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JOHN DONNE AND
FRANCISCO DE QUEVEDO:
PETRARCH AND BEYOND

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INTRODUCTION

This study is an attempt to establish a basis for a comparative analysis of John Donne's and Francisco de Quevedo's love poetry. Both poets operate within as well as transcend the boundaries of the poetic principles established by Petrarch in his *Canzoniere*. As far as the transcendence of Petrarch is concerned, it is my view that Quevedo developed a number of specific strategies to disguise it in order to avoid censorship. As opposed to Quevedo's "disguised" transgression of Petrachism, Donne's *Songs and Sonnets* subverts the Petrarchan conventions of love with absolute explicitness. Therefore, Donne's *Songs and Sonnets* could be regarded as an ideal, non-censorship-bound stage at which Quevedo's transgression of the Petrarchan conventions aim. On the other hand, the presence of unmistakable Petrarchan topoi and imagery in Donne's *Songs and Sonnets* mirrors in turn the overall Platonic/Petrarchan nature of Quevedo's love poetry. Hence, my comparative study will have a two-fold purpose. First, I will study Donne's and Quevedo's acceptance of the poetic conventions inaugurated by Petrarch's *Canzoniere* which set up the dominant tendency in "serious" love poetry as practiced in courtly circles for three centuries. Petrarch's collection of themes and imagery was handed down from poet to poet to be reworked with continual modifications and enrichments. However, this continual reworking did not have an effect on its philosophical basis, anchored in Plato and his dissociation between body and soul, between earthly and heavenly love. Second, I will investigate the presence of certain "beyond Petrarch" attitudes in Quevedo's and Donne's poetry which claim the body's share of the amorous experience, trying, thereby, to reconcile body and soul. As we shall see, it was Aristotle's philosophy that laid the foundations for such a deviation from the Petrarchan norm.
This ambivalent nature of Donne’s and Quevedo’s love poetry (both Petrarchan and beyond-Petrarchan, both Platonic and Aristotelian) is closely linked, in my opinion, to their equally ambivalent attitude towards the court as a cultural and political institution. The court, in both England and Spain, constituted the very centre of national patronage. It provided a unique avenue for opportunity and reward in society by improving one’s social and economic status. However, place-seeking inevitably led to self-abasement, corruption and parasitism.

It is this simultaneous allurement and repugnance originated by the court that determines Donne’s and Quevedo’s art. As regards Quevedo, his continuous attacks on the political organization in works such as *Marco Bruto*, *La fortuna con seso* and *La hora de todos* are contradicted by his wholehearted defence of the monarchical system in other works like *Política de Dios y gobierno de Cristo*: “A los reyes la majestad de Dios, cuando ordenó que naciesen reyes, dióles la administración y tutela de sus reinos; hizolos padres de sus vasallos, pastores.” As for Donne, his ambivalent position towards the courtly establishment is visibly manifested in his *Satyres*. Thus, whereas in his *Satyre I* he expresses his lack of sympathy for the court (“As vaine, as witlesse, and as false as they/who dwell at Court”), in his *Satyre III* he alludes to Queen Elizabeth (whose favour constituted the very “raison d’être” of courtly life) as the “greatest and fairest Empresse.”

Donne’s and Quevedo’s love poetry constitutes, in my view, no exception to the ambivalence expressed towards the courtly establishment in their political works. Thus, on the one hand, their defence of monarchy is paralleled by their adherence to the poetic style fashionable in courtly and satellite-courtly circles (Petrarchism) and the philosophical system upon which it was based: Platonism. On the other hand, their dissatisfaction with the parasitism and corruption characteristic of the courtly organization is mirrored by their subversion of Platonic/Petrarchan love
through the incorporation of the body into the amorous experience. It was Aristotle's philosophy which—as we shall see—provided the basis for this new conception of love. Therefore, my study will be organized in two broad sections according to these two fundamental notions of love. In the first section I shall examine the presence of certain poetic conventions characteristic of the Petrarchan/Platonic tradition in Donne's and Quevedo's poetry. In the second section I shall survey their subversion of such conventions, that is, the inclusion of the body in the scope of their love poetry. In the latter section, Quevedo's avoidance of censorship through his "disguised" treatment of the physical side of love will be paid special attention.
QUEVEDO AND DONNE: THE PETRARCHAN HERITAGE

INTRODUCTION

Poetry, like language, is conventional. It provides the poet with a set of "obligatory options" to convey his message, just as language provides the speaker with a whole system of conventions that must be adopted. If we wish to find out the probable impact that Donne or Quevedo had on their respective readers, we must be able to speak their own language; that is, we must know the conventions that shaped the literary tradition in which they wrote. Familiarity with these conventions will be of the utmost importance in order to understand the expectations upon which Donne and Quevedo relied.

As Jonathan Culler points out, "the shape a text assumes for its readers is determined by the complex of sign systems readers conventionally apply to it [...] the poem must be thought of as an utterance that has meaning only with respect to a system of conventions which the reader has assimilated" (Tomkins, Reader-Response Criticism, 102). Such a system of conventions lies within the reader's memory of earlier works, which provides the necessary background against which a work's individuality is recognized. As Jauss notes "every perception, in order to be sensed in its singularity, has to be foregrounded and silhouetted against an anonymous undifferentiated setting" (Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, xiii). Likewise, every particular work stands out in its singularity from a whole set of literary conventions, aesthetic clichés and ideologies. Works cannot be fully perceived on its own. They originate in a "dialectic interplay
between knowing and not-knowing, between the familiar and the unfamiliar, like a question-answer or foreground-background structure" (Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, xii).

If literature originates as a process arising out of the dynamic tension between work and norm, then it is essential that we attempt to reconstruct the literary norm. Quevedo’s and Donne’s literary norm can be unreservedly identified with Petrarchism, which constituted a poetic “langue” or background, against which Donne’s and Quevedo’s poetry may be foregrounded as different poetic “paroles.” From the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, Petrarchism can be considered as a synonym for love poetry. It was a system, a language on its own, a kind of grammar or syntax with relatively fixed relations of its own as far as imagery, themes and modes of expression were concerned. The Petrarchan manner was a language that summarized for the first time the Latin classical tradition of linguistic purity and authority, the Christian tradition of Augustinism in the form of confessional introspection and deep dissatisfaction with the mutable, and the medieval preference for paradox and punning characteristic of troubadouresque poetry. It amounted to an international language for poetry, a poetic “esperanto,” a compendium of rhetorical devices and conceits, an encyclopedia of poetic expression.

If, as has just been mentioned, every literary work is perceived against the background of other works and in association with them, then pure synchronicity is illusory. Each system necessarily comes forth as evolution. As far as Petrarchism is concerned, there are two main stages in its development and expansion as a poetic system or norm. The first stage (until the end of the fifteenth century) is dominated by the so-called “quatrocentisti” poets, who regarded Petrarch’s Canzoniere as a collection of useful conceits and rhetorical devices; Petrarch became, thus, a model of rhetoric; he was the author to be imitated in verse just as Cicero was in prose. The second stage constituted a real turning-point in the evolution of Petrarchism. It is known as “bemboism.” “Bemboism” was a classicizing movement whose basic tool was Pietro Bembo’s
Neoplatonic love treatise *Gli Asolani* (1505). In Bembo’s treatise Petrarch’s poetry was used to illustrate Plato’s theories concerning love. Hence, Petrarch’s statements about love were put on the same level as Plato’s doctrines. From Bembo onwards Petrarch was regarded not only as a model of rhetoric, but also an intellectual “auctoritas,” a compendium of philosophical maxims. In addition to this, Bembo gave official approval to Quintilian’s principle of “imitatio/emulatio” as far as the imitation of Petrarch was concerned. Petrarchan imitation was intended to surpass, not merely to reproduce its models, and, thereby enabled the poet to avoid the endless repetition of worn out poetic formulas. Petrarchism became, thus, an evolving mode, not a static one, and that is the reason for its remaining in force throughout three centuries. Therefore, as a result of Bembo’s intervention, amorous poetry was given a thorough study and an importance that it had never had before in classical treatises on poetry.

Although *Africa* (a Latin epic) and the *Trionfi* were both known in England and Spain, Petrarch’s influence was not really apparent until the arrival of his “vulgar” poetry at the beginning of the sixteenth century. It was Sir Thomas Wyatt’s translations and imitations after his travels through Italy in 1526-27 that brought Petrarch to England. Since *Gli Asolani* had been published in 1505, Petrarch had already been filtered through Bembo by the time his poetry arrived in England. After Wyatt’s death in 1542, there is a considerable gap of time until the publication of Sidney’s *Astrophil and Stella* in 1591, which inaugurates the golden age of sonneteering (Spenser, Daniel, Drayton, Shakespeare). During this interval, the sonnet was not in fashion; however, Bembo’s imitatio was fashionable:

If I should undertake to wryte in prayse of a gentlewoman, I would neither praise hir christal eye, nor hir cherrie lippe, etc. For these things are tritta & obvia. But I would either finde some supernatral cause whereby my penne might walke in the superlatife degree, or else I would undertake to answere for any imperfection that shee hath, and thereupon rayse the prayse of hir commendation [...] or use the covertest meane that I could avoyde the unconemely customes of common writers. (George Gascoigne, *Certayne Notes of Instruction Concerning the Making of Verse or Ryme in English*. 465-466).
The arrival of Petrarchism in Spain takes place officially in 1525. On that year, Andrea Navagero (ambassador of the Republic of Venice) attended the Emperor’s wedding in Granada. The interview and exchange of poetic ideas that took place between Boscán and Navagero at the Emperor’s nuptials is one of the commonplaces of Spanish literature. As a result of this poetic exchange, Boscán published his Petrarchan compositions in 1526, which shaped the outlines of love poetry in Spain for the next 150 years. The “Italian trip” became from now on a common feature of Spanish poets: Garcilaso, Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, Hernando de Acuña, Gutierre de Cetina, and Quevedo himself, among others, all visited Italy. Bembo’s *imitatio* was in force all this time, as one Petrarchan poet who was half way between the first Petrarchan generation and the late Petrarchans or baroque generation makes clear:

«porque no todos los pensamientos y consideraciones de amor, y de las más cosas que toca la poesía, cayeron en la mente del Petrarca y del Bembo, y de los antiguos, por que es tan derramado y abundante el argumento del amor, y tan acrecentado en sí mismo, que ninguno ingenio pueden abrazallo todo [...] y pudiendo así haber cosas y voces, ¿Quién es tan descuidado y perezoso, que sólo se entregue a una sola imitación?» (Fernando de Herrera, *Anotaciones a Garcilaso*).

As we can see, the free imitation of the model was a basic concept within the principles that governed Petrarchan international practice.

In the following section, I shall explore Quevedo’s and Donne’s handling of Petrarchan language through an examination of a number of poetic topoi representative of the Petrarchan manner. My intention is to provide a clear picture of the literary background or norm against which Quevedo’s and Donne’s poetry must be perceived. The thoroughly Petrarchan pedigree of Quevedo’s love poetry and his compliance with Petrarchan conventions are well known to his readers and have been sufficiently examined.6 Donne’s Petrarchism constitutes a much more controversial issue. Many critics have considered Donne as a poet entirely outside the Petrarchan tradition. Thus, a considerable amount of Donne criticism has concentrated on his departures from
the poetic norm, his iconoclasm and his violation of traditions. However, it is my intention in the following chapters to show that part of Donne’s love poetry is clearly indebted to the Petrarchan manner, just as Quevedo’s is. In order to do so, I shall devote each of the next four chapters to examine the presence of four unmistakably Petrarchan conventions in both Donne’s and Quevedo’s love poetry.
Both Donne and Quevedo subscribe to the fundamental distinction between spiritual and profane love characteristic of Neoplatonism. This was the theoretical basis of post-Petrarchan Platonic treatises on love. Thus, in Ficino’s De Amore, the appetite for coitus and the appetite for love are not only different impulses, but “show themselves to be contraries” (Smith, The Metaphysics of Love, 99). In the same fashion, León Hebreo, in his Diálogos de Amor, uses two different verbs (“amar” and “desear”) in order to make a clear-cut distinction between spiritual and worldly love, as can be seen in the following excerpt:

FILON: El conocerte, ¡Oh, Sofía! causa en mí amor y deseo.  
SOFÍA: Discordantes me parecen, ¡Oh, Filon! esos efectos que en ti produce conocerme.  
FILON: De tu parte discuerdan, que son ajenos de toda correspondencia.  
SOFÍA: Antes, entre sí mismos son contrarios afectos de la voluntad amar y desear. (León Hebreo, Diálogos de amor, 15).

An almost identical codification to that of Hebreo’s can be found in Quevedo’s love poetry. In his Sonnet 331 (“Amor que sin detenerse en el afecto sensitivo pasa al intelectual”), Quevedo uses the verbs “amar” and “querer” instead of Hebreo’s “amar” and “desear” to illustrate the same distinction between the physical and the spiritual manifestations of love:

Mandóme, ¡Ay Fabio!, que la amase Flora,  
y que no la quisiese; y mi cuidado,  
obediente y confuso y mancillado,  
sin desearla, su belleza adora.

Lo que el humano afecto siente y llora,  
goza el entendimiento, amartelado  
del espíritu eterno, encarcelado  
en el claustro mortal que le atesora.

Amar es conocer virtud ardiente;  
querer es voluntad interesada,
grosera y descortés caducamente.
El cuerpo es tierra, y lo será, y no fue nada;
de Dios procede a eternidad la mente:
eterno amante soy de eterna amada.

The Petrarchan lady, following literally the principles embodied in the Petrarchan manuals for lovers, wants to be loved spiritually ("que la amase"), but not physically ("Y que no la quiescere"). "Amar" is a cognitive activity whose purpose is to reach the world of abstract ideas, such as virtue: "amar es conocer virtud ardiente"; whereas "querer" has nothing to do with the cognitive faculties of the mind, but with "voluntad," indicating that it belongs to the baser realm of impulses. This is why "querer" is characterized as coarse ("grosera"), discourteous ("descortés") and fleeting ("caducamente"). As a result of his adherence to his beloved's instructions, the lover finds himself "confuso" because his soul and his body take different and opposite directions: "lo que el humano afecto siente y llora/goza el entendimiento [...]." The sonnet is unmistakably influenced by Plato's theories; the image of the soul imprisoned within the body is as old as Plato's Phaedo. Quevedo's conception of love manifestly conforms to the Neoplatonic ideogram, as we can see again in Hebreo's treatise:

"[...] y aunque el deseo, como otra vez te he dicho, presupone la ausencia de la cosa deseada, ahora te digo que aunque la cosa exista [...] se puede desear no de haberla, pues que es habida, sino de gozarla con unión cognoscitiva."
(León Hebreo, Diálogos de Amor, 49-50).

The last tercet in Quevedo's sonnet reinforces the low and contemptible quality of "querer" through religious arguments. The tercet is a perfect example of the Augustinian "contemptu mundi," which—as I mentioned before—was adopted by Petrarchism. "Querer" is a bodily activity and, according to Christian religion, the body is a potential nothingness made to decompose into the earth: "el cuerpo es tierra, y lo será, y no fue nada." It is the soul that allows us to transcend our perishable nature because it permits us to reach God and, thus, to share his eternity: "de Dios procede a eternidad la mente."
As can be seen, the beloved lady’s existence is utterly obliterated by this pattern of thought; she is egoistically manipulated by the lover in order to reach the domain of abstract ideas (“proceder a eternidad”). “Amarilis,” “Lisi,” “Floralba” or, in this particular case, “Flora” are analogous to different makes of cars at the lover’s disposal to drive to the Platonic ideal heights. The lady is just a means through which the divine is manifested. As Dante put it: “it [love] is the union of my soul with the gentle lady in which so much of the divine was revealed to me” (*The Metaphysics of Love*, 71).

The same Neoplatonic drive and “contemptu mundi” can be found in Donne’s *Valediction: Forbidding Mourning*. In the first stanza, Donne gives proof of the existence of a human soul that can be isolated from the body. Donne chooses a familiar example (man’s expiration, the precise moment of his death) to demonstrate the soul’s independence from the body:

As virtuous men pass mildly away,
And whisper to their souls to go,
Whilst some of their friends do say,
“the breath goes now,” and some say, “No,"

It is interesting to note that Donne chooses a particular kind of men (“virtuous men”) to exemplify the soul’s dissociation from the body. Virtue was also the main foundation of Quevedo’s argument to illustrate the soul’s detachment from the body: virtue is the target of the soul’s activity (“amar [the soul’s faculty] es conocer virtud”), whereas the body pursues a tangible object: “querer [the body’s faculty] es voluntad interesada.”

In the *Valediction*’s second stanza, the lovers’ souls fuse at an abstract, spiritual level. This is the reason why they engage in no worldly activity, such as shedding tears, sighing, or making noise. The “secret,” silent nature of love is—as we shall see in the following chapter—one of the most characteristic conventions of Petrarchan love:
So let us melt, and make no noise,
    No tear-floods, no sigh-tempests move;
'Twere profanation of our joys
    To tell the laity of our love.

Quevedo’s lovers, as we saw, not only belong to the realm of the spiritual (“eterno amante soy de eterna amada”), but also come together in an abstract world in which God dwells: “de Dios procede a eternidad la mente.” There are no explicit references of contact with God in Donne’s Valediction. However, it is possible to find in it the same kind of divine references and Augustinian “contemptu mundi” as we saw in Quevedo’s previous sonnet. On the one hand, the world outside the lovers’ spiritual fusion is regarded as “laity”; that is, it is populated by men whose nature is simply earthly. In a similar fashion, Quevedo’s sonnet also highlighted the earthly nature of the world outside the lovers’ spiritual fusion. Quevedo identified such a world with the body, a synonym for earthliness: “es tierra, y lo seré, y no fue nada.” On the other hand, it would be “profanation” if the lovers’ spiritual world was trespassed by the aforementioned “laity.” Such a transgression would be the equivalent—in Quevedo’s terms—of allowing the verb “amar” to enter the domain of the verb “querer.”

The next stanza reinforces the abstractness of the lovers’ union by resorting to the widely known Platonic argument of love allowing access to the realm of celestial bodies. If lovers do not fuse at a terrestrial level—as we gathered from the previous stanza—then they will fuse at a celestial one:

Moving of the earth brings harms and fears,
    men reckon what it did and meant;
    But trepidation of the spheres,
      Though greater far, is innocent.

The same argument can be found in Dante’s Paradiso, in which Heaven gathers in Beatrice’s eyes and shows the poet all the souls that enjoy Christian salvation (“the hosts of
Christ’s triumph”), wheeling about Beatrice’s eyes in the shape of stars attending a full moon. Likewise, in Quevedo’s Sonnet 333, the beloved’s eyes (“luces sacras”) provide the first step (“primeros moviles”) of a spiritual ladder that leads to the heavenly world:

Las luces sacras, el augusto día
que vuestros ojos abren sobre el suelo [...] 
primeros moviles son vuestras esferas. (Sonnet 333).

The choice of the lady’s eyes as the first step on this ladder leading to absolute spirituality was not accidental. Eyesight was believed to be the purest, less sense-bound of the senses. Therefore, it provided an ideal point of departure for the apprehension of beauty, a cognitive activity which must be as detached from the senses as possible, as we know from Quevedo’s sonnet 331.

Donne’s scientific knowledge was not limited to Neoplatonic astrology, as was Quevedo’s. In the fifth stanza, in order to justify the unearthly “superlunary” nature of his lovers, Donne gives a brief account of atomic theories:

Dull sublunary lovers’ love
(whose soul is sense) cannot admit
Absence because it doth remove
Those things which elemented it.

The material objects are “elemented,” that is, they are made of atoms. Any attempt to isolate those atoms carries with it the inevitable destruction and decomposition of the object. “Dull sublunary lovers” have failed to make the basic Platonic distinction between body and soul because their soul is sense. Hence, they must remain within the boundaries of the “sublunary” material world and, consequently, are subject to the same rules as material objects: they are doomed to decompose. “Sublunary lovers” cannot admit “absence” (ab-sense, anything beyond sense)
because their separation—as any material object that is separated into its atoms—entails their destruction.

In the next stanza, Donne focuses on “superlunary” lovers. In contrast to “dull sublunary lovers,” this new kind of lovers belongs to a heavenly (“superlunary”) world; they are “interassured of the mind” and, therefore, the laws that regulate the physical world are not relevant to them. As opposed to “sublunary lovers” (who could not admit absence), “superlunary lovers” can “care less eyes, lips, and hands to miss”:

But we, by love so much refined
That ourselves know not what it is,
Interassured of the mind,
Care less, eyes, lips, and hands to miss.

The following stanza is an explicit assessment of the Neoplatonic theory of the lover’s two-in-oneness, according to which lovers forsake their sense-bound bodies and become one single spiritual entity. In order to illustrate the lovers’ flight from their sense-bound world, Donne resorts to alchemy. “Superlunary” lovers only care about the mind, man’s noblest part according to Plato. This is why they are equated to gold, the noblest of metals. According to alchemy, any metal can be “glorified” by transforming it into gold. Such “glorification” entails separating the metal into its elements by beating it into the thinnest possible sheets. In the same fashion, “superlunary” lovers, in order to be transformed or “glorified” into its highest possible state of spirituality, must be separated from each other:

Our two souls therefore, which are one,
Though I must go, endure not yet
A breach, but an expansion,
Like gold to airy thinness beat.

The final stanzas are dominated by one of Donne’s most celebrated metaphors, that of the lovers as “twin compasses”:
If they be two, they are two so
    As stiff twin compasses are two:
Thy soul, the fixed foot, makes no show
    To move, but doth, if the other do;

And though it in the centre sit,
    Yet when the other far doth roam
it leans, and harkens after it,
    And grows erect, as that comes home.

Such wilt thou be to me, who must,
    Like the other foot, obliquely run;
Thy firmness makes my circle just,
    And makes me end where I begun.

This metaphor has always been regarded as an example of Donne’s striking revolutionary innovations. However, as Donald Guss points out, the compass was frequently used in love poetry as an emblem of constancy (John Donne, Petrarchist, 43-45). Thus, a contemporary parallel of Donne’s “compass metaphor” can be found in the Italian poet Guarino. Nevertheless, what is of real importance is that the compass image strengthens the idea of an abstract, perfect union. The compass is used to draw circles, which were regarded as symbols of ideal perfection. Thus, the lovers’ fusion is as ideal and perfect as circles are. Another interesting point about the compass metaphor is that its structure parallels the roles played by the lovers within the framework of Petrarchism. Thus, the compass’ “fixed foot,” which “makes no show to move” and “grows erect, as that [the other foot] comes home,” clearly mirrors the coldness and disdain characteristic of Petrarchan lady, who also “makes no show to move” and “grows erect” when approached by her lover.

A Valediction: Forbidding Mourning is, thus, a poem that contradicts the picture of Donne as an iconoclast, fond of overturning all the poetic conventions of his time and standing alone among mere imitators. As can be seen from my analysis, Donne did not wholly reject the Petrarchan manner and the Platonic conception of love. Some of his Songs and Sonnets, like A
Valediction: *Forbidding Mourning*, were unmistakably written within the Platonic/Petrarchan mode.
THE SECRECY OF LOVE

_A Valediction: Forbidding Mourning_ provides a good point of departure to examine the presence of another Petrarchan topos in both Donne’s and Quevedo’s love compositions. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, in the second stanza of his _Valediction_, Donne introduces the Petrarchan convention of “the secrecy of love”:

So let us melt, and make no noise
[...] ’T were profanation of our joys
To tell the laity of our love.”

The secret nature of love is not a Petrarchan motif _per se_; it can be traced back as far as courtly love poetry, where love was secret because of its adulterous quality. Petrarch incorporates this courtly formula to his _Canzoniere_, adapting it to the divine nature of Platonic love: if lovers are divine, their heavenly feelings cannot be expressed in human, earthly language. The nature of the lovers’ feelings and the nature of the language available to express those feelings are simply incompatible. Therefore, love must be kept in secret, otherwise the heavenly would be debased by the earthly.

There are several instances of “the secrecy of love” topos in Donne’s _Songs and Sonnets_. In _Twickenham Garden_, the lover wants to be a mandrake in order to break the Petrarchan principle of silence by groaning:

make me a mandrake, so I may groan here
or a stone fountain weeping out my year.
The mandrake has a forked shape that roughly resembles the human body; that is the reason why Donne chose it as a metaphor for his plaintive Petrarchan lover. Moreover, the mandrake was supposed to groan when uprooted. Therefore, if the lover were a mandrake or a fountain, he could groan his sighs or weep his tears in an inhuman fashion, inconspicuously subverting the Petrarchan “secrecy of love” convention. The idea of the lover turning into a weeping stone appears frequently in Petrarch himself. In his Sonnet XXIII the lover undergoes a metamorphosis in which he transforms himself into a stone and a fountain of tears:

Anzi le diss’il ver pien di paura;  
ed ella ne l’usata sua figura  
tosto tornando fecemi, oì mè lasso!  
d’un quasi vivo et sbigottito susso.  
[...] ne’ giammai neve sotto al sol disparve  
com’io senti me tutto venir meno  
et farmi un afontana a piê d’un faggio  
chi udì mai d’uom vero nascer fonte?

[I told her the truth, full of fear  
and she in her accustomed form  
quickly returning made, alas,  
an almost living and terrified stone  
[...] nor did ever snow under the sun disappear  
as I felt myself entirely melt  
and become a fountain at the foot of a beech.  
Who ever heard of a spring being born  
of a real man?]

In the same fashion as Donne’s *Twickenham Garden*, the image of “the lover as fountain” allows Petrarch to express the lover’s feelings without transforming their spirituality and holiness into a human, bodily manifestation. It might be argued that the fountain’s shedding of water would be the equivalent of human crying; it is so, but the lover cannot express his feelings in explicit human terms. He has to manage to express his feelings through an indirect, non-bodily means, otherwise his love would no longer be purely spiritual, as dictated by the Petrarchan protocol. Therefore, Petrarchism provided the poet with a set of conventions to be observed and, at the same time, with an assortment of prescribed tricks to subvert those conventions.
The same motif of "the lover as fountain" appears in Quevedo's Sonnet 298 in a more refined stage:

Músico llanto, en lágrimas sonoras,
llora monte doblado en cueva fría,
y destilando líquida armonía,
hace las peñas cófraras canoras.

Ameno y escondido a todas horas,
en mucha sombra alberga poco día ;
no admite su silencio compañía:
Sólo a ti, solitario, cuando lloras.

Son tu nombre, color y voz doliente
señas, más que de pájaro, de amante ;
puede aprender dolor de ti un ausente.
Estudia en tu lamento y tu semblante
gemidos este monte y esta fuente,
y tienes mi dolor por estudiante.

González de Salas, Quevedo’s editor, provides us with the context for this sonnet:

"Refirióme Don Francisco que en Génova tiene un caballero una huerta, y en ella una gruta hecha de la Naturaleza, en un cerro, de cuya techumbre menudamente se destila por muchas partes una fuente, de ruido apacible. Sucedió, pues, que dentro de ella oyó gemir un pájaro que llaman solitario, y que al entrar él se salió, y en esta ocasión escribió este soneto."

Quevedo transforms the bird into a plaintive Petrarchan lover ("Son tu nombre, color y voz doliente/señas, más que de pájaro, de amante") whose moaning the fountain has to imitate:

"estudia en tu lamento y tu semblante/gemidos este monte y esta fuente." The "secrecy of love" convention is based upon a complex triple metaphorical realization: bird=fountain=lover. In order to accomplish this triple metaphor Quevedo fused two different metaphors characteristic of Petrarchism. On the one hand, the lover=bird metaphor. This metaphor also articulates Quevedo’s sonnet 359, which constitutes—as José Manuel Blecua points out—a free imitation of Petrarch’s sonnet CCXXVI:
Passer mai solitario in alcun tetto
non fu quant'io [...].

[No sparrow was ever so lone on any roof
as I am [...]]

Más solitario pájaro ¿En cuál techo
se vió jamás? [...].

On the second hand, the lover=fountain metaphor, which we have already seen in
Petrarch's sonnet XXIII and in Donne's Twickenham Garden. If the lover is identified with the
bird and the fountain at the same time, then the bird can be logically identified with the fountain.
Quevedo's sonnet is, therefore, a perfect illustration of logical reasoning. It is the poetic realization
of a widely known logical category, the Aristotelian syllogism: if A=B and B=C, then A=C; if
lover=bird and lover=fountain, then bird=fountain.7

The Undertaking is Donne's poem most overtly built upon the convention of "the secrecy
of love." In it the Petrarchan agony of being in love and not being able to express it amounts to a
legendary exploit that is "braver" than those of the outstanding heroes of antiquity ("the
Worthies"):

I have done one braver thing
    Than all the Worthies did,
And yet a braver thence doth spring,
       Which is, to keep that hid.

The second stanza is devoted to the "contemptu mundi" motif. The lover's agony is as rare
and precious as "the skill of specular stone" (the craft of cutting old selenite, an ancient transparent
material used for glazing, but no longer available in Donne's time):

It were but madness now to impart
    The skill of specular stone,
When he which can have learned the art
       To cut it can find none.
The lover cannot disclose the exquisite spiritual nature of his Platonic love to the world because he is at a different, “higher” level. “It were but madness” to do so. He speaks the select spiritual language of Neoplatonism (symbolized by the rarity of the specular stone), whereas the world speaks the language of baseness and matter (symbolized by the absence of specular stone): “to cut it can find none.”

The third stanza insists on the uselessness of sharing Platonic feelings with the rest of the world. Even if the lover deigned to utter his feelings, he would not succeed in exerting any influence on the way ordinary people love; they would continue loving at the earthly level “but as before”:

So, if I should now utter this,
Others (because no more
Such stuff to work upon there is)
Would love but as before.

The “contemptu mundi” is once again conveyed through the metaphor of Platonic love=specular stone. The material world does not deserve the poet’s attention because of the impossibility of finding any kind of spirituality within its earthly boundaries: “because no more/such stuff to work upon there is.”

The fourth stanza amounts to a compressed Neoplatonic manifesto. According to Plato, every form possesses the divine nature inside. The more noble the form, the more it retains the divine nature. The human soul, the noblest form of all, logically receives more of the divine nature than the body, which is nothing more than “love’s oldest clothes”:

But he who loveliness within
Hath found, all outward loathes,
For he who colour loves, and skin,
Loves but their oldest clothes.
As we have seen, stanzas three and four are an illustration of the interdisciplinary use of Petrarchan conventions. The “secrecy of love” topos led so naturally into the Augustinian “contemptu mundi” that both became almost imperceptibly bonded for the reader. The reason behind this interpenetrating use of poetic topoi is that the seventeenth-century Petrarchan poet could no longer carry out poetry's main task: to reproduce the individual, essential quality of the poetic object through linguistic synthesis. After three centuries in working order, the conventional metaphors that wove Petrarchism grew so threadbare that Petrarchism had ended up being as lifeless as any other ordinary language, which—because of its analytic and generic nature—is opposed per se to any synthetic attempt to achieve individuality. As the set of metaphors at the poet's disposal had become “grammaticalized” the poet could no longer carry out his mission, that is, succeed in “de-grammaticalizing” language through metaphor. Hence, the poet had to contrive new strategies in order to keep his poetic message alive and effective. One of these strategies or “de-grammaticalizing” techniques was to merge different poetic conventions.

In the fifth stanza Donne proposes to forget the individual features of each lover (“the He and She”) and reach a hermaphroditic state of asexuality:

If, as I have, you also do
   Virtue attired in woman see,
And dare love that, and say so too,
   And forget the He and She.

This was a Platonic ideal that circulated all throughout Europe. According to Italian theorists like Ficino, in an ideal perfect love, lovers are joined to such an extent that they lose their own semblance and become a third species, neither male, nor female. The same argument can be found in Hebrew’s *Diálogos de Amor*: 
For when the lover is in ecstasy, contemplating that which he loves, he has no care or memory of himself [...] Rather, he is quite alien to himself, and belongs to the object of his love and contemplation, into which he is totally converted. (Smith, *The Metaphysics of Love*, 1999).

Virtue in Donne’s *The Undertaking* is, once again, the keyword. Love’s mission is to contemplate virtue (“If you [...] also virtue in woman attired see”), in the same fashion as in Quevedo’s Sonnet 331 examined above: “Amar es conocer virtud ardiente.”

The two final stanzas deal again with the “contemptu mundi” convention. In the first one, Petrarchism merges again with the Christian dogma: the world is full of “profane men” who do not “bestow faith” on the lovers’ Platonic experience and deride it:

And if this love, though placed so,  
From profane men you hide,  
Which will no faith on this bestow,  
Or, if they do, deride:

The final stanza merely repeats the initial stanza of the poem. The lover is “braver” than the heroes of antiquity because he is able to “keep up with” Petrarchan standards by agonizing in silence:

Then you have done one braver thing  
Than all the Worthies did.  
And a braver thence will spring,  
Which is, to keep that hid.

The instances of “the secrecy of love” topos are more abundant in Quevedo’s love poetry than in Donne’s. However, their treatment of this topos is identical. Thus, in Quevedo’s sonnet 381, as in Donne’s *Twickenham Garden*, the lover’s eyes speak with tears what his tongue cannot utter:

Ojos, guardad al corazón secreto,  
pues le guarda la lengua a sus pasiones;
Ved que son vuestras lágrimas razones

Likewise, in Quevedo’s Sonnet 334—as in Donne’s The Undertaking—we find silence as the appropriate language for divine feelings:

Esa benigna llama y elegante,  
que inspira amor, hermosa y elocuente,  
la entiende l’alma, el corazón la siente,  
aquella docta y éste vigilante.

Los misterios del ceño y el semblante  
y la voz del silencio que, prudente,  
pronuncia majestad honestamente,  
bien los descifra mi respeto amante.

It is worth noting that in both Donne’s The Undertaking and Quevedo’s Sonnet 331 (the first sonnet analyzed in the previous chapter, “The Platonic Nature of Love”), virtue (“esa benigna llama y elegante/que inspira amor.”) is the original source of love. According to Quevedo, since virtue dwells in the realm of abstract ideas, it can only be apprehended by the lover’s soul: “la entiende el alma.” In similar fashion, in the The Undertaking, it is the lover’s soul that is able to find “the loveliness within.” Also, in both The Undertaking and Quevedo’s sonnet 334 “la voz del silencio” (“to keep that hid”) is the proper language for this high-ranking love.

It must also be noted that—following strictly the dicta of Neoplatonism—love is valued according to its position within a hierarchical order. Thus, in Donne’s The Undertaking religion is used to establish a hierarchy of love, in which the superior position of Neoplatonic love can be logically deduced from the characterization of the lower stages, occupied by ordinary love. If only “profane” and “faithless” lovers can perceive ordinary love, then Neoplatonic love must be perceived by a different kind of lovers: a divine and sacred one. In his Sonnet 334, Quevedo—by using the word “majestad” to refer to Platonic love—chooses a lay hierarchy to rank such a kind of love as the highest possible manifestation of love. The other manifestations of love must belong,
therefore, to the "peasantry of love." This hierarchical representation of love—whether based on a religious or lay scale—comes straight from Plato, who in his *Symposium* pictures the lover ascending a scale of being that starts with the perception of beauty in particular objects and ends in an appreciation of beauty in the abstract, as a philosophical universal.
THE “VIVA MORTE”: THE PETRARCHAN LOVER
AS EXEMPLUM FOR OTHER WOULD BE LOVERS

Unlike Dante, whose universe is absolutely “God-centered,” Petrarch’s *Canzoniere* is based on a fundamental tension between a “God-centered” universe and a “self-centered universe.” For Dante, the lady becomes a sort of symbol of the divine, and any kind of sensual approach is excluded. Hence, because of the lady’s unattainable nature, tears, complaints and laments are not the basic ingredients of the lover’s discourse. Petrarch’s Laura is an attempt to synthesize Dante’s divine lady and the troubadours’ material and sexually attainable lady.11 Laura is a real woman whose physical presence becomes as important as her spiritual perfection. Petrarch, however, failed to reconcile the heavenly with the earthly, and his attempt amounted to an inner contradiction rather than a fusion. This perpetual quarrel between the divine and the mundane constitutes the essence of Petrarchan love. Love is, thus, a dualism that baffles the lover and tears his feelings in two between the spiritual and the bodily. This is the reason why tears, complaints and laments are now at the core of poetic expression. In accordance with this dual conception of love, Petrarch’s imagery is made up of antitheses and of dual and opposing correspondences, such as freedom/servitude, love/war, heat/cold, etc. Petrarch’s complex network of antitheses and oxymora was regarded as extremely useful, from an aesthetic point of view, by later generations of poets. However, Petrarch’s network was more than a set of useful rhetorical devices; it provided an artistic formulation for the main philosophical issue in the Western World since Early Christianity: the debate between body and soul. From Petrarch onwards, poetry and philosophy were not regarded as separate and mutually exclusive disciplines.12
The centre of this network of opposing correspondences was occupied by the "viva morte" paradox, which laid the ground for the whole concept of Petrarchan love, and from which—as we shall see—various other antithetical pairs could be derived. According to Petrarch, love has two main characters. On the one hand, there is a masochistic lover who takes pleasure in his own pain by yearning for a real but, at the same time, ever-unattainable divine lady; on the other hand, there is a sadistic "killer lady" who takes pleasure in frustrating and scorning her lover's hopes from the heights of divinity. Therefore, the Petrarchan lover had to face the paradox of being killed by his lady’s disdain while loving. Love amounts, thus, to a death-wish, in which love and death are not only inevitably linked but become inseparable and identical:

O viva morte, O dilettoso male,
come puoi tanto in me, s'io no'l consento.

[O living death, O delightful harm
How can you have such power over me, if I do not consent to it.]  
(Petrarch, Sonnet CXXXII).

O perverse sex, where none is true but she,
who's therefore true, because her truth kills me.  
(Donne, Twickenham Garden).

Aqué para morir me falta vida,
allá para vivir sobró cuidado.  
(Quedero, Sonnet 474).

In Quevedo's sonnet, Lisi's lover cannot kill himself because—after having been killed by Lisi's scorn—he has no life left to be killed: "Aqué para morir me falta vida." At the same time, he cannot live in the other world because such a life without his lady would be empty like death: "Allá para morir sobró cuidado." As for Donne's lover, his very death becomes the proof of his lady's life. He dies because of her very existence ("her truth") and, at the same time, she lives ("she is true") because of her lover's death.

The "life in death/death in life" paradox can be articulated by various metaphors in Petrarchan language. For instance, the beloved lady is transformed into a luminous source (a
candle or even the sun) which attracts and then kills flies and butterflies, whose irrational plunge into self-destruction constitutes the metaphorical realization of the Petrarchan lover’s suicidal tendencies:

Come talora al caldo tempo sólo
semplicetta farfalla al lume avezza
volar negli occhi altrui per sua vaghezza,
onde aven ch’ella mora, altri si dole
casi sempre io corro al fatal mio sole

[As sometimes in the summertime the simple butterfly seeking the light, will in its desire fly into someone’s eyes, whereby it dies and the other is pained: so always I run to my fated sun.] (Petrarch, Sonnet CXLI).

Call us what you will, we are made such by love;
Call her one, me another fly,
We’re tapers too, and at our own cost die. (Donne, *The Canonization*).

In Petrarch’s sonnet, there is a double process of metaphorization. Whereas the lover transforms himself directly into a fly, the lady does not transform herself directly into a luminous source but into “someone’s eyes.” Relying unreservedly on his readership, who was familiar with the “eyes=sun” and the “lady=murderess” metaphors from previous sonnets (and so are we after having read the foregoing pages), Petrarch took for granted that his readers would be able to understand that—by joining these two metaphors—the lady could be identified with the sun. The lady destroys her lover in the same fashion as the sun melts and destroys everything that approaches it. As for Donne’s readership, its aesthetic expectations had already been shaped by almost two centuries of love poetry. Donne relied, hence, on his reader’s mastery over the whole system of conventions that constitute the Petrarchan manner. Otherwise, the “fly image” would have been as meaningless for his readers as it was for us before we knew its signification. As I mentioned in the general introduction to the first section of my study, every work stands in its singularity from a whole set of literary conventions, like a foreground-background structure.
There can be no doubt that Donne's reader had to be familiar with Petrarchan conventions in order to understand *The Canonization*. The Petrarchan manner was Donne's literary background.

Both the "taper/fly" and the "sun/fly" metaphors illustrate the aforementioned self-destructive and suicidal nature of Petrarchan love. The fly rushes towards its own destruction (the sun, the taper) in the same fashion as the death-wish drags the Petrarchan lover towards his "killer lady." Quevedo refines the "taper/fly" metaphor through the use of mythology. Thus, in Sonnet 449, the suicidal tendencies of the Petrarchan lover are embodied by several well-known mythological figures, such as Leander, Icarus and Tantalus. Whereas mythology is practically absent from Donne's *Songs and Sonnets*, Quevedo seems to be particularly keen on this kind of encoding:

Leandro, en mar de fuego proceloso,  
su amor ostenta, su vivir apura;  
Icaro en senda de oro mal segura,  
arde sus alas por morir glorioso  

[...]Tántalo en fugitiva fuente de oro.

The similarity between the "fly/sun" metaphor and the "Icarus/sun" metaphor is evident. At the bottom of Quevedo's mythological refinement lies the same conception of love as a lethal compulsion. The "Icarus/sun" metaphor is no more than a "bookish" elaboration of Petrarch's and Donne's "fly/sun" metaphor. Quevedo's sonnet is, thus, an excellent example of the continual reworking and re-elaboration of poetic conventions that Bembo's concept of *imitatio* made possible. Such a concept, as we know, provided Petrarchism with the flexibility necessary to survive as a system for three hundred years. It is interesting to note, also as a perfect example of this flexibility, how Quevedo transformed Icarus' accidental death into a conscious act of self-destruction. According to the myth, Quevedo should have chosen the verb "quemar" (an inanimate verb by nature) to describe Icarus' unintentional death. However, he chose an active verb
("arder"), suggesting the willfulness of Icarus’ death. Hence, after Quevedo’s re-elaboration, Icarus becomes another Petrarchan suicide.

Quevedo’s Sonnet 346 illustrates again the motif of the Petrarchan lover’s self-destruction. The whole sonnet is now devoted to a single mythological figure: Acteon, killed by his own dogs when he was turned into a fleeing deer by Diana, after having seen her naked while bathing. This sonnet parallels Petrarch’s Sonnet XXIII, the longest sonnet in the Canzoniere, in which Petrarch’s lover undergoes six consecutive self-destructive metamorphoses (Daphne, Phaeton, etc), the last of which is Acteon:

[...] ond’ella ebbe vergogna
et per fàrne vendetta o per celar-se
l’acqua nel viso co le man mi sparse
[...] ch’ i’ senti’ tarmi de la propria imago
et in un cervo solitario et vago
di selva in selva ratto mi transformo,
et ancor de’ miei can fuggo lo stormo.

[she felt shame and, to take revenge or to hide herself, sprinkled water in my face with her hand
[...] I felt myself drawn from my own image and into a solitary wandering stag
[...] and I still flee the belling of my hounds.] (Petrarch, Sonnet XXIII).

[...] Con la arena intentaron el cegalle
mas luego que de Amor miró el trofeo,
cegó más noblemente con su talle

su frente endureció con arco feo,
sus perros intentaron el matalle,
y adelantóse a todos su deseo. (Quevedo, Sonnet 336).

Quevedo’s last verse ("y adelantóse a todos su deseo") gives us the opportunity to dig deeper into this “viva morte” topos. As mentioned above, the origin of this motif lies in the paradoxical, antithetical essence of Petrarchan love. However, we must also take into consideration, as a possible origin of the “viva morte” topos, the dilemma faced by Neoplatonic
poets writing in a Christian environment. According to Platonists, the lover is sexually dragged to his lady because love is the animating and cohesive principle that keeps the universe together:

But why do we deem love a magician? Because all the power of magic is to be found in love. The work of magic is the attraction of one thing by another [...] now the elements of this world, which are as members of one sole being, all depending upon one creator, are bound to each other by the communion of a single nature [...] From their common bond is born a common love, and from love a common attraction. This, indeed, is true magic. (Ficino, De Amore, ii, 1348).

In this formation of love, all objects (including human beings) are linked to one another by the influence and bond of love. Nevertheless, according to Christian dogma, such amorous link between objects (sex) is a synonym for sin and, by extension, for death. Therefore, the lover is once again forced to die while loving. This is the reason why Acteon’s own “deseo” (his sexual impulse) kills him, outstripping his own dogs’ hunting instinct.

Finally, it is interesting to note that the half-rhetorical, half-philosophical life-in-death paradox was immediately adopted by several poetic manifestations other than love poetry. St. Teresa’s “muero porque no muero” and Donne’s Death’s Duell, ([the Lordwill neither] “let me dye, nor let me live, but dye an everlasting life and live an everlasting death”) are two obvious examples of the interdisciplinary use of the “viva morte” topos.13 However, it is Quevedo who squeezes the life-in-death antithetical pair as far as possible. His metaphysical sonnets are swarmed with numberless variations of this particular oxymoron. Whereas in Sonnet 2 he joins “pañales y mortaja,” in Sonnet 3 the “life-in-death” paradox is linked to “the inexorable passing of time” topos characteristic of metaphysical poetry: “¡Fue sueño ayer, mañana será tierra! ¡Poco antes nada; y poco después humo!”

The “life in death” paradox leads us directly to another Petrarchan topos: the lover as exemplum for other would-be lovers. As we know, the Petrarchan lover lives in a middle
stage between life and death, in an unsolvable situation in which life and death are equally painful. Since this situation of never-ending pain is almost identical to martyrdom, the lover can be considered as a model, an exemplum of suffering, just as martyrs were incarnations of exemplary behaviour in Christian religion. In contrast to the “viva morte” topos—which was an example of the way in which love poetry lent its imagery to religious and metaphysical poetry—the “lover as exemplum” topos illustrates the way in which love poetry borrowed from religious poetry’s imagery. The lover becomes a martyr by love, worth being worshipped by future lovers in the same fashion as religious martyrs were worshipped by Christian believers.

Once the Petrarchan lover became a member of love’s martyrology, then, he was in a position to warn and give advice to other would-be lovers. Sometimes, as in Quevedo’s and Donne’s poetry, he even offered himself to be studied and dissected:

Los que han de ser, y los que fueron antes,  
estudien su salud en mis sollozos  
y envidien mi dolor si son constantes. (Quevedo, Sonnet 486).

Study me then, you who shall lovers be  
At the next world, that is, at the next spring. (Donne, A nocturnal upon St. Lucy).

[...] If I must example be  
to future rebels, if the unborn  
must learn by my being cut up and torn,  
kill and dissect me [...]. (Donne, Love’s Exchange)

The “living epitaph” metaphor, in which after so much suffering the lover has become an epitaph of himself, seems to have been a specially appealing one for Donne and Quevedo in order to express this martyrdom by love:

Once I loved and died  
and am now become  
mine epitaph and tomb. (The Paradox)

Yo me seré epitafio al caminante,  
pues le diré, sin vida, el rostro mío:
“Ya fue gloria de Amor hacerme guerra.” (Sonnet 473).

The poetic allure of this metaphor lies in its capacity to accomplish a two-fold purpose. On the one hand, it makes reference to the Petrarchan lover’s “viva morte,” to his paradoxical existence half way between life and death. Whereas Donne’s *The Paradox* is clearly based on “the life in death” topos (“once I loved and died”), Quevedo’s poem does not allude to it directly, but through one of its most characteristic derivative formulations: the war/peace image. Secondly, since the epitaph can be considered as a final will or message to be noticed and read by future generations of lovers, the “living epitaph” metaphor obviously illustrates the topos of “the lover as exemplum for future lovers.” As can be in seen in the previous excerpts, Quevedo’s epitaph is more explicit than Donne’s. It quotes the actual message to be read by future lovers on the lover’s headstone: “Ya fue gloria de Amor hacerme guerra.”

The topos of “the lover as exemplum for other would-be lovers” was used for the first time by Petrarch himself in his *Canzoniere* and became from then onwards part and parcel of the conventions of love poetry for two centuries:

Ond’io consiglio: “Voi che siete un via volgete i passi, et voi ch’amore avampa, non v’indugiate su l’estremo ardore, 

che perch’io viva, de mille un no scampa.

[Wherefore I counsel: “You who are in the way turn back your steps, and you whom love inflames Do not wait for the fiercest burning, For, though I am alive, of a thousand not even one escapes.”] (Sonnet LXXXVIII).

As I mentioned before, Petrarch’s doomed-to-fail attempt to reconcile divine love and physical love led to a paradoxical situation of “viva morte” in which loving amounted to a state of everlasting contradiction. The lover was attracted by his lady’s physical appearance, but physical
love entailed sin and eternal damnation. The sinful nature of physical love is unmistakably alluded to in Petrarch’s sonnet through the hellish image of the “the fiercest fire.”

In spite of the presence of the topos of “the lover as exemplum for future lovers” in Petrarch’s *Canzoniere*, Donne and Quevedo did not have to go back to Petrarch to be aware of the martyr-like nature of love. Due to Bembo’s “imitatio”—by which poetic conventions were continuously reworked—later generations of poets had taken care of keeping this poetic convention alive. Garcilaso turned his personal martyrdom into a public matter as a form of advice for future lovers and Spenser addressed his advice directly to the reader:

> lloraré de mi mal las ocasiones
> sabrá el mundo la causa porque muero. (Garcilaso, Canción III).

See how the Tyranesse doth joy to see
the huge massacres which her eyes do make. (Spenser, Amoretti XXIII).

As in the case of the “viva morte,” the “love as martyrdom” convention has been considered as a possible basis for a straight relationship between English Metaphysical poets and Spanish mystics. It is true that Donne had a copy of St. Teresa’s works in his library and that some English Metaphysical poets were familiar with Spanish mystical works. However, in my opinion, it is not possible to argue for a direct connection between Spanish religious poets and English seventeenth-century Metaphysical poets. Both the “life-in-death” and the “martyrdom by love” conventions were already present in Petrarch’s *Canzoniere*, which was the decisive fact that made both love and religious poets realize the possibility of exchanging imagery. Divine love found its heaven in non-existence, and so did Petrarchan love. As Quevedo put it: “Y el no ser por amar será mi gloria” (Sonnet 460).
Plato’s philosophy and his theory of the "chain of being" were unfailingly identified with Petrarch’s aesthetics since the publication of Bembo’s *Gli Asolani*. This identification had an immediate impact on poetic conventions, such as the portrait of the lady. According to Platonic theories, the lady, as any other earthly entity, was open to undergo a process of generalization from the particular towards the general or the universal. Thus, the lady’s features were liable to experience a cosmic expansion that enabled them to encompass the whole universe.

Quevedo’s Sonnet 465 (“Retrato de Lisi que traña en una sortija”) is a perfect illustration of these Platonic “cosmic portraits.” There Quevedo combines the topos of the portrait with that of the ring, which was a common practice of seventeenth-century Italian Petrarchists like Marino and Tasso. Due to this combination of topos, the Platonic expansion is taken to its extreme: it is not solely the lady’s features that are able to expand and encompass the universe, but a tiny portrait of her in a ring. The tininess of the ring emphasises, therefore, the amplifying effects of the portrait. The sonnet reads as follows:

En breve cárcel traigo aprisionado,  
con toda su familia de oro ardiente,  
el cerco de la luz resplandeciente,  
y grande imperio del Amor cerrado.

Traigo el campo que pacen estrellado  
las fieras altas de la piel luciente;  
y a escondidas del cielo y del Oriente  
día de luz y parto mejorado.

Traigo todas las Indias en mi mano,  
perlas que, en un diamante, por rubíes,  
pronuncian con desdén sonoro yelo,
y razonan tal vez fuego tirano
relámpagos de risa carmesíes,
auroras, gala y presunción del cielo.

In the first stanza, the lover concentrates on his lady’s hair, whose blondeness and luminosity are “Platonically” expanded to its highest possible universal degree and, thus, are equalled to the sun’s radiance: “el cerco de la luz resplandeciente/con toda su familia de oro ardiente.” The same expansive phenomenon takes place in the following stanza. The lover concentrates on the lady’s eyes, which become—again through a process of cosmic amplification—the heavenly spheres (“el campo [...] estrellado”) where all the constellations (“las fieras altas de la piel luciente”) gather. The particular qualities of specific objects (the eyes’ brightness, the hair’s radiance) are, hence, enlarged to their cosmic potentiality (the stars’ brightness, the sun’s radiance).

In the next stanza, Quevedo again utilizes the technique of fusing poetic conventions that we have seen in previous chapters and which was also shared by Donne (A Valediction: Forbidding Mourning). Quevedo now fuses the Petrarchan topos of the “jewelled beauty” of the lady (teeth=pearls/lips=rubies) with the topos of the lady’s disdain.17 In order to do so, he transforms the Petrarchan lady’s disdain into a diamond on account of their common qualities of unyieldingness and coldness. Hence, the lady is able to speak diamonds (her scornful words) through rubies (her lips) and pearls (her teeth): “perlas que, en un diamante, por rubíes/pronuncian con desdén sonoro yelo.” Like the lady’s eyes and hair in the previous stanzas, this metaphorical fusion is also expanded. Thus, the lady’s face is not only full of jewels, but—because of the brightness of its pearls (teeth), rubies (lips) and diamonds (dismal words)—is also able to undergo a cosmic enlargement and become the Indies themselves, which were supposed to be crammed with the brightest jewels on earth.18
As it can be seen, the Platonic view, as far as the lady’s portrait is concerned, magnifies the visage’s features in such a way that they are able to transcend the boundaries of the particular and enter the domain of the universal. The lady’s portrait is, thus, a cosmic pintura.\(^1\)

The idea of a cosmic enlargement was already present in Petrarch’s *Canzoniere*. In his Sonnet CXCIX, the poet concentrates on Laura’s hand, which encompasses the whole nature and the heavens:

\[
\begin{align*}
O \text{ bella man che mi destringi’ l core} \\
e’ n poco spazio la mia vita chiudi, \\
man or’ ogni arte et tui loro studi \\
poser Natura e’l Ciel per farsi onore.
\end{align*}
\]

[O beautiful hand that grasps my heart and encloses in a little space all my life, hand where Nature and Heaven have put all their art and all their care to do themselves honour.].

The same “cosmic trend” with regard to feminine portraits can be found in Donne’s *Songs and Sonnets*. In *The Good Morrow*, Donne’s lovers are transformed into two respective universes and their room has become an “everywhere” as a result of love:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{For love, all love of other sights controls,} \\
\text{And makes one little room an everywhere.} \\
\text{Let sea-discoverers to new worlds have gone,} \\
\text{Let maps to others, worlds on worlds have shown} \\
\text{Let us possess one world, each hath one, and is one.}
\end{align*}
\]

The lovers’ room is stretched “ad infinitum” until it becomes a universe in itself. We must bear in mind that for Platonists love plays an active part in the process of “universalization”; it acts upon particular objects and transforms them into universals. Likewise, in *The Good Morrow* love is in charge of the enlargement or “universalization” by acting upon a particular object (the lovers’ room) and turning its particularity into universality (“an everywhere”). Furthermore, each lover
contains a universe within: “each [each lover] hath one [one world], and is one.”
Hence, Donne is able—in just one stanza—to carry out a double process of Platonic expansion.

For both Donne and Quevedo, the Indies seem to be one of their favourite metaphors to illustrate this Platonic process of “universalization.” The idealized seventeenth-century conception of America as a promised land undoubtedly provided an excellent source for “idealizing” and “generalizing” the particular. American riches were not just mere riches, they symbolized the philosophical universal for riches, the “rich-ness” of riches. In the Sunne Rising, Donne combines the Indies topos with the topos of lady’s eyes=the sun. If the lady’s eyes are identified with the sun, then each of her eyes can be respectively identified with the far east (where the sun rises) and with the far west (where the sun sets), which constitute, in turn, the very source of spices (the philosophical universal for spices) and the very source for precious metals (the philosophical universal for precious metals):

If her eyes have not blinded thine.  
Look, and tomorrow late, tell me  
Whether both the Indies of spice and mine  
Be where thou leftst them, or lie here with me.

The same motif—as we remember—was present in Quevedo’s portrait of Lisi contained in a ring: “Traigo todas las Indias en mi mano.” There are many more instances of this Petrarchan motif throughout Quevedo’s love poetry:

Tú, que la paz del mar, ¡Oh, navegante!  
molestas, codicioso y diligente,  
por sangrarle las venas al Oriente  
del mas rubio metal, rico y flamante,

detente aquí; no pases adelante;  
hártate de tesoros, brevemente,  
en donde Lisi peina de su frente  
hebra sutil en ondas fulminante.

Si buscas perlas, más descubre ufana
su risa que Colón en el mar de ellas;
si grana, a Tiro dan sus labios grana.

Si buscas flores, sus mejillas bellas
vencen la primavera y la mañana;
si cielo y luz, sus ojos son estrellas. (Sonnet 445)

Particularly keen—as we know—on fusing poetic conventions with impeccable logic, Quevedo joins the topoi of “the lover as sea wanderer” and the “jewelled beauty” in one single motif. In order to do so, Quevedo transforms the Petrarchan lover/sailor into an explorer looking for treasures and jewels which are, in turn, the poet’s cue to enumerate once more the jewelled features of the Petrarchan lady. As in Donne’s The Good Morrow, it is not necessary for the lover to navigate across the world because the whole universe is revealed through the lady’s physical attributes. The same fusion of the “lover as sea wanderer” and the “jewelled beauty” can be found in Spenser’s Amoretti XV, which bears a striking resemblance to Quevedo’s sonnet. In fact, if we substitute Quevedo’s “navegante” for Spenser’s “tradeful merchants,” we would seem to be reading the same poem:

Ye tradeful merchants that with weary toyle
Do seeke most pretious things to make your gaine:
And both the Indias of their treasure spoile,
What needest thou to seeke so farre in vayne?
For loe my love douth in her selfe containe
All this worlds riches that may farre be found

It must be noted that every expansion always needs a point of reference from which to expand, otherwise the enlargement could not be perceived. The Petrarchan process of expansion involved, thus, surpassing the known limits established by an ideal entity, or entailed superseding a commonly accepted paragon that was meant to represent the highest, most universal degree to which a particular earthly quality could aspire. This is the reason why the “cosmic portrait” convention necessarily had to make continuous reference to commonly agreed upon paragons and poetic landmarks in order to make the Platonic process of generalization or “universalization” come
true. Thus, in Petrarch’s sonnet CXXIX, Laura outshines Helen, the classical paragon of feminine beauty:

si fatta che Leda
avria ben detto che sua figlia perde
come stella che’l sol copre col raggio;

[...] And ever fashioned so
that Leda would have surely said her daughter
fades like star outshone by the sun’s rays].

Laura goes beyond the paragons instituted by classical tradition. Likewise, for later poets like Donne and Quevedo the beloved lady will surpass the paragons established by Petrarch himself. Consider the Phoenix myth, for instance, which—on account of its capacity to continuously resurrect from the flames—was used by Petrarch to “universalize” the eternal quality of the lovers’ spiritual fusion:

Così sol si ritrova
lo mio voler, et così in sua la cima
de’ suoi alti pensieri al sol si volve,
et così si risolve,
et così torna al suo stato di prima;
arde et more et riprende i nervi suoi
et vive puoi con la fenice a prova.

[Thus my desire is unique
and thus at the summit
of its high thoughts it turns to the sun
and thus it is consumed
and thus returns to its former state;
it burns and dies and takes again its sinews
and lives on, vying with the phoenix.] (Petrarch, Sonnet CXXXV)

The Phoenix riddle hath more wit
By us; we two being one, are it. (The Canonization).

Hago verdad la Fénix en la ardiente
llama, en que renaciendo me renuevo. (Sonnet 450).

Whereas Petrarch vies with the Phoenix, trying to reach its paragon-like position,

Quevedo’s lover is able to reach it ("hago verdad la Fénix") and Donne’s lover even excels it ("the
phoenix riddle hath more wit by us). As in Petrarch's love poetry, in both Donne's and Quevedo's love poetry Platonic expansion is achieved by leaving behind a point of reference.
BEYOND PETRARCH

INTRODUCTION

In the first section of this study, we saw how Petrarch tried to assimilate two opposing traditions in his *Canzoniere*. On the one hand, "troubadouresque" love poetry and its praise of sexual satisfaction in love. On the other hand, thirteenth century Italian love poetry: the "dolce stil nuovo," in which the lady was identified with the divine and became a living metaphor of it. In this "dolce stil nuovo" tradition love was assimilated to virtue, the pursuit of the good. Thus, sex was banned "ex-definitio" from the amorous experience. In addition to this, we must also take into account the fact that Petrarch and the "stil nuovisti" were, above all, Christian poets; this means that, in accordance with the Christian Church's directives, any sexual or strictly physical approach to love was automatically labelled as sin in their poetry. As a result of the meeting of these two incompatible traditions, Petrarchan love amounts to a permanent contradiction, an unsolvable, baffling dualism. This is the reason why Petrarchan love was articulated by countless antithetical images and unnatural couplings such as fire/water, life/death, war/peace, etc.

The "troubadouresque" tradition posed no problems as far as the body was concerned: bodily experiences were part and parcel of love. It was Dante's "stilnuovisti" tradition that introduced the dilemma between body and soul in Petrarch's love poetry. Dante drove a wedge between flesh and soul because his poetry was based upon St. Augustine's philosophy, which, was based, in turn, upon Plato's disregard for material objects and the physical world in which
they exist. The point of departure for Plato's contempt towards the material world was Heraclitus' philosophy, according to which sensible things were inconstant per se because they are subject to change. We live in a physical world in which everything changes. If this is correct, Plato said, then sensible things can never be known: they are changing all the time. It is impossible to have any knowledge of things that are variable by their very nature. Our knowledge, therefore, must be based on invariable elements or universals. Such immutable elements are what Plato called "ideas," which are the only real and permanent elements beside the changing phenomena of the sensible world. Real existence (permanence) is only possible, therefore, in the world of "ideas." Anything outside the realm of "ideas" is an illusion, it is subject to change, it is not permanent and, consequently, it does not have a true existence. Things outside Plato's ideal world are no more than shades or imitations of the real things that exist in the domain of "ideas." Following Plato's reasoning, the mind must get rid of all sense impressions in order to achieve real knowledge, that is, knowledge of real things ("ideas"). Man must, therefore, concentrate on the mind's purely spiritual activity.

Plato's theory of knowledge rules the rest of his philosophy. Thus, "real" beauty and "real" love are not performable within the sensible world. If we want love to be real, then it must belong to the sphere of "ideas." Therefore, Platonic love is founded on only the most tenuous basis of experienced actions. Since the body is the source of all experience acts, the body and all its manifestations (sex among them) must be excluded from the true, real amorous experience. Hence, it should come as no surprise that beauty--the source of love--was thought of by Plato as pure symmetry, harmony and mathematical relations. Beauty, in order to have a true existence, must be a mere contemplation of the mind:

It is only when he discerns beauty itself through what makes it visible that a man will be quickened with the true, and not the seeming, virtue--for it is virtue's self that quickens him, not virtue's semblance. (Plato, The Symposium. Quoted from Smith, The Metaphysics of Love, 40).
As we have seen, the distinctive feature of Plato's "ideas" is that they are not subject to change; this is the reason why their existence is a real one, as opposed to the fake existence of material objects. According to Christian religion, man, while he lived in Paradise, was not subject to change, that is, to a temporal existence: he was eternally young. Thus, Plato's realm of "ideas" could be easily identified with Christian Paradise. It was St. Augustine who took over Plato's "idealism" and adapted it to the Christian dogma. According to Augustine, love in Paradise was the same as love in Plato's "ideal" world: the body had no place in it. Adam's and Eve's copulation was performed without "lust's full appetite, only by voluntary use." *(The City of God, xiv, 16).*

As opposed to Plato's philosophy, Aristotle's provided—as we shall see—a different view with regard to the relationship between body and soul. For Aristotle, the essence of a thing, what a particular thing really is (the "idea" of a particular thing, in Platonic terms), is not common with anything else. The essence of a specific thing belongs to that specific thing and to nothing else; it is identical with the thing itself; it is one and the same with that particular thing. Therefore, the essence of a thing cannot be found in an "ideal" world beyond the physical world. To have knowledge of the essence is to have knowledge of the particular, not of an abstracted "idea." For Aristotle, being and existence are exactly the same thing, whereas for Plato there is a great deal of difference between being ("ideas") and existence (actual material things):

"I ask what is this thing? The answer will be what it is: this thing is a table. But what is it that is a table? What is the what it is? Is this thing to be identified with what is made out of? Is it enough to say it is wood? Is the thing to be identified with its material? Is it just wood? No; for this thing is clearly more than just wood—it is 'this here wood' [...]."

"[...] Is what the thing is its form? Is it a classroom table, something to put books and papers upon? No; form alone does not tell us what this individual thing really is. Classroom table is what we can truly say this thing is. But this thing is not merely a classroom table. Classroom table in general does not exist. What exists is this here thing, this here classroom table." *(Randall. Aristotle, 118.).*
For Plato, the essence of the classroom table would be "something to put books and papers upon." It would be a potential or "ideal" state of perfection for classroom tables at which all its "imperfect" realizations that populate the material world (all actual classroom tables within the sensible world) try to reach. Therefore, as opposed to Aristotle's "this here classroom table," the essence or "idea" of a classroom table, according to Plato, would be shared by millions of classroom tables in the physical world. The same applies to the soul in relation to the body: the soul constitutes the potential or "ideal" state of perfection at which the body must aim. True "ideal" love is carried out by the soul, which functions as a paragon for the physical love of the material world, in the same fashion as the "idea" of classroom table is a paragon for all the actual classroom tables of the sensible world. Moreover, in Plato's thought, the potential or the "ideal" is never attained by the actual. The actual classroom table will never become the "ideal" classroom table. Likewise, the body will never reach the soul, there will always be a gap between them. As we remember, this was the philosophical basis of Quevedo's "las manchas de la tierra no las siento" (Sonnet 458) and of Donne's "he who loveliness within hath found, all outward loathes/for he who color loves, and skin, loves but their oldest clothes" (The Undertaking).

Aristotle rejected the conception of a soul independent of the body. The soul is not a substance capable of existing on its own. Aristotle is not only a naturalist rather than an "idealist," but also a functionalist. It is in terms of the object's activity that we can grasp its essence. It is in terms of actuality that we understand potentiality. As a matter of fact, actuality (any classroom table of the sensible world) and potentiality (the "idea" or essence of classroom table) are the same thing. Similarly, we can only understand the soul in terms of the body. The body is the actuality of the soul, the realization in function of the soul's potential capacities:

Those are right who regard the soul as not independent of the body and at the same time as not itself a species of body. It is not body but something belonging to the body, and therefore resides in the body, what is more, in such and such body. (Aristotle, De Anima I, i. Quoted from Smith, The Metaphysics of love, 187).
The main flaw of the Platonic "ideal" theory, according to Aristotle, is that it considers "ideas" or essences (like the soul, for instance) as transcendent and separate from material things (the body). For Aristotle, true being is not an abstract universal, but the concrete individual thing. This is the reason why Garcilaso's verse "no cabe en mi cuarto en vos veo" (Sonnet V) no longer makes sense from an Aristotelian viewpoint. Garcilaso regarded his lady as a Platonic universal or "idea" whose essence could never be encompassed by her lover. She belongs to the Platonic "ideal" world whose perfection will never be reached—as we know—by the baser material world, to which her lover belongs. From Aristotle's viewpoint, on the contrary, the lover is perfectly able to reach his lady because there is no longer such a distinction between "ideal" universals and physical individuals. In the following chapters we shall see in more detail the impact that these different thought patterns had upon poetic conventions through some of Donne's and Quevedo's poems.¹ This change in thought patterns stems, as I said in the introduction to this study, from a rejection of courtly cultural practices and was a manifestation of Donne's and Quevedo's detachment from the court.² The main difference between Donne's and Quevedo's love poetry—as far as their adherence to Aristotle's emphasis on the physical is concerned—is one of degree. The Aristotelian emphasis on the body will be much more explicit in Donne's Songs and Sonnets than in Quevedo's love poetry on account of their different systems of transmission. The manuscript system of transmission of Donne's Songs and Sonnets undoubtedly allowed for a greater freedom of speech.

There are several facts that support the idea of the Songs and Sonnets' association with the manuscript system of transmission. First, the Songs and Sonnets did not achieve literary recognition until its 1633 edition: this means that they were not originally conceived by Donne as literary monuments to be preserved in printed editions. Furthermore, there seems to have been a general ignorance of the existence of Donne's lyrics. As Alan McColl notes, "the bulk of his poems scarcely began to circulate to any great extent until well into the second decade of the
century. Most of the collections belong to the twenties and thirties and a great number of manuscript miscellanies were compiled after his death [...] to all this, it should be added the very infrequency with which Donne mentions his poems” (“The circulation of Donne’s poems.” 32). Second, the fact that some of Donne’s Songs and Sonnets appeared in different songbooks along with poems by Campion, Jonson, Beaumont, and others reinforces the idea that they were transmitted individually and not as a group or collection of poems. Third, Donne’s poetry was subject to modifications by its readers. He himself, in a letter to his friend Sir Henry Goodyer (1611), alludes to “copies which have crept out into the world without my knowledge.” All poems written within the manuscript system of transmission could be considered as belonging to a more or less authorless discourse practice. The “pseudo-anonymity” inherent in this kind of transmission of poetical works provided the poet with a protective barrier that undoubtedly allowed him to subvert poetic conventions more freely.

In contrast to Donne’s freedom of speech, the public nature of Quevedo’s love poetry, forced him, in my opinion, to devise a number of specific disguising strategies in order to hide the body’s presence in his poems and, thus, to avoid censorship. Quevedo’s literary career is fraught with restrictions on his freedom of speech arising from censorship.3 In 1632, all his satirical works (including El Buscón, whose authorship Quevedo denied) were banned. The publication of La hora de todos—his most ambitious satirical work—had to be postponed until 1630, after Quevedo’s death. His Política de Dios was denounced to the “Inquisición” in 1631. He even went as far as manipulating the imprint of El chitón de las tarabillas, which was printed in Madrid and not in Huesca as appears on its cover. It is also the avoidance of censorship that lies at the bottom of Quevedo’s repentant manner at the end of his career. Quevedo, in his last works, asks the censors for mercy with regard to his earlier works. Thus, in the dedication to his aunt that precedes his volume of religious poetry, El Heráclito cristiano, Quevedo states the following in relation to the “scandalous” works of his youth: “Sólo pretendo, ya que la voz de mis mocedades
ha sido molesta a Vm. y escandalosa a todos, conocer por este papel mis diferentes propósitos.”

Similarly, in the introduction to his *Juguetes de la niñez*, Quevedo stated the following: “Yo escribir con ingenio facinoroso, en los errores de la niñez, más ha de veintiuno años, los que llamaron sueños míos, y, precipitado, les puse nombres más escandalosos que propios. Admiérase por disculpa que la sazón de mi vida era por entonces más propia de ímpetu que de consideración.”

In addition to all these facts, it should also be noted that revising and amending texts was a common practice for Quevedo. As José Manuel Blecua points out, Quevedo corrected his poems just as thoroughly as Fray Luis de León or Góngora did (*Poesía original completa*, x). Thus, in 1629 he asked “El Tribunal de la Inquisición” to withdraw all the previous editions of *Los Sueños* published outside Castile and prepared a new edition in which he suppressed some controversial passages.

All these facts support my working hypothesis, according to which Quevedo made use of a number of “disguising techniques” in order to subvert the ideological basis of poetic courtly practices: Platonism. The use of such techniques was due to “circunstancias externas, entre las cuales una de las principales sería la diferencia en el siglo de Oro, entre lo que se podía escribir para un círculo cerrado de amigos y admiradores y lo que se permitía publicar o circular libremente” (Henry Ettinghausen, “Quevedo, ¿Un caso de doble personalidad?,” 43). Freedom of speech depended heavily on the system of transmission chosen by the writer for the circulation of his works. The difference between Donne’s explicitness and Quevedo’s use of “disguising devices” as far as their Aristotelian subversion of Platonic love is concerned, must be seen, therefore, as a consequence of their adherence to two different systems of transmission. In the following chapters I will try to disclose Quevedo’s use of such “disguising devices” in his love
poetry by comparing some of his sonnets with Donne's straightforward expression of the body's role in the amorous experience.
BODY AND SOUL

As we have seen, Aristotle is particularly concerned with the "thisness" or the particularity of things. A substantial part of his philosophy hinges upon this concept. Let us consider again the example of the classroom table. What is it that makes a classroom table a classroom table as opposed to the tree of which it was once part? Aristotle's answer is: change, movement. In contrast to Plato—for whom change was the main obstacle towards true or essential knowledge of things—Aristotle considers change as the very source of true knowledge, as the necessary condition for the existence of essences. For Aristotle the world is a great spectacle of changes and processes. The view that nature is dynamic is the fundamental feature of Aristotle's vision of the world. Since nature (actual existence) is dynamic and being and existence are—as we saw in the introduction—exactly the same thing, then being and movement must also be identical. This Aristotelian identification between being and movement has considerable aesthetic consequences: movement (and bodily activity, in general) will now be the artist's main concern.

Because of its visual impact, painting provides an excellent example of this new emphasis on movement as the source of essence and true identity. Renaissance painting was inspired by the perfection of Plato's "ideal" generalizations. It was modelic, abstract, "ideal." Based on Plato's philosophy, it had no option but to support a purely static conception of being: being as power or potentiality rather than actuality or activity. In contrast to Renaissance painting, seventeenth-century painting—based on Aristotelian precepts—concentrates on the dynamic features of objects. It tries to achieve a photographic reproduction of reality. Moreover, by developing such techniques as the "chiaroscuro" (figures emerging from a dark shapeless background) seventeenth-century painting enhanced the corporeal nature of objects. We should remember that, for Aristotle,
essence and existence are the same thing. Therefore, by concentrating on the external features of objects (their "existence"), the painter was able to bring to light their real nature (their "essence"). As far as the human figure is concerned, the painter tries to capture the person’s individuality, his/her soul, through his/her bodily features and gestures:

“Los mártires y apóstoles de Ribera, los monjes de Zurbarán, los cortesanos y los idiotas de Velázquez están en los lienzos para hacernos sentir su eternidad de criaturas, su insobornable autonomía espiritual, el derecho perenne a su propio yo y a su definitiva salvación personal.” (Orozco, Temas del barroco de poesía y pintura, xliv.).

This Aristotelian conveyance of the soul through outward appearance provided the basis for several new aesthetic motifs. The artist not only turns his attention to external, bodily activity, but also to the objects that surround the person. Thus, Quevedo portrays Lisi with a child in her lap in Sonnet 477. In the same fashion, there is an amazing proliferation of portraits and self-portraits: the visage mirrors the soul.

Seventeenth-century artists seek, hence, to overcome the "homme double" (body/soul), created by Plato and continued through Dante’s and Petrarch’s poetry, as well as through Renaissance art. They seek a man “higher than corporeal nature but also more substantial than man’s sublimation in merely spiritual ["ideal" in Platonic terms] essence” (Hanak, “The Emergence of Baroque Mentality,” 318).

Quevedo’s Sonnet 321 (“Quiere que la hermosura consista en el movimiento”) and Donne’s The Ecstasy are excellent examples illustrating this interpenetration of spirit and matter. Let us consider Quevedo’s sonnet first:

No es artifice, no, la simetría
de la hermosura que en Floralba veo ;
ni será de los números trofeo
fábrica que desdeña al sol y al día.
No resulta de música armonía
(perdónen sus milagros en Orfeo),
que bien la reconoce mi deseo
oculta majestad que el cielo envía.

Puédese padecer, mas no saberse;
puédese codiciar, no averiguarse,
alma que en movimientos puede verse.

No puede en la quietud difunta hallarse
hermosura, que es fuego en el moverse
y no puede viviendo sosegarse.

As I mentioned in the introduction to the second section of my study, Plato’s idealism regarded beauty as mathematical relations of pure symmetry and harmony. Quevedo explicitly rejects Plato’s static “mathematical” view of beauty in the first stanza of this sonnet: “ni será de los números trofeo.” Quevedo’s rejection of the Platonic mathematical rejection of beauty parallels Aristotle’s overall rejection of Plato’s philosophy: “ideas” (beauty in this particular case) cannot be isolated from “real-life” existence. Hence, beauty cannot be a purely abstract construct («No es artifice») separated from actual, material existence; it cannot be “fábrica que desdeña al sol y al día.” Beauty needs the body to be appreciated.

In the following stanza, Quevedo restates his rejection of the Platonic concept of beauty. Plato, following Pythagoras’ theories, identifies musical language with mathematical language, which, in turn, was the very language of “ideas.” Therefore, Quevedo’s rejection of a mathematical conception of beauty necessarily entails the rejection of a musical conception of beauty as well: “No resulta de música armonía.” It is also interesting to note that it is the lover’s “deseo” and not his “amor” that recognizes Floralba’s beauty. As we know, Petrarchan treatises on love are based upon a fundamental distinction between “amar” (a cognitive activity) and “desear” (a merely physical activity) which, in turn, parallels Plato’s dissociation between an “ideal” higher world—attainable through the mind’s cognitive activity—and a baser material world—
limited to the body’s activity. Such a distinction is profusely illustrated throughout Quevedo’s love sonnets:

Mándome ¡Ay, Fabio! que la amase Flora
y que no la quisiese [...] 

Lo que el humano afecto siente y llora,
goza el entendimiento amartelado. (Sonnet 331).

In contrast to Sonnet 331, in Sonnet 321 the lover’s “deseo” (his “humano afecto”) is now able to decode the heavenly messages that only the mind’s cognitive activity (“el entendimiento amartelado”) was able to decode in Sonnet 331: “bien la reconoce mi deseo/oculta majestad que el cielo envía.” Body and soul do not speak different languages anymore. Those Platonic times in which “lo que el humano afecto siente y llora/goza el entendimiento amartelado” seem to be over.

If the soul manifests itself through the body, then spiritual enjoyment and physical enjoyment must be identical. Nevertheless, in the third stanza Quevedo hesitates to open the door to bodily or sexual enjoyment by inserting what seems to be an excerpt from León Hébreo’s Diálogos de Amor: physical beauty can be coveted but not actually possessed:

Puédese padecer, mas no saberse;
puédese codiciar, no averiguarase.

[...] El deseo, como otra vez te he dicho, presupone la ausencia de la cosa deseada [...] aunque la cosa exista y se posea de todas maneras se puede desear no de haberla [...] sino de gozarla con unión cognoscitiva. (Diálogos de Amor, 49-50).

It is here that we clearly perceive that Quevedo’s love poetry was not protected by the anonymity of the manuscript system of circulation as Donne’s poetry was, and that his freedom of speech was consequently restricted.
In the last stanza, Quevedo echoes again Aristotle's philosophy. Our apprehension of beauty is basically sensitive and not, as Plato posited, spiritual: "No puede [la belleza] en la quietud difunta hallarse." Beauty reveals itself in the woman's movements ("que es fuego en el moverse/y no puede viviendo sosegarse") in the same fashion as every philosophical universal or "idea" manifests itself through actual existence, namely, through movement. The whole distinction between Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy (and, therefore, between Platonic love and a new conception of love that claims the body's share in the amorous experience) hinges on the value attached to movement. For Plato, movement is valueless. Consequently, the body is totally excluded from "true," ideal love. For Aristotle, on the contrary, movement is the very evidence of existence. Therefore, the body must be considered a fundamental constituent of the amorous experience.

Quevedo's "alma que en movimientos puede verse" is paralleled by *The Ecstasy*, in which Donne--by mocking the consequences of a strict adherence to Platonic love--arrives at the conclusion that man (and, therefore, human love) is a "subtle knot" between body and soul.

In the first stanza, Donne's lovers are sitting on the bank of a river staring into each other's eyes. The eyes play a fundamental role in Platonic love. Eyesight is the least earth-bound of the senses, hence providing an ideal point of departure for a conception of love based on only the most tenuous contact with earthly experience. Such tenuous contact with the material world is mockingly emphasised by Donne. His lovers' "propagation" and their physical contact are respectively limited to "pictures in their eyes to get" and the "intergrafting" of the hands:

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where, like a pillow on a bed,
   A pregnant bank swelled up [...] 
[...] Sat we two [...] 
Our eye-beams twisted, and did thread 
    Our eyes, upon one double string [...] 
So to intergraft our hands, as yet
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was all the means to make us one
And pictures in our eyes to get
was all our propagation.

This mockery of Platonic/Petrarchan love becomes even more apparent in the fourth and fifth stanza, in which Donne shows us the consequences of regarding love as a purely cognitive, spiritual activity and despising the body as a nuisance that obstructs the lovers' spiritual fusion. The lovers become “two sepulchral statues,” two living examples of what Quevedo's defined as “quietud difunta”:

As, 'twixt two equal armies, Fate
Suspendes uncertain victory,
Our souls (which to advance their state
Were gone out) hung 'twixt her and me

And whilst our souls negotiate there,
We like sepulchral statues lay;
All day, the same our postures were,
And we said nothing all the day

In the following stanzas, the lovers keep on strictly observing the norms of Platonic love. Thus, we find one of the conventions of Petrarchan love with which we are already familiar: the lovers as “exemplum for other would-be lovers.” If an eavesdropper familiar with Petrarchan conventions (someone who “souls’ language understood”) took notice of these strict Platonic lovers, then he might learn “a new concoction” and “part far purer than he came”:

If any, so by love refined
that he souls language understood
And by good love were grown all mind,
within convenient distance stood,

He (though he knew not which soul spake,
because both meant, both spake the same)
might then a new concoction take,
And part far purer than he came
As in *A Valediction: Forbidding Mourning* (in which the lovers were “one”), the lovers of *The Ecstasy* are also able to achieve the Platonic hermaphrodite, the spiritual state in which the lovers’ souls are linked to such an extent that they constitute an asexual “two-in-oneness.” They form such a spiritual unity that they are immune to the corruption characteristic of worldly objects. The immutability of their union is analogized to the atoms’ immutability. As David Hedrich notes, “by anatomizing the representative body to the limits of material dissection, Donne attempts to discover a radical immutability of the selfhood [...] for the atom, as the limit of the self’s deconstruction might also serve as the origin of that self’s reconstruction” (“Donne’s atomies and Anatomies,” 71):

We then, who are this new soul, know
Of what we are composed, and made,
For the atomies of which we grow
Are souls whom no change can invade.

However, a few stanzas later follows the realization of what constitutes the true nature of love: it involves soul as well as body. Following Aristotle’s doctrines, Donne presents the relationship between soul and body as a functional one: the soul acts through the body. As we know, according to Aristotle, every instrument has a specific structure that allows it to perform its particular function; in the same fashion, the soul’s functions (love amongst them) must be performed by the body, which is the soul’s specific structure. Donne illustrates this functionalist relationship between body and soul with an astrological analogy. According to traditional astrology, the celestial spheres were governed by angels and intelligences; likewise, the body is governed by the soul:

But oh, alas, so long, so far
our bodies why do we forbear
They are ours, though they are not we, we are
the intelligences, they the sphere.
In the next stanza, Donne presses on with Aristotelian functionalism. The lovers' souls must be thankful to their bodily shape because their bodies "did to us first convey." It is the body that makes communication and contact between the lovers possible. Therefore, the body cannot be "dross" (the impurity which is discarded in the process of refining metal) as Platonic love treatises stated. The body is as valuable as "alay" (alloy):

We owe them thanks because they thus
Did to us first convey,
Yielded their forces, sense, to us
Nor are dross to us, but alay.

In the next stanza, Donne resorts again to astrology in order to illustrate Aristotle's functionalism. According to astrology, stars exerted their influence on man through their effect on the air. Likewise, the soul needs the body to exert its influence on man:

on man heaven's influence works not so
But it first imprints the air,
so soul into the soul may flow,
though it to body first repair.

In addition to astrology, Donne provides medical evidence for the necessary link between body and soul. Man is a "subtle knot" between flesh and spirit because—in accordance with commonly accepted medical theory—the blood produces vapours which are able to connect body and soul:

As our blood labours to beget
Spirits as like souls as it can
because such fingers need to knit
That subtle knot which makes us man:

The same view of man as a "subtle knot" between body and soul is present in Donne's sermons:
In the constitution and making of a natural man, the body is not the man, nor the soul is not the man, but the union of these two makes up the man. 

(Sermons, II, 12).

The next two stanzas are the conclusion of Donne’s argument in favour of his conception of man as a “subtle knot” between flesh and soul: “Pure lovers’ souls” must “descend to human affections and faculties.” Although “love’s mysteries in souls do grow” the body is the soul’s “book”:

So must pure lovers’ soul descend  
To affections and to faculties,  
Which sense may reach and apprehend,  
Else a great Prince in prison lies.

To our bodies turn we then, that so  
Weak men on love revealed may look;  
Love’s mysteries in souls do grow,  
But yet the body is his book.  
And if some lover, such as we,  
have heard this dialogue of one,  
Let him still mark us, he shall see  
small change, when we are to bodies gone.

As opposed to Platonic “pure lovers,” who reject any bodily manifestation, Donne’s “pure lovers” are pure precisely because they “descend to affections.” Otherwise “a great Prince [the soul] in prison [the body] lies.” This image can be traced back to Plato himself. However, whereas Plato simply uses this image as an illustration of the body’s and soul’s opposing natures, Donne uses it to argue against Platonic dualism. According to Plato, if the soul were released from his bodily imprisonment, it would immediately fly to the heights of “true” being or “ideas.” The soul is alienated by its bodily imprisonment. For Donne, on the contrary, there is no such thing as a bodily imprisonment. The soul’s alienation is due to its refusal to come to grips with the body. By ignoring the body, the soul frustrates its own capacity for acting, its own actuality, that is, its own being. Therefore, the soul’s descent to “human affections” is not an act of self-abasement,
but rather an act of self-fulfillment. As a matter of fact there is but "small change" between physical and spiritual love.

Both *The Ecstasy* and Quevedo's Sonnet 321 support the idea that love and beauty need the body in order to be appreciated. Love cannot be a purely abstract construct. Man's spirituality is impotent without the actuality of the senses. The soul needs the body in order to make itself palpable and visible. Not to believe so is to be no more than "a loving wretch" suffering from amorous "seasickness":

That loving wretch that swears,  
"Tis not the bodies marry, but the minds,  
Which he in her Angelique finds,  
Would swear as justly, that he hears,  
In that day's rude hoarse minstrelsy, the spheres. *(Love's Alchemy).*

Who ever loves, if he does not propose  
the right true end of love, he is one which goes  
To sea for nothing but to make him sick. *(Love's Progress).*

The body becomes living proof of the soul's existence. As Donne himself put it in one of his letters: "For as our bodies glorified shall be capable of spiritual joy, so our souls demerged into these bodies are able to partake earthly pleasures." (Letter "To All my Friends: Sir Henry Goodyer," 1612). Aristotle's assertion that "those are right who regard the soul as not independent from the body" is clearly mirrored by Donne's and Quevedo's new conception of love.
DREAMS

Petrarch did not "elevate" his lady to the point of denying her humanity, as Dante did. Dante's lady was unidimensional: she was simply a heavenly creature. Therefore, there was no conflict between heaven and earth, between soul and body. Dante's lover knows right from the beginning that his lady is unattainable in earthly, physical terms. In order to attain his lady he has to ascend the Platonic ladder, whose final steps belong to an utterly spiritual domain in which the body has no place.

As opposed to Beatrice's monolithic divine nature, Laura's dual nature (half divine and half profane) forces the poet to reassess the role body and soul play within the amorous experience. Petrarch's realization that women are also made of flesh and bone makes things more complicated for the lover, who is now compelled to take into consideration the physical as well as the spiritual side of his lady's nature. Thus, from Petrarch onwards, the lover will be torn between heaven and earth, between soul and body. As we know, the pain that such an internal conflict produces will be explicitly illustrated by tears, sighs and groans, which will constitute the distinctive features of the Petrarchan lover's discourse.

Dreaming constitutes the very essence of the aforementioned painful internal conflict. In the still of the night, the lover is left alone with his conscience. He concentrates on himself and on his mental processes. Silence and solitude undoubtedly provide the perfect background for bringing the Petrarchan lover's suffering to the foreground. His painful inner conflict becomes much more apparent at night-time:
Quando'l sol bagna in mar l'aurato carro
et l'arre nostro et la mia mente imbruna,
col cielo et co le stelle et co la luna
un' angosciosa et dura notte innarro;

poi lasso, a tal che non m'ascolta narro,
tutte le mie fatiche ad una ad una,
et col mondo et con mia cieca fortuna
con Amor, con Madonna et meco garro.

Il sonno è'n bando et del riposo è nulla
ma sospiri et lamenti infin a l'alba
et lagrime che l'alma ali occhi invia.

Vien poi l'aurora et l'aura fosca in alba,
me no; ma'l sol che'l cor m'arde et trastulla
quel po solo adolcir la doglia mia.

[when the sun bathes in the sea his gilded chariot and darkens
our air and my mind, with the heavens and with the stars and
with the moon I begin an anguished, bitter night;
then, alas, to one who does not listen I tell all my troubles one
by one, and I quarrel with the world and with my blind fortune,
with love, with my lady, and my self.

Sleep is banished and there is no rest, but sighs and laments till
dawn, and tears my soul sends forth to the eyes.

Then the dawn comes and lights up the dark air, but not me; the
sun that burns and delights my heart, only that one can sweeten
my suffering.] (Sonnet CCXXIII).

There is an obvious identification between the lover's suffering and night-time in Petrarch's
sonnet. This is the reason why the dawn is able to illuminate everything except for the lover:
"then the dawn comes and lights up the dark air, but not me." Since night-time is identified with
the Petrarchan lover's suffering (the very essence of his nature), the lover's nightly experience is
taken as the point of departure to describe his overall existence. Nightly suffering constitutes the
very definition of Petrarchan love.
As opposed to troubadouresque “happy” lovers who long for the night in order to fulfill his desires, the Petrarchan lover in Sonnet CCLV explicitly expresses his dislike towards night-time because of its magnifying, “redoubling” effects with regard to suffering. Night is rejected and day’s soothing effect is embraced:

La sera desìare, o diar l’aurora
soglionquesti tranquili et lieti amanti;
a me doppia la sera e doglia et planti.
La matina è per me più felice ora,

[...] Così di me due contrarie ore fanno,
et che m’acqua è ben ragion ch’i’ brami
et tema et odi’ chi m’adduce affano.

[To wish for evening, to hate the dawn, that is the habit of untroubled happy lovers; for me evening redoubles woes and weeping. Morning for me is a happier hour.

[...] Thus two contrary hours have their will of me, and it is natural that I desire the one that calms me [morning], fear and hate the one that brings me suffering [evening].]

In the fourth chapter of the previous section (“The Viva Morte”) we defined the Petrarchan lover as a masochistic figure who delights in his own suffering. Therefore, the lover’s nocturnal pain—the very definition of Petrarchan love—should not only be a source of pain, but also a source of pleasure. This assumption is confirmed in Sonnet CLXIV:

Or che’l ciel et la terra e’l vento face
et le fere et gli angelli il sonno afrena,
notte il carro stellato ingiro mena
et nel suo letto il mar senz’onda giace

veggio, penso, ardo, piango; et chi mi sface
sempre m’è inanzi per mia dolce pena:
guerra è l’ mio stato, d’ira et di dol piena
et sol di lei pensando ‘è qualche pace.

Così sol d’una chiara fonte viva
move’l dolce et l’amaro ond’io mi pasco,
una man sola me risana et punge [...].

[Now that the heavens and the earth and the wind are silent, and
sleep reigns in the beasts and the birds. Night drives her starry car
about, and in its bed the sea lies without a wave,

I am awake, I think, I burn, I weep; and she who destroys me is
always before me, to my sweet pain: war is my state, full of
sorrow and suffering, and only thinking of her do I have any
peace.

Thus, from one clear living fountain alone spring the sweet
and the bitter on which I feed; one hand alone heals me and pierces
me.]

Petrarch, by opposing his suffering to the rest of the world’s nightly bliss and calmness,
dwells once more on the amplifying effect that night-time has on his painful amorous experience.
Nevertheless, if we continue reading the rest of the sonnet, the half-painful, half-delightful nature
of Petrarchan love (“dolce et amaro”) becomes apparent. In sonnets CCXXIII and CCLV Petrarch
was only concentrating on the painful side of his conception of love, whose very essence was
illustrated by night-time suffering. In Sonnet CLXIV, however, nocturnal suffering is regarded
not only as a source of pain, but also as a source of pleasure. Dreaming, by providing the lover
with his lady’s image (“my sweet pain”), constitutes a “living fountain” from which “spring the
sweet and bitter.” Therefore, dreaming can be considered—on the one hand—as the perfect
illustration of the Petrarchan painful side of love (sonnets CCXXII and CLXIV) and—on the other
hand—as a synthesis of the whole bittersweet idea of Petrarchan love as a “viva morte.”

As Petrarchism evolved, dreaming and nocturnal fantasizing became some kind of physical
“relief” after so much exhausting conflict during daytime. Therefore, the lover ended up longing
for night-time rather than abhorring it, as Petrarch did. Quevedo’s and Donne’s treatment of
dreams follow this new trend. While—as in Petrarch’s treatment of dreaming—the lady’s image
also inflames her lover’s imagination, in Donne’s and Quevedo’s treatment of dreams there is an
actual encounter with the lady. The lover’s imprisoned desires are now “released” through
dreams, in which sexual fulfilment is made possible. Dreams have become the domain of desire
and the lover’s account of his dreams constitute a vivid a projection of his innermost desires. Nevertheless, Quevedo’s treatment of dreams is—as we shall see—different from Donne’s.

As for Quevedo’s handling of dreams, the reader will be faced with a step-by-step process towards sexual accomplishment and its explicit poetic expression. Such a process begins with Sonnet 337, “Amante agradecido a las lisonjas mentirosas de un sueño.” As we know, any physical manifestations were banned from love poetry by Petrarchan and Neoplatonic treatises on love. The renunciation of desire is, in fact, one of the main commonplaces of these guides for Petrarchan lovers, according to which the lover must renounce his “deseo” in order to be able to love. Let us simply recall León Hebreo’s Diálogos de Amor in this respect:

FILON: El conocerte, ¡oh Sofía!, causa en mí amor y deseo.
SOFIA: Discordantes me parecen, ¡Oh Filón!, esos afectos que en ti produce conocerme.
FILON: De tu parte discuierdan, que son ajenos de toda correspondencia.
SOFIA: Antes, entre sí mismos son contrarios afectos de la voluntad amar y desear. (Diálogos de Amor, 15).

Hebreo’s opposition between “amar” and “desear” is overcome via dreaming in Quevedo’s Sonnet 337. In the first stanza, dreaming provides the lover with a shield under which he can use words with an obvious sexual content such as “gozaba”:

¡Ay, Floralba! Soñé que te [...] ¿Dirélo?
Si, pues que sueño fue: que te gozaba.
¿Y quién sino un amante que soñaba
juntara tanto infierno a tanto cielo?

This kind of words would not be normally present in a Petrarchan sonnet. However, dreaming provides the poet with a licence to use them. The reason for this is that the lover is telling us a dream, and dreams are conventionally regarded as counterfeit and untrue experiences.
In the second stanza, the physical contact between both lovers is made explicit through one of the most common metaphors of Petrarchism: the "icy fire." However, Quevedo tries to make such contact less apparent by inserting it within the Petrarchan boundaries of virtuous, divine love. Thus, physical communication takes place within the borders of purity ("honesto") and adoration (adoración):

Mis llamas con tu nieve y con tu yelo,
cual suele opuestas flechas de su aljaba,
mezclaba Amor, y honesto las mezclaba,
como mi adoración en su desvelo.

Interestingly enough, Quevedo’s lover is clearly enjoying his dreaming. As opposed to Petrarch’s lover, for whom dreaming was a half-painful, half-delightful experience, Quevedo’s lover concentrates only on the enjoyable aspects. He is so amused that he does not want to be awaken; moreover, in contrast to Petrarch’s lover, Quevedo’s does not regret his dreaming:

y dije: «Quiera Amor, quiera mi suerte,
que nunca duerma yo si estoy despierto,
y que si duermo, que jamás despierte»

Nevertheless, as he did in the second stanza by introducing the words "virtud" and "adoración," in the last tercet Quevedo will again make his sexual account less explicit. Quevedo now disguises his lover’s sexual account by stating dream’s unreal nature. The lover awakes and realizes that his dreaming was no more than an illusory, self-deceptive experience: a "desconcierto" (a bewilderment). He is alive in death ("y vi que estuve vivo con la muerte") because he is participating in a sexual experience, which entails sin and, therefore, death: "Mas desperté del dulce desconcierto/y vi que estuve vivo con la muerte."

As I mentioned above, Quevedo’s treatment of dreams follows a step-by-step process towards sexual accomplishment and its straightforward expression. Sonnet 365 involves one step
further into explicitness. This time the word "gozar" is accompanied by a more detailed and vivid description of the lover's dreams:

Embarazada el alma y el sentido
con un sueño burlón aunque dichoso
aumentando reposo a mi reposo
me hallé toda una noche entretenido.

Tu rostro vi en mis llamas encendido,
que dora lo cruel con lo hermoso,
enlazando tu cuello presuroso
con nudo de los brazos bien tejido.

Túvele por verdad el bien pequeño;
llegué luego a soñar que te gozaba,
hecho de tanta gentileza dueño.

Y en esto conocí que me engañaba,
y que todo mi bien fue breve sueño,
pues yo, tan sin ventura, le alcanzaba.

The lover is once again amused ("entretenido") by his dream and forgets about Petrarchan decency. He has, once more, physical contact with his lady ("hecho de tanta gentileza dueño"), and, consequently, ignores the precepts stated in Petrarchan manuals:

[...] y aunque el deseo, como otra vez te he dicho, presupone la ausencia de la cosa deseada, ahora te digo que aunque la cosa exista y se posea de todas maneras se puede desear, no de haberla, pues que es habida, sino de gozarla con unión cognoscitiva. (Diálogos de Amor, 49-50).

In addition to creating a dream world in which he replaces the unattainable Petrarchan lady with a physically attainable one, Quevedo's lover provides a vivid account of his dream through a detailed description of his amorous manoeuvres: "enlazando tu cuello presuroso/con nudo de los brazos bien tejido." Not simply mentioned in passing, sex is regarded as a valuable experience in itself, well worth devoting two stanzas to it (the second and third ones). However, as in the previous sonnet, the final tercet functions as a "disguising device" through which the lover states again the deceitful nature of dreams: "Y en esto conocí que me engañaba, y que todo mi bien fue
breve sueño.” Dreams, therefore, play an ambivalent role, allowing the poet to speak of sex and to invalidate, at the same time, such an experience on the grounds of its unreal or virtual nature. They constitute an ideal means for surreptitiously avoiding the Petrarchan ban on sex, enabling the poet to have his cake and eat it.

Quevedo’s “Romance” 440 can be considered as the final stage on his road towards sexual explicitness cloaked in dreams. The lover, once again, has had a dream of sexual content and dares to tell us about it because dreams, as such, are illusory and, therefore, inoffensive:

No pueden los sueños, Floris,
ofender prendas divinas,
pues permiten a las almas
el mentir para sf mismas.

In addition to stating dreams’ unreal nature, the lover hesitates before telling his dream, following almost word for word the same pattern we have seen at the beginning of Sonnet 337, examined above:

«Soñé (gracias a la noche)
no sé, Floris, si lo diga [...]» (“Romance” 440).

«¡Ay, Floralba! Soñé que... ¿Dirélo?» (Sonnet 337).

In the following two verses, Quevedo’s lover insists again on the peculiar nature of dreams, which allow the lover to deviate from the established patterns of Petrarchan love, ignoring what Petrarchan decency (“cortesía”) is all about: “[...] mas perdona, que los sueños/no saben de cortesía.”

Once the deviant nature of dreams has been stated, the lover proceeds to describe the sexual content of his dreams with painstaking detail:
soñé […]
que estabas entre mis brazos,
pues eres, diosa divina,
de un amante bullicioso las obras ejecutivas.
_Soñaba el ciego que veía_
y _soñaba lo que quería._

Tus voces y tus razones
me di Floris tanta prisa
a beberlas de tu boca,
que me excusaba de oírlas.
Es no decir lo que vi
apiadarme de la invidia,
y guardar para mí solo
mis glorias con avaricia.
Lo que tocaron mis manos,
adestradas de mentiras,
no lo darán por el cetro
de todas las monarquías.
Hechas demonios, andaban
tentando abajo y arriba,
al escondite jugaban
mis obras con tu basquía.
_Soñaba el ciego que veía,_
y _soñaba lo que quería._

Andávete con la boca
rosa a rosa las mejillas,
y aun dentro de tus dos ojos
te quise forzar las niñas.

No doubt, the vividness of Quevedo’s lover’s description is the feature that first draws the reader’s attention. The poet, therefore, needs to state clearly that his sexual account is just a dream before going into detail about it. In this fashion, the reader knows beforehand that what he is about to read should not be considered as a valid amorous experience.

If we try to put ourselves in a well-trained Petrarchan reader’s place and examine the content of Quevedo’s “romance” in the light of the principles of Platonic love, then we will be aware of Quevedo’s deliberate subversion of some specific Petrarchan motifs. First of all, the Petrarchan reader would notice Quevedo’s mockery of the “lady’s disdain” topos.
Tus voces y tus razones
me di Floris tanta prisa
a beberlas de tu boca
que me excusaba de oírlas

Quevedo’s lover is obviously ignoring his lady’s scorn, which provided the Petrarchan lover with a main source of sexual frustration. The instructions of Petrarchan manuals—in which reason’s instrument (disdain) rules over passion—are clearly not taken into account in Quevedo’s “romance”:

[...] los que amando siguen la razón, la cosa más perfecta siguiendo en sus amores hazen por tanto como hombres, y los que siguen al sentido, metiéndose en pos dela menos perfecta, hazen como fieras. (Bembó, Los asolanos. Quoted from El lenguaje poético de la lírica amorosa de Quevedo, 62).

Another blatant transgression of the Petrarchan norms lies in the prominent role assigned to the sense of touch throughout the “romance.” As we know, sight was the most important sense for Neoplatonic love. The opposition between «ver» and «tocar» in Petrarchan/Neoplatonic manuals is parallel to that between «amar» (a cognitive activity) and «desear» (a physical activity). Eyesight is the primary tool for the soul to make its way to an idealized, harmonic, heavenly beauty:

las luces sacras, el augusto día
que vuestros ojos abren sobre el suelo,
con el concento que se mueve el cielo,
en mi espíritu explica armonía [...]
primeros nobles son vuestras esferas
que arrebatan en cerco ardiente de oro
mis potencias absorbidas y ligeras. (Sonnet 333).

Eyesight’s top position within the hierarchy of the senses is usurped in Quevedo’s “romance” by the sense of touch (“tocaron,” “tentando”), which becomes the basic tool for a not so heavenly exploration:
«Lo que tocaron mis manos [...] 
nú lo darán por el cetro 
de todas las monarquías. 
Hechas demonios andaban 
tentando abajo y arriba.»

From the perspective of orthodox Platonism, Quevedo’s “romance” could also be regarded as an actual heresy. The characteristic Neoplatonic vocabulary for divine love (“cielo,” “altas maravillas”) is violently coupled with words such as “hartazga,” “hambre” and “deseo.” In this fashion, Neoplatonism’s spirituality is overthrown by the intrusion of a baser vocabulary with an extremely “earthly flavour.” Quevedo’s lover makes no distinction between heavenly and earthly love:

Dime una hartazga de cielo 
en tan altas maravillas; 
maté la hambre al deseo, 
y enriqueció la codicia.

The poem’s erotic peak (the accomplishment of sexual intercourse) is achieved through another violent coupling: the use of religious vocabulary within an erotic context. The words “cuentas,” “hermita” and “llorar”—most appropriate in a religious context—are inserted within the frame of the lover’s erotic account, acquiring, thereby, unexpected sexual connotations. Thus, “cuentas” and “hermita” respectively make reference to the masculine and feminine sexual organs, whereas “llorar” unmistakably alludes to ejaculation:

con mis cuentas en la mano 
lloré en la postre hermita [...].

As in previous sonnets, Quevedo takes advantage of dreams’ unreality as a protective layer that enables him to introduce sex within the amorous experience. However, the poet’s sexual explicitness and linguistic audacity are such in this “romance” that he has to resort to other techniques in order to subdue the intensity of his message. On the one hand, Quevedo makes use
of an “estribillo” (“Soñaba el ciego lo que veía/y soñaba lo que quería”) in order to systematically remind the reader of the invalidity of the lover’s dream: sexual accomplishment is as illusory and remote as the fact that a blindman could recover his sight. The “estribillo” is, therefore, persistently used as a debunking device in order to moderate the forthright nature of the “romance.” On the other hand, Quevedo’s violations of Petrarchan precepts has gone so far this time that he is forced to disguise such violations within the conventions of popular poetry and the plain style. We must bear in mind that the sonnet was a prescriptive metrical pattern designed to convey a prescriptive attitude towards love: Neoplatonism. Any conception of love outside the boundaries of the Neoplatonic precepts had to be conveyed through a metrical pattern other than the sonnet. Quevedo’s sexual account was too mean to be incorporated into a sonnet. The “romance”--designed for a more popular, less sublime kind of poetic message than Neoplatonism--was the appropriate pattern to convey such a baser vision of love. The comic ending of his “romance,” reinforces the idea that Quevedo was trying to soften the explicitness of his poem through the use of poetic conventions characteristic of popular poetry:7

[...] Andando desta manera,
topé con las barandillas,
desperté con un chichón
estando en la cuna el día.
Perdona al sueño sabroso
lisonjeras demasiadas,
que, aun despierto, en la memoria
me están haciendo cosquillas.
Soñaba el ciego que veía
y soñaba lo que quería.

Donne’s use of dreams as a means to introduce sex within the amorous experience goes further than Quevedo’s. As opposed to his Spanish contemporary, Donne does not use dreams’ unreality as a shield under whose protection he can stealthily insert sex within the scope of his love poetry. For Donne, there is simply no difference between dreams and reality. In this respect,
Donne’s love poetry is closer to the concept of Baroque than Quevedo’s. His *Elegy X* (*The Dream*) constitutes a perfect illustration of his outlook on dreams:

Image of her (whom I love, more than she,  
Whose fair impression in my faithful heart  
Makes me her medal, and makes her love me  
As kings do coins to which their stamps impart  
The value) go, and take my heart from hence,  
Which now is grown too great and good for me.  
Honours oppress weak spirits, and our sense  
Strong objects dull; the more, the less we see.

When you are gone, and reason gone with you,  
Then fantasy is queen, and soul, and all;  
She can present joys meaner than you do,  
Convenient and more proportional.  
So, if I dream I have you, I have you,  
For all our joys are but fantastical.  
And so I escape the pain, for pain is true;  
And sleep, which locks up sense, doth lock out all.

After a such fruition I shall wake,  
And, but the waking, nothing shall repent;  
And shall to love more thankful sonnets make  
Than if more honour, tears, and pains were spent.  
But dearest heart and dearest image, stay;  
Alas, true joys at best are dream enough;  
Though you stay here you pass too fast away,  
For even at first life’s taper is a snuff.

Filled with her love, may I be rather grown  
Mad with much heart than idiot with none.

Reason’s control over the senses was, according to Petrarchan theorists, the guardian that kept love within Platonic terms: “Los amantes se allegan a las veces a objectos dañosos y malos [...] porque ellos en amor siguen más a los sentidos que a la razón” (*Gli Asolani*, Quoted from *El lenguaje poético*, 62). However, in Donne’s elegy, as in Quevedo’s “romance,” reason has been eliminated: “when you are gone and reason gone with you”’”tus voces y razones [...] me excusaba de oírlas.” This is why Donne’s elegy and Quevedo’s “dream sonnets,” unlike Petrarch’s sonnets, posit an actual physical encounter with the lady: “If I dream I have you, I have you.” Love can leave the boundaries of Platonic love behind and plunge into the discovery of its physical,
forbidden side. In addition to this, whereas for Petrarch night-time fantasizing was both a source of pleasure and pain, for Donne and Quevedo dreams are simply a source of pleasure. Thus, in Donne’s elegy dreaming turns out to be much more satisfactory than reality: “She [fantasy] can present joys meaner than you do.” Likewise, in Sonnet 337, Quevedo’s lover did not want to be awaken from his dreams:

Y dije: “Quiera Amor, quiera mi suerte,
que nunca duerma yo si estoy despierto
y que si duermo, que jamás despierte.

Hence, as opposed to Petrarch’s “for me evening redoubles woes and weeping” (Sonnet CCLV), dreams now amount, for Donne and Quevedo, to a true relief from daytime pain. They constitute an outlet for so much diurnal, unreciprocated Petrarchan love: “I scape the pain, for pain is true”/“Todo mi bien fue breve sueño.” (sonnet 365).

In spite of all these similarities, there is a fundamental disagreement between Donne’s and Quevedo’s treatment of dreams. Donne’s lover does not invalidate his oneiric experiences by asserting their unreality. As opposed to Quevedo’s, Donne’s lover is able to move freely from reality to fantasy without any kind of hesitation or apology (“and nothing shall repent”) because reality and fantasy are now one single unit. Therefore, if the lover possesses his lady in his dreams, he truly possesses her in real terms:

So if I dream I have you, I have you
[...]But dearest heart, and dearest image, stay
Alas true joys at best are but fantastical

As Ruffo Fiore puts it, “Donne’s flights into fantasy overcome the irreconcilable Platonic chasm between the real and the imagined” (Donne’s Petrarchism, 62).
It is interesting to note, however, that in Donne’s elegy, as in Quevedo’s “romance,” there is an evident mockery of some of the conventions that make up the Petarchan manner. As opposed to Petrarchan lovers—who spend their nights in “tears and pains” and compose their verses out of sexual frustration caused by decency or honour”—Donne’s lover is able to compose his verses on the basis of sexual fulfilment:

After such a fruition I shall awake,  
And, but the waking, nothing shall repent;  
And shall to love more thankful sonnets make  
than if more honour, tears, and pains were spent.

Donne’s mockery becomes even more apparent and forthright in the last two verses of his elegy, in which he resorts to the insult:

Filled with her love, may I be rather grown  
Mad with much heart than idiot with none.

Donne wrote another poem with the same title (The Dream) within the frame of his Songs and Sonnets. The bridging of the gap between reality and fantasy will also be the characteristic feature of this poem. Unlike Quevedo—who cloaks the physical manifestations of love under dreams’ unreality—Donne does not hide his dealings with physical love behind the mask of dreams’ fantastical nature. He begins The Dream by clearly stating that his dream is not “a theme for phantasy,” but for reason:

Dear love, for nothing less than thee  
would I have broke this happy dream;  
It was a theme  
For reason, much too strong for phantasy,  
Therefore thou waked’st me wisely;

The lady wakes her lover up because his dreams are not something to be confined within the realm of pure fancy. They deserve to be carried out into real life because they are “much too strong for fantasy.” It is interesting to note that it is the lady that makes possible the passage from
fantasy to reality. As opposed to the abstract and passive nature of Petrarchan mistresses, the lady in Donne’s *The Dream* is so real (“truth”) that the mere thought of her is enough to “make dreams truths, and fables histories.” Thus, the beloved lady acts as a catalytic agent that is able to transform dreams into reality and to make the lover’s fantasies come true:

My dream thou brok’st not, but continued’st it,  
Thou art so truth, that thoughts of thee suffice  
to make dreams truths, and fables histories;  
Enter these arms, for since thou thought’st it best  
Not to dream all my dream, let’s do the rest.

In the next stanza, Donne departs again from the Petrarchan conventions by giving “the lady’s angel-like nature” topos an unexpected twist. Donne—like Aristotle—tries to reconcile abstractness with real existence. He wants his lady to be as idealized as angels are and, at the same time, to exist in real terms. Hence, his lady must resemble the only being able to have both an earthly and a heavenly nature: God, who assumed human form as Christ. This identification is evidenced by the fact that the lady is able to see into her lover’s thoughts. According to Church doctrine, only God, and not angels, can see into the heart and thoughts of man:

As lightning, or a taper’s light,  
Thine eyes, and not thy noise, waked me;  
Yet I thought thee  
(For thou lovest truth) an angel, at first sight,  
But when I saw thou sawest my heart,  
And knew’st my thoughts, beyond an angel’s art,  
When thou knew’st what I dreamt, when thou knew’st when  
Excess of joy would wake me, and came’st then,  
I must confess, it could not choose but be  
Profane to think thee anything but thee.

This identification between the lady and God seems to be supported, moreover, by the last two verses of the stanza. To think of God as anything but God is profanation. Likewise, to think of the lady as anything but a lady is profanation as well. Donne’s study of the relationship between body and soul through the figure of Christ had its parallel in the religious prose writings
in which the relationship between nature and Grace was discussed. According to these writings, the compatibility of nature's manifestness and Grace's abstractness found its warrant in God's own being and, more specifically, in Christ's human existence. Christ, in becoming a human being, was not separating himself from his divine nature; on the contrary, both natures became one in him. Likewise, Donne's lady, by being identified with Christ, is able to reconcile body and soul.

In spite of Donne's attempt to harmonize the lady's divinity with her earthly existence, in the last stanza the reader is witness to a conflict between the lady's human and divine halves. If the lady is real, then her love must be as "weak" as real love is. The "weakness" of real love is due to its composite nature, a mixture of "fear, shame, and honour." Anything composed of several elements was believed to be subject to dispersal and corruption, that is, to death. Thus, real love--on account of its transience--can be identified with a torch, lit once, only to be finally extinguished:

Coming and staying showed thee, thee
But rising makes me doubt, that now
  that now thou art not thou.
That love is weak, where fear's as strong as he;
'Tis not all spirit, pure, and brave,
If mixture it of fear, shame, honour have.
Perchance, as torches which must ready be,
  Men light and put out, so thou deal'st with me
Thou cam'st to kindle, goest to come.

As we have seen, Quevedo's and Donne's treatment of dreams--as opposed to Petrarch's--describe an actual physical encounter between the lovers. However, Quevedo is acutely aware of the difference between fantasy and reality. In spite of all the intense and explicit details in which he recounts sexual fantasies, his lover's dreams remain within the realm of illusion. Dreaming is just a strategy, a poetic device Quevedo utilizes in order to subvert the Petrarchan conventions without arousing suspicion. Donne's treatment of dreams--in both his Elegy X and in The Dream--takes Quevedo's physical fulfilment a step further into the real world: the distance between reality and fantasy has vanished.
The different systems of circulation of Donne’s and Quevedo’s poetry help explain their diverse treatment of dreams. The public circulation of Quevedo’s poetry did not allow him to cross the line between fantasy and reality. If such a transgression should occur, then he would be approaching sex as an actual part and parcel of the amorous experience and, consequently, he would suffer restrictions on his freedom of speech. This is the reason why Quevedo begins his fantastic sexual accounts by apologizing and hesitating (“Soñé que...¿dirélo?” [Sonnet 337], “no sé Floris si lo diga/mas perdona que los sueños/no saben de cortesía” [“Romance” 440]) and concludes them by clearly stating their unreality and debunking their validity as true experiences: “Y en esto conocí que me engañaba/y que todo fue un breve sueño.” In contrast to Quevedo, Donne—protected by the anonymity of the manuscript system of circulation—acknowledges the validity of his sexual fantasies by erasing the borderline between dreams and reality. Dreams acquire, thus, the same validity as real-life experiences.
HYPOTHESES AND GO-BETWEENS

In the chapter devoted to dreams, we saw how Quevedo highlighted the unreality of dreams in order to deny the validity of the amorous experiences encompassed by them. Nevertheless, dreams also provided Quevedo with a safe means to introduce sex within his love poetry. Dreaming constituted, thus, an ideal poetic device to subvert the conventions of Platonic/Petrarchan love without undue notice. In this last chapter, I shall examine two more techniques used by Quevedo in order to disguise the presence of the body in his amorous sonnets. As in the two previous chapters, Quevedo’s disguising devices will be contrasted with Donne’s explicitness. The two techniques that I shall look into are hypotheses and the accomplishment of sexual intercourse through a go-between. I shall concentrate first on Quevedo’s use of hypothesis and then I shall go on to examine his use of go-betweens.

In order to study Quevedo’s use of hypothesis, I have chosen his Sonnet 448, “Comunicación de amor invisible por los ojos”:

Si mis párpados, Lisi, labios fueran,
besos fueran los rayos visibles
de mis ojos, que al sol miran caudales
águilas, y besaran más que vieran.

Tus bellezas, hudrúpicos bebieran,
y cristales, sedientos de cristales;
de luces y de incendios celestiales,
alimentando su morir, vivieran.

De invisible comercio mantenidos,
y desnudos de cuerpo, los favores
gozarán mis potencias y sentidos;
mudos se quebrarán los ardores;
pudieran, apartados, verse unidos,
y en público, secretos, los amores.

As Paul Julian Smith points out the sonnet is based on an “impossible hypothesis familiar in contemporary logic which [...] serves to imply the existence of that which cannot exist” (Quevedo on Parnassus, 165). However, as we shall see, it is Quevedo’s ability to infuse ambiguity into Petrarchan conventions that plays a fundamental role in this sonnet.

Sight, as we know from previous sonnets, functions as the point of departure for Petrarchists to elevate their love towards the heights of Platonic purity and divinity. The eyes were regarded as miniature suns or stars, able to reflect the lights of heavens. In his sonnet 448, Quevedo fuses this typically Petrarchan convention with the equally typical conventions of “passion as fire” and “the viva morte.” Thus, through the lady’s eyes, Quevedo is not only able to point at the heavenly nature of the lady (whose eyes become “luces celestiales”) but also to articulate the lover’s passion in the form of heavenly fires (“incendios celestiales”) and his “viva morte” by his staring at his lady’s eyes (the sun or the celestial lights): “alimentando su morir vivieran.” This fusion of conventions acquires, in turn, a new and ambiguous perspective through the use of metaphor. Quevedo equates the lover’s eyes to his lips through the following process: eyes---->[(crystal balls)---->(moisture)]----------->lips. The lover’s eyes are seen as two crystal balls which, on account of their liquid appearance, can be said to have the same moist quality about them as lips have. Therefore, the lover’s eyes can be identified with his lips. From now on, every visual image must be interpreted as an oral image. Consequently, the visual rays that depart from the lovers’ eyes can be identified with his kisses (“besos fueran los rayos visuales de mis ojos”). Every time the lover stares at his lady, he is actually kissing her (“besaran [los ojos] más que vieran”) and, likewise, his eyes’ longing for other crystals (“cristales sedientos de cristales”) must be interpreted as an unbridled yearning for kissing the lady. However, Quevedo—well aware of the Petrarchan ban on the use of any sense other than the sight—confines the
eyes=lips metaphor within the sphere of the hypothetical through the use of the subjunctive ("fueran, bebieran").

The same ambiguity can be found in the last two stanzas. The expression "desnudos de cuerpo" might be understood in two ways: either the lovers are actually naked in physical terms, or they have left their bodies behind in order to achieve a Platonic, purely spiritual fusion. Line 9 ("de invisible comercio mantenidos") seems to point at a spiritual fusion on account of the invisibility of the lovers’ communication. However, line 10 ("gozarán mis potencias y mis sentidos") seems to hint at bodily nakedness because of the presence of the word "gozar," which emphasizes the physical aspects of love and was totally proscribed from Neoplatonic treatises on love. In addition to the presence of the word "gozar," we should bear in mind the fact that, according to line 11, it is not only the intellect ("potencias") that is involved in the amorous experience, but also the body ("sentidos"). After reading this verse, we cannot help bringing Donne’s The Ecstasy to mind: "love’s mysteries in souls do grow/but yet the body is his book." The conjunction of potentiality and actuality, of body and soul, was—as we remember—the main objective of Aristotle’s philosophical system.

The ambiguity of the three previous stanzas exerts its influence on the last tercet: "mudos se quebraran los ardores/pudieran apartados verse unidos/y en público, secretos, los amores." The reader hesitates again whether to interpret these verses as an invisible sexual intercourse or as a Platonic invisible communion of the lovers' souls. Paul Julian Smith highlights the fact that the same confusion stemming from the exchange of actions proper to mouth and eye can be found in Marino’s Lira II, which fulfils Quevedo’s hypothetical desires by using the indicative mode instead of the subjunctive. This fact seems to be enough for Smith to characterize Quevedo’s sonnet as "conservative." However, in my view, there can be no doubt that Quevedo’s Sonnet 448 constitutes an evident change of attitude towards love in relation to the orthodox Neoplatonic
sonnets which we examined in the previous section of this study. First, instead of sight being raised to ideal, divine heights, we have now sight lowered to hypothetical carnal possession. Secondly, there is a manifest attempt to reconcile mind with matter, soul with body, "potencias" with "sentidos," underlying Quevedo’s use of hypothesis and ambiguity. Quevedo’s alleged "conservatism" must be explained in the light of his conscious use of "disguising techniques" (hypothesis and ambiguity” in this particular case) in order to subvert Petrarchan conventions surreptitiously.

With regard to the second "disguising technique" that I shall examine in this chapter (Quevedo’s use of go-betweens), we must go beyond the boundaries of poetry and try to place ourselves in a wider artistic context. The indirect depiction of human figures through external objects was a common practice in seventeenth-century art. Painting—on account of its immediate visual impact—provides, once more, the most palpable examples of this new concern for allusive portraits:

Predomina [...] el tipo de retratos en que la figura se enlaza y apoya en algún objeto circundante... el hombre del barroco parece necesitar este enlace con la realidad. (Orozco, Temas del barroco de pintura y poesía, xlix).

The inclusion of the external reality within the scope of the portrait must be considered a step towards realism. There is a stark contrast between these "realistic" portraits and the idealized "cosmic pinturas" that we examined in the first section of this study. Quevedo’s Sonnet 477 (“A una niña que dormía en las faldas de Lisi”) provides a perfect illustration of this new aesthetic interest in the reality surrounding the portrayed figure:

Descansa en sueño, ¡Oh tierno y dulce pecho!, seguro (¡Ay cielo!) de mi enojo ardiente, mostrándote dichoso y inocente, pues duermes, y no velas, en tal lecho.

Bien has a tu cansancio satisfecho,
si menor sol, en más hermoso Oriente,
en tanto que mi espíritu doliente
de invidia de mirarte está deshecho.

Sueña que gozas del mayor consuelo
que la Fortuna pródiga derrama;
que el precio tocas que enriquece al suelo;

que habitas fénix más gloriosa llama;
que tú eres ángel, que tu cama es cielo,
y nada será sueño en esa cama.

In the first and second stanzas, the lover expresses his anger ("seguro de mi enojo ardiente") and his envy ("mi espíritu doliente/de invidia de mirarme está deshecho") towards the girl that is sleeping in Lisi's lap. The girl is actually able to sleep with Lisi, whereas the lover has to content himself with his nocturnal fantasies: "pues duermes, y no velas, en tal lecho."

In the following stanza the lover impersonates himself as the girl and transfers his fantasies to the girl's mind. The lover puts in the girl's mind a number of thoughts which, obviously, have not even crossed her mind. Thus, the girl dreams that she takes advantage of her privileged situation in order to have physical contact with the lady's body ("sueña que gozas del mayor consuelo/que la Fortuna pródiga derrama/que el precio tocas que enriquece el suelo"). The presence of words such as "tocar" and "gozar"—totally unthinkable within the boundaries of Platonic love—unmistakably hint at a transgression of the principles of Platonic, purely spiritual love.

The last stanza takes the transgressive mood of the previous one to its extreme. There is an actual sexual intercourse between Lisi and the girl conveyed indirectly through the verb "habitar." Quevedo transforms the girl into an angel, who is, therefore, able to "dwell on" Lisi's divine sphere—sacrilegiously identified with her bed. As in his "Romance" 440 ("[...]dime una hartazga de cielo/en tal alas maravillas/mató la hambre al deseo [...]"") Quevedo subverts the conventions of
Petrarchan love and devalues its heavenly quality by interpreting it in earthly terms. It is also worth noting that the characteristically Petrarchan image of the Phoenix as an exemplum for the lovers' spiritual fusion is likewise debunked by making Lisi superior to it: "que habitas fénix más gloriosa llama." Thus, Quevedo, through his dismissal of such abstract Petrarchan constructs as the Phoenix, seems to echo Donne's rejection of Petrarchan abstract ladies in the following verses of *The Primrose*:

For should my true-love less than woman be
she were scarce anything; and then, should she
Be more than woman, she would get above
All thought of sex, and think to move
my heart to study her, and not to love

Quevedo is making use of two simultaneous "disguising techniques" in order to subvert the conventions of Platonic love. On the one hand, he is transmitting the lover's sexual desires through an indirect means: a girl sleeping on his lady's lap. On the other hand, he is invalidating such desires by encompassing them within a dream, just as he did in sonnets 337, 365 and in his "Romance" 440. According to Paul Julian Smith, Quevedo's conveyance of the lover's sexual impulses through a child is just an instance belonging to a whole poetic subgenre, in which more plainly erotic versions than Quevedo's can be found. Smith notes the existence of a "madrigal" by the Italian poet Groto, in which the go-between's function is performed by a boy to whom the lady gives comfort by kissing him. Quevedo—extremely knowledgeable about Italian poetry—must have been familiar with Groto's "madrigal." His choice of a girl to convey the lover's sexual impulses rather than a boy is, therefore, totally deliberate and it must be due to significant restrictions on his freedom of speech.

*The Flea* will serve to contrast Donne's and Quevedo's use of hypothesis and go-betweens. In this poem Donne uses a flea as an indirect means to express the lovers' sexual accomplishment.
The poem hinges on a basic metaphor from which the whole poem is developed: Transmission of blood=sexual intercourse.

According to medical theory in Donne’s time, sexual intercourse literally entailed the mingling of blood. Donne reverses the connection between these two elements. If, according to medical theory, sexual contact involves the exchange of blood, then, according to Donne, any exchange of blood entails sexual intercourse. Therefore, a flea which has sucked both lovers’ blood can be considered as a perfect symbol of their sexual union:

Mark but this flea, and mark in this
How little that which thou deny’st me is;
It sucked me first, and now sucks thee,
And in this flea our two bloods mingled be;
Thou know’st that this cannot be said
A sin, nor shame, nor loss of maidenhead,
Yet this enjoys before it woo,
And pampered swells with one blood made of two,
And this, alas, is more than we would do.

The flea symbolizes, moreover, the lover’s protest against the restrictions imposed by the Petrarchan ban on physical contact. Even an insignificant insect like a flea is merrier than the two suffering Petrarchan lovers are: “And pampered [the flea] swells [...] and this, alas, is more than we would do.”

The same disagreement with Petrarchan, exclusively spiritual love is present in the following stanza. The flea, by sucking the lovers’ blood, has inevitably encompassed their existence: “this flea is you and I.” The same inevitability can be applied to the likelihood of the lovers having physical contact. The lovers must have sexual intercourse (“we’re met and cloistered in these living walls of jet”) in spite of social conventions (“Though parents grudge”) and poetic conventions (“you,” namely, the disdainful Petrarchan lady):
Oh stay, three lives in one flea spare,
Where we almost, yea more than married are.
This flea is you and I, and this
our marriage bed, and marriage temple is;
Though parents grudge, and you, we're met and cloistered
in these living walls of jet.

In the last three verses of this stanza, Donne specifically attacks one of the most
characteristic conventions of Petrarchism: the “viva morte”:

Though use make you apt to kill me,
Let not to that, self-murder added be
And sacrilege, three sins in killing three.

These verses are clearly aimed at the topos of “the lady as murderess.” If the lady—
following the Petrarchan common practice (“use”)—delights once more in disdaining/killing her
lover’s yearning for sexual contact (symbolized by the flea), then she will commit suicide because,
as stated above, the flea “is you.” Therefore, Petrarchan ladies, by killing/scorning their lovers
and depriving themselves of the physical dimension of love, are actually “killing” themselves. By
renouncing physical contact they become “sepulchral statues” or “quietud difunta,” as we saw in
the first chapter of this section.

It is worth noting, moreover, that religious vocabulary is inserted, once more, within the
framework of love poetry. The flea, which encompasses three beings (the lover, the lady and the
flea itself), is compared to God, who also encompasses three beings: the Father, the Son, and the
Holy Spirit. Thus, frustrating the physical manifestations of love becomes a synonym of killing
God and, therefore, deserves to be labelled as a “sacrilege.”

In the last stanza, the lady decides to ignore his lover’s reasoning and kills the flea. After
having squashed the flea, she realizes that what her lover told her was not true: in spite of having
killed the flea, she is still alive (“Find’st not thyself, nor me, weaker now”). The flea is, therefore,
an insignificant creature. However, we must remember that the flea symbolized the lovers’ sexual union. If the flea’s life is absolutely insignificant, so must be the lovers’ sexual accomplishment. Consequently, the Petrarchan ban on sex is no more than a trifle. Petrarchism is based upon conventions that are as insignificant and meaningless as a flea’s life:

Cruel and sudden, hast thou since
Purpled thy nail in blood of innocence?
Wherein could this flea guilty be,
Except in that drop which it sucked from thee?
Yet thou triumph’st, and say’st that thou
Find’st not thyself, nor me, the weaker now;
’Tis true; then learn how false, fears be;
just so much honor, when thou yield’st to me,
will waste, as this flea’s death took life from thee.

Two main conclusions can be drawn from our analysis. First, Donne—in contrast to Quevedo—uses identification (exchange of blood=sexual intercourse; flea=sexual act) instead of hypothesis. Donne is not hiding or shielding his argument in favour of the physical manifestations of love behind the irreality of supposition. Second, Donne does not merely use go-betweens as an indirect means for conveying sexual fulfilment, but as a means of minimizing the conventions of Petrarchan love. Donne chose a flea as go-between with the idea of transferring its insignificance to the conventions that make up Petrarchism.
CONCLUSION

According to Plato, all human experience is no more than a mediation, worthless in itself. Since the body is the source of all human experience, it must be regarded as a worthless mediation as well. Sensible or bodily experience is limited to providing the first step in an ascending scale leading to true objects or “ideas,” whose nature is purely spiritual. Essence or true being is more perfectly accomplished as we approach the top of the scale, the realm of “ideas.” From the first step of the scale upwards, it is the contemplative activity of the mind that leads man towards a true, “ideal” world of essences where things are an end in themselves. Therefore, only our intellectual activity allows us to transcend the boundaries of physical worthlessness. Sensible, material things are simply a metaphor for a higher “ideal” reality.

St. Augustine “christianized” this ascending road towards the sphere of true being: “we burn and go onwards, we ascend our stairs in our heart and sing a song of degrees” (Smith, *The Metaphysics of Love*, 60). Plato’s philosophy became, thus, sanctioned by the Church and--due to the Church’s control over all fields of culture--it had a sweeping influence on poetry until the end of the sixteenth century:

Es más que un breve punto  
el bajo y torpe suelo, comparado  
con ese gran trasunto  
do vive mejorado  
lo que es, lo que será, lo que ha pasado. (Fray Luis de León, *Noche Serena*).

As can be gathered from Fray Luis de León’s poem, poetry was based upon a fundamental distinction between a higher perfect world (“ese gran trasunto”) and a lower world (“el bajo y torpo
suelo”); between a true permanent world not subject to change and corruption and a fake world subject to variation and dissolution.

As far as love poetry is concerned, its assimilation of Platonism carried out by Dante transformed love into the prey of the mind’s contemplative activity. Love became a thoroughly spiritual activity. The aforementioned Platonic distinction between the physical and the spiritual—according to which the physical reality frustrates the perfection of “ideas”—thwarted any attempt to incorporate the body into the lovers’ amorous experience. Petrarch’s breathtaking boldness (loving a real woman!) was considered as the very borderline for the admissible with regard to amorous experience. However, Petrarch himself finishes his Canzoniere in repentance for all his years of worldly passion, which almost “extinguished” his virtue—the main purpose of the mind’s contemplative activity, according to Plato:

Tennemi Amor anni ventuno ardendo
[...] Omai [...] mia vita reprendo
di tanto error che di vertute il seme
à quasi spento [...].

[Love held me twenty-one years gladly burning
[...] Now [...] I reproach my self for so much error,
which has almost extinguished the seed of virtue [...]]. (Sonnet CCCLXIV).

We must bear in mind that trying to overthrow the Platonic spiritual conception of love was too risky a task on account of the Church’s assimilation of Plato’s philosophy. This is the reason why Petrarch concludes Sonnet CCCLXIV as a real act of contrition, asking divine forgiveness for having dared to pay attention to Laura’s physical beauty:

Signor che’n questo carcer m’ài rinchiuso:
tramene salvo da li eterni danni,
ch’i’ conosco l mio fallo et non lo scuso.

[Lord who have enclosed me in this prison: draw me from it safe from the eternal harm, for I recognize my fault and I do not excuse it].
Petrarch thus failed to incorporate bodily experiences into love poetry and finally surrendered to Plato’s and Dante’s dualism. Petrarchism (and, consequently, the Platonic conception of love) was immediately adopted by courtly, cultivated elites throughout Europe as the very code of love poetry. Due to the Court’s decisive influence on social and cultural practices, Platonism became the philosophical framework in which “serious” love poetry had to be written. Moreover, authors such as Ficino (1433-1499), who managed to accommodate Plato’s philosophy to even the most controversial aspects of the Christian dogma, provided Platonism with a prevalent position within western intellectual tradition. From Ficino onwards, Plato will be considered as a pre-Christian theologian, whose status approaches that of the Prophets.

However, at the end of the sixteenth century, there was a change in the philosophic outlook throughout Europe. Plato was replaced by Aristotle. The rise of the experimental sciences is a clear indication of this change. The Aristotelian scientific method, as developed in his *Organon* (taking instances of the material world in order to discover the mathematical relations that link them) was taken over by scientific pioneers such as Newton and Galileo. This emphasis on Aristotle’s philosophy and the subversion of the established patterns of thought that it involved also affected the outlook on human existence. Aristotle’s philosophical system entailed a whole new conception of the body/soul relationship. According to Aristotle, there are no transcendent “ideas” separated from objects existing in the material world: “all existence is determinate and individual [...] to be means to be something” (Randall, *Aristotle*, 63). Likewise, the soul, in order to exist, needs to materialize and objectify itself into the body. Body and soul are not discrete elements in us. The body is not at odds with the spirit, nor are sensible appearances mere shadows of a trascendent reality.

As a result of applying Aristotle’s philosophy to love theory, the body became a constitutive element of the amorous experience. The Aristotelian rescue of the body from its
Platonic imprisonment can be detected—as we have seen throughout the second section of this study—in both Donne’s and Quevedo’s love poetry. The decisive role played by bodily experiences in some of their poems seems to bring the Platonic cycle to an end and to recall the lover to life.

The transgression of the Platonic poetic rule in Donne’s and Quevedo’s love poetry had its origin in their ambiguous and ambivalent position towards the court as a social and political organization and, consequently, towards its characteristic ideology and cultural practices. Quevedo’s ambivalent stand can be clearly seen in his political writings, in which we can find continuous attacks on the institution of the monarchy along with an uncompromising defence of the monarch. Thus, whereas in *Discurso de todos los diablos* he stated his opposition to the monarchy (“Para ver cuán poco caso hacen los dioses de las monarquías basta ver a quienes se las dan.”), in his *Marco Bruto* he asserts the following: “El rey bueno se le ha de amar; el malo se ha de sufrir.” The same can be said of his attacks on the “validos” or “privados.” In *El sueño de la muerte*, Quevedo defines “validos” as “los que quieren tomarse con los reyes más mano de lo que es razón.” However, at the same time, he not only dedicated his edition of Fray Luís de León’s poetry to the Count-Duke of Olivares, but flattered him in the following fashion:

[...] le dedico estos escritos de tanto precio [...] poque no conozco otro que con tal afecto y estimación haya admitido autores desta nota [...] si no es vuestra excelencia.” (“Al Excelentísimo Señor Conde-Duque”).

Quevedo’s ambiguity towards the court as a political and social institution was echoed by his ambiguity towards the court as a cultural institution, which is manifested—as we have seen in this study—by both an adoption and a rejection of the ideological system underlying courtly poetry, that is, Platonism.
As for Donne, his ambivalent position towards the court and its cultural practices was a consequence of his position on the margins of the courtier status. As we know, Donne’s marriage ruined his promising career as a courtier and forced him, thereafter, to recover his former privileged status by trying to gain the favour of prominent men in the court. Donne’s transgression of the conventions that articulated Platonic courtly poetry has been interpreted as some sort of revenge on behalf of those banished from courtship.4 Others see Donne as “a representative of the new intellectual and cultural centre in London, the Inns of Court, which during the nineties successfully challenged the court’s venerable positions” (Peterson, The English Lyric, 287). In addition to this possible explanation of Donne’s poetic subversion, we must also take into account the fact that Donne always tried to be accepted by courtly circles. This is the reason why his poems—while sometimes subverting the Platonic guidelines of courtly poetry through Aristotle’s philosophy—are also unmistakably indebted (as we saw in the first section of this study) to the Platonic/Petrarchan tradition for various themes and conventions.

Donne and Quevedo’s treatment of the theme of separation can very well illustrate their ambiguous attitude with regard to Platonism. As Peterson points out, separation for the Platonic lover must be “a trivial matter” (The English Lyric, 319). In order to support this assertion, Peterson quotes the following excerpt from the fourth book of Castiglione’s The Courtier, in which Bembo states:

[The lover] shall not take thought at departure or in absence, for he shall evermore carrie his precious treasure about with him shutte fast within his hart. And beside, through the vertue of imagination hee shall fashion with himselfe that beautie much more faire than it is in deede.

For Bembo, as for Plato, “ideas” are always more real than things. Therefore, as Peterson says, “to imagine her [the Petrarchan lady] as being more beautiful than she actually is, is more desirable than to remember her as she actually is” (The English Lyric, 320). According to
Peterson, Donne rejects Platonism because, for him, separation is a “real issue,” as can be seen in such poems as *A Nocturnal upon St. Lucy*: “and often absences/withdrew our souls and made us carcasses.” Nevertheless, we must remember that Donne’s “superlunary lovers” in *A Valediction: Forbidding Mourning* unreservedly comply with Castiglione’s view of separation:

Dull sublunary lovers’ love  
(whose soul is sense) cannot admit  
Absence, because it doth remove  
Those things which elemented it.

But we, by a love so much refined  
That ourselves know not what it is,  
Interassured of the mind,  
Care less, eyes, lips and hands to miss.

Our to souls, therefore, which are one,  
Though i must go, endure not yet  
A breach, but an expansion.

The same ambivalent position is present in Quevedo’s treatment of separation. In his “Romance” 424 (“Amante ausente, que muere presumido de su dolor”), the lover—incapable of putting up with his lady’s absence—rejects Catiglione’s Platonic view:

Quien bien ama, puede estar  
apartado, mas no lejos:  
que no se entiende en las almas  
esto de la tierra en medio.

However, in his Sonnet 458 (“Dice que el amor no tiene parte alguna terrestre”), the lover asserts that his love is not governed by the principles that rule the earthly world:

La llama de mi amor, que está clavada  
en el alto cénit del firmamento,  
ni mengua en sombra ni se ve eclipsada.

Las manchas de la tierra no las siento:  
que no alcanza su noche a la sagrada  
región donde mi fe tiene su asiento [...].
Consequently, the lack of the lady’s presence—being no more than an earthly thing—cannot affect the unearthliness of his love.

Despite Donne’s and Quevedo’s coincidence as far as the ambiguity of their ascription to, and departure from the Petrarchan manner is concerned, there are still many differences between their love poems. The treatment of the physical manifestations of love is—as we have seen—more explicit in Donne’s poetry than in Quevedo’s. Quevedo, unlike Donne’s, had to resort to certain “disguising techniques” (such as dreaming, hypothesis and the use of go-betweens) in order to include the body’s share of the amorous experience within the scope of his love poetry. The reason for cloaking his subversion of the Platonic concept of love under such “disguising techniques” is in all likelihood related to his decision to publish his poems, abandoning, thereby, the protection and freedom of speech characteristic of the manuscript system of circulation. As Pablo Jaurlalde notes, the seventeenth-century writer’s ascription to the manuscript system of circulation could possibly mean “que el autor se hurtaba a la censura y al compromiso legal de la obra impresa, es decir, podía expresarse con mayor desenfado y libertad” (“La transmisión de la obra de Quevedo,” 164). It was Donne’s adherence to this system of circulation that provided him with the sufficient lack of inhibition and freedom of speech to subvert openly the principles of Platonic love. This lack of inhibition can not only be seen in his sexual explicitness, but also in other additional features. Thus, Donne rejects the traditional metric patterns of love poetry (rhyme royal, ottava rima, sonnet) and creates a new different pattern for almost each of his poems. Quevedo’s choice of metric patterns, on the contrary, is traditional (“silva,” “romance,” “lira,” etc.) showing, moreover, an open predilection for the standard pattern of Petrarchan collections: the sonnet. Therefore, Donne’s poetry—as opposed to Quevedo’s and the rest of his English contemporaries’—is based on the idea that content makes form. Poetry must no longer be written in pre-existent containers in which material may be poured. In the Songs and Sonnets, every utterance assumes a unique, original, prosodic pattern.
Likewise, in keeping with his rejection of tradition, Donne exiles the gods and rejects—with very few exceptions—the whole apparatus of classical mythology. Quevedo's love poetry, on the contrary, is crammed with such mythical figures as Leander, Tantalus, Acteon, etc.

Donne's singularity with regard to metric patterns and mythology is also reflected on the dimensions of his poetic universe. Donne's universe is much wider than Quevedo's. It could be said that Donne's universe is a "real" one, whereas Quevedo's universe is highly depersonalized and dominated by what Paul Julian Smith calls "dematerializing tendencies" (Quevedo on Parnassus, 168). This process of "dematerialization" can be seen in Quevedo's choice of such abstract names as Lisi, Aminta, Flora and Floralba to designate the ladies of his sonnets and in his systematic exclusion of any personal detail or domestic triviality in their portraits. Donne's universe, on the contrary, is highly "materialized," as can be seen in such poems as The Canonization and The Sunne Rising, which are crowded with merchants, soldiers, lawyers, schoolboys, kings, courtiers and place seekers:

[...] Take you a course, get you a place [...]  
What you will approve,  
So you will let me love

Alas, alas, who's injured by my love?  
What merchant's ships have my sighs drowned?  
[...] Soldiers find wars, and lawyers find out still  
Litigious men, which quarrels move,  
Though she and I do love. (The Canonization).

Saucy pedantic wretch, go chide  
Late schoolboys, and sour prentices,  
Go tell court-huntsmen that the king will ride,  
Call country ants to harvest offices. (The Sunne Rising).

The same variety is to be found in Donne's imagery. His images are drawn from such disparate fields of knowledge as geometry (the "compass" of A Valediction Forbidding Forbidding Mourning), botany (the "mandrake root" of a Nocturnal upon St. Lucy), alchemy (the
"refinement" of the souls in *A Valediction Forbidding Mourning*, etc. Unlike Donne's imagistic pluralism, Quevedo's imagery is—as Paul Julian Smith notes—"reduced to the confines of Petrarch's cameretta" (*Quevedo on Parnassus*, 176). Hence, Quevedo—as far as the width of his poetic world and the variety of his imagery are concerned—could be regarded as a "minimalist," in contrast to Donne's expansive engagement with the world.
NOTES

SECTION 1

Donne’s and Quevedo’s lives are also determined by this ambivalent feeling of allurement and repugnance towards the court. Both of them were once fully involved with the courtly establishment and became finally estranged from it as political and social outcasts. Quevedo was born a courtier. His father was appointed secretary to Philip II’s fourth wife and his mother held the post of lady-in-waiting to the queen. He was brought up in the court himself, entered the Duke of Osuna’s service as his unofficial secretary and was named—at the peak of his courtly career—a Knight of the Order of Santiago. The Order of Santiago was a clear sign of belonging to the courtier status. It was conferred only by royal decree and only prominent men in court (Velázquez, Calderón) were given such a distinction. Nevertheless, he ruined his political career after Osuna’s failed Venetian conspiracy, exiling himself from the court and being imprisoned for some time. Osuna was convinced that Spain could recover its supremacy in the Mediterranean by destroying Venice’s commercial and naval hegemony. He secretly incited a rebellion from within Venice while offering outside support from Spanish ships, but his plot failed. It is unknown exactly what part Quevedo played in the Venice conspiracy. However, he was Osuna’s private secretary by that time and he felt compelled to defend the Duke in later occasions. Osuna’s frequent visits to Quevedo upon his return to court aroused suspicion and Quevedo was exiled in La Torre de Juan Abad. Osuna was finally imprisoned in 1621. (Baum, Doris. *Traditionalism in the Works of Francisco de Quevedo y Villegas*, 29-30).

As for Donne, his life was a continuous debate between his eagerness to be admitted to the courtly establishment and political and social frustration. After being denied access to an establishment education at Oxford and Cambridge on account of his Catholicism, he entered the Inns of Court, which were essentially designed to provide the gentlemen with “the civility and sophistication that would help them function successfully at the court or in another prestigious milieu.” (Marotti, *John Donne, Courtie Poet*, 25). However, his failure to enter the courtly circles through the Inns of Court impelled him join the Earl of Essex’s 1596 expedition to Spain, during which he met Sir Thomas Egerton, lately appointed as Lord Keeper. Donne eventually became Egerton’s secretary. Nevertheless, after eloping and marrying Egerton’s fourth wife’s niece without his consent, he was dismissed from his post and thrown into prison. He spent the rest of his life in poverty, flattering those of an elevated social status and striving to be admitted again to courtly circles.

The Queen’s favour was the organizing principle of courtly life. Thus, Elizabeth “rewarded Spenser with a pension for his presentation of *The Faerie Queene* at court and John Lyly complained to the queen that she had given him nothing for his service to her.” (*The Elizabethan Courtier Poets*, 2).

Cervantes, another courtly outcast, shares Quevedo’s detachment from Petrarchan poetic patterns:

“¿Piensas tú que [...] fueron verdaderamente damas de carne y hueso, y de aquellos que las celebran y celebraron? No, por cierto, sino que las más se las fingen por dar suento a sus versos.” (*El Quijote*. Quoted from *The Philosophy of Love in Spanish Literature*, 114).
My whole study is an attempt to apply Culler’s view of literary criticism to Donne’s and Quevedo’s love poetry. According to Culler “the critic must make explicit the underlying system which makes literary effects possible, the internalized system of rules that makes literature intelligible to us. Literature is not only centered in the reader him/herself but also in the institutions that teach the reader to read […] by making received modes of understanding explicit readers will become aware of how innovatory a work is.” (“Literary Competence.” Reader-Response Criticism, 101-118). My intention in the first section of my study is to make the reader familiar with the set of poetic conventions that made up the Petrarchan manner so that he/she can appreciate, in the second section, the innovations that Donne and Quevedo introduced in such poetic system through Aristotle’s philosophy.

For this brief account of Petrarchism’s evolution as a system, I have drawn from John Donne, Petrarchist, 43-45.

Pozuelo’s El lenguaje amoroso de la lírica de Quevedo provides a thorough and cogent analysis of the prevalence of the Petrarchan/Neoplatonic ethos in Quevedo’s love poetry.

In my opinion, this is a much clearer example of Quevedo’s “metaphysical wit” or “ingenio” than those provided by Parker (“La agudeza en algunos sonetos de Quevedo”), Terry (“Quevedo and the Metaphysical Conceit”), and Paterson (“Sutilzai del pensar en a Quevedo Sonet”). As Paul Julian Smith points out, Quevedo was a “poet-logician.” According to Smith, “Quevedo’s originality is not likely to be found in the selection of motifs, but in the way he combines them through logic to form something new.” (Quevedo in Parnassus, 54). As a matter of fact, no poet’s originality was likely to be found in his selection of motifs. Poetry, as far as themes or motifs are concerned, was limited to a re-writing of Petrarch’s Canzoniere. Therefore, the poet was forced to develop his originality through his capacity to combine effectively those motifs in a new fashion, that is, to his mastery over rhetoric. Logic and rhetoric became, thus, a fundamental tool in order to achieve poetic originality. Quevedo’s use of logic was in tune with the precepts stated in the most important treatises on poetry of post-Petrarchism (Gracian’s Agudeza y arte de ingenio, Tesauri’s Il Cannocchiale Aristotelico and Peregrini’s Delle Acutezze), whose organizing principles are logical or dialectical. As A. J. Smith points out, “Invention in rhetoric and poetry was judged to be a matter of handling the places wittily so as to produce new ingenuous conjunctions and recombinations of things […] The end of rhetoric is persuasion, which is simply an abbreviated and less rigorous form of syllogistic reasoning… In practice, it was well understood that rhetoricians and poets must draw heavily upon logic.” (Metaphysical Wit, 12-13). In addition to this, we must bear in mind that Aristotle’s Organon was the basis of Quevedo’s studies in logic at Alcalá.

“El lenguaje no poético contempla uno sólo entre los ingredientes sintéticos del contenido anfímico, el ingrediente genérico, el concepto, mientras a través de la poesía se nos produce la ilusión de contemplar el contenido anfímico tal como es, en su aspecto de todo particular. La poesía no puede consistir únicamente en conceptos, pues los conceptos, en cuanto tales, han perdido el carácter individual […] en poesía de lo que se trata es de conocer no lo general sino lo particular.” (Teoría de la expresión poética, 20-23).

“El lenguaje convencional, al ser puramente conceptual, no puede proporcionarnos esa ilusión indispensable de particularidad propia del lenguaje poético […] La lengua en su calidad de normativo está en estado doblemente la realidad psicológica, convirtiéndose visiblemente en un género lo que es un individuo, analizando lo sintético.” (Ibid.).
The "aubade"—poetic subgenre characteristic of troubadouresque poetry in which two lovers wake up in the same bed—constitutes conclusive evidence with regard to the physically attainable nature of the troubadouresque lady.

The *Roman de la Rose* is the first well-known evidence of Petrarchan love poetry at the service of philosophy. The whole poem constitutes a long medieval debate between body and soul encoded in the Petrarchan manner. As the lover argues for carnal love, Reason shows him the inadequacy of love rooted in sense.

Restrictions of overall length make it inevitable that only a small proportion of Donne's and Quevedo's poems be considered here. Suffice it to say that there is a considerable number of instances of "the lover as exemplum" and the "martyrdom by love" topoi in Donne's and Quevedo's love poetry:

\[
\text{Whate'er she meant by it, bury it with it,}
\]
\[
\text{for since I am}
\]
\[
\text{Love's martyr, it might breed idolatry}
\]
\[
\text{If into others' hands these relics came. (The Funeral).}
\]
\[
\text{All women shall adore us, and some men;}
\]
\[
\text{And, since at such time miracles are sought,}
\]
\[
\text{I would have that age by this paper taught}
\]
\[
\text{What miracles we harmless lovers wrought. (The Relic).}
\]

¡Mirad cómo me trata mi deseo:
que he venido a tener sólo por gloria
vivir contento en lo que más me mata! (sonnet 374).

Ved cuán errado mi camino ha sido
cuán sólo y triste, y cuán desordenado,
que nunca anfie le anduvo pie perdido. (sonnet 478).

See 13.

The title of this chapter is inspired by *Quevedo on Parnassus*, 84.

Quevedo, as well as Petrarch, follows the canonic order for the description of feminine beauty familiar from medieval texts: from top to bottom (hair, eyes, mouth).
Querido himself mocks the Petrarchan canon of jewelled beauty in his satirical works: “Por cuanto el siglo está pobre y necesitado de plata y oro, mandamos a que se quemen las coplas de los poetas, como franjas viejas, para sacar el oro y la plata que tienen, pues en sus versos hacen sus ninfas de todos los metales, como estatuas de Nabuco.” (“Premática del desengaño contra los poetas güeros,” Obras festivas)

As Leonard Forster points out, the same “jewelled expansion” was used in painting. Nicholas Hilliard’s “Ermine” portrait of Queen Elizabeth I provides an excellent illustration. (The Icy Fire, 3-4).

The same idea of the individual as encompassing the whole universe is present in Donne’s Anatomie of the World (Eulogy to Elizabeth Drury):

She to whom this world must it selfe refer
as suburbs or the microcosm of her.

The image of the shipwreck is one of the most common encodings for the lack of physical communication between the Petrarchan lovers: “La poetización petrarquista de la incommunicación se acoge a un motivo insistentemente repetido y que será como contexto quedesado para el tópico: el del peregrinaje de amor. Es más, entender la vida como un continuo acercamiento hacia la amada se articulará sobre el eje semántico del viaje (comunicación) y naufragio (comunicación frustrada). La alegoría del naufragio es la que organiza semánticamente el tópico en Petrarca y también en Quevedo”:

Passa la nave mia colma d’oblio
per aspro mare, e mezza notte il verno
enfra Scilla e Caribidi, et al governo
siede l’ signore, anzi il nemico mio
[...] la vela rompe un vento unido eterno
di sospir, di esperanze, e di desio.

[My ship laden with forgetfulness
passes through a harsh sea, at midnight, in winter
between Scylla and Caribdis, and at the tiller
sits my lord, rather my enemy;
[...] a wet, changeless wind of sighs,
hopes and desires breaks the sail.] (sonnet CLXXXIX).

Flota de cuantos rayos y centellas,
en puntas de oro, el ciego Amor derrama,
nada Leandro: y cuanto el punto brama
con olas, tanto gima por veicellas.
[...] Ni volver puede, ni pasar a nado;
si llora crece el mar y la tormenta:
que hasta poder llorar le fue vedado. (sonnet 311).
(Pozuelo-Yvancos, José María. El lenguaje poético de la lírica amorosa de Quevedo, 129-131)
SECTION 2

The Aristotelian trend in love poetry can also be appreciated in Shakespeare's Sonnets. According to Aristotle, the main purpose of all animal species is their self-perpetuation. Breeding constitutes one of the main concerns of Shakespeare's Sonnets. Shakespeare begins his collection of sonnets (sonnets 1-17) by telling a young man to marry in order to gain immortality through his children:

And nothing 'gainst Time's scythe can make defence
Save breed, to brave him when he takes thee hence. (Sonnet XII)

Smith believes that Donne's adherence to Aristotle's philosophy has its origin in the Aristotelian school of Padua (The Metaphysics of Love, 187-221). However, Aristotle's philosophy was simply part of any cultivated person's education. Aristotle's and Plato's philosophical systems shaped western philosophical tradition. Rejection of one of them led almost inevitably to embracement of the other.

According to Pablo Jaurelde the new 1627 legislation on censorship (which reinforced the 1558 existing one) seems to have deterred Quevedo from an intended massive publication of his works. ("La transmisión de la obra de Quevedo," 164)

Góngora suffered the same restrictions on his freedom of speech as Quevedo. He never published his works during his lifetime. However, a pirated edition of his works was published under the title of El Homero español. Góngora's editor cunningly dedicated this edition to Cardinal Zapata (Inquisitor General) in order to avoid revisions of the text by "El Santo Oficio." In spite of this astute manoeuvre, the text was eventually revised and banned. The incorporation of the body into the amorous experience seems to have been one of the main concerns of "El Santo Oficio," as it can be read in the report that was made on Góngora's love poems:

"Porque, aunque este libro no sea del todo lascivo, más porque el autor sólo tuvo su famosa eminencia en lo lascivo y picaril, verde y picante, por esta sola materia es leído y buscado, como si de esto sólo se escribiera [...] y derechamente comprendiendo en la regla Séptima del Índice Romano y de España que condensa y prohibe los libros que tratan, cuentan y enseñan cosas lascivas y, en parte, convida a ellas y las aconseja [...] entre los romances amorosos, el romance tres que comienza: "Dejad los libros ahora, etc." cuenta de si mismo que estuvo mal amigado con una dos años y no aborrece, sino predica su pecado [...] Al fin convida y aconseja a mala y lujuriosa vida cuando dice: "Y vos, tronco, a quien abraza/la más lujuriosa vida/ [...]" vivid en sabrosos nudos."

The use of religious vocabulary with sexual connotations is a common feature of Donne's Holy Sonnets. Thus, in Sonnet IX, the relationship between Church and Christ is compared to that between an unfaithful wife and an acquiescent cuckold:

Who is most trew, and pleasing to thee [Christ] then
When she is embraced and open to most men.

According to Peterson, different manifestations of the "plain style" can be found in European poetry all throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The incorporation of physical love into the scope of serious love-lyric was one of them. All these manifestations had a common origin in medieval
didactic verse, which was written in "rude, barren, or plain style" and whose overall manner was colloquial "in order to accommodate itself to its parochial, non-sophisticated audience." (The English Lyric from Wyatt to Donne, 9-10)

7 Quevedo—as we know—thoroughly revised his texts and left precise instructions for their publication. With regard to "Romance" 440, he did not include it within the frame of his satirical poetry. Therefore, there is no reason to consider it as an essentially burlesque composition.

8 The blurring of the boundaries between dreams and reality is one of the most characteristic features of Baroque literature. Prospero's "we are such stuff as dreams are made of" or Segismundo's "la vida es sueño y los sueños, sueños son" are two perfect, widely-known illustrations of this phenomenon.

9 Unlike Donne's other elegies, The Dream is not written in rhymed couplets. Some manuscripts even include it among the Songs and Sonnets. These are the reasons why I have included it within the scope of my study.

10 Grace is the unmerited favour of God, a divine strengthening influence. The nature and conditions of Grace were the subject of a long-lasting controversy among the Fathers of Church. The central issue of the controversy lay in how far the divine influence supposed to be transferred from divinity (a purely abstract concept) into actual human existence. The controversy reached its peak between St. Augustine and Pelagius. The latter maintained that the human will is capable of good without the help of divine grace. Pelagius was finally condemned as heretic.

11 Quevedo was undoubtedly familiar with Marino's poetry. Both of them held membership at "La academia de los Ocioos" in Naples, an association of the most renowned literary talents from Spain and Italy. Therefore, it is not possible to view Quevedo's poetry as detached from the main poetic innovations that were taking place in Europe. Quevedo's alleged conservatism is absolutely deliberate and must have been due to major restrictions imposed on his freedom of speech.

12 In addition to note 11, it must be remembered that Quevedo himself wrote some of his sonnets "en toscano," for instance Sonnet 326.
CONCLUSION

"[...] the court directly influenced poetry by its approval or disapproval of individual works and authors. Indirectly, moreover, courtiers influenced out-of-court writers by their example [...] the sonnet craze of the 1590s was a direct result of the publication of Sidney's *Astrophil and Stella.*" (*The Elizabethan Courtier Poets*, 1).

2 Ficino was even able to conciliate the Christian dogma of the Trinity with Plato's philosophy in his *De Amore*.

3 Quevedo's attack on Góngora must be seen in the light of the latter's popularity in courtly circles. Quevedo's anti-gongorism is also a good illustration of Quevedo's ambiguous position towards courtly poetic standards; whereas he wrote explicit anti-gongorist poems, he also incorporated a considerable number of "gongorisms" into his love poetry.


5 Take a course of action, get yourself a position (probably in court).
BIBLIOGRAPHY

DONNE


**QUEVEDO**


DONNE AND QUEVEDO


PETRARCH


RENAISSANCE AND BAROQUE


**BACKGROUND**


