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ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS DETERMINING RUMANIAN NATIONALITY POLICY

TOWARDS ETHNIC HUNGARIANS UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME

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Thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Ottawa in fulfilment of the requirements towards the obtention of the Degree of M. A. in Political Science.

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to examine the factors which have determined Rumanian policies towards ethnic Hungarians since Rumania took over Transylvania at the end of the First World War. The principal thesis which is to be demonstrated is that various Rumanian regimes, particularly the communist regime (especially under Ceaucescu), sought legitimacy and justification for their policies, thereby prompting the official exploitation and promotion of Rumanian nationalism and generating a discriminatory policy of forced assimilation, or ethnocide, directed against the ethnic minorities in Rumania, including those of Hungarian nationality. The Rumanian nationality policy therefore served to legitimize the regime in power and this policy was justified by a nationalistic official version of history which also depicted the Hungarians as a threat to Rumanian national security and territorial integrity. The objective of the nationality policy of the "unitary national Rumanian State" was therefore:

to "Roumanize Transylvania" - that is to secure for the Roumanian element a position of unquestioned superiority ... the political enemy in chief consists of the Magyar minority, whose power, influence, and numbers must be weakened by all possible means. (1)

The primary factors, both internal and external to Rumania, which will be examined are of historical, political, and ideological nature. The various nationality policy implementation methods employed by the Rumanian authorities will be used as indicators in order to establish a chronological trend and to
correlate Romanian nationality policy with internal and external factors. In this manner, the fundamental causes and consequences of this problem will be determined.

The problem of the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Romania is the result of a complex set of factors with wide-ranging historical and political ramifications. This problem, otherwise referred to as the Transylvanian Question, is therefore part of a wider geopolitical context of interrelated problems of similar nature. The Transylvanian Question is the central issue of Hungarian-Romanian relations. It is a seemingly irreconcilable and highly controversial territorial and ethnic dispute with deep historical roots, both sides claiming exclusive rights for the possession of Transylvania, accusing each other of having oppressed their co-nationals living there, and denying each other's accusations. Thus, with each side blaming the other for causing this problem, no solution has yet been reached.

The Transylvanian Question, or more specifically the issue of the Hungarian minority's situation, is itself part of the Hungarian Question which refers to the problem of the Hungarian minorities living in the states surrounding Hungary. At present, there are an estimated 4-5 million ethnic Hungarians (official censuses recognize approximately 3 million only)\(^2\), representing approximately one third of all ethnic Hungarians inhabiting the Carpathian Basin, living outside of Hungary in the neighboring
states as a result of the border changes which have taken place following the two world wars.

The estimated 2.4 to 3 million Hungarians in Rumania (3) constitute the largest Hungarian minority and have also been subjected to extremely harsh conditions as a result of Rumanian nationality policy which was reported as being the most oppressive compared to the other states neighboring Hungary, although these states are also engaged, to varying degrees, in discriminatory policies towards ethnic Hungarians. The Hungarian Question thus involves Hungary with Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Austria, and each of these states is also involved in other domestic ethnic problems and/or territorial disputes with other states.

The Hungarian Question is the product of historical ethnic conflicts, otherwise known as the Nationality Question, which centered upon the clashing national aspirations of the Hungarian and non-Hungarian ethnic groups of the Middle Danubian Basin. To a considerable extent, this nationality problem has been generated by intervening major external powers seeking to dominate the region by exploiting the potential antagonisms among its nationalities. This problem has been perpetuated and exacerbated by the conflicting interpretations of the history of these nationalities. The mutually contradicting and often politically influenced historical versions tend to distort the view these nationalities have of each other,
thus sowing discord among them and preventing the resolution of their conflicts.

The problem of the Transylvanian Hungarians raises the conflicting issues of nationalism and of minority rights with which international relations have been increasingly preoccupied since the 19th c. Nationalism and nationality problems have been at the root of most major wars and revolutions which have fundamentally altered the political configuration of Europe during the past two hundred years, opposing the concept of the unitary nation-state to the concept of cultural, territorial, and administrative autonomy for ethnic minorities. The principle of state sovereignty is also in contradiction with the declared universality of human rights, which are assumed to include minority rights as well, hence the ineffectiveness of international agreements and guarantees for the protection of national minorities in a system of sovereign states.

The present study is a multi-disciplinary approach to the issue of the Transylvanian Hungarians. The historical, political, legal, socio-economic, demographic, cultural, and ideological aspects of this problem will be examined in order to provide as comprehensive a view as possible, which is essential for the accuracy of this type of analysis.

Due to the nature of the problem which is to be analyzed, the historical dimension seems to occupy a preponderant role among the
determining factors of the Transylvanian Question. Thus, the historical background is of great importance for the understanding of this problem and will examine the roots of the Transylvanian Question, focusing on Hungary's loss of Transylvania to Rumania, as this event provides a unique insight into the origins of this problem and the factors determining Rumanian nationality policy towards ethnic Hungarians.

Following the historical background, the present study will then proceed with the analysis of Rumanian nationality policy towards ethnic Hungarians. This analysis will determine the objective and examine the methods of implementation of Rumanian nationality policy in the cultural, socio-economic, political, and legal fields, leading to the analysis of the factors determining this policy.

The international and domestic legal status of the Transylvanian Hungarians will also be examined, giving an account of the attempts to solve this problem through formal legal measures, and of the reasons for their lack of success.

A demographic section will also present statistical data in order to provide a picture of the changing ethnic composition and distribution of Transylvania's population. This change itself is an indicator of the historical roots of the Transylvanian minority problem and of the Rumanian nationality policy.
By examining the various aspects of the Transylvanian Hungarian minority problem, this thesis will present a synthesis of the different positions relative to this problem. Two main difficulties confront this task: the relative inaccessibility of primary sources and of original documents (most of which are undisclosed official records, and some may even have been destroyed) as well as the difficulty in finding truly impartial expert opinions on the subject matter, be they Hungarian, Rumanian, or "neutral" third party. Therefore, another

... obstacle to a fully documented study of minority problems in Transylvania is the absence of sufficient reliable data. (4)

With respect to the question of source reliability, it should be pointed out that documents published in Hungary or Rumania cannot be attributed with the same level of objectivity and accuracy as some independent Western scholarly sources, due to political and ideological factors. This seems to be particularly the case of documents originating from Rumania, as they are characterized by

a lack of credible statistical information as well as an overabundance of biased propaganda. (5)

Certain designations used in this research paper require some clarification. The geographical name of Transylvania, as it is most commonly understood today, refers to all the territories annexed by Rumania from Hungary after W.W. I (103,903 km2)(6). These territories include historical Transylvania itself (57,804 km2)(7), and in addition, parts of other former Hungarian territories known as Maramaros (Maramures), Szatmar (Satu Mare), Koros Vidék
(Crisana), and the Bansag (Banat). Transylvania will therefore be referred to in its present wider geographical extent, unless otherwise specified. The name "Transylvania" is the Latin translation of the original Hungarian name "Erdély" from which the Rumanian name "Ardeal" is also derived (8).

The name of "Rumania" and the term "Rumanian" will be used rather than "Romania" and "Romanian", except in direct quotations where it is spelled with an "o" or "ou" instead of a "u". Both "Rumania" and "Romania" are presently in use, although "Rumania" represents the original version which has been gradually displaced by the official "Romania" version. Prior to the creation of the Rumanian state in 1859, the Rumanians referred to themselves as "Rumini" (9).

Two divergent historical conceptions underly the two different spellings. The name "Romania" is based on the Daco-Roman theory of the origin of the Rumanians (10), whereas "Rumania" is based on the more widely accepted view that the Rumanians originate from the Balkans, "Rum" being the designation given by the Turks to the Balkans (11). The "Rumanian" designation itself has only been used since the 19th c., prior to that, the Rumanians were known as "Vlachs" or "Wallachians" ("Olah" in Hungarian)(12).

The origin and the relationship of the "Hungarian" and "Magyar" designations should also be clarified in order to avoid certain
confusions. The term "Hungar", from which the "Hungarian" designation is derived, is a collective ethnic name meaning Hun people or tribe (13). Each Hunnic tribe and tribal federation had a specific name: Kuman, Pecheneg, Magyar, Bulgar, Avar, Khazar, etc... These names became more widely known after the breakup of the political unity of the Huns, following Atilla's death in 453 A.D. Thus, the Székelys of Eastern Transylvania (who were there before the Magyars) (14) and the Moldavian Csangos are also Hungarian ethnic groups, as well as the Magyars themselves, although Rumanian historiography has claimed that the Székelys and Csangos were "Hungarianized" Rumanians, as a justification for the policy of forced assimilation (15).

The proposed thesis is therefore that Rumanian nationality policy towards ethnic Hungarians has been determined essentially by the need for legitimization of the Rumanian state. This need for legitimization was generated by historical, political, ideological, and economic factors, which will be analyzed in the following chapters. As a work of synthesis, the originality of this thesis does not lie in the identification of the factors determining the nationality problem of the Transylvanian Hungarians, but in the conclusions drawn from the analysis of these factors, more specifically in the proposed means of solution to this nationality problem, and possibly to others as well. A fundamental long-term solution seems to be the revision of the distorted and mutually antagonistic national historical perceptions of the peoples in
question in order to help resolve nationalistic rivalries. This would require decisions made at the political level and the freedom for unbiased scientific historical research. A possible key to the resolution of nationality problems seems to lie in the newly emerging (or re-emerging) historical data which contradict the established versions upon which the present ideologically biased national identities and perceptions are based.

This case study is set in a historical and international relations perspective rather than a social science theoretical framework. This is due to the fact that the purpose of this study is not to conduct theoretical research but to conduct policy analysis with the objective of deriving practical applications from the analysis in terms of foreign and domestic policy options and proposals relating to the issue of the Transylvanian Hungarians. However, this is not to say that this study does not have theoretical implications which could be relevant to other cases of ethnic conflict, but these implications would require further investigation.

The position taken in this thesis is that a defense of the case of the Transylvanian Hungarians is required in order to counterbalance the wide dissemination of anti-Hungarian propaganda in the West by Rumanians and others, in which serious accusations are directed against the Hungarians. The defense of this case will therefore strive for an objective analysis of factual evidence and
for the avoidance of ideological bias.

NOTES

(7) Ibid., p. 1.
(8) Ibid., p. 1.
(10) Ibid., p. 4.
(11) Ibid., p. 5.
(12) Ibid., p. 5.
(17) MaCartney, op. cit., p. 286.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The importance of the study of the Transylvanian Question's historical background lies in that it demonstrates the origin and the role of the key factors which have determined Rumanian nationality policy: the concern over the legitimacy and the permanence of Rumanian territorial possessions, the interests and policies of major powers relative to the area concerned, and the dissemination of anti-Hungarian propaganda, which had a definite impact on the situation of the Hungarian minorities.

The problem of the Hungarian minorities was created by the Treaty of Trianon of June 4, 1920, just as numerous other minority problems were created by the post-W. W. I settlements imposed by the victorious Entente Powers. One of the critical factors contributing to the plight of the ethnic minorities was that the implementation of the minority rights protection clauses of the Peace Treaties was inadequately guaranteed by the Entente Powers. As a result of the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary lost 72% of its territory and 64% of its population (1), and one third of the entire Magyar population was forced under foreign rule (2). Therefore, the conditions imposed upon Hungary after W. W. I were by far harsher in both relative and absolute terms than those imposed upon any other state (3).

The terms of the Treaty of Trianon were, however, largely
determined by diplomatic events leading up to and during the war, as well as by military events following it. There is conclusive evidence that plans for the annexation of Hungarian territories were envisaged well before the outbreak of the First World War by the states which benefited from the partition of Hungary (4). The expansionist aims of the Czechs, Serbia, and Rumania were manifested by the promotion of separatist movements among the nationalities of Hungary (5) and by conducting a highly publicized propaganda campaign in the West, with the collaboration of certain influential personalities such as R. W. Seton-Watson (6), in order to popularize their cause and to gain acceptance and support for their territorial claims against Austria-Hungary:

[Wickham] Steed, as the foreign policy editor of the Times, and Seton-Watson as the editor of New Europe... used the press as weapons, often arbitrarily and with biased arguments, on behalf of the imperialist objectives of the Entente: the maximum territorial claims of the Slavs and the Romanians... Steed, Seton-Watson, and the officials and specialists, including journalists and politicians... contributed a great deal to the process of dissolution, to the fermentation within the Monarchy. The new order in Central Europe, and the new boundaries can be regarded largely as the fruits of their work before and after 1914. (7)

Thus, the propaganda campaign before and during the war had a definite impact upon the political restructuring of the Danubian region (8).

Major powers, such as Russia, seized the opportunities presented by the emergence of new nationalistic small states such as Rumania, and exploited the latter's territorial ambitions in order to serve their own hegemonistic objectives (9). As a result, the Entente
Powers recognized and supported territorial claims by Balkan states against Austria-Hungary even before W. W. I (10). Serbia and Rumania also realized that the territories they sought could only be obtained through the intervention of major powers. Thus, the Balkan states were not merely the pawns of the major powers, but they also exploited the latter's imperialistic rivalries:

Each national disturbance presented some of the Great powers with an opportunity to further their own interests at the expense of others. Each nationality that succeeded in its struggle for independence did so with at least the tacit support, if not open assistance, of one of the Great powers. Those like the Poles and Hungarians, who lacked a powerful patron were unsuccessful. (11)

During the war itself, through secret agreements, Hungarian territories were promised by the Entente Powers to their Balkan allies. On August 17, 1916, the secret Treaty of Bucharest was signed between the Entente and Rumania (12). The treaty promised the Hungarian territories East of the Tisza river to Rumania, which, in exchange, could not conclude a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers, as this would invalidate the Bucharest Treaty (13). Consequently, the Rumanians turned against their former ally, Austria-Hungary, and on August 27 proceeded to invade Transylvania, declaring war upon the Dual Monarchy only after the attack had begun (14). The Rumanians based their declaration of war on the claim that Hungary was oppressing its Rumanian minority (15). Nevertheless, the Central Powers mounted a successful counter-offensive as a result of which Rumania was forced to sign the Peace Treaty of Bucharest on May 7, 1918, thereby invalidating
the 1916 Bucharest Treaty with the Entente (16).

On November 3, 1918, Austria-Hungary concluded an Armistice at Padua with Italy which had received the mandate and authorization to act on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers (17). On that day, there were no Allied forces on Hungarian territory (18). The Armistice designated the existent frontiers of Austria-Hungary as the demarcation lines for the Balkan and Eastern fronts. This Armistice was thus valid for all Austro-Hungarian fronts and officially put an end to all hostilities between Austria-Hungary and the Allied and Associated Powers (19). However, on November 4, 1918, the Supreme War Council of the Allies unilaterally cancelled the Padua Armistice without the knowledge and consent of the Austro-Hungarian authorities on the grounds that one of the contracting parties to the Armistice, Austria-Hungary, had ceased to exist. However, this argument had no validity since the new Hungarian government had also accepted the terms of the Padua Armistice (20).

Because at that time Germany was still at war, the presence of German troops in Hungary prompted the Allies to invade (21). These circumstances proved favorable for the territorial claims of the Czechs, Serbians, and Rumanians. On November 13, 1918, the Allies concluded the Belgrade Military Convention with Hungary in order to occupy certain Southern and Eastern parts of that country (22). This was meant only as a temporary measure which was not supposed
to change the Hungarian administration in the occupied regions (23). However, the Czechs, Serbians, and Rumanians violated the Belgrade Convention by occupying more territory than they were authorized to and by replacing the local Hungarian administration by their own (24). Hungarian sovereignty and territorial integrity were thus violated after that state had concluded a legal agreement for the termination of the war. In this respect, it is interesting to note that on January 24, 1919, the Supreme Allied Council declared that its members were deeply disturbed by the news which comes to them of the many instances in which armed force is being made use of, in many parts of Europe to gain possession of territory, the rightful claim to which the Peace Conference is to be asked to determine. They deem it their duty to utter a solemn warning that possession gained by force will seriously prejudice the claims of those who use such means. It will create the presumption that those who employ force doubt the justice and validity of their claim and purpose to substitute possession for proof of right and set up sovereignty by coercion rather than by racial or national preference and natural historical association. (25)

Nevertheless, as a result of the violation of the Padua Armistice by the Allies, large parts of Hungary's territory remained under foreign occupation, and those territories were subsequently annexed by the successor states - Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania.

Several factors contributed to the extent of Hungary's losses after the war. Having fought on Germany's side, Hungary was considered and treated as a defeated enemy power by the Allies (26). Consequently, the successor states were given preferential treatment regarding their claims against Hungary. The foreign
invasion of Hungary precipitated the economic and political collapse of that country which had also demobilized its army following the Armistice, thereby facilitating the advance of enemy troops into Hungarian territory. As a result of the ensuing chaotic conditions, a coup installed the communist regime of Béla Kun, a turn of events which prompted further Allied intervention in Hungary, resulting in the occupation of Budapest by Rumanian troops (27), and causing losses estimated at 6.5 billion Swiss Francs (28).

The other major concern of the Allies, besides Germany, was the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the resulting threat of the spread of Communism:

The Allied decision to embrace officially the "New Europe" plan had a great deal to do with the loss of Russia as an ally following the Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917... exiles from Austria-Hungary suddenly became more precious than ever before in the propaganda war against the Central Powers. (29)

Hungary was thus in a particularly unfavorable set of circumstances where its interests were subordinated to the intervening interests of major powers, especially those of France, which was taking an increasingly hegemonic role in East Central Europe. It was under such circumstances that Rumania took over the Eastern part of Hungary, including historical Transylvania, as a reward for Rumanian assistance against the Russian Red Army (30).

Another factor which determined the extent of Hungarian
territorial losses to neighboring states such as Rumania, was the
general lack of knowledge or interest among Western statesmen
concerning facts pertaining to Central and Eastern Europe, combined
with the particularly unfavorable image of Hungary created by the
propaganda campaigns of the successor states:

reminiscing over Hungary's punishment at the Paris
Peace Conference, the British diplomat Harold Nicolson
noted: "I confess that I regarded, and still regard,
that Turanian tribe with acute distaste. Like their
cousins the Turks, they had destroyed much and created
nothing." This Allied participant at the Paris Peace
Conference did more than just express his unflattering
opinion of the Hungarian people. He captured the biased
political atmosphere of the international setting in
which the historical Hungarian state met its death. (31)

It is therefore a fact that the anti-Hungarian propaganda campaign
had a considerable impact in terms of major power policy towards
Hungary. This has also been a determining factor in the subsequent
treatment of the Hungarian minorities.

The Treaty of Trianon was not negotiated but merely imposed upon
Hungary by force:

what Trianon effected in actual fact was quite simply
to endorse and legalize the occupations by conquest,
achieved after the cessation of hostilities, by the
armed forces of the so-called successor states, in
stark violation of the armistice agreements concluded
with the Allied and Associated Powers. (32)

The new borders of Hungary were determined on the basis of claims
and information presented by the parties interested in the
territorial dismemberment of Hungary. Hungary's objections and
demands for plebiscites were not taken into consideration at the
Peace Conference (33). In this manner, all ethnic, historical,
geographical, strategic, and economic considerations were applied discriminatorily in favor of the successor states and to the detriment of Hungary in the determination of the new frontiers (34).

The Hungarians reluctantly agreed to sign the Treaty of Trianon, but only with the understanding that the possibility of future revision was open (the so-called Millerand letter) and that the acquisition of Hungarian territories by the successor states was conditional upon the latter's compliance with the treaties for the protection of national minorities (35). However, neither of these guarantees were respected by the Allies and the successor states (36).

All this was accomplished under the claim of serving justice and of realizing the ideals proclaimed by the Allies (President W. Wilson's 14 Points for the self-determination of the nationalities of Central and Eastern Europe). However, the terms and the methods of implementation of the Treaty of Trianon were in contradiction with the principles in the name of which the Allies claimed to have fought:

According to those principles "peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game", but "every territorial settlement involved must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the population concerned", and also "upon the basis of free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned". (37)

As a result, 3.5 million Hungarians were placed against their will
in a minority status in the successor states (38). With only one exception where the outcome proved favorable to Hungary (the Sopron plebiscite), the populations of the transferred territories were not consulted as to which state they wished to belong to:

The Treaty of Trianon violated the principle of self-determination... The peoples living on the territories severed from Hungary did not constitute themselves separate political units. No action on the part of these peoples can be regarded as representing a wish either to break away from Hungary, or to form independent units. The so-called Rumanian, Slovak and Serb "National Councils" which were set up in certain towns had no justification whatever to consider themselves representative of the whole population in the sense that they had the right to decide anything in the name of that population. They had never been elected; they were self-constituted bodies. (39)

The arguments used in order to justify the Treaty of Trianon were that Hungary was responsible for W. W. I. and that the millenial existence of the Hungarian state represented in itself an injustice (40).

In the Dual Monarchy, decisions relating to diplomatic and military matters were taken in Vienna (41). In July 1914, the Hungarian government was firmly opposed to the aggressive Habsburg policy towards Serbia (42). However, the Hungarian objections were overruled by the Austrians, and Hungary was forced to accept the decisions taken by the Habsburg government. The accusation that Hungary was responsible for the war is therefore questionable:

When the Crown Council decided for war, Hungary had no other course than to stand by her obligations as an ally. But if there is any nation whose responsible leaders were against the war, it is Hungary, and the guilt of engineering the war can certainly not be laid to her charge. (43)
The responsibility for W. W. I lies, in varying degrees, with the Habsburgs, Russia, Germany, France, as well as Serbia, all of which pursued expansionist or revanchist policies. Unlike such states as Rumania, Hungary had no territorial ambitions. Territorial and hegemonic expansionism were among the main causes of the war.

The other accusation levelled against Hungary, that of the injustice of that state's millennial existence, referred to the alleged thousand years of Hungarian oppression of the national minorities. The implication of this accusation was that the Carpathian Basin was already occupied by non-Hungarian populations before the arrival of the Magyars, in 895 AD, who then supposedly subjugated the previously settled inhabitants of the region. These claims of the successor states represented the principal justifications of their territorial acquisitions from Hungary.

These accusations raise the Nationalities Question of pre-war Hungary, referring to the problems between the Hungarian and non-Hungarian ethnic groups living in Hungary. The origins of this problem are of particular importance to this study due to the fact that this problem is still present under the form of the Hungarian minorities in the states surrounding Hungary. It is therefore important to examine the roots of these ethnic conflicts which, to a considerable extent, have determined, among others, the Transylvanian Question, and have thus been influential factors in Rumanian nationality policy.
Hungary's neighbors claimed that they had inhabited the Carpathian Basin before the Hungarians, and that therefore they had the historical right of possession of its territories (44). The Rumanians, for their part, based their historical claims on the so-called Daco-Roman continuity theory. This highly controversial theory is still the subject of extremely divided opinions (45). While the Hungarians maintain that the theory of Daco-Roman continuity is not substantiated by any conclusive evidence (46),

The Roumanians claim with passion that their ancestors have, on the contrary, inhabited Transylvania, in unbroken continuity, since its days of Roman greatness, having been merely ousted from their heritage by the barbaric, Asiatic Magyar intruders... We do not know for certain that Roumanians were in Transylvania in the year A.D. 1000... they cannot have been either numerous or important, neither can they have possessed any ordered social or political society... nor do we find any record even of isolated groups... (47)

In fact, the historical claims of the successor states appear to be questionable:

Up to the sixteenth century there is no historical evidence that alien races in any considerable strength lived next to the Magyars in the territory of pre-war Hungary. Apart from a moderate immigration of German and Slovak settlers and Wallach (Rumanian) herdsmen, which began slowly about the thirteenth century, the population of the country was overwhelmingly Magyar. The change in the ethnographical composition of the country from the original homogeneous Magyar into a heterogeneous one is... chiefly the result of quite recent immigration. (48)

With respect to the question of historical rights for territorial possession based on priority of settlement, it is interesting to note that some of the most recent researches into the ancient history of Europe have arrived to the conclusion that
before the appearance of the Indo-European peoples in Europe, non-Indo-European peoples had already laid the foundations of European civilization (49). These conclusions are supported by archeological finds, such as that made in Transylvania in 1961 which indicates that the earliest civilized settlements in the Carpathian Basin were of Mesopotamian Sumerian origin (50).

During the 19th c., British, French, and German researchers discovered the most ancient civilization, that of the Sumerians, in Mesopotamia, and deciphered their language, coming to the conclusion that the Sumerians were neither Semitic, nor Indo-European (51). Comparative linguistic analysis has shown that the language closest to Sumerian is Hungarian (52).

The evidence therefore suggests that the ancestors of the present-day Hungarians had established themselves in the Carpathian Basin as early as the Neolithic period, well before the arrival of the Magyars in 895 AD, who represented the last major link in the Scythian-Hun-Avar-Magyar continuity of Turanian peoples which amalgamated with their ethno-linguistic relatives of Near Eastern origin previously settled in the Danubian region. It should also be mentioned, in connection with the Daco-Roman theory, that according to Roman sources, the Dacians, who inhabited today's Transylvania, belonged to the family of Scythian peoples, which also included the Huns, Avars, and Magyars (53).
However, during the centuries of warfare and foreign occupation, starting with the Turkish invasion and division of Hungary, a considerable shift in the ethnic distribution of the population of the Carpathian Basin took place. While the Hungarian population suffered comparatively greater losses, other ethnic groups from the Balkans and Eastern Europe sought refuge or were settled by foreign rulers in the depopulated areas of Hungary (54), thus considerably reducing the proportion of Hungarians in Hungary, while the non-Hungarian population grew more rapidly due to immigration and due to the fact that the areas they inhabited were less exposed to devastation than those inhabited by Hungarians (55). Transylvania was also affected by these trends as an increasing influx of Rumanians took place, starting in the 13th c., as a result of the Mongol and Turkish invasions of Eastern Europe and the Balkans (56).

The various nationalities of the Carpathian Basin coexisted peacefully until the Habsburgs introduced their policy of inciting the various nationalities settled in Hungary against the Hungarians:

the policy of the Imperial Government in Vienna, which, in order to check Magyar ambitions towards freedom and independence, stirred up the subject nationalities and used them as a weapon against the Hungarians. (57)

The Habsburgs pursued a policy of divide and rule in Hungary since their take-over of that country (58), starting with the partition of Hungary between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans in the 16th c.
This policy consisted essentially in settling large numbers of foreigners in Hungary, in order to economically exploit and politically divide Hungary to the Austrian Habsburgs's advantage:

It is estimated that in the course of the XVIIIth c., the Habsburgs installed or introduced in Hungary some 400 000 Serbs, 1 200 000 Germans, and 1 500 000 Rumanians and thus lowered the proportion of Magyars in the historic Kingdom, that had totalled 80 per cent before the Turkish conquest, to less than 40% by 1780. (59)

In order to incite the foreign nationalities against the Hungarians when the latter repeatedly revolted against Austrian rule, the Habsburgs fostered the development of the national self-consciousness of the non-Hungarian nationalities and directed them against the Hungarians (60).

In this context, the theory of Daco-Roman continuity was therefore a useful means of mobilizing the Rumanians against the Hungarians:

The principal center of this ["Dacian"] idea lay across the Carpathians in Austrian territory, where Roman Catholic propaganda made considerable progress among Rumanian-speaking populations. Official Austrian support of Catholicism helped to forward the movement... (61)

The aims of this ["Transylvanian School"] movement were not primarily scientific. The study of Rumanian history and language... was to support a distinctly Rumanian political struggle... (62)

The objective of this struggle was to re-establish the Rumanian nation "in the position of pre-eminence" (63) which it was believed to have occupied in ancient times. As a result, during the 18th and 19th c. Hungarian uprisings against the Habsburgs, Rumanians settled in Hungary slaughtered entire Hungarian villages, thereby
contributing to the depopulation of Hungarian-inhabited areas and increasing the Rumanian population's proportion in Transylvania and other parts of Hungary (64). Due to the Rumanians's siding with the Habsburgs against the Hungarians (65), the relations between these two nationalities deteriorated considerably during the course of the 19th c.

The nationality problem which was thus created had serious repercussions in the origins and aftermath of the First World War. As a consequence of the nationality problem in Hungary, certain non-Hungarians advanced the claim, mostly under foreign influence (66), that the Hungarians have been oppressing the nationalities which have supposedly inhabited the Carpathian Basin before the Hungarians who subjugated them. These claims have been widely propagated since the latter part of the 19th c., essentially in order to justify the territorial partition of Hungary.

However, the evidence seems to contradict these politically motivated historical claims:

The administrative and political organizations of the Hungarian statehood, based on autonomy and self-government, was also the inherited legal system of the nomadic tribal life... Thus the nomadic empires were built on autonomy and self-government, and the concept of discrimination against different racial or language groups was unknown. This principle of self-government and tolerance toward foreign groups, together with the respect for the liberty of others, prevailed in the same way within the Christian Hungarian Kingdom. (67)

As a matter of fact, it was in Transylvania that religious freedom
was legalized for the first time in Europe, in the 16th c. (68) Furthermore the Hungarian state not only allowed the various ethnic groups settled in Hungary to preserve their language and culture, but actually contributed to their cultural and economic development:

the Magyars lived for centuries in complete harmony with their co-nationals of other races and always fostered their national and cultural development. Of this, no better proof can be given than the fact that all the minorities of pre-war Hungary not only maintained their national characteristics, but developed them and grew in strength and wealth to an incomparably greater extent than did their kinsfolk in Serbia, Wallachia, and Moldavia. (69)

Rumanian historians have interpreted the peasant rebellions against the Hungarian feudal regime as Rumanian national uprisings against Hungarian tyranny. This is a misinterpretation since the Hungarian nobility was not exclusively of Hungarian origin (70) and ethnic Hungarians constituted the bulk of the exploited peasantry. It was therefore a case of feudal socio-economic conflict and not a manifestation of conscious ethno-linguistic discrimination (71).

The Rumanians and other nationalities have also claimed that they have been the victims of a systematic campaign of forced Magyarization, or Hungarianization. In relation to this claim, it should be noted that the so-called "Magyar Chauvinism" for which Hungary was criticized was a manifestation characterizing a small and unrepresentative minority of the Hungarian population, namely the upper and middle classes which, to a considerable extent, were composed of elements of non-Hungarian origin (72). This important
fact seems to have been overlooked by Hungary's critics, such as
R.W. Seton-Watson (Racial Problems in Hungary), who made the
mistake of accusing the Hungarian nation as a whole for the
policies of the reactionary oligarchy in power at the time.
Hungary's ruling classes exploited Hungarian nationalism for
similar political reasons as later Rumanian governments exploited
Rumanian nationalism. It is also a fact that

the Hungarian policy towards the racial minorities
within pre-war Hungary was far from being such as has
been alleged in anti-Hungarian propaganda. (73)

The evidence seems to suggest that Hungarianization occurred
essentially as a natural and gradual assimilation of the immigrants
into the more developed Hungarian society, just as most immigrants
from Europe tend to assimilate into the dominant North American
Anglo-Saxon culture:

Moreover, some nations... do possess an active power
of attraction which enables them easily to absorb
alien elements, while others are passive, yielding
readily to assimilation... few, if any nations in
Europe possess this attraction in so large a measure
as the Magyars... No other European nation contains
so many recruits who are not at all unwilling priso-
ners but, on the contrary, heart and soul for their
adopted cause - indeed, its most intolerant champions.
To deny that the "Magyarization", whether in older or
in more recent times, often met with the full approval
of the persons assimilated would... be to misunder-
stand the position very seriously. (74)

The policy of Magyarization was a nation-building measure designed
for the same purpose as the cultural policies which led to the
formation of nations such as the French and the Americans through
the assimilation of minorities and immigrants (75). However, the
French, the Americans, and other powerful nations were not
criticized as were the Hungarians for pursuing such policies (76). The aim of the policy of Magyarization which was implemented in the second half of the nineteenth century was the preservation of an endangered nation (77), the continued existence of which was placed in doubt due to its numerical inferiority (see p. 23) relative to the surrounding nationalities (78). The integrity of the Hungarian state was also threatened:

In the eighteenth century Hungary had been extensively colonized with non-Magyar elements; and the [Habsburg] Crown favoured these elements... The granting of national privileges to the immigrants was, in fact, unconstitutional, as it infringed the unitary character of the Hungarian constitution which each newly-crowned Habsburg swore to maintain, and threatened the integrity of the Hungarian kingdom. (79)

Therefore, through the policy of Magyarization, the Hungarian nation sought the re-establishment of its ethnic homogeneity and of its political sovereignty over the Hungarian kingdom which it had lost due to centuries of foreign rule and occupation. The survival of an independent Hungarian national state was therefore seen as impossible without the policy of Magyarization. However, in the case of Hungary's ethnic minorities, the process of assimilation was interrupted by the emergence of modern nationalism and by foreign intervention which provoked and exploited conflicts between the Hungarians and the non-Hungarians, leading to the territorial disintegration of Hungary, as a result of which, approximately 4-5 million Hungarians are forced to live outside of Hungary's present borders (80).

It therefore appears that the political boundaries established
by the Treaty of Trianon were based on distorted and falsified information provided by the parties interested in the partition of Hungary:

the Trianon peacemaking was above all a triumph of propaganda. (81)

The Allied powers claimed as a reason for the partition of Hungary the inability of that state to solve its nationality problem - this task was entrusted to the successor states (82). Thus,

Transylvania was transferred to Rumania, on condition that the latter "assumed full and complete protection" of the rights and liberties of the Minorities. (83)

However, instead of solving the nationality problem of Hungary, the Treaty of Trianon perpetuated it through the creation of new or enlarged multinational states which contained large Hungarian minorities:

Lloyd George himself pointed out in a memorandum of March 25, 1919, "There will never be peace in South Eastern Europe if every little state now coming into being is to have a large Magyar irredenta within its borders". (84)

In many respects, the nationality problem in the Danubian Basin deteriorated as a result of the Treaty of Trianon:

Mr. Vajda Voevode, [a former] Rumanian Prime Minister, said:"... More Transylvanian-Rumanians were appointed to the Hungarian High Court in Budapest than are now appointed in Bucarest. In Hungary there were eight high financial officials who were Rumanians from Transylvania; to-day in Rumania there are but two."...

Father Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak Catholic Party, wrote...: "For a thousand years we did not suffer half at the hands of the Hungarians that we have had to suffer in a few years at the hands of the Czechs."...

Svetozar Pribitchevitch, former Yugo-Slav Minister of the Interior, [wrote]: "... If we speak without bias, we have to say that the Yugo-Slavs of Austria and Hun-
Gary had before the war more political freedom than they had in Yugo-Slavia even before the dictatorship..." (85)

Following the Rumanian invasion of Transylvania in November 1919, a Rumanian assembly declared the union of Transylvania with Rumania at Gyulafehérvár (Alba Julia) on December 1st (86). However, the legitimacy of the Alba Julia decision was questionable due to the fact that the Rumanians did not represent the majority of the population of the claimed territories since the non-Rumanians represented 57% of the total population (87). Transylvania was therefore not united with Rumania by the free will of its people, contrary to Rumanian claims (88), but was conquered and annexed by military force (89). On January 19, 1919, over 30,000 Hungarians demonstrated in Kolozsvar (Cluj) against the Rumanian occupation; Rumanian troops opened fire on the unarmed crowd, killing over 100 and wounding over 1000 Hungarians (90). The situation of the Transylvanian Rumanians themselves did not improve with the creation of a greater Rumanian national state:

The Transylvanian Romanians, long accustomed to considerable autonomy and self-government under Hungarian rule, resented the imposition of central control, especially under the administration of officials from Bucharest. (91)

Even before the annexation of Transylvania was recognized by the Treaty of Trianon, all Hungarian language signs were being removed and replaced by Rumanian signs in the occupied territories (92). As a result of the Rumanian annexation of Transylvania, approximately 260,000 Hungarians fled to the remaining portion of Hungary between 1920 and 1940 (93), while a large number of
Rumanians migrated to Transylvania (94). Thus, the Rumanian government began the implementation of discriminatory measures against the ethnic minorities under its jurisdiction and amounting to one third of the total population of Greater Rumania (95), particularly against the Hungarians:

The Hungarians became second class citizens in Transylvania... Rumanian officials from across the mountains flooded the province...(96)

Following the annexation, large numbers of Transylvanian Hungarians became the victims of illegal expropriations (97). In 1923, the Rumanian government introduced a land reform in which land was taken from non-Rumanians, mainly Hungarians, and given to Rumanians (98). In 1924, the Rumanian government imposed extra taxes on Hungarian businesses still using the Hungarian language (99). In 1925, as a result of the policy of Rumanianization, Hungarian schools were closed, and in 1926, censorship of Hungarian language publications was increased (100). In 1928, a Transylvanian delegation presented in Geneva to the League of Nations a 280-page report documenting 166 cases of Rumanian violations of the Minority Treaty, but without effect (101). On October 15, 1934, a Hungarian Csango revolt in the Gyimes Valley of Eastern Transylvania was crushed by the authorities (102). In 1936, the extreme right-wing organization of the Iron Guard conducted other violent acts against non-Rumanians, including Hungarians (103). In 1938, royal dictatorship was imposed, and all political parties were disbanded, including the organizations of the national minorities (104).
In 1940, Rumania lost Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union, and the German-Italian arbitration of the Second Vienna Award returned Northern and Eastern Transylvania with 1.2 million Hungarians to Hungary, while the 600 000 Hungarians remaining under Rumanian rule were subjected to increasing abuses by the Rumanian authorities (105). In 1944, siding with the Soviets, Rumania reoccupied Northern and Eastern Transylvania, committing atrocities against the Hungarian population and forcing the Soviets to intervene (106). However, thousands of Hungarians were massacred and an estimated 200 000 were deported to forced labor camps in Rumania, where most of them perished (107).

Following the Second World War, the Rumanian authorities considered the Transylvanian Hungarians as enemies of the state and treated them accordingly (108). As a result, between 350 000 and 400 000 Hungarians were expropriated and expelled from their homes, thus demographically and economically strengthening the position of the Rumanians at the expense of the Transylvanian Hungarians (109).

It appears thus that the policies of the Rumanian state towards ethnic Hungarians were, to a considerable extent, determined by the conditions under which Rumania acquired Hungarian territories. Having annexed Transylvania by force and under questionable legal circumstances, the legitimacy of this acquisition was in dispute. As a result, the territorial integrity of Greater Rumania was not
secure and the Hungarian minority was seen as a threat to the security of the enlarged Rumanian state. The Rumanian apprehensions concerning their territorial integrity were therefore the principal motive for the treatment of the national minorities forced under Rumanian rule. The situation of the Transylvanian Hungarians was further aggravated by the intervention of major powers such as France, Germany, and Russia, which exploited and exacerbated the Hungarian-Rumanian conflict, and also by the propaganda campaign directed against Hungary, which promoted anti-Hungarian sentiments.
NOTES

Horvath, E., op. cit., pp. 74–75.
(9) Calder, op. cit., pp. 1–2.
Horvath, in Apponyi, op. cit., p. 39.
(12) Pastor, in Cadzow, op. cit., p. 166.
(13) Horvath, in Apponyi, op. cit., p. 94.
(14) Pastor, in Cadzow, op. cit., p. 166.
(18) Ibid., p. 80.
(19) Ibid., p. 82.
(20) Ibid., pp. 82–83.
(22) Ibid., p. 169.
(23) Deak, F., Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference, Columbia U.
(24) Horvath, in Apponyi, op. cit., p. 89.
(28) Horvath, in Apponyi, op. cit., p. 96.
(33) Deak, op. cit., p. 246.
(38) Horvath, in Apponyi, op. cit., p. 100.
(40) Great Britain, op. cit., p. 442.
(41) Ibid., p. 8.
(42) Ibid., pp. 8, 444.
(43) Hanak, op. cit., p. 34.
(44) Great Britain, op. cit., p. 440.
(45) Ibid., p. 441.
(46) Ibid., p. 441.
(51) MacCartney, Hungary and her Successors, op. cit., p. 256.
(53) Czege, op. cit., p. 11.
(56) Ibid., p. 261.
(57) Great Britain, op. cit., p. 437.
(59) Daruvar, op. cit., p. 20.
(64) Harasztí, op. cit., p. 105.
(66) Hitchins, op. cit., pp. 244-245.
(73) Great Britain, op. cit., p. 438.
(75) Jaszi, op. cit., p. 328.
(81) Borsody, S., "Hungary's Road to Trianon: Peacemaking and Propaganda", in Kiraly, op. cit., p. 27.
(82) Szasz, op. cit., p. 20.
(83) Ibid., p. 20.
(84) Kertesz, S. D., "The Consequences of World War I: The Effects on East Central Europe", in Kiraly, op. cit., p. 47.
(87) Pastor, in Cadzow, op. cit., p. 171.
(91) Keeffe, op. cit., p. 19.
(92) Czege, op. cit., p. 25.
(93) Cadzow, op. cit., p. 337.
(94) Szasz, op. cit., p. 62.
(95) Ibid., p. 49.
(98) Cadzow, op. cit., p. 29.
(101) Cadzow, op. cit., p. 29.
(102) Ibid., p. 30.
(103) Czege, op. cit., p. 27.
(106) Cadzow, op. cit., p. 31.
(108) Cadzow, op. cit., p. 316.
(109) Ibid., pp. 314-325.
ANALYSIS OF THE RUMANIAN COMMUNIST REGIME'S NATIONALITY POLICY

I. Soviet influence on post-W.W.II Rumanian nationality policy.

i) The Sovietization of Rumanian nationality policy.

The Soviet military occupation of Rumania and subsequent political take-over at the end of W.W.II effectively placed Rumania under Soviet control. This had a definite impact upon Rumanian nationality policy affecting the ethnic minorities as the entire political, economic, and social structure of the country was reorganized according to the Soviet model (1). As a result, and in order to win over the support of the national minorities for the communist regime, the minorities were reassured of the protection of their rights:

Stalin - using the national minorities as a means for undermining anti-communism in Romania - promised far-reaching cultural concessions and stipulated that the annexation of Northern Transylvania by Romania was conditional on the new Romanian government securing full, equal rights for the Hungarians in Transylvania. (2)

This represented the Stalinist approach to nationality policy:

This policy consisted of the recognition of ethnic autonomies, and it was based on a federation of these autonomies. These autonomies are national in form, and socialist in substance. (3)

It was during this brief period from the end of W.W.II until the early fifties that the Hungarians in Rumania managed to obtain some concessions. The Hungarian People's Alliance in Rumania was formed in order to protect the political, economic, and cultural interests of ethnic Hungarians. The People's Front government of Petru Groza
(1945-1947) made extensive promises and granted certain concessions to the minorities in terms of equality of rights, administrative autonomy, cultural development, and peaceful coexistence (4).

With the proclamation of the Rumanian People's Republic in 1947, the process of Sovietization was intensified, leading to the monopolization of power by the communist party (the Rumanian Workers' Party). The 1948 and 1952 constitutions of the People's Republic guaranteed the free use of the nationalities' languages, the organization of educational institutions of the nationalities, and equality of rights for the nationalities with the Rumanian people (5). Also, in 1952, the Hungarian Autonomous Region was set up in Eastern Transylvania, an area of compact Hungarian population. Thus, the Rumanian People's Republic sought to gain the support of the national minorities by claiming to apply the Marxist-Leninist solution to the nationality problem:

This program was in many respects successful. On the other hand, however, behind the concessions made to the national minorities lay the goal of consolidating the regime, in other words, of strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat, as a result of which particular national features would lose their meaning. (6)

Therefore, it was believed that communism would erase, or at least diminish ethnic particularism, but effectively, this would have meant the absorption of the minorities into the dominant culture of socialist Rumania:

In the foreseeable future there will no longer be nationalities in Romania, but only one socialist nation. (7)
The brief period of relative relaxation of discriminatory policies towards ethnic minorities by the Rumanian state was only superficial (8). The official attitude towards ethnic minorities in general and the Hungarians in particular remained fundamentally unchanged. Although the situation of the nationalities during this period represented an apparent improvement, this was due more to Soviet influence than to a genuine effort on the part of the Rumanian government to improve relations with the nationalities:

the establishment of the Magyar Autonomous Region... based on the Soviet model of autonomous territorial organization and Marxist-Leninist teaching on national minorities, was a measure prompted by Soviet pressure. (9)

ii) The reassertion of Rumanian nationalism: a reaction to Soviet influence.

The increasing Soviet control in Rumania provoked a nationalist reaction among Rumanians. As a result, in order to avoid being seen as a Soviet instrument and to consolidate its position, the Rumanian Communist Party undertook a fundamental re-orientation of its policies in the early 1950's, and sought to distance itself from Moscow, placing the priority on Rumanian national interests:

In their determination to maintain political identity in the face of Stalinist and post-Stalinist pressures exerted by the Soviet Union, the new Romanian leaders slowly abandoned internationalism in favor of national communism. (10)

In this manner, the Gheorghiue-Dej regime embarked on a nationalistic course designed to increase the domestic support for its policies. The national minorities were detrimentally affected
by this new course:

The rights which had been won by the minorities in the preceding period were soon eliminated by an awakening spirit of Romanian nationalism. (11)

This shift in nationality policy was also reflected by the changing composition of the Rumanian Communist Party, which, until then, had a high percentage of ethnic minority members - a factor which may have contributed to the relative improvement of the minority question following W.W. II (12). However, the Rumanian faction of the RCP proceeded to eliminate the non-Rumanian elements of the party which were seen as agents of Moscow.

The Rumanian nationality policy undermined the political, economic, and cultural interests of the nationalities. In 1953, the Hungarian People's Alliance was abolished (13). The Magyar Autonomous Region was itself created for external propaganda considerations and to divert attention from the policy of assimilation. The Magyar Autonomous Region had in fact no real autonomy as it was controlled by Rumanian officials (14) and two thirds of the Transylvanian Hungarians were left outside of this administrative unit (15).

In 1952, the deportation and the confiscation of the property of individuals belonging to ethnic minorities from Transylvania was resumed along with the resettlement of large numbers of ethnic Rumanians from other parts of Rumania in order to alter the ethnic
composition of Transylvania (16).

After Stalin's death, the Rumanian regime reiterated that the nationality question was a resolved internal affair. As a result, any further discussion of this question was officially denounced as a nationalistic and separatist manifestation and all foreign interference was condemned as imperialistic and revanchist. With the abolition of all political organization outside the RCP, the minorities were deprived of any organized means for protecting their rights. Their cultural and educational institutions were accused by the regime of separatism and nationalism, thereby placing their existence in question, thus furthering the erosion of the minorities' rights in the process of denationalization (17).

Both the de-Stalinization of the Soviet Bloc and the Hungarian National Uprising of 1956 proved to be advantageous for Rumania. Both events were exploited externally and internally to further Rumanian national interests (18). In terms of Rumanian foreign policy, the process of de-Stalinization provided the opportunity for an independent course which was to serve effectively to promote a favorable image of Rumania in the West, as a result of which Rumanian human rights violations were overlooked while Rumania benefited from Western technical and financial assistance.

The Hungarian Uprising presented the Rumanian regime with the opportunity to implement repressive measures against ethnic Hungarians while at the same time showing loyalty to the Soviet
Union. During the Hungarian Uprising there were Hungarian demonstrations in Rumania. For the Rumanian regime, these events served as pretexts for "launching a new anti-Hungarian campaign" (19). The Rumanian authorities accused the Hungarians of revisionism and counter-revolutionary attitudes. As a result, tens of thousands of Hungarians were arrested, imprisoned, sent to forced labour camps, or executed.

Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania in 1958, the repressive measures directed by the authorities against ethnic Hungarians increased. In 1959, the Hungarian universities and schools throughout the country were forcibly amalgamated with Rumanian institutions, thereby furthering the process of systematic elimination of Hungarian education (20). The merger of the Hungarian University of Kolozsvár with its Rumanian counterpart led to the suicide of four Hungarian professors (21). This was an indication of the severity of the impact of the Rumanian nationality policy upon the Hungarians of Transylvania. In 1960, the territory of the Hungarian Autonomous Province was altered, reducing the Hungarian proportion of the population from 77.3% to 62%, leading to the liquidation of the Autonomous Province in February 1968 (22).

The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 seemed to have a moderating effect upon the Rumanian nationality policy. The apparent threat of a similar intervention
in Rumania, which had voiced its opposition to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, prompted the Rumanian leadership to adopt a more tolerant attitude towards the ethnic minorities, with the liberalization of its nationality policy (23). In November 1968, a Council of Workers of Hungarian Nationality was formed (24). However, such institutions were only designed to provide an appearance of real concessions. The Workers' Councils of the nationalities were in fact powerless to protect the interests of the nationalities and their recommendations were ignored by the government (25). In fact, as the threat of a Soviet invasion receded, the Rumanian regime resumed its course of increasing forced assimilation:

as soon as the danger of Soviet invasion was over, restrictions on the minorities began to increase again. (26)

II. The nationality policy of the Ceausescu regime.

i) The intensification of nationalism.

The Ceausescu regime (1965-1989) was characterized by extremely nationalistic policies which exerted unprecedented assimilationist pressures upon the ethnic minorities:

National oppression is practised in present-day Romania to an even greater extent than between the two world wars. (27)

As a result, during the 70's and 80's, an intensification of the policy of forced assimilation of the nationalities took place with
the deployment of a considerable array of repressive measures:

The Rumanian regime's anti-minority policies today exhibit an increased militancy and radicalism; the frequency and severity of repressive measures reflect a concerted effort to accelerate the process of attaining the final solution: the complete eradication of minority cultures. (28)

The policy of forced assimilation was made more systematic and effective by the fact that the Ceausescu regime had at its disposal the apparatus of a totalitarian communist police-state which provided it with an unprecedented degree of political, economic, and cultural control over the population of the country:

A program of interlocking actions and measures working to destroy the language, culture, traditions and religious life of the minorities has been applied, with devastating consequences... Its impact has been heightened, in a manner unparalleled in the history of the region, by virtue of the centralized, total control exercised by the Rumanian Communist Party over every aspect of community life. (29)

Thus, under the Ceausescu regime, the state apparatus was systematically mobilized in order to eliminate the non-Rumanian ethnic groups through the eradication of their distinctive cultural identity and of their national self-consciousness.

Under the Ceausescu regime's doctrine of national communism, the policy of minority assimilation was rationalized as the consequence of the process of socio-economic homogenization taking place as a result of the progress towards communism made by the "multilaterally developed" socialist Rumanian state. Furthermore, the Rumanian Socialist Republic was also declared a national unitary state, and this also had detrimental implications for the
existence of ethnic diversity and autonomy. The assimilationist policies of the Ceausescu regime were enforced by the secret state police, the Securitate, which used various methods of intimidation and an extensive network of informants to keep the entire population under control, neutralizing all forms of dissent, and effectively enforcing a regime of state-sponsored terrorism (30). Thus, the Ceausescu regime's nationality policy followed the ethnocidal orientation of previous Rumanian regimes, but with a quantitative and qualitative difference in terms of the number of measures taken and of the methods of implementation.

The Rumanian state pursued discriminatory and assimilationist policies against its national minorities in the cultural, socio-economic, and political fields with the use of legal and administrative provisions:

laws and decrees have been introduced which have tended to restrict Hungarian language education in Romania, put in question the future of the cultural and religious heritage of the Hungarian minority, discourage contact between members of this minority and citizens of the Hungarian People's Republic, and disperse the Hungarian minority. (31)

The Rumanian regime also resorted to the tactic of accompanying the implementation of an anti-Hungarian measure with the granting of an apparent concession in order to camouflage the gradual deterioration of the situation of the minority through illusory and temporary reprieves (32).
ii) Cultural discrimination.

In the cultural field, Rumanian government policy focused on the curtailment of minority education, media, language use, religion, arts, contact with foreign citizens, and travel. Since education is one of the most important instruments of assimilation, the Rumanian government has taken a variety of measures affecting the minorities' educational system. Due to the fact that the Hungarian schools and universities have been merged with their Rumanian counterparts, the number of subjects and classes taught in Hungarian have progressively been cut back, especially in technical and scientific fields (33). Thus, the need for technical standardization in a modernizing industrial society was used as a pretext to alienate the technical intelligentsia of the national minorities from their ethnic communities. Through the application of administrative restrictions such as the provisions of the decree law 278/1973 increasing the minimum number of students required for a minority-language high school class from 25 to 36, whereas no minimum number was required for Rumanian-language classes (34), the policy of Rumanianization sought to decrease both the number of minority-language classes and the number of minority nationality students. The proportion of ethnic Hungarian students dropped from 10.35% in 1958 to 5% in 1975 (35). Thus, the ethnic minorities were forced to choose between assimilation or marginalization through the educational system. An estimated 30-50% of Hungarian students were forced into the Rumanian-language educational system (36), with the proportion increasing at higher level and specialized
education. The number of Hungarian teachers was also decreased, thereby providing another pretext for the discontinuation of Hungarian-language classes (37). Student exchanges and visiting professors were also banned. The schools of the Csango Hungarians of Moldavia have been completely eliminated:

Ethnologists have recently predicted that the Csango minority are threatened with cultural and linguistic extinction, as a result of the Romanian government's discriminatory policies. (38)

The educational system of the minorities was thus progressively being eliminated through Rumanianization. In this process, minority-language education was being phased out and replaced by Rumanian-language education with Rumanian national content, including the official Rumanian historical version. The nationalities were therefore deprived of their culture in the educational field and were instead exposed to Rumanian culture in an attempt to further the policy of forced assimilation:

With the start of the 1985-86 academic year, all secondary schools teaching in the Hungarian language were eliminated... Hungarian-language instruction is now available only at a diminished number of sections in Rumanian schools. (39)

The nationality-language publications and mass communications were also curtailed and strictly controlled by the Rumanian state which sought to align them with its cultural policy (40). In January 1985, all minority-language radio and television broadcasts were terminated (41). The import of Hungarian-language materials had also been forbidden as all such material had been declared subversive by the Rumanian government (42).
The use of the Hungarian language in public places, in the administration, in the courts, and in the workplace was also strongly discouraged and reprimanded (43). All place names had to be Rumanianized as the use of non-Rumanian ethnic names was forbidden, and members of ethnic minorities were pressured to Rumanianize their names (44).

The churches of the ethnic minorities were also a target of the Rumanian discriminatory policies because of their important role in the cultural life of the nationalities, fulfilling not only their religious function, but as the schools of the nationalities were progressively eliminated, the churches took over the role of the educational institutions as well. The Rumanian state has attempted to limit the role of the churches and has placed them under its control, interfering in their internal affairs (45). The theatres and other cultural institutions and associations of the nationalities were also similarly repressed (46).

The archives of the cultural institutions of the nationalities, their libraries and museums, as well as private possessions, have been confiscated by the state under the decree laws 63/1974 and 206/1974 for the protection of the national cultural heritage and of the national archives (47). In this manner, important historical documents and objects belonging to the nationalities have been appropriated by the Rumanian state:

The aim of the law, therefore, amounts to little more than robbing the national minorities of the documents
of their own past which could still act as a source of national consciousness. No sooner had the law concerning the protection of national cultural treasures begun to be implemented than treasures of irreplaceable value for European culture began to be destroyed... (48)

Contacts between the members of the national minorities and their co-nationals outside of Rumania had also been severely restricted with limitations on travel in and out of Rumania (49).

In this manner, the discriminatory cultural policies enforced by the Rumanian government against the nationalities were designed to cut them off from their cultural roots and to denationalize them through the destruction of the fundamental elements of their ethnic identity.

iii) Socio-economic discrimination.

One of the most important instruments used by the Ceausescu regime towards the assimilation of the ethnic Hungarians was the policy of forced resettlement (50). This socio-economic measure fulfilled the dual function of demographic de-Hungarianization and Rumanianization of Transylvania by relocating Hungarians from Transylvania to other regions of the country and settling in their place ethnic Rumanians from outside of Transylvania, thereby breaking up the Hungarian ethnic communities in an attempt to alter the ethnic composition and distribution of Transylvania in favor of the Rumanian ethnic element. In this manner, communities throughout Transylvania which once had a majority Hungarian population now
have a majority Rumanian population (51). There are no accurate figures available on the number of Rumanians settled in Transylvania and the number of Hungarians deported from there, but the total number of people involved in the resettlement program is estimated to run into the millions (52). This process has been going on since Rumania took over Transylvania, but it has intensified under communist rule:

Migration from Rumanian-inhabited territories - mainly from the pre-1920 royal Rumanian provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia - to Transylvanian towns and industrial centres began to increase in 1948, the year of the establishment of the totalitarian regime, and sharply accelerated after 1975. (53)

The policy of resettlement was implemented under the guise of the industrialization and urbanization program of the Ceausescu regime which was a process requiring the relocation of large numbers of people:

The Romanian leadership appears to have been engaged in some socio-economic and cultural assimilation attempts... The goals of modernization and industrialization have required socio-economic mobilization of ethnic groups... At the same time, the RCP leaders have taken active steps to cure the expressions of national particularism among minorities, especially the Hungarians. (54)

For this purpose, the Rumanian communist state exercised full control over its labor force:

Thousands of people have been removed from Transylvania and forced to settle in other parts of the country. The provisions of Decrees 24 and 25/1976, which allow the authorities to recruit or allocate manpower from one region of Romania to another, are presently being increasingly used to resettle members of the Hungarian minority. (55)

The implementation of the Rumanian economic development plans
provided therefore a justification for the policy of assimilation of the ethnic minorities:

Romanian authorities justify administrative resettlement by quoting the needs of the ambitious national economic plan... to achieve this rapid industrialization, a mass resettlement of Hungarians was initiated after 1956. Since 1968 this practice has increased. (56)

In line with the nationalist policy pursued by Rumania, the process of industrialization was seen and promoted by the communist regime as indispensible for the consolidation of Rumanian independence (57). This led to the "Systematization" plan of the Ceausescu regime, which represented an extension and an intensification of the industrial resettlement program aiming for the assimilation of the nationalities. Under the Systematization plan, over half of the estimated 13 000 villages in Rumania were to be destroyed (mostly the ones located in the Hungarian parts of Transylvania) and their population was to be moved and concentrated into 500-600 "agro-industrial complexes" (Le Monde, 30.08.88). The effects of this plan would have been greatly detrimental for the ethnic Hungarians since it meant the uprooting of long established traditional cultural communities and their forced relocation into modern centers, thereby promoting the process of assimilation by destroying the sources of the nationalities' ethnic culture, in effect alienating the minorities from their national identity.

Thus, the Rumanian government's strategy is to ensure a Rumanian majority in all areas while, simultaneously, dispersing the Hungarian minority (particularly the intelligentsia) throughout the country... As a consequence of these policies, Hungarians are
being increasingly pushed to the periphery, in both the geographical and social sense of the term... Hungarian society in Rumania has been reduced to a bipolar society... which is composed of utterly pauperized masses of industrial and agricultural workers... [and] an ever thinner stratum of the intellectual elite. This change... entailed a special loss from the perspective of the minority population, as the middle strata, which have always played an important role in the preservation of national identity, have virtually disappeared. The mutilation of society has also led to a mutilated language. (58)

The program of industrialization and urbanization of the Rumanian regime therefore seems to have been one of the most effective anti-minority measures.

iv) Political discrimination.

In Rumania, the nationalities are also politically underrepresented at all levels of government (59), and repressive legal measures against members of ethnic minorities protesting against the discriminatory policies of the Ceausescu regime have been stepped up, resulting in large numbers of politically motivated arrests and charges, with many cases of physical abuse, often resulting in the deaths of leading activists of the ethnic minorities (60). Some of these cases of human rights violation have received wide media coverage in the West (61), and have been documented by human rights monitoring groups such as Amnesty International and the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation:

In recent years consistent reports have reached Amnesty International that members of the Hungarian minority who publicly complain about cultural and political discrimination or engage in cultural activities disapproved of by the authorities, are exposed to maltreatment, short term detentions and other forms of harassment. Some have been sent to forced labor camps or to psychiatric hospi-
tals... Amnesty International is concerned that members of the Hungarian minority who have protested at such policies and legislation have been sentenced to terms of imprisonment and subjected to various forms of persecution. (62)

those who, in [the] spirit of the Helsinki Final Act, monitor and protest human rights violations against the Hungarian minority are singled out for repression. (63)

The case of Zoltan Kallos is a typical illustration of the Rumanian government's discriminatory nationality policy:

Amnesty International adopted Mr. Kallos as a prisoner of conscience because it was probable that the genuine reason for his imprisonment was his persistent efforts to preserve and compile works of Hungarian culture. (64)

This was a clear indication of the Ceausescu regime's intentions towards the preservation of Hungarian culture.

v) Statistical discrimination.

Hungarians in Rumania are also statistically underreported:

Some Romanian demographers in the Western world, like G. Satmarescu believe that the Romanian census has seriously underreported the number of Hungarian and German minorities by at least 5-900 000. (65)

The underreporting of the minority populations and the increasing unavailability of statistical data relating to the minorities underscore the Rumanian regime's nationality policy which considers the nationality question as non-existent. The study of this question is therefore hampered by the lack of accurate information, particularly since the last available official Rumanian census dates from 1977 (66).
vi) The Rumanian propaganda campaign.

In order to divert attention from its nationality problems, and to refute accusations of human rights violations and of minority persecution, the Ceausescu regime mounted an intensive international propaganda campaign. The regime claimed that the ethnic minorities were well treated in Rumania, enjoying full rights under the Rumanian Constitution, with equality before the law, equal employment opportunities, full educational possibilities in the nationalities' languages, promotion of nationality cultural development, a comprehensive network of mass communications and cultural artistic institutions at the nationalities' disposal, referring to official statistics and to officially selected spokesmen representing the nationalities. Thus, the official Rumanian position on the nationality question is that:

România, a unitary national state on whose territory other nationalities have also settled down in the course of history, is one of the few countries in the world where the national question has been fully and forever solved... (67)

As Ceausescu himself reiterated the position of the Rumanian Socialist Republic on the nationality question in a speech before the joint cession of the Hungarian and German Nationality Workers' Councils in Bucharest, December 27, 1984:

The national question has been settled completely in this country, and any attempts at diversion, at questioning it, can only misinform the respective peoples or nations. (68)

The Ceausescu regime denied all foreign reports concerning the deteriorating situation of the ethnic minorities, claiming that these reports were untrue and that they were deliberately seeking
to provoke unrest:

In the light of the historic achievements scored by the Socialist Republic of Romania in the development of economy, science and culture, in the improvement of the people's living standards, in the settlement, in the spirit of scientific socialism, of the problems regarding the peaceful coexistence of all working people, irrespective of nationality, all the more blamable are the perfidious attempts made by certain reactionary circles abroad to deny and denigrate these realities, to interfere in our internal affairs, to distort historical truths, to raise again for discussion the decisions of the peace treaties and the question of the existing frontiers... certain reactionary circles which, under the pretext of upholding the rights of the national minorities, incite to nationalist, chauvinist, irredentist, and revanchist manifestations, use international meetings - the all-European Meeting in Vienna too - for propagandist attacks... (69)

The Rumanian propaganda campaign concentrated heavily on discrediting the Western Hungarian community as well as the Hungarian state, accusing them of subversive anti-Rumanian activities such as the dissemination of false reports about Rumania, the falsification of the history of Transylvania, and the promotion of nationalistic agitation with the intention of separating Transylvania from Rumania. The Rumanian authorities therefore expressed their condemnation of any attempt at falsifying the truth, the realities in Romania, which is aimed at destroying our unity by disseminating nationalism, chauvinism, and by reviving the irredentist and revanchist conceptions... hostile attitudes which are manifest even in the Hungarian People's Republic... the increasing number of studies, articles, books and history treatises, maps and other teaching and propagandistic materials printed in the Hungarian People's Republic which reveal both the lack of knowledge and the falsification of the Romanian people's history, the attack against the territorial integrity of the country... (70)
The Rumanians were therefore accusing the Hungarians of provoking ethnic unrest in Rumania. In order to counter Hungarian claims concerning the history of Transylvania and the Hungarian minority there, the Rumanian government disseminated large quantities of written material throughout the West. Universities, libraries, and politicians were provided with numerous official Rumanian publications (The Globe and Mail, March 25, 1987), exhibitions were mounted (Morisset library, University of Ottawa, February 1989), public relations meetings were convened (Rumanian cultural evening, University of Ottawa, February 1988), and advertisements appeared in newspapers (Financial Post, November 28, 1988, p.22), with the objective of presenting a favorable image of Rumania and of conveying a negative image of the Hungarians in Western official circles and public opinion:

Transylvania... is Romanian territory historically, and has been a part of Romania for two thousand years... the birthplace of the nation. This historical right and claim, however, is continually disputed by Hungarians, both here and abroad. Some Hungarian activists are not only vehement, but violent and wrongfully accuse Romania of persecution of minorities within Transylvania, especially the Hungarians who live there... minorities there as well as elsewhere in Romania are not persecuted. They are well treated and in fact, the Romanian government bends over backwards in dealing with them so as to allow them more freedom of expression. Nevertheless, Transylvania continues to be a source of agitation and friction... for still another committee of Hungarians for the purpose of severing Transylvania from Romania and joining it to Hungary. (71)

The Rumanians also engaged in the dissemination of anti-Hungarian literature (72). Such disinformation concerning the Transylvanian Question has also been a contributing factor in the deterioration
of the nationality problem, making it possible for Rumania to receive not only diplomatic support, but also technological and economic assistance from the West, thus allowing the Ceausescu regime to pursue its policies (73). The Western states, as in many other cases, seemed to attach a greater importance to the apparent independent course taken by a country vis-a-vis the Soviet Union than to the human rights record of that country. However, the degree of actual independence of Rumania vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the advantage which the West might have drawn from the support of Rumanian independence while neglecting the minority rights issue are questionable. In fact, as events have shown, the nationality question, and particularly the Transylvanian Hungarians, played a key role in the Rumanian revolution of December 1989, and the continuing nationality problems within the former Soviet Bloc are a destabilizing factor which still represents the greatest threat to European security.

vii) The effects of Rumanian nationality policy.

Despite the intensive measures enforced by the Ceausescu regime in order to assimilate the non-Rumanian nationalities, it appears that this policy was not as effective as it may have been thought. The pressures exerted by the communist regime upon the minorities to forcibly assimilate them have apparently resulted in increased awareness of ethnic culture, and this in turn prevented any linguistic "Romanianization". On this basis, it seems unlikely that further socio-economic "assimilation" will reduce Hungarian and German separateness; on the contrary, ethnic pride and particularism might increase...
There appears to be some assimilation of elites, but the masses of Hungarians and Germans have remained staunchly true to their ethnic heritage. (74)

The policy of forced assimilation pursued by the Rumanian regime therefore appears to have been counterproductive. The failure of the Ceausescu regime's nationality policy may have prompted the authorities to increase the level of oppression against the minorities, but this did not eliminate the resistance of the nationalities against cultural assimilation. As a matter of fact, it seems that ethnic minorities have tended to assimilate to a greater extent in liberal democratic societies than under totalitarian regimes. In the former, there is no policy of forcible cultural assimilation and ethnic groups are free to preserve their culture. However, the free-market economies have a greater assimilative effect, possibly due to the fact that the integrating and standardizing factors in an economically developed and technologically advanced liberal society are more subtle and effective than the imposed policies of a totalitarian regime.

As a result, the Rumanian cultural and socio-economic policies imposed considerable hardships upon the nationalities and aggravated the internal and international tensions between Rumanians and non-Rumanians:

Ceausescu's strongly ethnocentric national communism, highlighted by the anti-Hungarian character of the Daco-Roman theory, aggravates its relations with Hungary and effectively alienates the country's significant Magyar population. (75)
Rumanian nationality policy may in fact have been based on a self-fulfilling prophecy (76). The Rumanian authorities considered the ethnic Hungarians as virtual enemies of the Rumanian national state and therefore treated them accordingly:

the Romanian state treats the Hungarian minority as an alien body, considers it a potential danger to the territorial integrity of the Romanian state, and therefore subjects it to greater pressure and discrimination... (77)

This treatment effectively forced the ethnic Hungarians to oppose the Rumanian state since their existence as a distinct cultural entity was threatened by the policies pursued by the Ceausescu regime. In this manner, the discriminatory nationality policy of the Rumanian government towards ethnic Hungarians may in fact have been more of an actual source of threat to the Ceausescu regime's own stability and to the state's security than the presumed separatist intentions of the Transylvanian Hungarians (78). The downfall of the Ceausescu regime in December 1989 tends to support this argument since the Hungarian protest of Temesvar/Timisoara against the treatment of the Reverend Laszlo Tokés seems to have sparked the Rumanian revolution.

III. Determining factors in Rumanian nationality policy.

i) Legitimacy.

A key factor determining Rumanian nationality policy under the Ceausescu regime seems to have been the need for legitimacy, both political and historical. There was a need for the justification of Rumanian claims for historical rights for the possession of
disputed territories such as Transylvania, and there was also a need for the justification of the regime's policies (79). In both cases the Rumanian regime sought legitimacy through the exploitation of nationalism based on the official historical interpretation (80). Thus, the Ceausescu regime can be characterized as "national-chauvinistic"...
The present chauvinism of the Ceausescu regime has been a source of political strength in the ethnic Romanian population... the very chauvinism of the Ceausescu regime had also ensured the loyalty of important societal elites in the ethnic Romanian population... Such a policy, while contributing to the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the ethnic Romanians, has clearly been perceived as dangerous and ill-conceived by most of the ethnic minorities in Romania. (81)
The apprehensions expressed by these ethnic groups seem to have been justifiable as they have become one of the principal targets of Rumanian nationalism. As a result, they are denigrated, used as scapegoats, and subjected to a policy of forced assimilation:

an excessive emphasis on the interests of the state is a disguised form of nationalism, unmistakably aimed at the assimilation of minorities... (82)

... the Rumanian dictator's ideology of nationalism which strives to generate at least some measure of popularity by propounding the myth of Rumanian cultural, historical and political superiority. National minorities, the bone-in-the-throat of this neo-fascist myth of a culturally and ethnically "pure" nation-state, must be forced to relinquish their uniqueness, to lose their national identities and to assimilate. But, even until this goal is achieved, minorities can and do serve as convenient scapegoats for the country's severe economic decline. (83)

Ethnic Hungarians were therefore subjected to a highly discriminatory nationality policy due to the Rumanian regime's need for legitimacy. There were several historical, political, and economic reasons which urged the Rumanian regime to seek
legitimacy, both externally and domestically.

ii) Historical factors - territorial integrity.

Since its creation, the existence of a Greater Rumania required justification because of the contested legitimacy of Rumania's acquisition of Transylvania, the Banat, Bessarabia, the Bukovina, and the Dobrudja. Rumania acquired these territories by wars of conquest during the 20th c. at the expense of its neighbors, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Russia. These neighboring states were in possession of the territories in question prior to the creation of Rumania in the 19th c. Rumania's claims for historical rights for the possession of these territories were repeatedly challenged by Rumania's neighbors, resulting in territorial revisions, as in the case of Transylvania:

Romania was a state artificially created in 1918 through acts of aggression and annexation of foreign territories, a multinational state in which the nations are kept by force... (84)

The possession of these disputed territories was therefore an unsettled matter.

Because Rumanian historiography claims Transylvania as the birthplace of the Rumanian nation (85), and because Rumania's other territorial disputes are politically related to the Transylvanian Question (86), any challenge to Rumania's territorial possessions, especially to the possession of Transylvania, is perceived by the Rumanians as ultimately questioning the legitimacy of the existence of their national state. Given such challenges, whether real or
perceived, the Rumanian state is not secure in its possession of the annexed territories, especially since these territories are also inhabited by non-Rumanian ethnic groups. The Rumanian state therefore requires justification for its territorial possessions and considers its ethnic minorities as potential threats to its territorial integrity. Rumanians are therefore extremely sensitive to questions concerning the possession of Transylvania and the status of the Hungarians inhabiting that region.

The most recent flare-up in the dispute over historical rights to Transylvania following the publication of a three-volume History of Transylvania (Erdély Torténete) by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1986 illustrated the sensitivity of the Rumanian regime which reacted extremely negatively to what it perceived as a criticism and contradiction of its official historical version:

the virulence of the Romanian response to the fundamental theses of the Hungarian publication attests to the continuing relevance of territorial issues in the formulation and evolution of foreign and domestic policies in contemporary Eastern Europe. (87)

According to N. Stone, history professor at Oxford University, in an article published in the Times Literary Supplement, the Rumanian reaction was "exaggerated, grotesque, and hysterical" regarding the Hungarian position relative to the theory of Daco-Roman continuity (Magyar Elet, Apr. 2, 1988). This incident represented an escalation in the "war of words" between the two countries.

The Rumanian attitude stems from the persistent fear that the
question of Transylvania's status has not been definitively settled and that the Hungarian state might once again reclaim this province using the presence of the Hungarian minority as a pretext. Although previous historical experience may seem to justify the Rumanian concerns about Hungarian revisionism, successive Hungarian governments have repeatedly denied such aims:

no Hungarian government or organization of any kind since the war has presented any territorial claims toward Romania. The expressed Romanian fear of this is therefore unfounded. (88)

However, as a result of this fear, the Hungarians are seen as both an external and an internal threat to Rumanian security and territorial integrity. This may partly explain the Rumanian efforts to eliminate the presence of the Transylvanian Hungarians through cultural assimilation and relocation in other territories, thereby removing what is considered as a domestic source of threat and eliminating the basis for possible Hungarian demands for territorial revision. Rumanian nationality policy may therefore be dictated to some extent by such strategic considerations:

[Romanians] fear that the presence of a Hungarian population in Transylvania might once again provide a pretext for detaching part of it from Romania, as happened in 1940... Thus, from the Romanian viewpoint, the only long-term solution that makes sense is the disappearance of the Hungarian minority. (89)

iii) Hungarian-Rumanian relations and the nationality question: the Hungarian position relative to the Transylvanian Question.

Since the Rumanian authorities have repeatedly blamed the Hungarian state and Hungarian groups in the West for instigating
Transylvanian separatism, it is also necessary to determine the Hungarian position relative to the Transylvanian Question and to what extent it may have affected Rumanian nationality policy.

Between the two world wars, Hungarian foreign policy was based on the rejection of the validity of the Treaty of Trianon (90). Hungary protested against Rumania's annexation of Transylvania, questioning that country's claim of legitimate historical right for the possession of Transylvania and criticizing the treatment of the Hungarian minority by the Rumanian state (91). The objective of Hungarian foreign policy was the recovery of the lost territories, including Transylvania (92). During W.W.II, this policy was only partially and temporarily successful.

However, this revisionist policy was abandoned as the imposition of Soviet-style communism in Hungary was accompanied by a policy aiming to replace Hungarian national consciousness with "socialist patriotism" and "proletarian internationalism":

The "patriotism" of the Communist Party in Hungary had nothing to do with the real interests of the nation... the Hungarian Communist leadership... engaged in extinguishing national feelings of its own people. (93)

... the Hungarian Communist Party, which has been vigorously antinational ever since it came to power after World War II... (94)

In effect, this meant unconditional loyalty to Moscow, Sovietization, and the falsification of Hungarian history. For this purpose, the Hungarian communist regime also found it useful to perpetuate a theory which the Habsburgs had imposed after the
defeat of the Hungarian War of Independence of 1848-49. Then, the Habsburgs took over the Hungarian academic institutions and introduced the so-called Finno-Ugrian theory about the origins of the Hungarians:

This theory was welcomed and strongly supported for political reasons by the Habsburg dynasty, which was anxious, after the tragic events of 1849, to curb Hungarian influence... by injecting the leaders of that nation with an inferiority complex. (95)

The politicians of the [Habsburg] Emperor advocated this theory not only to foreign nations, but they also wanted to make the Magyar people believe in the low level of their origins... (96)

Absolutism attacked the Hungarian Academy... with changes that threatened the national character of the Academy... the members of the Academy were appointed by the K.u.K. High Command... to give Széchenyi's great establishment an anti-national direction. (97)

...the scientific apparatus patronised by Vienna started to give the Hungarians a new concept of their own history: a history aimed at producing humility and obedient servants. (98)

...certain foreign scholars, mainly Germans... hardly concealed their hate towards the Hungarians... scientific objectivity was often lost in this fervour to create a Finno-Ugrian prehistory for the Hungarians. (99)

The Hungarian Academy of Sciences therefore became an instrument of first the Habsburg, and later, of the communist regime’s cultural policy, the objective of which was to eliminate Hungarian national consciousness through the distortion and falsification of data relating to the origin, the history, the culture, and the language of the Hungarians. It was therefore in the interest of the communist regime to let the conquered Hungarians believe that they have an ancestry more primitive than that of the Indo-European peoples. In Habsburg times Hungarian children were
taught that most of their civilization came from the Germans; today they are taught that their "barbaric" ancestors were civilized by the educated Slavs. (100)

The Finno-Ugrian theory claims that the Hungarians and the Finnish peoples originated from primitive Siberian hunter-gatherer nomads who wandered Westward and who acquired a higher culture upon coming into contact with European peoples and settling among them. From the culturally biased Western point of view, the implication of this theory is that the Hungarians are a culturally and racially inferior ethnic group which is alien to Europe. This theory was therefore useful for those regimes which sought to justify the subjugation of the Hungarians and which had territorial claims against them. In contrast, prior to the introduction of the Finno-Ugrian theory, the Hungarians' own traditional account of their origins and history was that their ancestors were Atilla's Huns. This knowledge was passed on orally from one generation to the next as all the ancient written records of the Hungarians had been destroyed during the forced Christianization of Hungary. However, the Hungarians' national consciousness was greatly influenced by this knowledge. The Finno-Ugrian theory, which denies the Hun-Magyar ethnic relationship, was therefore designed to weaken the Hungarians' national consciousness and thus to facilitate their domination by external forces. The Finno-Ugrian theory has been increasingly brought under criticism by Hungarian researchers forced into exile by the Hungarian communist regime which prohibited any research orientation which did not follow the
officially imposed Finno-Ugrian theory. This theory was criticized because of its negative portrayal of the Hungarians in relation to their neighbors, because of the historical and political circumstances under which this theory was imposed and perpetuated, and because this theory fails to take into consideration a substantial amount of scientific data which contradicts it. The dissenting researchers have therefore come to the conclusion that the official version of Hungary's history has been fundamentally falsified in order to serve foreign interests. (For further reference, consult the non-communist Hungarian sources listed in the bibliography.)

Thus, as a result of the national policy of the communist regime, Hungary officially renounced all former territorial claims (101), and the issue of the Hungarians living in the neighboring states was passed under silence (102):

It is as though certain forces in the mother country and in minority circles as well had sought to eradicate from the mind of the public any awareness of the cohesiveness of the Hungarian nation... During the Rakosi era, the question of Hungarians living in neighboring countries was declared taboo... [even after 1956] the basically unaltered official position was that Hungary had nothing to do with the Hungarians of neighboring countries... (103)

As a result, until recently, the former Hungarian communist regime withdrew from any active role in the Transylvanian Question. Under the Kadar regime, Hungary's official position was one of non-involvement in the question of the Hungarian minority's situation in Romania (104). This policy of non-intervention was determined by
political and ideological considerations:

The global ideological cleavage prevents Hungary from raising the question of Hungarian national minorities before the United Nations... Hungary, being a member of the Soviet-led bloc of Communist states, could not think of bringing a complaint against another member of the bloc before an international agency...
Postwar Communist Hungary alone among the countries of the Soviet bloc has been ruled by a regime which ostensibly indulged in antinational indoctrination. The Communist regime in Hungary was forcibly feeding its people humiliating doctrines of national inferiority. Hungarians were taught to regard themselves as a "guilty" nation, a "fascist nation", and to behave accordingly, unlearning in particular such nationalist bad habits as poking their noses into the internal affairs of their neighbors ruling over Hungarian minorities. (105)

The question of ethnic minorities as they touched upon Hungarian-Rumanian relations was settled by the official declaration, in 1977, that the ethnic minorities should fulfill the role of "bridge building" (106) between the two nations. This rather vague diplomatic formulation proved to be devoid of substance as the Rumanian regime continued unhindered its policy of forced assimilation against ethnic Hungarians, the seemingly conciliatory Hungarian policy - non-intervention in the Transylvanian Question and the generous treatment of Rumanians in Hungary - having no apparent effect other than possibly giving the impression to the Rumanian regime that its discriminatory nationality policy could be enforced without fear of any retaliatory measure from Hungary. The appeasement policy of the Kadar regime towards Rumania has therefore failed to solve the problem of the Transylvanian Hungarian minority, and may have actually contributed to it:
In their criticism of earlier Hungarian nationalism and irredentism, Stalinist ideologues and propagandists in Hungary frequently adopted the arguments of nationalists in neighboring countries... In a manner unique to Central Europe, the criticism of nationalism was applicable only to Hungarian nationalism... excusing and even indirectly encouraging nationalism in some of the neighboring countries. (107)

However, Hungarian official policy with respect to the issue of the treatment of the Hungarians in Rumania has undergone a marked shift during the late 1980's. This was due to both internal and external factors:

the recent relaxation of political pressure within the country, coupled with the deterioration of the situation of Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries, has served to further strengthen Hungary's resurgent national consciousness. (108)

The political transformation taking place within Hungary has thus been accompanied by an increasingly openly voiced public and official concern over the situation of the Hungarians in Rumania (109), especially since this problem has been directly spilling over into Hungary as tens of thousands of ethnic Hungarian refugees from Transylvania have fled to neighboring parts of Hungary due to the Ceausescu regime's systematization program, and this was also accompanied by an increase in incidents at the Hungarian-Rumanian border (110). These developments have therefore forced the Hungarian government to involve itself in the problem. The new Hungarian position is increasingly critical of the Rumanian policy towards ethnic Hungarians and Hungary is actively seeking a solution to this problem within the framework of the U.N. and of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This
reorientation in Hungarian policy corresponds more closely to the affirmation of Hungarian national interests and represents a long-delayed response to the persistent anti-Hungarian policies pursued by Rumania:

It demonstrates the bankruptcy of official internationalism, the failure of efforts of four decades aimed at purging Hungarian society of patriotic interest in problems affecting the existence of the Hungarian state and the Hungarian people. (111)

However, so far, Hungarian policies relative to the Transylvanian Question seem to have had no decisive impact upon Rumanian nationality policy towards ethnic Hungarians (112). The Rumanian policy of forced assimilation against ethnic Hungarians has been enforced irrespective of the official Hungarian position. It may have been in the political interest of the Ceausescu regime to maintain the Hungarian-Rumanian antagonism over the issue of the Transylvanian Hungarians and to use the ensuing threat (real or imaginary) of the loss of Transylvania to Hungary as a justification of its policies. The Ceausescu regime therefore promoted and exploited the clash of Hungarian and Rumanian national aspirations in order to gain domestic support.

Furthermore, Hungary does not have at its disposal any effective means of directly influencing the Rumanian regime's nationality policy, and if Hungary attempts to conciliate the Rumanian regime, the latter may interpret this as a recognition of the legitimacy of Rumanian historical claims and of its policies, but if Hungary
protests against these policies, the Rumanian regime can exploit this in order to justify its expressed apprehension of Hungarian revisionism. In either case, there seems to be no positive effect on the situation of the Transylvanian Hungarians. Thus, Hungary's policy options towards Rumania, and their effectiveness, seem to be rather limited under the present circumstances. It is therefore the Rumanian interpretations or allegations concerning Hungarian intentions relative to the Transylvanian issue, rather than actual Hungarian policies, which seem to play an apparent role in determining Rumanian nationality policy. A further constraining factor upon Hungarian policy may have been the fact that

The Rumanian government uses the Hungarian minority in Rumania as a hostage, as a means of blackmail in Hungarian-Rumanian interstate relations. The character and timing of each anti-minority measure leave no doubt that it was intended as an unfriendly gesture towards Hungary. (113)

A factor which further antagonized Rumanian-Hungarian relations was the comparatively more liberal nature of the Hungarian communist regime and the relatively higher Hungarian living standard. This placed additional pressure upon the Rumanian Communist Party to justify its domestic policies. As a result, Hungary was considered to have a subversive counter-revolutionary influence upon Rumanian society by the Ceausescu regime (114), thereby providing a further pretext for the isolation of the Transylvanian Hungarians from Hungary, both of which were accused of being sources of Rumania's domestic problems by the Rumanian regime. The latter was therefore acting out of political expediency by assuming a confrontational attitude vis-a-vis the Hungarians,
exploiting the anti-Hungarian sentiments inherent to Rumanian nationalism.


The Rumanian apprehensions concerning the Transylvanian Question are heightened by the fact that this issue is involved in the triangular relationship between the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Rumania (115). In 1964, the Soviet Union reopened the Transylvanian Question in response to the Rumanian policy of greater independence within the Soviet bloc and the reassertion of Rumanian nationalism which accompanied it (116). The resurgence of Rumanian nationalism, with its traditional anti-Hungarian and anti-Russian overtones, also rekindled the Bessarabian question. Therefore, as a countermeasure, the Soviet Union raised the Transylvanian Question in order to neutralize Rumanian claims to Bessarabia (117). The reopening of the Transylvanian Question also served the divide and rule policy of the Soviet Union and provided it with leverage over Hungary. The Soviet involvement in territorial issues concerning Rumania, with the tacit encouragement of Hungarian criticism towards Rumania, seems to have had repercussions in terms of Rumanian nationality policy:

> With the degeneration of Russo-Rumanian relations, and particularly after the reopening of the territorial question in 1964, the process of making Transylvania more "Rumanian" gained more momentum. (118)

The apparent Soviet-Hungarian collaboration in relation to the Transylvanian issue therefore seems to have prompted an intensification of the Rumanian policy of forced assimilation of
ethnic Hungarians. However, it should be noted that

at no time in the 1960s or, for that matter, ever since
did the Kremlin support Hungarian irredentism outright
nor did it support Budapest make specific demands for territorial
readjustments in Transylvania. Yet, the Transylvanian
Question remains a major issue in Romanian, Hungarian
and, indirectly, in Soviet policies for reasons rooted
in the history, past and present, of all concerned. (119)

In the past, Soviet policies concerning Transylvania varied in
accordance with Russian interests and objectives, shifting in
support from the Hungarian to the Rumanian side depending on the
circumstances:

The exploitation of nationalism and corollary territorial
issues has been instrumental in the attainment of the
Russian goal, as laid down by tsars and restated by the
Comintern and the Kremlin, of securing hegemony in Eastern
Europe. (120)

In this manner, the Soviet Union has been exploiting and
exacerbating the Hungarian-Rumanian dispute over the Transylvanian
Question:

Moscow is exploiting the grievances of Romania's mini-
orities for its own ends, applying the traditional prin-
ciple of divide and rule to play off Bucharest and
Budapest against each other. (121)

It appears therefore that Soviet policies had some influence over
Rumanian nationality policy: for example, in 1964, the linkage of
the Bessarabian and Transylvanian territorial issues was followed
by an intensification of the process of Rumanianization, whereas in
1968, the perceived threat of Soviet intervention was followed by
a relaxation of anti-minority measures. However, this effect seems
to have been only marginal and temporary as former Rumanian regimes
have sought to isolate that country from foreign influences (122).
The Soviet Union has therefore influenced Rumanian nationality
policy to a certain extent, but this influence does not appear to have been a fundamental determining factor.

v) Political and ideological factors: legitimization through nationalism.

For political and ideological reasons, the Rumanian communist regimes also required the acceptance of the Rumanian population and sought its support. Since the Rumanian Communist Party came to power as a result of the Soviet occupation at the end of W.W.II, following which it pursued a pro-Soviet policy, and given the anti-Russian and anti-communist character of traditional Rumanian nationalism, the RCP had to prove its patriotism in order to gain popularity and the acceptance of communism:

The communists' lack of commitment to Romanian nationalism until the mid-fifties is a matter of record... the equating of communist nationalism with historic Romanian nationalism... was made largely because of the pragmatic requirement of political survival. (123)

Thus, in order to legitimize the imposition of the socialist transformation of the country, the RCP sought to promote its image as the protector of Rumanian national interests.

vi) Economic factors.

The increasing emphasis on Rumanian nationalism and on the absolute priority of Rumanian national interests by the Ceausescu regime was, to a growing extent, related to the economic situation resulting from the regime's policy of national independence. In this context, the paying off of the country's foreign debt through
increased exports and the industrialization of the country were promoted by the regime for reasons of national interest, but in fact, these policies resulted in the severe deterioration of the living conditions of the country's population:

The Party leadership has endeavored to compensate for domestic tensions and deficiencies resulting from over-ambitious plans and the inherent inefficiencies of the regime by fanning the flames of national sentiment, by a constant reiteraton of Romanian independence, and by frequent coercive measures... There was a basic need to create a political atmosphere in which, through a constant emphasis on independence and Romanian national interests, attention could be drawn away from the gradually emerging economic difficulties, including serious inadequacies of supply... (124)

... faced with popular discontent resulting from sharply deteriorating economic conditions, the Ceausescu regime has intensified appeals to chauvinistic sentiment. Instead of instituting long overdue reforms, the government actively propounds the myth of Rumanian cultural superiority, hoping in this way to deflect criticism and salvage some measure of national cohesion. (125)

Attention was to be diverted from Romania's economic ills with the suggestion that, if only the country could be nationally homogeneous, the Romanian people would not suffer the difficulties they were experiencing. Discontent was inevitably focused on the Hungarian minority, for the other acceptable target, the Soviet Union, was too dangerous. (126)

The worsening economic conditions therefore contributed to the deterioration of the nationality problem as the minorities became the target of increased discrimination due to the Ceausescu regime's diversionary policy of inciting nationalism.

vii) Official Rumanian history: policy justification

In its pursuit of legitimacy through nationalism, the Rumanian regime has sought historical justifications for its policies:
the essential task of Romanian historiography has been to provide a "scientific basis" for validating the varying claims advanced by leaders of the Romanian communist movement in search of legitimacy... The political requirements made mandatory not only the reinterpretation of Romanian history but also the falsification of data. (127)

President Ceausescu's search for legitimacy... has contributed to the rewriting of the history of Romania... [the communists] assumed the role of executors of the historical legacy and presumed goals of the Romanian nation and the history of Romania and of the Romanians had to be adapted to the needs of the communist leaders... [whose] reading of the myths and realities of Romanian history... is also not in conformity with the historical truth. (128)

Since the RCP posed as the defender of the traditional historical interests of Rumania,

the Romanian leadership adopted extreme nationalist positions commensurate with claims of execution of historic legacy rooted in the legitimacy of the entire Romanian historic experience... (129)

Due to the fact that traditional nationalism is considered to be the central element of the Rumanian historical legacy which the RCP claimed to be defending (130), and that "anti-Magyarism" is an integral part of traditional Rumanian nationalism (131), certain aspects of the official version of Rumanian history, as well as certain Rumanian policies, have "a distinctly anti-Hungarian character". (132)

The xenophobic nationalist doctrine promoted by the Ceausescu regime (133) has largely replaced marxism-leninism as the state ideology:

[Rumania] is simultaneously an autocratic and an ethnocratic state. Its present leadership strives less and less to compensate for their oppression and pauperization of Rumanian citizens by appealing to the class struggle and,
instead, increasingly resorts to nationalistic phraseology suggestive of national supremacy. In line with fascist models, its ideology treats the minority, and any alien in general, as a scapegoat and source of danger... The propagation of Rumanian national supremacy and enforcement of anti-minority policies are a logically matched pair in nationalist ideology. (134)

The theory of Daco-Roman continuity constitutes the principal ideological weapon of state policy towards ethnic minorities in Rumania (135). This theory is offensive and discriminatory towards ethnic minorities, labelling them as second-class citizens with the implication that they should emigrate or assimilate (136).

The objective of official Rumanian historiography is to present the Rumanian people as the original inhabitants of all lands claimed by Rumania, including Transylvania. The ancestors of the Rumanian people are claimed to have had an ancient civilization, whereas the "co-inhabiting nationalities" are described as being uncultured latecomers who invaded the ancestral Rumanian lands (137):

the Rumanian discovered in his past... his superiority to the other nations of Transylvania. (138)

Thus, the nationalities are portrayed as the historical enemies of the Rumanian people (139). The official Rumanian ideology therefore depicts the Hungarians as "Asiatic barbarian hordes" which invaded the ancient lands of the Rumanians and subjugated and oppressed that "indigenous population" for a thousand years (140). Today's Transylvanian Hungarians are accused by the Rumanian authorities of harboring "chauvinistic anti-Rumanian tendencies... with the pernicious slogan of Magyar unity" (141):
[Hungarian] efforts to assert their cultural rights are seen as an endeavor to restore their Transylvanian dominance. They are accused of seeking more rights for themselves than the Rumanians enjoy in their own native home. (142)

According to official state propaganda, the Hungarians' conciliatory approach hides their "revisionist, irredentist, fascist" motives (143). Such incitement to national hatred seeks to prevent any cooperation and the possibility of peaceful coexistence between the nationalities in Rumania (144).

The official Rumanian history attempted to explain all events leading up to the creation of Greater Rumania as being part of a continuous conscious effort by a nationally self-aware Rumanian people to achieve full national unity and independence in order to restore their homeland in its "ancient glory" (145). Furthermore, the Ceausescu regime claimed that it was only with the socialist transformation of Rumania and its progress towards communism under the leadership of the great "Conducator" that the restoration of the Rumanian "golden era" could be achieved (146). Professor Fischer-Galati described this interpretation as a "historic fairy tale" (147). The present official Rumanian historical version is therefore a product of the Ceausescu regime which sought justification for its policies. This historical version promotes Rumanian nationalism with its inherent anti-Hungarian bias, thereby enhancing the discriminatory character of the nationality policy and of the popular attitude towards Hungarians.

IV. The Hungarian-Rumanian conflict and the anti-Hungarian bias.
The anti-Hungarian bias manifested by Rumanian historiography and by Rumanian policies stems from the antagonistic Hungarian-Rumanian relationship which developed during the last two centuries. The Hungarian-Rumanian ethnic conflict and the resultant anti-Hungarian bias are two fundamental factors which have determined Rumanian policy towards Hungarians.


Anti-Hungarian policies were not an exclusive feature of the previous communist Rumanian regime and were not exclusively conditioned by its particular political, ideological, or economic concerns. The Rumanians were not the only nationality to be in conflict with the Hungarians, nor were they the only ones to pursue anti-Hungarian policies or to manifest an anti-Hungarian bias. The Hungarian-Rumanian ethnic conflict and the discrimination and prejudices directed against the Hungarians are not limited to contemporary Rumania but are an integral part of a much broader context. The Hungarian-Rumanian conflict did not develop in isolation and did not involve only these two nations. It was essentially generated and conditioned by factors which were external to the Carpatho-Danubian region, namely the interference of major foreign powers and of their rivalries, which had a decisive impact upon Hungarian-Rumanian relations:

the ultimate determining factors for instability in Transylvania [were] the concern and actions of the Great Powers in general and of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in particular... (148)

At first, the Ottoman Empire’s advance into the Balkans,
starting in the 14th c., caused large-scale population movements as a result of which the Croats, Serbs, and Rumanians (known as Wallachians at the time) shifted Northward into Hungarian territory. The Hungarians and Rumanians were thus brought into closer contact with each other. At that time, before the age of modern nationalism, there was no Hungarian-Rumanian antagonism. The antagonism started under Habsburg rule during the 18th c. The latter pursued a policy of foreign colonization in Hungary in order to apply the divide and rule principle. As a result, frictions increased between the Hungarians and Rumanians, whose numbers were rapidly growing due to immigration. Tensions reached a critical level during the 1848-49 Hungarian War of Independence. The Rumanians sided with the Habsburgs against the Hungarians, thus generating antagonism between the two nationalities. Following the Habsburgs, France (during the interwar period), Germany (during W.W.II), and the Soviet Union (since W.W.II) have successively pursued hegemonic policies in the Danubian Basin, applying the divide and rule principle by promoting and exploiting conflicts among the nationalities of the region. Such foreign intervention and domination in the Danubian region prevented peaceful cooperation among the various nationalities and rendered the latter politically dependent upon the major powers. The Transylvanian Question was therefore essentially determined by major power interests (149).

A further contributing factor to the Hungarian-Rumanian conflict is the cultural difference between the two ethnic groups. A
characteristic of this difference is the religious divide separating the Catholic and Protestant Hungarians from the Orthodox Rumanians. This factor is a manifestation of the division between the Eastern and Western civilizations. In this context, Hungary has been portrayed as a "bastion" or "spearhead" of Western Christianity against the East. However, it should be emphasized that the Hungarians have been forced to convert to Christianity and that this had highly detrimental consequences for the original Hungarian culture. As a result, there is an emerging reaction on the part of many nationally conscious Hungarians against Western influence and in favor of an increased interest in and awareness of the original cultural identity of the Hungarians. Culturally and ethno-linguistically, the Hungarians are more closely related to the Turanian peoples of the East, such as the Turks.

ii) Anti-Hungarian bias.

A crucial factor which had a detrimental effect upon the situation of the Hungarian minorities is the image of the Hungarians and the anti-Hungarian policies which that image promotes. In the West, there is a widespread anti-Hungarian bias rooted in certain misconceptions about the origins and the nature of the Hungarians. Although Germans, Czechs, and Rumanians, among others, have considerably contributed to the propagation of such misconceptions about the Hungarians since the 19th c., this is not a relatively recent phenomenon. Even in early Judeo-Christian literature, the traditional ancestors of the Hungarians were
unfavorably regarded (150), and the Huns were defamatorily portrayed in certain Roman and Medieval sources (151). These early manifestations of anti-Hungarian literature were the products of the ignorance and fear with which the Hungarians were confronted as they came into contact with various other peoples through the ages (152). As a result, certain disputable and distorted views concerning the Hungarians have found general acceptance in the West:

where reference to Hungary is necessary, not only are the interpretations, as a rule, out of date, primitive and often unwarranted, but the facts themselves are all too often erroneous... (153)

One of the most persistent and harmful images held of the Hungarians is that they are an alien and anomalous presence in Europe, differing ethno-linguistically from the surrounding Indo-Europeans (154). The Hungarians are often portrayed as "Asiatic barbarian intruders" who caused great harm to Europe. The legitimacy of their presence in Europe is therefore questioned, and they are considered to be a culturally inferior race:

since the eighteenth century, the Hungarians' rival nations began to wish the Magyars "back to Asia". And slurs denigrating the Hungarians as "barbarian intruders" are still to be heard from some "Europeans" at odds with their Hungarian neighbors... unfriendly views of German professors and philosophers putting down the "Asiatic Magyars" as an inferior race had found a lively response among the cultural elites of Hungary's ethnically awakening non-Magyar nationalities... denouncing the Hungarians as the source of all things evil in both the past and the present... the settlement of the Magyars in the Carpathian Basin as the "greatest misfortune"... Although sheer fantasy, these views, since World War I, have found wide acceptance in the West. (155)
The Rumanians have also adopted such anti-Hungarian theories, with the view that the Hungarians are "despoilers of ancient Romanian soil of many millenia" (156), and that the Hungarians have no right to be in Europe and should be sent back to Siberia, from where they are supposed to have originated (157). Similarly unfavorable views concerning the Hungarians are also present in Western publications, as the following sample indicates:


... the 1919 Settlements put the Germans and Magyars at long last in their rightful position as two racial minorities. (Seaman, L. C. B., From Vienna to Versailles, University Paperbacks, Methuen, London, 1955, p. 202.)

German and Hungarian [minorities]... were disloyal irredentists, who used the guarantee of the rights of minorities as a shield to screen their treacherous designs... To assume that these people will overnight shed their Fascist propensities... would be quixotic... national federalism and cultural autonomy as we have proposed cannot immediately be applied to them... [they] must undergo a period of tutelage... It would be folly... to endow smaller German and Hungarian minorities with cultural autonomy... (Janowsky, O. İ., Nationalities and National Minorities, MacMillan, New York, 1945, pp. 152-153)

(In this context, it should be noted that the Rumanians, who have also sided with the Germans during W.W. II, were not labelled as a "Fascist" nation deserving punishment as were the Hungarians.)

By all rights, some say, the Hungarians should not be in Hungary at all; if their language is incomprehensible to their neighbors, if their history has been problematic, it is their own doing. Where had they come from?... just East of the Urals in Western Siberia... They were a mix of Caucasian and Mongoloid. They are now called the Finno-Ugric people... Some live a very archaic life... (Putman, J., Hungary's New Way - A Different Communism,

... les Magyars, peuple asiatique apparenté aux Mongols...
(Pernet, L., ed., *Géographie - le continent européen*, Hachette, Paris, 1973, p. 147. This is a school textbook)

An influential English-language book by a Czech medievalist advanced the theory that the "invasion of the Magyars" destroyed the "bridge" built by the Moravian Empire between East and West. Unable "to take over the task of intermediaries and to transmit to the rest of Europe the treasures of Constantinople," the Magyars supposedly "severed" Western Europe from "its intellectual roots," thus delaying the rediscovery of antiquity that came with the Renaissance. See Francis Dvornik, *The Making of Central and Eastern Europe* (London, 1949), 183-84. Quoted in Borsody, S., ed., *The Hungarians: A Divided Nation*, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, New Haven, 1988, p. 27.

In Midgley, R., ed., *Europe*, Caxton Publishing Co. Ltd, Amsterdam, 1973, p. 18, the Asiatic origin of the Hungarians is emphasized, and the relatively detailed ethno-linguistic maps on that page fail to indicate the Hungarian minorities in the states surrounding Hungary, although such other minorities as the Bretons, the Basques, the Romansch, and the Lapps are shown.

In François, D., et al., *L'époque contemporaine*, Bordas, Paris, 1971, p. 111, (this is another school textbook) an ethnographic map of Austria-Hungary showing the Transylvanian Hungarians is accompanied by the following statement: "Les Hongrois forment un bloc compact (l'enclave des paysans de Transylvanie ne compte guère)." In other words, even if the presence of the Hungarians in Transylvania is acknowledged, the Hungarian minority is dismissed as being of no importance.

The propagation and the teaching of this type of biased and inaccurate information in the West about the Hungarians is
detrimental to the survival of the Hungarian minorities since the misinformation of Western public opinion and policy-makers allows such states as Rumania to pursue discriminatory policies. This situation can be contrasted to that in South Africa, where, due to the intensive media coverage which has focused the attention of Western public opinion and policy-makers on the policy of Apartheid, relative progress has been accomplished in the field of human rights. This shows the importance of the propagation of information on policy-making.

The problem of the discriminatory treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Rumania is also related to the manipulation of information - the falsification and distortion of historical facts and of statistical data - for ideological and political purposes. This phenomenon is not unique to the Transylvanian problem. It is characteristic of many cases where a group seeks to dominate and exploit another by proclaiming its own superiority, and by attempting to impose its own culture, religion, or political system upon others, often using ideologically biased historical or scientific arguments to justify such imperialistic policies. It is therefore important to realize that ultimately, the problem of the Hungarian minorities has its roots in the prevailing prejudices promoted through propaganda and which are often translated into discriminatory policies (158).

The Rumanian nationality policy is therefore the product of a complex set of factors: historically, a fundamentally determining
factor appears to have been the intervention of major powers which have generated and exploited the antagonism between the Hungarians and the Rumanians. Thus, to a considerable extent, external interference in the affairs of the Danubian region has determined the ethno-cultural, political, economic, and ideological conditions resulting in the discriminatory policies towards national minorities such as the Transylvanian Hungarians.

NOTES

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(9) Ibid., p. 117.
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(17) Ibid., p. 120.
(18) Ibid., p. 123.
(19) Ibid., p. 124.
(21) Illyés, op. cit., p. 177.
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(23) Illyés, op. cit., p. 129.
(24) Szucs, op. cit., p. 365.
(26) Illyés, op. cit., p. 129.
(27) Ibid., p. 138.
(33) Szaz, op. cit., p. 495.
(34) Ibid., p. 493.
(35) Schopflin, op. cit., p. 15.
(36) Ibid., p. 16.
(37) Ibid., p. 15.
(40) Illyés, op. cit., p. 258; Czege, op. cit., p. 46.
(41) Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, op. cit., p. 3.
(42) Schopflin, op. cit., p. 21.
(43) Czege, op. cit., p. 70.
(45) Illyés, op. cit., p. 255.
(46) Schopflin, op. cit., p. 16.
(47) Illyés, op. cit., p. 145.
(48) Ibid., p. 144.
(49) Czege, op. cit., p. 72.
(50) The Transylvanian World Federation and the Danubian Research and Information Center, op. cit., p. 42.
(51) Ibid., p. 98.
(52) Ibid., p. 131.
(53) Joo, op. cit., p. 33.
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(56) Ibid., p. 37.
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(65) Szaz, op. cit., p. 493.
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(70) Ibid., pp. 94, 121.
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(73) The Transylvanian World Federation and the Danubian Research 
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THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE TRANSYLVANIAN HUNGARIAN MINORITY

Following the First World War, the provisions concerning the legal status of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania were included in three separate documents: the Resolutions of Gyulafehérvár (Dec. 1st, 1918), the Minority Treaty of Paris (Dec. 9, 1919), and the Treaty of Trianon (June 4, 1920) (1).

Article 3 of the Gyulafehérvár Resolutions declared as fundamental principle of the new Rumanian state, among others, the

Complete national liberty for all the cohabiting peoples of Transylvania. Each people to educate, govern and judge itself in its own language through the medium of persons from its own midst. Every people to have the right of legislative representation and of taking part in the administration of the country in proportion to the number of individuals of whom it is composed. (2)

However, this resolution was not ratified by the Rumanian parliament and therefore did not become a law of the Rumanian constitution (3). This was to have repercussions for the international legal status of the Hungarian minority.

Article 47 of the Treaty of Trianon states that:

Roumania recognizes and confirms in relation to Hungary her obligation to accept the embodiment in a Treaty with the principal Allied and Associated Powers of such provisions as may be deemed necessary by these Powers to protect the inhabitants of that state who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion... (4)

The Treaty of Trianon also guaranteed the rights of the Hungarians forced under foreign rule to retain their nationality and their
property (5). Since the Treaty of Trianon itself did not provide specifically any form of autonomy for the nationalities living in territories annexed by Rumania, the Paris Minority Treaty concluded between the Entente Powers and their allies on Dec. 9, 1919 was a pre-condition for the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon to which it was incorporated in order to place the minorities under the protection of the League of Nations (6):

The purpose of the minority treaties was the preservation and protection of the ethnic, religious and linguistic identity of those groups which had come under alien regimes against their will and as a result of the new frontiers. In other words, the ethnocultural status of these minorities was not to be endangered or adversely affected by the changes of territorial sovereignty imposed on them. (7)

However, the Little Entente states considered that in exchange for their acceptance of minority rights protection, the Entente Powers should guarantee their territorial integrity (8).

The Minority Treaties were intended to provide guarantees for the free use of the minority languages, equality of rights before the law without discrimination, including property rights, and minority schools. The Minority Treaty with Rumania also included provisions for the cultural and religious autonomy of the Transylvanian minorities (9). In fact, however, the Minority Treaties and the League of Nations proved to be of little protection for the Hungarian minorities (10). Although Rumania, together with the other successor states agreed that any member state of the Council of the League had the right to draw attention upon any violation of the Minority Treaties by any member of the
League, Hungary was never represented in the Council (11). Thus, Hungary had no real opportunity to defend the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring states. Instead, Hungary was forced to resort to a complicated bureaucratic procedure in order to submit complaints to the Minorities Question Secretariat (12). This was a lengthy and inefficient process as a result of which, although Hungary lodged numerous complaints, only twice did the issue reach the Council of the League of Nations (13).

After W. W. II, the Minority Treaties of the interwar period were declared terminated "through basic changes in conditions" (14). As a result of events during the Second World War, the issue of human rights became more prominent, obscuring the minority question. The systematic extermination of large numbers of people, the belief that international guarantees for minority rights had been used by the fascist dictatorships as pretexts for war, the massive population exchanges which took place in Central Europe following the war, may have led to the assumption that the minority question had been resolved, and that therefore the concept of national minority protection had become superfluous. Furthermore, since the USA had played a key role in drafting the new international legal statutes, the American Public Law principle that immigrants have no right to claim for special status and protection as ethnic minority groups also "contributed to the neglect and disregard of national minority rights" (15).
Thus, although the authors of the U. N. Charter assumed that minority rights are included under human rights, and that therefore they do not require special guarantees, the basic statutes do not provide for minority protection (16). As a result, there was uncertainty as to whether protection of ethnicity was included under the term of human rights (17), although implicitly, this was the case. Furthermore, although the U. N. Charter drafters recognized the need for human rights protection, the U. N. had no authority to intervene in the domestic affairs of any state, thereby rendering the U. N. ineffective in cases of human rights violations (18). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) does not specifically state that national minority members have the right to use their own language in education, before the law, "or to enjoy their own special ethnic cultural life." (19) Therefore, under these conditions, it appears that the preservation of the distinct cultural identity of national minorities is only implicitly provided for. This leaves the question of the protection of the rights of national minorities open to interpretation:

Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the U. N. Human Rights Commission in 1962, states that

All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of this right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. (20)

However, this right to self-determination was interpreted as applying only to the colonized peoples of the Third World (21).
Thus, the provisions for minority protection enacted under the auspices of the U. N. suffered from vagueness and the U. N.'s inability to intervene in domestic matters. These factors and the artificial separation of minority rights from human rights (22) may have actually contributed to the continuation of national minority oppression, particularly in states like Rumania (23).

Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, to which Rumania is a signatory party, declares that

The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere. (24)

However, there is no explicit mention that national minorities have the right to preserve their ethnic culture in order to avoid being involuntarily absorbed by the ethnic majority of the states in which they live (25). Principle VIII of the Helsinki Final Act states that

The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.

By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social, and cultural development. (26)

However, during the negotiations leading up to the accord, the Soviet Bloc countries made a distinction between peoples and
national minorities, stating that only peoples have the right to self-determination, whereas national minorities could not be granted such a right (27). Such an artificial distinction between peoples and national minorities can only be of use to states unwilling to respect the rights of their national minorities.

As a result, the value of the Helsinki Accord as a guarantee for the protection of national minorities is questionable, although the accord states in Clauses I and V that, in case of non-compliance with the principles internationally agreed to,

They /the participating States/ consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law...
For this purpose they will use such means as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means... (28)

Therefore, according to these clauses, if a signatory state does not observe the rights of national minorities, the question of territorial revision can be raised. However, this seems to be in contradiction with the inviolability of existing borders also stated in the Helsinki Accord.

The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Rumania states in Articles 17 and 22 that

The citizens of the Socialist Republic of Romania, irrespective of their nationality, race, sex, or religion shall have equal rights in all fields of economic, political, judicial, social and cultural life. The State shall guarantee the equal rights of the citizens. No restriction of these rights and no difference in their exercise on the grounds of nationality, race, sex or religion shall be permitted.
In the Socialist Republic of Romania, the co-inhabiting nationalities shall be assured the free use of their mother tongue as well as books, newspapers, periodicals,
theatres and education at all levels in their own languages. In territorial-administrative units also inhabited by population of non-Romanian nationality, all bodies and institutions shall use in speech and in writing the language of the nationality concerned and shall appoint officials from its ranks. (29)

Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence that successive Rumanian regimes, be they monarchist, fascist, or communist, have consistently violated their own constitutions as well as international agreements concerning the protection of ethnic minorities:

The legal status of Hungarians living in Rumania is basically determined by two factors: the general situation regarding the application of the law and the current political attitude towards the Hungarian minority in line with the government's overall strategy of ethnic assimilation. Rumania lacks genuine constitutionality relying on the principle of legality and the unequivocal administration of justice. (30)

Due to the continuing reports of human rights violations, especially concerning the treatment of ethnic Hungarians, by the Ceaucescu regime, the United Nations Commission for Human Rights approved in March 1989 a resolution appointing a Special Rapporteur to investigate human rights abuses in Rumania (31). The resolution, authored by Sweden and co-sponsored by Australia, Austria, France, Hungary, Portugal, and the U. K., specifically condemned the Rumanian regime's village destruction plan as well as the severe state-imposed obstacles to the maintenance of national minority culture (32). Rumania has thus been the target of increasing international condemnations as a result of its refusal to adhere to and fulfill the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.
The Rumanian regime has drawn strong criticism from Hungarian and Western leaders and delegates at the Human Rights Conferences held in Vienna (Jan. 1989) and Paris (May 1989), as well as from the European Parliament (Mar. 1989) for its policy of forced assimilation and resettlement, and for its violation of international human rights agreements.

The Rumanian regime rejected all accusations on the grounds that the implementation of international human rights accords represented an interference in the Rumanian state's internal affairs, and as such, violated its independence and sovereignty. However, the Western states upheld their right to intervene based on the argument of the universality of human rights and because of Rumania's failure to comply with undertaken international obligations resulting in human rights violations (Le Monde, Feb. 8, 1989). The Rumanian position on the question of national minorities, which it considers to be an exclusively internal matter, also conflicts with the fact that the 2.5 million Hungarians under Rumanian rule are an integral part of the Hungarian nation which numbers 15 million in the Carpathian Basin where it constitutes the majority nation (33).

The Transylvanian Hungarians, who have been separated from the rest of the Hungarian nation against their will and are still being denied their right to self-determination, also represent the largest ethnic minority in Europe outside the Soviet Union (34).
Thus, the question of the legal status of the Hungarian minorities continues to be an unsolved problem with serious repercussions for the stability of the Danubian region.

The protection of minority rights through legal measures seems to have been inadequate as a result of the incompatibility between the principle of the universality of human rights and the concept of the sovereign national state. The concept of human rights also suffers from a lack of specificity concerning national minority rights as human rights refer to individual rights whereas minority protection requires the recognition and respect of collective rights.

ANNEX I

The following letter was co-authored and signed by representatives of the various Ottawa-based Hungarian cultural, political, and religious associations and was delivered to the French, British, American, Italian, and Japanese diplomatic representatives in Ottawa as a reminder to the responsible powers on the 70th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1990:

Today, the Hungarians of the Carpathian Basin, as well as those throughout the world, remember the Treaty of Trianon on its 70th anniversary. This treaty violated Hungarian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and was based on falsified information disseminated in anti-Hungarian propaganda.

Hungarians believe that the time is right to direct the attention of the Major Powers responsible for this treaty and its consequences to the relevance of Trianon to current events in Central and Eastern Europe.
The approximately 5 million Hungarians remaining in the areas beyond the current boundaries of Hungary within the Carpathian Basin have been and still are deprived of those freedoms and basic human rights which were formally guaranteed by the newly created states as a precondition for their acquisition of Hungarian territories. These states have failed to fulfill their obligations and must therefore be held to account for their violations. Hungary signed the Treaty of Trianon - which was virtually forced on her - on that basis and with the understanding that it would be reviewed at a later date.

Today's volatile political situation [in East Central Europe] can essentially be seen as a direct consequence of the miscalculations and misconceptions inherent in the Treaty of Trianon and the Treaty of Paris (1947). This has been recognized by several well-known statesmen since that time. History has already proven that the tensions created by Trianon contributed significantly to local conflicts and ultimately to World War II itself. It is also not inconceivable that the current repression of minority rights in the heart of Europe will be a source of serious future conflict.

Today, on the occasion of this 70th anniversary, every Hungarian is deeply concerned about the negative consequences of Trianon. It is the wish of all Hungarians that their compatriots who are now minorities in the countries surrounding Hungary be granted those human rights which they have been denied since 1920.

Hungarians have a legitimate right to decide the civil, economic, cultural, and political status of those Hungarians deprived of their basic human rights in the countries surrounding Hungary. These Hungarian minorities constitute an integral part of the Hungarian nation which cannot accept its dismemberment.

The reorganization of Europe is imminent. It is now time for the Major Powers to redress this situation in accordance with the right of all Hungarians for self-determination. It is time to retroactively guarantee justice for Hungary.

NOTES

(2) Ibid., p. 405.
(3) Ibid., pp. 24-25.
Hungarians: A Divided Nation, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, New Haven, 1988, p. 102.
(8) Ibid., p. 102.
(9) Ibid., p. 104.
(11) Vali, in Borsody, op. cit., p. 104.
(12) Bogdan, in Documentation sur l'Europe Centrale, op. cit., p. 84.
(13) Vali, in Borsody, op. cit., p. 104.
(14) Ibid., p. 107.
(15) Ibid., p. 108.
(18) Ibid., p. 108.
(20) Ibid., p. 109.
(22) Ibid., p. 108.
(24) Vali, in Borsody, op. cit., p. 112.
(25) Ibid., p. 112.
(26) Ibid., p. 112.
(27) Ibid., p. 112.
(29) Ibid., p. 51.
CONCLUSION

One of the main factors which seem to have determined the nationality policy of the Rumanian Communist Party, particularly under the Ceausescu regime, seems to have been the need to legitimize the territorial possessions of Rumania vis-a-vis its neighbors in particular, and internationally in general, and the need to legitimize the communist regime domestically. This need for legitimization was translated into nationalistic policies by the Rumanian regimes: nationalism was exploited as a legitimizing means which proved useful in foreign policy and later, internally as Rumania's international standing and domestic political and economic situation deteriorated (1). This nationalism had detrimental consequences for the ethnic minorities in Rumania as their rights were systematically violated in order to force their assimilation: the Transylvanian Hungarians were seen as an obstacle to the policy of "national communism", which promoted "Romanianism" to the detriment of the minorities (2).

While nationalism served as a substitute for socio-economic reform in pre-communist times, it served to justify the socialist transformation of Rumania under the communist regime, and later, to cover up its shortcomings. The oppression of the minorities was therefore a constant feature of the Rumanian state, regardless of the type of regime in power, although the intensity of ethnic discrimination fluctuated over time as a result of both domestic
and external factors. However, the overall trend seems to indicate a progressive deterioration of the situation of the ethnic minorities, as the violent flare-up in Marosvasarhely/Tirgu Mures in March 1990 showed. Although it might be too early to determine the probability of the improvement of the nationality problems due to the unstable situation in Rumania following the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime, given Rumania's past record of minority treatment, the outlook for the minorities does not appear to be favorable within the framework of a "unitary Rumanian national state".

Rumanian fears of Hungarian territorial revisionism seem to have also played a fundamental role in determining Rumanian nationality policy towards ethnic Hungarians. The fact that Rumania is also involved in other unresolved territorial disputes with other states, mainly with the Soviet Union over Bessarabia (presently the Moldavian S.S.R.) and Northern Bukovina, disputes which are linked with the Transylvanian Question through the Soviet-Hungarian-Rumanian triangle, has further complicated the issue and fuels Rumanian apprehensions concerning security and territorial integrity. The Transylvanian Hungarians were therefore seen as a threat to the unity of the Rumanian national state, which felt the necessity to eliminate that threat and to justify through a nationalistic historical interpretation its policies and its possession of contested territories having an ethnically mixed population, such as Transylvania.
The decisive influence exerted by major powers over the Transylvanian Question and the resulting persistent nationality problems have fundamentally determined the situation of the Hungarian minority. The Ottoman Empire, Austria, France, Germany, and Russia have successively determined the political alignment and the territorial configuration of the Danubian region according to their hegemonic interests. In order to further these interests, the major powers fostered the rivalries among the various nationalities of the region: "... outside forces incited, nurtured, and played on these animosities..." (3). The intrusion of external powers therefore caused the breakdown of the political cohesion and of the peaceful coexistence of the Danubian peoples. The intolerance among these peoples has been perpetuated and intensified due to propaganda and biased historical interpretations which have generated mutually exclusive and antagonistic national identities (4).

This situation has progressively deteriorated into a self-perpetuating cycle where the region's nationalistic feuds render it vulnerable to further major power involvement: the polarization of the region's peoples serves the interests of those major powers which seek to dominate Eastern Europe by perpetuating the divisions of Eastern European peoples and thereby increasing the risk that outsiders will continue to apply the divide and conquer rule (5). Such was the case after W.W.I when the opposition between the pro-status quo Little Entente and revisionist Hungary was exploited by
Nazi Germany, and after W.W.II, by the Soviet Union (6). The Hungarian-Rumanian dispute over the Transylvanian Question clearly illustrated this situation. Being unable to settle their dispute by themselves, they resorted to the arbitration of major powers. However, this did not settle the question to either party's satisfaction, as it was the case with the 1940 Vienna Arbitration, since it was in the interest of the major powers involved to maintain the Hungarian-Rumanian antagonism in order to exploit it to their own advantage. Thus, externally imposed decisions have failed to solve the Transylvanian problem in a manner equally acceptable to both Hungarians and Rumanians.

The main factor which still prevents a Hungarian-Rumanian bilateral resolution of the Transylvanian problem is the extreme form of nationalism which has prevailed in East-Central Europe, particularly in Rumania:

The nationalist orientations of the past two centuries have provided justification for the establishment and exercise of monopolistic and exclusivistic "nation-state" hegemony. The present exploitation and oppression of the Hungarians in Transylvania is based on this same nationalist orientation. Rumania's assertion that Transylvania is the communal property, sphere of interest, and inheritance exclusively of the Rumanian people makes the existence of Hungarians and other minorities an inconvenience that must be overcome in some fashion, via emigration, assimilation, exclusion, or deportation. (7)

Successive Rumanian regimes have pursued such nationalistic policies, including discriminatory minority policies and the propagation of a biased historical interpretation. By promoting hatred, the official Rumanian historical version has contributed to
the perpetuation of the discrimination against the ethnic minorities. The nationalities living in Rumania, including the Rumanians themselves, are therefore the victims of a nationalistic ideology - the Daco-Roman theory - which keeps them apart and prevents their peaceful coexistence.

Therefore, the three principal factors which seem to have determined Rumanian nationality policy towards ethnic Hungarians are the Rumanian leaders' need for legitimacy due to historical, political, and economic reasons, the intervention of major powers which has generated nationality conflicts, and the prevailing anti-Hungarian bias which promotes prejudice and discrimination. The exploitation of nationalism for the purpose of political domination is the common denominator of all these factors. This exploitation of nationalism is also related to the propagation of biased historical interpretations as nationalism and biased historiography mutually promote one another.

From the analysis of the factors which have determined the situation of the Transylvanian Hungarians, it is possible to deduce some potential solutions to this complex problem. As the historical record shows, both the application of the nation-state concept to the Danubian Basin and the attempts to protect national minority rights through legal provisions in treaties and constitutions have failed to solve the nationality problems of the region.
One of the most essential pre-conditions for a solution would be the termination of foreign domination and intervention in the Danubian region in order to allow the self-determination of its peoples. However, cooperation among these peoples will be impossible as long as they remain under the influence of discriminatory historical conceptions such as the Daco-Roman Finno-Ugrian theories which proclaim the racial and cultural inferiority of the "Asiatic" Hungarians vis-a-vis their "European" neighbors. Such questionable theories are harmful to the interests of the peoples concerned because they project a distorted image of these peoples and prevent their mutual understanding. An unbiased re-examination of the history of the peoples of the Carpatho-Danubian region would reveal their original ethnolinguistic and cultural common roots which have been ignored or denied by the nationalistic overemphasis of their apparent differences resulting from later foreign influences. This refers to the fact that there existed an ethnolinguistically homogeneous pre-Indo-European population in Europe and that later migrations resulted in the fusion of that pre-Indo-European population with various other peoples, thus giving birth to the present Indo-European peoples (8). The discrediting of the old exclusive nationalistic historical interpretations imposed on these peoples and the replacement of those interpretations by a more balanced, conciliatory, and integrating historical version in accordance with real historical facts is therefore necessary for the political reconciliation and cooperation of the Danubian peoples.
It would be in the common interest of these peoples to work towards their economic and political integration, possibly in a confederative form. This could only be realized under the condition of equality of rights for all nationalities, including the full restoration of the right of self-determination for all ethnic Hungarians. In this manner, Transylvania would have to be autonomous and distinct from Rumania, but both, along with Hungary and the other countries of the region, would be constituent components of a multinational confederation.

Although this would be difficult to achieve, it would not be impossible: the voices of national discord have always come from certain interest groups which do not represent the interests and the will of the peoples concerned. As recent events have shown, the peoples of East-Central Europe are now actively seeking greater freedom and democracy, through reform or revolution, and in the case of the Rumanian revolution, the nationalities of that country have demonstrated their willingness to cooperate with each other. The peaceful resolution of the Transylvanian Question involving the two largest nationalities of the Danubian Basin, the Rumanians and the Hungarians, would remove a major obstacle and might provide the key for the realization of a Danubian Confederation for which there seems to be a renewed interest as a result of the changing political situation in Central and Eastern Europe. The restoration of an independent bloc between Germany and Russia would also greatly contribute towards European security and stability.
111

NOTES

(4) Ibid., p. 229.
(5) Ibid., p. 241.
Although there are discrepancies between Austrian, Hungarian, and Rumanian censuses relating to Transylvania, it appears from the available population statistics that the Hungarians became a numerical minority in historical Transylvania during the 18th c. due to the increase of the Rumanian population. This increase was not only due to natural population growth but, to a considerable extent, to immigration from Wallachia and Moldavia. During the 18th c., the Rumanian population of Transylvania increased from 200 000 to 950 000, at a rate of almost 400% (1). However, in the following century, when the Rumanian immigration stopped, the Rumanian population of Transylvania increased from 950 000 to 1 472 000, at a rate of less than 60% (2). This clearly illustrates the considerable role played by the Rumanian immigration into Transylvania prior to the 19th c. in the growth of the Rumanian population of Hungary. As previously mentioned, there were also instances of massacres committed by Rumanians against Transylvanian Hungarians, thereby contributing to the reduction of the Hungarian proportion of the Transylvanian population (3).

Since Rumania took over Transylvania, the Hungarian proportion of the population has been further reduced as a result of mass expulsions, deportations to forced labor camps, resettlement, and the systematic Rumanian colonization of the region. In this manner,
an estimated 1 million Hungarians have been forced out of Transylvania, of which approximately 200,000 have been exterminated during W.W.II, while a comparable number of Rumanians have been resettled in Transylvania since the Rumanian takeover (4).

Following the annexation of historical Transylvania and the adjoining territories, resulting in the doubling of the area and population of the region referred to as Transylvania, there have been contradictory claims as to whether the Rumanian population represented a majority in those territories. The Rumanians may have represented a slight majority (53%) in historical Transylvania, but it may have been otherwise for the whole of the annexed territories (5).

Also, as is the case in the other countries with Hungarian minorities, the official Rumanian censuses underestimate the actual number of Hungarians for political reasons (6). Thus, according to Western estimates, the present Transylvanian population of 8 million includes 2.5 million Hungarians, who therefore constitute approximately one third of the Transylvanian population and approximately 10% of the total population of Rumania, 4.5 million Rumanians, and 1 million others (7).
### Table I

The population of Transylvania up to 1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hungarians</th>
<th>Rumanians</th>
<th>Germans</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Late 1500's</td>
<td>255,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>— (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1658 (Jesuit census)</td>
<td>520,000</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>860,000 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1794 (Austrian census)</td>
<td>687,244</td>
<td>512,988</td>
<td>118,782</td>
<td>43,442</td>
<td>1,362,456 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1822 (Austrian census)</td>
<td>550,000</td>
<td>700,000*</td>
<td>250,000*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,500,000 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>*includes 100,000 Hungarians also speaking Rumanian or German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>368,540</td>
<td>916,015</td>
<td>222,159</td>
<td>6,601</td>
<td>1,513,315 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>569,742</td>
<td>1,287,712</td>
<td>202,114</td>
<td>114,096</td>
<td>2,173,704 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>630,477</td>
<td>1,184,883</td>
<td>211,748</td>
<td>56,940</td>
<td>2,084,048 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>697,945</td>
<td>1,276,890</td>
<td>217,670</td>
<td>58,711</td>
<td>2,257,216 (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>814,994</td>
<td>1,397,282</td>
<td>233,019</td>
<td>30,703</td>
<td>2,476,998 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>918,217</td>
<td>1,472,021</td>
<td>234,085</td>
<td>54,044</td>
<td>2,678,367 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910 (Historical Transylvania and annexed territories)</td>
<td>1,704,851</td>
<td>2,800,073</td>
<td>559,824</td>
<td>200,696</td>
<td>5,265,444 (18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### The Population of Rumania and Transylvania According to Nationality

(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transylvania</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumanians</td>
<td>2,830</td>
<td>2,930</td>
<td>3,208</td>
<td>3,752</td>
<td>4,081</td>
<td>4,559</td>
<td>5,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>1,664</td>
<td>1,306</td>
<td>1,353</td>
<td>1,482</td>
<td>1,616</td>
<td>1,597</td>
<td>1,651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>5,260</td>
<td>5,112</td>
<td>5,549</td>
<td>5,792</td>
<td>6,232</td>
<td>6,720</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rumania</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumanians</td>
<td>10,524</td>
<td>13,186</td>
<td>11,360</td>
<td>13,598</td>
<td>15,081</td>
<td>16,746</td>
<td>19,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>1,823</td>
<td>1,362</td>
<td>1,553</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,654</td>
<td>1,620</td>
<td>1,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>64</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovaks and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechs</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatary</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>15,723</td>
<td>17,641</td>
<td>14,281</td>
<td>15,873</td>
<td>17,489</td>
<td>19,103</td>
<td>21,860</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table III (20)

**Changes in the Hungarian Population of Eight Major Transylvanian Towns**

*(official census data)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Towns</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1977</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inhabitants</td>
<td>Of which: Hungarians</td>
<td>Inhabitants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arad/Arad</td>
<td>106,960</td>
<td>31,850</td>
<td>126,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasov/Brasov</td>
<td>123,834</td>
<td>22,742</td>
<td>163,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolozsvár/Cluj</td>
<td>154,723</td>
<td>74,155</td>
<td>185,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcvarskétertely/Tîrgu-Năruș</td>
<td>65,194</td>
<td>48,077</td>
<td>86,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagybánya/Bala-Maros</td>
<td>35,920</td>
<td>15,322</td>
<td>64,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagyvárad/Crăciun</td>
<td>98,450</td>
<td>58,424</td>
<td>122,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szentmihálytettő/Șoțu-Măriș</td>
<td>52,096</td>
<td>31,204</td>
<td>69,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Târnovsă/Mălăoara</td>
<td>182,257</td>
<td>29,958</td>
<td>172,243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>778,934</strong></td>
<td><strong>311,742</strong></td>
<td><strong>992,547</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### In percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Towns</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1977</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arad/Arad</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasov/Brasov</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolozsvár/Cluj</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcvarskétertely/Tîrgu-Năruș</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagybánya/Bala-Maros</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagyvárad/Crăciun</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szentmihálytettő/Șoțu-Măriș</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Târnovsă/Mălăoara</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>40.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>34.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table IV (21)

Primary-level Pupils (grades 1-8)
Taught in Hungarian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Attendance</th>
<th>Taught in Hungarian</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>3,019,776</td>
<td>171,974</td>
<td>5.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3,308,462</td>
<td>179,569</td>
<td>5.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>3,035,209</td>
<td>80,806</td>
<td>2.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3,030,666</td>
<td>60,613</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table V (22)

Day-school Students of Secondary Schools
Taught in Hungarian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Attendance</th>
<th>Taught in Hungarian</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>901,977</td>
<td>26,417</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>979,141</td>
<td>28,568</td>
<td>2.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1,237,955</td>
<td>16,284</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1,226,927</td>
<td>16,073</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table VI (23)

**Ethnic Composition of the Teaching Staff**

of the Kolozsvár/Cluj University

**1970/71-1980/81**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Composition of Staff</th>
<th>1970/71</th>
<th>1977/78</th>
<th>1980/81</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total staff</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumanians</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Minority</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other minorities</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table VII (24)

**Ethnic Composition of the Teaching Staff**

of the Mureș/Cluj Institute of Medicine and Pharmacology

**1970/71 and 1982/83**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Composition of Staff</th>
<th>1970/71</th>
<th>1980/81</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total staff</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumanians</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total minorities</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>68.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other minorities</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table VIII (25)

Opportunities for Hungarian Language Education at the Elementary and High School Levels in Romania

- Official Hungarian percent of total population of Romania
- Preschool classes
- Primary and secondary schools
- High schools of general culture
- Vocational schools

Sources:
- A Living Reality in Romania Today: Full Harmony and Equality Between the Romanian People and the Communist Autocrats (Bucharest, Romania, 1978) p. 18
Rumania took possession of Transylvania from Hungary (1920)
Bessarabia (1918) from Russia
Dobrudja (1913) from Bulgaria
Bukovina (1919) from Austria-Hungary
TRANSYLVANIE : répartition ethnique
Basée sur le recensement de 1966

Hongrois
Roumains
Allemands
Autres

585-2 Nombre total des habitants du département en milliers
Hungary's boundaries after World War II (1945)

Hungarian population, 1910
- Over 50% with no other nationality over 10%
- Over 50% with other nationalities over 10%
- 25–50%
- 10–25%
NOTES

(2) Ibid., p. 125.
(9) Czege, op. cit., p. 42.
(10) Ibid., p. 43.
(11) Ibid., p. 22.
(13) Ibid., p. 264.
(14) Ibid., p. 264.
(15) Ibid., p. 265.
(16) Ibid., p. 265.
(17) Ibid., p. 265.
(18) Ibid., p. 252.
(21) Ibid., p. 91.
(22) Ibid., p. 91.
(23) Ibid., p. 94.
(24) Ibid., p. 95.
(27) Ibid., p. 29.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

The distribution of the bibliographical sources according to type and origin is a reflection of the current availability which is subject to various constraints. There are relatively few detailed and accurate Western historical and political analyses concerning East-Central European nationality problems. This deficiency is compounded by the relative unreliability of East European sources.

Furthermore, official communist Rumanian policy considered the nationality question as a solved and therefore non-existent problem, and official communist Hungarian policy also tended to avoid the issue. For example, the three-volume History of Transylvania published by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1986, and which was severely criticized by Rumania, failed to mention the problem of the Hungarian minority under the communist Rumanian regime. These factors have therefore curtailed the quantity and quality of available information concerning the issue of the Transylvanian Hungarians.

This bibliography is therefore more of a representative sample rather than an exhaustive compilation of all the available material relating to the subject of this thesis. Some sources listed in the bibliography may not appear in the notes sections due to the fact that there is a certain extent of repetitiveness of information among sources of similar nature and origin. If a particular source is not referred to, it is essentially because of this factor, in order to avoid unnecessary redundancy. In this respect, it should
also be noted that there is a very little noticeable degree of variance among Rumanian sources in terms of content, whereas there is a much greater degree of variance between Hungarian sources published outside of Hungary and those published in Hungary under the communist regime. To a certain extent, this has contributed to the apparent disproportion between the number of Rumanian and Hungarian sources listed in the bibliography.

Rumanian sources.
Bucur, N. A., Ceausescu of Romania - Champion of Peace, Quills & Scrolls, Cleveland, Ohio, 1981.
Paliga, S., "Thracian Terms for 'township' and 'fortress', and related place-names", in World Archeology, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1986. (This article originated from the "Czechoslovak Culture House" in Bucharest)
The Plenary Meetings of the Councils of the Working People of Magyar and German Nationality in the Socialist Republic of

Hungarian sources.
Daruvar, Y. de, The Tragic Fate of Hungary, Nemzetor, Munich, 1974.


*Western sources.*


Gilberg, T., "Ethnic Minorities in Romania under Socialism", in

**BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SUPPLEMENT**

The following are a few sources recommended as theoretical reference in order to complement the sources which have been used in this study and which are listed in the main bibliography.