and that to come.

185.18-29 "This endowment the Apostle...becomes a mere
'worldly wisdom'." I Cor. 1:19-20. The Apostle, Paul, had just
returned from Athens, the centre of learning and philosophy, where he
had been jeered for teaching the doctrine of the Resurrection. Here
Paul is warning the "educated Corinthians" against total reliance on
the "worldly wisdom" of the current Greek philosophy to the neglect of
the higher wisdom of God. The reference is relevant to Newman's
"present subject" in that he has been arguing for the inclusion of the
Divine Wisdom of Theology with the "worldly wisdom" of liberal
knowledge in the curriculum of a university.

185.26-29 "'We speak...hidden wisdom'." I Cor. 2:6-8.
St. Paul speaks in this passage of "that hidden wisdom which God
devised before the ages...; a wisdom which none of the rulers of
this world hath come to know...", (I Cor. 2:7-8), revealed
through the Spirit to the mature spiritually.
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Newman refers to this "gift of wisdom" as the "liberal knowledge of His favoured ones" (186.17) in that it involves an illumination by Faith that is in contrast "with the servile condition of mind, in which we act without being able to give an account of our actions" (186.18-19).

186.20-24 "'I will not now call you servants, ...but I have called you friends, ...made known to you'." St. John 15:15 Both this quotation and lines 186.15-19 express in the spiritual order what Newman has been saying in the natural order about the difference between useful or servile and liberal. The "servile condition of the mind" is like that of slaves or servants in that it lacks the illumination, the meaningful over all views given to those who are friends, "freemen" and equals. This quotation completes the imagery begun in 183.22-24.

186.27-28 "...that philosophical view or grasp of all matters of thought, in which I have considered Liberal Knowledge to consist..." is a clear definition of liberal knowledge omitted from the 1873 edition—a definition which makes more meaningful the quality of permanence attributed to liberal knowledge in the following sentence: "it is an acquired illumination, it is a habit, a personal possession, and an inward endowment." (187.8-10).

187.10-13 "...why it is more correct, ...to speak of a University as a place of education, than of instruction,..." Newman in the following sentences explains the difference between education and
In contrast, "...we speak of the communication of Knowledge as being Education,..." (187.25). By "Knowledge" capitalized Newman means "Liberal Knowledge" or that "Knowledge" which "is a state or condition of mind" (187.28). By "communication" Newman does not mean only the imparting of "knowledge" (187.13) or information as is involved in instruction, but he means that communication of meaning and insight between mind and mind, person and person that results in "an action upon our mental nature, and the formation of a character" (187.22-23); that is, formation of a particular kind of person with a particular kind of intellect and character.

187.28 - 188.1 Newman refers to this (187.22-23) process as "a cultivation of mind [that] is surely worth seeking for its own sake." (187.28-188.1).

"Cultivation of mind" accurately describes Newman's idea of education in that "cultivate" means to bestow labour and attention upon so as to promote the growth and improve the quality. The ideas of
preparation for growth and refinement of quality are essential to Newman's idea of education. See Discourse V, 142.16-18 where he describes education as a growth from within rather than an accumulation from without—an expression which succinctly gives the difference between education and instruction as outlined in Discourse VI.

188.2-6 "...the word 'Liberal' and the word 'Philosophy'...there is a Knowledge...itself a treasure, and a sufficient remuneration of years of labour." This sentence concludes Newman's answer to the questions he proposed at the beginning of this Discourse: "...what, after all, is the gain of this Philosophy, (168.29-169.1)...what are we proposing to effect, what inducement do we hold out to the Catholic community, when we set about the enterprise of founding a University?" (169.19-22).

188.13-15 "I am prepared to maintain that there is a knowledge worth possessing for what it is, and not merely for what it does" is Newman's summary of his answer to the questions cited above in 188.2-6. He further underlines the importance of the foregoing statement by saying in a sentence omitted from the 1873 edition: "This important principle is the issue, if not the drift, of all that I have been saying in my preceding Discourses;...for some time to come I shall employ myself upon it;" (188.15-19).

188.20-22 "...the removal of some portion of the
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Indistinctness and confusion with which it may in some minds be surrounded. The remaining part of the discourse is devoted to a clarification of Liberal knowledge by the answering of objections to the preceding arguments and the outlining of what Liberal Knowledge is not.

189.10-12 "...if...it [Liberal knowledge] is neither a physical or secular good on the one hand, nor a moral good on the other, it cannot be a good at all,...". The foregoing sentence is a statement of an anticipated objection by the opposition which Newman will answer in the remaining part of the discourse.

189.15-22"...the professors of this Liberal or Philosophical knowledge...have ever been attempting to make men virtuous; or, if not, at least have assumed that refinement of mind was virtue, and that they themselves were the virtuous portion of mankind." The foregoing argument is one way in which the professors of Liberal Knowledge "in every age" (189.17) have tried to counter the allegation that such Knowledge "is not worth the trouble which is necessary for its acquisition" (189.13-14): they associated knowledge with virtue. But Newman points out that "they have utterly failed in their professions, so as ever to make themselves a proverb among men, and a laughing stock..." (189.24-26).

190.1-2 "...from the time that Athens was the University of the world,..." Newman describes Athens as "the first and most celebrated home of European literature, and the source of European civilization,..." ¹

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190.2-4 "...what has Philosophy taught men, but to promise without practising, and to aspire without attaining?" Since Philosophy or Liberal Knowledge as Newman has described it is a habit of the mind, Philosophy, therefore, is not a habit of the will and consequently does not move to action; thus the reason for Newman's stating that Philosophy promises without practising and aspires without attaining.

190.14-26 All the proponents of Philosophy or Liberal Knowledge mentioned in this paragraph—Cicero, Seneca, Brutus, Cato, Rasselas—illustrate that Knowledge cultivates the mind, but does not necessarily provide the virtues of the will to deal with life's crises.

190.14-15 "Did Philosophy support Cicero...fickle populace," Cicero as consul in 63 ordered the execution of the Catilinarian conspiracy, but the nooses, who never forgot that he was a "new man" and were jealous of the great house upon the Palatine, failed to support him. One of them, Publius Clodius, brought forward a law condemning anyone who had put a Roman citizen to death without trial. Cicero left Rome in a panic and remained in exile from March to November in the deepest dejection unsustained by his philosophy. Meanwhile his house and villas were ordered destroyed by Clodius in his absence. 1

190.15-16 "...or nerve Seneca to oppose an imperial tyrant?" Seneca who was once the tutor and advisor of the young Nero fell into the emperor's disfavour when Seneca's enemies pointed out to Nero the vast wealth of Seneca and his popularity with the citizens. Consequently,

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Seneca withdrew to private life and was rarely seen in Rome. Finally in A.D. 65, on a charge of complicity in the conspiracy of Piso, Seneca was ordered by Nero to end his life. ¹

190.16-17 "It abandoned Brutus, as he sorrowfully confessed, in his great need,..." All these--Cicero, Seneca, Brutus--were adherents of the Stoic Philosophy. In that system of philosophy it was held that the world is governed by a good and wise God and that natural events are manifestations of His power. Happiness is not necessary, and pain, because natural, is not an evil, but should be endured. Duty, temperance and fortitude are the important virtues. While making preparations for war, Brutus attended lectures in philosophy. He had written a treatise On Virtue in order to strengthen himself for the coming crisis. But in vain; his philosophy deserted him at the Battle of Philippi, and he committed suicide exclaiming that virtue was only a name and not the reality that he had trusted. ²

Similarly Cicero, in spite of his Philosophy, succumbed to Clodius' plot, fled Rome in panic, and remained in exile in deep dejection over his loss of power and property. Also, Seneca's Philosophy did not enable him to withstand Nero's disfavour and did not give him power to oppose the tyrant's order to end his own life.

190.17-19 "...it forced Cato,...into the false position of defying heaven." Marcus Porcius Cato, known as Cato the Younger 95-46 B.C., a Roman Philosopher and tribune, supported Cicero at the time of

² M. L. Clarke, Higher Education in the Ancient World, p. 77.
the conspiracy of Catiline. As well, he supported Pompey during the Civil War that broke out in 49 B.C. After the decisive defeat at Thapsus (46) he shut himself up in Utica and stabbed himself. Following an aspect of the Stoic Philosophy, he considered that he should act upon a narrow sense of immediate duty without regard to the future. He thought that he was placed in the world to play an active part, and when disabled from carrying out his principles, he should retire from it. As Newman states, his philosophy forced him "into the false position of defying heaven" (190.18-19) and in defiance of heaven's law against suicide, he took his own life. The "panegyrist" Newman refers to is very likely Cicero who wrote a panegyric entitled Cato. His supporters said that he was too great-souled to be willing to view the end of the commonwealth and the tyranny that was to follow.  

190.20-21 "...like Polemo...a profligate course,..." Newman notes the innovations on the system of Plato introduced by the "austere Polemo"² before he was succeeded by Arcesilas.

190.21-23 "...like Anaxagoras, thought...in exchange for its possession?" Anaxagoras, c.500 – c.428 B.C., was a Greek philosopher who brought philosophy and the spirit of scientific inquiry to Athens from Ionia, probably c.480 B.C. where he had a great influence upon Pericles, and the poet Euripides, who derived from him an enthusiasm for science and humanity. He was celebrated for his discovery of the true cause of eclipses and was known for the ascetic dignity of his nature and for his superiority to ordinary weaknesses. Newman's reference is to


the fact that after a distinguished residence of thirty years Anaxagoras was forced to leave Athens on a charge of impiety—a charge that Plato attributed to Anaxagoras' holding the opinion that the sun was a red-hot stone somewhat larger than the Peloponnesus and the moon was made of earth. He retired to Ionia where he settled at Lambsacus, the Milesian colony.  

190.23-25 "The philosopher in Hasselas...superhuman doctrine, and then succumbed...to a trial of human affection." The sage taught Hasselas the "superhuman doctrine" that the reason and intellect were superior to fancy and emotions. "We compared reason to the sun, of which the light is constant, uniform, and lasting; and fancy to a meteor, of bright but transitory lustre, irregular in its motion, and delusive in its direction." 2 He therefore "exhorted his hearers to lay aside their prejudices, and arm themselves against the shafts of malice or misfortune by invulnerable patience." 3 However, as the sections quoted by Newman indicate 190.27 – 192.5, the master of wisdom himself "succeeded...to a trial of human affection" (190.25-26) and thereby repudiated his own philosophy when he was cast into despair over the death of his only daughter. The philosopher says, "My views, my purposes, my hopes are at an end: I am now a lonely being disunited from society." 4

3 Ibid., p. 37.
4 Ibid., p. 38.
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Rasselas' question, "'Had wisdom no strength to arm the heart against calamity?'" ¹ is an answer to his own query as well as to the point Newman is making in his references, 190.13-26, Cicero to Rasselas; namely, that wisdom or liberal knowledge is not sufficient to arm the heart against calamity. Or as Newman himself incomparably expresses his "knowledge is not virtue theme": "Quarry the granite rock with razors, or moor the vessel with a thread of silk; then may you hope with such keen and delicate instruments as human knowledge and human reason to contend against those giants, the passions and the pride of man" (196.23-27). Johnson writes that Rasselas "went away convinced of the emptiness of rhetorical sound, and the inefficacy of polished periods and studied sentences" ² to console the soul in affliction (195.14-15).

190.27 - 192.5 "He discoursed...will not be restored!" from Chapter XVIII of Johnson's, "The History of Rasselas", pp. 36-38.

192.6-13 "Better...to make no professions,...fulfilled its aim." Newman criticizes those who would attempt to make knowledge a means to virtue in that they must needs be unsuccessful; whereas, the proponents of the Philosophy of Utility at least fulfil their less noble aspirations.

192.13-16 "If that man of great intellect...true to his friend or faithful in his trust." Sir Francis Bacon, whom Newman refers to as the Prophet of the Philosophy of Utility, is Newman's example of the man who did not confuse the aims and provinces of Knowledge and Virtue: "Moral virtue was not the line in which he undertook to instruct men;" (192.17-18). When Newman writes that Bacon "was not bound by his

¹ S. Johnson, "The History of Rasselas," p. 36.
² Ibid., p. 38.
philosophy [of Utility] to be true to his friend or faithful in his trust" (192.15-16), he is doubtlessly referring to the fact that Bacon, anxious for preferment with Elizabeth, took part in the prosecution for treason of his former friend and patron, the Earl of Essex.

192.18-19 "...as the poet calls him, he was the 'meanest' of mankind,..." The poet, Alexander Pope, in his "Essay on Man" IV, 281, refers to Bacon as "the brightest, but meanest of mankind." Newman reinforces the point he made in 192.17-18 when he remarks that Bacon's being the "meanest" of mankind in his "private capacity" did not invalidate the main principle of his Philosophy of Utility; that is, the theory of induction. Rather, although Newman doesn't make the point here because it is extraneous to his argument, Bacon's meanness may well have been an effect of his philosophy. (See below 194.19-21).

192.21-23 "He had a right... for anything the Idols of the den or theatre... contrary." The Idols, fallacies or general classes of errors into which the human mind is prone to fall, constitute, according to Bacon, the obstacles to progress. See Bacon's Book I of the Novum Organum: "The Idols and false notions which are now in possession of the human understanding,...so beset men's minds that truth can hardly find entrance,..." ¹ "The Idols of the Cave are Idols of the Individual.

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man. For everyone...has a cave or den of his own, which refracts and
discolours the light of nature; owing either to his own proper and
peculiar nature; or to his education and conversation... "1 The
Idols of the Theatre were fallacious modes of thinking resulting from
received systems of philosophy and from erroneous methods of
demonstration. "These I call Idols of the Theatre; because in my
judgment all the received systems are but so many stage-plays,
representing worlds of their own creation after an unreal and scenic
fashion." 2 Rhetorically witty is Newman's conceding that Bacon has a
right to his own Idols of Cave and Theatre in spite of the criticism
Bacon himself levels at certain ways of thinking and certain philosophies
as obstacles to truth and progress.

192.24 - 193.10 "His mission...speak of him severely.".

Newman commends the achievement of the Philosophy of Utility when he
refers to Bacon as "the divinely provided minister of temporal benefits
to all..."(193.7-8).

192.27-29 "It will be seen...Mr. Macaulay in his Essay on
Bacon's Philosophy...agree with me." Newman does agree with Macaulay
in that "To make men perfect was no part of Bacon's plan. His humble aim
was to make imperfect men comfortable. The beneficence of his philosophy

1 Bacon, "The New Organon," p. 54.

2 Ibid., p. 55.
resembled the beneficence of the common Father, ... " 1 See Newman's statements, 192.24 - 193.19. Newman's phrase, "I don't know whether he would agree with me" is a polite way of indicating that Macaulay would be unlikely to give Theology the importance in the field of knowledge to which Newman assigns it.

193.1-6 "Almost day by day have we fresh and fresh shoots..., on the magical tree of knowledge..., and general well being." Here is another variation on the "tree of knowledge" metaphor (See above, 167. 2-4). He gives his natural opponents credit for as much as they have accomplished in that each new scientific discovery achieved by Bacon's method of inductive reasoning adds "fresh and fresh shoots and buds, and blossoms, which are to ripen into fruit, on the magical tree of knowledge." (193.1-3). There may be a Biblical allusion in this reference to the "magical tree of knowledge." See Genesis: 3:6. There may be implied the suggestion that Bacon's Philosophy has the possibility of being as dangerous to mankind as the original tree of knowledge.

193.6-19 "And,...the tendencies of his philosophy,...to depreciate, or to trample on Theology,...that beneficent Father,...wounds of human nature." In order to excuse the author of the inductive method from responsibility for the tendency "to depreciate, or to trample on Theology" (193.12-13) that has, according to Newman, developed from

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Bacon's philosophy, Newman refers in the footnote (193.21-29) to two instances in which Bacon has insisted on Theology as "The instrument of that beneficent Father, who...took on him...the office of assuaging the bodily wounds of human nature" (193.15-19). See below 193.21 and 193.21-29. There is the suggestion that Bacon's Philosophy developed in a direction that he himself would not entirely countenance.

193.21 "De Augment, IV 2, vid. Mr. Macaulay's Essay;"

Macaulay in his essay "Lord Bacon" refers to Bacon's "De Augmentis" as follows: "...Bacon vindicated the dignity of that art [the art of healing] by appealing to the example of Christ, and reminded men that the great Physician of the soul did not disdain to be also the physician of the body." 1

The passage to which Macaulay refers in Bacon's "De Augmentis" is translated as follows by Bacon in "The Advancement of Learning": After Bacon terms medicine "a most noble art" with "a most illustrious [pagan] pedigree," he writes "But a far greater honour accrues to medicine from the works of our Saviour, who was the physician both of soul and body; and as he made the soul the peculiar object of his heavenly doctrine, so he made the body the peculiar object of his miracles." 2


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193.21-29 "'In principio...mysteria oboriatur, etc.' Newman's second reference is to the "Preface" of the "Instauratio Magna": "At the outset of the work I must humbly and fervently pray to God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, that remembering the sorrows of mankind and the pilgrimage of this our life wherein we wear out days few and evil, they will vouchsafe through my hands to endow the human family with new mercies. This likewise I humbly pray, that things human may not interfere with things divine, and that from the opening of the ways of sense and the increase of natural light there may arise in our minds no incredulity or darkness with regard to the divine mysteries; etc." 1 The foregoing was Bacon's prayer at the beginning of his Great Work that the Blessed Trinity would endow the human family with knowledge that would assuage its miseries. He also prayed—and most important for Newman's point—"that things human may not interfere with things divine," 2 and further, in a following sentence, not quoted by Newman, "...the understanding being purified and purged of fancies and vanity, and yet not the less subject and entirely submissive to the divine oracles, may give to faith that which is faith's." 3 The foregoing sentence clearly illustrates Newman's contention that whatever


2 Ibid., p.20.

3 Ibid., p.20.
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has been the effect of Bacon's philosophy on his utilitarian heirs, Bacon himself gave due honour and importance to the concerns of Theology.

Newman's references to Bacon's esteem for Theology are

rhetorically apt in that he is using the words of the Father of the Inductive Method and of Utility to show by contrast what the nineteenth century utilitarians have become; and thereby to emphasize the main idea of the Discourses; namely, the importance of all the sciences in the field of knowledge, including Theology.

193.19 - 194.6 "And truly, like the old mediciner in the Tale, he 'sat diligently...herbs in the morning dew.'" The "old mediciner" is Master Helfrad in the Tale, "The Unknown Patient" by Friedrich Heinrich Karl La Motte-Fouqué (1777-1843), published in Romantic Fiction (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1876), pp. 39-62. Newman's quotation refers to pages 46 to 48. "Good old Master Helfrad, the far-famed physician," not only cured his unknown patient of bodily illness, but of spiritual malady of which his bodily illness seemed the manifestation. Master Helfrad singing "'a pious song'" (194.1) while "'gathering healing herbs'" (194.5-6), Newman seems to see as a figure of Bacon who prayed that the Holy Trinity would "'vouchsafe through my hand to endow the human family with new mercies'" (See above, 193.21-29); that is, with knowledge that would assuage its miseries.

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194.11-21 "Alas, that Bacon too...narrowness of his school."
The second footnote reference in 194.11, "Te maris et terrae, etc." is
from the opening line of Horace's Ode XXVIII, Book I, in which the
dialogue between the shade of Archytas and a mariner reveals the vanity
of the respective pursuits of both philosopher and man of the world.
The key words, "sed una nox manet omnes," "but one night awaits all,"
express the foregoing theme. In the poem the mariner-trader is so
intent on gain that he is unwilling to spare a minute to render the last
service to his brother man; thus he loses sight of the fact of death
and of their common humanity.

Bacon writes at the end of the prayer quoted above in 193.21-
29, "Lastly, that knowledge being now discharged of that venom which the
serpent infused into it, and which makes the mind of man to swell, we may
not be wise above measure and sobriety, but cultivate truth in charity." 1

The "Alas" at the beginning of both 194.11-15 and 194.15-21
sounds a rhetorical sign of misgiving that Bacon must be classed with the
pagan philosophers—here, Socrates and Seneca. Newman sees all three as
stripped of their holy-day coats in that their actions made a mockery of
their words. The metaphor of the "holy-day coat", is an apt way of
stating that the basic, every-day tenets of their philosophies were
evident once their conduct stripped their philosophies of their "holy-day
coat"; that is, of the religious or Theological aspects of their

1 Bacon, Works, p. 20.
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philosophies which were worn for show only on certain occasions, brought out only when most likely to be noticed, then doffed whenever practical affairs were concerned. Thus, each was inconsistent in some respect. In spite of his protestations of seeking truth with charity (see above 194.11-15) Bacon was accused and tried for bribery and corrupt dealings in chancery suits, an accusation that was the direct cause of his political downfall and retirement to seclusion. Socrates was accused of contributing to the immorality of Athenian youths and subsequently poisoned with hemlock. Seneca, too, fell from political favour with the Emperor Nero and was forced to retire from public life when it was pointed out by jealous observers that in spite of his Stoic philosophy he had amassed a huge fortune. Newman's concluding sentence indicates his over-all opinion of Bacon and his school: "...should in the littleness of his own moral being, but typify the intellectual narrowness of his school" (194.19-21).

194.21-23 "However,...proposed." While commending Bacon for as much as he did achieve, Newman thoroughly condemns him personally when he notes that "heroism after all was not his philosophy" (194.22).

195.10 - 196.27 "For all its friends, or its enemies, may say, I insist upon it,...pride of man." Here Newman is bringing to an emphatic conclusion his point of view "that it is as real a mistake to implicate it [Liberal Knowledge] with virtue or religion, as with the arts." (195.12-13) This section contains some of Newman's most frequently quoted
sentences concerning the idea that knowledge is not useful as a means to virtue. About Liberal Knowledge, he says, "it as little mends our hearts, as it improves our temporal circumstances" (195.19-20).

"Knowledge is one thing, virtue is another;" (195.25) is the theme Newman has been insisting on here and was the theme of his "Tamworth Reading Room" letters to the Times in 1841. "Philosophy, however enlightened, however profound, gives no command over the passions, no influential motives, no vivifying principles" (195.28 - 196.1) is the main point of the illustrations above concerning such philosophers as Cicero, Seneca, Brutus, Cato, Rasselas, and Bacon: "Liberal Education makes not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman" (196.1-3); that is, the person who is, or can make himself at liberty to acquire "a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, ... a noble and courteous bearing in the conduct of life" (196.4-6).

In summary, Liberal Knowledge is for Newman Science or Knowledge in a system, for the cultivation of the intellect, the preparation for as well as the process of intellectual growth. Liberal knowledge is valued for itself in that it has no end beyond the cultivation of the mind. It promotes a health and well-being of mind that is analogous in the intellectual realm to the benefits of nutrition and exercise for the body, and virtue for the soul in the physical and spiritual realms, respectively. Newman argues also that this benefit is a change, a growth that results in a formation of a particular quality.
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of intellect, or habit of mind the attributes of which are freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation and wisdom (See above, 170.10). There is also in Newman’s definition the idea it is a natural tendency of the mind to systematise, to bring all into order, to view whatever is presented to the mind in relation to other knowledge the mind possesses, and finally to view all as a whole. It is this very natural tendency of the mind that is cultivated and refined in the process of a Liberal Education.

The importance of the concept Liberal, Newman underlines by reference to the term in the ancients from Lycurgus to Plato. Liberal therefore is a term that has validity and importance in relation to the pursuits of the intellect and has had from the early days of the ancient Greeks. Liberal knowledge was considered by the Greeks and Romans -- Cicero, Xenophon, Seneca, and Aristotle--to be that knowledge acquired by the freeman who had the leisure to pursue those subjects that promoted his own culture.

Newman differentiates Liberal and Useful: Liberal aspires to be philosophical and therefore rises to ideas; whereas, Useful concerns the mechanical that is exhausted in the particular. In keeping with this definition, a University is a place of education rather than instruction. The latter is given in manual exercises and in the fine and useful arts where the method of instruction is the imparting of information and the details necessary to the practise of the art or
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skill. On the other hand, education concerns the communication of knowledge involving the transferring of meaning and insight from mind to mind that results in the formation or cultivation of a particular kind of intellect.

Newman has been explaining that Liberal knowledge is neither a physical nor a secular good; he ends his discussion of Liberal knowledge by maintaining that it is not a moral good. He has cited instances from Cicero, Seneca, Brutus, Cato, Rasselas, and Bacon to prove that knowledge cultivates the mind, but does not provide the virtues of the will to meet life's crises. Newman states that "it is as real a mistake to implicate it [Liberal Knowledge] with virtue or religion, as with the arts...it as little mends our hearts, as it improves our temporal circumstances" (195.12-20). Finally, Newman concludes that "knowledge is one thing, virtue is another;" (195.25) and therefore, a "Liberal Education makes not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman" (196.1-3).

Throughout Discourse VI, Newman has been inquiring the nature, and importance of Liberal knowledge and thus of a Liberal Education. He concludes that "everything has its own perfection" (197.8) and that beauty and perfection of intellect is achieved by a Liberal Education which "viewed in itself, is simply the cultivation of the intellect, as such, and its object is nothing more or less than intellectual excellence" (197.5-8).
INDEX OF THE DISCOURSES

Chapter XIII

DISCOURSE VII. PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE VIEWED
IN RELATION TO MENTAL ACQUIREMENTS

Discourse VII discusses the connection between Philosophical or Liberal Knowledge and "Material Knowledge or Acquirement" (205.13). By "mere or material knowledge" (205.2), Newman means mere detail or information. He depicts the mental development of various persons; for example, the school child whose primary concern is information; and the mature persons whose minds have not progressed beyond mere acquirement—the seafaring man, the popular essayist, the university student—all of whom may mistake information on many topics for cultivation of mind or education. By contrast with the foregoing, Newman is able to differentiate between what he describes as acquirement and the enlargement or illumination of mind that is the effect of a Liberal Education.

201.1 - 204.10 "It were well,...sufficient by mankind." This introductory paragraph summarizes Newman's views of Philosophical Knowledge presented in previous discourses and adds four terms or viewpoints not specifically mentioned in the foregoing discourses. Newman has stressed the idea that "the intellect must have an excellence of its own" (203.21-22) which he has described as a "habit of the intellect" (202.3), a particular "intellectual proficiency or perfection" (201.3) which is analogous to "health" in the animal frame and "virtue" in our moral nature (201.4-6). Also, it is the aim of "a University, taken in its bare idea" (203.8) "apart from the Catholic
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Church, or from the State, or from any other power which may use it" (203.13-20) to "educate the mind, to reason well in all matters, to reach out to truth, and to grasp it" (203.15-16). Also, since the function of a university is "intellectual culture" (203.13), "it contemplates neither moral impression [Virtue] nor mechanical production [Useful Knowledge]" (203.10-11).

But in Discourse VII Newman states that it is "the business of a University to make this intellectual culture its direct scope" (202.29-203.1). There is implied in the word "direct" the idea that there is an indirect scope which Newman has reserved for discussion and emphasis elsewhere. It is in Discourse VIII that Newman specifically deals with professional knowledge and its relation to Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge. Also, there are the following designations of Liberal Knowledge particular to Discourse VII: "Wisdom..., is a more comprehensive word than any other,..." (201.16-17) for Philosophy. Newman writes in an Oxford University Sermon of "Wisdom being that orderly and mature development of thought, which in earthly language goes by the name of science and philosophy." Then the phrase "realize to the mind" (202.14-15) is an expression Newman uses to describe a thorough comprehension of an idea. It is not until the mind is possessed of its own intellectual excellence that it is able to "realize to the mind" (202.

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14-15) the meaning and relation of ideas presented to it. Lastly, Newman describes Philosophy as "the perfection or virtue of the intellect" (202.23-24), "enlargement of mind" (202.25-26), or "intellectual illumination" (205.14). Newman elaborates in the Appendix on the latter term "illumination." According to a Tract of St. Bonaventure, all illumination, all human science, descends to man from God, "the Pontal Light" (389.26-27). It is the third of four kinds of illumination that is "philosophical knowledge" (390.13); it is called the "interior light," (390.12) "the light of rational philosophy" (390.21); "its object is intelligible truth" (390.13).

204.14-16 "...I proceed to inquire what this mental breadth, or power, or light, or philosophy consists in." Newman, in the first three paragraphs, has clearly outlined the way he has come; now, he turns to his plan and purpose for the following discourses: In this discourse (VII) and the following two (VIII and IX), Newman inquires what "philosophy consists in" by investigating "those qualities and characteristics of the intellect, in which its cultivation issues or rather consists" (204.24-26).

The differentiation theme begun in the first paragraph will be continued as Newman investigates, "the relation of intellectual culture, first to 'mere' or 'material' knowledge [Discourse VII]; secondly, to 'professional' knowledge [Discourse VIII]; and thirdly, to 'religious' knowledge [Discourse IX]" (205.1-4). In other words, Newman proposes three questions to be answered: "...are 'acquirements' and 'attainments'
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the scope of a University Education? [VII] or 'expertness in particular
arts and pursuits? [VIII] or 'moral and religious proficiency?' [IX]
(205.4-7).

205.10-12 "...I am led"to repeat what, either in these
Discourses or elsewhere, I have already put upon paper." Newman's
footnote references are to Sermon XIV, "Wisdom, as Contrasted with Faith
and with Bigotry," Oxford University Sermons, pp. 273-311. Several
sections of this Discourse VII have been taken with very little
alteration from this sermon.

205.15 - 207.7 "I suppose...the acquisition of knowledge."
Here Newman describes "Material Knowledge, or Acquiring" (205.13) as
the first step in the learning process, the stage peculiar to the school
boy, who stores his memory, "one of the first developed of the mental
faculties" (205.19-20), with facts, impressions, information, and others
opinions. He is at his time of leaving for the University "mainly the
creature of foreign influences and circumstances" (206.22-23). Newman
has more to say on the subject in his lecture "Elementary Studies," The
Idea of a University, Part II, pp. 331-333. (Also, see below, 208.4-6).

207.19 - 208.3 "There are indeed persons...suddenly as it
rose." Such a person was Henry Lord Brougham, one whom Newman made his
arch opponent in the mixed education issue. (See above, Discourse II, 50
8-22 for the biographical sketch of Brougham). A person such as Brougham,
newman would consider, reveals the lamentable effects of the lack of a
liberal education in that he has not progressed beyond the acquisition
stage of mental development; thus, not having gained possession of the
philosophical habit, he must base his conclusions on information, or in other words, on "material knowledge." The result, in Newman's words, is that even "the most original mind may be able indeed to dazzle, to amuse, to refute, to perplex, but not to come to any useful result or any trustworthy conclusion" (207.16-19). Consequently, "his readers are sure to find on the long run that his doctrines are mere theories, and not the expression of facts, that they are chaff instead of bread..." (207.28 - 208.2).

208.4-6 "Knowledge...attaining to it." Newman makes one of the most important points of the discourses when he states that material knowledge is the condition of and means to the "expansion of mind" (208.5) that he terms, philosophy. Not only does he not disparage factual knowledge, but rather gives knowledge its true and important place when he says, "there is no true culture without acquirements, and...philosophy presupposes knowledge" (207.11-12).

Newman's lecture, "Elementary Studies" depicts dramatically, the acquirement stage of the learning process. No where but in the introduction to this essay does he describe in more vivid and beautiful language the mind's natural progression from the gathering of unrelated bits and pieces of information, to the synthesizing of these into meaningful wholes, and finally to the enlargement of mind that is characterized by the mind's ability to reason clearly, accurately, and precisely. The important passage reads as follows:
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It has often been observed that, when the eyes of the infant first open upon the world, the reflected rays of light which strike them from the myriad of surrounding objects present to him no image, but a medley of colours and shadows. They do not form into a whole; they do not rise into foregrounds and melt into distances; they do not divide into groups; they do not coalesce into unities; they do not combine into persons; but each particular hue and tint stands by itself, wedged in amid a thousand others upon the vast and flat mosaic, having no intelligence and conveying no story, any more than the wrong side of some rich tapestry. The little babe stretches out his arms and fingers, as if to grasp or to fathom the many-coloured vision; and thus he gradually learns the connection of part with part, separates what moves from what is stationary, watches the coming and going of figures, masters the idea of shape and of perspective, calls in the information conveyed through the other senses to assist him in his mental process, and thus gradually converts a calidoscope into a picture. The first view was the more splendid, the second the more real; the former more poetical, the latter more philosophical. Alas! what are we doing all through life, both as a necessity and as a duty, but unlearning the world's poetry, and attaining to its prose! This is our education, as boys and as men, in the action of life, and in the closet or library; in our affections, our aims, our hopes, and in our memories. And in like manner it is the education of our intellect; I say, that one main portion of intellectual education, of the labours of both school and university, is to remove the original dimness of the mind's eye; to strengthen and perfect its vision; to enable it to look out into the world right forward, steadily and truly; to give the mind clearness, accuracy, precision; to enable it to use words rightly, to understand what it says to conceive justly what it thinks about, to abstract, compare, analyze, divide, define, and reason, correctly...The instruction given him, of whatever kind, if it be really instruction, is mainly, or at least pre-eminently, this,—a discipline in accuracy of mind.

In the foregoing passage Newman has been able "to describe and realize to the mind" (202.14-15) of his listener the essential quality of the learning process at both levels, that of acquirement and philosophy: of the school and the University—"a discipline in accuracy of mind" ¹ in order to dispel what he terms the "haziness of intellectual vision which is the malady of all classes of men by nature." ²

Not only is the passage important for the context of this discourse in that it describes more vividly than any in the discourse what Newman means when he says, "philosophy presupposes knowledge" (207.12), but it also illustrates by the metaphor of the baby’s growing and clearing intellectual vision, three essential aspects of the learning process that Newman does stress throughout the discourses: first, that it is according to the nature of the human mind to progress from the level of information to that of philosophy (Discourse IV); consequently, when Newman insists on enlargement of mind or philosophy being the scope of the ultimate level of formal education—the University—he is but insisting that education proceed on the same pattern of progression as does the human mind; secondly, that pattern involves a growth and development that is intrinsic to the mind itself: In the process of converting a "calidoscope into a picture" ³ "the original dimness of the

² Ibid., p. 333.
³ Ibid., p. 331.
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mind's eye" ¹ is removed and the intellectual vision is strengthened and perfected "to give the mind clearness, accuracy, precision..." ² The permanence that Newman associated in Discourse VI with the possession of the philosophical habit is made clear in the metaphor of the gradual clearing of the intellectual vision to a permanent condition of clarity of mental vision. The philosophical habit as a condition of mind clarifies the mental vision as a pair of glasses brings into correct perspective the actual vision of a short-sighted person: "To a short-sighted person, colours run together and intermix, outlines disappear, blues and red and yellows become russets or browns, the lamps or candles of an illumination spread into an unmeaning glare, or dissolve into a milky way: he takes up an eye-glass, and the mist clears up; every image stands out distinct, and the rays of light fall back upon their centre." ³ Finally, the passage above describes the system, order, and progression for a definite purpose—accuracy of mind—that is basic to the idea of intellectual growth as Newman sees the process of education.

208.9-12 "A narrow mind is thought to be that which contains little knowledge; and an enlarged mind, that which holds a great deal" is the prevalent idea that Newman intends to prove a mistake by presenting examples of what are "generally granted to be instances of the process of enlightenment or enlargement of mind, and others which are

² Ibid., p. 332.
³ Ibid., p. 333.
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not,..." (209.5-7). The rhetorical question in which Newman asks the listeners to judge for themselves whether acquiring knowledge only is the principle of enlargement of mind or whether that principle is something beyond mere acquirement is a means of realizing to the minds of the audience the problem, before Newman proceeds to prove his stand on the question.

209.12 - 213.4 "For instance...an awful moral." Each instance of mental enlargement acquired from travel, Physical Science generally, the study of history, the arguments and speculations of unbelievers, and Religion gives its own particular sense of enlargement to the mind "which is at this day considered the end of mental culture" (213.9-10), but it is not the kind of enlargement or enlightenment that Newman considers the essence of a Liberal Education, but rather that enlargement which results from "a mere addition to our knowledge" (213.29); in other words, the kind of enlargement that is knowledge of things, but no "of their mutual and true relations" (214.15-16).

212.4-6 "...that the fruit of the tree of knowledge,...has made it one of the gods,..." Here is a more definite reference to the Biblical tree of the knowledge of good and evil (Genesis) than was noted above, Discourse VI. There is the misleading aspect of "what the mind takes for knowledge" (212.5) that is made clear by the Biblical allusion to the fruit of the "tree of knowledge" (212.4).
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212.11-12 "...the judgment-stricken king in the Tragédy..." is Pentheus, King of Thebes in Euripides' tragedy "The Bacchae," 1.918. Pentheus, who repudiated nature and tradition in defying the god Dionysus is led to his own destruction by his desire to see the revels of the Bacchae, forbidden sights to an unbeliever and an uninitiated such as Pentheus.

The intoxication of the forbidden "fruit of the tree of knowledge" (212.4) and the eventual destruction of its possessor so vividly brought to mind by Newman's Biblical allusion in 212.4-6 is reinforced by his reference to Euripides' metaphor of the "two suns." Pentheus, bewildered with madness by Dionysus and humiliated in his disguise as one of the Bacchae, a garb he would have abhorred had he been in his right mind, now sees two suns—two sources of knowledge and power. He says,

I seem to see two suns blazing in the heavens and now two Thebes, two cities, and each with seven gates. 11.918-920.

Pentheus, one "who hunts a glory, ... who tracks some boundless, superhuman dream," (11.397-398) is led on to his own destruction at the hands of the Bacchae.

Both the Biblical and literary allusions emphasize Newman's idea that the mere addition of knowledge intoxicates and therefore misleads the mind with a sense of illumination that is not true enlargement.
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213.12-29 "The enlargement consists...to what we know already." The essence of Newman's idea of intellectual and personal enlargement, and hence of the philosophical habit, is a dynamic principle of growth accomplished by "the mind's energetic and simultaneous action upon and towards and among those new ideas,..." (213.14-16), and "a digestion of what we receive, into the substance of our previous state of thought" (213.21-22), so that "there be a comparison of ideas one with another,...and a systematizing of them" (213.24-26). The result is "we feel our minds to be growing and expanding..." (213.26-27) and there is "the movement onwards, of that moral centre, to which both what we know, and what we are learning, the accumulating mass of our acquirements, gravitate" (214.1-4).

214.5-14 "And therefore a truly great intellect,...and no centre..." Newman finds that "a truly great intellect" (214.5) such as those he has selected from different ages, countries, and fields of knowledge—Aristotle (384 B.C.–322 B.C.), a Greek philosopher of the pre-Christian era; St. Thomas (1225–1274), an Italian theologian of the Middle Ages; Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727), an English mathematician; and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), a German poet-philosopher of Newman's day—have in common that finished intellect that is able to take "a connected view of old and new, past and present, far and near, and which has an insight into the influence of all those one on another..." (214.10-13). Newman gives the name of systematizing to those abstract
exercises of Reason "employed upon the vast field of knowledge, not in conjecturing unknown truths, but in comparing, adjusting, connecting, explaining facts and doctrines ascertained. Such a use of Reason is Philosophy; such employment was it to which the reason of Newton dedicated itself; and...Those illustrious thinkers of the middle ages, who have treated of the Christian Faith on system, Athanasius, Augustine, Aquinas."

214.13-14 "...without which there is no whole, and no centre." Without true enlargement the mind fails to reflect the unity or "whole" that is the basis of creation, and therefore of knowledge; and consequently, lacks a "centre" or position from which to take a philosophic or over-all view. See above, Discourse V, 144.22-24, "We form and fix the Sciences in a circle and system, and give them a centre and an aim,..." See below "if we would improve the intellect, first of all, we must ascend: we cannot gain real knowledge on a level; we must generalize, we must reduce to method, we must have a grasp of principles, and group and shape our acquisitions by them" (220.14-18).

215.5-6 "...nothing more than well read men, or men of information." The statement can apply to the instances Newman quoted above in 209.12 to 213.4. Thus Newman would not attribute "culture of mind" or "Liberal Education" (215.7-8) to the instances he cites.

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215.13-15 "They abound in information in detail, curious and entertaining, about men and things...." These are the information men whose memory for detail that is "only as such phenomena, which are complete in themselves, and lead to nothing" (215.18-19) results in their not "teaching any truth, or instructing the hearer, but simply talking" (215.20-21).

216.1-6 "Seafaring men...tells no story." Seafaring men are types of information men for whom the "multiplicity of objects" they see in their travels "forms no symmetrical and consistent picture" (216.3-4).

216.5-6 "...they see the tapestry of human life, as it were, on the wrong side, and it tells no story." See above the quotation from "Elementary Studies" in 208.4-6 in which there is the same metaphor of the wrong side of a tapestry telling no story. To which the baby's just awakening senses and the memory of a seafaring man the rich profusion of the many-coloured threads of life are not joined to one another so as to form a picture that has meaning to either one. They are just the opposite to the great intellects mentioned in 214.5-14 who take "a connected view of old and new" (214.10-11) and therefore, to apply Newman's metaphor in the opposite sense, view the tapestry of life on its right side so that what it communicates has a unity and therefore a meaning.

216.11 "...Pompey's Pillar, or the Andes." Pompey's Pillar is a Corinthian column nearly one hundred feet high, with a monolithic shaft of red granite seventy-three feet long, standing on the site of ancient Alexandria, Egypt. The name is misleading, as it was erected about A.D. 296 in honour of Diocletian.
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The Andes is the name applied to the great mountain system which extends the full length of the western part of South America about 4,500 miles from North Colombia and Venezuela, South to Cape Horn. The highest peak is Aconcagua, 22,834 feet. Nothing, from an unusual granite monument to an immense mountain range has meaning for those who see everything as so much detail or phenomena. As Newman explains, "...nothing,...carries them forward or backward, to any idea beyond itself. ...Everything stands by itself, and comes and goes in its turn, like the shifting scenes of a show, which leave the spectator where he was."

(216.12-17).

216.29 - 217.2 "Instances...preceded" The example of the seafaring man as one whose mind is subjected to the "mere acquisition" of detail which no one would term philosophy contrasts with the instances of acquiring knowledge about physical science, history and religion referred to above. 209.12 - 213.4, which are often thought of as resulting in enlargement but which are really only an enlargement resulting from a kind of physical accumulation of detail rather than the enlargement of mental vision that results from making detail meaningful by the mind's active assimilation and systematizing of information.

217.2-10 "That only is true enlargement of mind,...constitutes its perfection." True enlargement of mind gives "the power of viewing many things at once as one whole" (217.3-4), and thus is Universal Knowledge (Discourse III) "set up in the individual intellect, and
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constitutes its perfection" (217.9-10). These sentences are most
important as they express the core idea of the discourses; namely, that
the mind, in order to attain its perfection, must reflect in the unity
of its knowledge that unity which exists in the created universe and
originally in the Creator. See 39.20-21 for "universal knowledge" and
Discourse III, 69.20-70.9 for a description of universal knowledge.

217.10-29 "Possessed of this real illumination, the mind
never views any part of the extended subject-matter of knowledge,
without recollecting that it is but a part,...to the true centre." The
converging and connecting of all the threads of knowledge to form a
meaning whole in the mind Newman has previously clearly depicted by
means of the tapestry metaphor. See above, 216.1-6.

218.1-6 "To have...the portion of the many." Here Newman
states the value to the person of possessing "even a portion of this
illuminative reason and true philosophy" (218.1-2).

218.6-19 "Men, whose minds are possessed with some one
object, take exaggerated views of its importance,...for want of internal
resources." These sentences depict the disorder and lack of mental
integrity that results from lacking "the true centre" (217.29), the
"illuminative reason and true philosophy" (218.1-2).

218.19 - 219.2 "But the intellect,...how its path lies from
one point to another." In contrast to the statements in 218.6-19 Newman
here depicts the mind that possesses "true philosophy" as "majestically
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calm,...because it even knows where it stands, and how its path lies from one point to another" (218.27-219.2).

1 219.2-4 "It is the...of the Peripatetic, and has the 'nil admirari' of the Stoic." The person whose intellect "has been disciplined to the perfection of its powers" (218.21), who possesses the enlargement of intellect that Newman terms philosophy, is the man who combines the best of the two schools of Greek Philosophy, the Peripatetic, or Aristotelian, and the Stoic.

The Greek word in 219.3 means "truly good" or "foursquare beyond reproach". Aristotle writes as follows of the man who will be happy throughout his life: "...he will be engaged in virtuous action and contemplation, and he will bear the chances of life most nobly and altogether decorously, if he is 'truly good' and 'foursquare beyond reproach'.

The "nil admirari," the "wonder at nothing" of the Stoics, those not ruled by their emotions, is a motto that forms the opening words of Horace's "Epistle" I. 6.1:

Nil admirari prope res est una, Humici solaque, quae possit facere et servare beatum

"To wonder at almost nothing, Humicius, is the one and only policy which can make and keep one happy."

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1 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, I, 1100b 18.
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The theme of the "Epistle" is that the steady composure of philosophy is the only source of happiness.

219.17-22 "That perfection of the Intellect, which is the result of Education,...to be imparted to individuals in their respective measures, is the clear, calm, accurate vision and comprehension of all things, as far as the finite mind can embrace them,..." Two important points are made in this sentence: they are, that "Education" for Newman means "that perfection of the intellect" (219.17-18) which he terms the effect of a Liberal Education. Secondly, "that perfection of intellect" (219.17-18) is to be imparted to individuals in proportion to their ability to acquire it.

220.14 - 221.1 "...if we would improve the intellect, first of all, we must ascend: we cannot gain real knowledge on a level:... reconnoitering its neighbourhood." See above 214.13-14.

221.5-6 "The learning of a Salmasius or a Burman, unless you are its master, will be your tyrant." Claudius Salmasius, the Latinized name of Claude de Saumaise (1588-1653), educated at Paris and Heidelberg, was a celebrated French Huguenot scholar, editor of classical texts and author of treatises with theological, canonical, and political implications. His Plinianae Exercitationes in Caii Julii Solini Polyhistora (2 vols.; 1629) explains the excerpts from Pliny that Gaius Julius Solinus incorporated in his Collectanea Rerum Memorabilia.
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is remembered not for his inhaustible stores of erudition, his editions of the classics, or his treatises on classical antiquities, but for his controversy with John Milton. Salmassius' Defensio regia pro Carolo I, written at the request of Charles II, discussed the claims of the absolute monarchy and the lawfulness of the execution of Charles I. Milton's reply, Pro populo-angelicano defensio, utterly overwhelmed his adversary, who replied with Ad Miltonem responsio. While Salmassius' learning was encyclopedic, his writings show a lack of critical revision and his numerous controversies betray his penchant for invective.

Apparently, Salmassius was not Newman's man of Liberal Education who could ascend above his subject in order to grasp its principles (220.14-16), or who personally possessed an "almost supernatural charity from its freedom from littleness and prejudice" (219.27-28). Rather, he was the man of acquirement possessed by his great stores of erudition. One source terms him a great scholar of the old-fashioned clumsy sort, but neither his wit nor his acumen was sufficiently keen to give an intellectual and critical value to his lucubrations.

Burman(n) was probably Peter Burman (1668-1741), the most important member of a Dutch family celebrated for learning. Burman who took his degree in law from the University of Utrecht in 1668 was later appointed professor of history and rhetoric at the university and afterwards professor of Greek. His chief works are editions of Latin
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classics characterized less by taste and critical acumen than by learning, fulness of matter, and beauty of style.

The encyclopedic learning of both Salmiasi and Burman illustrates Newman's idea that acquirement without philosophy results in the mind's being tyrannized and overwhelmed with facts so that it lacks the power to be master of its own learning or of itself.

221.6-7 "'Imperat aut servit'; 'It rules or it serves' is a phrase that appears in Horace's "Epistle," I,10.47 as "Imperat aut servit collecta pecunia cuique": 'Money stored up is every man's master or slave.' Horace extols in this "Epistle" the freedom from the desire for gain that characterizes life in the country as opposed to that in the city.

The phrase "imperat aut servit" in Newman's context applies to knowledge that will rule the mind, be the mind's tyrant, if it is only encyclopedic--knowledge accumulated for a useful purpose--as was that of Salmiasi or Burman (221.5-6). On the other hand, knowledge that perfects the intellect and becomes philosophy is knowledge that serves the mind.

221.7-8 "...if you can wield it with a strong arm, it is a great weapon;" The comparison of knowledge that the intellect has mastered to "a great weapon" (221.7-8) emphasizes the value, for Newman, of acquiring the philosophical habit in that knowledge that has become philosophy gives the mind power in its conquest of truth.
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221.8-10 "otherwise; 'Vis consili expers mole ruit suä';" "Power, without wisdom, falls to ruin by its own great weight" is from Horace’s "Ode," III.4.65. The "Ode" is the poet’s invocation to the muse Calliope to continue her counsel for his guidance and safety. In Newman’s context, "power without wisdom" is the acquirement without philosophy that "falls to ruin by its own great weight." In other words, the mind can be so overwhelmed by the accumulation of detail that it cannot systematize its knowledge into philosophy.

221.11-13 "You will be overwhelmed, like Tarpeia,...tributary generations." In the time of Romulus, Tarpeia, daughter of Tarpeius, governor of the Roman citadel on the Capitoline, covetous of the golden ornaments on the arms of the Sabine soldier, and tempted by their offer to give her what they wore on their left arms, opened a gate of the fortress to the Sabine King Titus Tatius. The Sabines, keeping their promises to the letter, crushed Tarpeia beneath their shields. Subsequently those charged with treason were hurled from the Tarpeian Rock. The reference to Tarpeia well illustrates the betrayal of the mind resulting from subjecting the mind, overwhelming the mind, by the covetous acquirement of mere knowledge.

221.14-21 "...there are authors; who are as pointless as they are inexhaustible, in their literary resources...wondering at the learning which has passed before us, and wondering why it passed! These sentences apply to Salmassius and Burman in the previous paragraph as well
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as to Mosheim, Du Pin, and Jeremy Taylor, mentioned in this paragraph. They all seem to have in common the measuring of "knowledge by the bulk without symmetry, without design" (221.16-18).

221.22-25 "How many writers are there of Ecclesiastical History, such as Mosheim or Du Pin, ...anxiety about the parts!" Johann Lorenz Von Mosheim, (1694-1755) German Protestant church historian and professor of theology in Helmstedt from 1723, was the most influential person in the Lutheran Church and the educational system in Brunswick; consequently, Mosheim was a decisive influence in determining the internal organization of the University of Gottingen where he was professor and chancellor from 1747. He was a pioneer of modern church historiography in that his departure from any exclusively denominational viewpoint and his striving after a strictly objective presentation of the facts was a practice hitherto unknown in ecclesiastical historiography. For Mosheim the church was not a part of the kingdom of God, but rather a purely earthbound society whose history he therefore treated, not as a theological, but as a secular problem. In that Mosheim's Institutiones historiae ecclesiasticae (1755) was geared to the practical requirements of a textbook, its scholarly worth is limited to that of a simple inventory of facts.

Newman writes of Mosheim in the introduction of his essay, "The Last Years of St. Chrysostom": "When you have read through a century of him, you have as little distinct idea of what he has been
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about, as when you began. You have been hurried about from subject to subject, from external history to internal, from ceremonies to divines, from heresies to persecutions, till you find that you have gained nothing but to be fatigued. If history is to mirror the actual course of time, it must also be a course itself; it must not be the mere emptying out of a portfolio of unconnected persons and events, which are not synchronous, nor co-ordinate, nor correlative, but merely arranged, if arrangement it can be called, according to the convenience of the author."¹ The phrase, "the mere emptying out of a portfolio of unconnected persons and events" depicts the writing of a mind that has concentrated on acquirement and has not progressed to the stage of philosophy.

Louis Ellies Du Pin (Dupin) (1657-1719), a French patristic scholar, Doctor of Theology at the Sorbonne, and professor of philosophy at the Royal College, wrote Nouvelle Bibliothèque des auteurs ecclésiastiques, 58 vols. (1686-1704). Dupin broke with scholastic tradition by treating biography, literary and doctrinal criticism, and bibliography all in one work, and by writing in a modern language. Violent opposition, led by Bossuet, resulted in Dupin's being censured by the Archbishop of Paris, his exile for a time on a charge of Jansenism.

Dupin's works were placed on the Index in 1757.

221.26-28 "The sermons,...of Protestant Divines in the Seventeenth Century,...miscellaneous and officious learning." The "Protestant Divines" refers to that group of theological writers known as the Caroline Divines, or "the great Anglican Divines" beginning with Archbishop Laud and Bishop Launcelot Andrewes. Many lived under Charles I; others were high Churchmen of Charles II's time and after, who maintained that Catholicity, Biblical, but non-Roman, was the chief feature of the Reformed Church of England.

222.1 "...those of Jeremy Taylor..." Jeremy Taylor (1613-1667), one of the Caroline Divines, was educated at Cambridge, but given a fellowship at All Souls, Oxford by Archbishop Laud. After the Restoration in 1660, Taylor was named vice chancellor of Trinity College, Dublin and Anglican Bishop of Down and Connor in Ireland. His best devotional works are Rule and Exercise of Holy Living (1650) and Holy Dying (1651). These with the Worthy Communicant may be said to offer a complete summary, according to Taylor, of the duties, and specimen devotions, of a Christian. Although Taylor's prose is one of the glories of the English language, he was apt to spoil his effects by over

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accumulation of detail and superfluous argument. It is for his over-
accumulation of detail that Newman cites him as an example of these
authors "who are as pointless as they are inexhaustible, in their
literary resources" (221.14-16).

222.4 "House of Feasting; or the Epicure's Measures" in
Sermon XVI, Part I and Sermon XVI, Part II in The Whole Works of Right
217-248.

222.12 - 223.12 "After quoting Seneca...leaving the subject
pretty much as he found it." This "catalogue of names" (223.2) of the
great writers of classical antiquity and the early centuries of the
early church is, with some ironic repetitions, Newman's illustration of "the
marvellous availability of his writer's [Taylor's] erudition for
enforcing truisms and proving proverbs,..." (223.3-5). Newman has made
somewhat ridiculous the useless accumulation of important names for so
insignificant a purpose and thus made clear by example his apt descrip-
tion of Taylor's writing as "an array of quotations,...good sayings,
strung upon how weak a thread of thought!" (222.1-3).

223.13-17 "Such is learning, when used, not as a means, but
as an end,...nothing comes of pedantry." The Latin quotation, for which
Newman gives the English, is from Ecclesiastes 7:6. The chapter 7 of
Ecclesiastes is entitled, "Wisdom and Folly Contrasted." The complete
quotation is

For as the crackling of thorns under a pot,
so is the fool's laughter. This also is vanity.

The hollowness that the "fool's laughter" and "the crackling thorns"
have in common emphasizes the meaninglessness of a "catalogue of names"
(222.12 - 223.12) merely as an indication of the writer's erudition.
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223.18 - 224.14 "How could divines of a school such as this... without philosophy." Newman has selected Jeremy Taylor and the divines of the school to which he belonged—the Caroline Divines—as examples of "acquirement without philosophy" (224.13-14). He omitted from the 1873 edition, all mention of Taylor and his school of divines. The omitted lines are 221.28 to 224.20; "Take those of Jeremy Taylor... of mere acquisition."

The discourse in the 1873 edition suffers from the omission in that Newman's examples from Taylor's "House of Feasting" realize to the mind, the pointlessness of knowledge that has not been "thought through, and thought out" (224.26-27) and, as well, the almost ludicrous result of the mind's being tyrannized by the memory so that, as Newman describes it, "once fairly started on any subject whatever, they have no power of self-control;... they are passed on from one idea to another, and go steadily forward, plodding along one line of thought in spite of the amnest concessions of the hearer, or wandering from it in endless digression in spite of his remonstrances" (225.16-24).

The latter quotation, was included in the 1873 edition, although the example to which it referred (Taylor's sermon) was omitted. This fragmentation of thought and example is the reason an annotation of and a commentary on the original 1853 edition is necessary. Furthermore Taylor is the first example of "the various mistakes which at the present day,... beset the subject of University Education" (220.11-13) and is
therefore an illustration of the first mistake; namely, "that it is no
great gain to the intellect to have enlarged the memory, at the expense
of faculties which are indisputably higher" (226.11-13).

226.16 – 227.10  "I will tell you, Gentlemen, what has been the
practical error of the last twenty years... the wonder of the age." The
rhetorical beginning of this section with the words, "I will tell you,
Gentlemen," marks the tone of anger and exasperation with which Newman
expresses the error in education that results from considering mere
acquirement, enlargement. Newman emphasizes the "error of the last
twenty years" (226.17-18) -- "enfeebling the mind" (226.23) -- by stating
that the error has not been "to load the memory of the student with a
mass of undigested knowledge" (226.18-19); but rather, a greater error
that is the effect of the tyranny of memory: "the error of distracting
and enfeebling the mind by an unmeaning profusion of subjects; of
implying that a smattering in a dozen branches of study was not
shallowness, which it really is, but enlargement." (226.22-26). The
result is that such accumulation of activities and detail as "an
acquaintance with learned names," "the attendance on eloquent lecturers,"
the "membership with scientific institutions," "the sight of the
experiments of a platform and the specimens of a museum" (226.26 – 227.2)
is considered progress, whereas, actually such acquirement, according to
Newman, results in a "dissipation of mind" (227.3).

The idea of the mind's being mastered by mere acquirement
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mentioned above in 221.5-13 becomes here the effect of the mastering as a breaking down of the mind expressed in the words "enfeebled" and "dissipation."

227.10-12 "What the steam engine...pernicious of delusions."
The passivity of the mind in the acquisition of information, expressed metaphorically as a subjection of the mind in 221.5-13 above, is, in these lines, emphasized again in the metaphor of the printing press as a steam engine grinding out the tools of learning whereby people are deluded and victimized into considering education a mere mechanical process in which everyone can participate as long as the materials of learning are made available.

227.19-25 "Wise men...but inwardly smile." Essentially, Newman is referring to the Oxford-Cambridge opposition to the establishment of London University and by implication the establishment of the Queen's Colleges on the same theory of education. "Wise men" is a rhetorical means of gathering in support for an education based on enlargement and illumination of intellect instead of on acquirement.

227.28 - 230.9 "'In looking at our age,' says Dr. Channing in one of his works, 'I am...on popular education'; William Ellery Channing (1780-1842), a graduate of Harvard, was an American Unitarian clergyman and author. Channing's form of religious liberalism emphasized humanitarianism and toleration rather than doctrinal novelties. For Channing all questions were moral questions. He was ahead of his time in his views on labour problems and public and adult education. He considered slavery an evil to be wiped out at the earliest possible
opportunity. A pacifist, Channing organized the Massachusetts Peace Society to destroy the romantic glamour of war.


Channing, whom Newman refers to as "one of the prophets of this fantastic doctrine" (227.26-27), is extolling the universal diffusion of knowledge by means of popular education as a means of progress. See above 227.10-21 in particular for Newman's statement of the doctrine.

The section 227.26 to 230.14, "Let us listen...education of the people," was omitted from the 1873 edition; consequently, a literary reference for the second error in education that of "implying that a smattering in a dozen branches of study was not shallowness,...but enlargement" (226.24-26) is lacking in the 1873 edition. However, Newman's statement to which his Channing quotation refers is included in the 1873 edition. This statement is as follows: "A thorough knowledge of one science and a superficial acquaintance with many, are not the same thing; a smattering of a hundred things or a memory for detail, is not a philosophical or comprehensive view" (231.12-16).

230.28 "Vid. Knight's Half Hours, 1850." Newman is giving Charles Knight's Half Hours with the Best Authors (4 vols. 1847-1848) as
a footnote reference to Channing's statement, "The greatest minds are at work on popular education" (230.9). Knight, born in 1791, was an eminent nineteenth century author and publisher who devoted a long and honourable career to the cause of popular literature of which he was one of the earliest and most accomplished advocates. Among his other publications were the Penny Magazine (1832-1845), the British Almanac, the Penny Cyclopaedia (39 vols., 1833-1856), a Pictorial Shakespeare, and a Popular History of England, (1856-1862).

230.28-29 "However, the author writes, or attempts to write, better in his Self-Culture." The author is Channing; the reference is to his lecture "Self-Culture," an address Introductory to the Franklin Lectures, delivered at Boston, September, 1838, Works, pp.12-36. The following quotation from Channing's "Self-Culture" indicates an agreement with Newman's definition of "intellectual culture" and explains Newman's compliment in 230.28-29:

Intellectual culture consists, not chiefly, as many are apt to think, in accumulating information, though this is important, but in building up a force of thought which may be turned at will on any subjects on which we are called to pass judgment. This force is manifested in...rising from particular facts to general laws or universal truths. This last exertion of the intellect, its rising to broad views and great principles, constitutes what is called the philosophical mind, and is especially worthy of culture. ...You must have taken note of two classes of men, the one always employed on details, on particular facts, and the other using these facts as foundations of higher, wider truths. The
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latter are philosophers. ... In a word, one man sees all things apart and in
fragments, whilst another strives to
discover the harmony, connection, unity
of all. ... To build up that strength of
mind which apprehends and cleaves to
great universal truths, is the highest
intellectual self-culture:...

Although Channing agrees with Newman as to what "intellectual
culture" is, he differs as to the means of acquiring intellectual growth.
To him, popular institutions "present at the same moment to a whole
people great subjects of thought, and bring multitudes to the earnest
discussion of them... It is in such stirring schools, after all, that the
mind of a people is chiefly formed." 2 Channing, in Newman's view, has
mistaken the diffusion of knowledge resulting from popular education for
enlargement of mind and has thus earned Newman's censure: "...call
things by their right names, and do not confuse together ideas which are
essentially different" (231.10-12). Newman is pointing out that such
writers as Channing do confuse acquirement with enlargement.

232.5-6 "having seen a Red Indian or Caffir, or having
measured a palaeotherion." These are examples of fact-gathering from the
anthropological and biological fields of knowledge that are individual
pieces of knowledge interesting in themselves, but not at all concerned

with truths or principles" (232.4).

232.6-7 "Education...is nothing less than a formation of the mind" is a concise definition of education omitted from the 1873 edition.

232.17-20 "A University is,...an Alma Mater,...not a foundry, or a mint, or a treadmill." The metaphor of a university as an "alma mater" (See Discourse V, 140.3-6) emphasizes Newman's idea of education as a growth of the individual watched over assisted, and in the company of those personally involved with the student's "enlargement" of mind and character. Newman writes that "Truth has been upheld in the world not as a system, not by books, not by argument, nor by temporal power, but by the personal influence of such men..., who are at once the teachers and the patterns of it;..." 1 Whereas, the "foundry,...mint,...treadmill" comparison depicts the utilitarian concept of education as "acquirement" of knowledge in various branches of study that results in education being reduced to an impersonal, mechanical process in which the student follows a meaningless round of subjects to be moulded, with all his fellows; for progress in society.

These two contrasting metaphors of the university as an "alma mater" or as "a foundry, or a mint, or a treadmill" depict Newman's idea of a university as contrasted with the idea of a university that he regretfully sees being accepted in his own day. It is the "alma mater" concept of the university that Newman hopes to persuade his audience to realize in the proposed University of Ireland rather than the "foundry...treadmill" concept of a university already existing in the London

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University and the Queen's Colleges, recently established in Ireland.

232.21.-233.13 "I protest to you, Gentlemen, that if I had to choose between a so-called University, which dispensed with residence and tutorial superintendence, ... exacted of its members an acquaintance with every science under the sun." Newman is stating his preference for the pre-Reformed Oxford system of the 1790's to the concept of a university that has grown out of the criticism of that system. (See Discourse VII, 246.4-23).

233.14-16 "... if results be the test of systems, the influence of the public schools and colleges of England." Newman maintains that results bear out the fact that the Oxford system, flawed as it was, "was the more successful in training, moulding, enlarging the mind, which sent out men the more fitted for their secular duties, which produced better public men, men of the world, men whose names would descend to posterity, ..." (233.6-10) than a University "which exacted of its members an acquaintance with every science under the sun" (233.12-13). Newman prophetically asks the rhetorical question "what would come, ... of the ideal systems of education which fascinate the imagination of this age..., and whether they would not produce a generation languid, frivolous, fresourceless, and imbecile, remains to be seen;" (233.18-23).

233.24 - 234.1 "...the Universities and scholastic establishments,... of ethics." The deficiencies of Oxford referred to in
these lines, Newman described more fully in one of his University Sketches: He writes in "Abuses of the Colleges, Oxford" that "the Colleges, left to themselves, in the course of the last century became shamefully indolent and inactive. They were in no sense any longer places of education; they were for the most part mere clubs, and sinecures, and almshouses, where the inmates did little but enjoy themselves. They did next to nothing for the youth confided to them: suffered them to follow their own ways and enjoy their own liberty, and often in their own persons set them a very bad example of using it." 1

However by the time that Newman arrived in Oxford as a student in 1816 the abuses had been corrected to some extent. (See above Discourse I, 4.3-21 and 4.21-26). When Newman himself was tutor of Oriel College, Oxford in the years 1828-1832 it was "a virtual unbelief, and a hollow profession of Christianity" (233.28-29) that Newman himself sought to change by the personal influence involved in his pastoral care view of the tutorship.

234.1-3 "God forbid I should defend in the concrete...falls under my present subject." This sentence, omitted from the 1873 edition, indicates that Newman is commending the Oxford system in these discourses only so far as that system illustrates the kind of the liberal education he is advocating and forms a contrast to the utilitarian concept he is

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criticizing.

234.3-10 "I say, at least they can boast...able to subdue the
earth, able to tyrannize over Catholics." This sentence is rhetorically
effective in that it counters one of the main objections to liberal
education in the minds of many of Newman's audience; namely, that such
an education would serve, as far as they could see, no practical purpose.

But Newman is saying to his Irish audience, if you want the kind of
education that can boast of "heroes and statesmen,...of men conspicuous
for great natural virtues, for habits of business,...for practical
judgment" (234.4-7)--the kind of education that made the English your
rulers--then adopt the liberal education that was the ideal of Oxford.

This sentence just touches briefly, in its last phrases, what
was the underlying purpose of the Discourses and the reason Newman was so
very eager to embark on the project of founding a university: he wanted
to make available to the Irish and English laymen the same quality of
education that Oxford had given to the leaders of English society for
generations.

234.12 - 236.8 "When a multitude of young persons...influence
of its moral atmosphere." This section explains the aspects of the
English university system that educated "a succession of heroes and
statesmen, of literary men and philosophers,..."(234.4-5). Newman's
description of the process of learning that takes place among "keen...and
observant young persons"(234.12-14) resembles that of his depiction of
the learning process itself. "The students come from different places, with widely different notions," (235.3-4); thus "the conversation of all is a series of lectures to each, and they gain for themselves new ideas and views,...and distinct principles for judging and acting..." (234.16-20), until "the whole assemblage is moulded together, and gains one tone and one character" (235.8-9). Thus Dewman has described the learning process of the university student body in the same terms as he depicted the enlargement of the individual's mind; namely, "we refer what we learn to what we know already" (213.28-29) so as to form "a connected view of old and new, past and present, far and near, and which has an insight into the influence of all these one on another; without which there is no whole, and no centre" (214.10-14).

235.11-14 "I am not dreaming of...anything truly Christian,...as animating... ." This phrase, omitted from the 1873 edition, indicates that Dewman is speaking, in this discourse, of a university as a human organization from a temporal point of view.

235.14-18 "...they will constitute a whole, they will embody a specific idea,...principles of thought and action." The university as "the world on a small field" (235.2) will, in its organization, doctrine, and code of conduct, represent that unity of view that is a prerequisite for a liberal education.

235.21 "...genius loci,..." is, in this context, a "spirit of the place" which "imbues and forms,...one by one, every individual who
is successively brought under its shadow" (235.22-25); the result for the student is "the distinct stamp it impresses on his mind, and...the bond of union which it creates between him and others,..." (236.3-5) both fellow students and professors. See "What is a University?" Historical Sketches. III, p. 16.

236.8-11 "Here then...of the intellect." It is in such an institution that what Newman terms "real teaching" (236.9) takes place and its result is the "cultivation of the intellect" (236.11).

236.13-24 "...it is a something, and it does a something... pompous anniversary." In contrast to the university described in 234. 12-236.8 is the institution that bases its idea of education on acquirement, or in other words, on the "passive reception of scraps and details" (236.12-13). The result is an institution with "no mutual sympathies and no inter-communion,...with no common principles" (236.16-18), "which, professing so much, really does so little for the mind" (237.6-7).

237.7-10 "Shut your College gates...entrance into your babel." The comparison of an institution of learning that presents to the students "a large set of subjects, different in kind, and connected by no wide philosophy" (236.20-21) to the tower of Babel emphasizes the meaninglessness of a profusion of subjects without a unity of principle.

238.6-17 "...those earnest...habit of application." Here Newman describes the process of an education based on acquirement and involving the tyranny of the memory. The result for the students is
that "they leave their place of education simply dissipated and relaxed by the multiplicity of subjects, which they have never really mastered,..." (238.22-24).

239.1-32 "How much more profitable...poetry of his own!"

Rather than subject the mind to such an education as described in 238.6-17, Newman suggests that the person of independent mind might better read in the Book of Nature and the Book of Literature and thus "fashion for himself a philosophy and a poetry of his own" (239.21-22).

239.7-8 "...exiled Prince..." tongues in the trees,...running brooks!" The quotation is from Shakespeare's As You Like It, II, 1, 16.

239.15-16 "...as the village school and books a few supplied" is from George Crabbe's Tales of the Hall, published in 1819. George Crabbe (1754-1832), in his concern for the suffering of the peasantry was realistic, objective, and analytical. Crabbe fearlessly set down the harshness and desolation of human nature as he saw it.

Newman describes Crabbe's Tales of the Hall a Classic: "A Work, which can please in youth and age, seems to fulfil (in logical language) the 'accidental definition' of a Classic." (239.26-28)

The foregoing references to As You Like It and Tales of the Hall are literary references to Newman's injunction that "self-education in any shape, in the most restricted sense, is preferable to a system of teaching, which, professing so much, really does so little for the mind" (237.4-7).
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In summary, Newman has been differentiating between enlargement of mind and acquirement of mere knowledge or information. The former is a result of intellectual growth and the latter describes a collection of details. A. D. Culler has problems with the imagery involved in the term "enlargement" (See Culler, The Imperial Intellect, pp. 206-207), but Newman's imagery is clear. In Newman's discussion there are, as it were, different levels or degrees of enlargement. The first level is that of acquirement of information—a prerequisite to enlargement of mind in the complete sense: this first level is represented by the baby whose widening vision gradually makes sense of his surroundings; then the school child stores his mind and memory with treasures for a future day. "It is the seven years of plenty with him" (206.13-14). Next, there is the enlargement of mind that occurs when one experiences new situations or encounters new ideas. At this stage the mind is stocked with facts, scraps and details of information, to use Newman's imagery, as is a "bookseller's shop: it is of great value to others, even when not to the owner" (226.6-7). Newman describes the condition of the mind as follows: "They abound in information in detail, curious and entertaining, about men and things;" (215.13-15), but unless the mind relates what it acquires to what it already knows and sees the "mutual and true relations" (214.15-16) of its knowledge, it remains on the first levels of enlargement that of acquirement or aquisition: "the multiplicity of external objects, which they have encountered, forms no symmetrical and consistent picture upon the imagination; they see the
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'...on the wrong side, and it tells no story' (216.2-6).

On the other hand, the enlargement of mind that benefits the mind itself is a growth, a widening of the horizons of the mind much as one's view widens as one ascends to the summit. Then one has a "whole [or] centre" (214.14), a position or set of principles from which to view new ideas and situations. The "intellectual eyes" (232.10) can determine "landmarks to guide him to a conclusion" (216.25-26). This true enlargement or enlightenment, an intellectual habit that becomes a permanent quality of the mind, consists "in the mind's energetic and simultaneous action upon and towards and among those new ideas, which are rushing in upon it...it is the action of a formative power, reducing to order and meaning the matter of our acquirements;...[it is] a comparison of ideas one with another, as they come before the mind, and a systematizing of them. We feel our minds to be growing and expanding 'then,' when we not only learn, but refer what we learn to what we know already. It is not a mere addition to our knowledge [the enlargement resulting from detail], which is illumination; but the locomotion, the movement onwards, of that moral centre, to which both what we know, and what we are learning, the accumulating mass of our acquirements, gravitate" (213.15-214.4). It is then that the intellectual enlargement allows one's mind to assimilate the unity or whole that is the basis of creation and therefore of knowledge and thus to take a philosophic or over-all view.
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Newman has been drawing an implied contrast between the kind of education that produces a perfection of mind, an intellectual habit, which gives the mind "intellectual eyes to know withal" (232.10-11) and the education proposed by Brougham and company and made concrete in London University and the Queen's Colleges. Newman describes "the better specimen of the fruit of that ambitious system, which has of late years been making way among us" (238.18-20) as follows: students "leave their place of education simply dissipated and relaxed by the multiplicity of subjects, which they have never really mastered, and so shallow as not even to know their 'shallowness' (238.22-25).

Newman gives what seems a prophetic description of an educational system based not on the cultivation of the intellect, but on "a sort of passive reception of scraps and details" (236.12-13). He writes that no real education "will issue from the most strenuous efforts of a set of teachers, with no mutual sympathies and no inter-communion, of a set of examiners with no opinions they dare profess, and with no common principles, who are teaching or questioning a set of youths who do not know them, and do not know each other, on a large set of subjects, different in kind, and connected by no wide philosophy, three times a week, or three times a year, or once in three years, in chill lecture rooms or on a pompous anniversary" (236.14-24). The result of such a system of instruction in which the mind is distracted and enfeebled by an unmeaning profusion of subjects (226.22-24) Newman
aptly compares to the confusion and tumult associated with the building of the biblical Tower of Babel.

The foregoing description, which Newman visualizes as the issue of Brougham's system of education, is the opposite to the education resulting from a grouping of "open-hearted, sympathetic, and observant" (234.13) young people into a "youthful community...[that] will constitute a whole, they will represent a doctrine, they will administer a code of conduct, and they will furnish principles of thought and action. They will give birth to a living teaching which in course of time will take the shape of a self-perpetuating tradition, or a 'genius loci',...; which haunts the home where it has been born, and which imbues and forms, more or less, and one by one, every individual who is successively brought under its shadow" (235.14-25). The result is a kind of education characterized by an organic growth, and a movement onward toward a centre that results in a living teaching and a self-perpetuating tradition that Newman describes as a "genius loci" (235.21). The education based on the cultivation of the intellect is a gradual ascent of knowledge through the various levels of enlargement of mind to the summit of philosophy—the over-all view, or as Newman describes the quality of mind in this Discourse VII, enlightenment, illumination, or "an enlargement, not of tumult, but of peace" (212.18-19).
ANNOTATION OF THE DISCOURSES

Chapter XIV

DISCOURSE VIII. PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE VIEWED IN RELATION TO PROFESSIONAL

In Discourse VIII Philosophical Knowledge or Liberal Knowledge is viewed in relation to Professional Knowledge. This discussion is the second of three in which Newman investigates "those qualities and characteristics of the intellect, in which its [Liberal Knowledge's] cultivation issues or rather consists" (204.24-26). See above, 205.1-8.

In order to discuss the relation between Liberal and Professional Knowledge Newman refers to the historic controversy over this very subject that raged in the first decade of the nineteenth century between the Edinburgh Reviewers—John Playfair, Richard Payne Knight, and Sydney Smith—and the Oxford defenders—Dr. Copleston and John Davison. Discourse VIII, therefore, consists of extensive quotations from these writers as historical authority for the two aspects of the problem, as well Newman's own comments on the liberal versus useful education issue.

241.1 – 243.17 These introductory paragraphs refer to the main ideas presented in the two preceding discourses: Discourse VI in which Newman insisted "on the cultivation of the intellect as an end which may reasonably be pursued for its own sake" (241.2-4) and Discourse VII which dealt with "what that cultivation consists in" (241.5).

241.5-6 "Truth of whatever kind is the proper object of the
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intellect;... ." See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1139a 2-1139b 11
for the idea that "the proper object of contemplation is truth."

241.11-17 "We know,...by going round an object,...exercises
of mind." These sentences are a restatement of an often-used Newman
metaphor for describing the way in which the intellect obtains truth.
(See Discourse IV, 126.15-1); Discourse VII, 220.27-221.4;) for a
previous statement of the reconnaissance metaphor.

242.9 "...yet we lingering in the vestibule of knowledge..."
is an expression that well describes the fact that the "acquirement"
Newman discussed in Discourse VII is the entrance or means, as it were,
to liberal knowledge, but is not that knowledge itself.

242.13-15 "...he may have no power at all of advancing one
step forward of himself, in consequence of what he has already
acquired,... ." This statement expresses one of several disabilities
suffered by a person whose mind lingers "in the vestibule of knowledge"
(See 242.9-10). (See Discourse VII, 213.12-23; 213.29-214.4;) for the
idea of the "scientific formation of the mind" (242.20) being a dynamic
process.

242.26-27 "...the eye of the mind, of which the object is
truth, is the work of discipline and habit." (See Discourse VII, 232.
6-14;) for the elaboration of the philosophical habit's resulting in
clarity of intellectual vision. It is a liberal education that develops
the "eye of the mind".
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243.18 - 244.9 "Now this is what some great men...science of every kind." These lines contain a statement of the utility point of view in education as well as the statement Newman will answer throughout the discourse, "what is the real worth in the market, of the article called 'a Liberal Education'" (244.1-2).

244.10 - 246.3 "These views...the general cultivation of the mind,..." This section, with the references to Locke, was in the 1873 edition omitted from the present context and placed after what is in the 1853 edition, 268.8. Since the reference to Locke, which is, "Some Thoughts Concerning Education," Works (1824), VIII, 86-87, 167, and 152-153, is a particular reference for the preceding paragraph (243.18 - 244.9) in which Newman outlines the point of controversy, "what is the real worth in the market, of the article called, 'a Liberal Education',...it more logically belongs in this context rather than after the mention of the Edinburgh Reviewers and the Oxford defenders.

Newman begins his commentary by quoting his adversaries so that he can, rhetorically, knock down the straw men he has set up before his audience. Chronologically and logically he begins with Locke who states the case for utility in education: "'Reason, if consulted with, would advise, that their children's time should be spent in acquiring what might be useful to them, when they come to be men, rather than their heads should be stuffed with a deal of trash, a great part whereof they usually never do...think on again as long as they live';" (244.17-24)
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Then Newman turns to those in the present age who debated the question initiated in the passages quoted from Locke.

246.9 "...a celebrated Northern Review..." refers to the Edinburgh Review which published a series of articles from 1806 to 1811 criticizing the traditional Oxford education. The first of these articles was a review by John Playfair, professor of natural philosophy at Edinburgh, of Laplace's Traité de mécanique céleste in the January, 1806 issue, vol. XIII, pp. 249-264. (See above for the note on Laplace Discourse IV, 134.23). Only the final paragraphs in which Playfair laments "the inferiority of the English mathematicians to those of the continent" contain the criticism, "that it is chiefly in the public institutions of England that we are to seek for the cause of the deficiency here referred to, and particularly in the two great centres from which knowledge is supposed to radiate over all the rest of the island" (263). He continues with such insults as the following directed towards Oxford: "...where the dictates of Aristotle are still listened to as infallible decrees, and where the infancy of science is mistaken for its maturity,..." (283). Cambridge, which the Reviewer refers to as "the other seminary" is criticized for demanding its students to learn geometry "as a child does his Catechism, by heart, so as to answer

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1 Edinburgh Review, XXII (January, 1806), p. 262. Subsequently, in this discourse, all page numbers referring to the Edinburgh Review will be noted in parenthesis after the quotation.
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readily to certain interrogations" (283). He concludes his remarks
about the two great universities by saying, "We would wish to see, then,
some of those secular accelerations by which improvements go on
increasing from age to age" (284).

The second article in the Edinburgh Review criticisms of the
old universities was written by Richard Payne Knight (not Lord Jeffrey
as Newman supposed) 1, in the July, 1809 issue, XXVIII, pp. 429-441.
The article entitled, "The Oxford Edition of Strabo" criticizes the
scholarship and the Latin of the edition of Oxford. The publication of
Strabo's Herum Geographicorum Libri XVII, by the Oxford Clarendon Press,
gave Knight the opportunity, afforded by an apparently careless edition
of Strabo, to criticize Oxford education. He begins in these words:
"Nothing is at all comparable, in point of extent and magnificence, to
the endowment of the University of Oxford,—or to the veneration which
is there paid to the Greek and Latin languages. A competent knowledge
of these tongues, is the principal, if not the sole intellectual accom-
plishment required in individuals to qualify them for enjoying the
benefits of the very valuable and extensive ecclesiastical patronage
possessed by the different colleges; and a critically accurate
knowledge of them is justly esteemed the most safe and effectual means
of forming the taste, moulding the judgment, and directing the
imagination of those, whose stations or talents befit them for more

1 A. Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 220.
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active scenes of life, and open to their dawning ambition the more
brilliant prospects of political advancement." ¹

Knight's criticism takes the following form: the University
of Oxford is a richly endowed institution that enjoys "extensive
ecclesiastical patronage" (430), provides "comfortable annuities, and ample
revenues" (430) for its instructors, but professes "a competent
knowledge of Greek and Latin which its members, according to the example
of the Strabo edition, do not possess." Knight also indirectly hits at
the narrowness from which the Oxford world suffers when he states that
"a successful edition of Aristotle's Poetics was produced by an auxiliary
volunteer, residing in the metropolis, engaged in business, and never
secluded from the avocations of society" (451). The narrownesstheme
was to be one the Oxford critics would develop.

Knight ends his criticism with the following statements:
"...the concern that we feel at seeing such a pile of rubbish heaped up
with so much labour, and under the function of such authority, has been
serious indeed.... That there are men of learning in the University of
Oxford competent to a great undertaking of this kind, we can scarcely
allow ourselves to doubt; and happy should we be to rouse their industry
and stimulate their ambition, so as to make them shake off the benumbing

¹ Edinburgh Review, LXVIII (July 1809), pp. 429-430.
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influence of port and prejudice,..." (441).

The other two articles from the Edinburgh Review are Sydney
Smith's review of R. L. Edgeworth's Essays on Professional Education,
XXX (October, 1809), pp. 40-53; and a joint effort by Playfair,
Knight and Smith, entitled, "A Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh
Review Against Oxford; containing an Account of Studies pursued in that
University," XXXI (April, 1810), pp. 158-167. The latter is a review
of and a reply to the pamphlet of the same title written by Provost
Coplestone. See below 246.10.

Since these two articles are referred to by Newman in
Discourse VIII, comment will be reserved until the pertinent lines.

246.10 "...defenders of the University of Oxford..." The
first defender was Dr. Coplestone, Provost of Oriel College, Oxford, who
wrote a pamphlet, "A Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review
Against Oxford; containing an Account of Studies pursued in that
University." Coplestone also wrote a Second and a Third Reply to the
Edinburgh Review published in one volume, with the First Reply by the

John Davison was the second, and acknowledged by Newman to be
the more effective defender of Oxford's Classical curriculum. See
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II, pp. 375-420. He wrote the following articles in the Quarterly Review: the first was a review of Copleston's "A Reply..." and "A Second Reply...", in the August, 1810 issue, pp. 177-206; and the second was a review of "Edgeworth's Essays on Professional Education" in the October 1811 issue, pp. 166-191. These articles are discussed below with reference to Newman's quotations from them.

246.11-19 "Hardly had the authorities...set on foot a plan for the education of the youth committed to them,...the reform was taking." Newman is referring to the reforms of the examination system led by Provost John Eveleigh of Oriel College. Newman for rhetorical emphasis represents the Edinburgh Reviewers as unjustly attacking "the direction and shape which the reform was taking" (246.18-19) when the university was already in the process of reform. Actually, the reform undertaken by the University of Oxford was an internal reform meant to correct abuses that had crept into its own Litterae Humaniores course. What the Reviewers wanted was a change in Philosophy of University Education; that is, a greater emphasis on contemporary, and therefore, useful subjects.

246.24 - 247.5 "'Classical Literature...its name something less.'" The quotation is from Sydney Smith's review of "Edgeworth's Professional Education," The Edinburgh Review, XXIX (October, 1809), p.51.

247.6-19 "In this passage...sentences which follow." This
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paragraph, omitted from the 1873 edition, contains three important comments on the Edinburgh Review article: first that the article has "laid down the principle of Utility as the basis of University Education" (247.6-8), and secondly, as a consequence of that principle, has advocated "a number of unconnected and independent educations going on at the same time in the same place..." (247.10-12)—a concept that is contrary to the unity of knowledge concept Newman has maintained in Discourses II to V. Thirdly, it follows "that the young men who come for education are not the supreme and real end of a University,..." (247.14-16). Following from the Reviewer's idea of education is the subject-centred, not student-centred university—again contrary to Newman's idea of education as an individual growth and development. The university then becomes a centre for "the advancement of science" (247.16-17) that will be useful "to mankind at large" (247.18). The philosophy of utility in education results in the individual's losing his importance at the centre of education and the concept of education for the progress of "mankind at large" becoming the purpose of a university. Nowhere else in the discourses does Newman express the foregoing important ideas so clearly as he does in this passage; therefore, its omission from the 1873 edition severely restricts the interpretation of Newman's educational thought.

247.20 — 248.19 "When a University...imagination inflamed"
The Edinburgh Review, XXIX (October, 1809), pp. 51-52.
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248.20 - 251.9 These paragraphs, which are Newman's comments on the Reviewer's remarks quoted above, 247.20 - 248.19, were omitted from the 1873 edition. Newman begins his comment by noting that the Reviewers cannot possibly agree with the extremes of Edgeworth's theory: Edgeworth "carries out the theory of the Reviewers to lengths which they themselves must consider extreme;..." (248.24-26); what Newman leaves unsaid is the fact that Edgeworth's work is merely an occasion for the Reviewer's own remarks.

249.8-9 "'all liberal arts...human life'." The context of the quotation is as follows: "...but if all liberal arts and sciences useful to human life had been taught there,...the system of such an University would have been much more valuable, but the splendour of its name something less."¹ The Reviewer's contention throughout his article is that the older universities are restricting their curriculum to the classics in order to retain their reputation for erudition as well as the time-honoured preferment to political and social advantage that followed from an Oxford or Cambridge degree.

249.19-23 "But these Reviewers...unwilling to give up the word 'liberal,'...what it means." In stating, "I do not profess to understand the writer or writers of the above passages very clearly" (249.5-7), Newman makes effective rhetorical use of the fact that the

¹ The Edinburgh Review, XXIX (October 1809), p. 51.
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Reviewer has not defined his terms "liberal" and "useful" and had thereby weakened his argument.

249.24-26 "...they wish one student of a University to 'dedicate' himself to chemistry, and another to 'mathematics'." The reference is to the Edgeworth review, p. 51. The idea expressed by the Reviewer is contrary to the concept of liberal education as a means of developing the individual. The dedication to one subject results in the progress and development of the subject, not the person. The result is the narrowing of the intellectual vision that Newman so deplored in Discourse IV. Newman has remarked that he who knows only his own subject does not even know that.

250.6-12 "There is in that case no such thing as a University; ...preceding Discourse." See above Discourse V, 139.22-29.

250.20-25 "...and so it is decided that residence is not necessary for him; that attendance merely for the examinations will suffice; nay, that it may be even better to make the University perambulate, and hold its visitations here and there in turn." These characteristics--applicable to some present-day universities--Newman terms "a 'reductio ad absurdum' of this theory of Utility, as applied to a University" and advocated by the Edinburgh Reviewers.

250.27 - 251.4 "A common home...found on the banks of the Seine and of the Isis." See above Discourse VI for Newman's comparison
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of a university to a home. In historical Sketches, Vol. III there is a
relevant passage in which Newman is describing the intellectual movement
towards the end of the fourth century which resulted in the public or
grammar schools developing into universities: Newman writes that, "No
such movement could happen, without the rise of some deep and comprehen-
sive philosophy; and, when it rose, then the existing Trivium and Quad-
rivium became the subjects, and the existing seats of learning the
scene, of its victories; and next the curiosity and enthusiasm, which
it excited, attracted larger and larger numbers to places which were
hitherto but local centres of education. Such a gathering of students,
such a systematizing of knowledge, are the notes of a university." 1

The foregoing passage gives explicitly three important notes
of a university: a "deep and comprehensive philosophy", "a systematizing
of knowledge," and "a gathering of students" to one centre that would be
their intellectual home. These three characteristics are implied in the
discourses, but not so clearly stated.

Also in these lines, Newman has again stressed the living,
developing aspect of education when he insists on the necessity of a
University being "a common home...a body...a living power" (250.27-251.
2).

251.2-4 "...that great and noble creation of the Church,

1 J. H. Newman, "Schools of Charlemagne," Historical Sketches,
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which once was found on the banks of the Seine and of the Isis." In Historical Sketches, Vol. III Newman writes of Charlemagne having established "in Paris a Universal School like that at Rome" and of his confining the schools to certain central and celebrated spots, not more than to three in his whole empire—Paris, and in Italy, Pavia and Bologna."

251.5-8 "All this, ...so steady an advocate." Newman has routed the Reviewers first, by illustrating that the end result of their Utility philosophy is a "reductio ad absurdum" of the idea of a university even so far as the Reviewers themselves are concerned in that it carries the Philosophy of Utility to "lengths which they themselves must consider extreme" (248.24-25). Secondly, Newman has successfully discredited his opponents' arguments by showing that the Reviewers have not foreseen the end result of their reasoning.

251.8-28 "but still, ...intellectual portion of our nature?" Newman answers Locke's question first by a rhetorically effective agreement with Locke's contention that "nothing is worth pursuing but what is useful; ..." (251.10-11), but then he proceeds to meet Locke's objection to Liberal studies by showing in what way these studies can be considered useful. Newman has stated "that intellectual culture is in itself; for what has its end in itself, has its use in itself also" (251.16-18).

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2 Ibid., p. 157.
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Then to explain that whatever is a good has a use in and for itself, Newman cites the following comparison: "for if a healthy body is a good in itself, why not a healthy intellect? and if a College of Physicians is a useful institution, because it contemplates bodily health, why not an Academical Body, though it were simply and solely engaged in imparting vigour and beauty and grasp to the intellectual portion of our nature?" (251.22-28). The analogy of the usefulness of an Academical Body dedicated solely to imparting health of intellect to a College of Physicians concerned with promoting bodily health is Newman's most effectively convincing answer to his useful education opponents from Locke to the Edinburgh Reviewers.

252.4-22 "'The present state...prove his assertions'." From, the review of "Edgeworth's Professional Education," The Edinburgh Review, XXIX (October, 1809), pp. 48-49.

252.20 - 253.15 "Now, I am not at present...call a useful education." Newman skilfully answers the Reviewer's charge that a classical education "'cultivates the 'imagination' a great deal too much" (252.5-6) by stating that he is not dealing with the subject of a classical education, but if he were he would question the use of the term "imaginative" as applicable to a classical education. But then using the same rhetorical tactics as he did in dealing with Locke, Newman turns the Reviewer's words to his own account by saying "what they mean by 'useful' is just what I mean by 'good' or 'liberal'" (253.7-8).
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Treated in such a way the entire question of "useful" versus "liberal" becomes a verbal one. Newman has defeated his opponents by dissolving the question and thereby dispersing the opposition.

255.28 - 256.18 "...as health ought to precede labour...to which another is a stranger." This paragraph adds to the health of mind and health of body analogy the idea that "as health ought to precede labour of the body (255.28-29)...so in like manner general culture of mind is the best aid to professional and scientific study,..." (256.4-5). The foregoing words are Newman's statement about the relation between Philosophy (Philosophical Knowledge) and Professional Knowledge; that is, Philosophy, or what to Newman is the effect of Liberal Knowledge, prepares the intellect for Professional knowledge. As Newman expresses the idea: one who has acquired "general culture of mind" (256.4) "will be placed in that state of intellect in which he can take up any one of the sciences or callings...with an ease, a grace, a versatility, and a success, to which another is a stranger" (256.14-18).

256.27 - 257.1 "In saying that Law...or Medicine" Newman is anticipating a misapprehension and therefore correcting in advance the idea that he would not advocate the teaching of the professions in a university, but rather he states, a university "teaches 'all' knowledge by teaching all 'branches' of knowledge,..." (257.3-4).

257.4-20 "I do but say...his liberal education." Newman
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maintains that the professor of Law, Medicine, or Political Economy will

gain the advantage within the university of knowing "where he and his

science stand, he has come to it, as it were, from a height, he has

taken a survey of all knowledge," (257.12-14). Newman frequently uses

the reconnaissance metaphor to make clear the ability to take an over-all

view that is the product of a liberal education.

257.26-29 "I say that a cultivated intellect, because it is a

good in itself, adds a power and a grace to every exercise and occupation

which it undertakes." This sentence is Newman's answer to Locke's

fallacy "that no education is useful which does not teach us some

temporal calling..." (257.24-25). In the 1873 edition Newman adds the

following which clarifies his refutation of Locke: a cultivated intellect

...enables us to be more useful, and to a greater number. There is a duty we

owe to human society as such, to the state to which we belong, to the sphere

in which we move, to the individuals towards whom we are variously related,

and whom we successively encounter in life; and that philosophical or liberal

education, as I have called it, which is the proper function of a University if it

refuses the foremost place to professional interests, does but postpone them to the

formation of the citizen, and, while it subserves the larger interests of

philanthropy, prepares also for the successful prosecution of those merely

personal objects, which at first sight it seems to disparage. 1

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The foregoing passage from the 1873 edition makes clear that for Newman a liberal education is useful in a very real sense in that it forms the person for his various roles in society as well as prepares the individual's mind for the personal interest of a professional training. For Newman, an education should form the entire person for his general role as a member of the family and the community, before it trains the doctor or the lawyer for the more narrow requirements of the professional world.

257.29 - 258.6 "And having thus opened the subject...seem like a digression." These sentences were omitted from the 1873 edition. They form an important thought-bridge between the views of the "useful" education advocates, Locke and the Edinburgh Reviewers, as well as Newman's own refutation, on the one hand; and the views of the Oxford defenders, on the other, whom Newman cites as the first defenders in the nineteenth century of the traditional Oxford classical education.

258.12-16 "In the heart of Oxford, there is a small plot of ground,...the home of one society for above five hundred years." That "Society" was Oriel College founded in 1326 by Adam de Brome, the Rector of St. Mary's and Almoner to Edward II. "The College of St. Mary, as Oriel was called in its first years, was a body of advanced scholars engaged in individual study but helping and stimulating each other by the community of their interests. It contained no undergraduate members, and it was not formally divided into the teachers and the taught but was a
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hierarchy of those more or less advanced in the prosecution of their

studies." 1

256.18-24 "In the old time...back in safety." By means of

the references in these lines, Newman is pointing out that Oriel

College, established in the days of active controversy between secular

and religious authorities, was founded as a religious house in honour

of the Blessed Virgin in fulfilment of Edward II's promise.

Newman is setting the stage for his later claim of eminence

for Oriel in the nineteenth century when he emphasizes the college's

founding as the fulfilment of a promise under such distinguished

heavenly and earthly patronage at a time when those associated with

other colleges in Oxford were engaging in anti-ecclesiastical

controversy.

256.16-17 "In the old time of Boniface the Eighth..."

Boniface VIII, Pope from 1294 to 1303, disagreed with Philip IV (1285-

1314) of France over the principle of clerical immunity from taxation.
The papal bull *Clerici laicos* (1296), which forebade the lay power to

exact and the clergy to grant taxes without papal consent, led to a

The entire controversy was the opening skirmish of a dispute about papal

authority which rocked the foundations of papal theocracy. 2


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1 A. Dwight Culler, *The Imperial Intellect*, p. 90.

2 Philip Hughes, *A Short History of the Catholic Church*, pp. 120-121.
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258.17 "John the Twenty-second, ..." was Pope from 1316 to 1334. His conflict with Lewis of Bavaria, eventually Roman Emperor, over papal theocracy gave rise to an ideological controversy which swept the European centres of learning for many years. With the publication of Defensor Pacis the papacy was explained as a human institution subordinate to the Emperor and his General Council. 1

258.18 John Duns Scotus (c.1265-1308), ordained a Franciscan priest in 1291, was the principal author of the two great commentaries on the Sentences, the Opus Oxoniense and the Reportata Parisiensia. He followed the Augustinian-Franciscan tradition of holding the doctrine of the superiority of will to intellect; thus he emphasized freedom rather than love, though he held the superiority of love to knowledge, a superiority which is closely connected with his theory that the supreme practical principle is that God should be loved above all things. Thus he is considered in some interpretations as the direct precursor of Ockham and Luther.

Scotus rejected the Thomist doctrine on our knowledge of the singular in his De Anima: he held that the singular is intelligible to us in our present state, but not in a complete and clear manner. Scotus' philosophy thus undermines the certainty of our knowledge. He also rejected the Thomist view of theology as a speculative science.

1 Philip Hughes, History of the Catholic Church, pp. 122-125.
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Since he held the priority of the will over the intellect, he considered Theology a practical science concerned with the regulation of conduct. 1 Many of the philosophical positions that Newman is combating in the nineteenth century would seem to have had their origin in the philosophy of John Scotus.

258.16 William of Occam (Ockham) (c.1300 - c.1349) was another member of the Franciscan Order who taught at Oxford. On trial for heresy, he took refuge at the court of Emperor Louis of Bavaria whose authority he upheld in his conflict with Pope John XXII. Occam's characteristic trend of speculation was nominalism. For him, since universals do not have objective reality, experimental knowledge, which gives us reality as it truly exists, is superior to conceptual knowledge. According to Occam, since the existence of God cannot be demonstrated, there is a separation between science and faith, between physics and metaphysics. What follows is the idea that they are opposed; as a result science would attempt to take the place of metaphysics and theology—a modern philosophical trend. 2

258.16 Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), the greatest of Italian

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poets and author of the Divine Comedy was steeped in all the learning of his time. As well, he was an original political thinker who in 1301 was banished from his city Florence by Boniface for his firm opposition to papal interference in Florentine politics and remained in exile for the rest of his life. Dante's opposition to papal temporal authority is the reason he is grouped here with Occam.

258.16 Wyclif (Wycliffe) (c.1320-1384), student and master of Balliol College, Oxford, was another drawn into the politico-ecclesiastical conflicts of the day. His De civili dominio argued that the church had no concern with temporal matters, that for the clergy to hold property is sinful, and that it is lawful for statesmen, as God's stewards, to deprive the clergy of such goods as they deem fit. He would rebuild Christianity on the sole basis of pious meditation on the Scripture. Wycliffe's treatise De eucharistia anticipated the teaching of the Protestant Reformers; thus the spirit of the English reformer had its influence on Luther and the Reformation.

258.18 John Huss (Hus) (1369-1415) was educated at the University of Prague where he began to lecture in 1398. He was subsequently dean of the philosophical faculty and rector of the university. The De Ecclesia, which furnished most of the material for

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1 Philip Hughes, History of the Catholic Church, pp. 136-137.
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the charges against him, was largely based on the doctrines of Wycliffe. By propagating the reformatory doctrines of Wycliffe, Huss may be said to have handed on to Luther the torch which kindled the Reformation.

All the names mentioned above from Boniface to Huss bring to mind some kind of political-ecclesiastical conflict. By contrast, Oriel College, orthodox in its preservation of tradition in those days of religious versus secular strife, was to be true to its tradition in its valiant nineteenth-century defense of a liberal education.

258.20-26 "...an unfortunate king of England,...City of Alfred;" Edward the Second, (1284-1327) that unfortunate king who was the subject of Marlowe's Tragedy, was defeated at Bannockburn by Robert Bruce in 1314. In fulfilment of his promise, in 1326, assisted by his Almoner Adam de Brome and building on de Brome's Society of Scholars, Edward II established the house of the Blessed Mary which became Oriel College.

259.4-8 "...but day by day a memento...in the Holy Sacrifice by...one Catholic Priest, once a member of that College,...many years." The reference is to Newman himself who had taken upon himself the responsibility of saying the Prayer for the Founders of Oriel College. "For several years now he had said prayers for 'The Universities as

1 Hughes, History, p. 137.
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schools of the Church' and for 'All my benefactors,' including Edward II
and Adam de Brome, the two founders of Oriel; Bishop Carpenter and
Archdeacon Franck, who had endowed fellowships in the fifteenth century;
and Edward Lord Leigh, who had bequeathed all his books to the college
library."

259.18-25 "But it had at that time a spirit working within
it,...conscience pointed out as best." See above the description of
Oriel's founding under auspicious circumstances for the explanation of
the phrase, "the honest purpose to administer the trust committed to
them..." (259.23-24).

259.25 - 260.9 "So, whereas the Colleges of Oxford...patrio-
tic grounds." Oriel, unlike other colleges in Oxford, did not restrict
its fellowships to members of its own college. Newman himself benefited
from Oriel's enlightened practice in that he, a Trinity graduate, was
awarded an Oriel fellowship in 1822.

260.9-23 "Wey,...with remarkable independence of mind,...
believed he had at heart." Other Oriel competitions were open to
members of Oxford from other colleges.

260.23 - 261.3 "Such persons did not promise...condition to
be her champion." Since the reform of Oriel College synchronized with

1 J. H. Newman, "Memoranda, Personal and Most Private, IV,"
quoted in A. Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 91.
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the reform afoot in the university it was natural, according to Newman, that when the Edinburgh Review stormed the ancient university with its attack on Oxford's exclusively classical education, the university should find its first defenders within the walls of Oriel College.

261.4-24 "These defenders,...combined against him." Newman commends Copleston by depicting him as a young knight, the champion of his college, with "that peculiar vigour and keenness of mind, which enabled him,...single-handed, with easy gallantry, to encounter and overthrow the charge of three giants of the North combined against him" (261.20-24).

261.29 - 262.5 "...Professor Playfair, Lord Jeffrey, and the Rev. Sydney Smith...into one article of their Review,...defence of his own Institutions." Actually, the "three giants of the North" (261.23-24) were Professor Playfair, Richard Payne Knight, and Sydney Smith. The article to which Newman refers was a review of and reply to Copleston's defence of Oxford, entitled "A Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review..." in the Edinburgh Review, XXXI (April 1810), pp. 158-187.

262.10-16 "As might be expected...would willingly use myself." These sentences express Newman's criticism of Copleston's "A Reply..." Although Newman has applied such complimentary terms as "scholarlike taste" and "purity of style" (262.9) to Copleston's reputation in general, he nevertheless pinpoints what he considers to be four
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weaknesses in Copleston's thought and method in "A Reply..." when he notes, "...his matter is various and heterogeneous, and his line of argument is discursive; he is not led to analyse his views on Education to their first principles, and...he adopts a more secular tone, than...I would willingly use myself" (262.13-16).

The third weakness of Copleston noted by Newman of not analyzing "his views on Education to their first principles" (262.13-14) is, ironically enough, one of the criticisms that Sydney Smith levels at those who have had an Oxford classical education. Smith writes, "...a classical scholar of twenty-three or twenty-four years of age, is a man principally conversant with works of imagination. ...nor has he formed the invaluable habit of pushing things up to their first principles,..."

The fourth weakness--"the secular tone"--is one reference Newman makes to the fact that Copleston was a member of the Oriel Noetics and therefore a liberal Oxford Anglican in the company of Whately, Hawkins, and Thomas Arnold. See also 267.23-26. It was the liberalism of such men that the Oxford Movement was meant to counter; furthermore, these Discourses on University Education were intended as an answer to the educational theory that was an expression of liberalism. Therefore, in actuality, Newman and Copleston had been growing further apart in cast of mind from the time of Newman's winning the Oriel fellowship in

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1 The Edinburgh Review, XXIX (October, 1809), p. 49.
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1822 until his writing of the present discourses in 1852.

However, Newman cites Copleston here in that they both express "sentiments, which are in substance the same, under the different exterior..." (262.18-19); they are then as "two witnesses,...to the same general representation" (262.21-22). But, the mention of Copleston's literary and scholarly weaknesses do cast a blight to some degree on his being a "witness" in behalf of liberal education and may account in part for Newman's omitting this section from 262.10 and the following two paragraphs to 264.2 from the 1873 edition.

262.23 - 263.5 "His mode then of answering...duties of his profession." Newman notes that although Copleston speaks of Literature and he of Philosophy, they both advocate "an intellectual culture...which is desirable for its own sake,...which saves him from narrowness and pedantry, both in society and amid the duties of his profession" (262.29-263.5).

When Copleston writes of Literature as the unifying factor in education, he is referring to the Classical Literature of Greece and Rome, which concerned pagan, but human, nature in all its heroism as well as its faults. In contrast to Newman's idea, Copleston would not consider Theology a unifying factor; in that, religion to the Oxford Hoetics was a mere matter of certain formalities, rather than a body of doctrine to be studied with serious intellectual intent.
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263.1-2 "...the education of the man, not the lawyer,..." Copleston and Newman agree that intellectual culture is desirable for the education of the person.

263.5-9 "Speaking...he maintains that the knowledge useful to an individual, and the knowledge useful to a community, are, not only not the same, but are directly contrary to each other;" See Dr. Copleston, "A Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburga Review,..." Chapter III, pp. 105-106. The foregoing idea is expressed by Copleston in the three paragraphs preceding those quoted by Newman. (See below 263.15 - 267.9).

263.9-14 "...that division...not that of the community." In these two clauses Newman presents the gist of the six paragraphs he has quoted from Copleston. The last clause, "...that the end of direct Liberal education is the good of the individual, and not that of the community" (263.12-14) expresses a main reason Liberal Education, even before 1852, had fallen into disfavour as a philosophy of education. Such was the trend that began in Newman's day with the economic theories of Adam Smith which made all subservce the progress of the community. As a result, the individual's own growth and development as a person became not only irrelevant to, but also positively in conflict with, the progress of the community. See 266.4-5 for this idea quoted by Newman from Copleston.

The foregoing is the popular conception of Liberal Education; that is, that it benefits the individual in an inverse ratio to its
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benefit to the state. But Newman, with quotations from Davison, proves
that a Liberal Education renders ultimate and indispensable benefits to
society.

263.15 - 267.9 "'It is sometimes asked,...of peace and war'.'"

This section is a quotation from Copleston's "A Reply to the Columnies
of the Edinburgh Review,...'Chapter III, pp.106 to 112. Within this
quotation the following two paragraphs were omitted from the 1873
dition: 263.15 - 264.2 and 264.22 - 265.7.

Newman's omissions in Copleston's text are indicated in the
1853 text, but not in the 1873 edition.

Newman gives Copleston's ideas his own emphasis by omitting
and adding italics. For example, Newman italicizes the following
sentence: "'...although the art itself is advanced by this concentration
of mind in its service, the individual who is confined to it goes back.'"

This sentence does summarize the effect of the application of Smith's
principle of the division of labour in the form of a specialization in
one subject, and is, therefore, a key idea in Copleston's context that
is worthy of particular note.

266.16-22 "'In the cultivation of literature...more or less
infected.'" Newman has noted in 262.25-27 that Copleston "speaks of
Literature, whereas I have spoken of Philosophy" (262.26-27) as the
cultivation of which "'without directly qualifying a man for any of the
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employments of life,...enriches and ennobles all''' (266.28 - 267.1).

267.7-9 "'to perform justly...of peace and war?' The reference is to John Milton's "On Education." Newman added the footnote for the source of the reference which Copleston had omitted.

267.10-18 "The same subject...by posterity." Newman refers to the two reviews by John Davison in the Quarterly Review mentioned above, 246.10 as treating the subject of Liberal Education "with greater care and distinctness,...with greater force and beauty and perfection, both of thought and of language,..." than Copleston has achieved in his "A Reply..." In his article entitled, "John Davison" (1842) (See above 246.10), Newman writes, "His [Davison's] review of Mr. Edgeworth's Professional Education, the best sustained and most self-possessed, is also one of the earliest of his writings." 1

267.19-23 "a very remarkable person,...towards Catholicism,..." Newman refers to John Keble as "the first author of" (267.20) the Oxford Movement, which resulted in many, including Newman himself, entering the Catholic Church. See Newman's essay, "John Keble" (1846), Essays Critical and Historical, Vol. II, pp. 421-453 in which Newman, in the course of a critical appreciation of Keble's Lyra Innocentium (1846), unearth's the Catholic elements in Keble's poetry. See in particular,

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pp. 440 - 441.

Newman, designating Keble as "the true and primary author"\(^1\) of
the Tractarian Movement, writes in the Apologia, "...Sunday, July 14th,
Mr. Keble preached the Assize Sermon in the University Pulpit. It was
published under the title of 'National Apostasy.' I have ever considered
and kept the day, as the start of the religious movement of 1833."\(^2\)

267.23-26 "(As on the other hand, Dr. Copleston, was the
master and head of that opposite school of thinkers, which numbers among
its members Dr. Whately)." The foregoing parenthesis was omitted from
the 1873 edition. The parenthesis is important in that it points out by
contrast that Davison and Keble, while both Fellows of Oriel, were men of
Tractarian Sympathies; whereas, Copleston and Whately were of "that
opposite school of thinkers" (267.24-25), the liberal school in Oxford
and the Anglican Church, and thus explains the possible reason Newman has
an obvious preference for Davison's treatment of the subject of Liberal
Education. For further details about Copleston and Whately, see the
Introduction, pp.

268.20 - 269.5 "In the Essay...comprehensive passages:" The

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\(^1\) J. H. Newman, "My Religious Opinions to the Year 1833,"
Apologia Pro Vita Sua, p. 17.

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 35.
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Essay referred to is John Davison's review of "Edgeworth's Essays on Professional Education," The Quarterly Review, VI (October 1811), pp. 166 - 191. Here Newman contrasts Copleston's idea that "the Utility of knowledge to the individual varies inversely with its Utility to the public,..." (268.24-25) with Davison's two main ideas; namely, "that a Liberal Education is something far higher, even in the scale of Utility, than what is commonly called a Useful Education, and next, that it is necessary or useful for the purposes even of...Professional Education,..." (268.27 - 269.2).

269.6 - 274.24 "'In a series of essays,'...paramount attention'." This is the first of a series of four sections quoted from John Davison's review of "Edgeworth's Essays on Professional Education (hereafter designated as Davison's review), pp. 173-176. Davison sees Edgeworth as the Arch-utilitarian of the educational world in whose system, "'the value of every attainment is to be measured by its subserviency to a calling'" (269.25-26). "'In short,' Davison writes, 'a man is to be usurped by his profession'" (270.1-2).

Also in this section, Davison makes an important point in favour of the usefulness to the person in society of a Liberal Education when he makes the statement, "'but the professional character is not the only one which a person engaged in a profession has to support. He is not always on duty. ...As a friend, as a companion, as a citizen at large; in the connections of domestic life; in the improvement and
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embellishment of his leisure; he has a sphere of action...in which if he can show none of the advantages of an improved understanding, whatever may be his skill or proficiency in the other [in his profession] he is no more than an ill-educated man." Unlike Copleston, who saw a Liberal Education as useful only to the individual, Davison sees a liberal education as useful on a grand scale to the person in society and hence to society at large.

274.25 - 275.5 "Having thus shown...is directed." This is Newman's bridge-paragraph between quotations from Davison in which he summarizes the argument of the previous quotation and points to the matter of discussion in the following excerpt from Davison's review.

275.6 - 278.12 '"'We admit, ...judging of them'?" Quoted from Davison's review, pp. 179-180. Concerning the narrowness of specialization as the initial aim of education, Davison writes, '"...a man who has been trained to think upon one subject or for one subject only, will never be a good judge even in that one" (276.16-19). Davison explains his statement as follows: '"So much do ideas act, not as solitary units, but by grouping and combination; and so clearly do all the things that fall within the proper province of the same faculty of the mind, intertwine with and support each other! Judgment lives as it were by comparison and discrimination"' (276.21-26). This description of Davison's bears a resemblance to Newman's description of the processes of the mind when the unity of knowledge is made accessible to it. See
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above, Discourse V, 144.22-145.2; Discourse VII, 242.19-24.

Davison separates from other faculties that of Judgment as
being "that master-principle of business, literature, and talent, which
gives him strength in any subject he chooses to grapple with, and enables
him to seize the strong point in it...It describes the power that every-
one desires to possess when he comes to act in a profession, or elsewhere
and corresponds with our idea of a cultivated mind" (277.8-17). What
Davison here terms "that master-principle"; "the power," Newman
has termed Philosophy as the mark of "a cultivated mind."

Davison names the following subjects as helping to form the
two habits that the judgment ought to possess, "exactness and vigour,"
(276.6-7): "...religion (in its evidences and interpretation), ethics,
history, eloquence, poetry, theories of general speculation, the fine
arts and works of wit" (277.25 - 278.27). Newman notices in footnote
(277.27 - 278.29) that Davison seems to include "doctrine" in
"interpretation" of scripture, but, Newman notes, "that judgment has no
jurisdiction over doctrine" (278.28).

Two points are noteworthy concerning the foregoing discussion
about judgment and doctrine: first, although Davison expresses several
similar ideas to those of Newman's and is therefore a witness to Newman's
idea of a Liberal Education, Davison was, nevertheless, an Oriel Noetic
tinged with enough Liberalism of the day to disregard doctrine in his
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c onsideration of the subject of religion. It would be the task of the
Oxford Movement, more than twenty-years after Davison's review, to
reinstate and re-emphasize doctrine in religion.

The second point is that it would seem from context that
Davison does not mean by judgment so much the decision faculty between
alternatives as does Newman, but rather for want of a better term, means
very much what Newman does by the term Philosophy.

The fact that Davison sees the faculty of judgment as formed
by the unity of "these large divisions of learning" (278.2-3) bears
out the foregoing interpretation. Davison writes about those divisions,
"First, they are all quarried out of one and the same great subject of
man's moral, social, and feeling nature. And, secondly, they are all
under the control...of the same power of moral reason" (278.5-9).

These ideas are similar in spirit to the essence of Newman's
idea of a Liberal Education; namely, the unity of knowledge is a
representation of the unity that exists first in the Creator and then in
His creation. The mind of a person is fully formed in proportion as it
reflects that unity, and to that extent, it possesses, in Newman's
terminology, a "Philosophical Habit." (See above Discourse VI, 170.10).

278.13 - 282.14 "...be such as give a direct play...are a
mischief." Quoted from Davison's review, pp. 182-184.
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Davison's remarks that, "'poetry,... has been objected to as teaching men to imagine and not to reason'" refers to Sydney Smith's accusation that, "the present state of classical education cultivates the imagination a great deal too much, and other habits of mind a great deal too little;"¹ Unlike Copleston, who often turns to invective rather than answering charges, Davison answers the reviewer's statement by claiming that poetry teaches men both to imagine and to reason. See Davison's argument (278.20-24).

282.20 - 285.2 "'Instead of making well educated men,...a spurious conceited wisdom'." Davison's review, pp. 189-190.

285.6-8"...that training of the intellect, which is best for the individual himself, best enables him to discharge his duties to society" is Newman's summary statement of the usefulness of a Liberal Education and thus his answer to the question under discussion in this discourse. In order to defeat the utilitarians on their own ground, he writes, "If then a practical end must be assigned to a University course, I say it is that of training good members of society. Its art is the art of social life, and its end is fitness for the world" (285.14-18).

285.24-28 "It does not promise a generation of Aristotles or Newtons, of Napoleons or Washingtons, of Raphaels or Shakespeares..."

¹ The Edinburgh Review, XXIX (October, 1809), p. 48.
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within its precincts." That is, a university, according to Newman, does
not specifically aim to turn out philosophers or scientists, generals or
statesmen, artists or dramatists; in other words, men of genius in
particular lines, but rather, "It is the education which gives a man a
clear conscious view of his own opinions and judgments, a truth in
developing them an eloquence in expressing them, and a force in urging
them. It teaches him to see things as they are, to go right to the
point, to disentangle a skein of thought, to detect what is sophistical,
and to disregard what is irrelevant. It prepares him to fill any post
with credit, and to master any subject with facility" (286.10-18).

286.2 - 287.10 "but a University training...failure and
disappointment have a charm." This expertly expressed statement of the
effect of a Liberal Education is a well-known, frequently anthologized
section from Newman's Discourses on education. The particular tone of
precision and completeness of enunciation are achieved by the
accumulation of a series of antitheses--"he can ask a question
pertinently, and gain a lesson seasonably" (286.26-27)--which are
punctuated by the summary sentence: "The art which tends to make a man
all this, is in its idea as useful as the art of wealth or the art of
health,..." (287.10-12).

Discourse VIII dramatizes the conflict between the Liberal
knowledge versus the Useful Knowledge antagonists by means of quotations
from the Edinburgh Review, the Quarterly Review, and Copleston's Replies.
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The conflict centred in the nineteenth around the emphasis on the classics in the traditional Oxford-Cambridge education and the religious exclusiveness of the old universities. The latter of the two causes for dissension concerned Newman in Discourse VIII.

The argument for a Liberal education was based on the importance of the individual and his growth and development as a person. However, the Edinburgh Reviewers argued for a subject-centred, rather than a student-centred university. The philosophy of utility advocated by the Reviewers as the basis of education results in the individual losing his importance at the centre of education. When the university becomes the centre for the advancement of science, mankind at large becomes the purpose of the university.

Newman describes the true nature of a university as follows: a deep and comprehensive philosophy, a systematizing of knowledge, and a gathering of students to one centre that is their intellectual home. Newman insists on a university as "a common home...a body...a living power" (250.27-251.2).

Lastly, Newman deals with the usefulness theme from the point of view of a Liberal education becoming indirectly and eventually useful. He asked rhetorically at the beginning of discourse: "what is the real worth in the market, of the article called, 'a Liberal Education'". He answers that as health of body is useful for the benefit of the body, so health of mind enables the intellect to take up
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any subject with credit. Also, a cultivated intellect graces both the professional and personal life of the individual. Newman quotes John Davison, one of the Oxford defenders concerning the indirect value of a Liberal Education as follows: "But the professional character is not the only one which a person engaged in a profession has to support. He is not always on duty... as a friend, as a companion, as a citizen at large; in the connections of domestic life;... he has a sphere of action... in which if he can show none of the advantages of an improved understanding, whatever may be his skill or proficiency in the other [in his profession] he is no more than an ill-educated man!" (270.14-271.2). Newman's summary of the value of a Liberal Education is as follows: "...the training of the intellect, which is best for the individual himself, best enables him to discharge his duties to society" (285.6-8).
DISCOURSE IX. PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE VIEWED IN RELATION TO RELIGION

Discourse IX is the third discourse in which Newman has discussed Liberal Knowledge or Philosophical Knowledge in relation to other subjects. Discourse VII discussed Liberal Knowledge in relation to the acquiring of information; the Liberal Knowledge—Useful Knowledge controversy in the university curriculum was the subject of Discourse VIII; now in Discourse IX Newman's topic is the relation of Liberal Knowledge to Religion.

Philosophical Knowledge is that quality, perfection, or intellectual habit that is the fruit of a cultivated intellect. The educated mind has "what may be considered a religion of its own" (291.12-13) which Newman refers to as "the Religion of the Intellect or of Philosophy" (291.28-29). On occasion, the Religion of the Intellect may be in open warfare with the Church; at other times in defensive alliance (291.17-18). Since "nothing can act beyond its own nature" (296.12), the improvement in nature that results from the cultivation of the intellect gives an indisposition towards excesses and enormities of evil (299.4-6). However, there are those down through the ages who have been almost pattern-men of philosophical knowledge from the Emperor Julian to Lord Shaftesbury, but who were in open warfare with Christianity. Newman points out that many of the qualities of a
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cultivated intellect can serve as counterfeits of corresponding moral virtues and thus so engross the admirers of the Religion of Civilization that they declare the Religion of Philosophy all sufficient for the individual who needs not the Religion of Christianity. But Newman points out that it is the Religion of Christianity that regenerates our nature, whereas, the Religion of Civilization paints "a smooth and perfect surface" (305.18-19).

289.7 - 291.7 "First I employed...preceding Discourse." These paragraphs are a summary of the preceding three discourses; namely, Discourse VI, "that knowledge is its own reward" (289.8); Discourse VII, "what is meant by knowledge, when it is pursued for its own sake" (289.12-13); and Discourse VIII "what was so good in itself, could not but have a number of external uses,...its social and political usefulness" (290.22 - 291.5).

291.11-20 "The educated mind...in thus speaking." That "the educated mind has "a religion of its own, independent of Catholicism,...at one time in open warfare with her, at another in defensive alliance" (291.11-18) is the subject of this Discourse IX. Newman first discusses the cultivation of the intellect as being "in defensive alliance" (291.18) (See below, 295.22-297.29) with religion and then, "in open warfare with her" (291.17). (See below, 304.3-26).

291.23-24 "...as preparatory...Church puts it,..." Discourses I to IX have ascertained the "function and the action of a University, viewed in itself" (291.22-23) in preparation for the discussion in Discourse X of the value of Philosophical knowledge to the Church and the duties of the Church towards the university and Liberal Education.
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292.15-17 "I am not concerned...brought against Revelation." Newman explains that he is not writing here of Catholic Theology, which he has spoken of in earlier discourses "as one main portion of the truths which must be contemplated by Philosophy, if it deserves the name." (292. 5-6). A discussion of Theology, not the subject of this discourse, would concern the "Reasonableness of Christianity" (292.14-15) or the "Evidences" (292.15). "by the Evidences of Christianity and meant exercises of Reason in proof of its divinity." 1 The Evidences are based on "an authoritative teaching, which bears witness to itself and keeps itself together as one,...and speaks to all men, as being ever and everywhere one and the same, and claiming to be received intelligently, by all whom it addresses, as one doctrine, discipline, and devotion directly given from above. In consequence, the exhibition of credentials, that is, of evidences, that it is what it professes to be, is essential to Christianity as it comes to us,..." 2 The Notes of the Church are that it is a social religion and addresses individuals as parts of a whole; it is a public religion, a city set upon a hill; and it is both social and public in the very highest sense, because it is Catholic, universal everywhere. 3

292.24 - 293.4 "Grace does not supersede nature;...as regards


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the Reason." In the sermon "Nature and Grace" Newman differentiates the gifts of Grace from those of Nature:

Grace is lodged in the heart; it purifies the thoughts and motives, it raises the soul to God, it sanctifies the body, ... [But] Recollect that it is by nature, not by grace, that man has the gifts of reason and conscience; and reason and conscience will lead him to discover, and in a measure pursue, objects which are, properly speaking, supernatural and divine. The natural reason is able, from the things which are seen, from the voice of tradition, from the existence of the soul, and from the necessity of the case, to infer the existence of God. The natural heart can burst forth by fits and starts into emotions of love towards Him; the natural imagination can depict the beauty and glory of His attributes; the natural conscience may ascertain and put in order the truths of the great moral law, may even to the condemnation of that concupiscence, which it is too weak to subdue, and is persuaded to tolerate.

The Religion of Philosophy or of Civilization which Newman contrasts in this discourse with genuine religion has its roots in the gifts of Nature, reason and conscience as Newman has described them in the foregoing paragraph, without the gifts of Grace. In the sermon "Illuminating Grace" Newman gives the difference between Reason and Grace with reference to the truths of revelation and thus gives a basis for the insufficiency of the Religion of Philosophy—a basis not

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explained, but taken for granted in this discourse: "Not the keenest eyes can see in the dark. Now, though your mind be the eye, the grace of God is the light; and you will as easily exercise your eyes in this sensible world without the sun, as will be able to exercise your mind in the spiritual world without a parallel gift from without." 1

In the same sermon, Newman points out that the writings of learned men outside the Church on the evidences of religion are intellectual views only; they are not a grasping or seeing of the truth. 2 He continues "...you see what the natural man can do; he can feel, he can imagine, he can admire, he can reason, he can infer; in all these ways he may proceed to receive the whole or part of Catholic truth; but he cannot see, he cannot love." 3 Newman concludes, "No one is a Martyr for a conclusion, no one is a Martyr for an opinion; it is faith that makes Martyrs." 4 That is, Nature and its gift of Reason without Grace does not make an essential change in a person’s moral nature so that he possesses and acts upon a conviction, a belief. In


2 Ibid., p. 187.

3 Ibid., p. 187.

4 Ibid., pp. 191 - 192.
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In other words, Nature without Grace "cannot see," "cannot love" and therefore is not moved to action. Thus, the view that Newman gradually builds throughout the discourse is that of the Religion of Philosophy as a spurious religion that is content only with a polished outside, not with the regeneration of the heart. It is a religion of reason without grace, an effect of faith, and therefore it is a superficial religion only, the tenets of which no one would defend with his life. It is a religion of the intellect only, not of the intellect plus the will.

The quotations from the two Newman sermons are necessary to present the aspects of genuine religion a knowledge of which Newman takes for granted in his audience as he proceeds to give the characteristics of the spurious religion, the Religion of Civilization.

293.10-12 "...there is a Religion of civilized times, of the cultivated intellect, of the philosopher, scholar, and gentleman." In his sermon, "The Religion of the Day," Newman describes "A state of refinement...to which men might be brought, quite independent of religion, by the mere influence of education and civilization,"¹ and he questions "whether...this mere refinement of mind is not more or less all that is called religion at this day."² Newman gives the following

² Ibid., p. 313.
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characteristics of the Religion of Philosophy:

This is the religion 'natural' to a civilized age, and well has Satan dressed and completed it into an idol of the Truth. As the reason is cultivated, the taste formed, the affections and sentiments refined, a general decency and grace will of course spread over the face of society, quite independently of the influence of Revelation. That beauty and delicacy of thought, which is so attractive in books, then extends to the conduct of life,... Our manners are courteous; we avoid giving pain or offence; our words become correct; our relative duties are carefully performed. ...Vice now becomes unseemly and hideous to the imagination, or, as it is sometimes familiarly said, 'out of taste'. Thus elegance is gradually made the test and standard of virtue, which is no longer thought to possess an intrinsic claim on our hearts, or to exist, 'further than' it leads to the quiet and comfort of others. Conscience is no longer recognized as an independent arbiter of actions, its authority is explained away; partly it is superseded in the minds of men by the so-called moral sense, which is regarded merely as the love of the beautiful; partly by the rule of expediency, which is forthwith substituted for it in the details of conduct. Now conscience is a stern gloomy principle; it tells us of guilt and of prospective punishment. Accordingly, when its terrors disappear, then disappear also, in the creed of the day, those fearful images of Divine wrath with which the Scriptures abound. They are explained away. Every thing is bright and cheerful. Religion is pleasant and easy; benevolence is the chief virtue; intolerance, bigotry, excess of
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zeal, are the first of sins. Austerity is an absurdity;--even firmness is looked on with an unfriendly, suspicious eye. On the other hand, all open profligacy is discomtenced; drunkenness is accounted a disgrace; cussing and swearing are vulgarities. Moreover, to a cultivated mind, which recreates itself in the varieties of literature and knowledge, and is interested in the ever-accumulating discoveries of science, and the ever-fresh accessions of information, political or otherwise, from foreign countries, religion will commonly seem to be dull from want of novelty. Hence excitements are eagerly sought out and rewarded. New objects in religion, new systems and plans, new doctrines, new preachers, are necessary to satisfy that craving which the so-called spread of knowledge has created. The mind becomes morbidly sensitive and fastidious; dissatisfied with things as they are, desirous of a change 'as such,' as if alteration must of itself be a relief.  

The foregoing summary of the Religion of Philosophy from "The Religion of the Day," a sermon of the 1820's, concisely expresses all that is meant by religion in a civilized age more succinctly than the ideas are expressed in Discourse IX.

294,6 "...to delineate a philosophy,..." Newman is referring here to the Religion of Philosophy or to the way of thinking peculiar to a civilized age. He makes the point that this philosophy is "compatible

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1 Newman, "Religion...Day," pp. 311-313.
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with the profession of Catholicism" (294.7-8). See 294.11-22.

294.27 - 295.12 "I speak of it,...charity is the fulfilling of the Law;..." These are the aspects of "Catholicism as a system of pastoral instruction and moral duty" (294.24-25) which Newman will contrast in this discourse with "the moral and social teaching of philosophy" (295.18-19).

295.22 - 297.29 "...a momentous benefit which the philosopher is likely to confer on the pastors of the Church... It expels the excitements of sense by the introduction of those of intellect." Here Newman expresses in the imagery of battle "the defensive alliance" (291.18) of philosophy or mental culture with religion in the person's battle with sensuality: philosophy is able to rescue human nature "from that fearful subjection to sense, ...to break through the meshes of that thraldom, and to disentangle and to disengage its ten thousand holds upon the heart," (295.26 - 296.1). Continuing the metaphor of war, Newman describes "divine grace" as the defeated contender for the human heart who "is ordinarily baffled, and retires, without expedient or resource, before this giant fascination" (296.3-5), "the besetting power of sensuality" (297.18-19).

"Religion indeed...access of temptation" (296.20 - 297.1) continues the metaphor of the "sinful spirit" (296.24) overcome by the "malice of its foe" (296.26) sensuality with religion powerless to
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"obstruct and stave off the approach of our spiritual enemy" (297.3-4) because, as Newman explains, "nothing can act beyond its own nature" (297.12). Therefore what is needed is a development, refinement, cultivation of nature; in other words, that "which is capable of resting on the mind, and taking up its familiar lodging with it, and engrossing it, and which thus becomes a match for the besetting power of sensuality, ..." (297.16-17). Newman concludes as follows: "here then I think is the important aid, which intellectual cultivation furnishes to us in rescuing the victims of passion and self-will" (297.20-23).

298.11-12 "...in the words of the Apostle, 'knowledge puffeth up':" 1 Cor. 8:1 "Yet mere knowledge puffeth up, while charity edifieth." That Liberal knowledge might tend to substitute "pride for sensuality" (298.15) is "not a necessary result, it is but an incidental evil."

300.6-7 "...will act as a 'remora' till the danger is away."

"Remora" is from the Latin verb remoror meaning to hold back, to detain, obstruct, hinder, delay, or defer. Also, "remora" is any of a genus of fish having on its head an oval suckorial disk by means of which it attaches itself to sharks, other fishes, or floating objects, being thus carried great distances. In context, the fastidiousness characteristic of refinement of mind will act as a hindrance or impediment, a remora, in the form of "an irresolution and indecision in doing wrong,..." (300.5-6).


301.12-21 "but, when in the advancement of society...sensual
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excess the holyday of the vacant mind?" Newman's description of society, if accurate for the nineteenth century, seems even more so for the twentieth century. As a remedy for the "vacant mind" Newman hopes liberal knowledge "taking up its familiar lounging with it, and engrossing it... thus becomes a match for the besetting power of sensuality" (297. 10-19).

301.21 - 302.6 "This is so well understood... with intellectual and honourable recreations... keeping at bay the enemies, not only of the soul, but of the social fabric." In this section Newman commends the efforts of such men as Lord Brougham, one of the founders of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (See above, 50.22-25); Sir Robert Peel, who delivered the address on the occasion of the opening of the Reading Room at Tamworth (See above, 13.27-14.21); and Charles Knight (See above, 230.28), who published the Penny Cyclopedia. Newman comments, "...these are the human means, wisely suggested, and good as far as they go, for at least parrying the assaults of moral evil," (297.18)

There is a fine distinction between the ideas of Peel, whom Newman criticized severely in the "Tamworth Reading Room," and Newman's ideas: Peel claims that knowledge is virtue; that is, "in becoming wiser a man will become better, '...will rise 'at once' in the scale of intellectual and 'moral' existence," 1 that knowledge, in the sense of accumulation, makes men good; whereas, Newman has maintained so far in this discourse that knowledge tends the mind towards good, or in Newman's words, knowledge, in the sense of philosophy, is a "defensive alliance" (291,18) with religion in the battle against the foe of sensuality. It should be noted that knowledge for Peel diverts the mind by attracting it

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to various new and interesting aspects of information such as the "facts and theories of physical science," ¹ and therefore deals with only the surface of the mind, but knowledge for Newman is the philosophy or liberal knowledge that produces in the mind the philosophical habit, that so develops and engrosses the natural faculties of the mind that philosophy becomes "the first step...in the conversion of man and the renovation of his nature" (295.24-25) and by disengaging his heart from the thraldom of sense, brings him, "I might almost say, half way to Heaven" (296.1-2).

302.11-21 "...they are but the foremost of a series of influences, which intellectual culture exerts upon our moral nature, and all upon the type of Christianity,...naturally adapted to virtue." Newman is saying that the ideal of intellectual culture tending to combat moral disorders by advocating the development of such characteristics as "...veracity, probity, equity, fairness, gentleness, benevolence, and amiability,..." has its type in Christianity. In the sermon, "The Philosophical Temper, First Enjoined by the Gospel," Newman maintains that, "a true philosophical temper is...allied to that which the Scriptures incalculcate as the temper of a Christian,..." ² for he states,


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"we shall find that some of those habits of mind which are throughout
the Bible represented as alone pleasing in the sight of God, are the
very habits which are necessary for success in scientific investigation,
and without which it is quite impossible to extend the sphere of our
knowledge. ...an argument will almost be established in favour of
Christianity, as having conferred an intellectual as well as spiritual
benefit on the world." ¹

The following paragraph from the "Philosophical Temper" sermon
is most important as it points out that although Christianity was the
first to give the world the pattern of the philosophical temper, there
is a danger—"and this evil has in a measure befallen us"—"lest the
philosophical school should be found to separate from the Christian
Church." The very fact that the philosophical school was found to have
separated from the Christian Church in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries is the subject of Discourse IX. Newman gives a remedy in the
last sentence of the paragraph—a remedy that is basic to Discourses II
to V. The paragraph is as follows:

Although, then Christianity seems to have
been the first to give to the world the
pattern of the true spirit of
philosophical investigation, yet, as the
principles of science are, in process of
time, more fully developed, and become
more independent of the religious system,

¹ Newman, "The Philosophical Temper...", p. 7.
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there is much danger lest the philosophical
school should be found to separate from
the Christian Church and at length disown
the parent to whom it has been so greatly
indebted. And this evil has in a measure
befallen us; that it does not increase,
we must look to that early religious
training, to which there can be no doubt
all persons—those in the higher as well
as in the poorer classes of the community—
should be submitted.

302.23-27 "...the inspired Teacher...deprecation of self..."
refers to St. Paul and several of his epistles; see in particular
1 Cor., 13:1-7.

302.21 - 303.13 "If you would obtain...noble and beautiful"
Newman refers to the specimens in the studio of Philosophy as so many
pictures that fulfil with "greater or less exactness" (302.29) the ideal
of nature expressed in St. Paul's Epistles noted above, 302.23-27.

303.16-22 "The radical difference indeed of this mental
culture from genuine religion,...the very cardinal point...in a
particular light." The "seeming relationship" (303.18) between "mental
culture" and "genuine religion" is what Newman has been referring to in
302.12 - 303.13 when he notes the product of mental culture is "the
type of Christianity" (302.14) and "a character more noble to look at
more beautiful, more winning, in the various relations of life and in
personal duties, is hardly conceivable, than may, or might be, its

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result, when that culture is bestowed upon a soil naturally adapted to virtue" (302.16-21). Newman maintains that the attributes that are the effect of intellectual culture are those which most closely follow the pattern of Christian virtue, and therefore Christianity can be said to be the pattern of the intellectual man; furthermore, mental culture grown upon the soil of Christian virtue effects a most noble and beautiful character. Actually the man of culture and the man of religion fused in one person is the ideal that is basic to these Discourses and is the ideal underlying Newman's entire educational philosophy.

However, Newman proceeds to point out as "the very cardinal point on which my present discussion turns" (303.19-20) that the relationship between mental culture and Christianity is a "seeming relationship" (303.18) which "may really be assigned to a Christian origin by hasty or distant observers," (303.20-22). But actually the origin of the concept of mental culture is Greek and bears only an analogous relationship to the virtues advocated by St. Paul. Newman is careful to point out the foregoing fact, because he wants to differentiate the man of religion from the man of culture in spite of the fact their surface virtues are analogous.

In Chapter VII, "Athenian Schools," University Sketches, Newman describes the origin of what he variously refers to in this discourse as "the Religion of the Intellect or of Philosophy" (291.28-29), "this
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"intellectual religion" (292.3-4), "a Religion of civilized times, of the cultivated intellect, of the philosopher, scholar, and gentleman" (293.10-12), or "a godless intellectualism" (310.14). Among the exponents of this "spurious religion," (304.27-28), Newman mentions in this discourse the Emperor Julian and his eighteenth century counterparts, Edward Gibbon, and Lord Shaftesbury. Newman describes the origin of "the Religion of Civilization" (293.26) as follows: "...I observe that the guide of life, implanted in our nature, discriminating right from wrong, ...is our Conscience, which Revelation does but enlighten, strengthen, and refine. ...but man—not being divine, nor over partial to so stern a reprover within his breast, yet seeing too the necessity of some rule or other, ...if Society is to be kept together, ...as soon as he has secured for himself some little cultivation of intellect, looks about him how he can manage to dispense with Conscience, and find some other principle to do its work." ¹

Newman gives in this lecture three principles of conduct, which may be plausibly made use of in order to dispense with Conscience;"² namely, "the Law of the State, human law:" "the rule of Expediency:" and "the principle of Beauty."³ It is the third of these principles of


² Ibid., p. 77.

³ Ibid., p. 76.
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conscience that Newman discusses in this Discourse. He states that "the Athenians chose the last of them, as became so exquisite a people, and professed to practise virtue on no inferior consideration, but simply because it was so praiseworthy, so noble, and so fair. Their model man, like the pattern of chivalry, was a gentleman...." 1 Newman follows this statement with a quotation from Horace, Epistles I, XVI, 40. See University Sketches, ed. Prof. M. Tierney, p. 262 for the comment, "Horace's meaning actually is that such 'goodness' [as is associated with the gentleman] often hides depravity: he is criticising from a Greek point of view, a kind of Pharisaism to which Roman 'gravitas' easily gave rise." 2

The points the foregoing references illuminate for this Discourse IX are as follows: first, the ideal of intellectual culture of which the gentleman came to be the epitome was of Greek, (pagan), not Christian origin. Even the non-Christian Roman poet Horace associated some Pharisaism with the concept of this ideal nobility and goodness. Lastly, since the ideal involved the substitution of the principle of beauty for Conscience, the religion of culture is, as Newman says, "a spurious religion."


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304.3-26 "Now this feeling...against human nature." In this paragraph Newman notes the difference in the attitude of the mind and that of conscience towards sin: the cultivated mind will view "some kinds of vice" (303.29) with "utter disgust and profound humiliation" (304.1); therefore, the cultivated mind tends to react with shame and self-reproach "directed and limited to our mere sense of what is fitting and becoming," (304.16-17), and thus "a false philosophy has misinterpreted emotions which ought to lead to God" (304.11-12).

On the other hand, Conscience "inflicts upon us fear as well as shame,...fear implies the transgression of a law, and a law implies a law giver and judge," (304.7-12-14). Therefore, the "besetting sin" (304.20-21) of a civilized age is to substitute the fear and shame that belong to the conscience for the shame and self-reproach that characterizes the cultivated intellect's reaction to vice. As a result "conscience becomes what is called a moral sense; the command of duty is a sort of taste; sin is not an offence against God, but against human nature"(304.23-26). What is called "a moral sense," "taste" and what is fitting and becoming to human nature replaces conscience "implanted in the breast by nature" (304.6-7) as a means of interpreting the laws of the Divine Law giver and Judge. The result is that "conscience...is not the word of a law giver, as it ought to be, but the dictate of their own minds and nothing more." (305.4-7).

305.18-20 "...to paint a smooth and perfect surface, and to be
 ability to say to themselves that they have done their duty." Such a
religion of self-respect based on a sense of personal degradation
instead of on contrition towards God in which transgressors refer to
themselves as fools rather than sinners is the religion peculiar to a
civilized age and was the expression of religion of the Oxford noetics,
a religion that Newman referred to as an aspect of liberalism.

See also, for this section, "Tamworth Reading Room,"
Discussions and Arguments p. 275 and "The Religion of the Pharisee,"
Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, pp. 20-25.

306.24 - 307.14 "Rather a philosopher's, a gentleman's
religion,...wisdom in philosophy." Here Newman is stressing the
similarity of the philosopher's or gentleman's religion to that of the
ancient heathen (Greek, very probably) and the fact that both are opposed
to the Christian ideal of suffering before joy and of worship of a
Divine Law giver, but rather both the ancient heathen and the man of
culture make "their own minds their sanctuary, their own ideas their
oracle,..." (307.11-12).

307.16-21 "...I might illustrate this intellectual religion
from the history of the Emperor Julian,...the shadow of the future Anti-
Christ;...the pattern-man of philosophical virtue." Julian, surnamed the
Apostate on account of his renunciation of Christianity, was Roman
Emperor from 361 to 363. His tutor Mardonius introduced him to
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Hellenistic culture, but he read extensively in Christian literature, received Baptism, and served as a lector in the church. However, contact with the Neoplatonists, Maximus of Ephesus, led to Julian's secret apostasy from Christianity. Julian was completely devoted to Greco-Roman civilization and thought he was mystically called to rescue it from alien, uncouth Christianity.

Although disinclined to persecution by force, he removed Christians from political office and forbade them to teach the classical curriculum of the schools. In his work, Against the Galileans, he expounds his anti-Christian position. His religious program envisioned a rejuvenated paganism with Neoplatonism as an intellectual base. His rule, compared with many of the so-called Christian emperors, was just, liberal, and humane. He seems to have been more attached to philosophy than to religion, and he more readily apprehended as truth what commended itself to the intellect, than what spoke to the heart.

In Tract 83, "The Patristical Idea of Anti-Christ," quoted in part in the Appendix, pp. 440-443, Newman several times refers to Julian as the Anti-Christ, one of his marks being that he "was engaged in bringing back Roman Paganism". See the complete Tract 83, entitled "The Patristical Idea of Antichrist," Discussions and Arguments, pp. 55, 67, 71 for further references to Julian as the type of Antichrist.

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1 J. H. Newman, "Appendix," Discourses..., p. 44.
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The following quotation from Tract 83 is one of the Biblical passages that Newman says, "speaks generally of the impieties of the last age of the world, impieties which we may believe will usher in and be completed in Antichrist:..." In the last days perilous times shall come, for men shall be lovers of their own selves, covetous, boasters, proud, blasphemers, disobedient to parents, unthankful, unholy, without natural affection, trucebreakers, false accusers, incontinent, fierce, despisers of those that are good, traitors, heady, high-minded, lovers of pleasures more than lovers of God, having a form of godliness but denying the power thereof:" 1

Newman has in this Discourse IX been noting that the spurious religion—that characteristic of an age of civilization, an age of cultivated intellects—has two of the above mentioned characteristics; namely, "'men shall be lovers of their own selves!'" (304.17-19; 307.11-12) and "'having a form of godliness but denying the power thereof!'" (307.23-25).

Newman's reference to Julian with his repudiation of Christianity in favour of Hellenic culture—one of the marks of the Antichrist—makes clear by comparison the attributes of the spurious religion Newman sees characteristic of the nineteenth century England;

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namely, the nineteenth century religion of philosophy, of cultivated
intellectualism has its roots in Hellenic culture, has the lineaments of
religious virtue without faith in the Deity; and lastly, has adherents
who have "made their own minds their sanctuary, their own ideas their
oracle,..." (307.11-12).

307.25-26 "...rude greatness of Fabricius or Regulus..."
Gaius Luscinus Fabricius, Roman general and consul, who, after the defeat
of the Romans by Pyrrhus at Heraclea in 280 B.C., was sent to treat for
the ransom and exchange of the prisoners. As Plutarch recounts,
"Pyrrhus, admiring the wisdom and gravity of the man, was more
transported with desire of making friendship instead of war with the
city, and entreated him personally, after the peace should be concluded,
to accept of living with him as chief of his ministers and generals." ¹
But Fabricius could not be bribed either by money or by praise from the
enemy.

307.26 Marcus Atilius Regulus, Roman general and consul in
256 B.C. was one of the commanders in the naval expedition which
shattered the Carthaginian fleet at Ecnomus. So harsh were his terms of
peace after one of the battles of the Punic Wars that the defeated
Carthaginians resolved to continue the war. After being taken prisoner,

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but released on parole to go to Rome to negotiate a peace and exchange of prisoners, he strongly urged the senate to refuse both proposals in spite of the adverse effects for himself of the decision. On his return to Carthage, Regulus was put to death.

Both Fabricius and Regulus represented the "rude greatness" (307.25) of heroic endurance and the inability to be won over by the blandishments of the enemy. Such endurance and stability are, according to Newman, part of the character of Julian, "the pattern-man of philosophical virtue" (307.20-21).

307.26-27 "...with the accomplishments of Pliny or Antoninus...." Pliny, the younger, A.D. 61 or 62 - C.113, was a Roman author and administrator, nephew and adopted son of the elder Pliny, who left a collection of private letters of great literary charm, which intimately illustrated public and private life in the heyday of the Roman Empire. Pliny's official correspondence as a provincial governor is a unique set of documents, and his career is characteristic of those concerned with the management of the peaceful areas of the Roman Empire.

Pius Antoninus A.D. 86-161, a friend of Pliny, the younger, was consul in 120 and Roman Emperor from 138 to 161. Antoninus was an intelligent and experienced ruler who sincerely desired the welfare of his subjects. He showed his respect for the dignity of the senate by consulting it in person on matters of state. With the help of his...
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council of skilled jurists, he made legal reforms tending to greater simplicity and humanity. In Italy he promoted art and science, built baths and aqueducts, and expanded the system of provision for orphans. Under his personal care the provinces prospered; their burdens were lightened, and liberal relief was granted to distressed cities.

Both Pliny and Antoninus illustrate the accomplishments peculiar to peace and to efficient, humane government which were as well traits of Julian, the "pattern-man of philosophical virtue" (307.20-21).

Faoricius and negulus, on the one hand and Pliny and Antoninus on the other, illustrate their own aspects of "that complete and generous education which fits a man to perform justly, skilfully, and magnanimously all the offices, both private and public, of peace and war" (See discourse VIII, 267.6-9) traits which were all characteristic of the emperor Julian.

308.7 - 310.6 "he employed...hour of midnight". The quotation is from Edward Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Vol. II of 4 volumes, Chapter 24, London: Frederick Warne and Co., 1894), pp. 99-101.

308.6-10 "...a writer...hatred of Christianity,...papal..." The writer is Edward Gibbon (1737-1794), privately educated until he entered Magdalen College, Oxford in his sixteenth year. About the university, which he thoroughly disliked, Gibbon said, "I spent fourteen
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months at Magdalen College, they proved the fourteen months the most idle and unprofitable of my whole life." 1 While there, Gibbon, influenced by Middleton's *Free Inquiry* (1749) and Bossuet's *Variations of Protestantism and Exposition of Catholic Doctrine*, joined the Church of Rome in 1753. But the Roman creed soon disappeared, after his angry father sent him to Lausanne to live with a Calvinist minister. There he learned French so thoroughly that that language influenced his style to the last. In 1761 Gibbon published "Essai sur l'étude de la litterature," which was translated into English in 1764. He published the first volume of the *Decline and Fall* in 1776 and finished the monumental work in 1787. The criterion by which Gibbon judged civilization and progress was the measure in which the happiness of men is secured. He considered political freedom an essential condition of happiness.

Newman, several times in his writings mentions Gibbon. Speaking of those who consider that the experience of evil gives them "a larger and more impartial view of the nature and destinies of man than religion teaches," 2 Newman refers to Gibbon's panegyric of Julian, who is a worldly type of the opposite cast: "A more opposite instance of

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This state of soul cannot be required than is given us in the celebrated work of an historian of the last century,..." And continuing, Newman remarks about Gibbon, "...who for his great abilities, and, on the other hand, his cold heart, impure mind, and scoffing spirit, may justly be accounted as, in this country at least, one of the masters of a new school of error, which seems not yet to have accomplished its destinies, and is framed more exactly after the received type of the author of evil than the other chief anti-Christis who have, in these last times, occupied the scene of the world." 2

The "new school of error" mentioned in the foregoing paragraph is, according to Newman's context, "the belief that the religious system...is an inadequate solution of the world's mysteries, and a rule of conduct too simple for its complicated transactions;" 3 the result being the error "of trusting the world, because it speaks boldly, and thinking that evil must be acquiesced in, because it exists,..." 4 It would seem that Gibbon is a type of the "'spirit of anti-Christ'" 5 who

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2 Ibid., p. 126.
3 Ibid., p. 124.
4 Ibid., p. 127.
5 Ibid., p. 120.
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dispenses with conscience in favour of both Propriety and Expediency (See above, 303.16-22); thus, Newman has referred to Gibbon as "a writer, well fitted" (308.8-9) to be the panegyrist of Julian, another type of anti-Christ, who replaced conscience with Propriety in the form of the principle of beauty; that is, the beauty, on a purely natural level, of a completely virtuous and wholly admirable character. Newman remarks that, "Gibbon paints with pleasure, what conformably with the sentiments of a godless intellectualism, was an historical fulfilment of his own idea of moral perfection" (310.13-16).

Julian, the ancient epitome of the beautiful, in virtue and nobility of character, Newman mentions as an introduction to the eighteenth century exponent of the religion of "godless intellectualism" (310.14), Lord Shaftesbury.

310.16-19 "Lord Shaftesbury... 'Characteristics of men, manners, opinions, views'." The reference is to Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) whose major work, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, etc., which first appeared in 1711, went through eleven editions by 1790. As founder of the "moral sense" school in ethics, his ideas were used and developed by Bishop Butler, Adam Smith, and Hume. He played an important role in the Deistic movement, particularly influencing John Toland and Anthony Collins. In the sphere of literature, his effect can be traced in the writings of Addison, James Thomson, Mark Akenside, and Henry Fielding.
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The influence of Shaftesbury's philosophy in Germany contributed to the rise of romanticism, particularly through his aesthetic theories. ¹

310.25 - 311.6 "Men have...worth." This quotation from Characteristics..., Vol. I, is from "An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour," p. 66. The italics are Newman's. Shaftesbury's statement that men are not content "to show the natural advantages of honesty and virtue" (310.26-27) relates him to Julian who did show the advantages on the natural level of honesty and virtue of character. Shaftesbury's advocating the desirability of virtue for its natural advantages and criticizing rewards as an incentive to practise virtue places him among those who would replace conscience, the individual voice of the Divine Law giver, with the principle of beauty. See above, 304.6 - 26.

311.6-20 "'If'...servile.'" From Shaftesbury's "Concerning Virtue or Merit," Vol. I, p. 267. Shaftesbury claims in this section that virtuous conduct because of hope of reward or fear of punishment from the Deity is a servile obedience that does not indicate "rectitude, piety, or sanctity, in a creature thus reformed" (311.12-13). Shaftesbury has no idea of the individual's conscience as the spokesman

¹ From the "Introduction" to the Earl of Shaftesbury's Characteristics..., ed. J. M. Robertson, intro. Stanley Green. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), pp. XIII - XIV. All page references including those in parenthesis, for quotations from Shaftesbury are from this edition.
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for the Divine Law giver, nor of the obligation of the creature to recognize and obey his creator, but rather submission to any principle beyond or outside of one's nature is to Shaftesbury "abject servitude [which] implies the greater wretchedness and meanness in the creature" (267. This quotation from Shaftesbury and its context is particularly relevant to Newman's statement, "conscience becomes what is called a moral sense; ... sin is not an offense against God, but against human nature" (304.23-26). Furthermore, Shaftesbury and those who follow the religion of culture earn the following censure: "they shut themselves up in themselves" (305.24-25); "they made their own minds their sanctuary, their own ideas their oracle,..." (307.11-12).

312.1 - 313.2 "'Some by mere nature, ... beauty is truth'..
From "An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour," Vol. I, pp. 89-94. This quotation from Shaftesbury clearly indicates his Platonic identification of the Beautiful and the Good: "'The most natural beauty in the world is honesty and moral truth; for all beauty is truth' " (313.1-2). The sentence preceding this section from Shaftesbury quoted by Newman indicates that the gentleman, the man of "natural good genius" and of "good education" will have a sense of what is becoming; the gentleman can, therefore, dispense with conscience in favour of his sense of what is in good taste. The sentence is as follows: "By gentleman of fashion, I understand those to whom a natural good genius, or the force of good education, has given a sense of what is naturally
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graceful and becoming" (89).

313.5-27 "'Could we once...other arts and sciences'?' From Shaftesbury's "Advice to an Author," Vol. I, pp. 216-218. Shaftesbury's criterion of conduct is, in his words, a matter of "'a right and wrong taste',..." (313.8-9).

314.1-10 "'After all...latter way'." From Shaftesbury's "Miscellaneous Reflections," Vol. II, p. 265.

314.10-14 "...somewhat like a Jansenist,...higher than sensual."

314.14-16 "'Even conscience...taste is set amiss',"


315.6-8 "'...he has entitled one of his Treatises, a 'Soliloquy,' with the motto, 'Nec te quasiveris extra'.' The motto of Shaftesbury's a 'Soliloquy' is "Seek nothing beyond yourself." Newman's comment is pertinent to the motto which expresses concisely Shaftesbury's entire philosophy: "...our great rule is to contemplate ourselves,'if we would gain'a standard of life and morals" (315.4-6).
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315.8-24 "'The chief interest...never can explain or comprehend.'" From Shaftesbury's "Advice to an Author," Vol. I, pp. 115-116.

315.25 - 316.11 "Taking these passages...ungentlemanlike."
The quotations from Lord Shaftesbury illustrate "the Religion of Philosophy" (315.26). Newman's criticism of Shaftesbury is that "almost every statement is perverted and made false, because it is not the whole truth" (315.29 - 316.1); furthermore, "a doctrine which makes virtue a mere point of good taste, and vice vulgar and ungentlemanlike" cannot effect any deep moral regeneration since "such a doctrine is essentially superficial,..." (316.12). The result of the Religion of Philosophy is a superficial religion in which "to 'seem' becomes to 'be'; what looks fair will be good, what causes offence will be evil; virtue will be what pleases, vice what pains" (316.19-22).

316.25-26 "...celebrated sentiment...a great and wise man was betrayed,..." The reference is to Edmund Burke (1729-1797) who attended Trinity College, Dublin, from 1743 to 1748. He published A Vindication of Natural Society and the Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas on the Sublime and Beautiful in 1756. Burke entered Parliament in 1765, but it was through his published writings that he gained an extraordinary influence in England, reaching the climax of his fame with the publication, in 1790, of Reflections on the Revolution in France. This great British statesman and publicist devoted his life to five
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"great, just and honourable causes": the preservation of the English Constitution, the emancipation of Ireland, the emancipation of the American Colonies, the protection of the people of India from the misgovernment of the East India Company, and opposition to the savages of the French Revolution. ¹

316.27 - 317.3 "It is gone,...all its grossness." The quotation is from Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 89 (Dolphin Edition). Burke, with the famous statement that begins this passage--"but the age of chivalry is gone" ²--has been lamenting the fact that no respect for refinement, rank, nor nobility prevented the carnage surrounding the capture of Marie Antoinette and Louis XVI and the slaughter of the French nobles of the court by the French Revolutionists.

Newman's italicizing Burke's phrase, "vice lost half its evil by losing all its grossness" emphasizes the fact that this phrase expresses "the ethical temperament of a civilized age" (317.5-6). Burke, in his valediction to the spirit of chivalry (316.26-317.3), has expressed the basic tenet of the Religion of Philosophy.

317.6-24 "It is detection, not the sin,...ends by excusing it." These are the attributes of the "ethical temperament of a


² Ibid., p. 89.
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civilized age" (317.5-6). Of these, the idea that "decency is virtue" (317.8), that "squalid poverty, improvidence, laziness, slovenly disorder, make up the idea of profligacy" (317.11-12) is basic in that all these deal with the lack of a polished surface so necessary to the Religion of Civilization, but do not reveal the true state of heart and soul, which is the concern of genuine religion.

In contrast to Burke's statement, Newman illustrates in Lecture IX of Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching Vol. I that grossness of surface does not necessarily indicate evil of heart, but rather, in the case in point, weakness of will: "There is a feeble old woman who first genuflects before the Blessed Sacrament, and then steals her neighbour's handkerchief, or prayer-book, who is intent on his devotions. Here at last, you say, is a thing absolutely indefensible and inexcusable." 1 Newman has explained previously in the lecture that the "spiritual sight, which is included in the idea of faith is...perfectly distinct in its own nature from desire, intention, and power of acting agreeably to it. As men may know perfectly well that they ought not to steal, and yet may deliberately take and appropriate what is not theirs;" 2


2 Ibid., p. 271.
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Newman then proceeds to explain the difference between faith and obedience; that is, between knowledge and action: "Faith is illuminative, not operative: it does not force obedience, though it increases responsibility; it heightens guilt, it does not prevent sin; the will is the source of action, not an influence, ... She worships and she sins; she kneels because she believes, she steals because she does not love; she may be out of God's grace, she is not altogether out of his sight." ¹

Newman has been illustrating the difference between the operation of the intellect and that of the will. It is precisely this difference between faith and good works that is basic to Newman's criticism of the Religion of Philosophy—a religion that is based on the intellect's abhorrence of "scandals, vulgarities, whatever shocks, whatever disgusts,..." (317.8-9), but, as Newman has illustrated in the foregoing quotations, what the intellect recognizes as gross, does not of necessity influence or dissuade the will from action; therefore the Religion of Philosophy is, as Newman has said, "essentially superficial" (316.12).

₃1₃.₄-₇ "True Religion is slow in growth,...its intellectual counterfeit has no root...suddenly withers." Although applied to True

¹ Newman, "Certain Difficulties...Teaching," p. 271.
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Religion in this context, the growth metaphor is basic to Newman's concept of education in that education for Newman involves the gradual growth, development, and consequent change in the individual, intellectually and personally. See above, 111.25-112.2 for the growth metaphor in reference to education.

The superficiality of the Religion of Philosophy that Newman has been emphasizing is made clear by the comparison of the Religion of Philosophy to a plant without a root that suddenly withers. This "intellectual counterfeit" (318.6) has no root in that its purpose is not the regeneration of depths of human nature, but the smoothing of surfaces. The result is, in Newman's words, "...since deformity is its abhorrence; ...since it cannot dissuade men from vice, to escape the sight of the deformity, it embellishes it" (318.11-13).

318.14-17 "It 'skin[s] and film[s] the ulcerous place,'...infests unseen." This quotation from Hamlet, III, 4, 11. 147-149, is Newman's final emphasis on the effect of the Religion of Philosophy, a religion that effects "a polished outside, with hollowness within." The quotation from Hamlet depicts not hollowness, but a "rank corruption" that is like a hidden infection growing unseen and finally undermining the entire constitution of a person and of a state. Such was the case in

Hamlet: While Queen Gertrude and King Claudius presented a polished

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outside the "rank corruption" of how the throne was obtained undermined the entire state.

With this reference to Hamlet, Newman is stressing the necessity for the regeneration of the depths of human nature by means of the intellect and the will; that is, by faith and obedience to the Divine Lawgiver. (See above, 317.6-24 second paragraph). The words that follow Newman's quotation from Hamlet's speech to his mother,

Confess yourself to heaven; Repent what's past; avoid what is to come; (III, 4, 149-50),

express the necessity for the regeneration of the heart that characterizes true as opposed to spurious religion.

319.2-6 "When I interrupted...ethical precepts of St. Paul,...characters of this day." See above 302.21-303.13.


Hume continues the section quoted by Newman with the following observation: "Cicero was certainly one of the finest gentlemen of the
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age; yet I must confess I have frequently been shocked with the poor figure under which he represents his friend Atticus,..." (188-189 in the Hume text; see above 320.14-18.); hence the source of Newman's observation in 320.28 - 321.2.

Newman terms Hume, "an unexceptionable witness here" to Newman's point that the modern idea of the gentleman was unknown to the pagan (Greek and Roman) world—a point that introduces the fact that although the idea of the gentleman "may be a logical result of Philosophy,...it is an historical offspring of Christianity"(321.3-5).

Newman's use of Hume's quotation as proof of his point of view is a rhetorical device frequently used by Newman of selecting a quotation from one whom he would consider his natural opponent in perhaps all but the instance quoted. For Newman, the agreement on a single point with a writer who was in other respects at opposite poles from him, only served to reinforce the validity of his (Newman's) argument. A glance at Hume's essay "Of Vice and Virtue" as one example will give ample proof of Hume's usual antithetical position as far as Newman is concerned.

321.22-23 "...she is 'treating...the judgment to come'."

322.9-12 "Lord Shaftesbury...'panic fear.'...'the saving of souls is now the heroic passion of exalted spirits!'". This statement in which Shaftesbury repudiates the Divine Lawgiver and scoffs at the idea of "'the saving of souls'" (322.11) is an introduction to Newman's
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statement that Shaftesbury has selected from Christianity only what pleased him: "...he discards the theological, the mysterious, the spiritual; he makes selection of the morally or esthetically beautiful" (322.14–16).

322.16–25 "To him it matters not at all,...he and they will be no more." The remarkably developed metaphor in this section brings to a close all that Newman has been saying about Shaftesbury. Instead of putting down roots that gradually grow and develop into the tree of true culture, of lasting personal development, Shaftesbury is interested only in gathering the effects of culture, "its flowers for his bouquet" (322.19). The quickly dying flowers that "do but last to the end of his revel" (322.21) clearly depicts the superficiality of Shaftesbury's seeking only what is "morally or esthetically beautiful" (322.16) and discarding "the theological, the mysterious, the spiritual" (322.14–15). Furthermore, the phrase "the end of his revel" (322.21) with its literary allusion to the speech which concludes Prospero's graceful illusion in The Tempest, IV, 1, 1.148—a speech in which Prospero describes the world and all that it possesses as an "insubstantial pageant faded" (The Tempest, IV, 1, 1.55)—illustrates Newman's statement about Shaftesbury: "he only aims at this life, his philosophy dies with him" (322.19–20). The fact that Shaftesbury's Religion of Philosophy is a temporal religion only that is beautiful in Time, but produces no lasting effects for the life after the temporal is depicted in the
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"withered leaves" of the bouquet that "may be mingled with his own ashes" (322.23).

322.28-29 "...the profession of an artist, not the commission of an apostle." The contrast is between the appreciation of the aesthetically and morally beautiful that is characteristic of "the profession of an artist" (322.28-29) and the conviction of an apostle that moves to carry out a commission.

323.1-2 "This embellishment of the exterior is the beginning and the end of philosophical morality." This statement introduces the contrast between the virtue of humility and its philosophical counterfeit, the virtue of modesty. Newman states, "this is true humility, to feel and behave as if we were low, not to cherish a notion of our importance, while we affect a low position" (323.24-26). He gives as an example St. Paul's humility, "when he called himself 'the least of the saints'" (323.27-28). In 1 Cor. 15.9 St. Paul writes "For I am the least of the apostles,... ."

324.9-13 "As the world uses the word, 'condescension'... so firmly established." This sentence contrasts "the world's humility and the humility of the Gospel" (324.8-9): With the former, "condescension," the manifestation of humility, is "but a bending forward, unattended with any the slightest effort to leave by a single inch the seat in which it is so firmly established" (324.11-13). On the other hand, "the humility
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of the Gospel" (324.9) requires a "condescension" that is "an abdication, as far as their own thoughts are concerned, of those prerogatives or privileges to which others deem them entitled" (324.1-3).

The superficial nature of the "world's humility" in contrast with the "humility of the Gospel" and its lack of true sincerity in dealings with others is emphasized in the following description: "It [the world's humility] is an act of a superior, who protests to himself, while he commits it, that he is superior still, and that he is doing nothing else but an act of grace..." (324.13-16).

325.9-15 "Rather it is the advanced guard or sentinel of the soul militant... Its province is the outward deportment,..." The military image of the virtue of modesty as a guard or sentinel stationed in the outer fortifications of the senses, countenance, eye, ear, voice and gesture emphasizes the fact of its "being more superficial than other virtues" (325.17) and therefore explains why modesty "at first sight, simulates humility so well" (325.5-6).

325.26-28 "Pride... gets a new name;... self-respect;..." Pride, the opposite vice to the virtue of humility, also has its surface counterpart in the Religion of Philosophy; namely, self-respect. Newman is pointing out that where humility is replaced by the surface mask of modesty, in actuality, pride reigns in the heart. But the grossness of pride is covered by the veneer of self-respect that "is directed into
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the channel of industry, frugality, honesty, and obedience; and it becomes the very staple of the religion and morality held in honour in a day like our own" (326.8-11).

Thus Newman has described self-respect as "the very household god of the Protestant" (326.13), which, he says, inspires "neatness and decency in the servant girl, propriety and refined manners in her mistress, uprightness, manliness, and generosity, in the head of the family" (326.14-17).

Many critics of Nineteenth-Century England have isolated self-respect as one of the main tenets of Victorianism, but few have so clearly delineated its origin and characteristics as has Newman in 325.26 - 327.27.

326.23-25 "It breathes upon the face of society, and the hollow sepulchre is forthwith beautiful to look upon." The metaphor of the "hollow sepulchre" emphasizes again the one-half of the contrast that is basic to this discourse; namely, "the world is content with setting right the surface of things; the Church aims at regenerating the very depths of the heart." ¹ The world (in this context, the Religion of Philosophy) is content with a polished outside while there is beneath, the hollowness and death of that which has no power of

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regenerating itself from within.

Furthermore the indirect allusion to the Biblical passage in which Christ referred to the Pharisees as "whited sepulchres, which appear beautiful without, but within are full of dead bones and of all uncleanness" (St. Matthew, 23:27) suggests the surface—goodness that conceals the self-seeking hypocrisy of the Nineteenth-Century Religion of the Pharisees, the Religion of Philosophy.

Other references in this discourse for which the "hollow sepulchre" (326.24) metaphor is a culmination, are expressed in 305.17-20; 316.17-22; and 318.11-17.

327.5-11 "It detests gross adulation;...in the preparation."
The fact that the virtue of self-respect in the Religion of Philosophy "detests gross adulation" but does not tend "at all to the eradication of the appetite to which the flatterer ministers" (327.5-7) is another point for Newman's contention that "the world is content with setting right the surface of things" (See above, 326.24-26).

327.16-20 "As Lord Shaftesbury...natural to uneducated minds."
Concerning "putting down what is objectionable" (327.17-18), Shaftesbury writes, "A freedom of raillery, a liberty in decent language to question everything, and an allowance of unravelling or refuting any argument, without offence to the arguer, are the only terms which can render such
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speculative conversations any way agreeable." For Shaftesbury,
disagreements between those of so-called educated mind should be carried
on without destroying the beautifully polished surface of refinement and
good nature.

Newman himself, who was proficient at the sword-play, rapier-
wit method of felling an opponent, is here noting that vanity, becomes
self-conceit in the Religion of Philosophy. In order "to paint a smooth
and perfect surface" (305.18-19), it teaches men to suppress their feel-
ings, and to control their tempers, and to mitigate both the severity
and the tone of their judgments" (327.14-15), but no regeneration of the
heart necessarily underlies the "smooth and perfect surface" (305.18-19).
That such regeneration of the heart is the task of the Church is the
subject of the next and last discourse.

327.28 - 330.16 "Hence it is that it is almost a definition
of a gentleman, ... the attendant on civilization." Newman's famous
definition of the gentleman depicts the characteristic product of the
Religion of Philosophy. The gentleman, in Shaftesbury's words, who
belongs to "the liberal, polished, and refined part of mankind," 2

1 Lord Shaftesbury, "Freedom of Wit and Humour,
Characteristics..., p. 149.

2 Lord Shaftesbury, "Miscellaneous Reflections,
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preserves the "notion [in Newman's words of criticism] that virtue is nothing more than the gracefull in conduct."

Hence, all the attributes of the gentleman are concerned with the manner and deportment of one who assiduously preserves the polished outside that conceals and preserves his own inner nature, views, and opinions, whatever they may be. His actions are guided by taste, rather than motivated by principles. As Shaftesbury writes, "Thus we see, after all, that 'tis not merely what we call principle, but a taste which governs men." As Newman describes the product of civilization, the gentleman "carefully avoids whatever may cause a jar or a jolt in the minds of those with whom he is cast" (328. 16-18); "from a long-sighted prudence, he observes the maxim..., that we should ever conduct ourselves towards our enemy, as if he were one day to be our friend" (329.8-11); and "he will be too profound and large-minded to ridicule religion or to act against it; he is too wise to be a dogmatist or a fanatic in his infidelity" (330.4-7). In other words, the gentleman's actions are motivated by whatever will be useful in facilitating superficially amicable relations with those with whom he must associate, rather than by the justice and charity that are enjoined on all by the teachings of the Bible.


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What those who have anthologized Newman's definition of the gentleman usually fail to note is that Newman is not giving his wholehearted and unqualified approval of "the gentleman." In context, this depiction of the gentleman, as the product of the civilization that extols taste and utility as motives, rather than principle, is the emphatic conclusion of a discussion that contrasts the spurious Religion of Philosophy with the genuine Religion of Christianity. Newman's summary comment about the gentleman is as follows: "Such are some of the lineaments of the ethical character, which the cultivated intellect will form, apart from religious principle." (331.7-9). As Newman has previously stated, "A Liberal Education makes not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman."

The word "almost" in the opening sentence of the definition—"it is almost a definition of a gentleman"—(327.28-29) indicates that something is yet lacking for the definition of a true gentleman. That something is the teachings and principles of Christianity that motivate the conduct of the genuine gentleman after the pattern laid down by St. Paul. See Newman's description in 319.10-23, "The Apostle gives us a pattern...his external relations." Newman's ideal does not culminate with the gentleman, but with the Christian gentleman whose polished deportment is not motivated by the superficial guide of taste, but rather is the manifestation of his justice and charity of heart.

331.7-18 "Such are some of the lineaments of the ethical
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classical, which the cultivated intellect will form...scoffing, and relentless foe." The ideal of the gentleman, which forms "the 'beau-
ideal' of the world" (331.11) can be "seen within the pale of the Church and without it" (331.9-10) as the careers of the following people indicate.

331.13-14 "...St. Francis de Sales..." (1567-1622) was born at the Château de Sales at Thorens in Savoy. He studied the humanities and philosophy at the Jesuit College of Clermont in Paris and was a student of law and theology at the University of Padua where he received his doctorate in law in 1591. He was made Bishop of Geneva, the same year that he had been sent to Paris on a religious and diplomatic mission. In 1609 Francis de Sales published his most famous work, Introduction to the Devout Life. The first edition of his complete works was published in 1637 and a critical edition in twenty-one volumes was published in 1892. He was declared a saint on April 19, 1665 and a doctor of the universal church on July 7, 1877.

331.14 "...Cardinal Pole" (1500-1558) was born at Stourton Castle, Staffordshire, England. He was educated at the grammar school founded by John Colet at Sheen and Magdalen College, Oxford where his tutors were Thomas Linacre and William Latimer. He continued his studies at Padua in 1521, where he corresponded with Erasmus and other humanists, and again at Paris in 1529. At Padua he joined Caraffa (Pope Paul IV) and others who were eager to reform ecclesiastical abuses, but regarded
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the maintenance of papal supremacy as necessary to preserve the unity of Catholic Christendom. In reply to Henry VIII’s question of divorce and royal supremacy, Pole wrote *Pro ecclesiasticae unitatis defensione* (usually known as *De Unitate*). He was made Cardinal in 1536, sent as Papal Legate to England in 1537, and was one of the three legates to preside over the Council of Trent in 1545. On Thomas Cranmer’s deposition, Pole became Archbishop of Canterbury in 1556. On his death in 1558, he was buried at Canterbury near the site of the shrine of St. Thomas a Becket.

Both Francis de Sales and Reginald Pole I were noblemen who had received not only the liberal education of the gentleman and the diplomat, but also the religious training that made them noteworthy for piety and a devout life as well as for steadfastness in their opposition to forces contrary to Revealed Truth. These men, who were men of the world of the Church, and of God, exemplified the ideal of the Christian gentleman which is basic to Newman's idea of education.

331.14-5 "the limits of the virtue of a Shaftesbury or a Gibbon." Newman is noting that the education of both Shaftesbury and Gibbon progressed as far as the development of intellectual culture, the aim of a liberal education, and did not proceed to the development of the whole person, spiritually as well as intellectually.

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331.15-lü "Basil and Julian...relentless foe." Basil the Great (c.330-379) came of a famous family, which gave a number of distinguished supporters to the Church. Basil studied at Constantinople and at Athens, where he was a fellow student with the Apostate Julian. Basil sought out hermit saints in Syria and Egypt to learn from them how to attain to sincere piety and how to practise asceticism. As a result, Basil became the founder of monastic institutions. After being made Bishop of Caesarea in 370, his great powers of oratory were used to stamp out Arianism. Basil is also noteworthy for his improvement of the liturgy. His principal writings were De Spiritu Sancto and Hexaemeron, a series of sermons on the opening verses of Genesis and on exposition of the psalter. His ascetic writings include the Moralia and Regulae, ethical manuals for use in the world and the cloister respectively.

Newman writes of Basil as, "the man of firm resolve and hard deeds, the high-minded ruler of Christ's flock, the diligent labourer in the field of ecclesiastical politics."¹

Newman notes that Basil "would make the monk to be the true gentleman"² and follows this statement by an excerpt from one of Basil's letters that describes the characteristics of the true gentleman that the


² Ibid., p. 64.
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monk should ideally possess: The gentleman-monk should have

knowledge how to converse; to interrogate without over-
earnestness; to answer without desire of display; not to interrupt
a profitable speaker, not to desire ambitiously to put in a word of one's
own; to be measured in speaking and hearing; not to be ashamed of
receiving, or to be grudging in giving, information, nor to disown
what one has learned from others, as depraved women practise with their
children, but to refer it candidly to the true parent. The middle tone
of voice is best, neither so low as to be inaudible, nor ill-bred from
its high pitch. One should reflect first what one is going to say, and
then give it utterance; be courteous when addressed, amiable in social
intercourse; not aiming to be pleasant by smartness, but
cultivating gentleness in kind admonitions. Harshness is ever
to be put aside, even in censuring. 1

The fact that Basil became a "Saint and Doctor of the Church"
(331.17) and Julian "her scoffing and relentless foe" (331.18), even
though both were given an education that cultivated the intellect and
both knew the characteristics of the gentleman, re-emphasizes Newman's
point that a liberal education as such makes the gentleman only, not the
Christian and that cultivation of the intellect, the aim of a university,
is no guarantee of either orthodoxy or sanctity in the spiritual order.

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Newman’s subject in discourse IX has been a comparison and a contrast of the moral and social teaching of philosophy with Catholicism (295.17-20). Newman makes clear that he has viewed Catholicism in this discourse not from the point of view of its Creed, but rather as Religion, then viewed as Religion, rather than as Theology. "Catholicism [is] a system of pastoral instruction and moral duty; and I have to do with its doctrines only as they are subservient to its direction of the conscience and the conduct" (294.24-27).

The "momentous benefit which the philosopher is likely to confer on the pastors of the Church" (295.22-23) is that the pursuit of knowledge draws the mind from things which will harm it; namely, the turmoil of sense and self-will, to subjects which are worthy of a rational being (295.1-4). Secondly, "knowledge, the discipline by which it is gained, and the tastes which it forms, have a natural tendency to refine the mind, and to give it an indisposition,... a disgust and abhorrence, towards excesses and enormities of evil,..." (299.1-6). Newman differs from the knowledge is Virtue advocates, such as Whigham and Peel: Newman is maintaining that knowledge inclines the mind towards good; not that knowledge makes men good.

When the scorn and hatred which a cultivated intellect feels towards vice is not rooted in faith and love there is evident a false philosophy, the danger of a civilized age. Newman describes the "sin of the Intellect" (304.23) or "the philosophical sin" (305.4) as follows: "conscience becomes what is called a moral sense; the command of duty
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is a sort of taste; sin is not an offence against God, but against human nature" (304.23). This "spurious religion" (304.27-28) was the religion of English Liberalism: "...their one object,..., is to paint a smooth and perfect surface, and to be able to say to themselves that they have done their duty. When they do wrong, they feel, not contrition, of which God is the object, but remorse, and a sense of degradation. They call themselves fools, not sinners; they are angry and impatient, not humble" (305.17-24).

Further from the Christianity of the Lawgiver and Judge (304.13-14) is the intellectual religion of the ancient heathen who substitu-
ted a "moral sense or taste for conscience" (305.14). "Imperator Julian,
the apostate from Christian Truth, the foe of Christian education...was all but the pattern-man of philosophical virtue" (307.17-21). Newman describes Julian as "one of the most eminent specimens of pagan virtue, which the world has ever seen" (308.2-4). A modern English exponent of "a godless intellectualism" (310.14) was Lord Shaftesbury, for whom "...all beauty is truth" (313.2). "...virtue being only one kind of beauty, the principle which determines what is virtuous is, not conscience but 'taste'" (313.3-6). Newman concludes concerning the Religion of Philosophy that no "real conversion follows from a doctrine which makes virtue a mere point of good taste, and vice vulgar and ungentlemanlike" (316.8-11). Thus "that very refinement of Philosophy, which began by repelling sensuality, ends by excusing it" (317.22-24).

Newman notes that the origin of the idea of a gentleman "may be
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a logical result of Philosophy, but...it is an historical offspring of Christianity" (321.3-5). It is St. Paul in his exhortation on charity who "draws the Christian character in its most graceful form, and its most beautiful hues" (319.11-13). Newman's definition of a gentleman describes "some of the lineaments of the ethical character, which the cultivated intellect will form; apart from religious principle" (331.7-9); therefore, this delineation of a gentleman, Newman states, is "almost a definition of a gentleman" (327.28-29). What remains for its completion is the dimension added by St. Paul. Basil, the saint and Doctor of the Church, was the complete definition of a gentleman; whereas Julian, his fellow student in Athens, who became the scoffing and relentless foe of the Church (331.15-18), represented "almost a definition of a gentleman" (327.28-29), and he "was all but the pattern-man of philosophical virtue" (307.17-21). Thus Newman concludes by example the comparison between Philosophy and Catholicism. Regardless of his admiration for the benefits and gracious lineaments of civilization, he concludes that Religion is necessary for the correction and completion of the product of Philosophy.
ANNOTATION OF THE DISCOURSES

Chapter XVI

DISCOURSE X. DUTIES OF THE CHURCH TOWARDS PHILOSOPHY

"Duties of the Church Towards Philosophy" refers to the Church's responsibility towards those various subjects that are the matter of a Liberal Education and whose end is intellectual culture or philosophy. The main point of the Discourses, which Newman emphasizes in Discourse X by way of summary, is that an education is not liberal, does not result in the philosophical habit, if it is disjoined from Religion. Newman writes, "I observed in my Introductory Discourse, that 'the main principle on which I should have to proceed in the controversy to which I was addressing myself, was this, that Education must not be disjoined from Religion, or that Mixed Schools are constructed on a false idea" (336.22-27).

Newman makes clear that he is addressing these Discourses to "any one who thinks that the doctrines of Revelation are true in the same sense that scientific principles and historical facts are true" (337.11-13). For those who so think, Newman reiterates his basic principle in these Discourses: "the idea of a University in fact external to the Catholic Church is both unphilosophical and impracticable, supposing, that is, by University is meant a place of education in general knowledge" (337.13-17).

Concerning the meaning of "duties" in the title, Newman states
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"...even though the case could be so, that the whole system of Catholicism was recognized and professed, without the direct presence of the Church, still this would not at once make a University a Catholic Institution, nor be sufficient to secure the due weight of theological truth in its philosophical studies" (338.12-18). Furthermore, Newman continues, "...it is no sufficient security for the Catholicity of a University, even that the whole of Catholic theology should be professed in it, unless the Church breathes her own pure and unearthly spirit into it; and fashions and moulds its organization, and watches over its teaching, and knits together its pupils, and superintends its action" (339.10-17).

333.3-4 "...the difficult and anxious undertaking to which I have been immediately addressing myself." Newman states, "my inquiry has borne a preliminary character, not as the duties of the Church towards a University, nor the characteristics of a University which is Catholic, but as to what a University is, what is its aim, what its nature, what its bearings" (335.16-21). Therefore, Newman's immediate purpose, and therefore the purpose of the Discourses, was not that of delineating the characteristics of a Catholic University, but rather, the preliminary subject of inquiring the aim, nature, and bearings of a University in itself. Consequently, Discourse X bears a somewhat sequential relationship to the Discourses I to IX; in the sense that, after Newman has established the nature of a University in Discourses I to IX, he
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inquires in Discourse X the specific nature of a Catholic University.

333.7-10 "...for I have attempted...grounds." See Discourse I, 9.16-26 and 14.22 - 16.7 for the initial statements of the idea that any religious body, if it truly believes its own tenets will be vigorously opposed to separating secular and religious education and that the battle of "mixed education," before fought on the grounds of other denominations, is now transferred to Ireland and the Catholic domain.

333.10-14 "I declared my intentions,...of treating it as a philosophical and practical, rather than as a theological question, not to ecclesiastical rules;" Newman emphasizes here that he has been dealing with the subject of a University from a philosophical, not a theological point of view. See Discourse I, 9.16-26.

Newman's great dream was to establish an Irish "Oxford", 5.17, at least his Oxford ideal—a university infused with the spirit of Christianity, but not dominated by nor restricted by the Church, as an organization, in the full pursuit of liberal knowledge. Yet, on the other hand, he saw as the duty of the Church to see that the true spirit of religion pervaded and guided, the development of what Newman saw as an essentially secular organization—the University.

334.1-2 "...investigate without error and instruct without obscurity." This balanced sentence expresses Newman's purpose throughout the Discourses of searching for truth in the development of his educational theory and writing that truth with accuracy and clarity of expression.
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334.2-6 "...if the past discussion has at any time tried the patience of the kind persons...on no one can it have inflicted so great labour and fatigue as on myself." Newman's letters in the last weeks before he completed the Discourses express vividly the "great labour and fatigue" which the Discourses inflicted upon him: To Sister Mary Imelda Poole he wrote on October 13, 1852: "At present I am simply overcome with the University Discourses which are upon me. About a fortnight since I attempted an ordinary Lecture here [Edgbaston, Birmingham], and broke down." 1

Another letter to Sister Poole on October 22, 1852 expresses the great labour involved in all of Newman's writing, and in particular, that caused by the Discourses: "The first book I wrote, my 'Arians' I was almost fainting daily, when I was finishing it—and (except my Parochial Sermons) every book I have written, before and since I was a Catholic, has been a sort of 'operation,' the distress has been so great. The Discourses, now (thank God) all but finished, have been the most painful of all." 2

In one of the letters at this time, Newman expressed the hope to have completed the Discourses by December 8; on November 2, 1852 he


2 Ibid., p.183.
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wrote to T. W. Allies as follows: "The truth is I am quite worn out with work. My University lectures have taken out of me, no one can say how much, and I am fit for nothing but to lie on a sofa. ...It will be very long before I write another book." ¹

334.11 - 335.9 "...but for myself, ...under review." Newman's making his way through the Discourses as compared to a navigator in strange seas in the dark of night is an effective introduction to the idea that the Discourses are of a preliminary nature. The comparison illustrates that he felt unable to see the distant shore when he set out "The lessons of antiquity, the determinations of authority, are here rather the needle, chart, and plummet, than great objects,..." (334.19-21). They are, in other words, the means by which, rather than the objects of his voyage. The past is to be a guide for the present, a means to the future, not that which is sought for its own sake. The final part of the metaphor--"it is not till the morning comes, and the snore greets us, and we see our vessel making straight for harbour, that we relax our jealous watch, and consider anxiety irrational" (334.26-335.1) --suggests that the great burden of the argument is over and that Discourse X serves only to bring the vessel safely ashore. Newman's one regret seems to be that he has not had "the finished work of writers" (335.5-6) as authorities. But in a lengthy Appendix Newman did make

¹ Newman, Letters and Diaries, pp. 188-189.
numerous extensive quotations from pertinent references.

335.16-21 "...my immediate undertaking," See above 333.3-4.

335.21 - 336.14 "I have...dangerous foe." This section forms a concise summary of the ideas in Discourses II to IX.

335.21-23 "I have...all branches of knowledge are, ...its subject matter;" See Discourse II, specifically, 39.7-8.

335.23-25 "...that these branches...form together a whole or system;" See Discourse III, in particular, 69.20-26. Discourse V, 136.4-8. Discourse VI, 166.1 - 167.26.

335.26-29 "...and that, in proportion to our knowledge of them as a whole, ...knowledge of them separately;" See Discourse III, 72.21 - 73.2; 78.25 - 79.2; and 89.2-19. Discourse IV, 104.17-25. Discourse V, 136.9-15. Discourse V, (1873 edition) 75.6-25.

335.29 - 336.6 "...that the process of imparting...their own-sake." See Discourse VI, 187.25 - 188.6 and also VI, 170.11-19. VIII, 242.28 - 243.5.

336.6-9 "...that they are, ...political life;" See Discourse VIII. 253.24-29 and 254.14-23. VIII. 257.26-29; VIII. 270.14 - 271.2.

336.9-14 "and lastly, ...dangerous foe." See Discourse IX. 291.8-18.
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336.22-27 "I observed in my Introductory Discourse, that "...Mixed Schools are constructed on a false idea." See Introduction, 12.12-18 for the initial statement of this idea. What Newman means by the statement that "Mixed Schools are constructed on a false idea" he explained in 12.19-27 as follows: "...every sect of Protestants, which has retained the idea of religious truth and the necessity of faith, which has any dogma to profess and any dogma to lose, makes that dogma the basis of its education, secular as well as religious, and is jealous of those attempts to establish schools of a purely secular character,..." (12.20-25). In other words, all those who are earnest about and hold sincerely a particular religious belief are opposed to the separation of secular and religious education or so called "Mixed Schools."

336.27 - 337.1 "Here of course...confined myself;" "What is meant by University Education" is the summary statement of the inquiry that Newman is making in these discourses. He has mentioned that this inquiry is of a preliminary nature--see 336.15-18 and 335.17--and continues by saying that "further proofs in detail will form the subject of future discussions"(337.4-5).

337.4-7 "Those further proofs...entering upon them;" The future discussions became the subject of Lectures and Essays on University Subjects (1858) and Historical Sketches, Vol. III. These two volumes comprise lectures and essays Newman wrote on the subject of university education during the years that he was Rector of the Catholic University of Ireland.
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337.8-17 "...I consider...general knowledge." Here Newman is speaking with his particular audience in mind; that is, with those who were going to build and support the Catholic University of Ireland; whereas, throughout the Discourses he has been inquiring what was meant by a University education for all those who had a particular religious belief; namely, for all those who think "that the doctrines of Revelation are true in the same sense that scientific principles and historical facts are true," (337.11-13) and for all those who sincerely hold their own belief and know what they hold. A theme, implicit in Newman and basic to his thought, is the idea that there is no such thing as an actual separation between secular and religious education. The Queen's Colleges, as Newman and the Bishops of Ireland recognized, were undenominational, but not non-sectarian. In actual fact they were based on the principles and beliefs of those who had established them: the English utilitarians and the Anglican Liberals. It would seem then, that all education is based on a religion in the sense of a structure of beliefs in the nature of man, his Creator, his relation to his Creator, and his purpose in life. Therefore, "Mixed Schools", with all that the phrase implies, is a hypothetical term that has no true existence in fact.

See the following sections in Discourse I--6.3-8; 7.17-26; 8.13 - 9.26; 11.24 - 12.3; 14.25 - 15.4--for Newman's stressing the ecumenical basis of his educational principles, for the idea that those who sincerely and intelligently hold a religious belief are resolute in
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their opposition to the separation of secular and religious education, (also Discourse II 40.3-17); and finally, for the idea that such an opposition to "mixed education" was a resolution characteristic of various Protestant denominations, particularly of the Oxford-Cambridge Anglicans.

337.13-17 "...that the idea of a University...a place of education in general knowledge." Throughout the Discourses Newman has been arguing against the separation of secular and religious education or "mixed education" by means of his arguments for the necessity of including Theology in the university curriculum. Not to include Theology, Newman considers "unphilosophical" in that if a university is to be considered "a place of education in general knowledge" (337.16-17) it must not, by the very nature of the institution, omit a branch of knowledge, so very important to all other branches, from its curriculum. The foregoing is the argument principally of Discourses II and III. See in particular, 39.18 - 40.1.

Then the omission of Theology is "impracticable" in that the omission obviates the main purpose of a university education: that of acquiring "the sciences of sciences". Basing his argument on the unity of knowledge reflected in the circle of sciences and the necessity of the mind's reflecting that unity, Newman writes in Discourse V: "Imagine a science of sciences, and you have attained the true notion of the scope of a University. We consider that all things mount up to a whole, that
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there is an order and precedence and harmony in the branches of
knowledge one with another as well as one by one, and that to destroy
that structure is as unphilosophical in a course of education, as it is
unscientific in the separate portions of it" (144.14-20).

337.18 - 341.20 "A reason for calling...against the severe
and the terrible." This section is a summary of the Discourses from the
point of view of Discourse X; that is, from the point of view of the
Church's duties towards Liberal Knowledge.

337.21 - 338.7 "In the former,...defender is the Church."
Newman is reiterating here that in Discourses I to V he has dealt with
the argument of its being "unphilosophical" to omit Theology from the
University. With reference to his thought in Discourse X, he concludes
that the Church is the "proper defender" (338.6) of "theological
knowledge" (338.4) within the University curriculum.

338.12-22 "I have been showing in them...promises counteract
In the Discourses VI to IX, Newman has implied that it would be
"impracticable" to omit Theology. (See above, 337.13-17) Here in
Discourse X with references to VI to IX, he says that "without the
direct presence of the Church, ...it may easily happen that a particular
bias or drift may characterize an Institution,..." (338.14-20). The
particular bias may be a secularization in end (see below, 338.22-340.3)
or in "the character of their teaching" (340.6) (See below, 340.4-341.20)
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338.22 - 340.3 "We have an instance...more or less prejudicial to its interests." Newman cites the Spanish Inquisition as an example of an institution that was Catholic in matter, but not in form; that is, "it was simply and entirely a state institution. ...Considered 'materially' it was nothing but Catholic, but its spirit and form were earthy and secular" (338.28 - 339.7). As it was "an instrument of the state" (339.2-3) and "its immediate end was of a secular character" (339.19-20), Newman refers to the Spanish Inquisition as "an expression of that very Church-and-King spirit which has prevailed in these islands" (338.29 - 339.2). (See above, Part One of the Introduction to the thesis for a reference to the Anglican establishment and the Erastianism that necessitated the Oxford Movement).

Newman's comparing the Spanish Inquisition in its being materially religious, yet an instrument of the state to the "very Church-and-King spirit which has prevailed in these islands" (339.1-2) is, for Newman, a frequently used rhetorical device in which he here effectively turns the opponents' ace criticism of the Church and its association with the Inquisition back upon themselves, yet at the same time illustrates clearly the result of an institution—be it Church (Catholic in the Renaissance; Anglican in the nineteenth-century England) or University—being materially religious, but wholly earthy and secular in form. As Newman states, "...it is no sufficient security for the Catholicity of a University, even that the whole of Catholic theology should be professed..."
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in it, unless the Church breathes her own pure and unearthy spirit into it, and fashions and moulds its organization, and watches over its teaching, and knits together its pupils, and superintends its actions" (339.10-17).

But a University, by its very nature, as Newman has been maintaining throughout the Discourses, has a secular end, that of Liberal knowledge: "...Academical Institutions... are in their very nature directed to social, national, temporal objects in the first instance,..." Then too, since Universities "are living and energizing bodies,... and of necessity have some one formal and definite ethical character, good or bad, and do of a certainty imprint that character on the individuals who direct and who frequent them," (339.21-29), it is essential, for Newman, that the matter of Universities, though secular in end and "character of their teaching" (340.6), should be informed by the spirit of Catholicism.

"339.2-4 "'...it was an instrument of the state, according to the confession of the acutest Protestant historians, in its warfare against the Holy See." Newman identifies "Protestant historians" in his Present Position of Catholics: "...the Spanish Inquisition, which really was bloody, is confessed by the great Protestant authorities, such as Ranke, and Guizot, to have been a political, not an ecclesiastical institution; its officials, though ecclesiastics, were 'appointed by the crown, responsible to the crown, and removable at its pleasure.'
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...The Protestant Ranke distinctly maintains that it was even set up 'against' the Pope and the Church. 'As the jurisdiction of the Court,' he says, 'rested on the Royal Supremacy, so its exercise was made available for the maintenance of the Royal authority. It is one of those 'spoliations' of the ecclesiastical power, by which this government rose into strength; ...in its nature and its object, it was a purely political institute.' 1

"Ranke" was Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), the German historian to whom Newman specifically refers in 339.2-5. Ranke, whose objective was to write history free from prejudices of any kind and based on eyewitness narratives and genuine documents preserved in the archives, wrote the Ecclesiastical and Political History of the Popes During the 16th. and 17th. Centuries (3 vols., 1834, Eng. trans. by S. Austin, 1840) and the History of the Reformation in Germany (Eng. trans. by S. Austin, 1845-47). The collected edition of Ranke's works in 54 volumes was issued at Leipzig (1868-90).

"Guizot" was François Pierre Guillaume Guizot (1787-1874), the French historian and statesman, whose works pertinent to this context are Histoire de la civilisation en Europe (1828; Eng. trans. by W. Hazlitt, 3 vols. 1846) and Histoire de la civilisation en France (4 vols., 1830).

1 J. H. Newman, Present Position of Catholics, Lecture V. 6, pp. 210-211.
339.17-20 "The Spanish Inquisition...of a secular character."

See the Present Position of Catholics, pp. 211-212, for Newman's explanation of the action taken by the Holy See against the Spanish Inquisition.

340.4 - 341.20 "...such Institutions...against the severe and terrible." Also, by virtue of "the character of their teaching" (340.6). Universities "may be perverted into hostility to Revealed Truth" (340.4-5) in that "they are employed in the pursuit of Liberal Knowledge, and Liberal Knowledge has a special tendency, ...to impress us with a mere philosophical theory of life and conduct, in place of Revelation" (340.7-12). Newman discussed the foregoing idea in Discourse IX.

In Discourses VI to IX Newman was, according to the perspective afforded by Discourse X, actually discussing the ways in which the two attributes of truth, "beauty and power" (340.14) -- Liberal knowledge and Useful knowledge, respectively -- can become hostile to Revealed Truth, by making "present utility [Discourses VI - VIII] and natural beauty [Discourse IX] the practical test of truth, and the sufficient object of the intellect" (340.23-25). See above, the Discourse VI for an elaboration of the "present utility" theme, 176.27 - 177.3.

The result of viewing knowledge from the point of view of "present utility and natural beauty" (340.23) is that knowledge so
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considered "exerts a subtle influence in throwing us back on ourselves, and making us our own centre, and our minds the measure of all things" (341.3-6).

341.6-12 "This then is the tendency...developes there." The two metaphors in this section emphasize the result of the tendency of Liberal Knowledge to "measure and proportion [Revealed Truth] by an earthly standard" (340.26-27). Liberal Knowledge, expressed in a musical metaphor, tends to transpose Revealed Truth to an earthly or secular key; and expressed in mathematical imagery, Liberal Knowledge attempts to circumscribe Revealed Truth and confine it with the circumference of its own earthly perspective:

341.21-23 "...this intellectualism...the very principle of dogmatism"; "intellectualism" is, in Newman's words, "the notion, conscious or unconscious, that the human intellect, self-educated and self-supported, is more true and perfect in its ideas and judgments, than that of Prophets and Apostles,..." (341.12-16). In the following passage from "The Self-wise Inquirer" Newman describes the tendency of "intellectualism" to "cast down moral excellence from its true station, and sent up the usurping empire of mere reason,..."

The first sin of men of superior understanding is to 'value' themselves upon it, and look down upon others. They make intellect the measure of praise and blame; and instead of considering a common 'faith' to be the bond of union between Christian and Christian, they dream of some other fellowship of...
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civilization, refinement, literature, science, or general mental illumination, to unite gifted minds one with another. Having thus cast down moral excellence from its true station, and set up the usurping empire of mere reason, next, they place a value upon all truths exactly in proportion to the possibility of proving them by means of that mere reason. Hence, moral and religious truths are thought little of by them, because they fall under the province of 'Conscience' far more than of the intellect. Religion sinks in their estimation, or becomes of no account; they begin to think all religions alike; and no wonder, for they are like men who have lost the faculty of discerning colours, and who never, by any exercise of reason, can make out the difference between white and black. [See above for Newman's use of the colour-sight metaphor depicting the faculty of discernment.]

As to the code of morals, they acknowledge it in a measure, that is, so far as its dicta can be 'proved' by reasoning, by an appeal to sight, and to expediency, and without reference to a natural sense of right and wrong as the sanction of these informants. Thinking much of intellectual advancement, they are bent on improving the world by making all 'men' intellectual; and they labour to convince themselves that as men grow in knowledge they will grow in virtue. [Newman wrote the "Tamworth Reading Room" to disprove the foregoing point.]

As they proceed in their course of judicial blindness, from 'undervaluing' they learn to 'despise' or to 'hate' the authority of Conscience. ...The notions of better men about an over-ruling Providence, and the Divine will, designs, appointments, works, judgments; they treat with scorn, as irrational;...
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In the foregoing passage Newman elaborates on what he has merely mentioned in 341.21-23; namely, that "intellectualism" comes "into collision with precept, then with doctrine, then with the very principle of dogmatism" as a result of the empire of reason usurping the province of moral excellence and deposing the authority of conscience in favour of intellectual advancement.

341.23-24. "A perception...dogmatism." This substitution of the principle of the aesthetic, which belongs basically to the province of the senses and the imagination, for the principle of faith, primarily an act of the intellect and the will, as Newman maintains throughout, was discussed in Discourse IX and is mentioned here to indicate that after the Religion of Philosophy and its characteristic "intellectualism" does away with dogma, it must put something in its place to be believed in: that something is the appreciation of the Beautiful.

341.24-26 "External to the Church,...scepticism or infidelity;" By "infidelity" Newman means disbelief in Christianity, from "infidel" meaning a disbeliever in the True religion. Newman considers the nineteenth century in which he is writing an age of unbelief or infidelity, but he says, "I hold that unbelief is in some shape unavoidable in an age of intellect..." ¹ Also, he writes in the same essay, contrasting his age with the middle ages: "...in the present, when

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universal toleration prevails, and it is open to assail revealed truth (whether Scripture or Tradition, the Fathers, or the 'Sense of the Faithful'), unbelief in consequence throws off the mask, and takes up a position over against us in citadels of its own, and confronts us in the broad daylight and with a direct assault. And I have no hesitation in saying..., that I prefer to live in an age when the fight is in the day, not in the twilight; and think it a gain to be speared by a foe, rather than to be stabbed by a friend." ¹

The "citadels of its own" which Newman has been attacking throughout the Discourses are Useful Knowledge, valued only for its "present utility" (340.23) (Discourses II-VIII) and Liberal Knowledge apprehended only as "natural beauty" (340.23) (Discourse IX).

Newman continues in the essay, "A Form of Infidelity of the Day," "...one great advantage of an age in which unbelief speaks out, that Faith can speak out too;... In such an age it is possible to found a University more emphatically Catholic than could be set up in the middle ages, because Truth can entrench itself carefully, and define its own profession severely, and display its colours unequivocally,... And a kindred advantage to this is the confidence which, in such an age, we can place in all who are around us, so that we need look for no foes

¹ Newman, "Form of Infidelity..., p. 382.
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but those who are in the enemy's camp." ¹

341.26 - 242.21 "...but even within it,...an element of
corruption and debility...successive results." In 341.24-26 Newman was
saying that outside the pale of the Church "intellectualism" results in
scepticism and then infidelity. In this section, he states that within
the Church, "intellectualism" causes "an element of corruption and
debility" (341.28). That tuning of Revealed Religion to a secular key
(to give a variation on Newman's metaphor in 341.9-10) results in the
idea that "it [the Church] must keep up with the age" (342.9-10). With
such a tendency in mind, Newman warns, "Let this spirit [Liberal
Knowledge--Religion of Philosophy--Intellectualism] be freely evolved
out of that philosophical condition of mind,...and it is impossible but,
first indifference, then laxity of belief, then heresy, then an explicit
suppression of Catholic theology, will be the successive results" (342.
16-21).

Newman is always concerned with the unrecognized enemy, here
specifically, the spirit of "intellectualism" that evolves freely out of
that philosophical condition of mind (342.16-17) which is the result of
a Liberal Education--an education, which nevertheless, it is the nature
and aim of a university to impart. An aspect of the unrecognized enemy

¹ Newman, "Form of Infidelity...", pp. 382-383.
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that Newman discloses in this last discourse is the possibility of a university's being within the Church's pale, yet external to her faith. He maintains that "the University which does not profess the Faith, must in consistency denounce it. It becomes the prey and the organ of avowed infidelity, as bitter a foe to the interests of Revealed Truth, as it might have been a defence" (342.24-28).

Thus Newman has been introducing the major theme of this discourse--the "two injuries, which Revelation is likely to sustain at the hands of the Masters of human reason, unless the Church...protects the sacred treasure..." (342.29-343.3). Newman deals with these "two injuries", the result of that corruption of Liberal Knowledge he terms "intellectualism," in order to more clearly delineate "the false doctrine [which] may at first exert an influence even upon those who would shrink from it if they recognized it as it really is and as it will ultimately show itself." 1

342.29 -343.12 "Here then are two injuries,...subject of these discourses." The "two injuries, which Revelation is likely to sustain at the hands of the Masters of human reason" (342.29-343.2) are the ignoring of Theological Truth "under the pretence of not recognizing differences of religious opinion" (343.5-6)--the subject basic to

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Discourses I to VIII; and "a recognition...of Catholicism, but...an adulteration of its spirit" (343.9-11) -- the subject of Discourse IX.

343.18 - 344.2 "These are three great subjects,...upon Religion separately." The three great subjects on which Human Reason employs itself are God, Nature, and Man: the book of God is Theology, "the book of nature is called science, the book of man is called Literature" (343.23-25). It is the exclusion of the book of Theology by the book of Science and its corruption by the book of Literature that Newman will discuss from 344.3 to 362.9.

344.3 - 353.17 "As to Physical Science...consistently acted on." At the beginning of this section in which Newman discusses the influence of Physical Science on Religion, he states that "there can be no real collision" (344.3-4) between Physical Science and Catholicism in that they both "come from the same Divine Author" (344.5-6). However, he explains that historically there has always been what Newman terms, "a sort of jealousy and hostility between Religion and physical philosophers" (344.8-10). Newman deals with the Revelation versus Physical Science conflict in Essay VII, "Christianity and Physical Science," The Idea of a University. See below, 344.10-17 for the beginning of examples of the traditional hostility between Religion and Science.

344.10-17 "The name of Galileo...full revenge upon Theology
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since." Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), Italian mathematician, astronomer, and physicist, in his Letters on the Solar Spots (1613), ventured to take up a more decided position with regard to the Copernican theory of the solar system. Galileo's brilliant researches, enhanced by his formidable dialectic and enthusiastic zeal, drew the attention of the ecclesiastical authorities to the discrepancies between the Copernican theory and a literal interpretation of certain passages in Scripture.

Concerning the situation to which Newman refers in 344,11-14, "Not content...of Scripture," it would seem that Galileo not only tried to explain adverse texts, but also tried to produce Scriptural confirmation of the Copernican system. With reference to the foregoing point Newman states in "Christianity and Scientific Investigation" concerning "a teacher of Science actually laying down the law 'in a matter of Religion'...: It would be a great mistake in such a one to propose his philosophical or historical conclusions as the formal interpretation of the sacred text, as Galileo is said to have done, instead of being content to hold his doctrine of the motion of the earth as a scientific conclusion, and leaving it to those whom it really concerned to compare it with Scripture." ¹

In 1616 Pope Paul V ordered an investigation by the

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Congregation of the Holy Office and gave Galileo an injunction, which he promised to keep, not to hold, teach, or defend his opinion in any way. However, in 1632 Galileo completed his Dialogue on the Two Great World Systems in contradiction to the edict of sixteen years before and was subsequently censured in 1633 by Urban VIII. It would seem that Galileo, profoundly assured of the truth of his cause, set himself with his habitual vehemence to convince others, and so contributed in no small degree to the trouble which greatly embittered the latter part of his life. The ecclesiastical authorities, on the other hand, were loath to give approval to such a disturbing theory without, in their eyes, ample proof.

About the Galileo dispute Newman writes, "...nor were the received traditions, which were the ground of that alarm, [about the Copernican System] hastily to be rejected; yet rejected they ultimately have been. If in any quarter these human traditions were enforced, and, as it were, enacted to the prejudice and detriment of scientific investigation (and this was never done by the Church herself), this was a case of undue interference on the part of the Theological schools in the province of Physics." ¹

On the other hand, in the following passage Newman defends the

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censuring of Galileo in that his theory "revolutionized the received system of belief," and therefore, it was wise in charity to the faithful "to delay the formal reception of a new interpretation of Scripture, till their imaginations should gradually get accustomed to it." The passage from the Preface to The Via Media of the Anglican Church is as follows:

Galileo might be right in his conclusion that the earth moves; to consider him a heretic might have been wrong; but there was nothing wrong in censuring abrupt, startling, unsettling, unverified disclosures, if such they were, disclosures at once uncalled for and inopportune, at a time when the limits of revealed truth had not as yet been ascertained. A man ought to be very sure of what he is saying, before he risks the chance of contradicting the word of God. It was safe, not dishonest, to be slow in accepting what nevertheless turned out to be true. Here is an instance in which the Church obliges Scripture expositors, at a given time or place, to be tender of the popular religious sense.

"...Galileo's truth is said to have shocked and scared the Italy of his day. It revolutionized the received system of belief, as regards heaven, purgatory, and hell, to say that the earth went round the sun, and it forcibly imposed upon categorical statements of Scripture, a figurative interpretation. Heaven was no longer above, and earth below; the heavens no longer literally opened and shut; purgatory and hell were not for certain under the earth. The catalogue of theological truths was seriously curtailed. ...We are used to these questions now, and reconciled to them; and on that account are no fit judges of the disorder and dismay, which the Galilean hypothesis would cause to good Catholics, ...or how necessary it was in charity; especially then, to delay the formal reception of a new interpretation of Scripture, till their imaginations should gradually get accustomed to it.

"...All I say is, that not all knowledge is
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suited to all minds; a proposition may be ever so true, yet at a particular time and place may be 'temerarious, offensive to pious ears, and scandalous,' though not 'heretical' nor 'erroneous'.

See "Christianity and Scientific Investigation," p. 473, for a similar discussion.

Newman does say in the same essay that for the progress of Science it "is a matter of primary importance in the cultivation of those sciences, in which truth is discoverable by the human intellect, that the investigator should be free, independent, unshackled in his movements; that he should be allowed and enabled, without impediment, to fix his mind intently, nay, exclusively, on his special object, without the risk of being distracted every other minute in the process and progress of his inquiry, by charges of temerariousness, or by warnings against extravaganee or scandal." The foregoing paragraph represents Newman's attitude towards scientific investigation within the university community.

344.24-28 "...the run of experimentalists,...Humboldt."

Newman cites the scientists he mentions here in either their "positive or

1 The Via Media of the Anglican Church, 1830-1841, Vol. I (Longmans, Green, and Co., 1901), pp. liv - lvi.

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negative unbelief" (344.26-27) as implying "that in their opinion it
[Religion] had no voice at all in the subject-matter which they had
appropriated to themselves." (345.4-6).

344.27 "Laplace" See above, Discourse IV, 134.23.

344.27 "Buffon" See above, Discourse IV, 134.23.

344.27 "Franklin" is Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790), American
philosopher, statesman, publisher and science researcher. Franklin's
scientific discoveries, specifically in electricity, are the reason for
his being included in this list of experimentalists. That Franklin had
liberal-utilitarian ideas of education is evident from his plans in
1749 for establishing "The Academy and Charitable School of the Province
of Pennsylvania," later called the University of Pennsylvania. Franklin
had in mind that the children of Philadelphia should be taught practical
things, and especially, instructed in English as the centre of their
education rather than the usual first place afforded the study of Latin
in the classical schools of the eighteenth century. See The Writings of
Benjamin Franklin, ed. A. M. Smyth (10 vols., 1905-1907), for Franklin's
"Proposals for Establishing an Academy" and "Articles of Belief and
Acts of Religion."

344.27 "Priestley" is Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), English
chemist and nonconformist minister, whose studies in electricity gained
him the fellowship of the Royal Society in 1766 and supplied him with the
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material for his History of Electricity. In 1772 Priestley was chosen a foreign associate of the French Academy of Sciences. He made important contributions to chemistry and was the inventor of the "pneumatic trough"; thus Newman includes him with the experimentalists. Priestley's chief theological and philosophical works were Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion, 3 vols. (1772-74): An History of the Corruptions of Christianity, 2 vols. (1782): A General History of the Christian Church to the Fall of the Western Empire, 4 vols. (1790-1803).

344.27 "Cuvier" is Baron Léopold Chrétien Frédéric Cuvier (1769-1832) French naturalist who published in 1798 the Tableau élémentaire de l'histoire naturelle des animaux, the first general statement of his natural classification of the animal kingdom. In 1799 Cuvier became professor of natural history in the College de France, and in 1800 published Leçons d'anatomie comparée, a classical work which expounded his theory of comparative anatomy. In 1803 he was chosen perpetual secretary of the Institut National in the department of the physical and natural sciences. In 1817 he published Le Règne animal distribué d'après son organisation, which embodied the whole of his previous researches and the structure of living and fossil animals. As a member of the council of the Imperial University, Cuvier presided over several sessions of the commissions charged with examining the state of higher educational establishments in recently annexed territory and published reports of the commissions' findings.
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344.28 "Humboldt" See above, Discourse IV, 134.23.

Newman makes a statement in VII of the "Tamworth Reading Room" that sums up his general view of experimentalists such as those he has named in 344.27-28: "...I believe that the study of Nature, when religious feeling is away, leads the mind, rightly or wrongly, to acquiesce in the atheistic theory, as the simplest and easiest. It is parallel to that tendency in anatomical studies, which no one will deny, to solve all the phenomena of the human frame into material elements and powers and to dispense with the soul. To those who are conscious of matter, but not conscious of mind, it seems more rational to refer all things to one origin, such as they know, than to assume the existence of a second origin such as they know not. It is Religion, then, which suggests to Science its true conclusions: the facts come from Knowledge, but the principles come of Faith." ¹ Here in Discourse X Newman qualifies his viewpoint of experimentalists by saying that, "I do not of course mean to say that there need be in every case a resentful and virulent opposition made to Religion on the part of scientific men" (344.28 - 345.2); nevertheless, in Newman's view, there is the general tendency mentioned in the foregoing quotation "to solve all the phenomena...into material elements and power." Also, men of science have implied that in their opinion it [Religion] had no voice at all in

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the subject-matter which they had appropriated to themselves" (345.4-6).
The foregoing statement is particularly important for the curricula of
a university in that the idea that Religion has no voice at all in the
subject-matter of knowledge is the basic idea supporting the omission of
Theology from the university curriculum and the establishing of mixed
schools. See Sections 2 and 3 of the essay "A Form of Infidelty of the
Day," The Idea of a University, pp. 394-399.

345.7 "Friar Bacon" is Roger Bacon (c.1214-1292), called
Doctor Mirabilis, an English Franciscan philosopher and experimentalist
who studied at Oxford, but graduated from the University of Paris in
1237. Relinquishing his teaching position at the University of Paris,
he devoted himself to experiments, languages, 'secret' books, instru-
ments and astronomical tables. He wrote an encyclopaedia of all the
sciences, called Opus maius, followed by Opus minus, and Opus tertium,
which were synopses and developments of various sections of the main
work. For Bacon, languages, mathematics, and experimental sciences were
of far greater importance to theology and the Church than the four
popular sciences of grammar, logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics.
he considered mathematics a key to all the sciences. In his Compendium
philosophiae (c.1272), Bacon treated language, mathematics, optics,
alchemy, and experimental sciences. Jerome of Ascoli (Pope Nicholas IV),
minister general of the Franciscan order (1274-79) condemned Bacon's
teachings because they contained certain suspect novelties. Bacon was
imprisoned between 1277 and 1279. His interest in astrology and alchemy brought him great trouble as it was the custom of the day to attribute unusual skill in these experimental sciences to the influence of evil powers. The last of Bacon's writings, Compendium studii Theologiae (1292) criticized the vices and defects of all Christendom as well as the decline of theological studies in the schools of his day.

345.9-10 "Pope Sylvester the Second...natural secrets." (c. 940-1003) Sylvester II was pope from 999. He was educated at the Benedictine monastery of Aurillae and later at the episcopal school of Ausona in Spain where he acquired an unrivalled knowledge of mathematics. He was a gifted scholar who endeavoured to give reason its place by the side of revelation. He was one of the first mediaeval philosophers to elaborate the dialectical method and has been credited with attempting a synthesis between Plato and Aristotle. His mathematical, astronomical and other scientific knowledge was much admired by his contemporaries and even believed to be acquired by magic.

345.10-13 "...and the geographical ideas of St. Virgil,...the great St. Boniface...Martyr-Apostle of Germany." St. Virgil (Virgilius) (c.700-784), called the Apostle of Corinthia, was an Irishman (the Gàelic form of his name was Fergal) who was one of the most learned men of his age, especially in mathematics. He went to the continent in 743 where he served the diocese of Salzburg as bishop. St. Boniface, disapproving of his scientific doctrines, accused him to Pope Zacharias of heresy for
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holding the existence of the Antinodes.

St. Boniface (680-754) called the Apostle of Germany, laid the foundations of a settled ecclesiastical organization for Germany, reformed the entire Frankish church through a series of councils, founded the famous abbey of Fulda, became Archbishop of Mainz, c. 747, and was martyred in Frisia in 754, the area of his first missionary endeavours. The opposition of so progressive an apostle of the faith as St. Boniface to the scientific ideas of St. Virgil, even though they both shared the same faith and the same missionary spirit, is Newman's emphatic way of presenting the antagonism between men of religion and men of science even in the middle ages when there was no division over religious doctrine. Newman is pointing out that such antagonism seems to be characteristic of the two kinds of minds—the religious and the scientific in all eras, even the pre-Christian era. See below 345.16-23.

345.16-23 "...the hostility...ruin of science." See Tamworth Reading Room," 7, Discussions and Arguments, pp. 298-299. Also, see 347.15-18. Newman's three footnote references for this section are as follows: first, Henry Hallam (1777-1859), Introduction to the Literature of Europe in the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Centuries (2 vols., New York. Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1856) Hallam frequently mentions religion and religious institutions as being hindrances to the progress of science. For example, he states I, 243-244 that the Academies of Italy, which were schools devoted to the study of language
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and literature, "do not greatly favour the vigorous advances in science, and much less the original burst of genius, for which men of powerful minds, are designed by nature. They [the academies] form an oligarchy, pretending to guide the public taste as they are guided themselves, by arbitrary maxims and close adherence to precedents." Hallam's work, published between 1837 and 1839, is representative, it would seem from Newman's choice, of the nineteenth century attitude towards religious schools and the progress of science.

The second footnote (345.28) reference is to Macaulay's essay, "Francis Bacon". See Thomas B. Macaulay, Critical and Historical Essays (Vol. II, Everyman's Library, 1967), particularly, pp. 358-363. The following sentence from the passage expresses the ancient spirit of hostility between experimental science and philosophy: "The great work of improving the condition of the human race was still considered as unworthy of a man of learning" (363). The following quotation traces the spirit of hostility to the Socratic era: "The spirit which appears in the passage of Seneca to which we have referred tainted the whole body of the ancient philosophy from the time of Socrates downward...It pervades the dialogues of Plato. It may be distinctly traced in many parts of the works of Aristotle" (360).

The third reference in the footnote (345.29) is to Newman's Oxford University Sermons, IX, "Wilfulness, the sin of Saul." The Biblical reference made in the sermon is to 1 Sam: 15: 11. For this
context Newman has chosen Saul as an Old Testament example of the hostility between the spirit of Religion and the spirit of material betterment—the aim of physical sciences. In Saul, Newman referred to this spirit as "wilfulness, the unaccountable desire of acting short of simple obedience to God's will, a repugnance of unreserved self-surrender and submission to Him." (161).

Newman further says of Saul, "But he fell from his election, because of unbelief,—because he would take another part, and not the very part which was actually assigned to him in the decrees of the Most High" (166). In the context of Discourse X, in particular, Saul is the figure of that unbelief that Newman sees pervading the nineteenth century and which he fears will pervade even a Catholic University unless the Church preserves the spirit of faith within its walls. Moreover, in his sermon on the wilfulness of Saul Newman makes a further application of the spirit of Saul to the nineteenth century—an application that is pertinent to the last two discourses:

Reference to the law of Conscience, indeed, is of the nature of Faith; but it is easily perverted into a kind of self-confidence, namely, a deference to our judgment. ...This, then, if they knew their meaning, is the wish of the so-called philosophical Christians, and men of no party, of the present day; namely, that they should be rid altogether of the shackles of a Revelation: and to this assuredly their efforts are tending and will tend,—to identify the Christian doctrine with their own individual convictions, to sink its supernatural character, and to constitute themselves the
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prophets, not the recipients, of Divine Truth; creeds and discipline being already in their minds severed from its substance, and being gradually shaken off by them in fact, as the circumstances of the times will allow" (172-173).

The quotation does describe the spirit of unbelief or infidelity that is the motivation of Newman's arguments both for Theology in the university curriculum and for the Church's place in preserving the spirit of Faith within the community of scholars that is a university.

As well, the preceding quotation is one of Newman's best descriptions of the spirit of liberalism—that spirit that Newman fought from his Oxford tutor days until the end of his life—in its description of "the so-called philosophical Christians, and men of no party, of the present day...[who] are tending and will tend,—to identify the Christian doctrine with their own individual convictions, to sink its supernatural character, and to constitute themselves the prophets, not the recipients, of Divine Truth."

345.24-27 "...if we would investigate...opposition between Theology and Physics,...Lord Bacon's own explanation...." See below, 347.15-28.

346.8-9 "...the Homilies of the Established Church." Newman is referring to a collection of twelve homilies, several composed by
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Grafton, issued in 1547 for the use of disaffected and illiterate clergy. In 1571, a second book with twenty-one homilies was issued in the reign of Elizabeth I. Their titles are listed in the XXXVth Article of the Church of England. The two books are combined in Certain Sermons or Homilies appointed to be read in the Churches (London, 1623). More recent editions are by J. Griffiths, The Two Books of Homilies (Oxford, 1859) and J. T. Tomlinson, Prayer Book, Articles and Homilies (London, 1897).

346.10 "Leviticus" refers to the third book of the Old Testament which concerns an elaborate system of sacrificial worship, and therefore, its contents are almost wholly legislative, concerning mainly the Laws of Sacrifice, the Laws of Purification, and the Laws of Holiness.

346.10-11 "...the prophet Zachary" [Zechariah] was the eleventh in order of the minor Prophets of the Old Testament. He was associated with Haggai in stimulating the rebuilding of the temple at Jerusalem, begun in 520 and completed in 516. In 520 the political disturbances of the Persian empire were interpreted by these two prophets as a sign that the Messianic expectations were soon to be realized, and that the "Day of Yahweh" was at hand. Zechariah's prophecies, dated in 520 and 518, are found in the first eight chapters of the Book of Zacharias (Zechariah), the forty-third book of the Old Testament. The central feature of these chapters is a series of night visions intended
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to show Yahweh's immediate and effective intervention on behalf of his people.

346.11 "St. Luke" is the traditional author of the third Gospel and the Book of Acts, and the most literary among the writers of the New Testament. Luke was a physician, who seems to have practised his profession in conjunction with his missionary enterprises in association with St. Paul.

346.11 "the Council of Chalcedon", the fourth ecumenical council of the Catholic Church, was held in 451. The Council reaffirmed the Nicene and Constantinopolitan creeds and rejected both Nestorianism and Eutychianism by affirming the Christological doctrine that Christ had two natures, one Divine, one human, perfectly united in one person, who was at once both God and man.

The Council was also occupied with matters of discipline, episcopal jurisdiction, organization of diocese and parish, occupations of the clergy, and similar matters that concerned the temporal organization of the Church.

The foregoing references (346.10-11) to the particular one of the "Homilies of the Established Church" (346.8-9) from which Newman quotes all concern individuals (the prophet Zachary and St. Luke), a Book of the Bible (Leviticus), and a Council (the Council of Chalcedon) that are in some way involved with both the ecclesiastical and secular
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Concerns.

Newman's reference to the homily in 346.12-16 seems to illustrate "the incongruity of mixing religion and statute law" (346.17) which in turn is an illustration of an idea central to Newman's education thought; namely, the autonomy of each science to reason and investigate without hindrance in its own province—the subject of 346.18--347.14. Also, see above, Discourse V, for further references, (155.17-18).

347.15-28 "This is Lord Bacon's justification...fall of atheistic philosophy...suspicious and resentful." The following quotation from Bacon in 347.18-28 is a comment on the fact that "the fall of atheistic philosophy," the philosophy of Democritus, "was a blight upon the hopes of physical science" in that Aristotle and others were concerned with the final causes of metaphysics, which concern, was as a remora to hinder the progress of scientific investigation.

347.18-28 "'Aristotle...physical causes'" is from Francis Bacon's "The Advancement of Learning," Bk. III, Chap. IV, The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. J. Spedding, R. Ellis, D. Heath, Vol. IV, p. 363. As a preceding idea to Newman's quotation from Bacon the following from Bacon is important:

The second part of Metaphysic is the inquiry of Final Causes, which I report not as omitted, but as misplaced. For they are generally sought for in Physics, and not in Metaphysic. ...But this misplacing has caused a notable
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deficiency, and been a great misfortune to philosophy. For the handling of final causes in physics has driven away and overthrown the diligent inquiry of physical causes, and made men to stay upon these specious and shadowy causes, without actively pressing the inquiry of those which are really and truly physical to the great arrest and prejudice of science.

Newman's quotation from Bacon follows the preceding quoted lines and together they indicated that Bacon attributes the decline of physical science to the viewing of physical phenomena ("hairs of the eyelids...the bones for pillars...") from the point of view of final causes rather than from the point of view of physical or efficient causes. The lines that follow Newman's quotation indicate that Bacon prefers the ancient atheistic philosophy of Democritus, who regarded only physical causes, as preferable for the advancement of science to the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato who were concerned with final causes—the province of metaphysics, not physics. See "the fall of atheistic philosophy..." (347.16-18). The lines from Bacon are as follows:

And therefore the natural philosophy of Democritus and others, who removed God and Mind from the structure of things, and attributed the form thereof to infinite essays and proofs of nature (which they termed by one name, Fate or Fortune), and assigned the causes of particular things to the necessity of

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matter, without any intermixture of final causes, seems to me (so far as I can judge from the fragments and relics of their philosophy) to have been, as regards physical causes, much more solid and to have penetrated further into nature than that of Aristotle and Plato; for this single reason, that the former never wasted time on final causes, while the latter were ever inculcating them. 1

348.1-6 "here...one reason for the prejudice of physical philosophers against theology: ...interference of religious writers... and resentful." This paragraph is Newman's summary, before turning to another aspect of his topic, of the reasons as far as subject matter is concerned for the fact that "there always has been a sort of jealousy and hostility between Religion and physical philosophers" (344.8-10).

The first reason—"their deep satisfaction in the laws of nature indisposes them towards the thought of a Moral Governor, and makes them sceptical of the interposition" (348.3-5)—summarizes Newman's reasons for citing the physical scientists from Galileo in 344.10-17, to the experimentalists in 344.26-28, to Lord Bacon in 347.18-28. The second reason for the hostility between Religion and physical science applies particularly to the controversy that surrounded Galileo. See above, 344.10-17.

348.9- "Another reason of a kindred nature...consistently
353.17

1 Bacon, Advancement..., pp. 363-364.
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acted on." In this section, Newman's references are to the hostility between Religion and physical science, based on a difference of method; namely, the difference between the inductive and deductive methods: "Induction is the instrument of Physics, and deduction only is the instrument of Theology" (348.11-13). Newman explains the reason for deduction's being the instrument of Theology is that doctrinal knowledge has been given: "Revelation is all in all in doctrine; the Apostles its sole depository, the inferential method its sole instrument, and ecclesiastical authority its sole sanction. The Divine Word has spoken once for all, and the only question is about its meaning" (348.24-28). Whereas, "the school of Bacon" reasons inductively as it is ever searching for new truth; but Newman explains that we cannot increase Christian Truth, "except relatively to our own apprehensions" (349.17-18). Newman expresses the antagonism between the two schools of reasoning in the words: "no wonder, then, that that school [inductive school of Bacon] should be irritated and indignant to find that a subject-matter remains still, in which their favourite instrument has no office; no wonder that they rise up against this memorial of an antiquated system, as an eyesore and an insult; no wonder that the very force and dazzling success of their own method in its own department should sway or bias unduly the religious sentiments of any persons who come under its influence" (349.3-12). For the last point, see 350.19-29.

349.22-27 "Niebuhr...His work." The scientists mentioned in
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This section are examples of the great achievements possible in what Newman terms physical knowledge by the inductive method as contrasted with the fact that "God himself is the author as well as the subject of theology" (349.23-24) and therefore none can "supersede his work" (349.27).

Barthold Georg Niebuhr (1776-1831) was a Danish historian and statesman. Out of lectures delivered at Berlin University in 1810 on Roman history and archeology grew his Romische Geschichte 1811-1812 (Roman History, 1928-42). With this work was laid the foundations for the modern empirical science of history. He was the first historian to use the methods of textual criticism on a large scale in the examination of the credibility and genuineness of sources.

Antoine Laurent Lavoisier (1743-1794), a French chemist and founder of modern chemistry. He first gave a correct explanation of the phenomena of combustion and respiration, and recognized the true chemical elements. His Traité élémentaire de chimie (1789) presented Lavoisier's chemical doctrines, especially his list of the elements as well as spreading his new theory of the hydrogen-oxygen composition of water.

350.9-29 "but as to Theology,...enemies of Catholicism."

Newman is dealing here with the reason for the omitting of Theology from the university--a situation he argued against, particularly in Discourses II to V--as well as the basic mentality that gives rise to the omitting...
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of Theology; namely, that since Theology cannot be dealt with
inductively, "they cannot master it, and so they simply outlaw it and
ignore it" (350.10-11). Theology is replaced by an inductive or
scientific analysis of Scripture. As Newman explains, "Protestantism
[by which he means liberal protestantism; what he has termed "the
Lutheran leaven;" See Discourse II, 47.16-17] treats Scripture, just as
they ["the school of Bacon," 349.2-3] deal with nature; it takes the
sacred text as a large collection of phenomena, from which, by our
inductive process, each individual Christian may arrive at just those
religious conclusions which approve themselves to his own judgment"
(350.19-24). Such an inductive approach to Scripture results in
"Private Judgment," (35.3-4) (See Discourses II, 49.27-50.7; and IV,
134.7-10) which view makes the teaching of Theology in the university
impossible as well as unnecessary and therefore issues in the
establishing of mixed schools.

In "Christianity and Physical Science," an essay that deals
with the subject of the first section of Discourse X and the supposed
conflict between religion and science, Newman states concerning the
application of the inductive method to Theology: "...the history of the
last three centuries is only one long course of attempts, on the part of
the partisans of the Baconian Philosophy, to get rid of the method
proper to Theology and to make it an experimental science." 1

1 J. H. Newman, "Christianity and Physical Science," The Idea
of a University, p. 446.
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Further, Newman states in the same essay the result of attempting to apply the inductive method to Theology: "...that empirical method, which has done such wonderful things in physics and other human sciences, has sustained a most emphatic and eloquent reverse in its usurped territory,—has come to no one conclusion,—has illuminated no definite view,—has brought its glasses to no focus,—has shown not even a tendency towards prospective means; nay, further still, has already confessed its absolute failure, and has closed the inquiry itself, not indeed by giving place to the legitimate method which it dispossessed, but by announcing that nothing can be known on the subject at all,—that religion is not a science,..." 1 In the foregoing quotation from "Christianity and Physical Science," Newman has set forth the reason that the founders of London University and the Irish Queen's Colleges omit Theology from the university curriculum; namely, instead of realizing that Theology is a science with its own peculiar method—the deductive method, they try to make Theology one of the experimental sciences by applying the Baconian method to its subject-matter and thereby come to the conclusion that nothing can be known about Theology and it is therefore not a science. Although Newman argued against the omission of Theology from the university in Discourses II to V, it remained for Discourse X to explain the reasoning behind that omission; namely, the application of the method of the experimental sciences to the

DEDUCTIVE SCIENCE OF THEOLOGY RESULTS IN THE MISTAKEN IDEA THAT THEOLOGY IS NOT A SCIENCE.

351.1-5 "I have... untrue religious conclusions." In sections 3-5 of the essay "Christianity and Physical Science," Newman makes clear that there can be no collision between Revelation and Physical Science in that the latter has nothing to do with final causes, the province of Revelation. He brings his argument to a conclusion in the following sentence: "On the whole, the two studies do not merely occupy distinct fields, in which each may teach without expecting any interposition from the other. ... Theology and Physics would be distinct sciences; and nothing which one says of the material ever can contradict what the other says of the immaterial." ¹

351.5-22 "But at the same time... moral law and moral goodness." Here Newman makes clear a further reason there is no real collision between Revelation and Science: there is a difference in purpose between Theology and Physical Science, based on the fact that the universe, the subject-matter of Physical Science, was created "before the introduction of moral evil into the world" (351.9-10). But Revelation, through the remedial instrument of the Church, was given to meet that introduction of moral evil. "She sets before us a number of attributes and acts of

¹ Newman, "Christianity... Science," p. 440.
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the part of the Divine Being, for which the material and animal creation
gives no scope;..." (351.15-17).

The recognition of the distinct province of Theology as a
science, as Newman implies in this section, depends to a very definite
extent on the recognition of the existence in the world of moral evil.
In his discussion of the Religion of Philosophy in Discourse IX, Newman
clearly reveals that the Religion of Philosophy, based on a deification
of the beautiful, a worship of the aesthetic principle, results in moral
evil's being viewed only as grossness, with the consequent idea that only
what is vulgar and gross is evil; (See above, Discourse IX) all that is
beautiful is good; consequently, the idea of actual moral evil is lost.
With its loss comes the view that "revelation and the Church "the
instrument of a remedial dispensation" (357.11-12) to meet moral evil,
have no valid subject-matter in the circle of the sciences and no
necessary purpose, since liberal knowledge, acquired as a liberal
education, can remove all that is vulgar and gross.

Newman leaves to Discourse X the basic explanation for his
severe censure of Shaftesbury's Religion of Taste so succinctly expressed
in Burke's epithet: "vice lost half its evil by losing all its
grossness" (317.2-3); namely, the loss of the recognition and the
awareness of the existence of moral evil as a definite entity in the
world.
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351.17-19 "...power, wisdom, goodness are the burden of the physical world,..." See below, 352.16-18, the quotations concerning Natural Theology.

351.22 - 352.7 "Sacred theology," says Lord Bacon, 'must... good and evil.'" The quotation is from The Works of Francis Bacon, vol. V, "De Augmentis," Book IX, Chapter I, pp. 112-113. Newman's quotation from Bacon that "Sacred theology must be drawn from the words and the oracles of God: not from the light of nature or the dictates of reason" (351.22-25) serves as emphatic proof of Newman's position that Theology has a province distinct from that of the experimental sciences, and therefore, that there should be no collision between them, in that Bacon, the originator of the inductive method of Physical Science, readily admits the existence of the particular subject-matter of Theology. Newman has used the ancestor of the enemy in the field to defeat his opponents.

352.7-11 "That the new and further manifestations...made by Revelation,...harmony with the backing of the natural world,...Protestant Bishop Butler." Newman's reference is to Joseph Butler's The Analogy of Religion Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and Course of Nature (1736), particularly, Part II, Chapter V, pp. 404-406. Newman comments in his University Sermons "that the Revealed system is rooted deep in the natural course of things, of which it is merely the result and completion; ... Much might be said on the evidence thence [from Natural Religion] deducible for the truth of the Christian system. It is one point of evidence that..."
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the two systems coincide in declaring the same substantial doctrines: viz., as being two independent witnesses in one and the same question; an argument contained by implication, though not formally drawn out, in Bishop Butler's Analogy. ¹

352.16-18 "In a scientific age,...Natural Theology,...." See above, 45.28-46.1 for the definition of Natural Theology. See also "Christianity and Physical Science" in which Newman describes Natural Theology as "a science which avails itself of the phenomena and laws of the material universe, as exhibited by that school, as a means of establishing the existence of Design in their construction, and thereby the fact of a Creator and Preserver." ² Newman does not discount Natural or Physical Theology, the Theology peculiar to what he terms, "the school of Physics," but rather, he says, "there are a great many minds so constituted that when they turn their thoughts to the question of the existence of a Supreme Being, they feel a comfort in resting the proof mainly or solely on the argument of Design, which the Universe furnishes,...this science exhibits, in great prominence and distinctness, three of the more elementary notions which the human reason attaches to the idea of a Supreme Being, that is, three of His simplest attributes, Power, Wisdom, and Goodness." ³

Newman continues his view of Natural or Physical Theology by saying that true as it may be in itself, if viewed as the whole truth, it

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² Newman, "Christianity...Science", p. 449.
³ Ibid., p. 449.
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can be used as an instrument against Christianity. In that Natural Theology "is derived from information which existed just as they are now, before man was created, and Adam fell," it is not Christian in any true sense. Being only a particular aspect of the whole truth, Physical Theology "is dumb almost as regards the moral attributes of the Creator, and utterly so as regards the evangelical." The result is that "the God of Physical Theology may very easily become a mere idol," who is identified with his works: "Indeed, a Being of Power, Wisdom and Goodness, and nothing else, is not very different from the God of the Pantheist."

That Edward Maltby and Lord Brougham in the excerpts from their addresses Newman quoted (See above, 57.5-58.6) can refer to the dignity, power, and goodness of the Deity and at the same time advocate institutions that ignore Theology is explained by the foregoing quotations by the fact that Natural or Physical Theology is not Christian in that it reasons only from physical phenomena and ignores the existence of moral evil as well as of the moral and evangelical attributes of the Creator. Consequently, since Natural Theology can be inferred from the

1 Newman, "Christianity...Science", p. 454.

2 Ibid., p. 454.

3 Ibid., p. 454.

4 Ibid., p. 454.
findings of Physical Science and since it is considered the whole truth by the Physical school, they see no further subject-matter to be made the subject of a science in itself and therefore can easily ignore Theology as a subject for study in the university.

352.18-19 "...a wide-spread profession of the Unitarian creed." The Unitarian Creed was a type of Christian thought and religious observance which rejects the doctrines of the Trinity and the Divinity of Christ in favour of the unipersonality of God. Unitarians have no formal creed. Originally, their teaching was based on Scriptural authority, but reason and conscience became the criteria of belief and practice. Owing to their belief in the abiding goodness of human nature, they are critical of the orthodox doctrines of the Fall, the Atonement, and eternal punishment. The ethical and philosophical aspects of Unitarianism were emphasized by W. F. Channing (See above, VII, 227.28 – 230.9) and R. W. Emerson.

Newman states that in a scientific age there will be a wide-spread profession of the Unitarian creed (352.16-19) -- a fact understandable from the foregoing definition of the Unitarian creed as one based on reason and individual conscience and critical of the doctrines that concern moral evil: the doctrines of the Fall, the Atonement, and eternal punishment. It seems likely that the Unitarian creed was an outgrowth of what Newman refers to in "Christianity and Science" as "Scriptural Religion, or the Religion of the
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"Bible, the first of the three (Natural Religion being the third) partial views of religion obtainable by the inductive method that Newman discusses in "Christianity and Science," pp. 339-341.

352.21-26 "And to all this...warfare against Catholicism." The "beauty, order, and congruity" (352.23), the evident and attractive qualities of the universe with which art and science are concerned, Newman terms "the ensigns and colours...of a civilized age in its warfare against Catholicism" (352.24-26).

353.4-9 "That Physical Science...do an injury to all." See Discourses II, 66.18-21; IV, 104.21-25; 111.17-19; V, 153.2-6.

353.13-17 "Where Theology is,...consistently acted on." In this passage Newman makes a statement essential to his idea of a university; a statement that summarizes in a few words the core idea of these Discourses: "...a University cannot fulfill its name and office without the recognition of Revealed Truth" (355.14-15). The idea of fulfilling "its name" concerns Discourses II to V; that of fulfilling its "office" concerns the Discourses VI to IX. The recognition of Revealed Truth is essential to both. Implied in this statement is the fact that Newman would not consider London University nor the Queen's Colleges to be universities in that they do not recognize Revealed Truth.

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Furthermore, a university that does recognize Revealed Truth by teaching Theology requires the presence and guidance of the Church "to see that it is a bona fide recognition, sincerely made and consistently acted on" (353.16-17).

353.18 - 362.0 "And if the interposition...those which claim it rightfully." The second part of Discourse X concerns the third of the "three great subjects, on which Human Reason employs itself:— God, Nature, and Man: [and specifically] the book of man is called Literature" (343.18-25). Also, Newman stated at the beginning of the first section that Literature subserves the second of the "two injuries, which Revelation is likely to sustain at the hands of the Masters of human reason, unless the Church..., protects the sacred treasure which is in jeopardy" (342.29 - 343.3): that is, "a recognition indeed of Catholicism, but...an adulteration of its spirit" (343/9-11).

The corruption of its spirit that Revelation sustains at the hands of literature is similar to that received from Physical Science: namely, an ignoring of the idea of moral evil. Newman makes, in this section, an eloquent plea for the including in the university's curriculum of Literature which he defines as "the science or history, partly and at best of the 'natural man, partly of man fallen" (355.15-16). Further he states, "...if Literature is to be made a study of human nature, you cannot have a Christian Literature. It is a contradiction in terms to attempt a sinless Literature of sinful man" (356.6-9).
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Newman makes clear in this section that the cultivation of the intellect, which is education, is for the world (359.16-19). He writes, "If then a University is a direct preparation for this world, let it be what it professes. It is not a Convent, it is not a Seminary; it is a place to fit men of the world for the world" (359.23-26). Literature, which is "the manifestation of human nature in language" (359.8-9), and "is about all things, grave or gay, painful or pleasant" (358.11-12) is for Newman, a preparation for the world. To deny students such preparation is to leave them ill-prepared to cope with life in the world: "and it is not the way to learn to swim in troubled waters, never to have gone into them" (360.1-2). The foregoing idea as well as that expressed in 359.23-26 conflicted with Dr. Cullen's idea of a university.

As for the Church's role in the Book of Man which is Literature, Newman writes as follows: "Let her do for Literature in one way, what she does for Science in another; each has its imperfection, and she supplies it for each. She fears no knowledge, but she purifies all; she represses no element of our nature, but cultivates the whole" (361.15-19). Furthermore, to Literature, as to the other Books that comprise Liberal Knowledge the Church must apply her principle criterion towards knowledge: "not to prohibit truth of any kind, but to see that no doctrines pass under the name of Truth but those which claim it rightfully" (362.7-9).
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357.1-2 "Quicquid agunt homines,...discursus." "Whatever men do, their wishes, fears, anger, pleasures, joys, discourse" is from Juvenal, Satires, I, 11. 85-6.

357.20-23 "From the first, Jabel and Tubalcan, Nimrod,...are of the world." Jabel and Tubalcan were sons of Lamech, a descendant of Cain, cursed by God (Gen: 4, 12-13), and who therefore traditionally represents the spirit of the world as opposed to that of God. Jabel, the son of Lamech and Ada, "was the father of such as dwell in tents, and of herdsman" (Gen: 4, 21). Tubalcan, the son of Lamech and Sella, "was a hammerer and artificer in every work of brass and iron" (Gen: 4, 22).

Nimrod (Nemrod) was the grandson of Cham, the son whom Noah cursed. Genesis states of Nimrod: "he began to be mighty on the earth. And he was a stout hunter before the Lord. Hence came a proverb: Even as Nimrod the stout hunter before the Lord. And the beginning of his kingdom was Babylon,..." (Gen: 10, 9-11). From the first civilizations recorded by the Bible, those who began the material pursuits (the herdsman, the artificer, the builder of cities) belonged to the children of this world as opposed to the children of light. And Newman maintains that Literature concerns the Natural and Fallen Man, the children of this world.

357.21-22 "...the learning of the Pharaohs, and the wisdom of the East country,..." These lines may be a reference to the following...
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Biblical passage: "And the wisdom of Solomon surpassed the wisdom of all the Orientals, and of the Egyptians,..." (I11 Kgs. 4, 30).

357.23-25 "Every now and then...a Solomon or a Beseleel,... habitat of natural gifts is the natural man." Occasionally, the natural gifts—such as possessed by Jabel, Tubalcahin, and Nèmrod—gifts that result in material progress, are rivalled by those of supernatural origin and purpose, as those gifts possessed by Solomon and Beseleel.

Solomon, the son of King David and his wife, Bethsabee (I1 Kings, 24), asked, when he succeeded David his father as king, that God give him "an understanding heart, to judge thy people, and discern between good and evil" (III Kgs., 3 9), a request the Lord granted Solomon (III Kgs. 3, 12).

In contrast to Nèmrod, who built cities, is Beseleel, the artisan whom the Lord gave to Moses to build the "tabernacle of the covenant, and the ark of the testimony,..." (Exodus 31, 7). And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: "Behold, I have called by name Beseleel the son of Uri the son of Hur of the tribe of Juda, And I have filled him with the spirit of God, with wisdom and understanding, and knowledge in all manner of work" (Exodus, 31, 1-3).

With the references in 357.20-25, Newman is illustrating the following admonition about the subject-matter of Literature; "Nay, beware of showing grace and it's work at such disadvantage, as to make
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the few (the Solomon's and the Baseleal's) whom it has thoroughly influenced compete in intellect with the vast multitude (the Jabel's, Tubalcain's, and Memred's) who either have it not, or use it not" (357. 15-19).

358.22-23 "Little does it say...the produce of the Earth." The footnote reference, corrected in the 1873 edition, is actually to the sermons Newman wrote at Oxford, his "Parochial and Plain Sermons," Vol I, 25.

359.4-7 "We read...what might be in Scripture, and is not." Newman has been contrasting the subject-matter of Human Literature with that of the Inspired Word, the Bible (358.6 - 359.12). The following references Newman makes to the Bible mark rare instances in which "the ordinary occasions of festivity and mirth, which sweeten human life" (358.28 - 359.1) are recounted in the Inspired Word. "...the feast when Isaac was weaned,..." Gen. 21, 8. "...of Jacob's courtship,..." Gen. 29, 16-28. "...of the religious merry-makings of holy Job;..." Job, 1, 4-5.

360.13-14 "...tomorrow thrown upon Babel;--thrown on Babel,..." Babel is for Newman a symbol of the world. The Biblical allusion is to Genesis: 11, 1-9. The families of Noah, before they began to build the Tower of Babel, were of one tongue. But it would seem because of the sin of overweening self-sufficiency (liberalism in Newman's nineteenth-century terminology) and perhaps also, polytheism (the worship of many
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gods). "...the Lord scattered them from that place into all lands, and they ceased to build the city. And therefore the name thereof was called Babel, because there the language of the whole earth was confounded:" (Gen: 11, 8-9).

The point of the Babel allusion here is that the student in the university who does not meet in Literature the confusion of aims and tongues characteristic of the world will be unable to understand and bring to order the tumult and confusion he will encounter in the great world beyond the university. The Babel allusion serves to emphasize and extend the "troubled waters" metaphor, 360.1-2. Also, see above, Discourse for another use of the Babel metaphor (Discourse VII, 237.7-10).

360.20 - 361.8 "You have refused him the masters of human thought,...Homer, Ariosto, Cervantes, Shakespeare, because the old Adam smelt rank in them;...world his University"

This section emphasizes Newman's main idea concerning Literature: namely, that moral evil, a characteristic of fallen human nature, must of necessity also be an aspect of Literature that is the history of that same human nature. Furthermore, if students are denied the masters of human thought, "you have given him 'a liberty unto' the multitudinous blasphemy of his day" (361.1-2).

The four "masters of human thought" whom Newman cites as "the standard of their own mother tongue, and the pride and boast of their
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countrymen" (360.26-28) are the Greek epic poet, Homer, author of the great epic poems, the Iliad and the Odyssey; the great Italian writer of chivalric romance and satirical poetry, Ariosto (1474-1533); the great Spanish author of Don Quixote, Cervantes (1547-1616), and England's great poet-dramatist, William Shakespeare (1554-1616). For Newman's further comments on the classics of various languages see the essays "Literature," p.220 and "English Catholic Literature," p.240 in The Idea of a University, Part II.

361.12-15 "...that the Church's true policy, is not...the exclusion of Literature from Secular Schools,...into them." See the essay, "Christianity and Letters," the Idea..., Part II, pp. 196-197 for Newman's view of place of Literature and particularly the classics in education.

362.13-14 "...the history of my own special Father and Patron, St. Philip Neri." Philip Neri (1515-1595) was born in Florence, the son of Francesco Neri, a Florentine lawyer and his wife Lucrezia da Mosciano. From 1535 to 1538 Philip followed courses in philosophy at the Sapienza University and in theology at Sant' Agostino, where he earned high praise as a student.

Instead of becoming a priest, as expected, Philip abandoned his studies and for thirteen years followed what was, for that time, an unusual, even idiosyncratic vocation—that of a layman, entirely on his
own, devoting himself exclusively to prayer and the Christian apostolate.

Ordained in 1551, Philip lived at the church of San Girolamo
della Carita. For further instructions of penitents he arranged, in the
afternoon, informal talks, discussions, and prayers in an oratory, a
chapel without an alter, which he had made out of the loft over one of
the aisles of the little church of San Girolamo. "He made this chapel
because so many men were coming to his room to talk and pray that they
could not get in. The whole of Philip's work grew out of this gathering
in an upper room, the informal learning together of the way of the
Gospel, the way of the Spirit." Even the priests who eventually formed
the Congregation which called him founder...became 'Fathers of the
Oratory.'...the Oratory itself was a centre for priests and people to
learn how to pray and how to live in the spirit while still living in
the world. The word 'oratory' is used in England only in connection with
music, but in Rome it carried still the Latin meanings of speech and
prayer. All three activities went on in Philip's Oratory and his
disciples were to say that their mission was the Word of God." ¹

The popular daily afternoon service at the Oratory consisted of
four informal talks, interspersed with vernacular prayers and hymns.
The talks concerned the spiritual life, Scripture, Church history, and
the study of a saint's life. Palestrina, one of Philip's followers,

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contributed musical settings for the scriptural readings, hymns, motets, and "laudi spirituali." Hence the musical form termed the Oratorio had its beginnings. Also, the multivolume Annales Ecclesiastici of Caesar Baronius, whose standard of critical scholarship was high for his times, grew from his regular talks in the Oratory. Thus men of varied abilities and stations in life contributed their knowledge and talents to Philip's informal gatherings in the Oratory and reaped not only spiritual benefits, but the opportunity of developing and contributing their talents for the growth of others. Newman describes these gatherings, 364.4-27.

Philip and his Oratory were not without difficulties with high-ranking curial officials. "What could prelates make of a priest who walked about Rome in large white shoes, smelling at a bunch of broom and attended by a motley gang of young men, one of them protestingly carrying a fat little mangy dog, all of them talking and laughing and singing,..." However, in 1567, the intervention of Cardinal Charles Borromeo saved the Oratory from the charge of being an assemblage of heretics, where laymen preached and sang vernacular hymns.

In 1575 Pope Gregory XIII approved the new "Congregation of the Oratory" as a group of priests living in community without vows, for prayer and preaching. As the exponent of a real, living, personal faith,
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Philip Neri, called the "Apostle of Rome" was foremost in converting to personal holiness many of those most influential in the central government of the Church as well as many members of Italian noble families.

Newman chose St. Philip Neri as his "own special Father and Patron" (362.13-14) when, on a suggestion of Cardinal Wiseman's, Newman in 1840, at the time of his visit to Rome for ordination, visited St. Philip's Roman Church and Oratory, the Chiesa Nuova, and decided that he would establish an Oratory in England. The personal influence, involved in Philip's method of praying and preaching was a factor that would attract Newman, since personal influence had been one of the keynotes of his Oxford tutor days. Then too the ideal of praying and living in the Spirit while still living in the world had been very much a part of Newman's own pattern of living. And finally there was the similarity he saw in this ideal with what he had always conceived as the ideal of an Oxford college." ¹


¹ Louis Bouyer, Newman, His Life and Spirituality, p. 267.
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362.26-27 "...dazzled by the Enchantress...her song." It was the Enchantress Circe who lured, by "the magic of her song" (362.22), Odysseus and his men to her island home. In this context Circe represents the dazzle of all that is of the world.

363.9-11 "not to be a Jerome Savonarola...his Florentine house." Girolamo Savonarola (1452-98) Newman describes as follows: "that fiery reformer, also a Dominican...a sort of Apostle of Florence, a man of commanding eloquence and extraordinary influence, full of the tradition of his order, and cherishing a fierce hatred of the reviving heathen literature and the classical taste of the day." ¹

Newman notes in the same sermon that Savonarola effected a revolution, not a reform; in contrast, "St. Philip was raised up to be an Apostle of another sort" (217). "After the storm, the earthquake, and the fire, the calm, soothing whisper of the fragrant air. After Savonarola, Philip" (219).

363.11-13 "not to be a St. Carlo,...aureol of a saint:" St. Carlo refers to St. Charles Borromeo (1538-1584), one of the leaders of the Counter-Reformation, who became in 1560 Cardinal Archbishop of Milan. He soon became known for his ascetic life and his tireless energy in putting into effect the reforming decrees of the Council of Trent. He established seminaries for the education of the clergy and founded a Confraternity of Christian Doctrine for instructing children. He took

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a personal interest in the sick and the poor, notably during the plague of 1576.

Bacci, Philip's biographer, states that Charles Cardinal Borromeo "used to stay many hours at a time with him [Philip], not only to converse on spiritual matters, but to consult with him about the government of his Church." Bacci also recounts that Charles had the "face of an Angel."  

363.13-16 "not to be a St. Ignatius, ... Society's bell of call, ... send to it" St. Ignatius Loyola, founder of the Jesuits, gave up a military career to be a soldier of Christ. Ignatius endeavoured to reform the church principally by education, the more frequent use of the sacraments, and by preaching against heresy. Trevor says of him that he initiated the Jesuit "ideal of personal devotion to Christ as their captain in the great battle of good versus evil." Bacci recounts that "a great many who were converted by him [Philip] to a good life, even before he was a priest and confessor, he sent into different religious orders; so that Ignatius...used to call him "the Bell", meaning that as the bell calls people into church, but stays itself in the belfry, so


2 Ibid., I, 353.

3 Meriol Trevor, Apostle of Rome, p.60.
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Philip sent others into religion, but stayed in the world himself." 1

of Philip and Ignatius.

363.16-18 "not to be a St. Francis Xavier...in India with him"

St. Francis Xavier (1506-1552), called the Apostle of the Indies and of
Japan, was one of the original members of the Jesuit order. One of the
greatest of Christian missionaries, he is credited with over 700,000
conversions. Wherever he preached he founded Christian communities.
But St. Philip's "Indies were to be in Rome, where God would make much
use of him." 2

363.18-19 "not to be a St. Caietan, or hunter of souls," St.
Caietan (Cajetan) (1480-1547) was devoted to a greater personal holiness
among the clergy and to that end founded in 1524 with Pietro Caraffa
(Paul IV) and two other priests the congregation known as Theatines, for
clerics bound by vows and living in common, but engaged in pastoral work.

364.28 - 365.20 "In the words of his biographer, '...as a
holy man'." The biographer is Pietro Biacomo Bacci who published The
Life of Saint Philip Neri at Rome in 1837. The first part of Newman's
quotation, "'he was all things...House of Christian Mirth'," is from

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The second part of the quotation, "'Nay, people come...who'...man'," is from Bacci's Vol. II, p. 86.

365.21-23 "The first nobles of Rome...his friends and his penitents." Newman's mentioning these noble families by name gives some idea of the importance and esteem in which Philip was held by the secular world in Rome.

365.26-27 Federigo Borromeo (Federico Borromeo) (1554-1631), cousin of St. Charles Borromeo and his successor in the See of Milan from 1595 was the founder of the Ambrosian Library in 1609. Bacci writes that "Cardinal Frederick Borromeo, who...went by the name of 'Father Philip's soul' had such an opinion of his sanctity, that he speaks of him in the following terms: ...he [Philip] had such a knowledge of the spiritual and interior life, that he may be said to have put into practice in himself and in others, according to their needs, all that" ¹ others have written on the subject.

365.28 - 366.1 "The Cardinal-Archbishops...books in his honour" See Bacci, II, 72-3.

366.2 "Pope Pius the Fourth died in his arms". Pope Pius IV

¹ P. Bacci, I, 230; II, 74.
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(1499-1565) was Giovanni Angelo Medici. Among his achievements was the reassembling and successful conclusion of the Council of Trent 1562-3 whose decrees he began to put into execution during the last years of his reign. See Bacci, II, 71. Bacci writes, "Pius IV had such a veneration for him that he showed it not only during his life, but in his last hour desired to have Philip's assistance, well knowing the value of his prayers, and died in the Saint's arms." Bacci, II, 70.

366.4-7 Baronius, Zazzara, and Ricci...sanctity."

Cesare Baronius (1538-1607) was an ecclesiastical historian who became a member of the Oratory under St. Philip in 1557 and Superior in 1593. In 1596 he was made Cardinal and in 1597 Librarian of the Vatican. His most important work, the Annales Ecclesiastici (12 folio volumes, 1588-1607) is a history of the Church in chapters each corresponding to a year, undertaken as a Catholic reply to the Centuries of Nördlingen. This work at his death had reached the year 1198, but various attempts made to complete it were all worthless. Newman quotes from Baronius' Annales, the description of the meetings at the Oratory. See "The Mission of St. Philip Neri," pp. 225-226.

Francesco Zazzara was a young man studying law with the hope of rising at court when he first met Philip who vividly described to him all the honours that would accrue from his Law career, but then whispered to him, "And then?" Zazzara realized, "I am studying in order to get on
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in the world, and then?" He was admitted to the congregation a few months after Philip's death, became a priest in 1601 and took the management of the Cause for Philip's canonization.

Flaminio Ricci had taken a doctorate in law at Bologna and was auditor to Cardinal Caetaric. Bacci recounts, II, 37-38, that Ricci one day met Philip in the streets, who said to him, "come, follow me." He was one of the many members of the Curia who came to the Oratory. Ricci became Provost of the Roman Oratory in 1602.

366.7-8 "Palestrina...last moments" Giovanni Palestrina (c. 1525-1594), musical instructor at the Capella Giulia of St. Peter's, Composer of the Papal Chapel, and finally Choir Master of St. Peter's, under Philip's influence devoted himself and his music more to the service of the Church. In an age when ecclesiastical music had suffered greatly from secular influences, the austere polyphony of Palestina's work won the approval of the Church authorities and became an important factor in subsequent development of social music.

366.8-11 "Animuccia...to Heaven" Giovanni Animuccia, was born at the end of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century. He was Maestro di Cappella from 1555 until his death in 1571. He was the composer of the "Laudi" sung at the Oratory of St. Philip Neri and hence he has been called the "Father of the Oratorio." For the incident described here, see Bacci, I, 351-352.
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Fittingly, Newman has concluded his Discourses with a tribute to one who was not only his patron, but his ideal of a Christian gentleman whose personal influence enveloped and guided all whom he met. "He was the teacher and director of artisans, mechanics, cashiers in banks, merchants, workers in gold, artists, men of science. He was consulted by monks, canons, lawyers, physicians, courtiers; ladies of highest rank, convicts going to execution, engrossed in their turn his solicitude and prayers. Cardinals hung about his room, and Popes asked for his miraculous aid in disease, and his ministrations in death." ¹

"He allured men to the service of God so dexterously, and with such a holy, winning art, that those who saw it cried out, astonished: 'Father Philip draws souls as the magnet draws iron.' He so accommodated himself to the temper of each, as, in the words of the Apostle, to become 'all things to all men, that he might gain all'." ²

Newman's depiction of St. Philip expresses his ideal of the product of a Christian Liberal Education.

366.27-28 "...in the great undertaking...subject of these discourses." Newman refers to the establishment of the University of Ireland.

² Ibid., p. 237.
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In summary, Newman reiterates his view of University Education that he stated in Discourse I; that is, "I declared my intention when I opened the subject, of treating it as a philosophical and practical, rather than as a theological question, with an appeal to common-sense, not to ecclesiastical rules; ..." (333.10-14). Thus he compares himself to "a navigator on a strange sea" (334.12-13). His only guides have been "the lessons of antiquity [and] the determinations of authority," (334.19-20), but now with Discourse X, "the morning comes, and the shore greets us, and we see our vessel making straight for harbour" (334.27-28).

The main theme in Discourse X has been the Duties of Church towards Liberal Knowledge. In that regard, Newman states that "it is no sufficient security for the Catholicity of a University, even that the whole of Catholic theology should be professed in it, unless the Church breathes her own pure and unearthy spirit into it, and fashions and moulds its organization, and watches over its teaching, and knits together its pupils, and superintends its action" (339.10-17). The necessity for the guidance of the Church is as follows: Liberal Knowledge exerts a subtle influence on our minds; "making us our own centre, and our minds the measure of all things" (341.4-6). The resultant "Intellectualism" (341.21), external to the Church, runs into scepticism or infidelity (341.24-26) and, within the Church, acts "as an element of corruption and debility" (341.28). Thus there are two injuries, which Revelation is likely to sustain at the hands of the
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Masters of human reason, unless the Church...protects the sacred treasure..." (342.29-343.3): These are as follows: the "simple ignoring of Theological Truth altogether, under the pretence of not recognizing differences of religious opinion" (343.4-7) and the "recognition indeed of Catholicism, but...an adulteration of its spirit" (343.9-11).

With reference to the curriculum, Newman states that "there are three great subjects, on which Human Reason employs itself:--God, Nature, and Man" (343.18-19). The Book of Nature which in Science can inflict the former of the two injuries on Revealed Truth, that of ignoring Theological Truth; the Book of Man which is Literature can subserve the latter injury; namely, the corruption of Revealed Truth. The principal basis for ignoring Revealed Truth is that the Book of Science scorns "any process of inquiry not founded on experiment" (350.2-3); therefore since Theology's method of acquiring truth is deductive and Science places no credence in any method but the inductive, Science simply outlaws and ignores Theology. (350.11). Newman concludes that "if a University cannot fulfil its name and office without the recognition of Revealed Truth, she [the Church] must be there to see that it is a 'bona fide' recognition, sincerely made and consistently acted on" (353.14-17).

The corruption of its spirit that Revelation sustains at the hands of the Book of Man, which is Literature, is the ignoring of the
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fact that human nature in time is unregenerate; thus Literature concerns the natural man and the fallen man. It is not possible to have "a sinless Literature of sinful man" (356.9). "...the Church's true policy is not to contemplate the exclusion of Literature from Secular Schools, but her own admission to them. Let her do for Literature in one way, what she does for Science in another; each has its imperfection, and she supplies it for each. She fears no knowledge, but she purifies all; she represses no element of our nature, but cultivates the whole" (361. 12-19).

Newman closes Discourse X with references to his patron, the founder of the Oratorians, St. Philip Neri, the patternman of Liberal Education, who was at once gentleman, scholar, and saint.
ANNOTATION OF THE DISCOURSES

Chapter XVII

APPENDIX TO THE DISCOURSES...ON UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

"The Appendix (of about 3 sheets) containing illustrations in the shape of extracts, with a few remarks of my own..."¹ was, as well as the Preface, what Newman termed a Supplement to the 1852 Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education. It is noteworthy that only the 1852 edition of the Discourses contains the Appendix, which was omitted from the 1859 and 1873 editions. Newman was in comparative obscurity in 1852 as far as his prestige in the literary world was concerned. It was seven years since he had formally severed connections with Oxford and twelve years before he was to write the Apologia Pro Vita Sua, a work which restored his prestige and gave him a permanent place in the literature of the nineteenth century. Consequently, in the later nineteenth century and even to this day, Newman's Discourses are read by the majority in their final form, the 1873 edition, which omits the Appendix.

But the Appendix is valuable both for an enriched understanding of the Discourses and for an accurate perspective of Newman's scholarship. The extracts in the Appendix from authors representative of various historical periods add texture and depth to Newman's thought.

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by making particular and specific the ideals discussed within the Discourses as well as by giving historical precedent and authority for Newman's views on education. Although the Appendix seems to have been compiled quickly (See below 371.4-5), it represents the learning of a lifetime and illustrates the ability of a trained mind, the product of a Liberal Education, to organize and synthesize that learning in order to bring pertinent illustrations to bear on the ideas discussed in the lectures. Furthermore, surely if the Balliol man, Hastings Rashdall, who criticized in his Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages Newman's handling of historical material, had read the Appendix to the 1852 Discourses he would have had to admit the precise scholarship and acute sense of historical perspective that Newman displayed in the Appendix if he could not find such qualities elsewhere in Newman's writings.

371.1-5 "I am very sensible...at hand or on my memory."

Newman introduces the Appendix with, "I am very sensible of the meagreness of the following illustrations"--a sentence that serves on the one hand to disarm potential critics and on the other to indicate his own misgivings about an Appendix to which he could devote, due to circumstances to be explained, what he considered only inadequate time and labour.

The phrase "I am so situated" is a reference to several related

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circumstances that prevented Newman's satisfying his own sense of the references required to illustrate the main principles he had laid down in the Discourses. He was "so situated" in most unsettling circumstances. It was late November, 1852. Newman had waited all through the summer and fall of 1852 for the judgment in connection with the Achilli trial that had taken place during the four days from June 21 to June 24, 1852. There was real anxiety about the judgment. Because of the known prejudice of the judge and the jury, Newman expected to be imprisoned for libel even though the witnesses he had been able to procure, with great difficulty and expense, testified to the accuracy of his statements about Achilli, made in Lecture V of the Present Position of Catholics, \(^1\) lectures delivered in the Corn Exchange in Birmingham, the summer of 1851.

Then there was the necessity of collecting sufficient funds to meet the expenses of the trial and expected judgment. The following excerpt from a letter to Sister Imelda Poole, dated October 3, 1852, with the metaphor of shifting light and darkness, gives some idea of the intense mental suffering produced by the continuing anxiety and uncertainty that Newman endured all through the latter part of 1852 while he was composing the second five Discourses and finally the Appendix and the Preface.

Impossible to say how my matter [Achilli Trial] will turn out. Every day

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brings a different view, and it is this suspense and change of prospect which is the trial. It is like having the pupil of the eye exposed to a shifting light, now strong, now dim, now darkness, and then the blaze again. So far however is clear that, 'as far as the affair has gone,' we really have had our prayers answered. I told you in March I was to borrow L, 3000—and I recollect saying 'Well, I trust by Christmas I shall raise it.' Well, I have raised 'double' by Michaelmas—and there is a moral certainty that, 'if' I am not called up to judgment I shall soon have raised the whole. 'As far as things have gone' all the money is raised. What is 'not' raised is the L, 2000 consequent upon being called up to judgment. But this is 'future,' and not realized. 'If' it be God's will I should 'not' be called up, I really have triumphed. I have no debt, no inconvenience; and as to the Verdict, why, every one believes me right, and the Judge and jury wrong.

The Appendix and the Preface to the Discourses were written about the time that Newman was called to London for the judgment, which was set for November 22, 1852. Newman's letter from Ughlanston to J. Spencer Northcote dated November 30, 1852 indicates that all were in the printer's hands prior to November 30:

My Last Discourse will be out in a day or two, having been out of my hands for some days. The Appendix (of about 3 sheets) containing illustrations in the shape of extracts, with a few remarks of my own, is all in press—The preface

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too, which is another Supplement, is in the printer's hands too. I want to get away in a week's time, and have told Duffy so [James Duffy, Dublin publisher of the Discourses]—accordingly I 'expect' to have it all, done before the Immaculate Conception [December 8].

The anxiety of expecting any day to be called to judgment, of finishing the Discourses with Appendix and Preface in the expectation that the judgment would be imprisonment, and of collecting enough money to meet expenses told on Newman's health. In a letter of October 22, 1852 he wrote "...my medical adviser,...now says distinctly that, unless I give over working altogether, i.e. fatiguing the brain and nerves, I shall have a premature old age and an early death." However, Newman left on December 16 for Abbotsford, Melrose, the home of the Hope-Scotts, for rest and recuperation until the end of January, 1853.

371.4-5 "...I avail myself of such as happen to be at hand or on my memory." Newman was completing the Appendix and the Preface under the pressure of circumstances described above in 371.1-4. He had left the Oratory at Birmingham for London on November 18, 1852. The Preface is dated November 21, 1852, the day before he was called into court on the twenty-second of November for judgment.

2 Ibid., p. 182.
3 Ibid., p. 197.
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In his sincerity and earnestness, Newman clearly considered the Appendix not so well documented as he would have liked it to be had circumstances permitted him more time and freedom for research. Herein may be the explanation for his omitting the Appendix from the two subsequent editions, the 1859 and the 1873 editions.

Actually, the Appendix, in seven sections, serves as a valuable bibliography in which Newman gives not only the name of the author and his work, but also pertinent excerpts which reinforce his own ideas and make more particular, ideas that have been stated in theory in the Discourses. For example, see the definitions of a university, 381.27 - 383.34, as they reinforce and make particular Newman's general statement about a university in Discourse II, 39.18-26. Furthermore, the choice of excerpts from writers and thinkers representing different times, beliefs, and nations, interspersed with Newman's own comments, emphasizes the universality and permanence of Newman's own thought and therefore makes the Appendix a necessary supplement to the Discourses.

The quotations in the Appendix comprise excerpts ranging from the Greek poet Horace (65-8 B.C.), to the German Lutheran historian Von Mosheim (1693-1755), to the English contemporary George Waddington (1793-1869), church historian and Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Newman quotes from those with whom he agrees such as Juan Luis Vives (391.25-392.23); those with whom he fundamentally disagrees such as Edward Gibbon (396.8-28), but who, in the particular excerpt, reinforce his own ideas by their agreement in one respect: and from those
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exponents of liberalism whose views make them Newman's opponents, such as Henry Hallam (412.21-25) and therefore whose thought exemplifies that which Newman himself is contending against.

The Appendix differs in style from the Discourses. There is nothing else quite like the Appendix in all of Newman's writing. Here Newman is the scholar; whereas, in the Discourses he was the orator, clothing his scholarship in the rhetoric of eloquent arguments for liberal education as the primary end of a university education. But the Appendix reveals Newman the scholar with that cultivation of intellect, the product of a liberal education, that gives him a philosophical grasp of the knowledge of the ages. The Appendix reveals a depth and scope of learning that is not readily seen in his other writings where he usually must hold the literary stage and captivate a hostile, or at very least, a diffident audience. But in the Appendix Newman talks familiarly with the reader giving insights into the vast tradition of thought on which he has drawn to present his own thought through and thought out educational theory.
APPENDIX TO THE DISCOURSES ON UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

SECTION I

Section I of the Appendix is the Discourses in miniature. The Discourses set forth the theory of liberal knowledge as the direct end of University Education: Section I of the Appendix views that theory through the historical perspective of important writings about university education from Mediaeval times to the Nineteenth Century.

371.7-12 "I hardly know...hardly possible to prove." "That the education of the intellect or the diffusion of knowledge, is the direct scope of a University" (371.8-10) has been Newman's main educational principle throughout the Discourses, but he states here that he "hardly know [s] what steps to take in order to establish" (371.7) or to prove this principle in that it seems to him a self-evident truth from the nature of the institution throughout its history that "knowledge is the direct end of University Education" (371.6). Newman's method of proof throughout the Appendix is by reference to accepted opinion expressed by a cross-section of the most noted writers and thinkers down through the centuries.

371.12 - 372.7 "What would be...an 'Academy';" Newman states that he intends to present the "popular description of a University" (371.12-13), that "idea on the whole, or the formal conception; of a
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university in the minds of the generality of men" (372.3). The generally accepted description of a university is, according to Newman, "a seat of science and letters" and "its end is knowledge" (372.4-5).

371.13-14 'A place for 'learned' and 'scientific' men, a 'learned' body, a large corporation, with 'professors' of art and science'...." These descriptions of a university, although more particular, correspond to the mediaeval usage of the word "university" as discussed by a more recent writer, Hastings Rashdall in his Medieval Universities: "...the word 'university' means merely a number, a plurality, an aggregate of persons. ...in a more technical sense it denotes a legal corporation... . At the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth centuries, we find the word applied to corporations of either masters or of students;...the phrase is always 'University of Scholars', 'University of Masters and Scholars', 'University of Study', or the like. ...the term was generally in the Middle Ages used distinctly of the scholastic body whether of teachers or scholars...."¹ But C. E. Mallet's description of mid-twelfth-century Oxford as comprising Schools where clerks (students) "gathered in substantial numbers to hear men of learning teach"² more closely approaches

¹ Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, I, p. 5.

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Newman's description of a University as "a place for 'learned' and 'scientific' men" (371.13).

Note that in these lines Newman uses the words "scientific" (371.13) and "science" (371.14) in the sense of the Latin "scientia," meaning that knowledge in which one is skilled, well-versed, or expert, a knowledge characteristic of the intellectual achievements of those who belonged to the faculties of law, medicine, and theology; whereas, Newman seems to reserve "learned" (371.13) for the particular kind of knowledge, imparted in the Faculty of Arts, a knowledge which does not issue beyond itself.

371.14-15 "...with faculties in 'theology, law, and medicine' " These were the three superior or graduate faculties in the great mediaeval universities. In Oxford there were four graduate faculties as law was divided into Canon law and Civil law. ¹

371.15-17 "...with 'logical disputations,' with examinations in 'intellectual' proficiency, with degrees in token of that proficiency attained." In mediaeval Oxford the candidate for a Masters Degree had to face three series of tests: Responses, in which he was required to dispute in grammar and logic with a Master, came in his fourth year. Determinations required the candidate to face a board of four masters beginning on Ash Wednesday and lasting for several days. "The candidates were called on to dispute in the Schools, to defend propositions against all comers, to argue especially points of logic, to show the proficiency

¹ H. Rashdall, Medieval Universities, III, p. 65.
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which they had attained." ¹ This skill in disputation was not an examination in the modern sense, but rather a test of "intellectual proficiency" (371.16). After four years of study, Responses, and Determinations the student passed into the rank of Bachelors. He then began to give cursory lectures while he himself attended lectures and joined in disputation for the final stage of Inception. "Three more years at least of study, reading, and disputing, of ceremonies, festivities and charges, were needed to make a man a member of the community of Masters, to acquire the full license and the teacher's rights." ² At the end of this time, "nine Regents, besides his own Master who presented him, were called on to speak from personal knowledge to his character and attainments. Five others deposed more generally to their belief in them." ³ After receiving from the Chancellor, "in the name of the Holy Trinity the license to incept, to lecture, to dispute" ⁴ and engaging "a School to lecture in, ...finally he appeared in St. Mary's Church with a great concourse of Inceptors, Masters, and spectators, in the presence of the Faculty which he desired to join. ...he received the book, the cap, the ring, the kiss of peace. He delivered his inaugural

² Ibid., I, p. 188.
³ Ibid., I, p. 189.
⁴ Ibid., I, p. 189.
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address and joined in a last disputation. He took his final oaths, was hailed as Master... 1 The Master of Arts, now a teacher, was eligible for admission to the higher faculties of law, medicine, or theology; studies which required a further six to ten years before the degree of doctor was conferred.

371.18-19 "...Religious Festivals, Solemnities, and Sermons,..." Rashdall states that "the only relaxation which the University system provided for was the frequent interruptions of the regular routine for the whole or part of a day in honour of the greater holidays of the Church, or of the festivals of the patrons of a particular nation, or province, or faculty. For the Faculty of Arts the great days were the feasts of St. Scholastica and St. Nicholas." 2

371.19 - 372.1 "...of discipline, of Proctors, of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, delegates to Councils, etc." In mediaeval Oxford, the Chancellor of the University, who combined the power of an Archdeacon and a Justice of the Peace, was responsible for discipline among the Scholars and Masters, who could be summoned before the Chancellor's Court to account for misdeeds and crimes. 3


2 H. Rashdall, Medieval Universities, III, pp. 422-423.

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Two Proctors were elected yearly by the Faculty of Arts by representatives of the Northern and Southern Masters of Arts. Among their duties were regulating Academic business, taking part in graduation ceremonies, keeping order, making lists of offenders, to see to punishment and fines, supervising the University's expenditures and the University's accounts.  

Oxford was under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Bishop of Lincoln in whose diocese the university was located. Rashdall notes that "in the period immediately after 1214 the bishop, besides exercising his ordinary jurisdiction over masters and scholars, claimed at times to regulate matters of purely academical concern. The Chancellor was merely his officer, and enjoyed just so much authority as the bishop chose from time to time to delegate him." Not without struggle, Oxford finally gained emancipation from ecclesiastical jurisdiction in 1307 when Urban V dispensed with the need of the Bishop of Lincoln to confirm the election of the Chancellor by the Regents of the University.  

The government of the University was in the hands of the

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1 Mallet; History of Oxford, I, p. 175.
2 H. Rashdall, Medieval Universities, III, p. 114.
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Masters: the Regents, the teaching Masters; and the Non-Regents, the Masters who had ceased to lecture, but still took part in the making of Statutes and other important University Affairs. The Congregation of Regents of all Faculties dealt with all kinds of University business: finance, administration, lectures, studies, and eventually with the granting of degrees. The fact that the Faculty of Arts was the most influential in the Council of Regents may account for the decline in influence of the graduate faculties in English Universities. 1 See below 379.31 - 380.5.

The foregoing historical details are some of the aspects of the history of universities, particularly Medieval Oxford, called to mind by Newman's phrases in 371.13 - 372.1.

372.6-7 "Its recognized titles...an 'Academy';" Newman states that the recognized titles of a university correspond to the nature of that institution as it is thought of "in the minds of the generality of men" (372.3): A "Studium Generale" was a place of learning that attracted students from all parts as distinguished from the ecclesiastical and monastic schools which drew students only from the surrounding districts. 2 In addition to the foregoing characteristic, Rashdall states that a "studium generale" also implied, "(2) that it was a place of higher education; that is to say, that one at least of the higher

2 A. D. Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p. 179.
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faculties--theology, law, medicine--was taught there; (3) that such subjects were taught by a considerable number--at least by a plurality--of masters."¹ The last two characteristics are in keeping with those mentioned by Newman in 371.13-15.

"Universitas Litteraria" means, according to Huber, the body of "Teachers in Arts...."² Children trained in the monastic schools in the late ninth century were collectively referred to as the "schola." They were placed in the care of a professed monk, the "magister scholae."³ An "Academy" in this context refers to the Academy at Athens which attracted youths from all over the civilized world in order to acquire the then-known knowledge from such illustrious teachers as Plato and his successors.

Newman defines a university in his essay, "What is a University?" by referring to "its ancient designation of a 'Studium Generale,' or 'School of Universal Learning.' This description implies the assemblage of strangers from all parts in one spot--'from all parts;' else, how will you find professors and students for every department of knowledge? and 'in one spot;' else, how can there be any school at all? Accordingly, in its simple and rudimental form, it is a school of

¹ H. Rashdall, Medieval Universities, I, p. 7.

² V. A. Huber, The English Universities, I, p. 34.

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knowledge, of every kind, consisting of teachers and learners from every quarter." 1 Here Newman combines, under the more official term "studium generale," the meaning of "universitas"--a corporation of masters or students--with the meaning of "studium generale"--a school of higher learning for students from all parts. Rashdall notes that "by the fifteenth century the original distinction between the two terms was pretty generally lost; and 'universitas' gradually became a mere synonym for 'studium generale.'" 2

Newman's reference in the foregoing quotation to a "Studium Generale" as a "School of Universal Learning" 3 refers both to the fact that a place distinguished for learning draws masters and scholars from all parts of the world and to the fact that its curriculum is representative of the knowledge of the time. With reference to the latter point, Sir James Mountford writes about mediaeval universities, "in the circumstances of the times, the curriculum taken as a whole covered the entire range of human knowledge." 4


3 It is important to note that the Latin adjectives "generalis" and "universus" are synonyms meaning, "general" or "universal"; thus "School of Universal Learning" is the translation Newman gives for "studium generale."

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372.10 "[Atque] inter sylvas Academi quaerere 'verum'." From Horace, "Epistles," II.2.45. "And among the groves of Academus to search for 'truth'." Newman's italicizing "verum" emphasizes that a university is a place where students gather to quest for, to seek out truth, and he adds, in support of his principle that "knowledge is the direct end of University Education" (371.6), "the whole tenor of any work upon Universities implies this" (372.9).

Horace is Quintus Horatius Flaccus (65-8 B.C.), second only to Virgil in fame among the Roman poets. His works comprise four books of odes, one of epodes, two of satires, two of epistles, and the letter entitled "De Arte Poetica." As a boy Horace was sent to Rome for a liberal education. In the Epistle from which Newman quotes, Horace is describing his being sent to the Academy (c.387 B.C.-A.D. 529), the Greek school of Philosophy, established by Plato in the grove or park sacred to the Greek hero Academus, in Athens, then the university of the world.

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372.14-27 "'Before the time of Charlemagne,... were opened'."

Newman begins his proof from historical precedent that "Knowledge is the
Direct End of University Education" (371.6) with this quotation from V.
A. Huber's The English Universities, I, pp. 3-4. Newman's italicizing
Huber's phrases "'the cultivation of the higher learning'" (372.17-18),
"'intellectual'" (372.19), "'intelligence'" (372.24), and "'knowledge'" (372.26) emphasizes that the earliest monastic and cathedral schools,
both before and during the time of Charlemagne (742-814), Alfred the
Great (849-901), and Otto the Great (912-973), had as their aim "'the
cultivation of higher learning'" (372.17-18) and the "progress of
'intelligence'" (372.24) as new fields of knowledge became available.

The Huber quotation reveals that even in such early times as
the ninth and tenth centuries the aim of the Church established schools
was the secular purpose of cultivating learning, both past and present,
an aim that it is Newman's purpose to show is yet the end of a
university. Huber notes the secular character of learning as follows:
"'...the Church manifested an "intellectual" spirit much more similar
than is generally admitted, to the spirit of the Reformation and of the
period of revived classical learning...'" (372.19-21).

For the elaboration of a theme that Newman merely implies here
by means of this quotation from Huber and the following one (372.28-
373.10), see Newman's essay, "Schools of Charlemagne," University
Sketches, pp. 144-156. That theme is the union of what Newman refers to
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in the essay as sacred and profane knowledge in the sense that it was a Christian society under a Christian leader Charlemagne that established schools of higher learning in which "secular teaching was to be united to sacred" ¹ and whose aim was "to adjust the claims of Reason and Revelation, and to fit men for this world while it trained them for another." ² A Christian community establishing a university for the cultivation of learning is what Newman envisaged as the purpose of the Catholics of Dublin in establishing the Catholic University of Ireland.

372.28 - 373.10 '"As early as the end of the ninth century,... to the newly opened schools'." With the quotation from Huber's The English Universities, I, p. 45, Newman emphasizes that the University of Oxford even from the ninth century had as its aim the "highest intellectual cultivation" (372.29-30). For Newman's own account of the Christian community's preservation of "learning" in Ireland in the sixth and the seventh centuries, see "The Tradition of Civilization: the Isles of the North," University Sketches, particularly pp. 119-123: "For the Celt,...preceded the Anglo-Saxon, not only in his Christianity, but in his cultivation and custody of learning, religious and secular,... ." ³


² Ibid., p. 146.

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Alfred the Great (849-899), cited in the Huber quotation, was an early example of one who combined the religious spirit with a love for wisdom and literature and plans for the educational restoration of his people. 1

The point Newman is emphasizing by means of the quotations from Huber is that the cultivation of learning has always been the aim of schools of higher learning even from their earliest times. A secondary point evident from the Huber quotations is that the spirit of Christianity which imbued the respective societies led by Charlemagne on the continent, Alfred in England, as well as that which flourished in Ireland especially in the sixth and seventh centuries, resulted in the preservation and propagation of both sacred and profane knowledge. With these references Newman is reinforcing his argument for Theology in the university curriculum: "It is true that learning 'includes' theology and 'protects' religion" (373.10-11). Learning or Liberal Knowledge includes, for Newman, both sacred and profane studies, which protect religion in that they foster a largeness of mind that does not condemn although it may disagree. The value of learning for the preservation of Christianity is an important theme in Huber (See The English Universities, I, p. 227 and II, p. 413) and is also an implied theme in the Discourses, although stated explicitly only in this short sentence in the Appendix, 373.10-11.

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373.14 "Polydore Virgil" [Vergil] (c.1470 - 1555) was an Italian historian and Papal Chamberlain to Alexander VI, who went to England in 1502 as deputy collector of Peter's Pence. Already a promising young scholar and author of note, Vergil was asked by King Henry VII to write a history of England. His Anglica Historia, from which Newman quotes, was first printed in 1534 in twenty-six books, which included English history to 1509, the end of Henry VII's reign. The third edition in 1555, comprising twenty-seven books, brought the history down to 1537.

Unlike preceding chroniclers, Vergil wrote a history on modern lines, with his attempt to weigh authorities and to tell a connected story. His Anglica Historia influenced later English historians, particularly in their depiction of the character and achievement of such historical personages as Cardinal Wolsely. ¹ For Newman's purpose of establishing "the formal conception, of a University in the minds of the generality of men," (372.2-3), Vergil's English History is a reliable fifteenth-sixteenth century reference. Hay states about Vergil's history of universities: "There are a large number of references to Oxford and Cambridge colleges, and it is clear that Vergil aimed at recording the foundation of all the most important ones." ²

² Ibid., p. 90.
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373.14-19 "Polydore Virgil,...: 'Neotum...gratia'." The quotation is from Polydore Vergil's *English History*, Bk. V, Vol. I, containing the first eight books, comprising the period prior to the Norman conquest, ed. by Sir Henry Ellis (London, printed for the Camden Society by J. B. Nichols, 1846), p. 217. The quotation from Vergil corroborates Huber's view of Oxford (372.29-30) from its earliest times as established for the cultivation of liberal knowledge ("bonas artes profiterentur," 373.18).


373.20 "...an Oxford writer of the generation now passing away,..." was Edward Copleston (1776-1849), who had died just three years previous to the time Newman was writing the Discourses. Copleston had been Oxford Professor of Poetry from 1802 to 1812 and Provost of Oriel College, Oxford from 1814 to 1826, during which latter time Newman was student and fellow of Oriel College.

Newman designates Copleston as "an Oxford writer of the generation now passing away" in that Copleston considered the aim of a university to be the same in the nineteenth century as it was in the early state of universities; namely, to provide instruction in the professions and as well "that common basis of 'liberal information,' which might exercise and enlarge the mind, before its attention was
confined to the particular business of those several callings" (373.29 - 30). That generation, of which Copleston is, for Newman, one of the last representatives, with its regard for the cultivation of mind characteristic of a liberal education, had roots extending through the centuries to Vergil (c.1470 - 1555) and even to Alfred the Great (849 - 901).

373.23 - 374.9 "'The composition and early state of these bodies...commonly added'." The quotation is from Edward Copleston's article entitled, "Letter to Mr. Brougham on the subject of London University, together with Suggestions respecting the Plan," Quarterly Review, XXXIII (December, 1825), pp. 261-262. The article is Copleston's commentary on the proposed plans for London University by Thomas Campbell as sent to the Whig Member of Parliament, Lord Brougham. Both Campbell and Brougham were self-appointed representatives of the new generation of liberal educators who considered education to be "the mere acquisition of knowledge, [and applied] that term...to the single branch of it which is unconnected with religious instruction, and with the formation of manners and character." ¹ The new generation of educators tended to sacrifice the individual's enlargement of mind for the material progress of society, to replace the study of the classics for the liberal education of the individual by the training in practical subjects (the sciences).

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for the immediate usefulness of society.

374.10 "Charlemagne's design was the same as Alfred's;"

Having established that the aim of a university through the centuries from the time of Alfred to that of Copleson was the cultivation of learning, Newman turns to another aspect of his subject, implied throughout the Discourses, but made explicit in Discourse X; namely, "that intellectual, and not moral education is the direct end of a University" (375.8-9). Newman emphasizes the immediate and direct end of a university as "the culture of the intellect" (374.32) by referring to the fact that the design of both Charlemagne and Alfred "to promote the glory of God and the well-being of the Church" (374.12-13) were ends achieved by means of the intellectual culture that was the primary end of a university.


Joannes Launoii (Jean de Launoy) (1603-1678), from whom Newman quotes, was a French historian and canonist whose complete works were published by Abbot Granet in 10 volumes entitled, Joannis Launoii Opera Omnia (Geneva, 1731)
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The writer of Charlemagne's life referred to in 374.13 is identified by Launoii and by Joseph Berington as Eginhard, the friend and secretary of Charlemagne and author of Vita Caroli Magni. Berington writes, "The Life of Charlemagne by Eginhard, his friend and confidential secretary, is not destitute of elegance, but it is chiefly valuable as a record of facts, of many of which he was an eye witness, and it exhibits rather a partial delineation of the character of his master. ...He is also the author of Annals (rerum Francorum), which has acquired for him, in character and in priority of time, the first place in the list of German historians." 1

374.18-19 "In like manner,...his own Epistle to the Abbot of Fulda." Newman is quoting from Joannes Launoii, Opera Omnia, Tomus IV, P. I, p. 2. According to Launoii, Charlemagne's Epistle was addressed to Abbot Baugulfus and all his congregation at the Monastery of Fulda. The quotation which ends with the idea, "...those who desire to please God by living righteously, may not neglect to please him by speaking eloquently (qui Deo...loquendo)" (374.27-28) serves as historical proof of the fact that even in the early institutions of higher learning neither religion nor "science or literature as such" (374.31), but rather "culture of the intellect" (374.32) was the "immediate end of Charlemagne's schools" (374.30). Furthermore, Charlemagne exhorts Abbot

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Baugulfus, as he has exhorted the other Abbots of monasteries under his jurisdiction, that "'they should employ in the study of letters and should foster a desire for learning in those who, according to each one's abilities, are able to learn by the gift of God. (...) in literarum meditationibus...debeant impendere)'' (374.23-25). See, "Appendix to the Thesis," II, 374.19-28 for the translation.

375.2-4 "'Quamvis...facere.'" "'For although it is better to do than to know: to know, however, is prior than to do.'" This continuation from Charlemagne's Epistle emphasizes the idea that Charlemagne wanted his schools "to impart' knowledge and that 'for the sake' of practice" (375.4-5): that is, for the cultivation of the intellect—a cultivation that might be put into practice in, for example, "a better understanding of Holy Scripture" (375.6-7). The idea that learning protects and advances religion, a frequently mentioned theme in the Appendix, is dealt with more fully in Newman's essay "Christianity and Letters" in which he states that the civilization bequeathed by the learning of Greece and Rome "may even be called the soil out of which Christianity grew." 1

375.10-22 "...the institution of separate bodies within its jurisdiction...supply a want,...protection and security to the children...they protected morals, and formed religious habits..." Newman has maintained throughout the Discourses "that intellectual, and not

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moral education is the direct end of a University" (375.8-9): but it is only in this passage that he states, from an historical perspective, that it is the Colleges, Inns, and Halls—organizations within the jurisdiction of the university—to which is entrusted the task of protecting the morals and forming the religious habits of the students.

In University Sketches, XVIII, Newman elaborates as follows on the moral education afforded by the College in the University: "By a College,...is meant, not merely a body of men living together in one dwelling, but belonging to one establishment. ...It is then a household, and offers an abode to its members, and requires or involves the same virtuous and paternal discipline which is proper to a family and home. ...It is the providential shelter of the weak and inexperienced, who have to learn as yet to cope with the temptations which lie outside of it. It is the place of training for those who are not only ignorant, but have not yet learned how to learn, and who have to be taught, by careful individual trial, how to set about profiting by the lessons of a teacher. ...Moreover, it is the shrine of our best affections, the bosom of our fondest recollections, a spell upon our after life, a stay for world-weary mind and soul, wherever we are, till the end comes. Such are the attributes or offices of home, and like these,...are the attributes and offices of a College in a University." ¹

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375.16-17 "Such would be Seminaries for the secular clergy:"
In "Universities and Seminaries...," University Sketches, pp. 231-242, Newman discusses the distinction between Universities and Seminaries as well as the history of the establishment of Seminaries.

375.17-18 "...such would be monastic communities,...Benedictines:" Newman elaborates as follows: "And in Oxford,...the Benedictines founded Durham Hall for their monks of the North of England, and Gloucester Hall for their monks of the South on the respective sites of the present Trinity and Worcester Colleges." ¹

375.19 "...such Inns, Halls, and Chambers." Newman describes these foundations as evolving out of a need to provide instruction and residence for lay strangers to the university and the willingness on the part of individual professors to undertake, without the assistance of tutors, the whole course of instruction. Newman writes that this system "led in many instances to the formation of halls, inns, courts, or hostels, as they were variously called. That is, the Professor of the school kept house, and boarded his pupils." ²

375.21-24 "...but they protected morals, and formed religious habits...evils under which the German Universities..." Newman states that

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"the great seats of learning on the Continent, to say nothing of those in Scotland, show us the need of Colleges to complete the University;... The evil of a University, standing by itself, as in Germany, is often insisted on..."  

Edward Copleston in the Quarterly Review article Newman quoted above notes the evil of a university kept together only by a frame of public lectures: "...the constant object of the professor is to aim at some striking novelty, either in the arrangement of his materials, or in the leading principles of the subject which he professes to explain. He cannot expect to secure the attention of his class, except by some contrivance of this kind. ...the German schools of theology teem with speculations of the boldest and most licentious kind, offered to the reception of hearers who cannot possibly judge of the soundness of those opinions which are propounded for the first time, and which, on that very account, are sure to attract the greatest notice."  

375.32-33 "...yet theological truth was always professed and assumed as true in the secular teaching..." This statement is basic to all that Newman has written in the Discourses, although he does not so clearly state it as he does here. That theological truth was assumed


2 Edward Copleston, Quarterly Review, XXXIII (December, 1825), p. 266.
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ture in the secular teaching was the situation in Anglican Oxford, would be so of the Catholic University of Ireland, but that such would not be the basis of the non-sectarian Queen's Colleges was the very situation that made the University of Ireland necessary.

That theological truth be professed and assumed true in the secular teaching was actually what Newman was implying throughout Discourse X, in his discussion of the relation between the Church and Liberal Knowledge. See Section 2 of the Appendix, 378.28 - 379.26 for Newman's further elaboration of Theology in the University.

376.6-8 "Universities are 'institutions for the promotion of letters and the sciences, tending to the defence of the faith and the welfare of society'" is a sentence that states succinctly Newman's idea of a university as he set forth that idea in the Discourses on University Education. The excerpts from Papal Bulls (376.9 - 378.25) serve as an historical record that such has been through history the idea of a university and is so yet, according to Newman's view, at the time of writing the Discourses. Translations in "Appendix to the Thesis," II.

376.9-16 "Boniface the Eight, of Rome: '...ferventi...documentis.'" Quoted from the bull of Boniface VIII, (1294-1303) "In supremae praeminentia," (June 5, 1303) by which Boniface authorized the founding of a "studium generale" in Rome. Newman's source is the Appendix, "Bullae Romanorum Pontificum ad Gymnasium Romanum Spectantes,"
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of Josepho Carafa's De Gymnasio Romano et De Eius Professoribus (Libri duo, Antonii Fulgonii, Romae, 1751), pp. 573-574. Carafa, Bishop of Miletto, was, according to the title page, professor of ecclesiastical history in this same Roman University.

It is the hope of Boniface that Rome which has been ""adorned with many gifts of grace may become also rich in the works of science so that it may produce men distinguished for the maturity of their wisdom, crowned by the excellence of their virtue, and learned in the doctrines of many sciences"" (376.10-13).

376.17-27 "And Innocent the Seventh: 'Cum litterarum...addiscant.'" The quotation is from the bull of September 1, 1406 in which Innocent VII (1404-1406) instituted anew the Roman University which had fallen into decay during the troubled times which caused the Pope to take refuge in Viterbo until 1405. Newman's source is Josepho Carafa, Caput VII, "De Gymnasio Romano Saeculo Decimo Quinto," De Gymnasio Romano..., p. 168.

A century later than Boniface VIII, who established the Roman University, Innocent VII writes of the advantages to individuals and to society of ""the study of letters and the teachings of the fine arts"" (376.17-19). It was his purpose to restore these studies ""so that men may know the truth through genuine erudition and may acquire a like erudition in what concerns God and law"" (376.25-26).
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376.28 - 377.3 "Again, Benedict the Fourteenth: 'Quanta... administrari'." The quotation is from the opening paragraph of an official letter dated October 10, 1748 in which Benedict XIV (1740-1758), who had been Rector of the Roman University under Clement XI, set forth the principal innovations intended to renew the Roman University, which had again fallen into decay.¹ Newman quotes Benedict's letter from Josepho Carafa, Appendix, "Bullae Romanorum Pontificum ad Gymnasio Romanum Spectantes." De Gymnasio Romano, p. 636. In the eighteenth century Benedict XIV writes that "'it is through men highly cultivated and refined by the liberal disciplines that the manners and customs of the whole state are usually conformed to the rule of equity and justice...'" (376.31-33).

377.4-8 "In like manner, Nicholas the Third, of Paris: 'Dum attentae... invalescit', etc." It would seem that "Nicholas the Third" should read "Innocent the Third" (1198-1216). On at least three different occasions Innocent III issued official proclamations concerning the University of Paris: whereas, Nicholas III (1277-1280) does not seem to have had any particular connection with the University of Paris.

Innocent III's proclamations concerning the University of Paris

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are as follows: "A Bull of Innocent III [issued between 1210-1216] (himsel-f a Parisian master) empowers the society to elect a proctor...to represent it in the Papal Court." 1 By this means the University of Paris became a legal corporation.

Having been a student at the University of Paris, Innocent's keen interest in the university led him to issue, through his trusted councillor Cardinal Robert de Courçon, regulations which concerned both the studies and the discipline of the university and which were intended to reform abuses. 2

Also Innocent III issued in 1212 a bull "addressed to the bishop, dean, and archdeacon of Troyes and required them to compel the chancellor by ecclesiastical censure to redress the grievances of the masters." 3

Newman's source for his quotation reads "Launoii. Supr." (377.8), which would refer to the previous reference to Launoii which is Opera Omnia, Tomus IV, P. I, p. 2. See above, 374.13-17.

1 H. Rashdall, I, p. 300.


3 H. Rashdall, I, p. 308.
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The writer of the quotation notes that "'through the study of letters...men may be made learned by science, through whom the truth of Scripture is explained...and the Catholic faith grows stronger...'" (377.5-8). Here is expressed one of Newman's important ideas: namely, that a mind cultivated by means of liberal knowledge can with greater proficiency study Sacred Scripture; thus the study of letters is a bulwark to the faith and a means of its growth.

377.9-26 "Urban the Fifth, of Vienna: 'Commissae...documentis'." The quotation is from the papal bull of 1365 by which Urban V founded the University of Vienna. Newman's source for Urban's proclamation is Adam Franciscus Kollarius. Analecta monumentorum omnis aevi Vindobonae (2 Tom. Vindobonae, 1761-62) I. p. 53. Kollarius is quoting from Urban the Fifth (1362-1370) who, writing in the Fourteenth Century, about the establishment of higher learning at Vienna, includes all three benefits of the study of liberal knowledge noted severally in the preceding quotations—benefits accruing to the individual, to the church, and to the state: "'...we gladly give to the faithful our gracious approval for the study of letters, through which the reverence for the Divine Name and their Catholic faith is extended, justice is cultivated, both public and private business is carried on profitably, every favorable circumstances of man's state promoted...'" (377.10-14).

377.27 - 378.10 "Martin the Fifth, of Louvain: 'Nuper... commendantis', etc." From Martin V (1417-1431), Privilegia Academiae
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Louvaniensis, 1728. The Privilegia... was the papal bull issued by Martin V, December 5, 1425, recommending the establishment of the University of Louvain. Joseph Berington writes that owing to the beneficences of princes or pontiffs, a university was honoured with the distinctive title. "To this title privileges were annexed, by which the students and professors acquired distinction and were formed into a graduate society." 1

Martin V, writing in the fifteenth century the papal bull that authorized the establishment of the University of Louvain, commends the establishment of "'the fountain of the sciences, from which, for the praise and glory of God, individual men noted for the maturity of their judgment may drink and may prosper, crowned with the marks of virtue and doctrine,...'" (378.6-9).

378.12-15 "Clement the Sixth, of Prague: 'fidelibus... impendimus'." The quotation is from the foundation bull authorizing the establishment of the University of Prague issued by Clement VI in January 1347. Newman gives as his source for Clement VI's bull, the Monumenta Historia Universitas Carolo-Ferdinando. It was not possible to


Pearl Kibre, Scholarly Privileges in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, Mass., Medialeval Academy of America, 1962, p. 9 defines "Privilegia" as "the collection of documents which enumerated the specific rights, privileges, and immunities of scholars.")
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identify Newman's reference for the bull, but Rashdall gives as the
source either the Monumenta Universitas Prague or the Monumenta
Vaticana res gestas Bohemiae, illustrantia (I, ed. L. Klicman, Prague,
1903) No. 845. 1

Clement VI (1342-1352) writing in the Fourteenth Century about
the establishment of a "studium generale" at Prague, urges the faithful
"to pursue the study of letters, through which reverence for the Divine
Name and for their Catholic faith is extended, justice is fostered,
public and private business is profitably carried on, and every
favourable condition of human life is increased" (378.11-14).

378.17-25 "Eugenius the Fourth, of Caen: 'Dum [...] pensamus...confosetur' etc." Eugenius IV (1431-1437) in the bull
establishing the University at Caen (1437) writes of the "'many public
and private, spiritual and temporal benefits the study of letters...
confers on the world'" (378.17-19). The section Newman quotes ends with
the idea that "'the Church militant is strengthened both spiritually and
temporally from its [the study of letters] rich fruits...'."

Newman's source for the bull is "Erectio Academiae Cadomensis
ab Eugenio Papa IV," a letter of Pope Eugenius IV, dated June 3, 1437 and
quoted in the Spicilegium, sive collectio veterum aliquot scriptorum qui

1 H. Rashdall, Medieval Universities, II, p.215.
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The excerpts from Papal Bulls (376.9 - 378.25) authorizing the establishment of Universities in various locations serve as an historical record of the fact that "universities are 'institutions for the promotion of letters and the sciences, tending to the defence of the faith and the welfare of society'" (376.6-8).

In Section I of the Appendix, Newman has given references that present the idea of a university through the centuries from Horace (65-8 B.C.) to Charlemagne (742-814) down to Edward Copleston (1776-1849) and V. A. Huber (1800-1869) in the nineteenth century. The excerpts from several historical authorities indicate that the idea of a university through the centuries has been the one that Newman has made the thesis of the Discourses: namely, that liberal knowledge, which issues in the cultivation of the intellect, is the direct end of university education.
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The secondary themes of the place of Theology and the importance of moral education are also dealt with in this section. Section I of the Appendix states that liberal knowledge "'includes' theology and 'protects' religion" (373.11), a sentence that gives direction to much that Newman has said in Discourses I to V about the importance of Theology in liberal education and in Discourses IX and X about the relation of liberal knowledge and religion. Here also Newman states that intellectual, and not moral education is the purpose of a university. Newman has dealt with the topic particularly in Discourse IX, but here he makes clear that moral education is the province of the colleges and the halls, not of the university. Finally, the excerpts from papal bulls provide references for another important idea in the Discourses: namely, the value of a liberal education: a liberal education benefits the individual, and through the individual, the Church and the State.
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Section 1 dealt with the direct end or purpose of university education—liberal knowledge; Section 2 discusses, with references, the means to that end: the recognition, in Newman's view that, a university, in the widely accepted meaning of the word, should encompass in its subject matter "the whole circle of sciences," (383.12). The traditional idea that "schools..., which professed to embrace all the sciences within their walls,... were properly denominated Universities" (383.14-16) is the basis of Newman's proposition in Discourse II that a university, if consistent with its name, must teach universal knowledge, and therefore, must not omit Theology from its curriculum or at least must not be founded on the principle of ignoring Theology as a science (379.26). Section 2 of the Appendix is then an elaboration on a statement made in Section 1: "learning 'includes' theology..." (373.11).

379.24-31 "...and they would be specifically different from an Academical Institution which began by putting aside Theology as a science which was not to be recognized..., 'eminently practical.'" Here Newman anticipates and successfully counters a possible objection made by the Queen's Colleges advocates; namely, that ancient universities such as Bologna and Salerno cultivated one faculty. But Newman points out that
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there was no deliberate exclusion of other faculties in that Bologna
became famed as a school of Law and Salerno as a school of Medicine
because of "the circumstance of their civil origin" (379.29). See also,
375.24 – 376.3 where Newman explains why he considers the Queen's
Colleges to differ essentially in principle from those ancient
universities from which the faculty of theology was only accidentally
absent: In the universities of the middle ages "theological truth was
always professed and assumed as true in the secular teaching which was
actually given, it entered as truth into the subject matter of all the
knowledge which was actually taught there,..." (375.32 – 376.1).

379.28-31 "...nay that other Italian Universities...'eminently
practical'." See V. A. Huber, The English Universities, I, p. 32 in
which Huber notes that the practical subjects of Jurisprudence and
Medicine were not admitted into the "artes liberales". Even when they
eventually were grafted into the main stream, they still remained
subordinate; with the result that, Law and Medicine formed two new
Faculties separate from Arts.

379.31 – 380.5 "The same author..., 'So surpassing...in Arts'.
The reference is to V. A. Huber's The English Universities, ed. Francis

Since Huber reads "old sciences" rather than "other sciences,"
(379.33) there would seem to be a misprint in the text of "other" for
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"old." The "old sciences" refer to the Seven Liberal Arts comprising the trivium—Grammar, Rhetoric, Logic—and the quadrivium—of mathematics divided into four—Geometry, Arithmetic, Astronomy, and Music.  

Huber questions whether the Masters of Arts can be referred to as a "Facultas," in that Arts comprised the old sciences of the trivium and quadrivium and the new philosophy. Huber defines "Facultas" as a body of teachers who have the ability to teach in one branch and the right of examination in their own branch.  Furthermore, Huber states that the Masters of Arts are properly the "Universitas," in the sense of the legal corporation or governing body. For example, Arts in the University of Paris was divided into four nations—French, Picard, Norman, and English. Huber continues by explaining that it was from the Arts that "the Proctors of the Nations and the Rector" were elected; consequently, Arts, with one Proctor for each nation had four votes instead of one in the Assembly. However, by "the fifteenth century the national corporations, though existing, were no longer represented by the Arts, and the latter was but one Faculty, with a single vote, like each of the other Faculties."  The University can be said therefore to have

2 V. A. Huber, The English Universities, I, pp.33-34.
3 Ibid., p.35.
4 Ibid., p.35.
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had "its foundation in Arts" (380.4-5) in respect to curriculum and governing body.

The idea expressed by Huber that "the Masters of Arts are properly the 'Universitas'...the University has its foundation in Arts" is basic to Newman's argument that Liberal Knowledge is the direct or primary end of a university education.

380.5-9 "He observes too, that 'had not...severed from them'." Newman is again quoting from V. A. Huber, The English Universities, I, p. 33. Huber is contrasting the practical subjects of Law and Medicine, which formed two new faculties, with Theology that grew out of the old subjects of the trivium and quadrivium. The entire quotation is as follows: "As a science, it [Theology] had unfolded itself entirely out of the old studies, and could not be severed from them; and had not the coming-in of Canonical Law evolved new materials, Theology might perhaps not even have constituted a separate Faculty. In other places Jurists sought to keep possession of Canonical Law; but in Paris, they were weak: and the Theologians, by seizing upon it, first separated themselves from the students in Arts."

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By means of the Huber quotation, Newman is noting that Theology had its roots in the old studies that were the subjects of Arts, which was the foundation of the university. Then too, Canonical Law added to the subject-matter of Theology related Theology to the practical subject of Jurisprudence. Therefore, since Theology has its roots in the old subjects and is related to the practical subject of Law, it is, from historical precedent, an integral part of the university curriculum.

380.9-10 "Antony à Wood" (1632-1695) published in 1674, Historia et Antiquitates Universitatis Oxoniensis, in 2 vols; the first devoted to the university in general and the second to the colleges. Wood's great work was produced, 1691-92, in two volumes folio entitled, Athenae Oxonienses; An Exact History of all the Writers and Bishops who have had their Education in the University of Oxford from 1500 to 1690, to which are added the Fasti or Annals for the said time. More recently, Wood's Athenae Oxonienses was edited by P. Bliss (London, 1813-20), 5 vols.


380.9-381.8 "...according to Antony à Wood, as referred to by Keuffel,...words of Matthew Paris,... 'Et iam...acquirantur'...."
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references in this section are from Georg Keuffel, Historia Originis ac Progressus Scholarum Inter Christianos, Chapter LXXVII, pp. 372-378.

Keuffel, p. 373 quoting from Antony à Wood, Historia et Antiquitates Universitatis Oxoniensis, ad annum 1148, page 52 libr. I, identifies "The new Professor who comes from Lombardy and Bec" (380.13) as Roger Vacarius (1120-c.1200), an Italian civilian and canonist who, according to Keuffel, brought with him to Oxford, Roman Law, a new learning for which the scholars of Oxford eagerly flocked to him in 1149.¹

Keuffel gives the reason for Vacarius' coming to England as that of settling the dispute between Theobald, Archbishop of Canterbury and Henry of Blois, Bishop of Winchester about the legateship, a dispute settled in favour of Theobald. The "curious state of scholastic disorder at Oxford in the middle of the twelfth century" (380.10-11) resulted from the fact that as the study of law increased, because of the popularity of Vacarius' subject, interest in the Liberal Arts decreased. In fact, so popular did the study of law become, among both clergy and laymen, that complaints of the deterioration of learning reached King Stephen (d.1154), brother of Henry of Blois, who publicly imposed silence upon Vacarius, but not before, as Newman explains,

¹ G. G. Keuffel, Historia Scholarum ... Inter Christianos, p.373.
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"the very idea of a University was impaired, for their ceased to be a course or circle of studies" (380.16-17).

Newman describes the resulting superficiality in students' studies as well as the loss of respect for those "who had spent many years in Arts,... [who] were now with their doctrine neglected by upstarts" by means of a direct quotation from Antony à Wood, Historia et Antiquitates Universitatis Oxoniensis; Vol. I, P.2, p.169.

By the end of the century, Vacarius' compendium of the Digest and Code of Justinian entitled, Liber pauperum, became the popular text of Oxford law students. But Roger Bacon, in the next century, (c.1214-1294) studied at Oxford in the first half of the thirteenth century and taught at Oxford between 1250 and 1257. Newman's statement that "Roger Bacon... as might be supposed, was opposed to the change" (380.24-25) can be explained by the fact that Bacon, after 1247 began to collect materials for a vast and comprehensive work in which he endeavoured to "arrange human learning under four main headings of Grammar and Logic, Mathematics, Natural Science, Metaphysics and Morals and to set forth a reasoned scheme of intellectual progress, leading up from the study of things human to the study of things divine." Since Roger Bacon was interested in a comprehensive view of knowledge, he would be opposed to the limitation of that view to one subject such as Vacarius' Roman Law.

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380.25-30 "The students...build upon it." This passage Newman has translated from Keuffel, with minor variations. The Latin of Keuffel is as follows: "Clerici nunc Anglicani in triplici ponabantur differentia. Quidam vocabantur 'Superfeminati,' qui nullam artium fundamentum ponabant. Alii dicebantur 'Pannosi,' qui doctrinam particulatim, et quasi per panniculos arripiebant, apophthegmatum et sententiarum collectores. Denique quidam, appellabantur 'Massati,' qui basi profunde iacta nitentes, scientiam omnem solidissime superstruebant,..." ¹

380.30-381.3 "As time went on,...Hungary." This passage too is translated from Keuffel in which he notes that Innocent IV (1242-1254) issued an edict refusing to admit Lawyers to ecclesiastical dignities in the countries mentioned, presumably for the reason that they would be in either of the first two classes mentioned by Keuffel: the "Shallow" or at best the "Ragged" or "Patchy" (380.27). The implication is that lawyers who had confined themselves to the study of law without first having laid a solid foundation by the study of Arts would not have trained intellects and would therefore not be in Innocent IV's view, suitable candidates for ecclesiastical dignities.

381.3-8 "The words of Matthew Paris, speaking in the middle of the thirteenth century,..."

¹ G. G. Keuffel, Historia...Scholarum Inter Christianos, p. 376.
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Matthew Paris (c. 1199-1259), an English monk of St. Albans and a mediæval chronicler as well as an expert scribe and illuminator, was appointed annalist of the Benedictine monastery of St. Albans in 1236. Matthew Paris compiled the Chronica Majora, which was a history of the world from the creation to 1259. The early part of this work to 1235 is ascribed to Roger of Wendover; the latter part from 1235 to 1259 is the composition of Matthew Paris. The Historia Anglorum sive Historia Minor is an abridgement of Matthew Paris's greater work.

381.4-8 "Et iam fere...acquirantur." These words of Matthew Paris, which Newman has quoted from Keuffel's Historia Originis..., pp. 377-378, are, according to Keuffel's reference, from Matthew Paris's Historia Anglorum under the year 1254. See "Appendix to the Thesis," Section II, 381.4-8 for the translation.

Matthew Paris, writing about the same time as Innocent IV notes that "'almost all the students, with no foundation in grammar, or the authors and philosophers, hasten to hear lectures on Law',..." (381.4-6) He also states that Law is not one of the liberal arts since Law is studied in order to gain a salary.

With this extended quotation (380.9-381.8) in which Newman

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paraphrases from Keuffel’s Historia Originis ac Progressus Scholarum Inter Christianos, Chapter LXXXVII, interspersed with his own comments, Newman is drawing an instance from history of what occurred in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries when students were drawn away from the "Arts Liberales" by "the lucrative character of the new science" (380.15-16). Those who did not study arts were designated "the Shallow" (380.26-27); whereas, the ideal then, which Newman takes as the ideal of the Discourses, is the third classification -- the "'solid' (380.29), who after laying a deep foundation, went on to build upon it" (380.29-30).

381.9-12 "That a University...to mean it." The statement "that a University was really, in its idea, the seat of all learning" (381.9) is the idea basic to the Discourses. Newman has made clear, both in Section 1 and so far in Section 2 of the "Appendix to the Discourses" that the phrase "all learning" (381.9) includes Theology. He also states that he is basing his definition of a university on the "recognized meaning" (381.11-12), not on "the derivation' of the word" (381.11). Newman does not become concerned to no purpose with the etymology of the word "University;" but rather, sets forth the meaning of the word "university", "however it came to mean it" (381.12) "in the minds of the generality of men" (372.3).

381.12-16 "'Academiae...Morinus (Ordin. iii. 13 fin.)... tradita est'." The quotation is from Joannes Morinus (Jean Morin)
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The quotation from Morin, who wrote in the mid-seventeenth century, expresses the idea that academies were in a sense, "emporia" "market-places" (381.14), which drew people from all parts, "undique concursum est" (381.14), as places of study and sources of learning, "velut ad studiorum et scientiarum" (381.13-14). Morin also states that these Academies passed on Christian learning more perfectly than the Colleges and Seminaries of the Clergy (381.14-16). The description of an academy that Morin presents is Newman's idea of a university; that is, a lay institution drawing students from all parts, to the source of all learning, for the sake of study. Such an institution, since it teaches all knowledge, passes on, as Morin states, Christian doctrine, "more perfectly, diligently, and splendidly" (381.15), than would be the case in the Colleges instituted by the Clergy, presumably because in such Colleges there would be an undue emphasis on Christian doctrine to the de-emphasizing of other aspects of knowledge, a de-emphasizing that, to follow out Newman's theory to its logical conclusion, would impair the wholeness of Christian doctrine itself.

381.22-24 "...the word...acquired the sense of the
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universality of students from the use of the word 'Universitas,' in the civil law." "The word 'universitas,' in medieval Law Latin, meant nothing more than 'corporation'; it only later became specialised in the modern sense of 'universitas scholarum.'" ¹

Sir William Hamilton writes that "the word 'universitas' in the common language of Rome, is equally applicable to 'persons' and to 'things.' In the technical language of the civil law, it was, in like manner, applied to both. In the former signification,...it denoted a plurality of persons associated for a continued purpose,...; in the latter, it denoted a certain totality of individual things, constituted either by their mutual relation to a certain common end, ('universitas facti,') or by a mere legal fiction, ('universitas juris').--In the language of the middle ages, it was applied either loosely to any understood class of persons; or strictly (in the acceptance of the Roman law) to a public incorporation, more especially...to the members of 'a general study.'...it was used to denote either (and this was its more usual meaning) the whole body of teachers and learners, or the whole body of learners,...and in its academic application, always joined with 'magistrorum et scholarum,'.... [Universitas] came, during the fourteenth century,...to be used either simply by itself, or for a time,

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frequently in combination with 'studium,' or 'studium generale.' 1

From Hamilton's statement, the word "universitas" in Roman
civil law meant "a plurality of persons associated for a continued
purpose:" in other words, "a public incorporation:" and then came to
be applied to "the whole body of teachers and learners, or the whole
body of learners."

381.25-26 "I shall set down here some definitions of the
word,..." Newman gives thirteen different sources as definitions of a
"University" in order to illustrate that authors are divided in their
opinions: some defining "university" as "a universality of studies,
others of students" (381.18). These definitions make clear Newman's
statement, "I am not taking my stand upon the 'derivation' of the word,
but upon its recognised meaning" (381.10-12). See above, 381.23-24.
By the "recognised meaning" Newman means that the following writers of
different eras and nationalities (381.27 - 383.33) have considered a
University a "Studium Generale" in the sense that Newman is stressing:
namely, that the term university implies a universality of students and
of curriculum. As Newman has explained, "it is the variety of its
schools which brings students from all parts and the variety of its

1 Sir William Hamilton, "On the Right of Dissenters to
Admission into the English Universities," Discussions on Philosophy and
Literature, Education and University Reform (London: Longman, Brown,
Green and Longmans; M. DCCC.LIII), pp. 494-495.
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members which demands so many subjects of teaching,..." therefore, in the general usage of the word, a university can be rightly considered a "School of Universal Learning." 1

381.27-29 "'Receptissima...tracta sit'. Conring de Antiquo. Acad. Suppl., i.7." The quotation is from Hermannus Conringius. De Antiquitatibus Academicis, Vol. I of 7 vols., Supplementus I, Section VII., Gottingae, 1739, p.197. Hermann Conring (1606-1681) was a German Protestant theologian and professor of natural philosophy at Helmstadt.

Conring, writing in the seventeenth century, states that the word "University" or "Studium Generale" or "Universale" is the most commonly accepted meaning, regardless what the word university has referred to up to now (381.27-29)--a statement that corroborates Newman's definition of the word university from its ancient designation of a "Studium Generale", or "School of Universal Learning". 2

381.30-34 "'In his etsi universa...effectum est'. --Morhof Polyhistor i. 14, 11." The reference is to Daniel George Morhofius, Polyhistor, Liber I, Caput XIV, 1.11, p.138. D. J. Morhof (1639-1691), a German literary historian and scholar, was author of the Polyhistor

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1 J. H. Newman, "What is a University?", University Sketches, p.6.

2 Ibid., p.6.
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Literarius, Philosophicus et Practicus (4 ed. Aalen, Scientia Verlag, 1979) 3 vols. in 2, reprint of the Lubecae, 1747 edition. Written in Latin (1688-1692), the Polyhistor was the first history of universal literature by a German writer.

Mornof writes about universities: "...in these institutions the universal doctrine and science of divine and human things is taught, for they were established and obtained the name of Universities for this end" (381.30-32).


Van Espen, writing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, gives a definition of the schools that came to be called universities which supports Newman's designation of a university as a "School of Universal Learning." 1 Van Espen writes that "These schools (academies) were called public, because in them all the arts and sciences were taught" (382.1-2); furthermore, these schools were open "to all young

1 Newman, "What is a University?", p. 6.
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men indiscriminately; and from this fact they began to be called little
by little Universities; that is, universal schools';" (382.3-5).

382.6-15 "'[Antiquioris usus sunt] denominationes...stud-
quotation is from C. C. Keuffel, "Dum omnes scientiae in eodem loco tradi-
coeperunt, ortae sunt Universitates studiorum sive Academiae," Historia
Originis ac Progressus Scholarum Inter Christianos, Chapter LXXIV,
pp.319-320.

In this passage, Keuffel notes that the names "Studium
Generale" and "University", were attributed, by the authority of ancient
writers, to schools in which all the sciences were treated (382.6-8).
Also, Keuffel refers to [Huberus] 1 as giving another meaning to the word
university: namely, that of a legal corporation (382.10-13); but
another of Keuffel's references insists on the universality of studies as
characterizing a university (382.13-14).

382.16-19 "'Vocantur scholae...traduntur.'--Mendo, de jure
Academico, init." The reference is to Andrés Mendo (1608-1685), a
Spanish Jesuit Scholar, who wrote De Jure Academico, Selectae Questiones
Theologicae...et Politicae, 1668.

Mendo states that the public schools referred to as

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1 Since the Keuffel text reads "Huberus," the spelling
"Haberus" would seem to be a misprint.
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Universities are so called either because all the sciences are taught in them or from the fact that some sciences are taught to be heard and learned by all"(382.16-19).

382.20-21 "'Université...les sciences'--Encyclop. Méthodique."

The Encyclopédie méthodique ou par ordre de matières was a new and enlarged edition of the work organized by Diderot and D'Alembert entitled Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers begun in 1751 and completed in 1772 in twenty-eight volumes. Charles Joseph Panckoucke (1736-98) began a new edition in 1775, entitled Encyclopédie méthodique... in which the articles are arranged according to the sciences and arts to which they belong. There were to be twenty-six parts treated in distinct dictionaries entrusted to different editors, and completed by a "vocabulaire universel" with references to all places in which each word occurred. Publication started in 1782. The work continued with revisions until 1832 with volume 166.

The Encyclopédie méthodique defines a university as a school or college where all the sciences are taught.

382.22-25 "'On appela...de savior'--Fleury, Choix des Etudes, 8." The quotation is from Claude Fleury, Traite du choix et de la méthode des études (Discours sur Platon.--Comparaison d'une philosophie et d'un homme du monde tirée du Theetete de Platon), Paris 1686; another edition, Paris 1842.
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Fleury states that the term "university" indicates that within a single town is taught whatever it is beneficial to understand" (382.23-24).

Claude Fleury (1640-1725), an ecclesiastical historian, was noted for his Histoire ecclésiastique (1691-1720) in twenty volumes. It was the first large-scale history of the church carried down to 1414 by Fleury and to 1778 by J. C. Fabre and others. English portions of the Histoire ecclésiastique were edited by J. H. Newman (1842-1844) in three volumes.


Samuel Johnson (1709-1784). English biographer, poet, and lexicographer, completed his Dictionary... in 1755 after eight years of individual effort. Johnson's work was the first full-fledged dictionary of the English language. On the title page Johnson refers to his work as follows: "A Dictionary of the English Language: in which words are deduced from their originals and illustrated in their different significations by examples from the best writers, to which are prefixed, A History of the Language, and An English Grammar."

Johnson gives "University" as derived from the Latin
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"universitas" and defines the word as "a school, where all the arts and faculties are taught and studied." A Dictionary of the English Language, Vol. II.

382.28-36 "'A University...wisdom.'—A Wood's Oxford, Vol. I. p.2." The reference is to Antony à Wood, Historia et Antiquitates Universitatis Oxoniensis, Vol. I, p.2. Wood's definition reiterates the original meaning of university as a legal corporation. Secondly, he stresses the "generale" or "universale" idea in the name "studium generale" when he states that a university, such as Oxford, was "a place for the reception of all people that desire to learn; representing the whole kingdom wherein it is, nay the whole world,..." (382.31-32).


Newman gives his estimate of Mosheim's church history in his article on St. Chrysostom: "When you have read through a century of him, you have as little distinct idea of what he has been about, as when you began. If history is to mirror the actual course of time, it must also
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be a course itself: it must not be the mere emptying out of a portfolio of unconnected persons and events, which are not synchronous, nor co-ordinate, nor correlative.... 1

Although Newman criticized Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History for its lack of internal unity, he does quote the work here for the facts that support Newman's own definition of a university as being, "a place for cultivating all knowledge" (378.28-29). Mosheim states that the University of Paris was the first to embrace all the arts and sciences and thus the first to be known as a university (383.7-8). Mosheim refers to a university as a "Studium Universale," a statement that gives further support to Newman's definition of a university as a "School of Universal Learning." See above, 381.27-29.

383.10-17 "'Hitherto...Universities'.--Berrington[n]'s Middle Ages, p.354." The reference is to Joseph Berington (1743-1827), a Catholic divine who spent some time in France before returning to England where he allied himself with the liberal and moderate catholics who were striving to obtain their civil and religious liberties. Between 1776 and 1814 he published numberous philosophical, historical, and theological works, one being A Literary History of the Middle Ages; comprehending an account of the state of learning, from the close of the reign of Augustus to its revival in the fifteenth century, (London, 1814). Berington's

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Middle Ages was reprinted in The European Library, (London, 1846) with an introduction by William Hazlitt.

Newman's quotation is from J. Berington, "The State of Learning in the Thirteenth Century," A Literary History of the Middle Ages, Bk. V, p.238. This quotation from Berington is a reference for Newman's main idea of a university: Berington notes that schools whose object was to embrace within their walls "the whole circle of sciences, as far as the allotted period of time would allow" (383.12-13) "were properly denominated Universities" (383.16). The completion of Berington's sentence is as follows: "...of which Paris, about the year 1215, is said to have set the example." 1


J. K. L. Gieseler, (1792-1854) a German Protestant church historian, Doctor of Philosophy and Theology, and Professor of Theology.

1 J. Berington, Middle Ages, p.238.
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in Gottingen, was the author of a more lengthy work than that from which Newman quotes; namely, A Compendium of Ecclesiastical History, in five volumes, translated into English by S. Davidson and J. W. Hull, (1846 - 1855), with a revised edition by H. B. Smith (1857-1880).

Gieseler's paragraph from which Newman quotes begins, "From the beginning of the twelfth century Paris became the chief seat of the new science...." George Waddington (see below, 383.27-33) defines the "new science" as "Scholastic or Philosophical Theology as opposed to positive or traditionary theology."¹ Gieseler states that "the newly awakened zeal for philosophical theology now led distinguished men to establish courses of lectures on this subject apart from the cathedral and conventual schools" (383.19-21). To the lectures on philosophical theology were eventually added "lectures on canon law, on medicine, and the arts, and in this way the first University was formed by a congregating together of these various teachers" (383.23-25). Gieseler sees the beginnings of a university as that of a "universitas magistrorum." Furthermore, he sees the science of theology as the focal point of a circle of sciences that expanded around it. Gieseler, with his idea of theology as the actual starting point of what came to be known as a university is, therefore, an essential reference for the importance and place of theology in Newman's idea of a university.

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The words that follow Newman's quotation from Gieseler are these: "... (studium generale s. universale). In the thirteenth century other universities were formed on the same model, of which that of Oxford was, after Paris, the most celebrated for the study of scholastic theology (from A.D. 1200)." ¹ Gieseler's designation, "studium generale s. universale" for a university, the origin and growth of which he has described, substantiates Newman's definition of a university as "a studium generale or school of universal learning." See above, 381.27-29. Furthermore, Gieseler's words indicate that the universities so formed were no insignificant schools, but the great universities of Paris and Oxford.

383.27-33 "'The most celebrated...title of University'.-- Waddington's Ch.Hist., p.469." The quotation is from George Waddington, History of the Church from the Earliest Ages to the Reformation (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1835), p.376. G. Waddington (1793-1869) was a church historian and fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.

Newman quotes from Waddington's History of the Church, the section entitled, "On the University of Paris." The paragraph begins, "The numerous public schools or academies which had previously been formed in various parts of Italy and France, at Salamanca, at Cologne and

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elsewhere assumed the form by which they were afterwards characterized during the thirteenth century. The most celebrated..." Waddington notes that since "'Paris, alone pretended to embrace the entire range, it was the first which took the title of university'" (383.31-32). In the context of Newman's quotation, Waddington further notes about the University of Paris that the two faculties of Arts and Theology "appear to have been the earliest 'Faculties': nor is mention made of others in the Constitution delivered in 1215 by the legate of Innocent III." 1

Waddington notes that the very reason for the University of Paris' being designated a university was the fact that its curriculum embraced the whole range of the sciences. Furthermore, the fact that the first two faculties in the University of Paris were Arts and Theology is authority from historical precedent for Newman's placing such stress on Theology and the liberal arts in the university curriculum.

The foregoing thirteen definitions of a university from varied sources--Morph (381.33-34), seventeenth-century German literary historian; Van Espen (382.5), seventeenth-eighteenth-century Belgian canonist; Andrés Mendo (382.19), seventeenth-century Spanish Jesuit scholar; Waddington (383.34), English fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, a contemporary of Newman's--corroborate Newman's view of a

1 G. Waddington, History of the Church from the Earliest Ages to the Reformation, p.376.
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university. The quotations from a variety writers representing different eras and different racial, religious, and educational backgrounds only serve to emphasize the validity of Newman's definition of a university as a "Studium Generale" or "School of Universal Learning".

In Section 2 of the Appendix, Newman has given references to support his argument that "'the whole circle of sciences'" (383.12) constitutes the subject matter of a university education. That "all branches of knowledge" (378.26) are requisite for a liberal education it was Newman's particular purpose to maintain in Discourses II to V. Further to that purpose, he notes in Section 2 of the Appendix by means of quotations from Huber that the university had "'its foundation in Arts'" (386:4-5) and that theology, "'as a science,...had unfolded itself entirely out of the old studies..."' (386:7-8); that is, the Trivium and Quadrivium that were the basis of the Liberal Arts and therefore that Theology has always been an integral part of Liberal Knowledge. In addition, by means of a long reference to Keuffel, Newman illustrates that a practical subject, such as law, pursued without a solid foundation in arts leads to shallowness for the individual, and generally, impairs the "circle of studies" (386.17) that constitutes the very idea of a University. Finally, Newman concludes with thirteen definitions of a university that are excerpts from various authorities, all in agreement about a university's being characterized by universality and therefore of its being accurately designated as a "School of Universal Learning."
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In Section 1 of the Appendix Newman has proved by reference to historical authorities that liberal knowledge has from the establishment of universities been considered the primary end of a university education. Section 2 gave references to prove that traditionally all knowledge—including Theology—has been considered the subject matter of a university. In these two sections, by means of excerpts from writers representing the ages—Horace (65-8 B.C.) to George Waddington (1793-1869)—Newman has presented authorities for the primary aim of a university—liberal knowledge and the means to that end—the maintenance of the "circle of studies" as the subject matter of a university.

In Section 3 of the Appendix Newman turns to a contemporary aim of education: namely, "mere acquirement" (384.1), an aim that is contrary to the liberal knowledge idea of a university held through the centuries and therefore is, essentially, the viewpoint against which he is contending in the Discourses. In order to present his argument for "real knowledge" (384.1), or liberal knowledge, as the end of a university education, rather than "mere acquirement" (384.1), Newman draws his authorities from the contemporary scene with quotations from two nineteenth-century educators—Edward Copleston and Dr. Henry Tappan—as well as a quotation from one of his own early reviews.
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384.2-5 "I do not know... the passages on this subject." It is self-evident in Newman's view that the mere acquiring of facts is not "real knowledge," unless the information is "realized to the mind,"—a phrase by which Newman means that new knowledge becomes an integral part of the fabric of the mind through the mind's viewing its place, importance, and relation to other knowledge and thus achieving its thorough understanding. In Discourse V, Newman vividly described the lack of unity and therefore meaning and life resulting from "mere acquirement" in three metaphors: the "pantheon" (139.24 – 140.3), "a sort of monster" (142.13-16), and "specimens of animated nature" (143 4-8). In Section 3 of the Appendix Newman gives authorities for his view that merely acquiring information does not result in a liberal education. See Discourse VII, 209.2-3.

384.6 – 385.7 "Much we are told... the melancholy and irreparable result". The quotation is from Edward Copleston, "Of Plans of Education in general and particularly of English Education," A Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review (Chap. V, London, 1810) pp. 174-176.

Copleston, in the excerpt Newman quotes, makes particular the educational error Newman refers to as "mere acquirement": The Provost of Oriel College writes that "Never, while the world lasts, will it be wholly disabused of that specious error; that the more there is crammed
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into a young man's mind, whether it stays there or not, whether it is digested or not, still the viser he is!" (384.11-14). Copleston's description of "mere acquirement," of facts that "are received into the ear, but take no possession of the mind!" (384.30-31) as a particular elaboration for such phrases of Newman's as the following statement of the error in question from Discourse VII: "A narrow mind is thought to be that which contains little knowledge; and an enlarged mind, that which holds a great deal..." (208.9-12). On the positive side, Newman states that, "A science is not mere knowledge; it is knowledge which has undergone a process of intellectual digestion" (144.4-6).

Copleston notes that a student "'captivated by the novelty and variety of studies!" (384.22) that characterize the mere acquiring of information "'may become a skilful agriculturist, an improver of manufactures, an useful inspector of roads,...'" (384.24-25); in other words, a person apt in one phase of knowledge, "'but all that distinguishing grace which a liberal education imparts, he foregoes forever!" (384.26-27).

The quotation from Copleston further elaborates on Newman's distinction between "mere acquirement" and "real knowledge" by depicting the result of acquiring information that does not take "'possession of the mind'" (384.31): "'there is not only a moral blank, but an intellectual barrenness, a poverty of fancy and invention, a dearth of historical and poetical illustration, a void of all those ideas which decorate and enliven truth, which enable us to view over again the times
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that are past, to combine the produce of widely-distant ages, and to multiply into one another the component parts of each" (384.32 - 385.5). By means of the Copleston quotation Newman has presented the qualities that the mind lacks when it remains at the stage of "mere acquirement" rather than progressing to the cultivation of mind through "real knowledge."

385.8-9 "An interesting Essay on University Education...Dr. Tappan of New York." Henry Philip Tappan (1805-1881) was a minister of the Congregational Church and professor of moral and intellectual philosophy 1832-1837 at New York University. In 1852 Tappan became the first President of the University of Michigan--a position which he thought would afford an opportunity to integrate the university with the whole educational system. In his views on education, expressed in University Education (1851), Tappan was influenced by the Prussian system, which he had been able to examine during a visit abroad.

385.16 - 386.10 "We have destroyed...from childhood to youth". From H. P. Tappan University Education (1851), pp. 51, 54. There is a collection of Tappan's MSS. in the library of the University of Michigan.

Tappan's assessment of American education in the 1850's corroborates Newman's depiction of the result of education received as "mere acquirement." Tappan criticizes a kind of mental acquisition that
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results in the learning of "mere names of sciences, without gaining the sciences themselves" (385.23-24), from "a formidable curriculum of studies" (385.27), "in lectures adapted rather to Universities than to elementary schools" (385.32-33) with the result that there is "an immense and voracious deglutition of knowledge, where the mental digestion is estimated according to the rapidity with which these subjects are disposed of" (386.1-3).

This "voracious deglutition of knowledge!" described by Tappan substantiates Newman's own description of an education based on "mere acquirement" as described in the well-known passage in Discourse VII where Newman commiserates with "those earnest and ill-used persons, who are forced to load their minds with a score of subjects against an examination, who have too much in their hands to indulge themselves in thinking or investigation, who devour premiss and conclusion together with indiscriminate greediness, who hold whole sciences on faith,..." (238.6-12).

Lastly, Tappan's seeing education as "the orderly and gradual growth of mind according to its own innate laws fixed by God himself" (385.33 - 386.1) is a reference for Newman's idea of education as "the cultivation of the intellect" (197.6). Furthermore, Newman writes of a liberal education a "the growth of a principle from within" (142.17-18) as opposed to "mere acquirement" which he describes as "an accumulation from without" (142.16-17).
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386.12-13 "...a review of a book of Travels,..." The book of Travels referred to is John Horison Duncan's Travels Through Part of the United States and Canada, in 1818 and 1819 (2 vols., Glasgow: Hurst and Co., 1823). Duncan, who was Printer to the University of Glasgow, observed American education during his travels and wrote in praise of the kind of education that Tappan deplored—a kind of education in which the student is taught a great many facts in a short time for the purpose of insuring "...to their possessor a reasonable degree of success in any train of thinking or research to which, by his inclination or the exigencies of his future life, he may be led" (386.29-32). Such a philosophy of education makes of a university what Newman in discourse VI terms "a foundry, or a mint, or a treadmill" (232.20).

386.14 - 387.9 "We find that,...fail to impart." The quotation is from an early review of Newman's of John Horison Duncan's Travels Through Part of the United States and Canada, in 1818 and 1819. Newman noted in his Journal for January 26, 1824—that he had just written a review of Duncan's Travels in America for the British Review.¹ (According to R. D. Middleton, Newman's review of Duncan's Travels was published in the British Review, May, 1824).² Newman, as early in his career as 1824, before he had become an Oxford tutor, made the following comment in his review about the

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education based on "mere acquirement" for which Duncan has such praise: "To us, however, such a course seems likely to confuse the youthful mind by its variety, than to enrich it with its abundance. Those who aim at too much often end in doing nothing." (386.32–387.1). Newman depicted the idea of confusion vividly in his metaphor of a university based on the imparting of information only as the biblical Tower of Babel (See Discourse VII, 237.10).

In contrast to the ideal outlined by Duncan and based on "mere acquirement," the conclusion of the excerpt from Newman's early review is a description of the aims of a liberal education: "To enforce quickness in investigation and patience in research, to give the power of grappling with difficulties, accuracy of thought, and clearness of reasoning, to form the judgment, to refine the taste, to instil delicacy of feeling and quick perception of poetical beauty,..." (387.1-5). In Discourse VI, written almost thirty years later than the review of Duncan's Travels, Newman gives a similar depiction of the object of a Liberal Education in the passage, "To open the mind, to correct it, to refine it...to give it power over its own faculties,...resource, address, eloquent expression,..." (198.16-20).

Section 3 has presented the "mere acquirement" trend in nineteenth-century education through the opposition of two important educators of the century, one English, the other American--Edward Copleston, Provost of Oriel College, Oxford, and Henry Tappan, President
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of the University of Michigan. John Morison Duncan's argument is presented and countered by Newman's concluding description of "real knowledge" as the aim of a university education.
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An education based on "mere acquirement," the subject of Section 3, is an education built on variety and diversity for the purpose of possible usefulness. Newman is arguing for an education based not on diversity, but on unity: hence in Section 4, he gives authorities for another essential idea related to his liberal education idea of a university: that is, "the Branches of Knowledge form one whole" (387.10). In behalf of his argument for retaining Theology in the university curriculum, Newman frequently uses the metaphor of "the whole circle of sciences" (75.2-3) with reference to the fact that "the Branches of Knowledge form one whole" (387.10). Section 4 is an important reference section for the central Discourses in that its subject is basic to both the unity of knowledge theme of Discourses II to V and the mind's reflecting that unity by obtaining the "philosophical habit," the fruit of liberal knowledge--the theme of Discourses VI to VIII.

387.11-16 "It is curious how negligent English writers... departments of knowledge." With reference to these lines, A. D. Culler comments as follows on the meaning of "the very word Encyclopaedia" (387.13): "An encyclopaedia, properly considered, is simply a scriptural university, just as a university is an institutional encyclopaedia,... Originally, the word 'encyclopaedia' which Bacon translated as 'circle
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learning' and Sir Thomas Flyot as 'the circle of doctrine,' probably referred simply to the common knowledge in general circulation, but gradually it came to designate the whole body of the arts and sciences, especially those deemed essential to a liberal education."

387.16-18 "Coleridge... a man of philosophical mind... planned the Encyclopaedia... on a truer idea..." Newman refers to S. T. Coleridge's plan for the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana (1818-1845). The "truer idea" is that Coleridge's plan for the Encyclopaedia expresses "the manifest tendency of all the Arts and Sciences at present...to lose their former insulated character, and organize themselves into one harmonious body of knowledge."

"The Encyclopaedia Metropolitana was projected by the late eminent poet and philosopher, S. T. Coleridge (1772-1834). It differs in its plan from other Dictionaries of Universal Knowledge in being strictly methodical. The contributions of the scientific and learned men by whom it was composed, are arranged, not according to the letters of the alphabet which happen to form the initials of the English 'names' of the Treatises, but in agreement with a 'Philosophical System,' based on the 'nature' of the Subject,—a method which causes the entire work to become a rational exposition of the state of human knowledge, and the

1 A. D. Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p.174.
mutual dependence and relative importance of its different branches." 1

Coleridge set forth his plan for the Encyclopaedia in the "Preliminary Treatise on Method" which appeared as the "General Introduction to the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana."

Newman himself wrote for the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana treatises on logic and rhetoric as Whately's assistant in 1822: the article on "Cicero" in 1824 (now included in Historical Sketches, Vol. III), and in 1825, an article on "Apollonius of Tyana" and the related subject of miracles.

387.20-21 "Since beginning these Discourses I took down an Encyclopaedia of names..." The Encyclopaedia to which Newman refers is, according to A. D. Culler, "Brewster's Edinburgh Encyclopaedia (1830), which he found in his rooms at Dublin..." 2 Brewster's Encyclopaedia was apparently the kind Newman describes as "a sort of Dictionary of portions and departments of knowledge" (387.15-16). The unity, mutual dependence, and relative importance of the different branches of knowledge had been broken by the alphabetical arrangement; consequently,


2 A. D. Culler, The Imperial Intellect, p.176.
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as Newman remarks, "I could learn nothing about 'truth,' 'knowledge,' etc., the subjects of which I was in search" (388.1-2).

388.6-7 "Hugó de St. Victore...Treatise de Studio Legendi,... Newman refers to the Didascalicon, De Studio Legendi, Eugenius de Sancto Victore. Hugh of St. Victor (c.1096-1161) was educated by the canons regular of St. Augustine. He went to the monastery of St. Victor at Paris in 1115—a monastery which had become famous for learning. As a philosopher and theologian he was influenced by the Platonic tradition transmitted through St. Augustine. His principal theological work is the De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei in which he worked out his symbolist conception of the universe, according to which every creature is the sensible expression of a Divine thought.

His encyclopaedic work, the Didascalicon, a comprehensive view of the whole of secular and spiritual knowledge, is the work from which Newman quotes. For Newman's references, in 388.8 - 389.24 see the edition of the first half of the Didascalicon by Charles H. Buttiner (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1939) quoted as follows:

388.8 - 389.24 The following are Newman's quotations from the Didascalicon with page references to the Buttiner edition:

388.8 "'Studium sapientiae'," I. 2 or 4 pp. 6 or 11.

388.9 "'comprehensio...sunt','" VI. 14, p. 130.
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388.10 "'disciplina omnium...investigans'," I. IV. p.11.

388.11 "'rerum diversitates'" I. IV. p.11.

388.12 "'Philosophia...disciplinarum'" II, 1, p.23.

388.13 "'Omnes artes...terminum'," II, 17, p.35.

388.16 - 389.11 "'Ex his omnibus...non timueris'," III, 3-5, pp. 52-57.

389.12-24 "'Duo sunt genera...et historiae', etc." III, 4, p.54.

The translations for the excerpts from the Didascalicon quoted in 388.8 - 389.24 are from The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor, On the Study of Reading, translated from the Latin with Introduction and notes by Jerome Taylor (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961). These translations will be found in the Appendix to the Thesis Section II, 388.8 - 389.24.

The Didascalicon, composed in the late 1120's selects and defines all the areas of knowledge important to man, demonstrating that not only are these areas essentially integrated, but also in their integrity they are necessary to man for the attainment of his human perfection and his divine destiny.

The Didascalicon draws upon a long antecedent tradition of
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didascatic, or didactic, literature which originated with the quarrel of
Socrates and the Sophists in the fifth century B.C. The Didascalicon
appeared at a time when centers of education had moved from rural
monasteries to the cathedral schools of the rapidly growing cities:
when education was becoming specialized according to the limited
enthusiasms or capacities of particular masters and secularized in
response to the flowering of secular culture. In contrast to the
concentration on law, medicine, or the poetic arts at the schools of
Bologna, Montpellier, or Orleans, the Didascalicon set forth a program
insisting on the indispensability of a complex of traditional arts and
disciplines and on the need for their scientific pursuit in a particular
order by all men as a means of relieving the physical weaknesses of
earthly life and of restoring that union with the divine wisdom for
which man was made. 1

Newman's Discourses were written at a time too when education
was becoming specialized in favour of the kind of education that would
be immediately useful in the professional world; consequently, it is
appropriate that Newman should give extensive quotations from Hugh of
St. Victor's plea for that unity of knowledge represented by the liberal
arts—the trivium and quadrivium for St. Victor. Of the lines quoted
from Hugh of St. Victor, the following are particularly significant for

1 Jerome Taylor, ed., The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor,
pp. 3-4.
the idea that it is through the unity represented by the liberal arts that the mind is prepared for the "complete knowledge of philosophic truth" (388.23). Hugh of St. Victor writes as follows: "Ex his... omnibus...secreta sophiae introeat": "Out of all the sciences...the ancients in their studies especially selected seven to be mastered by those who were to be educated. These seven they considered so to excel all the rest in usefulness that anyone who had been thoroughly schooled in them might afterward come to a knowledge of the others by his own inquiry and effort rather than by listening to a teacher. For these... constitute the best instruments, the best rudiments, by which the way is prepared for the mind's complete knowledge of philosophic truth.

Therefore they are called by the name trivium and quadrivium, because by them, as by certain ways (viae), a quick mind enters into the secret places of wisdom. ...(388.17-25).

Newman, centuries later, wrote in Discourse III of the unity of the sciences preparing the way for the mind's apprehension of "objective truth": "Viewed all together, they become the nearest approximation to a representation or subjective reflexion of the objective truth, possible to the human mind, which advances towards the accurate comprehension of that object, in proportion to the number of sciences it has mastered:..." (72.21-26).

389.25 - 390.27 'Again, an eloquent writer in the Dublin Review...'From God,...illumination of glory', etc.--Dublin Review (Dec.
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SECTION A


The "Tract of St. Bonaventura's" quoted in the article is entitled, "The Reduction of the Arts to Theology." The excerpt Newman includes here is from pp.531-533 of the Dublin Review article.

The quotation from the Tract of St. Bonaventura emphasizes Newman's idea of the unity of knowledge in that the various branches of knowledge comprise aspects of that unity that is creation. Newman has written in Discourse III, "All that exists, as contemplated by the human mind, forms one large system or complex fact, and this of course resolves itself into an indefinite number of particular facts, which, as being portions of a whole, have countless relations of every kind, one towards another. Knowledge is the apprehension of these facts, whether in themselves, or in their mutual positions and bearings. And, as all taken together form one integral object,..." (69.20-29).

St. Bonaventure expresses the source of the unity of knowledge in these words: "'the Divine Light, from which, as from its source, all human science emanates, is of four kinds: the inferior light, the exterior light, the interior light, and the superior light'" (389.27-30). He proceeds to explain that these correspond to four degrees of human knowledge—sensitive knowledge, mechanical arts, philosophical knowledge,
and religious knowledge. All are illuminations "'from God, the Fontal Light'" (369.26-27). The metaphor of the light which is one in source and apprehension, yet divisible into many parts is an apt reference for Newman's idea of the unity of knowledge described in these lines: "All that exists,...forms one large system or complex fact, and this...resolves itself into an indefinite number of particular facts,..." (69.20-24) which become the intellectual abstractions Newman terms sciences. The closing words of the quotation express the idea that all the human sciences are part of a vast illumination that will be seen in its full clarity only on "'the seventh day of rest, [in] the illumination of glory,' etc." (390.26-27). The idea that the sciences of the earthly illumination are even here and now more meaningful in the light of the "'illumination of glory'" is basic to Newman's insistence on retaining Theology among the sciences studied in the university and also basic to his discussion of the relation between liberal knowledge and the Church in Discourse X.

390.28 - 391.8 "'Ea est ratio,'...Sacred Congregation, ...under Leo the Twelfth, [1823-1829] 'rerum...excitare,' etc.—Card. Bartazzolii Paraenesis, apud Collect. Leg. de rect. Stud. rat. Rom. 1828'.

The reference is to Francois Cardinal Bertazzoli (There is very likely a misprint of the spelling of the name in the text.) (1754-1832). The work from which Newman quotes would seem to be the, Collectio
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Legum de recta Studiorum ratione. Cardinal Bertazzoli was made Cardinal in 1823 and named by Leo XII prefect of the Congregation of Studies and protector of the Order of Carmelites of the Irish College and the Irish churches.

The quotation from the Sacred Congregation concerning the Regulations of Studies emphasizes the idea of order and harmony resulting from each science's being in its proper place in the "circle of the sciences:" "Hence it is that in Physics, Metaphysics and in Morals, indeed in the whole realm of the sciences, a most beautiful order shines forth, which draws the eye and the mind in a wonderful way," (391.2-4) and then it was thought advisable "to treat briefly a few aspects of the excellent harmony of the arts and sciences, in order to raise up the souls of young people and to excite in them a love of wisdom..." (291.5-7).

The preceding quotation expresses much the same idea of the order and harmony that exists in the unity of knowledge as does Newman's statement in Discourse V expressed in these words: "We consider that all things mount up to a whole, that there is an order and precedence and harmony in the branches of knowledge one with another as well as one by one,... We form and fix the Sciences in a circle and system, and give them a centre and an aim, instead of letting them wander up and down in a sort of hopeless confusion" (144.16-25).
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The source of order in the universe as well as the harmony that exists between the arts and sciences that delineate specific aspects of that universe is, in the foregoing quotation, "the idea of the eternal law, which has been imprinted on us: it is that law by which it is right that all things are most orderly;...being a disposition which gives to each thing its proper place" (390.31-33). Newman writes in a sermon preached in 1853, "All the works of God are founded on unity, for they are founded on Himself, who is the most awfully simple and transcendent of possible unities. He is emphatically One; and whereas He is also multiform in His attributes and His acts, as they present themselves to our minds, it follows that order and harmony must be of His very essence." 1

391.2-23 ""Amongst so many...studied but in passage"" --Advancement of Learning." The quotation is from Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, BK. II, 8. Bacon, the founder of inductive reasoning and consequently one who tended thereby to place the source of unity, authority, and order in the mind of man, or at least in the knowledge that man's mind is able to attain, regrets that "'Philosophy and Universality [the study of general principles 2]'" (391.18) are


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considered "idle studies" (391.18-19) and that it is not taken into
consideration that "all professions are from thence served and
supplied" (391.19-20). Once again, a thinker who fundamentally differs
with Newman, has lent emphasis by his agreement on the necessity and
indeed usefulness to all knowledge of "Philosophy and Universality"
(391.18).

Section 4 of the Appendix contains references to a variety of
important sources: First there is the reference to two kinds of
nineteenth-century Encyclopaedias, the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana,
embodying Newman's view of knowledge and its purpose and Brewster's
Encyclopaedia, based on the opposing views of the Useful Knowledge
School. Then Newman turns his attention to the Middle Ages, with
quotations from Hugh of St. Victor who criticized the emphasis in
education on the practical and useful to the exclusion of that which
perfected the person, the very trend that Newman was opposing in the
nineteenth century. The excerpt from the Tract, De Reductio Artium
ad Theologiam by St. Bonaventure (1221-1274), quoted by the Irish
Bishops in their article on the proposed Catholic University in
Dublin, eloquently describes Newman's "circle of sciences" idea of the
unity of knowledge. Bonaventure "considers the circle of human
knowledge, and the objects of which it treats, to be what God
created them—a universe, a whole, which can only be
understood in Him who is its Beginning and End, the dread Alpha
and Omega of Being, I am that I am.\textsuperscript{1} Cardinal Bertazolli's
\textit{Collectio Legum} is a contemporary reference for the order, harmony theme
as the way to wisdom. Finally, Section 4 concludes with a quotation
from Sir Francis Bacon, a man who recognized the necessity for
philosophy and the study of general principles although his personal
interest was in the advancement of knowledge in the particular.

\textsuperscript{1} Dublin Review, Vol. XXXI, No. LXII (December, 1851),
pp. 533-534.
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SECTION 5

The title of Section 5, "And are complements of each other" indicates that this section of the Appendix will develop a corollary of Section 4, "The Branches of Knowledge form one whole" (387.10). That the sciences are complements of each other, Newman discusses in Discourse III where he states that the sciences "are revised and completed by each other" (74.14). He further explains that "...as regards the whole circle of sciences, one corrects another for purposes of fact, and one without the other cannot dogmatize, except hypothetically and upon its own abstract principles" (75.2-6). Furthermore, since each science is part of the whole, in order to understand one science, it is necessary to know where that science belongs in the circle of sciences.


Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540), born in Valencia, Spain, was a thorough scholar and a skilled teacher, with a strong grasp of the educational needs of his age. Vives, who spent a considerable part of his life in Belgium and England, is numbered among the northern humanists with his friends and admirers Sir Thomas More and Erasmus. A layman and
always a devout churchman, Vives went to the University of Paris in 1509, but having no love for dialectic, he left in a few years to become professor of the humanities at the University of Louvain, where he formed a personal friendship with Erasmus. His De Anima et Vita (1519), from which Newman quotes in Section 6 of the Appendix, is a criticism of the studies and methods of the University of Paris. It is in the De Anima... that Vives develops his psychological theory of the phenomena of cognition. In this work, "Vives...initiated a new line of approach to psychological analysis...abandoning the hope of reaching an adequate explanation of mental activity from any 'a priori' starting point, whether classical or theological, he pursues on enquiry by the method of observation and analysis of actual intellectual processes."¹ Thus years before Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Vives emphasized the value of experiment as a road to truth and favoured induction as a philosophical and psychological method.

In 1522 Vives went to Corpus Christi College, Oxford where he accepted the University Readership in Humanity at the invitation of Wolsey. In connection with his duties as tutor to the Princess Mary, Vives wrote his noted work on the education of women, De Institutione Feminæ Christianæ (1523). But the great monument to the experience and

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wisdom of Vives as an educator, is the De Tradendis Disciplinis (1531) in seven sections, the first of which is entitled separately, De Causis Corruptarum Artium—the part from which Newman quotes in the opening paragraphs of Section 5. In the De Causis... Vives is dealing with the general causes of the decay of knowledge. Vives: On Education is a translation into English of the De Tradendis Disciplinis, edited with introduction by Foster Watson (Cambridge, 1913).

One of the causes for the corruption of learning mentioned by Vives, and quoted by Newman, is the tendency to consider one's own field the source of all knowledge. Vives writes as follows: "'The grammarian considers himself alone wise and most men foolish; the philosopher pities the rest of men as brutes; the lawyer laughs at all others; the theologian despises them; not that they would admit or reveal that they are ignorant of the other arts; on the contrary, they are not at all slow to confirm that all the other arts are included and contained in their own one discipline in a higher way than in those books which expressly treat of them'" (392.2-8). The resulting error, Vives gives in the following example: "'How many absurd philosophical doctrines have their origin in Homer, since many of the old authors read him not as an ingenious poet, but as a most learned and serious philosopher?'" (398.20-23).

1 The details of Vives' career have been compiled from W. H. Woodward, Studies in Education During the Age of the Renaissance and Joan Simon, Education and Society in Tudor England (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1961).
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The quotation from Vives illustrates the failure on the part of those who cultivate a particular science to realize that all the sciences are complements of one another and together they make up the circle of studies called knowledge or learning. About one "whose life lies in the cultivation of one science, or the exercise of one method of thought" (109.18-19) Newman writes in Discourse IV: "Thus he becomes, what is commonly called, a man of one idea: which properly means a man of one science, and of the view, partly true, but subordinate, partly false, which is all that can proceed out of anything so partial" (110.6-10). See 109.11 - 111.13 for a section of Discourse IV describing the possible errors resulting from being "a man of one science" (110.8).

392.24-33 "The strength...into every corner?"--Bacon: Adv. of Learning, I. i." The quotation is from Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, BK I, IV, 6. Bacon's reference to the Aesop's fable clearly expresses the unity and harmony that Newman maintains as existing among the branches of knowledge: the sciences viewed as a whole reinforce one another as do the sticks of a faggot; then too, as the one great light or branching candlestick illumines the entire room so it is possible to understand more by means of a general illumination from all the sciences than can be understood by each one individually.

392.34 - 395.20 "There is a paper...la style des Geometres". Newman's reference is to a paper entitled "Relexions Generales sur l'Utilite des Belles-Lettres,...en favour des Mathematiques et de la
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Physique" (393.3-5) in volume XVI of the Histoire de l'Académie des Inscriptions. This publication, which reached at least twenty-two volumes, was begun by the Benedictines of the Congregation of St. Maur and was continued by the members of l'Institut Académie des Inscriptions et Belle-Lettres. Founded by Louis XIV in 1663, l'Institut Académie des Inscriptions became "une organisation légale" in 1701 with the name "l'Académie royale des inscriptions et belle-lettres." See Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire Raisonné Des Sciences Des Arts et Des Métiers, 1751-80, Vol. I. pp. 52-54 for an account.

393.6-7 "It was occasioned by...Gibbon's Essay...Literature." The reference is to Edward Gibbon. An Essay on the Study of Literature (London: T. Becket and P. A. De Honat, 1764). Gibbon writes about the purpose of his essay: "It would be a talk worthy a man of abilities, to trace that revolution in religion, government and manners, that hath successively bewildered, baffled, and corrupted mankind" 1 See below. 396.8-28.

393.9 - 395.20 "'De la Grammaire...le style des Géomètres'" This paper from Volume XVI of the Histoire de l'Académie des Inscriptions. The quotation is from "Réflexions Générales sur l'Utilité (sic) des Belles-Lettres, et sur les Inconvénients du goût exclusif, qui paraît

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In tracing the history of modern literature, the writer notes that the science of Criticism which "undertook at first to rid the texts of the ancients of inaccuracies which ignorance or the inattention of transcribers had introduced into them" (393.10–12) resulted in the fields of learning beginning to co-operate and the subjects of study being multiplied (393.14–15). The one field of History "furnished material for an infinite number of fields of research" (393.15–17). This excerpt explains by example Newman's meaning in the title of this section: the various fields of knowledge "are complements of each other" (391.24) in that Criticism of the ancient authors opened history as a field of study which in turn led to research in "Religion, Law, Customs, . . . the migration of Peoples, the founding of Cities, the birth of the Arts, the progress of Science" (393.17–20). It is evident from the foregoing examples that the various sciences are related one to the other in one vast field of knowledge. In summary, "each branch of learning requires the same basis of study; . . . the same extent of knowledge, perhaps the same talent; to exhaust one genre, it is necessary to embrace all" (394.20–23).

The next section of the paper which Newman quotes defines the Philosophical Spirit as "intelligent Reason on true principle of
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things,...the result of reflections which men have made, in proportion as they have increased the number of their ideas, thence acquired from new knowledge by means of study’’ (394.34 - 395.6). The excerpt warns against allowing one of the exact sciences such as mathematics to become exalted ’’as a universal instrument’’ (395.15-16); that is, to be considered philosophy instead of the partial view that it is. The writer gives an example of what Newman refers to as ”a narrow 'exparte' scientific view of things” (394.26-27); that is, the viewing of other knowledge through the eyes of one particular science, when he writes ’’the scholastics of the thirteenth century...have transferred into Theology the method and style of the Geometrician” (395.18-20).

393.33 ”the Abbé du Resnel” refers to Jean-François Resnel du Bellay (1692-1761). L'Abbé du Resnel fit voir dès sa jeunesse beaucoup d'esprit et de talent pour la poésie. Dès qu'il se fut montré à Paris, il trouva des amis et il méritait d'en avoir. On lui procura l'abbaye de Fontaine et une place à l'académie française et à celle des belles-lettres. On lui doit six ”Mémoires” dans le Recueil de l'académie des Inscriptions, dont un traité des poètes couronnés, et un autre des prix proposés aux gens de lettres parmi les Grecs et les Romains. This information was compiled from M. L'Abbé Migne, Nouvelle Encyclopédie Theologique (Tome 3, 1851), p.726.

395.21 = 396.7  "In another Essay (t..XIII), 'Des Rapports... the author, the Abbé Nauze observes: 'L'Esprit...Littérature'.” The
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quotation is from an essay in volume XIII of the Histoire de l'Académie des Inscriptions, by Abbé Nauze, presumably another member of the Benedictines of St. Maur. See above, 392.34 - 395.20.

This entire excerpt is important for the definition and value of the Philosophical Spirit. Newman wrote in Discourse VII that Philosophy is "Thought or Reason exercised upon Knowledge" (220.7-8). In Discourse VI, Newman said that Philosophy consisted in "a comprehensive view of truth in all its branches, of the relations of science to science, of their mutual bearings, and their respective values" (170.22-24). Abbé Nauze defines the Philosophical Spirit--what Newman refers to as the Philosophical Habit--as "a talent acquired by study and practice, in order to give sound judgment concerning all things of the world. It is an intelligence by which nothing is overlooked, a force of reasoning which nothing is able to shake, a taste, trustworthy and thoughtful about everything that there is of good and evil in nature. It is a unique rule of truth and of beauty" (395.23-28).

Abbé Nauze maintains that the Philosophical Spirit is the share of only a few scholars, but he writes that "it is sufficient for a nation that certain great geniuses possess it, and the superiority of their enlightenment renders them the arbitrators of taste, the oracles of criticism, and the interpreters of the glories of literature" (395.34 - 396.3).
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It is by means of the Philosophical Spirit that the mind is enabled to draw the relationships between all the sciences and therefore can come to a "comprehensive view of truth in all its branches" (170.22).

396.8-28 "'The more deeply...in a similar manner'.--Essay on Literature." The quotation is from Edward Gibbon's An Essay on the Study of Literature (London: T. Becket and P. A. De Honat, 1764), Chapters XXXIX and XL, pp. 72-77. Gibbon's metaphor of the sciences resembling a vast forest in which every tree "appears at first sight to be isolated and separate, but, on digging beneath the surface, their roots are found to be all interlaced with each other" helps to realize to the mind the idea of unity and interrelationship that is involved in Newman's statement that the various sciences "are complements of each other" (391.24).


Hyacinthe-Sigismond Gerdil (1718-1802), un des noms les plus saillants de l'Église d'Italie du XVIII siècle, prêtre exemplaire de tout point, apologiste et métaphysicien très distingué, mais aussi érudit...
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The sixth recommendation of Cardinal Gerdil concerning the organization of an Academy is particularly applicable to Newman's subject of the various sciences composing a unity of knowledge. Gerdil describes the various necessary contributions of the skills and talents of the poet, the musician, the architect, the painter, the machinist, the dancer to a successful stage presentation (398.15-18). Similarly, he writes "'a learned society is able to frame, for the advancement of human knowledge, some projects, of which the accomplishment requires different kinds of researches, and consequently the co-operation of the different members who compose it. In this cause, each associate occupies himself with his part; but the different projects, reunited by their relation to the same purpose, form all and together, what can be regarded as the accomplishment of the society'" (398.21-27).

398.28 - 399.13 "I add a passage...: 'Religious knowledge... this main ingredient is wanting'." Copleston in Quarterly Review (December, 1825) Newman quotes from Edward Copleston's article in the Quarterly Review XXXIII (December, 1825), pp. 398-399. See above, 373.23 - 374.9.
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In order to bring the references for his topic, the sciences as complements of one another, to a conclusion Newman again refers to Copleston's article on the establishment of London University in the Quarterly Review. In this excerpt Copleston is pointing out the necessity for religious knowledge in the university curriculum in order that "the mind be carefully instructed in every...branch of liberal knowledge" (399.4-5). As Newman has maintained in Discourses II to V religious knowledge is, in Copleston's words, "intimately connected with the whole course of ancient history, with philosophy and...criticism, with the study of the learned languages, with moral and metaphysical philosophy. It runs parallel with the progress of the human mind in every liberal pursuit" (398.31-34). Copleston concludes with a sentence that lends strong emphasis to Newman's insistence on the importance of theology among the sciences taught in the university when he writes, "We cannot, therefore, too earnestly insist upon the incompleteness of any system of education in which this main ingredient is wanting" (399.10-12).

In Section 5 of the Appendix Newman has been occupied in giving references for one of the main aspects of his argument in the Discourses; namely, that if truth is to be viewed in its true perspective, it is necessary that the mind have acquired the Philosophical Spirit, the result of "a comprehensive view of truth in all its branches" (170.22) instead of the "narrow 'exparte'" (394.26-27) view from one particular science or...
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from a group of sciences that does not include Theology. The references are concluded with the quotation from Copleston that really expresses the main reason for the pursuing the argument that the various sciences are complements of one another; that is, Newman is defending the inclusion of Theology among the sciences in the university curriculum, his particular subject in Discourses II to V.
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As the title of Section 6—"Knowledge under this aspect is Philosophy or Liberal Knowledge"—indicates, knowledge that consists of "a comprehensive view of truth in all its branches, of the relations of science to science, of their mutual bearings, and their respective values" (170.22-24) is what Newman terms Philosophy or Liberal Knowledge. The references in this section are particularly applicable to the material of Discourses VI to VIII.

399.16 - 400.9 "'Adduxit...prodessent', etc. Vives, de Caus. Corr. Art., i. 2." From Ioannes Ludovicus Vives, "De Causis Corruptarum Artium," Opera Omnia Tomus VI, I, 2, p.14. See above, 391.25 - 392.23. Vives writes that men were led to the cultivation of the arts for the greatness of the objective, that of excellence of mind, our greatest dignity; and because there is nothing more noble or becoming to man than the desire for discovering truth (399.16-19). Such a discovery is counted as a victory which is preferred to works, dignities, and all other conveniences of life (399.24-27). About the cultivation of the arts for intellectual excellence Newman writes in Discourse VII, "It educates the mind, to reason well in all matters, to reach out to truth, and to grasp it" (203.15-16).

400.10 - 401.19 "'Calenus...prorsus,' etc.--Vives: de Caus.
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Corr. Art., i. 2." From Joannes Ludovicus Vives, "De Causis Corruptarum Artium," Omnia Opera, Tomus VI, I, 2, pp. 11-13. This quotation from Vives' De Causis... is a reference for the distinction between arts that a purpose issuing beyond themselves and "which are done by hand and are directed to providing for the needs of life, having no part in what is becoming and honourable" (400.27-28) and those arts, called liberal, which were named "free, as if the free-born alone used them". (401.1-2). Vives continues,"'Scarcely any free man in a free city did his work by the manual arts; rather a slave was kept for these things; the youth gave themselves only to those things which were considered worthy of a free man, as for example military service, the theatre, study, public business, the government of the state, legal affairs and exercises of this kind. ...For these arts were considered to be most becoming to free men in cultivating life and in ruling the state,...'" (401.2-10).

The foregoing excerpt from Vives makes clear the origin of the term liberal arts, as opposed to the manual or servile arts, as being those pursuits that are most appropriate to a free man for his intellectual and personal cultivation in order that he be a worthy citizen with the judgment, culture, and speech of an able lawmaker and ruler in his city.

Newman, in Discourse VI, has defined the distinction between the "liberal" as opposed to "servile" as follows: "...liberal knowledge and liberal pursuits are such as belong to the mind, not to the body"
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(175.16-18). He then makes the distinction clearer in the following sentence: "...that alone is liberal knowledge, which stands on its own pretensions, which is independent of sequel, expects no complement, refuses to be 'informed'...by any end, or absorbed into any art,... The most ordinary pursuits have this specific character, if they are self-sufficient and complete; the highest lose it, when they minister to something beyond them" (176.27 - 177.6).

401.20-33 "'Siquidur...patefaciam.' Vives de Anima, ii.10."
From Joannes Ludovicus Vives, De Anima et vita (1538), Omnia Opera, Tomus III, II, 10, pp. 380-381. See above, 391.25 - 392.23. In this excerpt from Vives' De Anima et vita, a work in which Vives delves into the psychological process of learning, Newman emphasizes the natural tendency of the mind towards truth and the great pleasure that the mind takes in the contemplation of truth. Vives writes that "...since every pleasure rises from a certain proportion and harmony between an object and a faculty and since nothing is more in harmony with the mind than truth, it happens that in contemplation the greatest pleasures are found" (401.24-27). Newman in Discourse VIII, states, "Truth of whatever kind is the proper object of the intellect; its cultivation then lies in fitting it to apprehend and contemplate truth" (241.7-10). Again, he writes, "...the eye of the mind, of which the object is truth, is the work of discipline and habit" (242.26-27).

401.34 - 403.11 "'Neque enim...plurima attinent'. Morhof."
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Polypisthion, 1. 1." From D. J. Morhofius, Polypisthion, Liber I, Caput I, 2-12, pp. 2-4. See above 381.30-34. This quotation from the first book and chapter of Morhof's Polypisthion is an important reference for several passages within the Discourses. Morhof begins, in the excerpt, by saying that only those who are poor judges of the capabilities of the human mind would think the mind "so narrowly formed that it would subsist within any one art" (401.34 - 402.4). Newman in Discourse VIII writes, "This process of training, by which the intellect, instead of being formed or sacrificed to some particular or accidental purpose, some specific trade or profession or study or science, is disciplined for its own sake, for the perception of its own proper object, and for its highest culture, is called Liberal Education" (242.28 - 243.5).

Newman more than once in the Discourses has used the phrase "the circle of knowledge" (See 97.25 and 106.4) in reference to the unity that exists among the sciences. Morhof writes, "there is therefore a certain affinity and union of the sciences, which the Greeks call encyclopædia (the circle of knowledge), so that one cannot be called perfect in one, without touching the others" (402.6-8). In Discourse III Newman stated that "no science is complete in itself, when viewed as an instrument of attaining the knowledge of facts; that every science, for this purpose, subserves the rest; and, in consequence, that the systematic omission of any one science from the catalogue, prejudices the accuracy and completeness of our knowledge altogether, and that, in
proportion to its importance" (78.25-79.2).

Concerning the natural tendency of the human mind to systematise and therefore unify knowledge, Newman has written in Discourse V: "...the human mind is ever seeking to systematise its knowledge, to base it upon principle, and to find a science comprehensive of all sciences" (140.15-16). Newman refers to such a science as "a science of sciences" (144.14-15) or "that architectonic science" (126.24). Again Newman writes, "we consider that all things mount up to a whole, that there is order and precedence and harmony in the branches of knowledge one with another as well as one by one,..." (144.16-19). The following sentences of Morhof's serve as a reference for the foregoing ideas of Newman's: "'There is a summit in our minds, if one may speak in this way, by which they are able, either by nature or by practice, to embrace many things at once, to abstract from individual things and go from that humble state to the sublime. Thus there emerges in it what we may call the architectonic (master planner), or from the teachings of the Stoics the hegemonicon (directive faculty), which penetrates all things as if by a royal spirit and like a thunderbolt, and illumines it all with a certain light!'" (402.24-30). Morhof further explains what he means by the "'summit in our minds'" that "'architectonic (master planner)'' faculty which enables the mind to abstract from many sciences the main principles and their relations: "'we shall seize this whole foundation with our mind, our heart, our desire, but we shall
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circumscribe with certain limits its most agreeable part which we shall pursue and in which we shall exercise our industry" (403.5-8). The mind grasps the overview of all the sciences, while at the same time pursuing one aspect of knowledge most agreeable to it. Newman has called this "grasp of many things brought together in one" (144.6-7) variously, "a science of sciences," "that architectonic science," "the philosophical habit," or simply "that special Philosophy". By whatever name, that faculty of being able to view the sciences as one is the aim of a liberal education and in turn the "true notion of the scope of a University" (144.15-16).

403.13 - 404.10 "'It is an assured truth...qui potuit', etc. Bacon, Adv. of Learning, vol. i. p. 60, ed. 1824." The quotation is from Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, BK. I, VIII. 1., pp. 67-68.

The Latin quotation in 403.13-14 which Newman has not quoted in its entirety from Bacon is as follows:

Scilicet ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes
Emolliit mores, nec sitit esse feros.

Ovid, Ep. Pont. ii. 9.47. 1

It is certain that the noble faithfully
consecrated to learning
Refine customs (character), and do not allow barbarity.

1 Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, ed. W. A. Wright, note, p.284.
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This excerpt from Bacon expresses the effects on mind and character of a liberal education. In Bacon's words the faithful consecration to learning "'taketh away the wildness and barbarism and fierceness of men's minds'" (403.14-15). Bacon then states that the accent should be on "'fideliter'" (faithfully, certainly, honestly) as a preventive for "'superficial learning'" (403.16) that has but the opposite effects to the benefits of a Liberal Education. Bacon, in emphasizing "fideliter", stresses an important point here that Newman seems to take for granted in the minds of his readers, but that is in many instances conspicuously absent from present-day educational principles and would therefore pass by the modern reader unnoticed; that is, in order for the effects of a liberal education, as extolled in this excerpt by Bacon and frequently by Newman in the Discourses, to become characteristics of the minds and personalities of the students all must be learned with careful precision, with an honest and faithful dedication to the thorough learning and complete mastery of the material under study. Newman writes in the Preface, "'...I hold very strongly that the first step in intellectual training is to impress upon a boy's mind the idea of science, method, order, principle, and system; of rule and exception, of richness and harmony. ...nor can too great accuracy, or minuteness and subtlety of teaching be used towards him, as his faculties expand,...'" (XXii - XXiv). 'In a lecture entitled, "Discipline of Mind," written after the Discourses, Newman writes, "...what a discipline in accuracy of thought it is to have to construe a foreign
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language into your own; ... And so of any other science,...; it does not matter what it is, if it be really studied and mastered, as far as it is taken up. The result is a formation of mind,—that is, a habit of order and system, a habit of referring every accession of knowledge to what we already know, and of adjusting the one to the other; ... the actual acceptance and use of certain principles as centres of thought, around which our knowledge grows and is located." ¹ The idea that regardless of subject—chemistry or natural history, or a language—so long as it "be really studied and mastered" results in "a formation of mind," is one that is fundamental to Newman's liberal education ideal, but one not emphasized within the Discourses.

Another important reference in this excerpt from Bacon concerns the effect of a liberal education described as follows: "'It taketh away vain admiration of any thing,... For novelty, no man that wadeth in learning or contemplation thoroughly, but will find that printed in his heart, 'Nil novi super terram'" (403.21–26). Newman has described the "'vain admiration'" that results from a mind stocked with knowledge, but without "Enlargement" (213.12 – 214.4) in Discourse VII where he describes the effect on the mind of new knowledge—"may almost whirl it around and make it dizzy" (210.3). See 209.12 – 212.16 for examples

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of the mind subjected to "'vain admiration'." On the other hand the
mind that possesses "Enlargement," (definition, 213.12 - 214.4) Newman
describes as follows: "Possessed of this real illumination, the mind
never views any part of the extended subject-matter of Knowledge,
without recollecting that it is but a part, or without the associations
which spring from this recollection." (217.10-14). To the mind that
views all knowledge as part of a whole, "Nothing is new under the sun.
Even the thing of which we say, 'See, this is new!' has already existed
in the ages that preceded us" (Ecclesiastes, 1.9-10).

Finally, the third important point from this Bacon excerpt is
that "'the knowledge of causes!'" (404.7-8) "'taketh away or mitigateth
fear of death, or adverse fortune; which is one of the greatest
impediments of virtue, and imperfection of manners'" (404.4-6). This
universal view which brings a calmness of spirit that can triumph over
adversity is expressed in the Virgil quotation which Newman quotes here
only in its opening lines. The complete quotation is as follows:

Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
Quique metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum
Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari

Virgil, Georgics, 11.49.

Newman has quoted this passage from Virgil in Discourse VI, 183.25-27.

404.12 - 406.3 "In quoting Gibbon,... With some [the

1 Quoted in Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, VIII.1,
p.68.
philosophical talent)... a creative genius'. Essay on the Study of Literature." The quotation is from Edward Gibbon, An Essay on the Study of Literature, XLV - XLVIII, pp. 88-99. See above 393.6-8 and 396.8-28 for previous references in the Appendix to Gibbon's Essay on the Study of Literature. Gibbon defines the "'philosophical talent'" as follows: "'The philosophical talent consists in the power of going back to simple ideas, of seizing and combining first principles'" (404.17-19). One who possesses the "'philosophical talent'" is described by Gibbon as one who views from a height: "'Placed upon an eminence, he takes in a wide range of vision, of which he forms to himself one simple and connected idea, while other minds, as correct in apprehension, but more limited in extent, see only some portion or other of it'" (404.20-24). Newman writes in Discourse VII as follows: "'...if we would improve the intellect, first of all, we must ascend: we cannot gain real knowledge on a level; we must generalize, we must reduce to method, we must have a grasp of principles, and group and shape our acquisitions by them. It matters not whether our field of operation be wide or limited; in every case to command it, is to mount above it'" (220.14-21). This "'philosophical talent'" which enables the mind to take a correct, but extensive view is termed by Newman the "philosophical habit": the science that is the perfection of this habit is termed by Gibbon "'that chief science'" (404.28) and by Newman "the science of sciences" or that "architectonic science," a term that suggests the over-all view of vision from a height.
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Gibbon sees in the study of Classical Literature (405.3-28), and he would add also the study of history, (405.28 - 406.2) the best means of effecting the "philosophical talent" in "that small number of geniuses" (404.27) who are able "to develop and exercise it" (405.5-6). Newman agrees with Gibbon in that he too considers the Classics the traditional means of effecting the characteristics of a Liberal Education: "...the Classics, and the subjects of thought and the studies to which they give rise, or, to use the term most to our present purpose, the Arts, have ever, on the whole, been the instruments of education which the civilized 'orbis terrarum' has adopted; ...And this consideration..., invests the opening of the School in Arts with a solemnity and moment of a peculiar kind, for we are but reiterating an old tradition, and carrying on those august methods of enlarging the mind, and cultivating the intellect, and refining the feelings, in which the process of civilization has ever consisted." 1

In the foregoing quotation from "Christianity and Letters," a lecture delivered in 1854 on the occasion of the opening of the Arts Faculty in the new Catholic University, Newman gave the traditional view of the value of the Classics in a Liberal Education. However, in the Discourses, he does not relegate the cultivation of the "philosophical habit" to the study of any particular subject, but rather to the

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cultivation of what Gibbon terms "a wide range of vision" (404.21) or what Newman calls "a philosophical or comprehensive view" (231.15-16) which sees each science in its place as part of the whole—a view that results from the mind's accessibility to all the sciences.

406.9-34 "There are many men of one idea...ignore them," etc." Quoted from Newman's Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England, Lecture VII, pp. 296-297. In Discourse IV Newman depicts the man of one idea, a man of one science whose view only partly true, leads to such principles as utility, combination, progress, philanthropy being exalted into leading ideas and keys (110.7-14). But the philosopher will, rather than ignore the views he considers false or dangerous, try to understand them (406.29-34).

407.1-20 "Sharon Turner" (1768-1847) was an English historian who, at an early age, began the study of Icelandic and Anglo-Saxon. He was the first to explore for historical purposes the Anglo-Saxon manuscripts in the Cottonian Library. The work to which Newman refers (407.5-20) is Turner's The History of England during the Middle Ages, comprising the reigns from William the Conqueror to the accession of Henry the Eighth, and also, the history of the literature, poetry, religion, and language of England during that period, 2nd ed., V vols. (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, Green, 1830). Newman's reference is to Vol. IV, Book VI, Chap. II, "The Literary History of England," pp. 174-175.

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Turner, whom Newman customarily considered an adversary, nevertheless describes the enlargement of mind as a result of a comprehensive view: "'Every hour his understanding,...is insensibly directed, enriched, and exercised, by the knowledge and talent that is everywhere breathing, acting, and conferring around him'" (407.12-15). Furthermore, there is benefit to society accruing from the resulting mental enlargement in the individual: "'he at last becomes a model imperceptibly benefiting others, as he has been benefited himself'" (407.18-19). Newman wrote in Discourse VIII, "'...that training of the intellect, which is best for the individual himself, best enables him to discharge his duties to society'" (285.6-8).

407.21 - 410.4 "From an exceedingly able article...[comprehensiveness of view]...and thing,' etc., etc." The quotation is from an article by Frederic Rogers, "Utilitarian Moral Philosophy," British Critic, XXIX. (January, 1841), 1-44, pp. 16 ff. This article was the second of two articles; the first, also entitled "Utilitarian Moral Philosophy," was published in the British Critic, XXVIII, July, 1840, pp. 93-125. Frederic Rogers (1811-1889), Lord Blachford, was elected Fellow of Oriel in 1833. Tutored by Newman, Rogers became one of Newman's closest friends, but separated from Newman's circle as Newman drew closer to Catholicism. Rogers, a lawyer, won fame as a colonial administrator and was created Baron Blachford in 1871. Rogers, who had renewed his friendship with Newman before Kingsley's attack, was one of
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Rogers defines "'comprehensiveness of view'" as "'the power of embracing without confounding a variety of facts, past, present, and to come, of holding in the mind a number of ideas, each perfect in itself, yet each with relation to the rest, of uniting an indefinite number of objects in one view as a whole'" (407.24-28). This definition is an expansion of what Newman describes in Discourse V as "'a philosophical comprehensiveness; an orderly expansiveness, an elastic constructiveness..." (142.25-27). The illustration from music (407.34 - 408.10) clearly depicts the psychology of the "'comprehensiveness of view'"; first the distinguishing of sounds, the remembering of them, then the relating to new sounds to form a simple tune; next sounds and melodies form a harmony "'and so on, till the accomplished musician is enabled to embrace in one grasp, as it were, a whole musical movement,...'" (408.6-7). Rogers' illustration from music of the mental steps that lead to a comprehensive view illustrates the idea of the grasp of many things brought together into one which Newman states in the Discourses, but leaves for the references in the Appendix to illustrate. The effect on

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the mind is that of gaining "a kind of double power of dividing and concentrating our mind, so that even while we direct our main attention to any one part, we yet do so with a kind of active and real, though perhaps unconscious, recollection of a variety of other objects, to which it has or may have reference" (408.17-21). The result is that, "after having run through a line of history, a philosophical system, or even a train of argument, we try so to fix our attention on the whole, as, without dropping the particulars, to grasp and unit them all in one view, in one course or group" (408.26-29). This uniting of particulars into one whole, which Rogers applies to a particular subject such as music or history, is analogous to the process Newman sees as applied to all knowledge in the course of a liberal education. Rogers expresses the ideal as follows: "There is no contradiction in supposing our present faculties so strengthened as to enable man to grasp without conscious effort the whole system of the universe, and to carry it about with him, colouring aright all the particulars on which he fixes his attention,..." (409.11-15). In so doing creatures are partaking in some degree of the "vast attributes of divinity" (409.22).

410.7-14. "'The object of a Liberal Education... give a reason'."

From William Whewell, On the Principles of English University Education (London: John W. Parker, 1838), p.139. Newman has quoted two excerpts from this work: (410.7-14) and (410.15-18). William Whewell (1794-1866) one of the most famous Cambridge educators of Newman's day, was master of
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Trinity College, Cambridge, professor of mineralogy from 1828 to 1832, and professor of moral theology from 1838 to 1855. Whewell, whom Newman refers to as "the learned and well-principled writer" (410.6), was in large measure responsible for the recognition of the moral and natural sciences as an integral part of the Cambridge curriculum.

William Whewell also wrote, Of a Liberal Education in General: Part I "Principles and Recent History" and Part II "Discussions and Changes" (1840–1850). Both the On the Principles of English University Education, from which Newman quotes, and Of a Liberal Education in General are important background works for the Discourses in that Whewell's idea of education and Newman's are similar in many respects. For example, Whewell writes in Of a Liberal Education in General the following definition of education: "Education..., to answer its higher purposes, consists, not in accumulating knowledge, but in educating the faculties of man. It does not consist in 'information,' in the modern sense of the term, but in the formation of the mind." 1 Since Newman is discussing a university only in its idea and its principles, he carefully avoids any practical suggestions. Whewell, a mathematics professor at Cambridge, frequently deals with the practical aspects of education in his day. For instance, he condemns the trend towards frequent examination.

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that test only the memory of the student and the extent of his information and therefore do not form what he terms permanent habits. 1 "For the preparation for an examination or a prize, has, in its immediate influences, little that improves the mind. On such occasions, knowledge is acquired by forced efforts, for a temporary purpose, is imperfectly assimilated, and is soon lost again. In such a course, there is no connected system of study no intellectual progress no pursuit of knowledge and truth for its own sake." 2

Then too, he has criticized the resort to private tutors as a means of preparation for examinations. In contrast Whewell writes as follows: "...the Tutors by whom College Lectures are delivered are, understood to be not only Tutors, but Guardians of their pupils. They are recognized,..., as standing in the place of a parent, and having it for their business to watch over the social and moral habits, as well as the intellectual progress of the student. And their opportunities, both of judging of the conduct of their pupils, and of influencing them for good, are much assisted by the daily intercourse which takes place when the Tutor directs the studies of the pupil." 3

Whewell has, therefore, a similar view of the importance of what Newman

1 Whewell, Of a Liberal Education, p. 155.

2 Ibid., p. 167.

3 Ibid., p. 140.
terms personal influence in the whole educational process as well as the pastoral care role of the tutor that was one of Newman's main practical means of effecting the ideas and principles he discusses in the Discourses.

Whewell sees the Classics and mathematics as "the only machinery by which Universities, as the general cultivators of the mind, can execute their office." ¹ Like Copleston, who considered the Classics as the means to a Liberal Education, Whewell sees mental cultivation the result of the thorough study of particular subjects; namely, mathematics, which develops the reasoning and the Classics that connect the present with the past. Newman's view, however, is that mental culture results from the accessibility of the mind to all branches of knowledge, both human and divine. Thus, although Whewell and Newman have in common similar ideas on the purpose of and means to a liberal education, Whewell writes from a more particular and contemporary viewpoint than does Newman.

In the excerpt from On the Principles of a University Education quoted by Newman in the Appendix, Whewell states that "the object of a Liberal Education is to develop the whole mental system of man, and thus to bring it into consistency with itself, to make his speculative inferences coincide with his practical convictions, to enable him to

¹ Whewell, Of a Liberal Education, p. 40.
render a reason for the belief that is in him..." (410.7-11). General passages in the Discourses refer to the effect on the mind of a Liberal Education that Whewell mentions here: that is, the development, integration, and control of one's own thinking processes: for example, "...we make use, as nature prompts us, of the faculty, which I have called an intellectual grasp of things, or an inward sense, which ...is really meant by the word 'philosophy'. Science itself is a specimen of its exercise; for its very essence is this mental formation. A science is not mere knowledge, it is knowledge which has undergone a process of intellectual digestion. It is the grasp of many things brought together in one, and hence is its power; for, properly speaking, it is Science that is power, not Knowledge" (143.27-144.9). See also, 183.9-20. In Newman's view, mere knowledge, until it has been mentally digested, has not become Science—knowledge in a system—has not formed the mind: that is, developed in the mind the philosophical habit that gives the mind power over its own thinking processes and power to be motivated on the basis of its convictions. Whewell's idea of the contrast between theory and practice, of the discrepancy between ideas held speculatively and the convictions that motivate the practical intellect are analogous in some degree to the idea Newman expresses in these words: "...it is Science that is power, not Knowledge" (144.8-9).

Whewell, in his own context, explains what he means by the statement, "...to make his speculative inferences coincide with his
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practical convictions;" (410.9-10). Whewell states "such a discipline of the reasoning power as will enable persons to proceed with certainty and facility from fundamental principles to their consequences" ¹ is an indispensable portion of "the cultivation of the mind." ² He states that the study of Mathematics and the study of Logic have been the means used by Universities to discipline the reasoning power. Whewell himself throughout emphasizes the value of mathematics as an "exercise of exact reasoning." ³ He writes, "It will probably be allowed by all, that the 'power,' at least, of tracing securely and readily the necessary consequences of assumed principles is a desirable acquisition. ...There prevails very widely an obscurity or perplexity of thought, which prevents men from seeing clearly the necessary connexion of their principles with their conclusions." ⁴ In this last sentence is expressed what Newman frequently refers to as a "dimness of intellectual vision," which it is the province of a liberal education to remove by developing the philosophical habit and giving the mind what Newman refers to as "a clear conscious view of his own opinions and judgments, a truth in developing them, an eloquence in expressing them, and a force

¹ William Whewell, On the Principles of University Education, p. 139.
² Ibid., p. 139.
³ Ibid., p. 138.
⁴ Ibid., p. 138.
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in urging them" (286.11-14).

In the Oxford University Sermon, "Implicit and Explicit Reason" (1840), Newman has stated more particularly than he did in the Discourses the idea expressed in Whewell's phrase describing the object of a Liberal Education: "to make his speculative inferences coincide with his practical convictions, to enable him to render a reason for the belief that is in him,..." (410.9-11). In Newman's words the idea is stated succinctly as follows: "All men have a reason, but not all men can give a reason." ¹ Whewell's idea that a Liberal Education should enable one "to render a reason for the belief that is in him" (410.11) corresponds to Newman's explanation of Explicit Reason; that is, "the reflective power of the human mind contemplating and scrutinizing its own acts,"² so that unlike "Solomon's sluggard" (410.12) (Proverbs. 26: 16), the man of Liberal Education has "a clear conscious view of his own opinions and judgments,..." (286.11-12).

410.15-18 "All exact knowledge...these ideas?" The quotation is the second excerpt from William Whewell, On the Principles of University Education, p.173. Although Whewell conceded the value of other subjects in the curriculum, his perspective was the importance of


² Ibid., p. 258.
mathematics and the "'exact knowledge'" (410.15) and "'certain fundamental ideas'" (410.17) characteristic of that discipline which he thought of as, to use Newman's expression, the furniture of the mind to be fixed and developed by a Liberal Education. What Whewell terms exact knowledge and fundamental ideas, Newman designates in A Grammar of Assent (1870) as speculative or notional assents, to which, he states, mathematical investigations and truths belong. Whewell maintains that "'it is one main office of a Liberal Education to fix and develop these ideas'" (410.17-18), which then become what Newman terms "Real Assents" They are sometimes called beliefs, convictions, certitudes;... Till we have them...we have no intellectual moorings, and are at the mercy of impulses, fancies, and wandering lights, whether as regards personal conduct, social and political action, or religion. These beliefs,...form the mind out of which they grow, and impart to it a seriousness and manliness which inspires in other minds a confidence in its views, and is one secret of persuasiveness and influence in the public stage of the world." 3

Section 6 of the Appendix comprises excerpts dealing with the main topic of the Discourses, a Liberal Education. Three excerpts from

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2 Ibid., pp. 75-76.

3 Ibid., pp. 87-88.
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Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540) express the origin and value of a Liberal Education. Vives' definition of the word "liberal" as designating that personal cultivation appropriate to a free man and a citizen is particularly enlightening about Newman's use of the word "Liberal" in the Discourses. The quotation from D. J. Morhof (1639-1691) is a reference for a frequently used phrase of Newman's "the circle of knowledge," as the requisite of Liberal Knowledge: as well as for the "architectonic science," that "summit in our minds" or that "architectonica (master planner)" faculty as the effect of a Liberal Education. Francis Bacon (1561-1626), quoting from Ovid, emphasizes the method of or means to the cultivation of the mind; that is, a faithful consecration to learning. In the excerpt from Edward Gibbon (1737-1794) the phrase "the philosophical talent," which seems to have much the same meaning as Newman's "philosophical habit," is an elaboration on the meaning of a phrase that depicts the effect on the mind of a Liberal Education. Another expression for the effect on the mind of such an education—"comprehensiveness of view"—is presented in the excerpt from an article by Frederic Rogers (1811-1889) published in the British Critic. An idea made clear by the Rogers quotation is that "comprehensiveness of view" is not a general view in any superficial sense, but rather the uniting of many into a whole so that the over-all is grasped without losing the particulars. Lastly, the two excerpts from William Whewell (1794-1866) emphasize that "the object of a Liberal Education is to develop the whole mental system of
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man. "" Newman has come down the centuries from Vives to Whewell in his selection of authorities for his ideas on the origin, value, method, requisites for, and effects of a Liberal Education.
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The title of Section 7—"Liberal Knowledge acts partly on the side of Christianity, and partly against it"—indicates that the references in this section are particularly applicable to Discourse IX where Newman discussed the relation between intellectual culture and Religion. He stated in Discourse IX that "the educated mind may be said to be in a certain sense religious: that is, it has what may be considered a religion of its own, independent of Catholicism. partly co-operating with it, partly thwarting it, at once a defence yet a disturbance to the Church...at one time in open warfare with her, at another in defensive alliance" (291.11-18).

In addition to three quotations from Newman's own writings, there are quotations from Newman's contemporaries Henry Hallam, Thomas Carlyle, and Isaac Disraeli. Appropriately, the references are predominately eighteenth and nineteenth century in that Newman was actually discussing in Discourse IX the "spurious religion" (304.27-28) that results from an exclusive preoccupation with and over-valuation of intellectual culture—a religion that Newman terms "the Religion of the Intellect or of Philosophy," (291.28-29) particularly, although not exclusively, characteristic of Newman's own and the previous century.

410.24 - 412.20 "'Some writers,...afford to purchase'." This
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First excerpt in Section 7 is from Newman's earliest extant writing, the article entitled, "Marcus Tullius Cicero," which he wrote for the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana in 1824 and which is now included in Historical Sketches (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1901), Vol. I, pp. 245-300. The theme of Section 7 of the Appendix, as of Discourse IX, is that Liberal Knowledge is at times the friend, at other times the foe of Religion. Liberal Knowledge becomes the foe, if that knowledge is confounded with virtue; that is, if the moral virtues peculiar to the individual soul—the particular province of religion—are confounded with the social virtues, such as honesty and propriety, which are the virtues peculiar to social relationships and specifically among the characteristics of the cultivated intellect, there is a tendency to consider Philosophy alone the means to the good order of society.

The excerpt quoted here from Newman's "Marcus Tullius Cicero" pp. 258-261 illustrates that the ancients clearly understood that knowledge is not virtue, nor did they expect that philosophical studies would issue in a practical effect on the conduct of those who pursued them. About the motives with which the ancients pursued philosophical studies, Newman writes as follows: "The motives and principles of morals were not so seriously acknowledged as to tend to a practical application of them to the conduct of life. Even when they proposed them in the form of precept, they still regarded the perfectly virtuous man as the creature of their imagination, rather than a model for
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imitation..." (411.6-10). In other words, in Newman's terminology of twenty years later in his Grammar of Assent, the notional assent of the ancients to the principle of the virtuous man did not usually or necessarily become the real assent that issued in a practical application of the principle to the conduct of their lives. As Newman states in answer to the charge against Cicero of inconsistency between principle and conduct, "there is a wide difference between calmly deciding on an abstract point, and acting on that decision in the hurry of real life" (410.26-28).

Newman also notes in general that the Athenians cultivated philosophy for "'intellectual amusement, not the discovery of Truth;" (411.16-17) -- Truth understood as what will so convince as to motivate to action. On the other hand the Romans, who were eminently practical, adopted "'this or that system, not so much by the harmony of its parts, or by the plausibility of its reasonings, as by its suitableness to the profession and political station to which they respectively belonged'" (412.7-10). These illustrations indicating that the ancients made no necessary application of philosophy to rules of conduct serve as a reference for Newman's idea that knowledge is not virtue. The fact that the ancient pagans were able to differentiate clearly between knowledge and practice lends additional weight to Newman's argument.

412.21-25 "The learned Dissertation on medieval society which Mr. Hallam concludes his 'Middle Ages,...his own personal
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sentiments about them." The "learned Dissertation" to which Newman refers is "On the State of Society in Europe During the Middle Ages," Chapter IX in Henry Hallam's The View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages (1818; supplementary note, 1848), which deals with the general state of society, the growth of commerce, manners, and literature in the middle ages. Newman states that the excerpts from Hallam supply "another illustration of literary or philosophical ethics as distinct from Christian" (412.22-23). Unlike the ancients Hallam confounds knowledge and virtue, in that he does consider that knowledge, not religion, will renovate society.

Henry Hallam (1777-1859), educated at Eton and Christ's Church, Oxford, was a barrister with literary, historical, and philosophical tastes. His reputation rests on three works: the Middle Ages, from which Newman is quoting here; Constitutional History of England (1827); and Introduction to the Literature of Europe in the 15th, 16th and 17th Centuries (1838-39), from which Newman quoted in Discourse X, See above 345. 16 - 23.

In Henry Hallam, Newman has chosen a nineteenth century historian who is an excellent example of what Newman has designated in Discourse IX as an exponent of the Religion of Philosophy; that is, one who derives his ethical principles from literary or philosophical sources rather than from Christian principles. In Hallam's view, according to Newman, Catholicism, far from being a source of "true
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morality is but "superstition" and society should rather receive its "correction from the true morality of literature, philosophy, romance, heresy, and gentlemanlike feeling" (412.28-30) than from religion.

412.30 - 418.10 These lines comprise quotations from Henry Hallam's View of the State of Europe During the Middle Ages (Vol. I, New York: Sheldon, 1863):

412.30 - 413.2 Hallam, Middle Ages p. 285.

413.4 Hallam, Middle Ages p. 286.

413.9-12 Hallam, Middle Ages p. 291.

It is Hallam's view in the foregoing three brief excerpts that religion was not conducive to the good order of society nor the improvement of morals in the middle ages.

413.23-24 "...the Manichees, Catharists, 'Ibigenses, and other heretical sects,...' The sect of the Manichees, founded by Mani the Persian in the third century, was widely influential for over a century in the Roman Empire. Once considered a Christian heresy, but largely due to the discovery of Manichaean manuscripts between 1899 and 1931, Manichaeism is now regarded as a complex dualistic religion based on the cosmogony that the world began in a mixing of two opposing elements, light and darkness, the one essentially good and the other essentially evil. The struggle to liberate the light from the darkness,
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will continue until the final conflagration which will consume the world. Light will be liberated from the clutches of darkness and the souls of the righteous Manichaean will be glorified in the kingdom of light. Mani borrowed his basic ideas from Christian and gnostic conceptions then prevalent in Syria and Mesopotamia.

The Catharists [Cathari] and the Albigenses, may be termed New Manicheans in that they were mediaeval dualistic sects, which, both in their dualistic teaching and in their organization and ascetic principles, represent a recrecidence of Manicheism with which they are historically related. The Cathari first appeared in France in the Eleventh Century, in Germany in the Twelfth Century, and remained in existence in Italy until the end of the Fourteenth Century.

The sect in Southern France is usually known as the Albigenses. According to their teachings, there are two eternal principles of good and evil, spirits having been created by the good, matter by the bad principle. When part of the spirits fell from their original goodness they were imprisoned in bodies as a punishment, wandering from one to the other (metempsychosis) until they had completed their expiation and merited heaven. The Albigenses interpreted Scripture as Allegories, teaching that Christ was an angel with a phantom body who, consequently, did not suffer nor rise again, and whose redemptive work consisted only in teaching. They therefore rejected the sacraments, the doctrines of hell, purgatory, and the resurrection of the body. Believing that all
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matter was bad, their moral doctrine was of extreme rigorism, condemning marriage, meat, and wine and recommending a kind of suicide by starvation called "endura." The Albigenses, who because of their unsocial doctrines were a menace not only to the church but to ordered society, were condemned by successive Councils from 1148 to 1215.

The foregoing three heretical sects, which seem to be outcroppings in different ages of similar ideas, have like the Religion of Philosophy, borrowed basic ideas from Christianity; for example, those ideas that Hallam extols, "'a sincerity, a piety, and a self-devotion'" (413.26-28). Also, like the Religion of Philosophy, these sects concern themselves totally with the conduct of man in society and not at all with the improvement of his individual nature in accordance with the laws of a transcendent God. These heresies were aspects of religion without spirituality. Little wonder Hallam, whom Newman cites as an exponent of the spurious religion Newman is contending against, should maintain that these heretical sects were means to the improvement of society.

413.25-28 "'...certainly a compound...they lived'." Henry Hallam, Middle Ages, p. 362. Instead of the teachings of religion, specifically of the Catholic Church, Hallam sees the improvement of society effected by "first the abolition of slavery, and the enforcement of fixed laws and a system of police; and next, the rise and spread of the Manichees, Catharists, Albigenses, and other heretical
sects, whose belief, "...was attended by qualities of a far superior lustre to orthodoxy,... . Thirdly, he attributed much to the influence of the institution of chivalry;..." (413.21-29). These are all an attempt by what Newman defines as the spurious Religion of Philosophy or Civilization to embellish the outer society with smooth-running systems while effecting no permanent improvement in the inner moral natures of the individuals who compose society.

413.34 -416.10 "...the best school...civil wars of the League." Henry Hallam, Middle Ages, 368-388. As a true exponent of the Religion of Philosophy, Hallam considers the mediaeval institution of chivalry as "'the best school of moral discipline'" (413.34) and the knight, the shining example of the social virtues of "'valour, loyalty, courtesy, munificence'" (416.15). It is Hallam who states that "'the character of the knight gradually subsided into that of gentleman'" (417.33). Newman's description of the gentleman (See above, Discourse VII) indicates that the ideal of chivalry—become the ideal of the gentleman—effects "a polished outside, with hollowness within."¹ Newman sees in Hallam's chivalric ideal "'the mingled character, partly protective, partly destructive, of Christian morality, which marks this creation of the natural man'" (414.11-13).

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418.11-12 ...a very able article...Edinburgh Review, in
1829. The article is Sign of the Times' by Thomas Carlyle.

418.13-15 ...the Shaftesbury School....the School of Locke
or Bentham. Newman's following sentence makes clear his idea: Here
is the theory of Beauty denouncing the theory of Utility' (418.15-16).
See Discourse IX for Newman's discussion of Shaftesbury's aesthetic
principles that make him an exponent of the Religion of Beauty in
contrast to such proponents of utilitarianism as Locke or Bentham.

418.17-24 ...still (as I have said in the text), Beauty and
Utility easily lose themselves in each other....Shaftesbury. In
describing the characteristics of the Religion of Philosophy in
Discourse IX, Newman notes the similarity between the theory of Beauty
and the Theory of Utility as follows: 'What looks fair will be good,
what causes offence will be evil; virtue will be what pleases, vice
what pains. As well may we measure virtue by utility, as by such a
rule' (316.20-23).

Newman states that the author (Carlyle), in placing the hope of
reward and fear of punishments in the 'Mechanics' not the 'Dynamics' of
our moral nature inherits Shaftesbury's Religion of Philosophy. Carlyle
defines the domain of Mechanism as the 'political, ecclesiastical.'
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or other outward establishments"¹—a domain concerned with the visible and finite world. Carlyle deplores this emphasis on the visible and laments that "'men have lost their belief in the Invisible'" (421.14-15) or, he states, in other words, "'this is not a Religious age'" (421.16-17). Yet, according to Newman's view, Carlyle mistakes the true nature of religion in that he places the sanctions on moral conduct in the mechanics, or that which treats of the finite, when he considers "'hope of reward and fear of punishment'" (419.4-5) to be "'immediate motives'!" (419.4) rather than dictates in keeping with the laws of a Divine Lawgiver. Carlyle’s idea of Religion concerns the "'Invisible Father'," who is "'the fountain of all Goodness, Beauty, Truth, and revealed in every revelation of these'" (422.7-9), and is, therefore, like that of Shaftesbury's religion in that its most dominant characteristic is "'a worship of the Beautiful and Good'," (421.20) a "'thousand-voiced psalm from the heart of Man'" (422.7), rather than, as for Newman, a real assent to the principles of a Divine Lawgiver.

418.25-27 "After characterizing 'this age...Mechanical Age'..." The quotation is from the Edinburgh Review (June, 1829), pp. 441-442. See above, 418.11-12. Carlyle defines the Mechanical Age as follows: "It is the Age of Machinery, in every outward and inward

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sense of that word; the age which with its whole undivided might, forwards, teaches, and practices the great art of adapting means to ends. Nothing is now done directly, or by hand; all is by rule and contrivance." ¹ Further, Carlyle states, "This faith in Mechanism, in the all importance of physical things, is in every age the common refuge of Weakness and blind Discontent; of all who believe,...that man's true good lies without him, not within." ²

The characteristics Carlyle assigns to the Mechanical Age are similar to those Newman attributes in Discourse V to the excesses of Private Judgment in his day. Newman writes as follows: "...the works of the age are not the development of definite principles, but accidental results of discordant and simultaneous action, of committees and boards composed of men, each of whom has his own interests and views,... As to their own creations, these are a sort of monster, with hands, feet, and trunk moulded respectively on distinct types. Their whole, if the word is to be used, is an accumulation from without, not the growth of a principle from within." (141.25 - 142.18). Both Carlyle and Newman regret the emphasis on the "accumulation from without," but differ about the invisible, the world within: to Newman there is the necessity for the "growth of a principle from within":

¹ Carlyle, Edinburgh Review, p. 442.

² Ibid., p. 457.
for Newman, "Ideas are the life of institutions, social, political, and literary" (142.6-7). But to Carlyle "the inward primary powers of man" (419.10) involve "the mysterious springs of Love, and Fear, and Wonder, of Enthusiasm, Poetry, Religion, all which have a truly vital and infinite character" (418.33-419.2)—a world to which Carlyle assigns the term the "Dynamics" of man's nature and fortunes. The contrast between Newman and Carlyle is between the realm of ideas and that of emotions.

418.30 - 423.19 "To speak a little pedantically,...he too stops short.' etc., etc...." This quotation is a continuation from Carlyle's article in the Edinburgh Review (June, 1829), pp. 448-457. See above 418.11-12 This section of Carlyle's essay reveals Carlyle "as a disciple of what may be called (generically...) the Shaftesbury School" (418.12-14) in that he ranks Religion with other dynamic influences such as the emotions of Love and Fear, the attributes of Wonder and Enthusiasm, and the art of poetry; in other words, Religion is just one of the natural influences that promote the betterment of humanity as was aesthetical beauty for Shaftesbury, or the ideal of mediaeval chivalry for Hallam, or the Classics for the Emperor Julian, or the study of the Classics and history for Edward Gibbon. Each exponent of the Religion of Philosophy places his own particular hope for human improvement in some natural influence. Christianity, according to Carlyle, is man's highest attainment (420.1); it is "the crowning glory, or rather the life and soul, of our whole modern culture," ¹ attained by the Dynamical, not the

¹ Carlyle, Edinburgh Review, p. 450.
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Mechanical nature of man; that is, not "by institutions and establishments, and well-arranged systems of mechanism,...[but] it arose in the mystic deeps of man's soul; and was spread abroad by the 'preaching' of the 'word,' by simple, altogether natural and individual efforts; and flew, like hallowed fire, from heart to heart, till all were purified and illuminated by it; and its heavenly light shone, as it still shines, and as the sun or star will ever shine, through the whole dark destinies of man."¹ This glowing tribute to Christianity leaves Christianity as a natural religion only and thereby serves to illustrate what Newman terms "the ambiguous position of the Religion of Philosophy relatively to Catholicism" (432.21-22); that is, the Religion of Philosophy concerns natural human truth as contrasted with supernatural Divine truth of Christianity.

423.22-26 "I have not a suspicion...a believer in Christianity." Newman, it would seem, did not know that the author was Carlyle, but he accurately characterized Carlyle as belonging to the Shaftesbury School when he stated that "it is impossible from his language to tell whether he was a believer in Christianity" (423.24-26) in that one who holds the particular kind of belief that Newman designates as the Religion of Philosophy has the outward trappings of Christian belief without the idea of the Divine Lawgiver and therefore

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is not a believer in Christianity in the full meaning of the word, but presents only certain outward social, but non-dogmatic indications of being a Christian.

423.31 "His "Metamorphosis of Plants," his Doctrine of Colours,..." are two works by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832).

"The Metamorphosis of Plants" was a poem illustrating Goethe's idea that "all plants are mere variations of one general type, that they are all kin and their variety of form can be explained by metamorphosis or transformation." 1 Goethe also wrote a treatise entitled, "An Essay to Explain the Metamorphosis of Plants" (c.1790). In the Doctrine of Colours, published in 1810, Goethe presented "the conclusion that Colour is not contained in Light, but is the product of an intermingling of Light and Darkness." 2 Lewes comments on Goethe's theory of colour as follows: "He began with a false conception of Newton's theory, and thought he was overthrowing Newton when, in fact, he was combating his own error. ...instead of going the simple way to work, and learning the a,b,c, of science, [he] tried the very longest of all short cuts, namely, experiment on insufficient knowledge." 3

Although Goethe was a man of various information in a number of fields of knowledge, it would seem from Lewes's comments on Goethe's

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1 Paul Carus, Goethe, with Special Consideration of His Philosophy (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1915), p. 252.
3 Ibid., pp. 341-342.
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Doctrine of Colour that he would not be considered among Newman's men of Liberal Education in that his generalizations and conclusions were not always based on deep and accurate particular knowledge.

423.31 - 437.6 "His "Metamorphosis of Plants," his Doctrine of Colours,...more light may come into the room." This section is comprised of a number of quotations from the Characteristics of Goethe, from the German of Falk and von Muller, with notes, original and translated, by Sarah Austin (3 vols., London: Effingham Wilson, 1833). The page numbers Newman has given after each excerpt refer to the 1833 edition.

The critical biography, from which Newman quotes (423.31-437.6) of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) by Falk and von Muller, entitled the Characteristics of Goethe is a wholly laudatory evaluation of Goethe's thought and art. There is a passage in the third volume in which the authors are assessing the influence of Goethe on German thought which clearly shows Goethe's affiliation with Shaftesbury's Religion of Beauty and therefore illustrates Goethe's membership in the Religion of Philosophy: "...the life of the artist assumed a higher import, and an aesthetic system arose, such as antiquity has divined but never developed. Aesthetics appeared as the Perfecter of life and of philosophy. Ethics, or morals, took a subordinate station; but religion, which had been made merely subservient to morals, rose above them, in as much as she was one with aesthetics. By aesthetics the mind...
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was enabled to soar to religion:—it was impossible to be religious without being aesthetical; and a finely constituted soul...could exist only in this state of profound aesthetics—religious feeling. Such were the effects Goethe produced on us." ¹

Newman states that the extracts from the Characteristics of Goethe serve "to illustrate further the Philosophical character in its contrast to the Christian" (423.27-28). A character he has been delineating in the Appendix with reference to Cicero, Hallam, and Carlyle and in the text with the references in Discourse IX to Lord Shaftesbury. Carlyle considered religion to be one of the dynamic emotions akin to Love and Fear as sources of human motivation. Goethe identified religion and aesthetics in that he thought it "impossible to be religious without being aesthetical." Aestheticism, for Goethe, was an expression of profound religious feeling. Furthermore, he thought that "only religious men can be creative." ² For Goethe, religion served the cause of aesthetics and it was aesthetics, not religion, that was "the Perfector of life and philosophy." About his own relation to religion as poet and artist Goethe wrote as follows: "As a poet and artist I am

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² Paul Carus, Goethe, with Special Consideration of his Philosophy, p. 205.
polytheistic, as a naturalist I am pantheistic, and I am the one as
decidedly as the other. In case I needed a God for my personality as a
moral being, I should be provided therewith.'" 1 It would seem that
religious feeling and religious ceremony, but not religious doctrine,
served Goethe, the poet, the artist, the naturalist by providing the
atmosphere for creativity.

Newman has noted the similarity between the Religion of
Philosophy and the School of Locke and Bentham (418.17-19). The
following excerpts from Falk and von Muller quoted by Newman in the
Appendix describing the Characteristics of Goethe are a reference for
that similarity: "'Goethe, by his very nature,...will not,...quit the
territory of experience,... All conclusions, observations, doctrines,
opinions, articles of faith, have value in his eyes, only in so far as
they connect themselves with this territory,...'" (425.17-22). And
again, "'With questions concerning time, space, mind, matter, God,
immortality, and the like, Goethe occupied himself little:...only
because they lay out of the region of experience, to which, upon
system, he exclusively devoted himself'" (426.4-9). As a result, he was
not an admirer of the mysteries in either philosophy or religion (427.
33). Only if there were imposed "'an inviolable, reverential silence on
the Mysteries of Religion, without compelling any man to assent to

1 Falk and von Muller, Characteristics of Goethe, p. 186.
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dogmas" would he submit himself "with willing edification to the
general, practical confession of a faith, which connected itself so
immediately with action" (428.26-429.2).

"Goethe's genius and disposition were for the beautiful..."
(429.26-27). His idea of worship was "to throw his whole imagination,
with the vividness and reality of sense, into the existence of a flower
or a star. To him, as to Nature, it sufficed to revel in uninterrupted
solitude, and to pass from one agreeable state of existence to another,
through all forms and modes of life". (429.5-9). Goethe's idea of
morals had nothing to do with religion or the obedience to the Divine
Lawgiver, but rather concerned the aesthetical ideals of "order and
obedience to law as to the main pillars of the public weal. Whatever
threatened to retard or to trouble the progress of moral or intellectual
improvement, and the methodical application and employment of the power
of nature...was to him... the utterly insufferable evil" (431.23-30).
Such natural virtue as is described in the following lines was his
ideal: "...had he not early acquired the habit of opposing labour and
study to affliction and regret..." (435.18-19). In keeping with his
Philosophy of Beauty Goethe did not "like people to dwell in his
presence on gloomy thoughts or lamentable occurrences, unless some
practical end was to be answered by such conversations" (435.32-34).
The editor, Sarah Austin, gives an enlightening footnote to the last
quotation: "These words might have been written for Mr. Bentham, who,
like Goethe, resolutely kept at a distance all painful subjects from which no practical good was to be extracted.  

Finally, the description of Goethe's death (437.1-6), as painless and harmonious is reminiscent of the description Newman gave in Discourse IX of the death of the Emperor Julian, another worshipper of Beauty in the Religion of Philosophy. In both instances, there was no consciousness of sin, no struggle with the forces of evil, only the submission to the eternally beautiful, symbolized in Goethe by the reverence for light. The adherents of the Religion of Philosophy have much in common with the Religion of the Pharisee. The Gospel Pharisee had no consciousness of his own flaws: rather, he saw only the indubitable worthiness, social acceptability, and therefore beauty of his own being.

437.11 "Dryden's 'Cymon and Iphigenia'." John Dryden (1631-1700), educated at Westminster and Cambridge University, was Poet Laureate from 1670 to 1688. Acclaimed one of England's greatest poets, Dryden became a Catholic after 1685. For "Cymon and Iphigenia," the particular poem of Dryden's to which Newman refers, see The Poems of John Dryden, Vol. IV, ed. James Kinsley. (London: Oxford University Press, 1958) pp. 1741-1757. The theme of the poem is that passion ennobles—a theme very much in keeping with a main tenet of the Religion of Philosophy; hence, Newman's comment: "I am sorry to say, Dryden was

1 Falk and von Muller, Characteristics of Goethe, ed. Sarah Austin, p. 83.
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a Catholic, when he published this poem" (437.26-27). The foregoing
comment is a reference to one of the main themes basic to the
Discourses; that is, Newman's attempt to delineate clearly the
different philosophies of the day in order that his audience sort out,
as it were, their thinking, lest they unwittingly adopt philosophies
(as Newman apparently thinks Dryden has done) which they would
repudiate did they clearly understand them.

437.12-26 "'Mr. Dryden,...effects of love"' From Lord
Chesterfield's The Principles of Politeness...To which is added The
Polite Philosopher (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1812) Philip Dormer
Stanhope, Fourth Earl of Chesterfield (1694-1773), the English
politician, who, distinguished for his polished manners and studied
grace, was the epitome of all the worldly virtues extolled by the
Religion of Philosophy. Chesterfield commends Dryden for "bestow[ing]
a "moral" where he found a tale" (437.18) and notes with approval the
improvement in Cymon's intellect and character being "the natural
effects of love" (437.25-26). The proponents of the Religion of
Philosophy found their source of moral improvement in the Arts and
Literature, as a form of the worship of the aesthetically beautiful, as
opposed to Newman's view that moral improvement is the province of
religion.

437.28 - 438.19 "'She stumbled,...holy font', etc." Tieck's
Romantic Fiction: Tales from Fouque, Tieck, etc. (London: Burns, 1843)
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Johann Ludwig Tieck (1773-1853) was a German poet, novelist, critic, and short story writer, who edited the A. W. Schlegel German translation of Shakespeare, *Shakespeare's Vorschule*, 2 vols. (1823-29). The contrast between "the Incarnate Lord" and "dust and ashes" in Newman's comment on the excerpt from Tieck--"Which is the object of worship here--the true Incarnate Lord, or the dust and ashes?" (438.20-21)--illustrates, together with the excerpt itself, the ridiculous aspect of confusing and commingling the supposed worship of "the true Incarnate Lord" with worship of the worldly beautiful--"the dust and ashes." Newman has felled his Religion of Philosophy adversaries with one sure blow: what they mistakenly worship for the beautiful is but "the dust and ashes" (438.21).


Benjamin Disraeli describes his father's education in Amsterdam as gained from wide reading in his indolent schoolmaster's library; before he was fifteen he had read the works of Voltaire and...when he was eighteen, he returned to England a disciple of
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Rousseau. 1 Disraeli describes his father's daily researches over a period of ten years in preparation for the writing of his History of Literature, as pursued 'among the MSS. of the British Museum, while his own ample collections permitted him to pursue his investigations in his own library into the night.' 2

It would seem that Isaac Disraeli's education had been fortuitously the kind Newman opposed in the London University-Queen's Colleges—an education based on wide, perhaps desultory reading and the gathering of not necessarily related bits of information from a variety of sources.

Disraeli describes his father's character in terms reminiscent of the character of the Emperor Julian whom Newman cites as the epitome of the natural perfection extolled by the Religion of Philosophy: "On his moral character I shall scarcely presume to dwell. The philosophic sweetness of his disposition, the serenity of his lot, and the elevating nature of his pursuits, combined to enable him to pass through life without an evil act, almost without an evil thought." 3

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1 "On the Life and Writings of Mr. Disraeli, By his Son," Curiosities of Literature, Vol I, p. XIII.
2 Ibid., p. XXVI.
3 Ibid., p. XXXVI.
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Newman's quotation from Isaac Disraeli is from the "History of the Skeleton of Death." Curiosities of Literature, Vol. III, pp. 206-210. The quotation from Isaac Disraeli illustrates the loathing of the Religion of Philosophy for what is hideous--death in this case--and the tendency of those who want to see only the beautiful to gloss over, as did the Ancients in fable and language, what is ugly by a seeming beauty.

Newman quotes Isaac Disraeli as an example of an attitude toward Christianity on the part of the adherents to the Religion of Philosophy; namely, that the ascetic realism of Christianity tramples on nature (Curiosities, p.209). In this regard, Gothic architecture, a result of the Christian religion spreading over Europe, depicted "the most revolting emblems of death" (Curiosities, p.209). Christianity seemed to encourage what Isaac Disraeli terms a "barbarous taste" (210) in contrast to the euphonious terms in which the Ancients depicted death: Disraeli like Matthew Arnold, Julian, and Gibbon much preferred the Hellenic to the Hebrew.

440.10-12 "Hume and Gibbon...many of their French Contemporaries." Newman notes that David Hume (1711-1776) and Edward Gibbon (1737-1794), as well as their French Contemporaries of the Enlightenment, such as, François Marie Arouet (Voltaire) (1694-1778) and Denis Diderot (1713-1784) all tended to feel kindly towards the "elegant mythology of the Greeks" (440.8). All four repudiated religion for the naturally or worldly beautiful in some aspects; Hume found the basis of
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moral life in feeling: Gibbon, in the intellectual and moral perfection of the natural order, as did Julian: the French Enlightenment, in scientific progress resulting from the unimpeded and clear use of reason.

440.14 - 443.2 "'Will Antichrist...into the Temple'. Tracts for the Times, No. 83' The Tract was reprinted in Newman's "The Patristical Idea of Antichrist." in four lectures, Discussions and Arguments (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1899), pp. 44-108. Newman's quotation is from Lecture II, 3, 'The Religion of the Antichrist,' pp. 67-71. The excerpt expresses the idea that when Christianity is abjured; there will occur a reversion to paganism in some form—the form discussed in Discourse IX is the worship of the aesthetically beautiful. This excerpt from Newman's own writings as well as the final excerpt emphasize the idea that the Religion of Philosophy in selecting some aspects of Christianity and ignoring others results in half-truth and. Newman notes, a "'half truth is often the most gross and mischievous of falsehoods'" (444.2-3).

In Tract 83, Newman outlined the following characteristics of the Antichrist: "'Neither true God, nor false God, will he worship'" (440.14-15). According to this reference to Scripture, the Religion of the Antichrist will be characterized by half-truths, by "'neither true God, nor false God'." Secondly, 'Antichrist is to 'exalt himself over all that is called God or worshipped'" (440.18-19). One expression of
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the Religion of Philosophy is the worship of beauty in various forms—the fine arts, poetry, the chivalric ideal, smooth-running systems in the social order, Bentham's pleasure as a motivating principle in the individual. These instances of the exalting of beauty and pleasure "'over all that is called God'" constitute an illustration of the kind of false worship which "'is predicted as the mark of Antichrist'" (440.28-29). The prediction is further that "'a god whom his fathers knew not shall he honour with gold and silver, and with precious stones and pleasant things'" (440.21-23).

The excerpt from Tract 83 concludes with an example of the kind of false worship observed within the last fifty years. Newman would seem to have been referring specifically to the ideals of the French Revolution when he wrote as follows: "'...after having broken away from all restraint of God and man, they gave a name to the reprobate state itself into which they had thrown themselves, and exalted it, that very negation of religion, or rather that real and living blasphemy, into a kind of god. They called it Liberty, and they literally worshipped it as a divinity. ...After abjuring our Lord and Saviour, and blasphemously declaring Him to be an imposter, they proceeded to decree, in the public assembly of the nation, the adoration of Liberty and Equality as divinities; and they appointed festivals besides, in honour of Reason, the Country, the Constitution, and the Virtues'" (442.3-16). The allusion to the French Revolution in the foregoing lines serves the
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rhetorical purpose of emphasizing, by a recent example, the devastating effects of a belief that abjurs the whole of Christianity while retaining some of its aspects.

443.3-4 ...some extracts from a Protestant sermon of my own, written just twenty years ago,... The reference is to Newman's sermon 'A Religion of the Day.' Parochial and Plain Sermons. I (London: Longmans, Green. and Co., 1898), pp. 309-324.

443.9 - 449.23 The excerpts from Newman's early sermon. The Religion of the Day, summarize not only Section 7 of the Appendix which gives references for the Religion of Philosophy, the topic discussed in Discourse IX, but also provides a re-emphasis of a basic theme throughout the Discourses: namely, 'that half the truth is often the most gross and mischievous of falsehoods' (444.2-3). Newman states that the Religion of the Day, of whatever age, 'acknowledged...the Gospel of Christ, [but] fastened on one or other of its characteristics, and professed to embody this one in its practice; while, by neglecting the other parts of the holy doctrine, it has, in fact, disturbed and corrupted even that portion of it,...: for he who cultivates only one precept of the Gospel to the exclusion of the rest, in reality attends to no part at all.' (443.13-21). The argument that a half-truth is no truth at all, but rather a gross and mischievous falsehood is the argument Newman presents in Discourses II to V against deliberately excluding any branch of learning from education, particularly one so
important as theology. The unity of knowledge in the sense of the availability to the mind of the whole of truth by not allowing any one science to usurp the territory of the others or by not excluding any particular area of truth is a requisite for a liberal education, the kind of education in which the mind can reflect the unity inherent in the whole of truth. Thus in re-emphasizing the result of fastening the mind on only partial truth, Newman summarizes what is to him a dominant characteristic of both the intellectual and religious thinking of the nineteenth century. The religious habit of excluding the 'austere character' (446.27) from the Gospel teaching is reflected in the intellectual tendency to exclude from the university curriculum all scientific discussion of theology, its principles and dogmas. Not acting 'from a love of the Truth, but 'from the influence of the Age' (447.10) results in what Newman terms a 'counterfeit Christianity' (447.22) and, in the university, certainly, in Newman's view a counterfeit education.

Section 7 of the Appendix has given references for the topic Newman discussed in Discourse IX, the Religion of Philosophy. The first reference, Newman's essay 'Marcus Tullius Cicero,' makes clear that the Religion of Philosophy had roots in a pagan non-Christian humanistic culture. The quotations from Henry Hallam's 'Middle Ages' extolling the chivalric ideal further illustrate the ideal of human perfection apart from that of Christianity. Carlyle and Goethe would include religion in their ideal of human perfection, but only as another human means to
engendering right feeling and conduct in society. The selection from Newman's own Tract 83, indicates that a religion based on a half-truth; that is, based on the human ideal of perfection only, has the marks of the Religion of the Antichrist and is, as the last excerpt "A Religion of the Day" points out, "a counterfeit Christianity" (447.22).

In summary, Newman said that the Appendix comprised "such as happen to be at hand or on my memory" (371.5). In seven sections Newman has given interesting and valuable references for the principal ideas he has discussed in the Discourses. The references in Section 1 from the histories of Huber and Polidore Virgil as well as from the Papal Bulls establishing universities give "the idea on the whole, or the formal conception, of a University in the minds of the generality of men" (372.2-3) as "a seat of science and letters" and "its end is knowledge" (372.4-5).

Section 2 makes particular the definition of a university by quotations from writers of different nationalities and religious beliefs over several centuries. These substantiate Newman's view stated as follows: "That a University was really, in its idea, the seat of all learning is plain from its very name: in saying which I am not taking my stand upon the 'derivation' of the word, but upon its recognised meaning, however it came to mean it" (381.9-12). One point that is important from Section 2 is Newman's statement that some early institutions did not have all the faculties, but "they would be specifically different from an Academical Institution which began by putting aside Theology, as
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a science which was not to be recognised" (379.24-26). The foregoing is, in principle, the real basis for the opposition to the Queen's Colleges.

Section 3 discusses the topic of Discourse VII, "mere acquirement is not real knowledge," (384.1). Newman has chosen excerpts from two of his contemporaries, Edward Copleston and Dr. Tappan, and from his own review in the British Critic to denounce one of the errors in education most deleterious to the cultivation of the intellect:

"'Never, while the world lasts, will it be wholly disabused of that specious error, that the more there is crammed into a young man's mind, whether it stays there or not, whether it is digested or not, still the wiser he is" (384.10-13).

Section 4 gives references for the central idea in the Discourses; namely, "that all branches of knowledge form one whole" (367.10). S. T. Coleridge's Encyclopaedia Metropolitana is based on the idea that the arts and sciences tend to organize themselves into one harmonious body of knowledge. Hugh of St. Victor's Didascalion demonstrates that all the areas of knowledge important to man are essentially integrated and that the recognition of their integrity is necessary for the attainment of our human perfection and our divine destiny. The reference to the Tract of St. Bonaventure expresses the idea that all the human sciences are part of a vast illumination that has its source in God "the Fontal Light" (389.26-27) and will be seen in its
full clarity only on "the seventh day of rest, [in] the illumination of glory" (390.26-27). Cardinal Bertazzoli's Collectio Legum depicts the most beautiful order that shines forth from the harmony inherent among the arts and sciences and the beneficial effect of that order on the minds of students. Francis Bacon's metaphor of digestion expresses the idea that the fundamental studies of Philosophy and Universality, far from being idle studies, supply all the other professions (391.11-23).

Section 5 is a further discussion of the unity of knowledge theme of Section 4. In the circle of knowledge, the individual sciences are "complements of each other" (391.24). One of the principal references, Juan Luis Vives in De Causis Corrupturum Artium, notes that the tendency to consider one's own field the source of all knowledge is one of the causes for the corruption of learning. Bacon's metaphor of the branching candlestick illuminating the entire room illustrates that the general illumination from all the sciences is greater than the light that can be shed by each science individually. Abbé Nauze defines the Philosophical Spirit as "a talent acquired by study and practice, in order to give sound judgment concerning all the things of the world" (395.23-25). It is the Philosophical Spirit that enables the mind to draw relationships between the sciences and come to a "comprehensive view of truth in all its branches" (170.22).

Section 6 gives excerpts dealing with the main idea in the Discourses, a Liberal Education. The quotations from Vives describes
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"Liberal" as that personal cultivation appropriate to a freeman and a citizen. Hornef's quotation is a reference for such important phrases as "the circle of knowledge," "the architectonic science," the "summit in our minds." Edward Gibbon's phrase "the philosophical talent" has much the same meaning as Newman's "philosophical habit" to depict the effect of a Liberal education. Frederic Rogers makes clear the comprehensiveness of view characteristic of a Liberal education is not a generalized view, but rather a uniting of the many into a whole so that the over-all is grasped without losing the particulars. Whewell emphasizes that the object of a Liberal education is to develop the whole mental system of man.

Section 7 gives references for the material of Discourse IX, the Religion of Philosophy. There are three references from Newman's own writing, "Marcus, Tullius Cicero," Tract 83, and "A Religion of the Day." The other references are from the eighteenth and nineteenth century writers such as, Hallam, Carlyle, Disraeli, and Goethe. Throughout, Newman emphasizes that the Religion of Philosophy, a spurious religion, with non-Christian origins, is an ideal of human perfection apart from that of Christianity. As such, the Religion of Civilization is a half truth that "is often the most gross and mischievous of falsehoods" (444.3).

Newman was apparently not satisfied with the Appendix as he considered it to be too hastily assembled, but the Appendix proves to be a most valuable supplement to the Discourses. Some ideas are clarified
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in the Appendix such as the definition of a university, given in Discourse II. Others are given elaboration; namely, Newman's particular definition of Philosophy or Philosophical Spirit. In summary, the Appendix consists of a wealth of illustration from authors of different nationalities down through the ages to Newman's contemporaries on the principal subjects of the Discourses; namely, the definition of a university; the unity of knowledge; the idea of a Liberal Education; and the counterfeit of true and complete intellectual culture—the Religion of Philosophy.
PART III
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The purpose of the thesis has been the presentation first of the complete text of the first edition of John Henry Newman's Discourses on the Scope of University Education Addressed to the Catholics of Dublin, and secondly of an Introduction and Commentary, composed mainly from the elaboration of Newman's references and his own writings. It is thought that the background of Newman's educational ideas, the summary of his Irish Campaign, and the discussion of some aspects of the literary style as outlined in the Introduction to the Thesis, have given a suitable introduction to the text and to the Commentary on the Discourses. The Commentary on selected points in each Discourse and in the Appendix has had the purpose of illuminating Newman's meaning for the reader in that the clearest possible exposition of Newman's own ideas has been the object of this thesis.

The theme of the thesis has been taken from Newman's poem, "The Age to Come"

And Joy the Age to Come will Think with Me:--
'Tis the Old History--Truth Without a Home,
Despised and Slain; then Rising from the Tomb.
(See above, p. III).

The university, "from the nature of the case [is] a place of instruction where universal knowledge is professed" (39.19-21); the University, therefore is, or should be, the home of Truth. But in the nineteenth century Latitudinarian view of university education, truth is "despised and slain" because the idea of unity has been lost (42.28-29). In the
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following image Newman vividly depicts the gradual loss of illumination that we associate with the dimming of understanding and the consequent loss of the grasp of Truth: "The majestic vision of the Middle Age, which grew steadily to perfection in the course of centuries, the University of Paris, or Bologna, or Oxford, has almost gone out in night" (142.21-25). That "majestic vision of the Middle Age" was "that all truths of whatever kind form into one larger body of Truth, by virtue of the consistency between one truth and another, which is a connecting link running through them all. ... all subjects of knowledge were viewed as parts of one vast system, each with its own place in it, and from knowing one, another was inferred." ¹ What Newman frequently refers to in the Discourses as "the circle of knowledge" (97.25) or (106.4) had its origin as far in the past as ancient Greek thought. "Aristotle, the most comprehensive intellect of Antiquity, [was] the one who had conceived the sublime idea of mapping the whole field of knowledge, and subjecting all things to one profound analysis,..." ²

The unity of Truth has its origin in the source of Truth: "All the works of God are founded on unity, for they are founded on Himself, who is the most awfully simple and transcendent of possible unities. He is emphatically One: and whereas He is also multiform in His attributes and His arts, as they present themselves to our minds, it


² Ibid., p. 195.
follows that order and harmony must be of His very essence." ¹

The various sciences are what Newman describes as "partial views or abstractions" (70.23) of "one large system or complex fact" (69.22). "The human mind cannot take in this whole vast fact at a single glance, or gain possession of it at once" (70.11-13), but must master it slowly by means of the partial views or sciences that "are the results of mental processes about one and the same subject matter, viewed under various aspects,... Viewed all together, they become the nearest approximation to a representation or subjective reflexion of the objective truth, possible to the human mind, which advances towards the accurate apprehension of that object, in proportion to the number of sciences it has mastered; ...(72.12-26). Newman's argument in Discourses II to V involves the necessity of not omitting any of these sciences, particularly one so important as Theology. Since all sciences "relate to one and the same integral subject matter" (89.5-6), "no science is complete in itself, when viewed as an instrument of attaining the knowledge of facts" (78.25-26), but needs "the support and guarantee of its sister sciences, ...if we would obtain the exactest knowledge possible of things as they are,..." (89.10-14).

The method by which the mind does master these various partial views or sciences varies according to the subject matter: "As

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the structure of the universe speaks to us of Him who made it, so the
laws of the mind are the expression, not of mere constituted order, but
of His will. ...It is He who teaches us all knowledge; and the way by
which we acquire it is His way. He varies that way according to the
subject-matter; but whether He has set before us in our particular
pursuit the way of observation or of experiment, of speculation or of
research, of demonstration or of probability, whether we are inquiring
into the system of the universe, or into the elements of matter and of
life, or into the history of human society and past times, if we take
the way proper to our subject-matter, we have His blessing upon us, and
shall find, besides abundant matter for mere opinion, the materials in
due measure of proof and assent." ¹ The Creator has set forth, as being
inherent in creation itself, not only the subject-matter of each
science, but the way the human mind grasps truth in each particular
subject-matter.

Each Science attains to truth by its own method. The
Physical Sciences and Theology differ in method: "Induction is the
instrument of Physics, and deduction only is the instrument of Theology" (348.11-13). Newman maintains that since truth does not contradict
truth, there can be no real collision between Theology and Physical
Science (344.3-4). "The Physicist treats of efficient causes; the

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Theologian of final. "¹ "...the two studies do most surely occupy distinct fields, in which each may teach without expecting any interposition from the other."² Physical Science is concerned with the "sensible facts, phenomena, or results"³ of nature and its laws. Whereas, Theology "begins at the other end of knowledge, and is occupied, not with the finite, but the Infinite. It unfolds and systematizes what He Himself has told us of Himself; of His nature, His attributes, His will, and His acts. ...Theology, ...contemplates the world, not of matter, but of mind; the Supreme Intelligence; souls and their destiny; conscience and duty; the past, present, and future dealings of the Creator—with the creature."⁴

Although there can be no collision between them if the Physical Scientists and the Theologians pursue their respective fields with their own method, Newman notes that "there always has been a sort of jealousy and hostility between Religion and physical philosophers" (344,8-10). He also states that this "hostility between experimental science and theology is far older than Christianity" (345,16-18). But Newman states that the attempt of the Physical Scientist to replace the theological method which is deductive by the Baconian method which is

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² Ibid., p. 440.
³ Ibid., p. 434.
⁴ Ibid., p. 434.
in the study of Theology has been the cause of the widespread hostility by the nineteenth century: "...the history of the last three centuries is only one long course of attempts, on the part of the partisans of the Baconian Philosophy, to get rid of the method proper to Theology and to make it an experimental science." But after pursuing the argument, Newman concludes that no truth is the result of using the inductive method in the study of the subject matter of Theology: Physical Science "has sustained a most emphatic and eloquent reverse in its usurped territory, ...has already confessed its own absolute failure, and has closed the inquiry itself, not indeed by giving place to the legitimate method which it dispossessed, but by announcing that nothing can be known on the subject at all,—that religion is not a science, and that in religion scepticism is the only true philosophy." Here is where Newman begins his argument in Discourses II to V against the Mixed Education opponents. The foregoing explanation of the attempt to apply the inductive method to Theology explains the source of the Latitudinarian view that Theology is not a science.

In several of his writings Newman notes that it seems to have been a tendency of the human mind from the beginning to resist authority.


2 Ibid., p. 448.

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and to substitute the dictates of the individual mind for those of any external authority. The inductive method is congenial to such a spirit of individualism which resents the idea of confining the intellect, with the idea "that God's intellect is greater than theirs, and what He has done, man cannot improve" (350.13-14). Newman describes the Liberals of his day as those for whom the law of conscience, which is of the nature of faith, has been "perverted into a kind of self-confidence, namely, a deference to our own judgment. ...This, then, if they knew their meaning, is the wish of the so-called philosophical Christians, and men of no party, of the present day; namely, that they should be rid altogether of the shackles of a Revelation: and to this assuredly their efforts are tending and will tend—to identify the Christian doctrine with their own individual convictions, to sink its supernatural character, and to constitute themselves the prophets, not the recipients, of Divine Truth; creeds and discipline being already in their minds severed from its substance, and being gradually shaken off by them in fact, as the circumstances of the times will allow." ¹

Thus Newman has revealed the source of the view that "there is some real contrariety between human science and Revelation" (104.5-6) and that therefore there can be a "separation of Secular Education from Religion" (104.3-4). But such a view dissolves the unity of subject matter that should be the basis of education. Instead of seeing

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knowledge as a whole, it is "a mere fortuitous heap of acquisitions and accomplishments" (141.7-8). Newman describes the Latitudinarian concept in these words: "Their whole, if the word is to be used, is an accumulation from without, not the growth of a principle from within" (142.16-18). "At the present day, they knock the life out of the institutions..." (142.11-12). Newman compares such institutions, the university so constituted, to "the lower specimens of animated nature, who with their wings pulled off, or a pin run through them, or eaten out by parasitical enemies, walk about, unconscious of their state of disadvantage" (143.5-8). Without the living principle; that is, the concept of unity, which constitutes the form, they are but the mutilated representations or shells of their real natures.

Newman warned in Discourse II that "You will soon break up into fragments the whole circle of secular knowledge, if you begin the mutilation with divine" (145.25-27). Such a mutilation is what Newman describes in Discourses VII to IX. Without the dimension of Faith that maintains the unity of viewpoint and thus the form that gives a living principle to education, the idea of education becomes mere acquirement and accomplishments, none of which form the mind. Then too education becomes limited in aim to professional training with the result that the view of life is limited to economic progress. The individual's personal development is sacrificed to his contribution to the state. When there is no unifying principle in the educational system, there is no resultant unity in the formation of the individuals who are victimized by a fragmented system of instruction. A further error results: as Newman
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foresaw in Discourse IV "if you drop any science out of the circle of knowledge, you cannot keep its place vacant for it; that science is forgotten; the other sciences close up, or, in other words, they exceed their proper bounds, and intrude where they have no right" (106.3-8). In Discourse IX Newman described the Religion of Civilization with its emphasis on the superficial refinement of the fine arts and literature as being only a counterfeit religion that polishes the outside, but leaves human nature hollow and unregenerate within. It has usurped the place of the true religious principle. The result is a limitation and thus a failure to develop all that constitutes the whole person.

In contrast there is what Newman has called the University principle; that is, "the principle of advertising and communicating knowledge for its own sake."¹ Newman writes in Discourse VI, "I am chargeable with no paradox, when I speak of a Knowledge which is its own end, when I call it liberal knowledge, or a gentleman's knowledge, when I educate for it, and make it the scope of a university" (180.28-181.2). This knowledge which is desirable for the individual's own personal development "is an acquired illumination, it is a habit, a personal possession, and an inward endowment" (187.8-10). "...it implies an action upon our mental nature, and the formation of a character; it is something individual and permanent" (187.21-24). When Faith as well as Reason constitutes this Knowledge, it tends "towards that eternal state

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of illumination, when Faith shall yield to sight" (186.13-15). Thus Newman's idea of a Liberal Education represents "an integral Christian humanism reminiscent of the Alexandrian Fathers" 1 to whom, particularly Clement and Origen, V. F. Blehl traces the source of Newman's ideal of the Christian Gentleman.

This formation of the mind that Newman has described as the object of a Liberal Education, Newman described in 1870 in his Grammar of Assent as "Real Assents." "They are sometimes called beliefs, convictions, certitudes; and, as given to moral objects, they are perhaps as rare as they are powerful. Till we have them, in spite of a full apprehension and assent in the field of notions, we have no intellectual moorings, and are at the mercy of impulses, fancies, and wandering lights, whether as regards personal conduct, social and political action, or religion. These beliefs, be they true or false in the particular case, form the mind out of which they grow, and impart to it a seriousness and manliness which inspires in other minds a confidence in its views, and is one secret of persuasiveness and influence in the public stage of the world." 2 Thus Newman maintained in the Discourses "that that training of the intellect, which is best for the individual himself, best enables him to discharge his duties to


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society" (285.6-8).

Without the formation that is the end of a university, the individual is a kingdom divided against itself: "The perfection of the intellect is called ability and talent; the perfection of our moral nature is virtue. And it is our great misfortune here, and our trial, that, as things are found in the world, the two are separated, and independent of each other; that, where power of intellect is, there need not be virtue; and that where right, and goodness, and moral greatness are, there need not be talent." 1 The individual Newman compares to a kingdom in the state of tumult, with "all these separate powers warring in his own breast,—appetite, passion, secular ambition, intellect, and conscience, and trying severally to get possession of him. And when he looks out of himself, he sees them all severally embodied on a grand scale, in large establishments and centres, outside of him,..." 2 Thus, according to Newman, there is the idea held by individuals and society at large that "virtue cannot be intellectual, that goodness cannot be great,...that, somehow or other, religious people are commonly either very dull or very tiresome." 3

1 J. H. Newman, "Intellect, the Instrument of Religious Training, pp. 5-6.

2 Ibid., p. 7.

3 Ibid., p. 8.
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The Truth that Newman saw rising from the tomb and taking up its home in the University of Ireland and all universities was the uniting of these hostile forces first in the individuals who make the university their Alma Mater and then by means of these individuals, made whole through the development of the intellectual and moral faculties in harmony, there would arise the leaven of Truth in society.

Newman's description of the reign of truth is as follows:

Here, then, I conceive, is the object of the Holy See and the Catholic Church in setting up Universities; it is to reunite things which were in the beginning joined together by God, and have been put asunder by man. Some persons will say that I am thinking of confining, distorting, and stunting the growth of the intellect by ecclesiastical supervision. I have no such thought. Nor have I any thought of a compromise, as if religion must give up something, and science something. I wish the intellect to range with the utmost freedom, and religion to enjoy an equal freedom; but what I am stipulating for is, that they should be found in one and the same place, and exemplified in the same persons. I want to destroy that diversity of centres, which puts everything into confusion by creating a contrariety of influences. I wish the same spots and the same individuals to be at once oracles of philosophy and shrines of devotion. It will not satisfy me, what satisfies so many, to have two independent systems, intellectual and religious, going at once side by side, by a sort of division of labour, and only accidentally brought together. It will not satisfy me, if religion is here, and science there, and young men converse with science all day, and lodge with religion in the evening. It is not touching the evil, to which these remarks have been directed, if young men eat and drink and sleep in one place, and think in another: I want the same roof to contain both the intellectual and moral discipline. Devotion is not a sort of finish given to the sciences; nor is science a sort of
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feather in the cap, if I may so express myself, an ornament and set-off to devotion. I want the intellectual layman to be religious, and the devout ecclesiastic to be intellectual. 1

Newman would therefore see destroyed "that diversity of centres" which "would persuade the world that, to be religious, you must be ignorant, and to be intellectual you must be unbelieving." 2 Thus he would see a re-illumination of that "majestic vision of the Middle Age" when in place of the state of tumult in which knowledge is set against itself and truth is made to contradict truth, 3 the Secular and the Religious are a unity both in the person and in society.

Newman's hope for the "Age to Come" is expressed in his image of the illumination of Truth—secular and religious, scientific and theological—with its source in "that Supreme Author of Light and Truth, from whom all good primarily proceeds," 4 embodied in the university and its members, faculty and students. It is a truth the illumination of which glows steadily and brightly down through the centuries; "it is carried on through and by means of communities of men


2 Ibid., p. 5.

3 Ibid., p. 5.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

and their leaders and guides; and it employs their minds as its instruments, and depends upon them, while it uses them. ¹ "A few highly-endowed men will rescue the world for centuries to come. ...Such men, like the Prophet, are placed upon their watch-tower, and light their beacons on the heights. Each receives and transmits the sacred flame, trimming it in rivalry of his predecessor, and fully purposed to send it on as bright as it has reached him; and thus the self-same fire once kindled on Moriah, though seeming at intervals to fail, has at length reached us in safety, and will in like manner, as we trust, be carried forward even to the end. ²


APPENDIX TO THE THESIS
Section I

FRENCH TRANSLATION

I Preface

XII.1–13 "'ce n'est pas,'...grande distinction'." From Giacinto Sigismondo Cardinal Gerulil, "Règlements, et Statuts Proposes Pour L'Établissement D’Une Académie Des Sciences," Ope Édite et Inédite, Roma, Dalle Stampe di V. Poggioli, 1806–1821, Vol. III of XX vols., p. 353: "'It is not so much that there is any real opposition between the spirit of the Academies and that of the Universities, but only different points of view. Universities are established to 'teach' the sciences to 'students' who wish to obtain a scientific education; Academies aim at carrying out new research for the development of the sciences. The universities of Italy have furnished men who have done honour to the Academies; and the latter have provided the Universities with Professors who have held their chairs with the greatest distinction'."

II Appendix

A. 393.9 – 395.20 "'De la Grammaire...la style des Géomètres'." From "Réflexions Générales sur l'Utilité des Belles-Lettres, et sur les Inconvéniens (sic) du gout exclusif, qui paraît s'établir en favour (sic) des Mathématiques et de la Physique," Histoire de l'Académie des Inscriptions, Vol. XVI: "'Grammar gave birth
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to Critique. The latter undertook at first to rid the ancient texts of inaccuracies which the ignorance or the inattention of transcribers have introduced into them, etc. ...Progressively, they went on to seek aesthetic models and rules of taste in the works of the Greeks and the Romans.

"...Progressively as learning spread, the subjects of study multiplied; curiosity increased. History, considered since the beginning of the world, offered an immense field and furnished material for an infinite amount of research. Religion, Law, Customs, successions of Empires, Princely lines, the migration of Peoples, the foundings of Cities, the birth of the Arts, the progress of Science; all these matters were investigated thoroughly. The critic examined the actual events, the Geographer determined the location of the places where they had occurred; the Chronologist determined the date; the Antiquarian found on marble and bronze, wherewith to enlighten them.

"...The natural order of their studies, of which the general plan comprised history and the monuments of all time, brought them near by stages, to that which is referred to as the Middle Ages; new quarry, so much the more interesting as each of them thought to see in it the germ of the government to which he was subject, and the cradle of the language which he spoke,' etc.

"...and he proceeds to remark upon a Discourse of the Abbé du
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Resnel, who 'complains in his Memoire not that the exact sciences, have become flourishing in our midst, but that letters have ceased to be so; not that a new authority has arisen, but that it has arisen on the ruins of another. The nine Muses are indeed sisters: by right, they may claim that public favour, which is the most precious part of their dowery, be shared among them with equality.'

"...It is not the same with Learning; its different branches make up an almost indivisible whole; more, or less, they are so very dependent on one another, that one could not separate precisely one, to cultivate it alone. Such a one, for example, is born with a talent for the science of Medals and wishes to distinguish himself therein: to the knowledge of languages, which taken separately, constitute [the science of] the grammarian, he must add the knowledge of epochs, which constitutes [the learning of] the Chronicler; that of places, which constitutes [the knowledge of] the Geographer; the discussion of facts, which constitutes [the science of] the critic, the assaying of metals, which constitutes the expert: and nevertheless we will have only an Antiquarian. In a word then, each branch of Learning requires the same basis of study; save in a few matters, the same breadth of knowledge, perhaps the same talent; to exhaust one genre, it is necessary to embrace all' etc.

"It is often said to extol the excellence of the exact sciences, that they are the ones that introduced into the world the
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Philosophical Spirit, this precious torch, by means of which we know, appropriately how to question and to believe. But that which is attributed exclusively to the sciences, may well be the province of criticism [literature], and consequently, should belong to letters. For after all, the spirit of philosophy can be defined [as], 'Reason enlightened on true principles of things, whatever their nature'; that is to say, as much for those that are subject to the senses, as for those which are of the jurisdiction of the spirit, considered in its diverse faculties. Now, this superiority of reason is the result of men's reflections, as they have increased the number of their ideas, by acquiring new knowledge by means of study. ...Seeing that the Spirit of Philosophy is applicable without exception, to all the objects of our knowledge, according to this saying of an ancient, 'Philosophy is necessary, even when one is not treating of Philosophy.' It is very necessary to beware of befuddling oneself with the spirit of mathematics, which from its very nature is enclosed in a circle from which it should not be permitted to extend. We will not hide the fact that our century is beginning to lose sight of this distinction: and by dint of pride in being itself the Geometrician-Century, or rather wishing to reduce everything to calculation, are applying its method everywhere; by exalting it into a universal instrument, it is almost ceasing to be the Philosopher-Century. Abroad or at home one could find more than one example of this excess, which, in essence is not new; the scholastic of
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the thirteenth century had already transferred into Theology the method and style of the Geometrician'."

B. 395.21 - 396.7 "'Des Rapports...sur ceux de Littérature'."

From Abbé Nauze, "Des Rapports que les Belles-Lettres et les sciences ont entr'elles," Histoire de l'Académie des Inscriptions, Vol. XIII:

"'The Philosophical Spirit is a talent acquired by study and practice, in order to give sound judgment concerning all things of the world. It is an intelligence by which nothing is overlooked, a force of reasoning which nothing can shake, a taste, trustworthy and thoughtful, a taste about everything good and evil in nature. It is the unique rule of the True and the Beautiful. There is accordingly nothing of perfection in the various works which come from the hand of man, but that which is animated by this spirit. The glory of Belle-Lettres is particularly dependant on this spirit; however, as it is the fruit of a consummate science, and shared out to very few scholars, it is neither possible nor necessary for the success of Letters, that talent so rarely found should be present in all who cultivate belle-Lettres. It is sufficient for a nation that certain great geniuses possess it, and that the superiority of their enlightenment render them the arbiters of taste, the oracles of criticism, and the dispensers of literary glory. The spirit of philosophy will reside properly in this small number; but it will spread, as it were, its influence on the entire body of the State, on all
ARTS, ON ALL PROFESSIONS, ON ALL WORKS OF MIND OR HAND, AND PRINCIPALLY ON THOSE OF LITERATURE'."

C. 396.33 - 396.27 "LES MATHEMATIQUES...L'OUVRAGE DE LA SOCIE\'TE,'ETC." FROM GIACINTO SIGISMONDO CARDINAL GERRIL, "RÈGLEMENTS, ET STATUTS PROPOSÉS POUR L'ÉTABLISSEMENT D'UNE ACADÉMIE DES SCIENCES," OPELE, VOL. III, PP. 347-349:

1. "Mathematics in all its branches; general and specific physics with all its subordinate parts; the study of nature, the relationships which link beings together; the laws and the means of their reciprocal action, the phenomena which result from it; the application of these phenomena to the needs of life; such are the aims with which it seems the Academy should be concerned.

2. "Every genuine discovery in order of nature cannot but be followed by a real or immediate use in the social order. But it is less the use in itself, than the source of the use which a learned Society ought to stress. It must undertake to extend the sphere of genuine knowledge, very confident of seeing flow from it sooner or later precious advantages for humanity.

3. "The Academy will not therefore make the applied arts the object of its work. It has been observed judiciously (in a marginal note) that the necessary step to apply to the practice of an art a calculated experience or principle, is usually very easy to take and that
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the minute observations which regulate the practice of the applied arts
might jeopardize the higher flights which we have a right to expect from
an Academy.

4. "It is not that there may not be in the practice of the
applied arts, rules or some results worthy of an Academy's attention;
but in such an instance, it concerns itself with such matters only
inasmuch as the process can be subsumed among the experiments or
observations of Physics or Natural History, or as furnishes matter for
the solving of some problem, or for the clarification of some
mathematical theory. In a word, the applied arts will be treated
scientifically in an Academy, and not as artisans treat them.

5. "It has been proposed to admit into the Academy the Study
of Antiquity, directing such study towards research or the sciences and
arts among the ancients. ... Works of this nature necessarily require
the co-operation of experts to be carried to the point of the perfection
of which they are capable. Nevertheless, before thinking of establish-
ing a class in Antiquities, it is fitting to have at one's disposal a
sufficient number of persons suited to this kind of work and who are
willing to apply themselves to such work.

6. "This example may already serve to explain in what sense
it is said in the text quoted above, that it would be appropriate for an
institute to have in view some plan of research, which could be regarded
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as the work of the entire body, and not simply as an isolated work of various members of the association. A common project may be considered from two points of view, either as a co-operative project or a common topic, or else as distinct projects by a number of members, projects relating to and contributing to the same objective. Let two or three artists undertake to paint a figure in common; while one works at painting the head, another the hands, or in turn each one touching his brush-stroke to the same lineaments, it would still be common work on a common subject. I acknowledge that such a method would not be likely to give the work the unity of character, which should be its principal merit. But were one to attempt the presentation of a spectacle on the stage; the Poet, the Musician, the Architect, the Painter, the Stage-setter, the Dancer, a great number of other artists must necessarily contribute to the success of the presentation. This is the idea of a work in common in the second sense; I mean, the result of dissimilar work very different in themselves, but nevertheless relating to the same object. A learned society may frame, for the advancement of human knowledge, projects, requiring for their accomplishment different kinds of research, and consequently the co-operation of its various members. In this case, each associate takes care of his part; but these different projects amalgamated by their relationship to the same purpose, form a unit and an ensemble which can be regarded as the work of the society.' Etc.
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373.14-19 "'Nectum...gratia'." "Alfred, with great affection chose Nectus, a very holy man of monastic profession, outstanding on account of his eminent learning; at his (Alfred's) exhortation, he established the college of Oxford, offering rewards to all who would publicly teach the fine arts. Many men distinguished by their learning gathered there to teach.' From Polydore Vergil, English History, bk. V, Vol. I, ed. Sir Henry Ellis (London: Camden Society, 1846), p. 217.

374.13-17 "'Domnus...Liberalium Artium.'" "'His Majesty King Charles,' says a writer of his life, 'brought with him from Rome teachers of the arts of grammar and mathematics to France, and everywhere ordered the study of letters to be widespread. For before the time of His Majesty King Charles there was no study of Liberal Arts in Gaul.'" From Joannes Launoli, "De scholis Celebrioribus seu A Carolo Magno, seu Post Bundem Carolum Per Occidentem Instauratis, Opera Omnia," Tomus IV, P. I, p. 2.

1 Nectus was one of the scholars Alfred gathered together in order to further his educational plans. Keuffel writes as follows about Nectus: "Fraepipers partes in schola Oxoniensi agebut NECTUS, sacrae enim theologiae praelector erat, quem vitae tamen monasticae brevi tanta cupidio cepit, ut in Cornubiam (sic) concesserit: Nectus played a leading role in the school of Oxford, for he was lector of theology. In a short while, such longing for the monastic life came over him that he retired to his cell." G. G. Keuffel, Historia Originis ac Progressus Scholarum Inter Christianos, p. 366. For a further reference to Keuffel, see below, 361.4-8.
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374,19-26 "'Notum sit Deo...recte loquendo.' "'Let it be known to your zeal [Abbot Baugulfus], which is pleasing to God, that we and our faithful have considered it useful that the episcopal schools and monasteries which are committed to our care by the favour of Christ, ought to be zealous in teaching, not only a way of life according to rule and an intimate acquaintance with holy religion, but also the study of letters, to those who, by God's gift, are able to learn and according to each one's ability. Just as the regular rule directs the honesty of manner so also the earnestness of teaching and learning directs and adorns the order of words, so that those who desire to please God by living righteously, may not neglect to please him by speaking eloquently'." From Joannes Launii, Opera Omnia, IV, P. I, p.2

376,9-16 "Boniface the eighth, of Rome: 'Ferventi...documentis'. "'We are lead by the zealous, praiseworthy desire that the same city which the divine bounty adorned with many gifts of grace may become also rich in the works of science so that it may produce men distinguished for the maturity of their wisdom, crowned by the excellence of their virtues, and learned in the doctrines of many sciences; and that there should be there the overflowing fountain of sciences, of which fulness all those who desire to be imbued with learning liberal arts may draw'." Quoted from Boniface VIII by Josephus Carafa, De Gymnasio Romano et de eius Professoribus..., Romae, 1751, p. 573.
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376.17-27 "And Innocent the Seventh: 'Cum litterarum... addiscant'." "Since the study of letters and the teachings of the fine arts seem to give the greatest distinction and dignity to those cities and regions where they thrive, in addition to the highest and most evident advantage which they convey to individuals and to society, and since they are most closely connected with peace and tranquillity, of which we profess ourselves most desirous, inspired by God we have resolved in this time of our Pontificate to restore to this city studies of this nature which have been so long neglected up to now and to stimulate them again by every incentive, so that men may know the truth through genuine erudition and may acquire a like erudition in what concerns God and law'." Quoted from Innocent VII by Josephus Carafa, De Gymnasio Romano..., p. 168.

376.28 - 377.3 "Again, Benedict the Fourteenth: 'Quanta... administrari!'." By the judgment and favorable experience of all men, it is most evident on how many benefits accrue to society from the public Universities, in which the lessons of the fine arts and the sciences are handed on to an upright youth; since it is through men highly cultivated and refined by the liberal disciplines that the manners and customs of the whole state are usually conformed to the rule of equity and justice and that things necessary in civil societies are seen to be done by a right and praiseworthy judgment and many things beneficial to men's customary ways of acting are found everywhere and all other affairs, both
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Latin Translation

Public and private, are administered prudently and profitably". Quoted from Benedict XIV by Josephus Carafa, De Gymnasio Romano..., p. 636.

377.4-6 "In like manner, Nicholas the Third, of Paris: 'Dum attentae... invalescit', etc." "When we examine with attentive consideration the fact that through the study of letters...men may be made learned in the sciences, through whom the truth of Scripture is explained, the ignorant are taught, the proficient rise to higher things and the Catholic faith grows stronger, etc'." Quoted from Joannes Launici. See above 374.13-17.

377.9-26 "Urban the Fifth, of Vienna: "'Commissae... documentis.'" "Extending the line of thought entrusted to us, we gladly give to the faithful our gracious approval for the study of letters, through which the reverence for the Divine Name and for their Catholic faith is extended, justice is cultivated, both public and private business is carried on profitably, every favorable circumstance of man's state is promoted... Since therefore the Duke himself [Rodolphaus], laudably concerned with the stability and utility and prosperity of such a state and of the inhabitants of his Duchy of Austria, as well as of neighboring regions, greatly desires that a Studium Generale in every faculty be set up and established by the Apostolic See in his City of Vienna, so that there the faith may be spread, the ignorant taught, equity be observed, respect for judgment increase, and the understanding of man grow; we etc., are led by the
fervent desire that the above mentioned Duchy and City be embellished by the services of the sciences, so that they may produce men conspicuous for the maturity of their judgment, crowned by the excellence of their virtues and learned in the doctrines of many sciences and that there may be in that place an ever-flowing fountain of the sciences, of whose fulness all men may drink who desire to be imbued with the lessons of literature." Quoted from Urban V by Adam Franciscus Kollarius, Analecta monumentorum... (2 tom., Vindonae, 1761-62), I, p. 53.

377.27 - 378.10. "Martin the Fifth, of Louvain: 'Super commendantis', etc." "Recently a petition was presented containing the following: that in the Duchy of Brabant etc. ...there is no place known where at least a Studium Generale Literarum may thrive, whence very many men of those regions are either ignorant of letters (of this kind) or must live in far away places in their search for knowledge of this kind... Among the other works of the virtues, those most pleasing to the Divine Majesty are doubtless those done to obtain a special crown of virtue, in which help is effectively given (by timely remedies and helpful stipends) to those who thirst to acquire the pearl of these same sciences. This being so, those in authority desire a Studium Generale Literarum, in order that, giving themselves to the study of knowledge and wisdom, they may become better both for their
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own sake and for the sake of others and that under God's guidance the prosperity of those regions may more easily increase; we, therefore, commending most highly the pious desire of these same men, through which the fountain of the sciences, from which, for the praise and glory of God, individual men, noted for the maturity of their judgment, may drink and may prosper, crowned with the marks of virtue and doctrine, etc'. "Quoted from Privilegia Academiae Louvaniensis, 1728.

378.11-16 "Clement the Sixth, of Prague:
"...fidelibus...impendimus" "...we willingly bestow our gracious approval on the faithful to pursue the study of letters, through which the reverence for the Divine Name and for their Catholic faith is extended, justice is fostered, public and private business is profitably carried on, and every favorable condition of human life is increased'." Quoted from Clement VI, Monumenta Historica Universitatis Carolopolitanae.

378.17-25 "Eugenius the Fourth, of Caen: 'Dum [...] pensamus...convoetur' etc." "When we consider how many public and private, spiritual and temporal benefits the study of letters, in driving away the darkness of ignorance, confers on the whole world, as a result of
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which the study of faith is strengthened against heresy, the worship of
God spreads, the salvation of souls is provided for, peace and
tranquillity among men is brought about, rewards are given to the good,
the wicked are punished with torments, the prosperity of the human state
is increased, justice, the queen of virtues is esteemed, the Church
militant is strengthened both spiritually and temporally from its rich
fruits..." Quoted from "Erectio Academiae Cadomensis ab Eugenio Papa
IV," a letter of Pope Eugenius of Caen, dated (June 3, 1437), quoted by
Jean Luc D'Achery, Spicilegium, Tomus III, p. 762.

381.4-8 "'And now almost all the students, with no foundation
in grammar, or the authors and philosophers, hasten to hear lectures on
Law, which evidently is not one of the liberal arts; for the liberal
arts are sought for themselves, Law in order to acquire a salary'."
Matthew Paris quoted by G. G. Keuffel, Historia Originis ac Progressus
Scholarum Inter Christianos, pp. 377-378.

381.12-16 "'Academiae...tradita est'.' 'Academies have been
set up,'...to which people come from all parts as to a market for study
and knowledge; in which Christian doctrine is handed on more perfectly,
more carefully and more splendidly than in the colleges and seminaries
of clerics'." Joannes Morinus (Jean Morin), Commentarius De Sacris
Ecclesiae Ordinationibus, Part III, Exercitationibus XIII, Section XIV.,
p. 187.
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381.27-29 "Receptissimâ...tracta sit'." "The word 'University' or 'Studium generale or universale' is most common; even if it is not clear enough, what the word University has been applied to up till now'. Hermann Conring, De Antiquitatis Academica, Vol. I, Supplementum I, Section VII, p. 197.

381.30-34 "In his...effectum est'. "Even if in these institutions the universal doctrine and science of divine and human things is taught, for they were established and obtained the name of Universities for this end; nevertheless, up to the present, little has been done in the study of natural things and mathematics'. Daniel George Morhof, Polynistor i. 14, II, p. 138.

382.1-5 "iae Scholae...coeperunt'. "These schools (academies) were called public, because in them all the arts and sciences were everywhere taught; nor were they open only to clerics or those about to become clerics, as the episcopal schools, but to all young men indiscriminately; and from this fact they began to be called little by little Universities; that is, universal 'schools'." Zeger Bernhard Van Espen, Jus Ecclesiasticum Universum, Vol. II; Titulus XI, Caput IV, Section IV, p. 152.

382.6-14 "[Antiquioris usus sunt] denominationes...studiorum'. "Ancient writers employed the names Studium Generale and University, attributed from then on to the schools of which I now treat,
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because in them all the sciences were treated, since on the contrary in
the cathedral and monastic schools and in the others which had been
erected before this, only certain doctrines were taught to the youth.
However Haberus gives another meaning to the name University, thinking
that this title belongs to academies insofar as they have jurisdiction
and exist with a definite government: but Thomasius warns us on this
text, 'the word does not refer to this, but to the universality of
studies'." C. G. Keuffel, Historia Originis Ac Progressus Scholarum
Inter Christianos, pp. 319-320.

382.16-19 "'Vocantur...tractuntur'." "'The well-known public
schools are called Universities, a name taken either from the fact that
all the sciences are taught in them; or if not all the sciences are
taught, from the fact that some sciences are taught to be heard and
learned by all'." Andres Mendo, De Jure Academico Selectae Questione
Theologicae...et Politicae, 1668.

388.6 - 389.23 "Hugo de St. Victore...quoque et historiae',
etc." "Hugh of St. Victor has a Treatise de Studio Legendi, in which he
treats of philosophy and its parts. He says that philosophy is the
'Study of wisdom,' and wisdom is 'comprehending (laying hold of or
grasping) things just as they are;'; or more largely, a 'thorough study
of all human affairs and a complete investigation of the science of
divine things'. Consequently, there are as many parts of philosophy as
there are 'diversities of things [subject-matters].' For this reason
'Philosophy is the art of arts, and the discipline of disciplines,' and
'all arts tend to the one end of Philosophy'. After dividing off and
enumerating the arts and sciences, he continues:

"Out of all the sciences, the ancients, in their studies,
especially selected seven to be mastered by those who were to be
educated. These seven they considered so to excel all the rest in
usefulness that anyone who had been thoroughly schooled in them might
afterward come to a knowledge of the others by his own inquiry and
effort rather than by listening to a teacher. For these, one might say,
constitute the best instruments, the best rudiments, by which the way is
prepared for the mind's complete knowledge of philosophic truth.
Therefore they are called by the name trivium and quadrivium, because by
them, as by certain ways (viae), a quick mind may enter into the secret
places of wisdom. ...Hence, it is a fact that in that time [Pythagoras]¹
there were so many learned men that they alone wrote more than we are
able to read. But the students of our day, whether from ignorance or
from unwillingness, fail to hold to a fit method of study, and therefore
we find many who study but few who are wise. ...It seems to me that our
effort should first be given to the arts, wherein are the foundations of

¹ Pythagoras (c.540 B.C.) was a Greek philosopher of Samos who
afterwards settled in Southern Italy, and founded the school named after
him.
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all subjects and wherein truth pure and simple is revealed, especially to those seven, previously mentioned, which are the tools of the whole of philosophy. ...These [the seven liberal arts] indeed are so connected with one another and so mutually dependent on their principles that if one is abandoned the others are not able to make a philosopher; whence they seem to me to err, who pay no attention to such a coherence among the arts; they select a certain one from them for themselves and, leaving the rest untouched, think they may become perfect in that one. ...There are indeed some, who, although they omit nothing of what is to be read, nevertheless, do not know how to give each art what belongs to it, but, while treating one, lecture on them all. In grammar they discourse about the theory of syllogisms; etc. etc. ...When you have studied the arts and come to know by disputation and comparison what the proper concern of each of them is, then, at this state, it will be fitting for you to bring the principles of each to bear upon all the others, and, by a comparative and back-and-forth examination of the arts, to investigate the things in them which you did not well understand before. Do not strike into a lot of by-ways until you know the main roads: you will go along securely when you are not under the fear of going astray' (ll.3-6).

"He brings in Literature thus:— 'There are two kinds of writings. The first kind comprises what are properly called the arts; the second, those writings which are appendages of the arts. The arts
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are subordinate to philosophy; that is, they deal with some definite and determined [limited] subject-matter of philosophy—as do grammar, dialectic, and others of this sort. The appendages of the arts are those which only refer to philosophy; that is, are concerned with some non-philosophical matter, which however sometimes touches in an intermittent and confused fashion topics taken from the arts, or, to put it simply, they prepare the way for philosophy. Of this sort are all the songs of the poets—tragedies, comédies, satires, heroic verse and lyric, iambics, certain didactic poems, fables and histories,...'"


390.26 - 391.7 "'Ex est ratio...excitare'." "That is the aspect,' says the Sacred Congregation, concerning the Regulation of Studies, under Leo the Twelfth, 'of things and of thoughts which has been naturally instilled in us, so that it may reveal the idea of order to us. Hence St. Augustine says: 'In order to explain to you therefore as well as I can and briefly the idea of the eternal law, which has been imprinted on us, it is that idea by which it is right that all things are most orderly; order however, whether of like or unlike things, being a disposition which gives to each thing its proper place,' does not permit a thing to wander about in a confused way; it constitutes each thing within its own limits. Hence it is that in Physics,
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Metaphysics and in Morals, indeed in the whole realm of the sciences, a most beautiful order suines forth, which draws the eye and the mind in a wonderful way. It is permissible to treat briefly a few aspects of the excellent harmony of the arts and sciences, in order to raise up the souls of young people and to excite in them a love of wisdom...

François Cardinal Borzaxoli, Collectio Legum de recta Studiorum ratione

391.25 - 392.23 "nullus...gravissimum." "There is no one of any art so mediocre or humble, even the lowly professor, who, if he is proud, either does not think his art to be the most outstanding of all or who does not seek and contend that it be considered such; and this is so accepted by custom, that it is thought to be licit and pious for someone to exalt his art and to make it equal to the heavens, even to place it before all others. The grammarian considers himself alone wise and most men foolish; the philosopher pities the rest of men as brutes; the lawyer laughs at all others; the theologian despises them; not that they would admit or reveal that they are ignorant of the other arts; on the contrary, they are not at all slow to confirm that all the other arts are included and contained in their own one discipline in a higher way than in those books which expressly treat of them.

"L. Crassus affirmed that in Cicero every kind of discipline and art was contained in the knowledge of law; and that indeed, if it
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please the gods, in the book of the Twelve Tables; and our lawyers are convinced of the same thing. The grammarian believes that the whole of philosophy, although widely diffused, is contained in the books of the historians and poets; with these in their hands they do not need Aristotle or Plato. Shall they rightly perceive and hand on an art, who think it to dwell in strange places and that it is to be sought there where scarcely a trace of it is to be found? Therefore you see now false and absurd are the things which are asserted in all the arts by those who treat them with violence, based on authors who say something about them in passing and when dealing with something else. How many absurd philosophical doctrines have their origin in Homer, since many of the old authors read him not as an ingenious poet, but as a most learned and serious philosopher?" Joannes Ludovicus Vives (Juan Luis Vives), "De Causis Corruptarium Artium," Omnia Opera, Tomus VI, pp. 20-21.

399.16 - 400.8 "'Adduxit...prodessent?" "'The magnitude of the matter drew men to treat and cultivate the arts and we judge one task to be by far the most worthy of our mind by its excellence—the desire of discovering truth—and nothing is more noble or becomes man more, since ignorance, error and deception are mean and miserable; and Aristotle, a most serious author, asserts that the ancients philosophised to avoid these things and not for any other cause or for any other purpose.

"'The wonder of so great a task compelled those great minds to
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the study and investigation of the causes; hence if they thought they had found anything new or unheard of by others, there followed an incredible pleasure, as over a victory for which they were responsible and, after overcoming so many difficulties, that pleasure kept them in their pains and labour, which they preferred to the works, dignities and all other conveniences of life; thus the natural inclinations of men were let loose, so that they might be devoted above all to finding and drawing out the truth, some led by the hope of reward, others that they might enjoy those pleasures which are had especially from observing the spectacle of nature, always changing yet enduring. The most noble characters, who considered themselves learned and endowed with great light of soul and power of mind, went so far under the inspiration of that sublime and generous character that they considered that such noble qualities should not be squandered on anything except in the investigation and enjoyment of what was most beautiful and, as far as possible, profitable to many..." "Juan Luis Vives, "De Causis Corruptarum Artium"," Omnia Opera, Tomus VI, I, 2, p. 14.

400.10 - 401.18 "'Galenus...prorsus'." "'The physician Galenus uses this division of the arts to say: 'some are contemptible and vile, which are done by corporal and manual work', which the Greeks called "Chirurgical," 'done by hand,' 'others are honourable and worthy of man', among which he places medicine first. This can be pardoned in
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the name of love for one's profession and as a form of piety toward a deserving nurse; then he adds: rhetoric, music, geometry, astronomy, dialectic, grammar, law. Nor is it wrong to add to this number those arts by which we model and paint, because these, although they are not without manual exertion, nevertheless, do not seem to need force and youthful muscles; Seneca may not be appealed to in order to count painting among the liberal arts, no more than sculptors or marble-masons or other servants of luxury. He rejects equally wrestlers and that whole science has to do with oil and mud, in which point he agrees with Galenus; nor, in the opinion of Seneca, are military exercises to be considered liberal studies; Sallustius also excludes hunting.

Posidonius the Stoic divided the arts in this way: some he called common and low, which are done by hand and are directed to providing for the needs of life, having no part in what is becoming and honourable; others he called trifling, which serve the pleasure of the eye or ear: they are childish and have something similar to the liberal arts, which the Greeks call "eleutherias," "that which befits a freeman" which do not lead the mind to virtue, but are helpful to it; finally the liberal arts, he says, are alone free, whose concern is virtue.

"The common opinion is that there are seven liberal arts, three concerned with speech, four with quantity. They named them 'free', as if freemen learned and used only these. Scarcely any free man in a free city
did his work by the manual arts: rather a slave was kept for these things; the youth gave themselves only to those things which were considered worthy of a free man, as for example military service, the theatre, study, public business, the government of the state, legal affairs and exercises of this kind. Hence the saying in the Comedy: 'Try something in letters, in the school, in music, which a free man should know.' For these arts were considered to be most becoming to free men in cultivating life and in ruling the state, that their speech might be correct and pure, etc. etc. ...I am surprised that they omitted architecture and optics, which are very useful. ...In our schools these arts are the foundations of three edifices—medicine, theology, and law—which we call the supreme arts and disciplines and which serve every day life with the first. We add moral philosophy, which greatly supports theology, and from which sacred and profane law are thought to arise: also knowledge of nature, without which medicine is most imperfect..." Juan Luis Vives, "De Causis Corruptarium Artium," *Omnia Opera*, Tomus VI, I, 2, pp. 11-13.

401.20-33 "'Sequitur...patefaciam'." "'Rest follows action: reason is like an examination, judgment a choice, contemplation however is like a quiet and prudent inspection of all those things which reason has collected and refined, which the judgment has received and approved. In it there is no reasoning, in which everything is already certain and
expounded. And since every pleasure rises from a certain proportion and
harmony between an object and a faculty and since nothing is more in
harmony with the mind than truth, it happens that in contemplation the
greatest pleasures are found. In this fact, both truth and nature are
seen, for truths are most gratifying to the extent that they are most
certain and most refined, put forth simultaneously with their principles
and first causes; if this may not be the case, the next thing is that
they should at least approach the truth as closely as possible and be
most like it. So one is of such a sluggish and abject mind that he is
not excited by the phrase: 'I will show you the cause of this thing'.
401.34 - 403.11 "'Neque...Attinent'." "The mind is not to be
so narrowly formed that it would subsist within any one art. Those who
do that certainly are poor judges and do not perceive how much human
nature is capable of; it is so agile and fast, that it cannot do one
thing only, if we listen to Fabius. Those inexperienced men are not to
be listened to who accuse man's "erudition," "wide learning" of being
greater than man's ability or useless. There is therefore a certain
affinity and union of the sciences, which the Greeks call "encyclopaedia"
"the circle of knowledge," so that one cannot be called perfect in one,
without touching the others. The notion of the mechanical, low and
common arts is different and among these there is no union; the liberal
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arts are not to be judged by their characteristics. He who deals with tools may safely know nothing of shoe-making; but in the liberal arts all conspire together and join hands. We know that Vitruvius demanded in his architect all these things which masters of those disciplines require in perfect orators and artists. The Stoics judged that all these arts and sciences should be gathered up into the philosopher, so that they would not want him to be ignorant of the mechanical arts and should think him unworthy if he used the services of others in his duties as a citizen. Let us come now to the more elegant disciplines: we are inspired by nature to extol all of them as one, so that it is a great disgrace to be weak in any one. There is no doubt that, even mediocre minds may be happy; for there is in them "an impulse for all the sciences," such as we find in great minds and which Plato describes for us. There is a "summit" in our minds, if one may speak in this way, by which they are able, either by nature or by practice, to embrace many things at once, to abstract from individual things and go from that humble state to the sublime. Thus there emerges in it what we may call the "architectonic," "master planner," or from the teachings of the Stoics the "negemonicon," "directive faculty," which penetrates all things as if by a royal spirit and like a thunderbolt, and illuminates it all with a certain light... Whoever has distinct ideas of things in his mind, mastered however and not confused, must increase by them, and not diminish, that "crypticon," "critical faculty," which results
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from the conciliation of all the parts. There is a greater fear of "want of distinction" in those who deal with a "limited science," who very often judge all other things by it, even though they know nothing of the other sciences... Nor however do I wish that whoever takes up all the types of disciplines should remain in all of them at the same time; for time and business and other hindrances prevent us from doing this. Hence we shall seize this whole foundation with our mind, our heart, our desire; but we shall circumscribe with certain limits its most agreeable part which we shall pursue and in which we shall exercise our industry. The very vastness of the sciences excludes its visitors; those who never stay will never be at home, if they wish to dwell everywhere or who reach out to many things in a light and passing way'.

D. J. Morhof, Polyhistor, i, 1, 2-12, pp. 2-4.
APPENDIX TO THE THESIS

SECTION II

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The following are corrections of obvious errors in the Latin text:

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<th>Amendment</th>
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<td>&quot;ut...privata&quot;</td>
<td>et privateae</td>
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<td>&quot;vicimarum&quot;</td>
<td>vicinarum</td>
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<td>&quot;tunc&quot;</td>
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<td>The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated</td>
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ABSTRACT

The Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education, Addressed to the Catholics of Dublin, by John Henry Newman (Dublin: James Duffy, 1852) is the text for the Introduction and Annotation that is the subject of this thesis. The Discourses were a projected series of lectures on university education requested by Dr. Paul Cullen, Archbishop of Dublin, for the purpose of launching the proposed Catholic University of Ireland.

The first five lectures were given on successive Mondays, beginning at three o'clock on the afternoon of May 10, 1852, in the New Assembly Rooms of the Rotunda Hospital in Dublin. The lectures were published in fortnightly pamphlets, the first five shortly after delivery, the second five, with a Preface and Appendix, in the autumn of that year, 1852. The ten lectures were then bound into a volume which is dated "In Fest. Praesent. B.V.M. (November 21st) 1852," the publisher being James Duffy of Dublin. A pencilled note in Newman's hand on the fly-leaf of one of his copies gives the actual date of publication as "Feb. 2nd (Feast of the Purification of the B.V.M.) 1853." This was the first edition, entitled: Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education. Addressed to the Catholics of Dublin. This thesis is based on the material of the ten lectures that comprised the first edition, with the Preface and Appendix.

The purposes of this research on Newman's Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education have been as follows: first to
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present the 1852 text of the ten Discourses, with the Preface and Appendix, as they were published in the first edition by James Duffy, Dublin; secondly, to provide an Introduction to the 1852 text that depicts Newman, the scholar and educator, with emphasis on the sources of and influences on the educational ideas that he presented to his Dublin audience; thirdly, to include annotation following the 1852 text containing critical commentary on the ideas, bibliographical sources, and prose style of the ten Discourses on university education, the Preface and the Appendix.

The present thesis has the form of an explanation of the text with an Introduction containing such biographical and explanatory material as will form a suitable introduction to Newman and the Discourses. Since the thesis is not a critical evaluation of Newman's educational ideals, nor a comparison of Newman's ideals with those of the present-day educators, but an attempt to determine Newman's meaning accurately from the text and related passages in his other works; the references, wherever possible, are to Newman's other numerous writings or to works that he has mentioned in the Discourses. The over-all aim of this study has been to present the first edition of Newman's Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education as worthy of careful study and appreciation.

The thesis is comprised of the following four sections: Section I contains five parts. The first, John Henry Newman, the Scholar and Educator, is a brief biographical sketch that emphasizes the
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sources and the development of Newman's educational ideals as well as notes Newman's major writings that preceded the writing of the Discourses. The account has been taken, wherever possible, from Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his Life in the English Church with a Brief Autobiography, edited, Anne Mozley, 2 Vols. (1891); Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman, edited, C. S. Dessain, Vols. 11-31; Autobiographical Writings, edited, Henry Tristram; and Apologia Pro Vita Sua. The second part, The Education that Made the Man, describes the sources of influence—home, family, school, and university—that formed Newman, the man. The third part is Newman's Campaign in Ireland. The account, taken mainly from Newman's letters, gives the immediate situation surrounding the presentation of the Discourses to a Dublin audience, as well as the organization and progress of the University of Ireland. Part IV is a summary of Newman's Idea of a Liberal Education from the ten Discourses. Part V is a discussion of the Prose Style of the Discourses...on University Education from the point of view of Newman as a controversialist, with an emphasis on the literary qualities.

Section II of the thesis comprises the annotation of the ten Discourses, the Preface and the Appendix of the Discourses...on University Education. Selected points in each discourse are annotated by means of commentary and elaboration from Newman's other writings with a view to illuminating Newman's main ideas in each discourse and their relation to his idea of a Liberal Education. The main idea in the
Discourses is the necessity for maintaining the unity of knowledge, secular and religious, as a requisite for the cultivation of mind that constitutes a Liberal Education. Newman stated that the principles he would maintain on the subject of Liberal Education have no special connection with Revelation, but are dictated by human prudence and wisdom, and though true, just, and good in themselves, they argue nothing whatever for the sanctity or faith of those who maintain them.

Section III, the Summary and Conclusion, emphasizes Newman's hope that in the university where Truth would find a home there would be destroyed that diversity of centres which results in an apparent hostility between Faith and Reason and there would be re-erkindled that majestic vision of the Middle Age in which the Secular and the Religious are a unity both in the person and in society.

Section IV, Supplementary Material, consists of the Bibliography and the Appendix to the thesis comprised of the French Translation and the Latin Translation of several excerpts that Newman included in the Appendix to the Discourses. These excerpts are important in that they are Newman's sources and references which throw considerable light on the main ideas in the Discourses.

In summary, the fact that there has not been to date an annotated edition of the Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education, Dublin, 1852, the first edition of a work that is known widely as the Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated, makes this research an important and necessary contribution to Newman
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The first edition of Newman's Discourses on...University Education is important in that it expresses his ideas on education just seven years after he had entered the Catholic Church and had resigned his Oriel Fellowship at Oxford. Understandably Newman was eager to be associated once more with university life. He began the writing of the Discourses with all the enthusiasm and hopefulness that a new project inspires. There was the vision before him of a new Oxford, this time imbued with the spirit of Catholicism, set in an Ireland, associated in his mind with centuries of learning and culture, flourishing amid the strength and stability of an ancient religion. Newman expressed his ideas on education most sincerely and openly in the Discourses with a feeling of security and hope that this time his insights into the very real danger to intellectual culture of the rising tide of Liberalism would be understood and accepted and that a bulwark against infidelity would be established in the proposed university. Therefore, the first edition expresses Newman's educational ideals in their original form at the time when he was involved with the planning of a new university. They were in a sense the ideals of a founding father on the establishment of a new institution of learning and delivered at the outset, much as the ideals of the respective founders were expressed and incorporated into the statutes of the various colleges of Oxford in their early beginnings.
Hospes eram, et collegiatis Me.

IN GRATIEUL NEVER-DYING REMEMBRANCE
OF HIS MANY FRIENDS AND BENEFACITORS,
LIVING AND DEAD,
AT HOME AND ABROAD,
IN IRELAND, GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE,
IN BELGIUM, GERMANY, POLAND, ITALY, AND MALTA,
IN NORTH AMERICA, AND OTHER COUNTRIES,
WHO, BY THEIR RESOLUTE PRAYERS AND PENANCES,
AND BY THEIR GENEROUS STUBORRN EFFORTS,
AND BY THEIR MUNIFICENT ALMS,
HAVE BROKEN FOR HIM THE STRESS
OF A GREAT ANXIETY,
THESE DISCOURSES,
OFFERED TO OUR LADY AND ST. PHILIP ON ITS RISE,
COMPOSED UNDER ITS PRESSURE,
FINISHED ON THE EVE OF ITS TERMINATION,
ARE RESPECTFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY INSCRIBED.

BY THE AUTHOR.

J. F. FOWLER, PRINTER,
3 GROW STREET, DAME STREET,
DUBLIN.
IN GRATEFUL NEVER-DYING REMEMBRANCE
OF HIS MANY FRIENDS AND BENEFACtors,
LIVING, AND DEAD,
AT HOME AND ABROAD,
IN IRELAND, GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE,
IN BELGIUM, GERMANY, POLAND, ITALY, AND MALTA,
IN NORTH AMERICA, AND OTHER COUNTRIES,
WHO, BY THEIR RESOLUTE PRAYERS AND PENSIONS,
AND BY THEIR GENEROUS Stubborn EFFORTS,
AND BY THEIR MUNIFICENT ALMS,
HAVE BROKEN FOR HIM THE STRESS
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THE view taken of a University in the DIS-
coursés which form this Volume, is of the
following kind:—that it is a place of teaching
universal knowledge. This implies that its
object is, on the one hand, intellectual, not
moral; and, on the other, that it is the dif-
fusion and extension of knowledge, rather
than the advancement. If its object were
scientific and philosophical discovery, I do not
see why a University should have students;
if religious training, I do not see how it
can be the seat of philosophy and science.

Such is a University in its essence, and
independently of its relation to the Church.
But, practically speaking, it cannot fulfil its
object duly, such as I have described it, without the Church’s assistance; or, to use the theological term, the Church is necessary for its integrity. Not that its main characters are changed by this incorporation: it still has the office of intellectual education; but the Church steadies it in the performance of that office.

Such are the main principles of the Discourses which follow; though it would be unreasonable for me to expect, that I have treated so large and important a field of thought with the fulness and precision, necessary to secure me from incidental misconceptions of my meaning on the part of the reader. It is true, there is nothing novel or singular in the argument which I have been pursuing, but this does not protect me from such misconceptions; for the very circumstance that the views I have been delineating are not original with me, may lead to false notions as to my relations of opinion towards those, from whom I happened in the first instance to learn them, and may cause me to be interpreted by the objects or sentiments of schools, to which I should be simply opposed.

For instance, some persons may be tempted to complain, that I have servilely followed the English idea of a University, to the disparagement of that Knowledge, which I profess to be so strenuously upholding; and they may anticipate that an academical system, formed upon my model, will result in nothing better or higher than in the production of that antiquated variety of human nature and remnant of feudalism, called “a gentleman.” Now, I have anticipated this change in various parts of my discussion; if, however, any Catholic is found to prefer it (and to Catholics of course this volume is addressed), I would have him first of all ask himself the previous question, what he conceives to be the reason contemplated by the Holy See, in recommending just now to the Irish Church the establishment of a Catholic University? Has the Supreme Pontiff recommended it for the sake of the Sciences, which are to be the

matter, or rather of the Students, who are to be the subjects of its teaching? Has he any obligation or duty at all towards secular knowledge as such? Would it become his Apostolical Ministry, and his descent from the Fisherman, to have a zeal for the Baconian or other philosophy of man for its own sake? or, on the other hand, does the Vicar of Christ contemplate such achievements of the intellect, as far as he contemplates them, solely, and simply in their relation to the interests of Revealed Truth? Has he any more direct jurisdiction over the wisdom than over the civil power of this world? Is he bound by office or by vow, to be the preacher of the theory of gravitation, or a martyr for electro-magnetism? Would he be acquitting himself of the dispensation committed to him, if he were smitten with an abstract love of these matters, however true, or beautiful, or ingenious, or useful? What he does, he does for the sake of Religion; if he looks with satisfaction on strong temporal governments, which promise perpetuity, it is for the sake of Religion; and if he encourages and patronizes art and science, it is for the sake of Religion. He rejoices in the widest and most philosophical systems of intellectual education, from an intimate conviction that Truth is his real ally, as it is his profession; and that Knowledge and Reason are sure ministers to Faith.

This being undeniable, it is plain, that when he suggests to the Irish Hierarchy the establishment of a University, his first and chief and direct object is, not science, art, professional skill, literature, the discovery of knowledge, but some benefit or other, by means of literature and science, to his own children; not indeed their formation on any narrow or fantastic type, as, for instance, that of an "English Gentleman" may be called, but their exercise and growth in certain habits, moral, or intellectual. Nothing short of this can be his aim, if, as becomes the Successor of the Apostles, he is to be able to say with St. Paul, "Non judicavi me scribere aliquid inter vos, nisi Jesum Christum, et hunc crucifixum." Just as a commander wishes to have tall and well-
formed and vigorous soldiers, not from any abstract devotion to the military standard of height or age, but for the purposes of war, and no one thinks it anything but natural and praiseworthy in him, to be contemplating, not abstract qualities, but his own living and breathing men; so, in like manner, when the Church founds a University, she is not cherishing talent, genius, or knowledge, for their own sake, but for the sake of her children, with a view to their spiritual welfare, and their religious influence and usefulness, with the object of training them to fill their respective posts in life better, and making them more intelligent, capable, active members of society.

Nor can it justly be said that in thus acting she sacrifices Science, and perverts a University from its proper end, under a pretence of fulfilling the duties of her mission, as soon as it is taken into account, that there are other institutions, far more suited to act as instruments of stimulating philosophical inquiry and extending the boundaries of our knowledge than a

University. Such for instance, are the literary and scientific "Academies", which are so celebrated in Italy and France, and which have frequently been connected with Universities, as committees, or, as it were, congregations or delegacies subordinate to them. Thus the present Royal Society originated in Charles the Second's time, in Oxford; such just now are the Ashmolean and Architectural Societies in the same seat of learning, which have risen in our own time. Such too is the British Association, a migratory body, which at least at times is found in the halls of the Protestant Universities of the United Kingdom, and the faults of which lie, not in its exclusive devotion to science, but in graver matters which it is irrelevant here to enter upon. Such again is the Antiquarian Society, the Royal Academy for the Fine Arts, and others which might be mentioned. Such is the sort of institution which primarily contemplates Science itself, and not students; and, in thus speaking, I am saying nothing of my own, being supported by no less an authority than Cur-
common sense of mankind has associated the search after truth with seclusion and quiet. The greatest thinkers have been too intent on their subject to admit of interruption; they have been men of absent minds and idiosyncratic habits, and have, more or less, shunned the lecture room and the public school. Pythagoras, the light of Magna Graecia, lived for a time in a cave; Thales, the light of Ionia, lived unmarried and in private, and refused the invitations of princes. Plato withdrew from Athens to the groves of Academus. Aristotle gave twenty years to a studious discipleship under him. Friar Bacon lived in his tower upon the Isis; Newton in an intense severity of meditation which almost shook his reason. The great discoveries in chemistry and electricity were not made in Universities. Observatories are more frequently out of Universities than in them, and even when within their bounds need have no moral connexion with them. Porson had no classes; Elmsley lived good part of his life in the country. I do not say that there

* Opere t. 3, p. 353.
are not great examples the other way, perhaps Socrates, certainly Lord Bacon; still I think it must be allowed on the whole, that, while teaching involves external engagements, the natural home for experiment and speculation is retirement.

Returning then to the consideration of the question, from which we may seem to have digressed, thus much we have made good,—that, whether or not a Catholic University should put before it, as its great object, to make its students "gentlemen", still to make them something or other is its great object, and not simply to protect the interests and advance the dominion of Science. If then this may be taken for granted, as I think it may, the only point which remains to be settled is, whether I have formed a probable conception of the sort of benefit which the Holy See has intended to confer on Catholics who speak the English tongue, by recommending to the Irish Hierarchy the establishment of a University; and this I now proceed to consider.

Here then, it is natural to ask those who are interested in the question, whether any better interpretation of the recommendation of the Holy See can be given, than that which I have suggested in this Volume. Certainly it does not seem to me rash to pronounce, that, whereas Protestants have great advantages of education in the Schools, Colleges, and Universities of the United Kingdom, our ecclesiastical rulers have it in purpose, that Catholics should enjoy the like advantages, whatever they are, to the full. I conceive they view it as prejudicial to the interests of Religion, that there should be any cultivation of mind bestowed upon Protestants, which is not given to their own youth also. As they wish their schools for the poorer and middle classes to be at least on a par with those of Protestants, they contemplate the same thing as regards that higher education which is given to comparatively the few. Protestant youths, who can spare the time, continue their studies till the age of twenty-one or twenty-two; thus they employ a time of life all-important and especially favourable to
mental culture. I conceive that our Prelates are impressed with the fact and its consequences, that a youth who ends his education at seventeen, is no match (caeteris paribus) for one who ends it at twenty-one.

All classes indeed of the community are impressed with a fact so obvious as this. The consequence is, that Catholics who aspire to be on a level with Protestants in discipline and refinement of intellect, have recourse to Protestant Universities to obtain what they cannot find at home. Here then is an additional reason,—assuming, that is (as the Rescripts from Propaganda allow me to do), that Protestant education is inexpedient for our youth,—why those advantages, whatever they are, which the Protestant sects dispense through the medium of Protestantism, should be accessible to Catholics in a Catholic form.

What are these advantages? I repeat, they are in one word the culture of the intellect. Insulted, robbed, oppressed, and thrust aside, Catholics in these islands have not been in a condition for centuries to attempt the sort of education, which is necessary for the man of the world, the statesman, the great proprietor, or the opulent gentleman. Their legitimate stations, duties, employments, have been taken from them, and the qualifications withal, social and intellectual, both for reversing the forfeiture, and for doing justice to the reversal. The time is come when this moral disability must be removed. Our desideratum is, not the manners and habits of gentlemen;—these can be, and are, acquired in various other ways, by good society, by foreign travel, by the innate grace and dignity of the Catholic mind;—but the force, the steadiness, the comprehensiveness and the flexibility of intellect, the command over our own powers, the instinctive just estimate of things as they pass before us, which sometimes indeed is a natural gift, but commonly is not gained without much effort and the exercise of years. This is real cultivation of mind; and I do not deny that the characteristic excellences of a gentleman are included in it. Nor need we be ashamed to admit it, since
the time the Poet wrote, that "Ingenuas didiciisse fideliter artes, Enollit mores". Certainly a liberal education does manifest itself in a courtesy, propriety, and polish of word and action, which is beautiful in itself, and acceptable to others; but it does much more. It brings the mind into form, for the mind is like the body. Boys outgrow their shape and their strength; their limbs have to be knit together, and their constitution needs tone. Mistaking animal spirits for nerve, and over-confident in their health, ignorant what they can bear and how to manage themselves, they are immoderate and extravagant; and fall into sharp sicknesses. This is an emblem of their minds; at first they have no principles laid down within them as a foundation for the intellect to build upon; they have no discriminating convictions, and no grasp of consequences. In consequence they talk at random, if they talk much, and cannot help being flippant, or what is emphatically called "young". They are merely dazzled by phenomena, instead of perceiving things.

It were well, if none remained boys all their lives; but what is more common than the sight of grown men, talking on political or moral or religious subjects, in that offhand, idle way, which we signify by the word unreal? "That they simply do not know what they are talking about", is the spontaneous silent remark of any man of sense who hears them. Hence such persons have no difficulty in contradicting themselves in successive sentences, without being conscious of it. Hence others, whose defect in intellectual training is more latent, have their most unfortunate erotchets, as they are called, or hobbies, which deprive them of the influence which their estimable qualities would otherwise secure. Hence others can never look straight before them, never see the point, and have no difficulties in the most difficult subjects. Others are hopelessly obstinate and prejudiced, and return the next moment to their old opinions, after they have been driven from them, without even an attempt to explain why. Others are so intemperate and
intractable, that there is no greater calamity for a good cause than that they should get hold of it. It is very plain from the very particulars I have mentioned, that, in this delineation of intellectual infirmities, I am drawing from Protestantism and Protestants; I am referring to what meets us in every railway carriage, in every coffee-room or table-d'hôte, in every mixed company. Nay, it is wonderful, that, with all their advantages, so many Protestants leave the University, with so little of real liberality and refinement of mind, in consequence of the discipline to which they have been subjected. Much allowance must be made here for original nature; much, for the detestable narrowness and (I cannot find a better word) the priggishness of their religion. Catholics, on the other hand, are, compared with them, almost born gentlemen. Take the same ranks in the two Religions, and the fact is undeniable. The simplicity, courtesy, and intelligence, for instance, of the peasants in Ireland and France have often been remarked upon. Still, after all, in this province, which is not of a distinctly religious nature, Catholicism does little more than create instincts and impulses, which it requires a steady training to mould into definite and permanent habits. They may begin well, and end ill. The want of that training, in Catholics, so far as there is a want, is a positive loss to them; and the existence of it among Protestants, as far as it exists, is to them a positive gain.

When the intellect has once been properly trained and formed to have a connected view or grasp of things, it will display itself with more or less effect according to its particular quality and measure in the individual. In the generality it is visible in good sense, sobriety of thought, reasonableness, candour, self-command, and steadiness of view. In some it will have developed habits of business, power of influencing others, and sagacity. In others it will elicit the talent of philosophical speculation, and lead the mind forward to eminence in this or that intellectual department. In all it will be a faculty
of entering with comparative ease into any subject of thought, and of taking up with aptitude any science or profession. All this it will be and do in a measure, even when the mental formation be made after a mode but partially true; for, as far as effectiveness goes, even false views of things have more influence and inspire more respect than none at all. Men who fancy they see what is not are more energetic, and make their way better, than those who see nothing; and so the undoubting infidel, the fanatic, the bigot, are able to do much, while the mere hereditary Christian, who has never realized the truths which he holds, is able to do nothing. But, if consistency of view can add so much strength even to error, what may it not be expected to furnish to the dignity, the energy, and the influence of Truth!

Some one, however, will perhaps object that I am but advocating that spurious philosophy, which shows itself in what, for want of a word, I may call "viewiness," when I speak so much of the formation, and consequent grasp, of the intellect. It may be said that the theory of University Education, which I have been delineating, if acted upon, would teach youths nothing soundly or thoroughly, and would dismiss them with nothing better than brilliant general views about all things whatever.

This indeed would be a most serious objection, if well founded, to what I have advanced in this Volume, and would deserve and would gain my immediate attention, had I any reason to think that I could not remove it at once, by a simple explanation of what I consider the true mode of educating, were this the place to do so. But these Discourses are directed simply to the consideration of the aims and principles of Education. Suffice it then to say here, that I hold very strongly that the first step in intellectual training is to impress upon a boy's mind the idea of science, method, order, principle, and system; of rule and exception, of richness and harmony. This is commonly and excellently done by beginning with Grammar; nor can too
great accuracy, or minuteness and subtlety of teaching be used towards him, as his faculties expand, with this simple view. Hence it is that critical scholarship is so important a discipline for him, when he is leaving school for the University. A second science is the Mathematics: this should follow Grammar, still with the same object, viz., to give him a conception of development and arrangement from and around a common centre. Hence it is that Chronology and Geography are so necessary for him, when he reads History, which is otherwise little better than a story-book. Hence too Metrical Composition, when he reads poetry; in order to stimulate his powers into action in every practicable way, and to prevent a passive reception of images and ideas which may else pass out of the mind as soon as they have entered it. Let him once gain this habit of method, of starting from fixed points, of making his ground good as he goes, of distinguishing what he knows from what he does not, and I conceive he will be gradually initiated into the largest and truest philosophical views, and will feel nothing but impatience and disgust at the random theories and imposing sophistries and dashing paradoxes, which carry away half-formed and superficial intellects.

Such parti-coloured ingenuities are indeed one of the chief evils of the day, and men of real talent are not slow to minister to them. An intellectual man, as the world now conceives of him, is one who is full of "views", on all subjects of philosophy, on all matters of the day. It is almost thought a disgrace not to have a view at a moment's notice on any question from the Personal Advent to the Cholera or Mesmerism. This is owing in great measure to the necessities of periodical literature, now so much in request. Every quarter of a year, every month, every day, there must be a supply, for the gratification of the public, of new and luminous theories on the subjects of religion, foreign politics, home politics, civil economy, finance, trade, agriculture, emigration, and the colonies. Slavery, the gold fields, German philoso-
phy, the French Empire, Wellington, Peel, Ireland, must all be practised on, day after day, by what are called original thinkers. As the great man’s guest must produce his good stories or songs at the evening banquet, as the platform orator exhibits his telling facts at mid-day, so the journalist lies under the stern obligation of extemporising his lucid views, leading ideas, and nutshell truths for the breakfast table. The very nature of periodical literature, broken into small wholes, and demanded punctually to an hour, involves this extempore philosophy. “Almost all the Ramblers,” says Boswell of Johnson, “were written just as they were wanted for the press; he sent a certain portion of the copy of an essay, and wrote the remainder while the former part of it was printing”. Few men have the gifts of Johnson, who to great vigour and resource of intellect, when it was fairly roused, united a rare common-sense and a conscientious regard for veracity, which preserved him from flippancy or extravagance in writing. Few men are Johnsons; yet how many men at this day are assailed by incessant demands on their mental powers, which only a productiveness like his could suitably supply! There is a demand for a reckless originality of thought, and a sparkling plausibility of argument, which he would have despised, even if he could have displayed; a demand for crude theory and un-sound philosophy, rather than none at all. It is a sort of repetition of the “Quid novi?” of the Areopagus, and it must have an answer. Men must be found, who can treat, where it is necessary, like the Athenian Sophist, de omnibus scibili,

“Grammaticus, Rhetor, Geometres, Pictor, Aliptes, Augur, Scholobates, Medicus, Magnus, omnia novit”.

I am speaking of such writers with a feeling of real sympathy for men who are under the rod of a cruel slavery. I have never been in such circumstances myself, nor in the temptations which they involve; but most men who have had to do with composition, must know the distress which at times it occasions them to have to write—a distress
sometimes so keen and so specific, that it resembles nothing else than bodily pain. That pain is the token of the wear and tear of mind; and, if works done comparatively at leisure involve such mental fatigue and exhausitlon, what must be the toil of those whose intellects are to be flaunted daily before the public in full dress, and that dress ever new and varied, and spun, like the silkworm's, out of themselves! Still, whatever true sympathy we may feel for the ministers of this dearly purchased luxury, and whatever sense we may have of the great intellectual power which the literature in question displays, we cannot honestly close our eyes to the evil.

One other remark suggests itself, which is the last I shall think it necessary to make. The authority, which in former times was lodged in Universities, now resides in very great measure in that literary world, as it is called, to which I have been alluding. This is not satisfactory, if, as no one can deny, its teach-
who have no need to be anonymous, as being supported by their consistency with their predecessors and with each other.

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DISCOURSES
ON
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION.

DISCOURSE I.
INTRODUCTION.

In addressing myself to the consideration of a question which has excited so much interest, and elicited so much discussion at the present day, as that of University Education, I feel some explanation is due from me for supposing, after such high ability and wide experience have been brought to bear upon it in both countries, that any field remains for the additional labours either of a disputant or of an inquirer. If, nevertheless, I still venture to ask permission to continue the discussion, already so protracted, it is because the subject of Liberal Education, and of the principles on which it must be conducted, has ever had a hold upon my mind; and because I have lived the greater part of my life in a place which has all that time been occupied in a
INTRODUCTION.

series of controversies among its own people and with strangers, and of measures, experimental or definitive, bearing upon it. About fifty years since, the Protestant University, of which I was so long a member, after a century of inactivity, at length was roused, at a time when (as I may say) it was giving no education at all to the youth committed to its keeping, to a sense of the responsibilities which its profession and its station involved; and it presents to us the singular example of an heterogeneous and an independent body of men, setting about a work of self-reformation, not from any pressure of public opinion, but because it was fitting and right to undertake it. Its initial efforts, begun and carried on amid many obstacles, were met from without, as often happens in such cases, by ungenerous and jealously criticisms, which were at that very moment beginning to be unjust. Controversy did but bring out more clearly to its own apprehension, the views on which its reformation was proceeding, and throw them into a philosophical form. The course of beneficent change made progress, and what was at first but the result of individual energy and an act of the academical corporation, gradually became popular, and was taken up and carried out by the separate collegiate bodies, of which the University is composed. This was the first stage of the controversy. Years passed away, and then political adversaries arose, and a political contest was waged; but still, as that contest was conducted in great measure through the medium, not of political acts, but of treatises and pamphlets, it happened as before that the threatened dangers, in the course of their repulse, did but afford fuller development and more exact delineation to the principles of which the University was the representative.

Living then so long as a witness, though hardly as an actor, in these scenes of intellectual conflict, I am able, Gentlemen, to bear witness to views of University Education, without authority indeed in themselves, but not without value to a Catholic, and less familiar to him, as I conceive, than they deserve to be. And, while an argument originating in them may be serviceable at this season to that great cause in which we are just now so especially interested, to me personally it will afford satisfaction of a peculiar kind; for, though it has been my lot for many years to take a prominent, sometimes a presumptuous, part in theological discussions, yet the natural turn of my mind carries me off to trains of thought like those which I am now about to open, which, important though they be for Catholic objects, and admitting of a Catholic treatment, are sheltered from the extreme delicacy and peril which attach to disputations directly bearing on the subject matter of Divine Revelation.

What must be the general character of those views of University Education to which I have alluded, and
of which I shall avail myself, can hardly be doubtful, Gentlemen, considering the circumstances under which I am addressing you. I should not propose to avail myself of a philosophy which I myself had gained from an heretical seat of learning, unless I felt that that philosophy was Catholic in its ultimate source, and befitting the mouth of one who is taking part in a great Catholic work; nor, indeed, should I refer at all to the views of men who, however distinguished in this world, were not and are not blessed with the light of true doctrine, except for one or two special reasons, which will form, I trust, my sufficient justification in so doing. One reason is this: It would concern me, Gentlemen, were I supposed to have got up my opinions for the occasion. This, indeed, would have been no reflection on me personally, supposing I were persuaded of their truth, when at length addressing myself to the inquiry; but it would have destroyed, of course, the force of my testimony, and deprived such arguments, as I might adduce, of that moral persuasiveness which attends on tried and sustained conviction. It would have made me seem the advocate, rather than the cordial and deliberate maintainer and witness of the doctrines which I was to support; and while it undoubtedly exemplified the faith I reposed in the practical judgment of the Church, and the intimate concurrence of my own reason with the course she had authoritatively sanctioned, and the devotion with which I could promptly put myself at her disposal, it would have cast suspicion on the validity of reasonings and conclusions which rested on no independent inquiry, and appealed to no past experience. In that case it might have been plausibly objected by opponents that I was the serviceable expedient of an emergency, and never could be more than ingenious and adroit in the management of an argument which was not my own, and which I was sure to forget again as readily as I had mastered it. But this is not so. The views to which I have referred have grown into my whole system of thought, and are, as it were, part of myself. Many changes has my mind gone through; here it has known no variation or vacillation of opinion, and though this by itself is no proof of truth, it puts a seal upon conviction, and is a justification of earnestness and zeal. The principles, which I can now set forth under the sanction of the Catholic Church, were my profession at that early period of my life, when religion was to me more a matter of feeling and experience than of faith. They did but take greater hold upon me as I was introduced to the records of Christian Antiquity, and approached in sentiment and desire to Catholicism; and my sense of their truth has been increased with the experience of every year since I have been brought within its pale.

And here I am brought to a second and more important reason for introducing what I have to say on the subject of Liberal Education with this refer-
ence to my personal testimony concerning it; and it is as follows: In proposing to treat of so grave a matter, I have felt vividly that some apology was due from me for introducing the lucubrations of Protestants into what many men might consider almost a question of dogma, and I have said to myself about myself: "You think it, then, worth while to come all this way, in order, from your past experience, to recommend principles which had better be left to the decision of the theological schools?" The force of this objection you will see more clearly by considering the answer I proceed to give to it.

Let it be observed, then, that the principles I would maintain on the subject of Liberal Education, although those as I believe of the Catholic Church, are such as may be gained by the mere experience of life. They do not simply come of theology—they imply no supernatural discernment—they have no special connection with Revelation; they will be found to be almost self-evident when stated, and to arise out of the nature of the case; they are dictated by that human prudence and wisdom which is attainable where grace is quite away, and recognized by simple common sense, even where self-interest is not present to sharpen it; and, therefore, though true, and just, and good in themselves, though sanctioned and used by Catholicism, they argue nothing whatever for the sanctity or faith of those who maintain them. They may be held by Protestants as well as by Catholics; they may, accidentally, in certain times and places, be taught by Protestants to Catholics, without any derogation from the claim which Catholics make to special spiritual illumination. This being the case, I may without offence, on the present occasion, when speaking to Catholics, appeal to the experience of Protestants; I may trace up my own distinct convictions on the subject to a time when apparently I was not even approximating to Catholicism; I may deal with the question, as I really believe it to be, as one of philosophy, practical wisdom, good sense, not of theology; and, such as I am, I may, notwithstanding, presume to treat of it in the presence of those who, in every religious sense, are my fathers and my teachers.

Nay, not only may the true philosophy of Education be held by Protestants, and at a given time, or in a given place, be taught by them to Catholics, but further than this, there is nothing strange in the idea, that here or there, at this time or that, it should be understood better, and held more firmly by Protestants than by ourselves. The very circumstance that it is founded on truths in the natural order, accounts for the possibility of its being sometimes or somewhere understood outside the Church, more accurately than within her fold. Where the sun shines bright, in the warm climate of the south, the natives of the place know little of safeguards against cold and wet. They have, indeed, bleak and
piercing blasts; they have chill and pouring rain; but only now and then, for a day or a week; they bear the inconvenience as they best may, but they have not made it an art to repel it; it is not worth their while; the science of calculation and ventilation is reserved for the north. It is in this way that Catholics stand relatively to Protestants in the science of Education; Protestants are obliged to depend on human means solely, and they are, therefore, led to make the most of them; it is their sole resource to use what they have; “Knowledge is” their “power” and nothing else; they are the anxious cultivators of a rugged soil. It is otherwise with us; fames ceciderunt mihi in preclaris. We have a goodly inheritance. The Almighty Father takes care of us; He has promised to do so; His word cannot fail, and we have continual experience of its fulfilment. This is apt to make us, I will not say, rely too much on prayer, on the Divine Word and Blessing, for we cannot pray too much, or expect too much from our great Lord; but we sometimes forget that we shall please Him best, and get most from Him, when we use what we have in nature to the utmost, at the same time that we look out for what is beyond nature in the confidence of faith and hope. However, we are sometimes tempted to let things take their course, as if they would in one way or another turn up right at last for certain; and so we go on, getting into difficulties and getting out of them, succeeding certainly on the whole, but with failure in detail which might be avoided, and with much of imperfection or inferiority in our appointments and plans, and much disappointment, discouragement, and collision of opinion in consequence. We leave God to fight our battles, and so He does; but He corrects us while He prospers us. We cultivate the innocence of the dove more than the wisdom of the serpent; and we exemplify our Lord’s word and incur His rebuke, when He declared that “the children of this world were in their generation wiser than the children of light.”

It is far from impossible, then, at first sight, that on the subject before us, Protestants may have discerned the true line of action, and estimated its importance aught. It is possible that they have investigated and ascertained the main principles, the necessary conditions of education, better than some among ourselves. It is possible at first sight, and it is probable in the particular case, when we consider, on the one hand, the various and opposite positions, which they enjoy relatively to each other; yet, on the other, the uniformity of the conclusions to which they arrive. The Protestant communions, I need hardly say, are respectively at a greater and a less distance from the Catholic Church, with more or with less of Catholic doctrine and of Catholic principle in them. Supposing, then, it should turn out, on a survey of their opinions and their policy, that in pro-
portion as they approach, in the genius of their religion, to Catholicism; so do they become clear in their enunciation of a certain principle in education, that very circumstance would be an argument, as far as it went, for concluding that in Catholicism itself the recognition of that principle would, in its seats of education, be distinct and absolute. Now, I conceive that this remark applies in the controversy to which I am addressing myself. I must anticipate the course of future remarks so far as to say what you have doubtless, Gentlemen, yourselves anticipated before I say it, that the main principle on which I shall have to proceed is this—that Education must not be disjoined from Religion, or that Mixed Schools, as they are called, in which teachers and scholars are of different religious creeds, none of which, of course, enter into the matter of instruction, are constructed on a false idea. Here, then, I conceive I am right in saying that every sect of Protestants, which has retained the idea of religious truth and the necessity of faith, which has any dogma to profess and any dogma to lose, makes that dogma the basis of its Education, secular as well as religious, and is jealous of those attempts to establish schools of a purely secular character, which the inconvenience of religious differences urges upon politicians of the day. This circumstance is of so striking a nature as in itself to justify me, as I consider, in my proposed appeal in this controversy to arguments and testimony short of Catholic.

Now, Gentlemen, let me be clearly understood here. I know quite well that there are multitudes of Protestants who are advocates for Mixed Education to the fullest extent, even so far as to desire the introduction of Catholics themselves into their colleges and schools; but then, first, they are those for the most part who have no creed or dogma whatever to defend, to sacrifice, to surrender, to compromise, to hold back, or to "mix", when they call out for Mixed Education. There are many Protestants of benevolent tempers and business-like minds, who think that all who are called Christians do in fact agree together in essentials, though they will not allow it; and who, in consequence, call on all parties in educating their youth for the world to eliminate differences, which are certainly prejudicial, as soon as they are proved to be immaterial. It is not surprising that clear-sighted persons should fight against the maintenance and imposition of private judgment in matters of public concern. It is not surprising that statesmen, with a thousand conflicting claims and interests to satisfy, should fondly aim at a forfeited privilege of Catholic times, when they would have had at least one distraction the less in the simplicity of National Education. And next, I can conceive the most consistent men, and the most zealously attached to their own system of doctrine,
Nevertheless consenting to schemes of Education from which Religion is altogether or almost excluded, from the stress of necessity, or the recommendations of expediency. Necessity has no law, and expediency is often one form of necessity. It is no principle with sensible men, of whatever cast of opinion, to do always what is abstractedly best. Where no direct duty forbids, we may be obliged to do, as being best under circumstances, what we murmur and rise against, while we do it. We see that to attempt more is to effect less; that we must accept so much, or gain nothing; and so perforce we reconcile ourselves to what we would have far otherwise, if we could. Thus a system of Mixed Education may, in a particular place or time, be the least of evils; it may be of long standing; it may be dangerous to meddle with; it may be professedly a temporary arrangement; it may be in an improving state; its disadvantages may be neutralised by the persons by whom, or the provisions under which, it is administered.

Protestants then, in matter of fact, are found to be both advocates and promoters of Mixed Education; but this, as I think will appear on inquiry, only under the conditions I have set down, first, where they have no special attachment to the dogmas which are compromised in the comprehension; and next, when they find it impossible, much as they may desire it, to carry out their attachment to them in practice, without prejudicial consequences greater than those which that comprehension involves. Men who profess a religion, if left to themselves, make religious and secular Education one. Where, for instance, shall we find greater diversity of opinion, greater acrimony of mutual opposition, than between the two parties, High Church and Low, which mainly constitute the Established Religion of England and Ireland? Yet those parties, differing, as they do, from each other in other points, are equally opposed to the efforts of politicians to fuse their respective systems of Education with those either of Catholics or of sectaries; and it is only the strong expediency of concord and the will of the state which reconcile them to the necessity of a fusion with each other. Again, we all know into what various persuasions the English constituency is divided—more, indeed, than it is easy to enumerate; yet, since the great majority of that constituency, amid its differences, and in its several professions, distinctly dogmatise, whether it be Anglican, Wesleyan, Calvinistic, or so called Evangelical (as is distinctly shown, if in no other way, by its violence against Catholics), the consequence is, that, in spite of serious political obstacles and of the reluctance of statesmen, it has up to this time been resolute and successful in preventing the national separation of secular and religious Education. This concurrence, then, in various instances, supposing it to exist, as I believe it does, of a dogma-
tic faith on the one hand, and an abhorrence of Mixed Education on the other, is a phenomenon which, though happening among Protestants, demands the attention of Catholics, over and above the argumentative basis, on which, in the instance of each particular sect, this abhorrence would be found to rest.

While then, I conceive that certain Protestant bodies may, under circumstances, decide, more successfully than Catholics of a certain locality or period, a point of religious philosophy or policy, and may so far give us a lesson in perspicacity or prudence, without any prejudice to our claims to the exclusive possession of Revealed Truth, I say, they are in matter of fact likely to have done so in a case like the present, in which, amid all the variety of persuasions into which Protestantism necessarily splits, they agree together in a certain practical conclusion, which each of them in turn sees to be necessary for its own particular maintenance. Nor is there surely anything startling or novel in such an admission. The Church has ever appealed and deferred to testimonies and authorities external to herself in those matters in which she thought they had means of forming a judgment; and that on the principle Civique in sua arte credendum. She has ever used unbelievers and pagans in evidence of her truth, as far as their testimony went. She avails herself of heretical scholars, critics, and antiquarians. She has worded her theo-

logical teaching in the phraseology of Aristotle; Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, Origen, Eusebius, and Apollinaris, all more or less heterodox, have supplied materials for primitive exegetics. St. Cyprian called Tertullian his master; Bossuet, in modern times, complimented the labours of the Anglican Bull; the Benedictine editors of the Fathers are familiar with the labours of Fell, Ussher, Pearson, and Beveridge. Pope Benedict XIV. cites according to the occasion the works of Protestants without reserve, and the late French collection of Christian Apologists contains the writings of Locke, Burnet, Tillotson, and Paley. If then, I come forward in any degree as borrowing the views of certain Protestant schools on the point which is to be discussed, I do so, not, Gentlemen, as supposing that even in philosophy the Catholic Church herself, as represented by her theologians or her schools, has anything to learn from men or bodies of men external to her pale; but as feeling, first, that she has ever, in the plenitude of her divine illumination, made use of whatever truth or wisdom she has found in their teaching or their measures; and next, that in particular times or places some of her children are likely to profit from external suggestions or lessons which are in no sense necessary for herself.

And in thus speaking of human philosophy, I have intimated the mode in which I propose to handle my subject altogether. Observe, then, Gentlemen, I have
no intention of bringing into the argument the authority of the Church at all; but I shall consider the question simply on the grounds of human reason and human wisdom. And from this it follows that, viewing it as a matter of argument, judgment, propriety, and expediency, I am not called upon to deny that in particular cases a course has been before now advisable for Catholics in regard to the education of their youth, and has been, in fact, adopted, which was not abstractedly the best, and is no pattern and precedent for others. Thus in the early ages the Church sanctioned her children in frequenting the heathen schools for the acquisition of secular accomplishments, where, as no one can doubt, evils existed, at least as great as can attend on Mixed Education now. The gravest Fathers recommended for Christian youth the use of Pagan masters; the most saintly Bishops and most authoritative Doctors had been sent in their adolescence by Christian parents to Pagan lecture halls*. And, not to take other instances, at this very time, and in this very country, as regards at least the poorer classes of the community, whose secular acquirements ever must be limited, it has approved itself not only to Protestant state Ecclesiastics, who cannot be supposed to be very sensitive about doctrinal truth, but, as a wise condescension,

* Vide, M. L'Abbé Lahané's recent work.

even to many of our most venerated Bishops, to suffer, under the circumstances, a system of Mixed Education in the schools called National.

On this part of the question, however, I have not to enter; for I confine myself to the subject of University Education. But even here it would ill have become me to pretend, simply on my own judgment, to decide on a point so emphatically practical, as regards a state of society, about which I have much to learn, on any abstract principles, however true and important. It would have been presumptuous in me so to have acted, nor am I so acting. It is my happiness in a matter of Christian duty, about which the most saintly and the most able may differ, to be guided simply by the decision and recommendation of the Holy See, the judge and finisher of all controversies. That decision indeed, I repeat, shall not enter into my argument; but it is my own reason for arguing. I am trusting my own judgment on the subject, because I find it is the judgment of him who has upon his shoulder the government and the solicitude of all the Churches. I appear before you, Gentlemen, not prior to the decision of Rome on the question of which I am to treat, but after it. My sole aspiration—and I cannot have a higher under the heavens—is to be the servant of the Vicar of Christ. He has sanctioned at this time a particular measure for his children who speak the English tongue, and the distinguished persons by whom it is
to be carried out have honoured me with a share in their work. I take things as I find them; I know nothing of the past; I find myself here; I set myself to the duties I find here; I set myself to farther, by every means in my power, doctrines and views, true in themselves, recognised by all Catholics as such, familiar to my own mind; and to do this quite apart from the consideration of questions which have been determined without me and before me. I am here the advocate and the minister of a certain great principle; yet not merely advocate and minister, else had I not been here at all. It has been my previous keen sense and hearty reception of that principle, that has been at once the cause, as I must suppose, of my selection, and the ground of my acquiescence. I am told on authority that a principle is necessary, which I have ever felt to be true. As the royal matron, in sacred history consigned the child she had made her own to the charge of its natural mother; so truths and duties, which come of unaided reason, not of grace, which were already intimately mine by the workings of my own mind, and the philosophy of human schools, are now committed to my care, to nurse and to cherish, by her and for her who, acting on the prerogative of her divinely inspired discernment, has in this instance honoured with a royal adoption the suggestions of reason.

Happy mother, who received her offspring back by giving him up, and gained, at another's word, what her own most jealous artifices had failed to secure at home! Gentlemen, I have not yet ended the explanations with which I must introduce myself to your notice. If I have been expressing a satisfaction that opinions, early imbibed and long cherished in my own mind, now come to me with the Church's seal upon them, do not imagine that I am indulging a subtle kind of private judgment, especially unbecoming in a Catholic. It would, I think, be unjust to me, were any one to gather, from what I have been saying, that I had so established myself in my own ideas and in my old notions, as a centre of thought, that, instead of coming to the Church to be taught, I was but availing myself of such opportunities as she gave me, to force principles on your attention which I had adopted without her. It would, indeed, be a most unworthy frame of mind, to view her sanction, however it could be got, as a sort of leave or permit, whereby the intellect obtains an outlet, which it is ever coveting, to range freely once in a way, and to enjoy itself in a welcome, because a rare holiday. Nor, so; human wisdom, at the very best, even in matters of religious policy, is principally but a homage, certainly no essential service to Divine Truth. Nor is the Church some stern mistress, practised only in refusal and prohibition, to be obeyed grudgingly and dexterously overreached; but a kind and watchful teacher and guide, encouraging us forward in the path of truth amid the perils which beset
it. Deeply do I feel, ever will I protest, for I can appeal to the ample testimony of history to bear me out, that, in questions of right and wrong there is nothing really strong in the whole world, nothing decisive and operative, but the voice of him, to whom have been committed the keys of the kingdom and the oversight of Christ's flock. That voice is now, as ever it has been, a real authority, infallible when it teaches, prosperous when it commands, ever taking the lead wisely and distinctly in its own province, adding certainty to what is probable, and persuasion to what is certain. Before it speaks, the most saintly may mistake; and after it has spoken, the most gifted must obey.

I have said this in explanation; but it has an application if you will let me so say, far beyond myself. Perhaps we have all need to be reminded, in one way or another, as regards our habitual view of things, if not our formal convictions, of the greatness of authority and the intensity of power, which accompany the decisions of the Holy See. I can fancy, Gentlemen, among those who hear me there may be those who would be willing to acquit the principles of Education which I am to advocate of all fault whatever, except that of being impracticable. I can fancy them to grant to me, that those principles are most correct and most obvious, simply irresistible on paper; yet, after all, nothing more than the dreams of men who live cut of the world, and who do not see the difficulty of keeping Catholicism anyhow afloat on the bosom of this wonderful nineteenth century. Proved, indeed, those principles are to demonstration, but they will not work. Nay, it was my own admission just now, that, in a particular instance, it might easily happen that what is only second best is best practically, because what is actually best is out of the question. This, I hear you say to yourselves, is the state of things at present. You recount in detail the numberless impediments, great and small, threatening and vexations, which at every step embarrass the attempt to carry out so poorly a principle in itself so true, and ecclesiastical. You appeal in your defence to wise and sagacious intellects, who are far from enemies, if not to Catholicism, at least to the Irish Hierarchy, and you simply despair, or rather you absolutely disbelieve, that Education can possibly be conducted, here and now, on a theological principle, or that youths of different religions can, in matter of fact, be educated apart from each other. The more you think over the state of politics, the position of parties, the feelings of classes, and the experience of the past, the more chimerical does it seem to you to aim at anything beyond a University of Mixed Instruction. Nay, even if the attempt could accidentally succeed, would not the mischief exceed the benefits of it? How great the sacrifice, in how many ways, by which it would be preceded and followed!—how many wounds, open
and secret, would it inflict upon the body politic! And, if it fails, which is to be expected, then a double mischief will ensue from its recognition of evils which it has been unable to remedy. These are your deep misgivings; and, in proportion to the force with which they come to you, is the concern and anxiety with which they occasion you, that there should be those whom you love, whom you revere, who from one cause or other refuse to enter into them.

This, I repeat, is what some good Catholics will say to me, and more than this. They will express themselves better than I can speak for them—with more nature and point, with more force of argument and fulness of detail; and I will frankly and at once acknowledge, Gentlemen, that I do not mean here to give a direct answer to their objections. I do not say an answer cannot be given; on the contrary, I may have a confident expectation that, in proportion as those objections are looked in the face, they will fade away. But, however this may be, it would not become me to argue the matter with those who understand the circumstances of the problem so much better than myself. What do I know of the state of things in Ireland that I should presume to put ideas of mine, which could not be right except by accident, by the side of theirs, who speak in the country of their birth and their home? No, Gentlemen, you are natural judges of the difficulties which beset us, and they are doubtless greater than I can even fancy or forebode. Let me, for the sake of argument, admit all you say against our enterprise, and a great deal more. Your proof of its intrinsic impossibility shall be to me as demonstrative as my own of its theological correctness. Why then should I be so rash and perverse as to involve myself in trouble not properly mine? Why go out of my own place? How is it that I do not know when I am well off? Why so headstrong and reckless as to lay up for myself miscarriage and disappointment, as though I had not enough of my own?

Considerations such as these might have been simply decisive in time past for the boldest and most able among us; now, however, I have one resting point, just one, one plea which serves me in the stead of all direct argument whatever, which hardens me against censure, which encourages me against fear, and to which I shall ever come round, when I hear the question of the practicable and the expedient brought into discussion. After all, Peter has spoken. Peter is no recluse, no abstracted student, no dreamer about the past, no doer upon the. Dead and gone, no projector of the visionary. Peter for eighteen hundred years has lived in the world; he has seen all fortunes, he has encountered all adversaries, he has shaped himself for all emergencies. If there ever was a power on earth who had an eye for the times, who has confined himself to the practicable, and has been happy in his an-
The winning side. The Apostle says not in order to unsay, for he has inherited that word which is with power. From the first he has looked through the wide world, of which he has the burden, and according to the need of the day, and the inspirations of his Lord, he has set himself, now to one thing, now to another, but to all in season, and to nothing in vain. He came first upon an age of refinement and luxury like our own, and in spite of the persecutor fertile in the resources of his cruelty, he soon gathered, out of all classes of society, the slave, the soldier, the high-born lady, and the sophist, to form a people for his Master’s honour. The savage hordes came down in torrents from the north, hideous even to look upon; and Peter went out with holy water and with bison, and by his very eye he sobered them and backed them in full career. They turned aside, and flooded the whole earth, but only to be more surely civilized by him, and to be made ten times more his children even than the older populations they had overwhelmed. Lawless kings arose, sagacious as the Roman, passionate as the Hun, yet in him they found their match, and were shattered, and he lived on. The gates of the earth were opened to the east and west, and men poured out to take possession; and he and his went with them, swept along by zeal and charity as far as they by enterprise, covetousness, or ambition. Has he failed in his successes up to this hour? Did he, in our fathers’ day,
fail in his struggle with Joseph of Germany and his confederates, with Napoleon, a greater name, and his dependent kings, that, though in another kind of fight, he should fail in ours? What grey hairs are on the head of Judah, whose youth is renewed like the eagle's, whose feet are like the feet of harts, and underneath the everlasting Arms?

In the first centuries of the Church all this was a mere point of faith, but every age as it has come has stayed up faith by sight; and shame on us if, with the accumulated witness of eighteen centuries, our eyes are too gross to see what the Saints have ever anticipated. Education, Gentlemen, involved as it is in the very idea of a religion such as ours, cannot be a strange work at any time in the hands of the Vicar of Christ. The heathen forms of religion thought it enough to amuse and quiet the populace with spectacles, and, on the other hand, to bestow a dignity and divine sanction upon the civil ruler; but Catholicism addresses itself directly to the heart and conscience of the individual. The Religion which numbers Baptism and Penance among its sacraments, cannot be neglectful of the soul's training; the Creed which opens and resolves into so majestic and so living a theology, cannot but subserve the cultivation of the intellect; the Revelation which tells us of truths otherwise utterly hid from us, cannot be justly called the enemy of knowledge; the Worship, which is so awful and so thrilling, cannot but feed the aspirations of genius, and move the affections from their depths. The Institution, which has flourished in centuries the most famed for mental activity and cultivation, which has come into collision, to say no more, with the schools of Antioch and Alexandria, Athens and Edessa, Saracenic Seville, and Protestant Berlin, cannot be wanting in experience what to do now, and where to do it. He whom the Almighty left behind to be His representative on earth, has ever been jealous, as he esteemed him, as of God's graces, so also of His gifts. He has been as tender of the welfare and interests of human science as he is loyal to the divine truth which is his peculiar charge. He has ever been the foster-father of secular knowledge, and has rejoiced in its growth, while he has pruned away its self-destructive luxuriance.

Least of all can the Catholics of two islands, which have been heretofore so singularly united in the cultivation and diffusion of Knowledge, under the auspices of the Apostolic See, we surely, Gentlemen, are not the persons to distrust its wisdom and its fortune when it sends us on a similar mission now. I cannot forget, Gentlemen, that at a time when Celt and Saxon were alike savage, it was the See of Peter that gave both of them first faith, and then civilization; and then, again, bound them together in one by the seal of that joint commission which it gave them to convert and illuminate in turn the pagan Continent. I cannot forget how it was from Rome that the
glorious St. Patrick was sent to Ireland, and did a work so great, that he may be said to have had no successor in it; the sanctity, and learning, and zeal, and charity which followed being but the result of the one impulse which he gave. I cannot forget how, in no long time, under the fostering breath of the Vicar of Christ, a country of heathen superstitions became the very wonder and asylum of all people;—the wonder by reason of its knowledge, sacred and profane; the asylum for religion, literature, and science, chased away from the Continent by barbaric invaders. I recollect its hospitality freely accorded to the pilgrim; its volumes munificently presented to the foreign student; and the prayers, and blessings, and holy rites, and solemn chants, which sanctified the while both giver and receiver. Nor can I forget how my own England had meanwhile become the solicitude of the same unwearied Eye; how Augustine was sent to us by Gregory; how he faint ed in the way in terror at our barbarian name, and, but for the Pope, had returned as from an impossible expedition; how he was forced on "in weakness, and in fear, and in much trembling," until he had achieved the conquest of all England to Christ. Nor, how it came to pass that, when Augustine died and his work slackened, another Pope, unwearied still, sent three great Saints from Rome to educate and refine the people he had converted. Three holy men set out for England together, of different nations; Theodore, an Asiatic Greek, from Tarsus; Adrian, an African; Bennett alone a Saxon, for Peter knows no distinction of races in his ecumenical work; they came with theology and science in their train; with relics, and with pictures, and with manuscripts of the Holy Fathers and the Greek classics; and Theodore and Adrian founded schools, secular and religious, all over England, while Bennett brought to the north the large library he had collected in foreign parts, and, with plans and ornamental work from France, erected a church of stone, under the invocation of St. Peter, after the Roman fashion, "which," says the historian, "he most affected." I call to mind how St. Wilfrid, St. John of Beverley, St. Bede, and other saintly men, carried on the good work in the following generations, and how from that time forth the two islands, England and Ireland, in a dark and dreary age, were the two lights of Christendom; and nothing passed between them, and no personal aims were theirs, save the interchange of kind offices and the rivalry of love.

O! memorable time when St. Aidan and the Irish Monks went up to Lindisfarne and Melrose, and taught the Saxon youth, and a St. Cuthbert and a St. Eata requaid their gracious toil! O! blessed days of peace and confidence, when Mailduf penetrated to Malmesbury in the south, which has inherited his name, and founded there the famous school which

* Cressy.
gave birth to the great St. Alkhelm! O! precious seal and testimony of Gospel charity, when, as Alkhelm in turn tells us, the English went to Ireland “numerous as bees”; when the Saxon St. Egbert and St. Willibrord, preachers to the heathen Frisians, made the voyage to Ireland to prepare themselves for their work; and when from Ireland went forth to Germany the two noble Erwalds, Saxons also, to earn the crown of martyrdom. Such a period, indeed, so rich in grace, in peace, in love, and in good works, could only last for a season; but, even when the light was to pass away, the two sister islands were destined not to forfeit, but to transfer it. The time came when a neighbouring country was in turn to hold the mission they have so long and so well fulfilled; and, when to it they made over their honourable office, faithful to the alliance of two hundred years, they did the solemn act together. High up in the north, upon the Tyne, the pupil of St. Theodore, St. Adrian, and St. Ben nett, for forty years was Bede, the light of the whole western world; as happy, too, in his scholars round about him, as in his celebrity and influence in the length and breadth of Christendom. And, a generation before him, St. John of Beverley, taught by the same masters, had for thirty years been shedding the lustre of his sanctity and learning upon the Archiepiscopal school of York. Among the pupils of these celebrated men the learned Alcuin stood first; but Alcuin, not content even with the training which Saints could give him, betook himself to the sister island, and remained a whole twelve years in the Irish schools. When Charlemagne would revive science and letters in his own France, to England he sent for masters, and to the cloisters of St. John Beverley and St. Bede; and Alcuin, the scholar both of the Saxon and the Celt, was the chief of those who went forth to supply the need of the Great Emperor. Such was the foundation of the school of Paris, from which, in the course of centuries, sprang the famous University, the glory of the middle ages.

The past never returns; the course of things, old in its texture, is ever new in its colouring and fashion. Ireland and England are not what they once were, but Rome is where it was; Peter is the same; his zeal, his charity, his mission, his gifts, are the same. He, of old time, made us one by making us joint teachers of the nations; and now, surely, he is giving us a like mission, and we shall become one again, while we zealously and lovingly fulfil it.
DISCOURSE II.

THEOLOGY A BRANCH OF KNOWLEDGE.

Great as are the secular benefits ascribed by the philosopher of the day to the present remarkable reception in so many countries of the theory of Private Judgment, it is not without its political drawbacks, which the statesman at least, whatever be his predilections for Protestantism, cannot in candour refuse to admit. If it has stimulated the activity of the intellect in those nations which have surrendered themselves to its influence, on the other hand it has provided no sufficient safeguards against that activity preying on itself. This inconvenience indeed matters comparatively little to the man of letters, who often has no end in view beyond mental activity itself, of whatever description, and has before now even laid it down, as the rule of his philosophy, that the good of man consists, not in the possession of truth, but in an interminable search after it. But it is otherwise with those who are engaged in the
business of life, who have work and responsibility, who have measures to carry through and objects to accomplish, who only see what is before them, recognize what is tangible, and reverence what succeeds. The statesman especially, who has to win, to attach, to reconcile, to secure, to govern, looks for one thing more than any thing else—how he may do his work with least trouble, how he may best persuade the wheels of the political machine to go smoothly, silently, and steadily; and with this prime desideratum nothing interferes so seriously as that indefinite multiplication of opinions and wills which it is the boast of Protestantism to have introduced. Amid the overwhelming difficulties of his position, the most Protestant of statesmen will be sorely tempted, in disparagement of his cherished principles, to make a passionate wish, that the people he has to govern, could have, I will not say with the imperial tyrant, one neck, but, what is equally impossible, one private judgment.

This embarrassment makes itself especially felt, when he addresses himself to the great question of National Education: He is called upon to provide for the education of the people at large; and that the more urgently, because the religious sentiments, which Private Judgment presupposes and fosters, demand it. The classes and bodies in whom political power is lodged, clamour for National Education; he prepares himself to give them satisfaction: but Edu-

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cation of course implies principles and views, and when he proceeds to lay down any whatever, the very same parties who pressed him forward, from their zeal for Education in the abstract, fall out with each other and with him, about every conceivable plan which is proposed to them in a substantive shape. All demand of him, what each in turn forbids; his proceedings are brought to what is familiarly called "a lock"; he can neither advance nor recede; and he loses time and toil in attempting an impossible problem. It would not be wonderful, if, in these trying difficulties, he were to envy the comparative facility of the problem of Education in purely Catholic countries, where certain fundamental principles are felt to be as sure as external facts, and where, in consequence, it is almost as easy to construct a national system of teaching, as to raise the school-houses in which it is to be administered.

Under these circumstances, he naturally looks about him for methods of eliminating from his problem its intractable conditions, which are wholly or principally religious. He sees then that all would go easy, could he but contrive to educate apart from religion, not compromising indeed his own private religious persuasion, whatever it happens to be, but excluding one and all professions of faith from the national system. And thus he is led, by extreme expediency and political necessity, to sanction the separation of secular instruction from religious, and
to favour the establishment of what are called "Mixed Schools". Such a procedure, I say, on the part of a statesman, is but a natural effort, under the circumstances of his day, to appropriate to himself a privilege, without the Church's aid, which the Church alone can bestow; and he becomes what is called a Liberal, as the very nearest approach he can make, in a Protestant country, to being a Catholic. Since his schools cannot have one faith, he determines, as the best choice left to him, that they shall have none.

Nothing surely is more intelligible than conduct like this; and the more earnest is his patriotism, the warmer his philanthropy, the more of statesmanship, the more of administrative talent he possesses, the more cordially will he adopt it. And hence it is that at the present day, when so much benevolence and practical wisdom are to be found among public men, there is a growing movement in favour of Mixed Education, whether as regards the higher or the lower classes, on the simple ground, that nothing else remains to be done. So far, I say, is intelligible; but there are higher aspects of the question than that of political utility. My business is, not with the mere statesman, but with those who profess to regulate their public conduct by principle and logic. I want to see into what principles such a policy resolves itself, when submitted to a philosophical analysis, for then we shall be better able to determine what should be a Catholic's judgment upon it.

Now, on entering upon my subject, first of all I put aside the question of the mixed education of the lower classes, being concerned only with University Education. Having done this, I am able to bring the question to this simple issue; a University, as the name implies, is the seat of universal knowledge; it follows then at once to ask, whether this definition of a University, which can hardly be gainsaid, is compatible with the political expedient which I have been describing; whether it is philosophical or possible to profess all branches of knowledge, yet to exclude one, and that one not the lowest in the series.

But this, of course, is to assume that Theology is a science, and an important one: so I will express myself in a more general form. I say, then, that if a University be, from the nature of the case, a place of instruction, where universal knowledge is professed, and if in a certain University, so called, the subject of Religion is excluded, one of two conclusions is inevitable,—either, on the one hand, that the province of Religion is very barren of real knowledge, or, on the other, that in such University one special and important branch of knowledge is omitted. I say, the advocate of such an institution must say this, or must say that; he must own, either that little or nothing is known about the Supreme Being, or
that his seat of learning calls itself what it is not. This is the thesis which I lay down, and on which I shall insist in the Discourse which is to follow. I repeat, such a compromise between religious parties, as is involved in the establishment of a University which makes no religious profession, implies that those parties severely consider, not indeed that their own respective opinions are truffles in a moral and practical point of view—of course not; but certainly as much as this, that they are not knowledge. Did they in their hearts believe that their private views of religion, whatever they are, were absolutely and objectively true, it is inconceivable that they would so insult them as to consent to their omission in an institution which is bound, from the nature of the case—from its very idea and its name—to make a profession of all sorts of knowledge whatever.

I think this will be found to be no matter of words. I allow then fully, that, when men combine together for any common object, they are obliged, as a matter of course, in order to secure the advantages accruing from united action, to sacrifice many of their private opinions and wishes, and to drop the minor differences, as they are commonly called, which exist between man and man. No two persons perhaps are to be found, however intimate, however congenial in tastes and judgments, however eager to have one heart and one soul, but must deny themselves, for the sake of each other, much which they like or desire, if they are to live together happily. Compromise, in a large sense of the word, is the first principle of combination; and any one who insists on enjoying his rights to the full, and his opinions without exception, and his own way in all things, will soon have all things altogether to himself, and no one to share them with him. But most true as this confessedly is, still there is an obvious limit, on the other hand, to these compromises, necessary as they are; and this is found in the provision that the differences surrendered should be but "minor," or that there should be no sacrifice of the main object in view, in the concessions which are mutually made. Any sacrifice which implicates that object is destructive of the principle of the combination, and no one who would be consistent, can be a party to it.

Thus, for instance, if men of various religious denominations join together for the dissemination of what are called "evangelical" tracts, it is under the belief, that the object of their uniting, recognized on all hands, being the spiritual benefit of their neighbours, no religious exhortation, whatever be its character, can essentially interfere with that benefit, which is founded upon the Lutheran doctrine of Justification. If, again, they agree together in printing and circulating the Protestant Bible, it is because they, one and all, hold to the principle, that, however serious be their differences of religious sentiment, such differences fade away before the one
great principle, which that circulation symbolizes—that the Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible, is the religion of Protestants. On the contrary, if the committee of some such association inserted tracts into the copies of the said Bible which they sold, and tracts in recommendation of the Athanaessian Creed or the merit of good works, I conceive any subscribing member would have a just right to complain of a proceeding, which compromised both the principle of Private Judgment, and the doctrine of Justification by faith only. These instances are sufficient to illustrate my general position, that coalitions and comprehensions for an object, have their life in the prosecution of that object, and cease to have any meaning as soon as that object is compromised or disparaged.

When, then, a number of persons come forward, not as politicians, not as diplomatists, lawyers, traders, or speculators, but with the one object of advancing Universal Knowledge, much we may allow them to sacrifice; ambition, reputation, leisure, comfort, gold; one thing they may not sacrifice—Knowledge itself. Knowledge being their object, they need not of course insist on their own private views about ancient or modern history, or national prosperity, or the balance of power; they need not of course shrink from the cooperation of those who hold the opposite views, but stipulate they must that Knowledge itself is not compromised; and those views, of whatever kind, which they do allow to be dropped, it is plain they consider to be opinions, and nothing more, however dear, however important to themselves personally; opinions ingenious, admirable, pleasurable, beneficial, expedient, but not worthy the name of Knowledge or Science. Thus no one would insist on the Malthusian theory being a sine quâ non in a seat of learning, who did not think it simply ignorance not to be a Malthusian; and no one would consent to drop the Newtonian theory, who thought it to be proved true, in the same sense as the existence of the sun and moon is true. If, then, in an Institution which professes all knowledge, nothing is professed, nothing is taught about the Supreme Being, it is fair to infer that every individual of all those who advocate that Institution, supposing him consistent, distinctly holds that nothing is known for certain about the Supreme Being; nothing such as to have any claim to be regarded as an accession to the stock of general knowledge existing in the world. If on the other hand it turns out that something considerable is known about the Supreme Being, whether from Reason or Revelation, then the Institution in question professes every science, and leaves out the foremost of them. In a word, strong as may appear the assertion, I do not see how I can avoid making it, and bear with me, Gentlemen, while I do so, viz.: such an Institution cannot be what it professes, if there be a God. I do not wish to declaim; but, by
the very force of the terms, it is very plain, that God and such a University cannot coexist.

Still, however, this may seem to many an abrupt conclusion, and will not be acquiesced in: what answer, Gentlemen, will be made to it? Perhaps this:—It will be said, that there are different kinds or spheres of Knowledge, human, divine, sensible, intellectual, and the like; and that a University certainly takes in all varieties of Knowledge in its own line, but still that it has a line of its own. It contemplates, it occupies a certain order, a certain platform of Knowledge. I understand the remark; but I own to you, Gentlemen, I do not understand how it can be made to apply to the matter in hand. I cannot so construct my definition of the subject matter of University Knowledge, and so draw my boundary lines around it, to include therein the other sciences commonly studied at Universities, and to exclude the science of Religion. Are we to limit our idea of University Knowledge by the evidence of our senses? then we exclude history; by testimony? we exclude metaphysics; by abstract reasoning? we exclude physics. Is not the being of a God reported to us by testimony, handed down by history, inferred by an inductive process, brought home to us by metaphysical necessity, urged on us by the suggestions of our conscience? It is a truth in the natural order, as well as in the supernatural. So much for its origin; and, when obtained, what is it worth? Is it a great truth or a small one? Is it a comprehensive truth? Say that no other religious idea whatever were given but it, and you have enough to fill the mind; you have at once a whole dogmatic system. The word “God” is a theology in itself, indivisibly one, exhaustibly various, from the vastness and the simplicity of its meaning. Admit a God, and you introduce among the subjects of your knowledge, a fact encompassing, closing in upon, absorbing, every other fact conceivable. How can we investigate any part of any order of Knowledge, and stop short of that which enters into every order? All true principles run over with it, all phenomena run into it; it is truly the First and the Last. In word indeed, and in idea, it is easy enough to divide Knowledge into human and divine, secular and religious, and to lay down that we will address ourselves to the one without interfering with the other; but it is impossible in fact. Granting that divine truth differs in kind from human, so do human truths differ in kind one from another. If the knowledge of the Creator is in a different order from knowledge of the creature, so, in like manner, metaphysical science is in a different order from physical, physics from history, history from ethics. You will soon break up into fragments the whole circle of secular knowledge, if you begin the mutilation with divine.

I have been speaking simply of Natural Theology; my argument of course is stronger when I go on to
Revelation. Let the doctrine of the Incarnation be true; is it not at once of the nature of an historical fact, and of a metaphysical? Let it be true that there are Angels; how is this not a point of knowledge in the same sense as the naturalist’s asseveration, that there are myriads of living things on the point of a needle? That the Earth is to be burned by fire, is, if true, as large a fact as that huge monsters once played amid its depths; that Antichrist is to come, is as categorical a heading to a chapter of history, as that Nero or Julian was Emperor of Rome; that a divine influence moves the will, is a subject of thought not more mysterious than the effect of volition on the animal frame.

I do not see how it is possible for a philosophical mind, first, to believe these religious facts to be true; next, to consent to put them aside; and thirdly, in spite of this, to go on to profess to be teaching all the while de omni scibili. No; if a man thinks in his heart that these religious facts are short of truth, are not true in the sense in which the motion of the Earth is true, I understand his excluding Religion from his University, though he professes other reasons for its exclusion. In that case the varieties of religious opinions under which he shelters his conduct, are not only his apology for publicly ignoring religion, but a cause of his privately disbelieving it. He does not think that any thing is known or can be known for certain, about the origin of the world or the end of man.

This, I fear, is the conclusion to which intellects, clear, logical, and consistent, have come, or are coming, from the nature of the case; and, alas! in addition to this prima facie suspicion, there are actual tendencies in the same direction in Protestantism, viewed whether in its original idea, or again in the so-called Evangelical movement in these islands during the last century. The religious world, as it is styled, holds, generally speaking, that religion consists, not in knowledge, but in feeling or sentiment. The old Catholic notion, which still lingers in the Established Church, was, that Faith was an intellectual act, its object truth, and its result knowledge. Thus if you look into the Anglican Prayer Book, you will find definite credenda, as well as definite agenda; but in proportion as the Lutheran leaven spread, it became fashionable to say that Faith was but a feeling, an emotion, an affection, an appetency, not an act of the intellect; and as this view of Faith obtained, so was its connexion with Truth and Knowledge more and more either forgotten or denied. The Prayer Book, indeed, contained the Creed, among other memorials of antiquity; but a question began to be agitated whether its recital was any thing better than the confession of a dead faith, the faith of devils, formal, technical, soul-deceiving, not the guarantee at all of what was deemed to be spiritual renovation. It was objected too, that whereas there was just one doctrine which was adapted
to move the feelings, open the heart, and change corrupt nature, viz.—the Atonement, that doctrine was not to be found there. Then again, spiritual-mindedness and heavenly-mindedness consisted, according to the school in question, not, as a Catholic would say, in a straightforward acceptance of revealed truth, and an acting upon it, but in a dreamy and sickly state of soul; in an effort after religious conversation; in a facility of detailing what men called experiences; nay, I will add, in a constrained gravity of demeanour, and an unnatural tone of voice. Now many men laughed at all this, many men admired it; but whether they admired or laughed, both the one party and the other found themselves in agreement on the main point, viz.—in considering that this really was in substance Religion; that Religion was based, not on argument, but on taste and sentiment, that nothing was objective, every thing subjective, in doctrine. I say, even those who saw through the affectation in which the religious school of which I am speaking clad itself, still came to think that Religion, as such, consisted in something short of intellectual exercises, viz., in the affections, in the imagination, in inward persuasions and consolations, in pleasurable sensations, sudden changes, and sublime fancies. They learned to say, that Religion was nothing beyond a supply of the wants of human nature, not an external fact and a work of God. There was, it appeared, a demand for Religion, and therefore there was a supply; human nature could not do without Religion, any more than it could do without bread; a supply was absolutely necessary, good or bad, and, as in the case of the articles of daily sustenance, an article which was really inferior was better than none at all. Thus Religion was useful, venerable, beautiful, the sanction of order, the stay of government, the curb of self-will and self-indulgence, which the laws cannot reach; but, after all, on what was it based? Why, that was a question delicate to ask, and imprudent to answer; but, if the truth must be spoken, however reluctantly, the long and the short of the matter was this, that Religion was based on custom, on prejudice, on law, on education, on habit, on loyalty, on feudalism, on enlightened expedience, on many, many things, but not at all on Reason; Reason was not in the number. It is true, Rational Religion is spoken of in the circles in question; but, when you carefully consider the matter, you will find this does not mean a kind of Religion which is built upon Reason, but merely a Religion which does not interfere with Reason, which does not clash with what are considered rational ideas, with rational pursuits, rational enjoyment of life, and rational views of the next world.

You see, Gentlemen, how a theory or philosophy, which began with Luther, the Puritans, and Wesley, has been taken up by that large and influential body
which goes by the name of Liberal or Latitudinarian; and how, where it prevails, it is as unreasonable of course to demand for Religion a chair in a University, as to demand one for fine feeling, sense of honour, patriotism, gratitude, maternal affection, or good companionship, proposals which would be simply unmeaning.

Now, in support of what I have been saying, I will appeal, in the first place, to a statesman, but not merely so, to no mere politician, no trader in places, or votes, or the stock market, but to a philosopher, to an orator, to one whose profession, whose aim has ever been to cultivate the fair, the noble, and the generous. I cannot forget the celebrated discourse of the celebrated man to whom I am alluding; a man who is first in his peculiar walk; whose talents have earned him nobility at home, and a more than European name; and who, moreover (which is much to my purpose), has had a share, as much as any one alive, in effecting the public recognition in these Islands of the principle of Mixed Education. This able person, during the years in which he was exerting himself in its behalf, made a speech or discourse, on occasion of a public solemnity; and in reference to the bearing of general knowledge upon religious belief, he spoke as follows:

"As men", he said, "will no longer suffer themselves to be led blindfold in ignorance, so will they

no more yield to the vile principle of judging and treating their fellow-creatures, not according to the intrinsic merit of their actions, but according to the accidental and involuntary coincidence of their opinions. The Great Truth has finally gone forth to all the ends of the earth", and he prints it in capital letters, "that man shall no more render account to man for his belief, over which he has himself no control. Henceforward, nothing shall prevail upon us to praise or to blame any one for that which he can no more change, than he can the hue of his skin or the height of his stature." You see, Gentlemen, if this philosopher is to decide the matter, religious ideas are just as far from being real, or representing an external object, as truly imaginations, idiosyncracies, accidents of the individual, as his having the stature of a Patagonian, or the features of a Negro.

But perhaps this was the rhetoric of an excited moment. Far from it, Gentlemen, or I should not have listened to the words of a fertile mind, uttered so long ago. What Mr. Brougham laid down as a principle in 1825, resounds on all sides of us, with ever growing confidence and success, in 1852. I open the Minutes of the Committee on Education for the years 1848–50, presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of her Majesty,

*Mr. Brougham's Glasgow Discourse.*
and I find one of her Majesty's Inspectors of Schools, at p. 467 of the second volume, dividing "the topics usually embraced in the better class of primary schools" into four:—the knowledge of signs, as reading and writing; of facts, as geography and astronomy; of relations and laws, as mathematics; and lastly sentiment, such as poetry and music. Now, on first catching this division, it occurred to me to ask myself, before ascertaining the writer's own resolution of the matter, under which of these four heads fell Religion, or whether it fell under any of them. Did he put it aside as a thing too delicate and sacred to be enumerated with earthly studies? or did he distinctly contemplate it when he made his division? Any how, I could really find a place for it under the first head, or the second, or the third; for it has to do with facts, since it tells of the Self-subsisting; it has to do with relations, for it tells of the Creator; it has to do with signs, for it tells of the due manner of speaking of Him. There was just one head of the division to which I could not refer it, viz., to sentiment; for, I suppose, music and poetry, which are the writer's own examples of sentiment, have not much to do with Truth, which is the sole object of Religion. Judge then my surprise, Gentlemen, when I found the fourth was the very head selected by the writer of the Report in question, as the special receptacle of religious topics. "The inculcation of sentiment", he says, "embraces reading in its higher sense, poetry, music, together with moral and religious education". What can be clearer than that, in this writer's idea (whom I am far from introducing for his own sake, because I have no wish to hurt the feelings of a gentleman, who is but exerting himself zealously in the discharge of anxious duties); I do but introduce him as an illustration of the wide-spreading school of thought to which he belongs); what, I say, can more clearly prove than a candid avowal like this, that, in the view of that school, Religion is not knowledge, has nothing whatever to do with knowledge, and is excluded from a University course of instruction, not simply because the exclusion cannot be helped, from political or social obstacles, but because it has no business there at all, because it is to be considered a mere taste, sentiment, opinion, and nothing more? The writer avows this conclusion himself, in the explanation into which he presently enters, in which he says: "According to the classification proposed, the essential idea of all religious education will consist in the direct cultivation of the feelings". Here is Lutheranism sublimated into philosophy; what we contemplate, what we aim at, when we give a religious education, is, not to impart any knowledge whatever, but to satisfy anyhow, desires which will arise after the Unseen in spite of us, to provide the mind with a means of self-command, to impress on it the beautiful ideas which saints and sages have struck out, to embellish it with the bright hues of a
celestial piety, to teach it the poetry of devotion, the
music of well-ordered affections, and the luxury of
doing good. The soul comes forth from her bower,
for the adoration of the lecture-room and the saloon;
like the first woman, in the poet's description,

"Grace is in all her steps, heaven in her eye,
In every gesture dignity and love."

As for the intellect, on the other hand, its exercise
is only indirect in religious education, as being an
instrument in a moral work (true or false, it matters
little, or rather anything must be true, which is
capable of reaching the end proposed); or again, as
the unavoidable attendant on moral impressions, from
the constitution of the human mind, but varying
with the peculiarities of the individual. Something

"In the diverse schools", he says, "amongst which my labours
are carried on, there are some, in which the Bible is the sole basis of
religious instruction; and there are others, in which catechisms, or
other abstracts of doctrine, are employed. As far as my own ob-
servation extends, it has ever appeared perfectly indifferent, as to
the results, what precise method or instrumentality may be adopted.
I have seen the happiest, and I have seen the most unsatisfactory
results, alike under both systems. In each case, the mere instru-
ment of teaching is of small importance compared with the spirit
which is infused into it by the teacher. The danger in each case is,
that of employing the instrument simply as the basis of an intellectual
exercise, and losing sight of the moral and religious sentiment it is
intended to draw forth."

like this seems to be the writer's meaning, but we
need not pry into its finer issues in order to gain a
distinct view of its general bearing; and taking it,
as I think we fairly may take it, as a specimen of
the philosophy of the day, as adopted by those who
are not conscious unbelievers, or open scoffers, I con-
sider it amply explains how it comes to pass that the
day's philosophy sets up a system of universal know-
ledge, and teaches of plants, and earths, and creeping
things, and beasts, and gases, about the crust of the
Earth, and the changes of the atmosphere, about sun,
moon, and stars, about man and his doings, about the
history of the world, about sensation, memory, and
the passions, about duty, about cause and effect,
about all things imaginable, except one—and that is,
about Him that made all these things, about God. I
say the reason is plain, because they consider
knowledge, as regards the creature, is illimitable,
but impossible or hopeless as regards the Cre-
ator.

Here, however, it may be objected to me that this
representation is certainly extreme, for the school in
question does, in fact, lay great stress on the evidence
afforded by the creation, to the Being and Attributes
of the Creator. I may be referred, for instance,
to the words of one of the speakers, at the solemn-
nities which took place, at the time when the principle
of Mixed Education was first formally inaugurated in
the metropolis of the sister island. On the occasion
of laying the first stone of the University of London, I confess it, a learned person, since elevated to the Protestant See of Durham, which he still fills, opened the proceedings with prayer. He addressed the Deity, as the authoritative Report informs us, "the whole surrounding assembly standing unveiled in solemn silence." "Thou", he said, in the name of all the denominations present, "thou hast constructed the vast fabric of the universe in so wonderful a manner, so arranged its motions, and so formed its productions, that the contemplation and study of thy works exercise at once the mind in the pursuit of human science, and lead it onwards to Divine Truth". Here is apparently a distinct recognition that there is such a thing as Truth in the province of Religion; and, did the passage stand by itself, and were it the only means we possessed of ascertaining the sentiments, not of this divine himself (for I am not concerned with him personally), but of the powerful body whom he there represented, it would, as far as it goes, be satisfactory. I admit it; and I admit also the recognition of the Being and certain Attributes of the Deity, contained in the writings of the noble and gifted person whom I have already quoted, whose genius, versatile and multiform as it is, in nothing has been so constant, as in its devotion to the advancement of knowledge, scientific and literary. He then, in his "Discourse of the objects, advantages, and pleasures of science", after variously illustrating what he terms its "gratifying treats", crowns the catalogue with "the highest of all our gratifications in the contemplation of science", which he proceeds to explain thus:

"We are raised by them", he says, "to an understanding of the infinite wisdom and goodness which the Creator has displayed in all His works. Not a step can be taken in any direction", he continues, "without perceiving the most extraordinary traces of design; and the skill, every where conspicuous, is calculated in so vast a proportion of instances to promote the happiness of living creatures, and especially of ourselves, that we can feel no hesitation in concluding, that, if we knew the whole scheme of Providence, every part would be in harmony with a plan of absolute benevolence. Independent, however, of this most consoling inference, the delight is inexpressible, of being able to follow, as it were, with our eyes, the marvellous works of the Great Architect of Nature, to trace the unbounded power and exquisite skill, which are exhibited in the most minute, as well as the mightiest parts of His system. The pleasure derived from this study is unceasing, and so various, that it never tires the appetite. But it is unlike the low gratifications of sense in another respect: it elevates and refines our nature, while those hurt the health, debase the understanding, and corrupt the feelings; it teaches us to look upon all earthly objects as insignificant..."
and below our notice, except the pursuit of knowledge and the cultivation of virtue, that is to say, the strict performance of our duty in every relation of society; and it gives a dignity and importance to the enjoyment of life, which the frivolous and the grovelling cannot even comprehend”.

Such are the words of this prominent champion of Mixed Education. If logical inference be, as it undoubtedly is, an instrument of truth, surely, it may be answered to me, in admitting the possibility of inferring the Divine Being and Attributes from the phenomena of nature, he distinctly admits a basis of truth in the doctrines of Religion.

I wish, Gentlemen, to give these representations their full weight, both from the gravity of the question, and the consideration due to the persons whom I am arraigning; but, before I can feel sure I understand them, I must ask an abrupt question. When I am told, then, by the partizans of Mixed Education, that human science leads to belief in a Supreme Being, without denying, nay, as a Catholic, with full conviction of the fact,—yet I am obliged to ask what the statement means in their mouth, what they, the speakers, understand by the word “God”. Let me not be thought offensive, if I question, whether it means the same thing on the two sides of the controversy. With us Catholics, as with the first race of Protestants, as with Mahometans, and all Theists, the word contains, as I have already said, a

theology in itself. At the risk of anticipating what I shall have occasion to insist upon in my next Discourse, let me say that, according to the teaching of Monothelism, God is an Individual, Self-dependent, All-perfect, Unchangeable Being; intelligent, living, personal, and present; almighty, all-seeing, all-re-nemembering; between whom and His creatures there is an infinite gulf; who had no origio, who passed an eternity by Himself; who created and upholds the universe; who will judge every one of us, at the end of time, according to that Law of right and wrong which He has written on our hearts. He is one who is sovereign over, operative amidst, independent of, the appointments which He has made; one in whose hands are all things, who has a purpose in every event, and a standard for every deed, and thus has relations of His own towards the subject matter of each particular science which the book of knowledge unfolds; who has with an adorable, never-ceasing energy mixed Himself up with all the history of creation, the constitution of nature, the course of the world, the origin of society, the fortunes of nations, the action of the human mind; and who thereby necessarily becomes the subject matter of a science, far wider and more noble than any of those which are included in the circle of secular education.

This is the doctrine which belief in a God implies: if it means any thing, it means all this, and cannot keep, from meaning all this, and a great deal more;
and, though there were nothing in Protestantism, as such, to disparage dogmatic truth (and I have shown there is a great deal), still, even then, I should have difficulty in believing that a doctrine so mysterious, so peremptory, approved itself as a matter of course to educated men of this day, who gave their minds attentively to consider it. Rather, in a state of society such as ours, in which authority, prescription, tradition, habit, moral instinct, and the influences of grace go for nothing, in which patience of thought, and depth and consistency of view, are scorned as subtle and scholastic, in which free discussion and fallible judgment are prized as the birthright of each individual, I must be excused if I exercise towards this age, as regards its belief in this doctrine, some portion of that scepticism which it exercises itself towards every received but unseruminized assertion whatever. I cannot take it for granted, I must have it brought home to me by tangible evidence, that the spirit of the age means by the Supreme Being what Catholics mean. Nay, it would be a relief to my mind to gain some ground of assurance, that the parties influenced by that spirit had, I will not say, a true apprehension of God, but even so much as the idea of what a true apprehension is.

Nothing is easier than to use the word, and mean nothing by it. The heathens used to say, “God wills”, when they meant “Fate”; “God provides”, when they meant “Chance”; “God acts”, when they meant “Instinct” or “Sense”; and “God is everywhere”, when they meant “the Soul of Nature”. The Almighty is something infinitely different from a principle, or a centre of action, or a quality, or a generalization of phenomena. If then, by the word, you do but mean a Being who has contrived the world and keeps it in order, who acts in it, but only in the way of general Providence, who acts towards us but only through, what are called, laws of Nature, who is more certain not to act at all, than to act independent of those laws, who is known and approached indeed, but only through the medium of those laws; such a God it is not difficult for any one to conceive, not difficult for any one to endure. If, I say, as you would revolutionize society, so you would revolutionize heaven, if you have changed the divine sovereignty into a sort of constitutional monarchy, in which the Throne has honour and ceremonial enough, but cannot issue the most ordinary command except through legal forms and precedents, and with the counter-signature of a minister, then belief in a God is no more than an acknowledgment of existing, sensible powers and phenomena, which none but an idiot can deny. If the Supreme Being is powerful or skilful, just so far forth as the telescope shows power, and the microscope shows skill, if His moral law is to be ascertained simply by the physical processes of the animal frame, or His will gathered from the immediate issues of human affairs, if His Essence is just as high
and deep and broad and long, as the universe, and no more; if this be the fact, then will I confess that there is no specific science about God; that theology is but a name, and a protest in its behalf an hypocrisy. Then, is He but coincident with the laws of the universe; then is He but a function, or correlative or subjective reflection and mental impression of each phenomenon of the material or moral world, as it flits before us. Then, pious as it is to think of Him, while the pageant of experiment or abstract reasoning passes by, still such piety is nothing more than a part of thought or an ornament of language, and has not even an infinitesimal influence upon philosophy or science, of which it is rather the parasitical production. I understand, in that case, why Theology should require no specific teaching, for there is nothing to mistake about; why it is powerless against scientific conclusions, for it merely is one of them; why it is simply absurd in its denunciations of heresy, for it does but lie itself in the province of opinion. I understand, in that case, how it is that the religious sense is but a "sentiment", and its exercise a "gratifying treat", for it is like the sense of the beautiful or the sublime. I understand how the contemplation of the universe "leads onwards to divine truth", for divine truth is but Nature with a divine glow upon it. I understand the zeal expressed for Natural Theology; for this study is but a mode of looking at Nature, a certain view taken of Nature, private and personal, which one man has, and another has not, which gifted minds strike out, which others see to be admirable and ingenious, and which all would be the better for adopting. It is the theology of Nature, just as we talk of the philosophy or the romance of history, or the poetry of childhood, or the picturesque, or the sentimental, or the humorous, or any other abstract quality, which the genius or the caprice of the individual, or the fashion of the day, or the consent of the world, recognizes in any set of objects which are subjected to its contemplation.

Such ideas of Religion seem to me short of Monotheism; I do not impute them to this or that individual who belongs to the school which gives them currency; but what I read about the "gratification" of keeping pace in our scientific researches with "the Architect of Nature"; about the said gratification "giving a dignity and importance to the enjoyment of life", and teaching us that knowledge and our duties to society are the only earthly subject worth our notice, all this, I own it, Gentlemen, frightens me; nor is Dr. Malthby's address to the Deity amid "solemn silence", sufficient to reassure me. I do not see much difference between saying that there is no God, and implying that nothing definite can for certain be known about Him; and when I find Religions Education treated as the cultivation of sentiment, and Religious Belief as the accidental hue or posture of
the mind, I am reluctantly but forcibly reminded of
a very unpleasant page of Metaphysics, of the relations
between God and Nature insinuated by such philosophers as Hume. This acute though most low-minded
of speculators, in his inquiry concerning the Human
Understanding, introduces, as is well known, Epicu-
rus, that is, a teacher of atheism, delivering an
harangue to the Athenian people, not in defence, but
in extenuation of that opinion. His object is to show
that, whereas the atheistic view is nothing else than
the repudiation of theory, and an accurate representa-
tion of phenomenon and fact, it cannot be
dangerous, unless phenomenon and fact be dangerous.
Epicurus is made to say, that the paradigm of philo-
sophy has ever been the arguing from Nature in behalf
of something beyond Nature, greater than Nature;
whereas God, as he maintains, being known only
through the visible world, our knowledge of Him is
absolutely commensurate with our knowledge of it, is
nothing distinct from it, is but a mode of viewing it.
Hence it follows that, provided we admit, as we
cannot help doing, the phenomena of Nature and
the world, it is only a question of words whether or
not we go on to the hypothesis of a second Being, not
visible but immaterial, parallel and coincident with
Nature, to whom we give the name of God. "Allow-
ing", he says, "the gods to be the authors of the ex-
istence or order of the universe, it follows that they
possess that precise degree of power, intelligence, and
benevolence, which appears in their workmanship;
but nothing further can be proved, except we call in
the assistance of exaggeration and flattery to supply
the defects of argument and reasoning. So far as the
traces of any attributes, at present, appear, so far
may we conclude these attributes to exist. The sup-
position of further attributes is mere hypothesis;
much more the supposition, that, in distant periods of
place and time, there has been, or will be, a more
magnificent display of these attributes, and a scheme of
administration more suitable to such imaginary
virtues."

Here is a reasoner, who would not hesitate to deny
that there is any distinct science or philosophy
possible concerning the Supreme Being; since every
single thing we know of Him is this or that or the
other phenomenon, material or moral, which already
falls under this or that natural science. In him
then it would be only consistent to drop Theol-
ogy in a course of University Education; but
how is it consistent in any one who shrinks
from his companionship? I am glad to see
that the author, several times mentioned, is in
opposition to Hume, in one sentence of the quotation
I have made from his Discourse upon Science, de-
ciding, as he does, that the phenomena of the
material world are insufficient for the full exhibition
of the Divine Attributes, and implying that they re-
quire a supplemental process to complete and
harmonize their evidence. But is not this supplemental process a science? and if so, why not acknowledge its existence? If God is more than Nature, Theology claims a place among the sciences; but, on the other hand, if you are not sure of this, how do you differ from Hume or Epicurus?

I end then as I began: religious doctrine is Knowledge. This is the important truth, little entered into at this day, which I wish that all who have honoured me with their presence here, would allow me to beg them to take away with them. I am not enlisting at sharp arguments, but laying down grave principles. Religious doctrine is knowledge, in as full a sense as Newton's doctrine is knowledge. Mixed Education, at least in a University, is simply unphilosophical. Theology has at least as good a right to claim a place there as astronomy. In my next Discourse it will be my object to show, that its omission from the list of recognized sciences, is not only indefensible in itself, but prejudicial to all the rest.

DISCOURSE III.

BEARING OF THEOLOGY ON OTHER BRANCHES OF KNOWLEDGE.

When men of great intellect, who have long and intently and exclusively given themselves to the study or investigation of some one particular branch of secular knowledge, whose mental life is concentrated and hidden in their chosen pursuit, and who have neither eyes or ears for anything which does not immediately bear upon it, when such men are at length made to realize that there is a glamour all around them, which must be heard, for what they have been so little accustomed to place in the category of knowledge as Religion, and that they themselves are accused of disaffection to it, they are impatient at the interruption; they call the demand tyrannical, and the requisitionists bigots or fanatics. They are tempted to say, that their only wish is to be let alone; for themselves, they are not dreaming of offending any one, or interfering with any one; they are pursu-
ing their own particular line, they have never spoken a word against anyone's religion, whoever he may be, and never mean to do so. It does not follow that they deny the existence of a God, because they are not talking of it, when the topic would be utterly irrelevant. All they say is, that there are other beings in the world besides the Supreme Being; their business is with them. After all, the creation is not the Creator, nor things secular religions. Theology and human science are two things, not one, and have their respective provinces, contiguous it may be and cognate to each other, but not identical. When we are contemplating earth, we are not contemplating heaven; and when we are contemplating heaven, we are not contemplating earth. Separate subjects should be treated separately. As division of labour, so division of thought is the only means of successful application. “Let us go our own way,” they say, “and you go yours. We do not pretend to lecture on Theology, and you have no claim to pronounce upon Science”.

With this feeling they attempt a sort of compromise, between their opponents who claim for Theology a free introduction into the schools of science, and themselves who would exclude it altogether, and it is this: viz., that it should remain indeed excluded from the public schools, but that it should be permitted in private, wherever a sufficient number of persons is found to desire it. Such persons may have it all their own way, when they are by themselves, so that they do not attempt to disturb a comprehensive system of instruction, acceptable and useful to all, by the intrusion of opinions peculiar to their own minds.

I am now going to attempt a philosophical answer to this view of the subject, that is, to the project of teaching secular knowledge in the University Lecture Room, and remanding religious knowledge to the parish priest, the catechism, and the parlour; and in doing so, you must pardon me, Gentlemen, if I find it necessary to sacrifice composition to logical distinctness, and trust to the subject itself to give interest to processes of thought, which I fear in themselves may be wearisome to follow:—I begin then thus:

Truth is the object of Knowledge of whatever kind; and when we inquire what is meant by Truth, I suppose it is right to answer that Truth means facts and their relations, which stand towards each other pretty much as subjects and predicates in logic. All that exists, as contemplated by the human mind, forms one large system or complex fact, and this of course resolves itself into an indefinite number of particular facts, which, as being portions of a whole, have countless relations of every kind, one towards another. Knowledge is the apprehension of these facts, whether in themselves, or in their mutual positions and bearings. And, as all taken together form one integral object, so there are no natural or
real limits between part and part; one is ever running into another; all, as viewed by the mind, are combined together, and possess a correlative character one with another, from the internal mysteries of the Divine Essence down to our own sensations and consciousness, from the most solemn appointments of the Lord of all down to what may be called the accident of the hour, from the most glorious seraph down to the vilest and most noxious of reptiles.

Now, it is not wonderful, that, with all its capabilities, the human mind cannot take in this whole vast fact at a single glance, or gain possession of it at once. Like a short-sighted reader, its eye pores closely, and travels slowly, over the awful volume which lies open for its inspection. Or again, as we deal with some huge structure of many parts and sides, the mind goes round about it, noting down, first one thing, then another, as it may, and viewing it under different aspects, by way of making progress towards mastering the whole. So by degrees and by circuitous advances does it rise aloft and subject to itself that universe into which it has been born.

These various partial views or abstractions, by means of which the mind looks out upon its object, are called sciences, and embrace respectively larger or smaller portions of the field of knowledge; sometimes extending far and wide, but superficially, sometimes with exactness over particular departments, sometimes occupied together on one and the same portion, sometimes holding one part in common, and then ranging on this side or that in absolute divergence one from the other. Thus Optics has for its subject the whole visible creation, so far forth as it is simply visible; Mental Philosophy has a narrower province, but goes deeper into it; Astronomy, plane and physical, each has the same subject matter, but views it or treats it differently; lastly Geology and Comparative Anatomy have subject matters partly the same, partly distinct. Now these views or sciences, as being abstractions, have far more to do with the relations of things, than with things themselves. They tell us what things are, only or principally by telling us their relations, or assigning predicates to subjects; and therefore they never tell us all that can be said about a thing, even when they tell something, nor bring it before us, as the senses do. They arrange and classify facts; they bring separate phenomena under a common law; they trace effects to a cause. Thus they serve to transfer our knowledge from the custody of memory to the surer and more abiding protection of philosophy, thereby providing both for its spread and its advance— for, inasmuch as sciences are forms of knowledge, they enable the intellect to master and increase it; and, inasmuch as they are instruments, to communicate it readily to others. Still, after all, they proceed on the principle of a division of labour, even though that division is an abstraction, not a literal separation.
into parts; and, as the maker of a bridle or an epaulet has not, on that account, any idea of the science of tactics or strategy, so in a parallel way, it is not every science, which equally, nor any one which fully, enlightens the mind in the knowledge of things, as they are, or brings home to it the external object on which it wishes to gaze. Thus they differ in importance: and according to their importance, will be their influence, not only on the mass of knowledge to which they all converge and contribute, but on each other.

Since then sciences are the results of mental processes about one and the same subject matter, viewed under various aspects, and are true results, as far as they go, yet at the same time independent and partial, it follows that on the one hand they need external assistance, one by one, by reason of their incompleteness, and on the other that they are able to afford it to each other, by reason, first, of their distinctness in themselves, and then, of their identity in their subject matter. Viewed all together, they become the nearest approximation to a representation or subjective-reflexion of the objective truth, possible to the human mind, which advances towards the accurate apprehension of that object, in proportion to the number of sciences it has mastered; and which, when certain sciences are wanting, in such a case has but a defective apprehension, in proportion to the value of the sciences which are thus wanting, and the importance of the field on which they are employed.

Let us take, for instance, man himself as our object of contemplation; then at once we shall find we can view him in a variety of relations; and according to those relations, are the sciences of which he is the subject matter, and, according to our acquaintance with them is our possession of a true knowledge of him. We may view him in relation to the material elements of his body, or to his mental constitution, or to his household and family, or to the community in which he lives, or to the Being who made him; and in consequence we treat of him respectively as physiologists, or as moral philosophers, or as writers of economics, or of politics, or as theologians. When we think of him in all these relations together, or as the subject at once of all the sciences I have alluded to, then we may be said to reach unto and rest in the idea of man as an object or external fact, similar to that which the eye takes of his outward form. On the other hand, according as we are only physiologists, or only politicians, or only moralists, so is our idea of man more or less unreal; we do not take in the whole of him, and the defect is greater or less, in proportion as the relation is, or is not, important, which is omitted, whether his relation to God, or his king, or his children, or his own component parts. And if there be one relation, about which we know nothing at all except that it exists, then is
our knowledge of him, confessedly and to our own consciousness, deficient and partial, and that, I repeat, in proportion to the importance of the relation.

That therefore is true of sciences in general, which we are apt to think applies only to pure mathematics, though to pure mathematics it applies especially, viz., that they cannot be considered as simple representations or informants of things as they are. We are accustomed to say, and say truly, that the conclusions of pure mathematics are applied, corrected, and adapted, by mixed; but so too the conclusions of Physiology, Geology, and other sciences, are revised and completed by each other. Those conclusions do not represent whole and substantive facts, but views, true, so far as they go; and in order to ascertain how far they do go, that is, how far they correspond to the object, to which they belong, we must compare them with the views taken of that object by other sciences. Did we proceed upon the abstract theory of forces, we should assign a much more ample range to a projectile, than in fact the resistance of the air allows it to accomplish. Let, however, that resistance be made the subject of scientific analysis, and then we shall have a new science, assisting, and to a certain point completing, for the benefit of questions of fact, the science of projection. On the other hand, the science of projection itself, considered as belonging to impulsive forces, is not

more perfect, as such, by this supplementary investigation. And in like manner, as regards the whole circle of sciences, one corrects another for purposes of fact, and one without the other cannot dogmatize, except hypothetically and upon its own abstract principles. For instance, the Newtonian philosophy requires the admission of certain metaphysical postulates, if it is to be more than a theory or an hypothesis; as, that the true explanation of phenomena is that which assigns them to the fewest causes; and this presupposes others, as, that there is such a thing as cause and effect at all, that order implies causation, that there is any real cause but the One First Cause, that the theory of the Occasionists is false, and that what happened yesterday will happen to-morrow; moreover, that phenomena are facts, that there is such a thing as matter, that our senses are trustworthy, and so on. Now metaphysicists grant to Newton all that he asks; but, if so be, they may not prove equally accommodating to another who asks something else, and then all his most logical conclusions in the science of physics would remain hopelessly on the stocks, though finished, and never could be launched into the sphere of fact.

Again, did I know nothing about the passage of bodies, except what the theory of gravitation supplies, were I simply absorbed in that theory so as to make it measure all motion on earth and in the sky, I should indeed come to many right conclusions, I should
hit off many important facts, ascertain many existing relations, and correct many popular errors: I should scout and ridicule with great success the old notion, that light bodies flew up and heavy bodies fell down; but I should go on with equal confidence to deny the phenomenon of capillary attraction. Here I should be wrong, but only because I carried out my science irrespectively of other sciences. In like manner, did I simply give myself to the investigation of the external action of body upon body, I might scoff at the very idea of chemical affinities and combinations, and reject it as simply unintelligible. Were I a mere chemist, I should deny the influence of mind upon bodily health; and so on, as regards the devotees of any science, or family of sciences, to the exclusion of others; they necessarily become bigots and quacks, scorning all principles and reported facts, which do not belong to their own pursuit, and thinking to effect every thing without aid from any other quarter. Thus, before now, chemistry has been substituted for medicine; and again, political economy, or intellectual enlightenment, or study of the Protestant Bible, has been cried up as a panacea against vice, malevolence, and misery.

Unless I am insisting on too plain a point; I would ask you, Gentlemen, to consider how prominent a place Induction holds in modern philosophy. It is especially the instrument of physical discovery; yet it is singularly deficient in logical cogency, and its deficiency illustrates the incompleteness of the sciences, severally, which respectively use it, for the ascertainment of particular matters of fact. Its main principle, I suppose, is this:—that what in our investigations is ever tending to be universal, may be considered universal. We assume that general proposition to be true, which is ever getting more and more like truth, the more we try it; we call that a proof, which is but a growing proof. We argue from some or many to all. Induction, thus described, is surely open to error; for, when engaged in the accumulation of instances, which are to subserve the elucidation of some particular science, it may have its path crossed any moment by the decisions of other sciences with reference to the remaining instances which it has not yet comprised in its investigation. In such a case it is of course at once interrupted and brought to a stop; and what actually takes place as regards some attempted inductions, may be of possible occurrence in many others. That is, the induction is complete for the purpose of determining the existence of a general law in the particular science which is using it; but that law is only proved to be general, not universal; inasmuch as particular instances, in which it ought to hold good, and which in fact have not been constituent elements of the induction, may after all fall under some general law of some other science also, which succeeds in modifying or changing them. For instance, supposing
Euphrates has flowed in its bed for three hundred and sixty days continuously in the current year, we may infer a general law, and expect surely that it will flow on through the five days, which, being future, are external to the induction; and so, physically speaking, it will flow; yet in matter of fact it did not flow on those remaining days at a certain historical era, for Cyrus turned it aside, and removed the question out of physics into politics and strategies. A physical lecturer would not be endured, who denied the historical fact of the anomalous course of the stream, because he would not take into account the volition and the agency of man, as foreign to his science; yet certainly he would be right in saying that, according to physics, the river ought to flow on, and on the hypothesis of physics did flow in its bed all through the five days, as it was wont. Such is the fallacy of experimental science, when narrowed to some single department, instead of expanding into all. In political arrangements the majority compels the outstanding minority; but in the philosophy of induction, as some are accustomed to apply it, the many actually deny the existence of the few.

Summing up what I have said, I lay it down that, no science is complete in itself, when viewed as an instrument of attaining the knowledge of facts; that every science, for this purpose, subserves the rest; and, in consequence, that the systematic omission of any one science from the catalogue, prejudices the accuracy and completeness of our knowledge altogether, and that, in proportion to its importance. Not even Theology itself, though it comes from heaven, though its truths were given once for all at the first, though they are more certain than those of mathematics, not even Theology do I exclude from the law to which every mental exercise is subject, viz., from that imperfection, which ever must attend the abstract, when it would determine the concrete. Nor do I speak only of Natural Religion; for even the teaching of the Catholic Church, is variously influenced by the other sciences. Not to insist on the introduction of the Aristotelic philosophy into its phraseology, its interpretations of prophecy are directly affected by the issues of history, its comments upon Scripture by the conclusions of the astronomer and the geologist, and its casuistical decisions by the various experience, political, social, and psychological, with which times and places are ever supplying it.

What Theology gives, it has a right to take; or rather, the interests of Truth oblige it to take. If we would not be beguiled by dreams, if we would ascertain facts as they are, then, granting Theology is a real science, we cannot exclude it, and still call ourselves philosophers. I have asserted nothing as yet as to the preeminent dignity of Religious Truth; I only say, if there be Religious Truth at all, we cannot shut our eyes to it, without prejudice to truth of
every kind, physical, metaphysical, historical, and moral; for it bears upon all truth. And thus I answer the objection with which I opened this Discourse. I supposed the question put to me by a philosopher of the day, "Why cannot you go your way, and let us go ours?" I answer, in the name of Theology, "When Newton can dispense with the metaphysician, then may you dispense with us." So much at first sight; now I am going on to claim a little more for Theology, by adding it with branches of knowledge which may with greater decency be compared to it.

Let us see then, how this supercilious treatment of so momentous a science, so momentous, it must be, if there be a God, runs in a somewhat parallel case. The great philosopher of antiquity, when he would enumerate the causes of the things that take place in the world, after making mention of those which he considered to be physical and material, adds, "and the mind and everything which is by means of man." Certainly; it would have been a preposterous course, when he would trace the effects he saw around him to their respective sources, had he directed his exclusive attention upon some one class or order of originating principles, and ascribed to these every thing which happened anywhere. It would indeed have been unworthy a genius so curious, so penetrating, so fertile, so analytical as Aristotle's; to have laid it down that every thing on the face of the earth could be accounted for by the material sciences, without the hypothesis of moral agents. It is incredible that in the investigation of physical results he could ignore so influential a being as man, or forget that, not only brute force and elemental movement, but knowledge also is power. And this, so much the more, inasmuch as moral and spiritual agents belong to another, not to say a higher, order than physical; so that the omission supposed would not have been merely an oversight in matters of detail, but a philosophical error, and a fault in division.

However, we live in an age of the world, when the career of science and literature is little affected by what was done, or would have been done, by this venerable authority; so, we will suppose, in England or Ireland, in the middle of the nineteenth century, a set of persons of name and celebrity to meet together, in spite of Aristotle, and to adopt a line of proceeding, which they conceive the circumstances of the time render imperative. We will suppose that a difficulty just now besets the enunciation and discussion of all matters of science, in consequence of the extreme sensitiveness of large classes of the community, ministers and laymen, on the subjects of necessity, responsibility, the standard of morals, and the nature of virtue. Parties run so high, that the only way of avoiding constant quarrelling in defence of this or

Arist. Ethic. Nicom., iii. 3.
that side of the question, is, in the judgment of the persons I am supposing, to shut up the subject of anthropology altogether. The Privy Council issues an order to that effect. Man is to be as if he were not, in the general course of Education; the moral and mental sciences are to have no professorial chairs, and the treatment of them is to be simply as a matter of private judgment, which each individual may carry out as he will. I can just fancy such a prohibition abstractedly possible; but one thing I cannot fancy possible, viz., that the parties in question, after this sweeping act of exclusion, should forthwith send out proposals on the basis of such exclusion, for publishing an Encyclopedia, or erecting a National University. It is necessary, however, Gentlemen, for the sake of the illustration which I am setting before you, to imagine what cannot be. I say, let us imagine a project for organizing a system of scientific teaching, in which the agency of man in the material world, cannot allowably be recognized, and may allowably be denied. Physical and mechanical causes are exclusively to be treated of; volition is a forbidden subject. A Prospectus is put out, with a list of sciences, we will say, Astronomy, Optics, Hydrostatics, Galvanism, Pneumatics, Statics, Dynamics, Pure Mathematics, Geology, Botany, Physiology, Anatomy, and so forth; but not a word about the mind and its powers, except what is said in explanation of the omission. That explanation is to the effect, that the parties concerned in the undertaking have given long and painful thought to the subject, and have been reluctantly driven to the conclusion, that it is simply impracticable to include in the list of University Lectures the Philosophy of Mind. What relieves, however, their regret is the reflection, that domestic feelings and polished manners are best cultivated in the family circle and in good society, in the observance of the sacred ties which unite father, mother, and child, in the correlative claims and duties of citizenship, in the exercise of disinterested loyalty and enlightened patriotism. With this apology, such as it is, they pass over the consideration of the human mind and its powers and works, with "heads uncovered" and "in solemn silence".

The project becomes popular; money flows in space; a charter is obtained; professors are appointed, lectures given, examinations passed, degrees awarded:—what sort of exactness or trustworthiness, what philosophical largeness, will attach to views formed in an intellectual atmosphere thus deprived of some of the constituent elements of daylight? What judgment will foreign countries and future times pass on the labours of the most acute and accomplished of the philosophers who have been parties to so portentous an unreality? Here are professors gravely lecturing on medicine, or history, or political economy, who, so far from being bound to acknowledge, are free to scoff at the action of mind upon
matter, or of mind upon mind, or the claims of mutual justice and charity. Common sense indeed and public opinion set bounds at first to so intolerable a licence; yet, as time goes on, an omission which was originally but a matter of expedience, commends itself to the reason; and at length a Professor is found, more hardly than his brethren, still however, as he himself maintains, with sincere respect for domestic feelings and good manners, who takes on him to deny psychology in toto, to pronounce the influence of mind in the visible world a superstition, and to account for every effect, which is found in it, by the operation of physical causes. Hitherto life and volition were accounted real powers; the muscles act, and their action cannot be represented by any scientific expression; a stope flies out of the hand, and the propulsive force of the muscle resides in the will; but there has been a revolution, or at least a new theory in philosophy, and our Professor, I say, in a brilliant Lecture before a thronging audience, after speaking with the highest admiration of the human intellect, limits its independent action to the region of speculation, and denies that it can be a motive principle, or can exercise a special interference, in the material world. He ascribes every work, or external act, of man to the innate force or soul of the physical universe. He observes that spiritual agents are so mysterious and unintelligible, so uncertain in their laws, so vague in their operation, so sheltered from experience, that a wise man will have nothing to say to them. They belong to a different order of causes, which he leaves to those whose profession it is to investigate them, and he confines himself to the tangible and sure. Human exploits, human devices, human deeds, human productions, all that comes under the scholastic terms of “genius” and “art”, and the metaphysical ideas of “duty”, “right”, and “heroism”, it is his office to contemplate all these merely in their place in the eternal system of physical cause and effect. What indeed is art, confessedly, but a modification and a microcosm of nature? Was not Bacon himself obliged to allow that no one overcomes Nature but by yielding to her? Warming with his subject, the Lecturer undertakes to show how the whole fabric of material civilization has arisen from the constructive powers of physical elements and physical laws. He descants upon palaces, castles, temples, exchanges, bridges, causeways, and shows that they never could have grown into the imposing dimensions which they present to us, but for the laws of gravitation and the cohesion of part with part. The pillar would come down, the loftier the more speedily, did not the centre of gravity fall within its base; and the most admired dome of Palladio or Sir Christopher would give way, were it not for the happy principle of the arch. He surveys the complicated machinery of a single day’s arrangements in a private family; our dress, our furniture, our hospi-
table board; what would become of them, he asks, but for the laws of physical nature? Firm stitches have a natural power, in proportion to the toughness of the material adopted, to keep together separate portions of cloth; sofas and chairs could not turn upside-down, even if they would; and it is a property of caloric to relax the fibres of animal matter, acting on water in one way, oil in another, and this is the whole mystery of the most elaborate cuisine—but I should be tedious, if I continued the illustration.

Now, Gentlemen; pray understand how it is to be here applied. I am not supposing that the principles of Theology and Psychology are the same, or arguing from the works of man to the works of God, which Paley has done, which Hume has protested against. I am not busy in my own existence and attributes of God, by means of the Argument from design. I am not proving anything at all about the Supreme Being. On the contrary, I am assuming His existence, and I do but say this:—that, man existing, no University Professor, who had suppressed in physical lectures the idea of volition, who did not take volition for granted, could escape a one-sided, a radically false view of the things, which he discussed; not indeed that his own definitions, principles, and laws would be wrong, or his abstract statements, but his considering his own study to be the key of everything that takes place on the face of the earth, and his passing over anthropology, here would be his error. I say, it would not be his science which was untrue, but his so-called knowledge which was unreal. He would be deciding on facts by means of theories; he would forget the Poet's maxim,

"There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

The various busy world, spread out before our eyes, is physical, but it is more than physical; and, in making its actual system identical with his scientific analysis, formed on a particular aspect, such a Professor as I have imagined was betraying a want of philosophical depth, and an ignorance of what an University Education ought to be. He was no longer a teacher of liberal knowledge, but a narrow-minded bigot. While his doctrines professed to be conclusions formed upon an hypothesis, they were undeniable; not, if they professed to give results in fact which he could grasp and take possession of. Granting indeed, that a man's arm is moved by a simple physical cause, then of course, we may dispute about the various external influences, which, when it changes its position, sway it to and fro, like a screw in a garden; but to assert that the motive cause is physical, this is an assumption in a case, when our question is about a matter of fact, not about the logical consequences of an assumed premise. And, in like manner, if a people prays, and the wind
changes, the rain ceases, the sun shines, and the harvest is safely housed, when no one expected it, our Professor may, if he will, consult the barometer, discourse about the atmosphere, and throw what has happened into an equation, ingenious, if not true; but, should he proceed to rest the phenomenon, in matter of fact, simply upon a physical cause, to the exclusion of a divine, and to say that the given case actually belongs to his science because other like cases do, I must tell him, *Ne sutor ultra crepidam*: he is making his particular craft usurp and occupy the universe. This then is the drift of my illustration. Our excluding volition from our range of ideas, is a denial of the soul; and our ignoring divine agency is a virtual denial of God. Moreover, supposing man can will and act of himself in spite of physics, to shut up this great truth, though one, is to put our whole encyclopedia of knowledge out of joint; and supposing God can will and act of Himself in this world which He has made, and we deny or slur it over, then we are throwing the circle of universal science into a like, or a far worse confusion.

Worse incomparably, for the idea of God, if there be a God, is infinitely higher than the idea of man, if there be man. If to blot out man’s agency is to deface the book of knowledge, on the supposition of that agency existing, what must it be, supposing it exists, to blot out the agency of God? See, Gentle-
it destroy the equilibrium of the whole system of Knowledge? This is the inquiry to which I proceed.

Now what is Theology? First, I will tell you what it is not. And here, in the first place, though of course I speak on the subject, as a Catholic, observe that, strictly speaking, I am not assuming that Catholicism is true, while I make myself the champion of Theology. Catholicism has not formally entered into my argument hitherto, nor shall I just now assume any principle peculiar to it; for reasons which will appear in the sequel, though of course I shall use Catholic language. Neither on the other hand, will I fall into the fashion of the day, of identifying Natural Theology with Physical; which said Physical Theology is a most jejune study, considered as a science, and really is no science at all, for it is ordinarily nothing more than a series of pious or polemical remarks upon the physical world viewed religiously, whereas the word "natural" really comprehends man and society, and all that is involved therein, as the great Protestant writer, Dr. Butler, shows us. Nor, in the third place, do I mean by Theology polemics of any kind; for instance, what are called "the Evidences of Religion", or "the Christian Evidences"; for, though these constitute a science supplemental to Theology and are necessary in their place, they are not Theology itself, unless an army is synonymous with the body politic. Nor, fourthly, do I mean by Theology that vague thing called "Christianity", or "our common Christianity", or "Christianity the law of the land", if there is any man alive who can tell what it is. I discard it, for the very reason that it cannot throw itself into a proposition. Lastly, I do not understand by Theology, acquaintance with the Scriptures; for, though no person of religious feelings can read Scripture, but he will find those feelings roused, and gain various knowledge of history into the bargain, yet historical reading and religious feeling are not science. I mean none of these things by Theology, I simply mean the Science of God, or the truths we know about God put into system; just as we have a science of the stars, and call it astronomy, or of the crust of the earth, and call it geology.

For instance, I mean, for this is the main point, that, as in the human frame there is a living principle, acting upon it and through it by means of volition, so, behind the veil of the visible universe, there is an invisible, intelligent Being, acting on and through it, as and when He will. Further, I mean that this invisible Agent is in no sense a soul of the world, after the analogy of human nature, but on the contrary is absolutely distinct from the world, as being its Creator, Upholder, Governor, and Sovereign Lord. Here we are at once brought into the circle of doctrines which the idea of God embodies. I mean then by the Supreme Being, one who is simply self-dependent, and the only being who is such; moreover that He is without beginning or Eternal, and the
only Eternal; that in consequence He has lived a whole eternity by Himself; and hence that He is all-sufficient, sufficient for His own blessedness, and all-blessed, and ever-blessed. Further, I mean a Being, who having these prerogatives, has the Supreme Good, or rather is the Supreme Good, or has all the attributes of Good in infinite greatness; all wisdom, all truth, all justice, all love, all holiness, all beautifulness; who is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent; ineffably one, absolutely perfect; and such, that what we do not know and cannot even imagine of Him, is far more wonderful than what we do and can. I mean one who is sovereign over His own will and actions, though always according to the eternal Rule of right and wrong, which is Himself. I mean, moreover, that He created all things out of nothing, and preserves them every moment, and could destroy them as easily as He made them; and that, in consequence, He is separated from them by an abyss, and is incommunicable in all His attributes. And further, He has stamped upon all things, in the hour of their creation, their respective natures, and has given them their work and mission and their length of days, greater or less, in their appointed place. I mean too, that He is ever present with His works, one by one, and confronts everything He has made by His particular and most loving Providence, and manifests Himself to each according to its needs; and on rational beings has imprinted the moral law, and given them power to obey it, imposing on them the duty of worship and service, searching and scanning them through and through with His omniscient eye, and putting before them a present trial and a judgment to come.

Such is what Theology teaches about God, a doctrine, as the very idea of its subject matter presupposes, so mysterious as in its fulness to lie beyond any system, and to seem even in parts to be irreconcilable with itself, the imagination being unable to embrace what the reason determines. It teaches of a Being infinite yet personal; all blessed yet ever operative; absolutely separate from the creature, yet in every part of the creation at every moment; above all things, yet under every thing. It teaches of a Being who, though the highest, yet in the work of creation, conservation, government, retribution, makes Himself, as it were, the minister and servant of all; who, though inhabiting eternity, allows Himself to take an interest, and to feel a sympathy, in the matters of space and time. His are all beings, visible and invisible, the noblest and the vilest of them. His are the substance, and the operation, and the results of that system of physical nature, into which we are born. His too are the powers and achievements of the intellectual essences, on which He has bestowed an independent action and the gift of origination. The laws of the universe, the principles of truth, the relation of one thing to
another, their qualities and virtues, the order and harmony of the whole, all that exists, is from Him; and, if evil is not from Him, as assuredly it is not, this is because evil has no substance of its own, but is only the defect, excess, perversion, or corruption of that which has. All we see, hear, and touch, the remote sidereal firmament, as well as our own sea and land, and the elements which compose them, and the ordinances they obey, are His. The primary atoms of matter, their properties, their mutual action, their disposition and collocation, electricity, magnetism, gravitation, light, and whatever other subtle principles or operations the wit of man is detecting or shall detect, are the works of His hands. From Him has been every movement which has convulsed and refashioned the surface of the earth. The most insignificant or unsightly insect, is from Him, and good in its kind; the ever-teeming, inexhaustible swarms of animalculae, the myriads of living motes invisible to the naked eye, the restless everspreading vegetation which creeps like a garment over the whole earth, the lofty cedar, the unbranched banana, are His. His are the tribes and families of birds and beasts, their graceful forms, their wild gestures, and their passionate cries.

And so in the intellectual, moral, social, and political world. Man, with his motives and works, his languages, his propagation, his diffusion, is from Him. Agriculture, medicine, and the arts of life, are His gifts. Society, laws, government, He is their sanction. The pageant of earthly royalty has the semblance and the benediction of the Eternal King. Peace and civilization, commerce and adventure, wars when just, conquest when humane and necessary, have His cooperation, and His blessing upon them. The course of events, the revolution of Empires, the rise and fall of states, the periods and eras, the progresses and the retrogressions of the world's history, not indeed the incidental sin, over-abundant as it is, but the great outlines and the issues of human affairs, are from His disposition. The elements and types and seminal principles and constructive powers of the moral world, in ruins though it be, are to be referred to Him. He "enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world". His are the dictates of the moral sense, and the retributive reproaches of conscience. To Him must be ascribed the rich endowments of the intellect, the radiation of genius, the imagination of the poet, the sagacity of the politician, the wisdom (as Scripture calls it), which now rears and decorates the Temple, now manifests itself in proverb or in parable. The old sages of nations, the majestic precepts of philosophy, the luminous maxims of law, the oracles of individual wisdom, the traditionary rules of truth, justice, and religion, even though imbedded in the corruption, or alloyed with the pride, of the world, bespeak His original agency, and His long-suffering presence. Even where there is
habitual rebellion against Him, or profound far-spreading social depravity, still the undercurrent, or the heroic outburst, of natural virtue, as well as the yearnings of the heart after what it has not, and its presentiment of its true remedies, are to be ascribed to the Author of all good. Anticipations or reminiscences of His glory haunt the mind of the self-sufficient sage, and of the pagan devotee; His writing is upon the wall, whether of the Indian fane, or of the porticoes of Greece. He introduces Himself, He all but concurs, according to His good pleasure, and in His selected season, in the issues of unbelief, superstition, and false worship, and changes the character of acts, by His over-ruling operation. He condescends, though He gives no sanction, to the altars and shrines of imposture, and He makes His own flat the substitute for its sorceries. He speaks amid the incantations of Balaam, raises Samuel's spirit in the witch's cavern, prophesies of the Messias by the tongue of the Sibyl, forces Python to recognize His ministers, and baptizes by the hand of the unbeliever. He is with the heathen dramatist in his denunciations of injustice and tyranny, and his auguries of divine vengeance upon crime. Even on the unseemly legends of a popular mythology He casts His shadow, and is dimly discerned in the ode or the epic, as in troubled water or in fantastic dreams. All that is good, all that is true, all that is beautiful, all that is beneficent, be it great or small, be it perfect or fragmentary, natural as well as supernatural, moral as well as material, comes from Him.

If this be a sketch, accurate in substance and as far as it goes, of the doctrines proper to Theology, and especially of the doctrine of a particular Providence, which is the portion of it most on a level with human sciences, I cannot understand at all how, supposing it to be true, it can fail, considered as knowledge, to exert a powerful influence on philosophy, literature, and every intellectual creation or discovery whatever. I cannot understand how it is possible, as the phrase goes, to blink the question of its truth or falsehood. It meets us with a profession and a proffer of the highest truths of which the human mind is capable; it embraces a range of subjects the most diversified and distant from each other. What science will not find one part or other of its province traversed by its path? What results of philosophic speculation are unquestionable, if they have been gained without inquiry as to what Theology had to say to them? Does it cast no light upon history? has it no influence upon the principles of ethics? is it without any sort of bearing on physics, metaphysics, and political science? Can we drop it out of the circle of knowledge, without allowing, either that that circle is thereby mutilated, or on the other hand that Theology is no science?

And this dilemma is the more inevitable, because Theology is so precise and consistent in its intelle
tual structure. When I speak of Theism or Monothelism, I am not throwing together discordant doctrines; I am not merging belief, opinion, persuasion, of whatever kind, into a shapeless aggregate, by the help of ambiguous words, and dignifying this medley by the name of Theology. I speak of one idea unfolded in its just proportions, carried out upon an intelligible method, and issuing in necessary and immutable results; understood indeed at one time and place better than at another, held here and there with more or less of inconsistency, but still, after all, in all times and places, where it is found, the evolution, not of two ideas, but of one.

And here I am led again to direct your attention, Gentlemen, to another and most important point in the argument,—its wide reception. Theology, as I have described it, is no accident of particular minds; as are certain systems; for instance, of prophetical interpretation. It is not the sudden birth of a crisis, as the Lutheran or Wesleyan doctrine. It is not the splendid development of some uprising philosophy, as the Cartesian or Platonic. It is not the fashion of a season, as certain medical treatments may be considered. It has had a place, if not possession, in the intellectual world, from time immemorial; it has been received by minds the most various, and in systems of religion the most hostile to each other. It has 

prima facie claims upon us, so strong, that it can only be rejected on the ground of those claims being nothing more than imposing, that is, false. As to our own countries, it occupies our language, it meets us at every turn in our literature, it is the secret assumption, too axiomatic to be distinctly professed, of all our writers; nor can we help assuming it ourselves without the most unnatural vigilance. Whoever philosophizes, starts with it, and introduces it, when he will, without any apology. Bacon, Hooper, Taylor, Cadworth, Locke, Newton, Clarke, Berkeley, Butler, and it would be as easy to find more, as difficult to find greater names among English authors, inculcate or comment upon it. Men the most opposed, in creed or cast of mind, Addison and Johnson, Shakespeare and Milton, Lord Herbert and Baxter, herald it forth. Nor is it an English or a Protestant notion only; you track it across the continent, you pursue it into former ages. When was the world without it? have the systems of Atheism or Pantheism, as sciences, prevailed in the literature of nations, or in respect of formation or completion, to compare with that of Monothelism? We find it in old Greece, and even in Rome, as well as in Judea and the East. We find it in popular literature, in philosophy, in poetry, as a positive and settled teaching, differing not at all in the appearance it presents, whether in Protestant England, or in schismatical Russia, or in the Mahometan populations, or in the Catholic Church. If ever there was a subject of thought, which had earned by prescription to be received among the
studies of a University, and could not be rejected except on the score of convicted imposture, as astrology or alchemy; if there be a science any where, which at least could claim not to be ignored, but to be entertained, and either distinctly accepted or distinctly reprobated, or, rather, which cannot be passed over in a scheme of universal instruction, without involving a positive denial of its truth, it is this ancient, this far-spreading philosophy.

And now, Gentlemen, I may bring a somewhat tedious discussion to a close. It will not take many words to sum up what I have been urging. I say then, that the various branches of knowledge, which are the matter of teaching in a University, so hang together, that none can be neglected without prejudice to the perfection of the rest, and if Theology be a branch of knowledge, of wide reception, of philosophical structure, of unutterable importance, and of supreme influence, to what conclusion are we brought from these two premisses but this? that to withdraw Theology from the public schools, is to impair the completeness and to invalidate the trustworthiness of all that is actually taught in them.

But I have been insisting simply on Natural Theology, and that, because I wished to carry along with me those who were not Catholics, and, again, as being confident that no one can really set himself to master and to teach the doctrine of an Intelligent Creator in its fulness without going on a great deal farther than
DISCOURSE IV.

BEARING OF OTHER BRANCHES OF KNOWLEDGE ON THEOLOGY.

Nothing is more common in the world at large, than to consider the resistance, made on the part of religious men, especially Catholics, to the separation of Secular Education from Religion, as a plain token, that there is some real contrariety between human science and Revelation. It matters not to the multitude who draw this inference, whether the protesting parties are aware that it can be drawn or not; it is borne in upon the many, so to say, as self-evident, that religious men would not thus be jealous and alarmed about Science, did they not feel instinctively, though they may not recognise it, that knowledge is their born enemy, and that its progress will be certain to destroy, if it is not arrested, all that they hold venerable and dear. It looks to the world like a misgiving on our part similar to that which is imputed to our refusal to educate by means of the Bible only; why
should you dread it, men say, if it be not against you? And in like manner, why should you dread secular education, except that it is against you? Why impede the circulation of books which take religious views opposite to your own? Why forbid your children and scholars the free perusal of poems or tales or essays or other light literature which you fear would unsettle their minds? Why oblige them to know these persons and to shun those, if you think that your friends have reason on their side, as fully as your opponents? Truth is bold and unsuspicious; want of self-reliance is the mark of falsehood.

Now, as far as this objection relates to any supposed opposition between secular science and divine, which is the subject on which I am at present engaged, I made a sufficient answer to it in my foregoing Discourse. In it I said, that, in order to have possession of truth at all, we must have the whole truth; that no one science, no two sciences, no one family of sciences, not even all secular science, is the whole truth; that revealed truth enters to a very great extent, into the province of science, philosophy, and literature, and that to put it on one side, in compliment to secular science, is simply, under colour of a compliment, to do science a great damage. I do not say that every science will be equally affected by the omission; pure mathematics will not suffer at all; chemistry will suffer less than politics, politics than history, ethics, or metaphysics; still, that the various branches of science are intimately connected with each other, and form one whole, which whole is impaired, and to an extent which it is difficult to limit, by any considerable omission of knowledge, of whatever kind, and that revealed knowledge is very far indeed from an inconsiderable department, this, I consider undeniable. As the written and unwritten word of God make up Revelation as a whole, and the unwritten, taken by itself, is but a part of that whole, so in turn Revelation itself may be viewed as one of the constituent parts of human knowledge, considered as a whole, and its omission is the omission of one of those constituent parts. Revealed Religion furnishes facts to the other sciences, which those sciences, left to themselves, would never reach; and it invalidates apparent facts, which, left to themselves, they would imagine. Thus, in the science of history, the preservation of our race in Noah's ark, is an historical fact, which history never would arrive at without Revelation; and, in the sciences of physiology and moral philosophy, our race's progress and perfectibility is a dream, because Revelation contradicts it, whatever may be plausibly argued in its behalf by scientific inquirers. It is not then that Catholics are afraid of human knowledge, but that they are proud of divine knowledge, and that they think the omission of any kind of knowledge whatever, human or divine, to be, as far as it goes, not knowledge, but ignorance.

Thus I anticipated the objection in question last
week: now I am going to make it the introduction to a further view of the relation of secular knowledge to divine. I observe then, that, if you drop any science out of the circle of knowledge, you cannot keep its place vacant for it; that science is forgotten; the other sciences close up, or, in other words, they exceed their proper bounds, and intrude where they have no right. For instance, I suppose if ethics were sent into banishment, its territory would soon disappear, under a treaty of partition, as it may be called, between physiology and political economy; what, again, would become of the province of experimental science, if made over to the Antiquarian Society; or of history, if surrendered out and out to Metaphysicians? The case is the same with the subject matter of Theology; it would be the prey of a dozen various sciences, if Theology were put out of possession; and not only so, but those sciences would be plainly exceeding their rights and their capacities in seizing upon it. They would be sure to teach wrongly, what they had no mission to teach at all. The enemies of Catholicism ought to be the last to deny this—for they have never been blind to a like usurpation, as they have called it, on the part of theologians; those who accuse us of wishing, in accordance with Scripture language, to make the sun go round the earth, are not the men to deny that a science which exceeds its limits, falls into error.

I neither then am able nor care to deny, rather
acts to a principle, and effects to a cause. In a word, it philosophises; for I suppose Science and Philosophy, in their elementary idea, are nothing else but this habit of viewing, as it may be called, the objects which sense conveys to the mind, of throwing them into system, and uniting and stamping them with one form.

This method is so natural to us, as I have said, as to be almost spontaneous; and we are impatient when we cannot exercise it, and in consequence we do not always wait to have the means of exercising it aright, but we often put up with insufficient or absurd views or interpretations of what we meet with, rather than have none at all. We refer the various matters which are brought home to us, material or moral, to causes which we happen to know of, or to such as are simply imaginary, sooner than refer them to nothing; and, according to the activity of our intellect, do we feel a pain and begin to fret, if we are not able to do so. Here we have an explanation of the multitude of offhand sayings, flippant judgments, and shallow generalizations, with which the world abounds. Not from self-will only, nor from malevolence, but from the irritation which suspense occasions, is the mind forced on to pronounce, without sufficient data for pronouncing. Who does not form some view or other, for instance, of any public man, or any public event, nay even so far in some cases as to reach the mental delineation of his appearance or of its scene, yet how few have a right to form any? Hence the misconceptions of character, hence the false impressions and reports of words or deeds, which are the rule, rather than the exception, in the world at large; hence the extravagances of undisciplined talent, and the narrownesses of conceited ignorance; because, though it is no easy matter to view things correctly, yet the busy mind will ever be viewing. We cannot do without a view, and we put up with an illusion, when we cannot get a true one.

Now, observe how this impatience acts in matters of research and speculation. What happens to the ignorant and hot-headed, will take place in the case of every person, whose education or pursuits are contracted, whether they be merely professional, merely scientific, or of whatever other peculiar complexion. Men, whose life lies in the cultivation of one science, or the exercise of one method of thought, have no more right, though they have often more ambition, to generalize upon the basis of their own pursuit, yet beyond its range, than the schoolboy or the ploughman to judge of a Prime Minister. But they must have something to say on every subject; habit, fashion, the public require it of them: and, if so, they can only give sentence according to their knowledge. You might think this ought to make such a person modest in his enunciations; not so: too often it happens that, in proportion as his knowledge is narrow, is,
not his diffidence of it, but the deep hold it has upon
him, his conviction of his own conclusions, and his posi-
tiveness in maintaining them. He has the obstinacy
of the bigot, whom he scorches, without the bigot's
apology, that he has been taught, as he thinks, his
doctrine from heaven. Thus he becomes, what is com-
monly called, a man of one idea; which properly means
a man of one science, and of the view, partly true, but
subordinate, partly false, which is all that can pro-
ceed out of any thing so partial. Hence it is that
we have the principles of utility, of combination, of
progress, of philanthropy, or, in material sciences, com-
parative anatomy, phrenology, electricity, ex-
alited into leading ideas and keys, if not of all know-
ledge, at least of many things more than belong to
them,—principles, all of them true to a certain point,
yet all degenerating into error and quackery, because
they are carried to excess, at a point where they
require interpretation and restraint from other
quarters, and because they are employed to do what
is simply too much for them, inasmuch as a little
science is not deep philosophy.

Lord Bacon has set down the abuse, of which I am
speaking, among the impediments to the Advancement
of the Sciences, when he observes that "men
have used to infect their meditations, opinions, and
doctrines, with some conceits which they have most
admired, or some Sciences which they have most
applied; and give all things else a tincture according
to them, utterly untrue and improper...."

So have the alchemists made a philosophy out of a few
experiments of the furnace; and Gilbertus, our
countryman, hath made a philosophy out of the
observations of a lodestone. So Cicero, when
reciting the several opinions of the nature of the
soul, he found a musician, that held the soul was but a
harmony, saith pleasantly, 'hic ab arte sua non reces-
sit'; 'he was true to his art'. But of these conceits
Aristotle speaketh seriously and wisely, when he
saith, "Qui respicient ad paucu, de facilii pronunci-
ciat'; 'they who contemplate a few things have no
difficulty in deciding'.

Now I have said enough to explain the incon-
veniences which I conceive necessarily to result from
a refusal to recognize theological truth in a course of
Universal Knowledge;—it is not only the loss of
Theology, it is the perversion of other sciences.
What it unjustly forfeits, others unjustly seize.
They have their own department, and in going out
of it, attempt to do what they really cannot do; and
that the more mischievously, because they do teach
what in its place is true, though when out of its
place, perverted, or carried to excess, it is not true.
And, as every man has not the capacity of separating
truth from falsehood, they persuade the world of
what is false by urging upon them what is true.
Nor is it open enemies alone who encounter us here,
sometimes it is friends; sometimes persons who, if not
friends, at least have no wish to oppose Religion, and are not conscious they are doing so; and it will carry out my meaning more fully if I give some illustrations of it.

As to friends, I may take as an instance the cultivation of the Fine Arts, Painting, Sculpture, Architecture, to which I may add Music. These high ministers of the Beautiful and the Noble, are, it is plain, special attendants and handmaids of Religion; but it is equally plain that they are apt to forget their place, and, unless restrained with a firm hand, instead of being servants, will aim at becoming principals. Here lies the advantage, in an ecclesiastical point of view, of their more rudimental state, I mean of the ancient style of architecture, of Gothic sculpture and painting, and of what is called Gregorian music, that these inchoate sciences have so little innate vigour and life, that they are in no danger of going out of their place, and giving the law to Religion. But the case is very different, when genius has breathed upon their natural elements, and has developed them into what I may call intellectual powers. When Painting, for example, grows into the fulness of its function as a simply imitative art, it at once ceases to be a dependant on the Church. It has an end of its own, and that of earth: Nature is its pattern, and the object it pursues is the beauty of Nature, even till it becomes an ideal beauty, but a natural beauty still. It cannot imitate the beauty of Angels and Saints which it has never seen. At first indeed, by outlines and emblems it shadowed out the Invisible, and its want of skill became the instrument of reverence and modesty; but, as time went on and it attained its full dimensions as an art, it rather subjected Religion to its own ends, than ministered to the ends of Religion, and in its long galleries and stately chambers, adorables figures and sacred histories did but mingle amid the train of the earthly, not to say unseemly forms, which it created, borrowing within a colouring and a character from that bad company. Not content with neutral ground for its development, it was attracted by the sublimity of divine subjects to ambitious and hazardous essays. Without my saying a word more you will clearly understand, Gentlemen, that under these circumstances Religion must exert itself that the world might not gain an advantage over it. Put out of sight the severe teaching of Catholicism in the schools of painting, as men now would put them aside in their philosophical studies, and in no long time you would have had, the hierarchy of the Church, the Anchorite and Virgin-martyr, the Confessor and the Doctor, the Angelic Hosts, the Mother of God, the Crucifix, the Eternal Trinity, supplanted by a sort of pagan mythology in the guise of sacred names, by a creation indeed of high genius, of intense and dazzling and soul-absorbing beauty, in which, however, there was nothing which subserved the cause of Religion,
nothing on the other hand which did not directly or indirectly minister to corrupt nature and the powers of darkness.

The art of Painting, however, is peculiar: Music and Architecture are more ideal, and their respective archetypes, even if not supernatural, at least are abstract and unearthly; and yet what I have been observing about Painting, holds, I suppose, analogously, in the marvellous development which Musical Science has undergone in the last century. Doubtless here too the highest genius may be made subservient to Religion; here too, still more simply than in the case of Painting, the Science has a field of its own, perfectly innocent, into which Religion does not and need not enter; on the other hand here also, as well in the case of Music as Painting, it is certain, that Religion must be alive and on the defensive, for, if its servants sleep, a potent enchantment will steal over it. Music, I suppose, though this is not the place to enlarge upon it, has an object of its own; as mathematical science, it is the expression of ideas greater and more profound than any in the visible world, ideas, which centre indeed in Him whom Catholicism manifests, who is the seat of all beauty, order, and perfection—whatever, still after all not those on which Revealed Religion directly and principally fixes our gaze. If then a great master in this mysterious science (if I may speak of matters which seem to lie out of my own province), throws himself on his own gift, trusts its inspirations, and absorbs himself in those thoughts, which, though they come to him in the way of nature, belong to things above nature, it is obvious he will neglect every thing else. Rising in his strength he will break through the trammels of words, he will scatter human voices, even the sweetest, to the winds; he will be borne on upon nothing less than the fullest flood of sounds which art has enabled him to draw from mechanical contrivances; he will go forth as a giant, as far as ever his instruments can reach, starting from their secret depths fresh and fresh elements of beauty and grandeur as he goes, and pouring them together into still more marvellous and rapturous combinations—and well indeed and lawfully, while he keeps to that line which is his own; but should he happen to be attracted, as he well may, by the sublimity, so congenial to him, of the Catholic doctrine and ritual, should he engage in sacred themes, should he resolve to do honour to the Mass, or the Divine Office,—he cannot have a more pious, a better purpose, and Religion will gracefully accept what he gracefully offers: but is it not certain, from the circumstances of the case, that he will rather use Religion than minister to it, unless Religion is strong on its own ground, and reminds him—that, if he would do honour to the highest of subjects, he must make himself its scholar; humbly follow the thoughts given him, and aim at the glory, not of his own gift, but of the Great Giver?
As to Architecture, it is a remark, if I recollect aright, both of Fénelon and Berkeley, men so different, that it carries more with it even than the names of those celebrated men, that the Gothic style is not as simple as ecclesiastical structures demand. I understand this to be a similar judgment to that which I have been passing on the cultivation of Painting and Music. For myself, certainly I think that that style which, whatever be its origin, is called Gothic, is endowed with a profound and a commanding beauty, such as no other style possesses, with which we are acquainted, and which probably the Church will not see surpassed till it attain to the Celestial City. No other architecture, now used for sacred purposes, seems to have an idea in it, whereas the Gothic style is as harmonious and as intellectual as it is graceful. But this feeling should not blind us, rather it should awaken us, to the danger, lest what is really a divine gift, be incautiously used as an end rather than as a means. It is surely quite within the bounds of possibility, that, as the Renaissance three centuries ago, carried away its own day, in spite of the Church, into excesses in literature and art, so a revival of an almost forgotten architecture, which is at present taking place in our own countries, in France, and in Germany, may in some way or other run away with us into this or that error, unless we keep a watch over its course. I am not speaking of Ireland; to English Catholics at least it would be a serious evil, if it came as the emblem and advocate of a past ceremonial or an extinct nationalism. We are not living in an age of wealth and loyalty, of pomp and stateliness, of time-honoured establishments, of pilgrimage and penance, of hermitages and convents in the wild, and of fervent populations supplying the want of education by love, and apprehending in form and symbol what they cannot read in books. Our rules and our rubrics are altered for the times, and an obsolete discipline may be a present heresy.

I have been pointing out to you, Gentlemen, how the Fine Arts may prejudice Religion, by giving the law where they should be subservient. The illustration is analogous rather than strictly proper to my subject, yet I think it is to the point. If then the most loyal and dutiful children of the Church must deny themselves, and do deny themselves, when they would sanctify to a heavenly purpose sciences as sublime and as divine as any which are cultivated by fallen man, it is not wonderful, when we turn to science of a different character, of which the object is tangible and material, and the principles belong to the Reason, not the Imagination, that we should find those who are disinclined to the Catholic Faith, even against their will and intention, as may often happen, acting the part of opponents to it. Many men there are, who, devoted to one particular subject of thought, and making its principles the measure of all things,
become enemies to Revealed Religion before they know it, and, only as time proceeds, are aware of their state of mind. These, if they are writers or lecturers, while in this state of unconscious or semi-conscious unbelief, scatter infidel principles under the garb and colour of Christianity; and this, simply because they have made their own science, whatever it is, Political Economy, or Geology, or Astronomy, not Theology, the centre of all truth, and view every part or the chief portions of knowledge as if developed from it, and to be tested and determined by its principles. Others, though conscious to themselves of their anti-Christian opinions, have too much a good feeling and good taste to wish to obtrude them upon the world. They neither wish to shock people, nor to earn for themselves a confessorship which brings with it no gain. They know the strength of prejudice, and the penalty of innovation; they wish to go through life quietly; they scorn polemics; they shrink as from a real humiliation, from being mixed up in religious controversy; they are ashamed of the very name. However, they have occasion at some time to publish on some literary or scientific subject; they wish to give no offence; but after all, to their great annoyance, they find when they least expect it, or when they have taken considerable pains to avoid it, that they have roused by their publication what they would style the bigoted and bitter hostility of a party. This misfortune is easily conceivable, and has befallen many a man. Before he knows

where he is, a cry is raised on all sides of him; and so little does he know what we may call the lie of the land, that his attempts at apology perhaps only make matters worse. In other words, an exclusive line of study has led him, whether he will or no, to run counter to the principles of Religion; which he has never made his landmarks, and which, whatever might be their effect upon himself, at least would have warned him against practising upon the faith of others, had they been authoritatively held up before him.

Instances of this kind are far from uncommon. Men who are old enough, will remember the trouble which came upon a person, eminent as a professional man in London even at that distant day, and still more eminent since, in consequence of his publishing a book in which he so treated the subject of Comparative Anatomy, as to seem to deny the immateriality of the soul. I speak here neither as excusing nor reproving sentiments about which I have not the means of forming a judgment; all indeed I have heard of him makes me mention him with interest and respect; any how of this I am sure, that if there be a calling which feels its position and its dignity to lie in abstaining from controversy and cultivating kindly feelings with men of all opinions, it is the medical profession, and I cannot believe that the person in question would purposely have raised the indignation and inured the censure of the religious public.

* Since writing the above, I have found grounds for believing that
then was his fault or mistake, but that he unsuspiciously threw himself upon his own particular science, which is of a material character, and allowed it to carry him forward into a subject matter, where it had no right to give the law, that, viz., of spiritual substances, which directly belongs to the science of Theology.

Another instance occurred at a later date. A living dignitary of the Established Church wrote a History of the Jews; in which, with what I consider at least bad judgment, he took an external view of it, and hence was led to assimilate it as nearly as possible to secular history. A great sensation was the consequence among the members of his own communion, from which he still suffers. Arguing from the dislike and contempt of polemical demonstrations which that accomplished writer has ever shown, I must conclude that he was simply betrayed into a false step by the treacherous fascination of what is called the Philosophy of History, which is good in its place, but is superseded in cases where the Almighty has superseded the natural laws of society and history. From this he would have been saved, had he been a Catholic; but in the Establishment he knew of no teaching, to which he was bound to defer, which ruled that to be false which attracted him by its speciousness.

I will now take an instance from another science. Political Economy is the science, I suppose, of wealth,—the work in question had more of purpose than I had imagined. This does not affect the general argument.

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a science simply lawful and useful, for it is no sin to make money, any more than it is a sin to seek honour; a science at the same time dangerous and leading to occasions of sin, as is the pursuit of honour too; and in consequence, if studied by itself, and apart from the control of Revealed Truth, sure to conduct a speculator to unchristian conclusions. Holy Scripture tells us distinctly, that "covetousness", or more literally the love of money, "is the root of all evils"; and that "they that would become rich fall into temptation"; and that "hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God"; and after drawing the picture of a wealthy and flourishing people, it adds, "They have called the people happy that hath these things; but happy is that people whose God is the Lord"—while on the other hand it says with equal distinctness, "If any will not work, neither let him eat"; and "If any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel". These opposite injunctions are summed up in the wise man's prayer, who says, "Give me neither beggary nor riches, give me only the necessaries of life". With this most precise view of a Christian's duty, viz., to labour indeed, but to labour for a competency for himself and his, and to be jealous of wealth, whether personal or national, the holy Fathers are, as might be expected, in simple accordance. "Judas", says St. Chrysostom, "was
with Him who knew not, where to lay His head, yet could not restrain himself; and how canst thou hope to escape the contagion without anxious effort?" "It is ridiculous," says St. Jerome, "to call it idolatry to offer to the creature the grains of incense that are due to God, and not to call it so, to offer the whole service of one's life to the creature." "There is not a trace of justice in that heart," says St. Leo, "in which the love of gain has made itself a dwelling". The same thing is emphatically taught us by the counsels of perfection, and by every holy monk and nun anywhere, who have ever embraced them; but it is useless to collect passages when Scripture is so clear.

Now observe, Gentlemen, my drift in setting Scripture and the Fathers over against Political Economy. Of course if there is a science of wealth, it must give rules for gaining wealth, and can do nothing more; it cannot itself declare that it is a subordinate science, that its end is not the ultimate end of all things, and that its conclusions are only hypothetical, depending on its premises, and exposed to be overruled by a higher teaching. I do not then blame the Political Economist for anything which follows from the very idea of his science, directly it is recognised as a science. He must of course direct his inquiries towards his end; but then at the same time it must be recollected, that so far he is not practical, but only pursues an abstract study, and is busying him-

self in establishing logical conclusions from indubitable premises. Given that wealth is to be sought, this and that is the method of gaining it. This is the extent to which a Political Economist has a right to go; he has no right to determine that wealth is at any rate to be sought, or that it is the way to be virtuous and the price of happiness; I say this is to pass the bounds of his science, whether he be right or wrong in so determining, for he is only concerned with an hypothesis.

To take a parallel case:—a physician may tell you, that, if you are to preserve your health, you must give up your employment and retire to the country. He distinctly says "if"; that is all in which he is concerned, he is no judge whether there are objects dearer to you, more urgent upon you, than the preservation of your health; he does not enter into your circumstances, your duties, your liabilities, the persons dependent on you; he knows nothing about what is profitable or what is not; he only says "I speak as a physician; if you would be well, give up your profession, your trade, your office, whatever it is". However he may wish it, it would be impertinent in him to say more, unless indeed he spoke, not as a physician, but as a friend; and it would be extravagant, if he asserted that bodily health was the sumnum bonum, and that no one could be virtuous, whose animal system was not in good order.

But now let us turn to the teaching of the Poli-
tical Eclecticist, a fashionable philosopher just now. I will take a very favourable instance of him; he shall be represented by a gentleman of high character, whose religious views are sufficiently guaranteed to us by his being the special choice, in this department of science, of a University removed more than any other Protestant body of the day from sordid or unchristian principles on the subject of money-making. I say, if there be a place where Political Economy would be kept in order, and would not be suffered to leave the high road and ride across the pastures and the gardens dedicated to other studies, it is the University of Oxford. And if a man could any where be found who would have too much good taste to offend the religious feeling of the place, or to say any thing which he would himself allow to be inconsistent with Revelation, I conceive it is the person whose temperate and well-considered composition, as it would be generally accounted, I am going to offer to your notice. Nor did it occasion any excitement whatever on the part of the academical or the religious public, as did the instances which I have hitherto been adducing. I am representing then the science of Political Economy, in its independent or unbridled action, to great advantage, when I select, as its specimen, the Inaugural Lecture upon it, delivered in the University in question, by its first Professor, immediately on the endowment of its chair by Mr. Henry Drummond of Albury Park. Yet with all these circumstances in its favour, you will soon see, Gentlemen, into what extravagance, for so I must call it, a grave lawyer is led in praise of his chosen science, merely from the circumstance that he has fixed his mind upon it, till he has forgotten there are subjects of thought higher and more heavenly than it. You will find beyond mistake, that it is his object to recommend the science of wealth, by claiming for it an ethical quality, viz., by extolling it as the road to virtue and happiness, whatever Scripture and holy men may say to the contrary.

He begins by predicting of Political Economy, that in the course of a very few years, "it will rank in public estimation among the first of moral sciences in interest and in utility". Then he explains most lucidly its objects and duties, considered as "the science which teaches in what wealth consists, by what agents it is produced, and according to what laws it is distributed, and what are the institutions and customs by which production may be facilitated and distribution regulated, so as to give the largest possible amount of wealth to each individual". And he dwells upon the interest which attaches to the inquiry, "whether England has run her full career of wealth and improvement, but stands safe where she is, or whether to remain stationary is impossible". After this he notices a certain objection, which I shall set before you in his own words, as they will furnish me with the illustration I propose.
This objection, he says, is, that "as the pursuit of wealth is one of the humblest of human occupations, far inferior to the pursuit of virtue, or of knowledge, or even of reputation, and as the possession of wealth is not necessarily joined,—perhaps it will be said, is not conducive,—to happiness, a science, of which the only subject is wealth, cannot claim to rank as the first, or nearly the first, of moral sciences".* Certainly, to an enthusiast in behalf of any science whatever, the temptation is great to meet an objection urged against its dignity and worth; however, from the very form of it, such an objection cannot receive a satisfactory answer by means of the science itself. It is an objection external to the science, and reminds us of the truth of Lord Bacon's remark, "no perfect discovery can be made upon a flat or a level; neither is it possible to discover the more remote and deeper parts of any science, if you stand upon the level of the science, and ascend not to a higher science".† The objection that Political Economy is inferior to the science of virtue, or does not conduce to happiness, is an ethical or a theological objection; the question of its "rank" belongs to that Architectonic Science or Philosophy, whatever it be, which is itself the arbiter of all truth, and which disposes of the claims and arranges the places of all the departments of knowledge, which man is able to master. I say, when an opponent of a particular science asserts that it does not conduce to happiness, and much more, when its champion contends in reply that it certainly does conduce to virtue, as this author proceeds to contend, the obvious question which occurs to one to ask is, what does Religion, what does Revelation say on the point? Political Economy must not be allowed to give judgment in its own favour, but must come before a higher tribunal. The objection is an appeal to the Theologian; however, the Professor does not so view the matter; he does not consider it a question for Philosophy, and if not for Political Economy, then not for science at all, but for Private Judgment,—so he answers it himself, and as follows:

"My answer", he says, "is, first, that the pursuit of wealth, that is, the endeavour to accumulate the means of future subsistence and enjoyment, is, to the mass of mankind, the great source of moral improvement". Now observe, Gentlemen, how exactly this bears out what I have been saying. It is just so far true, as to be able to instil what is false, far as the author was from any such design. I grant then, that beggary is not the means of moral improvement; and that the orderly habits which attend upon the hot pursuit of gain, not only may effect an external decency, but may at least shield the soul from the temptations of vice. Moreover, these habits of good order guarantee regularity in a family or household, and thus are accidentally the means of good to those who come under their protection by leading to their education, and thus

* See pages 11, 12. † Advancement of Learning.
accidentally providing the rising generation with a virtue or a truth which the present has not; but without going into these considerations, further than to allow them generally, and under circumstances, let us rather contemplate what the author's direct assertion is. "The endeavour to accumulate", the words should be weighed, and for what? "for enjoyment"; "to accumulate the means of future subsistence and enjoyment, is to the mass of mankind, the great source", not merely a source, but the great source, and of what? of social and political progress?—such an answer would have been more within the limits of his art, no, but of something individual and personal, "of moral improvement". The soul, as regards the mass of mankind, improves in moral excellence from this more than any thing else, viz., from heaping up the means of enjoying this world in time to come! I really should on every account be sorry, Gentlemen, to exaggerate, but indeed one is taken by surprise on meeting with so very categorical a contradiction of our Lord, St. Paul, St. Chrysostom, St. Leo, and all Saints.

"No institution", he continues, "could be more beneficial to the morals of the lower orders, that is, to at least nine-tenths of the whole body of any people, than one which should increase their power and their wish to accumulate; none more mischievous than one which should diminish their motives and means to save": No institution more beneficial than one which should increase the wish to accumulate! Then Chris-
happiness; it being all the while, as a Christian knows, the "root of all evils," and the "poor on the contrary blessed, for theirs is the kingdom of God".

As to the argument contained in the logical Sorites which I have been drawing out, I anticipated just now what I should say to it in reply. I repeat, doubtless "beggary", as the wise man says, is not desirable; doubtless, if men will not work, they should not eat; there is doubtless a sense in which it may be said that mere social or political virtue tends to moral and religious excellence; but the sense needs to be defined and the statement to be kept within bounds. This is the very point on which I am all along insisting. I am not denying, I am granting, I am assuming, that there is reason and truth in the "leading ideas", as they are called, and "large views" of scientific men; I only say, that, though they speak truth, they do not speak the whole truth; that they speak a narrow truth, and think it a broad truth; that their deductions must be compared with other truths, which are acknowledged as such, in order to verify, complete, and correct them. In short, as people speak, they say what is true with modifications; true, but requires guarding; true, but must not be ridden too hard, or made what is called a hobby; true, but not the measure of all things; true, but if thus inordinately, extravagantly, ruinously carried out, in spite of other sciences, in spite of Theology, sure to become but a great bubble, and to burst.

BEARING OF OTHER KNOWLEDGE ON THEOLOGY.

I am getting to the end of this Discourse, before I have noticed one tenth part of the instances with which I might illustrate the subject of it. Else I should have wished especially to have dwelt upon the not unfrequent perversion which occurs of antiquarian and historical research, to the prejudice of Theology. It is undeniable that the records of former ages are of primary importance in determining Religious Truth; it is undeniable also that there is a silence or a contrariety conceivable in those records, as to an alleged portion of that truth, sufficient to invalidate its claims; but it is quite as undeniable that the existing documentary evidences of Catholicism and Christianity may be so unduly exalted, as to be made the absolute measure of Revelation, as if no part of theological teaching were true, which cannot bring its express text, as it is called, from Scripture, and authorities from the Fathers or profane writers,—whereas there are numberless facts in past times, which we cannot deny, for they still are, though history is silent about them. I suppose, on this score, we ought to deny that the round towers of this country had any origin, because history does not disclose it; or that any individual came from Adam, who cannot produce the table of his ancestry. Yet Gibbon argues against the darkness at the Passion, from the accident that it is not mentioned by Pagan historians;—as well might he argue against the existence of Christianity itself in the
first century, because Seneca, Pliny, Plutarch, the Jewish Mishna, and other authorities are silent about it. In a parallel way, Protestants argue against Transubstantiation, and Arians against our Lord’s Divinity, viz., because extant writings of certain Fathers do not witness those doctrines to their satisfaction— as well might they say that Christianity was not spread by the Twelve Apostles, because we know so little of their labours. The evidence of History, I say, is invaluable in its place; but, if it assumes to be the sole means of gaining Religious Truth, it goes beyond its place. We are putting it to a larger office than it can undertake, if we countenance the usurpation; and we are turning a true guide and blessing into a source of inexplicable difficulty and interminable doubt.

And so of other sciences: just as Comparative Anatomy, Political Economy, the Philosophy of History, and the Science of Antiquities may be, and are turned against Religion, by being taken by themselves, as I have been showing, so a like mistake may befall any other. Grammar, for instance, at first sight does not promise to admit of a perversion; yet Horne Tooke made it the vehicle of scepticism. Law would seem to have enough to do with its own clients and their affairs; and yet Mr. Bentham made a treatise on Judicial Proofs a covert attack upon the miracles of Revelation. And in like manner Physi-

 Vide the Author’s work on Development of Doctrine, p. 139. 

ology may deny moral evil and human responsibility; Geology may deny Moses; and Logic may deny the Holy Trinity;* and other sciences, now rising into notice, are or will be victims of a similar abuse.

And now to sum up what I have been saying in a few words. My object, it is plain, has been—not to show that Secular Science in its various departments may take up a position hostile to Theology;—this is rather the basis of the objection with which I opened this Discourse;—but to point out the cause of an hostility to which all parties will bear witness. I have been insisting then on this, that the hostility in question, when it occurs, is coincident with an evident deflection or exorbitance of Science from its proper course; and that this exorbitance is sure to take place, almost from the necessity of the case, if Theology be not present to defend its own boundaries and to hinder it. The human mind cannot keep from speculating and systematising; and if Theology is not allowed to occupy its own territory, adjacent sciences, may, sciences which are quite foreign to Theology, will take possession of it. And it is proved to be a usurpation by this circumstance, that those sciences will assume principles as true, and act upon them, which they neither have authority to lay down themselves, nor appeal to any other higher science to lay down for them. For example, it is a mere unwarranted assumption to say with the Antiquarian, “Nothing

* Vide Abelaud, for instance.
has ever taken place but is to be found in historical documents"; or with the Philosopher Historian, "There is nothing in Judaism different from other political institutions"; or with the Anatomist, "There is no soul beyond the brain"; or with the Political Economist, "Easy circumstances make men virtuous". These are enunciations, not of Science, but of Private Judgment; and Private Judgment infects every science which it touches with a hostility to Theology, which properly attaches to no science whatever.

If then, Gentlemen, I now resist such a course of acting as unphilosophical, what is this but to do as men of Science do when the interests of their own respective pursuits are at stake? If they certainly would resist the divine who determined the orbit of Jupiter by the Pentateuch, why am I to be accused of cowardice or illiberality, because I will not tolerate their attempt in turn to theologize by means of Science? And if experimentalists would be sure to cry out, did I attempt to install the Thomist philosophy in the schools of astronomy and medicine, why may not I, when Divine Science is ostracized, and La Place, or Buffon, or Humboldt, sits down in its chair, why may not I fairly protest against their exclusiveness, and demand the emancipation of Theology?

DISCOURSE V.

GENERAL KNOWLEDGE VIEWED AS ONE PHILOSOPHY.

It is a prevalent notion just now, that religious opinion does not enter, as a matter of necessity, in any considerable measure, into the treatment of scientific or literary subjects. It is supposed, that whatever a teacher's persuasion may be, whether Christian or not, or whatever kind or degree of Christianity, it need not betray itself in such lectures or publications as the duties of his office require. Whatever he holds about the Supreme Being, His attributes and His works, be it truth or error, does not make him better or worse in experiment or speculation. He can discourse upon plants, or insects, or birds, or the powers of the mind, or languages, or historical documents, or literature, or any other such matter of fact, with equal accurateness and profit, whatever he may determine about matters which are entirely distinct from them.

In answer to this representation I contended, last
week, that a positive disunion takes place between Theology and Secular Science, whenever they are not actually united. Here, not to be at peace is to be at war; and for this reason:—The assemblage of Sciences, which together make up Universal Knowledge, is not an accidental or a varying heap of acquisitions, but a system, and may be said to be in equilibrio, as long as all its portions are secured to it. Take away one of them, and that one so important in the catalogue as Theology, and disorder and ruin at once ensue. There is no middle state between an equilibrium and chaotic confusion; one science is ever pressing upon another, unless kept in check; and the only guarantee of Truth is the cultivation of them all. And such is the office of a University.

Far different, of course, are the sentiments of the patrons of a divorce between Religious and Secular Knowledge. Let us see how they spoke twenty-five years ago in the defence formally put out for that formidable Institution, formidable, as far as an array of high intellects can make any paradox or paralogism formidable, which was then set up in London on the basis of such a separation. The natural, as well as the special, champion of the then University of London, and of the principle which it represented, was a celebrated Review, which stood at the time, and, I suppose, stands still, at the head of our periodical literature. In this publication, at the date of which I speak, an article was devoted to the exculpation of the Institution in question, from the charges or suspicions which it incurred in consequence of the principle on which it was founded. The Reviewer steadily contemplates the idea of a University without Religion; “From pulpits, and visitation dinners, and combination rooms innumerable, the cry”, he says, “is echoed and re-echoed, An University without religion”; and then he proceeds to dispose of the protest by one or two simple illustrations.

Writing, as he does, with liveliness and wit, as well as a profession of serious argument, this Reviewer can scarcely be quoted with due regard to the gravity which befits a discussion such as the present. You must pardon me, Gentlemen, if, in my desire to do justice to him and his cause in his own words, I suffer him to interrupt the equable flow of our discussion with unseasonable mirth; and in order to avoid, as much as possible, a want of keeping between his style and my own words, I will begin with the less sprightly illustration of the two. “Take the case”, he says, “of a young man, a student, we will suppose, of surgery, resident in London. He wishes to become master of his profession, without neglecting other useful branches of knowledge. In the morning he attends Mr. M'Culloch’s Lecture on Political Economy. He then repairs to the Hospital, and hears Sir Astley Cooper explain the mode of reducing fractures. In the afternoon he joins one of the classes which Mr. Hamilton instructs in French
or German. With regard to religious observances, he acts as he himself, or those under whose care he is, may think most advisable. Is there any thing objectionable in this? is it not the most common case in the world? And in what does it differ from that of a young man at the London University? Our surgeon, it is true, will have to run over half London in search of his instructors. Is it in the local situation that the mischief lies? Such is the argument; need I point out the fallacy? Whatever may be said of Political Economy, at any rate a surgical operation is not a branch of knowledge, or a process of argument, or an inference, or an investigation, or an analysis, or an induction, or an abstraction, or other intellectual exercise: it is a grave practical matter. Again, the primer, the spelling book, the grammar, construing and parsing, are scarcely trials of reason, imagination, taste, or judgment; they can scarcely be said to have truth for their object at all; any how, they belong to the first stage of mental development, to the school, rather than to the University. Neither the reduction of fractures, nor the Hamiltonian method can be considered a branch of Philosophy; it is not more wonderful that such trials of skill or of memory can safely dispense with Theology for their perfection, than that it is unnecessary for the practice of gunnery or the art of calligraphy.

So much for one of this Reviewer’s illustrations:

* Edinburgh Review, Feb., 1826.

The other is more infelicitous still, in proportion as it is more insulting to our view of the subject. “Have none of those”, he asks, “who censure the London University on this account, daughters who are educated at home, and who are attended by different teachers? The music master, a good Protestant, comes at twelve; the dancing master, a French philosopher, at two; the Italian master, a believer in the blood of St. Januarins, at three.” The parents take upon themselves the office of instructing their child in religion. She hears the preachers whom they prefer, and reads the theological works which they put into her hands. Who can deny that this is the case in innumerable families? Who can point out any material difference between the situation in which this girl is placed, and that of a pupil at the new University?” I pass over the scoff at a miracle, to which the writer neither gave evidence himself, nor imagined it in others; looking simply at his argument, I ask, is it not puerile to imply that music, or dancing, or lessons in Italian, have any thing to do with Philosophy? It is plain, that such writers do not rise to the very idea of a University. They consider it a sort of bazaar, or pantechinon, in which wares of all kinds are heaped together for sale in stalls independent of each other; and that, to save the purchasers the trouble of running about from shop to shop; or an hotel or lodging house, where all professions and classes are at liberty to congregate,
varying, however, according to the season, each of them strange to each, and about its own work or pleasure; whereas, if we would rightly deem of it, a University is the home, it is the mansion-house, of the goodly family of the Sciences, sisters all, and sisterly in their mutual dispositions.

Such, I say, is the theory which recommends itself to the public mind of this age, and is the moving principle of its undertakings. And yet that very instinct of the intellect of which I spoke last week, which impels each science to extend itself as far as it can, and which leads, when indulged, to the confusion of Philosophy generally, might teach the upholders of such a theory a truer view of the subject. It seems, as I then observed, that the human mind is ever seeking to systematise its knowledge, to base it upon principle, and to find a science comprehensive of all sciences. And sooner than forego the gratification of this moral appetency, it starts with whatever knowledge or science it happens to have, and makes that knowledge serve as a rule or measure of the universe, for want of a better, preferring the completeness and precision of bigotry to a fluctuating and homeless scepticism. What a singular contrast is here between nature and theory! We see the intellect in this instance, as soon as it moves at all, moving straight against its own conceits and falsities, and upsetting them spontaneously, without effort, and at once. It witnesses to a great

truth in spite of its own professions and engagements. It had promised, in the name of the patrons of our modern Colleges and Universities, that there need not be, and that there should not be, any system or philosophy in knowledge and its transmission, but that Liberal Education henceforth should be a mere fortuitous heap of acquisitions and accomplishments; however, here, as it so often happens elsewhere, nature is too strong for art. She bursts violently and dangerously through the artificial tramnels laid upon her, and exercises her just rights wrongly, since she cannot rightly. Usurpers and tyrants are the successors to legitimate rulers sent into exile. Forthwith Private Judgment moves forward with the implements of this or that science, to do a work imperative indeed, but beyond its powers. It owns the need of general principles and constituent ideas, by taking false ones, and thus is ever impeding and preventing unity, while it is ever attempting and thereby witnessing it. From the many voices crying "Order" and "Silence", noise and tumult follow. From the very multiplicity and diversity of the efforts after unity on every side, this practical age has thrown up the notion of it altogether.

What is the consequence? That the works of the age are not the development of definite principles, but accidental results of discordant and simultaneous action, of committees and boards, composed of men each of whom has his own interests and views, and,
to gain something his own way, is obliged to sacrifice a
good deal to every one else. From causes so adventi-
tious and contradictory, who can predict the ultimate
production? Hence it is that those works have so little
permanent life in them, because they are not founded
on principles and ideas. Ideas are the life of institu-
tions, social, political, and literary; but the excesses
of Private Judgment, in the prosecution of its
multiform theories, have at length made men sick of
a truth, which they recognised long after they were
able to realise it. At the present day, they knock
the life out of the institutions they have inherited, by
their alterations and adaptations. As to their own
creations, these are a sort of monster, with hands,
feet, and trunk moulded respectively on distinct
types. Their whole, if the word is to be used, is an
accumulation from without, not the growth of a
principle from within. Thus, as I said just now,
their notion of a University, is a sort of bazaar or
hotel, where every thing is showy, and self-sufficient,
and changeable. "Motley's the only wear". The
majestic vision of the Middle Age, which grew
steadily to perfection in the course of centuries, the
University of Paris, or Bologna, or Oxford, has
almost gone out in night. A philosophical compre-
hensiveness, an orderly expansiveness, an elastic
constructiveness, men have lost them, and cannot
make out why. This is wily: because they have lost
the idea of unity: because they cut off the head of a
living thing, and think it is perfect, all but the head.
They think the head an extra, an accomplishment,
the corona operis, not essential to the idea of the being
under their hands. They seem to copy the lower
specimens of animated nature, who with their wings
pulled off, or a pin run through them, or eaten out
by parasitical enemies, walk about, unconscious of
their state of disadvantage. They think, that, if
they do but get together sufficient funds, and raise a
very large building, and secure a number of able men,
and arrange in one locality, as the Reviewer says, a
suite of distinct lecture-rooms, they have at once
founded a University. An idea, a view, an indivi-
dual object, which does not admit of more or less,
a form, which cannot coalesce with anything else,
an intellectual principle, expanding into a consistent
harmonious whole,—in short, Mind, in the true sense
of the word,—they are, forsooth, too practical to lose
time in such reveries!

Our way, Gentlemen, is very different. We adopt
a method, founded in man's nature and the necessity
of things, exemplified in all great moral works what-
ever, instinctively used by all men in the course of
daily life, though they may not recognise it, discarded
by our opponents only because they have lost the true
key to exercise it withal: We start with an idea,
we educate upon a type; we make use, as nature
prompts us, of the faculty, which I have called an in-
tellectual grasp of things, or an inward sense, and
which I shall hereafter shew is really meant by the word "Philosophy". Science itself is a specimen of its exercise; for its very essence is this mental formation. A science is not mere knowledge, it is knowledge which has undergone a process of intellectual digestion. It is the grasp of many things brought together in one, and hence is its power; for, properly speaking, it is Science that is power, not Knowledge. Well then, this is how Catholics act towards the Sciences taken all together; we view them as one and give them an idea; what is this but an extension and perfection, in an age which prides itself upon its scientific genius, of that very process by which science exists at all? Imagine a science of sciences, and you have attained the true notion of the scope of a University. We consider that all things mount up to a whole, that there is an order and precedence and harmony in the branches of knowledge one with another as well as one by one, and that to destroy that structure is as unphilosophical in a course of education, as it is unscientific in the separate portions of it. We form and fix the Sciences in a circle and system, and give them a centre and an aim, instead of letting them wander up and down, in a sort of hopeless confusion. In other words, to use scholastic language, we give the various pursuits and objects, on which the intellect is employed, a form; for it is the peculiarity of a form, that it gathers up in one, and draws off from
discipline or the humanities. Every science, therefore, is a definite and limited field, within which the mind may work and fruitfully grow. It is the task of the philosopher to discover and define these fields, and to help us to understand and appreciate the various disciplines that make up the totality of human knowledge.

Now here, Gentlemen, I seem in danger of a double inconvenience, viz., of enlarging on what, as a point of scholasticism, is too abstruse, and, as put into familiar language, is too obvious, for an accomplished and philosophical auditory, which claims of me what is neither rudimental on the one hand nor technical on the other. And yet I will rather ask your indulgence to allow me in a very familiar illustration of a very scholastic term, than incur the chance, which might otherwise fall out, of being deficient in my exposition of the subject for which I adduce it.

For instance, we all understand how Worship is one idea, and how it is made up of many things, some being essential to it, and all subservient. Its essence is the lifting up of the heart to God; if it be no more than this, still this is enough, and nothing more is necessary. But view it as brought out in some solemn rite or public ceremonial; the essence is the same, and it is there on the occasion I am supposing;—we will say it is Benediction of the Most Holy Sacrament, or a devotion in honour of some Saint;—it is there still, but, first, it is the lifting up, not of one heart, but of many all at once; next, it is the devotion, not of hearts only, but of bodies too; not of eyes only, or hands only, or voices only, or knees only, but of the whole man; and next, the devotion passes on to more than soul and body; there
are vestments there, rich and radiant, symbolical of the rite, and odorous flowers, and a flood of light, and a cloud of incense, and music joyous and solemn, of instruments, as well as voices, till all the senses overflow with the idea of devotion. Is the music devotion? as the Protestant inquires; is the incense devotion? are candles devotion? are flowers? are vestments? or words spoken? or genuflexions? Not any one of them. And what have candles to do with flowers? or flowers with vestments? or vestments with music? Nothing whatever; each is distinct in itself, and independent of the rest. The flowers are the work of nature, and are elaborated in the garden; the candles form of the soft wax, which the “Apis Mater” (as the Church beautifully sings), which the teeming bee fashion; the vestments have been wrought in the looms of Lyons or Vienna or Naples, and have been brought over sea at great cost; the music is the present and momentary vibration of the air, acted upon by tube or string; and still for all this, are they not one whole? are they not blended together indivisibly, and sealed with the image of unity, by reason of the one idea of worship, in which they live; and to which they minister? Take away that idea, and what are they worth? the whole pageant becomes a mummer. The worship made them one; but supposing no one in that assemblage, however large, to believe, or to love, or to pray, or to give thanks, supposing the musicians did but play and

sing, and the sacristan thought of nothing but his flowers, lights, and incense, and the priest in cope and stole, and his attendant ministers, had no heart, nor lot in what they were outwardly acting, let the flowers be sweetest, and the lights brightest, and the vestments costliest, still who would call it an act of worship at all? Would it not be a show, a make, belief, an hypocrisy? Why? Because the one idea was away, which gave life, and force, and an harmonious understanding, and an individuality, to many things at once, distinct each of them in itself, and in its own nature independent of that idea.

Such is the virtue of a “form”: the lifting up of the heart to God is the living principle of this solemnity; yet it does not sacrifice any of its constituent parts, rather it imparts to each a dignity by giving it a meaning; it moulds, inspires, individualizes a whole. It stands towards the separate elements which it uses as the soul is to the body. It is the presence of the soul which gives unity to the various materials which make up the human frame. Why do we not consider hand and foot, head and heart, separate things? Because a living principle within them makes them one whole, because the living soul gives them personality. It brings under the idea of personality all that they are, whatever they are; it appropriates them all to itself; it makes them absolutely distinct from every thing else, though they are the same
naturally, so that in it they are not what they are out of it; it dwells in them, though with a greater manifestation and intensity in some of them than in others, yet in all in sufficient measure; in our look, our voice, our gait, our very handwriting. But as soon as it goes, the unity goes too, and not by portions or degrees. Every part of the animal frame is absolutely changed at once; it is at once but a corpse that remains, and an aggregate of matter, accidentally holding together, soon to be dissolved. What were its parts, have lost their constituting principle, and rebel against it. It was life, it is death.

Thus a form or idea, as it may be called, collects together into one, separates utterly from every thing else, the elements on which it is impressed. They are grafted into it. Henceforth they have an intercommunication and influence over one another, which is special; they are present in each other; they belong to each other even in their minutest portions, and cannot belong to any other whole, even though some of those portions might at first sight seem to admit of it. You may smash and demolish the whole, but you cannot otherwise find a way to appropriate the parts. A human skeleton may resemble that of some species of brutes, but the presence of the soul in man makes him differ from those animals, not in degree, but in kind. A monkey or an ape is not merely a little less than human nature, and in the way to become a man.

It could not be developed into a man, or is at present a man, as far as it goes; such a mode of speech would be simply unmeaning. It is one whole, and man is another; and the likeness between them, though real, is superficial, and the result of a mental abstraction.

Here I am reminded of a doctrine laid down by the Angelical Doctor, which illustrates what has been said. He says that no action is indifferent; what does he mean? surely there are many actions which are quite indifferent; to speak, to stop speaking, to eat and drink, to go hither and thither. Yes, they are indifferent indeed in themselves; but they are not at all indifferent, as referrible to this or that whole in which they occur, as done by this or that person. They are not indifferent in the individual: they are indifferent in the abstract, not in the concrete. Eating, sleeping, talking, walking, may be neither good nor bad, viewed in their bare idea; but it is a very different thing to say that this man, at this time, at this place, being what he is, is neither right nor wrong in eating or walking. And further, the very same action, done by two persons, is utterly different in character and effect, good in one, bad in another. This, Gentlemen, is what is meant by saying that the actions of saints are not always patterns for us. They are right in them, they would be wrong in others, because an ordinary Christian fulfils one idea, and a saint fulfils another. Hence it is
that we bear things from some people, which we should resent, if done by others; as for other reasons, so especially for this, that they do not mean the same thing in these and in those. Sometimes the very sight of a person disarms us, who has offended us before we knew him; as, for instance, when we had fancied him a gentleman in rank and education, and find him to be not so. Each man has his own way of expressing satisfaction or annoyance, favour or dislike; each individual is a whole, and his actions are incommunicable. Hence it is so difficult, just at this time, when so many men are apparently drawing near the Church; rightly to conjecture who will eventually join it and who will not; it being impossible for any but the nearest friends, and often even for them, to determine how much words are worth in each severally, which are used by all in common. And hence again it happens that particulars which seem to be but accidents of certain subjects, are really necessary to them; for though they may look like accidents, viewed in themselves, they are not accidents, but essentials, in the connexion in which they occur. Thus, when man is defined to be a laughing animal, every one feels the definition to be unworthy of its subject, but it is, I suppose, adequate to its purpose. I might go on to speak of the singular connexion, which sometimes exists, between certain characteristics in individuals or bodies; a connexion, which at first sight would be called accidental, were it not invariable in its occurrence, and reducible to the operation of some principle. Thus it has been said, rightly or wrongly, that Whig writers are always Latitudinarians, and Tory writers often infidels.

But I must put an end to these illustrations:—coming at last to the point, for the sake of which I have been pursuing them, I observe that the very same subjects of teaching, the Evidences of Christianity, the Classics, and much more Experimental Science, Modern History, and Biography, may be right in their proper place, as portions of one system of knowledge, suspicious, when detached or in bad company; desirable in one place of education, dangerous or inexpedient in another; because they come differently, in a different connexion, at a different time, with a different drift, from a different spirit, in the one and the other. And hence two Universities, so called, may almost concur in the lecture-papers they put out and their prospectus for the year, that is, in their skeleton, as man and certain brute creatures resemble one another, and yet, viewed as living and working institutions, not as preparations in an anatomical school, may be simply antagonistic.

Thus, then, Gentlemen, I answer the objection with which I opened this Discourse. I suppose it to be asked me, how it could matter to the pupil, who it was taught him such indifferent subjects as logic, antiquities, or poetry, so that they be taught him.
I answer that no subject of teaching is really indifferent in fact, though it may be in itself; because it takes a colour from the whole system to which it belongs, and has one character when viewed in that system, and another viewed out of it. According then as a teacher is under the influence, or in the service, of this system or that, so does the drift, or at least the practical effect of his teaching vary. Arcesilas would not teach logic as Aristotle, or Aristotle poetry as Plato, though logic has its fixed principles, and poetry its acknowledged classics; and in saying this, it will be observed I am claiming for Theology nothing singular or special, or which is not partaken by other sciences in their measure. As far as I have spoken of them, they all go to make up one whole, differing only according to their relative importance. For indeed am I from having intended to convey the notion, in the illustrations I have been using, that Theology stands to other knowledge as the soul to the body; or that other sciences are but its instruments and appendages, just as the whole ceremonial of worship is but the expression of inward devotion. This would be, I conceive, to commit the very error, in the instance of Theology, which I am charging other sciences, at the present day, of committing against it. On the contrary, Theology is one branch of knowledge, and Secular Sciences are other branches. Theology is the highest indeed, and widest, but it does not interfere with the real freedom of any secular science in its own particular department.

This will be clearer as I proceed; at present I have been only pointing out the internal sympathy which exists between all branches of knowledge whatever, and the danger resulting to knowledge itself by a disunion between them, and the object in consequence to which a University is dedicated. Not Science only, not Literature only, not Theology only, neither abstract knowledge simply nor experimental, neither moral nor material, neither metaphysical nor historical, but all knowledge whatever, is taken into account in a University, as being the special seat of that large Philosophy, which embraces and locates truth of every kind, and every method of attaining it.

However, much as lies before me to clear up, ere I can be said to have done justice to the great subject on which I am engaged, there is one prevalent misconception, which what I have been to-day saying will set right at once; and, though it is scarcely more than another form of the fallacy which I have been exposing, it may be useful, even for the further elucidation of the principles on which I have exposed it, to devote what remains of this Discourse to its consideration. It is this:—As there are many

* It would be plausible to call Theology the external form of the philosophical system, as charity has been said to be of living faith, vid. Bellarm. de Justif., but then, though it would not interfere with the other sciences, it could not have been one of them.
persons to be found who maintain that Religion should not be introduced at all into a course of Education, so there are many too, who think a compromise may be effected between such as would and such as would not introduce it, viz.: by introducing a certain portion, and nothing beyond it; and by a certain portion they mean just as much as they suppose Catholics and Protestants to hold in common. In this way they hope, on the one hand to avoid the odium of not teaching religion at all, while on the other they equally avoid any show of contrariety between contrary systems of religion, and any unseemly controversy between parties who, however they may differ, will gain nothing by disputing. Now I respect the motives of such persons too much not to give my best attention to the expedient which they propose: whether men advocate the introduction of no religion at all in education, or this "general religion", as they call it, in either case peace and charity, which are the objects they profess, are of too heavenly a nature not to give a sort of dignity even to those who pursue them by impossible roads; still I think it very plain that the same considerations which are decisive against the exclusion of Religion from Education, are decisive also against its generalization or mutilation, for the words have practically the same meaning. General Religion is in fact no Religion at all. Let not the conclusion be thought harsh, to which I am carried on by the principles I have been laying down in the former part of this Discourse; but thus it stands, I think, beyond dispute, that, those principles being presupposed, Catholics and Protestants, viewed as bodies, hold nothing in common in religion, however they may seem to do so. This is the answer I shall give to the proposition of teaching "general religion". I might indeed challenge any one to set down for me in detail the precise articles of the Catholic Faith held by Protestants "in general"; or I might call attention to the number of Catholic truths which any how must be sacrificed, however wide the range of doctrines which Protestantism shall be made to embrace; but I will not go to questions of mere fact and detail: I prefer to rest the question upon the basis of a principle, and I assert that, as all branches of knowledge are one whole, so, much more, is each particular branch a whole in itself; that each is one science, as all are one philosophy, and that to teach half of any whole is really to teach no part of it. Men understand this in matters of the world, it is only when Religion is in question, that they forget it. Why do not Whigs and Tories form some common politie, and a ministry of coalition upon its basis? Does not common sense, as well as party interest, keep them asunder? It is quite true that "general" tenets could be produced in which both bodies would agree; both Whigs and Tories are loyal and patriotic, both defend the reasonable prerogatives of the Throne, and
the just rights of the people; on paper they agree admirably, but who does not know that loyalty and patriotism have one meaning in the mouth of a Tory, and another in that of a Whig? Loyalty and patriotism, neither quality is what it is abstractedly, when it is grafted either on Whig or Tory. The case is the same with Religion; the Establishment, for instance, accepts from the Catholic Church the doctrine of the Incarnation; but at the same time denies that Christ is in the Blessed Sacrament and that Mary is the Mother of God; who in consequence will venture to affirm that such of its members as hold the Incarnation, hold it by virtue of their membership? the Establishment cannot really hold a Catholic doctrine, a portion and a concomitant of which it puts on one side. The Incarnation has not the same meaning to one who holds and to one who denies these two attendant verities. Hence, whatever he may profess about the Incarnation; the mere Protestant has no real hold, no grasp of the doctrine; you cannot be sure of him; any moment he may be found startled and wondering, as at a novelty, at statements implied in it, or uttering sentiments simply inconsistent with its idea. Catholicism is one whole, and Protestantism has no part in it. In like manner Catholicism and Mahometanism are each individual and distinct from each other; yet they have many points in common on paper, as the unity of God, Providence, the power of prayer, and future judgment, to say nothing of the mission of Moses and Christ. These common doctrines we may if we please, call “Natural Religion”, or “General Religion”; and so they are in the abstract; and no one can doubt that, were Mahometans or Jews numerous in these countries, so as to make it expedient, the Government of the day would so absolutely take this view, as to aim at establishing National Colleges on the basis of such common doctrines; yet, in fact, though they are common doctrines, as far as the words go, they are not the same, as living and breathing facts, for the very same words have a different drift and spirit when proceeding respectively from a Jewish, or a Mahometan, or a Catholic mouth. They are grafted on different ideas.

Now this, I fear, will seem a hard doctrine to some of us. There are those, whom it is impossible not to respect and love, of amiable minds and charitable feelings, who do not like to think unfavourably of any one. And, when they find another differ from them in religious matters, they cannot bear the thought that he differs from them in principle, or that he moves on a line, on which did he progress for centuries, he would but be carried further from them, instead of catching them up. Their delight is to think that he holds what they hold, only not enough; and that he is right as far as he goes. Such persons are very slow to believe that a scheme of general education, which puts Religion more or
less aside, does ipso facto part company with Religion; but they try to think, as far as they can, that its only fault is the accident that it is not so religious as it might be. In short they are of that school of thought, which will not admit that half a truth is an error, and nine-tenths of a truth no better; that the most frightful discord is close upon harmony; and that intellectual principles combine, not by a process of physical accumulation, but in unity of idea.

However, there is no misconception perhaps, but has something or other true about it, and has something to say for itself. Perhaps it will reconcile the persons in question to the doctrine I am propounding, if I state how far I can go along with them; for in a certain sense what they say is true and is supported by facts. It is true too, that youths can be educated at Mixed Colleges of the kind I am supposing, nay at Protestant Colleges, and yet may come out of them as good Catholics as they went in. Also it is true, that Protestants are to be found, who, as far as they profess Catholic doctrine, do truly hold it, in the same sense as that in which a Catholic holds it. I grant all this, but I maintain at the same time, that such cases are exceptional; the case of individuals is one thing, of bodies or institutions another; it is not safe to argue from individuals to institutions. A few words will explain my meaning.

There are then doubtless such phenomena as what may be called inchoate truths, beliefs, and philosophies. It would be both unreasonable and shallow to deny it. Men doubtless may grow into an idea by degrees, and then at the end they are moving on the same line, as they were at the beginning, not a different one, though they may during the progress have changed their external profession. Thus one school of party comes out of another; truth out of error, error out of truth; water, according to the proverb, chokes, and good comes from Nazareth. Thus, eternally distinct as orthodoxy is from heresy, the most Catholic Fathers and the worst of heretics belong to the same teaching, or the same ecclesiastical party. St. Chrysostom comes of that Syrian theology, which is more properly represented by the heterodox Diodorus and Theodore. Eutyches, Diodorus, and their faction, are closely connected in history with St. Cyril of Alexandria. The whole history of thought and of genius, is that of one idea being born and growing out of another, though ideas are individual. Some of the greatest names in many various departments of excellence, metaphysical, political, or imaginative, have come out of schools of a very different character from their own. Thus, Aristotle is a pupil of the Academy, and the Master of the Sentences is a heretic of Peter Abelard. In like manner, to take a very different science,—I have read that the earlier musical compositions of that great master, Beethoven, are written on the type of Haydn, and that not until a certain date did he
compose in the style emphatically his own. The case is the same with public men; they are called inconsistent, when they are but unlearning their first education. In such circumstances, as in the instance of the lamented Sir Robert Peel, a time must elapse before the mind is able to discriminate for itself between what is really its own and what it has merely inherited.

Now what is its state, whatever be the subject-matter on which it is employed, in the course of this process of change? For a time perhaps the mind remains contented in the home of its youth, where originally it found itself, till in due season the special idea, however it came by it, which is ultimately to form and rule it, begins to stir; and gradually energising more and more, and growing and expanding, it suddenly bursts the bonds of that external profession, which, though its first, was never really its proper habitation. During this interval it uses the language which it has inherited, and thinks it certainly true; yet all the while its own genuine thoughts and modes of thinking are germinating and ramifying and penetrating into the old teaching which only in name belongs to it; till its external manifestations are plainly inconsistent with each other, though sooner in the apprehension of others than in its own, may perhaps for a season it maintains what it has received by education the more vehemently, by way of keeping in check or guarding the new views, which are opening upon it, and which startle it by their strangeness. What happens in Science, Philosophy, Politics, or the Arts, may happen, I say, in Religion too; there is such a thing as an inchoate faith or incomplete creed, which is not yet fully Catholic, yet is Catholic as far as it goes, tends to Catholicism, and is in the way to reach it, whether in the event it actually is happy enough to reach it or not. And from the beginning such a creed, such a theology was, I grant, the work of a supernatural principle, which, exercising itself first in the rudiments of truth, finished in its perfection. Man cannot determine in what instances that principle of grace is present and in what not, except by the event; but wherever it is, whether it can be ascertained by man or not, whether it reaches its destination, which is Catholicity, or whether it is ultimately frustrated and fails, still in every case the Church claims that work as her own; because it tends to her, because it is recognised by all men, even enemies, to belong to her, because it comes of that divine power, which is given to her in fulness, and because it anticipates portions of that divine creed which is committed to her infallibility as an everlasting deposit. And in this sense it is perfectly true that a Protestant may hold and teach one doctrine of Catholicism without holding or teaching another; but then, as I have said, he is in the way to hold others, in the way to profess all, and he is
inconsistent if he does not, and till he does. Nay, he is already reaching forward to the whole truth, from the very circumstance of his really grasping any part of it. So strongly do I feel this, that I account it no paradox to say, that, let a man but master the one doctrine with which I began these Discourses, the Being of a God, let him really and truly, and not in words only, or by inherited profession, or in the conclusions of reason, but by a direct apprehension, be a Monotheist, and he is already three-fourths of the way towards Catholicism.

I allow all this as regards individuals; but I have not to do with individual teachers in this Discourse, but with systems, institutions, bodies of men. There are doubtless individual Protestants, who, so far from making their Catholic pupils Protestant, lead on their Protestant pupils to Catholicism; but we cannot legislate for exceptions, nor can we tell for certain before the event where those exceptional cases are to be found. As to bodies of men, political or religious, we may safely say that they are what they profess to be, perhaps worse, certainly not better; and, if we would be safe, we must look to their principles, not to this or that individual, whom they can put forward for an occasion. Half the evil that happens in public affairs arises from the mistake of measuring parties, not by their history and by their position, but by their accidental manifestations of the moment, the place, or the person. Who would say, for instance, that the Evangelical Church of Prussia had any real affinities to Catholicism; and yet how many fine words do certain of its supporters use, and how favourably disposed to the Church do they seem, till they are cross-examined and their radical heterodoxy brought to view! It is not so many years since, that by means of their “common doctrines”, as they would call them, they persuaded an ecclesiastical body, as different from them, as any Protestant body which could be named, I mean the ruling party in the Establishment, to join with them in the foundation of an episcopal see at Jerusalem, a project, as absurd, as it was odious, when viewed in a religious aspect. Such too are the persevering attempts, which excellent men in the Anglican Church have made, to bring about a better understanding between the Greeks or Russians and their own communion, as if the Oriental Church were not formed on one type, and the Protestant Establishment on another, or the process of joining them were any thing short of the impossible exploit of fusing two individuals into one. And the case is the same as regards the so-called approaches of heterodox bodies or institutions towards Catholicism. Men may have glowing imaginations, warm feelings, or benevolent tempers; they may be very little aware themselves how far they are removed from Catholicism; they may even style themselves its friends, and be disappointed it does not recognise them; they may admire
its doctrines, they may think it uncharitable in us not to meet them half way. All the while, they may have nothing whatever of that form, idea, type of Catholicism, even in its inchoate condition, which I have allowed to some individuals among them. Such are the liberal politicians, and liberal philosophers and writers, who are considered by the multitude to be one with us, when, alas! they have neither part nor lot with the Catholic Church. Many a poet, many a brilliant writer, of this or the past generation, has taken upon himself to admire, or has been thought to understand, the Mother of Saints, on no better ground than this superficial survey of some portion of her litigations. This is why some persons have been so taken by surprise at the late outburst against us in England, because they fancied men would be better than their systems. This is why we have to lament, in times past and present, the resolute holding off from us of learned men in the Establishment, who seemed or seem to come nearest to us. Pearson, or Bull, or Beveridge, almost touches the gates of the Divine City, yet he gropes for them in vain; for such men are formed on a different type from the Catholic, and the most Catholic of their doctrines are not Catholic in them. In vain are the most ecclesiastical thoughts, the most ample concessions, the most promising aspirations, nay, the most fraternal sentiments, if they are not an integral part of that intellectual and moral form, which is ultimately from divine grace, and of which faith, not carnal wisdom, is the characteristic. The event shows this, as in the case of those many, who, as time goes on, after appearing to approach the Church, recede from her. In other cases the event is not necessary for their detection, to Catholics who happen to be near them. These are conscious in them of something or other, different from Catholicism, a bearing, or an aspect, or a tone, which they cannot indeed analyze or account for, but which they cannot mistake. They may not be able to put their finger on a single definite error; but, in proportion to the clearness of their spiritual discernment or the exactness of their theology, do they recognize, either the incipient heresies within the Church's pale, or the unhopeful inquirer outside of it. Whichever he be, he has made a wrong start; and however long the road has been, he has to go back and begin again. So it is with the bodies, institutions, and systems of which he is the specimen; they may die, they cannot be reformed.

And now, Gentlemen, I have arrived at the end of my subject. It has come before us so prominently during the course of the discussion, that to sum up is scarcely more than to repeat what has been said many times already. The Catholic Creed is one whole, and Philosophy again is one whole; each may be compared to an individual, to which nothing can be added, from which nothing can be taken away.
They may be professed, they may not be professed, but there is no middle ground between professing and not professing. A University, so called, which refuses to profess the Catholic Creed, is, from the nature of the case, hostile both to the Church and to Philosophy.

It must not be supposed, that, in the remarks I have made in my foregoing Discourse on the organic character (if I may use so strong a word in want of a better) of the various branches of Knowledge, viewed together, that I have been merely pointing out a peculiarity, which we may recognise or not at our pleasure; and that, on the ground, for instance, that a System of knowledge is more beautiful intellectually, or more serviceable in practice, true though this may be, than a confused litter of facts, or a heap of observations or rules. On the contrary, I assumed the fact of a System, and went on to point out some of the consequences which it involved. I assume, not only as incontrovertible, but as more or less confessed by all men, that the various sciences, which occupy the field of Knowledge, have, not mutual relations only, but run towards and into each other, and converge and approximate to a philo-
phical whole, whether we will or no:—so active is the sympathy which exists between them, so ready is the human mind to recognise, nay so impatient to anticipate, the Principle of System in all matters whatever, even at the risk of investing with laws and moulding into one, materials too scanty or too detached to sustain the process. Nor is it any unmixed compliment to the intellect thus to speak of its love of systematising; it is obliged to view its various creations all together from their very incompleteness separately. As well may we expect the various trades of a political community to be founded on a logical principle of division, and to expose nothing for sale in their respective windows, which has a place in the stores of their neighbours, as that the finite intellect of man should comprehend and duly parcel out the vast universe which envelops it, or should achieve more than a series of partial and fitful successes in ascertaining the object of its investigation. Thus System is but the resource of beings, who know for the most part, not by intuition, but by reasoning; and that large philosophical survey of things, which I have set down as the scope of University Education, is necessary to us, as well as beautiful, and a monument, not only of our power, but of our poverty.

Here however, cautious and practical thinkers will consider themselves entitled to ask a question. They will inquire of me, what, after all, is the gain of this Philosophy, of which I make such account, and from which I promise so much. Even supposing it to enable us to repose the degree of confidence exactly due to every science respectively, and to estimate precisely the value of every truth which is anywhere to be found, how are we the better for this master view of things, which I have been extolling? Does it not reverse the principle of the division of labour? will practical objects be obtained better or worse by its cultivation? to what then does it lead? where does it end? what does it do? how does it profit? what does it promise? Particular sciences are respectively the basis of definite arts, which carry on to results tangible and beneficial, the truths which are the objects of the knowledge attained; what is the Art of this science of sciences? what is the fruit of such a philosophy? Or, in other words, on the supposition that the case stands as I have represented it, what are we proposing to effect, what inducements do we hold out to the Catholic community, when we set about the enterprise of founding a University?

This is a very natural and appropriate, and to me not unwelcome, question; I even wish to consider it. I agree with the Objectors, that the representatives of a great interest cannot reasonably resolve, cannot be invited, to join together in the prosecution of an object, which involves odium, anxiety, trouble, and expence, without having an end set before them,
definite in itself, and commensurate with their exertions. I own, I have done very little till I have answered the question; and it admits a clear answer, yet it will be somewhat a long one. I shall not finish it to-day, nor in my next Discourse, but I trust, Gentlemen, that from the first and at once I shall be able to say what will justify me in your eyes in taxing your patience to hear me on, till I fairly come to my conclusion.

However, I will not delay frankly to tell you what that conclusion is to be. When then I am asked what is the end of a Liberal or University Education, and of the Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge which I conceive it to impart, I answer, that it has a very tangible, real, and sufficient end, but that the end cannot be divided from that knowledge itself. Knowledge is capable of being its own end. Such is the constitution of the human mind, that any kind of knowledge, if it be really such, is its own reward. And if this is true of all knowledge, it is true of that special Philosophy, which I have made to consist in a comprehensive view of truth in all its branches, of the relations of science to science, of their mutual bearings, and their respective values. What the worth of such an acquirement is, compared with other objects which we seek—wealth or power or honour or the conveniences and comforts of life, I do not profess here to discuss; but I would maintain, and mean to show, that it is an object, in its own nature

so really and undeniably good, as to be the compensation of a great deal of thought in compassing, and a great deal of trouble in attaining.

Now, when I say that Knowledge is, not merely a means to something beyond it, or the preliminary of certain arts into which it naturally resolves, but an end sufficient to rest in and to pursue for its own sake, surely I am uttering no paradox, for I am stating what is both intelligible in itself, and has ever been the common judgment of philosophers and the ordinary feeling of mankind. I am saying what at least the public opinion of this day ought to be slow to deny, considering how much we have heard of late years, in opposition to Religion, of entertaining, curious, and various knowledge. I am but saying what whole volumes have been written to illustrate, by a "selection from the records of Philosophy, Literature, and Art, in all ages and countries, of a body of examples, to show how the most unpromising circumstances have been unable to conquer an ardent desire for the acquisition of knowledge." That further advantages accrue to us and redound to others, by its possession, over and above what it is in itself, I am very far indeed from denying; but, independent of these, we are satisfying a direct need of our nature in this very acquisition; and, whereas our nature, unlike that of the inferior creation, does not at once reach its perfection, but depends in order

* Pursuit of Knowledge under Difficulties. Intro.
to it on a number of external aids and appliances, Knowledge, as one of those principal gifts or accessories, by which it is completed, is valuable for what its very presence in us does for us by a sort of opus operatum, even though it be turned to no further account, nor subserve any direct end.

Hence it is that Cicero, in enumerating the various heads of mental excellence, lays down the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, as the first of them. "This pertains most of all to human nature", he says, "for we are all of us drawn to the pursuit of knowledge; in which to excel we consider excellent, whereas to mistake, to err, to be ignorant, to be deceived, is both an evil and a disgrace". And he considers Knowledge the very first object to which we are attracted, after the supply of our physical wants. After the calls and duties of our animal existence, as they may be termed, as regards ourselves, our family, and our neighbours, follows, he tells us, "the search after truth. Accordingly, as soon as we escape from the pressure of necessary cares, forthwith we desire to see, to hear, to learn; and consider the knowledge of what is hidden or is wonderful a condition of our happiness".

This passage, though it is but one of many similar passages in a multitude of authors, I take for the very reason that it is so familiarly known to us; and I wish you to observe, Gentlemen, how distinctly it

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Cicero. Offic. init.
enough to carry us on in the pursuit of knowledge, even without any exertion of our own”. The idea of benefiting society by means of “the pursuits of science and knowledge” did not enter at all into the motives which he would assign for their cultivation.

This was the ground of the opposition, which the elder Cato made to the introduction of Greek Philosophy among his countrymen, when Carneades and his companions, on occasion of their embassy, were charming the Roman youth with their eloquent expositions of it. A fit representative of a practical people, he estimated everything by what it produced; whereas the Pursuit of Knowledge promised nothing beyond Knowledge itself. It was as fatal, he considered, to attempt to measure the advantages of Philosophy by a Utilitarian standard, as to estimate a point of taste by a barometer, or to trace out an emotion by an equation. Cato knew at the time as little of what is meant by refinement or enlargement of mind, as the busy every-day world now knows of the operations of grace. He despised what he had never felt.

Things, which can bear to be cut off from everything else and yet persist in living, must have life in themselves; pursuits, which issue in nothing, and still maintain their ground for ages, which are regarded as admirable, though they have not as yet proved themselves to be useful, must have their sufficient end in themselves, whatever it turn out to be. And we are brought to the same conclusion by considering the force of the epithet, by which the knowledge under consideration is popularly designated. It is common to speak of “liberal knowledge”, of the “liberal arts and studies”; and of a “liberal education”, as the especial characteristic or property of a University and of a gentleman; what is meant by the word? Now, first, in its grammatical sense it is opposed to servile; and by “servile work” is understood, as our catechisms inform us, badly labour, mechanical employment, and the like, in which the mind has little or no part. Parallel to such works are the arts, if they deserve the name, of which the poet speaks, “which owe their origin and their method to chance, not to skill; as, for instance, the practice and operations of a quack. As far as this contrast may be considered as a guide into the meaning of the word, liberal knowledge and liberal pursuits are such as belong to the mind, not to the body.

But we want something more for its explanation, for there are bodily exercises which are liberal, and mental exercises which are not so. For instance, in ancient times the practitioners in medicine were commonly slaves; yet it was an art as intellectual in its nature, in spite of the low magic or empiricism with which it might then, as now, be debased, as it was heavenly in its aim. And so in like manner, we contrast a liberal education with a commercial edu.
cation or a professional; yet no one can deny that commerce and the professions afford scope for the highest and most diversified powers of mind. There is then a great variety of intellectual exercises, which are not technically called "liberal"; on the other hand, I say, there are exercises of the body which do receive that appellation. Such, for instance, was the palestra, in ancient times; such the Olympic games, in which strength and dexterity of body as well as of mind gained the prize. In Xenophon we read of the young Persian nobility being taught to ride on horseback and to speak the truth; both being among the accomplishments of a gentleman. War, too, however rough a profession, has ever been accounted liberal, unless in cases when it becomes heroic, which would introduce us to another subject.

Now comparing these instances together, we shall have no difficulty in determining the principle of this apparent variation in the application of the term which I am examining. Manly games, or games of skill, or military prowess, though bodily, are, it seems, accounted liberal; on the other hand, what is merely professional, though highly intellectual, nay, though liberal in comparison of trade and manual labour, is not simply called liberal, and mercantile occupations are not liberal at all. Why this distinction? because that alone is liberal knowledge, which stands on its own pretensions, which is independent of sequel, expects no complement, refuses to be informed (as it is called) by any end, or absorbed into any art, in order duly to present itself to our contemplation. The most ordinary pursuits have this specific character, if they are self-sufficient and complete; the highest lose it, when they minister to something beyond them. It is absurd to balance a treatise on reducing fractures with a game of cricket or a fox-chase; yet of the two the bodily exercise has that quality which we call "liberal", and the intellectual has it not. And so of the learned professions altogether, considered merely as professions; though the one of them be the most popularly beneficial, and another the most politically important, and the third the most intimately divine of all human pursuits, yet the very greatness of their end, the health of the body, or of the commonwealth, or of the soul, diminishes, not increases, their claim to the appellation in question, and that still more, if they are cut down to the strict exigencies of that end. If, for instance, Theology, instead of being cultivated as a contemplation, be limited to the purposes of the pulpit or be represented by the catechism, it loses, not its usefulness, not its divine character, not its meritoriousness (rather it increases it by such charitable condescension), but the particular attribute which I am illustrating; just as a face worn by tears and fasting loses its beauty, or a labourer's hand loses its delicateness;—for Theology thus exercised is not simple knowledge, but rather is an art or a
business-making use of Theology. And thus it appears that even what is supernatural need not be liberal, nor need a hero be a gentleman, for the plain reason that one idea is not another idea. And in like manner the Baconian Philosophy, by using its physical sciences for the purpose of fruit, does thereby transfer them from the order of Liberal Pursuits to, I do not say the inferior, but the distinct class of the Useful. And, to take a different instance, hence again, as is evident, whenever the motive of gain is introduced, still more does it change the character of a given pursuit; thus racing, which was a liberal exercise in Greece, forfeits its rank in times like these, so far as it is made the occasion of gambling.

All that I have been now saying is summed up in a few characteristic words of the great Philosopher. "Of possessions", he says, "those rather are useful, which bear fruit; those liberal, which tend to enjoyment. By fruitful, I mean, which yield revenue; by enjoyable, where nothing accrues of consequence beyond the use".*

Do not suppose, Gentlemen, that, in thus appealing to the ancients, I am throwing back the world two thousand years, and fettering Philosophy with the reasonings of paganism. While the world lasts, will Aristotle's doctrine on these matters last, for he is the oracle of nature and of truth. When I hear people ridiculeing Catholics, as they sometimes do, for deferring to the schools of Greece, I am reminded of the man who thought it strange or hard, that he should have been talking prose all his life, without knowing it. As prose is but a name for our ordinary style of conversation, so, while we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aristotelians, for the great Master does but analyse the thoughts, feelings, views, and opinions of human kind. He has told us the meaning of our own words and ideas, before we were born. In many subject matters, to think correctly, is to think like Aristotle; and we are his disciples whether we will or no, though we may not know it. He was most wonderfully raised up, as for other reasons, so especially to be minister to a Divine Revelation, of which personally he knew nothing; and it is both true wisdom and mere thankfulness to accept the gift provided for us, for the purposes which it answers. Now, as to the particular instance before us, the word "liberal" as applied to Knowledge and Education, expresses a specific idea, which ever has been, and ever will be, while the nature of man is the same, just as the idea of the Beautiful is specific, or the Sublime, or the Ridiculous, or the Sordid. It is in the world now, it was in the world then; and, as in the case of the dogmas of faith, it is illustrated by a continuous historical tradition, and never was out of the world, from the time it came into it. There have indeed been differences of opinion from time to time, as to what

* Aristot. Rhet. i. 5.
pursuits and what arts came under that idea, but such differences are but an additional evidence of its reality. That idea must have a substance in it, which has maintained its ground amid these conflicts and changes, which has ever served as a standard to measure things withal, which has passed from mind to mind unchanged, which there was so much to colour, so much to influence any notion or thought whatever, which was not founded in our very nature. Were it a mere generalisation, it would have varied with the subjects from which it was generalised; but though its subjects vary with the age, it varies not itself. The palestra may seem a liberal exercise to Lycurgus, and illiberal to Seneca; coach-driving and prize-fighting may be recognised in Elis, and be condemned in England; music may be despicable in the eyes of certain moderns, and be in the highest place with Aristotle and Plato,—(and the case is the same in the particular application of the idea of Beauty, or of Goodness, or of Moral Virtue, there is a difference of tastes, a difference of judgments)—still these variations imply, instead of indiscriminating, the archetypal idea, which is but a previous hypothesis or condition, by means of which issue is joined between contending opinions, and without which there would be nothing to dispute about.

I consider then, that I am chargeable with no paradox, when I speak of a Knowledge which is its own end, when I call it liberal knowledge, or a gentleman's knowledge, when I educate for it, and make it the scope of a University. And still less am I incurring such a charge, when I make this acquisition consist, not in Knowledge in a vague and ordinary sense, but in that knowledge which I have especially called Philosophy or, in an extended sense of the word, Science; for whatever claims Knowledge has to be considered as a good, these it has in a higher degree when it is viewed not vaguely, not popularly, but precisely and transcendently as Philosophy. Knowledge, I say, is especially liberal, or needs no end beside itself, when and so far as it is philosophical; and this I proceed to show.

You may recollect, Gentlemen, that, in my foregoing Discourse, I said that systematising, or taking general views of all departments of thought, or what I called Philosophy, was but a modification of the mental condition which we designate by the name of science, or was a Science of sciences; now bear with me, if what I am about to say, has at first sight a fanciful appearance. Philosophy then or Science is related to Knowledge in this way:—Knowledge is called by the name of Science or Philosophy, when it is acted upon, informed, or, if I may use a strong figure, impregnated by Reason. Reason is the principle of that intrinsic fecundity of Knowledge, which, to those who possess it, is its especial value, and which dispenses with the necessity of their looking abroad for any end to rest upon external to itself.
Knowledge indeed, when thus exalted into a scientific form, is also power; not only is it excellent in itself, but whatever such excellence may be, it is something more, it has a result beyond itself. Doubtless; but that is a further consideration, with which I am not concerned. I only say that, prior to its being a power, it is a good; that it is, not only an instrument, but an end. I know well it may resolve itself into an art, and terminate in a mechanical process, and in tangible fruit; but it also may fall back upon reason, and resolve itself into philosophy. In the one case it is called Useful Knowledge, in the other Liberal. The same person may cultivate it in both ways at once; but this again is a matter foreign to my subject; here I do but say that there are two ways of using Knowledge, and in matter of fact those who use it in one way are not likely to use it in the other, or at least in a very limited measure. You see then, Gentlemen, here are two methods of Education; the one aspires to be philosophical, the other to be mechanical; the one rises towards ideas, the other is exhausted upon what is particular and external. Let me not be thought to deny the necessity, or to decry the benefit, of such attention to what is particular and practical, of the useful or mechanical arts; life could not go on without them; we owe our daily welfare to them; their exercise is the duty of the many, and we owe to the many a debt of gratitude for fulfilling it. I only say that Knowledge, in proportion as it tends more and more to be particular, ceases to be Knowledge. It is a question whether Knowledge can in any proper sense be predicated of the brute creation; without pretending to metaphysical exactness of phraseology, which would be unsuitable to an occasion like this, I say, it seems to me improper to call that passive sensation, or perception of things, which brutes seem to possess, by the name of Knowledge. When I speak of Knowledge, I mean something intellectual, something which grasps what it perceives through the senses; something which takes a view of things; which sees more than the senses convey; which reasons upon what it sees, and while it sees; which invests it with an idea. It expresses itself, not in a mere enunciation, but by an enthymeme; it is of the nature of science from the first, and in this consists its dignity. The principle of real dignity in Knowledge, its worth, its desirableness, considered irrespectively of its results, is this germ within it of a scientific or a philosophical process. This is how it comes to be an end in itself; this is why it is called Liberal. Not to know the relative disposition of things is the state of slaves or children; to have mapped out the Universe is the beast of Philosophy.

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
Atque metas annis, et inebriabile fatum
Subiect pedibus, strapiumque Acherontis avari.

You may ask me, Gentlemen, how all this is
consistent with the dignity of Christianity, with the merit of faith. You will say that faith is confident, that obedience is prompt, yet without knowing why; that ignorance is the very condition both of the one and the other. Though we cannot verify by reason, yet we take upon us, on God's word, the very truth to be believed, the very work to be done; this is the beginning surely of all supernatural excellence. Here we are upon a new subject, yet I am not unwilling to say a word upon it by way of illustrating the point I am making good. In the first place, then, I deny that Faith is a mere unreasoning act; on the contrary, it has an intellectual nature. It is no brute or necessary sensation or perception; it has in it, as divines have noticed, a discursive process. We believe what is revealed to us from belief in the Revealer. But again, even though a state of mind were imposed upon us by Christianity, less elevated, less noble, than we should choose for ourselves, if the choice were ours, I suppose it must not be left out of consideration, that our race once was in a higher state and has forfeited it. Ignorance was not always our natural portion, nor slavery our birthright. When the Divine Voice quickens us from the dust in which we lie, it is to call us to a dignity higher even than that which was ours in the beginning; but it restores us by degrees. At first, we emerge from the state of slaves into that of children and of children only, and not yet of men. We are exercised by faith; it is our education. And in like manner children are exercised at school; they are taught the rudiments of knowledge upon faith; they do not begin with philosophy. But, as in the natural order, we mount up to philosophical largeness of mind from lessons learned by rote and the schoolmaster's rod, so too in the order supernatural, even in this life, and far more truly in the life to come, we pass on from faith and penance to contemplation. Such is the loving-kindness of the Everlasting Father, "suscitans à terrâ inopem, et de sterno ergens pauperem". To those who have begun with faith, He adds, in course of time, a higher gift, the gift of Wisdom, which, not superseding, but presupposing Faith, gives us so broad and deep a view of things revealed, that their very consistency is an evidence of their Author, and, like the visible world, persuades us to adore His Majesty. This endowment the Apostle speaks of, when addressing the educated Corinthians. First he makes mention of that liberal knowledge or philosophy in the natural order, which is my present subject, and which in the absence of theology had been sublimated into an empty worthless speculation, and had become a mere "worldly wisdom". After warning his converts against this perversion, he proceeds to say, by way of contrast, "We speak a wisdom among the perfect, yet not the wisdom of this world, but the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom, which is hidden wisdom". Such a wisdom
is the whole series of Christian Evidences, the cumulative proof of the Being of a God, of the divinity of Judaism, and of the mission of the Apostles; such the course of the Divine Dispensations, the structure of Scripture Prophecy, the analogy between the systems of nature and grace; such the notes of the Church, the history of miracles, the philosophy and phenomena of the heroic life, the neverending conflict between Christ and the world, the harmony of Catholic doctrine, and the process of its evolution. These and many other subjects of thought form a multitude, or rather a system and philosophy of divine sciences, which, rising out of Faith, tend nevertheless towards that eternal state of illumination, when Faith shall yield to sight. It is the gift of Wisdom; and of this our Lord seems to speak, and almost designates it as the liberal knowledge of His favoured ones, by contrasting it with the servile condition of mind in which we act without being able to give an account of our actions. "I will not now call you servants," He says, "for the servant knoweth not what his Lord doeth; but I have called you friends, because all things, whatsoever I have heard from my Father, I have made known to you".

Parallel then to this Divine Wisdom, but in the natural order, even though it takes cognisance of supernatural subjects, is that philosophical view or grasp of all matters of thought, in which I have considered Liberal Knowledge to consist, and which is desirable for its own sake, though it brought with it nothing beyond. Such knowledge is not a mere extrinsic or accidental advantage, which is ours to-day and another's to-morrow, which may be got up from a book, and easily forgotten again, which we can command or communicate at our pleasure, which we can borrow for the occasion, carry about in our hand, and take into the market; it is an acquired illumination, it is a habit, a personal possession, and an inward endowment. And this is the reason, why it is more correct, as well as more usual, to speak of a University as a place of education, than of instruction, though, when knowledge is concerned, instruction would at first sight have seemed the more appropriate word. We are instructed, for instance, in manual exercises, in the fine and useful arts, in trades, and in ways of business; for these are methods, which have little or no effect upon the mind itself, are contained in rules committed to memory, tradition, or use, and bear upon an end external to themselves. But Education is a higher word; it implies an action upon our mental nature, and the formation of a character; it is something individual and permanent, and is commonly spoken of in connexion with religion and virtue. When then we speak of the communication of Knowledge as being Education, we thereby really imply that that Knowledge is a state or condition of mind; and since cultivation of mind is surely worth seeking for its own
sake, we are thus brought once more to the conclusion, which the word "Liberal" and the word "Philosophy" have already suggested, that there is a Knowledge, which is desirable, though nothing come of it, as being of itself a treasure, and a sufficient remuneration of years of labour.

This then is the answer which I am prepared to give to the question with which I opened this Discourse. Before going on to speak of the object of the Church in taking up Philosophy, and the uses to which she puts it, I am prepared to maintain that Philosophy is its own end, and to-day, as I conceive, I have begun proving it. I am prepared to maintain that, there is a knowledge worth possessing for what it is, and not merely for what it does. This important principle is the issue, if it be not the drift, of all that I have been saying in my preceding Discourses; I hope it will not seem paradoxical or unreal; for some time to come I shall employ myself upon it; and what minutes remain to me to-day I shall devote to the removal of some portion of the indistinctness and confusion with which it may in some minds be surrounded.

It may be objected then, that, when we profess to seek Knowledge for some end or other beyond; whatever it be, we speak intelligibly; but, that, whatever men may have said, however obstinately the idea may have kept its ground from age to age, still it is simply unmeaning to say that we seek Knowledge for its own sake, and for nothing else; for that it ever leads to something beyond itself, which therefore is its end, and the cause why it is desirable;—moreover, that this end is two-fold, either of this world or of the next; that all knowledge is cultivated either for secular objects or for eternal; that, if it is directed to secular objects, it is called Useful Knowledge, if to eternal, Religious or Christian Knowledge;—in consequence, that if, as I have allowed, this Liberal Knowledge does not benefit the body or estate, it ought to benefit the soul; but if the fact be really so, that it is neither a physical or secular good on the one hand, nor a moral good on the other, it cannot be a good at all, and is not worth the trouble which is necessary for its acquisition.

And then I may be reminded that the professors of this Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge have themselves, in every age recognised this exposition of the matter, and have submitted to the issue in which it terminates; for they have ever been attempting to make men virtuous; or, if not, at least have assumed that refinement of mind was virtue, and that they themselves were the virtuous portion of mankind. This they have professed on the one hand; and on the other, they have utterly failed in their professions, so as ever to make themselves a proverb among men, and a laughing stock both to grave and dissipated, in consequence of them. Thus they have furnished against themselves both the ground and the means of their own exposure, without any trouble.
at all to any one else. In a word, from the time that Athens was the University of the world, what has Philosophy taught men, but to promise without practising, and to aspire without attaining? What has the deep and lofty thought of its disciples ended in but eloquent words? Nay, what has its teaching ever meditated, when it was boldest in its remedies for human ill, beyond charming us to sleep by its lessons, that we might feel nothing at all? like some melodious air, or rather like those strong and transporting perfumes, which at first spread their sweetness over every thing they touch, but in a little while do but offend in proportion as they once pleased us. Did Philosophy support Cicero under the disfavor of the sable populace, or nerve Seneca to oppose an imperial tyrant? It abandoned Brutus, as he sorrowfully confessed, in his greatest need, and it forced Cato, as his panegyrist strangely boasts, into the false position of defying heaven. How many can be counted among its professors, who, like Polemo, were thereby converted from a profligate course, or like Anaxagoras, thought the world well lost, in exchange for its possession? The philosopher in Rasselas taught a superhuman doctrine, and then succumbed without an effort to a trial of human affections.

"He discoursed", we are told, "with great energy on the government of the passions. His look was venerable, his action graceful, his pronunciation clear, and his diction elegant. He showed, with great strength of sentiment and variety of illustration, that human nature is degraded and debased, when the lower faculties predominate over the higher. He communicated the various precepts given, from time to time, for the conquest of passion, and displayed the happiness of those who had obtained the important victory, after which man is no longer the slave of fear, nor the fool of hope. He enumerated many examples of heroes immovable by pain or pleasure, who looked with indifference on those modes or accidents, to which the vulgar give the names of good and evil."

Rasselas in a few days found the philosopher in a room half darkened, with his eyes misty, and his face pale. "Sir", said he, "you have come at a time when all human friendship is useless; what I suffer cannot be remedied, what I have lost cannot be supplied. My daughter, my only daughter, from whose tenderness I expected all the comforts of my age, died last night of a fever. "Sir", said the prince, "mortality is an event by which a wise man can never be surprised; we know that death is always near, and it should therefore always be expected". "Young man", answered the philosopher, "you speak like one who has never felt the pangs of separation". "Have you then forgot the precept", said Rasselas, "which you so powerfully enforced..."
consider, that external things are naturally variable, but truth and reason are always the same. "What comfort?" said the mourner, "can truth and reason afford me? Of what effect are they now, but to tell me, that my daughter will not be restored?"

Better, far better, to make no professions, than to cheat others with what we are not, and to scandalize them with what we are. The sensualist, or the man of the world, at any rate is, not the victim of fine words, but pursues a reality and gains it. The Philosophy of Utility, you will say, Gentlemen, has at least done its work; it aimed low, but it has fulfilled its aim. If that man of great intellect who has been its Prophet, in the conduct of life played false to his own professions, he was not bound by his philosophy to be true to his friend or faithful in his trust. Moral virtue was not the line in which he undertook to instruct men; and though, as the poet calls him, he were the "meanest" of mankind, he was so in what may be called his private capacity and without any prejudice to the theory of induction. He had a right to be so, if he chose, for anything the Idols of the den or the theatre had to say to the contrary. His mission was the increase of physical enjoyment and social comfort;* and most wonderfully, most awfully has he fulfilled his conception and his design.

*De Augment, iv. 2, vid. Mr. Macaulay's Essay; Also *In principio operis ad Deum Patrem, Deum Verbum, Deum Spiritum, proges fundamentales et authenticas, ut humani generis arcanorum memoriae, et peregrinations istius vitae, in quibus peneos et malos terminos, noti sui commutandi, per manus nostras, familiam humanam doctre digenter. Aquae illud insuper suplices regnum, ut humani divinis officiis; novae revelationes rerum causae, et ascensione majore hominis naturalis, diligit incohalius aeterni, animis nostris euga divina mysteria obviar, etc. *Prof. Instaur. Magno-
with cheerful countenance, a pious song; and then in turn "went out" singing into the meadows so gaily, that those who had seen him from afar might well have thought it was a youth gathering flowers for his beloved, instead of an old physician gathering healing herbs in the morning dew".

Alas, that men are not in the action of life or in their heart of hearts, what they seem to be in their moments of excitement, or in their trances or intoxications of genius,—so good, so noble, so serene! Alas, that Bacon too in his own way should after all be but the fellow of those heathen philosophers who in their disadvantages had some excuse for their inconsistency, and who surprise us rather in what they did say than in what they did not do. Alas, that he too, like Socrates or Seneca, must be stripped of his holy-day coat, which looks so fair, and should be but a mockery amid his most majestic gravity of phrase, and for all his vast abilities, should, in the littleness of his own moral being, but typify the intellectual narrowness of his school. However, granting all this; heroism after all was not his philosophy; I cannot deny he has abundantly achieved what he proposed. His is simply a Method whereby bodily discomforts and temporal wants are to be most effectually removed from the greatest number; and already, before it has shown any signs of exhaustion, the gifts of nature, in their most artificial shapes and luxurious profusion and diversity, from all quarters of the earth, are, it is undeniable, brought even to our doors, and we rejoice in them.

Useful Knowledge then certainly has done its work; and Liberal Knowledge as certainly has not done its work: supposing, that is, as the objectors assume, its direct end, like Religious Knowledge, is to make men better; but this I will not for an instant allow. For all its friends, or its enemies, may say, I insist upon it, that it is as real a mistake to implicate it with virtue or religion, as with the arts. Its direct business is not to steel the soul against temptation or to console it in affliction, any more than to set the loom in motion, or to direct the steam carriage; be it ever so much, the means or the condition of both material and moral advancement, still, taken by and in itself, it as little mends our hearts, as it improves our temporal circumstances. And if its ene\$

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* Ponque's Unknown Patient.

† Te maris et terrae, etc. Hor. Od. i. 28.
motives, no vivifying principles. Liberal Education makes not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman. It is well to be a gentleman, it is well to have a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and courteous bearing in the conduct of life;—these are the connatural qualities of a large knowledge; they are the objects of a University; I am advocating, I shall illustrate and insist upon them; but still, I repeat, they are no guarantee for sanctity or even for conscientiousness, they may attach to the man of the world, to the profligate, to the heartless,—pleasant, alas, and attractive as he seems when decked out in them. Taken by themselves, they do but seem to be what they are not; they look like virtue at a distance, but they are detected by close observers, and on the long run; and hence it is that they are popularly accused of pretense and hypocrisy, not, I repeat, from their own fault, but because their professors and their admirers persist in taking them for what they are not, and are officious in arrogating for them a praise to which they have no claim. Quarry the granite rock with razors, or moor the vessel with a thread of silk; then may you hope with such keen and delicate instruments as human knowledge and human reason to contend against those giants, the passion and the pride of man.

Surely we are not driven to theories of this kind, in order to vindicate the value and dignity of Liberal Knowledge. Surely the real grounds on which its pretensions rest, are not so very subtle or abstruse, so very strange or improbable. Surely it is very intelligible to say, and that is what I say here, that Liberal Education, viewed in itself, is simply the cultivation of the intellect, as such, and its object is nothing more or less than intellectual excellence. Every thing has its own perfection, be it higher or lower in the scale of things; and the perfection of one is not the perfection of another. Things animate, inanimate, visible, invisible, all are good in their kind, and have a best of themselves, which is an object of pursuit. Why do you take such pains with your garden or your park? You see to your walks and turf and shruberies; to your trees and drives; not as if you meant to make an orchard of the one, or corn or pasture land of the other, but because there is a special beauty in all that is goodly in wood, water, plain, and slope, brought all together by art into one shape, and grouped into one whole. Your cities are beautiful, your palaces, your public buildings, your territorial mansions, your churches; and their beauty leads to nothing beyond itself. There is a physical beauty and a moral: there is a beauty of person, there is a beauty of our moral being, which is natural virtue; and in like manner there is a beauty, there is a perfection, of the intellect. There is an ideal perfection in these various subject matters, towards
which individual instances are seen to rise, and which are the standards for all instances whatever. The Greek divinities and demigods, as the statuary has moulded them, with their symmetry of figure, and their high forehead and their regular features, are the perfection of physical beauty. The heroes, of whom history tells, Alexander, or Caesar, or Scipio, or Saladin, are the representatives of that magnanimity or self-mastery which is the greatness of human nature. Christianity too has its heroes, and in the supernatural order, and we call them Saints. The artist puts before him beauty of feature and form; the poet, beauty of mind; the preacher, the beauty of grace: then intellect too, I repeat, has its beauty, and it has those who aim at it. To open the mind, to correct it, to refine it, to enable it to know, and to digest, master, rule, and use its knowledge, to give it power over its own faculties, application, flexibility, method, critical exactness, sagacity, resource, address, eloquent expression, is an object as intelligible (for here we are inquiring, not what the object of a Liberal Education is worth, nor what use the Church makes of it, but what it is in itself,) I say, an object as intelligible as the cultivation of virtue, while, at the same time it is absolutely distinct from it.

This indeed is but a temporal object, and a transitory possession; but so are other things in themselves which we make much of and pursue. The moralist will tell us, that man, in all his functions, is but a flower which blossoms and fades, except so far as a higher principle breathes upon him, and makes him and what he is, immortal. Body and mind are carried on into an eternal world by the gifts of Divine Municience; but at first they do but fail in a failing world; and, if the powers of intellect decay, the powers of the body have decayed before them, and, if an Hospital or an Almshouse, though its end be secular, may be sanctified to the service of Religion, so surely may an University, were it nothing more than I have as yet described it. We attain to heaven by using this world well, though it is to pass away; we perfect our nature, not by undoing it, but by adding to it what is more than nature, and directing it towards aims higher than its own.
DISCOURSE VII.

PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE VIEWED IN RELATION TO MENTAL ACQUIREMENTS.

It were well, if the English, like the Greek language, possessed some definite word to express simply and generally, intellectual proficiency or perfection, such as "health", as used with reference to the animal frame, and "virtue", with reference to our moral nature. I am not able to find such a term;—talent, ability, genius, belong distinctly to the raw material, which is the subject-matter, not to the excellence which is the result, of exercise and training. When we turn, indeed, to the particular kinds of intellectual perfection, words are forthcoming for our purpose as, for instance, judgment, taste, and skill; yet even these belong, for the most part, to powers or habits bearing upon practice or upon art, and not to any perfect condition of the intellect, considered in itself. Wisdom, again, which is a more comprehensive word than any other, certainly has a direct rela-
tion to conduct, and to human life. Knowledge, indeed, and Science express purely intellectual ideas, but still not a state or habit of the intellect; for knowledge, in its ordinary sense, is but one of its circumstances, denoting a possession or influence; and science has been appropriated to the subject matter of the intellect, instead of belonging at present, as it ought to do, to the intellect itself. The consequence is, that, on an occasion like this, many words are necessary, in order, first, to bring out and convey, what surely is no difficult idea in itself,—that of the cultivation of the intellect as an end; next, in order to recommend what surely is no unreasonable object; and lastly, to describe and realize to the mind the particular perfection in which that object consists. Every one knows practically what are the constituents of health or of virtue; and every one recognizes health and virtue as ends to be pursued; it is otherwise with intellectual excellence, and this must be my excuse, if I seem to any one to be bestowing a good deal of labour on a preliminary matter.

In default of a recognized term, I have called the perfection or virtue of the intellect by the name of philosophy, philosophical knowledge, enlargement of mind, or illumination; terms which are not uncommonly given to it by writers of this day: but, whatever name we bestow on it, it is, I believe, as a matter of history, the business of a University to make this intellectual culture its direct scope, or to employ itself in the education of the intellect,—just as the work of a Hospital lies in healing the sick or wounded, of a Riding or Fencing School, or a Gymnasium, in exercising the limbs, of an Almshouse, in aiding and solacing the old, of an Orphanage, in protecting innocence, of a Penitentiary, in restoring the guilty. I say, a University, taken in its bare idea; and before we view it as an instrument of the Church, has this object and this mission; it contemplates neither moral impression nor mechanical production; it professes to exercise neither in art nor in duty; its function is intellectual culture; here it may leave its scholars, and it has done its work, when it has done as much as this. It educates the mind, to reason well in all matters, to reach out to truth, and to grasp it.

This, I said in my foregoing Discourse, was the object of a University, viewed in itself, and apart from the Catholic Church, or from the State, or from any other power which may use it; and I illustrated it in various ways. I said, that the intellect must have an excellence of its own, for there was nothing which had not its specific good; that the word "educate" would not be used of intellectual training, as it is, had not that training had an end of its own; that, had it not such an end, there would be no meaning in calling certain intellectual exercises "liberal", in contrast to "useful", as is commonly done; that the very notion of a philosophical spiri
implied it, for it threw us back upon research and system as ends in themselves, distinct from effects and works of any kind; that a philosophical scheme of knowledge, or system of sciences, could not, from the nature of the case, issue in any one definite art or pursuit, as its end; and that, on the other hand, the discovery and contemplation of truth, to which research and systematizing led, were surely sufficient ends, though nothing beyond them were added, and that they had ever been accounted sufficient by mankind.

Here then I take up the subject; and, having determined that the cultivation of the intellect is an end distinct and sufficient in itself, and that, so far as words go, it is an enlargement or illumination, I proceed to inquire what this mental breadth, or power, or light, or philosophy consists in. A Hospital heals a broken limb or cures a fever; what does an Institution effect, which professes the health, not of the body, not of the soul, but of the intellect? What is this good, which, in former times, as well as our own, has been found worth the notice, the appropriation, of the Catholic Church?

I have then to investigate, in the Discourses which follow, those qualities and characteristics of the intellect, in which its cultivation issues or rather consists; and, with a view of assisting myself in this undertaking, I shall recur to certain questions which were started in the course of the discussion immediately preceding the present. These questions were three; viz. the relation of intellectual culture, first, to mere or material knowledge; secondly, to professional knowledge; and thirdly, to religious knowledge. In other words, are acquirements and attainments the scope of a University Education? or expertness in particular arts and pursuits? or moral and religious proficiency? or something besides these three? These questions I shall examine in succession, with the purpose I have mentioned; and I hope to be excused, if, in this anxious undertaking, I am led to repeat what, either in these Discourses or elsewhere, I have already put upon paper. And first, of Material Knowledge, or Acquirements, and their connection with intellectual illumination or Philosophy.

I suppose the prima facie view which the public at large would take of a University, considered as a place of Education, is nothing more or less than a place for acquiring a great deal of knowledge on a great many subjects. Memory is one of the first developed of the mental faculties; a boy's business, when he goes to school, is to learn, that is, to store up things in his memory. For some years his intellect is little more than an instrument for taking in facts, or a receptacle for storing them; he welcomes them as fast as they come to him; he lives on what is without; he has his eyes ever about him; he has a lively susceptibility of impressions; he imbibes information of every kind; and little does he make his

* Vid. the Author's University (Oxford) Sermons.
own in a true sense of the word, living rather upon his neighbours all around him. He has opinions, religious, political, and literary, and, for a boy, is very positive in them and sure about them; but he gets them from his schoolfellows, or his masters, or his parents, as the case may be. Such as he is in his other relations, such also is he in his school exercises; his mind is observant, sharp, ready, retentive; he is almost passive in the acquisition of knowledge. I say this in no disparagement of the idea of a clever boy. Geography, chronology, history, language, natural history, he heaps up the matter of these studies as treasures for a future day. It is the seven years of plenty with him: he gathers in by handfuls, like the Egyptians, without counting; and though, as time goes on, there is exercise for his argumentative powers in the Elements of Mathematics, and for his taste in the Poets and Orators, still, while at school, or at least, till quite the last years of his time, he acquires, and little more; and when he is leaving for the University, he is mainly the creature of foreign influences and circumstances, and made up of accidents, homogeneous or not, as the case may be. Moreover, the moral habits, which are a boy's praise, encourage and assist this result; that is, diligence, assiduity, regularity, despatch, persevering application; for these are the direct conditions of acquisition, and naturally lead to it: "Acquirements, again, are emphatically producible, and at a moment; they are a something to show, for both master and scholar; an audience, even though ignorant themselves of the subjects of an examination, can comprehend when questions are answered and when they are not. Here again is a reason, why mental culture should in the minds of men be identified with the acquisition of knowledge.

The same notion possesses the public mind, when it passes on from the thought of a school to that of a University; and with the best of reasons so far as this, that there is no true culture without acquirements, and that philosophy presupposes knowledge. It requires a great deal of reading, or a wide range of information, to warrant us in putting forth our opinions on any serious subject; and without such learning, the most original mind may be able indeed to dazzle, to amuse, to refute, to perplex, but not to come to any useful result or any trustworthy conclusion. There are indeed persons who profess a different view of the matter, and even act upon it. Every now and then you will find a person of vigorous or fertile mind, who relies upon his own resources, despises all former authors, and gives the world, with the utmost fearlessness, his views upon religion, or history, or any other popular subject. And his works may sell for a while; be may get a name in his day; but this will be all. His readers are sure to find on the long run that his doctrines
DISCOURSE VII.

are mere theories, and not the expression of facts, that they are chaff instead of bread, and then his popularity drops as suddenly as it rose.

Knowledge then is the indispensible condition of expansion of mind, and the instrument of attaining to it; this cannot be denied, it is ever to be insisted on; I begin with it as a first principle; however, the very truth of it carries men too far, and confirms to them the notion that it is the whole of it. A narrow mind is thought to be that which contains little knowledge; and an enlarged mind, that which holds a great deal; and what seems to put the matter beyond dispute, is the fact of the number of studies which are pursued in a University, by its very profession. Lectures are given on every kind of subject; examinations are held; prizes awarded. There are moral, metaphysical, physical Professors; Professors of languages, of history, of mathematics, of experimental science. Lists of questions are published, wonderful for their range and depth, variety and difficulty; treatises are written, which carry upon their very face the evidence of extensive reading or multifarious information; what then is wanted for mental culture to a person of large reading and scientific attainments? what is grasp of mind but acquirement? where shall philosophical repose be found, but in the consciousness and enjoyment of large intellectual possessions?

And yet this notion is, I conceive, a mistake, and my present business is to show that it is one, and that the end of a Liberal Education is not mere or material knowledge; and I shall best attain my object, by actually setting down some cases, which will be generally granted to be instances of the process of enlightenment or enlargement of mind, and others which are not, and thus, by the comparison, you will be able to judge for yourselves, Gentlemen, whether Knowledge, that is, acquirement, is after all the real principle of the enlargement, or whether that principle is not rather something beyond it.

For instance, let a person, whose experience has hitherto been confined to the calm and unpretending scenery of these islands, whether here or in England, go for the first time into parts, where physical nature puts on her wilder and more awful forms, whether at home or abroad, as into mountainous districts; or let one, who has ever lived in a quiet village, go for the first time to a great metropolis,—then I suppose he will have a sensation, which perhaps he never had before. He has a feeling not in addition or increase of former feelings, but of something different in kind. He will perhaps be borne forward, and find for a time that he has lost his bearings. He has made a certain progress, and he has a consciousness of mental enlargement; he does not stand where he did, he has a new centre, and a range of thoughts to which he was before a stranger.
Again, the view of the heavens, which the telescope opens upon us, if allowed to fill and possess the mind, may almost whirl it round and make it dizzy. It brings in a flood of ideas, and is rightly called an intellectual enlargement, whatever is meant by the term.

And so again, the sight of beasts of prey and other foreign animals, their strangeness, the originality (if I may use the term) of their forms and gestures and habits, and their variety and independence of each other, throw us out of ourselves into another creation, and as if under another Creator, if I may so express the temptation which may come on the mind. We seem to have new faculties, or a new exercise for our faculties, by this addition to our knowledge; like a prisoner, who, having been accustomed to wear manacles or fetters, suddenly finds his arms and legs free.

Hence Physical Science generally, in all its departments, as bringing before us the exuberant riches and resources, yet the orderly course, of the Universe, elevates and excites the student, and at first, I may say, almost takes away his breath, while in time it exercises a tranquillizing influence upon him.

Again, the study of history is said to enlarge and enlighten the mind, and why? because, as I conceive, it gives it a power of judging of passing events and of all events, and a conscious superiority over them, which before it did not possess.

And in like manner, what is called seeing the world, entering into active life, going into society, travelling, gaining acquaintance with the various classes of the community, coming into contact with the principles and modes of thought of various parties, interests, and races, their views, aims, habits, and manners, their religious creeds and forms of worship, gaining experience how various yet how alike men are, how low-minded; how bad, how opposite, yet how confident, in their opinions; all this exerts a perceptible influence upon the mind, which it is impossible to mistake, be it good or be it bad, and is popularly called its enlargement.

And then again, the first time the mind comes across the arguments and speculations of unbelievers, and feels what a novel light they cast upon what he has hitherto accounted sacred; and still more, if it gives into them and embraces them, and throws off as so much prejudice what it has hitherto held, and, as if waking from a dream, begins to realize to its imagination that there is now no such thing as law and the transgression of law, that sin is a phantom, and punishment a bugbear, that it is free to sin, free to enjoy the world and the flesh; and still further, when it does enjoy them, and reflects that it may think and hold just what it will, that "the world is
all before it where to choose, and what system to build up as its own private persuasion, when this torrent of bad thoughts rushes over and inundates it, who will deny that the fruit of the tree of knowledge, or what the mind takes for knowledge, has made it one of the gods, with a sense of expansion and elevation—an intoxication in reality, still, so far as the subjective state of the mind goes, an illumination. Hence the fanaticism of individuals or nations, who suddenly cast off their Maker. Their eyes are opened; and, like the judgment-stricken king in the Tragedy, they see two suns, and a magic universe, out of which they look back upon their former state of faith and innocence with a sort of contempt and indignation, as if they were then but fools, and the dupes of imposture.

On the other hand Religion has its own enlargement, and an enlargement, not of tumult, but of peace. It is often remarked of uneducated persons, who have hitherto thought little of the unseen world, that, on their turning to God, looking into themselves, regulating their hearts, reforming their conduct, and meditating on death and judgment, heaven and hell, they seem to become, in point of intellect, different beings from what they were. Before, they took things as they came, and thought no more of one thing than another. But now every event has a meaning; they have their own estimate of whatever happens to them; they are mindful of times and seasons, and compare the present with the past; and the world, no longer dull, monotonous, unprofitable, and hopeless, is a various and complicated drama, with parts and an object and an awful moral.

Now from these instances, to which many more might be added, it is plain, first, that the communication of knowledge certainly is either a condition or the means of that sense of enlargement or enlightenment, which is at this day considered the end of mental culture: so much cannot be denied; but next, it is equally plain, that such communication is not the whole of the process. The Enlargement consists, not merely in the passive reception into the mind of a number of ideas hitherto unknown to it, but in the mind's energetic and simultaneous action upon and towards and among those new ideas, which are rushing in upon it. It is the action of a formative power, reducing to order and meaning the matter of our acquirements; it is a making the objects of our knowledge subjectively our own, or, to use a familiar word, it is a digestion of what we receive, into the substance of our previous state of thought; and without this no enlargement is said to follow. There is no enlargement, unless there be a comparison of ideas one with another, as they come before the mind, and a systematizing of them. We feel our minds to be growing and expanding then, when we not only learn, but refer what we learn to what we know already. It is not a mere addition to our know-
ledge, which is illumination; but the locomotion, the
movement onwards, of that moral centre, to which
both what we know, and what we are learning, the
accumulating mass of our acquirements, gravitate.
And therefore a truly great intellect, and recognised
to be such by the common opinion of mankind, such
as the intellect of Aristotle, or of St. Thomas, or of
Newton, or of Goethe, (I purposely take instances
within and without the Catholic pale, when I would
speak of the intellect as such), is one which takes a
connected view of old and new, past and present, far
and near, and which has an insight into the influence
of all these one on another; without which there is no
whole, and no centre. It possesses the knowledge,
not only of things, but also of their mutual and
true relations; knowledge, not merely considered as
acquirement, but as philosophy.

Accordingly, when this analytical, distributive,
harmonising process is away, the mind experiences
no enlargement, and is not reckoned as enlightened
or comprehensive, whatever it may add to its know-
ledge. For instance, a great memory, as I have
already said, does not make a philosopher, any more
than a dictionary can be called a grammar. There
are men who embrace in their minds a vast multi-
tude of ideas, but with little sensibility about their
real relations towards each other. These may be
antiquarians, annalists, naturalists; they may be
learned in the law; they may be versed in statistics;
they are most useful in their own place; I should
shrink from speaking disrespectfully of them: still,
there is nothing in such attainments to guarantee
the absence of narrowness of mind. If they are
nothing more than well read men, or men of informa-
tion, they have not what specially deserves the name
of culture of mind, or fulfils the type of Liberal
Education.

In like manner, we sometimes fall in with persons
who have seen much of the world, and of the men
who, in their day, have played a conspicuous part in
it, but who generalize nothing, and have no observa-
tion, in the true sense of the word. They abound in
information in detail, curious and entertaining,
about men and things; and, having lived under the
influence of no very clear or settled principles, reli-
gious or political, they speak of every one and every
thing, only as so many phenomena, which are com-
plete in themselves, and lead to nothing, not discus-
sing them, or teaching any truth, or instructing the
hearer, but simply talking. No one would say, that
these persons, well informed as they are, had attained
to any great culture of intellect or to philosophy.

The case is the same, still more strikingly, where
the persons in question are beyond dispute men of
inferior powers and deficient education. Perhaps
they have been much in foreign countries, and they
receive, in a passive, obtuse, unfruitful way, the
various facts which are forced upon them there.
Seafaring men, for example, range from one end of the earth to the other; but the multiplicity of external objects, which they have encountered, forms no symmetrical and consistent picture upon their imagination; they see the tapestry of human life, as it were, on the wrong side, and it tells no story. They sleep, and they rise up, and they find themselves, now in Europe, now in Asia; they see visions of great cities and wild regions; they are in the marts of commerce, or amid the islands of the South; they gaze on Pompey's Pillar, or on the Andes; and nothing, which meets them, carries them forward or backward, to any idea beyond itself. Nothing has a drift or relation; nothing has a history or a promise. Everything stands by itself, and comes and goes in its turn, like the shifting scenes of a show, which leave the spectator where he was. Perhaps you are near him on a particular occasion, and expect him to be shocked or perplexed at something which occurs; but one thing is much the same to him as another, or, if he is perplexed, it is as not knowing what to say, whether it is right to admire, or to ridicule, or to disapprove, while conscious that some expression of opinion is expected from him; for in fact he has no standard of judgment at all, and no landmarks to guide him, to a conclusion. Such, is mere acquisition, and, I repeat, no one would dream of calling it philosophy.

Instances, such as these, confirm, by the contrast, the conclusion we have already drawn from those which preceded them. That only is true enlargement of mind, which is the power of viewing many things at once, as one whole, of referring them severally to their true place in the universal system, of understanding their respective values, and determining their mutual dependence. Thus is that form of Universal Knowledge, of which I have on a former occasion spoken, set up in the individual intellect, and constitutes its perfection. Possessed of this real illumination, the mind never views any part of the extended subject-matter of Knowledge, without recollecting that it is but a part, or without the associations which spring from this recollection. It makes every thing in some sort lead to every thing else; it would communicate the image of the whole to every separate portion, till the whole becomes in imagination like a spirit, every where pervading and penetrating its component parts, and giving them one definite meaning. Just as our bodily organs, when mentioned, recall their function in the body, as the word "creation" suggests the creator, and "subjects" a sovereign, so, in the mind of the Philosopher, as we are abstractedly conceiving of him, the elements of the physical and moral world, sciences, arts, pursuits, ranks, offices, events, opinions, individualities, are all viewed as one with correlative functions, and as gradually by successive combinations converging, one and all, to the true centre.
Philosophy and mental acquirements.

To have even a portion of this illuminative reason and true philosophy, is the highest state to which nature can aspire, in the way of intellect; it puts the mind above the influences of chance and necessity, above anxiety, suspense, tumult, and superstition, which are the portion of the many. Men, whose minds are possessed with some one object, take exaggerated views of its importance, are feverish in the pursuit of it, make it the measure of things which are utterly foreign to it, and are startled and despond, if it happens to fail them. They are ever in alarm or in transport. Those on the other hand who have no object or principle whatever to hold by, lose their way, every step they take. They are thrown out and do not know what to think or say, at every fresh juncture; they have no view of persons, or occurrences, or facts, which come suddenly upon them, and they hang upon the opinion of others, for want of internal resources. But the intellect, which has been disciplined to the perfection of its powers, which knows, and thinks while it knows, which has learned to leaven the dense mass of facts and events with the elastic force of reason, such an intellect cannot be partial, cannot be exclusive, cannot be impetuous, cannot be at a loss, cannot but be patient, collected, and majestically calm, because it discerns the end in every beginning, the origin in every end, the law in every interruption, the limit in each delay; because it ever knows where it stands, and how its path lies from one point to another. It is the τετράγωνος of the Peripatetic, and has the "nil admirari" of the Stoic. There are men, who, when in difficulties, originate at the moment vast ideas or dazzling projects; who, under the influence of excitement, are able to cast a light, almost as if from inspiration, on a subject or course of action which comes before them; who have a sudden presence of mind equal to any emergency, rising with the occasion, and an undaunted heroic bearing, and an energy and keenness, which is but made intense by opposition. This is genius, this is heroism; it is the exhibition of a natural gift, which no culture can teach, at which no Institution can aim; here, on the contrary, we are concerned, not with mere nature, but with training and teaching. That perfection of the Intellect, which is the result of Education, and its beau ideal, to be imparted to individuals in their respective measures, is the clear, calm, accurate vision and comprehension of all things, as far as the finite-mind can embrace them, each in its place, and with its own characteristics upon it. It is almost prophetic from its knowledge of history; it is almost heart-searching from its knowledge of human nature; it has almost supernatural charity from its freedom from littleness and prejudice; it has almost the repose of faith, because nothing can startle it; it has
almost the beauty and harmony of heavenly contemplation, so intimate is it with the eternal order of things and the music of the spheres.

And now I have said more than enough, as I conceive, in confusion of the notion, that the true and adequate end of intellectual training and of a University is Acquaintance; rather, it is Thought or Reason exercised upon Knowledge, or what may be called Philosophy. Henceforth, then, I shall take so much for granted; and I shall apply it, without any hesitation, to the exposure of various mistakes which at the present day, from ignorance or forgetfulness, beset the subject of University Education.

I say then, if we would improve the intellect, first of all, we must ascend: we cannot gain real knowledge on a level; we must generalize, we must reduce to method, we must have a grasp of principles, and group and shape our acquisitions by them. It matters not whether our field of operation be wide or limited; in every case, to command it, is to mount above it. Who has not felt the irritation of mind and impatience created by a deep, rich country, visited for the first time, with winding lanes, and high hedges, and green steeps, and tangled woods, and every thing smiling, but in a maze? The same feeling comes upon us in a strange city, when we have no map of its streets. Hence you hear of practised travellers, when they first come into a place, mounting some high hill or church tower, by way of reconnoitring its neighbourhood. In like manner, you must be above your knowledge, Gentlemen, not under it, or it will oppress you; and the more you have of it, the greater will be the load. The learning of a Salmasius or a Burman, unless you are its master, will be your tyrant. "Imperat aut servit"; if you can wield it with a strong arm, it is a great weapon; otherwise,

Via consili exepes
Mole ruat sua.

You will be overwhelmed, like Tarchia, by the heavy wealth which you have exacted from tributary generations.

Instances abound; there are authors, who are as pointless as they are inexhaustible, in their literary resources. They measure knowledge by bulk, as it lies in the rude block, without symmetry, without design. How many commentators are there on the Classics, how many on Holy Scripture, from whom we rise up, wondering at the learning which has passed before us, and wondering why it passed! How many writers are there of Ecclesiastical History, such as Mosheim or Du Pin, who, breaking up their subject into details, destroy its life, and defraud us of the whole by their anxiety about the parts! The Sermons, again, of Protestant Divines in the seventeenth century, how often are they mere repertoires of miscellaneous and officious learning! Take
those of Jeremy Taylor, for instance, and what an array of quotations, anecdotes, similes, and good sayings, strung upon how weak a thread of thought! Turn, for example, to his “House of Feasting”; which sets about proving nothing short of this, that “plenty and pleasures of the world are not proper instruments of felicity”, and that “intemperance is its enemy”. One might have thought it difficult either to dispute or to defend so plain a proposition; but Taylor contrives to expend upon it twenty closely printed pages, not of theology or metaphysics, but of practical exhortation. After quoting Seneca upon the spare diet of Epicurus and Metrodorus, and a Greek poet, he demonstrates that plenty and pleasure are not natural or suitable to us, by the help of Horace, Epicurus, Seneca, Maximus Tyrius, Socrates, Juvenal, Lucian, and two or three authors besides. Next he maintains that intemperance is the enemy of felicity; and for this purpose he appeals to St. Austin, Juvenal many times, Persius, Menander, Xenophon, Euripides, Plutarch, Horace, Pliny, Socrates, St. Chrysostom, Epicurus, Timotheus, Apuleius, Aristophanes, Diogenes, Plotinus, Porphyry, Prudentius, Clement of Alexandria, Homer, Plato, Pythagoras, Jamblichus, Alcæus, and Theophrastus. Having taken these means to settle the point, he proceeds to the important practical task of “describing the measures of our eating and drinking”, between “intemperance” and “scruples”. I am almost ashamed to trespass on your indulgence, Gentlemen, with a fresh catalogue of names; yet I should not do justice to the marvellous availableness of this writer's erudition for enforcing truisms and proving proverbs, unless I told you that to this new subject he devotes near a dozen pages more, using for his purpose, not any common-sense principles or clear broad rules, but Juvenal, St. Chrysostom, Antidamus, (? Terence, St. Ambrose, Martial, Dio, Seneca, Homer, Aristotle, Horace, Boethius, and others, leaving the subject pretty much as he found it.

Such is learning, when used, not as a means, but as an end, less dignified even than the “sonitus spinarum ardentium sub olla”, of Ecclesiastes, “the crackling of thorns under a pot”, for they at least make the water boil, but nothing comes of pedantry. How could divines of a school such as this, ever hope to emerge from words into things, or give birth to any religious doctrine, which savoured of philosophy or moral earnestness? Is it wonderful that they are neither consistent in their teaching, nor fair in their controversy, considering that they have read so much more than they have reflected? Is it wonderful that they can neither state what their adversaries really hold, nor know well what they hold themselves, when they have so little sense of what may be called the structure of knowledge, how one proposition is self-evident and another requires
proof, how this idea grows out of that, and is nearer to it than to others out of which it does not grow, and how to say a and b is, as even the poor child saw clearly, the direct road to c? This, I conceive, to be the true explanation, as far as the intellect has been in fault, of that psychological wonder, which Anglicanism has ever presented, of divines, able, erudite, grave, and respectable, content to be suspended between a premiss and its conclusion, describing three-fourths of a circle and refusing to finish it, deliberately commenting on verses and words, yet blind to the teaching of the chapter. It is the consequence of reading for reading's sake. It is acquirement without philosophy.

Do not suppose, Gentlemen, that I am wantonly going out of my way for the poor satisfaction of exposing a weakness of Protestantism; I allude to it merely as affording an illustration, more apposite than is elsewhere to be found, of the intellectual character of mere acquisition. Catholics also may read without thinking, but it is impossible they should similarly expose themselves in religion, safe, as they are, from the excesses of private judgment. However, in their case equally as with Protestants, it holds good, that that knowledge of theirs is unworthy of the name, which they have not thought through, and thought out. Otherwise, they are only possessed by it, not possessed of it; nay, in matter of fact they are often even carried away by it, without any volition of their own. Thus I may charitably account for the various extravagancies of the Protestant author I have been quoting. Recollect, the Memory can tyrannize, as well as the Imagination. Derangement, I believe, has been considered as a loss of control over the sequence of ideas. The mind, once set in motion, is henceforth deprived of the power of initiation, and becomes the victim of a train of associations, one thought suggesting another, in the way of cause and effect, as if by a mechanical process, or some physical necessity. No one, who has had experience of men of studious habits, but must recognize the existence of a parallel phenomenon in the case of those who have over-stimulated the Memory. In such persons Reason acts as feebly and as impotently as in the madman; once fairly started on any subject whatever, they have no power of self-control; they passively endure the succession of impulses which are evolved out of the original excitement; they are passed on from one idea to another, and go steadily forward, plodding along one line of thought in spite of the amolest concessions of the hearer, or wandering from it in endless digression in spite of his remonstrances. Now, if, as is very certain, no one would envy the madman the glow and originality of his conceptions, why must we extol the cultivation of that intellect, which is the prey, not indeed of barren fancies, but of barren facts, of random intrusions from without, though
not of morbid imaginations within? And in thus speaking, I am not denying that a strong and ready memory is in itself a real treasure; I am not disparaging a well-stored mind, though it be nothing beyond, so that it be sober, any more than I would despise a bookseller’s shop—it is of great value to others, even when not to the owner. Nor am I banishing, far from it, the possessors of deep and multifarious learning from my ideal University; they adorn it in the eyes of men; I do but say that they constitute no type of the results at which it aims; that it is no great gain to the intellect to have enlarged the memory, at the expense of faculties which are indisputably higher.

Nor indeed am I supposing that there is any great danger, at least in this day, of over-education; the danger is on the other side. I will tell you, Gentlemen, what has been the practical error of the last twenty years, not to load the memory of the student with a mass of undigested knowledge, but to attempt so much that nothing has been really effectually taught to so many things that nothing has properly been learned at all. It has been the error of distracting and enfeebling the mind by an inmeaning profusion of subjects; of implying that a smattering in a dozen branches of study was not shallowness, which it really is, but enlargement; of considering an acquaintance with the learned names of things and persons, and the possession of clever duodecimos, and attendance on eloquent lecturers, and membership

with scientific institutions, and the sight of the experiments of a platform and the specimens of a museum, that all this was not dissipation of mind, but progress. All things are to be learned at once, not first one thing, then another, not one well, but many badly. Learning is to be without exertion, without attention, without toil; without grounding, without advance, without finishing. There is to be nothing individual in it; and thus forsooth is the wonder of the age. What the steam engine does with matter, the printing press is to do with mind; it is to act mechanically, and the population is to be passively, almost unconsciously enlightened, by the mere multiplication and dissemination of volumes. Whether it be the school boy, or the school girl, or the youth at college, or the mechanic in the town, or the politician in the senate, all have been the victims in one way or other of this most preposterous and pernicious of delusions. Wise men have lifted up their voice in vain; and at length, lest their own institutions should be outshone and should disappear in the folly of the hour, they have been obliged, as far as was conscientiously possible, to humour a spirit which they could not withstand, and make temporizing concessions at which they could not but inwardly smile.

Let us listen to one of the prophets of this fantastic doctrine, not in order to refute his sentiments, but to justify the foregoing account of them. “In looking at our age”, says Dr. Channing in one of his works, “I am
struck inwardly with one commanding characteristic, and that is, the tendency in all its movements to expansion, to diffusion, to universality. This tendency is directly opposed to the spirit of exclusiveness, restriction, narrowness, monopoly, which has prevailed in past ages...... All goods, advantages, helps, are more open to all.....once we heard of the few, now of the many; once of the prerogatives of a part, now of the rights of all..... The grand idea of Humanity, of the importance of man as man, is spreading silently but surely...... If we look at the various movements of our age, we shall see in them this tendency to universality and diffusion. Look at science and literature. Where is science now? Locked up in a few Colleges, or Royal Societies, or inaccessible volumes? are its experiments mysteries for a few privileged eyes? are its portals guarded by a dark phraseology, which to the multitude is a foreign tongue? No; Science has now left her retreats, her shades, her selected company of votaries, and with familiar tone begun the work of instructing the race. Through the Press, discoveries and theories, once the monopoly of philosophers, have become the property of the multitude. Its professors, heard not long ago in the University or some narrow School, now speak in the Mechanics' Institute...... Science, once the greatest of distinctions, is becoming popular. A lady gives us conversations on chemistry, revealing to the minds of our youth vast laws of the universe, which, fifty years ago, had not dawned on the greatest minds. The school books of our children contain grand views of the Creation. There are parts of our country in which lyceums spring up in almost every village, for the purpose of mutual aid to the study of natural science. The characteristic of our age, then, is not the improvement of science, so much as its extension to all men......

"What is true of science, is still more true of literature. Books are now placed within the reach of all. Works, once too costly except for the opulent, are now to be found on the labourer's shelf. Genius sends her light into cottages. The great names of literature are become household words among the crowd. Every party, religious or political, scatters its sheets on all the winds......... Men grow tired at length even of amusements. Works of fiction cease to interest them, and they turn from novels to books, which, having their origin in deep principles of our nature, retain their hold of the human mind for ages.........

"The remarks now made on literature, might be extended to the fine arts. In these too we see the tendency to universality. It is said that the spirit of the great artists has died out; but the taste for their works is spreading. By the improvements of engraving, or the invention of casts, the genius of the great masters is going abroad. Their conceptions are no longer pent up in galleries, open to but few,
but must be in our homes, and are the household pleasures of millions.

"Education is becoming the work of nations. Even in the despotist governments of Europe, schools are open for every child without distinction; and not only the elements of reading and writing, but music and drawing, are taught, and a foundation is laid for future progress in history, geography, and physical science. The greatest minds are at work on popular education."

Now, in calling your attention, Gentlemen, to sentiments such as these, I must guard against any possible misconception of my meaning. Let me frankly declare then, that I have no fear at all of the education of the people: the more education they have, the better, so that it is really education. Next, as to the cheap publication of scientific and literary works, which is now in vogue, I consider it a great advantage, convenience, and gain; that is, to those to whom education has given a capacity for using them. Further, I consider such innocent recreations, as science and literature are able to furnish, will be a very fit occupation of the thoughts and the leisure of young persons, and may be made the means of keeping them from bad employments and bad companions. Moreover, as to that superficial acquaintance with chemistry and geology and astronomy and political economy and modern history and biography and

*Vid. Knight’s Half Hours, 1850. However, the author writes, or attempts to write, better in his Self-culture.

other branches of knowledge, which periodical literature and occasional lectures and scientific institutions diffuse through the community, I think it a graceful accomplishment, and a suitable, nay in this day a necessary accomplishment, in the case of educated men. Nor, lastly, am I disparaging or discouraging the thorough acquisition of any one of these studies, or denying that, as far as it goes, such thorough acquisition is a real education of the mind. All I say is, call things by their right names, and do not confuse together ideas which are essentially different. A thorough knowledge of one science and a superficial acquaintance with many, are not the same thing; a smattering of a hundred things or a memory for detail, is not a philosophical or comprehensive view. Recreations are not education; accomplishments are not education. Do not say, the people must be educated, when, after all, you only mean, amused, refreshed, soothed, put into good spirits and good humour, or kept from vicious excesses. I do not say that such amusements, such occupations of mind, are not a great gain; but they are not education. You may as well call drawing and fencing education, as a knowledge of botany or conchology. Stuffing birds or playing stringed instruments is an elegant pastime, and a resource to the idle, but they are not education; they do not form or cultivate the intellect. Jeremy Taylor could quote Plutarch and Plotinus and Pythagoras, yet
they could not keep him from veering about in religion, till no one can tell to this day what he held and what he did not; nor shall we be kept steady in any truths or principles whatever, merely by having seen a Red Indian or Caffir, or having measured a paleotherion. Education is a high word; it is nothing less than a formation of the mind; it is the preparation for knowledge, and it is the imparting of knowledge in proportion to that preparation. We require intellectual eyes to know withal, as bodily eyes for sight. We need both objects and organs intellectual; we cannot gain them without setting about it; we cannot gain them in our sleep, or by haphazard. The best telescope does not dispense with eyes; the printing press or the lecture room will assist us greatly, but we must be true to ourselves, we must be parties in the work. A University is, according to the usual designation, an Alma Mater, knowing her children one by one, not a foundry, or a mint, or a treadmill.

I protest to you, Gentlemen, that if I had to choose between a so-called University, which dispensed with residence and tutorial superintendence, and gave its degrees to any person who passed an examination in a wide range of subjects, and a University which had no professors or examinations at all, but merely brought a number of young men together for three or four years and then sent them away, as the University of Oxford is said to have done some sixty years since, if

I were asked which of these two methods was the better discipline of the intellect,—mind I do not say which is morally the better, for it is plain that compulsory study must be a good and idleness an intolerable mischief,—but if I must determine which of the two courses was the more successful in training, moulding, enlarging the mind, which sent out men the more fitted for their secular duties, which produced better public men, men of the world, men whose names would descend to posterity, I have no hesitation in giving the preference to that University which did nothing, over that which exacted of its members an acquaintance with every science under the sun. And, paradox as this may seem, still if results be the test of systems, the influence of the public schools and colleges of England, in the course of the last century, at least will bear out one side of the contrast, as I have drawn it. What would come, on the other hand, of the ideal systems of education which fascinate the imagination of this age, could they ever take effect, and whether they would not produce a generation languid, frivolous, resourceless, and imbecile, remains to be seen; but so far is certain, that the Universities and scholastic establishments, to which I refer, and which did little more than bring together first boys and then youths in large numbers, these institutions, with miserable deformities on the side of morals, with a virtual unbelief, and a hollow profession of Christianity, and a heathen code of
ethics,—God forbid I should defend in the concrete what I am only speaking of in that particular point of view which falls under my present subject,—I say, at least they can boast of a succession of heroes and statesmen, of literary men and philosophers, of men conspicuous for great natural virtues, for habits of business, for knowledge of life, for practical judgment, for cultivated tastes, for accomplishments, who have made England what it is,—able to subdue the earth, able to tyrannize over Catholics.

How is this to be explained? I suppose as follows:—When a multitude of young persons, keen, open-hearted, sympathetic, and observant, as young persons are, come together and freely mix with each other, they are sure to learn one from another, even if there be no one to teach them; the conversation of all is a series of lectures to each, and they gain for themselves new ideas and views, fresh matter of thought, and distinct principles for judging and acting, day by day. An infant has to learn the meaning of the information which its senses convey to it, and this seems to be its employment. It fancies all that the eye presents to it to be close to it, till it actually learns the contrary, and thus by practice does it ascertain the relations and uses of those first elements of knowledge which are necessary for its animal existence. A parallel teaching is necessary for our social being, and it is secured by a large school or a college; and this effect may be fairly called in its own department an enlargement of mind. It is seeing the world on a small field with little trouble; for the pupils or students come from very different places, and with widely different notions, and there is much to generalize, much to adjust, much to eliminate, there are inter-relations to be defined, and conventional rules to be established, in the process, by which the whole assemblage is moulded together, and gains one tone and one character. Let it be clearly understood, I repeat it, that I am not taking into account moral or religious considerations; I am not dreaming of anything especially exalted, anything truly Christian, anything of supernatural excellence, as animating that youthful community; but still they will constitute a whole, they will embody a specific idea, they will represent a doctrine, they will administer a code of conduct, and they will furnish principles of thought and action. They will give birth to a living teaching, which in course of time will take the shape of a self-perpetuating tradition, or a genius loci, as it is sometimes called; which haunts the home where it has been born, and which inbues and forms, more or less, and one by one, every individual who is successively brought under its shadow. Thus it is, that, independent of direct instruction on the part of Superiors, there is a sort of self-education in the academic institutions of Protestant England; a characteristic tone of thought, a recognized standard of judgment is found in them,
which, as developed in the individual who is submitted to it, becomes a twofold source of strength to him, both from the distinct stamp it impresses on his mind, and from the bond of union which it creates between him and others. It effects, which are shared by the authorities of the place, for they themselves have been educated in it, and at all times are exposed to the influence of its moral atmosphere. Here then is a real teaching, whatever be its standards and principles, true or false; and it at least tends towards cultivation of the intellect; it at least recognizes that knowledge is something more than a sort of passive reception of scraps and details; it is a something, and it does a something, which never will issue from the most strenuous efforts of a set of teachers, with no mutual sympathies and no inter-communion, of a set of examiners with no opinions they dare profess, and with no common principles, who are teaching or questioning a set of youths who do not know them, and do not know each other, on a large set of subjects, different in kind, and connected by no wide philosophy, three times a week, or three times a year, or once in three years, in chill lecture rooms or on a pompous anniversary. Were I not afraid of offending by a lightness of style for which this is not the place, I would remind you, Gentlemen, of the parallel which such a University affords to the mistake of the English Ambassador at a foreign court, who, wishing to recommend to the corps diplomatique a dish peculiar to his country, by

the omission of the principle of unity, simply deprived it of its consistency and form, and of its national pretensions.

Nay, self-education in any shape, in the most restricted sense, is preferable to a system of teaching, which, professing so much, really does so little for the mind. Shut your College gates against the votary of knowledge, throw him back upon the searchings and the struggles of his own mind; he will gain by being spared an entrance into your Babel. Few indeed there are, who can dispense with the stimulus and support of instructors; or will do any thing at all, if left to themselves. And fewer still (though such great minds are to be found), who will not, from such unassisted efforts, contract a self-reliance and a self-esteem, which are not only moral evils, but serious hindrances to the attainment of truth. And next to none perhaps, or none, who will not be reminded from time to time of the disadvantage under which they lie, by their imperfect grounding, by the breaks, deficiencies, and irregularities of their knowledge, by the eccentricity of opinion and the confusion of principle which they exhibit. They will be too often ignorant of what every one knows and takes for granted, of that multitude of small truths, which fall upon the mind like dust, impalpable and ever accumulating; they may be unable to converse, they may argue perversely, they may pride themselves on their worst paradoxes or their grossest truisms,
they may be full of their own mode of viewing things, unwilling to be put out of their way, slow to enter into the minds of others;—but, with these and whatever other liabilities upon their heads, they are likely to have more thought, more mind, more philosophy, more true enlargement, than those earnest but ill-used persons, who are forced to load their minds with a score of subjects against an examination, who have too much in their hands to indulge themselves in thinking or investigation, who devour premises and conclusion together with indiscriminate grediness, who hold whole sciences on faith, and commit demonstrations to memory, and who too often, as might be expected, when their period of education is passed, throw up all they have learned in disgust, having gained nothing really by their anxious labours, except perhaps the habit of application.

Yet such is the better specimen of the fruit of that ambitious system, which has of late years been making way among us: but its result on ordinary minds, and on the common run of students, is less satisfactory still; they leave their place of education simply dissipated and relaxed by the multiplicity of subjects, which they have never really mastered, and so shallow as not even to know their shallowness. How much better, I say, is it for the active and thoughtful intellect, where such is to be found, to eschew the College and the University altogether, than to submit to a drudgery so ignoble, a mockery

so contumacious! How much more profitable for the independent mind, after the mere rudiments of education, to range through a library at random, taking down books as they meet him, and pursuing the trains of thought which his mother wit suggests! How much healthier to wander into the fields, and there with the exiled Prince to find "tongues in the trees, books in the running brooks"! How much more genuine an education is that of the poor boy 'in the Poem'—a Poem, whether in conception or in execution, one of the most touching in our language—who, not in the wide world, but ranging day by day around his widowed mother's home, "a dexterous gleaner" in a narrow field, and with only such slender outfit

"as the village school and books a few
Supplied",

contrived from the beach, and the quay, and the fisher's boat, and the inn's fireside, and the tradesman's shop, and the shepherd's walk, and the smuggler's hut, and the mossy moor, and the screaming gulls; and the restless waves, to fashion for himself a philosophy and a poetry of his own!

* Crabbe's Tales of the Hall. This Poem, let me say, I read on its first publication, above thirty years ago, with extreme delight, and have never lost my love of it; and, on taking it up lately, found I was even more touched by it than heretofore. A work, which can please in youth and age, seems to fulfil (in logical language) the accidental definition of a Classic.
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But in a large subject, I am exceeding my necessary limits. Gentlemen, I must conclude abruptly; and postpone any summing up of my argument, should it be necessary, to another day.

DISCOURSE VIII.

PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE VIEWED IN RELATION TO PROFESSIONAL.

I have been insisting, in my two preceding Discourses, first, on the cultivation of the intellect as an end which may reasonably be pursued for its own sake; and next, on the nature of that cultivation, or what that cultivation consists in. Truth of whatever kind is the proper object of the intellect; its cultivation then lies in fitting it to apprehend and contemplate truth. Now the intellect in its present state, with exceptions which need not here be specified, does not discern truth intuitively, or as a whole. We know, not by a direct and simple vision, not at a glance, but, as it were, by piecemeal and accumulation, by a mental process, by going round an object, by the comparison, the combination, the mutual correction, the continual adaptation, of many partial notions, by the joint application and concentration upon it of many faculties and exercises of mind. Such a union and concert of the intellectual powers,
such an enlargement and development, such a comprehensiveness, is necessarily a matter of training. And again, such a training is a matter of rule; it is not mere application, however exemplary, which introduces the mind to truth, nor the reading many books, nor the getting up many subjects, nor the witnessing many experiments, nor the attending many lectures. All this is short of enough; a man may have done it all, yet be lingering in the vestibule of knowledge—he may not realize what his mouth utters; he may not see with his mental eye what confronts him; he may have no grasp of things as they are; or at least he may have no power at all of advancing one step forward of himself, in consequence of what he has already acquired, no power of discriminating between truth and falsehood, of sifting out the grains of truth from the mass, of arranging things according to their real value, and, if I may use the phrase, of building up ideas. Such a power is the result of a scientific formation of mind; it is an acquired faculty of judgment, of clear-sightedness, of sagacity, of wisdom, of philosophical reach of mind, and of intellectual self-possession and repose, qualities which do not come of mere acquirement. The bodily eye, the organ for apprehending material objects, is provided by nature; the eye of the mind, of which the object is truth, is the work of discipline and habit.

This process of training, by which the intellect, instead of being formed or sacrificed to some parti-

cular or accidental purpose, some specific trade or profession or study or science, is disciplined for its own sake, for the perception of its own proper object, and for its own highest culture, is called Liberal Education; and though there is no one in whom it is carried as far as is conceivable, or whose intellect would be a pattern of what intellects should be made, yet there is scarcely any one but may gain an idea of what real training is, and at least look towards it, and make its true scope and result, and not something else, his standard of excellence, and numbers there are who may submit themselves to it, and realize it in themselves in good measure. And to set forth the right standard, and to train according to it, and to help forward all students towards it according to their various capacities, this I conceive to be the business of a University.

Now this is what some great men are very slow to allow; they insist that Education should be confined to some particular and narrow end, and should issue in some definite work, which can be weighed and measured. They argue as if every thing, as well as every person, had its price; and that where there has been a great outlay, they have a right to expect a return in kind. This they call making Education and Instruction "useful," and "Utility" becomes their watchword. With a fundamental principle of this nature, they very naturally go on to ask, what there is to show for the expense of a University;
what is the real worth in the market, of the article called "a Liberal Education", on the supposition that it does not teach us definitely how to advance our manufactures, or to improve our lands, or to better our civil economy; or again, if it does not at once make this man a lawyer, a surgeon, or at least if it does not lead to discoveries in chemistry, astronomy, geology, magnetism, and science of every kind.

These views are sanctioned by the authority of no less a name than that of Locke. He condemns the ordinary subjects in which boys are instructed at school, on the ground that they are not needed by them in after life. "Tis matter of astonishment", he says in his work on Education, "that men of quality and parts should suffer themselves to be so far misled by custom and implicit faith. Reason, if consulted with, would advise, that their children's time should be spent in acquiring what might be useful to them, when they come to be men, rather than that their heads should be stuffed with a deal of trash: a great part whereof they usually never do (t is certain they never need to) think on again as long as they live; and so much of it as does stick by them, they are only the worse for".

And so again, speaking of verse-making, he says: "I know not what reason a father can have to wish his son a poet, who does not desire him to bid defiance to all other callings and business; which is not yet the worst of the case; for, if he proves a successful rhymers, and gets once the reputation of a wit, I desire it to be considered, what company and places he is likely to spend his time in, nay and estate too; for it is very seldom seen, that any one discovers mines of gold and silver in Parnassus. Tis a pleasant air, but a barren soil."

In another passage he distinctly limits utility in education to its bearing on the future profession or trade of the pupil, that is, he scorns the idea of any education of the intellect, as such. "Can there be any thing more ridiculous", he asks, "than that a father should waste his own money, and his son's time, in setting him to learn the Roman language, when, at the same time, he designs him for a trade, wherein he, having no use of Latin, fails not to forget that little which he brought from school, and which he is to one of the abbeys for the ill-usage it procured him?" Could it be believed, unless we have every where amongst us examples of it, that a child should be forced to learn the rudiments of a language, which he is never to use in the course of life that he is designed to, and neglect all the while the writing a good hand, and casting accounts, which are of great advantage in all conditions of life, and to most trades indispensably necessary? Nothing of course can be more absurd than to neglect in education; those matters which are necessary for a boy's future calling; but the tone of Locke's marks
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evidently implies more than this, and is condemnatory of any teaching which tends to the general cultivation of the mind, as distinct from the professional.

The question, started in these passages of Locke, has been keenly debated in the present age, and formed one main subject of the controversy, to which I referred in the Introduction to the present Discourses, as having been sustained in the first decade of this century by a celebrated Northern Review on the one hand, and defenders of the University of Oxford on the other. Hardly had the authorities of that seat of learning, waking from their long neglect, set on foot a plan for the education of the youth committed to them, than the representatives of science and literature in that city, which has sometimes been called the Northern Athens, reproached with their gravest arguments and their most brilliant satire, against the direction and shape which the reform was taking. The study of the Classics had been made the basis of the Oxford education, and the Edinburgh Reviewers protested that no good could come of a system which was not based upon the principle of Utility.

"Classical Literature", they said, "is the great object at Oxford. Many minds, so employed, have produced many works and much fame in that department; but if all liberal arts and sciences, useful to human life, had been taught there, if some had dedicated themselves to chemistry, some to mathe.

PHILOSOPHY AND PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE.

maties, some to experimental philosophy, and if every attainment had been honoured in the mixt ratio of its difficulty and utility, the system of such a University would have been much more valuable, but the splendour of its name something less."

In this passage something more is laid down than the principle of Utility as the basis of University Education. You will here observe, Gentlemen, the immediate and unavoidable consequence of that principle, viz., that there must be a number of unconnected and independent educations going on at the same time in the same place, some pupils being "dedicated" to one study, others to another. And again, from this will naturally follow a third principle, viz., that the young men who come for education are not the supreme and real end of a University, but the advancement of science,—that being "useful", which is useful, not to them, but to mankind at large. This is brought into view in the sentences which follow.

"When a University has been doing useless things for a long time, it appears at first degrading to them to be useful. A set of Lectures on Political Economy would be discouraged in Oxford, probably despised, probably not permitted. To discuss the inclusion of commons, and to dwell upon imports and exports, to come so near to common life, would seem to be undignified and contemptible. In the same manner, the Parr or the Bentley of the day would be scandalized, in a University, to be put on a
level with the discoverer of a neutral salt; and yet, what other measure is there of dignity in intellectual labour but usefulness? And what ought the term University to mean, but a place where every science is taught which is liberal, and at the same time useful to mankind? Nothing would so much tend to bring classical literature within proper bounds as a steady and invariable appeal to utility in our appreciation of all human knowledge. Looking always to real utility as our guide, we should see, with equal pleasure, a studious and inquisitive mind, arranging the productions of nature, investigating the qualities of bodies, or mastering the difficulties of the learned languages. We should not care whether he was chemist, naturalist, or scholar, because we know it to be as necessary that matter should be studied and subdued to the use of man, as that taste should be gratified, and imagination inflamed.

These passages occur in the course of the Review of a work on Professional Education by the well-known Mr. Edgeworth; a work which, whatever be its merits, I shall not be wrong in saying carries out the theory of the Reviewers to lengths which they themselves must consider extreme; since he seems to be content with nothing short of the absolute devotion and surrender of a child, on the part of his parents, "as early as possible", to some one profession or pursuit as his destiny, to the exclusion of every other.

Such then is the enunciation, as far as words go, of the theory of Utility in Education. I say, "as far as words go", because I do not profess to understand the writer or writers of the above passages very clearly. They contrast, yet unite, the Useful and the Liberal; for instance, they talk of "all liberal arts and sciences, useful to human life". I conclude from these words, that some liberal sciences are useful to human life, and some are not; how are we to distinguish them? what is meant by "liberal"? We indeed, Gentlemen, have been led to consider, that every science may be cultivated liberally, and again cultivated usefully, yet, that the liberal cultivation is ever simply distinct from the useful cultivation, and cannot be made one with it, any more that a physiologist is a physician, or a physician a physiologist, though the same person may be both. But these Reviewers seem unwilling to give up the word "liberal", in connexion with the education they advocate, yet without distinctly knowing what it means.

Then again, they wish one student of a University to "dedicate" himself to chemistry, and another to "mathematics". Now, if half a dozen systems of education are to go on on the same spot, unity of place is but an accident, and I do not see what is
the use of a University at all. What is the merit of bringing together youths from the four corners of a country, if they are to be kept apart from each other in separate schools and separate in processes of training, according to the destination of each? There is in that case no such thing as a University; it becomes nothing better than a rendezvous of sciences, pretty much what a bazaar is for tradesmen, and a cattle-fair for farmers; and such indeed is just the notion entertained of it by the same Reviewers twenty years later, as I showed you in a preceding Discourse. Well then, if so, the question arises, what does unity of place bestow in compensation for so great an effort, as the formation and the establishment of a central Body, which is to bring young men together from a thousand homes; for the original outlay, for the perpetual expense incurred by both parent and Institution, for the anxious risks to which it exposes the pupil? And this is generally felt, as it well may be; and so it is decided that residence is not necessary for him; that attendance merely for the examinations will suffice; nay, that it may be even better to make the University perambulate, and hold its visitations here and there in turn. And thus we have arrived at a reductio ad absurdum of this theory of Utility, as applied to a University. A common home implies a common education, and a common education implies mental culture as such; without which a University becomes a board, not a body, a government bureau, not a living power, and is only in name the same as that great and noble creation of the Church, which once was found on the banks of the Seine and of the Isis.

All this, I say, seems to be a simple reductio ad absurdum of the peculiar views and reasonings of which the Edinburgh School has been so steady an advocate; but still, I allow, it does not directly answer the question which Locke has raised. It certainly is specious to contend, that nothing is worth pursuing but what is useful; and that life is not long enough to expend upon interesting, or curious, or brilliant trifles. Nay, I will grant it is more than specious, it is true; but, if so, how do I propose directly to meet the objection? Why, Gentlemen, I have met it already, viz., in laying down, that intellectual culture is its own end; for what has its end in itself, has its use in itself also. I say, if a Liberal Education consists in the culture of the intellect, and if that culture be in itself a good, here, without going further, is an answer to Locke's question; for if a healthy body is a good in itself, why is not a healthy intellect? and if a College of Physicians is a useful institution, because it contemplates bodily health, why is not an Academical Body, though it were simply and solely engaged in imparting vigour and beauty and grace to the intellectual portion of our nature? And the Reviewers I am quoting seem to allow this in their better moments,
in a passage which, putting aside the question of its justice in fact, is sound and true in the principles to which it appeals:—

"The present state of classical education", they say, "cultivates the imagination a great deal too much, and other habits of mind a great deal too little, and trains up many young men in a style of elegant imbecility, utterly unworthy of the talents with which nature has endowed them....The matter of fact is, that a classical scholar of twenty-three or twenty-four is a man principally conversant with works of imagination. His feelings are quick, his fancy lively, and his taste good. Talents for speculation and original inquiry he has none, nor has he formed the invaluable habit of pushing things up to their first principles, or of collecting dry and unamusing facts as the materials for reasoning. All the solid and masculine parts of his understanding are left wholly without cultivation; he hates the pain of thinking, and suspects every man whose boldness and originality call upon him to defend his opinions and prove his assertions."

Now, I am not at present concerned with the specific question of classical education; else, I might reasonably question the justice of calling an intellectual discipline, which embraces the study of Aristotle, Thucydides, and Tacitus, which involves Scholarship and Antiquities, imaginative; still so far I readily grant, that the cultivation of the "under-

standing", of a "talent for speculation and original inquiry", and of "the habit of pushing things up to their first principles", is a principal portion of a good or liberal education. If then the Reviewers consider it the characteristic of a useful education, as they seem to do in the foregoing passage, it follows, that what they mean by "useful" is just what I mean by "good" or "liberal": and Locke's question becomes a verbal one. Whether youths are to be taught Latin or verse-making, will depend on the fact, whether these studies tend to mental culture; but, however this is determined, so far is clear, that in that mental culture consists what I have called a liberal or non-professional, and what the Reviewers call a useful education.

This is the obvious answer which may be made to those who urge upon us the claims of Utility in our plans of Education; but I am not going to leave the subject here: I mean to take a wider view of it. Let us take "useful", as Locke takes it, in its proper and popular sense, and then we enter upon a large field of thought, to which I cannot do justice in one Discourse, though to-day's is all the space I can give to it. I say, let us take "useful" to mean, not what is simply good, but what tends to good, or is the instrument of good; and in this sense also, Gentlemen, I will show you how a liberal education is truly and fully a useful, though it be not a professional education. "Good" indeed means one thing, and
"Useful" means another; but I lay it down as a principle, which will save us a great deal of anxiety, that, though the useful is not always good, the good is always useful. Good is not only good, but reproductive of good; this is one of its attributes; nothing is excellent, beautiful, perfect, desirable for its own sake, but it overflows, and spreads the likeness of itself all around itself. Good is prolific; it is not only good to the eye, but to the taste; it not only attracts us, but it communicates itself; it excites first our admiration and love, then our desire and our gratitude, and that, in proportion to its intenseness and fulness in particular instances. A great good will impart great good. If then the intellect is so excellent a portion of us, and its cultivation so excellent, it is not only beautiful, perfect, admirable, and noble in itself, but in a true and high sense it must be useful to the possessor and to all around him; not useful in any low, mechanical, mercantile sense, but as diffusing good, or as a blessing, or a gift, or power, or a treasure, first to the owner, then through him to the world. I say then, if a liberal education be good, it must necessarily be useful too.

You will see what I mean by the parallel of bodily health. Health is a good in itself, though nothing came of it, and is especially worth seeking and cherishing; yet, after all, the blessings which attend its presence are so great, while they are so close to it and redound back upon it and encircle it, that we never think of it except as useful as well as good, and praise and prize it for what it does, as well as for what it is, though at the same time we cannot point out any definite and distinct work or production which it can be said to effect. And so as regards intellectual culture, I am far from denying utility in this large sense as the end of education, when I lay it down that the culture of the intellect is a good in itself and its own end; I do not exclude from the idea of intellectual culture what it cannot but be, from the very nature of things; I only deny that we must be able to point out, before we have any right to call it useful, some art, or business, or profession, or trade, or thing, as resulting from it, and as its real and complete end. The parallel is exact:—As the body may be sacrificed to some manual or other toil, whether moderate or oppressive, so may the intellect be devoted to some specific profession; and I do not call this the culture of the intellect. Again, as some member or organ of the body may be inordinately used and developed, so may memory, or imagination, or the reasoning faculty; and this again is not intellectual culture. On the other hand, as the body may be tended, cherished, and exercised with a simple view to its general health, so may the intellect also be generally exercised in order to its perfect state; and this is its cultivation.

Again, as health ought to precede labour of the body, and as a man in health can do what an
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unhealthy man cannot do, and as of this health the properties are vigorous energy, agility, grateful carriage and action, manual dexterity, and endurance of fatigue, so in like manner general culture of mind is the best aid to professional and scientific study, and educated men can do what illiterate cannot; and he who has learned to think and to reason, and to compare and to discriminate and to analyse, who has refined his taste, and formed his judgment, and sharpened his mental vision, will not indeed at once be a lawyer, or a pleader, or an orator, or a statesman, or a physician, or a good landlord, or a man of business, or a soldier, or an engineer, or a chemist, or a geologist, or an antiquarian, but he will be placed in that state of intellect in which he can take up any one of the sciences or callings I have referred to or any other, with an ease, a grace, a versatility, and a success, to which another is a stranger. In this sense then, and as yet I have said but a very few words on a large subject, mental culture is emphatically useful.

If then I am arguing, and shall argue, against Professional or Scientific knowledge as the sufficient end of a University Education, let me not be supposed, Gentlemen, to be disrespectful towards particular studies, or arts, or vocations, and those who are engaged in them. In saying that Law or Medicine is not the end of a University course, I do not mean to imply that the University does not teach Law or Medicine. What indeed can it teach at all, if it does not teach something particular? It teaches all knowledge by teaching all branches of knowledge, and in no other way. I do but say that there will be this distinction as regards a Professor of Law, or of Medicine, or of Geology, or of Political Economy, in a University and out of it, that out of a University he is in danger of being absorbed and narrowed by his pursuit, and of giving Lectures which are the Lectures of nothing more than a lawyer, physician, geologist, or political economist; whereas in a University he will just know where he and his science stand, he has come to it, as it were, from a height, he has taken a survey of all knowledge, he is kept from extravagance by the very rivalry of other studies, he has gained from them a special illumination and largeness of mind and freedom and self-possession, and he treats his own in consequence with a philosophy and a resource, which belongs not to the study itself, but to his liberal education.

This then is how I should solve the difficulty, for so must I call it, by which Locke and his disciples would frighten us from cultivating the intellect, under the notion that no education is useful which does not teach us some temporal calling, or some mechanical art, or some physical secret. I say that a cultivated intellect, because it is a good in itself, adds a power and a grace to every exercise and occupation which it undertakes. And having thus
opened the subject, I proceed to show you, Gentlemen, how it was actually taken in hand, at the time to which I have alluded, by the combatants on the opposite side. And this I think you will allow me to do at some length, though at first it will lead me into what may seem like a digression.

The assault on the University of Oxford, of which I have been speaking, was met by two men of great name and influence in their day, of very different minds, but united, as by Collegiate ties, so in the clear sighted and philosophical view which they took of the whole subject of Liberal Education. In the heart of Oxford, there is a small plot of ground, hemmed in by public thoroughfares, which has been the possession and the home of one Society for above five hundred years. In the old time of Boniface the Eighth and John the Twenty-second, in the age of Scóras and Occan and Dante, before Wiclif or Huss had kindled those miserable fires which were to be the ruin of souls innumerable down to this day, an unfortunate king of England, Edward the Second, flying from the field of Bannockburn, is said to have made a vow to the Blessed Virgin to found a religious house in her honour, if he got back in safety. Prompted and aided by his Almoner, he decided on placing this house in the city of Alfed; and the Image of our Lady, which is opposite its entrance, is the token of the vow and its fulfilment to this day.

King and almoner have long been in the dust, and strangers have entered into their inheritance, and their creed has been forgotten, and their holy rites disowned; but day by day a memento is still made in the Holy Sacrifice by at least one Catholic Priest, once a member of that College, for the souls of those Catholic benefactors who fed him there for so many years. The visitor, whose curiosity has been excited by its present fame, gazes with disappointment on a collection of buildings, which have with them so few of the circumstances of dignity or wealth. Broad quadrangles, high halls and chambers, ornamented cloisters, stately walks; or unbraggious gardens, a throng of students, ample revenues, or a glorious history, none of these things were the portion of that old Catholic foundation; nothing in short which to the common eye sixty years ago would have given tokens of what it was to be. But it had at that time a spirit working within it, which enabled its inmates to do, amid its seeming insignificance, what no other body in the place could equal; not a very abstruse gift or extraordinary boast, but a rare one, the honest purpose to administer the trust committed to them in such a way as their conscience pointed out as best. So, whereas the Colleges of Oxford are self-electing bodies, the fellows in each perpetually filling up from among themselves the vacancies which occur in their number, the members of this foundation determined, at a time
when, either from evil custom or from ancient statute, such a thing was not known elsewhere, to throw open their fellowships to the competition of all comers, and, in the choice of associates henceforth, to cast to the winds every personal motive and feeling, family connexion, and friendship, and patronage, and political interest, and local claim, and prejudice, and party jealousy, and to elect solely on public and patriotic grounds. Nay, with a remarkable independence of mind, they resolved that even the table of honours, awarded to literary merit by the University, in its new system of examination for degrees, should not fetter their judgment as electors; but that at all risks, and whatever criticism it might cause, and whatever odium they might incur, they would select the men, whoever they were, to be children of their Founder, whom they thought in their consciences to be most likely from their intellectual and moral qualities to please him, if (as they expressed it) he were still upon earth, most likely to do honour to his College, most likely to promote the objects which they believed he had at heart. Such persons did not promise to be the disciples of a low Utilitarianism; and consequently, as their collegiate reform synchronized with that reform of the Academical body, in which they bore a principal part, it was not unnatural, that, when the storm broke upon the University from the North, their Alma Mater, whom they loved, should have found her first defenders within the walls of that small College, which had first put herself into a condition to be her champion.

These defenders, Gentlemen, I have said, were two, of whom the more distinguished was the late Dr. Copleston, then a Fellow of the College, successively its Provost, and Protestant Bishop of Llandaff. In that Society, which owes so much to him, his name lives, and ever will live, for the distinction which his talents bestowed on it, for the academical importance to which he raised it, for the generosity of spirit, the liberality of sentiment, and the kindness of heart, with which he adorned it, and which even those who had least sympathy with some aspects of his mind and character, could not but admire and love. Men come to their meridian at various periods of their lives; the last years of the eminent person I am speaking of were given to duties, which, I am told, have been the means of endearing him to numbers, but which afforded no scope for that peculiar vigour and keenness of mind, which enabled him, when a young man, single-handed, with easy gallantry, to encounter and overthrow the charge of three giants of the North combined against him. I believe I am right in saying, that, in the progress of the controversy, the most scientific, the most critical, and the most witty, of that literary company, all of them now, as he himself, removed from this visible scene, Professor Playfair, Lord Jeffrey, and the
Rev. Sydney Smith, threw together their several efforts into one article of their Review, in order to crush andound to dust the audacious controvertist, who had come out against them in defence of his own Institutions. To have even contended with such men, was a sufficient voucher for his ability, even before we open his pamphlets, and have actual evidence of the good sense, the spirit, the scholarlike taste, and the purity of style, by which they are distinguished. As might be expected, however, under the circumstances, his matter is various and heterogeneous, and his line of argument is discursive; he is not led to analyse his views on Education to their first principles, and in some places he adopts a more secular tone, than, even putting aside questions of religious doctrine, I would willingly use myself. Still it is not perhaps without its advantage to be presented with sentiments, which are in substance the same, under the different exterior which different minds throw around them; it is like meeting with two witnesses, who, each in his own way, depose to the same general representation.

His mode then of answering the objection, that a Liberal Education is not useful, will be found to fall in with that which I have adopted myself. It is indeed that he speaks of Literature, whereas I have spoken of Philosophy; this, however, is immaterial in the question, as it lies before us, for in either case an intellectual culture is advocated, which is desirable for its own sake,—which is the education of the man, not of the lawyer, antiquarian, or chemist,—and which saves him from narrowness, and pedantry, both in society and amid the duties of his profession. Speaking then principally of classical studies, he maintains that the knowledge useful to an individual, and the knowledge useful to a community, are, not only not the same, but are directly contrary to each other; that division of intellectual labour, which in fact the Reviewers advocate, is useful to a community, but is hurtful to the individual member of it; and that the end of direct Liberal Education is the good of the individual, and not that of the community.

"It is sometimes asked," he observes, "with an air of triumph, What is the utility of these studies? and utility is vauntingly pronounced to be the sole standard, by which all systems of education must be tried. If in turn we were to ask what utility is, we should, I believe, have many answers not quite consistent with each other. And the best of them perhaps would only give us other words equally loose and indefinite; such as wiser, better, happier, none of which can serve to unite a knotty question, and all of which lead us into a wider field of doubt and inquiry, than the subject which originally produced them. Before I attempt to show what the utility of classical learning is, in my own sense of the word, let it be permitted me to explain what it is
not; and to take up the inquiry a little further back than writers on this subject commonly go.

"It is an undisputed maxim in Political Economy, that the separation of professions and the division of labour tend to the perfection of every art, to the wealth of nations, to the general comfort and well-being of the community. This principle of division is in some instances pursued so far, as to excite the wonder of people to whose notice it is for the first time pointed out. There is no saying to what extent it may not be carried; and the more the powers of each individual are concentrated in one employment, the greater skill and quickness will be naturally display in performing it. But, while he thus contributes more effectually to the accumulation of national wealth, he becomes himself more and more degraded as a rational being. In proportion as his sphere of action is narrowed, his mental powers and habits become contracted; and he resembles a subordinate part of some powerful machinery, useful in its place, but insignificant and worthless out of it. . . .

"If indeed", he continues, "national wealth were the sole object of national institutions, there can be no doubt but that the method demonstrated by [the great and enlightened Adam] Smith, being the surest means of attaining that end, would be the great leading principle of political philosophy. In his own work it is the great and sole end of his inquiry; and no one can blame him for confining himself to that single consideration. His undertaking required no more, and he has performed his part well. But, in truth, national wealth is not the ultima ratio of human society; and, although we must forbear entering on the boundless inquiry, what is the chief good? yet all reflecting minds will admit that it is not wealth. If it be necessary, as it is beyond all question necessary, that society should be split into divisions and subdivisions, in order that its several duties may be well performed, yet we must be careful not to yield up ourselves wholly and exclusively to the guidance of this system; we must observe what its evils are, and we should modify and restrain it, by bringing into action other principles, which may serve as a check and counterpoise to the main force. . . ."

"There can be no doubt that every art is improved by confining the professor of it to that single study. There are emergencies, which call for his whole mind and faculties to be absorbed in it, which require him to forget every other relation of life, however sacred or natural, except that artificial one in which he is then placed. Times will occur when a surgeon or a general must dismiss the common feelings of human nature, and, in order to do his task well, must look upon himself as engaged in working out one problem, and upon all around him as instruments subservient merely to the acquisition of some one distinct purpose, without regard to their
bearings on any thing besides. But, although the art itself is advanced by this concentration of mind in its service, the individual who is confined to it goes back. The advantage of the community is nearly in an inverse ratio with his own.

"When the emergency is past, society itself requires some other contribution from each individual, besides the particular duties of his profession. And, if no such liberal intercourse be established, it is the common failing of human nature, to be engrossed with petty views and interests, to underrate the importance of all in which we are not concerned, and to carry our partial notions into cases where they are inapplicable, to act, in short, as so many unconnected units, displacing and repelling one another.

"In the cultivation of literature is found that common link, which, among the higher and middling departments of life, unites the jarring sects and subdivisions into one interest, which supplies common topics, and kindles common feelings, unmixed with those narrow prejudices, with which all professions are more or less infected. The knowledge, too, which is thus acquired, expands and enlarges the mind, excites its faculties, and calls those limbs and muscles into freer exercise, which, by too constant use in one direction, not only acquire an illiberal air, but are apt also to lose somewhat of their native play and energy. And thus, without directly qualifying a man for any of the employments of life, it enriches and ennobles all. Without teaching him the peculiar business of any one office or calling, it enables him to act his part in each of them with better grace and more elevated carriage; and, if happily planned and conducted, is a main ingredient in that complete and generous education, which fits a man "to perform justly, skillfully, and magnanimously, all the offices, both private and public, of peace and war".*

The same subject is treated, on the same general principles, but with greater care and distinctness, and, I will add, with greater force and beauty and perfection, both of thought and of language, by the other distinguished writer, to whom I have already referred, Mr. Davison; who, though not so well known to the world in his day, has left more behind him than the Provost of Oriel, to make his name remembered by posterity. This thoughtful man, who was the admired and intimate friend of a very remarkable person, whom, whether he wish it or not, numbers revere and love as the first author of the subsequent movement in the Protestant Church towards Catholicism,† (as on the other hand, Dr. Copleston, was the master and head of that opposite school of thinkers, which numbers among its members Dr. Whately,) this grave and philosophical

* Vir. Milton on Education.
† Mr. Keble, Vicar of Hursley, late Fellow of Oriel, and Professor of Poetry in the University of Oxford.
it is necessary or useful for the purposes even of that Professional Education, which commonly engrosses the title of useful. The former of these two theses he recommends to us in the following luminous and comprehensive passages:

"In series of essays," he says, "Mr. Edgeworth has traced different plans of Education, calculated for the wants of the several professions. His plans begin at a very early period, and undertake to regulate the habits, studies, and sometimes the amusements, of the boy, in almost every particular, with a view to his civil employment in future life. The advantage to be secured by this concentration of his tastes and studies, is the enabling him to fill his station well, and enlarge his attainments, as applicable to it . . . . . .

"And here he labours under a strong suspicion, in our mind, of pursuing a partial and unsatisfactory end. We think there is too much professional policy in such aims; and that it is to take a very contracted view of life, to think with great anxiety how persons may be educated to superior skill in their department, comparatively neglecting or excluding the more liberal and enlarged cultivation. In his system, the value of every attainment is to be measured by its subserviency to a calling. The specific duties of that calling are exalted at the cost of those free and independent tastes and virtues which come in to sustain the common relations of
society, and raise the individual in them. In short, a man is to be usurped by his profession. He is to be clothed in its garb from head to foot. His virtues, his science, and his ideas are all to be put into a gown or uniform, and the whole man to be shaped, pressed, and stiffened, in the exact mould of his technical character. Any interloping accomplishments, or a faculty which cannot be taken into public pay, if they are to be indulged in him at all, must creep along under the cloak of his more serviceable privileged merits. Such is the state of perfection to which the spirit and general tendency of this system would lead us.

“But the professional character is not the only one which a person engaged in a profession has to support. He is not always upon duty. There are services he owes, which are neither parochial, nor forensic, nor military, nor to be described by any such epithet of civil regulation, and yet are in no wise inferior to those that bear these authoritative titles; inferior neither in their intrinsic value, nor their moral import, nor their impression upon society. As a friend, as a companion, as a citizen at large; in the connexions of domestic life; in the improvement and embellishment of his leisure; he has a sphere of action, revolving, if you please, within the sphere of his profession, but not clashing with it; in which if he can show none of the advantages of an improved understanding, whatever may be his skill or proficiency in the other, he is no more than an ill-educated man. When we recollect also, that the leading professions, owing to causes which will always continue in force, in our country at least, are constantly so far overstocked in numbers that the necessary practice and study of them will not fully employ even that portion of their time and thoughts, which their respective members might well afford to give them, we must perceive that there will be a still larger surplus of the intellect of these professional men, to be carried to the fund for general purposes, and to seek its occupation in some spontaneous way.

“On this subject it is impossible to forget an evil incidental to the professions, or disregard the increase of it with which we should be threatened by a system of education dedicated exclusively or chiefly to them. The evil is one which is known by the hard name of pedantry, but which is commonly reckoned a disagreeable, rather than a mischievous thing. It escapes with this easy censure, we suppose, because men look at the fault of another as it affects themselves, more than as it injures him; and therefore the offensive, distasteful part of it is the most noticed. But the mischiefs of this contracted habit of mind to which we allude are so considerable; it runs so much into prejudice, conceit, and ignoble antipathies; it hinders so effectually, not the enlargement alone, but the justness and rectitude of the un-
understanding, that we do not hesitate to regard a system as radically wrong, which lays a plan of education and study that must prove nothing less than a hot-bed to this pernicious pest of all mental cultivation. The predominant love and esteem of one's own profession is not to be blamed. It is a strong stimulant. Like other stimulants, it may do infinite good or harm, just as it is tempered and applied: but when it is to be made the spring of all youthful exertion, and wrought into the blood as soon as the blood begins to circulate; whether this be a treatment which any constitution can bear well; and whether it will produce, upon the whole, a healthy enthusiasm of spirit, or diseased and decrepit idiomsynchracies, is not very hard to determine. We believe, that out of any given number upon whom it might be tried, many more would retain the narrow, unsocial, and vitiated temper of thought produced by it, than even the principle itself, managed as it will be in the hands of ordinary men.

"There is a certain faculty in which all nations of any refinement are great practitioners. It is not taught at school or college as a distinct science; though it deserves that what is taught there should be made to have some reference to it; nor is it endowed at all by the public; every body being obliged to exercise it for himself in person, which he does to the best of his skill. But in nothing is there a greater difference than in the manner of doing it.

The advocates of professional learning will smile when we tell them that this same faculty which we would have encouraged, is simply that of speaking good sense in English, without fee or reward, in common conversation. They will smile when we lay some stress upon it; but in reality it is no such trifle as they imagine. Look into the huts of savages, and see, for there is nothing to listen to, the dismal blank of their stupid hours of silence; their professional avocations of war and hunting are over; and, having nothing to do, they have nothing to say. Turn to improved life, and you find conversation in all its forms the medium of something more than an idle pleasure; indeed a very active agent in circulating and forming the opinions, tastes, and feelings of a whole people. It makes of itself a considerable affair. Its topics are the most promiscuous—all those which do not belong to any particular province. As for its power and influence, we may fairly say that it is of just the same consequence to a man's immediate society, how he talks, as how he acts. Now of all those who furnish their share to rational conversation, a mere adept in his own art is universally admitted to be the worst. The sterility and un instructiveness of such a person's social hours are quite proverbial. Or if he escape being dull, it is only by launching into ill-timed, learned loquacity. We do not desire of him lectures or speeches; and he has nothing else to give. Among benches he may be
powerful; but seated on a chair he is quite another person. On the other hand, we may affirm, that one of the best companions, is a man who, to the accuracy and research of a profession has joined a free excursive acquaintance with various learning, and caught from it the spirit of general observation. The tincture of a little professional taste will aid variety of remark, and give novel views to the subject of conversation; but much of it cuts off all sympathy and confidence, and extinguishes the intercourse of thought at once. If then those who are to shine at the bar or in the church may also be exceedingly useful if they can give light, unofficially, in other places, we cannot hail a scheme of education as promising well for them or for the cause of society as it stands at present, of which the aim is to collect all their lustre into a few points, with the loss of many essential utilities which it might serve in a more diffused state. It is to merge their education as men wholly in that which is necessary for them as members of a corps. It is to sacrifice the great scheme itself to an accident, an important accident; but which ought not in reason to engross our sole paramount attention.

Having thus shown that a liberal education is a real benefit to the subjects of it, as members of society, in the various duties and circumstances and accidents of life; he goes on, in the next place, to show that, over and above these direct services, which might fairly be expected of it, it actually subserves the discharge of these particular functions, and the pursuit of those particular advantages, which are connected with professional exertion, and to which Professional Education is directed.

"We admit," he observes, "that when a person makes a business of one pursuit, he is in the right way to eminence in it; and that divided attention will rarely give excellence in many. But our assent will go no further. For, to think that the way to prepare a person for excelling in any one pursuit (and that is the only point in hand), is to fetter his early studies, and cramp the first development of his mind; by a reference to the exigencies of that pursuit barely, is a very different notion, and one which, we apprehend, deserves to be exploded rather than received. Possibly a few of the abstract, insulated kinds of learning might be approached in that way. The exceptions to be made are very few, and need not be recited. But for the acquisition of professional and practical ability, such maxims are death to it. The main ingredients of that ability are requisite knowledge and cultivated faculties; but, of the two, the latter is by far the chief. A man of well improved faculties has the command of another's knowledge. A man without them, has not the command of his own. The difference between knowledge and faculties is a thing of which Mr. Edgeworth has a very steady conviction. We wish he had fallen.
upon a better method of reasoning, expanding, and strengthening those faculties, upon which he feels that all must ultimately depend.

"Of the intellectual powers, the judgment is that which takes the foremost lead in life. How to form it to the two habits it ought to possess, of exactness and vigour, is the problem. It would be ignorant presumption so much as to hint at any routine of method by which these qualities may with certainty be imparted to every or any understanding. Still, however, we may safely lay it down that they are not to be got by a "gatherer of simples", but are the combined essence and extracts of many different things, drawn from much varied reading and discipline, first, and observation afterwards. For if there be a single intelligible point on this head, it is that a man who has been trained to think upon one subject or for one subject only, will never be a good judge even in that one: whereas the enlargement of his circle gives him increased knowledge and power in a rapidly increasing ratio. So much do ideas act, not as solitary units, but by grouping and combination; and so clearly do all the things that fall within the proper province of the same faculty of the mind, intertwine with and support each other! Judgment lives as it were by comparison and discrimination. Can it be doubted, then, whether the range and extent of that assemblage of things upon which it is practised in its first essays, are of use to its power?

"To open our way a little further on this matter, we will define what we mean by the power of judgment; and then try to ascertain among what kind of studies the improvement of it may be expected at all.

"Judgment does not stand here for a certain homely, useful quality of intellect, that guards a person from committing mistakes to the injury of his fortunes or common reputation; but for that master-principle of business, literature, and talent, which gives him strength in any subject he chooses to grapple with, and enables him to seize the strong point in it. Whether this definition be metaphysically correct or not, it comes home to the substance of our inquiry. It describes the power that every one desires to possess when he comes to act in a profession, or elsewhere; and corresponds with our best idea of a cultivated mind.

"Next, it will not be denied, that in order to do any good to the judgment, the mind must be employed upon such subjects as come within the cognizance of that faculty, and give some real exercise to its perceptions. Here we have a rule of selection by which the different parts of learning may be classed for our purpose. Those which belong to the province of the judgment are religion (in its evidences and interpretation), ethics, history, eloquence,

*It is remarkable Mr. Davison does not notice doctrine. He seems to have included it in "interpretation" of Scripture. Thus, in his sense the passage cannot be admitted by a Catholic, for
poetry, theories of general speculation, the fine arts and works of wit. Great as the variety of these large divisions of learning may appear, they are all held in union by two capital principles of connexion. First, they are all quarried out of one and the same great subject of man’s moral, social, and feeling nature. And, secondly, they are all under the control (more or less strict) of the same power of moral reason. Probability is the test of decision in all. There is a better and a worse in the execution of them. There is a balancing, an option, and a doubt in judging of them.

If these studies, he continues, “be such as give a direct play and exercise to the faculty of the judgment, then they are the true basis of education for the active and inventive powers, whether destined for a profession or any other use. Poetry, which makes one article in that list, has been objected to as teaching men to imagine and not to reason. It does both. Its essence is impassioned, imaginative reason, and the higher kinds of it, which alone deserve to be regarded in education, are to an apprehensive capacity some of the most masterly and profound lessons of severe thought. What comparison can there be between Homer and Euclid for teaching to think and argue on any subject whatever, geometry excepted? One or two of the articles besides, as the judgment has no jurisdiction over doctrine; but its latter seems unexceptionable.
of diversified reading. One thing is unquestionable, that the elements of general reason are not to be found fully and truly expressed in any one kind of study; and that he who would wish to know her idiom, must read it in many books.

"If different studies are useful for aiding, they are still more useful for correcting each other; for as they have their particular merits severally, so they have their defects, and the most extensive acquaintance with one can produce only an intellect either too flashy or too jejune, or infected with some other fault of confined reading. History, for example, shows things as they are, that is, the morals and interests of men disfigured and perverted by all their imperfections of passion, folly, and ambition; philosophy strips the picture too much; poetry adorns it too much: the concentrated lights of the three correct the false peculiar colouring of each, and show us the truth. It is always dangerous to risk a single instance in support of any doctrine, unless it be candidly weighed and improved upon as a hint by the reader himself. In the present case, however, we shall be tempted to the imprudence of appealing to a solitary but splendid example. It may be of as much consequence to a man to know what to think of the word liberty, as any on which he can exercise his thoughts; where will you send him for information? to Roman or English history? In the history of his own times it is the subject of dispute; that history therefore will not compose his doubts. In more ancient history liberty is only seen as it has been perverted, oppressed, or misunderstood. Will you send him to the romantic pages of poetry in Lucan, Corneille, or our English Cato? There indeed he may catch the love of it; but that love will degenerate into extravagance, and his notions of the practical form of it can be none at all. Will you recommend him then to study the plan and sections of it in Montesquieu? His theory now may be more correct, but it will be too rigidly correct for use. The right mode of thinking upon it is to be had from them taken all together, as every one must know, who has seen their united contributions of thought and feeling expressed in the masculine sentiment of our immortal statesman, Mr. Burke, whose eloquence is inferior only to his more admirable wisdom. If any mind improved like his, is to be our instructor, we must go to the fountain head of things as he did; and study not his works but his method; by the one we may become feeble initiators, by the other arrive at some ability of our own. But, as all biography assures us, he, and every other able thinker, has been formed, not by a parsimonious admeasurement of studies to some definite future object (which is Mr. Edgeworth's maxim), but by taking a wide and liberal compass, and thinking a great deal on many
subjects with no better end in view, than because
the exercise was one which made them more rational
and intelligent beings.

"There is a trite maxim which tells us that
nothing is more pernicious than reading a little of
many different things. The maxim is perfectly just,
as to a little idle and superficial reading, or in such
things as do not naturally unite together. A cono
of chemistry, languages, and English history, might
be of this description; but a variety of strenuous and
penetrating application to such subjects as are in
harmony with each other, must escape this censure,
till it can be shown that accumulating ideas and con-
spiring energies of mind are a mischief".

Lastly, with these manifest benefits to man, as such,
which what I have called Liberal Education bestows,
he contrasts the absurd beings which would be reared
and exhibited in the busy scenes of life, under the
influence of Mr. Edgeworth's training:

"Instead of making well educated men, the object
of his system is to make pleading, and prescribing,
and preaching "machines. So far does he carry the
subdivision of his relative aims, that the knowledge of
the first and plainest truths of religion is made to
belong to a particular profession. The little uncas-
socked clergyman of six years old, is to be made
acquainted with the being of a God, in a proper
philosophical way. But his lay brothers have no
such regular instruction provided for them. It is no
part of their business. They must recollect that
they are not designed for the church, and follow
their proper profuse studies. Who knows but they
may live to hear their brother in the pulpit, and get
some religion from him there!

"The lawyer is to have his appropriate management
as soon as he begins to speak. A nurse of good
accent is to be procured for him, to modulate his first
babblings to the right tone of the bar. He is to
prattle for a fee. He is afterwards to be encouraged
to a little ill bred disputatiousness for the same wor-
ththy purpose. Mr. Edgeworth quotes a trite passage
of Roman history, to show that the Romans bestowed
much care upon the elocution of their children, and
repeats over again the tale of Cornelia and the
Gracchi. The Romans thought it a grace in their
children to speak their own language well. So thinks
every one. The peculiarity of Mr. Edgeworth's
mind, consists in making it exclusively a lawyer's
accomplishment.

"The physician that is to be, as soon as he can
wield a spade, is to have his garden, in imitation of
the great Sir Charles Linnaeus, and vex the ground
with his botanical arrangements. The culture of
opium and rhubarb will be his first step to the
prescription of them.

"The infant soldier is to be made a hero as soon as
possible. Indeed no time is to be lost with him; for
Mr. Edgeworth recommends that he be accustomed to the presence of domestic animals without terror, and be taken to the exhibitions of wild beasts, that he may be familiarized to their forms and cries. His nurse too must be chosen for her aptitude to the duties of rearing a great captain. When the defender of his country is grown up to a boy, his sports should be of the military cast. Without making too much parade, he should begin to work upon some fortification in the corner of a shrubbery. He must be trained also to a sense of honour, and abhor the disgrace of corporal punishment, as a soldier ought.

"Such is the grand scheme of partition to be made among the professional aspirants, according to their destinations of future life. Religion, a good education, gardening, and other amusements, a manly constitution of body and mind, and a tenderness of honour, we have always thought to be good for boys, as sensitive, rational beings, capable of instruction, health, and pleasure. To make cunning sport for them, and defraud them of the natural right of amusing themselves in their own way, does not agree with our feelings of kindness for them. It sophisticates them in the very point where they should be most free and natural. But to delegate the moral qualities, such as a just impression of religion, and a right sense of honour, to a station or title, or a piece of cloth, or to make the slightest difference in these respects, is to confound the essence of morality, and

run deliberately insane upon a spurious conceited wisdom."

The last sentences go beyond my present subject, which is the intellectual, not the moral bearings of Liberal Education. To-day I have confined myself to saying, that that training of the intellect, which is best for the individual himself, best enables him to discharge his duties to society. The Philosopher, indeed, and the man of the world differ in their very notion, but the methods, by which they are respectively formed, are pretty much the same. The Philosopher has the same command of matters of thought, which the true citizen and gentleman has of matters of business and conduct. If then a practical end must be assigned to a University course, I say it is that of training good members of society. Its art is the art of social life, and its end is fitness for the world. It neither confines its views to particular professions on the one hand, nor creates heroes or inspires genius on the other. Works indeed of genius, fall under no art; heroic minds come under no rule; a University is not a birthplace of poets or of immortal authors, of founders of schools, leaders of colonies, or conquerors of nations. It does not promise a generation of Aristotles or Newtons, of Napoleons or Washingtons, of Raphael's or Shakespeares, though such miracles of nature it has before now contained within its precincts. Nor is it content on the other hand with forming the critic or the experimentalist,
the economist or the engineer, though such too it includes within its scope. But a University training is the great ordinary means to a great but ordinary end; it aims at raising the intellectual tone of society, at cultivating the public mind, at purifying the national taste, at supplying true principles to popular enthusiasm and fixed aims to popular aspiration, at giving enlargement and sobriety to the ideas of the age, at facilitating the exercise of political power, and refining the intercourse of private life. It is the education which gives a man a clear conscious view of his own opinions and judgments, a truth in developing them, an eloquence in expressing them, and a force in urging them. It teaches him to see things as they are, to go right to the point, to disentangle a skein of thought, to detect what is sophistical, and to discard what is irrelevant. It prepares him to fill any post with credit, and to master any subject with facility. It shows him how to accommodate himself to others, how to throw himself into their state of mind, how to bring before them his own, how to influence them, how to come to an understanding with them, how to bear with them. He is at home in any society, he has common ground with every class; he knows when to speak and when to be silent; he is able to converse, he is able to listen; he can ask a question pertinent, and gain a lesson seasonably, when he has nothing to impart himself; he is ever ready, yet never in the way; he is a pleasant companion, and a comrade you can depend upon; he knows when to be serious and when to trifle, and he has a sure tact which enables him to trifle with gracefulness and to be serious with effect. He has the repose of a mind, which lives in itself, while it lives in the world, and which has resources for its happiness at home when it cannot go abroad. He has a gift which serves him in public, and supports him in retirement, without which good fortune is but vulgar, and with which failure and disappointment have a charm. The art which tends to make a man all this, is in its idea as useful as the art of wealth or the art of health, though it is less susceptible of method, and less tangible, less certain, less complete in its result.
DISCOURSE IX.

PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE VIEWED IN RELATION TO RELIGION.

We shall be brought, Gentlemen, to-day, to the termination of the investigation, which I commenced three Discourses back, and which, I was well aware, from its length, if for no other reason, would make demands upon the patience even of indulgent hearers.

First I employed myself in establishing the principle, that Knowledge is its own reward; and that, when considered in this light, it is called Liberal Knowledge, and is the scope of Academic Institution.

Next, I examined what is meant by Knowledge, when it is said to be pursued for its own sake; and I showed, that in order satisfactorily to fulfill this idea, Philosophy must be its form, or, in other words, that its matter must not be admitted into the mind passively, as so much acquirement, but must be
mastered and appropriated as a system consisting of parts, related one to the other, and interpretative of one another, in the unity of a whole.

Further, I showed that, such a philosophical contemplation of the field of knowledge as a whole, leading, as it did, to an understanding of its separate departments, and an appreciation of them respectively, might in consequence be rightly called an illumination; also, it was rightly called an enlargement of mind, because it was a distinct location of things one with another, as if in space; while it was moreover its proper cultivation and its best condition, both because it secured to the intellect the sight of things as they are, or of truth, in opposition to fancy, opinion, and theory, and again because it presupposed and involved the perfection of its various powers.

Such, I said, was that Knowledge, which deserves to be sought for its own sake, even though it promised no ulterior advantage. But, when I had got as far as this, I went further, and observed, that, from the nature of the case, what was so good in itself, could not but have a number of external uses, though it did not promise them, simply because it was good; and that it was necessarily the source of benefits to society, great and diversified in proportion to its own intrinsic excellence. Just as in morals, honesty is the best policy, as being profitable in a secular aspect, though such profit is not the measure

of its worth, so too as regards what may be called the virtues of the Intellect, their very possession indeed is a substantial good, and is enough, yet still that substance has a shadow, inseparable from it, viz., its social and political usefulness. And this was the subject to which I devoted the preceding Discourse.

One portion of the subject remains:—this intellectual culture, which is so exalted in itself, not only has a bearing upon social and active duties, but upon Religion also. The educated mind may be said to be in a certain sense religious; that is, it has what may be considered a religion of its own, independent of Catholicism, partly co-operating with it, partly thwarting it, at once a defence yet a disturbance to the Church in Catholic countries, and in countries beyond her pale, at one time in open warfare with her, at another in defensive alliance. The history of Schools and Academies, and of Literature and Science generally, will, I think, justify me in thus speaking. Since, then, my one aim in these Discourses has been to ascertain the function and the action of a University, viewed in itself, as preparatory to the consideration of the use to which the Church puts it, my survey of it would not be complete, unless I attempted, as I now propose to do, to exhibit its general bearings upon Religion.

Now, when I name the Religion of the Intellect or of Philosophy, and contrast it with Catholicism, you
must not understand me, Gentlemen, as implying that Catholicism is opposed to our Reason. So far from it, I have just spoken of this intellectual Religion as existing in Catholic countries, and among Catholics; and in my earlier Discourses you may recollect I spoke of Catholic Theology as one main portion of the truths, which must be received and contemplated by Philosophy, if it deserve the name. Certainly this religious theory or spirit, to which cultivation of the Intellect gives rise, may be found among good Catholics, may influence, for the better and for the worse, hearts which have true faith and a good hope of salvation. I am not concerned here at all with the question of the Reasonableness of Christianity, or with the Evidences as they are called, or with the Notes of the Church, or with the solution of objections which are brought against Revelation. I am supposing Catholicism taken for granted; even though it be, the exercise of Reason is not at an end; it has other offices and aims besides that of proof. Though it admit Catholicism, it does not go to sleep; it has an action and development of its own, as the passions have, or the moral sentiments, or the principle of self-interest. Grace does not supersede nature; nor is nature at once brought into simple coincidence and coalition with grace. It pursues its course, now coincident with that of grace, now parallel to it, now across, now divergent, now counter, in proportion to its own imperfection and to the attraction and influence which grace exerts over it. And what takes place as regards other principles of our nature and their developments, is found also as regards the Reason. There is a Religion of enthusiasm, of superstitious ignorance, of state-craft; and each has that in it which resembles Catholicism, and that again which contradicts Catholicism. There is the Religion of a warlike people, and of a pastoral people; there is a Religion of rude times, and in like manner there is a Religion of civilized times, of the cultivated intellect, of the philosopher, scholar, and gentleman. Viewed in itself, however near it comes to Catholicism, it is of course simply distinct from it; for Catholicism is one whole, and admits of no compromise or modification. Yet this is to view it in the abstract; in matter of fact, and in reference to individuals, we can have no difficulty in conceiving its presence in a Catholic country, as a spirit influencing men to a certain extent, for good or for bad or for both,—a spirit of the age, which, again may be found, as among Catholics, so with still greater sway and success in a country not Catholic, yet specifically the same as it exists in a Catholic community. The problem then before us today, is to set down some portions of the outline, if we can ascertain them, of the Religion of Civilization, and to determine how they lie relatively to those principles, doctrines, and rules, which Heaven has given us in the Catholic Church.
And here again, when I speak of Revealed Truth, it is scarcely necessary to say that I am not referring to the main articles and prominent points of faith, as contained in the Creed, any more than to the Evidences. As before, so I repeat here, had I undertaken to delineate a philosophy, which directly interfered with the Creed, I could not have spoken of it as compatible with the profession of Catholicism. The philosophy I speak of, whether it be viewed within or outside the Church, does not at once take cognizance of the Creed. Where the country is Catholic, the educated mind takes its articles for granted; where it is not, it simply ignores them and the whole subject-matter to which they relate, as not affecting social and political interests. Truths about God's Nature, Providence, dealings towards the human race, about the Economy of Redemption—in the one case it humbly accepts them, and passes on; in the other, it passes them over, as matters of simple opinion, which never can be decided, and which can have no power over us to make us morally better or worse. I am not then speaking of the Creed of Catholicism, when I speak of Religion, but I am contemplating Catholicism as a system of pastoral instruction and moral duty; and I have to do with its doctrines only as they are subservient to its direction of the conscience and the conduct. I speak of it, for instance, as teaching the ruined state of man; his utter inability to gain Heaven by any thing he can do; the moral certainty of his meriting eternal punishment if left to himself; the simple absence of all rights and claims on the part of the creature in the presence of the Creator; the illimitable claims of the Creator on the service of the creature; the imperative and obligatory force of the voice of conscience; and the inconceivable evil of sensuality. I speak of it as teaching, that no one gains Heaven except by the free grace of God, or without a regeneration of nature; that no one can please Him without faith; that the heart is the seat both of sin and of obedience; that charity is the fulfilling of the Law; and that incorporation into the Catholic Church is the ordinary instrument of salvation. These are the lessons which distinguish Catholicism as a popular religion, and these are the subjects to which the cultivated intellect will practically be turned. I have to compare and contrast, not the doctrinal, but the moral and social teaching of philosophy on the one hand, and Catholicism on the other.

Now, on opening the subject, we see at once a momentous benefit which the philosopher is likely to confer on the pastors of the Church. It is obvious that the first step which they have to effect in the conversion of man and the renovation of his nature, is its recuse from that fearful subjection to sense which is its ordinary state. To be able to break through the meshes of that thraldom, and to disentangle and to disengage its ten thousand bonds upon
the heart, is to bring it, I might almost say, half way to Heaven. Here, even divine grace, to speak of things according to their appearances, is ordinarily baffled, and retires, without expedient or resource, before this giant fascination. Religion seems too high and unearthly to be able to exert a continued influence upon us: its effort to rouse the soul, and the soul’s effort to co-operate, are too violent to last. It is like holding out the arm at full length, or supporting some great weight, which we manage to do for a time, but soon are exhausted and succumb. Nothing can act beyond its own nature; when then we are called to what is supernatural, though those extraordinary aids from Heaven are given us, with which obedience becomes possible, yet even with them it is of transcendent difficulty. We are drawn down to earth every moment with the case and certainty of a natural gravitation, and it is only by sudden impulses and (as it were) forcible plunges that we attempt to mount upwards. Religion indeed enlightens, terrifies, subdues; it gives faith, it inflicts recompense; it inspires resolutions, it draws tears, it inflames devotion, but only for the occasion. The sinful spirit repents, and protests it will never sin again, and for a while is protected by disgust and abhorrence from the malice of its foe. But that foe knows too well, that such seasons of repentance are wont to have their end: he patiently waits, till nature faints with the effort of resistance, and lies passive and hopeless under the next access of temptation. What we need then is some expedient or instrument, which at least will obstruct and stave off the approach of our spiritual enemy, and which is sufficiently congenial and level with our nature to maintain as firm a hold upon us as the inducements of sensual gratification. It will be our wisdom to employ nature against itself. Thus sorrow, sickness, and care are providential antagonists to our inward disorders; they come upon us as years pass on, and generally produce their effects on us, in proportion as we are subjected to their influence. These, however, are God’s instruments, not ours; we need a similar remedy, which we can make our own, the object of some legitimate faculty, or the aim of some natural affection, which is capable of resting on the mind, and taking up its familiar lodging with it, and engrossing it, and which thus becomes a watch for the besetting power of sensuality, and a sort of homeopathic medicine for the disease. Here then I think is the important aid, which intellectual cultivation furnishes to us in rescuing the victims of passion and self-will. It does not supply religious motives; it is not the cause or proper antecedent of any thing supernatural; it is not meritorious of Heavenly aid or reward; but it does a work, at least materially good (as theologians speak), whatever be its real and formal character. It expels the excitaments of sense by the introduction of those of the intellect.
This then is the *prima facie* advantage of the pursuit of Knowledge; it is the drawing the mind off from things which will harm it to subjects which are worthy a rational being; and, though it does not raise it above nature, nor has any tendency to make us pleasing to our Maker, yet is it nothing to substitute what is in itself harmless for what is, to say the least, inexpressibly dangerous? Is it a little thing to exchange a circle of ideas which are certainly sinful, for others which are certainly not so? You will say, perhaps, in the words of the Apostle, "Knowledge puffeth up": and doubtless this mental cultivation, even when it is successful for the purpose for which I am applying it, may be from the first nothing more than the substitution of pride for sensuality. I grant it, I think I shall have something to say on this point presently; but this is not a necessary result, it is but an incidental evil, a danger which may be realized or may be averted, whereas we may in most cases predicate guilt, and guilt of a heinous kind, where the mind is suffered to run wild and indulge its thoughts without training or law of any kind; and surely to turn away a soul from mortal sin, is a good and a gain so far, whatever comes of it. And therefore, if a friend in need is twice a friend, I conceive, that intellectual employments, though they do no more than occupy the mind with objects naturally noble or innocent, have a special claim upon our consideration and gratitude.

Nor is this all: Knowledge, the discipline by which it is gained, and the tastes which it forms, have a natural tendency to refine the mind, and to give it an indispension, simply natural, yet real, nay more than this, a disgust and abhorrence, towards excesses and enormities of evil, which are often or ordinarily reached at length by those who do not from the first set themselves against what is vicious and criminal. It generates within the mind a fastidiousness, analogous to the delicacy or daintiness which good nurture or a sickly habit induces in respect of food; and this fastidiousness, though arguing no high principle, though no protection in the case of violent temptation, nor sure in its operation, yet will often or generally be lively enough to create an absolute loathing of offences, or a detestation and scorn of them as ungenteel-like, to which ruder natures, nay such as have far more of real religion in them, are tempted, or are even betrayed. Scarceley can we exaggerate the value, in its place, of a safeguard such as this, as regards those multitudes who are thrown upon the open field of the world, or are withdrawn from its eye and from the restraint of public opinion. In many cases, where it is secured, sins familiar to those who are otherwise circumstanced, will not even occur to the mind; in others, the sense of shame and the quickened apprehension of detection, will act as a sufficient obstacle to them, when they do present themselves before it. Then again,
discipline, allowing brief intervals, or awarding a sharp penance, to sloth and sensuality. The crude food, the scanty clothing, the violent exercise, the vagrant life, the military constraint, the imperfect pharmacy, which now are attendants only on particular classes of the community, were once the lot more or less of all. In the deep woods or the wild solitudes of the medieval era, feelings of religion or superstition were naturally present to the population, which in various ways co-operated with the missionary or pastor, in retaining it in a noble simplicity of manners. But, when in the advancement of society men congregate in towns, and multiply in contracted spaces, and law gives them security, and art gives them comforts, and good government robs them of courage and manliness, and monotony of life throws them back upon themselves, who does not see, that resource or protection against evil they have none, that vice is the mere reaction of unhealthy toil, and sensual excess the holyday of the vacant mind? This is so well understood by the practical benevolence of the day, that it has especially busied itself in plans for supplying the masses of our town population with intellectual and honourable recreations. Cheap literature, libraries of useful and entertaining knowledge, scientific lectureships, museums, zoological collections, buildings and gardens to please the eye: and to give repose to the feelings, external objects of whatever kind, which may take
the mind off itself, and expand and elevate it in liberal contemplations, these are the human means, wisely suggested, and good as far as they go, for at least parrying the assaults of moral evil, and keeping at bay the enemies, not only of the soul, but of the social fabric.

Such are the instruments, by which an age of advanced civilization combats moral disorders, which Reason as well as Revelation denounces; and I have not been backward to express my sense of their serviceableness to Religion. Moreover, they are but the foremost of a series of influences, which intellectual culture exerts upon our moral nature, and all upon the type of Christianity, manifesting themselves in veracity, probity, equity, fairness, gentleness, benevolence, and amiableness; so much so, that a character more noble to look at, more beautiful, more winning, in the various relations of life and in personal duties, is hardly conceivable, than may, or might be, its result, when that culture is bestowed upon a soul naturally adapted to virtue. If you would obtain a picture for contemplation which may seem to fulfill the ideal, which the inspired Teacher has delineated in several of his Epistles, under the name of charity, in its sweetness and harmony, its generosity, its courtesy to others, and its depreciation of self, you could not have recourse to a better furnished studio than that of Philosophy, or to the specimens of it, which with greater or less exactness are scattered through society in a civilized age. It is enough, to refer you, Gentlemen, to the various Biographies and Remains of contemporaries and others, which from time to time issue from the press, to see how striking is the action of our intellectual upon our moral nature, where the moral material is rich, and the intellectual cast is perfect. Individuals will occur to all of us, who deservedly attract our love and admiration, and whom the world almost worships as the work of its own hands. Religious principle indeed,—that is, faith,—is, to all appearance, simply away; the work is as certainly not supernatural, as it is certainly noble and beautiful. This must be insisted on, that the Intellect may have its due; but it also must be insisted on for the sake of conclusions to which I wish to conduct our investigation. The radical difference indeed of this mental culture from genuine religion, in spite of its seeming relationship, is the very cardinal point on which my present discussion turns; yet on the other hand it may readily be assigned to a Christian origin by hasty or distant observers, or those who view it in a particular light. And as this is the case, I think it advisable, before proceeding with the delineation of its characteristic features, to point out to you distinctly the elementary principles, on which its morality is based.

You will bear in mind then, Gentlemen, that I spoke just now of the scorn and hatred which a cultivated mind feels for some kinds of vice, and the
utter disgust and profound humiliation which may come over it, if it should happen in any degree to be betrayed into them. Now this feeling may have its root in faith and love, but it may not; there is nothing really religious in it, considered by itself. Conscience indeed is implanted in the breast by nature, but it inflicts upon us fear as well as shame; when the mind is simply angry with itself and nothing more, surely the true import of the voice of nature and the depth of its intimations have been forgotten, and a false philosophy has misinterpreted emotions which ought to lead to God. Fear implies the transgression of a law, and a law implies a lawgiver and judge; but the tendency of intellectual culture is to swallow up the fear in the self-reproach, and self-reproach is directed and limited to our mere sense of what is fitting and becoming. Fear carries us out of ourselves, shame confines us within the round of our own ideas. Such, I say, is the danger which awaits a civilized age; such is its besetting sin (not inevitable, God forbid! or we must abandon the use of God's own gifts), but still the ordinary sin of the Intellect; conscience becomes what is called a moral sense; the command of duty is a sort of taste; sin is not an offence against God, but against human nature.

The less amiable specimens of this spurious religion are those, which we meet every day in Protestant England. We find men possessed of many virtues, but proud, haughty, fastidious, and reserved. Why is this? it is because they think and act, as if there were really such a thing as what theologians call the philosophical sin; it is because conscience to them is not the word of a lawgiver, as it ought to be, but the dictate of their own minds and nothing more; it is because they do not look out of themselves, because they do not look through and beyond their own minds to their Maker, but are engrossed in notions of what is due to themselves, to their own dignity and their own consistency. Their conscience has become a mere self-respect. Instead of doing one thing and then another, as each is called for, in faith and obedience, careless of what may be called the keeping of deed with deed, and leaving Him who gives the command to blend the portions of their conduct into a whole, their one object, however unconscious to themselves, is to paint a smooth and perfect surface, and to be able to say to themselves that they have done their duty. When they do wrong, they feel not contrition, of which God is the object, but remorse, and a sense of degradation. They call themselves fools, not sinners; they are angry and impatient, not humble. They shut themselves up in themselves; it is misery to them to think or to speak of their own feelings; it is misery to suppose that others see them, and their shyness and sensiveness often become morbid. As to confession, which is so natural to the Catholic, to them it is im.
possible, unless indeed, in cases where they have been guilty, an apology is due to their own character, is expected of them, and will be satisfactory to look back upon. They are victims of an intense self-contemplation.

There are, however, far more pleasing and interesting forms of this moral malady than that which I have been depicting: I have spoken of the effect of intellectual culture on proud natures; but it will show to greater advantage, yet with as little approximation to religious faith, in amiable and unaffected minds. Observe, Gentlemen, the heresy, as it may be called, of which I speak, is the substitution of a moral sense or taste for conscience in the true sense of the word; now this error may be the foundation of a character of far more elasticity and grace than ever adorned the haughty English Protestant. It is especially congenial to men of an imaginative and poetical cast of mind, who will readily accept the notion that virtue is nothing more than the graceful in conduct. Such persons, far from tolerating fear, as a principle, in their apprehension of religious and moral truth, will not be slow to call it simply gloom and superstition. Rather a philosopher's, a gentleman's religion, is of a liberal and generous character; it is based upon honour; vice is evil, because it is unworthy, base, and odious. This was the quarrel of the ancient heathen with Christianity, that, instead of simply fixing the mind on the fair and the pleasant,

it intermingled other ideas with them of a sad and painful nature; that it spoke of tears before joy, a cross before a crown; that it laid the foundation of heroism in penance; that it made the soul tremble with the news of Purgatory and Hell; that it insisted on views and a worship of the Deity, which to their minds was nothing else than mean, servile, and cowardly. The notion of an Allperfect, Everpresent God, in whose sight we are less than atoms, and who, while He deigns to visit us, can punish as well as bless, was abhorrent to them; they made their own minds their sanctuary, their own ideas their oracle, and conscience in morals was but parallel to genius in art, and wisdom in philosophy.

Had I room for all that might be said upon the subject, I might illustrate this intellectual religion from the history of the Emperor Julian, the apostate from Christian Truth, the foe of Christian education. He, in whom every Catholic sees the shadow of the future Anti-Christ, was all but the pattern-man of philosophical virtue. Weak points in his character he had, it is true, even in a merely poetical standard; but, take him all in all, and we shall recognize in him a splendid beauty and nobleness of moral deportment, which combines in it the rude greatness of Fabricius or Regulus with the accomplishments of Pliny or Antoninus. His simplicity of manners, his frugality, his austerity of life, his singular disdain of sensual pleasure, his military heroism, his application
to business, his literary diligence, his modesty, his
clemency, his accomplishments, go to make him one
of the most eminent specimens of pagan virtue, which
the world has ever seen. His last hours form a
unique passage in history, both as illustrating his
character under its critical trial, and as being re-
ported to us on the evidence of an eye-witness. "He
employed the awful moments", says a writer, well
fitted, both from his literary tastes and from his
hatred of Christianity, to be his panegyrist, "he
employed the awful moments with the firm temper of
a hero and a sage; the philosophers who had accom-
panied him in this fatal expedition, compared the tent
of Julian with the prison of Socrates; and the spec-
tators, whom duty, or friendship, or curiosity, had
assembled round his couch, listened with respectful
grief to the funeral oration of their dying Emperor.
"Friends and fellow-soldiers, the seasonable period of
my departure is now arrived, and I discharge, with
the cheerfulness of a ready debtor, the demands of
nature. I have learned from philosophy, how much
the soul is more excellent than the body; and that
the separation of the worthless substance should be
the subject of joy rather than of affliction. I have
learned from religion, that an early death has often
been the reward of piety; and I accept, as a favour of
the gods, the mortal stroke that severs me from the
danger of disgracing a character, which has hitherto
been supported by virtue and fortitude. I die
without remorse, as I have lived without guilt. I
am pleased to reflect on the innocence of my private
life; and I can affirm with confidence, that the
supreme authority, that emanation of the divine
Power, has been preserved in my hands pure and
immaculate... I now offer my tribute of gratitude
to the Eternal Being, who has not suffered me to
perish by the cruelty of a tyrant, by the secret
dagger of conspiracy, or by the slow tortures of
lingering disease. He has given me, in the midst of
an honourable career, a splendid and glorious de-
parture from this world, and I hold it equally absurd,
equally base, to solicit, or to decline, the stroke of
fate." 

"After this discourse, which Julian pronounced in
a firm and gentle tone of voice, he distributed, by a
military testament, the remains of his private fortune,
and making some inquiry why Anatolius
was not present, he understood from the answer of
Sallust, that Anatolius was killed, and bewailed with
unmanly inconsistency the loss of his friend. At the
same time, he reproved the inordinate grief of the
spectators, and conjured them not to disgrace, by un-
manly tears, the fate of a prince, who in a few
moments would be united with Heaven and with the
stars. The spectators were silent; and Julian
entered into a metaphysical argument with the
philosophers Priscus and Maximus on the nature
of the soul. The efforts which he made, of mind as
well as body, most probably hastened his death. His wound began to bleed with great violence; his respiration was embarrassed by the swelling of the veins; he called for a draught of cold water, and as soon as he had drank it, expired without pain about the hour of midnight." A memorable deathbed indeed! in the insensibility of conscience, in the ignorance of the very idea of sin, in the contemplation of his own moral consistency, in the simple absence of fear, in the cloudless self-confidence, in the serene self-possession, in the cold self-satisfaction, we recognize the Philosopher.

Gibbon paints with pleasure, what, conformably with the sentiments of a godless intellectualism, was an historical fulfilment of his own idea of moral perfection; Lord Shaftesbury had already drawn out that idea in a theoretical form, in his celebrated collection of Treatises which he has called "Characteristics of men, manners, opinions, views". In this work one of his first attacks is directed against the doctrine of reward and punishment, as if it introduced a notion into religion, inconsistent with the true apprehension of the beauty of virtue, and with the liberality and nobleness of spirit in which it should be pursued. "Men have not been content", he says, "to show the natural advantages of honesty and virtue. They have rather lessened these, the better, as they thought, to advance another founda-

* Gibbon, Hist., ch. 24.
out of tune. "Some by mere nature," he says, "others by art and practice, are masters of an ear in music, an eye in painting, a fancy in the ordinary things of ornament and grace, a judgment in proportions of all kinds, and a general good taste in most of those subjects which make the amusement and delight of the ingenious people of the world. Let such gentlemen as these be as extravagant as they please, or as irregular in their morals, they must at the same time discover their inconsistency, live at variance with themselves, and in contradiction to that principle, on which they ground their highest pleasure and entertainment. Of all other beauties which virtuosos pursue, poets celebrate, musicians sing, and architects or artists of whatever kind describe or form, the most delightful, the most engaging and pathetic, is that which is drawn from real life and from the passions. Nothing affects the heart like that which is purely from itself, and of its own nature: such as the beauty of sentiments, the grace of actions, the turn of characters, and the proportions and features of a human mind. This lesson of philosophy, even a romance, a poem, or a play may teach us....

Let poets or the men of harmony deny, if they can, this force of nature, or withstand this moral magic.... Every one is a virtuoso of a higher or lower degree; every one pursues a grace...of one kind or other. The venustum, the honestum, the decorum of things will force.

its way.... The most natural beauty in the world, is honesty and moral truth; for all beauty is truth.

Accordingly, virtue being only one kind of beauty, the principle which determines what is virtuous is, not conscience, but taste. "Could we once convince ourselves," he says, "of what is in itself so evident, viz., that in the very nature of things there must of necessity be the foundation of a right and wrong taste, as well in respect of inward character of features, as of outward person, behaviour, and action, we should be far more ashamed of ignorance and wrong judgment in the former than in the latter of these subjects.... One who aspires to the character of a man of breeding and politeness, is careful to form his judgment of arts and sciences upon right models of perfection.... He takes particular care to turn his eye from everything which is gaudy, luscious, and of false taste. Nor is he less careful to turn his ear from every sort of music, besides that which is of the best manner and truest harmony. "T were to be wished we had the same regard to a right taste in life and manners.... If civility and humanity be a taste; if brutality, insolence, riot, be in the same manner a taste,...who would not endeavour to force nature as well in this respect, as in what relates to a taste or judgment in other arts and sciences?"

Sometimes he distinctly contrasts this taste with principle and conscience, and gives it the preference
over them. "After all," he says, "I am not merely what we call principle, but a taste, which governs men." They may think for certain, 'This is right', or 'that wrong'; they may believe 'this is a virtue', or 'that a sin'; 'this is punishable by man', or 'that by God'; yet if the savour of things lies cross to honesty, if the fancy be florid, and the appetite high towards the subaltern beauties and lower orders of worldly symmetries and proportions, the conduct will infallibly turn this latter way". Thus, somewhat like a Jansenist, he makes the superior pleasure infallibly conquer, and implies that, neglecting principle, we have but to train the taste to a kind of beauty higher than sensual. He adds: "Even conscience, I fear, such as is owing to religious discipline, will make but a slight figure, when this taste is set amiss".

And hence the well known doctrine of this author, that ridicule is the test of truth; for truth and virtue being beauty, and falsehood and vice deformity, and the feeling inspired by deformity being that of derision, as that inspired by beauty is admiration, it follows that vice is not a thing to weep about, but to laugh at. "Nothing is ridiculous", he says, "but what is deformed; nor is any thing proof against raillery but what is handsome and just. And therefore 't is the hardest thing in the world to deny fair honesty the use of this weapon, which can never bear an edge against herself, and bears against every thing contrary".

And hence again, conscience, which intimates a Lawgiver, being superseded by a moral taste or sentiment, which has no sanction beyond the constitution of our nature, it follows that our great rule is to contemplate ourselves, if we would gain a standard of life and morals. Thus he has entitled one of his Treatises, a "Soliqoy", with the motto, "Nec te quesiveris extra"; and he observes, "The chief interest of ambition, avarice, corruption, and every insinuating vice, is to prevent this interview and familiarity of discourse, which is consequent upon close retirement and inward recess. It is the grand artifice of villainy and lewdness, as well as of superstition and bigotry, to put us upon terms of greater distance and formality with ourselves, and evade our proving method of soliloquy... A passionate lover, whatever solitude he may affect, can never be truly by himself... 'Tis the same reason, which keeps the imaginary saint or mystic from being capable of this entertainment. Instead of looking narrowly into his own nature and mind, that he may be no longer a mystery to himself, he is taken up with the contemplation of other mysterious natures, which he never can explain or comprehend".

Taking these passages as specimens of what I call the Religion of Philosophy, it is obvious to observe, that there is no doctrine contained in them which is not in a certain sense true; yet, on the other hand, that almost every statement is perverted and made
false, because it is not the whole truth. They are
exhibitions of truth under one aspect, and therefore
insufficient; conscience is most certainly a moral
sense, but it is more; vice, again, is a deformity, but
it is worse. Lord Shaftesbury may insist, if he will,
that simple and solitary fear cannot effect a moral
conversion, and we are not concerned to answer him;
but he will have a difficulty in proving that any real
conversion follows from a doctrine which makes
virtue a mere point of good taste, and vice vulgar
and ungentlemanly.

Such a doctrine is essentially superficial, and such
will be its effects. It has no better measure of right
and wrong than that of visible beauty and tangible
fitness. Conscience indeed inflicts an acute pang, but
that pang, forsooth, is irrational, and to reverence it
is an illiberal superstition. But, if we will make light
of what is deepest within us, nothing is left but to pay
homage to what is more upon the surface. To seem
becomes to be; what looks fair will be good, what
causes offence will be evil; virtue will be what
pleases, vice what pains. As well may we measure
virtue by utility, as by such a rule. Nor is this an
imaginary apprehension; we all must recollect the
celebrated sentiment into which a great and wise
man was betrayed, in the glowing eloquence of his
valediction to the spirit of chivalry. "It is gone",
he cried; "that sensibility of principle, that chastity
of honour, which felt a stain like a wound; which
inspired courage, while it mitigated ferocity; which
ennobled whatever it touched, and under which vice
lost half its evil by losing all its grossness." In
the last clause of this beautiful sentence, we have an
apt illustration of the ethical temperament of a
civilized age. It is detection, not the sin, which is
the crime; private life is sacred, and inquiry into it
is intolerable; and decency is virtue. Scandals,
scandalous, whatever shocks, whatever disgusts, are
offences of the first order. Drinking and swearing,
squalid poverty, improvidence, laziness, slovenly
disorder, make up the idea of profligacy: poets may
say any thing, however wicked, with impunity;
works of genius may be read without danger or
shame, whatever their principles; fashion, celebrity,
the beautiful, the heroic, will suffice to force any evil
upon the community. The splendours of a court,
and the charms of good society, wit, imagination,
taste, and high breeding, the prestige of rank, and
the resources of wealth, are a screen, an instrument,
and an apology for vice and irreligion. And thus at
length we find, surprising as the change may be, that
that very refinement of Philosophy, which began by
repelling sensuality, ends by excusing it. Under the
shadow indeed of the Church, and in its due development,
it does service to the cause of morality; but,
when it is strong enough to have a will of its own,
and is lifted up with an idea of its own importance,
and attempts to form a theory, and to lay down a
principle, and to carry out a system of ethics, and undertakes the moral education of the man, then it does but abet evils to which at first it seemed instinctively opposed. True Religion is slow in growth, and, when once planted, is difficult of dislodgment; but its intellectual counterfeit has no root in itself; it springs up suddenly, it suddenly withers. It appeals to what is in nature, and it falls under the dominion of the old Adam. Then, like dethroned princes, it keeps up a state and majesty, when it has lost the power. Deformity is its abhorrence; therefore, since it cannot dissuade men from vice, to escape the sight of its deformity, it embellishes it. It "skins and films the ulcerous place", which it cannot probe or heal,

"Whiles rank corruption, mining all within, Insecta inseet".

And now, taking up the thread of our remarks where we dropt it, we are, alas! by this time in a better condition to form a true estimate of the religious value of those intellectual influences, which at first sight give such promise of service to the cause of Catholicism. No word indeed of praise or satisfaction which I have ventured to bestow on them has to be withdrawn; nay, much upon other scores has to be added. But so far is undeniable, that they have a dark side, as well as a bright one, and that their very points of excellence may blind or

bribe us into a closer alliance with them, than Christian duty can approve. When I interrupted my favourable account of them, I had just made an allusion to the ethical precepts of St. Paul, and to the fulfilment which they seemed to receive at the hand of the pattern characters of this day. An attentive consideration of this correspondence, which at first sight tells for the latter, will but corroborate the contrast which I have since been drawing between Philosophy and the Gospel. The Apostle gives us a pattern of evangelical perfection; he draws the Christian character in its most graceful form, and its most beautiful hues. He discourses of that charity, which is patient and meek, humble and singleminded, disinterested, contented, and persevering. He tells us to prefer each other before ourselves, to give way to each other, to abstain from rude words and evil speech; to avoid self-conceit, to be calm and grave; to be cheerful and happy; to observe peace with all men, truth and justice, courtesy and gentleness, all that is modest, amiable, virtuous, and of good repute. Such is St. Paul's exemplar of the Christian in his external relations; and, I grant, it is remarkable that men of the world should be able to imitate it so closely; it is more remarkable still that they should be able, without any striking, overwhelming extravagance, to boast, as they do, that they imitate it even more exactly than those, who belong to the comminism and inherit the traditions of the Apostle himself. This
Indeed they seem habitually to assume; they appropriate to themselves a property of the Church; all that is beautiful in mind belongs to the gentleman, while Catholics are the representatives of primeval times, and a barbarous condition of society.

I do not wish to say anything in disparagement of the beneficial influence of Civilization, where it is not directly to my point; else, I might draw attention to the fact, that, whether or not it can create what it now calls "the gentleman", since Christianity has come, it had little conception of such a character before its appearance. In ancient times at least there was no such thing as a "pagan gentleman". It is an observation of Hume's, an unexceptionable witness here, that, "the arts of conversation", and we may take the word in its largest sense, "were not brought so near to perfection among" the ancients, "as the arts of writing and composition. The scurrility", he continues, "of the ancient orators, in many instances, is quite shocking, and exceeds all belief. Vanity too is often not a little offensive in authors of that age, as well as the common licentiousness and immodesty of their style... I shall also be bold to affirm, that among the ancients there was not much delicacy of breeding, or that polite deference and respect, which civility obliges us either to express or counterfeit towards persons with whom we converse".

The modern idea then of "a gentle-

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man" which Lord Shaftesbury would claim, was unknown to Cicero, and introduced by St. Paul. It may be a logical result of Philosophy, but, in the western world at least, it is an historical offspring of Christianity. Gradually only, and in the course of centuries, did that idea take possession of the world's intellect, and imbue its moral sense, and become one of the recognized elements of its standard of perfection; the more wonderful then, if Catholicism, as is often assumed, should at this day, have abandoned that ethical delicacy and grace, which it was itself the means of introducing to the world.

But, in truth, the real state of the case is but a fit illustration of the relative positions of the Church and the world. The Church ever begins with the beginning; and, as regards the multitude of her children, is never able to get beyond the beginning, but is continually employed in laying the foundation. She is engaged with what is essential, as previous and as introductory, to the ornamental and the attractive. She is curing and keeping men clear of mortal sin; she is "treating of justice and chastity, and the judgment to come"; she is insisting on faith and hope, and devotion, and honesty, and the elements of charity; and has so much to do with precept, that she almost leaves it to inspirations from Heaven to suggest what is of counsel and perfection. She aims at what is necessary, rather than at what is desirable. She is for the many as well as
for the few. She is putting souls in the way of salvation, that they may then be in a condition, if they shall be called upon, to aspire to the heroic, and to attain the substance, as well as the semblance, of the beautiful. Such is the method, or the policy (so to call it), of the Church: but Philosophy looks at the matter from a very different point of view; what have Philosophers to do with the terror of judgment or the saving of the soul? Lord Shaftesbury calls the former a sort of "panic fear". Of the latter he scoffingly complains that "the saving of souls is now the heroic passion of exalted spirits". Of course he is at liberty, on his principles, to pick and choose out of Christianity what he will; he discards the theological, the mysterious, the spiritual; he makes selection of the morally or esthetically beautiful. To him it matters not at all, that he begins his teaching where he should end it; it matters not that, instead of planting the tree, he merely crops its flowers for his bouquet; he only aims at this life, his philosophy dies with him; if his flowers do but last to the end of his revel, he has nothing more to seek. When night comes, the withered leaves may be mingled with his own ashes; he and they will have done their work, he and they will be no more. Certainly, it costs little to make men virtuous on conditions such as these; it is like teaching them a language or an accomplishment, to write Latin or to play on an instrument,—the profession of an artist, not the commission of an apostle.

This embellishment of the exterior is the beginning and the end of philosophical morality. It is the reason why it aims at being modest, rather than humble, and can be proud while it is unassuming. To humility indeed it does not even aspire; humility is one of the most difficult of virtues both to attain and to ascertain. It lies close upon the heart itself, and its tests are exceedingly delicate and subtle. Its counterfeits abound;—however, we are little concerned with them here, for, I repeat, it is hardly professed even by name in the code of ethics which we are reviewing. As has been often observed, ancient civilization had not the idea, and had no word to express it: or rather, it had the idea, and considered it a defect of mind, not a virtue; as to the modern world, you may gather its ignorance of it, by its perversion of the somewhat parallel term "condescension". Humility or condescension, viewed as a virtue of conduct, may be said to consist, as in other things, so in our placing ourselves in our thoughts on a level with our inferiors; it is not only a voluntary relinquishment of the privileges of our own station, but an actual participation or assumption of their condition to whom we stoop. This is true humility, to feel and to behave as if we were low, not to cherish a notion of our importance, while we affect a low position. Such was St. Paul's humility, when he called himself "the least of the saints"; such the humility of those many holy men, who have considered themselves the
greatest of sinners. It is an abdication, as far as their own thoughts are concerned, of those prerogatives or privileges to which others deem them entitled. Now it is not a little instructive to contrast with this idea, Gentlemen,—with this Latin, this theological meaning of the word “condescension”—its proper English sense; put them in juxtaposition, and you will at once see the difference between the world’s humility and the humility of the Gospel. As the world uses the word, “condescension” is a stooping indeed of the person, but a bending forward, unattended with any the slightest effort to leave by a single inch the seat in which it is so firmly-established. It is the act of a superior, who protests to himself, while he commits it, that he is superior still, and that he is doing nothing else but an act of grace towards those on whose level he is, by his theory, placing himself. And this is the nearest idea which the philosopher can form of the virtue of self-abasement, to do more than this is a meanness or an hypocrisy, and at once excites his suspicion and disgust. What the world is, such it has ever been; we know the contempt which the educated pagans had for the martyrs and confessors of the Church; and it is shared by the anti-Catholic bodies of this day.

Such are the ethics of Philosophy, when faithfully represented; but, an age like this, not pagan, but professedly Christian, cannot venture to reprobate humility in set terms, or to make a boast of pride.

Accordingly it looks out for some expedient by which it may blind itself to the real state of the case. Humility, with its grave and self-denying attributes, it cannot love; but what is more beautiful, what more winning, than modesty? what virtue, at first sight, simulates humility so well? though what in fact is more radically distinct from it? In truth, great as is its charm, modesty is not the deepest or the most religious of virtues. Rather it is the advanced guard or sentinel of the soul militant, and watches continually over its nascent intercourse with the world about it. It goes the round of the senses; it mounts up into the countenance; it protects the eye and ear; it reigns in the voice and gesture. Its province is the outward deportment, as other virtues have relation to matters theological, others to society, and others to the mind itself. And being more superficial than other virtues, it is more easily disjoined from their company; it admits of being associated with principles or qualities naturally foreign to it, and is often made the cloak of feelings or ends for which it was never created. So little is it the necessary index of humility, that it is even compatible with pride. The better for the purpose of philosophy; humble it cannot be, so forthwith modesty becomes its humility.

Pride, under such training, instead of running to waste, is turned to account; it gets a new name; it is called self-respect; and ceases to be the disagreeable, unaccompanionable quality which it is in
itsel. Though it be the motive principle of the soul, it seldom comes to view; and, when it shows itself, then delicacy and gentleness are its attire, and good sense and sense of honour direct its motions. It is no longer a restless agent, without definite aim; it has a large field of exertion assigned to it, and it subserves those social interests which it would naturally trouble. It is directed into the channel of industry, frugality, honesty, and obedience; and it becomes the very staple of the religion and morality held in honour in a day like our own. It becomes the safeguard of chastity, the guarantee of veracity, in high and low; it is the very household god of the Protestant, inspiring neatness and decency in the servant girl, propriety of carriage and refined manners in her mistress, uprightness, manliness, and generosity, in the head of the family. It diffuses a light over town and country; it covers the soil with handsome edifices and smiling gardens; it tills the field, it stocks and embellishes the shop. It is the stimulating principle of providence on the one hand, and of free expenditure on the other; of an honourable ambition, and of elegant enjoyment. It breathes upon the face of society, and the hollow sepulchre is forthwith beautiful to look upon.

Refined by the civilization which has brought it into activity, this self-respect infuses into the mind an intense horror of exposure, and a keen sensitive-

ness of notoriety and ridicule. It becomes the enemy of extravagances of any kind; it shrinks from what are called scenes; it has no mercy on the mock-heroic, on pretense or egotism, on verbosity in language or what is called prosiness in manner. It detests gross adulation; not that it tends at all to the eradication of the appetite to which the flatterer ministers, but it sees the absurdity of indulging it, it understands the annoyance thereby given to others, and if a tribute must be paid to the wealthy, or to the powerful, it demands greater subtlety and art in the preparation. Thus vanity is changed into a more dangerous self-conceit, as being checked in its natural eruption. It teaches men to suppress their feelings, and to control their tempers, and to mitigate both the severity and the tone of their judgments. As Lord Shaftesbury would desire, it prefers playful wit and satire, in putting down what is objectionable, as a more refined and good-natured, as well as more effectual method, than the expedient which is natural to uneducated minds, It is from this impatience of the tragic and the bombastic, that it is now quietly but energetically opposing itself to the unchristian practice of duelling, which it brands as simply out of taste and as the remnant of a barbarous age; and certainly it seems likely to effect what Religion has aimed at abolishing in vain.

Hence it is that it is almost a definition of a gentleman, to say he is one who never inflicts pain.
This description is both refined, and, as far as it goes, accurate; for certainly he may be represented as one who, while he abounds in services and civilities to others, aims (so to say) at others obtaining without his giving, at offering without obtruding, and at being felt without being seen. He is mainly occupied in merely removing the obstacles which hinder the free and unembarrassed action of those about him; and he concurs with their movements rather than takes the initiative himself. His benefits may be considered as parallel to what are called comforts or conveniences in arrangements of a personal nature: like an easy chair or a good fire, which do their part in dispelling cold and fatigue, though nature provides both means of rest and animal heat without them. The true gentleman in like manner carefully avoids whatever may cause a jar or a jolt in the minds of those with whom he is cast;—all clashing of opinion, or collision of feeling, all restraint, or suspicion, or gloom, or resentment; his great concern being to make every one at their ease and at home. He has his eyes on all his company; he is tender towards the bashful, gentle towards the distant, and merciful towards the absurd; he can recollect to whom he is speaking; he guards against unseasonable allusions, or topics which may irritate; he is seldom prominent in conversation, and never, wearisome. He makes light of favours while he does them, and seems to be receiving when he is conferring. He never speaks of himself except when compelled, never defends himself by a mere retort, he has no ears for slander or gossip, is scrupulous in imputing motives to those who interfere with him, and interprets everything for the best. He is never mean or little in his disputes, never takes unfair advantage, never mistakes personalities or sharp sayings for arguments, or insinuates evil which he dare not say out. From a long-sighted prudence, he observes the maxim of the ancient sage, that we should ever conduct ourselves towards our enemy, as if he were one day to be our friend. He has too much good sense to be affronted at insult, he is too busy to remember injuries, and too indolent to bear malice. He is patient, forbearing, and resigned, on philosophical principles; he submits to pain, because it is inevitable, to bereavement, because it is irreparable, and to death, because it is his destiny. If he engages in controversy of any kind, his disciplined intellect preserves him from the blundering discourtesy of better, though less educated minds; who, like blunt weapons, tear and exact instead of cutting clean, who mistake the point in argument, waste their strength on trifles, misconceive their adversary, and leave the question more involved than they find it. He may be right or wrong in his opinion, but he is too clear-headed to be unjust; he is as simple as he is forcible, and as brief as he is decisive. Nowhere shall we find greater candour, consideration, indulgence; he throws himself into the
minds of his opponents, he accounts for their mistakes. He knows the weakness of human reason as well as its strength, its province and its limits. If he be a unbeliever, he will be too profound and large-minded to ridicule religion or to act against it; he is too wise to be a dogmatist or fanatic in his infidelity. He respects piety and devotion; he even supports institutions as venerable, beautiful, or useful, to which he does not assent; he honours the ministers of religion, and he is contented with declining its mysteries without assailing or denouncing them. He is a friend of religious toleration, and that, not only because his philosophy has taught him to look on all forms of faith with an impartial eye, but also from the gentleness and effeminacy of feeling which is the attendant on civilization.

Not that he may not hold a religion too, in his own way, even when he is not a Christian. In that case his religion is one of imagination and sentiment; it is the embodiment of those ideas of the sublime, majestic, and beautiful, without which there can be no large philosophy. Sometimes he acknowledges the being of God, sometimes he invests an unknown principle or quality with the attributes of perfection. And this deduction of his reason, or creation of his fancy, he makes the occasion of such excellent thoughts, and the starting point of so varied and systematic a teaching, that he even seems like a disciple of Christianity itself. From the very accuracy and steadiness of his logical powers, he is able to see what sentiments are consistent in those who hold any religious doctrine at all, and he appears to others to feel and to hold a whole circle of theological truths, which exist in his mind no otherwise than as a number of deductions.

Such are some of the lineaments of the ethical character, which the cultivated intellect will form, apart from religious principle. They are seen within the pale of the Church and without it; they form the beau-ideal of the world; they partly assist and partly distort the development of the Catholic. They may subserve the education of a St. Francis de Sales or a Cardinal Pole; they may be the limits of the virtue of a Shaftesbury or a Gibbon. Basil and Julian were fellow-students at the schools of Atheus; and one became the Saint and Doctor of the Church, the other her scoffing and relentless foe.
DISCOURSE X.

DUTIES OF THE CHURCH TOWARDS PHILOSOPHY.

I have to congratulate myself, Gentlemen, that at length I have accomplished, with whatever success, the difficult and anxious undertaking to which I have been immediately addressing myself. Difficult and anxious it has been in truth, though the main subject of University Education has been so often and so ably discussed already; for I have attempted to follow out a line of thought, more familiar to Protestants just now than to Catholics, upon Catholic grounds. I declared my intention, when I opened the subject, of treating it as a philosophical and practical, rather than as a theological question, with an appeal to common-sense, not to ecclesiastical rules; and for this very reason, while my argument has been less ambitious, it has been deprived of the lights and supports which another mode of handling it would have secured.

No anxiety, no effort is more severe in its way,
than are demanded of him who would investigate without error and instruct without obscurity; and, if the past discussion has at any time tried the patience of the kind persons who have given it their attention, I can assure them that on no one can it have inflicted so great labour and fatigue as on myself. Happy they, who are engaged in provinces of thought, so familiarly traversed and so thoroughly explored, that they see every where the footprints, the paths, the landmarks, and the remains of former travellers, and can never step wrong; but for myself, Gentlemen, I have been not unlike a navigator on a strange sea, who is out of sight of land, is surprised by night, and has to trust mainly to the rules and instruments of his science for reaching the port. The everlasting mountains, the high majestic cliffs, of the opposite coast, radiant in the sunlight, which are our ordinary guides, fail us in an excursion such as this; the lessons of antiquity, the determinations of authority, are here rather the needle, chart, and plummet, than great objects, with distinct and continuous outline and completed details, which stand up and confront and occupy our gaze, and relieve us from the tension and suspense of our personal observation. And thus, in spite of the pains we may take to consult others and avoid mistakes, it is not till the morning comes, and the shore greets us, and we see our vessel making straight for harbour, that we relax our jealous watch, and consider anxiety irra-

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tional. Such in a measure has been my feeling in the foregoing inquiry; in which indeed I have been in want neither of authoritative principles nor distinct precedents; but of treatises in extenso on the subject on which I have written—the finished work of writers, who, by their acknowledged judgment and erudition, might furnish me for my private guidance with a running instruction on each point, which successively came under review.

I have spoken of the arduousness of my "imme-
diate" undertaking, both because the questions I have hitherto treated are but a portion of those which enter into the general subject of University Education, and also because those which are to come are, as I think, more frequently discussed and in themselves more easily settled. My inquiry has borne a preliminary character, not as to the duties of the Church towards a University, nor the characteristics of a University which is Catholic, but as to what a University is, what is its aim, what its nature, what its bearings. I have accordingly laid down first, that all branches of knowledge are, at least implicitly, its subject matter; that these branches are not isolated and independent one of another, but form together a whole or system; that they run into each other and complete each other, and that, in proportion to our knowledge of them as a whole, is the exactness and trustworthiness of our knowledge of them separately; that the process of imparting
knowledge to the intellect in this philosophical way, is its true culture; that this culture is a good in itself; that that knowledge which is both its instrument and result, is called Liberal Knowledge, that such culture and such knowledge may fitly be sought for their own sake; that they are, however, in addition, of great secular utility, as constituting the best and highest formation of the intellect for social and political life; and lastly, that, considered in a religious aspect, they concur with Christianity a certain way, and then diverge from it; and consequently prove in the event, sometimes its serviceable ally, sometimes from their very resemblance to it, an insidious and dangerous foe.

Though, however, these Discourses have only professed to be preliminary, being directed to the investigation of the object and subject-matter of the Education which a University professes to impart; at the same time I conceive they have laid the ground for deciding much more than what they have professed, even if they have not already advanced some way in the proof. I observed in my Introductory Discourse, that “the main principle on which I should have to proceed in the controversy to which I was addressing myself, was this, that Education must not be disjoined from Religion, or that Mixed Schools are constructed on a false idea.” Here, of course, the first step to determine was, “what is meant by University Education”; and to that inquiry...
political expediency, social utility, the tastes and dispositions which nature furnishes, constitute a sufficient guarantee that the claims of secular knowledge will be satisfied; theological knowledge requires on its part, and cannot safely dispense with, the vigilant presence of its own proper defender; and that that defender is the Church.

Such was the course of thought pursued in my first five Discourses; the view of the subject suggested in those which have followed has been less obvious indeed, but deeper and more serious than the former. I have been showing in them that, even though the case could be so, that the whole system of Catholicism was recognized and professed, without the direct presence of the Church, still this would not at once make a University a Catholic Institution, nor be sufficient to secure the due weight of theological truth in its philosophical studies. For it may easily happen, that a particular bias or drift may characterize an Institution, which no rules can reach, nor officers remedy, nor professions or promises counteract. We have an instance of such a case in the Spanish Inquisition;—here was a purely Catholic establishment, devoted to the maintenance, or rather the ascendancy of Catholicism, keenly zealous for theological truth, the stern foe of every anti-Catholic idea, and administered by Catholic theologians; yet it in no proper sense belonged to the Church. It was simply and entirely a state institution; it was an expression of that very Church-and-King spirit, which has prevailed in these islands, nay, it was an instrument of the state, according to the confession of the acutest Protestant historians, in its warfare against the Holy See. Considered "materially", it was nothing but Catholic; but its spirit and form were earthly and secular, in spite of whatever faith and zeal and sanctity and charity were to be found in the individuals who from time to time had a share in its administration. And in like manner it is no sufficient security for the Catholicity of a University, even that the whole of Catholic theology should be professed in it, unless the Church breathes her own pure and un-earthly spirit into it, and fashions and moulds its organization, and watches over its teaching, and knits together its pupils, and superintends its action. The Spanish Inquisition came into collision with the supreme Catholic authority, from the circumstance that its immediate end was of a secular character; and for the same reason, whereas Academical Institutions (as I have been so long engaged in showing) are in their very nature directed to social, national, temporal objects in the first instance, and since they are living and energizing bodies, if they deserve the name of University at all, and of necessity have some one formal and definite ethical character, good or bad, and do of a certainty imprint that character on the individuals who direct and who frequent them; it cannot but be, that, if left to
themselves, they will, in spite of their profession
of Catholic Truth, work out results more or
less prejudicial to its interests.

Nor is this all: such Institutions may be perverted
into hostility to Revealed Truth, in consequence of
the character of their teaching as well as of their end.
They are employed in the pursuit of Liberal Know-
ledge, and Liberal Knowledge has a special tendency,
not necessary or rightful, but a tendency in fact, when
cultivated by beings such as we are, to impress us
with a mere philosophical theory of life and conduct,
in the place of Revelation. I have said much on
this subject already. Truth has two attributes—
beauty and power; and while Useful Knowledge is
the possession of truth as powerful, Liberal Know-
ledge is the apprehension of it as beautiful. Pursue
it, either as beauty or as power, to its furthest
extent and its true limit, and you are led by either
road to the Eternal and Infinite, to the intimations
of conscience and the announcements of the Church.
Satisfy yourself with what is only visibly or intel-
gibly excellent, as you are likely to do, and you will
make present utility and natural beauty the prac-
tical test of truth, and the sufficient object of the
intellect. It is not that you will at once reject
Catholicism, but you will measure and proportion it
by an earthly standard. You will throw its highest
and most momentous disclosures into the back-
ground, you will deny its principles, explain away

its doctrines, re-arrange its precepts, and make light
of its practices, even while you profess it. Know-
ledge, viewed as knowledge, exerts a subtle influence
in throwing us back on ourselves, and making us
our own centre, and our minds the measure of all
things. This then is the tendency of that Liberal
Education, of which a University is the school, viz.,
to view Revealed Religion from an aspect of its
own,—to fuse and recast it,—to tune it, as it were,
to a different key, and to reset its harmonics,—to circum-
scribe it by a circle which unwarrantably amputates
here, and unduly developes there; and all under the
notion, conscious or unconscious, that the human
intellect, self-educated and self-supported, is more
true and perfect in its ideas and judgments, than
that of Prophets and Apostles, to whom the sights
and sounds of Heaven were immediately conveyed.
A sense of propriety, order, consistency, and comple-

teness gives birth to a rebellious stirring against miracle
and mystery, against the severe and the terrible.

First and chiefly, this Intellectualism comes into
collision with precept, then with doctrine, then with
the very principle of dogmatism. A perception of the
Beautiful becomes the substitute for faith. External
to the Church, it at once runs into scepticism or
infidelity; but even within it, and with the most
unqualified profession of her Creed, it acts, if left to
itselS, as an element of corruption and debility.
Catholicism, as it has come down to us from the first,
seems to be mean and illiberal; it is a mere popular religion; it is the religion of illiterate ages or servile populations or barbarian warriors; it must be treated with discrimination and delicacy, corrected, softened, improved, if it is to satisfy an enlightened generation. It must be stereotyped as the patron of arts, or the pupil of speculation, or the protégé of science; it must play the literary academician, or the empirical philanthropist, or the political partizan; it must keep up with the age; some or other expedient it must devise, in order to explain away, or to hide, tenets under which the intellect labours and of which it is ashamed—its doctrine, for instance, of grace, its mystery of the Godhead, its preaching of the Cross, its devotion to Mary, or its loyalty to Peter. Let this spirit be freely evolved out of that philosophical condition of mind, which in former Discourses I have so highly, so justly extolled, and it is impossible but, first indifference, then laxity of belief, then heresy, then an explicit suppression of Catholic theology, will be the successive results. But this is only the beginning of evils: there is no medium between truth and error, and the ultimate event of the struggle will show it. The University, which does not profess the Faith, must in consistency denounce it. It becomes the prey and the organ of avowed infidelity, as bitter a foe to the interests of Revealed Truth, as it might have been a defence.

Here then are two injuries, which Revelation is likely to sustain at the hands of the Masters of human reason, unless the Church, as in duty bound, protects the sacred treasure which is in jeopardy. The first is a simple ignoring of Theological Truth altogether, under the pretence of not recognizing differences of religious opinion—which can only take place in countries or under governments which have abjured Catholicism. The second, which is of a more subtle character, is a recognition indeed of Catholicism, but (as if in pretended mercy to it) an adulteration of its spirit. These two have successively constituted the subject of these Discourses; and now, at the risk of anticipating what may come before us in future discussions, I will proceed to show the dangers I speak of more distinctly, by a reference to the general subject-matter of instruction, which a University undertakes.

There are three great subjects, on which Human Reason employs itself—God, Nature, and Man: and the province of theology being, as the present argument supposes, for the time withdrawn, the physical and social worlds remain. These, when respectively subjected to Human Reason, form two books: the book of nature is called Science, the book of man is called Literature. Literature and Science, thus considered, nearly constitute the subject-matter of Liberal Education; and, while Science is made to subserve the former of the two injuries, which Revealed Truth sustains,—its exclusion, Literature subserves the
latter,—its corruption. Let us consider the influence of each upon Religion separately.

1. As to Physical Science, of course there can be no real collision between it and Catholicism. Nature and Grace, Reason and Revelation, come from the same Divine Author, whose works cannot contradict each other. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied, that, in matter of fact, there always has been a sort of jealousy and hostility between Religion and physical philosophers. The name of Galileo reminds us of it at once. Not content with investigating and reasoning in his own province, he went out of his way directly to insult the received interpretation of Scripture; theologians repelled an attack which was wanton and arrogant; and Science, insulted in her minister, has taken its full revenge upon Theology since. A vast multitude of its teachers, I fear it must be said, have been either unbelievers, or sceptics, or at least have denied to Christianity any teaching, distinctive or special, over the Religion of Nature. There have indeed been most illustrious exceptions; some men protected by their greatness of mind, some by their religious profession, some by the fear of public opinion; but I suppose the run of experimentalists, external to the Catholic Church, have more or less inherited the positive or negative unbelief of Laplace, Buffon, Franklin, Priestley, Cuvier, and Humboldt. I do not of course mean to say that there need be in every case a resentful and virulent opposition made to Religion on the part of scientific men; but their emphatic silence or phlegmatic inadverence as to its claims, have implied more eloquently than any words, that in their opinion it had no voice at all in the subject-matter which they had appropriated to themselves. The same antagonism shows itself in the middle ages. Friar Bacon was popularly regarded with suspicion as a dealer in unlawful arts; Pope Sylvester the Second has been accused of magic for his knowledge of natural secrets; and the geographical ideas of St. Virgil, Bishop of Salzburg, were regarded with anxiety by the great St. Boniface, the glory of England, the Martyr-Apostle of Germany. I suppose, in matter of fact, magical superstition and physical knowledge did commonly go together in those ages: however, the hostility between experimental science and theology is far older than Christianity. Lord Bacon traces it to an era prior to Socrates; he tells us that, among the Greeks, the atheistic was the philosophy most favourable to physical discoveries, and he does not hesitate to imply that the rise of the religious schools was the ruin of science.\(^*\)

Now, if we would investigate the reason of this opposition between Theology and Physics, I suppose we must first take into account Lord Bacon's own explanation of it. It is common in judicial inqui-

\(^*\) Vid. Hallam's *Literature of Europe*, Macaulay's *Essay*, and the Author's *Oxford University Sermons*, IX.
lies, to caution the parties on whom the verdict depends, to put out of their minds whatever they have heard out of court on the subject to which their attention is to be directed. They are to judge by the evidence; and this is a rule which holds in other investigations as far as this, that nothing of an adventitious nature ought to be introduced into the process. Take the well-known instance of the Homilies of the Established Church: when, in enjoining the ordinance of fasting, after appealing to Leviticus, the prophet Zachary, St. Luke, and the Council of Chalcedon, they go on to speak of abstinences “upon policy”, “in consideration of maintaining fisher towns bordering upon the sea, and for the increase of fishermen, of whom do spring mariners to go upon the sea, to the furnishing of the navy of the same”, we feel at once the incongruity of mixing religion and statute law. In like manner, from religious investigations, as such, physics must be excluded, and from physical, as such, religion; and if we mix them, we shall spoil both. The theologian, speaking of Divine Omnipotence, for the time simply ignores the laws of nature as restraints upon it; and the physical philosopher, on the other hand, in his experiments upon natural phenomena, is simply ascertaining those laws, precluding (to use the technical word) that Omnipotence. If the theologian, in tracing the ways of Providence, were stopped with objections grounded on the impossibility of physical miracles, he would

justly protest against the interruption; and were the philosopher, who was determining the motion of the heavenly bodies, to be questioned about their final or their First Cause, he too would suffer an illogical interruption. The latter asks the cause of volcanoes, and is impatient at being told it is “the will of God”; the former asks the cause of the overthrow of the guilty cities, and is postposonely referred to the volcanic action still visible in their neighbourhood. The inquiry into final causes for the moment passes over the existence of nature; the inquiry into physical, passes over for the moment the existence of God. In other words, physical science is in a certain sense atheistic, for the very reason it is not theology.

This is Lord Bacon’s justification, and an intelligible one, for considering that the fall of atheistic philosophy in ancient times was a blight upon the hopes of physical science. “Aristotle”, he says, “Galen, and others frequently introduce such causes as these:—the hairs of the eyelids are for a fence to the sight; the bones for pillars whence to build the bodies of animals; the leaves of trees are to defend the fruit from the sun and wind; the clouds are designed for watering the earth. All which are properly alleged in metaphysics; but, in physics, are impertinent, and as remoras to the ship, that hinder the sciences from holding on their course of improvement, and introducing a neglect of searching after physical causes”.

* In August., 5. 
Here then is one reason for the prejudice of physical philosophers against Theology:—on the one hand, their deep satisfaction in the laws of nature indisposes them towards the thought of a Moral Governor, and makes them sceptical of His interposition; on the other hand, the occasional interference of religious writers in a province not religious, has made them sore, suspicious, and resentful.

Another reason of a kindred nature is to be found in the difference of method, by which truths are gained in theology and in physical science. Induction is the instrument of Physics, and deduction only is the instrument of Theology. There the simple question is, What is revealed? all doctrinal knowledge flows from one fountain-head. If we are able to enlarge our view and multiply our propositions, it must be merely by the comparison and adjustment of existing truths; if we would solve new questions, it must be by consulting old answers. The notion of doctrinal knowledge absolutely novel, and of simple addition from without, is intolerable to Catholic ears, and never was entertained by any one who was even approaching to an understanding of our creed. Revelation is all in all in doctrine; the Apostles its sole depository; the inferential method its sole instrument, and ecclesiastical authority its sole sanction. The Divine Voice has spoken once for all, and the only question is about its meaning. Now this process, as far as it was reasoning, was the very mode of reasoning, which, as regards physical knowledge, the school of Bacon has superseded by the inductive method:—no wonder, then, that that school should be irritated and indignant to find that a subject-matter remains still, in which their favourite instrument has no office; no wonder that they rise up against this memorial of an antiquated system, as an eyesore and an insult; and no wonder that the very force and dazzling success of their own method in its own department should sway or bias unduly the religious sentiments of any persons who come under its influence. They assert that no new truth can be gained by deduction; Catholics assent, but add that, as regards religious truth, they have not to seek at all, for they have it already. Christian Truth is purely of revelation, that revelation we can but explain, we cannot increase, except relatively to our own apprehensions; without it we should have known nothing of its contents, with it we know just as much, as its contents and nothing more. And, as it was a divine act independent of man, so will it remain, in spite of man. Niebuhr may revolutionize history, Lavoisier chemistry, Newton astronomy; but God Himself is the author as well as the subject of theology. When Truth can change, if Revelation can change; when human reason can out-reason the Omniscient, then may it supersede His work.

Avoirdupois such as these fall strange upon the ear of men, whose first principle is the search after truth.
and whose starting points of search are things material and sensible. They seem any process of inquiry not founded on experiment; the Mathematics indeed they endure, because that science deals with ideas, not with facts, and leads to conclusions hypothetical rather than real; "Metaphysics" they even use as a bye-word of reproach; and Ethics they admit only on condition that it gives up conscience as its scientific ground, and bases itself on tangible utility: but as to Theology, they cannot deal with it, they cannot master it, and so they simply outlaw it and ignore it. Catholicism, forsooth, "confines the intellect", because it holds that God's intellect is greater than theirs, and what He has done, man cannot improve. And what in some sort justifies them to themselves in this extravagance, is the circumstance that there is a religion close at their doors which, discarding so severe a tone, has actually adopted their own principle of inquiry. Protestantism treats Scripture, just as they deal with Nature; it takes the sacred text as a large collection of phenomena, from which, by an inductive process, each individual Christian may arrive at just those religious conclusions which approve themselves to his own judgment. It considers faith a mere modification of reason, as being an acquiescence in certain probable conclusions till better are found. Sympathy then, if no other reason, throws experimental philosophers into alliance with the enemies of Catholicism.

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I have another consideration to add, not less important than any I have hitherto adduced. The physical sciences, Astronomy, Chemistry, and the rest, are doubtless engaged upon divine works, and cannot issue in untrue religious conclusions. But at the same time it must be recollected that Revelation has reference to circumstances which did not arise till after the Heavens and the Earth were made. They were made before the introduction of moral evil into the world: whereas the Catholic Church is the instrument of a remedial dispensation to meet that introduction. No wonder then that her teaching is simply distinct, though not divergent, from the theology which Physical Science suggests to its followers. She sets before us a number of attributes and acts on the part of the Divine Being, for which the material and animal creation gives no scope; power, wisdom, goodness are the burden of the physical world, but it does not and could not speak of mercy, longsuffering, and the economy of human redemption, and but partially of the moral law and moral goodness. "Sacred theology", says Lord Bacon, "must be drawn from the words and the oracles of God: not from the light of nature or the dictates of reason. It is written, that 'the Heavens declare the glory of God'; but we nowhere find it, that the Heavens declare the will of God: which is pronounced a law and a testimony, that men should do according to it. Nor does this hold only in the
great mysteries of the Godhead, of the creation, of the redemption. . . . We cannot doubt that a large part of the moral law is too sublime to be attained by the light of nature; though it is still certain, that men, even with the light and law of nature, have some notions of virtue, vice, justice, wrong, good, and evil. That the new and further manifestations of the Almighty, made by Revelation, are in perfect harmony with the teaching of the natural world, forms indeed one subject of the profound work of the Protestant Bishop Butler; but they cannot in any sense be gathered from nature, and the silence of nature concerning them may easily seduce the imagination, though it has no force to persuade the reason, to revolt from doctrines which have not been authenticated by facts, but are enforced by authority. In a scientific age, then, there will naturally be a parade of what is called Natural Theology, a wide-spread profession of the Unitarian creed, an impatience of mystery, and a scepticism about miracles.

And to all this must be added the ample opportunity which physical science gives to the indulgence of those sentiments of beauty, order, and congruity, of which I have said so much as the ensigns and colours (as they may be called) of a civilized age in its warfare against Catholicism.

It being considered, then, that Catholicism differs from physical science, in drift, in method of proof,

* De Augm. § 28.

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and in subject-matter, how can it fail to meet with unfair usage from the philosophers of any Institution in which there is no one to take its part? That Physical Science itself will be ultimately the loser by such ill treatment of Theology, I have insisted on at great length in the first part of these Discourses: for to depress unduly, to encroach upon any science, and much more on an important one, is to do an injury to all. However, this is not the concern of the Church; the Church has no call to watch over and protect Science; but towards Theology she has a distinct duty: it is one of the special trusts committed to her keeping. Where Theology is, there she must be; and if a University cannot fulfill its name and office without the recognition of Revealed Truth, she must be there to see that it is a bōnd fide recognition, sincerely made and consistently acted on.

2. And if the intervention of the Church is necessary in the Schools of Science, still more imperatively is it demanded in the other main constituent portion of the subject-matter of Liberal Education—Literature. Literature stands related to Man, as Science stands to Nature; it is his history. Man is composed of body and soul; he thinks and acts; he has appetites, passions, affections, motives, designs; he has within him the lifelong struggle of duty with inclination; he has an intellect fertile and capacious; he is formed for society, and society multiplies and diversifies in endless combinations.
his personal characteristics, moral and intellectual. All this constitutes his life; of all this Literature is the expression; so that Literature is in some sort to him what autobiography is to the individual; it is his Life and Remains. Moreover, he is this sentient, intelligent, creative, and operative being, quite independent of any extraordinary aid from Heaven, or any definite religious belief; and, as such, as he is in himself, does Literature represent him; it is the Life and Remains of the natural man, or man in pura natura. I do not mean to say that it is impossible in its very notion that Literature should be tinctured by a religious spirit; Hebrew Literature, as far as it can be called Literature, certainly is simply theological, and has a character imprinted on it which is above nature; but I am speaking of what is to be expected without any extraordinary dispensation; and I say that, in matter of fact, as Science is the reflection of Nature, so is Literature also—the one, of Nature physical; the other, of Nature moral and social. Circumstances, such as locality, period, language, seem to make little or no difference in the character of Literature, as such; on the whole, all Literatures are one; they are the voices of the natural man.

I wish this were all that had to be said to the disadvantage of Literature; but while Nature physical remains fixed in its own laws, Nature moral and social, has a will of its own, is self-governed, and never remains any long while in that state from which it started into action. Man will never continue in a mere state of innocence; he is sure to sin, and his literature will be the expression of his sin, and this whether he be heathen or Christian. Christianity has thrown gleams of light on him and his literature; but, as it has not converted him, but only certain choice specimens of him, so it has not changed the characters of his mind or his history; his literature is either what it was, or worse than what it was, in proportion as there has been an abuse of knowledge granted and a rejection of truth. On the whole, then, I think it will be found, and ever found, as a matter of course, that Literature, as such, no matter of what nation, is the science or history, partly and at best of the natural man, partly of man fallen.

Here then, I say, you are involved in a difficulty greater than that which besets the cultivation of Science; for, if Physical Science be dangerous, I have said it is dangerous, because it necessarily ignores the idea of moral evil; but Literature is open to the more grievous imputation of recognizing and understanding it too well. Some one will say to me perhaps: "Our youth shall not be corrupted. We will dispense with all general or national Literature whatever, if it be so exceptional; we will have a Christian Literature of our own, as pure, as true, as the Jewish." You cannot have it— I do not say you cannot form a select literature for the young, or for
the middle or lower classes; this is another matter altogether: I am speaking of University Education, which implies an extended range of reading, which has to deal with the standard works of genius, or what are called the classics of a language: and I say, from the nature of the case, if Literature is to be made a study of human nature, you cannot have a Christian Literature. It is a contradiction in terms to attempt a sinless Literature of a sinful man. You may gather together something very great and high, something higher than any literature ever was; and when you have done so, you will find that it is not Literature at all. You will have simply left the delineation of man, as such, and have substituted for it, as far as you have had any thing to substitute, that of man, as he is or might be, under certain special advantages. Give up the study of man, as such, if so it must be; but say you do so. Do not say you are studying him, his history, his mind and his heart, when you are studying something else. Man is a being of genius, passion, intellect, conscience, power. He exercises these various gifts in various ways, in great deeds, in great thoughts, in heroic acts, in hateful crimes. He founds states, he fights battles, he builds cities, he ploughs the forest, he subdues the elements, he rules his kind. He creates great ideas, and influences many generations. He takes a thousand shapes, and undergoes a thousand fortunes. Literature records them all to the life,

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Quisquis aequus homines, votum, timor, ira, voluptas, Gandia, discursus.

He pours out his fervid soul in poetry; he sways to and fro; he soars, he dives, in his restless speculations; his lips drop eloquence; he touches the canvas, and it glows with beauty; he sweeps the strings, and they thrill with an ecstatic meaning. He looks back into himself, and he reads his own thoughts, and notes them down; he looks out into the universe, and tells over the elements and principles, of which it is the product.

Such is man: put him aside, keep him before you; but, whatever you do, do not take him for what he is not, for something more divine and sacred, man regenerate. Nay, beware of showing grace and its work at such disadvantage, as to make the few whom it has thoroughly influenced compete in intellect with the vast multitude who either have it not, or use it not. The elect are few to choose out of, and the world is inexhaustible. From the first, Jabel and Tubalcain, Nimrod, the stout hunter, the learning of the Pharaoh, and the wisdom of the East country, are of the world. Every now and then they are rivalled by a Solomon or a Besedu, but the habitat of natural gifts is the natural man. The Church may use them; she cannot at her will originate them. Not till the whole human race is regenerate, will its literature be pure and true. Possible of course it is in idea, for nature, inspired by grace, to exhibit
itself on a large scale, in an originality of thought or action, even far beyond what the world's literature has recorded or exemplified; but, if you would in fact have a literature of saints, first of all have a nation of them.

What is a clearer proof of the truth of all this than the structure of the Inspired Word itself? It is undeniably not the reflection or picture of the many, but of the few; it is no picture of life, but an anticipation of death and judgment. Human Literature is about all things, grave or gay, painful or pleasant; but the Inspired Word views them only in one aspect, and as they tend to one scope. It gives us little insight into the fertile developments of mind; it has no terms in its vocabulary to express with exactness the intellect and its separate faculties: it knows nothing of genius, fancy, wit, invention, presence of mind, resource. It does not discourse of empire, commerce, enterprise, learning, philosophy, or the fine arts. Slightly too does it touch on the simple and innocent courses of nature and their reward. Little does it say of those temporal blessings which rest upon our worldly occupations, and make them easy; of the blessings which we derive from the sunshine day and the serene night, from the succession of seasons, and the produce of the Earth. Little about our recreations and our daily domestic comforts; little about the ordinary occasions of festivity and mirth, which sweeten human life; and nothing at all about various pursuits or amusements, which it would be going too much into detail to mention. We read indeed of the first when Isaac was weaned, and of Jacob's courtship, and of the religious merrymakings of holy Job; but exceptions such as these, do but remind us what might be in Scripture, and is not. If then by Literature is meant the manifestation of human nature in language, you will seek for it in vain except in the world. Put up with it, as it is, or do not pretend to cultivate it; take things as they are, not as you could wish them.

Nay, I am obliged to go further still, even if we could, still we should be shrinking from our plain duty, Gentlemen, did we leave out Literature from Education. For why do we educate, except to prepare for the world? Why do we cultivate the intellect of the many beyond the first elements of knowledge, except for this world? Will it be much matter in the world to come, whether our bodily health or whether our intellectual strength was more or less, except of course as this world is in all its circumstances a trial for the next? If then a University is a direct preparation for this world, let it be what it professes. It is not a Convent, it is not a Seminary; it is a place to fit men of the world for the world. We cannot possibly keep them from plunging into the world, with all its ways and principles and maxims, when their time comes; but we can prepare them against what is
inevitable; and it is not the way to learn to swim in troubled waters, never to have gone into them. Proscribe (I do not merely say particular authors, particular works, particular passages) but Secular Literature as such; cut out from your class books all broad manifestations of the natural man; and those manifestations are waiting, for your pupil's benefit, at the very doors of your lecture room in living and breathing substance. They will meet him there in all the charm of novelty, and all the fascination of genius or of amiability. To-day a pupil, to-morrow a member of the great world: to-day confined to the Lives of the Saints, to-morrow thrown upon Babel;—thrown on Babel, without the honest indulgence of wit and humour and imagination ever opened to him, without any fastidiousness of taste wrought into him, without any rule given him for discriminating "the precious from the vile", beauty from sin, the truth from the sophistry of nature, what is innocent from what is poison. You have refused him the masters of human thought, who would in some sense have educated him, because of their incidental corruption: you have shut up from him those, whose thoughts strike home to us, whose words are proverbs, whose names are indigenous to all the world, the standard of their own mother tongue, and the pride and boast of their countrymen, Homer, Ariosto, Cervantes, Shakespeare, because the old Adam smelt rank in them; and for what have you reserved him?

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Difficult then as the question may be, and much as it may try the judgments and even divide the opinions of zealous and religious Catholics, I cannot feel any doubt myself, Gentlemen, that the Church's true policy, is not to contemplate the exclusion of Literature from Secular Schools, but her own admission into them. Let her do for Literature in one way, what she does for Science in another; each has its imperfection, and she supplies it for each. She fear no knowledge, but she purifies all; she represses no element of our nature, but cultivates the whole. Science is grave, methodical, logical; with science then she argues, and offers reason to reason. Literature does not argue, but declaims and insinuates; it is multiflora and versatile: it persuades instead of convincing, it seduces, it carries captive; it appeals to the sense of honour, or to the imagination, or to the stimulus of curiosity; it makes its way by means of gaiety, satire, romance; the beautiful, the pleasurable. Is it wonderful that, with an agent like this, the Church should claim to deal with a vigour
corresponding to its restlessness, to interfere in its proceedings with a higher hand, and to wield an authority in the choice of its studies and of its books, which would be tyrannical, if reason and fact were the only instruments of its conclusions? But, any how, her principle is one and the same throughout: not to prohibit truth of any kind, but to see that no doctrines pass under the name of Truth but those which claim it rightfully.

Such at least is the lesson which I am taught by all the thought which I have been able to bestow upon the subject; such is the lesson which I have gained from the history of my own special Father and Patron, St. Philip Neri. He lived in an age as traitorous to the interests of Catholicism as any that preceded it, or can follow it. He lived at a time when pride mounted high, and the senses held rule; a time when kings and nobles never had more of state and homage, and never less of personal responsibility and peril: when medieval winter was receding, and the summer sun of civilization was bringing into leaf and flower a thousand forms of luxurious enjoyment; when a new world of thought and beauty had opened upon the human mind, by the discovery of the treasures of classic literature and art. He saw the great and the gifted, dazzled by the Enchantress, and drinking in the magic of her song; he saw the high and the wise, the student and the artist, painting, and poetry, and sculpture, and music, and architecture,

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drawn within her range, and circling round the abyss; he saw heathen forms mounting thence, and forming in the thick air—all this he saw, and he perceived that the mischief was to be met, not with argument, not with science, not with protest and warnings, not by the recluse or the preacher, but by means of the great counter-fascination of purity and truth. He was raised up to do a work almost peculiar in the Church, not to be a Jerome Savonarola, though Philip had a true devotion towards him and a tender memory of his Florentine house: not to be a St. Carlo, though in his beaming countenance Philip had recognized the aureol of a saint; not to be a St. Ignatius, wrestling with the foe, though Philip was termed the Society's bell of call, so many subjects did he send to it; not to be a St. Francis Xavier, though Philip had longed to shed his blood for Christ in India with him; not to be a St. Cajetan, or hunter of souls, for Philip preferred, as he expressed it, tranquilly to cast in his net to gain them; he preferred to yield to the stream, and direct the current, which he could not stop, of science, literature, art, and fashion, and to sweeten and to sanctify what God had made very good and man had spoilt.

And so he contemplated as the idea of his mission, not the propagation of the faith, nor the exposition of doctrine, nor the catechetical schools; whatever was exact and systematic pleased him not; he put from him monastic rule and authoritative speech, as David
refused the armour of his king. No; he would be but an ordinary individual priest as others, and his weapons should be but unaffected humility and unpretending love. All he did was to be done by the light, and fervour, and convincing eloquence, of his personal character and his easy conversation. He came to the Eternal City and he sat himself down there, and his home and his family gradually grew up around him, by the spontaneous accession of materials from without. He did not so much seek his own, as draw them to him. He sat in his small room, and they in their gay worldly dresses, the rich and the wellborn, as well as the simple and the illiterate, crowded into it. In the mid heat of summer, in the frosts of winter, still was he in that low and narrow cell at Saint Girolamo, reading the hearts of those who came to him, and curing their souls' maladies by the very touch of his hand. It was a vision of the Magi worshipping the infant Saviour, so pure and innocent, so sweet and beautiful was he; and so loyal and so dear to the gracious Virgin Mother. And they who came, remained gazing and listening, till at length, first one and then another threw off their bravery, and took his poor cassock and girdle instead; or, if they kept it, it was to put haircloth under it, and to carry off his light yoke upon their shoulders.

In the words of his biographer, "he was all things to all men. He suited himself to noble and ignoble, young and old, subjects and prelates, learned and ignorant; and received those who were strangers to him with singular benignity, and embraced them with as much love and charity, as if he had been a long while expecting them. When he was called upon to be merry he was so; if there was a demand upon his sympathy he was equally ready. He gave the same welcome to all: caressing the poor equally with the rich, and wearying himself to assist all to the utmost limits of his power. In consequence of his being so accessible and willing to receive all comers, many went to him every day, and some continued for the space of thirty, nay forty, years, to visit him very often both morning and evening, so that his room went by the agreeable nickname of the Home of Christian mirth. Nay, people came to him, not only from all parts of Italy, but from France, Spain, Germany, and all Christendom; and even the infidels and Jews, who had ever any communication with him, revered him as a holy man."

The first nobles of Rome, the Massimi, the Aldobrandini, the Colonna, the Altemps, the Vitelleschi, were his friends and his penitents. Nobles of Poland, Grandees of Spain, Knights of Malta, could not leave Rome without coming to him. Cardinals, Archbishops, and Bishops were his intimates; Federigo Borromeo haunted his room and got the name of "Father Philip's soul". The Cardinal-Archbishop:  

of Verona and Bologna wrote books in his honour. Pope Pius the Fourth died in his arms. Lawyers, painters, musicians, physicians, it was the same too with them. Baronius, Zazzara, and Ricci, left the law at his bidding, and joined his congregation, to do its work, to write the annals of the Church, and to die in the odour of sanctity. Palestrina had Father Philip’s ministrations in his last moments. Animaccia hung about him during life, sent him a message after death, and was conducted by him through Purgatory to Heaven. And who was he, I say, all the while, but an humble priest, a stranger in Rome, with no distinction of family or letters, no claim of station or of office, great simply in the attraction with which a Divine Power had gifted him? and yet thus humble, thus unennobled, thus empty-handed, he has achieved the glorious title of Apostle of Rome.

Well were it for his clients and children, Gentlemen, if they could promise themselves the very shadow of his special power, or could hope to do a miserable fraction of the sort of work in which he was pre-eminently skilled. But so far at least they may attempt,—to take his position, and to use his method, and to cultivate the arts of which he was so bright a pattern. For me, if it be God’s blessed will, that in the years now coming, I am to have a share in the great undertaking, which has been the occasion and the subject of these discourses, so far I can say for certain, that whether or not I can do any thing at all in St. Philip’s way, at least I can do nothing in any other. Neither by my habits of life, nor by vigour of age, am I fitted for the task of authority, or rule, or initiation. I do but aspire, if strength is given me, to be your minister in a work which must employ younger minds and stronger lives than mine. I am but fit to hear my witness, to proffer my suggestions, to express my sentiments, as has in fact been my occupation in these discussions; to throw such light upon general questions, upon the choice of objects, upon the import of principles, upon the tendency of measures, as past reflection and experience enable me to contribute. I shall have to make appeals to your consideration, your friendliness, your confidence, of which I have had so many instances, on which I so tranquilly repose; and after all, neither you nor I must ever be surprised, should it so happen that the Hand of Him, with whom are the springs of life and death, weighs heavy on me, and makes me unequal to anticipations in which you have been too kind, and to hopes in which I may have been too sanguine.
APPENDIX

TO

THE DISCOURSES

ON

UNIVERSITY EDUCATION.

ADDRESSED TO

THE CATHOLICS OF DUBLIN.

BY

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DUBLIN,

JAMES DUFFY, 7, WELLINGTON QUAY.

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I am very sensible of the meagreness of the following illustrations of the main principles laid down in the foregoing Discourses; but, as I am so situated that I cannot give the time or labour necessary for satisfying—my own sense of what they ought to be, I avail myself of such as happen to be at hand or on my memory.

§ 1. Knowledge is the direct end of University Education.

I hardly know what steps to take in order to establish this position, which has been startling to some persons, viz., that the education of the intellect, or the diffusion of knowledge, is the direct scope of a University. It seems a truth, or rather an historical fact, which it is impossible to dispute, and therefore hardly possible to prove. What would be the popular description of a University? A place for learned and scientific men, a learned body, a large corporation, with professors of art and science, with faculties in theology, law, and medicine, with logical disputations, with examinations in intellectual proficiency, with degrees in token of that proficiency attained. I do not say that, over and above this, account of it, the notions will never suggest themselves of Religious Festivals, Solemnities, and Sermons, of discipline, of Proctors, of
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eclesiastical jurisdiction, delegates to Councils, etc.; but the question before us is as to the idea on the whole, or the formal conception, of a University in the minds of the generality of men; and I cannot doubt it would be pronounced at once to be a seat of science and letters, or that its end is knowledge.

Its recognized titles correspond: it is a "Studium Generale"; a "Universitas Literarum"; a "Schola"; and an "Academia"; while, if we would know what an Academy is, we learn from Horace, that youths were sent to Athens,

Inter sys Academi quarere rerum.

And the whole tenor of any work upon Universities implies this. Huber's learned Treatise implies it from beginning to end, and for that very reason scarcely ever says it categorically.

He observes, for instance, "Before the time of Charlemagne, monastic and cathedral schools existed in Italy and in England; after his time, they were established on the Continent, north of the Alps. These schools were intended for the cultivation of the higher learning... Indeed, under Charlemagne and Alfred, and even in Germany under the Othos, the Church manifested an intellectual spirit much more similar than is generally admitted, to the spirit of the Reformation and of the period of revived classical learning. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, however, the Schools continued to rise and extend their organization, parallel to the general progress of intelligence. Speculation, Theology, and Philosophy were growing out of the narrow Logic and Rhetoric of the ancient Trivium and Quadrivium, and two new sources of knowledge—Roman Law and Graeco-Arabian Natural History—were opened."

Again, he says of Oxford: "As early as the end of the ninth century, Oxford was the seat of a school of the highest intellectual cultivation then existing. By the end of the eleventh, it had as good a title to be called a University, as had that of Paris: whether

as regards the quality of its studies, or its inward organization. It is well known how England was devastated by the struggles of Saxon chiefs, and by incursions of the Sea Kings of the North. Meanwhile learning was so triumphed over that no traces of it were to be found, except in Ireland, and in the North and West of England, where Alfred appeared for his people's rescue. From the less distracted parts of his own kingdom he collected pious and learned men, and brought others from the Continent... The will and example of the King gave a vast impulse to learning, and his youths flocked to the newly opened schools." It is true that learning includes theology and professed religion; but the simple question is, not what learning does or is, but whether the object contemplated by a University is or is not learning.

Polyb. Virgil, centuries ago, had said the same thing: "Neotum imprimis, monastic, professionis virum sanctissimum, ob eumque eruditionem mira amore complexus est (Alfredus); quo honorato Oxoniis gynesium instituit, propusit mercede omnibus, qui publice bonos aedec proferrent. Quid multi doctrinae divini confluxerant docendi gratia... Polyb. Virgil, Hist. v, adfin.

And an Oxford writer of the generation now passing away, even while reclining the modern schemes of education, has borne a similar testimony: speaking of Universities, he says—

"The composition and the early state of these bodies appears to have been nearly the same all over Europe, and, except in the instance of the two English Universities, has not undergone any material change... The object was in the main the same then as it is now; to provide for the three chief professions of theology, law, and physic, not only the best instruction in those departments, but that common basis of liberal instruction, which might exercise and enlarge the mind, before its attention was confined to the particular business of those several callings; and at the same time to afford ingenuous men an opportunity of displaying their talents in

teaching or improving the several arts and sciences which comprehended all that was thought most important in human knowledge. In this Encyclopaedia were usually included ethics, physics, and metaphysics (to which three heads the title Philosophy was especially given), and as a preparatory discipline, grammar, logic, rhetoric, geometry, astronomy, and history, to which the study of the Greek language was, as early as the latter part of the fifteenth century, commonly added. Copleston in Quarterly Review, Dec. 1825.

Charlemagne's design was the same as Alfred's; viz., by means of the intellectual culture, which Universities or Academies contemplate and impart, to promote the glory of God and the well-being of the Church. "Domus Rex Carolus," says a writer of his life, "ut Romae artis grammaticae et computatoriae magistros sequere adduxit Franciam, et utique studium litterarum expandere jussit. Ansa ipsum enim domum Carolum Regem in Gallia nullum fereat studium Liberalium Artium."

In like manner, but more fully in his own Epistle to the Abbot of Fulda. "Notus sit Deus, fie vertutis vestrae, quia nos unum cum fidelius nostri consideravimus utile esse, et Episcopum et monasteria, nobis, Christo prorogitis, ad gubernandum commissa, propter regulam vitae ordinem atque sancta religionis conversationem, atiam in literarum mediationibus, quae dominus Dominum dicere posunt, servandam unius satis capacitiem, docendi studium decreant impendere; qualiter sint rectius norma honestation morum, ita quoque docendi et docendi instantia ordinet et cultum scribit verborum, et qui Deo placere apptent recte vivendi, ei placere non negligente recte locando."

Here two points are clear; first, that Religion is not the immediate end of Charlemagne's schools, but of the existing monasteries; and on the other hand, that science or literature as such, was not the end, but, as I have said above, the culture of the intellect.

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Those who learned to live well from monastic teaching, were to learn to speak well from collegiate or academic. He proceeds: "Quomodo erit in societatis, quanta nescit, prius tamen est nescire quam scire". He wished that his schools to impart knowledge, and that for the sake of practice. Hence he goes on in the same letter to notice the benefit for learning for a better understanding of Holy Scripture.

I think it abundantly evident that intellectual, and not moral education is the direct end of a University; and the formation of its members into particular Societies, and the institution of separate bodies within its jurisdiction, is an additional evidence of it. There were established to supply a want, to give that which the University, from the nature of the case, could not give, though it might and would attempt it, protection and security to its children against the temptations of a great city, or at least against the disorders necessary to a mixed multitude of students. Such would be Seminaries for the secular clergy; such would be monastic communities, as Durham and Gloucester Colleges in Oxford for the Benedictines; such Halls, Halls, and Chambers. These bodies did not set them- selves to teach anything which could not be taught in the University, for the University taught theology in all its parts; but they protected morals, and formed religious habits, in those who otherwise would have been exposed to the evils under which the German Universities are said to lie in this day. I do not mean to say, that, in the absence of the institution of the theological faculty here or there, a Seminary or a College might not fulfill accidentally this function of the University; but I am speaking here of the normal state of a University or College. And in saying this it is evident, I am making no admission to those who, as in the Queen's Colleges among us, would banish theology from the public teaching and confine it to the private Society; for though there were Universities in the middle ages, without the theological faculty, yet theological truth was always professed and assumed as true in the academic teaching which was actually given, it entered as truth into the subject.
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matter of all the knowledge which was actually taught there, and
was ever implicitly present, and absent only accidentally.

I set down the following extracts from Papal bulls or letters, not
in proof of what I think cannot be doubted, but simply as an histori-
ical record. According to them Universities are "institutions for
the promotion of letters and the sciences, tending to the defence of
the faith and the welfare of society".

Boniface the Eighth, of Rome: "Fervent, non immerito desiderio
ducuntur, quod cadem urbe, quam divina bonitas tot gratiarum
dotibus insignitiv, scientiarum etiam fat facienda numeribus, ut
vires productur consiliui matutitate conspicuo, viribus relictis
continens, nec diversarum facultatum dotamentia eritotes, sitque
ibi, hos scientiarum irrigantes, de cibus pleniutudo hauriant universi
liberalibus eripientes ubiui documenta". Caraf. De Gymnus. Rom.,
p. 573.

And Innocent the Seventh: " Cum litterarum studia et bonarum
artium doctrina, pretiosam et manifestissimam utilitatem, quam
privatim atque publice afferunt, maximum nomenum ac
dignitatem illa civilitatis et locis, in quibus ipsa vigebat,
prehbore videntur, et eum pace ac tranquillitate, cibus nos esse
cupieniitum proficiem, maxime in confection, decretibus, Deo 
auctore, haussiici studia per longissima spatia haecne inveniendae, in 
hoste Tempore Pontificatus ad hunc urbem redire de et omni fomento ea
ruram excitar, ut hones per eruditionem veritatem veram agnos-
cant, et Deo atque legibus parem addiscant". Vid. Caraf. De

Again, Benedict the Fourteenth: "Quanta reipublice commoda
obvehant ex publicis studiorum Universitatis, in quibus bonarum
artium et scientiarum docentia ingenio juventutis trahuntur, om-
nium judicio et felici eruditis evidendam esse constat; dum per
hones maximae liberalibus disciplinis excolunt atque expolit, totius
cessitis nutris ad aquatatis ut justitiis rationem conformes solent,
et necessaria in civilibus societatis judicio recte et laudabiliter

exercere, plurique hominum nullius profectione patres conspi-
ciantur, ut religione vnume privae et publice res prodere utiliter
qua administrari". Ibid., p. 635.

In like manner, Nicholas the Third, of Paris: "Dum attulisse
considerationem in aliquo se servitutur, quod per litterarum studia...
vei obedientur scientiare eritotes, per quos Scripturarum veritas
explicatur, eruditur castus, provest ad aliora concrescam, et
fides Civitatis inviolavit", etc. Lat. " Supr.

Urban the Fifth, of Vienna: "Commissae nobis speculationum
scienia accuratissime, hos libarum ipsi ad quendam litterarum studia, per
que divini munus, etque eorum civitatis cultus prosperti, justi-
tiae collinare, tam publica, quam privata res geritum utiliter, omnium
propteribus humanae eruditionis agitator, libenter favores gratiosos
impendit", etc. "Cum ipsa Deu Dux [Folielanas] ad solam
et utilitatem propter quam haussiici studia, et incolarum
ducatum sui Austria, vel etiam auctore partium vicissarum laudabili
intendere, in Villa in Wissen jeplun si sucepta dicitur et
ordinari per quendam spectabilem Studium Generale in qualibet facultate,
ut ibidem fases ipsa dilatetur, explicetur simplicissime, avinias securit,
judicis crescat ratio, et intellectus hominum augeretur; nos ete
fervent desiderio dominium, quod Ducas in solam Villa praecipua sciencia
numeris ampliatur, ut produscan omnium natiuraerum comites,
virtutem redactis omniis, ac diversarum facultatum
degniitis eritotes, atque ille scientiarum sui irigantes, de eis
pleniutudo hauriant universi, litterarum eripientes ubiui documenta".
Kollar. Analog. l., p. 65.

Martin the Fifth, of Louvain: "Niper exhibita petitio con-

tinuata, quod in Duca Brabantiae etc., nullo loco esse nocet,
in quo saltem Generale viget Studium Literarum, unde partem
illorum praecepit, unde universi litterarum integritas subserit, vel in
remos partibus degere habeat. Scientiae haussiici in eis sectante
incrementum... Quod inter seu virtutiem opera, illa divina
majestatis gesta plurimum nullius ampligatur, per quae ad
unciproduit assistente virtutum dioenum illud qui scientiarum.
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that it might not give especial attention to one branch over the rest; but only that all branches of knowledge were presupposed or implied, and none omitted on principle. Universities would naturally commence with Arts, and might, at least for a time, have no Professor or Teacher of Theology; but the truths of Theology would from the first be taken for granted and used, whenever they naturally entered into the subject of the lectures which were given in Philosophy or (if so be) the Languages. Or this or that University might be a special school for Law or for Medicine; still it would be on the same type as other Universities, being by accidental circumstances drawn aside in one particular direction. Just as any church or cathedral implies chancel, nave, aisles, etc., yet need not be built in all its parts at once, yet would from the first presuppose and make provision for all these parts; or even when finished, might be remarkable for the length of its chancel or nave, or its height, or for its Lady Chapel; and again, as a church never might be finished, or might be made in parts of bad materials, or might gradually become dilapidated, or be virtually demolished in whole or part; in like manner we may find much irregularity or inconsistency in the studies or in the annals of a given University, yet this without any prejudice to the ideal upon which it is constructed, and which it professes and tends itself to fulfill.

Universities, which fell under these various suppositions, would still be the same in kind, one with another; and they would be specifically different from an Academic Institution which began by putting aside Theology, as a science which was not to be recognised. Accordingly we need not be surprised to find that Law was especially cultivated at Bologna, and Medicine at Salerno; nay that other Italian Universities, from the circumstance of their civil origin, instead of being simple schools of Literal Knowledge, were, as Haber tells us, “eminently practical”. The same author says, on the other hand, “So surpassing was the pre-eminence of Arts, embracing, as it did, all the other sciences and the new philosophy, that it is even questionable whether the term Facultes is strictly

§ 2. All branches of knowledge are subject matter of University Education.

Though I have spoken of a University as a place for cultivating all knowledge, yet this does not imply that in matter of fact a particular University might not be deficient in this or that branch, or

carundem situm acquirere magnitudinem, opportunitis re mediali et auxiliariis commodis, subveniuntis praecipium efficaciter impetriter, Generale literarum Studium ordinati desiderant, ut inniti disciplinae atque sapientiae se studiis exercentes, sibi et aliis meliora effici valeant, et paritura illarum prosperitatis motore Domino facilius incrementum sequatur nos pluris carundem desideriam, per quod recensierantur fons, ex quo ad Dei laudem et gloriam hauriri possint singuli viri consiliis matutitate perspicui, virtutum et dogmatum eminenciae redinti sucedanto, pluibus commendantes", etc. Privil. Acad. Lovan. 1728.


Engenius the Fourth, of Caen: "Dum pensamus quantum litterarum studia ad profugandas ignorantiae tenebras commodissis, tam publica quam privata, spiritualia ac temporalia, mundo conferant univerro, ex quibus adversus hereses confirmatur fides, Dei cultus agitur, animarum consolitur salutis, pac et tranquillitas inter homines procuratur, dispersenatur bonis praemia, mala supplicis puniuntur, humanae conditionis ampliatur prosperitas, cultur regina virtutum justitia, Ecclesia militans ex orare uberrimis fructibus spiritualiter et temporali fuerit confiverse", etc. Dacher. Spicileg. t. 3, p. 762.
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Applicable to the Masters of Arts, who are properly the Universitas. The studies of Law and Medicine grew up by the side of Arts, but never gained strength to compete with the last; nor has the principle ever been attacked, that the University has its foundation in Arts. His observates, too, that, "had not the coming in of Canonical Law evolved new materials, Theology might perhaps not even have constituted a separate Faculty"; for, "as a science, it had unfolded itself entirely out of the old studies, and could not be severed from them." Again, we have, according to Antony à Wood, as referred to by Keniel, a curious state of scholastic disorder at Oxford in the middle of the twelfth century, on the first introduction of lectures on Roman Law. Highborn and lowborn flocked to the new Professor who came from Lombardy and Sec; and Arts began to be neglected and to decline. The change of studies was mischievously prevented by the lucrative character of the new science. Thereby too the very idea of a University was impaired, for there ceased to be a course or circle of studies.

"This, eulogies, or skipping from one science to another," says à Wood, "before they have hardly made an entry, caused much abruption in literature, and a great displeasure in critical and knowing men that lived in those times; and especially for this cause, that they, who had spent many years in Arts, and had therefore gained great respect, were now with their doctrine neglected by upstarts." Roger Bacon (cant. xiiii.), as might be supposed, was opposed to the change. The students were now considered to fall under three classes, which had their names given them: "the Shallow" who did not study Arts at all; the "Ragged" or "Patchey," who crammed up, as we should now say, from abstracts or formulae; and the "Solid," who, after laying a deep foundation, went on to build upon it. As time went on, this state movement, for so it seems to have been, excited the alarm of the Holy See, and Pope Innocent published a Constitution, prohibiting the admission of Lawyers to ecclesiastical dignities in France, England, Scotland, Spain, and Hungary. The words of Matthew Paris, speaking of the middle of the thirteenth century, are remarkable: "Et iam summas scholarum, intactis grammaticis rudimentis, insectoribus et philosophis, ad Leges properant indicatas, quas constat non esse de numero Artium Liberalium; Artes enim Liberales propter se appauvantur, Leges autem et salaria aquirantur."

That a University was really, in its idea, the seat of all learning is plain from its very name; in saying which I am not taking my stand upon the derivation of the word, but upon its recognised meaning, however it came to mean it. "Academia instituta sunt," says Morinus (Ordin. iii. 13 fin.), "ad qua, vel ad studiorum et scientiarum usum, unde acceperat est; in quibus doctrina Christiana perfecta, diligentissim, et splendida, et in Collibus et Seminariis clericorum tradita est." As to the meaning of the word, authors are divided in opinion; some explaining it of a university of studies, others of students. As, however, it is the variety of its schools which brings students from all parts, and the variety of its members which demands so many subjects of teaching, it does not matter much how we settle the derivation of the word. Any how, it is certain that the word must soon have acquired the sense of universality of students, from the use of the word Universitas, in the civil law.

I shall put down here some definitions or descriptions of the word, as I have found them.


2. In his eis unius sola doctrina et rerum humanarum divinae, etque scientiae propinquit, non in illum finum sunt institutae, ac Universitatum nominem sunt aeditae, parum tarnen lacteis in rerum naturalium studiis et mathematicis effectum est"—Morhof. Polyhictor i. 14, 11.

4. Denominationes Studii Generalis et Universitatis, unde schola de quibus nunc ago, attribuit [sunt], quod scientiae universae in illis, proponebantur, non solamente in scholis cathedralibus, monasticis, et que pratera autem exstant erant, quodam tantum doctrinae juvenitut tradantur. Aliam tamen notionem vocabulo Universitatis assignat: Haburus (de jure civ., ii. § 3. 2) existimans, titulum hunc academiae competer, quatenus jurisdictionem habent, et cetera constant regiunae: sed moeas Thomasius ad illum locum, non respici ad hunc significatum, sed ad universitatem studiorum —Keswell, Histor. Orig. et Progress. Schol., p. 319.

5. Vacatur schola publica celebres Universitatis, ut necupatione desumpta ab universis scientiis, quae in his educantur; vel si non omnes scientiae legantur, ab universis tamen audient et ad descendent abique traduntur.—Mendo, de jure Academico, init.


7. "On appelle le composé 'Université des études'; et enfin simplement 'Université', pour marquer qu'en une seule ville on enseignait tout ce qu'il était utile de savoir"—Fleury, Choix des Études, 8.

8. "University: a school, where all arts and faculties are studied"—Johnson.

9. "A University, such as Oxford was made, is a joining together, and an incorporation under one government, of many public schools in one or the same town or city. 'Tis a place for the reception of all people that desire to learn; representing the whole kingdom wherein it is, may the whole world, as Gerson saith, inasmuch as any person thereof may come to it, and acquire doctrine and wisdom"—A Wood's Oxford, vol. i. p. 2.

10. "In these public schools or academies, which were founded at Padua, Modena, Naples, Casuin, Toulouse, Salamanca, Lyons, Cologne, and in other places, the whole circle of the sciences then known was not taught, but only certain parts of it, or some particular sciences. That at Paris, which exceeded all others in various respects, as well as in the number both of teachers and students, was the first to embrace all the arts and sciences; and therefore first became a University, or, as it was expressed, Studium Universitatis"—Moheun, Eccl. Hist., vol. ii. p. 229. London, 1811.

11. "Hitherto the public studies had been limited to certain branches of learning: but, as the views or desires of men were enlarged, the whole circle of sciences, as far as the allotted period of time would allow, did not appear to be an object beyond the comprehension of youthful minds. Schools then, which professed to embrace all the sciences within their walls, and to appoint masters to each, were properly denominated Universities"—Berrington's Middle Ages, p. 354.

12. "Hitherto only the Trivium and Quadrivium had been taught in these schools, but the newly awakened zeal for philosophical theology now led distinguished men to establish courses of lectures on this subject apart from the cathedral and conventual schools, though in a certain degree connected with them. To these were added, one after another, lectures on canon law, on medicine, and the arts, and in this way the first University was formed by a congregating together of these various teachers"—Gieseler, Text. Book, vol. ii. p. 313, ed. 1836.

13. "The most celebrated was that of Paris. It was adorned more than any other by the multitude, the rank, and the diligence of its students, and by the abilities and various requirements of its professors; and since, while other academies confined their instructions to particular branches of science, that of Paris alone pretended to embrace the entire range, it was the first which took the title of University"—Waddington's Ch. Hist., p. 469.
§ 3. More acquirement is not real knowledge.

I do not know that it is worth while to say in the words of others what it is so evident when stated by any one; but as I am engaged in referring to authors who have gone before me, I will set down two passages on this subject.

"Much we are told from day to day", says Dr. Coploton, "of the folly of pedantry. The folly is indeed ridiculous, and it is seldom spared. But the pedant in chemistry, or in physics, is at least as disagreeable an animal as the pedant in classical learning; and the pedant in political economy is not disagreeable only, but dangerous..." Never, while the world lasts, will it be wholly disabused of that specious error, that the more there is crammed into a young man's mind, whether it stays there or not, whether it is digested or not, still the wiser he is. A half-educated father hears that lectures are read in Chemistry, Botany, Mineralogy, etc., etc., at one place, and his son is learning nothing of this sort at school. Incapable of judging how mental powers are improved by continual exercise, and how the moral character is in a great measure formed by the study of good authors, he fancies that when the grammar of a language is learned, all further attention to that language is lost time, and then there is nothing new gained, because there is no new name. If the boy is captivated by the novelty and variety of the studies which is presented to him, he seldom returns with any relish to philological pursuits. He may become a skilful agriculturist, an improver of manufactures, a useful inspector of roads, mines, and canals; but all that distinguishing grace which a liberal education imparts, he foregoes for ever. It cannot be acquired in a late period of life, if the morning of his days have been occupied with other cares, or the intellectual habits already settled in different forms and postures. If, as too often happens, these matters are received into the ear, but take no possession of the mind, there is not only a moral blank, but an intellectual barrenness, a poverty of fancy

and invention, a dearth of historical and poetical illustration, a void of all those ideas which decorate and enliven truth, which enable us to view over again the times that are past, to combine the produce of widely-distant ages, and to multiply into one another the component parts of each. - The experiment is a correct one. I have seen it tried; and have witnessed the melancholy and irreparable result": — *Reply to the Edinburgh Review*.

"An interesting Essay on University Education has lately been published by Dr. Tappan of New York. As, however, it is to be expected in a work of his school, there are many opinions expressed in it, which a Catholic will think not only false, but extravagant and unreal; but still passages may be found there, which I gladly would quote in illustration of the views I have been maintaining, and the more readily, because they are the result of experience in national experiments in education. He has a keen sense, for instance, of the evils of which I am at present speaking. "We have destroyed the charm of study," he says, speaking of his own country, "by hourly and unnatural pressure, and we have rendered our scholarship vague and superficial. We have not fed thought by natural supplies of knowledge. We have not disciplined mind by guiding it to a calm and profound activity; but we have stimulated acquisition to perfunctory exertions, and have learned, as it were, from an Encyclopædia the mere names of sciences, without gaining the sciences themselves... The highest institutions will set the tone of education. And this we are realizing in schools of every grade for both sexes. Our schools for boys, our schools for girls, present on the prospectus a formidable curriculum of studies, and immature beings of sixteen or seventeen are carried through the mathematics, the natural sciences, general history, the philosophy of history, belles-lettres, and metaphysic, together with two or three languages, and various polite accomplishments. These higher branches too, are often taught in lectures adapted rather to Universities than to elementary schools. The popular growth of education is not the orderly and gradual growth of mind according to its own innate
laws fixed by God himself, but an immense and veracious deglutition of knowledge, where the mental digestion is estimated according to the rapidity with which these subjects are disposed of. The more masters, the more books, the more branches of knowledge in a given time, the faster the process goes on . . . We forget, that, although we can quicken the labours of our hands, and increase the power and scope of our machinery, we may not overdo the organise power of nature; and that, as trees have their time to grow, and harvests their time to ripen, so the mind of man must grow from infancy to childhood, from childhood to youth”—&c., pp. 51, 54.

This evil is of long standing in America. I had occasion myself to remark on it nearly thirty years ago in a review of a book of Travels, in which just a similar mode of education, if it can so be called, was praised. We find that, in the space of four years, the student, whose age need not exceed fourteen, in addition to a long and varied list of books, attends lectures in chemistry, mineralogy, geology, natural philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, and theology, engages in forensic disputations, and is moreover expected to be connected with one or other of three literary societies, established among them. A range of literature and science of this nature is not only unfavourable to the acquisition of classical learning, but detrimental to application of any kind. Mr. Duncan indeed is of opinion, that, although Yale College, in the United States, may not produce many writers in mathematics to surpass those of Cambridge, or giants in Greek literature to wrest the palm from those of Oxford, it is very probable that it will send forth a greater proportion of men, whose minds are steadily trained to order and activity, and stored with those elements of knowledge, which are available in almost every situation, and which may be said to insure to their possessor a reasonable degree of success in any train of thinking or research to which, by his inclination or the exigencies of his future life, he may be led. To us, however, such a course seems likely rather to confuse the youthful mind by its variety, than to enrich it with its abundance. Those who aim at too much often end in doing nothing. To ensure quickness in investigation and patience in research, to give the power of grappling with difficulties, accuracy of thought, and clarity of reasoning, to form the judgment, to refine the taste, to instill delicacy of feeling and a quick perception of poetical beauty—objects such as these have surely range enough to fill the most exalted mind, and magnitude enough to satisfy the most exalted spirit, even if the student left the scene of study with little besides the accidental knowledge, which discipline of this nature could not fail to impart.

§ 4. The Branches of Knowledge form one whole.

It is curious how negligent English writers seem to be just now of the necessity of comprehensiveness and harmony of view, in their pursuit of truth in detail. The very word Encyclopedia ought to suggest it to them; but the alphabetical order has assimilated the great undertaking to designated to a sort of Dictionary of portions and departments of knowledge. Coleridge indeed, a man of philosophical mind, has felt the evil, and planned the Encyclopedia with which he was connected, on a truer idea; but if I have a right to judge by such specimens as I have met with, he is an exception. Since beginning these Discourses I took down an Encyclopaedia of name, hoping it would give me light on the subject I was considering. I turned out the word “Philosophy”—there was no article on it, but a reference, “see Natural”, “see Moral”. I turned out Science, and found instead a notice to the effect that, whereas each science will be found discussed under its own name, there is here a vacant place for enumerating some entertaining problems or curiosities, etc., in science; and then followed some such as “the Invisible Girl”, vegetarianism, sugar from old rags, etc., etc. I turned out
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various other words, but I could learn nothing about "truth", "knowledge", etc., the subjects of which I was in search. I had recourse to the article on Metaphysics, but even that did not supply the desideratum.

Really wise persons, whatever their religious feelings, have felt its importance. Hugo de St. Victor has a Treatise de Studiis Legendi, in which he treats of philosophy and its parts. He says that philosophy is "Studium sapientiae" (i. 8), and sapientia is "comprehensio rerum propt sunt" (vi. 14.); or more largely, "disciplinae omnium rerum humanae atque divinarum rationes plenè investigans". Consequently there are as many parts of philosophy as there are "rerum diversitates" (i. 5). For this reason "Philosophia est ars artium, et disciplina disciplinarum" (ii. 1), and "omen artes ad unum Philosophian tandem terminum" (ii. 18). After dividing off and enumerating the arts and sciences, he continues (iii. 3, etc.):

"Ex his omnibus scientiis septem specialiter decreverant antiqui in studiis suis, ad opus erudiendiorem, in quibus tandem utilitatem esse præ easteris omnibus perspexerunt, ut quiquis virum disciplinarum similitur perquisaret, ad diversum ostenderit postes inquirendo magis et exerceendo, quæ audiendo perveniret. Sunt cum quasi optima quædam instrumenta et rudimenta, quibus via peratur animo ad plenam philosophicæ veritatis notitiam. Hinc trivium et quadrivium novem accepti, eo quod ipsi quæbusdam vis vivax animus ad secretum sapientiae intraret. ... Hinc profecto accidit in tempora [Pythagorei] tot fuisse sapientes, ut plura ipsi scriberent quam nos legere possuimus. Scholasticæ aut nostri aut volunt aut nescientium modum congruam in discedente servare, et idcirco multos studentes, paucos sapientius inveniisse. ... Huius videtur primum operum donde esse artibus, ubi fundamenta sunt omnium, et per simplicem veritas apertur, maximè his septem quae prædixi, quæ totius philosophicæ instrumenta sunt. ... Hac quidem ita sibi coharent, et alterius vicissim rationibus indigent, ut, si una defecerit, extera philosophicæ suaret non possit; unde hibis errare videtur, qui non attendentes solum in artibus cohaerentiam, quasdam sibi ex ipsis eligent, et, ceteris intactis, his se posse fieri perfectos putant. ... Sunt quidem, qui, hic ex iis quæ legendarum sunt, nihil praetermissunt, nulli tamen arti quod sequi est tribuere normam; sed singulius legant omnia. In grammaticæ de ejuslogismorum ratione disputant, etc., etc. ... Cum legere artes, et quod unius cucujaque sibi proprium agnoeris disputans et concurrans, tunc demum rationes singularum invicem confitere licebit, et ex aliena consideratione virisim quæ minus prioris intellectus investigari. Noli multiplicare diversiter, quos deum sensibilia disceretis. Securus disceret, et esse necesse non timeret."—iii. 3, 6.

He brings in Literature thus:—"Duo sunt genera scripturarum. Primum genus est carminum quae propriis Artes appellantur, secundum est earum, quae sunt appendentia Artilus. Artes sunt quae Philosophiam supponunt, id est, quæ aliqnam certam et determinatam Philippian materiam habent, ut est grammaticæ, dialecticæ, et externa humanæ. Appendentia Artium sunt, quæ tantum ad Philosophiam spectant; id est, quæ in aliqnam extra Philippian materiam versantur, eligendo, tamen quædam ab Artibus discipulae specie et confici attingant, vel si simplici narratio est, viam ad Philosophiam puriæbar. Humanæ sunt casus postquam carminis, ut sunt tragedia, comedia, satyrum, heroica quoque et lyricæ, et istaque et illicia quandam; fabulae quoque et historiae"; etc.—iii. 4.

Again, an eloquent writer in the Dublin Review gives the following account of a Treatise of St. Bonaventura's:—"From God, the Potal Light, all illumination descends to man. The Divine Light, from which, as from its source, all human science emanates, is of four kinds: the inferior light, the exterior light, the interior light, and the superior light. The inferior light, that of sensitive knowledge, illuminates in respect of the natural forms of corporeal objects, which are manifested to us by the five senses. Its range does not extend beyond the knowledge of sensible things. The second, or external light of mechanical art, illuminates in respect of artificial
forms. It embraces the whole circle of those arts which aim at protecting man from the weather, clothing, feeding, healing him when sick, and the theatrical arts directed to his recreation. Thus it includes all productions of the needle and the loom, all works in iron and other metals, stone, and wood; all products and all preparations of food; all navigation and commerce, which superintend the transit or the exchange of these; medicine in its widest sense, and music with the arts belonging to it. Manifold as are the objects of this light, it is all concerned with artificial productions; it touches only one side of human nature; it deals with man almost exclusively as an animal; it is directed to supply his bodily needs and console his bodily infirmities. The third, or interior light, is that of philosophical knowledge; its object is intelligible truth. It is threefold, for we may distinguish three sorts of verities, truth of language, truth of things, and truth of morals. Lastly, the fourth, or superior light, is that of grace and of the Holy Scripture, which illuminates in respect of saving truth. Thus the fourfold light, descending from above, has yet six differences, which set forth so many degrees of human knowledge and science. There is the light of sensitive knowledge, the light of the mechanical arts, the light of rational philosophy, the light of natural philosophy, the light of moral philosophy, and the light of grace and Holy Scripture. And so, adds the saint, there are six illuminations in this life of ours, and they have a setting, because all this knowledge shall be destroyed. And therefore there succeedeth to them the seventh day of rest, which has no setting, and that is the illumination of glory, etc.—Dublin Review, Dec. 1851.

"Et est ratio", says the Sacred Congregation, de Studiis mediorum, under Leo the Twelfth, "rerum et cogitationum, quo nobis naturaliter insculptum est, ut ordinem idealis nobis patefaciat. Hinc S. Augustinus, "Ut ipiter breviter faciam Legem nostres, quae impressa est nobis, quantum valeo, velis explicem, ea est, quae, justum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima; ordo autem, sive parum disparitumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio", non patitur.

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"Amongst so many great foundations of Colleges in Europe", says Lord Bacon, "I find it strange that they are all dedicated to professions, and none left free to arts and sciences at large. For, if men judge that learning should be referred to action, they judge well; but in this they fall into the error described in the ancient fable, in which the other parts of the body did suppose the stomach had been idle, because it neither performed the office of motion, as the limbs do, nor of sense, as the head doth; but yet, notwithstanding, it is the stomach that digests and distributes to all the rest: so, if any man think Philosophy and Universality to be idle studies, he doth not consider that all professions are from thence served and supplied. And this I take to be a great cause that hath hindered the progressio of learning, because these Fundamental Knowledges have been studied but in passage"—Advenement of Learning.

§ 5. And are complements of each other.

"Nullus est cujusdam artis adeo mediocris aut humili quoque, ac utiis professor, qui, si sit excellent, non ilium aut practicam omnium consuevat, aut non certe existimari potest, ac constant; illeque adeo maximus est receptum, ut esseque quantum sibi sum

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et laudibus eoque aequare, etiam aliis omnibus antepone, licere ac. 
plum esse arbitrarum. Grammaticus se unum putat sapere, desci-
pere plurimas; Philosophus reliquas miseretur ut pecudes; Juris-
consultus alios omnes derideat; Theologus despicat; non quae se 
extrahet artes ignorare dicit, aut praec se ferat, immo nihil conctan-
tur confirmare sed illa una disciplina reliquas univeras praeclarii,
clandi nec continuer, quia in libris eorum qui de illis nominantiam 
tradiderunt.

"L. Crassus apud Ciceroem omne disciplinarum atque artium 
genus cognitioe juris continuai asservare; et quidem, si illa placeat, 
libello xii. tabularum; haec idem nostri Jurisconsulti habeant perana-
sissimam. Grammaticus totam philosophiam, quam late se diffun-
dit, historicorum et poetarum libris contineri naturam; quos habet 
in maibus, nihil sit quod Aristotelis aut Platonis indigent. Quam 
artem rite persequi ac tradant, qui eam alienis imitari in locis 
habitari censent, et illae esse petiendum, ubi vix illius sit 
estigium ullam inventae? Ideo vero video falsissima atque absur-
dissima omnia argumentum esse, quia illa vitae existime aut auctoritis, 
qui aliquis esse poterit et quasi alium agentem alterum. Quo 
absurdo in philosophia dogmati ab Humeo traxerunt originem, quam 
multi veterum non illum ut ingeniosum Poeta legere, sed ut-philosophum docetissimum et gravissimum?"—Ludov. de Vives, de Causis Corrupt. Art., i. 3.

"The strength of all sciences is, as the strength of the old man's 
faggot, in the band. For the harmony of a science, supporting 
each part of the other, is, and ought to be, the true and brief confini-
tation and suppression of all the smaller sorts of objection; but, on 
the other side, if, you take out every axiom, as the sticks of the 
faggot, one by one, you may quarrel with them, and spend them and 
break them at your pleasure. . . For were it not better for a man 
in a fair room, to set up one great light, or branching candlistick of 
lights, than to go about with a small watch candle into every 
corner?"—Bacon: Adv. of Learning, i. i.

There is a paper in the sixteenth volume of the Histoire de l'

Académie des Inscriptions, very much to our purpose here, though 
it is too long to present before the reader except in extracts. It is 
enitled "Réflexions Générales sur l'Utilité des Belles-Lettres, et 
sur les Inconvénients du goût exclusif, qui paraît s'établir en favor 
des Mathématiques et de la Physique."

It was occasioned by the same circumstances which led to 
Gibbon's Essay on the Study of Literature. The writer is tracing 
the history of modern literature, and observes:

"De la Grammaire naquit la Critique. Celle-ci entreprit d' 
abord de purger les anciens textes, des fautes que l'ignorance ou l' 
inattention des copistes y avaient introduites, etc. . . . Peu à peu 
elle s'élève jusqu'à chercher dans les ouvrages des Grecs et des 
Romains, les modèles du beau et les règles du goût.

"A mesure que les connaissances s'entendaient, les objets d 
éude se multipliaient; la curiosité croissait. L'Histoire, considérée 
dans l'origine du monde, offre un champ immense, et 

fournit la matière à un nombre infini de recherches. Religion, 
Littérature, successions d'Empires, suites de Princes, migration 
de Peuples, fondations de Ville, naissance des Arts, progress 
de Sciences; tous ces points furent approfondis; le critique 
discuta les faits, le Géographie l'emplacement, la position des lieux où ils 
s' étaient passés; la Chronologie en fixa la date; l'Antiquaire Pu 
trouva sur le marbre et sur l'airain, de quoi les éclaircir.

. . . ."L'ordre naturel de leurs études, dont le plan général 
embrassait l'histoire et les monuments de tous les temps, les rappro-
chait, par degrés, de celui qu'on nomme le Moyen âge; nouvelle 
carrière, d'autant plus intéressante que chacun d'eux croyait y 
voir le germe du gouvernement auquel il était soumis, et le berceau 
de la langue qu'il parlait", etc.

Here the author speaks of the use of the Mathematics in France, 
and of the exact sciences; and of the jealousy which it occasioned 
among the men of letters; and he proceeds to remark upon a Dis-
course of the Abbé de Bezanc, who "se plaint dans son Mémoire 
non que les Sciences-Exactes soient devenues florissantes parmi
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nous, mais que les lettres nient cessé de l'être; non qu'un nouvel empire se soit élevé, mais qu'il ne s'élève que sur les ruines d'un autre. En effet, les neuf Muses sont sourdes: à ce titre, elles sont en droit de prétendre que la faveur public, qui fait la portion la plus précieuse de leur dot, soit partagée entre elles avec égalité.

After remarking that the various branches of Science are not so closely connected with each other, as those of Literature, he proceeds to illustrate the mutual relation and influence of the latter. "Il n'en est pas de même à l'Erudition; ses différentes branches composent un tout presque indivisible; la plupart, au moins, sont si fort dépendantes les unes des autres, qu'on ne saurait en détacher précisément une, pour la cultiver seule. Tel, par exemple, est né avec du gout pour la science de Médailles et voudrait s'y y distinguer: il faut qu'à la connaissance des langues, qui, prise séparément, constitue le grammarien, il joigne la connaissance des temps, qui constitue la Chronologiste: cela des lieux, qui constitue le Géographe: la discussion des faits, qui constitue le critique; l'expérience du métier; qui constitue le connoisseur: et toute fois nous n'aurons qu'un Antiquaire. Disons tout en un mot; chaque branche de l'Erudition exige le même fond d'étude; il peu de choses près, la même étendue du savoir, peut-être les mêmes talents; pour épuiser un genre, il faut les embrasser tous. Etc.

The remainder of the paper is principally on the subject of the utility of literature: the following passage, which I quote, is on the subject of philosophy, and the danger of mistaking a narrow part science view of things for it:

"On dit souvent, pour relater l'excellence des sciences exactes, que ces sont elles qui ont introduit dans le monde l'Esprit Philosophique, ce flambeau précieux, à la faveur duquel nous savons douter et craindre après. Mais ce qu'on attribue aux sciences, exclusivement pourrait bien être l'ouvrage de la critique, et, par conséquent, appartenir aux lettres. Car ainsi, l'esprit philosophique peut se définir, 'la Raison éclairée sur les vrais, principes des choses, de

que quelque nature qu'elles soient; c'est à dire, tant de celles qui

sommes aux sens, que de celles qui sont du ressort de l'esprit, considéré dans ses diverses facultés. Or cette supériorité de raison est le résultat des reflexions que les hommes ont faites, à mesure qu'ils ont accru le nombre de leurs idées, en acquérant de nouvelles connaissances par la voie de l'étude... Parfois l'esprit philosophique s'étend, sans exception, à tous les objets de nos connaissances, suivant ce mot d'un ancien, "La Philosophie est nécessaire, lors même qu'on ne traite pas de Philosophie, il faut bien se garder de se confondre avec l'esprit de calcul, qui de sa nature est renfermé dans un cercle, au dehors duquel on ne doit pas lui permettre d'y étendre. Nous ne dissimulerons pas que notre siècle commence à perdre de vue cette distinction et que forç de se piquer d'être Géomètre, ou plutôt de vouloir tout ramener au calcul, d'en appeler partout la méthode, de l'embrasser un instrument universel, il est presque d'être Philosophe. Nous trouverions chez les étrangers, et chez nous plus d'un exemple de cet excès qui, dans le fond, n'est pas nouveau; les scholastiques du xiiie siècle avaient déjà transporté dans la Théologie la méthode et la style des Géomètres."

In another Essay (t. xii), "Des Rapports que les Belles-Lettres et les Sciences ont entre elles", the author, the Abbé Nauze, observes: "L'Esprit Philosophique est un talent acquis par le travail, et par l'habitude, pour juger raisonnablement de toutes les choses du monde. C'est une intelligence à qui rien n'échappe, une force de raisonnements que rien ne peut ébranler, un goût sûr et réfléchi de tout ce qu'il y a de bon ou de vices dans la nature. C'est la règle unique du vrai et du bien. Il n'y a donc rien de parfait dans les différents ouvrages qui sortent de la main des hommes, que ce qui est animé de cet esprit. De lui dépend en particulier la gloire des Belles-Lettres; cependant comme il est le fruit d'une science consommée, et le partage de bien peu de savants, il n'est ni possible ni nécessaire pour le succès des Lettres, qu'un talent si rare se trouve dans tous ceux qui les cultivent. Il suffit à une
nation que certains grands génies le possèdent, et que la supériorité de leurs lumières les rend les arbres du goût, les oracles de la critique, les dispensateurs de la gloire littéraire. L'esprit philosophique résideira proprement dans ce petit nombre; mais il se répandra, pour ainsi dire, ses influences sur tout le corps de l'État, sur tous les arts, sur toutes les professions, sur tous les ouvrages de l'esprit on de la main, et principalement sur ceux de Literature".

"The more deeply the sciences are investigated", says Gibbon, "the more clearly is it seen that they are all connected. They resemble a vast forest, every tree of which appears, at first sight, to be isolated and separate, but, on digging beneath the surface, their roots are found to be all interlaced with each other. There is no branch of study so insignificant and unimportant, as not sometimes to afford facts, disclosures, or objections, to the most sublime and exalted sciences. I like to dwell on the reflection, that it is highly necessary to show different professions and nations their mutual wants. Point out to the English the advantages they may derive from the French; acquaint a natural philosopher with the assistance he may obtain from Literature; and self-love will perform the office of sound reasoning. Thus philosophy is extended, and human nature benefited. Before, men were rivals; now, they are brethren. All sciences are founded upon reasoning and facts. Without the latter, our studies would be chimerical; deprived of the former, they would be blind. Thus it is that the different branches of Literature are united: and all the various ramifications of the study of nature, which under an apparent meanness often hide a real magnificence, are connected together in a similar manner".—Essay on Literature.

The following instructions of Cardinal Gerill for the establishment of an Academy of Science, strikingly illustrate what I have insisted on in the text, as to the indivisibility of the various branches of knowledge.

1. "Les Mathématiques dans toute leur étendue; la physique générale et particulière avec toutes ses dépendances; l'étude de la nature, les rapports qui lient les Étres entre eux; les loix et les moyens de leur action réciproque, les phénomènes qui en résultent; l'application de ces phénomènes aux besoins de la vie; tels sont les objets dont il paraît que l'Académie doive principalement s'occuper.

2. "Toute découverte réelle dans l'ordre de la nature ne peut qu'être suivie d'une utilité réelle ou immédiate dans l'ordre de la société. Mais c'est moins à l'utilité en elle-même, qu'à la source de l'utilité, qu'une Compagnie savante doit s'attacher. Elle doit se proposer de s'étendre la sphère de ses connaissances réelles, bien assurée d'en voir découvrir tôt ou tard des avantages précieux pour l'humanité.

3. "L'Académie ne sera donc pas des arts l'objet de son travail. On a observé judicieusement (dans une note marginale) que le pas qu'il faut faire pour appliquer à la pratique de l'art une expérience ou un principe calculé, est ordinairement très facile, et que les observations minutieuses qui règlent la pratique des arts, naissent à cet essor plus relâché, qu'on est en droit d'attendre d'une Académie.

4. "Ce n'est qu'il n'y sit dans la pratique des arts, des règles ou des résultats dignes de toute l'attention d'une Académie; mais dans ce cas incréé, elle ne s'en occupe qu'autant que le procédé de l'art rentre dans la classe des expériences ou observations de Physique ou de Histoire naturelle, ou bien qu'il fournirait matière ou à la résolution de quelque problème, ou à l'édification de quelque théorie mathématique. En un mot, les arts seront traités dans l'Académie scientifiquement, et non à la façon des artistes.

5. "On a proposé d'admettre dans l'Académie l'étude de l'Antiquité, en dirigeant cette étude à la recherche des sciences et des arts chez les anciens... Des ouvrages de cette nature exigent nécessairement un concours de lumières pour être portés au point de perfection, dont ils sont susceptibles. Néanmoins, avant que de songer à établir une classe d'Antiquité, il convient de s'assurer d'un nombre de sujets propres à cette sorte de travail et qui verraient s'y employer.
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6. "Cet exemple peut déjà servir à expliquer en quel sens on a dit dans l'écrit cité ci-dessus, qu'il serait à propos qu'une Académie se proposât quelque plan de recherches, qu'on peut, regarder comme l'ouvrage du corps, et non simplement comme le travail isolé des différents membres de l'association. Un travail commun peut être conçu de deux manières, on en tant que plusieurs co-opèrent au même travail sur un même sujet, et qui dans que les travaux distincts de plusieurs se rapportent et concourent à un même objet. Que deux ou trois artistes entreprirent de peindre en commun une figure; que l'un s'applique à peindre la tête, l'autre les mains, on que ce relevant tour à tour chacun ait passa son coup de pinceau sur les mêmes traits, ce serait là un travail commun sur un même sujet. J'avoue qu'une telle méthode serait peu propre à donner à un ouvrage cette unité de caractère, qui en doit faire le principal mérite. . . . Mais qu'il faille étape no spectacle sur la scène; le Poète, le Musicien, l' Architecte, le Peintre, le Machiniste, le Danseur, grand nombre d'autres artistes doivent nécessairement concourir au succès de la représentation. Voilà l'idée d'un travail commun dans le second sens; je veux dire, le résultat des différents travaux très différents en eux-mêmes, mais qui se rapportent pourtant à un même objet. Une société savante peut former, pour l'avancement des connaissances humaines, des projets, dont l'exécution exige différentes sortes de recherches, et par conséquent le concours des différents membres qui la composent. Dans ce cas, chaque associé s'occupe de sa partie; mais ces différents travaux, réunis par leur rapport à un même objet, forment un tout et un ensemble, qu'on peut regarder comme l'ouvrage de la société," etc.

I add a passage of a writer already quoted, who is speaking of Religion: "Religious knowledge is not merely a code of agend or credenda, a summary of articles, or a manual of devotion. It is intimately connected with the whole course of ancient history, with philosophy and criticism, with the study of the learned languages, with moral and metaphysical philosophy. It runs parallel with the progress of the human mind in every liberal pursuit. The peasant

may be as wise as his condition requires him to be, without the light of learning or philosophy; but the information which is sufficient for the peasant is beneath the claims which such a subject has upon the scholar and the gentleman. If indeed the mind be carefully instructed in every other branch of liberal knowledge, without a corresponding acquaintance with that which is the most momentous of all, an undue bias must be given to the judgment; the topic which is not expanded in proportion to the rest, will virtually shrink into insignificance, and be despised; its track will be forsaken, its treasures undiscovered, its domain uncultivated. We cannot, therefore, too earnestly insist upon the incompleteness of any system of education in which this main ingredient is wanting."

--Camplin in Quarterly Review, December, 1825.

§ 6. Knowledge under this aspect is Philosophy or Liberal Knowledge.

"Admutit ad tracdendas atque excelendas artes magnitudo rei, et opus unum excellenti notum nostrum longe digressiunum, cupidos veri inventi soli, quim nihil est praecarius, nec quod magis decet hominem, sicut ignorantia, falli, decipi, turpe et miserum judicamus; quam ut evitarent, philosphetas esse prsesos ilios, nec alia eas, aut in eliun um, Aristoteles prohibet gravis in primum auctor."

"Admiratio hujus tantius operis ingentes illos animas ad studium et insinuationem causarum compulit; hinc sic quid se putarent novum et alius insulitum invenisse, incredibili sequatur delectatio, tum quam parta victoria, et tantis difficultatibus superati, ea delectatio detenebat eos in cura et labore, quam illi delectationem opibus, digitationibus, et alios omnibus vitas cominodis proponebant: ergo expoliant aut varia hominum ingenios, ut in verum loc quasi de-
fodiendum ac crudaum prorsus incumberent, alia, spe praemii
inducta, alia, ut fuerentur ilia oblectamentis, quae ex spectacione
theatri hujus naturae maxime capiantur, varia subinde ac dinturna.
Præstantia ingenii ex sublimi illa et generosi notû huc venerant,
quod, quæ se tantâ póstūra hæc illo vigore mentis prædites repü-
pararent ac instructos, nullâ in re alia consúmi tanta bona oportere
censurant, quum ut rem palherrimam scrutemur at complectē-
rentur, et, quatenus liceret, quam plurimis prodessemus", etc. Vives,

"Galenus medicus hoc utitur sectione arium, ut "alii" dicat
"contemptibilis visque, quam corporis laboribus et manibus excrē-
cetur" quæ Graeci χερσογραφία vocarunt, "alii hominum et
homine libere dignus", de quo genere primum facit Medicinam. Nos
condonandum amori proficuus est, tamquam pictati in nutricem
bene meritam : addit Rhetoricam, Musicam, Geometrian, Astronomi-
am, Arithmetican, Dialectican, Grammaticam, Legum pruden-
tiam. Nec reprehendat si quia voluit huius numero adscribere eas,
quæ singulæ plumulacique, quod hic, tametsi citra manuum operam
non obestur, tamen non videatur egero robore ille et ilcectro juve-
nilius. Sanea vero non adducatur, ut in numerum liberalium
arium pictorem recipiat, non magis quam quodam usque, aut
marmoratia aut cetere luxuriae ministras. "Equid lectores et totam oleo ac
luto constantem scientiam expellit, quod ci convenit cum Galeno ;
nec liberalia studia sunt, sententia Saneæ, exercitationes rei
militariae; veperationum quoque a liberalibus Salustius exclaudit.
Possibilitas Stoicus artes hanc in mediam partilatur, ut alius
voluerat et sorbitibus nominaret, quæ magis constare et esse ad
instruendam vitam occupatas, expertas decori atque honesti; alius
ledes, quæ ad volupiam tendenter ocellorum atque aurium:
pueriles sunt, et aliquod balentes liberalibus simul, quæ σκω-
δης Græci vocant, quæ non perdurant annuin ad virilem, sed
expedient; liberales vero, imò, ut liquid, sola libera sunt, quibus
est cura virtus.

"Recepta opinio est, sepetem esse liberales artes, tres de sermò-
ne, quatuor de quantitate. Has ingenias cognominamus, quasi bas
solas ingenii disserent ac exercerent. Nemo enim ferre in libere
civilissimis ingenius magnarissimis artibus operam accommodabant;
sed eis hic erat artibus declitas, jurensis verò militae, campo,
gymnasio, aut publicis negotiis, administrandæ reipublicae, causis aci-
tandis, et ejusmodi exercitamentis, quae sola ensebant illi digna
homine libero, unde illud in Comedii, "Fac periculum in litteris,
fac in palaestra, in musici, quæ liberum scire aquam est". Illæ
enim artes maximæ existimabantur ingenii hominibus ad vitæ
cultum et ad rempublicam gereandam congrue-re, ut sermo esset
enim et parus, etc., etc. . . . Miror pratermissas ab illis
Architecturan et Perspectivam ad multa utiliæ. . . . In nostris
scholis hæc quoque fundamenta sunt trinum mediciorum, Medicinæ,
Theologie, et portia juris, quæ supræmax artes disciplinacque
sapiens, et nee quotidiano cum primum serviant. Philosophiam
moralem aliamquæ, quam multum Theologiae administratur; et ex
quæ juss est orrum existimandur Sacrum et Profanum; tam cogitationem
Natura rerum, sine quâ Medicina mæsca est procesus", etc.—

"Secutur post actionem quæs. ratio est velut scrutatio, judicium
eleétio, contemplatio autem inspectio quæ et tua omnium, quæ à
ratiōne sunt collata et exspectata, à judicio autem-recepta atque
approbata. Non est in ea ratione ullo, in qua quæstio sunt
certa jam atque experta. Et quando declaratio omnium nascitur ex
proprietate quædam congruentia autem objecti cum facultate, sibi nec
est menti congruentia quæm, si satis sit ut in contemplatione magis
sint delectationis. In quo tamen spectantur veritates et ingenii, et veritates saeun sunt gratissimae quam certissimae maximeque defacares,
prolata simul cum suis originiis prinique causis; id vero ci non
concedatur, secundum est ut ad veritatem quam proximè accedant
similimissimae sint. Nemo est tam tormenti et alidecto in terram
animo, quid non excitetur ad hanc vocem, "Ego tibi hujusce rei
opusque patefaciam". Vives de Animo, ii. 10.

"Necque enim ita in artibus contingentes est animus ut intra unus
aliquam artem subsistat. Quo enim illud faciant, iniqui profecto judices, non perspicuus, quantum natura humana ingenii vadat; quae ita agilis est et vela, ut se possit quidem aliquid agere tantum minus, si Fulmine animos. Non audieni sunt homines imperiti qui humano ingenio majorem, vel inutilis et rebus gerendis adversum, solaliusinum criminarunt. Est igitur quidam scientiarum cognitio et concilia, unde et alii ignorantes vocant gratia, ut in una percutas dicit nequeat, qui facta non attigerit. Sallustium, villiam, et sorciaram artiam alia ratio est, quisquia nulla iustus se est conjunctio; ex quarum ingenio liberales illi censebant non sunt. Fabellis qui tractat, impune ignorare autoriam potest; et in liberalibus illis conspirant omnes manumque jungunt. In architecto quid requirat Vitruvius, normam. Nulla praecedit disciplina est, quam illo non attingit veli. In Oratoribus et Poetis, perfecta scilicet, ea omnia quae in architecto sae Vitruvius, requirant eum disciplinarum Magistrati. Et haec quidem scientiae pretiosae omnes haec congruas in Philosopham saepe jucularent Stoicis, ut nec mechanicae artiam rurum esse vel lerint. ac desiderium se crediderint, si aliorum ministeria ad vitae civilis necessitates uteretur. Veniamus ad disciplinas eloquentiae; ad quas juculam excedendas in natura ductam, ut extra viris pudori sit, in una aliqua consensit. Non dubium est, mediscritus etiam ingenii hic licere esse felicem; inest scilicet illius epistola empatia, quae ingenio magno convenit, et qualis habebal Plato descripsi. Est animorum nostrorum, si ita loqui licet, ὁ οὖν, quod illi vel per naturam vel assensus incipiatur sunt multi sint complexi, obstruthrowsa in singularibus, sequa ab illo humili statu in sublimem perducere. Itaque se excitat in illo, quod χριστιανοί appellare passamus, ut, ex Stoicorum disciplina, τὸ ἀγαθοῦ, regio quasi spiritu, et fulminis instar omnium penetrans, et sub quidam loco omnia perstramos. Qui distinctas rerum ideas animo tenent, modo ali subordinatas nec confusas, illis non immineant, sed aperiari τὸ κριτικὸν, necesse est, quod ex conciliazione omnium partium resultat. Major enim profecto ambiguitas est ab illis, qui circa ἐρυθρὸν μάθημα versantur, qui plerumque ex illius iute, et illarum rurum sint, omnia aliud substantur. Neque tamen id volo, ut qui omni incitatur disciplinarum genere, in illis omnibus simul habitet; nam et tempore et negotii, alisque impediendi omnibus, et fieri a nobis non posset. Quare superabdit quidem tumum hinc fundam alia, nunc, idque; sed convenientissimam ejus parit quasi limitibus quidam circumscribendum, quam excludamus, et in qua inducet nostrum exercitandum. Excludit igitur scientiarum vestitas hospites nos; qui nequeam habitabant, nunc quam domi erant, si ultra habitare voluissent, nesciunt penitentiae plurima attingent. Morbus. Polybius, i. 1. I have left out sentences here and there for the sake of brevity.

"It is an assured truth which is contained in the versific, 'Sciencias deditis solliciter,' etc. It taketh away the wildness and barbarism and fierceness of men's minds; but indeed the accent had need be on sollicitus; for altogether superficial learning doth rather work a contrary effect. It taketh away all levity, temerity, and insolence, by copious suggestion of all doubts and difficulties, and acquainting the mind to balance reasons on both sides, and to turn back the first opinions and conceits of the mind, and to accept of nothing but examined and tried. It taketh away vain admiration of any thing, which is the root of all weakness: for all things are admired, either because they are new, or because they are great. For novelty, no man that understandeth learning or contemplation thoroughly, but will find that printed in his heart, 'Nihil novi super terram.' Neither can any man marvel at the play of puppets that goeth behind the curtain, and adviseth well of the motion. And for magnitude, as Alexander the Great, after that he was used to great amusements, and the great conquests of the amphi-cites provinces in Asia, when he received letters out of Greece, of some fights and services there, which were commonly for a passage, or a fort, or some walled town at the most, he said, 'It seemed to him, that he was advertised of the battle of the frogs and mice, that the old tales went off.' So certainly, if men meditate upon the universal.
frame of nature, the Earth with men upon it, the divineness of souls excepted, will not seem much other than an ant hill, where some ants carry corn, and some carry their young, and some go empty, and all to and fro a little heap of dust. It taketh away or mitigateth fear of death, or adverse fortune; which is one of the greatest impediments of virtue, and imperfections of manners. And therefore Virgil did excellently and profoundly couple the knowledge of causes, and the conquest of all fears together, as

\textit{Felix qui potuit}, etc. Bacon, \textit{Adv. of Learning}, vol. i. p. 60, ed. 1824.

In quoting Gibbon, it is generally necessary to apologize for his irreligious tone. "With some [the philosophical talent] consists in tracing out new paths and ridiculing every prevailing opinion, merely because it is prevalent. With others it is identified with geometry, that imperious queen, who, not content with reiging, proscribes her sisters, and declares all reasoning unworthy of the name, which turns not upon lines and numbers. The philosophical talent consists in the power of going back to simple ideas, of seizing and combining first principles. The glance of its possessor is correct, but it is at the same time extensive. Placed upon an eminence, he takes in a wide range of vision, of which he forms to himself one simple and connected idea, while other minds, as correct in apprehension, but more limited in extent, see only some portion or other of it. He may be a mathematician, or an antiquary, or a musician, but still he is a philosopher; and by dint of penetrating into the first principles of his art, he becomes superior to it. He has a place among that small number of genii, who, at distant intervals, cultivate that chief science to which, were it perfected, all others must submit. Taken in this view, the talent is extremely rare. There are plenty of minds capable of correctly apprehending particular ideas; but there are very few who can collect into one abstract idea a numerous assemblage of others of a less general nature. What study can confer this talent? None that I know of.

It is a gift conferred by Heaven; the majesty of mankind are ignorant of, and despise it; it is wished for by the wise; has been given to few; has been acquired by none; but I think that the study of Literature, that habit of alternately becoming a Greek or a Roman, a disciple of Zeno or of Epicurus, is admirably adapted to develop and exercise it. Throughout all these infinitely diversified minds, may be observed a general conformity between those who, by the similarity of their times, countries, and religions, have acquired very nearly the same manner of looking at objects. Those minds which are least indebted with prejudice, cannot be entirely free from it. Their ideas have a paradoxical appearance; and, even when breaking their fetters, you perceive that those ideas were once shackled by them. Among the Greeks I look for favourers of democracy; among the Romans for enthusiastic lovers of their country; among the subjects of a Commodus, a Caesar, or a Caracalla, for apologists for despotic power; and among the ancient Epicureans, for invokers against the religion of the times. How striking a spectacle for a truly philosophic mind, to see the most absurd opinions received among the most enlightened people; barbarians attaining to the knowledge of the most sublime truths; legitimate but incorrect consequences drawn from most erroneous premises; admirable principles continually approaching nearer to truth without ever quite reaching it; language formed by ideas, and ideas corrected by language; the sources of morality always the same; the opinions of the quarter-one metaphysicians always varying, generally extravagant, clear only while they are superficial, and subtle, obscure, and uncertain whenever they pretend to be profound. [In history] the philosophic mind sees a system, connections, and consequences, where others can discern only the caprices of fortune. It considers this science as one of causes and effects; and it well deserves an attempt to lay down some particular rules, not to enable genius to bud forth, but to guard it from mistakes. Perhaps, if this had always been well weighed, evening
would not so often have been mistaken for penetration, obscurity for depth, and an air of paradox for a creative genius. *Essay on the Study of Literature.*

To enter into the opinions of others, and to be skeptical about the truth of any, are not, as Gibbon supposes, synonymous. For surely it is no paradox to say, "I understand you, but I think the contrary of your opinion true." Here it will save me trouble, if I express its meaning in my own words on a former occasion.

"There are many men of one idea in the world; your intellectual machine, who eats, drinks, and sleeps, is a man of one idea. Such, too, is your man of genius, who strikes out some new, or revives some old view in science or in art, and would apply it as a sort of specific or interpretation to all possible subjects, and will not let the world alone, but loads it with bad names, if it will not run after him and his darling fancy. . . . Such again are the benevolent persons, who, with right intentions, but yet, I think, narrow views, wish to introduce the British constitution and British ideas into every nation and tribe upon Earth; differing, how much, from the wise men in the Greek epic, whose characteristic was that he was 'versatile'; for he had known 'the cities and the mind of many men.' History and travel expand our views of man and of society; they teach us that distinct principles rule in different countries and in distant periods; and though they do not teach us that all principles are equally true, or, what is the same thing, that none are either true or false, yet they do teach us that all are to be regarded with attention and examined with patience, which have prevailed to any great extent among mankind. Such is the temper of a man of the world, of a philosopher. He may hold certain principles to be false and dangerous, but he will try to enter into them, to enter into the minds of those who hold them; he will consider in what their strength lies, and what can be said for them; he will do his best to analyze and dissect them; he will compare them with others; and he will apply himself to the task of exposing and disproving them. He will not ignore them;" etc.

It is not to be supposed that any Catholic can endure. Sharon Turner, though he was after all fairer than his generation; but still it is pleasant to find him, after a contemptuous mention of the Trivium and Quadrivium, give utterance to the following just sentiment:—"The classical minds whom we are accustomed to venerate, were not formed merely from the literature which preceded them, but from the general intellect, business, conversation, and pursuits of their day. It is a mistake to imagine that a man of great intellectual eminence is made only from his library; he is the creature of the improvement of society about him, reflecting upon him the rays of a thousand minds, and pouring into him information from a thousand quarters. Every hour his understanding, if it has the capacity, is haimably directed, enriched, and exercised, by the knowledge and talent that is everywhere breathing, acting, and converging around him. His mind expands, without his own consciousness of its enlargement; his ideas multiply independently of his will; his judgment rectifies, his moral and political wisdom increases with his experience; and he at last becomes a model imperceptibly benefiting others, as he has been benefited himself." Middle Ages, vol. iv. p. 241.

*From an exceedingly able article in the British Critic for January, 1831, on "Utilitarian Moral Philosophy," I select the following passage, as having an immediate bearing on our subject:*

"[Cooperation—success of view] is the power of embracing without confusing a variety of facts, past, present, and to come, of holding in the mind a number of ideas, each perfect in itself, yet each with relation to the rest of guiding an indefinite number of objects in one view as a whole. This power is to a certain extent exercised in any, the commonest case of comparison, every time we assert any kind of likeness or unlikeness, preference or relation; at the same time, it is perhaps in this more than any other exercise of the intellect, that we are able to feel distinctly how far our natural ability falls short of our capacities. Illustrations may be taken from any quarter. In music, we are first able to distinguish a
pleasing from an unpleasing sound, and that is all; shortly we become able to remember the sounds which led to it, and to view each present note coloured by those which we hold still in our memory, to understand, that is, a simple air; next, we detect simultaneous sounds and melodies as they combine to form one harmony; and so on, till the accomplished musician is enabled to embrace in one grasp, as it were, a whole musical movement, with all the history and relations of the various threads of melody, which appear and disappear, are echoed, varied, entangled, and disentangled, enforced and overthrown through the whole composition. Thus, too, in examining a piece of mechanism, after we have mastered one by one the various ingenious contrivances by which minor difficulties are obviated, and the forces applied to their different destinations, we step and try to see them for a moment all at once, to embrace in one glance all the complicated movements of the parts, as subordinate and ministering to the common purpose of the whole. By such an effort we seem to gain a kind of double power of dividing and concentrating our mind, so that even while we direct our main attention to any one part, we yet do so with a kind of active and real, though perhaps unconscious, recollection of a variety of other objects, to which it has or may have reference. The same might be said of our mode of feeling the composition of a picture or poem; but with even more weight and truth, of history and philosophy; and here it is that we may most truly feel what we may have done for our own minds, and how very much remains to do, when, after having run through a line of history, a philosophical system, or even a train of argument, we try so to fix our attention on the whole, as, without dropping the particulars, to grasp and unite them all in one view, in one course or group. In such an effort we ordinarily succeed a little, and fail a great deal; and while in our mode of failure we seem to feel very clearly where it is that we fail, so our success, such as it is, seems to teach us how much our nature might be made capable of, by the mere extension of its present faculties. We seem to have some clue given us to a conception of those powers, which it is not impossible may some day be given to man, of embracing in one sweeping and piercing glance the real living truth of all those vast dispensations which he has wondered at in history, embracing them as well in their vastness as in their minute details, from their relation to each other, and effects on the course of human history, down to the capricious human passions, as we call them, and paltry accidents, which were the instruments of their accomplishment. And this indeed is but a small part of what is conceivable. There is plainly no limit to the extent, to which the mere faculties, which we now have in a weak imperfect state, may be excited and extended. There is no contradiction in supposing our present faculties so strengthened as to enable mere man to grasp without conscious effort, the whole system of the universe, and to carry it about with him, colouring all the particulars on which he fixes his attention, as easily and naturally as music, which we hear without recognizing, may give life to what we are reading, or as a purpose quickens our interest in what surrounds us, even when we are least distinctly aware of its presence. At the same time, it is but conceivable; for, as we cannot conceive, so we cannot presume to push forward to any assumed limit, the degree to which creatures may be allowed to partake of those vast attributes of divinity, which are now granted us only in each measure as to help us in conceiving them.

"It is by mimicking this power to which it should subserve, that science is apt to make itself ridiculous; when, not content with its own legitimate power of laying out materials for thought, it claims for its abstractions a reality which they do not and cannot possess; proud of a kind of second-rate comprehensiveness, a comprehensiveness obtained not by enlarging our powers, but by paring out to a portable form the subject-matter which we would grasp, embracing a great many objects by neglecting all in which they differ, and then perhaps, as if conscious of the incongruences, which is the necessary result of casting away so much of the essence of each subject which it contemplates, trying to regain its lost reality by a
A multitude of arbitrary subdivisions; each, it is true, adding something to the original bare idea, but at the same time not founded on the real mass of complicated relations which subsist between thing and thing", etc., etc.

I have eagerly looked for exact information and instruction on the subject, in the works of the learned and well-principled writer, from whom the following short passages are extracted: "The object of a Liberal Education is to develop the whole mental system of man, and thus to bring it into consistency with itself, to make his speculative inferences coincide with his practical convictions, to enable him to render a reason for the belief that is in him, and not to leave him in the condition of Solomon's sluggards, who is wiser in his own conceit than seven men that can give a reason".—Whewell on English University Education, p. 139.

"All exact knowledge supposes the mind to be able to apply, steadily and clearly, not only the processes of reasoning, but also certain fundamental ideas: and it is one main office of a Liberal Education to fix and develop these ideas."—Ibid., p. 178.

§ 7. Liberal Knowledge acts partly on the side of Christianity, partly against it.

I am led here to quote a passage on the subject of the ethical aspect of ancient philosophy, which occurs in a sketch I wrote many years ago of the writings of Cicero. "Some writers, as Lyttleton, have considered it an aggravation of Cicero's incoherencies, that he was so perfectly aware of what was philosophically upright and correct. It might be sufficient to reply, that there is a wide difference between calmly deciding on an abstract point, and acting on that decision in the hurry of real life; that Cicero in fact was apt to fancy (as all will fancy when assisted by interest or passion) that the circumstances of his case constituted it an exception to the broad principles of duty. . . . But the argument of the objection proceeds on an entire misconception of the design and purpose with which the ancients prosecuted philosophical studies. The motives and principles of morals were not so seriously acknowledged as to tend to a practical application of them to the conduct of life. Even when they proposed them in the form of precept, they still regarded the perfectly virtuous man as the creature of their imagination, rather than a model for imitation, an idea which it was a mental recreation rather than a duty to contemplate; and if an individual here or there, as Scipio or Cato, attempted to conform his life to his philosophical conceptions of virtue, he was sure to be ridiculed for singularity and affectation.

"Even among the Athenians, by whom philosophy was, in many cases, cultivated to the exclusion of every active profession, intellectual amusement, not the discovery of Truth, was the principal object of their discussions. That we must thus account for the ensuing questions and sophistical reasonings, of which their disputations consisted, has been noticed in our article on Logic; and it was their extension of this system to the case of morals, which brought upon their sophists the irony of Socrates, and the sterner rebuke of Aristotle. But, if this took place in a state of society in which the love of speculation pervaded all ranks, much more was it to be expected among the Romans, who, basing as they were in political enterprises, and deficient in philosophical acuteness, had neither time nor inclination for abstruse investigations, and who considered philosophy simply as one of the many fashions introduced from Greece, 'a sort of table furniture', as Warburton well expresses it, a mere refinement in the arts of social enjoyment. This character is borne both among friends and enemies. Hence the popularity which attended the three Athenian philosophers, who had come to Rome on an embassy from their native city; and hence the indefatigable determination with which Cato pressed their
The learned Dissertation on medieval society with which Mr. Hallam concludes his "Middle Ages", supplies us another illustration of literary or philosophical ethics as distinct from Christian; an illustration contained partly in the historical facts he puts before us, and partly in his own personal sentiments about them. He considers the ethics of Catholicism simply defective and incomplete, which suffered to prevail without restraint, almost ruining of true morality, but admitting and commonly receiving correction from the true morality of literature, philosophy, romance, heroics, and gentlemanlike feeling. He cautiously observes that "whether the superstition of the dark ages had actually passed that point, where it becomes more injurious to public morals and the welfare of society than the entire absence of all religious notions, is a very complex question, upon which I would by no means pronounce an affirmative decision". Vol. iii., p. 219. Then he is candid enough to state the favourable side of the question, telling us that ecclesiastical ethics, indeed, did not make much account of "justice and veracity"; yet they were characterised by precepts of meekness, self-denial, and charity, which could never be wholly effaced, and especially by the gnomosynary spirit (as indeed was Mohammedism) and the still higher praise of sanctity and the oppressed. On the whole, however, "religion lost almost every quality which renders it conducive to the good order of society": though "there are a few great landmarks of moral distinctions so deeply fixed in human nature, that no degree of rudeness can destroy, nor even any superstition remove them". Now, that the state of society and of morals in the middle ages was lamentably low, I have no need here to deny; I am not denying that it is to be traced, as far as possible, to the "rudeness of semi-barbarous populations"; what I do deny, and what I am saying that the author affirms, is that it was owing to the "superstition" of Catholicism.

Such then being the poverty, to use a mild word, of ecclesiastical ethics, let us see what it is that Mr. Hallam considers their historical restoration. Not the teaching of the Catholic Church, but first the abolition of slavery, and the enforcement of fixed laws and a system of police; and next, the rise and spread of the Manichees, Cathariotics, Albigensians, and other heretical sects, whose belief, though "certainly a compound of strange errors with truth, was attended by qualities of a far superior lustre to orthodoxy, by a sincerity, a purity, and a self-devotion, that almost purified the age in which they lived". Thirdly, he attributes much to the influence of the institution of chivalry; and it is to this part of his Dissertation I would direct particular attention, for we shall find that that institution did both service and disservice to the ethical teaching of Catholicism, of the same kind as, in Historica IX., is attributed to literature, civilization, and philosophy.

He says then, that "the last school of moral discipline", that is,
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in contradistinction to Catholicism, "which the middle ages afforded, was the institution of chivalry. There are, if I may so say, three powerful spirits, which have from time to time moved over the face of the waters, and given a predominant impulse to the moral sentiments and energies of mankind. These are the spirits of liberty, of religion, and of honour. It was the principal business of chivalry to animate and cherish the last of these three. And whatever high magnanimous energy the love of liberty or religious zeal has ever imparted, was equalled by the exquisite sense of honour which this institution preserved."

Now let us see the mingled character, partly protective, partly destructive, of Christian morality, which marks this creation of the natural man. We shall see, in the course of his account of it, that the author parallels it, and justly, as a principle of influence, to the sentiments found existing in the religion of Homer, Mahomet, and the Red Indians.

"The soul of chivalry was individual honour, coveted in its entirety and absolute a perfection, that it must not be shared with any army or a nation. Most of the virtues it inspired were what we may call independent, or opposed to those which are founded upon social relations. The knights-errant of romance perform their best exploits from the love of woman, or from a sort of abstract sense of justice, rather than from any solicitude to promote the happiness of mankind. If these springs of action were less generally beneficial, they are, however, more connected with elevation of character, than the systemic tendency of men accustomed to social life. This solitary and independent spirit of chivalry, dwelling, as it were, upon a rock, and despising injustice or falsehood from a consciousness of internal dignity, without any calculation of their consequences, is not unlike what we sometimes read of Arabian chiefs or the North American Indians. These nations, so widely remote from each other, seem to partake of that moral energy which, among European nations, far more from both of them, was excited by the spirit of chivalry. But the most beautiful picture that was ever pain-

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tered of this character, it is the Achilles of Homer, the representative of chivalry in its most general form, with all its sincerity and magnanimity, all its courtesies and self-sacrificing. Calmly indifferent to the cause in which he is engaged, and contemplating with a serious and melancholy look the premature death that awaits his, his heart only beats for glory and friendship."

Then, after alluding to the spirit of devotion and of gallantry, which were the animating principles of chivalry, and observing that the latter, so far from conducing to the moral improvement of society, actually debased it, he goes on to mention the special virtues of a knight—loyalty, courtesy, and magnanimity.

1. "The first of these, in its original sense, may be defined, fidelity to engagements; whether actual promises, or such tacit obligations as bound a vassal to his lord, and a subject to his prince. It was applied also, and in the utmost strictness, to the fidelity of a lover towards the lady he served. Breach of faith, and especially of an express promise, was held a disgrace that no value could redeem. False, perjured, disloyal, recreant, were the epithets which he must be compelled to endure, who had sinned from a pledged engagement, even towards an enemy. This is one of the most striking changes produced by chivalry. Treachery, the usual vice of engage, as well as corrupt nations, became infamous during the reign of that discipline. As personal rather than national feelings actuated its heroes, they never felt that hatred, much less that fear of their enemies, which blind men to the leisures of ill faith. . . .

2. "A knight was to remain a member of the order, if he violated his faith; he was ill accounted with its duties, if he proved wanting in courtesy. This word expressed the most highly refined good breeding, founded less upon knowledge of conventional politeness, though this was not to be omitted, than on the spontaneous modesty, self-denial, and respect for others, which ought to spring from his heart. Besides the grace which this beautiful virtue threw over the habits of social life, it inclined from the
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natural roughness of war, and gradually introduced that indulgent treatment of prisoners which was almost unknown to antiquity.

After the battle of Poitiers, the English and Gascon knights, says Froissart, having entertained their prisoners, went home each of them with the knaves or squires he had taken; whom he then questioned upon their honour, what ransom they could pay without inconvenience, and easily gave them credit; and it was common for men to say, that they would not stain any knight or squire, so that he should not live well, and keep up his honour.

3. "Liberty judged, and disdain of money, might be mentioned, as I have said, among the essential virtues of chivalry. All the romance inculcates the duty of scattering this wealth with profusion, especially towards minstrels, pilgrims, and the poorer members of their own order.

"Valour, loyalty, courtesy, munificence, formed collectively the character of an accomplished knight, so far as was displayed in the ordinary tenor of his life, reflecting these virtues as an unsullied mirror. Yet something more was required for the perfect idea of chivalry, and enjoined by its principles; an active sense of justice, an ardent indignation against wrong, a determination of courage to its last end, the prevention or redress of injury. It grew up as a salutary antidote in the midst of poisons, whilst scarce any law but that of the strongest obtained regard, and the rights of territorial property, which are only right as they conduci to general good, became the means of general oppression.

"The characteristic virtue of chivalry bear so much resemblance to those which eastern writers of the same period extol, that I am a little disposed to suspect Europe of having derived some improvement from imitation of Asia. Though the Crusades began in horror of infidels, the sentiment wore off in some degree before their cessation; and the regular intercourse of commerce, sometimes of alliance between the Christians of Iplestine and the Saracens, must have removed part of the prejudice, while experience of their energies, courage, and generosity in war, would with these gallant

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Knights serve to lighten the remainder. . . . Certainly, excepting that romantic gallantry towards women, which their customs would not admit, the Mahomedan chivalries were, for the most part, abundantly qualified to fill the duties of European chivalry. . . .

"I have already mentioned the dissolutions which almost inevitably resulted from the prevailing tone of gallantry. . . . An undue thirst for military renown was another fault that chivalry must have nourished; and the love of war, sufficiently pernicious in any shape, was more founded as I have observed, on personal feelings of honour, and less on public opinion, than in the citizens of free states. A third reproach may be added to the character of knighthood, that it widened the separation between the different classes of society, and confirmed that aristocratical spirit of high birth, by which the larger mass of mankind were kept in unjust degradation.

"Tournaments may be considered to have arisen about the middle of the eleventh century. . . . The Church uttered her excommunication in vain against so wanton an exposure to peril; but it was more easy for her to excite, than to restrain that martial enthusiasm.

Writers of the nineteenth look back upon the deeds of six or seven centuries before them, and are able to trace the points distinctively, in which their deeds and their principles were agreeable or contrary to right reason, and (whether they are Catholics or not) to Catholicism. In like manner the world, some centuries hence, if it lasts to long, will desparately contemplate the theories and measures of this day, and pass judgment upon its commercial, its gentlemanlike, and its selfish ethics, both according to the standard of common sense and Christianity. The author I have quoted proceeded to run the chivalrous into the gentlemanlike spirit, and there he leaves it.

"The spirit of chivalry left behind it a more valuable successor. The character of knight gradually subsisted into that of gentleman; and the one distinguished European society in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, as much as the other did in the preceding age. A jealous sense of honour, less romantic, but equally elevated, a conscientious gallantry and politeness, a strictness in devotional observances, an high pride of birth, and feeling of independence upon a sovereign for the dignity it gave, a sympathy for martial honour, though now submerged by civil habits, are the incitements which prove an inimitable descent. The cavaliers of Charles the First were genuine successors of Edward's Knights; and the resemblance is much more striking if we ascend to the civil wars of the League.

The following are extracts from a very able article which appeared in the Edinburgh Review, in 1829. The writer is a disciple of what may be called (generically and multis tantum) the Shaftesbury School, in contrast with the School of Locke or Bentham. Here is the theory of Beauty denouncing the theory of Utility. I need not observe that every Catholic will pronounce his theory indefinitely higher than the theory here expressed; still (as I have said in the text), Beauty and Utility easily lose themselves in each other, and (without entering into a metaphysical argument, in which accuracy of thought is not to be stricken off evenest calamos), when the author places hope of reward and fear of punishment (e. g. the sense of a moral Lawgiver) in what he calls the "Mechanics", and not the "Dynamics" of our moral nature, he seems to inherit the errors as well as the excellences of Shaftesbury.

After characterising "this age of ours, as not an heroic, devotional, philosophical, or moral but above all others, the Mechanical Age", and showing this to be true, not only as regards its material works, but as regards education, cyclical masters, the fine arts, literature, science, and politics, the writer continues:

"To speak a little pedantically, there is a science of Dynamics in man's fortunes and nature, as well as of Mechanics. There is a science, which treats of, and practically addresses, the primary, unmodified forces and energies of man, the mysterious springs of

Love, and Fear, and Wonder, of Emancipism, Poetry, Religion, all which have a truly vital and infinite character; as well as a science which practically addresses the finite, modified developments of these, when they take the shape of immediate motives, as hope of reward and fear of punishment.

"Now it is certain, that in former times the wise men, the enlightened lovers of their kind, who appeared as moralists, poets, or priests, did, without neglecting the Mechanical province, deal chiefly with the Dynamical; applying themselves chiefly to regulate, increase, and purify the inward primary powers of man; and facing heretofore the chief difficulty, and the best service they could undertake. But a wide difference is manifest in our age. For the wise men, who now appear as Political Philosophers, deal exclusively with the Mechanical province; and occupying themselves in counting up and estimating men's motives, strive, by various checking and balancing, and other adjustments of Profit and Loss, to guide them to their true advantage; while, unfortunately, the same 'motives' are so innumerably, and so variable in every individual, that no really useful conclusion can ever be drawn from their enumeration. But though Mechanism, wisely contrived, has done much for man, in a social and moral point of view, we cannot be persuaded that it has ever been the chief resource of his worth or happiness. Consider the great elements of human enjoyment, the attainments and possessions that enliven man's life. In its present height, and see what part of these he owes to institutions, to Mechanism of any kind; and what to this instinctive, unbounded force, which Nature herself lent him, and still continues to him. Shall we say, for example, that Science and Art are indebted principally to the founders of Schools and Universities? Did not Science originate rather, and gain advancement, in the obscure dens of the Roger Bacon, Kepler, Newton: etc., etc.? . . . or to take an infinitely higher instance, that of the Christian Religion, . . . how did Christianity rise and spread abroad among men? was it by the institutions and establishments, and well-arranged systems of Mechanism? Not so;
man's highest attainment was accomplished, dynamically, not mechanically. Nay, we will venture today that no high attainment, not even any far-extending movement among man, was ever accomplished otherwise. . . . The Crusades took their rise in Religion; their visible object was, commercially speaking, worth nothing. It was the boundless, invisible world that was laid bare in the imaginations of those men; and in its burning light, the visible shrunk as a scroll . . . No dining at Freemasons' Tavern . . . only the passionate voice of one man, etc., etc. . . . The Reformation had an invisible, mystic, and ideal aim: . . . our English Revolution, too, originated in Religion; men did battle, even in those days, not for purse sake, but for conscience sake . . . The French Revolution itself had something higher in it than the cheap bread and Decrees Corpus act. Here too was an idea; a dynamic, not a mechanical force, etc., etc. . . .

Thus does man, in every age, vindicate, consciously or unconsciously, his celestial birth-right. Thus does Nature hold on her unswerving unquestioned course . . . When we can drain the Ocean into our mill ponds, and bottle up the force of Gravity, to be sold by retail, in our gas jars, then may we hope to comprehend the infinitude of man's soul under formulas of Profit and Loss; and rule over this too, as over a patent engine, by checks, and valves, and balances.

Nay, even with regard to Government itself, can it be necessary to remind any one that Freedom, without which indeed all spiritual life is impossible, depends on infinitely more complex influences than either the extension or the contraction of the democratic interest? . . . Institutions are much; but they are not all. The first and highest spirits of the world have been often found under strange outward circumstances; St. Paul and his brother, apostles were politically slaves; Epictetus was personally one, etc.

To define the limits of these two departments of man's activity, which work into each other, and by means of one another, so intricately and inseparably were, by its nature, an impossible attempt . . . It seems clear enough that, only in the right co-ordination of the two, and the vigorous forwarding of both, does our true line of action lie. Undue cultivation of the inward or dynamical province leads to idle, visionary, impractical courses; and especially, in rude ages, to Superstition and Fanaticism, with their long train of hateful and well-known evils. Undue cultivation of the outward, again, though less immediately prejudicial, and even for the time productive of many palpable benefits, must, in the long run, by destroying moral fibre, which is the parent of all other force, prove not less certainly, and still more hopelessly pernicious.

We shall find this faith in Mechanism has now struck its roots deep into men's most intimate, primary sources of combustion; and is thence spreading up, over his whole life and activity, immemorial stems, fruit-bearing and poison-bearing. The truth is, men have lost their belief in the Invisible, and believe, and hope, and work only in the Visible; or to speak it in other words, this is not a Religious Age. Only the material, the immediately practical, not the divine and spiritual, is important to us. The infinite, absolute character of Virtue has passed into a finite, conditional one; it is no longer a worship of the Beautiful and Good; but a calculation of the Profitable. Worship, indeed, in any sense is not recognized among us, or is mechanically explained into the fear of pain or hope of pleasure. Our true Deity is mechanism. It has subdued external Nature for us, and, we think, will do all other things. We are Titans in physical power; in a deeper than a metaphorical sense, we are Titans, that strife, by heaping mountain on mountain, to conquer Heaven also . . .

'Cause and effect' is almost the only category under which we look at, and work with, all Nature. Our first question with regard to any object is not, 'What is it?' but 'How is it?' We are no longer instinctively driven to apprehend and try to know what is Good and Lovely, but rather to inquire, as onlookers, how it is produced, where it comes, whether it goes? . . . An Enthusiast of our day differs much from his pleasant predecessor. An intellectual
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Appalling of these times boasts chiefly of his irresistible perspicacity, his "dwelling in the daylight of truth," and so forth. . . . Wonder, indeed, is on all hands dying out; it is the sign of unbelief to wonder. . . . It is the force of circumstances that does everything; the force of one man can do nothing. . . . Religion, in most countries, more or less in every country, is no longer what it was and should be, a thousand-voiced psalm from the heart of man to his Invisible Father, the Fountain of all Goodness, Beauty, Truth, and revealed in every revelation of these; but for the most part a wise prudential policy grounded on mere calculation; a matter, as all others now are, of expediency and utility, whereby some smaller quantum of earthly enjoyment may be exchanged for a far larger quantum of celestial enjoyment. Thus Religion too is Profit; a working for wages: not Reverence, but vulgar Hope and Fear. . . . Let us look at the higher regions of Literature, where, if anywhere, the pure melodies of Poetry and Wisdom should be heard—what is the song they sing? Is it a tone of the Muses, a breath of music as the "high priest touches it? a "liquid wisdom" disclosing to our sense the deep, infinite harmonies of Nature and man’s soul? alas! no. It is not a matin or vesper hymn to the Spirit of all Beauty, but a fierce clashing of symbols and shouting of multitudes, as children pass through the fire to Moloch. -Poetry itself has no eye for the Invisible. Beauty is no longer the god it worships, but some brute image of strength, which we may well call an idol, for true strength is one and the same with beauty, and its worship also is a hymn. . . .

Again, with respect to our moral condition; here also he who runs may read that the same physical, mechanical influence are everywhere busy. For the "superior morality" of which we hear so much, we too would desire to be thankful; at the same time, it were but blindness to deny that this "superior morality" is properly rather an "inferior criminality" produced, not by greater love of virtue, but by greater perfection of Police; and of that far subtler and stronger Police, called Public Opinion. This last watches over us with its Argus eyes more keenly than ever; but the inward eye seems heavy with sleep. Of any belief in invisible, divine things, we find as few traces in our morality as elsewhere. It is by tangible, material considerations, that we are guided, not by inward and spiritual. Self-denial, the parent of all virtue, in any true sense of that word, has perhaps seldom been rarer; so rare is it, that the most, even in their abstract speculations, regard its existence as a chimera. Virtue is pleasant, is profit: no celestial but an earthly thing. Virtuous men, philosophers, martyrs, are happy accidents; their state lies the right way. In all cases, we worship and follow after Power, which may be called a physical pursuit. No man now loves Truth, as Truth must be loved, with an infinite love; but with a finite love, and as it were pur amour. Nay, properly speaking, he does not believe and know it, but only "feels" it, and that "there is every probability." He preaches it aloud, and rushes courageously forth with it, if there is a multitude huzzaing at his back; yet ever keeps looking over his shoulder, and the instant, the huzzaing languishes, he too stops short. Etc., etc. . . .

This brilliant essay illustrates what I have said in Discourse IX on the ambiguous position of the Religion of Philosophy relatively to Catholicism. I have not a suspicion who the author is, nor am I presuming to judge what was the real state of mind under which he wrote; but, in spite of all he says so well and truly, it is impossible from his language to tell whether he was a believer in Christianity.

In order to illustrate further the Philosophical character in its contrast to the Christian, I will make some extracts, in the order in which they meet the reader, from the "Characteristics of Goethe" (London, 1833), from the German of Falk and Von Müller.

His Metamorphosis of Plants, his Doctrine of Colours, are beautiful monuments of his calm spirit of investigation: they are, so to speak, filled with the inspired glimpses of the ever, reaching
deep into hidden ages, and into the hidden domains of science; while, on the other hand, his biographical delineations of two characters so utterly different from his own as those of Winck and J. H. Voss, sufficiently manifest, not so much his literary skill, as his own beautiful nature, which could take in every object in all its genuineness and purity, and reflect it back like a clear, spotless mirror. . . . As this lofty talent of Goethe has been universally acknowledged, so, on the other hand, has he been as loudly reproached with the lukewarmness of his moral sentiments, as far as these can be inferred from his writings. . . . It appears to me that the disputants on both sides overlooked a main point throughout the whole discussion. A mind like that of Goethe, in which a calm observation of all things was an innate and characteristic quality, could by no possibility fall into that moral enthusiasm which the age exacted, and which it was too much inclined to consider as the highest possible prerogative of human nature. Goethe was born to identify himself with things, not things with himself. From the moment in which the public enters the lists with passion against real or supposed evil, it cares little to examine the good sides which this very evil, if considered with perfect calmness, might perhaps present to the eye of the observer." Vol. i., p. 14.

"In society he would rather talk of one of Boccaccio's tales, than of matters on which the welfare of Europe was thought to depend. Many attributed this way of thinking to cold, unsympathizing indifference of temper; assuredly with injustice. To be other than he was, to share the universal ardour and struggle for a new order of things... Goethe must have ceased to be himself, and have suddenly and utterly renounced the many-sided observation with which he was wont to regard, and the mature deliberation with which he was wont to weigh, all things, and consequently this historical phenomenon among the rest. Certainly, the tranquil observer of all the events of this moving and chequered life, and the actual participant, whether done or suffered, in the strife and tumult, are characters essentially distinct and incompatible. The latter can by no possibility form an accurate and impartial estimate of his own situation. There is no point of neutral ground on which he can gain a footing. It would be absurd to ask the dove to write the natural history of the eagle; it must be one-sided. There is wanted some third nature, elevated far above both; truly god-like; which receives both into its bosom, and discriminates their respective excellencies and deficiencies; acknowledges the former, and, if it cannot love the latter, at least strives to bear and even to execute them. It is only by taking a firm stand on this elevated and commanding point wherein the low game of human life, with all its contradictions, is seen to roll up beneath our feet, (like the many-coloured curtain of a theatre), that we can either form an idea of the soul which animates Goethe's works, or acquire the least right to form a judgment of our own on so extraordinary and unique a man." \textit{Ibid.,} p. 19.

"Goethe, by his very nature, cannot, must not, will not, set a single step which may compel him to quit the territory of experience, on which he has so firmly and so happily planted his foot and taken root, for more than half a century. All conclusions, observations, doctrines, opinions, axioms of faith, have value in his eyes, only in so far as they connect themselves with this territory, which he has so fortunately conquered. The blue horizon beyond it, which man is wont to paint to himself in such beautiful colours, troubled him little; indeed he shunned it, knowing, as he did, that it is the abode of all brain-worn fancies, and that all the phantoms of dim and gloomy superstition, which he hated, held their throne there. . . .

"Even virtue, laboriously and painfully acquired, was distasteful to him. I might almost affirm that a faulty but vigorous character, if it had any real native qualities as its basis, was regarded by him with more indulgence and respect than one which at no moment of its existence is genuine; which is incessantly under the most un-
Wilde constraint, and consequently imposes a painful constraint on others. "Oh," said he sighing, on such occasions, "if they had but the heart to commit some absurdity!" etc., p. 27.

"With questions concerning time, space, mind, matter, God, immortality, and the like, Goethe occupied himself little. Not that he denied the existence of beings superior to ourselves. By no means; they were foreign to his pursuits, only because they lay out of the region of experience, to which, upon system, he exclusively devoted himself. Repugnance to the super-sensual was an inherent part of his mind."

"Our scientific men," he said, "are rather too fond of details. They count out to us the whole consistency of the Earth in separate lots, and are so happy as to have a different name for every lot. This is argil, that is quartz; but what am I the better, if I am ever so perfect in all their names? ... Every thing in science is become too much divided into compartments. In our professors' chairs, the several provinces are violently and arbitrarily severed, and allotted out into half-yearly courses of lectures, according to fixed plans."

"He laid down the proposition, that Nature, accidentally, and as it were against her will, became the tell-tale of her own secrets. That everything was told, at least once; only not in the time and place at which we looked for, or suspected it; we must collect it here and there, in all the nooks and corners in which she had let it drop. Hence the Mysterious, the Sublime, the Incoherent, in our observations of Nature. That she was a book, of the vastest, strangest contents; from which, however, we might gather, that many of its leaves lay scattered around in Jupiter, Uranus, and other planets. To come at the whole would be difficult, if not utterly impossible. On this difficulty, therefore, must all systems suffer shipwreck."

"On the day of Wieland's funeral, I remarked such a solemn tone in Goethe's whole manner, as we were seldom accustomed to see in him. ... For the super-sensual Goethe commonly showed a repugnance, if not a contempt; completely on principle, as it appears to me; for it was more congenial with his natural disposition rather to confine himself to the Present, and to all agreeable and beautiful objects, which Nature and Art offer to the eye and the observation, in parts accessible to us. ... I asked him ... 'And what do you think at this moment the occupation of Wieland's soul? 'Nothing petty, nothing unworthy, nothing out of keeping with that moral greatness which he all his life sustained', was the reply. ... It is something to have passed a life of eighty years in unblemished dignity and honour; it is something to have attained to that pitch of refined wit, of tender, elegant thought, which predominated so delightfully in Wieland's soul; it is something to have perceived that industry, that iron persistency and perseverance, in which he surmounted all ... Wieland's soul is one of Nature's treasures: a perfect jewel. ... I should be little surprised, inasmuch as I shall find it entirely agreeable to my views of the subject, if, thousand years hence, I were to meet the same Wieland as the wise men of a world; as a star of the first magnitude; even to see him, and be witness how he quickened and cheered everything that approached him by his beautiful light. To fashion the unity substance of some comet into light and clearness, that were truly his welcome, glad-one task for the wise men of our Wieland; as indeed, speaking generally, if we suppose the eternity of the actual state of the world, we can admit to other distinction for mankind, than, as blessedly cooperating powers, to share eternally in the immortal joys of gods. The work of creation is intrusted to them. Called or uncalled, they flock together of themselves, on every way, from all mountains, out of all seas, from all stars,—who may stop them? I am certain, as you here see me, that I have been there a thousand times already, and hope to return thither a thousand times again."

"After speaking of certain philosophies, he went on to say, "Of popular philosophy I am just as little an admirer. There are mysteries in philosophy, as well as in religion. The people ought to be spared all discussions on such points; at least, they ought by no
means to be forcibly dragged into them. Epicurus somewhere says,
'This is right, precisely because the people are displeased at it.' It
is difficult to foresee the end of those unprofitable and unpleasant
mental vagaries which have arisen among us since the Reformation;
from the time that the mysteries of Religion were handed over to
the people to be puzzled about, and set up as a work for the quibbling
and cavilling of all sorts of one-sided judgments. The measure of
the understandings of common men is really not so great, that one
needs set them such gigantic problems to solve, or choose them as
judges in the last resort of such questions. The mysteries, and more
especially the dogmas, of the Christian Religion, are allied to sub-
jects of the deeper and more intricate philosophy; and it is only the
positive dress with which it is invested that distinguishes the former
from the latter. . . . The multitude, however, are never so well
satisfied as when they can repeat, in a still louder tone, the loud de-
clamations of some few who give the cry. By this process the
strangest scenes are produced, and there is no end to the exhibition
of presumption and absurdity. A half educated, 'enlightened,' man,
often, in his shallowness and ignorance, jests on a subject before
which a Jacob, a Kant, the admitted ornaments of our country,
would bow in reverential awe.

"The results of philosophy, politics, and religion, ought certainly
to be brought home to the people: but we ought not to attempt to
exalt the mass into philosophers, priests, or politicians. It is of no
avail. If Protestants sought to define more clearly what ought to
be loved, done, and taught; if they imposed an inviolable, reveren-
tial silence on the Mysteries of Religion, without compelling any
man to assent to dogmas, tortured with afflicting presumption into a
conformity to this or that rule; if they carefully refrained from de-
grading it in the eyes of the many by ill-timed ridicule, or from
braving it into danger by indiscreet denial, I should myself be the
first to visit the Church of my brethren in religion, with sincere
heart, and to submit myself with willing edification to the general,
practical confession of a faith, which connected itself so immediately
with action." P. 100.

"In Goethe, all ideas became forms. He would have liked to
remake the imperfect medium of language, to speak, like
Nature, in symbols, and to throw his whole imagination, with the
vividness and reality of sense, into the existence of a flower or a
star. To him, as to Nature, it sufficed to revel in uninterrupted
solitude, and to pass from one agreeable state of existence to
another, through all forms and modes of life. At such moments, he
didn't even the mention of Herder, whose northern severity led
him to insist on overshadowing those gay, delightful visions of art
and imagination, with the thunderbolts and mists of policy and of
actual life. There, as Goethe truly remarked, were two totally
different and widely-separated spheres; it was absolutely necessary to
keep them quite distinct, and to let every man take care of himself,
and God of us all. Thus what seemed to Goethe narrow and par-
tial, Herder called noble and philanthropic; while, on the contrary,
what Herder admired as the substitute of a great idea, revealing
itself to man, in various godlike contemplations, in the value of the
hero, the wisdom of the legislator, the inspiration of the poet, or the
events of a world, this sort of elevation moved Goethe so little, that
such characters as Luther and Calvin excited in him a sort of un-
comfortable feeling, which could be satisfactorily explained only on
the hypothesis that their nature stood in a mysterious sort of opposi-
tion with his. Goethe's genius and disposition were for the Beau-

"The mind that wrought so powerfully on mine," said Goethe,
"and had so powerful an influence on the whole frame of my
opinions, was Spinoza's. After I had looked around the world in
vain, for means of shaping my strange moral being, I fell at length
on the Ethics of this man. What I read in this work, what I
thought I read in it, I can give no account of; enough, that I
found there a calm to my passions; it seemed to open to me a wide
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and free view over the sensual and the moral world. But what peculiarly riveted me, was the boundless disinterestedness that beamed forth from every sentence. Those wondrous words, 'He who loves God aright, must not require that God should love him in return; with all the principles on which they rest, with all the consequences which they bear, fill my whole mind. To be disinterested in all, most of all, in love and in friendship, was my highest desire, my passion, my task; so that those dazing words which follow, If I love you, what is that to you? were the true language of my heart', etc. P. 194.

"His intimacy with Herder first led him to penetrate into the lofty sentiment of the Italian school of art, and to become acquainted with poetry under a totally new aspect, and on much more in harmony with his character... During his first era, he had inclined to the Flemish school of art, to which indeed he never ceased to do justice; but Italy opened his eyes to the full perception of high art; his rich, fertile spirit, which embraced at once the lovely and the Child-like and the Lovely; his delicate, and at the same time profound, taste for nature and for art, now turned with love to the Noble and the Exalted. In the place of his former principle of naturalness or reality, now arose that of ideality; but that pure ideality which transports nature into the region of Ideas and of pure Beauty". Vol. iii., pp. 227—233.

"By means of his passionate, severe, objective way of looking upon the world and upon life, a view of human things had been opened to him equally removed from traditional one-sided narrowness, and from preconceived theories; this led him to regard everything as fitted to its place; to see the Individual in its connexion and co-operation with the Whole; and, in human life, effort and action as the main duty and happiness. Of necessity, this threw a milder light on that dark point at which, the threads of human existence are knotted together in a dim and fathomless destiny. This at length raised him to the idea of a Theodicea", etc. Vol. iii., p. 234.

"The greatest genius", he said, "will never be worth much, if

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he pretends to draw exclusively from his own resources. What is genuine, but the faculty of retaining and turning to account everything that strikes us; of co-ordinating and breathing life into all the materials that present themselves; of taking here marble, there brass, and building a lasting monument with them... The most original young painter, who thinks he owes every thing to his invention, cannot, if he really has genius, come into the room in which we are now sitting, and look round at the drawings with which it is hung, without seeing out a different man from what he came in, and with a new supply of ideas. What should I be, what would remain to me, if this art of appropriation were considered as derogatory to genius? What have I done? I have collected and turned to account all that I have seen, heard, observed; I have put in requisition the works of nature and of men. Every one of my writings has been furnished to me by a thousand different persons, a thousand different things, the learned and the ignorant, the wise and the foolish, infancy and age, have come in turn, generally without having the least suspicion of it, to bring me the offering of their thoughts, their faculties, their experience; often they have sowed the harvest I have reaped; my work is that of an aggregation of beings taken from the whole of nature; it bears the name of Goethe". Vol. iii., p. 75.

"He held fast to order and obedience to law as to the main pillars of the public weal. Whatever threatened to retard or to trouble the progress of moral and intellectual improvement, and the methodical application and employment of the power of nature, or to abandon all that is best and highest in existence to the wild freaks of unbridled passion and the domination of rude and violent men, was to him the true tyranny, the moral foe of freedom, the utterly insufferable evil. This was the persuasion which dictated all his endeavours to infuse the minds of others by conversation or by writing; to suggest, to instruct, to encourage, to restrain; to represent the False, the Distorted, the Vulgar, in all their nothingness", etc. P. 284.
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"You young people", he used to say, "easily recover when any tragical explosion gives you a transient wound; but we old gentlemen have all possible reasons for guarding ourselves against impressions which produce a violent effect upon us, and interrupt the course of steady employment to no purpose". When his mind was filled with any great thought, or any new work, he would sometimes refuse to hear a word read from newspapers or public prints". P. 288.

"Around him all must acquire life, form, motion; all must lend itself to energetic action. The Symmetrical must be sought out and brought home, must be thoroughly apprehended, must be modelled anew into fresh forms. Without assuming the pedagogue or the pedant, he impressed a peculiar stamp on all who surrounded or assisted him; he knew how to keep every man within the limits of his own appropriate sphere; but, within that, to urge him on to excellence and to productiveness; to engrave in his mind invariable maxims of order, steadiness, and consistency, out of which the "germs of a higher culture might gradually and spontaneously unfold themselves". P. 291.

"Every thing that was sent out in writing, the smallest note of invitation, must be written, folded, and sealed with the greatest possible care, neatness, and elegance. Every thing unsymmetrical, the slightest blot or scratch, was intolerable to him. His enjoyment from the sight of the most beautiful engraving was disturbed, if he saw it awkwardly handled, or at all crumpled; for all that surrounded him, and all that proceeded from him, must be in union with the symmetry and clearness of his inner perceptions, and nothing must be allowed to trouble the harmony of the impression". P. 298.

"In the hundreds of things which interest me", says he, "one always places itself in the centre, as chief pleasure, and the remaining quadlibet of my life revolves around it in various moon-like shapes, until at length one or other of them succeeds in working itself into the centre in its turn". Not always, however, could he obtain this instantaneous self-concentration; and fully conscious of his vehement susceptibility and irritability, he then seized on the extremest means, and suddenly and inexorably, as if in a state of siege, cut off all communication from without. Scarcely, however, had solitude delivered him of the full torrent of crowding thoughts, than he declared himself free again, and accessible to new objects of interest; carefully knit up the threads he had let drop, and floated and bathed in the fresh element of widely extended Being and Acting; till a new irresistible crisis of inward metamorphosis transformed him once more into a hermit". P. 300.

"He took great and manifold interest in the missionary reports from Halle, as he did indeed in all endeavors to diffuse higher feelings of morality by religious means; and if his nearest friends were sometimes surprised at finding him engaged in the theological writings of Dauth, Kretzer, Paulus, Marheinecke, Rohr, or ever poring over the folios of the fathers of the Church, his admirers will perhaps be still more so, when they learn, that at the time of the jubilee of the Reformation, he was most intensely buried on an historical cantata on Luther and the Reformation, a complete sketch of which, in all its parts, was found among his papers". P. 306.

"One of his greatest and most peculiar enjoyments was the weekly visit, which both the deceased Grand Duchess Louise and the reigning Grand Dukes and Grand Princess Maria, constantly paid him on a fixed day and hour. . . . If ever some inevitable obstacle to the wanted visit occurred, he seemed to feel a chasm in his existence; for it was exactly the constancy, the punctual recurrence of those days and hours, which to him gave them their peculiar charm; which had the most animated effect on him through the whole week. Amidst the vast variety of external impressions and internal workings, he found in the steadiness of this beautiful, pure, and noble connexion, not only a cheering object, but a beneficent resting place, where his mind was refreshed, to devote itself with more varied powers to the tranquil observation of all things.
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"For it was an absolute want of his nature to gain a clear conception of every subject, however heterogeneous; and the incredible readiness with which he could transform every incident, every personal state or situation, into an Image, must be regarded as the main foundation of his practical wisdom and good sense; and certainly contributed, more than any other quality, to preserve a man by nature so passionate, so easily and so deeply excitable, in secure equanimity amid all the catastrophes of life. As he invariably referred every passing and particular incident to some higher and universal standard, and sought to bring it under some exhaustive formula, he could strip it of all that was startling or repulsive, and could then calmly regard it as an example of conformity to the general rules of nature, or neutralize it as a simply historical fact, an addition to his stock of ideas. Now often have I heard him say, 'That may now turn out as it will; the conception of it I have got fast hold of; it is a strange complicated affair, but it is perfectly clear to me now'". P. 309.

"When Goethe had to bear the death of his only son, he wrote to Zelter thus:—Here the mighty conception of duty alone holds us erect. I have no other care than to keep myself in equipoise. The body must, the spirit will; and he who sees a necessary path prescribed to his will, has no need to ponder much. Thus did he shut up the deepest grief within his breast, and hastily seized upon a long postponed labour, in order entirely to lose himself in it. In a fortnight, he had nearly completed the fourth volume of his life, when nature avenged herself for the violence he had done her; the bursting of a blood-vessel brought him to the brink of the grave". P. 314.

"I feel myself surrounded, nay, besieged, by all the spirits I ever conjured up, he was heard to say. As a relaxation, he had Plutarch read aloud to him quite through. He would try his judgment upon the present state of the world, and took up the modern French literature, that "literature of despair", as he called it, with as much patience and labour as if he had had still many lustres in

which to look on at the morbid game of life. Then did the silent, peaceful genius [Death] unexpectedly draw near, and in the midst of the most cheerful industry, of the most zealous and benevolent schemes and actions, he saw him summoned to that higher and more perfect sphere of activity, where that grand solving word, which he uttered to his friends a year before, shall be fulfilled."


"The year 1827 inflicted upon Goethe the heaviest blows he was doomed to feel; the Grand Duke ended his long and beneficent life in the course of a journey. He was so overpowered by this irreparable loss that, contrary to his custom and to the rules he had set for himself, he yielded to his grief, and even gave vent to it in his correspondence. These rules were not the offspring of self-love, but the result of observation and of a great force of will. Susceptible to a high degree, he would have obeyed every impulse; he would have been the sport of passions which would have poisoned and shortened his life, had he not early acquired the habit of opposing labour and study to affliction and regret; and as we have already remarked, his labour changed its nature. Goethe seemed to create—a thing impossible in the hour of real suffering,—he resumed the task of observation and inquiry, and sought the condition he needed in the contemplation of the works of nature". Vol. iii, p. 47.

"It has been truly remarked that he avoided conversation on painful or exciting subjects; but this did not arise from feebleness or pusillanimity; it was the result of reflection and of the highest degree of self-knowledge. Intensely susceptible, as we have remarked, to all impressions, subjected by any new and striking ideas, he had above any man to dread those which might have turned him aside from his track, and given up his warm imagination to unwholesome wandering. Nor did he like people to dwell in his presence on gloomy thoughts or lamentable occurrences, unless some practical end was to be answered by such conversation. It was for
this reason that he avoided the common gossip of society; and that
those around him took care not to fatigue his ears with sinister
rumours of political troubles, cholera, or other disasters. But we
heard him question M. Walter, physician, etc. In this case he
was sure of being rewarded by valuable information, etc. It
was the same with the thought of death: he never forgot his age,
nor the necessity of yielding to the universal law; he only cal-
tulated the chances which still remained to him of life and enjoy-
ment, and the means he might employ for increasing them: among
the foremost of which he placed care in keeping at a distance all
gloomy thoughts, all exaggerated anxiety; as well as constant ex-
ercise of the intellectual faculties to preserve them from torpor and
decay. When an irremediable calamity overtook him, he compelled
himself to neutralize the pernicious effects of long regrets by
zealous application to study. There were moments when, to a
superficial observer, he might have appeared insensible; whilst the
most painful conflict agitated his soul. In such a case you might be
certain to guess what was passing within, by taking the very con-
trary of his conversation: thus he related one anecdote after
another with excessive vivacity, at a time when all his thoughts
were concentrated on one point.

"... He spoke to his friends several times of his death, and of
the means of warding it off to a remote age. 'Yes,' said he, 'we
can make head against him for sometime as yet; as long as one
creates there is no room for dying; but yet, the night, the great
night, will come, in which no man shall work.' He used to call
that solemn hour 'the undetermined hour'. Vol. iii., p. 82.

"All his conversation showed that, if he thought himself dying,
he did not fear death. Faithful to his principles, he constantly oc-
cupied himself, that he might not give the thinking faculty time to
grow dull and inactive. Even when he had lost the power of
speaking, his hand preserved the character of his life; his voice
was mute, but he traced characters in the air; and when his hand
sank slowly on his knee, the radiant star sank beneath our horizon'.
Vol. iii., p. 92.

Goethe died the most blessed death that man can die, conscious,
cheerful to the last breath, perfectly painless. It was an univer-
sal groan, sinking and going out of the frame of life, harmonious,
without struggle. 'Light' was his last request. Half an hour
before the end he said: 'Open the shutters that more light may
come into the room'. P. 93.

One of the most miserable, yet natural, characteristics of this love
of the Beautiful, is its connexion with sensuality. This will most
obviously take place through the medium of the Fine Arts. It is
often inveterate with an odious affection of philodoxy, as in
Dryden's Cymon and Iphigenia. On this Lord Chesterfield
remarks, 'Mr. Dryden, who knew human nature, perhaps as well
as any man who ever studied it, has given us a just picture of the
force of female charms in the story of Cymon and Iphigenia.

Becaria, from whom he took it, had adorned it with all the tinsel
fancy an Italian composition is capable of. The English poet, like
most English travellers, gave sterling silver in exchange for that
superficial gilding; and beloed a novel, where he found a tale.
He points in Cymon, a soul buried in confusion of ideas, inflamed
with so little fire, as scarce to struggle under the load; or afford any
shimmering of sense. In this condition he represents him struck
with the rays of Iphigenia's beauty; kindled by them, his mind
awakes; its intellectual faculties seem to awake, and that
smallest faculty of manners, by which he had hitherto been distin-
guished, gave way to an altering behaviour, the natural effects of
love'. "Percy's Reliques. I am sorry to say, Dryden was a
Catholic, when he published this poem.

Again, take the following passage from a tale of Tieck's: 'She
stumbled, and quickly as she sprang forward, he could not hinder
but that for a moment she, in the most charming posture, lay
kneeling at his feet. He raised her, etc. . . . He followed her
into the church, and saw only the image as she knelt before him,
and, etc. . . . His existence was forgotten; his heart flung for-
ever in the finest emotion. Nature was now friendly to him, and,
her beauty revealed to his meditation, he felt himself no longer a stranger to devotion and religion; and now he trod the threshold, the mysterious dimness of the temple, with far other feelings than in those days of levity. . . . He held towards her the holy water; her white fingers trembled as they touched his; she bowed graciously. He followed her and knelt near her. His whole heart melted away in melancholy and love. It seemed to him as if, from the wounds of longing, his existence was bleeding away in ardent prayers. Every word of the priest thrilled through him; every tone of the music gushed devotion into his bosom; his lips quivered, as the fair one pressed the Crucifix of her rosary to her ruby mouth. How had she not been able to comprehend this faith and this love before? The priest raised the Host, and the bell sounded. She bowed herself more humbly, and crossed her breast. Like lightning it struck through all his powers and feelings; and the altar-picture seemed alive; the coloured dimness of the windows as a light of Paradise. Tears streamed profusely from his eyes, and allayed the inward burning of his breast. Divine service was ended. He again offered her the holy font", etc. —Romantic Fiction, London, 1843. Which is the object of worship here— the true Incarnate Lord, or the dust and ashes?

In the following passage religious fear is represented simply as a corruption of Christianity; and heathen security and indifference is held up to imitation as the healthy state of mind.

"Euthanasia! Euthanasia! an easy death!" was the exclamation of Augustus; it was what Antonius Pius enjoyed; and it is that for which every wise man will pray, said Lord Orrery, when perhaps he was contemplating the close of a Swift's life.

"The Ancients contemplated death without terror, and met it with indifference. . . . Though they did not court the presence of death in any shape, they acknowledged its tranquillity; in the beautiful fables of their allegorical religion, Death was the daughter of Night, and the sister of Sleep; and was the friend of the unhappy. To the eternal sleep of death they dedicated their sepulchral monuments. . . . Eternal Somno. If the full light of revelation had not yet broken on them, it can hardly be denied that they had some glimpses and a dawn of the life to come, from the many allegorical inventions which describe the transmigration of the soul, a butterfly, etc., etc. . . . They did not pollute their imagination with the contents of a charnel house. . . .

"It would seem that the Romans had even an aversion to mention death in express terms, for they disguised its very name by some periphrases, such as 'diessit e vita'.

"The ancient Artists have so rarely attempted to personify death, that we have not discovered a single revolving image of this nature in all the works of antiquity. To conceal its deformity to the eye, as well as to clothe its suggestion to the mind, seems to have been a universal feeling, and it accorded with a fundamental principle of ancient art. . . . Catullus ventured to personify the Sister. Destinies as three crises; but in general, Winkelmann observes, 'they are represented as beautiful virgins', etc. . . . Death was a munificence to the ancient artist. Could he exhibit what represents nothing? Could he animate into action that which lies in a state of eternal tranquillity? Elegant images of repose and tender sorrow were all he could invent, to indicate the still of death. . . .

"When the Christian Religion spread over Europe, the world changed. The certainty of a future state of existence, by the affright of wicked worldly men, terrified instead of consoling human hearts; and, in the Resurrection, the ignorant multitude seemed rather to have dreaded retribution, than to have hoped for reparation. The Founder of Christianity everywhere breathed the blessedness of social feelings. It is 'Our Father', whom He addresses. . . . Amid this general gloom of Europe, their troubled imaginations were frequently predicting the end of the world. It was at this period that they first beheld the grave yawn, and Death, in the Gothic form of a giant anatomy, parading through the universe. The people were frightened, as they viewed everywhere hung before their eyes, in the twilight of their Cathedrals, and their 'pale doctors', the most revolting symbols of death. . . ."
Their barbarous taste perceived no absurdity in giving action to a heap of bones, which could only keep together in a state of immovability and repose; nor that it was будуя та сръдства, under whom the unnatural and licentious figure of mortality drawn out of the corruption of the grave. Dismal's Curiosities of Literature.

Sentiments such as these suggest to us the possibility of the "elegant mythology of the Greeks," as paganism has been called, commanding itself to educated minds in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries. Hume and Gibbon have both shown a kind feeling towards it; so, it is scarcely necessary to say, did many of their French contemporaries. This subject has been touched upon in one of my Tracts for the Times.

"Will Antichrist profess any religion at all? Neither true God, nor false God, will he worship; so far is clear, and yet something more, and that obscure, is told us. Indeed, as far as the prophetic accounts go, they seem at first sight incompatible with each other. Antichrist is to 'exalt himself over all that is called God or worshipped.' He will set himself forcibly against idols and idolatry, as the early teachers agree in declaring. Yet in the book of Daniel we read, 'In his estate shall he honour the god of forces; and a god whom his fathers knew not shall he honour with gold and silver, and with precious stones and pleasant things. Thus shall he do in the most strong with a strange god, whom he shall acknowledge and increase in glory.' What is meant by the words translated 'god of forces,' and afterwards called 'a strange god,' is quite hidden from us, and probably will he be so till the event; but any how some sort of false worship is predicted as the mark of Antichrist, with this prediction the contrary way, that he shall set himself against all idols, as well as against the true God. Now it is not at all extraordinary that there should be this contrariety in the prediction, for we know generally that infidelity leads to superstitious worship, and that the men most reckless in their blasphemy are cowards also. They cannot be consistent, if they would. But let me notice here again a remarkable coincidence, which is contained in the history of the last fifty years; the Tract is dated 1838] "a coincidence between actual events and prophecy sufficient to show us that the apparent contradiction in the latter may easily be reconciled, though beforehand we may not see how; sufficient to remind us that the all-watchful Eye, and the all-seeing Hand of God is still over the world, and that the seeds sown in prophecy above two thousand years since are not dead, but from time to time, by blade and tender shoot, give earnest of the future harvest. Surely the world is impregnated with uncertainty symptoms, which ever and anon, in unheady seasons, give lowering and muttering tokens of the wrath to come!"

"In that great and famous Nation which is near us, once great for its love of Christ's Church, since memorable for deeds of blasphemy (which leads me to mention it,) in the capital of that powerful and celebrated Nation, there took place, as we all well know, within the last fifty years, an open apostasy from Christianity; nor from Christianity only, but from every kind of worship which might retain any resemblance or pretence of the great truths of religion. Atheism was absolutely professed;—yet in spite of this (it seems a contradiction in terms to say it, a certain sort of Worship, and that, as the prophet expresses it, a strange worship, was introduced. Observe what this was."

"I say, they avowed, on the one hand, Atheism. They prevailed upon an unhappy man, whom their proceedings had forced upon the Church as an Archbishop, to come before the public, and declare that there was no God, and that what he had hitherto taught was a fable. They wrote up over the burial places, that death was an eternal sleep. They closed the churches, they seized and decorated the gold and silver plate belonging to them, turning those sacred monuments, like Belshazzar, to the use of their reliefs; they formed solemn processions, clad in priestly garments, and singing prophetic hymns. They trampled the divine ordinance of marriage,
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resolving it into a mere civil contract to be made and dissolved at pleasure. These things are but a part of their enormities.

"On the other hand, after having broken away from all restraint of God and man, they gave a name to the reprehensible state itself into which they had thrown themselves, and exalted that very negation of religion, or rather that real and living blasphemy, into a kind of god. They called it Liberty, and they literally worshipped it as a divinity. It was almost incredible, that men, who had flung off all religion, should be at the pains to assume a new and senseless worship of their own devising, whether in superstition or in mockery, were not events so recent and so notorious. After allying our Lord and Saviour, and blasphemously declaring Him to be an impostor, they proceeded to decrees, in the public assembly of the nation, the adoration of Liberty and Equality as divinities; and they appointed festivals besides, in honour of Reason, the Country, the Constitution, and the Virtues. Further, they determined that tutelary gods might be worshipped; and they enrolled in the number of those some of the most notorious infidels and profligates of the last century. The remains of the two principal of these were brought in solemn procession into one of their churches, and placed upon the holy altar itself; incense was offered to them, and the assembled multitude bowed down in worship before one of them, before what remained on Earth of an inveterate enemy of Christ.

"Further, let it be remarked, that there was a tendency to introduce the old Roman democratic worship, as if further to show us that Rome, the fourth monster of the Prophet's vision, is not dead. They even went so far as to restore the worship of one of the Roman divinities (Ceres) by name; raised a statue to her, and appointed a festival in her honour. Still further, it is startling to observe, that the former apostate in the early times, the Emperor Julian, too, was engaged in bringing back Roman Paganism. Further still, let it be observed that Antiochus too, the Antichrist before Christ, the persecutor of the Jews, he too signifi-

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lied himself in forcing the Pagan worship upon them, introducing it even into the Temple."—Tracts for the Times, No. 83.

I am induced to add some extracts from a Protestant sermon of my own, written just twenty years ago, both for its special connexion with the above extracts, and also as a sort of illustration of what I have said above, in Discourse I, concerning the long hold which the class of opinions, which I have here been advocating, have had upon my mind.

"In every age of Christianity since it was first preached, there has been what may be called a Religion of the world, which so far imitates the one true religion, as to deceive the unstable and the unwise. The world does not oppose Religion as such. I may say, it never has opposed it. In particular, it has, in all ages, acknowledged in one sense or other the Gospel of Christ, fastened on one or other of its characteristics, and professed to embody this one in its practice; while, by neglecting the other parts of the holy doctrine, it has, in fact, disturbed and corrupted even that portion of it, which it has exclusively put forward, and so has contrived to explain away the whole; for he who cultivates only one precept of the Gospel to the exclusion of the rest, in reality attends to no part at all. Our duties balance each other; and, though we are too mindful to perform them all perfectly, yet we may in some measure be performing them all, and preserving the balance on the whole; whereas, to give ourselves only to this or that commandment is to incline our minds in a wrong direction, and at length to pull them down to the earth, which is the aim of our adversary, the Devil.

"It is his very aim to break our strength; to force us down to the earth, to bind us there. The world is his instrument for this purpose; he is too wise to set it in open opposition to the word of God. Not he affects to be a prophet like the prophets of God. He calls his servants also prophets; and they mix with the scattered remnant of the true Church, with the solitary Michaels who were left upon the Earth, and speak in the Name of the Lord. And in
one sense, they speak the truth; but it is not the whole truth; and
we know even from the common experience of life, that half the
truth is often the most gross and mischievous of falsehoods'.

Then I allude, first, to the Neo-platonists, to Ammonius, his
connexion with Origen and the school of Alexandria, to Julian, etc.

"Even in the first ages of the Church, while persecution still
raged, he set up a counter-religion among the philosophers of the
day, partly like Christianity, but in truth a bitter foe to it; and it
deceived and shipwrecked the faith of those who had not the love of
God in their hearts".

Next I allude to the superstitions of the middle ages, as ordeal,
the savage feudalism, the fanaticism of chivalry, the wild excesses
of the era of the Crusades, the Flagellants, and the cruel and
bloody persecutions of Jews and heretics, all of which a Catholic
condemns, though here I ignorantly implicate the Church in them.

"Time went on, and he devised a second idol of the True Christ,
and it remained in the temple of God for many a year." The age
was rude and fierce. Satan took the darker side of the Gospel; its
awful mysteriousness, its fearful glory, its sovereign inflexible
justice; and here his picture of the truth ended. "God is a con-
suming fire; we know it. But we know more, viz., that God is love
also; but Satan did not add this to his religion, which became one
of fear. The religion of the world was then a fearful religion.
Superstitions abounded, and cruelities. The Noble of the
Christian, the graceful austerity of the true Christian were subdued by
forbidding spectres, harsh of eye, and haughty of brow; and these were
the patterns of the tyrants of a beguiled people".

Then I come to the Religion of Civilization, which is the subject
of the Ninth Discourse in this volume.

"What is Satan's device in this day? a far different one; but
perhaps a more pernicious... What is the world's Religion
now? It has taken the brighter side of the Gospel, its tidings of
comfort, its precepts of love; all darker, deeper views of man's
condition and prospects being comparatively forgotten. This is the
religion matured to a civilized age, and well has Satan dressed and
completed it into an idol of the Truth. As the reason is cultivated,
the taste formed, the affections and sentiments refined, a general
sensibility and grace will of course spread over the face of society,
quite independently of the influence of Revelation. That beauty
and delicacy of thought, which is so attractive in books, extends to
the conduct of life, to all we have, all we do, all we are. Our
manners are courteous; we avoid giving pain or offence; our words
become correct; our relative duties are carefully performed. Our
sense of propriety shows itself even in our domestic arrangements,
in the embellishment of our houses, in our amusements, and so also
in our religious profession. Vice now becomes unseemly and hideous
to the imagination; or, as it is sometimes familiarly said, 'out of
taste'. This elegance is gradually made the test and standard of
virtue, which is no longer thought to possess intrinsic claims on our
hearts, or to exist further than it leads to the quiet and comfort of
others. Conscience is no longer recognized as an independent
witness of actions; its authority is explained away; partly it is
superseded in the minds of men by the so-called moral sense, which
is regarded merely as the love of the beautiful; partly by the rule of
expediency, which is forthwith substituted for it in the details
of conduct. Now conscience is a stern gloomy principle; it tells
of guilt and of prospective punishment. Accordingly, when its
terrors disappear, they disappear also, in the creed of the day, those
fearful images of divine wrath with which the Scriptures abound.
They are explained away. Every thing is bright and cheerful.
Religion is pleasant and easy; benevolence is the chief virtue;
intolerance, bigotry, excess of zeal, are the first sins. Austerity
is an absurdity; even frugality is looked on with an unfeignedly
suspicious eye. On the other hand, all open profligacy is discon-
tinued; drunkenness is accounted a disgrace; cursing and
swearing are vulgarities. Moreover, to a cultivated mind, which
receives itself in the varieties of literature and knowledge, and is
interested in the ever accumulating discoveries of science, and the
ever-fresh inventions of information, political or other, from foreign
countries, Religion will commonly seem to be dull, from want of
novelty. Human excitements are easily sought out and rewarded. New objects in religion, new systems and plans, new doctri-nes, new preachers, are necessary to satisfy that craving, which the so-called spread of knowledge has created. The mind becomes morbidly sensitive and fashions; dissatisfied with things as they are, and devisions of a change as such, as if alteration must of itself be a relief.

"Now, I would have ye put Christianity for an instant out of your thoughts; and consider whether such a state of refinement, as I have attempted to describe, is not that to which men might be brought quite independent of religion, by the mere influence of education and civilization; and then again, whether, nevertheless, this mere refinement of mind is not more or less all that is called religion at this day. In other words, is it not the case, that Satan has so composed and dressed out what is the mere natural produce of the human heart under such circumstances, as to serve his purposes as the counterfeit of the Truth? I do not at all deny that this spirit of the world uses words and makes professions which it would not adopt except for the suggestions of Scripture; nor do I deny that it takes a general colouring from Christianity, so as really to be modified by it; nay, in a measure enlightened and exalted by it. Again, I fully grant, that many persons, in whom this bad spirit shows itself, are but partially infected by it; and at bottom good Christians, though imperfect. Still, after all, here is an existing system, only partially evangelical, built upon worldly principle, yet pretending to be the Gospel, spreading its whole side of it, viz., its aureate character, and considering it enough to be benevolent, courteous, candid, correct in conduct, delicate,—though it has no true fear of God, no fervent zeal for His honour, no deep hatred of sin, no horror at the sight of sinners, no indignation and compassion at the blasphemies of heretics, no jealous adherence to doctrinal truth, no especial sensitiveness about the particular means of gaining ends, provided the ends be good, no loyalty to the Holy Apostolic Church of which the Cred speaks, no sense of the authority of Religion as external to the mind; in a word, no seriousness, and therefore is neither hot nor cold, but (in Scripture language) lukewarm. Thus the present age is the very contrary to what are commonly called the Dark Ages; and together with the faults of those ages, we have lost their virtues. I say their virtues; for even the errors then prevalent—a persecuting spirit, for instance, fear of religious inquiry, bigotry, there were, after all, but perverted and excesses of real virtues, such as zeal and reverence; and we, instead of limiting and purifying them, have taken them away, root and branch. Why? because we have not acted from a love of the Truth, but from the influence of the Age. The old generation has passed, and its character with it; a new order of things has arisen. Human society has a new framework, and fosters and develops a new character of mind; and this new character is made by the Enemy, of our souls to resemble Christian obedience, as near as it may, its likeness all the time being but accidental. Meanwhile, the Holy Church of God, as from the beginning, continues its course steadfastly; despised by the world, yet influencing it, partly correcting it, partly restraining it, and in some happy cases, reclaiming its victims, and fixing them firmly and for ever within the lines of the faithful host, militant here on Earth, which journeys towards the City of the Great King.

After speaking of the reception of this counterfeit Christianity by the Puritan or Wesleyan party of the day, I proceed to describe its acceptability to the so-called Liberal.

"The form of doctrine, which I have called the Religion of the Day, is especially adapted to please men of sceptical minds, who have never been careful to obey their conscience, who cultivate the intellect without disciplining the heart, and who allow themselves to speculate freely about what Religion ought to be, without going to Scripture to discover what it really is. Some persons of this character almost consider Religion itself to be an obstacle in the advance of our social and political well-being. But they know that human nature requires it; therefore they select the most rational form of Religion (as they call it) which they can devise. Others
or other cause. But they all discard what they call gloomy views in religion: they all trust themselves more than God's word; and thus may be classed together; and are ready to embrace the pleasant, consoling religion, natural to a polished age. They lay much stress on works on Natural Theology, and think that all religion is contained in these; whereas, in truth, there is no greater fallacy than to suppose such works in themselves, in any true sense, to be religious at all. Religion, it has been well observed, is something relative to us; a system of commands and promises from God towards us. But how are we concerned with the sun, moon, and stars? or with the laws of the universe? how will they teach us our duty? how will they speak to sinners? They do not speak to sinners at all. They were created before Adam's fall. They declare the glory of God, but not His will. They are all-perfect, all-harmonious; but that brightness and excellence which they exhibit, in their own-creation, and the divine benevolence therein seen, are of little moment to fallen man. We see nothing there of God's truth, of which the conscience of the sinner loudly speaks. So that there cannot be a more dangerous, though a common device of Satan, than to carry us off from our secret thoughts, to make us forget our hearts, which tell us of a God of justice, and holiness, and to fix our attention merely on the God who made the heavens; who is our God indeed, but not God as manifested to us sinners, but as He shines forth to His angels, and to the elect hereafter.

"When a man has so far deceived himself as to trust his destiny to what the heavens tell him of it, instead of consulting and obeying his conscience, what is the consequence? that at once he misinterprets and perverts the whole text of Scripture. . . . We are expressly told that 'strait is the gate and narrow the way that leads to life, and few there be that find it'; that we must 'strive', or struggle, 'to enter in at the strait gate', for that 'many shall seek to enter in', but that is not enough; they merely seek, and do not find it; and farther, that they who do not obtain everlasting life, 'shall go into everlasting punishment'. This is the dark side of religion; and

the men I have been describing cannot hear to think of it. They shrink from it as too terrible. They easily get themselves to believe that these strong declarations of Scripture do not belong to the present day, or that they are figurative. They have no language within their heart responding to them. Conscience has been silenced. The only information they have received concerning God has been from Natural Theology, and that speaks only of benevolence and harmony; so they will not credit the plain words of Scripture. They seize on such parts of Scripture as seem to countenance their own opinions; they insist on its being commanded us to 'rejoice evermore', and they argue that it is our duty to rejoice ourselves now (in moderation, of course) with the goods of this life; that we have only to be thankful while we are here; that we need not alarm ourselves; that God is a merciful God; that repentance is quite sufficient to atone for our offences; that, though we have been irregular in our youth, yet that is a thing gone by; that we forget it, and therefore God forgets it; that the world is, on the whole, very well disposed towards Religion; that we should avoid enthusiasm; that we should not be over-serious; that we should have enlarged views on the subject of human nature; and that the Lord loves all men. This indeed is the creed of shallow men, in every age, who reason a little, and feel not at all, and who think themselves enlightened and philosophical. Part of what they say is false, part is true, but misapplied; but why I have noticed it here, is to show how exactly it fits in with what I have already described as the peculiar religion of a civilized age—it fits in with it equally well as does that of the so-called religious world, which is the opposite extreme".

THE END.