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Aesthetic Perception in Mikel Dufrenne's
Phénoménologie de l'expérience esthétique:
A Phenomenological Critique
by
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Thesis presented to the School of Graduate Studies and Research of the University of Ottawa, as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

I think that Mikel Dufrenne should be praised for his *Phénoménologie de l'expérience esthétique*. The reason why I think this is that he attempts to describe aesthetic experience in terms which are wholly amenable to the experience of art itself from a phenomenological point of view. However, I believe that despite his attempts, Dufrenne ventures into an area which is not phenomenologically accessible, namely ontology. In general, it is the purpose of this thesis to show that Dufrenne's venture into the realm of ontology is beyond the phenomenologically given. And more so, that in attempting such a venture, Dufrenne neglects phenomenologically accessible data, namely, the acts which the spectator deploys when he confronts the aesthetic object. Specifically, it is the purpose of this thesis to show this neglect on Dufrenne's behalf by way of identifying the most simple acts contributed by the spectator.

This thesis has three main divisions. The first two divisions are primarily expository, although not without criticism. The last division concretizes the criticism of the first two parts and shows my specific point of criticism regarding Dufrenne's text. In effect, the third part could be read as a supplement to Dufrenne's work itself.

The first division consists in two chapters. The first chapter of this division is purely expository. It recounts Dufrenne's account of
the a priori or the accord between man and world which grounds straightforward perception. The second chapter shows how the subjective moments of perception deploy themselves such that this accord is pregnant with, and capable of reading, meaning. There is, however, a critical overtone to the second chapter. This consists in noting that Dufrenne does not recognize the full extent in which the subject arrests and constitutes the meaning of straightforward perception.

The second division consists in three chapters, all of which are expository and firmly delineate the subject matter as properly 'aesthetic'. For Dufrenne, aesthetic perception is demarcated from straightforward perception on the basis of objective as well as subjective content. With this in mind, this second part examines the a priori accord between spectator and aesthetic object, the nature of the aesthetic object itself, the subjective moments which realize its proper meaning, and the ontology by which 1) the aesthetic object has meaning and 2) this object is capable of expressing the reality of Being itself. The critical exposition makes clear that here, as in Dufrenne's notion of straightforward perception, there is a lack of attention paid to the subjective aspects of perception itself, or to say the same thing, the contribution on behalf of the subject by which he recognizes aesthetic meaning proper.
The third division ties together the exposition and criticism from the first two divisions. Here, it is seen that Dufrenne's reluctance to delve into the subjective contribution to perception is rooted in a naive or superficial deployment of the phenomenological method. In addition, the data which he misses by refusing or neglecting to consider the subjective structures of perception are made explicit. This explicitation should not be conceived as definitive. Rather, it is a description which shows a subjective contribution in arresting aesthetic meaning. That this explicitation is not definitive is of no harm to my thesis. On the contrary, it is enough to show that there is in fact a subjective contribution to aesthetic perception which is neglected by Dufrenne in his attempt to explain aesthetic experience according to the ready-made nature of the aesthetic object and its meaning.
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PREFACE

§ 1: The lived-unity of body and consciousness in our simple awareness

In Mikel Dufrenne's Phénoménologie de l'expérience esthétique, an attempt is made to describe the moment in which the spectator lives a work of art. Dufrenne gives precision to the moment of aesthetic experience by contrasting it with straightforward or ordinary experience. The major strength of Dufrenne's work is his attempt to deal with aesthetic and straightforward experience in their own terms. He focuses on the meaning and feeling lived by the spectator or subject. He claims that these are lived in such a way that any attempt to explain experience with concepts is futile. Such attempts are futile because experience, he claims, admits of a singularity which is not amenable to consideration outside experience itself.

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1 Mikel Dufrenne, Phénoménologie de l'expérience esthétique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France (two volumes) 1953, 1967. (Further references to this text shall appear as PE in brackets in the body of this thesis followed by pagination.)


3 Dufrenne employs the term sentiment. As we will come to see, it assumes an important status in his aesthetic.
The main focus of Dufrenne's book is the description of aesthetic experience. For him, aesthetic experience consists in a unity of the aesthetic object and the spectator who encounters it. His descriptions draw evidence, on one hand, from the differentia he finds between the subjective appropriation to the aesthetic object and objects which are straightforwardly encountered. On the other hand, he draws evidence from the very natures of these objects themselves in order to specify aesthetic experience. In both cases, Dufrenne stresses not only the epistemic priority of our lived-perception but also its aesthetic import. In doing so, he restores primacy to the sense of aisthesis or our simple awareness of the world prior to explicitly reflective thought.

Dufrenne's descriptions then, focus on the unity of the subject as he lives the object. This is to say that he adheres to the law of intentionality (PE 4). But we need to make explicit to ourselves at this point the various nuances involved in living an object. Our original mode of living an object is perception. We live it, in this instance, as it presents itself to our senses. Yet we live it without being conscious of all its horizons: for example we live an object without seeing its back from 'this' perspective; we are conscious of its tactility even though we do not perceive the object in its entirety. In this instance,

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1 In the proper etymological sense of the term. In this sense, aesthetics is derived from aisthesis, meaning simple sensation and the knowledge and feeling which may accompany it.
the subject deploys both the contents perceived and consciously registered as well as the contents which are not perceptually grasped in the strict sense. Another nuance of living an object occurs when we live an object although we are not before it in the flesh. In this instance, we are conscious of the object and live it as such, yet we do not perceive it. We make previous experiences explicit in memory but we do not perceive them; we make thoughts thematic but we do not see the objects upon which these thoughts are founded.

Our living an object seems to be possible, paradoxically, through several acts which are at once mutually inclusive and exclusive. For example the subject perceives and is conscious of that which he perceives. Yet the subject does not simultaneously perceive hidden profiles of the thing of which he is conscious. Thus the acts of perception, consciousness or thought and experience may seem inexorably related but it is possible for one to occur in the absence of the other or others in the subject’s straightforward life. But in the aesthetic realm, the subject lives aesthetic meanings only when conscious perception is registered and gives way to a certain type of experience, what Dufrenne refers to as feeling.

Precision should be given to Dufrenne’s orientation toward our simple awareness of the world and the feelings which pre-reflectively

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1 In this thesis, words importing the masculine gender shall include the feminine.
accompany it. Dufrenne's treatment of perception should not be envisioned after the manner of a Lockean empiricism. Nor should it be conceived similar to a behavioristic model of empiricism. Both of these positions, he contends, imply that the spectator merely receives representations of the reality of the world\(^1\). Speaking with Dufrenne, the world is not other than the spectator such that he can only stand outside its reality. This would imply that his only proximity to the world would be through the impressions he somehow receives and his response to it as a reality which does not require him to enter its scene. Rather, as a spectator I am involved in the world at a level of existential presence. In the same way that Merleau-Ponty says that I offer myself to situations\(^2\), Dufrenne claims that I participate in the world (PE 667-69). I do not find myself as something to which situations merely happen. Nor does the world simply happen to me. Rather, I bring them about and live them. Thus for Dufrenne, the spectator's presence to the world in its fundamental and original sense cannot be reduced to merely receiving impressions.

In addition Dufrenne's treatment of perception and his emphasis on simple awareness should not be conceived as maintaining that, as

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\(^1\) Mikel Dufrenne, *La Notion d’a priori* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959) p. 145. (Further references to this tex will appear as NA in brackets in the body of this theis followed by pagination.)

a spectator, I am wholly constitutive of my experience (NA 98). For Dufrenne, it is illegitimate to accept an idealist or intellectualist thesis in which thought would have priority at the expense of corporeity and the full pregnancy of existential presence. To be sure, Dufrenne would claim that thought is involved in our simple awareness of the world. But certain modes of thought, for example reflective thought and predicative judgment, do not explicitly manifest themselves in the originality of perception\(^1\). They derive from perception but lived-perception is anterior to their inception.

Thus instead of adopting either an intellectualist or an empiricist thesis, Dufrenne maintains that our lived-perception embodies corporeal as well as intellectual moments (NA 121-2). This is not to introduce a Cartesian dualism on his behalf. Rather, it is to affirm and restore primacy to the lived-unity of body and thought. We should not reduce the body to intellectual capacity, nor intellectual capacities to reception of the world. Rather, for Dufrenne, the subjective structure of our simple awareness of the world consists in a fundamental unity, namely a corporeal soul or to say the same thing, an animated body (NA 168). Consciousness, he claims, must be recognized in its bodily incarnation.

\(^1\) They do not manifest themselves explicitly for Dufrenne. But he does claim that they stem from the immediacy of perception itself although they are more the result of a rupture from presence in is radical originality.
This lived-unity is the locus from which I perceive according to Dufrenne. In this unity I am involved in the world. I do not live either sense-data or concepts. Rather I am involved in living the world. Most significantly, according to Dufrenne, the subject situates himself to the world, thereby involving himself in it. I am, thus, present to, and involved in, the world in each of my perceptions and activities. I live in all my perceptions and experiences no matter how diverse they may be. I not only endure counting cigarettes, seeing, walking, working, etc., but more so I fundamentally and primordially bring them about. These activities would not have any sense without my situating myself in the world and being present to it in each case. And further, none of these activities exhaust the subjective unity of my simple awareness. I am neither given as thought alone or body alone when I walk down a beach or work with my hands. Rather I am given as an active subject in my entirety (NA 181). I am given as that subject who lives diverse situations. Reflective consciousness can show that in my diverse experiences, I originally deploy my body as consciousness orienting myself in a world. But this orienting myself is fundamentally lived as awareness of the world. I am not merely capable of this awareness, but rather in the immediacy and existential urgency of aisthesis, I am this activity itself.

Thus for Dufrenne I come to know the world by being what I am and by continually deploying myself as an active subject who is pre-
reflectively involved in the world. My simple awareness of the world places me in knowing proximity to it. Dufrenne echoes Merleau-Ponty's claim that we are rooted in our being in the world and go beyond it to meet the world. As a spectator, I am already situated in the world and it is already there for me according to my situatedness.

\[1\] Maurice Merleau Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*. (Paris: Gallimard, 1945. p. 432. He writes "...c'est le mouvement profond de transcendance qui est mon être même, le contact simultané avec mon être et avec l'être du monde". (Further references to this text shall appear as PP in brackets in the body of this thesis followed by pagination.)
§ 2: The awareness of our simple awareness

Dufrenne claims that our simple awareness of the world is perceptual. Perception, he tells us, grasps meaning (PE 42l). It is a process which has simple and complex, immanent and transcendent, and specific and diverse aspects. It consists in proximity or presence to the world. In addition, it also consists in a pregnant play of the imagination, simple thought and feelings, and sedimentations of these thoughts and feelings from previous perceptions. But to whatever degree the acts of thinking are included in perception, Dufrenne claims that the fundamental characteristic of our simple awareness, receptivity, is not constituted by thought. The seeing of something, he writes, is not the thought of something. Thought may, and in fact does according to Dufrenne, accompany the perceived. But this type of thought is pre-reflective and awakened in perception. It is not generated from a source exterior to presence itself.

Perception, then, embodies meaning without producing it. This meaning contributes to our dealings with the ongoing concerns of our lives, even if it is not made explicit in reflection and even though perception is incapable of synoptic knowledge. Perception, for

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1 Mikel Dufrenne, L'Inventaire des A Priori: Recherche de l'originaire (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1981) p.124. (Further references to this text will appear in the body of the thesis as LI in brackets followed by pagination.)
Dufrenne, admits of epistemic indeterminacies. There are two reasons for this. On one hand, not all perception is conscious and registered. At times we see things and grasp their meaning without either making them explicit to ourselves nor communicating them to others. Yet the meaning which is not thematically arrested belongs to perception. On the other hand, perception, for Dufrenne, is but a moment\(^1\) of our experience of the world. There is always more to the world and its objects than can be perceived. For example, there is more to a garden or a painting than their being-seen, and more to a melody than its being-heard. Perception, however, is a point of entry to the meaning of the world.

But by describing perception in this way, we should not think that it assumes an unimportant status for Dufrenne. He stresses that perception yields an original knowledge, one which is irreducible to all other modes of knowing. It begins, not chronologically but rather logically, at our being in the world. The intrinsic structure of perception consists in three moments: presence, imagination and understanding. These moments unify our awareness of the world into original knowledge "in which presence to the world is realized and in which there is manifested an ability to read directly the

meaning borne by the object" (PE 422). Thus for Dufrenne, we grasp meaning in our pre-reflective being in the world and these meanings engage us "in action or reflection and are integrated into the course of our life" (PE 421).

It is important to remember that for Dufrenne our simple awareness is characterized by its lack of explicitly reflective thought. It consists in an original presence to the world in which "all the adventures of the mind, all the discoveries of thought, as well as all the attitudes or operations of consciousness" take their root (NA 117-18). We can show this originality by referring to Sartre's well known example1. This example will show Dufrenne's claim that our simple awareness knows what it perceives before explicit reflection.

In its originality, our proximity to objects and is grounded in an accord between the perceiver and the thing to which he is present. So when I count cigarettes in their pack I emphasize that there are twelve and in so doing I give expression to the end of my counting activity. But when I am actually counting cigarettes, that is when I have an originary presence to them,-- a presence which consists in the activity of counting not in the activity of returning to this counting activity once it is completed -- my perceptions have a content which founds further judgments such as "there are twelve cigarettes".

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Originally I live the ongoing activity of counting and it is only when I am finished counting that I give expression to the terminus of my activity. Only then can I say "there are twelve". It is only when I as a subject and performer of tasks meet the end of my task and begin to turn to it in reflection that I find distance between its being originally lived and the judgment I make about it after it has been completed.

The awareness engaged in being present to an object embodies a meaning or content which is originally lived. The cigarette counter's actions and judgments are grounded in an original act of living, being engaged with the cigarettes in the act of counting. And these acts deploy a lived-knowledge according to which the subject situates himself to the object. Like the person who counts cigarettes, the athlete also exemplifies this original knowledge. The athlete orients himself to the game in the same way as the person counting cigarettes, namely, according to a primitive accord and knowing relationship with the world. William Luijpen writes,

"The arms and legs, or rather the entire body of a famous football player 'know' much more about the field, the ball, the goal, the team, and space and time than the player himself. As long as he can rely on this mysterious 'knowledge' he is an excellent player. As soon as he must begin to 'reflect', the time has come for him to look for a job as a trainer"\(^1\).

Similarly, "my feet 'know' much better than I myself the stairs which I climb every day, and my body 'knows' my car better than I"\(^1\).

In the originality of perception, the subject is this act of being-in-accord-with-the-world. In this act there is no distance between myself and the cigarettes I count, or the athlete and game in which he excels. In the immediacy of perception, the perceiver and the perceived are of the same race, as Dufrenne says; "there is no screen between them" (PE 423). Dufrenne gives emphasis to the accord between the perceiver and the perceived throughout his text. He identifies this accord as anterior to specific perceptions yet manifesting itself in perception. It is responsible for the subject's familiarity with the world and its objects in his simple awareness. It thus guides and structures our simple awareness, making it meaningful in the very first place.

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1 Luijpen, \textit{loc cit.}
§ 3: The relation between straightforward and aesthetic perception and the problematica

Throughout his project Dufrenne works from the presupposition that we live the world neither explicitly as a body, nor explicitly as consciousness, but rather as incarnated consciousness. This type of subject has an accord with the world because he has a familiarity with it anterior to any reflection. Dufrenne employs this insight as the ground in the area of his predominant interest, aesthetic considerations. Aesthetic perception, he claims, is more firmly engaged in this accord and realizes it to a greater extent. Correlatively, he claims that there is a wealth of data which manifests itself concretely in aesthetic perception due to the manifestation of this accord. It is precisely by fleshing out this accord that Dufrenne attempts to make explicit the sense of aesthetic perception.

That this accord manifests itself differently in straightforward perception than in aesthetic perception points to a difference between the two modes of perception. Indeed Dufrenne's descriptions of the differences between the structure of straightforward and aesthetic perception and their respective objects emphasize it. He claims that the aesthetic object does not demand the type of appropriation as the straightforwardly perceived object. Thus the subjective aspects of our
simple awareness are seen differently in aesthetic perception than in straightforward perception.

Included in this claim is the presupposition that the aesthetic object demands that the subject appropriates himself to it and live it according to its demands. It demands that we are open to it and receive it according to the meaning it expresses. The aesthetic object demands that it be perceived and felt on its own terms. It does not require to be understood. Thus the operations of the understanding and also those with which the understanding works in tandem are not invoked\(^1\), according to Dufrenne.

But can we accept the different levels in which the subject engages himself in the world, either by straightforward or aesthetic appropriation? Does the spectator deploy himself differently in straightforward or aesthetic life at the moment of perception? Or more precisely, are the structures and contributions of our simple awareness unique to a specific mode of awareness? Are they, as Dufrenne claims, contemporaneous with the demands of the aesthetic object? And in surrendering and adhering to these demands, can it be said that the spectator deploys himself in the absence of the structures and the functions they perform?

Answers to these questions are complicated by Dufrenne’s thoroughgoing emphasis on the a priori accord between the perceiver

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\(^1\) As we will see later, certain aspects and acts of the imagination.
and the perceived. In aesthetic perception the demands made upon us do not include some of the structures deployed in straightforward perception because its accord with us is stronger. Dufrenne claims that we are more familiar with it, and more so, we are not required to 'do' anything with it except perceive it and feel it. But can we really accept this notion that the demands of the aesthetic object do not require certain contributions from subjectivity which are included in, and are contemporaneous with, awareness of the world? More so, and this is the point to which I shall address myself in the last two chapters, if we can show that Dufrenne's claim that there is a lack of subjective contribution to aesthetic perception is ill-founded and that there is indeed a contribution which he misses or neglects, then we can make this contribution explicit and thereby make available sense which belongs in aesthetic concerns.

This thesis shall deal with these questions within the context of Dufrenne's theory of aesthetic perception. It shall begin by showing the ground from which he works, namely the a priori which renders all meaning possible in straightforward perception, and from there move on to make explicit the subjective structures which grasp meaning in our straightforward awareness. We will not be deviating from Dufrenne's own route on this score for he himself uses straightforward perception as an entrée to his description of aesthetic perception.
We shall then move to aesthetic considerations proper. These shall follow a slightly different orientation. Similar to our exposition and description of Dufrenne's theory of straightforward perception, we shall begin by presenting his claims regarding the a priori ground of aesthetic perception. But at that point, we shall make explicit Dufrenne's claims regarding the aesthetic object rather than delving immediately into the subjective structures of aesthetic perception. Whereas an exposition regarding the straightforwardly perceived object is not necessitated to the same extent, it is essential that we make explicit the nature of the aesthetic object due to the privileged position it assumes within Dufrenne's thought. From there, we shall move to present Dufrenne's position regarding the subjective structure of aesthetic perception. Throughout, reminders of Dufrenne's ontology of aesthetic experience must be brought to mind.

The final two chapters shall present reasons why Dufrenne has described aesthetic perception in the manner in which he has and show how his descriptions are incomplete. It shall be seen that Dufrenne works from the phenomenological given, the pregnancy of aisthesis, and from there goes on to make ontological claims which neglect the subjective deployment in aisthesis. In so doing, he neglects sense which belongs in aesthetic considerations, namely the basic lived-substrates of aesthetic perception itself.
PART ONE: STRAIGHTFORWARD PERCEPTION
CHAPTER I: THE A PRIORI OF STRAIGHTFORWARD PERCEPTION

§ 4: Delimitation

At this point Dufrenne's notion of the a priori which guide and structure our straightforward perception shall be presented. We shall begin this exposition by making explicit his identification of the accord the subject has with the world. This relation is often neglected because it is so implicit, but it is nonetheless important due to its thoroughgoing pervasiveness. Dufrenne draws heavily from Kant regarding the notion of the a priori. He does not, however, simply accept Kant's notion. Instead Dufrenne argues for a more pregnant notion of the a priori, one which recognizes it in its subjective (or existential) aspect as well as its objective (or cosmological) aspect and also in its material and formal aspects. Because of the role Kant plays in the development of Dufrenne's notion of the a priori, it is essential that Dufrenne's thought be presented in juxtaposition with Kant's in order to give precision to the notion of the a priori he espouses. Once Dufrenne's a priori is firmly delineated from Kant's, and the various nuances he introduces are made explicit, we will be in a position to show how it functions in our straightforward perception.
§ 5: Dufrenne’s identification of the accord of being in the world

We are not in the world as mere things but as active participants. We are involved in the world. Dufrenne claims that our involvement in the world admits of pre-reflective knowledge which is lived originally in perception (NA ch. 4). This is to say that the world we live already has meaning before we turn to it in reflection\(^1\). Prior to reflection we have a reciprocity or connaturalité\(^2\) with the world according to which we find ourselves in a familiar environment. This connaturalité, according to Dufrenne, gives us the world for it is a power (pouvoir) which not only places us in contact with the world, but also opens it up and articulates our experience\(^3\). He writes, "the world is made known, [it] is revealed to someone capable of knowing it; this defines the a priori" (NA 122). Despite his emphasis on knowing and articulating our being in the world, Dufrenne should not be conceived as reducing this accord to a strictly knowing relation for he writes "the accord between man and world is a carnal one

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\(^1\) "...cette activité se fond sur une réceptivité primordiale: quelque chose est donné, qui n’est pas seulement un divers à organiser, mais qui est d’emblée chargé de sens" (LI 20).


\(^3\) Ibid.
which attests to their connaturalité"¹. It is thus a relation of being which participates in a 'flowing onward'. This connaturality expresses itself in our appropriation to the world.

We should emphasize the character of participation between man and world. The familiarity we have with the world and our connaturality with it, signify a flowing onward which consists in a unity reverberating with lived-sense. We could refer to the concept of reverberation in the sense of Minkowski's **retentir**². Minkowski illustrates this concept in vivid terms. The reverberation or resonance is likened to "the sound of a hunting horn, reverberating everywhere through its echo, making the smallest leaf, the smallest piece of moss shudder in a common moment and transforming the whole forest, filling it to its limits, into a vibrating and sonorous world"³. Now we can cast Dufrenne's thought on this score in these terms because our appropriation to the world could be said to be rooted in this reverberation. Our situatedness 'comes to life' in our encountering the world to which we are intimately proximate, and can do so only because we have such proximity. In all of our endeavours, the world is constantly 'there'. It is constantly there, to

¹ Ibid.


be more precise, as that in which we already find ourselves each time we turn to it. This signifies, for Dufrenne, an immutable accord which cannot be neglected. It deserves the name a priori for the relation between us and the world founds all possible content which can be experienced. The terms given in our being in the world must be considered equi-primordial, for Dufrenne, because it is impossible to speak legitimately of one term without the other upon which it is dependent. This is to say that there is no world without man to realize it as such. Correlatively, there is no such being as man without a world in which he lives and which assumes the status of constantly being there as a background upon which all his lived-endeavours take place.

Thus we see, certainly without making it, nor its implications, fully explicit, the notion of the a priori upon which Dufrenne places considerable emphasis. His identification of the a priori is Kantian to the extent that it establishes the foundations of our perception in the conditions of the possibility of experience in general in the very first place. But there are subtle yet significant differences introduced by Dufrenne to challenge what he refers to as Kant's overly formalistic conception of the a priori (c.f. LI 19). To properly understand these

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differences we would do well to recall Kant's notion of the a priori and from there move on to show the nuances Dufrenne introduces.
§ 6: Kant's notion of the a priori

We shall begin our exposition of Kant's notion of the a priori with a consideration of how our perception is given as articulated perception. For Kant, our immediate simple awareness of the world is realized only with an intuition. Kant uses the term Anschauung to designate this simple awareness. It could be said that Anschauung is not an exact translation of aisthesis, nor Dufrenne's term percevoir. These latter terms, however, are absolutely compatible provided that we speak of percevoir in an originary sense and also that we do not confuse the logical with the chronological. Kant employs the term Anschauung to designate the purely passive or receptive moment of perception. This moment, for Kant, is sensibility or the capacity for receiving representations¹. The moment of sensibility, in the strict sense, is merely passive for it functions according to the manner in which it is affected by objects. It is logically speaking prior to thought and therefore non-mediated by concepts. This is not to say, however, that he claims that perception in toto is wholly passive for, as we will see, perception cannot be reduced to the moment of sensibility. It is to say, rather, that originary perception is object oriented and not, in essence,

¹ Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason trans. N. Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965) A19=B34. (All further references to this text will occur in the body of the paper as Critique in brackets followed by the pagination.)
reflective. For whereas sensibility is logically prior to thought, we cannot say it is chronologically prior; thought is contemporaneous with sensibility and renders it intelligible only upon its givenness. Similarly for Dufrenne, our perception has presence to the world as its first logical moment. It is so originary that, in the same sense as Kant's concept of sensibility, it is not mediated by thought or conceptual thinking. It is perceiving rather than conceiving. Cast in this light, then, Kant's Anschauung and Dufrenne's percevoir fall within the domain of aisthesis for they designate an immediate lived presence to the world anterior to the upsurge of conceptual and reflective thought.

Now for Kant, as perceivers we have a capacity\(^1\) for being aware of objects, namely the ability to receive representations and, as noted, this capacity defines sensibility. He writes, "objects are given to us by means of sensibility and it alone yields intuitions" (Critique, B33=A19). Our intuitions yield appearances. Objects appear to us in intuitions. The objects of intuition are composed of two moments: on one hand they consist of 'matter' or "that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation" (Critique B34=A20); on the other, the 'form

\(^1\) Kant uses the term Vermögen while Dufrenne uses the term pouvoir. Casey makes an important point regarding the similar sense these terms express, namely, both designate a faculty or a power, or more so, a fundamental disposition which is pre-reflective (c.f. Mikel Dufrenne, The Notion of the A Priori, trans Edward Casey (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966) p. 13 n.40.
of appearance' "determines the manifold of appearance [such] that it allows of being ordered in certain relations" (Critique B34=A20). We must, then, emphasize that these two moments belong to simple awareness for Kant. We can cast them in slightly different terms, namely the givenness of a thing to perception, and the activity of bringing the understanding to bear upon it such that it appears as that unified thing and not another. These two aspects are not chronologically distinct but rather logically distinct. Form is given a priori whereas matter is given empirically. Form, for Kant, is a subjective contribution to perception whereas the matter or content actually perceived is not. Kant states that form is not given in perception but rather with it in as much as it allows "of being considered apart from all sensation" (Critique B34= A20).

If we consider the actual framework or structure of simple awareness for Kant, we will see that it is 'already' ordered. This is due, in congruence with Kant's 'Copernican Revolution', not to an autonomous existing order in nature, but rather to the contribution of the subject in his simple awareness. It might be worth pausing for a moment to offer an argument in support of this thesis, namely that there is some sort of understanding at work a priori in our simple awareness. If we reflect upon our simple awareness, perhaps one of the most striking features is that our descriptions of the thing consist in general terms. But note, we describe reflectively. In this reflection we describe what we have already perceived prior to such
explication. This sort of knowledge prior to reflection indicates that perception is not wholly passive or receptive; there is already an understanding at work. Our reflection presupposes this understanding. Our communication with others presupposes this understanding. To be sure, it involves not only the given but in addition it involves the subjective activity, however tacit and presupposed it may be, of pre-reflectively making the given, the matter of perception, intelligible and somewhat articulated.

The structure of our simple awareness which Kant espouses can be made explicit, first at the moment of sensibility. Here, awareness in its primitivity consists in space and time. We are not given objects without their spatial specifications nor temporal determinations. Thus Kant's 'Transcendental Aesthetic' specifies space and time as the formal necessary conditions of perception. As such they a priori order the perceived. Kant claims that our perceptions are ordered as such because objects of simple awareness have already been subjected to the a priori forms of sensibility. Or to put it another way, the actual matter of our simple awareness is already subjected to and subsumed under specific activities of the understanding, namely spatialization and temporalization. According to Kant, this characteristic belongs to every appearance.

In addition to the forms of sensibility, the understanding contemporaneously contributes a degree of thought. Kant identifies this contribution as the concepts of the understanding. For Kant, the
concepts of the understanding are pure; they are not empirically nor perceptually given. They are, rather, discursive. This is to say that only upon reflection can they be deduced as the general presuppositions common to all experience. They order perception such that it has a certain objectivity. This is required for Kant because if we hypothetically isolated sensibility from the concepts of the understanding, there would be no way to distinguish between subjectivity and objectivity. This is also to say, by implication, that there would be no way to know what holds for an individual subject and what holds objectively, for all subjects.

In perception itself, the categories simultaneously order the content of the Anschauung such that it is intelligible. For Kant, they function by thinking the intuition in representation. This shows the correlation of the content of the Anschauung to the categories of the understanding. The form which the categories supply to the matter cannot be legitimately conceived apart from the matter itself, for as Kant says, "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (Critique A51=B75). Thus for Kant, although the understanding is not sensibility, it accompanies sensibility and works conjointly with it. In keeping with Kant's Copernican Revolution, the understanding and its concepts function a priori by providing a framework for, and proffering our simple awareness with, thought in concepts.
But what are these concepts and how can we think intuited contents in them? To begin to approach these questions, we should remember that concepts are pure forms, that is they have no empirical content. They merely subsume matter and provide order for it. They function in assembling a number of representations under a single one (Critique A68=B93). The concepts of the understanding thus provide an originary rule such that the perception of a thing consists in our awareness of its many features. We regard it as such, not a different thing each time we observe different features or relations of features (Critique A105). In this case, then, the concept under which the content is subsumed produces unity among diverse features of a thing so that we have a single thought of a thing despite its diverse features.

Now how is this so? To begin with we should note that the character of the subject to which the objects are originally given is receptive. The manifold of representations, Kant writes, is "given in an intuition which is purely sensible, that is, nothing but receptivity" (Critique B129). He continues:

"the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and cannot, therefore, be already contained in the pure form of sensible intuition. For it is an act of spontaneity of the faculty of representation; and since this faculty, to distinguish it from sensibility, must be entitled understanding, all combination -- be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination of the manifold of intuition,
empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts -- is an act of the understanding" (Critique B129-30).

The combination with which we are interested would be the intuition of the empirically given. Thus based on this passage it seems that there are actual 'inhabitants' of empirical intuition, be they called sense data or sensa, which accompany the things perceived. It is not the case that the actual sense data present themselves to us and we do no more than receive them since we are in a passive receptivity. If we were to follow this implication, perception in its upsurge (remembering that this distinction is a logical and not a chronological one) would consist in isolated components of sense data, each of which would be by itself. But Kant guards himself against this interpretation precisely because our awareness is not purely receptive. The activity of the understanding also belongs in this consideration as that which structures receptivity1.

Lastly, it is also the case, for Kant, that in order for perceptions and their contents to be given as articulated, an 'I think' must accompany all representations. "Otherwise", as Kant says, "something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would

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1 It is worth noting that it is to this point that Dufrenne explicitly objects. That the content perceived is "already contained in the pure form of sensible intuition", as Kant says, suppresses the "irreducible originality of intuition" (NA 69). Thus Dufrenne contends that Kant's emphasis on the understanding neglects an a priority embedded in content itself. We shall address this point at length in the following sections.
be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me" (Critique B131-32). Thus Kant claims that there must be a subject presupposed as one and the same, and capable of maintaining this identity throughout its various perceptions. More so, in standing over and against the various perceptions, the subject emerges as conscious of objects in their own right, not as merely subjective impressions. The 'I think' is the fundamental act of knowing. It is synthetic in character and forms the original unity by which we have perception. Not only, then, are various sense data connected for me, but in addition, they are given to me as known (Critique B134). We should note that the 'I think' and the knowledge it secures, whether they are made explicit or not, derive solely from the subject. To be precise, they derive from the understanding alone, which itself is nothing but the faculty of combining a priori, and of bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception" (Critique B134-35).

Thus we see the a priori at work in Kant's conception of our simple awareness. These a priori are pure and are derived solely from the subject. Further, they are given in perception only to the extent that they accompany the perceived content and form no part of it. Instead, they endow it with an intelligibility and as such constitute it 'from the outside'. As we will see, Dufrenne has reservations about each of these points. In order to reach these reservations, we shall at this point shift our exposition from Kant's
thesis to show Dufrenne's concerns about these issues. At that point, we will be in a better position to deal with Dufrenne's thesis proper.
§ 7: Dufrenne and Kant on the a priori

It is obvious that Dufrenne embraces a Kantian notion of the a priori to the extent that it provides the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. But Dufrenne introduces nuances that are foreign to Kant's notion. We could say that Dufrenne 'existentializes' Kant's a priori. Dufrenne's innovations extend the Kantian notion and furthermore characterize his notion as quite unique.

To make this point, we shall emphasize two places at which Dufrenne significantly differs from Kant. The first can be identified in terms of Kant's and Dufrenne's respective projects and the due the a priori is given in light of these projects. Kant's project should be defined as a logico-epistemological endeavour. He attempts to investigate the fundamental concepts which structure our experience. These concepts, however, are accessible to pure reason even though they may accompany empirical experience. With Kant there is a particular orientation away from perception even though this orientation is intended to render objects of perception as well as disciplines which stem from the nature of perceived objects, such as aesthetics and physics, intelligible. Dufrenne's project, on the other hand, is explicitly concerned with aesthetics. Instead of venturing beyond perception, Dufrenne claims to remain at the original deployment of simple awareness, complete in its existential pregnancy.
We can show this difference by focusing on the subject of simple awareness upon which Kant and Dufrenne place different emphasis. The locus of Kant's epistemology is the transcendental subject's acts. In this endeavour, arguing with Dufrenne Kant enters the realm of the theoretical because he shifts from the simple awareness that we as embodied subjects deploy to that of an impersonal subject, one devoid of a body and a specific personality. He alienates the subject from bodily awareness and treats the content of experience as the workings of a purely formal subject. Dufrenne recognizes a fundamental problem with Kant's orientation, namely that there is no legitimate due paid to lived-perception as lived. Instead, he feels that Kant only attends to it 'from the outside', from the point of view of a 'theoretician looking in'.

Now given the scope of Dufrenne's project, the subject he introduces is an embodied subject, one who is bodily present to paintings, music and theatre. This subject lives a painting, for example, in a radically different way than an impersonal subject because he is present to it in the flesh and not according to concepts or presuppositions. But even though the subject is treated as embodied by Dufrenne, there are still various a priori which guide simple awareness. In orienting himself to perception from the point of view of the concrete spectator, that is the 'whole' spectator and not an abstract, partial or intellectual subject, Dufrenne insists on the a priority of the subject's existential proximity to the world and thereby
rejects Kant's formalistic overtones while accepting the notion of a priori knowledge. He writes, "we shall remain faithful to the "Introduction" of the *Critique of Pure Reason* by defining the a priori as knowledge [connaissance]... and as rule or principle" (NA 68-9). But he rejects Kant's guiding presupposition that the a priori is a purely formal, non-empirical character contributed wholly by a disembodied subject in accordance with the principles of thought alone. Dufrenne thus 'bends' the a priori beyond Kant's logico-epistemological schema by introducing a different notion of the subject and correlatively a different notion of the a priori which guides his awareness.

The second point of difference is located within perception itself although our commentary on it is derived from a consideration of the orientation we have just outlined. We have seen that there is a unity in perception for Kant because there is a unity of thought which accompanies each and every perception. This unity of thought is pure for Kant because it has no empirical content. Further it accompanies the content perceived, a priori providing order to it 'from without' for it is not given in the content itself.

Dufrenne, on the other hand, claims that Kant relegates content to secondary importance on this score. The actual content given in perception is not treated by Kant in its lived existential immediacy. This is why Dufrenne contends that whatever emphasis Kant places on the priority of the *Anschauung* is illegitimate. Its illegitimacy
consists in content being subsumed under the forms and operations contributed by an intellectual subject. Therefore, he claims that Kant's account loses the specific empirical sense of lived intuition itself which belongs in a consideration of the a priori.

Specifically, Dufrenne claims that the a priori consists in a reciprocity between empirical content and pre-reflective thought. In making this contention, he does not follow Kant's emphasis on the demarcation between content and form. Rather than emphasizing such a distinction, Dufrenne stresses that the relation between content and form is always present as one founding the other. Perceived content, he writes, is given to a consciousness "attuned [to it] before all experience" (NA 54). Being attuned to the content of perception signifies the a priori contribution of the subject. Consciousness, however, does not know content without actually being present to it. The a priori thus provides a link to, and founds, empirical content in immediate knowledge of it. For Dufrenne, empirical content fulfills our accord with the world, which would be quite empty without it. He contends that our a priori conception of space, to cite an example, is empty without empirical content and our experience of empirical content, conversely, would not be possible without an a priori which governs the possibility of such an experience in the first place. Taken together, the a priori form of space and the empirical givenness of actually inhabiting space provide a proximity to the world which formal concepts alone cannot.
We can show this by referring to our simple awareness itself. Our inhabiting the world provides us with a first hand acquaintance of it in the flesh. Our situatedness is possible only because we have an accord with it, not because we have a knowledge of concepts which describe it. A mathematician is pre-reflectively situated in it prior to his theoretical activities of formalization and conceptualization. This original situatedness founds and provides a content for formalization (NA 118). The world which formal concepts describe, however, is a world of a 'second order' and the concepts themselves are 'second order expressions', because they can only account for an original experience of the world in which the a priori of spatiality is given in the empirical situatedness in space¹. Thus, rather than stressing the a priori as formal or purified of empirical content, Dufrenne concludes that the empirical must be considered in the notion of the a priori. In effect, this demands that the notion of the a priori must be widened such that its lived empirical sense is made evident.

Dufrenne proposes, in contradistinction to Kant, to 'deformalize' or existentialize the a priori. This means that the a priori is not merely a form contributed by the subject; in addition it has a material reality which is given in empirical or existential awareness itself.

¹ To be sure, Dufrenne is drawing from Merleau-Ponty's distinction between first order or immediate experience, and the type of activity which attempts to make this experience intelligible, what he refers to as second order expression. c.f. (PP p. iii).
Both the material and formal aspects of the a priori have a content or a sense which is knowable and with which the subject is in primordial accord (NA 67). But to show how Dufrenne arrives at such a conception and how it finds its original lived-manifestation in our deployment of straightforward perception, we shall show how he deformalizes the Kantian a priori.
§ 8:  Dufrenne's deformalization of the Kantian a priori

Dufrenne follows two paths to show that the a priori is neither reducible to formal aspects nor to a wholly subjective contribution as Kant claims. First, he draws attention to the criteria of universality and necessity by which Kant defines the a priori. Along Dufrenne's lines of thought, these should be exposed and identified as illegitimate in as much as they derive from a formalistic conception of the subject. Dufrenne notes that for Kant, the a priori and its criteria are introduced in relation to a judgment as the "necessity and universality which may characterize a proposition" (NA 67 / see Critique B 3-6). We should also note that Kant introduces the criteria of necessity and universality with respect to "certain concepts, no less than in judgments" (Critique B5). In either case, Dufrenne's point is that Kant's notion of the a priori pays no homage to the lived sense of perception.

We could show this by referring to Kant's concept of space in its a priority and Dufrenne's subsequent critique. Kant writes:

"If we remove from our empirical concept of a body, one by one, every feature in it which is [merely] empirical, the colour, the hardness or softness, the weight, even the impenetrability, there still remains the space which the body (now entirely vanished) occupied, and this cannot be removed" (Critique B5-6).
Space, then, is a priori necessary because it cannot be removed from the concept of body. Further, it is a priori universal because all bodies are given in space. It thus follows independently of perception of particular bodies, in all instances. And as we saw the a priority of space is formal and subjectively contributed.

Dufrenne is concerned that since the a priori are strictly intellectual and do not proceed from the embodied incarnate subject, actual lived perception is replaced by the perception of an impersonal and inhuman formal subject (c.f. NA 68). He contends that subjectivity should not be replaced by intellectual moments, i.e., the strict moments of reflective judgment and deduction to which Kant relates the a priori. He writes that Kant relates the a priori to judgments, not lived-objects (LI 21), and thus loses track of the proper field of perception, the very field in which the a priori is most originally at work. We can show this by referring to Kant's notion of the a priority of space. Despite Kant's claims that space accompanies all of the subject's representations (Critique A24=B38-9), Dufrenne would say that Kant's subject may have space but he stands outside it. And even though there is only, as Kant says, one space and all particular spaces are but limitations of this one space (Critique A25=B39), Dufrenne would say that the subject is apart from this space because it only accompanies his representations; it is not part of his representation. Dufrenne thus points to the question: can we really say that the subject is in space in an originary lived-manner if
it only accompanies his representations? It must be, for Kant, that the subject has a proximity to objects and the content perceived only once the categories are invoked and the data of experience are absorbed into the logical conditions of knowledge\(^1\).

Dufrenne rejects this implication that the subject is in space but the sense of spatiality is derived from logical conditions and not the existential proximity by which he lives it. Dufrenne claims that the subject is in space. He responds to the space in which he finds himself and in so doing lives objects, not propositions nor logical conditions. The latter can only be derived from the original experience of space. Space is a priori for Dufrenne not because it accompanies all perception, as Kant claims, but rather because it is pre-given to the subject. Space has a lived-validity consisting in the subject's response to that which is pre-given, namely the milieu in which he finds himself.

Dufrenne, then, still maintains the a priority of space. But it should be seen as occupying an unmediated proximity to the subject who occupies it. To use the language of Merleau-Ponty, the subject has space because it is the very expression of his total life in the

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\(^1\) c.f., NA 69. Dufrenne writes "Kant contrasts the form of intuition which 'gives only a manifold' with the formal intuition which 'gives unity of representation'. Here the formalist signification of the formal is restored at the expense of the irreducible originality of intuition. As Tran Duc-Tao says, the result is 'to suppress the autonomy of the Aesthetic and absorb all objective meaning into the logical conditions for knowledge'".
world\textsuperscript{1}. For Dufrenne, things given in perception have more than an intellectual proximity as Kant would have it. Perception itself involves a real presence to things, one which cannot adequately be accounted for by formal categories which are autonomous with respect to the content subsumed under them. Content, or matter in Kant’s terms, must be involved in a consideration of the a priori according to Dufrenne.

This leads us immediately into Dufrenne’s second point of deformalization. In keeping with the emphasis he places on the primacy of aisthesis, Dufrenne undertakes a rethinking of Kant’s a priori by looking at it in its original state. If we attempt this we will be led to see that we must free the a priori from the restrictions established in having it set in an elaborated state as elements of pure knowledge (c.f. NA 70). We will, according to Dufrenne, be led to a consideration of the diversity of the a priori and see that it is irreducible to formalism if we "consider the a priori in its native state: not as it appears when elaborated by reflection... but as it appears immediately in perception, forming in us a primordial knowledge which organizes perception without stemming from it" (NA 71).

\textsuperscript{1} Merleau-Ponty, \textit{Phénoménologie de la perception}, p. 327. "La perception de l’ espace... et ses modalités exprimant toujours la vie totale du sujet, l’ énergie avec laquelle il tend vers un avenir à travers son corps et son monde."
It could be said, at first glance, that Dufrenne falls back and relies on Kant's categories\textsuperscript{1}, especially in light of some of the examples he chooses to exemplify his claim. He writes:

"we might invoke here the experience of spatiality which we have before we learn geometry, or of plurality before knowing the theory of number, or of the tragic before developing a pure aesthetics as a theory of affective qualities, or of domination before having a pure sociology of intersubjectivity, or of myth before elaborating a theory of archetypes" (NA 71).

But we said before that Dufrenne bends the a priori beyond Kant's logical preoccupations. Certainly, then, an immediate grasping of the tragic or of intersubjective discourse do not fall within the realm of concerns in which Kant sought to solidify science. This is because the experiencing of the tragic, for example, involves a content which is not formal. Similarly, the objects of science, which clearly lend themselves to formalization, have a material reality which is irreducible to their expression in propositions. And most importantly, this irreducible character is a constituted meaning given in living through counting, in living through a Greek tragedy etc.. These lived activities escape being totally expressed in

\textsuperscript{1} c.f. Critique A80=B106. Kant lists four categories under which he lists three sets of modalities. I) Of Quantity--unity, plurality, totality; II) Of Quality--reality, negation, limitation; III) Of Relation--of inherence and subsistence, of causality and dependence, of community; and IV) Of Modality--possibility and impossibility, existence and non-existence, necessity and contingency.
propositions. They are, rather, constitutive of, and at the same time, immanent in, experience. The a priori in this sense designates the objectivity of the object experienced, an object pre-given in our simple awareness. It is, as Dufrenne writes, "the immediate meaning grasped in experience and instantly recognized" (NA 71). And this meaning takes on the character of 'the feeling of familiarity'; it is a recognition, a reconnaissance as opposed to a connaissance.

Dufrenne claims that the a priori is given in the immediacy in which objects are perceived (c.f. NA chap IV). The immediate givenness constrains thought with an inherent lived-necessity by giving it a content about which to think (NA 74). If there is to be any reference to intellectual activity within the structure of perception, Dufrenne prescribes that it must bear in on the object as perceived and not the object qua product of general categories, however formally and logically necessary they may be. This prescription, of course, is nothing other than the fundamental law of intentionality initiated by Brentano\(^1\) and to which Husserl gave precision throughout his works. The intellectual or formal necessity which Kant prescribes, on the other hand, tends to remain faithful to itself and to this end may bear no adequation to perception itself due to its steadfast endeavour to avoid logical contradiction (NA 72-5). But once

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it is made clear that perception has the world as its content, Dufrenne claims that the a priori will be seen as embodying a diversity which is irreducible to formalism and subjectivism.

Dufrenne's deformalization of the Kantian a priori, then, consists in emphasizing its material and objective aspects. In claiming that the a priori has an objective aspect, Dufrenne is widening Kant's notion of the a priori to include the content or matter of objects themselves. The material aspect specifies content and this content, for its part, specifies or constitutes lived-objects. At this point, we shall turn to Dufrenne's thesis regarding the material a priori and its place in specifying the objects lived in perception as such.
§ 9: Dufrenne's material a priori and the theory of constitution

Dufrenne's notion of the material a priori is influenced by several thinkers who, like himself, do not accept Kant's formalism. For these thinkers and Dufrenne, the notion of the material a priori is embedded in the theory of constitution. It is essential, therefore, to explicate Dufrenne's notion of the material a priori in light of both these historical influences as well as the notion of constitution in order to give it due precision.

Dufrenne's notion of the material a priori and his theory of constitution are rooted in Husserl's objection to Kant's thesis that matter is derived from form. At one point in Experience and Judgment\(^1\) Husserl distinguishes matter from form and claims that the latter is derived from the former. The formal a priori, which finds expression in science, in mathematical, logical and grammatical rules to name a few examples, derive from the pre-scientific experienced content of the life-world already present to the subject in aisthesis, even if the subject does not make this content explicit\(^2\). Content, in this sense, consists in substrates immediately experienced and serves as the stuff or referents found in predicative

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\(^2\) Ibid., c.f., p. 27; p. 58.
judgments and science\(^1\). This is to say that it is not given 'under' a form but rather forms, such as quantity, quality, relation, etc., are invoked after the manner of a second order judgment of the content encountered and already constituted in such and such a determination.

Husserl's emphasis on the immediacy of experience rather than Kant's formalistic thesis was adopted as the general phenomenological program to be followed. It was accepted as the general direction for phenomenologists because lived-encounter could not be legitimately subsumed under logical categories. But still, it cannot be said that his program was accepted outright, in its entirety\(^2\). For Husserl, however freed the given became from Kant's logical subsumption, it assumes a noetic status. He writes, "the original category of Being, generally, in which all other regions of Being have their root" is noetic\(^3\). The originary noetic activities of the subject constitute "within itself the being-sense of the world [and] precede the being of the world\(^4\)". Husserl, in reacting against Kant's formalism, still could be interpreted as aligning himself with Kant to

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1. Ibid., p. 45.
3. Husserl, Ideas, p. 212,
the extent that the subject's noetic activities are constitutive of the
meaning of the world in general, and objects of perception in
particular.

It is in response to Husserl's subjectivistic orientation that
Heidegger emphasizes a different aspect of the being of the given.
Heidegger agrees with Husserl that the being of the given cannot be
exhausted in logical subsumption. But unlike Husserl, he claims
that there is a dimension of things responsible for revealing itself to
the subject rather than the subject constituting the thing noetically,
that is wholly within consciousness. Heidegger introduces the notion
of erschliessen to designate the property of things responsible for the
disclosure of that thing itself to consciousness\(^1\) in our simple
awareness\(^2\), prior to any reflection. In doing so, he emphasizes the
being of things in their own right, and what could be called an
objective performance by which they reveal themselves to the subject.
Heidegger thus represents an alternative to Husserl's subjectivism
for Dufrenne.

It is not our purpose to explicate the differences between Husserl
and Heidegger. But it is essential to note how Dufrenne draws from
these two thinkers and how he incorporates their thought into his

\(^1\) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans J. MacQuarrie (New York:

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 48.
own. Dufrenne draws from Husserl to the extent that he recognizes that material content has priority over form. Content a priori specifies the very being of objects or things. The form which a thing assumes is only yielded upon the givenness of the thing lived in the flesh. But Dufrenne parts company with Husserl and embraces Heidegger to the extent that he claims that the a priori has a being which cannot be exhausted exclusively as a contribution of the subject. The subject for Dufrenne is only responsible for situating himself with respect to the object and intentionally encountering it. In its originary deployment, intentionality affirms and constitutes the very relation of Being itself. Dufrenne, however, does not accept Heidegger's position outright. He accepts it in so far as it attests to an a priority which is not exclusively a contribution of the subject. But still Dufrenne admits that there is an a priority to subjective performance as well as objective performance. Intentionality, for Dufrenne, already attests to the nature of the subject in addition to the being of the object, and specifies his transcendence toward the object\textsuperscript{1} \textit{qua} object as inexhaustible in subjective constitutive activity.

\textsuperscript{1} Dufrenne, "\textit{Intentionnalité et esthétique}", p.54
The subject's transcendence originally consists in a movement beyond the givenness of the thing toward intellection or action\(^1\). Once representation is gained, it is investigated "as a sign which delivers other appearances and not the thing in itself"; it invites us to look for a content or truth beyond appearance\(^2\), namely in reflection or praxis\(^3\).

Thus for Dufrenne intentionality yields the material a priori in as much as it is a point of entry into the communication between the subject and the content of the object. Intentionality presupposes that the "subject opens itself up to the object or transcends itself toward it" and additionally "that something of the object is present in the subject anterior to all experience, and in return that something of the subject belongs to the structure of the object prior to every project of the subject"\(^4\). This 'something' of the subject which belongs to the object is its *co-naissance*, its a priori consubstantiality and familiarity with it. Our perception and appropriation to the world, then, involves a reciprocity which is irreducible to the noetic activities of

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 56. At this point we are still referring to straightforward perception and not to the notion of aesthetic perception. We will see that this very point is perhaps the most important point of demarcation between the two modes of perception.

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 56

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 55.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 60.
consciousness, to judgment and intellection. Rather, it deploys a more fundamental and originary activity motivated by consubstantiality. It is an activity which passively receives the world.

We may wonder how this activity makes itself manifest. For Dufrenne it deploys itself as neither intellectually constitutive of the meaning of the object, nor in the terms of a strictly knowing, relation with the world. This activity, this simple receptivity, manifests itself in feeling the being of the perceived. Dufrenne, on this score, is influenced by Max Scheler. Scheler claims that we do not, strictly speaking from the subject's original perception, perceive the world; rather, we feel "what belongs to the world"\(^1\). With Scheler, Dufrenne claims that simple awareness grasps the whatness of perceived content. It's immediate familiarity with this content embodies the meaning which is investigated with the onset of reflection. Only then is the consubstantiality with the world set in terms of knowing.

But the real value of Scheler's thought for Dufrenne lies in his descriptions of the material a priori and how it is felt. Referring to Scheler, Dufrenne writes that the material a priori "cannot be subjected to the norms of judgment, or itself be judged according to the standards setting it forth, because it is the truth of the judgment

itself" (NA 87). Its truth is given and felt immediately in the appearance "as such to the person who grasps it intuitively" (NA 88). It is precisely in this immediacy that the truth of appearance is given with necessity as an essence without which the appearance could not be what it is (NA 97).

The material a priori is lived, then, as an essence. It is constitutive in so far as it attaches itself to particular objects and determines the object qua object of a particular perception (NA 101-02). The diversity of the material a priori is evidenced by its dispersion throughout objects of perception, constituting each object in its particularity as such. It does not specify perceived objects in general. Rather it is originally given in particular lived objects. The content of the a priori is yielded originally in lived terms, such as festivity, youth, piety etc. It is not originally lived in terms of intellectual nor logical categories such as quantity, quality, relation etc. Terms such as festivity and youth are lived in perception anterior to any reflection. They cannot be reached, and their lived-meaning captured, by abstraction nor "generalization or rational definition... [but rather] must be experienced in certain particular objects" (NA 101). According to Dufrenne, youth, for example, is originally lived in one of Mozart's melodies, in springtime or in a child playing (c.f. NA 99). Youth belongs to springtime and it is

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perceived in it as such. It is originally given, Dufrenne would say, in
the fields in their fertile infancy yet still admitting of the promise of
fecundity, in the buds which are still susceptible to peril due to their
immaturity etc. It can only be given derivatively in reflection and
deduction as something unlived.

The material a priori and our encounter with it is thus
constitutive of perception. It functions objectively by depositing its
meaning in the subject. The subject receives it passively, feels it and
connives with it. The subject can connive with it in the first place
because it is already a part of him and he recognizes it as such. The
material a priori should be seen to animate our accord with the
world, continually setting it in motion complete with a content which
is familiar to us. Thus by virtue of the content lived in our original
awareness, our perception is made to appear, or constituted. This
content deserves the term a priori because it belongs in the subject
and finds its manifestation in an intentional predisposition or
inclination toward the meaning of the object. It is the meaning of the
object that the subject remembers, as Dufrenne says, something
which the subject is itself (c.f. NA 156, my emphasis) prior to any
reflection. And lastly, because it is attached to objects and connived

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1 Levinas say this very succinctly: "L' a priori vu dans L' Etre, laisse
with as such by a subject who feels its meaning within himself, it can be said to specify both subject and object.
§ 10: The a priori of our simple awareness

It is the purpose of this section to provide summation regarding Dufrenne’s notion of the a priori in our straightforward perception by showing it in its active deployment. To begin with, we saw that the a priori is always given in an empirical intuition in which the meaning of appearance is deposited in a subject capable of responding to it. The a priori is thus perceived and felt as bearing such and such a content or material reality by a subject who acts prior to strictly intellectual activities. As such, the a priori is said to belong to a subject in the world according to Dufrenne. It is given in and to subjectivity (NA 145). It constitutes the meaning of perception in its diversity. That is, it constitutes the meaning of perception initially by specifying our intentional deployment toward the world. Intentionality aims at and receives the world as a world which is revealed to someone capable of knowing it. In specifying the movement of the subject and the mode in which the world is known as it is revealed in particular objects, the a priori is said to deploy itself 'existentially'. The existential a priori, then, determines the content of the subject as the subject capable of receiving the meaning of the world. The a priori, however, was also said to specify the world toward which a subject aims. As such, the cosmological a priori specifies the content of a world, the meaning of which is received by the subject.
The actual content of the various a priori are realized in perception. Considered in the most general, primitive sense, we do not learn this content, but rather we know it from the beginning. We have a fundamental recognition of this content, or rather we are this content anterior to all perception due to our co-naissance with the world. While claiming that this content is always, and without fail, a human content\(^1\), Dufrenne also claims that the a priori in its primitive state is inexplicable\(^2\). The a priori in its originality is best defined as that which "life has always been doing without writing, long before writing, and without any reference to writing"\(^3\). In this sense, the activity of writing is endemic of reflective mediation. In effect, Dufrenne is claiming that the a priori is content experienced prior to reflection in such an irreducible manner that any attempt to explicate it fails to arrest it in its primitive state. It is a lived essence, immediately recognized in its own right (NA 145). Without being so inherently attached to things, springtime would not be youthful; childhood would not be innocent etc. The subject knows such meanings as youth and innocence anterior to thought in a manner amenable only to lived experience itself.

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1 Mikel Dufrenne, “The A priori and the Philosophy of Nature”, p. 204. See also PE p. 54.


3 Ibid., pp. 206-7.
The a priori is perceived precisely after the manner of the 'virtual commanding the actual' or the empirical (NA 150). The virtual, in this broad and general sense, consists in an horizontal structure of experience which, although non-thematized in our straightforward perception, designates the specific content of objects experienced (NA 150). We do not consciously participate in its formation save for situating ourselves in the world. This is not to say that we are merely passive with respect to objects. It is to say, rather, that we deploy a passive synthesis of sense by which we pre-reflectively register the results or contents and through which we acquire a certain disposition to the world (NA 153). This disposition is nothing other than an inclination toward the world.

An implication which stems from this present exposition must be made clear. For Dufrenne, the virtuality of the a priori is in relation to Being, not to knowing (NA 154-5). The virtual aspect of subjectivity is not so much consciousness as it is unconsciousness. It is not a knowledge which I know and have, but rather a knowledge which I am; I deploy it in situating myself and in doing so, actualize this self-knowledge (NA 155). What occurs in perception then is the actualization of the virtual by giving consciousness (i.e., the actual) access to unconsciousness (i.e., the virtual, the a priori) (NA 155). Consciousness thus situates itself to the unconscious meaning I deploy through memory. It is a latent or implicit memory of my connaissance with the world which is awakened in perception (NA 156).
Thus, "consciousness", Dufrenne writes, "discovers in itself what it already knew implicitly: the a priori which perception re-animates" (NA 120). This memory, however, is not a mere 'going back'. It is more a memory which anticipates what my perception will be given what has already been perceptually delivered. It is a knowledgable memory which "anticipates the knowable" (LI 70). It is a memory which always occurs within the broad field of my presence in the world and opens me up to it (NA 157). Correlatively subjectivity is defined as the power to open oneself up to presence (LI 106). In doing so, the subject lives the object or world as 'already-there', and more so, as already there with an order and meaning. It is important to emphasize that this order is given a priori in Being. It is not the result of an operation of the understanding (LI 108).

Thus the a priori in perception opens objects to us and us to the world. It is unthematic, or perhaps it is better to say unthematically deployed. Nonetheless, it specifies the structure of the world at large and its specific objects as contents already known, even if they are known only implicitly (NA 103-4).

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1 It is worth continuing this quote: ..."The geometer possesses a primordial consciousness of spatiality and does not have to search in the external world for means of making it explicit. He returns to this consciousness in order to fathom its secrets..." (NA 120).
At this point we shall turn our exposition away from the a priori of straightforward perception in an attempt to make explicit the structure of perception in its straightforward deployment. We have briefly touched upon this already but need to go into it in greater detail, such that we have a specific idea of not only the thing or object of straightforward perception but also the structural mechanics of straightforward perception itself. To this end we shall leave our explicit considerations of the a priori of straightforward perception, remembering the foundation it lays, and turn to the structural deployment of straightforward perception.
CHAPTER II:  THE STRUCTURAL DEPLOYMENT OF
SUBJECTIVITY IN STRAIGHTFORWARD
PERCEPTION

§ 11:  Delimitation

It is the purpose of this chapter to make explicit Dufrenne's notion of the subjective structures in straightforward perception. We shall begin by noting the nature of the thing to which straightforward perception appropriates itself, as Dufrenne sees it. The greater part of the exposition, however, will not deal explicitly with the thing, but rather the subjective moments by which the thing is recognized and lived as such. To this end, we shall make explicit the three moments of straightforward perception, namely, 1) presence, 2) imagination and representation, and 3) the moment of understanding. Lastly, Dufrenne's descriptions shall be cast in a context other than he himself attempts, namely, that of the temporal genesis within perception. It is necessary to make the temporality within perception explicit for we shall be drawing from this explicitation in future sections\(^1\).

\(^1\) c.f. § 18, § 39 and §§ 47-53.
§ 12.: The thing of straightforward perception

Straightforward perception, for Dufrenne, reveals things but not as the products of a constitutive nor intellectual synthesis undertaken by the subject (PE 282). Things are revealed as objects existing for a consciousness capable of recognizing, studying and manipulating them. There are many things which fall into the class of things of straightforward perception. There are living beings, natural things and objects of use, each of which are pregnant with cultural, historical and intersubjective horizons. Such objects signify. This is to say, according to Dufrenne, that they have a meaning which points to other meanings, uses and truths beyond themselves.

The thing of straightforward perception, for Dufrenne, consists in an 'in-itself-for-us' (PE 283). It admits of a meaning which is inexhaustible in its being perceived because it has an aspect which is, and will always be, inaccessible to me (PE 283-4). Its inaccessibility is due to two sources. On one hand, Dufrenne notes that the thing of perception is given in profiles according to the subject's situatedness to it. As such, there are perceptual aspects hidden from the gaze. In other words, the thing is never revealed to perception in its entirety.

The second source of the thing's inaccessibility stems from the infinity of uses to which it lends itself. To show this we can refer to
what Merleau-Ponty refers to as symbolic behavior\(^1\). According to this thesis, meaning is capable of serving to symbolize other meanings, none of which are exclusively given in perception itself, but all of which are fostered by our appropriation to the perceived thing. These meanings consist in diverse but not disparate aspects. Despite the diversity of possible uses to which a thing lends itself, the thing itself does not cease to be that thing. Its signification, however, is taken in a much more pregnant sense. A garden hoe, for example, is not just an implement for turning soil; it is also possibly an instrument for retrieving objects beyond arm's length, or rescuing a drowning person. A rock is not just something to be removed from the field after the thaw; it is possibly something to secure a foundation.

What is essential to Merleau-Ponty's thesis from Dufrenne's point of view is that the things of perception lend themselves not only to signification but also to symbolization, or the recognition that the material structure of the thing is amenable to a wide variety of life situations. Thus our appropriation to the world consists in a movement not only fixed to a single stratum of meanings, but rather according to a system of meanings which admits of different possible actions beyond the straightforward encounter with a thing and its signified use. Thus any signifying object is not restricted to a single

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use. The ongoing possibility of usage defines a continual temporal movement which forbids our grasping the totality of a thing (PE 284). And as such, the thing of straightforward perception is never exhausted in a strict epistemic sense, nor in the realm of action.

The thing of straightforward perception therefore has an aspect which lies beyond perception of appearances. Due to this 'beyond', Dufrenne writes that the things of straightforward perception admit of an ambiguity. Its ambiguous nature consists in its assured yet precarious status. It is assured, according to Dufrenne, because the subject, when present to it, is immediately familiar with it. Yet it has an aspect beyond perceptual proximity and familiarity. Even though it may be present, its whatness or essence beyond appearances is never exhausted (PE 284). This aspect renders the thing precarious or indeterminate. The thing of straightforward perception for Dufrenne, then, embodies "a truth which continually eludes perception, although perception always has an inkling of it" (PE 285).

But how does perception even come to grips with its object? How does the subject obtain this 'inkling' of the object? To provide answers to these questions, we must make the subjective structure of perception explicit. That is, we must show how the subject makes use of his subjectivity in order to deploy simple awareness of objects. We shall devote the next five sections to this project.
§ 13.: The three moments of perception

For Dufrenne, the subjective deployment of straightforward perception has three moments: first, presence; second, a two-fold moment which embodies imagination and representation; and lastly, understanding. These three moments fit together to form a gestalt in which subjective acts are related in an ongoing, dynamic, horizontal fashion. To say that it is horizontal is to say that there is a certain concentricity to perception in which the moments revolve around the given, the latter serving as the locus of perception itself. The three moments provide a foundation for each other. More so, because there is an inexorable unity amongst them, it must be emphasized that a consideration of one necessarily involves a consideration of the other two moments. In our consideration, then, we must continually remember that these three moments may be logically distinct but in their lived deployment, they function and belong together.
§ 14.: The first moment of perception: presence

The first moment of perception consists in the subject's presence to objects. Dufrenne works from the description that we are in the world and that we are somewhat familiar with, and can manipulate, the objects of our environment pre-reflectively. Presence is thus existential or bodily proximity to things. The world of objects reveals itself in our presence to it as something capable of being known by someone capable of knowing it (NA 122). The given is not exclusively for my thought at the level of presence, but rather for my body (PE 423). Things are known 'in the flesh', in their corporeity. They are not explicitly known after the manner of a reflective judgment.

There is an irreducible originality to this moment of perception, according to Dufrenne, not because it excludes all other moments of perception by 'happening first' in a chronological sense. Rather, our being present to the world nourishes the other moments of perception. In its originary mode, presence is brute presence. It is prior to specific intuition. Yet even in this primitive moment it is not without content for it bears material sense. Its content derives from existentiality, namely our awareness of our being in the world. "The verb to know (savoir)", Dufrenne writes, "indicates both a dimension of my being and a form of my knowledge (connaissance)" (NA 156). In the same fashion we should note that the verb "to be" indicates a content, that is to be something in a world. In our simple awareness,
we are situated in the world according to our being, and we know this content according to our being situated. To be in the world, to be present to it, is to have an a priori link, with it. And more so, as being in the world, "I possess a certain knowledge (connaissance) of the world concerning not its reality but its meaning, this meaning allows me to find my way about in the world" (NA 156). This knowledge is a priori. But it is not a priori after the fashion of a Cartesian innate idea that has been placed in my understanding to bridge the impasse of the intramental and the extramental worlds. Rather it founds the possibility of recognizing the world and orienting myself in it. This knowledge, given in the vast pregnancy of presence, 'equips' me to know and deal with the reality of the world. In presence even if we care to think of the most primitive of experiences, my a priori capacity to articulate the virtual is deployed. This capacity makes use of pre-reflective memory, employing the re-awakened to orient myself to the conditions my experience will take (NA 157).

Now of course, this orientation would not be possible without an intimate relation with things. We have this intimacy in our simple awareness. Recall, Dufrenne said that in our originary perception we are of the same race as the things we perceive, we are of the same flesh. Yet, citing Merleau-Ponty, he claims that the flesh of the
world is not my flesh (LI 237). I distinguish myself from the brute being of the world, from all beings in the world, but nonetheless I remain in the world and deploy myself in an originary fashion (LI 237). This consists in making the given visible. This is not, at this moment of perception, to make it represented in image, but rather to first and most originally to give it birth. Its birth should not be thought of as its creation, but rather its illumination (éclairage). In presence, I effect this task at a level prior to intellectual synthesis. As an incarnated body in the world, deploying myself in originary fashion, I can see because I participate in the self-same visibility and corporeity in which all things in general participate (LI 239). This is to affirm the connaturality and affinity of the seen and seeing as anterior to vision itself (LI 240). This connaturality is a priori and consists not only in my participation in presence but also in the sheer givenness of things giving themselves to visibility.

Presence, then, should be taken in the pregnant sense of being proximate to the world and pre-reflectively orienting myself to it in this bruteness. The activity of concretely responding to the perceived, however, cannot be reduced to presence. This leads us to a consideration of how presence nourishes other moments of perception. We must, therefore, follow the course of perception from

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presence to the point at which simple awareness detaches itself from presence and makes available representations of presence. This is not to say that in leaving presence we are leaving the evidence of simple awareness. On the contrary, our simple awareness includes representation and simple pre-reflective thought. Our immediate task will be to show how our simple awareness moves from the moment of presence to imagination such that a wealth of representation is made available to the perceiving subject.
§ 15.: The second moment of perception: imagination and representation

To begin with, we should again emphasize that although we shift our exposition from presence to representation and the image-giving function of the imagination, we still remain within the domain of aisthesis. Representation, for Dufrenne, is not radically divorced from presence. On the contrary, it always works in tandem with presence by seizing the thing to which we are proximate and providing visage in image form. Representation is the re-presentation of presence; it mentalizes or internalizes presence (PE 440). With the onset of representation, presence is conferred with a status, namely a conscious content in image. Imagination thus visualizes presence and in doing so gives the represented a distance from presence, or the brute immediacy to things. Brute immediacy becomes transformed into the being of a spectacle such that the object appears present as re-presented (PE 432).

Dufrenne claims that the distance from presence which the represented assumes is the result of a detachment characteristic of the upsurge of perception itself. This is to say that the detachment from presence is a structure in our simple awareness proper. Whereas presence is always an immediate proximity to things, representation detaches itself from things in their immediacy. It retreats internally to consciousness. This retreat signifies an
intentional movement into consciousness in which the immediacy of presence is given a visage. Thus the detachment from presence to presence re-presented in image still intentionally adheres to the brute given. But in addition representation achieves a more completed possession of the brute given than the bodily proximity which is characteristic of presence. This 'achievement' consists in illuminating the brute given in consciousness (PE 433) such that brute bodily presence is converted into something visible. More so, the detachment from presence is functionally significant within Dufrenne's thesis because time and space are invoked (PE 435), thereby fulfilling the image.

How, we should ask, does the detachment from presence invoke time and space? Recall that Dufrenne claims that our simple awareness is intentional. Intentionality, he tells us, presupposes a certain attention to the given. Once representation is effected, according to Dufrenne, the given qua internalized within consciousness becomes a terminus for further and higher orders of attention. He writes, "to be attentive, to give representation its full due, is to transport one self into the past in order to grasp the object in its future" (PE 434). As a subject, I 'stand back' from the ongoing flux of perception without ceasing to live it, and give my attention to the terminus I arrested in representation. In effect, I institute a chronology. The attention I pay to the represented gives way to a
future in which I make use of it in contemplation\(^1\) or praxis. Within the very structure of our simple awareness itself, then, representation invokes time by not only arresting a terminus but also by firmly aligning consciousness with this terminus as a presence in image retroactively, thereby opening a future for this image and the use I will make of it. There can be a future, according to Dufrenne, "only if I am already in the past" (PE 434), and am attentive to it in its presence as a visage in a consciousness which is founded upon bodily presence.

The withdrawal from the immediacy of presence to presence represented also invokes space for Dufrenne. Again, this is due to the very structure of simple perception itself. We saw that representation, for Dufrenne, consists in transporting oneself to the past. The subject, he claims, is transported into the past with the power of representation (PE 434). Thus equipped, re-presented presence becomes the "milieu where the other can appear... [and] seeing is possible" (PE 434). The givenness of presence, then, is given a visage in consciousness. This occurs necessarily and in all instances.

\(^1\) It is worth noting that contemplation, although it is a possible future horizon of representation, is itself a return to the past (PE 434). But to be precise, the return to the past in this case is founded on representation and it must be considered as consequent to it.
Now, according to Dufrenne, the givenness of representation is made possible in the first place because the imagination assumes the character of the transcendental in representation. Thus, whereas the body was the transcendental for the moment of presence, the imagination is the transcendental in representation and provides the possibility of seeing (PE 432). This seeing is furnished with an inherent spatio-temporality. The transcendental aspect of the imagination not only governs the representation itself, but initiates the moment from presence to representation. It is thus given as the condition of each appearance (PE 435).

But we should not think that the activity of the imagination in representation is exhausted in providing this transcendental function. Dufrenne identifies another aspect of the imagination at work in representation, namely the empirical aspect. The transcendental aspect of the imagination founds appearances by initiating the withdrawal from presence to representation. The empirical aspect is rooted in the transcendental but it cannot initiate the withdrawal from presence. Rather, according to Dufrenne, it "prolongs this movement, converting appearance into object" (PE 435). Thus it should not be thought that the transcendental aspect of the imagination is autonomous without the empirical aspect. The latter contributes an irreplaceable function. It, Dufrenne says, enriches the given by providing 'possibles' (PE 435). In other words, it fulfills the possibility of an object by providing the object as
appearance itself. Ultimately, the empirical imagination yields the
givenness of things which are, correlatively, in accord with the
subject capable of knowing them in his simple awareness.

The relation of the empirical to the transcendental imagination
within Dufrenne's schema can be exemplified in light of the genesis
of perception to this point. It has been seen that presence consists in
bodily proximity to the world. But the world as such is a pure
exteriority for the subject; this is to say that it has not yet been
interiorized in consciousness. The world is, as such, indeterminate
for the subject who is present to it. With the onset of the
transcendental imagination, a movement is initiated upon which the
possibility of seeing this given, yet indeterminate, world is founded.
The world, at this point, is possible; its specific contents are
unfulfilled possibilities. But with the onset of the empirical
imagination, these possibilities, according to Dufrenne, are fulfilled
in their specificity and given determinate signification (c.f. PE 646).
The empirical imagination can be said to be at work at this point,
furnishing the open-ended possibilities of a world in a visage
according to the perspective the subject assumes.

Thus the 'providing of content in visage' to the indeterminate
possibilities given in presence is the actual contribution of the
empirical imagination to perception. It enriches representation,
animating, extending and nourishing the given "with modes of
implicit knowledge previously constituted in lived-experience" (PE
435). As such the empirical imagination mobilizes this implicit knowledge 'from the past' and makes use of it to convert the presence of our awareness into something visible with a meaning (PE 435). Dufrenne claims that it is in this manner that the imagination "constitutes the associations which form the indispensable commentary on present impressions and which enable us to know an object" (PE 435). He acknowledges his indebtedness to Husserl's identification of the 'passive synthesis' by which we attain a familiarity with presence through horizontal elements of our experience which lie sedimented and are activated in perception. By this synthesis, the imagination contributes implicit knowledge to enrich presence and give it the status of a spectacle. This incorporates givenness in its flesh into representation, thus following the course of the concrete incarnated subject and its previous experience (PE 436). Of course, this synthesis cannot operate 'from without' according to an autonomous Humean principle; it is rather immanent in our simple awareness itself and motivated by it.

Now once presence is given visibility and the detachment from presence is effected in representation, to what extent is the represented known in straightforward perception? At this point Dufrenne would say that the given is known by what is given in it and

1 It should be noted, however, that Dufrenne is essentially critical of Husserl (c.f. NA pp. 107-13; 153).
with it (PE 437). It is known as an image, more precisely, an image given immediately. This is to say that the given is not known from the outside nor through reflective mediation. It consists in a presence. There is a knowing proper to it which entails the possibility of detachment while the imagination gives it a visage from the horizontally (i.e., the meaning not explicitly visible per se) and the previously given. The world is known in images because it is present to us implicitly as offering itself to the play of the imagination.

At this point, then, the given is known incompletely in image, although the image is always guided by the thing itself. In effect, this is to say two things. First it is to say that the knowing which accompanies the image does not exhaust the being of the thing represented. Nonetheless, the imagination is guided by the content of the thing itself according to the subject's perspective of it, and the extent to which he is present to the thing. If the subject's presence to the thing is interrupted or halted, the imagination's representation of the thing produces the thing in absence of this content (LI 112). Second, this is to make a statement on the nature of the implicit knowledge to and from which our simple awareness continually turns. Implicit knowledge, in this sense, should be conceived of along the lines of 'empty intentions'. An empty intention is one which is devoid of any lived-content but always has the bearing in on
the virtual truth of an object as its referent. For example\(^1\), we can talk about a lake but our conversation may not contain any lived-proximity to it. That is to say that if we talk about a lake, there is not the same lived-proximity as actually being in it in the flesh. It is not, then, an intention fulfilled by lived content. Implicit knowledge, in the same sense, is empty of lived content yet it is the horizon to which our perception tends. Or in other words, it is the horizon against which all our awareness situates itself. More so, it guides and anticipates our awareness. It becomes incarnate or fulfilled in objects (PE 438), thereby giving the perceived its place as a moment of representation without adding anything to, nor altering, it.

Thus following this exposition we see not only the structuration of our detachment from presence to presence re-presented, but also the irreplaceable function of the imagination in representation. Despite the claim that there are two aspects to the imagination, we should think of it as a unified structure, rooted in making presence accessible to re-presentation in visage and culminating in giving it a visage as such. In a word, representation inherits presence (PE 439). More so, it makes content accessible for reflection since it allows us, as Dufrenne says, to substitute the perceived for the lived (PE 439). This is to say that it puts the originary presence of the lived in

perspective. It allows us to leave brute presence and return to it 'in visage'.

But we should be careful what emphasis to give this notion. We should not think of this detachment in the same sense as Sartre's conception of the imagination and its 'derealizing function'. Like Dufrenne, Sartre defines the imagination as an inextricable moment of consciousness and could even be said to be more emphatic about it. For Sartre it is not only a moment of consciousness, but a type of consciousness itself\(^1\). The product of the imagination, the image, indicates "the relation of consciousness to the object... a certain manner in which the object makes its appearance to consciousness, or... a certain way in which consciousness presents an object to itself"\(^2\). But unlike Dufrenne, he claims that what is represented is represented as absent\(^3\). For Sartre, what is represented in absence signifies a modality of nothingness\(^4\) that is, the 'for-itself'. He bases this claim on simple descriptions, the perception of a cube or an armchair sitting on a rug. When we see a chair sitting on a rug, hiding the patterns of the rug from our sight, we imagine the


\(^2\) Ibid., p. 17.

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 229.

\(^4\) Ibid., c.f. pp. 23-26; p. 232.
patterns as if they were actually given to us. But they are not given for the chair blocks them from our sight; they are absent. As we imagine them in the place where they are, i.e., where the chair obsurses them from our glance, we posit them "where they are not given to me [thus] I grasp them as a nothing for me". Sartre claims that this shows "the imaginative act is at once constituting, isolating and annihilating". More so, he claims this shows that the imagination is constitutive by virtue of the nothingness it confers on its object. Sartre writes:

"to posit an image is to construct an object on the fringe of the whole of reality, which means to hold the real at a distance, to free oneself from it, in a word, or to deny it. Or in other words, to deny that an object belongs to the real is to deny the real in positing the object".

He continues: to imagine is to

"be able to posit the world in its synthetic totality, and... [to] be able to posit the imagined object as being out of the reach of this synthetic totality, that is, posit the world as a nothingness in relation to the image".

We should, however, be aware of the peculiar status Sartre attributes to the imagination, if not to perception or consciousness.

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1 Ibid., p. 230.
2 Ibid., p. 230 (Sartre's emphasis).
3 Ibid., p. 233.
4 Ibid., p. 233.
altogether. Granted, our perception has a certain 'doxic character' to it as Husserl says¹, but does this really entail a negativity? To be aware of a chair does not make it other than what it is, nor does it annihilate it. Rather, it arrests it as it is given to perception. To be aware of the rug and its arabesque patterns is, as Sartre himself notes, only to be aware of it in profiles. Our awareness of things is never completed due to the fact that they are always seen against the infinity of the synthetic totality of the world as its background². Thus to present the patterns on the rug which are obscured by the chair is to 'make' present something which is not explicitly given. But Dufrenne would say that this 'something' is not nothing; it is not merely constituted by an annihilating act of consciousness. It is yet another profile of the given, one which enriches the given. To make these patterns present is not to isolate oneself from the synthetic totality of our perceptual field; it is rather to gain access to it either by presentation, representation or anticipation. It is to delve into this awareness more profoundly, making explicit what is horizontal, or not explicitly included in the perspective we assume, yet nonetheless accessible. It is to restore primacy to presence and make explicit its pregnancy. Of course we should note that epistemic proximity and certitude may be lacking. The chair could well obscure a tartan

¹ c.f. Husserl, Experience and Judgment, pp. 81-2.
² Sartre, L’Imaginaire, p.20.
pattern and not the arabesque pattern we anticipate as missing. But this is ingredient to our perception in the first place (NA 116), so whatever difficulties in knowing the imagination presents must be dealt with in a discussion of perception itself. Imagination not only opens up presence, then, but it does so without altering nor annihilating its content.

Lastly, however much emphasis Dufrenne gives to the irreplaceability of the imagination in perception, due to its opening up a world of visibility and nourishing the given with some degree of lived content (PE 444), he also notes that the imagination can 'roam'. The imagination can go beyond the parameters of the brute presence to which it gives a visage and affirm bizarre and illusory aspects. It can produce aspects which are not in fact given in the immediacy of presence. These imagined aspects are said to have no 'real' foundation, according to classical rationalism, and this is precisely why it has a disdain for perception as a reliable source of knowledge. Now Dufrenne notes that the imagination can be led astray (PE 444) but this is not to say that illusion is without real foundation or without knowing. We always have an accord with the real, he says (PE 445); thus to create illusions is but another manner of appropriating ourselves to it. Perception may intend an illusion, for Dufrenne, but it is real illusion and a genuine content of our perception. The imagination must, however, be held in check by the functions of the understanding, to which we shall now turn.
§ 16: The third moment of perception: understanding and its function in our simple awareness

Whatever existential priority Dufrenne attributes to presence and whatever noetic priority he attributes to the imagination for giving brute presence a visage in representation, his emphasis on the equipriority of the understanding within the structure of perception should not be neglected. Whereas the imagination opens up a world and sees to it that it is visible, the understanding thinks this world in natures or characters (PE 446) and in so doing further detaches itself from presence. Yet it functions in accordance with the imagination. The imagination constantly furnishes the possibilities of the given; it furnishes implicit knowledge which preforms things and makes them accessible to thought. Thus it should be noted that even in our simple awareness, understanding deploys itself in representations. This occurs in terms of knowing or, better, extending the implicit virtual knowledge of the given and providing it with actual precision. The imagination must continually be restrained from lapsing into the chaos and disorder of giving unreal and wholly fictitious objects to representation. Once the understanding restrains the free reign of the imagination, reflection seeks meaning in representation. As reflection bears in, the represented takes on the character of being an 'account of the lived'. Dufrenne writes "to reflect is to restrain, at least provisionally, the imagination which is at the source of lived-
experience, and to loosen the bond which it weaves between the world and myself. Thus we discover something primary which is logical and un-lived" (PE 462-3). The understanding uncovers a necessity which, in the exclusion of a roaming imagination, sanctions the objectivity of the world (PE 463).

Presence is further detached in the movement by which the understanding turns to representation in reflection. Of course, presence is never dismissed in any real sense for the understanding, according to Dufrenne, can do nothing without the imagination. And the imagination, for its part, is empty without presence (PE 463). Nonetheless, the understanding plays on the imagination, not presence. Imagination plays on presence, granted, but it also gives way to the understanding; it mediates presence and the understanding (PE 432). In other words, it imparts richness to presence whereas the understanding fixes the givenness in its objectivity. This objectivity harbors two essential characteristics (c.f. PE 464). One is the necessity with which we seize a thing as such, that is as that one thing bearing an intrinsic relation with the world as background (which we also seize with necessity). The other is the distance we take in regard to this thing. With the advent of imagination and understanding, we are no longer 'of the same race' as the things to which we have brute existential proximity for our simple awareness has undergone a rupture.
Thus imagination and understanding form a unity to which the subject does not enjoy existential presence for it is constrained to representation in image or thought, either of which is an 'account' of presence. In this sense, this unity is the sphere in which the subject returns to himself. Experience is not disparate; it has a continual reference point, namely, our presence in the world. But in noetically detaching ourselves from existential presence we break its brute opacity by gaining a knowing perspective. We affirm our reference point and in so doing effect a 'self to self' turn (PE 463). At this point understanding promulgates a necessity upon our awareness which "binds objects together in an intelligible nature" (PE 464). Without such binding and bestowal of intelligibility, our awareness would consist in disparate, indeterminate and purely possible contents, such as those defined at the moment of brute presence (c.f. PE 463). The understanding imposes a necessity upon the imagination's furnishing the given with possibilities and it does so by thinking what the imagination represents and calls forth by deploying the faculty of rules in which the image is interpreted as an object (PE 464). Thus the understanding, for Dufrenne, enjoys an ambiguous type of relation with the imagination. On one hand the understanding is anterior to the imagination in as much as it pre-forms the imagination's activities through its deployment of the faculties of rules. On the other hand it is consequent to the activities of the imagination in as much as it holds the imagination in check.
Of course, we should not think of this unity of the imagination and the understanding in the absence of presence. As said, the imagination's inclination to disorder must be constantly undone. This is because our simple awareness constantly feeds on the indeterminate givenness of presence. The imagination is immediately invoked to give brute presence a visage, but the imagination, we should note, is not invoked without the understanding restraining its play upon the brute givenness of presence.

This 'correcting function' does not exhaust the activity of the understanding. In addition, it deploys what Dufrenne refers to as a 'determinant judgment' (PE 465). Dufrenne employ this term in Kantian usage. A determinant judgment, Dufrenne tells us, is "the intellectual activity through which the categories assume their function in the most ordinary perception" (PE 465). This judgment deploys itself in the very immediacy of our simple awareness after the manner of subsuming a particular under a universal. It prescribes law to nature and recognizes the element of indubitability in the content perceived in the actual immediacy of perception itself. Further, another activity of the understanding affirms (or negates) this determinant immediacy but only a posteriori and after reflection.

This activity should also be referred to as a mode of judgment, specifically a 'reflective judgment', which stems from the immediacy of our simple awareness rather than being immanent in it. It is, as Dufrenne says, called forth from the unreflected determinant judgment yet determines the very certitude of it 'from the outside', as it were, for in this type of judgment, content is always animated with the sense that 'I am positing' the unity of experience or particular objects as such (PE 467).

In the domain of the reflective judgment, our communion with the object is haunted with two senses, one being, as mentioned, that 'I am positing' it; it thus acquires an 'as if' which Dufrenne says is the mark of subjectivity which I cannot ignore (PE 467). Thus in positing the object, I expect it to respond according to the 'as if' which I posit. The second sense is a primitive act of doubt, which we should properly qualify as doxic as opposed to negating. There is no guarantee that the tacit 'as if' I posit is a mark of objectivity, and further, by definition, objectivity will transcend our glance as well as our judgment. It escapes awareness save for its brute givenness. As such, since it is I as an active subject who forms this tacit hypothesis which I am led to anticipate but not able to confirm with all apodicticity, I also put myself into question. I am not lost, however, for I have continual presence to the real in this brute givenness. It is precisely the task of the understanding to make sense of this brute givenness and its primitive articulation of representation.
Lastly, it should be seen that the understanding participates in the constitution of appearances only minimally, that is, only to the extent that it works in tandem with the imagination. We have seen that, for Dufrenne, the two are intimately related to each other. The understanding acts to pre-figure and correct the imagination. But in addition, the understanding also deploys the function of judgment. Whereas the 'correcting activity' of the understanding and the imagination taken together give presence a visage and therefore can be said to constitute it as such, the judgment does not. The judgment, according to Dufrenne, is consequent to the constitution of appearance. It only adds to the constitution by 'saying something' about the appearance as already constituted.

In removing the judgment from the activities of constitution, Dufrenne, of course, is not claiming that it plays an unimportant role in perception. Through judgment, he claims, we enter into a more profound communion with the object than in constitution (PE 466-7). The consubstantiality we have with the world is first one of Being, not knowing. Any understanding is founded upon this fundamental and inexhaustible relation of Being. Thus the faculties of rules deployed in the judgment act upon a constituted appearance and only then can the appearance be made intelligible through an intellectual communion.
§ 17: The structure of straightforward perception in its temporal genesis

None of the three moments of perception, for Dufrenne, can assume primacy. Rather, each contributes an irreplaceable function; without the contribution of each moment, perception is not completed. When these moments function, according to Dufrenne, straightforward perception attains its completion or culminates in reflection, action, or praxis (PE 280). This culmination, however, does not exhaust the meaning of its object. The inexhaustibility of the object is due in part to the fact that it never reveals itself in its entirety to perception. It is also due to the structure of perception and the perceiving subject who appropriates himself to the given object. The meaning of the object to which the subject appropriates himself is always 'in the future' because it consists in a course of action or a reflective act exterior to perception itself. And this 'future' determines the givenness of perception as indeterminate. The subject, therefore, does not enjoy fixed proximity to this indeterminate and inexhaustible meaning precisely because it is in the future.

That the culmination of perception for Dufrenne exists indeterminately, due to the future horizon, invokes the notion of a temporality proper to perception itself. And in espousing Dufrenne's descriptions of straightforward perception we would do well to make
explicit the temporality of perception as he sees it. However our task is complicated because although Dufrenne mentions a temporality which is inherent in and proper to perception, he does not mention how the meaning immanent within each moment flows genetically within the structure of straightforward perception itself. Our exposition shall not try to integrate his thought into descriptions which cash in this point. Rather we shall identify Dufrenne's descriptions as far as they go and from there provide a more completed account of the temporal genesis of sense within perception. Once this is accomplished, we are in a position to show a lacuna not only within Dufrenne's description of straightforward perception but also later on when we address aesthetic perception.

To begin with, Dufrenne claims that perception proceeds "from the past and into the future" (PE 434). In making this claim, he recognizes a certain temporal thickness to perception, the locus of which is the present. In the present, the perceiving subject "can only act" (PE 434). Dufrenne claims that the psychological characteristic of the subject throughout the act of perception is attention (PE 434). This is to say that the subject is attentive throughout the moment of presence and also to the re-presented content yielded by the imagination and the thinking of this image in natures or intelligible characters by the understanding.

Perception can only proceed from the past and into the future because it is founded in the present. As we saw for Dufrenne,
perception begins in presence. The bodily proximity to things we enjoy in presence can be cast in temporal terms; it is the present, the now. We act in this presence and in the movement of our act we are transported "into the past in order to grasp the object in its future" (PE 434). We are transported to the re-presentation of presence by the imagination. As we saw, it is the function of the imagination to represent our original bodily proximity to things in image form. Its function is to break away from the present in order to represent presence in consciousness. Representation must, therefore, return and attend to bodily presence in order to be able, in the first place, to give it a visage in image form. In this sense, representation returns to the past.

But as said, perception not only moves to the past to provide representation. It also, according to Dufrenne, moves from the representation of the past into the future such that the understanding can think the represented image in intelligible characters or natures. These characters or natures, as Dufrenne has told us, are "logical and unlived" (PE 426-3). Further, they are consequent to actual bodily presence. This is to say that they are 'in the future' but founded upon the now of presence.

According to Dufrenne, this temporality proper to the subject living his perception expresses the interiority of his perception (c.f. PE 307). This is to say that the movement from the past into the future which perception deploys defines the successive phases of
perception which the subject is (PE 307). In transporting oneself from the opacity of presence to its re-presentation in image, we saw that a rupture began to occur. This rupture defines the self's transcendence, or as Dufrenne says the hollowing out of oneself, the self's leaving itself for the past only to return to itself in the future. In temporal terms it defines the succession of lived phases as deployed in perception. It defines the internal specifications of perception.

Dufrenne adamantly claims that a consideration of time must include a consideration of space (c.f. PE ch. 7). Space provides the exteriority which at all times accompanies the interiority of perception which time specifies (PE 307). In defense of his claim, Dufrenne cites Jean Nabert and writes that time "cannot be determined without the representation of space" (PE 310)\(^1\). Time is imperceivable, he claims, without the "prompting of external perceptions...[and] the particular content which it represents" (PE 311).

Space and time are thus always given together according to Dufrenne. The actual movement which he claims is involved in perception (that is the movement from presence which is initiated by the representation and the imagination and is extended by the

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understanding) is always a movement toward an exteriority. The subject is this movement toward exteriority.

Now this movement from the now of the present to the past of imagination, to the future of the understanding, defines and limits the original living of perceptions, as Dufrenne says, both spatially and temporally. The subject is this temporal movement. The subject remains itself in this movement in a 'unity of extstaces outside the now of presence' (PE 307). And further, the subject is the space which 'spatializes' this movement (c.f. PE 310).

Dufrenne's influences and his predominant interest in the consubstantiality between man and world have led him to identify and emphasize the internal sense of temporality and the external sense of spatiality as a priori. They are, more specifically, material a priori because they specify the interior/exterior content of perception as such. But in addition I think we must say that Dufrenne's treatment of these two a priori of perception implies that they are also objective a priori to the point at which their subjective correlates are for the most part neglected. In other words, the various contributions of subjectivity which are deployed such that the subject grasps the meaning of the object are not attended to by Dufrenne. Dufrenne goes as far as refering to Husserl's notion of a 'passive synthesis' of sense (c.f. PE 436). He mentions Kant's notion of the successive synthesis of the manifold in outer intuition in general by means of the productive imagination (c.f. Critique B 155; PE 312) as a
statement representative of the solidarity between space and time. But Dufrenne does not show how the three moments of perception make use of the meaning lived in a temporal genesis. He does not identify the explicitly subjective contribution of the subject with respect to temporality, retention and protention.

In demanding the need to consider the explicitly subjective contributions, our endeavour should not be conceived as lessening the significance of the externalities of spatiality. On the other hand, the contribution of the subject is the very power by which the subject appropriates himself to externality and recognizes it in its own right. Husserl has defined these subjective contributions as retention and protention in his *Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*. Retention and protention structure perception in a temporal continua. Retention is the awareness of the 'just past'. Through retention we have access to the past. More so, we retain the content of the past to the extent that it is haunting the present in which we act. It haunts the present with an undeniable presence of its own. This content is continually moving away from the present (which itself is continually renewed). Yet it structures the present because it is contained in it, however horizontally it may be. Similarly,


protended content of the future also remains horizontal in the present. It moves toward the present as the present turns into a continually renewed present which was, a moment ago, the future. The subject's deployment of the powers of protention and retention should be identified as cognitive or existential a priori according to Dufrenne's schema because they belong to a subject qua subject capable of knowing a world. However, they are conspicuously absent from his descriptions.

Before showing the significance of recognizing this temporal structure we shall provide an example which will make clear the notions of protention and retention and will show that they are in fact necessary contributions of the subject which belong in a consideration of perception. We are all familiar with the well known motif from Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, what he himself referred to as 'fate knocking on the door', the Da Da Da Dum¹. We are aware of this motif as a movement of notes which provide a unity of melody because the whole melody is either protended or retented in each particular note given the position of the note in the melody. For example, if we find ourselves living the last note, the Dum, we find the other notes contained in it in varying degrees of just-pastness. Each of these preceding notes enjoys a retentive proximity to the

¹ This example has been used by Professor Harry Reeder in addressing the Department of Philosophy at the University of Guelph, March 1978.
present according to its degree of just-pastness. The last note is specified within this melody by the three notes which precede it for it is the present to which they tend. Correlatively, the last note retends the preceding notes such that they are 'almost' heard in it. But most significantly, the subject has and contributes the power of protending and retending the sense of the melody as it is heard. The melody has coherence for the subject only because he can grasp, retend, and pretend the various notes. The pregnancy of the present is preserved only by the subject's contribution of protention and retention.

It is essential to note that Dufrenne does not identify contributions of the subject with respect to temporality and that nothing he does identify can be collapsed into a protentive-retentive structure. His emphasis, as noted, is focused upon the presence-imagination-understanding structure of perception. Yet it is unclear how there exists a genesis of meaning within that structure apart from the agency of an objective a priori which structures objects as capable of being known by a subject. Even though he claims that time animates space (PE 312) thereby implying priority with respect to time, they must be taken together. Spatiality implicates temporality and vice-versa. Yet the subject's act of spatializing and temporalizing is said to be one of passive reception of an exterior objective content in the absence of considerations as to how this reception occurs from the standpoint of the subject.
It must be recognized that the subject contributes to temporality. He does not merely 'invoke it', as Dufrenne says (recall PE 435), but rather he has the power to temporalize by deploying protention and retention. It should not, of course, be conceived that the subject makes a conscious decision to temporalize; rather temporalization is an a priori put into play pre-thetically. Nonetheless it is a contribution on behalf of the subject and not the workings of an objective a priori.

It is essential that we introduce the notion of a subjective contribution to perception. In doing so we are not returning to a Kantian conception of the a priori. Nor is it to return to formalism. The identification is made, rather, in the recognition that subjectivity plays a role in the being of objectivity. Objectivity cannot be objectivity without subjectivity. The recognition of the phases of objectivity is no exception. Objectivity already consists in a unity and the recognition of its constituent moments belongs to the subject taking due note of it and deploying its meaning cognitively. This involves the temporal horizons of protention and retention, but more specifically the power to pretend and retain meaning. And these are exclusively subjective contributions.
§ 18: **Summation and evaluation of Dufrenne's theory of straightforward perception**

It is necessary at this point in the thesis to provide a brief summary of Dufrenne's position regarding straightforward perception. From there we shall move on to one point of critical evaluation specifically concerning the function of the judgment in our simple straightforward awareness. It should be noted that this point of evaluation will again show that Dufrenne neglects the exclusively subjective contributions to perception. But rather than taking temporality as our point of entry as we did in the last section, we shall instead be focusing upon the judgment.

To begin with, the structure of Dufrenne's theory of straightforward perception is based on the pre-intellectual givenness of an object to a subject. We must properly qualify this moment in its originality as pre-intellectual because, as Dufrenne says, subject and object are of the same race. The object is specified by objective determinations which correlate to a subject capable of knowing it as such. Once the subject perceptually engages in the act of awareness, the process of perception yields a content. There are three moments in which this process consists. First, existential presence takes hold of the perceived by being bodily present to it. But at this moment the perceived is opaque and in need of further perceptual elaboration. The second moment of perception provides some of this elaboration. At this moment, the imagination re-presents original existential
proximity and gives it a visage. Imagination makes the content appear by putting the brute opacity of presence into perspective. As we saw, in doing so the imagination initiates a rupture from presence. The third moment of perception is defined by the activities of the understanding. These activities prolong the rupture from presence initiated by the imagination and think the representation in intelligible natures. The understanding is also responsible for exercising the powers of judgment. The understanding does not, however for Dufrenne, constitute the object in these activities. The understanding arrests a meaning which is 'logical and unlived', whereas the imagination makes the object appear, or constitutes it as such. The understanding adds to this appearance but does not play a part in bringing the appearance about.

Perhaps the most significant point about Dufrenne's thesis is his insistence on the material a priori. The a priority of the world has a content, or material structure, which corresponds to the a priority of the subject in the world. Now because of this, there is a reality which goes by the name of world and is logically independent of the subject because the subject does not add anything to it. The world, however, cannot be considered as an autonomous reality for it is not what it is without a subject's apprehension of it. It requires the subject's proximity but this subjective contribution does not add anything to it except presence in, and representation of, it. This already admits of a type of knowing. The activities of the understanding further this
knowing in second-order terms for in the rupture from presence that
the understanding prolongs, subjective activity moves beyond its
originary encounter with the world into action or reflection. Thus
the functions of restraining the imagination and judgment play no
part in its constitution.

But can we really say that the judgment plays no role in the
constitution of the world? Does not the originary presence to the
world, more precisely to a specific region of the world and the giving
of it to representation as that specific region define an originary type
of judgment? Our presence is certainly retended in the activities of
the understanding and therefore this originary pre-thetic judgment
is the first clue from which all judgments and predications draw
their meaning. It logically precedes the explicit categorical activities
of the reflective judgment. Thus can we not say that in the very
givenness to things, the bodily presence which the subject deploys in
embracing and affirming the accord with the world also defines a
radically original type of judgment?

Of course, to say this is to imply that we originally perceive the
world as an horizon of logical substrates. But this does not imply that
our subsequent activities assume the explicitly propositional form 'S
is P' or some variation thereof. It is, on the other hand, still possible
to maintain that in this original situatedness, we perceive the world
as bearing within itself infinite possibilities of meaning. This is
consistent with what Dufrenne says. The world, then, is not reduced
to a world made explicit in reflective or categorical activities. In its radical originality, the world is given to a self-deploying subject who operates in light of a primitive act of appropriation which could and should go by the name of judgment, however primitive and pre-thetic it may be. Our original perception could then be described as consisting in an active, situating and intentional apprehending. Its fundamental 'intentional turning toward a content' is a judgment in as much as we situate and appropriate ourselves to this meaning as given perspectively, as opposed to that thing, in this intentional manner as opposed to that. Thus, is not some subjective contribution required to initiate this specific act, an act which is motivated by a decision or judgment however implicit or pre-thetic? It is still possible for the wealth of meaning that this primitive act disengages to be retracted in the determinate and reflective judgment, and ultimately in action. But only once it is disengaged and isolated in a primitive judgment as a lived-substrate for further articulation can the given be identified as a datum of perception.

It is important to raise this contention for the following reasons. The first reason is that constitutive activity should be restored to the faculty of the understanding. The second reason is that the claims to autonomy to which the material a priori lends itself must be questioned, however provisionally, at this point. We have seen that according to Dufrenne the understanding plays no role in the constitution of appearances save for what we have called its
correcting function in conjunction with the imagination. But if we recognize this originary mode of judgment which is incarnated by a pre-thetic deployment of the understanding in the very act by which we situate ourselves, and gain existential presence to the things of straightforward perception, then we must also recognize this act of the understanding in the constitution of appearances as a radical anteriority. Now this contention can be questioned on the ground that if this is the case then is there not a mode of presence already anterior to it and a corresponding 'making the sense of this presence available' to this alleged pre-thetic understanding by the faculty of representation? In effect, it would be to introduce a three-fold structure which is itself anterior to the presence-imagination-understanding structure which operates in straightforward perception. But is this not merely to restate the issue for then we could say that even at this 'more' primitive pre-thetic level there must be something which decides and judges, thereby providing a point of entry into presence and by which the meaning of presence is that meaning according to the subject's situatedness.

Perhaps Dufrenne would respond to this point of criticism (and this takes us to the second reason why it is important to raise this objection) on the grounds that not only does the material a priori provide a link between subjectivity and objectivity by which perception is motivated toward a content but also that there is an 'a priori to the a priori' which structure our simple awareness (c.f. PE 568-9). The a
priori of the a priori is Being itself\(^1\) and it is ultimately responsible for specifying the a priori which belongs to the subject and the world with which a subject is in accord. Although we are not in a position to deal with the full magnitude of this claim at this point, we should note provisionally that there is a radical difference between, on one hand, attributing the first grip into our situatedness in a world to the pre-thetic deployment of judgment, and on the other hand, attributing it to Being. In a word it is the difference between a brand of idealism and a form of realism which I would prefer to call, provisionally, naive ontologism\(^2\). We are not, as mentioned, in a position to deal with this and the implications arising from this point at length. Nonetheless we may still wonder why we need to introduce a regress when a recognition of the full and proper pregnancy of our simple awareness, specifically the function of the understanding, will accomplish the same thing. The introduction of the exclusively subjective contribution of the judgment within the constitution of appearances must be recognized in every one of our acts. It motivates the meaning which is embodied in: our presence to things; the type of thing to which we are present; and the upsurge of perception from there. And to make this claim is to imply that the

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1 We shall identify Dufrenne's ontology later in Chapters III and VI.

2 This shall be explained at length at a later point. It is enough to say that a naive ontologism subordinates man's being in the world to Being itself.
meaning of perception, be it aesthetic or straightforward perception, should not be subordinated to Being itself without due recognition of the exclusively subjective performance which goes into making intelligible the sense of being in the very first place. It is to this implication specifically with respect to aesthetic perception which we shall return in later parts of this thesis. Before we are in a position to do this we must, however, flesh out Dufrenne’s notion of aesthetic perception.
PART TWO: DUFRENNE'S NOTION OF AESTHETIC PERCEPTION

§ 19: Delimitation of the topic

As said, it has been necessary to make explicit Dufrenne's notion of straightforward perception in order to appreciate his notion of aesthetic perception. Dufrenne himself claims that aesthetic perception is essentially perception (PE 25; 419-20). In making this assertion, he recognizes that there is a certain common ground in both straightforward and aesthetic perception. The common ground, however, does not distinguish the two modes of perception. In order to understand fully Dufrenne's notion of aesthetic perception, the nuances which define aesthetic perception must be defined. We shall, at this point, briefly identify these differences in order to preface the exposition of the second part of this thesis.

It is important to take note of a significant difference found in the degree of intimacy the subject enjoys with the object. In aesthetic perception, the subject or spectator enjoys much more intimate proximity to the aesthetic object than does the subject with respect to the object of straightforward perception. The reasons for this greater intimacy are two-fold. One reason is that the aesthetic object exerts itself such that we, as spectators, cease to be concerned with praxis and intellection, the very characteristics which define straightforward perception. Rather, we are content to dwell upon
and feel the meaning of the aesthetic object. The second reason can be found in the nature of the subject or spectator who lives the aesthetic object. That we are content to dwell on the object of aesthetic perception implies that our attitude before the aesthetic object is radically different than it is before the object of straightforward perception. There is a reciprocity between the aesthetic object and the attitude we assume toward it. The aesthetic object lends itself to contemplation and feeling. It requires no intellection. Correlatively, if we are to feel the authentic sense of the aesthetic object, we must assume an attitude which does not seek its completion in action or intellection.

Most significantly, for Dufrenne, the reciprocity between the spectator in front of the aesthetic object and the expression of the aesthetic object defines the accord between subject and object with utmost precision. This is to say that the accord between the subject and the object is most pronounced in aesthetic perception. The spectator, therefore, is more engaged in, and aware of, the meaning of the aesthetic object than the perceiver who is aware of objects straightforwardly.

Now, for Dufrenne, neither the workings of the subjective moments of perception nor the aesthetic object can serve to wholly define aesthetic perception. This points to a third term which must be taken into account. This third term is Being or nature to which both the spectator and the aesthetic object are subordinate (c.f. PE
657). It is Being which founds aesthetic perception. It is Being, for Dufrenne, which ultimately governs the meaning of the aesthetic object and the moments of subjective appropriation to that object. And it is Being which is responsible for the intimate affinity between the spectator and the aesthetic object. Being, Dufrenne tells us, is the 'a priori of the a priori'\(^1\). It is the very meaning of Being which passes through man via aesthetic perception. And correlatively, aesthetic meaning discloses Being in itsoriginary, brute state. A consideration of Being, then, belongs in an exposition of Dufrenne's notion of aesthetic perception.

It is the purpose of this second part of the thesis to present Dufrenne's notion of aesthetic perception. We shall begin by making explicit the a priori ground of aesthetic perception and how it is manifest therein. From there, we shall move on to specify Dufrenne's notion of the aesthetic object. At that point, Dufrenne's descriptions of the subjective moments of aesthetic perception must be presented. Last, Dufrenne's descriptions of aesthetic perception shall be cast in terms of Being. At that point, we shall have completed our exposition on Dufrenne's notion of aesthetic perception proper and can move on to a systematic evaluation.

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CHAPTER III: THE A PRIORI OF AESTHETIC PERCEPTION

§ 20: The affective, existential and cosmological a priori

It is the purpose of this section to identify and give precision to the various moments of the accord of being-in-the-world as they manifest themselves in aesthetic perception. We shall see that the affective a priori, for Dufrenne, designates this accord in its radical originality in as much as it manifests the concrete subject in his concreteness as such. It is anterior to the diverse acts the subject performs and for this reason must be said to specify and guide these acts. Further, we shall see that the existential a priori, that is the various a priori moments which structure the subject's diverse acts, and the cosmological a priori, or the moments which structure a world into which the subject deploys these diverse acts, are grounded in the affective a priori.

Recall that according to Dufrenne the a priori is at work throughout our appropriation to the world and our appropriation is originally perceptual. At the moment of presence various corporeal a priori structure the deployment of the lived-body in its proximity to things such that we participate, and are in league, with these things. At the moment of representation, bodily presence is given a visage. The a priori determines the possibility of knowing these things in their bodily presence as represented. It determines the possibility of
objective knowledge of these things as we as perceivers detach ourselves from the immediacy of presence in the upsurge of perception. This detachment continues as we become concerned with moving beyond the actual representation of the thing into the realm of action or reflective thought.

It should be noted that both action and reflection presuppose a type of knowledge which should be characterized as a project of the cogito. In the deployment of the cogito, the subject makes himself impersonal. As such, there is a certain depth which is identified by Dufrenne as lacking or unfulfilled. This depth is that by which the subject is a person with a personality which is uniquely and concretely his own as opposed to being the impersonal thinker which characterizes the cogito. According to Dufrenne, this lacking depth is concrete only in the deployment of the affective a priori which specifies and determines the deep self (PE 548). Now as we shift our concerns here from straightforward to aesthetic perception, we must arrest the a priori as it gives itself to the subject of aesthetic perception. This is significant because according to Dufrenne, there is no aesthetic meaning lived by a cogito, or to say the same things an impersonal spectator. We must, therefore, focus on the affective a priori as it is manifested by the concrete subject as he deploys himself in his full and radical concreteness, that is as he feels the aesthetic object, before he acts or deploys himself as an impersonal thinker.
To begin with, we should first ask just what is the affective a priori. A consideration of the affective a priori, according to Dufrenne, will take us to the very origin and soul of what he refers to as 'the immanent world of the aesthetic object' (PE 549)\(^1\). The affective a priori permeates the aesthetic object, thereby providing it with unity and meaning (PE 549). The affective a priori is, simultaneously, expressed by the aesthetic object. Dufrenne writes "an affective quality is a priori when, expressed by the work, it is constitutive of the world of the aesthetic object and when it can be felt independently of the represented object" (PE 549).

Two important qualifications must be made. First, similar to what was seen in considering the a priori at work in straightforward perception, it should be noted that for Dufrenne there is no pure affective a priori. The affective a priori is always grasped through the empirical, which in this case is the aesthetic object. Conversely, the affective a priori cannot be grasped apart from the aesthetic object and the meaning it expresses. The affective a priori, however, is not exhausted in any specific aesthetic object. Rather, it expresses itself

\(^1\) It is worthwhile introducing a working definition of the notion of the immanent world of the aesthetic object given the importance Dufrenne attaches to it and also the use we will make of it in our exposition before we can deal with the object of aesthetic perception proper. Dufrenne defines the immanent world of the aesthetic object as a unity of expression in which all the meaning expressed by the aesthetic object is expressed. It is, technically speaking, the proper object of aesthetic perception. We shall devote a portion of the following chapter to this notion.
in nuances in specific objects. Second, we have said that for Dufrenne the affective a priori permeates the aesthetic object and provides unity to it. In making this claim, Dufrenne is not saying that it is exclusively in the aesthetic object. Rather the affective a priori characterizes and specifies both the subject and the aesthetic object (PE 546). It exists in the subject as a possible response to the givenness of a certain structure. This structure, the aesthetic object, is itself permeated by the meaning specified by the affective a priori (c.f. PE 544). The affective a priori then is not added to the object by the subject somehow during the course of perception (PE 550). Rather, it specifies the very course of perception itself both objectively and subjectively. This specifying or structuring, which is the working of the affective a priori, defines the originary unity between spectator and aesthetic object.

In the original moment of perception, spectator and object are of the same race, as Dufrenne says, with no screen between them. With the felt presence of the affective a priori expressed in the object and the immediate grasping of this by the spectator as a response to the givenness of expression, the spectator finds himself aware of meaning in the sense that he finds himself already equipped with, and in possession of, the requirements demanded of him by the aesthetic object. He thereby consummates his affinity with the aesthetic object and initiates a more profound communion with it.
We could also cast Dufrenne's notion of the affective a priori in terms of manifesting the four aspects of the a priori in the most concrete manner. Recall that for Dufrenne, the a priori is simultaneously existential and cosmological (or to say the same thing, it is subjective and objective), as well as formal and material. The intrinsic unity between spectator and aesthetic object admits of existential and cosmological as well as formal and material aspects. In emphasizing the unity between spectator and aesthetic object, Dufrenne is at once emphasizing the solidarity of these four aspects of the a priori. In doing so, he is acknowledging the pregnancy of the a priori, that is its ability to bring forth a world into which the subject lives (c.f. PE 557). In effect, Dufrenne is saying that in the most concrete sense, the four aspects of the a priori are grounded in affectivity. This is not to introduce a different a priori with the notion of affectivity. There is but one a priori which admits of different nuances or adumbrations. But in its concreteness, this a priori is affective. Before moving on to identify the aspects of the affective a priori, we should note that it is simultaneously pregnant and singular. We should pause to give exposition to how the affective a priori is simultaneously pregnant and singular, thereby establishing the very possibility that the affective a priori can be cast in terms of the previously mentioned aspects - the existential, the cosmological, the formal and the material.
To begin with, Dufrenne claims that the affective a priori is essentially characteristic of the life of the concrete subject, that is, his awareness anterior to all diverse and specific acts (PE 551). We should recall that the subject is a subject engaged in the world. The various acts which the subject deploys in coming to know the world and thereby affirming his consubstantiality with it are consequent to the affective a priori. The affective a priori is prior, therefore, to the specific projects of the subject. It is pregnant (être grosse PE 557) enough, however, to structure the specific acts such that its a priority is expressed in each and every act. This is to say that the affective a priori not only guides the specific acts of the subject, but more so it is present in each of them. The affective a priori is pregnant, then, in the sense of giving birth to the specific acts of the subject because it is prior to them and structures them. It accommodates the possibility of the diversity of acts which the subject performs.

But despite the diversity of acts which the subject deploys, we should not think that some acts partake of affectivity while others do not. Originary subjectivity, that is concrete subjectivity prior to the various projects he may deploy, is the locus of the subject's acts. All acts stem from concrete subjectivity. All acts, therefore, are imbued with affectivity, the meaning of which may or may not be felt. The various acts, therefore, which have validity at a level beyond that of the concrete subject, that is acts which admit of second-order appropriation such as reflection, action and praxis, are horizontally
related to the life of the concrete subject. The meaning we discover in the acts of second-order appropriation, each in their own way, contains a singular nuance of affectivity, however implicit, unthematic and adumbrated it may be. It is for this reason that Dufrenne claims that the affective a priori admits of a singularity as well as a pregnancy.

The affective a priori, for Dufrenne, defines the original accord between the absolute position of the subject and a world. That is, it defines the subject's participation in a world in which he already and most originally finds himself. The subject, according to Dufrenne, is most at home in this accord in his concreteness for he is irreducible to any one of his specific acts. And correlative, any one of his specific acts stem from this originary accord. Since to deploy oneself concretely is not to reduce oneself to a cogito, Dufrenne claims that we find ourselves in our concreteness when we deploy ourselves through feeling. Feeling is the deployment of the total self or the deep self, as he calls concrete subjectivity in places, in which there is an awareness prior to any specific act. The affective a priori guides this awareness. It yields the immediate presence of meaning (NA 60-1) such that the world is revealed to someone capable of knowing it through feeling. Because feeling is capable of grasping meaning prior to all acts, pre-thetically guiding the subject's articulation of the world, it can only be reflectively grasped in specific acts directed toward an empirically given content. In this sense, the affective a
priori must be considered as that which structures and articulates
man's accord, or consubstantiality, with a world in its formal and
material, subjective and objective aspects. But we have yet to identify
the sense of the terms involved in the accord between man and world
at this originary level of affectivity. At this point, we shall flesh out
the notion of the subject to which a world is given at the originary
level of affectivity as well as the notion of the world as given to a
subject.

Now to begin with, the subject and the world in which he lives,
according to Dufrenne, cannot be what they are without each other as
their respective correlate. But in spite of this reciprocity, we may
examine each aspect for the purpose of exposition. For Dufrenne, the
existential a priori specifies the projects of the subject and the
cosmological a priori specifies the unity of validities of a world. He
claims that in their originary deployment, they collapse into the
affective a priori which must be considered as anterior to them. But
since they are only given in the empirical, we cannot focus on their
originary sense without a consideration of their empirical
manifestation. We shall, following Dufrenne, work our way back to
the transcendental or originary character of the affective a priori
through a consideration of the existential and cosmological a priori
as manifested in the empirical.

The existential a priori specifies a pattern of life (c.f. NA 57-8) or a
habitus. It embodies various psychological, social, cognitive, creative
and corporeal a priori and deploys itself according to the accord in which the subject assumes his at-homeness in a world. These various a priori are grounded in the original transcendental act of the concrete subject. On this score, the original accord and its specific manifestation can be given a content. Dufrenne writes "a concrete subject is a subject who is born and possesses a nature" (NA 152). The birth of a person or a concrete subject signifies a metaphysical event (NA 152). The subject is revealed as a subject already equipped to realize his own possibilities upon birth because he possesses a nature or a content. He begins his life by deploying his nature which is nothing other than the consubstantial pre-comprehension of the world with which he is in accord. In doing so, the subject traces out the shape its life will take.

But the birth of the subject is also an empirical event (NA 152) because he deploys his nature in various lived-situations. The nature of the subject manifests itself on the empirical level in terms of the body which he is and by which he is capable of being bodily present to the world. The nature of the subject manifests itself in terms of the power of representation and the simple thought which corresponds to imagination and understanding respectively. The a priori of presence, imagination and understanding are existential a priori. Dufrenne includes the summation of these cognitive a priori by which the subject participates with the world, as well as those which
are psychological, sociological, cultural, historical, logical and mathematical in the class of existential a priori.

The existential a priori governs the possibility that the subject can deploy himself. The subject can take charge of himself and his life, according to Dufrenne, because he himself is already created (PE 551) and as created he deploys the existential a priori, which are nothing other than his own nature. At a strictly experiential level, the existential a priori are recognized in connivance with the objective or cosmological a priori. The object delivers its essence before its essence can be explicated. The existential a priori guides the subject's encounter with objects. It operates in order to open up oneself to the knowable. The knowable, the world, announces itself as unknown yet intelligible (LI 70). As knowable, it anticipates, yet resists, being exhaustively known (LI 70).

The existential a priori are thus carried within the subject as a virtuality. That is, the existential a priori are modes of meaning which guide his endeavours yet are never fully realized. In its most universal sense, the existential a priori manifests itself as a virtuality which is common to all human nature; that is, all men participate in it but never fully actualize it for it is never completed (c.f. NA 199). Nonetheless, it continues to guide all specific human

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1 LI p. 69: "l'objet vrai est celui qui semble livrer son essence avant même que cette essence soit explicitée".
endeavour and permeate all endeavour with human meaning. It is thus virtual while at the same time grounded in the transcendental which guides and makes possible the actual specific acts of individual men. We should again emphasize that when we speak of the existential a priori as determinate of the subject, this subject would not be what he is without a world in which he finds himself and to which he appropriates himself. We should turn to this notion of a world and the a priori which specifies it as such, the cosmological a priori.

The cosmological a priori specifies the notion of a world. In light of the reciprocity between subject and world, it should be noted that the world, very simply, is both inside and outside the concrete subject. It is inside in as much as the subject possesses originary knowledge of it, knowledge that he does not learn but rather which is with him at birth. This knowledge is a pre-comprehension of a world which founds and directs his further activities. As it is actualized in experience, it is lived. In this sense, the major difference between the existential and the cosmological a priori consists in the knowledge of a world and the actualization of this knowledge which the existential embodies as opposed to the horizon in which this knowledge is consummated or fulfilled. Whereas the existential a priori specifies the possibility of experience in this world, complete with a content, the cosmological a priori specifies the pre-existing
shadow or promise of a world in which the subject always finds himself and to which all knowledge is related.

Dufrenne claims that the cosmological and the existential a priori, however complementary they are to each other, are not to be considered the ground of the a priori. Before going on to show how the cosmological and the existential a priori are rooted in the affective a priori, it is worthwhile to briefly pause and provide an entrée to the depth provided by the affective a priori to the cosmological and the existential a priori by way of summarizing Dufrenne's notion of the affective a priori. The accord between the affective a priori and the subject in his concreteness is binding and intimate. For Dufrenne, the accord is one in which the brute content of a world as felt by the subject is identified. But even in its bruteness, the lived content of the world is already specified. The subject does not colour a pre-existing world with his own articulation of it. Rather, the subject deploys the world in which he finds himself. In deploying the world, the subject exteriorizes himself into the world in which he lives. Otherwise put, the subject consummates his consubstantiality with the world.

Now, the exteriorization of the subject is impossible without its having been solicited by the world. For Dufrenne, the world signifies that to, and in, which the subject situates himself. The subject disperses himself into the world in and through his pre-comprehension of his consubstantiality with it. In doing so, the
subject articulates the world. He also continually articulates himself.

It should again be emphasized that the subject capable of feeling the affective a priori is a subject in his concreteness, anterior to the specific acts he may deploy as a thinker, a mathematician, a parent, a worker etc. At this originary level, for Dufrenne, "the subject is so intimately linked with this world that the affective a priori which founds it is himself" (PE 552). The world emanates from the subject as he exteriorizes and extends himself. It is a world guided by a human destiny common to all men. The subject, even in his concreteness, has a pre-comprehension of this destiny and it too is deployed in his act. Thus, Dufrenne writes "the world to which the subject is thus related, and which is at once his destiny and his own act... is proportionate to his being. Its consistency and reality increase as the subject gains depth and authenticity" (fidélité à soi (PE 553)). At this point, we shall turn to Dufrenne's claim that the existential and the cosmological a priori are not only structured by, but also derive their sense from, the affective a priori.
§ 21: The existential and the cosmological a priori as deepened by the affective a priori

In claiming that the existential and cosmological a priori are structured by, and derive their sense from, the affective a priori Dufrenne is not saying that they are subordinated to the affective a priori. The existential and cosmological a priori are moments of the affective a priori. Perhaps it is more to the point to say that they cannot be subordinated to the affective a priori on Dufrenne's account. Dufrenne, rather, introduces the notion of the a priori of the a priori as the ground from which all particular a priori stem as the accord in which the subject finds himself with the world. To repeat, however prior to the existential and the cosmological a priori the affective a priori is claimed to be, it is the very determination of Being itself which is ultimately responsible for their content (PE 657). We may wonder whether in making this claim Dufrenne leaves phenomenology for the a priori of Being which structure the affective and ventures into an unfulfillable ontology. We are a long way off from properly dealing with this, however, for we must first show how the affective deepens the existential and the cosmological and from there proceed to show how it is structured by its a priori, Being itself.

It should be remembered that the existential and the cosmological a priori work in tandem. They are not two different sets of a priori but rather they are aspects or moments of the self-same a priori; they
are in fact one according to Dufrenne (PE 676). We saw that the existential a priori specifies the subject as capable of a world via the summation of the a priori by which the subject is himself and intends and articulates a world, namely virtual knowledge. The cosmological a priori specifies a world as suitable for the subject as that which he originally intends and into which he appropriates himself. In this originary lived unity, the subject finds meaning in the sensible.

The structures of this originary unity spring from a common ground according to Dufrenne. This is to say that the subject, his world, and the meaning of the sensible are determinations of Being. Being determines these a priori; it is the a priori of the a priori (P 181). For Dufrenne, the meaning of Being, however originary, is still given in the sensible (PE 131); the a priori of the a priori is still manifested in the empirical. And further, the sensuousness of Being, still requires a subject in a world such that its a priority is revealed as the common ground to both subject and world.

Since the subject is most concrete when not reduced to the acts of the cogito, nor the activities involved in praxis, it follows for Dufrenne that Being is revealed most originally to feeling. Feeling is irreducible to specific acts. It is the deployment of the subject in his concreteness. The concrete subject feels Being and responds to it through affectivity. However irreducible feeling is to the specific acts, we must nonetheless include these acts as potentialities of the subject, none of which are more originary than the a priori of
presence and imagination. To show this and flesh out the sense of the subject's feeling the a priori of the a priori, each of these moments and their a priori shall be examined in turn.

We need not dwell too long on presence for it is obvious that the subject is and must be proximate to Being. He is born and upon his birth has a being which is properly his and which he deploys. But we should remember that he is not merely present to Being. He shapes Being in and through his concreteness and the faculties he deploys. His proximity to Being is never in isolation from the use of the imagination, for presence and the imagination are co-responsible for feeling Being (c.f. LI 111-12). Thus we see that the imagination is not only active at the level of sensibility but also at this more primitive level at which Being specifies meaning as given to the concrete subject.

Being expresses itself to the concrete subject in originary images at a level prior to sensibility. These 'pre-images', as Dufrenne calls them, show that which cannot be said, namely an original and virtual promise of the real (c.f. LI 112). At this originary level, "the function of the imagination is not so much to create the images than to feel (éprouver) their sense" (LI 113). The difference between this originary deployment of the imagination and the deployment of the imagination in sensibility is that whereas the latter gives rise to a detachment from presence in order to provide representation, the former is unqualifiedly adherent. In its adherence to the pre-images
of Being, it noetically becomes the image which offers itself to the
concrete subject.

But how do these pre-images, as the expression of the a priori of
the a priori, specify and structure a world? Since we have said that
the affective a priori specifies the existential and cosmological a
priori in their most pregnant sense, and feeling is the mode of
apprehension by which the concrete subject feeds on the bruteness of
the world through presence and imagination, we must also identify a
primitive presence and imagination at work in the reception of the
pre-images of Being. All pre-images of being have an element of
cosmicity (la cosmicité) as their correlate (LI 113). And since the a
priori is a pre-comprehension, that is a virtual knowledge possessed
at birth, these pre-images haunt subjectivity and give birth to the
receptivity of Being at a level radically prior to that of sensibility.
According to Dufrenne, at this originary level the image is more
profoundly engaged in Being whereas at the level of sensibility the
imagination begins the process of noetically detaching the subject
from presence and even from representation as it gives way to the
activities of the understanding. The imagination, at this primitive
level, in bearing in on the a priori of the a priori, bears in on Being
and lets itself be enchanted by it (LI 114). Thus feeling opens up a
world prior to its being articulated; this world, reciprocally and
reflexively, awakens feeling (LI 114). Once we speak of these pre-
images in terms of a world, in as much as their promise of cosmicity
is fulfilled, we should recall that it is a world with which the subject is immediately familiar and in which he situates himself in order to live his destiny.

Thus the relation between the existential and the cosmological a priori and that from which they stem, that is the world felt by the concrete subject, is a relation between fundament and that which grounds the fundament. Both terms are pregnant with a meaning with which we are immediately familiar, but the ground only manifests itself in the fundament. Being, that is the ground of the fundament, animates the affective with qualities. Being is thus constitutive of the fundament, or the affective, and gives it a singular visage before the concrete perceiving, feeling subject (LI 116). These visages must be, then, the expression of the ground in their inalterable solidarity, that is, the expression which is so originary that it guides our articulation of a world (LI 117). But whereas our articulation of and appropriation to the world may take numerous shapes and paths, such as those into which straightforward perception lead, the ground itself cannot manifest itself in any other way than the way in which it expresses itself to the subject. Its manifestation is thus singular and ingovernable (c.f. LI 116, 118). Thus due to their a priori status, these pre-images which express the ground of Being are authentic original representations. They specify depth which is at once an allusion to the depth of Being and
correlatively the subject who participates in Being because he himself is a being.

But at this point, we must raise a question. To speak of the sense of the existential and the cosmological a priori is to speak in terms of the phenomenologically accessible. The existential a priori and its meaning correspond to the language and sense of noeses, that is the actual specifications of conscious subjectivity\(^1\). The cosmological a priori corresponds to the language and sense of noemata, or the determinations of that which is immediately given to conscious subjectivity\(^2\). Both of these aspects are given in phenomenological reflection. But can we say that the identification of an a priori which structures their meaning and by which their meaning and deployment is made possible is phenomenologically accessible? To answer this, Dufrenne must be able to have access to both the nature of these pre-images and the manner by which they are structured in perception. But does he?

Dufrenne characterizes subjectivity not only according to the capacity to receive meaning but also according to the capacity to express it\(^3\). Dufrenne must identify Being as a quasi-subject for it

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\(^1\) Husserl, *Ideas*, p. 249.

\(^2\) Husserl, *Ideas* p. 258.

\(^3\) As we will see, this leads Dufrenne to identify the aesthetic object as a quasi-subject (see chap. IV).
expresses itself to a concrete subject capable of reading its pre-images most originally and most authentically through feeling. The quasi-subjectivity of Being, although determined predominantly by the objective a priori, specifies its expressivity and manifestation through affective qualities (PE 544). But what exactly are these affective qualities?

For Dufrenne, authentic affective qualities constitute both the a priori with which we are familiar as well as the a priori which we are (PE 570). Each quality relays a singular knowledge. The knowledge exists noetically in the subject as a possible response to the world. To claim that they are singular is to say that affective qualities -- for example the festive, the noble, the tragic, the powerful, the innocent -- are not dispersed over a number of individuals. Further, it is to say that they are not images which represent festivity or power. Each image expresses itself as only it can. Power is manifested by Being in many instances, each of which is irreducible to the other, or to say the same thing, in ways which cannot be expressed by other things. For example, the thrusting of a seed to break the soil, the reaching of limbs toward the sun, the current of a river and the movement of wind all manifest the powerful in singular fashions. Despite the diversity of these instances, we recognize the powerful in each of them. More so, we recognize it as something with which we are already familiar by simple acquaintance and it is only upon reflection that we make it explicit.
As such, that is existing prior to the specific activities of the cogito such as reflection, praxis and the exchange of information, it is immanent in the habitus of the concrete subject and realized in feeling.

Very simply then, the affective serves as the middle ground between Being and sensibility, or more precisely the upsurge of sensibility into higher modes of knowledge. The affective qualities are specified by Being as that which constitutes the existential and cosmological a priori. As existential, the affective constitutes a dimension of consciousness (that is, consciousness as understood in its bodily aspects) which is in solidarity with a world. It engenders consciousness to act as the correlate of this world (PE 582-3), bearing in itself the meaning of Being as it originally expresses itself. As cosmological, the affective constitutes aspects of a world by concretizing virtual knowledge as that of which the subject is capable. Dufrenne must speak in terms of virtual knowledge for this world is more properly a promise of a world; it is not yet populated. This is to say that it exists prior to distinctions between subject and object, between the literal and the figurative, and between the image and the being conscious of it (c.f. PE 582). The affective, as felt by the subject, "expresses a certain way of opening oneself up to a world"

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1 "...le monde que désignent les catégories n'est pas encore peuplé.." PE 582.
(PE 583) such that an undeniable truth is realized (PE 583), that of Being itself.

Let us return to the question: is Being phenomenologically accessible? To be sure, it is mediately accessible through the affective. But does this admit of evidence 'in the flesh'? To this question we must answer no in a strong sense and yes in a weak sense.

We can say no because we do not have access to the pre-images of Being at a level prior to the gaze which arrests objects as other than us, a level which admits of the most primitive phenomenological meaning, the noeses and noemata. Even if we were to say that we do have access to a noetic-noematic solidarity as consummated in our gaze, we are at a level above the primitive meaning of which Dufrenne speaks. To answer no in this sense is to imply that Dufrenne violates the fundamental rules of phenomenology, namely that "no opinion is to be accepted as philosophical knowledge unless it is seen to be adequately established by the observation of what is seen as itself given 'in person'. Any belief seen to be incompatible with what is seen to be itself given is to be rejected". On this score, it seems Dufrenne moves beyond that which is observed or felt 'in person' in order not to describe but rather to explain how aesthetic

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perception is grounded. But even if this is so, Dufrenne's venture into speculation as opposed to observation need not necessarily affect the descriptions of aesthetic perception proper he offers. His explanation of these descriptions, however, may be ill-founded. Ultimately, if he places undue emphasis on phenomena which are not given 'in person', then we may be in a position to argue against his notion of aesthetic perception precisely because of a lack of phenomenological evidence.

Now we can say yes to the question raised but only in an extremely weak sense. We can gain access to Being through the affective quality for it is the quality in which the subject realizes his integral unity and consubstantiality with the world in a simple awareness of it. And in the same sense that the subject and the world share a unity, this unity must be grounded in a larger unity (PE 56l). But if we are allowed to claim this with mediate evidence and in the absence of immediate evidence, what is to stop us from introducing yet another larger unity to which we can subordinate Being such as God, or an Hegelian principle. We must, then, be prepared to hold Dufrenne's ontological grounding in abeyance until we are in a position to gather all the terms in his descriptions.
§ 22: The affective as aesthetic

The next step in our exposition is to move to a level one above the a priori of the a priori and deal with the sense of the affective a priori proper. To this end it is required that we distinguish the affective category from the affective quality and keep these terms distinct from aesthetic value. When accomplished, this will place us firmly in the confines of aesthetic perception and will enable us to specify the ontological sense of the aesthetic object as perceived in greater detail.

For Dufrenne, the affective category is a generality (PE 584). It "is the idea of an impersonal world and subject" (PE 584). In this sense, the notion of the affective category as impersonal can be approached from two different points of view. First, as general, the category need not be pinned down to any specific aesthetic object for we can speak of festivity or innocence, for example, without being before an aesthetic object which manifests such meanings in their concreteness. And second, in the very process of speaking of such meanings without encountering them through feeling, we operate in a secondary order of experience for we do not have the imperious presence of the sensuous as our guide, nor are we at our most concrete and hence personal selves.

The affective quality, on the other hand, is given to feeling as arising "in the presence of a singular world and subject" (PE 584). It is unqualifiedly singular, according to Dufrenne, due to its
manifestation in the unity of a concrete subject in the presence of the aesthetic object. Like all a priori, the affective quality is delivered to us as contemporaneous with the empirical (PE 579) and is immediately recognizable and meaningful (PE 577). Such a recognition arrests the quality in its singularity as emanating from, and permeating, the work. As singular, the quality is subsumed under the category as the subject assumes his place before the aesthetic object. The quality, in this sense, is a concrete nuance, a singularity which is given to the spectator in the immanent world of the aesthetic object in a way which cannot be duplicated by any other object. Monet's *La Rue Montorgueil* expresses festivity but so do his *Rue Saint-Denis: Fête du 30 juin 1878*, as well as the remaining panels of his *Le Déjeuner sur l'herbe*. For that matter, so do paintings by other artists and even works of music, poetry and theatre productions. But each does so in a different manner, one which cannot be reduced to the other. This is to say that the nuance of festivity in each of these works cannot be reduced to a general category of festivity. This is because, very simply, *La Rue Montorgueil* expresses its own festivity; it does not express the festivity of *Rue Saint-Denis*. Yet both paintings admit of an immediately given meaning which solicits pre-existing knowledge in the spectator and which goes by the name of festivity. The quality, or the nuance, is known as such on the condition that the spectator has an already existing knowledge of the category or the generality (PE
578). Thus the category is not an empirical generalization for in as much as the a priori possession of the category pre-exists and can only be recognized or read in feeling, it should properly be thought of as singular and anterior to the generalization which smacks of second order appropriation, albeit not as singular as the nuance feeling reads in the concreteness of the sensuous.

The affective category, then, does not exhaust the unique atmosphere revealed in, and deployed throughout, the sensuous, which is to say that the general idea of festivity however a priori it may be, does not exhaust the irreducible sense of festivity expressed in La Rue Montorgueil, nor Rue Saint-Denis, nor Le Déjeuner sur l'herbe. The category, therefore, is not adequate to the singular expression of the sensuous (PE 579). It, rather, serves as a virtuality which, acting as a point of entry into the work, has the character of acquaintance necessary for our understanding a meaning already present in the sensuous and already known by us. But in order to make this meaning more explicit, we must reflect upon its givenness for the arrestation of the category cannot be accomplished without reflection (PE 579).

We should note that reflection merely elucidates the category as read by feeling. It does not constitute, nor add anything to, it. For when we speak of affective categories, that is the sense of the tragic, the festive, the innocent etc., our very reference is guided by the immediate concrete perception of a meaning which is already there
prior to reflection. Further, it is already there, in keeping with Dufrenne's fundamental position on the a priori, as both aspects of a world and as aspects of consciousness. Although they are inseparable, we can make each explicit for a better understanding. First, as aspects of a world, the categories designate an unpopulated world (PE 582) not only because it is a world in which the nuance is unfulfilled, but also because in its primitivity it is anterior to the distinction between self and otherness. Thus the sense of otherness which characterizes a world, albeit a world in a radical unity with the subject, is lacking. Further, it is a world in which the sensuous qua sensuous is also unfulfilled. In order to be fulfilled reflection must be solicited, and this involves an aspect of consciousness. Thus, the affective as an aspect of the world goes hand in hand with the affective as an aspect of consciousness. Dufrenne writes, "this consciousness is like an impersonal creator, who, from having been a particular person who creates, transforms himself into an absolute spectator, assuming and bearing within himself the meaning of the spectacle" (PE 583). The festive world of La Rue Montorgueil, according to Dufrenne, presupposes a consciousness capable of feeling festivity. It does not presuppose that this consciousness lives festivity but rather simply that one is capable of both opening up to festivity and correlativelv, feeling it (c.f. PE 583).

But as much as the category comes into play in feeling the sensuous, we are still only dealing with capabilities for the sensuous
yields the quality in its immediacy. Whereas the categories yield the impersonal\textsuperscript{1}, the qualities yield the personal. The singularity of the quality yields the nuance of the sensuous and the artist both. It must therefore be remembered that the category founds the quality retroactively as that which gives an originary clue to that under which a nuance is subsumed and belongs. The nuance is, correlatively, the concreteness and fulfillment of this clue such that it is no longer a generality but a specific givenness in the flesh itself. In the presence of the sensuous, neither is absent; but in the absence of the sensuous, the category remains helplessly general and not fulfilled by any amount of reflection.

\textsuperscript{1} "It is the consciousness of a possible artist conceived in the image of a real artist. We could also conceive of this consciousness as a possible structure of a subject who can be known implicitly outside of any reference to a real subject" (PE 583).
§ 23: The hierarchy of affective meaning

At this point the hierarchy of affective meaning at work in aesthetic perception should be identified. Further their respective contents should be made explicit. To this end it should be noted that we have dealt with affective categories and qualities in terms of their structural deployment. We need only to make their content explicit. We have not, however, introduced the notion of affective or aesthetic value as promised at the beginning of the last section. We shall fulfill that promise in this section.

Dufrenne makes it clear that it is impossible to enumerate a definitive list of affective categories and qualities (PE 600). The affective category is existential in as much as it is an aspect of consciousness and cosmological in as much as this consciousness is in accord with the world. It specifies the dimensions of a consciousness by which a world is already known and grasped. But because we are dealing in terms of capabilities, such dimensions may be extended according to the attitudes adopted by different men (c.f. PE 584). According to Dufrenne, we cannot foresee the end of such attitudes in terms of their being given expression in the sensuous, nor in terms of their being grasped and appropriated by the spectator. In this sense, a list of affective categories and their respective nuances read as a system of unforeseeable innovations (PE 602) and is incapable of being exhausted in a definitive inventory.
 Nonetheless, we should properly speak of the content of the category as a type of knowledge. In its generality, the category does not exhaust the meaning of the sensuous. It merely serves as that aspect which orients our gaze and allows us to prepare for and follow the work (PE 587-8). It is a knowledge of what we already are and are capable of living as a person. Thus, the affective category, for Dufrenne, embodies a human meaning (PE 593). It is nothing other than our habitus (PE 594). It founds all the experience we live through and with which we are familiar.

The affective category and the affective quality share a plateau or a plane in Dufrenne’s hierarchy of aesthetic meaning. Recognition of affective categories and qualities presuppose some degree of the spectator’s communion with the aesthetic object. The opposite of the meanings embodied in the affective quality and category is what Dufrenne would refer to as the abortive. Aesthetic meaning is aborted, as we shall see, when the spectator fails to assume the properly aesthetic attitude or when the attention he pays to his perception is not adequate to the aesthetic object.

Now if we were to draw an horizontal line and place the affective category and the affective quality above this line to indicate that perception is indeed dealing with aesthetic meaning, and we placed the abortive below this line to indicate that perception was not dealing with aesthetic meaning, we may wonder if there are more intense degrees of aesthetic perception and what sort of content is to be found
in these degrees. Dufrenne would claim that the spectator, assuming that he is engaged in aesthetic perception, oscillates between the category and the quality until a critical moment occurs. This critical moment defines the success of aesthetic perception as it aims at an aesthetic object. And further, such success is defined as the manifestation or revelation of the aesthetic value, which Dufrenne identifies as the pinnacle of aesthetic meaning, the beautiful.

We should be careful how we locate the value within the hierarchy of affective meaning for although it is the mark of all authentic aesthetic objects, it is not properly speaking a structure or an essence, or for that matter, anything specifiable at all (PE 17). Although unspecifiable, Dufrenne writes that the beautiful alone can be called a value and thus must be rendered logically distinct from the category, the quality and their contents (PE 573). But however logically distinct the beautiful is from the festive or the innocent, it denotes the success of the object in fully expressing the festive or the innocent and thereby manifesting the undeniable truth of a world (PE 573). The beautiful thus accompanies the successful deployment of the aesthetic category in its concrete nuance.

The beautiful, for Dufrenne, designates a value which is in the object and attests to its being" (PE 18). It designates "a particular category or style which we can easily define in another way and which we must so define as soon as we are to aim at some precision"
(PE 19). These 'other ways' of defining the beautiful are nothing other than the sense of the categories which are read in their immediacy by feeling. Authentic value permeates the object and designates its truth only when it is "immediately sensuous and recognized" and when it "imperiously announces the ontic perfection it enjoys" (PE 20). Further, it does this and can only accomplish this prior to reflection and the awakening of the felicitous (heureux) in us (PE 20).

Now since the aesthetic object has been identified as a quasi-subject and since it has just been said that authentic aesthetic value permeates the object, it should be noted that the authentic aesthetic object seeks to bring its embodied value to the fullest possible sensuous realization. The aesthetic object, according to Dufrenne, attempts this realization by deploying its own self-contained 'norm' (PE 22). This norm is the manner according to which the aesthetic object manifests itself as only it itself can. This norm is nothing other than the a priori specifications which enable possible success for a work of art.

We can describe this norm by referring to an aesthetic object. Monet's painting of La Rue Montorgueil possesses an inner coherence or unity. This unity is at work in Monet's expressivity, that is it provides a unity by which his painting is what it is. It has a cosmological aspect in as much as it admits of a world which is peculiarly its own. The world manifests a singular nuance of
affectivity which the spectator grasps. This singular nuance of affectivity, the aesthetic value in Dufrenne's schema, permeates the sensuous in both its subjective and objective aspects. It may receive its birth from the artist (PE 22) but the artist, according to Dufrenne, follows and deploys the norm as it unravels itself in the aesthetic object. Dufrenne likens the unravelling of this norm to the "will to the absolute" (PE 22). "And", he continues, "to the extent that the aesthetic object proclaims and attains this norm, the object itself becomes in turn a norm for aesthetic perception" (PE 22).

The aesthetic object, then, admits of and deploys the capacities for successfully manifesting itself in terms of how it expresses itself and the actual extent to which it does so. This is to say that it embodies the content and the a priori specifications by which the content expresses itself as such. It is important to note that on Dufrenne's account, we as spectators do not decide the beautiful according to some convention or rule. Rather, the beautiful is decided by the nature of the aesthetic object and the capacities it deploys in expressing itself successfully.

We should briefly conclude this section by giving precision to the pinnacle of aesthetic meaning. Although we have distinguished it from the aesthetic category and the aesthetic quality, we should note that on Dufrenne's account the aesthetic value presupposes both the category and the quality. They belong together, embodying and deploying the genesis of sense in the aesthetic object. The value
permeates the aesthetic object and is realized according to the success the quality obtains in manifesting itself. Its meaning is realized, although not exhausted, in the particular nuance and we know it in its specificity. We can, however, only name it in its generality for we speak of festivity, for example, in both Monet's La Rue Montorgueil and his painting of Rue St. Denis, although the nuances of festivity expressed in these paintings are quite particular.
§ 24: The attitude of the spectator before aesthetic value

What is our attitude, as spectators, before the supreme order of aesthetic sense, the value or the beautiful? Dufrenne specifies our attitude before the beautiful by contrasting it with two inauthentic aesthetic attitudes, those being our attitudes before the true and the pleasing. Recall, to know truths is not to gain proximity to the aesthetic object for understanding is essentially absent from aesthetic perception. But it should be remembered that feeling is contemplative in its adherence to the sensuous. Since this is the case, could it not be that truth is the distinguishing mark of the aesthetic and our attitude before it is one which is, accordingly, guided by the reective elucidation of truth?

Dufrenne himself recognizes this possibility. He begins his exposition by raising the question “is the impassive respect imposed by the aesthetic object comparable to the attitude demanded by what is true?” (PE 528). He claims that these attitudes, although comparable, are not reducible to each other for they differ on the following scores: 1) the course our appropriation takes to realize the beautiful and the true; 2) the attitude we take once we have gained possession of them; and 3) the identity we assume before them. We shall now flesh out these divergences.

First, Dufrenne likens the appropriation of the true to a hunt (c.f. PE 529). He claims that it is pursued through the questioning
attitude I take toward it. Even when I am finished pursuing it, and have 'tracked it down' and arrested it, I continually re-evaluate it. My pursuit of it is never complete for it must be continually re-appropriated. I therefore, according to Dufrenne, "consider the true as something acquired after considerable struggle" (PE 529). When I achieve the true I become pleased with myself and the fact that I have overcome epistemic obstacles which have presented themselves along the way, scheming to thwart my appropriation to truth. As a result, my appropriation to, and conquest of, the true is marked by avarice (PE 529).

On the other hand, the aesthetic attitude is not marked by avarice. This is to say, for Dufrenne, that my appropriation to the beautiful is not realized in an achievement which overcomes uncertainties. The achievement involved in my appropriation to the beautiful does not deserve to be identified by avarice and the pleasure felt in overcoming uncertainty. Rather, this achievement is found only in innocence. It is realized only to the extent that I open myself to the aesthetic object, accept it on its own grounds, and enter its immanent world. Thus, whereas appropriation to, and gaining possession of, the true is a result of my own efforts, Dufrenne writes that "in aesthetic experience I have the impression that something has been given to me which is quite independent of my questioning zeal" (PE 529). This 'something which has been given' is not a creation of mine. It
is nothing other than the unity of the aesthetic object and the
demands it makes of me to adhere to it.

This leads to the second point of comparison between the beautiful
and the true, namely the attitude which we assume once we have
obtained possession of them. Dufrenne claims that I do not treat the
beautiful and the true in the same manner once I have possessed
them. Once I have gained possession of the true I incorporate it into
my being and am capable of giving it expression for the purposes of
communication. It eventually becomes embedded in my awareness
of the world and horizontally guides my being in the world. Yet
however implicit it becomes I still have it and its character is marked
by the mode of having. I can call it up at will and use it in
combination with other truth in the same way I use premises in an
argument to infer further truths. It is thus, as Dufrenne writes,
"capitalized, inherited and exchanged for language as if it were
monetary in character" (PE 529). But if the true is marked by the
mode of having or to be more precise, the possession I have of it, the
beautiful is marked by the possession it has of me as its spectator.
Further, it is not capable of being capitalized and exchanged in the
same manner. The true, since it can be used in seemingly infinite
combination, can alway annex new territory (PE 530). But aesthetic
perception cannot annex new territory in the same way for its object
is a self-enclosed totality; it contains its own meaning and does not
refer to meaning outside itself. If it can be said to progress, it can
only be to the extent that it unfolds in increasing depth thereby making us more in league with it and more amenable to it. In addition to the self-enclosed nature of the aesthetic object, it should be noted that it is irreducible to conceptualization and for that reason we cannot exchange it for language in the same way as we can the true. Its meaning cannot be retained in language to the same degree as it can be felt. Thus Dufrenne writes "aesthetic experience once finished, leaves no more than a pale and futile memory, and the knowledge by which it is replaced cannot compensate for its disappearance" (PE 530-1). And to qualify this, we should note that this is to once again emphasize that presence nourishes feeling; there can be no aesthetic meaning felt without the adherence to presence which feeling deploys. On the other hand, the true does not make such a use of presence; it has a validity through the activities of the understanding which, as we have seen, deploy themselves in and through a rupture from presence, thus moving beyond the givenness of things.

The last point of comparison between the beautiful and the true consists in the identity of the self which entertains these respective contents. Dufrenne claims that the self who confronts the beautiful is not the same self as the self who confronts the true. The self which knows truth, he claims, is not the concrete self but rather the self which arrests the objectivity of objects at the expense of "all that constitutes the self's depth, by reducing [himself] to an abstract point
of the cogito" (PE 531). The feeling of the aesthetic object, on the other hand, results from the object's persuasiveness calling to us to affirm it with all that we are. That is to say that we do not know it impersonally, but rather we feel it from the depths of our being. And with the more depth we respond to it, the more pregnant the meaning of feeling becomes. We need not deploy our total being to recite addition tables, nor to theorize about the motions of the heavens; but we do, according to Dufrenne, deploy our total being when we respond to the aesthetic object we confront. It is this total participation which characterizes aesthetic value from the true.

Due to these respective differences between the true and the beautiful, the former cannot be reduced to the latter in Dufrenne's account. The true can in no way lay claim to being authentic aesthetic value. Nor can the attitude we assume when we seek the true shed light on the object of aesthetic perception because of the intellectual faculties of which it makes use and the distance it assumes from its object. But what about an attitude which does not assume such an intellectual distance, namely our attitude before objects which are not strictly known yet nonetheless give us pleasure? It could be said that when we confront objects of pleasure, we not not deploy the same intellectual faculties that we do to realize the true and therefore do not effect the rupture from presence which is foreign to aesthetic perception. Correlatively, the object of pleasure would not be known in a manner foreign to aesthetic perception,
namely as it is in itself (PE 527); it would simply be felt as a pleasing object. Could it not be said, in light of this possible claim, that because the attitude which confronts pleasure adheres to its object without making use of intellectual faculties that the attitude we assume when we entertain pleasurable objects defines the attitude of the spectator when he confronts or rather lives into the immanent world of the aesthetic object?

Dufrenne rejects this claim but does allow a place for pleasure in aesthetic perception. To begin with, he rejects the claim that pleasure is exclusively the mark of the attitude of the spectator of aesthetic perception because it denotes an activity in which there is more preoccupation with the spectator himself than with the aesthetic object (PE 98-9; 527-8). With this in mind, he notes two reasons why the pleasurable is not aesthetic value. First, to identify pleasure as aesthetic value does not recognize the irreducible ipseity of the aesthetic object. It has been seen that he claims that the aesthetic object deploys a quasi-subjectivity. This is to say that it not only solicits us through its expression, but it also embodies and deploys its own norms of expression. The success the aesthetic object achieves in bringing this norm to fruition through its own expression decides what is beautiful. We, as spectators, therefore do not decide the beautiful according to our feeling of pleasure because we would neglect the being of the aesthetic object.
The second reason why Dufrenne notes that the pleasurable is not aesthetic value is because the identification of the pleasurable places its limits on the pregnancy of the sensuous itself. We have seen that for Dufrenne the sensuous is defined as an act common to subject and object. On one hand, its objective aspect would be limited by the identification of the pleasurable as aesthetic value because there would be no recognition of its depth beyond that of merely giving pleasure. For example, certain natural objects please us. We confront this pleasure and look no further into the object. We are thus comfortable with what we feel about a blooming flower in the garden or a rock formation. The being of these objects is not recognized in our attitude toward them. Our attitude, on the other hand, that is the subjective aspect of the sensuous, is limited by the depth of Being which is excluded in our contented contemplation.

Dufrenne claims that the sensuous in its own right demands further contemplation. The sensuous, he writes, "is not quite so restrained as the pleasurable object" (PE 528). It thus transcends the category of the pleasurable. If we continue to orient ourselves to the pleasurable then we operate at a level which is purely subjective and one which does not respond to the depth found in an aesthetic object by feeling. The attitude which seeks pleasure does not focus on the aesthetic object proper. Aesthetic perception, on the other hand, reaches its fullest deployment when it is responsive and not merely self-referring because it aims at recognizing the aesthetic object
according to the meaning the object solicits rather than the meaning the subject projects onto the object in the name of pleasure.

But however much the pleasurable cannot be said to fulfill the requirements to be met in authentic aesthetic value, Dufrenne claims that it is not entirely irrelevant. He writes "the only pleasure which we considered to be a necessary ingredient of aesthetic experience was that of the body's feeling at ease before, and in league with, the object" (PE 528). It should be noted that this should not properly be referred to as pleasure in the strict sense for it is nothing other than the accord between spectator and object. It is, in this sense, a recognition of unity and the possibility for communion.

Thus precision should be given to Dufrenne's notion of pleasure in aesthetic perception. Pleasure is the condition by which we come to be in league with, and gain access to, the aesthetic object while at the same time not motivating any attitude other than adhering to the object itself. I do not seek to possess it; nor do I renounce my being as a spectator confronted with the imperiousness of the sensuous in order to prolong this pleasure. Pleasure is merely a feeling of at-homeness in the immanent world of the aesthetic object, which as Dufrenne notes is to be expected of me as an authentic spectator (c.f. PE 94-5). There are times when this remains implicit. That is, I need not feel overt pleasure in the world of the aesthetic object. In fact there are times in which such pleasure is essentially absent, for example, when I confront the grotesque, the ugly, the horrible, the
tragic, etc. Nonetheless, I am in league with these meanings and know them immediately. Pleasure, then, cannot be said to be the exclusive content of aesthetic value, nor is it the aim of the spectator of authentic aesthetic perception.

It should be noted, therefore, that the true and the pleasurable do not designate authentic affective or aesthetic meaning. They are irreducible to the beautiful on the issues of their being appropriated to and their place in the sensuous. Further they do not add authentic affective meaning to the sensuous. The beautiful, on the other hand cannot really be said to add anything to the sensuous either. But in as much as it stems from the unity and coherence of the sensuous, the beautiful designates the immanent progression and fruition of the sensuous. It and no other sense characterizes a successful aesthetic object in the very completeness of the expression it engenders.
CHAPTER IV: THE AESTHETIC OBJECT

§ 25: Delimitation

Now that our exposition of the a priori of aesthetic perception has been completed, we shall turn to the aesthetic object. This object, of course, designates the objective aspect of aesthetic perception. It is not merely an object to which the spectator is present. Rather, for Dufrenne, the spectator dwells upon the object in his presence to it and feels it intensionally. This is to say, according to Dufrenne, that the spectator 'enters' the aesthetic object through feeling.

It is the general purpose of this chapter to make explicit Dufrenne's notion of the aesthetic object. This shall be attempted by, first of all, identifying the distinction Dufrenne draws between the aesthetic object and the work of art. From this point we shall identify and describe what Dufrenne refers to as the world immanent to the aesthetic object into which the spectator enters. Last, because Dufrenne identifies this world with the artist's world, we shall provide the reasons by which he makes this identification.
§ 26: **Dufrenne's distinction between the aesthetic object and the work of art**

In exposing Dufrenne's notion of the aesthetic object, the first point we shall address is the distinction he makes between the aesthetic object and the work of art. For Dufrenne, the aesthetic object should not be thought of as the work of art. The aesthetic object is affective through and through. It exists as a felt unity of meaning which does not refer to meaning 'outside' itself. Its immanent affectivity has meaning only for the perception which dwells on it intensionally and does not move from there to the sphere of action or intellection (PE 25). The work of art, on the other hand, precedes the aesthetic object. The work of art and the perception which takes due note of the aesthetic meaning it yields is the condition by which the aesthetic object appears (PE 26). But in itself, the work of art is not, strictly speaking, affective. "The work of art", according to Dufrenne, "can be considered as an ordinary thing" (PE 26). It may not warrant attention beyond its givenness as an ordinary thing by a perception which does not feel it. Despite its lack of affectivity, Dufrenne tells us that it still yields the aesthetic object to a perception which is attuned to the possibility of its giving way to aesthetic meaning.

One manner by which Dufrenne distinguishes the work of art from the aesthetic object can be seen by examining the 'material
basis'. We shall focus on a painting to make this reason explicit. To an extent, the painting consists in paints, canvas, wood and nails or maybe some glue. On a closer inspection we can see the actual arrangement of the theme of the painting as well as the use of space, contour, and dimensions. We can be aware of the brushstrokes and maybe even the brushes used. The experience of the painting, for example, by a curator in a gallery, an art dealer or the teacher who is concerned with the technique involved in the painting can attend merely to its material basis. The curator attends to its safekeeping and its exhibition; the dealer attends to it as an item which can at one time bring a profit; the teacher dwells on the technique involved in brushstroke, use of dimension, contour and colour. But we should not say, according to Dufrenne, that our experience of the painting \textit{qua} authentic aesthetic spectator consists solely in attention to these material aspects. Our experience of the painting, as authentic spectators, for Dufrenne, consists in attention to a unity of meaning which cannot be reduced to attending to its brushstrokes and paint or the maintenance of its frame and its canvas. Our experience consists in dwelling upon the immanent world of the aesthetic object, not the matter of the physical work of art itself. Thus the aesthetic object, we should note, does not consist exclusively in a material substratum; rather it consists in what Dufrenne identifies as expression.
The aesthetic object is also distinguished from the work of art by Dufrenne according to its noetic difference. This difference is already implied in the difference stemming from an examination of the material basis of a painting. From a strictly material point of view, the work of art and the aesthetic object do not have the same content. The aesthetic object has expression as its matter. This expression demands to be felt by the perception which attends to it. The aesthetic object yields this expression directly and immediately to the spectator who pays it due (PE 257). The work of art can be said to exist merely as a thing. It does not make demands on its perceiver; rather, the perceiver makes use of the work of art according to his own intention, be that a need for profit, a need to exemplify a style of painting for a lecture etc.. Thus, the aesthetic object and the work of art can be distinguished according to the noetic life of the perceiver.

Dufrenne employs the notion of the 'sensuous' to distinguish the aesthetic object from the work of art at a noetic level. The aesthetic object is defined as "the apotheosis of the sensuous" (PE 41). "The sensuous", Dufrenne tells us, "is an act common to both the sensing being and what is sensed" (PE 83). Now in this schema, the content of what is sensed expresses itself. This expression, he believes, is worthy of the name 'act'. The sensing being, of course, 'acts' in responding to what is expressed. It accepts the expression without creating it, nor moving beyond it into the sphere of action as straightforward perception would. The sensuous is the conscious
content of the aesthetic object. But the act of the spectator must adhere to it in order for its authentic meaning to be expressed. Thus Dufrenne writes "art can express only by virtue of the sensuous and according to an operation which transforms brute sensuousness into aesthetic sensuousness" (PE 187). The aesthetic object expresses by virtue of a specific type of noetic activity which takes heed of expression and adheres to it. This type of noetic activity is neither present in, nor demanded by, the work of art proper.

Now if the experience of expression of the aesthetic object is given proper attention in its own right, Dufrenne claims that the spectator is not led beyond the sensuous. Rather, he adheres to it even more closely and seeks the meaning immanent to it. But what is this expression and how does it express a world of meaning, as Dufrenne says, immanent to itself? We shall, in the following two sections respectively, address ourselves to these questions.
§ 27: The expression of the aesthetic object

We have seen that Dufrenne distinguishes the aesthetic object from the work of art according to what we could refer to as 'intensional evidence'. The aesthetic object admits of an immanence which is felt intensionally. The work of art, on the other hand, does not admit of this immanence. Rather, it is capable of being considered as a thing in a relation with other things and states of affairs. The aesthetic object, it must be said, has no referent which is external to itself. It is a self-contained unity of expression. It can be penetrated only by the spectator who pays it proper due. The spectator's act of paying it proper due is the act of feeling. Proper due is not given by the spectator who attempts to translate the meaning felt into another mode of elucidation. This is to say that whatever is expressed by the aesthetic object is radically alienated by, say, a prose account of the same thing, or a psycho-analytic explanation, or any attempt to restate in concepts the felt unity which the aesthetic object manifests because these admit of second-order elucidation.

Dufrenne casts the relation of second-order elucidation to the original expressivity of the aesthetic object in an analogy of language. The relationship here is "of one language to another whereby a commentary is forced to re-express an object already expressed by some means of art" (PE 172-3). The spectator who adheres to the original expressivity of the aesthetic object is, so to speak, at the
doorstep to its immanent world. In elucidating Dufrenne's notion of the aesthetic object, we must make explicit its expression as that to which the spectator aligns himself in order to grasp its immanent world.

Dufrenne conceives that language consists in a "continually unstable equilibrium" according to which we deploy words to express ourselves (PE 173). Language is both signifying and expressive. To say that it is signifying is to say that it points or refers to things other than itself. And to say that it is expressive is to say that it simply unveils what is harbored in itself. Dufrenne writes:

"It is signifying in that it harbors an objective signification which is in a sense external to it and requires the operation of the understanding. It is expressive in that it bears an immanent signification within itself which surpasses the objective meaning grasped by the understanding" (PE 174-5).

The language of the aesthetic object does not signify. It is, rather, exclusively expressive. It immediately and directly yields meaning which cannot adequately be grasped by the understanding. The language of the aesthetic object cannot be captured in a mode of language designed to refer to something that has already been lived. It is, rather, the original giving of something to be lived.

It is important that we emphasize three points regarding the distinction between the signifying and expressive aspects of language. First, a peculiar, irreducible meaning is given
immediately in expression and it is lived immediately by feeling. Second, this meaning escapes the understanding and this entails that feeling alone is capable of coming to grips with the meaning of expression. And third, that the meaning given in expression does not signify entails that it can only be manifested by the particular manner in which it is originally expressed. Any other mode of language is incapable of saying what is originally expressed.

Let us at this point make explicit what is entailed in the manifestation of expression for Dufrenne. Expression is manifested in a gesture by a subject (PE 178). The gesture is involved in all language. Most originally it is the subject's appropriation to the world and committing this appropriation to the world to words. But it is possible that this type of gesture may signify and not express. For example, if I gain proximity to certain phenomena and the language I use to convey the meaning of these phenomena to another refers to something external to the gesture itself, my language signifies these other things. It is possible, on the other hand, that the gesture involved does not make any reference to another thing but the meaning signified is contained in the actual signification of meaning itself. In this case, the gesture would be the meaning it expresses. For example, a shaking voice, as Dufrenne says, does not refer to timidity "it is timidity and violent and raucous sputtering is anger" (PE 181). The gesture which expresses is, according to Dufrenne, one which does not "claim to make any objective statement" yet it is one
which is immediately known through feeling (PE 181). Again, feeling alone is capable of gaining original proximity to the meaning of raucous sputtering or a shaking voice because the meanings expressed in their specificity escape conceptualization by the understanding.

Now, that expression is manifested by a subject entails that we feel not only the presence of a singular meaning, for Dufrenne, but also another as the subject who expresses this meaning. Expression delivers presence "due to an expression of the subject" (PE 183) who reveals himself (PE 178). The gesture is an act performed by a subject for another subject. It expresses only because its meaning overflows the act itself and is immediately comprehensible. Dufrenne tells us that:

"this type of comprehension...is limited to what is commonly called feeling, that is, to a certain way of being in the world, of instituting a particular relationship with it, of discovering its character, and of living certain experiences in its terms" (PE 179).

It is in light of this model of expressive language and the gesture which is required of it that Dufrenne understands the meaning of the aesthetic object. Expression is not amenable to conceptual clarification because it conveys first hand what concepts can only refer to in a second order fashion. The same can be said of the aesthetic object: it cannot be clarified by concepts because they operate at a level removed from the originality in which the object
expresses itself. Expressive language is both singular and unique. It is singular because it does not refer to something exterior to itself. It is its own meaning in its own singularity. And because it is that meaning, it is singular in such a way that it expresses itself in a manner which no other object, concept or account can, it is unique. Similarly, the aesthetic object, for Dufrenne, conveys a singular, unique meaning of which we are immediately sensitive in our presence to it. The content of expressive language and the aesthetic object both are affective content. But the aesthetic object is expressed in a medium radically other than a shaking voice, or raucous sputtering. Its expression is conveyed in the sensuous. A painting, for example, expresses itself in a visage of characters, be they representational or non-representational. Dufrenne claims that this visage simultaneously emanates, and is unified by, affectivity. It is, therefore, expressive of, and animated by, a quality of which we are immediately sensitive. At this point, we shall endeavour to make clear how the aesthetic object expresses affectivity and also how the expressed affectivity, according to Dufrenne, deserves to be identified as a world immanent to the aesthetic object.
§ 28: Expressed affectivity as a world immanent to the aesthetic object

How does the aesthetic object, on Dufrenne's account, express affectivity? This question can be answered by applying the notions of expression and the gesture to the aesthetic object. The aesthetic object itself is a mode of expression. The gesture is deployed by the artist. In the same sense that we feel timidity in a shaking voice, Dufrenne claims that we feel affectivity in a painting. We feel the serenity of Monet's lilies in a pond or the acceptance of fate in Van Gogh's Les Souliers. Expression fills the aesthetic object according to the artist's gesture which, for its part according to Dufrenne, reveals his own appropriation to the world. The artist's own appropriation to the world is immediately felt and known by the spectator. "The aesthetic object", Dufrenne writes, "is expressive because the creator expresses himself in it" (PE 182). Thus it is the artist's originary speech "which instead of bringing forth conceptual meaning, simultaneously awakens a feeling and conjures up a presence" (PE 184). And in making this claim, Dufrenne is making a disjunction between the bringing forth of conceptual meaning and the awakening of feeling which conjures up presence to a world. The latter is the character of expression whereas the former is absent from the expression of the aesthetic object to which the spectator originally appropriates himself.
It is important to give emphasis to Dufrenne's notion of this gesture in its originality. It is simply offered by the artist to be felt and responded to and no more. It is not offered to refer to anything other than itself. That is, it is offered in its own terms and those are that it be felt without the mediation of rationality, conceptual thinking or inference. Further, what is expressed cannot be reduced to what is represented for if that were the case, then it would not be expressive; it would merely signify the thing or state of affairs that it represents. We can show this by referring to a specific painting, a festive painting by Monet. We could describe his *La Rue Montorgueil* in terms of the street activity marking the first national election after the war of 1870 and the election of a new president. But the representation of these states of affairs and the descriptions thereof ultimately fall short of expressing what the painting does originally. That is, they can only describe second-hand what the painting does first-hand. Painting reveals something to me because it expresses. It awakens feeling, in this instance, affectivity. Descriptions are not capable of expressing what Monet's painting expresses originally; they can only refer to Monet's original expression. Further, representation does not exhaust the meaning of Monet's original expression even though it must be represented to appear. The

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meaning is beyond description and beyond representation. "This meaning", however as Dufrenne tells us, "can be easily grasped ... by a natural movement of perception which knows with certainty what an expression means through the feeling it awakens" (PE 185). Thus what the painting reveals to me as a spectator through its expression, which is nothing other than the artist's gesture to me, is something which is simply perceived and felt.

Now we can begin to expose Dufrenne's notion of the immanent world of the aesthetic object by focusing on the notion of world in general. All worlds consist in a principle of unity. This holds for the most general notion of world as well as particular worlds. The world in general, or the Lebenswelt, is the constant background upon which all our particular endeavours take place. We constantly, at all times, find ourselves in this world which admits of many interpretations and which grounds endeavours that arise according to these interpretations. Whether we concern ourselves with the natural world, the cultural world, or the ideal world of geometry, to cite only a few examples, we are always in the world in general. And when we cease to be concerned with the world of nature, for example, we are, and have always been, in the Lebenswelt. The principle of unity for the notion of the world in general is a principle that enables a multiplicity of different regions of appropriation and the various concerns found therein while never ceasing to be the ground of these regions and their respective concerns.
The specific regions of concerns can also be identified as individual worlds according to Dufrenne. Each of these individual worlds themselves admit of a unifying principle. For example, the natural world is bound together by physical, spatial and temporal determinations; the world of geometry is bound together by a coherence of idealities; and the cultural world is bound together by intersubjective norms and conventions. We live in a specific world by appropriating ourselves to the demands it places on us. For example, we appropriate ourselves to the inherent flux of time and space in the natural world which manifests itself in growth and decay of various phenomena.

Further, for Dufrenne, we can even speak of the world of an individual person. Even for a single person we can say that there is a world, or an horizon of experience in as much as it is bound together by his presence to it. He is present to his feelings, his fantasies, energies, etc., because he deploys them. His presence to these acts is the unifying principle of his world. They constitute his world.

Most importantly, for our purposes, Dufrenne claims that the aesthetic object expresses a world immanent to itself. It is this world into which we, as spectators, live. The expression of the aesthetic object deserves the name world because it admits of a unity of sensuousness which is at once expressed and felt. Dufrenne writes: "Genuine works, even when they baffle the understanding, bear in themselves the principle of their
unity. Their unity is both the perceived unity of the appearance as rigorously composed and the felt unity of a world represented by the appearance or, rather, emanating from it in such a way that what is represented itself signifies totality and is converted into a world" (PE 234).

It should be emphasized that for Dufrenne the world of the aesthetic object is an expressed world and not a represented world even though it can express itself through representation. This is to say that it need not represent or imitate a previously existing state of affairs, or figure of some historical importance. The world of the aesthetic object, as an expressed world, has a lived-validity for the spectator without referring to anything else but itself. The aesthetic object, Dufrenne writes, "shows only itself", sometimes without referring to anything real (PE 221). That it shows only itself precludes it from being exclusively signifying. And that it need not refer to anything real entails that it is not exclusively representational or imitative of something other than itself (c.f. PE 221).

Dufrenne offers the following reasons to further support the claim that the world of the aesthetic object is expressed and not represented. First, Dufrenne notes that there is a mode of art which is non-representational. He claims that the world of the aesthetic object is common to all arts and aesthetic objects, even those which do not deploy representation (PE 232). For example, a painting by Paul
Klee, *Architecture*, consists in rows and columns of violet, purples, greens, yellows, and various shades of blues. There is no object represented. There is, however, the expression of meanings conveyed in such a way that only this particular painting can convey. When we dwell on this painting, we live into Klee's use of colour and the world it expresses. There can be no synonymity, according to Dufrenne, between the world immanent to the aesthetic object and the world of representation. The second reason by which Dufrenne distinguishes the expressed world of the aesthetic object from the represented world rests upon the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. We have seen that the aesthetic object deploys itself according to its own norms of expression. Now, if a painting were to represent or imitate an existing state of affairs, then it would adhere to an 'objective' norm (c.f. PE 232). This norm is not the norm of the aesthetic object. At best, it could be seen as a norm which is transposed onto the sensuous but it is not one which is originally belonging to the aesthetic object. Dufrenne claims that this is not the case. Instead, the world immanent to the aesthetic object deploys itself according to its own norms. These norms are not objective but rather 'subjective' and manifest themselves in the sensuous in the painter's act of creation -- the gesture. In effect, this leads Dufrenne to identify the expressed world immanent to the aesthetic object with the world of the subject (PE 232). It is a subjective world which deploys itself according to the norms of subjectivity. At this point, we
shall turn to Dufrenne's identification of the world of the aesthetic object with the world of the artist, the subject, in an attempt to see how the artist finds his way into our perception of the aesthetic object.
§ 29: The artist and the world immanent to the aesthetic object

The artist, according to Dufrenne, finds his way into our perception of the aesthetic object as the source of unity for the world of the aesthetic object because he provides unity to its immanent world. This is to say that the artist is the source of the unity of the world immanent to the aesthetic object. It is worth quoting Dufrenne at length on this score. He writes:

"What is the source of the unity by which the expressed is able to assume the shape of a world? We already know, from the fact that the consciousness of the artist is expressed through it, since there can be expression only of a subjectivity (and that is why we are able to identify the world of the aesthetic object and the world of the creator; the creator as revealed by the work is the guarantee of what the work reveals). The unity of an atmosphere is thus the unity of a Weltanschauung; its coherence is the coherence of a characteristic or quality. This Weltanschauung is not a doctrine but rather the vital metaphysical element in all men, the way of being in the world which reveals itself in a personality. We are not surprised that it can turn itself into a world, the world of the aesthetic object since each man already radiates a world" (PE 234).

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1 This is not to contradict the claim that Being itself is the a priori of the a priori, thereby providing the ultimate source of unity to the world. It is rather an observation which Dufrenne must make when dealing with the world of a created object.
The artist himself, then, is expressed in the aesthetic object. He is expressed as the source of unity which stems from his act of creation, or in the language of expression, his gesture. Dufrenne claims that we as spectators, immediately feel the presence of the painter, for example, when we are before one of his paintings.

The world of the aesthetic object has a peculiar sort of status. It is not an ordinary object consisting in material, nor spatial and temporal determinations. Rather it transcends these determinations for it is the very expression of a subject and cannot adequately be measured or accounted for according to these 'objective' standards. As expressed, it manifests its own spatiality and temporality which are à propos only itself. Further, in the same sense that our discourse with other subjects presupposes that we bear in on the meanings they offer, appropriate ourselves to these meanings, and respond to these meanings, the aesthetic object expresses itself in such a way, according to Dufrenne, that we respond to it. We have seen that the expression of the other is an originary expression; it is felt and known not through high orders of thought such as the mediation of reason, reflective thinking and judgments. Rather, it offers itself to the perceiver through feeling. It presupposes that we bear in on its meanings in their immediacy. And in the same way that discourse demands a response, the aesthetic object demands a response to consummate its 'being-perceived'. That it expresses itself in a singular fashion, deriving its unity from subjective rather
than objective norms, and in so doing places certain demands on us, leads Dufrenne to identify the aesthetic object as a 'quasi-subject' (c.f. PE 249).

Again we can turn to the perception of a painting, again Monet's La Rue Montorgueil, to make explicit the notion of an immanent expression in the world of the aesthetic object and its identification with a quasi-subject, that is one which expresses and in so doing places certain demands on us as spectators. As we said, this painting "manifests a certain quality which words cannot translate but which communicates itself in arousing a feeling" (PE 235). This consists in an atmosphere produced in "the ensemble from which it emanates" (PE 235), that is, the atmosphere of the felt presence. Monet's painting exudes festivity and celebration. The bright colours of an abundance of Tricolores, the congregation of people lingering without the urgency to be somewhere, and a sun under which these activities are illuminated and are all the more a spectacle for the spectator, all express the atmosphere of festivity. The world of this painting is determined by these immanent traits because they are expressed with a personal interpretation, namely Monet's. Everything immanent in the sensuous stems from Monet's original act of painting, and even more fundamentally from his realization of this possible world as concretized in the visible. The colour, the air of festivity, the arrangement of activity on the streets are all traits for which Monet is directly responsible for their inclusion. Also there
are traits which do not find their way into the sensuous for which Monet is directly responsible. For example, the reason why Monet in the first place undertook to paint this street, his choice of brushes and paints, how his technical skills enabled him to give the content of this painting its specific animation -- all these do not explicitly find their way into the painting. Yet they are implicitly present. "Expression", Dufrenne writes, "is as much a principle of integration as of exclusion" (PE 237).

Thus the ensemble from which the atmospheric unity of the painting stems could be said to be Monet's style (c.f. PE 149-50). It acutely expresses Monet as the sole stylist of this painting. But more so, if we are to feel its meaning, the aesthetic object demands that we accept it in its own terms, that is the terms in which it is given. And once we accept its world in these terms as expressed to us in the unique style which Monet deploys, we enter this singular world which emanates from the specificity of Monet's style and Monet's style alone. The fact that it is Monet, or Cézanne, or Kandinsky who is the stylist of any given painting is only incidental to our entering the immanent world of the aesthetic object. What is essential is that we take the sensuous on its own terms, not according to representational detail as Dufrenne says. We revel in what the artist expresses to us. We appropriate ourselves to his organization of the sensuous. We accept the buildings depicted are that close to the street and their tops seem to cut right into the sky; we accept that
what appears to be people with no feet visible, nor physiognomy at all, can stand erect and walk. We do not question that the shadows seem too dark for a sun so high in its arc. In our appropriation to the immanent world of the aesthetic object there are things which are more important than perspective, more important than the expected ratio between sun and shadow. The mark of the immanent world is its expressivity, its affectivity, such that things have a meaning by themselves within this immanent world. For as Dufrenne writes "the affective quality of a world matters more than its geography. Things are no longer a mere locus of action, they truly have a meaning by themselves -- a meaning which is not their utilitarian meaning" (PE 236). The meaning immanent to the world of the aesthetic object is felt, according to Dufrenne, and "amenable only to the logic of feeling" (PE 237).

Let us pause briefly to characterize Dufrenne's notion of the logic of feeling and show how it is present in our activities as spectators. What Dufrenne refers to as the logic of feeling should not be considered as a fixed or static logic, autonomous and quite apart from our felt encounter with a painting yet somehow directing the meaning we grasp. Rather, the logic of feeling has validity only in the act of feeling itself. And because it is at work in our adherence to the unity of the sensuous, its proper domain is the perceiver as well as the perceived. It congeals perception into a unified genesis in our appropriation to the aesthetic object. That is, the painting offers itself
as a singular world for us to enter and the logic of feeling takes this singularity as its point of departure in adhering to the meaning of the painting, the painter's presence and our response to them. It is within the logic of feeling that our adherence to the aesthetic object fulfills the demand made by the aesthetic object itself.

Now in the same sense that we are present to the meaning of a painting, the painter is also present in the meaning of the painting. It is his presence which guides the logic of feeling. In Cézanne's numerous paintings of La Montaigne Sainte-Victoire his presence is expressed in the sensuous for all these paintings are his despite the diversity of their composition. Cézanne's being in the world forms an irrepressible unity which binds them into a singular commentary on the famous mountain. It is Cézanne, Dufrenne would say, who provides unity for our gaze. On a slightly different scale, there may be diverse themes within the object itself. Dali comes to mind as an example of a painter who expresses himself through such diverse themes. In one of his paintings we find a melting wristwatch, a piece of string, dogs with unusual faces, fruit dishes with human features resting on a beach which appears to drop off into nothingness beyond the sensuous, all in meticulous detail yet seemingly with no inherent unity. Despite the apparent lack of unity, there can still be, according to Dufrenne, a unity in disunity (PE 237-9). Here we feel unity and not disunity by simply feeling the painting. Dufrenne writes "when the work is done, one does know whether
there is a unified feeling such as one experiences upon arriving in a coherent world, in a world which is truly a world" (PE 238). We immediately feel the unity in Dali's painting; we immediately enter the world of the surreal as composed and unified by Dali and as guided by the logic of feeling in connivance with that particular stylization.

Yet despite the certain unity we may feel in a painting, Dufrenne is careful to dispel the implication that the logic of feeling is always present and always discerns unity within the aesthetic object. It is possible that feeling may not attain its goal due to faulty perception. The sensuous must be perceived in order to be felt. But "it is possible", he writes, "to have imperfect, maladroit, or incomplete perceptions of it" (PE 25). Our attention to the painting may be distracted before we enter its immanent world. Or we may simply not properly respond to it and hence not enter it on its own terms. Here in such cases the logic of feeling is not contradicted. It is simply, rather, not put into play.

In conclusion to this section, we should emphasize that it is the artist, according to Dufrenne, who provides unity to the aesthetic object. He is the source of unity. His act of creation, or in the language of expression, his gesture serves as a locus from which the immanent world of the aesthetic object radiates. The meaning expressed is a human meaning, one which, Dufrenne has told us, is expressed in the view or interpretation and articulation of a possible
world. This possible world is fulfilled in the creation of the aesthetic object as an original expression. It is important to note that the artist is not only related to the aesthetic object. The artist, being the creator of the aesthetic object, expresses himself, his interpretation and articulation of this possible world, in the aesthetic object. Dufrenne has told us that we, as spectators, immediately feel and become consubstantial with, the meaning expressed in the aesthetic object. As such, we become consubstantial with the artist who guides our immediate feeling of the expression of a human meaning. And further, the artist is responsible for expressing an original human meaning which cannot be without our adherence to it. This is to say that the aesthetic object demands that we adhere to its own terms, according to its own norms. As such the artist, as the creator, is the source of the demands placed on us by the aesthetic object.
§ 30: The indeterminacy of the aesthetic object

Lastly, it is important to dispel the implication that the aesthetic object, however much a world, however much a totality, however much a self-contained unity of expression Dufrenne claims it to be, is given in its completeness. It is the very character of the aesthetic object, according to Dufrenne, to be indeterminate. This is to say two things. First, it is to say that its meaning is not given in its entirety. And second, it is to say that we, as spectators, are incapable of providing the meaning which it does not give.

We can expand on the first point by referring again to Monet's La Rue Montorgueil. From a strictly visual point of view, La Rue Montorgueil is not painted in its completedness. The road winds around buildings and eventually disappears from sight. The road, therefore, could be said to be visually indeterminate. The peoples' activities are not really known, nor are the ongoings under the awnings and behind the flags. These are not given. Nonetheless, through the inherent unity of the painting, these absent affairs constitutes the visage for the sensuous (PE 239). This ability of the aesthetic object to be indefinitely fulfilled attests to its openness and its possibility to be felt in depth (PE 239). Yet this possibility does not exhaust the meaning of the aesthetic object for its depth is inexhaustible and therefore it renders the immanent world of the aesthetic object indeterminate. The object has a depth, according to
Dufrenne, that is "indefinite in the sense of a potentiality which no actualization can exhaust" (PE 240). The dimensions of La Rue Montorgueil, which can be felt only because we enter its world, constitute the actual determinations of a world. The affective quality, the festivity, animates these. But also it animates the indefinite and indeterminate horizons as well and incorporates them into the visage.

According to Dufrenne, we need not worry about these indeterminacies. In congruence with the demands of adherence placed on us by the aesthetic object, we need not concern ourselves with where the road goes, for example. We simply anticipate its course and wherever it does go will be grounded in, and animated by, the self-same festivity which permeates the actual dimensions of the painting. Further, those hidden figures amongst the awnings are equally animated by, and grounded in, festivity. But these horizons, according to Dufrenne, are not indefinite because there is always more content to be made explicit or rather animated by the atmosphere of the painting. Rather, they are indeterminate because "there is nothing yet" to animate (PE 240). The world of a painting, he would say, is not "crowded with objects: it precedes them" (PE 240). It is an horizon, albeit an horizon of great importance, upon "which all things that can display themselves are revealed" (PE 240). The aesthetic object is indeterminate precisely because it refuses to give more than this atmosphere. Despite its complexity, this
atmosphere does not expose its contents; it rather accommodates them in its visage for if they were exposed they would be objects of representation and it is precisely its inability to be reduced to representation alone that characterizes the aesthetic object. Whatever objects are represented are never known as mere representations; they are only felt, provided that one enters the world in which they are given with the proper attitude.

The second point by which Dufrenne claims that the aesthetic object is indeterminate is due to the subjective structure of the perceiving subject which takes note of it. This holds for two aspects. For one, we have seen that it is possible for the spectator's perceptions to be incomplete, or maladroit as Dufrenne says. This entails that the rich meaning of the aesthetic object is not noted. Thus rather than the spectator adhering to the meaning immanent to the aesthetic object, the spectator consciously or unconsciously aborts the genesis of perception and the meaning expressed therein by the aesthetic object.

The second aspect by which the subjective structure of perception is unable to exhaust the meaning of the aesthetic object is correlative to the very nature of the aesthetic object itself. That the aesthetic object admits of a depth which is inexhaustible in its own terms entails that even the perception which takes proper note of it through the adherence of feeling is not capable of exhausting its meaning. But we have not identified the subjective structure of aesthetic perception
as espoused by Dufrenne. It would be fruitless to expand on this point here. It would be more to the point to venture into the structure of perception and endeavour to make explicit its various moments. This will make clear how the subjective moments of perception come to grips with the aesthetic object. We shall turn to this theme at this point.
CHAPTER V: THE SUBJECTIVE STRUCTURE OF AESTHETIC PERCEPTION

§ 31: Delimitation: aesthetic perception and its moments

Dufrenne claims that straightforward perception consists in three moments, presence, imagination and representation, and understanding. Straightforward perception culminates in action or reflection and the meaning it elucidates, although it is rooted in perception, is beyond perception itself. Aesthetic perception differs from straightforward perception due to its object, and also due to the attitude of the spectator when engaged in aesthetic perception.

The difference between straightforward perception and aesthetic perception is both quantitative and qualitative although all perception, be it straightforward or aesthetic, is essentially perception. It consists in presence to, representation and a knowing of the things we encounter. But the things we perceive aesthetically are not acted upon; they are rather dwelled upon. They are felt intensionally; that is the aesthetic object is felt in its interiority. Dufrenne's inclusion of feeling in the structure of aesthetic perception accounts for this quantitative difference between straightforward perception and its aesthetic counterpart. Feeling belongs to the structure of aesthetic perception whereas it does not belong to straightforward perception. Thus straightforward and aesthetic perception are essentially two different modes of perception.
The qualitative difference between aesthetic and straightforward perception consists in the responses to demands made on the moments of subjective appropriation to the aesthetic object by the object itself. Whereas adherence to an object is aborted in favour of action or intellection in straightforward perception, it is restored in aesthetic perception. This is to say, according to Dufrenne, that the subjective moments of aesthetic perception are all characterized by their adherence to the givenness of the aesthetic object. They do not move beyond the givenness of the aesthetic object but rather dwell on it intensionally.

It is the purpose of this chapter to make explicit Dufrenne's descriptions of the subjective appropriation to the aesthetic object. This appropriation is grounded in presence; it is extended in the play of the imagination and representation and a very limited function of the understanding; and it culminates in feeling. Feeling yields a unique sort of knowledge, a type which is irreducible to the knowledge elucidated by the understanding. It has as its proper object, the depth of the aesthetic object. In making Dufrenne's descriptions of the subjective structure of aesthetic perception clear, it shall be seen that this structure represents a radically different mode of perception than straightforward perception, one in which the subject is more intimately engaged with the object.

Lastly, Dufrenne's descriptions and the claims he makes which are based on these descriptions shall be questioned. Specifically we
shall begin to raise the possibility, in contradistinction to Dufrenne, that there is more subjective contribution to aesthetic perception than the adherence he mentions. It is important that we raise this possibility in conjunction with his descriptions of the subjective appropriation to the aesthetic object. Dufrenne himself moves beyond the subjective appropriation to the aesthetic object and instead of recognizing the radical intension of subjective performance, chooses to venture into an ontological consideration of aesthetic perception (PE 666). But once the need to inquire more deeply into the subjective structure of aesthetic perception is realized, we begin to see that there is a wealth of data which should be included in a consideration of aesthetic perception, data which Dufrenne neglects in favour of his ontological orientation toward the meaning of aesthetic perception. These notions shall be given greater precision in Part III.
§ 32: Presence in aesthetic perception

As we begin to make this moment of aesthetic perception explicit, we must not forget that it somewhat parallels its straightforward counterpart. Recall that the moment of presence embodies the meaning of a concrete subject's originary proximity to things. It embodies the meaning of being present to things in their flesh. Our body accommodates this proximity; things are given to us only through our body's presence to them. Our proximity to the aesthetic object embodies this meaning but it does so, however, in an entirely different manner than that of straightforward perception and this is due largely to the nature of the aesthetic object.

The aesthetic object is a thing, albeit a thing which bears a peculiar meaning. As was said before, it is the apotheosis of the sensuous and "all its meaning is given in the sensuous" (PE 425). Its meaning is first and most originally given to the body. It appeals to the "demands of the body" (PE 426). It thus anticipates our bodily being in the world by tracing out a thing for us to encounter and arrest. Rather than having its meaning deployed in the sphere of action or reflection or uses external to the object itself, the aesthetic object invites us to enter its immanent world. It can be said to possess a schemata which organizes the sensuous with a brilliance and prestige of a specific sort (c.f. PE 426). What makes this so peculiar is that this schemata is not deployed in our bodily presence
to objects of straightforward perception thus giving way to a presence of an entirely different order. The presence of aesthetic perception is proximity to a unity of expression which we immediately feel and to which we immediately respond.

Dufrenne writes that the meaning embodied in our immediacy to the aesthetic object is one of innocence (PE 426). There are essentially two reasons by which he claims this. On one hand, due to the peculiar nature of the aesthetic object, our presence to it and its immanent world, we, as spectators, are not motivated to seek appropriation in the sphere of action. We simply have a proximity to it which does not attempt to become integrated into a body of knowledge and praxis. Rather, our proximity to it is one of innocence and leisure (PE 426). According to Dufrenne, we entrust ourselves to the aesthetic object and its 'unreal' world where all is play or spectacle for our gaze and we are freed from work (PE 426). In the same sense that we follow a melody or a pathway in the park without concern for understanding these things, we enter the immanent world of a painting when we do not seek its correlation in information about a world existing outside it. Thus we are transported amongst the immanent landscapes and buildings of a painting. We become located amongst the Tricolores in La Rue Montorgueil without having to physically climb to their perches; our gaze embodies this presence. Our gaze also gives us proximity to the activity on the street without being physically entangled in it. It
delivers us to the action and meaning given in the sensuous yet when this is realized we are not committed to act; rather, we are free to continue our gaze or to abort it. In this sense, our originary presence to the aesthetic object embodies a fundamentally original accord with the world, an accord which Dufrenne claims "stops short of discords and demands" (PE 427). It does not seek demands beyond the givenness of the sensuous itself and for this reason operates according to an innocence proper to a gaze which is not motivated to venture into the sphere of action.

The second reason for which Dufrenne claims that our originary presence to the aesthetic object embodies innocence is due to the radically different deployment of the imagination and the understanding in aesthetic perception. The aesthetic object is primarily for the body and this presupposes an 'intelligent body' (PE 428-9). But the aesthetic object is not for the body alone, it is also for reflection, albeit reflection of a different type than that associated with the elucidation of knowledge and its fulfillment in action. Thus complementing the innocence realized in an originary accord with the aesthetic object, our presence is not repressed by the functioning of the imagination nor the understanding. The imagination and understanding must let the immanent world of the aesthetic object 'be' on its own terms; they must not convert and incorporate its meaning into intentions stemming into higher orders of thought.
Thus we do not find a 'correcting activity' on behalf of the understanding and its tight reign over the image-giving function of the imagination. Nonetheless they are not absent for they accompany the body's intimate proximity to the object and make its meaning explicit in image form. Rather than straying from that point, they attempt to articulate the specific meaning in which the object moves the body and resonates within it. Reflection in aesthetic perception shows itself as arresting the signification for the body (PE 43l) rather than being concerned with meaning removed from the original encounter, such as the precise shades of the *Tricolores*, the actual motions of the crowd that day in late June 1878, etc. etc.. It maintains an innocence because the deployment of the imagination and the understanding in aesthetic perception restore meaning to perception at the very level of accord between spectator and object; it is free from the activities which lead perception into knowledge.

In the same sense that straightforward presence cannot be said to be the whole of straightforward perception in Dufrenne's schema, presence to the aesthetic object is not the whole of aesthetic perception. One reason for this claim is that the functions of the imagination and the understanding by which the originary presence to the aesthetic object is restored constitute a significant contribution to aesthetic perception (even by their absence). Another reason is that aesthetic perception culminates in feeling and hence feeling cannot be neglected. At this point, these activities must be made
explicit, beginning with the activities of the imagination and the understanding in aesthetic perception.
§ 33: Representation and imagination in aesthetic perception

For Dufrenne, the activities and functions of the imagination in aesthetic perception become relieved of some of the duties they deployed in straightforward perception. Recall that the imagination effected a rupture from presence in straightforward perception for it re-presented presence in image form. Now this rupture does not destroy the meaning of presence for instead it gains perspective and furnishes it with a sense of space and time. It is thus indispensable in straightforward perception for it constitutes or makes the image appear and without which perception would remain opaque and disparate at the moment of brute presence. In aesthetic perception, however, the actual content is the expression of the sensuous. It is both significative and signifying according to Dufrenne. The aesthetic object is a for-itself-for-us whereas the straightforwardly perceived object is essentially in-itself, that is something which is to be known and manipulated. The aesthetic object is expressive for us as spectators; it already is a spectacle. Thus the withdrawal from presence to presence re-presented in straightforward perception is not required in aesthetic perception precisely because the aesthetic object already exists as a spectacle prior to the deployment of subjective moments of perception. The aesthetic object is given to the spectator complete with its own immanent order of space and time, something which, according to Dufrenne, the object of
straightforward perception does not have in and of itself. This richness of the aesthetic object, then, is responsible in part for the lack of activity on behalf of the imagination.

That the aesthetic object seems to exert more control over the imagination than the object of straightforward perception implies that the actual functioning of the imagination is not required to the same extent, or in the same areas in aesthetic perception as it is in straightforward perception. What are these specific areas? For one, Dufrenne names the functioning of the empirical imagination. Whereas it played such an important role in straightforward perception, fulfilling the bare possibility of images with content, it "is more repressed than aroused in aesthetic perception" (PE 448). Thus, both its enriching the content made possible by the transcendental imagination and its inherent tendency toward discord are held in check due to the self-sufficiency of the aesthetic object. The aesthetic object does not require the imagination to enrich its meaning, especially in representation, for as said it is already a spectacle. Rather than converting the givenness of presence strictly into a presence re-presented, the imagination of aesthetic perception does not alter the given with the introduction of possible visages; it rather 'returns to and dies away in' the very givenness of presence (PE 450). Whereas the extensions of a straightforwardly perceived object are the goal of the straightforward imagination, Dufrenne claims that the aesthetic imagination functions to deepen the
appearance, thereby making available a world internal to itself (PE 449). It does not anticipate possibilities which perception may follow, but rather it is limited by the internal necessity of the aesthetic object to yield a given appearance in increasing dimensions of depth. The image-giving function of the imagination is stripped of its constitutive powers in aesthetic perception because of the nature of the aesthetic object. The aesthetic object, according to Dufrenne, is constitutive of itself; it need only be taken note of in its own right. The imagination in aesthetic perception adheres to this demand.

Thus the potential for action and knowledge which the imagination pre-figures in straightforward perception is absent from aesthetic perception. In the aesthetic mode of perception the imagination works 'within' the aesthetic object, according to Dufrenne. This is to say that it adheres 'intentionally' to the object, not in the possibilities of action which are external to the object. The knowledge made possible by the imagination is not knowledge which is external to the aesthetic object. It is, rather, immanent in the world of the aesthetic object. The contribution of the empirical imagination in aesthetic perception is therefore radically altered from its straightforward counterpart.

Despite these limitations to the empirical aspect of the imagination in aesthetic perception, the transcendental imagination still exercises its function. It simply, according to Dufrenne, does not lead to the point where its empirical complement takes over. It
functions at an originary level for the appearance of the aesthetic object is still an appearance which is made possible in the first place by the transcendental imagination. This aspect of the imagination, according to Dufrenne, "always provides the possibility of seeing" (PE 450). But we should be quick to note Dufrenne's qualification of this claim. The imagination in aesthetic perception makes possible meaning as internal to the appearance, not outside it in action (c.f. PE 449). The transcendental imagination functions on a higher, yet still very modest, level at which it animates the appearance of not only the aesthetic object, but also all appearances for a consciousness. We should note, then, that the aesthetic moment of the imagination does not enlarge the field of significations; rather it adheres to the depth of the significations expressed in the sensuous intensionally (c.f. PE 450). If it does not adhere to this depth, the aesthetic object vanishes for perception becomes encumbered by extensions and misses the immanent depth.

We can make explicit how the imagination deploys itself within aesthetic perception on Dufrenne's schema by again referring to our example. To aesthetically perceive La Rue Montorgueil is to dwell on its immanence. The immanent is a singular world; it is not a lesser image of the real world. In this sense, the immanent world of the painting is said by Dufrenne to be an 'unreal' world for "the aesthetic object derives its primary sense from what it represents, that is from an unreal which per se has no need of elaboration by the
imagination... the represented object exists only by virtue of the appearance, which itself only exists in order to signify this object" (PE 449). Thus the aesthetic object is unreal simply because the meaning to which it points is wholly unto itself and does not bear in on an actually existing state of affairs external to itself. The street in La Rue Montorgueil, its buildings and the abundance of the Tricolor are equally unreal for they need no justification from a world external to the painting itself. The painting is self-sufficient unto itself. Its meaning, according to Dufrenne, is nonetheless felt immediately as that which is given in the sensuous without reference to an external source.

The aesthetic imagination deploys itself within the sensuous in the following manner. Like its straightforward counterpart the imagination of aesthetic perception allows the possible to arise. In the case of La Rue Montorgueil, it allows for the appearance of the immanent world in the first place. But in contradistinction to the imagination of straightforward perception which institutes a distance from the given, the aesthetic imagination adheres to the given. It works in tandem with the given, yielding to its authority and adhering to the unity expressed by the aesthetic object. It receives and gives visage to the given, thus re-presenting the sense of festivity and the atmosphere of celebration in La Rue Montorgueil. But it does not constitute the immanent world of this painting for it is already constituted in the gesture of the artist. Further, the imagination does
not move beyond presence to the painting and the resonance we feel in our body when we embrace the immanent world of the sensuous. For example, through our gaze we are amongst the street activity and the furling Tricolores. The imagination thus adheres to the intension (compréhension) of the immanent world of the aesthetic object (PE 450).

We should note that in adhering to the intension of the aesthetic object, the imagination plays an irreplaceable and necessary function. This adherence yields the possibility of entering communion with the aesthetic object and it is only within the intension of the aesthetic object that aesthetic perception is at work. Whatever is felt, according to Dufrenne, is felt in the intension of the aesthetic object. Further 'what' is felt cannot be said to be of the same order as the knowing of straightforwardly perceived objects for, as emphasized, the sensuous does not lead to knowledge nor action. Nor can it refer to these for the world immanent to the aesthetic object possesses merely "the shadowy existence of a represented object, not the inexhaustible existence of a real object which the imagination decks out with possibilities" (PE 455). This is to say that representation adheres to a uniquely singular world which is without external referent or justification.

Thus the immanent meaning of the aesthetic object and the functioning of the imagination in aesthetic perception complement each other, the former being recognized and adhered to as such by
the latter. The imagination could be said to be intentional in articulating this immanence in so far as it yields and adheres to the authority of the aesthetic object. The imagination makes possible images of meaning which resonate in the spectator as he appropriates himself to the presence of the aesthetic object. It represents the signification for my body. In so doing it unfolds meaning. It thus evokes a future in the unfolding of meanings; it evokes a past in the meanings unfolded. The unfolded flows into the unfolding and the imagination adheres to this. This immanent temporality contains promises as it unfolds to our gaze. In La Rue Montorgueil, the promise of the motion in the wind and on the streets, the promise of a promenade down the street itself all implicitly unfold to our gaze and are given visage by the imagination. But these promises are unfulfilled for if we compare them to the actual experience of them, then we transport the meaning of the sensuous into the straightforward order of space and time and miss it in its own right (PE 457). This meaning is only a promise of a 'real' object, according to Dufrenne, for it is an object experienced in a radically different manner than an actually existing object in an objective state of affairs. Thus the immanent temporality, although it contains these promises, should be thought of as the "pure present of contemplation", one which cannot be broken off without violation and ultimately destruction to aesthetic perception itself (PE 457). The imagination does not constitute this temporality in detaching itself
from the pure present of contemplation, but rather adheres to the
temporality immanent in the unfolding of meaning in the immanent
world of the aesthetic object (PE 457).1

Thus, in concluding these remarks, two points should be noted.
First we should again emphasize the restricted character of the
imagination in aesthetic perception. The pregnancy of the aesthetic
object should be said to compensate for this restriction and thereby
solicit the adherence which is demanded, and which the
straightforward deployment of the imagination cannot provide.
Correlatively, this attests to the being of the aesthetic object as a
quasi-subject.

The second point to be noted involves the imagination's lack of
upsurge into understanding. It aligns itself more with presence in
aesthetic perception whereas in straightforward perception it makes
available a wealth of material to be known and manipulated. The
imagination in aesthetic perception has a paradoxical status,
according to Dufrenne. It "exists within the body and yet is more
than the body" (PE 447-8). The body participates in perception, yet
detaches itself from it. In aesthetic perception the imagination
imitates and represents the body's resonance with the aesthetic

1 Dufrenne writes "the work succeeds precisely when it restricts the
imagination within the work's limits, discouraging any further
elaboration" (PE 457). Its constitutive function is thus held in abeyance
within the object as already constitutive of a world. Thus it already has a
temporality of its own to which our imagination adheres.
object. It does not provide possible visages which may lead into action. It is, therefore, in adherence with the sensuous. It represents the body's resonances with the sensuous. This is significant for the imagination, in its limited capacity, already restricts higher orders of comprehension which find their way into straightforward perception. The most obvious point which comes to mind to show this revolves around the heart of the function of the understanding, the judgment. Whereas straightforward perception deploys both the determinant and reflective judgment, the former designating the intellectual activity in which our intuition grasps a thing as such in its immanent necessity and the latter determining the certitude of the former, aesthetic perception does not. Aesthetic perception does not recognize the reflective judgment as a final step on the way to action or intellection for, simply, none is required by the aesthetic object according to Dufrenne. It is clear, then, that the imagination and the understanding are reduced in their function in the aesthetic mode of perception.

The understanding's function could and should be said to be even more repressed in aesthetic perception than the functions of the imagination. It belongs in our exposition only to the extent that its elucidation maintains the distinction between aesthetic and straightforward perception. For this reason, we shall bypass explicit commentary on the understanding proper and move on to the notion of feeling in aesthetic perception.
§ 34: Feeling in aesthetic perception: feeling as a 'return' to presence

Dufrenne identifies feeling as the third distinct moment of aesthetic perception. Could it be said, then, that feeling occupies the same location in aesthetic perception that the understanding does in straightforward perception? This identification should not be made too hastily nor without qualification. First, understanding places us in a knowing relation to things. But however much the aesthetic object is known, we cannot say that feeling knows it in the same sense as understanding knows objects of straightforward perception. The understanding may only take implicit cognizance of a thing without making it fully explicit, yet nonetheless giving rise to the manipulation of the thing. But aesthetic perception does not culminate in action and the knowledge which promotes it as such is essentially absent. Second, we saw that the imagination is repressed in aesthetic perception and the understanding operates minimally whereas in straightforward perception their activities are more pronounced, especially within the context of constitution. Feeling, to be precise, does not occupy the same location in aesthetic perception as the understanding does in straightforward perception within Dufrenne's schema. It should be considered as an addition to the specialized or restricted functions of the imagination and the understanding within aesthetic perception.
The path which feeling takes, then, is a return to the presence of perception, in this case the pregnancy of the aesthetic object. Feeling restores seeing to its actuality. But feeling should not be thought of as simply returning to, and transforming, the sensuous by making it other than it is qua represented. Dufrenne offers three reasons to support this claim. To begin with, it is not simply a return to presence due to the meaning it dislodges. Its object is not appearances in their exteriority and opacity. The object of feeling is, rather, an interiority. It thus "introduces us to another aspect of the given" (PE 469). Feeling, moreover, is not merely a mode of the subject's being; it is, more precisely, "a mode of being in the subject which corresponds to a mode of being in the object" (PE 469). It is "that in me which relates to a certain quality of the object through which the object manifests its intimacy" (PE 469). The interiority of the aesthetic object is thus felt intimately by a self which responds to it in making its interiority active and alert. The object of this act according to Dufrenne is the revelation of 'depth', that is, the unfathomable (PE 470).

Another manner by which feeling is not identified as simply being a return to presence is found in the way it deploys the representations made available to it. Feeling presupposes that representation has been exhausted and surpassed toward something else" (PE 470). To be exhausted in this sense means that the reign of the imagination and its representations are not invoked nor retended in the activities
of the understanding. Further, these activities may be altogether absent apart from their repressed deployment for it is possible, Dufrenne tells us, to attain feeling without the imagination and explicit reflection being involved (PE 470) even though the imagination is responsible for awakening feeling to the extent that it re-presents presence. Most primordially, to feel is to make use of our simple awareness in its immediacy. But it does so in a way which suppresses our imagination and the understanding's bestowal of necessary significations and intellectual capacities. Its suppression gives rise to the 'something else', the immanent pregnancy of the sensuous. Feeling is thus free to open the subject up immediately to realities which must be experienced from within.

Lastly, Dufrenne claims that feeling is irreducible to a mere return to presence for it defines a "new attitude on the part of the subject" (PE 470). We situate ourselves to the world which feeling reveals. In so doing, we noetically assume the meaning of this world. In other words, feeling derives a type of knowledge (PE 471) which we find is nothing other than the meanings which we are and by which we are consubstantial with a human world. Feeling a priori deploys our simple awareness to make use of this world and the manner in which it is originally offered to us. According to Dufrenne, we enter the world of the comic, for example, by assuming the feeling of merriment (PE 471). If we do not assume the corresponding attitude by which comedy is realized, its meaning is
lost. It is by assuming the appropriate attitude that we attune ourselves to the immediacy of the expressed world. Feeling is, therefore, concomitantly a return to presence as well as adherence to a demand made that the spectator assume the precise attitude which corresponds to the expressed meaning of the aesthetic object. It is because we assume this attitude demanded of us by the aesthetic object, according to Dufrenne, that we affirm our accord with the expressed world, an accord in which meaning is nothing other than that which we are. As such, the encounter with the aesthetic object and our return to presence stops 'short of discord' because the meaning of the aesthetic object is felt as being harmonious and correlative to our own being. Feeling, in this sense, is said to accompany our entry into the expressed world by being fundamentally predisposed to receive and know expression (PE 471-2).

In conclusion to this section it should be noted that feeling restores primacy to presence and specifies the subjective activity in which presence is articulated in greater depths. The object of feeling is expression in the immanent world of the sensuous. For feeling, expression differs from appearance. We do not, strictly speaking, feel appearances, we know them. In feeling, we know the expression of a subject, or a quasi-subject (PE 473) as given in the sensuous. This expression is a specific kind of content for, as said, it does not point beyond itself; rather it gestures to us to enter its Interiority. Things of straightforward perception, on the other hand, do not act
as quasi-subjects. Nor do they manifest themselves as expressive things. Expression is immediately known, even though it is never exhausted, as an interiority whereas things of straightforward perception are known as exteriorities bearing hidden aspects. Further, if we read expression we find that our own subjectivity exteriorizes itself thereby revealing itself in its interior dimensions. Expression and its being known in feeling, Dufrenne writes, is "the revelation of self, simply because it causes us to actually be what is expressed" (PE 474), noetically speaking of course (PE 472). The knowing of expression in feeling thus grants a different status to the given. Before knowing it, perception, as noted, grasps appearances. It grasps the object as an exteriority due to the distance we take in situating ourselves to it. But in feeling, the interiority of appearance "gains autonomy and distinguishes itself from the exterior in the very moment when it identifies itself with, and is constituted by, the exterior" (PE 475). This is to say that our awareness of things is the ground for entering a more profound and intimate communion with them, and feeling seeks this depth from the very ground of our original encounter with the aesthetic object. It seeks expression and oscillates between the reflected and unreflected, mobilizing it with implicit knowledge (PE 476-7).

Further it should be noted that the attitude of the subject in feeling is properly within the domain of aisthesis for the feeling of expression is given originally in our simple awareness. To
contemplate the immanence of the aesthetic object, to dwell on feeling, is to take and alternative route of apprehension in the same sense that praxis or reflection offer alternative routes. In feeling, the alternative offered to consciousness is within the domain of the concrete perceiving subject himself and is irreducible to second-order expression, projects of the cogito, and praxis. Feeling lives a new meaning of appearance, specifically its interiority whereas reflection and praxis move beyond the appearance and do not know the return to presence which feeling deploys. Thus it should not be thought that feeling is removed from the meaning of aisthesis itself.
§ 35: Feeling and its object, the depth of the immanent world of the aesthetic object

The character which distinguishes the aesthetic object and its immanent world from the straightforwardly perceived object is its depth. Feeling seeks the depth of the aesthetic object. Further on Dufrenne's account, only feeling is capable of knowing depth qua aesthetic meaning. At this point we shall make explicit how the spectator dwells through feeling on the immanent world of the aesthetic object and how feeling has the depth of this world as its proper object.

To begin with, it should be recalled that to feel is to restore the spectator's presence to the aesthetic object (assuming that this presence has not been aborted). In such a restoration the spectator, according to Dufrenne, yields to the expression of the aesthetic object and accepts it in its own terms. To feel is not to re-create the presence of the aesthetic object in constitutive fashion. This is because, according to Dufrenne, the aesthetic object lends itself to us at a level of immediate complicity; it therefore requires no constitution for it is already pre-constituted as such. It lends itself to our inspection with ease (PE 482). This is to say that it appeals to, and convinces our body. It adapts spontaneously to our awareness (c.f. PE 481). It is thus immediately given on its own ground, that is as an imperious presence through which we recognize expression in
which "someone is striving to tell us something" (PE 482). Now, to
dwell on, or to feel, this object involves a questioning. Feeling does
not question the 'thatness' of an object, for it is already given as 'that'
object which we feel. It questions, rather, its content or 'whatness' by
attempting to see how the meaning of the aesthetic object unfolds to
us as we enter its immanent world. Thus to dwell on the immanent
world of the aesthetic object involves an activity which is at once
reflective and, more so, adherent. In saying that feeling admits of
reflection, Dufrenne is not saying that the spectator invokes the
understanding to the extent that he is reduced to a cogito, and the act
of feeling a mere project of the cogito. Rather, in adhering to the
expression of the sensuous, feeling's 'reflection' does not admit of the
rupture from presence characteristic of straightforward perception.

This reflective activity should be identified as a communion with
the immanent meaning of the aesthetic object. This communion can
only be possible and is only fulfilled, according to Dufrenne, 'from the
beginning' (PE 487), that is according to the spectator's immediate
adherence to the sensuous' immanence. Thus we should be aware of
various activities which go by the name of reflection yet are incapable
of capturing the depth of which Dufrenne speaks. On one hand, it
should not be thought that communion with the aesthetic object
exclusively concerns itself with the representational aspects of the
work, that is in terms of form or the means by which the artist
represents content. An emphasis on the structure or form of
representation, according to Dufrenne, lacks the proximity of adherence. Further, it smacks of constitutive activity in as much as it "defines the object by detaching it from the self so that it may be subjected to a critical examination" (PE 483). In this detachment which is made manifest in the upsurge of the imagination in as much as form itself is given a content, I do not dwell on the immanent meaning of La Rue Montorgueil as I meet it in the originality of my perception as such; rather "I look into how it is made... [how it is] produced by a making whose process and results I can reconstruct and appreciate" (PE 483). Thus, the direction of this gaze is further removed from the expressive nature of the sensuous for not only do the imagination and understanding have the same free reign as in straightforward perception in as much as they are responsible for conjuring up an image, but its object is exterior to the expressivity of the sensuous itself. It transposes a re-created form onto a painting which it considers in its exteriority. Thus the sensuous in its immediacy is alienated. It should be noted that form is but an horizon of the aesthetic object and to focus exclusively on it is to deprive the object of its rich content. Thus, due to the magnitude of detachment realized in a consideration of the form of representation, and due to the loss of original proximity to the immanent meaning of the aesthetic object, original meaning is lost. The means by which Monet came to represent La Rue Montorgueil are essentially distinct from an original grasping of the festivity it
expresses. Thus if we focus on this, no intimacy is gained; only detachment is realized.

But it should not be thought that reflection on form, in spite of its incompleteness, is an entirely fruitless endeavour. According to Dufrenne, it provides a point of entry into the aesthetic object by way of a sign, its significations, and how meanings immanent to the sign take shape (PE 483). A consideration of form will inevitably show us how the signified is signified as such. Further, a reflection on form is a short step away from showing how the artist's various techniques and painterly activities say something (PE 484). Yet in the same breath, however, we should be aware that such a reflection is a second-order type of experience, one which is, at best, grounded upon an originary feeling. It cannot be reduced to the type of authentic aesthetic feeling Dufrenne describes because it focuses exclusively on events anterior to the expression of the painting itself. These events are projected on to the painting by an understanding seeking to recreate its meaning. Although these aspects are implicitly given in the painting, Dufrenne believes that to focus on them alone is the work of a reflection which will not culminate in the depths of the aesthetic object.

In addition to form, the material content of the work can also provide a wealth of data upon which feeling can dwell. But reflection upon content also admits of the same irrevocable detachment as reflection on form, for Dufrenne, because it can only dwell once the
imagination and the understanding have initiated a rupture from presence and treat content as an exteriority. To reflect on content, according to Dufrenne, is to reflect on what was given, what appeared. It is to ask, for example, 'what is the meaning of the red, blue and white in the Tricolores in La Rue Montorgueil?'; 'what are the differences in the blues used by Monet?'. This line of questioning deals in terms of answers which are not easily, if at all found, for it forces us to make a transition from perception to conception. In so doing we move away from the perceived which is felt in its singularity to a commentary which is derived from the perceived, a commentary which cannot help but move from the feeling of expression to an account of that expression. The red, blue and white as expressed by Monet in La Rue Montorgueil already mean what they express according to Dufrenne. And if we attempt a prose account of those colours, we illegitimately transcribe their meaning. In other words, as we move from perception to conception, or "from the work considered as appearance to the represented object" we "transcribe into the language of prose what the work says in its own language" (PE 486) and thereby lose the meaning of the sensuous by corroborating it with the thing it represents. The detachment involved in this process is rooted in the understanding as it mediates

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1 Dufrenne specifically writes "what is the meaning of this shade of yellow which resounds like a fanfare through a painting by Van Gogh" (PE 485).
the representation to confer a necessity upon it. Because of the
detachment involved as reflective understanding seeks to reinstate
what has already been said by the work, Dufrenne claims that this
undertaking is, for the most part, futile (PE 486). But reflection on
content is more fruitful than reflection on form for it focuses on the
expression as opposed to a schemata by which content takes shape.
It thereby attunes itself somewhat to a world. Nonetheless, it aligns
itself too closely to representation. We must therefore seek a reflection
on content which adheres to representation without being restricted
to representation itself.

The proper type of reflection, according to Dufrenne, adheres to
the sensuous and its depth in the same way that an implication is
unfolded and made explicit. But we should qualify this. As
Dufrenne notes, the explication of an implication involves meaning
anterior to the act (PE 486). But the meaning of the sensuous is given
in it, not anterior to it. There is no logical nor chronological priority.
There is no necessary correlation of the represented to an objective
state of affairs. Aesthetic communion must not treat the sensuous
from the outside, but rather according to the self-same complicity
with which it lends itself to our body. For these reasons, Dufrenne
claims that communion with the aesthetic object is fulfilled in
adherence (PE 487). In an adherent reflection I submit myself to the
work itself, rather than submitting the work to the understanding's
jurisdiction. "I allow the work to deposit its meaning within me",
Dufrenne writes; "I do not look for a causal agent, whether this be the intention of the creator, the influence of a tradition, or some other circumstances which may bear on the creator's intention" (PE 488). Thus I simply accept La Rue Montorgueil in the joyful, festive immediacy in which it lends itself to me. I do not attribute primary importance merely to the fact that it represents a sense of history involved in this celebration, nor the activity Monet deploys in displaying the street according to a certain geometry and the buildings according to another. Rather I accept its meaning as it unveils itself to my adherence in an 'autogenesis' (PE 488), that is, in the singular nuance that the painting expresses festivity and celebration to me from the very beginning of my awareness of it.

Now how does this autogenesis function? Recall that the a priori specifies the meaning of a subject in a world and attests to an accord between the two. The subject is equipped to be acquainted with a world simply by being himself, engaged in a world. The subject knows his world by realizing that implicit knowledge which he is and which he carries with him in his constant participation with the world. This principle of participation plays a similar role in adhering to the autogenesis of the aesthetic object. We adhere to the deployment of the autogenesis of the aesthetic object, Dufrenne writes, "by means of participation, that is, on the condition that we identify ourselves with the object sufficiently to rediscover within ourselves that movement by which the object is itself" (PE 489). This
presupposes not only the content by which the spectator and aesthetic object are themselves, but more so, it presupposes the mutual affinity between the two. Feeling reads the meaning of the object and finds that it is nothing other than what already lies in the depths of the subject implicitly. Thus, this autogenesis involves both spectator and object. It consists in an adherence to the object in which the spectator's consubstantiality has already taken root. The meaning of its immanent world is thus affirmed and entered due to the subject's immediate familiarity with it. Thus the meanings of the red, blue and white of the Tricolores in La Rue Montorgueil are affirmed, from the beginning, in their very 'being-felt' as permeated with the self-same festivity of La Rue Montorgueil. For Dufrenne, we do not have to think about them as isolated moments in which red could be seen, according to some colour theorists, as exciting and stimulating¹, blue as being in a state of retiring from us², and white as light, and which as an ensemble contribute discord to the perceptual field. Rather, they are all animated with festivity and reciprocally animate and haunt the visage of represented objects with festivity. Further the buildings tower from the street, not merely lending continuity between the activity it hosts and the unfurled flags which crown it,


² Goethe, op. cit., p. 311.
but necessarily providing a bridge between festivity on the street and the complacent majesty of the flags. This meaning, immediately given in the immanence of the sensuous, serves as evidence, according to Dufrenne, of the self-sufficient necessity within the aesthetic object (PE 491). This evidence shows therefore, "the work such as it is and not such as it might be" (PE 491). It specifies the meaning immanent to the aesthetic object in its singularity, a singularity which no other work can reproduce, nor which any generalization can embody.

Now in addition to finding myself as consubstantial with the object itself, I also find myself consubstantial with the artist. In this sense that there is a mutual affinity between myself and the artist, I feel impelled toward him (c.f. PE 489). The locus of this affinity is expression. What is expressed, as has been said, is a common metaphysical element, a genuinely human content. More so, it is a content which is given to me as a gesture. The artist has something to say to me; I respond to this gesture by dwelling on its meaning.

Thus by affirming my consubstantiality with the painting, I attest to, and, if my reflection continues, realize the depth of the aesthetic object which, in turn, corresponds to the depth in me. Such depth, according to Dufrenne, is inexhaustible for it consists in a "plurality of significations which are (more than the perspectival viewings [by] which we take on the object) complete expressions of the object" (PE 493). And since these significations are expressions, they do not
merely 'show' the way or point to some meaning; they, rather, say this meaning. They are original and, therefore, they realize that particular nuance. Thus the festivity immanent in *La Rue Montorgueil* would not be realized without the painting itself and a spectator adhering to it from the inception of perception to the depth it realizes through feeling, however complete or incomplete that may be.
§ 36: **Depth in aesthetic perception**

It has been seen that feeling knows expression and has depth as its object in aesthetic perception. Feeling dwells on the meaning of a world immanent to the aesthetic object. But his notion of depth has not yet been given precision. We shall, then, at this point provide exposition on Dufrenne’s notion of depth in its own right and from there move on to specify its place in aesthetic perception. We shall not venture to give depth a determinate content in conjunction with any specific aesthetic object. According to Dufrenne, depth is unfathomable and thus eludes definition. For this reason it would be essentially erroneous to specify depth by explicitly identifying it in, say, *La Rue Montorgueil*. Our treatment of Dufrenne’s notion of depth in aesthetic perception shall be somewhat formal for it will only be dealt with in as much as it is a structure which feeling makes available. We shall reserve critical commentary on it for a later section.

We should begin our exposition of the notion of depth by identifying a general concept and holding in abeyance any notion of depth in the context of a specific aesthetic object. Dufrenne begins by drawing the distinction between the superficial and the profound (PE 495). It should be said that the superficial is distanced from the profound. The profound is at the core or origin of meaning whereas the superficial maintains a distance from the core. Now in light of
Dufrenne's emphasis on the a priori and the accord between man and world, the origin of meaning is the very deployment of what we are, namely, being in, and equipped to know, the world in various degrees. To adhere to the immanent world of the sensuous in feeling is to seek depth in the same sense that one makes a 'pilgrimage to the origin' (retour au pays natal) (PE 496). It is not enough that this pilgrimage occurs; rather what is necessary is that one makes use of, and is attuned to, it. Depth, according to Dufrenne, arises in the use I make of this origin when I anticipate the unforeseen nature of the present as it deposits its meaning in me (c.f. PE 496-7). Thus to make a pilgrimage to the origin, or that which I am, presupposes that I deploy the capacity to be myself along the way, to collect myself together and to commit myself to the meaning of things as opposed to being indifferent (c.f. PE 499). In collecting myself I make use of my concreteness, that is, my desires, my fantasies, my energies, my culture, my history, the knowledge, etc., which I am.¹ To commit myself can take the form of communion by which I gain intimacy with the meaning of things by recognizing my co-naissance with them. It should be noted that this commitment to the meaning of things is radically other than what could be said to be the essential characteristic of the straightforward attitude. This attitude is

defined by an unreflective living-through experience without concern for the manners of givenness themselves, nor the depth or origins. This does not imply a lack of concern for life itself, but rather a lack of knowing proximity to the actual givenness of things and states of affairs.

It is important to cast this description of depth in terms of aesthetic perception, for as Dufrenne writes, this sort of depth belongs to aesthetic perception (PE 500). Feeling initiates depth. Feeling is the immediate recognition of expression such that the sign which expresses is transparent. Expressed meaning is thus immediately given. But this immediacy should not be seen as detrimental to the acquisition of depth. Whatever lack of 'perseverance' is embodied by depth due to feeling's act of immediate apprehension, the rich 'plenitude' of meaning made available through feeling more than makes up for (PE 501). This meaning is recognized both in the subject and the object. The subject deploys himself in his concreteness. He is neither a pure consciousness nor a pure look. These horizons are present but never in their purity for they are laden and infused with 'all that the subject is' (PE 501). The aesthetic object lends itself to the entire subject. It reaches everything that he is (c.f. PE 501). And due to the thoroughgoing nature of this reciprocity, it instructs the subject to a much greater extent, lending and depositing its meaning to the very recesses of
subjectivity itself (PE 501) thereby filling up consciousness (PE 513). This, in turn, serves to open up the object in increasing degrees.

At this point, we may wonder in what the experience of depth consists. According to Dufrenne, it consists in two essential aspects. One of the aspects is strangeness (PE 506). The majority of our perception is straightforward perception. Through straightforward perception we become aware of the world in which live and act. The experience of depth, however, uproots us from the familiarity we deploy in straightforward perception. We are so familiar with the world in which we straightforwardly live that we tend to take it for granted. In taking it for granted, we operate at the level of the superficial. Thus we could actually walk down Rue Montorgueil and get along quite well without taking note and making explicit the particular way in which it appears to us as such in our straightforward perception. Our straightforward modes of being in the world are so accustomed to the world that they work through habitual familiarity. But the experience of depth forces us to break from this familiarity and come face to face with the meaning of a new world, or better a new expression of the world which demands a new outlook (PE 506). This new meaning is the way in which La Rue Montorgueil appears in its specificity in the expression of Monet. We are not used to it and this newness animates it with a strange and wonderful sense. Such strangeness provokes wonder and reflection (c.f. PE 506). It makes us adhere to the meaning while we seek a new
familiarity with it. It is worth noting that the aesthetic object never loses its capacity to be strange and provoke wonder as long as we do not reject the aesthetic attitude (PE 507) according to Dufrenne, for it consists in a meaning which is irreducible to straightforwardness. It is thus a positive attribute of the object for in attesting to such an irreducible meaning which provokes wonder, it is not confusing. Its strangeness serves, therefore, as motivation for feeling and further communion.

The second aspect of depth is difficulty. Similar to the aspect of strangeness, the difficulty involved in depth is not a negative attribute but rather attests to the inexhaustibility of the aesthetic object. The aspect of difficulty, according to Dufrenne, is rooted in the understanding (PE 508). Even though the understanding is only at work at a very modest level in aesthetic perception, it is still at work. It still attempts to know. Yet its attempt is somewhat thwarted by, on one hand, being repressed, and on the other, by the strangeness of which the aesthetic object admits. It thus finds the reaching of depth difficult.

Now it should not be thought that these two aspects exhaust the depth in aesthetic perception for the very attainment of depth must also be made explicit. Perception of the aesthetic object involves a reciprocity (c.f. PE 512). On the one hand, the aesthetic object appeals to aesthetic perception in order to exist in its own right. On the other, perceptual consciousness lends something of its own being to the
aesthetic object to enable it to be. Although this consciousness is
nothing\(^1\) (PE 513), it lends the depths of the subject's being to the
object. It makes itself consubstantial with the immanent world and
realizes its meaning only by being itself and attuning itself to that
origin by which meaning is possible, namely the concreteness of a
subject in a world or more precisely a world which is the
manifestation of a quasi-subject. Both are inexhaustible for they
transcend the concept of mere thinghood due to their inclination for
expression and the inherent propensity to self-exteriorize. It is for
this reason that depth itself is inexhaustible and unfathomable, even
despite immediate familiarity and consubstantiality.

Thus the depth of aesthetic perception consists in the irreducible
reflexive activity between the subject and the aesthetic object. It is
realized in an ongoing dialogue or communion between the two. It
can only be defined in terms of the concreteness which it constantly
escapes in its very unidentifiability. It makes use of the concreteness
of the subject which lends itself to the concreteness of the aesthetic
object in order to motivate or invoke communion. The depth of the
subject thus affirms and assumes the expression by subjectifying it
as the origin of a world (PE 514). It is this world into which feeling
enters; it is the expression of this world which feeling reads and

\(^{1}\) In this sense, Dufrenne is referring to the self-sufficiency of the
aesthetic object.
knows immediately in the depth according to which the subject makes use of what he is. And it is this depth which defines the profundity of aesthetic experience.
§ 37: Summary and conclusion

To conclude this chapter we shall summarize the subjective structure of aesthetic perception as Dufrenne understands it and from there provide a brief examination of his thesis. This examination shall focus on the originary manner in and by which we are present to the aesthetic object and its immanent world. Whatever questions are raised should be kept in mind for part III which will embody critical evaluation of Dufrenne’s notion of aesthetic perception in detail.

To begin with it should be noted that aesthetic perception embodies structures and moments which are not identical to their straightforward counterparts. We shall not exclusively focus on the differences for they have been dealt with earlier. Rather, we shall recall the sense of aesthetic perception. The object of aesthetic perception is expressive, which is to say that its signification contains what it signifies. It does not refer to a meaning outside itself; it is self-referring. It has as its locus, what Dufrenne calls an immanent world. This world is an atmosphere in which a singular meaning is immediately recognized by the spectator as that which permeates this specific object. Further, because it is singular, it has its own identity which is to say that it does not merely express a lesser image of the world of our straightforward concerns, but rather it is a world unto itself.
The aesthetic object, according to Dufrenne, is realized in moments of perception. Presence designates our proximity to the aesthetic object. In presence, we find we have an immediate affinity with the aesthetic object. The aesthetic object seduces our body to dwell upon it and what it already recognizes in it. It seduces us to follow the tracings of the object as they give themselves to appearance. The appearing of the aesthetic object signifies another moment of aesthetic perception, namely the moment of imagination. For Dufrenne, the imagination does not constitute the appearance of the aesthetic object for it is already constituted as such. Rather the imagination adheres to its own transcendental function and engenders the possibility of an appearance. It operates only at this very modest level. Yet still it is absolutely necessary as such for without it the aesthetic object would not appear. Understanding, for the most part, is absent from aesthetic perception for it is not required to restrain the imagination since the imagination is already restrained to the act of giving visage to the aesthetic object by the latter's pre-constitution as a spectacle for the spectator.

Further, according to Dufrenne, presence and imagination belong to aesthetic perception only to the extent that they adhere to the meaning of the aesthetic object. Presence adheres to this meaning without exception. But with the onset of the imagination, a rupture begins as perception distances itself from the object and potentially comes to know it from the outside, or as an exteriority. But in
aesthetic perception the imagination deploys itself only to the point at which this distancing does not arise. In other words, it deploys itself only in so far as it adheres to the aesthetic object. Thus it does not follow this upsurge by which perception comes to know objects in their exteriority. In adhering to the immanence of the object, the imagination gives way to feeling and in so doing aborts the rupture from presence. In this sense, feeling restores primacy to presence. More so, in returning to presence it specifies, first of all, a new type of meaning dislodged, a meaning which is not elucidated but rather read in its immediacy, and second, a new attitude on behalf of the subject or spectator. It is an attitude in which the spectator recognizes that this immediate grasping is nothing other than the meaning which he is and which he has been solicited to recognize as a response to the aesthetic object. Feeling thus adheres to the immanent meaning of the aesthetic object.

But more so, feeling is capable of articulating the depth of the aesthetic object. When we speak of depth in relation to the aesthetic object, we mean, according to Dufrenne, the inexhaustible plenitude of meaning which is realized in the spectator's recognition that aesthetic meaning is deposited in him and he is capable of responding to, and dwelling upon, it because it solicits what he already is. Now, to return briefly to the aesthetic object, what characterizes aesthetic meaning is its expressivity; it expresses a genuinely human content. The aesthetic object embodies this and as
such is identified as a quasi-subject. The essential characteristic of subjectivity is that it is irreducible to a thing because it expresses. Thus the spectator, because he is a subject, and the aesthetic object as a quasi-subject, are both inexhaustible. They admit of infinite depth. It is this depth to which feeling tends in reading the infinite wealth of meaning given in aesthetic perception.

Perhaps the most significant point to be emphasized in a consideration of aesthetic perception is its irreducibility to straightforward perception. Although aesthetic perception is essentially perception, it is distinguished from its straightforward counterpart on the grounds of, first, the adherence it assumes to the aesthetic object in feeling, and second, the notion of the world to which it adheres. Now there are several questions which could and should be raised in connection to both these points. To this end, we shall take a point of entry to the first similar to that we took in our brief critical examination of straightforward perception.

In considering straightforward perception, we saw that Dufrenne removes the understanding from constitutive activity. We questioned this on the grounds that to be present to things in the first place involves a decision, and we likened this decision to a primitive act of judgment by which the subject situates himself to this as opposed to that thing. In doing so, we raised the possibility of calling the pervading constitutiveness of the material a priori into question as well.
It is possible to raise a similar question in connection with the pre-constituted pregnancy of the aesthetic object. For Dufrenne, the understanding is repressed in aesthetic perception to the point of being absent because the aesthetic object does not demand us to know it and go beyond this knowing in action. The understanding thus has no place in constitutive activity. This is because of the demands made by the aesthetic object and also due to the claim that it is pre-constituted as a spectacle for the spectator. But we also saw that it is only when the spectator adheres to the aesthetic object that the authentic meaning of the aesthetic object is given. Now how is it that the spectator comes to adhere to the aesthetic object and accept its meaning on its own ground? Even though it is demanded of him by the object, the spectator may still abort it or his perception may not be adequate to give rise to the aesthetic attitude. For example, one may be aware of the meaning of the aesthetic object. But upon this realization, he may venture to make a profit from the painting by selling it or to adorn a room in his home with it. In these cases, he makes a decision to abort the aesthetic attitude and move beyond the simple givenness of the sensuous into a realm of concerns extraneous to it. Is it not the case that a spectator makes a decision in this case, however detrimental it may be to the required adherence to the aesthetic object's immanent world? Further, is it not the case that a decision is involved in situating oneself to adhere to the
aesthetic object in the first place before these extraneous concerns are entered? And could we not liken this to a primitive act of judgment?

This does not lessen Dufrenne's claim that aesthetic perception is essentially perception for this primitive act of judgment is at work in both modes. Nor does it lessen the claim that it is possible that we necessarily must adhere to the demands of the aesthetic object through feeling. It does, however, call into question his prescribed lack of constitutive activity on behalf of the subject in aesthetic perception. Dufrenne claims that the aesthetic object is so completely pre-constituted that it requires no such activity from the subject save adherence. But in admitting the necessity of adherence, Dufrenne must also admit the necessity of this primitive judgment. This admission lessens the pre-constitutiveness of the aesthetic object for it widens the scope of presence to the object to include such a judgment. Correlatively it calls into question the naivety which the body deploys. Although it is an intelligent naivety, for as Dufrenne says at one point the body's naive deployment is smarter than the understanding (cf PE 492), it must be motivated throughout its diverse acts by a primitive act of the understanding if we allow for this judgment. Dufrenne somewhat allows for this decision or primitive judgment. He claims that "I agree" to be who I am and seek the meaning which engenders depth to aesthetic perception (cf PE 501). But this agreement, as he understands it, is only put into play once our consubstantiality with the aesthetic object is affirmed.
It does not play any role in situating the subject, nor in the aesthetic object's constitution and for this reason it must be said that even though he acknowledges an agreement, this is not the thesis regarding a primitive judgment which is being advanced here and which must be taken seriously.

The second point of contention takes shape regarding the nature of the aesthetic object and its immanent world. If we can show that this primitive judgment is at work in the constitution of the aesthetic object then it is possible to show that the understanding or some degree of intellectual capacity is at work in the constitution of its immanent world. To begin we should recall the representation of the immanent world of the aesthetic object. The meaning of this world, according to Dufrenne, is not exhausted in representation. Rather it is an inexhaustible given which expresses a singular world. This world is not a mode of the world we straightforwardly encounter, but rather a world in its own right. Thus what actually manifests itself in our awareness of the painting is a process by which the expression
of representational aspects of the sensuous are transformed into a world\(^1\). Now the question arises: is this process the doing of the aesthetic object or is it the working of a primitive act of judgment?

Dufrenne, of course, would claim that it is the work of the aesthetic object. The expression immanent in the aesthetic object says everything; it does not point to anything outside itself in order to be completed. Thus in the very act of the artist's creation, the immanent world, according to Dufrenne, is pre-constituted. This much, we must say, refers to a process anterior to the spectator's awareness of the immanent world of the aesthetic object. The question remains given that we, following Dufrenne's lead\(^2\), must note that this process does not enter into the spectator's perception of the givenness of the sensuous. Could we not say that the meaning is made available to us as spectators by the working of the understanding functioning at a primitive level? To say this is to say that when we originally encounter the painting, our attention of the

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1 Even if it be remembered that a painting, as Dufrenne claims, does not represent or refer to anything which is real \textit{per se}, the immanent world must be presented on canvas for perception to enter. In Klee's \textit{Architecture} we find no resemblance between the figures on the canvas and anything 'objective'. Yet, even in his expression, which excludes reference to a real or objective state of affairs, we find the emergence of a world in the colours and shapes which are represented for perception to enter and live in.

2 Recall that Dufrenne claims that the events anterior to the feeling of the expression of the sensuous do not come into consideration in the spectator's awareness of the aesthetic object and its immanent world.
givenness of the sensuous is focused on the representation. We attune ourselves to the buildings, the figures and activity on the street, and of course the Tricolores in La Rue Montorgueil. What makes this possible is perception itself in its pregnancy. There is a mode of being present to the object which attunes itself to the meaning of the painting, and there is a presence by which the subject has, in the first place, something to which he attunes himself.

The reciprocity of these respective acts find their fulfillment in perception. Perception is always a 'going beyond' the subject's presence to things even if aesthetic perception initiates a movement by which perception, once it moves beyond its presence to representation, restores primacy to presence again. In returning to the meaning of presence, which Dufrenne identifies as the immanent world of the aesthetic object, perception treats it as that which is given; it does not treat it as that which stands before us only by virtue of belonging to a metaphysical category. Although it is unreal with respect to the world in which we constantly find ourselves, it still is. It is thus 'neutralized' with respect to its status of being, which is to say that it is not imparted with the stamp of modes of being; it is simply something which we encounter, something into which we live irrespective of claims to being it may have. And further it still is -- and this is something which does not

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1 c.f. Husserl, Ideas, pp. 311-12. (see also op. cit. 109-112).
contradict what Dufrenne has told us -- an object which is charged with the sense of affectivity for we cannot question its affective status, but rather, only its status as an entity which is according to a metaphysical category.

It is absolutely important to emphasize this notion of neutralization and make explicit its implications. In its originality the perceived content is encountered anterior to the affirmation of its status as being or non-being, real or unreal. It is, simply, qua encountered. As such, its meaning, irrespective of its metaphysical status, becomes a locus of further investigation, not only in terms of depth sought but also in terms of animating the given. Thus the painting in toto is held, as it were, before the glance of the spectator. The spectator is free in an unqualified sense to delve into the richness it expresses.

Now how does this primitive act of judgment and its constitutiveness of which Dufrenne refuses to acknowledge fit into this consideration of the aesthetic object's immanent world? In the actual adhering to the immanent world, the aesthetic imagination gives rise to a representation into the originary presence of which feeling will dwell. The primitive act of judgment involved in situating oneself to the immanence of the sensuous recognizes the latter as detached, but not in terms of proximity to presence; rather it is detached from, and in no way resembles a lesser image of, the world of straightforward concerns. It thus pre-thetically affirms the
immanent world of the aesthetic object not merely as detached or neutralized, but rather as this singular world of festivity, or innocence, or comedy, etc., etc.. Thus the act of pre-thetic judgment is not dissociating as Dufrenne would claim, but rather it is adherent. It lends perception to the given qua given in the most precise sense. Further, due to the depth which feeling seeks and the reflexive communion by which it seeks depth, there is an inexhaustible number of pre-thetic affirmations or judgments, all of which enrich the original intuitive grasping of the sensuuous as, say, festive.

This pre-thetic judgment must be included in aesthetic feeling and in the constitution of the singular immanent world which feeling grasps. It specifies the movements of perception not only in originally arresting the immanent world but also as the gaze moves about and feels its increasingly profound manners of expression. At each level of depth there is the same adherent awareness and situatedness to this awareness assumed by the spectator. There is not a question here of reducing the spectator to a cogito for the subject in his concreteness still assumes priority. The inclusion of this primitive judgment, rather, attests to the concentricity of acts of the subject in his concreteness. And more so, it attests to the claim that the original transcendental function of opening up the world of the aesthetic object is not the workings of the object exclusively but rather
it is the workings of the spectator for prior to the object being opened up, it must be first arrested and affirmed as possible.
PART THREE: CRITIQUE

§ 38: Introduction

In the previous chapters I have presented Mikel Dufrenne's descriptions of aesthetic perception. It was seen that although aesthetic perception stems from the self-same pre-reflective immediacy to the world as straightforward perception, it differs on several scores. The first consists in the actual deployment of subjectivity in perception. For Dufrenne, straightforward perception consists in concentric moments of presence, representation, and understanding. These three moments realize the meaning of an object as such. Once the meaning is discovered and registered as the object presents itself to the perceiving subject, some use can be made of it. The subject uses meaning in reflection or deploys it in action and thereby transcends the primitive level of simple awareness. Aesthetic perception, on the other hand, consists in presence, a minimal amount of representation and understanding, and feeling. Further, it does not transcend the primitive level of simple awareness of the aesthetic object into action. Nor is it's goal an explicit understanding of the aesthetic object. It thus adheres to the object in feeling, or to say the same thing, aesthetic contemplation.

The second point of difference is correlative to the first and consists in the respective natures of the straightforwardly perceived
object and the aesthetic object. The former, according to Dufrenne, is signifying. This is to say that the object of straightforward perception points beyond itself to other meanings or possible uses in action; it signifies these meanings. The aesthetic object, on the contrary, is essentially expressive. It does not point beyond itself; it does not signify meaning. Rather it externalizes a meaning which is immanent to itself. It expresses this meaning, or to be more precise it is this meaning. This is to say that this meaning which Dufrenne identifies as a world has no referent beyond the aesthetic object itself; or rather, its referent is its own immanence.

It is the purpose of this part of the thesis to critically evaluate Dufrenne's position regarding the perception of the aesthetic object and the feeling of its immanent world. The problematic to which I am specifically addressing myself arises from the insistence Dufrenne places on the material and cosmological a priori deployed in aesthetic perception. These a priori, according to Dufrenne, are both existential or subjective, and cosmological or objective. It must be noted, however, that the stuff or matter of the aesthetic object seduces the subject and connives with the subjective moments of perception. It thus exerts an 'objective performance' and must assume a primacy in relation to the subject. I will claim that this insistence on the objective, material a priori of aesthetic perception will not make explicit a fundamentally original content, namely, the subject's acts of appropriation to a content. In other words, I will
show that there is a fundamental stream of acts by which the meaning of the aesthetic object is realized in the very first place. From a different perspective, I will show that Dufrenne's descriptions fall short of showing how a subjective contribution to aesthetic perception actively structures the feeling which is so immanent in, and peculiar to, aesthetic experience. This needs to be shown because by attributing a primacy to the objective or material structure of the aesthetic object, Dufrenne does not make fully explicit the meaning deployed in aesthetic perception. To attribute its origins, its being, and the use that we make of it as spectators, to an a priori which is manifested or given in the immediate familiarity and consubstantiality we have with it is to neglect the subjective appropriation to familiarity and consubstantiality itself.

My specific contention is that there is a wealth of aesthetic meaning immanent in the subjective acts deployed by the genuine aesthetic spectator living into the aesthetic object. These meanings must be included in a phenomenology of aesthetic perception. If not then two untenable positions may occur. On one hand, the subject matter of aesthetic perception would become exclusively 'object oriented'. Even if attention is paid to the spectator's living into the aesthetic object, the subjective life of the spectator itself becomes objectified because it is viewed 'from the outside' as an object. Dufrenne, I think, is not guilty of this. Dufrenne identifies them but does not recognize the role that they play in the genesis of meaning,
even at the simplest level. He merely recognizes the immediate familiarity that the spectator has with the aesthetic object. But I think the subjective acts of consciousness should not be subordinated to, nor exhausted in, immediate familiarity, as Dufrenne would have it, such that the a priori has validity for the spectator in knowing immediacy to an already ordered and structured object and its immanent world (which itself is ordered and structured, what he refers to as un monde déjà amenagé).
§ 39: The problematic

The first step along the way to providing concrete criticism is to identify the problematic in detail. In previous sections the problematica has been all too briefly dwelled upon. It would be useful to once again recall and frame Dufrenne's position at the point at which my contention arises, namely his refusal to allow for the subject's specific acts of appropriation, acts of the understanding, the acts of judgment, and the temporalizing acts of protention and retention in aesthetic perception.

In order to re-frame Dufrenne's notion of aesthetic perception, it would be useful to note its lack of constitutive moments in juxtaposition with those of straightforward perception. This demarcation, in congruence with Dufrenne, has been emphasized throughout this thesis. For Dufrenne, aesthetic perception is identified according to the adherence it assumes to the immanent world of the aesthetic object. This world is adhered to in feeling. Feeling, in Dufrenne's schema, is the moment of aesthetic perception which realizes the aesthetic object, in a manner which the act or contribution of the understanding in straightforward perception cannot. We must ask, however, to what extent feeling

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1 Previously in §§ 17; 18; 20; and 27.
accomplishes what the acts of the understanding cannot. In order to address this question, we should recall these acts.

Dufrenne claims that the understanding performs two essential functions. On the one hand the understanding is responsible for restricting the empirical imagination's acts of providing possible visages to presence. In giving a visage to presence, the imagination produces but one of a multiplicity of possible appearances. The understanding restricts the imagination such that presence is represented in strict accordance to the modalities of its givenness. This function of the understanding is necessary according to Dufrenne because the imagination has an inherent propensity to roam from the modalities of givenness and therefore must constantly be held in check (PE 462).

The second function of the understanding is the judgement. Once the imagination imparts the richness of appearance to the exteriority of presence in re-presentation, the understanding thinks the nature of the appearance by invoking categorical activity. The understanding effects this by subsuming the particularity of the given appearance under a category with the 'stamp of necessity' as Dufrenne says.

Dufrenne indentifies the essential character by which the understanding deploys itself as a rupture from presence. By thinking presence in general terms, the understanding operates in a specialized sphere. It immediately and spontaneously deploys the
data of presence and therefore still belongs to perception proper. But as Dufrenne tells us, the immediate bond between self and world is loosened (PE 462-3) as the specificity of presence is surpassed in the generality of thought. At this logical moment of perception, then, the actual content of perception itself is 'thought-about-X' whereas in the primitivity of presence anterior to the acts of the understanding, content is not thought but encountered. Thus, this content is nourished by presence re-presented in its singularity but it assumes the identity of 'I think' or 'I am positing' as opposed to the 'I am encountering' which prevails in presence.

Now Dufrenne claims that an authentic encounter with the aesthetic object does not make use of the understanding and the rupture from presence that it entails. And it is precisely this lack of rupture which defines aesthetic experience. The aesthetic object has validity for us as spectators only in our adherence to it in its immediacy. Thus, since the understanding loosens the bond of the immediate encounter between subject and object, it is essentially absent in aesthetic perception.

The reason for Dufrenne's limitation of the understanding in aesthetic perception is due to the peculiar character of the aesthetic object. The aesthetic object, according to Dufrenne, places certain demands on us as spectators. The most significant of these, in this specific context, is that it demands our adherence to its presence such that we dwell on this presence in feeling rather than in
thought. But in order for its presence to be felt in the very first place, that is in the absence of understanding, it must, he says, be pre-established as a spectacle. Whereas objects of straightforward perception require an active imagination and understanding in order to be constituted as such, the aesthetic object does not. A painting, for example, is already constituted as a spectacle in the very act in which the painter gives it to a canvas. This presence, which is simply 'there for the spectator', is the condition for feeling. Each and every act of the understanding which may come into play on the aesthetic object, therefore, will not adhere to the richness that it already has for us prior to the rupture from presence engendered by the understanding. At best, Dufrenne says it will reduce the aesthetic object to an intellectual object, that is one appropriated through thought rather than adherence to the perceived. The aesthetic object will as such lose the intimacy by which it asserts itself\(^1\) most originally and authentically. For this reason, Dufrenne claims that the understanding is absent from our appropriation to the aesthetic object.

If the understanding is said to be absent in our appropriation to the aesthetic object, it is all the more so absent in the constitution of

\(^1\) It is legitimate to use the notion of self-assertion when referring to this object due to its privileged status as a 'quasi-subject'. Dufrenne identifies the aesthetic object, like the subject, by its expression. In turn, its expression must by considered its self-assertion or its self-affirmation.
the pre-structured and pre-ordered spectacle in which the aesthetic object consists. It should be recalled that the understanding does play a role in the constitution of a straightforwardly perceived object for Dufrenne. Its 'correcting function' by which the imagination and its 'representing function' is held in check serves to define the parameters in which presence is given a visage in re-presentation. This is to say, according to Dufrenne, that the understanding provides and secures the unity of appearances with an intelligible nature. Thus, in restricting the acts of the imagination, the understanding plays a role in the constitution of the object, i.e., the understanding makes the object's consubstantiality amenable to thought. It is already ordered and structured for a spectator as a representation without any contribution on behalf of the understanding due to its very nature.

In an earlier chapter\(^1\) the question was raised concerning the spectator's adherence to the immanent world of the aesthetic object and whether or not he makes a decision, however implicitly, to assume the aesthetic attitude. We should raise it again: how is it that the spectator comes to assume the aesthetic attitude and accept the meaning of the aesthetic object on its own ground? And we suggested that this adherence was due to a judgment, however implicit and primitive. The spectator must enact and deploy a

\(^1\) c.f. Chapter V, § 37.
judgment which makes use of the meaning of the aesthetic object in order to accept and adhere to it rather than think it in terms of categorical logical necessity, thus removing himself from presence into the realm of thought. In order to deploy this primitive judgment the spectator must be motivated to accept the meaning of the aesthetic object. In order to be motivated to accept the meaning of the aesthetic object, then, the spectator must be interested in and attentive to it. The spectator then appropriates himself to the immanent meaning of the aesthetic object in order to accept its meaning prior to any reflection in the first place. He must, therefore, have a fundamental and primitive grasp or understanding of this meaning, one which founds and motivates further and deeper considerations, or in Dufrenne's terms, feeling.

Now Dufrenne would identify this fundamental grasp as the encounter or presence to the aesthetic object. My contention is that there must be a wholly originary and thus primitive act of judgment which not only accompanies this presence, as Dufrenne would have it, but more so anticipates this presence and renders it receptive in the very first place. This act by which the spectator turns toward and receives the meaning of the aesthetic object must be identified and made explicit. And further, it must be emphasized that this primitive act immanent in presence contains the understanding, the judgment, and is responsible for motivating and constituting the meaning of the aesthetic object as such.
This contention can be cast in a slightly different light. Dufrenne claims that the immanent world of the aesthetic object is immediately felt and known as such. But he never addresses himself to the question how this is so beyond the point at which I am a subject -- present to the object with all my past -- who is solicited and seduced by the content of the aesthetic object. All he can say is that the aesthetic object and the subject which I am connive with each other; the meaning I feel is a Minkowskian reverberation by which I, in my concreteness, resonate with the singular manifestation of the aesthetic object's immanent world. For example in La Rue Montorgueil, I feel its festivity. The painting, Dufrenne would say deposits its meaning in me and I respond by recognizing the festivity which solicits, seduces me and resonates within by body.

But as phenomenologists, we still have more work to do. We must ask how this resonance is nourished by the meaning in La Rue Montorgueil for it is not enough to simply have this world and dwell on it intensionally as Dufrenne prescribes. To have this world in the first place requires our turning toward it; it requires our interest in it and our active appropriation and anticipation of it. As phenomenologists we must explicate the sense of turning toward the meaning of the aesthetic object, of our interest in it, of our active appropriation and anticipation of it. As phenomenologists we must, rather than focusing on a world as such, focus on our perceptual experience as that which presents the world of La Rue Montorgueil.
To repeat, in contradistinction to Dufrenne's approach, we must "focus upon the experience as it presents the world rather than the world it presents". This alteration of emphasis is a subtle shift in method. But it is necessary in order to make explicit the meaning in our perception of La Rue Montorgueil in its radical originality. If we do not follow this shift in method, then we remain as subjects encountering the aesthetic object and neglect the objectivity of that painting precisely to the extent that objects, the aesthetic object included, are only objects by virtue of a subject taking note and being aware of them.

For the remainder of this thesis I will show how Dufrenne does not employ the phenomenological method in a radical fashion. Further, it is due to this that he misses a wealth of evidence which belongs in the consideration of aesthetic perception. To provide evidence for my assertion, I shall initially give some precision to Dufrenne's understanding of phenomenology as a working method. From this point, I shall go on to show, firstly, that his text does not make use of radical phenomenological method, and secondly, how the use of such a method will elucidate increasing depths of aesthetic meaning.

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CHAPTER VI: DUFRENNE'S EMPLOYMENT OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD

§ 40: Preamble: explicit and non-explicit influences

It is impossible to discuss Dufrenne's employment of the phenomenological method without noting influences which creep into his thinking, some of which are noted in detail and others which are not. George Seidel identifies a passage of thinking from Kant to Hegel, through Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger, to Sartre and Merleau-Ponty upon which Dufrenne draws¹. We could complicate this framework by noting the influences and philosophic ancestors with which Kant was working. Eugene Kaelin mentions that Dufrenne makes use of several thinkers not involved in the phenomenological tradition and incorporates their thought into his own alongside his phenomenological influences². This complicates an attempt to isolate a specifically phenomenological method. Dufrenne himself indicates that he is not leaving the reader an


exhaustive list of references\textsuperscript{1} such that the reader may examine texts from the direction in which he attacks a problem.

It would be an exhausting task to note the influence that traditional empirical and rationalism had on Kant and how his dealings with them influenced the movement of phenomenology up to Dufrenne. It would be exhausting to show the influence of non-phenomenologists on phenomenologists and how phenomenologists differ in appropriating or disavowing non-phenomenological theses\textsuperscript{2}. And it would be equally exhausting to track down the friends, painters, novelists, philosophers and musicians with whom Dufrenne has spoken in order to show their influence. There seems to be a great deal of thought within Dufrenne's text which could be attributed to some source yet which is not mentioned by Dufrenne.

And this brings us to the relationship between Dufrenne and Merleau-Ponty. There is no doubt that the major influence on Dufrenne is Merleau-Ponty, be this influence overt or covert, be it

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} To preface his bibliography, Dufrenne writes "We are not (Il ne saurait être question de) presenting here an exhaustive or systematic bibliography bearing on the problem of aesthetic experience... Unfortunately we cannot name our friends -- philosophers, novelists, painters, and musicians -- with whom we have had discussions as clarifying and stimulating as anything that we have read...Yet we can at least mention the principal works which have inspired us" (PE 679).
\item \textsuperscript{2} For example, Heidegger seems to disavow science whereas Merleau-Ponty attacks science on its own ground, using its own vocabulary.
\end{itemize}
referenced or non-referenced\(^1\). Some of these points revolve around matters specifically aesthetic\(^2\), while others are rooted in problems of methodology, epistemology and ontology. I am primarily interested in exposing two points. First, I am interested in exposing Merleau-Ponty’s influence on Dufrenne concerning the simple awareness of the world, and second how Dufrenne, as a phenomenologist, explicates the content of his awareness.

Both of these points touch upon method. Inevitably the choice and employment of method quickly yield a certain type of ontological and epistemic findings while it excludes others. Rather than delving into extensions of these, it is best to arrest the ontological and the epistemic at a primitive level, i.e. as they are immediately opened up by the deployment of a certain method. Again, it is not necessary to provide a synoptic description of the world, its regions, and the points at which Dufrenne and Merleau-Ponty converge. For my purposes it is enough to show Merleau-Ponty’s influence on Dufrenne in matters where Husserl, had his emphasis on the subjective acts of the subject been recognized, would have provided an alternative.

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1 Kaelin is critical of Dufrenne for not properly citing his references to Merleau-Ponty (c.f. op. cit., pp. 371-2).

2 Kaelin mentions four points of relevance: i) the notion of the form of the aesthetic object as a concrete structure; ii) the unity of the aesthetic object as realized in a sympathetic meaning-intending gaze; iii) the notion of the truth of the aesthetic object as 'original expression'; and iv) he claims that Dufrenne borrows the notion of sense and non-sense and raises it to the levels of reality and being. (Ibid.)
§ 41: **Dufrenne's stated intent: Phenomenology as the study of lived encounter**

In the opening passages to the *Phénoménologie* (PE 4-5), Dufrenne provides us with brief yet telling indications of the phenomenological method he employs. They are telling because these indications mark the course for his entire work and his subsequent descriptions of perception. It is in these remarks that we find the germs of the reason why Dufrenne does not follow a radical phenomenological program: he wants to avoid Husserl's emphasis on the constituting nature of consciousness and its contributions to perception. It would be worthwhile to make these points more explicit in order to make clear Dufrenne's phenomenological orientation.

To begin with, Dufrenne tells us that aesthetic experience can and should be identified and studied as such only in correlation to the aesthetic object. Conversely, the aesthetic object may only be indentified and studied as such in correlation to aesthetic experience (PE 4). Thus, his method is 'circular' as he says (PE 4) or reflexive. The focus of inquiry is the correlation of subject to object, and object to subject. He then goes on to say that this "same circle is found in phenomenology, which makes use of it in defining intentionality and in describing the interdependence of noeses and noema" (PE 4). Right at this point, Dufrenne offers a footnote which is invaluable for
our criticism. However, I shall hold off dealing with this footnote until I have commented on his identification of phenomenology as a reflexive or circular inquiry.

It is clear that Dufrenne makes use of a reflexive method in identifying the subject as a subject correlative to an object and the object as an object correlative to a subject as the phenomenon of inquiry. Due to the pact or accord which Dufrenne identifies between subject and object, the two participate in an ongoing reflexivity which reverberates with meaning. This meaning, for Dufrenne, is not exclusively the result of the being of the object, nor a constitutive act performed by consciousness. Meaning, rather, is already given in the subject-object ensemble and need only be discovered by phenomenological reflection. The subject encounters the meaning of the perceived object only because he prepares for the object from within his own depths, and the object is offered to him as an exteriority, an opacity. The subject, for Dufrenne, 'prepares for the object from within his own depths', simply by being awake to the world in its diverse moments of givenness. The world and its objects are the constant background upon which our experience occurs. It is, further, 'already-there' complete in its historical, cultural and practical horizons.

To be sure, Dufrenne's remarks in this case are phenomenological. They identify a program devised to study the lived straightforward encounter of the world and the objects which can be
found in these various horizons. This emphasis on the lived straightforward encounter with the object is in accord with the starting point for all phenomenologies. And it is precisely due to Dufrenne's emphasis upon both subject and object, and upon the intentionality by which the object is lived by the subject, that his statement of intent belongs within the confines of phenomenological method. Thus there can be nothing objectionable to Dufrenne's general idea of phenomenology associated with this quote. But, as we will immediately see as soon as we provide exposition of his delineations of this method, Dufrenne does not remain at this general level. It is necessary, therefore, to further explicate his conception of phenomenology as a working method in order to first of all, outline his specific interpretation of this method, and second to show how the specific application of this method can be augmented with a more radical employment.
§ 42: Dufrenne's 'acclimation' of Phenomenology

It is with the next remark that we see some specificity in Dufrenne's phenomenological orientation and also a first glimpse of Merleau-Ponty's influence. Although lengthy, this footnote already referred to in the previous section, is worth citing at length while making the sense of the claim explicit.

"It will be seen that we are not striving to follow Husserl to the letter. We understand phenomenology in the sense in which Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have acclimated this term in France; a description which aims at an essence, itself defined as a meaning immanent in the phenomenon and given with it. The essence is something to be discovered, but by way of an unveiling, not a leap from the known to the unknown. Phenomenology applies primarily to the human because consciousness is consciousness of self; in this we have the model of the phenomenon: appearing as the appearing of meaning to itself. Not until the end of this work shall we consider the use of this term in Hegelian metaphysics, in which the phenomenon is an adventure of being reflecting upon itself whereby essence is surpassed in the concept" (PE 4-5).

Now the first two sentences of this passage require substantial explication. Dufrenne claims that he understands phenomenology in the sense in which Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have taken over the
term from Husserl. But how are we to understand this? Although Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have radically different projects, they both take Husserl, each in their own way, as their starting point. For both Sartre\(^1\) and Merleau-Ponty\(^2\), in congruence with Husserl, the life of the subject and the being of the object are given in each an every act of perception. This perhaps is too general a similarity to dwell upon for it is nothing other than the fundamental arena of consideration with which all phenomenologists concern themselves.

More to the point, however, is a specific criticism directed against Husserl by both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty which revolves around his treatment and emphasis on the primacy of subjectivity and the immanence of consciousness. Although Sartre and Merleau-Ponty both cast this criticism in vivid terms, I am going to dwell upon the

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\(^{2}\) It must be noted that due to Merleau-Ponty's opposition to the Cartesian *cogito* as an entry into phenomenology and also as an accurate description of the subject living into the world (c.f. PP pp. 423-6), these initial apparent similarities must ultimately be read as discrepancies.
latter for several reasons\textsuperscript{1}. First, we have already seen Dufrenne's discrepancies with Sartre concerning the imagination and its relation to perceptual consciousness\textsuperscript{2}. It is best not to align Dufrenne with a thinker with whom he shares only general similarities given the strictures of phenomenological method, and a general distaste for Husserl's alleged idealism. On the other hand, and this is my second point, Dufrenne is greatly influenced by Merleau-Ponty and is much closer to him than Sartre because he adopts his anti-Cartesian starting point and also a shared emphasis on the lived-body\textsuperscript{3}. His

\textsuperscript{1} Although I am going to avoid commenting on Sartre's critique it is worth citing a passage which provides the general flavour of these two thinkers' criticism of Husserl. Sartre writes:

"We have in Husserl... a gradual elucidation and a remarkable description of the essential structures of consciousness... but never the posing of the ontological problem, namely that of the being of consciousness... in the same manner the problem of the being of the world remains in suspense... We never return from the phenomenological epoché to the world".


\textsuperscript{2} Recall earlier in the thesis at § 15.

reaction to Husserl, then, is all the more an extension of Merleau-Ponty's acclimation of Husserl's phenomenology in France.
§ 43:  **Method**

The first point to be mentioned regards method. "Merleau-Ponty, unlike Husserl, is not one to start from scratch"¹. Whereas Husserl devises a means of proceeding in the attempt to avoid presupposition by attending 'to the things themselves'², Merleau-Ponty situates himself in the midst of a problem and exposes the prejudices, presuppositions and shortcomings of what he considers to be two polar antagonists to phenomenological thinking, classical empiricism and intellectualism. He only minimally employs what could be called a resemblance to Husserl's reduction³, and then only for the purposes of thematizing the phenomena which ground the

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² Husserl refers to this method as the 'reduction' and attempts to isolate the invariant structures of objects of consciousness. At times he refers to the eidetic reduction (c.f. *Phenomenological Psychology: Lectures, Summer Semester 1925*, trans, J. Scanlon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977) § 9); at other times he refers to the phenomenological reduction (c.f. *Ideas* §§ 31-33) or the transcendental reduction (c.f. *Crisis*, §§ 35-55).

³ Theodore F. Geraets, *Vers une nouvelle philosophie transcendantale: La genèse de la philosophie de Maurice Merleau-Ponty jusqu'à la Phénoménologie de la perception* (La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971) p. 169. "La réduction phénoménologique, pour Merleau-Ponty, c'est 'la réduction de l'idée de monde' (PP 66), la remise en question de la pensée objective (c.f. PP 60) et nous savons que cette pensée est, pour lui, celle d'une phénoménologie transcendantale entendue comme passage du naturel au naturant".
problematic at hand\textsuperscript{1}. He thus is not faced with attempting to devise a system (nor would he attempt to do so\textsuperscript{2}). Instead, he attends to the things themselves by showing how the theses of empiricism and intellectualism stray from them and by re-directing his phenomenological glance 'back' toward the proper subject matter, lived experience itself\textsuperscript{3}. The redirection of his glance is not as well defined as Husserl's. It is not engaged because Merleau-Ponty feels it is incomplete; it can never capture the richness of our being-in-the-world without illegitimately 'reducing' it to a conscious content. He writes that "the most important lesson that the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction" (PP viii).

Dufрене repeats these words exactly\textsuperscript{4}. With this simple rejection of the end of Husserl's transcendental method, Dufрене rejects the content of Husserl's 'transcendental turn' via the conscious act in a manner which has already been done by Merleau-Ponty. Like

\textsuperscript{1} C.f. Ibid., p. 160 p. 162. Ultimately, this problematic can be traced to a transcendental root, the original experience of the life-world itself (c.f. Ibid., p 161; PP pp. 418-9).


\textsuperscript{3} It is in the later thought of Merleau-Ponty that we find the beginnings of a concerted attempt to explicate a theory of reflection. This reflection would "take itself and the changes it introduces into the spectacle into account. It accordingly would not lose sight of the brute thing and the brute perception" (Le visible et l'invisible, p. 61).

\textsuperscript{4} Dufрене, "Intentionnalité et esthétique", p. 54.
Merleau-Ponty, Dufrenne feels that the distance and absence to the things entailed by the reduction does not engage the philosopher with the things themselves, but rather with the idea of these things. He feels it is illegitimate to treat the corporeity of the world as an idea. Phenomenological method, he contends, must make use of the corporeity of the world and the subject's in it.

To this end Dufrenne attempts to capture the essence of the subject's presence to the world, be it the unthematized Lebenswelt of straightforward experience, or the specificity of an immanent world of an aesthetic object. This presence in either case, as we have seen, is a bodily presence. And phenomenology, for Dufrenne, must describe it as being co-determined by the world in its corporeity. At this point precision must be given to the notion of the world in which the subject lives as found in Husserl, yet acclimated by Merleau-Ponty and eventually by Dufrenne.
§ 44: Merleau-Ponty's adaptation of Husserl's emphasis on the Lebenswelt and the subjects appropriation to it.

Despite his rejection of Husserlian phenomenological method, Merleau-Ponty draws inspiration from the findings of Husserl, particularly the Husserl of the post-Formal and Transcendental Logic period of 1929-38. This statement should not be made without qualification. Even though he is closest to the Husserl of this latter period\(^1\), Merleau-Ponty still has reservations because he feels that Husserl still maintains some of his earlier prejudices, most notably the emphasis upon the constitutive nature of a transcendental consciousness (PP 73 and note). Merleau-Ponty adopts the last phase of Husserl's career and criticism of this position that Merleau-Ponty develops his own thought.

The last phase of Husserl's career stresses the primacy of the Lebenswelt as the ground and object of phenomenological endeavour more than any other stage in his career. The Lebenswelt, for Husserl, does not consist exclusively in the objects of science, the objects of mathematics, the objects of politics, or even the objects of

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\(^1\) Merleau-Ponty indentifies three stages of Husserl's career, the first being the period of "eidetic method or logicism" (PP 281 n. 1), the second being the period of the Ideas (PP 281 n. 1), and the third being Husserl's 'existentialist' period (c.f. PP 317 n. 1) with an emphasis on the Lebenswelt. Of this later period, he writes that "Husserl in his last period concedes that all reflection should in the first place return to the world of living experience (Lebenswelt) ... Husserl's thought moves increasingly in this second direction, despite many throwbacks to the logicist period" (PP 419).
philosophy. Correlatively, it is not the attitudes scientists, mathematicians, politicians and philosophers assume in taking up their various endeavours. Rather, the Lebenswelt grounds the natural attitude, that is the simple awareness of the world and the unreflective attitude we assume in this awareness as we most originally encounter the world. This attitude, he writes "Can be characterized as a life naively, straightforwardly directed at the world, the world being always in a certain sense consciously present as a universal horizon. without however, being thematic as such". The phenomenological study of the Lebenswelt, then, must evolve in making explicit the meanings we straightforwardly and unreflectively live as we originally and pre-predicatively encounter the world.

Merleau-Ponty takes Husserl’s emphasis on the Lebenswelt as his point of entry into phenomenology. For Merleau-Ponty, it is the phenomenologically indubitable datum. Like Husserl, Merleau-Ponty claims that it is the task of phenomenology to understand how this world is accessible to, and lived by, a human subject (PP passim). And also like Husserl, he finds that it is given to a subject

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3 Husserl, The Crisis of European Science, p. 144.
living into it, simply and straightforwardly. There is a world. The world and I exist together. I find myself living into it. And far from having constructed it (PP iv), I find it already-there and very much inhabitable (PP i). My original act of living into the world is one of nascent, primitive awareness. But rather than accepting Husserl’s emphasis on the purely conscious aspect of this act, Merleau-Ponty claims that this original act of living into the world is perceptual¹ (PP pp.iv-v). Thus the world in all its complexities and nuances, that is, its historical, social, cultural and scientific horizons have the subject’s simple perceptual awareness of the Lebenswelt as its ground.

Already at this point of similarity there is a point of dissimilarity to be noted. Merleau-Ponty claims that the original movement of our simple awareness is defined as perception, and in so doing, parts company with Husserl. Paul Ricoeur writes that from the works preceding and including his Logical Investigations of 1900 - 1901 until the Cartesian Meditations of 1929, Husserl "does not define

¹ See also his address to the Société française de philosophie from 1946 in which he claims that "the perceived world is he always presupposed foundation of all rationality, all value and all existance". "The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences" trans. J. Edie in The Primacy of Perception (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964) pp. 12-42. p. 13. It should be stressed, as M.C. Dillon does, that the thesis "of the primacy of perception and its correlate, the ontological thesis of the primacy of phenomena, are two central tenets in Merleau-Ponty's thought which support and inform the entire structure of his ontology". M.C. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty's Ontology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988) p.51.
consciousness by perception." Perception is not recognized by its "presence to things but its absence and its distance\(^1\) from them. It is only in the last ten years of his life, Ricoeur continues, the perception becomes the "genetic origin of all operations of consciousness\(^2\). Now even though it could be said that Husserl's phenomenology undergoes a change when he makes explicit the primacy of the Lebenswelt\(^3\), we have seen that Merleau-Ponty nonetheless feels that Husserl operates according to his 'earlier prejudices' in which consciousness is attributed primacy at the expense of a movement of simple awareness which grasps the reality of the Lebenswelt in its full-blown corporeity. Thus Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on the primacy of the Lebenswelt must be recognized as embodying a different correlate thesis, namely the primacy of perception as opposed to Husserl's emphasis on the conscious act.

The shared emphasis on the primacy of the Lebenswelt and the discrepancy regarding the subject's original awareness of it gives way to another discrepancy. Merleau-Ponty parts company with Husserl to a greater extent when considering the being of both the

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2  Ibid.

3  Ricoeur identifies this as the passage from a transcendental to an existential phenomenology (Ibid).
subject and the world into which he lives. Both agree that the Lebenswelt is not only the ground upon which all human activities take place, but also from which all idealizations, objectifications, generalizations and formalizations take root\(^1\). It has a certain content or matter which is irreducible to these 'second order expressions' which it founds. Now although Merleau-Ponty embraces Husserl's endeavour to explicate the contents of lived-experience as the subject lives straightforwardly into the Lebenswelt, he objects to the status Husserl attributes to both the subject and the world.

Merleau-Ponty claims that Husserl's earlier methodological bracketing of metaphysical claims\(^2\) such as those regarding the validity of our straightforward experience\(^3\), the mathematico-scientific world\(^4\), and even the Lebenswelt itself\(^5\) do not do justice to the very givenness of being-in-the-world. More so, these methodological procedures deal with the Lebenswelt as though it

\(^1\) We have already seen this for Merleau-Ponty. For Husserl see *The Crisis of European Sciences* § 9h.

\(^2\) Husserl brackets metaphysical claims in an attempt to avoid a particular interpretation of the world (c.f. *Ideas* § 32).

\(^3\) Husserl, *Ideas*, pp. 110-11.

\(^4\) Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences* § 35.

\(^5\) Ibid., § 44.
were wholly immanent in consciousness. Thus in an obvious reaction to Husserl's endorsement of Saint Augustine's claim "do not wish to go out; go back into yourself. Truth dwells in the inner man"\(^1\), Merleau-Ponty writes:

"Truth does not 'inhabit' only 'the inner man', or more accurately, there is no inner man, man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself. When I return to myself from an excursion into the realm of dogmatic common sense or of science, I find, not a source of intrinsic truth, but a subject destined to the world." (PP v.)

Merleau-Ponty claims, contra Husserl, that it is not 'I' as an inner man, the constituting ego outlined in *Cartesian Meditations* and at work throughout Husserl's phenomenology\(^2\), that defines the living subject. Rather, the 'I' must be defined by its vital corporeity which cannot be reduced to an interiority or conscious capacity. It is the 'I' in its corporeity which makes the world appear as a world of things, men, colours and sounds, culture, science and history. As such, it is a corporeal 'I', an embodied consciousness which inhabits the world; the world is not constituted by an intellectual,

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\(^1\) Cited in *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 157.

\(^2\) We can find references to Merleau-Ponty's claim that Husserl's 'earlier prejudices' haunted the writings of the last period of his career. He refers to self-evidence in the language of the subjective life of consciousness and its acts. Self-evidence can only be found within the indubitable, sphere of evidence, the *soma cogitans*, the *ego cogito-cogitata qua cogitata*, c.f. *Crisis*, p. 77.
purely conscious subject. More so, the embodied subject defines the transcendental nature of subjectivity whereas a purely conceived consciousness does not because on Merleau-Ponty's hypothesis, perception is the original appropriation to the world for it intends the world in its original intimacy. As such the Lebenswelt is transcendent to consciousness and it is corporeal. Its things, its various horizons, its ambiguities and opacities, and the status it assumes as the living subject intends it, become the authentic transcendental field (c.f. PP 418-9).

Thus we should note what is perhaps the major discrepancy between Merleau-Ponty and Husserl regarding the status of the Lebenswelt and the subjects which live into it. Although Merleau-Ponty feels that Husserl’s inquiry is centred around the proper subject matter, i.e. the subject's being-in-the-world, he also feels that Husserl offers a one-sided treatment. It neglects the world as exterior to the subject. Merleau-Ponty is claiming that, to be sure, there is a certain subjective appropriation to the world. But to treat this appropriation or this relation between subject and world as being rooted in subjectivity, specifically as Husserl claims in the Cartesian Meditations, the ego-cogito-cogitatum structure\(^1\), is not to pay proper regard to the very givenness of the world, the world in its transcendence to consciousness.

\(^1\) Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 33.
Thus Merleau-Ponty feels that Husserl does not capture the proper identity of the living subject, the world into which the subject most originally lives, and the organic lived-relation between subject and world, however good his intentions may have been. Husserl, according to this interpretation, establishes a distance between the subject and the world. By recognizing primacy in the immanent nature of the conscious subject as opposed to an embodied worldly nature, Merleau-Ponty feels that Husserl is recognizing a subject which is apart from, outside, and other than, the corporeity of the Lebenswelt. Husserl thus illegitimately defines the immediate experience of it according to categories and modalities of thought.

For Merleau-Ponty, the transcendental nature of subjectivity is not defined by consciousness operating at a distance from the Lebenswelt. Rather, it is the incarnate subject's immersion in the corporeity of the world prior to the upsurge of intellectual acts. The subject, then, is not as Husserl would have it, representative of a 'hole' in the being of the world. Rather, for Merleau-Ponty the subject is immersed in the self-same corporeity as the world itself. And far from being a hole or lacuna in the being of the world, Merleau-Ponty claims that the subject is a 'fold' which, although distinguishable from things in the world, cannot be defined nor identified apart from the world itself (PP 215). Phenomenological thought or phenomenological description must be borne from our being-in-the-
world, which is simultaneously our inheritance of the world and all its meaning\(^1\).

Ultimately, these discrepancies give rise to the following. The \textit{Lebenswelt} Husserl describes simply cannot be identified with Merleau-Ponty's \textit{monde vécu}. The things, people, culture and history of Husserl's \textit{Lebenswelt} are not originally discovered (nor are they discoverable), according to Merleau-Ponty, by examining consciousness and reducing these phenomena to the being of a conscious content. Husserl's reduction to consciousness, or as he puts it in his 'egological account' of experience in the \textit{Cartesian Meditations}, the 'sphere of ownness'\(^2\), is illegitimate. For Merleau-Ponty, the phenomena of inquiry are not purely data of consciousness. The return to the primacy of the \textit{Lebenswelt} must recognize the transcendent nature of things as well as the stream of immanent evidence. Thus, in effect, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty make use of a different sphere of inquiry.

\textsuperscript{1} Ricoeur, "Phénoménologie existentielle", p. 19-10\textsuperscript{4}·10.

\textsuperscript{2} Husserl, \textit{Cartesian Meditations}, § 44.
§ 45: These discrepancies cast in terms of intentional encounter

Merleau-Ponty acknowledges Husserl's insight into the nature of the conscious act because of its reference to an object in the world. The object to which consciousness tends must be taken into consideration when attempting to define the subject's movement within the world. Consciousness, then, is co-determined by the object to which it is related. The world is thus understood by examining our conscious experience of it.

The act of consciousness on Husserl's analysis, is noetic and embodies the meaning of a certain mode of relating to an object. The object of consciousness, on the other hand, is a purely noematic moment because it is immanent in consciousness and illuminated by the act which gives it rise. Further, it is not only illuminated by the noetic act; it is also determined by it.

It should be noted that the noetic act which intends the noema is essentially a doxic act. It involves a matrix of what Husserl refers to as 'world belief' or the natural attitude. In assuming the natural attitude, the subject expects the course of his experience in the world to continue as such. I expect the ground to continue under my feet, for example, and I expect the things I see are relatively hard and impenetrable for the most part. I expect the world to be continually present. Based on this expectation, Husserl claims that 'I can' live
in the world on the psycho-physical doxic level of the natural attitude but 'I can' also live the world as a correlate of consciousness. The transcendental I which lives the world as a correlate of consciousness, for Husserl, lives a primary experience which is constitutive of our perception of the world and its objects.

Merleau-Ponty, however, objects to Husserl's identification of this originally intending act with noeses, that is as defined purely by consciousness. Instead he feels that our original tending toward a world is not originally 'consciously directed' at knowing the world: it is rather an affirmation of one's being-in-the-world. He writes:

"The relation between subject and object is no longer that relationship of knowing postulated by classical idealism, wherein the object always seems the construction of the subject, but a relationship of being in which, paradoxically, the subject is his body, his world, and his situation, by a sort of exchange"\(^1\).

Far from being strictly cognitive and conscious, as Husserl would have it, Merleau-Ponty claims that the relationship between subject and world is irreducible to the language of noetic and noematic correlates of consciousness. According to Merleau-Ponty, the 'I can' espoused by Husserl may see the world as a correlate of consciousness in unmediated fashion, but it does not account for the

corporeity of the world. Merleau-Ponty claims that original experience is defined by a more bodily 'I can' (le peux, PP 160) and cannot be reduced to a transcendental 'I think' as Husserl would have it. 'I am able', Merleau-Ponty claims, to appropriate the world because the lived subject is not exclusively defined by thought; rather, it is defined by the self-same stuff as the world, that is corporeity\(^1\), visibility\(^2\), spatiality (PP 164), temporality (PP 483), etc.. My consubstantiality with the world is grounded in the fact that it is already-there as inhabitable for me upon my arrival in it. I am not apart from the world. Even at the most primitive of levels, according to Merleau-Ponty, I am engaged in it in a relation of being.

Merleau-Ponty's reaction to Husserl's thinking on this point could be illuminated and its consequences identified. His objection, as noted, is directed against Husserl's emphasis on the conscious acts of the experiencing subject. He objects to the distance that the subject assumes from the intimacy of the Lebenswelt. And also by treating the Lebenswelt as a noematic content, he feels Husserl is illegitimately defining it as purely conscious, without proper regard for its corporeity. He feels a need to redefine the original act of intending the world, one which defines the living subject in terms other than those with reference to consciousness.

\(^1\) Of course it is a corporeity incarnate with consciousness.

Otherwise put this calls into question Husserl's identification of the two poles of our experience. Husserl writes:

"In so far as every thought demands a thought object and this relationship to the pure 'I' in the cognitive act we find a remarkable polarity in every act: on the one side the 'I' pole and, on the other, the object as counter pole. Each of these two is an identity but the character and origins of these two identities are radically different".

Thus the noetic act is polar to, and at a distance from, the noematic content. The distance involved is unavoidable, however, at this level of conscious appropriation. But, and this is Merleau-Ponty's point, all levels of conscious appropriation be they scientific, mathematical, philosophico-reflective or simply reflective consciousness, are founded upon an original perceptual awareness of the world. Perception admits of a consubstantiality between subject and world. Intentionality, he claims, should not be restricted to noetic-noematic correlates (PP 72). He claims that there is a more fundamental mode of intentionality, one which the subject deploys in his original

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appropriation to the world. He refers to this intentionality as a natural, vital, or operative intentionality\(^1\). He writes:

"We found beneath the intentionality of acts or thetic intentionality, another kind which is the condition of the former's possibility: namely an operative intentionality already at work before any positing or any judgment"(PP 490).

These operative modes of intentionality can be found in the simplest of bodily activities such as the look, the reach, walking, and the unreflective corroboration of all modes of awareness within these simple activities. All these activities 'bear in on something in the same way that Husserl claims that 'all consciousness is consciousness of something'. This operative intentionality functioning here binds the subject to the work in a way which can never be conceived as intellectual awareness. In a frequently cited passage, it is shown how the body aims at the world in its own way, at a level anterior to intellectual acts and in a way which cannot be reduced to the intellectual:

"Erotic perception is not a cogitatio which aims at a cogitatum, through one body it aims at another body, and takes place in the world, not in a consciousness"(PP 157).

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\(^1\) PP xiii. It is worth noting that Merleau-Ponty acknowledges his indebtedness to Husserl on this point. However he objects to its being subordinated to the intentionality of conscious acts.
To be sure, a pure consciousness does not deploy this vital intentionality. But reflection upon perceptual experience shows it at work everywhere. It adheres to a world which is not revealed as things that are transparent to consciousness. It is bound to a world which discloses itself in profiles, in modes of appearing, in an opaque richness and diversity which is radically other than the ideas and concepts conceived by consciousness.

The intentionality deployed by the body shows us several things. First it tells us that the body and its senses should not be subordinated to consciousness. The original intending of a thing is pre-thetic. It is not mediated by an idea or concept: it does not posit qualities, nor a succession of qualities. Rather, the intentionality of the body is the vehicle by which I "enter into a sympathetic relation" with things, and "find in them a momentary law" (PP 214).

Second it shows us that the subject does not intend things unilaterally. This is to say that there is an irreducible concreteness to human subjectivity which does not admit of differentiation between body and consciousness, nor of the individual senses or functions of the body proper in its originality. At the most primitive level of simple awareness, there is not a specific field which corresponds to a specific sense or aspect of awareness. Things exist for-us but they

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1 This point, Ricoeur notes, is significant in demarcating Husserl's transcendental phenomenology from Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology (c.f. "Phénoménologie existentielle" p. 19-1089).
reveal themselves in profiles. I am capable of attending to the diversity of profiles. I can encounter the 'white-hotness' of an object, its 'sharp odour' or 'biting taste' because I am present to them (and them to me) without exhausting myself in any one sense.

Third, it leads us to recognize a change in the subject's relation to himself in his original awareness of the world. In the primitivity of perception itself, there is no 'I' deploying the act, nor is there a subject appearing to himself. The concept of the 'I', according to Merleau-Ponty, is a concept established reflectively (c.f. PP 215). It is a 'presumptive horizon' which itself always has the being of the world as its horizon (PP 254). Thus perception is anterior to self-identity, self-awareness, and the specific acts deployed by an identifiable subject. Original perception, therefore, is pre-thetically or pre-reflectively deployed by an anonymous subject.

The point to be emphasized here is the priority which Merleau-Ponty's thesis regarding the primacy of perception assumes over any remnant of reflective thinking over and constructs established on the basis of reflection. The subject is absolutely and inexorably immersed in the Lebenswelt pre-thetically. Phenomena issue forth from the Lebenswelt to be pre-reflectively lived and explicated by a reflection which delves into the subject's living immersion in the world. Ultimately the thesis of the primacy of perception yields an ontological content, the being of the world. Reflection shows that the world as a content is the ontological correlate of the primacy of
perception. For example, we can say that we see the garden. The proposition 'I see the garden' is consequent to seeing the garden, which itself is consequent to there being a garden-for-us to see. The things-for-us, of course, are the very situation of engagement and that they are there-for-us is the very definition of things in the world.

Merleau-Ponty thus emphasizes the subject's engagement in a world which is originally lived in its corporeity. It is not enough to treat the subject and world as ideas, as noetic and noematic correlates as Husserl has done. Rather, they must be seen in their corporeity according to the subject's living it.
§ 46: Dufrenne and Merleau-Ponty

Herbert Spiegelberg identifies Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology as 'bi-polar', and Husserl's as 'subject centred'. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, he writes, "attempts to combine the subjective with the objective" whereas Husserl's is aimed at the subjective acts of consciousness. Bi-polar phenomenology is not so named for recognizing a correlation between nooses and noemata, but rather with respect to the characterization of phenomena as both immanent and transcendent to consciousness. Dufrenne follows Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on a bi-polar consideration.

It has been seen that Dufrenne adopts Merleau-Ponty's rejection of the phenomenological reduction. He also adopts the description of the world or the world-view Merleau-Ponty espouses which is built upon the rejection of the reduction. Like Merleau-Ponty, Dufrenne claims that the world in which we live has a certain being which is irreducible to a cogitatum of constituting consciousness. Inherent in this agreement with Merleau-Ponty is Dufrenne's claim that the world is not constructed by a thinking substance, a cogito in the


2 Ibid.

3 But, as I will contend, he goes beyond bi-polarity into the other extreme, an emphasis on objectivity in its transcendence with regard to consciousness.
Husserlian sense, which stands over and above it but is not immersed in it (LI 25-6). The world, for Dufrenne, is given or lived prior to the acts of the cogito as a "presence which I encounter and to which I submit" (PE 647). I have an implicit, but immediate knowledge of it, even in its most brute state (PE 647). There is, as with Merleau-Ponty, a consubstantiality between the bruteness of the subject and the world. The original act of the subject is defined as an 'I am able', a je peux in Merleau-Ponty's sense (LI 70). And this is deployed by a corporeal, vital subject. The world, corresponding to my 'being able' to appropriate it, is defined as a possibility. It is possible as inhabitable and as knowable (connaissable) (LI 70).

Dufrenne claims that in its original brute state, the world is "never present except in terms of the various a priori of presence which structure it and confer a meaning on it in accordance with a vital subjectivity" (PE 648)\(^1\). At this level, however, it has no shape: it exists only in terms of possibilities (c.f. PE 655). This 'possibility of a world', it should be noted, defines the transcendental.

Thus we see that for Dufrenne, like for Merleau-Ponty, the subject is engaged in the world and in its originality this engagement

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\(^1\) He identifies these a priori of presence in another text as spatiality and temporality (LI 104). These are in turn structured according to a series of couplets: presence and absence, full and empty, before and after, close and far, above and below, straight and crooked, and large and small. These are proposed by the object rather than being assimilated by acts of the understanding in order to unify perception (LI 108-9).
is the very possibility of meaning. There is meaning most originally for the gaze or the look, and this must be read as an acceptance of Merleau-Ponty's repudiation of Husserl. Again, for Dufrenne (as for Merleau-Ponty), the world is not exclusively given to, nor made by, consciousness. It is, rather, for Dufrenne lived by the subject which is at once bodily or corporeal and deploying itself according to the a priori of bodily presence as manifested in a body's engagement in the corporeal world. Ultimately the subject's movement into this world and the world itself are manifested prior to the distinction between subject and object, as well as conscious intentions, as is the case with Merleau-Ponty. Specifically, for Dufrenne, the world is given as possible to affectivity which is at all times implied and presupposed in the subject's appropriation to it (PE 658).

Affectivity not only specifies the possibility of a world but also the familiarity of it at a level of originary bodily presence. It is from this origin, this bodily presence to the world, that a self-withdrawal is initiated at the very moment a specific look or intention (however vital or operative as contrasted with Husserl's emphasis on the conscious) is deployed. At this moment, a distance arises between the look which is not the world and the not, or as Merleau-Ponty says the non-ipseical character, to which the world emerges (PE 659). The look first and most originally affixes itself to the possibility of a world in

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1 "Exister, c'est d'abord être ancré dans la matière" (LI 168).
the face of its givenness. Thus this self-withdrawal opens a distance between subject and object. The look, according to Dufrenne, traverses this distance and binds itself to objects (PE 659). Affectivity, it should be noted, specifies the life of the concrete subject, that is the subject prior to his being identified by a matrix of specifically conscious acts. It corresponds to the intentionality which Merleau-Ponty claims is found beneath, or prior to, thetic intentionality.

If we were to follow the upsurge of perception, we would be led to a consideration of presence in straightforward perception. We have identified this moment and its concentricity with other moments. At this point in our treatment, however we need not follow it into its upsurge into these other moments. Rather we need to focus exclusively on this moment at which the look binds itself to objects, this moment of immediate familiarity, and make its contents and their functions or contributions explicit. We can, at that point, better evaluate the phenomenological legitimacy of Dufrenne's descriptions.
§ 47: Dufrenne's venture into transcendence

At this moment of immediate familiarity, the subject and world are of the self-same flesh, or of the same race as Dufrenne says. The world is revealed as a human world, and interchangably, the subject manifests itself as a worldly subject. This is the case because the notions of the subject's immediate familiarity of the world, and the world as that which manifests itself as knowable and inhabitable for a subject, render each other possible.

The content of this structure of original encounter is a human content, because, in the immediacy of being-in-the-world in which there is no distinction between subject and world, the subject is the meaning felt. The interchangeable content, that is the nuance of affectivity which is revealed by the world into and in which the subject lives, is realized as uniquely human because the straightforwardly living subject is this content. In other words, the subjective existential a priori not only correspond to the objective cosmological a priori but are identical to them. Thus, the meaning of a world as corporeal, inhabitable and knowable for a living subject is revealed. Meaning, as Dufrenne claims in his characterization of

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1 And it is precisely in this simple and naive givenness of the the world to the look which serves as the transcendental act by which the contours of a world begin to emerge (c.f. PE 659).
phenomenology (PE 5n) appears as the 'appearing of meaning to itself'.

To collapse the distinction between the subject and world in this fashion is to recognize the subject as immersed in the world's 'worldliness', and also to recognize the human element of the being of the world. This latter point is made all the more explicit when, according to Dufrenne, we consider art. In aesthetic experience, the world is revealed in its full-fledged humanity. This is not to project the human onto the bruteness of the being of the world but rather it is to recognize that the world is consubstantial with the being of the subject (PE 667). The subject is capable of recognizing his consubstantiality with the being of the world, and indeed with Being itself because he is a being and therefore at home in, and equipped to know, his habitus. Dufrenne writes that the bruteness of the being of the world-- even in its very bruteness-- offers itself in terms of qualities to the "man capable of contemplating them [as] a familiar face in which he can recognize himself without having composed the being of this face" (PE 667). Thus, we can recognize the meaning which we ourselves are when we feel the sensuous. We recognize our festivity in Monet's La Rue Montorgueil and Rue Saint-Denis. We recognize our peaceful solitude and innocence in Van Gogh's Les Souliers and a more stark disquieting solitude in his painting of his room at Arles.
But what we must ask, gives rise to this immediate familiarity? And further, what gives rise to a recognition of it as such? Can it really be said to be a matter of consubstantiality in which the language and function of ontological categories have priority over the cognitive faculties of lived awareness? It is precisely at this point of immediate familiarity that the bi-polar phenomenology upon which Dufrenne embarks appears to be a unilateral phenomenology. After following Merleau-Ponty into the bi-polar realm of immanence and transcendence, Dufrenne appears to leave one of these poles, the immanent, and employ the transcendent pole as evidence in his phenomenological claims to a much greater extent. This is to say that Dufrenne makes an 'outward turn' rather than dwelling on the immanent content of consciousness, and certainly rather than attributing the same importance to it as he does to the object which the subject encounters. Instead he grounds his claims on various a priori, which are in turn grounded upon a much larger a priori, which grounds all a priori, Being or Nature.

Now in reviewing this position, it should be recalled that this a priori of the a priori is not phenomenologically accessible. It is grounded in a reflection which makes use of evidence transcendent to consciousness, evidence which is not experienced and therefore evidence which is unaccessible to even the most adherent of reflections. In so doing, Dufrenne violates a fundamental principle of phenomenological method.
There is an additional point which must be noted and shall be
dwelled upon in the sections to follow. If we were to focus upon the
subjective acts of consciousness in a manner which Husserl has
done, we would see that there is a wealth of evidence which is
founded upon immediate experience. This data is not founded upon a
transcendent reality, as is the case with Dufrenne's descriptions.
Rather, it is so immediate that it is at work in the very constitution
(or the making appear) of objects and how objects in the world are
recognized as such. It identifies the acts of consciousness as the
embodiment of meaning. This is to say that it is by the acts of
consciousness, for Husserl, that the world in which the subject finds
himself is anticipated, encountered and remembered. In a word it is
by these acts that the world of human endeavour is rendered
intelligible, not according to an external reality, the meaning of
which is defined by its correlation to subjectivity.

My contention is that Husserl's emphasis on the act of conscious
appropriation to the world will provide another dimension of
meaning. An explication of this additional stratum of meaning will
not only augment Dufrenne's analysis but extend it and therefore
furnish a more fundamental explicitation of aesthetic perception in
its originality. This dimension should be identified provisionally as
the 'howness' of meaning. An explication of the 'howness' yields the
content or the essential quiddity of experience according to the
subjective deployment which aims toward, fixes upon, retends and
anticipates meaning. This is to say that 'what' is manifested in perception is only manifested in, and according to, a 'howness' or subjective deployment. Otherwise put, 'how' content is given yields its 'whatness'. This always proceeds according to a continuous stream of temporal phases. Each of these phases admits of a meaning of which consciousness is aware (either thematically or implicitly) and it is according both to 'how' this meaning is given and 'what' itself is given that the subject orients itself to the content of the world and anticipates the various horizons of perception. These 'various horizons of perception' themselves should be interpreted temporally, according to the various loci which the gaze intends. Whatever is given (that is the intended 'whatness' of the gaze) is only given in the 'how', in the original deployment and genesis of conscious phases and the contents they embody. Meaning, therefore, flows in the deployment of subjective activity within the moments of perception to form a unified whole. It is precisely on the basis of this point that it must he determined 'how' meaning is arrested and how the arrestation of such meaning belongs in the consideration of aesthetic perception. Last, because each of these phases are pregnant with meaning, it is necessary that we, as phenomenologists, determine how subjective performance arrests the continuity of meaning such that: 1) we are able to anticipate or pretend what is to come in perception as it moves into the present locus of our gaze in and through the continuity of retended meaning, or what has
previously been perceived; and 2) we have a unified perception which is legitimized by the meaning of retention as well as protention such that our perception is not disparate.

In the following chapter it is not my intention to identify and delve into the intricacies of Husserlian phenomenology. Rather it is my purpose to show the absence of an explicit identification of a subjective contribution or performance to aesthetic perception on Dufrenne's account. From there, I will identify this contribution, this 'how' of aesthetic perception and show how this augments and extends Dufrenne's descriptions to provide a more adequate account of aesthetic perception. This is to say that I shall focus on Dufrenne's description of our immediate familiarity with the immanent world of the aesthetic object and show that 'what' we are familiar with is only given, and intelligible, according to a 'howness', or in other words, I shall show that the subjective performance in aesthetic perception demands to be recognized as fundamental to the meaning which can only be specified by Dufrenne's a priori in a posterior manner. This requires that emphasis be placed on the temporal givenness of the aesthetic object, again in accordance with our recurring example, Monet's *La Rue Montorgueil*, and the recognition of each phase according to the subjective performance which yields it.
Chapter VII  THE SUBJECTIVE LIFE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN AESTHETIC PERCEPTION

§ 48: Delimitation

The subjective contribution to aesthetic perception can be identified, although certainly not exhaustively, by taking note of several simple acts performed by us as spectators as we come to feel the meaning immanent to the aesthetic object. We can speak in terms of our thematizing, or better, our 'individuating' the aesthetic object and its intensions. Note well that our thematizing a painting from the rest of the gallery in which it resides is an activity which cannot be identified with thematizing different aspects within the self-same painting. These acts of thematization or individuation, therefore, must be considered in their unique specificity, as two distinct acts. Another act which must be identified is our attentiveness toward the object itself and its intensions. By way of our attentiveness, we are motivated to anticipate its meaning. It must be, also, that anticipation is a subjective contribution to aesthetic perception which needs to be noted.

These contributions ground the possibility of a specific painting appearing as such. Dufrenne's near exclusive emphasis on the pre-constituion of the world of the aesthetic object denies the necessity of not only these contributions but the very subjective structure of aesthetic perception itself. This point can be easily shown by applying
Dufrenne's descriptions to our perceptual experience of *La Rue Montorgueil*. This chapter will proceed by such an application. This will make explicit the lacuna in Dufrenne's descriptions with respect to the subjective contribution to aesthetic perception.
§ 49: **Application of Dufrenne's descriptions**

I find myself in front of Monet's *La Rue Montorgueil*. I am moved by it and simultaneously live its immanent world. But how, we must ask, do I live this immanence on Dufrenne's account?

We have already seen Dufrenne's account in its generality. The general exposition has been condensed and its problematic recalled previously (in the second section of Part III). But we should now deal with Dufrenne's position as applied to a specific aesthetic object. Unfortunately for our purposes, Dufrenne speaks rarely of any specific work of art and more rarely of a specific painting. At best he speaks about being authentically present to two different kinds of art forms, spatial arts (represented by architecture and painting) and temporal arts (represented by a melody or a novel) in order to make explicit the contribution and function of the imagination and the understanding at one point (PE 452-4). Although being in a cathedral can in no way be equivocated with being in front of a painting and although seeing a painting can in no way be equivocated with reading a novel or listening to a melody, there is significance to be elucidated from Dufrenne's descriptions. This significance lies in an account of a subjective contribution (or a lack thereof) in the spectator's presence to, and perception of, the aesthetic object.

The most general feature of these contributions resides in the subject's deployment of his own being as a spectator. Here he deploys
himself according to an affective a priori, that is "a certain way of being open to an object", a certain way of feeling it (LI 77). Being open to the object in order to feel it could be identified as a contribution, one which is totally pre-thetic and immediate. It simply enables one to reverberate (retentir) with that quality with which the spectator has an immediate familiarity (LI 77). In fact, however, this 'contribution' is hardly worthy of the name at all. It is at best a recognition of what the spectator is when he brings himself to aesthetic perception. The question of 'how' the spectator is familiar at the very level of perception may still be addressed.

Familiarity is instantaneous on Dufrenne's account. And further it admits of no internal parts or processes due to the expressive force of the aesthetic object and the spectator's adherence to it. When referring to our feeling a cathedral from a specific location within it, one that cuts off the cathedral in its entirety from our view, Dufrenne notes that the imagination "seems... to open out space in terms of future perspectives in order to grasp the object in its plenitude as more than a truncated appearance" (PE 452). Clearly here he is talking about gaining view of the entire building from the outside and inside, every window, chamber and passageway as a complete perception and the role that the imagination would assume in providing such a representation. Let us take this observation and apply it to the appearance of the immanent world of La Rue Montorgueil. Thus applied, "seems" is the operative word for
Dufrenne. The immanent world of this painting is more than just a truncated appearance. But this is not due to any contribution of the imagination which strives to enrich the given. The imagination, in this instance, is held in check (PE 453). The imagination does not need to gain access to the entirety of the object because the object is given as an object with a meaning that requires no verification of such a truth. Further, it would be impossible to do so because in aesthetic perception, like all perception, the object is inexhaustible. Thus the object appears as more than a truncated appearance but not due to any contribution of the imagination.

Could it be said that even the holding in check of the imagination is itself a subjective act or contribution, for is it not part of the subject's immediate familiarity with the painting? But on Dufrenne's account it is not. Recall (PE 481 ff) that holding the imagination in check is not so much a function deployed by the spectator as it is an unnecessary act which is not solicited by the aesthetic object. It is held in check to the extent that the aesthetic object is not envisioned by the empirical imagination according to possibilities of understanding, use, action or utility etc. Aesthetic perception does not consist in these future possibilities; it consists only in seeing and feeling its presence. As Dufrenne writes when speaking of the cathedral, when the spectator "enters it, he does not do so to engage himself in any future enterprise. He enters to see" (PE 453).
Clearly, these 'future considerations' do not admit of explicitly aesthetic import for Dufrenne. But could it not be otherwise? For example, is it possible to identify a subjective act which anticipates the future considerations which render the given as more than a truncated appearance while adhering to the immediate presence of a painting? This identification would entail that perception, however instantaneous, consists in a series of parts or moments deployed by the spectator. Dufrenne says no to this possibility, thereby limiting any consideration of subjective activity to immediate familiarity. The immediate familiarity or being immediately present to La Rue Montorgueil, Dufrenne would say, is not thick with a future; it does not pretend a future. A visit to see this painting, for however long, would consist in a series of discontinuous present moments, as many as the number of times the spectator's look reposes on and isolates a perspective of the totality of the object (PE 453). These foci upon which the look fixes and the look which fixes upon them do not admit of a future because they are absolutely self-sufficient (PE 453) given that the spectator yields to the imperious presence of the aesthetic object (PE 179), from the beginning (PE 487) and accepts the object in its own terms (PE 179). Dufrenne would reject the notion of
anticipation or protention in the aesthetic perception of a painting\textsuperscript{1}. A painting, he claims, manifests itself in a single glance (PE 455)\textsuperscript{2}, it admits of no parts, moments or phases and therefore no protention nor retention.

But is this the case? To hold this position would be to terminate a consideration of certain evidences, all of which can be legitimized and point to the conclusion that Dufrenne's descriptions are incomplete. We can find continuous phases within what Dufrenne refers to as the discontinuous moment of aesthetic perception. If we focus upon the flags, the street activity and the sky in \textit{La Rue Montorgueil}, we find a continuity amongst them such that these foci are assimilated into a total perception. Dufrenne refuses to recognize continuity of moments or phases within aesthetic perception. This is due to his insistence that the painting as perceived is self-sufficient and completed in such a manner that it is given as a totality in each

\textsuperscript{1} This is not the same for the temporal arts. Reading a novel or following a melody "presupposes virtual and undeveloped images which are woven into perception"(PE 456). Here "imagination functions as little more than an implicit memory which retains the past, realizing it without imposing it on us and enables us to sense the future without actually inhabiting it"(PE 456).

\textsuperscript{2}"Turning now to the arts of time, we observe that they seem at first glance to demand a pronounced constitutive activity in order: a) to regulate time and by keeping the past immanent in the present; and b) to give continuity to represented objects. A painting can manifest itself in a single viewing, but a sonata and a novel reveal themselves only successively; their contemplation involves both a past and a future" (PE 455).
appearance. This is not to say that each time the gaze focuses on the painting that it sees everything there is to see in it. Rather it is to say that everything that can be seen by the gaze which fixes on it, and isolates a moment of La Rue Montorgueil, is seen. What escapes this gaze can be seen again in another moment of perception. But it will not differ from what is seen in previous moments of completed perceptions because each perception or each perspective from which the painting is viewed expresses the self-same festivity in, perhaps, varying degrees of depth.

The self-sufficiency of the appearing of the painting, it must be noted, makes demands on the spectator such that various moments of subjectivity are not deployed. The particular perspectives, on this hypothesis, could never be assimilated, nor could they be continuous with one another, because the imagination connives with the aesthetic object. It merely affirms or engages the perspective and lets it be seen. This is nothing other than its transcendental function, which allows for the object to be seen in visage. This minimal operation defines a contribution which is yielded only passively because, in Dufrenne's own terms, the imagination yields to the object. It does not make the appearance of the painting possible by initiating an act which protends the whole object as that which "is not now seen and yet could be seen from another position"(PE 454).

Similarly the understanding is working at a very low level, in no way deploying judgment, nor restricting the imagination. The
functioning itself is so facilitated by the very nature of the aesthetic object itself (PE 481) which adapts "itself spontaneously to the rules by which the understanding subsumes the variety of the given under the unity of the 'I think'" (PE 481).

To be sure, in Dufrenne's treatment of the subjective moments of perception are subordinated to the quasi-subjectivity of the aesthetic object itself which acts as an authority for the spectator. Whatever contribution is present is always one of adherence rather than one of initiative, that is, one which is always solicited or provoked by the authority of the aesthetic object. And this subordination, in its turn, means that the object exists in such a manner that it has priority over the subjective acts of perception.

Now if it can be shown that there are discernable continua within our presence to the aesthetic object and that they manifest themselves according to a subjective contribution, then Dufrenne's thesis is incomplete. The way to show this is to recognize a thickness in what Dufrenne refers to as the immediate familiarity with the aesthetic object, in which we find the subjective contribution. We can find this thickness within the original dynamism of activity and receptivity in which Dufrenne claims the spectator exists\(^1\). The active-passive reciprocity is at work throughout the subjective moments of aesthetic

\(^1\) Recall, Dufrenne claims that the spectator originally exists in concentric moments of activity and receptivity or passivity (LI 62).
perception. But more evident is Dufrenne's emphasis on the subject's passivity. In presence, we find the subject in front of the aesthetic object in a receptive fashion. Correlatively, we find the subject's performance in presence as adherent\(^1\). And this presence must be maintained throughout aesthetic perception or meaning is lost. Similarly, the imagination admits of a passive-active dichotomy. Its passivity is manifested in the minimal operation of it in its transcendental function of letting the object appear. Its activity, however, is repressed because it does not operate beyond this minimal function. The understanding, likewise, is at work only passively. It loosens its restraints on the imagination such that it does not interfere with it in order to confer logical necessity on the perceived. It does not work beyond its 'lessened' restraint on the imagination and this must be considered as the understanding functioning in its passivity.

Yet these moments of activity and passivity must be considered as being continuous with one another. This is to say that perception would not arrest meaning without the continuous 'playing off' one another of the active and the passive moments of subjectivity. As 'playing off' one another, the active and the passive moments form a

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\(^1\) The specific existential or subjective a priori he lists in this adherence, those of knowing, responding, participating and feeling (éprouver)(LI 77), are solicited by the object and subordinated to immediate familiarity, thus shedding no light on how we are, or become, familiar with the appearance, nor how the appearance gives itself to perception.
thickness to perception. This thickness can be identified as the meaning which is carried through the subjective moments of perception, however simultaneous our familiarity to this meaning may be.

If it is considered in a certain way, aesthetic perception can be designated in two senses. On the one hand, there is the presence to the aesthetic object which is never lost in an authentic perception. On the other hand, there is the presence to the object which is pregnant with other moments of subjective appropriation, such as the imagination and the understanding, the pre-thetic judgments, the anticipations and retentions. The very absence or manifestation of these acts of appropriation can be identified and their formal and material contents can be described. And these contents constitute a thickness or a series of continuous moments which are said to be absent in aesthetic perception by Dufrenne.

This thickness first of all manifests itself in the very nature of our simple awareness. Our simple awareness is not only perceptual; it also must be considered as giving birth to and protending experience itself. This is to say that the playing off of the active and the passive expresses a movement. This movement, in turn, defines the thickness of our immediate presence to, or familiarity with, the aesthetic object.

Perhaps the easiest way of defining this thickness, this playing off of the active and the passive moments of subjectivity, is to revert to the
language of perception and experience to identify our simple awareness. We can define this in two different ways\(^1\), in terms of perceiving and of admitting an awareness or an experience of our perceptions. That subjectivity encounters appearances attests to its perceptivity. But in addition to perceiving or encountering, there is also a moment in which the encountered undergoes an apprehension of sorts. We could speak of this apprehension in terms of an experience, or a non-perceptual awareness to designate that it cannot be reduced to perceptual data even though it is given in perception. Perceptual intentions are not perceived as such yet they are data which are immanent in perception. They are meanings of which we are aware in such a way that they 'haunt' the perceived. Dufrenne does not speak about the intentional act of perception because it cannot be perceived. This intentional act, however, is present as an experience or an awareness. It is, to be more precise, experienced as a 'howness'. At one point Dufrenne says that when one experiences joy or festivity, he must be joyful or festive (LI 77). Thus he tells us how one experiences meaning. But the question remains how one is festive in the first place or better how does this one -- this spectator-- who is festive deploy himself in being festive? This being festive is both an acquired attitude and also the ground from which the

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spectator assumes presence to the immanent world of a painting. As such, it defines the intentional act and contributes a meaning which haunts perception itself. And by recognizing that the intentional act of perception yields an apprehension or an awareness which is at work in perception, we recognize further the thickness of our immediate presence to the painting.

Dufrenne's emphasis on the subject's passivity in recognizing an immediate familiarity with the aesthetic object is more pronounced than his recognition of a subjective contribution in realizing such immediate familiarity. His statements that the immediate presence to the aesthetic object requires no future protentions and the seeing of a painting in a single viewing -- the viewing itself identified as a moment discontinuous with all other moments or viewings--emphasize that there is no recognition of subjective contribution. And it is precisely this lacuna in Dufrenne's descriptions, specifically found at the moment at which the subject is said to be immediately familiar with the aesthetic object (itself identified as a self-sufficiency which requires no more than this immediate familiarity) which must be addressed.

To this end we must flesh out this thickness in the immediate presence to the aesthetic object. This involves taking note of the intentional act of perception and its nuances, which will be done in the remainder of this chapter.
§ 50: Individuation as a subjective contribution

In identifying an act of individuation as a subjective contribution to aesthetic perception, it must be remembered that such an identification stems from my fundamental divergence with Dufrenne's endeavour to describe a world encountered, rather than to describe perception as it presents a world. By identifying the act of individuation we are actively engaged in making explicit our perception of a world, rather than a world which we perceive. In other words, we are focusing on how the spectator deploys himself within his presence to the immanent world of the aesthetic object rather than the world to which we are present.

To identify the act of individuation is to recognize, most thoroughly, subjective performance in presence. And it demands identification of a wider conception of presence than the one Dufrenne espouses. But it is not to diverge from the emphasis Dufrenne places on presence, both as the first logical moment of aesthetic perception and that to which aesthetic contemplation returns in feeling. Rather, it is to offer descriptions which occur within the self-same sphere of reference as Dufrenne's yet in greater depth, due to the recognition of subjective performance and the actual contribution of the spectator.
a. Motivation as the ground of individuation

To begin with, it must be noted that the act of individuation is a motivated act. This is to say that the content of a subject's intention is always rooted in other acts which are not so much causes as they are factors contributing to the formation of a specific intention\(^1\). For example, my viewing \textit{La Rue Montorgueil} is always motivated, although the motivation itself may differ from viewing to viewing. It may be motivated by an interest in Monet's work, or by a desire to take refuge from the flux of everyday demands by taking refuge in an art gallery for an afternoon. Even within these motivations themselves great differences can be discerned. It was seen earlier\(^2\) that the spectator may be interested from a theoretical point of view, an entrepreneurial point of view or from a custodial point of view, to name only a few examples. The meaning embodied in these points of view, or manners in which a spectator may view \textit{La Rue Montorgueil} differs radically from the point of the point of view of a spectator who approaches it to see it and adhere to its authentic meaning. Similarly, one who seeks refuge from everyday demands in an art

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\(^1\) c.f. Reeder, \textit{The Theory and Practice of Husserl's Phenomenology}, p. 13. It is important to explicate the motivation because it refers to a "sort of historicalness ... hidden sense-moments and 'causal' sense-relations" (Husserl, \textit{Formal and Transcendental Logic}, p. 208).

\(^2\) Recall § 26.
gallery is motivated by a meaning different from the spectator who seeks the expression of Monet.

The meaning of the motivation may, however, be implicit. A spectator for example, may come across a painting without consciously seeking it or expect it. Even here, the encounter is motivated by a meaning, be that the meaning of surprise or perhaps disinterest. Motivation is a property of each and every intentional act.

It is worthwhile emphasizing that the subjective acts of the spectator already bear a meaning in their intending an object in the very first place. This meaning motivates other meanings. More so, this meaning 'haunts' encountered meanings. A caretaker does not feel beauty if he is motivated by the sense of 'safe-keeping'. Similarly, a spectator expecting the grotesque morbidities of a Goya exhibition is motivated by a different sense than one whose encounter is rooted in an expectation of Monet's expression of colour and light. These motivating meanings are immanent in the subject's act and any phenomenology which seeks completeness must include them in their description. The sense of motivation must be seen not so much as an explicitly subjective contribution, but rather as a meaning which is embedded in the subject's every encounter. As such, it is present in a consideration of the awareness which presents a world. This consideration, as we have said, escapes Dufrenne. It must however be seen as horizontal to each and every intentional act, be
this act explicitly consciously deployed, or deployed pre-thetically as is the case of the spectator of aesthetic perception.
b. The first act of individuation

Our description now shifts from horizontal concerns to those which have the subject's actual encounter with the aesthetic object as their theme. This is not to minimize the importance of motivation in our descriptions. Rather, it is an alteration of standpoint which aims at a synoptic description.

We must recall that presence is the first moment of our lived-encounter with the aesthetic object. We can imagine encountering the works of art at the Musée de Rouen. We stand before the various works, maybe enjoying them or maybe terminating our gaze and breaking off our encounter with them. And then we come along to Monet's painting *La Rue Montorgueil*. It becomes the determinate object of our attention. It thereby becomes legitimized as the aesthetic object, speaking with Dufrenne, as the object upon which we dwell, the object which admits of an immanent world into which we enter.

Now this 'coming along to' *La Rue Montorgueil* should be identified as an act of turning toward it. Within this act of 'turning toward' *La Rue Montorgueil*, the spectator contributes two distinct acts of individuation, both of which are motivated acts. Both of these processes of individuation bear in on substrates. But we should note that of these two processes, one is completed as we enter the immanent world of the painting and the other will always remain ongoing and will never be exhausted. The moment of presence, as we
have seen with Dufrenne's descriptions, is defined as being present to things immediately. When we wander about the art museum, passing from one work to another, our perceptual effort is not specifically concentrated on any one work. Yet when we come to *La Rue Montorgueil*, we deploy the first act of individuation. This act consists in the thematization of the work as we bear in on this work as opposed to other works and accept it on its own terms as the determinant object of our gaze.

Still, at this first level of individuation *La Rue Montorgueil* exists for us as a composite. This is to say that the painting as a unified whole is the substrate which yields many horizons or predicates, all of which are given in principle yet none of which are specifically arrested and felt until we explicitly turn to them. Thus at this level of individuation, *La Rue Montorgueil* is simultaneously the determinant and indeterminant object of our gaze. Its indeterminacy consists in that it exists as an inexhaustible unity. We may approach this inexhaustibility in our turning toward, for example, lines, or colour, or the representational aspects such as the figures on the road. But these acts of individuation are contingent upon the initial act of thematization and are haunted by the meaning yielded in this initial act.

At this point, we should note that our description differs significantly from Dufrenne's. Dufrenne identifies the acceptance of the immanent world of the aesthetic object as the subjective act
necessary for the entrance to the aesthetic object itself. But he does not explicate how we as spectators come to accept the meaning of this world. He neglects the priority upon which the immanent world is presented in our perception, namely via the subjective act of individuation.

Now we have become increasingly insistent that this subjective act is a primitive form of judgment as deployed by the understanding in as much as it requires a pronouncement made on the substrates with which the gaze of the spectator in its primitivity deals. In this case, at the first level of individuation, the pronouncement consists in the inclusion and arrestation of a content as such which is given in simple receptivity. The immanent meaning of La Rue Montorgueil is only made accessible when it is individuated, first, from its external horizons\(^1\) or the museum and its other paintings, and second according to its internal horizon, or the intension of the object itself. The first act grasps the object as such in its immanent festivity; the second act of individuation opens into an ongoing and continual arresting of the particularities which are haunted by the initial feeling of festivity. Thus we must recognize both acts as primitive judgments which specify a content according to an operation of the understanding. The first act arrests the meaning of the painting as

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\(^1\) The external horizon is the thematic object with its "objectively copresent surroundings... these surroundings being always cogiven by way of a background". Husserl, *Experience and Judgment*, p. 149.
peculiar to itself and in no way belonging to any other painting, no matter how similar they may appear to be representationally. And the second act specifies further meanings according to the founding act of individuation. The understanding's contribution here is representative of the thickness of immediate familiarity which Dufrenne neglects.

Further, we must identify these acts of subjective performance as embodying a whatness. The whatness in this case, of course, is the perceived content of the painting. The two moments belong together in a consideration of the immanent world of the aesthetic object. We shall, at this point, turn to and begin to explicate this whatness. But because we seek to explicate the content of the internal horizons of the painting as given in the 'how', or to be more precise as given in the acts of individuation of the second level, we must also provide further explication of the subjective contribution in each of these acts. This being the case, our exposition will take on a reflexive character in as much as the immanent content must be described in conjunction with the subjective act of appropriation by which they are engendered.
§ 51: The second level of individuation: Attention to internal horizons

The act of individuation signifies that the subject contributes 'attention'. In individuating a painting in a museum, we are attentive to it and inattentive to others. This act is undertaken in its primitivity according to a doxicity. When we originally tend toward a specific painting, we do so pre-reflectively with no explicit judgment deployed other than the intention we execute in order to receive it in simple awareness. As we pause and continue to gaze at this painting, perhaps shifting our gaze or our bodily position, it appears continually as the determined object throughout a flux of appearances. We are attentive to this determined object as that which endures throughout the diversity of appearances. It is within this original intention that the painting is determined in the flux of appearances by a subjective act as that substrate which admits of various modes of appearing and more so as that object to which we continue to tend.

But in dwelling on this determined object and shifting our gaze to various loci. We become aware of and attentive to its internal horizons. It is only when we attend to its various internal horizons within the natural and straightforward flow of our gaze that we become aware of the immanent world of the object as such. Our original tending toward the painting, then, should be defined as an
empty intention which, although it aims toward a determinate object, is yet to be fulfilled by specific content. The painting becomes rich or is fulfilled phase by phase when we begin to attend to its internal horizons.

At this point we should ask how the aesthetic object is fulfilled phase by phase. We shall begin to provide an answer to this question by recalling and explicating the temporal structure of perception in the perception of La Rue Montorgueil. Dufrenne can begin to aid us with this description. He has told us that the painting provides us with a point of entry into its immanent world, be it colour, line or representational aspects. But he has also told us that it is possible that a painting is seen as a totality in a single viewing (PE 455), and further that each moment of aesthetic perception is discontinuous with other moments (PE 453). This is to say that the internal horizons, for example, line, colour and representational aspects, are all 'seen' in one moment, and this moment is complete (it can yield the totality of the painting) and discontinuous with other moments. But we have seen that this can be called into question by noting the various moments of perception itself which go into constituting a totality. Now even though Dufrenne claims that the totality of the painting presents itself immediately to, and simultaneously with, the spectator's encountering it -- his individuating it-- we must now recognize that the spectator himself constitutes the immediacy to the painting in its totality. To this end we must recognize a second level
of individuating acts, one which constitutes the painting in it's totality through a retentional and protentional synthesis of internal horizons or points of entry into the painting such as colour, line, or representational aspects.

The second act of individuation begins with attentiveness to some point of entry into the immanent world of the painting, that is one specific horizon internal to the painting itself. The gaze focuses on the outline of the street, for example, and follows its gentle arc to the left under the Tricoles until it eventually winds out of sight. But as we follow this horizon and the multitude of horizons of which this representational aspect itself admits, we find there is no discontinuity amongst the specific loci of our focus (i.e., the road by this building, now by this building, or the road under this flag or as obscured by this particular congregation of celebrants on the street). In the language of protention and retention, one particular locus is retended in the next. Correlatively, one locus protends the next. The workings of protention and retention preserve how we are aware of the representation of the road itself, i.e. from 'near' to us, to 'far' from us as it winds ever so gently away.

The workings of protention and retention within the intentional structure of perception yield the preservation of the road, for example, as a unity throughout the various loci our gaze may assume, shows yet another aspect of subjective contribution, namely the synthetic assimilation of phases. This synthesis accounts not only
for the continuity of subjective acts intending and protentionally fulfilling the internal horizons of the painting but also for the sedimentation of meanings which bear into each specific phase and their subsequent haunting of further phases as the gaze makes use of these retended meanings. Each phase, of course, is lived by the spectator in differing degrees. The spectator is free to abort his attentiveness to the various phases, in which case he loses the continuously thematic perception of the object. In such a case, the protentions and retentions do not disappear but rather they are implicit and not made explicit.

But we should not concern ourselves with transitive, inattentive or unindividuated perception because it will not bring us to the authentic grasping of the aesthetic object. Rather, we should endeavour to flesh out the second level of individuation in which the subject deploys himself to his most attentive capacity. In other words, we should focus on the spectator as accepting the internal meaning of the aesthetic object such that he lives the meaning in each of its phases. To this end, we should consider the example of following the road in La Rue Montorgueil from its nearest point, or its utmost breadth, to the point at which it disappears from sight. If we make the content of our perception explicit, we will be obliged to note our own attentiveness to the various loci in which the road appears as such. Within this second act of individuation then, we can identify
various moments\(^1\), all of which take the road as its theme or point of entry into the painting beyond the initial act of thematizing the painting as such.

Our attentiveness at this moment of individuation has the road as its theme. But more so, our attentiveness is also capable of attending to the horizontal aspects of this theme as well. This is to say that our attentiveness to the road as theme admits of horizons of meaning. For example, the road itself admits of horizons of colour, of line, of representational aspects and of technique in the same sense as _La Rue Montorgueil_ in sum. But the meaning and horizons of the road itself are contingent upon, and haunted by, the grasping of the painting itself as theme in the first act of individuation. Once this contingency is realized, the horizons internal to the road can become manifest provided that the spectator maintains interest in the content. These internal horizons of the road give way to other appearances of the painting, each of which are legitimized by the content yielded in the protentional and retentional syntheses which organize the flux of appearances. Such syntheses organize appearances such that the road is determined in its specificity as identical to itself whether thematized at its point of greatest or least breadth.

\(^1\) I.e. the road, the flags, the people on the street and their activities or more formal senses such as colour or line etc..
It is important to emphasize that to identify the act of individuation, complete in its various moments of motivation, attentiveness and interest, and the syntheses which bind the various individuated phases into a unified hole, is to identify a primitive level of subjective performance in which substrates are most originally constituted, lived and thereby made available for reflection. It is most important to emphasize the point that our encounter with substrates is made available for reflection in a richness of which Dufrenne's account does not admit. This is because here we recognize a subtle shift of emphasis toward 'how' the content is lived as opposed to his enduring and unfulfilled preoccupation with 'what' is lived. But could it not be said that Dufrenne's emphasis on the existential a priori of subjectivity, specifically those of presence and imagination, accounts for the same primitive actualization? For could it not be said that Dufrenne's identification of the presence-representation-feeling structure of aesthetic perception yields the lived-object and thereby dwells upon the object as such in its specificity as it appears? And if these claims can be upheld, could we not go on to say that his descriptions of aesthetic perception penetrate to this primitive level with which we are here concerned, and therefore once explicated yield the substrates of aesthetic perception in both immediacy and depth?

Our responses to the preceding questions must be in the negative. The reasons for these replies stem once again from Dufrenne's
willingness to speak about meaning which is transcendent to consciousness, already ordered, structured and capable of being lived into by a spectator who undertakes to appropriate himself to the painting, and the various loci within it, in the very first place. It should be recalled that, for him, the meaning of the painting resides in the painting itself and is no way rooted in the spectator's appropriation to it. It exists as an already ordered, already structured expression which is capable of being perceptually inhabited and requires no constitution save for the spectator's adherence.

In effect this is to say that, because a painting is already appearing as structured and ordered, its meaning is not manifested in its appearance but rather its existence (NA 132). In saying this, Dufrenne is venturing into a region other than that given phenomenologically in appearance. This is legitimate in so far as no meaning can be exhausted in its appearing. But he violates this incontestable phenomenological fact and claims that the "structuring and making meaningful" of an object is expressed by the object itself (NA 132). "In consequence", he continues, "the a priori is not for the condition of objectivity which [proceeds] from the subject... it is objectivity itself since it is present in the object as constituting it"(NA 132). I claim, on the other hand, that positing any degree of an 'objective performance' is foundationless because it neglects the fundamental contribution of subjectivity by which
objectivity is objectivity and recognized as such. It is the first moment of such a recognition that the process of individuation is found. Further, the spectator lives in individuated perspectives which flow on to form a unified object. Whatever content is not given to the spectator, i.e. the notion of existence beyond the appearance, need not be rejected. But in the same breath, any claims made about it are at best speculative and foundationless. We have, therefore, no evidence which allows us to ground claims about 'objective performance' whereas the subjective performance is deployed originally in the primitive moments of perception and readily made available for reflection.

This places Dufrenne's descriptions at opposite ends from the descriptions we find and offer here. His emphasis on the subjective contribution to perception is clearly seen to be the reception of the objectivity of the aesthetic object with little attention paid to how subjectivity comes to receive it. His only attempt to attend to the spectator's contribution is found in his claims that a thing is not a thing without being correlative to a subject. This is to say that the subject is not responsible for constituting the meaning of the aesthetic object, and consequently we cannot gain insight into its meaning by focusing on the content immanent in the acts of the spectator. The meaning, rather, consists in its being already ordered and structured such that the spectator can live into it and this is the doing of the object itself. The spectator's performance is thus
relegated to mere reception of its meaning as manifested, however consubstantial with, and correlative to, the objectivity of the thing he may be in Dufrenne's account.

Once again, we must emphasize the need to take into account the act of individuation. It is essentially attentive to the thing as a perceived substrate. Further, it is essentially attentive to the internal horizon of the thing, attending to the perspectives and the various contents within according to which the thing appears. Both of these acts intend contents or lived-substrates, the meaning of which, if made explicit, yield the meaning of perception. Now as a phenomenologist, one must make explicit the meaning contributed in the act of individuation and the continua of meanings lived phase by phase. But before we can provide the actual content of these phases, there is still further characterization of the nature of this subjective performance required. To this end, we shall endeavour to show the precise manner in and by which the act of individuation is lived. And from this point, we will be in a solid position to consider the structure of perception as it functions in connivance with the aesthetic object.
§ 52: Individuation and anticipation as constitutive of the immanent meaning of a painting

The act of individuation, however doxic and pre-reflective, must be considered intelligent. This is to say that it is not a blind tendency towards its object. On the other hand, it presupposes a certain knowledge of the object even in its first tending toward it. Its second and more enduring tendings toward the object seek to bring about the appearance of it by attaining continually new internal horizons. The spectator, then, has a pre-reflective undeniable knowing presence to the object. And since presence always protends new and further presences, it should be said that the spectator pre-reflectively anticipates the attainment of new internal horizons. To cast this in an order of experience, we should say that the object appears initially 'empty' in the first act of individuation and becomes increasingly fulfilled in further acts of individuation. The continua of individuating acts should, then, be identified as being univocal with protention itself, providing the matter for the formal temporal structure. Individuation should therefore be identified in its temporal character as lived-anticipation. This anticipation which characterizes the act of protention should be considered as an intention which aims at substrates horizontal to the object itself.

This notion of anticipation should further be identified at the ground or Urspruung from which the meaning of the object is
elucidated. The first act of individuation grasps the meaning of *La Rue Montorgueil* as festive, but this festivity is not yet fulfilled. It begins to be fulfilled in the second level of individuations according to which the internal horizons are aimed at. These internal horizons, once they become the locus of our gaze, can be treated as substrates, themselves admitting of horizons of meanings or predicates. In tending toward these loci and their internal horizons, anticipation grasps meaning in very general terms, specifically in terms of 'same as' or 'other than' the substrate retained in it. Again, this is to recognize a subjective contribution in perception, specifically that of the use made of meaning sedimented within previous phases of perception and the assimilation of this meaning into general categories of 'sameness' and 'otherness' or 'newness' in the anticipation of further meanings in the flow of perception. The act by which otherness is arrested in the very first place yields the richness and diversity of the object and continues the task of fulfilling it as that object which is emptily intended in the first act of individuation.

This can be shown by referring to *La Rue Montorgueil*. At this point of our description we as spectators have firmly embraced this painting and are simply gazing about it internally, moving from one locus or point of interest to the next. We recognize its general air of festivity. But as phenomenologists, we must ask 'how does this pre-reflective recognition have validity for us?'. We have, in the last section, spoken about the street itself so that would be a good
thematic point to resume our description. When we dwell on the street, our perception assumes some legitimation when our anticipation of it as 'being capable of maintaining the activity of which a street is possible' is fulfilled. The people on the street seem to be engaged in participating in a celebration with no urgency to do anything else than just that. The street provides a background upon which this celebration is possible. But upon a closer inspection we find an element of otherness or dissimilarity within this locus of our gaze and its internal horizons. What we anticipate as people are more precisely seen as having no human attributes. They have no hands with which to gesture, no facial expressions and no feet on which to move from point to point. Further, what we anticipated as their clothing is seen to be expressed in nothing more than dabs of paint, a charcoal here, a dark spot there and the odd pale blue and white. This 'close inspection' yields data, then, which, based on our first moment of individuation within the sensuous, seems to be discontinuous with our anticipation.  

1 Recognition of these dabs of paint, Dufrenne could say, are symptomatic of treating the aesthetic object as a work of art (cf § 26). In turn, he could say that these descriptions do not touch upon the aesthetic object proper. We must insist, rather, that this distinction he makes is invoked reflectively. Pre-reflectively, after the first act of individuation and when individualizations of the second level take command, the spectator is committed to the sense of the aesthetic object proper. Brush-strokes and dabs of paint are thus legitimate data.
This notion of anticipation and the notion of an anticipation which is upset by a sense of newness or otherness upon a closer inspection can and should be exemplified further. But what is important in the immediate present is to give precision to this notion of 'further' or 'closer inspection'. It is important to give this act precision in order to locate it within the sphere of aesthetic perception itself. For, if it could be said that this closer inspection is derived from a reflective judgment which aims to 'see' the painting more clearly or specifically then it would seem that the spectator would be leaving the immediacy of presence and would engage in a reflective act. He would then be engaging in the rupture from presence which is characteristic of the upsurge of the acts of the understanding or reflective thinking. Ultimately, according to Dufrenne's thesis, this would entail that the spectator would be aborting aesthetic perception.

This 'closer inspection' to which I am referring, however, should not be interpreted in this sense. That is, it should not be interpreted as embodying any sense of reflection whatsoever. Rather the act itself is found within the retentional-protentional synthesis. The gaze individuates and fixes upon a specific locus, in this instance, the people on the street, in such a manner that it yields wholly to anticipation. This anticipation manifests itself according to a more intensified 'looking'. This is to say that anticipation itself protends the closer inspection as an extension of itself. It is not invoked
the closer inspection as an extension of itself. It is not invoked reflectively. Nor does it constitute a rupture from the spectator's presence to the aesthetic object. This 'closer inspection', rather, is a pre-reflective awareness. Its 'howness' consists in an anticipation of resolve, i.e. an anticipation that the sense of otherness which has upset the previous flow of my anticipations can be seen and experienced as harmonious with the anticipations themselves. In the case of the people on the street on La Rue Montorgueil, the anticipations which 'on a closer inspection' would yield people with human attributes, yet instead yield dabs of paint, is protended in the very act of paying homage to representation in the first place. It is the goal of this close inspection to pre-reflectively resolve the data or meaning which appears as discontinuous with an anticipation of figures with human attributes. And again it does so pre-reflectively.

Another example which can show the sense of otherness in represented aspects within the painting arises when our gaze moves from the street to the buildings at its sides. We expect, largely out of habit, a certain hardness of line to perceptually define architecture from its environment. For example, one would expect the tops of the buildings to be represented as well defined and sharp. Yet

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1 Or else it cannot. This will result in an unharmonious perception. The success of the work in this case, what Dufrenne refers to as the aesthetic value, will either manifest itself in this disharmony, or it will be lost due to the work's inability to self-exteriorize.
perceptually, the buildings represented are arrested as being somewhat rounded and feathery such that there is no precise demarcation between one building and another nor between the building top and the sky above. Despite this sense of otherness between that which we anticipate and what is actually represented in the sensuous, we follow their outline and recognize them immediately as buildings.

The above examples identify the notion of otherness which creeps into our anticipation of purely representational aspects in the sensuous. But we can also speak of anticipation and having our anticipations upset by a sense of otherness in the context of purely formal considerations, namely the colours in the flags. We should identify the flags as yet another possible internal horizon of the painting and as such it too can and should be treated as a theme yielded by an act of individuation at the second level. As we gaze at the flags, they preserve the unity manifested by the painting. Due to their very abundance, each gently streaming over crowded streets, the air of festivity is preserved. But if we were to dwell on a particularly visible flag we would find a sense of otherness within that arrestation of perceptual data immanent to the flag itself admitting dissimilarity. The blue seems to yield to our gaze, yet it still attracts us by offering a "contradiction between excitement and
repose"¹. The red, on the other hand, rather than yielding to our gaze overpowers and invades us such that we cannot relax². The white in between these two acts as a medium, itself neutral and therefore discontinuous with them, breaking up the surface of the flag and yet paradoxically providing a continuum between red and blue. Nonetheless the internal dissimilarity between anticipated repose and then being overpowered suffices to show otherness in phases of perception of the self-same represented object.

Now in each of these three examples, our abiding anticipation of a specific theme is 'upset', as Husserl says³. In the perception of the street activity, we anticipate people engaged in such a celebration. But this anticipation is upset by an element of newness, namely streaks of paint instead of represented human figures. In the perception of the buildings, the feathery demarcation between building and building, and building and sky represent a newness which is discontinuous with and upsetting to our anticipation of hard, fixed lines of demarcation. And last, in the perception of the flag, our overpowering the blue content and the pretended anticipation that will continue is upset by the perception of the red which instead of being overpowered by our gaze, itself overpowers our

¹ Goethe, Theory of Colours, p. 311.
² Goethe, op cit., p. 315.
³ Husserl, Experience and Judgment, pp. 88-9.
gaze. In each case there is a notice of newness which is radically other than the preceding phase and the anticipation to which we cling. We must ask, at this point, how *La Rue Montorgueil* has validity for us as spectators as a unified expression of festivity despite the various immanent loci which admit of conflicting moments of meaning, that is despite the various moments of otherness which upset our anticipations? Or perhaps more so, we should ask how each of these internal horizons presents itself in light of the dissimilarity and otherness within?

Let us begin with the latter. To provide an answer to this question, we should focus on the meanings of otherness or newness which upset our anticipations and how we establish perceptual equilibrium in the face of conflicting phases. In the perception of the celebrants on the street, our anticipation of figures with human attributes has been upset by the closer inspection which yields mere brush strokes and dabs of coloured paint. The two phases of this particular locus, the former being the anticipated perception of human figures and the latter, the recognition of dabs of paint, are in conflict with one another. There is a 'battle' between the two. But as we dwell more intimately and in increasing congruence with the self-given data of perception, the latter (that is, our arrestation of dabs of paint) wins. The former phase, however, does not disappear but rather paradoxically belongs to the unity of perception as, to use Husserl's
term, a 'null-member'\(^1\) such that the anticipation of human figures pervades all perceptual notice. They, thereby, retroactively occupy a status in the totality of preceding phases and are retended in the present phase or locus of our gaze. As a null-member, the preceding perception of human figures and the anticipations it engenders haunts all forthcoming phases with its sense of human attributes.

We should note that our recognition of newness and its significance in upsetting and assimilating previous phases is a subjective contribution which is absent in Dufrenne's account. The subjective performance can be cast in terms of predication. The content representing people on the street can be identified as a substrate. When we initially perceive the content as such, we live "S" as 'P'. But when we recognize the lack of human attributes to this perceived content, we live "S" as 'R'. The predicate in this 'lived-proposition' is not without being rooted in the predicate of the first individuated act. Thus, the awareness of brush strokes has retended in it the notice of figures complete with human attributes. The complete account of the perception at this point should therefore be read as "S' as 'PR'", with the former predicative term indicating that the latter is haunted by and included in, it. Even with the recognition of brush strokes there has been an immediate displacement in the retentional continua of phases. This is to say that the passing away

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\(^1\) Husserl, *Experience and Judgment*, p. 89.
from the locus of presence which was once occupied by the notice of human figures has been upset and displaced from our present preoccupation with activity on the street. In its place, a new phase results from the conflict of anticipations, that being the emergence of our notice of an arrangement of paint, haunted by an initial notice of human figures celebrating festivity.

This subjective performance is embedded in our presence to all objects and is deployed, if the perceived content demands it, in each and every act of simple awareness. The change in perceptual notice yields a change in the phases of perception. Perception still adheres to its fundamental formal structure of protention and retention, but the content yielded in its various phases is modified. The modification of protention and retention cannot be the result of a preconstituted objectivity as Dufrenne claims. This would imply that the aesthetic object is given and known as such yet appears other than in its immediate grasping. This, in turn, means that Dufrenne violates his own claim that the aesthetic object is given and known immediately as such. But if this were so, what we apprehend as people, for example, would be immediately apprehended as brush strokes and dabs of paint. To abide by Dufrenne's claim is to neglect the subjective activity which anticipates the possibility of people appearing in the brush strokes, buildings being clearly defined in their own identity despite their lack of precise boundary, and the
flags positively signifying festivity despite their internal formal dissonance.

But precision must be given to this criticism. To say that the world immanent to the aesthetic object is known immediately does not necessarily admit of neglect to subjective performance. Dufrenne is correct in emphasizing the spectator's immediate familiarity with the aesthetic object. The act identified as being equivocal with his description, the act of individuation, is intelligent. It therefore knows that to which it tends. But its knowing is an unfulfilled knowing which requires to be more concretely constituted in presence to the object. The spectator does not leave presence only to return to it in feeling, but rather the immanent acts of presence are contained within the first act of individuation; they only need to be explicated. Thus the thickness of perception which goes unnoticed in Dufrenne's account must be identified, and the act of the spectator must be noted. This in turn implies that Dufrenne's emphasis on the meaning of the immanent world of the aesthetic object as deriving its meaning from an objective a priori is amiss and unfounded. In focusing on the subjective contribution to perception as we have done in this Husserlian manner, we find evidence to claim that it is immediately constituted in the flux of perceptual phases. But this is not to introduce a new realm of Being as Dufrenne claims this kind of treatment does; nor is it to illegitimately fracture the unity of the object into different modes of Being. It is rather to recognize the
internal pregnancy of acts immanent in the arrestation and familiarity of the aesthetic quality of a specific painting.

The acts immanent in the immediate familiarity of the aesthetic quality of a painting thus constitute the painting in its appearing. The festive character of *La Rue Montorgueil* is constituted in the flow of phases in their protentional and retentional structure. These phases are characterized by intentions or individuations which, as said, are intelligent by nature. They aim at bringing to appearance the meaning immanent in the sensuous such that the painting as theme is fulfilled. Each intention retends the initial unfulfilled festivity as our gaze moves about the painting's immanent world. For example, our perception of the figures on the street is haunted by the retended unfulfilled festivity which legitimized them as human figures engaged in celebration. The undefined physiognomy of the figures takes away the sense of individual peculiarities and purposiveness; thus we are all invited to participate in this festivity irregardless of our individual quirks. The internal dissonance of the colours in the *Tricolore* similarly embody the same unfulfilled retended festivity. The red which invades our gaze to the point of repulsion is so brilliant yet exuberant that our recoil is one of being set back such that we too are spectators to this celebration. The blue which yields to our gaze is one of appeasement as opposed to ascetic reticence. We are thus at home being spectators to this celebration. And the imprecise demarcation of the buildings retend the same
unfulfilled festivity which haunts them as the background to the celebration itself.

The anticipation of meaning and the meanings which follow must be included in a description of aesthetic perception. If they are not, then we lapse into speculation and abort the phenomenological enterprise. Dufrenne is guilty of this precisely to the extent that he posits the already structured being of the aesthetic object.
§ 53: Conclusion: Dufrenne's 'naive ontologism'

We could go to greater lengths to describe the immanent world of *La Rue Montorgueil*. In fact, as phenomenonologists, our task is never completed. There is a constant need for the basic lived-substrates to be described. Further, there is a constant need for clarifying the sense of the explanation itself. But we have, at this point, begun to show 'how' we live our perceptions of an aesthetic object. We have, thus, located enough evidence to claim that there is indeed a subjective performance which has been neglected in Dufrenne's exposition. He has gone as far as noting the necessity of the spectator's assuming the aesthetic attitude in order to receive the meaning of the aesthetic object. But he has gone no further. His reasons for neglecting the meaning of subjective performance are due to his emphasis on the objective a priori. This is to say that he attributes primacy to the meaning immanent in, and belonging to, the aesthetic object. This meaning is said to be correlative to the spectator and therefore requires that the spectator takes note of it. But the acts by which the spectator comes to grips with this meaning are absent from Dufrenne's account. At best, the meaning could be said to be simply 'felt'. Thus in the last analysis, the spectator contributes nothing to the grasping of the aesthetic object save for accepting it on its own ground such that its meaning is deposited in him and that he
dwells upon this meaning in feeling. Even the acts of feeling, however, are not made explicit.

In neglecting the spectator's contribution to aesthetic perception, Dufrenne also neglects the ground by which meaning has validity for us in our perception. This ground is not something which deposits meaning in us. Rather it consists in the acts by which we as active spectators come to grips with an actual existent. To come to grips with an existent does not require that we make it, as Dufrenne seems to feel this kind of treatment entails. It requires, rather, that we as spectators taking note of it actually do take note of it: that we as perceivers actually do perceive it. The phases by which we take note of it and perceive it are the condition for the appearing of the object, not the naive supposition that an object deposits meaning in us in a stimulus-response type fashion. Despite the attempts Dufrenne has undertaken to avoid a stimulus-response mode of perception, he seems to have lapsed into it to a certain extent. But only to a certain extent. He does not identify the subject as an empty receptacle as in classical empiricism. Still, the subject is receptive and only upon the reception of meaning does he find a knowledge re-awakened as something 'already-known' and as something of which we are immediately familiar.

Now we cannot contest the notion of immediate familiarity. The perceived always admits of perceptual meaning. We are familiar with this meaning by virtue of being perceivers. We are moved by it;
we shy from it; we dwell upon it. In each case, however, we always appropriate ourselves to it and our appropriation itself is grounded in some degree of familiarity. But Dufrenne's insistence on immediate familiarity lends itself to the interpretation that the aesthetic object externalizes itself for us rather than admitting that we as spectators play an active role in the expression of this immanent world.

Included in Dufrenne's position is the thesis that the immanent world of the aesthetic object exists as a pre-constituted spectacle which requires no activity on our behalf save for our adherence to it. In offering this thesis, Dufrenne is guilty of what we could refer to as 'naive ontologism'. The immanent world of the aesthetic object is reified into a thing, however 'unreal' in his account. Its reification consists in its being posited as already structured and ordered as that with which we are immediately familiar, rather than being unveiled in our perceptual experience such that we discover its ever-increasing depths of immanent meaning. It is posited without due reference to the subjective activity by which it deserves the name phenomenon, namely the spectator's arrestation of lived-meaning. Its meaning is accounted for, rather, by the unfounded identification of a pregnant conception of a priori meaning. He falls into naive ontologism by assuming that the meaning displayed in the sensuous has an ontic status both in-itself and by-itself, however for-the-spectator it may be, and that it merely deposits its meaning in its subjective correlate, i.e. the spectator. In addition he does not explain
how the spectator comes to grips with this in-itself-for-him. Dufrenne thereby does not penetrate to the origin of meaning. Even if he claims that it is Being in its pregnancy, Dufrenne does not describe how Being has validity for us in our perception apart from it being consubstantial with us and us with it, such that we recognize its meaning once it is deposited in us. His naive ontologism, thus, treats the subjective acts of appropriation as subordinate to being and gives primacy to the objectivity which deposits its meaning in the subject.

My claim, on the other hand, does not contest the immediate recognition of meaning however implicit and unfulfilled it may be. But rather than positing it, I show that immanent to his recognition there is a matrix of acts contributed by subjectivity, all of which consist in phases and flow together to yield a unified whole, namely the perception of the aesthetic object. Further, this is not to contest the consubstantiality we have with the aesthetic object. It is rather to make this consubstantiality explicit, thereby showing the aesthetic dimension of meaning as perceived and lived in perception. Our

1 André de Muralt (L'Idée de la Phénoménologie: L'exemplarisme Husserlién (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958) makes a similar observation but his emphasis is placed on a different terminus within the aesthetic process. De Muralt is critical of Dufrenne's insistence on the primacy of Nature at the expense of the human artist. Due to this emphasis, the artist's creative activity is subordinated to Nature (c.f. PE 673). The artist has no 'creative choice', therefore, and is reduced to the function of a pure instrument of Being (op. cit., p. 360). De Muralt thus claims that there is a lack of recognition on the subjective activity, and what we have identified as 'naive ontologism' is at work with concerns regarding the creative activity of the artist.
consubstantiality is found in and founded upon our tending toward meaning, not the objective act of depositing meaning and the subjective act of receiving it. Our tending toward the aesthetic object does not create it; rather it aligns us with objectivity and allows it to appear in its own right.
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