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THE DEVELOPMENT
OF
FEDERAL CRIME PREVENTION
POLICY INITIATIVES
IN CANADA:
1992-1993

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Submitted to the Department of Criminology
University of Ottawa
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
in Criminology
1994

Christine Gervais, Ottawa, Canada, 1994
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For Jason,

who, without knowing
or even being capable of understanding,
has inspired my quest for
social justice.
RÉSUMÉ


L'auteure avance que la capacité de la stratégie préventive proposée de diminuer la criminalité et la victimisation de façon efficace est très limitée. Elle est restreinte car elle cherche à inclure des mesures autant réactives que proactives, ou des méthodes d'exclusion et d'inclusion. L'auteure conclut alors que les stratégies préventives proposées au niveau fédéral entre 1992 et 1993 n'apporteront aucun changement majeur dans la politique et pratique du contrôle social. De fait, elles risquent d'étendre le schéma historique de progès désordonné qui caractérise les transformations du contrôle social.
ABSTRACT

Crime prevention has recently become a significant part of the rhetoric in the apparent transformation of criminal justice policy and practice. This thesis explores the implications of the Canadian federal crime prevention policy initiatives developed between 1992 and 1993. As a descriptive analysis, this thesis identifies the nature, the direction and the practical implications of the pending prevention policy initiatives aimed at reducing crime and victimization, and achieving community safety in Canada.

A particular emphasis is placed on whether or not the proposed policy initiatives constitute a shift away from traditional reactive criminal justice responses, and towards a focus on proactive approaches. The analytical framework used derives from Stanley Cohen's (1985) views of social control and Ross Hastings' (1993a) Crime Prevention Typology.

The author argues that the proposed "comprehensive" crime prevention strategy is limited in its capacity to significantly reduce crime and victimization because it emphasizes both inclusionary and exclusionary, as well as, both proactive and reactive measures of deviancy control. The author concludes that the federal crime prevention initiatives developed between 1992 and 1993 are not likely to result in significant changes in the delivery of social control. They may be considered, at best, a mere extension of the historical patterns of uneven progress in transformations of social control.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Most academic endeavours exploring social issues are the products of collective efforts and this one is definitely no exception.

Sincere gratitude is extended to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Ross Hastings, for his noteworthy inspiration, genuine encouragement, sound advice and above all, his constructive editing.

A sincere thank you to all support staff for their kindness, encouragement and efficiency, without whom, many technical hurdles would not have been overcome.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## I INTRODUCTION ........................................ 1
   Overview of Thesis ................................ 5

## II CRIME PREVENTION IN CANADA ....................... 7
   The Emergence of Crime Prevention In Canada .... 8
   Crime Prevention: Another Transformation? ..... 15
   Debate Between Rhetoric and Action ............ 21
   Final Remarks ..................................... 22

## III METHODOLOGY ....................................... 23
   Documentary Analysis ............................. 23
   Classification Grid ............................... 24
      Tertiary Prevention ............................ 26
      Secondary Prevention ......................... 28
      Primary Prevention ............................ 31
   Scheme of Analysis .............................. 33
   Final Remarks .................................. 34

## IV DESCRIBING THE PROGRESS ......................... 35
   Toward A National Strategy ...................... 36
   Proceedings of the National Symposium ....... 51
   Community Safety Through Crime Prevention ... 58
   Final Remarks ................................ 67

## V ASSESSING THE PROGRESS ............................ 69
   The Implications ................................ 71
   Intentions of Progress ........................... 72
   Unintended Consequences ....................... 74
   Divergence Between Rhetoric and Action ...... 82
      Implementation Difficulties .................. 84
      A Story of Change ............................. 91
   Final Remarks .................................. 94

## VI CONCLUSION ......................................... 96
   A Transformation in Waiting ..................... 99
   An Alternative .................................. 101

REFERENCES ............................................. 104
I

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to describe and analyze the federally proposed crime prevention policy and programme initiatives developed in Canada between 1992 and 1993. While there may be many definitions, crime prevention refers to the "anticipation, recognition and appraisal of a crime [or victimization] risk and the initiation of some action to reduce that risk" (National Crime Prevention Institute, 1978: 1-2). In this particular instance, crime prevention refers more specifically to policies and programmes that are proactive, that focus on the community, and are based on interagency cooperation (Hastings, 1991: 86).

During the period under study, the federal crime prevention policy includes three initiatives. The first is *Crime Prevention in Canada: Toward a National Strategy* (February, 1993; known hereafter as the Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, or the Horner Report).

These three initiatives represent only the most recent endeavours in the development of Canadian crime prevention policy. The concept of prevention and the shift toward proactive measures has been on the Canadian agenda for over two decades. Prevention projects including research, campaigns and programmes have been carried out and implemented since the mid 1970's (Bernier, 1985: Introduction). A significant federal government initiative on crime prevention took place in Canada in the early 1980's. This involved projects such as the establishment of a National Crime Prevention Week, the emergence of social development approaches, as well as, the conception of a national strategy (Solicitor General of Canada, 1982: 14; Solicitor General of Canada, 1983a: 3; Waller and Weiler, 1985: 4).

Thus, crime prevention in Canada is not a new phenomenon. There appears, however, to be an underlying sense among many of the politicians, policy-makers and practitioners involved, that the policy developed at the federal level between 1992 and 1993 represents a greater commitment to prevention and a different approach to fighting crime and victimization than was previously the case (Ad Hoc, 1993: 1). The policy recommends:

*a comprehensive and coordinated crime prevention and community safety strategy which addresses the safety and security needs of individuals and communities by dealing with the causes of criminal motivation, personal vulnerability and situational opportunity* (Ad Hoc, 1993: 11).

The purpose of analyzing the current progress towards this
goal of an integrated approach is to ascertain whether or not the three initiatives under analysis constitute a shift away from traditional reactive criminal justice responses, and towards a focus on proactive approaches. The analytical framework used derives from Stanley Cohen's views of social control. It involves investigating the potential impact of the proposed interventions on current organizational arrangements, and on current patterns of transformation in deviancy control.

This is accomplished, in part, through an analysis of the discrepancy between rhetoric and action as it pertains to the three federal crime prevention initiatives. This involves determining whether there are inconsistencies between what the Canadian federal government is proposing to do, and what it is actually doing. This investigation also attempts to uncover whether or not the proposed federal crime prevention initiatives represent an actual change in criminal justice policy and practice. To this end, a look at the recommended federal prevention policy within the historical patterns of transformation in social control serves as the organizing theme of this thesis.

Cohen argues that there have been two critical transformations in the realm of criminal justice. The first took place at the turn of the nineteenth century. It involved a shift from public spectacles of corporal punishments to a less visible mode of punishment. The archetype of this transformation was the prison (Cohen, 1985: 25). Here, the
proposed change was translated into action, and deviancy control took on a completely different form, one that still dominates the organization of our present day systems of control.

The second transformation began during the 1960s. It involved the advocacy of alternatives to the autonomy, and professionalism of the criminal justice system (Cohen, 1985: 20). Evidence of the full implementation of this proposed reform, however, is less evident.

This study attempts to determine whether or not the crime prevention initiatives under analysis in this thesis are a part of this second transformation. In other words, does this allegedly "different" approach to prevention and community safety translate into concrete reforms?

OVERVIEW OF THESIS

The purpose of this thesis is to understand the nature, the direction and the practical implications of the prevention policies and programmes aimed at reducing crime and victimization in Canada. A particular emphasis is placed on their capacity to effect significant change in the organization of the criminal justice, or in its impact on crime and victimization.

Chapter II provides a brief historical overview of crime prevention in Canada and describes Cohen's vision of social control. Emphasis is placed on the historical patterns of transformations in criminal justice practices, as well as on the
tension between rhetoric and action in these patterns of reform.

Chapter III outlines the methodology adopted in this study. It establishes a framework for the examination of the proposed crime prevention strategies and presents a typology for categorizing the range of these strategies. This facilitates the description and analysis of policy options, and clarifies the implications of adopting certain crime prevention orientations.

The two subsequent chapters apply the methodological framework to the three government initiatives under analysis. The aim is to determine the precise nature of Canadian federal crime prevention initiatives developed between 1992 and 1993. More specifically, chapter four describes the findings of the thesis and categorizes them within the typology. Chapter five analyses the proposed policy including the content of the Report of the Standing Committee, the Proceedings of the National Symposium and the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee's Report. This assists in establishing where the federal government is heading with respect to crime prevention strategies. This chapter also explores the tension between rhetoric and action as it applies to crime prevention in Canada as an alleged current transformation in the social control industry.

The thesis concludes with a discussion of the results of this study, and addresses the implications of the crime prevention policy development in Canada. This provides the basis for some speculation of the future of crime prevention and community safety in Canada.
II

THE EMERGENCE OF CRIME PREVENTION IN CANADA
THE EMERGENCE OF CRIME PREVENTION IN CANADA

While there is nothing inherently new in the idea that crime is a problem, there has been, in recent years, an increasing acknowledgement of its extensive consequences on individuals, on communities and on society in general. Public opinion polls and other sources suggest that Canadians have become more concerned about their safety and security (Waller, 1991: 1, 8, 12). This concern, as expressed in the passage below, is not that crime is a violation of an abstract law, but rather that it hurts people, and makes it difficult to establish safe communities (Ad Hoc, 1993: 1).

Just as cancer eats away at people, crime eats away at our communities and societies. If we do nothing about it ... it will erode everything ... we need the dedication and the sincerity and the desire that Terry Fox had if we're going to make a difference in the prevention of crime (House of Commons, Don Evers, 1993, 83: 25).

A result of this concern has been a demand by both the public and spokespersons for community groups, that governments deal with crime and victimization without delay. In response, Canadian criminal justice policy makers and practitioners have identified crime prevention as a key component to a crime reduction strategy. In fact, "it has become almost a truism ... that the future is prevention" (Hastings, 1993a: 1).
Crime prevention initiatives have been on the Canadian agenda since the mid 1970s. These earlier prevention projects included workshops, campaigns and various community programmes. A significant federal government initiative on crime prevention took place in Canada in the early 1980s (Bernier, 1985: Introduction). These undertakings were spearheaded primarily by the Ministry of the Solicitor General. They involved projects such as, the establishment of a National Crime Prevention Week (Solicitor General of Canada, 1983c: 1), as well as, the development of the role of the community and partnerships in prevention (Solicitor General of Canada, 1983a: 3; Solicitor General of Canada, 1983b: 2). In addition, the concept of a national crime prevention strategy and social development initiatives were also developed in the early 1980s and efforts to establish them have been carried out ever since (Solicitor General of Canada, 1982: 14; Waller and Weiler, 1985: 4).

More recent endeavours, which are the subject of this thesis, attempt to advance the prevention agenda even further. The initiatives under analysis is comprised of three endeavours (each of which resulted in the release of a final report). The general purpose of these initiatives was to advance the development of a national strategy on community safety and crime prevention in Canada at the federal level.
The first of these initiatives is the work of the House of Commons' Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General which resulted in the release of a report entitled *Crime Prevention in Canada: Toward a National Strategy* (February, 1993; known hereafter as the Report of the Standing Committee). This is the work of a six member non-partisan committee comprised of federal Members of Parliament. In consultation with public "stakeholders," and with the help of policy analysts and researchers, they produced a report proposing a new role for the federal government in crime prevention.

The preparatory background documents preceding this report are also important. These are the House of Commons' "Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General" (issues 69 to 86, dating June 18, 1992 to February 11, 1993, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), Consideration of Questions relating to Crime Prevention for the Third Session of the Thirty-Fourth Parliament).

These official minutes contain the testimony of various witnesses from across Canada, within a four month period from November 1992 to February 1993. They provided their opinions on the future possibilities for crime prevention strategies in Canada. The list of witnesses included crime prevention
practitioners, academics, crime victims, government officials, community groups, volunteers and law enforcement agencies. This material is considered to be the background source of information in preparation of the Standing Committee's Report.

The second document contains the "PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COMMUNITY SAFETY AND CRIME PREVENTION" which took place in Toronto, Ontario from March 10 to 12, 1993; (otherwise herein known as the "Proceedings"). The National Symposium brought together almost 300 delegates from government, community groups, and a wide range of non-governmental organizations to establish a plan of action to make Canadian communities safer from crime. Through addresses, panels, plenary and workshop sessions, the delegates shared their insights on how to achieve community safety through crime prevention. The results of this National Symposium were to contribute to the development of a Canadian crime prevention strategy at the federal government level.

The third document under analysis is COMMUNITY SAFETY THROUGH CRIME PREVENTION, the Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee for a National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention which was released in October, 1993 (otherwise, herein known as the "Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee").
The Ad Hoc Advisory Committee was established to advise the federal Minister of Justice on how to build a strategy that meets the needs of Canadian communities. The committee was made up of a representative group of twenty-five symposium participants. The result of their work was the release of this report outlining the strategies required to achieve community safety through crime prevention in Canada. These three policy initiatives are based on three fundamental tenets (Hastings, 1993a: 3; Hastings, 1991: 86). The first tenet is that successful crime prevention requires a proactive approach directed at the root causes of crime and victimization. The corollary is a decreased emphasis on reactive responses.

The second tenet is that current criminal justice practices are limited in their capacity to deal with crime and victimization effectively. There is now greater awareness that traditional criminal justice responses are only partial and incomplete solutions to reducing crime and victimization rates and increasing community safety (Hastings, 1993: 13; Rosenbaum, 1988: 323; Currie, 1989: 6). The problem is that current criminal justice responses: the police, the courts and the correctional system, focus primarily on reacting after the criminal incident. An additional criticism is that they are
only dealing with the symptoms of crime rather than the underlying causes. In other words,

\[
\text{increasing our capacity to punish and control individuals will do little to address the fundamental problems of inequality, inequity and injustice, the vulnerability of victims, or the situations which bring these types of people together in a manner which provides opportunities for victimization (Ad Hoc, 1993:8)}
\]

In this light, the proposed federal policy claims that the task of making communities safer from crime extends beyond the work of law enforcement, courts and corrections. Within the recommended strategy, the focus is on a proactive approach to dealing with the problem of crime and victimization.

The third tenet is that, given current fiscal restraints, new resources are unlikely to be allocated to criminal justice initiatives, especially where these extend beyond existing traditional reactive measures. As a result, the proposed federal policy claims that the most efficient way to use available resources is through "cooperative partnerships" or interagency collaboration (Hastings, 1993a: 4).

These three tenets are often so taken for granted that preventive interventions often overlook the conflicting theoretical and political issues which must be resolved in any attempt to design a comprehensive crime prevention policy.
Part of the problem is that crime prevention has become, in recent years, the fashionable thing to do (House of Commons. Sharron Hilsen. 1993. 80: 12). The notion of prevention seems to have captured the imagination of many criminal justice policy makers and practitioners, the media and the public. There is no doubt that the notion of prevention is attractive to many people. The appeal is that crime prevention promises to deliver a more cost-effective alternative to the reliance on reactive responses to crime (Hastings, 1993a: 1).

However, despite the considerable support for a proactive approach, the rhetoric on crime prevention in the realm of criminal justice has obscured what is actually meant by prevention, how it should be implemented and under whose jurisdiction it should fall (Hastings, 1991: 85). As a result, the strategy of crime prevention has not yet been translated effectively into action. At the present time, the rhetoric seems to be ahead of the policy and programme implementation. This gap between rhetoric and action is, however, often typical of a policy in transformation.
PREVENTION: ANOTHER TRANSFORMATION?

In Canada, a current trend in criminal justice practices is the advocacy of a shift away from an overreliance on traditional reactive responses to crime in favour of proactive prevention practices. The appeal is the promise to deliver community safety more effectively. During the discussions and debates leading up to the decision to shift the focus of our efforts, some policy-makers and practitioners argued that we must "recognize [that] this is a time of profound change and that our systems have to change to match that" (House of Commons, Calvin Lee, 1993, 80: 37).

The current shift towards the advocacy of crime prevention can be located within the historical patterns of change in social control policy and practice. The subsequent discussion is not a comprehensive historical overview. The focus is on the emerging patterns of transformation or reform which have a practical significance for crime prevention policy-making. Only a limited number of initiatives are reviewed.

Two critical transformations in the realm of criminal justice have been described. The first, which took place at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, laid the foundations of subsequent deviancy control systems (Cohen, 1985: 13). The second reform, which supposedly began in the 1960s and is apparently continuing now, "is thought by some to represent ... a radical reversal of that earlier transformation, by others to merely signify a continuation and
intensification of its patterns" (Cohen, 1985: 13). Figure 1 is a summary of Cohen's interpretation of the results of these two transformation. Figure 1 has been extracted (and modified) from Stanley Cohen's *Vision of Social Control*, 1985: 32).
**FIGURE 1**

**THE MASTER PATTERNS**
(Cohen, 1985: 32)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NINETEENTH-CENTURY TRANSFORMATION</th>
<th>1960s TRANSFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Centralized state control</td>
<td>(1) Decentralization, deinstitutionalization, decriminalization, diversion, divestment, informalism, non-intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Categorization, separate knowledge systems, expertise, professionalization</td>
<td>(2) Deprofessionalization, demedicalization, delegalization, anti-psychiatry, self-help, removal of stigma and labels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Segregation: victory of the asylum</td>
<td>(3) Decarceration, deinstitutionalization, community control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Positivist theory: move from body to mind</td>
<td>(4) Back to justice, neoclassicism, behaviourism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first transformation, at the turn of the nineteenth-century, shaped the foundation for the present deviancy control system. This original reform was characterized by an increase in centralized state involvement in the social control industry (Cohen, 1985: 16). There also emerged at this time, a classification process which differentiated deviants and types of deviancy. This gave rise to a strengthening of the presence of professionals in the social control field. This categorization process led to an increase in segregative methods of control, such as penitentiaries, mental hospitals, and reformatories. In the late eighteenth century, the prison, as a form of exclusion, became the dominant instrument of control (Cohen, 1985: 13). At the same time, there was a decline in the use of corporal or physical punishments carried out as public spectacles. Here the object of punishment was the mind and not the body; the idea was that the prison could provide a place of solitary confinement where solitude and austerity would inspire penitence and lead to rehabilitation (Blanchfield, 1985, 10;7: 3). The focus of the sanction became the individual offender and not the offence.

During this transition, the prison was seen as a more humanitarian substitute for cruel and barbaric corporal
punishments inflicted on the body, such as hanging, branding and whipping (Blanchfield, 1985, 10:7: 2). Within a few decades, public spectacles of corporal punishments which were open and collective disappeared, and a less visible mode of punishment, the prison, was firmly established (Cohen, 1985: 25). In addition, the vengeful executioner was replaced by a variety of relatively autonomous professionals: wardens, doctors, chaplains, educators, social workers, etc (Cohen, 1985: 26). Control passed from the community to the "experts." At the turn of the nineteenth century, deviancy control took on a completely different form, one that still dominates the organization of our present day systems of control.

The second transformation has been more apparent than real. It began during the 1960s and has been characterized by uneven progress and disillusionment. This apparently "new" wave of reform involved a search for alternatives to the autonomy, professionalism and separation of the criminal justice system (Cohen, 1985: 20). The alleged purpose of this second transition was also humanitarianism.

This mid-twentieth century's alleged transformation was supposed to be an attack on the concept of imprisonment. It was characterized by the multiple D's: destructuring,
decentralization, decriminalization, diversion, demedicalization, delegalization, deformalization, decarceration and deinstitutionalization (Cohen, 1985: 32). The underlying motive for this 'D' movement was a belief that the institution was "a failure - a colossal mistake whose commission [could] only be redeemed by its abolition" (Cohen, 1985: 32). In turn, the new focus for deviancy control became the community, a form of inclusion. On the surface, this suggested a decline in rates of incarceration or forms of segregation, and a corollary rise in the use of release programmes. These included community-based residential homes or community service orders. These were mostly geared towards the rehabilitation and reintegration of the offender. However, an in-depth look into the implications of this movement reveal inconsistencies, contradictions and unintended consequences (Cohen, 1985: 35).

The gap between rhetoric and action (or promise and fulfilment) is enormous. Cohen argued that

\[
\text{none of the programmes turned out the way their designers hoped ... so diluted became the ideas, that practice bore no relationship to the original text. Closed institutions hardly changed and were certainly not humanized; the new programmes became supplements, not alternatives, thus expanding the scope and reach of the system; discretion actually became more arbitrary; individual treatment was barely attempted, let alone successful ... opera-}
\]
tional needs ensured survival while benevolent rhetoric buttressed a long-discredited system, deflect ed criticism and justified 'more of the same' (Cohen, 1985: 20).

Cohen further argued that the patterns emerging at this point are not of change but of proliferation, elaboration diversification, expansion and intensification of the criminal justice system (Cohen, 1985: 83-84). This occurred despite the absence of scientific proof that reacting to an increase in crime and victimization by expanding and reinforcing the present system would have a significant impact on protecting society. It fact, in many instances, it is counterproductive (Cohen, 1985: 49). Consequently, what seemed to have occurred is more a case of good intentions having been translated into disastrous consequences: the result is the delivery of more of the same old thing.

**DEBATE BETWEEN RHETORIC AND ACTION**

In light of the claim of uneven progress and unintended consequences, one is led to question where the emerging federal crime prevention policy is located in these "master patterns." Will the proposed crime prevention policy reflect the changes that occurred at the turn of the nineteenth-century? Or will it be part of the second transformation that has resulted in consequences other than change?
The policy-makers and practitioners who are developing the comprehensive strategy seem to have recognized that the prevention of crime must go beyond being just a concept, at the level of rhetoric, to becoming an actual intervention practice (House of Commons, 1992, 70: 44). They contend that

*it is time to translate the rhetoric of crime prevention into policies, legislation and programs if we are to make any real progress in our attempt to protect Canadians, and particularly vulnerable people and their communities (Ad Hoc, 1993: 3).*

This acknowledgement bears great significance. There is not only an awareness of the potential gap between rhetoric and action, but there is also an expressed commitment to ensure that the gap remains as narrow as possible.

**FINAL REMARKS**

The question to be answered is whether the concept of crime prevention will simply remain a well-intentioned "in" thing to do? Will it be trapped at the level of rhetoric or will it actually be translated into action? This thesis sets out to determine whether or not the current rhetoric on crime prevention at the level of the federal government has the potential to translate into real substantive changes.
III

METHODOLOGY
This project is a descriptive analysis of the development of national crime prevention policy in Canada between 1992 and 1993. In brief, the purpose of this research is to contribute to an understanding of the direction in which Canada is heading in prevention. More specifically, the goal is to assess whether the emerging federal crime prevention policy is capable of effecting real change.

**DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS**

In order to establish what crime prevention initiatives the federal government is developing, this study analyzes the three initiatives that are part of the process of developing federal policy. The key initiatives are:


2. The *Proceedings* of the National Symposium on Community Safety and Crime Prevention (March, 1993);

These documents are public statements which constitute important steps in the policy development process. The methodology adopted herein flows from the suggestion that the processes and products of written communication should be studied through content analysis (Holsti, 1969: 1). The documents are a valuable source of objective sociological knowledge (Duchatel, 1993: 158).

CLASSIFICATION GRID

The data in the documentary analysis are analyzed on the basis of a classification grid. In order to describe the characteristics and patterns of communications and to discover the particular significance of the message studied, categorization of the data is essential (L'cuyer, 1987: 50; Holsti, 1969: 43, 60). Categorization groups the component elements of the content by distinguishing them according to specific criteria defined beforehand (Bardin, 1989: 150). This enables the presentation of particular characteristics that may serve as clues for the analyst in deciphering the content (Bardin, 1989: 134). The typology presented below facilitates the categorization process.
FIGURE 2

ANALYSIS GRID

A CRIME PREVENTION TYPOLOGY
(HASTINGS, 1993a: 7-10)

LEVELS OF INTERVENTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRIMARY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SECONDARY</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERTIARY</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OFFENDER   SITUATION   VICTIM

TARGET ELEMENTS
This thesis uses the typology of crime prevention as a classification tool. This typology represents a "map" that describes the possible range of policy and programme options within a crime prevention strategy (Hastings, 1993a: 5). In assessing the intended direction of federal crime prevention policies, this grid allows the classification of the levels of intervention; as well as, the point or target of intervention. In brief, this typology describes what, when, where, and how prevention policies could target their programmes.

As shown in Figure 2, crime prevention can be targeted at one of three different levels of intervention: primary, secondary and tertiary, as well as, at one of three different elements of a crime event: the offender, the situation and the victim (Hastings, 1993a: 8-10). The following pages briefly describe each of the strategic options. Each box (indicated in Figure 2) represents a different target element and level of intervention. Not every box in the typology will necessarily be filled in a specific crime prevention policy.

**TERTIARY PREVENTION**

Tertiary prevention involves policies that are activated after the crime has occurred. The focus is primarily on the
individual offender or victim (Waller, 1991: 27; Hastings, 1991: 88). With regards to the offender in box 1: traditional law enforcement, right-wing criminology places an emphasis on choice and responsibility; this involves the adaptation of the neo-classical model of human nature: the individual rationally calculates gain and pain (Hastings, 1993b: 63). The focus here is on the traditional criminal justice system's ability to control individuals, in essence through appropriately calibrated sanctions (Hastings, 1993b: 63; Hastings, 1991: 89). On the other hand, the positivist solution involves correctionalist intrusion aimed at treating the individual who demonstrates the symptoms of being different and determined (Hastings, 1993b: 63). The underlying assumption here is that the solution to crime is to be found in our ability to diagnose offenders and deliver appropriate treatments to the individual.

In terms of box 3: victim services, the focus is on repairing the harm inflicted upon the victim as a result of a criminal incident (Hastings, 1993a: 11). Activities at this level imply a commitment to helping the victim. They involve services such as shelters and transition houses for battered women and children, rape crisis centres and phone lines, victim self-help groups and a host of community outreach services.
Other victim services, such as victim witness programmes, attempt to ensure greater cooperation on the part of the victim during the court process. However, the real motive is simply to increase the efficiency of the traditional justice system (Hastings, 1993a: 11).

**SECONDARY PREVENTION**

Secondary prevention is achieved through policies that target those persons or situations that are more at risk (Waller, 1991: 27). Within this level of intervention, prevention strategies include developmental projects, situational crime prevention, community based programmes and victim risk management.

*Box 4 involves Crime Prevention through Social Development with an emphasis on developmental approaches.* Developmental intervention is based on longitudinal studies. It refers to strategies targeted at those individuals who are living through experiences that make a career of persistent offending crime a probability (Waller and Weiler, 1985: 3).

In this case, the offender is considered a product of individual or social differences, and the solution is to respond to the causes of these differences in order to prevent a career
of persistent offending (Hastings, 1993a: 7). Underlying factors related to the development of persistent offenders may involve family dysfunction, poverty, unemployment, inadequate housing, education or alcohol abuse. Developmental strategies involve programmes targeted to address these disadvantages in the hopes of reducing crime (Waller, 1991: 30). The delivery of services at this level is made possible through interagency cooperation: the cooperation among all related services and departments (health, employment, education, etc.) to improve the social development of these "at risk" individuals (Hastings, 1993a: 12). Such interventions may involve, for example, a special child care programme such as the Perry Pre-school programme. This is a head-start project offered to children aged 3-5, identified "at risk" because of the situation of their parents (Waller, 1991: 29).

In terms of the criminogenic situation (corresponding to box 5), the basic argument is that physical and/or social structures conspire to make certain types of situations more or less criminogenic. The task, then, is to identify the factors which cause this 'difference' and to design programs aimed at correcting the situation (Garafolo, 1987: 41; Hastings, 1991: 89; Hastings, 1993b: 60). This strategy may take the form of
either situational crime prevention or community based strategies. *Situational crime prevention* comprises opportunity reduction measures directed at highly specific crimes that involve management design or manipulation of the immediate physical environment. The intentions are to increase the risk and the effort of offending, to eliminate potential targets, or to make them less accessible or appealing to the potential offender (Clarke, 1992: 4; Hastings, 1993a: 11). Examples of these interventions include alarm systems, natural surveillance (better street lighting), and property identification (Clarke, 1992: 13).

Similar to situational prevention, *Community Based Strategies*, (also box 5) aim to reduce crime by changing the environment. In this case, however, it is through social rather than physical manipulation. The underlying logic of a community based prevention programme is that coordinated collective citizen action and the social processes it allegedly activates can rebuild a sense of community. The expected consequence is that it informally controls crime and reduces fear more effectively (Rosenbaum, 1987: 103). An example of this is where a city promotes a Neighbourhood Watch programme to reduce residential burglaries (Waller, 1991: 27; Hastings, 1993a: 11).
Box 6 of the typology involves victim risk management interventions. The focus on the victim emphasizes target hardening techniques or teaching potential victims to reduce or manage their risk of, or vulnerability to victimization (Hastings, 1991: 89). Activities can range from a focus on the individual’s responsibility not to precipitate a criminal incident, to initiatives educating victims on how to protect themselves and ensure their personal safety (Hastings, 1993a: 12). This protection often requires individuals to modify their lifestyle.

**PRIMARY PREVENTION**

Many criminologists argue that the definition of both the problem of crime and of its solutions are anchored in the wider social processes and conflicts within which both crime and control are constructed (Hastings, 1991: 91). Herein lies the focus of primary prevention which represents the most general level of intervention. In this case, there is a commitment to place crime and victimization within wider frameworks so that the processes of deconstruction and analysis are more thorough (Hastings, 1993b: 65). The theoretical implications involve crime being relocated within wider social and class
problems. Within the intervention options at the primary level (boxes 7, 8 and 9), there is an assumption that broad social policies can have a considerable effect on the rates of motivated offenders, vulnerable victims or situations conducive to crime (Hastings, 1993a: 12).

At the practical level, primary prevention is to be achieved through general social, economic or public policies. The reduction of the rate of crime is a by-product of the initiative. This is known as "crime prevention through social development" with an emphasis on the social aspect. An example of an activity at this level involves programmes aimed at reducing unemployment or relative child poverty. There is a claim that these may have a significant impact on crime by alleviating some of the conditions which are correlates of criminal activity (Waller, 1991: 27; Hastings, 1993a: 7).

This schematic representation oversimplifies the explanations of crime and different strategic orientations to crime prevention. It also underestimates the degree of overlap among actual practices; that is, there are few crime prevention initiatives in the real world which fit exclusively into only one box. Nonetheless, this framework should help to illustrate the range of options which might be included in a comprehensive crime prevention strategy (Hastings, 1993a: 12).
THE SCHEME OF ANALYSIS

For the purpose of this thesis, the typology is used to classify the content in each of the documents under analysis. In terms of *Crime Prevention in Canada: Toward A National Strategy*, the first stage of classification served to categorize the witnesses' testimony as reported in the *Minutes of the Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General*. The typology then enabled the categorization of the explanations put forth in the Standing Committee Report. In a third instance, it allowed the classification of the interventions recommended by the committee; this helped to determine the strategic perspective they are adopting. The fourth phase involved classifying the recommendations that have been implemented thus far. The analysis of each stage was compared to assess the strategic coherence of the proposed crime prevention policies and initiatives.

A similar categorization was carried out with the second document under review: *The Proceedings of the National Symposium on Community Safety and Crime Prevention*. The first step involved the classification of the content of the various addresses and panels. These presented the causal explanations
and the strategic options being considered to deal with crime. The second stage involved the categorization of the National Symposium's workplans; these constitute the recommendations of the participants. These two stages were compared to assess the strategic coherence of the proposed policies.

The third document classified within the typology is the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee's Report on Community Safety through Crime Prevention. The first step entailed the classification of the causal explanations and the policy options discussed in the four chapters of this report. This first step was then compared to the second one, the categorization of the recommendations. This comparison served to assess the strategic coherence of the proposed initiatives.

**FINAL REMARKS**

The methodology adopted herein sets the stage for a descriptive analysis of the current phase of crime prevention policy development in Canada. The purpose of the classification within the typology is to demonstrate the evolution of crime prevention initiatives at the federal level between 1992 and 1993. In addition, this methodology should shed some light on the distinction between the strategic orientations which were adopted and those which were not.
IV

DESCRIBING THE PROGRESS
This chapter presents the results of the descriptive analysis of the development of crime prevention policy in Canada between 1992 and 1993. The presentation is divided into three sections, corresponding to the three documents under review. The first is the Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General: *Crime Prevention in Canada: Toward a National Strategy*. The second is the *Proceedings of the National Symposium on Community Safety and Crime Prevention*, and the third is the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee Report on *Community Safety Through Crime Prevention*. The contents of each document are classified on the basis of the Crime Prevention Typology.

**Toward a National Strategy**

There are two sources of information on the work of the Standing Committee. The first is the background documents of the Standing Committee Report as presented in the "Minutes and Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General" (issues 69 to 86). The second focuses on the Standing Committee's final report: *Crime Prevention in Canada: Toward a National Strategy*. The report is analyzed in three phases. To begin, it describes the explanations, provided within the report, of the factors
associated with crime and of the possible strategies to prevent it. The next stage involves the categorization of the Standing Committee's recommendations to determine the consistency in the proposed analysis. The final step describes the information available to date on the implementation of the recommendations.

FIRST STEP: MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS (consult Table 1)

The witnesses who took part in the hearings of the Standing Committee represent many groups from across Canada. They include prevention practitioners, academics, crime victims and women's advocacy groups, government officials, community groups, Native representatives, groups concerned with youth, as well as law enforcement agencies. As summarized in Table 1, their testimony reflects varied and sometimes conflicting explanations of crime and its prevention.

For instance, several witnesses argued for tertiary interventions by way of increasing enforcement, treatment and sanctions for the offender (box 1) and reparation services for victims (box 3). One witness explained that "we do need stronger deterrents ... for a certain segment of the population we need to have harsher sentencing" (House of Commons, Sharron Hilsen, 1993, 80: 17). In addition, another witness argued that
"the government must recognize that it must include increased use of services for battered women" (House of Commons, Debi Forsyth-Smith, 1992, 71: 7).

At the secondary level, various academics and practitioners promoted developmental strategies based on the need for early intervention (box 4). In box 5, various witnesses insisted on intervening in the community, as well as, situational prevention measures. Various advocacy groups recommended assisting those individuals who are most at risk of victimization (box 6). Others insisted on primary intervention to address the broader factors associated with crime (boxes 7, 8, 9). In fact, one witness who testified at the hearings, argued that "crime cannot be divorced from the social, economic, and political landscape in which it occurs" (House of Commons, John Anderson, 1993, 80: 54).

Witnesses also suggested delivery mechanisms required to implement these interventions. These include interagency cooperation and partnership, community participation and improved relations between the police and the public. Witnesses also emphasized the importance of federal leadership through a national council. Other delivery strategies proposed include the reallocation and investment of funds into crime prevention,
research, evaluation, training, improved statistics, legislation, awareness, as well as, volunteerism. Despite these suggestions, the witnesses generally failed to provide adequate details on how these delivery mechanisms are to be coordinated.
### TABLE 1

**FIRST STEP: THE MINUTES AND PROCEEDINGS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>-recognition of causal sources of crime: poverty, unemployment, racism</th>
<th>-awareness of strategies necessary to eradicate causal factors</th>
<th>-causal sources of victimization: sexism, racism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| -harsher punishment -deterrence -rehabilitation -enforcement -law reform -Native justice model | | -judicial assistance -shelters -crisis intervention -victim services -insurance -victim protection |
SECOND STEP: THE REPORT'S EXPLANATIONS (consult Table 2)

At this stage, specific orientations or approaches were selected for inclusion in the final report of the Standing Committee. Several issues were discussed; these include the problem of crime in Canada and the factors associated with it, prevention strategy options, and the federal role in prevention.

While the content of explanations in the Report covers most of the categories in the typology, the emphasis is placed at the secondary level on the offender (box 4). Although social development policies that help individuals "at risk" to overcome their disadvantages were stressed, these were not linked to primary level considerations or situations. In the section on "factors associated with crime," primary level issues were briefly mentioned. These involve the recognition of social and economic deprivation, and the role of the patriarchal society in producing gender inequality, etc. One witness, Hugh Baker, even argued that "any attempt to reduce crime and violence ... will not succeed unless social and economic deprivation ... is addressed" (Standing Committee, 1993: 11). However, the "causal source" of this poverty is not addressed.

The report outlines the limits of reactive measures at the tertiary level (especially in box 1). However, these same repressive strategies are still promoted in this second stage.
Despite the recognition by the Standing Committee members that current after-the-fact measures are limited in their capacity to reduce crime and victimization, these are still included as part of the crime prevention strategy.

In terms of the delivery process through which the problem of crime is to be overcome in Canada, several strategies were proposed. These implementation mechanisms include partnerships and interagency cooperation. An emphasis is placed on both vertical and horizontal cooperation between all levels of government, criminal justice organizations and community social agencies (Standing Committee, 1993: 2, 12, 13, 14, 15). Together, these organizations can achieve "safer communities" by identifying and responding to short and long-term community needs by bringing together individuals from a range of sectors to tackle crime (Standing Committee, 1993: 12).

Additional delivery mechanisms include accessible and visible community policing which is to be made possible through neighbourhood mini-stations, foot patrols, citizen advisory committees and comprehensive training (Standing Committee, 1993: 19, 20). Additional emphasis was placed on the importance of local elected officials serving on police commissions (Standing Committee, 1993: 20). The Standing Committee also acknowledged the importance of police services provided by Native peacekeepers in Native communities (Standing Committee, 1993 20).
**TABLE 2**

**SECOND STEP: THE STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT'S EXPLANATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>-underlying social, political and economic factors associated with crime -social and economic deprivation of Aboriginal communities</th>
<th>-factors associated with victimization -repercussions of patriarchal society on gender inequality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-inappropriate discipline by parents -physical &amp; sexual abuse, illiteracy, -inadequate housing -school failure -unemployment -dysfunctional families -substance abuse -high risk populations -social development</td>
<td>-community context -safer communities agenda -community is focal point of effective crime prevention -community based policing -opportunity reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-traditional criminal justice system responses</td>
<td>-education -responsibilization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THIRD STEP: THE STANDING COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS (consult Table 3)

The Standing Committee Report put forth eleven recommendations to advance the crime prevention initiatives in Canada. It proposed that:

1: The federal government, in cooperation with the provinces and municipalities, take on a national role in crime prevention and develop a national crime prevention policy which would be included in the mandates of federal departments and agencies responsible for criminal justice, policing, immigration, housing, and social and economic development; these agencies must work together in local communities involving a coordinated, multidisciplinary effort to address the root causes of crime. Prevention measures must include law enforcement, community-based policing, social development and reduction of criminal opportunity (Standing Committee, 1993: 33).

2: The federal government, in consultation with the provinces and territories and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, must support the development of a national crime prevention council. The council's mandate should deal mainly with issues of reducing crime, such as, community safety, provide advice to the federal government in policy development, gather, analyze and disseminate knowledge about crime and crime prevention, provide training, research evaluation and public education on the prevention of crime, provide funding assistance to local governments and community organizations to implement community safety initiatives (Standing Committee, 1993: 33).

3: A share of the monies forfeited as proceeds of crime be allocated to crime prevention activities and that the federal government allocate 1% a year of the current federal budget for police, courts and corrections to crime prevention over a five year period. At the end of five years, Canada should spend 5% of the current federal budget on crime prevention (Standing Committee, 1993: 34).
4: The Department of Justice maintain its role as the Department responsible for crime prevention and that it appoint a senior official responsible for crime prevention policy and program development (Standing Committee, 1993: 34).

5: The federal government support the establishment of an international centre for the prevention of crime (Standing Committee, 1993: 34).

6: Parliament’s commitment to crime prevention be given clear expression in principles contained within the Criminal Code, the Young Offenders Act, the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and related criminal justice statutes (Standing Committee, 1993: 34).

7: The federal government expand Statistics Canada’s program of victimization surveys to allow for the analysis of trends in crime victimizations at regular intervals and to allow for population samples sufficiently large to capture the experiences of important sub-groups of the Canadian population (Standing Committee, 1993: 34).

8: The federal government work with the provinces, the territories and relevant professions to promote violence-prevention education as an integral part of the curriculum in all education levels in Canada (Standing Committee, 1993: 34).

9: The Minister of Justice in consultation with provincial Attorneys General review existing charging policies and powers of arrest in domestic violence situations to ensure that, where appropriate, abusers are removed from the home, for reasonable period, to allow victims adequate time to determine an appropriate course of action and to defuse the emotional climate thereby reducing the immediate likelihood of continuous violence (Standing Committee, 1993: 35).
10: A hybrid offence of intimidation be included in Part VIII of the Criminal Code that would prohibit following or other forms of harassment, with intent to convey a threat. The Standing Committee also recommends that violation of an existing court order should be an aggravating factor that would allow for greater penalties (Standing Committee, 1993: 35).

11: The Committee recommends that s.495 of the Criminal Code be amended to allow police arrest, without warrant, of parolees found committing a breach of their parole conditions. The Committee further recommends that C.P.I.C. publish, as part of the information concerning persons identified in their records, complete conditions of parole, probation and interim release (Standing Committee, 1993: 35).

Certain recommendations emphasize secondary level interventions, such as community crime prevention strategies, violence prevention, and social development policies. There is an emphasis, however, on tertiary measures promoting stricter laws and harsher sanctions. The problem is that the Report is recommending interventions at the tertiary and secondary levels despite its own earlier recognitions of their limited potential.

Contradictions also emerge where the Standing Committee recognizes the need to address the root causes of crime. However, it recommends nothing concrete at the primary level other than to briefly mention that crime prevention should be included in the mandates of federal departments responsible for housing and social and economic development (Standing Committee, 1993: 33). Thus, there is a lack of internal consistency. The
problem is that the recommendations are not consistent with the proposed explanations. That is, while the Standing Committee recognized the causal factors of crime at the primary level, most strategies recommended fall within the secondary and especially tertiary levels. In addition, as a comparison between Tables 1 and 3 indicates, these proposals only reflect a proportion of the views expressed by participants at the Minutes and Proceedings.

Although recommendations 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 propose how crime prevention is to be achieved through education, interagency cooperation, allocation of funds, etc., they fail to explain how these delivery mechanisms are to be organized and coordinated.
### TABLE 3

**THIRD STEP: THE REPORT'S RECOMMENDATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1: social and economic development, immigration</th>
<th>1: federal departments incorporate prevention into their mandates</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: social development</td>
<td>1: community based policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: housing, social services &amp; programs</td>
<td>1: opportunity reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: health, education</td>
<td>2: education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2: local community intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8: violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>prevention education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 1: law enforcement                              | 9: after-care for domestic violence situations, victims' responsibility to take appropriate course of action |
| 9: increase charging powers in domestic violence|                                                               |
| 9: remove abusers from home                     |                                                               |
| 10: extend the offence of intimidation and increase the penalty |                                                               |
| 11: increase police powers of arrest            |                                                               |
| 11: C.P.I.C. publish conditions of parole, probation and interim release |                                                               |
FOURTH STEP: IMPLEMENTATION UPDATE (consult Table 4)

So far, midway through 1994, only recommendation 10, which proposed an amendment to Part VIII of the Criminal Code, prohibiting harassment, has been implemented. This recommendation is a tertiary level intervention promoting stricter laws and harsher sanctions, of which the limited potential of "preventing" crime or effecting real change has already been recognized. Two of the delivery mechanisms proposed: the International Crime Prevention Centre and the (Canadian) National Crime Prevention Council have been established in the spring of 1994. These organizations represent promising steps in the advancement of prevention initiatives in Canada. While these first steps are crucial to the development of crime prevention policy and practice, they are but initial ones.

As Table 4 indicates, only one substantive recommendation has been implemented thus far, and it has limited potential. In addition, the above mentioned delivery mechanisms are still in their development stages. The evolution from Tables 1 through 4 demonstrates the funnel-type selection of intervention options that occurred to arrive at this stage of the prevention policy development. In general, an inconsistency emerges within this document: the recommendations reflect only a portion of the views expressed during the Standing Committee hearings.
FOURTH STEP: IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS

<p>| | | |</p>
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<tr>
<td>-stalking law in</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>effect prohibiting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>harassment</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The second source of analysis is the PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COMMUNITY SAFETY AND CRIME PREVENTION. The categorization of the contents of this document within the typology is presented in two parts. Part I includes the information gathered in the first part of the National Symposium: the addresses by guest speakers and the panel sessions involving the delegates. Part II involves the symposium workplans. These were generated by the National Symposium delegates who were divided into workshop groups to develop strategic plans for crime prevention and community safety. The workplans serve as the recommendations emerging from the National Symposium.

FIRST STEP: ADDRESSES AND PANELS (consult Table 5)

Various speakers and panelists at the National Symposium, insisted that Canadian crime prevention strategies be comprehensive. As Table 5 indicates, all three levels of intervention and all three target elements were stressed. Interestingly, fundamental factors related to crime and victimization were acknowledged. These include racism, gender inequality, poverty, etc. The mechanisms to deal with these causal factors effectively were also recognized as part of the
effort to reduce crime and victimization. These involve the reexamination of laws, as well as, social, political and economic reform. In addition, several secondary level interventions, such as early intervention through social development were emphasized. A number of after-the-fact tertiary strategies dealing with both the offender and the victim were also suggested (consult Table 5).

The implementation mechanisms outlined include partnerships based on shared responsibility, cooperation, open communication and compromise, non-partisanship, as well as, federal leadership. The delivery of crime prevention in Canada, as outlined in the addresses and panels, also involves community mobilization. Here local agencies are to assume a leadership role in marshalling public support and the financial and organizational resources necessary to implement prevention policy and programmes (Department of Justice, 1993: 2, 4, 9, 14, 24, 26, 72, 81, 84, 88, 92, 108).

Additional details defining the process through which crime prevention in Canada is to be established involve developing national and international strategies (Department of Justice, 8, 85, 108, 109). Other tactics specified involve public education, the financing of community programmes and environmental scanning (Department of Justice, 1993: 5, 18, 25, 74, 85). An emphasis was also placed on an increase in media accountability in the reporting of crime (Department of Justice, 1993: 44, 50).
TABLE 5

PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COMMUNITY SAFETY AND CRIME PREVENTION: FIRST STEP: ADDRESSES AND PANELS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bridge chasm of racism</th>
<th>Demographic change globalization, economic change, socio-political trends, health, Aboriginal issues, gender inequality, racism, poverty, equality for women: reexamine laws, change attitudes, reexamine our institutions</th>
<th>To achieve the goal of preventing crime, we must address violence against women and children in the context of a reformed social and political framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chronic delinquency, high risk offenders, social development, early intervention, work with boys &amp; men to attack violence against women</td>
<td>Crime prevention involves community safer communities agenda community policing First Nations policing</td>
<td>Precautions for at risk victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase charging treatment and corrections gun control, increase penalties enforcement, legislative reforms deterrence diversion</td>
<td>Community based justice system</td>
<td>Victim services respond to family violence victim protection treatment services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECOND STEP: THE WORKPLANS (consult Table 6)

In the second part of the National Symposium, delegates were divided into twelve workshop groups to develop strategic plans for community safety and crime prevention. The results of these workshops (see Table 6) are consistent with the information found in the addresses and panels. Delegates respected the need for a comprehensive crime prevention approach as all levels of intervention and all target groups were included in the proposed strategy. The participants, through the workplans, recognized several factors related to crime and their solutions at the primary level (boxes 7, 8, 9). These include employment inequity, sexism, racism, etc. At the secondary level, delegates proposed targeting the offender through social development efforts, and attacking the situation through a community driven response (boxes 4, 5). Suggested interventions for the victim at this level include risk management efforts with a particular emphasis on women, children and ethno-cultural minorities.

Table 6 indicates that at the tertiary level, delegates recommended such traditional reactive measures as enhanced police and judicial services, improved sentencing, restraint and punishment where necessary, and criminal law reform (box 1). As
for the victim (box 3), Symposium participants indicated that we need resources to help people, especially victims, get information from the courts and to follow up with the victims (Department of Justice, 1993: 152).

The delivery mechanisms recommended by the National Symposium delegates to make our communities safer are based on local action and require community mobilization, empowerment and participation, as well as partnerships involving all levels of government in strategic alliances (Department of Justice, 1993: 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 130, 148, 155, 156, 160). This is to be achieved through community advisory committees, shared power, responsibilities and ideas, cooperative leadership, and through the support of community services (Department of Justice, 1993: 127, 134, 148, 153, 157, 158, 162).

Other strategies identified involve setting precise goals and objectives for community safety, identifying priorities and adjusting immediate resource allocations accordingly (Department of Justice, 1993: 121, 129, 132). It was also strongly suggested that money be invested immediately and that mechanisms be put in place to ensure accountability (Department of Justice, 1993: 125, 130, 157). In order to deliver resources and structures for crime prevention effectively, delegates also
insisted on training, education and action-oriented research, as well as, consultation with women's groups and victim advocates (Department of Justice, 1993: 122, 134, 146, 157).

The strategic plan is also to include a national crime prevention council as a federal coordinating mechanism in the creation and communication of the crime prevention vision and policy (Department of Justice, 1993: 124, 133, 136, 140, 163).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Child Care Plan</th>
<th>Egalitarian Society</th>
<th>Fear of Crime Related to Equality Issues and Gender Imbalance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-addressing root causes</td>
<td>-revolution from within</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-crime is a symptom of deeper problems: inequality, poverty, sexism, racism, homophobia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Development</th>
<th>Community Driven Response</th>
<th>At Risk to Victimization: Women and Children, Ethno-Cultural Minorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-education</td>
<td>-safer public spaces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-educate parents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-community services</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policing</th>
<th>Community Policing</th>
<th>Victims' Rights for Assistance in Court Proceedings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-community sentencing, weapons control</td>
<td>-restrain dangerous offenders</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
COMMUNITY SAFETY THROUGH CRIME PREVENTION

The third focus of analysis is the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee Report on COMMUNITY SAFETY THROUGH CRIME PREVENTION. This presentation is divided into three parts. The first categorizes the contents of the reports' four chapters detailing the explanations of crime and victimization. The second classifies the recommendations proposed by the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee. The third briefly outlines the recommendations that have been implemented to date.

FIRST STEP: EXPLANATIONS (consult Table 7)

The goal of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee was to contribute to a national strategy designed to increase community safety and the protection of all Canadians from victimization (Ad Hoc, 1993: 2). Its particular mandate was to provide advice on specific proposals for community safety and crime prevention that could guide medium and long term actions (Ad Hoc, 1993: 4).

Within chapters I through IV, the report emphasizes the role of primary level issues such as economic, gender and racial inequality as causal factors of crime and victimization (boxes 7, 8, 9). At the secondary level, the report reinforces the
need to deal with the offender through social development strategies (box 4) and in the community (box 5). Despite the recognition of the broader causal issues related to crime, the report still places a large emphasis on after-the-fact tertiary level interventions. The strategies targeted at the offender involve stricter legislation; as for the victim, they include after care services (boxes 1 and 3, respectively).

The delivery mechanisms proposed by the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee reflect a more detailed comprehensive strategy; they include four steps. In the first step, the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee identifies the problem of crime and victimization as stemming from such primary level issues as inequality, oppression, sexism, injustice, and social and economic disadvantage (Ad Hoc, 1993: 15, 16). In the second step, the goal of crime prevention is to achieve community safety, personal liberty and equality (Ad Hoc, 1993: 13).

The third step, program implementation, is to be achieved through cooperative partnerships between community agencies, the justice system and all levels of government. The purpose of this interaction is to identify local problems and the best practices to deal with them (Ad Hoc, 1993: 3, 13, 17, 19, 25, 27, 40, 42). The Ad Hoc Advisory Committee also insisted that
crime prevention be an ongoing national priority where the federal government takes a leadership role and establishes a national body to coordinate and promote national policy and programmes (Ad Hoc, 1993: 25, 26, 29, 31, 33). This requires reworking the organizational structures of government. The Committee cautions, however, that policy should also come from the bottom up, and not only be dictated from the top down.

In addition, the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee insisted that preventive interventions be given priority in resource allocation so as to enable community safety initiatives (Ad Hoc, 1993: 21, 23, 28, 41). Accountability mechanisms must also be put in place. These should include subjecting government justice programs to audits, and parole board and judicial council decisions to external reviews (Ad Hoc, 1993: 30). Additional delivery mechanisms involve access to information and research findings, adequate training and education for all personnel. A particular emphasis should be placed on domestic violence, race, gender and class relations (Ad Hoc, 1993: 31, 32, 41). The Ad Hoc Advisory Committee also recognizes that the contribution of volunteers is crucial. It suggests that rewarding their participation may help to mobilize and retain them. The committee also suggested that the justice system better respond
to the needs of victims, and improve the conduct of bail hearings and services offered by justices of the peace (Ad Hoc, 1993: 13, 31).

In the fourth step, evaluation, the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee argued that evaluation research is necessary to implement the most appropriate prevention practices. The Committee further emphasizes the need for action research in which community groups are to have power and control in the process of identifying research needs and conducting evaluation research.
**TABLE 7**

**Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee: Explanations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic inequality, social, political &amp; cultural oppression</th>
<th>Challenge federal legislation, policies and practices</th>
<th>Gender inequality, systemic vulnerability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Social development: early investment in children, families</td>
<td>- Reduce opportunity</td>
<td>- Prevent in local communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessible legal aid, responses to crime must reflect public intolerance, dangerous offender procedures, monitored pre-trial diversion, increased gun control sanctions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shelters, victim services, compensation, restitution, legal aid, treat victims with respect</td>
</tr>
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</table>
SECOND STEP: RECOMMENDATIONS (consult Table 8)

The inconsistency in the Standing Committee's Report seemed to have translated into a lack of clear direction for change. The results of the National Symposium, on the other hand, demonstrate a greater consensus among the participants regarding what, and how crime prevention strategies are to be carried out in Canada. As the follow-up document to the National Symposium, the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee Report on *Community Safety through Crime Prevention* produced a clearer picture of how community safety is to be achieved. Table 8 denotes that this report presents a more comprehensive approach to crime prevention. Most intervention levels and target elements are addressed, and much more detail is provided on how the proposed interventions are to be delivered.

However, as indicated in Table 8, there seems to be a greater emphasis on interventions at the secondary level, less at the tertiary level and next to nothing at the primary level. This demonstrates a discrepancy similar to the one found in the Standing Committee's proposals. The Ad Hoc Committee fails to deliver an adequate approach to reducing the primary level issues such as the race, class and gender inequality that it mentioned in earlier stages of the development of this report.
These recommendations are nonetheless consistent with the current popularity of social development and community-based secondary level interventions.

In brief, the delivery process recommended by the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee reflects that outlined in the preceding step (Table 7). It involves empowering communities, cooperative and equal partnerships between all relevant agencies, awareness and accessible information (Ad Hoc, 1993: i, ii, iv, v). The Committee also proposed that the federal government take a leadership role in making community safety a national priority, as well as, in providing the resources necessary to support all stages of the crime prevention initiatives (Ad Hoc, 1993: ii, iii). The government is also expected to take steps to ensure fair and equitable treatment of all Canadians and to foster a culture of non-violence and mutual respect.

Additional strategies recommended include incorporating prevention into all departmental mandates, as well as, establishing interdepartmental steering committees. This is to ensure that safety and prevention are systematically included in the development of legislation, policy and programmes (Ad Hoc, 1993: v). The Committee also recommended the establishment of local, National and International Crime Prevention Councils.
These are to coordinate action research, programme development, recruit and train volunteers. An additional responsibility is to administer the funds received through the proceeds of crime and the 1% allocation from the federal justice and law enforcement budgets over the next five years (Ad Hoc, 1993: iii, v). The Committee also proposed the reform of the justice system to ensure that it becomes more efficient, effective and accountable to all members of the public (Ad Hoc, 1993: i, iii).
<table>
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<th>Recommendations</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>-equity: justice system must respect race, class &amp; gender</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>-Aboriginal self-government</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>-deal with motivation, supports for parents, literacy, education, job training, health care</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>-reduce opportunity</strong></td>
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<td><strong>-Aboriginals involved in community prevention</strong></td>
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<td><strong>-reduce vulnerability to violence</strong></td>
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<td><strong>-corrections: custody, rehabilitation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>-change structure and delivery of policing</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>-victims' needs: crisis centres, shelters</strong></td>
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</table>
THIRD STEP: IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The only recommendation from the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee's report implemented so far is the establishment of the National and International Crime Prevention Councils in the spring of 1994. This particular recommendation was a delivery mechanism thought necessary to achieve community safety through crime prevention. The Ad Hoc Advisory Committee did not, however, provide sufficient detail explaining the process through which these councils are to be put in place. In this light, it would be interesting to examine the results of the implementation of these two councils at a later date.

At this point, no other recommendation, among the thirty-five listed by the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee has been implemented. Similar to the results of the Standing Committee's final report, the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee's progress seems also slow in its advancements.

FINAL REMARKS

The presentation in this chapter demonstrates that despite the consensus among crime prevention policy-makers and practitioners over the need for a comprehensive approach to
community safety, there is relatively little agreement on what this entails and how it should develop. As a result, the development of crime prevention policy in Canada has been uneven.

As Tables 1 through 4 indicate, the Standing Committee's Report was inconsistent and lacked clear direction. Tables 5 and 6 denote a greater consensus among academics, politicians, practitioners and policy-makers at the National Symposium about what should be done and how it should be implemented. Tables 7 and 8 demonstrate, that despite, a few discrepancies, the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee arrived at a more comprehensive approach to community safety through crime prevention. The development of the federal crime prevention policy has advanced over the course of the period between 1992 and 1993.

However, discrepancies still seem to emerge. The proposed strategy involves intervening at the secondary and tertiary levels for the moment, despite the known potential of primary level interventions. In other words, despite the promise of progress, the wheels of change or transformation seem to turn slowly.
V

ASSESSING THE PROGRESS
The period between 1992 and 1993 was marked by a great deal of crime prevention policy activity at the federal level. The endeavours resulted in the release of three documents: *Crime Prevention in Canada: Toward a National Strategy*, the *Proceedings of the National Symposium on Community Safety and Crime Prevention*, and *Community Safety Through Crime Prevention*. The development of these three policy initiatives resulted in certain types of targets and intervention strategies being prioritized. The goal of a "comprehensive" crime prevention policy was translated into specific programmes and practices. The proposed policy development resulted in primary level explanations regarding factors associated with crime and victimization being neglected. The corollary was that the priority shifted to secondary and tertiary level strategies.

The purpose of this chapter is to establish whether or not these proposed crime prevention policy interventions represent a change in social control practices. The goal is to identify whether or not the recommended policy can "transform" current criminal justice activities to the extent that they can achieve community safety in Canada. In an effort to shed some light on the implications of the recommended policy, the subsequent discussion focuses on the location of the planned prevention initiatives within wider patterns of transformations in social control.
THE IMPLICATIONS

Canada's proposed community safety strategy seems to favour developmental and community interventions at the secondary level, especially those focused on the offender or the situation. There is also an emphasis on after-the-fact tertiary measures geared particularly towards the offender and to a lesser extent towards the victim. Although several causal factors were recognized at the primary level, few strategies were proposed to address these broader issues (Department of Justice, 1993: 151).

The following discussion is an analysis of the implications of the strategies recommended by the Standing and Ad Hoc Advisory Committees and by the participants of the National Symposium. This interpretation is based on Stanley Cohen's views on social control. The discussion begins with an investigation of the potential impact of the planned interventions on current organizational arrangements, and on current patterns of deviancy control. In an effort to uncover the extent to which the proposed policy represents a transformation, this discussion also considers the tension between rhetoric and action.
INTENTIONS OF PROGRESS

The fundamental purpose of the recent shift toward prevention, at least in rhetoric, has been the promise of a more effective approach to dealing with crime and victimization. A driving force behind this shift is the empirical demonstration of the current ineffectiveness of the present methods of controlling crime (Standing Committee, 1993: 2). The particular appeal of new ideologies and intervention strategies has led to a vision of progress through dealing with crime proactively in the community.

The promise of prevention to deliver a new approach to dealing with crime, appears, at first glance, to be progress over the existing deviancy control methods. In this sense, if one can assume that reform is motivated by benevolence, altruism and humanitarianism, then a series of consecutive reforms should be viewed as "an incremental story of progress" (Cohen, 1985: 18). For example, the birth of the prison appears to have been a victory in the late eighteenth century over barbaric corporal punishments. This and other reforms may be attributed to changes in social circumstances and advances in knowledge. Nonetheless, whatever the justification, reforms are always seen, at least at the level of rhetoric, as stories of progress and change.
Within the sequence of transformations in the social control industry, incarceration was seen as progress over cruel corporal punishments in the nineteenth century (Cohen, 1985: 13). The reforms that took place at this time were indices of a real transformation. Evidence of change is found in the fact that there was a significant decline in the use of physical punishments. The result was that the prison became the dominant instrument of control (Cohen, 1985: 16).

During the transformation in the mid-twentieth century, community correction alternatives were viewed as progress over the criminal justice system’s focus on the incarceration of offenders (Cohen, 1985: 20, 76). However, evidence of change within this second reform movement is less clear. It was supposed to be a radical attack on the whole concept of imprisonment. The alleged reform was apparently characterized by decarceration, decriminalization, and diversion type changes. Cohen argued, however, that the pattern emerging from this shift into the community is not of change, but of proliferation, diversification, and expansion of the criminal justice system (Cohen, 1985: 83-84). What seemed to have occurred is a case of good intentions translating into disastrous consequences. The result is the delivery of more of the same old thing.
Now, in the late-twentieth century, the proposed crime prevention policy initiatives claim to establish a new and different way of reducing crime and victimization (Ad Hoc, 1993: 1). They appear, in their preliminary stages, as progress over current criminal justice practices, and by implication over most prior reforms. However, evidence of change or transformation within the planned crime prevention policy is unclear.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

The proposed national policy explains the problem of crime at one level: primary, and proposes to deliver a crime prevention approach at another: secondary and tertiary. The result is that the intervention strategies are not consistent with the theoretical justifications from which they derive. In this sense, crime prevention is not quite what it appears to be. The Canadian federal approach to prevention and community safety may be a continuation of the pattern of proliferation, and intensification.

Essentially, the problem is that the federal level initiatives recommend different and apparently new ways of dealing with crime, without breaking away from the old ways of organizing and delivering criminal justice. There is a focus on
both exclusionary and inclusionary modes of social control. "Exclusion" refers to modes of separation, or segregation and isolation; for example, the prison, or other forms of custodial facilities and law enforcement practices (Cohen, 1985: 267). "Inclusion" refers to integration, absorption, or incorporation; for example, programmes that are the result of the shift into the community (Cohen, 1985: 267).

Within the proposed federal policy, projects of exclusion are evident at the tertiary level on the offender (box 1). For example, the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on Community Safety and Crime Prevention insists that the incarceration and the rehabilitation of offenders remain an important aspect of crime prevention measures (Ad Hoc, 1993: iv). Similarly, the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, through recommendations 9, 10, 11, propose legislation and amendments that increase penalties where appropriate (Standing Committee, 1993: 34-35).

In addition, a significant emphasis is placed on projects of inclusion which extend social control into the community and other social spaces. For example, the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General and the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on Community Safety and Crime Prevention recommend
interventions at the community level. These take the form of community based prevention and policing, developmental strategies and interagency cooperation (Standing Committee, 1993: 33; Ad Hoc, 1993: i, ii, iv, v).

Cohen explains the implications of attempting to implement both exclusionary and inclusionary modes of social control; he argues that

*if the use of community control is increasing and if traditional custody is either increasing or only remaining constant, the system overall is getting larger* (Cohen, 1985: 49).

In other words, while inclusionary strategies may be aimed at decreasing the size of the formal control system, there may actually be an expansion of it. This may occur because a new mechanism intended to replace the old system is merely grafted onto the old framework (Cohen, 1985: 43, 98). In turn, it will be difficult to determine where the work of crime prevention in dealing with crime and victimization begins and ends, and under whose jurisdiction it really falls.

Three specific illustrations demonstrate the potential penetration and expansion of the criminal justice system arising from the proposed policy. The three primary institutions that may be penetrated are the family, the school and the community.
Within the federal crime prevention policy, these institutions are the site for both tertiary and secondary level interventions. For the purpose of this discussion, "penetration" refers to a redistribution of penal power into wider social spaces beyond the alleged known space of the criminal justice system (Cohen, 1985: 76).

Within the federally proposed prevention policy, the family is the site of a great deal of "preventive" activity. Based on the notion that the lost functions of the family should be restored, it is both a target and an agent of preventive intervention (Cohen, 1985: 78). The policy initiatives recommend that the family play a key role in the prevention of crime (Standing Committee, 1993: 33). Consequently, the federal policy proposes that in families whose children are "at risk" (potential offenders), parents should be provided the necessary resources required to rear children as law-abiding members of society (box 4). These developmental interventions are geared towards helping families better deal with educational, economic and social disadvantages (Department of Justice, 1993: 145).

Penetration or expansion of the criminal justice system's reach also occurs within the family when the latter becomes a target for intervention. The federal policy recommends domestic
violence prevention activities (box 6), as well as, after care
services for victims of domestic violence (box 3) (Department of
Justice, 1993: 153). The role of the family in prevention,
either as an agent or a target may be beneficial. Nonetheless,
in the proposed policy, the contemporary family has become the
site for expert invasion and penetration. Once the policy is
implemented, there will be an increasing array of guidance,
instruction, therapy, and counselling offered to the family.
These "preventive" strategies extend the reach of interventions
which have traditionally fallen under the jurisdiction of the
criminal justice system (Cohen, 1985: 78). Similarly, penetration of criminal justice activities into the schools may
also occur as a result of the proposed policy. The school will
become an agent of, and a target for preventive interventions.
As an agent, the school will become the site of increased
educational campaigns. Violence (physical and sexual)
prevention is to be made an integral part of the curriculum of
elementary, junior and high schools across Canada (Standing
Committee, 1993: 34; Department of Justice, 1993: 134, 140,146).
The school will also become an agent of prevention based on the
assumption that education (literacy and high school completion)
plays a key role in preventing delinquency (Ad Hoc, 1993: i, iv;
Department of Justice, 1993: 157).
In the proposed federal policy, the school is also a target for preventive interventions. This is based on the claim that the school is a major site where crime, delinquency and violence takes place (Cohen, 1985: 79). The federal initiatives have recommended prevention campaigns within school curriculums to make schools safer from violent activity (Ad Hoc, 1993: i). Within the proposed policy, the school becomes (or remains) an agent of social control, a role traditionally perceived as that of the criminal justice system (Cohen, 1985: 79).

The third institution penetrated is the community. The ideology of reintegration and the strategies of community proposed in the federal policy translate into a relocation of deviancy control (Cohen, 1985: 81). The business of control extends into the space where ordinary people live. Communities are absorbed into crime prevention strategies, both as an agent and a target of intervention.

The community becomes an agent because it is to be the site of local crime prevention projects and community based policing strategies (Department of Justice, 1993: 128, 144; Standing Committee, 1993: 33; Ad Hoc, 1993: iv). The social processes that local strategies activate may prove beneficial to the neighbourhoods themselves by increasing the sense of
"community." However, within the proposed policy, the community seems to become an "untapped human resource for delinquency prevention" (Cohen, 1985: 83). There emerges a growing network of new agencies, or existing ones, taking on prevention as part of their mandate. Here, the penetration may appear less visible because it is difficult to determine the boundaries of social control amongst the various community agencies. Nonetheless, based on the recommendations put forth by the federal policy initiatives, penetration into the community is undeniable.

These examples of penetration seem to be rationalized by appealing to a vision of what real family, school and community looked like in the past, and should look like now (Cohen, 1985: 83). They are but a few examples of the business of extending social control into wider social spaces. To the extent that the proposed policy is implemented, the mandate of prevention will penetrate even further into other agencies such as, housing, immigration, employment, health, etc. Expansion is bound to occur as more and more "agents" and "targets" become absorbed into the business of crime prevention. As a result, the parameters of deviancy control will increasingly extend into wider social, economic and political spaces and are consequently stretch far beyond the boundaries of the criminal justice system (Cohen, 1985: 82).
There is nothing inherently wrong with expanding the system. In fact, a great deal of good has occurred and may continue to occur as a result of the shift into the community and into other social spaces. Both offenders, victims and their families seem to have benefited from various reintegration strategies or after care services. These, however, are still after-the-fact interventions. The problem is that there are limits to their potential to reduce the rates of crime and victimization by extending the role of the current criminal justice system (Standing Committee, 1993: 1). The heart of the problem is that the plans are not entirely new. They are, in many instances, simply new ways of delivering the same old thing. For example, while the stalking law (now implemented as Part VIII of the Criminal Code) represents "new" legislation, it is still a reactive measure that intervenes after the crime or victimization has occurred. Consequently, one is led to question the capacity of the proposed comprehensive approach to bring about genuine reform. Given the example above, implementing "new" strategies or legislation does not necessarily translate into significant changes.

The emphasis on secondary and tertiary measures within the pending federal strategy may translate into other unintended
consequences. Many of the proposed interventions target individual (or potential) offenders, individual (or potential) victims, and particular (or potential) criminogenic situations. According to Cohen, these strategies geared toward specific targets, translate into "the blaming of the victim" (Cohen, 1985: 126). This refers to the notion that the offender may not be completely responsible for his or her deviant behaviour. (S)he may be a "victim" of circumstance. The logic of the argument is that the individual's deviant behaviour is symptomatic of circumstances such as, social and/or economic deprivation (Waller and Weiler, 1985: 18). In trying to change the particular individual or situation, the intervention is merely addressing the symptoms of the crime and not its causes (Cohen, 1985: 126; Department of Justice, 1993: 151).

THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN RHETORIC and ACTION

Throughout history, discrepancies between rhetoric and action have played significant roles in various efforts attempting to bring about change. Within the context of organizations attempting to reproduce order and, in this case, "community safety," the consequences of proposed reforms are
often different from the original intention (Cohen, 1985: 110). This discrepancy or gap between intentions and consequences often emerges during the transition from rhetoric to action.

Countless commissions, committees, and conferences since the inception of the Canadian criminal justice system have recommended various types of structural or ideolological reforms to ensure justice and equality before the law. However, most of these have generated little, if any change. A similar pattern of uneven progress seems to be emerging with the current federal crime prevention initiatives. The likelihood of the proposed policy to be translated into practice is uncertain.

For the purpose of this thesis, "rhetoric" refers to the use of persuasive language to justify changes in the policy and programmes of the criminal justice system. "Action," on the other hand, refers to actual policies and programmes.

The discussion on this issue is divided into two parts. The first examines how the proposed crime prevention initiatives (rhetoric) may be difficult to translate into action (programmes/practices) as a result of implementation difficulties. The second discusses how the rhetoric on crime prevention influences the image of the current policy as an instrument of change.
IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES

In recent years, the rhetoric on crime prevention has been quite extensive. The issue has been on the Canadian agenda for over two decades. This is in large part a result of its promise to deliver a more effective approach to dealing with crime and victimization. However, since very few recommendations have been translated into action to date, the gap between rhetoric and action remains enormous. Cohen argues that this may be due, in part, to the fact that social reality (political/bureaucratic conflicts of interest) resists most attempts at reform (Cohen, 1985: 19). It is questionable whether federal agencies can confront the challenges of overcoming theoretical, political, and bureaucratic resistance to new strategic directions.

When practitioners attempt to put rhetoric into practice, a gap between the two may also arise as a result of organizational difficulties at the design and implementation stage. These may include a lack of efficient and effective cooperation between related agencies, insufficient funding, a lack of qualified staff and volunteers and a lack of organizational resources, etc.

In the case of the initiatives proposed at the federal level, these problems seem all too probable. The presentation
of data in Chapter IV described the recommended process through which the strategies outlined in the corresponding tables were to be implemented. Obviously, some attention was paid to the delivery process. The Ad Hoc Advisory Committee Report certainly provided more detail about delivery mechanisms than the Standing Committee Report and the Proceedings of the National Symposium. However, neither designed the blue print required to implement the proposed methods of prevention efficiently and effectively.

All three reports recommended that implementation be carried out through interagency and interdepartmental cooperation. This partnership-type collaboration is to be the work of all related organizations, such as those responsible for health, employment, and education. However, few details are provided on how to bring these groups together. In addition, there is no consideration of the jurisdictional, ideological and practical compromises that are necessary for these groups to work together towards prevention and community safety. The problem here is that different agencies, departments and community groups may be in conflict because they have different mandates, different funding objectives, and different controls. The coordination and the compromises required to bring these
groups together to work under the mandate of crime prevention and community safety is an enormous challenge. The main obstacles are the extent of the restructuring tasks and the amount of political will and resources required to set the wheels of change in motion.

An additional problem may emerge as a result of conflicting mandates within an interagency approach. Despite the national strategy’s established goal of community safety, there are many ways of delivering the crime prevention mechanisms necessary to achieve it. Different agencies or departments’ own interpretations of crime prevention may translate into a variety of different and even conflicting ways of delivering community safety. There is certainly nothing wrong with having a variety of mechanisms because there are often different needs that have to be met. However, there is no evidence of either a planned or established mechanism that can prevent or reduce the potential of the different implementation strategies from contradicting each other.

Another example of a potential implementation difficulty can be found in community policing. While support for this approach is strong, the three reports do not outline the specific implications of community policing for crime
prevention. Although it is located in a secondary level logic, the basic premise is drawn from a commitment to law enforcement at the tertiary level. Furthermore, the concept of community policing, at least at the level of rhetoric, implies a partnership between the community and the police. The intention is that the community and police work together, in consultation with each other, to identify the crime problems and to establish a solution. However, while the responsibility between the two parties is to be shared, the three Reports fail to establish what resources are needed to initiate, organize and sustain these activities. Consequently, the process through which community policing efforts are to be achieved remains unclear.

Another recommendation pertaining to the implementation process involves prioritizing prevention and reallocating the funds necessary to make an impact. The reports, however, do not specify how the financial resources are to be distributed. There are no criteria to determine from exactly which existing institutions money will be removed, or to precisely which measures it will be reallocated. In addition, guidelines have not been established to determine which specific areas within prevention are to have priority. It is unclear which target element (the offender, the situation, or the victim) will be the
initial focus of prevention efforts. By the same token, although there is a great deal of emphasis placed on both secondary and tertiary level interventions, the proposed policy does not identify how the funding will be distributed between the strategies that fall within these two levels. This lack of clarity is significant because without appropriate and sufficient financial reinforcements, the implementation of prevention in Canada will be difficult.

An additional implementation problem that emerges is within box 5 where the proposed policy promotes community action and target-hardening efforts simultaneously. This plan of action is problematic because the fortress type living required by target-hardening mechanisms may undermine the citizen mobilization required in community crime prevention efforts. For example, if Canadians choose situational measures, such as locked gates and fenced yards, to protect themselves from victimization, then who will participate in the proposed community prevention projects? This discrepancy is but another example of the power of prevention rhetoric. The proposed policy seems to have been approved without consideration of the potential implementation obstacles.
Cohen offers an explanation for this particular situation. He argues that the message of prevention became even more convincing when safer communities could be achieved through target-hardening activities supplemented by "invoking the rhetoric of community... because the ideology of community offered something more palatable" (Cohen, 1985: 214).

In this case, it was not so much the rhetoric of prevention that played such a crucial role. It was more the sense of "community" that made the prevention rhetoric more enticing. However, it is that very same rhetoric that may jeopardize the successful implementation of these efforts because they appear to be in many ways mutually exclusive. In this sense, people may be so taken by the sense of community which appeals to most individuals' sense of security, that they readily accept "community" prevention as the strategy that will ensure their safety. This is not to say that community efforts are not in themselves viable, but under the conditions in which they are promoted at the federal level (in conjunction with target hardening practices), they may fail to achieve their intended goal of community safety.

Within the three federal level documents under review, there are other examples of a lack of specificity, definition
and direction in terms of the process necessary to implement the proposed crime prevention initiatives. Not all can be discussed within the limits of this text. The aforementioned organizational difficulties will more than likely disrupt the efficient delivery of crime prevention and therefore, widen the gap between rhetoric and action. This lack of efficiency will more than likely inhibit the effectiveness of crime prevention strategies in ensuring community safety.

Indeed, the process of translating prevention rhetoric into action in Canada may be hindered by a great many obstacles, especially because the delivery mechanisms outlined either lack sufficient detail or require changes which may be difficult to achieve. The policy makers seem to be aware of what has to be done in order to implement crime prevention in Canada. However, it appears that they are not yet sure of how exactly to go about doing it.

For now, crime prevention in Canada is still at the level of rhetoric. The proposed prevention initiatives are still in their developing stages. Nonetheless, the image of crime prevention, as an instrument of change, endures.
STORY OF CHANGE

So far, this thesis has established that the federally proposed national crime prevention strategy is a limited version of an approach capable of bringing about progressive change. However, despite this recognition, there is still an assumption that these crime prevention initiatives represent a change in direction. Within the proposed policy, "there is an emerging commitment to a new way of [delivering] community safety" in Canada (Ad Hoc, 1993: 1). There is no doubt that some some aspects of the prevention agenda represent new or different strategies that have not yet been tried, at least not to the extent proposed in the federal prevention policy.

Among the "new" prevention strategies or delivery mechanisms, is the National Council on Crime Prevention, as well as, interdepartmental and interagency cooperation in the area of prevention. Very few other recommendations, however, reflect brand new ideas; many are simply different ways of delivering social control. In fact, many strategies, such as enforcement and corrections, which make up a large part of the proposed policy, are mere extensions of the existing criminal justice system. These reactive measures are likely to inhibit the proposed policy's potential as an instrument of real
transformation because they do not constitute a change in
direction. They represent much of the same strategies that have
classified the social control industry since its inception.
However, despite these contradictions, the proposed prevention
policy still seems to evoke thoughts of change. Herein lies the
power of rhetoric.

Cohen explains that while a transformation may not be
really happening, there is a need to create the appearance that
it is happening. Cohen (1985: 89) argues that

*whatever the demands, we will tell stories to justi-
tify and rationalize what we are doing.*

In this sense, the rhetoric on crime prevention may not
necessarily be translated into action, but it at least projects
an appearance of change. In other words, the concept of
prevention becomes an image or a story of change, and not a
change in itself. Cohen explains the power of rhetoric:

*the language which the powerful use to deal with
chronic social problems like crime is very special
in its banality. Invariably, it tries to convey
choice, change, progress and rational decision
making. Even if things stay much the same, social
control talk has to convey a dramatic picture of
breakthroughs, departures, innovations, milestones,
turning points - continually changing strategies
in the war against crime. All social policy talk
has to give the impression of change even if
nothing new is happening at all (Cohen, 1985: 157).*
What emerges from, and is justified by the social control talk is often a series of departmental shuffles where new names are invented, slogans recited, commissions, laws and programmes are announced (Cohen, 1985: 158). This has been the case in much of the recent shift towards crime prevention and community safety. The Departments of Justice and the Solicitor General of Canada have adopted crime prevention as a priority in their agendas. Publicity campaigns on violence prevention have been launched; crime prevention councils have been established; and "new" legislation (Part VIII of the Criminal Code) has passed. While these activities represent the beginning of the implementation process, they may not necessarily translate into community safety due to aforementioned ideological contradictions and implementation difficulties.

As a result, the gap between rhetoric and action within the proposed policy remains quite extensive. The Canadian federal agencies have not, in any significant manner, to date, translated their prevention policy into programme and practice. There is, consequently, no evidence, thus far, indicating that community safety can be achieved through the proposed federal crime prevention policy.
Current social control talk on prevention is trying to give the impression that federal agencies are actually 'walking the walk' (implementing crime prevention strategies). In fact, they have not even completed 'talking the talk;' they are still creating policy. In other words, the federal initiatives on crime prevention are still trapped at the level of rhetoric. Federal departments and agencies have not yet, adequately outlined the details of the delivery mechanisms through which prevention in Canada is to be achieved. Until these are designed, translating the 'talk' (rhetoric) into the 'walk' (action) is unlikely to occur with any degree of success.

Rhetoric, therefore, can never be taken as a literal explanation of what is happening. It is powerful language that guides and justifies apparent policy changes. The federally proposed crime prevention initiatives remain, thus far, a "story" of change, and not a transformation in itself.

**FINAL REMARKS**

The intention of the crime prevention policy proposals developed between 1992 and 1993 was to establish new and different ways of reducing crime and victimization, and
achieving community safety in Canada. The Standing and Ad Hoc Committees, as well as the delegates to the National Symposium attempted to create a policy that could accomplish this goal.

Despite good intentions, the implementation of the proposed strategies may result in certain unintended consequences. The use of both exclusionary and inclusionary or tertiary and secondary measures may result in an expansion of the existing criminal justice system. The findings suggest that current modes of control are likely to penetrate wider social spaces. In addition, due, in part, to potential implementation difficulties, the gap between rhetoric and action is likely to remain extensive.

The danger is that the proposed policy will generate little, if any change. At the moment, the federal initiatives seem trapped at the level of rhetoric. Perhaps it was naive to expect a flawless synchronization of words with deeds (or rhetoric being translated into action). This is especially true given the historical patterns of uneven progress in transformations of social control.

Despite the appearance of change or progress, the proposed federal crime prevention policy may be considered, at best, a step towards the dream of reform.
VI

CONCLUSION
The aim of this thesis was to describe, analyze and locate the current direction of federally proposed crime prevention policy initiatives within patterns of transformation in the social control industry. The purpose was not to advocate a framework, a model or a political line.

The development of the federal crime prevention policy initiatives emerged out of a growing concern about the effects of crime on our communities. The initiatives reflect the results of three key documents: *Crime Prevention in Canada: Toward a National Strategy*, *The Proceedings of the National Symposium on Community Safety and Crime Prevention*, and *Community Safety Through Crime Prevention*.

By classifying the contents of these initiatives within the "Crime Prevention Typology," this thesis has identified the general strategy through which community safety is proposed to be achieved in Canada. The central argument has been that, in translating the goal of a comprehensive approach into specific programmes and practices, primary level strategies were neglected and the priority shifted to secondary and tertiary level interventions targeted especially on the offender, and to a lesser extent on the victim and the situation.
Despite the commitment to establishing a "new" way of reducing crime and victimization, and achieving community safety, the proposed strategy does not fully meet the goal of an innovative crime prevention strategy. The analysis reveals that the emphasis on both inclusionary and exclusionary modes of control does not translate into a genuinely "proactive" crime prevention strategy. While secondary level interventions are, for the most part, proactive, the tertiary strategies, which comprise a large part of the proposed policy, reflect the traditional reactive measures that have characterized the criminal justice system over the last two centuries.

As a result, the recommended policy will probably not result in any significant changes in the social control industry. Mindful of a few "new" ideas, the proposed strategy, at best, will result in different ways of delivering deviancy control. There is only limited potential, within the proposed policy, of significantly reducing crime and victimization in Canada. Since the proposed national strategy seems to have such limited potential, then one might argue that

"a difference that makes no difference is no difference" (William James in Cohen, 1985: 237).

Good intentions underlie the evolving national strategy.
However, secondary and tertiary level interventions, such as developmental and community strategies, and correctional measures cannot eradicate the primary sources of crime and victimization identified in the policy initiatives. Factors such as gender and racial inequality, exploitation and social and economic deprivation are virtually ignored in the concrete recommendations which emerge in the initiatives under analysis. As a result, it is unclear whether the proposed policy can result in a difference in the rates of crime and victimization.

**A TRANSFORMATION IN WAITING...**

The proposed crime prevention initiatives, therefore, do not seem to promise any significant changes in the social control industry. They appear to be an extension of the criminal justice system established in the nineteenth and modified in the mid-twentieth centuries (Cohen, 1985: 13, 57, 83). The result of the current strategy emerging at the federal level threatens to be the delivery of more of the same, rather than a revolutionary transformation.

The analysis established that the emphasis on both inclusionary and exclusionary modes of control translates into
an expansion and penetration of the criminal justice system. This is consistent with the results of the apparent transformation which took place in the mid-twentieth century (Cohen, 1985: 13). The proposed prevention policy is an extension of this second (alleged) transformation; it is characterized not by change, but by uneven progress and disillusionment. It is also an extension of the transformation which took place at the turn of the nineteenth century. The emphasis on tertiary or exclusionary measures reinforces the presence of the dominant instrument of control which emerged in the late eighteenth century: the prison. As a result, the traditional reactive measures, such as law enforcement and punishment, continue to pervade the present day social control system.

The federally proposed crime prevention policy initiatives developed between 1992 and 1993 do not reflect a transformation of social control. It appears that their capacity to change is so limited that they may, at best, be considered piecemeal reforms of the criminal justice system established at the turn of the nineteenth century and expanded in the mid-twentieth century. The federal policy, therefore, becomes part of the patterns of uneven progress in the social control industry. In
addition, since many of the recommendations have not yet been implemented, the proposed crime prevention strategy represents a "limited" transformation in waiting.

AN ALTERNATIVE

The purpose of this thesis is neither projection nor speculation, and it is certainly not to provide a panacea in the form of a crime prevention strategy. This is impossible. Currie argues that, to be effective at preventing crime (1989: 23),

we must place the integrity of the social environment firmly at the top of our political and intellectual agenda and ... we cannot concern ourselves only with the downstream consequences of the systematic abuse and neglect of the social environment; we must be bold enough to look unflinchingly at the source.

The closer crime prevention practices can come to the root causes of crime and victimization, the better the chances of enhancing both the magnitude and the duration of the effects (Rosenbaum, 1988: 384). The promise of prevention requires getting at "structure, power, history and politics - the real stuff of social problems" (Cohen, 1985: 237).
The most crucial option to be considered refers to the definition of crime prevention established in the introduction of this thesis. In this definition, the emphasis was placed on "proactive" or, as the word itself suggests, "pre"vention. A genuine shift away from reactive exclusionary measures to proactive approaches may improve the proposed crime prevention policy's capacity as an authentic vehicle of transformation.

Eradicating or even reducing crime and victimization is a challenge given that there can be no totally valid general solution (Cohen, 1985: 244). Nonetheless, initiatives at the federal level cannot end any attempt to "look unflinchingly at the sources" of crime and victimization. This will require a genuine transformation in the delivery of social control, and not only the projection of change. A failure to do so would result in an extensive injustice against all Canadians.
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