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TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDER

Beatrice D. Lawrence

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology School of Psychology University of Ottawa

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is intended as a contribution to theoretical psychology. It is elaborated from an existential context but also from the perspective of critical-rationalism. It is intended to give formal definition to the existentialist notion that time is central to human existence and to frame a conjecture following the critical-rationalist approach. At the metatheoretical level, we shall elaborate a relatively formalized language in which our hypotheses will be formulated and which will also permit the logic of the predictions and conclusions drawn from the theory to be evaluated without implying a critique of the observed "facts". At the theoretical level, where conjectures are made which permit observable predictions to be drawn, the experience of obsessive-compulsive disorder is conceived of as an attempt to refuse the future. This conjecture is framed in terms of a temporal analysis of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Predictions are expressed in terms which make them open to falsification. On the basis of the analysis of experience which underlies our theoretical conjecture we proffer a classification of psychopathologies, applied in this instance to an understanding of obsessive-compulsive disorder.
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CHAPTER ONE

The Argument and Epistemological Stance

Introduction: This theoretical effort is intended as a contribution to existential theoretical psychology. The fundamental construct in use in existential theoretical psychology is the philosophical notion of existence which, for the purposes of a theoretical psychology, is treated as the hypothesis that subject and world cannot be known apart from each other (van Kaam, 1963/1983). However, a fully-elaborated comprehensive theory of psychology has not yet been realized. Subordinate constructs which will give operational definition to the insights of existential philosophy and phenomenology still need to be developed.

Among the insights awaiting such operational definition is that of the centrality of time to human existence. Heidegger (1988) identified the capacity to be in-relation as fundamental to human existence, that is, to the individual's being-in-the-world. A consequence of this capacity to be in-relation is that the individual, who knows both himself and his world in this fashion, is fundamentally "out beyond himself" (p. 298). Put another way, the capacity to go beyond oneself i.e., to be transcendent, is grounded in the relational aspect of self and world which
Heidegger conceives as being directed both "toward itself" and "out-from-itself" (p. 300). The "bidirectional" character of the individual's relation to himself and his world, when combined with the further insight that the individual is occupied with the possibilities of his being-in-the-world, leads Heidegger (1988, p. 270-271) to identify temporality as the "primary outside-itself" for the sake of which Dasein is.

Formulated as an hypothesis, the insight that time is intimately bound up with the structure of Dasein itself as it relates to itself and world may be expressed as the notion that time is the relation which the individual establishes between various facets of his experience.

This hypothesis in its turn raises the question as to how the individual might accomplish this. Moreover, it demands a "field of application" in which any conjecture as to how this might be accomplished may be tested. The purpose of this theoretical effort is to conjecture how the individual might differentiate his experiential relations and to apply our conjectural understanding to obsessive-compulsive disorder. To make this a critical undertaking, our conjecturing will be conducted along critical-rationalist lines (Popper, 1965; 1968; 1972).

A theoretical endeavour in the positivist notion of science is commonly understood to be the last step in a
series which began with the testing of various hypotheses by observation and experiment. Only when all results are in does one begin to fashion a general theory, drawing upon the remaining tenable hypotheses to do so. From this perspective, the critical scientific activity is observation and experimentation intended to verify an hypothesis.

This approach contrasts with that of critical-rationalism in which the distinctive activity of science is conceived to be the formulation of problems in terms which best suit the question at issue. Suitably formulating a problem in this approach means that, at the metatheoretical level, a relatively formal language is developed which permits a conjecture to be expressed with the least ambiguity possible. At the theoretical level conjectures are conceived which permit observations and predictions to be made. At the empirical level these conjectures are tested. To accommodate this domain, the predictions must be susceptible to refutation.

These three problem domains are inter-related, which implies that one needs to identify the problem domain in which one is working. In this theoretical endeavour our effort is directed primarily at the metatheoretical and theoretical levels.
Statement of Problem: The problem background of this theoretical conjecture implies the articulation of a critical conception of how the individual develops a sense of self. In our context "develops a sense of self" designates the process whereby the individual, taken as the "source of actions" (Luijen, 1965b), differentiates from his experience the notion of himself as subject and object. In other words, in our conception we assume the individual to be a relationship (Nordentoft, 1978) between those elements of experience the individual is putting into relation and the individual himself, understood as a knowing and symbolizing subject.

Against this background, the forthcoming theoretical analysis conjectures how the individual might differentiate, that is, establish a boundary between the experience of himself as subject and the idea of himself as object. Our theoretical discourse makes the assumption that the proper subject matter of psychology is the experiencing subject.

The importance of framing the question in these terms lies in the fact that, generally, speaking, whenever traditional scientific thought has broached the topic of the subject, it has been in terms which represent it as quite ancillary to the object, or else it has been simply to cite "subjectivity" as a synonym for a bias impeding knowledge of the object. In the case of scientific psychology, the
approach has not been notably different. The result of this neglect by both traditional science and scientific psychology has been that subjectivity has been ignored as a domain of investigation.

Yet this outlook is at variance with the evidence of lived experience: One is unable, even deliberately, to exorcise the standpoint of the subject from one's thinking, although one may very well eliminate its mention. In this inescapable standpoint, we are dealing with a "given" of our experience. As such, we are obliged to give it due consideration if we aim not to exclude arbitrarily any dimension of human experience and knowledge from analysis.

For human being, although partaking of both organic and animal spheres of existence, also inhabits a unique, transcendental sphere of existence, in that the individual is capable of abstracting the form of the "self's relation to all outwardness" from the welter of personal experience. Put another way, even though all life appears to manifest a measure of transcendence, in that it can go beyond itself, the fullest expression of this transcendence resides in the individual's unique capacity to reflect upon himself as the subject of his own experience i.e., to appear to his consciousness as the subject of his objectifying activity (Jonas, 1968, pp. 85; 185).
The uniquely human capacity to know oneself reflexively as the source of one's objectifying results in a form of insight (Bohm, 1982) or an abstract conceptual framework (Gorman & Wessman, 1977) by means of which the individual can organise or establish relations between his experiences. The relations thus established we consider to be personal time.

At this point we should digress briefly and point out that we have no primitive experience of time as such (Whitrow, 1980). Indeed, the role of time in our consciousness of phenomena has been debated widely (Whitrow, 1973) and has been conceived of variously. For instance, Jaspers (1964) points out that it has been understood as a sensory or perceptual category which forms patterns of organization which can be known only through the objects which give consciousness its content or, again, as a psychic form which reflects the use the individual makes of it (concretely, his personal attitude toward it) in constructing the historical dimension of his existence. In taking the view that time is a psychic form, Jaspers treats it as a perceptual category peculiar to human existence, organising perceptions but not revealing itself directly. We might express time’s operation in this case by analogy with the operation of Javanese shadow puppets. The puppets, themselves unseen behind a lighted screen, enact a drama
which the audience sees by means of the puppets' shadows cast on the screen. Similarly, time, operating as a psychic form, organises perceptions, but does not reveal itself directly; its organisation of perceptions, however, is reflected in the historical dimension of the individual's existence.

There are a number of different ideas about time. For example, in one case, it is considered to be one of the forms of our intuition (Kant in Whitrow, 1980). At the opposite end of the spectrum is the notion that time is a concept arising as a consequence of our experience with the world rather than as the result of the functioning of an a priori principle (Guyau in Whitrow, 1980; Voyat, 1977; Riegel, 1977). Other notions about time treat it as the ultimate sense of the individual taken as Dasein (Richardson, 1963); the original self-projection (Heidegger, 1980); the equivalent of consciousness (Nordentoft, 1978) and as an abstract conceptual framework acquired through experience and construction (Gorman & Wessman, 1977).

The present conception of time, as the set of relations expressing differentiations among various facets of an individual's experience of his existence, can apply to either a normal or a neurotic person. The advantage of this conception is that symptom-formation and psychopathology reflect more the individual's attempt to cope with arbitrary
changes occurring in the process of differentiating his existence than the unhappy consequences of the operation of other, more fundamental causes (e.g., instinctual impulses, developmental arrests or fixations).

The implication of this theoretical conception of time is that it implies no dissociation between the individual as subject and time taken as the object of experience. Instead, the individual is conceived as a knowing, experiencing subject who establishes as series of subject-object complementaries among various of his experiences. In this respect, the individual is imagined as being a "tension" which (who) unites various personal experiences. That tension is personal time.

This, then, is the conceptual background against which our theoretical endeavour is undertaken. Having stated the hypothesis that time is a relation which the individual establishes between various facets of his experience, we shall begin by developing at the metatheoretical level a "formal language" which will express in rigorous terms the architecture of the experiential relations we conjecture the individual must establish.

Using the language of the metatheory, we shall formulate a specific conjecture at the theoretical level. The metatheory, by providing us with a formal language, permits us to talk relatively unambiguously about the
characteristics of time. Yet, whatever the architecture of our formal language, it must frame a conjecture at the theoretical level which is sufficiently encompassing as to embrace the particular instances of a phenomenon and at the same time specific enough to be refutable. Moreover, since our subject matter is human being, our metatheoretical terms must be grounded in experience. That is, the ultimate basis for evaluating the "goodness of fit" of a construct in existential psychology is whether it is grounded in the unitary experience of behaviour.

The empirical context or field of application of the metatheory and theoretical conjecture will be the problem of obsessive-compulsive disorder. We shall be asking how such an individual establishes relations among aspects of his experience. From our theoretical conjecture, we shall derive testable predictions, formulated in refutable terms, which will serve as the basis for the formulation of some therapeutic implications.

The focus of this theoretical endeavour is primarily the metatheoretical and theoretical domain of inquiry. Nonetheless, we take account of the empirical domain by framing our predictions such that they are susceptible to refutation. Then, should the predictions derived from our theoretical conjecture (which have been framed in terms derived from our formal metatheoretical language) survive
tests of falsification, we shall have further confidence that the relationships which we have defined formally do hold. Accordingly, following Popper (in Schilpp, 1974), the critical activity in our endeavour will be the formulation of a conjecture as to how the subject as subject differentiates among his experiences. The empirical context for this theoretical conjecture is obsessive-compulsive disorder.

Intellectual Background of Our Epistemological Stance:
The rationale for the critical-rationalist approach lies in Popper's (1968) belief that Hume had found a logical flaw in the inductive method: In the move extending particular statements to universal ones, universal statements, in the final analysis, always are founded upon individual experience. This implies that we are not entitled to make statements averring the certainty of how things are since we may not have encountered, thus far, an instance which runs contrary to our experience.

To Popper (in Schilpp, 1974), Hume's insight indicted the search for certainty and precision as scientific ideals in themselves and made it necessary that we come to terms with the fact that we shall never know how things "really" are. Popper advocates that, in consequence of this, we instead should grapple with how best to formulate a problem.
Considered from this perspective, his insistence on the refutability of hypotheses and theories reflects an attempt to integrate the empirical testing of theoretical predictions into the more general activity of problem formulation.

Moreover, Popper (1972) views all languages as being "theory-impregnated". Not only does language express a culturally-conditioned point of view but that point of view, once expressed, continues to shape our perceptions and intuitions autonomously, so to speak. Consequently, the only way in which a theory can be truly objective, in Popper's view, is for it to be strictly formulated. Only then is it susceptible to critical discussion and possible refutation.

The formalization of a theory in Popperian terms is a particular undertaking which demands that theoretical assertions be formed in terms as unambiguous as possible. A theory formalized in this sense draws upon a higher-order, semantical "metalanguage" which encompasses the semantics of an "object language". This hierarchical arrangement of theoretical levels has an important consequence: By virtue of the metalanguage, we can talk about the consistency of our observation language. This is something which otherwise we could not have done because the consistency of a language cannot be criticized in terms of that language since the
logic of that language lies outside it (Popper, 1965; 1972). Distinguishing between a metalanguage and an observation language underscores the distinction between a theory and the facts which it describes. This in turn makes it easier to examine how well the theory accounts for facts in the "real world", without implying any criticism of the "reality" of the facts observed.

Finally, the existence of a metalanguage implies an awareness that language is itself an essential part of the scientific enterprise; it must be used precisely because it is the "indispensable medium of critical discussion (Popper, 1972, p. 136).

Given that we are ignorant as to what is the "real" state of the world and that our theories give no picture of how the world "really is" (Barbour, 1971; Bohm, 1982; Popper, 1972), we must exact from theories a high degree of truthlikeness or verisimilitude (Popper, 1972). To achieve this verisimilitude our theories must be rich in content and simple in formulation; must advance interesting and important solutions to problems; and be able to survive tests designed to refute them (Popper, 1965, 1972). Based on these criteria one may begin to see, even before a theory has been tested, that one theory is more encompassing than another if it can correct a competing theory either by outright contradiction or by rivalling or expanding its
explanatory power (Popper, 1965; 1972; in Schilpp, 1974).

From the foregoing, it will be clear that the critical-rationalist approach is at variance with the positivist approach to science. Consequently, we shall take up some of the objections which are frequently voiced about critical-rationalism.

It is a canon of positivist science that the formulation of anything like a theoretical conjecture at the outset of one's endeavour irreversibly biases one's subsequent treatment of a phenomenon. Medawar (in Schilpp, 1974) notes that everyone anticipates what is to be empirically established or rejected. The conjecture cannot be avoided. Moreover, an objection against theoretical conjecturing overlooks the fact that we already possess an unexchangeable bias in the form of our common, every-day language, which is a culturally-conditioned interpretation of experience. Together with personal philosophies and shared notions about our world, language shapes our perceptions and thus the form in which problems present themselves to us (Popper in Schilpp, 1974).

Another criticism of this approach suggests that critical-rationalism, through its conjectural theorizing, does not sufficiently demarcate science, which is based on observation, and pseudoscience, which is based on speculation. Indeed, it is objected, it very nearly puts
pseudoscience on a par with science.

Popper (1965) points to the criterion of the refutability of a theory as a means of distinguishing science from pseudoscience. Predictions derived from a theory must be put in terms which can be refuted. Then, if some of the predictions (or even the entire theory) is rejected in the course of empirical testing, we may be assured that our theory is not an entirely arbitrary construction i.e., it says something about the world which can then be tested. Refutability of theories, Popper maintains, is adequate to assess the efficacy of both our problem formulation and our experiments.

Another aspect of this objection is that metaphysics should be excluded from scientific language. This, Popper (1965) maintains is not possible since many of the words we use in setting forth our observations or our hypotheses are themselves universals. (An example of a universal is the word "fruit"; talking about apples we imply fruit which is a category encompassing more than simply apples.) As a result, our theories will always say much more than what is merely testable (Popper, 1965).

The foregoing criticisms and objections basically comprise a defense of induction and the method of confirmation of hypotheses against Popper's critique (1972) that they are deficient ways of gathering knowledge. A
critique of another sort comes from Goodman (1983) who recasts the problem of induction into the problem of how best to determine which hypotheses are confirmed by any given piece of evidence.

Taking it for granted that we make numerous, spontaneous predictions, which are gradually modified or abandoned on the basis of experience, Goodman (1983) sees us as being faced with the problem of how best to sort valid from invalid predictions once we have eliminated obviously disconfirmed or unconfirmable hypotheses. Expanding our pool of hypotheses by the addition of other, often conflicting and as yet "unprojected" (i.e., unconfirmed) hypotheses, he suggests that, in making our selection, we do refer to the rivals' records of past confirmations (or projections). However, in contrast to induction, this is not the only useful criterion to determine the most adequate hypothesis: Not only are the recurrent features of experience to which any particular projection applies of significance to us, but so also are the "recurrences" we identify in the set of terms which are used to record observations (Goodman, 1983, p. 96).

By means of this latter criterion, Goodman accords a place to the role of language in shaping our perceptions of what are the recurrent features in our experience and develops from it the notion of the "entrenchment" of
projective predicates. That is, the recurrent features of experience, as encompassed by valid projections, are distinguished as being those features for which we habitually have adopted predicates. In other words, not only does a term become entrenched through its projective power, but it also becomes entrenched through the vagaries of language. This is an important point because, in Goodman’s view, it forms the basis on which we can eliminate some competing hypotheses, even before any particular hypothesis has been disconfirmed. Put another way, a new predicate needs, first of all, to become an habitually adopted predicate to “be in the running” as a contending hypothesis (or, as in our case, theory).

The implication of Goodman’s (1983) notion for our theoretical tentative is twofold: First, Goodman’s view of the reciprocal action of language and perceptions accords with Popper’s notion that language is “theory-impregnated” and, in this respect, lends support to Popper’s demand that we formalize our theories in order to select the most adequate theory.

Second, we may consider our theory as being all the stronger if, following Goodman’s criteria, some of the predicates it employs become “entrenched” i.e., are habitually used to described recurring features of experience. In other words, if the view we can generate
from our theoretical window is a good one, then that window ought to become an often-frequented i.e., entrenched, vantage point. In this sense, Goodman's condition concretely expands upon one of the Popperian hallmarks of a "better" theory (i.e., its virtual explanatory power) by stating what constitutes an enhancement of a theory's explanatory vigour.

Criteria of Rigour Used in This Theoretical Endeavour:

Following the critical-rationalist approach, we shall focus on the identification and articulation of a problem which we shall develop in the form of a deductive theoretical system.

The first criterion of rigour of our theory will be the internal consistency of the arguments which comprise its metatheory and theory. That is to say, we intend to avoid contradiction within and between these two levels of discourse.

Next, we shall assess the "boldness" of our theory. We shall expect our theory to expand upon another theory or some aspect of it.

Finally, we shall look to the conclusions drawn from the theoretical conjecture. To make our discourse amenable to translation into the empirical domain of discourse, our conclusions must be framed in terms which allow for refutation and there must be no contradictions among
predictions.

Thus, the criteria which will bear upon this theoretical endeavour are the internal consistency of our argument; the boldness of its formulations; and its power to account for particular phenomena.

**Application:** Based on our theoretical conjecture, a broad categorization of psychopathology, founded on experiential and abstract relations which the individual posits on the basis of his own experience, will be developed. It will include some of the constructs developed in our metatheory. This categorization of pathology is intended to be applicable to psychopathologies other than obsessive-compulsive disorder which, in this case, functions as the "field of application" for our conjectural discourse.

**Outline of Following Chapters:** Chapter 2 outlines the existentialist critique of Freudian conceptions of human being and psychopathology and as an existentialist critique outlines the general conceptual background to our problem. Chapter 3 is an overview of the current conceptions of obsessive compulsive disorder. Chapters 4 and 5 are the metatheory and theoretical conjectures respectively of this theory. The predictions derived from this theory are stated in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7 the classification of
pathologies based on the Me/not-Me complementary is presented. Chapter 8 presents the therapeutic implications of this conjecture and our conclusions.
CHAPTER TWO

Existentialist Critique of Freud

Introduction: In this chapter we outline some of the existentialist criticisms of Freudian psychoanalytic theory. We shall focus on Binswanger, Boss and May because their criticisms aim to preserve the human dimension in the psychoanalytic theoretical conception and because their existentialist critique figures against the philosophical background from which eventually must be drawn those subordinate constructs which will contribute to the development of a comprehensive theory of psychology.

Freud's theory represents the synthesis of a variety of streams of thought into a single theory of psychological functioning and, even today, is one of psychology's most thoroughly elaborated theories of mental functioning. Its conceptual starting point is with the neuroses rather than normality and Freud's model of mental functioning reflects this orientation, focusing as it does on the dynamic, intrapsychic, conflictual character of psychic activity. Consequently, the account Freud gives of the individual is analytical. Presently, we stand in need of a psychological theory which will do justice to the unitary character of experience, since neither the individual nor his experience
can be adequately understood as the sum of elemental parts. However, before undertaking an examination of this critique, we shall present a brief discussion of the intellectual background of existentialism.

*Foundations of Existentialism*: Kierkegaard, Kant and Nietzsche each articulated themes later taken up by modern-day existentialists. Kierkegaard's central concern was discovering how one becomes an individual (May, 1958) i.e., responsibly self-aware (Nordentoft, 1978). His conception of truth-as-relationship put the lie to the notion that science could discover truths completely objective and independent of the individual. For psychology, this implied that subjective reality no longer had the status of a confounding bias which affected one's investigations. Now the subjectively true could be treated as being genuinely so, even if it contradicted so-called objective fact (May, 1958).

Kant anticipated existentialism in that his ideas about the constitutive functioning of understanding were a stimulus to Heidegger's analysis of Being. Kant himself taught that the mind, being neither wholly detached from nor entirely a passive subject of nature, is able of itself to give us knowledge about nature (Needleman, 1968). Put another way, mind is free to invent causal series.
Moreover, mind is also free to be subject to the obligation it has created for itself. In this perspective, moral or ethical will also finds its principles within itself, with the consequence that concepts of good and evil now essentially refer to the will. In this conception, will acts in respect to impulse and desire as understanding does to sensory input, i.e., will gives form to impulse and desire (Olafson, 1967).

The general structure mind imposes on what it knows forms the basis for experience. This implies that the knowledge we may have about nature is conditioned by how sense impressions are organized by mind. Thus, the idea that we can attain knowledge of "things-in-themselves" is mistaken.

However, as both Needleman (1968) and Olafson (1967) point out, Kant would not be justified in claiming that mind does make synthetic a priori judgments about objects of knowledge. Rather, as Needleman specifically points out, Kant makes the assumption that mind is constitutive with the result that he introduces a new perspective on the nature of experience. The implication of this conception of mind with respect to the exercise of choice was that the criterion for the rightness of an action became the will's realizing its own volitional nature (Olafson, 1967).
Nietzsche's contribution to existentialism was his idea that our evaluative interpretations of the world give it its character of being free or determined. Specifically, Nietzsche believed that we impose our ideas and our beliefs upon our experience of the world. Moreover, he believed that a true morality would be less concerned with regulating personal compatibilities than with the creation and realization of ways of living which would exact from the individual's choices an expression of what he is (Olafson, 1967). He maintained that we are free to lose our human values and, along with them, the sense of our own being, despite the fact that the central existential thrust of life is to realize the possibilities of one's life. In May's (1958) view, Nietzsche's beliefs laid the groundwork for existential psychotherapy's definition of neurosis as being that which interferes with the individual's capacity to realize his being.

We include Heidegger in this outline of intellectual influences on existentialism because his existential-phenomenological investigations proposed for consideration the philosophical basis for a new understanding of human being while situating this discourse against the background of Kantian thought (Olafson, 1967). In these investigations Heidegger (1988) identified four ways in which the individual differentiates or specifies his existence: as a
being who differentiates or distinguishes himself from others; who articulates his personal being into a way-of-being; who, without weakening the unity of his own existence can articulate his existence into multiple ways-of-being; and, finally, who reveals himself as being by means of a particular theatre of existence, i.e., the temporal mode of existing.

These insights require further integration into psychology. In this light, our theoretical effort addresses the latter insight; that is, the means by which the individual specifies his existence in the temporal modality.

Heidegger expressed the fundamental structure of human existence as being-in-the-world, intending thereby to articulate an essential condition which would determine existence in general (Binswanger, 1962; 1958). Van Kaam (1961/1983) points out that the central hypothetical construct in existential psychology, framed as the hypothesis that subject and world cannot be thought of as separate from one another, derives from the notion of existence.

Being-in-the-world is thus antecedent to all other modes of being or experiences which the individual may have. Care and its components (called the existentials) signify the modes by which Dasein may relate to the world. According to Needleman (1968), the existentials function for
Heidegger in a manner analogous to the manner in which Kant imagined the categories of understanding to operate with respect to the object we know. The existential a priori(s) are universals or forms which give meaning to our experience. If there is any law, so to speak, of human being it is that it is in the nature of the individual to constitute his own world (Binswanger in Needleman, 1968). In other words, the individual constitutes the being of world and self through his capacity to endow his experience with meaning.

The Existentialist Critique of Freud: Having given a brief outline of some of the major ideas which undergird existentialist thought, we turn to the specific existentialist criticisms of psychoanalytic theory.

There appears to be a diversity of opinion among these critics as to the central point their critique should address.

In May's (1958) view, the central question animating the existential critique of psychology is whether the clinician sees the patient as he really is, or whether he sees the patient predominantly in terms of his theories. From the perspective of the present writer, seeing the individual in terms of our theories about him is unavoidable. However, the tendency to confuse our theory
about the individual with "reality" can be somewhat
counterbalanced if we treat the efforts undertaken at the
empirical level as attempts to critically test theoretical
conjectures.

Turning from the question of whether theories occlude
our understanding of the patient, we note that another
prominent focus of existentialist criticism is the theory of
human being which psychoanalysis presupposes.

Boss (1963) maintains that Heidegger and Freud are
basically talking about the same phenomena with the
difference that Freud discusses his experience of human
being from the basis of an uncritical everyday experience,
while Heidegger speaks more rigorously about his experience.
That is, Freud speaks from the perspective of "common-sense"
axioms (Carini, 1983) while Heidegger subjects his own
experience to a critical analysis, seeking to discern in the
particular experience of human being what is generalizable.

However, both Boss and Binswanger criticize Freud when
he turns from a consideration of psychoanalysis as a therapy
to a consideration of psychoanalysis as a psychological
theory framed as a natural science.

Binswanger criticizes the notion of systematic
explanation as it is applied in psychoanalysis. Needleman
(1968), in his extended commentary on Binswanger's writings,
notes that there is a difference between understanding and
explanation and, further, that systematic philosophic explanation must achieve a balance between the reductive and the naive, uncritical tendency in explanation. The ideal would be to keep unaltered what is to be explained while simultaneously reducing it to that with which we are already familiar. Put another way: the goal is, ideally, to understand an entity by leaving aside all interpretations. This, Needleman contrasts with explaining an entity by subsuming the phenomena under laws which reduce the phenomena to its "more real", constituent parts. The willingness to see structures emerging from the side of the phenomenon, when applied to an understanding of the individual, implies an openness to the meaning of an experience for the individual.

Despite the penetration of Needleman's analysis, it would still appear that one cannot help but make interpretations or theories about phenomena. Perhaps more precisely the goal should be to ensure that the theorizing activity is carried on within the context of some limits, which we would identify in the criterion for making theories refutable.

Needleman goes on to point out that in accepting uncritically the natural science framework, psychoanalysis runs the risk of trying to investigate a subject which is of the same order as the subject which undertakes the
investigation. Whereas individual pieces of scientific data may be meaningless until connected to other data by means of a conceptual scheme, in psychology, each datum of experience already has its own meaning to the human being who experiences them. Being consistent with the logic of the natural science framework of explanation, means that psychoanalysis must exclude from direct experience of consciousness a large part of the psychic processes. These excluded processes now constitute the "unconscious" which, Needleman points out, is really only another way of talking about the meaning the subject’s experiences have for him. So considered, the individual’s meanings apparently no longer pose a difficulty to treat or observe according to the scientific method.

Implied in this whole analysis of meaning into "unconscious" is the more fundamental assumption that psychic phenomena are reducible to their instinctual components. Needleman makes the further point that intentionality, while still kept "in the picture", is located in the instincts with the consequence that intentionality becomes "agent-less" and the fundamental intentional act becomes an unconscious one. Thus, Freudian psychoanalysis preserves meaning but not meaning-to-a-self (Needleman, 1968).
Bass (1963) criticizes Freud for having let his insight into the historical perspective of a patient's problems fall into relative theoretical neglect. By postulating unconscious processes that were more important than the individual's immediate experience, Bass maintains that Freud lost a theoretical understanding of the subject as the creator of meaningful connections between his experiences.

Binswanger (1968) sees Freud as having truly formulated a theory of *homo natura* and identifies his real contribution as a theoretical one: He produced a mechanistic account of mental functioning. The consequence of formulating his theory in these terms was that the identity sought beneath the differences was narrowed down to one kind of meaning, the wish, with the result that psychological facts became symptoms. These, rather than the individual understood as meaning-giver, then became the reference criterion. Binswanger's appraisal of Freud's genius as a theoretician accords with that of Sulloway (1983) and Izenberg (1976).

Needleman's (1968) own view is that psychoanalysis succeeded in drawing the mean between over-reduction and non-reduction but at the expense of making the instincts into intentional acts without an agent and by disallowing meaning for an individual self. Values became "vicissitudes of the instincts" and it is the instincts which express the real purpose of a person's life. Other values independent
of instinctual values cannot be introduced. Thus, in setting a standard of normality, psychoanalysis can only address the way in which mind as a whole gratifies itself, and not the purpose on account of which mind strives. In our view, to introduce a subjectless "agent" into one's theory does not constitute achieving a balance between over- and non-reduction.

Binswanger (1968) further opposes Freud's reductionistic conception on the grounds that such an account fails to do justice to the experiential phenomena which express the meaning of what is symbolized. He holds that Freud's idea of human being as homo natura is an idea taken from natural science which, consequently, has reduced the various aspects of Man's being to the level of general needs which in turn have a certain psychic significance. Rather than say that something which is unconscious is an entity existing somewhere in the mind, Binswanger would prefer to describe something that is unconscious in terms of the world-relations of the individual. This new understanding of human being, he maintains, should be formulated in terms of a phenomenological investigation of the total articulation of the individual's relation to self and world (Binswanger, 1962).

In the light of the individual's capacity to be in-relation, what is characteristic of the individual is the
tendency to move toward something, to continually go beyond himself. This notion is vitally important for a theory of human being because it obviates the classic Cartesian split between subject and object in the world. Moreover, being-in-the-world always implies having a world and sharing it with others (Binswanger, 1958). In saying that the basic constitution of an individual is his being-in-the-world, we also mean that the basic structure of his existence is to be transcendent. That is, not only do we participate in an objective, commonly-shared world, but we cannot be known by others or, indeed, know ourselves apart from our world. In other words, we are fundamentally relational beings. Given our capacity to be transcendent, we can go beyond the "world" we have created and elaborate our subjecthood. This implies that being a subject implies being subject to change.

The concept of being-in-the-world presents psychology with a shift of emphasis. The new conception of psychopathology, as a specific mode of transcendence reflecting modifications in the structure of the individual's being-in-the-world, facilitates an understanding of mental disorder as an expression of disturbances in the attitude and manner in which the individual lives out his capacity to be in-relation. This conception of mental disorder, in Binswanger's (1968; 1958)
view, comes closest to circumscribing fundamental psychic disturbances.

Extending the existentialist critique beyond that applicable to psychoanalytic theory, Boss (1962) notes that none of the modern anthropological theories have adequately answered the fundamental question of what would have to be the nature of a psyche which perceives and forms relations. He maintains that Heidegger’s Daseinsanalysis provides this foundation by articulating what, for most of us, is our everyday experience of being. According to Boss, Daseinsanalysis, in its critical investigation of the experience of human being, found that we exist only in and as our relations to others and the objects in our world. Therefore, human being must have an intrinsic understanding of being which is the prerequisite for being personally affected by something. As a consequence of this primordial awareness of being, Dasein is open to the world not only in respect of concrete objects but also in respect of relations with others. Moreover, this primordial awareness entitles the individual to view himself as the being who should care for his fellows in such a way that they achieve their full possibility for being.

While Boss (in Needleman, 1968) differs with Binswanger on the issue of whether neurosis and psychosis should be conceived of as modifications in the essential structure of
the Dasein (Boss maintaining that the essential structure of
the Dasein is not modifiable), he, too, gives strong
emphasis to the conception of the individual as meaning-
giver. Boss (1963) maintains that as long as we do not
understand the essential nature of human being as being
meaning-endowing/meaning-disclosing, then we are not able to
grasp how an individual can identify another as an
individual like himself, let alone consider how an
individual develops interpersonal relationships. In Boss's
view, the essence or essential structure of human being is
the possibilities for being.

Conclusion: The major existentialist criticism of
Freud's theory of human being is that, in striving to
situate his theory within the framework of natural science,
he has failed to treat people as emerging or becoming
through realizing possible ways of being within the context
of their lived experience.

The existentialist alternative to the natural science
conception of psychic malfunction is to recast
psychopathology as a particular deviation in the structure
of the individual's existence, rather than as a variety of
mental disease.

In so framing their alternative to Freud's theoretical
psychology, existentialists have undercut the traditional
dichotomy between self and object and replaced it with an understanding of self and world which represents them as a unitary, structural whole. "World" is thus the set of meaningful relationships which an individual creates and in which he exists. Consequently, to know another, we must seek to know him within the context of his own world, his own set of meanings. This complex of meaningful relations, this world, is not static any more than is the individual himself.

This reformulation side-steps arguments about specific psychical dynamics or mechanisms and permits an analysis of the underlying assumptions about human nature to be undertaken (May, 1958).

Thus, where Freud located the "mystery of life" in the instincts, Binswanger (1958; 1952) relocated it in the individual, considered as the creator of the network of meaning which shapes his world. Given his fundamental capacity to be "in-relation", the individual can stand somewhat apart from himself and reflect upon his being and his actions. The central context in terms of which the individual endows his reflections with meaning is temporal, with the future being the temporal domain proper to human being.

The existentialists value lived experience as a realm of investigation. One of the characteristics they attribute
to human existence is that it is Being-in-the-world. Being itself is considered irreducible to any other "more real" constituents. Human existence, being, is the sphere of potentiality, of becoming, of being in-relation vis-a-vis oneself and world.

Among the areas of existentialist investigation are the three modes of world which characterize us as being-in-the-world: time, transcendance and love (May, 1958). Of these, the treatment of time concerns us because of Heidegger’s insight into the centrality of time to human existence. Moreover, the concept of time is widely recognized to be a central feature in the organization of mental functioning (Piaget, 1981; Meerlo, 1981; Wessman & Gorman, 1977; Whitrow, 1973; Dubois, 1954). Indeed, a notion of time is so central to our psychology that it has been called "the essence of mind and personality alike." (Mowrer quoted in May, 1958, p. 66). Given the foregoing, the question naturally arises whether we might not profit from analysing a psychopathological manifestation in temporal terms.

We have already established the hypothesis that time is the relation the individual establishes between facets of his experience. Now we must turn to a discussion of the psychopathology which will act as the field of application for the conjectures concerning the temporal relationships we shall later elaborate in Chapter 4. Thus, in the next
chapter we shall present an overview of the current conceptions of obsessive-compulsive disorder prior to offering our own conjecture as to how the individual differentiates aspects of his experience.
CHAPTER THREE

Various Conceptions of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder

Freudian Conception: In The Defence Neuro-Psychoses (1894) Freud stated that hysteria, obsessions and certain acute hallucinatory confusions all shared in common the fact that they were attempts to repress an idea that was incompatible with the individual's ego. The factor which distinguished among these neuroses was the means by which the individual tried to resolve the clash between disturbing idea and troubled ego. The obsessional, "lacking the capacity for conversion", separates the idea from its accompanying affect with the result that the idea remains in the conscious mind while the affect, which has been isolated in the unconscious, is free to become displaced onto other, neutral ideas.

Freud's theory of childhood sexual seduction provided the initial conceptual frame for his understanding of how the obsessive-compulsive dealt with the conflict between impulse and ego. In the aetiology of obsessional neurosis Freud (1895) identified sexual acts which the child initiated and in which he took pleasure. He also identified a substratum of hysterical symptoms in obsessional neurosis which he related to an even earlier pleasurable sexual
experience in which the child played a passive role. Thus, he considered obsessions to be transformed self-reproaches emerging from repression. Later, Freud (1909) identified hostility toward someone whom the individual loves as being the impulse which the obsessive attempts to repress.

Initially, Freud (1895) thought that the reason the idea was substituted by another, less painful one was due to a kind of mental predisposition to substitute as a defensive reaction against painful ideas. By 1896 he had changed his mind that substitution was due to a predisposition and appealed to the idea the symptoms arise because they are the effect of an infantile trauma. However, what made the experience traumatic for the person was the memory which, at puberty, was reawakened at the unconscious level. The affect surrounding the reawakened memory is repressed.

Freud identified a natural history of obsessional neurosis, marking four stages: that of "childhood immorality" in which the child has a sexual experience which later gives rise to the neurosis. In the next stage, that of "sexual maturity", the child represses the memories of the experience without self-reproach. In the third period, that of "apparent health" symptoms of conscientiousness, shame and self-distrust take over. In the final stage, "illness", the repressed memories return in a "compromise-formation" of obsessive idea and affect which takes the
place of the real, repressed memory.

Freud identified two forms of obsessional neurosis depending on whether it was the memory or the reproachful affect which forced itself into consciousness. Typical cases of obsessional ideas are due to the memory breaking into consciousness and the sense of affect being rather indefinite. In the other form the affect of reproach can change into any other unpleasant emotion, thereby gaining access to consciousness.

Compromise-symptoms signify the return of a repressed impulse and thus a collapse of the "primary" defense of isolation and repression. In response to this threat, the individual's ego will engage in a further, "secondary" set of defenses (e.g., undoing, reaction formation and displacement) which are protective measures meant to resist the traces of the repressed memory (Nagera, 1976). If these work, Freud (1896) felt that the compulsion would be transferred to the protective measures themselves, creating a third form of obsessional neurosis - that of obsessive actions. Some examples of a secondary defence against obsessional ideas are obsessional brooding or thinking, a compulsion to test things or a mania of doubting. Nagera (1976) reports that undoing and isolation appear to contribute more to the formation of clinical symptoms, while reaction formation results more in the formation of
character traits.

Freud (1909) described a certain "hybrid" of rational and pathological thinking which appears if the obsessional idea breaks fully into the individual's consciousness. In such instances the obsessive individual blends ideas which accept certain premises of the obsessional idea with his normal, unimpaired thinking in an attempt to exclude from consciousness any awareness of the repressed emotion.

In "Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defense", Freud (1896) originally defined obsessional ideas as self-reproaches referring to the pleasure the individual took in his own childhood sexual seduction. Later, when discussing the case of the Rat Man (1909), he expanded his notion of what comprised obsessional neurosis (i.e., images, ideas and actions) to include wishes and temptations.

When an individual performs obsessional acts, it is with the intention of protecting himself against obsessional affects and ideas (Freud, 1909). The obsessional ideas are fundamentally self-reproaches sparked by the individual's repressed sexual enjoyment. Usually the obsessional acts occur in two successive steps, the second step neutralizing the first. While the compulsive acts initially may be quite remote from anything sexual, their final form is often very imitative of the repressed sexual act (Freud, 1912). If these acts successfully help to repress the symptoms of the
repressed material, then the obsession is transferred to the protective measures themselves, resulting in obsessional actions. A secondary defence against obsessional affects may be achieved by recourse to a wide group of protective obsessional acts which can be either penitential or precautionary measures or measures which have to do with the fear of betrayal or which ensure numbing (dipsomania) of the mind (Nagera, 1975).

Freud continually reformulated his psychoanalytic theory and his thoughts about obsessional neurosis were no exception (Sulloway, 1983). In discussing the mechanism of symptom formation and the factors which predispose to obsessional neurosis, Freud (1907; 1913) attributed the basis of obsessional neurosis to the repression of instinctual impulses. This was a reformulation from his earlier view (1896) that in all cases of obsessional neurosis there was a substratum of hysterical symptoms traceable to an instance of sexual passivity preceding a pleasurable action in which the child later took an active part.

In his later formulations Freud (1913) maintained that the grounds for the "choice" of a neurosis were independent of the pathogenic experience; the disposition to a particular neurosis lay in an inhibition in development. To support this notion he pointed out that hysteria,
obsessional neurosis, paranoia and schizophrenia basically corresponded to the order of ages at which the onset of these disorders occurred. Each neurosis has different fixation points to which the instinctual impulse regresses. The hysteric, for example, regresses to the developmental level of incestuous object choice while retaining the genital stage of instinctual development. This means that the hysteric will retain the capacity for reproduction even while repressing it. The obsessive-compulsive returns to a similar early developmental level of object-choice (i.e., those nearest and dearest to him) but retreats to an even earlier stage of instinctual development (i.e., the anal-sadistic level). In "The Ego and the Id", Freud (1923) emphasises that the obsessive individual's regression of libido from the genital to the sadistic-anal phase represents a defusing of the instincts, while his advance from the earlier phase to the final, mature genital phase would proceed only as more erotically developed components accrue to the instincts.

In a final attempt at formulating his thinking about obsessional neurosis in the light of his theory of the Love and Death instincts, Freud (1920) stated the obsessional neurosis was due not only to the attempt of regressed instincts, fixated at an earlier developmental level, to force themselves into awareness but the neurosis also
reflected the defusion of love-impulses that were transformed into impulses of aggression against the love-object. This aggressivity resulted from the liberation of the death instinct, which apparently intends to destroy the object. In this theoretical view, compulsive acts reflect the conflict of two apparently equally strong impulses of love and hate.

Freud was uncertain whether neurotic ambivalence should not also be conceived of as the product of an instinctual defusion. He concluded that, more likely, it represented an incomplete fusion of instincts. However, he was unsatisfied with this formulation and conceived it first as a product of instinctual defusion and then again as demonstrating a lack of sufficient instinctual fusion (Nagera, 1976).

Nagera (1976) concludes that the psychoanalytic clinical picture of obsessional neurosis is still not clear-cut because individuals often manifest different combinations of obsessional characteristics at one time which makes diagnosis difficult.

**Behaviourist and Learning Theory Conceptions:** A number of different models of obsessive-compulsive disorder have been offered from this perspective. Some assume an ethological perspective in which rituals are conceived as displacement activity meant to discharge anxiety provoked by
threat or conflict. Others treat compulsions as varieties of fixed action patterns for which the obsessions have become a secondary explanation. Another group of theorists view rituals as examples of stereotypic behaviour associated with certain avoidance paradigms. Theorists who favour neuroanatomical models appeal to various brain structures as responsible for the development of this disorder (Insel, 1984).

Clearly there is a lot of diversity of opinion concerning how best to conceive of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Consequently, we shall give a brief outline of three current behaviourist/cognitive-behavioural conceptions of this disorder to illustrate this variety.

The first example is that of Salkovskis (1985) who conceives of obsessional thoughts as stimuli which provoke the individual to react with negative automatic thoughts because the obsessions are at variance with his personal set of beliefs. That is, the individual thinks negative thoughts about having had intrusive thoughts in the first place and this gives rise to his emotional upset. Salkovskis believes that the relationship between automatic and obsessional thoughts ought to be clarified because obsessions, or "automatic thoughts", are a part of normal experience. Moreover, with this relationship clarified, the link between depression and worsening of obsessions could be
accounted for as the result of the individual's increasing receptivity to negative thoughts in depression. This in turn might facilitate the development of specific cognitive techniques for this disorder which then might offer hope for treating so-called "treatment failures".

In Salkovskis's (1985) theory there are many potential stimuli which could trigger the intrusive thoughts which the obsessive-compulsive generally tries to avoid, either overtly or covertly. An intrusive thought triggered by environmental cues is ego-dystonic, i.e., foreign to the individual's ego. If the intrusive thought is very much at variance with his beliefs, the individual will respond with negative, automatic thoughts concerning blame, threat or loss. The negative thoughts with which he reacts to the intrusive thought will be ego-syntonic i.e., in accord with his ego's estimation of himself. These negative thoughts, in their turn, upset the individual's mood and prompt him to begin making "neutralizing" responses, i.e., he will engage in "undoing". For example, he might perform an act and then immediately perform its opposite. While a pre-existing disturbance in mood is not a central concept in his theory, Salkovskis considers that mood, by itself, might provoke specific intrusive thoughts without the contribution of any specific environmental stimuli. He also observes that neutralizing behaviour generally does not occur if the
automatic thoughts have about them no quality of "being responsible" or "to blame".

Salkovskis sees three consequences of neutralizing: a reduction in the individual's discomfort; having experienced no punishment for performing his neutralizing action, the individual then will interpret this as a sign that his neutralizing was the appropriate thing to do; the neutralizing itself will become a very powerful, comforting stimulus that suggests safety.

Salkovskis further notes three sets of observations which need to be encompassed by his theory. The first is that there are "senseless" compulsions which are not specifically related to thoughts of responsibility or blame and which are sometimes quite pleasurable for the patient to perform. He suggests that in these cases a highly effective, stereotypical, neutralizing behaviour is always present, which has become rewarding to perform in its own right. The second observation to be accounted for is that thoughts of blame or responsibility are not prominent in many "normal" obsessions in contrast to clinical obsessions which contain themes of blame or responsibility. Finally, for some obsessive-compulsives depression results in a decrease and, sometimes, a complete remission of their obsessional symptoms. This observation is at variance with what would be predicted given that depression has long been
understood in terms of the impact that negative automatic thoughts have on the individual's mood.

Reed (1985), who elaborates a cognitive-structural approach to obsessive-compulsive disorder, identifies the failure to spontaneously categorize and integrate experience as the central problem in this disorder. The consequence of such failure is an over-structuring of experience. In other words, the central problem is one of fixing cognitive/perceptual boundaries or limits. Reed conceives of compulsivity as reflecting the experience of failure to end a sequence of thought or fix conceptual limits while repetition expresses the individual's striving for synthesis i.e., for an optimum level of performance such that he can terminate a sequence of action. Reed does not assume anxiety necessarily causes the disorder or that obsessive doubts cause anxiety; rather it appears as a consequence of the individual's inability to fix cognitive limits.

With respect to the obsessional's ritualizing and indecisiveness, Reed observes that the individual is unable to decide his own level of satisfaction or on what should satisfy him or on the quality of performance that a task requires. Consequently, the individual strives to complete a task which has no objective limits.

McFall & Wollersheim (1979) maintain that the obsessive-compulsive individual, faced with an experience
of threat, becomes anxious. However, the individual's initial problem is that he does not accurately size up the situation. This appraisal deficit is compounded by the individual's underestimation of his ability to cope with a situation. These theorists conceive of the obsessive-compulsive individual as one whose beliefs concerning his own performance are overly-rigid. Moreover, obsessive-compulsive individuals tend to "catastrophize" the consequences of their mistakes.

In the cognitive-behavioural framework, the primary focus has been on the behavioural treatment of obsessive compulsive patients. Exposure procedures or blocking or punishing techniques (Foà & Steketee, 1984) have contributed to an improved outlook for these sorts of patients. However, the success of behavioural treatment programs is not unqualified. Complications in the treatment program can arise from a variety of factors such as depression, anxiety, or the degree to which the individual anticipates disaster without the protection his rituals supposedly afford him. Moreover, about twenty-five percent of obsessive-compulsive individuals do not respond to exposure and response-prevention techniques (Foà, Steketee & Ozerov, 1985).

**Pharmacotherapeutic Approach:** While medication may be used to augment the efficacy of the behavioural treatment
program (Foa & Steketee, 1984), other researchers have addressed themselves to the question of a psychopharmacologic treatment regime for those patients who do not benefit from behavioural programs (Insel & Mueller, 1984). A wide variety of drugs have been tried; among them lithium, phenlzine, tranylcypromine and clonidine. As yet, the results of these psychopharmacologic investigations, as well as those investigations into the efficacy of cognitive approaches (Hamilton & Alagna, 1984), are still equivocal.

Recent studies (Leonard & Rapoport, 1987; Rapoport 1986) have suggested that imbalances in the neurotransmitter, serotonin, may be a factor in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Treatment with the tri-cyclic antidepressant chlormipramine generally achieves good results. However, it can have certain unpleasant side effects and often when patients discontinue the drug their obsessive-compulsive symptoms return.

Recently several groups, among them Baxter et al. (1987) and Flament et al. (1987), have singled out a variety of brain structures which may be implicated in this disorder. These groups used a combination of positron emission tomography (PET scans), which measure rates of glucose uptake, and neurotransmitter studies. While these neurological and neurochemical associations are suggestive, they are not definitive in singling out a particular brain
site that is responsible for the onset of the disorder; nor do these associations account for the causes of the disorder. In a review of neurological factors which might contribute to this disorder, Kettl and Marks (1986) concluded that most cases of obsessive-compulsive disorder have no organic pathology which is detectable by any of our present means of examination.

Existentialist Conceptions: Boss (1963) notes that Daseinsanalysis treats the psychoanalytic notion of isolated, separately existing, displaceable affects as an abstraction. In reality, the individual exists as a meaning-disclosing being. In Boss's view there is a specific constriction in the existence of the obsessive-compulsive: He acknowledges only the "pure", objective and conceptual aspects of his being. Boss believes the obsessive-compulsive is better conceived of as avoiding any full engagement of himself in his world-relationships than as warding off threatening emotions. The effect of such partial engagement is that the individual is a captive of that aspect of existence which he has rejected i.e., decomposition.

Von Gebsattel (1958) conceives of the obsessive-compulsive individual in a somewhat similar fashion. The individual battles with the form destroying powers of
existence because his experience of the inhibition of
Becoming translates into the experience of the loss of form
of the person. Thus, the individual protects himself by
rejecting objects or thoughts in which or by means of which
the form-destroying aspect of existence expresses itself.
Binswanger, in "The Case of Ellen West", picks up a similar
theme, viewing compulsions as a particular form of being-
with-others or of being-with-oneself characterized by a
defensive battle against "dis-being" (sic). For Boss
(1963), the power which decay has over these individuals
makes them fight not to fall into its apparent chaos.

Von Gebsattel's formulation of the individual's partial
engagement in world-relationships represents the individual
as moving ahead of himself in time with the consequence that
he does not fully enter into the doing of an action. This
in turn leads to doubt whether the action occurred. He goes
on to state in another instance that not-freeing-oneself-
from-the-past accounts for part of the obsessive's concern
with being polluted. The individual does not permit the
past to take on "the past perfect tense" because that would
imply openness to the future. For Von Gebsattel, the
essence of the obsessive-compulsive's position is that his
impairment or inhibition in Becoming is experienced as a
loss or dissolution of form.
Boss (1963) notes that Daseinsanalysis, while accepting that aggressive and destructive impulses are behind the patient's associations to dirt and excrement, does not accept the idea that psychodynamic mechanisms explain the necessity of the relation. Moreover, Daseinsanalysis does not accept that there is a causal relation between a child's experience of excrement and dirt and the "retentive" style of his relationship to others. Instead, it conceives of the individual as having restricted himself to one mode of existence, with the result that he is "in debt" to existence. In other words, the individual is existentially guilty.

In sum, the existentialist conceptions of this disorder stress the individual's partial engagement in existence and the restrictiveness of the individual's being to one mode of being.

**Summary:** Much effort has been expended in investigating obsessive-compulsive disorder yet the results are contradictory and no single therapeutic approach has had unqualified success. Furthermore, no comprehensive theory of obsessive-compulsive disorder has been developed nor have the different understandings of the disorder been articulated into a common frame of reference.
Our review of the various conceptions of obsessive-compulsive disorder completed, we shall turn to a consideration of the formal characteristics of time as they apply in our theoretical conjecture. In the next chapter we shall present the metatheory or formal language of our theory.
CHAPTER FOUR

Metatheory: The Formal Characteristics of Time

Introduction: This chapter proposes to explore how far it is possible for us to proceed in conceptualizing the formal characteristics of time.

Since a notion of time arises out of our lived experience, experience will naturally be at the centre of this analysis. Our task, then, will be to create a set of non-contradictory terms which will rigorously express that fundamental experience which, we posit, is instrumental in generating the individual's notion of time. These aspects of basic experience will be important for our conjecture as to how the individual symbolically represents the flux of experience.

The Analysis: As we analyse experience, we can divide it initially into the experience of that-which-is-always-there and the experience of that-which-is-not-always-there. Put another way, we can consider experience as being partly continuous and partly discontinuous.

The experience of that-which-is-always-there we will designate as corresponding to the notion of the Me. The experience of that-which-is-not-always-there will correspond
to the notion of the not-Me. Encompassed in the notion of the not-Me is experience with things-which-are-not-like-me and things-which-are-like-me. That is to say, what is not-Me divides into objects and other subjects, respectively. In this perspective we can consider objects as being "discontinuous" with the Me and subjects as being "continuous". The criterion of continuity being "like me", defined as always-there-to-themselves.

The two categories of experience - of that-which-is-always-there and of that-which-is-not-always-there - stand in an important, complementary relation to each other. Characteristic of complementaries is that one of them cannot be known without reference to the other. Thus, in sorting out notions of Me and not-Me, the individual must oppose the continuity of his experience in general to the particular, periodic absence and reappearance of certain features of his experience. From this opposition arises the notion of the Me which, in contrast to the experience of the Me, derives from reflexion on and the naming of that part of experience which is continuous. The notion of that-which-is-not-always-there is generated through contrasting the experience of that-which-is-always-there (taken as that locus of experiencing which is independent of specific features in the environment) and the experience of the periodic absence and reappearance of things.
Drawing on the notion of continuity, we have formally identified, in our analysis of that-which-is-always-there, the experience of Me. However, because the Me is always there, it is always now. Thus, we can designate the now not only as another dimension of experience of the Me, but also as being an experiential absolute.

When we conceive of the now in such a manner, this does not imply that we conceive its absolute character to be something infinite, limitless or unbounded. Rather, the notion of the now as an experiential absolute implies that it is an invariant, or constant, frame for our experience. Moreover, the now represents a perspective which is "unexchangeable".

An illustration of what is meant by something which is absolute in the sense of invariant, or constant, yet not infinite or unbounded, would be the speed of light. It is absolutely constant or invariant - as seen from the perspective of Einsteinian physics - but it is not absolute in the sense of being infinite.

Considering the now as being experientially "unexchangeable", we recognize from our own experience that, in the now, we have a perspective which we can never abandon: even our recollections of the past and anticipations of the future take place in an experiential present. Furthermore, this perspective is unexchangeable in
the same way that no subject can abandon its perspective and view life from the perspective of another subject or of a non-living thing. When we consider that in all our experience events, past or present, take place or have taken place in an experiential present, we confront the invariability of the now as a frame for our experience.

We conceive of that-which-is-always-there as a continuity of experience. Further, we take this continuity of experience to be capable of conferring an experiential core of permanence on the Me. The effect of this felt core of permanence would be to make of the experience of the now, not the experience of a series of fleeting, disconnected nows, but the experience of an enduring now.

A word of caution here: The Me, taken as that-which-is-always-there, should not be considered to be synonymous with the now. Ordinarily, experiencing occurs in the now without any explicit reference being made to that-which-is-always-there. However, through reflexion, that-which-is-always-there can become an explicit component of awareness, albeit framed in the now. More accurately, the Me and the now should be conceived of as being symmetrical, e.g., in the manner of a foreground/background relation.

Thus far, we have divided experience into the experience of that-which-is-always-there and that-which-is-not-always-there, and we have specified the experience of
the now as distinct from the experience of that-which-is-always-there. Of these, it is the experience of that-which-is-always-there and the experience of the now which we shall designate as experiential primaries because, in our view, together they constitute the standpoint of the subject.

At this point we must make a distinction in our conception and use of now as contrasted with the notion of the "present". For us, the now is a definition intended to encompass that experience which is occurring at this very moment. Conceived of thusly, the now stands in relation to the present as emotion does to experiencing. To illustrate this idea: When one sheds tears, they can be tears of happiness, sadness or even anger. However, it is only until the individual has reflected upon his tears that he is able to name them as tears of anger, sadness, happiness or whatever else they might be. It is the same way, too, with the experience of the now. It is only until the individual reflects upon the now and names it that the now receives its meaning and becomes that notion which we designate as the present.

Continuing our consideration of the now, we note that the idea of duration is implicit in the concept of the now. Our first task, then, is to elaborate how duration is related to the now.
From our earlier discussion of the Me we know that that-which-is-always-there is also always now. By extension, that-which-is-not-always-there is also not-now. Thus, implicit in the contrast which gives rise to the notion of the Me and not-Me, lies the notion of now and not-now.

Having specified our conception of the now, it remains for us to refine our notion of the not-now; particularly as it might contribute to the elaboration of the relation of duration and the now. The not-now encompasses what we commonly call past and future. We shall designate as corresponding to the past those contents of the mind consisting of things thought of as certainly being in a former now but which are not here now. Similarly, things not here now, but thought of as having the capacity to be here in another now, will correspond to the future.

It should be noted that the crucial difference between "past" and "future" is one of degree of certainty: the past is a relatively certain other experiential now, the future is a relatively uncertain other now. We may state this in spatial terms thusly: the past is a now that is not there but is certainly elsewhere; the future is a now that is not there but may be elsewhere. By contrast, the Me is always here (and now). The Me, plus the not-Me which is there now, constitute experience.
We note that the spatial and temporal refinements of the idea of not-now are linked by their degrees of certainty. Let us treat the now as being that-which-is-certain. The past can be thought of as that-which-is-relatively-certain, and the future as that-which-is-relatively-uncertain. Then, that of which I am most certain possesses a definite duration, the "length" of which we shall designate as the now. Hence, the Me, which is now, becomes that-which-is-most-certain and thus carries the most duration in contrast to the not-now.

It is only by contrast with the not-now that a notion such as that of duration can arise; because that-which-is-always-there, since it is always now, would be equivalent, without the opposition provided by the not-now, to a sense of timelessness. However, with experience of that-which-is-not-always-there, the notion of not-now develops and, with it, the notion of time.

Herein we have an apparent paradox: the same experiential absolute, the now, appears, upon examination, to give rise to two separate and contrary notions: that of timelessness, born of the combination of that-which-is-always-there and its experiential frame, the now, and the notion of time, arising from the contrast of the now and the not-now.
If we think about the *now* as having a duration, we are also thinking implicitly about the extension and the limits of that duration. The "extension" of the *now* we may formally define as that-experience-which-always-occurs-now. And, although we experience no sense of limit to the *now*, we may formally define the limit of the *now* as "the intersection where that-which-does-not-change observes that-which-does-change".

**Conclusion:** We have considered experience as being partly continuous and partly discontinuous and have defined this as the experience of that-which-is-always-there and that-which-is-not-always-there. From an analysis of the experience of that-which-is-always-there we have derived the notion of the Me and the *now*. Notions of duration, extension and limit were characterized formally in relation to the *now*. We have analyzed the experience of that-which-is-not-always-there (the not-Me) and the not-*now* and developed relatively formal definitions of the experience of past and future.

In the following chapter we shall draw upon some of these formal definitions to conjecture how an individual might differentiate among various of his experiences. Obsessive-compulsive disorder will be the "field of application" for our conjecture.
CHAPTER FIVE

Theoretical Conjecture

Introduction: As mentioned in the previous chapter, obsessive-compulsive disorder will function as the "field of application" for our conjecture as to how the individual establishes a boundary between the experience of himself as subject and the idea of himself as object. Specifically, we are asking how the individual might establish a set of constructs which will frame the relations holding among his various experiences.

We shall consider the variety of symptoms which characterize this disorder to express unsuccessful attempts to satisfactorily juxtapose complementary sets of experience. Thus, we are not presently interested in examining the content of obsessional thoughts or the meaning of repetitive, compulsive activities per se. Rather, we conceive these and the many and various symptoms of the disorder as expressing a basic continuity of form which we propose to analyse by reference to our most general category of complementaries, the experience of that-which-is-always-there and that-which-is-not-always-there.

Our theoretical notion, as we have repeatedly stressed, will be expressed as a conjecture. Moreover, we shall
imagine that the individual himself engages in conjectural activity: i.e., that he forms conjectures which are capable of being refuted about the world and his experience of it. We further conjecture that the individual does so with the aim of being able to make predictions, thereby gaining control over the situations in which he finds himself. Note that we are not asserting that the individual does in fact form such conjectures; only that we believe it worthwhile to investigate this problem by approaching it as though the individual did make such conjectures. Within our theoretical conception, we shall take the creation and refutation of conjectures to be one of the means by which a normal individual exercises his personal freedom. One of the distinguishing marks of the psychoneuroses being the lack of freedom which they entail (Boss, 1963), we shall take the individual's inability to accept the refutation of a conjecture as an instance of his lack of freedom.

Given the foregoing and our assumption that the individual frames relations among his various experiences and that these result in a notion of personal time, we are now in a position to ask: What might be the refuted conjecture which the individual is trying to rehabilitate and which results in an obsessional disorder?
Conjectures Any Individual Might Make: To begin with, let us first project what might have been the molar chain of conjectures which any individual might have advanced on the basis of his experience. We are seeking eventually to specify the point at which an individual responds to the refutation of a conjecture with a new conjecture of the form that will land him into an obsessive-compulsive disorder.

We propose that the first conjecture any individual might make is: There is permanence.

We begin with this conjecture for two reasons. Firstly, we note that it has been hypothesized (e.g., by object-relations theorists among others) that the psychic differentiation of the infant develops in the course of the child's interaction with his world and receives a specific push from the infant's frustration at being unable to control the most important individual in his world, i.e., mother. Prior to this interaction with the world, the infant's psychic structure is thought to be relatively undifferentiated, i.e., initially there is little or no distinction between infant and mother (Fairbairn, 1966). From our perspective, then, in this early stage of development, the individual may be said to conjecture that "there is permanence".

Secondly, we assume a Gestalt character to the configuration of any group of psychic contents - regardless
of the individual's stage of development — which can be disrupted by a cognitive shift either in the form of a Gestalt organization or in its meaning (Kohler, 1970).

Thus, in respect of any individual's experience of this undisrupted Gestalt organization, we may imagine that the individual conjectures that "there is permanence".

To put this "initial conjecture any individual might make" into the terms of our discussion of the formal characteristics of time, we may say that the integrity of the experience of that-which-is-always-there has not yet been challenged.

The immediate refutation of "that conjecture which any individual might be expected to make" is: There is change.

Once again, in terms of the formal characteristics of time, the experience of that-which-is-not-always-there challenges the integrity of the experience of that-which-is-always-there.

At this point, the individual may form a second conjecture. If he treats the refutation of his initial conjecture as a misidentification of the locus of permanence, he may conjecture that the refutation does not apply to the notion of permanence per se. Rather, what is refuted is merely the notion that, because permanence is a general feature of his experience, permanence is the normal state of things in general. From conceiving the experience
of that-which-is-always-there as being unrestrictedly
generalizable, the individual progresses to a comprehension
of the limits of his particular experience of that-which-is-
always-there. That is, the individual grasps this
experience as being the Me and from this identification
there arises a felt core of permanence.

Ideally, the individual should reconcile the experience
of that-which-is-always-there and that-which-is-not-always-
there such that he takes his sense of permanence for granted
(having grasped that the limits imposed on the
generalizability of the notion of permanence do not imply a
limitation on the experience of permanence). However, if he
does not succeed in achieving this reconciliation, the
individual will lack the conviction of his experience and
may feel, to borrow a phrase, as though "there is no there
there".

The Search For an Experiential Vantage Point: Where
the individual lacks the conviction of his experience, he
may nonetheless conjecture that some link exists between the
experience of that-which-is-always-there (permanence) and
that-which-is-not-always-there (change) and that this link,
if made explicit, would put the sense of permanence on a
solid base. In terms of the discussion of the formal
characteristics of time, this is to say that the experience
of that-which-is-always-there can reassert itself against
the experience of that-which-is-not-always-there. Thus, the link made between these two sets of experience will constitute an experiential vantage point from which the individual can encompass the experience of permanence and change.

Let us suppose, however, that the individual is unable to form a conjecture which explicitly links his experience of permanence with his experience of change. At this point the individual might begin to doubt his ability to form adequate conjectures. One might say that he doubts his conjecturing ability because, thus far, he cannot make predictions which ensure him a measure of control over his experience. Alternatively, one might propose that he doubts his ability because, having no firm grasp of the relation between the experience of that-which-is-always-there and that-which-is-not-always-there, he is confronted by two apparently incompatible sets of experience which threaten the sense of personal intactness which was expressed by the initial conjecture that "there is permanence".

The consequence for the individual of failing to make this link is that he is faced with the possibility of losing his experiential vantage point. Without it, he will be unable to reconcile his experience of that-which-is-always-there and that-which-is-not-always-there and his sense of personal intactness will be threatened. Without an
experiential vantage point, change will appear to be without relation to permanence and chaos will impend.

Possessed of no conjectural link which adequately expresses the relation of the experience of that-which-is-always-there and that-which-is-not-always-there, the individual's sense of permanence - normally conferred by that-which-is-always-there - may be shaken. Nevertheless, the individual needs an experiential "high ground" from which he can encompass the experience of permanence and change.

An alternative vantage ground may present itself in the form of the now which, as an unexchangeable perspective, "frames" personal experience. Being an experiential absolute, the now offers the possibility of forging a possible link between the experience of permanence and change. In this respect, its attributes of extension and duration become important in conjecturing how this might be accomplished.

We propose that if the individual finds the experience of that-which-is-not-always-there too great a challenge to the experience of that-which-is-always-there, he will focus on the now in an attempt to gain a more secure grasp of his sense of permanence. More exactly, we propose that the individual focuses on a particular aspect of the now i.e., its extension (taken as that-experience-which-occurs-now) in
his attempt to secure the experiential vantage point from which he can encompass his experience of permanence and change.

By virtue of its unexchangeable perspective, the now possesses a kind of permanence. For a normal individual this unexchangeable perspective of the now "frames" the experience of that-which-is-always-there and, as such, forms an experiential background.

We conjecture that, in his attempt to secure an experiential vantage point, the obsessive-compulsive individual latches onto a particular aspect of the now i.e., that-experience-wh ich-occurs-now. In other words, the individual fastens onto what otherwise would form the experiential frame for the experience of that-which-is-always-there, i.e., the now.

We further propose that the individual mistakenly infers, based on the continuity of experiencing which constitutes that-experience-which-occurs-now, that access to permanence is available to him only when experiencing, or more specifically particular contents of experience, is continuously generated. Put otherwise, it is as though the individual was to take our definition of the extension of the now (that-experience-which-occurs-now) and redefine it as that-experiencing-which-occurs-now.
Let us rephrase the foregoing idea. If the individual feels that the limits imposed on his notion of the unrestricted generality of permanence also imply a limit on the sense of permanence that arises from the experience of that-which-is-always-there, then, to secure his sense of permanence, he will "reinterpret" the extension of now as that-experiencing-which-occurs-now rather than as that-experience-which-occurs-now.

The following is our conception of how the individual attempts to put his sense of permanence on a more solid footing given that he has no satisfactory conjectural link between his experience of permanence and change and has fastened on the extensional aspect of the now.

Prolonging the Now to Secure Permanence: It is our view that it is a fundamental tendency of the human spirit to try to resolve itself into an eternal now (i.e., to abolish time). We suggest two possible ways by which this could be achieved: either by seeking an eternal, all-encompassing now or by trying to bring certainty to all other nows.

Considering the first tendency as a means of resolving the individual's dilemma: If the distinction between the now and the not-now was to be dimmed, then no conjectures need be formed to unite what would then be "all of a piece". Presumably this would be an especially attractive option for
an individual who had lost faith in his ability to form
conjectures sufficient to broach change (the not-now) and
ensure access (through the now) to permanence.

Practically speaking, however, it would not be possible
for an individual entirely to dim his perception of the
distinction between the now and the not-now. One is not
able to eliminate from one's consciousness every instance of
awareness of the now having become a former now. Moreover,
language, possessing different verb tenses, continually
confronts one with the not-now.

Turning to the tendency to bring certainty to all other
nows: We have stated that change is problematical for the
obsessive-compulsive individual, because it suggests to him
that his access to permanence is blocked. We have described
how, without an adequate conjectural link uniting his
experience of permanence and change, the experience of that-
which-is-not-always-there apparently ruptures the continuity
of the experience of that-which-is-always-there.

In the contrast of experience between that-which-is-
always-there and that-which-is-not-always-there, the act of
experiencing (i.e., that-experience-which-occurs-now)
appears as an island of continuity from which the individual
may circumscribe his experience of change. It then becomes
important for the individual to secure the now by
perpetuating his experiencing. If the individual's
experiencing was to come to an end, it would be giving way to the not-now which, signifying change, threatens him personally. Consequently, the individual must refuse or somehow thwart the advent of the not-now.

One way to retain one's access to permanence is to assimilate former nows to the now on the basis of their degree of certainty vis-a-vis the now. Thus, what is most certain is the now. In other words, that-experience-which-occurs-now is also that-which-is-certain. In this sense, the now reflects the certainty of the Me. What is next most certain is the past (that-which-is-relatively-certain) and what is least certain is the future (that-which-is-relatively-uncertain).

We propose that the obsessive-compulsive individual, possessed of a fragile sense of permanence arising from having not adequately linked his experience of that-which-is-always-there (permanence) and that-which-is-not-always-there (change), first focuses on the extensional aspect of the now in an attempt to secure an experiential vantage point from which he can encompass these diverse sets of experience. However, focusing on the now implies that, faced with the not-now, the individual must prolong the now, taken as that-experience-which-occurs-now. Next, he must make certain that that-experience-which-occurs-now really is now. That is, he must assure himself of its degree of
certainty vis-a-vis the \textit{now}. This experience is also that-which-is-certain. Moreover, to retain his sense of permanence the individual must stop the \textit{now} from giving way to the not-\textit{now}. The question is now: What "vehicle" will most effectively prolong the \textit{now} and thus stave off the advent of the not-\textit{now}?

We propose that the individual attempts to "save" the \textit{now} from the not-\textit{now} by assimilating former nows to the \textit{now} through repetition. That is, the \textit{now} taken as that-experience-which-occurs-now, is also that-which-is-certain. By definition, a former now is that-which-is-relatively-certain; a future now that-which-is-relatively-uncertain. On the basis of their relative certainty, it follows that the individual will refuse the future. A former now, revivified through repetition, becomes that-experience-which-occurs-now. Nevertheless, the \textit{now} must give way to the not-\textit{now}. With it crumbles the individual's foundation of certainty (i.e., the \textit{now} as that-which-is-certain). To thwart this, the individual must revivify by repetition the experience which threatens to become part of the not-\textit{now}.

In the sense that the individual resists the not-\textit{now}, we can also say that he is trying to abolish time and institute moment. However, the not-\textit{now} cannot be resisted because without it the \textit{now} cannot be known. The struggle to prolong the \textit{now} by repetition is ultimately futile and
effectively stops everything else in the individual's world.

The Refuted Conjecture: We have speculated herein that the refuted conjecture which the obsessive-compulsive individual is trying to rehabilitate is: There is permanence. When this conjecture is refuted the individual is faced with the task of forming a conjecture which will link his experience of permanence and change. If these experiences remain inadequately linked, we propose that the individual attempts to rehabilitate his refuted initial conjecture by recourse to the now. However, in seeking his sense of permanence in the now, the individual focuses on particular aspects of the now, i.e., the now taken as that-experience-which-occurs-now. The individual is then faced with generating experience to thwart the advent of the not-now. We propose that the obsessive-compulsive individual uses repetition to help him refuse the not-now.
CHAPTER SIX

Theoretical Predictions

We have postulated in the preceding chapter that that-which-is-less-certain can be made more certain by basing it on that of which one is most certain. As mentioned in the chapter on the formal characteristics of time, the things which are less certain are those in the future; and those which are more certain are in the past. Therefore, we must assume that the future can be made more certain by referring to the past. (The universal search for certitude would lead one to that conclusion.) Presumably, the combination of the certainty of the now, i.e., oneself, and the past would "arm" one well against the uncertainty of the future.

Examining the obsessive-compulsive in this light, we identify an individual who is:

1) creating a series of identical past events, which reassures him that the future is simply a repetition of the past; thus reducing time to a series of neatly-encapsulated, repeated events
2) using the certainty of the experience of his own existence as the basis on which to abolish time
3) is searching, in his obsessive-compulsive behaviour, not for truth but for certainty.

4) whose behaviour can be described in terms of an oscillation between, and finally an accommodation to, two opposite experiences: those of permanence and change.

On the basis of the foregoing and our theoretical conjecture, we make the following predictions.

**Prediction No. 1:** Our theoretical conception depicts the obsessive-compulsive individual as attempting to wrestle former nows to the point where they "have already come to be" a part of the now. Therefore, we predict that, at least initially, the obsessive-compulsive individual will consider his repetitive activities to be of some use. We base this prediction on the idea that repetition, conceived as an attempt to secure certainty, is the individual's attempt to secure a sense of certainty, i.e., permanence, for himself. So long as he appears to be accomplishing this aim, things will be fine for the individual and anxiety or depression need not be a component of the clinical picture.

**Prediction No. 2:** We have described repetitive activities as attempts to manoeuvre the former now into becoming now. Clearly, this is impossible. Even if an action is an exact repetition of a past one, the present
repetition is still an activity performed now. Therefore, it is other than that which preceded it.

On this account we predict that the obsessive-compulsive individual will become emotionally upset (e.g., anxious or depressed) at the point where he begins to sense the futility of his efforts to stave off the not-now.

**Prediction No. 3:** We predict that the individual's focus on staving off the not-now, by blurring the distinction between the now and the not-now through a chain of repetitions, predisposes the obsessive-compulsive individual to feelings of depersonalisation. We speculate that the individual does not distinguish very clearly either in his experience of himself or in his experience of the world and the other because to do so would be either to generate or to acknowledge change (the not-now).
CHAPTER SEVEN

Categories of Psychopathology Based on the Me/not-Me

Complementary

Classifications: Making a distinction between the contents of the mind based on data of experience and those based on data of abstraction, we can derive a very broad classification of pathologies from the basic Me/not-Me dichotomy.

Experience: Focusing only on things directly experienced we note that the experience of that-which-is-always-there is synonymous with the Me. The experience of that-which-is-not-always-there constitutes the experience of that which is not-Me. This latter experience encompasses the experience of things-which-are-like-me and things-which-are-not-like-me, or other subjects and objects. Note that here we speak only of things directly experienced, i.e., the Me, the other subjects which are not always there but which are there now, and the objects which are not always there but are there now. These we shall symbolize by SUB, Sub and Obj respectively.

Abstractions: The contents of the mind consisting of data about things which are not always there and which are
not there now include, among other things, what we call abstractions. Things-like-me not there now we shall symbolize as sub; things-not-like-me and not there now we shall symbolize as obj. Note that the category of "data" we have called abstractions are those belonging to what we designate the not-now.

Their Relations: In the experiential dimension we have the experienced-in-the-now relations between the Me (SUB) and the not-Me (Sub or Obj) that is there now. These experiential relations engender in the Me the abstract terms "sub" and "obj" which encompass all things in the mind not there now and further generate the mental relations between those terms. All these abstract relations can be expressed as statements to the effect that, when certain not-Me's are there, certain other not-Me's are also always there or not always there or never there. Of course, the mind can overlay these abstract terms and statements on the experiential now, either to confirm or deny the validity of these statements, or, if the mind is already convinced of their validity, to interpret or manipulate the now. (Note that abstractions, as the term is used in this theoretical conjecture, refers to the relation established in the mind between the experience of the now and the not-now.)
Whatever the particular intent at a given moment, we conjecture that the goal is always the achievement of certainty in the experiential dimension; the criterion of absolute certainty being the certainty of the Me. This can also, as already noted, be expressed as the certainty of the now, or, in other words, the abolition of time.

Pathologies Derived From the Me/not-Me Relations: From the foregoing, it is possible to classify certain pathologies according to how they superpose perceived relations between terms in the abstract realm over relations between the Me and the not-Me's in the experiential realm; or, within the experiential realm, whether they confuse SUB-Sub relations with SUB-Obj ones.

Considering the pathology associated with the superposition of perceived abstract relations on experiential relations, let us examine how the obsessive-compulsive individual might attempt to master the not-now using this strategy.

Characteristic of experience is that it is never-there-except-now. Abstractions, as products of reflection on experience, are rooted in the not-now. We may then define them as characteristically being always-there-except-now. Considered in this light, what is common to both experience and abstractions is their lack of ambiguity. Therefore, on
the basis of their lack of ambiguity, both can lay claim to a degree of certainty. Overlaid abstraction on the experience of the now — they can help obscure the transition from now to the not-now for the obsessive-compulsive individual and serve to buttress the sense of certainty that repetition secures through the attempt to assimilate former nows to the now.

Put another way, in normal experiential relations, the constancy of the now, born of that—which-is-always-there and taken as that unexchangeable experiential standpoint, generates a "background" of permanence against which change, in the form of that-experience-which-occurs-now, is the "figure".

In the case of the individual who has not as yet found his experiential vantage point the situation is somewhat different. The experience of change and permanence appear to clash. No relation between the two is evident. However, in the overlay of abstraction on experiential relation, the abstraction has achieved, by the very reduction of its concreteness, a kind of permanence. That is, the characteristics of uniformity, stability or continuity that result from the elimination of the concrete in the abstractive process afford a substitute source of permanence. That is, the obsessive-compulsive individual can put the abstraction to use as a substitute "background"
of permanence: When that-experience-which-occurs-now necessarily becomes not-now, threatening change, the individual can fall back upon the background of permanence afforded by abstraction.

Paradoxically, the abstract relations by means of which the individual attempts to secure a sense of permanence arise from experience with the not-now. That is to say, the individual tries to resist the not-now by resorting to abstractions which are derived from experience with the not-now.

Turning to a consideration of the pathology associated with confusing SUB:Sub with SUB:Obj relations in the experiential domain, we note that, normally, our dealings with objects reflect our assumption that objects are not there-to-themselves.

We conceive of the obsessive-compulsive's uncertainty whether (e.g.) a gas jet has been left on or otherwise overlooked as expressing the displacement of his status as subject onto inanimate objects. Unwilling to accept his capacity to be there-to-himself, i.e., to be in-relation to aspects of his own experience (specifically the not-now) the individual effectively refuses that aspect of his consciousness taken as consciousness-as-relation. That is, he displaces his capacity to be in-relation or, put another way, to be there-to-himself, onto an inanimate object.
Disowning this particular aspect of his consciousness, the individual then experiences himself as being acted upon by what is ordinarily inanimate. It is as though the individual and the inanimate object, or idea, has "traded places".

**Summary:** We have applied our categorization of the pathologies that arise from the Me/not-Me dichotomy to the specific instance of obsessive-compulsive disorder. The general pathologies we identify based on this dichotomy are a) the confusion in the experiential realm of SUB:Sub and SUB:Obj relations and b) the superposition of perceived relations between terms in the abstract realm over relations between the Me and the not-Me's in the experiential realm.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusions and Final Remarks

Therapeutic Implications: In our conception, the obsessive-compulsive individual is trying to evade the advent of the not-now because it threatens him with the loss of his access to permanence. Stating this another way, we may say that the obsessive-compulsive person refuses the future; this refusal of the not-now is the root of the problem as we conceive it.

Considering treatment strategies when the individual superposes abstract relations on relations between the Me and the not-Me's in the experiential realm, we recall that we have defined abstractions as being always-there-except-now. Overlaid on experience by the obsessive-compulsive individual, they are intended to obscure the transition of the now to the not-now.

When such individuals superpose abstract relations on experiential relations, we propose that the treatment goal be to confirm the individual in the permanence of that-which-is-always-there and to assist the individual in reconciling himself to the not-now as an unavoidable dimension of experience.
With this in mind, we propose that to circumvent the continued formation of abstractions—which we understand to be an ersatz permanence—therapeutic efforts be focused on evoking the bodily experience which accompanies or underlies the abstraction. Our rationale for this treatment strategy is the idea that the experience of that—which-is—always—there is given most concretely through body-centred experience. Moreover, insights gained about oneself and one's way of being-in-the-world are not easily denied when they are connected to bodily experience because the impact of the insight is not muted by having first passed through a web of abstraction.

The treatment strategy which we would propose for the individual who confuses SUB:Sub relations with SUB-Obj relations reflects the idea that the individual who makes this sort of confusion is essentially refusing his capacity to be a being who establishes relations. That is, the individual is attempting to obliterate that aspect of his consciousness that is consciousness-as-relation.

In our view, a concrete way to help to restore the individual's sense of himself as a consciousness-in-relation is to focus on creating a strong therapeutic alliance and, in the course of treatment, to actively use this therapeutic alliance as a tool in pointing out to the individual how he limits himself in the exercise of this relational aspect of
his consciousness.

In summary, we suggest two different therapeutic strategies depending on focus of the pathology. For the individual who confuses SUB-Sub relations with SUB-Obj relations we suggest that the therapeutic encounter would be most effective in helping the individual come to a concrete sense of the permanence of that-which-is-always-there via the development of himself as a being who is in-relation.

For the individual who superposes abstract relations on experiential relations we suggest that individual can benefit from being grounded in the experience of that-which-is-always-there through bodily-focused experiencing.

**Theoretical Discussion:** We have framed the existentialist insight that time is central to human existence as the hypothesis that the relation the individual establishes between facets of his experience is personal time. This hypothesis implicitly builds upon the central hypothetical construct of existential psychology, namely that one cannot think of the individual and world as separate from one another. That is to say, the individual is fundamentally a relational being; in relation to himself, others and world.

The problem which we have chose as the "field of application" for our theoretical conjecture is obsessive-
compulsive disorder. In our analysis of this disorder we have drawn upon relatively formalized hypothetical constructs, grounded in experience and referring to no other level of discourse for their validity, to develop our conjecture.

It is in the latter respect that our theoretical discourse has sought to expand on Freud’s theoretical account of psychological functioning which relied heavily on biogenic metaphors. Our theoretical conception seeks no extratheoretical foundation in biology or even phenomenology but bases itself in an explicitation — in the form of a metatheory — of the terms used in our theory. It sets our predictions in refutable terms which thus encourages their critical testing.

Reed (1985) has commented that Freud’s conception of obsessional neurosis appears to reflect a concern more with understanding the necessity of the idea returning to the individual rather than understanding why the individual returns to the idea (which was more in line with Janet’s thinking). From our perspective, thinking about the individual as having confused SUB:Sub with SUB:Obj relations in the experiential domain may be a more profitable way of understanding why the individual returns to the idea. That is, having yielded up that facet of his consciousness which is consciousness-as-relation, the individual effectively
puts himself in the position of an Obj which is being acted upon by a SUB (in this case the obsessional idea or the compulsion).

Our conception of obsessive-compulsive disorder takes into consideration the criticisms which existentialists launched against Freud when they pointed out that his theoretical account neglects to consider the individual as a relational being. Moreover, we have taken into account the existentialist insistence on an understanding of the individual as a relational being and, further, have grounded our theoretical notions in a metatheoretical analysis of experience, reflecting the assumption that the standpoint of the subject is worthy of consideration in its own right. Again, our theoretical effort makes reference to no other sets of terms but those founded in this analysis of experience.

Additionally, we have conducted our theorizing following the criteria set for scientific explanations (Carini, 1983; van Kaam, 1961/1983). That is, following a critical-rationalist approach, we have developed a relatively formalized set of postulates (the metatheory) upon which we drew to form our theoretical conjecture (the theory). The predictions developed at this level were framed in terms susceptible to refutation, in accordance with the criteria of critical-rationalist theory.
The metatheory is intended to play the role in our theory of a kind of "conjecture generator". That is, as a relatively formal system it functions as a means by which conjectures can be made with the least amount of ambiguity and predictions can be framed. This marks the crucial difference between our theoretical effort and that of Freud as well as the behaviourist tradition. Their theories were built up from particular instances to arrive at a general statement. In contrast, our theory begins with the general, and with the theoretical conjecture refers to a particular instance of our general statement. Then, in developing our predictions we return again to the level of the general. Moreover, we acknowledge that the interpretations which we give to "facts" are deductions from our theory.

We have noted a point of convergence between one of our predictions and Reed's (1985) observation that anxiety is not alleviated by obsessions or compulsions but arises in response to them when the obsessive-compulsive individual finds he can no longer control his repetitive activities. We have predicted that, as long as repetition appears to give the individual a sense of permanence, he will not become emotionally upset, be it anxious or depressed. Only when repetition ceases to be "useful" (i.e. will no longer stave off the advent of the not-now) will the individual become upset.
We propose that obsessive-compulsive disorder arises when the individual fails to accept that the not-now must supplant the now. This proposal makes the assumption that the contents of an individual’s obsessions are idiosyncratic and are determined by the individual’s personal history. This notion accords with Reed’s (1985) view that looking at the formal attributes of this disorder affords a better understanding than does an analysis of the contents of the obsessions and compulsions which are idiosyncratic.

Finally, our conjecture implies that the individual who refuses the future, i.e., that the now must give way to the not-now, forgoes his capacity to reflect on his experience and establish relations between aspects of it. That is, the individual refuses consciousness considered as consciousness-as-relation.

A Consideration of Various Existentialist Conceptions of Time: Our theoretical effort has dealt with the notion of time against the background of the existentialist critique. Hence, it is appropriate that we say a few words about how these various existentialist notions of time differ from ours. Both Binswanger and Von Gebsattel (in May, 1958) take the view that distortions in the individual’s capacity to temporalize result in certain psychological disorders. Both also maintain that
transcendence, which is the individual's way of being beyond himself, is rooted in temporality.

Binswanger's Conception of Time in the Case of Ellen West: Heidegger maintained that our everyday experience of time is an aspect of the broader concept of temporality. Binswanger's understanding of temporization appears to share the same basic outlook; however, he extends his notion of temporization beyond the inclusion of inner time-happenings to embrace the notion of the self-temporalizing of the individual considered as existence. That is, temporization is the original outside-itself of the individual existence; the past reveals that we-are-from-the-point-of-having-been. Ultimately, futurity is founded in having-been.

In his analysis of the case of Ellen West, Binswanger notes that she wants to stop time by clinging to a "timeless ethereal wish-self". Her mode of temporality reverberates between the "subtle" and the "heavy" state of existence, eventually succumbing to the temporal mode of creeping, submerging, congealing through her suicide. He further notes that she made no concessions to the world of practicality. Consequently her unauthentic self, constructed in the aethereal world, was always threatened by the boundary of "having-been"; while the other aspect of her
unauthentic self, as reflected in the tomb-world, paradoxically was ruled by the "ever-present past". Put another way, the aethereal world represents a dread of the future and the tomb world represents a dread of the past. What practical action Ellen West did involve herself in appeared to represent the coming to the fore of her passion for numbing herself rather than being an expression of any real desire to make an impact on the world around her.

All in all, Ellen West seemed to focus herself on a wilful self-relatedness with the result that her greed for life degenerated into an "enpresenting (sic) of the mere Now", bereft of future or past. Considered in another light, having abandoned authentic temporalization, Ellen West became enslaved to mere objective time i.e., responding to the appearance of hunger, thirst, etc.

Binswanger attributes an authentic and individual existence to Ellen West when she faces death, when she seizes upon the present to deliver herself by suicide to Nothingness. He points out that the closer to death she came, the more she could allow herself to feel and to know something about true love and begin to free herself from herself. That is, by putting herself on the edge of non-being she found herself capable of standing in being. The tragedy of this case lies in the fact that it was apparently only in the face of death, taken as suicide, that she could
realize some of the aspects of her potential to live authentically.

From our perspective, the case of Ellen West represents the attempts of an individual to live "spatially" rather than as authentically temporal. Our understanding of the case arises in this fashion. Beginning with the conjectures which any individual might make (namely that there is permanence and the refutation this conjecture receives is that there is change) we move to identifying the problematic conjecture which any individual might make. In our view, based on the manner in which that-which-is-not-always-there intrudes upon the integrity of that-which-is-always-there, the individual conjectures that that-which-is-not-always-there is the stronger and, to exist, that-which-is-always-there must take up the position of that-which-is-not-always-there. This conjecture becomes problematic when it receives no refutation.

Put another way, the legitimacy of the individual's own now, taken as that-experience-which-occurs-now, is undercut. Given, from our metatheory, that the future can be considered as a now that is not there but may be elsewhere, we may speculate that Ellen West's struggle went on at the limit of the Me/not-Me and the now/not-now such that she began to believe that, to continue in existence, she must "locate", her own now elsewhere. That is, she attempted to
locate her now either in the future (where the now, defined spatially, is not there but may be elsewhere) or in the past (where the now is not there but is certainly elsewhere). Contrastingly, what she seems to have begun to seek is a now that upon closer inspection is really a not-now. Moreover, in an attempt to secure that coveted now which is not here but may be elsewhere or is elsewhere, she begins trying to shed that obstacle which most clearly attests to the "hereness" of her particular unvalidated now, namely her body.

**Von Gebsattel’s Concept of Time in the Case H.H.** For Von Gebsattel the time structure of the obsessive-compulsive individual reflects a peculiar mingling of dawdling and rushing such that time is always "lost" and then must be made up for again. For this sort of individual the flow of inner happenings has become rigid: Time passing and becoming-present begins to feel like "lust time" which the individual must then make up. Von Gebsattel notes that peculiarly the obsessive-compulsive acts but does so in such a way that his impairment in Becoming reflects a loss of form; time passing represents the increasing possibility of losing form.

Von Gebsattel considers how the obsessive-compulsive individual ought best to be understood. He concludes that
the world of the compulsive is constituted by forces inimical to form. He maintains that, even if the encounters of the obsessive-compulsive with the powers of "disformation" do not invariably involve real objects, the factors that do impinge upon him do so as though from the outside with the result that the individual is very much deprived of a world.

How, from our perspective, might this state of affairs be conceived? We identify this experience of things impinging upon him from the outside as an instance of the individual's confusion in the experiential domain of SUB:Sub with SUB:Obj relations.

We see this confusion arising out of the individual's displacement of his status as subject onto inanimate objects. Effectively, the individual is refusing that aspect of his consciousness taken as consciousness-as-relation. Put another way, he displaces his capacity to be there-to-himself onto inanimate objects with the result that in the world of things meaning takes its shape "toward" him with the result that the individual finds himself in a situation in which he feels he is being "acted upon" by what is ordinarily inanimate. Put in terms of the individual's capacity to temporalize: he forsakes his own capacity to come-toward-himself (i.e., his own futurity) and displaces it onto what has no possibility of coming-toward i.e., the
inanimate world.

**Heidegger’s Notion of Being-Toward-Death and Its**

**Application to the Me and the Now:** Heidegger’s concept of being-toward-death refers to an individual’s recognition of his finitude and the urgency of living out his most authentic possibilities of being given that there will be a certain, albeit indeterminate, end to his personal existence. From Heidegger’s point of view, death is better conceived of as a perspective than as a thing which will happen to us at some point.

Considering how the concept of being-toward-death applies to the Me and the now, we can reframe this question as an enquiry into how the future (taken as death) is included in the present and answer it in terms of the now/not-now.

A condition of our mortality is to know that at some point we will be no-longer-now-and-no-longer-there. That is, we face non-being and the destruction of meaning the Me has for a particular me. Grasping that prospect means that the content of that-experience-which-occurs-now implies a negation of all experiencing. This puts us squarely at the boundary situation we earlier defined as the limit of the now, namely the intersection where that-which-does-not-change (Being) observes that-which-does-change (Existence).
Considering existence as its own boundary, we can then specify the point at which the individual faces death from within i.e., from the now.

Another question which arises from this perspective is how coming-toward-oneself, which is the primordial phenomenon of the future, can be addressed in the concept of the Me and the now. Since the mind cannot experience non-existence, it then must throw up a scaffolding of ideas to help it. However, at the limit of the now ideas are undercut by the prospect of imminent non-being. With the now, taken as that-experience-which-occurs-now, being then of little help, on what basis can the individual recover himself? It is the Me which, as that-which-is-always-there, provides the foundation for the individual to grasp that, whatever the content of the experiencing, experiencing is never there except now. With that, the individual can then grasp that-experience-which-occurs-now as one of "having been". We have specified our conception of the point at which futurity is founded temporally.

**Future Lines of Enquiry:** Since this thesis deals with only one instance of repetition, obsessive-compulsive repetition a potential line of enquiry is an examination of repetition in other, non-pathological contexts. One might in this instance formulate a question of research such as:
In what respects does the now/not-now differ between individuals who can be described as having obsessive or compulsive personality traits and those who are better described as obsessive-compulsive disorder.

The Me/not-Me dichotomy has been specified but not elaborated upon in this thesis. A potential avenue of enquiry in this respect might be to address the experience of the dissolution of the boundary between the Me and the not-Me in case of atopic dermatitis. An example of the sort of research question which could be formulated in this respect is: What is the experience of the now for an individual who faces the gradual erosion of the physical boundary between the Me and the not-Me which the organ of the skin represents?

Finally, we have indicated how the notion of being-toward-death applies to our concepts of the Me and the now and have specified our notion of the point at which death comes from within. In this respect we have addressed the now as it represents a limit situation. We suggest as another limit situation demanding exploration, namely humour, taken as reflecting the capacity of the Me to be in-relation to itself.
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