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"CONSCIENTIZAÇÃO": THEORY AND PRACTICE OF A LIBERTARIAN EDUCATION. A PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF PAULO FREIRE'S PEDAGOGY

By Admardo S. de Oliveira

Thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Ottawa as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Ottawa, Ontario (Canada), July, 1980

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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The writer is also indebted to Professors Yvon Lafrance and Carlos Bazan for their fruitful commentaries on many parts of the thesis. To Paulo Freire himself, for his suggestions and encouragement to make the "thesis project" a reality, the writer also wants to say a word of special thanks. The writer is also grateful to his colleague Kwasi Agyemang who, patiently, read the whole thesis and helped the writer -- whose mother language is not English -- in the correction of the text.

Finally, the writer wants to express his gratitude to the Federal University of Espirito Santo State, Brazil and to the University of Ottawa for their necessary financial support which made the accomplishment of his work possible.
CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

Admardo S. de Oliveira was born May 7, 1942, in Alegre, ES, Brazil. He received his B.A. in Theology from the "Centro de Estudos Teológicos da Fundação Cícero e Cecília Siqueira", Vitória, ES, Brazil, in 1971. He also received his B.A. in Philosophy from the "Faculdade Dom Bosco de Filosofia, Ciências e Letras", São João del Rey, MG, Brazil, in 1972. He received the degree of Master of Sacred Theology from Union Theological Seminary, New York City, in 1975. The title of his thesis was Christianity and Social Revolution in the light of the Latin American "Theology of Liberation". In 1978 he received the degree Master of Arts (Philosophy) from the University of Ottawa and the degree of Licentiate in Philosophy from Saint Paul University, Ottawa.
ABBREVIATIONS

(1) PAULO FREIRE'S WORKS (*


INT - Interview. It refers to a taped interview Freire gave to this writer at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, July 1979.


(* ) All translations from Freire's or other works only available in Portuguese or Spanish are mine, unless, otherwise indicated.
(2) OTHERS

AESA - American Educational Studies Association

CELAM - Conselho Episcopal Latino-Americano
Latin American Council of Bishops

CIDOC - Centro Intercultural de Documentación
Intercultural Centre of Documentation

CNBB - Conferência Nacional de Bispos do Brasil
National Conference of Brazilian Bishops

ICIRA - Instituto de Capacitación e Investigación en Reforma
Agraria
Agrarian Reform Training and Research Institute

IDAC - Instituto de Ação Cultural
Institute of Cultural Action

INODEP - Institut Oecumenique au Service du Développement des
Peuples
Ecumenical Institute for the Development of Peoples

LADOC-USCC - Latin American Documentation Series of the U.S.
Catholic Conference

MEB - Movimento de Educação de Base
Basic Education Movement

MOBRAL - Movimento Brasileiro de Alfabetização
Brazilian Literacy Movement
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**ABSTRACT OF "CONSCIENTIZAÇÃO": THEORY AND PRACTICE OF A LIBERTARIAN EDUCATION, A PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF PAULO FREIRE'S PEDAGOGY** .................... 498
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it" (01).

This is how Marx summarizes the perennial attitude of the philosophers whose voices have been hardly heard because, most of the time, they do not engage themselves entering into the grim affairs of existence or even involve themselves in the daily efforts of improving human life. Since the time Marx wrote these words they, however, have constituted a challenge for most people. By tradition, the philosophers look at the buzz and boom of human matters from a considerable distance; even when they theorize or comment, they, frequently, hope that others listen to them, but they do not expect or cannot expect to have many followers. Due to this, philosophers are seen, mostly, as men of theories and not men of practice.

On account of this, I would like to begin with this question: Can philosophy, and particularly philosophy of education, deal with reality? Karl Jaspers says that

"Every philosophy defines itself by its realization. We can determine the nature of philosophy only by actually experiencing it. Philosophy then becomes the realization of the living idea and the reflection upon this idea, action and discourse on action

in one. Only by thus experiencing philosophy for ourselves can we understand previously formulated philosophical thought" (02).

Nowadays Paulo Freire's pedagogy and philosophy are serious and profound attempts in answering this sort of questioning. His efforts are exactly how a theory of education can be utterly derived from, and engaged with, reality. But contrary to most pedagogues, educators and philosophers of education, Freire does not manufacture a theory to be listened to, nor as a gift to be practiced by others. Indeed, his theory evolves as a result of his own practical activities. In his philosophy of education the dialectical unity inherent between theory and practice is perfectly accomplished. One can not be fully comprehended without the other. His theory emerges from his practical activities which, in turn, are always turning again to the underlying theory for a constant dialectical analysis and understanding of reality.

"The theoretical foundation of my practice" -- says Freire -- "can be explained, at the same time, in itself; but not as something already finished, rather, as a dynamic movement in which both practice and theory, make and re-make one another" (03).

This dissertation is related to contemporary philosophy of education. Nevertheless, it also deals with other philosophical areas such as cultural, social and political

(03) "A alfabetização de adultos - crítica de sua visão ingênua, compreensão de sua visão crítica", in ACL, p. 17.
philosophy. Since there is no neutral philosophy of education, in the sense that all philosophy of education, or any educational system postulates, or at least, presupposes one sort of societal milieu, or another, from which it is itself derivatively constituted, Freire's educational works and efforts reflect, automatically, the philosophical tendencies of our times, mainly those experienced by the people of the Third World. For this very reason this dissertation can not escape the entanglements of the social, cultural and political situations of Latin American reality.

In the analysis of our topic (04), five different moments shall appear throughout the thesis, although they can not be interpreted separately due to the intimate dialectical relationships between them. The first moment is the encounter as the dialogical characteristic of conscientização; the second is the awakening of consciousness as the prime aim of conscientização; the third is the crisis which occurs in both oppressed and oppressors as the process of conscientização manifests itself in the emergence of the popular masses; the fourth is the integration between theory and practice on which the whole process of conscientização, as a methodology

---

(04) There is no appropriate English translation for the word conscientização. Due to this the term will be preserved in its original Portuguese form in order to avoid confusion and misunderstanding with similar, but basically different concepts and in deference to its origins.
for libertarian education, is based, and from which the cultural revolution, at the same time, gives birth to a new social order of which the character is one of a process of both continuing education and revolution. The fifth moment is liberation which is the ultimate goal of the process of conscientização as well as of the entire Freire's philosophy of education.

In order to study these different but inseparable moments of Freire's pedagogy, I would like to employ the analytic method and divide the dissertation into five chapters. The first chapter examines the different stages of consciousness and tries to show: (1) how man responds to each one of these stages; (2) how these stages are related to different types of society; (3) and how do they correspond to the different models of the human knowledge. The second chapter presents Freire's approach to the problem of conscientização and its phenomenological, dialectical, utopian and theological aspects. The third chapter provides an analysis of Freire's philosophy of dialogue and the features of a true dialogical relationship. It also compares and contrasts the theories of anti-dialogical and dialogical actions which hinder or stimulate the very process of conscientização. The fourth chapter departs from the presupposition that anti-dialogical and dialogical actions incide upon the educative process and determine its goals towards domestication or liberation which
INTRODUCTION

constitute the grounds for Freire's concept of "banking" and problem-posing educational theories. The fifth and concluding chapter furnishes some philosophical reflections about Freire's concept of conscientização and how it is integrated with his notion of revolution. It also offers some criticisms concerning some controversial points in Freire's concept of conscientização and its relations to the problems regarding:

(1) the different philosophical trends of his thought; (2) his methodology; (3) and his philosophy of liberation.

In sum, the dissertation concludes that Freire's concept of conscientização is not philosophically oriented towards an education for freedom. Rather, his pedagogy is, indeed, limited, due to its lack of a systematic and metaphysical analysis of freedom, but seriously oriented towards an education for liberation from socio-politic-economic oppression. It is for this reason that this dissertation is entitled "Conscientização: Theory and Practice of a Libertarian Education.

A - PAULO FREIRE: THE MAN AND HIS WORKS (05)


great drought interior, a semi-arid area, covered with sparse spiny vegetation, called caatinga (a stunted spare forest) as well as with the maldistribution of land, have transformed this entire region into being the proper place for the study of the “geography of hunger” (07). Recife itself portrays, in a most visible manner, the oligarchical inheritance of its Portuguese colonization which coexists side by side with some of the worst Latin American slums, known by the name of favelas (08), the product and the consequence of peasant exodus from the interior backlands.

Freire’s father, Joaquim Temístocles Freire, was an official of the State Police Force, spiritualist and a very honest, upright and intelligent man. His mother, Edeltrudes Neves Freire, was a housewife, catholic and a very gentle and kindly personality. From his own parents, Freire learned the first letters and beneath the leafy shadows of the tropical mangoes tree in the backyard of his Recife’s home, he became


(08) In Brazil, very poor houses made of tin and scrap-material huts in the big urban centers. They generally cover some of the hills of the cities and are located in the periphery of the cities. Thus, the suburbs in Latin America, specially in Brazil, are not often the place for the wealthiest families. There exists suburbs for the rich and suburbs for the poor. In the case of Recife, it is estimated today that more than 50 per cent of its population lives an inhuman and degrading life in the favelas. In the Northern coastal cities, like Recife, the favelas are also known by the name of mocambos when they are built in low swamplands of the mangroves, like pala-fittes.
"The words that I first learned were the words of my child's universe. My first blackboard was the ground itself, and my first chalk a small stick" (09).

In a home where always existed an atmosphere of love, understanding, and sharing, Freire grew up, seeing in the examples of his own parents the road which would lead him, later on, to embark on the fights and claims for social justice. He himself speaks lovingly and gently about his parents:

"With them I learned the dialogue which I try to keep with the world, with all men, with God, with my wife, with my children. The respect of my father regarding the different religious beliefs of my mother taught me, since my childhood, to respect the choices of others. I still remember the caressing way with which he heard me when I told him that I was going to have my first communion. I decided to embrace my mother's religion and she helped me in order that my choice was effective. The hands of my father had not been made to hurt his offspring, but rather to teach them to do right things" (10).

The Great Depression of 1929 greatly harmed Freire's middle class family to the point of bankruptcy. The family was, then, obliged to move to Jaboatão (interior of Pernambuco State), in 1931. Nevertheless, his father fought to maintain the aspects and appearances of moderate financial success. Although, almost empty, the family house was kept and his father never gave up wearing a tie. This stubborn at-

(09) LGB, p. 132
(10) CON, p. 13
INTRODUCTION

titude of Freire's father in trying to mask poverty was the fact which allowed the young Freire to continue his studies. In Jaboatão, Freire lost his father. Facing great difficulties, Freire, at the age of fifteen, started the secondary school, two years behind the age of his schoolmates. Those were hard times in which Freire learned what it is for a school child to go hungry and struggle courageously against listlessness -- which is provoked by hungry -- and which was interpreted by his teacher as mild mental retardation. His performance in school at this time was just barely adequate to qualify him for secondary school. Professor Richard Shaull reports that at this stage Freire decided to dedicate his life

"to the struggle against hunger, so that other children would not have to know the agony he was then experiencing" (11).

Once the family situation improved a bit, and after graduation from high school, Freire entered the Federal University of Pernambuco State where he enrolled in the Faculty of Law at the same time he started, by himself, his studies in philosophy and in the psychology of language. As a law student, he was an average one. While working part-time as an instructor of Portuguese in a secondary school, Freire, besides the opportunity of pleasing himself in

(11) Foreword to Freire's PO, p. 10
study of his own mother language, helped his other brothers in the sustenance of the family. At this time, he started to question the great abyss between the real life and what he used to hear on the Sunday Masses. For about one year's time he tells us:

"I turned myself away from the Church, but never from God... I returned to it through the lectures of Tristão de Athayde, for whom, since then, I nourish a steady admiration. To those lectures would immediately join the lectures of Mâritain, Bernanos, Mounier, and others" (12).

In 1944, at the age of 23, Freire married Elza Maria Costa Oliveira, of Recife. To his wife, an elementary school teacher, and later a principal, Freire is greatly indebted. With her, he bore two sons and three daughters with whom both, Freire and wife, were able to amplify their area of a genuine dialogical practice. His wife's courage, her comprehension and interest for everything he does, her never undenied help, mainly in those hard and difficult situations, her capacity to love and share with others her own life and everything she has, has been the main strength and energy behind the weakness and slenderness of this man's body, a body which carries in it until today the marks of suffering and hunger. It was after his marriage that Freire became interested in educational problems which grew to the point that he was doing more readings in education, philosophy and sociology.

(12) CON, p. 14-15
INTRODUCTION

of education than in law.

After finishing his legal studies, Freire worked, for a short time, as a labor-union lawyer among the poor in the slums. Having abandoned law, after his first cause, as a way of earning a living, he began to work as a welfare official in the SESI-Social Service of Industry. Soon he became the director of the Department of Education and Culture of SESI. It was through this work that Freire became involved in literacy training. During those years of public service he had the opportunity of being in direct contact with the slum workers. By 1947 he had developed a great interest in adult literacy education among these urban poor. It was, then, among the common and desinherited popular masses that Freire began to search the answers to some of the most astonishing problems of the philosophical discourse, chiefly the issues regarding philosophy of education.

"In learning with them and with the workers in the fields and factories, it became possible for us also to teach" (13).

As a result of such experience, Freire became an educator fostering and taking part in seminars for adult education. By this time, he had become very much concerned: (1) about the means of communicating with the dispossessed, which, later on, gave origin to his dialogical methodology;

(13) LGB, p. 9
(2) about the materials and methods employed in literacy training programs because of the paternalism and authoritarianism with which they were involved; (3) and, above all, about the fundamental educational and philosophical purposes camouflaged behind the traditional materials and methods.

In 1959 Freire's thought on the philosophy of education was first expressed in his doctoral dissertation. This degree was the result of formal academic activities and not an honorary doctorate as it is suggested by some. Freire was then appointed professor of the History and Philosophy of Education at the Federal University of Pernambuco State. In 1962 he became Director of the University's Cultural Extension Service whose one of the chief functions was to provide education for adults. Even after this event, he maintained his interest in the field of adult literacy and now influencing students and recruiting from among them many volunteers in his elaboration of projects for adult literacy programs and involving a considerable group of these students in the literacy campaigns in the slums and in the peasants' hinterland. In few months, thousands of volunteers coordinators (teachers) were trained and started to work immediately.

"We began" -- says Freire -- "with the conviction that the role of man was not only to be in, the world, but to engage in relations with the world -- that through acts of creation and re-creation, man makes cultural reality and thereby adds to the natural world, which he did not make. We were certain that man’s relation to reality, expressed as a Subject to an object, results in knowledge, which man could express through language" (15).

Soon the new methodology Freire developed began to be widely employed by Catholics (specially by the Catholic Church’s Rural Assistance Service) and other literacy campaigns which were held and supported by various popular movements. These campaigns quickly spread throughout the Brazilian Northeast flourishing and met with tremendous success: three hundred workmen were able to read and write in 45 days only. It caused a very deep impression in the public opinion. Paulo de Tarso, a close friend of Freire and then, Minister of Education, was also so impressed that in 1963 the Ministry of Education committed itself to a nationwide literacy campaign adopting Freire’s method and Freire himself became Secretary of Education for the Pernambuco State and General Coordinator of the National Plan of Adult Literacy. It was estimated that 20,000 discussion groups, by 1964, would be ready to provide literacy training for two million people in a course lasting no longer than three months. The remaining forty million illiterates -- which com

(15) EPF, p. 43. A complete analysis of Freire's method and its applicability is furnished in Chapter IV, Item 4.3.
prised, at that time, almost half of the total population of
the country -- would be reached by such training within a few
years.

Unfortunately, all these efforts were brought to an
abrupt end in April, 1964. A disastrous and irrational mili-
tary coup d'état suppressed all popular movements as well as
Freire's and other literacy campaigns on account of their
"subversive ideological" tendencies (16). Freire, after being
arrested in Aracaju, capital of the Northeast State of Ser-
gipe, was thrown into jail, with some 150 other political
prisoners. In jail, being repeatedly accused and questioned
for seventy days, he found refuge in the Bolivian Embassy.
There, he was "encouraged" to leave the country, after being
considered by the new military dictatorship a "traitor of

(16) Among many references concerning the 1964's coup d'état
and its relation with Freire's and other literacy cam-
paigns, see: Emmanuel DeKadt, Catholic Radicals in Bra-
zil, London, Oxford University Press, 1970; Joseph Page,
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Editions du Cerf, 2e. éditions, 1973; John L. Elias,
"Adult Literacy Education in Brazil, 1961-1964: Método
Paulo Freire", in Canadian and International Education,
Toronto, Ontario, Vol. 2, No. 1, June 1975, p. 61-84; Lewis H. Diuguid, "Brazil Wages Two-Pronged War on Lit-
eracy", The Washington Post, Section D-3, December 20,
1970.
INTRODUCTION

Christ and of the Brazilian people"(17) and under the accusation that what he intended with his new method for adult literacy was merely an attempt to transform the nation into a "Bolshevist" country.

In jail, Freire began to write the first of his major works, *Education: The Practice of Freedom* which arose out of Freire's involvement in adult literacy programmes throughout Brazil prior to the military coup of 1964. In this work, Freire develops the basic components of his literacy method and program. Education here is described as the practice of freedom because Freire believes that it frees both the educator and the educatee from the claws of monologue and silence, which is typical of that give-and-take educational process of domestication and indoctrination. However, an education for freedom is only possible of full realization in a society where there exists the socio-economic-political conditions for the existence of such freedom. Hence, the political consequences of his educational theory and why this work is also an analysis of Freire's failure to effect change in Brazil.

After his expulsion from Brazil, Freire, with his wife and children went to Santiago, Chile. For five years (1964-1969) he worked as a UNESCO consultant and with the adult education projects of the Eduardo Frei government in

(17) CON, p. 20
the Agrarian Reform Training and Research Institute-ICIRA. In Chile, Freire's method for adult literacy training was implanted with a so tremendous success that this country, in 1968, was recognized by UNESCO as one of the five nations that most effectively overcame illiteracy.

While in Chile, Freire wrote, besides many articles and small essays, two other books. The first entitled *Extension or Communication?* was written in 1968 and published in 1969 at a time when the United States model of rural extension was spreading throughout Latin America. The book itself, a small but significant study, deals with the problem of communication between the technicians and the peasants in the process of development of the new agrarian society which was being built. Thus, Freire is here concerned with the role of agronomists as educators. The book is, indeed, a semantic inquiry regarding the two words which provide educational options in its title. Extension is described as the process of extending to peasants, as passive recipients, the knowledge and methods needed for agrarian reform. According to Jacques Chonchol,

"Freire shows us how the concept of extension leads to actions which transform the peasant into a 'thing', an object of development projects which negate him as a being capable of transforming the world. In this concept the peasant is not educated but instead is treated as a depository for propaganda from an alien cultural world, containing the things which the technician (who is modern and there
fore superior) thinks the peasant ought to know in order to become modern also" (18).

Extension programs, in this sense, err and are doomed to failure when they treat people as "things", as objectified extended knowledge without revealing or unveiling the reality of man-world relationships. Successful "extension" has to be primarily communication.

The second book Freire wrote in Chile, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, is the most famous and the best known of all his major works. Here one finds a deeper exposition and development of his earlier writings and basic themes, such as: man has to become subject in order to be fully human; the development of critical consciousness; the use of dialogue in achieving a liberated and humanistic society; education as a non-neutral political enterprise; the distinction between two concepts of education: the "banking" education (or education for domestication) and the problem-posing education (or education for liberation); the contrast between cultural action for liberation and cultural action for domestication; and finally, the introduction of a pedagogy of the oppressed in which two fundamental stages are to be found: (1) unveiling the nature of oppression by which men become aware of their oppression and the transformation of

(18) Preface to Freiré's EC, p. 88
it through praxis; (2) the use of this pedagogy by everyone in the process of achieving freedom is a permanent mode of liberating cultural action.

Most of the articles and essays Freire wrote in Chile were published in a book form under three different titles (19). The first, Sobre la Acción Cultural, is where Freire, for the first time, identifies traditional education as "banking" education and it is also in this book that his pedagogy is named "cultural action for freedom" for the first time. Most of the topics studied in the articles and essays presented in this book are more directly addressed to the problems of education among peasants in an agrarian reform environment. Among the seven articles and essays of the book, only one, "The Role of the Social Worker in the Process of Change", has been translated and published into English. The second book entitled, Contribución al Proceso de Concientización en América Latina, deals more specifically with articles and essays which are more linked with Freire's literacy method for adult education. To my knowledge no one of the six articles and essays contained in this book has been translated and published into English. The third book, Educação e Conscientização: Extensionismo Rural, though in Portuguese, was published in Cuernavaca, México.

(19) These books have not been translated into English. For further references about them, see the annotated bibliography in the end of this dissertation.
in 1968. It contains Freire's views on the role of education in promoting the awakening of consciousness in a rural environment.

Also in Chile, Freire's method was suppressed after the fall of the Salvador Allende's government. Those same "hidden and mysterious forces" that banished all attempts at liberation and economic independence in Brazil in 1964 were now at work in Chile. Fortunately, at this time, Freire was not in Chile when the shameful assassination of Allende occurred.

At this point, it has to be stressed the extent to which Freire's thought influenced Latin America. It is sufficient to mention how strongly it influenced the program documents in which the Second General Assembly of the CELAM-Latin American Council of Bishops, held in Medellin, Colombia, in August, 1968, tried to apply the Second Vatican Council to Latin American reality. This aspect and many others, are indicative of the tremendous impact Freire's method and thought had on all Latin America. César Jerez and Juan Hernandez Pico state that Freire's influence

"has to be considered as one of the most important and recent events in Latin America, comparable, for example, to that of Ché Guevara" (20).

INTRODUCTION

In 1969, after receiving an invitation from Harvard University, Freire left Latin America and became a visiting professor at Harvard's Center for Studies in Education and Development (CSED) and was also a Fellow at the Center for the Study of Development and Social Change, both in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The short period of his permanence in the United States influenced Freire profoundly. At this time, he became aware that oppression, alienation, domination, and exclusion of the powerless from political and economic life were not characteristic of the Third World only. He began to perceive that the First World has also within itself its Third World. His concept of the Third World was, then, extended from a geographical setting to a political concept.

During his short stay in the United States, Freire wrote two essays for the Harvard Educational Review entitled Adult Literacy Program as Cultural Action for Freedom and Cultural Action and Conscientization. Later on, both essays were released in a joint publication in a booklet entitled Cultural Action for Freedom which contains an introduction written by Freire himself. The booklet itself reflects Freire's ideas regarding alienation, domination and oppression, etc., not only within the context of cultures of total silence but also within the context of sub-cultures of the developed countries. In sum, the work restates
thesis on the impossibility of a neutral education and that it has to be a cultural action for liberation. It summarizes, for the first time, for English speaking readers, the educational theories of Freire which were previously elaborated in Portuguese and Spanish.

On July, 1970 Freire became the President of INODEP-Institut Oecumenique au Service du Développement des Peuples. In this same year he moved to Geneva, Switzerland. Until the end of 1979 he worked there as a special Educational Consultant to the World Council of Churches. In 1972 and 1973 he lectured in the United States at the Fordham University. In 1973 he founded the Institute of Cultural Action (IDAC) at Geneva whose aims are to develop efforts in order to utilize his method in other parts of the world and also to promote Freire's ideas and applying them to liberation issues around the globe and in situations different from those of Latin America. This Institute is responsible for the publication of two Freire's booklets, Liberation of Woman: To Change the World and Re-Invent Life (1974) and Toward a Woman's World (1975) in which Freire deals more specifically with the relations between a humanizing education and the women's liberation.

While living in Geneva, Freire still wrote and published the following works: The first, Conciertización;

(21) See annotated bibliography in the end of this dissertation.
Teoría y Práctica de la Liberación, was published in Bogotá, in 1974 and later on published in São Paulo, in 1979. It contains: a short autobiography of Paulo Freire and the historical context of the experience of his method in Brazil and Chile; an analysis on the problem of literacy and conscientización and also a description of his method with its different phases; a study on the praxis of liberation in which Freire deals again with topics such as oppression, dependency, marginalization, cultural action, cultural revolution, etc. The work has some fruitful commentaries and notes added to it by the editor, the "Asociación de Publicaciones Educativas". The second work is entitled Concientización and was published in Buenos Aires, in 1974. It is a collection prepared by INODEP; it contains several texts written by Freire on the theme Conscientización. The third book, Diálogo Paulo Freire - Ivan Illich, was published also in Buenos Aires, in 1975. It is a series of talks between the two famous educators with special emphasis on the chief differences regarding their ideas about the educational process and systems. A fourth book, Educación y Cambio, published in 1976 in Buenos Aires, describes the views of Freire on how education can be seen and employed as an important agent for social change.

Freire has also spent the last ten years travelling all over the world delivering lectures and seminars and giving his personal assistance to educational projects of many
underdeveloped countries, mainly in Asia and Africa. It is due to his recent experience and personal assistance in educational projects in Africa that he received, in April, 1975, an invitation from the government of Guinea-Bissau to give his personal contribution to the efforts of that government in the area of adult literacy education. The result of such experience and contribution is the publication of his most recent major work, Pedagogy in Process: The Letters to Guinea-Bissau. The book describes Freire's and his staff's experience in their efforts to develop adult educational programs which are able to serve to the plans of national reconstruction of Guinea-Bissau after five centuries of Portuguese colonization and exploitation. The program in itself is described in three phases: analysis, evaluation and synthesis. The book contains, besides a lengthy introduction, a series of seventeen letters written by the author and also a postscript. Eleven letters are addressed to Mário Cabral, the Commissioner of State for Education and Culture in Guinea-Bissau; six to members of the Literacy Commission. The letters comprise two essentially different, but related correspondences: the former dealing with more general issues of collaboration and program policy; the latter with details of the literacy program development process. The main thesis of the book is that the educational practice must be consistent with the revolutionary political compromise. The
fundamental purpose of the book is to offer to the readers a dynamic vision of the activities which have been developing in Guinea-Bissau.

In the Summer of 1979, Freire lectured at Michigan University, in the United States, from which he received a Doctor Honorary Degree. On that occasion, he was informed about the General Amnesty granted by the Brazilian government and started to make plans to return to Brazil. In August, he went to Brazil for a short visit. These were his first words when stepped the Brazilian soil after fifteen years in exile:

"I see my return with a great joy. It is with an almost adolescent joy that I arrive in Brazil, after fifteen years in exile. I look to myself and I feel very happy. There is nothing more that I can tell now. Due to the profound respect and love which I have for this people I have to re-learn Brazil" (22).

In sum, Freire may be loved or hated, but never can he be ignored when one discusses contemporary educational problems. Speaking about his influence on actual educational issues John W. Donahue says:

"(Freire) is one of the two or three Catholic Christians since the Renaissance to have achieved a sizable and non-parochial reputation as an educational pioneer" (23).

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B - THE FORMATION OF FREIRE'S THOUGHT

Freire's thought constitutes a very diversified global synthesis which expresses itself in a variety of many different philosophical currents with its own style, orientation and configuration. Although it is not very difficult to determine the various philosophical tendencies that have influenced the formation of his thinking -- due to the great number of footnotes and quotations which can be found in his writings -- Freire's thought is highly eclectic and flows, mostly, from his life experience. Hence, the difficulty, sometimes, in grasping the totality of this thought. Professor John L. Elias affirms:

"The difficulty in treating Freire's thought comes not in determining its sources, but in the area of finding consistency of structure. He draws on so many diverse thinkers that one begins to question how well these ideas are integrated" (24).

At any rate, I think, like Professor Carlos Alberto Torres:

"There exists a categorical structured thought in Freire and not simply a confused mixture of ideas or philosophical currents, nor is his thought a mere novelty eclecticism" (25).

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Such a viewpoint typifies a lack of a full understanding of Freire's syncretism as well as the failure in perceiving the structure and integration of his thought that he has been so frequently accused of being a Hegelian idealist, a Marxist, a masked theologian, an adherent of personalism, an existentialist, a phenomenologist, etc., etc.

All these above six philosophical trends, and many of the philosophical problems and questionings posed by them, in fact, shaped Freire's thought. But it does not necessarily mean that his thought lacks "consistency of structure" or that his ideas are not integrated. Spokesmen from each of these quarters convinced Freire that the world is not an eternal given stratum and that there is a possibility for man to act in order to eliminate oppression and alienation. Yet, most of the philosophical issues present on these six trends form the basic principles and premises upon which Freire's thought is to be grounded and fully comprehended. Hence, the necessity of a close look at these trends and in what sense they give any valuable contribution to the formation of Freire's thought.

(1) HEGELIAN IDEALISM

Freire is much indebted to Hegelian philosophy. Alias, it can be said that it is in the Hegelian dia-
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The dialectics where one can find the fundamentals of Freire's thought (26). On the other hand, the analysis of consciousness, which occupies a very important place in Hegel's philosophy, is also a key element in Freire's thought. For both what is a very characteristic mark of the oppressed (or of the Bondsman) is his subordination to the consciousness of the oppressor (or of the Master) (27).

From the Hegelian dialectics Freire borrows and develops, under other practical angles, the notion that man as a self-conscious being, moves from the common experience until the point in which such experience ascends to the dialectical science; through the dialectical process what merely is "in itself" comes to be "in itself and to itself". Hegel argues, for instance, that self-consciousness is the reflection, which from the sensible world, is essentially a return of such world to the realm of reflection. Self-con...


sciousness is, then, an active and practical consciousness which expresses itself in a sort of contraposition. Such contraposition is the act to examine the objects which pose themselves in front of the consciousness as if the "notion" of the objects was not the same as their truth; or, if what the objects show (which is also what they immediately deny), is not expressed in what they really are. In this dialectical process, consciousness becomes self-consciousness and it is able now not only to contemplate the objects (theoretical consciousness) but also is capable of apprehending the true essence of the objects, which is itself (28).

The radical difference, however, between Freire's actual dialectics and that of Hegel is that the former, when incorporated in his thought the valuable elements of other philosophical currents, reduces the positivity of the determined negation and creates, automatically, new horizons for the understanding of the historic-social phenomenon and its consequent praxis. Freire thinks, like Hegel, that education is the motor power of the historical process which challenges and questions -- due to its contradictions at the subjective level -- the consciousness, which can reach, through a qualitative jump, critical consciousness. This, in Hegel, would be the ultimate end of Absolute Knowledge.

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In Freire, differently as it is in Hegel, such qualitative jump is the consequence of the educational process, though inserted in a concrete historical process. This is why Freire's dialectics is not totally tied to the Hegelian's. Freire differs from Hegel's dialectics when he assumes that man is the maker and re-maker of history, and molds his philosophy as liberation, as praxis. He says:

"The reflectiveness and finality of men's relationship with the world would not be possible if these relationships did not occur in a historical as well as physical context. Without critical reflection there is no finality, nor does finality have meaning outside an uninterrupted temporal series of events. For men there is no here relative to a there which is not connected to a now, a before, and an after. Thus men's relationships with the world are per se historical, as are men themselves. Not only do men make the history which makes them, but they can recount the history of this mutual making" (29).

Therefore, those who use to accuse Freire of being a Hegelian idealist have to be very alert about his praxis in order to avoid naive or false interpretations regarding his thought. On the other hand, it will be convenient for them to ask or to know what has been the practice of Freire's pedagogy before nicknaming him -- as Professor Manfred Stanley did -- as a man "dangerously abstract, rhetorical and that the "application of his ideas to the developed Western World and other parts of the Third World could have

(29) CAC, p. 456
tragically irrational results" (30). Even Professor Gilberta S. Martino Jannuzzi in her excellent work (31) on the comparison between MOBRAL's "tactics" of literacy and Freire's method does not escape entirely from interpreting (in some passages) Freire under a pure idealist framework.

(2) MARXISM

Since its beginning Freire's political and social thought has been eminently socialist. From many issues Freire is entirely dependent on Marxism and its Dialectic and Historical Materialism, especially his interpretation of history, culture, and religion. Such dependence came, originally, from Herbert Marcuse and his analysis of negative reason.


MOBRAL (Brazilian Literacy Movement) was created by the Brazilian Ministry of Education and implanted throughout the country after the military coup of 1964. In terms of method it can be said that MOBRAL was influenced by Freire. However, it could not adopt or even recognize the social and political implications of Freire's method. MOBRAL is, indeed, contrary to Freire, a pedagogy of the oppressor to the oppressed whose aim is indoctrination and attempts of adjusting and silencing through "education" the popular masses. On the one hand, as a nationwide literacy campaign, MOBRAL has been very successful; on the other hand, however, it was capable of politically creating illiteracy among the large majority of the Brazilian illiterate population, which from its viewpoint and goals signifies a tremendous victory.
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in developed societies and the phenomenon of manipulation and of "massification" (32). Also on Erich Fromm and his studies about codification, psychological freedom and its incidence on democracy, Freire is very much dependent. He is also indebted to Louis Althusser, Paul and Lucien Goldman, Karel Kosik, Antonio Gramsci, Georg Lukács, and some revolutionaries Marxist leaders such as Mao Tse Tung, Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, Father Camilo Torres, Amilcar Cabral, etc. However, Freire tends neither to anyone of them nor to any of their particular philosophical or ideological tendencies. His philosophy of education is, actually, directed towards political actions, but Freire is very careful in not embracing or advocating any political ideology or philosophy, which in a sense, would mean a contradiction to his dialectical way of thinking. If it is so, Freire does not commit the same alleged mistake of Marx in not subjecting his own theory to a dialectical critique, if this charge against Marx is to be

(32) In Freire's terminology "massification" is the process of reducing the people to a manageable, unthinking agglomeration. Freire employs the term to designate the state in which people do not make their own decisions although they may think that they do. 'Massification' is dehumanization and alienation. The 'irrational' and the 'myth' are always associated with 'massification'. The same meaning is implied in phrases such as 'mass society', 'mass man', 'the faceless crowd', etc.". Cf. EC, p. 112, note 10. See also EPF, p. 8, note 8 (Translator's notes)
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credible. Freire himself says:

"I see a very great danger in the revolutionary or political processes when they tend to a non-continuity. By myself I do not idealize any sort of revolution or political actions" (33).

Freire is loath to say what form an action must take beyond a "vague socialism". When, therefore, accepting many theoretical concepts of the Historical and Dialectical Materialism, Freire's only aim is to analyse the concrete reality of the contemporary man, reality in which occurs his social, political, economic, and cultural alienation. But, in any hypothesis, these theoretical concepts imply in Freire's total adhesion to the Marxist ideology as such.

At this point it is convenient to remind one that dialectical thinking is prompted and stimulated in an environment where contrasts are so painfully evident. One can not forget that Freire is a man from Latin America and he knows how to contrast the destitute with the rich, the powerless with the powerful. In a situation like this, it is very difficult to see life as much else than a struggle for the larger part of humanity. Denis Collins puts it promptly:

"It is easy for educators to discuss the liberal arts in the comfort of a university; it is far more practical to talk about liberating arts in a village (or slum) with muddy streets populated by hungry people without shoes" (34).

(33) INT
Hence, the justification for the strong Marxist terminology and approach in Freire's writings is warranted. Thus, one of the chief and most difficult task of interpreting Freire's thought is to unveil this Marxist terminology and approach in order to penetrate into their true meaning without accusing Freire of being "another Marxist".

But the Marxist approach found in Freire's writings is not a mere matter of methodology or because it speaks better and deeper to an oppressive social reality. It is also a strong conviction that this sort of approach is capable of offering some positive elements and provoking, at the same time, some radical changes in Latin American society. Freire has, therefore, a profound admiration for the Marxist message but not for some of its practical attempts. His Marxist approach and the great admiration he nourishes for the Marxist message are nothing more than a way to fully understand the dynamic reality of the Third World, in general. Freire is very cautious in separating the philosophy of Marx from the Marxist ideology, since he recognizes in what amount and prejudice the ideological aspects of Marxism can be distorted and also used as a means of man's domestication instead of his liberation.

(3) CHRISTIANITY
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Yet, despite the strong dependence on Marxism, the very roots of Freire's thought is Christianity. Those who are close to him know that he is a Christian living in peace with his Christian positions and convictions as strange as it may sound to many people; of course, we are not talking here of mystical or magical Christian convictions. Hence the vehement charges sometimes thrown against him of being a very contradictory man; charges cast frequently by those who cannot perceive or refuse to admit (not a total synthesis) the various common points between Marxism and Christianity, chiefly in their insistence on the calling for man's liberation. It is precisely at this point where lies, for example, the tremendous difficulty of some people in their efforts to understand the Latin American theology of liberation once it implies, automatically, a deep comprehension of the Marxist methodology it employs in its interpretation of reality. And Freire's exegesis of Christianity is, actually, based on the main guidelines of such theology. What I am suggesting, then, is that without an accurate understanding of the theology of liberation, it is very difficult to fully grasp the kind of Christianity Freire is constantly referring to (35).

Moreover, no doubt, the main problem in understanding Freire's dependence on Christianity and grasping the

(35) Further details about this subject matter is given in Chapters II, Item 2.2.5, and V, Items 5.1, 5.2.1, 5.2.3.
enormous contribution of Christian religion upon the formation of his thought is the immense difficulty in accepting or thinking about new and different forms of Christian life and actions. Freire, although born into Catholicism, does not practice his faith in the "traditional way". It has to be stressed here that "traditional Christianity" in the context of Latin America has aligned a majority of churchmen with the power elites. It is in this sense that Freire is not a "traditional Catholic"; he is neither a man of the Church. In his own words to me: "I am not even a religious man; I am a man looking for and searching the faith" (36). Freire can be seen, from this position, as a prototype of what the German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer envisaged almost forty years ago, a man engaged in a sort of Christianity "without a Church" or in an "a-religious type of Christianity without the all-powerful God of religion" (37). Thus, seen from the perspective of "traditional Christianity" Freire can not be considered a Christian. And his contradiction seems to appear deeper when one admits that the Marxist discourse can be very helpful, indeed, as a powerful instrument not only as an attempt to refine and cure this kind of Christianity from its institutional religious and ecclesiastical blemishes and stains, but also

(36) INT
as a strong and influential element for a critical reading of the Latin American reality.

Freire's thought has its genesis and operates in history, and Christianity is, in fact, a preeminently historical development although subjected to degeneration, of being transformed into cool ritualism disconnected from life and full of social conformism. What is, then, an unthinkable truth or a very painful possibility for many -- i.e., the possibility of admitting Christianity only as Laos Tou Theou, or a Christianity always in the "desert" dwelling in tents and always ready to move forwards with history -- it is perhaps a reality already lived and experienced by Freire by anticipation. In the midst of the rubbish of an old building we can foresee the presence of a new one; under our eyes we are seeing, in Latin America, an old religious and "ecclesiastical" Christianity dissolving and a new one coming into existence. Perhaps, in not perceiving this point, one is led either not to understand Freire's approach to Christianity or to misinterpret him and the Christian background in the formation of his thought. It is really difficult, many times, to think in a Christianity without boundaries, or without a "Church" because for many people the institutionalized Church is, indeed, their God. Men's deepest temptation is to be idolatrous.
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(4) PERSONALISM

As stated before, Freire, in his youth days, was acquainted with the writings of the French philosopher Emmanuel Mounier. According to Leslie Paul, Mounier tried "to prove that the impulse to remake the world, which receives so much Christian disapproval, has a Christian origin" (38).

A careful reading of Mounier's philosophy leads us to perceive that Freire develops in his thought many themes which are directly derived from Mounier's personalism. Among them, it can be mentioned the following two: (1) For both, Mounier and Freire, history has a meaning and despite wars and mutual hatred between men and men, and between nations and nations, history is leading society towards liberation and betterment; (2) both welcome the development of science and technology, but both of them also warn us that such development can drive men towards amelioration of life or -- when not well conducted -- it can guide men to a total alienation and enslavement transforming men into beings entirely dependent on the power of machine. Consequently, we can infer that technology and scientific development are good. But if they are not mastered and subordinated to a humanistic

ethics, humanity is literally lost. Thus, Freire's statement:

"What is not legitimate for us to do is to settle indifferently to the destiny which can be given to our findings by those who detaining the power of decision and submitting science to their own interests, prescribe their finalities to the majority" (39).

Man, and not science and technology, is the one who is called to be the vehicle of his own liberation by imposing upon himself the laws of reason. Only in this way can technology and scientific growth be subjected to the good of man. Probably because Mounier's personalism can not be interpreted as a finished philosophical or political system but rather as an optimistic manner in which the world is seen, it was capable of stamping Freire's thought, which is a dialectical way of thinking.

(5) EXISTENTIALISM

It is another great philosophical trend which contributed to the formation of Freire's thought. Although it is not possible to trace here all the influence of Jean-

Paul Sartre, Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, Martin Buber, etc., upon Freire, one easily can identify in his thought concepts and notions which were derived directly from existentialist philosophy or from one or other particular existentialist thinker.

Existentialist philosophy has considered man as a being whose very being is his own issue, and of which he is capable of transforming not only his being but his world also. Dasein has thus, as fundamental of its structure, the temporality which implies a permanent tension as anticipation of the future, dependency of an imposed past and the necessity of being also in contact with the present. This is the existentialist interpretation of "being-in-the-world". From an ontological perspective it means "being-in-time" or as Heidegger puts it: "The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence" (40). Well, the authentic existence is -- both in Freire as well as in existentialism -- a painful tension between the risk of alienation and the struggle for liberation and personalization. Both conceive human experience as a project to be realized, or as a word to be pronounced. Hence, Freire's insistence on authentic or inauthentic conditions of existence, on the authenticity or inauthenticity of education, on the true acts of knowing, and on man's freedom

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to choose and to act in order to become himself subject to
the historical development of mankind.

Having insisted that man is a "being-in-the-world", existentialism also has considered man as a "being-with-the-others". Dialogue is the external form of communication in which the "I" and the "Thou" are to be grounded. Communication is, thus, the origin of the existence and its realization is dependable on the existence of others which manifest itself through the empirical relations between persons. At this point, Freire is utterly influenced by Karl Jaspers and Martin Buber. One of the main thesis in both Jaspers and Buber's philosophy is that the individual can not be truly human only by himself; the being-in-itself can only be fully realized in an open, warm and unreserved communion with the other being-in-itself. The isolated being or the being who isolates itself falls in mere possibility or disappears in the midst of nothingness. As Jaspers says: "I am only in the conjunction with the Other, alone I am nothing" (41). Man, in order to accomplish his authentic existence, has therefore, to be involved in ever deepening communication. Or in the statement of Buber:

"There is no I as such but only the I of the basic word I-You and the I of the basic word I-It.

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When a man says I, he means one or the other. The I he means is present when he says I. And when he says You or It, the I of one or the other basic word is also present. Being I and saying I are the same. Saying I and saying one of the two basic words are the same. Whoever speaks one of the basic words enters into the word and stands in it" (42).

So nobody is a true and full person if he is unable to say "Thou" to others, seeing them not as a simple means or object but as ends in themselves. Or in Freire's own words: "Nobody is, if he prohibits others to be" (43).

But Freire's emphasis upon dialogue has to be seen as an essential yardstick for judgement of the level to which oppressed and oppressors can both evidentiate any given socio-economic-politic structure. This implies the denunciation of the oppression because it prohibits man to be subject and maker of his own history, and also includes the annunciation of liberation and the hope that a new man is to be born, a man who will be ever critical about reality (44). This is why education for Freire is something more than memorization of empty words alienated from reality. It is an act of knowledge in which

(43) "La concepción bancaria de la educación y la deshumanización. La concepción problematizadora de la educación y la humanización", in CAI, p. 18.
(44) Freire calls "utopian" the dialectical process between denunciation and annunciation. See the examination of this subject matter in Chapter II, Item 2.2.3.
"the learners must assume from the beginning the role of creative subjects. It is not a matter of memorizing and repeating given syllables, words, and phrases, but rather of reflecting critically on the process of reading and writing itself, and on the profound significance of language... (It) ought to be an opportunity for men to know what speaking the word really means: a human act implying reflection and action. As such it is a primordial human right and not the privilege of a few. Speaking the word is not a true act if it is not at the same time associated with the right of self-expression and world-expression, of creating and re-creating, of deciding and choosing and ultimately participating in society's historical process" (45).

In this act of knowing man is expected to be fully aware with respect to the concrete situation in which he lives and acts. This has been also a very preoccupation of the existentialist philosophy and also a lively evidence of how much Freire esteems and the extent to which he is indebted to existentialism in the formation of his thought. 3

(6) PHENOMENOLOGY

The formation of Freire's thought follows some of the guidelines of the phenomenological movement, particularly, Edmund Husserl's philosophy (46). It suffices to stress at this point that not only Freire's language but also the very structure of his way of thinking

(45) ALP, p. 212
(46) For further references concerning this topic, see Chapter II, Item 2.2.1.
finds echo in phenomenological philosophy, especially with reference to its methodology.

From Husserl's phenomenological method Freire accepts the notion that exploration of consciousness is a condition *sine qua non* to the knowledge of reality. It guides the knower to the analysis of reality when fully intent upon what appears to the perceiving subject. For Husserl consciousness is

> "what has just being and not mere consciousness of the now-point of the objective thing appearing as having duration. In this consciousness, we are aware of what has just been in the continuity pertaining to it and in every phase in a determinate 'mode of appearance' differentiated as to 'content' and 'apprehension'" (47).

Consciousness in Freire's view -- as well as in Husserl's -- is able to reflect upon itself so as to know its own structure, consciousness of self. Also like Husserl man, according to Freire, constitutes his consciousness as intentionality. This intentionality of the consciousness is one of the main basic points of resemblance between Freire's notion of man with that of the phenomenologists.

> "That which had existed objectively but had not been perceived in its deeper implications (if indeed it was perceived at all) begins to 'stand out', assuming the character of a problem and therefore of challenge. Thus, men begin to single out elements

from their 'background awaremesses' and to reflect upon them. These elements are now objects of men's consideration, and, as such, objects of their action and cognition (48).

It is with the sole aim of unveiling the way of human knowledge that Freire employs a phenomenological analysis of consciousness and of reality. Similar to the phenomenological philosophy, there exists in Freire's thought also, a dialectical relation between the world as a living experience and the transcendental subject.

"These relations do not constitute a mere enunciation, a simple sentence. They involve a dialectical situation in which one of the poles is the person and the other the objective world -- a world in creation, as it were. If this historical-cultural world were a created, finished world, it would no longer be susceptible to transformation. The human being exists as such, and the world is a historic-cultural one, because the two come together as unfinished products in a permanent relationship, in which human beings transform the world and undergo the effects of their transformation (49).

It is in this relationship that it is possible to understand reality and it is in it that reality, by its turn, reveals its objective meaning. Therefore, Freire assumes some contents of the phenomenological methodology but he relates them to the social structure.

"As men act upon the world effectively, transforming it by their work, their consciousness is, in turn, historically and culturally conditioned" (50).

Accordingly, those who accuse Freire of being a dreamer

(48) PO, p. 70
(49) EC, p. 145
(50) CAC, p. 457
who aspires to transform society by a merely transformation of human consciousness are completely mistaken. Basically he is using the mental process of the phenomenological reduction as a sort of paradigm or model to its problematization. Nonetheless, his chief interest is to transform reality, not understanding it in a purely intellectual level. This is done in such a way that men can come to discover themselves as part of reality and capable of examining and changing it. Hence, they become aware of the social conditioning of consciousness and of the power of thinking subjects to act on their own behalf. In sum, what Freire, in fact, proposes is a criterion to men, mainly the oppressed, to overcome their magic-naive stages of consciousness for a critical one. This point shall be the focus of the first chapter of this dissertation.
CHAPTER I

THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

If we recognize man as a being who is in constant relations with the world and who is always transforming reality, we are able to see him as a being also capable of knowing. However, for Freire,

"Human actions in the world are conditioned by their own results, by their own outcome. Thus there are different degrees of relations to the world, different degrees of action and perception" (01).

In order to secure the understanding of Freire's thought it is crucial to comprehend his concept of the different stages or degrees of consciousness. One of the main achievements of such concept is the fact that it makes Freire's educational theory universal, establishing its relevance for highly industrialized societies as well as for those of the Third World. Nevertheless, it has to be pointed out that Freire's purpose is not an attempt to trace the "historical evolution of consciousness" but rather to offer an analysis of its different stages and its implications to the "cultures of silence" both of the Third World and also of the First World.

For Freire, conscientização constitutes a process whose aim is the awakening of critical awareness which must grow out by means of a critical educational effort associ -
ated with social and political responsibilities. It is exactly the whole process of conscientização which is to be studied from three distinct stages of consciousness: magical, naive and critical, since

"Any objectification implies a perception which is conditioned by the elements of its own reality" (02).

Freire's approach to the relationships between the stages of consciousness and the social structure follows, to some extent, a Marxist line of interpretation extensively reflected in the works of Louis Althusser. Freire thinks, for instance, that man's consciousness is conditioned by the historical and cultural situations of which he is a part.

"According to the quality of this conditioning, men's consciousness attains various levels in the context of cultural-historical reality... To understand the levels of consciousness, we must understand cultural-historical reality as a superstructure in relation to an infrastructure" (03).

But Freire, in rejecting both the mechanistic objectivism (which views consciousness as a mere replica or copy of reality) and the idealist subjectivism (which attributes to consciousness the power of creating reality) refers to the existence of the different stages of consciousness and to their relationships to the social structures in terms of preponderance and not of exclusivity. Hence, I shall discern

(02) EC, p. 146
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in relative terms the chief features of the historical-cultural configuration of Freire's different stages of consciousness. My approach to each one of these stages shall be firstly, an attempt to describe them and, secondly, to analyse them from three distinct perspectives: (1) Men's response, i.e., how they reflect and act in each of these stages; (2) each of these stages corresponds to different types of society: the magical stage to closed societies, the naive stage to societies in transition and the critical to open societies; (3) the relation between the three different stages and the three different models of human knowledge: the magical stage and its relation to mythical knowledge, the naive stage and its relation to ordinary knowledge and the critical stage and its relation to critical-scientific knowledge.

1.1 - THE MAGICAL STAGE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The magical stage of consciousness is the lowest stage of consciousness, according to Freire. He employs an analogy from grammar (transitivity) in order to describe the different levels of the two first stages. Thus, the magical stage of consciousness is sub-divided into these two levels:

(1) INTRANSITIVE CONSCIOUSNESS
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At this level men's sole interest is the satisfaction of their most elementary needs. It is the consciousness proper to men belonging to those "circumscribed" and "introverted" communities. Here men are almost impervious to problems and challenges beyond the pure biological domain and, consequently, they are characterized by a total lack of historical consciousness. Their sphere of perception is limited since their consciousness represents a disinterestedness regarding their own existence. Hence, their capacity of discernment is extremely precarious. They "confuse their perceptions of the objects and challenges of the environment, and fall prey to magical explanations because they cannot apprehend true causality" (04).

This sort of "primary consciousness" is, therefore, characterized as a limitation of men's domain of knowledge, an imperviousness to situations going beyond the vegetative orbit and a non-involvement with existence as a problem.

Even at this level of consciousness, however, men are open beings. The proper condition of being subjected to this lowest stage of consciousness does not mean men are closed within themselves subjugated to the forces of an all-powerful time and space. It only signifies that they are unable to perceive reality outside the realm of vegetative life. They can not understand the relationships which have

(04) EPF, p. 17
shaped their socio-cultural situations. They are submerged into a time which is experienced as an one-dimensional oppressive present. They are simply passive objects of history entirely submerged by the exigencies of daily life. Incapable of comprehending the situation which envelops them, they are powerless to act or even to reflect about their own liberation.

(2) SEMI-INTRANSITIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

At this level of consciousness individuals are yet incapable of taking distance from reality to objectify it in order to possess a critical knowledge of themselves and of the world.

"Semi-intransitiveness is a kind of obliteration imposed by objective conditions. Because of this obliteration, the only data which the dominated consciousness grasps are the data which lie within the orbit of its lived experience. This mode of consciousness cannot objectify the facts and problematical situations of daily life" (05).

Individuals interpret the facts and events of their social-cultural environment as "givens". They are quasi-immersed in concrete reality and their knowledge is a distorted one. They still lack "structural perception" which implies a true understanding of their own problems which lead them to a critical immersion into the transforming process. For this very reason, semi-intransitive consciousness

(05) CAC, p. 461. See also CON, p. 67.
"simply apprehends facts and attributes to them a superior power by which it is controlled and to which it must therefore submit" (06).

On account of this, such model of consciousness is characterized by a fatalistic mentality in which men, folding their arms, resign themselves before the "impossibility" of changing reality. Everything is related to destiny, God, deities or other superior powers beyond men's control. However, this fatalistic mentality has to be interpreted as being

"the fruit of an historical and sociological situation, and not an essential characteristic of a people's behaviour. It almost always is related to the power of destiny or fate or fortune -- inevitable forces -- or to a distorted view of God. Under the sway of magic and myth, the oppressed... see their suffering, the fruit of exploitation, as the will of God -- as if God were the creator of this 'organized disorder'" (07).

In this context, therefore, men's explanation for almost everything is to be found in magical-religious ceremonies and rites. But it has to be reminded that neither the belief in God, nor humility in the face of God is a characteristic of magical consciousness, but rather the dependence on God for action, and the denial of the human capacity to act (with God) to change events and facts. Hence, self-deprecation as well as excessive emotional dependence

(06) EPF, p. 44
(07) P0, p. 48. In regard to those oppressed peasants, almost totally submerged in nature, and their fatalistic and magic vision of the world, see Cândido Mendes, Mem- mento dos vivos - A esquerda Católica no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, Editora Tempo Brasileiro, 1966.
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are marks of this level of consciousness. And people are dependent not only on those transcendental powers but also on their own internalized and negative values imposed upon them by the dominant class. The power, for instance, to transform the situations of exploitation is the responsibility of the dominant class. To be, is to be under someone, to depend on him.

1.1.1 - MEN'S RESPONSE TO THE MAGICAL STAGE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Having traced the main aspects of the two different levels of the magical stage of consciousness, according to Freire, we can now raise the question: What are men's responses to this stage of consciousness? Simply we can state that men's reflections and actions at the magical stage of consciousness are oriented not towards the transformation of their socio-cultural environment but rather towards a passive submission to the destiny or to the wills of the superior-powers. Nevertheless, the best answer to the question can be given if we show some concrete examples and also assert that men's responses to this stage of consciousness are characterized:

(1) By passive acceptance and resignation of the oppressive reality through silent and quietist behaviours. Example:
"We must not protest or go on strike because we run the risk of losing our jobs".

(2) By simplistic causal relationships due to the incapacity to perceive reality as problematic. Example: "Our children can't go to school. They have to work in order to help us".

(3) By very short and easy responses to very complex and intricate questions due to a distorted knowledge of reality. Example: "The plague of lizards totally destroyed our crops. So there is nothing we can do".

(4) By attributing facts to superior powers in order to explain why things are as they are. Example: "Our boss is a very rich man because God has blessed him". Or "What can we do? We have to accept our poverty. It is the will of God".

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(08) PO, p. 163, note 40. In interviews with peasants and in his own observations, Freire himself furnishes some examples in which this level of magical consciousness is clearly manifested: "The peasant begins to get courage to overcome his dependence when he realizes that he is dependent. Until then, he goes along with the boss and says 'What can I do? I'm only a peasant!'. PO, p. 47.

"In the Northeast of Brazil it is usual to combat a plague of lizards by fixing three stakes in the form of a triangle in the place most affected by them. At the end of one of the stakes there is a nail on which the peasant spikes a lizard. He is sure that the remainder will be afraid and withdraw 'in procession' between the stakes. While the peasant is waiting for them to go, however, he loses part or all of his crop". EC, p. 101-102.

"The peasant feels inferior to the boss because the boss seems to be the only one who knows things and is able to run things". PO, p. 49.
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(5) By a total absence of guilt and attribution of events to fatalism. Example: "It is not my fault if my wife had twelve children and only four survived. It is destiny".

(6) By denying or avoiding the existence of problems locating them in another place and time. Example: "We do not need doctors. We do not have health problems. We know people who always visit doctors and are also dying like us!"

(7) By the myth of natural inferiority which results in humility and fear of the oppressor. Example: "We are afraid when the boss speaks to us, when our babies cry on the busses and he calls us bitches and horny"

(8) By an almost "masochistic" sympathy for the oppressor who becomes the model of what is good. Example: "The boss is the most honest man I ever seen. He pays his taxes which benefit all of us, and even then, people criticize him". Or "When you say the priest charges a lot for baptizing our children you don't take into consideration that he must also live, eat, and dress".

Therefore, men's response to the stage of magical consciousness -- mainly at the level of semi-intransitive consciousness -- is expressed in defensive or therapeutic magic.

"They know that they do things, what they do not know is that men's actions are transforming" (09).

"So often do they hear that they are good for nothing, know nothing and are incapable of learning anything -- that they are sick, lazy, and unproductive -- that in the end they become convinced of their own unfitness" (10).

Magical thinking is, thus, typical of oppressed consciousness in its most extreme form. By virtue of this sense of impotence before the challenges of their own reality, men are tied to magical and fatalistic explanations of such reality. Hence, their natural attitude of passive conformity instead of attitude of resistance to transform the oppressive reality, is a response to the reality of the magical stage of consciousness.

1.1.2 - THE MAGICAL STAGE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AS CHARACTERISTIC OF CLOSED SOCIETIES

Freire regards magical consciousness as a typical characteristic of closed societies. But what does he mean by the expression "closed societies"? According to Karl R. Popper, from whom Freire seems to borrow the expression, a closed society is one which

"has not yet fully recovered from the shock of its birth -- the transition from the tribal or "closed society", with its submission to magical forces, to the 'open society' which sets free the critical powers of man"(11).

(10) P0, p. 49
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According to Freire the whole of Latin America, since the time of its conquest by the Spanish and Portuguese, has been a subjugated land. It constitutes a unique and solid bloc of a closed society which is characterized:

"by a rigid hierarchical social structure; by the lack of internal markets, since their economy is controlled from the outside; by the exportation of raw materials and importation of manufactured goods, without a voice in either process; by a precarious and selective educational system whose schools are an instrument of maintaining the status quo; by high percentages of illiteracy and disease, including the naively named 'tropical diseases' which are really diseases of underdevelopment and dependence; by alarming rates of infant mortality; by malnutrition, often with irreparable effects on mental faculties; by a low life expectancy; and by a high rate of crime" (12).

The fact of being a "closed society", added to the fact of also being a "culture of silence" are, indeed, the most vivid aspects of what the various Latin American societies have in common in their totality.

Since the very beginning, Latin American societies had no participation in the solution of their own problems since they were decided in Spain or Portugal by the absolutist crowns.

"The excess of power which has characterized our culture from the start created on the one hand an almost masochistic desire to submit to that power and on the other a desire to be all-powerful" (13).

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(12) CAC, p. 460-461. See also CON, p. 66-67.
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Due to this, our people were stamped by an authoritarian and "a-critical frame of mind" which has been the roots of Latin American mutism. Dialogue which requires social and political participation and which is also a pre-requisite for self-government was never cultivated among our people. Our colonizers (indeed explorers) maintained our countries in total isolation. It greatly contributed to the creation of certain conditions which hindered the development, among us, of a truly democratic climate. Lack of democratic aspirations, therefore, has marked our cultural heritage. It also was, and still is, one of the major barriers to a genuine democratization of our culture. Hence, self-government was almost unknown in our countries. So they

"never experienced that sense of community, of participation in the solution of common problems, which is instilled in the popular consciousness and transformed into a knowledge of democracy. On the contrary, the circumstances of our colonization and settlement created in us an extremely individualistic outlook" (14).

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(14) EPF, p. 24-25. Zevedei Barbu states: In order to make their society 'by their hand' the members of a group have to possess considerable experience in, and knowledge of, public administration. They need also certain institutions which allow them to take a share in the making of their society. But they need something more than this; they need a specific frame of mind, that is, certain experiences, attitudes, prejudices and beliefs shared by them all, or by a large majority". Cf. Democracy and Dictatorship: Their Psychology and Patterns of Life, London, Basil Blackwell, 1950, p. 13. Also quoted by Freire, in EPF, p. 29.
The Spanish and Portuguese colonial system was also unable to create any genuine civilization because it was primarily concerned with commercial undertaking.

"It was dependent upon foreign markets, and usually followed a cyclic pattern. Moreover, its economic structures, biased from the beginning in favor of the conquerors, were based on natural resources which were systematically exploited and directed towards European markets. The economic, social, political and cultural control of the colonizing centers -- Spain and Portugal -- molded the Latin American societies into both agrarian and exporting societies, subject to a rural oligarchy, initially transplanted and always dependent upon foreign interests" (15).

As a rule the colonizers did not only discover the fabulous wealth; they took possession of them. They had no intention of creating a civilization; they were

(15) "Cultural Freedom in Latin America", in Human Rights and the Liberation of Man in the Americas, Edited by Louis M. Colonnese, Notre Dame, Notre Dame University Press, 1970, p. 169. Darcy Ribeiro points out that Spain and Portugal, during the Mercantile Revolution, remained salvationistic mercantile empires and failed to develop into mercantile capitalistic formations. Even at the close of the most brilliant cycle of their history they were not integrated into the Industrial Revolution. On the contrary; they regressed, losing their slavistic colonial and mercantile empire to the new capitalistic industrialist imperialisms. Thus, both Portugal and Spain entered the world economy as dependent areas of neocolonial conformation... This Iberian Europe, its entire productive sector retarded, economically obsolete in the face of the rise of European capitalism, and religiously salvationistic and fanatical, directed the cultural transfiguration of Latin America, condemning it to backwardness". Cf. The Americas and Civilization, Trans. Linton L. Barrett and Marie McDavid Barrett, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1971, p. 56, 58.
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"interested only in a profitable business venture... Unfortunately for our development, the first colonizers... lacked a sense of integration with the colony. They wished only to exploit it, not to cultivate it; to be 'over' it, not to stay in it and with it." (16).

This procedure gave birth, in Latin America, to the colonizer elites who gradually turned into their serfs the native inhabitants, "who had their origin in the race mixtures which emerged as a result of miscegenation" (17). But the colonizer elites also imposed their own cultural patterns, directed the exploration of the colonies, subjugated the native consciousness and manipulated the new born independent processes which were oriented by the illustrated lib

(16) EPF, p. 22. The first incoming Portuguese colonizers, in the case of Brazil, were predominantly degredados (exiled criminals) who, therefore, came to the new land not with the aim of building or founding a new country, as the Pilgrims Fathers did. Clodomir V. Woog in his Bandeirantes and Pioneers, New York, Herder and Herder, 1964, compares the Brazilian and North American cultural development and shows the causes of the development and of the underdevelopment of both cultures.

(17) "Cultural Freedom in Latin America", in Human Rights and the Liberation of Man in the Americas, Op. cit., p.169. The phenomenon of miscegenation occurred on account of the fact that the Iberians were, for centuries, accustomed to mixing with different ethnic groups. The invasion of the Moors, for example, culturally more advanced, led them to think that the darker and foreign man was more cultured, learned and artistic. He was the rich man and the Iberians became vassals upon their own land. In this conditions it would be deemed an honour for the white to marry or mate with the ruling and oppressor class. Besides, during the first century of colonization few European women emigrated to Latin America. While their families stayed in the homeland, our explorers not only looked frenetically for richness, but also tresured themselves in new sexual behaviours with the indians and with the black-slaves populations.
eralism to an Europeanized transformation of the colonial societies. This attitude is what explains the origin of what Freire calls "the culture of silence". Since the very beginning, Latin American societies were submitted to a twofold kind of dependency: dependency from the point of view of the metropolis which considered the colonial society as a mere object of exploitation; and dependency from the point of view of the popular consciousness, within the colonial society, from the colonizer elites. Both elites and masses lacked integration with our reality.

"The elite lived 'superimposed' upon that reality; the people, submerged within it. To the elite fell the task of importing alien cultural models; to the people, the task of following, of being under, of being ruled by the elite, of having no task of their own" (18).

The political independency -- which started in the dawn of the nineteenth century -- did not provoke, however, much considerable modifications of the socio-economic-cultural status of the former colonies. Soon they became, firstly, dependent on England, and later on, on the United States. The elite taste of imitating, assimilating and imposing upon the popular consciousness all the alien cultural patterns and values of our "new metropolis" continued. Hence, as it happened in the old Portuguese and Spanish colonization of the past, it continues to happen in the present dependent cap

(18) EPF, p. 8
italistic system, i.e., the closed society (both its elites and its masses) is a being-for-others. The "culture of silence" was and continues to be the necessary substructure of a structure of domination.

"The dependent society is by definition a silent society. Its voice is not an authentic voice, but merely an echo of the voice of the metropolis -- in every way, the metropolis speaks, the dependent society listens. The silence of the object society in relation to the director society is repeated in the relationships within the object society. Its power elites, silent in the face of the metropolis, silence their own people in turn" (19).

On the one hand, the myth of natural inferiority which expresses itself in the feelings of humility, fear and "sympathy" for the oppressor, who is seen as the perfect model of every good (hence the tendency of imitating him), can also be applied here.

"The relationships between the dominator and the dominated reflect the greater social context, even when

(19) CAC, p. 459. One has to be careful in interpreting Freire's notion of "dependency". He thinks that "The problem of dependency in itself is not what characterizes the bad aspect of a relationship between nations. What is bad is when such relationship becomes a relation of domination and exploitation. Indeed, a being in formation is dependent upon the being in a more developed level. For example, a child, because it is a being in development, is dependent on his parents. The problem is when the relation between the child and his parents becomes one of dominion of the latter upon the former. So, there is also a relation of dependency between nations at this level. My impression, for instance, is that the Cuba's relation with the USSR has not the same nature as it had when it was directly dependent on the American imperialism". Cf. INT.
formally personal. Such relationships imply the intro-
ejection by the dominated of the cultural myths of the
dominator. Similarly, the dependent society intro-
jects the values and life style of the metropoli-
tan society, since the structure of the latter shapes
that of the former. This results in the duality of
the dependent society, its ambiguity, its being and
being itself, and the ambivalence characteristic of
its long experience of dependency" (20).

On the other hand, this myth of natural inferiority can also
be interpreted as one of the main causes which leads the pow-
er elites to attitudes of modernization of certain sectors of
the closed societies which does not imply a true development
of those societies because

"development is achieved only when the locus of de-
cision for the transformations suffered by a being is
found within and not outside of him. And this does
not happen with dependent societies, which are alien-
ated and, as such, are 'object societies'. When the
source of decision-making, including the political,
economic, and cultural aspects, continues to be out-
side, in the metropolitan society upon which the com-
mon people depend, only a modernization process is
achieved" (21).

At this point one question has to be posed, i.e., the
closed societies run the risk of never being transformed into
open societies. As soon as the latter sell their advanced
technology to the former, the power elites of these societies
use this technology to silence the popular masses whenever
they try to emerge.

"The dominant class of the First World has an hegemon-
ic power which is not only exercised over its group

(20) CAC, p. 458-459
(21) "Cultural Freedom in Latin America", in Human Rights and
and dominated classes but also over the conjoint of the dependent societies. The dominant class of these societies, subordinated as they are to the interests of the dominant class of the First World, whose lifestyle they tend to reproduce, also exercise its power over the national dominated classes" (22).

The undeniable truth is that the dominated consciousness literally assimilated the dominating consciousness; externally, in the relationships between metropolitan and dependent societies and, internally, in the relationships between the power elites and the popular masses. In the case of the popular masses, more specifically, they gradually develop a way of reflecting and acting always in conformity to certain elitist values which, besides helping to perpetuate the status quo, also inspire attitudes and beliefs to justify it. Such is the mechanism typifying the magical consciousness. Lacking a coherent mental outlook and a critical capacity of interpreting reality such consciousness acquires the habit of submission. This attitude drives men to adjust and adapt to reality and not to integrate themselves in such reality seeking its transformation.

"Integration results from the capacity to adapt oneself to reality plus the critical capacity to make choices and to transform that reality. To the extent that man loses his ability to make choices and is subjected to the choices of others, to the extent that his decisions are no longer his own because they result from external prescriptions, he is no longer integrated. Rather, he has adapted. He has 'adjusted'" (23).

(22) "Ação Cultural e Conscientização", in ACL, p. 70-71. This passage is missing in the English text of CAC. Translation is mine.
(23) EPF, p. 4
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Therefore, integration and participation, characteristic behaviours of flexible, democratic and open societies, which require a maximum capacity for dialogue and critical consciousness, were and are still missing in the magical consciousness of the most part of the closed societies of Latin America.

1.1.3 - THE MAGICAL STAGE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS RELATIONS TO MYTHICAL KNOWLEDGE

Freire argues that the relationships between men and the world also occur in different levels. Being creatures endowed with the capacity of knowing, men's knowledge is, however, expressed in three different levels, i.e., of doxa, of magic, and of logos, which constitutes the true knowledge. In any of these levels men's reflections and actions are to be understood through the elaboration of a theory.

"Nevertheless, whatever the degree of action on the world, it implies a theory. Even those actions called magic are governed by theory" (24).

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(24) EC, p. 110. Bronislaw Malinowski affirms: "The magic art is directed towards the attainment of practical ends; like any other art or craft it is also governed by theory, and by a system of principles which dictate the manner in which the act has to be performed in order to be effective". Cf. Magic, Science and Religion, New York, Anchor Books, 1957, p. 140. Also quoted by Freire, in EC, p. 110, note 4.
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In the same way that there are different stages of consciousness, men's perception of the world is an expression of the correspondent stage of consciousness to which they are submitted. Hence, the magical forms of reflections and actions imply a theory of knowledge in which the magical consciousness is to be related to its correspondent magical or mythical form of knowledge.

For my immediate purpose here, I shall define mythical knowledge as being a kind of figurative way of knowing, whose objective is to offer a poetic answer to a logical question. It employs a metaphoric and imaginative language in order to explain reality and existence itself; it is a profound intuition, a manner of perceiving reality based on a fanciful language. This is why it is full of existential meaning. Freire himself gives us some examples of mythical knowledge. This is just one of them: In a certain region of the Peruvian plateau

"cold starry nights are a sign of a snowfall which will not be long in coming. When they perceive this sign, the peasants run to the highest point of the village and implore God with desperate cries not to punish them. If hail threatens... peasants make a great fire, and throw pieces of ash into the air, using special rhythms, accompanied by 'words of power'. Their magic belief, of a syncretic-religious type, is that the hailstones are 'produced' by the spirits of those who die without baptism. Hence, the sanction this community imposes on those who do not baptize their children" (25).

(25) EC, p. 101
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Mythical knowledge, nevertheless, does not derive from a rational logic. But it does not mean it is an irrational way of knowing. Freire states:

"Magic thought is neither illogical nor pre-logical. It possesses its own internal logical structure and opposes as much as possible any new forms mechanically superimposed. Like any other manner of thinking, it is unquestionably bound not only to a way of acting but to a language and a structure" (26).

It is because the logic-scientific knowledge has not been able to control the mythic language that it has considered mythical knowledge as illogical. In view of that, when science lays the mythic language in the realm of logical incoherence, it is admitting, as Arcângelo R. Buzzi suggests (27), the limits of its own comprehension and proclaiming, in the universe of its own knowledge, another unknown knowledge to the logic model of comprehension. The knowledge which expresses itself through the magical consciousness also renders a very original validity. It is equally worth, even if it has to be understood from a different perspective of that of the rational logic. Ernst Cassirer, interpreting Sir James Frazer, says that

"there is no sharp boundary separating magical art from our modes of scientific thought. Magic, too, however imaginary and fantastic in its means, is scientific in its aim. Theoretically speaking, magic is science, although practically speaking it is an

(26) EC, p. 102
(27) Introdução ao Pensar: O Ser, o Conhecer, a Linguagem, Petrópolis, Editôra Vozes, 1975, p. 81-82.
elusive science -- a pseudo-science" (28).

Mythical knowledge, therefore, has its own "logic" which defies and challenges our basic principles of thought because it is incommensurate with all our conceptions of scientific or empirical truth. In order to grasp the full meaning of this "pseudo-science" it is necessary, first of all, to penetrate its environment and to participate intensively in the historical and cultural circumstances in which such a way of knowing occurs. So it is impossible to reduce mythical knowledge to some fixed and static elements. Rather it is necessary to strive in grasping it in its inner life, in its dialectical and dynamical principles.

Mythical knowledge is the kind of knowledge which typifies magical consciousness, and consequently, the magic and silent cultures of the most part of the closed societies in Latin America, mainly in those areas where men are in daily and continuous contact with nature and without being able to perceive it critically or scientifically. Thus, the relationship between "things perceived" is not strange to the magical consciousness.

"Magic perception, which concerns the real and the concrete, is as objective as this relationship; magic thinking, however is not. This is why, when a

people perceive a concrete fact of reality, without 'entering into' it critically in order to be able to 'look at' it from within, faced with the appearance of a mystery, and being unsure of themselves, they assume a magical posture. Finding themselves unable to apprehend the challenge in its authentic relationships with other facts, their tendency (understandably enough) is to go beyond the true relationships to seek an explanation for what is perceived. This happens not only with the natural world but with the historical-social world" (29).

In this context of magical consciousness and its correspondent magical way of perceiving the world, the function of philosophy is to accept the truth that mythical knowledge has a philosophical, an understandable "meaning". The task of philosophy is, therefore, to discover, behind all types of symbols, images and metaphors, the hidden meaning of this knowledge and try to unmask it, mainly in cases in which the hidden meaning of such knowledge camouflages an oppressed reality.

1.2 - THE NAIVE STAGE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Freire suggests that naive consciousness emerges from magical consciousness and that there is no sharp frontier separating the historical moments which produce qualitative changes in human consciousness. If magical consciousness is predominantly rural, naive consciousness is, by its turn, an urban phenomenon which is provoked by rural

(29) EC, p. 101
the former remain present and operating in the latter despite a transformation of awareness towards transitivity. I shall approach this second stage of consciousness also subdividing it into two different levels:

(1) NAIVE TRANSITIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

When men are able to enlarge their ability in capturing the answers to the question arising from their environment and are also capable of amplifying their ability to enter into dialogical relationships with others and with the world, they become "transitive", i.e., they move from magical to naive transitive consciousness. This process makes them "permeable" and open to the historical circumstances in which they live. They start to become aware of their own existential problems and begin to perceive that they are beings-in-the-world and with-the-world. In such process

"of emerging from silence, the capacity of the popular consciousness expands so that men begin to be able to visualize and distinguish what before was not clearly outlined" (30).

Their consciousness becomes incontestably more disposed to discern the causes of its existential ambiguity in the very objective conditions.

Also at this stage of consciousness, criticism and

(30) CAC, p. 463
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pressure begin to be cast over the dominant class whose populist leaders respond allowing some superficial reforms and granting certain privileges to the discontented in order to assure their control. At the same time, art becomes directed towards problems of concrete social projects and no more reflects the values and aspirations of the bourgeoisie. Students and intellectuals become engaged in social-political projects rejecting imported schemes and solutions.

Nevertheless, there is an inherent ambiguity which the naive consciousness and the populist leadership have to face. This is the ambiguity between an elitist idealized system which should work at any price and specific violations and interventions of such system by some "evil" individuals.

"The oppressor knows full well that this intervention would not be to his interest. What is to his interest is for the people to continue in a state of submersion, impotent in the face of oppressive reality" (31).

But if these "evil" individuals could be accommodated -- and "for the naive thinker, the important thing is accommodation to this normalized 'today'" (32) -- then the system would function "perfectly", i.e., making the status quo work; a better tomorrow can only mean a perfection of today's norms. This previous procedure of the oppressor leads Freire

(31) PO, p. 37-38
(32) PO, p. 81
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-- employing two terms from Erich Fromm -- to identify the oppressor consciousness as "necrophilic" because it seeks the dehumanization not only of the oppressed as such but also of the oppressors themselves. Loving dehumanization, this sort of perverted love, loves death. The oppressor consciousness is, then, opposed to the "biophilic" consciousness which characterizes those who loving themselves and others thereby love life.

It is with the sole aim of adjusting and silencing the "deviant thought" that populist leaders perform their rôle at this stage of consciousness since the popular masses depend on them because they are still unable to speak for themselves. The attempt of the populist leadership is to manipulate popular opinion either by force or by means of propaganda, slogans, or dehumanizing utilization of technology. In order to effectuate such attempt, the populist leaders seek help from students and intellectuals. Some of them become easy prey to such leadership due to the good jobs and other economic advantages which are offered to them. Others, though not naive in themselves, are rather cunnings, and they know very well what they want, where they are going and whom they are working for. In both cases, the populist leaders use the protests of these groups with the purpose of cementing their own political ranks. Freire is very correct when he sees the populist leadership as
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"an adequate response to the new presence of the masses in the historical process. But it is a manipulative leadership -- manipulative of the masses, since it cannot manipulate the elite" (33).

For this very reason, the radical transformation of reality would not result from the contradictions arising from the populist leadership. Because it

"simply manipulates instead of fighting for authentic popular organization, this type of leader serves the revolution little if at all" (34).

Therefore, if manipulation of the popular masses is the main target of the populist leadership; if the basic aim of such leadership is to silence the popular masses and to remove them from participation in the important sphere of decisions; and, if naive transitive consciousness does not progress towards critical consciousness it will certainly be transformed into "fanaticized consciousness".

(2) FANATICIZED CONSCIOUSNESS

This sort of consciousness is, indeed, a deviation of the naive transitive consciousness towards the attainment of the critical consciousness. This expression Freire takes from Gabriel Marcel who sees fanaticized consciousness as a malady because

(33) CAC, p. 465. I shall return to this topic in Chapter III, Item 3.3.3. For an exhaustive study of populism, see Francisco C. Weffort, Classes Populares e Política. Uma contribuição ao estudo do populismo, São Paulo, Universidade de São Paulo, 1968.

(34) PO, p. 147
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"the fanatic never sees himself as a fanatic; it is only the non-fanatic who can recognize him as a fanatic; so that when this judgment, or this accusation, is made, the fanatic can always say that he is misunderstood and slandered" (35).

Referring to a pathological form of consciousness, all kinds of fanaticized consciousness are extremely aggressive. Whatever goals the fanaticized consciousness aims -- even if its purpose is the togetherness of all men -- in practice, it can only foster disunion. In not wishing the effectiveness of men's separation it is, at the same time, driven by a strong desire of wiping out its opponents. To the fanaticized consciousness these words of Ortega y Gasset are very proper:

"Anybody who is not like everybody, who does not think like everybody, runs the risk of being eliminated. And it is clear, of course, that this 'everybody' is not 'everybody'. 'Everybody' was normally the complex unity of the mass and the divergent, specialised minorities. Nowadays, 'everybody' is the mass alone" (36).

Freire's emphasis on this irrational form of consciousness also lies on "massification". His view is that the individual becomes more and more alienated from reality.

"To the extent that a person acts more on the basis of emotionality than of reason, his behavior occurs adaptively and cannot result in commitment, for committed behavior has its roots in critical consciousness and capacity for genuine choice. The adaptation

and lack of engagement typical of semi-intransitivity are thus more prevalent still in a state of massification. The power to perceive authentic causality is obliterated in the semi-intransitive state; hence the latter's magical quality. In massification this power is distorted, producing a mythical quality. In the semi-intransitive state, men are predominantly illogical; in fanaticized consciousness the distortion of reason makes men irrational" (37).

Fanaticized consciousness, therefore, does not conduct itself to the transformation of the oppressive reality into a liberating one. Rather it only exchanges one oppressive situation for another. Fostering massification it leads men to irrational behaviours. Massification is, thus, the opposite of conscientização since it does not allow men to achieve a critical consciousness. Through massification the oppressed become tools, manipulated by small groups who have the scientific and technological power of decision in their hands. Through massification the human being

"is crushed, diminished, converted into a spectator, maneuvered by myths which powerful social forces have created. These myths turn against him; they destroy and annihilate him. Tragically frightened, men fear authentic relationships and even doubt the possibility of their existence. On the other hand, fearing solitude, they gather in groups lacking in any critical and loving ties which might transform them into a cooperating unit, into a true community. 'Gregariousness is always the refuge of mediocrities'. It is also an imprisoning armor which prevents men from loving" (38).

In a situation like this the masses are seen as a sort of tabula rasa who have to be grafted on with all the

(37) EPF, p. 19-20
(38) EPF, p. 6
values and norms of that fanaticized consciousness to the extent that they also become a "sick organism". Therefore, Freire's analysis of the fanaticized consciousness is very much akin to that of Herbert Marcuse (39) who sees men in highly industrial societies, losing their power for critical reasoning. Once "massified" the individual -- including the intellectual who is transformed into a technocrat -- assimilates his protests into the limits of the system as, for instance, the student rebellion in the United States. In this case, massification can be interpreted as a contemporary version of alienation.

1.2.1 - MEN'S RESPONSE TO THE NAIVE STAGE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Men's response to the naive stage of consciousness corresponds to one or other of the two different levels into which they are situated. If they are encased in the first level -- naive transitive consciousness -- their reflections and actions are characterized

"by an over-simplification of problems; by a nostalgia for the past; by underestimation of the common man; by a strong tendency to gregariousness; by a lack of interest in investigation, accompanied by an accentuated taste for fanciful explanations; by fra-

gility of argument; by a strongly emotional style; by
the practice of polemics rather than dialogue; by
magical explanations" (40).

At this level of consciousness men's response can be
defined by attributing the causes of problems to individuals
rather than to the social structure itself. Their explana-
tions are fanciful because their attempt is the understand-
ing of the individual isolated from the social body. This
attitude drives ultimately to arguments which easily fall in the
face of concrete reality. Any possible answer to any spe-
cific problem has to be found in the past where things seemed
to work better. To them the actual system is the ideal
one. Hence, it can not be touched. They see it as the pro-
vider, a source of support with norms and rules governing
their behaviour. Due to this, a deviated thought can not
be tolerated since it constitutes a threat to the "social
optimum" and to the legitimate norms of the oppressed.

At this point one tackles the question regarding
"problem -statements" which can be either inner directed or
outer directed. It is inner directed whenever the break of
rules is connected to some incidents in which the oppressed
look at themselves as being the problem: their uncleanli-
ess, their habits, their conduct. The oppressed, then, expe-
rience a sense of guilt in not being like the oppressors
or in not adjusting themselves to the oppressors' expecta-

(40) EPF, p. 18
tions. This is what Freire calls "playing host to the oppressor". In this case the oppressed "house" those oppressors' values and beliefs and make them their own.

"Their ideal is to be men; but for them to be men is to be oppressors. This is their model of humanity. This phenomenon derives from the fact that the oppressed, at a certain moment of their existential experience, adopt an attitude of 'adhesion' to the oppressor... At this level, their perception of themselves as opposites of the oppressor does not yet signify engagement in a struggle to overcome the contradiction; the one pole aspires not to liberation, but to identification with the opposite pole... Because of their identification with the oppressor, they have no consciousness of themselves as persons or as members of an oppressed class. They live in the duality in which to be is to be like, and to be like is to be like the oppressor" (41).

As Hegel points out, what characterizes the oppressed is his subordination to the Master's consciousness. He says:

"The one is independent, and its essential nature is to be for itself; the other is dependent, and its essence is life or existence for another. The former is the Master, or Lord, the latter the Bondsman" (42).

By virtue of this, Freire argues that the oppressed, when promoted to the office of foreman, always become a more cruel oppressor towards his former companions than the boss himself. This is why the situation of oppression is difficult to eliminate. Peasants, for instance,
want agrarian reform not because it would free them from a situation of exploitation. Rather they want it because it would give them land, and thus they would be also landowners. In other words, they would become bosses over others, i.e., oppressors, due to the internalized image of their former bosses.

However, the fact of internalizing the image of the oppressor is not a passive acceptance by the part of the oppressed as it happens, for example, in the magical stage of consciousness. On the contrary, it is a deliberate effort, an active process in which the oppressed try to look like the oppressor in all aspects of their existence. They "feel an irresistible attraction towards the oppressor and his way of life. Sharing his way of life becomes an overpowering aspiration. In their alienation, the oppressed want at any cost to resemble the oppressor, to imitate him, to follow him. This phenomenon is especially prevalent in the middle-class oppressed, who yearn to be equal to the 'eminent' men of the upper class" (43).

Here one finds the motive for Freire's reference to "horizontal aggression" and "intra-punitiveness". Because of the internalized image of the oppressor within themselves, the oppressed are incapable of seeing clearly the "order" which is at the service of the oppressor's interests.

(43) PO, p. 49. See also Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, Boston, Beacon Press, 1967. This author gives an interesting analysis of the colonized consciousness and its relation to that of the colonizer.
"Chafing under the restrictions of this order, they often manifest a type of horizontal violence, striking out at their own comrades for the pettiest reasons. It is possible that in this behavior they are once more manifesting their duality. Because the oppressor exists within their oppressed comrades, when they attack those comrades they are indirectly attacking the oppressor as well" (44).

With regard to the outer direct problems-statements it suffices to say that they are related to an individual or group of individuals from the power elites, who, taking advantages of their social status, violate the norms of the social structure. Nonetheless, their statements are never addressed to the social structure as such, but only to some of its members.

Therefore, in both cases -- i.e., in the inner and outer directed problems-statements -- men's response at the level of naive transitive consciousness does not go beyond the sphere of blaming others. On the contrary, their response is a mere effort to make the existing social structure work, and not an attempt to transform it courageously. This is basically a defensive attitude which seeks to use the existing social order to reduce its own negative aspects and consequences. In such context, men can see themselves as being exploited and oppressed, they can even identify some specific social injustices, but they are unable to understand

(44) P0, p. 48. "The colonized man will first manifest this aggressiveness which has been deposited in his bones against his own people": Cf. Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, New York, Grove Press, 1968, p. 52. Also quoted by Freire, in P0, p. 48.
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these problems from a critical outlook. Then, they naively assume that they are free beings, independent from the social structure.

If men are situated in the second level of deviated naive transitive consciousness, i.e., fanaticized consciousness, their reflections and actions are characterized by polemics and emotional rhetoric. In this level of consciousness the possibility of dialogue is reduced considerably. Speeches replace discussion circle and harangues replace dialogue in order to ascertain that the oppressed will blindly follow the populist leaders with their manipulative tendencies. Because their naive consciousness seeks simple solutions and presume that they are superior to facts and to history, men's response to the populist leaders is an acceptance of the manipulative myths formulated by the power elites to maintain oppression. Hence, the oppressed masses will not claim any creative participation in the process of transforming reality.

Even in some contexts in which the goal of the populist leadership is the overcoming of oppression it is, in its very basis, doomed to failure. Avoiding the dialogue with the masses and seeking the ends to justify the means such leadership (which is oriented towards massification) focuses on the oppressed inability to guide themselves. Only they, as "superior-individuals", have the solutions which will conduct the oppressed masses to victory.
Freire identifies this type of fanaticism with sectarianism which is
"predominantly emotional and uncritical. It is arrogant, antidualogical and thus anticommmunicative. It is a reactionary stance, whether on the part of a rightist (whom I consider a 'born' sectarian) or a leftist. The sectarian creates nothing because he cannot love. Disrespecting the choices of others, he tries to impose his own choice on everyone else" (45).

Herein lies the tendency of the sectarian men to activism -- i.e., actions disconnected from reflections -- for slogonizing, mythologizing, and attributing absolute truths to relative ones. Freire argues, then, that sectarianism, which is nourished by fanaticism, is castrating, irrational, mythic, pathological, and alienated. It is, in other words, the proper feature of the fanaticized consciousness. Its interpretation of reality is that of an immutable given. Sectarianism constitutes itself a huge barrier for the genuine emancipation of men. Consequently, sectarian men, either of the right or the left, if they succeed, will simply replace one tyranny by another.

"While the rightist sectarian, closing himself in 'his' truth, does no more than fulfill his natural role, the leftist who becomes sectarian and rigid negates his very nature. Each, however, as he revolves about 'his' truth, feels threatened if that truth is questioned. Thus, each considers anything that is not 'his' truth a lie" (46).

(45) EPF, p. 11
(46) P0, p. 23
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Therefore, the activism of sectarian men is oppressive in that they refuse to work with the popular masses in the search for truth and that they reject their cooperation in the process of liberation of both. Sectarian men consider the popular masses as crippled children who must be led and not as a sound and mature people capable of responsible participation.

"For the sectarian, the people matter only as support for his own goals. The sectarian wishes the people to be present at the historical process as activists, maneuvered by intoxicating propaganda. They are not supposed to think. Someone else will think for them; and it is as protégés, as children, that the sectarian sees them" (47).

Sectarians are in themselves unfree persons. Due to this they are incapable of carrying out any genuine struggle for liberation. Besides,

"the sectarian, whether rightist or leftist, sets himself up as the proprietor of history, as its sole creator, and the one entitled to set the pace of its movement" (48).

Accordingly, both the rightist and the leftist sectarian men act a-historically. The first by trying to domesticate history so that the future will be a mere copy of the past; the second by rashly thinking that history will assume a configuration prefixed a priori by consciousness. In either case the sectarian man can not think dialectically. Dominated by his irrationality he is incapable of perceiving the dynamic

(47) EPF, p. 11-12
(48) EPF, p. 11
aspect of reality.

But men's response to the fanaticized consciousness also corresponds to these characteristics proper to mass society in which

"men are defeated and dominated, though they do not know it; they fear freedom, though they believe themselves to be free. They follow general formulas and prescriptions as if by their own choice. They are directed, they do not direct themselves. Their creative power is impaired. They are objects, not subjects" (49).

New fads and stimuli are constantly introduced in their daily lives and, in addiction to the vicarious existence of their persons who find the drama of life largely through watching television which is used as a powerful weapon in order to demolish not only the "inner directness" but also the desire for participation. Wherefore, men become merely absorbed observers of the dramas (or pseudo-dramas) of history rather than engaged participants in the real historical events. Men's consciousness becomes so narrow that they are generally incapable of thinking reasonably. Men become so dehumanized that they no longer aspire to participate in the transformation of the unjust social structure.

"Men begin thinking and acting according to the prescriptions they receive daily from the communications media rather than in response to their dialectical relationships with the world. In mass society, where everything is prefabricated and behavior is almost automatized, men are lost because they do not have to 'risk themselves'" (50).

(49) EFP, p. 20
(50) CAC, p. 474-475
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Therefore, all self-consciousness is lost. Men's conduct is automatized; their most elementary needs are immediately satisfied. The element of risk and planning disappears since standard prescriptions are always offered instead of critical analysis of reality. Human existence is no more an "adventure" but rather responses to the stimuli of machines.

"Technology thus ceases to be perceived by men as one of the greatest expression of their creative power and becomes instead a species of new divinity to which they create a cult of worship. Efficiency ceases to be identified with the power men have to think, to imagine, to risk themselves in creation, and rather comes to mean carrying out orders from above precisely and punctually" (51).

Freire still argues that this "cult of technology" ejects once again the mythological power of magic rites. He says:

"The myth of technology will replace the magical entities which formerly explained problematical situations. Further, the myth of technology might be seen, not as the substitute for the old forces which, in this case, continue to exist, but as something superior even to them. Technology would thus be projected as all-powerful, beyond all structures, accessible only to a few privileged men" (52).

Furthermore, in mass society men do not need to plan their own existence since it is already planned. Mass society is, indeed, a well-schooled society in which men have given up independent thinking for mere learning based on expert advice. Their lives are so practical, so excited, so active, but also so confused, that little time remains to them for thought. Freire says:

(51) CAC, p. 475
(52) CAC, p. 462, note 20
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"They do not have to think about even the smallest things; there is always some manual which says what to do in situation "a" or "b". Rarely do men have to pause at a street corner to think which direction to follow. There is always an arrow which de-problematises the situation. Though street signs are not evil in themselves, and are necessary in cosmopolitan cities, they are among thousands of directional signals in a technological society which introjected by men, hinder their capacity for critical thinking" (53).

Contact and fellowship also do not exist in mass society. Men suffer from a psychological disease known by the name of "anomie" which I prefer to call "loss of self-identity" or "loss of self-freedom". The "you" is no more a companion to whom one can share his "I"; the "you" is no more a fellow who besides reason has also feelings and emotions which must be partaken. On the contrary, the "you" is the adversary of the "I" or, at least, the stumble of one's whims and stingy desires; the "you" is mostly a simple "thinking and living object" to whom the "I" is obliged to hide all its interiority; the "you", submerged in the insatiable thirst for success and richness at any price, has no more free time for others, even, sometimes, for his own family. And Freire warns:

"If children reared in an atmosphere of lovelessness and oppression, children whose potency has been frustrated, do not manage during their youth to take the path of authentic rebellion, they will either drift into total indifference, alienated from real-

(53) CAC, p. 475
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ity by the authorities and the myths the latter have used to 'shape' them; or they may engage in forms of destructive action" (54).

Due to this sort of procedure men, thus, not only destroy their own selves in the exclusivity and emptiness of their solicitude and solitude, but also destroy their own families. However, in order to remedy the funest consequences of such response men try to sublime it in their formal "social activities", in their entertainments and leisure hours, in the office hours of their psychiatrists, in their adherence to some forms of opitiate religious behaviour or, finally, in the "success" of their professions and careers which give to them a very strong possessive and selfishness consciousness.

"In their unrestrained eagerness to possess, the oppressors develop the conviction that it is possible for them to transform everything into objects of their purchasing power; hence their strictly materialistic concept of existence. Money is the measure of all things, and profit the primary goal. For the oppressors, what is worthwhile is to have -- more -- always more -- even at the cost of the oppressed having less or having nothing. For them, to be is to have and to be the class of the 'haves'" (55).

(54) PO, p. 153
(55) PO, p. 44. "Selfishness is a passionate and exaggerate love of self, which leads a man to connect everything with himself and to prefer himself to everything in the world... (It) originates in blind instinct; individualism proceeds from erroneous judgement more than from depraved feelings; it originates as much in deficiencies of mind as in perversity of heart". Cf. Alexis C. H.C.W. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. II, New York, Vintage Books, 1954, p. 104.
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Summing, mass society produces the "mass men" and the fanaticized pathological consciousness in which men's response is never to admit themselves as such. They cannot accept the idea that the social system they have been creating is in danger of extinction since everything seems to function so perfectly. Such attitude, added to the myth of natural superiority and with the incapacity of thinking by themselves, blinds men and does not allow them to perceive critically the sophisticated situation of oppression in which they are living, even if oppression in this context does not necessarily mean lack of material goods as it happens in the underdeveloped countries. Men's response to the irremediable and irrational fanaticized consciousness of the mass society is that it insists on showing a false appearance of glamour and sanity and calling it "civilization". Hence, the irresistible attraction and influence it exercises on the fanaticized and naive consciousness of both the oppressor and the oppressed of the Third World.

1.2.2 - THE NAIVE STAGE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AS CHARACTERISTIC OF SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION

The naive stage of consciousness corresponds to what Freire has called "societies in transition", i.e., societies which have inaugurated the breaking of their customary his-
torical process and have forced the entering into a new phase of their development. It is as though "major economic changes began to effect the system of forces which had maintained the closed society in equilibrium; with the end of that equilibrium, society split open and entered the phase of transition" (56).

Regarding time, societies in transition are divided into two antagonistic eras: one which is in a process of shutting can be named "traditional era"; the other is the one which is now in a process of gestation. The existing time between these two different eras is the "time of transition". Hence, societies in transition are those which are assisting the end of an old historical epoch and are witnessing the advent of a new one. Their component members constitute the threshold between two opposite historical epochs. The transition is, therefore, characterized as being the time of crisis of the closed societies. But it is also the time for options and for struggle between the old and the new historical themes. Societies in transition experience, therefore, a deep breach between the past and the future, though both are present and in open conflict in the stage of transition.

"The time of epochal transition constitutes an historical-cultural 'tidal wave', Contradictions increase between the ways of being, understanding, behaving, and valuing which belong to yesterday and other ways of perceiving and valuing which announce

(56) EPF, p. 30
the future. As the contradictions deepen, the 'tidal wave' becomes stronger and its climate increasingly emotional. This shock between a yesterday which is losing relevance but still seeking to survive, and a tomorrow which is gaining substance, characterizes the phase of transition as a time of announcement, and a time of decision" (57).

Societies in transition are, therefore, deeply marked by certain socio-politic-economic-cultural changes which considerably affect the infrastructure of the closed societies. In Latin America these changes started in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. In Brazil, particularly, it began in the end of the century (1888) with the abolition of slavery and reached its climax during the two world wars and continued with ups and downs until 1964 when the military coup d'état, once again, condemned the nation to silence.

All these changes provoked the split of the closed societies in Latin America, thus, making possible the coming of the phase of transition.

"This does not mean, however, that movements towards emergence automatically break open the culture of silence. In their relationship to the metropolis, transitional societies continue to be silent totalities" (58).

Notwithstanding, silence is seen as being no longer an unchangeable fact, but rather as the consequence of a reality which must be transformed.

(57) EPF, p. 7
(58) CAC, p. 462
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But the emergence of the popular consciousness also implies the developing and the "awakening" consciousness of the power elites. Freire states:

"Just as there is a moment of surprise among the masses when they begin to see what they did not see before, there is a corresponding surprise among the elites in power when they find themselves unmasked by the masses. This two-fold unveiling provokes anxieties in both the masses and the power elites. The masses become anxious for freedom, anxious to overcome the silence in which they have always existed. The elites are anxious to maintain the status quo by allowing only superficial transformations designed to prevent any real change in their power of prescription" (59).

Thus, the phase of transition determines, on the one hand, the end of the absolutist oligarchical control of the political power -- though, the economy remains unchanged -- and, on the other hand, it is what contributes to the emergence of the popular masses. However, the emergence of the masses -- though announcing the first rays of democracy and liberation -- appears only as historical possibilities which cannot become effective without struggle. Freire's argument is that

"societies which found themselves in this historical phase... live in a climate of pre-revolution whose dialectical contradiction is the coup d'état" (60).

(59) CAC, p. 463. Karl Mannheim says: "As democratic processes become widespread, it becomes more and more difficult to permit the masses to remain in a state of ignorance". Cf. Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, New York, Mcmillan Publishing, 1950, p. 50. Also quoted by Freire, in EPF, p. 41.
(60) CAC, p. 466. See also CON, p. 71.
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For this very reason the total emergence of the popular masses is doomed to failure or it is only a very remote possibility. I shall point out four reasons for this:

First: internally, the claims of the popular masses being in disagreement with those of the power elites, drive these same elites to answer the crisis provoked by the emergence of the masses using the weapons of the coup d'état. The justification of the elites for such procedure is that they have to make the "revolution" before the people are able to.

Besides, Freire suggests that the coup d'état

"reactivates' old patterns of behavior in the people, patterns which belong to their former state of quasi-immersion. Only this 'reactivation' of the culture of silence can explain the passivity of the people when faced with the violence and arbitrary rule of Latin American military coups" (61).

Therefore, the coup d'état alters the process towards liberation of the transitional societies at the same time it inaugurates a new beginning for a new transition. It does not matter how strong the ideological foundation of a coup d'état is. What is impossible and unreasonable is the pretention of a society to return to its former political style that was the determinant force which engendered the previous coup. The coup d'état can only postpone the total emergence

(61) CAC, p. 466. Freire still stresses that the Latin American military coups have become "the answer of the economic and military power elites to the crises of popular emergence". On account of this the coups d'état in Latin America "are incomprehensible without a dialectical vision of reality; any attempt to understand them mechanistically will lead to a distorted picture". Ibid.
of the popular masses. This is why it is "necessary" that wherever and whenever the masses start again the process of emergence, societies begin once more their transitional historical march. This explains why coups d'état are so frequent in Latin America and why countries, such as Bolivia, for example, in less than 160 years of political independence has experienced and suffered more than 200 coups d'état.

Second; externally, the revendications of the popular masses are also in an open conflict with the interests of the metropolis. Also in this case the metropolis always interferes even if such interference ends in a military coup d'état or in the establishment of a civil or military dictatorship. In any case the sole purpose of the metropolis is to guarantee its interests and maintain the situation of dependency. It explains many of the United States external policy interferences in the internal affairs of some Latin American countries. It helps us to understand this Freire's statement:

"The underdevelopment has not its raison d'être in itself, but on the contrary, it is to be found in the development" (62).

Furthermore, these interferences always have a very strong repercussion in public opinion. American public opinion,
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For instance, frequently endorses the United States reprisals to many of the libertarian movements in the Third World. Most of these movements are interpreted as communist, as hostile to the United States interests and equate them with Soviet communism. Professor Henrique C.de Lima Vaz, asks:

"Why does U.S. public opinion fall into the mistake of looking on every tendency toward socialism in Latin America as a reproachment to Marxist communism and to the Soviet bloc? Why do U.S. public opinion and U.S. policy drive every revolutionary attempt in Latin America toward enmity with the United States?" (63).

Needless to say, none of this is true. The truth is the necessity of the metropolitan societies, as well as of the national power elites of the satellites societies, to hide the real causes regarding the appearance of such libertarian and revolutionary movements. So the fundamental task of the Third World countries is the suppression of their situation as dependent societies. In fact, we have to be aware of the ambiguity of the term "Third World" when it is used to designate the underdeveloped countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa. It has become ideological, in the bad sense of the word, when it is taken as a sociologically valid analytic term. There is no real "Third Word", because the countries thought of as making it up are still prevented

from forming a cohesive group capable of defending their own interests. They should really be described as "satellites" dominated by one or other of the imperialist blocs; for that is what prevents them from becoming a third world in any true sense. The best way to understand the expression "Third World" is as a rallying call to the liberation of the dominated and oppressed nations. Their efforts, therefore, have to be oriented towards their own conversion into beings-for-themselves. Without this conversion, even despite the external "aids" and "assistencialisms", they will continue to be "cultures of silence", beings-for-others. On account of this,

"the total phenomenon of the emergence consists, on the one hand, in the emergence of the Third World from the world as a totality (i.e., the First World); on the other hand, in the emergence of the non-privileged sectors of the Third World from its own totality" (64).

Third: as stated before, in the transitional phase the popular masses are still under the influence and control of the populist leaders whose aim is the manipulation of these masses. They know that the emergence of the masses is a serious threat to their own interests and to the interests and privileges of the power elites. This explains the role performed by the populist leaders as mediators between the masses and the elites. The task of the elites -- with the

(64) "Cultural Action: A Dialectical Analysis", in Cuadernos CIDOC, 1004, Cuernavaca, México, 1970, p. 4-14.
support of the populist leaders -- is the invention of new methods to keep the masses quiet and silent. Among these new methods we can mention an obsessive appeal to a fanaticized type of patriotism and to an irrational form of nationalism. The elites also develop new strategies in order to destroy all attempts to the total emergence of the masses. As examples we can cite: instilling the fear of communism, invocation of religious myths to canonize ecclesiastical and secular authorities, etc. Then, it is easy to infer that the populist leadership is a mere instrument used by the elites in order to maintain the status quo just the same way as the elites are used by the metropolis for the same purpose. One can see, therefore, how difficult it is for the masses to struggle for their total emergence, and how high is the price of liberation. Hence, Freire's emphasis that

"conscientization is an unrealizable project for the Right... The Right cannot unmask itself, nor can it sponsor the means for the people to unmask it more than it is willing to be unmasked. With the increased clarity of the popular consciousness, its own consciousness tends to grow, but this form of conscientization cannot convert itself into a praxis leading to the conscientization of the people. There can be no conscientization without denunciation of unjust structures, a thing which cannot be expected of the Right. Nor can there be popular conscientization for domination. The Right invents new forms of cultural action only for domination" (65).

Fourth: once "massified", the popular masses become, per-

(65) CAC, p. 471. See also Chapter V, Item 5.1.
haphazard, modernized, but they do not develop. There exists an economical progress linked with the process of modernization. But it can not be confused with real development because "the society in transformation is not the subject of its own transformation. On the contrary, the point of decision in the process of development lies within the being undergoing transformation -- the process is not a mechanical one. Hence, while all development is modernization, not all modernization is development" (66).

This explains why the common good of the myth of the "societies in development" (indeed, societies in process of modernization) is only shared by their power elites who become richer and more powerful and the popular masses poorer and more modernized.

In order to maintain this situation the power elites give all their support to the ideology of the technical specialization which is seen as being the "lever of progress". Freire comments:

"In our highly technical world, mass production as an organization of human labor is possible one of the most potent instruments of man's massification. By requiring a man to behave mechanically, mass production domesticates him. By separating his activity from the total project, requiring no total critical attitude toward production, it dehumanizes him. By excessively narrowing a man's specialization, it constricts his horizons, making him a passive, fearful, naive being. And therein lies the chief contradiction of mass production: while amplifying man's sphere of participation it simultaneously distorts this amplification by reducing man's critical capacity through exaggerated specialization" (67).

(66) EC, p. 127-128
(67) EPF, p. 34
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But how has such a thing been possible? Ortega y Gasset (68) argues that since by the end of the nineteenth century appeared in Europe a type of scientist only acquainted with one science, and more precisely, only with a small corner of that science in which he became an activist researcher. He was no more a man of judgement; he was totally disinterested in anything outside the narrow field of his specialization. Any attempt of seeking a general kind of knowledge was considered as "time wasting". To become acquainted with the intellectual tradition and heritage of mankind was something unreasonable. Man's disposition towards wisdom through the study of Philosophy, Literature, Religion, Arts, Social and Political Sciences, were seen as pure dilettantism. And today, as Freire reminds us, we arrive at the point that to speak to a technocrat of the need for the study of all these fields

"produces a hint of mistrust. (It) constitutes a scandal to be suppressed... For the technocrat all this is wasting time. It is the dreams of idealists and of those without a sense of the practical" (69).

Technical specialization, which implies the division of science into small sections is, thus, responsible for the disarticulation of knowledge. Like the bees in their hives, specialists give their contribution to the advance of science but shutting up themselves in the rooms of their labo-

(69) EC, p. 129
ratories. Nevertheless, specialists see themselves as "men who know" everything within the limits of their fields of specialization.

"By affirming the absolute ignorance of others, they reveal their own ignorance. This means that they practice what I call the 'alienation of ignorance'. This supposes that ignorance is always present in others, never in the person who 'alienates'... Neither ignorance nor knowledge can be absolute. No one can know everything, just as no one can be ignorant of everything... If we possessed absolute knowledge, this knowledge could not exist because it would not be in a state of being. A person who knew everything would not be able to continue knowing because s/he would never ask anything" (70).

The problem with specialists is that they ignore everything outside the field of their narrow specialization. They are neither ignorant because they know everything in their tiny portion of knowledge. So they are "learned ignoramus", i.e., they are ignorant but not in the same way as the common "ignorant men" are, since they are learned in their own special manner. Thus, science, specially empirical sciences -- which are the roots of the mass-society -- have developed, in part, due to the efforts of astoundingly mediocre men.

The consequence of this exaggerated specialization is that nowadays there is more living scientists than ever before in the history of mankind. But there are also much less living "cultured" men than ever existed. What is more

(70) EC, p. 116-117
import, however, is the fact that in specializing men, mass
society has transformed them into self-satisfied beings, into
hermetic men with all their own limitations. They will cer-
tainly behave -- in almost all spheres of daily life -- in
the same expected way as the common mass-men also do. Prof-
fessor Hilton Japiassu is very correct when he says:

"I see in the specialized knowledge -- when it is
closed and divorced from a theory of culture -- one of the most efficacious forms of mental and moral
alienation." (71).

It is in this context par excellence that education
becomes a means for indoctrination. In transitional societ-
ties it is transformed into channels to neutralize the poten-
tial hostile forces unleashed by the consciousness of the
popular masses. The humanities, which are the fostering ele-
ment in the raising of critical thinking, are completely
discredited because they are "useless" for the "progress" of
society.

"Our traditional curriculum, disconnected from life,
centered on words emptied of the reality they are
meant to represent, lacking in concrete activity,
could never develop a critical consciousness" (72).

Added to this is the fact that, sometimes, "dangerous" dis-
ciplines and even courses are prohibited or put under severe
control and vigilance. Moreover, the cult of technical spe-
cialization is over-emphasized: (1) because, in the

(71) O mito da neutralidade científica, Rio de Janeiro, Ima-
go Editora Ltda., 1975, p. 150.
(72) EPF, p. 37
highly technological societies, technical specialization is seen as a pre-requisite for the functioning of a consumer mass-society; (2) because

"specialism narrows the area of knowledge in such a way that the so-called "specialists" become generally incapable of thinking. Because they have lost the vision of the whole of which their "specialty" is only one dimension, they cannot even think correctly in the area of their specialization" (73).

Therefore, the cult of specialization, typical of mass-society, is also an important element in the transitional societies in their attempts of controlling the total emergence of the popular masses, in maintaining the oppressive system and prohibiting the raising of the critical thinking of the masses in search for liberation. For this very reason the over-emphasis on specialization is a distinctive feature of fanaticized consciousness both of the societies

(73) CAC, p. 474. The over-emphasis on specialization also leads Jacques Maritain to refute the modern form of intellectualism because it "seeks the supreme achievements of education in scientific and technical organization of modern life, yet it should be compensated for by a more vigorous general training, especially during youth. If we remember that the animal is a specialist, and a perfect one, all of its knowing-power being fixed upon a single task to be done, we ought to conclude that an education program which would only aim at forming specialists ever more perfect in ever more specialized field, and unable to pass judgment on any matter that goes beyond their specialized competence, would lead indeed to a progressive animalization of the human mind and life... The overwhelming cult of specialization dehumanizes man's life". Cf. Education at the Crossroads, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1957, p. 18-19. Also quoted (in part) by Freire, in EPF, p. 39.
in transition looking for modernization as well as of the highly developed societies. In this case, if the cult of specialization continues, fanaticized consciousness will increase considerably since there will be no one else to think critically. Hence, the motive why Freire's pedagogy is an attempt of offering an education as a cultural action for liberation by means of which men are able not only to learn but also capable of acquiring new habits and attitudes of participation and intervention. Since the beginning Freire knew that it

"was essential to harmonize a truly humanist position with technology by an education which would not leave technicians' naive and uncritical in dealing with problems other than those of their own specialty" (74).

1.2.3 - THE NAIVE STAGE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS RELATION TO ORDINARY KNOWLEDGE

Before men know things with a perfect, critical and scientific knowledge, they know them but in an imperfect, un-critical and unscientific way. In the naive stage of consciousness men's perception of themselves and of reality corresponds to this ordinary manner of knowing. I shall, therefore, define ordinary knowledge as the type of knowledge proper to the common sense which is obtained by fortuity. It is

(74) EPP, p. 39
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an a-methodic and a-systematic way of knowing which consists, for the most part, of mere opinions and beliefs, though more or less founded. As Jacques Maritain reminds us:

"It is essential for man to aspire to truth, and perhaps he has the capacity to reach it by his own powers -- even if it be in stumbling and zigzagging along the way, a way which is endless -- in the things which depends on sense experience or to which such experience give us indirect access" (75).

Ordinary knowledge is, thus, an attempt at apprehending reality by the senses in a fragmentary manner and without order or critical reflection. It is not concerned with the connections which may exist between facts and phenomena.

"Here fact, natural phenomena, things are 'presences' of which people are aware, but which are not revealed in their own true interrelationships" (76).

Through the ordinary knowledge men grasp the signification of things in their outside appearance. Even acquiring some "reasonable" explications regarding the why and the how things exist, ordinary knowledge, however, arrives at this point by mere casual experience, by means of personal investigations, or by the accumulative and preserved knowledge of the community. In this sense ordinary knowledge is a sort of existential knowledge of the common men who keep in their living experience and traditions, the current but superficial notions about things and events. It can be exemplified by the proverbial and adage wisdom, by the own ob-

(76) EC, p. 100
servations of peasants regarding the metereological accidents, by the relationships between their agricultural activities and the different phases of the moon, the seasons of the year, etc., etc.

Ordinary knowledge is, then, a mode of interpreting reality in a spontaneous and instinctive manner. Such interpretation is due to the necessity men face in certain immediate circumstances in which they are obliged to solve by themselves some specific problems without any previous discussion. Ordinary knowledge is a judgement upon reality, but a judgement entirely destitute of critical reflection. So it is a simple way of knowing which is proper to the realm of doxa.

"Within the sphere of doxa in which human beings... are ingenuously aware of the presence of things, and of objects, perception of this presence does not mean an 'entering into' them, which would result in a critical perception of them" (77).

Although it can also be regarded as the natural and primitive kind of judgement of human reason and so also proper, in some cases, to magical consciousness, ordinary knowledge is imperfect in its mode because it apprehends facts only by pure observation and without any yardstick regarding the statement or scientific validity of these facts. Even in more advanced stages when ordinary knowledge includes a solid kernel of genuine certainties, or

(77) EC, p. 100
when it offers any logicality or carries convincing truths it is, nevertheless, devoid of critical demonstration; it simply does not offer or indicate enough proofs of its own truths. The possessor of ordinary knowledge has, in fact, an imperfect kind of knowledge once the grounds he bases it on are not enough to convince about the truth of its own validity.

Accordingly, ordinary knowledge is the type of knowledge which characterizes naive consciousness since it is a way of knowing incapable of explaining its own raison d'etre. Being proper of naive consciousness, ordinary knowledge is to be found more specifically in societies in transition in which men emerging from the culture of silence are not able yet to perceive the world from a critical framework. It is by virtue of this specific existential condition that men -- when at the level of naive transitive consciousness -- are so easily transformed into instruments of manipulation of the populist leaders. And once manipulated, instead of moving themselves to the stage of critical consciousness, they fall into the irrational form of the fanaticized consciousness which typifies men in the mass-society of both the First World and the Third World. Hence, Freire's affirmation:

"The form of perceiving facts is not different from the manner of relating them to others. Both are con-
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ditioned by the concrete cultural reality in which human beings find themselves" (78).

This is the reason why Freire also tries to build a pedagogy which is a way of liberating men from the oppressive reality conditions; a pedagogy which is able to drive men into the transformation of the unjust social system by means of their work and also by means of their critical engagement in the historical concreteness. In sum, a pedagogy capable of leading and helping men to move from magic-naive to critical consciousness.

1.3 - THE CRITICAL STAGE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

If naive consciousness frees itself from the threat of manipulation and avoids the irrational burden of the fanaticized consciousness it is, then, capable of progressing towards the third and highest stage of consciousness, i.e., critical consciousness. It is achieved through the process of conscientização and constitutes the core of Freire's philosophy of education. This sort of consciousness is, characterized:

"by depth in the interpretation of problems; by the substitution of causal principles for magical explanations; by the attempt to avoid distortion when perceiving problems and to avoid preconceived notions

(78) EC, p. 100-101
when analyzing them, by refusing to transfer responsibility; by the practice of dialogue rather than polemics; by receptivity to the new for reasons beyond mere novelty and by the good sense not to reject the old just because it is old -- by accepting what is valid in both old and new" (79).

On account of these specific characteristics, critical consciousness is consciousness in its full totality, or better yet, it is what Freire -- employing a concept from Lucien Goldman -- calls "the maximum of potential consciousness which lies beyond the sphere of 'real consciousness'" (80).

Critical consciousness is deeply marked by receptiveness, self-confidence in discussion and dialogical practice, refusal to shirk responsibilities, rejection of all sort of manipulation, an openness of mind in moving from one point of view to another, etc. The distinctive aspect in the ascension from magic-naive to critical consciousness is, therefore, the historical engagement in rational options solely grounded on the structural perception of the existential problems and whose goal is the radical transformation

(79) EPF, p. 18.
of reality by means of cultural revolution. Only in this way are men able to become subjects of the historical process and not only its mere spectators. This is also the only road which leads men to become the source of their own decisions. Critical consciousness is, thus, entirely opposed to the emotional and irrational behaviours of the previous stages of consciousness. Professor Álvaro Vieira Pinto affirms that critical consciousness represents

"things and facts as they exist empirically, in their causal and circumstantial correlations... Native consciousness considers itself superior to facts, in control of facts, and thus free to understand them as it pleases" (81).

At this stage of "maximum potentiality" and development, critical consciousness is able to scrutinize its own thoughts; it is continually ready to re-make these thoughts; its sees the proper causal and circumstantial correlations in which nothing can be interpreted as immutable datum. Through the dialectical relationships between knowing and doing

"critical consciousness is brought about not through and intellectual effort alone, but through praxis--the authentic union of action and reflection" (82).

In this manner, reflection, action and consciousness are to be developed together. In order to become fully conscious of their existence, with all its historical themes, men have to

(81) Consciência e Realidade Nacional, Rio de Janeiro, ISEB-Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros, 1961. Also quoted by Freire, in EPF, p. 44.
(82) CAC, p. 473
emerge from their own world, inspect what they have absorbed, question what they have accepted, and scrutinize what they have been taught. This is not an easy enterprise. Freire himself argues that the attainment of critical consciousness, as well as the entire process of conscientização, implies a "new birth" or an "Easter experience" in which the consciousness of both the oppressor and of the oppressed has to die in order to be re-born. Hence, new men are born from such process but only after they have made an utter revision of their values and beliefs; only after they have proclaimed the death of their own dear myths and behaviours; only after they have suicided as a privileged bourgeoisie class. This is, indeed, a moment of self-discovery and "the moment of discovery is exactly that in which a necessity, until then only sensed, constitutes itself as a 'perceived detached' one" (83).

Nonetheless, Freire warns us that this moment of discovery "provides on the one hand the retreat of some, their silence, their accommodation; on the other hand, however, new adherents. But one of the fundamental differences between those who depart and those who stay is that the latter assume the existence as a dramatic tension between the past and the future, between death and life, between departing and staying, between creating and non-creating, between saying the word and the castrating silence, between hope and despair, between being and not-being" (84).

(83) Cartas à Guiné-Bissau. Registros de uma experiência em processo, Rio de Janeiro, Editora Paz e Terra Ltda., 1977, p. 77. Translation is mine since this passage is missing in the English text of LGB, p. 163.
(84) "O papel educativo das Igrejas na América Latina", in ACL, p. 113.
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All this means that critical consciousness has to be in a continuous process of questioning itself and always re-making its previous interpretation of reality. If the process of continuing quest stops, critical consciousness will be no more a critical way of thinking but rather a dogmatic and fanaticized one whose purpose is the proclaiming of its own absolute and definitive truths. By its own principles, Freire's thought is, therefore, anti-dogmatic. In its dialectical it is, on the contrary, an effort to make action transparent to thought and to forward thought by going beyond it. He says:

"If the human beings, as transformers beings, remain adhered to the new reality, which is a result of their action, they would be submerged into a new 'opacity': Conscientização, which occurs as a process in a given moment, must continue to be in the next moment in what the transforming reality assumes a new profile" (85).

1.3.1 - MEN'S RESPONSE TO THE CRITICAL STAGE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Men's response to the critical stage of consciousness begins when they

"see themselves as transformers of reality (previously a mysterious entity) through their creative work. They discover that, as men, they can no longer continue to be 'things' possessed by others" (86).

(85) "O processo de alfabetização política - uma introdução", in ACL, p. 95. See also PO, p. 38.
(86) PO, p. 175
At this stage of consciousness men's reflections and actions are manifestations of a real understanding of themselves and of the social structure which coerces both the oppressor and the oppressed into collusion. Men reject "to play host" to the oppressors as role models. Oppressors become vulnerable individuals losing their mythical quality of omnipotence. Men's image of self becomes more realistic and they realize that self and peer are not only good but also powerful. They overtly refute into-punitiveness as well as horizontal violence. There is a full-scale of non-acceptance of the oppressor's values, behaviours and beliefs. Men start to perceive how their collusion makes the oppressive system work which is a clear demonstration of their passage to a critical stage of consciousness. This is the condition sine qua non in the struggle for their own self-affirmation as subjects. Now they see themselves as unique individuals, as beings-for-themselves and, consequently, capable of naming the world, giving meaning to history and culture. This is possible because "as man perceives the extent of dehumanization, he asks himself if humanization is a viable possibility... (And) who are better prepared than the oppressed to understand the terrible significance of an oppressive society? Who suffer the effects of oppression more than the oppressed? Who can better understand the necessity of liberation?" (87).

(87) P0, p. 27, 29
Thus, in the critical stage of consciousness men cannot accept manipulation. They are aware that manipulation is an attempt to transform them into "docile" objects who will probably give their support to the oppressive status quo. So they are the contrary of the sectarian men who are the prototype of the fanaticized consciousness. For this very reason, one of the most distinctive marks of critical consciousness is the relationship established among the oppressed themselves, i.e., their radicalization. According to Freire such radicalization involves

"increased commitment to the position one has chosen. It is predominantly critical, loving, humble, and communicative, and therefore a positive stance. The man who has made a radical option does not deny another man's right to choose, nor does he try to impose his own choice. He can discuss their respective positions. He is convinced he is right, but respects another man's prerogative to judge himself correct. He tries to convince and convert, not to crush his opponent. The radical does, however, have the duty, imposed by love itself, to react against the violence of those who try to silence him -- of those who, in the name of freedom, kill his freedom and their own. To be radical does not imply self-flagellation. Radicals cannot passively accept a situation in which the excessive power of a few leads to the dehumanization of all" (88).

Another vivid aspect of critical consciousness is men's response to self-esteem. It replaces negative references to self and peers. The myth of natural inferiority is substituted by a growing sense of self-worth. Humility, stupidity and unfitness are now seen as products of oppression

(88) EPF, p. 10-11
and not as matters of heredity or heritage. Hence men begin to question why they are as they are. Blame is no more placed on themselves but on the system of relationships which binds them together to a solely oppressive reality. Men are also imbued with a reliance on self which may be interpreted by the oppressor as arrogance. Their perspectives, information, attitudes are continually being tested and subjected to revisions according to the results of their actions. Reflection and action are transformed into a constant cycle of thinking and doing as modes of improving the accuracy of understanding. At this point the unity between theory and praxis is fully accomplished and it is in an open opposition to either excessive emphasis on rhetoric -- which Freire calls "naive verbalism" -- or on isolated actions -- which Freire calls "naive activism". For Freire the radical men reject both verbalism and activism and are always submitting their actions to reflection.

Also at this stage of consciousness men come to focus their attention on historical development as such. Freire writes:

"The radical is a Subject to the degree that he perceives historical contradictions in increasingly critical fashion; however, he does not consider himself the proprietor of history. And while he recognizes that it is impossible to stop or to anticipate history without penalty, he is no mere spectator of the historical process. On the contrary, he knows that as a Subject he can and ought, together with other Sub-
jects, to participate creatively in that process by discerning transformations in order to aid and accelerate them" (89).

Therefore, men begin to realize that many events, norms, procedures, and relationships are simply examples of systematic institutionalized oppression. This allows them to perceive the contradiction between the system's slogans and propaganda and its real-life results. Hence, their relations extend beyond themselves to the macro socio-economic-political domain. They become fully aware, for instance, of how economics operates to coerce and manipulate the oppressive system. Consequently, they see the urgency to combat the effects of such system orienting their actions towards the radical transformation of the system and not towards a palliative reform which would simply result in the continuation of the status quo. Aggressiveness is then directed against the system or/and against its internal or external supporters. Hence, reliance is placed not on the practice of "assistencialism". Radical men reject "assistencialism" because they know it is an instrument of and for domination; they know it is a pernicious method which robs men of their own responsibilities for a genuine participation in the historical process of their epochs. Men are, thus, convinced that "assistencialism".

(89) EPF, p. 12
"contradicts man's natural vocation as Subject in that it treats the recipient as a passive object, incapable of participating in the process of his own recuperation." The great danger of assistencialism is the violence of its anti-dialogue, which by imposing silence and passivity denies men conditions likely to develop or to 'open' their consciousness" (90).

Reliance, therefore, is placed on community resources. A deep and strong sense of class consciousness appears at this stage of consciousness. Due to this, communal problems are more emphasized than the personal ones. Whoever does not discover the value of collective life can not give an affirmative answer to the problems which arise in the efforts towards the transformation of an unjust social order. All men's actions and reflections are expressions of the importance of community participation in the solutions of their own problems. It is because men have ejected the oppressor once "housed" in themselves, they are now free to experience cooperation as a way of changing reality. They, however, see power not as a manner to destroy the oppressor or as a means of defending themselves or their interests against the oppressor, but rather as a way of building a new system of relationships, a new social order in which justice and rights are privileges of all citizens and not only of a few powerful elites.

(90) EPF, p. 15. See also Chapter III, Item 3.3.3.
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Obviously, the struggle for justice and equal rights for all implies boldness and risk-taking. Despite the fact that the individuals are now less afraid of change than they are sick of the status quo, they are more willing to act according to some "dangerous and inappropriate" ways. They are able to act in ways which the actual social system defines as wrong. Their actions constitute a menace to the paternalistic system because they are seen as outside of the accepted rules.

"Engaged in the process of liberation, he cannot remain passive in the face of the oppressor's violence... The more radical he is, the more fully he enters into reality so that, knowing it better, he can better transform it. He is not afraid to confront, to listen, to see the world unveiled. He is not afraid to meet the people or to enter into dialogue with them. He does not consider himself the proprietor of history or of men, or the liberator of the oppressed; but he does commit himself, within history, to fight at their side" (91).

In this context -- if the system fails in its attempts at adapting once again the awakened masses to its control -- the response of the power elites to such failure is to enlist themselves in order to preserve at all cost the social system in which they are the dominant class. In the eyes of the oppressors the efforts of the oppressed in trying to supersede the unjust system mean to subvert it criminally. Hence, they label as "subversives" all those who have responded to the calling for the transformation of that

(91) PO, p. 22, 23-24
"disorganized established order". At this moment, a huge wave of irrationalism begins to operate. It is when the power elites put at work all their apparatus of repression. The regime of terror, fear, brutality, insanity, hatred, fanaticism and violence is, thus, inaugurated. This is why, for Freire,

"violence is initiated by those who oppress, who exploit, who fail to recognize others as persons -- not by those who are oppressed, exploited, and unrecognized. It is not the unloved who initiate disaffection, but those who cannot love because they love only themselves. It is not the helpless, subject to terror, who initiate terror, but the violent, who with their power create the concrete situation which begets the 'rejects of life'. It is not the tyrannized who initiate despotism, but those who despise. It is not those whose humanity is denied them who negate man, but those who denied that humanity (thus negating their own as well). Force is used not by those who have become weak under the preponderance of the strong, but by the strong who have emasculated them" (92).

1.3.2 - THE CRITICAL STAGE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

AS CHARACTERISTIC OF OPEN SOCIETIES

One can term "open society" the type of society in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions. It implies a society of free men fostered by a true democratic charter. The framework in which Freire describes the open society corresponds to the human aspirations towards the

(92) PO, p. 41. See also Chapter V, Item 5.1.
attainment of certain tenets such as justice for all citizens, equality of all before the law, freedom of thought and expression, respect for the human rights and dignity, etc. An open society, from a Freirean outlook, is then, a society where an authentic democracy is a real datum and it is constantly cultivated. But such possibility depends on the acquiescence of a critical consciousness which is the

"characteristic of authentically democratic regimes and corresponds to highly permeable, interrogative, restless and dialogical forms of life -- in contrast to silence and inaction, in contrast to the rigid, military authoritarian state, an historical retreat which the usurpers of power try to present as a re-encounter with democracy" (93).

In his first writings, Freire's concept of democracy and open society is that both are essentially and intrinsically characterized by change, by a proper climate for dialogue and participation, by the development of public solidarity, by the commitment of all citizens to common problems, by an equal distribution of the common good, by a type of authority not considered as a mythical, untouched and venerable being, by justice and moral righteousness, by a non-admittance of the state as a transcendental and infallible power imposed from above upon human life, etc., etc. In short -- employing like Freire the words of Alexis de Tocqueville -- a society which is able to "be brought about not

(93) EPF, p. 18-19
only with the assent of the people, but by their hands" (94) which is the essence of democracy, indeed.

Although he does not deny, but rather praise the values of those above tenets, nor does he reject, but rather exalt the mentioned characteristics of the open society, Freire does not believe that it is the model of democracy adequate for the closed societies of Latin America. This is the model of democracy which flourished and developed in Western Europe (except in Portugal and Spain) and in North America (except in Mexico). The imposition of this model of democracy in Latin America will simply give its portion of contribution to the "Europeanization" or to the "Americanization" of Latin American culture. What is, then, necessary for Latin America is the achievement of a new model of democracy adequate to its own context and cultural values. It is a very difficult task to be undertaken, because it has to be created. But it has to be done by our own people, by our own hands. Any borrowed and transplanted solution to our problems which

"are neither generated by a critical analysis of the context itself, nor adequately adapted to the context, they prove inoperative and unfruitful" (95).

Freire argues that European civilization, for instance, has

(95) EPF, p. 13
evolved under a regime of political experience. It did not occur in Latin America due to the specific characteristics of its colonization. Hence, the attempt at importing any foreign model of democracy for Latin America is doomed to fail.

"Not only did we lack experience in self-government when we imported the democratic state; more importantly, we were not yet able to offer the people either the circumstances or the climate for their first experiments in democracy. Upon a feudal economic structure and a social structure within which men were defeated, crushed and silenced, we superimposed a social and political form which required dialogue, participation, political and social responsibility, as well as a degree of social and political solidarity which we had not yet attained" (96).

On account of these facts one can not see, and Freire does not offer either, examples of open societies in Latin America. He seems to think that, at least, Cuba, in some sense, is approaching this sort of society. He says:

"I do not idealize any revolution. But it is an undeniable fact that the Cuban revolution has led Cuba to be itself. Of all the Cubans I have had the opportunity to talk to they speak about the revolution with an incontinent joy. And I do not believe all these people have been domesticated and conditioned to behave in this way. There is no power which makes it possible. If the Cuban revolution were a "demon" so dreadful the people would not speak about it in a so affective manner. On the contrary, they are proud of their revolution and speak about it as being 'my revolution'. All I have known from the Cuban revolu-

(96) EFP, p. 28
tion is that it has been characterized by a "critical reading" of the historical process through a constant praxis" (97).

In his later writings Freire throws new light on his concept of open society. Obviously it is a democratic society. However, it is far from stability, i.e., it refuses all sorts of temptations for immobilism or conformism. In the same manner the attainment of critical consciousness is a dialectical process also democracy has to avoid stagnation in order to survive. The same threat which appears as perennial danger for the critical thinking is also a menace to the open society. Both run the risk of falling into irrationalism if this dynamic aspect is neglected. And Freire is constantly calling attention to this fact, the stagnation of the critical consciousness, i.e.,

"the bureaucratization of conscientização. Its institutionalization, the emptiness of its dynamism which transforms it into another form of mystification" (98).

If democracy is to be permanent, then its practice has also to be uninterrupted. Democracy, like freedom,

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(97) INT. Indeed, Freire does not furnish a large or deep discussion regarding this point. He limits himself only to pointing few notes in some of his works. See, for example: P0, p. 122, note 4, p. 164, p. 169-171, p. 179, note 51, CAC, p. 464, note 24; LGB, p. 157; "Cultural Action: A Dialectical Analysis", Op.cit., p. 4-11, note 1; "O papel educativo das Igrejas na América Latina", in ACL, p. 120; "O processo de alfabetização política -- uma introdução", in ACL, p. 93.

(98) "Algumas notas sobre conscientização", in ACL, p. 149.
"is acquired by conquest, not by gift. It must be pursued constantly and responsibly. (It) is not an ideal located outside of man; nor is it an idea which becomes myth. It is rather the indispensible condition for the quest for human completion" (99).

Otherwise one can simply raise the question if democracy, just as many other forms of governments that came, is not also destined to vanish in the course of history. Hence again the urgency of a permanent dialectical relationship between the acts of denouncing and announcing. Unfortunately this is exactly what is not happening today. People in mass-society are more and more absent from the important sphere of decisions. Besides, they are also disinterested in any genuine engagement in political life. Their hopes and trusts are not oriented towards their own participation but rather towards the power of technology. But technology, as Freire reminds us, is not a neutral enterprise. There are those who control it and certainly they will also exercise control over those whose "faith" is placed on technology.

"Indeed, an analysis of highly technological societies usually reveals the 'domestication' of man's critical faculties by a situation in which he is massified and has only the illusion of choice. Excluded from the sphere of decisions being made by fewer and fewer people, man is maneuvered by the mass media to the point where he believes nothing he has not heard on the radio, seen on television, or read in the newspapers. He comes to accept mythical explanations of his reality. Like a man who has lost his address, he is 'uprooted'" (100).

(99) PO, p. 31
(100) EFF, p. 34
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Another point to be remembered is that some practical attempts of democracy today are grounded on ideological basis, i.e., anyone or any government seeking to legitimate certain actions would say they are democratic actions. Karl Jaspers remarks that

"what we hear today about democracy is paradoxical. All governments, whether totalitarian or free, cite the will of the people and call themselves democratic. All of them present the people as their sovereign, at least in mass meetings, national celebrations, and memorial orations. As a word, 'democracy' has become publicly sacrosanct, an idol of our time" (101).

From this perspective, "democracy", in order to combat not only its very enemies but also in its attempts to preserve the status quo, is forced to copy the inhuman methods of irrationalism. With such attitude, however, this sort of deviated democracy is denying the essence and the premises on which true democracy is founded. In Latin America, for example, the power elites "in the name of a supposedly threatened freedom... repel the participation of the people" (102). With the purpose of safeguarding democracy they inaugurate totalitarianism. They

"defend a sui generis democracy, in which the people are 'unwell' and require 'medicine' -- whereas in fact their 'ailment' is the wish to speak up and participate. Each time the people try to express themselves freely and to act, it is a sign they continue

(102) EPF, p. 14
to be ill and thus need more medicine. In this strange interpretation of democracy, health is synonymous with popular silence and inaction" (103).

At this point it is interesting to recall that Marx himself foresaw the communist revolution firstly occurring in countries where there existed a strong totalitarian tradition. He envisaged, for instance, the communist revolution happening in Europe, firstly, in totalitarian and czarist Russia (104). From this Marxist approach, we can raise the following problem for Latin America: on the one hand, it must abandon, definitely, the military dictatorships or the other totalitarian regimes; on the other hand, it must accept the democratic system as the only viable in terms of human liberation and dignity. Contrariwise, in spite of all apparatus of repression, in spite of all indoctrination and propaganda regarding "National Security", it is irremediably on the road towards communism. When such event happens, those responsible before history will be, therefore, those who in the name of freedom and democracy impose a regime of terror and fear, though, perhaps, not knowing that they have been working not to free the people from the advent of communism but rather hastening the day in which communism falls down upon the people. Thus, they have

(103) EPF, p. 14
to learn and be convinced that democracy is

"founded on faith in men, on the belief that they not only can but should discuss the problems of their country, of their continent, their world, their work, the problems of democracy itself" (105).

Consequently, even with the aim of defending itself from its enemies, or even with the objective of building an open society of free men, "democracy" -- when based on ideological grounds -- in its attempts of using other methods rather than those established on democratic principles, is betraying the proper philosophical basis of a true democracy. Perhaps, those who wish to protect democracy from its adversaries are, actually, its most dreadful enemies in using, for this purpose, the non-democratic methods. Probably they are defending not democracy but rather a system which guarantees their privileges as dominant class. The existence of an open society -- let us repeat once more -- is only possible with a permanent critical consciousness. Karl R. Popper is correct in affirming:

"If we are tempted to rely on others and so be happy, if we shrink from the task of carrying our cross, the cross of humaneness, of reason, of responsibility, if we lose courage and flinch from the strain, then we must try to fortify ourselves with a clear understanding of the simple decision before us. We can return to the beasts. But if we wish to remain human, then there is only one way, the way into the open society" (106).

(105) EPF, p. 38
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Nevertheless, a society which intends to be really an open and democratic society can not admit the social distance between the different groups of people in a distribution of property and goods which are extremely unequal. So Freire's aim is a radical democratization of society, i.e., its total liberation from internal and external socio-economic-politic-cultural dependency through a general mobilization of the oppressed masses by means of an education capable of fostering critical consciousness. It means nothing more than a certain form of democratic socialism. The problem, however, is that Freire does not offer much detail about this sort of socialism. He says, for instance, that "the integral development is not viable in a class society" (107), that the new world "has to be created through the revolutionary process which must, however, be a permanent one" which "can never be 'sacralized' and must demand the participation of the popular masses" (108), and that "new human relations, characteristics of the newly restored structure based on a different material reality, be able to create a new style of life radically different from the former" (109). Freire, nonetheless, does not specify how the

(107) "O papel educativo das Igrejas na América Latina", in ACL, p. 120.
(108) "O processo de alfabetização política - uma introdução", in ACL, p. 93.
(109) "Ação Cultural e Reforma Agrária", in ACL, p. 33.
transformation of this sort of democratic socialism will occur. Such limitation is imposed by his epistemology and also by his own dialectical way of thinking. Obviously it may, sometimes, irritate anyone looking for precise eschatological premises in Freire's thought. At this point we can only argue, like Herbert Marcuse, that

"the development of a radical political consciousness among the masses is conceivable only if and when the economic stability and the social cohesion of the system begin to weaken" (110).

It is because the future is not yet an existing reality, any discussion of it is doomed to be reverted to pure idealism in discussing objects which only exist in the mind of the thinking subject. Like Marx, Freire's discussion of future society is most restrained and cautioned. Thus, he avoids the danger of falling into utopianism. He thinks that this new form of socialism will be determined by some specific historical conditions -- which he calls "the untested feasibility, i.e., the futurity to be construed" (111) -- under which it will be established. But these conditions can not be predicted in advance.

1.3.3 - THE CRITICAL STAGE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS RELATION TO CRITICAL-SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

Critical consciousness and critical-scientific knowledge are the consequence and the apex of the process of conscientização. The existence of one is, however, inconceivable without the other. Men can not achieve the stage of critical consciousness without also attaining a critical knowledge of themselves and of the world and vice-versa.

Being the highest form of human knowledge critical-scientific knowledge is undoubtedly the most perfect and authentic way of apprehending reality. But critical or philosophical knowledge alone has some features in common with scientific knowledge. Like the latter it is also methodic and systematic since it also contains laws and principles, hypotheses and theories, validity and universality, etc. In the same manner as the pure scientific knowledge, critical knowledge also aims at the attainment of true knowledge trying to discover its connexions, causes and principles; like scientific knowledge it can also be characterized by a sense of pragmaticism and by a lack of absoluteness or definiteness. In other words, both types of knowledge intend to grasp the meaning of things and of human existence. This explains why they want to investigate everything. In this
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sense, both critical as well as scientific knowledge have the same objective. Nevertheless, critical knowledge surpasses scientific knowledge because science satisfies itself with relative knowledge through which reality is objectively apprehended by the knower. However, critical knowledge aspires to know the roots, the first causes of reality, inquiring about its finality, its worth and meaning. For this very reason, critical knowledge is constantly raising the problem regarding knowledge obtained by science. J. M. Bochenski writes:

"Whereas other sciences know, philosophy investigates the possibility of knowledge itself; the presuppositions and the limits of possible knowledge... At this point where other sciences come to a standstill, where they assume conditions without further investigation, that is where the philosopher first begins to question. The sciences know -- he asks what knowledge is" (112).

The difference between critical and the scientific knowledge, therefore, lies in their method as well as in the object and purpose of their investigations. The object and purpose of critical knowledge is the perception of the immediate reality, which can not be perceived by the senses because it is a supra-sensible data beyond the possibilities of being tested or experimented by the empirical method. Arcângelo R. Buzzi is, then, correct when he affirms:

"The difference between philosophical and scientific knowledge is in the moment called 'representation' of the real. Such representation is the form through which intellect questions the real... To think is to represent. The difference between the philosophical and scientific thinking is not in the representation as such but rather in the way of perceiving the representation" (113).

Thus, the object of critical knowledge is the ontological, i.e., the most fundamental meaning, the proper essence of things. It means the possibility of tearing up the object of its particular isolation in order to see it related, situated, unveiled, manifested with a final sense.

Because of its own particularities critical knowledge is able to judge or reject, as false or true, every other kind of knowledge, including scientific knowledge. Freire, states, for example:

"Scientific knowledge cannot be knowledge that is merely transmitted, for it would itself become ideological myth, even if it were transmitted with the intention of liberating men" (114).

When this happens, critical knowledge has to condemn or severely criticize scientific knowledge. That is to say, critical knowledge governs the other modes of knowing which are thus directly subordinated to it. Critical knowledge is, then, wisdom whose nature consists essentially in things in their totality. This is why Freire, like Lucien Goldman,

(114) CAC, p. 472
affirms that critical consciousness is "the maximum of potential consciousness". The result of this is men's achievement of critical knowledge in

"discovering their own presence within a totality, within a structure, and not as 'imprisoned' or 'stuck to' the structure or its parts. When they do not perceive reality as the totality within which the different parts interact, they lose themselves in a 'focalist' vision of it. Merely to perceive reality partially deprives them of the possibility of a genuine action on reality" (115).

Critical knowledge, therefore, can be viewed as knowing with certainty. It is able to say what things are, why they are and why they can not be otherwise. It is a permanent inquiry about the profound meaning of everything because everything hides in itself its true signification. Hence, everything can be known from an ontological perspective, i.e., as a way of apprehending the essence of things. Herein lies the reason why in Freire's gnosiology, critical knowledge is the proper domain of logos, or better yet, knowledge founded on evidence or rational considerations, which implies the overcoming of

"the doxa by the logos of reality... The more one approaches the objective, challenging raison d'être of reality through action and reflection, the more one can reveal it by entering into it" (116).

Accordingly, critical knowledge operates in defending itself against every possible objection to the achievement of wisdom and truth, that is, against any pos-
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possible encumbrance in the attainment of a true humanism. So it can not be interpreted as a finished knowledge but rather as a continuing search for the meaning, justification, and understanding regarding everything which involves men and their existence. The ultimate goal of such permanent investigation is men's possession of critical consciousness by means of critical knowledge in which both, in the constant process of conscientização, become one and the same thing. They make

"possible for human beings, through the problematizing of the unity being-world (or of human beings in their relations with the world and with other human beings) to penetrate more deeply the prise de conscience of the reality in which they exist. This deepening of the prise de conscience, which must develop in the action which transforms reality, produces with this action an overlaying of basically sensuous knowledge of reality with that which touches the raison d'être of this reality" (117).

Summing, critical consciousness is, for Freire, the true one because it is the only which is capable of giving men the possibilities to acquire a critical and perfect knowledge of the world and of everything concerning human existence.

"While it implies overcoming 'false consciousness', overcoming, that is, a semi-intransitive or naive transitive state of consciousness, it implies further the critical insertion of the conscientized person into a demythologized reality" (118).

(117) EC, p. 105
(118) CAC, p. 471
True critical consciousness and true critical knowledge enable men to commit themselves to the radical transformation of reality. At the same time they offer men the opportunity of being actors in the authentic humanization of society which implies a returning to the very essence of democracy. The other previous stages of consciousness are false because they constitute barriers which prevent men from reaching critical knowledge. Hence, they are incapable of bringing about any program destined to change reality radically and to give a genuine contribution for a true humanization of society. However, in Freire's view, the achievement of both critical consciousness and critical knowledge (the climax of the entire process of conscientização) is the pursuit of the educational process and constitutes the proper grounds for a pedagogy of the oppressed in search for liberation. Nevertheless, we can derive many different aspects from Freire's concept of conscientização. Thus, my next task in the following chapter shall be focused on this important point before embarking on the pedagogical implications of the process of conscientização itself in Freire's philosophy of education.
CHAPTER II

CONSCIENTIZAÇÃO AND ITS DIFFERENT ASPECTS

2.1 - APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIENTIZAÇÃO

Few words have become so widely known in the pedagogical vocabulary of today as that very Portuguese, quite untranslatable one, "conscientização". Etymologically, the word is directly derived from the Latin conscientia which is formed from cum alio scientia whose meaning is the application of knowledge to a particular case performed by an action. It is in this sense that it was mostly employed by the Scholastics (01). Thus, properly speaking, conscience is neither a faculty nor a habit, but an act: the act of applying knowledge to conduct. It is preferentially in this case that the term conscientização was coined and began to be first employed by a group of professors -- among them the philosopher Álvaro Vieira Pinto -- in the Superior Institute for Brazilian Studies (ISEB) in the end of the 1950's. At this time the term also started to be used by the Basic Educational Movement (MEB), the Church-based endeavor headed by Marina Bandeira and supported by the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB). Later on the Brazilian Bishop D. Helder P. Câmara translated and publicized the term into the English and French speaking countries. Since then the term

became an integral part of Freire's writings and it is, in fact, the core of his philosophy of education. He says:

"Since I heard, for the first time, the word conscientização, I perceived immediately the profundity of its meaning. I am absolutely convinced that education, as a practice for freedom, is an act of knowledge, a critical approach to reality" (02).

Simply put conscientização means "awakening of consciousness", "critical consciousness" or "making people aware politically and socially". More precisely, conscientização, as it is used by Freire,

"refers to the process in which men, not as recipients, but as knowing subjects, achieve a deepening awareness both of the socio-cultural reality which shapes their lives and of their capacity to transform that reality" (03).

It means that conscientização involves change of mentality. It is also linked with an accurate awareness of one's locus in nature, time, and society; the capacity of a critical judgment with all its causes and consequences; the coming of logical action whose purpose is the radical transformation of reality.

However, Freire contends that conscientização is not merely a prise de conscience, as it is described, for example, by Gabriel Marcel. It is something deeper than the prise de conscience because it penetrates the profundity of reality and shows it the way it really is.

(02) CON, p. 25
(03) CAC, p. 452, in footnote
"In a first moment, reality is not given to men as a cognizable object through their critical consciousness. In other terms, in the spontaneous approximation men make of the world, the normal fundamental position is not a critical but rather a naive one. In this spontaneous level, men, in approaching reality, make simply the experience of reality in which they are inserted and are also in quest of" (04).

Hence, deepened consciousness of the man-world relationships makes the individual aware of his situation of oppression, but it is not yet conscientização. Rather it is only the first step towards it.

"If the prise de conscience goes beyond the mere apprehension of the presence of a fact, and places it critically in the system of relationships within the totality in which it exists, it transcends itself, deepens, and becomes conscientization" (05).

The prise de conscience is, indeed, a positive element in the supplantation of a naive conception of reality for a critical one. But it alone is not able to achieve human liberation because it does not suffice to change the oppressive reality. Liberation is fully reached through conscientização when men, taking possession of reality, demythologize it and act upon it.

"Liberation is not given within the domain of men's consciousness, isolated from the world, but in men's praxis within history which, implying in the relation consciousness-world, evolves the critical consciousness of such relation" (06).

(04) CON, p. 26
(05) EC, p. 146
(06) "Concientizar para liberar: nociones sobre la palabra 'concientización'", in Contacto, Secretariado Social Mexicano, Vol. I, No. 8, February 1971, p. 44.
CONSCIENTIZAÇÃO AND ITS DIFFERENT ASPECTS

It is in this sense that conscientização and liberation are inseparable, the latter being the ultimate end of the former. But both consist in the critical development of consciousness. It implies that

"we go beyond the natural and spontaneous sphere of apprehension of reality in order to reach the critical sphere in which reality is to be seen as a cognizable object and in regard to it men assume an epistemological position" (07).

By virtue of this, conscientização refers to learning to perceive social, political, and economic contradictions, and to take action against the oppressive elements of the social structure. Men have the ability to reflect critically upon themselves and also upon reality. Consequently we can adduce that men are able: (1) to transcend the situation of oppression; (2) to temporalize their situation historically, as a process; (3) and to intentionalize, i.e., men are capable of establishing purposes and directions for themselves in the transformation of reality. These are the criteria for men's liberation.

"Reflections upon situationality is reflection about the very condition of existence: critical thinking by means of which men discover each other to be 'in a situation'. Only as this situation ceases to present itself as a dense, enveloping reality or a tormenting blind alley, and men can come to perceive it as an objective-problematic situation -- only then can commitment exist. Men emerge from their submersion and acquire the ability to intervene in reality as it is unveiled. Intervention in reality -- historical awareness itself -- thus represents a step forward from emergence, and results from the

(07) CON, p. 26
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... conscientização of the situation. Conscientização is the deepening of the attitude of awareness characteristic of all emergence" (08).

Men's actions are, then, the condition sine qua non in the struggle for liberation. It implies a gnosiological understanding and an awareness of those oppressive elements which constitute obstacles for a true human existence. A dehumanized world is a world without a consciousness of the historical forces determining existence. When there exists a lack of full awareness of men's life activity it is when dehumanization occurs.

Conscientização and liberation, therefore, mean the creation of new norms, procedures and policies; the radical transformation of a complex system of oppression and not simply its superficial reformation or a mere prise de conscience of few individuals so as to reduce the negative consequences of such system. Hence, Freire's refutation that it is enough to change consciousness in order to achieve liberation.

"We can not" -- he says -- "in the process of conscientização, attribute to consciousness a role which it does not have, i.e., the role of transforming reality" (09).

In fact, Freire denies he ever said that, although some of

(08) PO, p. 100-101
(09) "O processo de alfabetização política - uma introdução" in ACL, p. 94.
his interpreters insist on accusing him of such idealist mistake (10).

Actually, the problem of idealizing the process of conscientização becomes acute when we realize that it is possible to be liberal on some political and social issues without seriously recognizing complicity with the oppressor, for to do so would threaten the lifestyle of the minority power elites. This is why it is common for various libertarian movements in Latin America, for example, to get financial and moral support from some elements of the dominant classes. There is, in a sense, a certain amount of "radical chic" in this phenomenon, although there is also an idealism present which presses individuals to act beyond sphere of affluence. By virtue of this Freire defends himself against the charges of being an idealist saying that:

"Many of these criticisms reveal the mechanistic-objectivist position (and therefore an anti-dialectical position) of those who make them. While being mechanists -- denying the proper reality of consciousness -- they refuse, consequently, the process of conscientização" (11).

On account of this, the idealization of conscientização makes it proceed social change. The process, therefore, becomes one of changing people's consciousness in order to change

(11) "Conscientização e Libertação - uma conversa com Paulo Freire", in ACL, p. 132.
society. For Freire, transformation of consciousness must be followed by actions towards the attainment of liberation which are ultimately political actions. Hence, the political dimension and significance of conscientização as well as Freire's insistence on the practice of changing consciousness. It is an interdependent process in which action and reflection are mutual. Without some ongoing action aimed at changing the social reality in which people live, there can be no significant change of mind. Conversely, there can be no decisive change in the social and political structures if people simply inhabit new structures with the same old mentality.

Beginning with his work on adult literacy, Freire realized that it was not enough to teach oppressed people to read and write. It was also necessary to discover how to change their outlook, their way of life and the community's collective attitudes and behaviours. Freire perceived that if education is to be meaningful, it must be tied to the life process of the individuals and to their communal environment. It would be able to create critical attitudes in increasing men's ability to discuss and to participate in the solution of their own problems. An education that would put men in a constant and critical revision of the social reality, leading them to the search of their common goods, or, more precisely, an education that would be able to prepare
men for the exercise of a genuine democracy. In sum, an education that

"would enable men to discuss courageously the problems of their context -- and to intervene in that context; it would warn men of the dangers of the time and offer them the confidence and the strength to confront those dangers instead of surrendering their sense of self through submission to the decisions of others" (12).

Due to this Freire started to conceptualize a process of consciousness-raising leading towards a dynamic concept of liberation and towards what he has referred to as "more complete humanness". Within this framework learning becomes a source of liberation and a tool for social transformation. Conscientização, thus, came to be a degree of consciousness in which the social-politic-economic-cultural order is critically questioned. People begin to be aware of the resultant contradictions of their own lives, and consequently, they start to generalize those contradictions to others surrounding them and ask themselves how they, in a common task, can transform society, radically and creatively.

For this very reason, conscientização is a social process which takes place among people when they unite themselves in a common reflection and action upon their world. When it is accomplished the unity between theory and practice is utterly effectuated. Then, the major objective of conscientização is not a mere intellectual effort which ends

(12) EPF, p. 33
at the awakening of perception, it proceeds to praxis which, by its turn, provides the grounds for new reflection, new perception.

"In the same way the gnosiological cycle does not end in the stage of the acquisition of the existing knowledge since it prolongs till the phase of the creation of the new knowledge, conscientização also cannot stop in the stage of the revelation of reality" (13).

If it stops at this level, the libertarian process becomes mythologized, which means, the idealization of the praxis so that conscientização is transformed into a subjective idealism. Rather than being grounded on the actual events of history, it is disconnected from it and becomes so universalistic and abstract as idea and process, that it has almost no connection with life as it is being lived. What fulfillment is hoped for lies so far in a future that it has little impact on present conditions. Because of this, Freire maintains that conscientização

"is a test of reality. Much more conscientização the more reality unveils itself and more it penetrates into the phenomenological essence of the object which we wish to analyse. For this same reason, conscientização does not consist in being in front of reality assuming a false intellectual position. Conscientização can not exist apart from the praxis, or better saying, without the acts of reflection and action. This dialectic unity constitutes, in a permanent manner, the way of being or of transforming the world which characterizes men" (14).

(13) DFI, p. 28
(14) CON, p. 26
People are, then, dehumanized because of the lack of inter-relationship between consciousness and practice.

"The effort of conscientização, which identifies itself with the proper cultural action for freedom, is the process by which -- in the subject-object relations -- the subject becomes capable of perceiving in itself, in critical terms, the dialectic unity between itself and the object" (15).

The ultimate goal of conscientização is, therefore, the humanization of the world in which each particular individual becomes aware of the social forces at work upon him, reflects upon those forces, and starts to change social reality. But it is not a simple goal to be reached; it is rather the climax of the pedagogy of the oppressed in its efforts towards liberation. Joel Spring says:

"To be human is to be an actor who makes choices and seeks to guide one's own destiny. To be free, to be an actor, means knowing who one is and how one has been shaped by the surrounding social world. It is one's social world and environment that determine the nature of one's consciousness and ideology. Without a knowledge and awareness of that determination, humanization is impossible" (16).

Freire's purpose is to restore humanity to the oppressed by giving them a conscious life. And humanization is for Freire man's vocation. But he remarks:

"This vocation is constantly negated, yet it is affirmed by that very negation. It is thwarted by in-

(15) "Conscientização e Libertação - uma conversa com Paulo Freire", in ACL, p. 139.
justice, exploitation, oppression, and the violence of the oppressors; it is affirmed by the yearning of the oppressed for freedom and justice, and by their struggle to recover their lost humanity... This struggle is possible only because dehumanization, although a concrete historical fact, is not a given destiny but the result of an unjust order that engenders violence in the oppressors, which in turn dehumanizes the oppressed" (17).

In this sense conscientização initiates and supports a process by which as soon as the individual becomes conscious of the contradictions and conditionings of the social system in which he lives, he also unfastens his efforts in order to change such system. Hence, Freire writes:

"Conscientization implies, then, that when I realize that I am oppressed, I also know I can liberate myself if I transform the concrete situation where I find myself oppressed. Obviously, I can not transform it in my head; that would be to fall into the philosophical error of thinking that awareness 'creates' reality, I would be decreeing that I am free, by my mind. And yet, the structures would continue to be the same as ever -- so that I would not be free. No, conscientization implies a critical insertion into a process, it implies a historical commitment to make changes" (18).

This process actually operates with the purpose of provoking changes in the individual's attitudes and beliefs. It automatically involves changes in his vision of himself and of the social reality. Consequently, the process offers to man a new sense of action and decision. With the birth of such critical vision regarding himself and the world, man sees

(17) P0, p. 28
himsell as a new-born being. His new abilities to decide affect permanently the existential quality of his life. For this very reason Freire insists that conscientização can not be based on the separation between consciousness and world.

To know himself as an oppressed is, thus, the first condition for an individual to begin his own process of liberation by engaging himself in a historical commitment which is to be based on the relation consciousness-world. So conscientização demands involvement and intervention with reality through action. This means that conscientização is "also historical consciousness; it is a critical insertion in history, which implies that men assume the role of subjects who make and re-make the world. It exacts that men create their existence with the material which life offers to them" (19).

Those who are, then, aware of the state of oppression and conscious of their nature are able to break with the trajectory of history and participate in the radical change of self and society. As Professor Richard Shaull points out, the individual "comes to a new awareness of self, has a new sense of dignity, and is stirred by a new hope" (20). And

(19) CON, p. 26
(20) Foreword to Freire's PO, p. 13-14. "I appear to myself as captive if I am conscious not only of being thrown into a situation, but engaged by it -- under external constraint -- in a mode of existence which carries with it restrictions of all kinds on my own actions. Such a situation makes it impossible for me to raise to an experienced plenitude either of feeling or of thought". Cf. Gabriel Marcel, The Existential Background of Human Dignity, The William James Lectures, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963, p. 142.
hope is always linked to an experience of captivity. However, those who have no self-consciousness, who have nothing but life activity, are completely propelled by social forces.

"The starting point for such an analysis must be a critical comprehension of man as a being who exists in and with the world. Since the basic condition for conscientization is that its agent must be a subject (i.e., a conscious being), conscientization, like education, is specifically and exclusively a human process. It is as conscious beings that men are not only in the world, but with the world, together with other men. Only men, as 'open' beings, are able to achieve the complex operation of simultaneously transforming the world by their action and grasping and expressing the world's reality in their creative language" (21).

Although it begins in the individual realm, the end of conscientização is utterly accomplished in the social sphere. It is only in society that the individual is able to discover that he can move from a consciousness of himself as an oppressed being to a consciousness that he belongs to an oppressed class. Class consciousness of oppression drives man to realize that historical circumstances are susceptible of transformation when he knows it authentically, i.e., capable of naming the world and giving meaning to it by introducing another direction to history. In Freire's view, therefore, conscientização is not only the pursuit of individual liberation. Its goal is a social goal, and man's need to be a being-for-himself is achieved when a society is able to become also a being-for-itself. For Freire, individual man

(21) CAC, p. 452-453
neither knows nor exists isolated from society. In order to act according to reason the individual needs to receive, besides material needs, certain goods essential to him from society.

"It is sufficient to know that conscientization does not take place in abstract beings in the air but in real men and women, and in social structures, to understand that it cannot remain on the level of the individual" (22).

Because it is a historical commitment, and hence a social process, conscientização cannot be interpreted as a mere technique for information-transfer, or even for skill training. Furthermore, being an act of knowledge, whose major purpose is the application of knowledge to praxis in order to transform reality, conscientização has, in Freire's thought, various and different aspects. The study of these aspects shall be my next task.

2.2 - THE DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF CONSCIEN'TIZAÇÃO

(22) EC, p. 146-147. In this sense Freire's view is very akin to Jacques Maritain who states that the person "unless it is integrated in a body of social communications, it cannot attain the fullness of its life and accomplishment. Society appears, therefore, to provide the human person with just those conditions of existence and development which it needs. It is not by itself alone that it reaches its plenitude but by receiving essential goods from society". Cf. The Person and the Common Good, Trans. John J. Fitzgerald, London, Geoffrey Bles, 1948, p. 34-35.
The difficulty in grasping the different aspects of conscientização as they appear in Freire's thought has been the source of many misunderstandings (23). One of the most frequent of them is the attempt at interpreting his concept of conscientização from a behavioristic point of view. Freire thinks that both forms of behaviorism, i.e., mechanistic behaviorism and logical behaviorism are unable to understand the relationship between man and world.

"Under the form called mechanistic behaviorism, men are negated because they are seen as machines. The second form, logical behaviorism, also negates men, since it affirms that men's consciousness is 'merely an abstraction'. The process of conscientization cannot be founded upon any one of these defective explanations of man-world relationships. Conscientization is viable only because men's consciousness, although conditioned, can recognize that it is conditioned" (24).

Freire's intention is to show that conscientização can not be reached at by a pure psychological road. Every attempt to imprison Freire's thought in a closed system of principles or laws is contrary to its very essence. So those works which have been trying to study Freire's concept of


(24) CAC, p. 455. See also EC, p. 146.
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This perspective is doomed to fail. It is not by creating an operational definition of conscientização or by a way of measuring and applying its central concepts to daily situations that one can reach a clear and deep understanding of its effects. To obtain mere verbal samples of a group of individuals is not an adequate way which allows us to encase someone in any specific level of consciousness since these samples can be totally disconnected from the praxis of the declarant. Besides, as it was stated before, conscientização is primarily a social process and not an individual achievement. On the other hand, it seems to be unfair to use people as a species of "guinea pigs" in order to satisfy anyone's academic and scientific goals. We have to keep in mind that Freire is continuously warning us that science is never neutral and that the

"scientist can not 'hide' himself in what he considers the neutrality of his scientific activities, being indifferent to the use of his findings and interested in even thinking about whom he is working for." (25)

The scientist works for a socio-political system which expects him to behave according to its established norms and

(25) "O processo de alfabetização política - uma introdução", in ACL, p. 90. Professor Hilton Japiassu argues that science does not constitute a separate world in which specialists place themselves in a sort of transcendent rationality, in an a-historic objectivity looking for a pure and for a non-disinterested knowledge. The scientific neutrality is a myth. Science carries in itself the marks of its own socio-cultural universe which produces and also determines its objectives. Cf. O mito da neutralidade científica, Op. cit., p. 150 ff.
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requires that the results of his findings be in accordance with its pre-fixed rules. Hence, Freire's affirmation:

"In trying to know scientifically the reality in which the themes are occurring, we must not submit our epistemological proceedings to 'our truths' but rather to seek to know the truth of the facts" (26).

Therefore, it is true that there are people troubled with the study of conscientização trying to test it empirically or to transform it into an object of consumption. In this case, as Denis Goulet says, "Freire is the first to rejoice in thus gaining a new weapon against mystification" (27). Indeed, conscientização never signified in Freire's thought something that could be measured or tested empirically. It is rather something to be fostered, a very difficult task to be undertaken by those who are not afraid, of assuming the risks it implies. It can not be effectuated by those

"who declare themselves committed to liberation but act in accordance with the myths which deny the humanization. They want men's humanization but at the same time they also want the maintenance of the social reality in which men are dehumanized. At bottom, they fear liberation. In fearing it they cannot risk themselves in the struggle for liberation in the communion with those who are deprived of it"(28).

By virtue of all these misunderstandings, Freire has not been employing the term conscientização in his later

(26) "Algumas notas sobre humanização e suas implicações pedagógicas", in ACL, p. 97.
(27) Introduction to Freire's EPP, p. vii.
(28) "Algumas notas sobre humanização e suas implicações pedagógicas", in ACL, p. 104.
works, although he has not abandoned its process or discredited its viability. It can be seen, for instance, in his last book, *Pedagogy in Process: The Letters to Guinea-Bissau*, in which the word *conscientização* does not appear any time. Nevertheless, the possibility and the belief in the power of *conscientização* is present in the whole book. According to Freire himself it is due to what he has called "the bureaucratization of *conscientização*" or "the mystification of *conscientização*" that he has avoided lately the usage of the term.

It is in order to prevent these and other sorts of misinterpretations that I shall embark on the study of each of these different aspects of *conscientização* in Freire's thought. In studying them separately it does not mean, however, to put a gulf between them once they form a total unity which can not be fully comprehended if one of these aspects is disconnected from the others.

### 2.2.1 - THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ASPECT OF *CONSCIENTIZAÇÃO*

In the early 1900's the term "phenomenology" began to be used by Edmund Husserl as a way of doing philosophy by employing the phenomenological method. Since then the term started to be used in two distinct senses: for the phenome-
nologists it is the best and, sometimes, the only legitimate way of philosophizing; for other philosophers, phenomenology is a school or a philosophical movement. At the same time, the oldest sense of the term endures and phenomenology continues to be seen as a study of any given phenomenon.

It is in the first sense that we can approach the phenomenological aspect of conscientização as it appears in Freire's thought, even though he does not seem to have accepted the argument that the phenomenological method is the only way of understanding conscientização. This explains why we are able to find other aspects of conscientização in his thought.

Freire's chief source of phenomenological analysis of conscientização is the philosophy of Husserl. As it is known, from a Husserlian point of view, phenomenology is the science that deals with the understanding of the diverse nature of a given phenomenon. Like Husserl, Freire thinks that the "naturalistic" method of the empirical sciences is incapable of understanding the essence of human consciousness. Both see phenomenology as a sort of rebellion against the attempts of the empirical sciences to reduce the human knowledge to factual sciences in which man becomes an outsider, a stranger to his own findings. Phenomenology wants to give back to man his own "subjectivity"; it aspires to reveal to man his real human meaning.
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Freire's main purpose in developing his phenomenological aspect of conscientização is precisely an effort at offering to man the opportunity of a full understanding of his humanity. Because of this, phenomenology appears in Freire's thought as a meditation about the human knowledge. Under such circumstances it faces consciousness as a phenomenon, and consciousness presents itself, in this sense, as a consciousness of a given object, the social reality. In fact, Professor Ernani Maria Fiori states:

"World and consciousness are not statically opposed to each other, they are related to each other dialectically, within their original and radical unity. For this reason the truth of one is to be gained through the other; truth is not given, it conquers itself and makes itself. It is, at once, discovery, and invention" (29).

So it is correct to assert that the entire process of conscientização is the outcome of a "phenomenological reduction" elevated to a higher degree after being applied to the social domain. Man can not become a conscious being isolated from others. Again Professor Ernani Maria Fiori admiringly remarks:

"Consciousness constitutes itself as consciousness of the world. If each particular consciousness had its own world, consciousness would go different and

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separate ways; they would be mere uncommunicable monads. Consciousness does not find itself in the emptiness of itself. Since it is always, and radically, consciousness of the world" (30).

Freire's concept of conscientização, therefore, has a marked resemblance to Husserl's notion of consciousness. It is not what the idealists -- especially Hegel -- thought it to be, i.e., truth metaphysically conceived in its becoming, nor it is the transcendental ego of Fichte. It cannot be identified with the Kantian transcendental unity of apperception that makes experience possible nor with the Descartes' ego cogito that separates man from his own experience. Conscientização is the expression and the meaning of all my actions as related to the actions of each individual being. It is not because they belong to a transcendental metaphysical reality outside the concrete and material universe that my actions are to be considered as transcendental actions. No, they are transcendental actions because they have a meaning which is not just mine, since they belong to all mankind. In this context, transcendentality means -- in Freire's thought

"the capacity of the human consciousness to surpass the limitations of the objective configuration. Without this 'transcendental intentionality', consciousness of what exists beyond limitations would be impossible" (31).

(30) "Aprenda a dizer sua palavra", in Preface to the Brazilian edition of Freire's PO, p. 8.
(31) CAC, p. 453, note 3.
Hence transcendentalism, according to Freire, is something eminently finite because it is a fundamental feature of man. Or in the words of Professor Ernani Maria Fiori:

"If consciousness distances itself from the world and objectifies it, it is because its transcendental intentionality makes it reflexive. Since the first moment of its constitution, in objectifying its originate world, it is already virtually reflexive. It is present in and distant from the world; the distance is the condition of the presence" (32).

Based on this exegesis, we can argue that Freire identifies, likewise Husserl, the phenomenological method of research with the truth to be searched. In the case of Freire the truth to be achieved is man's capacity to act consciously under the objective reality in order to provoke the radical transformation of those social structures responsible for the maintenance of oppression.

"For men, as beings of praxis, to transform the world is to humanize it, even if making the world human may not yet signify the humanization of men. It may simply mean impregnating the world with man's curious and inventive presence, imprinting it with the trace of his works... Thus men's relationships with the world are per se historical, as are men themselves. Not only do men make the history which makes them, but they can recount the history of this mutual making" (33).

(33) CAC, p. 455-456. At this point Freire makes a distinction between men's relationship with the world and the animal's contact with it. He says that only men work. He cites Marx's example of the bees' activities which "at the end of every labor-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the laborer at its commencement". Cf. The Capital, Vol. I, Trans. Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling, Edited by Frederick Engels, Chicago, Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1932, p. 198.
Freire's aim is men's acquisition of a new understanding of themselves and of the world in order to perform actions which, besides transforming them into new men, are also capable of changing the situations of oppression in which they live. The phenomenological aspect of conscientização is, thus, something more than a simple use of a method for the analysis of consciousness. It is rather the proper awakening of men. Professor Álvaro Vieira Pinto says:

"The method is, in fact, the external form of consciousness manifest in acts, which takes on the fundamental property of consciousness -- its intentionality. The essence of consciousness is being with the world, and this behavior is permanent and unavoidable. Accordingly, consciousness is in essence a 'way towards' something apart from itself, outside itself, which surrounds it and which it apprehends by means of its ideational capacity" (34).

Therefore, Freire also embraces the notion of consciousness as "intentionality". From an epistemological viewpoint it means that every act of knowledge is characterized by the intentional or mental existence of an object. This intentional object is immanent; it is in the mind of the knower and it is the only way we are able to understand the outside world. The act of knowledge contains, somehow, the objects known, and that the knower becomes involved and identified with anything that he knows. Consciousness, therefore, can know the structure of real objects since the na-

(34) Ciência e Existência, Rio de Janeiro, Editôra Paz e Terra Ltda., 1971. Also quoted by Freire, in PO, p. 56, (no page).
nature of consciousness is its "intentionality", i.e., the state of being intentional. It always overcomes itself by doing so gives a meaning to all things of which it is conscious.

It is also from Husserl that Freire borrows the notion of consciousness as intentionality. He states:

"The human being is a conscious body. His or her consciousness, with its 'intentionality' towards the world, is always consciousness of something. It is in a permanent state of moving towards reality. Hence the condition of the human being is to be in constant relationship to the world. In this relationship subjectivity, which takes its form from an objectivity, combines with the latter to form a dialectical unity from which emerges knowledge closely linked with action" (35).

Here again Freire rejects objectivism as well as subjectivism because neither is adequate in its efforts at interpreting the relationship between consciousness and world. He sustains that critical consciousness of subjects is intentional consciousness which means that the consciousness is actively and affectively engaged in the world; reality does not enter consciousness to fill it; it is the other way around: consciousness goes out of reality, examining it, exploring it, questioning it. It is, therefore, an error to think that

"a consciousness, which receives permanently the deposits that the world makes upon it, goes on in

(35) EC, p. 144
transforming such deposits into their own contents" (36).

This is why Freire argues that only human beings are beings of praxis. They have a thought-language which enables them to act and reflect on themselves and on their own actions.

"Only they are beings of relations in a world of relations. Their presence in this world, a presence which is a being-with, comprises a permanent confrontation of the human being with the world. Detaching themselves from their surroundings, they transform their environment. They do not merely adapt to it" (37).

Contrary to other species which can not "animalize" the world, men impregnate the world with their reflective human presence. It is by virtue of this reflective capacity that men are able to transform reality for better or for worse driving the entire human race to its humanization or dehumanization.

"While the tiger" -- writes Ortega y Gasset -- "cannot cease being a tiger, cannot be 'detigered', man lives in the perpetual risk of being dehumanized" (38).


(37) EC, p. 109

Unlike all the other beings in the universe, men are also beings of relations, different from the rest of other creatures which are merely beings of contacts. For Freire,

"to be human is to engage in relationships with others and with the world. It is to experience that world as an objective reality, independent of oneself, capable of being known. Animals, submerged within reality, cannot relate to it; they are creatures of mere contacts. But man's separateness from and openness to the world distinguishes him as a being of relationships. Men, unlike animals, are not only in the world but with the world" (39).

In perceiving all the causal relationships of a given reality, which includes their own capacity to reflect and act in history, men become "fully intent" upon the universe; they thereby discover what was already implicit but inconspicuous in the perceived phenomena.

"I cannot exist without a not-I. In turn, the not-I depends on that existence. The world which brings consciousness into existence becomes the world of consciousness... As men, simultaneously reflecting on themselves and on the world, increase the scope of their perception, they begin to direct their observation towards previously inconspicuous phenomena" (40).

Therefore, Freire views intentionality as "the essence of consciousness" which is always consciousness of something having the capacity to surpass the object and to face it as such. However, consciousness has also the quali-

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(39) EPF, p. 3
CONSCIENTIZAÇÃO AND ITS DIFFERENT ASPECTS

The ability of reflecting upon itself "in a Jaspersian 'split' -- consciousness as consciousness of consciousness" (41). Through his consciousness man is able to distance himself from the world and penetrate into reality. This action of his consciousness is one of a subject which forms the basis for the development of his perception. Objects are not seen as simple objects, but rather as problems: something which is in front of man as obstacles to be removed. Thus, consciousness is reflection, contemplation, convocation and challenges initiated by posing-problems. Or in the words of Professor Ernani Maria Fiori: "Consciousness of the world is simultaneously and implicitly, presentation and elaboration of the world" (42).

But how does the phenomenological aspect of conscientização affect Freire's pedagogy? (43). At this point, it is sufficient to stress that the way of knowing that discovers the subjective aspect of consciousness, "intending" reality, affects Freire's educational theory. It signifies that all act of knowledge which objectifies man as well as the

(41) PO, p. 67. Karl Jaspers states: "The reflexion of consciousness upon itself is as self evident and marvelous as is its intentionality. I aim at myself: I am both one and twofold. I do not exist as things exists, but in an inner split, as my own object, and thus in motion and inner unrest". Cf. Philosophy, Vol. I, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1969, p. 50.
(43) I shall develop this topic, in more detail, in Chapter IV.
world can not treat man or the world from a neutral perspective reducing man to a simple spectator. In the act of knowing -- intentionality -- every objectification, every act of abstraction is performed so that knowledge is seen as a challenge both to the educator as well as to the educatee.

It is because man is a constant searcher, humanization is his natural ontological vocation. The distinctive feature of learning is not conditioning, skill training or memorization, but changes in consciousness.

"Thus, education (or cultural action for liberation, which it cannot fail to be) reproduces the dynamism which characterizes the historical-social process. Its mobility depends on the mobility of the facts which must genuinely be known in the practice of education. It is only through an education which does not separate action from reflection, theory from practice, consciousness from the world, that it is possible to develop a dialectic form of thinking which contributes to the insertion of men as subjects in their historical reality" (44).

Therefore, everything men come to know theoretically must be given meaning by their action. Here lies the reason why, for Freire,

"conscientização does not stop at the level of mere subjective perception, but through action prepares men for the struggle against the obstacles to their humanization" (45).

(45) PO, p. 112.
2.2.2 - THE DIALECTICAL ASPECT
OF CONSCIENCIZAÇÃO

2.2.2.1 - The dialectical versus
the dogmatic aspect

Since the time of Plato -- who can be said to be the
originator of the theory of knowledge because the pre-
Socratic philosophers did not give much attention to the
gnosiological problems -- questions like the following have
been raised: What is knowledge? Where is knowledge generally found? How much of what we ordinary think we know is
really knowledge? Do the senses provide knowledge? Can reason (or reason alone) supply knowledge?

The first thing to be pointed out is that in Freire's thought there is no room for a static theory of
knowledge. His gnosiological approach is one whose main
preoccupation is the practice of a dialectical theory of
knowledge solely grounded on a politico-pedagogical activity
which also includes a dialogical action. He affirms:

"If conscientização can not be produced without the
revelation of the objective reality, as an object of
knowledge to those subjects inserted in the process,
then, such revelation -- even when it is a clear
perception of reality -- is not yet enough for an
authentic conscientização... Conscientização is au-
thentic only when the practice of revealing reality
constitutes a dynamic and dialectic unity with the
practice of transforming reality" (46).

(46) DFI, p. 28
Like the English empiricists or like the eighteenth-century French materialists, Freire does not place reflection as the starting point of knowledge since it would drive him to a mechanistic notion of reflection. For him, reflection has to be united to action. Reflection without action is sterile intellectualism or mere empty verbalism which is much dear to those who want the preservation of the status quo. Freire, indeed, is fully aware of the danger of dogmatism. This explains why he is frequently submitting his dialectical gnosiology to a dialectical judgment, accepting the denials it forces upon him and, then, changing the initial hypothesis which consequently leads him to reorganize the entire body of the acquired knowledge. This is the principal reason why his thought and writings, sometimes, seem to be full of contradictions, although they are not destitute of totality. Contradiction and totality are, thus, two inseparable moments of Freire's dialectical theory of knowledge, which is, at the same time, a dialectic of work, being a particular instance of the latter. It is in this dialectical unity between reflection and action that the process of conscientização is fully realized. So conscientização can never be interpreted as a finished process, exactly because it is a dialectical process. In order to be, it has always to be in the process of be-coming.
2.2.2.2 - The relation between the unity of subject versus object

If we are concerned with the liberation of man, we also must be concerned with a genuine understanding of what knowledge is, its degrees and values, and above all, with its applicability in the libertarian process. The theory of knowledge deals exactly with the ways things are known. Thus, it is concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge, its presuppositions and basis, and the general reliability of claims to knowledge. Due to this, the theory of knowledge is and can not be absent from the pedagogical inquiries. On the contrary, it has to be an integral part of any genuine educational discourse because of its relationships between subject and object, between knower and known. So it is not surprising to find in Freire’s thought a serious concern regarding the gnosiological dimension of conscientização.

This aspect of Freire’s thought is deeply influenced by Marx. It is from Marx that he derives his key notion that reality is not merely an objective datum, external to man, but it is shaped by him through consciousness.

"Knowledge of reality is indispensable for the development of self-consciousness, and this, in the
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increasing of that knowledge" (47).

In Freire, as it is in Marx, the constructive nature of human consciousness can not be limited to merely cognitive action. He interprets cognitive action as the whole process of the development and evolution of reality; getting acquainted with reality constitutes shaping and changing it. In both Freire and Marx, epistemology ceases to be a merely reflective theory of cognition, and becomes the instrument for shaping and moulding society. Freire writes:

"The comprehension of the process of conscientização and its practice are to be found, therefore, in the direct vinculum with the comprehension one has of the consciousness in its relation with the world ... Self – consciousness of the human beings as consciousness of the things, of the concrete reality in which they are as historical beings and what they learn through their cognitive ability" (48).

The identification of conscientização with the practical process of reality as shaped by man is Freire's epistemological achievement, because according to him -- and also to Marx -- reality is always human reality in the sense that man shapes nature. This act also moulds man and his relations


(48) "Algumas notas sobre conscientização", in ACL, p. 144.
to other human beings; it is a total process, implying a constant interaction between subject and object. On this basis we can argue that Freire's epistemology draws on the tradition of both classical idealism and Marxism. Indeed, it synthesizes both traditions although it transcends the classical dichotomy between subject and object.

"We recognize" -- affirms Freire -- "the indisputable unity between subjectivity and objectivity in the act of knowing. Reality is never just simply the objective datum, the concrete fact, but also men's perception of it. Once again, this is not a subjectivist or idealistic affirmation, as it might seem. On the contrary, subjectivism and idealism come into play when the subjective-objective unity is broken" (49).

In another passage, Freire states:

"Only through the comprehension of the dialectic unity in which subjectivity and objectivity are met solidarily can we escape from the subjectivist error as well as from the mechanistic mistake and then perceive the role of consciousness or of the 'conscious body' in the transformation of reality" (50).

This Freirean synthesis solves, at least indirectly, the Kantian antinomy between the cognitive and the moral realms. However, we have to admit that due to certain

(49) ALP, p. 213-214
(50) "Conscientização e Libertação: uma conversa com Paulo Freire", in ACL, p. 133. See also CON, p. 26-27. Freire reminds us Jean-Paul Sartre when he says: "There are two ways to fall into idealism: The one consists in dissolving the real in subjectivity; the other in denying all real subjectivity in the interests of objectivity". Cf. Search for a Method, Trans. Hazel E. Barnes, New York, Vintage Books, 1968, p. 33. Also quoted by Freire, in ALP, p. 214, note 12 and in "0 processo de alfabetização política - uma introdução", in ACL, p. 94, in footnote.
circumstances it is almost impossible to practice this new epistemology. Oppression indicates the continuous existence of the gulf between subject and object as a result of the still distorted process of cognition. Hence, there is an internal tension in Freire's epistemology. His is an attempt to eliminate the traditional epistemological problems, but it tacitly holds that human consciousness could operate according to the new epistemology only if the obstacles in its way are removed from the present society, because,

"if I place myself in an idealistic position, dichotomizing consciousness from reality, I submit to it as if reality were constituted by consciousness. Thus, the transformation of reality occurs by the transformation of consciousness. If I place myself in a mechanistic position, dichotomizing equally consciousness from reality, I consider consciousness as a mirror which only reflects reality. In both cases, I deny conscientização which exists when I do not only recognize but also experiment the dialectical unity between objectivity and subjectivity, reality and consciousness, practice and theory" (51).

"Thus in both conceptions of consciousness there can be no true praxis. Praxis is only possible where the objective-subjective dialectic is maintained" (52).

Consequently, Freire's epistemology is, sometimes, divided against itself. At the same time it is a description of conscientização and the importance of its role in the radical transformation of reality, it is also a vision of the future.

(51) "Algumas notas sobre conscientização", in ACL, p. 144.
(52) CAC, p. 454
The applicability of Freire's epistemology to his notion of *conscientização* and to his pedagogical speculation is one of the main exigencies needed for the understanding of the whole of his educational theory (53). Here it suffices to stress the two interrelated concepts of what Freire calls "the theoretical context of dialogue" and "the concrete context of facts". In the latter, the educatees are subjects and objects in dialectical relation with the object; in the former the educatees play the role of cognoscible subjects in the relation of subject-object which is performed in the "concrete context". So in Freire's perspective all educative theory is subjected to an educative practice and vice-versa. Every theoretical reflection in order to be authentic has to be addressed to the concrete. On account of this, libertarian education, and all the process of *conscientização* that it implies, both are fully realized in the "concrete context".

"Precisely because consciousness does not transform itself outside the practice, the theoretical context cannot be reduced to a 'disinterested' center of studies" (54).

But Freire still argues that the unveilment of reality is meaningless if it is not oriented towards a polit-

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(53) I shall return to this subject matter in Chapter IV.
(54) "Conscientização e Libertação: uma conversa com Paulo Freire", in ACL. p. 136.
Critical action because

"the comprehension of the unity of the practice and theory, in the dominion of education, also demands a comprehension of the unity between theory and social practice which occurs in a given society. Thus, the theory that ought to inform the general practice of the dominant classes -- whose educative theory is one dimension -- can not be the same that must give its support to the revendication of the dominant classes, in their practice... One thing, therefore, is the unity between practice and theory in an education oriented towards liberation, other thing is the same unity in a form of education for domestication" (55).

Once again, this explains Freire's insistence on the impossibility of a neutral educational practice and theory and his attacks on those educators who refuse to admit the political implications of their pedagogical activities.

"Hence they speak of a conscientização "strictly pedagogical", different from that which is developed by politicians. A sort of conscientização that would occur in the intimacy of their seminars, more or less aseptic, which would not have anything to do with any compromise of political order" (56).

Freire goes on and sustains that even

"the organization of the programmatic content of education... is an eminently political act, just as politics is an attitude which we assume in the choice of the techniques and methods for the concrete accomplishment of the task" (57).

This is the motive why Freire constantly reminds us about Marx's rejection of the "old materialism" because it simply

(55) "A alfabetização de adultos - crítica de sua visão ingênuas; compreensão de sua visão crítica", in ACL, p. 18.
(56) "Algumas notas sobre conscientização", in ACL, p. 146.
(57) LGB, p. 102
"forgets that it is man who changes circumstances and that
the educator himself needs education" (58).

In sum, Freire wants to say that the dominant ideol-
ogy determines epistemology and this determines the educa-
tive theory and practice. By virtue of this he stresses:

"In discussing education we have to discuss episte-
mology; it is impossible not to. So if my choice is
a domesticating one, my epistemology will be other
than if my choice is a liberting one. Because of
this, education for domestication is nothing but a
mere act of transferring knowledge" (59).

This sort of education, therefore, could never be oriented
towards conscientização of the educatee.

2.2.2.3 - The communicative aspect of knowledge

According to Freire the whole process of conscienti-
ização as well as the entire educational practice is an act
of knowledge. Therefore, it presupposes a theory of knowl-
edge, but one which does not dichotomize -- as stated before
-- consciousness from the world and which also avoids, on
this account, falling into the error of idealism or into the
illusion of mechanism. Freire strongly emphasizes the

(58) Karl Marx, "Third Thesis on Feuerbach", in Reader in
(59) "By Learning They Can Teach", in Convergence-An Inter-
national Journal of Adult Education, Toronto, Ontario,
This sort of education is what Freire terms "banking
education". I shall return to this topic in Chapter IV,
Item 4.1.
close relationships of consciousness and world because he sees in such relationships the proper place for intercommunication. Since it appears as a decisive factor for human knowledge it is in the gnosiological relation between consciousness-world that communication between the subjects and the objects is primarily established.

"The gnosiological function cannot be reduced to a simple relation between a Subject that knows and a knowable object. Without a relation of communication between Subjects that know, with reference to a knowable object, the act of knowing would disappear. The gnosiological relationship does not therefore find its term in the object known. Communication between Subjects about the object is established by means of intersubjectivity" (60).

Freire refutes some gnosiological tendencies, such as that of Descartes, Socrates, and Plato, because they do not give much attention to the communicative aspect of knowledge or because they do not stress its practical dimension. For Freire there is no true thinking, no real knowledge if it is totally isolated from the social sphere or if it is only a mere theory of knowledge disjoined from praxis. Knowledge begins, theoretically, in the inner depths of the human nature, albeit it grows and nourishes itself in the praxis of the social context. Outside the dominion of communicability, there is no knowledge.

Freire does not accept the Cartesian proposition Cogito ergo sum. Descartes suggests that I can doubt every
thing except that I doubt. Since doubting is a form of thinking, I can not doubt that I think, and since thought requires a thinker, I can not doubt the existence of myself as the thinker. However Freire thinks that in order to be a genuine gnosiological position it must be changed to Cognitamus,

"because I cannot think if you do not think. Second ly, if I cannot think with you, we cannot know" (61). "There is not an 'I think' which transfers its thought, but rather a 'we think' which makes possible the existence of an 'I think'" (62).

This is another reason why Freire affirms that the act of knowledge is a dialectical one. He says that in any true theory of knowledge, the very "object of knowledge is not the term of the knowledge of the cognoscent subjects, but its mediation" (63). Hence, communication supposes an uninterrupted reciprocity. Knowledge can not be fully grasped without this twofold dimensions: the cognitive and the communicative.

"The thinking Subject cannot think alone. In the act of thinking about the object s/he cannot think without the co-participation of another Subject. This co-participation of the Subjects in the act of thinking is communication. Thus the object is not the end of the act of thinking, but the mediator of communication. Hence it cannot be communicated from one Subject to another as the object of communication, i.e., a 'communiqué'. If the object of

(61) "By Learning They Can Teach", Op. cit., p. 79.
(63) "O processo de alfabetização política - uma introdução", in ACL, p. 86.
thought were a mere 'communiqué', it would not be a significant meaning, mediating the Subjects" (64).

Freire's pedagogy has been called a "pedagogy of communication". In fact he thinks that the human world is a world of communication. In the same way, if there is no isolated man, there is neither isolated knowledge. Any true education, an education whose chief objective is liberation must be a communicative one. Otherwise, if it denies man the right of pronouncing his own words, it will become an education for indoctrination.

Freire also rejects the Socratic intellectualism because it "mistook the definition of the concept for knowledge of the thing defined and this knowledge as virtue" (65). This sort of abstract theory of knowledge could not offer a true knowledge since there is no adduction to practical social problems. The Socratic maieutic, though dialogical, had among its participants a minority of intellectual aristocrats enchanted with some abstract philosophical speculations mostly, however, disconnected from the social context. They were not men of the people; men to whom the words had no meaning because they were not related to their daily problems. Knowledge is not virtue. It is a right every man possesses as a being created to acquire wisdom. Does not

(64) EC, p. 135
(65) ALP, p. 218
Plato say in his Phædo that "all true virtue is companion of wisdom", and in Meno does he not state that "virtue is the power of attaining good with justice?" (66). When man is denied the right of achieving such end he has the right to fight in order to obtain, once again, what has been negated. Freire's gnosiology, therefore, can not be interpreted as a mere new "Socratic tropical maieutic" as suggested by Michel Schooyans (67).

Finally, Freire refutes the Platonic conception of the pre-existence of knowledge in the human mind which, descending into the body, has contemplated the eternal Ideas. This Plato's gnosiological posture, as it appears in his Phaedo, suggests that knowledge can be achieved by comparing, dividing and struggling with our own ideas once it is something innate in us.

Freire argues that Plato's gnosiology did not go much further than that of Socrates, even though Plato considers the prise de conscience as an indispensable condition in the act of knowing and that to reach the truth implies the substitution of doxa by logos. In Meno, Plato associates knowledge with the ability to give a logos. In the last section of the Theaetetus it is suggested that knowledge may

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consist of true belief together with the giving of a logos. But Freire states that:

"For Plato, the prise de conscience did not refer to what man knew or did not know or knew badly about his dialectical relationship with the world; it was concerned rather with what man once knew and forgot at birth. To know was to remember or recollect forgotten knowledge. The apprehension of both doxa and logos, and the overcoming of doxa by logos occurred not in the man-world relationship, but in the effort to remember or rediscover a forgotten logos" (68).

In order to become true knowledge, communication between the knowing subjects is necessary. It allows them to interpret reality critically, seeking the dialectical links which give a true explication of reality. To know, consequently, is not merely to remember what has been known and now is forgotten. Doxa can not be substituted by logos without taking into account the dialectical relationship of man-world and without men's reflective interference upon the world.

The prise de conscience, which belongs to the domain of doxa, can not, therefore, constitute true knowledge. 

Eduardo Nicol says:

"Although doxa may achieve a state of coherence, it does not imply an objective coherence in things. It does not even aim at being verified, that is, apprehended for rational, non-emotional motives" (69).

Plato dichotomizes consciousness (the cognoscent subject)

(68) ALP, p. 218
(69) Los principios de la Ciência, México, D.F., Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1965, p. 44. Also quoted by Freire, in EC, p. 100, note 12.
from world (the cognoscible object). It is something impossible for Freire who thinks that one can not exist without the other.

"Human beings (who cannot be apprehended without their relations with the world, seeing that they are 'beings-in-a-situation') are also beings who work and transform the world. They are beings of 'praxis': of action and of reflection. Humans find themselves marked by the results of their own actions in their relations with the world, and through their action on it. By acting they transform; by transforming they create a reality which conditions their manner of acting. Thus it is impossible to dichotomize human beings and the world, since one cannot exist without the other" (70).

2.2.2.4 - The relation between "doxa" and "logos"

It is through the relationships between consciousness and world that the dominion of doxa is to be found. However, doxa is not a finished or absolute knowledge. From a Freirean view point, it is related to the naive and a-critical knowledge man has of the world and of himself. In the sphere of doxa natural phenomena, for instance, are simply captured by man, but they are not yet totally revealed to him in their interrelationships. It is what occurs in those preponderantly magic-naive cultures of Latin America.

"What cannot be denied is that whether we are dealing with pure doxa, or whether we are dealing with

(70) EC, p. 100
magic thought, we find ourselves faced with ingenuous forms of apprehending objective reality. We are faced with simple forms of pre-scientific knowledge (71).

Besides the process of conscientização in itself, the entire process of education is, according to Freire, an act of knowledge put into practice because it deals with questions such as these:

"What to know? How to know? Why to know? In benefit of what and of whom to know? Moreover, against what and whom to know? These are fundamental questions, in dynamic relationship to others around the act of educating, its possibilities, its legitimacy, its objectives and ends, its agents, its methods, and content. All of these closely interwoven questions demand replies that are also interrelated. Thus, in concerning myself with what should be known, I am also necessarily involved with why it needs to be known, how, in benefit of what and in whose interest, as well as against what and whom" (72).

Hence, any answer concerning these questions implies many and different angles which have to deal with socio-political-economic reality. Those engaged in any genuine and libertarian educational enterprise ought to be very aware of their political option questioning themselves in favour and against what and in favour and against whom they are working for. Once again we tackle Freire's emphasis on the impossibility of a neutral education.

But how does Freire relate his gnosiological position to the above posed questions. He answers saying that:

(71) EC, p: 104
(72) LGB, p. 100
"For the learner to know what he did not know before, he must engage in an authentic process of abstraction by means of which he can reflect on the action-object whole, or, more generally, on forms of orientation in the world. In this process of abstraction, situations representative of how the learner orients in the world are proposed to him as the objects of his critique" (73).

In this statement, Freire stresses again the dialectical unity between reflection and action and why for him knowledge always implies a permanent integration of action and reflection upon reality. The gnosiology Freire proposes gives to the educatee the opportunity to be in a continuing process of re-building his former "ad-miration" of the world or to be engaged in a genuine process of abstraction.

"To 'ad-mire' is to objectify the 'not-I'. It is a dialectical operation which characterizes man as man, differentiating him from the animal. It is directly associated with the creative dimension of his language. To 'ad-mire' implies that man stands over against his 'not-I' in order to understand it. For this reason, there is no act of knowing without 'ad-miration' of the object to be known. If the act of knowing is a dynamic act -- and no knowledge is ever complete -- then in order to know, man not only 'admires' the object, but must always be 're-ad-miring' his former 'ad-miration'. When we 're-ad-mire' our former 'ad-miration' (always an 'ad-miration' of) we are simultaneously 'ad-miring' the act of 'ad-miring' and the object 'ad-mired', so that we can overcome the errors we made in our former 'ad-miration'. This 're-ad-miration' leads us to a perception of an anterior perception" (74).

Besides, the "ad-miration" of our former "ad-miration" is always a moment of joy because it is also a moment

(73) ALP, p. 213
(74) ALP, p. 215-216
for self-awakening.

"Enthusiasm -- a certain joy in living -- like that which comes over us when we have discovered something entirely new and we ask ourselves how it was ever possible to live without this for so long. It is as though it were something that had been latent in us, awaiting the proper moment to appear. The discovery constitutes a moment whose time has come... 'We never knew before that we knew. Now we not only know that we knew, but we also know that we are able to know a lot more'" (75).

Thus, knowledge, from this Freirean perspective, is in agreement with Maritain's affirmation that it is something "immersed in existence" (76). For this very reason, Freire never detained, very long, in

"studying adult literacy methods and techniques for their own sake, but looked at them in relation to and in the service of a specific theory of knowledge, applied in practice, which in its turn must be consonant with a particular political stance" (77).

Freire applies his theory of knowledge to the suppression of the magical-naive perception of reality for a critical one. It is actually, the principal aim of Freire's philosophy of education. Accordingly, it involves the overcoming of doxa by logos, i.e., the substitution of a mere contemplation of the world for a critical pronouncement of it; or better yet, the elimination of the "culture of silence" for a culture in which man is allowed to name the

(75) LGB, p. 163-164
(77) LGB, p. 10
world. In Freire's own words:

"It is the attempt to extend knowledge which is largely sensuous to knowledge which, taking its departure from the sensuous, touches the raison d'être of reality" (78).

2.2.3 - THE UTOPIAN ASPECT OF CONSCIENTIZAÇÃO

It was in 1516 that Thomas More coined the word "utopia" with the publication of his famous Utopia. Etymologically, the word comes from the Greek and means "no place". Later on it was associated to "euporia", which means "the good place". Since then this double meaning has characterized utopian literature. However, throughout the years the words "utopia" and "utopian" have been used with many different connotations. They have been employed as an ideal or imaginary project, or to stress something unacceptable for the status quo. They also have been used to designate radical demands for social reforms, impracticable threatening idealism, imaginary ideal societies or ideal ways of living, wishful thinking, fantasies, etc., etc.

The use of these words "utopia" and "utopian" is, indeed, symptomatic of the prevailing attitudes towards social transformation. It is in this restricted sense that Freire's thought is utopian. But he gives another interpre-
tation to the utopian way of thinking. He argues that utopia is not something unreal or impracticable; it is not mere idealism or a daydream about the social optimum. Rather it is the existing "dialectical unity between the act of denouncing and the act of announcing, i.e., between the act of denouncing the inhuman structure and announcing the humanized structure" (79).

Utopia, thus, means for Freire, a historical engagement. In this respect, conscientização becomes man's response before the challenges of the world. Through the process of conscientização man is convoked to denounce the oppressor social system which denies the free exercise of his natural rights.

Being an act of denunciation utopia is also an act of critical knowledge because "I can not denounce the inhuman structure if I do not penetrate into it in order to know it. I can not announce if I do not know. But between the moment of annunciation and its full realization there is something which must be detached: it is the fact that the annunciation is not the annunciation of an anti-project because it is in the historical praxis that such anti-project becomes a project. It is acting that I am able to transform my anti-project into project" (80).

The time existing between the anti-project and its concretion is what Freire calls "historical time". By this he means the time in which transformations must be realized; it is the time for man's historical commitment. Freire's

(79) CON, p. 27
(80) CON, p. 28
notion of time is, thus, very similar to that of "duration" in Henri Bergson's philosophy in which permanence and change play an important role (81). It is in this sense that Freire sees man as maker and re-maker of history, i.e., man creating and deciding, forming and re-forming the historical epochs. From this outlook, history is interpreted as a series of continuous epochal units each one of which characterized by its own ideas, values, doubts, needs, hopes, and aspirations.

"These epochal units are not closed periods of time, static compartments within which men are confined. Were this the case, a fundamental condition of history -- its continuity -- would disappear. On the contrary, epochal units interrelate in the dynamics of historical continuity... The concrete representation of many of these ideas, values, concepts, and hopes, as well as the obstacles which impede man's full humanization, constitute the themes of that epoch" (82).

It is when men are capable of capturing and engaging in all the above themes that they are able to participate in their own epoch. A historical epoch is, therefore, concretized when all its themes are captured and all its tasks entirely realized. At the moment when new challenges, values, needs, 


(82) P0, p. 91
aspirations, etc., appear and the old themes do not correspond any more to the new exigencies of the new times, it is the moment for the suppression of a historical epoch.

"Men play a crucial role in the fulfillment and in the superseding of the epochs. Whether or not men can perceive the epochal themes and above all, how they act upon the reality within which these themes are generated will largely determine their humanization or dehumanization, their affirmation as subjects or their reduction as objects. For only as men grasp the themes can they intervene in reality instead of remaining mere onlookers" (83).

Hence, without being able to capture the themes of their historical epoch, men can not make history; they are simply thrown into the historical process without a full awareness of it. Or better yet, history is seen, from this perspective, as a mythical entity, something external to men which capriciously control them from above and beyond. Because history as such is a process, men are also, according to Freire, unfinished creatures and so, they are also process. Situated in a spatio-temporal reality, men's praxis is a continuing task of becoming.

"Men, as beings 'in a situation', find themselves rooted in temporal-spatial conditions which mark them and which they also mark. They will tend to reflect on their own 'situationality' to the extent that they are challenged by it to act upon it. Men are because they are in a situation. And they will be more the more they not only critically reflect upon their existence but critically act upon it"(84).

(83) EPF, p. 51
(84) PO, p. 100
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Consequently, men's conditions are manifested in these two dialectical opposites: to be and to be in the process of becoming which characterizes them as cultural and historical creatures.

By virtue of this, we can deduce that conscientização can not escape from the limits imposed by the historical circumstances. Man have to know how to read "the signs of times" in order to engage themselves in the process of transformation of the oppressive structures of society. For this very reason, the utopian aspect of conscientização, because it is an act of denunciation and annunciation, is also an act of knowing.

Herein, I would like to stress two connected points in Freire's utopian aspect of conscientização: (1) It is an utopian enterprise because it is something unacceptable for supporters of the status quo since the primary end of conscientização is the denunciation of the oppressive elements of such status quo; (2) as a consequence of this act of denunciation, the utopian aspect of conscientização is also a prophetic enterprise because it, at the same time, denounces the inhuman status quo it also announces the advent of a new eon, a new historical epoch.

Beginning with the first point, Freire always identifies the sustainers of the status quo with the rightist politicians and with the economic power elites, or both.
does not matter if they receive the name of liberals or conservatives. Indeed, they are always conservatives, since their only purpose is the preservation of the established order. By analogy, they can be compared as prisoners of the "Plato's cavern". In the bottom of the dark cavern they see a small sign of light. But the years in darkness do not allow them to see the light in all its magnitude. Otherwise, even if the cavern were opened they would not have the courage to face the world and the challenges of liberty. They prefer, thus, to stay in the cavern where they are secure and safe. So in the security of their dark cavern, in which only a tenuous light precariously shines, they think they can see reality. In fact, they see it, but in a dimmed and altered manner. Liberty is a calling for hope. Without the experience of liberty, the conservatives live in function of the past; they cannot foresee the future and so, they have no hope; they lack what I would call "futurity sense". For them the only alternative is to preserve the present which can not be changed. Any kind of transformation is considered a menace. In certain circumstances they permit small changes, since they too are necessary for the maintenance of the present. But even these small changes have to be done in the light of the past, the "ideal time" for most of them. This is why, Freire thinks, that they are constantly advocating reforms of the structures, but never their radical transfor-
mations. They allow many reforms but only to the extent that they do not constitute a threat to the status quo.

Actually, conservatives are always trying to put "a piece of new cloth to patch up an old coat", because they are extremely fearful of the future. For, they embark themselves in an impossible struggle, i.e., the struggle against time, against the coming of the future. They are, according to Freire, the opposite of the utopian and prophetic men, who denouncing and announcing, are bearers of hope. But the conservatives, the rightists, the oppressors,

"the dominators, who merely denounce those who denounce them, and who have nothing to announce but the preservation of the status quo, can never be utopian nor, for the matter, prophetic" (85).

Obviously, the power elite can not denounce what is the essence and affirmation of its existing condition, i.e., the status quo. The power elite only strives to idealize actual conditions, not to change them. One has, then, to get rid of the naive expectancy that the elites will collaborate or even give their support to those whose efforts constitute a menace to the destruction of their cosmos.

It is in this particular that conscientização is a utopian enterprise. It denounces what is immutable for those who have all the power necessary for transforming reality into an unchangeable order. Incapable of denouncing what is the vital element for its survival, the oppressor power

(85) ALP, p. 221. See also Leszek Kolakowski, Toward a Marxist Humanism, New York, Grove Press, 1969, p. 71-72.
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The elite cannot be utopian neither prophetic because
"in its rigidity it prefers the dead to the living; the static to the dynamic; the future as a repetition of the past rather than as a creative venture; pathological forms of love rather than real love; frigid schematization rather than the emotion of living; gregariousness rather than authentic living together; organization men rather than men who organize; imposed myths rather than incarnated values; directives rather than creative and communicative language; and slogans rather than challenges" (86).

The power elite is, then, hopeless; the only thing it proclaims is its own myths. But myths are temporary illusions and hence they cannot be messengers of human hope.

"There is no hope in the passive hope. Indeed, who ever hopes in the pure hope lives in a time of vain hope. Hope only has meaning when, full of hope, we fight to concretize the announced future which has its birth in the militant denunciation. There is no true hope either in those who try to make the future a mere repetition of the present, neither in those who see the future as something pre-determined. Both have a 'domesticated' notion of history. The former because they pretend to stop the time; the latter because they are sure of a future already known" (87).

At this point, Freire calls attention of the Third World Societies to refuse to imitate the highly technological societies in their attempts to imprison the future within the present, since it is the present with all its myths that they wish to preserve. So what seems, for most people in the developed societies, to be the social optimum is precisely what the underdeveloped societies must avoid. They

(86) CAC, p. 469
(87) "Ação cultural para a libertação", in ACL, p. 59. Translation is mine since it is not a very faithful one that of the English text of ALP, p. 221.
need to seek a new synthesis beyond that of both Capitalism and Communism. Freire, as John W. Donahue, stresses

"is consequently critical of both Capitalist and Communist societies because he believes that neither allows for the maximum self-development and growth in freedom of all men and women" (88).

But Freire still argues that there is no denunciation without annunciation. Here we tackle the second point of the utopian aspect of conscientização, i.e., the prophetic aspect. If the power elite can not be utopian nor prophetic, since it can not denounce its own myths, then, only utopian men are capable of being prophets and so bearers of hope. Only they are able to denounce and to announce:

"denounce the world in which they exist but are forbidden to be, and announce the world in which they are able to be, and which demands their historical commitment in order for it to be brought into being. It is only they who have a future different from the present, and aspiration to be created and re-created. In their present as dominated beings can be found the plan of their liberation, which can be identified with the future which they must build" (89).

Thus, only they, the dominated, are deeply involved in a radical process of transformation of the world in order to make it more human.

For this very reason, Freire also argues that his pedagogy is a utopian pedagogy.

"By this very fact it is full of hope, for to be utopian is not to be merely idealistic or impractical but rather to engage in denunciation and announcement. Our pedagogy cannot do without a vision of man and of the world. It formulates a scientific humanist conception which finds its expression in a dialogical praxis in which the teachers and learners together, in the act of analysing a dehumanizing reality, denounce it while announcing its transformation in the name of the liberation of man. For this very reason, denunciation and announcement in this utopian pedagogy are not meant to be empty words, but an historic commitment" (90).

Therefore, an education which satisfies the interests of the power elites and corresponds to their ideologies and myths can not be a libertarian education. It can never be utopian, hopeful, and prophetic. It is rather a domesticating education. From this angle, education would be a mode for changing reality, a political program in the continuing effort to bring liberation to the oppressed.

"From the prophetic point of view, the specific subject matter of education is of little importance; whatever the subject matter, education is always an effort to understand better something that is concrete. As they focus on it together, the educator-educatee and the educatee-educator will be joined in creative, active presence, in a clarifying praxis that, as it unveils the reality of awareness, will help to unveil the reality of reality, too" (91):

2.2.4 - THE THEOLOGICAL ASPECT
OF CONSCIENTIZAÇÃO

(90) ALF, p. 220
(91) "O papel educativo das Igrejas na América Latina", in ACL, p. 127. I shall examine, in full details, this subject matter in Chapter IV, Item 4.2.
From the utopian-prophetic dimension of conscientização we can derive its theological aspect, once Freire also defends a utopian kind of Christianity, and insists that "a utopian and prophetic theology leads naturally to a cultural action for liberation, and hence to conscientization" (92).

He criticizes, for example, the churches when in their efforts of "defending the faith" or "preserving the tradition", they fail to exercise the true prophetic role. This traditionalist kind of Church stresses life in the world beyond, urging people to reach transcendence without passing through worldliness. It fosters the closed society and becomes a vehicle in the maintenance of the status quo. Its advocates' "enlist themselves in the 'defence of the faith', when, indeed, they unite around the defense of their class interests, subordinating that to these" (93).

In Latin America, particularly, this kind of Church -- together with the syncretic Roman-Afro-Indian cults of some countries -- constitutes the refuge of the sleepy masses. The education it fosters and supports is, consequently, a quietist, alienated, and alienating one (94).

(93) "O papel educativo das Igrejas na América Latina", in ACL, p. 111.
(94) An exhaustive analysis of the educative role of the Church shall be given in Chaper IV, Items 4.1 and 4.2.
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This attitude of the traditionalist Church helps us to understand, in part, at least, the very known fact -- sad and painful on the one hand, but promising and bearer of joy on the other -- that in many countries of the Third World, many Christians in order to remain faithful to their prophetic vocation have, in most cases, to abandon this kind of Church because they do not find in her bosom the necessary reception to their revendication in favour of the struggle for the liberation of the whole man, and not only the salvation of souls. This Church, as it was in the past, continues until today, to sustain the social-economic-political structures which engender oppression. Doing so, it has been obliged to sanction, approve, and sacralize those structures in its efforts to enjoy power, prestige, and even economic advantages.

Freire also attacks the modernizing kind of Church. It changes some of its practices, liturgy, doctrinal and even some of its theological positions; it also engages itself in some social, cultural and political problems. But in its attempts at modernization, it has supported the power elites and, consequently, the existing oppressive situations. Hence, this kind of Church which

"is dying of cold in the warm bosom of the bourgeoisie can not look with good eyes and hear with good ears the defense of ideas and practices with are con
sidered by the elites as 'diabolics'" (95).

The measures employed by the modernized Church are, in fact, halfway, since they do not touch the real causes of the problems. Thinking from the point of view of the power elites, the "impossible neutral theologians" of this kind of Church

"propose to the oppressed classes an even greater passivity, as they break the unity between reconciliation and liberation. For them, reconciliation is nothing else than the adaptation of the dominated to appetites of the dominant classes. All happen as if it were possible to reduce the reconciliation to a simple pact between the dominant and the dominated classes -- between the rich and the poor. A pact in which the latter, accepting the continuity of the oppressed reality received, in contraposition, an efficient and modernized social assistance" (96).

So what the "neutral" theologians of the modernized Church really intend is to reconcile and adapt the oppressed to the interests of the oppressors, though they do it, sometimes unconsciously.

This procedure, nonetheless, leads the modernized Church to defend the structural reforms, but not the suppression of these structures. It speaks, for example, about the "humanization of capitalism", but not about its suppression. In adopting such measures the Church is incapable of an authentic participation in the radical transformation

(95) "O papel educativo das Igrejas na América Latina", in ACL, p. 116.
(96) "Prefácio à edição Argentina de 'A Black Theology of Liberation' de James Cone", in ACL, p. 130.
of the oppressive structures. Even though it views education as a libertarian enterprise. However, in practice, it only promotes changes in techniques and, libertarian education "means no more than liberating the pupils from the blackboards, from passive classes and bookish curricula; it means just providing slide projectors and other visual aids, dynamic-class plans and technico-professional instruction" (97).

Therefore, this sort of "conservative modernized" Church, according to Freire, dies because it refuses to die; it is a kind of new opium and the proper place in which the bourgeoisie finds shelter for its sorrows. This kind of Church "would say to Christ today: why, Master, to leave, if everything here is so good, so beautiful" (98).

Finally, Freire suggests that only the prophetic kind of Church is able to participate actively in the radical transformation of society. He says:

"Christ was not a conservative. Like him, the prophetic Church must be a runner, a constant traveler, always dying and always being born again. In order to be it has to be be-coming" (99).

In this context, the so-called theology of the modernized development is replaced by the political theology of liberation, prophetic, utopian, hopeful. Although it is not yet systematized it is, however, historically committed to the cause of the oppressed in their search for liberation. Hence,

(97) "O papel educativo das Igrejas na América Latina", in ACL, p. 124.
(98) Ibid, p. 123
(99) Ibid, p. 126
"a theology of denouncing and announcing implies prophecy and hope. A theology that serves the bourgeoisie cannot be utopian and prophetic and hopeful. On the contrary, that sort of theology would create a passive, adjusted man waiting for a better life in the hereafter. It would dichotomize the world" (100).

A prophetic theology, therefore, does not dichotomize concerns of this world from concerns about transcendence. Salvation and liberation are inseparable realities. This kind of theology is aware that it is senseless to talk about salvation of souls with people in state of starvation, and who are sick, naked, jobless, homeless, etc., etc.

By virtue of this we can infer that the theology able to foster conscientização is that which makes possible for Christianity to engage in the world in the name of liberation announced and fully lived and suffered by Christ. So Christianity can not remain passive in the face of social injustices. It has to denounce prophetically any order (including the religious order) of exploitation; and Freire is convinced that it is in perfect harmony with the Christian message and teachings.

Like Mounier, Maritain, Teilhard de Cahrdin, and others, Freire also sees Christianity as a living call concerning to the difficult task of mankind's redemption. But it is not a task to be fulfilled in the far future. On the contrary, it is an urgent work which has to start here and

now, particularly among those who more suffer the consequences of oppression and who are more in need of liberation. This is why Freire, according to Denis Collins,

"is a Christian deeply committed to extradition of the oppressed from circumstances which condemn them to lives that are less than human... The fact that he remains a believer, more Christian than many of us who close our eyes to instances of social injustices, gives the lie to those who believe that his optimism is founded exclusively in politics" (101).

Indeed, Freire does not see any gulf between education, politics and theology. In the same way which there is no neutral education or no neutral politics there is neither neutral theology.

"Precisely because it assumes a critical way of thinking it does not conceive itself as neutral nor does it hide its option" (102).

Alias, for Freire every proclaimed neutrality is, in fact, a hidden option. In the case of Christianity, it either denounces the oppressive status quo or simply gives unjustifiable theological support to the structures responsible for the dehumanization of man. In Freire's view, Christianity has to work actively against dehumanization, in whatever form it is found.

Freire still reminds us that this prophetic attitude of the Church is not an exclusivity of the Third World. Peo-

(102) "O papel educativo das Igrejas na América Latina", in ACL, p. 124.
people from the First World do not need to go to the Third World in order to become "prophets". It suffices for them to leave the comfort of their suburban houses and go to the ghettos of their cities; there, they will certainly find enough stimulus to re-think their behaviour. In doing so they can easily understand the permanent anxiety in which the prophetic role of the Church in Latin America is carried out. It is the Church for those who are aware that the symbol of Christianity is the cross, and that what happened long ago to their Master would probably happen again to those who wish to remain faithful to Him. Thus, it is the Church for those who have courage enough to face, sometimes, the risks of defamation and calumny, denial and betrayal, persecution and prison, torture, martyrdom, and death; it is the Church which has the audacity of saying to the modern Pharaohs: "Let my people go". Due to this,

"conscientização is evidently linked to utopia and implies utopia. The more conscious we become, the more we are enabled to become denouncers and announciators due to the compromise of transformation we assume" (103).

Such attitude, however, has to be a permanent one because if we simply denounce without engaging ourselves in the reality which we are denouncing we are no more utopian nor prophetic. Rather we will certainly become or an easy

(103) CON, p. 28
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prey to bureaucratization or we will fall into the weft of alienated intellectualism. It is in this particular sense that Freire points out that the role of conscientização -- which is also the function of education -- is the demystification of the oppressor structures. Here again we tackle the problem regarding the impossibility of the power elites as agents of the process of conscientização once it is their intention to mystify reality in order to prevent the oppressed from having a critical consciousness of it. This is the reason why, for Freire,

"conscientização is the more critical way. possible to look into reality whose aim is to unveil reality in order to know it better and also to know its myths which deceive and help maintain the dominant structure of reality" (104).

Hence, the only viability of carrying out the process of conscientização is that one which only counts on the utopian and prophetic man, since only he

"tends to be dynamic rather than static; tends to life rather than death; to the future as a challenge to man’s creativity rather than as a repetition of the present; to love as liberation of subjects rather than as pathological possessiveness; to the emotion of life rather than cold abstractions; to living together in harmony rather than gregariousness; to dialogue rather than mutism; to praxis rather than 'law and order'; to men who organize themselves reflectively for action rather than men who are organized for passivity; to creative and communicative language rather than prescriptive signals; to re-
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reflective challenges rather than domesticating slogans; and to values which are lived rather than myths which are imposed" (105).

We have to bear in mind that, contrary to the utopian-prophetic men, the oppressors, the privileged men live in intranquility, always preoccupied with the possibility of their slaves' freedom. Hence, their cunning in inventing new weapons in order to maintain them always in the state of slavery. Besides, because the slaves almost always represent the majority, it makes the oppressors even more fearful. It can be evidenced, for example, by the fear engendered by the increasing population among the poor. At this point, one can raise the question about the purposes behind the variety of programs carried out by some institutions concerning the restrictions of natality or birth control among those oppressed. Do these programs really intend to save future generations from poverty and starvation or do they also represent -- albeit unaware -- a strategy of the contemporary "pharaohs" in demanding from the modern midwives the killing of lives even before their birth? It is necessary to impede that the poor population continue to grow since it signifies a threat to the tranquility and stability of many oppressors who can not assume a utopian-prophetic behaviour.

According to Freire, this utopian-prophetic behav-

(105) CAC, p. 468-469
iour -- contrary to that of the conservatives, rightists, and oppressors --

"affirms men as beings who transcend themselves, who move forward and look ahead, for whom immobility represents a fatal threat, for whom looking at the past must only be a means of understanding more clearly what and who they are so that they can more wisely build the future" (106).

It has to be stressed that the conservatives, the rightists, the oppressors, on the one hand, have the tendency, most of the time, to capture the prophetic announcement but only in those matters in which "their security" are not questioned or threatened. On the other hand, the radical revolutionaries (the unauthentic revolutionary men) have the tendency to capture only the prophetic denouncement. This attitude leads, inevitably, to an anarchical kind of prophetism, i.e., when the prophet is seen as an individual who merely condemns. The true prophet is the one who, actually, denounces all sorts of exploitation of men by men and that of the structures. However, he is either the one who announces the advent of a new tomorrow in which justice and equal rights will be no longer privileges of the few or simply hope, but rather a perennial reality to all men. This genuine form of prophetism gives, in this particular sense, a message of hope to the destitute. This is the very reason why Freire considers as authentic contemporary prophets men like Father Camilo Torres, Ernesto

(106) PO, p. 72
Ché Guevara, Amilcar Cabral, etc. (107).

Furthermore, the walk of these prophets amid the oppressed masses nourishes and encourages the prophetic vocation. It also drives the masses to a deep understanding concerning the presence of the prophetic voice in their midst. Obviously, it does not occur so frequently. Many times the oppressed themselves do not want to hear the talks about liberation. They know that liberation is not a gift; it implies struggle and risks which many are not disposed to face. They are those who suffer from "the fear of freedom" which is also something verified among the oppressors themselves. Hence, Freire's statement:

(107) Father Camilo Torres "became a guerrilla not out of desperation, but because, as a lover of men, he dreamt of a new man being born in the experience of liberation". CAC, p. 470. See also PO, p. 162, note 38. Ernesto Ché Guevara "incarnated the authentic revolutionary utopia as did few others. He was one of the great prophets of the silent ones of the Third World. Conversant with many of them, he spoke on behalf of all of them...Matching with his companions in the same risk of life, he had with them, in the guerrilla, an introduction to freedom, a calling to life to all those who are dead in life". "Açao cultural e conscientização", in ACL, p. 80. Translation is mine since part of this quotation is missing in the English text of CAC, p. 470.

Amilcar Cabral: "...the authenticity of the great leader's witness and of the intensity of his communion with the people, without which he could not have accomplished what he did nor been what he was and continues to be for his people. No one can live completely alone. Long before Cabral became the 'Father of the Nation', he was the 'Son of the People' who learned with them and taught them in the revolutionary praxis". LGB, p. 33.
"This fear of freedom is also to be found in the oppressors, though, obviously, in a different form. The oppressed are afraid to embrace freedom; the oppressors are afraid of losing the 'freedom' to oppress" (108).

In this context, both oppressed and oppressors can not assume the prophetic-theological dimension of conscientização. They constitute themselves the multitude of modern slaves who prefer slavery rather than paying the price for their own liberation. Or in the words of Hegel:

"Those who remain slaves suffer no absolute injustice; for he who has not the courage to risk his life to win freedom, that man deserves to be a slave" (109).

Thus, among the oppressed masses the presence of the prophetic voice is, sometimes, so annoyed as among the oppressors to whom the prophetic message of denunciation is, par excellence, addressed. They still prefer the full and abundant pots of Egypt rather than facing the dangers of the desert, the challenges of liberation.

Having arrived at this point in which only the utopian-prophetic men can be the true instruments of conscientização we can affirm that they form what the Brazilian Bishop D. Helder P. Câmara has called "the Abrahamic minorities" (110) or what Jacques Maritain has called "the pro-

(108) PO, p. 31, note 3
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Phetian shock-minorities" (111). They are a vital and necessary social phenomenon, though, sometimes, a "dangerous" one in the eyes of the oppressors. People, and more particularly, oppressed people, need them. Freedom and human dignity stand threatened without their voices, mainly in times of crisis. Maritain tells us that their chief task

"is to awaken the people, to awaken them to something better than everyone's daily business, to the sense of a supra-individual task to be performed" (112).

It is not easy, however, to fully penetrate into the deepest utopian-theological aspect of conscientização. It is due to the fact that prophets are, indeed, very difficult people to be entirely comprehended; whether radical or moderate, their message are always irrepairable and untenable. This is why, sometimes, they are sent to exile, hanged or stoned, made prisoners, tortured (physically and psychologically), etc. They are heralds of men's liberation. Only those who totally commit themselves to their historical epoch and are fully aware of all its themes, are able to understand the prophets. For example, many priests in Latin America were capable of a better understanding of them when they were obliged to held their Masses with a rifle or a machine gun pointed at their heads; many students and

(112) Ibid, p. 141
versity professors were able to grasp the profundity of the prophets' messages when facing the spies of their own governments joining them in the same classroom; many and many others changed their opinions concerning the prophets when in jail they were suffering the most degrading human humiliation of torture, agony and death. In sum, Amilcar Cabral synthesizes, in this short sentence, the difficulty of understanding a prophet: "What I am saying to you, perhaps, does not make any sense now; I am speaking for tomorrow" (113).

Having analysed the different aspects of conscientização in Freire's thought, it is now necessary to study how the process of conscientização itself plays the role in the dialogical and libertarian educational philosophy proposed by Freire. It shall be my task in the next two chapters, of this dissertation.

(113) Unité et Lutte, Vol. I, L'arme de la théorie, Paris, Cahiers Libres-Maspéro, 1975, p. 201. Also quoted by Freire, in LGB, p. 19. In another passage Freire quotes Cabral when the great leader says: "We, the people of Guinea-Bissau, will accomplish many things before the palm tree that grows from this seed will bear fruit". LGB, p. 60.
CHAPTER III

FREIRE'S PHILOSOPHY OF DIALOGUE

The transition from magic-naive to a critical stage of consciousness, as well as the suppression of fanaticized consciousness, implies a very deep socio-political change. This change is reached through a process of "creation of culture" by means of human intervention. In the outbreak of this process education occupies a pre-eminent role as method of "cultural action for liberation". It involves -- with the whole process of conscientização -- some theoretical and practical elements whose principal aim is

"to offer the people the means by which they could supersede their magic or naive perception of reality by one that is predominantly critical, so that they could assume positions appropriate to the dynamic climate of the transition. This means that we must take the people at the point of emergence and, by helping them move from naive to critical transitivitiy, facilitate their intervention in the historical process" (01).

But how can it be possible? Freire himself tells us that the answer can be found "in an active, dialogical, critical and criticism-stimulating method" (02). It shall constitute the subject-matter of my approach to Freire's concept of dialogue as well as to its features and antagonistic theories. The purpose shall be an attempt to show how the entire process of conscientização -- which is linked to

(01) EFF, p. 44-45
(02) EFF, p. 45
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a libertarian educational practice -- can be stimulated through genuine dialogical attitudes and how it can be, otherwise, thwarted.

3.1 - FREIRE'S APPROACH TO DIALOGUE

The notion of dialogue has become a key issue in the contemporary philosophical debate. It is indicative of the confrontation between men and reality which reaches the human being at the centre of his existence and makes him conscious that he cannot live isolated from others. Dialogue is seen as a condition to become more human since the individual can only fully develop in community and in the interaction with a "You". As Martin Buber wisely remarks:

"The basic word I-YOU can be spoken only with one's whole being. The concentration and fusion into a whole being can never be accomplished by me, can never be accomplished without me. I require a YOU to become, becoming I, I say YOU. All actual life is encounter" (03).

Dialogüe is, thus, the core of human existence. The "I" can never become real in its solitude but only in the communion with the "You". Through dialogue the individual "I" experiences a calling, an appeal to the "You".

Freire's notion of dialogue is, in fact, not a novelty. One can find it in the writings of Aristotle and St.

Thomas of Aquinas. Indeed, that Freire himself does not pretend the ideal of dialogical analytic-synthetic education, is first seen in his writings. He acknowledges his indebtedness to John Dewey and Karl Jaspers who value education, and even dismisses others’ concern with his lack of originality by quoting Dewey:

"On the subject of originality, I have always agreed with Dewey, for whom originality does not lie in the 'extraordinary and fanciful', but 'in putting everyday things to uses which had not occurred to others'" (04).

Freire’s achievement regarding the notion of dialogue is that he sees it from the perspective of a dialectical theory of knowledge. It brings out the active element of knowledge in the construction of models which intends to comprehend the different aspects of reality. It implies that one has something to learn from the other investigator, even if he starts from other hypothesis. The profound significance of dialogue in Freire is that it is not a skillful or a polite form of polemic or rhetoric imprisoned in dogmatic system, all of which are equally convinced that they alone possess the whole truth and whose only tactical objective is to force and coerce the other part to accept it. It is not either an attempt to replace inevitable conflicts by purely

verbal confrontations which are to be interpreted as ends in themselves. Contrariwise, Freire regards dialogue as a method of inquiry which permits our teaching to incorporate not only every fragment of truth that may have appeared from various theoretical views, but also and above all, to make sure of the living development of its own truth by taking into consideration what is being born in its new presentation. Dialogue between men extends itself to dialogue between men and the world they are building. Hence, the new aspect added by Freire to this pattern is a philosophical anthropology, i.e., man is regarded as being both the carrier and the creator of culture. Dialogue is not simply a way of exchanging different ideas or point of views nor as merely an attempt to become more open to others; it is, above all, an opportunity to clarify one's own stage of perception, to make it an object of a critical examination of the world. So dialogue, in Freire's view, marks the starting point of an inquiry into the meaning of history, a history made and written by men. Hence, the meaning of life and of history is not the creation of the individual man, as existentialism suggests. Freire's approach to this point is very Marxist, indeed. He defines dialogue as being

"the loving encounter of people, who, mediated by the world, 'proclaim' that world. They transform the world and in transforming it, humanize it for all
people. This encounter in love cannot be an encounter of irreconcilables" (05).

Furthermore, Freire thinks that man's relations to members of his species determines the means of his existence as well as its contents. In this anthropological view his maxim -- never treat man as an object, but always as a Subject -- restates Kant's categorical imperative, implying that only when man sees other human beings as ends and not as means does he behave like a truly human being (06). As an absolute moral standard, it puts greater credence on adhering to a principle than on the consequences of actions. Due to this, Freire criticizes "assistancealism" because it considers man as objects. And nobody is totally a person if he can not say "You" to others, seeing them as ends in themselves and not as mere objects. The only way to suppress this lack of solidarity, which is the natural consequence of

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(05) EC, p. 113
(06) According to Kant, categorical imperative "concerns not the material of the action and its intended result but the form and the principle from which it results. What is essentially good in it consists in the intention, the result being what it may. This imperative may be called the imperative of morality... There is, therefore, only one categorical imperative. It is: Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become an universal law... Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only". Cf. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Trans. with an Introduction by Lewis W. Beck, Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1959, p. 33, 39, 47.
the application of the individualistic model, is to add to it a regulatory element. However, Kantian antinomy evidences that such an element must be external and heteronomous. It will only aggravate the inner contradictions of the initial model. Freire tries to overcome this barrier by seeing all human activity as social and other oriented; it is either depending on or affecting other's experience.

The import of Freire is that he seeks to develop an educational theory that operates upon a theory of radical social change through the medium of a literacy program devoted to the raising of the level of consciousness of the disadvantaged (07). For the present, it is enough to stress that Freire's pedagogical theory can not decline from dialogue which, according to him, is

"a horizontal relationship between persons...Whoever enters into dialogue does so with someone about something, and that something ought to constitute the new content of our proposed education. We felt that even before teaching the illiterate to read, we could help him to overcome his magic or naive understanding and to develop an increasingly critical understanding" (08).

Freire still argues that dialogue is not a mere abstract inquiry between men; it is also an encounter of men with a determined reality. Hence, the existential character of dialogue and its opposition to pedagogical subjec-

(07) I shall return to this topic in the next chapter, Item 4.3.
(08) EPF, p. 45, 46
tivism which considers the process of formation as solely based on men's own efforts. While refuting this pedagogical subjectivism, Freire's educational theory is grounded on dialogue, i.e., an existential encounter and an encounter with existence.

"Dialogue is thus an existential necessity. And since dialogue is the encounter in which the united reflection and the action of the dialoguers are addressed to the world which is to be transformed and humanized, this dialogue cannot be reduced to the act of one person's 'depositing' ideas in another, nor can it become a simple exchange of ideas to be 'consumed' by the discussants... Because dialogue is an encounter among men who name the world, it must not be a situation where some men name on behalf of others. It is an act of creation; it must not serve as a crafty instrument for the domination of one man by another. The domination implicit in dialogue is that of the world by the dialoguers; it is conquest of the world for the liberation of men" (09).

Dialogue is also able to renew relationships already existent -- though reduced to the triviality of routine or emptied of meaning -- and fill again these relationships with contents. In this sense Otto F. Bollnow (10) argues that dialogue, from an existential perspective, drives man to face something entirely different from that which constitutes his previous conceptions. It obliges man towards a new orientation; the dialogical process casts him outside the line of development he has been following and coerces.

(09) PO, p. 77
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him to a new beginning. Man is, then, literally "shaked" with a new reality which he has to confront; a reality which does not draw back before him. It demonstrates the absolute and unconditional character of dialogue. Man ought to change his life. For this reason one can not comprehend Freire's approach to the problem of conscientização without fully understanding his notion of dialogue. The dialogical process of conscientização demands a radical conversion of one's former life, a total transformation of his imperfect and distorted view of reality.

Nevertheless, dialogue does not tell man what he must or must not do, nor does it indicate him which direction he must follow. It only leads him back to himself and forces him to new decisions, to new choices. Man is, thus, tested through dialogue. He is first invited to hear and then to respond with responsibility. Before the other who challenges him, he is impelled to confirm or to reject his own perceptions of himself and of the world. Here lies the justification for dialogue as a condition sine qua non in the process of conscientização. In this sense, dialogue is a proof of man's authenticity in which he becomes a being-for-himself endowed with critical consciousness. Here also lies the roots of Freire's humanism.
"For humanism there is no path other than dialogue. To engage in dialogue is to be genuine. For true humanism, to engage in dialogue is not to engage without commitment. Humanism is to make dialogue live. Dialogue is not to invade, not to manipulate, not to 'make slogans'. It is to devote oneself to the constant transformation of reality. In that dialogue is the content of the form of being which is peculiarly human, it is excluded from all relationships in which people are transformed into 'beings for another' by people who are false 'beings for themselves'" (11).

Although powerful, dialogue is also something threatening and gloomy. This explains why man fears dialogue and is always scared of any dialogical process. It is easier for him to impose his word than to allow the other to pronounce his word as well. In such procedure man hides himself behind his former state in which he sees himself as the only owner of the word. But the word, says Freire,

"is not the privilege of some few men, but the right of every man. Consequently, no one can say a true word alone -- nor can he say it for another, in a prescriptive act which robs others of their words. Dialogue is the encounter between men, mediated by the world, in order to name the world. Hence, dialogue cannot occur between those who want to name the world and those who do not wish this naming -- between those who deny other men the right to speak their word and those whose right to speak has been denied them. Those who have been denied their primordial right to speak their word must first reclaim this right and prevent the continuation of this de-humanizing aggression" (12).

Therefore, in order to effectuate a true dialogue man ought to accept, without any external constraint, the new chal-

(11) EC, p. 113
(12) PO, p. 76-77
lenges of the other's word which implies new options and continuing revisions of himself and of reality. Because of this, one can argue that not always all human contacts can be viewed as true dialogue. True dialogue is, indeed, rare. According to Freire, it is based on some specific features.

3.2 - THE FEATURES OF TRUE DIALOGUE

In order to be or become a genuine practice, dialogue has some specific features which cannot be neglected. Freire stresses six of these features.

3.2.1 - LOVE

Love is the first feature of a true dialogue. For Freire true dialogue can not exist without love for men and for the world.

"The naming of the world, which is an act of creation and re-creation, is not possible if it is not infused with love. Love is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself. It is thus necessarily the task of responsible Subjects and cannot exist in a relation of domination. Domination reveals the pathology of love: sadism is the dominator and masochism is the dominated. Because love is an act of courage, not of fear, love is commitment to other men... And this commitment, because it is loving, is dialogical" (13).

(13) PO, p. 77-78. See also CON, p. 83.
FREIRE'S PHILOSOPHY OF DIALOGUE

For this particular reason, Freire is convinced that true revolutionaries must see revolution as an act of love. He thinks that there is no irreconcilability between love and revolution. On the contrary, revolution, in order to be genuine and to avoid the irrationalisms of insurrections or mere revolts, has to be grounded on love and continually be nourished by love. It explains why men such as Father Camilo Torres, Ernesto Ché Guevara, Amílcar Cabral, etc., are considered by Freire as authentic revolutionaries due to their capacity to love and to be committed to others in dialogue in the struggle for liberation. Ché Guevara once said:

"Let me say, with the risk of appearing ridiculous, that the true revolutionary is guided by strong feelings of love. It is impossible to think of an authentic revolutionary without this quality" (14).

In this context, love can not be sentimental since it is impregnated with bravery. Consequently, it rejects all forms of "assistencialism", because being

"an act of freedom, it must not serve as a pretext for manipulation. It must generate other acts of freedom; otherwise, it is not love. Only by abolishing the situation of oppression is it possible to restore the love which that situation made impossible. If I do not love the world -- if I do not love life -- if I do not love men -- I cannot enter into dialogue" (15).

Accordingly, we can infer that Freire's concept of love, as a characteristic of true dialogue, is that of agape

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(15) PO, p. 78
in opposition to eros. Particularly today, the importance of love must be stressed. Indeed, two things have been greatly forgotten nowadays and they must be rediscovered, i.e., the sense of love and the sense of being. In Freire's thought one can observe that agape, or genuine love, leads man to rediscover the true value of existence. It is worth more than anything else and it is the only thing in which man can really put his hope. Besides, it is the very basis for life in society. -- the only way to foster man's togetherness. With out love all other things, even good things, only serve to conduct man to unhappiness. When man ceases to love he also ceases to be. And the anguish of contemporary man derives from a false love of self which drives him to sentimentalism, to naturalist cult of the individual, or the group, or the power, or the status quo. In short, the worship of eros. It is, for Freire, what has transformed men

"from persons into objects and submerged them into a new culture of silence. Their work and education have paralyzed their ability to participate in life and death decisions. Their life is reduced to two categories: consumption and self-defence. Everything is programmed for them. They cannot even risk friendship, because a friend makes demands on one's time, and time is money" (16).

Agape is born in faith and in truth and it reaches out to those who do not have the same convictions. Agape calls man to come out of himself towards the other in order

to complete in himself what is missing in his own existence. This is why dialogue is, for Freire, an "existential necessity" and why love is a very distinctive mark of genuine dialogue. Agape has its genesis when one prefers the other rather than himself; when he accepts the differences and the liberty of the other; when he allows the other to experience other presences; when he does not pretend to respond to all the other's necessities. All these are not lack of love but rather the highest proof of love. Roger Garaudy (17) points out that love is the reverse of jealousy, of envy, of possession, of having. These are, in fact, characteristics of eros which tends to reduce the other to one's own dimension and also tends to destroy in the other everything which is different from his. While agape is openness to the other, eros is the submission of the other to one's wishes. Agape is, then, the proof of the other's existence as well as the proof of the existence of the world, but a world imbued with the sense of futurity which gives meaning to the present. Man can not love if there is no future, no hope. Agape is thus linked to transcendence, and to love, is to experience the Absolute. Love is, therefore, the only proof of God's existence and only those who are endowed with the gift of love are able to know God, since "God is agape".

But agape has to be a continuous creation. Nobody deserves it if he is not able to conquer it permanently amid the battlefields of sterile jealousy, in the doubts regarding its signification and validity, in the decadent sexuality, in the disbeliefs concerning the bourgeoisie institution of marriage, in the breaks provoked by a repressive and disguised "Christian" morality which emphasizes the Platonic-Cartesian dualism between body and soul, etc. Therefore, according to this notion of love it is to be interpreted within a dialectical framework. In order to be it has to involve a process of becoming.

3.2.2 - HUMILITY

According to Freire, dialogue also requires humility. Man is incapable of naming the world and performing a genuine dialogical practice if he is arrogant. Without humility man can learn nothing from the other. Dialogue is utterly incompatible with self-sufficiency. Freire himself asks:

"How can I dialogue if I always project ignorance onto others and never perceive my own? How can I dialogue if I regard myself as a case apart from other men -- mere 'its' in whom I cannot recognize 'I's'? How can I dialogue if I consider myself a member of the in-group of 'pure' men, the owners of truth and knowledge, for whom all non-members are 'these
people' or 'the great unwashed'? How can I dialogue if I start from the premise that naming the world is the task of an elite and that the presence of the people in history is a sign of deterioration, thus to be avoided? How can I dialogue if I am closed to -- and even offended by -- the contribution of others? How can I dialogue if I am afraid of being displaced, the mere possibility causing me torment and weakness?" (18).

Yet, man who lacks humility is automatically hindered from approaching others in humble dialogue; there is nothing in and for him to share with others. If he "cannot acknowledge himself to be as mortal as everybody else still has a long way to go before he can reach the point of encounter. At the point of encounter there are neither utter ignoramuses nor perfect sages; there are only men who are attempting, together, to learn more than they now know" (19).

Self-love, or eros, therefore, makes impossible for man to engage in any true dialogical practice. The false myth of "natural superiority" annihilates his being and robs him the very essence of life. He becomes a being more and more closed within himself. In his selfishness and hopelessly pride he dies gradually because he refuses to open to others.

The requirement of humility as a precondition of dialogue is not, however, a Freirean discovery. It was first taught by Christian thought. It is necessary to stress that dialogue between man and man, man and God was only established when God Himself by his "own free will" and "giving up all he had", decided to assume the human nature and become

(18) PO, p. 78-79. See also CON, p. 83.
(19) PO, p. 79
man. God appears as being the source of dialogue. Apart from Him, any encounter between man and man is not a true dialogical one. God only speaks to man through the mediation of another man. And man can only accept the word of other man through the mediation of God. Walter Kaufman is very right when he states:

"God is present when I confront You. But if I look away from You, I ignore him. As long as I merely experience or use you, I deny God. But when I encounter You I encounter him" (20).

3.2.3 - FAITH IN MAN

It is another a priori feature of genuine dialogue. As Karl Jaspers reminds us, dialogue is

"the indispensable path not only in questions of existence for our political order, but in every aspect of our being. But the impetus and content of this converse are furnished by faith alone; by faith in man and his potentialities, by faith in the One that can guide the association of all, by the faith that I myself only become with the becoming of the other self" (21).

Freire, nevertheless, warns us that the faith of the "dialogical man" in others is not a naive one. Possessing a critical consciousness and, consequently, the power of transforming reality, he is aware of the fact that the use of

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such power may be impaired in concrete situation of alienation. However, this possibility, instead of destroying his faith in others, constitutes, indeed, a challenge to which he has to respond. The "dialogical man" is, then,

"convinced that the power to create and transform, even when thwarted in concrete situations, tends to be reborn. And that rebirth can occur -- not gratuitously, but in and through the struggle for liberation -- in the supersedence of slave labor by emancipated labor which gives zest to life" (22).

Faith in man, therefore, implies faith in his capacity to make and re-make the world and in his natural right of being more fully human. It is not a false faith grounded on a catalogue of truths completed finished. On the contrary, it is a faith which is characterized by its openness to creation; a faith which enables man to march towards the future.

But we can raise the following question: Why faith in man and not in God? Karl Jaspers answer to this question is that

"faith in man is faith in his potentialities arising from liberty, not faith in a man in the sense of the deification of that man. Faith in man presupposes faith in the Deity through whom he is. Without faith in God, faith in man degenerates into contempt for man, into loss of respect for man as man, with the final consequence that the alien human life is treated with indifference, as something to be used and destroyed" (23).

(22) PO, p. 79. See also CGN, p. 83-84.
Hence, a faith in God which does not imply faith in man and in his possibilities to transcend his own limitations (what Freire calls "limit-situations") as human being, would be merely a shameful negation of what is considered the very essence of Christianity, i.e., the calling to the construction of the kingdom of God. However, such construction is not to be undertaken in the ghettos of heavens or in the boundaries of eternity, but rather here on earth. The Christian eschatology does not say that the earth will be substituted by the heavens but that a new heaven and a new earth are already coming. Though this notion lies in the origin of Christian thought, today it is seen, sometimes, as a sign of a mature form of Christian faith or, sometimes, it is interpreted as being the great achievement of Marxist eschatology. The truth is that the centuries of Platonic philosophical impact and the influence of his doctrines on the immortality of the soul and on the separation between body and soul led the Christian mind to incorporate these Platonic beliefs which have nothing to do with Christianity. Due to this, the revolutionary hope took the place of the Christian hope. In this respect the Latin American theology of liberation means a returning to the origin of the revolutionary Christian hope. The history of salvation is a libertarian project, inaugurated in the Incarnation, fulfilled in the Cross, sealed in Resurrection and continued through
the work of those "Abrahamic minorities" who have the courage and the faith to engage in the libertarian process of those oppressed. Christianity is not a history without hope or a hope without history which would allow man to maintain comfortably a subjective revolutionary language but to live concretely as a sectarian-conservative in the objective reality. For Freire,

"to be revolutionary means to be against oppression, against exploitation and be in favour of the liberation of the oppressed classes in concrete terms and not in idealist ones" (24).

Christianity never signified a call to stability, or security. On the contrary, it negates its own essence when it searches shelter on these premises. Christianity is to be engaged in the struggle against all "evil forces" which dehumanize man; it has to be committed to the process of liberation which implies faith in man and dialogue. And since nobody liberates anybody, but all men are liberated, in communion, with others, dialogue and faith in man are, therefore, imperatives in the libertarian process.

3.2.4 - MUTUAL TRUST

Faith in man is linked to mutual trust, another feature of genuine dialogue, according to Freire. It is, in

(24) "O papel educativo das Igrejas na América Latina", in ACL, p. 113.
FACT, A LOGICAL RESULT SINCE IT WOULD BE CONSIDERED A CONTRADICTION IF DIALOGUE -- WHEN GROUNDED ON LOVE, HUMILITY, AND FAITH IN MAN -- WERE NOT ABLE TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL, I.E., MUTUAL TRUST. SUCH ACHIEVEMENT GUIDES THE DIALOGUERS INTO AN EVER CLOSER RELATIONSHIP IN THEIR EFFORTS TO PRONOUNCE THE WORLD. TRUST IS THEN ESTABLISHED BY DIALOGUE. WHEN TRUST DOES NOT EXIST DIALOGUE IS A FARCE BECAUSE IT MEANS THAT THE OTHER PREVIOUS FEATURES WERE ALSO NOT CULTIVATED.

"FALSE LOVE, FALSE HUMILITY, AND FEEBLE FAITH IN MAN CANNOT CREATE TRUST. TRUST IS CONTINGENT ON THE EVIDENCE WHICH ONE PARTY PROVIDES THE OTHERS OF HIS TRUE CONCRETE INTENTIONS; IT CANNOT EXIST IF THAT PARTY'S WORDS DO NOT COINCIDE WITH HIS ACTIONS. TO SAY ONE THING AND DO ANOTHER -- TO TAKE ONE'S OWN WORD LIGHTLY -- CANNOT INSPIRE TRUST" (25).

IT IS BY VIRTUE OF THIS THAT FREIRE ARGUES, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SPEAK ABOUT HUMANISM AND DENY MAN THE RIGHT TO BE; IT IS A TRICK TO GLORIFY DEMOCRACY OR DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION AND CONDEMN THE PEOPLE TO SILENCE. WHEREAS THE VERY ESSENCE OF DEMOCRACY IS ITS TRUST IN MAN, ONE CAN NOT ASPIRE A GENUINE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY WHILE REGARDING THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PEOPLE AS BEING A GIFT DONATED BY THOSE IN POWER. IN THIS CONTEXT ONE CAN REALIZE WHY FREIRE CALLS ATTENTION TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONARY ACTION AND THE REACTIONARY OR SECTARIAN ACTION. THE former is characterized by its deep trust in the people as agents of the revolutionary process in the search of

(25) PO, p. 80
their own liberation towards a more just social order. The latter, characterized by its lack of trust in the people, tries to make the "revolution" and impose upon the people its "new social order". In Latin America, particularly, when such procedure is carried out by the Rightist majority it is what always gives success to the coups d'état; but when it is a movement headed by the Leftist minority it almost always ends in insurrections. It happens because

"the new stimuli characteristic of an 'opening' society generate a complex of activist mental attitudes. However, the somewhat abrupt emergence of the people from their previous stage of submersion leaves them more or less perplexed by the new experience of participation, and their activism takes the naive and highly emotional form of rebellion" (26).

Therefore, both the Rightist majority and the Leftist minority, in their reactionary tendencies of declining from the collaboration of the people, are incapable of accomplishing any true revolutionary action. Hence, Freire admonishes:

"It is indispensable for revolutionaries to witness more and more to the radical difference which separates them from the rightist elite. It is not enough to condemn the violence of the right, its aristocratic posture, its myths. Revolutionaries must prove their respect for the people, their belief and confidence in them, not as a mere strategy but as an implicit requirement to being a revolutionary. This commitment to the people is fundamental at any given moment" (27).

In this line of thought we can say that true revolutionaries are those who base their political actions on an absolute

(26) EPF, p. 35
(27) CAC, p. 469. See also Chapter V, Item 5.1.
trust in the creative power of the people. The sectarian revolutionary, on the contrary, is the one who grounds his political action on the notion of a consciousness which must be brought to the masses from outside. In this context, courage appears as a precondition in order to discuss with the people their rights regarding participation in social problems. Due to this motive Freire adduces that any educative practice which is not able to create the climate for making such discussion possible can not be regarded as a true libertarian education. Therefore, both the Rightist and the Leftist reactionaries are incapable of fostering any educational effort oriented towards liberation because of their distrust in the people. For this reason Freire proposed an educational practice

"which would lead men to take a new stance toward their problems -- that of intimacy with those problems, one oriented toward research instead of repeating irrelevant principles. An education of 'I wonder', instead of merely, 'I do'" (28).

3.2.5 - HOPE

Dialogue, being the encounter of men in their search of becoming more fully human, can not exist in hopelessness. It is to say that hopelessness is a form of silence and a

(28) EPF, p. 36. I shall return to this topic in Chapter IV, Item 4.2.
way of escaping from the world. So it denies men their right of pronouncing their word. Freire, thus, regards hope as an important feature of any authentic dialogical practice. He states:

"The dehumanization that results from an unjust order is not a cause for hopelessness, but rather of hope, and guides incessantly to the search of humanization which injustice denies to men" (29).

It is quite obvious then that hope is not a mere passive waiting. Men can not expect things to happen without their interference. For Freire, hope "does not consist in crossing one's arms and waiting. As long as I fight, I am moved by hope, and if I fight with hope, then I can wait... If the dialoguers expect nothing to come of their efforts, their encounter will be empty and sterile, bureaucratic and tedious" (30).

But we have to keep in mind that Freire conceives hope in the context of the utopian aspect of the act of denunciation of the unjust social system and in the annunciation of another more just social order. From this perspective he argues that only when man is filled with hope it is possible for him to wait and look for a reflective action in which that announced future is attained by virtue of the act of denunciation.

It was already mentioned in the last chapter, that it is in the context of denunciation and annunciation that

(29) CON, p. 84
(30) PO, p. 80
the utopian aspect of Freire's pedagogy is founded. So such a pedagogy is full of hope because it is at the same time a historic commitment. But in this pedagogy the act of denunciation is a permanent one. Hence, its continuing character which is not exhausted in the moment when the denounced reality of today cedes its place tomorrow to the previously announced reality. For Freire,

"when education is no longer utopian, i.e., when it no longer embodies the dramatic unity of denunciation and announcement, it is either because the future has no more meaning for men, or because men are afraid to risk living the future as creative overcoming of the present, which has become old" (31).

None of men's historical realizations can, therefore, be considered as ultimate ends. The prophets of Israel, for example, taught us that nothing which constitutes work of men's hands and spirit ought to be taken as something absolute and finished. Hence their vehement attacks on idolatry and why they can, in a sense, be considered predecessors of the struggle against alienation.

History, being interpreted from this dialectical outlook, makes man conscious that he has no other essence than the future. To live consists in seeing oneself as an unfinished being. It is the meaning of transcendence, i.e., the historic dimension that man is an open being towards the future. Without hope man is dissolved in the existing state of

(31) ALP, p. 220
things. In this respect, Roger Garaudy (32) also reminds us that each man (and all men) can become the creator of history and not mere object of other's history. Man to whom adaptation to the existing present constitutes the negation of his capacity for transcendence; man to whom the future has always to be invented. Unquestionably, one of the great contributions of Freire's pedagogy lies in its strong attack on the conditionings and manipulative attempts of transforming man's vocation of being more fully human into mere aspiration. The task of his pedagogy is precisely to call man's attention to the structures that try to domesticate and adjust his consciousness to the present. From the hopeful-dialogical dimension of this pedagogy, man is seen as being able to win the battle against the forces which prohibit him to be. Professor Rubem Alves stresses:

"When we discover, however, that we share similar hopes, that we participate in the same symphony of groans, willing to risk our lives for the creation of a world we both love, we may clap hands, embrace, and kiss each other. It is participation in a common universe of meaning that makes communication pos-

sible. Community requires alliance of the spirit. It can not exist apart from the sense of ultimate commitment to a common future" (33).

Obviously, a pedagogy such as this implies a political humanism which is mutilated every time man's capacity of transcending the obstacles of the present is not recognized. In this condition man is impeded to surpass those "limit-situations" and realizes that beyond and in contradiction to them, lies an "untested feasibility". It is not at random that Freire himself warns us that a pedagogy like this will reach very gradually (when and if it will) the assent of those in the political sphere of decisions once

"those who are served by the present limit-situation regard the untested feasibility as a threatening limit-situation which must not be allowed to materialize, an act to maintain the status quo"(34).

Nicolai Berdyaev also puts it as thus:

"The higher values in the world appear to be weaker than the lower, the higher values are crucified, the lower triumph. The politician and the sergeant major, the banker and the lawyer, are stronger than the poet and the philosopher, the prophet and the saint. The Son of God was crucified. Socrates was poisoned. The prophets were stoned. The initiators and creators of a new thought and a new way of living have always been persecuted, and oppressed and often put to death. The average man of the social routine of daily life has triumphed" (35).

(34) P0, p. 93
It is from this point of view that Freire's pedagogy can be interpreted as a utopian one. As we stated before, not because it is an idealist or impractical educational theory, but rather because it is prophetic. Being a pedagogy of the oppressed in their struggle for being more, it can not receive the support of those who, destitute of being, are dead in life and, therefore, hopeless. Exactly because this sort of pedagogy is full of hope it can be compared to what Professor Rubem Alves describes as being

"the presentment that imagination is more real and reality less real than it looks. It is the hunch that the overwhelming brutality of facts that oppress and repress is not the last word. It is the suspicion that Reality is much more complex than realism wants us to believe, that the frontiers of the possible are not determined by the limits of the actual, and that in a miraculous and unexpected way life is preparing the creative event which will open the way to freedom and resurrection" (36).

3.2.6 - CRITICAL THINKING

Finally, dialogue requires critical thinking. It is, in fact, as we already stressed, the ultimate end of the entire process of conscientização and the major purpose of Freire's educational theory. Being the distinctive mark of critical consciousness, critical thinking -- whose aim is not accommodation to reality but, rather its transformation--

"discerns an indivisible solidarity between the world and men and admits of no dichotomy between them -- thinking which perceives reality as process, as transformation, rather than as a static entity -- thinking which does not separate itself from action, but constantly immerses itself in temporality without fear of the risks involved" (37).

Because only dialogue is capable of creating critical thinking; because critical thinking ought to be the main goal of any true libertarian education, so only a dialogical form of education is able to stimulate critical attitudes. Such education refuses to impose the contents of its program since such procedure frustrates the development of critical thinking.

"Thus, the dialogical character of education as the practice of freedom does not begin when the teacher-student meets with students-teachers in a pedagogical situation, but rather when the former first asks himself what he will dialogue with the latter about. And preoccupation with the content of dialogue is really preoccupation with the program content of education" (38).

Besides, Freire regards dialogue as being the bearer

(37) PO, p. 81. At this point Freire quotes Pierre Furter to whom "the goal is no longer to make sure that the space already conquered remains as it is, thereby eliminating the risks of temporality, but rather to temporalize the space. I become aware that the space where I live will be shaped by what I do. If the space tells me that the universe preexists my discovery of it, the temporalization of the space proves that this created universe is unfinished". Cf. Educação e Vida. Uma contribuição à definição da educação permanente, Petrópolis, Editora Vozes Ltda., 1974, p. 26-27. This book was originally written in Portuguese. Translation is mine once the one of PO, p. 81 is not very good.

(38) PO, p. 81-82. I shall return to this topic in the next chapter, Item 4.2.
of true communication. It is seen as the very characteristic of his gnosiology since it generates critical behaviour. For him there is no real communication without dialogue and no true education is ever possible without communication. The human world is a world of communication and human knowledge can not be transmitted without communication.

"Communication implies a reciprocity which cannot be broken. Hence it is not possible to comprehend thought without its double function, as something which learns and as something which communicates. But this function is not the 'extension' of the significant content of the object (i.e., the object of knowing and thinking). To communicate is to communicate about the significant content of the object. Thus during communication there are no passive Subjects. Subjects showing co-intentionality towards the object of their thought communicate its content to each other. Communication is characterized by the fact that it is dialogue, in that dialogue communicates" (39).

In order to build an educational theory oriented to social problems and based on dialogue and critical thinking, Freire departs from the fact that society is divided between oppressors and oppressed. The only way to face this iniquitous reality is the elaboration of a pedagogy of/with the oppressed and not a pedagogy of the oppressor for the oppressed. It means

"a pedagogy which must be forged with, not for, the oppressed (whether individuals or peoples) in the incessant struggle to regain their humanity. This pedagogy makes oppression and its causes objects of reflection by the oppressed, and from that reflection will come their necessary engagement in the struggle

(39) EC, p. 136
for their liberation. And in this struggle this pedagogy will be made and remade" (40).

Freire’s proposal is, then, an active educational theory in which the oppressed as such, being able to participate effectively in the educative process, become themselves the agents of their own liberation. This libertarian and humanist pedagogy possesses two different stages:

"In the first, the oppressed unveil the world of oppression and through the praxis commit themselves to its transformation. In the second stage, in which the reality of oppression has already been transformed, this pedagogy ceases to belong to the oppressed and becomes a pedagogy of all men in the process of permanent liberation. In both stages, it is always through action in depth that the culture of domination is culturally confronted" (41).

Freire’s fundamental point lies in his insistence on the praxis. Without praxis the entire effort towards an education for conscientização and critical thinking will certainly end in mere rhetoric. Both the educator and the politician have a special function in the concreteness of this praxis. But they are supposed not to have the right of imposing or even proposing pre-fabricated solutions to any problem without the free concordance of the people.

"It is not our role to speak to the people about our own view of the world, nor to attempt to impose that view on them, but rather to dialogue with the people about their view and ours. We must realize that their view of the world, manifested variously in their action, reflects their situation in the world" (42).

(40) PO, p. 33
(41) PO, p. 40
(42) PO, p. 85
If authentic dialogue and critical thinking are not carried out satisfactorily, educators as well as politicians will simply be preaching in the desert. Yet, they will be wasting time speaking a language which can not be understood by those they are addressing their words to because they are words not attuned to the existential situations of the listeners.

"Their talk is just alienated and alienating rhetoric... In order to communicate effectively, educator and politician must understand the structural conditions in which the thought and language of the people are dialectically framed" (43).

Any true dialogical practice -- which demands critical thinking -- has to be one in which both educators and educatees, masses and politicians are seen and respected as subjects.

"One can not speak of an actor, nor simple of actors, but rather of actors in intercommunication... Apart from this communion, we do see dichotomy: leaders on one side and people on the other, in a replica of the relations of oppression" (44).

As educators and educatees have to work together in mutual dialogue in order to foster (in both) critical thinking, also the revolutionary leaders and the popular masses have the same task to perform together in the process of the radical transformation of reality. The genuine revolution is not like the coup d'etat, i.e., something made by some

(43) PD, p. 85, 86
(44) PD, p. 123
reactionary leaders and imposed upon the people without any contestation.

"Dialogue with the people is radically necessary to every authentic revolution. This is what makes it a revolution, as distinguished from a military coup. One does not expect dialogue from a coup -- only deceit (in order to achieve 'legitimacy') or force (in order to repress). Sooner or later, a true revolution must initiate a courageous dialogue with the people. Its very legitimacy lies in that dialogue. It cannot fear the people, their expression, their effective participation in power. It must be accountable to them, must speak frankly to them of its achievements, its mistakes, its miscalculations, and its difficulties" (45).

Therefore, for Freire, authentic revolution is one which can never break the dialogue with the popular masses. It must always be calling them to a mutual effort in the building of the new tomorrow and in their constant struggle

(45) P0, p. 122. On page 83, note 10, Freire reminds us the words of Mao Tse Tung: "Our cultural workers must serve the people with great enthusiasm and devotion, and they must link themselves with the masses, not divorce themselves from the masses. In order to do so, they must act in accordance with the needs and wishes of the masses. All work done for the masses must start from their needs, and not from the desire of any individual, however well-intentioned. It often happens that objectively the masses need a certain change, but subjectively they are not yet conscious of the need, not yet willing or determined to make the change. In such cases, we should wait patiently. We should not make the change until, through our work, most of the masses have become conscious of the need and are willing and determined to carry it out. Otherwise we shall isolate ourselves from the masses". Cf. "The United Front in Cultural Work", in Selected Works, Vol. III, Translation of the second edition of the third volume of the Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung, published by the People's Publishing House, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1967, p. 186-187.
for liberation.

"Originally in objective conditions, revolution seeks to supersede the situation of oppression by inaugurating a society of men in the process of continuing liberation. The educational, dialogical quality of revolution, which makes it a 'cultural revolution' as well, must be present in all its stages. This educational quality is one of the most effective instruments for keeping the revolution from becoming institutionalized and stratified in a counter-revolutionary bureaucracy; for counter-revolution is carried out by revolutionaries who become reactionary" (46).

For this very reason, Freire insists on the fact that faith and trust in the people are the core of any authentic revolution. In any hypothesis the revolutionary leaders are to be seen as the only proprietors of the revolutionary wisdom which must be imposed upon the ignorant masses. So those who dedicate themselves to the cause of liberation of the oppressed must re-examine their practice permanently. Even after the revolution has occurred these leaders can not prescind from the collaboration of the popular masses and think that now it is the time for technicians and specialists to trace the plans for development, and that it is no more necessary to have the accord of the masses. In this procedure, these leaders will betray the people -- since they lost their faith in them -- and will deny the own revolutionary cause. Freire says that what is important

(46) P0, p. 132
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"is that the values born in the duress of struggle continue to prevail. The more conscious that (leadership), as the vanguard of the people, is of the necessity of preserving its communion with the people, in whose hearts their very position as vanguard is sealed, the more surely the revolution will be safe from threats of distortion" (47).

Summing, Freire's position is that without genuine dialogue there is no critical thinking and without critical thinking libertarian education as well as authentic revolution are not accomplished. However, genuine dialogical attitudes are only possible if they are based on the features we have just analysed. When all these features are observed man's actions correspond, therefore, to authentic dialogical actions. But if they are neglected or shelved, man's actions correspond to anti-dialogical actions. These actions, nevertheless, are characterized by some theories. Hence the importance to study Freire's theories of anti-dialogical and dialogical actions in order to fully understand his philosophy of dialogue.

3.3 - THEORIES OF ANTI-DIALOGICAL AND DIALOGICAL ACTIONS

Freire's theory of anti-dialogical action is characterized by conquest, divide and rule, manipulation and cul-

(47) LGB, p. 37. See also P0, p. 47.
tural invasion. This theory lacks the above features of an authentic dialogical attitude. Its purpose is to serve the oppressors in order to maintain the climate of silence and to block the emergence of the popular masses in the process of liberation. Contrary to this theory exists the theory of dialogical action. It is characterized by cooperation, unity for liberation, organization and cultural synthesis. In order to be effectuated this theory has to be marked by the above features of a genuine dialogical practice. Its chief aim is to guide men to the achievement of revolutionary-libertarian attitudes. It enables men to overcome their silence which forbids them to be beings-for-themselves and capable of naming the world.

Therefore, theories of anti-dialogical and dialogical actions are antagonistic and irreconcilable.

"Anti-dialogue and dialogue are embodied in contradictory forms of actions; the latter in turn imply equally irreconcilable theories. Some of these forms of action interact in an anti-dialogical sense, others in a dialogical sense. Thus, the factor which distinguishes an action of anti-dialogue cannot be a constitutive element of an action of dialogue and vice-versa" (48).

While the theory of anti-dialogical action tends to domesticate and adjust men to the interests of the oppressors and to the status quo which guarantees their privileges, the theory of dialogical action seeks men's liberation from the

(48) EC, p. 110-111
power elites' tutelage, and consequently, from an unjust social order.

"Whereas cultural action for freedom is characterized by dialogue, and its preeminent purpose is to conscientize the people, cultural action for domination is opposed to dialogue and serves to domesticate the people. The former problematizes, the latter sloganizes" (49).

Let us confront both theories and stress their characteristics in order to comprehend their domesticating or libertarian purposes.

3.3.1 - CONQUEST versus COOPERATION

To conquer -- from the Latin *conquirere* -- means to seek everywhere. The anti-dialogical action characterizes the oppressor's tendency of conquering the oppressed in order to exploit him economically and culturally. The subject of the conquest imposes his values and patterns upon the conquered object who becomes an ambiguous being 'housing' another. Such conquest has to be maintained at all cost in order to uphold the oppressed situation which guarantees the oppressor's privileges.

Being manifested by its dominative aspect, conquest is, thus, the first characteristic of the anti-dialogical action. It intends to control man through various and dif-
different ways. The commonest are paternalism and "assistencialism". The conquest itself occurs not only by control over potential agencies for liberation (for example, educational agencies) but also through the cultivation of certain false beliefs. The sole objective of these false beliefs is the increasing of the masses' alienation and passivity. The conqueror, then, develops a number of tactics that make the conquered see the world as a given entity to which he has to accommodate himself but not as a problem to be solved.

The oppressors, therefore, approximate to the masses not to stay with them but to inject amid them some myths indispensable for the preservation of the established order. Among these myths Freire mentions:

"the myth that the oppressive order is a 'free society'; the myth that all men are free to work where they wish, that if they don't like their boss they can leave him and look for another job; the myth that this order respects human rights and is therefore worthy of esteem; the myth that anyone who is industrious can become an entrepreneur -- worse yet, the myth that the street vendor is as much as entrepreneur as the owner of a large factory; the myth of the universal right of education...; the myth of the equality of all men, when the question: 'Do you know who you're talking to?' is still current among us; the myth of the heroism of the oppressor classes as defenders of Western Christian civilization' against 'materialist barbarism'; the myth of the charity and generosity of the elites, when what they really do as a class is to foster selective 'good deeds'...; the myth that the dominant elites, 'recognizing their duties', promote the advancement of the people, so that the people, in a gesture of gratitude, should accept
the words of the elites and be conformed to them; the myth that rebellion is a sin against God; the myth of private property as fundamental to a personal human development (so long as oppressors are the only true human beings); the myth of the industriousness of the oppressors and the laziness and dishonesty of the oppressed..." (50).

The introjection of these myths is fundamental to the conquest of the oppressed. They are intruded by the mass-media through slogans and propaganda. Conquest, therefore, is an anti-dialogical action which forbids men to be. It transforms them into mere objects possessed by others. If in Ancient Rome there was a common custom to give "bread and circus" in order to maintain the masses quiet and silent, the Latin American dominant elites of today continue to conquer the oppressed with the same purpose in order to oppress them better. In Brazil, for instance, it often functions in terms of sport practices (mainly soccer), carnival, and many alienating religious attitudes such as the syncretic Afro-Roman-Indian cults and Pentecostalism which receiving moral, and sometimes, financial support from the elites, deeply contribute to the "adjustment" of the oppressed to the status quo. When, however, voices, even from the Church, arise to protest against this sort of manipulation, the elites themselves demand the silence of such voices. As Freire states:

"The content and methods of conquest vary historically; what does not vary (as long as dominant elites exist) is the necrophilic passion to oppress." (51).

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(50) P0, p. 135-136
(51) P0, p. 137
Contrary to the conquerable aspect of the anti-dialogical action, in the dialogical action, men meet in cooperation aspiring for the transformation of the world.

"The anti-dialogical, dominating I transforms the dominated, conquered thou into a mere it. The dialogical I, however, knows that it is precisely the thou ('not-I') which has called forth his own existence. He also knows that the thou which calls forth his own existence in turn constitutes an I which has in his I its thou. The I and the thou thus become, in the dialectic of these relationships, two thouns which become two I's" (52).

In the dialogical action there are neither dominators nor dominated men. On the contrary, they are subjects whose encounter has, as a task to be fulfilled, the proclamation of the world seen as a problematic reality to be transformed. At this point, Freire, once again, stresses that in the revolutionary process the leaders and the masses can not prescribe the cooperative role of each other. It has to be attained through mutual dialogue which is always communication. Hence, the revolutionary leaders are not supposed to conquer the cooperation of the masses. Rather they

(52) PO, p. 167. Freire refers to Martin Buber who says: "When I confront a human being as my You and speak the basic word I-You to him, then he is no thing among things nor does he consists of things. He is no longer He or She, limited by other Hes and Shes, a dot in the world grid of space and time, nor a condition that can be experienced and described, a loose bundle of named qualities. Neighborless and seamless, he is You and fills the firmament. Not as if there were noting but he; but everything else lives in his light". Cf. I and Thou, Op. cit., p. 59.
have to expect patiently their free adhesion to the revolutionary cause.

"We are convinced" -- writes Freire -- "of the positive and undeniable consequences of a patient effort. Patience is also a revolutionary virtue, which has, as its opposite, the reactionary impatience." (53).

Mere adherence does not conduct the masses to embrace consciously the revolutionary cause. On the contrary, it is a vivid sign of their domination by the leaders. The masses' free adhesion to the revolutionary process is a fruit of self-response to the awakening of their consciousness, i.e., the result of the process of conscientização.

"The commitment of the revolutionary leaders to the oppressed is at the same time a commitment to freedom. And because of that commitment, the leaders cannot attempt to conquer the oppressed, but must achieve their adherence to liberation. Conquered adherence is not adherence; it is 'adhesion' of the vanquished to the conqueror, who prescribes the options open to the former. Authentic adherence is the coincidence of choices; it cannot occur apart from communication among men, mediated by reality." (54).

Freire still emphasizes that the adhesion of the masses to the revolutionary cause implies trust in themselves and in the leadership. Such trust, which is not naive, has to be mutual. One must reflect confidence to each other. On the one hand, the leadership has to trust in the capacity of the masses in the search of their own liberation. On the

(53) "O processo de alfabetização de adultos como ação cultural para a libertação", in ACL, p. 57. This quotation is missing in the English text of ALP.
(54) PO, p. 168. See also Chapter V, Item 5.1.
other hand, the masses have to trust in the leadership as instrument able to foster a truly revolutionary process. But a certain degree of mistrust has to be considered here. Not mistrust in the people as such, but mistrust in the oppressor "housed" in the oppressed which is manifested through their natural fear of freedom. It may be a guide to attitudes of denouncing the revolutionary leaders, desertions and even betrayal of the revolutionary cause. Freire mentions the example of Ché Guevara when he speaks about the "deserter's ambiguity":

"Mistrust: at the beginning, do not trust your own shadow, never trust friendly peasants, informers, guides, or contact men. Do not trust anything or anybody until a zone is completely liberated" (55).

Nevertheless, this degree of mistrust does not mean the break of the dialogical action. It is, indeed, a realistic behaviour. It serves to reinforce the necessity of dialogue and communion with the masses in order to help them to emerge from their magic-naive consciousness. Dialogue and communion engender cooperation, a true fusion between masses and leaders in the revolutionary struggle towards liberation. Such struggle, obviously, implies the embarkment in revolutionary actions. However, they are not hateful or "necrophilic" actions.

"The revolution loves and creates life; and in order to create life it may be obliged to prevent some men from circumscribing life. In addition to the life-death cycle basic to nature, there is also an unnatural living death: life which is denied its fullness" (56).

The theory of dialogical action denounces the forces which produce and propagate injustice and misery. Such denouncement is fulfilled by those who dispose themselves to the risks of this dangerous journey in search of being and with the companion and cooperation of those who "are 'living corpses', 'shadows' of human beings, hopeless men, women, and children victimized by an endless 'invisible war' in which their remnants of life are devoured by tuberculosis, schistosomiasis, infant diarrhea... by the myriad diseases of poverty (most of which, in the terminology of the oppressors, are called 'tropical diseases')" (57).
Moreover, the revolutionary actions (which can not be confused with the reactionary actions) are seen by Freire also as cultural actions not only due to its objectives but also on account of the methods employed. So they renounce the irrationality of the oppressor's methods such as that of the coups d'état. Authentic revolutionaries must demand "an imperious coherence" between their theory and their practice. They must not advocate a reactionary practice and call themselves revolutionaries.

"They must suit their action to historical conditions, taking advantage of the real and unique possibilities which exist. Their role is to seek the most efficient and viable means of helping the people to move from the levels of semi-intransitive or naive-transitive consciousness to the level of critical consciousness. This preoccupation, which is alone authentically liberating, is implicit in the revolutionary project itself. Originating in the praxis of both the leadership and the rank and file, every revolutionary project is basically 'cultural action' in the process of becoming 'cultural revolution'" (58).

Therefore, cultural action as well as revolutionary action are oriented towards liberation. But they are also linked to the scientific unveiling of reality, i.e., the exposure of myths and ideologies. Freire, like Louis Althus-
ser, insists on the necessity of separating science from ideology. On the one hand, cultural and revolutionary actions for liberation, in Freire's view, are the "rational and rigorous critique (of ideology)" in Althusser. On the other hand, cultural and revolutionary actions for domestication, according to Freire, would be what Althusser calls "the mystification of ideology" and the perpetuation of its mistakes. Thus,

"the fundamental role of those committed to cultural action for conscientization is not properly speaking to fabricate the liberating idea, but to invite the people to grasp with their minds the truth of their reality" (59).

Revolution is, consequently, a critical process which cannot be fully concretized without the cooperation of the oppressed masses.

3.3.2 - DIVIDE AND RULE versus

UNITY FOR LIBERATION

To divide with the purpose of maintaining the oppressive status quo is proper to anti-dialogical action. To the minority elites it is necessary to divide the majority oppressed class in order to guarantee their own hegemony.

and power. The oppressors do not permit any action of the oppressed towards their union and organization since it is seen as a threat to their class' privileges. As Professor Rubem Alves puts it, the oppressor's "basic experience is not that of impotent pain but of omnipotent pleasure. His ultimate concern, therefore, becomes the preservation of things as they are. And he creates idols. These, for him, are the expression of his actual conditions of life. He sees himself as the embodiment of goodness, justice and truth. And the groans of pain and protest that reach his ears are like the sounds of a diabolical orgy. His love for his idols leads him to see in anyone who opposes him a demon who wants to destroy his cosmos" (60).

What the oppressors really want is the enfeeblement of the oppressed through divisions and schisms. It is carried out by means of different and numerous procedures, such as these:

(1) The repressive statal bureaucracy.

(2) Some forms of cultural actions whereby the oppressors give the impression that the oppressed are being aided.

(3) The overemphasis on the focalist view of problems -- instead of facing such problems as being dimensions of a totality -- which makes difficult a critical perception of reality.

(4) Interference in the unions, granting some benefits to certain "representatives" of the oppressed classes who are, indeed, representatives of the oppressors' classes.

(5) The promotion of those who revealing some leadership ability could signify a menace if they were not "softened up" in this way.

(6) Distribution of benefits to some and penalties to others.

(7) Leadership training courses which, in fact, serve to foster alienation. Their aim is the development of the community through leadership training as attempts of promoting the whole by means of its parts, when it should be the reverse. These leaders are trained in accordance with the oppressors' norms and purposes. They will be simply "used" as instruments of the oppressors to oppress their own oppressed comrades. Therefore,

"the oppressors do not favor promoting the community as a whole, but rather selected leaders. The latter course, by preserving a state of alienation, hinders the emergence of consciousness and critical intervention in a total reality. And without this critical intervention, it is always difficult to achieve the unity of the oppressed as a class" (61).

(8) Because the oppressors do not consider themselves as an oppressor class but rather as a "producer" one, the concept of class conflict upsets them very deeply. So they proclaim the urgency of harmony and understanding between them who buy and those oppressed who sell their labor. However, Freire suggests that the only viable harmony is among the oppressors themselves.

(61) P0, p. 139
"Although they may diverge and upon occasion even clash over group interests, they unite immediately at a threat to the class. Similarly, the harmony of the oppressed is only possible when its members are engaged in the struggle for liberation. Only in exceptional cases is it not only possible but necessary for both classes to unite and act in harmony; but when the emergency which united them has passed, they will return to the contradiction which defines their existence and which never really disappeared" (62).

Harmony between oppressor and oppressed classes is, therefore, something untinkable due to their antagonistic aspects. The solution is not harmony but their suppression. It is naive to think of harmony between classes in an economic system which fosters class division. Besides, how can the oppressors speak about harmony if they are the most responsible for divisions among the lower classes? What they want from the oppressed is, in fact, their alliance in the preservation of the status quo.

(9) The oppressors attempt to separate intellectuals, students, and all those who dedicate themselves to the "brave

(62) Po, p. 140. Regarding the struggle between class in modern society Freire calls attention to the Marx's letter to J. Weydemeyer, dated of March 5, 1852 in which he says: "...no credit is due to me for discovering the existence of class in modern society or the struggle between them. Long before me bourgeois historians had described the historical development of this class struggle and bourgeois economists the economic anatomy of the class. What I did that was new was to prove: 1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production; 2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat; 3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society". Cf. Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Op.cit., p. 679.
pursuit" of men's liberation. They insist on showing to the popular masses -- mainly to the peasants and to the urban proletariat -- that all these people are, mostly, disorderly, rowdies, bearers of "dangerous ideas", evil subversives, enemies of God, traitors of the nation, etc. It is, thus, necessary to convince the oppressed class that their testimony is false for all these people should be "working" towards the nation's progress. From here derives

(10) the oppressors' messianism whereby they try to be seen as "saviors" of those who they oppress and divide. Their mistake is that salvation is not an individualistic or an oppressor class enterprise. It can only be reached in a brotherly community. However, as oppression is the essence of the elites' behaviour, it is quite obvious that they can not be at the side of those who are the objects of their oppression. Here lies the oppressors' dichotomy between being oppressors and saviors. What really lies behind this false messianism is the oppressors' intention, i.e.,

"they want to save their riches, their power, their way of life; the things that enable them to subjugate others" (63).

All these mentioned procedures are indicative of divisions among the oppressed. Their only objective is to prevent the emergence of the popular masses and the preservation of the elites' interests. Because the oppressed inter-

(63) PO, p. 142
nalize the oppressors' values and patterns it is not difficult for them to obtain positive results from these divisive practices.

"In addition" -- says Freire -- "the oppressed know from experience the price of not accepting an 'invitation' offered with the purpose of preventing their unity as a class: losing their jobs and finding their names on a 'black list' signifying closed doors to other jobs is the least that can happen. Their basic insecurity is thus directly linked to the enslavement of their labor" (64).

It is through the creation of their world by means of their transforming labor that men fulfill themselves. And for Freire -- like Marx -- if men's work does not belong to them they can not attain their fulfillment. If it is not a free work it becomes a tool for men's dehumanization. The oppressed union is, then, necessary because it points to the very condition of their own alienation. It shows them that in being divided they become easy prey for domination. So it is imperative once again the urgency of conquering and divid- ing the oppressed. But it is also necessary to keep them

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(64) P0, p. 141. Furthermore, the enslavement of the oppressed labor also implies the enslavement of their persons. Bishop Franic Split, referring to this problem, says: "If the workers do not become in some way the owner of their labor, all structural reforms will be ineffective... At present the workers are increasingly aware that labor represents a part of the human person. A person, however, cannot be bought; neither can he sell himself. Any purchase or sale of labor is a type of slavery". Cf. "15 Obispos hablan en pro del Tercer Mundo", in CIDOC Informa, Doc. 67/35, Cuernavaca, México, 1967, p. 1-11. Also quoted by Freire, in P0, p. 139, note 18.
far from the chances of perceiving these strategies. In such attempt the necrophilic oppressors in their false messianism call themselves biophilic whereas those biophilic engaged in the cause of men's humanization, they call necrophilic. At the end, however, history itself unmasks these designations. As an example, Freire offers the case of José Joaquim da Silva Xavier - o "Tiradentes" whom the power elites and the official terminology termed "conspirator" and "conspiracy" the libertarian movement for the independence of Brazil from Portugal, in 1789. Nevertheless, the national hero is not the Viscount of Barbacena (Governor of Minas Gerais Province where the episode occurred) nor Joaquim Silvério dos Reis, who fearing freedom became Tiradentes' traitor. Today the national hero is the one who was

"hanged and quartered, and had pieces of the bloody corpse strewn through the streets of the neighboring villages as an example. It is Tiradentes who is the hero. History tore up the 'title' given him by the elites, and recognized his action for what it was. It is the men who in their own time sought unity for liberation who are the heroes -- not those who used their power to divide and rule" (65).

(65) P0, p. 143. Immediately after his death Tiradentes' home was to be razed and the site strewn with salt. A pillar was to be erected on the spot declaring his infamy, and his children and grandchildren were despoiled of their property and declared infamous. The fact is that Tiradentes became a martyr and his death had much more significance than his original "conspiracy". Thirty years after his death, his efforts were rewarded. The seeds he had planted germinated and bore their fruits in September 7, 1822 when Brazil became, politically, independent, after 322 years of a disastrous Portuguese colonization.
Opposed to anti-dialogical action, in dialogical action, the aim of the revolutionary leadership is to unite the oppressed in their praxis towards liberation. The achievement of such praxis is, in fact, a very difficult one since it is always hindered by the irrational forces of the power elites. Whereas in their praxis the elites organize and unite themselves freely in order to defend their interests, in the oppressed praxis attempts of organization and unification are scarce because they count only on the people's free commitment. And such conscious commitment implies, mostly, a hard, long and patient process of gradual conscientização. One can not expect the elites' consensus, for their internal unity requires the division of the oppressed. The oppressors' praxis is characterized by its antagonism with the masses, while the oppressed praxis is due to its communion with the united masses. Once more, on account of their duality, this communion is barred because the oppressed, "housing" the oppressors' values, patterns, standard of living, etc., fear freedom. Without liberating themselves from this situation of being dual beings, the oppressed will continue to be divided internally and externally (i.e., divided among themselves).

In addition, the concrete situation of oppression is objectively a divisive one. It makes the oppressed "to adhere" to an unchanged and powerful reality. It is, thus, nec-
essay to divide in order to maintain them "adhered" to the oppressive but mystified reality. In a condition like this the oppressed himself becomes a divided I. Freire states:

"Part of the oppressed I is located in the reality to which he 'adheres'; part is located outside himself, in the mysterious forces which he regards as responsible for a reality about which he can do nothing. He is divided between an identical past and present, and a future without hope. He is a person who does not perceive himself as becoming; hence he cannot have a future to be built in unity with others" (66).

But as he responds positively to the process of conscientização and, critically emerges from his former state of "sleepy consciousness", he starts to see himself as a subject with the capacity to confront an object (reality); he wants to know the real motives of his former magic-naive condition and also begins the process of the demythologization of that reality.

"At this moment, sundering the false unity of his divided self, he becomes a true individual... Hence, the effort to unify the oppressed does not call for mere ideological 'sloganizing'. The latter, by distorting the authentic relation between Subject and objective reality, also separates the cognitive, the affective, and the active aspects of the total, indivisible personality" (67).

Therefore, Freire advises that the dialogical action does not have the function of "dislodging" the oppressed from a mystified reality and making them "adhere" to another one. The fundamental task of this action is rather to help the op

(66) PO, p. 173-174
(67) PO, p. 174
pressed -- by perceiving their former adhesion -- to opt freely for an undertaking which enables them to participate as subjects in the transformation of the dehumanizing reality. It implies the union of the oppressed and their critical awareness of being exploited as individuals and as a class:

Union and critical thinking of the oppressed are, actually, very difficult. Among Latin American peasants, for instance, such attempts are frequently thwarted. They are silent, apathetic, and closed to any dialogical intention. Their existential experience ends at the limits of the latifundium (a large privately owned landholding). The latifundary structure, being vertical and closed, leaves no place for dialogue. This situation

"enables the landlord (because of strength and prestige) to extend his 'possession' over the people as well as over the land. This 'possession' of the people, who are more or less 'reified', is expressed through an interminable series of limitations which diminish their field of free acting... This is why the latifundary structure cannot transform the humanitarianism of a few into a true humanism of all" (68).

It is because peasants are totally submerged into nature and are owned by their oppressors that it is so difficult for them "to discern" themselves as persons who have been prohibited of being. It is because their consciousness has been historically developed within the latifundary

(68) EC, p. 118
structure that they constitute the consciousness of the oppressed.

"With no experience of dialogue, with no experience of participation, the oppressed are often unsure of themselves. They have consistently been denied their right to have their say, having historically had the duty to only listen and obey. It is thus normal that they almost always maintain an attitude of mistrust towards those who attempt to dialogue with them. Actually, this distrustful attitude is directed also toward themselves. They are not sure of their own ability." (69).

Accordingly, attempts at unifying peasants can not be grounded on activist and verbalist methods but rather on cultural action which prepares them to free themselves from the yoke of the world of oppression. In other words, on an educational practice that allows the oppressed to break their "culture of silence" in which they will be considered no longer beings "possessed" by others. Cultural action is to be seen -- once again -- as revolutionary action and vice-versa. Only form of action as these, says Freire,

"which avoid mere speech-making and ineffective 'blah' on the one hand, and mechanistic activism on the other, can also oppose the divisive action of the dominant elites and move towards the unity of the oppressed" (70).

Besides, the culture of silence can not be broken with antithetical dialogical attitudes but rather with a dialogical practice in which the very silence of the oppressed is questioned and presented to them as a problem.

(69) EC, p. 118-119
(70) PO, p. 176
3.3.3 - MANIPULATION versus ORGANIZATION

Manipulation is another characteristic of the anti-dialogical action. It is around manipulation that the other features of the anti-dialogical action revolve. Through manipulation the power elites "adjust" the popular masses to the status quo as a way of saving their privileges. Their objective is not to allow them to acquire

"a structural perception of the problems which would result in their critical insertion in the process of transformation" (71).

The greater the political immaturity of the masses is, the more easily this goal is obtained. The oppressed,

"conditioned by the dominant ideology, not only obliterates their capacity of perceiving the real, but also, sometimes, docilely 'surrender' themselves to the myths of that ideology" (72).

Manipulation occurs on account of those myths numbered by Freire and already mentioned in the analysis of the conquest. The function of such myths is to drive the oppressed to accept passively the words and the "world" of the oppressors.

"As a form of leadership which exploits the emotions of the people, manipulation inculcates into the invaded the illusion of acting or their acting within the action of the manipulators" (73).

(71) "Ação Cultural e Reforma Agrária," in ACL, p. 34.
(72) "A alfabetização de adultos - crítica de sua visão ingênua; compreensão de sua visão crítica," in ACL, p. 23.
(73) EC, p. 112.
But Freire adds another element here, i.e., manipulation is also verified by means of pacts between the oppressor and the oppressed classes. The accomplishment of these pacts, however, does not depend on a true dialogical action. They have only one aim, namely, to conform the oppressed masses to the objectives of the power elites. For Freire, pacts are only historical possibilities among the popular masses themselves during the process of their emergence.

Yet, the process of emergence of the oppressed masses is seen, as we already know, by the power elites as a threat. Consequently, at this moment they duplicate the manipulative tactics. Thus, for Freire,

"manipulation is a typical feature (although not exclusively) of those societies which undergo the process of historical transition, from the 'closed' type of society to an 'open' one in which the presence of the emerging masses makes itself felt. In the preceding stage of the process, the masses are 'submerged' in society. But when they emerge from the transition they undergo a change of attitude: from being mere spectators they insist on participation and a share in running affairs" (74).

In the anti-dialogical theory of action manipulation is the response of the dominant classes to the popular emergence of the masses which are "anesthetized" by the former with the purpose of hindering them from thinking critically. The power elites are so aware but at the same time so fearful with regard to the critical emergence of the masses that almost

(74) EC, p. 112, note 9. Parenthesis is mine.
instinctively they use all methods, including physical and psychological violence in order to keep the people from thinking.

Through manipulation the power elites are able to obstruct the authentic organization of the popular masses. In not receiving the manipulative formulae of the oppressors, the oppressed will find for themselves the way to liberation. If the genuine organization of the masses can not be stimulated by the power elites so it has to be carried out only through the revolutionary leaders. Nonetheless, at this state, Freire poses the problem that the majority of the popular masses is, mostly, formed by urban "modernized" proletarians without a revolutionary consciousness. They see themselves as "privileged" due to the myth of the bourgeois appetite of individual success. Hence, Freire's affirmation:

"Manipulation, with its series of deceits and promises, usually finds fertile ground here. The antidote to manipulation lies in a critically conscious revolutionary organization, which will pose to the people as problem their position in the historical process, the national reality, and manipulation itself" (75).

Again Freire stresses the necessity of a permanent dialogue between the masses and the revolutionary leadership. Through a genuine dialogical practice the masses, in their process

(75) PO, p. 146. See also Francisco C. Weffort, "Política de Massas", in Política e Revolução Social no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1965.
of emergence, will certainly join the revolutionary cause and acquire a revolutionary consciousness or a class consciousness.

But it is precisely the dialogue between the masses and the revolutionary leaders what frightens the dominant classes. Then, the necessity of manipulation which is effectuated by the elites themselves or, as stated before, by the populist leaders in a more direct way. But at this particular point it is necessary to add that the manipulative character of populism, according to Freire, can be seen from two different angles:

"On the one hand, it is undeniably a kind of political opiate which maintains not only the naiveté of the emerging consciousness, but also the people's habit of being directed. On the other hand, to the extent that it uses mass protest and demands, political manipulation paradoxically accelerates the process by which the people unveil reality. This paradox sums up the ambiguous character of populism: it is manipulative, yet at the same time a factor in democratic mobilization" (76).

What is quite clear is that both the elites and the populist leaders know that the emergence of the popular masses constitutes a menace to their privileges. So their manipulative efforts "to soften" the masses and the role performed by the populist leaders as mediators between the emerging masses and the oligarchical elites. Hence, Freire's statement:

(76) CAC, p. 465. See also Chapter I, Item 1.2, p. 27 of this dissertation.
"The emergence of populism as a style of political action thus coincides causally with the emergence of the oppressed. The populist leader who rises from this process is an ambiguous being, an 'amphibian' who lives in two elements. Shuttling back and forth between the people and the dominant oligarchies, he bears the marks of both groups" (77).

Because of their manipulative tendencies the populist leaders are incapable of carrying out any true revolutionary process. They have to decide either to stay with the people and be opposed to the power elites or vice-versa. In the first alternative they are obliged to renounce their bourgeois class conditions and give up their dual function as mediators between the masses and the elites. If they do it they will be rejecting manipulation but putting themselves against the power elites. Automatically the elites will join themselves and reinforce their apparatus of repression in order to curb such attempts. Freire mentions the case of the Brazilian President Getúlio Vargas whose efforts were conducted towards the unification and organization of the working-class in the defence of their rights. The reactionary elites, then, reacted so vehemently that Vargas tragically suicided, in August 24, 1954. And Freire adds:

"Any populist leader who moves (even discreetly) towards the people in any way other than as the intermediary of the oligarchies will be curbed by the latter -- if they have sufficient force to stop him. But as long as the leader restricts himself to paternalism and social welfare activities, although there
may be occasional divergencies between him and groups of oligarchies whose interests have been touched, deep differences are rare" (78).

It is so because paternalism as well as "assistencialism" act as "anesthetics", i.e., they are instruments of manipulation which serve the purpose of conquest. Moreover, "assistencialism" attacks only the symptoms of the social ills but not their real causes.

"Assistencialism offers no responsibility, no opportunity to make decisions, but only gestures and attitudes which encourage passivity. Whether the assistance is of foreign or national origin, this method cannot lead a country to a democratic destination" (79).

Nonetheless, Freire sees a positive element in "assistencialism": those who receive any sort of aid always want more whereas those who do not receive any also want to. And since the elites can not "aid" everybody at the same time they increase, with this attitude, the restiveness of the masses. This is the exact moment for the revolutionary leaders to organize the popular masses and pose to them the con-

(78) P0, p. 149. Peter Flynn states that "the relation between Vargas and the working class, and the threat it seemed to pose for more privileged social groups, was the second major theme of his last years in power, and the source of his most bitter opposition... The greater freedom of action, combined with open debate on the whole structure of the economy and society, together with a steadily worsening economic situation for the working class, brought the whole issue of rewards and distribution to the front of popular political debate". Cf. Brazil: A Political Analysis, London, Ernest Benn & Westview Press, 1978, p. 160-161.

(79) EPF, p. 16. See also Chapter I, Item 1.3.1, p. 68-69.
traditions of manipulation as a problem. In this sense, "although it is an instance of manipulative paternality, 'assistencialism' offers the possibility of a critical analysis of the manipulation itself. Within the whole play of contradictions and ambiguities, the emergence of the popular masses in transitional societies prepares the way for the masses to become conscious of their dependent state" (80).

For this very reason, the organization of the popular masses appears in Freire's thought as a dialogical theory in opposition to the anti-dialogical aspect of manipulation. This organization -- whose responsibility depends on the maturity and critical vision of the revolutionary leaders -- is directly connected to the unity of the masses. Unity and organization, thus, imply in the witness that all the efforts towards liberation are a common task. Only this attitude avoids anti-dialogical formulae. So this sort of witness demands a continuing endeavor of the revolutionary process. Hence the urgency of knowing critically the historical moment and to perceive clearly the actual social contradictions in order to effect accurately the revolutionary action. This is why Freire is indefatigable in stressing that experiences have to be reinvented and not simply transplanted. Simple transplantation of solutions would prove inadequate without a preliminary study of the social and cultural contexts. The main manifestation of the cultural and pedagogical dimensions of the revolution is verified at this

(80) CAC, p. 465
point, i.e., the witness of the dialogical theory of action. But Freire goes further and outlines some constitutive elements of such witness, which historically do not modify. Among these elements are included:

"consistency between words and actions; boldness which urges the witnesses to confront existence as a permanent risk; radicalization (not sectarianism) leading both the witnesses and the ones receiving that witness to increasing action; courage to love (which, far from being accommodation to an unjust world, is rather the transformation of that world in behalf of the increasing liberation of men); and faith in the people, since it is to them that witness is made -- although witness to the people, because of their dialectical relations with the dominant elites, also affects the latter (who respond to that witness in their customary way)" (81).

A genuine witness, therefore, involves the free adhesion of the popular masses. It implies risks and so it can not be expected as an immediate occurrence. Freire is continuously stressing the importance of patience exactly because an unfruitful witness of today must not be judged as absolute failure; it is able to germinate and bear its fruits tomorrow. But for Freire

"patience is not conformity. The best way to accomplish those things that are impossible today is to do today whatever is possible" (82).

(81) PO, p. 177
(82) LGB, p. 64. With regard to this Freire quotes Amílcar Cabral: "We must walk rapidly but not run. We must not be opportunists, nor allow our enthusiasms to make us lose the vision of concrete reality. It is more important to begin an armed struggle with apparent delays but with the guarantee of continuity than to begin too early or in any moment when we do not have conditions that guarantee continuity and victory for our people" Cf. PAIGC- Unidade e Luta, Lisbon, Publicações Nova Aurora, 1974, p. 12-13.
FREIRE'S PHILOSOPHY OF DIALOGUE

It is the case of "Tiradentes" in Brazil whose courage and witness thwarted the elites' attempts of silencing his voice; it is the example of Amílcar Cabral in Guinea-Bissau - whose witness so deeply marked his people as one can see from these words:

"Amílcar Cabral has not died. He continues living in us. All that he spoke of is being born day by day in our work. Many of the dreams that he dreamed -- dreams of the people, our dreams -- are now being realized. The enemy published throughout the world the news of the death of Cabral. But Cabral is not dead. We are all Cabral" (83).

So if in the anti-dialogical action manipulation is an instrument used for the purposes of conquest, in the dialogical action the courageous and humble, the loving and audacious witness of the revolutionary leaders stimulate the organization of the masses whose natural unfoldment is their union. The organization of the revolutionary leadership -- contrary to that of the dominant classes -- is, thus, made with the masses. When the power elites organize themselves, the aim is to dominate more efficiently the masses. Hence it

(83) LGB, p. 174. In this connection, Freire gives us another example. It refers to an incident occurred at the time of Amílcar Cabral's assassination by the Portuguese colonialists. Standing besides Cabral's body, one militant said: "I do not cry for Comrade Cabral. He has not died. The one who speaks now is not I, but he. He speaks through me. Comrade Cabral will continue to speak through his people, calling us for the battle and for the victory against the oppressor". Cf. LGB, p. 93, in footnote.
is an organization for domestication. But the organization of the revolutionary leadership and its union with the masses has as objective "the practice of liberation". It is, in this sense, an organization for liberation once nobody can fight for the people unless the people themselves fight for their own organization. Nevertheless, it is important to point out, as Freire does, that the discipline necessary for the organization of the masses must not be confused with their mere regimentation.

"It is quite true that without leadership, discipline, determination, and objectives -- without tasks to fulfill and accounts to be rendered -- an organization cannot survive, and revolutionary action is thereby diluted. This fact, however, can never justify treating the people as things to be used. The people are already deperonalized by oppression -- if the revolutionary leaders manipulate them, instead of working towards their conscientização, the very objective of organization (that is, liberation) is negated thereby" (84).

The revolutionary leadership seeks, thereby, the organization of and the union with the masses not aiming to impose its words upon them but, on the contrary, in mutual dialogue, to begin to name the world together. But Freire suggests that this behaviour does not mean that the leaders must embrace a "liberalist position" which would foster licentiousness among the oppressed masses. He thinks that the dialogical theory of action precisely because it refuses

(84) PO, p. 178
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authoritarianism and licentiousness, it affirms, therefore, authority and freedom. It recognizes that there is no freedom without authority and vice-versa. One can not be separated from the other. Moreover, genuine authority is conceivable by a simple transference of power; it is only possible by delegation. Pure transference of authority or its imposition upon the people, ruins freedom. It is the prime source of authoritarianism which is, by its own nature, the proper negation of freedom.

"In the theory of dialogical action, organization requires authority, so it cannot be authoritarian; it requires freedom, so it cannot be licentious. Organization is, rather, a highly educational process in which leaders and people together experience true authority and freedom, which they then seek to establish in society by transforming the reality which mediates them" (85).

The lack of such mutual experience and apprenticeship concerning authority and freedom, I think, is exactly what has been paving the way for Latin American totalitarianisms. They have led man to sadistic brutality, frenzied ideas and to moral nihilism in the defense of an All-Powerful State, characterized by its hate, scorn, and fear of the people. Hence, the attempts of impeding the awakening of the collective consciousness which is per se-- despite the diabolical totalitarian propaganda -- an unreasonable task.
since man, by his own nature, is to be engaged in the moral struggle in order to attain his truly personality in the social structure in which he lives. Totalitarianism prevents man from the natural development of his true personality. Perhaps, the falls of the totalitarian States throughout the history of mankind can be explained from this perspective: they have to fall and disappear from history in order to allow man to grow as person in his search for liberation. It constitutes, indeed, a hope for those who are nowadays living under the terror of the totalitarian regimes. Probably this involves heroism because only heroism surmounts tragedy and nourishes man with courage to die for just and noble causes.

3.3.4 - CULTURAL INVASION versus CULTURAL SYNTHESIS

The theory of anti-dialogical action is, finally, characterized by cultural invasion which also serves to the objectives of conquest. Freire terms "cultural invasion" the penetration of an alien culture in the context of another. According to him, "any invasion implies, of course, an invading Subject. His cultural-historical situation which gives him his vision of the world is the environment from which he starts out. He seeks to penetrate another cultural-historical situation and impose his system of
values on its members. The invader reduces the people in the situation he invades to mere objects of his action" (86).

Imposing its own views of the world the alien culture blocks the natural originality, creativity and development of the invaded culture. Cultural invasion has, then, an alienating dimension. Regarding the majority of the popular masses, the more alienated they are,

"the more they struggle to deny their own roots...In this way, 'nostalgically' attracted by the dominant culture which gives them an inferior profile, in the denial of their culture they deny their own being" (87).

Cultural invasion is further an act of disrespect and violence against the invaded culture since the latter ought to be moulded according to the norms pre-established by the former. Hence Freire's statement that

"cultural conquest leads to the cultural inauthenticity of those who are invaded; they begin to respond to the values, the standards, and the goals of the invaders. In their passion to dominate, to mold others to their pattern and their way of life, the invaders desire to know how those they have invaded apprehend reality -- but only so they can dominate the latter more effectively. In cultural invasion it is essential that those who are invaded come to see their reality with the outlook of the invaders rather than their own; for the more they mimic the invaders, the more stable the position of the latter becomes" (88).

So cultural invasion, besides being a tactic for domination, it is already an economic and cultural manner of exploita-

(86) EC, p. 111
(87) LGB, p. 127
(88) P0, p. 150-151
tion totally based on authoritarianism.

"The invader acts, the invaded are under the illusion that they are acting through the action of the other; the invader has his say; the invaded, who are forbidden this, listen to what the invader says. The invader thinks, at most, about the invaded, never with them; the latter have their thinking done for them by the former. The invader dictates; the invaded patiently accept what is dictated" (89).

The success of the invader culture can be explained:

(1) By the conviction of those who invade of their natural superiority and of the intrinsic inferiority of the invaded. Hence the disinterestedness of the invaders regarding everything belonging to the national (pejoratively designated "native") culture.

"Worse than the lack of concern was the actual negation of every authentic representation of national people -- their history, their culture, their language. The history of those colonized was thought to have begun with the civilizing presence of the colonizers. The music of the colonized, their rhythm, their dance, the delicacy of their body, movements, their general creativity -- none of these had any value for the colonizers. And so these gifts were all repressed, and in their place the taste of the dominant metropolitan class was imposed... It is not by chance that the colonizers speak of their own language as 'language' and the language of the colonized as 'dialect'; the superiority and richness of the former is placed over against the poverty and inferiority of the latter... Only the colonizers 'have' culture, art and language and are civilized national citizens of the world, which 'saves' others. The colonized are uncultured and 'barbarian natives'" (90).

(2) By the support from the other theories of anti-dia

(89) EC, p. 111.
(90) LGB, p. 14, 126
logical action: conquest, division and manipulation.

"Thus, any cultural invasion presupposes conquest, manipulation, and messianism on the part of the invader. It presumes propaganda which domesticates rather than liberates. Since cultural invasion is an act of conquest per se, it needs further conquest to sustain itself" (91).

(3) By the increase use of science and technology at disposal of the invaders through which they improve and refine their action.

"Propaganda, slogans, myths are the instruments employed by the invader to achieve his objectives: to persuade those invaded that they must be the objects of his action, that they must be the docile prisoners of his conquest. Thus it is incumbent on the invader to destroy the character of the culture which has been invaded, nullify its form, and replace it with the byproducts of the invading culture" (92).

All these led the oppressed and convinced inferior "I" to adhere unconditionally to the superior "Thou". Here the explanatory reason concerning the duality of the oppressed and their imitative behaviour of the oppressors' cultural values. When the process of conscientização begins, the oppressed "I" initiates the critical gap of his adhesion to the oppressor "Thou" and, in consequence, the recognition of an oppressed socio-cultural structure. In the words of Amílcar Cabral,

"a reconversion of the spirit and mentality...is indispensable for true integration within the liberation movement. Such a reconversion (a re-Africaniza-

(91) EC, p. 111-112
(92) EC, p. 112
tion in the case of Cabral) can begin to operate before the struggle but it is not complete except in the course of the struggle itself, in daily contact with the masses and in the communion of sacrifice that the struggle requires" (93).

Such changes in attitudes -- fruit of one's positive response to the process of conscientização -- can not be achieved outside the praxis. At the same time, they can not be supported by the dominant elites whose interests are focused on the perpetuation of the existing order. In order to respond affirmatively to the process of conscientização the elites have to pass through, what Freire calls, the "Easter experience", i.e., to die as elites in order to be born again as revolutionaries as humble as their task may be. This means the renounce of their so many dear myths: the myth of their "superiority", their purity, their virtues, their absolute knowledge, their false belief as "saviors" of the poors, etc.

"Soon they perceive that the indispensable Easter -- which results in the change of their consciousness--really has to be existentially experienced. The true Easter is not commemorative verbalization, but praxis, historical compromise. Easter, in verbalist manner, means 'death' without resurrection. Only in the authenticity of the historical praxis, Easter means to die in order to live" (94).

Freire, however, suggests that cultural invasion is not always a deliberate project. Sometimes its agents are

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(93) Quoted by Freire, in LGB, p. 79(no source). Parenthesis is mine.
(94) "O papel educativo das Igrejas-na América Latina", in ACL, p. 107.
equally oppressed and unconsciously subjugated at the service of the invader culture. The institutions of the invaded culture, in this particular, are deeply influenced by the patterns of the invader culture. The family life, the religious communities and the educational systems (from nurseries to Universities) reflect the style of the alien culture and transmit all its values and myths. Concerning the religious communities, for instance, the cultural invasion is processed through a misinterpretation of what constitutes, in fact, the core of Christian mission. Freire states:

"The concept 'mission lands', originates in the metropolis. For a mission land to exist, there must be another which defines it as such. There is a significant coincidence between mission-sending nations and metropolises as there is between mission lands and the Third World. It would seem to us that, on the contrary, all lands constitute mission territory to the Christian perspective" (95).

The institutions of the invaded culture, therefore, become vehicles in the preparation of future invaders. As Professor Maurício Tragtenberg (96) argues the type of intellectual formed by these institutions -- mainly by those educational ones -- is forced to choose between being a serf of the power as a hirer of the dominant class or a militant in the democratic struggle which, in the case of Latin Amer-

(95) CAC, p. 459, note 15
ica, will probably lead to socialism. This is why, in the case of the religious communities, those engaged in the struggle against cultural invasion are also obliged to fight for new forms of Christian life, different from that introjected by the metropolitan missions which, indeed, are instruments of domination on account of their cultural invasion aspects. They have to oppose to the traditional concept of Christian mission once behind the naïveté of the mission-sendings lies the desire of the metropolitan societies for domination, although it is a domination made in the name of the evangelical calling for liberation and by means of well-intentioned missionaries.

In addition, the relationships between the invader and invaded cultures are, as stated before, grounded on authoritarianism. Therefore, they also determine the relationships between parents and child which, thus, mirror the surrounding socio-cultural environment. Authoritarianism is, in this sense, introduced into the homes and reinforces the atmosphere of oppression leading the child to internalize the paternal authoritarianism. Freire argues that this attitude is extended to the school. The students soon discover that in order to be praised, rewarded and attain any other satisfaction, they have to submit themselves to prescriptions and norms from above. And one of them is not to think by them-
selves. Freire goes on stating that:

"Internalizing paternal authority through the rigid relationship structure emphasized by the school, these young people tend–when they become professionals (because of the very fear of freedom instilled by these relationships) to repeat the rigid patterns in which they were miseducated. This phenomenon, in addition to their class position, perhaps explains why so many professionals adhere to anti-dialogical action" (97).

Therefore, it helps us to understand:

(1) Why for many intellectuals, the dialogue with the common man is seen as a "time-wasting", or something infeasible. How, for instance, asks Freire, can an agronomist dialogue with peasants who do not know absolutely anything regarding techniques for the increasing of production? How to dialogue with them if they are slow, uncertain and long-drawn-out? Freire himself offers three replies to these arguments:

(a) They show the gnosiological misinterpretation that knowledge is to be extended to those who do not have it instead of searching knowledge in mutual apprenticeship, since no one is totally ignorant. Agronomists, for example, have to remember that

"agricultural techniques are not foreign to the peasants. Their daily work is a confrontation with the land, preparing it and cultivating it. This takes place within the limits of their experience, that is, within the limits of their culture. It is not only a matter of teaching them, but also of learning from

(97) PO, p. 153
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them. It would be difficult for an experienced and receptive agronomist not to gain some benefit from living with the peasants. If dialogue reveals the structural difficulties..., anti-dialogue will encounter greater difficulties still" (98).

(b) They reveal a complete ignorance of the historic-socio-logical conditions for knowledge. Their authors forget that peasants, even when under the urban influence of the mass-media, retain certain basic forms of being which can not be changed rapidly and mechanically. These authors "see themselves as 'promoters' of the people. Their programs of action (which might have been prescribed by any good theorist of oppressive action) include their own objectives, their own convictions, and their own preoccupations. They do not listen to the people, but instead plan to teach them how to 'cast off the laziness which creates underdevelopment'. To these professionals, it seems absurd to consider the necessity of respecting the 'view of the world' held by the people. The professionals are the ones with a 'world view'. They regard as equally absurd the affirmation that one must necessarily consult the people when organizing the program content of education...

(98) E3, p. 121, note 20. Freire tells us about one of his experiences in Latin America during a seminar in which he heard from one of its participants the following:
"If you say that dialogue between antagonists is impossible, how can I dialogue with slummers? Why? -- asked Freire. Because we are antagonists. And Freire continues: How do you explain such antagonism? I know, they do not know. Besides, they stink. In all his 'wisdom' -- concludes Freire -- this man did not know something so obvious: that it was due to his class condition that he had the chance to bathe everyday, to use fragrant soaps and deodorants and change his clothes daily. Without this condition, which is not intrinsical to anyone's being, he would be so stinking as the slummers of his example". Cf. "O papel educativo das Igrejas na América Latina", in ACL, p. 107, in footnote.
al action. They feel that the ignorance of the people is so complete that they are unfit for anything except to receive the teachings of the professionals" (99).

(c) They express a deep lack of faith in men, in their power of reflection and in the possibility of being the proper subjects in the search of knowledge.

"Hence the tendency to transform them into objects of the 'knowledge' imposed on them. Hence the haste to make them the docile and patient recipients of 'communiqués' which are inducted into them, while on the contrary the act of knowing and of learning requires a seeking, which, inasmuch as it is a seeking, cannot be reconciled with the static attitude of one who merely acts as the depository of the contents delivered by another" (100).

(2) Why many people, convinced of the necessity of a revolutionary commitment, continue to mistrust the people, avoiding communion with them. On account of this, says Freire, quoting Amílcar Cabral:

"If they are not to betray these objectives (of the liberation struggle), the middle class has only one possible road: that is, to strengthen their revolutionary conscience, to repudiate all that draws them toward middle-class standards and the natural attraction of that kind of class mentality, and to identify themselves with the working class by not opposing, in any way, the normal unfolding of the process of the revolution. This means that, in order to fulfill their specific revolutionary role in the struggle for national liberation, the revolutionary members of the middle class must be capable of committing suicide as a class in order to rise again as revolutionary workers, completely committed to the deepest aspirations of the people to which they be-

(99) PO, p. 153-154
(100) EC, p. 116
long. This alternative, to betray the revolution or to commit class suicide, constitutes the real option of the middle class in the general picture of the struggle for national liberation" (101).

Otherwise, they will continue to retain the oppressor within themselves; fearing freedom they will never be able to conquer it. However, that act of rebirth brings in itself an anguished existential crisis because those who decide to commit the suicide are confronted with a difficult alternative:

"they feel the need to renounce invasion, but patterns of domination are so entrenched within them that this renunciation would become a threat to their own identities. To renounce invasion would mean ending their dual status of dominated and dominators. It would mean abandoning all the myths which nourish invasion, and starting to incarnate dialogical action. For this very reason, it would mean to cease being over or inside (as foreigners) in order to be with (as comrades). And so the fear of freedom takes hold of these men" (102).

The fear of freedom, nevertheless, is more intense among those who have not yet been awakened that their professional activities are of invasive nature, and as such, dehumanizing. Whenever this question is posed they realize that they have either to affirm or to divest themselves of their myths. Precisely at this very instant the crisis occurs:

"Divesting themselves of and renouncing their myths represents, at that moment, an act of self-violence. On the other hand, to reaffirm those myths is to reveal themselves" (103).

(102) PO, p. 154
(103) PO, p. 155
This same sort of retreat also happens among oppressed people already domesticated by "assistencialism". Freire mentions the following incident: a big pile of garbage on a street corner in New York City was shown to a group of people from the ghetto. One among them said: "I see a street in Africa or Latin America... because we are the United States and that can't happen here". The man was simply trying to escape from a very offensive reality to him and whose acknowledgment was deeply threatening.

"For an alienated person, conditioned by a culture of achievement and personal success, to recognize his situation as objectively unfavorable seems to hinder his own possibilities of success" (104).

This case as well as that of the professionals show enough evidence that cultural invasion hinders men from being subjects of their own decisions in the historical process.

"None of them are theoreticians or ideologues of domination. On the contrary, they are effects which in turn become causes of domination" (105).

Freire thinks that this is one of the most astonishing problems which have to be faced by the revolution as soon as it reaches power. Because revolution can not dispense the participation and the activities of those professionals it has to re-educate many of them. It has to seek a state of equilibrium and avoid falling into irrational sectarianism. Since most of these professionals were condi-

(104) P0, p. 156
(105) P0, p. 156
tioned by a culture of domination it transformed them into dual beings "afraid of freedom. At this point, cultural revolution appears as an essential stance as being a progressing form of what was previously dialogical cultural action. Society as a whole and all human activities have then, to be reconstructed. For

"the culture which is culturally recreated through revolution is the fundamental instrument for this reconstruction. 'Cultural revolution' is the revolutionary régime's maximum effort at conscientização -- it should reach everyone, regardless of his task" (106).

Still, such efforts can not be carried out in the same models of those before the revolution. The scientific and technical training can not rest on the old forms and base on the same ends attributed by the old society. The same is true regarding the training of men. In the new revolutionary society scientific and technological discoveries and all other achievements in human knowledge are to be used towards a continuing process of liberation rather than means for dehumanization.

"As the cultural revolution deepens conscientização in the creative praxis of the new society, men will begin to perceive why mythical remnants of the old society survive in the new. And men will then be able to free themselves more rapidly of these specters, which by hindering the edification of a new society have always constituted a serious problem for every revolution" (107).

(106) PO, p. 157
(107) PO, p. 158
Accordingly, through these "cultural remnants" the invasion of the oppressor society continues its work, now invading the revolutionary society itself. But this new type of invasion is no longer accomplished by the old dominant classes but, on the contrary, by those who have participated in the revolutionary process. They resist frantically the measures taken by the revolutionary power. Indeed, they are acting through the oppressor still "housed" in themselves. For this reason,

"they also accept (still due to the remnants) power which becomes bureaucratized and which violently repress them" (108).

Freire suggests that such bureaucratic power -- which is violently repressive -- can be better understood by what Louis Althusser calls "'the reactivation of old elements' in the new society each time special circumstances permit" (109). This is why for Freire, dialogical cultural action is the same as revolutionary process, being both the prolongation of cultural revolution as soon as power is taken. Equally, they are the channels through which the whole process of conscientização passes guiding men to engage in the historical development as subjects. Besides, by cultivating the dialogical practice between the people and the leaders, cultural revolution solidifies the participation of the people in

(108) PO, p. 158
power. Assuming this critical attitude both people and leaders strengthen their defense against new forms of invasion and oppression.

Freire still argues that because cultural invasion implies a static and focal vision of reality, and since all those who suffer invasion are frequently not able (or are "prohibited") to make any decision by their own, they cannot develop authentically, unless they become beings for themselves surpassing the duality in which they are caught. By the same token, it is also unthinkable to expect any genuine socio-economic development in dual, "reflex", invaded societies. We should remember that Freire is always insisting on the distinction between modernization (or mere transformation) and real development which is only possible if societies are considered beings-for-themselves. He says:

"In order to determine whether or not a society is developing, one must go beyond criteria based on indices of 'per capita' income (which, expressed in statistical form, are misleading) as well as those which concentrate on the study of gross income. The basic, elementary criterion is whether or not the society is a 'being for itself'. If it is not, the other criteria indicate modernization rather than development. The principal contradiction of dual societies is the relationship of dependency between them and the metropolitan society. Once the contradiction has been superseded, the transformation hitherto effected through 'aid', which has primarily benefitted the metropolitan society, becomes true development, which benefits the 'being for itself'" (110).

(110) P0, p. 160-161
Satellite societies, therefore, are only capable of modernizing themselves. Even thus, this modernization is afforded the extent to which it interests the metropolitan societies, i.e., if it does not constitute a threat to their domination over the dependent societies. But it has also to be stressed that the modernization of the latter is always undertaken through the "aids" of the former.

"Almost always the metropolitan society induces these reformist solutions in response to the demands of the historical process, as a new way of preserving its hegemony. It is if the metropolitan society were saying: 'Let us carry out reforms before the people carry out a revolution'. And in order to achieve this goal, the metropolitan society has no option other than conquest, manipulation, economic and cultural (and sometimes military) invasion of the dependent society -- an invasion in which the elite leaders of the dominated society to a large extent act as mere brokers for the leaders of the metropolitan society" (111).

Regarding those "aids", which the metropolitan societies offers to the satellite ones, one has to bear in mind that, besides being a mechanism for the stimulation of cultural invasion, in fact, they favour the former more than the latter. Michel Bergmann (112) mentions some examples to prove it. I would like to call attention to three of them:

(1) The loans from the developed countries to the underdeveloped ones. It is usual for the poor countries to request loans from the rich ones. Sometimes even before the

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(111) PO, p. 161
request is made such loans are offered as "aids". However, they have to be reimbursed after a limited time with the correspondent interests. Now, who ever has debts to pay is always indebted to and in the dependency of someone else. So why to call "aids" such an advantageous investment?

(2) The remittance of personnel from the independent societies to the dependent ones. Those who are sent are often technicians, professors, specialists, etc. They are the "cooperators" whose average indicates a low or medium professional rank. Some, in fact, have professional standards so low that they are incapable of getting good jobs and wages in their own countries. Thus, they "decide" to emigrate to the underdeveloped countries with the purpose of helping in their development, even if they are obliged to live uncomfortably among the "natives" and subject themselves to the dangers of all sort of "contaminations". However, their concept of "help" is, indeed, the imposition of their "superior" cultural trends. In the case of highly qualified professionals they normally receive very good salaries but they only stay for a short time, returning to their countries of origin with the wealth acquired and retreated from the poor countries.

(3) The "exodus of brains". The most qualified professionals from the poor countries almost always emigrate to the rich ones. This process, sometimes, starts with invest-
ments in scholarships to the "aided" nations. The best students are commonly invited to work in Universities or other central installations for research, invention, creativity, etc. When it refers to individuals with specialization in technical areas, besides the temptation of high salaries, they find in the specialized laboratories of the rich countries all the necessary conditions and materials they need in order to develop their studies and researches. Concerning those who dedicate themselves to the field of humanities, they find (particularly in the developed countries of the Western World) a great margin of freedom of thought and expression in the realization of their researches, since they are, mostly, free from coercion and governmental vigilance. Thus, on the one hand, the poor countries -- after having financed in great part the education of their youth -- lose their best intelligences to the rich ones due to this type of "aid". On the other hand, a poor country that makes possible the high training of a certain number of its professionals without offering them adequate possibilities of work, obliges them to emigrate. In the case of those who return to their country of origin their tendency is to work, consciously or not, to foster cultural invasion. The training they received in the alien and "superior" culture will determine their professional actions as well as their personal behaviours. The type of "aid" received by those who return is then an evi-
dence that all dominant class creates the "organic" intellectual in and through which it maintains and legitimates its domination. They are the prototype of those oppressed to whom the perfect image of being is that of the oppressor, but now the foreign oppressor.

In sum, the "aids", in form of modernization, given by the metropolitan societies to the satellites ones are

"associated with the process of 'cultural invasion' through which the metropolitan societies try to guarantee their preponderance over the dependent societies" (113).

Freire, however, does not condemn aids as such. What he condemns is that sort of "aids" which serve the purposes of exploitation. For this particular reason, he states:

"Authentic help means that all who are involved help each other mutually, growing together in the common effort to understand the reality which they seek to transform. Only through such praxis -- in which those who help and those who are being helped help each other simultaneously -- can the act of helping become free from the distortion in which the helper dominates the helped. For this reason there can be no real help between dominating and dominated classes nor between 'imperial' and so-called 'dependent' societies" (114).

The conclusion, therefore, is simple: the "aids" of the metropolitan societies to the satellites ones are a mere mechanism of compensation whose chief intention is moderni-

zation and the perpetuation of the cultural invasion in order to secure the situation of dependency.

"In order to have the continued opportunity to express their 'generosity', the oppressors must perpetuate injustice as well. An unjust social order is the permanent 'fount of this 'generosity', which is nourished by death, despair, and poverty. That is why the dispensers of false generosity become desperate at the slightest threat to its source" (115).

In short, the truth that most people wish to ignore is the exploitation, masked with the name of "aids", of the poor countries by the rich ones. The two thirds of humanity which live in conditions of misery and abject poverty have been used to increase the "irrational development" of the one third of the wealth nations. And it is known today that this state of things will certainly continue in the near future. Although one can not think in regression of the under-developed countries, the truth is that the rhythm of devel-

(115) P0, p. 29. At this point, in the original Brazilian edition of P0, p. 31, Freire makes this astonishing quotation from St. Gregory of Nysse's, Sermon Against the Usurers: "Perhaps you give alms. But where do you take them off from no other than from your cruel pillages, sufferings, tears and sighs? If the poor knew from where your small alms come he would refuse it because he would have the impression of biting the flesh of his own brothers and of sucking the blood of his own neighbours. He would say to you these courageous words: 'Do not sate my thirst with the tears of my brothers. Do not give to the poor the bread hardened with the sobs of my companions of misery. Devolve to your alike what you reclaimed and I will be very grateful to you. What worth does it have to console a poor if you make another one hundred?" - Translation is mine.
opment of the rich countries is incomparably greater than that of the poor ones. This situation probably will remain until favourable conditions and forces appear in the countries in development which will be capable of establishing new structures more adapted to a sort of development with social signification and political autonomy, i.e., without the old and the new characteristics of colonial exploitation. Perhaps these countries will have to draw an entire new concept of development; perhaps they will have to create new values oriented towards a different philosophy of development; perhaps they will be forced to build another civilization in which the principal emphasis will be put on more humanized organizations; perhaps this will be the greatest historical task reserved to the oppressed people of the Third World. Indeed, Freire is of the view that liberation proper, can be brought about by the oppressed. This is due to the fact that he alone knows what it is like to be in need of liberation. Thus only he and he alone can free both himself and the oppressor. Hence, Freire's statement:

"The oppressors, who oppress, exploit, and rape by virtue of their power, cannot find in this power the strength to liberate either the oppressed or themselves. Only power that springs from the weakness of the oppressed will be sufficiently strong to free both" (116).

(116) PO, p. 28
Finally, Freire proposed cultural synthesis as a theory of dialogical action opposed to cultural invasion, characteristic of the theory of anti-dialogical action. Here men as actors, and not as mere spectators, engage in action with the people aiming at the transformation of reality in order to achieve men's liberation. Cultural synthesis, therefore, can be seen as a vivid manifestation of the process of conscientização. Contrary to cultural invasion,

"in cultural synthesis, the actors who come from 'another world' to the world of the people do so not as invaders. They do not come to teach or to transmit or to give anything, but rather to learn, with the people, about the people's world" (117).

Once, in the cultural synthesis, there are no invaders nor imposed prescriptions to be uncritically followed, the actors -- who do not isolate theory from praxis -- insert themselves in the historical process as subjects. People and leaders, mutually identified, build the plans of their action.

"In this synthesis, leaders and people are somehow reborn in new knowledge and new action. Knowledge of the alienated culture leads to transforming action resulting in a culture which is being freed from alienation. The more sophisticated knowledge of the leaders is remade in the empirical knowledge of the people, while the latter is refined by the former" (118).

So in the cultural synthesis the different visions of reality that exist between the people and the leaders are solved

(117) Po, p. 181
(118) Po, p. 183
with the experience of both. It does not imply, however, the negation of these opposed visions. Rather it is grounded on their differences. What it can not accept is the invasion of one by the other.

Cultural synthesis is, in addition, a kind of cultural action which confronts culture as such. It is a historical action whose objective is the suppression of the alienated and alienating culture. Freire affirms, for example:

"One of the characteristics of colonization is that in order for the colonizers to oppress the people easily they convinced themselves that the colonized have a mere biological life and never a historical existence. It is then necessary to invite people to discover that their cultural creation, in spite of resulting from their biological life, has a historical dimension. The people must be challenged to discover their historical existence through the critical analysis of their cultural production: their art and music. Once they perceive that their music is as much culture and art as the music of Beethoven, they can begin to break down one of the dimensions of inferiority. It is this inferiority which prevents them from participating in the true creation of their society" (119).

It is in this context that Freire thinks that every genuine revolution is at the same time a cultural revolution. The starting point for every action as cultural synthesis is the investigation of the people's social conditions. The purpose of this investigation is to grasp the most basic themes of the people's social environment. Hence, the impossibility of

separating the thematic investigation from the action as cultural synthesis.

"Such a dichotomy would imply an initial phase in which the people, as passive objects, would be studied, analysed, and investigated by the investigators -- a procedure congruent with anti-dialogical action. Such division would lead to the naive conclusion that action as synthesis follows from action as invasion" (120).

It is precisely because cultural synthesis is a dialogical theory this separation can not occur. The investigators of the basic themes can not be formed only by professionals but also and with the people whose thematic universe is being investigated.

"Investigation -- the first moment of action as cultural synthesis -- establishes a climate of creativity which will tend to develop in the subsequent stages of action. Such a climate does not exist in cultural invasion, which through alienation kills the creative enthusiasm of those who are invaded, leaving them hopeless and fearful of risking experimentation, without which there is no true creativity" (121).

This is the motive, argues Freire, that those who suffer the process of cultural invasion judge themselves incapable of surmounting the models of the prescriptions of the invaders.

At this point, Freire tackles again the problem of the close relationships which must always exist between the revolutionary leaders and the masses. Apart from these relationships the actions of the revolutionary leaders -- even

(120) P0, p. 182
(121) P0, p. 182-183. See also Chapter IV, Item 4.3.
if they are well-intentioned -- will be inauthentic since they will lead to the inevitable cultural invasion. For the true revolutionary leaders there is no other way than that of cultural synthesis. It implies, automatically, the respect of the people's view of the world,

"a view which explicitly and implicitly contains their concerns, their doubts, their hopes, their way of seeing the leaders, their perceptions of themselves and of the oppressors, their religious beliefs (almost always syncretic), their fatalism, their rebellious reactions. None of these elements can be seen separately, for in interaction all of them compose a totality" (122).

To know this totality means for the oppressors to be more equipped with the tools necessary to stimulate cultural invasion. Their anti-dialogical action is carried out without the participation of the popular masses since it is against these very masses. But to know the same totality constitutes for the revolutionary leaders an indispensable condition in fostering cultural synthesis.

"Cultural synthesis (precisely because it is a synthesis) does not mean that the objectives of revolutionary action should be limited by the aspirations expressed in the world view of the people. If this were to happen (in the guise of respect for that view), the revolutionary leaders would be passively bound to that vision. Neither invasion by the leaders of the people's world view nor mere adaptation by the leaders to the (often naive) aspirations of the people is acceptable" (123).

Freire furnishes us a concrete example of V.I. Lenin who

(122) PO, p. 184
(123) PO, p. 184
strongly refuted the Russian Democratic Party in the overemphasis on economic aspirations of the proletarian classes as being a weapon of the revolutionary struggle. Such practice Lenin himself called "economic spontaneity" (124).

Revolutionary leaders, therefore, can not be naive to fall into the temptation of adapting the revolutionary process to the aspirations (some of them bourgeois, indeed) of the masses nor by disregarding these aspirations, engage themselves in cultural invasion. The achievement of the process of conscientização of the working class, in which they perceive themselves as owners of their own labor, goes beyond these mere palliative solutions. Hence, the aim of the process of conscientização is not to transform the oppressed into bourgeois masses. If cultural synthesis is the only true solution it is because it serves to the authentic organization of the masses towards liberation. Once the masses -- dual beings, crushed and oppressed -- can not by themselves alone build a theory of liberating action, they need, therefore, the revolutionary leaders, who in close communion with them, construct such theory.

Concluding, Freire thinks that all cultural action implies a systematic model of action upon the social structure. This action is guided in the direction of the main-

tenance of this structure or towards its transformation. Furthermore, all cultural action is based upon a theory which defines its methods and also determines its goals. From this perspective it can be used as a cultural action for domestication or for liberation. The first hinders the whole process of conscientização, the second stimulates it. The former fosters permanence and domestication, the latter encourages change and liberation. The anti-dialogical cultural action exemplifies the former since conquest, division and manipulation, as manifestations of cultural invasion, can never be seen as means for liberation but obviously for domination. Contrary to this, cooperation, unity, and organization are manifestations of cultural synthesis and examples of dialogical cultural action for liberation. Both types of cultural action (anti-dialogical and dialogical) incide upon the educational process and determine its ends. This shall constitute the subject-matter of my next analysis.
CHAPTER IV

EDUCATION AS CULTURAL ACTION

According to Freire all education is cultural action. But the contradiction which exists between the oppressors and the oppressed polarizes education into having two distinct possibilities: (1) Education as a cultural action designed for domestication, basing itself on a "banking" concept of education, involving an anti-dialogical activity, fostering silence and the perpetuation of the status quo; (2) Education as a cultural action designed for liberation, grounding itself upon a "problem-posing" concept of education, involving a dialogical practice, stimulating change.

"The former is rigid, dogmatic, and authoritarian. The latter is mobile and critical. It does not confound authority with authoritarianism, nor liberty with libertinism... In the first conception education is an instrument of domination. In the second it is the constant search for liberation" (Ol).

While education for liberation makes the individual aware of his fatalistic posture before reality -- since this education implies unveiling reality -- education for domination insists upon keeping man alienated. By virtue of this, the first is a humanist action, and the second is a dehumanizing practice. Thus, education for domination can not hide its necrophilic character.

These two possibilities constitute the key point to the understanding of Freire's philosophy of education, whose

(01) EC, p. 150
one of the main emphasis lies on the impossibility of a neutral education. Traditionally, libertarian education, is often regarded as the public transmission of neutral bits of information about the world, which can then be used according to private disposition. What is taught is frequently regarded as empty of ideological content, and education is reduced to the status of an inanimate tool, like a slide rule or a box wrench. Freire, however, does not agree with this notion. For him, there is no neutral education, mainly in the context of oppressed societies. He severely criticizes those who advocate the neutrality of education as being exactly those who are, indeed, afraid of losing the right to use the tendentious nature of education in their own benefit. We are continuously faced with the dilemma (that was already Jean-Jacques Rousseau's and before him Plato's) of how to free the educatee from indoctrination into a type of society that we desire to transform and yet to shape it for the fight for liberation and for transformation. Anyway, Freire refutes the neutrality of education with the following argument:

"If we claim to go beyond the naive, formal interpretation of the human task of education, this must be the starting point of a critical or dialectical reflection. Lacking this critical spirit, either because we are alienated to thinking statically and not dynamically, or because we already have ideological interests, we are incapable of perceiving the true role of education, or if we do perceive it, we disguise it. We tend to ignore or to obscure the
role of education, which, in that it is a social praxis' will always be in the service either of the domestication of men or of their liberation. At other moments, alarmed by the inevitable choice we have to make between education as a domesticating praxis and education as a liberating praxis, we seek a third way -- which is non-existent per se. We declare education to be neutral" (02).

From a Freirean perspective it means: or we build a pedagogy of the oppressed or a pedagogy against them. In any educational process there is an inherent conflict between the necessity of the transmission and maintenance of the existing cultural values -- which is the conservative task of education -- and the necessity of the construction of a new culture -- which is the revolutionary task of education. In any given society either the one or the other tends to be the dominant.

"In this way as the struggle for the humanization presupposes the dehumanization, as a contrary fact or as a threat, thus both also involve antagonistic educative practices. It is as contrary themes between themselves that humanization and dehumanization point to educative tasks also necessarily contrary" (03).

For this very reason, the educational system as well as educators themselves can not stop at the level of merely being aware of this fact. They are forced to embark on an educational practice which leads to domestication or to liberation, to an anti-dialogical cultural action or to a dialogical one.

(03) "Algumas notas sobre humanização e suas implicações pedagógicas", in ACL, p. 98.
"It is impossible for neutrality to exist in the human praxis... So I cannot use the same methods and techniques which are used to dominate if my choice is to liberate. I cannot use the same methods, precisely because it is dialectically (and I cannot think outside of a dialectical form) impossible to dichotomize methods and objectives from the praxis" (04).

Therefore, following this Freirean remark concerning the impossibility of a neutral education, my objective in this chapter is to offer an analysis of Freire's two concepts of education: "banking" and "problem-posing" education.

4.1 - EDUCATION AS AN ANTI-DIALOGICAL CULTURAL ACTION: THE "BANKING" CONCEPT OF EDUCATION

Freire's concept of banking education is only one of the various ways in which education can go wrong. But it is a particular way because it is one the few mis-educative processes that tends to become confused with genuine education. So it is extremely difficult to detect in ourselves because, sometimes, due to our own ideological postures, we are not very conscious of our choices.

According to the banking concept, education is an act of depositing, transferring and transmitting knowledge, values, norms, etc. And since one's ideology conditions

one's epistemology.

"The epistemological practice of cultural action or education for domestication divides teaching from learning, knowing and working, thinking and doing, informing and forming, re-knowing existing knowledge and creating new knowledge. In this kind of action, knowing is receiving information, or stocking 'deposits' made by others" (05).

Being an anti-dialogical cultural action, banking education presupposes that educators are the subjects-actors who possess knowledge as information which is deposited in the spectator learner-objects. In the banking theory, the teacher is the depositor and the student the bank. The educational process is carried on as the teacher makes periodic deposits of "knowledge" into the account. At regularly stated intervals, the teacher writes a check on each student's account in the form of an examination. If the check comes back marked "Insufficient Funds", a lien is placed on the account in the form of a bad grade. Thus, we can infer that in the banking concept of education teachers are simply channels through which cultural and ideological values are transmitted and preserved. The pupils become the infinitely manipulable, malleable clay of the dominant culture. Seeing the students as empty receptacles or "stockpot of knowledge", educators seek their control, integration and incorporation to the established order by means of the following attitudes:

(05) "Education: Domestication or Liberation?", Op. cit., p. 177.
"(a) the teacher teaches and the students are taught; 
(b) the teacher knows everything and the students know nothing; 
(c) the teacher thinks and the students are thought about; 
(d) the teacher talks and the students listen weekly; 
(e) the teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined; 
(f) the teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the students comply; 
(g) the teacher acts and the students have the illusion of acting through the action of the teacher; 
(h) the teacher chooses the program content, and the students (who are not consulted) adapt to it; 
(i) the teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his own professional authority, which he sets in opposition to the freedom of the students; 
(j) the teacher is the Subject of the learning process, while the pupils are mere objects" (06).

Similarly, Freire criticizes the educational-gnosiological posture in which knowledge is an act of extending something to someone else by those called rural extension agents. He is severe, for example, on his attacks on the relationships between Latin American peasants and agronomists because the latter see themselves as those who, possessing technical and scientific knowledge, ought to extend such knowledge to peasants. The act of extension, according to his view,

"means that those carrying it out need to go to another part of the world to 'normalize it', according to their way of viewing reality: to make it

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(06) Po, p. 59. See also Con, p. 78-80.
resemble their world. Thus, in its 'field of association' the term extension has a significant relation to transmission, handing over, giving, messianism, mechanical transfer, cultural invasion, manipulation, etc.All these terms imply actions which transform people into 'things' and negate their existence as beings who transform the world" (07).

And the great mistake of agronomists, as well as other technicians, is the fact that for them "the world" only means nature. For this reason the so-called "educational extension" is a banking procedure impregnated with a domesticating practice.

"Underestimating the creative and re-creative capacity of peasants, despising their knowledge (it does not matter the level in which they are found) and trying to 'fill' them with what the technicians think is right, are ultimately expressions of the dominant ideology" (08).

So to persuade peasants to accept passively the "superior" knowledge of those agrarian specialists means to use them as "blank pages" of their own prescriptions. Knowing is an act in which subjects are confronted with reality demanding its transformation. It is not an act in which a subject, merely transformed into a docile object, has to accept the contents of one's knowledge. It is only as subjects that men are able to know. And it is exactly what the concept of extension does not permit.

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(07) EC, p. 93
(08) "Ação Cultural e Reforma Agrária", in ACL, p. 32.
The work of the agronomist-educator, therefore, involves a philosophical problem which can not be ignored. It implies the substitution of a real critical knowledge for an extended one or vice-versa. He has to choose between an extension practice (anti-dialogical in itself) and a communicative one.

"This then is the dilemma of agronomists and extension agents, in the face of which they must be critically aware. If, in accordance with the concept of extension, they transform their specialized knowledge and methods into something static and materialized and extend them mechanically to the peasants -- invading the peasant culture and view of the world -- they deny that men and women are beings who make decisions. If, however, agronomists affirm their knowledge through dialogical work, they neither invade, manipulate, nor conquer. They thus deny the connotation of the term 'extension'" (09).

Freire still points out that from a gnosiological point of view rural extension agents only show their knowledge without, however, unveiling to the people the "hidden extended" contents of that knowledge. For any educational attempt which does not challenge the capacity of men to reflect critically about the world, and contents itself only in speaking or narrating about reality, impedes men's capacity for knowledge and skirts the problems to them. Wherefore, instead of encouraging conscientização it is, in fact, stimulating naiveté. So it does not offer true apprenticeship because

(09) EC, p. 114
"in the learning process the only person who really learns is s/he who appropriates what is learned, who apprehends and thereby re-invents that learning; s/he who is able to apply the appropriate learning to concrete existential situations. On the other hand, the person who is filled by another with 'contents' whose meaning s/he is not aware of, which contradict his or her way of being in the world, cannot learn because s/he is not challenged" (10).

Accordingly, rural extension educators collaborate nothing with the people in helping them untie themselves from their magical-naive way of interpreting the world. Being a mechanical act of transference of knowledge the educative practice employed by these educators prevents the learners from transcending the limits of doxa in order to reach the domain of logos. So it is quite obvious that any educational project associated with professional training or not, whether in agricultural or industrial sphere which employs the methods of extension does not lead to conscientização because in its process.

"the educator has the right, as a person, to have options. What s/he does not have is the right to impose them. To do this is to prescribe these options for others. To prescribe is to manipulate. To manipulate is 'to reify'. and to reify is to establish a relationship of domestication which may be disguised behind an apparently inoffensive façade" (11).

In this case, to speak of conscientização is meaningless. For rural extension educators there is only one alternative: to domesticate by means of the banking concept of education.

(10) EC, p. 99
(11) EC, p. 147
Freire casts identical criticism on the educational practices of some socialist societies. Not being able to surmount the domesticating aspects of their inherited bourgeois education, they continue to use banking educational practices.

"Thus, almost always, the socialist education confuses itself with the reduction of the Marxist thought -- a thought which can not be jailed -- to 'tablets' which must be 'swallowed'. Perpetuating the school as an instrument of social control, dichotomizing teaching from learning, they forget that Marx's fundamental warning in his third 'Theses on Feuerbach' is that 'the educator himself needs educating'" (12).

Freire's view on the concept of banking education is that it simply means to teach, instruct or inculcate doctrines or principles, and it is understood that whatever it is that is to count as teaching, instructing, and inculcating is at least morally acceptable. In this concept of education

"educators recognize themselves as those who know, those who have knowledge. Knowledge for them necessarily is a fact, something static and not a process. Knowledge is something that they possess; and by possessing knowledge and by recognizing that the educatees are those who do not know, they conclude that their task is to transfer their knowledge" (13).

Hence, one of the chief features of banking education is its narrative aspect which becomes automatically lifeless and

(13) "By Learning They Can Teach", Op. cit., p. 79.
petrified. Jacques Maritain (14) has also called attention to the extreme position -- of what he terms "the concept of education as encyclopedic inculcation" -- in which the student is imagined as a sort of "intellectual dwarf" who has to be inculcated, in a diminutive form, with the knowledge mastered by the educator.

Due to its narrative aspect Freire argues that the function of educators, in the use of banking education, is merely

"to 'fill' the students with the contents of his narration -- contents which are detached from reality, disconnected from the totality that engendered them and could give them significance. Words are emptied of their concreteness and become a hollow, alienated, and alienating verbosity" (15).

Thus, from its narrative aspect, one derives another characteristic of banking education, i.e., the sonority of words,


(15) P0, p. 57. Referring specifically to the Brazilian educational system Freire states that our critics "have customarily accused our education of being 'theoretical', mistakenly equating theory with verbalism. On the contrary, we lacked theory -- a theory of intervention in reality, the analytical contact with existence which enables one to substantiate and to experience that existence fully and completely. In this sense, theorizing is contemplation (although not in the erroneous connotation of abstraction or opposition to reality). Our education was not theoretical, precisely because it lacked this bent toward substantiation, toward invention, toward research". Cf. EPF, p. 37.
their verbosity, which, losing the power of transforming reality, leads to accommodation to the present order. Moreover, the narrative and verbalist behaviours of the educator drive the educatee to mere mechanical memorization rather than a critical understanding of the contents of the program.

"The more completely he fills the receptacles, the better a teacher he is. The more meekly the receptacles permit themselves to be filled, the better students they are" (16).

In this sense, banking education becomes a model of the basic element of the relationship between the powerful and the weak, the oppressor and the oppressed prescription. For Freire, every man's prescription represents the imposition of the choice of one upon the other. The consequence is the slow transformation of the consciousness of the prescribed to the consciousness of the prescriber. Conformation by erosion. Banking education, then, does not stimulate the development of one's own expressiveness, once

"the educator substitutes the expressiveness by the donation of expressions in which the educatee must go on 'capitalizing'" (17).

Basing ourselves on this argument we can adduce that banking education is a serious obstacle to the growth of genuine critical thinking since the students become merely repeti-

(16) P0, p. 58
(17) "Os camponeses e seus textos de leitura", in ACL, p. 24.
tive of the educator's knowledge. It is exactly why it cannot be naively seen as an instrument capable of fostering conscientização. In its practice

"the learners are never called to think critically about the conditioning of their own thought process; to reflect on the reason for their own present situation; to make a new 'reading' of the reality that is presented to them simply as something to which they should adapt themselves. The thought-language, absurdly separated from objectivity, and the mechanisms used to interject the dominant ideology, are never discussed. They learn that knowledge is something to be 'consumed' and not made and remade" (18).

The applicability of the banking methodology, therefore, transforms the act of studying into a meaningless enterprise disconnected from reality. It does not demand an intellectual discipline, something which is gained only through praxis. For this very reason, the act of studying, for Freire, is a very difficult work since it asks for critical and systematic attitudes before the world. And it can not be enforced by banking education whose

"keynote objectifies the killing of the educatees' curiosity, their spirit for investigation and creativity. Its 'discipline' is that for a passive ingenuity before a text and not-to an indispensable critical posture" (19).

Thus, the students, being prohibited from a critical appropriation regarding the real meaning of the programatic contents, are simply "invaded" by the words of the educators

(18) LGB, p. 23
(19) "Considerações em torno do ato de estudar", in ACL, p. 9-10.
who, instead of communicating, make communiqués.

"Because of this, in general, the good educatee is neither restive; nor indocile; he does not show doubt, he does not wish to know the reason for facts; he does not go beyond set-models, he does not denounce 'mediocratizing' bureaucracy, he does not refuse to be an object. The good educatee, in this type of education, on the contrary, is he who repeats, who refuses to think critically, who adapts to models" (20).

Employing an anti-dialogical action, banking education can not furnish a truly humanistic and dialectic education because it is not founded on invention and re-invention of reality in a continuing, hopeful and restless inquiry between men and men, men and world. This type of education, "projecting an absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the ideology of oppression, negates education and knowledge as processes of inquiry. The teacher presents himself to his students as their necessary opposite; by considering their ignorance absolute, he justifies his own existence. The students, alienated like the slave in the Hegelian dialectic, accept their ignorance as justifying the teacher's existence -- but, unlike the slave, they never discover that they educate the teacher" (21).

The students, thereby, are incapable of grasping the historical and sociological conditionings of knowledge; they are prevented from re-inventing, re-writing reality which appears to them as if it were motionless. Banking education, in so far as reality is concerned, dichotomizes consciousness from the world and considers the former as an "empty space"

(20) "Algumas notas sobre humanização e suas implicações pedagógicas", in ACL, p. 102.
(21) PO, p. 58-59
which has to be filled with contents.

"This separation, which results in the consciousness and the world being taken as statically opposed separate entities, implies the negation of the power of reflection of the consciousness, which is transformed into the empty space referred to... Thus, the mythification of the world -- the world of consciousness -- means the mythification of the consciousness: consciousness of the world" (22).

Banking education has, then, a false view of men, i.e., men as mere spectators and not re-creators of the world. Hence its anti-historical dimension. It mythicizes reality in trying to conceal the reason why things are as they are. From this outlook, men are in the world, but not with the world. They are not conscious beings but only the possessors of an empty consciousness which receives the deposits from the outer world.

"This view makes no distinction between being accessible to consciousness and entering consciousness. The distinction, however, is essential: the objects with surround me are simply accessible to my consciousness, not located within it. I am aware of them, but they are not inside me" (23).

Consequently, the task of educators is only to discipline the perception of the world into the educatees' consciousness and to organize the spontaneous process of depositing their knowledge -- which they think is the only true one -- over the students. Hence, it is easy to detect the profile

(23) P0, p. 62
of man which emerges from this type of education. It is the image of a man whose consciousness is "spatialized" and must be filled with contents in order to know. Freire suggests that in this kind of educative practice the educators' behaviour is what constitutes Sartre's criticism on the "digestive" or "nutritive" aspect of education wherein "to know is to eat".

"From the point of view of this false conception those who study must do it in order to become 'intellectually fat'. Hence the usage of expressions such as 'hunger of knowledge', 'thirst for learning', to have or not to have 'appetence for knowing'" (24).

It was precisely what led Sartre to exclaim: "O philosophie alimentaire!" (25), since from this perspective knowledge is the "aliment" of the educators that must "fill out" their students. And Freire adds:

"And since men 'receive' the world as passive entities, education should make them more passive still, and adapt them to the world. The educated man is the adapted man, because he is better 'fit' for the world. Translated into practice, this concept is well suited to the purposes of the oppressors, whose tranquility rests on how men fit the world the oppressors have created, and how little they question it" (26).

Banking education, thereupon, treating students as

(24) "O processo de alfabetização política - uma introdução", in ACL, p. 86.
(26) PO, p. 63
mere objects, leads them to renounce their role as critical agents of transformation of reality. Once its aim is to minimize or annul the students' critical capacity such method re-inforces their accommodation to the status quo. Obviously, it benefits the privileges of the oppressors who do not wish the transformation of the present order. On account of this they react vehemently against any educational experiment which fosters conscientização. Because it effectively mobilizes people, it is seen as a threat to the power structures. Conscientização is, then, a sure sign of the impact it has had on the repressive regimes which have tried to put it down. Thus,

"it would be, indeed, a naive attitude to expect that the dominant classes developed a form of education which furnished to the dominated classes the ways of critically perceiving the social injustices" (27).

Freire -- like Simone de Beauvoir (28) -- also stresses that the only purpose of the oppressors is to change the consciousness of the oppressed without changing, however, the social conditions of oppression. He argues that we ought to get rid of an "illusory dream" of trying to change man without changing the reality he lives in.

(27) "O processo de alfabetização política - uma introdução", in ACL, p. 89.
"Such an attitude, which no doubt appeals to those who enjoy comfortable living conditions, would make us want to preserve the status quo, in which oppressed peoples are kept from being fully human... So then, the more we get involved in action programs based on that illusory dream, the more we are playing the game of the power elites... Instead of working with men to transform the social reality that blocks them from being fully human, we will cooperate in maintaining that unjust reality by ineffectual actions that are no more helpful than aspirin pills. Obviously, the power elites will love us and praise us for doing what they want -- and we will sleep on blithely, perhaps after having taken our little nip of scotch whisky" (29).

The aim of banking education -- added to a paternalistic social action -- is, therefore, to change the individuals' behaviour in order to conform with the established order which creates oppression. It does not matter if it is a conscious or unconscious enterprise. In both cases the oppressors see the oppressed

"as individual cases, as marginal men who deviate from the general configuration of a 'good, organized, and just' society. The oppressed are regarded as the pathology of the healthy society, which must therefore adjust these 'incompetent and lazy' folk to its own patterns by changing their mentality. These marginals need to be 'integrated', 'incorporated' into the healthy society that they have 'forsaken'" (30).

Nevertheless, Freire rejects the ideology of the dominant classes that the solution is to integrate the oppressed to their "healthy society". The oppressed are, indeed, not marginal, but men who have always been inside of an unjust

(30) P0, p. 60-61
structure. It is unthinkable to accept the notion that the oppressed are marginals by an act of free choice. Did they decide by themselves to move out to the periphery of society? Did they choose, by a sadistic desire, to live in a continuous state of starvation, hunger, sickness, mental deficiencies, rickets, promiscuity, crime, despair, death, etc.? If, then, marginality is not an act of free choice,

"those who consider them marginal must, nevertheless, recognize the existence of a reality to which they are marginal -- not only physical space, but historical, social, cultural, and economic realities -- i.e., the structural dimension of reality" (31).

If integration of the oppressed to the oppressors' society is not the solution to the problem of marginality of the formers, Fráire's proposal is, then, the radical transformation of the entire social body. It will be no longer a situation in which the oppressed are dependent on those who falsely name themselves automatons and free, when, in fact, they are inauthentic and unfree. As such radical transformation would frustrate the oppressors' purposes, so the only alternative is their utilization of the banking concept of education which prevents the process of conscientizacão. The problem here is that almost always the students respond affirmatively to the oppressors' purposes. They refuse to know since their experience has been that of mere recipients of

the formal knowledge of the dominant classes and not of knowers who critically approach reality. The educational system, which represents the interests as well as the ideologies of the power elites,

"permêet à une jeunesse qui vit plus ou moins bien d'accéder à un meilleur niveau de vie. Ainsi la grande majorité de la jeunesse accepte le 'processus de domestication, et c'est parce qu'on la domestique qu'elle intérieurise tout un processus mythificateur qui l'empêche de se rendre compte qu'elle devient domestiquée" (32).

Freire suggests that from these youth totally "adhered" to the ideologies of the dominant classes nothing can be expected regarding the struggle for the radical transformation of reality.

"But there will be others who, also perceiving themselves to be captive of the old ideology, will nonetheless attempt to free themselves from it through the new practice to which they will adhere. It is possible to work with these persons. They are the ones who 'commit class suicide'. The others refuse to do so" (33).

Freire still refutes "imported education" because it typifies a banking educational practice. Being an alien education it is unable to consider the historical, cultural and sociological aspects of the other reality. Besides, it mines the possibilities of real transformation of reality.

"If the education of a society does not exist in a concrete context, showing the influence of human

(33) LGB, p. 15
beings and at the same time influencing them, it cannot advance the transformation of the reality of that society. Imported education, which is the manifestation of a form of being of an alienated culture, is something which is merely superimposed on the reality of the importing society. Hence this education which is not because it is not being in a dialectic relationship with its context, contains no force of transformation for reality" (34).

Imported education cannot, therefore, explain the educational phenomena of other societies. The school system, in this situation, does not correspond to the real necessities of these societies. The schools are themselves like "strange bodies" due to their total alienation from reality. Because the educational model imported by many Latin American countries is that from the United States it explains why so many educators today are fed up with that slogan: "What is good for the United States is also good for us in Latin America". It does not only reflect that deep myth of natural inferiority but also shows the extent to which the economic and political dependency manifest themselves in the social and cultural spheres. Imported education, at least, serves the purposes of fostering cultural invasion from the metropolitan societies to the satellites ones. Consequently, it cannot be other than an education for domestication. Freire himself was challenged on his theory. When invited by the government of Guinea-Bissau to collaborate in the literacy program of that new African country he rejected to offer as solution to

(34) EC, p. 154. See also EFP, p. 13.
its illiteracy problem his previous experiences in other countries, mainly in Brazil and Chile. Here his own deposition:

"We would start, in any case, from a radical position, refusing to accept packaged or prefabricated solutions and avoiding every kind of cultural invasion, whether it be open or cleverly hidden... One of our most pressing concerns when we were preparing as a team for our first visit to Guinea - Bissau was to guard against the temptation to overestimate the significance of some aspects of an earlier experience, giving it universal validity" (35).

Thus, Freire's project to collaborate with the government of Guinea-Bissau in its struggle against illiteracy did not originate from his office in Geneva. It was there, among the illiterate population of that small country that the project was initiated and developed amid a deep respect for the historical, sociological and cultural aspects of their own reality.

"Our conviction" -- Freire says -- "is that we will have nothing to teach there if we do not learn from and with you. For this reason, we go to Guinea-Bissau as comrades, as militants, curiously and humbly, and not as foreign technicians with a mission. We do not judge ourselves to be the possessors of truth, nor do we carry with us a report of our visit already written or even drawn up in general lines with advice and prescriptions about what to do and how to do it" (36).

In this way, Freire himself was able to put into practice his theoretical rejections of the imported-banking concept of education.

(35) LGB, p. 9-10
(36) LGB, p. 73
Furthermore, Freire reminds us that for those who employ the banking concept of education, sooner or later, the contradictions of such education are manifested. Students beginning to perceive the domestication to which they are subjected, turn themselves against it and become more and more convinced with respect to the struggle for liberation. They discover that their actual way of life is contrary to men's vocation of being fully human. Whenever men's attempts to act and to use their faculties as free beings are negated, they suffer. But this suffering brings with it the cause of men's refusal of their impotence. They try then to restore their capacity of acting responsibly. They uncross their arms, renounce passivity and demand participation and intervention in their social environment. So, in spite of all forces which try to domesticate them, men start to emerge critically, denouncing the ways of dehumanization. Men's journeys throughout history have been attempts (sometimes by means of trial and error) to supersede the forces which make them adjusted to the world of oppression. It is nothing else than men's positive answer to their process of conscientização, i.e., their response to the reflective character and intentionality of their consciousness.

"If all this attempt at alienating, at de-dialectizing thought 'domesticates' the capacity of the consciousness for the reflection and criticism, or of man to be a conscious being, it cannot however make this capacity disappear. Sooner or later, the power
of reflection and criticism reconstitutes itself in the very process of its 'domestication'. This is why we are able to talk about the liberation of man, even when we have to say that this does not stem from the mere recognition that it is necessary, but rather from the praxis which transforms the world in which we are not free" (37).

Hence, it is in the very process of domestication that the seeds of liberation grow. If such seeds are continuously being watched by the ideological and repressive apparatus of the dominant classes it is a signal that they are budding. Thus, if a libertarian education becomes possible tomorrow it is because it has already been growing inside the reactionary and domesticating educational processes of today. Obviously, it demands that same revolutionary patience and we have to be aware that historically we are asked to do what is possible and reasonable, which excludes our omissions. This effort appears as an imperative for all those convinced that men's vocation is to become more fully human.

Nevertheless, in committing themselves to that effort, those who lack patience, are exposed to the risks of identifying themselves with the powerful. In this manner they fall into the illusion that they are acting through them when, in fact, they are only surrendering themselves to those who really act. It can be best exemplified by that identification of the emergent masses with the populist or

other charismatic leaders. Hence, they can not be ingenuous in expecting any attempt to build a new social order from a school system that serves the purposes of the power elites and employs the banking concept of education. Both the school system and the banking educational theory are, actually, instruments of social control. Stimulating the naivété of the students they aspire their domestication. Even educators themselves do not perceive it very often. Surely they become paradigmatic of a certain type of thoroughly uneducated men. They are also indoctrinated men.

"La domestication est pour tous ceux qui entrent dans le système scolaire. Dans ce système, l'éduteur est le seul sujet de l'action culturelle, l'éduqué n'étant que l'objet qu'il manipule; c'est l'inversion de la praxis; l'école force l'homme à s'adapter à elle, au lieu de se laisser transformer par lui! L'école est un instrument de contrôle social et ne peut pas ne pas l'être. Tous ceux qui accèdent au lieu du contrôle social sont manipulés par le contrôle social" (38).

Contrary to Ivan Illich (39), Freire, however, does not advocate the idea of the deschooling of society. It does not suffice to suppress all the educational institutions if the social structures which engender oppression are not

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abolished. He says:

"I have insisted on the impossibility -- which is evident to me -- of considering the educational system as an instrument of social transformation. I do not, however, deny the use of making serious efforts within this system" (40).

Freire wants to show that the school system is a reflection of the social organization. Preserving such organization it is impossible, through the educational institutions, to systematize the tendency towards change and innovation. Hence, the failure of simple reforms of the educational system and why Freire discredits the

"widespread and naive belief in the power of institutionalized education in transforming reality... No society is organized on the basis of its actual educational system which, having instilled a certain image of man, would then ensure the proper functioning of society. On the contrary, the educational system is created and re-created by the social practices which constitute a given society... In reality, the role of systematic education, in the repressive society from which it stems and on which it acts as an agent of social control, is to preserve that society" (41).

The banking concept of education also does not foster the partnership and dialogical practice between educators and educatees. For if it does, it will be no longer banking education serving the ends of oppression. The lack of partnership and dialogical attitudes in this type of education can be observed by the following examples:

(41) Ibid, p. 68
(1) The verbalist atmosphere of the classroom which, many times, is "rationally" justified because there is "no time to lose" and there is a syllabus to be fulfilled.

"Once again in the name of time which is not to be wasted, time is wasted. Young people are alienated by the kind of copybook thought that is almost entirely verbally narrated. Moreover, the content of what is narrated must be passively received and then memorized for repetition later" (42).

(2) The distance between the educator and the taught.

"The educator who 'divinizes' himself in the sacredness of the school, equally sacral, is almost always an untouchable being not only in relation to his mystified authority but also -- and coherently -- to his own body. The student, for instance, can not even, in an affectionate gesture, put his hands on the teacher's shoulder. This sort of intimacy would threaten the necessary distance between him and his students" (43).

(3) The indication of bibliography in which some educators specify the pages that should be read in order to help the students.

"Those who fear dialogue prefer lengthy and erudite discourses full of quotations. Instead of problemposing dialogue, they prefer a so-called 'reading-control' (which is a form of controlling the students rather than the reading). This does not result in any kind of creative intellectual discipline, only in the subjugation of the educatee to the text, the reading of which has to be 'controlled'. Sometimes this is called evaluation. Alternatively it is asserted that young people should be 'made to study', or 'forced to know" (44).

(42) EC, p. 123
(43) "Algumas notas sobre humanização e suas implicações pedagógicas", in ACL, p. 102.
(44) EC, p. 124
(4) The criteria of promotion and the methods for evaluating by means of marks which are given according to what educators expect the students to respond before a syllabus previously elaborated without any consultation from the part of the pupils. And most educators -- as Professor Lauro de Oliveira Lima (45) reminds us -- still enjoy that privilege that only few tyrants have had, i.e., they can totally destroy a life by means of a simple zero or any other kind of low mark. Besides, the criteria of promotion and the methods for evaluation can also be seen as an unconscious (sometimes conscious) form which protects educators from the rebellion of those students who simply do not "con-form" or adjust themselves to their pre-established expectancies. Freire, however, does not simply condemn promotion or evaluation. He thinks they are necessary. But

"the important thing is, first, that there be ongoing evaluation of the work being realized and, second, that the evaluation never become a type of fiscalization" (46).

In this way, tests, as criteria for evaluation, for example, are not seen as something which impedes creativity nor as a failure in the relationships between educators and educatees. Evaluation is, for Freire,

(46) LCB, p. 98
"not the act by which A evaluates B. It is rather the act whereby A and B, together, evaluate a practice, its development, the encountered obstacles or the mistakes and oversights committed. Hence its dialogical character. Instead of being an instrument of inspection, evaluation is, then, the problematization of the action itself" (47).

All the above examples of lack of partnership and dialogical practice suffice in showing that the aim of the banking concept of education is to prohibit or make difficult the emergence of critical thinking. The bank-clerk educators

"have no wish to run the risk of adventuring into dialogue, the risk incurred by problem-posing. They retreat into their discursive and rhetorical classes, which have a lulling effect on students. Enjoying the narcissistic pleasure of the sound of their own words, they lull the critical capacity of the educatee to sleep" (48).

These educators cannot admit the idea that to live authentically is to live in solidarity with others. It requires communication whereby human life has its meaning. They refuse to accept the notion that their thinking are genuine only by the authenticity of the thinking of their students. Educators cannot think alone and impose their thoughts upon their students.

"Authentic thinking, thinking that is concerned about reality, does not take place in ivory tower isolation, but only in communication. If it is true that thought has meaning only when generated by ac-

(47) "Os camponeses e seus textos de leitura", in ACL, p. 26: (48) EC, p. 124
tion upon the world, the subordination of students to teachers becomes impossible" (49).

It is precisely because this sort of subordination occurs in the banking educational practice that it is an anti-dialo-
gical cultural action for domestication. Once it can not fos-
ter the development of "biophilic" attitudes it stimulates,
on the contrary, "necrophilian" behaviours since it serves the ends of oppression and its love for death.

Freire also suggests that the educative practice fos-
tered by the Church, more specifically that type of conserv-
ative Church, has always been that which embraces the bank-
ing concept of education. It has served to propagate fatal-
ism and led to an educational practice full of social con-
formism due to its alienation from reality. On account of
this the so-called

(49) PO, p. 64. Simone de Beauvoir wisely remarks: "On ne peut révéler de monde que sur un fond de monde révélé par les autres hommes; aucun projet ne se définit que par son interférence avec d'autres projets; faire 'qu' il y ait' de l'être, c'est communiquer à travers d'être avec autrui... Tout homme a besoin de la liberté des autres hommes et, en un sens, il la vent toujours, fût-il tyran; il lui manque seulement d'assumer avec bonne foi les conséquences d'une telle volonté. Seule la liberté d'autrui empêche chacun de nous de se figer dans l'absurdité de la facticité. Et s'il faut en croire le mythe chétien de la création, Dieu même était d'accord sur ce point avec la doctrine existentialiste, puisque, selon le mot d'un prêtre antifasciste, 'il avait un tel respect de l'homme qu'il l'a créé libre'". Cf. Pour une morale de l'ambiguïté, Paris, Editions Gal-
"théologians of the impossible neutrality use a mystifying language. They pawn themselves in mitigating the hardness of the oppressed reality and convoke the dominated classes -- which invariably they call 'poor' or 'less fortunate' -- to face with resignation their sacrifice. The pain they suffer, the humiliating discrimination, their existence as death in life, all these must be assumed by the dominated classes as being ways of purification of their sins. At bottom, they should thank the 'rich' for the opportunity they offer them to be saved" (50).

But in insisting on the practice of banking education, sooner or later people become aware of the domesticating character of the Church's teachings. Here appears a dilemma, a deep and anguished tension which many would like to answer publicly but do not feel strong enough and are impotent in the face of a conscious option. Even facing the hardness of the ecclesiastical structure and the asphyxiation of its manipulative character, those preoccupied with the educational role of the Church today ask seriously if they must stay within the institutionalized Church in order to provoke the subversion or if they must abandon her to live exclusively for men and the world in that type of "Christianity without a Church". If some people choose the first alternative they ought to be prepared in demanding for the Church radical innovations. But they also have to be aware that often the Church is an evident example of how the traditional structures resist innovations and use, in the case of the

(50) "Prefácio à edição Argentina de 'A Black Theology of Liberation' de James Cone", in ACL, p. 129.
Church, the name of God in order to preserve the status quo. So they have to be convinced that the "evil forces" do not act only in the external world; they also act within the Church herself. In many occasions it is, then, necessary to undertake a crusade of the Church’s teachings against the "church’s teachings". As Jürgen Moltmann (51) points out, hopes for something totally new disappeared from the Church and were replaced by revolutionary actions. What remained in the Church were, most often, conservatism and resistance regarding the future. It is in this sense that the Church became "religious", i.e., in her obstinacy towards tradition she has sanctioned her authority on the basis of the force she had enjoyed in Medieval times.

Those who defend a religious educational practice solely grounded on the banking concept of education are called by Freire:

(1) The innocents -- or moralists according to Reinhold Niebuhr (52) -- who think that by means of humanitarianism

(52) The moralists, according to Niebuhr, are those who “do not recognize that when collective power, whether in the form of imperialism or class dominion, exploits weakness, it can never be dislodged unless power is raised against it”. Cf. Moral Man and Immoral Society, New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1960, p. xii. Also quoted by Freire, in "O papel educativo das Igrejas na América Latina", in ACL, p. 108, in footnote.
and empty verbalist sermons disconnected from reality they will first change men's consciousness through their "conversion" and then, consequently, they will change the world. Nevertheless, the so-called "Western Christian World" is still here as a proof of such naive way of thinking.

(2) The clevers, who know that embracing banking education they will be delaying the process of radical transformation of reality and the critical emergence of men's consciousness towards liberation. Both the innocents and the clevers, however, forget that consciousness is not transformed by means of speeches, eloquent sermons, courses, etc. but rather in the praxis upon the social reality. They can not agree with the idea -- due to the proper historical circumstances -- that there is no sacral society whose values have universal validity which can not be contested. They also avoid to face the truth that libertarian education can not be carried out by the dominant elites.

"In a class society the power elites are necessarily those who define education and, consequently, its aims. Obviously, these aims can not be addressed against their class interests. It would be a primary ingenuity to hope that these elites put into practice, or consented to be put into practice -- in a general and systematic way -- an education that, defying the people let them perceive the raison d'être of the social reality. The maximum that such elites permit is the verbal expression of this sort of education and, at times, some experiences which are soon paralyzed if they reveal any threat to stability" (53).

(53) "O papel educativo das Igrejas na América Latina", in ACL, p. 116.
Therefore, those innocents and clever religious educators, playing in their traditional, and sometimes in their modernized churches, the games of the power elites, try to distort or impede any effort towards the practice of a libertarian education and towards a society of equals. Agreeing with the ideology of the power elites they often make use of some isolated Church's teachings, disconnected from their global significance and historical contexts, in order to justify their alliance with the secular structures of domination. A good example of this is the following passage from Pope Leo XIII on his attacks on socialism:

"The Church, with much greater wisdom and good sense, recognizes the inequality among men, who are born with different powers of body and mind, inequality in actual possession, also, and holds that the right of property and of ownership, which springs from nature itself, must not be touched and stands inviolate" (54).

Furthermore, many of those innocents and clever, as "spiritual leaders", appear and point themselves as defenders of the people from those dangerous and demoniac subversives -- products of unadapted revolutionary communists -- enemies of men and of the Western "Christian" Civilization. They forget that if those "subversives" seek justice before all else and try to subvert the established order, it is not because they

are communists or adversaries of Christianity, but rather because this order is unjust and anti-Christian. It happens because those who lack the ability to understand the signs of times respond to each advance towards the future with dreadful hopelessness and tragic awe.

The only option for those innocents and clever religious educators is, thus, to assume consciously the ideology of domination or engage themselves in the real cause of liberation. Because they know very well how to manipulate the Gospels' teachings for the purposes of domestication they have also to "suicide" as bank-clerk educators in order to be born again as authentic utopian-prophetic educators. They have to be aware that, in fact,

"no oppressive order could permit the oppressed to begin to question: Why?... (so they) cannot utilize the banking method as an interim measure, justified on grounds of expediency, with the intention of later behaving in a genuinely revolutionary fashion. They must be revolutionary -- that is to say -- dialogical -- from the outset" (55).

Without this sort of rebirth it will be utterly infeasible for those educators to become denouncers of a domesticating educational practice, which fosters oppression, and announcers of a libertarian educational action, which encourages men to fight for a more human social order. As opponents of emerging values which seek for their own affirmation and as

(55) PO, p. 74. See also CON, p. 82.
advocators of earlier values which seek to be maintained at any rate, the bank-clerk religious educators

"castrate the prophetic dimension of the Church, whose testimony comes to be that of fear to change and to the radical transformation of the unjust world, fearful of losing herself in the 'uncertain future'. But, in fearing to lose herself in the uncertain future, in intending to avoid the implicit risk in the future which must be build and not received, the Church really loses herself" (56).

Besides, being an anti-dialogical and domesticating practice, banking education is unable to foster true democratic values and beliefs. Once it forms obedient and submissive people it is incapable of preparing them

"for integration in the process of democratization, because it contradicts that very process and opposes the emergence of the people into public life" (57).

We have to keep in mind that by inappropriate means we can never achieve good ends. It is impossible to reach a given historical end by going in the opposite direction. If our purpose is democracy and freedom, we have to teach people the arts of governing themselves and how to attain freedom.

Thus, it is not by means of an educational practice which foster bullying and passive obedience that we will achieve a true democracy. The end to correct man's distortion of his vocation to be more fully human can never be achieved by dehumanizing means. Trying to hide itself behind a pseudo-

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(56) "O papel educativo das Igrejas na América Latina", in ACL, p. 111.
(57) EPF, p. 38.
neutrality this sort of education has, indeed, fulfilled with success its tasks, i.e., to cement the ideologies of the upper classes. Through the school system it has legitimated its totalitarian actions which are barriers in the march towards a real democracy.

"a democracy which does not fear the people, which suppresses privilege, which can plan without become rigid, which defends itself without hate, which is nourished by a critical spirit rather than irrationality" (58).

But it is in its unfruitful attempts of stimulating democratic values and beliefs that banking education almost always dichotomizes moral education from global education. Freire suggests (59) that all educative action must be a moral one. He wants to see education the way it must be, i.e., as a moral whole and not as a moral moment of the educational process. Besides, moral is not something to be taught by the systematic education whose responsibility is intellectual in nature. The main preoccupation for moral education concerns the family. If it fails in this task, very little can be done by the educational institutions.

In the case of civics, for instance -- whose aim is to foster common convictions in the democratic charter -- it is frequently given (as it occurs in the Latin American educational system) as a separate discipline. It had better be

(58) EPP, p. 58
(59) INT. See also Chapter V, Item 5.1, p. 412.
stimulated simultaneously with the teaching of other disciplines such as History, Literature, Arts, Philosophy, etc. Civics is not, in fact, something which needs to be taught; it stems almost instinctively in the educatee. In some Latin American countries, for example, where civics is introduced in the curricula as an obligatory discipline (in Brazil it is a compulsory credit from kindergarten to graduate studies) the great majority of the students receive that teaching with a high degree of suspicion and with a certain tone of revolt, irony and indifferentism. Hence one can raise the question regarding the ambiguity of some of the Latin American totalitarianisms which constitute a serious menace to them: How can dictatorial regimes cope with an educational practice which is destined to stimulate democratic values? Thus, it is more than evident that what is intended with such "civics" is to domesticate the students according to the interests of the power elites and to inculcate in them the dominant political ideology. Hence Freire's observation that the people "could be helped to learn democracy through the exercise of democracy; for that knowledge, above all others, can only be assimilated experientially. More often than not, we have attempted to transfer that knowledge to the people verbally, as if we could give lessons in democracy while regarding popular participation in the exercise of power as 'absurd
and immoral" (60).

So, one has to remember that civics as well as democratic values and beliefs do not need and can not be inculcated. They are values to be lived by everyone; realities to be experienced by all in the daily life; truths to think about and to be converted into praxis. Banking education, in this particular, characterizes the educative practice fostered by the closed and totalitarian societies as well as by those inauthentic open-democratic ones.

Accordingly, the efforts made by the school system to inculcate democratic values can amount to no more than indoctrination.

"Instead of permanently seeking the reason for the existence of the objective facts, in order to theorize them, the school becomes an agency specialized in the formal enunciation of them" (61).

It leads us back to that epistemological mistake in which

(60) EPF, p. 36. In this sense, Freire's thought is in opposition, for instance, to that of Jacques Maritain to whom the democratic charter is to be inculcated by the educational system by means of moral education. However, he agrees with the Maritian notion that "it would be sheer illusion to think that the democratic charter could be efficiently taught if it were separated from the roots that give it consistency and vigor in the mind of youth, and if it were reduced to a mere series of abstract formulas -- bookish, bloodless, and cut off from life. Those who teach the democratic charter must stake on it their personal convictions, their consciences, and the depth of their moral lives... for no teaching deprived of conviction can engender conviction". Cf. The Education of Man, Op. cit., p. 64, 65.

knowledge is reduced to a simple transference of given facts. Democracy has a unique relation to education in that the prime goal of genuine libertarian education, the free men, is also the prerequisite of a true democratic society. For an authentic democratic society can only exist if its members are capable of recognizing the inalienable values and rights of all human beings. It is exactly what banking education can not afford. Stimulating a despotic and arbitrary school system it can never produce citizens able to love democracy. In such circumstances it can only produce individuals who, remaining at the margin of the historical events, ingenuously confuse democracy with demagogy. Education is not an ultimate condition for democracy although it is a necessary one, if it is really a true humanist education. By the same token, if education alone can not make the transformation of society, it is also true that this transformation can not be effectuated without education.

In sum, for Freire, true democracy as well as its values and convictions can not be seen as something to be merely deposited in others; they imply practice, i.e., men's reflection and action upon the world with the aim of transforming it whenever those values are threatened. Thus, it also demands that the bank-clerk educator

"die each day as an exclusive educator of the educatee in order to be born again as an educatee with the educatees. But, on the other hand, at the moment at which the educator for liberation is dying as
an exclusive educator, he also has to challenge the educatees in order for them to die as exclusive educatees in order to be born again as educators. In this mutual cycled rebirth both become subjects of the process of knowing, of the process of transforming reality, and not one the subject of the transferring of knowledge and the other the object or recipient of that knowledge which is transferred" (62).

Educators, principally, if they refuse to die as exclusive educators of the educatees they will probably become policemen of the true libertarian education instead of stimulating it. Professor Moacir Gadotti (63) in his proposal for a pedagogy of conflict is correct in claiming for the educator not only the right to contradict himself but also the practice of "disobedience" and "disrespect". It is necessary to undertake "an education against the education". It is true, but only when the existing educational practice is a domesticating one. But even in this case we must be cautious in order that the new proposed libertarian educational practice may not become another form of domination even if our purposes are the most well-intentioned ones. Freire himself once said:

"I considered that attitude of rebellion as one of the most promising aspects of our political life -- not because I espoused it as a form of action, but because it represented a symptom of advancement, an introduction to a more complete humanity. For that very reason, it could not be allowed to remain at

the predominantly emotional level. My sympathy for the new activism was joined to a recognition of the need to progress from naive rebellion to critical intervention" (64).

The educator has, thus, to be disrespectful, initially with himself and with the pretended image of an educated and wise man. He is obliged to disregard the traditional pedagogy, questioning it, doubting its basic premises in order to perceive its validity and its negative aspects. He is asked to execute this type of pedagogy since it is the only rational manner through which he and the people can assume their own autonomy. So it is on behalf of democracy itself that we are called to this sort of disobedience because our customary attitude

"has not been to exchange ideas, but to dictate them; not to debate or discuss themes, but to give lectures; not to work with the student, but to work on him, imposing an order to which he has to accommodate. By giving the student formulas to receive and store, we have not offered him the means for authentic thought; assimilation results from search, from the effort to re-create and re-invent" (65).

It is by means of organized critical disobedience that men are capable of edifying a society of equals. Rebelliousness is a very human characteristic which is always present wherever oppression exists. Men are not merely rebel by nature. But we also have to remember

(64) EPF, p. 35-36
(65) EPF, p. 38
"that cannons alone do not make a war and that the resolution of a war only comes when the vulnerabili-
ty of the oppressed becomes strength, capable of transforming the power of the oppressor into weakness" (66).

It is only after having supported with serenity and patience all attempts of domestication that men begin to struggle against oppression. And it has to be so since a domesticated species always tends to extinction; and in the case of the human species it is by means of gradual dehumanization. It is not without reason that true pedagogues, philosophers, artists, revolutionaries, etc., always had an eminently critical role in history, i.e., the role of annoying, disturbing, perturbing. Therefore, a philosophy which is only preoccupied in pure reflection, avoiding to interfere in the transformation of things, can never, in fact, resist a praxis. A philosophy of education merely contented with an abstract pedagogical discourse is, indeed, an unfruitful and sterile intellectual effort. Maritain is right in affirming that "philosophy starts from experience" (67). Besides, the prime role of philosophy is to awaken reason. But according to Freire's viewpoint it implies a dialogical cultural action and the replacement of the banking concept of education by the problem-posing concept.

(66) LGB, p. 19
In opposition to the banking concept of education, Freire proposes another pedagogical theory, i.e., the problem-posing concept of education as being a dialogical cultural action. It is an educational practice which, undressing itself from its alienated and alienating aspects, constitutes a force towards liberation and change. It corresponds to the intentional aspect of men's consciousness. Avoiding communiqués it embodies communication and identifies itself with the proper essence of consciousness which is always consciousness of. But, for Freire,

"being conscious, in this sense, is not simply a formula or a slogan. It is a radical form of being, of being human. It pertains to beings that not only know, but know that they know. The act of learning, in this instance, is a creative act that involves a critical comprehension of reality... The reading of a text now demands a 'reading' within the social context to which it refers" (68).

In problem-posing education knowledge is viewed as a shared process of inquiry and not as an act of transferring or depositing upon the students that exclusive knowledge of the educators. That educator-educatee contradiction of the banking education is solved with the establishment of dia-
logical relations. The classroom atmosphere becomes a meeting place where knowledge instead of being transmitted, is sought by all.

"Indeed, problem-posing education, which breaks with the vertical patterns characteristic of banking education, can fulfill its function as the practice of freedom only if it can overcome the above contradiction. Through dialogue, the teacher-of-the-students and the students-of-the-teacher cease to exist and a new term emerges: teacher-student with students-teachers" (69).

Dialogue, then, as the seal of the epistemological relationships between subjects in the knowing process, makes possible the educator-educatee reconciliation. That Cartesian posture "I think" -- which implies the transference of its thought -- is substituted by a "we think" which makes possible the existence of an "I think". From a Freirean point of view, true education is the one which incarnates the reciprocity between educators and educatees in the permanent search of knowledge. So, in a truly gnosiological dimension there is not a specific moment in which educators isolating themselves in laboratories or libraries acquire knowledge and, then, in other moment transmit this knowledge to their students.

"The problem-posing method does not dichotomize the activity of the teacher-student: he is not 'cognitive' at one point and 'narrative' at another. He is always 'cognitive', whether preparing a project or engaging in dialogue with the students. He does not

(69) PO, p. 67
regard cognizable objects as his private property, but as the object of reflection by himself and the students. In this way, the problem-posing educator constantly re-forms his reflections in the reflection of the students. The students--no longer docile listeners--are now critical co-investigators in dialogue with the teacher" (70).

Freire's emphasis, therefore, on his proposal of problem posing education, lies in the fact that in this educative action educators and learners are co-investigators, joint participants in a gnosiological process in which all share their knowledge and grow in mutual wisdom. Learning from and with the students, educators

"have a task from which they cannot escape and for which they must be well prepared: that of helping, in the authentic sense of this word, the groups to analyse their praxis and to systematize their learning derived from this praxis. Thus they go beyond mere opinion about the facts to the critical comprehension of those same facts" (71).

So, according to Freire, educators and specialists as well have special functions in the educational process. But their presences ought not to be to transform others into mere shad

(70) Po, p. 68. Freire reminds us of a declaration of Mao Tse Tung to Andre Malraux in which he states: "Vous savez que je proclame depuis longtemps: Nous devons enseigner aux masses avec precision ce que nous avons reçu d'elles avec confusion" Cf. Antimemoires, Paris, Librarie Gallimard, 1967, p. 531. Freire thinks that such declaration contains in itself a real dialogical theory of how is it possible for educators to elaborate the program contents of education according to the needs of the students and with their total participation.

(71) LGB, p. 56
ows of their own presences. Their presences, therefore, cannot be considered as unnecessary. Rejecting manipulation, Freire never accepted spontaneity. He says:

"Education, as instrument of reproduction of the dominant ideology or as a method of revolutionary transforming action, always demands such presences. There is, however, a radical difference between the two forms of being present and of being presence."

(72)

Obviously, it does not mean that educators are not allowed to inform. They are allowed to. But only if their information is understood not in terms of mere transmission of knowledge but rather in terms of developing real communication. Thus, it is essential that the information reconstruct, in absolute terms, the process of knowing.

"In fact, when we consider adult literacy learning or education in general as an act of knowing, we are advocating a synthesis between the educator's maximally systematized knowing and the learners' minimally systematized knowing -- a synthesis achieved in dialogue."

(73)

From this outlook, arguments based on the "authority" of the educators, disappear. Knowledge is always something to be brought together with the learners' experience in which both (educators and students) learn from each other as they examine, reflect, and act upon their common reality, i.e., the historical, social and cultural environment in which they live.

(72) "O processo de alfabetização política – uma introdução", in ACL, p. 92.
(73) ALP, p. 217
As subjects of the knowing process both educators and educatees, in the problem-posing method, reject the attitudes of the rural extension agents and of the technicians simply because they do not share with others their own search for knowledge. They refuse the notion that the search for knowledge demands not extension but rather conscientização which enables the learners to take a critical posture, with others, before reality.

"What is being attempted in this kind of education is the exercise of critical reflection, at deeper and deeper levels, about how human beings live in their world. It means taking the daily routine itself as an object of analysis, trying to penetrate its meaning. It means replacing knowledge based largely on feelings about the facts by knowledge based on the underlying meaning, the raison d'être, of those facts" (74).

This raison d'être of the facts is the impulse which allows men to assume the role of subjects in the transformation of reality. Freire's refutation of the practice of extension is precisely its refusal to see men as subjects in the act of learning and, consequently, its indifference to dialogical attitudes. For Freire, all the difficulties encountered in the establishment of a dialogical relationship can not be excuses to indulge anti-dialogue. These difficulties are what cause agronomists and technicians, in general, to rationalize their anti-dialogical behaviours talking about

(74) LGB, p. 134
lost time or time wasted in dialogue. Yet, it can not be considered a wasted time that spent on dialogue which presenting problems to men, criticizes these problems, and in criticizing them, inserts men into their own reality as transforming agents.

"Lost time is that in which people are 'reified'. Lost time, even time which gives the illusion of having been saved, is time spent in bla-bla-bla, in verbalism, just as pure activism is also 'time lost; neither constitutes the time of true praxis" (75).

Dialogue always requires a problematic-critical confrontation with the knowledge about reality. Such confrontation drives men to realize the necessity to transform that reality whenever this necessity is an exigency. Obviously, those fearful of such transformation are forced to find "rational" justification to their anti-dialogical behaviours. They know that this confrontation leads to conscientização and that the new educator-educatee relationships engender the development of critical thinking, once

"problem-posing supersedes the old magister dixit behind which those who regard themselves as the 'proprietors', 'administrators', or 'bearers' of knowledge attempt to hide themselves. To reject problem-posing dialogue at any level is to maintain an unjustifiable pessimism towards human beings and to life. It is to lapse back into the practice of deposing false knowledge which anaesthetizes the critical spirit, contributes to the 'domesticating' of human beings, and makes cultural invasion possible" (76).

(75) EC, p. 120
(76) EC, p. 125
And for the majority of educators, perhaps, avoiding dialogue is better than the raising of questions like these: In the search for knowledge, how can a dialogical relationship be established between educators and students (at the same level) if the former is already the possessor of that knowledge? If the role of students is to be that of learners, how can one consider them as knower subjects? The Freirean answer to these questions is the following:

"These observations, which are basically objections, cannot conceal the preconceptions of the person who makes them. They always originate with those who consider themselves to be the possessors of wisdom face to face with the educandos who are regarded as ignorant. Education through dialogue and communication is seen by them in their misinterpretation (whether erroneous or ideological) as a threat. It is in fact a threat to their false knowledge" (??).

Memorizing their lectures, those educators do not admit problem-posing education as being a gnosio-dialogical practice. In their sophisticated specialization they transform the classroom atmosphere into a mere "market place" in which they sell their knowledge to consumers and hungry students. Being victims of bureaucracy, they destroy their curiosity as well as the curiosity of the students. This is why, for Freire,

"it is essential that educators learning and learners educating make a constant effort to refuse to be bureaucratized. Bureaucracy annihilates creativity
and transforms persons into mere repeaters of clichés. The more bureaucratized they become, the more likely they are to become alienated adherents of daily routine, from which they can never stand apart in order to understand their reason for being (78).

As it occurs in the social sphere it also happens in the educational process, that is to say, educators by means of bureaucratization transform their students into a type of educational technical "aided". And like the material aid also this sort of intellectual aid thwarts the learners' efforts towards a critical vision of the world and of themselves. This is the reason that, for Freire, an educator who opts for a libertarian education among people ought to be involved with them as subjects with other subjects in the transformation of reality.

"Instead of asphyxiating initiative with bureaucratic requirements (he) stimulates and even requires initiative and creativity, without allowing (his) action to get lost in a world of papers coming and going, filling a vacuum with bureaucratic uselessness" (79)

which is, indeed, sometimes, a disguised form of avoiding a face-to-face dialogue. Thus, being a gnosioc-dialogical practice, problem-posing education reaches its ultimate goal, that is, the critical emergence of the learners' consciousness. In so far as this type of education is concerned it can not, however, be seen as a mere new sort of "group dynamic practice", a didactic mechanism which many times is used

(78) LGB, p. 12
(79) LGB, p. 58
in order to hide the mediocrity and incompetency of many educators. Freire does not deceive this or that other didactical methods and techniques. He just emphasizes that they can be employed either for the purposes of domestication or for liberation and that the function of educators, in the libertarian educative practice, is only to create the ways — with their students — in which both can reach a true critical knowledge, that knowledge found at the level of logos.

Freire still regards problem-posing education as a permanent process in its dialectical relations with reality. In this sense, education becomes a historical event in which men make history and make themselves in history at the same time. The starting point for this dialectical movement

"lies in men themselves. But since men do not exist apart from the world, apart from reality, the movement must begin with the men-world relationship. Accordingly, the point of departure must always be with men in the 'here and now', which constitutes the situation within which they are submerged, from which they emerge, and in which they intervene. Only by starting from this situation — which determines their perception of it — can they begin to move. To do this authentically they must perceive their state not as fated and unalterable, but merely as limiting — and therefore challenging" (80).

Education for liberation, thereby, has to operate within the world, the world of human beings. It denies men as beings unattached to the world and the world as an existing reality independent from men. Hence, the relationships between

(80) PO, p. 72-73
men and the historical-cultural world constitute the point of departure for the pedagogical speculation. If this historical-cultural world is to be interpreted as a finished one it is not susceptible of changing. But Freire, rejecting this notion, severely condemns all attempts of locking up history to an immutable present order which thwarts men's possibility of transforming reality.

"In problem-posing education, men develop their power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in which they find themselves; they come to see the world not as a static reality, but as a reality in process, in transformation" (81).

As Teilhard de Chardin (82) puts it very clearly, the proper process of men's evolution brings with it the process of their "hominization", i.e., the starting point of men's autobiography. Thus, Freire is correct in stressing the dialectical relations between world-consciousness and that the problem-posing educational practice has to furnish men with what he calls "the archeology of consciousness". Through it men are able

"to take the natural way by which consciousness emerges capable of perceiving itself... However, since that very remote moment, the reflexive consciousness characterized man as an animal not only capable of knowing but also capable of knowing that he knows. So in the emerging process, consciousness emerges as

(81) PO, p. 70-71
'intentionality' and not as a mere recipient to be filled up" (83).

Freire, thus, returns to the original sources of the social praxis as cultural praxis. This is the reason why he refutes so vehemently the banking concept of education, which, adapting men to a static reality, robs them of their creativity and domesticates the intentionality of their consciousness prohibiting them from building a new hopeful future. True education can not follow this way; it can not be characterized by the simple transmission of what Alfred North Whitehead calls "'inert ideas' -- that is to say, ideas that are merely received into the mind without being utilized, or tested, or thrown into fresh combination. Education with inert ideas is not only useless. it is, above all things, harmful -- Corruptio optimi pessimam... Every intellectual revolution which has ever stirred humanity into greatness has been a passionate protest against inert ideas" (84).

In order to be a genuine libertarian practice education can not be characterized by a simple transference of knowledge or even cultural values; it can not be seen either as a pure extension of specialized knowledge of technicians; it can not be an attempt to adjust the learners to the milieu. In a gnosio-dialectical approach education must present the contents of its programmes as problems to be jointly analysed.

(83) "Algumas notas sobre humanização e suas implicações pedagógicas", in ACL, p. 100.
and solved by educators and educatees rather than be shown as finished and completed solutions.

"Problematization is so much a dialectical process that it would be impossible for anyone to begin it without becoming involved in it. No one can present something to someone else as a problem and at the same time remain a mere spectator of the process... Educators who are problematized by engaging in this kind of action 're-enter into' the object of the problem through the 'entering into' of the educatees. This is why educators continue to learn. The humbler they are in this process the more they will learn" (85).

The alternative Freire suggests to replace banking education is, therefore, an educative action centered around the problematization of men-reality. This new educative proposal does not dichotomize manual from intellectual work. In this sense, we can argue that Freire rejects the empiricist education which despises abstract reason as well as the rationalist education which ignores experience. A true education is one that inspires eagerness for experience and for reason. The former teaches the latter to ground itself in concrete facts; the latter, by its turn, teaches the former to realize itself in rational knowledge in order to grasp the profound meaning of the "how" and of the "why" of things. When such an integrated education is carried out, hands and minds work side by side and the social abyss between homo faber and homo sapiens tends to disappear with the unity between theory and practice.

(85) EC, p. 151
"In a certain moment it becomes true that one no longer studies in order to work nor does one work in order to study; one studies in the process of working. There comes about, thus, a true unity between practice and theory. We must be clear, however, that what is eliminated is not that study which is critical reflection on practice completed or in process (theory), but the separation between the two. The unity of theory and practice thus establishes the unity, also, between the school, whatever its level, and productive activity as a dimension of the concrete context" (86).

In the unity between manual and intellectual work men become conscious that the act of studying drives them to an amelioration of their working conditions. It does not mean, however, to ascend the social pyramid and become alienated bourgeois intellectuals. On the contrary, it is a manner whereby men perceive that through the betterment of their working conditions they become more able to transform reality. It is, consequently, a revolutionary attitude. In this regard, Freire's emphasis on the unity between manual and intellectual work resembles, indeed, that of Marx. In many passages, Marx points out that labour, which makes men, is the main constituent of the human personality and that

"an early combination of productive labour with education is one of the most potent means for the

(86) LGB, p. 21. Jacques Maritain also stresses that "the whole of education and teaching must tend to unify, not to spread out; it must strive to foster internal unity in man. This means that from the very start, and, as far as possible, all through the years of youth, hands and mind should be at work together." Cf. Education at the Crossroads, Op. cit., p. 45."
transformation of present-day society" (87).

Furthermore, from that gnosio-dialectical aspect, problem-posing education signifies the problematization of everything related to men's work. It involves the problematization of the proper world of history and culture in order to achieve a critical posture.

"To present this human world as a problem for human beings is to propose that they 'enter into' it critically, taking the operation as a whole, their action, and that of others on it. It means 're-entering' the world through the 'entering into' of the previous understandings which may have been arrived at naively because reality was not examined as a whole. In 'entering into' their own world, people become aware of their manner of acquiring knowledge and realize the need of knowing even more. In this lies the whole force of education in the gnosiological condition" (88).

From this framework men discover that, in the act of knowing, they can not passively and uncritically receive the deposits of someone's knowledge. In such attitude they progress towards the raison d'être of reality which begins to be mastered and humanized. They perceive that everything has a temporal meaning and that the world is not a cul-de-sac but, on the contrary, something susceptible of transformation, full of challenges and possibilities. Thus, they also real-


(88) EC, p. 152-153
"education is not solely and exclusively permanence or change in something. Education is 'duration' (in the Bergsonian meaning of the term) because it results from the interplay of these two opposites in dialogue. Education shows 'duration' in the contradiction of permanence and change. This is why it is possible to say that education is permanent only in the sense of duration. In this case 'permanent' does not mean the permanence of values, but the permanence of the educational process, which is the interplay between cultural permanence and change" (89).

On account of this, the concept of permanent education in Freire's thought lies beyond the sphere of mere professional training or actualization. Education does not end with the acquisition of a diploma. It is something which must be seen as a continuing process of self-education, i.e., an endless process of self-renewal. He affirms, for example, that

"primary education, while it is still the responsibility of the total system and maintains relations with the rest of the parts, is not seen as a 'path' leading to a higher point" (90).

(89) EC, p. 153. Parenthesis is mine.
(90) LGB, p. 123. This same position is also held by Julius Nyerere who says: "The education offered in our primary schools should be an education complete in itself. It should not continue to be simply a preparation for secondary school. Instead of the activities of the primary school being aimed at competitive examinations which select the few who will go to secondary school, they should constitute preparation for the life which the majority of children will lead". Cf. "Education for Self-Reliance", in Essays on Socialism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 61. Also quoted by Freire, in LGB, p. 123.
In this respect, Freire's view is the same as John Dewey to whom the school's task is not the preparation for life but, on the contrary, it has to be life itself. Education, thus, consists in preparing the person for right choices because those irrational forces, or latent barbarism, are still immense in human nature. In order to avoid the awakening of such forces men need a permanent education once the school system or the systematic education as such only plays a part with respect to this task since its role is more related to the education of the intellect than to that of the will. Besides, Freire still thinks that the whole process of education has to be continuous in the sense that if does not transform itself according to the new exigencies of the social body it loses its transformative power. It is what makes the educational process "durable", i.e., not as something which is, but as something which is in a process of being.

"Problem-posing education affirms men as beings in the process of becoming -- as unfinished, uncompleted beings in and with a likewise unfinished reality... In this incompleteness and this awareness lie the very roots of education as an exclusively human manifestation. The unfinished character of men and the transformational character of reality necessitate that education be an ongoing activity. Education is thus constantly remade in the praxis. In order to be, it must become. Its 'duration' is found in the interplay of the opposites permanence and change" (91).

(91) P0, p. 72. See also CON, p. 81.
So, problem-posing education is one that takes into account all the historical and cultural dimensions of reality in which it is inserted. It fosters change contrary to the theory of banking education which stimulates permanence. In this sense it identifies itself with the "revolutionary futurity" and hence its prophetic and hopeful dimensions.

Being in a dialectical relation with the world problem-posing education can not be seen as an intellectual amusement separate from action and concrete situation. This is why Freire does not discuss, for instance, concerns about transcendance without first discussing the concrete reality. Men live in relation to a transcendent Being. The relationships between men and men, men and the world are to be moulded and determined according to the relationships which should exist between men and God. And since the existing relationships between men and God are grounded on love, oppression and domination are not to be verified among men. Freire describes this sort of relationships in this way:

"Cette capacité de transcender s'enracine aussi, selon nous, dans sa finitude, dans la conscience qu'il a de cette finitude. L'homme découvre qu'il est un être inachevé, dont la plénitude s'accomplit dans la relation avec son Créateur. Et cette relation, par sa nature même, ne sera jamais domination ou domestication, mais toujours libération. Il s'ensuit que la Religion (relier -- relier), qui incarne la transcendance des relations de l'homme, ne doit jamais devenir un instrument de son aliénation. Car, précisément, l'homme, pauvre être fini, détient
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dans sa transcendance, grâce à l'amour, la possibilité de retourner à la source que le libère" (92).
Likewise moral education -- which can not be separated from education as a whole -- Freire's view on religion is not that in which God is seen as the Unmoved Motor of Aristotle. His vision of God is that of an active and dynamic Being who acts in history with the purpose of liberating men from all sort of bondage and oppression. He creates and is creating the world with men's cooperation. A religious education like that of the banking concept which contents itself in presenting God only as a transcendental Saviour of individual souls and not as Someone who brings men and history to true freedom is, in fact, paradoxically endorsing the Marxist criticism that religion

"is the imaginary realization of the human essence, because the human essence possesses no true reality. Thus, the struggle against religion is, indirectly, the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion. Religious suffering is at the same time an expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the feeling of a heartless world and the soul of soulless circumstances. It is the opium of the people" (93).

This Marx's criticism of religion, in general, can, in fact, be considered as being very relevant. But we have to realize that its applicability to Christianity is to be understood in the historical context of one portion of the XIX Century Church in her adhesion to a Christian ethics full of conformity before the social injustices. It is only within the framework of such ethics, in which the Church is seen as instrument of social control, engaged in mythologizing reality in order to domesticate men, that Marx's criticism of religion makes echo on Christianity. The problem with Marxism is that it was incapable of grasping the difference between Christian ethics and "Church's ethics". Hence, the similitude and difference between Marx's criticism on religion and Freire's own criticism on the traditional model of Latin American Church.

Freire is concerned with the question of how the depressed masses can move towards full human existence as persons. This is the very essence of a true Christian ethics. Whenever the Church as an institution puts herself as an obstacle to the full achievement of such ethics it is the duty of Christians to admonish her about this sort of deviation from the core of Christianity. However, if they silence their voices because they are unaware of this or because they are fearful regarding the consequences it implies, then, Marxism probably will find here the proper soil to flourish
and propagate its ideology by means of its attacks on Christianity. By virtue of this the task of the problem-posing religious education is, consequently, to show that the mission of Christianity is also to work with God in saving the world by combating all forms of oppression. Here again the difficulty of many to understand the very Marxist-philosophical foundations of the Latin American theology of liberation which does not engender false beliefs whereby men "want to reach transcendence without passing through worldliness; want the meta-history without experiencing history; want salvation without liberation." (94).

Problem-posing religious education stresses that the role of Christianity must not be resumed in stimulating and developing the pious sentiments nor to provide "spiritual safety" to those who are frightened and fearful in regard to the rapid changes of the contemporary world; that the Church must not reduce herself to a closed institution only preoccupied with her own defense, since to witness the libertarian acts of God in favour of men, is her raison d'être; that the Church must not be considered as a simple kind of "insurance company" against the evils of the technological society; that the Church must take seriously her responsibility to make men more human, more conscious of their destiny towards freedom. Thus, the concept of Church that problem-

(94) "O papel educativo das Igrejas na América Latina", in ACL, p. 117.
posing religious education fosters is that of the utopian-prophetic one.

Parallel to the above subject-matter lies the fact that the religious education given by the Church is automatically expressed in the other spheres of secular education, i.e., the family as well as in the school system. Hence, the necessity to tackle the educative role of the Church. Since she can not exist in abstractum, as a historical institution, her educative function can not be comprehended outside reality. Freire states:

"The Word of God is inviting me to re-create the world, not for my brothers' domination but for their liberation. I am not really able to hear that Word, then, unless I am fired up to live it fully. Listening to the Word of God does not mean acting like empty vessels waiting to be filled with that Word. The Word of God is not some content to be poured into us as if we were mere static recipients for it. And because it saves, that Word also liberates, but men have to accept it historically. They must make themselves subjects, agents of their own salvation and liberation" (95).

So, salvation and liberation can only be attained if the educative practice of the Church is a problem-posing one. In a situation of oppression there is no neutrality for the Church and for her educative action. Opting for problem-posing education, she helps men to overcome their fatalistic mentality as well as, in consequence, their passivity and resignation before oppression. The traditional lethargy of

the oppressed gives way to dynamic initiatives for social changes in which a different order will be adequate for the dispossessed to attain their full existence as persons. Such sort of education enables them to cut the umbilical cord with nature and with a sacralized social order and thus discover themselves as participants in a concrete historical reality open to the future.

Those who, with the Church, commit themselves to a problem-posing educational practice, inevitably adhere to a utopian-prophetic pedagogy. So they must be conscious of the impossible neutrality of education as well as of its consequences already manifested in the praxis of those who advocate it by means of banking education.

"It is a naivété to think of an abstract role, in a conjoint of neutral methods and techniques for an action which occurs in a reality which is not neutral either" (96).

Those who, in the context of oppression like that of Latin America, defend the neutrality of the Church or her educative role, are, actually, advocating a political adhesion favouring themselves and the interests of the oppressor classes. They think:

"If education lasts, it is because it can transform what it maintains. They forget that the power which creates education in order that it be maintained does not permit education to work against it. This is why the radical and profound transformation of the education, as system, only occurs -- and even so

(96) "O papel do trabalhador social no processo de mudança", in ACL, p. 39.
not in an automatic and mechanical form—when society is also radically transformed" (97).

Hence the demand for a problem-posing-utopian-prophetic pedagogy which rejecting stability is itself a call to undertake a tramp with all those who, taking history into their hands, make and re-make it, leaving their marks and presences wherever they pass, not as alienated Christian educators, but as men and women engaged in reality.

"As(they) emerge from time, discover temporality, and free themselves from 'today', their relations with the world become impregnated with consequences. The normal role of human beings in and with the world is not a passive one. Because they are not limited to the natural (biological) sphere but participate in the creative dimension as well, men can intervene in reality in order to change it. Inheriting acquired experience, creating and re-creating, integrating themselves into their context, responding to its challenges, objectifying themselves, discerning, transcending, men enter into the domain which is theirs exclusively -- that of History and of Culture" (98).

Nevertheless, Freire suggests that educators, in adopting problem-posing education, can not, naturally, expect that the dominant elites thereby abandon the usage of banking educational practice. His intention is to remind true humanist educators that they can not, in the pursuit of liberation, employ the banking methodology which is a denial of such pursuit. Nor may this methodology be continuously used in the revolutionary society once it represents the

(97) "Algumas notas sobre conscientização", in ACL, p. 146.
(98) EPF, p. 4
very negation of this society due to its mistrust in men.

"Unfortunately" -- says Freire -- "those who espouse the cause of liberation are themselves surrounded and influenced by the climate which generates the banking concept, and often do not perceive its true significance or its dehumanizing power. Paradoxically, then, they utilize this same instrument of alienation in what they consider an effort to liberate. Indeed, some 'revolutionaries' brand as 'innocents', 'dreamers' or even 'reactionaries' those who would challenge this educational practice" (99).

True problem-posing educators, in order to avoid the above paradox, can not commit themselves to the cause of men's liberation, employing the same weapons of those who esteem their domestication. If banking education serves to the ends of alienation how can educators, using its methodology, speak on behalf of liberation?

"The political-revolutionary action cannot repeat the political-dominating action. Antagonistic as they are in their objectives, they are also antagonistic in their methods" (100).

Such antagonism happens exactly because educators -- due to their ideology of class position -- frequently verbalize a revolutionary action but act in opposition to that action, i.e., they did not yet commit the necessary class suicide.

For this particular reason, Freire stresses that problem-posing education is more feasible to be carried out, in systematic terms, in the context of a revolutionary society in which the revolutionary educator has already "died"

(99) PO, p. 66
(100) "Conscientização e Libertação - uma conversa com Paulo Freire", in ACL, p. 142.
as an exclusive educator of the educatees. In this sense, the revolutionary problem-posing educator ought to orient his efforts with that of the students, i.e., to commit himself to a critical posture in which he and the educatees, together, search for their mutual humanization.

"Their efforts must be followed by a deep trust in men and in their creative power. In order to obtain such result the educator must place himself at the same level of the students in his relation with them" (101).

Consequently, they can not admit the notion that men's consciousness is an empty vessel in which knowledge is to be poured by those who consider themselves the absolute owners of its contents. Even when the aim of these contents is to foster democratic values and beliefs they can not be indoctrinated. Insofar as an attempt to indoctrinate these values and beliefs is successful the result, nonetheless, will not be democratic because any sort of indoctrination, treating men as objects, transforms them into caricatures of human beings. Democratic values and beliefs require the genuine consent of men, which in turn, require, among other things, that they be able to evaluate rationally their own fundamental commitments. This is why, for Freire,

"education is an act of love, and thus an act of courage. It cannot fear the analysis of reality or, under pain of revealing itself as a farce, avoid creative discussion" (102).
According to Freire, problem-posing education is able to lead to an authentic democracy. It seeks solutions to the social problems with the genuine participation of the people instead of imposing prefabricated solutions upon them. Stimulating dialogue and critical consciousness, it is able to create a society homogeneously open with an unprecedented commitment of all people to their own destiny. So, it fosters social and political responsibility at the same time it is an incentive towards common participation in the development of life in community. Problem-posing educators can not, therefore, in the pursuit of genuine democracy, defend an educational practice and a political order which are the proper negation of such democracy.

"An education that envisages making concrete such values as solidarity, social responsibility, creativity, discipline in the service of the common good, vigilance and a critical spirit... is not possible if, in that education, the learners continue to be what they were in the (banking) educational system, mere recipients of packaged knowledge, transferred to them by their teachers" (103).

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(103) LGB, p. 43. It is not without motive that Karl Jaspers stresses: "Reason can prevail reliably only if it guides the people along with their leaders, not just a few lone, aloof individuals. This is impossible unless every individual has a chance to think and to act with the rest. Democracy, therefore, requires the whole people to be educated so as to develop everyone's thought and judgment to the limits of his natural capacity. It calls for publicity of thought, especially of news, discussions, propositions, and plans". Cf. The Future of Mankind, Op. cit., p. 292.
Moreover, problem-posing educators can neither advocate an economic system which does not share equally the use of its common good with all. When one man calls this good his, another calls this good his, then the divisions among men begin. V.I. Lenin once stressed:

"If we are not to mock at common sense and history, it is obvious that we cannot speak of 'pure democracy' so long as different classes exist; we can only speak of 'class democracy'" (104).

True humanist educators have, therefore, to repudiate such a system that makes profit its essential or ultimate motivation. It does not matter if they agree with Marx or not but they will recognize that he created the image of a society not based on profit. They will conclude, at least, that if there exists an intrinsic evil it is part of the capitalist system itself which must, therefore, be suppressed. They may even end up realizing that this Marx's achievement was firstly stirred up by the Judeo-Christian thought. The prophetic voices of the VIII Century B.C. -- particularly Amos and I Isaiah -- are full of condemnations regarding the huge profits gained by a few through the impoverishment of many. "Woe of the rich" Christ said in many occasions. Although it is out of question to construct an economic system from his teachings; nonetheless, He gave some broad guidelines, re-

jecting profit as the driving force behind men's activities. The proper essence of the Gospels' message, "to love all men, even the humblest", is entirely contrary to this sort of economic system which benefits only a few. Such a system which does not constitute a Marxist aspiration, can neither be interpreted as a Christian inspiration. Christians can not admit that to possess things as one's own, to the exclusion of all others, is an intrinsic natural right granted to every man. Hence, Freire's statement:

"Neither the Christian message nor Marx's scientific thought is an invitation to sit back passively and watch oppression taking place, nor are they devilish instruments for enslaving man. Marx is no more responsible for the wooden distortions of his concept of man and the world than Christ is for our cowardice. Hence the first requirement for knowing how to hear the Word of God (and not only hearing it but putting it into practice) is in my opinion, a willingness to dedicate oneself to the liberation of man. Such a process, though, let me say it once again, demands of us a historical commitment, it requires a transforming activity, one that will embolden us to challenge the powerful of the earth" (105).

It is on account of this oppressive character that problem-posing-utopian-prophetic educators ought to reject the capitalist economic system. Embracing the cause of men's liberation they are forced to break with its way of life not only to the extent of trying to avoid its defects, but also to replace it with something else.

It has also to be pointed out that, contrary to banking education, the relationships between educators and educatees, in the problem-posing educational practice, are not characterized by that social distance. Offering the proper climate to dialogue it fosters automatically -- and without the necessity of indoctrination -- democratic values and beliefs. Wherever dialogue does not exist, to speak of democracy, as well as of libertarian education, is meaningless. Due to this, problem-posing education refuses imported education and the foreign models of democracy as feasible solutions to the problems of any society because of their anti-dialogical features. Any society, in its attempts at experiencing democracy, has to adopt an educational system solely grounded on dialogical practice. It was exactly in a context similar to this -- when the transitional phase of the Brazilian society occurred and the first rays of democracy began to glitter -- that Freire proposed his dialogical pedagogy. He knew that our new-born democracy would survive only if an education founded on dialogical attitudes was enforced. He was certain that

"before it becomes a political form, democracy is a form of life, characterized above all by a strong component of transitive consciousness. Such transitivity can neither appear nor develop except as men are launched into debate, participating in the examination of common problems" (106).

(106) EPF, p. 29
And it is something that banking education never can do. Once it does not engender democratic attitudes it is incapable of stimulating changes which is a very distinctive characteristic of democracy. Thus, only problem-posing education is able to help men to assume critical attitudes towards reality in order to transform it by means of the advent of a true democracy.

Problem-posing educators, therefore, have to be aware that they do not adhere to a supposedly neutral educative practice; they have to be convinced that the fundamental problems which trouble education are not only the pedagogical ones but also the political and ideological questions; they have to be conscious that they are working in favour of the liberation of men and, consequently, against the expectancies of the dominant classes; they have to be certain that they embraced a type of educative practice which, beyond being an act of knowledge, is also a means for the radical transformation of reality; they have to be sure that embarking themselves on this sort of educative action, they will become the prototype of the radical-utopian-prophetic-revolutionary educators whose fruitful results, perhaps, they will never see; finally, they have to know that their engagement in such pedagogical activity, exposes them to many risks.
"which we do not always want to run, since we are tempted by the stability we fear to lose. In the long run, in preferring stability, immobility, self-censure, conspiratorial silence, all we do is renounce liberty because we are afraid of it. We shall thus not be able critically to have 'unusual ideas about education', since thinking in this way is to be committed, and requires of us a greater risk that of putting into practice some of the unusual ideas" (107).

So, in opposition to the anti-historicity of the banking educational practice, problem-posing education is a historical one due to its commitment to the acts of denunciation and annunciation. It is its responsibility to make men more human, indeed, an idea which alarms and terrifies the dominating classes. For these wealthy minorities, nothing is more appalling than the idea that the dispossessed masses, totally proletarianized for centuries in inhuman conditions, are beginning to acquire a class consciousness. In advocating such utopian-prophetic concept of education, Freire is, in fact, formulating an educational theory which, inserted in history, is in accordance with the very mode of human being. Hence the previous statement that problem-posing education as a dialogical cultural action implies an epistemological practice utterly in antagonism with the domesticating character of the banking concept of education.

"The utopian nature of cultural action for freedom is what distinguishes it above all from cultural action for domination. Cultural action for domination, based on myths, cannot pose problems about reality.

to the people, nor orientate the people to the unveiling of reality, since both of these projects would imply denunciation and annunciation. On the contrary, in the problematizing and conscientizing cultural action for freedom, the annunciation of a new reality is the historical project proposed for men's achievement" (108).

However, one can not be ingenuous to think that Freire's proposal to a problem-posing education, has to be the same for all societies. For example, his recent experience in Guinea-Bissau was totally different from those of Brazil and Chile where peasants and urban proletarians are often illiterate linguistically and politically. In the case of Guinea-Bissau things were quite different.

"People's lives had all been touched directly or indirectly by the war for liberation, 'a cultural fact and a factor of culture', to use Amilcar Cabral's expression. The political consciousness of the people has been born of the struggle itself. While 90 percent of the people were illiterate, in the literal sense of the term, they were politically highly literate -- just the opposite of certain communities which possess a sophisticated kind of literacy but are grossly illiterate about political matters" (109).

Although the aims of Freire's pedagogy are the same for all societies, i.e., men's liberation from oppression, the methods, strategies and contents, obviously, vary from one society to another. He writes:

"The libertarian effort of education is one thing in a society where the socio-economic cleavages are clearly visible, where the contradictions are obvious, and the violence of the dominant class on the dominated classes is crude and primary; it is quite

(108) CAC, p. 472-473
(109) LGB, p. 10
another thing in a highly modernized capitalist society which enjoys a high level of 'social well-being', where existing contradictions are less easily discernible, and the 'manipulation of consciousness' exerts an indisputable influence in masking reality. In the latter case, much more so than in the first, and for obvious reasons, the educational system becomes a highly sophisticated instrument of social control" (110).

In conclusion, it is also necessary to stress that the dispute between those who embrace the banking concept of education and those who defend the problem-posing concept is basically the conflict between traditionalism and progressivism in education. Freire's description of problem-posing education, for instance, is quite similar to John Dewey's (111) concept of experimentalist or progressive education. However, he can not be interpreted as being a contemporary progressive educator. He himself says:

"Je ne suis pas un éducateur progressiste, je suis un éducateur révolutionnaire. Quand je parle de processus éducationnel, quand je parle des méthodes édu- cationnelles, de l'éducation pour la révolution, je fais une relation dialectique entre le processus et l'intention politique de l'éduteur. L'éduteur progressiste ne fait pas cette connexion. L'éduteur progressiste reste dans les méthodes, dans les projets, dans le matériel didactique, etc..." (112).

Freire's approach to problem-posing education has also many points in common with Maritain's concept of

(112) "L'éducation pour la libération", Op. cit., p. 36. Edward D'Angelo, for example, thinks that Freire is a new type of progressive educator. See his "The Revolutionary Pedagogy of Paulo Freire", in Revue Revolution- ary World, Amsterdam, Netherlands, No. 15, 1975, p. 67-73.
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education as a way of solving problems. For Maritain,

"it is a normal auxiliary means, destined to prevent contemplative learning from degenerating into passivity and inert docility. For there is no contemplative learning if it does not respond to and stimulate a searching effort of the mind, an anxiety to know. Truth, in education, can be betrayed in two ways: either by substituting mechanical drill, and skill in solving difficulties, for the élan toward knowledge, or by putting the intellect of the student to sleep in ready-made formulas, which he accepts and memorizes without engaging his own self in the grasping of what they supposedly convey to him. Genuine contemplative or truth-grasping learning fails in its very nature if it does not develop in the youth both critical activity and a kind of thirst and anguish whose reward will be the very joy of perceiving truth" (113).

Nevertheless, the great achievement of Freire's pedagogy is its application to the cause of liberation of the oppressed and its usage as a methodology for the raising and awakening of critical consciousness. It can only be efficaciously carried out through dialogue and critical participation of the educantes in the educative process as well as in the social reality. The core of Freire's pedagogy is, therefore, liberation. His emphasis on this is not, in fact, a novelty of his pedagogical speculations. The very roots of education for freedom can be found in the Classical philosophy and it has been greatly incorporated to various and different philosophical trends since Jean-Jacques Rousseau, G.W.F. Hegel, Karl Marx, Jacques Maritain, etc. The singu-

Iarity of Freire's pedagogy, however, lies in the fact that it is not a mere abstract concept or an intellectual philosophical debate about liberation; it is rather, and chiefly, a historical-revolutionary engagement in the struggle against oppression. His pedagogical theory, in this sense, is also a strong refutation against those who try to convert the so well-known education for freedom into a purely methodological or metaphysical problem, taking the methods as something neutral. In this same line of thought, he also criticizes those who seek to empty the educative action from its political content and the expression "education for freedom" becomes, then, senseless. This sort of "education for freedom" can be so domesticating as any other, although it is a sophisticated form of domestication made in the name of freedom and on behalf of "democratic liberties". Hence, Freire's preference for the use of the word "liberation" instead of "freedom". The former has a more historical and concrete connotation whereas the latter is susceptible to misunderstandings once it can be interpreted by a purely metaphysical point of view.

In sum, Freire's proposal for a problem-posing education as a cultural dialogical action for liberation is something indispensable and urgent in order to raise the consciousness of the oppressed by means of their self-
reflection and critical posture regarding their own historical conditionings. Since the very beginning of his activities in Brazil it meant

"to accept the challenges of our alarming rates of illiteracy, and ideally, since a literacy program was only part of the need to work on it and education for intervention simultaneously" (114).

However, his efforts towards this libertarian pedagogical practice were the price he paid in prison and exile due to his courage to denounce an unjust social order, to his "dissobedience" in undertaking "an education against 'the education'", and to his bravery to love and believe that

"only by working with the people could (he) achieve anything authentic on their behalf. Never had (he) believed that the democratization of culture meant either its vulgarization or simply passing on to the people prescriptions formulated in the teacher's office" (115).

Therefore, the study of Freire's methodology as a way of raising and awakening consciousness -- mainly among illiterates -- which automatically drives people to a historical commitment by means of revolutionary action is of great importance to the understanding of the process of conscientização as well as to the other aspects of Freire's pedagogical inquiries.

(114) EPF, p. 38-39
(115) EPF, p. 41
4.3 - Freire's Method and "Conscientização"

The prime goal of Freire's pedagogy is to enable people to awaken and move from their magic-naive stage of consciousness towards the attainment of a critical perception of themselves and of reality. As it has already been stressed in the preceding section this goal is reached through a problem-posing educational action. It is, therefore, the result as well as the consequence of the process of conscientização. Men are no longer in a dichotomized situation between being and not-being but rather in a new situation between being and being more. As Freire has dedicated most of his pedagogical activities to the analyses of illiteracy and literacy training it is necessary, firstly, to take a look into the traditional meaning of illiteracy.

Etymologically the prefix ill has a very strong negative connotation. Thus, a priori, when someone is called illiterate a very deep and radical difference is established between his negative existence and the plenary existence of others. According to Pierre Furer (116), the illiterate is a totally strange and unknown man; he is a kind of sub-human man, the depreciated individual. He is not studied as a man since he is not considered as man as such; he is

only a support for a negation. The question: "Are you literate or not?" has the same tone of "Do you exist or not?". Because illiterates exist only to serve a function of something that they are not, there is no distinction between them; they all are merely reduced to the same common denominator: illiterates. From this pejorative treatment they appear as being a "social ill", a flagellum which has to be extirpated quickly. Such procedure can be interpreted as a misapplication of that Hegelian reasoning; let us deny the negation and the fruits of the affirmation will soon appear. In this mistaken sort of reasoning are found the reasons in which are based the traditional literacy campaigns and Freire's refutations of them.

4.3.1 - FREIRE'S REFUTATION OF THE TRADITIONAL LITERACY CAMPAIGNS

To begin with, some assumptions always troubled Freire regarding the traditional reasons to combat illiteracy. Among these reasons are:

(1) the raising of the cultural-educational level of the people;

(2) the integration of the illiterates into the very structures and values of society;

(3) the provision of the necessary knowledge by virtue of
which people can assume their role in the development of their society;

(4) by giving to the people the opportunities for participation in the political, social and economic processes;

(5) the fact that illiteracy is directly related to national prestige and to the defense of the "international stand" of a country; what is important is not the social function of illiteracy but what it represents to others, mainly to the international community;

(6) the false belief that learning to read and write is automatically linked to the betterment of the people's living conditions. Freire writes:

"This naivété reveals, at least, a failure to perceive the structure not only of illiteracy, but of social phenomena in general. Such an approach may admit that these phenomena exist, but it cannot perceive their relationship to the structure of the society in which they are found. It is as if these phenomena were mythical, above and beyond concrete situations, or the results of the intrinsic inferiority of a certain class of men. Unable to grasp contemporary illiteracy as a typical manifestation of the 'culture of silence', directly related to underdeveloped structures, this approach cannot offer an objective, critical response to the challenge of illiteracy. Merely teaching men to read and write does not work miracles; if there are not enough jobs for men able to work, teaching more men to read and write will not create them" (117).

It was these very assumptions which disturbed Freire, more particularly, as he saw in the traditional literacy

(117) ALP, p. 209
campaigns a way of indoctrination in the very values and patterns of a stratified, dehumanizing society and, in their methods, a mere continuation of the objectifying, dependency-creating schooling typical of such society. According to Freire, the problem of all these literacy campaigns is that they "idealize literacy" giving to it a power which it does not, in fact, possess. The fundamental question to be tackled is how to put all these campaigns at the service of a real national development and how to treat illiterates as subjects capable of being the agents of the necessary transformations in regard to the attainment of a more just social order. From the outset Freire saw behind these traditional literacy campaigns the purpose of domestication since they were frequently based on cultural, economic or humanitarian grounds without any reference to the social and political implications. And Freire does not separate the question of illiteracy from the structures of oppression. The problem of illiteracy can not be solved unless the causes that engender oppression are abolished. Escaping from this problem, and

"in accepting the illiterate as a person who exists on the fringe of society, we are led to envision him as a sort of 'sick man', for whom literacy would be the 'medicine' to cure him, enabling him to 'return' to the 'healthy' structure from which he has become separated. Educators would be benevolent counselors, scouring the outskirts of the city for the stubborn illiterates, runaways from the good life, to restore them to the forsaken bosom of happiness by giving them the 'gift of the word'" (118).

(118) ALP, p. 211
Thus, it is quite obvious that such a concept of illiteracy can never be a stimulus for literacy campaigns as a practice for liberation. These campaigns will never question the causes which deprive men of their rights to pronounce their own words. Even if their purpose is liberation, their efforts, nonetheless, will be in vain since men will continue to be seen and treated as beings-for-others, beings oppressed inside a dehumanized social structure. So it is meaningless to speak about illiteracy or about literacy training without the radical transformation of the oppressed reality.

Moreover, the methods employed by the traditional literacy campaigns are simply a way of perpetuating the actual oppressed order. That "digestive" concept of knowledge appears herein with all its force:

"Illiterates are considered 'undernourished', not in the literal sense in which many of them really are, but because they lack the 'bread of the spirit'. Consistent with the concept of knowledge as food, illiteracy is conceived of as a 'poison herb', intoxicating and debilitating persons who cannot read or write. Thus, much is said about the 'eradication' of illiteracy to cure the disease. In this way, deprived of their character as linguistic signs constitutive of men's thought-language, words are transformed into mere 'deposits of vocabulary' -- the bread of the spirit which the illiterates are to 'eat' and 'digest'... If millions of men are illiterate, staring for letters', 'thirsty for words', the word must be brought to them to save them from 'hunger' and 'thirst'" (119).

Hence, the material used in the traditional literacy cam-

(119) ALP, p. 207-208
paigned campaigns are deeply oriented towards that notion that man has a "spatialized" consciousness and that the role of teachers is only to fill up the illiterates' consciousness with alienated words which reflect their own class values. Under such conditions

"written and read, the word is as if it were amulet juxtaposed to man who is forbidden to say it, but merely repeat it. It is a word almost always without relation to the world and to the things that it names" (120).

Or better yet, the methodology employed by these campaigns is a banking one in which words are deposited in the object-students in a purely mechanical form.

Rejecting the mechanistic methodology of the traditional literacy campaigns, Freire proposed a new method in which illiterates as soon as they begin to read the first letters, also start to 'read' their existential socio-cultural reality. In such a process they initiate the awakening of their consciousness.

"We wished" — says Freire — "to design a project in which we would attempt to move from naivety to a critical attitude at the same time we taught reading. We wanted a literacy program which would be an introduction to the democratization of culture, a program with men as its Subjects rather than as patient recipients, a program which itself would be an act of creation, capable of releasing other creative acts, one in which students would develop the impatience and vivacity which characterize search and invention" (121).

(120) "A alfabetização de adultos - crítica de sua visão ingênua; compreensão de sua visão crítica", in ACD, p.13.
(121) EPP, p. 43
Freire's proposal is, then, macro-social; his pedagogical theory intends a critical reading of reality in a global scale. Due to this, as we have already stressed, conscientização is not, in a Freirean conception, a chronological individual undertaking; it is not the mere conversion of the individual's consciousness that will provoke the transformation of the social structure. On the contrary, the collective consciousness will be the responsible force towards the collective transformation of reality. This is the motive why Freire regards literacy training also as a process of cultural action.

"The 'reading' or 'rereading' of reality as it is being transformed is the primary consideration, taking precedence over the mere learning of the written language. Even in teaching children, the process is social and involves 'reading' the world" (122).

Although Freire does not deny the importance of the subjective aspect in the process of conscientização and in the process of transformation as well, his emphasis is that the process of change can only be effectuated dialectically, or in other words, when the subjective and the objective aspects -- converging, opposing and uniting in themselves -- work in a sole process of social transformation. So, any authentic experiment in literacy training as cultural action for liberation results inevitably in the discovery by the learners of the importance of collectivity.

(122) LGB, p. 160
Following this line of thought Freire came to develop the concept of conscientização as a means of bringing liberation to the oppressed illiterates. His method of literacy training, thus, engenders a process of social transformation, and is ultimately related to transformation, as the system of education coincides with a very specific form of social praxis: the awakening of consciousness. The intention -- as we have been emphasizing -- is to help people to take a critical possession of their environment in order to modify it. In Freire's methodology for literacy training, however, illiterates do not come to the classroom

"simply to receive 'letters' passively as though these were a gift from the teacher. They (come) to help the teachers become teachers. Without them, this learning would not take place. Thus, from the beginning, the learners would be called upon to assume the role of Subjects in the process of their own learning, in the course of which they would also have something to teach" (123).

Insofar as the method is founded on a problem-posing educational practice, it avoids manipulation in the sense that one does not make choices for others. One of the fundamental tasks of Freire's method consists primarily in teaching people to make their own choices, knowing that any decision implies imminent action. Regarding the choices of literacy educators, he says:

"If our ideological choice is a liberating one, then the literacy process has to do something more than

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(123) LGB, p. 81
to train people technically and mechanically to learn how to read and write. What is fundamental in the literacy process, if our choice is a liberating one, is to invite people to discover that the importance for them is not to read alienated histories but to make history" (124).

We have to bear in mind that Freire's method, nonetheless, is not an abstract discourse on liberation; it is already in itself an action towards liberation here and now. Yet, the learning process is seen as a way of "awakening", a search for liberation which is not an empty concept or a simple and passive human aspiration. It constitutes that very synthesis between theory and practice. For Freire, a real education is that in which

"the content is in a constant dialectical relation with the needs of the country. In this kind of education, knowledge, resulting in practical action, itself grows out of the unity between theory and practice. For this reason, it is not possible to divorce the process of learning from its own source within the lives of the learners themselves" (125).

Thus, concerning Freire's theory of education as cultural action for liberation, one has to remember that it did not originate in the cloister of his office through his intellectual speculation. Rather its origin is to be founded on his praxis as an educator deeply committed to the destiny of the oppressed. Through them and with them he learned how to teach them. It was among them that he was able to build his method for literacy training as well as his pedagogical

(125) LGB, p. 42
theory. Educators, if they really want to accept such a theory, not in theoretical terms only but principally in practical ones, they have to ask themselves seriously

"if they really believe in the people, in ordinary people, in the peasants. If they are really capable of communing with them, of 'proclaiming' the world with them. If they are incapable of believing in the peasants, of communing with them, they will at best be cold technicians. They will probably be technocrats, or even good reformers. But they will never be educators who will carry out radical transformations" (126).

In the context of Freire's educational thought, therefore, the idea of liberation has a full meaning due to its relations with the concrete struggle of men concerning the amelioration of their social conditions. It means that millions of the oppressed people are able to find in this concept of education a substantial help or maybe a starting point for their liberation; when someone says that education is an education for liberation he is obliged to recognize the conditions of oppression. People are, then,

"required to stand at a distance from the daily lives in which they are generally immersed and to which they often attribute an aura of permanence. Only at a distance can they get a perspective that permits them to emerge from that daily routine and begin their own independent development. The necessary precondition to taking a distance from 'dailiness' is the analysis of past and present practice and the extension of this analysis into their possible future, remembering always that every practice is social in character" (127).

(126) EC, p. 162
(127) LGB, p. 56-57
So, Freire's method is not an attempt to adapt the learners to their own oppressed world in order to make them less wretched. It is, on the contrary, an opportunity to awaken, in them, reality, and to realize prospects opened up as a result. The aim is to enable people to recover their identity as the chief agents of their own destiny. It is exactly in this sense that the educative practice becomes a cultural action for liberation.

"Militant educators and learners, when we are truly Subjects moving in the world, take on the role of Subjects who know the world that we are transforming and in which we move. It is our task, based on our critical analysis of our practice -- that is, of all we do -- to achieve an ever more rigorous knowledge of reality as it is being transformed; we are both overcoming obstacles in daily life and clarifying it, including those ingenious methods of confronting the concrete" (128).

An authentic literacy training, thus, involves teaching the illiterates to express their own experiences as authors and witnesses of their own history. In awakening their consciousness it allows them to become engaged in activities of more and more human significance. For Freire, to acquire literacy demands something more than simple psychological and mechanical abilities of being able to read and write. It also involves the capacity of the illiterates to dominate reading and writing techniques in terms of consciousness; it means to understand critically and to communicate graphical-

(128) LGB, p. 135-136
ly and orally what they read and write. Thus, for Freire, "acquiring literacy does not involve memorizing sentences, words, or syllables -- lifeless objects unconnected to an existential universe -- but rather an attitude of creation and re-creation, a self-transformation producing a stance of intervention in one's context" (129).

The envisioned goal, nevertheless, can only be reached if the educative practice is solely grounded on mutual dialogue between illiterates and their educators, concerning the concrete situations of their daily lives and experiences. In other words, it simply means the substitution of the banking by the problem-posing concept of education. In this case, Freire suggests the preparation of a "notebook" whose purpose is "to offer the learners support and greater security during their learning while at the same time stimulating their creativity; to make possible an easy and rapid transition to post-literacy; and to assist the learners in their political-pedagogical task" (130).

Obviously, one must notice that the texts of these "notebooks" can not be used for mere mechanical reading. Alias, some of these texts, sometimes, are born among the people themselves like that published, in 1968, in Montevideo, under the title Se Vive Como se Puede ("You Live as You Can"). Its contents, filled with beauty and strength, were taken from tape recordings of literacy classes for urban dwellers.

(129) EPF, p. 48
(130) LGB, p. 168-169
The reason of Freire's rejection of the little primers used by the traditional literacy campaigns lies precisely in this point, i.e., their mechanistic methodology. There are, however, at least, two noteworthy exceptions among these primers: (1) In Brazil, in 1962-63, a group of specialists from the Basic Educational Movement (MÉB), sponsored by the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB), developed and published *Viver é Lutar* ("To Live is to struggle"); (2) In Chile, despite some small defects, in 1964, the "Jefatura de Planes Extraordinários de Educación de Adultos" of the Public Education Ministry, organized and published the ESPIGA collection. But in a general sense, the primers employed by the traditional literacy campaigns "set up a certain grouping of graphic signs as a gift and cast the illiterate in the role of the object rather than the Subject of his learning. Primers, even when they try to avoid this pitfall, end by donating to the illiterate words and sentences which really should result from his own creative effort" (131).

Due to their mechanistic methodology the act of teaching illiterates to read and write through the usage of these primers becomes a tiresome and boring process. Depositing alien words upon the learners these primers limit their capacity to pronounce their own words as subjects in the learning process.

(131) EPF, p. 49
"Such a technique is mechanical and relies on memorizing; the learners are made to repeat again and again, with their eyes closed, all together: la, le, li, lo, lu: ba, be, bi, bo, bu; ta, te, ti, to, tu; a monotonous chant which implies above all a false conception of the act of knowing. 'Repeat, repeat, in order that you may learn' is one of the principles of this false understanding of the act of knowing" (132).

Therefore, the method employed by the traditional literacy campaigns through the usage of the primers castrates the creativity of the learners and reinforces domestication. Freire asks, for example, what can be expected from peasants or even urban proletarians, in the process of the transformation of their oppressed situations, by means of a literacy training which teaches and makes them to repeat over and over: "Peter saw the wing", "The wing is of the bird", "Eva saw the grape", "The dog barks", "The cock crows", etc. In sum, lessons which talk of grapes to men and women who never ate grapes. Lessons such as these only serve to reinforce

"the 'silence' in which the dominated popular masses are, due to the prescription of a word tied to an ideology of accommodation. Nothing can be expected from a work such as this in terms of being an auxiliary instrument in the transformation of reality" (133).

Furthermore, the primers used by the traditional literacy campaigns are frequently the same also employed in

(132) LGB, p. 72
(133) "A alfabetização de adultos - crítica de sua visão ingênia; compreensão de sua visão crítica", in ACL, p.15.
the normal literacy classes of the primary schools. Hence, they reflect a very infantile language, as one can observe by the above examples. It contributes, in great part, to the transformation of the adults into literate men and women with an "infantile consciousness", i.e., it blocks their passage from the magic-naive stage of consciousness to a critical one; it destines them to live in a continuous culture of silence.

"Overcome by the myths of this culture, including the myth of their own 'natural inferiority', they do not know that their action upon the world is also transforming. Prevented from having a 'structural perception' of the facts involving them, they do not know that they cannot 'have a voice', i.e., that they cannot exercise the right to participate consciously in the socio-historical transformation of their society" (134).

From the results of these conventional efforts in literacy training one can easily conclude that the majority of ex-illiterates, in the literal sense of the term, continue to be illiterates, politically. In many occasions, as experience has shown, occurs the fact that a great percentage of these former illiterates regress to their previous state of absolute illiteracy. Even when, in some sporadic cases, the results are positive ones, they only serve to increase the ranks of those oppressed who -- in their thirst to be like the oppressors, although without the socio-economic-political status for this -- will be at the service of the dominant

(134) ALP, p. 213
classes. Hence, Freire's affirmation:

"If the educational system follows an elitist verbal and auditory model that satisfies the interests of the dominant classes -- even though it may be reform ed at this or that point -- then literacy education for adults, whatever its particular orientation, will turn out to be the means of access for a few to the privileges which the system is set up to defend" (135).

In this procedure, stimulating the banking and "humanitarian" literacy campaigns, the dominant classes cement their ideology and guarantee their privileges as being the classes of the "haves". The dominated masses, now even being literate, continue to explain the causes of their oppressed conditions in fatalism and not in the real components which engender such a situation. Therefore, these are the motives for Freire's refutations of the traditional literacy campaigns.

From this perspective a true libertarian literacy training is a permanent effort of the people with their revolutionary leaders in the conquest of their word.

"From such a perspective, literacy education cannot escape from the depths of the people, from their productive activity, from their culture. It will not become hardened in the soulless cold of bureaucrati zed schools in which primers designed by distant intellectuals -- sometimes with the best of intentions -- emphasize the mechanical memorizing to which I referred before. Literacy education of adults, as we understand it, is one dimension of cultural action for liberation. It cannot, for this reason, be thought of in isolation, but always in relation to other aspects of cultural action taken in its totality. To discuss it means to discuss also the social, economic and cultural politics of the country"(136).

(135) LGB, p. 104-105
(136) LGB, p. 72
4.3.2 - THE APPLICABILITY OF FREIRE'S METHOD

Freire’s works in the field of literacy imply a methodology that

"in changing the program content of education; in the use of techniques like thematic 'breakdown' and 'codification'" (137)

is capable of basing itself entirely on dialogical grounds. These two propositions are the key points to the understanding of the applicability of Freire’s method for adult literacy training.

Freire’s method has been applied in many countries and in many different socio-economic-politic-cultural contexts. Besides Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde Islands, where it was used in national literacy campaigns, the method has also been utilized among trilingual Indians in Guatemala and Honduras (138); in farm cooperatives and among Indians in Ecuador (139); in the shanty fringes of Buenos Aires; in many educational activities of

(137) EPF, p. 45
(138) References to some of these experiences can be found in, César Jerez & Juan Hernandez Pico, "Paulo Freire y la Educación: Acción Cultural Liberadora", Op. cit., p. 537-539.
(139) Regarding to some of these experiences in Ecuador (made from a sociological-experimentalist point of view), see William A. Smith, The Meaning of "Conscientização":The Goal of Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy, Amherst, Mass., Center for International Education, University of Massachusetts, 1976.
the Latin American Council of Bishops (CELAM) throughout Latin America; in many private and clandestine educational initiatives of clergymen, teachers and University professors in most of the Latin American countries; among Blacks; "Chicanos" and Puerto-Ricans' ghettos in the United States; in one of the Montreal's poor communities (140), among proletarian communities in Southern France; in some fishermen communities in Portugal, Spain and Italy; among prisoners in the Central Prison of Helsinki, Finland (141); among transient and untrained workers in the Scandinavian Academy of Adult Education, in Sweden (142); among adult non-literate in London's East End (143); in many rural communities in El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru, Colombia, Puerto Rico, Ivory Coast, Swaziland, Niger, Madagascar, Cameroon, Senegal, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Iran, Iraq, etc.

(140) This effort was made by a group of social animators. For more details, see Isaac Scott's "Adapting by Educating the Man", Review of Freire's "Pedagogy of the Oppressed", in Last Post, Montreal, Québec, Vol. 2, No. 2, November 1971, p. 41.

(141) This program has been carried out by the Finnish Association of Adult Education Organization. Details of the program can be found in, Helena Kekkonen, "An Experiment in Outreach and the Pedagogy of Paulo Freire", in Convergence-An International Journal of Adult Education, Toronto, Ontario, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1977, p. 53-57.

(142) A full account of such experience throughout Sweden is to be found in, Carol & Lars Berggren, The Literacy Process. A Practice in Domestication or Liberation, London, Writers and Readers Publishing, 1976.

(143) Ibid for the same experience in London's East End.
Freire's method has also been applied among children in the Centre for Opening Learning and Teaching in Berkeley, California (144) as well as in school for children in London and Poplar, both in England (145). Nevertheless one of the most astonishing experiences regarding the applicability of Freire's method among children is the one which has been carried out by the Radcliffe Institute, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. This program, under the direction of a linguist, Carol Chomsky, has been applied to children between four and six years of age. She proposes that children be permitted to be active participants in teaching themselves to read.

"In a school setting" -- she says -- there is no reason that this approach cannot be utilized, if the teacher is interested in having the child 'assume from the beginning the role of creative subject'" (146).

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(144) This experience in Berkeley is the work of Cynthia Brown, Herbert Kohl and Brenda Bay. For more details see Cynthia Brown's Literacy in Thirty Hours. Paulo Freire's Process in Northeast Brazil, London, Writers and Readers Publishing, 1976.

(145) For the description of the experience in London, see Elena Gianini Beloti's Little Girls, and for the experience in Poplar, see Chris Searle's Classrooms of Resistance. Both publications are from Writers and Readers Publishing, London, 1976.

Freire's method includes, instead of traditional schools, a "Culture Circle"; instead of teachers, a coordinator; instead of lectures, dialogues with the learners; instead of pupils, group participants. Themes such as democracy, development and underdevelopment, nationalism, patriotism, illiteracy, the votes of illiterates, profit remittances abroad, poverty, housing, health, etc., are suggested for discussion by the groups themselves. These themes are presented to the groups with visual aids, in the form of dialogue. The results, as we already know, are amazing. Basically the applicability of the method includes five different stages:

The first stage is the investigation of the context. The interdisciplinary educational team -- including a linguist, sociologist, and psychologist -- moves into a community, studies the social context in which the illiterates live, and with their collaboration determines the common vocabulary to be used and the key issues, problems and aspirations of the community.

"It is to the reality which mediates men, and to the perception of that reality held by educators and people, that we must go to find the program content of education. The investigation of what I have termed the people's thematic universe -- the complex of their 'generative themes' -- inaugurates the dialogue of education as the practice of freedom. The methodology of that investigation must likewise be dialogical, affording the opportunity both to discover generative themes and to stimulate people's..."
awareness in regard to these themes. Consistent with the liberating purpose of dialogical education, the object of the investigation is not men (as if men were anatomical fragments), but rather the thought-language with which men refer to reality, the levels at which they perceive that reality, and their view of the world, in which their generative themes are found" (147).

Volunteers are selected from the community to become part and work with the educational team. Most of them become the "coordinators" of the "Culture Circle".

The second stage is the selection of certain words taken from the discovered contextual vocabulary of the people. The chosen words, designated as generative words, are those with a more phonemic richness, i.e., those more related with existential significance and emotional content. They are still chosen according to

"(a) their pragmatic value, i.e., as linguistic signs which command a common understanding in a region or area of the same city or country (in the United States, for instance, the word 'soul' has a special significance in black areas which it does not have among whites), and (b) their phonetic difficulties which will gradually be presented to those learning to read and write. Finally, it is important that the first generative word be tri-syllabic. When it is divided into its syllables, each one constituting a syllabic family, the learners can experiment with various syllabic combinations even at first sight of the word" (148).

These generative words should, therefore, include the basic sounds of the language. It is important to keep in mind that in Portuguese as well as in Spanish words are based on sylva

(147) PO, p. 86. Emphasis added.  
(148) ALP, p. 218
bles. Making use of the syllabic character fifteen to twenty tri-syllabic generative words are selected in order to cover the sounds of the language. Professor Jarbas Maciel points out that

"these criteria are contained in the semeiotic criterion: the best generative word is that which combines the greatest possible percentage of the syntactic criteria (phonemic richness, degree of complex phonetic difficulty, 'manipulability' of the groups of signs, the syllables, etc.), the semantic criteria (greater or lesser 'intensity' of the link between the word and the thing it designates), the greater or lesser correspondence between the word and the pragmatic thing designated, the greater or lesser quality of conscientização which the word potentially carries, or the grouping of sociocultural reactions which the word generates in the person or group using it" (149).

The use of generative words helps the group participants to move from simple letters and sounds to more complex ones. They also serve as stimuli to the discovery of new words due to their generative character. Sometimes, as Freire himself witnesses in Chile, these words are "written by newly literate peasants with their farm implements on the roads leading to their work fields" (150). For example, the Portuguese word PAVELA ("slum") consists of the syllables FA-VE-LA, from which one can make a family of sounds or what Pro-

(149) "A Fundamentação Teórica do Sistema Paulo Freire de Educação", in Estudos Universitários, Revista de Cultura, Universidade do Recife, Recife, No. 4, April-June 1963, p. 42. Also quoted by Freire, in EPL, p. 51. Emphases added.

(150) LGB, p. 132
fessor Aurenice Cardoso called "discovery cards" (151). Thus: FA, FE, FI, FG, FU; VA, VE, VI, VO, VI; LA, LE, LI, LO, LU, etc. This same discovery card in its different combinations allows the group participants to make different and new words such as FALA ("talk"), VELA ("candle"), AVE ("bird"), ELA ("she"), LA ("there"), VÊ ("see"), FE ("faith"), VA ("go"), etc.

The third stage is the creation of existential situations. The generative words are introduced with codifications, i.e., graphic representations of the existential situations of the learners suggested by the word in picture (slides, for example), story or simply dramatization.

"These representations function as challenges, as coded situation-problems containing elements to be decoded by the groups with the collaboration of the coordinator. Discussion of these codifications will lead the groups toward a more critical consciousness at the same time that they begin to learn to read and write" (152).

Through the codification process the "concrete context" is deeply analyzed in the "theoretical context" in order to unveil the former, i.e., reality as such. One can not forget that during the codification process the generative word must always be shown in the picture. In the act of coding, however, we have to avoid two errors:

(152) EPF, p. 51
"The first is that we may reduce the coding simply to a message to be transmitted when it is, in reality, an object to be known, even a challenge, a problem to be revealed. The second is that we may transform the code into some kind of puzzle to be solved." (153).

Freire divides the codification process in:

(1) simple, if it is effectuated only through one channel, i.e., tactile, auditive, visual or audio-visual. The visual is sub-divided in: pictorial (painting, drawing, photograph, etc.), printed, written language, pantomime or mime;

(2) composed, if it employs a simultaneity of channels;

(3) from the point of view of style, it can also be comical or humorous which can be distinguished from each other when, possessing a cathartic effect, they invoke laughter and relaxation.

Freire still highlights the impossibility of a neutral codification once

"an educationally dominating approach also uses codes, the constitution and the objectives of which are different from these found in a liberating educational praxis. The learners are forced to assume a quite different posture" (154).

Using the problem-posing educational method, discussion helps the group participants to reflect upon their existential reality. This new process is called de-codification, and being an act of knowing it allows the learners

(153) LGB, p. 92-93
(154) LGB, p. 88
"to 'enter into' their own prior perceptions of their reality. De-coding is thus a dialectical moment in time, in which the consciousness concentrated on the challenge of the codification, rebuilds its power of reflection in the 'entering into' of present understanding which progresses towards a new understanding. Through this process (people) recognize that it is they who transform the world" (155).

Through the de-codification, the two previous descriptive stages are integrated with a third analytic one whose objective is to form a projective synthesis regarding the existential situations already shown in the coding process.

The de-codification process has four different phases:

(1) When the group participants start to describe the elements of the codification, i.e., the different parts of its whole. Here the intentionality of the consciousness of each member of the group plays a decisive role; the consciousness sets up relations with the object of its intentionality. So it is possible that in showing to a group of oppressed people a codification which portrays their imitating attitudes in regard to the dominators' cultural values they

"would perhaps, in self-defence, deny the truth of the codification. As they deepened their analysis, however, they would begin to perceive that their apparent imitation of the dominators' models is a result of their interiorization of these models and, above all, of the myths of the 'superiority' of the dominant classes which cause the dominated to feel inferior. What in fact is pure interiorization ap-

(155) EC, p. 159-160
pears in a naive analysis to be imitation. At bottom, when the dominated classes reproduce the dominators' style of life, it is because the dominators live within the dominated. The dominated can eject the dominators only by getting distance from them and objectifying them. Only then can they recognize them as their antithesis. To the extent, however, that interiorization of the dominators' values is not only an individual phenomenon, but a social and cultural one, ejection must be achieved by a type of cultural action in which culture negates culture" (156).

(2) When the "ad-mired" totality splits in its process. In such splitting the act of apprehending reality does not end. This splitting is described as a kind of movement in which the subject as it were looks reality from within.

(3) When the subject with other subjects return to the former "ad-miration" in which the coded situation as a whole is grasped. In this way people are able to perceive the situation as a structure wherein various and different parts are to be found in a closely knit relationship.

"The learners must discover the reasons behind of their attitudes toward cultural reality and thus confront cultural reality in a new way. 'Re-ad-miration' of their former 'ad-miration' is necessary in order to bring this about. The learners' capacity for critical knowing -- well beyond mere opinion -- is established in the process of unveiling their relationships with the historical-cultural world in and with which they exist" (157).

(4) When this critical perception becomes deeper and deeper, the fourth phase is inaugurated. Things are no more merely accepted as they are. The group participants are,

(156) ALP, p. 216
(157) ALP, p. 217
then, able to separate out opinion from knowledge; they initiate the overcoming of doxa by logos.

However, as Freire himself reminds us

"all the steps mentioned here, which are not so rigidly separated as their description implies, form part of the conscientization process, which results in men and women being able to achieve their critical insertion in reality. Education which does not attempt to make this effort, which rather insists on the transmission of communiqués, on the extension of technical contents, cannot conceal its dehumanizing aspect" (158).

Herein, when the four phases of the de-codification process end, the process of conscientização reaches its goal with people emerging from their magic-naive stage of consciousness to a critical one. Nevertheless, we have to remember that conscientização does not precede the act of learning to read and write and vice-versa. Both processes occur simultaneously. And it has to be so since in Freire's method the word is not something unconnected with the people's existential reality. On the contrary, the word is, indeed, an aspect of people's thought-language about the world.

"That is why" -- writes Freire -- "when they participate critically in analyzing the first generative words linked with their existential experience; when they focus on the syllabic families which result from that analysis; when they perceive the mechanism of the syllabic combinations of their language, the learners finally discover, in the various possibilities of combination, their own words. Little by little, as these possibilities multiply, the learners, through mastery of new generative words, expand both

(158) EC, p. 161
their vocabulary and their capacity for expression by the development of their creative imagination" (159).

The prise de conscience becomes, thus, conscientização and the alienated men begin to integrate themselves in reality. In the example given by the word FAVELA ("slum") people begin to discuss their own concrete existence as people from the slums and also start to see the relationships between the word FAVELA and the reality it represents. They initiate the suppression of their own "limit-situations".

"As they separate themselves from the world, which they objectify, as they separate themselves from their own activity, as they locate the seat of their decisions in themselves and in their relations with the world and others, men overcome the situations which limit them, the 'limit-situations'. Once perceived by men as fetters, as obstacles to their liberation, these situations stand out in relief from the background, revealing their true nature as concrete historical dimensions of a given reality" (160).

And as soon as men perceive the "limit-situations" not as immutable barriers, which forbid them to be more, but as challenges to be faced, they engage themselves in the struggle for their humanization; they begin to increase their

(159) ALP, p. 222
(160) P0, p. 89. According to Professor Álvaro Vieira Pinto "the 'limit-situations' are not 'the impassable boundaries where possibilities end, but the real boundaries where all possibilities begin'; they are not 'the frontier which separates being from nothingness, but the frontier which separates being from being more'". Cf. Consciência e Realidade Nacional, Vol. II, Op. cit., p. 284. Also quoted by Freire, in P0, p. 89, note 15.
critical perception towards the attainment of the untested feasibility implicit in that perception.

The fourth stage of Freire's method consists in the elaboration of agendas which help the coordinators in their works. But they are not "rigid schedules" to be imposed and obeyed. For if they are they will become means used by the coordinators for the practice of banking education. It is one of the most difficult temptations the coordinators have to avoid to fall into. Freire himself is aware of this when he states:

"Among the most obvious errors, we might note the impatience of some of the workers that led them to create the words instead of challenging the learners to do so for themselves; the tendency of some to rely on the repetition of syllables in chorus; or the lack of vivacity on the part of some of the workers as they participated in discussions of the themes related to the generative words...The ongoing process of the evaluation seminars would be a powerful force in overcoming these mistakes. 'Effective practices would be reinforced and errors eliminated' (161).

These mistakes often occur because many coordinators are still fastened to their class ideology. Many of them are still conditioned by the myth of their superiority which was assimilated during their own class educational period in which they were victims of being reduced to mere "warehouse" of their former teachers. So, now, instead of challenging their learners they also reduce them to simple depositories.

(161) LGB, p. 28
for their knowledge; speaking to them in a language utterly strange to their understanding.

The fifth stage is the preparation of cards showing the phonemic families correspondent to the generative words. The preparation of these cards is, indeed, according to Freire, the concretion of what Aldous Huxley calls "the art of dissociating ideas" (162). Among the many examples let us consider the following ones:

1. SLUM ("favela"). Principal necessities or themes for discussion: housing, food, clothing, health, education, etc.

2. COFFEE ("café"). Themes for discussion: the production of coffee in Brazil: its geographical areas of cultivation; modern and traditional techniques of cultivation; the socio-economic conditions of peasants in the coffee latifundium; coffee nutrition and health; the exportation of coffee, etc.

3. THE AFRO-BRAZILIAN CULTS. Themes for discussion: the history of slavery in the New World and in Brazil; the Afro-cultural traits preserved by the negro populations in Brazil; the rapid spread of these cults throughout the country; its causes and consequences; popular culture, folklore; cultural alienation, etc.

Therefore, within 45 days, more or less, the group

participants, in this method of literacy training, are able to master enough syllables and to express a very wide number of words from their own existential context. Hence,

"research into the 'generative themes', and education as a gnosiological condition, are different stages of the same process... Thus one passes from a stage which tends mainly towards the search for the 'generative theme' to another whose tendency is mainly educational-gnosiological" (163).

The results -- obtained through the application of questionnaires and interviews -- allow:

(1) The educational team to evaluate its work once "the task of evaluation is a means of training and, as such, is intimately linked to the search for new forms of action. Looking at one's own practice as a problem provides the critical moment in evaluation. The subjects of the practice can thus go back over what has been done in order to confirm or to rectify it in this or that aspect, enriching subsequent practice and being enriched by it... It is for this reason that in meetings of active comrades nothing can be hidden, neither the things that have gone well nor the mistakes. It is in hiding these things that the real error lies... It is for this reason that I keep insisting that the practice of thinking about practice is the best way to think correctly" (164).

(2) The members of the group to distinguish the world of nature from the world of culture which is the consequence of their own creative and re-creative work. It means that they have learned a love for life which is the prerequisite condition regarding their engagement in revolutionary actions towards the transformation of the world of oppression.

(163) EC, p. 157
(164) LGB, p. 97, 131, 148
Or better yet, they are now conscious of their active role as subjects in the world and with the world. Therefore, the illiterate start

"to effect a change in his former attitudes, by discovering himself to be a maker of the world of culture, by discovering that he, as well as the literate person, has a creative and re-creative impulse. He discovers that culture is just as much a clay doll made by artists who are his peers as it is the work of a great sculptor, a great painter, a great mystic, or a great philosopher; that culture is the poetry of lettered poets and also the poetry of his own popular songs -- that culture is all human creation" (165).

Time and again ex-illiterates have expressed these discoveries in striking ways after a few days in the "Culture Circle". Here are some of their testimonies which manifest the impact of the process of conscientização upon them and the joy of those who had won the difficult battle regarding their rights to be more human as individuals now valued as persons:

"'I make shoes, and now I see that I am worth as much as the doctor who writes books'. 'I know now that I am cultured because I work, and working, I transform the world'. 'I want to learn to read and write, so that I can stop being the shadow of other people'. 'I want to learn to read and to write so I can change the world'.

'Before the agrarian reform, my friend, I didn't even think. Neither did my friends. It wasn't possible. We lived under orders. We only had to carry out orders. We had nothing to say'. 'When all this land belonged to one latifundio we weren't responsible for anything. The boss gave the orders and we obeyed. Why read and write? Now it's a different story'.

'One can not say that an Indian is an illiterate be-

(165) EPF, p. 47
cause he lives in a culture which does not know the letters. In order to be illiterate it is necessary to live amid the letters and do not know them" (166).

Accordingly, for Freire, the beginning of critical, as opposed to magic-naive ways of thinking, occurs when men start to distinguish nature -- the matrix in which the great majority of the oppressed live (mainly in the Third World countries) -- from culture, that world which men make. This is the reason why, for Freire, literacy has meaning only if it makes possible for men to reflect about themselves and about their own capacity to transform the world by means of their work. Literacy training is valid only if it enables men to understand

"words in their true significance: as a force to transform the world. As illiterate men discover the relativity of ignorance and of wisdom, they destroy one of the myths by which false elites have manipulated them. Learning to read and write has meaning in that, by requiring men to reflect about themselves and about the world they are in and with, it makes them discover that the world is also theirs, that their work is not the price they pay for being men but rather a way of loving -- and of helping the world to be a better place" (167).

Nevertheless, we have to keep in mind that the positive or negative response men give to the process of conscientização depends entirely on the intentionality of their consciousness. Thus, it is a matter of choice. As far as Freire's method helps men to become more conscious and aware of their

(166) EPF, p. 47, 48, 50; ALP, p. 222, 223; "A alfabetização de adultos -- crítica de sua visão ingênua; compreensão de sua visão crítica", in AOL, p. 20.
(167) EPF, p. 81
own dehumanization, they are free to accept or reject becoming politicized, i.e., historically committed to the transformation of the context which engenders oppression. Henceforth, men can start with others the process of the transformation of reality in their struggle for liberation or they can simply accommodate themselves to the status quo which now seems to them not so oppressed. Actually, they have become literate, "cultured" and "modernized" men, or in other words, less wretched. Of course, only very few are able to make the first choice since it implies those risks concerning "stability" and "security", which men normally do not want to lose. At this point we tackle once again the utopian-prophetic aspect of conscientização. The others, the majority of "clevers" will make the second choice. As John Holt stresses:

"Only a few slaves talk about getting free. The rest argue about who has the biggest house, the finest establishment, the richest and strongest "master" (168).

Freire, however, does not confine his method just to adult literacy programs. He himself once said:

"Obviously we could not confine that work to a literacy program, even one which was critical rather than mechanical. With the same spirit of a pedagogy of communication, we were therefore planning a post-literacy stage which would vary only as to curriculum... Further, by making a catalog of thematic breakdowns and bibliographic references available to

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high schools and colleges, we could widen the sphere of the program and help identify our schools with our reality" (169).

Alias. Freire's experiences began in post-literate areas, first as a High School teacher and, later on, as a University professor. It was on account of those experiences that he decided to dedicate himself to adult literacy training and started, in this way, his apprenticeship with and from the people.

"In the beginning of my work" — he says — "my surprise in the face of the critical positions assumed by these unschooled workers arose from the perception that I had up to that time that these were positions held exclusively by university students. My surprise had its origin in my own class position, increased by my university training -- perhaps, to be more accurate, I should say by my elitist university training" (170).

It is not without reason that in some cases -- as that of Guinea-Bissau where people are politically highly literate -- the post-literacy takes place before the literacy training. It is only when people are engaged in certain concrete tasks which demand literacy training that it is carried out.

Furthermore, Freire regards post-literacy not as a separate moment from literacy itself. On the contrary, it is already being announced during the literacy training in which the act of learning to read and write is connected to the development of one's self-expression which grows deeper as

(169) EPF, p. 56
(170) LGB, p. 116-117
he moves from one stance to another. For example:

"In post-literacy work, the reading of reality continues in a deeper form. However, it now stresses a more technical and specialized knowledge, including a greater mastery of language, a sharper perception of economic and social organization, as well as an understanding of history, geography and mathematics" (171).

In such practical and theoretical vision, therefore, literacy can not be seen as a formal learning whose aim is to prepare the learners to the post-literacy stage.

Freire's method can be and, in fact, has been applied to more advanced stages. Many experiences have been done in this particular area. There is the experience carried out by a professor of the Universidad Autónoma de México who applied Freire's method to his undergraduate students (172). However, one of the most interesting experiences in this area was held by a group of students from the Department of Agricultural and Extension Education of the University of Wisconsin, in the United States. In a graduate seminar on the philosophy of adult education they adapted Freire's method to their academic situation (173).

In more advanced stages Freire's method includes all

(171) LGB, p. 90
(173) A detailed account of this experience can be seen, in Chere S. Coggins', "An Encounter with Paulo Freire's Conscientization", Department of Agricultural and Extension Education, University of Wisconsin, Madison, May 17, 1972.
levels of the educational activities in which a pedagogy of communication ought to be established in order to foster the awakening of the consciousness of all those who live under the burden of oppression. In this sense, Freire’s approach to education and social change gains a universal dimension. Nonetheless, Freire stresses that, in advanced stages, scientific education and highly specialized training ought to be intensified. But they can not be unrelated to a critical reflection regarding social responsibilities. Hence his emphasis on the permanent character of the process of conscientização. In this manner specialization will avoid the irrationality of "specialism". The main function of professional schools and universities

"will be to train technicians in different fields with sufficient background to make their contribution indispensable to the transformation of the country. That training will be broad enough to avoid turning them into technocrats with such narrow, focused vision of their specialty that they are alienated from everything else" (174).

Hence, professional educational institutions will form workers conscious of their historical responsibilities, able to commit themselves to the struggle for liberation wherever it becomes an imperative in the process of social transformation. Of course, an education such as this can not serve the purposes of individual success in a profitable economic

(174) LGB, p. 44
system once it drives men to see their work as being the origin of their own knowledge, as being also the production of what is socially necessary. Thus, Freire's educational proposal for advanced professional stages is one in which men will be educated in such a way that their education will be

"as broad as life itself and will develop a critical comprehension -- neither narrow nor ingenuous -- regarding their own praxis within the larger praxis of the society in which they participate. Both the specific and the social practice of this critical comprehension demand a political formation as thorough as their technical and professional training" (175).

From this perspective education comes to be a genuine democratization of all cultural spheres. So, one can affirm that Freire's method is grounded on a deep vision of the world and of men. It is on the one hand, a scientific method once it is based on research, experimentation, tests of the obtained results, permanent modifications through analysis and synthesis, etc. On the other hand, it is also an humanistic method since its keynote is the belief that men are called to become the agents of their own humanization by means of their commitment to the cause of transformation of all structures which forbid them to be and rob them of the rights in saying their own words.

"In truth, the process of liberation of a people does not take place in profound and authentic terms unless this people reconquers its own Word, the right to speak it, to 'pronounce' it, and to 'name'
the world... In the struggle to re-create a society, the reconquest by the people of their own word becomes a fundamental factor" (176).

It is what explains, for instance, the recent acceptability of Freire's method by the government of Guinea-Bissau which makes him sure that the work of adult literacy training in that country is not only a promise but it is already a reality.

Unfortunately it is also what explains the refusal of Freire's method. His experience in Brazil, for example, was sufficient to convince him that one can not naively expect the support of the power elites in order to undertake a libertarian education. These elites were conscious that "education for all" was a real necessity for the progress of the country. But it had to be an education in which the people had to remain quiet and silent. Indeed, even before the military coup d'état of 1964, Freire's activities were one of the principal targets of the dominant classes in Brazil since these activities were involved with the popular movements towards the democratic ascension of the masses. Freire states:

"Thus the tone of the literacy campaign in Brazil was eminently political. It was to our interest in the historical situation in which we found ourselves to establish as close a link as possible between the literacy education and the political consciousness of the masses" (177).

(176) LGB, p. 126, 176
(177) LGB, p. 110
Well, the Brazilian elites knew that one of the chief goals of the literacy training headed by Freire was the enlargement of the masses' participation in the process of democracy; they were convinced that the fundamental purpose of Freire's method for literacy training was not merely to transform an illiterate into a voter; they were aware that the basic philosophical principle which oriented that training was the very process of conscientização; they were certain that it was necessary, more than ever, to defend an economic system in which the aims of education were

"the continuation of a class of wage earners, obliged to sell their labor to the capitalist class. The education required to continue reproducing this class was one that would continuously increase the efficiency of the workers in their participation in the work process" (178).

Besides, these reactionaries elites could not understand why a Christian educator (and not a Marxist-Communist one) would make himself the expression of the oppressed; they could not admit an educational model other than that produced in a class society which could lead the masses to doubt the legitimacy of their privileges and prerogatives as being the class of the "haves". Thus, they began to accuse Freire for ideas which he never professed and at the same time started

to attack his method, once they saw in it the germs for a revolution.

However, in the case of Brazil, the revolution never was. Before it occurred the right wings of the Brazilian Armed Forces, with the support of the power elites, both protected by the American foreign policy, made the coup d'état (179). From the point of view of the civil and military elites the coup de d'état was necessary in order to preserve their interests; from the perspective of the American foreign policy it was a condition sine qua non in the maintenance of the economic dependency from the United States. Nevertheless, as Jonathan Kozol says,

"if Freire's efforts in Brazil and Chile have been arrested, in the short run, by the not-so-subtle operation of the C.I.A., or of those governments imposed upon the people of both nations by domestic rulers who conduct their business in collaboration with the North American and European corporations, Freire himself is... industriously at work in building that revolution, made of 'words that shape the world'" (180).

Summing, a pedagogy of liberation such as that of Freire, can bring with it the signs of the revolution. The new climate created by the very critical process of learning to read and write as well as the whole process of conscientização in more advanced level, leads people to a deeper


(180) Foreward to Freire's LGB, p. 1.
"reading" of the reality itself, in which the socio-economic "readings" make clear the urgency for revolutionary action. Freire's method, thus, makes possible the appearance of a new kind of men, i.e., those who, becoming literate linguistically and politically, also become conscious that they are oppressed, acquiring exceptional conditions to start their own process of liberation. No more as apathetic but rather as active and organized oppressed masses, people begin to fight on behalf of their stolen rights. The process of conscientização drives inevitably to a critical attitude towards the present due to its denouncing dimension. However, it also proposes a new type of action towards the future on account of its announcing character. Hence, the revolutionary, utopian-prophetic aspect of conscientização. Nevertheless, Freire's concept of conscientização implies some philosophical reflections which shall be the focus of the concluding chapter of this dissertation.
CHAPTER V

PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS CONCERNING FREIRE'S CONCEPT OF "CONSCIENTIZAÇÃO"

Freire's concept of conscientização brings about many philosophical reflections. Some of them represent the enrichment and contributions of his pedagogical ideas to the field of philosophy of education, particularly his concept of conscientização and its relations to his notion of revolution. Some of them, however, demonstrate a lack of deeper philosophical basis when submitted to a rigorous critique. My intention in this concluding chapter, in stressing these philosophical reflections, will not be an attempt to cover all the implications regarding the contributions or the controversial points of Freire's pedagogy. My purpose will rather be to call attention to some aspects which have been neglected or not yet fully developed by Freire's other interpreters.

5.1 - FREIRE'S CONCEPT OF "CONSCIENTIZAÇÃO" AND ITS RELATIONS TO HIS NOTION OF REVOLUTION

When we speak about conscientização and revolution, from a Freirean viewpoint, we think about social transformations; some kinds of changes which occur in certain places and among certain people. These changes are frequently inevitable since they arise from historical "necessities" and
questionings.

In our modern Western societies man is expected to behave obeying the rules of his egoistical needs. The plague of our social structures is the proliferation of individualism, a heritage of German philosophy with its Protestant reflections. Individualism is, in fact, a serious obstacle to the achievement of liberation. It sets man against other man and denies the very foundation of personality. In giving prominence to the individual dimension of his nature, man's attitudes give birth to evil which manifests its painful results in the social sphere. Individualism is willful self-assertion against the demand of responsible interaction and solidarity for the sake of being truly human. Thus, when men get determined to be liberated, it is because they have glimpsed the meaning of liberation and realized that only in community there is the necessary security and strength to conduct the libertarian process, whereas in individualism there only exists competition and fearful security for the dominant few. In this regard, Freire is always accentuating that liberation as well as conscientização are communal processes which can only be achieved in a mutual dialogical relationship with others.

Besides, individualism can be seen as having some responsibility for the division of labour, the exploitation
of the working class, the competition among capitalists, the universality of capitalism, and many other stains of a society based on the accumulation of profits and surplus-value. This approach is, indeed, very akin to that Marx's (01) model of man as an other-directed being. Hence one can envisage how, for example, the occupation of one individual can engender satisfaction in another, since each is now convinced as a moment of the other's social being and not as an external, even potentially dangerous, competitor. One man can find joy and satisfaction in another's occupation, provided that the social structure is oriented towards such possibilities. Engels already pointed out that

"competition has penetrated all relationships of our life and completed the reciprocal bondage in which men now hold themselves. Competition is the great mainspring which again and again jerks activity our aging and withering social order, or rather disorder" (02).

In order to solve these problems -- which are the forger forces as well as the causes of oppression -- Freire also stresses that society has to be changed by the overcoming of oppression and of this kind of society by means of revo-
olution. But because revolution means many things it should be added that the central idea for Freire is radical democratization as a process carried out by the oppressed themselves. He states:

"Being less human leads the oppressed to struggle against those who made them so. In order for this struggle to have meaning, the oppressed must not, in seeking to regain their humanity (which is a way to create it), become in turn oppressors of the oppressors, but rather restorers of the humanity of both" (03).

It implies a revolutionary action grounded on the theory and practice of a libertarian education which fosters the awakening of critical consciousness. Despite the fact that these Freirean assumptions resemble very much those of Marxism, they have, nonetheless, their own peculiarities.

To begin with, the process of conscientização rests upon certain value assumptions: the equality of all men, their right to knowledge and culture as well as their right to criticize their existential situation and act upon it. Properly applied and understood, the process as such, has no predictable directions and does not prescribe certain rules regarding the politization of the oppressed. Nevertheless, its content of dignity, criticism and social transformation almost inevitably leads to a quest for channels of effective action. Once it shows a real situation of oppression the

(03)-F0, p. 28
PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS CONCERNING FREIRE'S CONCEPT OF "CONSCIENTIZAÇÃO"

most evident consequence is, thus, man's engagement in revolutionary action. Although Freire negates internalization and socialization as described in social sciences as being domestication, and as something proper to his banking concept of education, one question can be posed at this point: Can conscientização not be seen as one dynamic of the socialization process which includes such other processes as the internalization of new belief patterns and constructs for organizing experience and behaviours? But on the other hand, to bring someone from a magic-naive to a critical stage of consciousness does not necessarily mean to transform him into a revolutionary. To become revolutionary is a matter of free option; it is almost a kind of vocation which implies, in some degree, a "prophetic calling". The individual can reach a stage of critical consciousness and opts for an alienating practice.

The process of conscientização opens the way for someone to express his social dissatisfaction which is a real datum of an oppressed situation. If many peasants and urban proletarians, after their literacy training, adhered to the organization of trade unions, for example, it is because they perceived in such adherence a way of defending their rights and class interests. Since the very beginning of the elaboration of his method Freire knew that its pedagogical
inquiries had many political implications which, as a whole, interested the people and not the dominant classes. Since then he has been working actively towards political organization. Throughout his writings he persists in showing the impossibility of a neutral education concerning the political domain. According to him, we are already committed, and our abstention, equally with our engagement, plays its part in this confrontation of forces. To condemn, for example, the violence of the oppressed who revolt or embrace the true revolutionary cause, is to become an accessory to the permanent violence of the oppressor. However, in so far as Freire's pedagogy is concerned it refuses the traditional idea that if education can not be seen as the "lever of progress", it is also out of question to understand it as being the "lever of revolution". So it is not correct to assure that the revolution as such is the main target of Freire's pedagogy. As Francisco C. Weffort suggests

"une pédagogie de la liberté peut aider une politique populaire, car la conscientisation permet de comprendre comment les structures sociales sont utilisées comme instruments de domination et de violence; mais il revient aux hommes politiques, non à l'éducateur, d'orienter cette prise de conscience dans une direction spécifiquement politique" (04).

(04) "Éducation et Politique. Réflexions sociologiques sur une pédagogie de la liberté", in Foreword to the French édition of Freire's L'éducation: Pratique de la Libér-
The role of education as well as of educators is to foster the awakening of critical consciousness. But the political application regarding the process of conscientização is to be conducted by the politicians. Obviously, from an educational system which forms alienated and accommodated citizens to the established order, one can not expect them to become "conscientized" politicians and, consequently, social transformers.

For Freire, the transformation of society is always revolutionary and dependent on the dominated classes, once the dominant class "cannot be utopian, nor, therefore, can they practice a form of cultural action which would conduct to conscientização. It is impossible to offer the means for the conscientização of the people without the radical denunciation of the dehumanizing structures which must go together with the proclamation of a new reality that can be created by men. The right cannot unmask itself, nor can it give to the people the means to do it" (05).

By its turn, however, the social change can never be predetermined since it implies a deep change in human praxis, i.e., the passage from magic-naive to critical consciousness. In a Freirian perspective, man is not only the product of circumstances; he is also, and above all, a potential changer of circumstances; he is conditioned by structures.

(05) CON, p. 90. See also Chapter I, Item 1.2.2, p. 50.
but at the same time he creates new structures and transforms the old ones. Hence the great emphasis Freire puts on the notion of a pedagogical practice which is both an instrument for the awakening of consciousness and the drive force behind men's emancipation. It is not, however, a passive procedure or a mere contemplation of the world. On the contrary, it is that which alone can embody the social contradictions and at the same time demand men's commitment concerning their resolutions in a reciprocal communion between their practice and their aspirations.

"Only praxis in the context of communion makes conscientization a viable project. Conscientization is a joint project in that it takes place in a man among other men, men united by their action and by their reflection upon that action and upon the world" (06).

Thus, social transformation is an act by which the oppressed, becoming conscious of their own state of alienation, seek solutions for their empirical situations of oppression. The oppressed, being the subjects that experience, to the extreme, the contradictions of the human existence, are thereby, capable of resolving them, at once, by means of revolution.

At this point we may ask: Is Freire's pedagogy dependent upon a rigorous class analysis? By virtue of this, one can look at Marxist social science as an indispensable
requirement for engaging in the pedagogy of the oppressed. Nonetheless, others can feel that Freire is not a Marxist in the hard sense of the term. Still others can argue that the critical awareness of class differentiation and its effects is a minimal requirement for anyone who would take Freire's pedagogy seriously. Freire, however, insists that conscientização without class analysis is "small talk". The implications of his revolutionary pedagogy, therefore, call for an oppressed class movement which is seen as the carrier of the social changes whose ultimate obligation is the abolition of the oppressed structures and the achievement of a more just social order.

"On the one hand" -- Freire says -- "the class consciousness does not beget spontaneously outside the revolutionary practice; on the other hand, this practice implies a clear consciousness of the historical role of the dominated class" (07).

In the attempt of changing society the unity between theory and practice is effectuated and man is transformed from an objectless world into the realm of objective activity. In this sense we can deduce that the philosophy of education will be no longer a mere intellectual extravaganza or a pure theorization about reality; it will also include the practice of its transformation. Thus, absolute knowledge or simple philosophying unconnected with the practice can not

(07) "Conscientização e libertação: uma conversa com Paulo Freire", in ACL, p. 140-141.
bring about men's liberation. They can, indeed, constitute a new form of alienation called "speculative alienation". This is the reason why the real significance of conscientização can not be fully understood if both theory and practice are dichotomized. These words of Roger Garaudy are very suitable to remind us that:

"Prendre conscience du possible ce n'est pas croire en quelque recette magique nous sauvant 'du dehors', sans notre participation personnelle. Il n'y a pas de libération passive: c'est dans la lutte pour la liberté que nous commençons à exercer notre liberté. Si nous ne l'exerçons pas dès maintenant et personnellement nous ne le recevrons jamais" (08).

The unity between theory and practice is, then, the possibility of changing the course of history through human intervention. But this revolutionary attitude can come into existence only through the mediation of a material basis, i.e., human needs. It is necessary to point out that need, in this sense, is not only individual but also social. It takes the form of historical necessity which can culminate in insurrection or revolution. By means of this need the transition from oppression to revolution is effected. Hence, it is the human needs which make the revolution possible. Only in this aspect can theory -- when it fulfills the people's needs -- be accomplished. Due to their material needs

the oppressed, helped by a pedagogical activity which stimulates the process of conscientização, are able to begin to emerge from passivity and force social changes. In this approach regarding the unity between theory and practice lies the dialectical relationship between the philosophical understanding of the world and the ability to transform it. Freire, thus, forges an unbreakable link between theory and practice, philosophic thought and militant action, for the transformation of reality. In fact, he makes theory an element in history being made.

"This is why reflection is only legitimate when it always leads us, as Sartre stresses, to the concrete, whose facts it seeks to clarify, becoming possible, in this way, our actions more efficient upon these facts. Enlightening an action exercised or being exercised, a true reflection clarifies at the same time the future action in which it is tested and, by its turn, a new reflection must occur" (09).

In addition, we can argue that Freire thinks -- like Marx -- that theory must involve an adequate interpretation of reality before it is able to transform it. This, actually, has been the effort of the history of philosophy, i.e., to reach an appropriate interpretation of reality. But when it is done such interpretation abolishes itself -- due to the new historical circumstances -- and starts to work towards another interpretation. Freire, however, does not commit the

(09) "Conscientização e Libertação: uma conversa com Paulo Freire", in ACL, p. 135.
error of not submitting his own philosophy of education to a
dialectical process. For this particular reason he is con-
stantly insisting on the continuity of the process of cons-
cientização and warning us against the dangers of its bu-
reaucratization. The awakening of consciousness is like a
flame to be kindled. But it has to be continuously nourished
in order not to become extinguished. Freire is a man who
thinks dialectically and believes that in the historical
process nothing can be seen as absolute, unchangeable or
having universal validity. Even revolution in order to be
genuine has to be characterized by its continuity.

"In order to be authentic, revolution ought to be a
permanent event. Otherwise, it will cease to be rev-
olution and will be converted into a sclerotic bu-
reaucracy" (10).

Freire also seems to suggest that the key to revolu-
tion is to be found in the economic growth of capitalism.
Until today many people -- specially economists -- still con-
sider the existing capitalist system, with all its modes of
dishonest competition and monopoly, as something in accord-
ance with human nature. Freire suggests that this system is
responsible for the creation of oppressors and oppressed
within the same society and also in regard to the dominant

(10) CON, p. 94
and dominated nations. In this respect one has to agree with Marx to whom "imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism" (11). However, as soon as the differences between oppressors and oppressed, dominant and dominated nations become stronger and the contradictions of this inhuman situation become more and more manifested through the mediation of an educational practice which stimulates conscientização, these contradictions and differences increase in importance and size. All this will lead inevitably, sooner or later, to discontentment and, as a result, to the establishment of a revolutionary action. By virtue of this, revolutionary action is, according to Freire, inseparable from cultural revolution. True revolution towards liberation can not be imposed from above if a cultural revolution is not yet taking place. In Freire, liberation is a dynamic process, as is every historical event; it is not a state that can be achieved and then rested in.

"Since I cannot"—he states—"prefigure a historical era of absolute freedom, I refer to liberation as a permanent process in history. Similarly, the true and permanent revolution is a revolution which both has been and is no longer, since in order to be it must be in a process of becoming" (12).


Thus, if the libertarian process as well as the cultural revolution come to be monuments to be preserved, it they refuse their continuing renovation, they will degenerate into new myths and will become enemies of men's humanization. Hence, the permanent dimension of Freire's pedagogy.

In a Freirean outlook, however, cultural revolution and revolutionary action depend on the servant and vanguard. Its principal role is not to regiment the masses against their oppressors in order to overthrow the structures of domination. Its task is rather to help the oppressed to prepare themselves to be free and teach them what liberation really is. This group probably will be always a minority. The people in this group know that they must get out of the total-ity. They refrain themselves "from manipulative suggestions about mass affiliations" with the revolutionary process once they know "that what is required is both awareness and dedication to the cause of the working people rather than new, opportunistic members" (13) for the revolutionary action. They criticize the oppressing party and help to lead the oppressed towards authentic liberation. Hence, they are distinct from both group in some respect. This type of leadership is able to comprehend the weakness, fears, prejudices, and competitiveness of the oppressed; it knows these are the

(13) LGB, p. 50
results of the cultural invasion imposed upon the people in order to keep them weak and divided. So the function of such leadership is to help the oppressed to cease to imitate the oppressors and to become beings-for-themselves which implies to liberate themselves from the duality of their beings. This is why this leadership of the revolution is a servant vanguard; it serves the people, identifying itself with the people and enabling them to discover their own dignity. When the people have confidence in themselves they will make the revolution; they will demolish all the system of domination and manipulation. If the people are not ready for the revolution it is doomed to failure since it will be based on the arrogance of a small elite rather than on the self-confidence of the people. True libertarian revolution is to be made by the people; it believes in their capacity to understand and to want justice for all. Those who aspire to help the revolutionary process towards liberation must believe in the people.

Helping the people to believe in their own dignity the vanguard leaders are more true revolutionaries than those who through charisma lead millions to faith and to dependence on them due to their distrust of the people. Jacques Maritain brings out this question in an admirable way, saying that:
"There were men who believed, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau put it, they should force the people 'to be free'. I say they were betrayers of the people. For they treated the people like sick children while they were clamoring for the rights and freedom of the people. Those who distrust the people while appealing to the highest feelings and to the blood of the people cheat and betray the people. The first axiom and precept in democracy is to trust the people. Trust the people, respect the people, trust them even and first of all while awakening them, that is, while putting yourself at the service of their human dignity" (14).

Freire emphasizes, however, that it is by means of a pedagogy which fosters the awakening of critical consciousness that revolutionary action will avoid the dangers of irrationalisms and the hateful fanaticisms of radical and reactionary revolutionaries. Thus, there is a huge difference between those charismatic leaders -- prototype of fanatic reactionaries -- who create a new dependence and, therefore, a new cultural alienation, and those utopian-prophetic leaders who embody in themselves the inarticulate aspirations of the people. Hence, Freire's affirmation:

"If my option is a revolutionary one it is impossible to consider the people as objects of my libertarian action. But, at the moment in which I refuse, coherently, to have in the people the mere incidence of my revolutionary action, I can not, equally, transform them into recipients of my 'revolutionary knowledge'" (15).

(15) "Conscientização e Libertação: uma conversa com Paulo Freire", in ACL, p. 142.
Wherefore, the pedagogy of the servant leaders is that they live as participants in a great historical drama at the same time they dare to be free. They use their own lives not merely as a point from which they speak, but as a stage on which they act out liberation. Speaking the language of the people, loving them and believing in their capacity to liberate themselves, these servant leaders will draw upon themselves hate and fear from those who are opposed to the advent of a free society in which justice, equality and human dignity will exist for all. In this sense, these leaders are symbols of hope to the hopeless but also a symbol of fear to the dominators who want no transformation of the status quo. But it is not sufficient to kill them, as it is to kill a guerilla leader. Even as corpses they still speak. The people start to feel them as a presence, very real to them now, and not as a myth from the past. They speak of (their) extraordinary vision, of (their) capacity to foresee what could come about, of (their) dreamers and of (their) influence” (16).

This is why Father Camiló Torres, Tiradentes, Amílcar Cabral, Ché Guevara, Martin Luther King, only to cite a few, are still speaking. These utopian-prophetic leaders speak of hope and it is the hope that they radiate what causes those in pow

(16) LGB, p. 174
er to tremble. It is the reflection of a manipulative social and political order that threatens men of power. Hence, "their fundamental objective is to fight alongside the people for the recovery of the people's stolen humanity, not to 'win the people over' to their side. Such a phrase does not belong in the vocabulary of revolutionary leaders, but in that of the oppressor. The revolutionary's role is to liberate, and be liberated, with the people -- not to win them over" (17).

I wonder, however, if it is not a rough mistake to interpret the coming of the revolutionary society as an advent of a rapid messianic occurrence. Freire shows conscientiously that the authentic revolution does not happen as a sudden apocalypse. It seems to imply a long process in which the new age gradually will become a reality in the minds and hearts of men as soon as they start little by little to respond affirmatively to the educative process of conscientização. Within this framework true libertarian revolution starts with the founding of the flocks of those pilgrims who throughout history have moved forth because they have foretasted the coming of "another city". Many men from a variety of political and cultural backgrounds are contributors to the plenary realization of such an age; an age in which all human creatures, freed from all types of oppression, will live deeply motivated by the sense of brotherhood. It will be a real free society, probably, according to Freire, a

(17) PO, p. 83-84
different kind of socialist society in which the principal objectives will be the general welfare and democracy as well as the actualization of men's essence.

Herein, we reach the hidden but implicit eschatological aspect of Freire's concept of a libertarian revolution. It is quite obvious that it is not eschatological in terms of being something beyond the realm of human affairs. Freire's eschatology contains, actually, elements from Marxism and Christianity. Nevertheless, in many aspects, he puts more emphasis on the Marxist elements. It may sound strange and even inconceivable for a Christian reader who is informed that Freire is a Christian and who is also aware of the Christian background of his thought. Thus, why is it so? Freire tells us (18) that the reason for this lies in the fact that the Marxist eschatology is more compromised with the concrete historical process. It does not mean, however, that the Christian eschatology should not be also submerged in the historical reality. But it has, in many senses and in so many times, divorced from this dimension and hidden itself in the boundaries of eternity and in the afterlife that many people would find difficult to understand things on the other way. They are so much accustomed to identifying Christianity with some forms of alienated religious prac-

(18) INT. See also the Introduction of this dissertation, p. xxx-xxxvi.
tices that they automatically link Christianity with counter-revolution. Here, probably, we find the justification for Freire's emphasis on the eschatological elements of Marxism instead of the Christian ones. Perhaps it is not by chance that in this century it is Marxism and not Christianity which has produced the greatest number of witnesses, for whom the Greek word is "martyrs". Perhaps many Christians reject Marxism not simply because it is atheistic but rather because it is revolutionary.

The Marxist elements of Freire's eschatology appear in its stimulation of a classless society which, however, is not oriented towards the suppression of the State and the advent of the proletarian dictatorship. Freire does not give much details regarding these points. But does he suggest, for instance, that the simple abolition of the State shows unfruitful in itself if the conditions which engender oppression are not overcome and that the proletarian dictatorship, in this sense, becomes merely another "dictatorship"?

The Christian elements of Freire's eschatology are not easy to be detected due to the lack of available data. But they seem to be founded on the hope that a new age (the kingdom of God) is already here and will be perfectly established in the future because this is, since the beginning of the human history, God's purpose for all mankind. From this
viewpoint we can argue that Freire does not advocate the notion of some Protestant theologians who defend the idea of an eschatology already totally "realized" with the first coming of Christ nor he embraces the idea of a "consequent eschatology" which is to be fulfilled in the future (19). Much less does he adhere what can be termed "popular eschatology" in which, as in a magic fairy-tale, Christ suddenly will come and Christians, like angels, will meet him in the air in order to live forever in the new Eden. What Freire seems to accept, in fact, is the concept of an "eschatology in development, in process", consonant with the spirit of the Latin American theology of liberation. Engaged in history, this eschatology occurs every time the struggle for liberation is effectuated. The kingdom of God is "within man" who has to fight in order to conquer it. The future can not constitute an excuse for impeding man from being aware of his own responsibility as subject who acts and creates his own history and not as object of a history that simply reduces him to being no more than the sum of the conditions of his existence. Hence, it is possible for man to revindicate his claim to control his own destiny. And in a context of oppression, like that of Latin America, to escape from this struggle is to become "heretic" even if one carries the

(19) A full account and discussion of these two eschatologies is to be found in Norman Perrin's The Kingdom of God in the Teaching of Jesus, London, SCM Press Ltd., 1966.
label of "Christian". As a matter of fact, this new age is already being experienced, in an embryonic state, among those "Abrahamic minorities". Dedicating themselves to the establishment of a new society consonant to the common good, they are, in their faith and hopes, living by anticipation the full concretion of this age.

We can deduce, therefore, that Freire's eschatology is not a sort of "man's invented or pre-fabricated" eschatology in which God is banished from history and from man's heart and mind; an eschatology which leaves to man alone the destiny and fulfillment of history and the responsibility of his own humanization. It is in this particular point that Freire's eschatology radically diverges from the Marxist one. What seems to be absent in Marx is plentifully present in Freire, i.e., the guarantee of a genuine and libertarian revolution, because any revolution only grounded on human capacity and initiative is condemned, sooner or later, to dwindle. And if I underlined the word "seems" it is because what gives success to the Marxist revolution is precisely its "evangelical" emphasis on a world freer and more human. Perhaps in their atheistic attitudes many Marxists are more "Christians" than one can imagine; they are working with God even though, unaware, whereas many respectful and well-intentioned Christians are doing the opposite in silencing their voices of repudiation before oppression.
From this context emanates some disturbing questions: How can a philosophy like that of Marxism which disseminates atheism be conciliated with the values of the Christian faith, even more if one considers Latin America as a continent extremely and historically conditioned by the values of such faith? How, then, can one pretend that the theology of liberation be both a Christian theology and, at the same time, be methodologically and philosophically grounded on the basis of Marxism? Does it not mean that in order to implant or to safeguard Marxism the Christian faith runs the risk of being annihilated, as it has been the case in many contemporary States? But on the other hand, can we not argue that one of the principal reasons for the growth, spread, and success of Marxism is not exactly the existence in it of this transcendental element which calls all men for the construction of a new world? Freire himself tells us:

"I went to the popular masses in my youth because of Christ, and when I arrived there, the oppressed masses sent me back to Marx. I went, then, to Marx, and I did not find any motive to quit to continue meeting the Christ in the corner of the streets" (20).

Furthermore, how to harmonize the Christian elements of Freire's eschatology with the materialistic approach of the ethical system of Marxism? Is Marxism able to perform an

(20) "Educação é prática da liberdade. Reflexões de um educador cristão", in Revista Tempo e Presença, CEDI- Centro Ecumênico de Documentação e Informação, Rio de Janeiro, No. 154, October 1979, p. 3.
authentic libertarian revolution? In rejecting the metaphysical dimension of the human being, can Marxist ethics furnish the tools for the genuine revolution aspired by man in the amelioration of the human existence? Freire does not give any explicit answer to these questions. But as his eschatology follows the main guidelines of the theology of liberation, I think, it is correct, at least, to conjecture that in order to be coherent with that theology and also faithful to his Christian convictions, Freire is, probably, forced to agree that the Marxist revolution can only promise but it is unable to bring about the plenitude of its proclaimed liberation from oppression since it rejects the metaphorical dimension of a libertarian revolution.

Freire's concept of conscientização and its relation to his notion of revolution is, thus, inseparable from the context of oppression in which both have developed. Their concretion, however, depends on local and historical circumstances which vary from place to place. Hence, his statement:

"Conscientização cannot escape, adventurously, from the limits which the historical reality imposes upon it. This is to say, the effort of conscientização is not possible in disrespect to the historical feasible" (21).

(21) "Conscientização e Libertação: uma conversa com Paulo Freire", in AGL, p. 139. See also Chapter II, Item 2.2. 3, p. 138.
When the historical possibilities do not exist or are inappropriate any attempt to undertake, for example, a genuine revolution is doomed to fail. We have to remember that Freire is frequently pointing out patience as a very distinctive mark of a true revolutionary; he has to wait for the opportune historical circumstances in order to act promptly and efficaciously. "In history" — he says — "we make what is historically possible and not what we would like to do" (22).

Man is entirely responsible for becoming not what he is but what he is not yet and what is nowhere set down. But at the same time he is also forced to accept the historical conditions created by the previous generations. For this special reason, I think, Freire only indicates the historical possibilities of the revolution; he never guarantees its success since it depends on the continuing educational practice in order to maintain alive the very process of conscientização. He neither idealizes nor even envisages a "perfect" historical epoch.

(22) "Algumas notas sobre conscientização", in ACL, p. 147. This Freire's view resembles that of Marx when he says: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past". Cf. "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", in Selected Works, Po. cit., p. 97.
"Within history it is impossible to think in the coming of a kingdom of an undisturbable peace. History is futurity; it is a human event" (23).

Exactly because it is a human happening history is subjected to the proper conditions of imperfectness of the human beings. Thus, if the process of conscientização dies after the revolution has occurred the revolution will be no more.

"The revolution is born as a social entity within the oppressor society; to the extent that it is cultural action, it cannot fail to correspond to the potentialities of the social entity in which it originated. Every entity develops (or is transformed) within itself, through the interplay of its contradictions. External conditioners, while necessary, are effective only if they coincide with those potentialities. The newness of the revolution is generated within the old, oppressive society; the taking of power constitutes only a decisive moment of the continuing revolutionary process. In a dynamic, rather than static, view of revolution, there is no absolute 'before' or 'after', with the taking of power as the dividing line" (24).

Hence, Freire seems to suggest that revolution is not an end in itself nor an ultimate end. The ultimate end is rather to make every man, oppressor and oppressed, a truly man. Nevertheless, if it occurs that the process of conscientização dies after the revolution or with the taking of power these words of Martin Buber will be very suitable in reminding us that:

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(23) "O papel educativo das Igrejas na América Latina", in ACL, p. 114. See also Chapter III, Item 3.3.3, p. 212-223.
(24) PO, p. 132
"It is an illusion that revolution breaks with the old. It is only that the old makes its appearance with a new mask on. The old slavery changes its dress, the old inequality is transformed into a new inequality" (25).

In addition, Freire maintains that the true revolution is destined to happen if only there exists a revolutionary consciousness. As we already pointed out he refutes any revolutionary attempt made by an elitist vanguard. The people will not be fooled for long, nor will they trust a would-be elitist-revolutionary-teachers who feel superior and impede them to achieve a revolutionary consciousness. Well, this revolutionary consciousness is precisely what lacks in most of the Latin American countries because

"the popular masses emerge in the historical process intensively conditioned by all their experience in the culture of silence. They emerge, obviously, without a class consciousness, once they could not have it in their former state, i.e., that of their immersion... On the one hand, they claim; on the other, they accept the assistencialist and manipulative formulae" (26).

It helps us to understand the facility with which the coups d'état are carried out by the dominant classes. The people passive and calmly assist the coups d'état taking place without any contestation; the power elites know that they do not possess a revolutionary consciousness or when they do, it is in a very weak and disorganized way. Alias, as we have already mentioned...

(26) "O papel educativo das Igrejas na América Latina", in ACL, p. 121.
ready affirmed, the coups d'état aim exactly to impede or thwart the emergence of the revolutionary consciousness. At any rate, if such feeble and disordered revolutionary consciousness exists it is a sign that the revolution is already taking place. We are, then, expected to be patient. Mário Moreira Alves summons us to be aware that:

"The time of man flows faster than the time of history. We are always impatient to live our dreams to their final results. But we now face a task that has only begun, a task that may consume more time than we are ready to surrender, but a task we cannot hasten. If we refuse to follow its rhythm, if we try to force its natural pace too much, we may slow its maturing and perhaps never accomplish it. Liberation is 'like a grain of mustard seed, which, when it is sown in the earth, is less than all the seeds that be in the earth. But when it is sown, it groweth up, and becometh greater than all herbs, and shooteth out great branches; so that the fowls of the air may lodge under the shadow of it'" (27).

Freire, therefore, looks forward to a gradual process of transformation of reality. He does not advocate violence or bloody revolution. He seems to be aware that to rely on the weapons of violence is not truly revolutionary. These weapons only forge new bonds of fear and resentment. Violence calls for violence and violates the dignity of both victor and vanquished. One important question to be posed at this point is that Freire, however, does not give enough at

tention to the construction of libertarian structures and the ways of how can they be created using means others than violence. Perhaps it can be interpreted as a weak point of his political philosophy. The fact is that he himself has never engaged in any revolutionary conspiracy; he has never prepared himself for an imminent revolution nor has he formed or joined any revolutionary group nor has he given his support to any reactionary radical movement. For him the use of violence seems to prove to be useless; its employment achieves nothing; it will ultimately substitute the means for the ends:

"In fact, however, conscientização does not lead men to 'destructive fanaticism'. On the contrary, by making it possible for men to enter the historical process as responsible Subjects, conscientização enrolls them in the search for self-affirmation and thus avoids fanaticism" (28).

For this very reason we have to be vigilant about the means as well as the ends of the revolution and of the whole process of conscientização. It is to be understood as the pedagogy of non-violence. It is neither primarily concerned in setting the stages for confrontation nor in fostering the protest movements. Rather it strives to use non-violent pedagogical methods to awaken the consciousness of both the oppressed and oppressors to the meaning of human liberation for

(28) Po, p. 20
all. This lack of comprehension leads many to implant or impose, in the name of revolution and human liberation, their own revolution (or revolt). We have always to be on the alert once the evil forces have also their faithful martyrs.

Therefore, it is convenient to infer that from a Freirean point of view, a true libertarian revolution is only able to succeed if it employs those means which are beyond the ability of others to use. It is a revolution solely grounded on faith in men and in their capacity to fulfill the laws of their beings. It does not mean, however, to cross the arms and passively contemplate the events occurring without participation or simply wait for a sort of "spiritual or metaphysical" revolution without commitment to the historical reality. The vindication of a sanguinary revolution is the mistake of those who interpret Freire from a dogmatic Marxist framework as well as of those radical extremists. Both have emancipated themselves from many of the most brilliant aspects of Freire's achievements. Sectarian revolutionaries like these may become the "grave diggers" of Freire's thought and the very own betrayers of his theory of libertarian education. Engels himself, in his typical style, in a letter to Marx of May 7, 1852, remarks that "revolutionary adventurers like these should be caught and ex-
ecuted" (29).

Freire, nevertheless, does not deny that in the revolutionary process, sometimes, violence may occur. He says: "Pour moi 'révolution' signifie 'libération'. S'il y a Sang ou non, je l'ignore" (30). Although he does not defend a bloody revolution, Freire seems to be fully aware that in order to face the violence of the oppressor there is no other alternative left than the violence of the oppressed. Thus, they have, at least, this right, of employing a certain measure of coercion which is able to re-establish order and justice. It does not mean civil disobedience. Citizens have to be obedient to their rulers, but it does not mean a kind of blind obedience. An obedience which is contrary to the very nature of the individual, i.e., to be more human, ceases to be obedience; it is transformed into mere submission and enslavement. Societies have always been built -- as Brady Tyson remarks (31) -- on the basis of coercion and consensus. When the latter deteriorates, the role of the former expands. In order to convince the people that government by consensus is more efficient and less costly and that

consensus in itself is not necessarily a good thing, tyrannical leaders always try to create an apparatus of symbols and generate about them a mass loyalty and dependence rooted in fear and terror.

Hence, I think it is correct to argue on the basis that Freire is calling people to passive resistance and, occasionally to armed forces, if necessary, in order to combat an unlawful and tyrant socio-political system. However, he maintains that the violence of the oppressed is different, in many senses, from that of the oppressors.

"Yet it is -- paradoxical though it may seem -- precisely in the response of the oppressed to the violence of their oppressors that a gesture of love may be found. Consciously or unconsciously, the act of rebellion by the oppressed (an act which is always, or nearly always, as violent as the initial violence of the oppressors) can initiate love. Whereas the violence of the oppressors prevents the oppressed from being fully human, the response of the latter to this violence is grounded in the desire to pursue the right to be human" (32).

The violence of the oppressors is, then, "necrophilic", hateful, cruel, passionate, barbaric, irrational, fanatic. The violence of the oppressed, by its turn, should be nourished by love and compassion which in order to become real seek to be effective. When wrapped out in violent actions they have to be embued by a great precaution in order not to become "necrophilics". It was not moved by an act of hate, for ex-

(32) PO, p. 41-42: See also Chapter I, Item 1.3.1, p. 71.
ample, that Jesus used violence in order to expel the merchants from the temple. Love is the only tool authentic oppressed-revolutionaries have to destroy the fortress of evil; the only weapon capable of overcoming obstacles of the most difficult kind. And for Freire,

"the great, the only proof of a true love that the oppressed can give to the oppressor, is to retreat, radically, the objective conditions which give them the power to oppress, and not to accommodate themselves, masochistically to oppression. Only in this way those who oppress can be humanized. And this loving task, which is politic revolutionary, belongs to the oppressed. The oppressors, while being a class which oppresses, never liberate, in the same manner they never liberate themselves. Only the debility of the oppressed is sufficiently strong to do so" (33).

Accordingly, the concern is for the practice of an efficacious love. Those engaged in the libertarian process do not content to feel an interior satisfaction (love in the sense of eros) which is the result of psychological mechanisms which soothe their consciousness. Hence, Freire’s refutation of "assistencialism" and of certain forms of "aides". Those committed to the liberation of man want love to achieve its desired purpose: that those who are hungry today may eat their bread with dignity; those who are thirsty may satiate their need without humiliation; those who work may receive the fruit of their labour without exploitation. They

are those who love not only in words and speeches but also in deeds and in truth. They announce the truth to a social system that has deviated from it; they deeply believe in what they proclaim and this is why they are always ready to run the risks of deviating from some accepted social patterns; they assert that what the social structure sees as true or good is not, sometimes, true nor good; engaging themselves in the process of liberation they cannot remain passive in the face of the oppressor's violence; they are aware of the contradiction between "what is" and "what might be". They are the true revolutionaries who fight with the weapons of dramatic truth and suffering love. And these are not to be regarded as passive instruments. When well used, they are strong enough to awaken despairing people to a sense and discovery of their own potentialities and values. It is in this sense that Freire's notion of revolution is to be interpreted as being an act of love, and thus, love in the sense of agape. We must not forget this point if we do not want to misinterpret Freire, as many have done (34).

The long periods of terror and bloodshed which have so brut-

ishly marked many Latin American revolutions in the past are sufficient confirmation of this Freire's remarks. Nonetheless, I wonder if the great gap of his speculation in this field is not precisely the lack of a political philosophy able to carry out this memorable observation. In offering concrete programs for concrete situations Freire still has to reflect deeper about the political consequences of his philosophy and educational methodology.

Moreover, Freire still states that the aim of the oppressors' violence is to maintain oppression. But whenever the oppressed are forced to use violence it is due to their desire in edifying a society of equals.

"And this is a radical difference between the violence of the oppressor and the violence of the oppressed. That of the former is exercised in order to express the violence implicit in exploitation and domination. That of the latter is used to eliminate violence through the revolutionary transformation of the reality that makes it possible" (35).

So if the oppressed embark themselves on any revolutionary action -- fruit of their conscientização -- it is because they truly believe in a better tomorrow which has already started. It is the beginning of a new historical epoch in which the dignity of all human creature is utterly recognized. Oppressed as they are, but now conscious of their role in the historical process, they no longer believe in human fables or

(35) LGB, p. 34
are deceived by false and demagogical promises. On account of this they throw themselves entirely into the utopian-prophetic hope of a new tomorrow.

It is also important to remember that for Freire, violence is always, and firstly, introduced by the oppressors themselves.

"Any situation in which 'A' objectively exploits 'B' or hinders his pursuit of self-affirmation as a responsible person is one of oppression. Such a situation in itself constitutes violence, even when sweetened by false generosity, because it interferes with man's ontological and historical vocation to be more fully human. With the establishment of a relationship of oppression, violence has already begun. Never in history has violence been initiated by the oppressed. How could they be the initiators, if they themselves are the result of violence? How could they be the sponsors of something whose objective inauguration called forth their existence as oppressed? There would be no oppressed had there been 'no prior situation of violence to establish their subjugation" (36).

Thus, if the oppressed are obliged to use violence it is because the violence used against them by the oppressors has become insupportable. If they wish to subvert the established order it is not because they are maladjusted to that order; it is simply because such order is inhuman. In oppressed situations there are no subversive individuals, in the pejorative meaning of this term. There are, indeed, subversive social and political structures. If such thing as "sub-

(36) PO, p. 40-41
versive individuals" exist, they only exist under conditions of oppression sustained by the subversive and tyrannical regimes. They are the impelling forces which guide the "subversive individuals" to join the libertarian movements (or the authentic revolutionaries or the reactionaries and irrational ones) for the suppression of the subversive social and political structures which are, actually, "legal" and established disorder.

"As beneficiaries of a situation of oppression, the oppressors cannot perceive that if having is a condition of being, it is a necessary condition for all men... Humanity is a 'thing', and they possess it as an exclusive right, as inherited property. To the oppressor consciousness, the humanization of the 'others', of the people, appears not as the pursuit of full humanity, but as subversion... If the humanization of the oppressed signifies subversion, so also does their freedom; hence the necessity for constant control" (37).

At this point it is convenient to call attention for the fact that Freire has been accused of a simplistic social analysis of dividing society into oppressors and oppressed, dominant and dominated countries, or better yet, the bad and good guys. The way Freire poses the question I agree with Professor William S. Griffity that Freire "compares the position of the oppressors on the right with the enlightened revolutionaries and that "he acknowledges no middle

(37) P0, p. 44, 45
grounds" (38). I have no intention of refuting the idea that the implementation of the revolution requires the participation as well as the contribution of other kinds of leaders which have not been appointed by Freire. Perhaps Freire is wrong in dealing with such simplistic bi-polarity. But I wonder if the charge against Freire is not a problem regarding the choice of words and not a problem concerning the meaning. Let us examine, first, the problem of meaning. The refutation which is levelled against Freire is that society can not be simply reduced into two diametrically opposed class categories. But I am convinced that it is not what Freire intends to. We have to keep in mind that Freire deals with a situation in which the great majority lives in permanent state of oppression and abject poverty. He is sure that it is due to the social and political structures that oppress, but also benefits a relatively small part of society, the small but powerful elites. This class is labeled by Freire "oppressors" who maintain and even strengthen an oppressive order. But, at no time Freire affirms that the oppressors must necessarily be aware of the fact that they op-

(38) "Paulo Freire: Utopian Perspective on Literacy Education for Revolution", in Paulo Freire: A Revolutionary Dilemma for the Adult Educator, Edited by Stanley M. Grabowski, Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University, Publications in Continuing Education and E.R.I.C. Clearing-house on Adult Education, 1972, p. 74.
press or that they are guilty for this situation. He merely points out the fact that there are those who oppress and those who are the victims of oppression. Time and time again he emphasizes that the oppressors are themselves oppressed once they also are victims of a false consciousness (the consciousness of the "haves"). Then, according to Freire all members of an oppressive situation are virtually oppressed. Among these oppressed, some, the power elites, are the authors -- although perhaps unaware -- of the oppression. So they are oppressors as well. However, if we analyse the problem of the choice of words, I really do not know any other way to see things differently in the context of Latin America. To speak about "middle ground" in that context is, in fact, to choose the way of neutrality which is per se -- as Freire himself puts it -- an option to stay at the side of the dominators. From a Latin American perspective we allure to work for the maintenance of oppression even if we pretend, sometimes, to deny it, or we put ourselves at the service of the libertarian revolutionary movements of the oppressed. There is no other choice, no "middle ground", no other words than those oppressors and oppressed to describe that Latin American situation.

It is on this basis that Freire sees true libertarian revolution as social transformation. I agree, however,
that he can be attacked on the philosophical grounds that he does not evidentiate enough that social transformation also must include transformation of the internal side of the human life; in other words, transformations in the minds of men and in the body politic. Hence, we can raise the question: Is the process of conscientização to be interpreted only as a vehicle to stimulate social transformations or do these transformations also involve new visible attitudes in the moral realm? If this moral revolution does not occur, i.e., if the process of conscientização does not involve moral transformation it can not produce its expected results, and hence, the social revolution will be a farce. Thus, authentic libertarian revolution asks first for a deep transformation of moral attitudes. In this respect Maritain is right in admonishing us that

"the social revolution will be a moral revolution or it will not be at all. To wish to change the face of the earth without first changing one's heart (which no man can do of his own strength) is to undertake a work that is purely destructive. Perhaps indeed if omnipotent love did truly transform our hearts, the exterior work of reform would already be half done. You can only transform the social order of the modern world by effecting at the same time and first of all within your own soul a renewal of moral and spiritual life; by digging down to the moral and spiritual foundations of human existence, and reviving the moral ideas that govern the life of the social body as such; and by awakening a new impulse in the secret sources of its being" (39).

PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS CONCERNING FREIRE'S CONCEPT OF "CONSCIENTIZAÇÃO"

Therefore, mere awakening of critical consciousness, simple passage from magic-naïve to critical way of thinking, as it is suggested by Freire, without moral transformation will lead to nothingness, or if it will, to new forms of alienation and domination. In the libertarian revolutionary process education for the awakening of critical consciousness is a very important element. But the most essential is the inner and moral renovation both of the oppressors and of the oppressed. Only in this way can the former stop to oppress and the latter stop to be oppressed and dual beings. In this regard Freire's emphasis on that "Easter experience", which must include the process of dying in order to be born again with new moral attitudes, becomes more meaningful. Such is the road that conducts the oppressors to die as oppressors and the oppressed, in their process of emergence from an oppressive reality, to die as oppressed. Liberation, in this sense, is like

"a childbirth, and a painful one. The man who emerges is a new man, viable only as the oppressor-oppressed contradiction is superseded by the humanization of all men. Or to put it another way, the solution of this contradiction is born in the labor which brings into the world this new man: no longer oppressor nor longer oppressed, but man in the process of achieving freedom" (40).

However, this rebirth must include new moral attitudes. Without this condition there will be no genuine and lasting lib-

(40) PO, p. 33-34
ertarian revolution. So, any intent aiming social transformation will be a disaster if, first of all, an inner renewal and changes in moral attitudes are not proved true. Is it by virtue of this that Freire does not separate moral from global education when he suggests that "all educative practice must involve a moral education?" (41) As stressed before, Freire does not see moral education as a specific discipline to be taught by the systematic education. Wherefore, in this respect, his thought resembles Kant, who says:

"Morality is something so sacred and sublime that we must not degrade it by placing it in the same rank of discipline" (42).

Therefore, the process of conscientização also carries in itself a moral transformation and, according to Freire, all education, in this sense, would be moral education or it would not be an education at all. But there are still some controversial points in Freire's concept of conscientização which have to be submitted to a philosophical critique.

5.2 - CONTROVERSIAL POINTS IN FREIRE'S CONCEPT OF "CONSCIENTIZAÇÃO"

- A PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE

(41) INT. See also Chapter IV, Item 4.1, p. 286.
Freire has been the target of much uncritical flattery as well as bitter criticisms. The criticisms vary from ridiculous, inopportune and personal attacks to the sensitive and worthy ones. Some of these criticisms are related to the inner contradictions between Freire's thought and his activities, or even to his alleged lack of originality. I will not be concerned here with these sort of criticisms (43). Rather I will try to be impartial as much as possible in my criticisms of Freire, notwithstanding my personal admiration for his works and many of his ideas.

It was stressed in the Introduction of this dissertation that the formation of Freire's thought is based on some different philosophical currents. In the Second Chapter I tried to show the different aspects of conscientização in relation to these philosophical tendencies. The first point I want to stir up here concerns the role played by these diversified philosophical trends in their relation to Freire's concept of conscientização. Afterwards, I intend to raise some problems concerning Freire's method and its relation to his notion of conscientização and then, to analyse how this same notion is related to his philosophy of liberation.

5.2.1 - PROBLEMS REGARDING THE DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHICAL TRENDS OF FREIRE'S THOUGHT AND THEIR RELATIONS TO HIS CONCEPT OF "CONSCIENTIZAÇÃO"

How does Freire embody all the different philosophical trends of his thought in their theoretical integration? How are they interrelated with one another and with his concept of conscientização? Do they form a systematic unity? All these questions seem to receive a negative answer when we analyse Freire's thought from this perspective. To begin with, I think it is impossible to speak about the theoretical integration of Freire's thought when we study it departing from these philosophical trends. In fact, Freire does not base himself on these different trends. He simply employs some of their questionings and tries to apply them, in his own way, to his thought. He is neither preoccupied with their interrelationships nor how they are connected, in a systematic way, with his concept of conscientização.

Just at this point we face some problems in dealing with Freire's thought. Sometimes he gives us the impression that he does not care very much about the whole context from which he derives some of the questionings posed by these philosophical currents in their applicability to his own in-
vestigations. Other times he does not seem to be aware of some puzzles which arise from the interrelationships between these currents. For example, Freire's gnosiology is in great part grounded on the pedagogical applicability of the "intentionality of consciousness", a theme he borrows from Husserl's phenomenology. Limiting himself to the social dimension of this theme Freire maintains, untouchable, the metaphysical realm, and even the ethical implications of the same theme are not fully discussed. Moreover, he totally disregards any analysis of this theme by others pre-Husserlian philosophers such as Franz von Brentano, from whom Husserl himself derives it. Also there is no reference in his works about other post-Husserlian philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty who has given many astonishing remarks on Husserl's phenomenology.

Furthermore, a closer look at Freire's usage of the phenomenological investigation leads us to conclude that for him "phenomenon" is identified with fact, or reality, or the appearance of a given experienceable object. Thus, his phenomenological analysis of reality can be seen as a descriptive study that is to precede any attempt to provide explanations of the social phenomena. Though Freire utterly disdains Kant's philosophy, in this respect, his gnosiology resembles the Kantian distinctions between objects and events.
as they appear in our experience from objects and events as they are in themselves, independently of the forms imposed on them by our cognitive faculties. Hence, likewise Kant, the phenomenal world, the empirical reality constitutes, for Freire, the object of knowing. Accordingly, all we can ever know are phenomena. But is, for Freire, the noumenal world, the essence of the things in themselves, something beyond man's capacity of apprehension, as it is in Kant? If it is we have an unsolvable problem at this point. Different from Kant, Freire does not develop a systematic metaphysics of his gnosiological postures. So how does one, for instance, harmonize the principle that all we know are phenomena with the Christian dimension of Freire's thought? How is the perception of the noumenal world, in a Freirean viewpoint, possible? How can knowledge of God be understood in Freire's gnosiology? These important metaphysical questions remain unanswered by Freire, despite the strong role Christianity plays in the formation and further development of his thought. Therefore, I agree with Professor Maxine Greene who sees in "the work of Paulo Freire many implications for a phenomenological approach to the teaching of teachers-to-be" (44). However, the way he exposes his phenomenological anal-

ysis is limited by the stress he places upon consciousness and the importance of each individual becoming aware of his own life-world. Consequently, from a phenomenological point of view, the concept of conscientização employed by Freire is also limited by a critical awareness of objects and events as they occur in the present reality.

Another puzzle appears if we try to analyse Freire's concept of freedom through the variety of the philosophical trends of his thought. If we attempt, for example, to base ourselves on the Marxist and Existentialist foundations of his thought this concept clashes with one another of these foundations. Both Marxism and Existentialism probably will agree on the fundamental fact that man's existence is in conflict with his essence. But where the Marxist outlook is essentially optimistic, once it counts on the working class for a collective and total reconstruction of reality, Existentialism is pessimistic, seeing man alone in a hostile world of nothingness. Is it possible to reconcile these two different concepts of freedom in Freire's thought? A careful study of his works, however, does not show such possibility. He seems to avoid an Existentialist approach in his discourse about freedom once it seeks freedom in isolation of the struggling individual without much of a past or a future. For Freire, on the contrary,
"the liberation of the oppressed is a liberation of men, not things. Accordingly, while no one liberates himself by his own efforts, neither is he liberated by others. Liberation, a human phenomenon, cannot be achieved by semihumans. Any attempt to treat men as semihumans only dehumanizes them. When men are already dehumanized, due to the oppression they suffer, the process of their liberation must not employ the methods of dehumanization" (45).

In fact, Freire widely employs the Marxist approach in which freedom is interpreted as a historic concept to be realized for the individual man in a society in harmony with nature and the whole of mankind.

From the Marxist approach of Freire's thought comes other embarrassing problems. Besides Marx himself he puts great emphasis on the works of Louis Althusser, Karel Kosík, Paul and Lucien Goldman, Georg Lukács, etc. in his interpretation of Marxism and also tries to incorporate many points of these interpretations to his own pedagogical inquiries. Nonetheless, other distinguished exegetes of Marxism such as Roger Garaudy, Rosa Luxemburg, V.I. Lenin, Jean-Yves Calvez, etc., are entirely or almost neglected. Why does it happen? Is Freire not also being tempted by his own ideological positions? He himself says:

"It is fundamental for us to know that... when we plan, when we draw the educational policies, we are engaged in political acts which imply an ideological choice" (46)

(45) PO, p. 53
and that our ideology determines our epistemology. Employing this statement, can one not criticize Freire for also choosing an ideological position in his approaches and interpretation of Marxism? If this criticism is to be valid will his notion of conscientização not be in jeopardy?

From the Christian background of his thought Freire assumes the same attitude. In the beginning of his career he follows many of the guidelines of the philosophy of Emmanuel Mounier and Gabriel Marcel, for example, whereas he disregards one of the most influential Catholic thinkers of this century, Jacques Maritain. Even in the specific context of the Latin American theology and philosophy of liberation some renowned figures such as Gustavo Gutierrez, Juan Luis Segundo, Leonardo Boff, Enrique Dussel, Rubem Alves, etc., are seldom or not even referred to. However, many of the Freirean insights are very much in the same line of thought as these intellectuals.

Moreover, a careful look at some of Freire’s later works leads us to adduce that many of his inquiries, particularly the theological ones, do not make references to some famous Catholic theologians such as Hans Küng, Danielou, Yves Congar, Karl Rahner, etc. They are indeed, more akin to the speculations of some Protestant theologians such as Jürgen Moltmann, Reinhold Niebuhr, James Cone, etc., although he
omits other acknowledged and more systematic Protestant theologians such as Rudolf Bultmann, Oscar Culmann, Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, etc. Can it be explained on the grounds of Freire’s activities in the World Council of Churches? Despite its ecumenical character this institution is, actually, more theologically oriented by Protestantism since the Roman Catholic Church is not filiated with it. Can one, based on this fact, talk about the "Protestantization" of Freire’s thought? If it is so, does it, in any sense, affect his concept of conscientização? Is it possible, for example, to reconcile the individualistic outlook of Protestantism with the social and collective dimension of the process of conscientização? In any event I think that accusations and questions like these are dangerous and can not be applied to Freire: (1) Freire’s theological speculations are limited to the sphere of pedagogy; (2) he does not deal with any ecclesiastical or doctrinal interpretation; (3) he himself has already surmounted the passionate sectarian barrier of confessionalism; (4) his approaches to theology is in what it has of ecumenic value for all Christians, and so he avoids any sort of theological quarrels. This is why he is able to see and interpret "ecumenism as a search for unity in the diversity of persons, of peoples who can be mediated by the same world which they must re-create. For this reason I enlarge the ecumenical horizon including in it those
who do not believe as we do. Because there is not, in my opinion, ecumenism which is not democratic, participant, tolerant and respectful. Apart from this, ecumenism is transformed into a Catholic or Protestant rigidity" (47).

Yet from the Christian background of his thought Freire is not free from what many people can interpret as being some contradictory tangles. We already know that he is always stressing the dialectical aspect of his thought. It is precisely what constitutes for many people a true cul-de-sac of Freire's investigations when they attempt to make the conciliation between his dialectical analysis and Christianity. So, for instance, they ask how it is possible to harmonize the absolute value of the Christian faith with a dialectical approach in which nothing can be interpreted as absolute. Other people, however, do not see any difficulty in making the link between Freire's dialectical way of thinking with the Christian faith. As they interpret the historical reality from a dialectical viewpoint, they also see faith in the same way. Faith has, then, not only an internal dimension; it also expresses itself in the historical events. In this perspective faith comes to be a historical commitment. It is, in fact, the utopian-prophetic dimension of faith. It is enough to remember, among many, the examples of Moses versus Pharaoh, Samuel versus Saul, Nathan versus David, Amos versus Amaziah, Jeremiah versus Zedekiah, John

the Baptist versus Herod, Jesus of Nazareth versus Pilate and all the Christian martyrs who had the audacity to challenge and say "no" to the powers of this world, responsible for oppression. Apart from this outlook one can not understand Freire's position which is entirely in accordance with the very postulates of the Latin American theology of liberation. Therefore, we can see a link between Freire's dialectical process of conscientização and the absolute values of the Christian faith. In the same manner he insists that conscientização is inconceivable outside the unity between practice and theory, also faith can not be fully understood in the dichotomy between contemplation and action. For this reason he states that

"theological training should be one kind of cultural action for liberation, in which man gets rid of his ingenuous concept of God (it is a myth that alienates him) and gets a new notion of Him in which God, as a presence in history, does not in the slightest keep man from 'making history' -- the history of his liberation" (48).

It is undeniable that the process of conscientização in itself can be seen as a way of growing in faith, which is the theoretical and contemplative aspect of faith. But it is also a manifestation of an engaged faith in the historical and libertarian processes. Christ himself was not a man who used to express his faith in a pure contemplative way. He

was also a man of action. If one forgets this point of his ministry he is never able to understand the profound meaning of his miracles. They are to be interpreted as being the practical manifestation of his faith and a manner of showing that liberation from all sort of oppression (inner and social) was already here and now. Thus, if faith is reduced to a mere theoretical concept it may delute and lose its historical dimension. Christians can not achieve a critical perception of reality and remain isolated from it, mainly when it is one in which oppression is a daily routine. Faith as well as conscientização, when disincarnated from reality, turn out to be another form of alienation. Hence, the dialectical dimension of faith, in its manifestation in history, does not contradict its absoluteness. It has, however, to recognize that man's acquisition of faith is a gift, a matter of grace. No one can argue, for example, that lack of critical consciousness also means lack of faith or vice-versa. Wherefore, when we make the connection between Freire's dialectical aspect of conscientização and the absolute value of the Christian faith we are thinking of a kind of "engaged consciousness" to a "mature faith". Faith starts by a free initiative of the Spirit and by a free response of man to the Spirit. But, like conscientização, it also has to be a permanent process which is the result of the action of
the Spirit in man's life whose expression makes itself present in history. Therefore, the unity between theory and practice is accomplished in both the dialectical aspect of conscientização and the absolute value of the Christian faith.

In conclusion, we can argue that all the philosophical currents which lie behind the background of Freire's thought are, sometimes, in conflict with each other, when we attempt to analyse some of the major themes of his pedagogical-philosophical inquiries. They do not converge in the sense of forming an integral and systematic unity of thought. Freire does not create a finished system in which his pedagogical thought can be fully harmonized with those philosophical trends.

5.2.2 - PROBLEMS REGARDING FREIRE'S METHOD AND ITS RELATIONS TO HIS CONCEPT OF "CONSCIENTIZAÇÃO"

In the previous chapter of this dissertation it was shown how the applicability of Freire's method is able to foster the awakening of critical consciousness. Nevertheless, some problems arise when, from a philosophical outlook, we analyse the application of his method in relation to the process of conscientização in itself.
As stated before Freire's eclectic way of thinking emerges from his own experiences. So it lacks, in most cases, a deeper theoretical foundation which, sometimes, has been interpreted as one of the weakest points of Freire. Though he strongly emphasizes the unity between theory and practice, his thought is, indeed, more turned to the practical aspect. Well, any practice in order to be fully valid has to be firmly grounded on a very deep theoretical basis. Without this requirement, and according to Freire's own critique, the practice runs the risk of becoming a "blind activism" (49). Can this criticism be applied to Freire himself? If it can, we have to bear in mind that his educational theory has probably been the most widely diffused and accepted non-formal education in the last fifteen years. Besides, we also have to remember that many attempts concerning the applicability of Freire's method have failed. Why? Can these failures be explained on account of the fragility of the theoretical basis of Freire's method? Can these failures also be attributed to the "coordinators" due to their evidently incorrect engagement of conscientização? In other words, it means that the "coordinators" do not themselves achieve a sufficient change from their former paternalistic attitudes to internalize the spirit of the method.

(49) "Conscientização e Libertação: uma conversa com Paulo Freire", in ACL, p. 135.
Another problem may trouble the philosopher in the analysis of Freire's method. It also refers to the emphasis he puts on the unity between theory and practice, but now in its relation to manual and intellectual work in the achievement of conscientização. Does Freire's integration between manual and intellectual work include, as in Marx, for example, the artistic production? Freire does not give specific answer to this question. Only by conjecture can we argue that the integration between manual and intellectual work makes possible the stimulation for artistic expression and aptitudes because art is one aspect of man's activity as transformer of nature, i.e., as worker. And in transforming nature, man transforms himself. The creation of new objects is connected to the creation of a new subject. It is in this sense that a contemplation becomes possible, in which man sees in the object not only its content of utilitarian significance but also the expression it contains of his own creative act. Hence, the aesthetic attitude starts when man, to his delight, finds in the object he has created something more than a way to satisfy a need, when he sees it as a witness of his creative act. The problem with Freire's method, however, is that in its insistance on the integration between manual and intellectual work it does not enter into the analysis and implication of the aesthetics problems,
which from a philosophical point of view can be regarded as a lacuna.

We are also informed that Freire's method is solely based on dialogue. But among all the abilities he claims for man this seems to be the one with less empirical evidences. Can man reach a stage of consciousness capable of predisposing him to a loving and humble dialogical practice? And if it is possible, does this not assume for all men a collective and common consciousness? Dialogue only exists in the diversity and plurality of thought. If every man achieves a stage of consciousness, such as that proposed by Freire, dialogue will probably cease because there will be nothing more to discuss once everybody will have reached the same unity of thought. Moreover, on what proof can one justify the faith that man is able to live in a loving dialogical relationship with others when much of the history seems to contradict this belief? And if such possibility is out of question much of Freire's philosophy of dialogue would not be regarded as another utopia?

Still Freire's method, as a dialogical practice, proposes a problem-posing educational theory. Well, if we admit that Freire's theory is true, we come to face what can be seen as the key contradiction of his pedagogy. How to engage in such type of educational theory if I know I possess the
true theory and the other does not? Thus, it is not easy to see how Freire himself can avoid the banking educational theory which so vehemently he refutes, once he has a view of the world which he considers as true and comes to form the contents as well as the end and the means of his pedagogy? Let us consider some passages from Freire in which he himself falls into the practice of the banking education. He states, for example:

"While it is normal for investigators to come to the area with values which influence their perceptions, this does not mean that they may transform the thematic investigation into a means of imposing these values. The only dimension of these values which it is hoped the men whose thematics are being investigated will come to share (it is presumed that the investigators possess this quality) is a critical perception of the world, which implies a correct method of approaching reality in order to unveil it. And critical perception can not be imposed" (50).

We face two problems in this passage: (1) Is it humanly possible for the investigator to avoid imposing his own values on the investigating and codifying processes? If it is possible the investigator, perhaps, has to submit himself to a sort of "brain washing". Besides, how to separate someone's beliefs from his own attitudes? But if it happened would it not be amount to breaking the unity between his theory and his practice, which is so dear to Freire? However, if it is not possible, education comes to be, at least, in some de-

(50) PO, p. 102-103
gree, prescriptive. (2) The assumption that "a correct method of approaching reality", which is the possession of the investigator and which is to be learned by the investigated, unquestionably transforms education into a 'banking practice.' Freire still states that:

"If educational programming is dialogical, the teacher-students also have the right to participate by including themes not previously suggested" (51).

The same above problem regarding the investigator is also the problem here with the teacher-students. In being allowed to introduce themes they are also tempted to projecting their own values and making education a prescriptive undertaking. Nonetheless, another passage seems to contradict almost all of what Freire so hard attempts to avoid. He says:

"If the educators lack sufficient funds to carry out the preliminary thematic investigation as described above, they can -- with a minimum knowledge of the situation -- select some basic themes to serve as 'codifications to be investigated'. Accordingly, they can begin with introductory themes and simultaneously initiate further thematic investigation" (52).

Therefore, does Freire's method actually attain the type of non-prescriptive educational practice which it proposes? My own point of view is that Freire's method is, in fact, not entirely free from certain domesticating aspects he so dislikes as he wants to think. Perhaps it is doubtful that such

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(51) PO, p. 114
(52) PO, p. 117. Emphasis added.
a "pure" methodology is viable. What Freire wants to do, seems to be impossible in absolute terms. This criticism, however, does not despise the method in itself. On the contrary, it shows that Freire has, probably, to face more directly some difficulties involving the entire range of his pedagogy.

The truth is that we do not know yet a long and continuous experiment of Freire's method. As it was mentioned in the previous chapter his method has been applied throughout the world, mainly in the underdeveloped countries and in poor communities of the developed nations, but mostly as sporadic or temporary occurrence and not as a permanent enterprise. In order to explain these short-lived experiences it is difficult to accept, as an exclusive excuse, the reactionary behaviour of the power elites, as it was the case of Brazil and Chile. The only exception up to now seems to be the recent example of Guinea-Bissau whose results, however, have not yet been revealed.

Concerning the applicability of Freire's method to children education the problem is quite similar. But at this field only few experiences have been made and most of them were conducted in developed countries. Although -- as it was shown in the previous chapter -- we are informed that the applicability of the method, in general, was made successfully, the results of the most interesting and recent experiments
are still unrevealed. Also many experiences in this area have been sporadic and soon paralyzed. Why? Has it been so because most of them were made outside the regular school system? If it is so, are the traditional and institutional school systems the only alternative for children education? Did the experiences fail due to the lack of financial or even moral support? Did the experimenters arrive to the conclusion that the method is only applicable for adult education among oppressed? These and many other questions can be raised in order to explain the failures regarding the applicability of Freire's method to children education.

To the philosopher of education, however, the most important questions, at this particular aspect, are the following: Is it possible to make children move from naive to critical stage of consciousness since their universe of perception is quite different from the adults? How to speak to children about historical commitment, engagement in revolutionary action, etc.? I think that in raising these questions it does not mean that the process of conscientização as such is not viable to be applied to children. It does, but in the sense that education for critical consciousness must start in the very beginning of children education. Conscientização is, indeed, necessary to any education which includes both democratization of culture and the
awakening of critical consciousness. The problem here is that many themes which are proper to the process of conscientização among adults can not be presented to children in the same way, since educators have to be aware of the capacity of perception of children's consciousness. In the same way that it is impossible to children, in the first grades of elementary school, to understand a problem of trigonometry, it is also impossible for them to participate, for example, in discussions concerning commitment to the revolutionary cause. Thus, it demands that educators be patient. They can start at this level to prepare the soil for sowing. But they have to wait for the proper season to sow the seeds and the opportune time for the crop, which obviously will depend on the quality of the soil, the seed, and of the efficiency of the sower.

I wonder, however, if the sporadic and temporary character as well as the failures regarding the applicability of Freire's method among adults or even among children can not be defended on the grounds that it is a method proper for non-formal education. In order to be carried out satisfactorily the method can not be applied to the traditional educational institutions within a regular school system. Therefore, if we want to do justice we can not reduce or apply Freire's method to the level of technique as a means of im-
proving existing systems of education. Freire is not concerned with "improving" educational systems. His pedagogy is designed to enable a revolution in the nature of society; it is not aimed at instituting a new curriculum or a free university. For this very reason he says:

"To conceive of systematic education as an instrument of liberation is simply to invert the rules of the game and... to endow education with an autonomous capacity for transforming society, the very process without which liberation as a permanent aspiration is meaningless" (53).

Hence, the adaptation of the pedagogy of the oppressed for use in a curriculum or classroom involves the risk of its becoming "another new thing" which almost always, after passing the enthusiasm and the impact of its novelty comes to end in ostracism. Thus, if we try to reduce Freire's pedagogy to the level of technique it certainly loses its potentially radical importance and becomes a mere instrument of modernization depicting it as an artifice of progressive education -- "learning by doing". This, probably, helps us to understand the many failures and the sporadical and temporary aspects regarding many applications of Freire's method.

5.2.3 - PROBLEMS REGARDING FREIRE'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERATION AND ITS RELATIONS TO HIS CONCEPT OF "CONSCIENTIZAÇÃO"

(53) "Literacy and the Possible Dream", Op. cit., p. 68.
PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS CONCERNING FREIRE'S CONCEPT OF "CONSCIENTIZAÇÃO"

Perhaps one of the most difficult tasks which has to be faced by the philosopher of education is the answer to this question: Is Freire's pedagogy concerned with an education as the practice of freedom or is it concerned with an education as the practice of liberation? Indeed, when we try to deepen ourselves in the study of this question we touch some difficulties.

One way of viewing this problem is to perceive Freire within the same perspective he shares with the wider movement for liberation in Latin America. This movement has reached concrete expression in the writings of the theologians and philosophers of liberation (54). Their inquiries are based upon an inductive method which derives its author-

ity from the experience of liberation and the biblical stories of Exodus and Easter. Their exegesis of revelation is one in which it is seen as an ongoing process in the history of mankind and sees the just ordering of society as the unfolding history of the kingdom of God. Thus, their notion of eschatology, as stated before, is not that of a "realized" or "consequent" one. The kingdom of God is already here whenever the struggle for liberation is taking place.

"An audacious theology of the revolution" -- Freire says -- "has to go further than St. Thomas in the recognition concerning the right to rebel. As a theology of the 'violence', it has to unmask a series of myths, among them, the one that only the oppressed is violent when defending himself against the violence of the oppressor. To me, violent is the act with which a man or some, or a class, impede others or other class from being. Here is where the lack of love lies" (55).

The liberation process is, then, associated with the political, cultural and soteriological dimensions of freedom. The term liberation is used instead of the more metaphysical word "redemption" for several reasons: (1) it draws upon the imagery of freedom in the Exodus and Easter events; (2) it is better understood by contemporary men, mainly the oppressed; (3) and it connotes a concreteness which redemption does not convey. These three aspects interpenetrate because evil has a concrete history in unjust situations and

the creation of a new man depends upon recognition of the existing conflict between good and evil, or in a more theological language, between grace and sin. We can, thus, surmise that liberation has two dimensions: it is liberation of history and liberation in history. The first is liberation as suppression of a history which alienates and hinders man from living his faith in its truthfulness. Such history fills man with idols which incites him to express his faith in empty and symbolical rites. Probably these strong prophetic words are still very irksome:

"I hate your religious festivals; I cannot stand them! When you bring me burnt offerings I will not accept them... Stop your noisy songs; I do not want to listen to your harps. Instead, let justice flow like a stream, and righteousness like a river that never goes dry. Do you think I want all these sacrifices you keep offering to me? Who asked you to bring me all this when you come to worship me? I cannot stand your religious gatherings; they are all corrupted by your sins... Wash yourselves clean. Stop all this evil that I see you doing. Yes, stop doing evil and learn to do right. See that justice is done -- help those who are oppressed" (56).

The second is liberation as a "historical praxis", once faith is to be comprehended, as stated before, in the very unity between theory and practice which convokes man to edify a new history. Consequently, the movement for liberation in Latin America begins with discovering the violent situations in which 70-80% of the population is forced to live in ab-

(56) Amos 5:21-24; Isaiah 1:11-17
ject state of poverty. In this context Christians emerge as protagonists who move from pastoral concerns to political action which does not mitigate the pastoral dimension but infuses it with a historical reality of oppression and human degradation.

However, the problem posed by Freire to the philosopher is that he does not make a clear distinction between the dialectical and historical meaning of liberation with a more rigorous metaphysical significance of freedom. This passage, from one of his most recent interviews, seems to show it:

"Many times, some people, initially, make an option for liberation and are not conscious of all its implications. They see liberation as if it were a thing and not a process, as if it were outside and not inside of this process; as if it were an arriving point and not as a permanent process. When in a certain moment of liberation freedom is reached, this same conquered freedom, in awhile, can be superseded by other necessities of freedom. This is why I refuse to discuss freedom as a metaphysical category. I only understand it as a historical category. It is the libertarian process in permanent search of freedom" (57).

Can liberation be utterly identified with freedom? What kind of liberation and freedom is Freire dealing with? Is the process of conscientização something which reduces freedom to the economic realm? If the answer to this question is an affirmative one Freire would be giving us the key to the so-

olution of one of the most anguished problems of the Third World and also the method to make the revolution. In so far as this kind of interpretation is concerned it is, however, a simplistic one if we consider the fact that Freire is constantly calling attention to the danger of the mythologization of conscientização and the efforts of transforming it into a miraculous prescription capable of giving pre-fabricated solutions to all social problems.

At any rate, another question remains: Will the oppressed be totally free if the economic exploitation ceases? If the answer is yes, perhaps, on the one hand, the wealthy oppressed and also the rich nations can furnish us the ways of getting rid of this naive believe. On the other hand, the communist societies also can teach us that freedom is not simply reached by the mere suppression of the capitalist system. Wherefore, if conscientização is not reduced to economic exploitation, will it still have any value? What will happen with the process of conscientização when all the material needs of the destitute are fulfilled? We have already stressed that conscientização has no aim at transforming the oppressed masses into bourgeois masses. Thus, what are the other values of conscientização beyond that of economic exploitation if we agree, from a Christian point of view, that man does not live only for bread? Freire does not enter into
this arena of speculation. In the above quotation he categorically affirms that he does not talk about freedom from a metaphysical perspective. To conciliate such affirmation with Christianity is really problematic. If one does not regard freedom in its metaphysical dimension, he is, indeed, talking about relative or half freedom, which in the case of Freire, gives room to interpret it only from its economic aspect. But if it is true, the whole process of conscientização as well as the ultimate goal of Freire's philosophy is not an education for freedom but rather an education for liberation. Herein lies, precisely, the justification for the title of this dissertation.

I wonder, nevertheless, if Freire can not be excused for not developing the metaphysical aspect of freedom once it is the specific task of the philosopher and not of the pedagogue. But if there is a philosophy implicit in his educational theory -- which I think there is since every education involves some philosophical postulates -- this important question can not be left aside by the philosopher of education. Education can not escape the entanglements of philosophy and the function of the philosopher consists in asking what are the main aims of Freire's pedagogy. Throughout his works these aims appear clearly as being the humanization of man so that he is able to humanize the surrounding
reality and engage himself in an ongoing process of becoming, with others, more progressively human. These aims are carried out by the very process of conscientização which is both end and means, the purpose and the method of education. Hence, conscientização, i.e., man's emergence from a dehumanized to a humanized state is the ultimate aim of education. However, may such aim offer a starting point for man in order to conquer his social but also his internal freedom? Freire gives us convincing arguments regarding the first sort of freedom, i.e., liberation from economic oppression, but he is almost totally silent concerning the second kind of freedom, i.e., internal freedom.

Accordingly, Freire's concept of freedom implies that man can achieve some sort of liberation from oppression, but it is limited to liberation from material needs. Nonetheless, liberation whose foundations are based only upon this premise does not suffice for man. Man also wants to transcend the boundaries of his present material necessities and contemplate the eternal; he desires to surmount the limits of matter and time; he longs to reach a higher degree of liberation since there is in human nature a transcendental element which aspires to pass beyond the present human condition. This transcendental element is man's natural aspiration to God, i.e., by nature man desires God.
ism, for instance, is no less than an attempt to break this natural link between the creature and the Creator. Maritain memorably remarks that:

"It is not by accident, it is by a strictly necessary effort, inscribed in the nature of things, that every genuine experience of atheism, if it is consciously and rigorously conducted, in the end provokes psychic dissolution" (58).

Hence, it is in that higher degree of liberation where lies the plenitude and superabundance of the human existence.

One has to bear in mind that man is both a material and a metaphysical being. In order to be fully human he has to be permanently nourished by these two aspects of his existence. Thus, it is a unilateral position the effort of studying man only through an empirical point of view without further references regarding the ontological and metaphysical implications which, obviously, can not be tested and verified by means of the sense-experience data of the factual sciences. The material and the metaphysical aspects of the human being are so inextricably interwoven that they leave no room for any sort of dualism such as that of Hinduism, Platonism, and Cartesianism. Both of these aspects compose one single substantial unity that when one of them is overestimated at the expense of the other, the human being is mutilated in its very essence to the extent that the psy-

chosomatic unity of the human nature is automatically damaged.

At this point I would like to pose two other questions:

(1) Has Freire dedicated most of his time in pointing out the social aspect of freedom because the most basic material needs are the real elements of an oppressed situation so hardly experienced by the great majority of the Third World population? Taking the affirmative side of this question for granted we can deduce that Freire does not neglect on purpose the metaphysical character of freedom because he sees no value in it. He simply does not develop it or because he does not feel capable of doing it as a pedagogue or because it does not show concrete evidences to overcome the situations of economic oppression. Even so, we have to remember that someone can be economic, social and politically oppressed and enjoy the mystery of internal freedom. Freire himself seems to have had such experience when he was jailed in 1964 and put into a very small cell. Even in that condition, he says, he "was able to transcend the narrow limits" (59) of his cell. But probably no better example, in this case, can be given than that of Jesus of Nazareth. On the

(59) "Conscientização e Libertação: uma conversa com Paulo Freire, in ACL, p. 134."
other hand, someone can possess economic, social and political freedom and be internally oppressed.

(2) Does Freire forget -- as a Christian thinker -- that old but always new Gospel's truth that if Christ, first, does not free man he will never be totally free? By virtue of this it seems meaningless to think about social, economic, and political freedom if it is to be carried out by those who have not yet experienced the internal freedom. Besides, Freire states that "freedom is acquired by conquest, not by gift" (60). In the sense of the first type of freedom it is quite true. But concerning internal freedom to conciliate this statement with Christianity is doubtful. Man's internal freedom is a gift of God through the action of the Spirit. To deny it is to reject, in part, the essence of the vicariate dimension of Christ. Of course, once this internal freedom is offered by God and freely accepted by man, man must strive permanently to conquer this freedom if he does not want to lose it and return to his former conditions of enslavement; it is nothing but the effort of perseverance. Hence, the first initiative for the acquisition of internal freedom belongs to God alone. Man simply responds to this invitation by faith. Without this condition man can spend his whole life speaking of freedom when, in fact, he is only

(60) PO, p. 31
speaking about liberation here and now from economic oppression. He is like the slave, who enjoying a relative sort of freedom, thinks he is utterly free and starts to propagate the absoluteness of his relative freedom.

Therefore, the process of conscientização as it is described by Freire seems to be more related to liberation from socio-economic-politic oppression. It does not tackle the philosophical meaning of freedom. If it does not entirely reject the metaphysical aspect of freedom, it also does not go beyond the realm of temporal freedom. It does not develop the notion that beyond his material individuality, which looks for freedom here and now, man is also a person endowed with a rational-spiritual nature looking for transcendental freedom whose importance is much greater than that of any other element in the universe -- an end in itself with an eternal destiny. Furthermore, Freire's dialectical and Marxist methodology can show efficacious for the practice of a libertarian education. But his theory, if it is applied to an education for freedom -- which also implies the metaphysical aspect -- will certainly show to be insufficient. However, a careful reading of Freire leads us to infer that despite the dialectical character of his methodology, some goals he proposes for his philosophical investigations are not, in a certain degree, dialectical in themselves, once
they also imply some metaphysical aspects which, nevertheless, Freire does not develop. Yet, if he argues that some of these goals he suggests are also dialectical he will be falling into the same error of not submitting them to a dialectical critique, which is not his case, as already stated. But if he sustains that some of these goals are not dialectical he, probably, has to face a dilemma: How to draw the metaphysical dimension of these goals within a pure dialectical interpretation of reality? Is it possible? Freire does not offer evidences of such possibility. But if it is not, he will be led to abandon his dialectical methodology concerning these goals, or to show how it is possible to harmonize the metaphysical aspects of these goals with a dialectical vision of reality, or to continue to despise the metaphysical implications of a true education for freedom. It will be a pity if the enormous contribution he has been able to offer to the contemporary pedagogical debate comes to be seen only as contribution to an education for liberation; an education which was incapable of surpassing the temporal domain of freedom -- what is very important but does not suffice -- and achieve the realm of a pedagogy for freedom, both social and internal.

From this approach we can adduce that the function and responsibility of educators are immense. Freire's method
for the awakening of critical consciousness through the process of conscientização and the problem-posing dialogical education he has postulated -- and whose achievement depends on the unity between theory and practice -- must demand that educators, experiencing, first, the internal dimension of freedom, be able to foster an educational practice which goes beyond the mere liberation from socio-economic-political oppression. Educators who, having already experienced an inner moral revolution, are capable of becoming true utopian-prophetic revolutionaries in the context of a Continent where the minorities have everything and the great majority has nothing, except hope. Educators for whom these words of Martin Buber are very proper: "To be utopian in our age means to be out of step with modern economic development" (61). Educators who have the audacity to speak there where nobody has been speaking; there where the truth is not heard; there where life and human dignity are at stake; there where the possibilities for a better future seem infeasible. Educators who, not knowing what is impossible, are able to make the impossible, possible; who are certain that "we must do what we can today with whatever small resources we have. Only in this way will it be possible to do tomorrow what we could not do today" (62).


(62) LGB, p. 120
who are animated by the hope that those who are not able to understand them today, may perhaps understand tomorrow since it takes many years in order that history tear up the titles that erroneously it gives, sometimes, to those who try to write it differently. Educators who can not allow that the rights of the poor be violated; that the powerful man abuses his force to oppress the weak; that the wise man uses "his wisdom" to entangle and cheat the naive; that the rich man, through the power of his money, famishes the needy while he increases his profits. Educators who resist those who, in the name of the order, transform injustice into right and, on behalf of a supposedly threatened democracy, inaugurate a dreadful and awesome regime running a type of government by the gun; who are fully sensitive to the value of man as an individual, person and creature who has both physical and metaphysical dimensions; who request, insist and fight for a society based on genuine democracy and equality in duties, liberties and common rights. Educators who exert a force and make a prolific contribution in creating new standards and moral attitudes suitable before the challenges of our contemporary world; who give their assistance in shaping and defending the dignity of man in the face of the irrational scientific and technological growth and dehumanization of industrialization; who do not nurture the spirit of competition nor identify security with possession or gratification.
with consumption, who denounce the absolute truth socially accepted as being false and announce the relativity of all human truth. Educators who are fully conscious that their role in history involves the acceptance of risks, persecution and marginalization by those in the strategic positions of command; who are aware that even when the work of conscientização is thwarted and obscured it continues its process in history once the efforts of evil are in vain because they tend towards nothing; who, being hopeful sentinels, know that a new day is beginning to break, making sound the trumpets for those who are able to recognize the coming, in good times, of a new tomorrow for the hungry, thirst, naked, sick, downtrodden, exploited oppressed of the world to whom the earth is promised to belong to. In fine, educators who are convinced that the true Revolution, true Conscientização, true Education and true Liberation (which involves social and inner freedom) is that utterly firméd in love; being soaked and bathed in love only they can construct a new tomorrow without destroying the human being; only they, due to their trust and faith in man, are able to participate "in the creation of a world in which it will be easier to love"(63) and live in fraternity; only they are able to conduct the process of conscientização as a theory and practice of a true libertarian education to its final destination.

(63) P0, p. 24
Our bibliography consists of three different parts. Part one contains, specifically, Freire's own works which have appeared in many different languages and in many different places, and have been combined into several books. Our attempt is to present Freire's works arranged in chronological order of production (and not of publication). Firstly we shall present Freire's major works followed by a small commentary, since other informations about them have already been furnished in the Introduction of this dissertation. Secondly, we shall present Freire's articles, speeches, seminars, interviews, video tapes, etc., divided into two sub-parts: Freire's productions from 1958-1970 and Freire's productions from 1971-1980. All the material of this first part shall first appear in the original language in which they were written followed by the existing translations, when the data were available.

Part two of the bibliography deals with works on Freire. It is divided into four sub-parts: Books and Dissertations on Freire; Books with references to Freire; Journal and Magazine articles, unpublished papers, seminars, speeches, audio and video tapes interviews, etc.; Introductions, forewords and reviews of Freire's works. The three first sub-parts shall present, first, materials only available in English or French and second, materials only available in Portuguese or Spanish.
The third part of the bibliography comprises all other works (books and then articles) which have been mentioned in the dissertation. All the material of the second and third parts shall be shown in alphabetical order of authors or titles.

PART ONE - FREIRE'S WORKS

(A) FREIRE'S MAJOR WORKS

Educação e Atualidade Brasileira, Recife, Universidade Federal do Recife, 1959. 139 p.
This work describes the main problems of the Brazilian education. It is important in order to comprehend the beginning of Freire's dissatisfaction regarding some traditional educational issues.

This book outlines the development of critical consciousness as the motor of cultural emancipation among the Brazilian people which was the result of the applicability of Freire's method through a national literacy campaign. It is also available in German, Italian, Dutch, Swedish, Finnish, Danish, Norwegian, Greek, Japanese.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


This book is a collection of the following Freire's essays: (1) La alfabetización de adultos - crítica de su visión ingenua e comprensión de su visión crítica; (2) La concepción bancaria de la educación y la deshumanización. La concepción problematizadora de la educación y la humanización; (3) Investigación y metodología de la investigación del "Tema Generador"; (4) A propósito del Tema Generador y del Universo Temático; (5) Sugerencias para la aplicación del método en terreno; (6) Relación bibliográfica: consideraciones críticas en torno del acto de estudiar.

The essays (1) and (6) were published in Portuguese, in Freire's Ação cultural para a liberdade e outros ensaios, p. 13-24.


Portions of this book have been published separately. It contains, among others, the following essays: (1) Aprender a decir su palabra, by Ernani Maria Fiory (which also appears as foreword of the Brazilian and Spanish editions of Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed); (2) Educación y Concientización (which corresponds to Freire's IV Chapter of Education as the Practice of Freedom); (3) La alfabetización de adultos; (4) La concepción bancaria de la educación y la deshumanización. La concepción problematizadora de la educación y la humanización (which also appears in Contribución al proceso de concientización en América Latina); (5) Investigación y metodología de la investigación del "Tema Generador" (Ibid); (6) A propósito del Tema Generador y del Universo Temático (Ibid); (7) Dialéctica e Libertad by José Luis Fiori; (8) El Rol del Trabajador en el Proceso de Cambio (which also appears in Sobre la Acción Cultural); (9) Extension o Comunicación? (which later on appeared separately as a book).


This work applies the lessons of conscientizacão to a domain of vital importance in Latin America, namely, rural extension. It analyses how technicians and peasants can communicate in the process of developing a new agrarian society and how man, through his conscious actions, is able to transform the reality in which he lives. Also, it is published in French, Italian, and German.


This book is also a collection of the following Freire's essays: (1) Los campesinos también pueden ser autores de sus propios textos de lectura; (2) Acción Cultural y Reforma Agraria; (3) El Rol del Trabajador Social en el Proceso de Cambio; (4) Investigación de la Temática Generadora; (5) El compromiso del profesional con la sociedad; (6) La práctica del método psico-social; (7) Conscientizar para liberar.

The essays (1), (2) and (3) were also published in Portuguese in Freire's Ação cultural para a liberdade e outros ensaios, p. 24-30, 31-36, 37-41. The essay (3) is also available in English under the title "The Role of the Social Worker in the Process of Change".

Several sections of chapters in this book also appear in Educação e Conscientização: Extensionismo Rural.


This work is a theoretical treatise dealing with the nature of oppression and how an authentic dialogical educative process can help oppressed people to reach a critical consciousness in order to liberate themselves.
Oppression is described as being the imposition of one's choice upon others, such that oppressed people often do not see themselves as belonging to an oppressed class since they are totally adjusted to the prescriptions of the oppressors. The overcoming of this situation is possible by the proposal of a method in which the words are something that help the oppressed to become subjects of the historical process. This book is also available in Dutch, Swedish, Finnish, Danish, Norwegian, Greek, and Arabic.


This book, in its original text in Portuguese, contains a collection of Freire's essays, including, among the principal, "Adult Literacy Program as Cultural Action for Freedom" (which gives title to the book) and "Cultural Action and Conscientization". These two essays form the actual texts of the English and Spanish versions. Both were first published by the Harvard Educational Review, Center for the Study of Development and Social Change, 1970. The first describes Freire's rejection of the mechanistic conception of adult literacy process; the second deals with Freire's view on education as cultural action for liberation and with the different levels of consciousness: magic, naive, and critical. These essays are also available in French, German, and Italian.


This book is a collection and a global introductory synthesis of the main ideas and themes of Freire's pedagogical theory.


This book contains a collection of various texts of other Freire's major works.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


This book is a collection prepared by INODEP and contains several texts by Freire about the theme "Conscientización." 150 p.


This book holds a series of talks between the two famous educators. It points out their main ideas and different viewpoints concerning their educational theories.


This book shows the main ideas of Freire on the issue of how education can or cannot be an instrument for social change.


This book presents a firsthand account of the most comprehensive effort yet put into practice Freire's concept education within a total societal setting. It insists on unity between theory and practice, manual and intellectual work, past and present experience, the non-neutrality of education, and that literacy and post-literacy can not be separated. The work is, indeed, a report of an attempt by the author to put his ideas into practice. The aim is to explain his experience to others who are trying to create their own rather than to impose his pedagogy upon a culture in which he is alien.
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(B) FREIRE'S ESSAYS, ARTICLES, SEMINARS,
INTERVIEWS, SPEECHES, VIDEO TAPES

1. FREIRE'S PRODUCTION FROM 1958-1970


"Conscientização e Alfabetização: uma nova visão do processo", Estudos Universitários, Revista de Cultura, Universidade do Recife, Recife, No. 4, April-June 1963, p. 5-23.


Adult Education as Cultural Action. Draft program and bibliography for a seminar conducted by Freire at the Center for Studies in Education and Development, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., Fall 1969.

Cultural Action: A Dialectic Analysis, CIDOC, Cuaderno 1004, Cuernavaca, Mexico, 1970, 41 p. This essay was originally written, in English, for a seminar at the Center for Studies in Education and Development, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1969. This same text was used by Freire for a series of talks given in Spanish at CIDOC during Spring Term 1970.


"El proceso de alfabetización de adultos como acción cultural para la libertad", in Paulo Freire en América Latina, Picha No. 4, Lat., Buenos Aires, Editorial Tierra Nueva, December 1974, p. 5-32.


"Algumas notas sobre humanização e suas implicações pedagó-
Notes on Humanization and its Educational Implications, Trans.\nLouise Rigwood. Mimeographed manuscript of a seminar, Educ-

"Cultural Freedom in Latin America", in Human Rights and the\nLiberation of Man in the Americas, Edited by Louis M. Colon-


"Carta a un joven teólogo", Perspectivas de Diálogo, Monti-
video, Vol. 5, No. 50, December 1970, p. 301-303. Also pub-
lished in Contacto, Mexico, Vol. 9, No. 1, February 1970.
"Letter to a Theology Student", Trans. provided by LADOC-

"Tercer Mundo y Teologia", Perspectivas de Diálogo, Monti-
"The Third World and Theology", Trans. and publication pro-
vided by LADOC-USCC, Keyhole Series, Division for Latin Amer-

"Educación para un despertar de conciencia: una charla con\nPaulo Freire", Cristianismo y Sociedad, Montivideo, No. 10,\n1972, p. 75-84.
"Eduecação para a conscientização: conversa com Paulo Freire",\nin "Uma educação para a liberdade", Textos Marginais, Pórito,\nPortugal, No. 8, 1974, p. 41-59.

Proceedings of "Encuentro International INODEP", Paris, De-
cember 9-17, 1970. These are the mimeographed proceedings of\nthe first meetings of this encounter group of which Freire\nused to be president.


"Conscientizing as a Way of Liberating", LADOC-USCC, Keyhole Series, Division for Latin America, Washington, D.C., Vol. 29a, No. 2, 1972, p. 4-8. This article was the subject of a talk given during a seminar: Educ-International - Tomorrow Began Yesterday, Rome, November 1970.

2 - FREIRE'S PRODUCTION FROM 1971-1980


Desmitificación de la Concientización, CIDOC, Cuernavaca, Mexico, January 1971. Typed transcript of a lecture given at CIDOC, in January 1971. Later on it was published under the title "La Concientización desmitificada (por Freire)", SIC, Caracas, No. 38, 1975, p. 164-166.
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"Prefácio à edição Argentina de 'A Black Theology of Liberation' de James Cone", in Ação cultural para a liberdade e outros ensaios, Rio de Janeiro, Editora Paz e Terra Ltda., 3rd. edition, 1978, p. 128-130. This preface to the Argentinian edition of Cone's A Black Theology of Liberation is only available in its original text in Spanish, or in the above Portuguese translation by Paulo Freire himself.


"Concientizacíon y Liberación", Editorial Axis, Colección Documentos. Rosário, Argentina, 1975 (no page). This article is an interview given by Freire to the Institute of Cultural Action (IDAC), in Geneva, 1972.

Video Tapes of the Fordham Workshop. These are two tapes made of a two day workshop, with Freire, at Fordham University, February 26-27, 1972 and of two subsequent lectures: "The Pedagogy of the Oppressed", on February 29 and "Educational Innovations in the Developed World", on March 2. Video and audio copies may be available at Fordham University, Lincoln Center, New York, N.Y., 10023, USA.


"Algumas notas sobre conscientização", in Ação cultural para a liberdade e outros ensaios, Rio de Janeiro, Editora Paz e Terra Ltda., 3rd. edition, 1978, p. 143-149. This article was firstly presented in a seminar promoted by the Department of Education of the World Council of Churches, in 1974 under the title "An Invitation to Conscientization and Deschooling - a Continuing Conversation". Freire himself was responsible for this Brazilian edition from IDAC, 1975.


"Conhecer, praticar, ensinar os Evangelhos", Revista Tempo e Presença, CEDI-Centro Ecumênico de Documentação e Informação, Rio de Janeiro, No. 154, October 1979, p. 7. This small article refers to some of Freire's notes for four young German seminarists. It was written in Geneva, 1977, but published here, for the first time.


PART TWO - WORKS ON FREIRE

(A) BOOKS AND DISSERTATIONS ON FREIRE

1 - IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH


describes the attempts of applying Freire's methodology for literacy training among children. This program was conducted by the Centre for Opening Learning and Teaching, Berkeley, California.


ROMERO, Joan Arnold, Radical Politics and Liberation Theology, School of Theology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1972. Doctoral Dissertation. The second part of this thesis deals with Freire's method for adult education in Brazil and the relation of his work to both theology and politics.


& ALSCHULER, Alfred S., How to Measure Freire's Stages of "Conscientização": The C Code Manual, Amherst, Mass., Center for International Education, University of Massachusetts, 1976. 188 p. This book provides instructions for individuals who wish to measure conscientização, operationally. It also provides a description of Freire's stages of conscientização (from a sociological viewpoint), how to obtain verbal samples of individual's consciousness, and how to reliably classify those verbal statements into one of the stages.


2 - IN PORTUGUESE AND SPANISH


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CUNHA, José Roberto, Aspectos Metodológicos del Sistema Paulo Freire, Santiago, SEDECOS-Secretariado de Comunicación, 1969.


EDUCACIÓN Y CONCIENTIZACIÓN, Mexico, Cuadernos Liberación, Secretariado Social Mexicano, 1970.

FIORE, José Luis & PEREIRA, Maria, Investigación de la Temática Cultural de los campesinos de "El Recurso", Santiago, CLAL, 1969. 305 p.


SANTA ANA, Julio de (Ed.), Conciencia y Revolución, Montevideo, Editorial Tierra Nueva, 1970. 117 p. This book contains the following essays: (1) "Cambio Social e Ideología", by Hiber Conteris; (2) "La alienación como conciencia dual", by Julio Barreiro; (3) "De la consciencia oprimida a la consciencia crítica", by Julio de San...
ta Ana; (4) "Condicionantes ideológicos - obstáculos para el Hombre Nuevo", by Ricardo Cetrule; (5) "La Acción Cultural o acción concientizadora", by Vincent Gilbert.


et alii, Consciência e Historia: Praxis Educativa de Paulo Freire, Mexico, Editorial Guernika, 1977. 120 p.

(B) BOOKS WITH REFERENCES TO FREIRE

1 - IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH


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DeKADT, Emmanuel, Catholic Radicals in Brazil, London, Oxford University Press, 1970. 304 p. This book is very helpful in order to understand the political climate in which Freire's method was born. It also gives background information on the precursor movements of cons cientização.


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2 - IN PORTUGUESE AND SPANISH


... "De la erótica a la pedagógica", in Filosofía Ética Latinoamericana, Mexico, Edicaol S.A., 1977.


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(C) JOURNAL AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES, UNPUBLISHED PAPERS, SEMINARS, SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS, ETC.

IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH


ARRUDA, Marcus, Audio-tape interview, 60 minutes. It is an interview taped in February 1972, by Miss Harriet Sherwin. The tape deals with Mr. Arruda's (who was imprisoned in Brazil) use of Freire's method with workers he has involved with.


BONO, Gus, "An Illiterate Dream", Unpublished paper. Written in September 1971, this paper deals with the applicability of Freire's method in Latin America.
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CHAIN, Beverly C., "An Examination of Three Paulo Freire-Inspired Programs of Literacy Education in Latin America", Literacy Discussion, Tehran, Iran, Vol. 5, No. 3, Fall 1974, p. 383-408.


COGGIN, Chere S., "An Encounter with Paulo Freire's Conscientization", Department of Agricultural and Extension Education, University of Wisconsin, Madison, May 1972. 16 p. Mimeographed. This articles is an account of the adaptation of Freire's method to an academic graduate situation.

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DIUGUID, Lewis H., "Brazil Wages Two-Pronged War on Illiteracy", The Washington Post, Section D-3, December 20, 1970. This article contrasts the efforts to bring about adult literacy in Brazil after the military coup of 1964 with the efforts of Freire and the Basic Education Movement (MEB).


EGERTON, John, "Searching for Freire", Saturday Review of Education, New York, Vol. 1, No. 3, April 1973, p. 32-35. This article illustrates the difficulties encountered by some educationists in trying to come to grips with Freire, the man, and his theory.

ELBOW, Peter, "The Pedagogy of the Bamboozled", Soundings- An Interdisciplinary Journal, Nashville, Tenn., Vol. 56, No. 2, Summer 1973, p. 247-258. This article is a study which concludes that institutional teachers in the USA are unable to follow Freire's principles due to the "dangers" these principles represent to the institutional education.

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MYHR, Robert, "The Paulo Freire Method", Unpublished paper, Universidade de Recife, Recife, 1964 (no page). The author was a Fulbright scholar in Recife (Brazil), in 1963-64.


RABIL, Albert, "The Experience of Limits, Or, On Not Confusing Education and Salvation", Soundings-An Interdisciplinary Journal, Nashville, Tenn., Vol. 5, No. 2, Summer 1973, p. 228-238. This article deals, more specifically, with the invalidity of Freire's pedagogy to the situations of oppression in U.S.A.


Video-tape interview, 25 minutes, Department of Adult Education, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Toronto, Ontario. This interview was conducted in early 1970 by Professor J. Roby Kidd and deals with Reimer's view of Freire as "the greatest living educator in the world today".


SHERMAN-LESSING, Rosalyn, "Pedagogy of the Oppressed: A Response", Soundings-An Interdisciplinary Journal, Nashville, Tenn., Vol. 56, No. 2, Summer 1973, p. 239-246. It defends the principle that both students and radical educators are oppressed by the educational system which tries to control and manipulate them.


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URBAN, Wayne J., "Comments on Paulo Freire", Unpublished paper, Department of Educational Foundations, Georgia State University. This paper was presented at AESA, University of Illinois, Chicago, February 23, 1972, 10 p.


WOOCK, Roger, "Paulo Freire: Reformist or Revolutionary", Faculty of Education, University of Calgary, Alberta. This paper was presented at AESA, University of Illinois, Chicago, February 23, 1972. 7 p. Unpublished paper.


2 - IN PORTUGUESE AND SPANISH


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BOLETIM INFORMATIVO, Universidade do Recife, Recife, No. 11, March 1963, p. 18-21. It is important in order to know the beginning of Freire's method.


CONCLUSIONES DEL SEMINARIO SOBRE LA FILOSOFÍA DE LA EDUCACIÓN LIBERADORA E SUAS APORTES PARA LA REFORMULACIÓN DE UNA PEDAGOGIA UNIVERSITARIA, Cuadernos de Pedagogia Universitaria, Universidad de Buenos Aires, No. 1, March 1974 (no page). This was a seminar organized by the Argentinian Ministry of Education from November 7-9, 1973 and coordinated by Paulo Freire himself and with the participation of representatives from all national universities.

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FIORE, José Luis, "Dialéctica y Libertad: Dos Dimensiones de la Investigación Temática", Cristianismo y Sociedad (Suplemento), Montevideo, September 1968, p. 87-96.


JEREZ, César & HERNANDEZ PICO, Juan, "Paulo Freire y la educación: Acción cultural liberadora", Estudios Centro Americanos (ECA), Universidad José Simeon Cañas, El Salvador, Vol. 26, No. 272, June 1971, p. 498-539. This paper deals with the contribution offered by Freire to educational and political democracy in Latin America, organized as follows: Background information on Freire's life; The existing relations between the stages of consciousness and reality; The methodological principles of Freire's pedagogical theory; Some criticisms to Freire's thought.


TORRES, Carlos Alberto, "Servidumbre, Autoconciencia y Liberación. La dialéctica Hegeliana y la filosofía de la alfabetización problematizadora de Paulo Freire. Notas provisorias para su confrontación", Franciscanum, Universidad de San Buenaventura, Bogotá, Vol. 18, No. 5, September-December 1976, p. 405-478. This article studies the existing relationships between Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind with the whole of Freire's educational philosophy.


"A dialéctica Hegeliana e o pensamento lógico-estrutural de Paulo Freire", Síntese Nova Fase, Edições Loyola, Rio de Janeiro, Vol. 7, No. 3, April-June 1976, p. 61-78. This article is an analysis concerning the confrontation of the philosophical presuppositions in the dialectics of Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed with the entire range of his thought.

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PART THREE - OTHER WORKS MENTIONED IN THIS DISSERTATION

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FURTER, Pierre, "L'Imagination Créatrice, la Violence et le Changement Social", in CIDOC, Cuaderno 14, Cuernavaca, Mexico, 1968, p. 3/7.


APPENDIX

Further informations regarding publications
by and about Paulo Freire:

Institute for Cultural Action
27, Chemin des Crets
1218 Grand Saconnex
Geneva, Switzerland
This Institute furnishes almost any information concerning publications by and about Freire.

Editora Paz e Terra Ltda.
Rua Andre Cavalcanti, 86
Rio de Janeiro, RJ
20.000 - Brazil
This publisher can offer informations regarding publications by and about Freire which appeared only in Portuguese or Spanish.

The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education
252 Bloor Street West
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
This Institute, through its Department of Adult Education, has almost everything published in English and French by and about Freire.

Convergence - An International Journal for Adult Education
P.O. Box 250, Station "F"
Toronto 5, Ontario, Canada
This journal is published in four languages: English, French, Spanish, and Russian. It was the first specialized journal in its genre to call the attention of adult educators around the world for Freire's ideas. The journal has published many articles by and about Freire.

Research Library, Latin America Bureau
Division for Latin America, Dept. of International Affairs
United States Catholic Conference
P.O. Box 6066
1430 "K" Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C., 20005 - U.S.A.
This institution maintains one of the most complete collections of Freire related documents in the U.S.A. available for anyone's perusal.
Center for the Study of Development and Social Change
1430 Massachusetts Ave.
Cambridge, Mass., 02138, U.S.A.
The center is an independent group of persons engaged in reflective study and new ways of communicating about development and social change. Freire is a member of its Board. The Center has been responsible for many of Freire's publications in the U.S.A.

CIDOC-Center for Intercultural Documentation
Apartado 479, Cuernavaca, Mexico
Established by Ivan Illich and his colleagues, the center has provided many opportunities for Freire to speak and write. It has published and divulgated many of Freire's ideas throughout the world.

U.S. Office of the World Council of Churches
Publications Service, Room 439
475 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y., 10027
This office maintains a list of publications available for sale. It may be able to help other World Council of Churches materials on or by Freire.

INODEP-Institut Décuménique au Service du Développement des Peuples
7, Impasse Reille
Paris 14e, France
This Institute, responsible for many of Freire's publications, is able to furnish almost any information regarding works by and about Freire available in French.

Syracuse University Publications in Continuing Education
105 Roney Lane
Syracuse, N.Y., 13210, U.S.A.
It has published many interesting articles and small essays about Freire which are available at the above address.

LARU-Latin American Research Unit
Box 673, Adelaide St. Post Office
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
It is able to offer general informations concerning Latin American educational issues.
ABSTRACT

This dissertation is related to contemporary philosophy and to one of the most famous living pedagogues of our times, the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire. It deals, precisely, with the key element of Freire pedagogical philosophical speculation, i.e., the notion and the development of his concept of conscientização as a manner of raising critical consciousness for liberation, principally, among oppressed people. This process is carried out by means of an educative practice in which education is defined as being both cultural and revolutionary action for liberation.

In order to proceed in his approach the writer, employing the analytic method of investigation, divides the dissertation into five chapters. The first chapter consists of an examination of the three levels of consciousness, according to Freire: magic, naive and critical. The chapter is an attempt to show: how man responds to each one of these levels; how they are related to different kinds of societies, i.e., the magical consciousness as characteristic of closed societies, naive consciousness of societies in transition, and critical consciousness of open societies; and how do these levels are related to the various models of the human knowledge, i.e., the magical consciousness to mythical knowledge, the naive consciousness to ordinary knowledge, and the critical consciousness to the critical-scientific knowledge.
The second chapter presents Freire's approach to the problem of conscientização and examines its phenomenological, dialectical, utopian and theological aspects. One of the principal aims is to stress the insistence on the relation between theory and practice, consciousness and reality and that any attempt to dichotomize one from the other leads to a distorted vision of man and of reality. The third chapter is a study of Freire's philosophy of dialogue and of the main characteristics of a genuine dialogical relationship. It compares and contrasts the Freirean theories of anti-dialogical and dialogical actions which thwart or stimulate the whole process of conscientização. The fourth chapter departs from the assumption that anti-dialogical and dialogical actions incide upon the educational process and determine its aims towards indoctrination or liberation which comes to be the very basis upon which Freire develops his concept of "banking" and "problem-posing" educational theories. The fifth and concluding chapter offers some philosophical reflections concerning Freire's concept of conscientização and how it is linked with his concept of cultural and revolutionary actions. It also furnishes some critical views about some controversial points in Freire's concept of conscientização and its relations regarding the different philosophical currents of his thought, his methodology for adult literacy, and his philosophy of liberation.
The writer concludes that the concept of conscientização, the way it is described by Freire, is a very interesting and astonishing contribution to the contemporary pedagogical-philosophical debate, mainly when it is viewed from the perspective of an oppressive reality such as that lived and experienced by the great majority of the Third World's population. Nevertheless, this concept is limited to liberation from socio-economic-political oppression once, from a philosophical outlook, Freire does not tackle the metaphysical implications of freedom. In other words, Freire reduces freedom to a simply liberation from socio-economic-political oppression. Disregarding the metaphysical dimension of freedom he is induced to study man only from an empirical point of view which, in fact, if it is not a radical posture, is at least, an incomplete analysis of man. Man is also a metaphysical being who nourishes himself from transcendental things. Therefore, Freire's philosophy of education is not oriented towards an education for freedom but rather it is an educational methodology oriented towards an education for liberation from socio-economic-political oppression. Hence, the title of this dissertation: "Conscientização: Theory and Practice of a Libertarian Education."