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AN INTERPRETATIVE-THEORETICAL MODEL OF ETHICAL DECISION MAKING FOR SPORT ORGANIZATIONS

by

David Cruise Malloy

Thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Ottawa in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Dedication

I wish to dedicate this dissertation to my father, Group Captain Dennis Graland "Bud" Malloy, to my mother, Mary, to my wife Teresa, and to my sons Connor and Gaelan. This dissertation is also dedicated to my brother Brian, and my sisters Gini and Barbara. Thank you all from the depth of my heart for your support, your example, and your love.
Acknowledgements

This encompassing experience was made possible only through the assistance and support of a significant collection of scholars and friends. I wish to thank my advisor, Dr. Hal Hansen, and Drs. Ruth Wright and Ruth Whitehead, for their patience, insight, and support throughout this unconventional academic sojourn. I wish to thank Dr. Don Lang for allowing me constant access to his eclectic mind. I would like to thank Ted Purnell, my brother-in-law, for suggesting the idea of a Ph.D. as we played golf one day in 1984. Thanks are also extended to the examining committee consisting of Drs. DeSensi (University of Tennessee), Hersom (University of Ottawa), Jefferson (University of Ottawa), and Ross (University of Ottawa). Finally, I wish to express my sincere thanks to my colleagues at the University of Regina for their support, friendship, and faith in my scholarship.
Abstract

An Interpretative-Theoretical Model of Ethical Decision Making for Sport Organizations

Ethical decision making in organizational contexts, though receiving increased attention by practitioners, is a relatively untapped area of theoretical and empirical inquiry. This paucity of literature exists not only in the administration literature generally, but also in the sport administration literature specifically. As ethical behaviour, in addition to administratively competent behaviour, is seen as necessary for the future administrator, sport or otherwise, the researcher and practitioner alike require a comprehensive theoretical basis from which to examine and enhance the ethical decision-making practices idiographically and nomothetically. The purpose of this study is to develop a model of ethical decision making which will provide a generic and comprehensive philosophical and psychological theoretical foundation for the extension of current theoretical knowledge of ethical behaviour in organizations. In addition, the study's purpose is to provide information which might enhance the practitioner's ability to make ethically right, good,
and authentic decisions.

The primary data for the study are 14 theoretical models of ethical decision making developed in or having relevance to administrative contexts. The study employs an interpretative-theoretical methodology of model construction which is both rigorous and deliberative. This methodology consists of four sequential phases: exploration, analysis, classification, and explanation. Exploration involves the description of the study's primary data sources within the framework of a set of research questions developed from a review of literature. Analysis systematically compares primary data sources in terms of their collective responses to each research question. Classification incorporates the data, refined in the analysis phase, and organizes them into logical categories based upon pre-established criteria. These categories form the building blocks to create an interpretive-theoretical model of ethical decision making. In the final phase, explanation, the model is presented and the relationships between and among categories are discussed. In this phase, the five questions posed in the exploration phase are answered in terms of the emergent model. The five questions are as follows:

1. What is the purpose of ethical decision making?
2. What are the theoretical foundations of ethical decision making?
3. What are the elements of ethical decision making?
4. What are the moderators of ethical decision making?
5. What is the process of ethical decision making?

The study concludes that there are two general purposes of ethical decision making in administrative contexts, member utility and organizational utility. Member utility refers to the enhanced effectiveness of organizational members who are able to avoid ethical transgression; organizational utility refers to the general enhancement of the organization in terms of efficiency and effectiveness as mediated through the organizational culture and climate.

The theoretical foundations for ethical decision making are philosophical and psychological. The philosophical foundation includes the teleological, deontological, and existential schools of thought. The psychological foundation includes both behavioural and masculine and feminine perspectives of the cognitive structural approach to ethical behaviour.

Seven elements of ethical decision making are identified in the model. These elements are the recognition of the ethical issue, alternative
generation, ethical evaluation of the alternatives, ethical judgement, intention, overt ethical/unethical behaviour, and ethical evaluation of behaviour.

The moderators of ethical decision making are eclectic and have been grouped into five distinct categories of influencing variables. They are: individual, issue specific, significant other, situational, and external moderators. They influence the process directly, as well as indirectly, as they may be mediated through each other.

The moderators influence the decision maker and the ethical decision-making process. The model proposes that the process that ought to be employed by decision makers is open and rational. The process incorporates the deontological, teleological, and existential critique of each of the proposed stages in order for the administrator to make ethically right, good, and authentic decisions. The study presents a model of ethical decision making which is philosophically and psychologically comprehensive and suggests a prescriptive means for administrators to enhance their ethical decision making behaviour.

The model provides immediate utility as a prescriptive guide to enhance the administrator’s ethical behaviour. The model also provides the basis of future qualitative and quantitative research to
extend our knowledge regarding ethical decision making in administrative contexts.
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Chapter I: Introduction

Following the disqualification of the sprinter Ben Johnson from the Seoul Summer Olympics in 1988, the Canadian federal government established the Commission of Inquiry into the Use of Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance to investigate the charges of unethical practices among Canadian athletes. The conclusion reached by the so-called 'Dubin Inquiry' was that sport is in a state of moral crisis. A subsequent report sponsored by the Ministry of Fitness and Amateur Sport suggested that the Canadian sport community is devoid of ethical leadership at all levels of the sport delivery system (Blackhurst, Schneider, & Strachan, 1991). The report quoted one sport administrator as suggesting that "sport has been taken over by TV, political expediency, and money. There are no ethics" (p.33). MacIntosh and Whitson (1990) note that perhaps the athletes involved in the reported ethical transgressions are not so much victims as they are products of a federally supported system "whose discourse and reward structures are entirely oriented towards winning" (p. 137). Boudreau
and Konzak (1991) state that

The Ministry [of Fitness and Amateur Sport] wanted winners, so did Canadians, and so did the Canadian news and sport media. We wanted to look big in the world of sports and in the world in general, and Ottawa has worked very hard at it for the past 20 years in a rather singleminded way....The federal government and its ministers and bureaucratic rationalizers badly needed winners to confirm and legitimate their gigantic financial investments in high performance sport. Winners were to become the proof of enlightened policy and judicious action (p. 90).

In such an environment, the administrators of sport organizations have been faced with a myriad of ethical decisions. Apart from the day-to-day ethical issues that confront all administrators, e.g., hiring, firing, evaluating, and planning (Hodgkinson, 1991), those involved in federal and provincial sport organizations have been faced with significant external sources of pressure. For example, political pressure
is prevalent as funding is tied to performance; corporate pressure exists in the association of performance with sponsorship dollars (MacIntosh & Whitson, 1990; Makosky, 1991); and public pressure for athletes to win and programs to be successful domestically and internationally exists as a matter of regional and/or national pride (Boudreau & Konzak, 1991). As a result the philosophy of 'win at all cost' had become a metavalue for many athletes, coaches, and sport administrators (Blackhurst et al., 1991; Makosky, 1991). Following the 'Dubin Inquiry' an additional pressure has been imposed upon the sport administrator from political and societal sources - to conduct themselves and their programs ethically (Blackhurst et al., 1991; Dubin, 1990). For example, the Assistant Deputy Minister for Fitness and Amateur Sport, Lyle Makosky, made the following comments in a speech to the North American Society for Sport Management about the values and ethical vacuum that exists in sport:

I fear if we don’t undertake the training and development of these skills [ethical and value examination] in our future administrators and leaders then we may indeed
develop more and more experts who are cleverer managers who can negotiate and package and sell and organize more excellently than ever before and the results will be that their efforts will raise to a new level the science of packaging and selling...And meanwhile the essence, integrity, and direction of sport will be left unexamined and subject to external forces and interests not of sport's making...In the end it may be said that the unexamined life is not worth living. I'd like to suggest that a life of sport unexamined is not worth playing. (June, 1991)

These comments are echoed by Whitson and MacIntosh (1990) who state that "the young sport scientist or administrator is encouraged to see his or her job as the production of performance (individual or organizational performance) and is seldom seriously introduced to ethical and political questions surrounding the concentration of resources on elite sport" (p. 48).

In order to examine and attempt to overcome this
so-called value and ethical vacuum, theoretical models of ethical decision making are a beginning (Ross, 1981). It would appear to be essential that the people operating within the sport environment need an appreciation of ethical decision making to assist them in their practice. Yet, at present, however, it appears that no model of ethical decision making exists in the field of sport administration. There have been attempts, however, to provide general theoretical guidance for participants in sport (e.g., Galasso, 1988; Lawson, 1988; Shea, 1978; Zeigler, 1982a, 1982b). For example, Shea’s (1978) work focused upon developing universal ethical principles of behaviour in sport; Zeigler (1982a) expanded the Harvard Case Study approach to include the selected concepts of consistency, of consequence, and of intention, which represent aspects of the works of Kant, Mill, and Aristotle; Zeigler (1982b) proposed an application of ‘scientific ethics’ to decision making in sport; and Lawson (1988) discussed the application of Kantian ethics to decisions regarding women’s issues in sport. Yet none of these writings provide a comprehensive theoretical guide for the sport administrator to make
ethical decisions.

Models which have been developed in the administrative realm that may be appropriate in the sport administration context are generally found in the business/marketing literature. These models have been generated from a variety of philosophical and/or psychological perspectives which provide us with a rather disparate view of ethical decision making in administration. For example, Trevino's (1986) model is grounded in Kohlberg's theory of cognitive moral development, i.e., limited philosophically, whereas the models by Cavanagh, Moberg, and Velasquez (1981), Ferrell and Gresham (1985) and Hunt and Vitell (1986) are based upon deontological and teleological theories of ethics, i.e., limited psychologically. The models which have attempted to combine both philosophical and psychological theory (e.g., Stead, Worrell, & Stead, 1987), have resulted in limited theoretical perspectives from both of these realms and do not provide the practitioner or theorist with a comprehensive view of ethical decision making in organizational contexts. As ethical behaviour, in addition to administratively competent behaviour, is
seen as necessary for the future administrator, sport or otherwise, the researcher and practitioner alike require a comprehensive theoretical basis from which to examine and enhance the ethical decision-making practices idiographically and nomothetically. Specifically, a comprehensive model which provides philosophical and psychological aspects of ethical decision making is needed generally quite apart from the necessity of providing a service to the sport community. The purpose of this dissertation is to develop a comprehensive model, generic in nature, of ethical decision making that will overcome the inadequacies of existing models and will provide the sport administrator with a more complete means to solve ethical dilemmas.

**Summary**

In this chapter the initial arguments for the need to develop an ethical decision making model for sport administrators were presented. In the following chapter the theoretical rationale for the development of a model of ethical decision making is presented. The chapter includes an overview of the literature concerning ethics in sport, the dominant approaches to
ethical theory, moral development, and models of decision making. Approaches to ethical theory and moral development form the philosophical and psychological grounding of an ethical model of decision making. Models of decision making are discussed to identify the elements and processes of ethical decision making in administrative contexts.
Chapter II - Theoretical Rationale

The purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical rationale for a comprehensive model of ethical decision making in an administrative context. The model, though generic in nature, is being developed primarily for the sport community. In order to establish the theoretical rationale, the discussion begins with an analysis of ethics in sport and is followed by reviews of literature describing approaches to ethics, moral development, and decision making.

Ethics in Sport

The literature in ethics of sport has been dominated by the concern of right conduct among athletes and/or coaches (e.g., Bredemeier & Shields, 1984; Freleigh, 1984; Galásson, 1988; Keating, 1979; Ross, 1989). Issues such as sportmanship, cheating, performance enhancement, aggression and violence, and exploitation are at the centre of much of scholarly work in sport ethics (Boudreau & Konzak, 1991; Læman, 1988; Pearson, 1988; Bredemeier & Shields, 1986; Lenk, 1979; Zeigler, 1988). For example, Shogan (1988) suggests that sport is a unique environment in which to
experience ethical issues because much of the athlete's behaviour is prescribed by rules which may conflict with the most expedient means to attain one's competitive goal, i.e., to win. She further asserts the view, echoed by Ross (1989), that this ethically prescriptive environment retards the athlete's ability to develop morally and to make ethically advanced decisions.

In terms of sport as a vehicle for moral development, Bredemeier and Shields (1984a; 1984b; 1986a; 1986b; 1986c; 1989) have conducted a variety of studies based upon the theoretical work of Kohlberg (1969), Rest (1979), and Haan (1978). They state that "sport is highly regulated, hierarchically structured, and heteronomous in its rule orientation. While these features are not unique to sport, they may combine to discourage high level moral reasoning in competitive sport settings" (1984a, p. 349). Their work has focused upon the moral development of child participants and of athletes/nonathletes. They have not examined the realm of moral development and the sport administrator.

Zeigler (1982a) discussed the need for ethical
decision making in sport and presents a method of case
study analysis which expands upon the traditional
Harvard approach. His case study analysis involves the
juxtaposition of the singular concepts of right conduct
from Mill, Kant, and Aristotle in order to view an
ethical situation from a broader perspective. In a
second work by Zeigler (1982b), the 'scientific ethic'
approach was applied to decision making in sport. In
this paper, the author discusses the relative
weaknesses of the traditional schools of ethical
thought and suggests that the pragmatic philosophical
school, based in Dewian thought, ought to be employed
by sportspersons and physical educators to resolve
ethical dilemmas. Shea (1979) developed a framework
with which the athlete, coach, and physical education
teacher may determine a set of universal principles of
right behaviour in sport. Similarly Fraleigh (1984)
proposed a set of guides to 'right action' which, if
followed, will result in ethical behaviour in all sport
contexts. Lawson (1988) suggests the employment of
Kant's 'categorical imperative' when making decisions,
particularly those involving equity issues in men's and
women's sport programs.
In terms of sport administration, relatively little has been written concerning ethical decision making. Vanderzwaag (1980) discussed the need to employ philosophy when formulating sport management policy. Malloy (1990) developed a model of planning/decision making for the sport administrator which extended the rational planning process to the administrator's planning repertoires by including a values audit. Malloy's (1991) study of moral reasoning among sport administration students reported that individuals tend to make decisions at Kohlberg's (1969) conventional level. The relative paucity of writing and research regarding ethics and philosophy in sport administration may be a function of the general lack of interest in ethical issues in what has been termed a burgeoning and highly positivistic field (Whitson & MacIntosh, 1990). An additional indicator of the limited interest in ethics in sport generally and ethics in sport administration particularly is the short supply of courses being offered concerning this field in Canadian university curricula (Bedingfield, Searle, Lemieux, & Sherlock, 1989; Malloy, 1992). Further, until recently (i.e., following the Ben
Johnson affair) ethics and philosophy in sport administration were perceived as being less important components of the administrator's competencies than the more practical skills including marketing, budgeting, and planning (MacIntosh & Whitson, 1990; Makosky, 1991; Malloy, 1990; Whitson & MacIntosh, 1990).

It appears that there is a limited amount of literature available in philosophy and sport administration, generally, and in ethics and decision making, specifically, to guide the sport administrator toward ethical decision making. Therefore, the present study has been undertaken to develop a comprehensive model of ethical decision making which may overcome the deficiencies in the existing literature.

**Approaches to Ethics**

In this section, four approaches to ethical theory are discussed. The first two approaches represent the traditional and dichotomous views of teleology and deontology. The third approach includes hybrid theories derived from both teleology and deontology. The final approach is existentialism which represents a philosophical revolt against and/or critique of traditional ethical theory.
In general, the body of knowledge concerning ethical theory can be addressed in terms of two dominant schools of thought - teleology and deontology (Brody, 1983; Mackie, 1977; Shaw & Barry, 1989). These two approaches represent ends, or consequentially oriented theories, and means, or non-consequentially oriented theories of ethical behaviour respectively. As these two approaches represent diametrically opposite views of right conduct, some attempts have been made to bridge the gap between teleology and deontology (e.g., Rawls, 1971; Ross, 1975). These so-called 'hybrid theories' of ethics (Robin & Reidenbach, 1987; Tsalikis & Ortiz-Buonafina, 1990) endeavour to employ the strengths and to avoid the weaknesses of both teleological and deontological approaches.

The existentialist perspective stands outside the traditional approaches to ethical conduct. It suggests that ethical behaviour is not a function of the consequences it creates (teleology) nor of the rules which ought to be followed (deontology) but rather behaviour is a function of an individual’s free will to choose and accept complete responsibility for all behaviour. Though the inclusion of existential
philosophy in administrative contexts has been limited, the notions of free will, choice, and responsibility have been considered as vital components of administrative decision making by some organizational theorists (Hitt, 1990; Hodgkinson, 1991a; Hughes & Flowers, 1977; Phillips, 1991). Figure 1 presents the underlying premise for the teleological, deontological, and existential approaches.

**Teleology**

The teleological approach to ethics advocates the position that an act can be judged right or wrong based upon its outcome or consequences only (Brody, 1983; Mackie, 1977; Mill, 1985). The basis for this judgement is the extent to which the act has resulted in the greatest amount of pleasure and/or the least amount of pain for the individual (hedonism) or for the collective (utilitarianism). The intentions or means which lead toward the ratio of pleasure over pain are irrelevant (Russell, 1979). Mill (1985) states that utilitarian moralists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action...He who saves a fellow creature from
Figure 1: Underlying Premises of Teleological, Deontological and Existential Theories of Ethics.

**Teleology:** an ethical approach which suggests that an act is right or wrong based, solely, upon the consequences of its performance (Brody, 1983).

**Deontology:** an ethical approach which suggests that an act is right or wrong based upon rules or principles of action or duties or rights or virtues (Mackie, 1977).

**Existentialism:** an ethical approach which suggests that an act is right or wrong based upon the actor's free will, responsibility, and authenticity (Guignon, 1986).
drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his trouble. (p.130)

Within the utilitarian approach there exist two schools of thought: the act utilitarians and the rule utilitarians. Act utilitarians believe that right behaviour is based upon the act which will bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number. In contrast, rule utilitarians insist that the rule, based upon known consequences which lead to the greatest good for the greatest number, ought to be the basis for right behaviour (Mabbott, 1967; Mackie, 1977; Rachels, 1986). Both approaches place emphasis upon the product or end of behaviour as the ultimate criterion for rightness. Of the teleological theories, utilitarianism has made a significant impact upon western society as it is arguably the basis for liberal democratic political philosophy, the capitalistic underpinnings of the western economic system, as well as the foundation of rational decision making in administrative contexts (Feinberg, 1973; Macpherson, 1987; Reidenbach & Robin, 1990).

One strength of teleological ethics is that its
ultimate goal, i.e., happiness or the ratio of pleasure over pain, is explicit and secular. It therefore may be more palatable for the general population than the more implicit and/or sacred notions of right conduct. As Bentham, founder of utilitarianism, stated, "(t)o love one's fellow-men, one must not expect much of them" (Dinwiddy, 1989, p.37). A second strength of teleology is the process by which ethical behaviour is determined (Brody, 1983). The procedure involves the development of alternatives, the evaluation of probable outcomes of each, and the selection of the best alternative that which will result in the known goal of achieving pleasure or happiness, i.e., the hedonistic calculus (Mill, 1985). The calculus is not dissimilar to the rational planning process advocated in the world of administration (Reidenbach & Robin, 1990). A third strength of teleology is that it provides the individual with flexibility with regard to the means to achieve the desired end (Shaw & Barry, 1989). As noted by Mill (1985), the means to achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number are not the concern of the utilitarian. As a result, the means become situation or consequence specific (Brody, 1983). The
ability to overcome conflict in ethical rules is the fourth strength of teleology. When such conflicts occur, the teleologist is able to calculate which rule leads to the greatest happiness or the least amount of pain (Mill, 1985; Shaw & Barry, 1989; Rachels, 1986).

The ambiguity of the concept of happiness is a basic weakness of teleology. For example, is the individual concerned with the quality or quantity of happiness? Does the notion of happiness vary within the individual as he/she matures through his/her life span? Does the notion of happiness vary among individuals of the same culture? In different cultures? In different eras? (Brody, 1983; Garratt, 1950; Mabbott, 1967; Mackie, 1977). A second weakness of the teleological approach is the procedure, which is also its strength, to justify ethical behaviour. Is it possible to list all the possible alternatives? Is it possible to accurately formulate the probable consequences of each alternative? Is it possible to measure quantitatively the notion of happiness? (Brody, 1983; Mabbott, 1967; Mackie, 1977; Shaw & Barry, 1989). A third weakness of teleological approach is that because of the situational approach to achieving ends, such
fundamental concepts as justice and individual rights may be sacrificed (Carritt, 1950; Rachels, 1986). As a result, the theory may condone the belief that ends justify the means, which, many may argue, is intuitively unacceptable (Brody, 1983; Russell, 1979). A fourth weakness concerns the utilitarian belief that all individuals count equally in the calculation of the greatest good for the greatest number (Brody, 1983). This notion disregards any special relationship that one has toward children, parents, siblings, and friends. All are to be treated with the same calculated notion of right behaviour without special circumstance (Ross, 1975).

Deontology

Where teleological theory stresses the outcome or ends of one's behaviour as the basis to judge its rightness, deontological theory stresses the means and intentions which one uses to judge the rightness of behaviour. Deontology proposes that ethical behaviour is that which abides by certain universal principles of conduct or rules (e.g., notions of individual rights and justice). The outcome of one's principled behaviour is, according to some deontologists, of no
consequence (e.g., Kant).

As with teleology, there exists a variety of interpretations of right behaviour within the deontological school of thought. One interpretation is based upon theological rationale. Here rules are presented as the will of God and, as children of God, humans are obligated to abide by these principles of right behaviour. For example, the Divine Command Theory suggests that what is morally right is commanded by God and what is morally wrong is forbidden by God (Rachels, 1986). Therefore, the individual must follow scripture or the advice of its clergy to determine accepted rules of conduct.

The second perspective of deontology according to Brody (1983) is based upon societal norms. Rules of conduct are established and sanctioned by the consensus of members of the society. Rousseau (1979) states that although in civil society man surrenders some of the advantages that belong to a state of nature, he gains in return far greater ones....man acquires with civil society, moral freedom, which alone makes man the master of himself; for to be governed by
appetite alone is slavery, while obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself is freedom.

(p.65)

Brody (1983) characterizes this source of deontology as a cultural relativism whereby "the proper moral rules are the ones believed in by most members of the society in which the agent finds himself" (p. 26). This approach to deontology, then, involves the establishment of a social contract in which the rightness of an individual's behaviour is based upon the will of the collective as opposed to the will of God.

A third approach to deontology is based upon self-evidence or intuition (Brody, 1983; Mabbott, 1967). Intuition is considered not in terms of 'hunches' but rather in the classical sense of understanding or 'intellectual seeing'. As Raphael (1989) points out rationalist philosophers used the word 'intuition' first for the understanding of self-evident truths in logic and mathematics, including the self-evident necessity by which a conclusion follows from the premises of a deductive inference. Some of them applied
the word to the understanding of moral principles, claiming that these were strictly analogous to the self-evident truths of logic and mathematics. (p.43).

Perhaps the most dominant figure in intuitionistic deontological theory is Immanuel Kant. His approach to right behaviour is based upon the universal capacity of humans to exercise their ability to reason. Knowledge of results, divine commandments, nor societal mores, are the basis for right action according to Kant. Only a self-evident good will to do one's duty is the essence of moral behaviour. Doing one's duty is following, what Kant terms, the categorical imperative. It states "act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (1968, p.45). One's perception of the universality of a particular action is self-evident, based upon one's a priori power of reasoning (Kant, 1968). For example, one may believe, intrinsically, that lying is wrong and require neither the word of God nor knowledge of consequence to justify this belief - it is self-evidently wrong. The categorical imperative is the basis of more contemporary theories of
individual rights and freedoms.

One strength of deontology is that rather than focusing upon the results of actions to establish rightness, risking the teleological suspension of common moral behaviour, deontology places emphasis upon the intent and moral good will of our behaviour (Kant, 1968; Raphael, 1989; Ross, 1975). As a result, an explicit code of conduct can be employed by advocates to guide their moral behaviour (Shaw & Barry, 1989). A second strength of some interpretations of deontology is that special rules may be employed to apply to unique situations when 'universal principles' conflict with 'common sense morality', e.g., extreme emergencies or the obligation to special familial relationships (Brody, 1983; Rachels, 1986; Ross, 1975). It, therefore, has some capacity for flexibility in choosing right action (Brody, 1983).

Of the more strict orientations, i.e., the categorical imperative of Kant, the 'absoluteness' of universal principles present a fundamental weakness for deontology. For example, that special exceptions cannot be made in Kantian ethics, such as, stealing to save one's life, is, in practical terms, unrealistic
(Raphael, 1989; Ross, 1975). A second weakness of deontology is that it lacks a well defined method or process for resolving conflicts between rules unlike the teleological process of measuring utility (Raphael, 1989). A third weakness of deontology centres around the goal of morality (Brody, 1983). That deontology lacks an explicit reason why a person ought to be moral in favour of a more implicit and universally self-evident rationale, makes it a more difficult approach to adopt than the more explicit and empirical teleological perspective. Further, the notion of self-evident right behaviour may be less consistent than Kant may presume. For example, Shaw and Barry (1989) state that

what seems obvious, even self-evident, to one culture or at one time in human history may turn out to be not only not self-evident, but actually false...the inferiority of women and various non-white races was long taken for granted as something anyone with the slightest degree of common sense could see; it was so "obvious" that it was hardly commented on. (p. 73)
Teleology and deontology, although espousing two broad and disparate views of right behaviour, contribute essential components to our understanding of ethics and ethical decision making. However, these two approaches do not account for all aspects of occidental ethical beliefs. Hybrid theories have been developed which attempt to overcome the inadequacies of the teleological and deontological traditions. The primae facie theory by Ross (1975) and the theory of justice proposed by Rawls (1971) are two seminal works which have attempted to provide holistic perspectives to ethical theory.

Prima Facie Principles

The objection to the absoluteness of Kant’s theory has been addressed by Sir William David Ross (1975) in his work dealing with ‘prima facie’ principles. According to Ross, moral obligations are prima facie, that is, they are self-evident truisms. A prima facie right act is

self-evident just as a mathematical axiom, or the validity of a form of inference, is evident. The moral order expressed in these propositions [i.e., prima facie principles]
is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe...as is the spatial or numerical structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic. (pp. 104-105)

We must follow these principles (deontologically) unless, through our mature and reasoned analysis, we find that a conflicting obligation (teleologically) is more important. Ross states that

if as almost all moralists except Kant are agreed, and as most plain men think, it is sometimes right to tell a lie or to break a promise, it must be maintained that there is a difference between prima facie duties and the actual or absolute [e.g., the categorical imperative]. (p. 104)

The essence, then, of Ross’s theory is that the mature person, using his/her power of reasoning, ought to be able to determine his/her prima facie duty and act upon it, unless a conflicting and more important obligation must necessarily and self-evidently supercede it. The difficulty with Ross’s argument, and that of Kant’s, is the relativity of self-evident truths. This is pointed out by Shaw and Barry (1989)
who suggest that we should be cautious in assuming that the rationally mature individual will necessarily know, self-evidently, what is morally right.

Theory of Justice

The notion of justice has a long philosophical tradition dating back to the Socratic era. Aristotle paid considerable attention to the concept of justice in *Nicomachean Ethics* in which he states that

Justice...is not a part of virtue but the whole of virtue; its opposite, injustice, is not a part of vice but the whole of vice. If it be asked what is the difference between virtue and justice in this sense, the answer is clear from what we have said. They are the same, but the idea of them is different; the state of character which, if regarded in its relation to others, is justice, if regarded absolutely as a moral state, is virtue. (1971, p. 157)

From the same work, Aristotle distinguishes between distributive and rectificatory or corrective justice. Distributive justice refers to the principle which states that equals ought to be treated equally and
unequals ought to be treated unequally, i.e., justice is proportionate; rectificatory justice refers to the principle which suggests that inequalities ought to be restored to form just proportions. Though the principle of justice is generally accepted as part of the deontological tradition, the contemporary work of Rawls (1971) combines aspects of both deontological and teleological thought (Feinberg, 1973).

Rawls' theory of justice is primarily concerned with the notion of social justice and the means to obtain maximization of rewards for the disadvantaged. His approach begins with the introduction of the ideal observer who, under a 'veil of ignorance', must develop principles of justice in a society where s/he cannot know her/his station in life, i.e., advantaged or disadvantaged; male or female; Catholic or Shinto; Indian or non-Indian. Rawls proposes that each person will be bound to the principles formulated in future circumstances the peculiarities of which cannot be known, and which might well be such that the principle is then to his disadvantage...These principles will express the conditions in accordance with which each
person is the least unwilling to have his interests limited in the design of practices, given the competing interests of the others, on the supposition that the interests of the others will be limited likewise. (pp. 373-374)

The result of this deductive process, according to Rawls, is the formulation of two principles, the 'liberty principle' and the 'difference principle'. The 'liberty principle' refers to the equal access for all persons to such basic human liberties as freedom of speech and religion, freedom to own property, and freedom to vote. The second principle provides the conditions allowing the first principle to be overridden. That is, inequality can be accepted when the advantages of all persons is the result of the transgression of the 'liberty principle'. Rawls suggests that individuals, acting in their self-interest, will generally place emphasis upon the principle of liberty and then agree to the allowable departures from it. In other words, the individual will choose to err on the side of his/her own advantage.
Rawls, like Ross and Kant before him, does not consider the variance of just behaviour due to situational and cultural factors. Raphael (1989) suggests that

Rawls has not made his veil of ignorance dark enough to blot out all the psychological affect of his own culture. A modern American places high value on personal liberty; he wants to be free to do his own thing, and he has enough confidence in his own powers to be bold in accepting the risks of freedom. In other cultures, present and past, harsh conditions have induced most people to be more fearful and to regard limitations on personal freedom as inevitable if one has to stay alive. (p. 74)

A similar criticism is stated by Arrow (1973) who questions Rawls’ assumption that all individuals in the ‘original position’ are supposed to have a common rational understanding of the laws of the physical and social worlds. For example, Arrow describes the real possibility that an individual may rationally believe that religious pluralism is nonsense and that
in fact Catholicism is the true religion, that it is part of the knowledge which all sensible people are supposed to have in the original position, and that he insists on it for the salvation of all mankind. How could this be refuted? (p. 255)

Further, Rawls assumes that individuals will act in the original position based upon an egoistic calculus of self-interest. This of course ignores the possibility of benevolence, altruism or 'imaginative sympathy' in creating social justice (Arrow, 1973; Raphael, 1989). Therefore, while both Ross and Rawls attempt to build upon the strengths of teleological and deontological theory, their approaches exhibit many of the weaknesses inherent in traditional ethical thought.

In addition to teleology, deontology, and the derived hybrid theories, some theorists have recognized the need to include existentialism as an additional approach to ethical decision making (Hodgkinson, 1991a; Hitt, 1990, Jaspers, 1955). The existentialists argue that in the case of conflicting perceived consequences of one's behaviour (teleology) or of conflicting ethical principles (deontology), the decision maker is
left abandoned by both ethical approaches and must ultimately decide, based, perhaps, on a transrational leap of faith (Kierkegaard, 1962) or on a subrational feeling (Sartre, 1957). The existentialist offers no prescription for decision-making conflict or pathology apart from the imperative to discover one’s own authenticity and genuineness.

**Existentialism**

Existentialism has been referred to as a revolt against traditional philosophy and the philosophy of ambiguity (Barrett, 1958; de Beauvoir, 1964; Kaufmann, 1975; Sayegh, 1988). It rejects the teleologist doctrine of utility as dehumanising and creaturely, i.e., the reduction of morality to pleasure seeking (Nietzsche, 1962); it rejects the deontological rule-based approach because it absolves individuals of responsibility for their actions. For example, Kierkegaard (1966) complains that "'on principle' a man can do anything, take part in anything and himself remain inhuman and indeterminate...everything becomes permissible if done 'on principle'” (p. 74).

Like teleology and deontology, existentialism has been interpreted in a variety of ways by its proponents
particularly in terms of secular or religious orientations. Yet, there exists common ground among all existential writers in terms of the ontological basis for the individual. The existentialist contends that "existence precedes essence" (Sartre, 1957, p. 15) or that "essence lies in its existence" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 42). These statements refer to the ontological premise that an individual is shaped by the decisions which s/he freely makes and for which s/he takes 'absolute' responsibility rather than by predetermined or extraneous circumstances, e.g., family, society, and/or religion. Thus two basic components of existentialism are freedom and responsibility (Sayegh, 1988). Rejection of reason as the definitive explanation of rationality is a third component of the existential school. Nietzsche's exclamation that 'God is dead' was more a statement of the tenuousness of rationality and emergent potential for the individual's freedom to live authentically than an attack on the transrational. Similarly, Dostoevsky (1972) stated that reason is a good thing, that can't be disputed, but reason is only reason and
satisfies only man's intellectual faculties, while volition is a manifestation of the whole of life, I mean the whole of human life including both reason and speculation. And although in this manifestation life frequently turns out to be rubbishy, all the same it is life and not merely the extraction of a square root. (p. 35)

The 'authentic' person, according to the existentialists, is one who has become conscious of the burden of absolute responsibility for one's own existence as well as the existence of all of humanity. With this burden of freedom and responsibility come the emotional states of despair (Kierkegaard, 1962), of suffering and nihilism (Nietzsche, 1966), of anxiety (Heidegger, 1962), and of anguish (Sartre, 1957). It is the acceptance of one's responsibility to oneself and to others that results in the existentialist's notion of virtuous behaviour. de Beauvoir (1964) suggests that existentialism does not offer to the reader the consolations of an abstract evasion [i.e., Hegalism]: existentialism proposes no
evasion. On the contrary, its ethics is experienced in the truth of life, and then it appears as the only proposition of salvation which one can address to men....If it came to be that each man did what he must, existence would be saved in each one without there being any need of dreaming of paradise where all would be reconciled in death. (pp. 158–159)

The ethics of existentialism, therefore, lie in the individual’s ability to choose for oneself and, in one’s choosing, to accept absolute responsibility for all actions and consequences, i.e., all means and ends, for oneself and for others.

The strengths of existentialism lie in the belief that an individual is capable of exercising and taking responsibility for one’s free will. The existentialist’s realization and acceptance of the notions of "the agony of thinking" (Wiggins, 1980, p. 237) and the will for and anguish of freedom (Sartre, 1966), spawn a character which is "better equipped to evaluate different ethical standpoints and applicability to specific contexts of action than the
slavish rule-follower or the cool cost/benefit calculator" (Guignon, 1986, p. 88). Existentialism provides a theory in which the Socratic dictum 'the unexamined life is not worth living' and the words of Shakespeare's Polonius, 'to thyne own self be true' are fundamental tenets. Therefore, genuine integrity is the cornerstone of the existentialist's approach to ethical behaviour (Albert et al., 1988).

The main criticism against existentialism is that it is a subjectivistic and a nihilistic philosophy that offers little practical advice to those seeking ethical guidance. This philosophy, according to Raphael (1989), provides for the worst kind of relativism that "[if] applied to all values, it results in a moral anarchy in which a humanistic ethic (like that of Kant or what we call the 'higher' religions) has no more validity than sadism or fascism or racism" (p. 65).

Further, though the existentialist condemns the utilitarian approach for its 'creatureliness', Sartrian existentialism condemns the individual to equally basic impulses for where making a decision is just a matter of plunking for one option rather than another,
with no pre-given basis for moral deliberation, Sartre's 'terrible freedom' tends to collapse into the worst sort of slavery - the isolated self-buffeted about by momentary impulse and whims. (Guignon, 1986, p. 82)

Kierkegaard (1971, 1988) offers perhaps a more holistic perspective than that of Sartre when he suggests that three levels of authentic existence are possible: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. Where Sartre's and Nietzsche's existential person, e.g. the Dionysian 'ubermensch' or superman, may reside in the aesthetic realm, Kierkegaard's 'knight of faith' is found in the religious level of existential existence. It is here where religious faith has transcended impulse and reason.

**Research in Ethics in Administration**

The empirical research is limited in ethics in general and in ethics in administration in particular (Reidenbach & Robin, 1990). The research that has been undertaken is often not based in ethical theory, i.e., specific schools of thought (e.g., Brenner & Molander, 1977; Ferrell, Zey-Ferrell, & Krugman, 1983; Hegarty &
Sims, 1979; Kelly, Ferrell, & Skinner, 1990; Stanga & Turpen, 1991; Vitell & Davis, 1990). When theoretical foundations are considered they are generally limited to the perspectives of deontology and teleology (e.g., Fritzshe & Becker, 1984).

Recent studies using a more comprehensive theoretical treatment of ethics have been undertaken by Reidenbach and Robin (1988, 1991). Their empirical research, using questionnaires, found that administrators have a tendency toward ethical eclecticism rather than toward the adoption of one theory of ethics exclusively, e.g., deontology, utilitarianism, egoism, relativism, or justice. Their research also supports the notion that the use of any particular theory is a function of the demands of the situation in which the administrator finds himself/herself.

**Summary of Ethical Approaches**

Four major approaches to ethical theory have been presented and critiqued. Each approach views right behaviour from a significantly different perspective: the teleologist is concerned with the consequence of behaviour for society and/or for the individual; the
deontologist is rule based with emphasis placed upon the individual's duty; the hybrid theories focus on both ends and means; and the existentialist emphasizes free will and responsibility. Each theory makes important statements of how one ought to act, yet taken individually, each suffers from some conceptual weakness. For example, in teleology the notion of individual justice is ignored (Rachels, 1986); in deontology the reality of individual and cultural differences is overlooked (Mabbott, 1966); and in existentialism free will may lead to moral anarchy (Raphael, 1989). The decision maker has at least four options available. First, one approach may be selected to the exclusion of the others. Such a choice may result in consistent decisions at the expense of flexibility (e.g., Kant and the categorical imperative versus Ross and the prima facie principles). A second alternative is the combination of approaches which has been attempted by Ross (1975), Rachels (1986) and by the rule utilitarians (Whitehead, 1938). A third alternative could be the selection of an approach based upon the context of one's situation. This alternative has been alluded to by Hodgkinson (1983, 1991a) in
terms of administrative function and by Brady (1985) in terms of the temporal nature of one's moral dilemma. A final alternative is to adopt no moral stance and to make one's decisions based upon an unconscious unexamined philosophy. Such a position is least desirable, for as Dimock (1958) states, "at bottom our professional life is meaningless unless each one works through to a philosophy which sees human dignity and significance as the essential criteria" (p. xi).

Theories of ethics tell about the content of right behaviour, they do not, however, explain the reasoning behind the choice of what that behaviour ought to be. This is the strength of the psychological models of moral behaviour which will be discussed in the following section.

**Psychological Approaches to Moral Behaviour**

The psychological approaches to moral behaviour can be distinguished in terms of three broad categories: the psychoanalytical approach, the behavioural approach, and the cognitive structural approach (McCabe, 1986; Shuster & Ashburn, 1986). Psychoanalytical theories deal with internal drives or motivations (e.g., Chodorow, 1978; Erikson, 1963;
Freud, 1923; Loevinger, 1976); behavioural theories focus upon behaviour which is acquired from one’s environment (e.g., Bandura, 1977; Skinner, 1976); and cognitive structural theories are concerned with cognitive process (e.g., Gilligan, 1977; Kohlberg, 1969; Perry, 1970; Piaget, 1965). Figure 2 presents the underlying premise of psychoanalytical, behavioural, and cognitive structural theory.

The Psychoanalytic Approach

The psychoanalytic approach to moral behaviour posits that one’s actions are determined by instinctual drives which develop as the individual matures. The psychoanalytic tradition begins with the work of Freud (1923) who posited that humans exist on three levels: the id or animal level, the ego or rational level, and the superego or moral level. It is Freud’s notion of the superego, i.e., the ability to recognize ourselves as one ought to be, which provides for the basis of guilt and anxiety, whose avoidance, according to this school of thought, will result in moral behaviour. Erikson (1963), considered a neo-Freudian, adopted much of Freud’s theory, yet rather than focusing on the psychosexual aspects of personality development,
Figure 2: Underlying Premises of Psychoanalytical, Behavioural, and Cognitive Structural Theories of Moral Behaviour.

**Psychoanalytical Theory:** a school of thought which suggests that an individual's behaviour is a function of a basic, inherent motivational force which is an instinctual drive. (Freud, 1923)

**Behavioural Theory:** a school of thought which suggests that an individual's behaviour is the result of one's interaction with the environment, i.e., all behaviour is learned. (Skinner, 1976)

**Cognitive Structural Theory:** a school of thought which suggests that behaviour is the result of the individual's ability to assimilate, accommodate, and develop increasingly complex cognitive structures or schemas for evaluating and judging moral behaviour (Piaget, 1965).
considered the social context of the individual as a necessary agent in the formation of the self. His psychosocial approach to personality development suggests that an individual may experience eight internal conflicts during his/her lifetime. The successful resolution of each conflict leads to the development of one’s ego and, in turn, to one’s moral sensitivity in terms of the virtues of hope, will, purpose, competence, fidelity, love, care, and wisdom. Similarly, Loevinger’s (1976) work describes the development of one’s personality in terms of ego as a process of development which is social in origin. She contends that as an individual develops through seven stages, which integrate aspects of Kohlberg’s (1969) theory, the ego attempts to make sense out of experience, to achieve self-understanding, and to integrate this understanding with behaviour. As a result, the individual is capable of progressively more mature and responsible behaviour and of more authentic and mature moral reasoning.

The limitation of the psychoanalytical approach is that it has been developed ostensibly from a clinical environment and can be criticized for its lack of
empirical, i.e., experimental, vigour and generalizability (McCabe, 1986). In addition, this approach does not provide the decision maker with a means to determine what is morally right/wrong and good/bad behaviour.

The Behavioural Approach

The behavioural approach is based upon the notion that behaviour is learned from one’s interaction with one’s environment. The unconscious and the notion of cognitive process are rejected by strict behaviourists who view phenomenon which cannot be translated into overt measurable physical behaviour as beyond the realm of scientific inquiry. The Skinnerian (1971) school suggests that behaviour is a function of positive or negative reinforcement. Moral behaviour, then, may be described, according to the behaviourists, as being the result of the reinforcement one receives from one’s proximal and distal environment, e.g., family, peers, organizational policy, professional code of ethics, societal norms and sanctions. As a result, in the strict sense of behaviourism, the individual cannot accept praise or blame for his/her ethical or unethical behaviour as it has been predetermined by the
environment - physical and social. For example, Skinner (1971) states that "a person’s behavior is determined by a genetic endowment traceable to the evolutionary history of the species and by the environmental circumstances to which as an individual he has been exposed" (p. 101).

The belief that behaviour is a function of modelling, imitating, and role playing is central to the behavioural approach and is generally referred to as social learning theory. Bandura (1977) suggested that learning occurs to a significant extent through one’s observation of other individuals and the corresponding reinforcement one receives for the behaviour.

Two theoretical examples of the notion of social learning can be found in the work of Sutherland and Cressey (1970) and Merton (1957). Sutherland and Cressey (1970) developed the theory of differential association which suggests that a person’s ethical behaviour is learned through the process and frequency of interaction with one’s referent group. Therefore, if a person’s organizational peers are behaving ethically or unethically, and if he/she has frequent
contact with the group, then the adoption of the group's behaviour is likely. Merton's (1957) role-set configuration theory posited that the role-set, i.e., the characteristics of referent others in terms of their location in the hierarchy, power, attitudes, and behaviours, will influence the behaviour of the individual within the organization. For example, if a worker's superior has significant authority or power over him/her and the relative organization hierarchical distance between them is small, then it can be predicted that the superior's behaviour will have significant influence upon the worker.

The influence of behavioural theory is evident in most explanations of organizational behaviour (e.g., House, 1971; Katz & Kahn, 1966; Simon, 1976; Weber, 1947). In terms of ethical decision making, the suggested influence of various internal and external environmental factors, such as organizational climate and culture, upon the ethical behaviour of the decision maker is all but ubiquitous (e.g., Bommer, Gratto, Gravender, & Tuttle, 1987; Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Trevino, 1986). The implication of this approach is that the individual's ethical decision-making
behaviour is predetermined by his/her micro and macro organizational environment. Despite the traditional penchant for behavioural explanations regarding organizational behaviour, it is the cognitive structural approach which has, according to McCabe (1986), the most relevance to the investigation of moral reasoning.

The Cognitive Structural Approach

The cognitive structural approach to moral behaviour is concerned with internal logical cognitive functioning relating to moral reasoning. It supports the belief that moral behaviour can be explained neither by the manifestations of the developing ego nor by the reinforcement and repeated practice of ethical actions. Rather, moral behaviour is the result of the development of the individual's ability to assimilate, accommodate, and develop increasingly complex cognitive structures or schemas for evaluating and judging moral behaviour (Piaget, 1965; Kohlberg, 1969, 1981).

Piaget (1965) contends that the child's morality is governed by the interaction of his/her developing cognitive structure with his/her expanding social experience. This development passes through two
stages: moral realism (objective responsibility) and moral relativism (subjective responsibility). Moral realism refers to the acceptance of the concreteness of rules of conduct and of the consequence rather than the intent of action. Moral relativism is the subsequent stage wherein the child sees rules as flexible and arbitrary and intentions become of greater concern than consequences.

Kohlberg (1969, 1981) expanded upon Piaget’s two stage model and has dominated the cognitive structural field of moral reasoning for the past two decades. Kohlberg has also been a dominant influence in the theoretical and empirical literature concerning ethical decision making in administration (e.g., Baxter & Rarick, 1987; Cooper, 1985; Harris & Brown, 1990; Wood et al., 1988). His focus, unlike that of the ethical philosophers (e.g., Kant, Mill, Ross), is not upon the content of one’s moral philosophy but rather upon its context and progressions (Duska & Whelan, 1975; Forsythe, 1980; Kohlberg, 1981). Following the conceptual lead of Piaget, Kohlberg’s research focused upon the development of cognitive moral reasoning. His initial research (1969) involved the longitudinal
analysis of the responses of a group of 72 white adolescent males to a number of hypothetical dilemmas. Subjects were asked to resolve, in writing, ethical dilemmas and their answers were then assessed based upon the rationale for their particular response, i.e., the form of their answer as opposed to the content of their answer. From his findings, Kohlberg proposed an invariant six stage sequence of moral reasoning whereby each successive stage represents quantitatively and qualitatively more complex moral reasoning. Within each stage, Kohlberg proposes two substages. Substage A consists of a moral orientation with an emphasis upon normative order (i.e., rules and roles) and consequence (i.e., impact of behaviour upon self and others). Substage B describes a moral orientation which focuses upon justice and ideal-self (i.e., actor with conscience). The six stages are grouped into three levels: the preconventional, the conventional, and the post conventional level.

The preconventional level describes behaviour that is based exclusively upon self-interest. An individual will be motivated to act so as to avoid punishment (stage 1) or to seek out reward (stage 2). The
conventional level of the hierarchy describes behaviour that has progressed beyond self-interest to consider the expectations of significant reference groups and society in general. Stage three is focused upon the individual's conforming to the expectations of significant others, e.g., family and friends. The fourth stage involves conforming to the social order and to the expectation of authority figures - to do one's duty - to abide by the law. Kohlberg suggests that most individuals fail to develop beyond this level of moral reasoning (1969, 1981).

The highest level of moral reasoning is the postconventional level which incorporates the themes of social contract, the utilitarian doctrine, and the Rawlsian principles of justice. In addition, Gibbs (1977) argues, Kohlberg's "postconventionality is the existential experience of disembedding oneself from an implicit worldview and adopting a detached and questioning posture" (p. 56). The fifth stage acknowledges the principles of the social contract as suggested by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. In this stage of social and legal obligation one's duty is to avoid violating contractual or positive and natural
rights. The final stage of moral reasoning involves the idiographic and Rawlsian formulation of abstract ethical principles, such as justice, equality of human rights, and the respect for the dignity of all individuals. At stage six the adherence of these unique principles is necessary in order to avoid self-condemnation. According to Kohlberg's research (1969, 1981; Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983) less than ten per cent of all subjects were able to reach the highest stage of moral reasoning. Those who have reached this stage have highly individualistic moral beliefs that may conflict with the will of the majority.

The extent to which individuals are capable of developing through the various levels is not only based upon one's internal cognitive development but also upon one's cognitive interaction with one's social environment. Such interaction may foster an internal reorganization of moral concepts. Cooper (1985) suggests that persons living in homogeneous social environments are less likely to achieve higher levels of moral reasoning than those living in pluralistic ones because the stimulus to encourage a moral
reorganization may not be present to the same degree. Further he notes that "the stages are, then, the sequential result of processing moral experience and not simply derivative from biological growth, I.Q., or particular teachings about ideologies" (p. 318).

The work of Kohlberg has significantly enhanced the knowledge of the rationale and evolution of moral grounding. His theory has received considerable support in longitudinal studies (e.g., Kohlberg, 1976), in cross-sectional studies (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969); in cross-cultural studies (e.g., Edwards, 1978); and in a variety of correlational studies (e.g., Candee, 1976; Haan, 1975). Kohlberg's influence has been felt not only in the classroom of elementary schools but also in the lecture theatres of universities and corporations where the notion of moral development has become a concern of employers and employees alike (Cooper, 1985; Damon, 1988; Duska & Whelan, 1975).

Kohlberg's work has been criticized from a number of perspectives. Jensen and Wygant (1990) question the usefulness of Kohlberg's work suggesting that reason can provide justification for immoral or unethical behavior, from stealing to the
taking of human life. Immoral behavior can thus be served as well, if not better, by sophisticated moral reasoning. Much of the current blight of ethics in business may well have resulted from the application of sophisticated moral reasoning to justifications of unethical behavior [e.g., Carr, 1968]. (p. 217)

Baumrind (1978) suggests that Kohlberg’s work does not allow for cultural differences. Power and Reimer (1978) note that Kohlberg’s theory concerns moral attitudes not moral behaviour as may be alluded to in the descriptions of the stages of his model. They suggest, as does Gilligan (1977), that thinking about moral behaviour, i.e., evaluating hypothetical dilemmas, and overt moral action are very separate phenomena.

Other criticisms of Kohlberg’s work have come from Holstein (1976) and Gilligan (1977), who have suggested that the model was biased against females. Their concern is based upon the fact that women tend not to achieve levels beyond the conventional stage three, that is, interpersonal concordance, whereas males tended to locate at the fourth level of ‘law and
order'. This, according to Gilligan, is not unexpected as "the very traits that have traditionally defined the 'goodness' of women, their care for and sensitivity to the needs of others, are those that mark them as deficient in moral development" (1977, p.384).

In response to the perceived anti-feminine bias of Kohlberg's model (Holstein, 1976), Gilligan's research identified a uniquely female perspective of moral development. She states that

the systematic exclusion from consideration of alternative criteria that might better encompass the development of women indicates not only the limitation of a theory framed by men and validated by research samples disproportionately male and adolescent but also the effects of the difference prevalent among women, their reluctance to speak publicly in their own voice, given the constraints imposed on them by the politics of differential power between the sexes. (p. 490)

Her research involved cross-sectional interviews conducted with 29 women of various ethnic backgrounds.
The women were faced with the very real ethical dilemma of the decision to have an abortion (as opposed to the hypothetical dilemmas used in Kohlberg’s research). The results of her research revealed a sequence of moral development which places responsibility and care as the highest form of moral reasoning for females.

Her findings (1977, 1979, 1982), supported by Lyons (1983), identified three distinct levels of women’s moral reasoning. The first describes a mode of reasoning based upon the woman’s pragmatic need for self-protection and individual survival. From this initial level, the woman begins to examine her selfishness as she acknowledges her attachment or connection with and responsibility for others. This transition from selfishness leads to a second level where ‘good’ is equated with caring for others at the sacrifice of one’s own moral care. Gilligan states that "at the second level moral judgement comes to rely on shared norms and expectations.... Consensual judgement becomes paramount and goodness the overriding concern as survival is now seen to depend on acceptance by others" (p. 496). The woman’s worth is seen at this level to depend upon her ability to care and protect
others. The transition to the third and highest level involves the woman's examination of her own needs juxtaposed with her responsibility for others. This shift in criteria from goodness to truthfulness, i.e., the reality of one's own needs, represents a retrieval of "judgemental initiative" (p. 498) from the consensus of others to oneself. The final stage of Gilligan's treatise describes the morality of nonviolence. Here the woman has rejected the traditional criterion of feminine morality, i.e., self-abnegation and self-sacrifice, in favour of one in which care becomes the universal obligation where "the worth of the self in relation to others, the claiming of the power to choose, and the acceptance of responsibility for choice" (p. 507) become the paramount issues. The woman now becomes

the arbiter of an independent judgement that now subsumes both conventions and individual needs under the moral principle of nonviolence. Judgement remains psychological in its concern with the intention and consequence of action, but now it becomes universal in its condemnation of exploitation
and hurt. (p.492)

The work of Gilligan first revealed the unique feminine character of moral development (morality of caring) as distinct from the masculine perspective (the morality of justice). The implications of her research are significant particularly if the popular notion of moral development, i.e., Kohlberg’s work, is conceptually inaccurate for the female population. Acknowledging the inherent differences in moral reason between genders may enhance the theorist’s as well as the practitioner’s ability to explain and to understand ethical behaviour.

Gilligan’s theory is hampered by a number of weaknesses. First, her conclusion that a gender difference exists is based upon an all female sample who were posed with a dilemma that may be appreciated by males but could only be fundamentally understood by females. As a result no true comparison can be made with males. Brabec (1986) suggests that other ‘weaknesses’ of Gilligan’s model are due to the nature of qualitative methodology. For example, her interviews were open-ended and, therefore, results are difficult if not impossible to replicate; her sample
size was small and, therefore, generalizability is questionable. These 'weaknesses' are perhaps responsible for the paucity of empirical research to support her work. Nonetheless, Gilligan has presented a feminine alternative to cognitive moral reasoning that questions the postconventional supremacy of justice, as did Erikson (1963).

The work of Perry (1970) provides another framework with which to understand the notion of ethical development. His research, based upon the open-ended and longitudinal interviews with male undergraduate students at Harvard (n=464), reflects a similar sequence of development as described by both Kohlberg and Gilligan. Perry found that among his subjects a pattern of three levels consisting of nine positions of intellectual and ethical development were observable. The three distinct levels he found are dualism, relativism, and personal commitment. The dualistic phase is characterized by a thinking pattern oriented toward right and wrong behaviours and one which places great weight upon authority figures. For example,

in this structure's most primitive form,
Authority's omniscience is so taken-for-granted that no distinction is made between Authority and the Absolute. "Truth" and "what They say" function as tautological alternatives of expression, as do "right" and "what They want". (p. 59)

The relativistic phase of Perry's model is indicative of an individual who perceives all ethical stances as acceptable. In contrast to the dualist, the relativist accepts the notion that right and wrong behaviour are a matter of personal and/or cultural preference. One group ought not, therefore, impose its ethical orientation upon another as all are valid perspectives. According to Perry, relativism is a necessary phase to pass through in order to reach the highest level of ethical development.

Personal commitment is Perry's final stage of intellectual and moral development. At this point the individual is capable of processing a broad variety of data and of developing an ethical orientation that suits his/her idiographic world view. Perry states that

the drama of development now centres on this
theme of responsibility. The hero makes his first definition of himself by some engagement taken at his own risk. Next he realizes in actual experience the implications of his initial commitments. Then, as he expands the arc of his initial engagements and pushes forward in the impingements and unfoldings of experience, he discovers that he has undertaken not a finite set of decisions but a way of life. (p.153)

This level, according to Perry, suggests an existential theme analogous to Camus' (1975) description of the hope and despair and reason and unreason of the mythical Sisyphus.

Perry's model provides additional support for the preconventional, conventional, and postconventional hierarchy and sequence of moral development. Perry's research also found that the developmental sequence was not invariant as suggested by Kohlberg (1981). He observed that some deviant patterns may occur in the form of a retreat to a previously held position, or of temporizing or pausing within a position, or of escaping or denying the possibility of further
development.

Perry's theory is best restricted to the explanation of the moral and intellectual development of advantaged white American college-aged males (McCabe, 1986). As with Gilligan's research, the nature of Perry's qualitative methodology precludes it from replication and verification. If generalized to the population at large, his work may fall short of providing a comprehensive model of moral development, as would the Kohlberg and Gilligan models.

The work of Haan (1978; 1983) provides an additional perspective to the realm of cognitive structural approaches to moral development. Her interactional theory, based upon the analysis of the moral action of subjects in various simulation games (e.g., The Prisoner's Dilemma), focuses upon the manner in which people resolve moral issues and arrive at moral consensus. According to Haan (1978), people engage in dialogues with each other with the intents of achieving new or maintaining old moral balances, which may represent compromises or identifications of mutual interests, in order to protect and
enhance their sense of themselves as moral beings among other beings. (p. 287)

Moral balance refers to the extent to which the individual is in moral agreement in his/her interpersonal relationship(s). If one is in moral imbalance, s/he may resolve the dilemma through moral dialogue. Such dialogue may be communicated explicitly through direct verbal communication, or implicitly through a variety of verbal and physical cues.

Haan (1978) sees the individual as functioning from one of five levels of interpersonal morality. The levels describe a moral sequence incorporating essentially egocentric notions of moral balance at the base level through to increasingly differentiated views of self in moral interchange with others and one’s self, accompanied by increasingly sensitive and particularistic understandings of the elements involved in achieving and restoring moral imbalances within the context of inevitable human fallibility. (p. 289)

Moral levels describe the approach an individual takes in order to restore and/or maintain moral balance.
The underlying premise of Haan's (1978, 1983) work is that morality is not based upon deductive rules or timeless universal principles of 'right' conduct or rationale, rather that moral truth is constructed inductively daily through one's experiences and interpersonal dialogue. She states that "moral tensions are ubiquitous, and moral resolutions are constantly created, instead of occasionally reproduced" (p. 233).

Haan's empirical work points toward a relativistic 'everyday morality' which disputes the claims of Kohlberg (1969) and Socratic philosophers before him who have argued that "a person who has a properly developed moral character will choose the proper rule and behave accordingly to remove the problem" (p. 233). Haan's use of simulation games as a means for analyzing moral action improves upon the use of the written response to hypothetical dilemmas, i.e., Kohlberg (1969), as the moral behaviour of participants is open to observation. The games, however, remain hypothetical and actual moral behaviour, such as that reported by Gilligan (1977), is therefore not accessible. Haan's theory (1978; 1983) has focused
predominantly upon adolescent morality and has not been employed in adult and/or administrative contexts despite the fact that moral dialogue is an integral part of the administrator's daily reality (Hodgkinson, 1991).

Rest's (1984) process model attempts to overcome gaps in the psychological literature, particularly with regard to Kohlberg and Gilligan, by introducing four components of morality which combine to produce ethical behaviour. The function of the first component is to identify the moral relevance of a situation or event with regard to the effect of one's potential action upon others. The dominant theme in this component is empathy. The second component consists of the actor's determination of the morally ideal conduct in the particular situation. Rest suggests that in this component "both abstract-logical and attitudinal valuing aspects are involved in the construction of systems of moral meaning" (p. 27). The third component involves establishing moral intent. Here the individual chooses a course of action by selecting, among competing values, a solution in which moral concerns outweigh nonmoral ones. Finally, the plan is
executed and implemented. In this component, one's relative ego strength is a strong determinant of successful execution.

Rest's model assimilates themes from both Kohlberg (1981) and Gilligan (1977). Components one and three describe Gilligan's concern for the ethics of care and responsibility for self and others. Component two describes the abstract Kohlbergian theme of moral judgement and justice. Therefore, Rest's model includes not only universalistic principles which guide behaviour but also contextual themes which affect the individual's moral choice (McCabe, 1986).

Research in Moral Development in Administration.

The research involving moral development in administrative contexts has been dominated by behavioural and cognitive structural schools. The behavioural approach has investigated various external/environmental factors which influence ethical behaviour. For example, the seminal work of Zey-Ferrell and Ferrell (1981) and Ferrell, Zey-Ferrell, and Krugman (1983) demonstrated the effect of differential association, role-set configuration, and opportunity upon the ethical behaviour of managers.
More recent research has shown the effect of culture, of educational background, of placement in the organizational hierarchy, and of occupational and organizational environment on ethical behaviour in administrative contexts (e.g., Harris, 1990; Izraeli, 1988; Kelley, Ferrell, & Skinner, 1990; Lyonski & Gaidis, 1991; McCabe, Dukerich, & Dutton, 1991; Nystrom, 1990; Weber, 1990; Zahra, 1985).

Research investigating the cognitive structural realm of ethical behaviour in administrative contexts has been dominated by the Kohlbergian framework (e.g., Nelson & Obremski, 1990; Penn & Collier, 1985; Weber & Green, 1991; Wood, Longenecker, McKinney, & Moore, 1988). Studies have generally supported Kohlberg's original findings in terms of the relatively small proportion of individuals that reason beyond Kohlberg's fourth stage. For example, Wood et al. (1988) in a study of senior level business administration students and practitioners state that egoism and individualism are deeply ingrained in the psyche of the current business student population. A substantial number are willing to resort to any means to achieve their
interests. Many others cannot reason beyond Kohlberg's 'law and order' stage (4), indicating a serious lack of awareness of, or commitment to, fundamental moral principles.

(p. 256)

Despite the fact that Kohlberg's work has been shown to be conceptually flawed in many respects, it has remained dominant in the literature. The application of other approaches to moral reasoning may provide us with a more indepth perspective of ethical behaviour in administrative contexts.

The work of Gilligan (1977) has been given relatively little attention, empirically or conceptually, in the administrative literature. Derry (1989) first attempted to test Gilligan's hypothesis in an administrative context. In a study that involved open-ended interviews with female and male first level managers employed in a Fortune 100 company, Derry attempted to determine if gender difference exists in terms of the nature of moral reasoning, i.e., a focus upon the morality of justice or care. Her findings revealed that the morality of justice was dominant for both female and male subjects. She concluded that the
influence of corporate culture upon ethical behaviour
may provide powerful ethical guidelines for managers
and that individuals may dichotomize their moral
orientation in terms of their work and personal lives.

**Summary of Psychological Approaches**

Though the psychological theories differ in many
important aspects, they provide a wealth of knowledge
pertaining to the basis of an individual's ethical
decision-making behaviour. Psychoanalytical theories
suggest that ethical behaviour is the function of one's
ego development which results in authentic and mature
moral reasoning. The behavioural perspective posits
that environmental factors influence the decision
maker's ethical behaviour. Finally, the cognitive
structural approach centres around the sequential
development of the internal cognitive processes of the
individual as s/he attempts to provide rationale for
his/her moral judgements. Each school of thought
suggests that an individual develops his/her capacity
to reason morally. The implication of the notion of
moral progression is significant in the realm of
administration where the leader's ability to deal with
more complex ethical issues may be limited by his/her
level of ethical development (Baxter & Rarick, 1987; Cooper, 1985; Harris & Brown, 1990; Wood et al., 1988). Further, if the individual is capable of obtaining levels of higher ethical reasoning, then the opportunities for such growth may become a more explicit function of formal education, of corporate training and selection, and of organizational culture and climate (Baxter & Rarick, 1987; Bloom, 1987; Jensen & Wygant, 1990; Nelson & Obremski, 1990).

The major drawback of the psychological theories is that though they explain the rationale for holding a particular ethical stance, they do not describe or suggest what the content of that stance ought to be (Forsythe, 1980; MacCabe, 1986). For example, referring to Kohlberg's (1984) work, Williams (1990) states that from the standpoint of professional ethicists the "empirical explanations of how people act - do not translate directly into grounds for how they ought to act" (p. 47). Wilson (1981) remarks that in Kohlberg's sixth stage "any kind of reasons can, in point of strict logic, be used to back whatever behavior I think is right for myself and others to engage in - though it does not follow that all reasons are equally good"
(p.218). The postconventional levels of Gilligan (1977) and Perry (1970), the Interactional Theory of Haan (1978), and the behavioural and psychoanalytical schools of thought fall as equal prey to the critique of relativism (McCabe, 1986). Therefore, in order to develop a comprehensive model of ethical decision making, the knowledge of form (moral development) as well as content (ethical theory) of behaviour is necessary. The following section discusses the dominar*: administrative models of decision making that have traditionally contained neither explicit statements of ethical theory nor of moral development.

Models of Decision Making

Decision making in organizations is often considered to be the administrator's central function (Katz & Kahn, 1966; Pavlak & Popps, 1989; Simon, 1976). Theorists have developed a variety of normative *nd descriptive approaches to decision making in an effort to guide practitioners to better organizational results. A review of the literature demonstrates a recurrence of five dominant approaches to decision making: the rational and the bureaucratic models (Drucker, 1967; Katz & Kahn, 1966; Lindblom, 1959;
Simon, 1976; Weber, 1947), the consensual or participatory model (Ouchi, 1981; Wynn & Guditus, 1984), the political or power model (Kanter, 1979; Mechanic, 1962; Pfeffer, 1981), and the garbage can or organized anarchy model (March & Olsen, 1976; Weick, 1982). The commonality among these disparate approaches, with the exception of the organized anarchy model, is the desire to accomplish some implicit or explicit goal. It is the means and implicit philosophical underpinnings which provide for their significant variation.

The Rational Model of Decision Making

The rational model of decision making has been described by Drucker (1967) as a systematic process resulting in effective executive decisions. Nutt (1984) describes this generally accepted rational process as being composed of five stages: formulation (problem identification and alternative selection criteria), concept development (alternative generation), detailing (refinement of alternatives), evaluation (cost/benefit analysis of alternatives and choice), and implementation (action). The extent to which decision makers employ any one or all of the
stages of decision making is a function of the degree of control that an individual has over the decision-making process as well as the salience of the decision problem.

Simon (1976) distinguished between two types of rational models of decision making - the economic and the administrative. The economic model he describes as a preposterously omniscient rationality. The economic man has a complete and consistent system of preferences that allow him always to choose among alternatives open to him; he is always completely aware of what these alternatives are; there are no limits on the complexity of the computations he can perform in order to determine which alternative is the best. (p. xxvii)

Simon contends, however, that the economic model is untenable as the individual is limited in terms of his/her skills, habits, and the extent of his/her knowledge and access to information, i.e., rationality is bounded and subjective. Therefore, the more realistic decision-making archetype, according to
Simon, is the administrative person who seeks to 'satisfice' or find the best alternative under the particular conditions and restrictions. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) concur with Simon as they suggest in their theory of reasoned action that "human beings are usually quite rational and make systematic use of information available to them" (p. 5).

One strength of the rational model is that it provides a logical method of problem resolution. It is a method that relies upon quantification, verification, and fact. It is a method that attempts to provide certainty for the decision maker (Estler, 1988).

The critics of the rational model contend that it assumes that the organization has goals, and that these goals are shared by the employees or at least by the decision makers (Scott, 1987). Further, the rational model, with its primary focus or metavalue being efficiency (Simon, 1976), results in the personal detachment of individuals from the decision-making process (Estler, 1988). This, in turn, contributes to alienation of the worker from the organization and its output (Marx & Engels, 1986), naturalistic and homogenetic fallacies (i.e., confusing fact with value
and assuming that all values are equal in importance respectively) (Hodgkinson, 1990), and amorality (Scott & Hart, 1979). A final critique of the rational model is that it assumes decisions are made individually or at least by unified decision makers thus ignoring the influence of other stakeholders both within and outside the boundaries of the organization (Estler, 1988).

Philosophical Basis. The implicit philosophical basis for the rational model is teleology. Efficient results are the "raison d'être" for this approach to decision making. Hodgkinson (1983) states

[the rational or technical archetype] is vulnerable to philosophical attack. All of the criticisms of utilitarianism, for example, apply with force to the technician [i.e., rational decision maker], with direct implications for praxis, most specifically, the assertion that the utilitarian maxim is vain, for no hedonic calculus is possible. Subjective qualities are non-comparable and, indeed, from the standpoint of inter-subjective truth the quality of work life, the quality of any human and social life, can
never be determined or assessed quantitatively, not even in principle. (pp. 175-176)

The Bureaucratic Model of Decision Making

Weber's (1947) bureaucratic model of decision making is based upon a number of principles: division of labour, the hierarchy of authority structure, the system of abstract rules, impersonality, and technical competence. Division of labour ensures that decision-making jurisdiction remains within designated sections. The authority structure considers decision 'power' as a function of one's office as opposed to one's individual characteristics. The system of abstract rules provides parameters for all decision-making activity to ensure an individual's behaviour is organizationally sanctioned. Impersonality is needed, according to Weber (1947), to promote value free decision making, i.e., to ensure rational decision making and adherence to stated policies. Finally, technical competence is necessary to promote rational behaviour. Chelladurai (1985) states that "the authority of a position cannot be considered to be rational if the occupants of that position do not possess the requisite competence" (p.
The bureaucratic model's primary strength lies in its attempt to rationalize and control the decision-making behaviour of organizational members. Once control and rationalization are realized, the organization will perform more effectively and efficiently.

The bureaucratic model has been criticized from a number of perspectives. Rinehart (1987) contends that the division of labour leads to boredom and alienation as workers are faced with the agony and monotony of task repetition. He states that "performed under such conditions [i.e., the division of labour], work becomes repetitive and mindless and narrowly circumscribes the development of human capabilities" (p. 21). A second criticism concerns the notion of abstract rules. Gouldner's (1964) research demonstrated that rules, though helping to create and maintain control, will establish a minimum acceptable level for satisfactory performance which will ultimately become the performance norm. In addition, rules may become ends in themselves rather than guidelines for expected behaviour. The result, according to Gouldner (1964),
is that broader organizational goals may be obfuscated by the decision maker's rigid adherence to rules.

A third criticism is directed toward the principle of impersonality or rational and value-neutral behaviour. Hodgkinson (1991a) criticizes the bureaucratic value-neutrality with the same enthusiasm as the value freedom of Simon's (1976) rational decision maker. He contends that in a complex bureaucracy, people are not whole persons but role incumbents, partial sets of skills which are of utility to the organization whole. They are parts, replaceable and substituteable parts at that. In the organization, rationally construed, no one is indispensable. Morality, in glaring contrast, is a function of total personality and this latter exceeds and overflows any role. (p. 123)

Selznick (1987), discussing the organizational act of delegating in formal organizations, suggests that assigning tasks to roles or positions overlooks the reality that "individual personalities may offer resistance to the demands made upon them by the
official conditions of delegation" (p. 121). Echoing the sentiments of Barnard (1968), Selznik (1987) states that "control and consent cannot be divorced even within formally authoritarian structures" (p. 120).

**Philosophical Basis.** The implicit philosophical basis for bureaucracy is utilitarianism, i.e., effective and efficient goal accomplishment (Hodgkinson, 1991a). Perhaps more accurately, bureaucracy is philosophically based upon rule utilitarianism which considers right behaviour that which follows explicit rules of conduct which will result in the 'greatest good for the greatest number'.

**The Consensual Model of Decision Making**

The consensual model of decision making advocates the inclusion of organizational members in the decision making process. While the process used is shared with the rational model, the emphasis is placed upon member participation (Wynn & Guditus, 1984). Estler (1988) notes that in fact the consensual model is a subset of the rational-bureaucratic model of decision making.

The consensual or participatory model of decision making shares with the rational model the assumption of the existence and the general acceptance of
organizational goals by staff. Further, as Ouchi (1981) states the decision process takes place within the framework of an underlying agreement on philosophy, values, and beliefs. These form the basis for common decision premises that make it possible to include a very large number of people in each decision. (pp. 38-39)

The strength of the consensual model lies in "the belief in the authority of knowledge" (Wynn & Guditus, 1984, p. 113). Because the individual's rationality is bounded, the group's analysis of the problem becomes an aggregate bounded rationality which results in higher quality decisions. The consensual model also results in the enhancement of employee morale as well as satisfaction, performance, and commitment (Bacharach, Bamberger, Conley, & Bauer, 1990; Estler, 1988; Peters & Waterman, 1982; Wynn & Guditus, 1984).

One weakness of the consensual model is the amount of time required to reach a decision (Ouchi, 1981; Wynn & Guditus, 1984). Where the rational and bureaucratic models are relatively expedient, the consensual model,
involving debate and discussion, may not reach agreement quickly or at all. A second weakness involves the phenomenon of 'groupthink'. 'Groupthink' prevents individuals from expressing views that may be contrary to the pre-established norms and values of the group. It also creates the illusion of invulnerability, morality, and unanimity (Janus & Mann, 1977). As a result, the group decision, which ought to have the diversity of input, may, in fact, suffer from the self-imposed censorship of 'groupthink'. The final weakness of the consensual model is that the leader or administrator relinquishes power and control to the group and, as Hodgkinson (1983) notes, "groups are notoriously wrong. Progress is often made against the will of and in spite of the group" (p. 167).

**Philosophical Basis.** The implicit philosophical bases for the consensus model are teleology and Rousseau's social contract. This model assumes that shared goals are desirable and ought to be sought and that such goals are attainable through collective and co-operative means. These notions represent the teleological and social contract theories respectively. The existential criticism of the consensus model may be
characterized by Nietzsche’s phrase, "herd morality" or by Kierkegaard’s statement that
in order that everything should be reduced to the same level, it is first of all necessary to procure a phantom, its spirit, a monstrous abstraction, an all-embracing something which is nothing, a mirage - and that phantom is the public. (1966, p. 58)

The Political Model of Decision Making

While the rational, bureaucratic, and consensual models generally function in a closed organizational system, the political model, by definition, assumes an open environment for decision making (Dunlap & Goldman, 1991; Estler, 1988; Scott, 1987). This model incorporates the special interests and the relative amount of formal and informal power of a variety of stakeholders into the decision-making calculus (Hodgkinson, 1991; Mechanic, 1962; Pfeffer, 1981). It shares, with the other models of decision making, the general intent of goal achievement, yet differs in its recognition of external actors who may influence the acceptance of decisions (Estler, 1988; Jay, 1967; Scott, 1987). When the interests of various actors
conflict, which is a basic assumption of the theory, those with the greater power to influence will succeed (Jay, 1967).

Pfeffer (1981) notes that to understand the political model, one must understand who participates in decision making, what determines each player's stand on the issues, what determines each actor's relative power, and how the decision process arrives at a decision, in other words, how the various preferences become combined (majority rule; unanimity, 2/3 vote, etc.). (p. 330)

Therefore, while the organization or its decision maker has an idea of the direction that policy or organizational behaviour ought to go, the relative strength of various internal and external actors will determine both the process and the final product of the decision.

The strength of the political model of decision making is its recognition of the preferences of multiple stakeholders. Decisions based upon the political model will reflect multiple interests -
particularly those with the greatest influence on the organization (Jay, 1967). In this way the organization is able to survive by accepting and adapting to changes in the preferences of its clientele.

The primary weakness of the political model is that the interests of the most powerful stakeholder may not be in the best interests of the organization or the public at large, e.g., lobbyists against gun control legislation in Canada and the United States. As a result, the organization has difficulty maintaining control over its operation and must remain adaptable to the ebb and flow of political opinion (Hodgkinson, 1991b).

**Philosophical Basis.** As the primary task of the political model is organizational survival, the implicit philosophy is teleological. The organization's decision process and intermediate goals are linked to survival, as a metavalue, and thus strongly reflect the consequentialist philosophical approach.

**The Organized Anarchy Model**

This model, also termed the 'garbage can' model, describes a 'method' of decision making "characterized
by the absence of agreement about either ends or means" (Scott, 1987, p. 278). The model was developed based upon the overriding premise that organizations are internally fluid structures that are susceptible to external pressures from a variety of sources, and operate under ambiguous goals, technologies, preferences, and participation. According to March and Olsen (1976), the model rests upon the assumption that the real world of organizational life cannot be adequately explained by standard theories of choice. At best, individuals have only modest control over their immediate environment. Further the model assumes that

intention does not control behaviour precisely. Participation is not a stable consequence of properties of the choice situation or individual preferences. Outcomes are not a direct consequence of process. Environmental response is not always attributable to organizational action. Belief is not always a result of experience. (p. 21)

According to the model, when a decision is made, it is not necessarily an attempt to resolve an
identified problem, rather, it may serve to accomplish other organizational aims such as clarifying roles, discovering truth and virtue, distributing glory and blame, and examining individual and group interests (March & Olsen, 1976). The actual process is a function of the interweaving of organizational duty and responsibility to make decisions (choice opportunities), the influence of internal and external pressures both related and unrelated to the decision (problems), the availability of technical or personnel solutions (solutions), and the relative consistency and motivation of employee participation (participation) (March & Olsen, 1976).

The model proposes three styles of decision making: oversight, flight, and resolution. Oversight refers to a decision being made with minimum time and energy due to the individual's attention being directed toward other related problems. Flight describes a style which produces unsuccessful solutions to problems and leaves the solution waiting to be attached to congruent choice. Resolution refers to a style whereby decisions actually resolve problems (March & Olsen, 1976).
The advantage of the organized anarchy model is that it provides the decision maker with the flexibility to operate in rapidly changing and ambiguous internal and external environments. While organizational goals and the means to accomplish goals are vague and volatile, this model provides a rationalization for a break with traditional decision-making methodologies.

The primary weakness of the model is that its utility is restricted to the relative mayhem of the organization's internal and external environments. In stable conditions this model may breed inconsistency where none necessarily exists. Further, the model will not provide a basis for stability as its very nature is to react rather than to proact, i.e., to make decisions based upon more stable organizational values and goals.

**Philosophical Basis.** The philosophical basis for the organized anarchy model is existentialism (the philosophy of ambiguity). The model attempts to embrace the reality of organizational ambiguity rather than ignore it as a disfunctional variant of the rational process. By acknowledging ambiguity, the model encourages the organization and its members
toward a state of authenticity, i.e., the recognition and acceptance of the vagueness of experienced organizational reality. March and Olsen (1976) state that "the world of the absurd is sometimes more relevant for our understanding of organizational phenomena than is the idea of a tight connection between action and purpose" (p.17).

The model recognizes the limitations of traditional rational means of decision making and attempts to provide a 'post-rational' view of decisions and decision making that acknowledges the agony, complexity, contextuality, and ambiguity of choice in organizations (Daft, 1989; Estler, 1988; March & Olsen, 1976). In so doing the model rejects notions of rationalism, determinism, and behaviourism and espouses the existential premise that

in insisting on our freedom and responsibility, on the complexity of actual life-situations, on the need for experimentation in interacting with the world, and on the ambiguity and tenuousness of life, existentialists are suspicious of pregiven prescriptions for action. (Guignon,
1986, p. 87)

While neither existentialism nor the organized anarchy model of decision making provide clear procedures for conflict resolution, they represent a philosophy and a decision-making application of the individual's attempt to confront the Kierkegaardian 'despair', the Nietzschean 'nihilism' and 'purposelessness', the Heideggerian 'anxiety', and the Sartrean 'anguish' that is the existentialist's reality.

**Summary of Models of Decision Making**

The models presented demonstrate five very unique approaches to organizational decision making. Each contributes an important perspective to our understanding of the administrator's primary function (Simon, 1976). The rational model provides a logical process of decision making; the bureaucratic model suggests that organizations have rules, policies, and procedures that need to be followed when making a decision; the consensual model identifies the need to involve organizational members in the decision-making process; the political model suggests that outside interests must be considered or coopted into
organizational decisions; and the organized anarchy model demonstrates that organizations and their members are often unstable and irrational and that ambiguity is a fundamental aspect of organizational decisions.

In practice, however, these prescriptive models are rarely followed (Nutt, 1984). Decision makers are more likely to implement only selected aspects of the decision process and favour a more pragmatic commitment to action (e.g., Mintzberg, 1975; Nutt, 1984). This occurs despite the research suggesting that normative models result in higher quality decisions (e.g., Estler, 1988; Maier, 1970; Wynn & Guditus, 1984; Simon, 1976).

Summary

Literature has been presented regarding ethics in sport, theories of ethics, models of moral development, and models of decision making in an attempt to establish the groundwork for a more comprehensive model of ethical decision making in administration. As current models of ethical decision making fail to provide a holistic view of ethics, of moral development, and of the synthesis of the philosophical and psychological perspectives, a need exists to
develop a more complete model. Further, the application of such a model in the sport administration context will not only fill a theoretical void in the current literature but will also provide some direction for the sport administration community which, at present, is in search of ethical leadership. Based upon the discussions in this chapter, the following statements of the study’s problem and its purpose are made.

Statement of the Problem

At present there appears to be a dearth of theoretical work in the realm of ethical decision making in administrative contexts in general and sport in particular. Jones (1991) states that "one reason for this relative paucity of theoretical and empirical work in ethics may be that few scholars are interested in both ethics and organizational behavior and decision making" (p. 366-367). There has been no such theoretical work in the field of sport administration. Explicit methodology for model or theory building appears to be nonexistent in models of ethical decision making and according to Wright (1982), a vigorous and correct method must be employed in order for a model to
be considered or described as theoretical. The models that are available in the business literature do not provide holistic perspectives of ethical decision making, philosophically or psychologically. As a result, a significant gap exists in the literature and the rationale for the development of a more comprehensive model of ethical decision making that offers service to the sport community has been established.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to develop a model of ethical decision making for sport administration that will fulfill three objectives. The first objective is to construct a generic model of ethical decision making, using a theory building methodology, that will provide a more comprehensive view of ethics and of moral development than presently exists in current models. Developing a comprehensive synthesis between philosophical and psychological approaches to ethical decision making is the second objective of the study. The final objective of this study is to discuss its implication for research and practice in the sport administration context where, at present, the
leadership is searching for ethical direction (Blackhurst et al., 1991; Makosky, 1991). The following chapter describes the methodology to be used in this dissertation.
Chapter III - Methodology

Introduction

This chapter will describe the methodology to be used in the construction of an interpretative-theoretical model of ethical decision making in an administration context. It will include the philosophical rationale for the use of the chosen methodology and the description of each of the four phases of model building which consist of exploration, analysis, classification, and explanation.

Before discussing the nature of theory construction, it is appropriate to describe the philosophical assumptions underlying the research methodology, i.e., its paradigmatic grounding. Burrell and Morgan (1979) have developed a matrix which incorporates, what they perceive to be, the four fundamental paradigms of knowledge (Figure 3). The four paradigms are functionalism, interpretivism, radical structuralism, and radical humanism. The following will provide a brief overview of each paradigm.

Functionalism. The functionalist paradigm
Figure 3: Paradigms of Knowledge (Burrell & Morgan, 1979)
advocates the traditional scientific approach to theory building. This paradigm places emphasis upon the hypothetico-deductive/quantitative methodology that leads to generalizations and universal principles of human behaviour (Morgan, 1980). Theories generated by this paradigm have been characterized as being, "realistic, positivistic, deterministic, and nomothetic" (Griffiths, 1988, p. 42). From an administrative theory perspective, this has been described as one oriented "toward a managerial perspective and maintenance of the organizational status quo" (Gioia & Pitre, 1990, p. 590). The goal of organizational theory building is to refine and extend existing theory in order to better predict and to control organizational behaviour.

**Interpretivism.** The interpretivist approach to theory building proposes that social reality is constructed and sustained idiographically. Its method contrasts with that of functionalism as induction and the subjective analysis of qualitative data are its focus. Morgan (1980) states that the interpretive theorist views the functionalist's attempt to establish an
objective social science as an unattainable end. Science is viewed as a network of language games, based upon sets of subjectively determined concepts and rules, which the practitioners of science invent and follow. (p. 609)
The goal of interpretive theory building is "understanding the process through which human beings concretize their relationship to the world" (Morgan & Smircich, 1980, p. 493).

**Radical Structuralism.** Radical structuralism is hypothetico-deductive/quantitative in its orientation and is directed toward organizational and/or social change or transformation. Its intellectual basis is Marxism which, as a materialistic philosophy, views the investigation of the social realm as necessarily based upon positivistic science. Its goal in theory building is "to identify sources of domination and persuade in order to guide revolutionary practices" (Gioia & Pitre, 1990, p. 591).

**Radical Humanism.** The fourth paradigm, radical humanism, shares the Marxist view with radical structuralism that organizations dominate, exploit, and
alienate workers and must be transformed. It does not, however, accept the positivistic method to develop theories of organizational change rather it shares the interpretivist view that social reality is subjective and idiographically constructed. Its primary theoretical goal is to transform the status quo by means of subjective description and critique.

Of the four paradigms, the functionalist and interpretivist paradigms have dominated research (Sparkes, 1989) yet, the functionalist perspective has been by far the most often chosen by organizational scholars who have attempted to establish descriptive and predictive models of observable organizational behaviour using the tradition scientific method (Smircich, 1983; Weick, 1989; Gioia & Pitre, 1990). Lindblom (1987) has criticized the overuse of this paradigm as it results in "trivial theories because [the] process of theory construction is hemmed in by methodological structures that favor validation rather than usefulness" (p. 512). Gioia and Pitre (1990) contend that approaches to theory building that are grounded in appropriate paradigmatic
assumptions are better suited to the study of those organizational phenomena that are consistent with such grounded assumptions...The grounding of theory in paradigm-appropriate assumptions helps researchers to avoid the common tendency to try to force-fit functionalist theory-building techniques as a universal approach. (p. 587)

Thus, it would appear that the selection of the appropriate paradigm is a fundamental first step in the construction of a new theory or model. This study is concerned with ethical decision making. As the realm of ethics and, arguably, many aspects of decision making are subjective and qualitative (Greenfield, 1991; Hodgkinson, 1991a; Jaspers, 1955; March & Olsen, 1976), the interpretivist paradigm is the most reasonable choice for theoretical model construction.

Theory Construction in the Interpretivist Paradigm

The interpretivist paradigm represents a number of relatively disparate approaches to qualitative research. For example, ethnography, case study, symbolic interactionism, phenomenology,
constructionism, and naturalism are all members of the interpretivist research orientation (Rutherford, 1990). The common link among all these research methods is their ontological and epistemological assumptions. Ontologically, the interpretivist paradigm considers reality as a function of the individual's perception, in its extreme sense it is solipsistic (Morgan, 1980). Epistemologically, the paradigm rejects the objective form of knowledge seeking and places emphasis upon the importance of understanding the human condition. This epistemological debate is discussed by Hodgkinson (1990) who contrasts the German terms 'die erklärung' and 'das verstehen', i.e., explanation and understanding respectively. He notes that "what is philosophically desirable is a shift in emphasis in the contemporary organization theory (as well as research methodology) away from the erklaren of social science towards the verstehen of arts-informed humanities" (pp. 6-7).

The use of the interpretivist paradigm and its methodologies in organizational theory construction provides a means to overcome what Hodgkinson and others (e.g., Greenfield, 1991; Lindblom, 1987; Sparkes, 1989)
consider to be not only an overuse of the functionalist paradigm but also an inappropriate use of objective methods and assumptions on subjective phenomena. Strauss and Corbin (1990) suggest that "building theory by its very nature, implies the interpretation of data, for data must be conceptualized and the concepts related to form a theoretical rendition of reality (a reality that cannot actually be known, but is always interpreted)" (p. 22).

The congruence between paradigm and method is essential (Firestone, 1987). Sparkes (1989) suggests that the total research process must be, "characterized by a sympathetic vibration between parts" (p. 139). Therefore, congruence between the paradigmatic assumptions, the methodology to be used, and the nature of the data must exist to maintain the integrity and logic of the research project. As the data to be explored in this study fall under the interpretivist realm (Greenfield, 1975, 1991; Hodgkinson, 1983, 1990, 1991a), a method of model building consistent with this paradigm is required (Firestone, 1989).

The interpretative-theoretical approach developed by de Groot (1969) has been selected as the methodology
for this study. It has been chosen as appropriate based upon philosophical and technical rationales. Philosophically, it is most suitable to accommodate the qualitative nature of the data. Technically, it represents a method that is conceptually similar to other approaches to theory construction (e.g., Bourgeois, 1979; Dubin, 1969, Hage, 1972, Reynolds, 1971), yet, as Wright (1982) points out, it provides a more prescriptive format which the theorist may follow. A description of de Groot’s methodology is provided in the following section.

**Interpretative - Theoretical Model Construction**

The interpretative-theoretical method consists of four qualitative phases: exploration, description, classification, and explanation. These phases have been reinterpreted by Wright (1982) as exploration, analysis, classification, and explanation. It is this latter interpretation which will be used in this study as the term ‘analysis’ more accurately reflects the function of the second phase of the methodology.

**Phase I: Exploration**

The exploration phase involves the establishment of, "the research framework, which will define the
scope of investigation" (de Groot, 1969, p. 35). The data of the study are explored or described. Each data source is then juxtaposed with the research questions listed below to yield answers to be analyzed in the subsequent phase of the methodology, analysis.

Research Questions. Research questions in the interpretative-theoretical methodology establish the basis for data selection as well as the basis for data analysis. Questions arise logically from the review of literature and provide the researcher with the means to seek out appropriate data sources for model construction. Research questions then serve as the means to glean from the data the necessary information to form the categories or components and the logical relationships which will eventually form a new model or theory. Presented below is the rationale for each of the research questions which form the analytical framework for the study.

In order for the administrator to make ethical decisions, s/he must first understand the reasons why such decisions ought to be made (Hodgkinson, 1991). Therefore, the initial research question to be posed to the data refers to the justification for ethical
decision making. For a data source to respond to this initial research question, it must contain an explicit statement of the purpose of ethical decision making. The review of ethical decision-making literature demonstrates disparate philosophical and psychological theoretical bases for the administrator's ethical decision making (cf., Ferrell & Gresham, 1985 and Hunt & Vitell, 1986).

To develop a comprehensive model, the researcher must be cognizant of these different theoretical underpinnings. Therefore, the second research question concerns the theoretical foundations of the individual's ethical decision-making behaviour. Theoretical origins must be explicitly stated to allow data sources to respond to this research question.

The third research question addresses the need to discover the component parts or elements of ethical decision making. From the review of decision-making models in the previous chapter, five generic elements of decision making were identified: formulation of the problem, concept development, detailing, evaluation, and implementation (Nutt, 1984). A data source must address these generic elements in a general fashion in
order to respond to the third research question. The literature suggests that the administrator’s ethical decision-making behaviour is influenced by a variety of factors both within and outside the organizational environment (Bommer et al., 1987; Ferrell et al., 1983; Scott, 1987).

The fourth research question seeks to identify the variables that affect the administrator’s behaviour. A data source must identify explicit moderators in order to respond to the fourth research question. Decisions that are consciously made involve a process of reasoning (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).

The final research question addresses the course of cognitive action used by the administrator when making ethical decisions. Data sources that identify a process of decision making qualify to respond to the final research question. The research questions are presented below:

1. What is the purpose of ethical decision making?
2. What are the theoretical foundations of ethical decision making?
3. What are the elements of ethical decision making?
4. What are the moderators of ethical decision making?

5. What is the process of ethical decision making?

These five questions establish the theoretical framework for the collection and analysis of data from the available literature. The answers to these questions are found in the theoretical literature on ethical decision making in administrative contexts, i.e., the data sources, and provide the researcher with the necessary data to construct a comprehensive model of ethical decision making for sport organizations.

Data Sources. This methodology involves two kinds of data, primary and secondary. Primary sources refer to those data that will yield the components for model building; secondary sources function to clarify and/or place primary sources in context.

In order to answer research questions involving theoretical purposes, foundations, elements, moderators, and processes of ethical decision making, it is necessary to consider existing models of ethical decision making in administration as primary data sources. As the volume of theoretical literature regarding ethical decision making in administration is
relatively limited (Bowie, 1986; Jones, 1991), this study includes all theoretical models of ethical decision making that have been developed and/or applied in an administrative context available in the literature which meet the following criteria:

1. Theoretical models of ethical decision making that have been developed in an administrative context.

2. Ethical approaches and theories of moral reasoning that have been discussed or empirically applied to ethical decision making in administrative contexts, yet have not been incorporated into models of ethical decision making in administration.

For criterion one, a model is considered as a primary data source if it contains, in addition to an ethical/moral component, a primary focus upon the organizational member’s process of ethical decision making. The second criterion is established to allow the researcher to access data sources that, while having been shown to have relevance to ethical decision making in administration, have not been included in
models of ethical decision making in administrative contexts.

Manual and computer searches of the literature in ethical decision making in administration include the following databases:

1. *Dissertation Abstracts International*.
5. *Philosopher's Index*.
6. *Social Science Index*.

Computer searches were conducted by the University of Ottawa's On-Line staff and the researcher using the descriptors "ethics/ethical", "decision making", "theory/approach/framework/model", and "administration".

Manual searches accessed papers published in the following journals:

1. *Journal of Business Ethics*.
2. *Academy of Management Review*.
3. *Administration Science Quarterly*.
4. *Journal of Marketing*.
5. *Journal of Macromarketing*.
10. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport.
11. Quest.

In this first phase of de Groot's method, each data source is described and compared in terms of the interpreted responses to each research question. This phase results in the refinement of the data for the next phase - analysis.

Phase II: Analysis

In this phase of the methodology, the 'answers' yielded from the exploration of individual data sources are systematically compared with each other. de Groot states that this phase involves "that form of processing in which a given material is scrutinized methodically from different angles and by a variety of techniques, in quest of significant patterns of dependence which may be formulated as tentative
hypotheses" (p.53). Once the data are 'processed' by content analysis based upon the responses to research questions, the third phase of de Groot's methodology may be initiated.

**Phase III: Classification**

The next phase in de Groot's methodology is that of classification. Here data collected and interpreted in the first two phases are categorized into meaningful conceptual groupings or constructs in order to organize the researcher's thoughts about the phenomenon being studied. Strauss and Corbin (1990) state that categories are discovered "when concepts are compared one against another and appear to pertain to a similar phenomenon" (p. 61). While this phase of the methodology is highly intuitive, it is necessary to follow a logical process based upon criteria for category formulation (Guba & Lincoln, 1982).

In reviewing the literature regarding qualitative methodology a variety of criteria are suggested for the formulation of categories developed from the analysis of data.

1. Internal homogeneity (Guba & Lincoln, 1982; Marshall & Rossman, 1989).
4. Reproducibility (Guba & Lincoln, 1982).

Internal homogeneity refers to the similarity among items classified within each category. Items must be logically related and congruent. Strauss and Corbin (1990) refer to conceptual power as the characteristic of the category that allows it to conceptually encompass a variety of items and/or subcategories. External plausibility refers to the extent to which the set of categories provides a complete representation of the phenomenon being investigated. Reproducibility suggests that the categorization of items can be repeated by an external judge. The criterion of mutual exclusiveness refers to the necessity for categories to be conceptually dissimilar from one another in order to prevent the blurring or overlapping of concepts.
Categories that are emergent are those which have been developed from or grounded in the data and not borrowed from existing theory. Glaser and Strauss (1967) suggest that "the emergence of categories solves the problems of fit, relevance, forcing, and richness" (p. 37). Exhaustiveness suggests that all data analyzed can be placed into one of the categories in the set of categories. Though this phase of the methodology is highly intuitive, the placement of items within designated categories, particularly in terms of internal homogeneity, reproducibility, and mutual exclusiveness, should be repeatable by another competent judge. For example, a "second judge ought to be able...to verify that, first, the set of categories makes sense in view of the data from which they emerge, and, second, that the data have been appropriately assigned within the category system" (Guba & Lincoln, 1982, p. 97).

The process of classifying data into categories occurs in three phases. The first phase involves the researcher reviewing data, selecting appropriate category constructs, and organizing data into these emergent categories. In the second phase, two panels
of expert judges are asked to place data, itemized randomly in questionnaire format, in pre-selected categories. Should the pre-selected categories prove to be inadequate for some items, judges are provided space in the questionnaire for their suggestions for more appropriate constructs. The first panel of experts includes academics from the Faculty of Education and the School of Human Kinetics at the University of Ottawa; the second panel of experts includes senior administrators from the Canadian National Sport Centre. The results of the judges’ classification are used to verify the researcher’s initial categorizations. An inter-rater reliability level of 75 percent is set as the criterion for items to be placed into categories. Items which do not meet this level are clarified and re-submitted to the judges. In the final phase of the classification process, the researcher modifies, to a greater or lesser extent, the organization of data and/or the categories themselves based upon the comparison of results in phase two.

Once categories have been identified and the data organized into a more meaningful format, the researcher
is able to construct from these classifications a theoretical model. This final function represents the fourth phase - explanation.

Phase IV: Explanation

This final phase of de Groot's methodology may result in the development of a theoretical model based upon the interpretation and evaluation of the data set and the theoretical relationships among the various categories or constructs. Regarding theory or model construction, the physicist Stephen Hawking (1988) suggests that

in order to talk about the nature of the universe and to discuss questions of whether it has a beginning or an end, you have to be clear about what a scientific theory is. (p. 9)

Fry and Smith (1987) state that a theory is "an attempt to pattern some aspect of the world" (p. 118). Weick (1989) defines a theory as "an ordered set of assertions about a generic behavior or structure assumed to hold throughout a significantly broad range of specific instances" (p. 517). Van De Ven (1989) contends that good theory is that which advances
knowledge, guides research, and enlightens practitioners. In similar fashion Van Maanen (1979) suggests that the interpretive method seeks to "come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomenon in the social world" (p. 520).

Though 'model' and 'theory' are terms often used interchangably in the literature (e.g., Dubin, 1969), Kaplan (1964) makes the following observation:

models [are] only those theories which explicitly direct attention to certain resemblances between the theoretical entities and the real subject-matter. With this usage in mind, models have been defined as a "scientific metaphor". (p. 265)

Wright (1982) notes that models "represent a stage of thinking that often has to take place before theory can be stated or extended" (p. 39).

Lippitt (1973) suggests that there exists nine types of models: graphic, pictorial, semantic, mathematical, simulation, descriptive, explanatory, prescriptive, and predictive models. Kaplan's (1964) typology includes four categories: physical, semantic,
formal, and interpretive. de Groot (1969) contends that, generally, three categories successfully describe the universe of models, they are descriptive, exploratory, and interpretive-theoretical. It is this latter category that describes the character of the proposed model.

Limitations

The development of the proposed model is limited in three ways. First, the data sources have been restricted to those found in administrative contexts. Therefore, models of ethical decision making in other fields, such as medical ethics and bioethics, have not been incorporated into the data set. Second, the interpretation of each data source is based upon five research questions. That other questions could be posed is acknowledged. However, for the purposes of the present study, the five questions identified in this chapter are deemed adequate to yield the necessary data to construct a model. The final limitation of the study concerns the qualitative nature of data analysis. de Groot (1969) states that "one can never completely rule out other interpretations once a particular interpretation has been worked out. The issue is to
devise empirical methods and criteria to determine the 'value' or to 'weigh' a given interpretation" (p. 311). In the case of interpretative-theoretical methodology, it is the research questions which act as the method and criteria of valued analysis.

Summary

The purpose of this chapter was twofold. First, the chapter sought to demonstrate the rationale for the selection of the interpretative-theoretical method of research developed by de Groot (1969). Second, the chapter described the four phases of the study's methodology: exploration, analysis, classification, and explanation. This chapter also included a statement of the five research questions which will guide the researcher through interpretative-theoretical process. As well, the criteria for data sources and the sample from which they will be gleaned were discussed. Finally, limitations of the interpretative-theoretical approach to model construction were identified.

The following chapter includes the first two phases of the interpretative-theoretical methodology, exploration and analysis. In these phases the primary data sources are described and analyzed in terms of the
study’s five research questions.
Chapter IV - Exploration and Analysis

Introduction

In the previous chapter, the methodology was described, research questions were posited, and the criteria for the selection of primary data sources for the study were presented. The purpose of this chapter is to report the results of two phases of the interpretative-theoretical method - exploration and analysis.

Exploration

The exploration phase entails the description of each major data source guided by the five research questions. This description is presented in two forms. First, each data source is described in terms of its interpreted response to the five research questions. As part of this descriptive process, the interpreted responses of each data source are compared with other data sources to identify similarity and disparity among the data. Second, responses to each question will be presented in tabular form for each data source. The research questions are as follows:

1. What is the purpose of ethical decision making?
2. What are the theoretical foundations of ethical decision making?

3. What are the elements of ethical decision making?

4. What are the moderators of ethical decision making?

5. What is the process of ethical decision making?

Table 1 presents, in chronological order, the 14 major data sources described in the exploration phase.

_Perry (1970)_

The work of Perry, while not developed in the context of administration, demonstrates a degree of similarity with other cognitive structural theories, e.g., Kohlberg's (1969), however, in terms of methodology and content he maintains a more flexible stance. He developed his theory from open-ended and longitudinal interviews with male undergraduate university students at Harvard University. His theory described the ethical and intellectual development of individuals through nine positions encompassed by three levels: dualism, relativism, and personal commitment.

As an individual occupies a certain position, the purpose of his/her ethical behaviour, according to
### Table 1 Primary Data Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Publication Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perry</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td><em>Forms of intellectual and ethical development in the college years.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilligan</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>In a different voice: Women’s conception of self and morality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavanagh et al.</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>The ethics of organizational politics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferrell &amp; Gresham</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>A contingency framework for understanding ethical decisions in marketing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunt &amp; Vitell</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>A general theory of marketing ethics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trevino</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Ethical decision making in organizations: A person-situation interactionist model.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bommer et al.</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>A behavioral model of ethical and unethical decision making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubinsky &amp; Loken</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Analyzing ethical decision making in marketing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stead et al.</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>An integrative model for understanding and managing ethical behavior in business organizations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 1 continues)
### Table 1 Primary Data Sources Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Publication Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hitt</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td><em>Ethics and leadership: Putting theory into practice.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fritzsche</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>A model of decision-making incorporating ethical values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Ethical decision making by individuals in organizations: An issue-contingent model.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* denotes data source from text, remaining data sources are reported in scholarly journals.
Perry, is "to find those forms through which they may be understood and confront with integrity the nature of the human condition" (p. 201). These forms represent the stages and levels of his theory, i.e., dualism, relativism, and personal commitment.

Perry acknowledges the influence of philosophical as well as psychological theory in the construction of his framework. The initial position of his approach is based upon contextual pragmatism, that is, where the individual's ethical position reflects his/her means to understand and confront the human condition. The highest position reflects the existential tradition of personal commitment and the accompanying hope and despair. Perry's psychological influence is strongly Piagetian, as is Kohlberg's, in terms of the development of individuals from positions of egocentric duality through relativistic differentiation to the objective and detached ability to "meta-think" (p. 205).

The progression through the positions of intellectual and moral development is influenced by the proximal environment. The individual's sense of membership in the community and the extent to which
support is provided for intellectual and ethical risk taking, for example, accepting a new perspective and commitment, will enhance or retard this development.

Perry's approach would suggest that ethical decisions are made in different ways based upon the position of intellectual and ethical development. For example, the dualist decision-making behaviour will involve the consultation of authority in the form of superiors and/or rules and regulations. The relativist will base behaviour upon the situational variables present as opposed to necessarily following established 'right' conduct. The individual at Perry's highest level will view ethical decision making as exercising his/her own will to behave in a manner congruent with personal beliefs.

Perry's model, based in cognitive structural theory, was not developed in the context of administration yet it provides us with an alternative perspective to the work of Kohlberg regarding the development of intellectual and ethical capacities of individuals. The model explains the way in which a selected sample of male undergraduate university students develop their ability to process information
and to judge it ethically. It does not address the content of ethical decision making nor does it explain, in detail, the process nor the factors which influence the decision maker's behaviour. As a result, Perry's model may be used to provide balance to the cognitive structural component of a more comprehensive model of ethical decision making in an administrative context. A summary of information gathered from Perry is provided in Table 2.

Gilligan (1977)

Gilligan's work, like Perry's (1970), has not been incorporated into a model of ethical decision making in an administrative context. Her theory, however, has been discussed in the administrative literature as a needed feminine theoretical underpinning of ethical behaviour. It is argued that the introduction of the feminine perspective may provide a balance with the perceived masculine dominance of Kohlberg's theory of cognitive moral reasoning. Gilligan's model demonstrates similar features to other cognitive structural theories regarding the passage through egocentric, societal, and universal and existential levels of reasoning. While she accepts the Kantian
Table 2: Summary of Information Relative to Research Questions from Perry (1970)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Perry (1970)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the purpose of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>No comment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the theoretical foundations of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Philosophical: Contextual pragmatism and existentialism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Psychological: Cognitive structural theory (Piaget).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What are the elements of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>No comment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. What is the process of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>No comment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
premise, as did Piaget and Kohlberg, that knowledge is a function of the "active interchange between the individual and the physical and social world" (p. 483), she suggests that the physical and social world of the female is so dissimilar to that of the male, that a unique view of moral reasoning is justified. Her model describes feminine moral cognitive development as consisting of three levels: self-survival, self-sacrifice, and morality of non-violence.

At the first level, the woman places pragmatic emphasis upon her own needs, desires, and survival. Decisions are made to the exclusion of the impact they may have upon others. The transition from selfishness to the next stage, self-sacrifice, involves the woman's recognition of her attachment to and responsibility for others. Reaching the second stage, the woman acknowledges and accepts the role she ought to occupy in terms of societal expectations, norms, and values. Her behaviour is now directed towards her capacity to care. Gilligan states at this level "consensual judgement becomes paramount and goodness the overriding concern as survival is now seen to depend on acceptance by others" (p. 496). The transition from this stage
involves the recognition that the self-sacrifice expected by societal norms is, in fact, a form of psychological violence to the individual. In this transition, the woman attempts to come to terms with her honest need to be responsible for her own care as well as that of others. The final stage of moral reasoning in Gilligan’s model is that of the morality of nonviolence to others as well as to oneself. Gilligan asserts that by elevating nonviolence - the injunction against hurting - to a principle governing all moral judgement and action, she is able to assert a moral equality between self and other. Care then becomes a universal obligation, the self-chosen ethic of a postconventional judgement that reconstructs the dilemma in a way that allows the assumption of responsibility for choice. (p. 504)

The degree to which external moderators affect decision making is a function of the level of reasoning which the woman occupies. At the first level, though decisions are made for oneself, the decision maker
feels powerless in the face of external pressure. The second level demonstrates the woman’s strong sense of social responsibility and the acceptance of the influence of external factors as the norm. Gilligan suggests that at this level the woman "validates her claim to social membership through the adoption of social values" (p. 496). At the highest level, the decision maker acknowledges societal pressure, yet bases her decisions, existentially, upon a universal principle of nonviolence.

Gilligan’s work, like Perry’s, was not developed in the context of organizational decision making. As a result no mention is made of organizational contextual influencers, nor of the process of ethical decision making beyond the identification of levels from which the decision occurs. Finally, her model does not address the impact of ethical theory upon the decision-making behaviour of female decision makers. Gilligan’s work represents the woman’s view of the development of moral behaviour. Therefore, its inclusion in a model of ethical decision making in administration may provide an essential balance between the masculine (e.g., Kohlberg and Perry) and feminine perspectives of
how decision makers cognitively process the identification and resolution of ethical dilemmas. A summary of information gathered from Gilligan is provided in Table 3.

**Cavanagh, Moberg and Velasquez (1981)**

Cavanagh et al. developed their model of ethical decision making in the context of organizational politics. Political decisions are defined as those which involve "unsanctioned means, or sanctioned means for unsanctioned ends" (1981, p. 363). The authors suggest that once an organizational member steps outside the bounds of organizational policy and procedure (i.e., outside sanctioned behaviour) ethical issues emerge. Their model is an attempt to clarify the ethical nature of political decision alternatives in organizations.

The purpose of ethical decision making, according to Cavanagh et al., is for individuals to confront ethical issues and take responsibility for their political behaviour, to reduce the ethical uncertainty surrounding the political use of power, and to stimulate moral development. The model is restricted to three philosophical approaches: utilitarianism,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Gilligan (1977)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the purpose of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>No comment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the theoretical foundations of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Psychological: cognitive structural theory (Piaget, Kohlberg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What are the elements of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>No comment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. What is the process of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>No comment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
theory of rights, and theories of justice. Utilitarianism refers to the teleological theories of Bentham and Mill in which ends of organizational behaviour are the essential criteria to establish rightness of action. Theories of rights include the work of Kant and Locke which focus upon the notions of established rules, codes, principles, and standards of acceptable behaviour. Cavanagh et al. cite the following, taken from the American Constitutional Bill of Rights, as examples of moral rights: the right of free consent, the right to privacy, the right to freedom of conscience, the right of free speech, and the right to due process. Finally, theories of justice refer to the works of Aristotle and Rawls. Here decision makers are guided by notions of equity, fairness, impartiality, and liberty in their political organizational behaviour. Three fundamental moral prescriptions are identified as pertaining to the theory of justice. The first, distributive rules, suggests that "individuals who are similar in the relevant respects should be treated similarly, and individuals who differ in a relevant respect should be treated differently in proportion to the difference
between them" (p. 366). Second, principles of administering rules, refers to the canon that rules must be administered fairly and clearly; they must be consistently and impartially enforced; and they must excuse actions made from ignorance, from duress, and those made involuntarily. The third principle, compensation norms, refers to the responsibility for injuries suffered. Individuals ought not be held responsible for injuries which occurred as a result of actions beyond their control. In addition individuals ought to receive compensation for the cost of their injury by the actor(s) responsible.

Cavanagh et al. identify four basic elements in their decision-making matrix: the test of utility, the test of rights, the test of justice, the tests of exceptions to criteria, and the determination of the ethical/unethical nature of the political act. Cavanagh et al. propose that the individual must determine the extent to which the satisfaction of constituencies both internal and external to the organization (utilitarianism) have been achieved by the decision. Next, the decision must be assessed in terms of whether or not it upheld the rights of all affected parties.
(theory of moral rights). Finally, the decision must have adhered to distributive rules, the principles of administering those rules, and compensation norms (theories of justice). The authors acknowledge the reality that circumstances may arise whereby some criteria must be rejected or ignored in order to achieve 'greater' good. They identify these overwhelming factors as 'double effects' and 'incapacitating factors'. 'Double effects' refer to situations in which conflicts among criteria occur and the decision maker must weigh which one provides the greatest good effect and the least bad effect. The inability to employ the criteria based upon the lack of freedom to act, having insufficient knowledge to act, and/or having doubts about the legitimacy of the criterion itself represent 'incapacitating factors'. Finally, the decision maker must accept or reject the decision alternative.

The Cavanagh et al. model takes the form of a normative decision tree in which the three criteria representing utilitarianism, theory of rights, and theory of justice are presented. The decision maker is then asked whether any overriding factors exist which
may have excused him or her from following the principles of utility, rights, and/or justice. The questions which Cavanagh et al. suggest the decision maker ask himself/herself include the following: Does the act optimize the satisfactions of all constituencies? Does the act respect the rights of the individuals involved? Is the act consistent with the canons of justice? Are there overwhelming factors that justify suboptimizing these goals and satisfactions? Are there overwhelming factors that justify the abrogation of a right? Are there overwhelming factors that justify the violation of a canon of justice? According to Cavanagh et al., if all criteria have been answered positively, an act is accepted as ethical. If any response to the overwhelming factor criteria is negative, an act is rejected as being unethical.

The Cavanagh et al. model provides the decision maker with criteria, based on ethical theory, to judge decision alternatives. The model, while integrating three disparate approaches to ethical behaviour, does not consider the existential school of thought nor does it incorporate the psychological aspect of ethical behaviour. Further, the authors, while identifying the
influence of internal and external constituencies, do not address the impact of a variety of idiographic and nomothetic factors upon ethical decision making, e.g., demographic variables, organizational culture and climate, political, social, and economic conditions. Finally, the elements and process of decision making as suggested by Cavanagh et al. are limited and do not represent the complexity of ethical decision making in organizational contexts. A summary of information gathered from Cavanagh et al. is provided in Table 4.

Ferrell and Gresham (1985)

The model of ethical decision making proposed by Ferrell & Gresham is the first of a multidimensional nature. It incorporates not only external variables, such as culture and society, it also includes internal organizational factors, e.g., professional codes of conduct, corporate policy, and the behaviour of peers and superiors.

Ferrell and Gresham describe ethical decision making as having nomothetic and idiographic dimensions. They state that the "absence of a clear consensus about what is ethical conduct for marketing managers may lead to deleterious results for a business" (p. 87).
Table 4: Summary of Information Relative to Research Questions for Cavanagh, Moberg, and Velasquez (1981).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Cavanagh et al.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the purpose of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>To reduce the ethical uncertainty surrounding the political use of power in organizations. To lead individuals to assume responsibility for their political behaviour decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the theoretical foundations of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Philosophical: Utilitarianism, theories of moral rights, and justice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What are the elements of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Test of utility. Test of rights. Test of justice. Test of exceptions to criteria. Acceptance or rejection of decision alternative.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 5. What is the process of ethical decision making?                        | The decision maker’s behaviour is guided by a normative decision tree consisting of three criteria combined with three exceptions to criteria:
   Utilitarianism: Does the act optimize the satisfactions of interests inside and outside the organization? Are there overwhelming factors that justify suboptimizing these goals and satisfactions? |

(Table 4 continues)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Cavanagh et al.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. What is the process of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Rights: Does the act respect the rights of all affected parties? Are there overwhelming factors that justify the abrogation of a right?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Justice: Is the act consistent with the canons of justice? Are there overwhelming factors that justify the violation of a canon of justice?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Behaviour is accepted as ethical if responses to criteria or qualifying questions are positive; behaviour is unacceptable if responses to criteria and qualifying questions are negative.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Further, if employees behave unethically, particularly in their own interest, "productivity and other measures of efficiency may be low because employees maximize their own welfare rather than placing company goals as priorities" (p.87). Thus, according to the authors, ethical conduct, i.e., decision making, is very much a concern of utility for the organization.

The model is based upon two theoretical foundations: theories of ethics and behaviourism. The theories of ethics considered are teleology, i.e., utilitarianism, and deontology (theories of rights and justice). The decision maker's knowledge, values, attitudes, and intentions are all influenced by the extent to which any one or all of these orientations are held. From the behavioural perspective, Ferrell and Gresham, based upon their review of literature, contend that the decision maker's ethical/unethical behaviour is a function of various environmental factors including referent groups (differential association and role-set configuration), corporate policy, and reward/punishment structure (opportunity).

The model consists of four elements of ethical decision making. The first concerns the identification of the issue or dilemma facing the decision maker, such as advertising deception, falsifying research data, bribes, and/or bid rigging. The second and third
elements are the individual's process of decision making and the resulting ethical/unethical behaviour. The authors do not discuss these elements beyond acknowledging that they, in fact, exist. The final element is the assessment of the actual behaviour as being ethical or unethical based upon its juxtaposition with individual factors, significant others, and opportunity.

The Ferrell and Gresham contingency model identifies a set of moderators that affect an individual's ethical behaviour. They identify the general influence of social and cultural environments as well as the influence of idiographic and nomothetic factors. Idiographic factors include the individual's knowledge, values, attitudes, and intentions toward ethical issues. Nomothetic factors include the theories of differential association and role-set configuration. Differential association theory contends that a person's ethical or unethical behaviour is affected by the interaction with one's referent group. Role-set theory posits that ethical or unethical behaviour is influenced by one's position in the organization and the accompanying role
relationships. Role relationships are in turn influenced by the relative distance, i.e., intra- and inter-organizational boundaries, between the individual and referent other(s), by the relative power and status of referent other(s), by the behaviour of superiors, and by the frequency of interaction with referent other(s). Finally, the decision maker's opportunity to engage in ethical/unethical behaviour is influenced by the organization's or profession's code of ethics, the corporate policy, and the reward/punishment structure.

According to Ferrell and Gresham, the resultant behaviour, in response to an ethical dilemma, is the "first order interaction between the nature of the ethical situation and characteristics associated with the individual (cognitive factor), significant others, and opportunity" (p.95). Following this interaction, behaviour is evaluated in terms of the individual's ethical orientation and the influence of situational factors which include the perceptions of peers, and the adherence to corporate policy and procedure.

The Ferrell and Gresham model identifies factors both internal and external to the individual which may influence ethical decision making. It does not,
however, address the cognitive structural aspect of ethical decision making and, like Cavanagh et al., ignores the influence of existentialism in the decision making behaviour of organizational members. The authors have also neglected to provide a detailed description of the process of ethical decision making. A summary of information gathered from Ferrell and Gresham is provided in Table 5.

**Hunt and Vitell (1986)**

Hunt and Vitell approach ethical decision making from the perspective of deontological and teleological analysis in the form of a sequential process oriented model. The authors suggest that the purpose of ethical decision making is to enhance the performance of the decision maker/organization. Unresolved ethical dilemmas create tension, anxiety, and frustration among employees and may lead to poor performance and staff turnover. Therefore the ability to resolve ethical dilemmas serves a necessary organization function.

The model, which may be viewed as an extension of the Cavanagh et al. (1981) model, is grounded in deontological and teleological philosophy. Hunt and Vitell make the assumption that individuals incorporate
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Ferrell and Gresham (1985)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the purpose of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>To protect the organization and its clientele from deleterious effects of unethical behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To enhance the productivity and efficiency of employees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the theoretical foundations of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Philosophical: Teleology (utilitarianism) and deontology (theories of rights and justice).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Psychological: Behavioural theory (differential association theory, role-set configuration theory).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What are the elements of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Ethical issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual decision making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation of behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What are the moderators of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Knowledge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attitudes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intentions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Referent others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Status and relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Codes of ethics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corporate policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reward/punishment structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. What is the process of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Ethical behaviour is the result of first order interactions between individual knowledge, significant others, and opportunity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
both ethical approaches in the evaluation of alternatives and their perceived consequences in the process of ethical decision making. Their model also contains a behavioural underpinning, as do Ferrel and Gresham (1985) and Trevino (1986), as ethical behaviour is also suggested to be a function of various environmental factors.

Hunt and Vitell, unlike earlier models, place great emphasis upon the elements of the ethical decision process. They identify 12 elements of the ethical decision process. They are as follows: perceived ethical problem, perceived alternatives, perceived consequences, probabilities of consequences, desirability of consequences, deontological norms, ethical judgements, teleological evaluation, intentions, situational constraints, actual behaviour, and actual consequences. These elements are influenced by cultural, industrial, and organizational environments and the accompanying normative structure, as well as by the individual’s personal experiences and the organization’s stakeholders. The cultural norms include the law, respect for individuality, rights of property, religion, national identity and loyalty, values and customs. The industry and organizational influencers included by Hunt and Vitell consist of referent groups and industrial and social ethical
climate. Stakeholders, i.e., customers, stockholders, and employees, also play a role in the decision process particularly in terms of the potential consequences a given decision may have for them. Finally, constraints, such as opportunity for ethical/unethical behaviour, are identified as impacting upon the decision process in the same manner as Ferrell and Gresham (1985) had suggested.

The process of ethical decision making, according to Hunt and Vitell, begins with the individual perceiving a situation as having ethical content. Once the ethical problem has been identified, a two-pronged evaluation takes place involving deontological and teleological assessments of alternatives and consequences respectively. The deontological evaluation determines the rightness and/or wrongness of possible alternatives for action. The teleological evaluation is concerned with the consequences of alternatives in terms of the probability of consequences occurring, the desirability of these consequences, and the affect of consequences upon important stakeholders. At this point, the individual is able to choose the alternative that is deontologically right and teleologically good. Knowledge of what ought to be carried out is then juxtaposed with one's intention to execute the
behaviour. The congruence between ethical judgement and intent results in ethical decision-making behaviour.

The Hunt and Vitell model describes, in detail, the process of ethical decision making from deontological and teleological perspectives. The authors, though briefly mentioning the work of Kohlberg, have not incorporated cognitive structural theory as a variable in their model. The Hunt and Vitell model, like earlier models, has also negated the influence of existential theory in the process of ethical decision making. A summary of information gathered from Hunt and Vitell is provided in Table 6.

Trevino (1986)

In Trevino's model, she alludes to the purpose of ethical decision making as enhancing the performance of managers and the effectiveness of organizations. She suggests that managers, when faced with ethical dilemmas, must be able to make ethical decisions as a requisite skill. Accordingly, the level of moral development may predict managerial performance and influence personnel selection. Further, Trevino suggests that "as a result of unethical or illegal decisions of one or more managers, an organization
Table 6: Summary of Information Relative to Research Questions from Hunt & Vitell (1986)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Hunt &amp; Vitell (1986)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the purpose of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>To reduce poor performance and turnover due to the anxiety, frustration, and tension of troubling ethical dilemmas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the theoretical foundations of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Philosophical: Deontological and teleological ethical theory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Psychological: Behavioural theory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. What is the process of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Sequential process involving the perception of an ethical dilemma (as influenced by antecedents) followed by deontological and teleological evaluation of alternatives and the intervention of one's personal intent which leads to ethical behaviour.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
could be faced with lawsuits that possibly hold severe financial consequences and/or badly tarnish its public image" (pp. 614-615).

The theoretical foundation of this model is cognitive structural as well as behavioural. The decision maker’s initial moral position is based upon Kohlberg’s (1969) theory of cognitive development, i.e., preconventional, conventional, and postconventional levels of moral reasoning. Trevino contends that one’s level of reasoning can be influenced by various internal factors, e.g., ego strength, field dependence, and locus of control, and external factors, such as, the characteristic of the work, organizational culture, and the immediate job context.

Trevino’s model incorporates three elements which comprise the ethical decision-making behaviour of administrators. The first element, similar to that of Ferrell and Gresham (1985), is the identification of an ethical dilemma. The second element, according to Trevino, involves the data being ‘processed’ by the individual based upon his or her level of cognitive moral development (i.e., preconventional, conventional,
and postconventional decision rationale). For example, the manager making decisions from a conventional level of cognitive moral reasoning, will be looking for decision cues from his or her referent others (e.g., peers, family), from the organization's policy and procedure documents, and/or from societal norms in general rather than from his or her personal belief in what constitutes right conduct. The final element is the resultant ethical or unethical decision behaviour which is a product of the interaction of individual's level of moral reasoning and two contextual influencers or moderators.

Trevino proposes that the first influencer, termed 'individual moderators', consists of ego strength, field dependence, and locus of control. Ego strength refers to the individual's level of conviction or self-regulating skills. Those with high ego strength are likely to maintain their resolve and not succumb to external pressures to change or conform; those with low ego strength are more apt to allow their convictions to sway with pressures or trends. The extent to which individuals seek guidance from external sources or social referents is referred to as field dependence.
The field independent person is less likely to access external referents to make ethical decisions. The third individual moderator is locus of control. Those individuals with internal loci of control assume that their actions/behaviours are self-determined; those with external loci of control believe that they are not in control of their destiny.

The second contextual influencer, termed 'situational moderators', consists of immediate job context, organizational culture, and characteristics of work. Immediate job context refers to reinforcement contingencies as well as other job pressures which entice the individual to act ethically or unethically, such as personal costs, time, scarce resources, and competition. Organizational culture determines what behaviour is acceptable in terms of collective norms. The normative structure that the organization provides may encourage ethical behaviour, particularly for conventional level employees who seek ethical guidance from external sources. Referent others provide significant influence over the ethical behaviour of workers in terms of the phenomenon of modelling. A third component of organizational culture concerns the
authoritarian nature of the superior-subordinate relationship. Those organizations which are characterized by legitimate authority encourage blind obedience or ethical neutrality. As a result employees may, willingly or unwillingly, behave in an ethically unacceptable manner. Finally, the characteristic of work, i.e., the opportunity for role taking and resolving moral dilemmas, is identified as a factor influencing ethical behaviour. The extent to which an individual is situated in an environment where taking the perspective of others is encouraged will enhance moral development. Similarly, when individuals are given full responsibility for the resolution of moral conduct, they are likely to advance morally.

Trevino proposes that the level of cognitive moral development which the individual brings to the organization may interact to a greater or lesser extent with a number of internal and external antecedents, i.e., individual moderators and situational moderators. The result of the person-situation interaction is ethical or unethical decision-making behaviour.

Trevino’s model is the first to incorporate cognitive structural theory to explain ethical decision
making in an administrative context. While the introduction of Kohlberg's (1969) work provides us with a more substantial appreciation of how we make ethical decisions in organizations, it is arguably an incomplete and gender biased perspective (Gilligan, 1977). As pointed out by Gilligan (1977), Kohlberg's (1969) theory is methodologically flawed and may represent a hierarchy of moral development that is masculine. In addition, Trevino's model is based upon cognitive structural and behaviour theory and does not include ethical theories as part of its matrix. As a result, it describes for us the process of ethical behaviour and disregards the content of ethical behaviour. Finally, Trevino's model does not discuss in sufficient detail the process of ethical decision making. A summary of information gathered from Trevino is provided in Table 7.

**Bommer, Gratto, Gravender, and Tuttle (1987)**

Bommer et al. base their model, philosophically, upon intuitionism suggesting that many ethicists maintain that the question of which ethical theory is correct is itself answered by appeal to certain ethical
Table 7: Summary of Information Relative to Research Questions from Trevino (1986)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Trevino (1986)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the purpose of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>To enhance managerial performance/organizational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>effectiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the theoretical foundations of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Psychological: Cognitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>structural theory (Kohlberg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Behavioural theory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What are the elements of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Ethical dilemma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cognitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethical/unethical behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What are the moderators of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Individual moderators:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ego strength.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Field dependence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Locus of control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Situational moderators:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immediate job context.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reinforcement.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Organizational culture.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Normative structure</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Referent others.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Obedience to others.</td>
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<td>Responsibility for consequences.</td>
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<td>Characteristics of the work.</td>
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<td>Role taking</td>
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<td>Resolution of moral conflict.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Stage of cognitive moral development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. What is the process of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>The interaction between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>individual cognitions,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>individual moderators,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>situational moderators.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
behaviours, that is, that some behaviours in certain situations are so clearly morally correct that they provide a moral intuition with which any theory must correspond if it is to be considered correct. (p. 267)

In addition, they incorporate behaviourism, as did Ferrell and Gresham (1985), Trevino (1986), and Hunt and Vitell (1986), in their model as a variety of environmental factors are proposed as affecting the decision maker's behaviour. The cognitive structural theory of Kohlberg (1969) is also considered a theoretical basis of ethical decision making.

Six elements are recognized by the authors as comprising the process of ethical decision making. The decision maker first identifies the ethical problem or dilemma, then enters into a phase termed, 'selective perceptual filtering' which refers to the subjective and rationally bounded nature of human decision-making capacities. The third element, according to Bommer et al., is the creation of a conceptual model or internal representation of the complexity of the decision environment. The next element, cognitive process, refers to the decision maker's cognitive style and the
cognitive complexity, i.e., the ability to evaluate multiple dimensions of a problem situation, with which s/he is able to make an ethical decision. The fifth element is the evaluation of perceived rewards and losses based upon an intended course of action. The final element is the resultant ethical/unethical decision behaviour.

The Bommer et al. model provides an indelph review of moderators for ethical decision making. They consider six general variables that have an impact upon the decision process. The first variable, social environment, consists of religious, humanistic, cultural, and social values. The second variable is the governmental and legal environment. The decision maker’s professional environment is the third variable influencing decision behaviour. Bommer et al. suggest that the extent to which professional codes of conduct/ethics and the ability to license and sanction activity exist will effect ethical behaviour. The work environment, referring to the nature of goals, of policy, of organizational culture, of the conduct of senior management, and of communication flow, will play a significant role in determining ethical or unethical
behaviour of employees. The fifth factor is the decision maker’s personal environment which relates to the individual’s personal life outside the work environment. The authors suggest that one’s family, peers, and one’s home environment play a role in influencing one’s moral behaviour in the organizational context. Finally, the decision maker’s individual attributes influence organizational behaviour. Here Bommer et al. refer to one’s level of moral reasoning, based upon Kohlberg’s (1969) theory, and the demographic variables that may be used to predict levels of moral development, e.g., gender, age, and education. Each of these variables influences the decision-making process.

The process of ethical decision making follows a sequence beginning with the individual’s selective filtering of the parameters of the problem situation or dilemma and of the social, governmental/legal, work, professional, and personal factors. From this filtering phase, the decision maker constructs a conceptual model "which goes through an iterative process affected by the individual attributes and mediated by the individual’s unique cognitive process"
(p. 275). The decision maker assesses both perceived rewards and losses of a given course of action and ultimately makes a choice resulting in ethical or unethical behaviour.

The Bommer et al. model is the most comprehensive model to date in terms of situational variables which influence ethical decision making. It does not, however, give a complete view of ethical theory nor does it provide a comprehensive perspective of moral reasoning as it focuses exclusively upon the work of Kohlberg (1969). A summary of information gathered from Bommer et al. is provided in Table 3.

**Dubinsky and Loken (1989)**

Dubinsky and Loken developed a model of ethical decision making based upon the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). This theory, housed in the behavioural school of psychology, posits that behaviour can be predicted if we know the individual’s intention to behave in a certain manner. Intention, according to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) is the result of the interaction between the individual’s attitudes and societal norms. Though the theory suggests that individuals process information systematically, the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Bommer, Gratto, Gravender, and Tuttle (1987)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the purpose of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>No comment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 8 continues)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Bommer, Gratto, Gravender, and Tuttle (1987)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. What is the process of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Problem/dilemma and environment factors are selectively filtered, a conceptual model is created and evaluated based upon one's cognitive style and cognitive attributes, perceived reward and losses resulting in an ethical/unethical decision.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
resultant behaviour may or may not be ethical.

The Dubinsky and Loken model incorporates three
general moderators which lead to ethical or unethical
behaviour. The first component, determinants of
attitude toward behaviour, consists of four factors.
The first factor, the decision maker's behavioural
belief, refers to the likelihood that ethical/unethical
behaviour leads to certain positive or negative
outcomes. The second factor, outcome evaluations,
considers the individual's assessment of the goodness
or badness of outcomes. Normative beliefs constitute
the third factor which refers to the likelihood that
referents believe a behaviour should or should not be
performed. Motivation to comply is the fourth factor
and pertains to the willingness of an individual to
adhere to what referents wish him/her to do.

The second moderator, determinants of intentions,
includes the decision maker's attitude toward
ethical/unethical behaviour in terms of its goodness or
badness. This factor is influenced by behavioural
beliefs and outcome evaluations. The second factor
which makes up this component is subjective norms
toward ethical/unethical behaviour. Subjective norms
are one's perception of what referents think the decision maker ought to do. According to Dubinsky and Loken, this factor is a function of one's normative beliefs and one's motivation to comply.

The third moderator is the intention to engage in ethical/unethical behaviour. According to the reasoned action theory, intention refers to "the individual's subjective probability that he or she will engage in the behaviour" (p. 85). This interpretation of intent is similar to that used by Hunt and Vitel (1986), yet differs from that used by Ferrell and Gresham (1985) who consider it to be the underlying purpose or motivation behind an individual's actions. Intention is a function of the two factors which form the determinants of intentions, namely attitudes toward the behaviour and subjective norms.

According to the model, ethical/unethical behaviour is a function of one's intent to perform the behaviour. Intent, in turn, is a function of the decision maker's attitude toward the behaviour, in terms of utility and goodness or badness, and the subjective norms which may motivate him/her to perform ethically or unethically.
The model contributes to the ethical decision-making literature by recognizing the importance of the individual’s intent to behave ethically or unethically. It does not, however, consider the decision maker’s cognitive level of reasoning or the ethical content of one’s decision. Finally, the model does not provide a clear explanation of the process through which an ethical decision is made. A summary of information gathered from Dubinsky and Loken (1989) is provided in Table 9.

Stead, Worrell, and Stead (1990)

Stead et al., in their model of ethical behaviour in business, have expanded on the notion of person-situation interaction first discussed by Trevino (1986). The authors acknowledge the complexity of dealing with ethical issues and contend that it is necessary to provide employees with an indepth understanding of the factors surrounding ethical decision making in order to behave ethically themselves. Without such an understanding of ethical issues and ethical behaviour, the organization may not be able to avoid moral decay which may or may not affect its profitability, its competitiveness, and/or

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Dubinsky and Loken (1989)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the purpose of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>No comment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the theoretical foundations of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Psychological: Behaviourial theory: Reasoned action theory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What are the elements of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>No comment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What are the moderators of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Determinants of attitudes towards behaviour: behavioural beliefs, outcome evaluations, normative beliefs, and motivation to comply. Determinants of intentions: attitude toward ethical/unethical behaviour, subjective norms toward ethical/unethical behaviour. Intentions to engage in ethical/unethical behaviour. Referent others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. What is the process of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Ethical behaviour is a function of the decision maker's intention to behave ethically which is the result of the determinants of intention and the determinants of attitudes toward behaviour.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Stead et al. draw from the available literature, empirical and conceptual, in the formulation of their model. The theoretical basis is derived from behavioural theory as well as from ethical theories. The behavioural component identifies personality measures that will influence the internalization of an ethical system or theory, such as locus of control, machiavellianism, and ego strength, as well as the socializing influence received from significant others, i.e., parents, siblings, peers, teachers, managers, and public officials. In addition, the organization's reward/punishment system and the dimensions of the job, such as location in hierarchy, external contacts, and the scarcity of technical expertise also affect one's adoption of an ethical philosophy.

Ethical theories or systems are identified as utilitarianism, rights, and justice. The manner in which these theories are employed is a function of the individual's ethical decision ideology. Four disparate ideology archetypes are presented, based upon a relativism/idealism 2 x 2 matrix (Forsyth, 1980). They are situationists, subjectivists, absolutists, and
exceptionists. Situationists, those high in both idealism and relativism, reject universal principles and evaluate each situation in its unique context. Subjectivists, low in idealism and high in relativism, base moral judgements exclusively upon the individual decision maker rather than upon external principles. Individuals who are low in relativism and high in idealism are termed absolutists and accept universal principles as the basis for moral behaviour. Finally, exceptionists are those who are low in both relativism and idealism and believe that universal principles are valid yet may be overridden in certain circumstances.

Stead et al. identified seven major antecedents of ethical decision making as consisting of individual factors, ethical philosophy, ethical decision ideology, ethical decision history, past reinforcement of ethical decisions, organizational factors, and external forces. The first antecedent, individual factors, consist of personality in terms of ego strength, machiavellianism, locus of control, and socialization which includes, sex roles, religion, age, work experience, and significant others. Individual factors influence the orientation toward ethical philosophy and ethical decision
ideology. Ethical philosophy incorporates utilitarianism and theories of rights and justice. Ethical decision ideology, describing the manner in which a particular ethical philosophy is held, includes the situationist, subjectivist, absolutist, and exceptionist orientations. Ethical philosophy and decision ideology are reinforced by one's ethical decision history. Stead at al. suggest that "through this process ethical philosophies and decision ideologies are likely to become relatively enduring" (p. 235). The next antecedent, organizational factors, includes managerial philosophy and behaviour as well as the organization's reinforcement system, and the characteristics of the decision maker's job. Organizational factors are, in turn, affected by external forces which consist of economic conditions, the supply of scarce resources, the level of competition, the influence of multiple stakeholders, and political and social institutions.

The interaction of these antecedents results in an individual behaving in a particular manner which feeds back into the individual's ethical decision history. The initial linkage of the model demonstrates that "the
ethical beliefs that one holds and how and when those beliefs are applied, are strongly influenced by personality and background" (p. 237). The resultant decision behaviour is then reinforced by organizational and/or external factors. This reinforcement, over time, becomes the basis for the individual's decision history which, in turn, will influence future ethical decision-making behaviour. Stead et al. state that as the individual enters and gains experience in an organization, his or her ethical behaviors are influenced by managerial philosophy behavior, the reinforcement system and the characteristics of the job itself. This work experience with its reinforcement and significant influence by management in turn become crucial socialization forces influencing the individual. (pp. 237-238)

Though existentialism is not addressed in this model, the Stead et al. treatment of ethical theory is the most detailed of ethical decision-making models presented thus far. It suffers, however, as do the models developed by Cavanagh et al. (1981), Ferrell and Gresham (1985), and Hunt and Vitell (1986) from the
absence of a developmental cognitive structural component explaining the individual's rationale for ethical behaviour. The model does not provide a clear process of ethical decision making. A summary of information gathered from Stead et al. is provided in Table 10.

**Jensen and Wygant (1990)**

Jensen and Wygant question the use of traditional moral theories in business decisions as being too vague to be of practical use in making business decisions. Further, they assert the use of theories of moral reasoning, e.g., Kohlberg (1969), are equally suspect because they are conceptually flawed and incomplete. In response to the perceived weaknesses of philosophical and cognitive structural psychological theories, the authors proposed the incorporation of the basic elements of Bandura's (1986) social-cognitive theory of human behaviour into an ethical decision model. The central theme of the social-cognitive theory is that each person is guided by purpose and forethought. Jensen and Wygant state that "forethought serves as the basis for action. People act the way
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Stead, Worrell, and Stead (1990)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the purpose of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>To avoid moral decay.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2. What are the theoretical foundations of ethical decision making? | Philosophical: utilitarianism, theories of rights and justice.  
Psychological: Behavioural theory. |
| 3. What are the elements of ethical decision making? | No comment. |
| 4. What are the moderators of ethical decision making? | Individual factors: personality (ego strength, Machiavellianism, locus of control) and socialization (sex roles, religion, age, work experience, significant others).  
Ethical decision ideology: situationist, subjectivist, absolutist, and exceptionist.  
Ethical philosophy: Utilitarianism, rights, justice.  
Past reinforcement.  
Ethical decision history. Organizational factors: managerial philosophy and behaviour, reinforcement system, and characteristics of the job. |

(Table 10 continues)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Stead, Worrell, and Stead (1990)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. What is the process of ethical decision making?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External forces: economic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>conditions, scarce resources,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>competition, multiple</td>
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<td></td>
<td>stakeholders, political and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>social institutions.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>First order interaction</td>
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<td>between one's ethical</td>
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<td></td>
<td>philosophy and decision</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ideology as influenced by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ethical history,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>organizational and external</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>factors.</td>
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</table>
they do because of the way they anticipate the future, not necessarily because of past or present circumstances" (p. 218).

The theoretical elements extracted from Bandura are internal standards, self-observation, self-judgement, self-reaction, and self-efficacy. Internal standards refers to the personal values which guide an individual's behaviour. The set of values or standards have been internalized as a result of the influence of significant others in the individual's life, i.e., modelling. Self-observation refers to an individual's awareness of one's own activities. Judging self-observed behaviour against one's internal standards is the next element in Bandura's sequence. Reacting positively or negatively to one's judgement is termed self-reaction. Bandura suggests that individuals avoid behaviour which results in negative self-reaction and seek out behaviour which results in positive self-reaction. The next element, self-efficacy refers to the ability of the individual to carry out his or her intended behaviour. Jensen and Wygant state that "people with a low sense of self-efficacy, or self-confidence, may not pursue a course of ethical action
which they believe would bring about even the most
positive outcomes, if they do not believe that they can
do it" (p.221). The model proposed by Jensen and Wygant
modifies and extends Bandura's theory to the context of
organizational decision making. In their model three
elements are identified which form the process of
ethical decision making. The first element is termed
'self with values' and refers to the internal standards
by which an individual understands what he or she ought
to do, i.e., 'what should I do?'. The second element,
'self-regulation', consists of three steps: self-
observation, self-judgment, and self-reaction. This
element provides the answer to the question 'why should
I do it?'. 'Self-efficacy' is the third element in the
model and concerns the decision maker's ability to act
upon one's knowledge of rightness, i.e., 'can I do it?'
in terms of one's self-esteem, self-confidence, and
agency. The resultant force of these elements produce
the idiographic decision to act ethically.

Jensen and Wygant suggest that the idiographic
decision, that is, the one which has been reached as a
function of the internal evaluation of self with
values, self-regulation, and self-efficacy, is
influenced by two broad contextual factors, situational elements and past and present elements. Situational elements include one's opportunity to behave ethically or unethically, the extent to which one's behaviour is monitored by superiors or significant others, and the presence of others as one acts. Past and present incentives refer to rewards/punishments that are anticipated following one's ethical/unethical behaviour.

Unlike earlier theorists, Jensen and Wygant explore in detail the internal cognitive process of how an individual evaluates ethical behaviour against internal and external standards of proper conduct. The model does not address the ethical content of decisions, the notion of decision rationale based upon developmental hierarchy, or the process that the decision maker uses to identify, evaluate, and select alternatives to resolve ethical dilemmas. A summary of information gathered from Jensen and Wygant (1990) is provided in Table 11.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Jensen and Wygant (1990)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the purpose of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>No comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the theoretical foundations of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Psychological: Behavioural theory - Social-cognitive theory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What are the elements of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Self with values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-efficacy.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surveillance.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presence of others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incentives past and present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. What is the process of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Decision making is based upon the sequence which begins with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the decision maker’s values followed by one’s self-regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(i.e., self-observation, self-judgement, self-reaction) and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>one’s self-efficacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Before a decision is made, situational elements and past and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>present incentives are considered.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Hitt (1990)**

Hitt views ethical decision making as a function of leadership which promotes an ethical organizational climate, trust among organizational members, and ultimately the long term success of the organization. His model suggests that a means to attain ethical behaviour in organizations may be through the use of the existential treatise of the 'Encompassing' proposed by Karl Jaspers (1955). This work of Jaspers refers to the 'levels of being' or internal road maps which constitute our perception of reality.

The Encompassing Theory consists of four levels arranged hierarchically from empirical existence or 'daisen', to consciousness at large, to spirit or 'geist', and, finally, to 'existenz'. Empirical existence refers to a mode of being where the prime concern for the individual is seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. Consciousness at large posits that one's reality is a function of objective, natural, and scientific laws, rules, principles, and/or norms. It is a reality which is assumed to be common to all, i.e., one which is valid and reliable. The next level is that of spirit. It is a level where one has moved 'beyond' pure objectivism and defines reality in terms of the idea or ideal, e.g., an individual who places one's ultimate belief in God or in a 'movement' such as
communism. The final level is one in which the individual is able to define 'authentic selfhood' or 'existenz'. Nietzsche (1983) is perhaps describing the notion of existenz in *Untimely Meditations* when he implores that

the man who does not wish to belong to the mass needs only to cease taking himself easily; let him follow his conscience, which calls to him: 'Be yourself! All you are now doing, thinking, desiring is not you yourself'. (p. 127)

Hitt has adopted this hierarchical framework and juxtaposed theoretically congruent ethical approaches to each level. At the level of 'daisen' or empirical existence is the end-result ethic of Mill or teleology; consciousness at large is correlated with Kantian rule ethics or deontology; at the level of 'geist' or spirit is Rousseau's social contract theory of ethics; and, finally, at the level of 'existenz' is the personalistic and existential ethic of Martin Buber (1952). Jaspers suggests that what joins the levels of the encompassing is reason. According to Hitt

the basic characteristic of reason is the
will to unity. Reason moves beyond the unity of consciousness at large (understanding) and the unity of spirit (compelling ideas) to an all-embracing unity. It is reason that clarifies the four modes of the Encompassing, that then prevents their isolation, and presses on toward the union of all the modes of the Encompassing. (p. 91)

Thus, reality or truth is not an exclusive reliance upon any one philosophy but rather the reasoned consideration of all explanations of being. Hitt states that "never arriving at a state of completion, reason is constantly in the process of achieving ever-closer: approximations of truth" (p. 92).

The decision maker, when faced with an ethical dilemma, must consider each level of being, the philosophical correlate, and the accompanying decision-making strategy. Hitt suggests that the decision maker must address four decision-making strategies in order to arrive at a right and good decision, that is, a decision that is good economically and right ethically. These four strategies, from the objective/observable to the subjective/experiential, and their corresponding
ethical theories are as follows:

1. Test for results (teleology),
2. Test for policies and procedures (deontology),
3. Test for organizational values (social contract), and
4. Test for personal conviction (existentialism).

Hitt recommends that the solution alternatives generated by the decision maker must be subjected to each ethical test. The alternative that is chosen is the one which has, ideally, satisfied each of the four decision criteria and will result in an ethically right and economically good decision for the organization.

Hitt provides the first model of ethical decision making which incorporates existential theory. The notion of 'existenz' and The Encompassing Theory suggest that the decision maker's personal commitment, responsibility and authenticity are essential components of ethical behaviour. Though Hitt's model is comprehensive in its treatment of ethical theory, its weakness is its disregard for the psychological aspect of ethical behaviour. Further, the model, relative to earlier models, e.g., Bommer et al. (1987) and Hunt and Vitell (1986), provides limited
descriptions of contextual influencers and the elements and nature of the decision process. A summary of information gathered from Hitt (1990) is provided in Table 12.

Fritzsche (1991)

The decision maker’s behaviour, in Fritzsche’s model, is based upon the interaction between the decision maker’s personal values and the elements of the organization’s culture. Values are, according to the author, "the linchpin of ethical decision-making" (p. 842). Fritzsche refers to the work of Rokeach, specifically in terms of his notion of instrumental and terminal values. Instrumental values are those beliefs or conceptions which lead to the attainment of desirable end-states. Terminal values are beliefs or conceptions about desirable end-states. One’s values are based upon deontological or teleological beliefs. In addition, the model is founded on behavioural theory as a variety of external and internal environmental factors will influence ethical decision-making behaviour.

Contextual moderators include organization culture, climate, goals and stakeholders. Fritzsche,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Hitt (1990)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the purpose of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>To create an ethical organizational climate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To establish trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To foster long term organizational success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To make ethically right and economically good decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the theoretical foundations of ethical</td>
<td>Philosophical: The</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decision making?</td>
<td>Encompassing Theory of Ethics:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teleology, deontology, social contract, existentialism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What are the elements of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Ethical issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Test of results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Test of policies and procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Test of organizational values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Test of personal commitment. Reason (Existenz).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Right-good decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What are the moderators of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Organizational mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational code of ethics.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. What is the process of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Decision maker through the use of reason seeks to answer to four ethical tests:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. The test of results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. The test of policies and procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. The test of organizational values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. The test of personal conviction.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Based upon this information, the decision maker is in a position to make a</td>
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<td></td>
<td>reasoned and ethical decision.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
referring to Schein (1984), defines organizational culture as "the common set of assumptions, beliefs and values which has developed within the organization to cope with the external and internal environment and which is passed on to new members to guide their actions with respect to these environments" (p. 844). Organizational climate is characterized by the concepts of differential association and role-set configuration. Organizational goals refer to the focus upon short and/or long term objectives, as well as the organization’s policy and reward structure for achieving these nomothetic goals. The organization’s internal and external stakeholders are also considered as factors which influence ethical behaviour.

In addition, Fritzscbe considers the nature of the managerial problem in terms of strategic and tactical decisions as factors which influence ethical decision making. Strategic decisions are those generally made by senior management and have a greater propensity for damaging outcomes than do tactical decisions. Tactical decisions are those made by lower level managers, and, while they do have ethical content, they may not result in as deleterious consequences as the former decision type. Once the issue is identified, the decision maker must develop alternatives from which to solve the dilemma. Fritzscbe suggests that, in addition to the
manager's value orientation, the organization's policies and reward structure have a significant role to play in terms of the quality and ethical depth of decision alternatives produced. Once alternatives have been generated, a set of criteria is used to select the best alternative. The criteria include economic issues, political issues, technological issues, social issues, and ethical issues.

The process of decision making is termed a 'phased heuristic' by Fritzsche. The first phase consists of a minimum cutoff point for each decision dimension, i.e., the conjunctive test rule. Fritzsche suggests that the nature of the ethical dilemma may raise or lower the minimum standard of acceptability. The alternatives that are acceptable based upon this first phase are then incorporated into a decision calculus, i.e., a linear compensatory heuristic, which involves placing a relative importance weighting (w), and perceived benefit evaluation (b) for each alternative. The product of these two factors yields the overall value of a decision alternative (v), i.e., \( v = w \times b \). The assumption being that the highest 'score' will be chosen as the problem's solution. The selection of a decision alternative will subsequently have an impact internally and externally and will influence future decision behaviour.
Fritzsche's model is the first to discuss personal ethical values as the basis of the decision maker's behaviour. He also introduces a detailed process of decision analysis and selection which provides the decision maker with an explicit method to resolve ethical dilemma. He does not, however, discuss the relevance of cognitive structural theory or of existential theory as factors necessary to comprehend ethical decision making. A summary of information gathered from Fritzsche is provided in Table 13.

Jones (1991)

Jones' model of ethical decision making, unlike previous theoretical offerings, proposes that the nature of the ethical issue confronting the individual plays the dominant role in determining the nature of the recognition, judgement, intention, and ethical behaviour of the decision maker. The theoretical basis of this model is the generic four-component model of ethical decision making developed by Rest (1986) and the social cognition research of Fiske and Taylor (1984). Rest's (1986) model describes the decision maker as following a sequence or process which includes the following elements: recognizing the moral issue, making a moral judgement based upon one's level of moral reasoning (i.e., according to Kohlberg's (1969) theory), establishing moral intent, and engaging in
Table 13. Summary of Information Relative to Research Question from Fritzschke (1991)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Fritzschke (1991)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the purpose of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>No comment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the theoretical foundations of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Philosophical: Deontology and teleology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Psychological: Behavioural theory (differential association theory, role-set configuration theory).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What are the elements of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Problem: strategic/tactical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alternatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conjunctive test rule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linear compensatory heuristic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethical Decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal and external impact of decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What are the moderators of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Stakeholders: internal and external.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organization culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational climate: differential association, role-set configuration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational goals: policy, reward structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision problem: strategic, tactical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision dimensions: economic issues, political issues, technological issues, social issues, ethical issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. What is the process of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Phased heuristic decision process: Ethical value of decision = importance weighting x perceived benefit factor.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
moral behaviour.

According to Jones, each element of this process is affected by the moral intensity of the issue and by various organizational factors which include group dynamics, authority relationships, and the socialization process. Moral intensity is defined as "a construct that captures the extent of issue-related moral imperative in a situation" (p. 372). This construct consists of six components: the magnitude of consequences, the social consensus, the probability of effect, the temporal immediacy, the proximity to the effected constituency, and the concentration of effect. Magnitude of consequence refers to the sum of harms which a particular moral/immoral act may have. Social consensus describes the extent to which a moral/immoral act is acceptable to the larger group. Probability of effect is concerned with the possibility that harm will be encountered as a result of the moral/immoral act. Temporal immediacy refers to the length of time between the initiation of the moral/immoral act and the onset of its consequences. The closeness of the effect of the act to the decision maker is termed proximity. Finally, the concentration of effect refers to the
degree of harm which may arise from the moral/immoral act.

Jones argues that previous models of ethical decision making, taken at face value, suggest that the individual's reaction to all ethical incidents, regardless of their unique nature, will be uniform. Not unlike the 'prima facae' principle of Ross (1975), Jones argues that each situation will present unique characteristics which will influence whether a moral issue is recognized or not, the determination of what is right behaviour, the intent to act upon this behaviour, and one's action. Jones' model is the first to consider the nature of the ethical issue as a fundamental component which influences the ethical behaviour of the decision maker. He is also the first theorist to introduce the four component model developed by Rest (1986) in a significant manner. Jones' model, while including cognitive structural theory as a central component, is restricted to Kohlberg's (1969) theory with its inherent flaws and biases. Jones also underplays the role of ethical theory in terms of the content of the decision maker's decision behaviour. Finally, Jones' description of the
actual process of decision making and the variables which influence it seems vague and provides little guidance for the administrator as compared to other models explored thus far. A summary of information gathered from Jones is provided in Table 14.

**Strong and Meyer (1992)**

The final data source to be examined is the Integrative Descriptive Model of Ethical Decision-Making by Strong and Meyer. This model posits that a positive correlation exists between one's level of moral development and the extent to which one is concerned with corporate social responsibility. The authors refer to the work of Kohlberg (1970) as the basis for the decision maker's level of moral development. In addition, they acknowledge the influence of Trevino's person-situation interactionist model which identifies various individual and situational moderators which affect and are affected by one's cognitive moral capacities. The concept of corporate responsibility is based upon the work by Carroll (1979) who developed a typology consisting of economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary responsibilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Jones (1991)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the purpose of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>No comment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the theoretical foundations of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Psychological: Cognitive structural theory (Four-component model of ethical decision making). Social Cognition theory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What are the moderators of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Moral intensity: magnitude of consequences, social consensus, probability of effect, temporal immediacy, proximity, concentration of effect. Organizational factors: group dynamics, authority relationships, socialization process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. What is the process of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Four-component model: recognizing the moral issue, making moral a judgement, establishing moral intent, engaging in moral behaviour in the context of the moral intensity of the moral issue.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Strong and Meyer implicitly suggest that the elements of decision process consist of individual cognitions which lead to the focus upon one (or more) elements of corporate social responsibility. The authors suggest that three main constructs influence the decision maker's orientation toward this responsibility. The first construct, external restraints, consists of competitions, regulations, laws, economic conditions, social norms and industry structure. The second construct, termed internal moral restraints, includes values, beliefs, locus of control, internalized social norms, and moral development.

Internal rational restraints is the third and final construct and contains the factors of intelligence, biases of information, boundedness, belief persistence, experience, and risk adversity.

The process of reaching a particular orientation toward corporate responsibility is a function of the interaction between environmental, internal moral, and internal rational restraint constructs. The authors tested the relationship between internal moral restraints and corporate responsibility. They hypothesized that managers with higher levels of moral
reasoning would show a greater concern for corporate ethical responsibility and that managers with lower levels of moral reasoning would demonstrate a greater concern for economic corporate responsibility. The result of their study, using a relatively small sample of managers, did not support their hypothesis.

Strong and Meyer contribute to the literature by hypothesizing a correlation between the moral development of managers and their conduct regarding social responsibility. The model is based upon cognitive structural theory and though the authors mention Gilligan's (1977) work, they focus upon Kohlberg's (1970) theory as it is more empirically palatable for research purposes. Strong and Meyer do not consider ethical theory in their model and the treatment of the actual decision process is vague. A summary of information gathered from Strong and Meyer is provided in Table 15.

**Summary**

In this phase of the interpretative-theoretical methodology, 14 data sources have been described in terms of the five research questions identified in the previous chapter. The data were described in written
Table 15. Summary of information relative to research questions from Strong and Meyer (1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Strong &amp; Meyer (1992)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the purpose of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>No comment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What are the theoretical foundations of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Psychological: Behavioural and Cognitive structural theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What are the elements of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Managerial behaviour and decision making and managerial conduct regarding social responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. What is the process of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>The interaction between environmental, internal moral, and internal rational restraints resulting in a particular orientation toward corporate social responsibility.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and tabular format. The order of presentation was chronological. The work by Perry (1970) and Gilligan (1977), though not developed in an administrative context, enhance the cognitive structural literature regarding administrative ethical behaviour. Gilligan’s work, in particular, is valuable as it is the only feminine view of moral development which has been applied to administrative contexts.

The Cavanagh et al. (1981) model introduces ethical theory to the decision making process yet ignores not only the psychological dimension of decision making, but also the influence of a complex array of moderators of ethical decision making such as those presented in more recent models (e.g., Bommer et al., 1987). Ferrell and Gresham (1985) provide the first multidimensional model of ethical decision making. Their model includes limited philosophical and psychological approaches to ethical decision making as well as a variety of decision moderators.

Hunt and Vitell (1986) provide the most detailed description of the elements and process of ethical decision-making. Their model includes deontological and teleological ethical theories. It does not address
the psychological dimension or the contribution of existential theory. Finally, Hunt and Vitell’s treatment of the influence of various moderators of ethical decision making is cursory relative to other models.

Trevino (1986) is the first theorist to apply Kohlberg’s work to ethical decision making in administration. Her Interactionist Model includes both individual and situational moderators yet does not discuss the significance of ethical theory, i.e., the basis for the content of ethical decisions.

The Bommer et al. (1987) model is the most detailed in terms of listing moderators of ethical decision making. It does not, however, discuss the relevance of approaches to cognitive development other than Kohlberg’s (1969) theory and, like earlier models, is limited in its scope of ethical theory.

Dubinsky and Loken (1989) broaden the psychological view by introducing the Reasoned Action Theory (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) to ethical decision making. Their model is weakened by the omission of cognitive structural theories and ethical theories, as well by the limited attention paid to moderators of
ethical decision making in an organizational context.

Stead et al. (1990) include limited perspectives of both ethical theory and cognitive theory in their model. While they describe the moderators of ethical decision making in some detail, the authors discuss neither the elements nor the process of ethical decision-making to a significant extent.

Jensen and Wygant (1990) contribute to the literature by introducing Bandura's (1986) Social Cognitive Theory. The model, while providing a detailed description of the cognitive process used by the decision maker, does not consider the individual's level of cognitive development or the ethical content of decisions made.

Hitt (1990) is the first theorist to develop a model in an administrative context to consider the significance of existential theory in ethical decision making. Juxtaposing Jaspers' (1955) Encompassing Model with teleological, deontological, social contract, and personalistic ethics, Hitt's model is the most comprehensive model in terms of ethical theory. The weakness of the model is the omission of psychological theory and a detailed description of the decision
process and decision moderators.

Fritzsche’s (1991) contribution to the literature is his detailed description of the individual’s values structure based upon deontological and teleological theory. In addition, Fritzsche’s model, unlike many of the earlier models of ethical decision making, discusses, cogently, the decision process. The model’s primary weakness is its failure to address the cognitive structural dimension of ethical decision making and the influence of existential theory upon the decision maker.

Jones’ (1991) model is unique in terms of its focus upon the ethical issue as the dominant moderator of ethical decision-making behaviour. The model is confined psychologically, as many of its predecessors, to the cognitive structural theory of Kohlberg (1969). However, in addition to Kohlberg’s work, Jones includes the closely related concepts developed by Rest (1986), i.e., the Four Component Model. Consistent with those models that rely upon Kohlberg’s work, Jones’ model does not address the influence of ethical theories upon the individual.

Finally, the model of Strong and Meyer (1992) is
an important contribution to the literature as it suggests a link between the decision maker’s moral behaviour and his/her conduct regarding social responsibility. The model’s primary weaknesses are failure to describe, in detail, the process of ethical decision making and the reliance upon Kohlberg’s (1970) cognitive structural theory. The purpose of the next phase of the interpretative-theoretical methodology is to analyze, systematically, the answers to the five research questions from all primary data sources.
Analysis

In this phase of the methodology information for each research question extracted in the exploration phase is analyzed. Analysis involves the "systematic interpretation...of 'tentative explanations' of phenomena encountered in the material" (de Groot, 1969, p. 53). The interpretation considers similarities, differences, and peculiarities among responses from data sources (Regular, 1989). Frequencies are presented for each item gleaned from the responses to research questions and are listed in the table following each research question subsection.

While frequency may not necessarily represent the salience of the variable, it does represent a trend in the literature for the relative acceptance of a particular item as a necessary component of ethical decision making (Guba & Lincoln, 1982). A subsection will be devoted to the responses from each research question.

The Purpose of Ethical Decision Making

From the data, 11 statements relating to the purpose of ethical decision making were derived. The rationale for making ethical decisions in organizations
Table 16: Analysis of Primary Data Sources Related to the Purposes of Ethical Decision Making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Descriptive Statements</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To reduce the ethical uncertainty surrounding the political use of power in organizations. (4)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To lead individuals to assume responsibility for their political behaviour decisions. (4)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To protect the organization and its clientele from deleterious effects of unethical behaviour. (5)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. To enhance the productivity and efficiency of employees. (5)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. To reduce poor performance and turnover due to the anxiety, frustration, and tension of troubling ethical dilemmas. (6)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. To enhance managerial performance/organizational effectiveness. (7)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. To avoid moral decay in the organization. (10)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. To create an ethical organizational climate. (11)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. To establish trust in the organization. (11)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. To foster long term organizational success. (11)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. To make ethically right and economically good decisions. (11)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the table from which the item was extracted.
appears to be a function of two broad concerns: the effect of ethical behaviour upon the success/performance of the individual and the effect of ethical behaviour upon the success/performance of the organization as a whole. Despite the concern for the individual's ethical growth, the primary motivation to make ethical decisions in organizational contexts is a utilitarian notion that ethical behaviour contributes to individual and organizational performance. Table 16 presents 11 statements, paraphrased from the data source, of the purpose of ethical decision making.

Theoretical Foundation

The theoretical underpinnings of the major data sources have origins in psychological and philosophical theory. Of the 14 data sources, 12 employed psychological theories, six of which relied exclusively upon psychology as a theoretical foundation (Dubinsky and Loken, 1989; Gilligan, 1977; Jensen and Wygant, 1990; Jones, 1991; Strong and Meyer, 1992; Trevino, 1986). Six models incorporated both philosophical and psychological components (Bommer et al., 1987; Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Fritzsche, 1991; Hunt and Vitell, 1986; Perry, 1970; Stead et al., 1990), while two models were based in philosophy only (Cavanagh et al., 1981; Hitt, 1990). In terms of cognitive structural theory, the work of Kohlberg (1969, 1970, 1981) was
used exclusively in three models of ethical decision making (Bommer et al., 1987; Strong and Meyer, 1992; Trevino, 1986) and employed secondarily in three other models (Gilligan, 1977; Jones, 1991; Hunt and Vitell, 1986). Two additional cognitive structural theories of moral development by Perry (1970) and Gilligan (1977) were identified, and while having relevance to administration, they have as yet not been part of administrative models. In addition to the cognitive structural approaches, four theories from the behavioural school of psychology were revealed as being theoretical foundations of models of ethical decision making (i.e., reasoned action theory; social-cognition theory; differential association theory; role-set configuration theory).

Philosophical underpinnings consisted of teleological theory in the form of utilitarianism (Mill) and contextual pragmatism, deontological theory generally in terms of Kantianism or Ross' (1975) 'prima facie principles', theories of rights and justice (Rawls, 1971 and Aristotle), social contract (Rousseau, 1979), and existential ethics (Jaspers, 1955 and Buber, 1952). Hitt (1990) provides the most
comprehensive treatment of ethical theory by including teleological, deontological, social contract, and existential theories within a single model of ethical decision making. Table 17 represents the theoretical foundations of ethical decision making and their corresponding frequencies from the major data sources.

Elements of Ethical Decision Making

The analysis of major data sources in terms of the third research question revealed 57 items related to the elements of ethical decision making. The responses to this question were extremely varied. For example, Trevino (1986) provides a general listing of three elements which include the ethical dilemma, cognitions, and the resultant ethical or unethical behaviour. In contrast, Hunt and Vitell (1986) describe a more complex process of ethical decision making which consists of 12 elements, perceived ethical problem, perceived alternatives, perceived consequences, deontological norms, deontological evaluations, probability of consequences, desirability of consequences, teleological evaluation, ethical judgement, intentions, behaviour, and actual consequences. Fritzsche (1991) prescribes an
Table 17: Analysis of Primary Major Data Sources Related to the Theoretical Foundations of Ethical Decision Making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Foundations</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Psychological Foundations</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Structural Theory:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forms of intellectual and ethical development. (2)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morality of nonviolence. (3)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stages of moral reasoning. (7, 8, 15)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four component model. (14)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cognition theory. (14)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural Theory:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural theory (6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasoned action theory. (9)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-cognitive theory. (12)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differential association. (5, 13)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role-set configuration. (5, 13)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philosophical Foundations</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teleology (utilitarianism). (4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextual Pragmatism. (2)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deontology. (6, 11, 13)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights. (4, 5, 10)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice. (4, 5, 10)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intuitionism. (8)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existentialism. (2, 11)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the table from which the item was extracted.
explicitly empirical approach to ethical decision making which consists of a quantitative conjunctive test rule and a linear compensatory heuristic. Though 57 items were identified, many appear to be semantically different yet similar in content. For example, Jensen and Wygant (1990) describe what Bommer et al. (1987) term as 'cognitive process', as consisting of self with values, self-regulation, self-observation, self-judgement, self-reaction, and self-efficacy. Cavanagh et al. (1981) describe the ethical evaluation of alternatives as consisting of tests of justice, rights, and utility. Similarly, yet more comprehensively, Hitt (1990) describes the ethical evaluation of alternatives as tests of results, policy and procedure, organizational values, and personal commitment.

Generally, the elements extracted from the data sources seem to follow the logic of the traditional rational process which consists of problem identification, alternative generation, selection, behaviour, and evaluation. The uniqueness of ethical decision making, however, is the attention paid to the ethical nature of the problem (e.g., Jones, 1991;
Fritzche, 1990), the ethical evaluation of alternatives (e.g., Cavanagh et al., 1981; Hitt, 1990; Hunt and Vitell, 1986), the intent to behave ethically (e.g., Dubinsky and Loken, 1989; Hunt and Vitell, 1986; Jones, 1991), and the resultant ethical or unethical behaviour which is addressed in all data sources.

In addition to the items which describe the overt stages of ethical decision making (e.g., Hunt and Vitell, 1986; Fritzche, 1991), there appear to be several items which explain the internal cognitive process of the decision maker (e.g., Dubinsky and Loken, 1989; Jensen and Wygant). For example, Jensen and Wygant (1990) discuss the concepts of 'self with values', 'self-regulation', and 'self-efficacy' as they relate to the individual's ethical decision-making behaviour. Similarly, Bommer et al. (1987) describe decision making as involving conceptual model formation and cognitive processes (e.g., cognitive style and personality). Table 18 provides a list of these elements in alphabetical order with their frequency of citation and their data source origin.

**Moderators of Ethical Decision Making**

The analysis of major data sources regarding the
fourth research question revealed 144 moderators of ethical decision making. The models proposed by Cavanagh et al. (1981), Dubinsky and Loken (1989), and Hitt (1990) either disregard or are extremely limited in their consideration of moderators which influence ethical decision making. In contrast, the models put forth by Bommer et al. (1987), Ferrell and Gresham (1985), Stead et al. (1990), Strong and Meyer (1992), and Trevino (1986) provide a wealth of factors which are suggested to affect ethical decision making. Similar to the elements of ethical decision making, many items identified represent semantic rather than content differences. For example, Trevino (1986) and Fritzscbe (1991) use the term 'organizational culture' whereas, Bommer et al. (1987) employ the term 'corporate culture'. The data sources revealed six different terms for organizational reward structures for ethical behaviour (item numbers 37, 64, 86, 87, 92, and 93 in Table 19) and seven different terms for persons which may influence the decision maker's ethical behaviour (item numbers 32, 72, 80, 84, 97, 103, and 112 in Table 19).

A general trend in the items suggests that
Table 18: Analysis of Primary Data Sources Related to the Elements of Ethical Decision Making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of Ethical Decision Making</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Acceptance/rejection of decision alternative. (4)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Actual consequences. (7)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Alternative. (13)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Behaviour. (5,3,7)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Cognitions (6)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Cognitive process. (8)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Conceptual model formation. (8)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Conjunctive test rule. (13)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Deontological evaluation. (7)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Deontological norms. (7)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Decision. (12)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Desirability of consequences. (7)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Engage in moral behaviour. (14)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Establish moral intent. (14)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Ethical/unethical behaviour. (6)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Ethical/unethical decision. (8)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Ethical decision. (13)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Ethical dilemma. (6)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Ethical issue. (5,11)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Ethical judgement. (7)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 18 continues)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of Ethical Decision Making</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21. Evaluation of behaviour. (5)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Individual decision making. (5)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Intentions. (7)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Internal and external impact of decision. (13)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Linear compensatory heuristic. (13)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Make moral judgement. (14)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Managerial behaviour and decision making. (15)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Managerial conduct regarding social. (15) responsibility.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Perceived alternatives. (7)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Perceived consequences. (7)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Perceived ethical problem. (7)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Perception of consequence and risk. (8)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Probability of consequences. (7)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Problem identification. (8)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Problem - strategic/tactical. (13)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Reason (Existenz) (11)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Recognize moral issue. (14)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Right-good decision. (11)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Self-efficacy. (12)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Self-judgement. (12)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 18 continues)
Table 18: Analysis of Primary Data Sources Related to the Elements of Ethical Decision Making Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of Ethical Decision Making</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41. Self-observation. (12)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Self-reaction. (12)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. Self-regulation. (12)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. Self with values. (12)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Teleological evaluation. (7)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. Test of justice. (4)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. Test of rights. (4)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. Test of utility. (4)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. Test of exceptions to criteria. (4)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. Test of personal commitment. (11)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. Test of organizational values. (11)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52. Test of policy and procedure. (11)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53. Test of results. (11)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the table from which the item was extracted.
groupings might be made based upon the relative influence and/or proximity of the moderator to the decision making process. For example, moderators which influence the individual's behaviour directly, such as, gender, level of moral development, and philosophical orientation, i.e., idiographic items, may compose a core set of moderators, and items which are more general in nature, such as economic, political, and societal conditions or issues, i.e., nomothetic items, may compose a more peripheral set of moderators. The moderators of ethical decision making presented in Table 19 are listed in alphabetical order with corresponding frequencies and data source origin.

The Process of Ethical Decision Making

The data sources reveal a rather narrow range of approaches to the process of ethical decision making. The models that do describe the process in some detail can be characterized generally as linear and rational. For example, they range from the prescriptive decision tree method used by Cavanagh et al. (1981) and Hunt and Vitell (1986) to the more quantitative phased heuristic decision process proposed by Fritzschke (1991). In general data suggest that the decision maker first
Table 19: Analysis of Primary Data Sources Related to the Moderators of Ethical Decision Making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moderators</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Administrative agencies</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Age</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Attitudes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Attitude toward ethical/unethical behaviour</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Authority relationships</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Behavioural beliefs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Beliefs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Belief persistence</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Biases of information</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Boundedness</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Characteristics of job</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Codes of conduct (professional)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Codes of ethics</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Competition</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Concentration of effect of consequences</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Corporate culture</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Corporate goals</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Corporate policy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Cultural environment</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Cultural values</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Decision problem - strategic/tactical</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Demographics</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Differential association</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Economic conditions</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Economic issues</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Ego strength</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Ethical decision history</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Ethical decision ideology (situationist, subjectivist, absolutist, &amp; exceptionist)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Ethical issues</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Ethical philosophy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. External constituencies: satisfactions, rights, and justice</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Experience</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Family</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Field dependence</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Group dynamics</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Humanistic values</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 19 continues)
Table 19: Analysis of Primary Data Sources Related to the
Moderators of Ethical Decision Making Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moderators</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37. Immediate job context. (7)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Incentives past and present. (12)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Individual personality. (6)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Industrial environment. (6)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Industry structure. (15)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Intelligence. (15)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. Intentions. (5)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. Intentions to engage in ethical/unethical behaviour. (9)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Internal constituencies: satisfactions, rights, and justice. (4)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. Internalized social norms. (15)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. Judicial system (8)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. Knowledge. (5)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. Laws. (15)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. Legislative agencies (8)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51. Level of ethical/intellectual development. (2)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52. Level of moral reasoning - ethic of justice. (6,8,14,15)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53. Level of moral reasoning - ethic of nonviolence. (3)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54. Licensing requirements. (8)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55. Life experiences. (8)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56. Locus of control. (7,10,15)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57. Machiavellianism. (10)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58. Magnitude of consequences. (14)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59. Managerial behaviour. (10)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60. Managerial philosophy. (10)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61. Meaning making, i.e., from proximal environment. (2)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62. Motivation mechanism. (8)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63. Motivation to comply. (9)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64. Multiple stakeholders. (10)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65. Normative beliefs. (9)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66. Normative structure. (7)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67. Past reinforcements. (10)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68. Obedience to others. (7)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69. Opportunity. (6,12)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70. Organizational code of ethics. (11)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71. Organizational culture. (7,13)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 19 continues)
Table 19: Analysis of Primary Data Sources Related to the
Moderators of Ethical Decision Making Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moderators</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>72. Organizational environment. (6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73. Organizational mission. (11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74. Organizational values. (11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75. Outcome evaluations. (9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76. Peer group. (8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77. Personal experiences. (6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78. Personal goals. (8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79. Personality. (8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80. Policy, i.e., organizational goals. (13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81. Political institutions. (10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82. Political issues. (13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83. Position/staus. (8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84. Presence of others. (12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85. Probability of effect of consequences. (14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86. Professional meetings. (8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87. Proximity of consequences. (14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88. Referent others. (5,7,9)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89. Regulations. (15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90. Reinforcement. (7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91. Reinforcement system. (10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92. Religion, i.e., socialization. (10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93. Religious values. (8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94. Responsibility for consequences. (7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95. Resolution of moral conflict. (7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96. Reward and punishment structure. (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97. Reward structure. (13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98. Risk adversity. (15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99. Role-set configuration. (5,13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100. Role taking. (7)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101. Scarce resources (internal &amp; external). (10)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102. Selective perceptual filtering. (8)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103. Self-concept. (8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104. Sense of community. (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105. Sex roles, i.e., socialization. (10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106. Significant others. (10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107. Socialization process. (14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108. Social consensus of consequences. (14)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109. Social environment. (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 19 continues)
Table 19: Analysis of Primary Data Sources Related to the
Moderators of Ethical Decision Making Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moderators</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>110. Social institutions. (10)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111. Social issues. (13)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112. Societal expectations. (3)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113. Societal norms. (3,15)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114. Societal values. (3, 8)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115. Stakeholders internal and external. (13)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116. Stated policy. (8)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117. Status and relationships. (5)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118. Subjective norms toward ethical/unethical behaviour. (9)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119. Support for risk taking. (2)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120. Surveillance. (12)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121. Technological issues. (13)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122. Temporal immediacy of consequences. (14)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123. Values. (5,13,15)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124. Work experience. (10)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the table from which the item was extracted.
perceives an ethical dilemma or problem as existing.

Jones (1991) contends that without this initial recognition, one's ethical schema may remain dormant. Once an ethical dilemma is recognized, the data support the view that various factors internal and external to the individual and organization will affect the manner in which s/he will assess the nature of the dilemma, weigh available alternatives, set a course of action, establish intent, and engage in ethical or unethical decision behaviour. Table 20 provides 12 statements extracted from the major data sources which describe how ethical decision making occurs in administrative contexts.

**Summary**

This chapter presented the exploration and analysis phases of the interpretative-theoretical methodology. In the exploration phase, major data sources, which included two theories of moral reasoning and 12 models of ethical decision making, were described and compared chronologically in terms of the study's five research questions. For each data source a written description and comparison and a summary table was presented. The data extracted from the
Table 20: The Process of Ethical Decision Making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The process involves a decision tree based upon the criteria of utility, rights and justice. (4)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The process involves the first order interaction between individual knowledge, significant others, and opportunity. (5)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The process involves the perception of an ethical dilemma followed by deontological and teleological evaluations of alternatives and the intervention of one’s personal intent. (6)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The process involves the interaction between individual cognitions, individual moderators, and situational moderators. (7)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The process involves the selective filtering of the ethical dilemma and environmental factors based upon one’s cognitive style and cognitive attributes. (8)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The process involves the interaction of the decision maker’s determinants of attitudes, the determinants of intentions, and the intentions to engage in ethical/unethical behaviour. (9)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The process involves the first order interactions between one’s ethical philosophy and decision ideology as influenced by ethical history, organizational, and external factors. (10)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The process involves an analysis of perceived results, congruence with policy and organizational values, and personal conviction. (11)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 20 continues)
Table 20: The Process of Ethical Decision Making Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. The process involves a sequence which begins with the decision maker's values, followed by one's self-regulation and one's self-efficacy, and the influence of situational factors and incentives. (12)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. The process involves an heuristic decision process which includes a conjunctive test and a linear compensatory heuristic. (13)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. The process involves a four component sequence comprised of issue recognition, moral judgement, moral intent, and moral behaviour. (14)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. The process involves the interaction between environmental, internal moral, and internal rational restraints resulting in a particular orientation toward corporate social responsibility. (15)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the table from which the item was extracted.
exploration phase was then analyzed in terms of the collective responses to each of the five research questions. A descriptive subsection and summary table containing frequency of item citation was presented for each research question. The following chapter presents the third of four phases of the methodology - classification. The data refined in the exploration and analysis phases will be organized into logical categories which will form the building blocks of the model.
Chapter V - Classification

Introduction

In this chapter, the third phase of the interpretative-theoretical methodology, classification, is presented. Classification involves organizing data into meaningful categories which will comprise the building blocks of the model of ethical decision making for sport organizations. Wright (1982) notes that three distinct procedures are involved in establishing categories. They are, analyzing, abstracting, and generalizing. Seven criteria were identified in the methodology chapter which guide the researcher in the selection of appropriate categories. Of these seven criteria, individual categories must adhere to emergence, internal homogeneity, conceptual power, and mutual exclusiveness. The set of categories must adhere to the criteria of external plausibility, reproducibility, and exhaustiveness. As indicated in the methodology chapter, two panels of independent expert judges were assembled to verify the researcher's classification of items pertaining to elements and moderators of ethical decision making. As a result of
the judges' classification, five of seven criteria have been met.

Internal homogeneity, referring to the similarity among items classified within a category (Guba & Lincoln, 1982; Marshall & Rossman), has been met as judges where able to identify and place similar items, arranged randomly, into single categories. Mutual exclusiveness, describing the conceptual uniqueness of categories (Guba & Lincoln, 1982; Halpin, 1958), was met as items were found not to overlap into more than one category. Exhaustiveness, referring to the ability of the categories, as a set, to accept all items (de Groot, 1969; Festinger & Katz, 1953) has been met as all items were placed into one of several initially available categories and a newly created category (as a result of the recommendations of the judges). The criterion, reproducibility (Guba & Lincoln, 1982), was met as the classification of the judges, with minor revisions, agreed with that of the researcher's. Finally, the conceptual power criterion, referring to the ability of a category to encompass a variety of items and/or sub-categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1989), was met for each of the five categories pertaining to
moderators of ethical decision making as various items, though at one level conceptually dissimilar, were placed consistently into their respective categories (e.g., cognitive level of moral development and modelling were both grouped into the individual moderator category). Regarding the category pertaining to the elements of ethical decision making, 'cognitive process', it demonstrated significant conceptual power as it provided for seven sub-categories of items.

The remaining criteria, external plausibility and emergence, were beyond the scope of the judges' task of classifying elements. External plausibility, that is, the extent to which the set of categories represents the phenomenon as a whole (Guba & Lincoln, 1982; Strauss, 1987), must be left to the researcher's subjective analysis of the data and the resultant construction of the theoretical model. The emergence criterion is equally subjective as the researcher, having observed the data, developed, intuitively, the category constructs to be employed in the study (Glasser & Strauss, 1967).

The following classification of data into
categories is the result of the researcher's initial classification and the minor modification as recommended by the judges. Each of the following subsections corresponds to one of the five research questions.

**The Purpose of Ethical Decision Making**

The analysis of the purposes of ethical decision making reveals that theorists perceive essentially one primary goal for ethical behaviour - the general performance enhancement of the organization. This dominant goal may be subdivided into two categories: organizational utility and member utility. The first category, organizational utility, refers to the perception that organizations which foster ethical behaviour, i.e., in their ethical culture and climate, will be better long-range performers than those which do not foster nomothetic ethics. For example, Hitt (1990) suggests that the purpose of ethical decision making is to create an ethical organizational climate, to establish trust in the organization, and to foster long term organizational success.

The second category, member utility, focuses upon the individual's ethical behaviour and considers that
those who behave ethically in organizational contexts will make better organizational decisions, will be more productive employees, will cause the organization fewer ethical and legal difficulties, and will enhance the organizational climate in terms of trust and good will. Hunt and Vitell (1986) describe the purpose of ethical decision making as reducing poor performance and turnover due to the anxiety, frustration, and tension of troubling ethical dilemmas. Cavanagh et al. (1981) suggests that the purpose is to lead individuals to assume responsibility for their political behaviour decisions. Table 21 presents the two categories of purpose of ethical decision making and the corresponding statements of purpose.

**The Theoretical Foundations of Ethical Decision Making**

The data describing the theoretical foundation of ethical decision making may be placed logically into two categories - psychological and philosophical. The psychological category consists of a disparate set of theories from both the behavioural and the cognitive structural schools of psychological thought (e.g., stages of moral development, morality of nonviolence, reasoned action, differential association). The
Table 21: Categories of the Purpose of Ethical Decision Making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Statements of Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Utility.</td>
<td>To avoid moral decay in the organization. (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To create an ethical organizational climate. (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To establish trust in the organization. (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To foster long term organizational success. (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To protect the organization and its clientele from deleterious effects of unethical behaviour. (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To reduce ethical uncertainty surrounding the political use of power in organizations. (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Utility.</td>
<td>To enhance managerial performance and organizational effectiveness. (5,7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To lead individuals to assume responsibility for their political behaviour decisions. (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To make ethically right and economically good decisions. (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To reduce poor performance and turnover due to the anxiety, frustration, and tension of troubling ethical dilemmas. (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the table from which the item was extracted.
behavioural influences are ubiquitous in the models of ethical decision making, with the exception Cavanagh et al., (1981) and Hitt (1990), as each identifies external factors which play a role in modifying or influencing the decision maker's behaviour. While the cognitive structural influence on the models of ethical decision making is dominated by Kohlberg's (1969, 1970, 1981) work (e.g., Bommer et al., 1987; Jones, 1991; Strong & Meyer, 1992; Trevino, 1986), the psychological category includes the contributions of Rest's (1986) Four Component Model, Perry's (1970) intellectual and ethical development model, and the feminine perspective of morality by Gilligan (1977). As a result of this rather obvious dichotomy in terms of psychological approaches, two subcategories are proposed which will include behavioural underpinnings and cognitive structural underpinnings.

The philosophical category is similarly disparate and includes the ethics of teleology (utilitarianism, contextual pragmatism), deontology, (rights, justice, intuitionism, social contract), and existentialism. Those models that have a philosophical theoretical foundation focus on deontological and teleological approaches (e.g., Cavanagh, et al., 1981; Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Stead et al., 1990; Hunt & Vitell, 1986). Hitt (1990), by employing, in addition to
deontology and teleology, existential theory, contributes the most comprehensive model in terms of philosophical foundations. Table 22 presents the categories for theoretical foundations of ethical decision making.

**Elements of Ethical Decision Making**

The result of the classification of elements of ethical decision making by the researcher and the panel of expert judges was the organization of data into the following seven sub-categories: the ethical issue, alternative generation, ethical evaluation of alternatives, ethical decision, intention to behave ethically, overt ethical/unethical behaviour, ethical evaluation of decision behaviour. These sub-categories were subsumed by a broad category, termed, 'cognitive process', which describes items concerning the internal mental activity involved in each stage of the decision process. A discussion of each sub-category and the main category, cognitive process, will follow.

**Recognition of Ethical Dilemma.** This sub-category, though containing only one item (existing in six of 14 data sources - items 18, 19, 31, 34, 35, and 37 in Table 18), describes the initial identification of the ethical issue or the identification of an issue as having an ethical nature. The recognition of an issue as having ethical dimensions is necessary in
Table 22: Categories of the Theoretical Foundations of Ethical Decision Making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Theories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Psychological</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Structural</td>
<td>Stages of moral reasoning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7,8,14,15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intellectual and ethical development. (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morality of nonviolence. (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social cognition theory. (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Four Component model (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural</td>
<td>Reasoned action theory. (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social-cognitive theory. (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Behavioural theory (5,6,8,12,13,15) (Differential association theory, Role-set theory).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philosophical</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teleology</td>
<td>Utilitarianism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4,5,6,10,11,13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contextual pragmatism. (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deontology</td>
<td>Deontology (6,11,13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rights. (4,5,10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Justice. (4,5,10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intuitionism. (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social contract. (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existentialism.</td>
<td>Encompassing theory. (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Existentialism. (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the table from which the item was extracted.
order for the decision maker to implement, what Fiske and Taylor (1984) described as one’s event schemata, i.e., a particular cognitive structure or script which enables the decision maker to view a particular situation through an ethical lens. Jones (1991) states that "the recognition of moral issues triggers schemata that are relevant to moral issues, that is, the moral decision-making process (event) and the moral decision maker (role)" (p. 383). If a decision maker does not recognize the ethical nature of a problem or dilemma, s/he cannot employ his or her ethical schema and may make a decision in an amoral fashion.

**Alternative Generation.** Once a problem is identified, the next stage of the process is to develop possible resolutions. This second sub-category contains two items, alternatives and perceived alternatives (items 3 and 29 in Table 18), found in two models (Fritzsche, 1991; Hunt & Vitell, 1986), which refer to the creation of possible answers to the ethical dilemma. As mentioned above, the decision maker’s ethical schema guides the development of ethical alternatives for the problem. The quality and quantity of information selected depends upon the
variety of moderators impacting upon the decision
maker, e.g., the individual’s bounded rationality or
selective perceptual filtering (Bommer et al. 1987).
Though only two items are contained in this sub-
category and only two models explicitly discussed the
notion of alternative generation as a distinct element,
it is generally accepted as an essential component of a
decision-making model.

**Ethical Evaluation of Alternatives.** The ethical
evaluation of alternatives is the third sub-category of
elements of ethical decision making. This category
contains a much richer assortment of items than the
former two categories. Sixteen items were identified
from four models (Cavanagh et al., 1981; Fritzschke,
1991; Hitt, 1990; Hunt & Vitell, 1987), pertaining to
the criteria by which alternatives are assessed as
being ethically acceptable. Three subcategories are
identified as the evaluation of alternatives has been
generally approached from three distinct ethical
perspectives. The sub-categories are deontological,
teleological, and existential ethical criteria.

The deontological criterion refers to items which
evaluate alternatives in terms of their inherent
ethical rightness or wrongness (items 9, 10, 12, 46, 47, 51, and 52 in Table 18). Alternatives are juxtaposed with such factors as organizational policy and procedure, the organization's value structure, as well as personal beliefs in codes of conduct and universal principles. The teleological criterion identifies items which assess the consequences or results of alternatives, e.g., will an alternative result in the greatest good for the greatest number? (items 8, 25, 30, 32, 33, 45, 48, 49, and 53 in Table 18). Finally, the existential criterion, found only in Hitt (1990), refers to the evaluation of alternatives in terms of its acceptability to the decision maker's conscience, i.e., personal commitment (item 50 in Table 18). For example, Buber (1952) states that

we find the ethical in its purity only there where the human person confronts himself with his own potentiality and decides in this confrontation without asking anything other than what is right and what is wrong in this his own situation. (p. 95)

**Ethical Decision.** The fourth sub-category pertains to items concerning the selection of an ideal
resolution to the ethical dilemma. Four items have been classified in this category (items 1, 13, 20, 26, in Table 18) from four models of ethical decision making (Cavanagh et al., 1981; Hitt, 1990; Hunt & Vitell, 1986; Jones, 1991). The decision maker, having assessed each alternative chooses one which best resolves the ethical problem. The models which contribute to this particular category may be described as prescriptive in nature as they suggest a means to reach the ethical solution to the problem. The remaining models are more explanatory in nature as they describe the process and/or factors which result in either ethical or unethical behaviour (e.g., Bommer et al., 1987; Dubinsky & Loken, 1989, Jensen & Wygant, 1990; Trevino, 1986). Items in this category refer, not to the actual decision behaviour but rather to the recognition of what the 'right' behaviour ought to be.

**Intention to Behave Ethically.** The fifth sub-category pertains to the intent of the decision maker to make an ethical decision (items 14 and 23 in Table 18). In the previous sub-category, the decision maker determines what the right behaviour ought to be, in this sub-category, items found in two models (Dubinsky
& Loken, 1989; Hunt & Vitell, 1986), reflect the motivation and/or probability to act upon what is perceived to be the ethical decision, i.e., intent. For example, an individual may understand what decision ought to be made, yet intend to choose another course of action. Conversely, an individual may intend to implement the chosen resolution, yet, because of a variety of moderators, may be unable to do so. For example, Hunt and Vitell (1986) state that "an individual may perceive a particular alternative as the most ethical alternative and, nevertheless, intend to choose another alternative because of certain preferred consequences" (p. 10). Dubinsky and Loken (1989) interpret the concept of intent in a similar manner as do Hunt and Vitell (1986) when they define intent as "the individual's subjective probability that he or she will engage in the behaviour" (p. 85).

Overt Ethical/Unethical Behaviour. The sixth sub-category describes the actual behaviour of the decision maker (items 4, 11, 15, 16, 17, 22, and 28 in Table 18). Following the determination of what is perceived to be the ethically right decision and recognizing the individual's intent to act upon the choice or to reject
it, the individual will demonstrate some form of behaviour, be it ethical or unethical. Jensen and Wygant (1990) describe the decision maker’s overt behaviour as the result of one’s self-examination, i.e., what s/he should do, what s/he ought to do, and what s/he can do, and the impact of situational elements and past and present incentives. Trevino (1986) suggests that the decision maker’s ethical/unethical behaviour is the result of the interaction of his/her cognitive level of moral development and individual and situational moderators.

**Ethical Evaluation of Behaviour.** The final sub-category of elements of the ethical decision-making process describes the evaluation of the individual’s overt decision behaviour (items 2, 21, and 24 in Table 18). Fritzsche (1991) uses the term, ‘internal and external impact’ to refer to the evaluation of the decision’s effect upon the organization and upon its external and future constituencies. Each of the sub-categories of the elements of ethical decision making and their corresponding items are presented in Table 23.
Table 23: Sub-categories of the Elements of Ethical Decision Making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-categories</th>
<th>Elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recognition of ethical dilemma.</td>
<td>Ethical issue/problem/dilemma. (18,19,31,34,35,37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Generation.</td>
<td>Alternatives. (3) Perceived alternatives. (29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 23 continues)
Table 23: Sub-categories of the Elements of Ethical Decision Making Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-categories</th>
<th>Elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intention to Behave Ethically.</td>
<td>Establish moral intent. (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intentions. (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overt Ethical/unethical Behaviour.</td>
<td>Decision. (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethical/unethical behaviour. (4, 15, 16, 17, 28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual decision making. (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical Evaluation of Behaviour.</td>
<td>Evaluation of behaviour. (2, 21, 24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the items found in Table 18.
Cognitive Process. This category of elements of ethical decision making, which subsumes the seven subcategories, contains items which refer to the internal cognitive processes which occur throughout ethical decision making (items 5, 6, 7, 27, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, and 44 in Table 23). These items identify the way in which the decision maker may approach, cognitively, the various stages of ethical decision making, e.g., problem identification or alternative selection. For example, one item proposed by Bommer et al. (1987), conceptual model formation, suggests that, in an attempt to manage the complexity and volume of information, decision makers create simplified models as internal representations of the decision situation. They also suggest that the individual's cognitive process, that is, his/her decision style and personality, will influence the decision behaviour generally. Jensen and Wygant (1990) describes the internal cognitive process as consisting of three stages, self with values, self-regulation (comprised of self-observation, self-judgement, and self-reaction), and self-efficacy. Items contained in the cognitive process category are presented in Table 24.
Table 24: Category of the Cognitive Process of Ethical Decision Making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Process.</td>
<td>Cognitions. (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cognitive process. (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conceptual model formation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-efficacy. (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-judgement. (39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-observation. (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-reaction. (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-reaction. (42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self with values. (43)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the items found in Table 18.
Moderators of Ethical Decision Making

The analysis of data, guided by the fourth research question, resulted in the identification of five categories of moderators: external factors, situational factors, significant others, ethical issue, and individual factors. The researcher’s classification of items into categories was compared with that of the independent judges’ classification. Among the data sources there exists a varied emphasis upon the influence of various moderators of ethical decision making. Hitt (1990), for example, does not discuss the moderators of decision making, whereas Bommer et al. (1987) catalogue 23 factors which have a role to play in ethical behaviour. Cavanagh et al. (1981) restrict their moderators to the constituencies of the organization, yet Fritzsche (1991) includes societal, technical, political, economic, and ethical issues as partial determinants of ethical or unethical behaviour. The resulting categories from the analysis phase and the accompanying set of items are presented in Tables 25 to 30.

External Moderators. Twenty-seven items were classified into this category which represents the factors external to the individual and to the organization that may influence the decision maker’s ethical decision making behaviour. Four sub-categories
were identified. They are societal factors, economic factors, political factors, and technological factors.

Societal factors are concerned with the development and maintenance of normative standards of behaviour which are condoned by society at large (items 19, 20, 29, 36, 61, 92, 104, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 119 in Table 19). Ten of 14 models included societal factors as salient regarding the decision maker’s ethical behaviour. Decisions which transgress societal and/or cultural mores, are subject to dispute. Decisions are not only compared to general and traditional societal expectations, they are also influenced by proactive societal pressures, e.g., Green Peace and Friends of the Earth. Factors included in this sub-category are community support, cultural environment, cultural values, society’s humanistic values, the process of socialization, society’s consensus on the ethical nature of issues, the social environment, social institutions, social issues, societal expectations, societal norms, and societal values.

Economic factors refer to the economic issues and conditions, the relative intraorganizational
competition, e.g., for funding, market shares, clientele, and scarce resources which the decision maker must contend with as an operative in an organizationally open system (items 14, 24, 25, and 101 in Table 19). Only three models discussed economic factors (Fritzsche, 1991; Stead et al., 1990; Strong & Meyer, 1992). Fritzsche (1991) states that longer term criteria [i.e., long-term profitability] tend to correlate more closely with ethical decisions...organizations utilizing get-rich-quick schemes are not in business long enough to be concerned with the impact of their actions upon customers or society. (p. 487).

Political factors, included in four models (Bommer et al., 1987; Fritzsche, 1991; Stead et al., 1990; Strong & Meyer, 1992) consider the political issues, institutions, governmental and legal environments which may play a role in influencing the decision maker's ethical behaviour (items 1, 47, 49, 50, 81, and 82 in Table 19). Bommer et al. (1987), referring to governmental and legal environments, contend that managers are likely to factor the legality/illegality
of their action into their decision making behaviour not only from their fear of the legal repercussions but also from the fear of the social stigma of being a law-breaking company.

Finally, technical factors may influence the decision maker's behaviour insofar as the individual may be faced with pressures unique to the organization's technological climate, e.g., Japanese management practices in the North American auto industry (items 40, 41, 54, and 121 in Table 19). The manager may also, as Hunt and Vitell (1986) point out, be influenced by what the industrial climate determines as ethical practices. Technical factors were part of four models of ethical decision making (Bommer et al., 1987; Fritzsche, 1991; Hunt & Vitell, 1986; Strong & Meyer, 1992). External factors, sub-categories, and related items are presented in Table 25.

Situational Moderators. Situational moderators are those influencers which are particular to the context of the decision maker's organization. Three
Table 25: Categories of the External Moderators of Ethical Decision Making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Societal Factors</th>
<th>Economic Factors</th>
<th>Political Factors</th>
<th>Technological Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community support. (61,104,119)</td>
<td>Competition. (14)</td>
<td>Administrative agencies. (1)</td>
<td>Industrial environment. (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural environment. (19)</td>
<td>Economic conditions. (24)</td>
<td>Judicial system. (47)</td>
<td>Industry structure. (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural values. (20)</td>
<td>Economic issues. (25)</td>
<td>Laws. (49)</td>
<td>Licensing requirements (54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical issues. (29)</td>
<td>Scarce resources. (101)</td>
<td>Legislative agencies. (50)</td>
<td>Technological issues. (121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanistic values. (36)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political institutions. (81)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious values. (92)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political issues. (82)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social consensus of consequences. (108)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social environment. (109)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social institutions. (110)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social issues. (111)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal expectations. (112)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 25 continues)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Societal Factors</th>
<th>Economic Factors</th>
<th>Political Factors</th>
<th>Technological Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Societal values. (114)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal norms. (113)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the items found in Table 19.
sub-categories, containing 35 items, have been identified which refine the data concerning interorganizational ethical behaviour: ideology, culture, and climate. Ideology refers to items which reflect the organization's 'raison d'être' - its purpose. Three items were classified in this sub-category: corporate goals, managerial philosophy, and organizational mission (items 17, 60, and 73 in Table 19). The organization's ideology, depending upon the extent to which it is articulated and understood, may guide the individual's ethical decision behaviour.

Stead et al. (1990) state that "the philosophies of top managers as well as immediate supervisors represent a critical organizational factor influencing the ethical behaviour of employees" (p. 235).

The culture of the organization refers to the internal shared norms, values, beliefs, attitudes, myths, ceremonies, and basic assumptions regarding how members are to behave within the context of organizational member qua organizational member (items 12, 13, 16, 18, 66, 70, 71, 74, 80, 86, and 116 in Table 19). Data sources were generally consistent in their description of organizational culture. For
example, Fritzche (1991) states that "culture in our model serves as the glue binding the organization together in common identity and actions. It influences the thoughts and feelings of the decision-maker and provides a guide for behavior" (p. 844).

Climate is the third sub-category of situational moderators. It refers to the means through which organizational culture is developed and maintained (items 11, 37, 38, 59, 67, 69, 72, 83, 90, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 107, and 117 in Table 19). Eight of 14 models suggested that various climate items influence ethical behaviour (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Fritzche, 1991; Hunt & Vitell, 1986; Jensen & Wygant, 1990; Jones, 1991; Stead et al., 1990; Trevino, 1986). The most frequently cited item by data sources was the reward structure of the organization (items 38, 67, 90, 91, 96, and 97 in Table 19). There is general agreement with Trevino (1986) who states that "an organization can influence the ethical/unethical behaviour of its members through specific rewards and punishments for ethical/unethical behaviour" (p. 613). Stead et al. (1990) suggest that "if ethical behaviour is desired, the performance measurement, appraisal and
reward systems must be modified to account for ethical behavior" (p. 236). While explicit reinforcement may contribute to ethical/unethical behaviour, Jones (1991) argues that implicit reinforcement, in terms of the organizational socialization process, may also influence the decision maker’s behaviour. Situational moderators, sub-categories, and related items are presented below in Table 26.

Significant Other Moderators. Significant others pertains to a category, containing 12 items, which relates to the interpersonal relationships which the decision maker has with others. Items have been organized into three sub-categories of relationships: interorganizational, extraorganizational, and personal.

Items pertaining to interorganizational relationships include the notion of differential association which posits that one’s ethical behaviour is influenced by the organizational distance and location, and the frequency of interaction with one’s referent others (items 5, 23, 35, 45, 84, and 115 in Table 19). The underlying assumption of differential association, incorporated by Ferrell and Gresham (1985) and Fritzscbe (1991), is that ethical/unethical
Table 26: Categories of the Situational Moderators of Ethical Decision Making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Climate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corporate goals. (17)</td>
<td>Code of conduct. (12)</td>
<td>Immediate job context. (11, 37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial philosophy. (60)</td>
<td>Code of ethics. (13, 70)</td>
<td>Managerial behaviour. (59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational mission. (73)</td>
<td>Corporate policy. (18, 80, 116)</td>
<td>Opportunity. (69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Normative structure. (66)</td>
<td>Organization environment. (72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional meetings. (86)</td>
<td>Regulations. (89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational culture. (16, 71)</td>
<td>Resolution of moral conflicts. (95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational values. (74)</td>
<td>Reward and punishment structure. (38, 67, 90, 91, 96, 97)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 26 continues)
Table 26: Categories of the Situational Moderators of Ethical Decision Making Continues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situational Moderators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role-set configuration. (99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role taking. (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarce resources (internal). (101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization process. (107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status. (83,117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance. (120)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the items found in Table 19.
behaviour is a learned behaviour from referent others. In addition, the authority relationships sanctioned by the organization, the relationships developed among the work group, and the presence of others may have an effect upon the ethical decision making behaviour of the individual (Jensen & Wygant, 1990; Jones, 1991). External relationships refer to the influence which various constituencies or multiple stakeholders have upon the decision maker, e.g., shareholders, trustees, clientele, lobbyists (items 31, 64, and 115 in Table 19). Stead et al. (1990) note that stakeholders may influence the decision maker not only toward ethical decisions but also toward unethical behaviour. Cavanagh et al. (1981) propose that the decision maker must be cognizant of the relative satisfactions, of the rights, and of the canons of justice of the organization’s constituents.

The third sub-category contains items which involve the personal relationships which one has with one’s family, friends, and peer group (items 33, 76, 88, and 106 in Table 19). Stead et al. (1990), Jensen and Wygant (1990), and Dubinsky and Loken (1989) argue that one’s personal relationships play a critical role
in developing, through the behavioural concept of modelling, the decision maker's ethical/unethical behaviour. The category, significant others, its sub-categories, and related items are found below in Table 27.

**Issue Specific Moderators.** This category of moderators refers to items identifying the nature of the ethical issue. Eight items are included in this category which describe how the relative intensity of the moral issue at hand may, to a greater or lesser extent, influence the decision maker's ethical behaviour (items 15, 21, 58, 85, 87, 94, 108, and 122 in Table 19). The items in this category are predominantly from Jones (1991) who suggested that the decision maker's ethical behaviour is influenced by the moral intensity of the issue to be resolved. He proposes that "issues of high moral intensity will elicit more sophisticated moral reasoning (higher levels of cognitive moral development) than will issues of low moral intensity" (p. 385). Fritzche (1991) suggests that the nature of the issue can be described in terms of strategic, i.e., upper level management, or tactical, i.e., lower level management problems. For
Table 27: Categories of Significant Other Moderators of Ethical Decision Making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interorganizational</th>
<th>Extraorganizational</th>
<th>Personal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authority relationships. (5)</td>
<td>External constituencies. (31,115)</td>
<td>Family. (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differential association. (23)</td>
<td>Multiple stakeholders. (64)</td>
<td>Peers. (76,88,106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group dynamics. (35)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal constituencies. (45,115)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of others. (84)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the items found in Table 19.
example, strategic issues that are resolved unethically have a more deleterious impact upon the organization than do tactical issues resolved unethically. This category and the related items are found in Table 28.

**Individual Moderators.** Individual moderators include those items which provide the internal building blocks for the decision maker’s ethical schemata. Forty-four items have been classified into three sub-categories: philosophical factors, psychological factors, and demographic factors. Philosophical factors are concerned with the content of one’s ethical orientation (items 27, 28, 30, 48, 93, and 123 in Table 19). Of the three models which describe the individual’s philosophical stance (Bommer et al., 1987; Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Stead et al., 1990), Stead et al. (1990) provide the most comprehensive description of the philosophical make-up of the decision maker in terms of ethical decision history, ethical decision ideology, and ethical philosophy. Other models discuss the individual’s philosophical orientation in more general terms, such as knowledge (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985), and values (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Fritzscbe, 1991). Fritzscbe (1991) is the only theorist among the
Table 28: Categories of Issue Specific Moderators of Ethical Decision Making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Specific Modifiers</th>
<th>(   )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concentration of effect</td>
<td>(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision problem - strategic or tactical</td>
<td>(21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnitude of consequence</td>
<td>(58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of effect of consequence</td>
<td>(85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity of consequence</td>
<td>(87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility for consequence</td>
<td>(94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social consensus of consequence</td>
<td>(109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporal immediacy of consequence</td>
<td>(122,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the items found in Table 19.
data sources who discusses values in terms of
deontological and teleological theory.

Psychological factors refer to items which
describe the means by which one acquires and maintains
his or her ethical orientation (items 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 26, 32, 34, 39, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48, 51, 52, 53, 55,
56, 57, 62, 63, 65, 68, 75, 77, 78, 79, 98, 102, 103,
105, 118, and 124 in Table 19). This sub-category is
by far the richest in terms of quantity and diversity
of items. One of the central concepts of this sub-
category is cognitive moral development which is a
component of six of 14 models of ethical decision
making (Bommer et al., 1987; Gilligan, 1977; Hunt &
Vitell, 1986; Jones, 1991; Perry, 1970; Strong & Meyer,
1992; Trevino, 1986). Of the cognitive approaches, it
is the work of Gilligan (1977) which alone addresses
directly the feminine perspective of moral development.
Trevino (1986) suggests that an individual’s ethical
behaviour is, in addition to situational moderators, a
function of one’s locus of control, field dependence,
and ego strength. Similarly, Stead et al. (1990)
include ego strength, locus of control, and
machiavellianism in their model. Strong and Meyer
(1992), though providing only a limited description of
psychological items, propose a variety of factors which
influence ethical behaviour. These items include:
beliefs, belief persistence, biases of information, boundedness, internalized social norms, locus of control, and personal experience.

The final sub-category refers to demographic factors (items 2 and 22 in Table 19). Only two data sources made explicit reference to the impact of demographic variables to decision making behaviour (Bommer et al., 1987; Stead et al., 1990). Individual factors, sub-categories, and related items are found in Table 29.

**Process of Ethical Decision Making**

The analysis of data sources resulted in the identification of essentially one process of decision making - a rational, linear, and open approach. Though 12 of 14 models included some aspect of decision process, only three discussed the phenomenon in detail (Bommer et al., 1987; Fritzsche, 1991; Hunt & Vitell, 1986). Each of these three models suggest that decisions are the result of a rational methodology which includes problem identification, alternative generation, selection of the preferred alternative and the implementation of the process alternative. The models describe this rational decision process as being
Table 29: Categories of Individual Moderator of Ethical Decision Making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Moderators</th>
<th>Psychological</th>
<th>Demographics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philosophical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical decision</td>
<td>Attitude. (3,4)</td>
<td>Age. (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>history. (27)</td>
<td>Behavioural</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical decision</td>
<td>Belief persistence. (8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ideology. (28)</td>
<td>Biases of information. (9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical philosophy. (30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge. (48)</td>
<td>Boundedness. (10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious values. (93)</td>
<td>Ego strength. (26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values. (123)</td>
<td>Experience (32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Field dependence. (34)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual personality. (39,79)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence. (42)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intentions. (43,44)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internalized social norms. (46)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knowledge. (48)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level of intellectual and ethical development. (51)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 29 continues)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophical</th>
<th>Psychological</th>
<th>Demographic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level of moral reasoning - justice. (52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level of moral reasoning - nonviolence. (53)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Life experience. (55,77)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Locus of control. (56)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Machiavellianism. (57)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motivation mechanisms. (62,63)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Normative beliefs. (65,118)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obedience to others. (68)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outcome evaluations. (75)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal goals. (78)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk adversity. (98)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table 29 continues)
Table 29: Categories of Individual Moderators of Ethical Decision Making Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Moderators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philosophical</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective perceptual filtering. (102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-concept (103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex roles. (105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work experience (124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Psychological</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the items found in Table 19.
influenced, to a greater or lesser extent, by a variety of individual, internal and external factors. For example, Bommer et al. (1987) suggests that given the limitation of our information-processing capacities, "managers tend to select information [i.e., from the internal and external environment] and process it in a sequential manner. What we select depends upon our internal representation of the problem situation" (p. 276). Similarly, Fritzche (1991) contends that "the type of interaction which occurs likely depends upon the composition and strength of the decision maker’s personal values as well as the strength and nature of the organizational mediating factors" (p. 850). As a result of the relative uniformity of process in ethical decision-making models, only one category, termed 'open-rational decision process', is proposed in response to the fifth and final research question. Table 30 contains 12 general statements of decision process from the data sources.

Summary

This chapter has presented the classification of data extracted from the major data sources related to ethical decision making. The classification phase
Table 30: Category of the Process of Ethical Decision Making.

Open-rational Decision-Making Process

The process involves a decision tree based upon the criteria of utility, rights, and justice. (4)

The process involves the first order interaction between individual knowledge, significant others, and opportunity. (5)

The process involves the perception of an ethical dilemma followed by deontological and teleological evaluations of alternatives and the intervention of one's personal intent. (6)

The process involves the interaction between individual cognitions, individual moderators, and situational moderators. (7)

The process involves the selective filtering of the ethical dilemma and environmental factors based upon one's cognitive style and cognitive attributes. (8)

The process involves the interaction of the decision maker's determinants of attitudes, determinants of intentions, and the intention to engage in ethical/unethical behaviour. (9)

The process involves the first order interactions between one's ethical philosophy and decision ideology as influenced by ethical history, organizational, and external factors. (10)

The process involves an analysis of perceived results, congruence with policy and organizational values, and personal conviction. (11)

The process involves a sequence which begins with the decision maker's values, followed by one's self-regulation and one's self-efficacy, and the influence of situational factors and incentives. (12)

(Table 30 continues)
Table 30: Category of the Process of Ethical Decision Making Continued.

Open-rational Decision-Making Process

The process involves an heuristic decision process which includes a conjunctive test and a linear compensatory heuristic. (13)

The process involves a four component sequence comprised of issue recognition, moral judgement, moral intent, and moral behaviour. (14)

The process involves the interaction between environmental, internal moral, and internal rational restraints resulting in a particular orientation toward corporate social responsibility. (15)

Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to the table from which the item was extracted.
involved the organization of data by the researcher and by a panel of judges into meaningful categories which will form the building blocks of the theoretical model to be constructed in the final phase of the interpretative-theoretical methodology to be presented in the following chapter. Table 31 provides a summary of categories developed in this chapter.
### Table 31: Summary of Categories of Ethical Decision Making.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Question</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the purpose of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Organizational Utility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member Utility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What is the theoretical foundation of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Philosophical: Teleology, Deontology, Existentialism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Psychological: Behavioural Theory, Cognitive Structural Theory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What are the elements of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Recognition of ethical dilemma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alternative generation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethical evaluation of alternatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethical decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intention to behave ethically.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overt ethical/unethical behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethical evaluation of behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What are the moderators of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>External moderators: Societal factors, economic factors, political factors, technical factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Situational moderators: Ideology, culture, climate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant other moderators: Interorganizational, extraorganizational, personal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Issue specific moderators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual moderators: philosophical, psychological, demographic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. What is the process of ethical decision making?</td>
<td>Open-rational decision process.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter VI - Explanation

**Introduction**

In this chapter the explanatory phase of the interpretative-theoretical methodology is presented. The categories developed from exploration, analysis, and classification phases form the essential components of the model of ethical decision making to be explained in this final phase.

The model identifies seven stages which make up the ethical decision-making process and five general moderators or factors which may influence the decision maker's approach to this process. A sub-section will be devoted to a discussion of each moderator and each stage of the ethical decision making process. The final section discusses the composite model.

**Moderators of Ethical Decision Making**

The model posits that moderators may influence ethical decision making in three fundamental ways. First, these moderators may affect the extent to which an ethical issue is recognized; second, the moderators may affect the content and form of the individual's ethical orientation; and third, the moderators may
affect the ethical decision-making process itself. The model contains five general categories of moderators presented as layers surrounding the ethical decision-making process. They are: individual, issue specific, significant other, situational, and external moderators. The latter four moderators will be referred to periodically as exogenous variables.

**Individual Moderators.** The first layer surrounding the ethical decision-making process contains the individual's philosophical orientation, psychological development, and demographic profile. The decision maker's philosophical orientation and accompanying value structure affects, in a profound manner, the way in which the individual views the ethical decision-making phenomenon as a whole - from the recognition of the ethical issue to the evaluation of the overt decision. In order to describe these varying philosophical positions, decision-making archetypes, i.e., idealized prototypes, will be used.

The archetypal deontologist will base his/her decision-making behaviour upon the adherence to principles, policies and procedures, and rules. The deontological archetype will ignore all exogenous
variables in favour of abiding by established and/or intuitively based principles of ethical behaviour. In contrast, the teleological archetype attempts to assess all exogenous variables in order to ensure that his/her ethical decision-making behaviour meets the teleological metavalue of effectiveness and efficiency for himself/herself (hedonism) or for the collective (utilitarianism). The existential archetype approaches ethical decision making from a highly personalistic perspective, valuing the notions of free will and responsibility for oneself and others. It is the existentialist alone who accepts the full weight of responsibility for all decisions, relying on neither policy nor deterministic exogenous factors to assist in making the decision.

From the psychological perspective, the model presents the individual’s cognitive level of moral reasoning as a fundamental component of ethical decision making. The model contains both masculine and feminine orientations to cognitive moral development which represent the underlying themes of justice and nonviolence or caring respectively. The decision maker’s relative level of moral development will
determine to what extent the individual accepts and or internalizes the various exogenous moderators. For example, the individual functioning from either Gilligan’s (1977) or Kohlberg’s (1969) convention level of moral development will be more open to external influence than the individual functioning from a postconventional level of nonviolence or justice.

The level of moral development will influence other psychological factors, such as, the individual’s locus of control, field dependence, motivation mechanisms, obedience to others, self-concept, ego strength, and machiavellianism, which will, in a profound way, influence ethical decision-making behaviour.

Finally, the model identifies demographic factors as variables which may influence the individual’s ethical decision-making behaviour. Factors such as age, gender, and education are intimately related to the development of one’s ability to reason morally from the behavioural and the from the cognitive structural perspectives. Figure 4 represents a schematic of the effect of individual moderators upon the process of ethical decision making.
Figure 4: Individual moderators affecting the ethical decision-making process.

Ph - Philosophy
Ps - Psychology
D - Demography

Note: Citation frequency indicated in parentheses
**Issue Specific Moderators.** Issue specific moderators refer to the characteristics of the identified dilemma and form the second layer of moderators. The model presents factors relating to the relative intensity (e.g., the proximity, magnitude, consensus, concentration, immediacy of the ethical issue) and strategic and tactical significance of the issue as potentially influencing the decision maker to attend more closely to the issue or to modify his/her behaviour to suit the perceived demands of the ethical dilemma. For example, an issue deemed, by the decision maker, to be ethically intensive and organizationally strategic may result in a behaviour significantly different, in method and content, than one perceived to be ethically neutral and organizationally moot. Figure 5 represents a schematic of the effect of issue specific moderators upon the process of ethical decision making.

**Significant Other Moderators.** The model's third layer is composed of three different cohorts of significant others, extraorganizational, interorganizational, and personal referent others, which may influence the individual's ethical decision-
Figure 5: Issue specific moderators affecting the ethical decision-making process.

I - Immediacy  R - Responsibility  IM- Individual Moderators
P - Proximity    M - Magnitude
C - Concentration  SC - Social Consensus
S - Strategic    T - Tactical

Note: Citation frequency indicated in parentheses
making behaviour in two fundamental ways. First, significant others may play a role in developing the individual's general philosophical orientation and level of psychological moral reasoning. Second, significant others may influence the actual ethical decision-making process. These individuals may affect the decision maker's general behaviour and/or his/her specific decision-making behaviour in two ways based upon behavioural theory. First, the decision maker's behaviour may be the result of his/her modelling of and/or teachings from significant others. Second, significant others may be a source of implicit and/or explicit reward and punishment for the decision maker. The support or censure from one's family, friends, co-workers, peers, and/or the wide variety of extraorganizational stakeholders may provide significant incentive to behave in a prescribed ethical or unethical manner. Figure 6 represents a schematic of the effect of significant other moderators upon the decision making process.

**Situational Moderators.** The fourth layer of moderators contains a variety of situational or organizational moderators which may effect the decision
Figure 6: Significant other moderators affecting the ethical decision-making process.

E - Extra-organizational
I - Inter-organizational
P - Personal
ISM - Issue Specific Moderators
IM - Individual Moderators

Note: Citation frequency indicated in parentheses
maker's ethical decision-making behaviour. These moderators describe the ideological or philosophical, the cultural, and the climatic context in which the individual makes ethical decisions as an agent or member qua member of the organization. Such factors as the organization's stated or unstated philosophy, the basic assumptions which guide, implicitly, organizational behaviour, the organization's code of ethics, the organization's socialization process, the decision maker's immediate job context, and the organization's reward and punishment structure may influence the individual to make decisions in an organizationally prescribed manner within an organizationally prescribed range of outcomes. Figure 7 represents a schematic of the affect of situational moderators upon the ethical decision-making process.

**External Moderators.** The final moderators which may have an impact upon the individual's ethical decision-making behaviour are those which exist outside the organizational context in the broad realms of society, of politics, of economics, and of technology. These moderators, which form the final layer of the model, may have a direct influence upon the
Figure 7: Situational moderators affecting the ethical decision-making process.

I-Ideology  SOM-Significant Other Moderators
CI-Climate    ISM-Issue Specific Moderators
Ct-Culture    IM- Individual Moderators

Note: Citation frequency indicated in parentheses
individual's decision behaviour or they may be mediated through situational, significant other, and/or issue specific moderators. For example, a particular religious orientation may override any organizational or familial obligation or loyalty to behave in a prescribed manner. Conversely, one's religious orientation may be incorporated into one's nonsecular nomothetic functioning, e.g., the acknowledged influence of the 'Medicine Wheel' upon First Nation people's perspectives of administration. Figure 8 represents a schematic of the effect of external moderators upon the decision-making process.

The Process of Ethical Decision Making

In this subsection, each of the stages of the ethical decision-making process is explained separately with a brief discussion of how the moderators may influence them. The stages of ethical decision-making process are: recognition of the ethical dilemma, generation of alternatives, ethical evaluation of alternatives, ethical decision, intention, overt ethical/unethical behaviour, and evaluation of behaviour.

Ethical decision making is, ideally, a cognitive
Figure 8: External moderators affecting the ethical decision-making process.

E - Economic
P - Political
S - Societal
T - Technical
SM - Situational Moderators
SOM - Significant Other Moderators
ISM - Issue Specific Moderators
IM - Individual Moderators

Note: Citation frequency indicated in parentheses
rather than an emotional operation (Rand, 1982). Individuals performing this cognitive activity may approach the process in general from disparate perspectives based upon their cognitive style as well as their cognitive self-examination of their moral stance and their ability to execute preferred behaviours.

Recognition of the Ethical Dilemma. The recognition of the ethical dilemma or issue is the first stage of the ethical decision-making process. In order for the decision maker to resolve the issue ethically, i.e., employ her/his event schemata, s/he must perceive it as having an ethical character. Once an issue is identified as having an ethical dimension the decision maker can then proceed through subsequent stages toward the issue's resolution.

The recognition of the ethical nature of an issue can be affected by a variety of influencing factors. External moderators which include societal, political, economic, and technological influencers, may be the basis, at a macro level, from which one determines if an issue has an ethical dimension. Situational moderators, in terms of organizational ideology,
culture, and climate may assist the decision maker in defining what is ethical or unethical at a micro level by providing the decision maker with implicit or explicit information regarding the organization's philosophy, its value orientation, its policy and procedure guidelines, and its reward and punishment structure. Significant others may also define or assist in defining for the decision maker what constitutes an ethical issue. Finally, individual moderators are perhaps the most influential factor in determining the ethical nature of an issue. The decision maker's philosophical orientation defines the ethical content of the dilemma. The deontologist identifies an issue in terms of the laws, principles, and/or rules which have been contested; the teleologist identifies an issue on the basis of its perceived consequences for the individual or for the group; the existentialist identifies an issue on the basis of its impact upon the free will and responsibility of the parties affected by the dilemma. The individual's psychological perspective identifies the decision maker's means to identify the ethical issue. The behavioural orientation points toward environmental
cues to determine the ethical nature of an issue; whereas the cognitive structural orientation refers to the individual's level of moral reasoning as a basis for ethical issue identification. Finally, the demographic make-up of the decision maker may play a role in his/her perception of the ethical nature of issues. For example, the decision maker's gender may influence his/her perception and resolution of an ethical issue, e.g., the morality of justice (Kohlberg, 1969) versus the morality of nonviolence (Gilligan, 1977).

**Generation of Alternatives.** The second stage of the model involves the generation of alternatives for the resolution of the ethical issue. Individual moderators influence the ethical content and the psychological rationale for all generated alternatives. The individual's cognitive complexity affects, to a great extent, the degree to which his/her rationality is bounded and, as a result, affects the quality and quantity of decision options. The nature of the ethical issue may influence the generation of alternatives from the pragmatic perspective of issue intensity and the relative weight of importance of the
dilemma. For example, an issue which requires immediate attention may necessitate a limited search for alternatives in contrast to an issue which is perhaps less pressing and/or less important to the decision maker or to his or her organization. Significant others may influence this stage, particularly when these individuals are invited or required members of the decision making process. Situational moderators may provide an environment for the extensive or restricted generation of alternatives in terms of perceived scarce resources of time, of technical expertise, of staff, and/or of capital. Finally, external moderators may influence the generation of alternatives by framing the general expectation of societal, political, economic, and/or technological pressures upon the individual and his/her organization to resolve a dilemma quickly or completely.

**Ethical Evaluation of Alternatives.** The model’s third stage is the evaluation of each alternative against a set of ethical criteria. The model posits that three criteria make up this set: they are the existential, the deontological, and the teleological
criteria. The model suggests that for a complete evaluation of any alternative, each of these criteria must be considered. However, based upon the pressures from the array of moderators, a focus on one criterion may result. The individual’s philosophical orientation may result in the selection of one criterion at the expense of the remaining two. Significant others, particularly interorganizational members, may pressure the individual to place emphasis upon a particular criterion to evaluate generated alternatives. The situational moderators may also influence the individual to choose a particular criterion, as the organization’s ideology, culture, and climate may underplay the importance of a comprehensive ethical evaluation. Finally, external moderators may influence the domination of a particular criterion, e.g., economic and political factors may influence the decision maker to place more emphasis upon the teleological criterion rather than the existential or deontological criterion.

**Ethical Decision.** The fourth stage of the model is the selection of the best alternative to resolve the ethical dilemma. The solution chosen is, ideally, the
one which has survived each of the ethical criteria identified in the previous stage. The decision maker must consider the extent to which each alternative has met the prescribed criteria and weigh it conceptually, i.e., through one's reason and 'existentz', and, quantitatively, through a more formal process such as a linear compensatory heuristic.

**Intention.** The fifth stage of the model is the decision maker's intention to carry out the selected decision. That the right decision is known, may or may not result in its implementation if the decision maker does not intend to carry it through. The decision maker's intention to implement the selected alternative may be significantly affected by each of the contextual moderators. The individual may not be able to implement the chosen solution, based upon his or her efficacy or upon his or her personal conflict with the 'right' decision, i.e., if it has not met the existential criterion as a result of exogenous pressure to focus upon teleological or deontological criteria. The relative intensity of the issue may compel the decision maker to implement an immediate solution that may resolve the issue temporarily yet fall short of the
ideal resolution selected in the previous phase. The influence of significant others may constrain the decision maker's ability to execute the desired solution despite his/her intention. For example, in a consensual process, the personal conviction of the decision maker may be overlooked by the group in favour of teleological or deontological concerns. Situational moderators may constrain the implementation of the ideal alternative in terms of organizational resources, i.e., organizational efficacy, and/or organizational policies and procedures which may be in conflict with the individual's existential commitment. Similarly, external moderators may place the individual's or the organizational's preferred choice in conflict with societal, political, economic, and/or technological expectancies.

**Overt Ethical/Unethical Behaviour.** The sixth phase of the ethical decision-making process is the decision maker's actual behaviour. The overt behaviour may be the preferred choice of the ethical evaluation phase or it may be another option chosen based upon exogenous influencers. Therefore, the decision may or may not be considered as ethical as the decision
maker's intentions, his/her efficacy, and/or the organization's preferences and efficacy may have disrupted the ethical decision-making process.

**Evaluation of Behaviour.** The model's final stage is the evaluation of the overt behaviour to determine if, in fact, it was the 'right' decision ethically. The behaviour must be evaluated against the ethical criteria established in stage three to determine if it has adhered to the scrutiny of existentialism, deontology, and teleology. Only the behaviour which meets these criteria may be considered a teleologically good, deontologically right, and existentially authentic ethical decision. Figure 9 represents a schematic of the model's ethical decision-making process.

**The Composite Model**

The interpretative-theoretical model of ethical decision making is composed of five levels of moderators which surround the model's core which describes the process of ethical decision making. The moderators include, from distal to proximal levels: external, situational, significant other, issue specific, and individual moderators. The moderators
Figure 9: The process of ethical decision making.
are located based upon their perceived strength of
influence. Though, there may be, for example,
occasions in which external influencers may affect the
individual’s behaviour to a greater extent than
situational or significant other moderators. Though
the moderators of the model are distinguished by
separate layers, it is proposed that they may influence
each other reciprocally. The model posits that
moderators affect, not only each other, but also each
stage of the process of ethical decision making from
issue recognition to the evaluation of the overt
decision which in turn may influence various
moderators.

The core of the model is the ethical decision-
making process. Each of the seven stages of the
process may be perceived through three distinct ethical
points of view, i.e., the teleological, the
deontological, and the existential. It is, however,
the contention of the researcher that though each stage
may be viewed through these disparate ethical eyes, the
decision maker must employ all views in order to
achieve ethically comprehensive and ideal decisions.
Such decisions can be described as ethically good
(teleologically), right (deontologically), and authentic (existentially). The model does not suggest an explicit or formal means to resolve conflict between teleological, deontological, and/or existential criteria or resultant choices. However, some philosophical and psychological writers have suggested that the more advanced positions are characteristic of the existential view whereas the less advanced positions are characteristic of the teleological approach (e.g., Barrett, 1958; Gilligan, 1977; Hodgkinson, 1991; Kohlberg, 1969; Perry, 1970).

Therefore, the model posits that a relative decision hierarchy may exist which consists of three levels in ascending order, they are the teleological level (the good), the deontological level (the right), and the existential level (the authentic). The composite interpretative-theoretical model is presented in Figure 10.

The explanation of the composite model is the final phase of the interpretative-theoretical methodology. Five research questions were developed to form the framework for the creation of the model. In the following discussion the answers to these questions
Figure 10: An Interpretative - Theoretical Model of Ethical Decision Making.

EM - External Moderators
SM - Situational Moderators
SOM - Significant Other Moderators
ISM - Issue Specific Moderators
IM - Individual Moderators

GENERATION OF ALTERNATIVES
ETHICAL DECISION
OVERETHICAL/UNETHICAL BEHAVIOUR

RECOGNITION OF THE ETHICAL DILEMMA
ETHICAL EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES
INTENTION
EVALUATION OF BEHAVIOUR

EXISTENTIALISM
DEONTOLOGY
TELEOLOGY
will be addressed in terms of the proposed model.

**Summary of Findings Related to the Research Questions**

"What is the purpose of ethical decision making?" is the first research question. The answer, based upon the responses from 14 major data sources is that ethical decision making, in an organizational context, serves to enhance the quality and quantity of production from individual members as well as the organization as a whole. Ethical decision making assists members to avoid contentious issues which hinder their performance explicitly in terms of litigation or punishment and/or implicitly in terms of the personal trauma involved in moral conflict. The organization profits through ethical decision making by enhancing the culture and climate of work as well as enhancing its reputation to multiple stakeholders.

"What are the theoretical foundations of ethical decision making?" is the second research question. The model has been developed from two general theoretical suppositions, the philosophical and the psychological. The philosophical underpinning of the model is based upon three ethical schools of thought, teleology, deontology, and existentialism.
The tripartite boxes depicting the stages of the decision-making process suggest that each stage can be viewed through each of the three ethical approaches. The model posits that each ethical position for each stage of the process must be considered to ensure ethically comprehensive decisions. The psychological foundations are based upon behavioural and cognitive structural theory. The behavioural aspect of the model is obvious by the model's inclusion of a disparate array of influencers which may affect the individual's ethical decision-making behaviour. The cognitive structural component forms the cognitive rationale for individuals holding a particular ethical stance. Included in the cognitive structural influence are the masculine and feminine perspectives of moral development.

"What are the elements of ethical decision making?" is the third research question. Fifty-seven items were organized into seven categories of elements: the recognition of the ethical issue, the generation of alternatives, the ethical evaluation of the alternatives, the selection of the issue's ideal resolution, the decision maker's intent, the overt
decision, and the ethical evaluation of the decision.

"What are the moderators of ethical decision making?" is the fourth research question. One hundred forty-four items were extracted from the major data sources to form five general categories of moderators: external, situational, significant other, issue specific, and individual moderators. The moderators are layered around the decision-making process and separated by dotted lines suggesting reciprocal influence as well as the possibility of distal layers affecting the process to a greater extent than proximal layers. The relative psychological and philosophical disposition of the individual will determine the degree to which s/he will be influenced by moderators.

"What is the process of ethical decision making?" is the fifth and final research question. The process of ethical decision making gleaned from the major data sources resembles an open rational model with an ethical underpinning. The elements extracted as a result of the third research question combine to form an 'ideal' linear process of decision making which is influenced by the individual's ethical orientation, cognitive level of reasoning, and a variety of
influencers.

**Summary**

This chapter has presented the explanation of the model which is the final stage of the interpretative-theoretical methodology. Based upon the exploration, analysis, and classification phases, conceptual building blocks and their interrelationships have been integrated into a model of ethical decision making. The seventh and final chapter of this dissertation will present a review of the study, the contribution that the interpretative-theoretical model of ethical decision making makes, and the implications the model has for research in the field of sport administration and for use by the practitioner.
Chapter VII - Summary and Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a summary and general conclusion of the study. Included are the study's contributions and its implications for research and practice. The first section of the chapter will consist of a review of the study. The second section will discuss the contributions that the model makes to the understanding of ethical decision making in organizations. The third section present the implications of the model for organizational research. The model will be applied in the fourth section through the use of a case study. The chapter is closed with a general conclusion of the dissertation.

Review of the Study

The interest in 'right' conduct in organizational contexts has increased dramatically in the last decade as the study of applied ethics has grown to include administrative behaviour. However, existing empirical and conceptual research has provided the field with only a limited theoretical foundation, philosophically and psychologically, from which to investigate the phenomenon of ethical decision making. Further, in the
particular realm of sport administration, empirical and conceptual investigations are, for all intents and purposes, non-existent. While the paucity of literature pertaining to ethics in sport administration may be, in part, explained by the relative youthfulness of the field, in the wake of blatant ethical transgression in Canadian sport, such a dearth of research in ethics is surprising. The purpose of this study was to develop a theoretical model, generic in nature, for sport organizations which incorporates comprehensive philosophical and psychological approaches to the phenomenon of ethical decision making.

The model was developed using an interpretative-theoretical methodology. This method was selected for its philosophical and technical consonancy. It requires the researcher to follow a rigorous and deliberate process which consists of four distinct phases. The first phase, exploration, establishes the framework for the study and poses the research questions which set the parameters for subsequent description, analysis, and classification of data. In this phase five research questions, which arose
logically from the literature, were juxtaposed with 14 major data sources to provide a basis for description. The second phase, analysis, systematically compared all major data sources in terms of each research questions. In this phase, citation frequency was recorded. Organizing the data into logical categories was the purpose of the classification phase. The data, which have been analyzed, were placed into categories that emerged from the investigation based upon their adherence to pre-established criteria. These categories formed the conceptual building blocks from which the model was constructed. The fourth and final phase of the methodology presented the explanation of the interpretative-theoretical model of ethical decision making.

The model and the explanation provide the answers to the questions posed in the exploration phase of the methodology. The research questions are:

1. What is the purpose of ethical decision making?
2. What are the theoretical foundations of ethical decision making?
3. What are the elements of ethical decision making?
4. What are the moderators of ethical decision making?

5. What is the process of ethical decision making?

The study concludes that ethical decision making in organizations plays an integral role in maintaining and/or enhancing the performance and productivity of individual members and the organization as a whole. Ethical decision making enables members to avoid the implicit and explicit pitfalls of unethical behaviour and provides a means to instill an organizational climate and culture of trust and long term survival.

The study demonstrates that the theoretical foundation of ethical decision making is eclectic. Philosophical foundations included teleological, deontological, and existential theories. Psychological foundations included behavioural and cognitive structural theories.

Seven categories of elements of ethical decision making emerged from the analysis and classification phases of the study. The categories include the recognition of the ethical dilemma, generation of alternatives, ethical evaluation of alternatives, ethical decision, intention, overt ethical/unethical
behaviour, and the evaluation of behaviour. The individual decision maker's approach to each element of the process is influenced to a greater or lesser extent by a variety of contextual moderators.

The study identified five categories of moderators which may influence the decision maker's approach to ethical decision making. The first moderator includes the individual's demographic, philosophical, and psychological orientation. The second moderator concerns factors which describe the nature of the issue to be resolved in terms of issue intensity and salience. Significant others is the third moderator which includes three distinct cohorts, extraorganizational, interorganizational, and personal significant or referent others. The fourth moderator describes the situational factors which may affect ethical decision making behaviour. These factor include the organization's ideology or philosophy, its culture, and its climate. The final moderator includes external or macro variables such as, political, economic, societal, and technical factors which may influence decision behaviour. Each of the moderators may influence the decision maker's behaviour directly
or indirectly, that is, they may be mediated through other moderators.

The study concludes that an individual's ethical decision making behaviour involves a seven stage process. The decision maker, in order to make ethically complete decisions, must assess each stage in terms of existential, deontological, and teleological criteria. In addition, each stage may be influenced to a greater or lesser degree, by the five categories of moderators.

**Contributions of the Study**

The purpose of model building is to clarify and extend our understanding of complex phenomenon. One of the primary contributions of this study was the extension and synthesis of philosophical and psychological theory in ethical decision making in an administrative context. The synthesis of philosophy and psychology provides the decision maker with a comprehensive view of ethical decision making in terms of its content, i.e., philosophy/ethics, and its form or process, i.e., psychological moral development.

Theories of ethics attempt to present the rationale for what we 'ought' to do. Teleologists
suggest that only the ends of our actions must be considered; deontologists recommend that the means are of primary importance; and existentialists place the content of one's decision exclusively upon the decision maker, i.e., upon his/her free will. While these theories attempt to assist us in the content of our actions, they do not explain why we hold a particular ethical perspective, i.e., the psychology of moral development.

Theories of moral development provide us with the rationale behind our choice, or lack of choice, of the content of ethical behaviour. These theories, while approaching moral development from a variety of perspectives, e.g., masculine versus feminine views, they share a common developmental sequence. The sequence, in general moves from an egocentric phase characterized by survival behaviour to a phase where the individual's actions are based upon the will of significant others to a final phase representing a more global and objective motivation for moral behaviour.

Clearly, to focus exclusively upon either the philosophical or psychological, as does the existing literature, will result in an incomplete understanding
of ethical decision making. The contribution of this theoretical model is that it not only integrates philosophical and psychological theories, it also provides comprehensive perspectives of both ethics and moral development. For example, the model incorporates existential, deontological, and teleological schools of ethical thought with masculine and feminine perspectives of psychological moral development.

A second contribution of this study is the introduction of the feminine perspective of moral development as an essential component to the conceptual understanding of ethical decision making in organizational contexts. Earlier models have been dominated by the masculine view of moral development primarily in terms of Kohlberg’s (1969) work. As ethical decision making in administrative contexts is not limited to the male population it is necessary, in a comprehensive model, to incorporate the feminine view of moral development. The work of Gilligan (1977) is included in the model to complement the masculine focus on the morality of justice with the feminine focus on the morality of caring.

The model’s third contribution to the literature
is the treatment of moderators as factors which affect each stage of the decision process. Existing models present moderators as affecting limited aspects of the process. For example, Ferrell & Gresham (1985) suggest that moderators do not affect such stages as the recognition of the ethical issue, the individual's overt behaviour, or the evaluation of the behaviour. The model also presents moderators as affecting not only the decision process but also as affecting each other reciprocally. Existing models make no such claim. The study also provides, unlike existing models, a synthesis of the complex nature of both the process of ethical decision making and the moderators of ethical decision making within a single theoretical framework.

In summary the study represents an initial attempt to present a model of ethical decision making for service in sport organizations. Although generic in nature, the model was developed for use in a sport context where, at present, no such theoretical approach to ethical decision making is available for the researcher or practitioner.
Implications for Research

The interpretative-theoretical model of ethical decision making for service in sport organizations developed in this study is explanatory and prescriptive. The model presents a normative ethical decision process and the moderators which may, by mediation through the individual, influence the process. The model provides the basis for a wealth of research in ethical behaviour in organizational contexts. A variety of relationships among items and the actual process of ethical decision making have been proposed which, if pursued through both qualitative and quantitative methods, may foster a greater understanding of ethical behaviour in organizations.

The first phase of a research strategy based upon the interpretative-theoretical model of ethical decision making may include a series of descriptive studies identifying the character of the various components of the model in a sport administration context. For example, such descriptive investigations may include the following questions:

1. How do sport administrators resolve their ethical dilemmas?
2. What is the philosophical orientation of sport administrators?
3. What is the level of moral development of sport administrators?
4. What demographic moderators influence ethical decision making?
5. What are the ethical issues that sport administrators face?
6. Who are the significant others of sport administrators?
7. What is the ideology, culture, and climate of sport organizations?
8. What political, social, economic, and technical factors impact upon sport administrators?
9. What are the most salient moderators of ethical decision-making behaviour?

The second phase of a research strategy may include investigations which approach the model’s relationship from an explanatory perspective. These studies may lead to a better appreciation of how various moderators influence the individual and his/her ethical decision making behaviour. Explanatory studies may seek to answer some of the following general
questions:

1. How does the administrator’s ethical orientation affect the decision process?

2. How does the administrator’s level of moral development affect the ethical decision making process?

3. How do the administrator’s significant others influence his/her ethical decision making process?

4. How does the organizational ideology, culture, and climate influence the administrator’s ethical decision making behaviour?

5. How does the political, social, economic, and technical/industrial environments affect the decision maker’s ethical behaviour?

6. How does gender affect ethical decision-making behaviour in organizations?

7. How do the various layers of moderators affect the decision making process?

8. How do the various layers of moderators of ethical decision making interact?

In answering these questions, through a variety of methodologies, two objectives may be the result. The
first is the validation of the model. The second is the extension of knowledge in the realm of ethical decision making in administration contexts in general and sport administration contexts in particular.

**Application of the Model in a Sport Context**

The interpretative-theoretical model having been explained as well as explanatory of aspects involved in ethical decision making provides a level of utility or prescriptiveness which can assist the sport administrator in overcoming ethical dilemmas in organizational contexts in order to make ethically right, good, and authentic decisions. To demonstrate the utility of the model, this section will describe its application to an ethical dilemma in a sport administration context. The case study to follow is based upon an incident which took place in a city in a western Canadian province. The names used are fictitious.

**Case Study.** In the fall of 1992 a female high school student, Ruth, of exceptional skill in the sport of soccer attended a high school training camp for the senior boys' team. She believed that the boys' team would play at a skill level comparable to her own and
that the involvement at a 'higher' level would develop her soccer abilities physically and mentally. She was successful in gaining a position on the team based upon her athletic skills.

News of Ruth’s success quickly found its way to the local and provincial media. As word spread of the 'girl playing on the boys' team', the executive director of the Provincial High School Athletic Association, Ted, was contacted by a number of parents, board members, and interested individuals expressing mixed feelings regarding the incident. Ted was faced with the following dilemma: should Ruth be allowed to continue playing with boys’ team or should she be restricted to 'girls only' teams?

Case Study Analysis. The case study analysis will be carried out in two phases. The first phase will involve a general description of the moderators of ethical decision making in the context of the case. The second phase will describe each stage of the ethical decision making process as it pertains to the case and is influenced by the situational moderators.

External Moderators. External moderators include societal, political, economic, and technical
influencers. From a societal perspective, competitive sport has traditionally been segregated in terms of gender. The public view, as received and interpreted by Ted, is that 'boys compete with boys' and 'girls compete with girls'. The public's argument for segregation include the belief that girls will be injured playing against boys, that the standard of competition will be unfair for girls, and that because fewer girls would excel in an 'open' league, fewer female sport role models would exist. This view is held despite the general trend in North America for the breaking down of barriers in terms of gender equity and the potential for skill development in a more highly competitive sport environment.

Politically, the issue of integration in competitive sport has not yet received attention locally or provincially. Ruth's case may be the first of a trend, a 'politically correct' trend at that, and therefore may become politically significant should the consciousness of the public be raised. While lobby groups and parent associations have been proactive regarding integration generally and gender equity specifically in educational contexts, there as yet
exists no political will, provincially or nationally, to desegregate boys and girls competitive high school sport.

The impact of the economy may have an effect upon Ted's decision in terms of the ability of the Association to withstand the costs of potential litigation should Ruth decide to proceed with a human rights court case. The cost of co-ed facility rental, e.g., dual locker room facilities, may also enter as a potential unacceptable cost to the Association. There may, however, be savings realized from program integration. For example, a parallel sport system, i.e., separate boys and girls leagues, would be reduced to a single gender 'neutral' sport system which may reduce costs by half for the Association and for the schools.

Finally, technical factors, may involve facility/logistic concerns that presently exist and/or those that may come about should gender integration occur. Integration may require the Association to make rule, facility and/or equipment changes to accommodate co-ed teams. In addition, the Association would have to rewrite all policy and procedure for each sport in
order to organize competitive schedules, official assignments, and facility and equipment rental.

_Situational Moderators._ Situational moderators include organizational ideology, culture, and climate. The Association’s mission statement, i.e., its ideology, is committed to the pursuit of athletic excellence through equitable yet separate programming for male and female student athletes. The Association, at present, does not recognize the notion of integration in terms of competitive sport in the high school setting.

The Association’s culture is predominantly reflective of the traditional view of gender segregation in sport contexts. The staff and the board of directors, with the exception of the office manager, are male and are committed to the Association’s implicit belief that equitable and segregated high school sport programming is right and just treatment for male and female student athletes. The Association’s membership has thus far supported the view of gender segregation. There has been no previous suggestion that integrated sport in the high schools was desired or desirable.
The Association's climate, that is, its explicit means to establish and maintain culture, also reflects a strong tendency against integration in terms of organizational procedure and the traditional behaviour of the staff and members of the board which supports gender segregation. For example, the Association maintains separate policy and procedure manuals for boys and girls high school sport as well as separate subcommittees to administer league and play-off competitions. As a result, there exists little opportunity or encouragement for the development of the concept of gender integration.

**Significant Other Moderators.** Three cohorts of significant others are identified by the model. They are extraorganizational, interorganizational, and personal significant others. The extraorganizational influencers in this case have expressed varied opinions regarding Ruth's fate. Generally, the female executive directors from other provincial sport governing bodies, such as, volleyball, basketball, swimming, and field hockey, have supported Ruth's efforts - their male counterparts in such sports as football, wrestling, track and field, and hockey, who form the majority of
the professional staff in the Provincial Sport Centre, do not. Within the school context, the male physical education teachers, are somewhat ambivalent toward the notion of integration whereas the female physical education teachers are supportive of the notion of integration. Other members of the staff accept the notion of integration, generally, as it has been a focus of many other programs in the curricula, e.g., students with mental and/or physical disabilities.

Within the organization, those who do have influence with Ted are in favour of the status quo, i.e., segregation. The Board of Directors is supportive of maintaining the policy of segregation as is the general membership as polled by Ted. Ted's friends and immediate family represent both sides of the issue - his teenage daughters favour integration.

**Issue Specific Moderators.** The characteristics of the ethical issue represent the fourth category of moderators of ethical decision making. An ethical issue may be described in terms of the following characteristics: immediacy, proximity, concentration, responsibility, magnitude, social consensus, as well as its strategic and tactical significance. This case
requires an immediate response from the Association; it affects directly the local and provincial high school community sport system; it is focused upon one girl yet has implications for all female student athletes; it is the responsibility of the executive director and his board to make a ruling; its magnitude is significant as it may change the face of high school athletics as has been practised, i.e., to sanction integration rather than segregation; it does not have social consensus, though there is a trend toward tradition beliefs in segregated sport. Finally, the decision which Ted must make is a strategic (policy) decision which implies a more global impact upon the Association than a tactical decision (procedural). In summary, this issue is morally intensive and requires a comprehensive ethical analysis in order to seek a favourable resolution.

**Individual Moderators.** Perhaps the most significant of the moderators are those that describe the individual's demographic, philosophical, and psychological, make-up. Ted is a 43 year old white male with a bachelor's degree in physical education from one of the Province's two universities. He is married with two teenage daughters. His philosophical
orientation is eclectic with some strong teleological tendencies, i.e., his focus is predominantly organizational ends. Had Ted's philosophical orientation been deontological, his focus would have been organizational policy, procedure, and tradition; had it been existential, his focus would have been upon individual free will and individual responsibility for all behaviour. Ted can also be described, in terms of his moral development, as falling into Kohlberg's (1969) conventional level. As a result, Ted is highly influenced by nomothetic values and significant others. Had he been preconventional in his moral development, his behaviour would have been characterized by selfish careerism, whereas had his level of development been postconventional, he would have demonstrated strong tendencies of individualism and universal/objective justice.

**The Ethical Decision Making Process.** The process of ethical decision making in the model consists of seven stages. They are: recognition of ethical dilemma, generation of alternatives, ethical evaluation of alternatives, ethical decision, intention, overt ethical/unethical behaviour, and evaluation of
behaviour. To make ethically complete decisions one must assess each stage in terms of existential, deontological, and teleological criteria. The following involves a discussion of each cell of the matrix found in Figure 11.

**Recognition of Ethical Dilemma.** From the teleological perspective, Ted may recognize the dilemma in terms of its impact upon the traditional view of segregation within high school sport and/or the impact upon the Association in terms of potential costs of litigation should Ruth proceed with a human rights case. Deontologically, Ted may view the dilemma as a matter of organizational policy. Existentially, Ted may perceive the issue as primarily one of Ruth's need for free will and responsibility for her own action.

**Generation of Alternatives.** Alternatives that will be generated by Ted will include those that attempt to achieve the best ends for the sport in general and the Association in particular (teleology), those which following the best means in terms of adhering to the Association's policy, procedure, and tradition (deontology), and those which reflect his authentic belief in the need for all individual's to
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethical Decision Making Process</th>
<th>Teleology</th>
<th>Deontology</th>
<th>Existentialism</th>
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<tr>
<td>Recognition of Ethical Dilemma</td>
<td>Sport Versus Litigation</td>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Free Will</td>
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<td>Generation of Alternatives</td>
<td>Ends</td>
<td>Means/Policy</td>
<td>Free Will</td>
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<td>Ethical Evaluation of Alternatives</td>
<td>Best Ends</td>
<td>Best Means</td>
<td>Best Possibility of Free Will</td>
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<td>Ethical Decision</td>
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<td>Decline Player</td>
<td>Allow Player</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intention</td>
<td>Decline Player with Support</td>
<td>Decline Player with Support</td>
<td>Allow Player without Support - Decline Player with Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overt Ethical/Unethical Behavior</td>
<td>Decline Player: Teleological Behavior</td>
<td>Decline Player: Deontology Behavior</td>
<td>Decline Player: Not Existential Behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of Behavior</td>
<td>A Good Decision</td>
<td>A Right Decision</td>
<td>Not an Authentic Decision</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
exercise their free will and take personal responsibility for all their actions (existentialism).

**Ethical Evaluation of Alternatives.** Each alternative generated will be juxtaposed with the three perspectives to determine their ethical viability. The teleological criterion will determine the extent to which an alternative satisfies the best end result for the dilemma, e.g., what is best, ultimately, for the sport of soccer. The deontological criterion will assess each alternative in terms of its adherence to existing organizational policy, procedure, and tradition. The degree to which an alternative provides for the individual’s free will and personal responsibility is the existential criterion.

**Ethical Decision.** Based upon the ethical evaluation, one alternative will be selected as meeting the ethical demands of the teleological, deontological, and existential perspectives. It may not, however, be possible for any one alternative to meet all criteria. For example, Ted may decline Ruth’s request because it is inconsistent with the wishes of the majority of the Association’s membership (teleology) and because it is against stated organizational policy (deontology).
Existentially, he may accept her request because to refuse it would be to deny her free will.

**Intention.** This phase suggests that though the decision maker may know what the right decision ought to be, he may not necessarily intend to carry it out for a variety of reasons. Ted's teleological intent to decline Ruth's request, based upon the supposed greater good of the high school program, is supported by his membership. Therefore, he has weak teleological rationale to support Ruth's position. Ted's deontological intent to decline is based upon existing organizational policy which supports segregation. Therefore, he receives additional philosophical support for his intent to prevent Ruth from participating. Ted's existential intent contrasts with the former two positions. He feels that Ruth's free will is being denied, yet realizes that he has no support for this position. As Ted looks externally for moral direction, i.e., Kohlberg's conventional level, his existential intent is subsumed by his teleological and deontological intentions.

**Overt Ethical/Unethical Behaviour.** Ted's overt behaviour to deny Ruth's request to participate with
the men's team is teleological and deontological. It is not existential. Ted's behaviour is teleological as it results in what the Association and the membership in general support as being ultimately best for high school sport. His behaviour is deontological because he adheres to existing organizational policy, procedure, and tradition, i.e., in favour of segregation. Ted's behaviour is not existential as he submits to external pressure, including the Association's membership and organizational policy, despite his belief that Ruth ought to be able to choose and take responsibility for her own actions as a student athlete.

**Evaluation of Behaviour.** Ted's behaviour can be considered as teleologically 'good', deontologically 'right', yet existentially unauthentic. As a result, Ted, while receiving support for his decision from external sources, i.e., the Association's Board and its membership, feels an inner tension as he was not able to support his authentic desire not to deny Ruth's free will and choice. While his behaviour did not satisfy all ethical criteria, it did receive support from the membership and from the organization. A decision
meeting the teleological criterion, i.e., that which results in the best end, and the deontological criterion, i.e., that which follows organizational policy, is generally accepted as optimal in most organizational contexts (e.g., the Janus head model as proposed by Brady (1985)). The existential criterion, which is lacking in Ted's overt behaviour, is overlooked typically in administrative contexts as the 'ideal organizational person' is encouraged to refrain from personal or authentic input in organizational affairs and behave in a value neutral (Weber, 1947) or value free (Simon, 1976) manner that is consistent with policy and procedure.

**Summary.** The case study demonstrates the utility of the model to analyze ethical dilemmas in a comprehensive fashion. The model, while prescribing the process of ethical decision making, does not attempt to prescribe what behaviour ought to be actualized. It does, however, provide the sport administrator with three scenarios to assess the ethical comprehensiveness of decision making behaviour. Its practical use is to assist the decision maker to understand, in a holistic manner, the moderators and
the process of ethical decision making in organizations.

Conclusions

The study presents the development of an interpretative-theoretical model of ethical decision making for sport organizations. Though the model is generic in nature, it has been developed in the wake of heightened ethical awareness in the sport administration community where at present no such model exists. The model has attempted to extend current knowledge regarding ethical decision making in administrative contexts where existing models are limited in philosophical and psychological scope.

The interpretative-theoretical methodology demands a rigorous examination of a set of data sources which have met pre-established criteria. The systematic exploration, analysis, and classification of data result in a theoretical framework from which a model emerges to explain the complex phenomenon of ethical decision making in an organizational context. The model provides an initial comprehensive theoretical basis for further research in the realm of ethical decision making in sport organizations.
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