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The July Monarchy in France, 1830-1848: Bourgeois or 'notable'? An Historiographical Perspective: 1830-1988

Robert Sauvé
1990

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Bourgeois or 'notable'?

An Historiographical Perspective: 1830-1988

A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School

of

The University of Ottawa

in

Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts in History

by

Robert Sauvé

1990
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Introduction

As I began to research my thesis question, I was reminded of how the papacy must have felt when it finally admitted to itself that the sun and not the earth was the centre of our universe. Discovering that one has followed uninformed beliefs in the case of the papacy, or has explored an incomplete question in mine, is a humbling albeit instructive experience. I had originally set out to analyze why the July Monarchy in France (1830-1848) was called a bourgeois monarchy, and how debate on this topic evolved in the historiography published between 1830 and 1988. My interest in the subject derived from the apparent rift among historians since about the mid-1950s concerning the exercise of political and administrative power during the July Monarchy. Whereas some historians were of the traditional view that the bourgeoisie were dominant among elected officials and government administrators, others suggested that the levers of political and social power had been in fact in the hands of a group called the 'notables' who were not necessarily bourgeois. Implicit, yet hidden in this debate, was the assumption that the nature of this period was uniquely determined by the group interests of those who exercised political, economic and social power. From this perspective, I originally considered the 'notables' as merely another group with particular interests. Accordingly, I consulted the relevant historiography in pursuit of a dual objective: (1) to ascertain how historians determined which of these two groups was dominant; and (2) to
establish when and how the historiographical debate began to revolve around the issue of purported 'notables' control.

The evidence soon showed that my initial assumption was incorrect and that my thesis question was therefore invalid. That is, although it was not unreasonable to characterize the regime in terms of those who exercised power within it, it was quite illogical to conclude that this was the only possible point of view. Indeed, one might also argue that the essential question has to do with what a regime does rather than with who exercises power within it. In that regard, I was struck by evidence suggesting that much of the progressive social legislation enacted during the July Monarchy enjoyed the support of all social classes and political tendencies. This type of "classless" political action was a revelation to me and led to a reevaluation of the meaning of the work of the French historian A. J. Tudesq whose work on the 'notables' between 1956 and 1982 contributed so much to modern scholarship on this subject.

Prior to Tudesq, most historians seemed to be comfortable with the notion that those in power during the July Monarchy had in fact legislated in their own group interests. Although some historians had earlier questioned this assumption, none had made an issue of it before Tudesq. He claimed that, although the composition of the 'notables' had changed over time, the 'notables', as members of the 'classe dirigeante', had routinely legislated in the interests of all classes. Thus, if traditional class imperatives were irrelevant at the level of legislation, it followed that the assumption supporting the original thesis question was at least suspect. Consequently, I redefined the focus of my research. I remained interested in the extent to which the historiography supports a class-compelled
bourgeois characterization of the July Monarchy. Nonetheless, I also directed my attention toward a "classless" definition.

Having thus established the focus of my research, I turned to the preparation of the thesis bibliography, concerning which I had two main objectives: (1) that it be large enough to support my research needs; and (2) that it be representative of the literature on the July Monarchy (what we may call the historiographical universe). The pursuit of these related objectives was complicated by the fact that the actual size and composition of the historiographical universe for the July Monarchy was not known. What is known are the titles assigned to various periods by librarians, a distribution whose adequacy depends very much on the knowledge and diligence of the librarians concerned. More importantly, such a distribution depends on the cataloguing standards imposed by their profession, some of which are not always adequate from the historian's standpoint. They do not, for instance, permit a historian's distinction between serious scholarship and hagiography. Similarly, librarians often do not catalogue as history less traditional works, such as those which focus on social, economic and cultural themes. Nor are their criteria always adequate as regards periodization, a fact which could have inhibiting consequences. For example, the Bibliographie annuelle de l'histoire de France, one of the main bibliographical tools used for this thesis, groups the entire period from 1815 to 1848 in a single era, that of the 'monarchie constitutionelle.' Accordingly, the explicit size and composition of the historical universe for the July Monarchy, one component of the 'monarchie constitutionelle,' cannot be known. Thus, it had to be estimated from the available
bibliographical data. As will be shown below, by using various bibliographical surrogates, I was able to compute the probable size and composition of the historiographical universe of the July Monarchy, at a level of accuracy sufficient to the modest needs of this thesis: that the thesis bibliography was large enough and reasonably representative of the historiographical universe from which it was derived.

In this regard, I assumed that the distribution of bibliographical items dealing with Louis Philippe is closely correlated with that dealing with the July Monarchy, and (more adventurously) that the latter is also reasonably well correlated with the historiography on the period. In Table 1, the 72 titles published per decade between 1955 and 1986 on Louis Philippe represented about 54 percent of the titles published on the 'monarchie constitutionelle' (Louis XVIII, Charles X and Louis Philippe). This share dropped to 42 percent for the 1921-1931 period, and 34 percent for 1866-1897. Moreover, we can compute the rate of publication of titles by converting the absolute values for the 'monarchie constitutionelle' into relative indexes. Thus, the 132 titles for the base period 1955-1986 are defined as 1.00, the 113 for 1921-1931 become 0.96 (113/132), and the 38 for 1866-1897 become 0.29. However, the nature of the historiography led me to analyze its evolution in terms of a different periodization schedule, one suggested by its internal logic. This periodization is indicated in Table 3, and is somewhat different from the periods that yielded the above shares and indexes. Since I was dealing with different periods, I was therefore compelled to assume further that these computed shares and indexes were equally relevant in roughly equivalent periods. Thus, the 1.00 index
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Louis XVIII</th>
<th>Charles X</th>
<th>Louis-Philippe</th>
<th>Napoleon III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1866-97</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-86</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Three Bibliographies

(for the surrogate bibliographical potential for the Constitutional Monarchy) computed for 1955-1986, for instance, applied also to 1961-1988. In addition, it seems obvious that data for missing periods could be approximated by proportional interpolation (the 0.93 index for 1931-1960 is assumed to be 7 percent less than the 1.00 for 1961-1988 since the 0.86 for 1901-1930 is 14 percent less than the same 1.00). These calculations have a limited value for they cannot in themselves be used to quantify the historical universe of the July Monarchy. Nonetheless, they are undoubtedly reasonably representative of its distribution.

It was only by using these structural data with an element in Table 2 that it became possible to quantify the historiographical universe of the July Monarchy. That is, Table 2 indicates that there were 890 titles published per year on the 'monarchie constitutionelle' between 1932 and 1987, or about 140 per year. This suggests about 4,200 for the period in which I am interested, 1961-1988. This also yields about 140 per year (150 x 0.93), or 4,200 for the period 1931-1960. As seen in Table 3, with this method I computed a bibliographical potential in the order of 14,500 titles.
for the constitutional monarchy for the period 1830-1988. Then, by applying the appropriate July Monarchy shares to the computed values for the Constitutional Monarchy, I obtained the related bibliographical potential for the July Monarchy: in the order of 6,700 titles for this period.
After having determined the level and composition of the historiographical universe for any period, one must decide how to exploit it. In order to examine this historiographical universe with some degree of objective detachment, I had to choose among three options. The first was to consult all the relevant material; the second to select a representative sample directly; the third to sample in some statistical fashion. Clearly, with such a large universe, it is not possible to consult all of this material. Furthermore, since the second option is reserved for only the most experienced historians, I could not use it. Alice Gérard, who will be mentioned later, is one example of an expert who selected her own representative sample. This leaves the third option: sampling. With such a substantial universe upon which to draw, sampling was also a practical option. Furthermore, as seen in Table 3, computing the size of this historiographical universe also yielded the standards against which to assess the representativeness of the thesis bibliography: the chronological or periodic distribution of the historiographical universe.

Having thus established the size of the historiographical universe for the July Monarchy, I then turned to the thesis bibliography. I assembled a preliminary bibliography of close to 500 titles, eventually consulting about 170 complemented by some 60 book reviews. It must be noted that these 500 titles were selected directly, not randomly as is required by orthodox sampling theory. However, there are advantages to this type of non-random sampling, not the least of which is the fact that librarians would have
already culled the obviously less relevant. In any event, this shift in method was imposed by the fact that relevant texts were not always available, which precluded the use of random sampling. Whether this is problematic is arguable. Since the thesis bibliography represents about three percent of the historiographical universe for the July Monarchy, it is clearly large enough: Samples of less than 0.01 percent of the Canadian population are used in public opinion polls to produce results considered to be over 90 percent accurate, 19 times out of 20. Therefore, my sample is statistically large enough; whether it is representative will be discussed later.

To further assess the numerical adequacy of my bibliography, I compared it to that used by the historian Alice Gérard in her analogous study of the French Revolution. On the one hand, as an expert in her field, it was proper that Gérard select directly her representative sample of 45 titles. On the other hand, since I am not sufficiently conversant with the body of material for this period, my selection had to exceed 45. Since I consulted almost four-times as many texts as Gérard (about 150 books complemented by some 60 book reviews), my sample appears to be large enough. And, since we can infer from Table 2 that the historiography available for the French Revolution (630 titles published between 1982 and 1987, for example) is about 40 percent larger than that of the July Monarchy (about half the 890 titles published in the same period for the Constitutional Monarchy), I insist that my sample is large enough.
Table 4
Percent Distribution of Texts: July Monarchy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Historiographical Universe</th>
<th>Thesis Bibliography</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1830-1860</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861-1900</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901-1930</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-1960</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1988</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Table 3, Thesis Bibliography

Nevertheless, even though the texts consulted appear to be numerically adequate, there is still the issue of their relationship to the related historiographical universe. Table 4 compares the periodic distributions of the historiographical universe and the thesis bibliography. Bearing in mind the assumptions used to estimate this historiographical universe, it is clear that the two distributions are related, though not identical. Although both build to peaks in the 1961-1988 period, the thesis bibliography is much more heavily biased toward the most recent scholarship. Nevertheless, since each period is reasonably represented, I would argue that the thesis bibliography is adequately representative of the historical universe. I would also argue that this over-representation is not necessarily undesirable; It adds more weight to the period when debate on the 'notables' peaked, a period of strategic importance in this thesis. A better statistical correlation could be obtained by dropping some of the most recent titles, an absurd though statistically orthodox approach.
An additional item of historiographical interest is the linguistic distribution of the thesis bibliography, which is outlined in Table 5. These data suggest: (1) that interest in the July Monarchy prior to 1950 was modest and largely francophone; (2) that anglophones accounted for almost half of the historiographical output after World War II; and (3) that general interest peaked in the 1970s. The total number of titles consulted climbed gradually from about two per decade (five gross) in the period prior to 1850, to 7 per decade (18 gross) for the 1926-50 period. Then, the number accelerated to 17 per decade for the 1950s, 38 for the 1960s, 45 for the 1970s, and an estimated 30 or so for the decade of the 1980s. The reasons for this acceleration and subsequent deceleration in published scholarship are not obvious. However, the opening of the archives after World War I may help explain the gradual growth up to World War II. It can also be assumed that the value for the 1926-50 period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years Published</th>
<th>French</th>
<th></th>
<th>English</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Books</td>
<td>Periodicals</td>
<td>Books</td>
<td>Periodicals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1850</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851-1875</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876-1900</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901-1925</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-1950</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-1960</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1970</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971-1980</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1988</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td></td>
<td>79</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Thesis Bibliography
might have been somewhat higher had it not been for the inhibiting effect on French scholarship of World War II. But, to interpret properly the great increase in interest after 1950, one must leave these data and seek qualitative clarification among the texts consulted. They suggest that the post-1950 period corresponded roughly with the advent of revisionist interest in the nature of the July Monarchy: Was it in fact bourgeois, for example. But the reason for the apparent decline in titles dealing with the July Monarchy after 1980 remains unexplained. It may have simply been the consequence of a shift in interest by historians.

The bibliographical data used to estimate the historiographical universe also yielded another useful item of information: Historians seemed to be less interested in the July Monarchy (or the Restoration) than in other similar periods in modern French history. According to the data in Table 1, it would appear that about twice as many historians were interested in the period ruled by Napoleon III as in those ruled by Louis XVIII, Charles X or Louis Philippe. This low rank was also evident in Table 2. Distribution B in this table confirms the relatively low historiographical rank of the July Monarchy, which contains about half of the historiography of the Constitutional Monarchy. That is, it would appear that historiographical interest was at its highest point for the Third Republic, and at its lowest for the Constitutional Monarchy.

The low historiographical rank of the July Monarchy suggested by these data was also confirmed by the few historians consulted here who actually commented on the nature of the historiography of that period. As
a rule, the few who did comment fell into one of two camps. In the first were those who felt that the writing on the period tended to have a republican or a marxist bias; in the second were those who felt that, until very recently, the nineteenth century history of France in general had received limited scholarly attention. Moreover, as I have shown, both camps appear to have been dominated by anglophone historians. Whether this language split is significant or mere coincidence is uncertain. There are not many models of historiographical research in the French language.²

In the first camp are historians such as the American A. P. Usher who referred to left-wing bias in a 1921 review of A. Clapham’s economic study of France and Germany. He declared that: "His (Clapham’s) judgements are sound and free from the doctrinaire elements that disfigure much writing on this period."³ Then in 1929 the British historian E. P. Brush claimed that nineteenth century French democrats had written the history of the Constitutional Monarchy in republican terms.⁴ This view was repeated in 1956 by her better known countryman J. P. T. Bury in a review of R. Rémond’s analysis of the French Right. Bury stated:⁵

*His (Rémond’s) book is, moreover, an understanding one and should usefully correct those histories, dominated by Republican orthodoxy of the left, which tend to dismiss the ‘Right’ as hopelessly unreasonable and obscurantist.*

The Canadian R. L. Koepke modified this assessment only slightly in 1979 by suggesting that the July Monarchy had long been scorned by French historians, first by Republicans and then by Marxists, because it was both a monarchy and bourgeois.⁶ In 1980, similar views were advanced by M. Agulhon and de Bertier de Sauvigny in France.⁷ Although I will not dispute the possible existence of republican or marxist bias in the wider field of

12
nineteenth century French historiography, this was not an issue in most texts consulted by me. In any event, those biases which were noticed by me appeared to be peripheral to the subject matter under consideration.

In the second camp, which deals with the extent and scope of scholarly attention accorded the July Monarchy, the historiographical examples are less numerous but equally discriminating. In a 1929 review of Plon's diplomatic history of France, the American R. B. Mowat referred to a dearth of historical interest in that particular period prior to World War I. He suggested that the growth in French scholarship since the Great War was driven in part by the great volume of official documents that had become available to historians after the war. However, if the British historian A. Cobban is to be believed, this new access to archival materials apparently did not have a very noticeable effect on the historiography of the period. He claimed in 1955 that, at least from a British perspective, "the political and economic history of France is still very imperfectly known." By ascribing this to a lack of access to documentary materials, he echoed Mowat's argument from an earlier generation. Furthermore, it would appear that time changed little in that a similar assessment was made in 1973 by the American P. H. Amann in his review of his countryman D. H. Pinkney's study of the Revolution of 1830. And, even within this restricted field of interest, de Sauvigny suggested in 1980 that American scholarship was dominant, especially after 1950.

Particularly significant among those who commented on this historiography were H. A. C. Collingham in Britain and the two Becks in the United States. In 1988 Collingham claimed that, apart from a few specialized monographs on republican and socialist themes, this period had
received little attention. In fact, his collaborator R. S. Alexander went so far as to say that "Hugh Collingham's is the first book written in English to analyze Orleanist politics in anything like a comprehensive fashion." Coincidentally, M. W. and T. D. Beck in the United States had made a similar claim the preceding year concerning analyses of French social strata in their study of the French 'notables':

The socially, economically and politically privileged of France in the first half of the nineteenth century have never been systematically analyzed as a group, although some historians have studied parts of this group.

While these last two claims may be self-serving, they appear to be supported by the bibliography consulted in this thesis. Even in France, one has to go back a century, in my view, before encountering a conceptual equivalent to Collingham in P. Thureau-Dangin's landmark work on the July Monarchy. Where Thureau-Dangin typified the tediously lengthy and event-oriented political historicism of the nineteenth century, Collingham is much more concise and analytical. Hence, where I would recommend the former as a data source, I would consult the latter for analysis. Furthermore, since Collingham acknowledged yet overcame the data constraints previously identified by Cobban, Mowat and Amann, one must conclude that lack of historical interest in the Constitutional Monarchy cannot be explained only by the lack of access to archival materials. Historians may have simply ignored that period for any number of reasons.

Among the possible causes of this apparent disinterest are either the biases mentioned previously or the more critical assessment of the Becks. In their book on the French 'notables' the Becks declared quite simply that the social historiography of the nineteenth century was marked
either by disinterest or by lack of analysis. They stated that French historians tended to be primarily interested in local history and hence paid little attention to more strategic questions such as power-sharing between the bourgeoisie and the nobility. Furthermore, the Becks downgraded what little interest was shown by declaring that their (local French historians') work was qualitative rather than quantitative. This last assessment may be best understood in the light of the great importance the Becks accorded the computer-oriented statistical analyses which dominate their own book. Though I did not seek evidence to support or challenge the Beck claim that French historians tended to be more interested in local narrative history than in strategic analysis—the little evidence available to me did not support the Beck assessment—, I tend to agree with their second claim, that quantitative analysis was relatively weak in the historiography of France of that period. Although other historians such as Tudesq and A. Daumard in France and S. Kent in the United States had produced some useful analyses using electoral data, they appear to have been exceptions. Moreover, none provided either the breadth or the depth of the Beck work.

Finally, the way in which this thesis was assembled was influenced by the methods used by Alice Gérard in her 1970 work _La Révolution française, mythes et interprétations 1789-1970_. In this work Gérard analyzed the history of the controversies attached to the various interpretations of the French Revolution of 1789. Focusing successively on each of the 45 most important historians of that period, she carried out a chronological review of the evolution of the historiography of the French
Revolution. She found that interpretations of that event were affected both by the background of the writer and the political imperatives of the time. As regards background, for instance, her reviewer found three interpretative strains: (1) the conservative which saw the Revolution as evil; (2) the liberal which had difficulty reconciling the moderation of 1789 with the violence of 1793–94; and (3) the radical which saw the Revolution as a whole and could not accept liberal distinctions. Among Gérard's own references to the historiographical impact of political events were: 1815 when royalists avenged themselves; 1830 when the bourgeoisie completed the work of 1789; 1889 which reflected Centenary interest; and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 which generated many comparisons with 1789.

However, I shall differ from the Gérard model in two respects. First, where she conducted a single pass through the period, I shall make several in order to cover all the elements affecting the thesis question. Second, I shall comment occasionally upon the arguments advanced by some historians. That is, where Gérard focused on a small number of relatively well known and eminent scholars whose authority required no justification, I have used a wider list of references, not all of whom are very well known. Hence, I shall sometimes have to contrast the lesser known with the more renowned. This can be problematic when the opinion of the renowned conflicts with the more cogent argument of a lesser known commentator. For instance, the relatively unknown British historian Collingham took issue with the renowned French scholar Tudesq concerning the significance of the term 'notable'. Where Tudesq's opinion would normally be expected to
prevail because of his pioneering work in this area, I found Collingham's argument compelling, though not necessarily decisive.

Within this methodological spectrum, this study will be developed in four chapters. In the first, *The Bourgeoisie and The 'notables': Who Were They?*, I will define the terms bourgeoisie and 'notables', especially as regards their historical evolution. Although this may unavoidably require some reference to the thesis question, the purpose is simply to define terms, not to develop the issue. In the second, *The July Monarchy: What Was It?*, I will attempt to describe the period in terms of the political, social and economic dynamics that drove it. This will permit me to address part of the thesis question: Is a unique class-compelled portrayal of the period warranted? In the third, *The July Monarchy: Who Ruled It - The Bourgeoisie?*, I shall complete the first part of the thesis question: If a class-compelled designation is warranted, to what extent does the historiography support a bourgeois hegemony? In the fourth, *The July Monarchy: Who Ruled it - The 'notables'?*, I will address the second part of the thesis question by describing the evolution of the debate on the 'notables', especially as regards Tudesq's contribution to it. Finally, in the Conclusion, I will summarize the historiographical evidence to show: (1) that the historiography of the period overwhelmingly supports the view that the July Monarchy of Louis-Philippe was in fact a bourgeois monarchy, no matter how one considers the evidence; (2) that Tudesq's classless-behaviour model is an interesting, even probable, though inconclusively argued hypothesis; and (3) that the relative political significance of the 'notables' and the 'grands notables' has yet to be determined. Finally, even if one concedes to Tudesq his classless thesis, the historiography
still demonstrates that the bourgeoisie were numerically dominant among the 'grands notables', their classless political behaviour notwithstanding.
Chapter 1

The Bourgeoisie and The 'notables': Who Were They?

Although class structure in nineteenth century France had clearly evolved from earlier times—when land-based feudal imperatives prevailed—toward a system more in keeping with the needs of a country under the twin pressures of urbanization and industrialization, a preliminary response to the question in the rubric above is to be found in the origins of the three-class social system of the 'ancien régime'. The first class was then called the First Estate with membership reserved for the Catholic clergy; the Second Estate grouped all of the nobility whose clerical status had not already placed them within the First Estate; the third was a residual category called the Third Estate and included such diverse occupational and social groups as: serfs, peasants and urban dwellers; lawyers, doctors and public servants; artisans, poets, teachers, intellectuals and businessmen. And, where the bourgeoisie sprang uniquely from the Third Estate, the 'notables' issued from all three.

As regards the term bourgeoisie, it originally referred to urban dwellers. Since they were thus not directly associated with the land, it became difficult to assign traditional feudal duties to them. As a result, some—commercial traders and money lenders, for instance—were eventually exempted from traditional feudal duties. Consequently, this originally simple geographic designation gradually took on additional significance by effectively separating the bourgeoisie from other members of the Third
Estate who were still liable for feudal duties. But, when other urban dwellers were later freed of feudal responsibilities, the term bourgeois was also applied to them. The term then evolved to include all non-nobles who were not manual workers: "Les hommes dont le travail est intellectuel." That is, the bourgeoisie were those who earned their living from activities requiring intellectual rather than physical skills. Since this definition stood the test of time and historiographical scrutiny, it acquired a measure of orthodoxy. It was used, for instance, by Louis Blanc in 1867, A. Babeau in 1875, Pinkney in 1972 and T. D. Beck in 1974. However, it differed markedly from the marxist model which defined the bourgeoisie more narrowly as those whose income was derived from the ownership of the means of production other than land. Although the marxist model had some adherents, it was rejected by others such as the French historians J. Aynard in 1934 and P. Gaxotte in 1972, and by the Americans M. W and T. D. Beck in 1987. Aynard and, not surprisingly, the royalist Gaxotte rejected the marxist correlation of capital and the bourgeoisie as simplistic. They argued, instead, that it was contradictory for Marxists to define farmers as non-bourgeois since they were in fact capitalists and hence bourgeois by virtue of the fact that their wealth was as much dependent on capital investment as on their own labour. The Becks, however, rejected the marxist interpretation, not because it may have been contradictory, but because they thought it inappropriate. Since they felt that the marxist model applied only during the second-half of the nineteenth century, they concluded that the bourgeoisie of the July Monarchy were better defined in orthodox terms as those non-nobles who were not manual workers.
Furthermore, this historically orthodox definition gradually acquired concrete references. For instance, in 1921 Clapham in Britain put a face on some of the bourgeoisie: They were millers, brewers, lawyers, and people skilled in real estate transactions. Then, intellectuals, political and social activists, administrators and teachers joined the list as historians delved more deeply into archival materials, and this led to new interest in their political and social relevance. The French historian F. Ponteil, for instance, focused in 1968 on "the elusive relation of the nineteenth century bourgeoisie to democracy." He noted how the French bourgeoisie of that time continuously espoused personal liberty and social equality as well as somewhat tempered 'laissez-faire' economic principles. Consequently, he saw the bourgeoisie as political progressives and economic conservatives who cherished liberty, social mobility and the representative system.\footnote{19} It was the British scholar Collingham who provided the most recent echo of the orthodox definition: Those non-nobles who were literate, politically conscious, prosperous and not manually employed.\footnote{20}

Within this non-marxist definition, historiographical interest was segmented and not monolithic. For instance, in 1946, the French scholar C. Morazé emphasized the economic dimension. Although he saw bourgeois numbers growing during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a result of the assimilation of exceptional individuals from the lower ranks of the Third Estate, he concluded that this growth was quite modest before bourgeois ranks were swelled by industrialization and population growth in the early nineteenth century.\footnote{21} His countryman, J. Lhomme followed much the same economic path in 1960 by describing the class structure in nineteenth century France as a social hierarchy composed of: (1) the landed
aristocracy; (2) the wealthy 'grande bourgeoisie'; (3) the relatively prosperous middle classes (petite et moyenne bourgeoisie); and (4) the remaining and undifferentiated "people." In a related vein, historians such as the American L. O'Boyle divided the bourgeoisie of the 1830s into: (1) a small group of businessmen; (2) a larger group of professionals and state officials; and (3) a larger and dominant group of landowners. Although O'Boyle's 1966 analysis of the French middle class remained unchallenged or unnoticed by most historians—with the exception of Cobban in 1967—, her proportional distribution was in fact not supported by data from the Beck analysis of 1987, which clearly indicated the opposite and clearly correct dispersion.

In summary, the historiography suggests that the bourgeoisie can be defined either by their occupations or by the values they espoused. As regards their values, some saw them as conservatives in political, social and economic matters; others as liberals; others still as revolutionaries. As regards occupation, some saw them as businessmen; others as administrators and politicians; others as intellectuals and social activists. Furthermore, some saw great significance in their financial segmentation within the business class. Moreover, it would appear that most historians focused on either their obvious political or economic contributions rather than on their less evident but strategically important value systems. Consequently, if the Tudesq hypothesis—to be discussed later—concerning the nature of the 'notables' is correct, this historiographical inattention to value systems was probably a strategic oversight by many historians.
But where the bourgeoisie evolved as a result of economic and ideological imperatives, the almost coincident emergence of the 'notables' was driven largely by political and administrative dynamics. This was detailed by the French historian Tudesq who popularized the term between 1956 and 1973. Using as reference a dictionary published by L'Académie Française in 1694, he defined the 'notables' as "les principaux et plus considérables d'une ville, d'une province, d'un État." Here we must note: (1) that there was no reference to the traditional class structure, a critical datum in his thesis; and (2) that the 'notables' were closely associated with wealth and influence. Moreover, as with the bourgeoisie, the definition of the term 'notables' evolved, according to Tudesq, to take account of their most current social or political functions. In 1764, for instance, the term 'notables' referred to those who had been given certain municipal responsibilities by the king; in 1787, the term was refined to refer primarily to the aristocracy and the rich bourgeoisie. As will be shown later, Tudesq defined the 'grands notables' of the July Monarchy in these pre-Revolutionary terms. But other historians, such as the Becks, saw greater relevance in the continuing evolution of the term. During the late-Revolutionary Consulat, for instance, the official "liste des notabilités" contained the names of the "corps électoral." Then, concurrent with the Bourbon Restoration in 1814, came the demise of the 'notable' as an official category. According to the Charter of 1814, a 'notable' thenceforth simply designated an older male who had paid sufficient taxes ('cens') to be eligible to vote. That this electoral designation fundamentally changed the nature of the 'notables' is seen by some as strategic since it enfranchised many new electors. Furthermore,
since many of these post-Charter 'notables' were neither particularly wealthy nor influential, they could hardly have been viewed as 'notables' within the Tudesq definition.

With the assimilation of the wealthy 'grande bourgeoisie' into the noble-dominated 'notables' in the eighteenth century, Tudesq concluded that the 'notables' (as defined in 1787) thus became a new "classe dirigeante." He referred to them as 'grands notables' and defined them as classless males of voting age who paid taxes in excess of 1,000 francs per year (as compared to simple electors defined in the Charter as those who paid as little as 200 francs, or potential office holders who paid 500). Clearly, Tudesq viewed the apparent tendency of the 'grands notables' to acquire political office as more significant than the ability of the lesser 'notables' to elect them. It was on this point of significance that some historians differed with Tudesq.

This included his countryman Ponteil who obviously was not referring to 'grands notables' when he wrote in 1968 that the 'notables' were "des representants de la classe moyenne enrichis par le commerce." Although Ponteil did not dispute the political power of the wealthier 'grands notables', he appeared to see greater significance in the growth of the lesser 'notables'. This view was shared by other historians including the Becks in the United States who, in 1987, defined the 'notables' as "the socially, economically and politically privileged of France in the first-half of the nineteenth century." They also declared that "the electorate of France is best described as the elite." Hence, the Becks claimed that the terms elite, electors and 'notables' were synonymous, a correspondence they declared was common currency during the July Monarchy.
Although the Beck-Ponteil focus—the 'notables' as electors—differed from Tudesq's—the 'grands notables' as the elected—, they nevertheless shared with him a common definition of the lesser 'notables' as defined earlier. However, as is seen in Table 6, the Becks and Tudesq clearly advanced different definitions of 'grands notables'. Where Tudesq's term included nobles and wealthy bourgeois, the Becks' was restricted to non-nobles. Whether this is significant or merely a matter of semantics was difficult to discern in their writings. But, as mentioned previously, what is significant is their different focus: Where the Becks, for example, were interested in all 'notables' as taxpayers and hence as electors, Tudesq's primary interest was in those electors who were most likely to have been the elected, those wealthier taxpayers who had traditionally managed to have themselves elected, the 'grands notables'. If the Beck distribution of 'notables' as electors in Table 6 is at all accurate, Tudesq's 'grands notables' accounted for about eight percent of the eligible electorate, a low though not inconsiderable share if they could focus their efforts on shared interests. Whether these common

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<td>Titled Nobles</td>
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<td>Least Wealthy</td>
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Source: Beck and Beck, pp. 78-84.
concerns were of sufficient import to have in fact produced coordinated political initiatives is a matter of some debate among historians, and strikes at the heart of the Tudesq hypothesis. So also does the question of whether the power of the 'grands notables' in office (Tudesq) was more characteristic of the period than that of the lesser 'notables' as electors (the Becks).

In a related vein, one might wonder why Tudesq emphasized the classless nature of the 'grands notables' when his own analysis makes clear that numerical dominance within that group had slipped from the nobility to the bourgeoisie during the July Monarchy. As will be shown later, it would appear that Tudesq was staking out new territory by making three strategic points: (1) that the power of the 'grand notables'—most of whom were landowners—as the elected was more significant than that of the lesser 'notables'—not all of whom were landowners—as electors; (2) that the political power of the 'grands notables' during the July Monarchy mirrored that of earlier times; but, (3) that, for whatever reasons, these new 'grands notables' were more concerned with problems common to all classes than with their narrower historic class interests. But, this apparent rejection of traditional class imperatives did not preclude Tudesq's interest in the obvious rise of the bourgeoisie among the 'notables'. For example, in a work carried out with his colleague, A. Jardin, he was to affirm the hegemony of the bourgeoisie as 'notables' during the July Monarchy. 27 It is not clear here if he meant that the lesser 'notables' had by then asserted their power as electors, or that the bourgeoisie had become dominant among the 'grands notables'. As is shown below, it would appear that data from the Beck analysis could support either alternative.
That is, although bourgeois occupational dominance among electors is not immediately obvious in the Beck data in Table 7, its social-order dominance is clear. (However, one would have expected intuitively to see a combined noble share in excess of four percent. If this is not a data anomaly, it may be explained by the view of some historians who claimed that many Legitimist nobles boycotted the Orleanist political process, at least during the early years of the July Monarchy.) Within the occupational data set, if we make the reasonable assumption that few of those in the business, professions and government categories were nobles, we can conclude that in the order of 40 percent of these electors had to be bourgeois. Then, when we examine the landed category, the principal source of Tudesq's 'grands notables', a category which accounted for 57 percent of electors, it is important to note that the Beck claim that only 43 percent of these 57 were true landowners; the other 14 actually worked the

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<td>Percent Distribution of Electors</td>
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Source: Beck and Beck, pp. 43, 194-5.
land without owning it. If we then assume, again reasonably, that most of these tenant farmers were not nobles—else they would likely have owned the land they farmed—we see a bourgeois occupational share well in excess of 50 percent. Moreover, we can logically conclude that a large proportion of the remaining 43 percent who were 'bona fide' landowners must have been bourgeois (especially if the data in the social order section of Table 7 are at all accurate), the consequence of which would have been an overall bourgeois occupational share approaching the social order figure. Finally, it would also appear from these same data that even the 'grands notables' were dominated numerically by the bourgeoisie. That is, if Tudesq's 'grands notables' were indeed included in the eight percent who were titled nobles and 'grands notables', as defined by the Becks in Table 7, and if, as shown in the same table, four percent of the electorate were (titled or untitled) nobles, the remaining four percent must have been bourgeois. Hence, the great probability of bourgeois hegemony even among Tudesq's 'grands notables'.

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Chapter 2

The July Monarchy: What Was It?

Some periods of history introduce enough change to be called pivotal. How much change is required is a matter of opinion, as is the required nature of the change; to what extent must it be political, social, economic or religious, for example? And of course there is always debate over whether one period is more pivotal than another. Many historians consider the Constitutional Monarchy in general and the July Monarchy in particular to have been a turning point in the modern history of France. Whether it was more pivotal than the Second Republic or the Second Empire depends upon whether the decision criteria are political or economic, for instance, and whether one is persuaded ideologically by one argument rather than another: Whether one is monarchist or republican, for instance.

When the July Monarchy is judged in this regard, it is considered as an independent unit by some or simply as part of the more extensive Constitutional Monarchy by others. But however it is viewed, it is often referred to as a period of transition. Furthermore, the political difficulty attending this transition was noted as late as 1957 by the British historian E. Lipsom when he said that "Napoleon bequeathed to his successors the problem of reconciling two divergent aims, the establishment of a form of government acceptable to France combined with the pursuit of a policy acceptable to Europe." By this historians have meant that, even though the French apparently pined for the glory of the Napoleonic era, the rest of Europe would not again tolerate the French militarism which had theretofore generated this glory. It was in part as a response to this
tension that some feel that Louis-Philippe's early policy of conciliation and accommodation in domestic affairs, the 'juste milieu', was his way of dealing with this inheritance. It was within this perspective of balancing difficult political options that the notion of the July Monarchy as a period of transition was discussed by the earliest analysts of the period.

Of course, since discussion of transition requires some reasonable chronological perspective, it could not be identified as such in the writings of nineteenth and early twentieth century historians. Nevertheless, many of the critical elements within this political transition were discussed by the earliest commentators. This included A. Thiers, one of Louis-Philippe's political allies in 1830, who in effect identified some of these transitional elements when he declared in 1831 that the Orleanist Louis-Philippe was quite different from his Bourbon predecessor: Where Louis-Philippe had accepted his dependence on and had chosen his ministers from among the majority in the Chamber of Deputies, Charles X had not; where Louis-Philippe's regime was therefore representative, that of Charles was consultative only. Of course, only in retrospect can one see these as elements in a transition and not merely as isolated cases of incidental change between successor regimes. Furthermore, self-serving rationalization notwithstanding, Thiers' 1831 description of the options facing the revolutionaries before they finally chose Louis-Philippe also points to transitional imperatives. He felt that they could have replaced Charles X: (1) with another Bourbon, Henri V, the infant grandson of Charles X; (2) with Napoleon II and a second empire; (3) with a second republic; or finally (4) with another monarchy headed by the Orleanist Louis-Philippe. As they evaluated these options, they were
guided by practical political considerations: The authoritarian nature of the preceding Bourbon reign, coupled with the violence of its final days precluded the choice of another Bourbon; since Napoleon II was not resident in France at the time, support for another empire was weak; and, recollections of the violence of the early 1790s, coupled with the lack of timely resolve by republicans postponed the republican option for yet another day. This left the fourth option, the compromise choice of Louis-Philippe: "Certes, voulant une monarchie, nous ne pouvions jeter les yeux sur d'autre que sur ce prince, si miraculeusement placé à coté de nous pour cette circonstance."31 In this regard, although one contemporary, C. Lahure, agreed with Thiers, another, Blanc, advanced a more critical view. For example, after perhaps having viewed the July Monarchy through romantic eyes, Lahure claimed in 1864 that the reign of Louis-Philippe had produced significant advances in industry, commerce, literature, the arts and sciences, and "la propogation des idées socialistes."32 Though this suggests one set of ideological transitional elements, Blanc analyzed the period in terms of a power struggle between the bourgeoisie and the king. He saw relations between the two progressing from cooperation to tension to conflict, the result of which was the eventual rejection of the monarchical form of government in favour of the republican in the Revolution of 1848, during which Blanc was an active rebel.33

But, the notion of the July Monarchy as a period of transition as such appears to have become prominent only after World War I. For example, typical was the American historian G. Elton who, in 1923, depicted the July Monarchy as a period of political transition between the 'ancien régime' and the Republic. In another case, the English historian Brush typified
the school which cast a wider net, but still within the political arena: In 1929 she defined the whole period of the Constitutional Monarchy (1815-48) as a time when the spirit of 1789 was being worked out, especially in the development of the institutions of parliamentary government. These views concerning strategic political change were echoed by the French historian E. Jarry in 1947 and by Collingham in Britain in 1988. On the economic front, it will be shown later that the American historian Pinkney was of the view that the 1840s represented a watershed in French economic history, an hypothesis not entirely shared by French historians such as F. Crouzet and M. Lévy-Leboyer. They felt instead that political and especially economic change were more rapid during the Second Empire.

Among those who considered the July Monarchy itself as pivotal were some who described the difficulty in this transition which arose from the implementation of Louis-Philippe's policy of the 'juste milieu'. For example, as Ponteil noted in 1949, the successful implementation of this relatively unfamiliar middle-of-the-road policy, which represented a clear change from the more authoritarian practices of previous regimes, required a political maturity which was not widespread in nineteenth century France. By political maturity he meant common sense and a capacity for reasonable political compromise among the polarized electorate.34 As a result, the regime was subject to considerable and continuing internal friction. Others such as the British historian T. E. B. Howarth saw transitional problems arising from a wider web of strategic forces. In 1961, he repeated earlier views which held that:35

The nation over which Louis-Philippe was called upon to reign and which he intended to govern was clearly in the grip of two interrelated revolutions, which as a man of the eighteenth century
he was never able to understand - one in the sphere of economics and one in that of thought.

The nature of these two so-called revolutions was outlined in 1973 by the French duo of A. Jardin and Tudesq; they concluded that the "monarchie censitaire" between 1815 and 1848 was dominated by the interrelation of parliamentarianism, the bourgeoisie and liberalism. According to these two scholars, these three interrelated elements helped to transform France from an agrarian society of privilege into a more urban and industrialized nation where universal suffrage eventually prevailed. It was during this period that they saw the bourgeoisie as 'notables' confirming their ascendancy. Whether this meant 'grands notables' or lesser 'notables' is uncertain. As mentioned earlier, the Beck data would support both options.36 In a similar vein, and roughly contemporaneous with Jardin and Tudesq, their countryman J. Chastenet, a noted monarchist and historical populizer, described the July Monarchy as a period of great political and social agitation: "L'époque de Louis-Philippe a été une des plus agitées de notre histoire." Chastenet saw the economy developing lock-step with industrialization; he also described its political ferment in terms of the growth in the number of secret societies opposing the government, a phenomenon which may have contributed to the nine attempts on the king's life; he observed that the intellectual life of the period was dominated by Romanticism and the liberal notions of the freedom and rights of the individual; he saw its social development influenced by the philosophies of Saint-Simon, Comte, Fourier and Cabot.37

From this general overview it is possible to consider the Constitutional Monarchy in general and the July Monarchy in particular in
terms of the effects of three distinct but probably interrelated environments: The intellectual, the economic and the political. As a result of the first environment, it appears that the attitudes of the bourgeois and 'notable' elite were influenced by new patterns of thought and social organization: Liberalism and socialism, for instance, were on the rise. Consequently, one could argue that this intellectual elite acted as a conduit for the propagation and implementation of these new ideas, the consequence of which was a society somehow marked by them. Because of the second environment, bourgeois-driven industrialization was transforming France from a rural and land-based regime to an urban and market-oriented economy. Hence, those who consider economic change as strategic could conclude that the period was best described in terms of bourgeois economic hegemony. Within the third and final environment, which nurtured a period of political instability, politically immature people wrestled with the complexities of an unfamiliar form of government, a representative parliamentary monarchy. According to some historians, it was within the turmoil of this last environment that the political ascendancy of the bourgeoisie was confirmed at the expense of the aristocracy. Consequently, those who judge history in terms of political power relationships would tend to classify the period as one dominated by the bourgeoisie. Clearly, when we consider the thesis questions relative to each of these three environments, it would appear that the bourgeois nature of the July Monarchy could have derived from any of them—from the intellectual, the economic or the political. Consequently, I shall review the historiography dealing with each environment commencing with the intellectual or ideological.
An important contribution to the debate concerning the impact of the ideological climate on French politics in the first half of the nineteenth century was made by the American Amann in his 1973 review of Pinkney's study of the 1830 Revolution. Although Pinkney contended that this revolution had not altered the political balance of power since there had been little change in the composition of those holding elected or appointed positions in government, Amann held otherwise. That is, whereas Pinkney, among many others, in effect postulated a direct correlation between social status and the uses to which political power was put, Amann considered this to be an unproven assumption. He said: 38

Granted that the administrative purges of 1830 failed to invest the bourgeoisie with state power, should our investigation stop there? I worry over Louis-Philippe, an aristocrat to his finger tips, suddenly affecting a bourgeois life-style after 1830. Why did he if nothing had changed? Is it just possible that the social climate did (change) even though the social and professional background of politicians and officials did not?

Although some may argue that Louis-Philippe and his government were, by their conduct, simply recognizing politically the importance of growing bourgeois economic power, I would argue that Amann was quite clear: He related changes in government attitudes to a social climate influenced more by new ideas than by narrowly focused class interests. Although it is possible to argue that Tudesq had made the same point implicitly in 1964 when he insisted on the classless nature of the 'grands notables', this was the first explicit challenge noted by me to the implicit assumption underlying much of the bourgeoisie-'notables' debate: That political power was assumed to have been used by those in power to further their specific class interests, even to the detriment of other classes. However, if, as
suggested explicitly by Amann and implicitly by Tudesq, ideas were class-

independent, which were decisive and how did historians treat them?

It can be argued that any consideration of the impact of ideas on

French social, economic or political life during the July Monarchy must

first determine the extent to which the historic and pervasive influence of

the Catholic Church was by then decisive. Although the political,

ideological and social influence of the Church waned considerably between

1789 and 1814 as a result of revolutionary imperatives, it regained some

lost ground during the Bourbon Restoration of 1814-1830 before sliding again

into official disfavour during the July Monarchy. But despite this second

fall from grace, historians still acknowledged the effect of even this

diminished Church on the climate within the July Monarchy, a climate which

arguably influenced Louis-Philippe and his governments.

Because of the historic association of the Church with the ruling

aristocracy, this residual influence of the Church was felt first in the

political arena. More particularly as a result of its still remembered

association with the recently deposed regime of the Bourbon Charles X, the

Church found itself with its traditional allies, the Bourbon aristocracy,
in political opposition to the ruling Orleanists. Consequently, Louis-

Philippe and his officials treated it at best with detached reserve. For

example, in one instance, in February 1831, when a riot greeted the Carlists
attending a mass in Paris on the occasion of the eleventh anniversary of the
dead of the Duc de Berry, the son of the deposed Charles X, the government
stood aside as the mob looted and then destroyed the residence of the
archbishop. Thiers was reputed to have said: "You (the Church) are not

only to blame for your own madness: you are to blame for the madness of

36
others." The British historian P. Spencer claimed that these riots reflected the release of pent-up frustrations caused by Bourbon and Church oppression in the post-1814 period, especially during the final years of the Restoration. He felt that this growing hostility toward the Church was an important contributor to the resurgence of anti-clericalism among the urban elite, a clear contrast to the deeply rooted religiosity of rural France where orthodox Catholic dogma and ritual blended with the traditional superstition and piety of the peasant. 39

Complementing this politically motivated anti-clericalism was a growing ideological gulf between the Church and bourgeois intellectuals, a rift caused in part by the Church's opposition to liberalism, an ideology with which so many of the bourgeois intelligentsia had identified. Furthermore, I would argue that this ideological chasm was unbridgeable in the short term in that it is possible to represent this opposition of the Church to liberalism as the resistance of faith to reason, of obedience to freedom, of tradition to change. The recognition of this gulf in this study is important since many historians viewed the July Monarchy as the period during which liberalism flourished. Therefore, in addition to the historic political factors which caused the Church and its allies to oppose the Orleanists, conflicting ideological dynamics also came into play.

This struggle of Catholic faith and reaction against liberal reason and freedom was noted by several historians. One of the first was the renowned French historian of the July Monarchy and Church-State dynamics in France and Britain, Thureau-Dangin. In his 1880 description of the stresses between Church and state during the July Monarchy, he chronicled the minutiae of this struggle. 40 Then, in 1909 during a period of deep
anti-clerical feeling in France following the Dreyfus affair, the French historian G. Weill complemented Thureau-Dangin's event-oriented work by concluding that the revolution of 1830 was as much a rejection of the Church as of the Bourbons. However, he noted that opinion within the Church at that time was not monolithic: Where conservatives may have been concerned with obtaining freedom for the institutional Church along pre-Revolutionary lines, liberal Catholics were prepared to accept the political consequences of 1830; that is, to accept the final rejection of privilege in favour of a much wider franchise.\textsuperscript{41} This was the position advanced by Lamennais, a liberal Catholic leader in the early years of the July Monarchy. He believed that the Church could prosper, not by seeking to reestablish its lost privileges, but by abandoning them in favour of a society where all could be free. After failing to convert to his cause either the Ultramontane French hierarchy or the Pope, he left the Church along with other like-minded people of his time.\textsuperscript{42}

However, not all analysts of the period shared the liberalism of Weill or Lamennais. In 1914 De Marcère, for instance, claimed that France during the July Monarchy could have been the saviour of Christian Europe had it been able to free itself from the grasp of Jews and Freemasons who, he claimed, were the powers behind the burgeoning power of bourgeois France.\textsuperscript{43} It is possible that this view reflected the Catholic anti-semitism which was endemic in France at the turn of the century and which was nourished by groups such as L'Action Française—witness the trial of Alfred Dreyfus, which was fuelled, inter alia, by virulent anti-semitism following France's humiliating military defeat at Prussian hands in 1870.
But then the Church appeared to be largely ignored by historians until the early post-World War II period when, as mentioned earlier, Spencer took up the subject. In his analysis of relations between the Church and the bourgeoisie in the post-1789 period, he pointed out that political and ideological antipathy between the two was deep and of long standing.\footnote{44}

Failing to recognize and cope with the growing power of the bourgeoisie, the Church committed itself to preserving the old order, and the bourgeoisie, already liberal in inclination, became automatically anti-clerical.

The practical effect of this antipathy remains an open question. For instance, in 1967 the American J. L. Osen noted that French Calvinist businessmen fared relatively well under Louis-Philippe. Although one might be tempted to draw a correlation between this observation and the effects of liberalism, Osen felt otherwise. He concluded that Protestant support of the July Monarchy was more a function of anti-clericalism and satisfaction at the overthrow of the Church-dominated Bourbon regime which had suppressed Protestants, than of an ideological attachment to liberalism. Finally, Stearns in 1967 and Collingham in 1988 reiterated the principal elements of Church-State relations and their effect on political action: Stearns revisited the conflict within the Church in his study of Lamennais; Collingham described the middle classes as having had "little sympathy for the Church", attributing this attitude to conflicts in ideology, religion and economics. As cited earlier, he claimed that, where the bourgeois middle classes tended to be liberal, the Church, and especially its hierarchy, tended to be conservative; where many of the commercially successful bourgeoisie tended to be Protestant, the Church necessarily found its strongest allies among the traditional Catholic
aristocracy, where the Church and its supporters derived their power and wealth from land and the practices of the past, the bourgeoisie owed their growing political influence to their more recent accomplishments in commerce and industry.45 Clearly, the bourgeoisie and the Church had polar-opposite antecedents and interests.

In summary, although it might have been theoretically tidy to be able to designate the conflict between liberalism and the Church as a unique political variable, the historiographical evidence does not permit such a facile conclusion. As important as this ideological clash was, it was not independent of other factors such as conflicting economic and regional interests, historic privileges and religious imperatives. Suffice to say here that, however constrained or complemented, the influence of religion in general and of the Catholic Church in particular on political and ideological dynamics during the July Monarchy was an item of note among historians.

Apart from this particular religious dimension, the contribution of ideas generally to political debate was noted early. In 1864, for instance, the French commentator Lahure described the reign of Louis-Philippe as a developing ground for socialist ideology.46 In 1924 H. D'Almeras referred to some of these socialist ideologies as "même les plus bizarres."47 Tudesq wrote in 1971 of the "Société des amis du peuple" which had been founded in 1830 by "jeunes bourgeois et d'anciens militaires" to defend the interests of exploited workers. He felt that the "Société" gradually "accentuated their socialist and communist tendencies."48 These ideological trends were also described in 1975 by B. H. Moss, E. L. Newman and J. M. Merriman in the United States. Where Moss and Merriman discussed
the evolution of republican socialism among Parisian workers in the early
1830s, Newman concluded instead that the workers were more interested in
pursuing their own economic interests than in following their "liberal
republican leaders." Then their countryman, E. Berenson, claimed in 1984
that the acceptance of these ideologies, bizarre or not, was due in no
small way to the fertile ground provided by an unlikely source, the
Catholic Church. That is, he felt that the Democratic-Socialists were
successful in 1846-52 because they had been able to tap a "reservoir of
Christian religiosity in peasant and artisan culture." He claimed that the
middle class theorists of socialism used their "shared commitment to the
moral principles of Christianity" as a bridge to the masses, a tactic which
Blanc had dismissed as outrageously simplistic a century earlier; he felt
instead that the Catholicism of the French was a fact of little political
significance. Yet, Blanc objected little when contemporary communist
radicals developed a critique of 'laissez-faire' bourgeois liberalism based
on the authority of the same Catholic tradition; they had described
Communism as Christianity in practice. In any event:

French socialism rejected the materialism of orthodox Marxism and
remained committed to republican institutions, in part because of
the antimaterialist bias and spiritual principles derived from the
democratic-socialist ideology that formed during the July Monarchy.

Moreover, L. Girard concluded in his 1985 study of French liberals
that "Le libéralisme s'affirme au XIXe siècle comme une composante
essentielle de la démocratie française." Complementing the social and
political effect of liberalism was the contribution of socialist thought as
noted by Pinkney in the United States: In his 1986 study of the last decade
of the July Monarchy, Pinkney went to some length to describe the
popularity of writers and opinion leaders such as Saint-Simon, Comte, Fourrier, Buonarroti, Blanc, Proudhon, Cabet, Leroux and Sand. In particular, Pinkney felt that the 'ancien régime' was being attacked not only by the changing economic tenor of the time but also by the positivism of Comte and the socialism of Blanc, Proudhon and others. Bury had earlier come to the same conclusions, saying that the net effect of these ideas and their political manifestations was the triumph of popular sovereignty during the July Monarchy. In 1988, the American L. Kramer accentuated the intellectual importance of Paris in his study of three exiles in Paris during the 1840s: Heinrich Heine, Karl Marx and Adam Mickiewicz. He described Paris at that time as "an extraordinary center of literary, intellectual and artistic talent", and suggested that Marx had been influenced significantly by French socialist thought. In summary, it is clear that historians throughout the period under review recognized the important contribution of new ideas to the evolution of political debate in France at that time.

Also recognized was the special association of these ideological trends with the bourgeoisie even though one cannot conclude that these new ideas were either unique to or shared equally throughout that class. For example, it would appear that differences obtained even within families: The younger were likely to be republican while the elder tended to be relatively conservative, though they generally remained political, economic and social liberals. That is, although businessmen quickly saw the political and economic benefits to be derived from the freedoms of a liberal regime, they resisted the implementation of republican and socialist programs which they considered inimical to their political and
economic interests. Therefore, though it can be argued that the ideological climate which nourished these new ideas was dominated by the bourgeoisie, it is also clear that there were important pockets of conservative resistance within the same general social group.

Moreover, the bourgeoisie were not the only proponents of these new ideas. It is common knowledge among students of the Enlightenment that eighteenth century French nobles routinely "sought the company of (bourgeois) authors and adopted the ideas of the philosophes." As a result of the growing spirit of political equality, F. C. Montague added that, "many nobles took service under revolutionary governments." In the same vein, his fellow countryman G. Chaussinand-Nogaret claimed that the ideas of the eighteenth century Enlightenment had been cherished by many members of the aristocracy. He even suggested that the nobility "a initié la réflexion des Lumières." In a 1976 review of Chaussinand-Nogaret's book, the reviewer claimed that this was not a novel thesis in that it had been advanced earlier in France by J. Égret and Gaxotte, the noted Legitimist historian. In 1989, the American reviewer R. O. Paxton said much the same thing: That the aristocrat Tocqueville "came from a milieu that took to enlightened intellectual activity as naturally as to public service."

Thus, the dilemma faced by Tocqueville and many other nineteenth century aristocrats was how to reconcile their class interests with their intellectual attachment to liberal principles. But, the obvious contribution of the aristocracy to the nurturing of new ideas notwithstanding, these emerging ideologies and the action they mandated appear to have been more closely associated with the bourgeoisie than with the aristocracy.
As regards the impact and origin of these new ideas, Morazé made two important points in 1946: (1) that developing ideologies had permeated the July Monarchy, and (2) that the bourgeoisie were responsible for them. Although his exuberance may have carried him too far—he claimed that the bourgeoisie had invented Rationalism and scientific thought—, he was not alone. In 1949 Ponteil made a similar albeit more subdued claim while describing the period as one dominated by liberalism and bourgeois power. He accordingly allied the liberal pursuit of freedom with the bourgeois pursuit of "le bien-être et la stabilité." This point was underlined in 1957 by his countryman G. Pradalie who declared that "La Monarchie de Juillet est dans notre histoire sociale le moment où la bourgeoisie domine entièrement la vie économique, la vie sociale, la vie politique, la vie intellectuelle." Although some may view the association of the bourgeoisie and ideological innovation as an unremarkable commonplace today, it was considered of sufficient import then to attract the attention of other historians throughout the twentieth century: D'Alméras in 1925, R. Burnand in 1955, G. Pradalie in 1957, Bury in 1962, Tudesq and Jardin in 1973, Chastenet in 1976, Berenson in 1984, Girard in 1985 and Collingham in 1988. They held that the bourgeoisie either promoted or transmitted notions of political and economic liberalism which influenced the life of the day. As a result, Bury, for example, declared that the doctrine of popular sovereignty evolved from this bourgeois adoption of liberal ideology. Concurrent with this growing liberal hegemony was the continued development of other and perhaps related streams of thought such as revolutionary republicanism and socialism which also enjoyed support within the bourgeoisie.
But, however much the bourgeoisie—and some of the aristocracy—nurtured these new ideologies, one must ask what influence they actually exerted on political decisions. In fact, that Louis-Philippe was influenced by bourgeois thought was noted throughout this period: By A. Boudin in 1847, A. E. Billaut de Gérainville in 1875, S. Girard in 1882, Thureau-Dangin in 1888, S. Charlety in 1920, Weil in 1930, A. Leroy in 1963, and P. A. Gagnon in 1964. Where Boudin, de Gérainville and Girard spoke of the well established bourgeois leanings of Louis-Philippe, Thureau-Dangin felt that, whatever his intellectual leanings, Louis-Philippe was greatly influenced by bourgeois interests. Charlety and Weill said that his educational background in fact made him think and act like a bourgeois—preserving social order by controlling the lower classes in order to create an environment where business rewards could be optimized. Where Gagnon described the bourgeoisie in terms of its values, Leroy, among others before him, described the government in terms of these bourgeois values: "L'esprit particulier de la classe moyenne devint l'esprit général du gouvernement." He went on to define this spirit in the words of Tocqueville: "Un esprit actif, industieux, souvent déshonnête, modéré en toutes choses, excepté dans le goût du bien-être et du médiocre." However, although this suggests that Louis-Philippe may have adopted some elements of bourgeois social ideology (liberalism and some social measures), others felt that he was much more attentive to bourgeois financial interests. For instance, in 1931 the well known Legitimist P. de la Gorce declared: "Ce prince porte sur le trône toutes les préoccupations du plus calculateur des bourgeois. Il est obsédé d'assurer le sort matériel de ses enfants." He was referring to the transfer of Louis-Philippe's
private holdings to his children on the very day of his coronation, a clear break with the tradition requiring the king to integrate his personal wealth with that of the crown. However, the implications of this act were disputed by J. J. Baughman in 1965 who showed that Louis-Philippe in fact had to finance his public needs from his own purse in order to avoid the austerity forced upon him by a parsimonious Chamber of Deputies. This surprised Baughman since most contemporaries of Louis-Philippe apparently assumed that the king would have used his position to enrich himself. At a more general level, E. Beau de Loménie noted in 1943 that the government of Louis-Philippe tended to favour large companies as instruments of public policy.

In summary, these references suggest that Louis-Philippe was more influenced by bourgeois financial notions than by their social ideology. Nevertheless, as will be shown later, much of the social legislation enacted during the July Monarchy cannot be explained in terms of traditional class interests, financial or social; the regime's legislative decisions had to have been influenced in some fashion by liberal and socialist ideologies, by changing social imperatives, or by routine political pressures. This tends to support Tudesq's thesis: That the class composition of the ruling 'grands notables' was less decisive in determining their behaviour than the class-indifferent social, economic and political imperatives which confronted all classes.

In this historiographical overview of the ideological environment of the period, there seems to be a consensus supporting the notions: (1) that the intellectual or ideological life of the time was dominated by the bourgeoisie; (2) that the bourgeoisie were generally guided by the liberal
notions of personal freedom, economic progress and representative government; (3) that these notions seem to have influenced the behaviour of all classes; and (4) that Louis-Philippe and his ministers were guided by bourgeois ideology, Howarth's 1961 comment notwithstanding:

The nation over which Louis-Philippe was called upon to reign and which he intended to govern was clearly in the grip of two interrelated revolutions, which as a man of the eighteenth century he was unable to understand— one in the sphere of economics and one in that of thought.

As we leave the ideological and enter the economic environment, I would like to identify what appears to have been an important shift in historiographical focus. Before World War II, traditional narrative tended to dominate economic issues; thereafter, accounting-oriented financial analysis carried the day. It should be noted, however, that this change was neither abrupt nor obvious in the short run. For instance, although an accountant's numerical approach would obviously qualify as financial analysis, so could a purely narrative and perhaps largely non-numerical treatise if it dealt with financial cause and effect, for instance. In this sense, it could be argued that event-oriented narrative gradually gave way to analytical narrative, which in turn was then transformed into the more numeric by analysts using mathematical models. However one may describe the rate of this transformation, it is clear that the event-oriented work of Thureau-Dangin in 1888, which was typical of the early narrative school, was clearly quite different from the economic analyses provided by scholars such as Pinkney, Lévy-Leboyer and Crouzet a century later.
Chronologically leading the narrative school was Lahure in 1864 who tempered his economic analysis with partisan political comment. For instance, where he acknowledged that much social good had derived from economic growth during the July Monarchy, he felt that the consequent enrichment of the bourgeoisie was politically and socially regrettable. This reluctance to treat economics on its own and independent of partisan considerations was going out of fashion in 1888 when Thureau-Dangin commented on railroad investment during the 1840s: "En matière économique, le gouvernement qui avait les vertus et les défauts de la bourgeoisie, était plus prudent que novateur." By way of example he cited the abandonment of innovative free trade initiatives by the government due to the influence of protectionist manufacturers, most of whom were bourgeois.

By the 1920s, historians seem to have freed themselves from the habit of colouring their economic analyses with social comment. For example, in his 1921 comparison of France and Germany, Clapham described how the rate of industrialization was more marked in Germany than in France. He attributed this in part to the relative scarcity of coal and the abundance of cheap labour in France, factors which would have been expected to retard the process of industrialization. Nonetheless, despite these constraints, he felt that improvements to the country's communication systems (1800-36: main roads and canals; 1830s: secondary roads; 1840s: railroads) provided the base upon which subsequent industrialization depended. Although this purely economic though narrative analysis appears to place Clapham squarely among modern economic historians, his reviewer suggested in 1922 that he was quite Rankean: "The author is not inclined to generalize, but prefers for the most part plain matter of fact." Although it is possible that his
apparent lack of generalization might have allied him with event-oriented
nineteenth century scholars such as Ranke in Germany, I would argue that
the way he used economic data also placed him on the road toward the end of
the analytical spectrum marked by Pinkney, Crouzet and Lévy-Leboyer.

This essentially narrative tradition also characterized the
writing of J. Lucas-Dubreton in 1938, Beau de Loménie in 1943, Ponteil in
1949 and Dunham in 1953 even though they, and Dunham in particular, tended
to be more analytical than most of their predecessors. As regards the
economic consequences of commercial activity during the July Monarchy, the
Orleanist Lucas-Dubreton declared effusively and not surprisingly: "Les
dix-huit années du règne de Louis-Philippe marqueront dans notre histoire
l’époque la plus heureuse, la plus libre, de tout point la plus prospère
qu’il ait été donnée à la France de traverser."

Although not as ebullient
as Lucas-Dubreton, other better known scholars shared substantially the
same view. For instance, Beau de Loménie suggested in 1943 that economic
growth during the July Monarchy was enhanced because Louis-Philippe
favoured large companies, a thesis some might dispute. At a more general
level, writing in the early post-World War II period, Ponteil and Dunham
associated the bourgeoisie with the first major attempts at modern
industrialization during both the Restoration and the July Monarchy.
Thus
did the late-1940s mark the end of the narrative period and the
commencement of the modern analytical era in French economic
historiography.

Among the historians consulted by me, the French scholar Morazé
was the first to offer a clearly strategic view of the economy during the
Constitutional Monarchy. Though I am not aware of the effect of Marx on
Morazé, it is clear that the latter owes some conceptual debt to the former. Writing in 1946, Morazé held that the hundred years following the mid-eighteenth century witnessed the growth of a new society in France—as it had in Britain—where the needs of the textile industry dominated. This he attributed to the relatively new clothing needs of a growing population. As well, he concluded that the burgeoning political and social power of the bourgeoisie at that time was the normal result of the ensuing financial enrichment of bourgeois industrialists. Although one might dispute certain aspects of this model, Morazé's analysis was important in that it offered a synthesis explaining bourgeois influence in terms of strategic economic and demographic variables. His countryman C. Pouthas used much the same approach in 1956 when he described the economy of the July Monarchy in terms of demographic variables such as birth rates and urbanization.

With this strategic model as an implicit reference, historians then undertook micro-analyses of the economy over which Louis-Philippe presided. For instance, J. P. Aguet in France, Stearns and Moss in the United States and the British R. D. Price were typical of those interested in the proletariat. In 1954 Aguet provided an overview of 382 of the 1,049 strikes which took place during the July Monarchy. A decade later Stearns reported that strikes by factory workers were largely ineffective because of poor planning and lack of organization. He explained this in terms of the lack of an established industrial tradition among factory workers. That is, coming largely from peasant cultures, and viewing themselves as both unskilled and insignificant, they were easily intimidated by their new environment. This was in sharp contrast to the smaller concentrations of
skilled artisans who had been nurtured in a more established urban-based industrial culture. Then in 1971 Price broadened the issue somewhat by observing that "Constitutional Monarchy in France had the misfortune to exist during a long period of economic depression." As a result, various proletarian and peasant groups sought relief via public protests, gestures which generated response in kind from Louis-Philippe: Not only did he suppress these demonstrations, he also often turned a blind eye to businessmen who sometimes took advantage of the economic conditions to reduce the wages of industrial workers. In 1975, Moss dealt with the contribution of Parisian workers to the development of republican socialism. These four studies demonstrate how one aspect—the proletarian dimension—of economic and political analysis evolved by taking on a narrower but deeper focus.

Still implicitly within Morazé's strategic model, other historians started to focus analytically on other elements within this developing industrial economy. At one end of this relatively short analytical spectrum are the French historians Burnand and Tudesq in the mid-1950s, while at the other is the American Pinkney in 1986. In his general and perhaps cursory study of daily life during the July Monarchy, Burnand remarked on the increasing number of business licences during the Constitutional Monarchy: 955,000 in 1822; 1,200,000 in 1830; 1,400,000 in 1840. This casual reference to business also obtained with Tudesq who quoted from an editorial (July 20, 1845) in Le Journal Des Débats which had reported that discussion in the Upper House (Peers) was becoming increasingly concerned with business matters. Tudesq attributed this to
increasing participation in business by Peers: In 1848, 83 of the 311 sitting Peers were associated with important commercial enterprises.  

This gradual dissection of the economy of the July Monarchy continued with Lhomme in 1960 when he said that "On se rapelera enfin que l'industrie n'a pas encore pris, en 1830, son grand départ."  

This view was repeated by Price in 1971 when he noted that the France of 1830 was a country of peasants, urban artisans and landowning 'notables' rather than of industrial workers and urban bourgeoisie. Significant here is the claim that France in 1830 showed few signs of important industrialization. In fact, several historians, including Pinkney who will be discussed later, saw little difference in France between the 'ancien régime' and 1830--society was still rural, hierarchical and dominated by landowners. Lhomme claimed that this new process of industrialization accelerated during the 1830s, the result of which was the continued enrichment of the bourgeoisie relative to the landed aristocracy. He observed that this also changed the composition of the 'grande bourgeoisie', the wealthiest of the bourgeoisie; where the generation of wealth had been monopolized theretofore by bourgeois bankers and merchants, it thenceforth included a growing share of industrialists. In fact, Lhomme held that, during the 1830s, the 'grande bourgeoisie' was dominated by industrialists and bankers.  

Although this tended to associate the bourgeoisie with industrialization and both with the July Monarchy, analysts such as J. Vidalenc in France were not so categoric. Vidalenc pointed out that, even though there was ample evidence to identify the bourgeoisie with the growth of a new industrial economy, there was little justification to associate the genesis of this correlation with the July Monarchy. Although he
accepted the view that the concurrent growth of the bourgeoisie and modern industrialization were synonymous, he pointed out that industrialization proceeded apace with the development of railroads, and that railroad construction had started in the earliest years of the Restoration under Louis XVIII. This led him to declare that "Les efforts d'ascension sociale amenaient un renouvellement constant de la bourgeoisie, surtout sous la Restoration." 91

Micro-analysis of the period continued in the anglophone world with the Americans C. H. Johnson in 1975, M. Traugott in 1983, Berenson in 1984, and the British B. M. Ratcliffe in 1978. Johnson compared the effect of state policy on industrial economic development in both the Restoration and Orleanist periods, both of which had been dominated politically by landowners; he concluded that it had been more intense and productive in the latter. Moreover, he claimed that the increased pace of industrialization during the 1840s owed much to public investment in social overhead during the 1830s. This included an improved school system to provide industry with literate workers, and a decade-long public debate on potential railroad investment, a debate which facilitated passage of the railroad law of 1842; this law provided financial incentives for new railroad investment upon which most historians feel industrialization in France depended.92 But where Johnson saw the economy growing as the result of a coincidence of interests between landowners and men of commerce, both of whom had surplus funds to invest in new industrial ventures, Ratcliffe still saw their competing interests inhibiting growth. For instance, in his treatment of the tariff reform debate, Ratcliffe pointed out that, while the bourgeois-dominated business community tended to favour low
import duties, the landowning aristocracy remained protectionist. At a more particular level, Traugott and Berenson plumbed other areas of more specialized interest: Traugott described how the agricultural crisis of 1845-47 wiped out many who had speculated in railroad stock; Berenson detailed the importance of growing consumer demand on economic growth, an interesting switch to a demand-pull orientation from the apparent supply-push preference of some economic historians.

In this continuum between Morazé in 1943 and Berenson in 1984, we see a series of micro-analyses within Morazé's implied strategic reference where each attempted to provide a more focused view of a particular economic element. It was only in 1986 that there appeared a more global economic view of this period—at least in the English speaking world—in a study of the 1840s by Pinkney in the United States who drew heavily upon the economic analyses of Crouzet in France. Highlighting Pinkney in this thesis is motivated by three factors. The first recognizes his important though obviously not unique change of view concerning this period. He now feels that the 1840s represented a watershed in French industrialization and were hence quite different from the 1830s; this represented a clear break with his previously held view that the whole of Louis-Philippe's reign was economically heterogenous and unremarkable. The second derives from the nature of his evidence and argumentation; in his analyses, he used readily verifiable statistics which permit the relatively simple testing of his arguments. The third permits us to compare Pinkney's use of W. W. Rostow's economic model—which Pinkney used to explain industrialization during the July Monarchy—with similar use of the same model by other historians.
During the late-1960s and early 1970s, there developed an interest among historians in the economic take-off theory of W. W. Rostow who had been one of President J. F. Kennedy's advisors. According to Rostow, take-off "was a period when long-established barriers to steady growth of national output are finally overcome." Furthermore, Rostow held that take-off required three concurrent conditions: (1) an institutional framework congenial to economic expansion and capable of mobilizing large quantities of investment capital; (2) at least one high growth leading-sector industry; and (3) investment equal to at least ten percent of national income. In 1968, the French analyst Lévy-Leboyer defined economic take-off as "une transition brève permettant à l'économie de se détacher de ses traditions agraires." But having thus defined the phenomenon, he then declared that it had not occurred in France. Instead, Lévy-Leboyer saw French industrialization as a gradual evolution spurred by two factors. The first was the creation of a national market by the railroads commencing in the late-1840s; the second was the effect of rapid urbanization after 1880. In 1970, he was supported by his fellow countryman Crouzet who produced a detailed analysis of industrial production in nineteenth century France. Crouzet's work was a landmark effort in that it produced theretofore unavailable numerical measures of economic performance. Moreover, its significance is exemplified by the fact that Pinkney relied heavily on Crouzet's work in his own analysis of the French economy of the 1840s. I shall return to Crouzet when I address Pinkney's contribution to the economic historiography of this period. Suffice to say here that Crouzet, like Lévy-Leboyer, saw no economic take-off. He said:
Il apparaît que l'industrie française a connu sa phase de croissance la plus rapide au milieu du XIXe siècle. Cette phase est centrée sur l'Empire autoritaire, mais elle avait commencée à la fin de la Monarchie de Juillet. A partir de 1840 la courbe remonte sensiblement.

He then added:

Si la croissance de l'industrie française n'a pas été très rapide, elle apparaît donc relativement régulière et continue, les deux accidents les plus graves qu'elle a subis étant liés à des facteurs exogènes, la révolution de 1848 et la guerre de 1870.

Hence, it is clear that these two French analysts rejected Rostow's take-off theory with respect to nineteenth century France; they saw gradual evolution, not a breakthrough. However, despite Crouzet's reserve, Pinkney used Crouzet's data in 1986 in an attempt to prove that take-off had indeed taken place during the 1840s. But I will demonstrate that Pinkney appears to have misinterpreted Crouzet's data.

In Pinkney's revisionist view, the economy of the July Monarchy had to be considered in two phases. In the first, during the 1830s, France was still as rural and as dominated by 'grands notables' as it had been during the 'ancien régime'. In the second, during the 1840s, fundamental economic, social and cultural changes were driven by investments in railroads which tended to centralize economic and political power in Paris. Railroads created a national market where the influence of Paris-based bourgeois industrialists and bankers gradually eroded the political and social power of rural 'notables'. It was this segmentation of the period (1830s versus 1840s) that distinguished Pinkney from most of his predecessors. He saw the 1840s as the watershed of modern French history, a thesis he had developed only since his 1972 study of the revolution of 1830; he attributed this change of view to new evidence which had not been
available earlier, including the results of Crouzet's scholarship. Central to Pinkney's new view was Rostow's model which he admitted had fallen into academic disfavour. Nevertheless, he felt that this model represented "a concept useful in describing and illuminating what happened to the French economy and more especially to French industry in the 1840s."100 As a result of using Crouzet's data, Pinkney concluded that the late 1830s served as a period of institutional preparation for the 1840s when increased investment in railroads provided the technological foundation for the take-off which took place between 1840 and 1860.101 Although Rostow's theory does not find favour in today's academic community, it is not my intention to enter that particular debate. And, Pinkney's use of the Rostow model appears to represent an advance in the economic historiography of the July Monarchy—even though one must be uncomfortable with his misinterpretation of Crouzet's data.

Among the statistics provided by Crouzet, Pinkney selected one data set which purported to describe the growth of French industrial production during the nineteenth century. In the data set selected, Crouzet had listed the year-to-year variations in production, not in absolute or relative terms for that particular year, but in relative terms with respect to the long term average growth rate of just under two percent per year.102 For example, Crouzet reported that the increase in industrial production between 1845 and 1846 was 30.3 percent higher than the long term average of two percent per year; this represented an actual growth rate of 2.6 percent between 1845 and 1846. The same data set showed that the actual growth rate for 1841 versus 1840 was about 2.3 percent (15 percent higher than the long term rate of two percent). What, an informed analyst
might ask, is the difference between growth rates of 2.3 and 2.6 percent? On the one hand, if the underlying data were precise, one might conclude that 2.6 is about one-eighth (12 percent) higher than 2.3. On the other hand, if the underlying data were suspect or uncertain—as is the case with many historical estimates—one might simply declare them both to be about equal at 2.5 percent. Then again, a more cautious analyst might be satisfied with simply declaring both to be somewhat above average and not carry the argument any further. But, either Pinkney was not cautious, or he harboured a view of the precision of Crouzet's data which other analysts would probably question. Moreover, Pinkney chose the portrayal method most susceptible to error or misinterpretation: a graph.
As can be seen in Graph 1, the 2.3 in 1841 was displayed graphically as 15 and the 2.6 in 1846 as 30. Although there are no inaccuracies in this approach, it does leave room for considerable misinterpretation. That is, unless the argument is surrounded with 'caveats', which it was not, or unless the reader has the ability and the resources to scrutinize the data, one is left with the impression that the growth rate in 1846 was much higher than in 1841; the unwary might even suspect that it was twice as high (30 versus 15). Furthermore, although Graph 1 clearly suggests that the July Monarchy was a period of rapidly increasing industrial production, this may be inaccurate since: (1) the underlying data may not have been accurate enough to rely so heavily on ratios which magnify potential errors in the data; and (2) the use of a graph simply magnified this potential error.

But that does not exhaust my concern with Pinkney's argument. Crouzet had actually reported industrial production in not one but two data sets. In the first, he included all industrial sectors; in the second he excluded some of the older and slow growing textile industries, the result of which would be relatively high growth rates in the second data set. According to the first set, industrial production rose by 27 percent over the 18 years of the July Monarchy; in the second, it increased by 73 percent. By using the second data set, Pinkney obviously showed the growth of the economy at its best. However, if we replicate Pinkney's graph (which is based on data that excludes the most sluggish sector) with the data from the first case (which includes the most sluggish sector) we see a completely different result in Graph 2. Where Pinkney's data
selection (Graph 1) shows an economically surging July Monarchy, Crouzet's other data set (Graph 2) shows quite the opposite, a struggling industrial sector with above average growth only at the end of the period. Since Graph 2 by definition is more representative of total industrial production than is Pinkney's Graph 1, the relevant historical data obviously do not support the existence of Rostow's economic take-off during the July Monarchy.

Although Pinkney did not explain why he chose one data set over the other, it is not my intention to comment upon his choice. My purpose in carrying out this critical description of his data and methodology was to show how exposed and vulnerable are historians of the more analytical school. Where historians whose authority is archival are protected by the daunting task of verifying references, analysts such as Pinkney and Crouzet
are exposed by the very nature of their methodology. Nevertheless, the
value of this mathematical approach is evident when we consider how it can
be allied with normal analytical narrative.

For example, in the same work, Pinkney also addressed the three
conditions Rostow postulated for take-off. As regards the first, he
described clearly how the institutional framework required for take-off had
been laid by Napoleon and the revolutionary governments of the 1790s. For
the second, his reference to significant production increases in the
metallurgical industry induced by the start of important railroad
construction in the 1840s, satisfied Rostow's second condition concerning
the need for an industry on the "cutting edge." However, despite his
claims to the contrary, the historiographical evidence cited here suggests
that he in fact failed to satisfy the related condition, sustained growth
subsequent to this breakthrough by this cutting-edge industry. For the
third, which dealt with the level of global investment, he admitted to a
weak argument. Given the lack of relevant data, Pinkney said: "The most
that can be affirmed with any confidence is that investment rose sharply
after 1835."104 Therefore, one would have to conclude that, however much
Pinkney offered Crouzet as support for Rostow's economic take-off theory
during the July Monarchy, both Crouzet and his data in fact supported a
more tempered view.

Nevertheless, Pinkney offered other compensations for this evident
weakness in analytical rigour. For instance, he described the growth of
the factory system in terms of changes in the workplace: In 1830, two-
thirds of cotton spinners worked in their own homes; by 1845 this had
debulked to one-third since most had transferred to factories.105 To
demonstrate the effect of the relatively new railroad system in the 1840s, he claimed that where fruits and vegetables sold in Paris in 1830 were supplied from within a 30-mile radius of the city, by 1855 this trading area had grown to 150 miles.\textsuperscript{106} Also indicative of the influence of railroads was their effect on demographics. Before railroads broke down barriers to interregional migration, population growth was essentially a function of local births and deaths. In the period 1801-46, for instance, there was steady growth in all departments save one, suggesting that migration was not significant during that interval. However, in the period 1846-51, when railroads were opening up economic opportunities, especially in urban areas, all 25 departments not served by railroads lost population: Migration to economically advantaged urban areas was on the rise.\textsuperscript{107} The railroads also had a political effect: As economic power gradually became centred in Paris, it also attracted rural 'notables', theretofore the apparent mainstays of provincial politics. Consequently, by the late 1840s, some districts could not find qualified residents to run for office in the Chamber of Deputies and had to accept expatriots living in Paris. As a result, by 1846, 188 of the 459 sitting deputies were Parisians, a disproportionate share for Paris alone.\textsuperscript{108} The increasing wealth of the period also had an effect on nutrition and clothing. Pinkney claimed that per capita meat consumption had changed not at all between 1780 and 1835, but had increased by 8 percent in the next decade, by 15 percent in the next, and by an additional 17 percent between 1855 and 1864. Quoting Jules Michelet, he claimed that 1843 marked the year when France changed from a producer to a consumer economy since clothing was now within the economic reach of working people: Regular changes of underwear apparently became
commonplace thereafter. Pinkney also described how the wealth of industrial entrepreneurs was transforming the social, economic and political structure of society. Where 15 percent of the members of the Board of the Bank of France were industrialists in 1840, their share had grown to 40 percent by 1870; starting in the late-1840s, wealthy Parisians loaded their portfolios increasingly with industrial stocks and bonds instead of traditional real estate holdings. In summary, the historiography cited here tends to describe a period of significant economic activity which was not only dominated by the bourgeoisie itself but also by bourgeois-influenced government policies.

This leads to politics, the third and final environment which coloured this transition period. In this historiographical review I shall deal with three of the major elements which seem to have influenced the politics of that time. The first focuses on the electoral system; the second on the prevailing political issues; the third on some elements of Louis-Philippe’s legislative record.

As regards the influence of the electoral system itself, it should be noted that one of the rallying cries of the 1830-revolutionaries was for a return of the electoral rights granted in the Charter of 1814, rights which had been abrogated by Charles X in 1830. The historiography suggests that the return of these Charter rights, coupled with the changes introduced by the electoral law of 1831, had a profound effect on the political climate of the time. That is, where the restoration of Charter rights threatened the hegemony of the traditional aristocracy by opening political opportunities to their lower class rivals among the wealthiest
bourgeoisie, who were often their financial peers or superiors, the expansion of the franchise in 1831 opened additional political opportunities to the less wealthy bourgeoisie. Thus, it can be argued that this enfranchisement inevitably produced social and political tension as the traditional aristocracy was required to share its theretofore exclusive political influence, first with its social inferiors and then with its poorer neighbours.

In order to put into more precise focus the political implications of the Charter and of the electoral law of 1831, a more detailed review of each is in order. According to the French historian P. Bastid, the Charter had established the eligibility of both electors and potential office holders at all levels of French political life. Writing in 1954, he noted that potential electors were defined in the Charter of 1814 as all males over the age of 25 who had paid annual taxes ('cens' or 'contributions directes') of at least 300 francs. Candidates for election to the Chamber of Deputies had to be over 40 and have paid annual taxes of at least 1,000 francs. While this suggests a simple link between wealth and political power, the correlation was constrained; this helps to explain the animosity then extant between the traditional and enfranchised aristocracy on the one hand, and the wealthy bourgeoisie on the other who had not only become disenfranchised when Charles X abrogated the Charter in 1830, but who were also discriminated against by the terms of the Charter itself. For example, to generate 300 francs of 'contributions directes' required: (1) 1,200 francs of real estate income; or (2) real estate assets valued at 1,500-2,000 francs; or (3) business income of 5,000-6,000 francs. 111 According to some historians, these higher tax rates on property tended to
favour politically the traditional landed aristocracy over all but the wealthiest businessmen, most of whom were bourgeois. That is, 1,200 francs of real estate income had the political value of 5,000–6,000 francs of business income. However, this situation changed as industrialization increased the relative wealth of the bourgeoisie since they tended to be more active industrialists than the aristocracy. In addition, the wealthiest bourgeoisie benefitted as Louis-Philippe gradually changed the definition of the 'cens' so as to bring into better balance taxpayers' various revenue sources; this tended to dilute the long standing political privileges of landowners. In much the same vein, the traditional landed aristocracy lost further ground to the wealthiest bourgeoisie when the electoral law of 1831 eliminated the double vote theretofore enjoyed by the wealthiest 25 percent of voters, most of whom were aristocrates.

Although the historiography describing this evolution of electoral power suggests a gradual transfer of hegemony from the aristocracy to the wealthiest bourgeoisie, evidence advanced by the Becks suggests that the transfer might have been more rapid than heretofore thought by many historians. In 1986, these two American scholars performed a computer analysis of electoral data compiled a half-century earlier by Kent. As a result, they were able to provide a much more precise definition of the 'cens' by identifying and quantifying its components: The land tax ('contribution foncière') and the business tax ('impots des patentes'). On the one hand, the land tax was composed of three elements: (1) a direct tax averaging about 3.3 francs per hectare; plus (2) the 'contribution personnelle et mobilière' equal to approximately five percent of the rental value of the buildings located on the property; and (3) the 'contribution
des portes et fenêtres' which varied considerably between rural and urban areas. On the other hand, the business tax had two components: (1) a relatively fixed fee of up to 100 francs which depended on the type and size of business; and (2) a variable fee resembling the 'contribution personnelle et mobilière' of the land tax equal to ten percent of the rental value of the business premises. Thinking that the second element of this business tax was negligible, many historians had assumed that only rarely would businessmen have paid sufficient taxes to compete politically with their landowning neighbours. But, on the contrary, the Becks found that the value of the second element of the business tax could be as much as ten-times the value of the first, as much as 1,000 francs and hence quite enough to satisfy the eligibility requirements for electors and potential office holders alike. The progression of this second business tax from insignificant to dominant status can be explained in terms of the effect of industrialization. That is, since the resale or rental value of a commercial venture is obviously a function of its profit potential, the accelerated industrialization of that period must have caused rental values and taxes on commercial property to increase proportionately. Since the variable business tax alone appears to have been sufficient to enfranchise many businessmen who were not landowners, it would appear therefore that electoral influence by the wealthier 'grande bourgeoisie' could have been greater than heretofore supposed. If this hypothesis is proven accurate, it would tend to challenge Tudesq's hypothesis concerning landowner hegemony.

At a strategic level, it could be argued that more significant than these electoral changes of benefit to the wealthiest bourgeoisie, were
amendments to the electoral law of 1831 which enfranchised a greater number of less wealthy bourgeois. These amendments changed franchise eligibility (for males) by lowering the tax minimum from 300 to 200 francs per year. Electoral office was also made more accessible by lowering the age minimum from forty to thirty, along with a concurrent reduction in the minimum tax requirement from 1,000 to 500 francs per year. These changes doubled the number of eligible voters to about 200,000.\textsuperscript{115} The new law also increased the proportion of less wealthy taxpayers in another way: Where the 1814 Charter had provided for a minimum of fifty electors per electoral district, regardless of the level of taxes paid, the 1831 law increased this minimum to 150. It must also be noted that this national trend was complemented by an even greater local enfranchisement. In a book edited by Rémond in 1973, Tudesq and Vigier described how the same law which expanded the national franchise to some 200,000 electors also granted "le vote communal à deux millions d'electeurs" in local elections. This was achieved by substantially reducing the 'cens'--to 24 francs, for example, in the commune of Lucq. Tudesq and Vigier held that this sudden democratization at the local level "a joué un role essentiel dans la descente de la politique vers les masses."\textsuperscript{116} So interesting was this phenomenon--especially as regards the implications of local politics on the national--that I expected to see it treated extensively. Unfortunately, local politics received limited attention in the texts consulted by me.

This historiographical evidence suggests that the potential for social conflict derived from the nature of the tax-oriented election law itself. Certainly, the increasingly enfranchised bourgeoisie must have been seen as a threat to many of the landed aristocracy. Their theretofore
unchallenged monopoly on political office was under pressure in that
political hegemony was passing to another class. But the greatest conflict
was probably within the bourgeoisie itself. That is, the financially
successful bourgeoisie must have created some jealousy among the less
successful. Furthermore, bourgeois intellectuals, such as Blanc and
Proudhon, were demonstrably pained to see their political and social ideals
dismissed by the 'laissez-faire' economic liberalism of bourgeois
industrialists; many Bonapartists considered these commercially successful
businessmen to be tawdry successors to the heroic Napoleonic age; and,
younger bourgeois saw their republican hopes threatened by the venality of
this regime, however dominated it may have been by their own class.

Although some tensions arose as a result of these shifts in the
very structure of the franchise, others derived from the use of bribery to
influence its application. For example, although one might have expected
democrats to applaud the consequences of the 1831 electoral law, some
considered it instead as the instrument with which the government corrupted
the electoral process. In 1937, for example, Kent wrote that the
corrupting effect of this law created so much discontent that it culminated
in the Banquet campaign which toppled the regime in 1848. His arguments,
however, may not be entirely convincing. For instance, he decried the
practice whereby Louis-Philippe dissolved the Chamber of Deputies "on a
whim" rather than at regular intervals. This obviously represents a bias
arising from an American political culture, and thus has nothing to do with
corruption: Elections called at the pleasure of the Prime Minister have a
long tradition within the British parliamentary system, a practice few
would consider either corrupting or undemocratic. Therefore, although Kent
may have been on safe ground when he claimed that government patronage was used to curry favour among elected deputies, he was clearly off the mark in attributing this phenomenon to the 1831 electoral law.117 Furthermore, as P. Guiral noted in 1982, and as any informed reader knows, it is not possible to draw a cause-effect relationship between electoral corruption and any one law since bribery is endemic in one form or another in all elections. Moreover, Guiral demonstrated that corruption was not confined to the July Monarchy when he showed that Louis-Philippe’s immediate Bourbon predecessors had often used electoral manipulation to advance their political interests.118

This debate over corruption continued with other analysts. In 1943, de Loménie declared, without reference to cause-effect, that Louis-Philippe had corrupted the parliamentary system: "On achetait les députés encore indépendents en leur offrant des places officielles." As a result of this practice, 184 of the 400 deputies sitting in 1846 also held appointed office within the public administration.119 However, the Higonnetts developed a contrary opinion in 1967. In a statistical analysis of the 1846 election they concluded that corruption charges against Guizot were not substantiated since there was no numerical evidence to prove that the election provided Guizot with additional support within the Chamber of Deputies.120 Although I am not sure that a statistical review of election results is the proper vehicle for analyzing electoral corruption—the attempts at corruption could simply have been ineffective—suffice to say that the notion of corruption during the July Monarchy engendered considerable discussion among historians, some concluding that it was a major contributor to the venomous atmosphere which marked the period.
As regards the effect of the second element, political issues, on the political environment of the period, I noted two obvious tendencies in the texts consulted: Issues favourable to Louis-Philippe during the early years when his policies of conciliation and the 'juste milieu' were generally successful; issues which challenged his authority during the balance of his reign as political imperatives changed. During the earlier years, it seems first that the new regime was basking in a state of fragile social peace, a reflection perhaps of the optimism which had carried over from the 1830-revolution; and second that the issues of concern to the electorate arose from the same event. Howarth reported on these early political concerns in 1961, declaring that the 1831 election, for instance, was dominated by the question of the hereditary peerage. As a result, although Louis-Philippe was apparently prepared to ignore this particular issue, pressure from Republicans was sufficient to force abolition of the hereditary peerage. This gesture of conciliation toward one branch of his political opposition subsequently permitted Louis-Philippe to name replacements to the peerage as death took its inexorable toll of incumbents. Not surprisingly, virtually all new peers were chosen from among his supporters. What was surprising was the very small number of bourgeois ennobled for this purpose, a reflection perhaps of Louis-Philippe's basic aristocratic tendencies.121

This early period of social peace was noted by Thiers, an active participant in the governments of the July Monarchy; he claimed that Louis-Philippe had succeeded in rallying to his cause the majority moderates, thereby isolating the minority radicals: "Le gouvernement a donc rallié la masse sensée et nombreuse de chaque parti, pour laisser en dehors la
portion extrême." In 1968, the American P. B. Higonnet made much the same point when he said: "Les rancunes révolutionnaires, qui empoisonnaient encore la politique en 1827, n'existiaient plus en 1831." As evidence, he declared that, during the 1831 election, not one elected deputy opposed the government of Louis-Philippe. He ascribed this pacific atmosphere to a growing weariness with the revolution and a desire for social peace—especially in the regime's early years. This social atmosphere was also abetted by active intervention from the government in the form of bribery. Billaut de Gérainville noted in 1875 that, where the Bourbon Charles X fought parliamentary opposition with brute force, Louis-Philippe was more subtle, achieving the same objective of royal rule with corruption and deviousness, especially during the 1840s. Although this comment may be dismissed as a partisan Legitimist attempt to besmirch the reputation of the king whom they considered an usurper, few historians would be shocked to be told that Louis-Philippe's reign was marked with corruption and deviousness. But, lest it be thought that Louis-Philippe was averse to using force, it should be noted that the historiographical record shows otherwise. For instance, writing in 1975, the American R. J. Bezucha dealt with the effect of worker unrest in Lyons during the early years of the July Monarchy. He claimed that it was only by using force and bribery that Louis-Philippe finally succeeded in overcoming working class opposition during the 1834 election in Lyons. In fact, only after the election of deputies loyal to Louis-Philippe did worker unrest actually subside.

However, as this period of social peace eroded, it was replaced by a period of political acrimony where newspapers were decisive. This was due to several coincidental factors: Technological innovations facilitated
the preparation and distribution of popular low cost newspapers; the easing of press censorship in the early years of the July Monarchy released a great deal of pent-up energy; and, socialists and other social critics became particularly adept at exploiting the press as a conduit for their ideas. For example, in 1836 Pinkney claimed that writers such as Blanc and Proudhon used the press at that time to popularize their versions of socialism as well as to attack bourgeois society generally. In fact, so effective was the use of newspapers as a vehicle for political debate that the French historian C. Ledrè utilized them in 1960 as primary sources for a study of the Orleanist bourgeoisie. In his work, he noted that press opinion was advanced both by anonymous editorialists and famous writers. As an example of the first, he quoted an editorial in the June 15, 1834 edition of the newspaper Le National: "Louis-Philippe a fait mieux que personne la besogne des deux partis monarchiques - des deux aristocraties féodales et bourgeoise." For the second, he cited the well known and influential novelist George Sand in 1844: "Le servage, c'est notre état de misère qui nous livre à la merci de l'usurier bourgeois, du fermier bourgeois, du propriétaire bourgeois." However, despite the obvious hatred visited upon the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie by these commentators, one must ask how influential they were in an era when literacy was not high.

In this regard, the effectiveness of the press was investigated by A. B. Maurice and F. T. Cooper in their 1904 analysis of caricature in French newspapers during the July Monarchy. They claimed that harassment by political cartoonists had become so aggressive after 1830 that Louis-Philippe was compelled to reimpose press censorship. So effective were
these caricaturists that Maurice and Cooper concluded that ridicule more than anything else drove Louis-Philippe from the throne. Although this could serve as the focus of another debate, I would simply offer as a caution a related comment on the influence of the French press at the turn of this century, a period contemporaneous with Maurice and Cooper: In a 1903 study of the Dreyfus affair (1894–1906), J. D. Bredin claimed that "All observers (during the Dreyfus trial) seem to agree that, for the first time, the (French) press exercised a major influence on political life." Nevertheless, it must be noted in support of Maurice and Cooper that Collingham appeared to harbour the same view; he noted in 1988 that newspaper publicity was actually quite popular and effective in the 1830s.

According to the historiography consulted, the honeymoon-like atmosphere of the early years deteriorated rapidly. As the political climate worsened, Louis-Philippe's opponents gradually coalesced into organized groups on both the right and the left: D'Almeras dealt in 1925 with the mounting frustrations of Bonapartists, Legitimists and Republicans during this period; Then Amann in 1960, and Merriman and Newman in 1975 described the completion of this political encirclement by including the working classes among Louis-Philippe's foes. In 1970, P. Pilbeam in Britain described the consolidation of this opposition—as early as 1831—into national associations of departmental deputies and local 'notables'. Although these provincial 'notables' were first concerned with France's international affairs, they quickly turned their attention to domestic matters as it became apparent that their own political and social goals would not be satisfied through Louis-Philippe's conservative policies.
That many of the leaders of these associations of local 'notables' later showed up in various republican movements is an interesting comment on the evolving interests of the 'notables', and is suggestive of further support for Tudesq's thesis concerning classless 'notables'. about whom more later.\textsuperscript{132} Another protest group was described by Tude in 1971: "La Société des amis du peuple." As described earlier, it was founded in September 1830--almost at the birth of the July Monarchy--by "jeunes bourgeois et anciens militaires" to advance the cause of exploited workers.\textsuperscript{133}

This overview of the political issues prevailing during the July Monarchy completes my coverage of two of the three elements which arguably influenced the politics of the period. Before I deal with the third, Louis-Philippe's legislative record which issued from the first two, it should be noted that the first two are conceptually similar to one another in that they each deal with the abstract: Objectives, systems and climate. This is in sharp contrast to the third which is very concrete: The laws actually enacted. That is, whatever one might infer from the distribution of classes among the elected or the electorate, political regimes must finally be judged by their legislative record and its consequences. This thesis was first noted by me in the 1929 work of Malet and Isaac when they said: "Les lois organiques achèverent de donner à la Monarchie de Juillet son caractère de gouvernement bourgeois."\textsuperscript{134} The same thesis was also advanced later by American scholars who saw no necessary correlation between class and legislative tendencies; they felt instead that the nature of the July Monarchy is more properly determined by its legislative record.
than by a questionable surrogate such as the class of the deputies who enacted the legislation. Although this view may appear to be unremarkable, perhaps obvious in modern times, it is not what one would expect to conclude from a review of the historiography of the July Monarchy. In fact, such a review raises an anomaly: If, as most historians seem to have assumed, the legislators of that time legislated in their own class interests, what then explains legislation in apparent opposition to these class interests? Tudesq was one of the few historians consulted by me to have confronted this anomaly.

Historiographical interest in the legislative record of the July Monarchy appeared early. In 1870 Guizot reported that Louis-Philippe had actually carried out what his predecessors had only talked about. For example, only during the reign of Louis-Philippe was legislation introduced (by Guizot) to reorganize France’s educational system. Guizot also emphasized the effect of the economic imperatives of the time by stating that Louis-Philippe was preoccupied with economic matters, especially with railroads during the 1840s. As mentioned previously, when Malet and Isaac declared in 1929 that: "Les lois organiques achevèrent de donner à la Monarchie de Juillet son caractère de gouvernement bourgeois", they were thinking of items such as: (1) laws on elections which extended the franchise; (2) laws on education which opened public instruction to a much wider populace; and (3) suppression of the hereditary peerage. Lucas-Dubreton came to the same conclusion in 1938, saying that laws such as these were the product of the bourgeois common sense of the deputies.

However, other historians saw avarice and incompetence instead of common sense driving bourgeois legislative efforts. In 1960, Lhomme
declared that the 'grande bourgeoisie' legislated in their own interests.

As evidence of this avarice he alleged were: (1) the voting franchise which favoured the 'grande bourgeoisie'; (2) the suppression of the hereditary peerage; and (3) excessive caution on social legislation such as child labour laws and public schools. As regards public schools, he said: 138

Aussi l'instruction n'a-t-elle fait, sous la Monarchie de Juillet, que de progrès médiocres, de 53 % en 1832, le pourcentage des conscrits illettrés descend à 40 % en 1848. L'amélioration est certaine, mais fort lente.

While his first two concerns smack of a desire to return to the Bourbon 'status quo ante', his last two appear to rest upon quite unreasonable expectations. That Louis-Philippe's social legislation was in fact enacted at all following the alleged legislative impotence of his immediate predecessors should be sufficient to silence Lhomme on this issue. As for his concern for literacy, such factually dramatic improvement in literacy should have merited plaudits, not disdain.

As regards economic legislation, in 1961 A. F. Thompson echoed Clapham's 1921 comment concerning tariffs. Both concluded that the protectionist tariffs of the Restoration had been maintained under Louis-Philippe; Thompson felt in fact that these tariffs were supported by both bourgeois businessmen and the landed aristocracy, a prime example of the impossibility of associating political, social or economic interests with any one class. He also claimed—erroneously, it seems—that more money was spent on public works of all kinds during the July Monarchy than during the immediate predecessor or successor regimes. 139 Then, in 1962, Lhomme's fellow countryman P. Vigier returned to the avarice model when he described how the landed bourgeoisie in the Chamber of Deputies enacted legislation
to finance economic expansion from borrowings instead of from land taxes. Vigier concluded that this transfer of the tax burden from landowners to all taxpayers was an abdication of landowners' responsibilities. Although avarice may have motivated these bourgeois landowners, to then conclude that this was socially undesirable is to fly in the face of widely held and orthodox though arguable economic assumptions: Many respected economists were then and are now of the view that the pursuit of one's personal economic interests should produce beneficial economic results for all. Whether one holds to this free-market model or to a more interventionist ideology, few would support Vigier's view. In fact, most would consider this expansion of the tax base a logical step in the process of democratization, whatever the personal motives of the individuals or classes concerned.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, that it had nothing necessarily to do with class is also evident since the transfer took place, according to Vigier himself, within the bourgeoisie itself.

To add another dimension to this debate, Tudesq and J. Rudel noted in 1961 that legislative initiatives came not from the elected deputies, whatever their class, but from the king and his ministers.¹⁴¹ If this was so, it should temper arguments associating legislative initiatives with the class-composition of the Chamber of Deputies--unless it can be demonstrated that only legislation favourable to the deputies was introduced to the Chamber by the government. Finally, it was Collingham in 1988 who demonstrated the illogic in drawing too close a correlation between class and legislative action. He showed, for example, that although universal suffrage did not appear to be in the interests of the traditional aristocracy, some Legitimist deputies thought otherwise on particular
issues. For instance, during an 1831 debate in the Chamber of Deputies, the Legitimists Berryer and the Marquis de Dreux-Brézé supported a call for a much wider franchise confident that superstitious and ignorant peasants would faithfully elect their local Legitimist landowners. Even though this may have satisfied narrow class interests, the promotion of democratic legislation is not what one would normally expect from a class traditionally associated with authoritarian privilege. In an analogous case, Collingham remarked that the Viscomte Alban de Villeneuve-Bargemont was "largely responsible for the first factory legislation" enacted during the July Monarchy. Whether the Viscomte was motivated by self-interest or compassion is unimportant; the relevant datum is that this case provided yet another example of the danger in any attempt to correlate class interest and legislative initiative. Further, Collingham declared that the 1830 election returned mostly Orleanist deputies to the Chamber of Deputies even though there appeared to be little change in their average wealth. In other words, whatever their class allegiances might have been, the only certainty was that their political allegiance had in fact changed. As a result, Collingham concluded that it was very difficult to be sure of the effect of class or wealth on political choices: Yet another vote for Tudesq.

With this historiographical treatment of the various dynamics of the July Monarchy, we can now address the first part of the thesis question: If a class-compelled view of the July Monarchy is appropriate, does the historiography support the view that it was a bourgeois monarchy? If the judgement criteria are the guiding principles and accomplishments of
the period, the historians consulted here indeed considered it a bourgeois monarchy. The historiographical record suggests that Louis-Philippe and his ministers were guided by bourgeois ideology, especially by the economic and social liberalism which appealed to the dominant business class, even though they resisted the emerging socialism and republican spirit of 1789 promoted by younger bourgeoisie and intellectuals. According to these historians, this influence manifested itself in a spate of social and economic legislation not seen in France before 1830. They felt, furthermore, that this growing bourgeois dominance of the intellectual environment was accompanied by increasing bourgeois hegemony in the economic and political spheres. Because of the obvious importance of the political sphere, I will examine the historiographical record in the next two chapters in order to reveal who, in the view of historians, dominated the politics of the July Monarchy—-the bourgeoisie or the 'notables'.

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Chapter 3
The July Monarchy: Who Ruled It?

The Bourgeoisie?

Before dealing with the political influence of the bourgeoisie, it must be noted that a few historians conceded political hegemony to neither the bourgeoisie nor the 'notables'. They saw little difference between the Orleanist regime and its Bourbon predecessor since the 'classe dirigeante' in each was dominated by landowners, most of whom, they claimed, were nobles. For example, Thiers, a member of Louis-Philippe's government, saw the Revolution of 1830 as only having brought forth a change in the head of government; he saw no fundamental changes in social or political power relationships. This he contrasted with the events of 1789 and 1815 that had indeed brought about fundamental change: Where 1789 had rejected the 'ancien régime', 1815 had restored it.\(^4\)\(^5\) His contemporary, the Catholic intellectual Lamennais, was of a like mind. Lamennais felt that, apart from having resurrected the Charter of 1814, Louis-Philippe had changed nothing from the reign of Charles X.\(^4\)\(^6\) While Thiers and Lamennais may have reported accurately what they had perceived in the political life of that period, their judgment could have been hindered by their proximity to and participation in it.

However, in 1937, the American Kent was obviously able to view the period with detachment, yet he also concluded that the Revolution of 1830 had changed very few power relationships. Despite the new electoral law of 1831 which had doubled the number of adult males eligible to vote, Kent felt that this still amounted to less than two percent of adult males and
was thus of limited import. However, I would argue that this argument is objectively naïve; more recent scholarship also suggests that he misinterpreted his own data. Kent implicitly assumed that political decisions are influenced only by the number of eligible voters. But even the most casual newspaper reader knows that elections are not determined by eligible voters, but by those who actually vote, however small their numbers may be. In fact, the political literature is replete with cases of minorities exploiting low voter turnout to "steal" elections. Moreover, by dismissing the political effect of doubling the number of potential voters, he showed political naivety. It is common knowledge that successful politicians cultivate new voters, no matter how small the number of voters, and that the unsuccessful do not. Therefore, to dismiss the potential political effect of a substantial increase in the franchise is to assume that politicians are indifferent to their own interests. Furthermore, the two elements of Kent's arguments are contradictory. If one argues that the political effect of a limited franchise is inconsequential, how can one then argue that a substantial increase in the franchise is also inconsequential? However, Kent was on more logical, though still uncertain, ground when he suggested that the increase in the franchise merely increased the number of landowners (mostly noble) who were eligible to vote, and that it left disenfranchised a large number of urban and relatively wealthy bourgeoisie. In support of his argument, he claimed that most of the deputies serving in the Restoration Chamber, the majority of whom were landowning nobles, were returned to office under Louis-Philippe. But, as will be shown later, in 1987 the Becks used Kent's 1937 data to prove that the Chamber of Deputies during the July Monarchy
had been dominated by the bourgeoisie, not by the aristocracy. Since one cannot draw contradictory conclusions from the same data, either the Becks or Kent are mistaken. On balance, I am inclined to accept the conclusions of the Beck computer-assisted analysis.

In 1955, Burnand also claimed that the office holders who served Louis-Philippe had previously served Charles X as well. The Higonnetts also advanced this view in 1967. As the result of a statistical analysis of the 1846 election, they concluded that the reign of Louis-Philippe was dominated by the aristocracy, not by the bourgeoisie. As proof they cited the increasing share of aristocrats in the Chamber of Deputies during the July Monarchy: 10 percent of the deputies were aristocrats in 1831, 33 percent in 1846.

It should be noted that these arguments are stayed by the following assumptions: (1) political and legislative decisions were determined by the traditional class-imperatives of the elected deputies (As reported earlier, this is disputed by many scholars.); (2) the landowning electorate was mostly aristocratic (If this was true at the beginning of the period, aristocratic dominance among landowners diminished as wealthy bourgeoisie invested in land to enhance their own social status.); (3) the doubling of the franchise was either irrelevant or benefitted only the aristocracy (Most modern scholars are of the view that the increase in the franchise and the concurrent elimination of the double vote previously enjoyed by the wealthiest electors, most of whom were nobles, had to have provided the greatest political benefit to the bourgeoisie.); and (4, similarity in the distribution of office holders in both the Bourbon and Orleanist regimes implied shared political interests.
(Some argued that the actual differences in the two legislative programs invalidated this assumption; others, such as Tudesq, claimed that the class of the legislators was irrelevant since the political problems facing them had changed so much that their resolution required an approach independent of narrow class or group interests.).

In summary, historians who supported the notion of the continuing hegemony of the aristocracy did not seem to consider important the fact that the electorate (1) had become increasingly non-noble and more bourgeois in class and outlook, and (2) had doubled in absolute terms after 1831. Consequently, politicians would have had to take account of this better informed bourgeois electorate, their own class or group interests notwithstanding.

To return to those who supported the notion of the political hegemony of the bourgeoisie, interest centred upon: (1) the source of this influence; (2) when it began; and (3) the composition of the bourgeoisie and the evolution of their political power, a focus which may have contributed to the bourgeoisie-'notables' debate to be discussed in the next chapter. Before addressing the first area of interest, it should be noted that fewer than ten percent of the authors consulted here defined the term bourgeoisie. This suggests that its widespread use precluded the need for further definition.

Most historians ascribed the source of bourgeois influence to their wealth, few to their non-financial contributions, despite the conclusions reached in a previous chapter. Among those who emphasized the non-financial were some who dealt with the ideological sphere. In 1925,
D'Alméras described "le triomphe de la bourgeoisie" which was accompanied by the rapid development of socialist ideologies, "même les plus bizarres."¹⁵⁰ In much the same vein, Malet and Isaac in 1929 and Pradalie in 1957 declared that the bourgeoisie had dominated the cultural environment of the time.¹⁵¹ However, since these points were made in conjunction with and subordinate to references to bourgeois wealth, it is clear that the non-financial source of bourgeois power was neither widely espoused nor keenly argued, however important it may have been in fact.

Moreover, the relationship between the political power of the bourgeoisie and their wealth tended to be recognized as a matter of fact requiring little elaboration. In 1834, Lammenais declared that, as a result of Louis-Philippe's accession to the throne "la fortune publique a été livrée à l'agiotage des hommes de finances, des grandes industries, au monopole des riches spéculateurs."¹⁵² Although one might argue that this did not necessarily refer to the bourgeoisie, Billaut de Gérainville removed all doubt in 1875 by declaring that "Il (Louis-Philippe) remplace le règne de l'aristocratie historique par le règne de l'aristocratie commerciale, industrielle et financière sortie des rangs de la bourgeoisie."¹⁵³ In 1882, Girard added that, as a result of this bourgeois ascent to power, Louis-Philippe turned France into a bourgeois-dominated commercial enterprise.¹⁵⁴ This sample of nineteenth century historiography suggests that the bourgeoisie brought Louis-Philippe to power and dominated him thereafter. Furthermore, not only did twentieth century historians not challenge this historic view of the hegemony of the bourgeoisie, they built upon it.

For instance, in 1903 J. S. C. Abbott referred to Orleanists as aristocrats of wealth.¹⁵⁵ In 1914 De Marcère declared that the July
Monarchy was dominated by the bourgeoisie, especially by "la bourgeoisie opulente" which included the banker Rothschild. In 1947 Jarry added:

*L'intérêt particulier de cette période, c'est qu'elle représente dans l'histoire de France le gouvernement de la bourgeoisie, c'est-à-dire de l'argent. La noblesse est encore une société, elle n'est plus une classe. Les ouvriers et les paysans sont sans droits politiques.*

Implicit in this last statement is the notion that the growing wealth of bourgeois businessmen tended to alienate them from both the aristocracy, whom they were displacing at the top of the social and political pyramid, and from the less fortunate masses at the bottom. Then in 1962, Vigier stated that this bourgeoisie was "la bourgeoisie censitaire", those who paid sufficient taxes to acquire the right to vote. It is partly on this point, on the significance of the franchise, that the bourgeoisie-'notables' debate in the next chapter will turn.

I noted two schools of thought concerning the second area of historiographical interest, the temporal origin of bourgeois political dominance. While the minority of historians sees little bourgeois influence before 1830, the majority sees the July Monarchy as the culmination of a long process of political change. Within the first school were Charlety in 1920 and Lhomme in 1960; they considered the ascension to power of both Louis-Philippe and the bourgeoisie as coincident events. Lhomme, for instance, was attempting to dispute de Loménier's claim that the bourgeoisie had come to power much earlier under Napoleon. However, these historians stood almost alone in their insistence that bourgeois power could be dated so precisely; most held instead that the power of the bourgeoisie grew gradually and could not be associated uniquely with a single regime.
Among the majority was A. Babeau who declared in 1886: "À la veille de 1789, ils (les membres de la bourgeoisie) exercaient de fait la prépondérance dans l'État et dans la société; ils étaient l'élite du tiers état et la pépinière de la noblesse."\(^{160}\) This reference to bourgeois political power in the pre-Revolutionary period was echoed later by historians such as Clapham in 1921, Aynard in 1934, de Loménie in 1943 and R. Magraw in 1983.\(^{161}\) But others only saw significant growth in bourgeois influence later during the Bourbon Restoration. This included Blanc in 1867 who claimed that "En 1816, la bourgeoisie pouvait presque se dire assise sur le trône à côté de Louis XVIII."\(^ {162}\) Bourgeois influence during the Restoration was also cited by D. Cochin in 1918, G. Lefebvre in 1925, Dunham in 1953 and Vidalenc in 1975.\(^{163}\) Clearly, the historiographical record tends to favour the school which associates bourgeois influence during the July Monarchy with bourgeois antecedents, not with events unique to the July Monarchy.

The third area of historiographical interest concerned the composition of the bourgeoisie and the evolution of their political power. In 1920, Charlety claimed that the bourgeoisie acquired power in 1830; that during the early years of his reign, Louis-Philippe shared power with them; and that the king tried to wrest power from them later.\(^{164}\) In 1938, Lucas-Dubreton showed how these stresses between the government and the bourgeoisie were exacerbated by divisions within the bourgeoisie itself: conservatives versus radicals, for example. He also defined "les députés bourgeois" as "des notables nommés par un collège électoral restreint."\(^{165}\) Interest in the composition of the politically oriented bourgeoisie took another turn with Pouthas in 1954. In his study of Louis-Philippe's
ministries, he noted that: "Il (le personnel politique) est en grande
majorité formé de gens de métier qui sont ministres pour leur compétence ou
leur complaisance." Then, in 1963, the French historian Daumard carried
this examination of the bourgeoisie to another plateau. She divided the
Parisian bourgeoisie into several categories, including national versus
local bourgeoisie, and 'notables' versus lower orders. Although this last
correlation of 'notables' and bourgeoisie placed her in the same school as
Lucas-Dubreton, it was not a relationship favoured by all historians, a
fact which will be treated in the next chapter. But, as regards their
influence, Daumard claimed that, whether as defenders or as opponents of
the ruling establishment, the bourgeoisie converted Paris into the economic
capital of France; by so doing, they were responsible for the basic
orientation of the constitutional monarchies from 1815 to 1848. She
claimed: "L'heritage et le profit industriel ou commercial sont à la base
de la domination bourgeoise dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle."

Then, P. B. Higonnet carried out a related computer-based analysis
in 1968 of membership in the Chamber of Deputies between 1827 and 1834. If
his data in Table 8 are accurate, they show that bourgeois numerical
dominance of the Chamber of Deputies actually pre-dated the 1830
revolution, a datum at obvious variance with other historians who held
diametrically opposite views.

Furthermore, Higonnet's analysis suggests that this bourgeois
numerical dominance increased steadily after 1830. As is shown in Table 9,
bourgeois lawyers were obviously the greatest electoral winners, landowners
the greatest losers. It should be noted, however, that the declining share
Table 8
Distribution of Deputies, 1827

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Nobles</th>
<th></th>
<th>Bourgeoisie</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propriétaires</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fonctionnaires</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militaires</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banquiers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negociants</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturiers</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconnus</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
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</table>


Table 9
Percent Distribution of Deputies, 1827-1834

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>1827-1830</th>
<th>1831-1834</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fonctionnaires</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militaires</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propriétaires</td>
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<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banquiers</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negociants</td>
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<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturiers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectuels</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avocats</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconnus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

enjoyed by 'fonctionnaires' may be misleading. That is, unless they are also included in other categories--among 'avocats', for instance--this conflicts with other scholarship which ascribed increasing 'fonctionnaire' influence during the July Monarchy to the practice of bribing deputies with positions within the public administration. For instance, in 1970, Julien-Laferrière described the phenomenon of the "deputés-fonctionnaires", most of whom were relatively poor bourgeois. He claimed that "plus de la moitié des parlementaires détenaient une fonction publique quelconque." 16

To further delineate this growing bourgeois hegemony, Higonnet set out the distribution of electoral results by class in the elections between 1831 and 1834. Here again, as shown in Table 10, bourgeois were clearly more numerous among elected deputies than were nobles, however defined. Agulhon described much the same trend in his 1980 analysis of elected deputies. As shown in Table 11, he found that the shift away from landowners between 1829 and 1831 was politically significant, dropping from 31 to 23 percent of all deputies in only two years. He also made the

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Table 10</th>
<th>Elections</th>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Distribution of Deputies Elected, 1831-1834</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ancienne Noblesse (titled)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(untitled)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noblesse Impériale</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourgeois with &quot;de&quot; in name</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourgeois without &quot;de&quot;</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</table>

Source: P. B. Higonnet 1968, p. 376.
Table 11
Percent Distribution of Deputies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1829</th>
<th>1831</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hommes d'affaires</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions libérales</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fonctionnaires</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propriétaires</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Agulhon, p. 23.

telling point that 2,000 proprietors with a single vote among 200,000 electors after 1830 must have had less political influence than the same 2,000 with a double vote among 100,000 electors before 1830.⁶⁹

In summary, the proponents of a bourgeois-dominated monarchy based their views essentially on the fact that growing bourgeois wealth had provided them with the key to power, the franchise which had been denied them in one way or another during the preceding Bourbon Restoration. These historians concluded that, not only had the bourgeoisie brought Louis-Philippe to power, they dominated his regime thereafter. Moreover, they considered this influence to be the culmination of an historical process, not an event coincident with the Orleanist reign. From their point of view, therefore, as a result of bourgeois economic power, the July Monarchy was dominated politically by the bourgeoisie, and could therefore be called a bourgeois monarchy. However, as will be shown in the following chapter, this class-oriented view was disputed by those who advanced a more complex hypothesis, the "classless" 'notables' option.
Those who used the term 'notables' tended to fall into one of two camps. In the first were those who seemed to consider the term as both uncontroversial and unremarkable, associating it generally with provincial landowners. Furthermore, although they did not always specify whether these landowners were bourgeois or noble, the latter were clearly implied. Within the second camp, the definition and use of the term engendered considerable debate. Leading this second group was Tudesq who insisted that the 'notables' of the July Monarchy be defined in pre-Revolutionary terms as wealthy individuals, mostly landowners, whose political behaviour transcended class lines. This thesis was disputed, particularly by some anglophone scholars who not only viewed the 'notables' within a more evolutionary context, they also seem to have missed or ignored the significance of the Tudesq thesis: The apparently classless political behaviour of the 'notables.' As will be shown here, this divergence was probably more the consequence of differing perspectives and strategic assumptions than of competing technical interpretations of the historical record.

In the first camp, Thureau-Dangin, the noted French authority on the July Monarchy, was one of the first to mention this elite group. He referred, almost in passing, in 1888 to "les notabilités politiques" in his treatment of the railroad boom of the 1840s.\textsuperscript{170} The term then went largely
unnoticed in the works consulted by me until it surfaced in Britain in a 1929 study of Guizot by Brush. She, however, was only slightly more specific in using the term to designate a non-landowner. By so doing she appeared to associate the term generally with the bourgeoisie. 171 Although Pradalie in France also appeared to restrict the term to the bourgeoisie in his 1956 study, he introduced a discriminating element by referring to "les notables de la grande bourgeoisie, maîtres du pouvoir." 172 Then in 1963, the British D. Johnson, probably influenced by Tudesq's 1956 work on the 'notables' (as probably were most historians interested in this subject who followed Tudesq), spoke of the cooperation between local notabilities and the Church in Guizot's plan to change the educational system. Here, Johnson was referring to the undefined landed elite, an apparent though uncertain break with historians such as Pradalie and Brush who tended to associate the 'notables' with the unspecified bourgeoisie. 173 In 1964, the American Gagnon, who typified those who attempted to bridge these two extremes, referred to the 'notables' several times as the ruling elite, a group he said included but was not restricted to the wealthy land owning bourgeoisie. 174 Clearly, Gagnon was influenced by Tudesq.

Implicit in this debate on landownership as a criterion for inclusion among the 'notables' was its essentially provincial focus, a fact noted by the British historian Pilbeam in 1970 when he referred to "National associations of departmental deputies and local notables" during the July Monarchy. 175 But where Pilbeam only implicitly associated the 'notables' with landowners, his countryman and contemporary Price was quite explicit. He described the France of 1830 as a country of peasants, artisans and landowning notables rather than of industrial workers and
urbain bourgeoisie. An example of this stereotype appeared in a 1975 article on anglophobia in rural France wherein P. Guillaume described the protagonist in the article as "un type assez achevé de notable provincial." This association between 'notables' and rural France was also cited in 1975 by the C. H. Johnson. In his study of political and social conflicts during the July Monarchy, he analyzed stresses between Paris and the provinces, between government administrators and politicians, between the 'grande bourgeoisie' and local 'notables'.

From this historiographical overview of the first camp, it is clear that its members implicitly accepted the Tudesq definition of 'notables'. However, the second felt that the term required better definition in order to recognize the true political and social power of this elite group. Their concern gave rise to a reassessment of the 'notables' in order to counter the more traditional body of scholarship which promoted the notion of bourgeois hegemony during the Orleanist period. And, since Tudesq led this reassessment, the second school is best described in terms of his scholarship.

As mentioned earlier, the French historian Tudesq was largely responsible for focusing scholarly attention on the term 'notables' in his work on the subject between 1956 and 1982. That he became the standard reference for subsequent scholarship in this area derives not only from the scope of his work but also from the new direction he forced on the conduct of class-related scholarship. As mentioned earlier, it would appear that the relative significance of this new direction was lost on most of his colleagues and reviewers, myself included until late in this study. Before I realized that my hostility toward Tudesq was largely a matter of
strategic perspective, I felt that Tudesq had derived conclusions at variance with his own data. This will become clear as my treatment of Tudesq evolves.

In his 1956 study of the Chamber of Peers, he observed that:  

La pairie de la monarchie de juillet, très parisienne et raisonnablement dynastique, apparaît donc, comme une assemblée de grands notables, de grandes dynasties familiales; mais, alors qu’une thèse élaborée à des fins politiques ne voit qu’une origine bourgeoise et révolutionnaire à ces dynasties, la réalité apparaît bien différent quand on examine avec objectivité un group précis de notables comme la Chambre des Pairs.

He concluded that, even with the integration of the 'grande bourgeoisie' into this new elite, 'ancien régime' nobles continued to dominate the 'notables' well into the 1840s. As evidence of the continuing influence of nobles within the Peers, he noted that, of the 406 sitting Peers in the 1840s, 99 dated from the Restoration and 307 (only 41 of whom were ennobled bourgeoisie) had been named by Louis-Philippe. However, Tudesq then appeared to weaken his argument about the power of these particular 'grands notables' by declaring:  

Partisans et adversaires de la monarchie de juillet étaient d’accord pour reconnaître le faible rôle politique de la Chambre des Pairs. Le titre de pair était cependant recherché par plusieurs familles.

Nevertheless, despite the apparent political impotence of the Peers, Tudesq's observation is still valid: The social prestige attached to the nobility was undiminished during the July Monarchy. However, although he questioned the purely bourgeois origins of the Orleanist ruling elite, his thesis concerning the power of the 'grands notables' still appeared weak in his 1956 study.

It was in his 1964 doctoral thesis that Tudesq developed his main hypothesis when he analyzed the political power of the 'notables', defining
them first in 1789 terms as "les principaux et plus considérables d'une ville, d'une province, d'un état." Tudesq claimed that, with the assimilation of the wealthy 'grande bourgeoisie' into the noble-dominated 'notables' starting in the eighteenth century, this elite group eventually became the new "classe dirigeante" under Louis-Philippe. Apparently conceding the obvious, he also admitted that his definition of 'notables' was not current in the political literature of the 1840s: The writers of that time felt that the "classes moyennes" were the "classes dirigeantes." But it would appear that Tudesq felt that these contemporary observers were mistaken since his more detached view of the historical record imposed a more informed conclusion. He observed, for instance, that Louis-Philippe's Chamber of Deputies was composed largely of wealthy landowners whom he identified, 'inter alia', by their family names. This, he concluded, supported his 'notables' claim against the 'classes moyennes' school. Moreover, since this situation had also obtained during the preceding Bourbon Restoration, he concluded that, while the expanded franchise of 1831 may have increased the number of electors, it had not altered the composition of the Chamber of Deputies: It remained under the control of these 'grands notables', a term Tudesq coined to designate this narrow list of potential office holders, those who paid an annual 'cens' of at least 1,000 francs. (As noted earlier, until the Becks demonstrated in 1987 that income from business was in fact an important factor in the calculation of the 'cens', historians appear to have assumed generally that the 'cens' was essentially a function of the revenue arising from land ownership; since Tudesq does not appear to have disputed this commonly held opinion, he must have considered the 'grands notables' and landowners as virtually
It also served to distinguish them from the general body of electors or simple 'notables', those who paid a minimum annual 'cens' of at least 200 francs.

To test his hypothesis, Tudesq analyzed the electoral rolls which listed the taxes paid by all eligible electors. Table 12, which lists the distribution of those electors who were also qualified to hold office, appears to support Tudesq's thesis concerning landowner political control of the Chamber of Deputies. However, on closer inspection, it obviously only represented potential control in that it implicitly assumed that the actual distribution of candidates for office also mirrored the potential distribution. In fact, dissimilarity between potential and actual distributions was implicitly admitted by Tudesq himself when he pointed out that many nobles had boycotted the Orleanist regime by staying on their estates, thereby leaving the political arena to the landowning 'grande bourgeoisie'. According to Tudesq, this produced an 1840 Chamber of Deputies dominated by non-nobles: Of 459 deputies, 45 were pseudo-nobles, 92 were true nobles of whom only 10 were from 'ancien régime' families. With these data at his disposal, one would have expected Tudesq to conclude

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12</th>
<th>Percent Distribution of Potential Office Holders 1840</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propriétaires</td>
<td>65.3</td>
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<td>Professions libérales</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fonctionnaires</td>
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<tr>
<td>Source: Tudesq 1964, p. 89.</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that the wealthy landowning bourgeoisie had effectively dominated the 'grands notables' during the Orleanist period. Instead, he insisted on a broader compass not necessarily mandated by his evidence—or so I concluded from my perspective. The claimed that these classless "grands notables représentent le groupe dirigeant dans une société en transition." Why he considered the less-than-obvious common interests of this bourgeois-noble group to be more significant than the historically differentiated interests of its two constituent classes, confused not only me but other reviewers as well. That he did, however, see greater significance in their common class-independent interests than in their traditional and sometimes competing class-related interests, must be noted here since it represented an important break with historiographical tradition, a tradition that tended to explain social change in class-related terms. 184

As mentioned previously, confusion—or at least a certain imperceptiveness—was evident among Tudesq’s reviewers. In France, his work was viewed as an essentially provincial study dealing with stresses among landowners: "Il (Tudesq) décrit l'hétérogénéité de leurs (notables) opinions qui s'explique par les oppositions entre légitimistes et orléanistes, ultramontains et gallicans, nobles et grands bourgeois."185 Bury followed much the same path by noting that, in this survey of the regional power of the 'notables', Tudesq recognized the important contribution of Legitimists.186 While the foregoing reviews were reasonably clear, though unremarkable, the American S. Mellon introduced a novel definition of the middle classes. Although he was quite orthodox in concluding that Tudesq had analyzed the disharmony extant between
provincial 'notables' and the Paris-based bourgeoisie, he inexplicably referred to the middle class as a combination of these 'notables' and the bourgeoisie: Nowhere else have I seen the middle class so defined. He then went on to say: "Rejected by the legitimists, these rulers of the middle class were hopelessly split into factions." But it was the Canadian R. F. Harney who took particular issue with Tudesq, suggesting that Tudesq had provided a trivial and not very useful definition of the term 'grand notable': One who had achieved respectability in various ways, and who had paid sufficient taxes to run for public office. He also disputed Tudesq's contention that these 'notables' shared interests sufficiently to coordinate their actions politically.

Tudesq then followed this 1964 study of the effect of provincial 'grands notables' on national politics with another in 1967 dealing with the participation of provincial 'notables' in local departmental politics. In this last study, he concluded that "Le conseil général (de département) a longtemps joué le rôle d'une assemblée de notables, soucieux d'assurer le développement de leur département: telle fut sa tâche sous la Monarchie de Juillet." He also said that Guizot's majority between 1840 and 1848 was composed of "notables locaux et hauts fonctionnaires." Hence, if there is a logical continuum between his 1964 and 1967 studies, we would conclude that the 'grands notables' elected to the Chamber of Deputies in Paris were either these same 'notables de département' or had been supported by them. As will be seen later, Tudesq did not address this distinction—if there was one. In still other areas, the confusion cited in his 1964 study of the 'grands notables' seems to have carried over to the 1967 work. On a few occasions he equated provincial 'notables' with the bourgeoisie. Although.
I would argue that this identity derives logically from his own analysis, he nevertheless saw greater significance in the essentially classless nature of the 'notables'—for reasons that will soon become clear.189

Another element of confusion was introduced in Tudesq's analysis of 2,399 'conseillers généraux' who held office in 1840. The first distribution in Table 13 represents the previously described potential distribution of membership in the Chamber of Deputies which Tudesq derived from electoral lists. These data were previously described in Table 12, and formed the basis for Tudesq's claim that landowning 'grands notables' must have dominated the Chamber of Deputies. The second distribution in Table 13 represents the actual distribution of the 2,399 departmental 'conseillers généraux' cited above. The significant data in this table are the two shares ascribed to 'propriétaires'. If, as Tudesq claimed, the Chamber of Deputies reflected departmental councils and that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 13</th>
<th>Percent Distribution of Deputies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Potential, Chamber of Deputies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propriétaires</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions libérales</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fonctionnaires</td>
<td>11.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industriels</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negociants</td>
<td>10.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officiers</td>
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<td>Magistrats</td>
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<td>Medecins</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inconnus</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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</table>

Sources: Tudesq 1964, p. 120.
Tudesq 1967, p. 113.
landownership was central to membership in each, how, in the absence of
data anomalies between these two data distributions, can one explain the
significantly different landowner shares in each? Also, since Tudesq used
the high proportion of landowners on the tax rolls (65.3 percent in the
first distribution) to conclude that the Chamber of Deputies must have been
dominated by these 'grands notables', the same logic should have compelled
him to conclude that the relatively low landowner share (28.2 percent in
the second distribution) among departmental councillors proved that control
of these councils lay in the hands of non-landowners. However, as claimed
earlier, landowners apparently dominated local councils. Hence, either
Tudesq's assessment of his data changed between 1964 and 1967, or the
Chamber of Deputies in Paris was dominated, not by wealthy 'grands notables'
as he claimed, but by bourgeois businessmen, administrators and members of
the professions who may or may not have owned land. Since I was still
looking at Tudesq through traditional class-oriented eyes, I asked myself
once again why he insisted on ignoring the obvious hegemony of the
bourgeoisie among the 'notables'? Moreover, this apparent evasion was not
mentioned by Tudesq's reviewers. Instead, Stearns, for instance, felt that
these local councils helped the ruling class to maintain its political and
social dominance after the Orleanist regime collapsed in 1848.190 In
France, Tudesq's reviewer simply noted the contrast between these
conservative provincial 'notables' and the more radical republicans emerging
in urban areas.191

It was only during my study of the work of the British historian
Pilbeam in 1970 that I noted a clue to the apparent contradictions in
Tudesq. Pilbeam felt that Tudesq had effectively demonstrated "the
irrelevance of political differences at a local level in France at this time." This conclusion was derived from Tudesq's description of the dynamics within departmental councils where all political stripes worked together to manage the local tax system and to address other problems of local concern. In fact, these departmental assemblies appeared to be so disinterested in national politics that they largely ignored discussions on electoral reform, if local imperatives were not at risk. Pilbeam saw in Tudesq's work an explicit recognition of the fact that political interests were not necessarily determined by one's class, but by the practical political problems of the moment. Although it is far from certain, it is possible to extrapolate this local dynamic to the national level. If true, this may explain why Tudesq was so insistent that the 'grands notables' were functionally classless despite their obvious dominance, first by the traditional aristocracy and later by the bourgeoisie. That is, Tudesq postulated that since the social and political problems of the day simply transcended class lines, the class of the decision maker was hence irrelevant. If so, it would tend to support the notion, described earlier, that ideas and economic imperatives were decisive elements during the July Monarchy. Consequently, Tudesq's approach represented an historiographical breakthrough since most of the historians cited in this thesis tended to either correlate political interests with class, or to analyze the dynamics of the period within a class-related model. For example, when viewed from within a class-related model, Tudesq's data clearly show bourgeois hegemony within the 'notables'. However, looking at it from a different perspective, Tudesq saw the common class-independent interests of the moment as more
decisive for the 'grands notables' than the narrower class interests of the past.

Then, in 1973, Tudesq and his associate Jardin produced a secondary school text which combined the essential elements of Tudesq's works in 1964 and 1967. In this text they portrayed the Constitutional Monarchy of 1815-1848 as a "monarchie censitaire", a monarchy dominated by electors who had been enfranchised by the taxes they paid. As a result:194

Avant même la fin de la Restauration, l'ancienne lutte entre l'aristocratie et la bourgeoisie s'achevait par le succès de cette dernière qui était composée principalement de propriétaires foncières... L'avènement progressif du régime parlementaire coïncide avec la prépondérance de la bourgeoisie et l'épanouissement du libéralisme.

Hence, there was no doubt in their minds that while political hegemony may have in fact passed from the landowning aristocracy to the landowning bourgeoisie, it remained nevertheless in the hands of landowners. That is, although the class of the landowners may have changed, the fact, according to them, of political power rooted in land ownership had not changed. They then referred to this new elite as "ces notables (qui) représentent la catégorie dirigeante d'une société de transition."195 Since the bourgeoisie were clearly dominant among these 'notables', most historians would have tended to emphasize this class-related characteristic rather than the classlessness of the 'notables'. And since Tudesq was demonstrably aware of this inter-class shift in hegemony, his emphasis of the classless nature of the 'notables' obviously reflected the transcendental nature of the problems facing this group.
One who showed interest in the 'notables' was Tudesq's countryman and contemporary P. Boyoux. In 1958 Boyoux analyzed the structure of the 'notables', not during the Constitutional Monarchy but during the First Empire. After having declared that "les membres du collège électoral dudépartement sont choisis parmi les 600 plus imposées", he asked "dans quelles classes sociales se recrutaient ces notables?" If the distribution in Table 14 is accurate, one must conclude that the majority of Napoleon's electors were relatively poor landowners, a distribution similar to that established by the Hecks for the July Monarchy. Also to be noted is the proportion of landowning electors (61 percent) which is almost identical to the potential share determined by Tudesq for the July Monarchy.

The first 'notable-bourgeoisie' dispute noted in this study took place between O'Boyle and Cobban in 1967 when Cobban took issue with O'Boyle's 1966 claim that Louis-Philippe's reign had been bourgeois-dominated. He declared, instead, that the association of the July Monarchy and the bourgeoisie was "propaganda advanced by self-serving politicians
and journalists." He insisted that the dominant class was not businessmen but landowning 'notables'. Although O'Boyle did not dispute the landowning status of these 'notables', she reminded Cobban that many were also businessmen, a fact which Cobban had conveniently ignored. Then in 1968, Ponteil tendered a definition of 'notables' which Cobban would have disputed as well: "Des représentants de la classe moyenne enrichis par le commerce." Finally in the same year, Rémond struck the chord favoured by many: "L'orléanisme, doctrine du juste milieu, représente le gouvernement des notables, des classes dirigeantes, de toutes les aristocraties, celles de la naissance, de la fortune et de l'intelligence." This corresponded roughly with R. Philippe's description in 1970 of an 1830 list of 'notables': "les magistrats, les grands propriétaires, les banquiers, les agents de change, les notaires, les avocats, les artistes, les manufacturiers, les militaires, les gens de lettres." This view was echoed by the Becks in 1987 and Collingham in 1988. As mentioned earlier, the Becks considered the 'notables' first as electors and then as potential office-holders, all of whom were dominated by the bourgeoisie.

Although this bourgeois dominance of the 'notables' was implicit, though ignored as irrelevant in Tudesq's analyses, it was made explicit and considered important by the Becks. By in effect dismissing the political relevance of electors as well as that of most potential office holders, Tudesq saw political and social significance only in the elected who, according to Tudesq, were chosen from among the wealthiest electors. It was with this narrowly focused significance that Collingham took issue. He claimed that France had no true ruling class as such:

Tudesq's 'grand notable' is essentially a historian's term to define the addition of new wealth and power to that of a traditional group,
but its limitations are themselves a point of importance to the historian.

By this he meant that the 'grands notables' did not share common interests.
For instance, some welcomed the Revolution of 1848 while others were appalled by it.201

Thus did Tudesq influence the debate on the 'notables'. In general, it would appear that, until Tudesq raised the issue, most historians were content to consider 'notables' indifferently in traditional pre-Revolutionary terms. But with Tudesq's concentration on a narrow band of very wealthy 'grands notables' whose political behaviour he claimed transcended class lines, the ensuing historiographical debate disputed, not so much their classlessness, which engendered little debate, but rather the relevance of a pre-Revolutionary definition during the July Monarchy. Where some followed Tudesq's lead on this issue, others agreed essentially with Harney who concluded first that the power of Tudesq's narrowly defined 'grands notables' was exaggerated; second that 'notables' during the July Monarchy were more correctly defined as electors than as the elected; and third that they were better described in terms of bourgeois hegemony than by their classlessness. But, if Pilbeam's assessment of Tudesq is accurate, it is likely that both Tudesq and his critics were addressing the issue from different strategic perspectives.
Conclusion

This thesis addressed a two part question. First, to what extent does the historiography support a class-compelled bourgeois characterization of the July Monarchy; and second, how did this historiographical debate evolve, especially as regards the transition from the class-oriented bourgeois to the classless 'notables' dimension. Although the historiographical evidence first pointed to a traditional class-compelled response to both parts of this question, closer scrutiny suggested a more complex reply.

If one attempts to answer the first from a traditional class-oriented perspective, the response is clear: The July Monarchy was indeed a bourgeois monarchy. That is, the historiographical evidence shows that the bourgeoisie dominated the economic life of the period, and that they also held the reins of political power, probably even among Tudesq's 'grands notables'—if not in 1830 then certainly by the early 1840s.

However, when one changes perspective to ask, not who exercised power, but what actually transpired, the response to the first part of the thesis question becomes somewhat less categorical. For example, had the ideological climate and the legislation enacted in fact reflected bourgeois imperatives, but had the aristocracy, and not the bourgeoisie, dominated politically, would a bourgeois label on the regime be valid? Although the historians consulted here who lived strictly by a class-related model would most likely have answered in the negative, those who judged the regime by
its product and not by the class of the producers would likely have
answered in the affirmative. Tudesq, however, questioned the relevance of
this particular class-related correlation. Since he appeared to belong to
the school which judged the regime by its fruits, he argued that the
leaders of the July Monarchy were functionally classless in their political
behaviour, their actual class allegiances notwithstanding. That bourgeois
landowners may have outnumbered the traditional aristocratic landowners he
obviously considered true but secondary. More important to Tudesq was the
fact of political power emanating from the ownership of land.

Before Tudesq broached the subject in 1956, most historians
appeared to have viewed the 'notables' in traditional terms as men of
wealth, prestige and influence who were probably motivated by traditional
class-related imperatives. Furthermore, these historians considered the
landed aristocracy as the dominant class within this group not only during
the July Monarchy but in previous regimes as well. But as was indicated in
the immediately preceding paragraphs above, this notion of an uninterrupted
period of aristocratic hegemony was disputed by those who saw the July
Monarchy as a period of bourgeois ascendancy.

However, Tudesq disagreed with both the aristocratic and bourgeois
schools. He argued instead that the dominant 'grands notables' were
classless politicians and public administrators, not necessarily by choice
but because the problems confronting them transcended traditional class
lines. Indeed, it is not an improbable thesis: If the problems associated
with the industrialization of France were as difficult as portrayed by most
historians, it appears likely that a concentration on old class imperatives
would have hindered their resolution. And, that impediments to this
process of industrialization were in fact overcome—in part as a result of action taken during the July Monarchy—is demonstrable. For example, when Pinkney described the effect of railroads on the food distribution system in France, he was implicitly supporting Tudesq's thesis that interests transcended class lines. That is, since it was obviously in the interests of all urban classes to improve access to a more diversified food supply from the relatively distant farms of landowning nobles, for instance, and since this food would be transported on (at least partly) bourgeois-owned or -financed railroads, support for government subsidized railroad construction could reasonably have transcended class lines.

Tudesq also introduced another distinction. Since the 'grands notables' tended to dominate among the elected, they were therefore of greater political significance than the lesser 'notables' who elected them. However, this was disputed by several historians who felt that the expansion of the franchise during the July Monarchy was of strategic political significance. Even though Tudesq's argument concerning the importance of the elected 'grands notables' is compelling, so also is the Beck view concerning the political relevance of the 'notable' elector. In my view, more significant than the relative importance of 'notables' and 'grands notables' is Tudesq's contention that the 'grands notables' were functionally classless in their political behaviour. Although there is some support for Tudesq's classless thesis in the historiography I consulted, support for his view is mixed. In fact, some of Tudesq's critics felt that his notion of the political significance and motivation of the 'grands notables' was either trivial or misleading.
On balance, until Tudesq's classless model is more closely examined, it would appear that the relevant standard for the July Monarchy will remain some combination of his and the traditional class-related model. On this basis, one can conclude that the historiography supports the view: (1) that the July Monarchy was indeed a bourgeois monarchy, no matter what decision criteria are used; (2) that Tudesq's classless-behaviour model is an interesting, even probable, though inconclusively argued hypothesis; and (3) that the relative political significance of the 'notables' and the 'grands notables' has yet to be determined. Finally, even if one concedes to Tudesq his classless thesis, the historiography still demonstrates that the bourgeoisie were numerically dominant among his 'grands notables', their classless political behaviour notwithstanding.
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(February-December 1922): 593-94.

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Notes


2. This apparent French disinterest was noted by the following reviewer who simply affirmed but did not explain why "l'historiographie est peu cultivée en France." Although he made this statement in a review of a book on the French Revolution, he clearly meant to include all periods of French history, including the July Monarchy.


5. J. P. T. Bury, review of *La droite en France de 1815 à nos jours-


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14. Ibid.


31. Ibid., 10, 11, 20-23.


34. R. H. S., review of *La Monarchie Parlementaire 1815-1848*, by P. Ponteil, In *History* 37 (February-October 1952): 78.


46. Lahure 1864: 425.


57. F. C. Montague, review of La Noblesse de France et l'opinion publique au XVIIIe siècle, by H. Carré, In English Historical Review 36 (April 1921): 274.


63. D'Alméras 1925: 375.


Chastenet 1976: 16.


66. A. Leroy, La civilisation française du XIXe siècle (Belgique: Casterman, 1963), 51.


76. Beau de Loménie 1943: 129.


79. Whether Morazé is a classical Marxist or not is unclear from his writing. In a review of Morazé's *Logic of History*, W. A. Galston called him "an old fashioned progressive, certain that the ascent (of man) from savage existence to civilization has been a blessing." *The American Journal of Sociology* (1979): 1516.


84. Moss, in *1830 in France* 1975: 203.


89. Pinkney 1986: 3.

90. Lhomme 1960: 31, 32.


98. Ibid., 91.


100. Pinkney 1986: 23.
101. Ibid., 26.
104. Ibid., 52.
105. Ibid., 55, 57.
106. Ibid., 61.
107. Ibid., 48.
108. Ibid., 46.
109. Ibid., 25.
110. Ibid., 12.
112. Ibid., 229.
122. Thiers 1831: 151.


133. Tudesq 1971: 90.


143. Ibid., 118.
144. Ibid., 36.
145. Thiers 1831: 55, 57.
146. Lamennais, *La Liberté Trahie*
    (Paris: La bibliothèque française, 1834), 38.
149. Higonnet and Higonnet 1967: 207.
152. Lamennais 1834: 36.
154. S. Girard, "Louis-Philippe Ier, roi des Français,"
    in *Les illustrations et les célébrités du XIXe siècle* 7
156. De Marcère 1914: 45.
157. E. Jarry, *Débuts de l'histoire contemporaine (1789-1848)*
    (Paris: Les éditions de l'école, 1947), 496.
159. Lhomme 1960: 15.
    Aynard 1934: 13.
    de Loménie 1943: 14.

    R. Magraw, *France 1815-1914: The Bourgeois Century*

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G. Lefèbvre, La Monarchie de Juillet (Paris: Centre de documentation universitaire, circa 1925), 2.

Dunham 1953: 385.

Vidalenc 1975: 42.


179. Tudesq 1956: 283.
180. Ibid.
181. Ibid., 261.
183. Ibid., 120.
184. Ibid., 123.
195. Ibid., 220.

