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SOCIAL THEORY AND CHRISTIAN PRAXIS

IN THE WRITINGS OF METROPOLITAN ANDREI SHEPTYTSKY, 1899–1944

by Andrii Krawchuk

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degrees of Doctor of Philosophy (Theology) and Doctor of Theology

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"Social Theory and Christian Praxis in the Writings of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, 1899-1944"

by Andrii Krawchuk

ABSTRACT

As the Eastern-rite Catholic Metropolitan Archbishop of L'viv, Galicia, during a period of turbulent social and political change, Andrei Sheptytsky played a key role in the social history of that western region of Ukraine. During his tenure in office, Galicia would change political hands so many times that the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in the first half of the twentieth century provides a unique case study of Church-state relations. At that same time, Ukrainian society was also undergoing profound change, particularly in connection with the emergence of a Ukrainian national movement which began to wage a struggle for political self-determination. Metropolitan Sheptytsky found himself faced with the task of addressing issues that emerged as a result of both of those social and political processes.

This dissertation surveys the social thought and activity of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, as a contextual instance of Catholic social ethics. Proceeding chronologically through the five major periods which the Metropolitan's career encompassed, it focusses on the key social and political issues that Metropolitan Sheptytsky addressed, with a view toward shedding new light on his ethical reflection.

In each period, the analysis follows three steps which are derived from Glen H. Stassen's (1980) typology of moral reasoning. The first step is a reconstruction of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's empirical reading of a situation or problem which called for ethical reflection.
And, since Metropolitan Sheptytsky very often also gave theological assessments of ethical problems and their broader implications, we also include this dimension of his preliminary reflection as part of the first step. The second step focusses on the rules and principles to which Sheptytsky referred in developing an ethical response to the problem. The third step examines the specific courses of action that the Metropolitan took in implementing his ethical decisions.

A close study of the Metropolitan's writings and activity clearly indicates that the operative norms of his theoretical and practical reflection on social and political issues were the Christian principles of love and justice, rather than nationalist or other political principles, as many have suggested.

In the social sphere, Sheptytsky's critics and supporters alike have argued that, under his leadership, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church became a national Church, aligned with the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Similarly, Metropolitan Sheptytsky's social thought and activity is commonly thought to have been influenced by Ukrainian nationalist ideas and influences.

The present study of the Metropolitan's social teaching and activity calls into question the above supposition, which does not appear to be supported by the evidence of the Metropolitan's social writings and activity. On the contrary, Sheptytsky's critique of militant nationalism and chauvinism, as well as his advocacy of Christian patriotism reveals that his social reflection was grounded in the Christian ethical norm of fraternal love. Other important social issues that the Metropolitan addressed (such as the socioeconomic action of the Church, socialism, and communism), and which are
examined here also reveal his commitment to the same fundamental norm of Christian ethics.

In the political sphere, much has been made of the accommodating posture which the Metropolitan assumed toward states and occupying authorities in each of the periods considered here. By focussing exclusively on those efforts by the Metropolitan to seek a modus vivendi, it has been argued that Sheptytsky was a loyal collaborator with the civil power of the moment (with particular emphasis on the period of the German occupation).

The present study analyzes Metropolitan Sheptytsky's approach to the question of Church-state relations in the five periods. What emerges is a complex approach to Church-state relations, one that was governed by a principle of justice expressed as a reciprocity of rights and duties. In that framework, it becomes clear that the Metropolitan did not consider the accommodationist line in the Pauline call to obey civil authority as an absolute principle, but rather as a rule of thumb which could be overridden by higher principles and values (for example, the state's duty to provide "wise leadership" and to issue "just dictates," and the ultimate precedence of divine over human law). The appeal to those higher principles was based on an assessment of the needs of the concrete situation at hand, and Metropolitan Sheptytsky showed considerable attentiveness to extremely complex and constantly changing situations. Other political issues that Sheptytsky addressed—in particular, the delineation of legitimate levels of political activity by priests—reveal a similar use of a language of rights and duties, and an underlying commitment to justice as the fundamental norm governing and defining the scope of the political action of the Church.
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INTRODUCTION

A. The Context

The industrial revolution brought dramatic social and economic changes to nineteenth century Europe whose impact was also felt in the intellectual life of the Catholic Church. By the end of the century, a new focus had emerged within the official ethical discourse of the Church: the social encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII addressed a broad range of social, political and economic issues of the day.

In the progressive shift from feudalism to parliamentary democracy, from clericalism to secularization and socialism, and, by the early twentieth century, from monarchic to republican structures, the Church found itself faced with unprecedented new questions about the nature of its role in society and of its relationship with the state in its new forms. And, since those processes of change were occurring at different rates in different European countries, papal social teaching would, from its very beginnings, require an ever increasing degree of practical interpretation and implementation by local episcopates. For, in so far as Catholic social teaching was by its very nature addressed to the economic, social and political reality of Christian communities, in order to become incarnate, so to speak, it would have to be attuned to the contextual, social reality, following Leo XIII's call "to look upon the world as it truly is." Hence, the emergence of papal social teaching was accompanied by a corresponding new importance of individual episcopal conferences as a mediating point between the official teaching of the Vatican and the particular social context.
A unique context for the application of Catholic social doctrine was that of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in the Austrian province of Galicia. Situated at the crossroads between two Christian cultures—Orthodox, tsarist Russia to the east and Latin-rite Polish Catholicism to the west—the story of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church was one of an attempt to bridge the divide between the Christian East and West. Historically, under the terms of its reunion with Rome in 1596, the Church had become Catholic but retained its Byzantine Slavic heritage. Thus, its Eastern roots were evident in a distinctive liturgical and ascetical tradition, one which refused to compartmentalize or separate moral theology from the total Christian life of prayer, and which took the community of worship and faith as the point of departure in its ethical reflection on society. Unity with Rome brought contacts with the West and provided access to schools, all of which raised the level of theological training among the Greek Catholic clergy. In addition, Western theological tracts were translated into Ukrainian and Ukrainian Catholic theologians drew heavily on Western sources, and, by the late nineteenth century, the social teachings of Leo XIII were on the local agenda in Austrian Galicia.

Catholic Austria had conferred upon this Church not only the title "Greek Catholic" but equal status with the Roman Catholic Church in the empire, along with an array of attendant social, economic and political privileges. For their part, the priests of the Greek Catholic Church, and later their children, were in the vanguard of the emerging Ukrainian movement for social, political and economic change: along with his pastoral and family responsibilities, the Greek Catho-
lic pastor was to be found organizing the first farm and credit co-
operatives, raising the national consciousness of the peasants and
participating in the political action that was intended to improve the
socioeconomic conditions of Ukrainian life. And, in the absence of an
extensive Ukrainian political representation, it was often the bishops
who, as *ex officio* members of the upper house ("Herrenhaus") in the
Viennese parliament, brought forth the needs of their people in the
political forum.

Such was the context into which in 1865 the aristocratic family
of Jan Szeptycki and Zofia z Fredrów welcomed the birth of a son,
Roman Alexander Maria. The personal journey by which the Polish, Roman
Catholic Count Roman was to become Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky
of the Greek Catholic Archeparchy of L'viv has been, and no doubt will
continue to be the subject of research, discussion and speculation.
Yet, although in its particular sociocultural environment this transit-
ion could scarcely have been seen as anything short of astonishing,
it is less so when one bears in mind that, among his many illustrious
ancestors, Roman Alexander could count, in the eighteenth century, no
less than four bishops of the Greek Catholic Church, two of them
Metropolitans of Kiev.

The future metropolitan's higher education began with the study
of law in Cracow. Having fulfilled his father's wish with a degree in
that field, in 1888 Roman took the momentous step of joining the
Galician Eastern-rite order of Basilian monks which had only recently
undergone a major reform by the Society of Jesus. It was thus as a
Basilian novice that he received his theological training and monastic
formation. As a highly educated priest (ordained in 1892), as a cel-
bate in a Church the vast majority of whose priests were married, and
as a monk who showed both initiative and skill in performing a wide variety of tasks ranging from novice master, to preacher, to co-founder and contributor to the religious periodical Misionar, Sheptytsky was eminently "episcopabile." And so it was that, in 1899, at the age of thirty-four, he was appointed bishop of Stanyslaviv. A year later, after the death of Metropolitan Yuliian Kulivs'kyi, Bishop Andrei was nominated to the Metropolitan See of L'viv.

As if the social issues with which Metropolitan Sheptytsky would deal in his forty-four years in office were not sufficiently complex in themselves, between 1900 and 1944 the territory of the Greek Catholic Archeparchy of L'viv (east Galicia) changed political hands numerous times. In fact, so closely was Sheptytsky's own life bound up with the social history of Galicia in those years that it is useful to suggest a periodization of his social thought and activity that centers on four pivotal moments in the political history of Galicia: September, 1914, when tsarist Russian forces occupied Galicia and exiled the Metropolitan into Russia; March, 1923, when in Paris the Council of Ambassadors decided to allow the incorporation of east Galicia into the new Polish republic; September, 1939, when the Soviets invaded Galicia; and July, 1941, when Germany took Galicia and held it for three full years, withdrawing only three months before the death of the Metropolitan.

Within each of the five periods that those four moments define, Metropolitan Sheptytsky faced an array of social and political challenges that demanded his ethical reflection and response as a Catholic bishop. Accordingly, it has been a key task of the present study to discover the nature of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's theoretical
and practical approaches to perceived ethical problems in each of those periods.
B. Statement of the Problem

The social role of the Greek Catholic Church was shaped by factors that reached back to the ninth-century Cyrillo-Methodian roots of Slavic Christianity. In contrast to the Western missionary model, according to which unity with the universal Church meant cultural adaptation to Latin forms, the mission to the Slavs had taken the path of translation of the gospel and liturgical books into the vernacular. This, in Jaroslav Pelikan’s estimation, paved the way for a uniquely Eastern identification of cultus and culture: one in which the development of Christian culture was to take on a decidedly contextual, autochthonous character, and in which the life of the Church would come to be characterized by a powerful “bond with the total life of the people.”

The question that such a linkage raises is whether the Ukrainian Church’s proximity to the culture extended as well to the political order or, in other words, whether the local Church was in fact a state church. In the case of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in the first half of the twentieth century, there was little possibility for such alliances with a national state since, with only momentary exceptions, the predominantly Ukrainian population of Galicia was to remain part of non-Ukrainian political entities. Even in the last two decades of the relatively favorable context of multinational, imperial Austria, whose monarchic values the Greek Catholic Church endorsed and cultivated, the road from L’viv to Vienna was seen as an avenue of political appeal for justice in Galicia rather than as a path between two homes.

Another factor preventing a total fusion of the Ukrainian Catho-
lic Church with the respective states within which it would find itself was that, in the task of interpreting the social message of the gospel to its nationally-conscious people, the Greek Catholic Church had recourse to yet another supra-national instance: Rome.

Closely related to the question about the nature of the Ukrainian Catholic Church's relationships with a range of political administrations in Galicia in the first half of this century is a question about the ethical reflection and decision-making of its leader, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, in the area of social and political issues and especially in regard to the Ukrainian national movement.

In the literature that deals with Metropolitan Sheptytsky's life and activity - whether in a scholarly, hagiographic, polemical or popular fashion - two fundamentally opposed schools of thought have emerged. On the one hand, Soviet writers have alleged that the Greek Catholic Church under Sheptytsky betrayed its bond with the Ukrainian people by endorsing militant Ukrainian nationalism and Hitler's plans for Eastern Europe. On the other hand, many students of Sheptytsky in the West have extolled the unity of the Church and Ukrainian society, some even rallying around that principle as a sort of unqualified sine qua non for the definition of the local Church. Basic, factual inaccuracy in the former position obliges one to question the scholarly responsibility of those who advance it while, in the latter case, ambiguity at the level of principles lends itself to a transformation of the Church into a political tool that has forfeited its critical perspective and which instead is locked into an intransigent assertion: "my people right or wrong".

It is perhaps ironic that, despite the difference in intrinsic problems, these diametrically-opposed views should actually share the
same fundamental premise: that under Metropolitan Sheptytsky, the Ukrainian Catholic Church fused completely and, by implication, uncritically with the Ukrainian national movement. From their respective ideological frameworks, Soviet critics have concluded that Sheptytsky was a "bourgeois nationalist" who willingly collaborated with Nazi Germany, while nationally-minded Ukrainians in the West have pointed to his patriotism in support of their struggle against Soviet communism.

It is not our purpose to enter into the polemical fray - whether to condemn or to canonize. Rather, an attempt is made to come to grips with and to understand the process of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's ethical reflection and activity in its context, through a thorough study of a resource that has been all-too-often neglected on both sides of the ideological divide: the actual writings of the Metropolitan on social and political issues.

C. Hypothesis

The hypothesis advanced here calls into question the presumed identification by Metropolitan Sheptytsky of the Ukrainian Catholic Church with the Ukrainian national movement and the related suggestion that his ethical reflection on social and political issues was guided by political ideology. To the contrary, it is proposed that the key to an accurate understanding of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's ethical reflection on social issues, and indeed the basis of his ethical decisions in the socio-political sphere, is to be sought not in a commitment to the a priori principles of some political ideology, but in a pains-taking effort of assessing the central social and political problems
as they existed in Galicia and then of addressing them through a practical implementation of the social message of the gospel and the Catholic social teaching.

Moreover, an adequate understanding of Sheptytsky’s approach to social and political issues must account not only for what positive things he had to say about the Ukrainian national movement, but his constructive criticism as well; nor can it selectively speak of his condemnation of communism, while at the same time overlooking the related distinction that he repeatedly drew between the struggle against false teachings and the Christian duty to love even the enemies of the Church.
D. Method

The method of inquiry that is employed here applies a number of categories outlined by Glen H. Stassen in his essay "Critical variables in Christian social ethics" (1980). Stassen has described dimensions of ethical reasoning by which moral arguments and types of moral reasoning may be classified.

The first set of questions that we have brought to the Metropolitan's writings in each period has to do with what Stassen calls the "perception of the situation." This dimension of ethical reasoning contains two variables that have a special importance to the present study: the question of the nature of authority in society and an appreciation of the perceived threat. In the unstable, constantly changing political and social environment in which he found himself, Metropolitan Sheptytsky repeatedly had to reflect on the nature, locus and limits of the prevailing civil authority at a given moment and on how it affected or challenged the authority of the Church. Related to this question, yet extending also beyond Church-state relations, was the matter of determining the main threat that was posed to the Church and to society at any given moment. In the case of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, so extensive is the linkage of empirical and theological considerations within this variable, that we have found it useful to include his theological interpretations as an integral part of his reading of social and political situations. (Stassen's suggestion - that in cases where the perceived threat is linked extensively to other elements one can expect to find broadly-stated solutions, such as calls for fundamental repentance by masses of people - is amply borne out in Sheptytsky's writings).
A second set of questions that have guided this inquiry have to do with what Stassen calls the "mode of moral discourse." This dimension contains four possible types of approach to ethical decision-making: situationism, which relies on non-binding rules of thumb; legalism, which refers to specific rules and directives; principlism, which is guided by the principles that underlie rules; and contextualism, which situates moral problems within the context of one's basic beliefs about the nature of God, His action, and human responsibility. Thus, following from an account of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's ethical (empirical and theological) readings of situations, the next step we have taken has been to ask: what are the operative ethical categories to which he appealed, and how did they shape his moral reasoning?

Rather than following only one of the modes to the exclusion of the others, Metropolitan Sheptytsky took a differentiated approach which drew on elements of all four modes and which saw ethical discourse as a mediating point between the empirical perspective of the situational mode and the faith perspective of the contextual mode. While underlying situational and contextual elements in Sheptytsky's ethical reflection emerge from our first step, we proceed in the second step to examine the more explicit, didactic modes of legalism and principlism. Beyond identifying the rules and principles to which the Metropolitan referred in his approach to social issues, an important part of answering the question about their impact has involved searching out situations in which general rules or guidelines were overridden by appeals to deeper principles and trying to find the underlying constants and variables in Metropolitan Sheptytsky's ethical reflection on social issues. At the foundational level of
basic beliefs, this second analytical step has also touched on the interaction of love and justice as norms of moral reflection and on the perceived social mission of the Church.

The final step in our analysis, an examination of the practical implementation by Metropolitan Sheptytsky of ethical decisions in the socio-political sphere has been carried out with a view toward further clarifying his preferred means of achieving social change in the concrete situation. This level of our analysis sheds light on the Metropolitan’s attentiveness and adaptability to the changing needs of a social environment in flux, as well as a capacity for self-criticism and self-correction.

The areas of Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s social reflection which are studied here may be seen as falling into two broad categories: the Church’s external relations with a variety of states and political orders, and the Church’s internal reflection on its life as a community of faith. Within each of the five chronological periods, different issues emerged both externally and internally, and this in turn resulted in different types of substantive analysis and response by the Metropolitan. Those variations notwithstanding, however, at the formal level we have tried to maintain throughout a focus on the same three analytical steps, namely: empirical and theological assessments of the ethical situations and problems, moral reasoning and its grounding, and the practical implementation of ethical decisions.

E. Terminology

The official name of the Ukrainian Catholic Church under Austria was "Greek Catholic," as distinct from the (Polish) Roman Catholic
Church. As the ethnic designation of the people, "Ruthenian" (from the German "Ruthenen"), came gradually to be replaced in general usage by the people concerned with "Ukrainian" between 1914 and 1918, the Greek Catholic Church began to refer to both itself and its people as "Ukrainian." However, in Polish-ruled Galicia between 1919 and 1939, the ethnic designation was prohibited and instead the denominational "Greek Catholic" was retained for official purposes.

Following the accepted scholarly convention in modern Ukrainian historiography, we use only the term "Ukrainians" to refer to the Ukrainian people of Galicia. As a general rule, the term "Ruthenian" appears only in direct quotations. The official denominational "Greek Catholic" and the unofficial ethnic "Ukrainian Catholic" are used here alternately, and sometimes together, since they refer to one and the same Church.

F. Transliteration


For the transliteration of the Metropolitan's name, see n. 3.
CHAPTER 1:

THE SOCIAL TEACHING AND PRAXIS OF METROPOLITAN ANDREI SHEPTYTSKY

IN THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE UP TO THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR I (1899 - 1914)

A. Introduction

This chapter surveys Metropolitan Sheptytsky's social reflection in the pre-World War I period of his episcopate. Four areas of Sheptytsky's social reflection are analyzed: the social action of the Church, the political involvement of priests, Church-state relations and Polish-Ukrainian relations.

The Metropolitan's reflection on Christian social action was an attempt to apply some of the official teachings of the Catholic Church to socioeconomic concerns in Galicia. As elsewhere in Europe, the rise of socialism in Austrian Galicia was perceived by the local Church as an economic, but also an ideological, challenge. In the spirit of Pope Leo XIII's teachings, Metropolitan Sheptytsky sought ways of reaffirming his Church's commitment to the advancement of the social and economic welfare of Ukrainian Catholics without yielding to secularization.

His second concern was with political activism among priests. In the Austrian context, political participation by the clergy and hierarchy had had a long history. But the proliferation of political parties in the latter part of the nineteenth century engendered an unprecedented form of divisiveness, and that divisiveness extended into the internal life of the Church. The Metropolitan therefore found it necessary to delineate the nature and limits of acceptable political involvement by priests.
The third issue that Sheptytsky addressed was that of Church-state relations. From the Church's perspective, secular tendencies in the Vienna and local Galician parliaments at the turn of the century were undermining the traditional Church-state harmony. This led Metropolitan Sheptytsky to adopt a more assertive stance in order to defend the Christian social values which he felt were threatened.

Finally, a social issue that was unique to the Galician context was the question of Polish-Ukrainian relations. It too had had a long history, and in the first sixteen years of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's episcopate the question continued to be the backdrop for social conflict. As a man who had been raised as a Polish Roman Catholic but who later chose to return to his Eastern Christian and ethnically Ukrainian roots, Metropolitan Sheptytsky brought a unique perspective and ethical proposals to the issue of conflicting patriotisms in Austrian Galicia.
B. The Social Question and Socialism

Whereas what came to be known as the "social question" in western Europe had sprung from industrialization and the attendant processes of social and economic change, the situation in Austrian Galicia was significantly different. Austrian policy had not favored industrial development in the province, but instead perpetuated a quasi-colonial agricultural economy that was subservient to the interests and priorities of the empire. Unlike western Europe where, according to Pope Leo XIII the condition of the working classes was "the pressing question of the hour," the social question facing the Greek Catholic Church in pre-industrial Galicia was centered on the endemic poverty among Ukrainian peasants that led to economic unrest and to a massive wave of emigration at the turn of the century.

1. Metropolitan Sheptytsky's empirical and theological assessments of the social question in Galicia

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky's pastoral letter "O kvestiі sotsial'nyi" ("On the Social Question," 1904) was the first serious attempt by a Greek Catholic hierarch in Austrian Galicia to grapple with the socioeconomic problems of the country. Inspired by the social teachings of Leo XIII's encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891), Sheptytsky set out to apply them to the specific needs of the situation in Galicia.

The Metropolitan was aware that the changes that European society had undergone were traceable to the industrial revolution; that in the new social order, capital was taking precedence over labor; that capital and power were concentrated in the hands of a few; and that the result was mutual hatred between the social classes. In Galicia,
this problem was further complicated by other factors. As the Metropolitan observed:

"The situation in our region is becoming even more difficult: this is because of the insupportable economic situation of the entire land, endless political struggles, excessive taxes, and a level of education among the peasants that is lower than anywhere else."

Sheptytsky saw the crisis as a precarious state of affairs that called for meticulous reflection; facile solutions would only exacerbate the lot of the poor. The social question was real, not metaphysical; the solution would likewise have to be tangible and concrete.

The pressing socio-economic issues in Galicia were closely tied to external challenges that were directed at the Church: a secularizing tendency had arisen in the form of a politically effective Ukrainian intelligentsia. The emergence of socialism had introduced a compelling program for social change and more equitable economic relationships, yet by the same token it was perceived by the Church as a threat to its hitherto exclusive moral hold on the popular mind. Indeed, by the turn of the century, the movement had made significant strides in advancing and speaking for the main social stratum among Galician Ukrainians, primarily peasants, and thereby loosened the clerical grip on the population.

This gave rise to religious concerns that a massive exodus from the Church could follow. The Church therefore made efforts to fore- stall any such movement, and did so with particular vehemence in the press. Religious periodicals published polemical tracts directed
against the "enemies of the Church" and tried to expose their methods and alleged goals to the public. In the decade and a half that preceded World War I, there was a sense of urgency in the Greek Catholic Church over socialism. In the apocalyptic words of the Ukrainian bishops in 1906: "We are approaching the moment when there will be only two camps in the world: that of Christ and that of his opponents."

Metropolitan Sheptytsky recognized that a powerful process of democratization was underway and, evaluating that development in light of the gospel, he welcomed the new efforts to improve the lot of the poor and the oppressed. Indeed, he felt strongly enough about this to open his major social pastoral letter with the words:

"The democratic movement, which throughout Europe is rallying all people of good will to the defence of the poor and the oppressed, is not foreign to the Church but, on the contrary, is very much favored (yest' sympatychnym) by priests of all countries, for the spirit of Christ's Gospel is also democratic through and through."

Yet even if there was a Christian basis for welcoming democratization, Metropolitan Sheptytsky also saw problems connected with the new social consciousness. The traditionally hierarchical, monarchical structures of both the state and the Church were being shaken by a sustained critique and bold new alternatives, and this collision of establishment and innovation resulted in a crisis of authority. As a hierarch of the Church, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was concerned that matters could potentially get out of hand:

"A spirit of disobedience to authority - which in our time
is spreading throughout Europe, which is gaining momentum through the diffusion of a theory of exaggerated freedom and absolute equality, and whose flame is fuelled by every abuse by the organs of power, by every illegality and injustice — is but one facet of a revolutionary spirit that has won adherents among our own people, and which could possibly plunge our people into an abyss of misfortune."

The "theory of exaggerated freedom and absolute equality" referred to socialism. The Metropolitan believed that, in the struggle for social and economic justice in Galicia, the fundamental distinctions between Christianity and socialism were being ignored:

"Among those in our land who more or less admit to being socialists, there are many Christians who are not sufficiently aware of the principles of the Church and of the principles of socialism. They adopt the latter because they see in them the fulfilment of their desires for social reform."

Philosophical ignorance of what was really at stake left the Galician public highly susceptible to socialist agitation. For their part, the socialists were all-too ready to exploit that ignorance. Well aware that "the banner of improving the lot of the poor" was also being raised by the Church, the socialists were "so adept at winning people over that they became leaders of the people/without many of them even realizing it."

By virtue of its secular, anticlerical, and "anti-Christian" nature, socialism was perceived by the Metropolitan as a threat to the
Christian foundations of Ukrainian society. In seeking solutions to the social question "without any regard for ethical or religious principles," socialists were undermining those foundations and thus were propagating an activity that was "harmful to the faith and to society."

But the threat of socialism was not limited to only the faithful. The social action of the Greek Catholic clergy was also at a crossroads: Sheptytsky felt that the difference between "democratic, Christian (social) action" and the work of socialists was not adequately understood in Galicia. Consequently, socialist tendencies in the Church's social action (i.e., in the work of priests) threatened to turn that constructive work from its proper ultimate purpose, the salvation of souls, into the spiritual ruin of the entire people:

"We must in the first place stand on guard for those ethical principles of divine revelation without which our entire socio-economic work will lead our people into perdition."

The Metropolitan feared that, unless the lines between Christianity and socialism were clearly drawn for all to see in Galicia, the Christian social action of his priests risked becoming syncretized with socialism. In Sheptytsky's reading of the situation, therefore, the implicit danger of the movement toward social and economic reform was that it could easily be diverted from its worthy ideals by a spirit of revolutionary upheaval, the evidence of which he saw in other countries. The Metropolitan was concerned that any such fusion of democratic and revolutionary tendencies could only bring negative social consequences, "an abyss of misfortune." Rather than reinforcing
the Christian faith and social values among the faithful, it would secularize the people and turn them over to the socialist camp.

2. Principles: Sheptytsky's guidelines for Christian social action

In applying Christian social teaching to the socioeconomic concerns in Galicia, Metropolitan Sheptytsky set forth a number of fundamental distinctions and practical guidelines that would keep the social action of his clergy on a course that could not be confused with the work of the socialists.

a. fundamental differences between Christian and socialist remedies

At the level of foundational principles, he drew distinctions between Christian and socialist remedies to the social question in two main areas: the right to property and the ideal of equality.

The first distinction had to do with the means of achieving a just distribution of wealth in society: whereas socialism stood for the abolition of private property, the Church considered it a natural and inalienable right, a first principle of its social action.

In elaborating the retentionist argument, Sheptytsky drew on many of the natural law premises that had also been employed by Pope Leo XIII in his encyclical *Rerum Novarum*: private property was a natural right that was historically confirmed by human customs and laws as well as by divine law; the right to the permanent possession of things, as opposed to their temporary use, was derived from human rationality and the capacity to reflect on needs for future welfare; a worker who cultivated land had a right not only to the fruits that were harvested, but to the land itself; the right to own property was also linked to a father's natural law obligation to provide for
the needs of his family; and remuneration was not the only incentive to work, for a worker was also entitled to the liberty of choosing how to spend his wages, a liberty that would be lost through the abolition of private property. Moreover, the Church took the view that abolition of private property would necessarily lead to harmful social consequences and economic stagnation.

The other fundamental distinction was over the ideal of human equality. Socialism was said to advocate absolute equality, which the Church criticized as a false ideal with no basis in human nature and impossible to achieve. In fact, the argument went, human life was full of natural inequalities over which people had no control, and it was deceptive and ultimately harmful to society to stir up hope for complete equality.

Here as well, Sheptytsky drew on the notion of "natural human inequalities" that was given in *Rerum Novarum*: inequalities of capacity, skill, health, strength and fortune, also citing differences in the degrees of diligence to which people became masters of their own progress, and in the (moral or amoral) perspective from which one "either corrected or spoiled what nature has bestowed." Such inequalities were, he declared, a fact of life.

b. distinctive features of Christian social action

In addition to those foundational distinctions, Christian social action differed from the socialist program in its guiding principles and aims, which we summarize in five points.

First, the Church based its social action on an alternative ethical interpretation of social and economic value. The distinctiveness of this interpretation lay in its focus on the eternal life as
the main point of reference:

"This brief life is followed by an eternal life – only then is it a real life (‘se dopera pravdyve zhytie’). Whether one possesses wealth or not is a matter that in its very essence is irrelevant. Only one thing has any bearing on true, eternal happiness, namely: how one makes use of the gifts he has received."

In light of the eternal life, temporal goods did not have any intrinsic moral value but were ethically assessed according to whether they served as effective means to achieving the ultimate, spiritual purpose of human life.

Similarly, contrary to popular attitudes, poverty was not seen by the Church as demeaning, since "human worth is not decided by possessions or by public opinion," but by virtue and merit. Nor was human suffering merely a material phenomenon that could be easily undone; it was a consequence of original sin and would not be removed from temporal life: "Nothing doing, it is necessary to see things as they are; to suffer is human." Yet, in view of the afterlife, this was not a form of fatalism; rather, human suffering acquired new meaning as a part of a pilgrim’s journey: "Man is a traveller in this world; his homeland (‘vitchyna’) is heaven." Christian social action therefore framed the social question within the larger context of the eternal destiny of man. While the commitment to socioeconomic progress was authentic, the ultimate goal of human progress was not in this world.

Second, in transmitting this teaching on the ultimate goal of human life, the Church was further guided in its social action by a
special commitment to the poor (similar to what we would now call the "preferential option"). Avoiding any struggle between the social classes, Sheptytsky stressed that through its priests the Church "...in upholding social morality, must decisively take a stand in defence of those who are unable to defend themselves effectively, and must set itself to work on all their grievances, even at the risk of its own welfare."

The Church recognized that rich and poor alike had legitimate claims on its assistance; but the poor were entitled to "special care and assistance" by virtue of "their more difficult and greater need." In this regard, the rich were also enjoined to show true charity toward the poor, above and beyond perfunctory almsgiving. Unlike socialism, which incited the poor to rise up against the rich and portrayed the two sides as natural enemies, the Church favored a path of reconciliation.

Third, the Church defended the legitimate rights of workers: prohibiting employers from exploiting their workers or treating them as slaves; reminding them of their duty to pay a just wage and warning them that withholding a salary was a sin "that cries to the avenging anger of heaven." In particular, the Church opposed the liberal view of labor as a commodity whose value was judged solely on the basis of supply and demand in the open market. On the contrary, the Christian view of labor was that it was a piece of the worker's life, a part of his mortal existence; furthermore, a worker had legitimate material and religious needs. All of these were factors that the Church considered important in the calculation of a just wage, that is, one which would reflect an equality of work and pay, as
required by natural law.

Fourth, as opposed to the limited capacity of human laws to achieve complete justice in the social order, the Church availed itself of another recourse. Civil authority, Metropolitan Sheptytsky declared,

"...ends where the internal conscience of people begins. To influence that conscience is a matter for the divine law and for the Church which protects it and which leads people to its fulfilment."

Similarly,

"Reviewing our /civil/ codices and statutes, we often recognize that in many cases the measure of what we call 'justice' in legal terms is not in fact just."

Restricted as they were to external reality, civil laws were unable to reach the internal dimension of human conduct; yet, according to the teaching of the Church, it was quite possible to commit a wrong (i.e., a sin of the mind or of the heart) without breaking any civil law as such.

Whereas the popular notion of justice was limited to external duty in the public forum, the Church broadened it to include one's internal sense of duty: the conscience. Metropolitan Sheptytsky considered this Christian understanding of justice, informed by personal as well as public considerations, to be "the principle that is essential to all attempts to unravel the social question." And it was essential precisely because, as the Church took the position that religion and ethics were not just private but also public matters, so too conscience was seen as an objective, social matter. Its personal
character could not be reduced to mere individual preferences, for:

"Duty in conscience" has meaning only where there is a
universal ethic (‘zahal’na etyka’): independent of the human
will, immutable, grounded in nature and the law of God, the
Lawgiver and Judge of human conscience; /that is,/ where
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ethics is recognized as a social thesis."

Fifth, Christian social action also proceeded from an under-
standing of justice that was informed by the law of love. Without
love, any system of justice was vulnerable to the natural human incli-
nation toward egoism, the desire to retain a biased, subjective per-
spective and to see rights and duties from the point of view of one’s
own best interests. The Christian teaching on love of neighbor
effectively drew the moral subject out of that naturally subjective
stance and put him into his neighbor’s shoes:

"By placing himself into the position of his neighbor, and
seeing the other’s right at least somewhat as his own, he
will not overstep the bounds of justice so easily, /but
will/ measure his rights and duties with one measure and one
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heart." 

The "social significance" of Christian love was that it animated an
otherwise "barren, restricted, stingy and stubborn" form of justice
and transformed it into a "generous, abundant, benevolent and precau-
tionary (‘uperedzhaiucha’) justice." The very same crucial dif-
ference obtained between the man who was "merely just" and one who had
an "internal sense of justice": the former followed the letter of the
law, while the latter strove to be benevolent and loving toward his
neighbor. This practical understanding of love informed the social action of the Church and, in particular, its work for the material and moral advancement of the poor and the defence of their rights.

Proceeding from the Christian view of human life as a path toward an eternal goal, Metropolitan Sheptytsky's guidelines set a course for Christian social action by the Greek Catholic Church in a way that further clarified the differences from the socialist strategy. There were, of course, substantive similarities in the special option for the poor and the commitment to workers' rights, but the spiritual rationale underlying the Church's social analysis gave its social action a distinctively Christian thrust. Similarly, although it was an aim of Christian social action to promote socioeconomic advancement, that was only a proximate goal, indeed, itself a means to a higher end. Since in Sheptytsky's elaboration the primary agents of the social action of the Greek Catholic Church were priests, whose first responsibility was saving souls, their social action was also directed towards that higher purpose:

"...in our time more than ever that method of economic work among the people is the indicated means of leading people to God. That is what the economic work of the clergy must be, for in general all temporal goods are but means ('sredstvo') of achieving eternal benefits."

Metropolitan Sheptytsky therefore hoped that, out of fidelity to their spiritual charge, Greek Catholic priests would not limit the focus of their economic work to worldly goods alone, but that through it they would seek the Truth and the Kingdom.

It was therefore the proper purpose of Christian social action to
lead people to God, rather than away from him; to defend the divinely-revealed ethical principles without which the Church's "socio-economic work will lead our people to perdition." In doing so, it would uphold that universally human sense of justice and natural order with which socialists were all-too-ready to dispense, and transform the existing social order into one that stood firmly on Christian foundations.

As Sheptytsky saw it, then, socialism may well have been committed to the progress of the people, but it disregarded their need for spiritual progress. For its part, the Church recognized its own social responsibility to participate in the struggle for justice, yet it would not allow that work to separate it from its primary raison d'être: the salvation of souls. That difference of approach to the social question in Galicia was evident in the guiding principles that Sheptytsky proposed for the social action of his priests: the ethical assessment of socioeconomic values in light of eternal ones, the preference of class harmony (through a special option for the poor and the defence of workers' rights) over class struggle, and the reliance on conscience and love as dynamic principles of social change toward true justice.
3. Praxis: the fraternal correction of existing social action

The implementation of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's guidelines took the form of fraternal correction of existing social action of the Greek Catholic Church.

a. The Church and workers' rights

One of the most immediate applications of the guidelines to the situation in Galicia had to do with the Church's own respect of workers' rights. In accordance with their privileged role as agents of Christian social action and advocates of justice, Greek Catholic priests stood to be called upon to serve as mediators in disputes between employers and employees. Yet, at the same time, those priests themselves employed their parishioners, sometimes in ways that bordered on exploitation. The main source of income for the predominantly rural clergy was the land that came with a parish appointment ("grunta erektsional'ni") and which local peasants would till and harvest, often without pay.

Because of the social role that the Church accepted, Metropolitan Sheptytsky felt that the onus was on the clergy more than on anyone else to exercise the highest possible degree of justice in their working relationships with the faithful. Sheptytsky considered the age-old custom of voluntary work on church land by the faithful as essentially a matter of the good will of the people. In his view, therefore, it had to be made clear that the faithful were under no obligation to do such work, and that priests had no right to demand it.

There were two related practices which the Metropolitan called his priests to abolish immediately: requiring farmwork in conjunction
with prenuptial catechism or in exchange for a priest’s normal pastoral functions. Such practices were dangerous, inappropriate and harked back to the days of serfdom, the Metropolitan declared; catechism was a priest’s duty, while the exchange of religious services for farmwork, which in the absence of a uniform scale of values was arbitrary and unfairly weighted in the priest’s favor, lent itself easily to the exploitation of peasants.

The reflection on the principles of social action thus led the Metropolitan to propose an ethical reconsideration of what had long been an accepted practice in the Church, for:

"The poor people find themselves in such a difficult situation and are so lacking in foresight that in the springtime they would rather promise three days of work during the harvest than pay a crown in cash. But such a condition, even though it might appear to be voluntary on the part of the worker, would contain a real element of extortion and would certainly amount to withholding a worker’s due."

There may have been nothing illegal about the employer-employee relationship that existed between Greek Catholic priests and their parishioners, but Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s point was that the situation was an occasion for abuses that could only undermine the Church’s credibility and social role.

b. special assistance to the poor and class harmony

Along with excessive political zeal (which we discuss later), the Metropolitan felt that some of his socially-active priests were fomenting class antagonism through an inordinate association with either
the rich or the poor. As we have indicated, the Metropolitan held the view, contrary to the revolutionary-minded, that the Church’s preferential option for the poor did not lead it to espouse class struggle. Apparently there were also priests who kept their distance from social action because of their own option for the rich. Sheptytsky rejected both extremes as contrary to Christian fraternal love:

"As it is abusive and excessive to become intimate with the rich and to clutch the door-knobs of the nobility, but not to admit a peasant into one’s kitchen; so too it is the same kind of excess, although to the opposite extreme, to kiss every peasant on both cheeks but to put on airs before anyone who may own some property."

The official position of the Church was to reject no one on the basis of class and the class harmony which it sought to achieve required everyone’s participation. Addressing the wealthy Greek Catholics of Stanyslawiv in 1899, the Metropolitan had challenged their narrow view of charity as simply giving alms, and directed their attention instead to the more profound, social dimension of Christian charity:

"When you set out to help your poorer brother, remember—he needs not only your money. Even more than that he often needs your active assistance; that is, your advice and comforting reassurance. Do not help the poor man in merely a sporadic way but, in so far as you are able, in such a way as to enable him to raise himself up out of his misfortune and to stand on his own two feet. Give the poor the oppor-
tunity to earn a fair wage—teach them, show them how to improve their lot."

Sheptytsky did not believe that poverty and economic disparities could ever be done away with completely, but he did feel that the condition of the poor could be measurably improved through their advancement to economic self-sufficiency.

c. restriction of the substantive social content of sermons

Social zeal also led some priests to preach their social message in church. But while Metropolitan Sheptytsky encouraged his priests to prepare themselves for social action through serious study of the social question and to acquaint themselves with the existing theoretical and practical literature on the subject, they were not to theorize or expostulate on socioeconomic matters at the pulpit. A sermon was to remain the word of God, and be concerned only with the truths of the faith and morality. Not even the social activity of a priest, which was recognized as a necessary part of his pastoral ministry, could be the subject of a sermon if it did not directly deal with faith and morality. The only items from social action that could be incorporated into sermons were the Church's principles, and the Metropolitan summarized them in the following five theses:

i— that religion and morality are not private matters, but have a social significance;

ii— that in accordance with divine and natural law, a man may acquire and hold private property;

iii— that all people are equal in their nature and in the ultimate purpose of their life, but not in status, certain rights or in autho-
rity; and that striving for equality in everything is utopian;
iv- that family bonds are sacred according to nature and divine law
and whoever undermined those bonds the foundations of human happi-
ness;
v- that socialism, which rejects those truths, is a sect that is 87
hostile to God, the Church, the faith and the good of the people.

This restriction on the substantive content of sermons was clearly intended to prevent any confusion between Christianity and socialism or between a priest's pastoral and social roles.

d. social commitment as part of a universal Christian mission

The corrective limits on social action were not the only practical thrust of the guidelines. The Metropolitan did, after all, strongly support his Church's involvement in social action. He had indicated his perception of the universal social mission of the Church early in his career. In 1900, as bishop of Stanislaviv, he wrote:

"Even today, the Church still has the same power as before: that comforts the dying prisoner and the African negro and enlightens the aboriginal ('pervisnyKh') American Indians; that stands up across the whole world in defence of the poor and the weak and ceaselessly protests against any injury or exploitation ('kryvzhennia i vyzyskuvannia') of them; that does not hesitate, when necessary, to boldly throw an accusation of lawlessness and injustice in the faces of even the greatest lords and princes of the world..."

Identifying with that global social commitment, the Metropolitan saw
the same kind of responsibility binding the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia. He commended the Greek Catholic clergy for its selfless dedication to the development of the Ukrainian people:

"To go among the people ('vyty v narod') in order to raise them up, defend them, enlighten them, save them, die for them: that is our ideal. This is the task of the clergy, this is the history of our renaissance...

Our entire national renaissance ('narodne vidrodzhenie') has the character of a slow awakening of the social masses. But the very history of nineteenth century /Galicia/ would not have that character if our patriotism had not had this aim, this meaning, this direction: to the people, to our people ('v liud, v narod').

The Ruthenian patriotism of Galicians has few historical traditions and little political thought but instead /there is/ across the board the pre-eminent, characteristic and elementary /imperative/: 'to our people.' We all have this sense: that our strength is our people; that our work for them is our duty; that their welfare is our future."

When he considered the practical side of social action in his 1904 pastoral, the Metropolitan pointed to an array of social and economic institutions established by the Church to improve the condition of the working class and of the poor. Such were the farm and commercial cooperatives and the credit unions which, the Metropolitan observed, by the turn of the century were to be found in almost every village in eastern Galicia. In addition, an association of priests was formed which focussed special attention on socioeconomic issues,
and Greek Catholic priests became involved in the agrarian strike of 1902 and other efforts to improve the wages of farm workers. While the Metropolitan endorsed these initiatives, he also devoted personal attention to the socioeconomic issues of his people in Galicia and abroad.

Realizing, however, that while some of his priests were actively involved in social action others remained hesitant, the Metropolitan gave a clear indication of his own endorsement of such work; his stated purpose in writing On the Social Question was to caution the former about "potentially dangerous errors" and to strongly urge ("rishurko pokhnut") the latter to become involved. Reinforcing that call to involvement, Metropolitan Sheptytsky addressed a stern warning to those priests who still had reservations about becoming involved in socioeconomic work:

"The tendency to neglect the socioeconomic side of things is altogether false and harmful. The Church does not neglect those temporal and material things, for through them it leads to faith and morality. A priest who ignores the desires of parishioners to set up a reading society, a general store or a community granary and who opposes all such establishments is not fulfilling his office."

Although he left the conduct of social action to the clergy, the Metropolitan set an example of personal commitment to the material development of the Ukrainian people in the form of philanthropic activity for which his name was imprinted on the popular mind. Throughout that activity and in his teaching, Sheptytsky saw the problem of poverty in Galicia as a problem of social development; the
search for solutions and economic self-sufficiency was therefore not limited to the economic self-sufficiency of some individuals but would have to encompass the entire society:

"Let our future generations take hold of industry and trade. For any nation that does not have its own industry and whose trade is run by foreigners is always a poor nation."

Grounded in natural law theory and inspired by the teaching of Leo XIII, Sheptytsky's thinking on the social question contained its own contextual thrust. Unlike Rerum Novarum, On the social question and related writings did not address the state regarding workers' rights but turned instead to the Greek Catholic clergy, which had been in the vanguard of Ukrainian social activism. The Metropolitan's main concern was that the Church's social action not serve as a vehicle for the transition of priests, and through them the faithful, to socialism which he viewed as incompatible with Christianity. Convinced that the center of the problem lay in ignorance about that incompatibility, he elaborated the key ideological principles by which Christianity and socialism could be sharply and clearly distinguished, and proposed corrective measures to ensure that Christian social action would indeed promote, and not undermine, Christian social values in Galicia.
C. Priests and Politics

The political side of the social question centered on the involvement of priests in party politics. The gradual democratization of Austrian society resulted in a proliferation of political parties and platforms. In the new climate of political pluralism, the political participation of Greek Catholic priests only exacerbated their long-standing disunity; a debate that had formerly revolved around differences in theological orientation toward either the Orthodox East or the Latin West became politicized in the public forum. As political fervor grew among the clergy, Metropolitan Sheptytsky tried to alert them to the delicate balance between their social and pastoral roles.

Yet as the Church addressed those internal matters, it could not afford to neglect external factors in the political scene. For, with the emergence of a secular intelligentsia in Galicia in the latter part of the nineteenth century, Ukrainian socialists were vying for elected office in the Viennese and local parliaments. At the same time, some socially-oriented Greek Catholic priests were openly supportive of such candidates and their political programs. Others brought their social concern into the public forum by way of participation in a Christian Social party, which had been established in Galicia in 1896.

1. Empirical and theological assessments of the problem

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's reading of the situation was that it was a time of political divisiveness, a time of "social antagonisms and political hatred." The problem was compounded as the political convictions of individual priests began to affect their pastoral work. The Metropolitan was convinced that "the spirit of political partisan-
ship had worked its way into our ranks and felt it was necessary to check politically-charged sermons in the churches. He was no less concerned that some priests were taking their political agitation to the point of interfering in parishes other than those to which they had been assigned and attacking other priests who did not share their political views. Not only did this amount to "undermining another priest's authority among the people;" it also lowered the social image of priests and of the Church. Indeed,

"A hundred atheists inciting people against their parish priests would not do as much damage as one of us who, forgetting his office, would say to the people: 'Do not obey your pastor.'"

Politically-motivated intolerance led some priests to "drag the private matters of other priests out into public scrutiny, thereby providing the faithful with the spectacle of one priest attacking another in the press." Anonymous articles whose authors admitted to being priests appeared in the press and attacked the clergy, church institutions and ecclesiastical authority. Similarly, public appeals that were attributed to priests criticized attempts to organize the clergy as "clericalism," labelled Christian schools "medieval institutions" and equated them with the Spanish Inquisition.

Nor were the adverse effects of political agitation by priests restricted to the clerical ranks. Some priests not above causing difficulties for those among the faithful whose political convictions differed from their own: from unnecessary delays in the arrangement of marriage ceremonies to the withholding of certificates of baptism and certificates of poverty (which were required for establishing elegi-
bility for social benefits). In addition, Sheptytsky lamented that priests were "... demanding to be paid for the fulfilment of their most essential duties and, in various ways that are incompatible with the priestly vocation, they are oppressing ("peresliduiut") /the faithful/." All of these factors indicated to the Metropolitan a lack of clerical solidarity.

The same problem extended to the relationship between the clergy and the bishops. When criticisms of the bishops appeared in the press, the Greek Catholic hierarchy responded collectively with the following admonition: "When our enemies attack us publicly, there are those among you who are pleased to see it. But how many would stand up in our defence?" Metropolitan Sheptytsky noted that because of clerical disunity the Church was losing its social authority:

"The Nemesis saw to it that the clergy, by disobeying its superiors, has lost the obedience of its own subordinates /i.e., the faithful/. And if it is with a heavy heart that we see today that the influence of the clergy has diminished, that the people look less and less to the priest's opinion in social and political matters, then regretfully we must admit that no one has undermined respect for the clergy to the extent that priests themselves /have/.

In Metropolitan Sheptytsky's interpretation, the politicization of Ukrainian society had lessened the social influence of the Church. In many areas of social life, priests were yielding place to the lay intelligentsia; as the Metropolitan put it, "the times when only priests constituted the Ukrainian intelligentsia are gone forever."
The effects of secularization were being felt, as people were breaking away from the leadership of the Church and as anticlerical attacks continued to appear in the press. In the midst of all of this, perhaps the single most pressing concern in Sheptytsky’s mind was the internal disunity of the Church:

"Not many years ago, our clergy still had the first, decisive say in our society. And almost the entire people followed their call without question. The clergy was internally united ("bulo mizh soboiu solidarne") — it truly constituted a single body, in accordance with the principle: ‘all for one.’ But now times have changed..."

Sheptytsky’s theological assessment of the crisis of clerical unity in the face of political challenges to the Church involved two steps: first, a discernment of the theological considerations underlying the situation, and second, a theological appraisal of the threat to society that followed from it.

In theological terms, Sheptytsky felt that some priests were falling into grave error by mistaking their "bitter hatred and partisan quarrels" for divine fervor, and their worldly wisdom for divine wisdom. Yet, from a Christian standpoint, political antagonisms, libellous statements and a spirit of vengeance were all instances of hatred and were contrary to Christ’s law of love.

In Sheptytsky’s reading of the situation, the very notion of clerical solidarity was being subverted and in its place a "false solidarity with evil" was creating tensions between the priests and
the bishops. He concluded that the political concerns of priests had gone out of control to the extent of displacing spiritual concerns:

"... among /our/ priests there are many servants and adherents of all sorts of political ideas, but servants of Christ are only rare exceptions among them; this clergy is placing partisan considerations above the good of the Church and the faith."

Intrinsically, the various instances of clerical disunity were bound to scandalize the faithful and injure the Church as a whole. Regardless whether it was cloaked in political or other considerations, the betrayal of Christ was nothing less than betrayal and any priests who engaged in or tolerated it were on the way to perdition.

No less important, however, were the more immediate implications of clerical disunity in the socio-political context. For the times had indeed changed and the political agenda included matters which the Church considered to be within its own jurisdiction:

"Whereas in the past many social or diplomatic principles (having nothing to do with faith and morality) entered into political and public affairs, today public and political life touches more and more on fundamental moral problems."

Two particular issues with which Sheptytsky was especially concerned at this time were the deconfessionalization of schools and proposed legislation on civil divorce and marriage. Both of these secularizing tendencies, although not yet law, were seen as threats to the Christian foundations of Ukrainian society in Austrian Galicia.
Deconfessionalization would deprive Ukrainian schoolchildren of religious education and a good grounding in Christian social values; civil marriage and divorce laws would likewise erode the Christian moral values that the Church tried to inculcate in the basic social unit: the family.

Since the main advocates of such legislative reform were socialists, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was concerned that if sufficient numbers of anticlerically-inclined representatives were to be elected to the respective parliaments, it could bring a persecution of religion and mark the end of the Church's social role in matters of faith and morality:

"I think that we are approaching times of real persecution. The enemies of the Church could easily come to power, or at least acquire greater influence on the government. Then without a doubt there would begin a whole sequence of anti-Church laws, aimed at suppressing all of the Church's influence on public matters, on the schools and, eventually, erasing as much as possible every last trace of Christianity from social life."

As in the socioeconomic sphere, then, so too in the political arena Metropolitan Sheptytsky felt that the lines were being drawn between two incompatible camps: Christianity and socialism. The Church was committed to seeing that Christian values were entrenched within the public life of society, yet that responsibility was proving ever more onerous as socialists entered the mainstream of Galician politics and as disunity among the clergy weakened the influence of the Church.
2. Principles: guidelines for the political activities of priests

On the basis of his empirical and theological readings, the Metropolitan proposed two guidelines for the political activity of the clergy: the limits of acceptable political involvement by Greek Catholic priests; and the principle of clerical solidarity. In this section, we examine those two guidelines; a related guideline, concerning the division of responsibilities between the Greek Catholic Church and the Austrian state, is treated separately in the next section of this chapter.

It should be noted that underlying Metropolitan Sheptytsky's guidelines for clerical activity in the political field there was an important premise. In Sheptytsky's view, Ukrainian society was fundamentally a Christian society that valued its Church and religion as its highest social goods. In upholding religious values in society, therefore, he saw the teaching Church not as a voice in the wilderness, but as the legitimate voice for the concerns and needs of the Ukrainian people. In its role as an advocate of the religious concerns of Christian citizens, the Church was seen as a defender of the faith and morality in the public sphere.

a. Prudence: the limits of acceptable political involvement

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's first guideline was an attempt to clarify the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable political activity by priests.

As with social and economic action, Sheptytsky began by elaborating on the legitimacy and the need for priests to be involved in the political life of their people. There were two main justifications for
such participation: the duty of every citizen to participate in the political life of the state, and the duty of priests to speak out for the Church and on behalf of Christians whenever the public debate touched on questions of faith and morality.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky therefore recognized that the solution to the problems associated with priests in politics was not to be sought in a ban on political participation. On the contrary, he himself emphasized that even priests were bound by civic duties; that they were entitled to their own political convictions; and that they were expected to make full use of their constitutionally-guaranteed civil rights as Christians and to transmit that same attitude to their people. Political participation was further seen as an essential part of the Ukrainian Church's duty toward the Ukrainian people, "whose rights we must defend always and everywhere."

Faith and morality were issues over which the Church always felt obliged to become involved in the public debate. When, because of them, a priest's participation in public affairs was "necessary for God's cause or for the common good," it was more than a right; it was a duty. It was the duty of priests to "defend the people from political injury and injustice," and "to work in the name of Christ toward the expulsion of every form of injustice and hatred, toward the introduction of the principles of justice and love into public life."

In affirming the Church's right to take a stand on public issues that touched on faith and morality, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was consciously opposing a widespread view in Ukrainian society: that political matters were to be strictly separated from the Christian faith and morality. In the same way, the Church was committed to seeing that
political leaders were attuned to the needs of the people and "in no way violated /the rights of/ the Church and the faith." In this protective role, the Church in Sheptytsky's view was employing its right to represent the religious interests of the faithful in civil society:

"... by virtue of the right that has been given to us, we do not now cease to hold - and will not in the future cease to demand - leadership in the most important social issues: /that is, in matters of faith and morality."

Challenging this, the Metropolitan affirmed that to divorce morality from politics was incompatible with Christian teaching. In the Christian perspective, the principles of faith and morality informed public and political life, and the law of Christ allowed people to defend their rights.

The duty to voice Christian political concerns in the Austrian context was linked specifically to religious matters that were on the political agenda, such as: religious education, civil marriage and divorce laws, and other matters of direct concern to the Church. (We discuss these issues separately in the section on church-state relations).

Thus, the Church was unequivocally committed to monitoring the enactment of new laws and to promoting the Christian values of the Ukrainian people in the Austrian political scene. Consequently, there was no question of stamping out all the political activity of priests or of confining parish priests to their sacristies. On the contrary, in light of the needs of the situation, the image of a politically passive priesthood was firmly rejected:
"Reverend Fathers, we must undertake to remedy our circumstances across the board. We must finally achieve that freedom to speak our minds openly and to give up that demeaning position which we have held up to now. We listened, bit our tongues and remained silent. We assented ('potaku-valy'), carried out /orders/ and we paid. The Areopagus may be there, but we too have completed university studies. We are citizens with the right to speak our minds freely. And our mind is first of all the teaching that we proclaim. We proclaim that teaching not only to the commonfolk, not only behind closed doors, but publicly and to all. /For the words/ 'you will stand before governors and kings for my sake' (Mark 13:9) were also intended for us. And with St. Paul we say again: 'I am not ashamed of the gospel.' 138
(Romans 1:16).

Having clarified the ways in which political participation was an imperative, Metropolitan Sheptytsky went on to explain what constituted unacceptable political activity. Basically, the political activity of priests could be unacceptable either qualitatively, in its form, or quantitatively, in degree.

Political activism was unacceptable whenever a priest crossed the line between politics and ministry. For example, a parish church was not a vehicle for furthering political ends; it was therefore always wrong for a priest to deliver political messages within the walls of a church. Political sermons, Metropolitan Sheptytsky warned, could only be regarded as "a betrayal of Christ and a profanation of the Word of God." It was one thing for a priest to hold private political
views; but he was never to be "a politician either in Church, or in the confessional or in any facet of his work as a pastor in relation to his faithful." Any mixing of politics with the pastoral duties of a priest was a serious error which the Church would not tolerate.

"In a word, a priest, may neither be a politician at the altar, nor in the confessional, nor in any aspect of his work as a pastor in relation to the faithful. In all those places he must be only a priest, for there he takes the place of Christ. For there his one job, his one mission and goal of his holy, priestly office is the salvation of souls that have been redeemed by the Blood of Christ."

The only place where a priest could participate in political life was outside the Church and only providing that such participation did not bring him into conflict with the teachings of Christ, and that his priestly duties were not neglected.

The acceptable degree of clerical involvement in political activism also centered on the requirement of fidelity to the priestly office. That requirement was the first priority of every priest's work and could never be reduced to accommodate political fervor. As Metropolitan Sheptytsky explained:

"Any priest who would be more preoccupied with politics (even well-founded politics) than with the catechization of children in the schools would be a bad priest, harmful rather than beneficial to the people."

As Sheptytsky saw it, the problem of the political involvement of
priests was not that it occurred, for he recognized its necessity; the problem was with regulating the degree of that political involvement so that it did not interfere with a priest’s fundamental, pastoral duty:

"It is an excess that is perhaps even more dangerous and worse /than neglecting such matters/ to become involved in material concerns to such a degree as to set aside or neglect the spiritual side of the Church’s work. It is definitely a caricature of pastoral work, as the very word suggests.

An even more dangerous excess would be to neglect /both/ spiritual work and concern for the material welfare of the people, and to see the entire object and aim of one’s action in the awakening of a political spirit."

According to Sheptytsky, the importance of keeping a clear sense of priorities was most evident in the priest’s relations with the faithful. Not only was it unacceptable for a priest to talk politics within the walls of the church; he also had to take care outside the church not to allow his political opinions and activity to come between him and his faithful. Sheptytsky explained:

"A priest cannot under any condition present an issue in such a way that some of his faithful could perceive him as their political opponent. He must always remain only a pastor to all those who have been entrusted to his care, for he is always responsible for every soul and must lead every soul to salvation, even were he to disagree with all of their political views."
The simple rule was that, no matter how important or necessary a given political action might be, a priest could participate but still remained a priest first and foremost. Whenever political convictions threatened to pit one priest against another, the priority of "duties toward God and the people" overruled personal opinions and preferences. Accordingly, the correct political path for priests was "to understand the good of the people in Christian terms."

In 1907, the Greek Catholic bishops of Galicia summarized their position on clerical involvement in politics as follows:

"We do not hold the view that priests must not come out of the sacristy. On the contrary, priests should participate in the social life. They should go out among the people; but as priests, not as politicians, agitators or agents of some party. They should go out among the people, but with work, not slogans; setting a good example, not causing scandal; with love, not passion; with charity, not obstinacy; with sacrifice, not greed. Priests should go out among the people in order to unite them with Christ, not with some political party.

A priest may have his own political convictions as long as they are not contrary to the Catholic faith and Christian morals; and as long as they in no way prevent him from fulfilling his priestly, pastoral duties; and, finally, on condition (and this is no less essential) that his politics never place him at odds with the people or with his pastoral care for those entrusted to him."
And as for actual political activity by priests, there were two conditions of acceptability:

"With regard to a priest's work outside /his own/ parish, the first condition, without which it cannot be beneficial, is that such work not occupy the first place in the life of a priest, that it not conflict with /his/ everyday duties in the parish. The second condition, which is no less important, is that that work not be directed against other priests, that it not undermine their reputations or damage their work."

In sum, the criterion of acceptability of clerical politics was its subordination to the requirements of the Christian faith and divine law. With that criterion in mind, therefore, a priest was to exercise prudence in his political activity: if he saw that his political enthusiasm was occupying more of his attention than was his pastoral work, or if it led him into public confrontation with other priests, then he could be sure that it was excessive. For, in carrying out his Christian and civic duty to participate in the political life of society, every priest was bound by a primary loyalty to the principles of the faith that overrode any political considerations, and to a principle of clerical solidarity that overrode any divisions that might occur along party lines. It is to that principle that we now turn.
b. The ideal of clerical solidarity

The second principle that Metropolitan Sheptytsky elaborated to counter the political divisions among the clergy was solidarity. This principle was to serve as a factor of unity at two levels: first, as a clerical spirit shared by all priests and second, as the foundation of fraternal trust between the clergy and the bishop.

It was in his 1899 pastoral letter to the clergy of the Stanyslaviv eparchy that Metropolitan Sheptytsky had first drawn attention to the need for clerical solidarity. "We need," he said, "to care all the more for solidarity amongst ourselves. We must focus all of our forces into one direction: we need to be of one spirit."

At that early time, the principle of solidarity was still a general, undifferentiated principle of unity in Metropolitan Sheptytsky's thinking; in that first pastoral, he was more concerned with allaying suspicions about his episcopal appointment and uncertainties about his plans for the Ukrainian Church than he was with the problem of politically-based disunity among the clergy. In the following years, however, as the urgent need for clerical unity made itself felt, solidarity acquired a much more substantive meaning in the Metropolitan's thought.

One of the first elements that emerged out of that process of reflection was a detailed examination of the corporate identity of the priesthood. The basis of clerical solidarity was "a clerical spirit" which was the sine qua non of every Catholic priest. Without that spirit, a man was nothing but a "base charlatan pretending to be a priest." Clericalism, as Sheptytsky understood it, was a special requirement that was placed only on priests:

"Clericalism is the spirit of our society of priests. We do
not impose it upon the laity; it is our internal principle of organization, the principles that serve us in our work, but which are not a subject of sermons."

The clerical spirit or fervor was not fanaticism, however; it referred to a clear view of the priestly mission and its priority over other purposes in a priest's life. It identified the raison d'être and the professional unity of the clergy:

"Our solidarity in action will consist first of all of holding high the banner of the faith and of Christ's work for the salvation of souls. Fervor for saving souls is the foundation of our unity and solidarity."

The concept of clerical solidarity followed from an understanding of the true nature of the priest's work as "animated by the spirit of Christ." All were driven by that same spirit and all had the first and most important duty to proclaim the word of God. The animating spirit that priests shared would make of them an "organized body," a "clerical organism." With the necessary solidarity, the clergy could become "one body animated by one spirit."

The call to clerical solidarity proceeded from the bishops' conviction that the "spirit of Christ" was to permeate not only a priest's pastoral work, but his political and social work as well.

"Clerical solidarity, grounded in the basic, conscientious fulfilment of the law of neighborly love, proceeds from a commonality of spirit ('spil'nosty dukha') and manifests itself in a uniformity of procedure, in a similarity of judgments and desires, in collective undertakings, mutual
assistance and in all aspects of the life and activity of 164 priests."

The ideal of clerical unity was thus seen as a form of likemindedness and as a sense of corporate identity. In that way, it encouraged a cohesiveness among priests that would take precedence over political loyalties:

"In no way can we regard as a good priest a man who is more in solidarity with some social or political organization or party than he is with the Church, with the clergy, and with us /bishops/."  

In Metropolitan Sheptytsky's view, the clergy indeed constituted 166 a "spiritual body," a "clerical society," and he therefore hoped that the solidarity of his priests would manifest itself as an esprit de corps, combining loyalty and collective identity. If it did, before entering into political battles with a neighboring pastor, a priest would be inclined to remember that he was first of all a member of 167 "that corps whose greatest good is solidarity." In its practical application, then, solidarity was aimed at preventing any activity 168 that could undermine another priest's reputation among the people.

Thus, solidarity operated not so much through commands or disciplinary measures within a hierarchical scheme of authority, as rather through the implementation of internally-held Christian principles, 169 namely: "objectivity, justice, toleration and one love for all."

The second level that solidarity was intended to address was the relationship between the clergy and their bishop. Conscious that he could not single-handedly deal with the crisis of anticlericalism
and secularization, Metropolitan Sheptytsky counted on the assistance of his priests who, acting in concert with him, would be able to form an effective front for "the victory of good over evil."

In that sense, solidarity may have been simply a means of affirming the hierarchical structure of authority and obedience. However, it is clear from the Metropolitan's expression of this dimension of solidarity that he saw it in fraternal, rather than paternal terms. He spoke of his duties toward his priests as "not those of an Archbishop, but of a brother and a friend." He felt linked in solidarity with his priests "more strongly than with anyone else," including his own family.

In this perspective, the authority relationship hinged not on submission but on an exchange of trust:

"I hope in God that I will be able to fulfill the duties of a friend to every one of you and all of your families. I ask you, Reverend Fathers, to turn to me with sincerity even in matters where only a friend could be asked for a favor.

We all need the greatest /possible/ unity and an ongoing rapprochement between myself and you in order to fulfill the obligations of the priesthood, which are so difficult in our time.

In caring for the solidarity in work between the entire clergy and myself, I ask you to seek my understanding ('porozumivatsia') in all matters - not only pastoral, but also social and national ('suspil'no-narodnikh') matters."

In his own relations with the clergy, therefore, Sheptytsky saw
solidarity as a mutuality or reciprocity of trust; as bishop, he resolved to be guided by that principle, and he expected the same of his priests. The obedience that was required by his episcopal authority was situated within a context of fraternal reciprocity:

"In my dealings with you, as I employ sincerity and trust and lend a fraternal hand to our common task, I also hope, Reverend Fathers, that I will always find sincerity, trust, assistance and obedience among you, regardless of how difficult the situation might be."

It was therefore in that same fraternal perspective that the Metropolitan spoke to his priests of the need for "a spirit of discipline and obedience." For, in light of the ideal of solidarity that he was proposing, the Metropolitan understood the authority-obedience relationship and his role as leader, as a fraternal exchange of trust.

The ultimate aim of solidarity was therefore not to create an exclusive society but to lead priests toward universal love and a spirit of toleration. Accordingly, priests were enjoined to practice love and toleration in their social and political work:

"Every priest may have his convictions, but along with them he must also have a broad tolerance, a broad heart for all those who hold different views; it is only on that condition that his participation in social and political work will not be harmful. Any political action by a priest that is carried out with passion in any form but without tolerance and love will be harmful to the Church and, subsequently, to the people."

The call to solidarity was not a call to yet another political
platform, but to "toleration and one love for all," and to broad-

mindedness that would encompass the faithful.

"If only we /priests/ are joined in solidarity, if only we

fulfil our duty, we are convinced that in those matters

/i.e., of faith and morality/ we will have the support of

the people and of the lay intelligentsia."

As a premise of the social unity that was expected in a Christian

society, solidarity was a duty.
3. Praxis

The practical response to the problem of priests and politics involved the implementation of the guidelines on political participation and solidarity.

a. the promotion of clerical participation and consensus

The lack of clerical solidarity was signalled with particular force in 1905 when the three Greek Catholic bishops in Galicia devoted their first joint pastoral to the subject. Echoing Sheptytsky's earlier sentiment that clerical disunity was largely the result of clerical involvement in and association with a variety of political parties, the bishops proclaimed, "There is no solidarity amongst us... because there is too little tolerance and too little of our clerical, priestly spirit."

In 1905, in the wake of press attacks on the Greek Catholic bishops, the latter condemned such provocation as sinful and detrimental to both the priestly office and to the Church:

"A very strange form of solidarity of priests against their bishops together with the occasional complaint to the bishops that they are not in solidarity with their priests is truly typical. You want us bishops to be in solidarity with you, but you do not feel up to the duty to help us in what is the most difficult part of our office: the correction of those who are falling or who have already fallen."

Slander and calumny among priests, which undermined both their pastoral work and solidarity, had no justification in the political sphere, for: "there are no civic duties that could justify
slander and calumny." Where priests were in error, the constructive way to clerical solidarity was through fraternal correction.

The practical intent of the principle of clerical solidarity was stated unequivocally by the bishops in 1907, when they linked it to those matters in the public sphere in which the Church felt it had the right and duty to intervene:

"The issue of clerical solidarity, of the collective action of priests in public life is one of those issues which touch on the Church and the faith....

Every one of you, brothers in Christ, sees that the divisions amongst our clergy are causing real harm to the Church and the people. Anyone who is not blind sees the danger that threatens our Church in this way and, by the same token, recognizes the authority of the bishop to decide in those matters and the duty of the priest to obey in conscience in those matters."

The implementation of clerical solidarity was aimed first and foremost at putting an end to the erosion of episcopal authority in the Greek Catholic Church. For his part, Metropolitan Sheptytsky appears to have understood the prevailing problem of authority as one that had political roots; seeing that it stemmed from political fervor rather than insubordination, he preferred persuasion over canonical sanctions as a way of restoring unity.

Two actions that he took in 1905 suggest that his thinking had already advanced along this line. In February of that year, he issued the first of six pastorals on clerical solidarity. Though, as we have noted, the Metropolitan had called for solidarity in earlier writings,
here the notion was elaborated more fully and linked to the socio-political context. Moreover, all six pastorals on solidarity were issued and signed collectively by all three Greek Catholic hierarchs, who in that first document of 1905 indicated that they were doing so expressively as an example of unity for the priests; indeed, they saw a practical, pedagogical value in their collective effort which "proceeding from solidarity, calls to solidarity."

Then, in December, 1905, the Metropolitan convoked a sobor which brought together the priests of the L'viv eparchy. The assembly, the first of its kind in L'viv since the provincial sobor of 1891, proclaimed guidelines on a variety of administrative and pastoral issues, including the school question and the subdivision of the eparchy. No less important than the actual decisions of the sobor was the underlying idea behind the convocation of such an assembly in the first place. In his pastoral introducing the published documents of the sobor, Metropolitan Sheptytsky explained that motivation as follows:

"The decisions of an eparchial sobor can, more than any other directives of the chancery office and the consistory, be a real, living form of legislation, answering to all the needs of society and one of perhaps the most essential conditions of the usefulness ('Khosennosti') of a law. The law /of the Church/ must answer to the customs, the needs and all the conditions of time and space in such a way as not to be a burden on society, but rather a help in that natural and universally-felt need of order..."

The law of the Church ...and our ecclesiastical practice of discussing important matters at meetings of the
consistory give episcopal decrees all the more importance the less they depend on the judgment of the bishop alone. The participation of at least some representatives of the clergy in the formulation of decrees gives those decrees, as it were, greater weight: not legally, but socially."

It was thus a decentralized, participatory model of church authority that Metropolitan Sheptytsky had in mind when he conceived of the sobor. Given the deep divisions of the Galician clergy at that time, it was "not without fear" about potential failure that the Metropolitan had taken to organizing the assembly; in a sense, it was a test of solidarity which in the end proved successful. Reflecting on the proceedings in his closing address, Sheptytsky observed:

"Everyone had an opportunity to state his opinion sincerely and candidly on the matters that were submitted for the decision of the sobor. All of the decisions came out in favor of the likeminded and unanimous agreement of all; thus, in those decisions there is not a single paragraph that was not unanimously supported, and there is no one amongst us now who would not agree with those sobor resolutions and each of their parts. In this way, we have confirmed the solidarity among ourselves, and through the actual decisions we have confirmed our solidarity with the people."

Metropolitan Sheptytsky believed that, through the sobor, the seeds of consensus had been planted among the clergy and that this represented an important step in the way of achieving clerical solidarity - of the clergy with the bishop, of the priests among them-
selves, and of the bishop and clergy with the people — "the foundation of our future and the program of our work."

b. The extension of solidarity to the faithful

The principle of solidarity acquired a political meaning at a time when suffrage was being extended to peasants in the rural regions, and as socialist candidates campaigned on a secular platform.

In an attempt to instil political solidarity among the clergy during the elections of 1907, Sheptytsky and the other bishops suggested that local assemblies ("soborchyky") of priests seek ways of achieving unanimity of support and endorsement for a given candidate in their electoral district. Priests were advised to discuss and arrive at a consensus with other priests in the same electoral riding, and to form a block of support for a single candidate of their choice. That plan failed, however, for although such assemblies did meet, they were unable to prevent some priests from breaking ranks and, as Sheptytsky put it, "reneging on their pledge of solidarity on orders from highly placed lay people."

After it became clear that such breaches of clerical solidarity were continuing well into the post-election period and were even spreading into the social and economic activity of priests, Sheptytsky imposed sweeping canonical sanctions: all clerical interference in other parishes was prohibited, even if it involved organization work that was purely cultural or economic. Moreover, those who continued such activities would be dealt with to the full severity of canon law.

Yet, despite that setback, the Metropolitan considered the out-
come of elections in Galicia as so vital to the future of society that he extended the teaching on political participation and solidarity, originally directed only to the priests, to the faithful as well. This could only have been expected since every vote could make a difference and now, with the extension of voting rights, priests and peasants were on an equal footing.

Turning attention to rampant corruption and bribery in the electoral process, the Metropolitan and his fellow bishops urged the faithful to make an honest use of their voting right, consulting their Christian conscience rather than their pocketbooks:

"Make an honest and Christian use of the civil right which you now have. Do not allow yourselves to be cheated or bribed, be it with money or with drink. Remember: it is dishonest to sell one's convictions."

Electoral solidarity was all the more crucial in view of Austria's indirect system of voting, where the electorate was actually two-tiered, with citizens voting only for delegates ("pravybortsi") who would then cast their decisive ballots for members of parliament. The faithful were therefore also instructed to "stay close to their priests" during elections, that is, to vote as a block and to give massive support to the "approved" candidate. The preferred candidates, as far as the Church was concerned, were simply those who were known to be "good Christians," who could be counted on not to "betray the cause of the Church," who would defend Christian schools and who would represent "our Christian and Catholic people." These, according to the Metropolitan, were the Christian interests of the voting Ukrainian public and it was therefore only

society. Reflecting this new political consciousness on the eve of the
election of 1911, the Greek Catholic hierarchs concluded a pastoral
with the prayer:

"Almighty God, let our people elect representatives who
would fulfill their duties as elected members and represent
all the needs of the people wisely and as Christians; and
who would in a given instance be able to defend the holy
Catholic and Christian faith and the rights of our holy
Church..."
C. The Church and the Austrian state

In the Austrian socio-political environment, the state conferred a variety of privileges upon the Greek Catholic Church: state salaries for priests, tracts of arable land, equal status with the Roman Catholic clergy, legal exemptions and for the hierarchy, which was nominated by the emperor, ex officio membership in the Austrian parliament (House of Lords).

For its part, the Church reciprocated with loyalty towards the imperial throne and the Austrian state. This loyalty was outwardly expressed, and reinforced among the faithful, in numerous ways. At the turn of the century, Greek Catholic prayerbooks contained an imperial hymn; gathered in their parish churches, the faithful sang of Emperor Franz Josef I who, strengthened by his faith, would continue to "rule wisely." Schoolchildren were expected to attend liturgies that were served on imperial holidays. And in November, 1908, on the 60-th anniversary of the emperor's coronation, the Greek Catholic bishops directed all their parishes to mark the festivities by ringing church bells, by serving festal liturgies with special prayers for the emperor, and by singing the imperial hymn and the traditional *viva* (*Mnohaia lita*) for the emperor.

1. Empirical and theological assessments: the loyalist heritage

It was within this setting that, in 1904, Metropolitan Sheptytsky touched on the question of Church-state relations in his social pastoral *On the social question*. While acknowledging the Church's right to defend itself and the faithful against abuses of political power, he nevertheless assumed a conservative posture, speaking of a need for "obedience to the just dictates of civil authority" and concluding
that "we cannot start up a struggle /with the civil authority/.

In Sheptytsky's view, it was best for the Church to maintain a modus vivendi with the state, "for without perspicacity we could expose the Church and the people to harm." Consistent with this approach, the Metropolitan considered the possibility that "imprudent action" might have negative consequences: if the Church were to oppose the Austrian state, it would surely run the risk of persecution by the civil authorities. Looking at the situation from a long-term perspective, Sheptytsky therefore appeared to be willing to tolerate some state interference in some church affairs in order to preserve a harmonious relationship with the state. There were, after all, tangible benefits to an accommodationist stance. Despite certain legislative shortcomings, the Greek Catholic Church still enjoyed a position of prestige and privileges that had been bestowed by the Austrian state, an arrangement that it was unwilling to jeopardize.

There were at least three important considerations behind Sheptytsky's conservative position on Church-state relations. First, he referred to Christian teaching and the Christian concept of authority which commanded obedience to the just dictates of civil authority. The Church considered those dictates of the state to be just which, in the first place, did not contravene divine law. Second, whereas the socialist movement's "theory of exaggerated freedom and absolute equality" were thought to contain the seeds of revolution, the Church took pride in its record of commitment to peaceful reformism. And third, the benefits accruing from a modus vivendi with the Austrian state seemed preferable to the costs and injury to the Church that would surely follow any "needless outbursts."
Thus, for example, even while going as far as admitting that Austria’s May Laws of 1868 went "contrary to divine law" in that they allowed the state to "meddle in church life," the Metropolitan still felt that this did not warrant direct opposition or confrontation; nor did Sheptytsky’s reservations about the May Laws lead him to condemn the state. Instead, the biblical principle, according to which there is no authority but from God (Romans 13:1), remained for him the operative guideline. Though the May Laws were unfavorable toward the Church, this in itself did not warrant disloyalty toward the Austrian state; the Pauline teaching took precedence.

This might have seemed to be an unduly submissive posture, yet despite the importance that Metropolitan Sheptytsky was assigning to obedience to civil laws, there was more to his position than benign passivity. A more complete picture requires an inquiry into his views on the limits of civic loyalty and the duty of obedience, as well as a consideration of his stands on some of the issues in which he felt the state Austria was being unjust towards Christians and the Church.

2. Principles governing the Church’s critical posture toward the state

a. limits of human laws and the social role of conscience

In spite of his commitment to the fundamental Christian duty of obedience to the just dictates of civil authority and the notion of divine right as it was applied to the Austrian monarch, Metropolitan Sheptytsky did not advocate blind obedience to the state. Christian civic loyalty hinged on the notion of "just dictates," which referred to those laws and directives of the state that did not transgress divine law; the divine law took precedence. Likewise, the rights of
the earthly Church had to be respected by civil legislation. As the Metropolitan pointed out: "We /priests/ need to protect ourselves and the people against potential abuses; we must demand our rights, for it is said/ vigilantibus iura."

In the years that followed On the Social Question, the Metropolitan became considerably more assertive of the Church's rights. When in 1907 he published the collective pastoral On the elections, the usual reminder about Christ's directive "obey your earthly masters" (Col. 3:22) was followed by an important qualification: "it is inappropriate to obey civil authority if it were to issue orders contrary to justice and the divine law." In itself, this addition was hardly innovative, for the conditionality of obedience to the state was well established in traditional Christian teaching. Yet, it was significant in its political context; by 1907, Metropolitan Sheptytsky and the other Greek Catholic bishops in Galicia had become convinced that the gravest threat that the Church faced from the state was the election of socialists to parliament, which increased the likelihood that new laws, contrary to principles that the Church regarded as sacred, would be enacted.

The Greek Catholic Church was entering a new phase in its relations with the Austrian state and the Metropolitan would have to decide how far he was prepared to allow the line between civil and ecclesiastical jurisdictions to be moved. Two legislative reforms that were emerging at this time were civil marriage and the deconfessionalization of schools.

That Sheptytsky did not place implicit trust in civil laws is clear from his own remarks: "After examining our codes and statutes,
we often have to admit that the measure of what we refer to in legal terms as justice is not in fact just." Such a position was by no means antinomian, however; for even the best of legal systems was not without the risk of conflicts and injustice, and even within the limits of the law, it was possible to perpetrate injustice. That risk of injustice existed because of "the extreme difficulty in determining and delineating what, according to justice, is a person's due." Another inherent limitation of civil laws was that they always remained vulnerable to manipulation. According to Sheptytsky:

"When those in authority and power act in bad faith, it is possible for them to circumvent even the most equitable of statutes in such a way that, proceeding quite legally, they nevertheless perpetrate a very real offence."

In Sheptytsky's view, the ideal of justice to which humanity aspired transcended temporal formulations; human laws could approximate but never achieve the ideal.

It was precisely in cases that went beyond the reach of civil law that the Church made its appeal to an internal criterion, the conscience. Defining it simply as the "internal awareness of duty" (unu-

\textit{trenna svidomist', oboviazku}), Sheptytsky illustrated how it transcends legalism and serves as a guide for moral conduct. Those who follow their conscience "do not violate another's rights, nor do they add any rights to their own; not even given a case that could be won in a court of law." Thus, Sheptytsky's point was that the Christian conscience, in its social application, was the principle that came into play when civil laws fell short of their purpose or whenever narrow legalism threatened to compromise true justice. An instance of
the social application of the Christian conscience occurred in 1906, when the Metropolitan's chancery office convoked a special conference of priests in order to work out a common position for an upcoming election; in that same year, Metropolitan Sheptytsky addressed the faithful with an appeal to protest against a proposed divorce law.

In cases of conflict between the state and the Christian conscience, the Metropolitan gave the greater weight to conscience. As the discourse on conscience in On the social question clearly indicated, he was indeed able to "step outside" of the historical particularities that favored loyalty to the Austrian state and to adopt a critical posture by appealing to a higher authority.

Thus, the Christian conscience, both in its individual and collective manifestations, not only had a definite role to play in society and in the political process; in Sheptytsky's understanding, it operated independently from civil law, as indicated by the principle de internis non iudicat praetor.

b. duties of the state

If in the evolving Church-state relationship Sheptytsky was becoming ever more concerned with legislation which he believed touched on morality, he also felt that it was necessary to review the Church's understanding of the duties of the state and of its elected representatives. In the first place, Sheptytsky noted, elected members of parliament had to represent Ukrainian voters' Christian values and needs. Sheptytsky identified a good political representative as one who understood and was prepared to stand up for those needs and concerns:

"A member /elected by Ukrainians/ who must defend Christian
schools has to understand clearly what the faith and the Church mean to us... Our faith and our Church are our greatest and most valuable social goods ('narodni dobra')."

Along with this, the Metropolitan observed that "only a Christian can be the representative of a Christian people." The direct implication was that only a Christian could represent the interests of Ukrainians, whom he considered a Christian people.

Similarly, the Church expected a political leadership that was sensitive to the religious values of the people, a leadership "which would not harm the people and, taking account of all their needs and convictions, would not in any way violate either the Church or the faith, those most precious of social goods." In the same way, the Church expected that political leaders would show tolerance and allow it to perform its work without interference:

"...let them not draw the people away from the Christian faith and the Catholic Church; let them show toleration toward us; let them allow us to work for the salvation of souls; let them not slander us whenever they have the opportunity; let them not obstruct us or spoil our work; let them recognize our civil rights and allow us to make use of those rights according to our conscience and our convictions. Every citizen has the right to require that from the leaders of the people, and so does every priest."

Implicit in that assertion was the hope that, in an increasingly secular political environment, the Church would still be able to
maintain the legal foundations of its coexistence with the state. Yet there was also a realization that fundamental changes affecting that relationship were imminent and so, in addition to reviewing the duties of civil authorities toward the Church and Christian citizens, the Greek Catholic bishops urged their priests to make use of all their constitutionally-guaranteed civil rights and to teach their people to do the same.

3. Praxis

As we have mentioned, Metropolitan Sheptytsky understood obedience of the state's just dictates as dependent on the state's respect for the divine law and the rights of the Church. The specific meaning that Sheptytsky attached to "divine law" and the "rights of the Church" in his discourse on Church-state relations became evident in his approach to two pressing issues in the Austrian period: civil marriage and divorce laws and the deconfessionalization of schools.

a. separate vs. free schools

The fundamental stance on the school question was spelled out clearly in 1906 when Sheptytsky affirmed: "Certainly the Church has the God-given right to run schools, and the school belongs more to the /domain of/ the Church than to the government." The Metropolitan expressed dissatisfaction with a new law which "with great injury to the Church and the clergy removed the Church's influence over the schools."

Priests would not longer receive state salaries for teaching religion in the schools. Consequently, some of them withdrew from the
schools altogether, and the Metropolitan saw this as an undue submission to the principle of the separation of the school and the Church. To check this trend, he pointed out that although the Austrian education reform was restrictive, it did not prohibit the teaching of religion in schools; the situation was not yet like that of other European countries such as France where religious education had been completely removed from schools.

Moreover, the pastoral duty to teach catechism overrode any question of remuneration; that duty was to be fulfilled with a view toward the spiritual needs of schoolchildren and of the Christian society, not to any material benefit. Accordingly, the sobor that Sheptytsky had convened in 1905 reaffirmed earlier pronouncements of the Greek Catholic Church requiring priests to teach religion on a voluntary, non-remunerative, basis.

For the moment, then, Metropolitan Sheptytsky did not consider the school situation critical, but he foresaw an imminent threat in the trend which it indicated to him:

"I think that we are approaching times of real persecution. The enemies of the Church could easily come to power, or at least acquire greater influence on the government. Then, without a doubt, a series of anti-Church laws would begin /to appear/ with the aim of removing all the Church's influence over public and school policy and, in the long term, to wear away the Christian character of social life as much as possible."

The perceived threat was thus not only to the Church and its influence on public policy in matters of faith and morality but, beyond that, to
the very future of Ukrainian society as an identifiably Christian society. According to Sheptytsky, the duty to impart a religious and moral education was one of the most important pastoral obligations because it involved the spiritual formation of the future generation of society. Indeed, the level of the Church’s commitment to its work in the schools would be the decisive factor determining “whether or not our people will in the future / continue to/ be Christian.”

Ultimately, there was little that the Church could actually do about the direction of school reform. By early 1907, the Greek Catholic bishops were warning their faithful that the deconfessionalizing, “free schools” movement had already made its way into Austria. The Austrian branch of the movement, they said, was actively lobbying parliament for education reforms “along atheistic lines.”

In essence, the Metropolitan’s response to the school issue consisted of two elements: a firm, official statement of the Church’s opposition to deconfessionalization, and a heightened commitment to catechization. The state could well withdraw its support for religious education, but the Metropolitan felt that the Church was still duty-bound to continue to fulfill that fundamental duty.

b. civil marriage and divorce laws

The second focal point of Church-state tension at this time was the institution of Christian marriage. Here too, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was well aware of contemporary developments in Western European countries, where civil marriage and divorce laws had already been passed.

The Metropolitan’s position on this issue was categorical: such laws were a usurpation of the Church’s claim of exclusive authority in
the matter. As far as Sheptytsky was concerned, civil marriage was "no marriage in the eyes of God" but "concubinage" ("zhytie na viru"); such people were excluded from the sacraments and the consequences of that were bound to affect their children as well. Similarly, civil divorces of Christian marriages were invalid in the eyes of the Church; moreover, any subsequent remarriage was concubinage and the children of the first Christian marriage were "lost to God, to the people and to themselves." From that perspective, civil marriage and divorce laws were "atheistic and contrary to the revealed truth of the holy faith."

It was primarily the sacramental nature of marriage that placed it under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Church, according to Metropolitan Sheptytsky. As he explained:

"Outside the Church there is no authority in the world that could decide anything in this matter. If any authority - be it parliament, or some minister, or any other civil authority - interferes in this divine act which is the Sacrament of matrimony, then any law that results from such interference is invalid just as any state decisions or resolutions about other Sacraments or the Divine Liturgy would be/.

In this matter, the civil authority must accept divine and ecclesiastical law. It is up to the Church to judge those civil matters which pertain to marriage."

In January, 1906, after a civil divorce law had been tabled in the Vienna parliament, Sheptytsky referred to it as "the first strike" of the enemies of the Church against the divine law and the rights of
the Church. Two months later, he took steps to mobilize his faithful to protest against the proposed law.

Church-state relations after the outbreak of war

The Church-state tensions over religious rights in the law were abruptly set aside on 28 July, 1914, when Austria declared war on Serbia. In the early days of the conflict, Metropolitan Sheptytsky addressed three aspects of Church state relations: he defined the fundamental position of the Greek Catholic Church toward the Austrian state in view of the new situation; he enacted wartime measures that modified the life of the Church; and, as the war moved on to the Russian front, he levelled a critique at the Russian model of Church-state relations, as compared with the Austrian model. Each of these positions that were taken shed further light on Metropolitan Sheptytsky's approach to Church-state relations.

c. Affirmation of fundamental loyalty

In the emerging crisis, as domestic policy matters were subordinated to the war effort, the question of the Church's position regarding political developments was no longer a matter of nuance and negotiation but a categorical option: it was either with Austria-at-war or against it. Given the either/or situation, Metropolitan Sheptytsky did not hesitate to revert to the traditional symbols of the Church's fundamental loyalty to the empire. On 29 July he issued a pastoral urging Greek Catholics "to defend the fatherland;" their support for the war effort was a collective duty grounded in loyalty to Austria:

"The time has come for us to prove our loyalty to the
blessed ('osviachenoi') person of the emperor, to the
dynasty and to the throne. We are certain that our entire
people will fulfil its duty conscientiously and piously.

No one amongst us will forget /their debt of/ gratitude
to this Austrian, Habsburg state in which we have found
religious and ethnic freedom and the development of our
national culture. We are certain that no one amongst our
people will forget that we are linked with the Habsburg
state and dynasty by age-old and sacred bonds. Our fortune
or misfortune is one /i.e., with the Habsburg state/; our
future is one."

Those words harked back to categories that had been etched into the
popular consciousness through the old imperial hymn: the sentimental
attachment to the emperor, the fatherland (the social heritage) and
the faith. As well, the traditional linkage of loyalty to the throne
and to the faith now lent a religious meaning to the war. As
Sheptytsky proclaimed, "Fulfil your duties with courage! Victory is
certain and the cause is sacred.... We shall fight for the freedom of
our people, for the sacred cause of the faith. God is with us."

However, victory became less certain as Russian forces continued
their advance into Galicia and, on 22 August, they occupied L'viv. The
occupation brought with it a propaganda campaign aimed at winning over
Galician public support for the Russian side. When it became known
that Russian Orthodox clerics were using religious arguments to per-
suade Galicians to repudiate their oath of loyalty to Austria, Metro-
politan Sheptytsky responded forcefully:

"... a heretic, who pretends to be a monk, has the audacity
to absolve our people, in the name of God, from loyalty to our Emperor. What gives him the right? What a shameless lie and sacrilege it is to usurp (sobi prypysuvaty) the rights of God!"

As the occupation threatened to erode the sense of loyalty among Galicians, Metropolitan Sheptytsky reaffirmed that duty all the more forcefully. Still employing the traditional symbols of loyalty to Austria, he now reinforced them further by adding a religious critique of treason:

"The oath of loyalty is a sacred duty toward the will of God and the law of God. In the name of God, as your Metropolitan and Spiritual Pastor, I exhort you not to accept the advice of Judas: do not obey those who want to put you in irons; do not heed the voice of the deceiving atheists, who dare to urge you to betray the Emperor - the Fatherland - the Faith.

Any assistance given to the enemy or to traitors is treason, and treason is a crime that incurs terrible punishment, both divine and human."

The Metropolitan’s appeal to the oath of loyalty as a sacred trust, and the implicit justification of punishment for treason placed the ultimate seal of approval on commitment to Austria. For indeed, the war had provided a powerful rallying point: in effect, a confluence of political, social and religious loyalties under one banner. As the Metropolitan put it, "Be loyal to the Emperor unto bloodshed. Be faithful children of our famous people. Be faithful to our holy, ancestral Church."
Although in peacetime the social concerns of the Greek Catholic Church had been on a collision course with the direction of Austrian legislation, in Austria's war with Orthodox Russia there was little question but that Metropolitan Sheptytsky would opt for loyalty over treason. In expressing that loyalty in appeals to the faithful, he employed the powerful, familiar symbol of combined loyalties that had been cultivated for generations in the Austrian subject's mind.

d. wartime measures affecting the life of the Church

Along with his endorsement of total loyalty in the war, Metropolitan Sheptytsky enacted emergency measures to regulate the life of the Church. These measures of course had a religious and social thrust, but, more importantly for our purposes here, they also reflected his attitude toward the Church's relations with the state in wartime. In Sheptytsky's view, the crisis required the Church to directly assist the state in mobilizing Christians for the war effort.

In his pastoral of 29 July Sheptytsky directed that during the war Sunday and feast-day liturgies be followed by special prayers for the emperor, the army, victory and peace. Priests were to assist the families of soldiers by seeing to it that they were informed about how to apply for wartime subsidies from the state. As well, the Church would take it upon itself to support a spirit of hope, patriotism, courage, and peace among the faithful, along the lines of the Metropolitan's own words: "Those who are looking forward to the certain and glorious victory have nothing to fear."

Beyond taking on additional tasks in response to the war, the Metropolitan implemented measures that subordinated some religious duties to the war effort:
"...during the war, as long as agricultural work in the fields requires it, the law of the Church— which prohibits hard work on Sundays and feast-days—is suspended. Likewise, as the need arises, priests are given the authority to grant absolution from fasts to those who request it."

The voluntary subordination of some of the Church's rights to the state was evident in another area as well: a priest's duty of residency was affirmed as a general rule, but was also subject to change, depending on the will of the civil authorities.

Thus, in Metropolitan Sheptytsky's mind, the war had placed the Church on a new footing in its relation to the state. The external threat was seen as being directed equally at the emperor, the state and the Church: the very complex of loyalties that had shaped the Church's political consciousness in the Austrian context. The urgency of the situation required accommodation from the Church and, with the exception of some proposed ecclesiastical reforms in Russia (discussed below), Metropolitan Sheptytsky showed himself ready, as the need arose in wartime, to cooperate and submit the rights of the Church to the will of the state.

e. Austria vs. Russia: the preferred Church-state model

In the days that followed the outbreak of war, Ukrainian political attention turned toward the Russian front. In sharing the view that an Austrian victory would result in the annexation of ethnically Ukrainian, Russian-held lands, Metropolitan Sheptytsky wrote a memorandum to the Austrian government with proposals for an administration of the annexed territory that would ensure Ukrainian autonomy through a complete break with Russia.
stration that he singled out—military, juridical, and ecclesiastical—it was the last of these that was drawn from the Metropolitan’s views on Church-state relations.

In essence, Sheptytsky proposed that the Orthodox Church in Ukraine be separated from the Russian synod in St. Petersburg. This would be achieved through a variety of measures, including: the exemption of the Ukrainian Church from the authority of St. Petersburg; the replacement of prayers for the Russian tsar with prayers for the Austrian emperor; the elimination of Great Russian saints from the liturgical calendar; and the replacement of bishops who refused to accept the new arrangement with others who would avow "Ukrainian and Austrian convictions."

On the surface, these changes may have appeared to amount to little more than a substitution of Austrian symbols for Russian ones. Certainly Metropolitan Sheptytsky would have been motivated by his own pro-Ukrainian, pro-Austrian and pro-Catholic convictions. Yet, he also objected to the Russian structure of ecclesiastical authority from another important perspective: namely, his perception of the type of Church-state arrangement that existed in tsarist Russia. There, he felt, religious toleration was lacking; the clergy was involved in "police and political activities" and had "endured much" from the Synod and the consistory. In Sheptytsky’s proposal for change, all of those aspects of Church-state relations would be altered to conform with the Austrian model: religious toleration of all creeds would be entrenched within the legal system and the clergy would be converted to activities of a purely ecclesiastical and Christian nature and freed from the "heavy yoke" of the Synod.
Moreover, Sheptytsky stipulated that all of the reforms of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine should be carried out through ordinances issued by the Church, and not by the (Austrian) state; indeed, this would further promote the shift away from the Russian model of Church-state relations, in which the Church was completely subordinated to the state. That distinction was a crucial one, and Metropolitan Sheptytsky elaborated on it again in September, 1914:

"... they /Orthodox Christians in Russian Ukraine/ call themselves 'orthodox' and we /too/ are 'orthodox.' Our orthodoxy is ecclesiastical, while theirs is civil: tied to the state ("ikh pravoslavie derzhavne, shcho tak skazhu: kazionne"). That is, they base their orthodoxy on the power of the state, while we derive strength from our unity with the holy, Catholic Church, through which God's grace is mediated and in which the true source of salvation is found."

Thus, despite accomodations by the Greek Catholic Church that Sheptytsky accepted as necessary and legitimate in view of the war effort, the sovereignty of the Church's jurisdiction over matters of the faith and salvation remained, for him, the cornerstone of Church-state relations in Austria. By that same criterion, Sheptytsky judged the Church-state arrangement in Russia to be completely unacceptable.

The Ukrainian Catholic Church in Austrian Galicia had entered the twentieth century with a strong tradition of loyalty to the Empire. However, as socialists began to vie for, and attain, elected office in Vienna, the traditional loyalty symbol of a Christian emperor was
shaken up by the pluralistic reality of non-Christian and anticlerical legislators. In this situation, while still remaining loyal to the person of the emperor, Metropolitan Sheptytsky found it necessary to restate his Church’s understanding of the separation of powers between the Church and the Austrian state, and to list the rights to which the Church felt that it was entitled within the political order as well as the duties it felt it was called to perform in the socio-political sphere.

This reflection, carried out against the backdrop of social and political change during the pre-war period, took Sheptytsky from an accommodationist stance, submissive and preferring a modus vivendi with the state, to a more critical, self-affirming posture: intent on defending Christian social values and opposing the usurpation of the Church’s authority by the state.

In Sheptytsky’s perception, the whole configuration of the Church-state relationship was undergoing rapid change that reflected the secular and anticlerical trends in society. However, the new aloofness toward the state, far from diminishing the Metropolitan’s perception of the Church’s social role as a guardian of morality, only reinforced his resolve to pursue that worldly mission with renewed vigor:

"Long ago, the Church of Christ, in order to lead people to salvation, would turn to the worldly powers for support and assistance. Those times are gone forever. The powers of this world, governments and states, have turned away from the Church and are making alliances with its enemies. Deprived of the single element of order in the world (that is, of morality), they are hurling themselves headlong into abysses
where they will perish, unless the Church — which, when persecuted, conquers and, as it conquers, it raises up its opponent — extends a helping hand and saves society from annihilation (‘zahldy’).

As in its struggle against socialism, the Church’s struggle with the secular state was centered on the question whether religion was to be recognized as a public matter or restricted to private life. A particular concern was with religious freedom: that the Church be allowed freely to fulfil its role as teacher of the faith. This, in effect, was a sine qua non for maintaining Church-state harmony.

In this regard, it is significant that in 1913, on the 1600-th anniversary of Constantine’s Edict of Toleration, the Metropolitan and his fellow Greek Catholic bishops issued a pastoral letter which interpreted that act as follows:

"The gospel was victorious. And through its victory in the souls of the converts, having changed their customs and transformed their private lives, it immediately acquired a powerful influence over public matters. Under the influence of the Church, the state’s legislation changed in a few short years. In a series of edicts and decrees, the Emperor Constantine himself gave the sanction of state law to various customs and laws of the Church. Thus occurred that which had seemed impossible: the influence of the Church transformed the social order of the state."

Metropolitan Sheptytsky recognized, though perhaps not without a touch of historical nostalgia, that the days of near-perfect harmony
between Church and state along the lines of the Constantinian model were "gone forever." But his fundamental conviction that the Christian life was a public, as well as private, matter remained unaltered. The issue of religious freedom, which was coming to the fore with increasing frequency in Austrian Galicia, was, he felt, as much of a social ideal for the Greek Catholic Church in the first decade of the twentieth century as it had been for Christians in the Roman Empire sixteen centuries earlier.

As a result of the war, the focal point of Church-state relations shifted from the protection of religious rights to the Church's fundamental stance with regard to Austria's war effort. In view of deep-seated religious, ethnic and imperial attachments, it was scarcely surprising that Metropolitan Sheptytsky should have sided with Austria. Yet, above and beyond those attachments, it appears clear that the Metropolitan's option for Austria was also informed by his reflection on the contrast between the Austrian and the Russian models of Church-state relations. Comparing the two on their own merits, and finding the Russian model wanting, the Metropolitan revealed his main concern in Church-state relations: that a state should guarantee the Church freedom to exercise its authority in religious matters without interference from civil authorities.

Following his sermon on September 6th, 1914, in which he criticized the Russian model of Church-state relations (and, by implication, also attempts to transplant that tradition into Galicia), Metropolitan Sheptytsky was arrested by the occupying Russian forces. On September 18th, he was sent into exile in Russia, where he would remain until his release in 1917.
E. The Church and Patriotism

1. Empirical and theological assessments

One of the most complex social issues that Metropolitan Sheptytsky faced in the pre-World War I period was the conflict between the patriotisms of the two dominant ethnic groups in Galicia: Poles and Ukrainians. The Ukrainian (Greek Catholic) Archeparchy of L'viv was situated in the Austrian province of Galicia, a territory which at the turn of the century was inhabited by just over 7 million people, 46% of whom identified themselves as Poles and 42% as Ukrainians. The eastern part of Galicia (east of the river Sian), the location of the Greek Catholic Archeparchy of L'viv, was predominantly 272 Ukrainian: 65% Ukrainian to 25% Polish. With the end of the nineteenth century, tensions between the two ethnic groups mounted, as Ukrainian political consciousness began to assert itself and come into increasing conflict with established Polish interests.

Realizing that the Greek Catholic Church was a key player in Galician society, Ukrainian political circles looked to the Church for moral support and were prepared to criticize it harshly whenever they sensed that such support was not forthcoming. Metropolitan Sheptytsky was sensitive to those concerns and gave clear indications of his favorable attitude towards Ukrainian patriotism from the very outset of his episcopate.

In 1899, Sheptytsky commented on the patriotism of Ukrainian Catholic priests; counting himself as a participant in that patriotism, he remarked that the clergy knew "how to love our people... for we love /the people/ through our work and self-sacrifice." Two years later, in a pastoral to the Ukrainian intelligentsia, he again gave a positive assessment of patriotism among the Ukrainian youth:
"Our guarantee of successful socioeconomic work is the youthful and strong patriotism which is more evident among our people than among those who have already been, as it were, worn out ('perezhylisia') with work and struggle through the ages."

The Metropolitan was aware that some doubted the sincerity of the Greek Catholic Church's commitment to Ukrainian patriotism. In his reading, they were "the enemies of the teachings of Christ" (i.e., socialists), adherents of the misconception that the Church "...by rubbing out the differences between peoples, is striving towards internationalism; that it is indifferent to a person's fulfilment of patriotic duties; and that good Christians make poor patriots."

In the Church's struggle with socialism, the issue of patriotism was a veritable bone of contention. Noting that the socialists were quite adept at "adorning their theories with patriotism," the Metropolitan objected to what he felt were abuses of the notion of patriotism. He noted that such instances were occurring in the contemporary press:

"In our times, when in the daily press people sin so often against love of neighbor, the general moral opinions on that matter are so erroneous that, under the appearance of patriotism and civic duties, the ugly habit of speaking ill of others is concealed."

From a theological perspective, such abuses of the virtue of patriotism were a matter of concern to the Metropolitan inasmuch as
they fomented hatred and contravened the law of love. In 1906, the Greek Catholic bishops of Galicia condemned the "lack of love... the injustice and hatred" that they were seeing.

Nor were Polish-Ukrainian tensions the only area of the problem; disagreements over patriotism were also an internal problem that could set Ukrainian against Ukrainian (as we have seen in the section on priests and politics). In 1907, Metropolitan Andrei together with the other Ukrainian Catholic bishops, observed:

"The greatest misfortune of our people and of our clergy is that there is such a polarity of opinions about the concept of nationality that some consider others to be their enemies."

The Metropolitan perceived the issue of patriotism as both a social and a religious problem. From a social point of view, the issue was a source of antagonism pitting Poles against Ukrainians in a struggle for social and political justice. As a religious problem, distorted views of patriotism were threatening to draw Christians away from the fundamental law of their faith and were being used to support anticlerical charges that Christianity was incompatible with patriotism.

2. Principles for society and the position of the Church
a. Christian patriotism: the law of love vs. hatred

In developing his response to the issue of Ukrainian patriotism, Metropolitan Sheptytsky first of all looked to gospel teaching, and found examples of patriotism in both Christ and St. Paul:

"Christ, who said of himself that he came 'only to the lost
sheep of the house of Israel' (Mt. 15:24); Christ, who wept because he foresaw the destruction of Jerusalem; and, after him, Paul the Apostle who was ready to give up his life for his brothers in blood— they truly loved their people. And not only did they not forbid patriotism; they cultivated 281 ('vshchipliuvaly') it."

But the patriotism that the Metropolitan saw in the gospel was not an exclusive form of love: directed only to one's own, and withheld from others. He noted that, whereas the pagan patriotism of the Greeks and the Romans saw foreigners not as brothers but as barbarians, and the Jews of the Old Testament taught that enemies were to be hated, the Christian was called to love everyone, including his enemies.

But the universal thrust of the Christian law of love did not oppose patriotism. The alleged incompatibility of Christianity and patriotism was in fact a misrepresentation for, in the Christian understanding, there was nothing intrinsically wrong about love of one's country. On the contrary, as the Metropolitan observed: "The 283 Christian can and should be a patriot."

When in the first decade of the century the Polish member of parliament Kozłowski launched a campaign to "save a million Poles who were threatened by Ruthenianization," that is, Ukrainianization within the Greek Catholic Church, Metropolitan Sheptytksy wrote a special pastoral in 1904 to the Polish Greek Catholics of his Archdiocese. In it, he gave a further clarification of his tolerant position:

"...I want you to know that I respect your convictions and that I am far from imposing Ruthenian patriotism upon you.
It is perhaps those who do not understand what the priesthood is and what the episcopal office is who suspect me of that. Indeed, I care for only one thing: that your life be Christian, that you be Christ's ("Chrstusowymi") in the full meaning of the word."

Language, convictions, ethnic identity: those are goods and rights that no one may ever take away. To respect them is a plain duty according to justice...

I can only encourage you in your patriotic convictions, in so far as that patriotism is a Christian love of the homeland and proceeds from a love of God and neighbor."

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's understanding of Christian patriotism was not reducible to narrow nationalism; one's particular choice of ethnic identity simply did not enter into the ethical discussion. Christian patriotism was framed within a supra-national perspective that provided no basis for objecting to, for example, the Polish ethnic affiliation which some members of the Greek Catholic community had chosen for themselves.

The Metropolitan brought a unique sensitivity to the issue, for he himself, now a Greek Catholic archbishop of the Ukrainians, had been raised as a Polish Roman Catholic. Yet, by the time that he began to write pastorals on the subject, he had clearly progressed in his thinking from the personal level of his own transition and had formed a fundamental ethical stance regarding patriotism and ethnic identity in general. In his ethical assessment of particular instances of patriotism, the Metropolitan showed himself to be concerned more with its compatibility with the Christian model of love than with making
value judgments about the ethnic self-identification of individuals. Ethnic identity was to him a fundamental, inalienable right; consequently, from a Christian point of view, the only legitimate question that could be asked about a person's patriotism was whether it was a form of love that proceeded from Christian love.

Another important element of discernment in Sheptytsky's approach to the question of patriotism was the via negativa to the Christian law of love, that is, the avoidance of hatred. As love (specifically that which was linked with love of God and neighbor) was a Christian requirement or test for the authenticity of patriotism, so too hatred was a sign of false patriotism. The Metropolitan often employed this motif in exhortations to his Ukrainian and Polish faithful alike. In 1899, as bishop of Stanyslaviv, he addressed his Ukrainian flock there with the following words:

"... love what is yours ('svoie'), keep to it and care for it. But beware of hatred, for hatred is an unchristian sentiment."

And:

"A Christian's patriotism cannot be hatred. Nor can it place upon him duties that are opposed to the faith. Whatever appears to be patriotism but in fact is hatred or runs counter to the faith is not true patriotism."

Five years later, in his pastoral to the Polish Greek Catholics of his Archdiocese, the Metropolitan again made the same point:

"All hatred is wrong because it is contrary to God's and Christ's commandment and human nature."
And:

"A Christian is obliged to love his native land and to care for the good of his people. Only one thing is forbidden: he is not allowed to hate, even under the guise of patriotism..."

The Christian patriot, then, always remained a Christian, bound by the law of love; he avoided hatred because it was an "unchristian sentiment," and in doing so distinguished between true patriotism, which adhered to the law of love, and false patriotism, which did not.

The love/hatred variable was, in effect, a criterion of discernment by which instances of patriotism could be ethically identified and assessed by Christians: "Whether it is class hatred or national hatred, whether it is masked by appearances of fervor and patriotism, or motivated by either real or apparent injuries, every hatred is always unchristian."

b. The patriotism of the Church: cosmopolitanism vs. particularity

The discussion of Christian patriotism was not merely an individual matter, but a collective one, which made it necessary for the Church to adopt a position on patriotism. Metropolitan Sheptytsky approached the question by speaking of two characteristic features of the Catholic Church: cosmopolitanism and particularity.

The Church was cosmopolitan, or international, in that its aim was the salvation of all people, the good of all the nations of the world and in all times. The Church stood for a truth and culture that were universal and which "no nation has the right to monopolize or keep for itself." By virtue of those universal principles and abso-
lute truth, the Church stood above historical and cultural differences.

In answer to charges that the Greek Catholic Church was unable to serve the Ukrainian people because of its submission to foreign (i.e., Vatican) influences, Sheptytsky responded that it was the way of all culture to "accept all human achievements that promote the progress of truth and the good." Moreover, by virtue of its divine nature and origin, the Church could not be subordinated or reduced to the level of a national organization, for:

"When it is understood as a purely national institution that embraces only one people and separates that people from all others, the Church becomes an instrument that supports schism, it incites ('pidsychuie') nationalistic passions and collaborates in the oppression of other nations. Such a Church promotes conflict, not peace; division, not unification, and thus is not the Church of Christ."

The Church could adopt some of its external features in order to answer to the needs of time and space; for example, by modifying its hierarchical structure or in applying its teaching to actual human situations ("do zhyttiovkyh vidnosyn liudei"), but its inner essence - the revealed truth, universal love, the sacraments, and the divine nature of the Church - were not changeable and had not changed in nineteen centuries. Sheptytsky clearly considered this immutable essence to be a reliable criterion for the discernment of the true Church.

At the same time, the Church had the divinely-given power to promote the social good in particular contexts and times. That power
was evident when the Church brought the Roman emperors to bow to Christ and give up their pagan morality, when it abolished slavery and servitude in almost all states, and when it "enlightened the dark, barbarian hordes and preserved knowledge from destruction." Sheptytsky saw that power present within the work of the Church in his own time, exerting its "ennobling influence" on all of humanity. Even in its unchangeable essence, then, the Church's work had a social thrust.

The other side of the Church was its particularity: the human side of its activity, in which it adapted itself locally to the needs of individual peoples. This it did by promoting the social and cultural development which were part of nationbuilding ("narodne budovy", "narodnytstvo").

In the cultural sphere, the Ukrainian Catholic Church promoted the use of the vernacular through translations of the Bible, of the Divine Liturgy, and of the works of the Church Fathers; its promotion of education served to develop literature and, through it, a national culture; its promotion of ecclesiastical art and music served to develop all the fine arts; its cultivation of a national (i.e., patriotic) spirit and its commitment to the Eastern rite reinforced the sense of a Ukrainian identity among the people.

In the social sphere, the Sheptytsky was committed to implementing within the Ukrainian Catholic Church the same principles of justice and love that characterized the universal Church:

"By removing and overcoming all that is opposed to natural law and which is harmful to humanity, /the Church/ contributes to the moral health of every nation and, indirectly, to the development of all national strengths (‘narodnykh
In Galicia, the Metropolitan argued, the Greek Catholic Church had been actively involved in Ukrainian social advancement. It brought education "to even the most neglected" Ruthenian village; it promoted sobriety, concord and love; it drew people away from lawsuits and promoted every good initiative — whether educational or economic — in every village. The Ukrainian Church's work in the cultural and social spheres left no doubt in the Metropolitan's mind that, while remaining unchanged in its universal essence, the Church was truly on the side of the Ukrainian people. The Christian synthesis of cosmopolitanism and national particularity was expressed succinctly: "love all but keep to what is yours."
3. Praxis: Christian patriotism and Polish-Ukrainian relations

Metropolitan Sheptytsky elaborated further and applied his understanding of Christian patriotism when he responded to specific issues that arose between Ukrainians and Poles in pre-war Austrian Galicia. Three such occasions were: the assassination of the Polish viceroy Potocki, the electoral reform issue, and the public debate on the paths to peaceful Polish-Ukrainian coexistence.

a. Potocki

On April 12, 1908, almost two months after violence had erupted in the course of provincial elections, the Ukrainian student Myroslav Sichynsky shot to death the Polish viceroy for Galicia Andrzej Potocki. Twelve days later, Metropolitan Sheptytsky condemned the act in his Good Friday sermon at St. George's cathedral:

"That public crime must be publicly condemned. It must evoke a decisive and vehement protest from Christians, a protest of indignation and disgust at such an affront to the light of divine law. And we have a particular duty to condemn the crime that has been committed since its perpetrator thought in his blindness that he would thereby serve the national cause. For God's sake, that is not so! One does not serve a people with crimes; a crime committed in the name of patriotism is a crime not only before God but also against one's own community and one's fatherland."

The Metropolitan recognized that, beyond the strictly moral question of homicide, the event had also had an immediate impact on Ukrainian society. The Ukrainian press and political leaders generally saw the
assassination in direct relation to social and political injustices suffered by Galician Ukrainians and many portrayed it as a heroic and virtuous act of patriotism. In turn, the Ukrainian Church was being accused of a lack of patriotism.

Aware that under the circumstances any criticism was likely to be branded as unpatriotic, Metropolitan Sheptytsky did not limit himself to a condemnation of only the assassination. The issue could not be effectively addressed by referring only to the intrinsic ethical evil of homicide; the social dimension of the crime had to be challenged as well. Thus, both in his sermon and in a subsequent collective pastoral of the Greek Catholic hierarchy, he levied a full-fledged critique of popular Ukrainian perceptions of the assassination.

While condemning the assassination as a grave social sin of atheism and amorality in politics ("polityka bez Boha;" "dumaty, shcho v politytsi use vil’no"), the pastoral was phrased in a way that would show a patriotic commitment of its own. In particular, the bishops took explicit account of social injustices that had been visited upon Ukrainians:

"We are aware that in public life today not everything is proceeding according to the requirements of strict justice and the intent of the divine law of love of neighbor. We are aware of the collective and individual disregard of our people /which occurs/ often and in many ways."

Together with you, we feel all the pain and suffering of our people; together with you we want to work and are working as much as we can towards improving our people’s destiny."
The message was clear: the bishops' objections to the assassination did not amount to a renunciation of the Ukrainian cause or siding with the Poles but proceeded from both Christian and patriotic convictions. The bishops distinguished between two separate levels in their critique: in their capacity as citizens and patriots, the bishops condemned injustices against Ukrainians; but as pastors responsible for souls, they felt obligated to "object even more to whatever is a moral evil or a moral danger to the task of your salvation which has been entrusted to us."

The assassination was just such an evil: a "heinous crime," a "trampling on the divine law in public" and a scandal to the faithful. Accordingly, the bishops protested against it both as Christians and as Ukrainians:

"If as Christians and bishops we raise a voice of disgust at the sight of the crime that has been committed and the divine law that has been trampled on, then even more vehemently as Ruthenians /i.e., Ukrainians/ we must loudly and decisively protest against the notion that it is possible to serve one’s native land with crimes, insults to God, scorn of Christ and the trampling of divine law.

No, a hundred times: no. Service to one’s people and country is a sacred service, and is also offered up to God; in order to undertake it, one must have clean, not bloodied, hands.

After God, a man’s country is /his/ most sacred thing; and, after the love of God, love of country is the noblest, highest and best sentiment. The desire to serve one’s country through lawlessness is like staining white garments with
blood and mud..."

By affirming the duty of Christian patriotism to object to the crime and its association with patriotism, the statement was a defence of Christian patriotism. From a social point of view, the popularization of the crime "debased the virtue of patriotism and undermined the moral foundations of work for the good of society;" it represented the transformation of noble, patriotic sentiments into something the Church could never condone: "an abominable feeling of hatred and anger," an "ill-conceived and material patriotism."

The popularization of the crime had potentially far-reaching social implications and the pastoral pointed out the inherent fundamental error: "Praising the sins of others, showing satisfaction with sin, defending sin, or abetting sin will always be a sin in politics." In the particular context, the error represented a subversion of moral categories and of the Christian fabric of society and was evident in:

"...the false and dangerous teaching that in politics everything is permissible and that politics should not be guided by divine law. From this, it follows that they are always ready to praise and defend every crime and every injustice. They are even ready to portray the crime as heroic, virtuous and sacred. No confusion of concepts could possibly be more harmful..."

In essence, the pastoral made three fundamental points. First, the assassination had to be criticized on both Christian and patriotic grounds. Second, a Christian perspective was not incompatible with
patriotism; on the contrary, the crucial distinction was between true patriotism (which, being grounded in Christian faith and morality, did not allow hatred) and the false patriotism of those who rejected any superior moral authority in social and political affairs. And third, homicide either committed or extolled in the name of patriotism was still homicide; it was as much a debasing of the noble virtue of true patriotism and a threat to the good of society as it was a violation of divine law.

b. electoral reform

The Metropolitan recognized that the conflict of patriotisms was largely due to persistent injustices in the electoral system of Galicia.

In a 1913 pastoral on electoral reform, he declared together with the other Greek Catholic bishops that social justice was the most important guiding principle for such a reform. Consequently, all forms of deceit, bribery and other illegalities which had become common would have to be eliminated as a way of restoring the Christian foundations of social life in Galicia:

"As long as that principle of justice is not strictly implemented, there can be no order in the land. The least injustice in the social order by its very nature causes dissatisfaction and becomes an occasion for electoral abuses, which only corrupt people and feed the flames of fratricidal hatred, that veritable plague of the Christian life."

Here, the bishops took a stand in defence of the right to convictions
of another sort: political convictions. To sell or impose them with or without violence was not only an indication of a lack of character, they said, but a grave sin.

Declaring themselves to be seeking the sincere agreement of the Polish and the Ukrainian peoples, the bishops voiced their hope that the parliamentary representatives of the Polish people "would find a way to keep their word without exposing to danger the Catholic faith and Church among the Polish people."

Thus, recognizing the importance of political factors in resolving the Polish-Ukrainian problem, it was felt that the premise of a meaningful agreement would be visible progress by Ukrainian and Polish politicians in the area of electoral reform. For, "the quarrels between us have already lasted too long" and the task of fraternal peace was "sacred."

When in January, 1914, a Polish-Ukrainian agreement for electoral reform ran into new difficulties and a deadlock seemed imminent, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was invited to address an ad hoc meeting of elected representatives from all parties. The Metropolitan's proposal for a new compromise agreement consisted of three points; yet far more telling was the shift of perspective to which he called the politicians of both ethnic groups. He felt that, in order for an agreement to be reached, the ethnic divisions would have to be transcended. He therefore tried to set an example and approach the issue by stepping outside of his own ethnic self:

"Permit me to forget, as it were, that I am a Ruthenian Metropolitan and to take the common position in the province so as to help incline, with God's help, both sides to shake hands and to become reconciled in this matter. Then, God
willing, we will walk together peacefully in many other matters."

Nor was this stepping outside of the ethnic self-identification merely a personal gesture on the Metropolitan's part; on the contrary, he believed strongly enough in the need for such a preliminary, fundamental perspective that he urged the assembled politicians also to adopt the new perspective:

"Gentlemen, in order to accomplish the blessed task, raise yourselves above the impressions of the current moment, which are so unpleasant to you. Let justified personal grudges not obscure your view of the historical fact that an agreement between the two peoples in a matter of such importance to our province would be. We have lived for ages in this land, where we are bound by the link of common issues, shared needs and misfortunes. Let us set aside that struggle and, together and today, lay the cornerstone of the development of both peoples and of a better future for the whole land."

The new focus that the Metropolitan was proposing was in view of long-term harmony between the Polish and Ukrainian peoples who lived in the same land. He saw the value of a settlement on electoral reform as going beyond the immediate issue at hand. Indeed, if the agreement were achieved according to his proposal, the Metropolitan was convinced that it could be "the first step to a new understanding" between Poles and Ukrainians and "the basis for further normalization and cooperation."
Such an outcome became a real possibility on January 28, when representatives from Polish and Ukrainian parties to the local parliament signed an agreement based on the Metropolitan's proposal. Unfortunately, the plan was shelved later in the year because of the outbreak of war.

c. patriotism vs national egoism

In April, 1914, the Cracow-based Polish Catholic periodical Przegląd Powszechny announced a survey requesting reader response to the question: "Beyond the controversial question of the Polish-Ukrainian question, what matters are common to both peoples and by what means could mutual cooperation be realized in such matters?" Metropolitan Sheptytsky responded to the survey with a short letter that shed further light on his understanding of Christian patriotism.

He began by pointing out a common error: to look upon patriotism "as an absolute virtue, as something intrinsically good and noble." Since many things went under the popular heading of "patriotism," the Metropolitan felt that it was vital to distinguish between abuses of the term (i.e., "pagan patriotism" or "national egoism... which are currently spreading like a disease") and authentic, Christian patriotism.

His feeling was that although the Christian idea of love of neighbor had more or less penetrated human consciousness at the individual level, international relations were still governed by a "cannibalistic," dog-eat-dog morality, according to which "it is alright for me to devour my neighbor, but not alright for him to devour me." In fact, such so-called "patriotism" was not patriotism at all, but egoism, and was but one instance of a corruption to which, ultimately,
every form of love was susceptible. As the Metropolitan explained:

"Every feeling, desire, disposition, every love of the human heart lies on a line (to put it geometrically) one end of which reaches down into the abyss of passion and lawlessness, while the other rises into the limitless expanses of the Kingdom of God..."

As with one's love for oneself, so too with love of family or country: each of these is in every heart a point on that line and is closer to either one or the other end."

For Metropolitan Andrei, the bane of every form of love was egoism, which could take on very subtle forms and made it difficult to distinguish from authentic love. And, as if individual egoism were not bad enough, it was even more hidden and therefore even more dangerous in its social form, where it became "the error and plague" of the social virtue of patriotism.

In the Metropolitan's estimation, therefore, the solution of Polish-Ukrainian relations lay not so much in the search for agreement on one or another issue, but rather in a conversion of social attitudes: the replacement of an essentially pagan social morality of collective, national egoism with a Christian patriotism that was rooted in an authentic Christian love for all peoples.

What clearly emerges from these three instances of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's practical reflection on patriotism in the Polish-Ukrainian context is his commitment to an enduring settlement.

The condemnation of the assassination, for which he was severely
criticized by many Ukrainians, indicated that his view of Christian patriotism was rooted in Christian ethics rather than narrow nationalism. But nor did the critique proceed from a narrow moralism, that would judge only individual acts and ignore their social context and implications; Metropolitan Sheptytsky was convinced that it was as dangerous for a society to extol homicide as it was for an individual to commit it. As the subsequent polarization of the two national groups confirmed, the path of violence was ultimately self-defeating. Sheptytsky's alternative proposal of a Christian basis for patriotism meant working toward lasting peace and justice along a path of love.

Sheptytsky's contribution to the electoral reform debate also showed his concern for placing individual disagreements within a broader perspective: the search for a long-term solution to Polish-Ukrainian relations. As he saw it, the driving force behind negotiations on particular issues had to be a shared desire for the ultimate goal of justice. And that could only be achieved in a spirit of Christian patriotism, since it provided the courage to step outside the national bias that one brought into the debate.

Finally, the letter to Przegląd Powszechny drove home an important point: that the solution to the Polish-Ukrainian question was not to be sought only in the examination and weighing of the respective interests and claims of each side. The real problem, to Sheptytsky's mind, was a crisis of patriotism. He therefore believed that the essential requirement for achieving stable and lasting social harmony was a transformation of consciousness: the replacement of national egoisms with genuine Christian patriotism.
F. Conclusion

We have examined four key areas of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's social thought and teaching during the period 1899-1914: on the social action of the Church, in which he affirmed spiritual values in contrast to the materialistic approach of socialism; on the political participation of priests, where he emphasized the primacy of the priestly ministry; on Church-state relations, where he tried to balance fundamental loyalty with the competing concern for the protection of Christian values and the rights of the Church in society; and on the Christian understanding of patriotism, in which he rejected "pagan" patriotism. In each of those areas, the Metropolitan was concerned with preserving the Christian foundations of society, against secularizing trends which regarded religion as strictly a private matter.

In elaborating his understanding of the Church's social mission, Sheptytsky addressed not only the perceived external threats (such as socialism, anticlerical attacks on the Church and secular legislation) but the internal situation of the Church as well. To a large extent, this corrective thrust of his social teaching was directed to the priests, seen initially as the primary agents of the Church's social mission. However, in response to developments particularly in the area of Polish-Ukrainian relations, this social message was extended to include the faithful as well.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's social reflection showed some variability, primarily in the form of shifts of emphasis in response to emerging developments and his changing perceptions of the needs of the situation. We have noted, for example, that his notion of soli-
darity underwent a shift from a predominantly clerical to an all-Christian ideal, which included the faithful more emphatically within the Church's social agenda.

An important shift also occurred in the area of Church-state relations. Before the war, the Metropolitan drew a fine line between traditional Greek Catholic loyalty to the empire and a critical assertiveness with a view toward safeguarding the rights of the Church. The war transformed the entire debate: given the simple choice between Austria and Russia, the Metropolitan sided unequivocally with Austria. It should be noted, however, that he arrived at that decision for essentially the same reason as that which had led him to criticize Austria in peacetime, namely: his strong reservations about state intervention in ecclesiastical matters.

Integral to Metropolitan Sheptytsky's ethical reflection on social issues was the Christian law of love. Following it, he systematically rejected all the forms of hatred that he saw in the four areas we have examined: in social action, the socialist doctrine of class struggle; in political action, partisan infighting among priests; in Church-state relations, the goal of revolutionary upheaval; and in inter-ethnic relations, chauvinism.

Throughout his reflection on the social issues of the day, Metropolitan Sheptytsky turned to the law of love as a reliable constant; in effect, he considered it a criterion of ethical discernment by which Christians, priests and faithful alike, could distinguish for themselves between authentically Christian and amoral, atheistic courses of action. This perspective situated the socio-political debate in Galicia in an entirely new context: the main question was
not whether or not the Church could endorse social action, political participation and patriotism (it did), but how to determine the authentically Christian path, which led to salvation, as opposed to the path of perdition. Sheptytsky found the most reliable answer to that question in the law of love applied to social reality.
CHAPTER 2:
THE SOCIAL THOUGHT AND PRAXIS OF METROPOLITAN ANDREI SHEPTYTSKY
DURING AND AFTER WORLD WAR I: 1914 - 1923

A. Introduction

The second period of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's activity covers three
more or less distinct phases, namely: his exile in Russia (1914-1917),
followed by a three-year period in L'viv, and finally a long voyage through
western Europe and North and South America (1920-1923).

Despite a wide variety of difficulties and obstacles, the Metropolitan
managed to remain active at this time: promoting the cause of Church unity
while in Russian exile or, after his return to L'viv, supporting Ukrainian
efforts to secure independence, and again assessing the needs of Ukrainian
Catholic communities abroad and seeking international economic and poli-
tical assistance for Ukrainians in war-torn Galicia.

However, as compared with the other four major periods of Metropolitan
Sheptytsky's life and activity which are treated in this study, the primary
source materials for this period are few. Among the most likely factors
that prevented the Metropolitan from producing a voluminous quantity of
writings at this time were his absence from L'viv for two three-year
periods and the disruptions of the World War, which in Galicia were com-
pounded by a Polish-Ukrainian war that lasted up to the middle of 1919.

Along with the relative paucity of documentary material, a further
difficulty in grappling with this period of the Metropolitan's social
thought and activity is that two of the key documents which are available
are pastorals that were collectively written and signed by all three Ukrai-
nian Greek Catholic bishops. A legitimate question might be raised about
the degree to which collective pastoral letters of the Ukrainian Greek
Catholic hierarchy may be attributed to Metropolitan Sheptytsky. Leaving for future study the question of the direct authorship of individual passages in those documents, we treat these documents as collective statements while at the same time recognizing that behind them was a process of collective reflection in which Metropolitan was directly and personally involved.

In light of these factors and of the rapid change that was going on in Eastern Europe, this second period, presented in a rather episodic fashion, is probably best considered a transitional phase, rather than as a distinct stage in the development of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's ethical reflection on social and political reality.

B. Exile in Russia: 1914-1917

The first three-year portion of this period began on 15 September, 1914, when the Russian forces occupying Galicia placed Metropolitan Sheptytsky under house arrest. Four days later, he was sent into exile in Russia. Until his release in March, 1917, by the provisional government of Alexander Kerensky, Metropolitan Sheptytsky's social activity was limited to written representations before the Russian government, primarily in the matter of wartime Galician deportees in Russia.

1. Sheptytsky's interventions with the tsarist government

One of the earliest communications is a letter that was mentioned in the polemical Russian literature of the day. Prior to the Revolution, Metropolitan Sheptytsky allegedly wrote to Tsar Nicholas I, and "greeted the victorious Russian army, expressed happiness that Ukraine was finally united with Russia and gave his assurances of loyalty to Russian ideals."

Later, the Metropolitan wrote to the Russian Minister of Internal
Affairs requesting a transfer to Tomsk or Minusinsk in Siberia, where other Ukainians had been deported from Galicia; the transfer was denied.

As the Russian occupation of Galicia wore on, military units began to round up Greek Catholic priests and members of the lay intelligentsia, and to deport them into Russia and Siberia. Deported children were registered as Orthodox and educated in the Orthodox faith. Learning of this, Sheptytsky protested to the Procurer of the Holy Synod Vladimir N. Lvov against the conversion of children and called for an investigation of those Russian Orthodox priests who, with Russian military assistance, had occupied Greek Catholic churches in Galicia and had sent the local parish priests into exile in Russia and Siberia. This initiative, too, was without any result.

In March, 1917, after the fall of the Romanov dynasty, the Russian provisional government declared an amnesty for political and religious prisoners, and Sheptytsky was freed. Shortly thereafter, a Central Ukrainian Council (Rada) was formed in Kiev as a governing body for Ukraine that was committed to the principle of national self-determination.

2. After the release

After his release, Sheptytsky made personal representations before ministries of the revolutionary government in St. Petersburg on behalf of tens of thousands of Galician deportees in Russia, among whom there were some eighty priests. But it was on the religious front that more dramatic changes began to occur.

a. the Sobor of St. Petersburg

At the end of May, Sheptytsky convoked a sobor (synod) in St. Petersburg with the aim of organizing the Eastern-rite Catholic Church in
Russia. The Metropolitan himself presided over the proceedings of the sobor, which was comprised of Russian Catholic priests including the Exarch of Russia, Leonid Fedorov. Among other things, the sobor resolved to seek the legalization of the Greek Catholic Church in Russia. When the Russian government appeared unreceptive to that proposal, Metropolitan Sheptytsky intervened personally to argue the case. After the sobor, he met with members of the government. He argued that Russia had nothing to lose but everything to gain from contacts with the West and a rapprochement with the western Church. In addition, he reminded the Russian authorities that the Greek Catholic Church already existed within Russian boundaries, namely: in occupied Galicia. Finally, he referred to some of the guiding principles of the Revolution:

"In your slogans you called for freedom of religious beliefs; supposedly, therefore, you will not restrict or abrogate it, but instead will allow the Church that you took over to develop.... If, in your thinking, every people may develop freely in the faith of its choice, then what danger do you perceive in the fact that many 'Russians' want to be in unity with the Roman Church?"

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's intervention was successful; the Russian provisional government granted the Greek Catholic Church equal status with the Roman Catholic Church. Its priests began to appear publicly at religious gatherings and exarch Leonid Fedorov was invited by the government to attend deliberations on religious affairs of its committee on Church-state relations. By the end of the year, the provisional government proclaimed a Regulation for the Catholic Church in Russia.

The resolutions of the sobor affirmed unity with Rome on fundamental issues (papal primacy, the truths of the faith and saints canonized in the
West were formally accepted), but at the same time they recognized the distinctiveness of the Eastern tradition in such areas as liturgy (no Latin forms would be accepted), canon law (canonical innovations in the western Church since the 7th Ecumenical Council were not binding unless they explicitly referred to the Eastern Church), and sacramental ministry (where Eastern practices such as the communion of infants were affirmed).

Church-state relations were covered in resolutions 25 and 26: the sobor considered the Church’s independence from the state as essential, however, it also considered legalization necessary. And, in a socially significant departure from the feudal practice of *lус patronatus* which was still widespread in Galicia, the synod recognized no lay patronage rights over churches: according to article N°35 of the sobor’s decisions, "a lay person who gives something to the Church relinquishes all claims on what has been given."

b. interpreting the fall of tsarism and its implications for Ukraine

In the months that followed his release, Metropolitan Sheptytsky expressed himself publicly on the developments in Russia and Ukraine. On leaving St. Petersburg on his way to Kiev on 24 April, 1917, he wrote a message to the Ukrainian National Council representatives in St. Petersburg, in which he referred to the "historic moment" that had occurred:

"In accordance with divine Providence, the shackles that once bound our Ukrainian people have fallen off; no longer are our people gagged. Along with the renewal of life in all of Russia our people too are revived.... I am grateful for being able to witness this moment and, with a sincere, silent prayer, I have bowed my head before the inscrutable paths of divine Provi-
Seeing the developments in Russia favorably, Sheptytsky understood them as having great significance for Ukrainians in Galicia. For indeed, he saw the national strivings of Ukrainians in Galicia and in Russian Ukraine as united and identical. It was in that light that he understood the warm reception that he had been given on arrival at St. Petersburg:

"I know that the ovations were directed not so much to me personally as rather to the entire Ukrainian people in Galicia; in that way, you have publicly demonstrated our indivisible national unity, the closest of bonds and fraternal regard /that exist between us/, and /our/ identical strivings for self-determination ("samooznachennia"), development and the raising up of our national culture.... not even boundaries can tear apart our national unity and the soul of our good Ukrainian people. This national unity of ours is the surest guarantee of a magnificent future to which we can look forward boldly, and toward which all of us, Ukrainians, will walk together in our cultural work."

On his way back to L'viv through neutral Sweden and Switzerland, the Metropolitan again had occasion to express his favorable view of the fall of tsarism and the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state in Kiev; in essence, it had brought and end to the period of harsh oppression of the Eastern-rite Catholic (Uniate) Church in Russia:

"Tsarism persecuted us and officially suppressed our Church at the end of the eighteenth century in Ukraine and in 1838 in Byelorussia and Volhynia. Today we have eight eparchies: 3 in Galicia, 3 in Hungary, and 2 in America. However, the memory of the Uniate Church has remained deep and very much alive in the
regions which it once occupied, and today it enjoys the favor which is accorded to all formerly oppressed forces. That is why the present Russian revolution, without actually being sympathetic towards us, is not particularly hostile towards us either."

In late August, 1917, Sheptytsky addressed Ukrainians in Vienna with much the same optimism about the anticipated end of the war:

"The moment is approaching when the bitter punishment will come to an end; the path that leads to a better future is opening up before us. The developments in Ukraine, which is now free, are the guarantee of a glorious future for the Ukrainian people."

He urged Ukrainians to give thanks to God "for those magnificent hopes for the future, for those beautiful beginnings of national development," and to ask for all that they needed "both in Russian Ukraine and here for the free and full development of all their God-given attributes and strengths." In Sheptytsky's view, those hopes for political freedom were closely interwoven with the expectation that a new era was at hand for Eastern-rite Catholicism:

"There, beyond the border, a free Ukraine has been resurrected. The people are reawakening to a new life and, with youthful strength and vigour they are working towards the establishment of their own state. Hope for the Holy Unia is also being revived, and the blood of our martyrs is beginning to bear the fruit of the Christian, spiritual rebirth of our people."

In September, 1917, Sheptytsky addressed his people in L'viv for the first time in three years. Again, the fundamental changes in Russia were foremost in his mind:
"Our faith and hope have overcome. The pagan tsarist authority has turned into dust, like a demonid idol before the tabernacle of God. The power which for centuries oppressed our faith and our nationality has disappeared from the face of the earth: it is no longer there! Those who wanted by every available means to shackle the Ukrainian people with a yoke, those who tried with all manner of violence to destroy the very memory of the Holy Unia have been struck down as if by a thunderbolt, by the hand of the Almighty; lowered and humbled, they have become an example of how God, ever-merciful though He is, nevertheless sometimes punishes injustice and humbles the proud even in this world."

Despite that national optimism, however, the Metropolitan did not set aside his loyalty to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Thus, his vision of a free, united Ukraine was still framed within the bounds of Austrian monarchism:

"We have a young monarch who sincerely loves his peoples. Among the members of the imperial family who are closest to him we have advisers who are wise and well-disposed towards us. The leadership has become convinced that our people is always faithful to God, that even in the most terrible misery they kept faithful to their monarch, that we gladly sacrificed our property and our blood, and that we only want to live in freedom in our own land."

Sheptytsky’s internment in Russia, which took him from Kiev to Nizhnii Novgorod and Kurs'k, then to the Spaso-Efimiev monastery prison in Suzdal’, and finally to Yaroslavl’, effectively isolated him from the Greek Catholic
Church in Russian-occupied Galicia and prevented him from carrying out any pastoral activity. Nevertheless, he made a point of raising humanitarian issues before the tsarist government that had ordered his arrest. And, in the six months between his release and his arrival back in L'viv, the Metropolitan was able to lay the groundwork for a Greek Catholic Church in Russia with the consent of the provisional government in St. Petersburg. In meetings with Ukrainian political circles, he also took the opportunity of expressing his views on the radical change in Russia and its implications for Ukraine.

Essentially, he welcomed the fall of tsarism, and saw it as opening up new possibilities for the religious and political future of Ukraine. In the area of religion, it appeared to him that the era of the Russian persecution of the Uniate Church was finally over; the promising direction of the provisional government's policy on religion and religious freedom fanned hopes for a Catholic missionary drive to the East. In the political sphere, Sheptytsky welcomed the beginnings of a Ukrainian political administration in Kiev as a significant step toward the political unification and self-determination of one Ukrainian people.

So sweeping and so unexpected were the shifts in political reality and in political ideas, that Sheptytsky felt he could only attribute them to "the inscrutable paths of divine Providence." At the same time, he knew that those changes offered Ukrainians unique and historic opportunities to which they themselves would have to respond.

Because of the enduring impact of the developments in Russia, it is not surprising that the Metropolitan's ethical reflection on social and political reality should have continued to be strongly oriented eastward after his return to L'viv in September, 1917. It is to that next moment that we now turn.
C. Restoration and new challenges in Galicia: 1917-1920

Upon returning to L'viv, Metropolitan Sheptytsky set about reconstruc-
ting the life of his Church, whose internal and external affairs had been profoundly shaken up by the war.

1. The restoration of the internal life of the Church

The main focus of attention in rebuilding the internal life of the Ukrainian Catholic Church was on the development of a highly qualified clergy that would be attuned to the new socio-political environment and equal to the challenge of a Catholic mission in the East.

a. Assessment of the situation: the war and its aftermath

On 21 February, 1918, in their first joint pastoral since the begin-
ing of the war, the Ukrainian Catholic bishops headed by Metropolitan Sheptytsky drew attention to the extreme suffering that the war had brought upon the Ukrainian people:

"The war inflicted deep and serious material and spiritual wounds upon us. It is not yet possible to describe all the suffering to which our poor people were exposed. Nor can the sacrifices that we made be counted yet."

Beyond the material losses of life and property, there had been spiritual losses. The Russian Orthodox attack on Greek Catholicism in Galicia, spear-
headed by Archbishop Eulogii, had had its impact. The pastoral letter went on to cite the "sad apostasy of some unfortunates who, either through fear or for some benefit, renounced their faith." Viewing the situation in which their Church found itself, the Greek Catholic bishops concluded that one of the most urgent tasks before them was the restoration of popular
religious education (mainly through catechism and preaching), which they
considered to have fallen into neglect. Thus, they concluded, many years
of dedicated pastoral work were needed in order to heal the wounds of this
war.

At the same time, the bishops also expressed an optimism that recalled
some of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's statements in the previous year; the end
of the war had opened a new era in the history of the Ukrainian people and
their Church. Politically, that new era was marked by "the awakening of
Ukraine into statehood;" in ecclesiastical terms, there was now a new
"glorious hope for a new flowering of our ecclesiastical Unia."

Moreover, in Galicia, there were signs that the former divisiveness
that had plagued the Greek Catholic clergy was finally coming to an end. In
particular, the Russophilism of some Greek Catholic priests, "who con-
sidered our people to be one with the Russians," was no longer tenable
because of the historical changes that had taken place, namely: the fall of
the Russian empire, the recognition by the civilized world of the right of
nations to self-determination, and "the worldwide recognition of the Ukrai-
nian people as an independent people, distinct from the Great Russian
people."
Indeed, the bishops argued, the war had revealed that the Musco-
phile or "Old Ruthenian" orientation among the Ukrainian Catholic clergy
was in fact harmful to the people and contrary to their good; during the
Russian occupation of Galicia, that tendency had been at the root of "the
apostasy of many confused Christians and some priests who were either
inadequate or extremely weak of faith." Now that this serious obstacle to
unity had been removed, the Greek Catholic Church would be free to address
the pressing needs of the time. And it was precisely the purpose of the
pastoral "to draw attention to the needs and the dangers of the moment."
b. Principles: the need of political and ecclesiastical leaders

Foremost among those needs, both in the political and in the ecclesiastical spheres, was the need of able leaders. In all walks of Ukrainian social and religious life, the fields were ripe, but the harvesters few. As the bishops saw it, exceptional individuals had to be found to take up the "great tasks" that lay ahead:

"Times are coming when our people, in the Ukrainian state and in our land i.e., eastern Galicia/, must produce an abundance of people to occupy the leading positions and to whom the common good in all areas of social and economic life will be entrusted."

In the socio-political sphere, the primary concern with nationbuilding was situated within a Christian worldview. Accordingly, Christian scholars and poets were urgently needed to "raise the level of Christian culture" among Ukrainians; politicians, to overcome the obstacles standing in the way of nationbuilding ("rozvoi narodnoho derzhavnoho zhyttia"); and geniuses, to "lead our people into a new era of development, prosperity and welfare." From the standpoint of the Church, what were needed were "great and holy servants of God who by word and example would be wise leaders in all areas of social, national (‘narodnoho’), and political life."

In the religious sphere, the primary concern of the bishops was with the sanctification of the Ukrainian people, so that they might become "a holy people, and fulfil their divine mission to convert the whole East to the light of the faith, and to contribute to the common good of the human race." This meant that, in the Ukrainian political entity that was taking shape, the source of religious unity was to be found within the Catholic
Church. Here too, the task was long and arduous, and would require special individuals: holy activists, apostles and teachers, who would not only strengthen Catholic life in Galicia, but would also "carry the banner of the Holy Unia to the whole Ukrainian state." And if one great saint could be found among the people, then he would surely take upon his shoulders "the burdens that entire generations could not bear."

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c. Praxis

i. Clerical unity and patriotic sentiment

In approaching the task of reconstruction, the Greek Catholic bishops placed special emphasis upon the cohesiveness of the Greek Catholic clergy, both among themselves and with the people. Just as they had done in the series of pastorals on solidarity in the Austrian period, they again stressed the importance of a collective approach by the Church to the social and religious challenges facing Ukrainians. Again, they chose the way of a collective pastoral to convey a living example of unity to the clergy and the faithful alike. The hierarchs pointed out that the views expressed in their pastoral were not the views of one individual but of the entire Ukrainian episcopate, and therefore they were more truly "the voice of the Church" and carried more weight. In particular, the bishops urged their priests to show unity with the episcopate, as well as unity among themselves and with the people. And, following their example, the entire Ukrainian Catholic community was exhorted to do away with all divisions and disunity among the people; for, in the work "for the Kingdom of God amongst our people," all would have to show the solidarity, unity in love, and community of work that "issue from Christian fraternal love."

Beyond those exhortations, the recent course of history was also seen as promising; the new situation appeared conducive to a new unity that had
not been possible before the war. The waning of Galician Russophilem and the emergence of a Ukrainian national consciousness were now indisputable facts of Ukrainian social history, and the Church had no alternative but to accept them. According to the Ukrainian bishops, this was a moral obligation:

"Priests whose national sentiments differ from those of the Ukrainian people are obliged in conscience to adapt themselves to those others in their work [outside the Church]. They must set aside their personal convictions and adapt in everything to the people whose pastors they are."

In addition, priests were encouraged to promote and in no way to obstruct the development of Ukrainian culture.

"We will require that, regardless of any personal national convictions, no one will obstruct the complete development of the national life and the culture of the Ukrainian people, but rather will serve them and will adopt a favorable attitude toward all of their matters."

Special attention would be given to seeing that this position was understood and put into practice by those priests who had formerly been associated with the Muscophile tendency. This was no different, the bishops explained, from what was expected of any non-Ukrainian priest who was entrusted with pastoral work among Ukrainians; in accordance with the Pauline example of being "all things to all men" (1 Cor 9:22), the official position of the Ukrainian Catholic Church was stated clearly:

"... a foreigner who works as a spiritual pastor among the Ukrainian people must renounce his own personal patriotism for their
sake, take up the Cross of Jesus Christ and, for the love of Christ and of his spiritual flock, become all things to his flock: a Ukrainian for Ukrainians, in order to save them."

In the new historical situation, the needs of Ukrainian society were such that the bishops felt that they simply could not allow any "political or national agitation that was contrary to the national sentiments of the Ukrainian people." Nor did this amount to a call to political activity by priests; on the contrary, the pastoral affirmed the primacy of the spiritual function of a priest. But, in a way that recalled Metropolitan Sheptytsky's pre-World War I endorsement of some socioeconomic and political involvement by priests, the bishops affirmed an essentially similar kind of pastoral synthesis, attending to both the material and the spiritual needs of the people:

"Any work /by a priest/ that would address the material welfare of the people, or which would take account of other needs besides their religious needs, must have the divine character of a spiritual ministry (‘dushpastyrstva’), that is, it must always be aimed toward the Christian goal of the salvation of the soul, and must always be founded on the principles of divine law and the Catholic faith. A priest's work for the community outside the Church should tie people to their Church and strengthen their Christian convictions; but, in order to reach their hearts (‘trasyty do serdets’ liudyi’), that community work outside the Church must be characterized by a love for the people."
ii. the selection of candidates to the priesthood

In October, 1918, Metropolitan Sheptytsky responded further to the needs associated with a Catholic Ukraine. By that time, he had become convinced that the historical moment placed a new moral duty on the Ukrainian clergy, "to respond to our mission to our brothers" (i.e., in Eastern Ukraine). Moreover, he came to believe that the only realistic way for the Ukrainian Catholic Church to fulfill that mission was by extending its ecclesiastical "army" to include a "light cavalry," namely: celibate priests. Considering also that the mission to the East was not a job for married priests, Sheptytsky issued a decree whereby one-half of the Seminary in L'viv would be reserved for candidates to the celibate priesthood for a period of twelve years.

No less important, however, was the task of assuring a constant flow of solid candidates to fill the clerical cadres on the home front in Galicia. With considerable candor, Sheptytsky confessed that before the war he had erred in allowing himself to be guided by the opinions of others as to the acceptability of candidates for the priesthood. In that way, he feared that some people were ordained who should not have been. "Today," he admitted, "I recognize that as a grave offense and I am determined to correct myself." He proposed to do so by devoting special attention to what he felt should be the main criteria for determining the worthiness of candidates to the priesthood: a spirit of holiness and prayer, a readiness to work hard (as opposed to candidates who were given to sloth), and a spirit of sacrifice (as opposed to those who merely sought personal gain). The quality of the decision about the acceptability of sacerdotal candidates was vital to the common good, Sheptytsky believed; indeed, so vital, that he considered it better to err in that decision on the side of the common good (that is, with excessive caution in screening candidates),
rather than to its detriment. As the Metropolitan explained:

"...it is preferable not to accept for ordination a candidate who could become a good priest than to admit an unworthy one. For the harm that an unworthy priest brings upon the Church is so great that it is probably difficult to be excessively cautious."

In their first collective pastoral after the war, the Greek Catholic bishops returned to a theme they had jointly addressed on a number of occasions prior to 1914: the vital importance of clerical solidarity to the Church’s work in society. But, mindful of the fundamental changes that the war had brought, the bishops did not simply reiterate their earlier position of unabashed clericalism. Instead, they explicitly acknowledged that, in the work of nationbuilding, both religious and secular leaders were needed. Moreover, the notion of clerical unity was itself broadened; in view of the perceived needs of the times, priests were henceforth expected to show unity with the national consciousness of the Ukrainian people. As for Metropolitan Sheptytsky, he approached the issue of religious leadership with a renewed commitment towards ensuring that future priests of the Greek Catholic Church would be truly dedicated: willing to make sacrifices, and prepared to serve the common good of all Ukrainians, as they anticipated the unification of western and eastern Ukrainian lands.
2. External issues

a. The Brest-Litovsk treaty and the principle of self-determination

On 9 February, 1918, a treaty was signed at Brest-Litovsk between the Ukrainian National Republic and the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey). By virtue of that agreement, the Central Powers would recognize Ukraine as a political entity and in return would receive economic assistance, primarily in the form of foodstuffs. Far more controversial, however, was a provision for the annexation by Ukraine of two regions: Kholm and Podlachia. That aspect of the treaty became a new bone of contention between Ukrainians and Poles. The former saw the decision as just, for it reflected the will and the ethnic character of the regions; the latter branded it "the fourth Partition of Poland." The dispute came to a head three weeks after the signing of the treaty, when two speeches were delivered in the Austrian House of Lords. Bishop Józef Pelczar, Latin-rite ordinary of Peremyshl', spoke for the Polish side, while the Ukrainian side was represented by Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky. Sheptytsky argued that a fundamental shift had occurred in the international community's thinking about the basis for setting territorial boundaries:

"The old principle of diplomatically constituted territorial boundaries... is being opposed in modern times by a new principle which... imposes new groupings that are more appropriate to the consciousness of peoples. Obviously, a principle that answers to the life and needs of peoples will prevail. It is no longer a matter of what was decided at some peace congress or other, but of what ethnographically distinct peoples want. It is a matter of ethnographic boundaries, and of the right of self-determination
In Sheptytsky's view, ethnographic boundaries and the underlying principle of self-determination served the interests of world peace, for this principle did not allow "the domination of one national group over another." On the contrary, the Metropolitan was convinced that the end of the war had signalled the dawn of a new historical era in which the peaceful coexistence of nations would replace the domination and hegemony of some over others:

"Obviously, the principle of ethnographic divisions will not please those who have become accustomed to hegemony over others. That kind of hegemony can no longer be sustained; it belongs to the obsolete, abnormal conditions of the past historical period."

From the context of the debate around contested regions, it is clear that when he said "hegemony," the Metropolitan was referring obliquely to Poland. In Sheptytsky's perception, the new world order had replaced political domination with the duty of every national state to serve humanity, for "The duty of nations and states is to rise up above every narrowly-conceived and self-serving egoism and to work and make sacrifices for the good of all humanity."

Yet, in addition to ethnographic considerations and democratic principles, the issue of religious identity had also been a pivotal factor in the history of the Kholm region:

"The bloody persecutions of our people in the Kholm region, and the Russian invasion of Galicia seemed to herald the last days in the history of the Unia. We thought that we were witnessing the complete destruction of our Church and of the last representa-"
tives of this idea of church unity. The miraculous reversal of that process, through the will of the Almighty, revives hopes for a greater future. And for us, in Galicia, the successful end to the war brings new hopes on that front.

The Catholicism that Poles wanted for the region was Latin and Polish; Ukrainian Catholics considered that to be a betrayal of the 16th century Brest Union, signed in that very region, whereby their Orthodox forefathers had joined with Rome but not with the Latin-rite. Metropolitan Sheptytsky made it clear that, in his view, the region was not only ethnically Ukrainian, but also historically Ukrainian Catholic.

b. The Polish-Ukrainian war in theological perspective

The dissolution of the Habsburg Empire and the end of the world war in October, 1918 left open the question of the control of Galicia. From November, 1918 to July, 1919 the Ukrainian Galician army struggled against Polish forces for possession of the area in a local war that compounded the devastation of the world war. In the end, Poland took Galicia.

In August, 1919, the Ukrainian Catholic bishops addressed the new situation of Galicia under Polish rule. The destruction caused by the second war outweighed that of the first, they pointed out. Thousands of civilians had been taken as prisoners of war; five priests had been killed, and hundreds of others were imprisoned; churches and monasteries had been looted.

Looking at the destruction and suffering from a theological perspective, the bishops related it to the will of God. "It pleased the Almighty One," they remarked, "to send these new and harsh sufferings upon us." And, in the conviction that nothing happens outside divine providence, they
resolved to accept "these blows from the hands of God."

Yet the theological explanation was not limited to a fatalistic acceptance of suffering; for, the bishops emphasized, God was a good Father, and even when He punished His children, He did so for their good and in view of a sacred purpose. It was therefore up to Christians to determine, in light of their faith, the meaning of that punishment. That process of discovery involved an introspective examination of conscience. The bishops instructed their faithful,

"Let us enter into ourselves and ask whether we have not offended God in any way; let us seek higher, further reasons for our sufferings. Let us look upon them from the point of view of our faith. Let us try to answer the question: why, for what reasons and towards what aim did God permit ('dopustyv') us to suffer in this way?"

Their own deliberation on that question led the bishops to suggest two possible sources that might have incurred divine punishment: those people "who wanted to undertake the work for the future of the nation not only without God, but with an outright struggle against His divine law," and those "who were unable to sacrifice personal gain for the sake of the common good and out of fraternal love."

From a Christian perspective therefore, as the bishops saw it, the fundamental problem was that some Ukrainian initiatives of nationbuilding had diverged from the Christian faith and social values. Consequently, the solution was a matter of restoring the theological foundations of Ukrainian social and political ideals:

"Only one thing is needed: for our entire people to understand that it is essential to return to the Lord God; for everyone to
focus their life’s goal first and foremost on the Kingdom of God, on divine righteousness, on truth and justice; for people to understand that the foundation of life is found in the divine truths which assure the morality (‘zapevniaut’ obychainist’’) of individuals and nations. By no other path will anyone achieve noble and enduring success."

Implicit in that fundamental reorientation towards Christian values was a corresponding shift of focus: from self-serving, private interests to a collectively shared concern for the common good. The bishops therefore urged Ukrainians, "let us try to earn God’s divine grace not only for ourselves but for everyone."

C. Sheptytsky’s representations after the Polish takeover of Galicia

In October, 1918, anticipating that the dissolution of Austria-Hungary was imminent, Ukrainian deputies of both the Vienna parliament and of the local diets of Galicia and Bukovyna called a meeting in L’viv to discuss the future of the Ukrainian territories of Austria: east Galicia, north-western Bukovyna, and Ukrainian Transcarpathia. On 19 October, this Constituent Assembly proclaimed an independent Ukrainian state in those territories. Later that day, this act was endorsed at a meeting of some 300 delegates from all three regions.

Present at both were the Ukrainian Catholic bishops Kotsiels’kyi and Khomyshyn, as well as Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky. Although the Metropolitan addressed neither of those two assemblies, two weeks later, on 1 November, he welcomed news that Ukrainians had seized power in L’viv with a bloodless coup.

In a matter of days, however, Polish forces controlled L’viv, and
placed Metropolitan Sheptytsky under house arrest in his residence on November 3; he was neither permitted to receive visitors nor to enter the adjacent cathedral. That forced isolation apparently lasted until the end of March, 1920.

In January, 1919, after Polish forces had conducted searches of the St. George’s Cathedral complex in L’viv and had seized correspondence of the Archeparchy, the Polish division commander, General Rozwadowski, wrote an open letter to Metropolitan Sheptytsky charging that the Ukrainian Catholic clergy were doing nothing to prevent Ukrainians from committing alleged acts of barbarism. Rozwadowski added that an official statement by the Metropolitan could go a long way towards ending the "artificial hatred of Ukrainians toward Poles."

Metropolitan Sheptytsky responded with an open letter of his own: he refused to comply with the general’s suggestion. In the first place, he doubted whether "regrettable acts of violence" had been committed by only one side. Secondly, as he was not in a position to have access to complete and accurate information, the Metropolitan suggested that an international commission be set up which could give an impartial hearing to both sides. Third, he emphasized that any official statement that he might make and which was known to have been either "inspired by the commander of the Polish army or written under his threat," would certainly fail to persuade the Ukrainian public.

Yet, despite his reluctance to accede to the general’s request, Sheptytsky did not set aside pressing humanitarian concerns. When the Polish army interned thousands of Ukrainians, among them some 600 priests, he intervened with the authorities. A good number of them were released, unfortunately only to be confined to quarters by the military authori-
ties.

In a similar fashion, the Metropolitan intervened with Ukrainian military authorities on behalf of Poles. While Ukrainian forces controlled East Galicia, some Polish priests were interned. The Metropolitan sent a memorandum to the President of the State Secretariat ("Rada Derzhavnykh Sekretariu") asking for their release, and on 9 March, 1919, the Latin-rite priests were freed.

A hotly contested issue at this time was education for Ukrainians. As Polish administrative control of Galicia extended itself into education, Ukrainian university students and professors staunchly refused to swear allegiance to Poland. Their punishment was exclusion from the university; any attempts to seek alternatives (such as studying abroad or organizing underground courses) were similarly quashed. Police harassment of Ukrainian educators and students was common.

After almost two years of such tensions, on 30 June, 1920, twenty-three prominent Ukrainians, representing cultural and academic institutions signed an open letter of protest against the Polish suppression of Ukrainian education in Galicia. Listing abuse after abuse, the document charged "the aim that Poland is pursuing in Galicia is nothing but the systematic destruction of the Ukrainian intelligentsia." Signing for the Ukrainian National Museum in L'viv were its director, Ivan Svientsits'kyi, and its founder, Andrei, Count Sheptytsky.

In his interventions after the Polish takeover of L'viv, therefore, Metropolitan Sheptytsky concentrated mainly on the defence of the fundamental rights of Ukrainians. Yet, at the same time, the humanitarian dimension of his activity continued to include a concern for the welfare of Ukrainians and Poles alike.

The final portion of this transitional, second period of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's activity was a three-year journey, from November, 1920 to October, 1923: through Western Europe, Canada, the United States, Brazil and Argentina, and then back again to Europe via North America.

The main purposes of the Metropolitan's trip were to seek economic assistance and political support for Ukrainians in Galicia. Economically, the country was in a crisis, having been devastated by a succession of wars and military occupations; relief was desperately needed. Politically, Galician Ukrainians were actively seeking international support for their aspirations toward national self-determination; Sheptytsky endorsed those aspirations and tried to advocate them before the international political community. In addition to those two aims, the Metropolitan also tried to promote the idea of creating Eastern-rite wings of Western monastic orders as a source of missionaries for Russia, but this does not enter into our area of inquiry. We therefore limit ourselves to a brief overview of the first two aims.

Although an important part of the Metropolitan's travel did involve meeting Ukrainian Catholic communities in various countries of the diaspora, he of course had no opportunity during this time to write pastoral letters or theological tracts. What we have reconstructed here cannot claim to be more than the main lines of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's activity in a period that will no doubt yet prove a fertile field for research.

1. Relief for victims of war in Galicia

One of the main aims of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's journey was to seek
economic relief for victims of the wars in Galicia. In his account, since 1914, the territory of Galicia had been crossed four times by warring armies. In many areas, trenches were so dense that the cultivation of fields was virtually impossible; homeless Ukrainian families, which in the Metropolitan's estimate numbered thirty thousand, often had no other recourse but to live in the abandoned trenches. Unsanitary conditions led to the spread of black typhus and a child mortality rate that was hovering at the level of 50%. Homeless orphans were in the tens of thousands. Compounding this human tragedy was a devaluation of currency in Galicia so drastic that lifetime savings were wiped out in a matter of months. As for the Polish government, whose forces now occupied the region, it seemed unable to alleviate the grave economic situation.

As he travelled through North America (from August, 1921 to April, 1922), the Metropolitan spoke about those socio-economic hardships in Galicia, emphasizing in particular the plight of the homeless orphans. In a letter to the New York-based Joint Distribution Committee of the American Funds for Jewish War Sufferers, Sheptytsky explained that his mission was "to help the poorest of the poor, viz., the helpless, abandoned orphans of all denominations in a country ravaged by war and pernicious Bolshevik mismanagement, economic and spiritual."

Although the available information about the success of the fund-raising campaign is scanty, it is known that what was collected enabled the Metropolitan to establish other orphanages in Galicia.

2. The political future of Galicia

The second side of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's activity abroad was diplomatic and involved the advocacy of Ukrainian self-determination in anticipation of the decision of the Council of Ambassadors in Paris. As a
member of the Ukrainian National Council headed by its president-in-exile Evhen Petrushevych, Sheptytsky remained in close touch with Ukrainian political and diplomatic missions during his travels. And in meetings with foreign dignitaries, the Metropolitan tried to convey the concerns of Ukrainians about the political future of Galicia. For example, in November, 1921, he submitted a memorandum on the subject to U.S. State Secretary Hughes. And it was in the the Unites States that the Metropolitan explained his sense of obligation in this matter:

"As long as I have the strength, I consider it my duty to assist our people and our Church. If the Council of Ambassadors were to turn Galicia over to Poland, I would consider myself at fault if, while in the European capitals and in Washington, I had not done everything that was possible to represent and defend our cause."

Metropolitan Sheptytsky was in Paris on the eve of the momentous decision of the Council of Ambassadors concerning the political future of Galicia. On 14 March, 1923, he met with French President Raymond Poincaré, to whom he explained that Ukrainians "would never accept Polish domination and that Polish sovereignty in East Galicia/ would be the beginning of eternal disquiet, of a state of war." The Metropolitan was also to have met Jules Cambon, the President of the Council of Ambassadors in an attempt to express Ukrainian concerns. Having thus done what he could, the Metropolitan looked forward to the Council's decision with a prayer: "God grant that our cause may be decided according to His will ('po Bozhomu')- so that our people may at least have the freedom to develop in a natural way."

On 15 March, the Council of Ambassadors gave East Galicia to Poland; the Metropolitan's efforts in Paris had failed to achieve the desired
result. Still, they shed light on his personal commitment to the Ukrainian national cause. They also showed that a three-year absence had not diminished his keen grasp of the socio-political conditions in Galicia: for, in the following two decades, his prediction to President Poincaré would, unfortunately, prove all-too-accurate.

E. Conclusion

This second period of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's social thought and activity (1914-1923) may perhaps best be characterized with reference to the main focus in each of its three phases: Church unity, the restoration of clerical cadres, and the economic and political future of Galicia. Each of those issues had its ethical underpinnings, and Metropolitan Sheptytsky showed both an awareness of them and a readiness to address them.

Under his guidance, the sobor in St. Petersburg reflected a sensitivity to the concerns of Orthodox believers who wished to become Catholic: while affirming papal primacy, the newly-constituted Eastern-rite Catholic Church in Russia would require no special oath of loyalty to the pope by its faithful, and the sobor left aside completely the question of infallibility. No less important in this respect was the sobor's endorsement of Eastern liturgical and canonical traditions.

Following through on other resolutions of the sobor, Metropolitan Sheptytsky tried to establish a framework for the Church's *modus vivendi* with the post-tsarist Russian state, one that would balance coexistence with jurisdictional independence. For it was the state that had to grant the Church its legal right to exist, and the Metropolitan's successful appeal in the matter centered on the Revolution's affirmation of religious liberty. At the same time, the sobor took a strong stand in favor of the
separation (understood as the jurisdictional distinctiveness) of Church and state. In doing so, the sobor also abolished an archaic institution that was still to be found in Galicia: parish patronage rights.

On the home front, the years between late 1917 and late 1920 were a chaotic time of continuing war, occupation, and idealistic attempts to restore social order. Internally, the Greek Catholic bishops addressed themselves to the pressing need of leaders in Ukrainian society by calling for a new breed and caliber of Ukrainian Catholic priest: patriotic, dedicated to the common good (understood here primarily in relation to the task of nationbuilding) and, if possible, celibate. In external relations, Metropolitan Sheptytsky advocated the internationally accepted principle of self-determination as the strongest foundation for Ukrainian aspirations towards nationhood.

Throughout this period, the unfolding of human history continued to be seen in light of divine Providence. Thus, the fall of tsarism was interpreted as a blessing and source of hope, and likened to the fall of demonic idols; on the other hand, the takeover of Galicia by Polish forces in 1919 was cast as a cosmic drama having both natural and supernatural dimensions.

From the point of view of social ethics, the final segment of this period, the Metropolitan's three-year mission abroad, may be said to have been pure praxis. For indeed, it was a time when action rather than reflection was desperately needed in order to secure economic and political assistance for Galicia.

Such was the many-faceted and troubled transition through which Metropolitan Sheptytsky, both in Galicia and abroad, accompanied his people as they entered the interwar years.
CHAPTER 3:
THE SOCIAL TEACHING AND PRAXIS OF METROPOLITAN SHEPTYTSKY
DURING THE YEARS 1923-1939

A. Introduction

The third major period of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's archepiscopal activity began with his return to L'viv after the fateful decision of the Council of Ambassadors in Paris in March, 1923. That decision signalled international consensus that the matter of Western Ukraine was closed and this put an end to Ukrainian diplomatic representations. Thenceforth, moderate Ukrainians in Poland would struggle for minority rights and regional autonomy within the limits of Polish law and parliamentary procedure; others, rejecting Polish rule in Eastern Galicia, joined the nationalist underground which aimed to overthrow what it saw as foreign rule.

In this chapter, we examine Metropolitan Sheptytsky's responses to social issues that emerged in interwar Poland. Three major areas stand out in the Metropolitan's social writings and activity at this time: the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church's struggle against communism, its position vis-à-vis the Polish state, and the response to Ukrainian nationalism in view of the future of the Ukrainian people.
B. Communism

1. Empirical and Theological Assessments of the Situation

The social question and the various forms of conflict between the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and socialism, which had been an important focus of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's attention during the Austrian period, continued to be a matter of urgent concern during the interwar, Polish period. In particular, Sheptytsky felt that the Russian Revolution, which had effectively installed a communist regime on Galicia's eastern border, increased the threat to the Church and the faith. Looking back at this interwar period in 1939, he wrote that the social question

"...which was only born and emerged in the time of Leo XIII, became a great threat to the Church and humanity during the pontificate of Pius XI in the form of communism, which captured a great world power and which uses and abuses every available means and international politics in order to shatter nations and states and to carry out a worldwide revolution."  

Similarly,

"We and our generations are witnesses to how an idea, even one that is false and which rests on the fantastic and unfulfilled principles of Marxism, is becoming a force that threatens the whole world with global revolution."  

To Sheptytsky, the Soviet Union represented a consolidation of anticlerical and atheistic forces and, as such, a threat to Christian societies everywhere. What he had foreseen during the Austrian period as an emergence of "two mutually hostile camps" appeared now to have arrived. The establishment of a communist and officially atheistic state, he felt, had given a tremendous boost to atheism in the world scene; until the revolu-
tion, atheists may have appeared to be exceptions in many societies, but
now, with the regime’s support, atheism was now “spreading like a terrible
disease throughout the whole world.” The Metropolitan sensed an urgency in
the situation; the “frenzied advance of the kingdom of Satan” was underway
and it was only a matter of time before communism would assert itself in
Galicia as it already had in other European countries. When it did, Ukrai-
nian Catholics would be subjected to the supreme test of their faith:

“... ruthless persecution may place us face to face with the need
to defend our faith even unto death, even, if necessary, unto
readiness to shed our blood for the cause of the holy faith.”

But the Metropolitan did not perceive communism only as an external
threat. In addition to the upheaval in Russia with all of its international
consequences, communism was present in Galicia as well, primarily centred
around the Communist Party of Western Ukraine. Throughout the 1920’s and
early 1930’s, that party had had a relatively isolated existence due to its
hostility toward virtually every other political grouping in Western
Ukraine. But in 1934, it began to approach the socialist parties with
proposals to form a united front that would bring together previously
disparate leftist formations under a common banner of “anti-fascism.” And
on May 16-17, 1936, an “Anti-Fascist Congress of Cultural Workers” took
place in L’viv; organized by the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, the
congress represented one of the greatest successes of the party’s united
front tactics.

As if those new initiatives by communists toward broadening the base
of public support were not a sufficient cause for concern, Metropolitan
Sheptytsky noticed that the communists of Western Ukraine were aiming an
aggressive recruitment campaign at the Christian community as well. Thus,
when he addressed the Ukrainian Catholic clergy and faithful in 1936 with a pastoral that pointed to communism as the main "danger of the present moment," Metropolitan Sheptytsky gave a clear indication of the nature of the propaganda campaign to which Ukrainian Catholics were being subjected. The wolf had taken on sheep's clothing: the communists, Sheptytsky noted, had undertaken a campaign of deception; they were "pretending to be believers and were sacrilegiously receiving the Holy Sacraments." Indeed, Ukrainian parish priests were reporting a significant increase in sacramental devotions, particularly among people who had not been practicing Christians or who had been widely known or suspected of being communists.

Seeing this as a deliberately deceptive cover for the real aim of the communists (to win Christians over to their cause), Sheptytsky described the scenario of infiltration in the following way:

"From Moscow there came a directive to all communists of the world: the supreme authority in Moscow commands all communists who are of Christian descent, that is, those who are baptized, to pretend to be the most pious and sincere of Christians. They are to confess their sins, receive Communion, and join all the brotherhoods and associations where Christians are working. Everywhere they are to pretend to be pious Christians so as to fool and deceive true, believing Christians all the more successfully.... In that way, their leaders tell them, 'you will be better able to incite the people against the priest and the Church.'"

Metropolitan Sheptytsky was further concerned that this danger was compounded by the general susceptibility of Ukrainian Catholics to such tactics. Many, he noted, "believe the Bolsheviks and think that it is
possible to help them without grave sin." Aware of the Stalinist repression of the Church, the Metropolitan warned his people that the conciliatory overtures were but a recruitment tactic, and that the Bolsheviks' hostility toward Christianity was historically unprecedented; in effect, it was one of the main aims of the communists to destroy the Church altogether.

Towards achieving that goal, they were committed to "a revolutionary struggle as part of which they manage to burn churches, murder priests and faithful, and destroy the faith in peoples' hearts." The Metropolitan pointed to such consequences of Bolshevism in Russia, Soviet Ukraine, Mexico and Spain. This led him to conclude that "wherever the Bolshevik Communists appear, there churches begin immediately to burn and innocent blood flows in swelling streams."

Considering the antireligious and destructive thrust of Bolshevism, the Metropolitan was convinced that any complicity with Bolshevism by Christians amounted to an act of religious treason. "Is it not obvious," he asked in 1936, "that to help such enemies of Christ is to betray Christ and His Holy Church?" As he himself had argued earlier, the gravity of religious treason exceeded by far even the betrayal of one's own country.

In Sheptytsky's assessment, therefore, Bolshevism represented a form of militant atheism that was making its way into the European political order and which posed a considerable threat to the Catholic Church and Christian social principles. Although the communists had not yet acquired political power in Polish Galicia, the Metropolitan noted that aggressive communist agitation was present within the Church and that the consolidation of the political left in an anti-fascist, united front was ultimately directed against the Church since it served to reinforce militant atheism. To Metropolitan Sheptytsky, the communist threat to the Greek Catholic
Church in Poland was a matter of urgent concern.

2. Principles

In order to counter this instance of apostasy and to prevent any further successes of communist recruitment among Christians, Metropolitan Sheptytsky in his 1936 pastoral levelled three theses against collaboration with the communists. They were: "whoever helps the communists, even in purely political work, betrays the Church;" "whoever helps the communists in carrying out their plans for a united, so-called 'popular' or 'peoples' front' with the socialists and the radicals—betrays his people;" and "whoever helps the communists in any of their activities, and especially in the organization of the so-called 'popular' or 'peoples' front,' betrays the cause of the poor, the suffering and the oppressed in the whole world."

Behind each of those three theses, there was a fundamental premise: that the proponents of the united front were operating on direct instructions from Moscow. As far as the Metropolitan was concerned, the united front's tactical decision to reduce its hostility toward the Christian faith and the sacraments, as well as toward other political formations, had originated in Moscow. In support of such a linkage, he pointed to the pattern of religious repression, social enslavement and common front tactics in Mexico, Spain, France, Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine: "everywhere one goal and one tactic reveals one leader.... in all of those instances we will find one hand which betrays one leadership."

The Metropolitan saw little difference between the situation in the Soviet Union and the priorities and work of Bolsheviks elsewhere:

"Wherever they manage to stir up confusion and revolution, there
immediately emerges that whole Muscovite program, which for a long time has been practiced in Moscow. So it was and is in Mexico, so it was and is in Spain."

This linkage of the popular front with the designs of Moscow was at the center of the Metropolitan's argument that collaboration with the popular front was a betrayal of the Church, the Ukrainian people and the cause of the poor and oppressed of the world. Support for the popular front amounted to support for the religious, social and economic conditions prevailing in Soviet Ukraine. We shall next examine individually Metropolitan Sheptytsky's arguments against collaboration with communists.

a. betrayal of the Church

Cooperation with the communists amounted to a betrayal of the Church, according to Sheptytsky, because one of the main goals of Bolshevism was the destruction of the Church. He saw evidence for this in the Soviet Union, where many village churches had been either closed, burned down or transformed into granaries or movie theaters, and where priests were being murdered and driven into destitution. In his estimation, the bloody repression of Christianity in the U.S.S.R. had cost "tens and possibly hundreds of thousands of Christian lives" including those of many Orthodox priests and bishops. He noted that communists often bragged that "within a few years there would not remain a single Church in all of Soviet Russia or Soviet occupied Ukraine."

At its root, this systematic repression of Christianity was grounded in lies, according to the Metropolitan. The Soviets could well point to constitutional guarantees that protected freedom of conscience and religious toleration, or to a single church in an area that was allowed to
remain open as "proof" of that toleration, but Sheptytsky was convinced that their militant atheism knew no compromise and that in their attitude toward Christianity "the only time the Bolsheviks are honest is when they express their hatred of God and of the revealed religion."

In addition to persecuting Christians, the anti-religious character of Bolshevism was evident in its cultivation of atheism - both in the "pagan" deification of Lenin and his likes and in its propagation of atheistic ideas among the youth.

Of course, the removal of religious values necessarily had grave social consequences. In the U.S.S.R., Sheptytsky observed, the institution of marriage had been transformed into a contract that could be unilaterally broken before a commissar. This had set the scene for mothers abandoned by "men without conscience" and an abortion rate so high that even the government had become alarmed and began to search for ways to stem it. A related phenomenon was that thousands of homeless children were roaming the land. The Metropolitan was convinced that precisely because it had cancelled out Christian family values (conscience, chastity, fidelity, a sense of vows and obligations) the "machine of social life" in the U.S.S.R. had fallen into disrepair.

Thus, taking account of the socially destructive record of Soviet Bolshevism, and of its method of supplanting Christian social values with a "materialistic and pagan religion" and filling young minds with "thoughts that God does not exist and that religion is a poison," Metropolitan Sheptytsky became convinced that any assistance extended to such "enemies of Christ" amounted to a betrayal of Christ and of the Church.

On 26 August, 1936, several weeks after his pastoral on communism, the Metropolitan returned to the subject of Christian apostasy to communism,
describing in greater detail his understanding of the nature and gravity of religious betrayal in such cases:

"They are always ready to stab even their father's back; on orders from their leaders, they are ready to burn down their own home and to kill their own brother. Such are those people who have dedicated themselves forever to the service of Bolsheviks or communists and have believed them to such an extent that they have completely discarded their faith in Jesus Christ, their love for the Blessed Virgin Mary, and no longer pay any heed to the reproaches of their own conscience."

What Metropolitan Sheptytsky feared most about communism, therefore, was not only the physical destruction of the Church, the demolition of individual parish churches and the murder of priests; no less than that, he feared the social demoralization that would necessarily follow from the uprooting of the Christian foundations of social life.

b. betrayal of the poor and the oppressed

The Metropolitan's economic argument against the Soviet system and its agents abroad was summarized in the statement: "Whoever helps the communists organize the 'Popular Front' betrays the cause of the poor, the suffering and the oppressed."

The first charge that Sheptytsky levelled at Soviet economic policy was that, contrary to their claim of having done away with capitalism, the Bolsheviks had actually permitted capitalism to evolve into its "most extreme and unjust form," namely: state monopoly. This had spelled disaster for the Soviet republics "which are seemingly free on paper but in
reality are groaning under the yoke of blood-stained Moscow." Through its monopoly on the means of production, through heavy hidden taxes and the use of unpaid labor, through takeovers of small, private enterprises, the state was, in the Metropolitan's words, "sucking the blood of the people." The state's monopoly also extended to the land; the introduction of "kolkhozes" (collective farms) had involved the requisition of family farms and created a situation where peasants were forced "to work on their land for the benefit of the government." Thus deprived of their chief means of subsistence, many were driven to desperation, the Metropolitan noted.

Nor was there any recourse for those who might want to oppose such measures; arbitrary arrests and convictions without trial ensured a steady flow of manpower into the hard labor camps at Solovky and in Siberia, where the Metropolitan estimated that several hundred thousand people had already been sent. As for any opposition to the collectivization of farmlands, the solution was quite simple: "the Cheka surrounds the village and sets it afire, allowing no one to escape from the burning houses."

In effect, the Bolsheviks had declared economic war on the peasants. Nowhere was this more evident than in the famine that had struck Soviet Ukraine three years earlier. In July, 1933, after news of the famine had reached the Archeparchy of L'viv, Metropolitan Sheptytsky and the entire Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy responded with a statement of protest, condemning Soviet Communism as a "cannibalistic system of state capitalism."

"Today we see the consequences of the Bolsheviks' ways; the situation worsens daily. The enemies of God and of humanity have rejected religion, the foundation of the social order; they have deprived people of freedom, the greatest human good; they have turned peasant citizens into slaves; and they lack the wisdom to nourish them in return for their slavish work and the sweat of
On October 17, the Metropolitan and his fellow Ukrainian bishops again protested against "the crimes of the Bolshevik authorities" and called on the faithful to prayer, penitence and alms to assist the work of the Ukrainian Relief Committee. And three years later, Sheptytsky again placed the blame for what he estimated to be "over three million deaths by famine" in Soviet Ukraine squarely upon the Bolsheviks.

Thus, the Metropolitan concluded, cooperation with the communists meant supporting and extending an economic system that exploited and oppressed peasants. As such, it was a betrayal of the interests of the poor:

"Whoever helps the Bolsheviks in their work—whether by working for the 'popular front' or by distributing leaflets or by reading their newspapers, or by propagating their principles and defending them before others— is helping nothing less than the creation of that 'paradise' of theirs."

c. betrayal of the Ukrainian people

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's final objection to collaboration with communists was that it amounted to the betrayal of one's people. In light of the famine in Ukraine during 1932-1933, he believed that, along with the destruction of the Church, one of the purposes of the "popular front" was to find unwitting accomplices for the fulfilment of a diabolical project: "to destroy the Ukrainian people and to erase them as completely as possible from the face of the earth."

In support of this attribution of a specifically anti-Ukrainian, genocidal intent to the Stalinist regime, Sheptytsky cited the enslavement
of nations that had been carried out by the Soviet Union since the Revolution. The Russian Communists, he argued, had dispensed with democratic institutions and had managed to "create a state in which a small minority holds the vast majority in harsh bondage." The experience of the nineteen years since the Revolution had unmasked the deception of the Bolsheviks: their talk of "freedom" was nothing more than slavery, the Metropolitan argued; their councils and soviets really referred to "a system in which no one is allowed to speak their mind." All of this indicated to the Metropolitan that one of the essential aims of the Soviet regime was to enslave peoples, to impose its will and cast its yoke upon them.

Essentially anti-Ukrainian, the "popular front" initiative was, according to the Metropolitan, better referred to as an "anti-popular" front. He expected that even Western Ukrainian leftists would hesitate before joining the Communist platform. First of all, Sheptytsky believed that Ukrainian Social Democrats and Radical Socialists were still "imbued with the democratic ideas that had prevailed in pre-war Europe." Moreover, even though these parties were committed to overthrowing the existing system, they acted on that commitment "by legal means, through the parliamentary process, by legislative reform, and through a gradual evolution from a capitalist to a socialist society." In contrast, the Soviet tendency to suppress national entities was also felt in the political sphere under Bolshevism: democratic pluralism and debate was suppressed through terror, intolerance and aggression. The second reason why Metropolitan Sheptytsky believed that Western Ukrainian leftists would hesitate before allying themselves with the pro-Soviet communists was that they still felt national ties to the Ukrainian people and their Ukrainian forebears. The Metropolitan expressed this metaphorically: "They dread /the thought of/ joining
with people whose hands are stained with the still warm blood of millions of our compatriots in Eastern Ukraine." In fact, Sheptytsky's positive description of Western Ukrainian communists was also a subtle appeal to their democratism and sense of Ukrainian identity which, he felt, could prevent them from joining the popular front.

In Sheptytsky's political argument, alliances with Bolshevik communism were alliances with political terror and stood for the subordination of national values to the rule of might. Accordingly, he warned anyone who might want to join with the popular front that, by doing so, they would in fact expose not only themselves but also the Ukrainian people to great harm. The crux of the argument was thus that, by cooperating with the communists, Ukrainians in Poland would only be buying into the system of religious, social and economic oppression that was already in force in Soviet Ukraine.

3. Praxis: the problem of discerning the truth

a. Christian and communist interpretations of Soviet reality

The "popular front" initiative had been accompanied by a strong propaganda campaign, and it was therefore the Metropolitan's practical intent in his pastoral on communism to undercut the potential impact of that effort. Having outlined the official position of the Greek Catholic Church regarding the religious, political and economic conditions in the U.S.S.R. and of the ethical implications of collaboration with communism, he felt that there still remained an important residual problem which had to be addressed, namely: the problem of credibility and the question of how the
truth could be discerned. For, although the basic facts as he had recounted them were supported by the reports of "hundreds" of people who had travelled to Soviet Ukraine and had been widely covered in the European and American press, the Metropolitan was also aware that a propaganda of denial was being implemented in order to answer all charges against the Soviet Union.

Propaganda was being disseminated in leaflets and in the press. Books and letters from Ukraine were also used to support the Bolshevik line. The Metropolitan noted that popular publications were a particularly effective form of propaganda. With specific reference to Bolshevik propaganda, he therefore warned:

"There are books that are so filthy and abominable that if you give them to the purest virgin soul which has not yet been stained by any sin, the poison will penetrate it to such an extent that, through the very reading of the book, that soul will become a contaminated rag."

With this in mind, the Metropolitan called on people not to read Bolshevik publications and for parents to see that their children did not read them. As for Galicians who travelled to Soviet Ukraine during or after the famine and who wrote positively about life there, the Metropolitan felt that no one really believed those reports; the operative principle in the Soviet Union was brutal terror and it was applied to everyone equally:

"For, to be honest, whenever the poor and the commonfolk, as well as the greatest leaders, chiefs, generals and ministers are well off, that only lasts so long as they can rip the shirt off another's back. But eventually and without exception, everyone's time comes to walk the plank. Even the chief must do so."
The propaganda campaign posed a special problem of distinguishing lies from the truth; the Metropolitan was quite aware that the facts that he had presented would be rejected by the supporters of the Soviet system. Nor did he underestimate the effectiveness of the Soviet propaganda campaign; indeed, his argument was not without its moments of exasperation.

As far as the Metropolitan was concerned, the lines were sharply drawn between the Christian and the Bolshevik interpretations of Soviet reality. To those Ukrainians who wanted to remain loyal to the Church, to their people and to the cause of the poor, he therefore suggested two preventive remedies: critical perspicacity and a Christian perspective.

Sheptytsky called for caution and scepticism toward whoever praised Bolshevism: one had to learn "to distinguish between their words and the truth." One path to a more critical attitude was a better grasp of the bi-perspective. Sheptytsky realized that one of the reasons why Western Ukrainians might be susceptible to Bolshevik propaganda was that it was difficult for someone in a Ukrainian village to see Moscow's hand in the popular front activity in other countries such as France and Spain, or to understand such global issues as the Third International, the Comintern, or Communism. Yet it was only from a broad, comparative perspective that one could see things as they truly were. The Metropolitan wrote:

"It is necessary to look at the thing in its entirety and to capture everything with one look in order to understand that whether in Verchany, or in Nahuievychi, or in L'viv - one goal and one tactic points to one leader. And when we compare these events in our land with what is happening in France, Spain, Mexico, Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine, we also see in all of those events just one hand, which betrays just one leadership."
Proponents of the Soviet system were not to be believed, according to the Metropolitan. Such people had no commitment to the truth; they were professional agents, agitators who had been trained in special schools and who were being paid or sometimes coerced into praising the Bolshevik system. They were the only people who denied reports coming out of Ukraine, for they had sold themselves and were betraying the Church and country for money. They were accomplices of a system that was thoroughly grounded in "fundamental, all-around and incessant lying."

b. discernment: seeing things as Christians

For Sheptytsky, the crucial function of ethical discernment in this case was illustrated in the Spanish conflict and in case of the Ukrainian famine. In Spain, it was largely through "ignorance and a lack of perception ('nesposterezhennia')" that people of good will had been misled into rallying round a flag that was hostile to the Church and Christianity. In Soviet Ukraine, however, where the Metropolitan pointed out that the imposition of collective farms had destroyed village life, peasants were not so easily deceived by Bolshevik propaganda. Because of their hard work on the land, they were attached to it and were not inclined to give it up easily:

"Ukrainian peasants understood from the first moment that by its very nature communism must be hostile toward every farmer and every producer, and thus toward every peasant..."

The Metropolitan therefore urged Ukrainians in Poland that, when they encountered Soviet propaganda, they were to remember the famine:

"When you meet such a person, look first of all at his hands to
see if they are not stained with the blood of the poor and the suffering, with the blood of the Fatherland which they have betrayed in exchange for money from bloody Moscow."

The practical thrust of the Metropolitan’s instruction was not lost in the metaphor: if people recognized what Bolshevism and communism had meant in Ukraine, they would not be easily deceived.

Along with remembering the famine, Metropolitan Sheptytsky called Ukrainians to look upon the issue of Bolshevik propaganda "as Christians." By that he meant, first of all, steadfastness in Christian duties: love of neighbor, of the fatherland, the Church and of God. In practice, this translated into obedience to the Church and its official position on both communism and the popular front. Accordingly, Sheptytsky urged Ukrainian Catholics to seek the counsel of a priest and, if he so requested, to withdraw from a given association or refrain from reading a particular book or newspaper.

As for the confusion resulting from communist agitation within the Christian community, the operative guideline was to be the principle of the complete incompatibility of Christianity and communism. With regard to the problem of communists who pretended to be practicing Christians, the Metropolitan advised his faithful that:

"...one must look not only at who is going to confession and who is receiving communion, but also at how one lives and what one says. Let this be a rule: whoever admits to being a communist and defends communism is no Christian but only pretends to be. A communist and a Christian are like fire and water, which cannot be in the same place together."

The guideline was intended for the Christian community at large; the Metro-
politician indicated that he expected his priests to know that they were not permitted knowingly to administer the sacraments to communists.

Also, as Christians, Ukrainians were to seek God's assistance; they were to pray for the wisdom and "the spirit of discerning truth from falsehood." In the spirit of this theological approach, Sheptytsky added a prayer of his own. It was addressed to the prophet Elijah who, the Metropolitan noted, found himself in a situation "similar to our own," when the Jewish people were heeding the false prophets of Baal:

"The holy Prophet Elijah exposed the false prophets of Baal before all the people and persuaded them that the true God is the God of Abraham and Israel. May the holy Prophet therefore obtain for you by prayer that heavenly light by which you may recognize the false prophets, who come to you with promises of paradise, promises which are nothing but lies and hellish words. May he permit you to understand where the truth lies, where the good of the people is, who is to be heeded in life, and which paths in life will lead to a better future."

According to the Metropolitan, the fundamental choice that Ukrainians faced over the issue of the popular front was essentially the same as that of the people of ancient Israel: between Jehovah and Baal. As their spiritual pastor, Sheptytsky was convinced that if they approached that decision truly as Christians they would be certain not to embark on the path of betrayal.
C. Church-State relations

The polarization of Ukrainian and Polish political interests, heightened as a result of the Ukrainian liberation struggle and short-lived independence in 1918, then exacerbated by the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918-1919 and the reprisals that ensued, was sealed definitively in March, 1923, when the Council of Ambassadors in Paris which recognized Western Ukraine as part of the Second Polish Republic.

Hardened by defeats in the war and on the diplomatic front, Ukrainian nationalism would grow to such an extent in the next sixteen interwar years under Polish rule, that Poland’s largest minority, its "involuntary" Ukrainian citizens, constituted one of the most pressing internal problems of the Republic until the outbreak of World War II.

1. Assessments of the situation

The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church was not aloof of these developments and already in the preceding period Metropolitan Sheptytsky had voiced support for Ukrainian political aspirations. But while militant Ukrainian nationalists would resist Polish rule and would struggle, even by violent means, for the independence of Western Ukraine, the Ukrainian Catholic bishops accepted the decision of the Council of Ambassadors. That acceptance, although it in no way spelled a transfer of loyalty to the Polish state or political interests, became an important premise of the relations between the Greek Catholic Church and the Polish Republic. As for Metropolitan Sheptytsky, he favored the option of those Ukrainian political circles which worked for change within the Polish parliamentary system, and he availed himself of the channels of communication with the Warsaw government that such an approach left open.
Metropolitan Sheptytsky worked out his position toward the Polish Republic largely in response to two key events: the decision of the Council of Ambassadors, and the Concordat of 1925. Both of these events set out the practical framework within which Church-state relations were played out in interwar Poland.

a. the decision of the Council of Ambassadors

Metropolitan Sheptytsky did not delay in conveying to the Polish government assurances of his favorable position on the decision of the Council of Ambassadors. Following the decision in Paris, Metropolitan Sheptytsky travelled to Rome, where he met with the Polish diplomat Władysław Skrzyński at the Polish Embassy to discuss the new situation. According to Skrzyński's report about this meeting to the Polish Foreign Ministry, Sheptytsky signed a declaration to the effect that he recognized the boundary settlement, that he would do all he could to keep his priests from politics and to appease the Ukrainian people.

Whether the report by Skrzyński was received in Warsaw or not, as Metropolitan Sheptytsky was returning to L'viv he was detained at the Polish border, then interned in Poland for three weeks before obtaining permission to re-enter L'viv.

After the decision of the Council of Ambassadors, the Polish government dealt with the Ukrainian minority with an iron fist, unleashing a campaign of anti-Ukrainian harassment.

One of the most hotly contested issues was that of education, in which the government showed itself to be committed to a policy of Polonization and de-Ukrainization. The Polish Ministry of Education imposed politically-based hiring and firing criteria for positions in Ukrainian schools, as well as Polish language testing for Ukrainian students who had completed
high school, and banned the use of Ukrainian in school administration. By
1920, 682 Ukrainian primary schools in Eastern Galicia had been closed. As a
result, there were 7,211 Polish-language classes to 2,645 Ukrainian-
language classes in a region with a majority Ukrainian population. Teachers' colleges fared no better; by 1924, 20 were Polish while only six
were Ukrainian. The official designation of schools as either Polish or
"utraquist" (i.e., partly Polish and partly Ukrainian) also proceeded in a
way that favored the ever-increasing use of Polish in Ukrainian areas. For
example, by 1938 the Stanyslawiv eparchy, whose Greek Catholic population
of 1,044,000 (82.5%) compared with 222,000 (17.5%) Roman Catholics, had the
following proportional distribution of schools according to language of
teaching: 99 (14.9%) Ukrainian, 162 (24.4%) Polish, and 402 (60.6%) ultra-
quist.

Anti-Ukrainian measures extended beyond the school system. For exam-
ple, the "Prosvita" society for public education saw its centers closed by
82 Polish authorities on the shallowest of pretexts. When in 1923 a minis-
terial decree exempted cultural associations from postage fees, the
government of L'viv refused to apply this to "Prosvita," calling it an
83 economic organization. Ticket office receipts of Ukrainian community
theaters were confiscated; use of Ukrainian symbols, such as the L'viv lion
84 or the very word "Ukrainian" were also punished. And when a crowd of
Ukrainians gathered in front of St. George's cathedral in 1923 to protest
against the persecution, Polish troops dispersed them with rifles and
85 swords. In 1925, Polish authorities ordered the dissolution of the St.
Paul Association of Greek Catholic priests, because of the alleged involve-
ment of its members in the struggle for Ukrainian rights.

Yet another source of tensions, which affected the Ukrainian Church
directly, was the issue of language. The civil authorities classified parish administration as a civil function and tried to impose the use of Latin in the administrative work of Greek Catholic parishes. Contravening that ruling on at least two occasions, the Metropolitan chancery office encouraged Greek Catholic priests to use Ukrainian. The authorities showed themselves prepared to punish such disobedience. By 1926, they were applying the official language law against Ukrainian Catholic priests, subjecting them to fines and arrests for filling out government statistical surveys in Ukrainian. In turn, the Ukrainian Catholic press responded by publishing a form that individual priests could fill out to file appeals to challenge the legal proceedings made against them. Central to the legal argument which the form contained was the reference to an "authoritative interpretation of the language law" by the former Minister of Religious Affairs and Public Education Stanisław Grabski. The form went on to cite a letter to Metropolitan Sheptytsky on 9 April, 1926, in which the Minister had affirmed that, "ecclesiastical authorities and offices cannot be considered self-governing authorities and offices within the meaning of the language law." By making available this letter from Minister Grabski, the Metropolitan gave considerable force to the appeal, according to which it was the government's own view that, for purposes of the language law, a parish administration was deemed a spiritual and not a civil matter.

A Polish Church historian has described the relationship between the Polish state and the Greek Catholic Church as "proper but marked by mutual distrust." That appraisal appears to be well-founded. On the government's side, that distrust was manifested in a variety of ways, ranging from the internment of and refusal of entry to Metropolitan Sheptytsky to the censorship of the Ukrainian religious press. On the Church's side, Metropolitan Sheptytsky tried to balance the necessary respect for the prevai-
ling political authority with a certain political aloofness. Thus, although he did accept the authority of the Polish government, he stated it in a tellingly indirect way: there could be "no question of his not accepting" that authority.

A similar kind of aloofness was carried over into the Greek Catholic Church’s relations with the Polish Roman Catholic Church. The Greek Catholic episcopate was part of the Conference of Bishops of Poland - they attended their conferences and plenary sessions, but for the most part they kept their distance.

In 1931, after Poland’s legislative committee had prepared a draft divorce law, the Polish episcopate headed by its primate Cardinal HJond issued a statement attacking the proposed law. Presenting it as contrary to the Catholic principle of the indissolubility of marriage, reaffirmed only a year earlier in Pope Pius XI’s encyclical "Casti Connubii," the Polish bishops expressed the hope that the government would reject the proposed law. In a show of support for that fundamentally Catholic viewpoint, all three Ukrainian Catholic ordinaries co-signed that pastoral.

Another issue which the bishops of Poland viewed similarly, regardless of ethnic affiliation, was the threat of communism.

But despite those convergent perspectives on certain issues, the pastoral commitments of the two episcopates often led them to diverge along ethnic lines and this, together with the perceived best interests of their respective peoples, interests which at that time were at loggerheads, necessarily precluded the complete normalization of relations between the Polish and the Ukrainian hierarchies.

b. the Concordat

The second moment that had a profound effect in shaping the relations
between the Greek Catholic Church and the Polish Republic was the Vatican's Concordat with Poland, which was signed on 10 February, 1925.

For the Greek Catholic Church, the Concordat was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it restored that Church's status to what it had been in Austria prior to the war: basically, placing it on an equal footing with the Roman Catholic Church and granting it virtual autonomy within its own area of jurisdiction. On the other hand, the Concordat also turned certain ecclesiastical matters over to the government. Above and beyond the requisite liturgical prayers for the Republic and its President on Sundays and national holidays (Article No. 7), the state would play a direct and decisive role in the appointment of archbishops and bishops (which, according to Article No. 11 required presidential approval). Although in the period 1923-1939 none of the three Ukrainian eparchs required the appointment of successors, Ukrainians who reacted negatively to this provision of the Concordat did not have the benefit of hindsight.

However, another of the Concordat's provisions did have a more direct effect on the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The state would also take a hand in the conferral of benefices to parish priests: the Ministry of Religious Affairs reserved the right to screen all such candidates for parish assignments to ensure that their activity did not "threaten the security of the state" (Article No. 19). Finally, the formula of the oath of allegiance to the state, which all bishops had to take, was phrased in unconditional terms, with no mention whatever of a Catholic bishop's duty of loyalty to divine law (Article No. 12).

The Concordat also marked the beginning of a unique experiment in the history of Catholic missions, which was called the "neo-Unia." Essentially a strategy for bringing the Orthodox Christians in Poland into union with
Rome, the neo-Unia was directed primarily at the provinces of Wilno, Nowogródek, Podlasie and Volynia. The implications of this initiative were that the Concordat effectively removed Greek Catholic episcopal jurisdiction in these areas (over a number of individual parishes) with Roman Catholic jurisdiction, and prepared the way for more sweeping anti-Orthodox measures in the 1930’s.

Beyond matters pertaining to the Eastern rite, the Concordat also regulated other affairs and exchanges of services to which both the Roman and the Greek Catholic Churches were equally subject. For example, Greek Catholic priests received some financial support from the Polish government. And a selected number of Ukrainian Catholic priests who met the necessary qualifications were assigned for service as Eastern-rite military chaplains for Ukrainians in the Polish army.

2. Principles of Church-state relations

a. criticism of the excessive subordination of the Church to the state

Committed to an apolitical stand in the sensitive question of the Ukrainian minority in interwar Poland, and mindful of Polish censorship, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was nevertheless able to give indications of his thinking on Church-state relations. He did so indirectly, that is, by referring to situations that were either historically or geographically removed from the immediate context of Galicia. One such reference was to the Byzantine model of Church-state relations: caesaropapism.

The Emperor Constantine had laid the foundations of caesaropapism in Byzantium yet, the Metropolitan remarked, seven hundred years later, "they
vomited themselves out in the final disastrous eruption of the religious slideism between the East and the West." The problem, according to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, was that Byzantine caesaropapism was contrary to the spirit of the Catholic Church. Whenever civil states asserted their authority over the Church as Sheptytsky felt they had not only in the Byzantine but also in the Russian empire, the Church inevitably found itself in a subservient position:

"By demanding complete and ever-more absolute submission to the will of the monarch in return for the dubious assistance that they lend to the Church, maintaining it in superficial unity... /secular states/ exact a high price in freedom."

Moreover, Sheptytsky observed that when empires fell the churches which had existed under their aegis, and now deprived of a civil protectorate, showed themselves to possess little stability of their own:

"When the secular state, up to a certain time the support of the Church, is shaken up or falls, soon the Church within it breaks up into countless independent churches. The history of the separated Eastern Church shows best how its unity is simply a fiction for — among those state churches, or 'autocephalous' churches as they are called — there is only as much cohesiveness as individual states will tolerate. There is /only/ the unity that proceeds from political unity or from agreements between states."

A fundamental distinction was to be drawn between ecclesiastical and political sources of unity, in the Metropolitan's view. The Church relied on its own internal life, not the state's, for its unity. As the Metropolitan explained, the unity which Christ wanted for his Church was a strong and lasting unity that did not compromise the Church's freedom or
subordinate it to the will of the state.

Whereas other Churches were subordinated to the administration of states and were achieving autocephaly either legitimately or illegitimately (that is, by breaking canonical ties with their superiors),

"... only the Catholic Church - in its struggle or endless contradictions with many, if not all, states and secular authorities - can preserve the unity of teaching and the unity of authority in a way that is by far stronger, more lasting and more internal ('sposobom bil'she unutrishnim') than that superficial unity which states give to individual groups of the separated Church."

The unity of the Church, Sheptytsky declared, was based on a fundamental and absolute affirmation of the free will of its members, while that of civil states employed coercion or punitive sanctions, at least to some extent. Only the Catholic Church, in his view, was able to preserve intact its internal unity of teaching and of authority without relying on coercive, secular support to which it was opposed in principle.

While the Church's unity was based on the fundamental and absolute principle of the free will of its members, states tended to impose their will to a greater or lesser degree through coercion or punitive sanctions. Unlike states, the Church was fundamentally opposed to either physical or spiritual coercion. As for instances in which the Church had employed coercive measures, Sheptytsky declared that those were breaches of the fundamental principle of religious liberty:

"Without a doubt, there were times when secular states employed coercion in the interest, as it were, of the Church. For example, in Spain Jews were forcibly baptized, and secular courts sen-
tenced those whom ecclesiastical courts pronounced to be heretics. There may even have been clerics ('liudy Tserkvi') who approved of such ecclesiastical methods and influence, or who practiced it themselves. Those were abuses that do not change the principle according to which the Church's unity relies exclusively on the free will of people."

Along with grounding its unity in the free will, rather than in force, the Church also differed from states in that its ultimate aim and raison d'être was spiritual. In the preferred model of Church-state relations, the state would respect that fundamental difference in the Church's perspective, for

"... the Christian clergy, Christian bishops and a Christian people need a liberation of religious ideals from the yoke of secular authority, which would prefer to divert Christian action to its own nonspiritual aims.

For such is the nature of secular statesmen: they naturally place their aim of the civil administration of a country or a state higher than the Christian aim of the salvation of souls, yet at the same time they readily make use of the work of priests and of the Church as a means toward achieving their goals."

The "diversion" or secularization of the life of the Church and the exploitation of its social work for secular purposes was always possible when a state was reluctant to concede more than nominal religious liberty. To Sheptytsky, that was contrary to the principle of freedom to which the Church was committed; in the preferred model, the Church needed to be completely free from any interference in its affairs by the state.
b. Jurisdictional distinctiveness without separation

The fundamental differences between the ecclesiastical and the civil authority did not close the door on Church-state relations. Having explained those differences, Metropolitan Sheptytsky considered the principles on which the Church grounded its coexistence with the state, and which he felt should guide the Church in its relations with the Polish Republic.

The first feature of proper Church-state relations, according to Sheptytsky, was the mutual recognition of jurisdictions. For its part, the Church was politically aloof and "may not without cause become involved in purely political, temporal matters." And whereas the "advocates of excessive state power" subordinated the Church to the state and turned matters of faith and morality over to the final decision of the state, Metropolitan Sheptytsky held the view that the Church was entitled to an independent jurisdiction over spiritual matters, free from state control. The state was not to "meddle in matters which are proper to the mission of the Church." Rather, it had to recognize that the Church was responsible for safeguarding the unchangeable character of the Christian faith:

"In disciplinary matters /the Church/ can adapt to various conditions of time and space, though she is obviously not free to alter the immutable principles of the faith or the unchanging truths of revelation. For it is her charge, her mission, to keep intact the treasure of revealed truths that were conferred upon her by the Lord Jesus Christ Himself."

The scope of the Church’s independent authority that corresponded to that responsibility encompassed all matters of faith and morality, the
administration of the sacraments and, in particular, "all conjugal matters." Above and beyond the areas of faith, morality and the sacraments, Metropolitan Sheptytsky pointed out that the Church also depended on a guarantee of certain fundamental liberties from the state, namely: freedom from persecution and from interference in matters relating to almsgiving and the customary abstinence from labor on Sundays and religious holidays.

When the Church found itself in conflict or disagreement with the state, it was guided by its primary adherence to the divine law; if necessary, it could "judge and declare that unjust laws are null and void ('nevazhnî')." Christian citizens too were expected to follow a similar line: although in normal circumstances, they were obliged to obey the directives and laws of the state, when those laws conflicted with or transgressed the law of the Church, the law of the Church took precedence. This followed from the Christian perspective, according to which human laws were transitory and ultimately subordinate to divine law.

Sheptytsky felt that the concrete example of the Spanish Civil War was instructive on Church-state conflict; he referred to the national uprising that had led to the war as "that holy revolution in defence of God and country," and spoke favorably of the Spanish bishops' decision to bless and join the uprising. An important aspect of that conflict, for Sheptytsky, was that the Church had not precipitated it. Rather, the process began when the enemies of the Church began to acquire influence in Spain, and when the government organized militia units that "began to burn and destroy monasteries and churches and to murder priests and monks." For several years (1931-1936) the Spanish Church endured persecution and humiliation and "had to adapt to the unjust laws and orders of the government." In effect, the
Church was a passive player in the conflict; it "endured everything and encouraged the faithful to be patient and obey those whom Spain still considered to be the legitimate authority." It was only five months after the elections of February, 1936, when the people of Spain "took up arms in the defence of God and Church /that/ the bishops blessed the popular uprising and aligned themselves with it." In Sheptytsky's view, the Spanish Church had been properly slow in mounting an opposition to the state and when it finally did so, it did not initiate subversion but merely joined itself with the democratic will of the people.

Sheptytsky appears to have been more interested in the Spanish Church's prolonged endurance of persecution rather than in its ultimate confrontation with the state. He put this quite directly in his preface to the Ukrainian translation of the Spanish bishops' pastoral of 1936. Addressing Ukrainian Catholics, the Metropolitan wrote:

"You will be all the more pleased to hear /what the Spanish bishops have to say/ since they are to some degree surrounded by the aureole of martyrdom. For if not they themselves, then their friends, brothers and sons - the bishops, priests, monks and lay people in their eparchies who were killed by the Bolsheviks - gave up their lives for their faith and their homeland."

Thus, by virtue of its divine nature and mission, the Church was necessarily independent of the state. Along with having a temporal dimension, the Church's organization was also immutable and God-given; as such, it constituted "a perfect association, independent of human considerations and which needs neither any sanction nor any completion by any human authority whatsoever." Similarly, the Church was deemed to have the right to fulfil its divine teaching mission "without regard for the permission or
the prohibition of the secular authority."

The Church also had the liberty of reminding those who had civil power that it was a sacred trust. As Metropolitan Sheptytsky put it,

"Members of the community council, bailiffs and village magistrates have a small portion of authority and, with it, the sacred duty to use that authority for the good of the community or communities. More than any other citizens, they must always act justly and not seek their own benefit but, as the Apostle /Paul/ says, the good of their neighbors."

Metropolitan Sheptytsky described political authority as a "great and important duty" for which leaders would one day be held accountable before God. Above and beyond providing actual leadership, they were to set a good example to other citizens, both in their private lives and in their public respect for "the Church, religion and good social customs." In the fulfillment of their duties, they were to bear in mind that, "if authority indeed comes from God, then those who hold it must take care to use it according to God, His will and His laws."

On the other side of the Church-state balance there was the Christian duty of obedience to the state. For, as the Church expected the state to recognize the legitimacy of its jurisdiction, so too it was bound to "render unto Caesar" in living up to its Christian disposition toward temporal authority.

Despite the difficulty that he could well have expected in trying to convince Ukrainians to obey Polish authority (many considered it an occupation), Metropolitan Sheptytsky did call them to that kind of obedience. He referred to the Pauline teaching on the obedient submission to the state. In fact, as the Metropolitan pointed out, this teaching applied even to the
extent that the Church recognized the authority of the state "even when that authority is in the hands of sinners."

An important form of Christian submission to the state was prayer for the civil authority, and the Metropolitan reminded Ukrainians of the Christian civic duty to pray for those who were in positions of authority. Indicating that this held true even if the state was hostile toward Christians, he indicated that St. Paul had called the early Christians to pray even for the Roman emperor, "who at that time was Nero, a cruel oppressor of Christianity." The duty of prayer for the civil authority was thus seen as absolute and independent of a particular state's policy toward Christians and the Church.

The very same duty was expressed in the ecclesiastical law which required priests to pray for "the highest representatives of authority in every state," and the Metropolitan pointed out that Greek Catholic priests fulfilled that obligation in their Sunday and feast day liturgies. For any Ukrainian priest who may have harbored doubts on that score, the Metropolitan's declaration would serve as a reminder.

The obligation of prayer for the secular authority extended to the Christian community at large; accordingly, the Metropolitan reminded Ukrainians that the apostle's command "applies to every lay person individually." Nor was the duty to be taken lightly: Sheptytsky emphasized that any failure to pray for the political leadership was a serious matter that had to be declared before a priest as part of one's Lenten confession.

The collective act of Christian prayer for the state was in fact a morally formative moment. By calling Ukrainians to fulfill this Christian duty, Metropolitan Sheptytsky placed them before a fundamentally Christian challenge: to pray for the oppressor.
The Church also upheld obedience to the state as an expression of the mutual interdependence between the duties of the state and those of its citizens. For, the Metropolitan explained,

"...there must always be such a divine order in the world that some manage the affairs that are common to all and that others obey them in those collective matters. It must never come to a point where no one obeys anyone else. For, in that kind of situation, which is anarchy, the poor and the weak suffer most. And in that kind of order, or rather disorder, people cannot achieve anything and cannot fulfill their most sacred duties."

In Sheptytsky's elaboration, then, Church-state relations had to be grounded in respect for the distinctiveness of each authority and its corresponding jurisdiction: the Church was to leave civil matters to the state, and the state was to allow the Church to fulfill its spiritual role. Balancing these two concerns, then, the Metropolitan expressed the ideal Church-state relationship as a harmonious interaction, rather than as a complete separation:

"The Church should not be separated from the state. The ideal of both of these authorities is harmonious coexistence and cooperation. For, even secular authority is in a sense from God, and so the Church recognizes the state and its rights. /For its part/, the state needs the Church and a just and good administration of the state without regard for the Church is unthinkable."

In effect, neither the fundamental differences in perspective and orientation nor the jurisdictional independence which the Church supported meant that the preferred Church-state relationship was a complete separation of the two authorities. For although Metropolitan Sheptytsky held fast to his
conviction that, in principle, the state's authority in certain public policy areas (such as civil marriage and divorce legislation and religious education) was invalid, at the same time he also recognized that it was necessary for the Greek Catholic Church to seek the desired legislative reform by working within the existing political process.

3. Praxis
a. terrorism and the "Pacification" campaign of 1930

Anti-government feeling among nationally-oppressed Ukrainians in Poland peaked between July and November, 1930, as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists stepped up its campaign of sabotage against the Republic. Primarily, it took the form of arson which targeted agricultural property, but political assassinations also occurred. Responding to that terrorism, the Polish government cracked down on September 16 with retaliatory measures against the Ukrainian community at large. Military and police detachments were sent into the villages in order to "pacify" the Ukrainian population. Along with the mandatory searches, there occurred a considerable destruction of property and a ruthless treatment of the Ukrainian people. Rather than restoring order, the "pacification" only escalated the conflict.

When it became clear that the "pacification" was getting out of hand, that innocent people were being victimized, and indeed that the campaign of pacification placed collective responsibility on all Ukrainians for the crimes of a few, Metropolitan Sheptytsky took steps to defend the Ukrainian community.

In the first week of October, he travelled to Warsaw and discussed the situation with senior government officials, including the Minister of
Internal Affairs Składkowski, Vice Premier Beck and the Minister of Justice Car. Those meetings confirmed that it was the official position of the Polish government to hold the entire Ukrainian community responsible for the violence. The Greek Catholic clergy, "who did not decisively oppose the arson and sabotage," were also being held accountable.

Describing that position as completely contrary to his own, Metropolitan Sheptytsky tried to argue three points in Warsaw. First of all, he rejected the attribution of collective guilt: the Ukrainian community could not legitimately be held responsible for the actions of "unknown conspiratorial elements of provocation." As the Metropolitan later explained, "I endeavored to draw the attention of the authorities to the fact that the whole peaceful population cannot collectively take responsibility for single cases of incendiarism which are accomplished without their knowledge."

Second, Sheptytsky objected to the application of collective guilt to the clergy. As Christians, Ukrainian priests could not be collectively accused of complicity in the crimes for, in principle, "they were and are opposed to arson and sabotage." And third, responding to criticisms, the Metropolitan explained that the Ukrainian bishops had not officially condemned the arson for, "by doing so, they would have confirmed that the Ukrainian public was perpetrating it, yet that is not true."

In further support of his argument against the "pacification," the Metropolitan also raised concerns that were common to both the Greek Catholic Church and the Polish government. For example, he warned that the violence which had been unleashed against Ukrainians risked pushing them toward communism.

The discussions in Warsaw appeared to have achieved a measure of
understanding, for the Metropolitan was given assurances that the abuses would be stopped. However, as the repressions continued unabated, Metropolitan Sheptytsky and his fellow Greek Catholic bishops on 13 October officially condemned the violence, both of the terrorists and of the Polish security forces. And then, disregarding an order by the municipal authorities of L'viv to delete certain passages from the text of their pastoral, the bishops ordered its publication in full. This led to an outright conflict, with an initial Polish censorship of passages which "could cause unrest among the population" and, on 17 October, the complete confiscation of all published copies of the pastoral and the suppression of any further attempts to publish it.

The pastoral responded to charges that were being levelled against the Greek Catholic Church and raised a protest against abusive repression by the authorities of the state. Recalling Sheptytsky's statement to government officials in Warsaw, the pastoral began with a defence against charges that the Ukrainian bishops were guilty of not having spoken out against acts of violence by Ukrainians. In the first place, it was in the very nature of the Church, which stood for the divine law, to oppose transgression of that law as morally evil. Because of the fundamental Christian principles to which they adhered, neither the Church authority nor the Christian faithful could ever support moral evil. It was therefore unnecessary, the argument went, to make any pronouncements for they would only "demean the divine dignity of the Church." From the Christian perspective as well, the bishops categorically rejected the imputation of guilt on the Church for the crimes that had been committed:

"All of us who think as Christians and who want to live as Christians recognize that, as in the cases of other crimes, so too here the hand of justice should reach the guilty. However, we
cannot accept responsibility for revolutionary groups or individuals. Arsonists and all sorts of would-be assassins are people who heed not the voice of the Church of Christ but the secret orders of some secret authority. We cannot answer... for their actions; we bear no guilt for them, nor should we be punished for them."

Secondly, such a pronouncement would have overstepped the bounds of the Church's jurisdiction for, as the bishops argued, "the Church may not speak out when the investigation and the punishment of the guilty is being handled by the police and the judicial authorities." And finally, a statement by the Church could also have raised unfounded suspicions about innocent people and could have exposed them to punishment which they did not deserve.

Because of the gravity of the situation, the Ukrainian bishops followed up with a memorandum to Rome, outlining the situation in detail and asking for the Vatican to intervene with the Polish government in the matter.

At the end of November, the pacification was halted. After nearly eleven weeks of brutal repression which had seen between one and two thousand Ukrainians arrested and imprisoned (among them 16 Ukrainian members of the Polish parliament), hundreds more injured, and some eight hundred villages pillaged, only fifty-eight individuals were actually charged with sabotage. Reportedly, some arsonists and terrorists had been turned over to the authorities by the Ukrainian public.
b. Catholic Union

In further response to the eruption of Polish-Ukrainian violence in 1930, and in anticipation of continued threats to Christian social values in the future, Metropolitan Sheptytsky called on Ukrainian Catholics on 22 October to organize a "Catholic Union" ("Katolyts'kyi Soiuiz"): "Difficult times and the approach of even darker clouds require us to gather together more solidly than we have so far and, with strong internal unity and supported by the truth, to defend what is most dear and sacred to us all."

With the stated aim of protecting the faith and morality in public life, and the common good of Ukrainians understood in Christian terms, this political but nonpartisan Catholic formation was to be guided by its foundational principles. Sheptytsky set them forth as follows:

1) "We shall hold fast to and defend the Catholic faith and morality, including in political life;
2) We shall obey the Church in matters of the faith and morality;
3) We consider the Christian family as the foundation of the nation and we shall defend its rights at every step, standing up for the indissolubility of marriage and for the Christian education of children in their own school;
4) We shall demand and defend social justice, the development of social care for the peasants, the workers, all employees in general, and especially the victims of social injustice;
5) In the unity, order and discipline of organized action, and standing on firm legal ground in our dealings with the state whose citizens we are, in all spheres of national and political life we shall devote our energies toward obtaining by legal means ever-higher
levels of education, culture, welfare and rights for our people. The complete good of the Ukrainian people, in the Christian meaning of that expression, is the aim toward which we aspire in political life;

6) In all matters of political activity, in which the Catholic faith and morality and the abovementioned social and national foundations are not violated, we leave complete freedom to members of our Union."

As the principles indicated, Sheptytsky's Catholic Union initiative was essentially an attempt to create a nonpartisan, political coalition or common front that would effectively represent Ukrainian Catholic interests within the Polish political context. On the Ukrainian side, the Church stood for social justice and the "unrestricted good of the Ukrainian people in Christian terms." On the Catholic side, the organization was to respect the directives of the Church and uphold the Christian faith and morality. In practical terms, this meant opposition to divorce legislation and support for religious instruction in the schools. At the same time, however, the organization would limit its political activity to what was legal and, in Christian terms, ethical.

By proposing a Ukrainian Catholic Union in that particular form, Sheptytsky showed that he supported the struggle for Ukrainian rights, but only within the framework of Polish law and Christian morality. For the proposal was not an attempt, contrary to his promises of 1923 and 1925, to activate the Ukrainian Catholic Church politically. Rather, it was aimed at rallying "under one banner" and under one slogan ("Christ is our strength") the various Ukrainian initiatives for social justice, some of which had lost their Christian bearings.

The principles of the Catholic Union essentially reiterated the cor-
nerstones of Sheptytsky's reflection on Church-state relations: the inseparability of Christian faith and morality from public policy, and the obedient submission to legitimate dictates of the state. Yet, at the same time, the rights of social justice and national self-determination were emphatically put on an equal footing with them as vital elements of the social and political agenda. Those social and national principles were authoritative and, as the Metropolitan observed, they were generally accepted by all Catholics.

Five days later, the Metropolitan called a press conference at which he elaborated further on his notion of a nonpartisan Catholic Union. Asked whether it was intended to be a new political party, he replied:

"If by 'political party' you are referring to what is usually called by that name, that is, a party as opposed to all other currently existing parties and a political program in contrast to all other programs, then the Catholic Union cannot and should not be such a party.

But if you call a 'party' a group of people who want to have an influence on politics, who want to act in unison on a range of political issues, and who only on those issues have their common, strictly defined program - then the Catholic Union should be such a party."

Moreover, the Metropolitan explained, Catholic Union members could belong to any existing parties or create new ones, as long as in doing so they did not violate its fundamental principles. Those principles indicated the nonpartisan thrust of the Catholic Union for, in Sheptytsky's understanding, they placed the Catholic Union above party lines.
c. the Polish school system

Metropolitan Sheptytsky recognized that the respect for religious and national minorities was a pressing issue within the Polish school system. In the area of education, he considered the right and duty of parents as primary, having precedence over both the Church and the state. It was a requirement of truth and justice, he felt, that parents be allowed to decide about the religion and nationality of the schools and of the teachers who were entrusted with the education of their children.

While that was the ideal arrangement toward which people could legitimately aspire, the Metropolitan was well aware that "civil laws do not always take sufficient account of the rights of parents and the rights of the Church [regarding education]." Turning to the situation of Ukrainians in the Polish Republic, he argued: Ukrainian children should have access to education in Ukrainian; their teachers should be Ukrainian and of the Greek Catholic rite; schools should be both confessional and "of our rite for children of our rite."

"In our children’s schools there can never be a teaching that is opposed to either the teaching of Jesus Christ or the Holy Church. There cannot and should not be anything in school that would denationalize or assimilate children. A school should educate children according to the wishes of the parents, forming them as their parents want to see them."

The way to achieve this was for Ukrainians to make their demands "with solidarity and persistence."

Underlying the Metropolitan’s position on education was the fundamental conviction that, to a Christian, civic obedience was always sub
ordinate to duty toward God and one's Christian conscience. In case of
conflict between those two levels of duty, a Christian was obliged to
disobey the state:

"If someone in power orders something that is contrary to con-
sience and divine law, a Christian may not obey such a command;
obedience to God precedes obedience to the people. So it was that
the Apostles did not obey the high priests: not to preach about
Christ. They spoke out boldly to the entire assembled tribunal of
high priests: 'Whether it is right to listen to you rather than
to God, decide for yourselves. For we cannot but speak of what we
have seen and heard.' (Acts 4:20)."

d. the destruction of the Orthodox Church

In June, 1938, an agreement was concluded between Poland and the
Vatican to regulate the issue of several Polish regions that had large
Orthodox populations: Volhynia, Kholm, Podlachia, and Polisia. According to
the agreement, Orthodox church properties were to be turned over to the
Polish Roman Catholic Church.

Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox deputies to the Polish parliament had
voted against the deal. The Orthodox found it objectionable not only be-
cause they were being deprived of their churches and land holdings, but
also because they were being converted under duress to Catholicism by the
Polish military authorities. Ukrainian Catholics objected to the agree-
ment since the regions in question, formerly part of the Russian empire,
had been predominantly Eastern-rite Catholic until the tsarist suppression
of Catholicism there in 1875; thus, it was felt that the Polish cuius regio
claims violated the historical Eastern-rite tradition of the area.
Metropolitan Sheptytsky intervened in the matter as a case of religious persecution. The situation was critical and on July 20, he issued a pastoral in which he took a stand "in defence of our persecuted brothers." He reported that, in June and July, some 100 churches had been taken over and ruined, mostly by fire; ancient monuments and sacred objects were also destroyed; many churches were closed and religious services were prohibited in them; people were coerced into joining Roman Catholicism; those who refused to yield were violently beaten and run out of their homes; priests were pursued, severely taxed or imprisoned; catechism and sermons in the native language of the people were forbidden.

In his view, a major blow had been dealt to the Orthodox Church whose faithful had suffered the heaviest losses. A blow had also been dealt, the Metropolitan argued, to the very idea of Church unity. The destruction of the Orthodox Church and the harsh treatment of the faithful created a serious obstacle to the reunion of churches. The Metropolitan explained,

"The events in the province of Kholm destroy in the souls of our separated Orthodox brothers even the thought of any possibility of reunion. They represent the Universal Church as a dangerous enemy of the Orthodox people. To the eyes of a population numbering several million within Poland, the Holy See is being presented as co-responsible for this destruction. A new divide has opened up between the Eastern Church and the Universal Church."

The Metropolitan did not directly blame the Polish Republic; instead, he asked, "who had the audacity to oppose the interests of the country?" But while he referred vaguely to "the hidden enemies of the universal Church and of Christianity and even singled out Masons, he was clearly also
disturbed by the collaboration of Catholics. For, if the enemies of the
Church had struck against the Orthodox (and, indirectly, the Catholic)
Church, they appeared to have done so with the tacit approval of many
Catholics. Indeed, Metropolitan Sheptytsky had quite deliberately not ap-
pealed for help to the Polish Roman Catholics, for "they could have refused
us help and considered us disloyal citizens.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky was clearly disturbed by the audacity of the
antireligious destruction which, after all, had occurred "in a Catholic
country, in plain view of many Catholic bishops and in plain view of the
nuncio." He was convinced that there were many "unconscious Catholics"
who had been manipulated into committing anti-Christian actions. Ultimate-
ly, he believed, "what has happened is and will remain a terrible memory
for Catholic Poland."

Nor did Sheptytsky blame the Vatican for the events in Kholm. On the
contrary, he criticized those who were trying to blame the Holy See for
what had occurred. The Vatican-Polish accord concerning the province of
Kholm which had preceded the persecution there was, in Sheptytsky's
thinking, only a "chronological coincidence;" the actual organizers and
initiators of the religious persecution were anxious to connect the Vatican
to the violence as a way of diverting attention from themselves.

To Sheptytsky, this issue was one of religious, as well as national
annihilation. For what had occurred was nothing less than the destruction
of "a part of the Universal Church and of a people that belongs to that
Church." The bearers of destruction had tried to explain their actions
with the "specious explanation that they were destroying the enemies of
their country." The whole campaign was conducted with patriotic slogans
such as the "uprooting of historical injustices" and "the annihilation of
the vestiges of slavery." In the face of such flagrant excesses, the
Metropolitan felt compelled to protest:

"With great pain we sympathize with all the sufferings of our brothers and we must condemn the anti-Christian acts. We must regard the destruction of churches, which the people need, the prohibition on celebrating the Divine Liturgy, and the punishment that is dealt out for prayer as acts of religious persecution....

We must protest against the attempt to create a shadow of suspicion that the Holy See approves of the struggle against the Orthodox Church. We must also protest against the attempt to justify the occurrences in Kholm and the political struggle against the Ukrainian people with allusions to the interests of the Catholic Church."

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's fundamental ethical objection to the destruction of Orthodoxy in the Kholm region was that it was anti-Christian. As far as he could see, the perpetrators could only be enemies of the Catholic Church and of Christianity. Their rude blows against the innocent Orthodox population, their patriotic slogans with which they deceived "uncritical Catholics" into performing anti-Christian acts had ultimately betrayed their evil aims and identity.

Without putting it directly, Sheptytsky had in fact condemned those in the Polish government and those in the Roman Catholic Church who, misguided in their patriotism, had either condoned or advocated the destruction of Orthodox churches. The authorities promptly confiscated the pastoral.
D. The Future of Ukrainian Society

1. Assessments of the Situation: militant nationalism

Commenting on the complex of problems that Ukrainians faced in interwar Galicia, Metropolitan Sheptytsky noted that foremost among them was the national question:

"What difficulties there are, what suffering, pain and misery there is amongst our people. In the first place, there are those nationwide misfortunes which weigh down so heavily on all of our hearts: the difficulties of our overall national situation, from which there appears to be no way out; wounds, which over many long years have not yet healed; and a pain that is more intense than /that caused by/ all other national divisions; fratricidal struggle, the division along party lines, mutual animosity, perpetual misunderstanding, and, the one thing /that is/ worse than anything else: what relates to the feeling of the most noble love of one's country."

It was hardly incidental that the Metropolitan chose to single out patriotic feeling as central to the social problems of Ukrainians. Continued Polish-Ukrainian hostility was a key factor that determined the lot of Ukrainians in the interwar period:

"The World War did indeed come to an end, on the surface, but a hidden struggle, hidden animosities and the oppression of some by others have not yet ceased to divide peoples and states among themselves."

Sheptytsky could not have been more direct about the political divide that had opened up between the Ukrainian people and the Polish Republic. He
observed that the state's discrimination along ethnic lines had effectively blocked access to employment for Ukrainian university graduates. Although the consequences of the economic crisis were global, he pointed out that high rates of unemployment among the Ukrainian youth in Poland had already existed years before its onset. Thus, political factors had aggravated the economic difficulty and the Metropolitan considered the situation of the youth to be desperate.

The social predicament of the Ukrainian minority in Poland radicalized not only the unemployed young intelligentsia, but also the Ukrainian population at large:

"Unfortunately, even the most serious people and those who keep farthest away from politics are often pushed out of their /apolitical/ stance perhaps for no reason other than that they are Ukrainians. Those kinds of instances /i.e., of discrimination/ create a feeling of hopelessness and facilitate the work of the emotional, senseless and irrational elements which in normal circumstances would play a markedly lesser role. Obviously the issue of employment opportunities is only one detail of the whole system. Purely emotional matters also have a great impact."

The social picture of Polish Galicia in the 1930's was dominated by the emergence of a particularly militant form of Ukrainian nationalism. Formerly encompassing a broad spectrum of political ideologies and parties, Ukrainian nationalism now shifted to the right. It combined two principles that were shared by most Ukrainians in Poland after the war and the disappointment of 1923: anti-Bolshevism and vehement opposition to Polish rule. At the same time, national extremism among the youth drove their militant wing of the Ukrainian nationalist movement to take the momentous
step of legitimizing terrorism and violence as valid means of forcing the political changes that they desired. This decision effectively separated them not only from more moderate, but less numerous, nationalist circles, but also, in a much more fundamental way, from the Greek Catholic Church. Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s principled stand on the issue furthered the split between nationalist extremism and Christian patriotism among Ukrainians; by May, 1933, when the Christian jubilee year was being celebrated in L’viv with a peaceful, 100,000-strong rally under the slogan "Ukrainian Youth for Christ," the event was boycotted by the more nationally inclined Ukrainian university youth.

Although it was known that the majority of the militant Ukrainian nationalists were young people, for the Metropolitan, the fundamental difference in ethical perspective was more significant than the generational difference:

"Almost all the tendencies among the youth also have their counterparts in the older generation. /But/ if it is a matter of serious Catholic circles, then they have repeatedly condemned all methods of struggle that are incompatible with Christian morality. It is unnecessary to add that both sides /i.e., both Poles and Ukrainians/ are using such methods, much like cog-wheels that drive each other and whose end cannot be seen..."

On the question of responsibility for the situation, Sheptytsky did not condone the ethics of ends-justifying-means but at the same time he saw its popularity as a consequence, rather than as the cause of the aggravated situation. Of course, from a Christian perspective, he criticized it, but the central ethical problem which he saw as "relating to the love of country" was the question of what was to be the future of Ukrainian socie-
ty. In his view, Ukrainian society faced a choice: it could either adhere to the social principles of Christianity or replace them with barbarism, as a segment of the population had already done. As a Catholic bishop, Metropolitan Sheptytsky felt it was his duty to warn Ukrainian Catholics that only the former path was viable and that the latter would certainly lead to perdition.

2. Principles: the discernment of Christian patriotism

As he had approached the issue of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the Austrian period, the Metropolitan again set out to correct the path of false patriotism on which he felt Ukrainians had embarked. In the 1930 pastoral protesting against the pacification, the Metropolitan directed special attention to the idealistic Ukrainian youth:

"...a few words to you, our youth. You are young and hot-tempered. You have a strong sense of love toward your native land, which demands action and which calls you to action. Persevere in that service and spare no sacrifice, but /by that we mean/ sacrifices which the national cause requires at the present moment and which are in accordance with the teaching of Christ and the good of the people."

Although critical of the notions of patriotism that had led to violence, Sheptytsky acknowledged that, from the Church's perspective, the national cause was a legitimate cause. What he proposed as an alternative to violent struggle was a kind of work for the common good—constructive, patient, and adhering to the divine law:
"We are weakened in the extreme; in order to be revived and to recover our health and energies, our people need daily, silent, ant-like, constructive and productive work in all areas of life; they need agricultural and scientific work, they need Catholic organizations. How much of this has been neglected! Persevere in that work, prepare for it and undertake it, all of you who are young. Our current conditions are truly and exceptionally unfavorable, but /by the same token/ that work is all the more essential for us, even more so than life itself. Do not allow anyone among you to be led into work for the underground. Whoever leads you away from positive work and inclines you toward conspiracy commits a crime against you and against our native land. Work openly for our people and subordinate that work always to the divine law."

The Metropolitan thus showed his support for the national cause, but in his view it always had to retain a self-critical posture, and stay strictly within the limits of Christian teaching. He illustrated the synthesis of religious and social values that characterized Christian patriotism, and which also distinguished it from an amoral or nonreligious perspective:

"A pagan considers himself dependent on no one, a master of his own life and behavior. A Christian considers his whole life as a service for God and country."

In the practical application of that distinction, the Metropolitan favored a self-critical outlook on the national question, for he considered it more of a service to the people to correct their errors that to teach them "to grow haughty and to delight in the glory or greatness of past generations."
In May, 1932, Metropolitan Sheptytsky addressed the issue of militant Ukrainian nationalism in an article titled "Remarks to the Ukrainian Youth." Clearly concerned that their understanding of patriotism had all but lost its Christian foundations, the Metropolitan levelled a critique at what he felt was a misguided, hot-headed patriotism. In so far as it was rooted in love and the readiness to make sacrifices, patriotism was not in itself contrary to Christian morality and the Christian life. These features were essentially Christian too. But whereas Christianity excluded hatred, some forms of patriotism did not. As Sheptytsky explained, from a Christian standpoint,

"...love cannot go together with hatred, for the narrower hatred becomes, the more it turns love into egoism. It is alright to defend and demand one's rights but not by means of hatred toward others."

a. sacrifice and spiritual equilibrium

An important distinction between Christian and pagan patriotism centred on the understanding of sacrifice. Whereas Ukrainian youths were wont to sacrifice not only their own good but also that of others and, consequently, the good of the Ukrainian people, the Metropolitan observed that, on the contrary, "another's good and welfare should be sacred not only to a Christian but to every human person as such." Moreover, he argued, "the best ends do not justify evil means."

Metropolitan Sheptytsky found that the patriotism of many young Ukrainians was rash and imprudent:

"You rush too quickly into politics and work for society. It
appears to you that the soldier on the field of battle cannot stop to think, to reflect. You think that a sacrifice is all the more successful the more it is offered with bravado and the less 193 with prudence."

The result of such an outlook, as far as the Metropolitan was concerned, was that many of the best-intentioned sacrifices of the nationalists were futile and even harmful. Sheptytsky argued that to get on the right path of patriotism, discernment was necessary, for "a spirit of deception walks upon the world, drawing uncritical followers off the right path and ruining them. And Satan assumes the form of a magnificent Angel." In practical terms, this meant that an uncritically patriotic person easily fell prey to the manipulation of hidden, anonymous political players. His patriotic idealism could then be exploited to further an unknown agenda, potentially even turning the patriot against the best interests of his native land.

Sheptytsky described the necessary process of ethical discernment as a careful scrutiny of what lay behind external appearances:

"It is necessary in life to scrutinize the spirit; to reflect on whether the spirit which is driving one in a particular direction is a good spirit that comes from God; to be able to doubt and not trust the judgment of a first impression about what is beautiful or good."

Unless one took the time to look closely at "the essence and the depth of things," one would easily be deceived by attractive slogans.

To counter the rashness in militant nationalism, Sheptytsky pointed to a spiritual perspective on patriotism. For although patriotism was a virtue, it was laden with hidden, subtle dangers. In order to avoid them, one
had to be able to situate one’s own love of country within a long-term, historical vision of the life of a nation. From that point of view, the differences between true and false patriotism began to emerge more clearly:

"...the sacrifice of a single instant cannot replace many years of ant-like work. It is not by momentary outbursts, but through tireless effort and sacrifice unto bloodshed and death on the part of many generations that a people raise themselves up. It is sometimes easier to spill blood in a single moment of enthusiasm than to do one's duty in the face of adversity, to bear the heat of the day, the scorching rays of the sun, the ill-will of people, the hatred of enemies, the absence of trust from among one's own, the want of assistance from one's closest friends - and, in the midst of such work, to fulfil one's task to the very end, without expecting any laurels for the triumph or any reward for the service."

As he distinguished the notion of sacrifice as a patient endurance and an offering from suicidal fervor and idealism, so too the Metropolitan tried to steer young people toward thinking about how they could contribute constructively to nationbuilding, which he saw as far more of a challenge than sabotage and terror.

In 1938, anticipating conflict over threats to the territorial autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine, Sheptytsky urged young Ukrainians to guard against allowing themselves to be provoked into committing acts of violence. It was not important, he argued, how trying the circumstances were, for "the more staggering and painful they are, the more they require us not to lose our spiritual equilibrium and well-advised peace."

Sheptytsky considered it imperative for young Ukrainians to overcome
their extremism, which was counterproductive, he felt, since it only led them to squander their energies and harm themselves, the Ukrainian people and their future. He appealed to their strong sense of patriotism to adopt a more critical attentiveness to the consequences of their activity: "It is precisely because you love your unfortunate Ukrainian people that you are not permitted not to see this."

b. solidarity with the past

The Metropolitan criticized the intolerance that led young Ukrainians to try to impose their views on others, even through the use of violence. The Metropolitan did not blame Ukrainians directly for this phenomenon, however; he believed that it was part of a worldwide current that was created by fascism and by Bolshevism. Nevertheless, it was an erroneous path that disregarded fundamental liberty. In particular, it appeared to ignore that "sacrifices that are not freely made are worthless;" that "outside of the individual free will there is no good or happiness or future for the people;" and that "it is a sign of weakness when a man cannot persuade another except by force."

The Metropolitan signalled a certain pride that was leading young Ukrainians to disregard the views and experience of their elders. Consequently, they often erred in their judgments. Sheptytsky tried to correct this by reminding them that, "as in the Church and in Christianity, so too in national life, tradition is the foundation of the future." Nation-building was not, in Sheptytsky's view, a matter of one instant; it involved the arduous process of transmitting tradition from generation to generation. That very process of transmission, which kept a people in touch with their past, was at the same time the door to their future.
"A nation whose every generation would break with the past and begin anew the work for their native land would necessarily remain a weak child among other nations. For nations do not arrive at adulthood through the work of one generation. That requires the long, laborious effort of many generations, it requires the linkage of those generations not only in the most proximate ideals, but in all the means by which they want to achieve those ideals. For, you see, my dear ones, a human person is a very tiny and frail being; and far from the truth is he who thinks of himself as great and mighty. In our hands is only one moment of the existence of our nation. And if in that moment we do not link up our work with those who came before us, and if again those who come after us do not link up their work in their time with our work and with the work of those who came before us, then what can our nation achieve, even after centuries?"

The rejection of the past and of the knowledge of older people was basically a rejection of authority, the Metropolitan observed. Its implicit danger was that it led to the rejection of all forms of authority—parental, national, ecclesiastical and divine: in a word, it led to anarchy.

Sheptytsky thus viewed the national cause as the collective project of the entire people, rather than one that was restricted to only one generation. He therefore reminded young people that they had much to gain from the experience of their elders:

"Do not scorn your parents and older people. On the contrary, let their experience and social responsibility always supplement and inspire your youthful and exuberant idealism."
The purpose of such advice was certainly not criticism for its own sake; the Metropolitan saw his role as that of a loving, caring father. His benevolent paternalism was part of a broad view of the Christian community as a family of believers supporting one another and, when necessary, correcting one another fraternally. As he put it,

"You should know and understand that you have a Father in L'viv who loves you deeply, who remembers you and prays for you; and that in Rome there is also the Father of all Catholic peoples in the whole world. Your father who resides in L'viv is happy when he hears... that you are becoming good Catholic Christians, good sons of the Church and good and loyal sons of your fatherland."

Concerned that some forms of nationalism were veering away from Christian social values, Sheptytsky tried to restore the collective, familial unity of the Christian community under a banner of Christian patriotism.

3. Praxis
   a. Catholic Action

   To counter the displacement of Christian morality by the nationalists, Metropolitan Sheptytsky encouraged the establishment of Catholic Action, a lay apostolate under an episcopal mandate. Tracing its origin to Pius XI's encyclical "Ubi Arcano Dei" (1922), the organization's first Greek Catholic chapters began to appear in Galicia in 1931.

   Metropolitan Sheptytsky explained that the aim of Catholic Action was "to organize and encourage lay Christians /to participate in/ pastoral
work, that is, to assist the pastors in their work." He was particularly interested in developing cadres of catechists to assist in religious education in the villages. In view of developing a lay apostolate, the organization would also offer lectures and courses, and would publish materials for study and information.

The Metropolitan saw the Catholic Action initiative as a way of revitalizing the Church and winning lapsed believers back into the Christian fold; he therefore called in 1935 on the members of Catholic Action to convert "those unfortunate ones who have completely removed themselves from the Church."

And in December, 1936, the three Greek Catholic hierarchs devoted a special pastoral to Catholic Action. Citing growing communist hostility towards Christianity, they addressed the need to extend the Church's apostolic, teaching mission to the laity. In this, they found the situation in Spain and Mexico instructive:

"The whole Catholic world bows its head to the immortal heroes of recent days in Mexico and Spain, who are struggling and giving their lives for the rights and cause of God and their homeland with the cry: 'Long live Christ the King!' The young heroes of Alcazar are an example to the youth of all nations, they are all living examples of Catholic Action. In the frenzied advance of the Kingdom of Satan against God and His Kingdom of love in this world, the mobilization of the entire Christian world against this enemy is essential, and, thank God, in accordance with the call of the Head of the Church, this is happening.

More than any other nation in the world, Ukraine is suffering at the hands of this enemy, and so we must all arm ourselves with the weapons of truth and love, for we need as many
heroes and apostles as possible /to defend/ the rights /and 211
cause/ of God and country."

Unlike the Catholic Union, which was explicitly conceived as a political instrument that would lobby for legislative reform, Catholic Action 212 was strictly apolitical. However, the bishops made a special point of declaring that Catholic Action would not stand in the way of Ukrainian patriotism. On the contrary,

"true love, sacrifice and dedication to one's people can only proceed from a properly understood love of God and neighbor. The believing Catholic is always and everywhere a good patriot."

b. Babii

The campaign of terror waged by revolutionary Ukrainian nationalists since the early 1920's had targeted primarily Polish victims. But on July 25th, 1934, just over a month after the assassination of the Minister of the Interior Bronislaw Pieracki, OUN terrorism claimed a Ukrainian victim, Ivan Babii. A leading member of Catholic Action in L'viv, Babii was known to have staunchly opposed and obstructed the recruitment of Ukrainian high school students for the terrorist underground.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky condemned both the crime and the criminal, reiterating the fundamental principle that "a crime is always a crime, and it is not possible to serve a sacred cause with bloodied hands." But the real focus of his criticism was the Ukrainian nationalist leadership which had its headquarters outside the Polish border (in Germany and Czechoslovakia). They were the ones who directed the Ukrainian underground movement in Poland, who ordered assassinations, and who recruited Ukrainian
high school students for terrorism. This was reprehensible for, in the Metropolitan's assessment, "whoever demoralized the youth was a criminal and an enemy of the people."

This statement represented a departure from other statements that the Metropolitan had made on homicide in that it was not primarily ethical; the Metropolitan appears to have considered the passing reference to the un-justifiability of criminal action even in the name of a sacred cause as a sufficient and complete expression of his ethical judgement on the issue. Nor was the argument theological; it made no mention whatever of the divine law that had been transgressed.

Instead, the Metropolitan's statement focussed almost exclusively on the broader social dimension of the crime. Babii's assassin was a high school student, one of the recruits of the terrorist underground. In Sheptytsky's opinion, that recruitment was itself a grave crime, for students were being drawn away from their schoolwork and into crime, homicide and, ultimately, injury to their own people. He argued that by following such a line, the hidden leaders of terrorism had completely divorced themselves from the best interests of Ukrainian society; their methods were not solutions, but had become part of the problem:

"... no reasonable Ukrainian would fail to oppose that criminal activity. No educator would fail to affirm that whoever draws the youth away from their work and into the underground commits a grave crime against the youth. No father or mother would fail to curse those who are leading our youth astray and into the dead end of crime.

If you want to treacherously kill those who oppose your work, you will have to kill all the teachers and professors who
are working for the Ukrainian youth, all the mothers and fathers of Ukrainian children, all the heads and directors of Ukrainian educational institutions, all the politicians and community activists. And, above all, you will have to remove by assassination the obstacles which are posed to your criminal and stupid work by the clergy and the Bishops."

This was as clear and fundamental a personal break with revolutionary Ukrainian terrorism as the Metropolitan could possibly have made; yet, as a pastor, he also felt obligated to lead others to the same ethical conclusion. He decided that, in order to ensure that Ukrainian Catholics would not be led astray, it was necessary to isolate the terrorists definitively from the mainstream of Ukrainian society. He therefore called on those who had known Ivan Babii to give public testimony to his character and achievements, so that all could "see clearly onto which paths Babii had wanted to guide our youth, and which path his murderers took."

c. attempts to politicize the Church

In spite of being ethically isolated from the Catholic mainstream, the militant wing of Ukrainian nationalism tried to curry favor and maintain a base of support within the Church.

In July, 1934, Metropolitan Sheptytsky learned that some church services that lay people requested were being turned into political rallies during which leaflets were distributed and secular songs were sung. Since local parish priests often faced the predicament of finding it awkward to stand up to such wishes of their parishioners, he issued a statement that clarified the official position of the Church. Quite simply, he ex-
plained, such abuses were a profanation and a sacrilege contrary to divine law. Accordingly, parish priests were prohibited from conducting services for secular, rather than religious purposes.

And, that same year, in preparing for the celebration of the anniversary of Ukrainian independence (November 1st), Metropolitan Sheptytsky explained the proper religious commemoration of the day. As Christians, Ukrainian Catholics would mark the occasion with prayer and thanksgiving. As well as asking God to have mercy on those who were suffering and those who had died in the fight for independence, Ukrainians would also ask for "those heavenly gifts which are needed for the complete and successful development of all the national strengths and attributes, as well as for the blessed development of the material and spiritual life of the people."

Since the annual celebration was commonly attended by people who were known to have fallen away from Christianity, Sheptytsky declared that the Church would continue to welcome them as it had done in the past, in the hope that their superficial attendance (i.e., without the same spirit of faith, hope and prayer in which Christians gathered) would perhaps some day lead them into the internal, spiritual community of believers. However, anyone who wanted to manipulate such religious gatherings for political purposes was not to be allowed to participate. As the Metropolitan explained,

"Unfortunately, there are people who have lost their Christian faith and who have become so alienated from Christian thinking that, in the festive moment of nationwide prayer, they enter our churches to trample on our sacred objects with their sacrilegious behavior. They turn a place of worship and prayer into an arena of clamorous and unwise political demonstrations with which they
insult the Almighty and offend the Christian sentiments of their own people. In the face of such abuses by unreasonable and blind people, for whom the Liturgy is only an external form and for whom patriotism consists only of words and slogans, we must close the doors of our churches."

The Metropolitan's desire to keep the Church free from political manipulation was the overriding concern here. Indeed, church doors would be opened even to atheists and agnostics who approached with an open mind, but not to those who sought to abuse holy places and objects for political purposes.

As for any priests who may have been drawn into the political fervor of the times, Sheptytsky urged them to be cautious not to overstep the bounds of acceptable political involvement. As he had done very forcefully in the Austrian period, the Metropolitan spoke out in the 1930's against the mixing of pulpits and politics; even sound politics, if voiced from a pulpit and in liturgical vestments, were nothing but "lies and falsehood:"

"That same abuse of the teaching of Christ occurs when /a priest/ stands on the platform of patriotism and speaks as a patriot, rather than as a messenger of Christ. Even a messenger of Christ may speak about patriotism, but he must always do so from the point of view of Christ and of the age-old heavenly truth."

And again, just prior to World War II, the Metropolitan lamented: "We must admit with shame that our preaching is all-too-often a purely human, weak, vain and worthless discourse."

On a number of occasions during the interwar Polish period, the Metropolitan explained his personal reluctance to become entangled in politics. In 1929, he wrote:
"Sad experience has taught me that the harder you try to stay out of politics the more likely it is that you will often be accused of meddling in political affairs."

Four years later, in an interview for a Polish periodical, the Metropolitan declined to comment on political issues and instead referred the reporter to lay Ukrainians who, he said, were more competent in such matters.

When in December, 1934, Rev. Vasyi' Mastsiukh was appointed Apostolic Administrator of Lemkivshchyna, the Ukrainian National Democratic Union strongly opposed this as a step toward the denationalization of the Ukrainians in the region. Mastsiukh wrote to Sheptytsky and expressed his concern over the conflict. The Metropolitan replied with advice that explained his own method of avoiding political tensions with the population:

"I try to carefully avoid all politics and that keeps me from any conflict with my faithful. No national group complains as long as no one steps on their toes, that is, when no one interferes in their political affairs with a political program or action that is contrary to their own. Purely Catholic, apolitical action can only help a people and no people is ever offended by such help.... It is important that no one be able to accuse us of any political action that might be contrary to those national goods, aims and desires which are not opposed to the faith and morality."

Also, he explained that Catholic Action was a "completely apolitical organization of societies." Even the Catholic Union, which was unequivocally political, was explicitly non-partisan.
d. birth control

Another area of particular social concern that was tied to the future of the Ukrainian people in the Metropolitan's thinking had to do with sexual ethics. A variety of reproductive interventions, ranging from contraception to abortion, were being practiced in Poland and, although the problem was perhaps not yet as widespread as in France and other Western European countries, the Metropolitan was alarmed at "seeing almost daily how families which should be Christian shamelessly adopt a system of neo-Malthusianism to such an extent that this filth has become an eyesore."

But while he was aware of Pius XI's encyclical "Casti Connubii" and while he objected to contraception on the grounds that it was an intrinsic evil that transformed the sacrament of marriage into pagan concubinage, Sheptytsky also voiced deep concern about the social consequences of "the system of two children or none at all." Contraception was contrary to nature because it "threatens the physical existence of humanity and condemns a nation or a human society to death and destruction." Moreover, he felt that the widespread practice of birth control would have a devastating effect on a country's population growth; that effect was apparent in some countries where there were already "more coffins than cradles."

Metropolitan Sheptytsky was convinced that by reducing the size of families entire peoples were destroying themselves, and the same fate awaited Ukrainians if they followed that path. For, the Metropolitan affirmed, birth control was a plague that avenged itself on an entire people and was far worse than enslavement by the enemy. Children were a nation's guarantee of the future, its potential political leaders, scholars, artists and writers and the loss to society of every individual life was incalculable, for one never knew the potential contribution to the
common good that was thereby erased:

"A child so barbarously deprived of life or not brought into life by its parents was perhaps appointed by God to render some service to its family, to its people, or even to all of humanity, which no one else will ever give, or to deliver some heavenly benefits which no one else will deliver."

Moreover, the incalculable spiritual worth of every individual human being was closely associated with the human soul, which was "more valuable than the greatest earthly treasures":

"From a Christian perspective, we have to say that every human soul is an almost limitless treasure for the parents, for society, for the Church and a limitless good for God Himself. The human soul is such a great good that Jesus Christ gives up His life for souls or, one could say, for 'the soul'....

From a Christian perspective, we have to say that the Christian soul, that is, a soul blessed by divine grace, participates in what Christ presents as the most essential feature of the Kingdom and which is a hidden treasure. The comparison will be clear when we remember two pronouncements of Jesus: that the Kingdom is like a hidden treasure (Mt. 13:44) and that the Kingdom is within you (Luke 17:21). Obviously, the gospel reference to the Kingdom of God refers to the Church, and to heaven, and to the Gospel, and to the coming of the Messiah, and, finally, to God's sanctifying grace. The Kingdom has the character of a hidden treasure in every one of the scriptural connotations of that word. But perhaps the most natural hidden treasure is that Kingdom of God which is within our souls, that is, that very
human soul which has been sanctified by divine grace."

Another important consideration in appreciating the social impact of
limiting the size of families was its effect on the ability of a society to
recover from massive losses of life, whether through wars or epidemics.
With this in mind, Metropolitan Sheptytsky contrasted "healthy" nations,
which were comprised of large family units, with weak nations, which arti-
icially restricted the size of families:

"In healthy nations, where every family always has six, seven,
nine, and more children, the worst pogroms and the bloodiest wars
are wounds that heal very quickly. But a people that has adopted
the system of two children is such a sick people that every
single wound /is one that/ will not heal."

Although the Metropolitan did not look upon patriotic motives as the main
argument against birth control, he acknowledged that "even those do well
who avoid that sin and struggle to overcome it in society only because of
those temporal considerations." For they too required the moral strength
on which the future of the motherland depended. Thus, he called Ukrainians:

"...preserve your innocence also because of your love of our
motherland. Young people who do not watch out for sins against
chastity are weak in will and character; they are poor soldiers
not only of Christ but of their motherland as well. In order to
be whole, healthy and strong, in order to know how to live and in
the battle of life to win a better future for oneself, one's own
and one's people, it is necessary to be not only physically but
also morally healthy and pure, and to keep one's distance from
that softness, worthlessness and feebleness to which the abuse of
sensual pleasures leads."
And, as he often did, Sheptytsky invoked divine wisdom with a prayer for the gift of ethical discernment:

"Let God's wisdom... allow our families to understand how precious and good numerous offspring are, and what a terrible crime against the family, the nation and humanity it is to restrict the number of offspring."

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's national argument against birth control suggests that he may have expected it to have a special resonance among Ukrainians in addition to the traditional natural law argument. For, as he had shown subtle attentiveness to Ukrainian sensibilities by elaborating his critique of excessively militant nationalism from within a strong affirmation of Christian love of country, so too with birth control Sheptytsky found that he could effectively appeal to the form of patriotism which the Church was able to endorse.

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As he had done in the Austrian period, so too in the interwar Polish period, the Metropolitan tried to chart out a path for Christian patriotism. Attuned to the Ukrainian political thought of the time, he proceeded now beyond the question of peaceful inter-ethnic coexistence, to reflect on the constructive elements and attitudes that were necessary for the process of nationbuilding. From a Christian perspective, that process could only be successful if it was based firmly on Christian values. And, since that Christian spirit was perhaps nowhere more needed than among the Ukrainian youth, Sheptytsky prayed:

"May Christ protect our youth from every evil influence, let Him create conditions in which they can develop all their God-given
talents. May every generation of our youth produce many people of conscientious and profound work: great scholars, genuine artists, excellent writers, lawyers, physicians, architects, great industrialists and merchants. Let every one of them grow up to be a citizen whose work will bring benefit and glory to our people."

The future of Ukrainian society would also depend on wise individuals, inspired by the Holy Spirit, who "with tireless scholarly effort would enlighten and for centuries indicate the path of work to future generations." In Sheptytsky's thinking, such wise political and social leaders were needed as

"...would seek the common good, not their own; who would provide leadership and not yield to every change in public opinion; who would boldly and loudly confess the principles of the Christian faith... who in the legislatures would defend those who have been wronged, who would courageously and wisely demand national rights, and who would always set themselves to work for the rights of our holy, Catholic Church."
E. Conclusion

The main threats to Christian social values that Sheptytsky perceived during the Polish period were both external to the Church (atheistic communism in Russia, anti-Ukrainian sentiment in the Polish state) and internal (militant nationalism and a secularized ethic). In responding to these threats, the Metropolitan focussed attention on standing fast in the faith as the fundamental ethical challenge for the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian society. And, as was his habit, he expressed this perception of a fundamental threat best within a prayer:

"Many have not recognized you; many have fallen away from you, having scorned your commandments.... Lord, be a King not only for the faithful who have not fallen away from you but also to the prodigal sons who have rejected you; grant that they may soon return to the family hearth and do not let them die in misery and hunger. Be a King for those who have been misled either by false teachings or by disagreements and bring them back to the source of the truth and unity of the faith so that they may soon become one flock and one pastor."

Keenly aware of the power of patriotic ideals in the popular consciousness of Ukrainians during the Polish period, Metropolitan Sheptytsky articulated the official position of the Greek Catholic Church on key social issues with special attention to Ukrainian patriotic sentiment. Thus, an important element in his critique of communist collaboration was the patriotic argument that it constituted a betrayal of the Ukrainian people. Similarly, patriotic concerns were a crucial part of Sheptytsky's dealings with the Polish Republic, for he actively opposed the attribution of collective guilt upon the entire Ukrainian community and made represen-
tations in defence of their linguistic and religious rights. Finally, reflecting on the future of Ukrainian society, the Metropolitan firmly endorsed the Christian understanding of patriotism and, from that perspective, he proceeded to level a critique at attempts to shift the Ukrainian social and political agenda away from its traditional, Christian foundation towards a secular, and even atheistic, base. In effect, by incorporating the element of Ukrainian patriotic self-awareness into Greek Catholic reflection on social ethics, Sheptytsky took an innovative step towards applying Catholic social teaching to the Ukrainian context.
CHAPTER 4:

METROPOLITAN SHEPTYTSKY'S SOCIAL TEACHING AND PRAXIS DURING
THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF EASTERN GALICIA (September 1939 - June 1941)

On September 17, 1939, shortly after the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov non-aggression pact between the U.S.S.R and Nazi Germany, Soviet forces invaded Poland and began an occupation of Eastern Galicia that was to last twenty-one months. The Greek Catholic Church was faced with a fait accompli that radically altered its relation with the civil authority— the occupying forces brought in a social order that was grounded in an official doctrine of atheism and which severely restricted the social role of the Church. It is hardly surprising that Metropolitan Sheptytsky's social thought and activity should have been shaped to a considerable degree by the new socio-political climate; both as an institution and as a community of faithful, the Church saw its very existence challenged. Metropolitan Sheptytsky therefore tried to identify and address the urgent social problems that resulted from the war and the occupation.

In this chapter, we consider the tenuous situation of the Church in its relation toward the occupying Soviet state and examine the implications of that relationship for three moments in Sheptytsky's social thought: his reading of the situation, his proposed guidelines for Christian social action and his implementation of those guidelines in practice.
A. Sheptytsky’s assessment of the Situation

1. Empirical reading

Although Western scholars generally agree that this first Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine was not accompanied by as harsh anti-Church policies as might have been anticipated, such assessments are historically informed by events that were to follow. However, operating within the context as it developed, Metropolitan Sheptytsky perceived the occupation as a genuine and immediate threat, both to the population at large and to his Church. In the first place, the occupation dealt a devastating blow to Western Ukrainian society, as was evident from the cost in human lives. The attempt at transition to a communist order, although short-lived, involved the deportation of some 400,000 people to Eastern lands, while the military withdrawal in June, 1941, was accompanied by massacres such as that in L’viv where 6,000 people perished.

Secondly, the Soviet occupation introduced policies and legislation that raised doubts about the future of Greek Catholicism in Galicia: nationalization, secularization and anticlericalism.

Nationalization proceeded almost immediately after the entry of Soviet forces into the land. Monasteries and convents were suppressed, while monks were dispersed and land-holdings were confiscated. The internal communication and administration of the Church was hamstrung by the nationalization of its printing presses. The Greek Catholic Church had depended on its many newspapers and periodicals to disseminate information and pastoral guidance, and now most of them ceased publication. To make matters worse, the Church was deprived of postal service. Metropolitan Sheptytsky related the resulting difficulties of
internal communication to his go-between with the Pope, Budapest nuncio Monsignor Rotta: "...the lack of postal and communication links or, rather, the unavailability of such services to the Church was the reason why I could not keep all the clergy of my diocese on the alert...."

A process of planned secularization was put into place in order to "sovietize" the newly-occupied Galician society, that is, to bring it more into conformity with the Soviet model. Organized religion was thus deemed to be a purely private matter and systematic efforts were made to remove it from public life. The school system was not only secularized — through the dismissal and forcible exclusion of catechists and the elimination of courses in religion — but was turned into a platform for the promotion of atheist doctrine. As well, in a variety of ways, the State attempted to subvert the institutional structure of the Church.

Priests were specifically targeted by anticlerical measures. Socially, they were stigmatized by means of specially designated passports and by official references to their homes and to church buildings as "unproductive institutions." No less significant were economic sanctions; whereas priests had formerly received state salaries, they now lost such benefits and instead were subjected to a heavy religious tax ("kul’tzbir") and, in some cases, were deprived of landholdings. Moreover, Sheptytsky noted that the ranks of the Greek Catholic clergy were being depleted at an unprecedented rate of attrition. A number of interrelated factors, in addition to those already mentioned, were behind this phenomenon: when the occupying forces began arresting, sentencing to hard labor and summarily deport-
ting priests, many others fled the Soviet-occupied zone into Nazi-held areas. In this way, the Greek Catholic Church lost about 200 priests during the Soviet occupation. Although this represented less than 10% of the total lay clergy in the Archeparchy, the loss was a matter of urgent concern for another reason: all three seminaries (located in L'viv, Stanyslaviv and Peremyshl') had also been forcibly dissolved, and there were very few new ordinations. The only source of replacements for the parishes became the monastic priests whom the state had expelled from the cloistered life.

In responding to all of these developments, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was primarily concerned with ensuring the survival of the Church and, in order to survive, the Church would have to be allowed to fulfil its duty of religious education. His fundamental social concern during this period was with the defence of religious freedom. He therefore focussed his social reflection and ethical decision-making on two questions that emerged directly from the historical context: how to define the appropriate posture of the Church toward the authority of the occupying state and how to indicate the acceptable means by which the Church might meet the social demands that were being placed on it in the new situation. Before turning to these issues, we shall briefly examine Sheptytsky's theological assessment of the situation.
2. Theological assessment

a. Nature of the threat: loss of faith

Along with the external threat to the life of the Church as an institution, Sheptytsky saw that the suppression of religious life in Galicia posed a deeper, spiritual threat to society. The state's systematic promotion of atheism was having an observable effect on the Greek Catholic community. In the first place, as the Metropolitan noted in a letter to Cardinal Tisserant, atheist doctrine was showing signs of taking root among the traditionally Christian people:

"...alas, despite the best intentions of parents and children, the imprint of official atheism of the teachers already began to show itself and it would have grown even more if that system had continued."

For those whose faith was strong the occupation was perhaps less of an insurmountable adversity than an opportunity for renewal. But, Sheptytsky feared, for many others it was a time of profound corruption. For, whether they submitted to the influence of the régime or freely chose to reconcile themselves with communism, Sheptytsky felt that he was seeing an unprecedented dissolution of society and social values:

"All the worst passions of the human nature were unleashed and this system of permanent and continual revolution raised the lowest and vilest elements to the surface of the social life; it also shook up the authority of the family, of the schoolmaster, and of all other moral authority, and stirred up a real hatred of what were called the Soviet authorities."
b. Socio-ethical implications

The devastating implications of the widespread loss of faith were therefore to be seen, according to Sheptytsky, in the moral degeneration of society. He specifically drew attention to three areas in which he saw symptoms of that degeneration: declining morality in marital and sexual relations, alcohol abuse and apathy with regard to work.

The fabric of society was being eroded, Sheptytsky felt, because the Christian family itself was "threatened in its very foundations." This referred in part to the state policy on civil marriage, and Sheptytsky considered it to be yet another vehicle through which the state was undermining the role of the Church and propagating atheism. But it also referred to actual issues of sexual ethics in Ukrainian society, to which Sheptytsky referred during this period, such as contraception, "the sacrilegious abuse of matrimony" and abortion. In the Metropolitan's view, Ukrainian society was no longer threatened merely from outside by the actions of the state, but it also was fallen internally as a result of sin.

Another social problem that became widespread after the Soviet takeover was drunkenness. On that subject, Metropolitan Sheptytsky wrote a special statement to the faithful. Considering the issue to be complex, he pointed out that it had several causes:

"Whenever people have many reasons to worry and fear for the future there is inevitably a great temptation to seek pleasure or strength in intoxicants. Such is human nature. And the enemy of our salvation exploits that weakness of
ours so as to increase and to constantly shooe that temptation upon us."

The problem, as Sheptytsky saw it in its specific historical context, arose out of two factors - the human weakness of "people of weaker character and faith" and the difficulties of that historical moment, "when a person is in the greatest need of God’s grace." Indeed, the expression "the enemy of our salvation" was a subtle double-entendre covering both the spiritual source of temptation on the one hand and, on the other, the specific conditions that prevailed in Galicia in the years 1939-1941:

"... from some quarters I am informed that there are people without conscience, atheists, who are not ashamed to induce and encourage people to drink."

Not only were the causes of alcohol abuse both psychological and social, in Sheptytsky’s estimation, but its consequences were equally serious in both a material and a spiritual sense. For, in addition to the loss of the faculty of reason and conscience, drunkenness also entailed the loss of divine grace and exclusion from the Kingdom.

Another temptation that Sheptytsky noticed at this time was apathy with respect to productive labor. Wartime conditions had created uncertainty about the future and about the security of property, with the result that some people gave in to despair and simply abandoned all work as futile. The Metropolitan recognized that the pressure of the times was indeed overwhelming:

"It appears to you that this work, although essential, will bring neither any benefit nor any good. Perhaps that is truly the case; the times of war in which we are living are
times when no one is sure of either his life or his possessions. At any moment, the sad circumstances in which we find ourselves can place any one of us before God's judgment, tearing us away from the present life and taking away an entire life's earnings and all the possessions that a good father may have wanted to leave for his children. In such circumstances, not only does one not wish to work, but everything seems to indicate that it is not worth the effort."

Sheptytsky appreciated that the state of emergency had caused some of his faithful to lose hope, and felt that it was not appropriate for him to tell people how they should conduct their personal affairs. Instead, he merely reviewed the biblical teachings on the meaning and importance of human work. According to those teachings, human work is necessary, though not in itself the aim of life; it is meant to lead people to God. In work are balanced both social duties (to assist the needy in a spirit of brotherly love) and religious duties (to do what is pleasing to God) so that, whenever it is fulfilled in the Christian spirit, it never goes to waste. In Sheptytsky's reading, the biblical teachings showed that there was a "danger of neglecting that work which perhaps will turn out to be indispensable and without which very unpleasant and hard times may yet come upon you." Productive labor was to be maintained in so far as it could never really be futile, even though it may have appeared so; by neglecting it, one risked great personal and national losses.

The complex interplay of material and spiritual considerations underlying the question of labor under wartime conditions did not
prevent the Metropolitan from taking a strong stand on the issue. While acknowledging that the war had made it difficult for people to choose between work and idleness and for him to personally argue for one course of action over another, he was nonetheless convinced that scriptural teaching overwhelmingly favored work over idleness, independently of historical vicissitudes. In relation to God, in other words, the value and dignity of human labor remained constant and did not depend on contextual considerations.

c. Spiritual and historical consequences

"In light of the Christian faith," Sheptytsky observed, "the greatest threat is loss of faith," and under Soviet rule he saw plenty of occasions where Greek Catholics were being exposed to that danger. Particularly vulnerable were the young, who were subjected to atheist indoctrination and pressure in the schools, while enrolling in the "Pioneers" youth organization and in the course of military service. Adults, he noted, were subjected to the same kind of pressures whenever they collaborated with the government or its agencies and, especially, when they carried out official decisions to expropriate church property.

All of these situations undermined the life of faith and prayer of the Greek Catholic community and, to Sheptytsky, this was ineluctably bound up with the sufferings of the people.

"The changed circumstances are an opportunity that has been provided by Divine Providence, an opportunity that we neither earned nor asked for, an opportunity to perceive the error in which we have been to this time. We are witnessing
historical events which for all times will clearly demonstrate the significance of prayer for humanity. We are seeing what consequences ensue when our prayer falls silent. A land where the words ‘give us this day our daily bread’ are omitted from the Our Father is condemned to famine by the historical Nemesis. The same fate may well await a land or a people whose voice is not constantly raised to heaven with the words ‘hallowed be Thy name, Thy Kingdom come.’ For, if so terrible are the consequences of omitting the words which are, as it were, closest to the land, what then might be the results of leaving out the other words?"

No less urgent from a theological perspective was the danger of grave sin which also carried both spiritual and socio-historical consequences. In other words, Sheptytsky felt that along with the direct, external threat posed by the Soviet régime internal risks were present as well; by severely restricting the activity of the Church, the new conditions effectively increased the occasions for grave sin. This danger was perhaps most pronounced in the sacramental ministry. Time and again, Sheptytsky warned his priests and the faithful against the sacrilege of knowingly administering or receiving the Eucharist in a state of mortal sin. Nor did he underestimate the detrimental impact of such a sin on the entire community of believers, for, as he put it, "With one sacrilegious Eucharist a miserable sinner does more harm to the entire Christian community than all atheists put together." Considering that sin to be tantamount to a historical repetition of the treason of Judas, the Metropolitan saw yet
another, more pernicious dimension to it: it necessarily involved a priest and this, from both a spiritual and a historical standpoint, was nothing short of courting disaster.

"For, if a sacrilege committed by a common Christian who does not know his catechism is a terrible misfortune for the entire community and people, then with what a weight does the burden of the treason of Judas bear down upon an entire people when it has been committed by a priest?

This crime is a thousand times more terrifying than the other; it is such a misfortune for an entire people that its consequences are more difficult to overcome than the consequences of a bloody war."

Likewise, priests were reminded that, in carrying out their clandestine ministry, they were exposed not only to personal risk; whenever they carried the presanctified gifts on their person and failed to take the appropriate precautions to avoid discovery, they exposed Jesus Christ to a dishonor "even worse than the insults dealt by atheists."

d. Linkage: the sufferings of war are brought on by sin

The chief source of social turmoil at this time, Sheptytsky recognized, was the war. But in analyzing the situation with all its attendant human suffering, the Metropolitan went beyond its immediately observable aspects and focussed on its deeper, spiritual backdrop. From a theological perspective, the Metropolitan saw the state of war as intimately connected with human sinfulness and human responsibility. Writing to monastic superiors in March, 1940, he remarked,
"When the Almighty has seen fit to send down upon our people heavy and painful crosses and experiences in the form of this World War, all of us, together and individually, are obliged to ask ourselves in a humble spirit whether we did not become the reason for that deep suffering of our entire people."

Reflecting on the tribulations of his people at the time, the Metropolitan recalled a pastoral letter he had written in 1934 titled "Who is to blame?":

"I was troubled by the thought that the reason for the sufferings of our people, sufferings which already then were plentiful,... were to a great extent caused by sins committed by us, priests. And like a nightmare, a bad dream, this thought returns to me now, as the sufferings of the innocent grow greater by the day."

Metropolitan Sheptytsky believed that there was a linkage between the historical sufferings of Ukrainian society and the rupture with God that was caused by a grave sin:

"... if the sins of men incur divine punishment on an entire people and if the penalties for those sins can become such a heavy burden that extreme suffering of the innocent along with bitter tears and relentless penitence (zhvhorstoki dila pokaiannia) by sinners become essential, then it seems that the sufferings brought onto our entire people by this war are at least in part a punishment for sins whose measure has tipped the scales."
In the equation that related the sufferings of war with human sinfulness, Sheptytsky necessarily dealt with the question of the locus of human responsibility: who bears the burden of responsibility? He approached this question by referring first of all to the specific historical context; the Galician experience was that the war had been brought in from outside and so the real question for the Greek Catholic Church was not about moral responsibility for waging a war. Rather, the sufferings of the Greek Catholics, who had neither had any hand in the outbreak of the war nor in precipitating the aggressive invasion of their land, and whom the Metropolitan therefore saw as truly innocent in that respect, raised for Sheptytsky the age-old question having to do with the problem of evil: why were the innocent being exposed to such suffering?

In his search for an answer, Sheptytsky came to the conclusion that, in this case, the cause of the suffering was spiritual, not temporal. According to the Metropolitan, the continuation of hardships due to the war was a divine punishment for grave sins. As for the questions of precisely what those grave sins were and who had incurred the wrath of God by committing them, Sheptytsky reasoned that only a grave sin or sacrilege could have been at the root of such widespread human suffering. In particular, he expressed concern that this may have taken the form of a defilement of the Eucharist by priests knowingly administering the sacrament to people in a state of mortal sin (for example, those who had usurped the Church’s land holdings on behalf of the state). Such was the gravity of that sin, to Sheptytsky’s mind, that it incurred the punishment of the entire people. For this reason, he saw an urgent need for repentance, atone-
ment and personal conversion among the clergy; in fact, he considered them as central aims of the Sobor of 1940:

"Being an act of atonement for the sins of the people and of the clergy, our Sobor must reflect on the means of correction and seek out the paths to raise the level of Christian righteousness among the people and Christian authority among the priests to such a degree that the commission of a grave sin by a priest would be an extraordinarily rare occurrence and a sacrilegious communion would be impossible."

Moreover, Sheptytsky called on the fathers of the Sobor to repent for sins and errors "with which so often we deserved God’s disfavor and wrath." Clearly of the opinion that the problem was truly far-reaching, he looked upon the Sobor as nothing less than "an examination of conscience not only of the clergy but also of the Eparchial authority." And in a similar way, the Metropolitan tried to raise awareness of this threat among the faithful, imploring the youth in particular to take care not to "expose the entire Ukrainian people to danger and to painful grief."

It is clear, then, that Metropolitan Sheptytsky saw the temporal sufferings of his people as linked to the spiritual reality of grave sin. Although grave sin may have been committed by only a few individuals, the punishment was severe, entailing as it did the collective suffering of great masses of innocent people.

The Metropolitan was convinced that the traditionally Christian society in Western Ukraine was running the risk of being transformed into an atheistic society. Since from a Christian standpoint this actual threat carried with it potentially far-reaching spiritual and
historical implications, the Metropolitan tried to handle it with all the urgency that he felt it required. In doing so, he recognized that the threat was actually twofold: on the one hand, it was an external threat followed directly from state policies that promoted and supported atheist indoctrination; on the other hand, it also proceeded from the fallible nature of man who, ever-vulnerable to sin and tested now by exceptionally harsh circumstances, could well jeopardize not only his own spiritual and historical welfare, but indeed that of an entire people. Consequently, Metropolitan Sheptytsky felt that the Church would have to go about fulfilling its social mission with a view toward countering the threat in both of its forms.
B. Guidelines for Social ethics

1. A neutral posture towards the state

Metropolitan Sheptytsky perceived the Soviet occupation of Galicia and the anti-religious stance of the new political administration as the main external threat to the Greek Catholic Church and its faithful. Consequently, the nature of the relationship that the Church would manage to strike with the state was to be of pivotal importance to his social teaching and praxis in this period.

The problem of determining the "appropriate" relationship was complicated by conflicting theoretical and practical considerations which favored either accommodation with the state or resistance.

In support of accommodation, there was the fundamental Christian duty to obey the just dictates of civil authority, to "render unto Caesar." This duty was reinforced in the immediate context by a pragmatic concern— the avoidance of persecution. While there are plenty of indications that Metropolitan Sheptytsky was personally willing to accept persecution as a cross, he was reluctant to expose his priests or the faithful to suffering that might have resulted from positions or statements made by him. Moreover, his own record under the successive administrations of Austria (1899-1914) and Poland (1923-1939), although not without exceptions, was ultimately characterized by compliance with the dictates of the state, for indeed as long as divine law was not challenged Sheptytsky preferred negotiation to confrontation.

On the other hand, the specific question in 1939 was about dealing with a political administration that officially espoused
atheism and that gave indications of its intent to enact policies hostile to the Church; when the state began to persecute citizens on the basis of their religious beliefs, did the basic Christian teaching on civic obedience continue to apply? Or, rather, was the Church allowed in such situations to defy the authority of the state and to call the faithful to resistance?

Sheptytsky’s own opposition to communism had been stated emphatically in 1936 when, a year before Pius XI’s encyclical on communism, Divini Redemptoris, he issued the pastoral titled "Nebezpeka tepe-rishnoi khvyli" (The danger of the present moment). But in 1939 the situation was very different: it was one thing to condemn communism as an ideology from a distance, and quite another to do so now that that ideology was embodied in the occupying state; at stake was the already uncertain future of the Christian community.

In his first pastoral shortly after the occupation, Sheptytsky addressed this problem:

"Our agenda is the following: we will comply with the civil authority; we will obey the laws in so far as they do not contravene the law of God; we will not meddle in politics and secular affairs, nor will we cease to work tirelessly for the Christian cause amongst our people."

The pastoral was a strong affirmation of the spiritual task of the Church, which remained unaltered by the prevailing conditions. In it, Sheptytsky called his priests to preach catechetical sermons, to lead their congregations in collective prayer and to encourage frequent confession and the teaching of catechism in the home. This intensification of the Christian life did not detract from the basic
position taken with respect to the state for, in so far as its laws were not contrary to Christian teaching, they would be obeyed. Quite clearly, the Church was at the mercy of the new régime and was in no position to engage in open hostilities or in any activities that might incite further reprisals against its members. But even such obligatory loyalty to the State was subordinated to the priority of the divine law.

Although expressed in the first weeks of the occupation, this proved to be a principle to which Sheptytsky would adhere consistently throughout this episode in the history of his Church: while the Church would remain aloof from purely political matters, Sheptytsky strongly affirmed his commitment to ensure the spiritual welfare of his Christian flock.

Situated between the poles of accommodation and resistance, Sheptytsky's approach toward the State nevertheless maintained political aloofness in that it was devoid of any politically partisan content. This perspective of a Church-state relationship in dialectical tension informed Sheptytsky's social thought during the Soviet occupation and served as a guideline for the social action of the Greek Catholic Church.

According to the principle of political aloofness, the Church would steer clear of purely secular matters which were properly the state's jurisdiction. A year later, the Sobor of 1940 reaffirmed this principle by issuing a regulation that urged priests to "avoid any appearance that /the Church/ is meddling in politics in any way." On the eve of the election of 15 December, 1940, Sheptytsky put the principle into practice; although priests were allowed to vote, he
asked them "to scupulously refrain from any influence on the people in this regard." Sheptytsky was concerned that partisan stands by priests could undermine both their pastoral work and their authority by opening them up to potential conflict with the faithful, who might not share the political views of their pastors.

The Metropolitan further reminded preachers to ensure that their sermons remained evangelical, and did not become secular speeches:

"Under the threat of a grave sin, a preacher is not permitted to add to the Gospel any purely human affirmations, nor to propagate any sort of political, national or state-related thesis, nor any personal matters, needs or hopes."

This was reaffirmed by the Sobor of 1940, which decreed:

"Even the appearance of political involvement by the clergy is to be avoided. Our task is to preach the Gospel and to lead all people to salvation. Out of complete love for our people and all our neighbors we do not meddle in any political matters."

Similarly, in February 1940, Sheptytsky forbade his priests to hang state or national banners in the churches and to name secular persons in the prayers of the liturgy. Thus, conscious efforts were made to prevent even a minimum of visible, symbolic support for the state.

Actually, political aloofness was a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it symbolized the Church’s resistance to the state which, it felt was usurping its legitimate social and spiritual authority; on the other hand, it served to check against potentially dangerous political idealism among the clergy; the Greek Catholic clergy tended
to support the anti-Soviet Ukrainian underground, but many, particularly the younger priests, went beyond more or less tacit support and were inclined towards vehemence in voicing their allegiance in public. Well aware of this, and of the possible consequences for the Church as a whole, Sheptytsky took pains to discourage ill-conceived moves that might have rendered the situation more volatile than it already was.

In order to counter the external threat of state repression Metropolitan Sheptytsky proposed for his Church an approach that balanced political neutrality with social commitment. This approach was to a great extent dictated by the prevailing dynamics of power: the Church could not afford to risk further reprisals from a hostile state that held the military and administrative instruments of power; at the same time, however, the Church did enjoy widespread public support and Sheptytsky could count on that support to back up his appeals for religious liberty.

The Metropolitan proposed a very similar approach for the internal life of the Church, and it is to his guidelines on that subject that we now turn.
2. Social sensitivity in the work of the Church

Metropolitan Sheptytsky considered the Church to have a social role that extended beyond spiritually-founded exhortations to an ethical critique. His view of the Church was that, in its capacity as teacher of morality as well as of the faith, it was not detached from but integrated with society and was actively concerned with social relations. Thus, among the Metropolitan's key reasons for convoking the Sobor of 1940 was that he felt it was necessary "for the Church not only to live and act but also to set the norms for relations among people."

The way that the Church was to carry out its assisting and critical role in respect to social ethics, according to Sheptytsky, was by balancing sensitivity and commitment to the needs of the people, and discernment of the characteristic traits and shortcomings of the people. These concerns were primarily addressed to the Greek Catholic priests whose work was at the center of the social program of the Church.

Sensitivity to the needs of the people meant, first of all, an attentiveness to historical context. In adhering to political aloofness, the Metropolitan felt that sermons should be free from political content. But at the same time, it was still important to apply Gospel teachings to the context and needs of the times. It was a positive feature in a priest when he quickly grasped the needs of the people and was able to apply his teachings to those needs, for

"Whoever would ignore the changed times and would preach today as he did ten or twenty years ago would probably be lacking in that trait."
And while Sheptytsky recognized that human nature remained constant and that therefore a good sermon on the Gospel had universal applicability, he still stressed the importance of "remembering the needs of the people, in their specific time and in their specific parish." Far from suggesting a watering-down of the gospel teaching, this meant that the appropriate teachings had to be selected to suit the needs of the context. Thus,

"In order for a sermon to be applicable to the needs of the times and of the people, it should elevate those truths which at that given moment people need more... It is necessary to explain those truths which are useful for successfully overcoming the flaws of the present moment."

Along the same line, he tried to inspire the Sobor of 1940 with a sensitivity to contextually specific needs:

"The decrees of the Eparchial Sobor have to be so suited to the needs of space, time and the nature of the people and the clergy that it is impossible to find anywhere a scheme of laws which could be transplanted verbatim into our eparchy. Some decisions which might be very beneficial and necessary in German or Italian eparchies would be unnecessary and perhaps even detrimental in our circumstances."

Secondly, sensitivity to the needs of the people required a living contact with them. Pastors were instructed to consult with and confide in a selected group of their parishioners:

"It is inconceivable for a pastor not to speak with pious parishioners about his sorrows and about this terrible task
which he must fulfil, and not to seek their assistance! It is inconceivable because without that assistance the pastor cannot fulfil his duties well."

In the Metropolitan’s view, the pastor actually needed that contact with the people, inasmuch as he felt that dialogue with parishioners was an essential precondition of good pastoral work.

Thirdly, social sensitivity required an element of tactfulness and respect for the hardships of the faithful. Thus, in addressing the problem of wartime apathy with regard to work, Sheptytsky deliberately refrained from personally giving advice to the faithful out of respect for the fact that truly extreme difficulties had driven some of them to despair. Similarly, tactfulness was to be observed in delivering sermons; at all costs, priests were to avoid using them as a vehicle for reproaching the faithful or, for that matter, to make personal remarks of any sort.

"A sinner to whom a given teaching is directed should apply the teaching to himself. When the preacher does this, he can do harm to the sinner or discourage him. There is no such danger when the sinner applies the teaching to himself."

The best sources to follow in maintaining a social sensitivity were the scriptures and tradition. Thus, if priests were not to chastise, it was because the word of God, the divine truths themselves "chastise like thunder"; and if priests were to avoid relying too heavily on their own perceptions of social needs, then it was because the teachings of the Church contained all of the necessary guidelines to enlighten a social ministry. Little was to be gained through mere
moralizing, Sheptytsky maintained, even when the faith itself was threatened. What people needed was the light of the faith and this meant that a priest had to focus attention on the gospel teachings and to deepen his life of prayer with the daily office, in which

"...he will find the response to all his needs, to the pains and needs of the family as well as the source of its sorrows and afflictions; he will find the needs of the entire people in all its affairs and aspirations; its hopes, its future, its power and glory; he will find all the instruments of pastoral work and of influence upon the people; he will find the obedience and respect of the parishioners, their needs and the way to respond to them, and sometimes he will even find a word that will provide themes for his best sermons."

The needs of society, finally, included also matters that were addressed through social philanthropy. The Church of course had already been involved in this sphere of activity prior to the war, but Metropolitan Sheptytsky realized that, in a time of general shortages and rationing, those in need of social assistance were in even greater difficulty as, for example, widows, orphans, the elderly, the ill and the various organizations and institutions that provided assistance to them.

Such, then, was the element of commitment and sensitivity to needs in Sheptytsky's social ethics. Balanced with it was a social critique that revolved around the identification of ethical shortcomings in society and an attempt to suggest ways to correct them. In setting the groundwork for the Sobor of 1940, the Metropolitan
reminded his priests of the corrective function of sobors:

"The point of every sobor is to correct faults and to raise the level of virtue and the religious life. No one can know better than you, Reverend Fathers, what are the deficiencies and faults amongst our people and by what means those flaws might be removed."

And indeed, once the Sobor was in session, this social concern was prominent in its proceedings. In the decree "On the Confession of the Universal Faith", for example, it was resolved that the Sobor should promote

"...work towards the correction and the accomplishment of our life and our pastoral work; work on the task of repentance for ourselves and the people; an act of correcting the errors of our work and the errors, or perhaps vices in the life of the people."

Yet when it came to the problem of apostates and collaborators with the régime, Sheptytsky refrained from harsh criticism, recognizing that their decisions and acts may well have been carried out under duress. Thus, when referring to "the rare exceptions who betrayed the Church and their people" by voting to close the monasteries, the Metropolitan also made an effort to see them in their context:

"In reality, the matter was decided under circumstances in which, fearing for their lives, the delegates /to the People's Assembly/ did not realize that they had become the blind instruments of our enemies and that through their decision, which was perhaps not very conscious and not very
free, they dealt a heavy blow to our Church and our 70 people."

It is significant that Metropolitan Sheptytsky did not condemn apostates and collaborators with the Soviet occupation. Rather, he showed an appreciation of the moral predicament of Christian deputies who had adapted to communist rule: rather than condemning what under almost any other conditions would have been considered a blow against the Church, to those who had injured the Church he left open the path to reconciliation.

The elements of the Church’s social mission examined here — an attentiveness to the needs of the people and the needs of the times — reflected the tenuous situation of the Church under the Soviet occupation. Attentiveness to needs required priests to find ways of communicating the gospel message so that it would reach the people regardless of the obstacles. To that end, the Metropolitan tried to cultivate an effective preaching and social ministry that would combine Christian teaching with social sensitivity.
C. Praxis: The social role of the Church in responding to the Occupation

The specific threat that the Soviet occupation posed for the Church was structural; it was feared that institutionalized atheism might replace the institutional Church. At the same time, the Greek Catholic community faced the threat of internal erosion through apostasy. Metropolitan Sheptytsky therefore sought ways to defend religious liberty against the State's atheist and anti-Church policy and, at the same time, to counter some of its effects by intensifying the internal Christian life of his spiritual flock. However, the means available to him were necessarily limited, since virtually all executive power was concentrated in the hands of the civil authorities. Metropolitan Sheptytsky's responses to the new situation included lawful measures and other measures which, in the eyes of the authorities, were illegal. This twofold approach reflects the opposite poles of accommodation and resistance between which the Church articulated its position toward the State.

In the present section, these two patterns of response are studied with a view toward shedding further light on the formative role of the Church-state relationship on Metropolitan Sheptytsky's social ethics at this time.

1. Patterns of accommodation

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's accommodating responses to the occupation occurred at two levels: in the Church's external relationship with the state and in the internal life of the Church itself. In relation to the state, this pattern was evident in his
attempts to secure religious liberty while remaining strictly within
the framework of Soviet legality. A similar accommodating pattern of
response was integrated into the internal life of the Church, where
traditional structures and practices were modified to suit the needs
of the moment.

a. Church-State: efforts to secure religious freedom

i. Appeals to constitutional provisions

In his appeal for religious liberty, Metropolitan Sheptytsky
found some support in the Soviet constitution of 1936. Article 123 of
this document contained the following statement of religious policy:
"In order to safeguard the freedom of conscience of citizens, the
Church is separated from the State and schools are separated from the
Church." Sheptytsky saw the reference to freedom of conscience in the
preamble as crucial to the interests of the Church, which wanted to
intensify Christian community life and to take a firm stand in defence
of religious freedom before the civil authorities.

Accordingly, in February 1940, he cited this constitutional
guarantee as a guarantee of freedom of worship and understood it to
permit the establishment of religious brotherhoods and other church
organizations, and later repeated this in a pastoral letter to the
clergy:

"We certainly must avail ourselves of the constitutionally-
guaranteed freedoms of conscience and of worship, and orga-
nize our parishes in the best possible way, beginning with
the organization of brotherhoods."
In April 1940, Sheptytsky declared that he intended to request permission from the Soviets to establish a pastoral ministry for those who had been resettled in lands to the east of Galicia. Evidently, he was assuming that the state might consider such a request permissible under the constitution. Similarly, in December 1940, Sheptytsky reminded Greek Catholic priests that in countering atheist propaganda they should make use of all the religious rights granted by the Soviet constitution. And in a letter to the education official Zharchenko, protesting against atheist propaganda in the schools (discussed below), Sheptytsky repeatedly referred to the provisions and guarantees of Stalin's constitution.

From such references, it may appear that Sheptytsky had a favorable opinion of the Soviet constitution of 1936. However, after the withdrawal of Soviet forces in the summer of 1941, he gave a more candid appraisal of the true situation than had been possible during the occupation:

"They even gave religious denominations a measure of the 'freedom of religion' that Stalin's constitution guaranteed; but the very notion of that liberty was so narrowly-conceived that it went hand-in-hand with an altogether formal persecution of the mere name 'Christian.'"

As well, in a situation report to Cardinal Tisserant of the Congregation for the Eastern Church, Sheptytsky referred to the "quasi-constitution of Stalin" and again pointed out that it was being contravened in practice by anti-religious propaganda. In that same report, he went on to say:

"Clearly, we did not recognize the Soviet regime as a
legitimate authority (pouvoir légal) since their methods, which were hostile in the extreme towards the entire population, contained nothing of what constitutes the minimal conditions of a legal power. Accordingly, we never mentioned the /civil/ authority in our liturgical services. That did not prevent me from declaring publicly that we submit to the just dictates of this quasi-power — that is, those dictates which were not contrary to divine law.

The Metropolitan therefore had no illusions about the legitimacy of the Soviet constitution as a legal instrument any more than he did about the legitimacy of the Soviet occupation. Under the Soviet occupation, however, the Church's critical capacity in social affairs was constantly being weighed against the pressing question of the survival of the Christian community, which remained the first priority. In light of that fundamental concern, the resort to strict Soviet legality was in effect nothing more than an attempt to establish a solid footing from which appeals and protests against the repression of religion could be launched.

It was specifically and exclusively under the repressive conditions of the occupation that Sheptytsky regarded the Soviet constitutional guarantee of freedom of conscience as a necessary and useful instrument through which the Church could voice its concern for religious liberty and mount an opposition to anti-religious propaganda; supported by provisions of the constitution, the argument for religious liberty was at least formally exempt from charges of disloyalty to the state. The necessity for such caution was self-evident from the context; the Metropolitan's approach responsibly avoided inciting the
State to further actions against the Church and the faithful.

Unfortunately, the constitutionally-based argument did not result in any change in state policy and Metropolitan Sheptytsky therefore undertook more forceful representations in the cause of religious liberty.

ii. The letter of protest against atheism in the schools

In accordance with Soviet education policy, schools in occupied Western Ukraine were subjected to reforms that replaced religious instruction with atheist doctrine, and catechists (mostly priests and nuns) with non-Christian teachers and administrators. This policy was therefore not merely a question of secularization and deconfessionalization of the education system - it went hand-in-hand with the active promotion of anti-religious attitudes. In addition to the schools, various youth organizations (such as the Soviet "Pioneers") cultivated attitudes that were hostile to a religious worldview.

Troubled by such a state of affairs, Sheptytsky in March 1940 wrote a letter of protest to the head of the District Department of Public Education in Lviv, Zharchenko. Invoking the constitutional guarantee of freedom of conscience and worship, the document defended the right of religious freedom.

In the first place, Sheptytsky argued that the constitutional guarantee applied to children as much as it did to adults. From this, it followed that schools were likewise bound by the duty to respect the freedom to fulfil one's religious obligations. Similarly, parents had the right to transmit their faith to their children and the right to demand that the school carry out those wishes or, at
least, not interfere with them by attacking a child's religion. However, the Metropolitan observed that the practical implementation of the freedom of conscience in occupied Western Ukraine left much to be desired:

"Although freedom of conscience is guaranteed by the constitution, it is interpreted in the schools of Western Ukraine in such a way that the school restricts the freedom of children and punishes those who wish to pray. This appears to indicate that certain individuals in the school system are attempting to deviate from the direction set forth by the Constitution, and this necessarily undermines respect for the authority of the Constitution among parents and Western Ukrainian society at large."

The appointment of non-Christians as teachers and principals was another unwelcome change which "placed the school at odds with the strong Christian tradition of the Ukrainian people." This too, Sheptytsky felt, would have the consequence of pitting the people against the education authorities and, by extension, would also harm the "prestige of the Soviet regime."

Sheptytsky was thus arguing for consistency between the provisions of the constitution and the religious education in Western Ukraine; in pointing out the contradiction between theory and practice, his argument avoided polemics and ideologically-based rhetoric, but instead addressed the interest of the state to consolidate its power. Knowing this to be a major concern of the civil authority, the Metropolitan argued that the popular support which it sought would only emerge when people would see the practical implementation of
constitutional guarantees:

"It is evident that our society will respect the Constitution and will grow stronger in that respect for and trust in the Soviet government when that government will stop tolerating blatantly anti-constitutional initiatives in every aspect of its administration of this land including, in this case, education."

In order to promote fidelity to the constitution by the education authorities, Sheptytsky further proposed a democratization of the educational system; parents, he felt, deserved a greater measure of influence in the running of schools, which in turn would then be less prone to thwart efforts to provide religious instruction for school children.

Sheptytsky's letter to Zharchenko epitomized the stand of the Greek Catholic Church toward the Soviet occupation. The argument developed in it was an attempt to place the concerns of the Church for religious freedom squarely on the political agenda by connecting them with the needs of the state - public loyalty to the constitution and, by extension, to the régime. To earn the loyalty of its Christian citizens, the state and all its organs would have to respect their religious rights.

iii. Protest against the suppression of monasteries

On October 27, 1939, the members of a newly-formed "People's Assembly" ("Narodni Zbory") passed a resolution to liquidate monasteries and to seize their land-holdings. There were also indications that the same sanction would be applied to individual parish
lands. Sheptytsky protested vehemently against this action, arguing that it abused the rights of the Church. In March, 1940, he referred to this move as a grave injury and an affront to the Church, as a "flagrantly illegal" decision coming from "an assembly which considered itself to be comprised of representatives of the entire population." And in a decree of the Sobor of 1940, he denounced the decision of the People's Assembly as invalid:

"This decision, in so far as it is contrary to divine law and the rights of the Church, has no legal force; it entails spiritual penalties for those who participated in it and those who stand to gain by it; and it requires restitution for the damage done." /Emphasis added/.

The confiscation of church property disregarded the basic and legitimate needs of the priests and the faithful. The state had already withdrawn other means of subsistence from the clergy (i.e., salaries) and now, Sheptytsky argued, it was proceeding to do the same with an indispensable source of their income. Nor were the consequences of such a policy limited to the priests: because of the social aspect of parish ministry, the sequestration of parish lands also injured the entire Christian community which needed its spiritual ministers and which had toiled to build and maintain places of worship. Sheptytsky's argument, although it was an outright challenge to the legality of the decision of the People's Assembly, still was formulated within the framework of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the Church.
These representations before the state on behalf of the Church were the legitimate means employed by Metropolitan Sheptytsky in his attempt to restore religious freedom. His appeals progressed in intensity from the straightforward request that the state respect its own fundamental law, through to protest against the promotion of atheism in the schools and the outright rejection of the legality of the decision to suppress monasteries.

At this external level of the Church's interaction with the state, that is, in official and public statements, Metropolitan Sheptytsky necessarily adopted an accommodating posture. In order to make forceful the appeals for religious liberty he needed— at least temporarily and pro forma—to set aside any questioning of the legitimacy of the Soviet administration in Western Ukraine and work instead within the framework of the Soviet constitution and Soviet law. A similar pattern of accommodation to the new socio-political conditions occurred in the internal life of the Church, and is examined in the following section.
b. Internal life of the Church: Adaptation

The Soviet suppression of the Greek Catholic Church's activity forced Metropolitan Sheptytsky to make certain adaptations in the internal life of the Church, in much the same way as he had followed a pattern of accommodation in relation to the state. We will examine two instances of adaptation within the Church, structural reorientation and ritual accommodation, and then draw out some of the operative principles that guided Sheptytsky's ethical reasoning in this area.

i. Structural reorientation and adaptation

The restraints imposed on the Church by the Soviet occupation led Metropolitan Sheptytsky to introduce a new measure of flexibility into the structure of the Greek Catholic Church. As the Metropolitan charted out the parameters of church activity under the Soviet occupation, this structural flexibility was particularly evident in two areas: a loosening of some rules regarding the clergy and the allocation of new tasks.

The relaxing of rules respecting the clergy was in direct response to the difficult situation. The invasion had eroded the ranks of the Greek Catholic clergy; fearing for their lives, many fled their parishes. By the end of the occupation, their numbers would reach almost 100. The Metropolitan tried initially to stem the flow of this exodus with a hard-line approach; in January, 1940, the chancery office issued two directives censuring those priests who had departed without official leave and promising to publish their names in the forthcoming issue of the eparchial organ, L'ujus'ki Arkhiiepar
Khial'ni Vidomosti. But, as the Soviets consolidated their authority
in the area in the occupied territory and as the plight of the Church worsened, it became clear that a more understanding approach was needed. In a report to the Vatican after the Soviet withdrawal, Sheptytsky described the gravity of the situation and the human psychological dimension of the problem which, in his view, overrode canonical obedience and required instead that the Church exercise tolerance:

"...first of all a word in defence of those who by fleeing the Bolsheviks abandoned their parish ministry. We lost almost one hundred priests in this way; among them, few had a chance to ask my permission to leave. I did not refuse /permission/ to anyone /who asked for it/, for my experience from the very beginning /of the occupation/ showed me that even without great fault a very good priest could do some very foolish things out of fear. I saw some very good priests who completely lost their balance and who practically no longer knew what they were doing. It was therefore preferable in every respect to let them go."

In a similar way, Sheptytsky instructed monastic superiors to exercise lenience in dealing with those monks and nuns who were forced to leave their monasteries:

"As long as it will remain possible to do so, monasteries or cloisters will continue to support orphanages, kindergartens, schools and other institutions. In proportion as this becomes impossible because of external circumstances, superiors shall permit monks and nuns either to leave the monastery with a full dispensation from all the duties of
monastic life or to live /ie., as religious, a.k./ outside
the monastery and in civilian clothes."

Structural adaptation involved the introduction of new structures
to assist the Church in addressing the spiritual needs of the
faithful, needs that were aggravated by the shortage of priests and by
the interruption of communication links. In answering to the growing
need for new priests, Sheptytsky instituted new courses in theology to
be given by local priests, and supplemented them with lessons circu-
lated in the organ of the Archeparchy and with lectures in the arch-
bishop’s residence. As well, a more immediate solution was available
to make up for deceased or departed parish priests:

"Fortunately, we were able to replace them with monastic
priests – Basilians, Redemptorists and Studites – as well as
by catechists who had lost their employment in the schools.
In this way, parish work continued without much of a
change."

In further support of work at the parish level, Sheptytsky also pro-
moted lay participation through parish organizations and lay brother-
hoods.

To overcome the problem of internal communication, Metropolitan
Sheptytsky instituted regular weekly meetings of the clergy in the
archepiscopal residence. In May, 1940, these meetings were trans-
formed into a "sobor," or diocesan synod, that dealt with a variety
of theological and pastoral questions and issued decrees and regula-
tions. Other means used to maintain communication links included an
underground network of couriers by which messages were transmitted to
and from the Archbishop’s chancery.
Finally, in order to extend financial assistance to the needy, the Metropolitan authorized pastors to disburse funds from parish treasuries to that end.

ii. accomodation of ritual practices

The war and the occupation gave rise to new ethical problems in the area of ritual worship. Metropolitan Sheptytsky found himself facing an array of special situations that, under the exceptional circumstances, forced him to rethink many traditional practices and to allow for considerable adaptation. For one thing, access to confession by a priest became difficult. Sheptytsky recognized that the usual requirement of a priest was often impossible to fulfill, thus forcing some accommodation:

"It is becoming common for Christians to find themselves in a situation where they may die without a final confession. Whether in the army, or on the battlefield, or far away from priests or in a hospital /ie., from which priests were barred, a.k./ any one of you may find yourself dying without the opportunity of receiving absolution from a priest. In such a case, the most important thing is to know how to awaken in the soul a perfect act of contrition and thereby return into divine grace even without a confession."

The Metropolitan devoted an entire pastoral to the topic, explaining the essence of an act of contrition and giving examples of prayers that might accompany it.

When priests attending the Sobor of 1940 concelebrated a liturgy, Sheptytsky felt that ablutions became chaotic and as such a potential
source of offence to the faithful; they were therefore to be dispensed with. Sheptytsky justified this by citing the liturgical principle, according to which

"Every liturgical prescription, if it does not relate to the liturgical essence of the service, ceases to oblige and must not be followed when that would cause a scandal to the faithful, as is always the case with every confusion of ritual."

Other accommodations waived restrictions that governed the celebration of the Divine Liturgy. With a view to ensuring the subsistence of priests, Sheptytsky allowed pastors to dedicate Sunday and feast day liturgies to individuals who made offerings (i.e., rather than to the parish, as was the customary practice). And in cases where a reasonably large number of parishioners were unable to attend the morning liturgy because of work on Sundays and religious holidays, permission was given to serve a second liturgy in the afternoon, as long as that liturgy was joined with a vesper service and the pastor observed a proper fast, as required by the Eastern tradition.

A variety of special dispensations were issued. During Lent, those who lived in student residences (bursy) or other institutions (i.e., those who ate in a collective setting) were exempted from fasting and, since dairy products were in short supply, it was permitted to substitute lard for butter. Furthermore, parish priests were authorized to confer other dispensations on an individual basis, as the need arose. The forcible expulsion of monks into the world and the persecution of priests required greater lenience with respect to clerical or monastic attire. Sheptytsky therefore directed monastic
superiors to allow religious who wished to remain faithful to their vows in the world to wear civilian clothing.

When the impossibility of resupplying wine and candle-wax threatened to cut short liturgical services, the Metropolitan urged to use both sparingly; accordingly, only two candles would be lit after the Liturgy of the Word and then extinguished immediately after the Eucharist. Later, when wax became altogether scarce, the chancery issued special provisions that allowed for substitutes such as vegetable oil or butter. With regard to wine shortages, some priests inquired whether it was permissible to administer the Eucharist under only one species (i.e., contrary to Eastern liturgical tradition); Sheptytsky replied that it was preferable to do so rather than to deprive a parish of liturgies for what risked turning out to be a long time. However, he also emphasized the importance of explaining to the faithful that such changes did not represent a permanent transformation of the rite, but that they were merely a temporary measure dictated by the prevailing circumstances.

Ritual accommodation also extended beyond the Greek Catholic community and included the question of administering sacraments to Orthodox believers. Soldiers from the occupying Red Army occasionally attended Greek Catholic liturgies and wished to receive communion. Sheptytsky urged priests to administer the sacrament even when the man before them was in uniform (i.e., likely to be an Orthodox); he reasoned that such persons could also be Catholic and should have the benefit of the doubt.

It was another matter altogether when an Orthodox Christian identified himself as such to the priest before the liturgy and re-
quested to receive communion. In such a case, the priest first had to hear the person's confession and to ask whether he had permission from his own ecclesiastical authorities to receive the sacraments in a Catholic church. The purpose of such precautions, the Metropolitan explained, was "so that the Eucharist, administered without any reservation and contrary to the prescriptions of ecclesiastical rules, would not confirm an Orthodox person in denominational indifference." On the one hand, withholding sacraments could well alienate an Orthodox believer from the Catholic fold for the rest of his life, while, on the other hand, a more caring approach would both "help his soul and draw him into the Catholic Church." In that case, Sheptytsky thought it necessary to overrule the prohibiting canon by invoking the principle "when the reason of a law ceases, then its binding force ceases also" (Cessante rationale legis, cessat lex ipsa).

This decision was part of a longer discussion of the applicability of the Roman Catholic prohibition on administering the sacrament of Penance to the Orthodox. Sheptytsky admitted that in so far as the canon had nothing to do with the ritual aspect of sacraments (i.e., it did not touch on the particularities that distinguish Eastern and Western practices) it was also applicable in the East. However, he also noted that in some cases a rigid adherence to that prescription could do more harm than good, both to the individual and to the Church.

"In a certain sense, there is here as in other cases a conflict between two laws: the law of the Church and the Law of God, that is, love of neighbor. According to Aristotle, epikeia is like a correction of the law which, because of
its universality, may err in some particular case. Roman law contrasts what is *aequum* with what is required by *ius strictum*. And for that reason people regard *aequitatem* (or, as we would call it, 'benevolent proportionality') as a virtue and situate it between justice and love. Another well-known saying is: *Sumnum ius, summa injuria*. That saying has a complete and full application whenever the positive law is contradicted by natural law... The wise use of that quasi-custom of the natural law is the virtue which ancient theologians used to call *gnome*. That virtue enlightens the use of graciousness and benevolence (*laskavosty i zych-lyvosty*), in matters of justice."

Sheptytsky felt that the Christian duty of fraternal love was fulfilled in various historical instances: by Aristotle, Roman law, ancient theology and popular wisdom. All of these represented a line of ethical reflection on *epikeia-aequitas* according to which human positive law was not the final word but needed to be tempered with love. Thus, Sheptytsky’s view of Christian ethical reflection was that it involved correcting laws that contravened the divine law of fraternal love.

iii. guiding principles

In exercising structural and ritual adaptability, Metropolitan Sheptytsky showed himself well able to transcend strict legality and to exercise lenience in responding to issues and problems.

The structural modifications that he introduced indicated that,
regardless of the damages sustained by the Church, no effort would be spared to ensure that its work was maintained; the focus of attention was therefore not formal and disciplinary (e.g., chastising priests who had left), but practical and aimed toward replacing them. In addition, as a social organism, the Church would expand its activity by encouraging a greater measure of lay participation. Modifications of the liturgical tradition were not taken lightly in 1939-1941, and Metropolitan Sheptytsky showed considerable sensitivity in his readiness to accommodate the practical needs of the situation, over and above the requirements of ritual practice.

An even more flexible ethical approach was evident in the Metropolitan's accommodation in matters of ritual. In the first place, the overall priority was to seek that which could unite people with the Church rather than alienate them from it, without encouraging denominational indifference through excessive liberalism toward the Orthodox. Secondly, in cases of conflict, as natural law always took precedence over positive law, so too did gospel teachings override canons of church law. Finally, epiteia, or "benevolent proportionality", served as a corrective device that came into play whenever the strict application of law threatened to divorce justice from love.

The aim of such mollifying structural and ritual changes appears to have been to sustain the faith of the Christian community despite the prevailing difficulties. By maintaining its ministry to the people even during the occupation, the Church addressed both their spiritual and social aspirations.
2. Patterns of Resistance
   a. Church-state: civil disobedience

   Metropolitan Sheptytsky sought to counter the secularizing effect of sovietization on the Greek Catholic community by reinforcing the Church's commitment to its specifically spiritual task. In the face of the régime's attempts to reduce the Church's role in society, he therefore undertook to maintain its pastoral and sacramental ministry, beyond the limits of the state's narrowly-conceived notion.

   In the foregoing discussion, it was suggested that Metropolitan Sheptytsky's resistance to the Soviet state cannot be seen in isolation, but that in so far as it was developed out of a concern for the survival of the Church, it was qualified by a degree of accommodation. In the present section, we examine the pattern of resistance as it emerged in the Church's attitude toward the state and in the internal life of the Christian community.

   In Sheptytsky's application, resistance to the state proceeded from the principle of political aloofness and, far from being a simple matter of refuting communism, was always characterized by a great degree of subtlety of reasoning and sensitivity to potential consequences.

   Sheptytsky's forceful protest against the suppression of monasteries, although staying as we have seen formally within the limits of the law, was at the same time a defiant rejection of the usurpation of the Church's authority by the state.

   Sheptytsky did not overlook the importance and value of ritual symbolism as a vehicle for conveying defiance and forging solidarity among the faithful; hence, the omission from the liturgy of prayers
for the state or its representatives. Also, priests were instructed to refuse to comply with requests to hang state banners in their churches. Liturgically attentive churchgoers would not have missed the implicit, yet powerful message that the Church thus communicated about its opposition to the Soviet state.

Another pastoral area in which the directives of the state were to be challenged was the ministry to the dying in hospitals. Under Soviet occupation, priests were prohibited to enter hospitals to hear confessions or administer the Eucharist and last rites. The state treated the administration of sacraments in hospitals as a crime punishable by six months in prison. Against this restriction, the Metropolitan protested to the government in Kiev, charging that the dying in Soviet hospitals were being treated worse than prisoners on death row throughout Europe - the latter could rest assured that their last wishes would be respected. In addition, the Metropolitan felt that the hospital ministry was an essential duty of the Church. And so, seeing that his protest had fallen on deaf ears, Sheptytsky decided to defy the ban and promote that ministry. Thus, Greek Catholic priests carried out a clandestine hospital ministry in civilian dress, were assisted by religious nurses, and were supported by the Metropolitan who even gave instructions regarding precautions to be taken in order to avoid discovery by the occupying authorities.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky did not limit his critique of Soviet legality to the legislative sphere. Equally dissatisfied with the judiciary, he invoked the Code of Justinian (Byzantine law) and authorized ecclesiastical tribunals to undertake and settle civil matters in the Archeeparchy such as disputes and contracts. The Metropolitan felt that such tribunals should be conducted with due
circumspection, "so that the Soviet government will have no grounds on which to cite us for impeding the work of the courts which it has established or to consider our ecclesiastical court illegal." As it turned out, the prevailing chaos prevented the church tribunals from coming into force, but the official statement by Sheptytsky nevertheless revealed his readiness at that time to follow Byzantine precedent and to extend the Church's administration into areas where the civil administration had been found wanting.

b. The internal life of the Church

i. renewed emphasis on the spiritual dimension of Christian life

In responding to the Soviet measures against organized religion, Metropolitan Sheptytsky devoted special attention in his social teaching and praxis to the internal dimension of the Christian life. This in turn had an impact on the institutional life of the Church which underwent a process of turning inward. The internalization process occurred at two levels: at the individual and corporate level of the Church as a community of faith and at the structural level of the Church as an institution. It should nevertheless be clear that when Sheptytsky emphasized internal, spiritual values over external appearances, the theme did not represent an innovation in his thinking; it had existed in his writings ever since his accession to the episcopacy, and merely acquired a new urgency and emphasis under the Soviet occupation.

Sheptytsky's renewed emphasis on the spiritual dimension of the Christian life indicated the internal focus of Christian piety and
prayer. In December 1939, he addressed the Ukrainian student youth on
the subject of the Eucharist and reminded them that a good preparation
for the sacrament consists of "approaching Jesus Christ not in order
to be observed by others, nor out of habit, nor even because others
are doing so, but only in order to obtain His holy grace."

Discussing the question of administering the Eucharist to
infants, Sheptytsky reasoned that not only was the practice part of
the Eastern tradition, but that it was truer to the spiritual meaning
of the Eucharist itself than were other practices which tended to
focus on external effects:

"In my opinion, a few or even several communions adminis-
tered to a child before school-age, when children usually
receive communion, are much more valuable than the external
festivities of the so-called 'First Communion'. Those fest-
tivities are played up in France to such a degree largely
because the majority of the children will never again return
for a second communion. So the priests want to leave them
with at least that souvenir for the rest of their lives and
surround that First Communion with the aura of festivity,
white dresses, candles with flowers, etc... Parents who
worry about their 8- or 9-year-old's First Communion are
often more concerned with showing off their child and her
dress before the whole community, and less with the
communion. And the clergy adapts itself to them."

Nor were priests exempt from such reminders; in an exhortation to
the clergy, Sheptytsky chided those who said the divine office per-
functorily:
"...the divine office, when it is performed without enthusiasm, without warmth and love, without the concentration /skuplenia/ which is necessary in prayer, and without any depth of mystical thought—what does it give? But when it is said conscientiously, attentively, it brings countless benefits..."

Such reminders were of course valid in any context as guidelines for the Christian life of priests and the faithful, but during the Soviet occupation this inward turning to integral Christianity also had the function of sustaining the faith of the Christian community. Thus, when the state prohibited public prayers in the schools, the Metropolitan urged school children to dispense with the "external /i.e., visible; a.k./) practices that normally accompany prayer" and to silently pray on their way to school.

The priority of the internal, spiritual dimension was a necessary feature in the religious life of monastic communities, and Metropolitan Sheptytsky strove to see to it that, undaunted by the Soviet occupation, that feature would be maintained in Greek Catholic religious communities. Accordingly, when monks and nuns in Soviet-occupied Galicia were forced to vacate their monasteries, Sheptytsky directed superiors to allow them to wear civilian clothing (i.e., without considering this to be an ipso facto termination of their religious life). The Metropolitan reasoned that "it is not monastic attire that makes a person a monk or a nun, but a spirit of humility, of prayer, of selfless love and work for one's neighbor." He later developed the same point further in an address to those religious who chose to continue to live according to their vocation in the changed
circumstances. The Metropolitan wrote:

"Let them remember that a monk or a nun is not constituted by monastic clothing, nor by the monastery in which they live, nor by the community of brothers and sisters, nor even by the way of life which has more to do with the external adherence to one or another daily schedule or custom. A person who is living according to the Gospel teachings, that is, a monk or a nun, a brother or a sister, is moved by the internal disposition of the soul and by the will to compete in an endless struggle with the passions, in order to become more perfect and more like Christ the Saviour every day."

(Emphasis added).

In a theological discourse at the closing of the Sobor of 1940, Sheptytsky made a point of contrasting the "internal practicality of divine love" with the external practicality of pastoral prudence, placing the former above the latter in order of precedence. Apparently a number of priests had criticized some of the decisions of the Sobor as being overly theoretical and lacking in practical value. To this, the Metropolitan replied,

"The regulations of the Sobor are not so theoretical as not to be of great practical importance for pastoral work and of even greater importance for the priestly life and priestly virtues. It is possible and, I think, necessary to distinguish here between external practicality, that is, the practicality of /our/ external work and internal practicality, which is the practicality of virtues and the spiritual life."
By emphasizing the internal dimension of the Christian life in his writings during the Soviet occupation, Sheptytsky was not merely repeating a theme already solidly present within his catechetical and spiritual writings. Rather, he was attempting to articulate its continued relevance even during times of extreme social and ecclesiastical tribulation. And though some Greek Catholic priests may have preferred for the Church to have adopted a more prophetic, confrontational posture toward the prevailing conditions and the state, Metropolitan Sheptytsky clearly opted for fidelity within the Christian life; the Church would indeed carry on its social and sacramental ministry, but nor would it neglect to ground its internal life in prayer and virtue. Thus, as the Church turned inward structurally, taking perhaps the first steps toward becoming an underground Church, it also began to turn inward in its life as a community of believers.

The process of internalization centered on the linkage between the Christian spiritual life and Christian duty in the world. That linkage was clearly expressed by the Sobor of 1941. In the 12 regulations devoted to spirituality and Christian piety, the Sobor drew a crucial distinction between true piety ("which leads to the happy fulfilment of even the least pleasant of duties") and false devotion ("which neglects the most important duties and merely seeks pleasure in religion"). The distinction, hinging as it did on the pivotal criterion of duty, was an eloquent testimony to the effect that the operative notion of the Christian life within the Greek Catholic Church under Soviet occupation did not separate but, on the contrary, integrated spirituality with duty in the world.

The process of internalization, with its emphasis on the spiri-
tual life, therefore did not entail a withdrawal from the world, but rather it was an intensification of the Christian commitment to social duty in the struggle for justice.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's preferred mode of articulating social ethics during the harsh conditions of Soviet occupation was therefore through a discourse that focussed on virtue. This enabled him to spell out the duties of Christians in a deontological language, balancing the needs of the specific context with the unchanging requirements of the Christian life of faith. We now turn to specific duties about which Sheptytsky reminded his clergy and faithful.

ii. the reinforcement of duties in relation to external conditions

Concerned with the possibility of massive apostasy from the Church that could result from the state's concerted promotion of atheism, Metropolitan Sheptytsky set out to consolidate the available human resources within the Church and to reinforce commitment to specific tasks. He focussed special attention on his priests, calling them to be steadfast in spite of the threat of persecution. Secondly, he looked for support to the faithful and the state-secularized religious who, in many instances, could carry out tasks that had become difficult or impossible for priests.

If there is a single duty that stands out above all others which Sheptytsky stressed to his priests at this time, it is the duty to preach and teach catechism. As we have seen, Sheptytsky felt very strongly that the principle of political aloofness was to be strictly adhered to at the pulpit. In addition to that concern, Sheptytsky now
addressed the problem of priests who, for fear of punishment by the state, were neglecting sermons. In order to counter that tendency, the Metropolitan adopted a hard line, warning that such priests would face ecclesiastical sanctions to the full force of canon law:

"I consider the omission of four sermons in a month to be a grave transgression which will incur canonical sanctions and the loss of a parish. In accordance with canonical obedience, I require tireless effort on the part of pastors in order to ensure that all children shall be taught catechism. Any priest who does not devote at least four hours of every week to that end I consider a careless and unworthy priest."

When in the following month reports continued to reach the Metropolitan to the effect that some priests were still neglecting to preach, he reiterated his position and promised to publicize any such complaints from the faithful. Moreover, any priest who failed within a specified period to justify his inactivity would be canonically censured.

However, the severity of the punishment was not absolute; the Regulations of the Sobor of 1940 listed canonically acceptable exemptions, such as: illness, a legitimate dispensation from the chancery office, an extended leave of absence from the eparchy or, most significantly, "circumstances that make even a short sermon impossible." This was an explicit recognition of the harsh situation, of the many obstacles faced by priests and of the need in such cases to permit of an exception. However it is equally clear that, as far as the basic duty of every priest to preach and teach the faith
was concerned, Sheptytsky was adamant in insisting that that fundamental task had to be taken seriously.

The added emphasis on the fulfilment of priestly duty begs the question of the scope of the perceived problem: whether there actually were many who neglected their preaching ministry. Doubtless there were some – we do have indications of complaints by parishioners, and it is known that some priests fled their parishes when the Soviets invaded the land. But the majority stayed and the urgency of the duty in Sheptytsky’s mind was more likely due to the actual threat of atheism and its anticipated social consequences. This is borne out by other instances where the Metropolitan emphasized the fulfilment of priestly duty, such as his encouragement of the hospital ministry and his plan to send a group of priests to serve Greek Catholics deported east. In neither case was Sheptytsky responding to a lack of resolve among the clergy; on the contrary, his exhortation was clearly an attempt to come to terms with what he believed to be a considerable threat to society, a threat which no longer was imminent but actual.

Prior to the Soviet occupation there had been no such interference in the internal affairs of the Church, and priests were allowed to perform their fundamental duties. But now sacerdotal functions were deemed criminal offences punishable by law, creating a situation that put the social role of the Church to the test. Sheptytsky stood up for the right of the Church to exercise that role and vigorously upheld the place of priests in that undertaking. In his view, the priestly duty remained constant even in the face of adversity.

In fact, Sheptytsky was modulating his discourse on the duties of priests: as the new conditions required proportionally greater courage
and commitment to duty, so too did the Metropolitan try to evoke that commitment with proportionally greater fervor. Furthermore, he consciously applied the notion of proportionally incremented duty to himself, hoping that this would set an example and inspire his priests to do likewise:

"According to a principle which seemed to me to be well-founded though also paradoxical, while the circumstances became less favorable I tried to develop a line of action that was all the more extensive and to draw into such work the clergy who quite often were demoralized and, in any event, terrified."

Indeed, despite formidable obstacles during the Soviet occupation, the Metropolitan continued to issue pastoral letters and instructions to the clergy and the faithful.

The same notion of proportional duty also appeared in Sheptytsky’s pastoral letter to the faithful in November, 1939. In it, he wrote:

"In some areas the Bolshevik authority does not permit us /i.e., priests/ into the schools and we are unable to reach many people and to properly instruct them in the divine teachings. Therefore the duty of parents – to ensure that their children are well raised and instructed from infancy in the truths of the faith – increases. As your spiritual pastor, I remind you of this grave duty towards children, a duty which with every passing day becomes greater."

(Emphasis added).
The duty to preach and teach was proportionally greater during the Soviet occupation because of the "greater needs of the present moment" and the greater difficulty in fulfilling the task. For, the Metropolitan pointed out, Ukrainian children needed religious education all the more now that, having been deprived of it, they were subjected to "harmful and dangerous" guardians. In turn, the task of priests was considerably more difficult in that, barred from the schools, they could no longer teach children in groups but could only try to reach them individually.

In the light of such difficulties, the Sobor of 1940 permitted and even encouraged priests to give over some of their catechetical work to parents.

As early as in October, 1939, in his first pastoral after the Soviet invasion, Sheptytsky had singled out the catechization of children as the main duty of priests. And because of its importance, that duty would encompass the entire Christian community:

"We will employ the more exemplary Christians, older boys and girls, for the teaching of catechism in the homes. I impart upon everyone the mission to teach religion. Every pastor shall instruct several heads of families how to baptize children so that, in the absence of a priest, they would be able to properly baptize a newborn infant with water."

In Sheptytsky's thought the Greek Catholic community, an organic social unit, was characterized by shared, collective duties. Normally, these duties were distributed primarily among the priests and, secondarily, among the faithful. When the Soviet occupation interfered with
the efforts of priests to fulfil their task, that task still remained unchanged. The solution therefore lay in the proportional allocation of tasks to the faithful. Obviously this did not include all of the duties of priests, but it nevertheless covered a relatively broad range of activity: from catechism in the homes to baptism, from religious nurses in the hospitals to clandestine couriers in the streets, Sheptytsky attempted to maintain as much as possible the day-to-day tasks of a socially-minded Greek Catholic Church. The hope that such activity could be successful rested, it appears, on the premise that the Christian community was an organic social unity and that wherever the political circumstances prevented one segment, the clergy, from safely performing its tasks, the faithful could be counted on to pick up the slack.

The special focus on the shared duties of the entire Christian community was rooted in a theological concern for salvation and overcoming the consequences of sin. Those aims could only be achieved through a dynamic cooperation and sharing of duties between the clergy and the faithful. In this connection, Sheptytsky affirmed that one of the aims of the Sobor of 1940 was

"... to take account of the means of improving, that is, of how we priests can fulfil our pastoral duties toward you /the faithful/ more correctly and more perfectly, and how through our work we can help you to correct the sins which make your salvation difficult or even impossible to achieve. We also want to help you to raise yourselves out of all those sins into which you are falling and to give you the assistance /that will enable you/ to better serve the Lord in the future by fulfilling all the duties of the Christian
life." (Emphasis added).

The patterns of resistance that are evident in both the Church's posture toward the state and in its internal, spiritual life further reflect the influence of socio-political reality upon Metropolitan Sheptytsky's social ethics. Both in civil disobedience and through the intensification of the Church's teaching ministry, Sheptytsky asserted the Christian identity and adopted as hard a line as was possible under the circumstances.
D. Conclusion

From the Metropolitan's Christian perspective, the fundamental social struggle during the Soviet occupation of Galicia was between the occupation authority which tried to establish an atheistic social order and the Church which was committed to maintaining its traditional role in Ukrainian society. The Metropolitan's concern with maintaining the Christian foundations of the social order even under communist occupation required a more differentiated approach than that which he had expressed in his denunciation of communist collaboration only three years before. The situation had changed dramatically; it was no longer a matter of merely a few agitators seeking a consolidation of the Left and recruiting Christians, but of war and a military occupation with the power to fundamentally alter the conditions of the existence of the Church.

In responding to this situation, Metropolitan Sheptytsky followed a differentiated approach, combining what we have referred to as patterns of accommodation and of resistance, both externally, in dealing with the civil power, and internally, in trying to maintain the work of the Church in society.

From the moment of the Soviet takeover of Galicia, Sheptytsky looked upon the new reality as a fait accompli and, consequently, he personally refrained and discouraged others from assuming a posture of open confrontation or of symbolic protest toward the occupation. The priority was to maintain and, in response to the social crisis that the occupation represented, to intensify the spiritual work of the Church. From that perspective, it was crucial to avoid exposing the Church to further sanctions. Thus, if the Metropolitan appealed for religious freedom and protested against the abuse of that freedom, he did so within the strict legality of
the Soviet constitution and without entering into the question of the legitimacy of Soviet rule. At the same time, when Soviet measures and prohibitions violated the Church’s understanding of its duty to minister to the people, the Metropolitan quietly ignored those prohibitions.

The same non-confrontational commitment to fundamental duty was developed for the internal life of the Church. Although vital administrative and communication links within the Church had been severed, the Metropolitan was firmly resolved that the work of the Church for souls should go on. He exhorted his priests to continue preaching and ministering, and he invited lay people to assist them in their catechetical work. They were to do so with due caution, above all avoiding any semblance of political provocation. In the process of expanding the work of the Church to compensate for the prevailing obstacles, whatever changes were deemed necessary to ensure that the faithful were not deprived of a pastoral and sacramental ministry were put into place. For, seeing the Christian basis of Ukrainian society threatened to its core, the Metropolitan showed that, in order to fulfill its spiritual duty toward the people, the Church was able and ready to adapt structurally and ritually in ways that were unthinkable in peace-time.
CHAPTER 5: METROPOLITAN SHEPTYTSKY'S SOCIAL TEACHING AND PRAXIS
DURING THE NAZI OCCUPATION OF GALICIA (1941-1944)

A. Assessments of the Situation

The transition from the Soviet to the Nazi occupation in Western Ukraine was swift; Soviet forces withdrew from L'viv on 29 June, 1941, and were replaced by German forces on the following day. That change brought with it new social issues to which Metropolitan Sheptytsky tried to develop Christian ethical responses. In order to understand those responses, it is necessary first to consider Sheptytsky's empirical and theological interpretation of the period.

1. Empirical Assessment

In coming to terms with the new situation, Metropolitan Sheptytsky considered a number of factors which, in turn, shaped his social thought and activity during the three-year German occupation. First, as in the beginning of the Soviet occupation, the Metropolitan looked at the policy of the state toward the Greek Catholic Church and society in Western Ukraine. Second, the expulsion of the Soviets was far from definitive and, until the situation became more stabilized, the possibility of their return was perceived as a very real threat. And third, perhaps the single most urgent social issue that Sheptytsky saw in this period was the unprecedented scale and frequency of acts of violence, perpetrated both by the occupying forces and by the local population; this too gave a specific thrust to Sheptytsky's social thought and activity at that time. In this section, we will examine each of these three empirical considerations which entered into Metropolitan Sheptytsky's appraisal of the situation under the German occupation.
a. Nazi policy toward the Church and Ukrainian society

The policy of the Nazi occupation authorities toward the Ukrainian Catholic Church consisted of a complex intermingling of permissions and restrictions: quite simply, what they gave with one hand they took back with the other. It did not take Metropolitan Sheptytsky long to see through this duplicity.

On July 18, 1941, the municipal authorities of L'viv decided to return to the Archeparchy land holdings that had been confiscated by the Soviet authorities. However, this was an exception rather than the rule; rural lands confiscated by the Soviets were still deemed to be the property of the German state. Since the Ukrainian Catholic clergy depended in large part on the land for their subsistence, the Metropolitan complained that, because the German state withheld such properties, "the endowment of the clergy is practically reduced to what the poor can spare." The German government did pay out a voluntary subsidy to the Ukrainian clergy (amounting to 50 Reichsmark per month) but again, Metropolitan Sheptytsky remarked, this was really an empty gesture ("une démonstration politique") rather than real assistance; indeed, a 25% tax was to be imposed on that subsidy.

Beyond the financial side of things, Metropolitan Sheptytsky looked closely at other aspects of German policy toward the Church. Aware of the Reich's anti-Catholic legislation inside Germany, he noted in August, 1942 that such measures had "not yet" been imposed in Galicia. In fact, many changes seemed to represent a real improvement on the conditions under Soviet rule. Thus,

"Priests are allowed to teach catechism to children in the schools. There is not yet very much meddling in sermons and
parish administration. There is a desire to regulate marriages, but not in a way that is contrary to canon law... Seminaries are allowed to be reopened... I am permitted to print the official organ of the diocese every month... I was able to convocate a diocesan synod which, with long intervals, is lasting almost a whole year... The monasteries are being reorganized little by little."

At the same time, the new situation was not all positive; as the Metropolitan put it, "all of this is far from sufficient to outweigh the nameless demoralization to which the poor and the weak are exposed." Indeed, embedded within the very same text (quite likely as a precautionary measure to avoid censorship), Sheptytsky included a more critical appraisal:

"There are attempts to harass the clergy, like all citizens, through the requirement of passports, permits and all manner of regulations restricting civil liberties that one could possibly imagine... the threat of a real persecution is with us constantly, like: sword of Damocles above our heads... /pastoral letters and instructions/ are confiscated for the most futile reasons in the world."

Far from seeing the situation as stable, Metropolitan Sheptytsky took account of various other forms of harassment and arrests of the clergy that were taking place. In addition to these, he noted that Ukrainian Catholic priests were prohibited access to hospitalized Soviet prisoners of war in Eastern Ukraine in order to administer sacraments. As well, priests were prohibited from baptizing Jews. And, despite
the renewed publication of the official organ of the archdiocese and
the possibility of writing full-length pastoral letters (which under
the Soviet occupation had been reduced to seldom more than a page or
two in length), random confiscations continued and a system of censor-
ship was put into place by the German authorities. Thus, as had been
the case under the Soviet occupation, Metropolitan Sheptytsky con-
tinued to regard his diocesan synods as the single most reliable
vehicle for internal communication with his priests.

External communication, though less restricted than in the prece-
ding period, was nevertheless an area in which Sheptytsky exercised
cautions: some of his letters to the pope were now addressed directly
to the Vatican rather than to a go-between, but the Metropolitan still
took precautions against abusing this restored privilege. On one
occasion, he chose not to publish a letter of the pope, because he
felt that it would be confiscated and he noted as well that, under the
guise of religious toleration, the German state was actually promoting
religious fractionization.

Nor was the Church alone in being subjected to restrictions; the
population at large fell victim to Nazi repression. In the first
place, this meant that much of the fallout of the Soviet occupation
was carried over into the new situation. The democratic process re-
mained in abeyance as long as political parties, many of which had
been dissolved during the Soviet occupation, continued to be prohi-
bited under the Nazis. Similarly, properties that had been confis-
cated by the Soviets were retained by the German occupation authori-
ties, notwithstanding their pronouncements to the contrary. In many
instances, the families of those who had been arrested or deported by
the Soviets still had had no word from their loved ones as late as a
year after the Soviet withdrawal. Observing all of this, Sheptytsky lamented that the Nazis, far from bringing about any of the anticipated changes "are perpetuating, extending and entrenching the Bolshevik system."

Apart from maintaining much of the Soviet status quo, the Nazi occupation also brought measures of its own, which were a matter of great concern to the Metropolitan. In the first days of the occupation, leading Ukrainian political activists were arrested and incarcerated. German policy was especially harsh in the Galician countryside where, Sheptyts'kyy noted,

"... a régime of slavery has been imposed upon the rural population; practically all their young people are rounded up and forced to go to Germany to work in factories or on farms. Whatever the peasants produce is taken away and they are required to double their production. The penalty for buying or selling directly with the producers is death."

Above and beyond the deportations and being pushed to produce impossible quantities of food for the war effort, peasants were subjected to such unprecedented violence and abuse by the police and other organs of the state that Metropolitan Sheptytsky could "scarcely believe that such characters as one encounters are possible. And yet they are real."

The continuing priority of the war effort entailed food shortages and an inflated cost of living for the local population; the ranks of the poor in Western Ukraine swelled and many starved. Even those who had formerly been reasonably well-off, the Metropolitan noticed, found themselves exposed to poverty and hunger.
b. Fear of a Soviet return

Another social factor that Sheptytsky took account of and which shaped his ethical decision-making was the public perception of the situation. After the termination of the twenty-two-month period of Soviet rule, with all of its deleterious consequences for Ukrainian society as a whole and the Church in particular, there was a concern with consolidating this "post-Soviet" order. And though it was the Nazis who had moved in with their own priorities and plans, the support that they enjoyed among the Ukrainians of Galicia generally stemmed less from an unqualified support for National Socialism than it did from the continuing fear of a Soviet return. Sheptytsky was well aware of this factor and, in a pastoral letter of 10 August, 1943, he exhorted the Ukrainian youth to "remember that every disorder in our land benefits the communists and can be exploited for their councils or for the provocations of their agents."

Throughout the Nazi period, Sheptytsky remained attuned to this atmosphere of fear that had penetrated the fabric of Ukrainian society. Those fears were heightened in February, 1943, when, after the German defeat at Stalingrad, the Soviets launched their westward counteroffensive. As the Soviet advance continued, Sheptytsky's reports to the Vatican reflected concern for the safety of the civilian population as well as of the clergy.
c. Violence

The initial sense of freedom that resulted from the Soviet withdrawal was short-lived, and soon a system was in place in which violence was the order of the day. In a letter to the pope, Sheptytsky reported:

"Today the entire country agrees that the German régime is, perhaps even more than the Bolshevik régime, evil and almost diabolical. For at least a year now, scarcely a day has passed without the most horrible crimes, assassinations, robberies, pillage, confiscations and upheavals."

Sheptytsky was appalled by the violence that occurred almost daily: massacres of Jews, with a death toll that he estimated at 23 200,000 in the first year; indiscriminate arrests and shootings some of which, the Metropolitan believed, were aimed at the extermination 24 25 of Ukrainians and Poles; and the killing of priests. Describing the public beatings and murders that had become commonplace by August, 1942, Sheptytsky lamented, "It is very simply as though a band of madmen or of raging wolves had swept down upon this poor people."

As the violence began to spread beyond the German military forces, it became difficult identify its perpetrators; underground resistance groups of various ethnic and ideological affiliations emerged and as a result it was seldom possible to ascribe responsibility for individual instances of violence with any degree of certainty. What became shockingly clear to the Metropolitan in the course of time was that, between the pressures exerted on Ukrainian society by the German occupation forces and the enduring fear of a Soviet return, there were Ukrainians who took part in acts of violence. As a pastor, Sheptytsky felt obligated to address that problem.
2. Theological Interpretation

Reviewing the massive scale of human suffering in the land, Metropolitan Sheptytsky tried to assess the theological significance of what was happening. He did so by focussing special attention on the suffering that was brought on by violence. Behind the harsh material suffering of his people, Sheptytsky saw "even worse suffering of the soul." He expressed alarm at the demoralization of society, the symptoms of which he saw in such things as: the breakdown of the family, the uncertainty of life and the imminence of death, general despair, weariness of life and the dissolution of hope in a better future.

But if this description of the spiritual degeneration of society seemed to hark back to his analysis of the situation under Soviet rule, it differed from the earlier experience in at least one important respect. According to Sheptytsky, the breakdown of the family, with all its attendant grief and worries was not merely the result of external factors - as had been the case with Soviet arrests and deportations of husbands and fathers. Under the German occupation, Sheptytsky felt that an internal factor had also come into play, namely the ingratitude of children and the shame of parents for their children's behavior. And by "shameful behavior" Sheptytsky specifically meant acts of homicide:

"With what heartache must parents look upon their children, once the pride and joy of their family but who have now become a heavy cross and a painful source of shame! What a pain it must be for a father to see his own son stained with innocent blood and to see neighbors and friends turn
Thus, for Metropolitan Sheptytsky the violence that came with the German occupation and which had already infected his own people was more than a matter of individual guilt for individual acts; at the spiritual level, blood guilt jeopardized the entire Christian community and was felt in the very heart of the Christian social order—the family.

Although the institutional life of the Church was less threatened now than it had been under the Soviets, the fabric of society and, in particular, the Christian foundations of society were undermined; as in the preceding period of occupation, Sheptytsky felt that he was seeing the demoralization of society. He considered one of the worst instances of this social degeneration to be the luring of local youth into German militia units, since "the German authorities made use of such militia units to achieve their perverse goals."

In the face of overwhelming historical forces, the predominant feeling was that, on its own, the local Church was powerless to stem the tide of violence. The Metropolitan felt that, in these times, hope and support were to be sought in the higher authority of divine providence:

"Considering that everything is already permitted to the Germans, their rage will not be abated, and there will be no power by which even the least amount of discipline could be imposed upon them. We therefore expect that this whole land will again be deluged by waves of innocent blood, unless some extraordinary event should stop the flow of events.

The only possible consolation in these terrible times
is /knowing/ that nothing happens to us unless our Heavenly 
31
Father wills it."

Similarly, in grappling with the slaughter of masses of people, parti-
cularly Jews, and in trying somehow to understand its spiritual impli-
cations, Sheptytsky concluded that the souls of non-Christians and 
Christians alike could only be entrusted to divine providence:

"I think that among the many massacred Jews many souls 
converted to God, for in centuries they have never faced as 
they now do the likelihood of a violent death; often entire 
months /pass/ before their death is carried out. The fate of 
Christians, of whom hundreds of thousands are either dead or 
dying without the sacraments, is also in the hands of 
32
God."

Another external source of spiritual support was the papacy, and 
writing to Pope Pius XII, the Metropolitan asked for his apostolic 
blessing for the Ukrainian Catholics who, as he put it, "are suffering 
so much and who are exposed to great dangers and even greater 
33
scandals."

The violence and killing, along with other attendant occurrences 
indicated what Sheptytsky saw as symptomatic of the moral degeneration 
of society. He noted that the commonfolk and the weak, driven to 
desperation, "are actually learning to steal and to commit murder; 
34
they are losing their sense of justice and humanity." And although 
he did press repeatedly for a stop to the violence, the Metropolitan 
felt that his interventions were "nothing compared to the rising tides 
of moral impurity which are flooding the whole land."
For Sheptytsky, this demoralization had a fundamental ethical significance: it carried with it the curse of Cain, through which human nature was fundamentally altered, degenerated, spoiled and abased; in this manner, human nature was brought lower than that of a wild animal. As before, the Metropolitan focussed not only on the evil of individual acts of murder, but also on their social implications. For, indeed, repeated occurrences of murder affected an entire people, in whose midst the murderers remained. In light of this, Sheptytsky expressed concern for the future of the Ukrainian people. The crimes of a few risked causing the suffering of many.

Moreover, whoever committed a homicide exposed themselves to the vengeance of the "historical Nemesis," and would be held accountable at "the hour of justice and punishment." For murder was "a terrible crime that draws damnation from the heavens upon the soul and leaves upon the body the stain of innocent blood;" it "calls to the heavens for revenge." In broader, socio-historical terms, that vengeance could affect the chances of an early end to the war; as for himself, the Metropolitan could not foresee a resolution of the armed conflict before the spiritual crisis had been addressed:

"Whoever observes the incredible audacity of those who every day continue to violate the divine law and in particular the fifth commandment with incredible scandal for the common-folk, easily become persuaded to expect the gravest penalties. To a certain extent, everyone almost daily thinks they foresee the end of the war, but they have no basis for thinking so other than the ardent desire that the scandals should cease."
The social implications of the widespread occurrence of homicide were also carried over into the ecumenical sphere. In particular, when new violence broke out that was directed against priests, Metropolitan Sheptytsky condemned it not only as an attack upon the institutional Church, but also as an offence against Christian unity. As he saw it, the murder of priests could not but stir latent inter-denominational tensions:

"...the Orthodox may blame such killings /i.e., of their priests/ on Catholics and thereby may be tempted to hate the Universal Church and lose sight of any possibility of the reunion of the Eastern Church with the Western Church.

When the priests of one rite die, as it would appear, for the cause of the faithful of another rite, then the fraternal love which should unite all Christians is exposed to great danger. Whoever aggravates the disunity between the two denominations which are already in ecclesiastical schism 44 harms the Church and wounds it deeply."

In the very same way, anticlerical violence was capable of undermining fraternal relations between Greek and Roman Catholics:

Whoever divides and disunites two Catholic denominations which differ only in rite and who thereby imposes grief, offence and /incites/ hatred toward the faithful of another rite, deals a heavy blow to the Church's most essential 45 attribute: all-encompassing fraternal love."

In the end, then, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was convinced that the real ethical challenge that Christians were facing was that of remaining faithful to the commandments and to Christian righteousness. From a
Christian standpoint, this path was the only security that human relations, from the family to society and international relations, could be maintained in a spirit of harmony and order. Without these basic elements, the moral foundation of human social relations was undermined, and the inevitable consequence would be a continuation of the chaos and violence:

"Let no one among us follow the modern political or social slogans which, supposedly in the name of the national good, dare to withdraw God's commandments as inapplicable or detrimental to our life. How many times in history have we seen, and continue to see, what becomes of people who, out of pride and malice, break the tablets of God's commandments and replace them with their own arbitrary will! How often we have seen, and continue to see, what happens when the notion of justice — which is the basis of all Christian righteousness — is removed from interpersonal and international relations. All of human culture, all of the achievements of the human mind and heart accumulated over the ages will be brought down and ruined. There will be chaos and barbarism. There will be neither any moral order nor law. The law will be anarchy (samovolja) and the rule of the strong over the weak."
B. General principles

Responding to the continuing social crisis brought on by the war and the Nazi occupation, Metropolitan Sheptytsky applied Christian teaching at two levels of the Church's social life: its external relations with society and its internal life as a Christian community.

1. Principles guiding the Church's external relations with society

In its external relations with secular society, the Ukrainian Catholic Church first of all had to deal with the wartime Nazi administration. The precise nature of the Church's relationship with the occupying regime was a crucial moment in the history of that Church's social teaching and activity. We will therefore examine the ethical reflection that informed Metropolitan Sheptytsky's view of that relationship, and then turn to a consideration of his ethical views on the Church's relation to Ukrainian society under Nazi rule.

a. The Church's relationship with the occupying German regime

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's position toward the German regime during its occupation of Galicia evolved with time. On the basis of available documentary sources, it is possible to identify three distinct perceptions that Sheptytsky had of the Nazi occupation and, consequently, of three successive postures that he adopted toward the state. In what was perhaps the most dramatic political about-face of his entire career, the Metropolitan started out with an initially positive perception of the German takeover as a liberation, then later became more critical of certain aspects of German policy, and finally voiced and acted on a fundamental opposition to the Nazi régime. In
order to better understand this shift of attitude and policy toward the state, each of the three phases is examined individually, for in each of them religious and socio-political factors were intertwined with the ethical principles that informed Sheptytsky's changing position toward the German state.

1. Initial welcome

In the first place, Sheptytsky welcomed the arrival of the Germans in Galicia. In the days that followed the takeover, the Metropolitan issued two key documents: on July 1, 1941, a pastoral letter in which he welcomed the proclamation of the independent Ukrainian state and also greeted the Germans as "liberators"; and four days later, on July 5, a second pastoral that greeted the "victorious German army," expressed "gratitude for the liberation from the enemy," and which called priests to lead their parishes in a song of salutation (mnoholitstvua) for the "victorious German army" at the end of liturgies.

This initially favorable response was, in part, due to religious and political considerations. From a religious standpoint, the change from Soviet to the German occupation meant first of all that the Greek Catholic Church in Western Ukraine was rid of official atheism, and Sheptytsky fully expected that, under the Germans, Ukrainian Catholics would enjoy a greater measure of religious liberty. And, in fact, those expectations were fulfilled to a degree, as the Germans allowed the Greek Catholic Church to renew some of its activity, which the Soviets had suppressed. Second, as he had done in the first days of the Soviet occupation, so too now under German rule Sheptytsky reiterated the principle of "rendering unto Caesar" and called his
people to "submit obediently to the just dictates of the state." 49 Third, as the German forces continued their advance into eastern Ukraine, Sheptytsky clearly saw this as opening up opportunities for church unity by way of an eastward expansion of Catholicism. In addition to this concern for religious freedom and ecclesiastical unification, the sense of liberation from Soviet rule was also tied closely to the political aspirations of Ukrainians, who expected Germany to heed their requests for political autonomy. Metropolitan Sheptytsky shared those hopes and would participate in various representations to the German government in that matter. Both from a religious and a political point of view, then, Metropolitan Sheptytsky initially perceived the new situation as basically a liberation, and he greeted the German presence accordingly.

Along with the religious and political considerations that entered into the accommodating stance, there was also an ethical backdrop. Thus, the Metropolitan spelled out two key conditions on which Christian obedience to civil authority would depend. The first was that the state not contravene any divine laws:

"The sacrifices which are absolutely necessary in order to achieve our goal /i.e., independent statehood/ will, first of all, consist of obedient submission to the just dictates of /the civil/ authority, which are not contrary to divine law." 52

The second condition was an egalitarian principle which could serve as a criterion for judging the wisdom and justice of civil leadership and civil dictates:

"From the government that has been called into being /by
Yaroslav Stets’ko/ we expect wise and just leadership, and
dictates which would take into consideration the needs and
the welfare of all the citizens inhabiting our land,
regardless of the religious, ethnic or social group to which
they may belong.*

In effect, respect for divine laws and equality before the law were,
in Sheptytsky’s thought, two constitutive elements of the "just
dictates" and "wise leadership" which Christians were required to
obey. The implicit, critical aspect of these conditions was that, when
they were not met, the Christian citizen ceased to be bound by civil
obedience.

Although these two conditions were spelled out in a document
addressed to the Ukrainian people on the occasion of the declaration
of Ukrainian statehood and did not refer specifically to the German
regime, there can be no doubt that they were intended to apply to the
occupation authority as well. For Sheptytsky was speaking about the
nature of the civil authority that Christians were bound to obey, and
there is no reason to believe that his conditions on civil obedience
would have been elaborated any differently in respect to the Germans.
On the contrary, the Metropolitan later did indeed apply the same
criteria — adherence to divine law and non-discrimination — to the
German authorities.

These careful qualifications on loyalty to the state came into
play mere months after the German takeover, as the Metropolitan became
better informed of the true intentions of the Nazis; but their mention
already in the first days of the German occupation, and the Metropo-
litav’s subsequent change of heart regarding the Germans, suggest that his welcome to the "liberators" was actually a tentative and conditional accommodation to the new situation rather than wholehearted support for Nazi Germany, its ideology and its policies.

ii. Emergent Critique

As German policy began to reveal Hitler’s intentions, however, Sheptytsky’s favorable attitude became more critical. When Ukrainian hopes for autonomy were dashed by the annexation of Western Ukraine into the Generalgouvernement (on August 1, 1941) and by the arrests of Ukrainian political activists, Metropolitan Sheptytsky joined the voices of protest. Similarly, despite official obstruction, he made efforts to send priests into eastern Ukraine.

In this transitional period, during which he became critical of the German occupation and even drew some parallels between it and the time of Soviet rule, Sheptytsky still stopped short of totally breaking with Germany. This may be attributed to two key factors: first, the reluctance to jeopardize the limited religious freedom under German rule which, at the very least, was an improvement on the conditions of the Church under Soviet rule; and second, the fear of a Soviet return, which was prevalent in Galicia at the time and which necessarily continued to orient much Western Ukrainian political sentiment toward Germany.

Yet, on the basis of Christian ethics, Sheptytsky also began to develop a critical stance. In 1942, he issued two key documents that spelled out his ethical views on the situation under German rule. The main ethical problem, as he saw it, centred on the Christian commitment to protect human life. Accordingly, in his pastoral "Pro mylo-
serdia" (On Christian charity), Sheptytsky declared that when human life was imperiled (as it was under the Nazi occupation), even the principle of private property was necessarily subordinated to the Christian duty to save life. Indeed, following the example of Christ, that duty went so far as to include placing one's own life at risk for the sake of another. The sanctity of human life was given an even more forceful expression in the pastoral "Ne Ubyj" (Thou shalt not kill); in it, the Metropolitan condemned various forms of homicide, including state-sanctioned summary executions.

In themselves, of course, these statements simply restated the Christian standard of respect for human life; but their timing in Nazi-occupied Galicia added a further, contextual meaning. For one thing, they showed that, in spite of the religious and political concerns that seemed to favor German-Ukrainian harmony, Metropolitan Sheptytsky did not lose sight of Christian ethical concerns; indeed, the latter took precedence over political concerns. The statement of Christian ethical principles also indicated Sheptytsky's critical capacity and readiness to challenge the legitimacy of German policy when that policy contravened divine laws. And although this ethically critical stance was directed to Ukrainian Catholics rather than to the German authorities, it marked the beginning of a process that would culminate in the Ukrainian Catholic Church's defiance of German laws.

iii. Resistance

Finally, Sheptytsky became convinced that the German state was inherently evil ("almost diabolical") and worse even than the Soviet régime. According to his own account, he arrived at this opinion a
considerable time before his August 29-31, 1942 letter to Pope Pius XII, when he first dared to go on record with a condemnation of the occupation. As the policy of systematic violence and extermination became evident, Sheptytsky criticized it as contrary to the Christian law of love:

"This system of lies, of deceit, of injustice, of pillage, a caricature of every idea of civilization and order; this system of egoism exaggerated to the absurd, of totally crazed national chauvinism, of hatred of all that is beautiful and good, this system constitutes something so phenomenal that one's first reaction at the sight of this monster is dumbfounded amazement. Where will this system lead the unfortunate German people? This can be nothing but the degeneration of the human race such as has never before been witnessed in history."

This marked the final stage of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's evolving views on the German régime and it was a position that was consolidated and hardened by subsequent events; indeed, after the outbreak of new violence in 1943, Sheptytsky actually looked forward to the return of the Soviets who, he hoped, would at least be able to restore peace and order. In a letter to the Vatican in March, 1944, the Metropolitan wrote, "the arrival of the Bolsheviks will perhaps be beneficial in the sense that it will put an end to the anarchy that now prevails throughout the land."

These, then, were the three successive positions from which Sheptytsky approached his relations with the German occupying regime.
Although religious and political factors were at play in the progression from one stage to the next, they were ultimately overridden by ethical principles. Accommodation to and acceptance of the occupation had, in part, resulted from the favorable interpretation of the German invasion, whose immediate effect was the expulsion of the Soviets and which was seen as consolidating the first steps toward the political autonomy of Western Ukraine. At the same time, the promise of conditional civic obedience hinged on "just dictates," that is, it required that the dictates of the state respect divine laws and the equality of all citizens. In the next stage, which was characterized by a critique of certain German policies through direct representations before the authorities, the Metropolitan took issue with the German disregard for Ukrainian political aspirations and Ukrainian Catholic efforts to achieve church unity. But, more importantly, his critical posture was ethically informed in that it applied the Christian conditions on civic loyalty to the actual situation at hand; the result was a condemnation of state-sanctioned violence and an affirmation of the Christian duty to defend the sanctity of human life. The final stage—resistance in the form of non-violent civil disobedience, notably through the organization of illegal sanctuary and escape operations for Jews—had neither political nor religious underpinnings. It served neither the purpose of Ukrainian independence nor the eastward expansion of Catholicism, but was simply the result of the application of Christian ethics into practice. By opposing the official policy of deportation and extermination of Jews in both word and deed, Sheptytsky led the way for those Ukrainian Catholics who were prepared to risk their lives in order to hide, shelter or smuggle the fugitives to safety.
As in the preceding Soviet period, Metropolitan Sheptytsky initially adopted a position of qualified submission and obedience toward the German occupation authorities. However, whereas we have noted concurrent patterns of accommodation and resistance in the Church's activity during the Soviet occupation, in the period of the Nazi occupation Metropolitan Sheptytsky's position toward the state and his social action underwent a definitive shift from accommodation to resistance. Although political and ecclesiastical concerns did enter into that shift, they were not the decisive factor; the shift was ultimately grounded in Christian ethical reasoning and, in fact, can only be understood in light of that ethical reasoning.

b. The Church's relation to Ukrainian society: nationbuilding and the principles of statehood

Catholic social teaching on the principles of the state had a very particular, contextual thrust in Western Ukraine in 1941. The fall of Poland in 1939 and, two years later, the withdrawal of Soviet forces gave rise to new hopes for Ukrainian autonomy and culminated in the declaration of and independent Ukrainian state. Thus, the Ukrainian political struggle entered a new phase. The Ukrainian Catholic Church identified with and endorsed that historical process and Metropolitan Sheptytsky felt that the situation called for reflection on the Christian ethical principles that ought to guide nation-building.

The Ukrainian national ideal was the creation of a viable, native, national homeland (piddna vsenatsionalna'na Khata-Bat'kiv-


shchyla). The crucial element was viability, and although as a human construct the nation-state was certainly not to be confused with natural organisms, in its ideal form it was to reflect very closely the organic life observable in nature. Necessarily, then, the prime focus of nationbuilding was to be placed on the consolidation of inner strength, solidarity and social unity. As for external obstacles to nationbuilding, Sheptytsky felt that they could only be left up to God, in whose hands was the destiny of nations. From a Christian standpoint, the way to nationhood was through internal regeneration. Accordingly, the Church would spell out the social ethics and thereby cultivate the social conditions that were necessary to sustain a viable national entity:

"The task of the Ukrainian people will consist of creating such Christian social conditions as would guarantee real and lasting happiness to citizens and would have sufficient internal strength to overcome the centrifugal tendencies of internal disintegration and to successfully defend the borders from enemies outside. The motherland can be just such a powerful guarantor of happiness to all its citizens only when it will not be a whole that is comprised artificially of many and various parts but when it is an organism similar to a monolith; that is, a body which is animated by one spirit; which develops out of its own inner vitality; which compensates for (dopouniuiue) its own deficiencies; which is naturally healthy, strong, and aware of its aims; and which is not only a material but /also/ a moral body."

At the time of writing the 1941 pastoral, "Idealom nashoho
naisional’noho zhyttia," it appeared to Metropolitan Sheptytsky that "divine providence will give the Ukrainian people a chance to fulfill their natural right—to choose and establish a system of government for their homeland." It was therefore necessary to see to it that the Ukrainian people would exercise that right "wisely and as Christians." In order to do so, they would have to understand and live by the Christian principles of sovereign authority, which Sheptytsky summarized in five points:

1. (political) authority is from God because it is the natural consequence of the (God-given) social nature of humanity;

2. authority resides within the nature of an entire people, not within any individual person;

3. a people may choose its own system of government (monarchy, oligarchy, democracy) and reserves the right to participate in the political process through elections, plebiscites or referenda;

4. the aim of civil authority is to serve the public welfare and to uphold the freedoms of its citizens, and it therefore enacts laws that are just (i.e., conforming to divine law and the common good) and establishes an impartial and independent judiciary which applies the general laws to specific cases and delineates the mutual rights and duties of citizens; and

5. the state authority has Christian duties which it must fulfill: in particular, it must exercise civil toleration towards all faiths and cults, ensuring that its citizens enjoy freedom from coercion and the freedom to fulfill their respective religious obligations.
Such, then, were the universal, "fundamental laws on which every social order is based." Sheptytsky understood these general principles and conditions, in effect, as ethical prerequisites for social and political harmony. As long as they were upheld, one could expect social peace, happiness and prosperity; moreover, just as every social order depended on the existence of these conditions, so too did the success of nationbuilding. If, however, the conditions were disregarded or replaced by "the false slogans of revolution or socialism," the inevitable result would be anarchy, enslavement and ruin.

The principles of authority set forth a reciprocal distribution of rights and duties in the social order, between the state and its citizens. The state had to fulfill its function and once it did, it was incumbent upon every citizen to submit obediently to its authority. Sheptytsky felt that this sense of authority was a necessary element and an indicator that a people had the political maturity to govern themselves:

"The Ukrainian people must in this historic moment show that they have the vital energy and a sufficient sense of authority to merit a position among the peoples of Europe in which they could develop all their God-given powers.

With discipline, solidarity and the conscientious fulfilment of duties, demonstrate that you are mature enough for statehood."

As we have seen in the previous section, this did not imply an *a priori*, passive submission to state authority. In the Christian
perspective, civic obedience was based on a constant, critical scrutiny of the state's fulfilment of its duties.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky therefore focussed special attention on the duties of the state. Foremost among those duties was ensuring the welfare (common good) of all its citizens. According to Christian teaching, authority carries with it the obligation to serve and thus also the duty to care for the good of those who are served. In practical terms, an abuse of authority occurred wherever the common good was subordinated to personal interests. In the immediate context, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Galicia provided Sheptytsky with an opportunity to criticize openly the regime on that score and to point to it as an example of a state which had failed in its duty of service:

"The aim of a state is to guarantee the happiness and welfare of families and individual citizens. /Ensuring/ the security of life, property and every civic right—such are the basic duties of the state; without them, there is no state. What is called the Bolshevik state is so far removed from that aim that in no way can one detect any trace of the basic, primary functions of the state in the Bolshevik government. Its rulers do not even dream about the prosperity and happiness of the people. It is the source of exploitation of human energy, health and life about which no one elsewhere has any inkling.... It is an atmosphere in which no organism can long survive. It is an atmosphere that follows from Marxism, which may be considered a system that turns a person into a machine and takes no account of his natural rights or needs."
Metropolitan Sheptytsky felt that the guarantee of religious liberty was a key characteristic of every civilized state. Indeed, it was a second fundamental duty of the state to show "civil toleration towards all creeds and cults" and, accordingly, "not interfere in the internal content of those faiths" and "guarantee in practice civil liberties to its citizens." The Soviet system had failed in its duty to safeguard that right; Sheptytsky regarded its official policy of atheism as "completely contrary to human nature and the laws of organic life, the laws of society and of the family." Moreover, there could be no talk of religious freedom in the Soviet Union as long as

"...the sick in the hospitals are treated worse than death row prisoners in civilized (kul’turnykh) states. For, in all the prisons of civilized states there is the age-old and universally respected custom of fulfilling the last wish of those who are sentenced to death whenever possible... But in Soviet hospitals, all of which are state institutions, the sick and even the dying, no matter how much they may request religious consolation, can never receive it, because of the atheist principle which is implanted in Marxist communism."

It was no doubt Metropolitan Sheptytsky's reflection on the state's duty of ensuring religious freedom that had led him to formulate the two requirements which the state had to fulfil in the interest of maintaining a harmonious relationship with the Church: respect for the divine law and non-discrimination for any reason, including religious
beliefs.

A third duty of the state was to provide "wise leadership." In the first place, this meant safeguarding the common good and religious liberty. Beyond that, Metropolitan Sheptytsky realized that wise leadership was also crucial to the process of nationbuilding. The problem was that even the best intentioned efforts at nationbuilding stood to be undermined by the accession into positions of power and leadership of people who "instead of caring for the common good, seek only the satisfaction of their personal egoism and place their own interests above the common good."

In Sheptytsky's view, that kind of political opportunism was symptomatic of the lack of a solid Christian foundation in social life. On the other hand, a society built on Christian principles manifested four features: the general acceptance of Gospel principles; adherence to the Christian life and virtues by the majority of citizens; a social life and prayer that is deserving of divine blessing; and the freedom of the Church to fulfill its God-given mission (to preach the Gospel, sanctify its people and pray for them). Whenever these conditions obtained, the difficulties associated with supreme authority could be resolved peacefully and in a way that promoted the common good. Conversely, "when these conditions are absent, there is no divine blessing, and individuals who are inept at leadership push their way to the top of the life of a society, thereby doing harm, not good."

Although Sheptytsky's main pronouncements of principles of the state are concerned primarily with Ukrainian aspirations to statehood, it would not be correct to infer that the Metropolitan was interested
in elaborating principles only for the Ukrainian situation. For even after the Nazis had, in a matter of months, dashed all Ukrainian hopes for German assistance toward achieving independent nationhood, the Metropolitan still continued to reflect on ethical questions within the political sphere.

As is readily evident from passages cited above, one further thrust of this ongoing discourse was a critique of the Soviet Union's shortcomings as a state. A second, less obvious, thrust was its applicability to the Nazi regime during its occupation of Galicia. This is not immediately apparent from the pertinent documents for a very simple reason: the Church did not then enjoy the kind of freedom of speech that would allow it to publish and distribute views that were explicitly critical of the occupation. But it is noteworthy that the German authorities viewed the pastorals "Idealon" and "Ne Ubyj" with enough suspicion to confiscate and delay publication of the former and to censor the latter. As we shall see in the final section of this chapter, the social action of the Ukrainian Catholic Church showed that, far from being selective in his commitment to the Christian principles of the state, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was prepared to apply them consistently, even if that entailed a critical posture toward the occupying Nazi regime.
2. Principles guiding the internal life of the Church

As well as dealing with the Church’s relations with the state, Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s social reflection and teaching during the German occupation was also directed toward the internal life of the Ukrainian community. Here, the Metropolitan stressed two principles that he considered paramount: social solidarity and the respect for human life. He saw a particular need for adherence to both of these principles during the Nazi occupation: social solidarity was urgently needed in both the religious and the political spheres of Ukrainian life at a time when national aspirations were at a peak, while the call to respect human life was in direct response to Nazi policy in Western Ukraine.

a. Social and religious dimensions of solidarity

In the December, 1941 pastoral letter, "Idealom nashoho natsional’noho zhyttia" (Our national ideal) Sheptytsky addressed what he perceived to be a powerful ideal among Ukrainians— the desire to have their own homeland. What he referred to as a "national home" (vsehutsional’na Khata) and a "fatherland" was a unified Ukraine that would comprise both the Catholic segment formerly under Austrian rule and, to the east, the predominantly Orthodox Ukrainian lands which had passed from tsarist to Soviet rule. This goal of a religiously and politically united Ukraine was an integral part of Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s vision of Catholic unity. In this vision, the task of nationbuilding had to be preceded by the establishment of a degree of social and political unity.

With regard to the specific problem of Ukrainian aspirations to
nationhood, it was important to distinguish between what promoted and what impeded social unity. Dispensing with "external obstacles" to unity (e.g., the successive foreign occupations of Ukrainian lands), Sheptytsky focussed on the internal obstacles to social unity or, as he called them, the "centrifugal forces" that were present among his people. He considered these internal causes of disunity to be of two types: political and religious.

i. Political obstacles to unity

The main obstacle that stood in the way of social unity among Ukrainians was, in Sheptytsky's view, "hot-headed patriotism" characterized by intolerance toward political views other than one's own. Sheptytsky considered this a worrisome trait that undermined Ukrainian efforts at nationbuilding.

"...there is in the Ukrainian soul a deep and powerful will to have their own state, yet along with that will there may be found an equally powerful and deep desire that the state should necessarily be exactly of the form that the party, the clique, the group or even the individual wants. For how else can we explain that fatal divisiveness, those arguments, schisms, quarrels— that partisanism which destroys every national matter? How/else/ can we explain the mind (psykhiku) of so many hot-headed patriots whose work has such a distinctively ruinous character?"

This created a kind of "Bolshevik intolerance" and the social unity that Ukrainians needed and desired so much was constantly threatened by the "centrifugal forces" of internal discord:
"...the Ukrainian national consciousness is aroused so readily and quickly through the work of patriots that one is led to believe that it is the manifestation of something that lies very deep within the popular psyche. On the other hand, ... hostile forces that want to destroy our society can supplant that psychic depth."

Although embedded within the social consciousness, not all of the forces of political disunity had their source in the Ukrainian psyche. According to Sheptytsky, some had their origin in the social history of Ukraine as a territory that had endured many occupations by foreign states:

"All of those antagonisms originated in the various states to which Ukrainians belonged and, perhaps, also in the ethnographic types and races out of whose mixture ages ago a Ukrainian people was formed. And now they join with the centrifugal forces which, perhaps, are still dormant in the depths of the Ukrainian psyche."

The point was not to lay blame elsewhere, but simply to indicate that some of the social antagonisms in Ukraine, being of foreign origin, had little to do with the native concerns of Ukrainians and therefore could be set aside as unnecessary impediments to unity. What had to be addressed were the internal disunity and divisions among Ukrainians:

"It is clear as day that there will be no homeland, no Ukrainian monolith until Ukrainian irredentists ("samostiînyky"), in spite of all the differences by which they are divided, achieve the greatest possible degree of unity among
The problem, as Sheptytsky saw it, lay not in the multiplicity of political parties but in doctrinaire positions that generated intolerance. In speaking of a "monolithic" society, therefore, Sheptytsky was not ruling out political pluralism but merely emphasizing the need for a climate of mutual respect in which debate over social and political issues could take place. He saw internal harmony as crucial to the success of nationbuilding:

"... our greatest danger is internal schism, the struggle against one another and the anarchy ("otamanshchyna") which results from schism and which already during the first attempt at nationbuilding in 1917-1920 dashed all our hopes. Whoever leads us into a civil war, even though he may have made great contributions, harms the national cause. All who survived the Bolshevik onslaught know that partisan divisions are a national crime that we cannot permit."

ii. Religious obstacles to unity

Obstacles to social unity were present also in the religious sphere. Though there were many Christian denominations to which Ukrainians belonged, the main source of religious antagonism was between Greek Catholics and Orthodox, and Sheptytsky therefore turned to this specific problem. His proposal consisted of a preliminary framework for reunion which he called a "program of religious reconciliation." This program presupposed the need for compromise in the Catholic-Orthodox debate and gave a historical apologia for the Ukrainian
(Greek) Catholic Church.

What was necessary first of all in order to achieve common ground between the Ukrainian Catholic and the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches was a willingness by both to make all possible compromises, that is, compromises which did not contravene the dictates of conscience. Sheptytsky argued that the particular denomination to which one belonged did not play a role here, since Catholics and Orthodox alike were subject to the duty of acting according to conscience. The only limit to this rule, also shared by both, was that matters of faith (having to do with revelation, the Gospel, the Law, etc.) could never be subordinated to reason and subjected to compromise.

Conscientious compromise was further characterized as a decision freely made, that is, independently of external (political) pressure. It presupposed a distancing from the divisions that in the past had been borrowed from other lands and which had nothing to do with indigenous Ukrainian concerns. Progress in the work towards unity could only be expected if this preliminary notion of conscientious compromise was accepted by both sides.

Sheptytsky reasoned that the primary cause of religious disunity among Ukrainians was a kind of "egoism and imperialism" which generated hostilities among one people:

"If the various Christian Churches in Ukraine are to fulfill the task of conferring unity upon the Ukrainian people, they must divest themselves of that spirit of hatred and schism that sets Ukrainian against Ukrainian."

Throughout his historical apologia for Greek Catholicism, Sheptytsky repeatedly employed this ethical notion of "spirit of hatred" as a
criterion by which to make ethical judgments. Thus, for example, after the creation of the Moscow Patriarchate, the theory of the "Third Rome" revealed its hidden "egoism and imperialism." The opposite line was obedient submission and, in another instance, Sheptytsky asked rhetorically: were not the Kievan bishops justified in reuniting with Rome in "the spirit of submission and /sic/ authority?" He answered his own question by referring to the same ethical criterion:

"In breaking /canonical/ ties with Constantinople, they did so not in the name of the complete sovereignty of each Metropolitan (for the Christian Church never accepted such a principle as correct), nor in the name of egoism, nor in a spirit of rebellion, but in the name of obedience and submission."

However,

"...for a bishop to break /canonical/ ties with his superior, when that is done in the name of egoism and of some unknown principle of the independence of every bishop, is a thing condemned by the entire tradition of the Church."

In his summation, Sheptytsky expressed a willingness on behalf of the Greek Catholic Church to make conscientious compromises (ustupky, literally "concessions") that would lead to religious unity. In order for this to take place, the Orthodox would first have to establish "that in the 16th century we /Greek Catholics/ broke canonical ties with Constantinople in a spirit of egoism and schism" and "that the Roman pontiffs separated from Constantinople in a spirit of schism and egoism." At the same time, it would have to be recognized that the
defamation of Uniates (Greek Catholics) by the Russian synodal Church had incited hatred towards their own brethren and that since the fall of tsarist Russia the Orthodox Church there was plagued by "the dis-integrating disease of ruin and schism."

Thus, social and religious unity was not only a goal but also a criterion by which progress toward the ideal of unity could be discerned and evaluated ethically. Where it could be shown that decisions or actions had been undertaken "in a spirit of schism and egoism," of "imperialism" and of rebellion against authority, rather than in a spirit of obedient submission, Sheptytsky was convinced that division had replaced the sincere quest for unity and, contrary to Christian teaching, love had given way to hatred. A closer analysis of the pastoral "Idealism" reveals a sort of "duae viae" motif in Sheptytsky's proposals for religious unification. In developing his argument, he repeatedly referred to the opposition between egoism-rebellion-schism and obedience-submission to authority-love. This model of two opposite paths exposed the contradiction between the Christian ethical imperative of love and its ideal of unity on the one hand and, on the other, the reality of ecclesiastical disunity. It appears that by such reasoning the Metropolitan was led to the fundamental ethical conviction that religious disunity contradicted the law of love.

In the quest for social and religious unity, Christian ethical discernment centred on the crucial distinction between what promoted unity and what aggravated discord and schism. Corresponding closely to the love-hate opposition crucial to Christianity, these categories in effect provided an ethical criterion by which the history of ecclesiastical disunity could be critically interpreted with a view toward developing solutions for the present. In essence, Sheptytsky was
applying the fundamental law of love to the contextual problem of social and religious disunity, reasoning that if the Christian always rejected hatred as morally wrong, then it was necessary in the same way to reject concrete instances of hatred in history (egoism, schismatic rebellion and imperialism). Likewise, if the Christian was bound to be motivated in his ethical choices by love, then that also required a fervent commitment to unity, which was served largely by obedient submission to authority. The disunity of the Church disturbed Sheptytsky because he saw it as contrary to the Christian ethical imperative of love.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's program for religious reconciliation was thus an interpretive, critical account of the causes of religious divisions in Ukrainian history and an attempt to overcome those divisions by learning from the mistakes of the past. Since the Catholic-Orthodox dispute over which side was in error had only led to a standoff, Sheptytsky's proposal was to establish common ground on which the debate might proceed toward a resolution. This common ground consisted of two elements—a readiness to make conscientious compromises and an objective ethical criterion (love-unity-obedient submission) which served as a Christian ethical standard for reading history and for distinguishing between ethically acceptable and unacceptable courses of action. In turn, the insights derived from this historical reading could also assist ethical decision-making in one's own time. Sheptytsky believed that such a preliminary backdrop could situate the debate within a climate of shared ethical convictions, a climate in which the mutual will of both sides to work towards unity was well established.
Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s aim in writing the pastoral “Idealom” was not to make specific moral decisions as such, but rather to lay the foundations of the social ethics that would guide the project of building a Ukrainian state. The issues that Sheptytsky raised touched on the broad questions of religious and social unity, and the Church’s self-awareness in its social role. The pastoral outlined the Christian social solidarity that Sheptytsky wanted to promote in responding to Ukrainian aspirations for political self-determination. At the same time, it was also a constructive critique of religious disunity, and set out proposals on how to overcome the East-West (Orthodox-Catholic) split that divided Ukrainians.
b. The social implications of Christian charity

In June, 1942, Metropolitan Sheptytsky wrote the pastoral letter "Pro mylosterdia" (On Christian charity), a discussion of the various forms of the Christian duty of brotherly love and its practical implications. Focussing particular attention on the Christian practice of almsgiving, the Metropolitan first of all distinguished it from non-Christian views. Whereas in material terms the sociologist and the Christian see alms in much the same way (the satisfaction of material needs), there is a difference at the formal level, having to do with the motives underlying almsgiving:

"For the Christian, such assistance is an act of love of one’s neighbor, an act performed out of love for God or, at least, with due consideration for God... the Christian act of mercy has a higher spiritual meaning; it is commanded by a higher, supernatural motive; it is illuminated by the light of Christian faith and divine grace."

On the basis of this same distinction, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was critical of the economic liberalism of his time; it had failed to deliver on its promise of serving the common good, and instead had only confirmed a little-understood pattern: "As production grows, so do the ranks of the poor." Instead of promoting economic justice, the existing system seemed doomed to collapse. Sheptytsky wrote:

"The growth of production, or 'hyperproduction' as it is called, leads to a certain crisis which rather seems to be an inevitable cataclysm or upheaval. Beyond it, no one can see the principles in which the social order could be grounded after the complete crash of the liberal economy with its
accompanying capitalism and monetary system."

Sheptytsky therefore saw no basis for hoping that the prevailing economic strategies in Europe could overcome the disparities that obtained between rich and poor. On the contrary, he fully expected the plight of the poor to worsen. In light of this concern, he felt that the role of the Church was "to use every means available to remind the faithful of their duty to give alms and to organize the practical implementation of Christian charity."

Metropolitan Sheptytsky drew special attention to the distinction between Christian and socialist approaches to economic justice, for indeed the same debate that raged in Europe between those two perspectives was present in the Galician context as well. According to Sheptytsky, the key difference between Christian and socialist economic philosophies was contained in the notion of private property. Whereas socialists regarded it as "the fruit of human injustice" (Kryudy), from a Christian perspective it was seen as "a legitimate, natural and, therefore, essential institution" that informed Christian charity and almsgiving (i.e., they were always carried out in ways that respected the right to private property). On this point, both civil law and divine law were in accord:

"...the temporal, earthly goods which Divine Providence gives can be and are the property of those who have acquired them legitimately and who are their owners before the law... Private property, whether it is acquired through inheritance or through thrift and hard work is a right that is protected by divine law."
From these divergent views of private property, different concepts of duty necessarily emerged. Whereas socialists believed that the rich were bound by justice to acts of restitution (i.e., dividing up their possessions and restoring to the poor what was considered to be rightfully theirs), the Christian position was firmly grounded in the inviolability of private property. Accordingly, the rich were entitled to their property; at the same time, however, they also had a duty toward the poor by virtue of the Christian requirement of fraternal love. The Christian option promoted class harmony rather than class struggle and based the duty of working toward economic equality not on justice alone, as the socialists did, but on the requirements of both justice and love:

"It is natural for people to mutually exchange services of Christian love and reciprocal kindness. In this way, justice and love, joined together under the just and light burden of Christ’s law, support very well the bonds of human society and lead its every member to work for his own private good and for the common good."

Finally, in this perspective that aimed at harmonious class relations, rather than class conflict, almsgiving was not "contrary to natural human dignity," as the socialists would have it,

"For when almsgiving is carried out according to the Gospel (Mt. 6:2ff) and in a Christian way, there is nothing in it that could either support the pride of the giver or demean the one who receives. Christian almsgiving can only facilitate the mutual relations between rich and poor, and strengthen the bonds of mutual service."
As opposed to a materialistic anthropology, Christianity saw humanity in spiritual, as well as material, terms. Because of their materialistic bias, socialists saw only the needs of the poor and the debts of the rich. In the Christian view, however, human needs and obligations were more evenly distributed between the haves and the have-nots; thus, the rich were not without their legitimate needs, nor the poor without their own obligations: "There is no one so rich as to need no assistance from others, nor anyone so poor as to be unable to give necessary and beneficial service to his neighbor."

Unlike the socialists who tended toward utopianism and who sought to achieve an ideal economic order in which the needs of everyone could be satisfied, Christians remembered the words of Christ: "The poor you always have with you" (John 12:8). This certainly did not mean that the pressing material needs of the poor could be disregarded or simply subordinated to higher spiritual needs. What the broader Christian view of human needs and obligations did was to situate almsgiving within the Christian discourse on brotherly love. That discourse was universal in its scope and did not distinguish between the needs of the poor and the needs of the rich.

The Christian response to social needs was further distinguishable from the socialist approach in that Christian almsgiving could not be reduced to mere perfunctory donations. This was because the call to charity necessarily involved the whole person and proceeded from an internal sense of compassion and will to help those who were in need, regardless of their social class.

Sheptytsky was consciously writing at a time when widespread poverty and starvation made it difficult for people to give alms.
But, citing the example of the widow’s mite (Mark 12:11), he argued that precisely in such hard times almsgiving takes on a profound new meaning. It mattered little that in material terms such gifts might not be very substantial; what was crucial from the Christian standpoint was the internal disposition of the heart, for

"Such gifts, although they may be insignificant in human terms and though they may pass unnoticed, penetrate the heavens... God looks on the heart. Whoever cannot give more than a good word or a prayer or render a small service can, with the grace of God, receive a word such as the one which Christ pronounced to the Canaanite woman: 'For this saying...you may go your way; the demon has left your daughter'. It is not easy to replace deeds with words, for 'Not everyone who says to me, 'Lord, Lord' shall enter the kingdom of heaven, but he who does the will of my Father who is in heaven.' (Mt.7:21) However, it sometimes happens that before God a word acquires the value of an act."

Far from ignoring material needs, the Christian duty to give alms was proportionally related to the needs in a particular situation, pointing out that "the duty to give alms increases as the needs of one's neighbor increase." In fact, in cases of urgent need, such as when a life was in danger, the right to life overrode claims on private property: "Whoever finds himself in dire straits (u.krainii budi) has the right to seek refuge even in another's property, even without the owner's consent." Thus, although Sheptytsky gave strong support to the fundamental principle of private property in so far as it was a key element that distinguished Christianity from socialism,
the preservation of human life always took precedence over private property.

The rationale for such a priority of values centered on the distinction between the right of use and the right of ownership: the utility of goods was a broader right than that of ownership and was not exclusive, but extended to everyone who could benefit from the use of privately owned goods. Accordingly, an owner's right to hold property entailed a concomitant duty: though private property was indeed a right protected by divine law, "the duty to share the use of that property with the poor is the Christian duty to love one's neighbor." (Emphasis added). By extension: if a person's life could be saved through the use of another's property, then the owner was bound to make available the use of those goods or property which were necessary for that purpose. As we have mentioned above, in such extreme cases not even the owner's consent was required, since the right to life was considered to override claims on private property.

In Sheptytsky's understanding, Christian charity was derived from more than merely a discourse on justice. Acts of Christian charity, grounded primarily in the evangelical message of love, aim at a substantive, qualitative transformation in the situation of the poor. More than perfunctory giving, Christian almsgiving is responsible giving which seeks to fulfill a corrective, edifying function, along with the immediate alleviation of need:

"It is necessary to give alms... to those who are really poor in a way that will not encourage or give rise to vices such as sloth or drunkenness. /The kind of/ almsgiving that best fulfills that requirement is alms in the form of an opportunity to earn, which advances and corrects a
Sheptytsky therefore did not interpret Christ's remark "the poor you always have with you" (John 12:8) to mean that one should resign to pessimism and inertia regarding the prospect of achieving a greater measure of economic justice. On the contrary, he was convinced that the requirements of brotherly love entailed a fundamental duty: to situate almsgiving within the discourse on brotherly love, to place the needs of others before one's own (i.e., before the principle of private property) and to promote the advancement of the poor toward self-sufficiency. This duty remained in force even though, from a Christian standpoint and on the basis of the human historical experience, one did not expect to eliminate completely poverty in the world. For while radical change was unlikely, the improvement of the lot of the poor was both possible and a Christian duty.

Sheptytsky's reflection on private property in the pastoral "On Christian charity" therefore has a twofold thrust. In the first place, the Metropolitan strongly reaffirmed the Christian tradition on the right to private property (which was grounded in natural law) and distinguished it sharply from the socialist alternative. In this, he was being consistent with both the social teaching of the Catholic Church and, in particular, with its critique of socialism. Secondly, the Metropolitan was also attentive to the prevailing situation created by the war and the Nazi occupation of Galicia, in which the fundamental right to private property was being put into question in a way that he, as a Christian, could not overlook. Human lives were at stake, and to affirm the superiority of property claims at a time when the Christian moral imperative was to save those lives (e.g., by provi-
Sheptytsky responded to this conflict of principles by affirming the superiority of the duty to save life over and above the duty to defend private property. The specific direction of the Church’s social mission which resulted from this choice was one that, informed by Christian charity and compassion, would try to assist the poor and to save life:

"The Church - whose task it is to preach the Gospel of love and to perform acts of mercy and which, in the name of the Good Samaritan, must come to the rescue of and heal those who have fallen into the hands of thieves - must also remind the faithful of that difficult duty of Christian love and in every possible way encourage people to fulfil it."
C. Praxis

1. Accomodation

In the first days of the Nazi occupation, Metropolitan Sheptytsky issued two key statements that were favorable toward the new situation. The first document is a pastoral of July 1, which recognized the independent Ukrainian government that was formed by Yaroslav Stets’ko. Sheptytsky read this particular moment of Ukrainian political history both in theological and historical terms. Theologically speaking, a new age had begun "through the will of the almighty and all-merciful Triune God;" it was the fulfillment of prayers; it was an act that had been undertaken "in God’s name and with divine grace;" and Sheptytsky was confident that, with God’s continued blessing and with leaders who were inspired by divine wisdom, political independence would be consolidated or, in his words, it "would come to a successful conclusion."

From a historical standpoint, Metropolitan Sheptytsky also saw the sequence of events that were behind the declaration of Ukrainian independence: namely, the Soviet withdrawal, followed by the Nazi occupation of Western Ukraine. And therefore, in this same pastoral which is primarily an expression of support for the Stets’ko government, the Metropolitan also drew the connection with this larger picture: "We greet the victorious (pobidonorosnu, literally "victory-bringing") German army." It is quite clear that these words were little more than an afterthought; the rest of the document, calling for obedience to civil authority, refers explicitly to the Ukrainian government, not to the German occupation authority.

At the same time, Metropolitan Sheptytsky expected that the state
would observe two minimum requirements which, in effect, were preconditions for the Church's submission to the state. In the first place, the Church would promote obedience and submission to the civil authority only in so far as its commands were just, that is, only if civil laws did not contravene divine law. Secondly, the Church grounded its loyalty to the state in the expectation that those who held political power would exercise it wisely, that is, by issuing "...directives that would take into account the needs and the welfare of all the citizens living in our land, regardless to which religious denomination, ethnic group or social class they may belong." Thus, Sheptytsky was not speaking about blind or absolute obedience to the state, but conditional obedience, which would be given only if the state remained within the limits of Christian ethics and if it avoided any form of discrimination.

The second document, dated 5 July, 1941, is also in the form of a brief pastoral and is addressed to the clergy and the faithful of the Ukrainian Catholic Church. It too addresses the new political situation and is similar in style and tone to the one which preceded it four days earlier. But while the theological backdrop is essentially the same (i.e., it also states that a new epoch had begun through the will of God, for which gratitude was due, along with prayers for continued blessings), now the political referents were quite different. Here, the Ukrainian government was referred to only obliquely and instead the greeting to the Germans took on a more expanded, elaborate form: "It is with happiness and gratitude for the liberation from the enemy that we greet the victorious army, which has occupied almost the entire land..." In addition, the Metropolitan called on his priests to serve a liturgy of thanksgiving, after which they were
to lead their congregations in a song of salutation (mnoholitstviia) "for the victorious German army and for the Ukrainian people."

The Ukrainian political framework within which this is set is no longer just the government of Stets'ko. Sheptytsky focusses his attention no longer on the Ukraine that already was, but on the one that was yet to come: "Soborna Ukraina," uniting Eastern and Western Ukrainian lands. There can be little doubt that this broader notion of Ukraine was directly related to the concurrent eastward advance of the German armed forces, but it is also clear from this document that Sheptytsky was pinning his hopes exclusively on the future of Ukraine, not on Nazi Germany or the ideology of National Socialism.

The German army was greeted specifically for having routed the Soviet forces which, Sheptytsky claimed, had "destroyed our economic, educational and cultural life." Beyond that greeting, the discourse centered exclusively on an independent Ukraine. Toward that goal, therefore, Metropolitan Sheptytsky called for an end to politically partisan schisms and exhorted his people to show the unity, concord and social solidarity that he considered necessary for the reconstruction of the homeland into a "living, organic state." The focus was to be on earnest effort and dedicated work by Ukrainians, rather than on empty words and concepts. Thus, the major thrust of Sheptytsky's appeal was again specifically on the future and the welfare of a free, Ukrainian state.

There is therefore no denying that Sheptytsky did in fact greet the German army in the first days following the takeover. But it is also clear that, in doing so, Sheptytsky was not taking an ideological stand and embracing Nazism. The evidence of these two documents simply
does not bear that out. First of all, in both documents, Metropolitan Sheptytsky laid out the minimal standards of political ethics (just dictates and wise leadership) on which the loyalty of Christian citizens would be predicated. In particular, this meant that Christians were bound by obedience only as long as the state adhered to divine law. Second, he clearly spelled out the priority of Ukrainian political goals and made no mention of German ones. Submission to the occupying regime and the restoration of order were seen as necessary for the consolidation and realization of Ukrainian political aspirations. Third, given the availability of other writings by Sheptytsky during the German period, it is not possible to treat these two documents in isolation and to take them to represent the supposedly unchanged position of the Ukrainian Catholic Church throughout that entire three-year period. Sheptytsky's political posture during the German period was in large measure shaped by his favorable view of the transition from Soviet to German occupation; initially, he saw it as a shift from the illegitimate authority of the Soviets to the legitimate rule of the Germans. While he had recognized the need for resistance to Soviet rule, which had curtailed religious freedom, the Metropolitan did not immediately see the need to resist German rule. On the contrary, and clearly motivated by an overwhelming sense of liberation from the Soviet yoke, he felt that the new situation called for a conciliatory relationship with the ruling power. In a pastoral dated 10 July, 1941, the Metropolitan wrote:

"The time that we spent in Bolshevik enslavement may well have developed in many people a revolutionary spirit which was understandable under illegal rule, yet detrimental when there is no longer any need for revolution but only for
ordering and consolidating what we can and what we recognize as necessary and beneficial to our future... Let /the youth/ not forget that behavior which had been justified under the Bolshevik onslaught can be sinful in times when that justification is no longer present."

Primarily concerned with overcoming internal divisions in the Ukrainian community, the Metropolitan also called for a restoration and stabilization of order within the new situation, which was perceived as a liberation.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky soon revised this accommodationist position and his subsequent social writings and activity became more critical of German rule.

2. Critique

In view of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's initially accommodating stance, the question arises: how was it that he ultimately condemned the Nazi occupation? How did he come to the conclusion that a continuation of the German occupation was worse than a potential Soviet return?

The argument advanced here is that Sheptytsky's initial accommodation was not a definitive, unconditional embrace of fascism and the Nazi occupation, but an open-ended, conditional statement of general Christian civic loyalty that was applicable under any régime. It was open-ended, in that it was left to be defined in relation to the emerging policy of the régime, and conditional, in that the Christian duty of civil obedience and loyalty to the state expired as soon
as the dictates of the state were no longer "just" and "wise," that is, when they contravened divine law or Christian conscience, or when they discriminated against people because of their religion, race or social class. Sheptytsky's initial position therefore had a variable practical thrust that would take its cue from the direction of unfolding events.

Although it did not in itself constitute a critique of the regime, this conditional component in Sheptytsky's statement of loyalty to the German state is significant: it showed that the overwhelming sense of liberation from Soviet rule did not lead the Metropolitan to rule out critical vigilance with respect to the Germans. Indeed, as the Nazi occupation wore on, Sheptytsky became more manifestly critical and he responded to specific events with interventions before the civil authority and with statements to the Ukrainian Catholic community.

i. Interventions before the state

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's interventions before the German authorities had their basis in his pronouncements of July, 1941; having stated in them his conditions on loyalty to the German state, Sheptytsky followed up by appealing for the modification of certain policies that seemed to contradict the regime's commitment to Ukrainian aspirations.

Sheptytsky's first interventions were of a political nature and related to the proposed annexation of East Galicia into the Generalgouvernement. When news of this plan reached Ukrainian political circles, Sheptytsky added his name to a statement by the Ukrainian
National Rada (Council) urging the German government to reconsider the decision. In the same matter, the Metropolitan wrote in a separate telegram to Hitler, "Our people, who remain completely loyal to the German army and government, would be struck with deep disappointment by such a move.... The negation (die Annulierung) of the Ukrainian ideal of statehood would shake their sincere sympathy and trust toward the German government..." The Metropolitan was making it clear that Ukrainian toleration of German policy, or indeed their loyalty to the state, did not go so far as to set aside Ukrainian aspirations to nationhood. After the annexation, which took place on August 1, 1941, the Ukrainian Central Rada (headed by Sheptytsky) sent a second telegram to the German government, stating that "the annexation of the Galician land into the Cracow Generalgouvernement, that is, into Poland, has generated a feeling of deep disappointment and oppression among the entire Ukrainian people." The same opposition to the annexation of Galicia was stated yet again in a January, 1942 letter from the Ukrainian National Rada to Adolf Hitler, which also noted widespread Ukrainian dissatisfaction with the German occupation policy in Eastern Ukraine.

No less significant was the Metropolitan's personal intervention before the German authorities, in particular, his stern letter of February, 1942, to Heinrich Himmler, protesting against the use of Ukrainian militia units to round up Jews for extermination. That letter, which may have been a response to an anti-Jewish pogrom that had occurred shortly before in Rohatyn, dealt with the killing of Jews and in particular with the use of Ukrainian auxiliary police units as part of those actions. Kost' Pankivs'kyi, a member of the Ukrainian National Rada, had an opportunity to read the letter, and
described its contents as follows:

"...the Metropolitan wrote that, not daring to interfere in matters that are being handled by the German civil authorities, as a priest he could not but be concerned about the oppression and shootings of people without trial and about the conduct of the German armed forces and the German police towards the local population, especially the Jews. Therefore he was permitting himself to call attention to this, for he did not know whether these things were actually known in Berlin. As the head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the spiritual leader of his people, he considered it his duty to request that the Ukrainian police, which without exception was formed up of his faithful, should not be used in actions against the Jews."

Himmler’s office responded to the Metropolitan’s letter with a "rude rebuff". Indeed, such a direct intervention before the German government was unique in its boldness; Sheptytsky later recalled that the answer he received was "insulting, and the German officer who brought me Himmler’s reply intimated that, but for my age, I would have been shot for daring to intercede on behalf of the Jews."

Shortly thereafter, apparently as another consequence of Sheptytsky’s letter, the Ukrainian National Rada was forced to suspend its activities. It is unlikely that the Metropolitan was surprised by such measures but, as a distinct departure from his earlier caution in dealing with the Germans, this case shows that he was prepared to pay the price of acting according to the dictates of his conscience.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky continued his interventions before the
German authorities even after his relations with them had begun to
deteriorate (in August, 1942). Such ongoing communication proved
valuable; in particular, it enabled the Metropolitan to raise humani-
tarian issues. When in April, 1943, the Capitular Vicar of the
Armenian Archdiocese of L’viv, Mgr. Kajetanowycz, was imprisoned by
the Nazis for issuing false baptism certificates to Jews, Sheptytsky
successfully intervened with the chief of the Gestapo and obtained his
release. Aware that the tide of the war was turning after the German
defeat at Stalingrad, Sheptytsky interpreted the release to be “a sign
that the German authorities want a rapprochement with the Church,
probably a sign of their weakness and of their apprehension.” As
the Soviets continued their westward advance, another humanitarian
concern was with securing the release of Ukrainian Catholic priests
who were being held in German prisons; the Metropolitan feared that
"the revolution which is coming will probably not be a liberation but
a certain death for prisoners." In May, 1943, he therefore undertook
133 efforts to have those prisoners freed.

Other communications between the Church and the occupying autho-
rities were initiated by the Germans themselves: with the beginning of
their occupation of Galicia, the Germans sought to consolidate their
power in a variety of ways. Knowing that Metropolitan Sheptytsky was a
respected figure in Ukrainian society, they solicited his endorsement
for their administrative directives to the public. Sheptytsky’s re-
sponse was either to decline such support or to give only a nominal
endorsement, stating clearly that he was being ordered to do so. On
July 19, 1941, the German agricultural commission wrote to the Metro-
politran, requesting that he give his backing to a call for dedicated
work by Ukrainian peasants. When Sheptytsky did so on July 25, it was in the form of a separate introduction to the official statement; in his introduction, Sheptytsky twice indicated that the statement which followed was that of the German agricultural commission (i.e., not his). Thus, even in the early days of the occupation, when the Metropolitan still saw the German presence as primarily a liberation from Soviet rule, he was reluctant to give even minimum unqualified support to the régime. It was by maintaining such a critical posture that he could protest against Nazi executions to SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. Ludwig Losacker and to Galician district Governor Karl Lasch when they paid him an official visit in late 1941.

The same critical caution was evident in the latter part of the Nazi occupation. In 1943, Sheptytsky was approached by the L'viv SD's man responsible for religious affairs, Hauptsturmführer Herbert Knorr. Knorr wanted to write to the Apostolic Visitor for Ukrainian Catholics in Germany, Petro Werhun, concerning the organization of a pastoral ministry for Ukrainian workers there; in this connection, he asked Sheptytsky for a letter of introduction. Sheptytsky provided the requested letter, but indicated in it that he was writing in response to "the local German government" and at the request of Knorr. Thus, it appears that the Metropolitan took pains to steer clear of what might have been interpreted as even a tacit endorsement of German policy.

ii. Appeals to the faithful

A second level of Sheptytsky's critical phase consisted of exhortations to the Ukrainian Catholic community. Sheptytsky himself outlined the interventions that he made in this regard: protests and
pastorals condemning occurrences of violence; a declaration that homicide was an offence punishable by excommunication; and a warning to Ukrainian youths not to enroll in the militia "in which they could be scandalized."

The recruitment of Ukrainians for militia units was a real problem and Sheptytsky addressed it on 10 July, 1941 with a warning to the Ukrainian youth about people who might urge them to perform actions contrary to their conscience and to divine law. In his first letter to Hitler, on 22 July, 1941, Sheptytsky indirectly criticized the militant wing of the Ukrainian nationalist movement by affirming that the Ukrainian public "condemned the spontaneous behavior of one faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists."

And, appealing to the Ukrainian people in his June, 1942 pastoral "Promyloserdria," the Metropolitan condemned those who had participated in the killing of innocent people:

"With a heavy heart and with fear for the future of our people I see that in many communities there are people whose souls and hands are stained with the innocent blood of their neighbors.... It is only by a long and difficult path that people who are stained by mortal sin and who have lost the innocence of baptism can return into a state of divine grace. Even when they have repented (naurnut'sia) and have purified their souls with bitter tears of penitence and with the sacrament of penance, for a long time they will still probably have /to continue/ to return into divine grace through a life of Christian righteousness and sincere, persistent Christian prayer..."
The turning point, from critique to resistance, seems to have come some time after the letter of February, 1942 to Himmler. When it became clear that it had had no impact other than to bring on the forcible suspension of the National Rada's work, and when, in a similar fashion, Sheptytsky's repeated requests that the authorities restore order in (i.e., return) the small farms of the rural rectories (cures) which the Soviets had confiscated were to no avail, Sheptytsky began to mobilize a Christian opposition.

Sheptytsky's critique of German policy was articulated with due regard to the possible consequences; indeed, though much of the Ukrainian naiveté about German intentions was dispelled already in the first few months of the occupation, the Metropolitan's decisive rupture with the occupying regime did not come until fourteen months into the occupation, in a private letter to Pope Pius XII. It was in August, 1942 that Sheptytsky wrote to the Vatican his first situation report on the German occupation of Galicia and said:

"Having been liberated from the Bolshevik yoke by the German army, we felt a certain relief, which nevertheless did not last longer than a month or two. Little by little, the government instituted a truly incredible reign of terror and corruption which every day becomes heavier and less tolerable. Today the whole country agrees that the German regime is, perhaps even more than the Bolshevik regime, evil and almost diabolical...."

A few days later, on September 3, Sheptytsky reaffirmed this stand in a letter to Cardinal Tisserant, in which he expressed the view that
the policies of both the Soviet and the German occupations were similar in their brutality.

Surveying this second stage of Sheptytsky's response to the German regime, therefore, we note that there is an overlap with the first (accomodating) stage. For indeed, not even the first pronouncements of July, 1941 were expressions of unqualified loyalty to the state, but rather they outlined the specific requirements for "just dictates" from a Christian standpoint and emphasized the precedence of Christian conscience.

The impact of Sheptytsky's critical stand toward the German regime is difficult to assess. Public disaffection for the Nazis grew with time. The earliest Ukrainian resistance to Nazism was likely that of ideologically-motivated Ukrainian communists, however as the German occupation wore on, the resistance became more broadly based. Ukrainian Catholic priests reported to their bishops about difficulties encountered in collecting state-imposed quotas (kontynentów) and revealed that many young people were defying the Nazi deportation order for work in Germany and instead were joining the anti-Nazi underground. Ukrainian nationalists, whose members had been persecuted by the Nazis, also formed their own resistance movements. While it is not unlikely that many of these people were Ukrainian Catholics, a much more thoroughgoing reconstruction of the times is required before the social impact of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's critique may be gauged with accuracy. Sheptytsky's teaching and activity began to have a more readily discernible social impact after it had shifted to resistance, and it is to that final phase that we now turn.
3. Resistance

The Nazi takeover of Western Ukraine (June 30, 1941) opened the grimmest chapter in the history of Galician Jewry. In the capital city of L'viv alone, German military units killed an estimated 4,000 Jews during the first week of the occupation, and another 2,000 in the last 148 days of July. Incited by the Germans, anti-Jewish riots erupted, 149 with local people rampaging in mobs and killing Jews. In the ensuing months, Jews were systematically rounded up, segregated in 150 ghettos and sent to labor camps. At the same time, sheltering Jews 151 was proclaimed a crime punishable by death. In March, 1942, deportations of Jews to Belzec and other death camps began; the deportation action was carried on for a full year, reaching a climax in August 1942, when an estimated 50,000 Jews were moved out within a 153 four-day period. The process of rounding up and deporting itself involved indiscriminate killing of Jews. August, 1942 was a turning-point: although the final "Judenrein" action – during which the ghettos and labor camps were liquidated – would only occur in the summer 154 of 1943, by late 1942 it had become "clear to everyone that it was no longer a question of sporadic killings but sheer genocide of the 155 Jewish people." When the Germans finally withdrew the population statistics bore out those fears: of an estimated 870,000 Jews who had lived in Western Ukraine (Eastern Galicia and Volhynia) in July, 1941, only 17,000 (about 2%) remained there after the Nazi withdrawal in 156 1944.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's action to save Jews followed closely the events as they emerged and the Metropolitan responded to developments as they were brought to his attention. One of the earliest
stands he took during the Nazi period and which had a bearing on his position on the Nazi policy of extermination was contained in his pastoral letter of July 1, 1941, on the day after the Nazi takeover. In his pastoral, the Metropolitan urged the newly-established Ukrainian government to ensure the safety and well-being of all, "regardless of religion, nationality and social status."

When anti-Jewish violence broke out in the days that followed, Rabbi Dr. Ezechiel Lewin asked Sheptytsky to intervene with the rioting mob. The Metropolitan offered sanctuary to Dr. Lewin and, shortly afterwards, issued a pastoral letter in which he called on his priests to remind the youth that

"...no human considerations and no statements that may be issued can justify a sin against a divine commandment.... There may come a time when you, the youth, will be advised to behave in a way that is contrary to your conscience and contrary to the law of God. At such times, always act as Christians: faithful and obedient to the law of God."

It may have been partly as a result of that statement that a number of Ukrainian Catholic priests did in fact intervene with the rioting mobs and thereby prevent some massacres of Jews.

Similarly, Sheptytsky's well-known protest in February, 1942 against the use of Ukrainian auxiliary police units in carrying out massacres was sent to SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler shortly after a massacre had occurred in Rohatyn, and may well have been a reaction to it.

The major shift that we have noted in Sheptytsky's activity and attitude - from protest to resistance - began to occur in the summer
of 1942, as the Nazi operation to deport Jews was moving towards its peak (20–23 August). But since the true intentions of Nazi policy toward the Jews were already becoming evident before August, Sheptytsky made a clear decision to save Jews and to exhort his clergy and faithful to do the same. In June, 1942, he issued the pastoral "Pro mylorderia" (On Christian acts of mercy) which, by linking the Christian duty of fraternal love with the sanctity of human life, was essentially a call to provide, even at grave personal risk, sanctuary for those whose lives were in danger. Then in the last days of August, 1942, he wrote a detailed situation report to the Vatican, detailing the wholesale massacre of Jews that was taking place. What had occurred specifically between August 20 and 23 was a massive deportation of Jews from the Lviv ghetto into death camps, involving an estimated 50,000 people. Within the week, Sheptytsky responded with a critique of the Nazi system and the German occupation of Galicia: "Today the whole country agrees that the German régime is, perhaps even more than the Bolshevik régime, evil and almost diabolical." And in a letter to Cardinal Tisserant, Sheptytsky wrote "the terror is growing. In the last two months, more than 70,000 Jews were executed in Lviv without trial."

But despite the risks involved in taking such stands, which were critical of the regime and which called Ukrainians to defy the law against protecting Jews, Sheptytsky's interventions were not limited merely to statements. In the late summer of 1942 Metropolitan Sheptytsky put into place a coordinated campaign to save Jews. The operation provided a safe passage for Jews, primarily those who had managed to escape from the Lviv ghetto and from the Janowski labor camp in Lviv. It also answered to specific requests coming to the
Metropolitan from the Jewish community. Thus, for example, after Rabbi Dr. David Kahana had met with Sheptytsky on 14 August, 1942 to discuss the situation and needs of the Jews, 200 Jewish children were "smuggled to one or another monastery, concealed in the crypt, given false certificates of baptism, Ukrainian-sounding names, and were dispersed throughout the convent schools and orphanages in and around Lviv. All of them survived the Nazi occupation and the war."

In November, 1942, Sheptytsky issued what is perhaps his best known pastoral of the period: "Ne aby" (Thou shalt not kill). In it, he criticized the various forms of murder that had swept through the land, including political assassination, fratricide and suicide. The pastoral made no explicit reference to the extermination of Jews, but the particular timing of this powerful statement on the sanctity of human life left no doubt that it was a critique of the policy of extermination as well. Grounding the protection of human life in its biblical sources, both the Decalogue and the law of love, Sheptytsky addressed the problem of homicide at the level of universal values of the human community; the most sacred of those values was that of human life. The scope of the biblical prohibition of homicide and the teaching on love went beyond the bounds of the Christian community in Sheptytsky's view for, "real love includes all one's neighbors" and the contradiction of homicide, which was fraternal love, was a duty that extended "to every person by virtue of their human nature."

Here, as in other times during the Nazi occupation, Metropolitan Sheptytsky chose an indirect way of making his point, and the document's implicit message was readily understood by its Jewish and Ukrainian readers alike.
In order to keep abreast of the plight of the Jewish people, Sheptytsky relied on a steady and reliable flow of information from the ghettos. He appointed Rev. Ivan Kotiv to maintain contact with the Jewish community and to report back to him on daily life in the ghettos: the kinds of rations that were being allotted, the situation of children and of the sick, and so on. Another contact person between the Jewish ghetto and the Ukrainian Catholic Church at this time was the wife of Rabbi Dr. David Kahana. Using forged documents, she was able to pose as a Ukrainian and to move about freely in L'viv, avoiding capture for two years.

Sheptytsky's efforts to save Jews extended beyond the walls of St. George's Cathedral and the Archbishop's residence: after having been informed of the situation of the Jews, he organized a network of trusted individuals who were involved in clandestine rescue and sanctuary operations. Primarily, these were clerics—individual parish priests took part in these operations, as did monastic communities, such as the Studite monks, led by their hegumen, Metropolitan Andrei's brother Clement. A clandestine network was set up within the existing structure of the Church to protect, shelter and ensure safe passage for Jews across the border. Escape routes were established to smuggle Jews out into Hungarian Carpatho-Ukraine. The crucial role of this monastic initiative, as well as the courage it required, has been noted by Holocaust survivor Kurt Lewin:

"This labor of saving Jews was possible only because of the cooperation of a small army of monks and nuns together with some secular priests. They gathered the Jews into their monasteries and convents, orphanages and hospitals, shared their bread with the fugitives, and acted as escorts with
total disregard for the danger of Jewish company."

One of the key players in this undertaking was the Studite superior, Father Marko Stek, who oversaw the issuing of Ukrainian identity documents to Jews and coordinated the escorting of fugitives into monasteries.

Complementing the work of the monks, other sectors of the Church also became instrumental in saving Jews. Ukrainian Catholic women’s religious orders cared for Jewish girls and women, while significant numbers of secular priests also participated in the efforts to save Jews. When the Nazis began to round up, segregate and deport Jews to labor and death camps, Ukrainian Catholic priests did what they could to help Jews. Contravening the Nazi ban on the baptism of Jews, many issued fake baptism certificates to Jews and falsified parish records to show Ukrainian Catholic ancestry. With such documents, these ethnically "naturalized" Ukrainians could then receive from the population registry office Ukrainian identification cards, ration tickets, domicile permits and other necessary documents. A good indication of the scope of involvement by the lay clergy in this work was given by Rabbi Kahana who drew up a list of over 240 Ukrainian Catholic priests who risked their lives either in this way or by hiding Jews, adding that the list was not exhaustive. In addition to calling for the participation of priests and monks in these activities, Metropolitan Sheptytsky also directed lay brotherhoods (parish-level organizations) to take up the task of saving lives. The Ukrainian population at large also provided instances of heroism, and it is quite possible that Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s example inspired many of them.
Following the liquidation of the L'viv ghetto in the summer of 1943, Sheptytsky remained in touch with fugitive Jews and after the liberation in July, 1944 he saw to it that all of the Jewish children who had been hidden by the Ukrainian Catholic Church were returned to the Jewish Committee in L'viv, and that the same committee was provided with all the necessary supplies (food and clothing) to help the survivors to begin to rebuild their lives. The illegal Ukrainian Catholic Church's operation to save Jews thus spanned a period of two full years, from the summer of 1942 to the end of the Nazi occupation in July, 1944.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's written interventions, both protests to the government and appeals to the people, were instances of political praxis. They were not merely theoretical pronouncements of a teaching whose implementation would be left up to the individual conscience, but urgent exhortations and reminders of the difficult duties that the Christian faith placed upon ordinary people in those extraordinary times. Indeed, they were integral to the rescue operations to which the Church had committed itself. As public pronouncements that were subject to censorship and confiscation by the Nazi authorities, they entailed considerable risk, being aimed at mobilizing the Christian community to disobey the law. The timing of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's interventions and initiatives on behalf of Jews further indicates that they were indeed responses to specific events, rather than purely theoretical ethical reflection divorced from the historical context. In particular, it is significant that all of the Metropolitan's interventions that we have mentioned were made long before the liquidation of the Jewish ghetto in L'viv, which took place in June, 1943.
Estimates as to just how many Jews were saved as the result of these efforts vary; nevertheless, it is clear that the Metropolitan did not remain aloof in those perilous times, but took up the struggle in the name of the Christian faith and urged his people to follow suit, even at the risk of their lives. Despite the fact that sheltering Jews was an offence punishable by death, Metropolitan Sheptytsky actively disobeyed that regulation in the name of Christian duty and also called his people to commit the "crime" of resisting the Nazi régime's policy of extermination.
D. Conclusion

Central to Sheptytsky’s articulation of a contextual ethic during the Nazi occupation was the changing relationship between the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the civil authority. Two ethical principles were considered to govern the Church-state relations: just dictates (adherence to divine law) and wise leadership (non-discrimination). Both remained operative in Sheptytsky’s teaching and praxis throughout the three-year Nazi period. However, as the German occupation authorities began to violate both of these principles, Metropolitan Sheptytsky stepped up his opposition to the extent of launching clandestine resistance in the form of rescue operations and reminding the Ukrainian Catholic faithful of the duties that were entailed by the Christian teachings on charity and the sanctity of human life.

The fundamental principles did not spell out an a priori stand between the Church and a civil order; rather, they were stated in a conditional and open-ended way, and left the Church with a variety of possible positions to adopt, depending on whether or not the civil authority adhered to them. They needed empirical input, that is, they required that the Church itself interpret the unfolding events and only then choose the ethically appropriate course that would most closely reflect the spirit of the principles. We have seen that, in the particular context of the Nazi occupation, that process ethical deliberation took Metropolitan Sheptytsky from a position of relative accommodation to fundamental opposition. As the German regime began to contravene divine law, Sheptytsky withdrew from his initially accommodating posture and gradually, though also irreversibly, moved toward a position of outright conflict with the political order.
In this light it is possible to understand what was perhaps most surprising about Sheptytsky's shift of attitude: namely, that it also involved the gradual erosion and eventual collapse of Sheptytsky's critique of the Soviet regime, which was centered on the Church's demand for religious liberty. It was only a matter of time before Sheptytsky's initial relief at the Soviet withdrawal wore off and, as one author has noted, the Metropolitan began to speak of the German occupation "in the same terms" as he had used to describe the Soviet occupation. Eventually, the violence became so rampant that he became convinced that a Soviet return was preferable.

In an ethical perspective, the scenario had been as follows: whereas the Germans were initially greeted as liberators from an atheistic system that had curtailed religious liberty, in time they posed a much greater ethical problem for the Church. The wanton destruction of human life by the Nazis removed any possibility for the Church to continue its conciliatory line, and Sheptytsky made what was certainly one of the most difficult ethical choices of his life: having broken decisively with the system that stood for the extermination of human life, to view the restriction of religious liberties that was certain to follow a Soviet return as the lesser evil.

Two key values to which Sheptytsky referred at this time - human life and private property - informed his critical stance both toward the German regime and toward Ukrainian society. In the face of Nazi policy, Sheptytsky repeatedly affirmed the Christian principle of respect for human life and called for the restoration of properties that had been confiscated by the Soviets. Likewise, Sheptytsky warned Ukrainians against participating in Nazi-coordinated round ups and
killing, urging them instead to save lives even by risking their own. For though the Church affirmed the right to private property and employed it in the ideological struggle with socialism, in cases of conflict it was always the value of human life that prevailed.

Sheptytsky therefore viewed the protection of human life as an ethical principle that was so basic as to override even the Church's differences with the Soviets over religious liberty and with the socialists over private property.

Nor was the primacy of Christian charity in Sheptytsky's ethical thinking evident only in the social teaching and praxis that he developed in response to the German occupation. In view of the Ukrainian goal of independent statehood, the Metropolitan appealed for social and religious solidarity, and in doing so introduced a criterion of ethical discernment that was based on the Christian law of love. Whether in the socio-political sphere or in the religious-ecclesiastical sphere, the historical quest for unification was either promoted by centripetal forces (love-unity-obedient submission) or impeded by centrifugal forces (hatred-egoism-rebellion). The Christian ethical option, which was necessarily grounded in love, always favored unification. Sheptytsky felt that it provided a standard by which the ethics of certain historical events could be weighed and according to which contemporary progress toward unity could be ethically assessed.
CONCLUSION

Our study of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's ethical thought and activity on social and political issues suggests that in addressing those issues the Metropolitan developed two parallel lines of ethical thought: the first focusing inward upon the life of the Christian community, and the second turning outward to the political realm. Indeed, it is perhaps not coincidental that in the period under study the Ukrainian community of Galicia found itself, with only the briefest exceptions, under foreign rule.

A. The Social Mission of the Church

In defining the social mission of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the two central issues which Metropolitan Sheptytsky faced were Ukrainian nationalism and socialism/communism. Our study indicates that his responses to both involved the articulation of creative alternatives that were grounded in the fundamental Christian principle of love. This permits a critical reassessment of the Metropolitan's alleged nationalism and anticommunism.

1. The alternative to militant Ukrainian nationalism: Christian patriotism

Ukrainian-Polish relations in Austrian Galicia were the first training ground for the Metropolitan's ethical reflection on the issue of patriotism. Ukrainian national sentiments were making themselves felt not only in the political scene but inside the Church as well, where Russophile and Ukrainophile factionalism divided the clergy.

Individual outbreaks of ethnic violence were widely understood as symptoms of social, economic and political unrest. In condemning the assassination of viceroy Potocki in 1908, Metropolitan Sheptytsky revealed his
grasp of and concern about the social dimension of that event: for it was not only the crime itself that he found morally abhorrent, but the debasing redefinition of the word "patriotism" by the people who condoned it.

In the wake of the Russian revolution and the creation of a Ukrainian National Republic, the Metropolitan took a very favorable position towards Ukrainian patriotism and national sentiment. In the years 1917 and 1918, he emphasized the importance of a nationally conscious clergy and, invoking the principles of national self-determination and of ethnographic boundaries, he supported the legitimacy of Ukrainian claims for self-rule in Galicia.

However, that convergence of the Church with Ukrainian national sentiment was short-lived, for, in the interwar Polish period, the views of the Metropolitan would diverge in a fundamental way from those of the nationalists. The beginnings of that process may be traced back to 1923, when Sheptytsky accepted something which was anathema to the militant nationalists: the decision of the Council of Ambassadors to turn Galicia over to Poland. In the years that followed, Metropolitan Sheptytsky would stand up for Ukrainian rights, but would not question the legitimacy of Polish rule. He would argue vehemently against the violent methods of the Polish "pacification," but no less vehemently he would condemn those who trained Ukrainian youths to perform acts of violence and to believe that terrorism was morally justified.

During World War II, when the Soviet withdrawal from Galicia fanned hopes for Ukrainian statehood, Sheptytsky issued key statements emphasizing respect for life as a fundamental principle of Christianity, and religious and social unity as central to the ideal of a Ukrainian state. So essential were these principles, that in his final break with Germany, the Metro-
politan could actually look forward to a Soviet return, with all its inevitable restrictions on religious liberty, as long as the basic respect for human life could be restored.

Although he criticized the violent side of Ukrainian nationalism, Sheptytsky also recognized the potential good of Ukrainian patriotic ideals and appreciated their powerful hold on the Ukrainian collective consciousness. Thus, he integrated elements of patriotic reasoning into a number of moral arguments: his criticism of the Soviet regime, his defence of Ukrainian cultural rights in Poland, and even his critique of contraception. Yet his most extensive appeal to Ukrainian patriotic sentiment was when he opposed its Christian variant to its secular, "pagan" form, rejecting the latter as a crude cannibalism for which there could be no place in a civilized, Christian society.

Proceeding from the law of love, the Christian alternative to secular nationalism unified people along national lines without dividing them from other peoples. As Sheptytsky emphasized, Christian patriotism excluded chauvinism just as the law of love excluded hatred. He explained:

"Pagan patriotism is the love of one's own together with a hatred towards all others. But Christian love of one's native land, by embracing all peoples, unites Christians with their opponents and enemies and gives their patriotism the foundation that is needed; it teaches unity."

Ultimately, then, any patriotism that had lost its Christian bearings was pagan and the Metropolitan would have no part of it. On the other hand, Christian patriotism was rooted in the law of love and was unswerving in its commitment to the fundamental unity of humanity. The threat to society that Metropolitan Sheptytsky saw in nationalism was that it could degene-
rate into a socially destructive force. Whether by setting priest against priest (as in the Austrian period), or brother against brother, or again national group against national group (as in the Polish period), unrestrained nationalist fervor along with its popular acceptance threatened to subvert the Christian foundations of Ukrainian society. It was in order to counter this "moral hemophilia", as he called it, that the Metropolitan indicated the alternative path of Christian patriotism within which the Ukrainian national ideal was expressed as the epitome of Christian and social unity.

2. Positions vis-à-vis Socialism and Communism

Before World War I, the main challenge that Sheptytsky believed socialism posed to the Greek Catholic Church centered on its socioeconomic action which, by advancing the cause of the people, also drew people away from the Church. The alternative that Metropolitan Sheptytsky proposed to his priests was a social action that addressed the pressing material needs of Ukrainian society but which also saw the work for socioeconomic advancement as integral to the Church's spiritual work for the salvation of souls. Whereas the socialists addressed only the material side, Metropolitan Sheptytsky instructed his priests to maintain a Christian course in their social action. Similarly, in the political sphere, the Church struggled against socialist proposals for secularizing legislation, especially in the areas of education and marriage law.

After the Bolshevik revolution, Metropolitan Sheptytsky's perceptions of communism were shaped largely by reports about the repressive religious and social policies in Soviet Ukraine. Thus, when in the mid-1930's attempts were made to consolidate the Left in Galicia, the Metropolitan
responded with a powerful condemnation of that undertaking and warned Christians against cooperating with it.

Yet, even while criticizing both the socialist and the communist options, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was careful to avoid the pitfall of an ideological stance. This enabled him to acknowledge areas of compatibility between the Christian gospel and the democratic movement, between the communist principle of collective ownership and the monastic way of life, and also to recognize the sincere dedication of many Ukrainian socialists and the patriotism of many Ukrainian communists.

Such a broadminded openness could hardly have been possible had the Metropolitan been unable to stand above the ideological divisions of political parties. Sheptytsky's impartial perspective may be traced to his reflection on the foundational Christian principle of love. It was in light of that principle that Sheptytsky drew a sharp distinction between the "false" doctrines of the socialists and the people themselves, who from a Christian perspective were to be loved. And it was that profound perspective which enabled the Metropolitan to say in 1940, at the height of the first Soviet occupation,

"In order to avoid all possible misunderstanding, I must first of all affirm that I have never and do not now call communism our enemy or an enemy of the Church. For there is also an evangelical communism, consisting of evangelical poverty and a communal way of life which I myself avow and to which I have belonged for over fifty years.... The enemy of the Church and of religion is the false principle of atheism. In that sense atheists as representatives of the enemy are enemies too. But as we struggle against the false idea, we do not stop loving the people and considering them as our poor, blinded and ailing brothers. That is why I
often call you to prayers for the good of atheists, for their conversion and salvation."

3. Love as the basic norm of the Church’s social mission (towards a reassessment of Sheptytsky’s “nationalism”)

As we have suggested, the fundamental norm that informed Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s ethical reflection on Ukrainian society, especially with regard to the poles of nationalism and socialism/communism, was the Christian notion of love. Not only was it the central principle underlying the notion of Christian patriotism, but it also was integral to his critique of militant nationalism and also tempered his statements and perspective on the Left.

In Sheptytsky’s understanding, Christian love was an ethical imperative that allowed no basis for social exclusion; whether in matters of ethnic (Polish-Ukrainian) differences or of ideological differences among Ukrainians, Christian love was all-encompassing. This radical social thrust of the gospel message repeatedly set the Metropolitan’s ethical perspective apart from the exclusivist tendencies within Ukrainian nationalism.

Underlying the Metropolitan’s understanding of the practical, social thrust of the gospel message for the Galician context was the overriding pastoral concern that Ukrainian society should not be allowed to hurl itself headlong into an abyss of spiritual perdition. His repeated recourse to a pedagogical duae viae motif — which contrasted the path of salvation with that of perdition, a society grounded in faith in God with an atheistic one, Jehovah with Baal, unity with schism, humble obedience with pride — was grounded in his understanding of the social implications of the Christian ideal of love, as well as the potentially devastating spiritual
and social implications of disregarding it.

It was therefore perfectly natural for Sheptytsky to explain his own sense of Ukrainian patriotism and social commitment by relating it to that basic law of love:

"True patriotism being in its essence nothing other than a true love of one's neighbor, in that way I became a Ruthenian patriot, and all my work which proceeded from that love was always aimed at the good that I wanted for my people. That good was first of all material, considering the abject poverty of our Church and our people: I did everything I could to remedy the situation. Secondly, it was a moral good: it was a matter of raising the level of Christian knowledge among the people, about the supernatural life, about the Christian life of the family and so on. I tried to embrace all of the needs of our people and to help everyone at least partially."

Integral to Sheptytsky's understanding of Christian patriotism was an understanding of the Church with the people, but above nationalism: promoting the social and cultural development through which they could realize their full potential and contribute to the good of humanity, while at the same time restraining the drive toward national hostility, disunity and conflict.
B. The Church and Politics

Our study of the Metropolitan's approach to politics has focussed on two particular areas: the political activity of priests, and the institutional relationships between the Greek Catholic Church and the various political administrations of Galicia. It has been found that, in addressing those two areas, the Metropolitan consistently grounded his reasoning in a conceptual framework of justice (rights and duties). This suggests that a reassessment of his alleged "anti-Russian Germanophilism" is in order.

1. The line between legitimate political activity by priests and excess

In approaching the delicate question of the acceptable limits of political involvement by priests, Metropolitan Sheptytsky showed himself to be concerned with ensuring that the primary spiritual duty of priests be respected. It was fidelity to that duty, the Metropolitan believed, that would allow priests to steer clear of partisan politics which could only divide them among themselves and cause scandal among the faithful. The primacy of their dedication to the spiritual welfare of the people was also at the core of what he referred to variously as a "clerical spirit," "fervor," and "priestly solidarity."

Yet an exclusive emphasis on the spiritual duty of a pastor would have amounted to an outright prohibition of all clerical involvement in politics. From the very beginning, Metropolitan Sheptytsky made it clear that that was not his position. For, balanced against a priest's spiritual duty was his civic responsibility. This civic responsibility was derived first of all from the fundamental right of every priest as a private citizen to have a political opinion, to vote and to participate in the political process. The emphasis was on non-partisan political activity, which took a
variety of forms, for example, under Austria, the mobilization of electoral support for candidates who were prepared to advocate Christian values and, under Poland, the organization of non-partisan or supra-partisan coalitions of citizens to give voice to Christian social and political concerns.

Secondly, it was derived from the social concern that was expected of a priest, from his obligations toward the material welfare of his people. In affirming those components of a priest's responsibility, Metropolitan Sheptytsky encouraged political participation by priests, even referring to it as a duty, as long as its fulfilment did not lead them to neglect or secularize their primary duty and did not undermine their professional unity. There were also instances of political activity which were directly related to a priest's spiritual duty (for example, opposing divorce and civil marriage legislation, and the deconfessionalization of schools).

Third, the rationale for clerical involvement in politics also had to do with the Metropolitan's firm conviction that Christian moral values were the lifeblood of the social order. In this perspective, the Church was seen as politically and socially active in fulfilling the historical role of Christianity: the spiritual revitalization of the world.

Fourth, given the absence of a significant Ukrainian political representation, Sheptytsky recognized that the historical role of the Greek Catholic clergy in the political field had extended to include the advocacy of Ukrainian socio-cultural, economic and political interests. Thus, beyond purely religious concerns, Metropolitan Sheptytsky felt that priests should be allowed to raise issues of social justice in the political forum. He did so himself on numerous occasions (to support the idea of a Ukrainian university, to promote a Polish-Ukrainian accord, to back the principle of self-determination in regard to the Kholm region, to protest against the
Polish pacification and against the destruction of Orthodox churches).

Metropolitan Sheptytsky believed that the issue of the propriety or the appropriate level of political activity by priests was essentially a matter of maintaining the proper sense of proportion in fulfilling two distinct types of duty — spiritual duty for the sake of the salvation of souls, which was absolute, and socio-political duty, which was limited in that it could never override the spiritual obligation.

2. The Church vis-à-vis the state: a balance of rights and duties

In a variety of political configurations, a recurrent pattern in Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s approach to Church-state relations was that he sought a modus vivendi with the state and, in doing so, appealed to the Pauline doctrine on submission to civil authority. Whether in wartime or in peace, whether he was dealing with a Catholic empire or a totalitarian regime, Metropolitan Sheptytsky appeared simply to accept each new change in the political situation and to submit to the civil authority of the day. But although that appearance has informed many an interpretation of the Metropolitan’s attitude toward political orders, we have seen that this simplifies and overlooks what was a considerably more complex approach to the political question.

In the first place, although Sheptytsky treated the “duty to Caesar” as an a priori obligation (a priori, in the sense that it typically informed his immediate responses to sudden changes in political rule), it is equally clear that that obligation was never stated in absolute terms, but hinged on a specific set of conditions. In essence, those conditions spelled out the Metropolitan’s understanding of the fundamental duties of any state whose authority in civil matters he was prepared to recognize.
The conditions may be summarized in two points. First, the state and its representatives, as part of their obligation to the common good, were required to respect the Church's jurisdiction in spiritual matters, that is, in matters of faith and morality, the administration of sacraments, religious education, ecclesiastical administration, and seeing to the religious obligations of the faithful. In connection with this, it is significant that, even during the Austrian period, when the Metropolitan felt that there was no call for struggle with the state, he was quite categorical in rejecting any civil authority in matters of religious education or legislation concerning marriage. Second, the state was only considered a legitimate authority in so far as it issued just dictates and showed wise leadership. Essentially, this referred to the requirement that the state operate within the limits of divine law, and the Metropolitan understood this to include respect for religious liberty, non-discrimination (whether on religious or on ethnic grounds), and human life. He also had occasion to show that he expected any occupying state to honor the age-old Christian tradition of the Ukrainian people; Christian citizens, in turn, were reminded of the fallibility of human laws and human justice, and of the duty to heed the dictates of their conscience. Such socio-religious priorities indicated that the Metropolitan looked upon religion as a public, and not just a private matter.

These qualifications are crucial to an understanding of Sheptytsky's attitude toward civil authority. They show that the Metropolitan did not treat the Pauline directive as an absolute principle (as has often been assumed), but as a rule of thumb that was overridden by the superior authority of divine law as soon as there was conflict between the two. The qualifications also indicate that the framework from which the Metropolitan approached Church-state relations was attentive to changes and develop-
ments, and thus it allowed for self-correction and adjustment as the evolving political situation required. Accommodationism was not the final word on the Metropolitan's approach to the civil administrations to which his Church was subjected.

Secondly, Sheptytsky's approach toward the various states and occupying regimes was worked out of a fundamental conviction that the spiritual mission of the Church in society was a sacred duty and, as such, absolute. Included as part of that mission, Sheptytsky felt, were the duties of preaching and teaching the faith, administering the sacraments and upholding the Christian life and Christian values in society.

Thus, when Austria withdrew state salaries for religious educators, Sheptytsky reminded his priests that it was still their fundamental obligation to teach catechism, with or without pay. And when during the Soviet occupation religious education was suppressed altogether, the Metropolitan censured those priests who neglected their preaching and catechetical ministries. Reflecting on his own hard-line approach, Sheptytsky admitted that he found it "paradoxical" for, as obstacles mounted he only stressed the importance of fulfilling that pastoral duty proportionally all the more. In fact, that was only to be expected, since Sheptytsky considered the spiritual needs of the faithful as an absolute duty of the clergy, regardless of the political situation and the obstacles. Related to that hard line, we have also noted a soft line, whereby the Metropolitan went out of his way to show lenience (epikeia-aequitas) in ritual and structural matters in order to facilitate the work of priests in a hostile environment.

Thirdly, Metropolitan Sheptytsky was well aware of the potential benefits of adopting what may be called a legalistic posture toward states
(that is, appealing to the strict letter of civil laws), if that could open the way to direct negotiation over matters of urgent concern to the Church. Thus, in 1917, in arguing before the Russian government for the establishment of an Eastern-rite Catholic Church in Russia, he referred to that government's avowed principle of religious liberty. In 1936, he personally met with Polish government representatives in Warsaw and presented his views on how best to achieve what they at least formally supported: an end to the crisis of ethnic violence. And in 1940, he appealed to the provisions of the Stalinist constitution regarding freedom of conscience and worship in raising a protest against the abuse of those freedoms by the occupying Soviet authority. In none of those cases was there any question of a transfer of loyalty by the Metropolitan; rather, he employed that legalistic mode in order to arrive at a basic common ground or a point of leverage at which civil authorities could be urged to live up to their own promises and stated priorities.

The Metropolitan therefore looked at Church-state relations through a prism of concomitant rights and duties, the most basic of which were the absolute duty of the Church to fulfill its spiritual task and the corresponding duty of the state to recognize its right to do so.

3. The basic norm of justice in the Church's political activity (towards a reassessment of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's "anti-Russian Germanophilia")

In his treatment of the two major areas of the political question as it existed in Galicia, Metropolitan Sheptytsky articulated his thought and activity primarily through a discourse on justice. The category of duty was central to his elaboration of the Church's work in the political sphere. Thus, the question of the acceptable level of a priest's involvement in
politics was answered with reference to the competing spiritual and temporal duties. Similarly, the Metropolitan's perspective on Church-state relations was framed within a reciprocal exchange of rights and duties between the two authorities. This allowed the Greek Catholic Church to adapt to changes in the political and/or military situation (in response to the behavior of the civil authority), without compromising its sense of obligation to divine law and to its spiritual mission. The justice axis, which delineated the autonomous jurisdictions of the Church and the state, was the central point of reference in Sheptytsky's stance toward the various political structures within which Ukrainian Catholics found themselves.

As opposed to what others have suggested was basically an ethnocentric or chauvinistic predisposition toward political structures (imputing anti-Russian Germanophilia to the Metropolitan), the Metropolitan's reflection and stated views on the subject appear on the contrary to have been drawn from his concrete assessments of Church-state relations as they existed at various times. Thus, his critique of tsarist Russia and, later, of the Soviet Union was centred not on personal, national animosity but rather on his reading of Church-state relations in pre- and post-revolutionary Russia, relations which he felt had gone out of kilter: in both cases, subordinating the Church to the absolute authority of the state.

Likewise, the suggestion that Sheptytsky's relations with Austria and Germany were shaped by a Germanophile predisposition must be set against the facts of his critique of Austria over the issue of civil incursions into the affairs of the Church, as well as his ultimate break with Germany over its breach of fundamental justice. Nor is there any evidence for attributing the Metropolitan's habitual pattern of initial accommodation toward new political rule to any national alignment or ideological consi-
derations. Rather, he appears to have followed a course of Pauline submission as a rule of thumb, applying it consistently at the beginning of every new political situation — regardless whether it was Polish, Soviet or German — and later adjusting or even discarding it as the evolving situation and the superior dictates of divine law required.
SOCIAL THEORY AND CHRISTIAN PRAXIS

IN THE WRITINGS OF METROPOLITAN ANDREI SHEPTYTSKY, 1899-1944

VOLUME II

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A. Introduction

1 For example, the treatise on the social question by the Austrian Jesuit Joseph Biederlack (Innsbruck, 1895) was translated into Ukrainian: Yosyf Biderliak, Suspil'ne pytanie. Prychynok do zrozuminia yeho suty i yeho rozv'iazania, /Trans. Rev. Amvrozii Redkevych/, (L'viv: Nakladom Suspil'no-ekonomichnoho Kruzhka, 1910).

The only manuals of moral theology that were available to pastors of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia at the turn of the century were: Yosyf Mil'nytskii, Rozmysleniia o Prawednosti Khristian'skii, (L'viv: Iz typohrafi Stavropihiiskoho Instytutu, 1881), and Aleksander Bachyn'skii and Yosyf Mil'nytskii, Korotkii vyklad Katolytskoho Bohoslouwia Moral'noho (Etyky Katolytskoi), 2 Vols., (L'viv: Nakladom Vydavnytstva "Biblioteky bohoslovskoi," 1899). The former drew, among other German sources and German translations, on the moral manuals of Ernst Möller (Vienna, 1879) and of Karl Martin, Bishop of Paderborn (5th ed., Mainz, 1865). The latter used as basic references the Latin compendia of moral theology of Ioannes Petro Gury (Ratisbonae, 1874), Ioseph Scheicher (Vienna, 1890) and M.M. Marathan (Paris, 1894), as well as to the above cited two German texts and the moral treatise of Thomas M.I. Gousset (Schaffhausen, 1851). Metropolitan Sheptytsky expressed the following opinion on the two Ukrainian manuals: "Both of those books were published still in the last century. Despite the great contributions of both of those theologians to the field of ecclesiastical literature, these two works may be considered the weakest of their writings. At the time when they were published, they may perhaps have been adequate to the average needs of priests; today they are only
found in a few libraries. Most priests do not have them and, of those who do, few ever open them." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro liberal'nu sovist'," (1942), in 03-69, p. 315.

It is not known for certain whether "Rerum Novarum" or, for that matter, any other of Pope Leo XIII's encyclicals were ever translated into Ukrainian for the use of parish priests. However, a decree of the Sobor of 1940 mentions the publication out of L'viv of papal encyclicals (a collection titled "Biblioteka Paps'kykh Entsyklik"), which presumably were translated into Ukrainian. See "Dekrety i Pravyla Aeparkhiial'noho Soboru 1940 roku: Paps'ki pys'ma," in 03-69, p. 65. Sheptytsky of course was familiar with the Leonine corpus and quoted from it regularly. He would have received all official documents from the Vatican, either in Latin or in official translation, and it is likely that Polish translations would also have been readily available in Galicia.

2
As Metropolitan Sheptytsky himself would later explain, "In Galicia, the Ruthenians had neither governors nor workers, nor people who were rich and influential. Their bishops were almost the only representatives of the nation. And, according to a law which might be called a 'law of substitution' ('loi de substitution'), our bishops are sometimes called upon to perform certain functions and to wield a level of influence which elsewhere only secular heads of state would possess." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, Report to Giovanni Gennochi, 12.II.1923, Beatificationis et Canonizationis Servi Dei Andreae Szeptyckyi Archiepiscopi Leopoliensis Ukrainorum Metropolitanae Haliciensis, Vol. 1: "Epistolae et Relationes ad Sanctam Sedem Lingua Gallica Exaratae," (Rome, 1965), p. 24.

3
The varieties of spelling of the Metropolitan's family name range from the
Polish "Szeptycki" to the transliterated Ukrainian "Sheptyts'kyi" and to the somewhat simpler English form "Sheptytsky," with countless variations in other languages, as will be noted in the bibliographic references at the end of this study. It is the third form that we have chosen to use in the present work when referring to the Metropolitan after he joined the Greek Catholic Church.

4 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky’s familial predecessors in the Greek Catholic episcopate were: Bishop Varlaam Sheptytsky of L’viv (1700-1715), Bishop Atanazii Sheptytsky of Peremyshl’ (1762-1779), Metropolitan Atanazii Sheptytsky of Kiev (1729-1746), and Metropolitan Lev Sheptytsky of Kiev (1778-1779). On this and other genealogical matters, the basic sources are Ivan Shpytkovs’kyi, Rid i herb Sheptyts’kykh, (L’viv: Biblos, 1936), and Andrzej A. Zięba, "Szeptycki/Sheptyts’kyi Genealogy," in Life and Times, pp. 437-439.


6 Patriiarkhat (New York - Philadelphia, 1967-), the monthly organ of the lay Ukrainian Catholic movement for the recognition of the Ukrainian Catholic Archbishop Major as Patriarch, proclaims on its logo the slogan "for the unity of the Church and the people" ("Za yedinist’ Tserkvy i Narodu").

7 With regard to the Ukrainian underground’s interwar campaign of terror against the Polish state, one author has incorrectly claimed that Metropolitan Sheptytsky "kept silent and never spoke about those matters until the fall of Poland in 1939" and has speculatively suggested that such
silence was consent: "The Metropolitan understood that the Lord gave every living being, every person and every nation, the right to a free life and, following from that, the right to defend one's own life against unlawful aggression and oppression." S. Shewchuk, "Vidnoshennia Mytropolyta do okupativ Ukrayn v rokah 1914-1945," in Pro velykoho Mytropolyta Andreia, Biblioteka Lohosu, Vol. XXIII, (Yorkton, Sask.: Redeemer's Voice Press, 1961), p. 89. As is demonstrated in the present study, the suggestion that the Metropolitan remained silent on this issue is as unfounded and contrary to the facts as the inference of his tacit support for Ukrainian terrorism.

8 There is no monograph-length study of the Metropolitan's social writings, and those Soviet and, more recently, Polish studies which purport to "expose" Sheptytsky's political thought and activity typically exclude any mention of such key social statements as "O kvesti sotsiial'nii" (1904), "Slovo do ukrains'koi molodi" (1932), "Idealom nashoho natsional'noho zhyttia..." (1941), "Pro myloserdia" (1942), and "Pro yednist'" (1943).


10 An informative discussion of the need to balance strict historicism ("Ruthenian") and anachronism ("Ukrainian") is given in John-Paul Himka, Socialism in Galicia: The Emergence of Polish Social Democracy and Ukrainian Radicalism (1860-1890), (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 7-8. Himka's use of "Ruthenian" makes sense in a work exclusively on nineteenth century Austrian Galicia, but studies that extend into the twentieth century, especially those that go beyond 1918, have commonly opted on the side of consistency with the term that finally prevailed and
B. Chapter 1


2 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, *O kwestii sotsial’nii* (Zhoukva: Drukar’nia oo. Vasyliian, 1904). All references are to this edition, cited hereafter as *OSO*, with page numbers followed by paragraph numbers.


The best known critique, made from a socialist standpoint, is Ivan Franko, "Sotsiial’na aktsiiia, sotsiial’ne pytannia i sotsiializm," *Litterarno-Naukovy Vistnyk*, XXVIII:10, (L’viv, 1904), pp. 1–23; reprinted in

3  OSE 7:14-15.

4  OSE 7:16.

5  OSE 8:19.


7  The semi-monthly catechetical journal, Misionar (Zhouka, 1897-1944), published a lengthy series of articles in 1899 under the title, "Pro vorohiv tscherkvy i narodu." Although these articles were unsigned, it is quite possible that their author was one of the founding editors of the periodical, the Reverend Andrei Sheptytsky, OSEM.

8  Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., "Rik mynaie..." (Zhouka, Dukarsia oo. Vasylia, 1906), p. 10.

In 1899, Sheptytsky spoke of those two competing ideological trends and linked that sense of urgency with the pressing economic concerns in Galicia: "From the very beginnings of the Holy Church, the work of priests was always very important, not only because salvation exceeds human capa-
bilities but also because our work and striving ('stremlinnia') is a struggle with evil in every form. In our time, this work is becoming even more difficult than ever before, for the power of evil is growing, it seems, in step with the progress of the cause of Christ. All of the forces that are hostile to Christ are joining together and consolidating their power with a frenzied effort. When we also consider that the struggle for daily bread is becoming ever more difficult and arduous, then the result is that people are weakening in their faith, materialism is growing, and the seed of the Word of God is falling more and more often on barren soil." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, *Nasha Prohrama* ("Uzhe vid samoho pochat-
ku...") in 02-65, p. 20.

The Catholic Church in eastern Europe was not alone in the economic struggle with socialism; the Russian Orthodox Church took an active interest in the social question as well, sending Vladimir Karlovich Sabler, from its Procurator General's office, into western Europe in order to study the Catholic workers' movement. Sabler later wrote a book entitled *0 mirnoi borbe s sotsializmom*, 2 Vols., (St.Petersburg, 1907-1908), which outlined the Christian cooperative alternatives to socialism in Italy, Germany, France and Holland.

9

050 3:1.

10

050 68-69:227.

11

Sheptytsky drew an explicit link between absolute egalitarianism and the socialist program in numerous passages of the pastoral. According to Sheptytsky, naive Christians, "attracted by the theory of the equality of people" were being drawn towards socialism (050 15:43); "The socialists aim to achieve the absolute economic and social equality of all people through
the abolition of private property" (OSO 18:52); and, with specific reference to the socialist program, "The absolute equality of all people is being proclaimed in theory..." (OSO 22:67).

12
OSO 15:43.

13 Sheptytsky assumed that the widespread perception among Galician Ukrainians of socialism as harmless was partly due to the more or less subdued variant of socialism that existed in Galicia. Galician socialists, he noted, were not as outspoken as their counterparts in Western Europe, and there had not yet been any clear-cut "struggle for the faith and morality," as had occurred in other countries. OSO 13:40.

14
OSO 12:36.

15
OSO 13:38.

16
OSO 13:38.

17 "...the Ruthenian people is a thoroughly Christian people..." OSO 13:39. See also Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Do ukrajns'koj intelligentsii" ("U pastyrs'koj komu lysti..."), in 02-65, p. 212: "The Ukrainian people is a Christian society. Comprised of only Christians ("zlozhenyi iz samykh xhrystyan"), it considers the faith as its collective and highest good, as its highest collective law."

18
OSO 12:34-36.

19
OSO 13:39.

20
OSO 13:39.
21  OSO 12:33.

22 On the abolitionist stance of the socialists, see OSO 17:49, 18:52; the retentionist stance of the Church is declared in OSO 29:93, "The first principle of Christian social action is the inalienability ('netykal'nis') of private property."


25 OSO 24:76; RN 210:11.

26 OSO 26:81; RN 210:11.


29 OSO 27:85; RN 211:13.

30 OSO 20:60-61; RN 207:5.

31 The list of evils that Sheptytsky expected to follow the collectivization of property was formidable: economic stagnation (OSO 18:53), harm to workers (21:61) and to the poor (28:92), the loss of motivation and incentives for workers to apply their skills with diligence (18-19:53-55; 28:90); moreover, the family would be undermined (28:98) and the state would acquire an authority that did not belong to it (28:90, 92), and the
floodgates of jealousy, dissatisfaction and discord would be opened (28:90) thereby hindering social peace and security (28:92).

32  
**OSO** 18:52, 22:67.

33  
**OSO** 18-19:54, 20:59, 61:204.

34  
**OSO** 18:53.

35  
**OSO** 29-30:96-97; **RN** 213-214:17.

36  
**OSO** 30:97.

37  
"Faktychnyi stan nashoho zhyttia," **OSO** 30:98; cf. Leo XIII’s exhortation regarding those human inequalities "to look upon the world as it really is," **RN** 214:18.

**OSO** is much more detailed in its critique of absolute egalitarianism than **RN** which, except for the mention of natural inequalities (214:17-18) did not discuss the socialist doctrine at all. Not finding sufficient material in **RN** in support of his argument against socialist egalitarianism, Sheptytsky quoted from another of Leo XIII’s encyclicals, *Quod Apostolici Muneris* (1878); see **OSO** 14:42.

The argument of natural inequalities appears to have been more of a rhetorical device to further highlight the differences between Christianity and society, rather than a substantive Christian statement on the human condition. For indeed, with all its opposition to socialism, the Christian perspective was also shaped by a fundamental principle and ideal of human equality. As Metropolitan Sheptytsky indicated, Jesus himself gave a new meaning to justice by "proclaiming the rights of man qua man and by placing all people as equals according to laws /which are/ universal and indepen-
dent of any social and political customs." OSO 41:134.
38
OSO 33:104.
39
OSO 34:108.
40
41
OSO 33-34:107.
42
OSO 34:107. See RN 214:18: "To suffer and to endure, therefore, is the lot of humanity."
43
OSO 34:108. See also Metropolitan Andriy Sheptytsky, "Pershe Slovo Pas-
tyr'ia" ("Isus Khrystos..."), in 02-65, p. 10: "God/ gives us suffering and hardships that we may know and remember that we are in exile here, and that only there, in heaven, is our true homeland."
44
OSO 9:23; see also OSO 53:168.
45
OSO 9:25.
46
OSO 9:24-25; 32:103.
47
OSO 53:168-170.
48
OSO 17:49, 9:24. "The two classes, the rich and the poor, are not naturally hostile to one another. It is an error to think that nature itself lockes them in relentless, eternal struggle. On the contrary, in accordance with nature, those two classes should mutually fulfil one another." OSO 34-35:109. The argument is identical to that given in RN 214:19.
49
OSO 35-36:114.
50  

51  
**OSO** 36:115.

52  
**OSO** 36:114; 37:118.

53  

54  
**OSO** 37:118.

55  
**OSO** 41-43:135-139.

56  
**OSO** 43:140.

57  
**OSO** 42:137.

58  
**OSO** 43:140-141.

59  
**OSO** 45:145.

60  
**OSO** 44:144.

61  
**OSO** 44:144.

62  
**OSO** 45:146.

63  
**OSO** 45-46:148-150.

64  
**OSO** 46:150.

65  
**OSO** 47:151.

66  

67  
**OSO** 53:168-169.

68  
Unlike some other pastorals that the Metropolitan wrote for the clergy
and the faithful, Ukraine was addressed exclusively to the clergy.


OSO 70:231-232. A basic guiding principle for the social action of the Church was a priest's constant commitment to his spiritual duty. As Metropolitan Sheptytsky explained to his priests: "Fervor with regard to saving souls is the foundation of our unity and solidarity. We shall engage in social and economic matters, but only for the love of our faithful, and that love demands first of all that we care for their souls." OSO 57:186-187.

Sheptytsky's view of Christian social action as promoting the Church's spiritual mission through economic progress is abundantly evident in OSO: in a time of increasing materialism, the Metropolitan was convinced that socioeconomic issues were "the means of our influence on the people" (62:206), an instrument for the salvation of souls (64:211) and for leading people to God (70:231); through temporal goods, the Church would lead people to faith and morality (66:220, 70:232); and it was a priest's duty to see to it that this ultimate aim of his social work was clear in the minds of the faithful (70:233).

The Metropolitan returned to the same idea in 1905, addressing the eparchial sobor in L'viv with the words: "We need to tie people to the Church through our care for the material, temporal side of human life... The foundations of the future society will emerge from the solidarity of the Church with the democratic masses of peoples. We, Ruthenian priests - to whom God has entrusted the salvation of that poor, hard working and therefore most democratic of peoples - we understand the spirit of our times, we understand the needs of our society and the path upon which the
Church has entered. We understand how we must work in order to win people - not for ourselves but for the Church - how to care for the people's welfare, how through temporal goods to lead /the people/ to eternal ones."


71

OOS 11:32.

72

OOS 10:28, 12:33.

73

OOS 12:33.

74

OOS 18:51.

75

OOS 8:22.

76

OOS 39:129.

77

OOS 40:130-131.

78

OOS 40:131-133. In December 1905, in the wake of a government decision to discontinue salaries for religious educators, the Metropolitan addressed his clergy with a strong affirmation of the duty to catechize: even without pay. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Za laskoiu Vseevshnioho..." in Rishenie l'vivs'koho eparkhiial'noho sobora vidbutoho 28 i 29 hrydnta 1905, (Zhoukva: Drukarnia oo. Vasyliian, 1906), pp. 8-12.

79

OOS 40:132-133.

80

OOS 40:41:133.
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pershe Slovo Pastyria," ("Isus Khrystos, daiuchy..."), (1900), in 02-65, p. 10.

"0 Viri," in 02-65, p. 66. It is not our purpose to discuss how accurate such an appraisal of the contemporary Church’s global social commitment might have been, but only to indicate the kind of Christian social mission with which Sheptytsky was prepared to identify himself explicitly.

Promova, 5/XI, 1911, p. 691. The Metropolitan composed a prayer for the Ukrainian people which further confirmed his concern for the progress of his people: "Bestow your blessing also upon the temporal welfare of our people, allowing them to develop the natural strengths which you have given them, grant them a true and unspoiled enlightenment, bless their work in all the fields of science and welfare..." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Molytwa za ruskii narid," in Bozha Siiba, (Zhovkva: Drukarnia oo. Vasyl- liian, 1913), p. 131.
ment and who wanted to alleviate the economic depression of the Galician countryside through community cooperation. The cooperative philosophy represented a significant departure from profit-oriented capitalism that characterized the prevailing economic relationships in Galicia. Credit unions granted credit on the basis of a borrower's character, rather than on capital holdings; they consciously tried to assist borrowers to achieve economic independence; profits were shared among members; and the credit unions had a democratic organizational structure, allocating one vote to each member at annual meetings. When the first farm cooperatives began to appear in 1904 (dairy cooperatives in the Stryi region), priests again played a prominent role in their organization. On the links between the cooperative movement and the Ukrainian national movement, see Petro Stavenko, "Pro kooperatsiiu za kordonom i na Ukraini," in Rozvah: Kalendar poloneznych ukrajintsiv na roky 1916 i 1917, (Freistadt, /1916/), pp. 221-222.

92 The association, known as the "Bohoslovs'kyi suspil'no-ekonomichnyi kruzhok" and headed by the Reverend Amvrosii Redkevych, translated into Ukrainian and published a major German treatise on the social question: Yosyp Biderliak /Joseph Biedrelack, SJ/, Suspil'ne pytanie: prychynok do rozumienia yeho suty i yeho rozviazania, (L'viv, 1910); Public Archives of Canada, Andrii Zhuk Collection, MG 30 C 167, Vol. 92 File 21.

93 For instance, the Greek Catholic priest Ivan Yavors'kyi (1856-1930), a member of the Galician provincial diet, was an organizer of the agrarian strike. Other clerics noted for their involvement in the promotion of workers' rights were Rev. Stefan Onyshkevych, also a member of the diet, and the Basilian hegumen Soter Ortyns'kyi, who later became bishop of the Greek Catholic Church in the United States. Cf. Hryhor Luzhnyts'kyi,
Sheptyts’kyi showed an ongoing interest in seasonal workers and emigrés from Galicia, maintaining pastoral links with them through pastoral letters and brochures and seeing that their financial and social needs were served while they were abroad. See Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts’kyi, Rusynam osamy v Kanadi, (Zhidkov, 1901); his "V spravi opiky nad emigrantamy," in Lvivs’ki Arkhiieparkhiial’ni Vidomosti, XXIII: 7 (Lviv, 6 June, 1911), pp. 80-84; and his Pamiatka dla ruskikh robitnykiv v Nimechchyni, Frantsii, Spoluchenykh Derzhavakh, Kanadi, Brazylii i Argentyni (Zhidkova, 1912). This particular aspect of Sheptyts’kyi’s social and pastoral activity has been studied by Bohdan Kazymyr, "Pastyr’s’ki lysty ta iksi pys’ma Mtropylyta Andreia do kanads’kykh ukraintsiv," Lohos, IX:3 (Yorkton, Sask., 1958) pp. 217-224; and his "Starannia pro sezonovykh robitynykiv u frankomovnykh krahnakh," Lohos, XXXII:3 (Yorkton, 1981) pp. 202-214.

OSO 71:234.

OSO 66-67:220. It should be noted that the Metropolitan was equally concerned about the other extreme of pastoral work, the neglect of its spiritual side, which he called a "caricature of pastoral ministry," OSO 67:221. We discuss this more fully in the section on priests and politics.


A few examples will illustrate this aspect of the Metropolitan’s
activity. In 1911, Sheptytsky donated land (some 15 acres) and buildings in Korshev to the agricultural association "Sil's'kiy Hospodar." Nyva VIII:22 (L'viv, 15.XI.1911), pp. 732-733. The decision by the Austrian government to allot a monthly pension for priests' widows and orphans has been linked to political initiatives undertaken by the Metropolitan, Stepan Baran, Metropolit Andrei Sheptyts'kyi: Zhyttia i Dzial'nist', (Munich: Ukrains'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo 'Vernyhora,' 1947), pp. 38-39. The Metropolitan also provided funds that were used to establish banks (for example, the Land Bank and the Agricultural Mortgage Bank) which provided good terms on mortgages, thus enabling peasants to buy land. Dzerovych, "Mytropolyt - Metsenat," p. 75.

98 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pershe Slovo Pastyria" ("Isus Khrystos, daiuchy..."), in 02-65, p. 13.

99 In the Metropolitan's words, "...priests are promoting publications that propagate socialism openly." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." (Zhovkva: Drukarnia oo. Vasyliian, 1907), p. 5.

100 The party, which was formed by a moderate wing of Galician populists, was originally known as the Catholic Ruthenian Peoples' Union. Renamed the Christian Social Party in 1911, its program of social and economic reform was inspired by the Christian social teachings of Pope Leo XIII. The official organ of the party was the L'viv daily Ruslan (1897-1914).

101 Sheptytsky, "Besida," (1906), p. 68; see also ibid., p. 65: "times of general disunity and partisan disputes."

102 050 55-56:179.

103 050 62:207-208: "A priest may not act as a politician in church; nor may
mix politics into his sermon... He may not abuse the pulpit or the confessional for a political purpose."

104 Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." (1907), pp. 3-4.

105 OSU 55:176.

106 Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." (1907), p. 11. The Metropolitan restated his belief that internal divisions among the clergy were more harmful to the Church than socialists, in his pastoral "Zblyzhait' sia vybory..." in L'aeV XXIII:5 (L'viv, 16.V.1911), p. 68.


108 Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." (1907), pp. 4-5. It is quite interesting that in this pastoral Sheptytsky did not consider the possibility that the anonymous articles could, at least in some instances, have been anticlerical provocations by people who were not priests at all. What is certain is that the Greek Catholic bishops worried about more than just the articles. In particular, they noted that almost no one among the clergy protested against these onslaughts and that there were priests who subscribed to, and thus supported, the anticlerical and socialist press. Ibid.

109 Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." (1907), p. 8. On Sheptytsky's criticism of the exacting of fees by priests, see n. 78.


111 Sheptytsky et al., O solidarnosty (1905), p. 17.
Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy...," (1907), p. 4. See also the Metropolitan's call for priests to leave destructive work to the enemies of the Church in his pastoral "Zblyzhait' sia vybory...," (1911), p. 68.

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Nasha Prohraama" ("Uzhe vid samoho pochat-ku...") in OSR 65:215.


OSR 65:215.


Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy...," (1907), p. 5.

Sheptytsky et al., O solidarnosty (1905), p. 8.

Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy...," (1907), p. 13; and Sheptytsky et al., O vyborakh do parlamentu (1907), p. 8.

Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy...," (1907), p. 12. "Priests who tolerate such things in their midst are not only doomed to perdition ("zatrachenie"), but, by virtue of dragging the people into their own perdition ("pohublenie"), they will leave this world with the mark of Cain."

Ibid.

The bishops also felt that many of the public, personal attacks amounted to grave sin: "There are which must truly be regarded as grave sin and a public scandal. For, without sufficient evidence, casting public suspicion on another in a serious matter is a grave sin. Even to suspect without foundation

122 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., "Rik mynaie...," (Zhoukva: Drukarnia oo. Vasyliian, 1906), p. 10. Similarly, Sheptytsky and his fellow bishops emphasized the importance of a Christian basis for ethical decision-making in the public sphere: "...more and more often now in public life we are encountering issues in which some principle of Christian teaching is decisive." Ibid., p. 12.

Furthermore, the bishops' indicated their perception of the gravity of the threat to faith and morality in society by speaking of a need "to stand as one" under threat of loss of eternal salvation. Ibid., p. 10.

123 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Za laskoiu Useyvshnioho..." (Zhoukva, Drukarnia oo. Vasyliian, 1906), p. 8. The Metropolitan's concern about a "potential persecution" of religion was not unique to this document. He had mentioned it in 1904 (OSQ 69:229) and would return to it again in 1908; see Sheptytsky et al., O tsisarskim vyvyleiu ("Dnia 2 hrudnia..."); Zhoukva: Drukarnia oo. Vasyliian, 1908), p. 5.


125 Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiia pered poslidnimy..." (1907), p. 17.

126 OSQ 66:219. One such duty was the duty to vote. Sheptytsky, "Zblyzhaiut'

ty. On the contrary, priests should participate in the social life..."

Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." (1907), pp. 27-28. The specific reference of this passage was to the secular press which had published items that were critical and even hostile to the Church. The bishops recognized that the newspapers enjoyed considerable popular authority and hence the reference to the Areopagus.


The same view was expressed in OSO 62:207: "a priest cannot be a politician in church nor mix politics into his sermons..."

OSO 63:210. Similarly, on mixing politics and pastoral work: "that kind of mixing of the human with the divine, of the sacred with the profane, would be an abuse of holy things for temporal, human goals." Sheptytsky et al., "Rik mynaie...", (1906), p. 2.

Sheptytsky et al., "Rik mynaie...", (1906), p. 3.

OSO 63:211; Sheptytsky et al., "Rik mynaie...", (1906), p. 3.

In 1906, the Ukrainian bishops wrote the following directive to the clergy: "We require not only that you do not diverge a single hair away from either the Law of God or from the principles of the faith, but that those principles be, for you and the people, the leading thought in political work ('v pratsi horozhans'kii')." Sheptytsky et al., "Rik mynaie...", (1906), p. 8.

OSO 64:211.

Sheptytsky et al., "Rik mynaie...," (1906), p. 8.

Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnymy...," (1907), pp. 8-9.

Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnymy...," (1907), p. 25.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky drew attention to the grave error of transforming pastoral duties into an exclusively political exercise in OSU 67:222.

The limit of acceptable clerical involvement in politics was stated in the following way: "In no way can we consider as a good priest one who is more in solidarity with any political or social organization or party than he is with the Church, with the clergy and with us /i.e., the bishops/." Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnymy...," (1907), p. 16.

Sheptytsky, "Nasha Prohrama," (1899), in 02-65, p. 27.

Sheptytsky stressed that he had accepted the episcopal appointment with some reluctance and only as an act of obedience, not because of ambition or a faltering monastic vocation; likewise, he identified himself ethnically as a Ruthenian and was certainly not a "foreigner" or a "cynical infiltrator."


OSU 56:182.

OSU 56:183.

OSU 57:185-186.

Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy...," (1907), p. 16.


Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy...," (1907), p. 16.


Sheptysky et al., "Khotiai pered posiidnimy...," (1907), p. 15-16.


Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro doistoistvo i oboviazky sviashchennykh," ("Po trydtsiatiykh..."), in *02-65*, p. 188.

Sheptytsky, "Nasha Prohrama," (1899), in *02-65*, p. 22.

Sheptytsky, "Pro doistoistvo," in *02-65*, p. 188.
Sheptytsky, "Nasha Prohrama," (1899), in 02-65, p. 22.

Sheptytsky, "Nasha Prohrama," (1899), in 02-65, p. 28.

Sheptytsky, "Nasha Prohrama," (1899), in 02-65, p. 28.

Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." (1907), p. 10.


Sheptytsky, "Nasha Prohrama," (1899), in 02-65, p. 22.

OSO 55-56:179.


Sheptytsky et al., O solidarnosty, (1905), p. 15-16.

Sheptytsky et al., O solidarnosty, (1905), p. 15.


Sheptytsky et al., O solidarnosty, (1905), p. 4. The other five collective pastorals were: Sheptytsky et al., "Rik mynaie vid khvyl..." (1906), Sheptytsky et al., O vyborakh do parlamentu (1907), Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy..." (1907), Sheptytsky et al., "Zblyzhaiut' sia vybory...," (1911), and Sheptytsky et al., O reformi vybornoho prava, (1913).

Sheptytsky, "Za laskoiu Usevyshnioho..." (1906), pp. 5-6.
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Poruchenia, 1-2. Sheptytsky et al., "Zblyzhajut' sia wybory...," (1911), p. 68. This attempt to instil clerical solidarity during the elections of 1907 did not succeed. See Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered hoslidnimi...," (1907), p. 4.

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Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered hoslidnimi...," (1907), p. 4.

192
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Poklykuiuchys..." Administrative notice dated 27 July, 1908. Reprinted in "Ad maiorem Poloniae gloriem," in Dilo XXIX:182 (14 August, 1908) p. 1. The controversial prohibition, which applied to the establishment of reading societies, brotherhoods and associations, organizing assemblies ("vicha"), conferences and meetings, was roundly criticized in the Dilo article.

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Sheptytsky et al., O reformi vyboroho prava, (1913), p. 6. See also Sheptytsky et al., "Zblyzhajut' sia wybory...," (1911), pp. 68-69.

195
Sheptytsky et al., O reformi vyboroho prava, (1913), p. 6.

196
"... during the elections, keep close to (''trymaite sia'') your spiritual fathers, proceed (''postupaite'') together with them." Sheptytsky et al., O vyborakh do parlamentu (1907), p. 13. See also Sheptytsky et al., O reformi vybornoho prava, (1913), p. 6.

198 "Ordynariiat poruchaie..." (1906), p. 3.

199 Sheptytsky et al., O vyborakh do parlamentu (1907), p. 11.

200 Sheptytsky et al., "Zblyzhaie' sia vybory...," (1911), p. 68.

201 Sheptytsky et al., O vyborakh do parlamentu (1907), p. 9.

202 Sheptytsky et al., "Zblyzhaie' sia vybory...," (1911), p. 69.

203 Sheptytsky et al., "Zblyzhaie' sia vybory...," (1911), p. 68.

204 Sheptytsky et al., "Zblyzhaie' sia vybory...," (1911), p. 69.


207 Sheptytsky et al., O tsisarskim yuubleju, (1908), pp. 7-8.

208 OSO 68:226.


210 OSO 69:230.
211
OSO 69:229.

212
OSO 68:225-226. The texts cited were Romans 13:1 and Titus 3:1.

213
OSO 69:227.

214
OSO 69:228-230.

215
OSO 69:229. The May Laws had placed schools and marriages under civil jurisdiction.

216
OSO 68:225.

217
OSO 68:225.

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Sheptytsky et al., O vyborakh do parlamentu (1907), p. 6.

219
OSO 42:136.

220
OSO 43-44:142-143.

221
OSO 43:139.

222
OSO 5-6:10.

223
OSO 45:145.

224
OSO 43:141.

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The document convoking the meeting of priests was attached to the pastoral Sheptytsky et al., "Rik myniaie...," (1906). On the efforts to mobilize clerical solidarity in view of the elections, see also the pastoral to the faithful Sheptytsky et al., O vyborakh do parlamentu (1907); the pastoral to the clergy, Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy...," (1907), and the
pastoral to the clergy, Sheptytsky et al., "Zblyzhajut' sia vybory..." (1911), pp. 67-69.

226 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Donoshu Vam..." /Zhovkva: Drukarnia oo. Vasyliian/, (1906).

227 OSO 43-45:140-145.

228 OSO 45:145.

229 Sheptytsky et al., O vyborakh do parlimentu (1907) p. 9: "Our member of parliament in Vienna must know and be attuned to all the needs of our people, for how could he defend the interests of the people if the good of the people and everything that concerns the people were not close to his heart?"

230 Sheptytsky et al., O vyborakh do parlimentu (1907) p. 11.

231 Sheptytsky et al., O vyborakh do parlimentu (1907) p. 9.


233 Sheptytsky et al., "Khotiai pered poslidnimy...," (1907), p. 18.

234 Sheptytsky et al., "Zblyzhajut' sia vybory...," (1911), p. 68.


237 "They considered themselves freed from the duty to oversee the school, and they came to see the school, now emancipated from ecclesiastical authority, as alien and of no concern to the Church." Sheptytsky, "Za laskoiu Vsevyshnioho..." (1906), p. 7.
Sheptytsky, "Za laskoiu Vseyvshnioho..." (1906), p. 7. Comparisons with the situation in France were also made in Sheptytsky et al., O vyborakh do parlamentu (1907) p. 10.


Sheptytsky et al., O vyborakh do parlamentu (1907) p. 10-11. As decon-fessionalization continued into 1908, the bishops l=mented that Catholic schools were being opened to all faiths. Sheptytsky et al., O tsisarskim yuuy-leiu, (1908), p. 5.


Sheptytsky, O supruzhestvi i rodyni, (1902), p. 10. (Emphasis added). Metropolitan Sheptytsky drew a further distinction between the jurisdictions of the two authorities: the discharging of estates was a civil matter, but
decisions about the permissibility or validity of marriages belonged to the Church alone. *Ibid.*

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Sheptytsky, "Naimylostyviishyi nash monarkh..." (1914), p. 96.

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Sheptytsky, "Naimylostyviishyi nash monarkh..." (1914), pp. 96-97.

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It appears that Sheptytsky’s theologically-founded objection to the "usurpation of God’s right" may indeed have been motivated by more than just a desire to defend Catholics from spiritual interference by Orthodox prelates. For, in a related statement of his own, Metropolitan Sheptytsky suggested that in light of the Christian faith he was prepared to respect the binding force of oaths of loyalty on both sides of the conflict. In his sermon on 6 September, 1914, he said, "I ask you to pray for all of them, even those who are fighting on this or on the other side. For, my Beloved, through Christ we are all brothers and need God’s mercy." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Zlishy-sia my...," in Dzerovych, "Materiialy do istoriif martyrol’ogi!," (1916), p. 231.

Sheptytsky, "Prevazhna - dorohi - khvylia..." (1914), p. 100. Elsewhere, the Metropolitan urged unswerving loyalty to the faith unto death: "You, who in battle are threatened with death every day, be ever ready to stand before the throne of God and to give an account of your whole life." "Naimylostvyiishyi nash monarkh..." (1914), p. 96; and "Keep to /the Church/ even if you would have to offer much for her, including your own lives." Sheptytsky, "Ziishlysa my...," (1914), p. 232.

The religious and social measures included an order that, until the end of the war, Sunday and feast-day liturgies be followed by a special prayer service ("Vo vremia brany") for victory and that they be concluded with supplications before the exposed Blessed Sacrament. In addition, access to churches would be increased by keeping them open during evenings and the faithful were to be encouraged to receive communion as often as possible. Finally, priests were directed to encourage the faithful to make donations through the archbishop's chancery to the Red Cross for the war wounded and to care for the families of those who went to war. Sheptytsky, "Naimylostvyiishyi nash monarkh..." (1914), p. 97.

Sheptytsky, "Naimylostvyiishyi nash monarkh..." (1914), p. 97.

Sheptytsky, "Naimylostvyiishyi nash monarkh..." (1914), p. 97.

Sheptytsky, "Naimylostvyiishyi nash monarkh..." (1914), p. 97.

Sheptytsky's view on the potential geopolitical consequences of an Austrian victory was no doubt informed by the prevailing Ukrainian political opinion at the time in Galicia. Two weeks earlier, on 1 August, 1914, a Supreme Ukrainian Council (Holovna Ukraїns'ka Rada) was formed by members of the major Ukrainian...
political parties in Galicia. In a manifesto on 3 August to the Ukrainian people, the Council had declared: "The victory of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy will be our victory. The more severe the blow to Russia, the sooner the hour of Ukrainian liberation will arrive.... Let Ukrainians devote all their material and moral strength toward destroying the historic enemy of Ukraine." Cited in Kost' Levyts'kyi, Istoriiia politychnoi dumky halyts'kykh ukrainaiv, 1848-1914, (Lviv: Nakladom vlasnym z drukarni oo. Vasyl'ian, 1926), p. 722.


264 Sheptytsky, "Memorandum," (1914), pp. 122-123. Rallying his people in his pastoral of 24 August, Sheptytsky again referred to the issue of religious liberty as a crucial point of contention in the conflict: "The war is being fought over us ('Viina vedes' o nas') because the tsar in Moscow could not stand that we in the Austrian state have religious and national freedom ('svobodu viry ta narodnosti'); he wants to tear it from us and put us in irons." Sheptytsky, "Prevazhna - dorohi - khvylia..." (1914), p. 99.

265 Sheptytsky, "Memorandum," (1914), pp. 122-123.

266 "All these decrees must proceed from the spiritual, rather than from civil
or military authorities, so that in this way a complete breach would be made
with the Russian system. The establishment of a system corresponding to that
of St. Petersburg would clearly be inappropriate." Sheptytsky, "Memorandum,
(1914), p. 123.
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Sheptytsky, "Ziishlysia my..." (1914), pp. 231-232.
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Another issue that Metropolitan Sheptytsky cited as an instance of invalid
state interference in the jurisdiction of the Church was that of transfer of
rite. In a 1904 pastoral to Polish-speaking Greek Catholics, Sheptytsky remin-
ded them: "A change of rite that is registered with the civil authority cannot
be recognized by the authority of the Church. It is unlawful and illegal
('nieprawną i nielegalną')." Metropolita Andrzej Szeptycki, Do Polaków obrządk-
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Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., O Yuvaliie svobody Tserkvy ("I prostr-
tupil' Isus..."), (Zhoffka: Drukarnia oo. Vasylia, 1913), p. 11.
271
Andrii Zhuk, Suspil'no-ekonomichni vidnosyny v Halychyni i kul'turno-ekono-
michna pratsia halyts'kykh ukraintsiv, (L'ivov: Nakladom avtora, 1911), pp. 4-
5. The proportions reflect figures from the census of 1900 for religious self-
identification: i.e., Polish Roman Catholics to Ukrainian Greek Catholics.
Although denominational affiliation was not always the same as ethnic affilia-
tion (i.e., some Poles were Greek Catholic, while some Ukrainians were Roman
Catholic), another indicator of ethnic self-identification in the same census,
native language, yielded a similar proportion of Poles to Ukrainians in Galici-
cia; in that category, 54% of Galicians considered Polish as their mother
tongue while 42% named Ukrainian.

Despite the awakening of Ukrainian nationalism and the bare majority of Poles in Galicia, Austria favored the Poles to such an extent that an eminent historian has referred to the province as a "Polish monopoly." A.J.P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918. A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria Hungary*, (London: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 218. For example, in 1871, the Poles had received effective administrative control of the province in the form of a special Minister for Galician Affairs. And in 1899, a declaration of German aims (the Whitsuntide program) had included a proposal to recognize the province's Polish "historic nationality" with its own official language.


Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Do ukrains'kol intelligentsi!," "V lysti pastyrs'kim..."), in 02-65, p. 213.


Sheptytsky et al., "Rik mynaie vid khuyli..." (1906), p. 12.


Sheptytsky et al., "Rik mynaie vid khuyli..." (1906), p. 12.
Sheptytsky et al., "Khoziai pered poslidnimy..." (1907), 15.


Sheptytsky, "Pershe Slovo Pastyria," 02-65, p. 17. The cited scriptural passage was Mt. 5:44.

Sheptytsky, "Pershe Slovo Pastyria," 02-65, p. 17. This did not, however, exclude a priority of loves. The Metropolitan thus spoke of the love of one's country as prior to other forms of love: "A Christian must love all people. But this in no way prevents him from loving his family and his country with his first love ('naipershoi liubov'iu liubyty')." Ibid. The same synthesis of universal and particular concerns was restated in the Metropolitan's prayer for the Ukrainian people: "We the children of the Ruthenian people, in obedience to Your holy will, love all the peoples whom You redeemed with Your Blood on the Cross, and we love our own Ruthenian people first and foremost ('peredousim')." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Molytva za ruskyi narid," in his Bozha Sibea, (Zhovkva: Drukarnia oo. Vasyliian, 1913), p. 130.


Szeptycki, Do polaków, (1904), pp. 6-7.


Sheptytsky, "Pershe Slovo Pastyria," 02-65, p. 17. The same message was echoed in another context in 1907: "Christians are permitted to join together and to organize for the defence of their rights, in order to improve their temporal destiny, but they would sin if jealousy or hatred were to be the
motive of their conduct, their unity, their organization." Sheptytsky et al.,

O wyborakh, (1907) p. 9.

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Bishop Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pravdyvna Vira," ("U truvin, tsicho roku..."),
(1900), in 02-65, p. 65.

292
Sheptytsky, "Pravdyvna Vira," (1900), in 02-65, p. 65.

293
Sheptytsky, "Pravdyvna Vira," (1900), in 02-65, p. 66.

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Sheptytsky, "Pravdyvna Vira," (1900), in 02-65, p. 66.

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Sheptytsky, "Pravdyvna Vira," (1900), in 02-65, pp. 66-67. In his pastoral
to Polish Greek Catholics, Sheptytsky again singled out language, convictions
and ethnic identity ("narodowość") as inalienable rights and assured them that
he would respect those rights. Szeptycki, Do polaków, (1904), p. 6.

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299
Sheptytsky, "Pravdyvna Vira," (1900), in 02-65, p. 68.

300
Sheptytsky et al., O reformi vybornoho prava, (1913), p. 6. The cited
Ukrainian precept ("Maite do vsikh liubov, ale svoho derzhit' sia") closely
resembled a popular couplet from the Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko: "Study
other /heritages/, but do not forsake your own."


302 According to Ukrainian Radical Party member of parliament Kyrylo Tryl’ovskyi, the Ukrainian public was quite receptive to such an image: "All the Ruthenians I spoke to — peasants, workers, officials and even gentry — were almost inspired by Sichyns’kyi’s act... Most Ukrainians consider Sichyns’kyi a national hero." /Kyrylo Tryl’ovskyi/, Pototskyi, Sichynskyi, Sheptytskyi, Promova posla dr. Tryl’ovskoho..., (Kolomyia: n.p., 1908), pp. 47-48.

303 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., "My uzhe neraz..." (Zhovkva: Drukarnia oo. Vasyliian, 1908), pp. 4-5. The non-Christian press was directly blamed for this. Ibid., p. 10.

304 Sheptytsky et al., "My uzhe neraz..." (1908), p. 5.

305 Sheptytsky et al., "My uzhe neraz..." (1908), p. 6.


308 Sheptytsky et al., "My uzhe neraz..." (1908), p. 10.

309 Sheptytsky et al., "My uzhe neraz..." (1908), p. 5.

310 Sheptytsky et al., "My uzhe neraz..." (1908), pp. 10-11.

311 Among the sources of Ukrainian dissatisfaction were: the election law of
1906, which they felt reduced their rights in provincial elections by limiting their number of mandates (to 28 of 106); the existence of "two-mandate" ridings, whose purpose even Polish sources admitted was intended to prevent Ukrainian representatives from outnumbering Poles in the rural areas; and the rigging of elections by the Polish authorities, which in the 1908 elections resulted in the election of 8 Russophiles. Demkovych-Dobrians'kyi, "Potots'kyi i Bobzhyns'kyi," p. 91; Levyts'kyi, Istor'ia politychnoi dumky, (1926), pp. 468-469.

312 Sheptyts'kyi et al., O reformi vyboroho prava, (1913), p. 2.

313 Sheptyts'kyi et al., O reformi vyboroho prava, (1913), p. 3.

314 Sheptyts'kyi et al., O reformi vyboroho prava, (1913), p. 4.

315 Sheptyts'kyi et al., O reformi vyboroho prava, (1913), p. 4.

316 The proposals were: first, that the Ukrainian parties agree to a proportion of 2:8 a the structure of the provincial board ("sklad kraiowego yddilu"); while provincial commissions and institutions would reflect the same proportion of ethnic representatives as were elected to parliament; second, that the Polish parties agree to a reduction of two-seat electoral ridings ("dvomandatovi okruhy") from 16 to 12; and third, that Polish parties agree to reopen talks on the question of establishing a Ukrainian university.

Levyts'kyi, Istor'ia politychnoi dumky (1926), pp. 42-43.

317 Levyts'kyi, Istor'ia politychnoi dumky (1926), p. 42.

318 Levyts'kyi, Istor'ia politychnoi dumky (1926), p. 43.

319 Levyts'kyi, Istor'ia politychnoi dumky (1926), p. 43.
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Bez wątpienia..." in "Z ankety polsko-ruskiej 'Przeglądu powszechnego'," Przegląd Powszechny CXXIX:385 (Cracow, January, 1916), p. 100. Although written in 1914, the letter was not published until 1916 due to the war.


Sheptytsky, "Bez wątpienia..." (1914), p. 100.

Sheptytsky, "Bez wątpienia..." (1914), p. 100.

In addition to numerous press attacks, Ukrainian politicians levelled criticism at Sheptytsky in the Austrian parliament. See /Tryl'ovskiy/, Pototskyi, Sichynskyi, (1908); and Mykhailo Lozyns'kyi, "Mitteilungen aus der österreichischen Ukraine," in "Interpellation des Abgeordneten Stefanyk und Genossen an Seine Exzellenz den Herrn Justizminister...," Anhang zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des österreichisches Reichsrates im Jahre 1908, 96 Sitzung der XVIII Session am 26 Juni 1908, (Vienna, 1908), pp. 10898-10904. An intriguingly original perspective is Mykhailo Hrushevsky, "Krov," in Literaturno-naukovy Vistnyk 42:5 (L'viv, 1908), pp. 380-385, which condemned not only homicide in all its forms, but which also lamented the rash of suicides among Ukrainian youth in the early months of 1908, which the author attributed to political reasons.
C. Chapter 2

1. In the preceding Austrian period, the collective pastorals did not pose much of a problem, since they were proportionally much fewer in relation to Sheptytsky's writings, and it was possible to situate them within the overall picture of Sheptytsky's ethical reflection on social issues at that time. But since that proportion is much higher in this second period, an explanation for their inclusion here seems warranted.

In the first place, it would appear to be unduly restrictive to exclude any and all official statements by Sheptytsky simply because they were co-signed by others. It appears to be a safe assumption that, since the Metropolitan participated actively and directly in the drafting of the collective pastorals in their entirety, he certainly would not have endorsed anything with which he was in fundamental disagreement.

Secondly, even leaving aside the question of attributing authorship on an individual basis, the documents in question have an importance as collective statements as well. For the possibility should not be excluded that, in the final analysis, the collective pastorals of the Greek Catholic episcopate will be understood as the products of a collective process of reflection, discussion and deliberation (as, the bishops often repeated, they were intended to be read) rather than as a mere collage of individual opinions.

2. Yu. D. Romanovskii, Ukrains'kii separatizm i Germaniia, (Tokyo: n.p., 1920), p. 8. Anti-Sheptytsky polemics in Russia, which began to appear shortly after his exile, was likely intended as a propaganda of justification in support of Russian policy towards the Greek Catholic Church. As international efforts were made to secure Sheptytsky's release, the Russian
polemicists stepped up their attacks.

While Sheptytsky's letter to Tsar Nicholas was apparently accessible only to Russian polemicists who used it as cannon fodder in their propaganda campaign, there appears to be no basis for doubting the authenticity of such a document. Indeed, the position that Sheptytsky is alleged to have expressed in it is virtually identical to his reactions to the military takeovers of Galicia during World War II: an explicit acceptance of the military-political situation, an implicit recognition that the Church had no say in the matter, and a readiness and commitment to carry on the Christian mission of the Church, no matter how hostile the conditions.

One of Sheptytsky's Russian critics, Yurii Romanovskii, had had the opportunity to peruse the Metropolitan's confiscated archives between 1914 and 1917, while they were in Russian custody. In his view, the Metropolitan was nothing but "a politician in a monastic soutane, a despiser of Russia and a loyal servant of Germany and Rome, who played a leading role in the organization of a Ukrainian separatist movement." Romanovskii, Ukrainskii separatizm i Germaniia, (1920), p. 10.

Polemical attacks against Sheptytsky followed the Russian takeover of Galicia. Among other things, the Metropolitan was alleged to have personally funded cadres of Ukrainian riflemen to fight the invading Russians and also to have been connected with the arrests of Russian activists by Austrian authorities. Kost' Levyts'kyi, Istoryia vyzvol'nykh zmahan' halyts'-kykh ukraintsiv z chasu svitovoi v'iani, 1914-1918, Vol. 1 (L'viv: Nakladom ulasnym, 1928), pp. 59-60.

In the summer of 1917, the Russian General Staff published intelligence information on the Metropolitan's activity, linking it with Ukrainian "separatist" collaboration with the Germans. Romanovskii, Ukrainskii separatizm, (1920), p. 13. Behind the polemics were Russian charges that Aus-
tria had rounded up, arrested and hanged suspected Russophiles in Galicia and Bukovyna, all of which, in Romanovskii's assessment, "was carried out with Sheptytsky's blessing." *Ibid.*, p. 8.

After the Metropolitan's release from Russian custody, personal attacks alleging that the Metropolitan was either anti-Polish or anti-Russian followed him on his journey back to L'viv. While in Switzerland, Sheptytsky clarified his position: "I have come to Switzerland ... via neither Berlin nor Austria, where I had no business, since I do not involve myself in politics. It is true that such aims have been attributed to me, but that was a mistake, for politics is not my business and I am not given to chauvinism. Despite being of Polish Ruthenian descent, I returned to the rite and the nationality of my ancestors, and that is certainly no proof of chauvinism. Those who claim that I am an enemy of Russia are confusing the /present/ country with the Bobrinskii-Evlogii régime which was disavowed by the Duma and by the Russian revolution, and they forget that a good number of my faithful and several priests in Russia who are with me are Russian." /Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky/, "Une interview de Mgr. Szeptycky. L'Archevêque uniate travaille au rapprochement de l'Eglise d'Occident et de l'Eglise d'Orient," interview in Fribourg, 13.VIII.1917 for *Journal de Genève*, reprinted in *Ereignisse in der Ukraine, 1914-1922, deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergründe*, Theophil Hornykiewicz, comp., Vol. II (Philadelphia: W. K. Lypynsky East European Research Institute, 1967), Document N*445, p. 438.

As for his involvement in the political sphere, Sheptytsky later would argue that it was both necessary and legitimate for him as a Ukrainian bishop to express the interests of Ukrainians. Addressing the Austrian House of Lords in February, 1918, he stated: "Unfortunately, Ukrainians are
represented in this esteemed House by only three members and so a bishop must often take the floor on purely political matters. Obviously, I do not need to justify myself. For, the view that a bishop must not become involved in purely political matters is a fundamentally false opinion and one that is insulting to us. Like all citizens, we have the right and often the duty to address purely political questions ('rein politische Fragen')." /Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky/, "Es ist die Frage...," Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Herrenhauses des Reichsrates, 28 Sitzung der XXII Session am 28 Februar, 1918, (Vienna: Staatsdruckerei, 1918), p. 809. At the same time, the Metropolitan saw real limits to what church leaders could actually do to effect political change. He cited the example of Pope Benedict XV, who had tried to intervene with the Entente and the Central Powers in order to seek an end to the hostilities, but to no avail. /Sheptytsky/, "Es ist die Frage...," (1918), p. 811; and the letter of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky to General Rozwadowski, 4 January, 1919, French translation ("J'ai recu hier...") in Korolevskij, Métropolite André Szeptyckyj, (1964), p. 410.

In a later statement, the Metropolitan seemed to indicate one of the fundamental lines that he drew between acceptable and unacceptable political activity. Quite simply, he considered it important to support legitimate aspirations of Ukrainians as long as this did not involve unfairness vis-à-vis the Poles. The Metropolitan explained, "Mon abstention de toute politique fut interprétée par les Polonais, et l'est jusqu'à présent, dans le sens d'une politique antipolonaise, ce qu'elle n'a jamais été... je n'ai jamais dit une seule parole qui ait été contre les Polonais; je n'ai même jamais parlé des souffrances que la politique polonaise nous infligeait, et je n'ai jamais tâché de gagner les sympathies de ma nation par une fronde contre le système polonais qui nous opprimait." Similarly, the Metropolitan


4 Tsars'kyi Viazzen', (1918), pp. 31-32, 48. According to Korolevskij, Galician orphans were taken to a government school in Taganrog on the Black Sea. If they responded negatively to the question whether they were Polish, they were enrolled as Orthodox pupils and educated in the Orthodox faith. However, when the Metropolitan's objections came to the attention of the school's director, the matter was apparently resolved satisfactorily.


7 Tsars'kyi Viazzen', p. 54.
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Tsars’kyi Viazen’, p. 54.

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Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky/, 26 August, 1917 "My vsi perenesly..."

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky/, "Veliyi yesy, Hospody...", 10.IX.1917,

Sheptytsky/, "Veliyi yesy, Hospody...," (1917), pp. 171-172.


Sheptytsky/, "Veliyi yesy, Hospody...," (1917), pp. 173-174. In the following year, Sheptytsky pointed out that, whereas in Russia Ukrainians were denied the right to exist as a people, in Austria they had had the opportunity to "preserve our national and religious life." Now that the war was over, Ukrainians expected that Austria would "allow us to develop all of our national strengths under the aegis of the Habsburg dynasty." In particular, he expected that Austria would soon provide for two vital Ukrainian needs: their own schools and regional self-government. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky/, "Es ist die Frage...," Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Herrenhauses des Reichsrates, 28 Sitzung der XXII Session am 28 Februar, 1918, (Vienna: Staatsdruckerei, 1918), p. 812.

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (L’viv: Zdrukarni "Dila," 1918), pp. 3-4.

The pastoral referred to thousands of Ukrainian children who had been orphaned by the war. Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 12.

Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 5.

Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), pp. 7-8. Along with
the focus on catechization and preaching, the attempt to restore Ukrainian Catholic life would also include greater attention to the distinction between "good" and "bad" books, and the promotion of a cult of St. Josaphat, the seventeenth-century Ukrainian Catholic martyr whose relics the bishops expected would be transferred from Vienna to Galicia after the war. Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), pp. 8-9.

25 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 5

26 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 4.

27 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 5.

28 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), pp. 5-6.

29 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 6.

30 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 6.

31 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 4.

32 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 10.

33 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 9-10.

34 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 11.


37 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 10.

38 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 11.
39 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 4.
40 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), pp. 5, 6.
41 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 5.
42 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 5.
43 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 6.
44 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 6-7.
45 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 7.
46 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 6.
47 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 7.
48 Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki...," (1918), p. 7.
50 Sheptytsky, "O vykhovanniu pytomsiv...," (1918), p. 207.
51 Sheptytsky, "O vykhovanniu pytomsiv...," (1918), p. 209. This attempt to introduce celibacy became a cause célèbre in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic and even the secular press in Galicia during the 1920’s, as Bishops Khomysyn and Kotsiiov’s’kyi banned candidates to the married priesthood from the seminaries in Stanyslaviv and Peremyshl’. Sheptytsky, however,
perhaps more attentive to the will of the people, favored a gradualist approach to the introduction of celibacy and allowed for the free, personal decision of seminarians in the matter. Also, unlike his episcopal colleagues, Sheptytsky continued to ordain married men. He would later explain that "in this matter more than in any other, excessive rigor always seemed dangerous to me." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Rapport au Père Gennochi," ("J'accepte avec grande reconnaissance...") Rome, 12 February, 1923, in Postulation for the cause of the Beatification and Canonization of Servant of God Andrei Sheptytsky, Collected Works, Vol. 1: "Epistolae et Relationes ad Sanctam Sedem lingua Gallica Exaratae, 1914-1943," (Rome, 1965), p. 14a (I:70).

Overall, despite considerable popular dissension, the combination of hard-line and soft-line approaches to the promotion of clerical celibacy did have its effect on the clerical composition of the Greek Catholic Archeparchy of L'viv. Whereas at the turn of the century celibate priests had represented only some 4% of the entire Ukrainian Catholic clergy, by 1939 that number had increased to 25%.

52 Sheptytsky, "O vykhovanniu pytomsiv..." (1918), p. 205.

53 Sheptytsky, "O vykhovanniu pytomsiv..." (1918), p. 205-206. In later years, Sheptytsky elaborated further on the "materialism" of some candidates to the priesthood in Galicia: "...vu que notre jeunesse est généralement pauvre et que les cas sont rares où les parents peuvent entretenir leurs fils au Séminaire, nous appréhendons toujours que des matérialistes sans vocation se présentent et que par une certaine hypocrisie se passent pour de bons séminaristes." Sheptytsky, "Rapport au Père Gennochi," (1923), p. 14 (I:69).

Sheptytsky also considered the virtue of serving the common good as
especially necessary for priests who wanted to serve in Russia. After the Bolshevik Revolution, he felt, missionaries to Russia would have to be prepared to sacrifice material benefits. As the Metropolitan explained, whereas the tsarist state had given some financial support to priests, the Revolution abolished those "material inducements." /Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky/, Address of Archbishop Andrew Szeptycki about the Catholic Missionary Work in what once formed the Russian Empire, (New York: n.p., 1922), p. 6. By the same token, Sheptytsky felt that the new order in Russia made it difficult for materialists among the Russian Orthodox clergy: "Those who were employees /of the state/ must now become pastors.... The position of the priest, which was so good for the materialist under the Old Régime, is now /imperilled/ under the Bolsheviks. Now nobody will want to be a /Russian Orthodox/ priest." /Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky/, Talk at St. Augustine's Seminary in Toronto, 26 August, 1922, ("I will first speak..."), in "Archbishop Andrew Szeptyckyj in Canada (1922)," Analecta O.S.B.M. Series II, Sectio II, Vol. III (Rome, 1958), p. 105.

54 Sheptytsky, "O vykhovanniu pytomsiv...," (1918), p. 205.


56 /Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky/, "Es ist die Frage...," Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Herrenhauses des Reichsrates, 28 Sitzung der XXII Session an 28 Februar, 1918, (Vienna: Staatsdruckerei, 1918), p. 810. Although formally the Brest treaty made no mention of the right of self-determination, Sheptytsky observed that the guiding idea of the treaty was "a desire to create ethnographic boundaries." Ibid. He considered that this had been stated with sufficient clarity in the official commentary to the treaty.
The public debate around the annexation issue was considerably less oblique. A case in point was an editorial in the socially-oriented Ukrainian Catholic periodical Nyva, which affirmed: "Throughout the world, democratic ideas are now coming to the fore. And the one positive consequence of the present World War will be the complete democratization of all public life in Europe. Everyone sees and understands this. Only the Poles, "aristocrats" that they are, though perhaps they too understand what is happening, are instinctively resisting this powerful, democratic idea. And naturally so: as the saying goes, 'beati possidentes.' That new idea requires them to make some painful sacrifices." "Za Kholms'ku zemliu," (1918), p. 67. The editorial went on to observe, quite perceptively, that the application of the democratic principle of ethnographic boundaries (i.e., majority rule) in the Kholm and Podlachia regions was bound to be seen by most Poles as a "dangerous precedent" at a time when the political fate of east Galicia was yet to be resolved.

Looking back at this time five years later, Sheptytsky would remark that, for a variety of reasons "it became more and more difficult /for the Poles/ to dominate over the Ruthenians." Sheptytsky, "Rapport au Père Gennochi," (1923), p. 26 (I:82).
Catholics. In the following month, on 27 March, 1918, at a meeting in L'viv of the St. Paul Association of Ukrainian Catholic priests, some 200 priests declared that they welcomed the establishment of a Ukrainian National state in Kiev and its annexation of Kholm and Podlachia, and protested against continuing efforts by Poland to Latinize and Polonize the local Ukrainian population. "Zaia va ukraïns'koho katolyts'koho dukhovenstva u spravi kholms'kii," Nyua XIV:4 (L'viv, April, 1918), p. 132-133.

To the Poles, as Bishop Pelczar argued, the martyrs of Kholm had died for the Catholic faith and now, through the treaty at Brest-Litovsk, their children were being given up to "the same Cossacks who had tortured their parents and grandparents." "Za kholms'ku zemliu," (1918) p. 65.


64 Sheptytsky et al., "Podobalosia Vsevyshniomu..." (1919), p. 4.

65 Sheptytsky et al., "Podobalosia Vsevyshniomu..." (1919), p. 3.


67 Sheptytsky et al., "Podobalosia Vsevyshniomu..." (1919), p. 4. The bishops had expressed quite the same perspective in their collective pastoral the year before. Placing their hope in God's mercy, they quoted the Biblical passage, "if our living Lord is angry for a little while, to rebuke and discipline us, he will again be reconciled with his own servants," (2 Maccab. 7:33). Sheptytsky et al., "Hlyboki i tiazhki..." (1918), p. 4.


74 iurs'Ko! Hory: Prychynky do biografi Sluhy Bozhoho Andreia Sheptyts'Koho

75 na pidstavu chuzhomovnykh zherel, Biblioteka Lohosu, Vol. 34, (Yorkton, Sask.: Redeemer's Voice Press, 1963), p. 67. See also Cyrille Korolevskij, Mētropolite André Szeptyckij, 1865-1944, Pratsi Ukraïns'Koho Bohoslovs'Koho


74 "Memorial ukrains'koho Posol'stvu do papy Benedyktta XV," 30 March, 1920,
in Ivan Choma, "Ukraïns'ke Posol'stvo pry Apostol's'Komu Prestoli, 1919-


75 Letter of General Rozwadowski to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, 1 or 2 January,

76 1919, French translation in Korolevskij, Mētropolite André Szeptyckij,


76 Letter of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky to General Rozwadowski, 4 January, 1919, French translation ("J'ai recu hier...") in Korolevskij,


See also Korolevskij, Météropole André Szeptyckij, (1964), p. 167.

"Aux Académies des Sciences, Universités et autres Sociétés Scientifiques du monde entier," open letter of Ukrainian cultural and academic leaders, L'viv, 30 June, 1920, in the Ivan Petrushevych Collection, Public Archives of Canada MG 30-C51, Reel M-5227, File "Petrushevych II: Ukraine, Galicia and Polish Terror." The following are some of the grievances included in the letter.

With only two exceptions, all Ukrainian university professors had refused to swear an oath of allegiance to Poland. As a result, they lost their positions and were prohibited from teaching in Ukrainian (in a region where an estimated 70% of the population was Ukrainian).

Ukrainian students were not admitted to university unless they had first sworn allegiance to Poland and served in the Polish army. Those who tried to study abroad were either refused an exit visa or were arrested. In June 1919, the Polish militia was brought in to disperse Ukrainian students at the university. Since the end of 1918, the Polish government had closed the doors of the L'viv University and of the L'viv Polytechnical Institute to Ukrainian students and professors.

When the Ukrainian Shevechenko Scientific Society organized its own alternative faculties, the Polish government abrogated them on 27 September, 1919. Similarly, on 9 March, 1920, police and army units were sent in to disperse organizers and participants of university courses that had been organized by the Stavropigiia Institute in L'viv.

The protest letter may have served to inform the international community, but it failed to change the situation. For example, when the Greek
Catholic seminary in L’viv was re-opened at the end of 1920, after being closed for some two years, more than half of the building was unavailable for use because it was reserved for Polish soldiers. "Pekucha sprava," Nyva XV:5-6. (L’viv, November-December, 1920), p. 113.

To date, the only detailed study of Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s three-year mission abroad is M.H. Marunchak, Mystropyty Andri Sheptyts’kyi na Zakho-di, 1920-1923, (Winnipeg-Edmonton: Krajova Rada Ukrains’kykh Orhanizatsii za Patriarkhat Ukrains’ko Tserkvy, 1981), 47 pp., which gives a good introductory survey of the Metropolitan’s itinerary, his economic and diplomatic representations, and coverage of his visits by local presses. The first monograph focusing on this period is currently being researched by U.S. historian Maria Klachko.

/Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky/, Address of Archbishop Andrew Szeptycki about the Catholic Missionary Work in what once formed the Russian Empire, (New York: n.p., 1922), p. 15. Particularly distressing was the lot of the orphans, whose care posed a special problem: "We have organized twenty orphan asylums, but it is difficult enough to give the children even the barest necessities of life. The children taken into the asylums are often so depressed by the tragedy of their young lives that the Sisters, who are as mothers to them, must give them many months of loving care before they can draw a smile from the little ones. The Sisters teach games and cheerful songs, but the children repeat them with a seriousness and sorrow which would befit a man of seventy years. The young lives of little boys and girls of three to twelve years are filled with more sorrow than the lifetime of many old men.

Those children who still have their fathers and mothers have a life not much better than the orphans. A poor mother told me once in tears, ‘I
am glad that three of my children are dead, because I can give a little more to eat to the other three who are alive." Ibid. See also Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, Address at St. Augustine's Seminary in Toronto, 26 August, 1922 ("I will first speak...") in "Archbishop Andrew Szeptyckyj in Canada (1922)," Analecta O.S.B.M. Series II, Sectio II, Vol. III (Rome, 1956), p. 109.


83 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, Letter to Felix M. Warburg, Joint Distribution Committee of the American Funds for Jewish War Sufferers, New York City, 5 April, 1922, in Joint (Distribution Committee) Archives, File N*468: "Ukrainian Provinces Diocesan Relief Fund, 1922," p. 1. In his letter to Mr. Warburg, the Metropolitan stressed the non-denominational nature of his relief effort and asked Warburg to assist him in seeking prominent Jewish people to join the Diocesan Relief Committee. He pointed out that the material support American Jews "would have a great influence upon the mentality of the population and upon the attitude of Christian towards Jew" and would help to "dissipate the animosity which unfortunately still exists." Ibid.

Felix Warburg was impressed by the sincerity with which the Metropo-
litan had conveyed his humanitarian concerns, and was initially inclined to lend assistance. However, after a meeting with Kenneth Reid, a representative of New York Archbishop Patrick J. Hayes, Warburg was of the opinion that: as "a prelate of the Roman /sic/ Catholic Church," the Metropolitan was probably "in a position of antagonism to the Orthodox Russian Church;" that he was "at odds with the priesthood of his own Church;" and that he was "apparently not persona grata to the Polish authorities." Felix M. Warburg, Draft letter to Dr. Boris D. Bogen (marked: "not sent"), Joint Distribution Committee of the American Funds for Jewish War Sufferers, New York City, 5 May, 1922, in Joint (Distribution Committee) Archives, File N*468: "Ukrainian Provinces Diocesan Relief Fund, 1922," p. 1. This raised doubts in Warburg's mind, and Sheptytsky apparently never heard from him.

84 Pope Benedict XV gave 100,000 Lire for the relief of Ukrainians in Galicia. Marunchak, pp. 12, 29. In Canada, Bishop Budka donated $2,000.00 on behalf of Ukrainian Canadians, while a separate collection in Edmonton yielded another $2000.00. Marunchak, pp. 21, 23.


91 Sheptytsky would later explain this commitment in direct relation to his commitment to the Christian foundations of Ukrainian society: "Naturellement que dans toutes les questions où toute la nation était solidaire dans la poursuite d'un bien qui lui était justement dû, je ne pouvais m'opposer à son désir ni même rester indifférent sans nuire à la cause catholique dans le coeur de mes fidèles." Sheptytsky, "Rapport au Père Gennochi," (1923), p. 26 (I:82).
D. Chapter 3

1 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "U dua dni..." LAeV LII:2 (L'viv, February, 1939), reprinted in 05-83, p. 87.

2 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Dozvol' te meni..." in Nyua XXXIV:7-8 (L'viv, July-August, 1939), p. 278.

3 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "I stalosia..." (15 May, 1932), reprinted in 05-83, p. 4.

4 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., "Z voli i ustanovy..." LAeV XLIX:12 (L'viv, December, 1936), 05-83, p. 472.


8 Solchanyk, The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, p. 307. Among the other forms of united front activity, there were: a joint action protesting the Polish government's increasing authoritarianism, the organization of committees in defence of political prisoners, and demonstrations in support of the international brigades fighting in Spain. On the Congress in L'viv, see also Proty fashyzmu ta viiny, Antyfashysts'kyi Kongres diiachiiv kul'


10 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 277.

11 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 277.

12 Sheptytsky's pastoral on communism revealed a detailed grasp of the religious situation in Soviet Ukraine. Although he would certainly have relied on many private sources of information, it is to be noted that the Stalinist repression of the Ukrainian and Russian Churches and of the Jewish faith had been amply covered in the Ukrainian Catholic press within Poland since the early 1920's. See, for example, "Rosia," in Nyua XVII:10 (L'viv, October, 1922), p. 377, on the confiscation of church property; "Rosia" in Nyua XX:1 (L'viv, January, 1925), p. 38, on the liquidation of monasteries, the burning of icons, and antireligious propaganda; "Ukraina," in Nyua XX:1 (L'viv, January, 1925) pp. 39-40, on the desecration of a church by a detachment of the Communist Youth, and on arrests of priests and rabbis. Such reports continued through the 1930's; see "Dal'shiyi plian borot'by z religiiieiu v bol'sheviiku," in Nyua XXVII:10 (L'viv, October, 1932), pp. 382-383, on a proposed five-year plan (for the years 1932-1937) in the Soviet struggle against religion. Other periodicals in Western Europe, notably La Documentation Catholique of Paris, also reported regularly on the religious repression in the U.S.S.R.

13 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 275.

14 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 275.
15 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, p. 276.

16 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, p. 277.

17 "The betrayal of Christ and of His Church is a worse and more terrible
offence than a soldier's treason, worse than the betrayal of one's coun-
try." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Poslannya do dukhovenstva na Velykyi

18 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, p. 275.

19 Roman Solchanyk points out that "beginning in 1928-1929 the Comintern
began to exercise a much greater degree of influence within individual
communist parties, steadily reducing their role to the mechanical execution
of directives formulated in Moscow." Solchanyk, The Communist Party of Wes-
tern Ukraine, p. 303. This would appear to support the Metropolitan's
assessment. However, not all united front tactics were coming into Poland
from the east. For example, after the outbreak of the war in Spain, the
French government of Léon Blum made representations in Poland in an attempt
to get it to join an anti-fascist alliance. See Bohdan Budurowycz,
"Shepyts'kyi and the Ukrainian National Movement after 1914," in Morali-
ity and Reality, forthcoming.

20 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, pp. 275, 277-278.

21 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, pp. 275, 278, 280, 281.

22 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, p. 281.

24 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, p. 275. The Metropolitan further explained that in the Soviet Union, "Churches are being closed with the aim of destroying religion. Sometimes the 'farce of the expressed will of the people' is used /i.e., as a pretext/, but more often even without that recourse churches are turned into theaters. Wherever the people are sufficiently inclined to favor the retention of a church and its pastor, such heavy taxes are levied on those churches that it becomes impossible to maintain them. Priests are prohibited from teaching catechism to children and the youth is submitted to a truly diabolical system of depravation, of the demoralization of children from their youngest years." Ibid., p. 276.

25 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, p. 286. In his 1937 preface to a pastoral letter of the Spanish episcopate, Sheptytsky again signalled the same pattern of religious oppression in Spain, where churches were destroyed and priests were murdered. /Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky/, "Pastyrs'ke poslannia entspans'kykh epyskopiv: vstupne slovo Vysokopreosv. Mytropolita," (December, 1937), in 05-83, pp. 474-475.

26 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, p. 276.

27 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, p. 276. See also: "Communists are atheists; in their program there is no point on which they are more sincere than they are on this one: the struggle against God." Ibid., p. 275.

28 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, p. 275.


30 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, p. 286.
31 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, p. 287.

32 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, p. 287.

33 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, pp. 275, 276.

34 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, p. 277.


36 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, pp. 275, 282. Metropolitan Sheptytsky's economic argument on communism was actually his third objection. Since it sheds considerable light on both the substantive and the emotional content of the second, political, objection, we discuss them here in reverse order.

37 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, pp. 283, 284. As in his earlier economic pastoral, "On the Social Question" (1904), so too here, Metropolitan Sheptytsky had no qualms about criticizing capitalism: "No one doubts and everyone admits that capitalism has its negative side and that it is the cause of many injustices and wrongs against the poor and the oppressed." Ibid., p. 283. The Metropolitan believed that the Christian social values of justice and love of neighbor could neutralize or lessen the harmfulness of "such evil systems as capitalism." In his words, "Justice and love of neighbor keep people from exploiting their economic superiority as much or even at all..." Ibid., p. 287.

38 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, p. 284.


Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, pp. 284, 286, 288. "Solovki" was the colloquial name of the Solovetski island group in the White Sea (northeast of Leningrad), the site of three monasteries in which rebellious Russian priests had been interned during the Middle Ages. After the Russian Revolution, the monasteries were transformed into the Solovetsky Special Purpose (i.e., forced labor) Camp.


Nor was Metropolitan Sheptytsky alone in blaming the Bolsheviks for the famine in Soviet Ukraine. In particular, it is noteworthy that among the voices of protest in Western Ukraine at that time, there was a joint appeal of three Ukrainian socialist parties: the Social Democratic Workers' Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the Radical Party. Addressed to all socialist organizations of the world, the statement condemned Soviet economic policy: "We declare that the single and the obvious cause of the famine in Soviet Ukraine is the unscrupulous economic exploitation of the Ukrainian people by the Bolshevik dictatorship, which considers Ukraine its colony.... The communist authorities are covering up the fact of the famine..."
in Ukraine... in order to continue its exploitation of the country that has been starved and destroyed by experiments in collectivization." Tryzub IX:30-31 (Paris, 27 August, 1933), p. 41.

Although the Metropolitan was well aware that the famine in Ukraine had occurred during the global economic crisis, he did not see the former as merely an extension or a regional instance of the latter: "The general crisis has obviously had an impact on us. Perhaps it has been worse elsewhere, but it really seems that nowhere can it be worse than in Great Ukraine where apparently millions of people have already starved to death, and where death by famine awaits millions more." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Khto vynení?" (Koly v ostannikh..."), LAeV XLVII:3 (L'viv, March, 1934), reprinted in 05-83, p. 123.


45 Sheptytsky's estimate of over three million victims of the famine in Ukraine was given in his pastoral "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 288. As late as March, 1934, the Metropolitan was still referring to "those /Ukrainians/ far away who are suffering and dying a terrible death by famine." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Do neduzhykh," LAeV XLVII:3 (L'viv, March, 1934), reprinted in 05-83, p. 160.

46 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 286.

47 The Metropolitan's exact words were: "...znyshchytu ukrains'kyi narid i stertye yoho po mozhnosti z lytsia zemli..." Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 275.

48 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 280.
Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 276.

Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, pp. 278, 280.

Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 279.

Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 279. Sheptytsky further felt that the democratism of Western Ukrainian socialists also led them to differ from the Russian Communists in their view of revolution: "No matter how one looks at it, revolution was also something of an ideal for the socialists. The very word seemed so attractive, so pleasant. But the revolution would have to be kept democratic. For, whoever was not a democrat was 'retrograde,' 'aristocratic,' 'clericalistic.' In a word, outside of democracy, there was no truly human program." Ibid. The Metropolitan also made a point of bolstering his argument by observing that even the leaders of the Western Ukrainian left were wary of the popular front and were warning their people about it. Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 287.

Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 280. It is quite possible that the Metropolitan was aware of the abovementioned condemnation by leftists in Western Ukraine of the famine in Soviet Ukraine. See n. 43, above.

Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 288.

Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 286.

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At one point, the Metropolitan remarked, "If you refuse to believe me, I think you are doing me wrong." Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, p. 288. He further tried to ground his argument by referring to his age, his many years of experience and his paternal benevolence, contrasting this with the naivete of young people who, in his estimation, were much more susceptible to manipulation. Ibid., pp. 281, 288.

However, the Metropolitan was also prepared to admit that, for obvious reasons, information from Ukraine was incomplete: "We do not yet fully know everything that the Bolsheviks did in order to destroy the Ukrainian village and to drive it into misery, but what has reached us makes it perfectly clear... the Bolsheviks are against the people, they are destroying it and want to continue doing so until they have driven the peasants into ruin." Sheptytsky, "Zaklyk do pokiaannia," (1938), 05-83, p. 360.

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Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, pp. 281-2, 288.

61
Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, pp. 281, 288.

62
Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, p. 281.

63
Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka..." (1936), 05-83, pp. 287-288. Coercion by the Soviets was also mentioned in Sheptytsky, "Zaklyk do pokiaannia," (1938), 05-83, p. 361: "The Bolsheviks coerce people to write such letters and, perhaps, they sometimes also pay for such treason. Then, against his own convictions and in the face of the truth which is as clear as day, the poor
peasant writes with praise for the Bolshevik régime and with descriptions of the wealth which, supposedly, everyone there possesses."

64 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 288.

65 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, pp. 275, 278. Sheptytsky illustrated the deception as follows: "...when the Bolsheviks spoke about freedom they meant slavery; when they mentioned welfare they meant famine; radas and soviets referred to a system in which no one was allowed to speak their mind; peasant rule meant a system in which a peasant was forced to do unpaid labor... and their talk of the rule of the proletariat referred to a proletarian caste that sucks the blood of the people." Ibid., p. 276.


68 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 287.

69 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 288.

70 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 282.

71 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 282.

72 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 277.

73 Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 288. Communists, Sheptytsky declared, could not receive absolution for sins that they confessed unless they publicly renounced Bolshevism and redressed the wrongs they had committed. Ibid., p. 277.

Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 289.

Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka...," (1936), 05-83, p. 288.

Archiwum Akt Nowych. Warsaw. Kolekcja Ministerstwa Wyznan Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego, 423. Raport Wyadysjawa Skrzyńskiego do Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych. Rome, 26 April, 1923. (Cited hereafter as Skrzyński Report). I am grateful to Andrzej Zięba of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow for bringing this important document to my attention. The apparent lack of public discussion around, or even references to, Sheptytsky's declaration during the 1920's or the 1930's suggests that both the meeting in Rome and Skrzyński's report remained the privileged internal information of the Polish government and was unknown to the Ukrainian public at large.

Sheptytsky was detained from 22 August through 14 October, 1923. Among the reasons that were cited for his internment in Poznań and refusal of permission for re-entry to L'viv were allegations that the Metropolitan had made anti-Polish statements while abroad; there were also suspicions about his loyalty to Poland, and fears that he would use his popularity among Ukrainians to cause unrest in Eastern Galicia. Osyp Krawcheniuk, Veleten' zo sviatovyr's' kol' hory, "Bibliotheca Logos," Vol. XXXIV, (Yorkton, Sask.: Redeemer's Voice Press, 1963), pp. 81-82.

Polish sources on this incident have tended to portray it as a legitimate and understandable measure. In 1930, a Cracow newspaper wrote that Metropolitan Sheptytsky had "received permission to enter Poland" on condition of "absolute loyalty to the Polish nation." "Administrative Authorities. Metropolitan Sheptytsky Knocks at the Door," from Illustrowany Kuryer Codzienny (Cracow, October, 3, 1930), translated in Polish atrocities in Ukraine, compiled and edited by Emil Revyuk, (New York: United


80 Korolevskij, Métropolite André Szeptyckyj, 1865-1944, p. 181.


84  Korolevskij, Métropolite André Szeptyckyj, 1865-1944, p. 181.

85  Avro Manhattan, The Catholic Church against the Twentieth Century, (Lon-


89  "Vidklyk do l'viu"koho voievidstva u L'vouii," Nyua XXI:10 (L'viv, Octo-
ber, 1926), pp. 360-362.

90  "Vidklyk do l'viu"koho voievidstva u L'vouii," Nyua XXI:10 (L'viv, Octo-


92  Scarcely more than a random sample of censored items can be given here,
by way of illustration: L. Kunyts'kyi, "Bił'shovyts'kyi Kongres," Nyua
XVI:11 (L'viv, November, 1921) at pp. 336-343; "Bez poludy na ochakh," Dilo
43-45 (L'viv, 1925) on the Concordat; "2 dniw nedoli nashoho dukhovenstva,"
Nyua XXI:3 (L'viv, March, 1926), one passage at p. 82; Sheptytsky et al.,
"Khrystova Tserkva..." Nyua XXV:10 (L'viv, October, 1930), pp. 365-367,
three paragraphs deleted; also in Nyua XXV:10 L'viv, October, 1930) pp.
363-364, pages blank and marked "censored pastoral letter of our bishops";
"Rozmova z Vysokopreosviashchenym Mytropolytom Andreiem," Dilo LI:222
(L'viv, 7 October, 1930), p. 1; several passages censored; Kh., "Mynulyi rik u zhyttiu nashof Tserkvy," Nyva XXVI:1 (L'viv, January, 1931), p. 4, on the pacification; the speech by Michael Halushchynsky at the Session of the Sejm Administrative Committee, delivered on January 20, 1931, during a debate on the pacification; published by Dilo and Nouvi Chas in L'viv shortly after January 20; two lengthy passages were deleted; and the Metropolitan's pastoral letter of 20 July, 1938 protesting against the destruction of Orthodox churches.

When entire issues of periodicals were confiscated, Ukrainian Catholic publishers often tried to print them a second time; for example, the following issues of Nyva went to press a second time and bear the marking "second edition, following the confiscation /of the first/": XXI:3 (March, 1926), XXV:10 (October, 1930), XXVI:1 (January, 1931), and XXIX:5 (May, 1934).

The official policy of censorship in Poland in the 1920's and the 1930's, particularly in regard to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, is a subject that will require further in-depth study of the relevant materials in the archives of the Polish Ministries of Internal Affairs and of Religious Denominations before a conclusive appraisal may be made. What is clear is that the censorship policy was carried on throughout the interwar period and that it targeted the Ukrainian Church and Metropolitan Sheptytsky in particular. However, a more detailed assessment weighing the consequences of, on the one hand, the Polish government's concern for suppressing criticism of its policy and, on the other, the silencing of even moderate Ukrainian voices, must be left to future research.

Skrzyński report.
Sliwa, "Kościół Greckokatolicki w Polsce w latach 1918-1939," (1980), p. 155. A similar opinion about the reserved attitude of the Greek Catholic hierarchy is given in Wyczawski, "Kościół w odrodzonym państwie Polskim (1918-1939): Cerkiew Greckokatolicka," (1979), p. 81. However, it should not be overlooked that on a variety of occasions the Ukrainian Greek Catholic episcopate did participate in meetings of the Roman Catholic bishops of Poland, for example: the synod of Bishops in Warsaw, 29 May, 1925; the National Polish Eucharistic Congress in Poznań, 26-29 June, 1930; and the special meeting of the Polish episcopate in Jasna Gora to discuss the position of the Catholic Church with regard to the developments in Spain, 25 August, 1936. Krawcheniuk, *Veleten' zo sviatojurs'koj hory,* (1963), pp. 82, 89, 93-94.


In December, 1927, the Polish Roman Catholic bishops issued a pastoral on communism. They wrote: "En Pologne, comme dans tous les pays, deux systèmes s'affrontent: l'un défendant les droits du Christ, l'autre hostile à tous les principes religieux. Le peuple polonais commence à se diviser en deux camps; ceux-ci rangées sous la bannière du Christ...; ceux-là voudraient insuffler à la République l'esprit de l'Antéchrist." "La question religieuse et les partis. Lettre collective de l'épiscopat," in *La Documentation Catholique* XIX:431 (Paris, 9 June, 1928), pp. 1450-1451. Although it appears that the Ukrainian bishops were not co-signatories of this particular document, a number of themes in the Polish bishops' pastoral harked back to statements on socialism that Metropolitan Sheptytsky had made during the Austrian period, and which he would develop further in his own pastoral on communism of 1936.
The inveterate issue popularly referred to as the "stolen souls" ("dusze kradzione") was a case in point. As the land of East Galicia was contested, so too were its people: Polish Roman Catholics claimed that Greek Catholic priests were illicitly baptizing Poles into the Greek Catholic rite, while Ukrainians complained about the opposite. At the source of this problem was the sensitive canonical issue of ritual transfer resulting from inter-ethnic marriages.


Sliwa, "Kościół Greckokatolicki w Polsce w latach 1918-1939," (1980), p. 162 points out that in fact there were instances in which the Polish authorities either refused to confirm the appointment of or demanded the resignation of Ukrainian pastors who advocated a distinct Ukrainian national identity.

The episcopal oath of loyalty, contained in Article 12 of the Concordat, read: "Before God and on the Holy Gospel I swear and promise, as befits a bishop, obedience to the Polish Republic. I swear and promise that I will respect the constitutionally-created government complete loyalty, and I will see to it that my clergy will respect it too. In addition, I swear and promise that I will not participate in any agreement and will not attend any conference which could harm the Polish state or the political order. I will not allow my clergy to participate in such activities. Caring for the good and for the interests of the state, I will try to keep it from any dangers which I may know to be threatening it."

Edmund Przekop, "Die griechisch-katholische (unierte) Ritus im pol-
nischen Konkordat vom Jahre 1925,* in *Ostkirchliche Studien* 28 (Würzburg, 1979), pp. 145-167. In essence, the Concordat limited Greek Catholic jurisdiction to the original boundaries of its three eparchies under Austria.

With regard to the four provinces that were targeted for the neo-Unia, Przekop indicates the Orthodox predominance on the basis of figures taken from the 1921 census:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Orthodox</th>
<th>Roman Catholics</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wilno</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
<td>42.2%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowogródek</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podlasie</td>
<td>79.3%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volinia</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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The neo-Unia was intended to be a vehicle for the conversion of Orthodox Christians to Catholicism, allowing them to retain the Eastern rite, but in contradistinction to the Brest model of 1596 that had brought most Western Ukrainians into union with Rome, there was no provision for an Eastern-rite episcopate for the new Catholics. Instead, they were to be subordinated to the Latin-rite ordinary, while their priests would be incorporated into Latin-rite deaneries. Entrusted to the Society of Jesus, this effort at ecumenism employed a principle of bi-ritualism; in effect, Polish Roman Catholic priests could be accepted into the Eastern rite and serve Catholics of both rites. Pope Pius XI, who had once served as Apostolic Visitor to Warsaw Achille Ratti, had become convinced that bi-ritualism was a practicable way to proceed with the Orthodox in Poland and was also a strong supporter of the neo-Unia.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky approached the question of reunion from a very different tack. Reviving a notion that had been put before the Propaganda Fide Congregation some four decades earlier by Cardinal Howard
and the Russian Jesuit Martinov, the Metropolitan took the position that the most effective path toward the reunion of the Eastern Churches would be to have all the Western congregations and religious orders form Eastern branches which would work for reunion: "Le pont par lequel les Orientaux passeront à l'unité catholique doit être bâti sur ces deux fondements: Congrégations occidentales organisant dans leur sein des branches orientales; Ordres orientaux se recrutant aussi entre les Occidentaux; organisation occidentale transplantée en Orient; monachisme oriental s'organisant et se renforçant par des éléments occidentaux." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "La mission du monachisme dans la cause de l'Union des Eglises," Bulletin des Missions (Bénédictines Belges) VI (Abbaye de St-André par Lophen, Bruges, 1921-1923), pp. 187-188. Another important step in Sheptytsky's program for reunion was the renewal of ancient Eastern monasticism which, he felt, was well equipped for the task because it shared many common elements with its Western counterpart: "... l'oeuvre de l'Union des Eglises sera en grande partie l'oeuvre du monachisme.... Ni pour la cause de l'Union des églises dissidentes, ni pour le bien des peuples orientaux, l'Eglise Catholique ne peut faire oeuvre plus importante que de restaurer et de renouveler le monachisme de l'Eglise Orientale, si florissant jusqu'au X-me siècle, et demeuré si proche du monachisme occidental par les principes communs sur lesquels l'un et l'autre se basent." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "La restauration du Monachisme Slave," Bulletin des Missions (Bénédictines Belges) VI (Abbaye de St-André par Lophen, Bruges, 1921-1923), p. 494.

To date, the most exhaustive treatment of Sheptytsky's ecumenical thought and activity is Lubomyr Husar, Andrei Sheptycky, Metropolitan of Halych 1901-1944, a pioneer of ecumenism, Ph.D. dissertation, Pontificia Universitas Urbaniana, 1972.
Metropolitan Sheptytsky mentioned a government donation to the Church; see his pastoral, "Pro poboriuvannia vorozhko Tserkvi propagandy," (1927) pp. 4, 9. Apparently some of the government funding was directed toward the operation of the Ukrainian seminary in L'viv. Stanislas Srokowski, "The Ukrainian Problem in Poland," Slavonic Review (March, 1931), p. 595.

In accordance with a decree of 27 February, 1926 of the Apostolic Nuncio to Poland, ratifying the agreement on military chaplains, every ordinary was to assign military chaplains from his eparchy for a period of two years. Among the Greek Catholics serving in this capacity in 1930 were: in Warsaw, Rev. Dr. Nykolai Nahorians'kyi, who also served as an advisor to the military Bishop General in liturgical matters of the Eastern rite; in Poznań-Torun, Rev. Podolyns'kyi; in Lódź, Rev. Nykolai Il'kiv; in Cracow, Rev. Vasyl' Kuz'ma; in Peremyshl', Rev. Omelian Vavryk; in L'viv, Rev. Nykolai Stetkevych; and in Stanyslawiv, Rev. Lev Kharkavyi. A brief notice to this effect is given in LāEv XLIII:4 (L'viv, 1 October, 1930), pp. 8-9.


Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro obriadovi spravy," ("Dvi prevazhni podit..."), Dilo (L'viv, 21 April, 1931), reprinted in 05-83, p. 103.


Sheptytsky, "U dua dni pered...," (1939), 05-83, p. 89.

In connection with his reflection on ecclesiastical independence, it is to be noted that the Metropolitan had a positive view of the Lateran Accord of 1929, which in his words "joined a great and powerful state to the Church, a powerful state that was practically built on a principle of hostility toward the Church and that by its nature could have gone over to the ranks of the enemies of the Church, if indeed it was not already among them." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "U dua dni...," LAAU LII:2 (L’viv, February, 1939), reprinted in 05-83, p. 88. Although others would disagree with the Metropolitan and criticize the Lateran Pact, the Metropolitan’s actual position was less telling than his reasons for adopting it; in his view, the pact was a step towards securing ecclesiastical independence, allowing the Church to "release herself more and more from the influence of secular states." Ibid., p. 89.


Sheptytsky, "Pro Tserkvy," (1936), 05-83, p. 259. The Metropolitan listed some of the theses of the statists that had been condemned by Pope Pius IX in his "Syllabus of Errors" (1864). The statists had maintained that the state is the only source of law; the authority of the state being higher than that of the Church, civil law prevailed in cases of conflict
between the two; the state could annul Concordats unilaterally: the state could involve itself in matters of religion, customs and the spiritual leadership of society; it could pass judgment on pastoral teachings; and it could set out the necessary conditions for administering and receiving the sacraments. *Ibid.*

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Metropolitan Sheptytsky drew attention to the confusion of the factual reality of civil laws and the "true concept of law." Sheptytsky, "Pro Tserkву," (1936), 05-83, p. 258. This harked back to the difference he had pointed out 32 years earlier, between justice as contained within civil laws and "what in fact is just." Sheptytsky, *O kvestīf sotsiial'īnīi*, (1904), p. 42 para 136.

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Sheptytsky, "Espaniia bula...," (1936), 05-83, p. 475.

Sheptytsky, "Espaniia bula..." (1937), in 05-83, p. 475.

Sheptytsky, "Espaniia bula..." (1937), in 05-83, p. 476.


Teofil Piotrkiewicz, Kwestia ukraińska w Polsce w koncepcjach Piłsudczyny, 1926-1930, (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego,
1901), p. 66.


142 "Rozmowa z Vysokopreosviashchenym Mytropolytom Andreiem," Dilo LI:222 (L’viv, 7 October, 1930), p. 1. A passage which apparently referred to the government’s response to Sheptytsky’s argument was confiscated from the article by the censor, and is not available.

The attribution of collective guilt upon Ukrainian Church was also furthered by the Polish press. On October 3, the Cracow daily Ilustrowany Kurjer Codzienny charged: "The Greek Catholic Metropolitan has tolerated the wildest violence and crimes by his spiritual followers, which have been carried out under the slogan of Ukrainian nationalism. He never moved a finger to stop those crimes or at least to condemn them. The Greek Catholic Consistory at L’viv, whose prominent representative is, for instance, that prelate Kunitsky /Rev. Leontii Kunyts’kyi was arrested by the Polish authorities, a.k./, took an active part in the criminal activities, the fruits of which are arsons and murders. In the church of St. George rebel knives were consecrated and requiem masses were sung for criminals, and Metropolitan Sheptytsky kept silent." Cited in Polish atrocities in Ukraine, ed. Revyuk, p. 183.

According to another writer, "all efforts made by the Polish autho-
rities to induce the Ruthenian Uniate /i.e., Ukrainian Greek Catholic/ clergy to condemn such acts came to nothing. This clergy, up to and including Archbishop Andrew Szeptycki, its highest authority, kept silent, looking with indifference upon what was going on, or, as was shown by judicial inquiries, even taking an active part in this action." Stanislas Srokowski, "The Ukrainian Problem," p. 595.

This position has been quite widespread among Polish writers, and Polish historian Teofil Piotrkiewicz found it "noteworthy" that the Ukrainian terrorists were not condemned clearly and decisively by Metropolitan Sheptytsky. Piotrkiewicz, Kwestia ukraińska, (1981), p. 66.

For its part, the Ukrainian press did publish articles that condemned the arsons and a joint appeal to that effect was also issued by the three Ukrainian parties (the Ukrainian National Democratic Union, the Radicals, and the Socialists). As well, political representations in the matter, denying complicity in the crimes, were made by Ukrainians before the voivodes (regional officials) of L'viv and Ternopil' as well as in the Warsaw parliament. See the "Speech of Deputy Michael Halushchynsky at the Session of the Sejm Administrative Committee, delivered on 20 January, 1931, during a debate on the 'pacification'," in Polish atrocities, ed. Revyuk, pp. 368-369.

143 "Mytropolyt Sheptyts'kyi u Ministra Skladkov's'koho," Dilo LI:220 (L'viv, 4 October, 1930), p. 4. The same point was raised in Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., "Khrystova Tserkva..." (13 October, 1930), in Nyva XXV:10 (L'viv, October, 1930), p. 366.

"Pislia konfiskaty pastyrs'koho liysta," Dilo LI:234 (L'viv, 21 October, 1930), p. 4. The pastoral was suppressed so effectively that, although a few of the censored versions were distributed, no known uncensored versions ever appeared in print in Polish Galicia. Fortunately, the Catholic press outside Poland did carry the full text of the pastoral. According to the full text as given in Katholische Kirchenzeitung 48 (Salzburg, 1930), p. 420, the three censored paragraphs, which apparently have never yet been published in Ukrainian, were

(Paragraph 2):

"Therefore we have kept silent until today, and if we speak out today, then we do so in order to face an /even/ greater misfortune. Those who are in power openly declare and suspect that, through our silence, we are in solidarity with the underground activity of arson and so-called sabotage. They blame us for everything that has happened in the country and they are punishing our people en masse for the offences of individuals who as yet have not been found out by the authorities."

(Paragraph 4):

"However, it is with great pain and sorrow that we are witnessing events with which, from the standpoint of justice, we cannot agree. The entire /Ukrainian/ people, the clergy, the intelligentsia and the farmers are being blamed for the /acts of the/ as yet uninvestigated culprits. The entire population is being severely punished with harassment, imposed contributions and requisitions without investigation. Punitive expeditions were sent from village to village, where no acts of sabotage had occurred and where there had been no resistance at all against the state authority; where, on the contrary, the population had remained completely peaceful and loyal. It is with great concern for the future that we have observed many
incidents where, to the greatest pain of all, physical violence was used unlawfully to annihilate (‘zur Vernichtung’) the cultural and economic possessions of the people or to mistreat the defenceless and the innocent; in many cases, even the clergy were beaten mercilessly and humiliated in public; their spiritual dignity and authority was trampled underfoot."

(Paragraph 5):

"We have gone to the governors and to the Ministers, we explained everything and asked for redress, and we hope that the civil authority will put a stop to and punish the lawlessness and the encroachment. We hope that the state will turn away from the path of massive reprisals. However, on the occasion of this pastoral letter, we cannot but remind those to whom it applies by quoting from the word of the Holy Scripture (on the promise of truth and peace) that where justice rules, there peace and unity shall prevail."

The scriptural reference appears to have been to Isaiah 32:17: "The effect of righteousness will be peace, and the result of righteousness quietness and trust forever."

On the beatings of priests (paragraph 4), it is known that at least one of the priests who were flogged by Polish soldiers, Rev. Evhen Mandzii of Bohatkiutsi, died from the injuries he had received. "The Report of Mr. John Elliot," in Polish Atrocities, ed. Revyuk, p. 10.

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It is noteworthy that the pastoral was by no means limited to the description of and protest against police and military violence. The second part of the pastoral was addressed to the Ukrainian people and called them to be true to their Christian principles. We discuss it in the next section of this chapter.

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Sheptytsky et al., "Khrystova Tserkva..." (13 October, 1930), in Nyva
In fact, even without such an intervention by the bishops, the civil authorities had proceeded to lay the blame for crimes on the Ukrainian public at large.


Compared with the estimates given in the above sources, Auro Manhattan’s suggestion, that "in 1930 there were over 200,000 Ukrainians in jail," appears to be an exaggeration. See his *The Catholic Church against the 20th Century*, (London: Watts, 1950), p. 303.

Piotrkiewicz, p. 67.

"Mytropoljt Sheptyts’kyi u Ministra Skladkows’koho," *Dilo* LI:220 (L’viv, 4 October, 1930), p. 2. The emerging split between between the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and militant nationalism is treated in the final section of this chapter.


165  In Volhynia, for example, Orthodox people were being forcible converted to Roman Catholicism. As government forces moved in with threats to expel the peasants from their land, entire villages "converted" to Roman Catholicism. The case of one such village, Hrynnychky in the Kremianets' district, evoked considerable indignation and was even raised before the parliament in Warsaw. In a letter of 2 April, 1938 to Cyrille Korolevskij, Metropolitan Sheptytsky mentioned such occurrences and made it clear that he saw through the facade of the purportedly "voluntary" conversion. Cyrille Korolevskij, Métropolite André Szeptyckyj, 1865-1944, "Pratsi Ukraїns'koho Bohoslovs'koho Naukovooho Tovarystva," Vol. XVI-XVII (Rome: Esse-Gi-Esse, 1964), pp. 184-185.
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Poslannia v spravi Kholmshchyny,"
("Potriasaiuch podii...") (2 August, 1938), in Stepan Baran, Metropolit
Andrei Sheptyts’kyi, Zhyttia i Diial’nist’ (Munich: Ukraïns’ke Vydavnyche


Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "U khvylini, koly..." (1932), in 05-83,
p. 10.

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "I stalosia..." (15 May, 1932), in 05-
83, p. 4.

"Rozmowa z J.E. Metropolitą Szeptyckim," (2 April, 1933), Bunt Młodych
120. "...the problem of what to do with scholars who are leaving centers of
higher learning with diplomas but without any prospect of finding employment is a matter of concern throughout the world. But please consider that among the Ukrainian youth that crisis has existed for years. That is why we are seeing unfortunate consequences." *Ibid.*

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"Rozmowa z J.E. Metropolita Szeptyckim," (1933), p. 120. The Metropolitan also acknowledged that the Polish Republic's refusal to permit the establishment of a Ukrainian university had served to heighten national feelings among Ukrainians. Ukrainian students were, he said, meeting with "chicanery at every step" and were being "deprived of any opportunity of leading a normal life." *Ibid.*, 120-121.

181

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) published a statement of principles in the summer of 1929. Consisting of ten "commandments of the Ukrainian Nationalist," the so-called "decalogue" represented a clear departure from any semblance of Christian morality. In view of the nationalists' primary aim of attaining independent Ukrainian statehood, it urged them to "avenge the deaths of the Great Knights," "to commit the greatest crime if the good of the Cause demands it," "to regard the enemies of /their/ Nation with hate and perfidy," and to "aspire to expand the strength, riches and size of the Ukrainian state even by means of enslaving foreigners." "The Ten Commandments of the Ukrainian Nationalist (Decalogue). June, 1929," Translated by Taras F.Pidzamecky, in *Ukraine during World War II: History and its Aftermath*, Ed. Yury Boshyk with the assistance of Roman Waschuk and Andriy Wynnyckyj, (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986), pp. 173-174.

Originally published in the underground, the "decalogue" by its very nature was probably not widely known until later; one of the "commandments"
in fact amounted to a vow of secrecy. Although Metropolitan Sheptytsky never mentioned the nationalist decalogue specifically, and perhaps did not have direct knowledge of it, this did not prevent him from condemning the morality of "ends justifying means," which he clearly saw behind the terrorism of the OUN, as "unethical and extreme." "Rozmowa z J.E. Metropolita Szyptyckim," (1933), p. 120.

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183
"Rozmowa z J.E. Metropolita Szyptyckim," (1933), p. 120.

184
"Rozmowa z J.E. Metropolita Szyptyckim," (1933), p. 120.

185
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky et al., "Khrystova Tserkva..." in Nyva XXV:10 (L'viv, October, 1930), p. 366.

186
Sheptytsky et al., "Khrystova Tserkva..." (1930), p. 366. In addition to calling the Ukrainian youth to remain faithful Christians in their patriotism, the bishops also directed their priests to add to every liturgy special intentions that were taken from the service for "times of nationwide suffering" ("vo vremia vsenarodnya skorby"). Sheptytsky et al., "Khrystova Tserkva..." (1930), p. 367.

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188
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Khto vynen?" (1934), in 05-83, p. 123.

189
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Slovo do ukra?ins'koj molodi," Meta 19
(L'viv, 22 May, 1932), reprinted in 05-83, pp. 104-108.

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Sheptytsky, "Slovo do ukrains'koi molodi," (1932), 05-83, p. 107. In 1939, responding to developments in Carpatho-Ukraine, the Metropolitan again felt obliged to respond by referring to the same distinction between the long-term, Christian understanding of sacrifice and the immediate satisfaction of passing desires: "As for the army which is fighting the enemy for a sacred cause, for which /the soldiers/ are sacrificing their lives, the fervent love with which they offer their sacrifice is a greater source of hope for the future of the sacred cause than any momentary victory that they might enjoy." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Chas Velykoho Postu..." Nyva XXXIV:4 (April, 1939), p. 152.

198
/Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky/, "Poklyk Mytropolita," ("Podi!, shcho my ikh teper...") in Dilo LIX:246 (L'viv, 5 November, 1938), p. 1. When by arbitration in Vienna on November 2, 1938, Carpatho-Ukraine lost some of its territory including its capital Uzhhorod, the autonomy of the province became tenuous. It was then that, foreseeing potential unrest, Metropolitan
Sheptytsky issued a terse statement urging Poland's Ukrainians to exercise prudence and "spiritual equilibrium." And again in 1939, following Hungary's takeover of Carpatho-Ukraine, he pointed out that an inner equanimity was needed: "Let us apply ourselves to the work at hand, let us maintain our spiritual equilibrium and the peace of Christ." Sheptytsky, "Chas Velykoho Postu..." (1939), p. 153.


203 Whoever rejects these authorities is left with either his own authority, or the authority of his party, or that of some nearby clique. Does this not lead to complete anarchy? Sheptytsky, "Slovo do ukrains'koľ molodi," (1932), 05-83, p. 106.


205 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Do ukrains'koľ molodi zorhanizovanoľ v K.A.U.M.-i," ("V den' molkh imenyn..."), (18 December, 1934), 05-83 p. 49.

206 Concentrated mainly in the cities, the Ukrainian version of Catholic Action had an autonomous structure; centred in L'viv, it was independent of the all-Polish Catholic Action whose headquarters were in Poznań. The organization's constitution was affirmed by the three Greek Catholic hierarchs at their meeting in L'viv in January, 1931. Metropolitan Sheptytsky et al., "Z voli i ustanovy...", LAeV XLIX:12 (L'viv, December,


208 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Shukaiemo pomichnykiv," ("Ne v spro-mozi..."), LAEV XLVII:3 (L'viv, 15 March, 1934), reprinted in 05-83, p. 25. The call to Catholic Action members to assist in catechization was repeated in the Metropolitan's pastoral "Pro znannia Katekhyzmu," ("Po nashykh selakh..."), LAEV L:4 (L'viv, April, 1937), reprinted in 05-83, p. 313.

209 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne spovidalysia..." ("Rik tomu...") LAEV XLVIII:10 (L'viv, 15 October, 1935), reprinted in 05-83, p. 251. The same view of the aim of Catholic Action was expressed two years later in the Metropolitan's pastoral "Pro tykh i do
tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne prystupyly do sv. Prychastiiia i ne spovidalysia,

LaeV (Lviv, November, 1937), reprinted in 05-83, p. 339.

210
Sheptytsky et al., "Z voli i ustanovy..." (1936), 05-83, pp. 467-473.

211
Sheptytsky et al., "Z voli i ustanovy..." (1936), 05-83, pp. 472-473.

212
Sheptytsky et al., "Z voli i ustanovy..." (1936), 05-83, p. 471.

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Sheptytsky et al., "Z voli i ustanovy..." (1936), 05-83, p. 472.

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Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Natsional'na richnytsia," ("Kozhna vazhnisha podiia..." LaeV XLVII:11 (Lviv, November, 1934), reprinted in 05-83, p. 46.

221
Sheptytsky, "Natsional'na richnytsia," (1934), in 05-83, p. 47.

222
Sheptytsky, "Natsional'na richnytsia," (1934), in 05-83, p. 47.

223
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Khto vynen?" LaeV XLVII:7 (Lviv, 15


226 "Rozmowa z Metropolita Szeptyckim," (1933), p. 121.

227 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Duzhe serdechno diakuiu..."), letter to Rev. Vasyl’ Mastsiukh of 28 December, 1935; cited in Hryhor Luzhnyts’kyi, "Nevidomyi lyst Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts’koho do apostol’i’s’koho administratora Lemkivshchyny Vasylia Mastsiukha," Holos Lemkivshchyny 11 (Yonkers, New York, November, 1985), p. 3. Nor was Sheptytsky’s evident preference for the moderate line of the UNDO a political endorsement. In this connection it is significant to note that, unlike other parties, the UNDO had within its program explicitly accepted Christian morality as espoused by the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia. In 1926, the party’s central committee adopted the following resolution: "In accepting the principles of Christian morality as fundamental to the development of a Ukrainian nation, the party supports the teaching and laws of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia and of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in other Ukrainian territories." Nyua XXI:10 (Lviv, October, 1926), p. 368.

228 /Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky/, "Interviu Vysokopreosvishchennoho Mytropolyta," Nyua XXV: 10 (Lviv, October, 1930), p. 375.

229 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Khto vynen?" LAv XLVII:3 (Lviv, 15
March, 1934), reprinted in 05-83, p. 122.


233 Sheptytsky argued that those who practiced birth control were destroying "our entire people through the ruin of their family." Sheptytsky, "Do tykh, shcho na Paskhui ne prychashchalysia," (1936), 05-83, p. 294.


236 Sheptytsky, "Poslannia na Pist," (1939), 05-83, p. 398. Applying the
same kind of moral uncertainty, the Metropolitan concluded that abortion "deprives a people of perhaps its most precious individuals." Ibid., p. 397.

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238
Sheptytsky, "Poslannia do dukhovnestyva na Velykyi Pist," (1935), 05-83, p. 226. Metropolitan Sheptytsky believed that the system of planned parenthood cost a society far more than "the bloodiest of wars which last a decade." Ibid.

See also his "Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne pryashchhalysia," (1936), 05-83, pp. 292-293: "...if that sin were to spread amongst our people they would lose more souls... than through a bloody war that might flare up every two or three years... the plagues on the healthy organism of a Christian people that are caused by the bloodiest war heal quickly, but the plagues that are caused by the pagan cohabitation ('pohans'ke spivzhyttia') of Christian couples are such that have no cure. A bleeding wound never heals. If a family has only two children and if by pagan cohabitation even that number is reduced, that nation will never be able to recoup the losses that it suffers through the death of childless, unmarried women and unmarried men. Every epidemic, war, and almost every death is /then/ an irreparable loss, a plague that will always be wet with blood. Thus, pagan cohabitation leads to the annihilation of an entire people."

See also his "Pro tykh'i do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne prystupyly do sv. Prychastia," (1937), 05-83, p. 335: "When such a system /i.e., of birth control/ becomes rooted within a nation, that nation must perish, for that system annually costs as much in lost human lives as a bloody war. In other words, every year that nation receives from its own children wounds that are worse than any inflicted by enemies in a bloody war. The only dif-
ference between those kinds of loss of life is that the wounds of a bloody war can heal, but the wounds caused by that system cannot..."

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240
Sheptytsky, "Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne prychashchalisya," (1936), 05-83, p. 303. On another occasion, the Metropolitan expressed the same contrast as follows: "Young people are only healthy, strong and mentally well developed and capable of high and noble ideas when they are pure. Young people who are given to the vices of impurity are weak-minded, lacking in strength, character and will, they are a herd that is easily dispersed by one man with a whip." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Poslannia na Velykyi Pist," ("Zatrubit' u truby..."), LAeU (L'viv, February, 1936), reprinted in 05-83, p. 265.

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243
Sheptytsky, "U khvilyni, koly..." (1932), 05-83, p. 13.

244
Sheptytsky, "U khvilyni, koly..." (1932), 05-83, p. 13.

245
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky/, "Molytva Posviaty Ukrains'koho Narodu Presviatomu Isusovomu Sertsiu," ("Usemohuchyi Bozhe..."), (November-December, 1938), reprinted in 05-83, p. 207. Substantially the same as the earlier prayer for the Ukrainian people (1913), a few new passages were added, including the one that is cited here.
E. Chapter 4

There was no interference in local church organizations and no large-scale anti-religious terror took place, such as that which accompanied the second Soviet occupation. See Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Orthodox Church in Ukraine since 1917," in UCE Vol.2 (1971), p. 174; and Volodymyr Kubijovych, "Western Ukraine to the Outbreak of the German-Soviet War," in UCE Vol.1 (1963), p. 872.

There have been various suggestions as to why the Soviets stopped short of totally destroying the Greek Catholic Church at this time. One important factor was clearly caution due to the as yet incomplete consolidation of political power in the area; on this, see Soviet Persecution of Religion in Ukraine, (Toronto: World Congress of Free Ukrainians, 1976), p. 21. Bohdan R. Bociurkiw has discussed three related considerations: the uncertainty of the international situation, Sheptytsky's popularity and the cohesiveness and strength of the Greek Catholic Church; see his paper, "Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi and the Greek Catholic Church under the Soviet Occupation of 1939-1941," in Life and Times, pp. 101-123. Such an assessment is borne out by other studies; see Bohdan Cywiński, Ogniem Próbowane. Z dziejów najnowszych Kościoła Katolickiego w Europie śród-Kowo-wschodniej, Vol.1: "Korzenie tożsamości," (Rome: Papieski Instytut Studiów Kościelnych, 1982), p. 126, as well as by Sheptytsky's own conclusion, that the Soviet authorities were guided by the perception that the overwhelming public support enjoyed by the Church was a factor to be reckoned with: "Il est bien certain que sous les bolcheviks nous étions tous quasi condamnés à mort; on ne dissimulait pas le désir de ruiner et de supprimer jusqu'aux dernières traces du christianisme. On n'avantait que lentement pour ne pas exciter une trop grande opposition de toute la population. On ne se croyait
pas tout-à-fait 'chez-soi;' c'est peut-être une des raisons pour lesquelles on nous a ménagés peut-être plus que nous ne l'espérions." Metropolitan Sheptytsky's letter to Budapest nuncio Angelo Rotta, 30 August, 1941, in ADSS-1, p. 437.

2
Sheptytsky estimated that half of the 400,000 deportees were Greek Catholics. See his letter of 7 November, 1941, to nuncio Rotta, in ADSS-1, p. 491.

3
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to nuncio Rotta, 31 August, 1941, in ADSS-1, p. 439.

4
Some of these were: Bohoslovia (L'viv, 1923-1939), Dobryi Pastyr (Stany-slaviv, Peremyshl', 1931-1939), Katolnyts'ka Aktsia (L'viv, 1934-1939), Meta (L'viv, 1931-1939), Nyua (L'viv, 1904-1939), Peremys'ki Eparkhial'ni Vidomosti (Peremyshl', 1889-1939), Vistnyk Stanyslaviv'ko Eparkhii (Stanyslaviv, 1886-1939).

The official organ of the Archeparchy of L'viv, L'vivs'ki Arkhi-eparkhial'ni Vidomosti (hereafter LAeU), continued to appear for a time in limited cyclostyle (stencil) runs of 200 issues; later, even the cyclostyle was confiscated and LAeU was distributed only in handwritten form, not appearing in print again until after the Soviet withdrawal.

5
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to nuncio Rotta, 7 November, 1941, in ADSS-1, p. 493.

6
Catechists were not only fired from teaching positions, but were also forbidden by the State authorities to return to the schools. See the following documents: "Naivazhnisha sprava..."; M.O. N°12 (January, 1940); and "Khoch ya uzhe poperednio..."; in 01-61, pp. 3, 11 and 16 respectively.
7  "Dès le premier moment toutes les écoles ont été déclarées écoles d'Etat. Défense d'enseigner la religion, et tendance systématique de corrompre la jeunesse, de l'attirer avant tout par des danses, musiques, jeux et puis par une propagande d'athéisme fanatique." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Tisserant 26 December, 1939, in ADSS-I, p. 169. The secularization of schools was carried out very quickly, being for the most part completed within two months. Cywiński, Ogniem Próbowane, pp. 124-125.

8  Soviet efforts to undermine the Greek Catholic Church were aimed at it from within and without. The activities of the Greek Catholic bishops were closely monitored by spies and there were unsuccessful attempts to sow internal discord between Bishop Khomyslyh and Metropolitan Sheptytysky. External interference took the form of an abortive initiative to set up a "Ukrainian National Greek Catholic Church," that would sever ties with the existing local Church and with the Vatican. Mykhailo Khomiak, "Borot'ba Ukraïns'koï Katolyts'koï Tserkvy proty Komunizmu," in Logos 1:4 (Yorkton, Saskatchewan, October-December, 1950) pp. 285-286.

More recent studies have identified steps that the Soviets took as early as in the spring of 1941 in preparation for the liquidation of the Unia in East Galicia through the forcible incorporation of the Greek Catholic Church into the Russian Orthodox Church. See Cywiński, Ogniem Próbowane, p. 126; and Bociurkiw, "The Orthodox Church," p. 174.

9  Kubijovyč, "Western Ukraine to the Outbreak," p. 872.

10  Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Naivazhnisha sprava...," M.O. N°4 (November, 1939), in 01-61, p. 4.
11 Sheptytsky estimated that by the end of the Soviet occupation, some 50 priests had been arrested, while in the last days 6 had been killed and 5 others were presumed dead. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to nuncio Rotta, 30 August, 1941, in ADSS-1, p. 439. Of the 50 who had been arrested, 33 were deported. Sheptytsky’s letter to Rotta, 7 November 1941, ADSS-1, p. 492. In an unpublished letter to Cardinal Tisserant (17 August 1941, p. 4) Sheptytsky reported that almost 100 priests had emigrated during this period. On the arrests, hard labor and the religious tax (“kul’tzbir”), see Khomiak, “Borot’ba Ukrains’koj Katolyts’koj Tserkvy,” p. 265.

12 Over half of the estimated vacancies in the parishes would have been filled by Basilian monastic priests who in 1939 numbered 133. In addition, the order comprised 91 scholastics and 149 brothers, who would likely have been considered for clandestine catechetical duties. The figures are given in Catalogus Ordinis Basiliani Sti Josaphat Ineunte Anno Sancto MCXL (Rome: Apud Curiam Generalem Ordinis, 1950), p. 52.

13 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 17 August, 1941, p. 7.

14 "Somme toute ces 21 mois passés sous le régime bolchévique a été pour un grand nombre l’occasion d’une conversion et de comprendre mieux que jamais que tous les biens terrestres ne sont que vanité. Nous avons vécu avec la persuasion de gens condamnés à mort, qui seront exécutés tôt ou tard..." Sheptytsky, letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 17 August, 1941, p. 10.

15 Ibid., pp. 10-11. As in the case of the Ukrainian underground, anti-Soviet sentiments ran high among the Greek Catholic clergy. See n. 54, below.
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Do spovidnykiv," ("Zvertau uvahu..."), M.O. N°52 (February-March 1940), in 01-61, p. 25.

17
"Une des occasions de propager l’athéisme pour les bolchéviques étaient les mariages séparés, car on exigeait les employés qui ne vivaient pas bien avec leurs femmes de se marier, naturellement par un mariage civil, et le nombre des employés était très grand..." Sheptytsky, letter to Tisserant, 17 August, 1941, p. 9.

18
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Oberulasia Kartka...." in 01-61, p. 1.; and Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Oskil’ky vy...." M.O. N°17 (31 January 1940), in 01-61, p. 12. On abortion as a sin for which absolution was withheld in the Archeaparchy of Lviv, as on the respective exceptions to this rule, see Regulation 72 of the Sobor of 1940, in 03-69, pp. 23-24.

The Metropolitan was quite concerned about the apparently rising incidence of sexual promiscuity, and regularly included it, along with drunkenness, in lists of pastoral issues. See Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro nebezpeku zaniedbannia potribnol pratsi," (Khoch shchoino....") M.O. N°48 (February-March, 1940), in 01-61, p. 28; "Pytaiuť'-sia sviashchenyky...." M.O. N°80 (15 April, 1940), in 01-61, p. 57; and Regulation N°23 to the Decree "Dogmatychni osnovy morali" (On the dogmatic bases of morality) of the Sobor of 1941, in 03-69, p. 108. In light of these issues – as well as that of onanism (which the Sobor of 1940 felt it necessary to address, also in Regulation 72) – one author’s suggestion that the Greek Catholic Church at the time had succeeded in "saving the Ukranian family from perdition" probably needs to be taken with a grain of salt. See Khomiak, "Borot’ba Ukrains’koj Katolyts’koj Tserkvy proty Komunizmu," p. 281.


Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro nebezpeku zanedbannia potribnoi pratsi," M.O. N°48 (February-March, 1940), in 01-61, pp. 25-28. See also the passage from Metropolitan Sheptytsky's letter to Cardinal Tisserant (17 August, 1941, p. 10): "Nous avons vécu avec la persuasion de gens condamnés à mort, qui seront exécutés tôt ou tard..."

It is interesting that in his 1940 statement Sheptytsky cited none of the biblical references that were employed in such key papal social teachings as Rerum Novarum (1891) and Quadragesimo Anno (1931). Even later Vatican social documents, for example Octogesima Adveniens (1971) and Laborem Exercens (1981), cite biblical references that are different from Sheptytsky's, while Mater et Magistra and Gaudium et Spes make passing reference to only two passages that were cited by Sheptytsky (1 Cor. 10:31 and Col. 3:17).


Ibid., p. 28.

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Podaiu do vidom...," M.G. N°90 (31 October, 1940), in 01-61, p. 72.

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pryminiuiiuchy do poodynokykh...," M.O. N°95 (9 December, 1940), in 01-61, p. 76.
28 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Deiaki vypadky nasyl’stva...," M.O. N°68 (March, 1940), in 01-61, p. 44.

29 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Podaiu do vidoma...," M.O. N°90 (31 October, 1940), in 01-61, p. 72.

30 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pytaie sviashchenyk...," M.O. N°65 (20 March, 1940), in 01-61, p. 41.

31 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Ubohyi cholovik...," Speech at the end of a session of the Sobor of 1940 (12 September, 1940), in 01-61, p. 77.

32 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Hornetesia...," M.O. N°9 (December, 1939), in 01-61, p. 7; and Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "U vazhnu khvyliu...," Address at the opening of the Sobor of 1940 (19 April, 1940), in 01-61, p. 65.

33 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Zvertaiu uvahê...," M.O. N°52 (February-March, 1940), in 01-61, p. 29.

34 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "U Svitlyi Chetver...," M.O. N°59-1 (March, 1940), in 01-61, p. 38; and Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "U vazhnu khvyliu...," Address at the opening of the Sobor of 1940 (19 April, 1940), in 01-61, p. 65.

35 Sheptytsky, "U vazhnu khvyliu...," Address at the opening of the Sobor of 1940 (19 April, 1940), in 01-61, p. 65.

36 "Mytropolychyi Ordynariat podaie...," M.O. N°57 (February-March, 1940), in 01-61, p. 32.
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "V Svitlyi Chetver...," M.O. N°59-1, in 01-61, pp. 37-38.

Sheptytsky, "U vazhnu khvyliu...," (April, 1940), in 01-61, p. 65.

Sheptytsky, "U vazhnu khvyliu...," (April, 1940), in 01-61, p. 64.

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pytaie sviaschchynyk...," M.O. N°65 (20 March, 1940), in 01-61, pp. 40-41.

Sheptytsky, "U vazhnu khvyliu...," (April, 1940), in 01-61, p. 66.

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Blyz’ko dva misiatsi...," M.O. N°88 (May-June, 1940), in 01-61, p. 68.

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "V Svitlyi Chetver...," M.O. N°59-1 (March, 1940), in 01-61, p. 37.

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Podaiu do vidoma...," M.O. N°90 (31 October, 1940), in 01-61, p. 72.

In a letter to Cardinal Tisserant on 26 December, 1939, Metropolitan Sheptytsky wrote: "... j’avais demandé, et je redemande, que Sa Sainteté daigne par sa bénédiction apostolique et paternelle me désigner, députer et déléguer à la mort pour la foi et l’Unité de l’Eglise." In ADSS-1, p. 172.

Much has been made, for example, of Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s supposed hesitancy about signing the oath of allegiance to the Polish state. See Chapter 3, herein.

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Nebezpeka teperishnioi khvyli...," in LÀeV (L’iuu, July-September, 1936) Vol. XLIX N°7-9, pp. 81-98.
"Obernulasja kartka..." M.O. N°1 (September-October, 1939), in 01-61, p. 1.

Sheptytsky, "Podaiu do vidoma...," M.O. N°90, 31.X.I.1940, in 01-61, p. 73.

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Prymieniuichy do poodynokykh...," M.O. N°95 (9 December, 1940), in 01-61, pp. 75-76.

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Rozyslaiuchy apostoliv...," M.O. N°66 (March, 1940), in 01-61, p. 41.

Regulation N°56, Sobor of 1940, in 03-69, p. 21.


Interview with Professor Bohdan Bociurkiw, 7 August, 1987. See also the communiqué of Stepan Bandera to the members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists: "... from the moment of the arrival of the (Soviet) armies, the Greek Catholic clergy not only does not in any way manifest its support for the Soviets, but on the contrary priests are sowing distrust towards them among the population and are stirring hopes for rapid changes to the situation which is undesirable to the Church." TsDIA. f. 201, op. 4b, spr. 2626, ark. 59; cited in Edward Prus, WJadyKa Światojurski. Rzecz o arcybiskupie Andrzeju Szeptyckim (1865-1944), (Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Związków Zawodowych, 1985), p. 207.
55 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Vid lit bazhav ya...," M.O. N°59 (13 April, 1940), in 01-61, p. 34.

56 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Rozsylaiuchy apostoliu...," M.O. N°66 (March, 1940) in 01-61, pp. 41-42.

57 Ibid., p. 42.

58 Ibid., p. 42.

59 Ibid., p. 42.

60 Sheptytsky, "Vid lit bazhav ya...," M.O. N°/5/9 (February-March, 1940), in 01-61, p. 34.

61 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pytaiut'sia sviashchenky...," M.O. N°80 (15 April, 1940), in 01-61, p. 57.

62 Sheptytsky, "Pytaiut'sia sviashchenky...," M.O. N°80 (15 April, 1940), in 01-61, p. 58.

63 Sheptytsky, "Pro nebezpeku zanedbannia potribnoi pratsi," ("Khoch shchoino..."), M.O. N°48 (February-March, 1940), in 01-61, p. 27.

64 Sheptytsky, "Rozsylaiuchy apostoliu...," M.O. N°66 (March, 1940) 01-61, pp. 42. A decree of the Sobor of 1940 resolved that priests should avoid actions that might deter people from an evangelical life, such as censuring sinners from the pulpit or, worse, naming them. The chancery office reserved for itself the jurisdiction to decide when such exceptional conditions had arisen as might justify these kinds of measure. "Decree N°8 of the Sobor of 1940: On sermons," in 03-69, p. 71.
Sheptytsky, "Rozsvyliuchy apostoliu...," M.O. N°66 (March, 1940) in 01-61, pp. 42.

66 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Ubohyi choolovik...," speech at the end of a session of the sobor, 12 September, 1940, in 01-61, p. 78.

67 M.O. N°3 (November, 1939), in 01-61, p. 3; Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro mylostyni" ("Polozhennia mnohyKh...") M.O. N°53 (February-March, 1940), in 01-61, pp. 30-31; and Sheptytsky, "Pytaiut'sia sviaashchenyky...," M.O. N°80 (15 April, 1940), in 01-61, p. 57.

68 Sheptytsky, "Vid lit bazhav ya...," M.O. N°/5/9 (February-March, 1940), in 01-61, p. 34.

69 "Decree of the Sobor of 1940: On the Confession of the Universal Faith" in 03-69, p. 64.

70 Sheptytsky, "V Svitlyi Chetver...," M.O. N°59-1 (March, 1940), in 01-61, pp. 36-37. There can be no doubt that Sheptytsky disapproved of the confiscation of church lands, for he served a stern reminder and warning to any lapsed Christians among the members of the "People's Assembly" who may have profited by such means: Christians were obliged before God and before their own conscience to ensure the livelihood of those who ministered to their spiritual needs. Whoever presumed to claim parish or monastic property for his own would incur "heavy penalties" from the Church, that is, excommunication until the injustice had been redressed. See Sheptytsky, "Naivazhnisha sprava...," M.O. N°4 (November, 1939), in 01-61, p. 4; and Khomiak, "Borot'ba Ukrains'koi Katolyts'koi Tserkvy proty Komunizmu," p. 263. As well, any priests who gave absolution to such "usurpers" were considered to have contravened Canon 2346 and were subject to the same extreme
punishment: excommunication. See M.O. N*11 (January, 1940), in 01-61, p. 10.

However, the tradition of the Church allowed for absolution if restitution was made, and Metropolitan Sheptytsky even took this a step further with special provisions for those who were unable to make restitution for fear of reprisals by the Soviets. Such people could retain custody of church property as hirelings and pay the Church a designated portion of the income from the holdings. See Sheptytsky, "Pytaie sviashchenykh..." M.O. N*65 (20 March, 1940), in 01-61, p. 41. In the end, therefore, the punitive thrust of Sheptytsky's response was outweighed by an appreciation of the difficult circumstances that effectively split the loyalties of some people.

71 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Khoch ya vzhe...," M.O. N*28 (February, 1940), in 01-61, p. 17.

72 Sheptytsky, "Pytaie sviashchenykh...," M.O. N*80 (April, 1940), in 01-61, pp. 56-57.

73 Sheptytsky, "Podaiu do vidoma...," M.O. N*83 (17 April, 1940), in 01-61, p. 61.

74 Sheptytsky, "Pryminiuiuchy do poodykoykh...," M.O. N*95 (9 December, 1940), in 01-61, p. 76.

75 Sheptytsky, "Protest proty nasyl'stva nad sovistiu ditei," ("Deiaki vy-padky nasyl'stva..."), M.O. N*68 (March, 1940), in 01-61, pp. 44-46.

76 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to the nuncio in Budapest Monsignor Rotta, 30 August, 1941, in ADSS-1, p. 437.


During the occupation, Sheptytsky had expressed a very different view of the constitutions of parish brotherhoods: he felt that a brotherhood becomes the heart of a parish "not by force of its statutes, but by virtue of the wise leadership of its pastor." See Sheptytsky, "Pytaiat'sia sviashchenyky...," M.O. N°80 (April, 1940), in 01-61, pp. 58-59. This preference of wise leaders over constitutions further supports the claim that Sheptytsky's surface adherence to the Soviet constitution was only a superficial posture that was dictated by the circumstances.

Sheptytsky at one point even referred to the eparchial sobors as "a legal fiction, as it were, to replace the monthly publication of the L'viivs'ki Archiparkhial'ni Vidomosti." See Sheptytsky, "U vazhnu khvyliu..." (19 April, 1940), in 01-61, p. 63. As well, by requesting permission to conduct pastoral work in the Eastern lands Metropolitan Sheptytsky was probing the régime by every means available to him, in an attempt to win some basic concessions. See M.O. N°83 (17 April, 1940), in 01-61, p. 61.

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky/, "Protest proty nasyl's'tva nad sovistiu ditei," ("Deiaki vypadky nasyl's'tva...") M.O. N°68 (March, 1940), in 01-61, p. 45: "The very fact that the education authorities appoint as teachers and principals non-Christians who are at times full of hatred toward Christianity places the school at odds with the very strong Christian tradition of the Ukrainian people."
Ibid., p. 44.

Ibid., p. 45.

Ibid., p. 45. Sheptytsky also criticized the reported use of atheist propaganda during the enrolment of children into the "Pioneers" organization as a violation of the freedom of conscience.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Sheptytsky, "U Svitliyi Chetuer...," M.O. N°59-1, in 01-61, p. 37.

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Dekret i pravila Arkhiieparkhial'noho Soboru z 1940 r. Pro tykh, shcho zhiiut' po yevanhel's'kyh radam," in 03-69, pp. 378-379; and 06-84, p. 247.

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Naivazhnisha sprava...," M.O. N°4 (November, 1939), in 01-61, p. 4; and in 06-84, p. 237.

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Tisserant, 17 August, 1941, p. 2.

M.O. N°13,14 (January, 1940), in 01-61, p. 11. At the end of May, 1940,
the chancery issued another terse reminder that any priests who left their parishes (without leave, presumably) were automatically suspended. See M.O. N°87 (30 May, 1940), in *01-61*, p. 67.

95 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Tisserant 17 August, 1941, pp. 2-3.

96 Sheptytsky, "Rozsivaiuchy Vas...," M.O. N°3 (November, 1939), in *01-61*, p. 3. See also Nahurs’kyi /Nagórski/, "Mytropolyt Sheptyts’kyy u litakh 1939-1940," p. 25.

97 M.O. N°20 (February, 1940), in *01-61*, p. 13.

98 M.O. N°32 (20 February, 1940), in *01-61*, pp. 17-18.

99 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Tisserant, 17 August, 1941, p. 4.

100 Sheptytsky, "Pytaiut’sia sviashchenyky...," M.O. N°80 (15 April, 1940), in *01-61*, pp. 56-59.

101 "Pour donner à mon clergé un support moral j’ai invité tous les prêtres de prendre part à des sessions de ce qu’on appelait autrefois le consistoire — chaque jeudi à 10 ou 11 heures tous les prêtres présents à Léopol se rassemblaient chez moi. Les actes de l’autorité ecclésiastique étaient lus, puis copiés et propagés par les prêtres. De cette manière j’ai pu écrire beaucoup de lettres pastorales, — presque chaque semaine j’en promulguais une..." Sheptytsky, letter to Tisserant, 17 August, 1941, pp. 4-5.

The Metropolitan estimated that, on average, the meetings were attended by 60-80 priests.

102 Sheptytsky, letter to Tisserant, 17 August, 1941, p. 5. During the
course of the war, four such sobors were held— in 1940, 1941, 1942 and 1943. Sheptytsky's letter to Tisserant of 6 September, 1942, discusses the first three synods, while the acts of all four sobors are contained in O6-84. A more recent monograph is the doctoral dissertation by Volodymyr Mudri, Cinque Sinodi Arcieparchiali di Leopoli 1905-1943, (Rome: Pontificio Istituto Orientale, 1983).

103
Sheptytsky's writings indicate that the network was primarily intended for the distribution longhand copies of the Archeeparchial organ, though it is not far-fetched to suppose that the same routes would have also been used as a mail service by the Church. See the following references in Sheptytsky's writings: M.O. N°24 (February, 1940), in O1-61, p. 14; M.O. N°84 (17 April, 1940), in O1-61, p. 62; and Sheptytsky, "U vazhnu khuy-liu..." (19 April, 1940), in O1-61, p. 63.

104

105
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Mnozhat'sia vypadky...", M.O. N°92 (6 November, 1940), in O1-61, p. 73.

106
Sheptytsky, "Mnozhat'sia vypadky...", M.O. N°92 (6 November, 1940), in O1-61, pp. 73-74.

107
"Povtoriuiuchy davni...", M.O. N°67 (March, 1940), in O1-61, p. 44.

108
Sheptytsky, "Pryminiuiuchy do poodynokykh...", M.O. N°95 (9 December, 1940), in O1-61, p. 76. Almost a year earlier, a similar directive had been issued allowing a second liturgy on the same day. See M.O. N°15 (January, 1940), in O1-61, p. 11.
109
M.O. N°98 (2 January, 1941), in 01-61, pp. 76-77. According to one source, there was considerable flexibility with the timing of liturgical services. "It was then that liturgies were celebrated at four or five in the morning and then also in the evening - an innovation that raised eyebrows in Rome. It was also against the standard practice of the Eastern Byzantine Churches which prescribe that the Liturgy may not begin after the noon hour." Letter of Rev. Lubomyr Husar to the author, 26 December, 1987. Although this accommodation went against both the Eastern and the Western liturgical traditions, it would have permitted Ukrainian Catholic workers to attend services on Sundays and feast days during the Soviet occupation.

110
M.O. N°51 (February-March, 1940), in 01-61, p. 29.

111
Sheptytsky, "Rozsivaiuchy Vas...," M.O. N°3 (November, 1939), 01-61, p. 3.

112
M.O. N°3 (January, 1940), in 01-61, pp. 9-10.

113
M.O. N°76 (3 April, 1940), in 01-61, p. 55.

114
M.O. N°33 (17 February, 1940), in 01-61, p. 18.

115
Orthodox communities in the L'viv region were also affected by shortages of priests and liturgical services during the occupation. As a result, Greek Catholic priests would occasionally be faced by Orthodox mothers who had brought their infants up to receive communion along with them. Sheptytsky encouraged his priests to administer the sacrament to Orthodox infants, reasoning that "to discourage the mother would be harmful to her and the child." See Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Prychastia neziedyennych ditei" ("Buvaie, shcho...") M.O. N°37 (23 February, 1940), in 01-61,
pp. 19-20; and Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Ishche pro prychastia pravoslavnych ditei" ("Mozhna by...") M.O. N°41 (February, March, 1940), in 01-61, pp. 23-24.

116
M.O. N°40 (February-March, 1940), in 01-61, p. 23.

117
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro sovist' neziedynenykh" ("Pytaut': Koly...") M.O. N°39 (February-March, 1940), in 01-61, p. 22.

118
The discussion of Canon 731 of the Code of Canon Law is in Sheptytsky, "Pro sovist' neziedynenykh" ("Pytaut': Koly...") M.O. N°39 (February-March, 1940), in 01-61, p. 21-23.

119
Sheptytsky, "Pro sovist' neziedynenykh" ("Pytaut': Koly...") M.O. N°39 (February-March, 1940), in 01-61, p. 22. In the same document, Metropolitan Sheptytsky understood epikeia to be "a benevolent, people-oriented interpretation not so much of the law as of the intent of the lawgiver." Thus, the Church as a lawgiver could suspend the obligation of a canon whenever strict adherence to it was either detrimental or was an excessive burden upon the people.

120
As one patriotic observer noted, "...the Ukrainian Catholic Church with its solemn liturgies and thanksgiving services dedicated to the Ukrainian people on such solemn occasions as the 22nd of January or the 1st of November; requiem services for fallen heroes, deceased national activists, tortured and murdered by the enemies of Ukraine; with processions past graves in the cemetaries - deepened the faith in a better tomorrow, in the victory of Good over Darkness, in the complete national and social liberation of Ukraine." Khomiak, "Borot'ba Ukraïns'koi Katolyts'koi Tserkvy proty Komunizmu," p. 281.
Nahurs'kyi /Nagórski/, "Mytropolyt Sheptyts'kyi u litakh 1939-1940," p. 25.

M.O. N°26 (February, 1940) 01-61, pp. 15-16.

The Metropolitan's chancery issued a number of statements to that effect. See M.O. N°30 (February, 1940) in 01-61, p. 17; and M.O. N°58 (March, 1940) in 01-61, p. 32. See also Nahurs'kyi /Nagórski/, "Mytropolyt Sheptyts'kyi u litakh 1939-1940," pp. 162-163.

The illegal hospital ministry depended a great deal on the assistance of religious nurses, and it was through their cooperation that priests were able to enter hospitals. Nahurs'kyi /Nagórski/, "Mytropolyt Sheptyts'kyi u litakh 1939-1940," p. 163.

"I am calling upon all pastors who live near hospitals to visit them as often as possible... in civilian clothes, of course, in order to enable the sick to have their confessions heard. I am also permitting taking the Holy Eucharist to the sick and to administer the sacrament in such a way that even the patient in the next bed will not notice it." Cited by Nahurs'kyi /Nagórski/, "Mytropolyt Sheptyts'kyi u litakh 1939-1940," p. 163.

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "2 ohliadu na voienne..." (March, 1940) M.O. N°63 in 01-61, p. 39.

Concerning the decision to set up ecclesiastical tribunals, Sheptytsky later wrote to Cardinal Tisserant, "Cette déclaration n'a été qu'une théorie, car les rapports sociaux et civils ont été de par les bolchéviques bouleversés d'une manière si incroyable que personne ne pensait à faire des contrats ou à faire valoir des droits quelconques." Sheptytsky, unpublished

128

129
Sheptytsky, "Hornetesia..." M.O. N°9 (December, 1939), in 01-61, p. 7.

130
Sheptytsky, "Prychastia neziedyennykh ditei" ("Buvaie, shcho...") M.O. N°37 (23 February, 1940), in 01-61, p. 20.

131
"Ubohii cholvik..." (delivered at the end of a session of the Sobor of 1940), in 01-61, p. 78.

132
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Zvertaiut' meni uvahu..." M.O. N°56 (1940), in 01-61, p. 32.

133
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Do monakhiv i Monakhyn' ta vsikh, shcho spil'no zhyvut' po yevanhel's'KYM radam," ("Rozsivaiuchy...") M.O. N°3 (November, 1939), in 01-61, p. 3.

134
"Pro tykh shcho zhyuiut' po Yevanhelskykh radam," ("Aep. Sobor protes-
tuie..."), in 03-69, p. 379; and 06-84, pp. 247-248.

135
Speech at the closing of the Sobor of 1940, ("Sered nezvychno tiazhkykh..."), in 01-61, pp. 69,71.

136
03-69, pp. 96-97; and 03-69, pp. 109-110.

137
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pryhaduiu tiazhkyi oboviazok...," M.O. N°1 (January, 1940) in 01-61, p. 9. The Sobor of 1940 fully endorsed this position with the statement, "Let us work tirelessly and with perseverance even unto death, that our preaching might be worthy of the Gospel."

Dekre-
ty i pravyla Arkhyeparkhiial’noho Soboru 1940 roku. Ch. 8: Propovidi,
("Mohutnim, perekonyvym..."), in 03-69, p. 70.

139
"Mnozhat’sia vypadky...," M.O. N°22 (February, 1940) in 01-61, pp. 13-
14.

139
See regulation N°12 of the Sobor of 1940, in 03-69, p. 15. Similar
exemptions were applied to the teaching of catechism; see regulation N° 27,
Sobor of 1940, in 03-69, p. 18.

140
"Mnozhat’sia vypadky...," M.O. N°22 (February, 1940) in 01-61, p. 13.

141
M.O. N°30 (January-February, 1940) and M.O. N°57 (February-March, 1940),
in 01-61, pp. 17,32 respectively.

142
M.O. N°83 (17 April, 1940), in 01-61, p. 61.

143
Letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 6 September, 1942, p. 2. See also
Sheptytsky’s address at opening of the Sobor of 1940: "As the external
circumstances, brought on by the war, became an ever greater obstacle to
our work, we needed to exert more intensity in our work." In 01-61, p. 62.

144
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Naivazhnoha sprava...," M.O. N°4
(November, 1939), in 01-61, p. 3.

145
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Khoch ya vzhe...," M.O. N°28 (February,
1940) 01-61, p. 16.

146
Regulations N°29,30, Sobor of 1940, in 03-69, p. 18.

147
Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Obernulasia kartka...," M.O. N°1
(September-October, 1939), in 01-61, p. 1. On the need to train catechists,
see also Sheptytsky, "Pryhaduiu tiazhkyi...," M.O. N°1 (January, 1940), in 01–61, p. 9.

148 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Blyz'ko dva misiatsi...," Pastoral letter to the clergy and the faithful, M.O. N°88 (May–June, 1940), in 01–61, p. 68.
1 TsDIA, f.201, op.46, spr.2665, ark.133. Cited in Edward Prus, "Cerkiew greckokatolicka w okresie wojny i okupacji hitlerowskiej," Słaskie Studia Historyczne 1 (Katowice, 1975) p. 69 n. 37. According to Prus, this restoration of church property was followed by a pastoral letter dated 25 July, 1941 "that expressed Sheptytsky’s gratitude for that gesture." Ibid., p. 69 n. 38.

2 Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s letter to Pope Pius XII, 29-31 August, 1942. in ADSS-2, p. 627.

3 Ibid. Initially, a lump-sum payment of 900,000 złoty was made by the German civil authorities to the Ukrainian Church and it was not until April, 1943 that the Ukrainian Catholic bishops began to receive monthly payments from the treasury of the Generalgouvernement. See Prus, "Cerkiew greckokatolicka," p. 72 nn. 50-51.

In Prus’ argument, this is presented as an instance of the Greek Catholic Church’s collaboration with the Nazis. However, a number of factors need to be considered. In the first place, it appears that such funding was purely gratuitous with no evidence to suggest that it was tied to any specific reciprocation by the Church. Second, in view of the grave impoverishment of the clergy at this time, the need was urgent and, apparently, a matter of preserving life. Third, there is no indication that these funds in any way altered Sheptytsky’s rapidly declining opinion of the German régime. On the contrary, by April 1943, when the government payments were to have begun, the Metropolitan was already on record in opposing the Nazi régime and shortly thereafter became convinced that even a Soviet return would be preferable to the prolongation of the Nazi occupa-
tion.

Nor did the Ukrainian Catholic Church rely exclusively on the German government for financial support during the Nazi occupation; Catholic groups in Germany also offered assistance. Thus, for example, the Roman Catholic episcopate in Germany transmitted to the Ukrainian Catholic Church a payment of 15,000,000 złoty, which was designated "for the struggle against Bolshevik propaganda." See Prus, "Cerkiew grecko-katolicka," p. 72 nn. 47-48. A similar initiative was undertaken by a Catholic association which served Germans living outside the Reich. See Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29-31 August, 1942, p. 627.

4 Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29-31 August, 1942, p. 627. A year before, the Metropolitan had also pointed out that the eastward advance of Germany into eastern Ukraine was accompanied by the rebuilding of churches and some renewal of religious life. He had felt then that there was a greater measure of religious liberty under the Germans than under the Soviets, and was also optimistic that such pressing concerns as the restoration of Soviet-confiscated church lands and a subsistence allowance for the clergy were forthcoming. See Sheptytsky's letter to Pope Pius XII, 29 October, 1941, in Beatificationis et Canonizationis Servi Dei Andreae Szeptyckyj Archiepiscopi Leopoliensis Ukrainorum Metropolitae Haliciensis, Vol. 1: Epistolae et Relationes ad Sanctam Sedem Lingua Gallica Exaratae," (Rome, 1965), (Cited hereafter as ERSS-LGE), p. 2.

5 Ibid.

6 Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29-31 August, 1942, p. 627.

7 "Nous avons eu des révisions à la cathédrale, ma maison, le chapitre, le


According to one source, twenty-five priests were arrested and another two were killed by the Nazis. "Ukrajins’ka Katolyts’ka Tserkva pid chas bil’shovys’ts’koi okupatsiî," in Martyrolohiia Ukrajins’kykh Tserkov, eds. Osyp Zinkewych and Taras R. Lonchyna, Vol. II: "Ukrajins’ka Katolyts’ka Tserkva," (Toronto-Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1985), p. 208.

8 Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29-31 August, 1942, p. 628. The prohibition of a ministry for Soviet prisoners of war is also confirmed by a recently published document: a written order from Reinhardt Heidrich, Chief of Police and of the security service of the Reich, to the Einsatzgruppen (special
task forces) of those formations. The religious ministry to prisoners was only permitted where a priest was already present; bringing in new priests from the Reich or the Generalgouvernement for that purpose was prohibited. See Ryszard Torzecki, "Stavlennia Hitlerivs'ko! Sluzhby Bezpeky ta politsii do tserkov na skhodi," Kalendar-Al'manakh Novoho Shliakhu na 1986 rik, (Toronto, 1985), p. 45. The Heidrich document sheds further light on the German suppression of religious activity in occupied Galicia. German forces were instructed categorically to block all attempts by the Catholic Church to extend its activity into the occupied, formerly Russian territories. Moreover, the order continued, "In areas where a Catholic or Uniate priest is still active, it is necessary to ensure an extensive restriction of his activity. All those Catholic and Uniate clerics who, disregarding the ban on their travel to Soviet areas, have appeared there must be deported back to their country of origin." Ibid., pp. 43-44. Directed likewise against the Orthodox and the evangelical Churches, the clearly stated aim of this policy guideline was to limit religious activity and to prevent the emergence of denominational solidarity: "...it is desirable that the Church be broken up into many small groups. In this regard, there are to be no obstacles in the way of the multiplication of sects in this territory..." Ibid., p. 44. See also n. 12, below.


10 The German authorities would occasionally retain original correspondence and transmit only copies to the Metropolitan; see Metropolitan Sheptytsky's letter to Budapest Nuncio Rotta, 30 August, 1941, in ADSS-1, Document №297 p. 437.
Confiscation and censorship were also applied to the Metropolitan’s pastoral letters, as for example "Idealom..." of December, 1941; see Ivan Hryniokh, Blahovisnyk Yednosti, (Munich: Nakladom autora, 1961), p. 35. When the German authorities confiscated his pastoral letters, the Metropolitan countered by reading the texts to the priests assembled for the synod; see his letter to Pius XII, 29-31 August, 1942, p. 627. In November, 1942, Sheptytsky’s pastoral letter "Ne Ubyj" (Thou Shalt not Kill) was seized and several passages were emended from the text; see Andrei Sheptytsky, "Ne Ubyj," in LAEV LV:11 (Lviv, November, 1942), p. 179, and Hansjakob Stehle, "Der Lemberger Metropolit Septyckyj und die national-sozialistische Politik in der Ukraine," in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 34:3 (Munich, 1986), p. 416. Eventually, the censorship of church publications became a routine matter; in a February, 1943 letter to the Greek Catholic Apostolic Administrator for Germany, Rev. Petro Werhun, Sheptytsky remarked almost matter-of-factly that the latest issue of the official organ of the Archeparchy had been sent to the censor the day before. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Rev. Petro Werhun, 17 February, 1943, in PPU, Document N*231, p. 346.

Two weeks later, Sheptytsky explained that he had not published a papal communication for fear that it would be confiscated; see his letter to Pope Pius XII, 14 September, 1942, in ADSS-2, p. 633. As the situation worsened later in the same year, the Metropolitan found it increasingly difficult to communicate with the Vatican: "J’écris à votre Eminence à toutes les occasions qui se présentent mais elles deviennent rares et il est de plus en plus difficile d’en trouver." Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 28 December, 1942, ERSS-LGE, p. 2. As had been the case under Soviet rule, so too under the German occupation some of the church’s exter-
nal communication was carried on by way of secret couriers; on several occasions, Archimandrite Johannes Peters travelled incognito to Berlin on the Metropolitan's behalf. Stehle, "Der Lemberger Metropolit," p. 415.

12 Sheptytsky's letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 22 January, 1943, p. 5. A case in point was that of the two Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in the formerly Polish territory, about which Sheptytsky wrote: "Les Allemands, passés maîtres dans l'art de diviser, soutiennent les antagonismes des deux côtés; reconnaissent les deux églises et admettent la possibilité de deux évêques et même de deux curés dans le même endroit..."

Les Allemands cherchent à organiser des évêchés indépendants des deux branches. Un certain évêque Photius (Tymochtchouk) s'est séparé de l'église de Policarpe, et s'est déclaré chef hiérarchique de toute l'Eglise Auto-céphale de Volhynie, indépendant de tous les métropolites, et confirmé seulement par les autorités allemandes." (Ibid.) Sheptytsky's assessment has received ample corroboration by German wartime documents that have subsequently come to light. John Armstrong referred to the German policy of preventing the Churches from acquiring too much internal cohesiveness; see his Ukrainian Nationalism, second edition, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 199-203. See also Torzecki, "Stavlenia Hitlerius'koi," pp. 43-46.


14 "Pro myloserdia" 02-69, July-August, 1942, p. 166.

15 Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29-31 August, 1942, p. 626.
Pan'kius'kyi, Roky, pp. 74-75. Pan'kius'kyi explains that during the German occupation even anonymous allegations of anti-Nazi activities (e.g., Soviet collaboration or membership in the Banderite wing of the OUN) were considered a sufficient cause for arrest and political imprisonment.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's letter to Pope Pius XII, 29-31 August, 1942, in ADSS-2, p. 626. It has been estimated that by August, 1942, as many as 250,000 Ukrainians had been moved into Germany for labor; see Stehle, "Der Lemberger Metropolit," p. 416.

Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29-31 August, 1942, in ADSS-2, p. 627.


Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Slovo Metropolyta," ("U vazhkii khvyl'nyi...") Krakius'ki Uisti IV:179/917/ (Cracow, 17 August, 1943) p. 2

In a letter of 8 May, 1943, to Cardinal Tisserant Metropolitan Sheptytsky expressed concern that incarcerated priests might not be released in time to escape death in the "upheaval that is approaching." See ADSS-2, p. 791. The Metropolitan again voiced a similar apprehension a year later, when the fear of the Soviet advance was further fueled by reports of actual reprisals against those who had cooperated with the German régime.

"L'armée bolchévique approche /sic/ de Léopol. Il devient presque sûr qu'ils occuperont la ville peut-être même dans 8 ou 10 jours. Cette nouvelle remplit nos fidèles de peur. Tous les intellectuels qui, pendant ces deux dernières années ont coopéré avec les allemands, même de la manière la moins volontaire, pensent qu'ils sont exposés à une mort certaine et quittent la ville ou le pays pour se rendre dans quelque endroit de l'ancienne Pologne, moins exposé que la Galicie. Des villages occupés par les
bolchéviques les émigrés ou évacués racontent que dès le premier moment les Bolchéviques tuent tous ceux qui sont accusés ou dénoncés, même faussement, de quelque crime contre le communisme." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 23 March, 1944, photographic copy in UMVR, p. 2. The fear of the Soviets was also cited by Rev. Joseph Slipyj, who nevertheless by March, 1943 felt that it had subsided to a certain degree among the population. Letter of Bishop Joseph Slipyj to Dr. M. Dzerovych, 1 March, 1943, PPU, Document N°232, p. 347.

22 Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29-31 August, 1942, p. 625.

23 "Jews are the first victims. The number of Jews killed in our little land has certainly surpassed 200,000. As the German army advanced eastward, the number of victims grew. In Kiev, in a matter of days up to 130,000 men, women and children were executed. All the towns in Ukraine bore witness to similar massacres and this has gone on for a year. At first, the authorities were ashamed of these inhuman acts of injustice and tried to procure documents that would prove that the local population or militia units were behind these murders. But with time, they began to kill Jews in the streets in plain view of the public and without any shame." Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29-31 August, 1942, p. 625.

Nor did the terror directed at Jews subside in the months that followed; in a letter to Cardinal Tisserant, Sheptytsky reported that in the previous two months more than 40,000 Jews had been killed in the city of Lviv alone. See Sheptytsky's letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 28 December, 1942, ERSS-LGE, p. 1.

The Jewish population of Western Ukraine, numbering more than a half million in 1931, had increased dramatically during the Soviet occupation,
before being decimated by the Nazis. Sheptytsky estimated that about
200,000 Jews had fled from German-occupied Poland into Soviet-occupied
eastern Galicia (i.e., between September 1939 and June 1941). With the Nazi
invasion, the Jewish community of Western Ukraine was almost completely
destroyed, and by 1945 barely a few thousand Jewish people lived in the
area.

24
"Naturally, many Christians, and not only baptized Jews but so-called
'Aryans' were also victims of unjustified murder." Sheptytsky to Pius XII,
29-31 August, 1942, p.p. 625-626. The Metropolitan expected that, having
become accustomed to killing innocent Jews by the thousands, the execu-
tioners would soon turn upon Ukrainians and Poles (Ibid., p. 628). Later
developments convinced him that his fears were well-founded: "From day to
day, it is becoming clearer that the aim is to exterminate the entire
Ukrainian and Polish intelligentsia." See Sheptytsky's letter to Cardinal

25
According to statistics provided in the official organ of the Archeaparchy
of L'viv (L'viuś'kii Arkhiieparhiial'ni Vidomosti) for the first quarter of
1944, four priests were listed as murdered, while two others were missing
and unaccounted for. Cited in Hryhor Luzhnyts'kyi, Ukraïns'ka Tserkva
mizh Skhodom i Zakhidom. Narys Istorii Ukraïns'koi Tserkvi, (Philadelphia:
384. Of those priests, apparently two were actually killed by the Nazis
(Martyrolohiia, 1985: 208). Another five priests were killed in 1943 in the
Lemkivshchyna and Peremyshlshchyna areas, allegedly by the Polish communist
partisans "Bataliony chYopskie," who are thought to have continued killing
Ukrainian priests into 1945 (Ibid., 67-68). The five priests were: Mykhailo
Velychko (1889-1943), Mykola Lis'kevych (1904-1943), Hryhorii Tyktor (1910-
1943), Stepan Shalash (1890–1943) and Yaroslav Shchypora (1902–1943) (Ibid., pp. 113, 132–133, 148, 153, 154). For Sheptytsky’s discussion of the violence directed at priests see Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, “Pro ubvy-
vannia sviaschennykov,” (On the murder of priests) (“U imeni Khristova
Tserkvy...”) /1943/ in 02–69, pp. 431–432.

26
Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29–31 August, 1942, p. 626.

27
"Toute la Volhynie et en partie la Galicie sont pleines de bandes, qui
ont un certain caractère politique. Il y a des bandes, constituées de
Polonais, d’autres d’Ukrainiens, des autres, enfin, de communistes. Il y a
outre cela des vrais bandits, parmi lesquels il y a des gens de toutes les
nationalités, Allemands, Juifs, Ukrainiens, Polonais et Russes.” Metropolitan
790.

28

29
"Pro myloserdia," (June, 1942), in 02–69, p. 167 para 9. Sheptytsky des-
cribed the spiritual pain of blood-guilt in very concrete terms: "Not even
streams of water can cleanse those stained hands, that soul which is
stained with another’s blood! Not even the fragrances of all Arabia could
overcome that cadaverous stench of the soul which rots in the sin of
homicide." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Dekret pro dukhove choloviko-
ubyvstvo sobto sobiazn’," (Decree on spiritual homicide or incitement),

30 Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s letter to Cardinal Tisserant, 3 September,
1942. Cited in Eugène Tisserant, L’Eglise militante, (Paris: Bloud & Gay,
1950) p. 14. Later that same year, Sheptytsky wrote again to Cardinal

31 Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29-31 August, 1942, ADSS-2, p. 628.

32 Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29-31 August, 1942, ADSS-2, p. 628.

33 Letter of Metropolitan Sheptytsky to Pope Pius XII, 14 September, 1942, ADSS-2, p. 633.

34 Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29-31 August, 1942, ADSS-2, p. 627.

35 Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29-31 August, 1942, ADSS-2, p. 628.


37 "With a very painful heart, and with fear for the future of our people I see how in many communities there are people whose souls and hands are stained with the innocent blood of their neighbors." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro myloserdia," (June, 1942), 02-69, p. 181 para 53.

38 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Slovo Mytropolyta," ("U vazhkii Khvy-lynii...") 10 August, 1943, Krakius'ki Visti IV:179 /917/ (Cracow, 17 August, 1943), pp. 1-2. In this pastoral, Sheptytsky repeatedly drove home the point that violence had far-reaching social consequences: "By taking it upon themselves to decide on matters of concern to the general public - without sufficient experience and without any desire to consult with their elders - the youth are exposing us all to grave danger. Among them are older people, who lead them ... and who in fact are inciting them to illegal acts and rash steps that later bring vengeance upon the whole
community" Ibid., p. 1, para 3; "...take care that your sons not commit crimes by which they could incur terrible misfortune upon the village" Ibid., p. 1, para 4; and "It is in the interest of our enemies to persuade our people to /act/ recklessly; /for/ that could and, indeed, necessarily would cause great harm to our people" Ibid., p. 2, para 7. In this last instance, the Metropolitan clearly referred to reprisals by civil authorities, though at other times he may also have been returning to the theme of divine punishment.


41 Sheptytsky, "Slovo Myropolita," 10 August, 1943, para 3. In a similar vein, the Metropolitan exhorted Ukrainian mothers "Standing on guard for the divine order in the community... do not allow /your sons/ to stain their souls with innocent blood..." Ibid., para 8.


Sheptytsky may have drawn on scripture here; his expression appears to hark back to the Old Testament passage: "And the Lord said, 'What have you done? The voice of your brother's blood is crying to me from the ground. And now you are cursed from the ground, which has opened its mouth to receive your brother's blood from your hand.'" (Gen.4:10-11).

44 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro ubyvannia sviashchenykh."
(On the murder of priests), ("U imeni Khrystova Tserkvy..."), n.d. /1943?/, in
02-69, p. 431.

45 Ibid.

46 Andrei Sheptytsky, "Rozdumyuchy nad kalendarem..." in Kalendar "Studion"
(L'viv, 1944), p. 31.

47 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Do ukrains'koho narodu," ("Z voli vsemohuchoho... zachalasia...") 1 July, 1941, in Kost' Pan'kivs'kyi, Vid
derzhavy do komitetu. "Zhyttia i Mysli": Book IV, (New York-Toronto: Vydav-

48 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Slovo Mytropolyta," ("Z voli Vsemohuchoho... pochnaiets'ia...") 5 July, 1941, in Pan'kivs'kyi, Vid derzhavy,
p. 120.

49 Sheptytsky, "Z voli vsemohuchoho... zachalasia...") 1 July, 1941, Ibid.

50 In a letter to Pope Pius XII on 29 October, 1941, Metropolitan Sheptytsky
referred to "cette tâche de pénétration de l'unité ecclésiastique dans ce
pays," ERSS-LGE, p. 4. And in a letter on 7 November, Sheptytsky wrote,
"Les possibilités de voir nos frères dissidents de la Grande Ukraine re-
venir à l'unité de l'Eglise éveillent en nous de grandes espérances."
Metropolitan Sheptytsky's letter to Budapest Nuncio Rotta, 7 November,
1941, in ADSS-1, p. 493.

51 Among the plausible reasons why Ukrainians were inclined to trust that
German political strategy could be compatible with their autonomist goals,
perhaps the most often cited one is the memory of Soviet rule. Cardinal
Tisserant, to whom Sheptytsky reported regularly on the situation, pointed out that by the end of the nearly two years of Soviet occupation, the Soviet régime was "universally detested" in Galicia: "Il ne faut donc pas s'étonner si les habitants saluèrent l'arrivée de l'armée allemande comme une libération. Mais l'enthousiasme tomba vite en raison des procédés brutaux des fonctionnaires nazis." Eugène Tisserant, _L'église militante_, (Paris: Bloud & Guy, 1950), p. 14. The same opinion was shared by the prominent American political historian John Armstrong, who suggested that the period of Soviet rule in eastern Galicia "created a state of mind in which the Ukrainians of the area would at least initially welcome any force which opposed the Soviet Union." John Armstrong, _Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939–1945_, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 27. Similarly, Sheptytsky biographer Cyrille Korolevskij observed: "Une chose est certaine, c'est que les Russes en ont tant fait en Galicie, surtout au moment de l'évacuation à la fin de la première occupation, qu'ils étaient universellement haïs." See his _Métropolite André Szeptyckyi 1865–1944_, Opera Theologicae Societatis Scientificae Ucrainorum: Vol. XVI–XVII, (Rome: n.p., 1964), p. 381. Israeli historian Shimon Redlich has pointed out that, along with anti-Soviet sentiment, Ukrainian political hopes were also at play: "... Hitler's policies towards the Slavs were not yet apparent in 1941, and numerous Ukrainians, Sheptyts'kyi among them, assumed that the mutual Ukrainian-German hatred of Soviet Russia would suffice to cement an anti-Bolshevik alliance and also ensure Germany's support for Ukrainian national objectives." See his "Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews during World War II," in _Life and Times_, pp. 145–162. In addition, the apparent compatibility of Ukrainian and German political objectives had received expression in the thought of Julius Rosenberg, Reichsminister for the eastern territories,
who at one time advanced the idea of Ukrainian autonomy.

52 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Z voli vsemohuchoho... zchalasia..."
pastoral letter of 1 July, 1941 to the Ukrainian people, in Pan'kivs'kyi,
Vid Derzhavy, p. 112. See also a spurious version of the text, which calls
for "obedience to divine laws which do not contravene the dictates of the

53 Ibid., p. 113.

54 Metropolitan Sheptytsky later regretted his move and explained that he
had been misled. Ivan Kedryn spoke with the Metropolitan on this matter in
August, 1941: "The Metropolitan disclosed that he was "troubled by his
conscience" about whether he had done well to give his blessing to the
Ukrainian government. From many sources he had heard criticisms of the
method by which that government was formed, and of how people found them-
selves faced with the fait accompli of the return of Ukrainian statehood in
Galicia. "But what was I to do ... when they came to me and said: 'Bless
the Ukrainian state!' Could I have refused to give my blessing?" Ivan
Kedryn, U mezhakh zatsikavlennia, (New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society,
forthcoming), p. 408.

Hansjakob Stehle has pointed out that crucial information had been
withheld from the Metropolitan in the days that followed the German take-
over. See his "Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi and the German Régime," in Life
and Times, pp. 125-144.

55 Sheptytsky tried to prevent the Generalgouvernement's annexation of
Western Ukraine before it occurred by appealing in a telegram to Hitler on
22 July, 1941. In it, the Metropolitan argued that Ukrainian support for
Germany would depend on the latter's acceptance of Ukrainian political
ideals. "The Ukrainian nation," he wrote, "has since 1918 waged a bloody struggle against the Polish and the Soviet states for the sake of its ideal: a united and free Ukraine, which is naturally necessary/natur-
notwendig/ and self-evident. The denial of their ideal of statehood would shake up their sincere sympathy and trust toward the German government and would affect very detrimentally the vital interests of the Ukrainian people and especially the just new order of Eastern Europe." The text of the telegram is given in /Jaroslaw Nagorski/, "Die Tragödie der ukrainisch-

56 Writing to the pope, Sheptytsky mentioned that "The first attempt/to send priests into German-occupied Eastern Ukraine/ did not succeed because of a formal prohibition by the German authorities in Berlin against admitting or tolerating any kind of work by Catholic priests in the occupied regions." Sheptytsky's letter to Pope Pius XII, ERSS-LGE 29 October, /1941/, p. 3. The prohibition has been confirmed by an internal German policy memorandum, the Heidrich report, which has recently come to light. See n.8, q.v.

57 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro myloserdia," ("Tsile dilo..."), June, 1942, LAEv LV:7-8 (L'viv, July-August, 1942); reprinted in 02-69 paras 29–30, pp. 173–174. All citations given here are from 02-69.

58 Sheptytsky, "Pro myloserdia," para 47, p. 179.
Sheptytsky recognized the right of the state to execute criminals convicted of grave offences, as long as four conditions were met: 1) criminal responsibility had to be duly established (i.e., before a court of law); 2) the death sentence had to be required by the existing law; 3) the accused had to have been given the opportunity to defend himself before the courts; and 4) the defendant had to have the right to appeal a guilty verdict to a higher court. Metropolitan Sheptytsky, "Ne Ubyj," (Thou shalt not kill) ("Khrystova Tserkva..."), L'aev LV:11 (L'viv, November, 1942), p. 179. What is perhaps most significant about this statement is that, although written and published during the war, it did not allow for waiving the due process of law in favor of summary justice under wartime conditions.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky made the following remark in a letter to Cardinal Tisserant: "Je me proposais de présenter à Votre Eminence un exposé de toute la position religieuse dans tout le terrain conquis par l'armée allemande. J'avais même écrit des lettres, que je n'envoie pas, comprenant leur insuffisance. La position change et évolue continuellement et nous attendons des événements, qu'on peut prévoir, mais qu'il est difficile de prédire. J'attends donc une meilleure opportunité." Metropolitan Sheptytsky's letter to Cardinal Tisserant, ERSS-LGE, 23 February, 1942, pp. 3-4. Apart from this terse and oblique reference to the German occupation, we have no information on the Metropolitan's changing views toward the German civil authority between February and August, 1942.

Sheptytsky to Pius XII, 29-31 August, 1942, pp. 628-629.


In this connection, an eminent Polish historian has observed that, as
early as in 1943, Sheptytsky expected a German defeat and was ready to co-operate with the U.S.S.R. as long as his Church could be given the assurance that it would be able to carry out missions to the east of Galicia. Ryszard Torzecki, "Kontakty polsko-ukraińskie na tle problemu ukraińskiego w polityce polskiego rządu emigracyjnego i podziemia (1939-1944), in Dzieje Najnowsze 1/2 (1981), cited in Andrzej Ziuba, "Metropolita Andrzej Szeptycki," Kwartalnik Historyczny, XCII (Warsaw, 1986), p. 897.

63 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Idealom nashoho natsional'noho zhyttia..." (Our national ideal) Decree of the Sobor of 1942 to the clergy, (L'viv, /1942/), para 1, p. 1.

64 Sheptytsky, "Idealom," paras 4-5, p. 1.


67 Sheptytsky, "Idealom," para 9, p. 2.

68 Ibid.


70 Sheptytsky, "Idealom," para 13, p. 3.

71 Sheptytsky, "Z voli vsemohuchoho... zachalasia..." 1 July, 1941, in Pan'kivs'kyi, Vid Derzhavy, p. 112; and Sheptytsky, "Z voli Vsemohuchoho... pochynaiet'sia..." 5 July, 1941, Ibid., p. 120.

72 Sheptytsky, "Z voli vsemohuchoho... zachalasia..." Ibid., p. 112.

73 Sheptytsky, "Idealom," para 21, p. 5.
/Metropolitan Sheptytsky/, "Slovo Mytropolyta Andreia pro bol'shevyzmu,
/6 October, 1941/, in Zakhidnia Ukraïna pid bol'shevykamy IX.1939–VI.1941,
Compiled by Milena Rudnycka, (New York: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka v

/Sheptytsky/, "Idealom," para 11, p. 3.


_Ibid., pp. 10-11._

Sheptytsky, "Idealom," para 32, p. 9: Wise leadership "fulfils the aim of
general welfare and happiness." In his pastoral of 1 July, 1941, Metropoli-
tan Sheptytsky linked the notion of wise leadership with respect for reli-
gious liberty. Sheptytsky, "Z voli vsemohuchoho... zchalasja...,
Pan'kivs'kyi, Vid Derzhavy, p. 113.


_Ibid., para 32, p. 8._ On the duty of the state to respect the divine
mission of the Christian Church to preach the revealed Word, see also
_Ibid., para 11, p. 3._

_Ibid._

Ivan Hryniokh's observation - that during the Nazi occupation
Sheptytsky's rejection of authoritarian and single-party political systems
("providnyts'ki chy monopartiini systemy") was necessarily stated implicit-
ly in order to avoid Nazi censorship - appears well-founded. Hryniokh,
_Sluha Bozhiy Andrei_, p. 49.

Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Idealom nashoho natsional'noho
zhyttia..." (Decree of the Sobor of 1942 to the clergy: "Our national ideal") L'viv, 1941. p. 10 para 40.

84
Ibid., p. 10 para 38.

85
Ibid., p. 12 para 47.

86
Ibid., p. 12, para 48.

87

88

89
Ibid.

90
Ibid., p. 18, para 69.

91
Ibid., p. 14, paras 56-57.

92
Ibid., p. 14, para 57.

93
Ibid., p. 15, para 59.

94
Ibid., p. 15, para 60.

95
Metropolitan Sheptytsky saw the categorical opposition as follows: "egoism and imperialism" vs. "submission and authority" (Ibid., p. 14, para 57); "egoism and rebellion" vs. "obedience and submission" (Ibid., p. 15, para 59); "hatred and schism" and "egoism and imperialism" vs. "love, Christian submission and Church authority" (Ibid., p. 18, para 69). The
former path was further characterized as one of "schism and egoism" (Ibid., p. 19, para 71); and of "hatred" (Ibid., p. 19, para 72).

96 Metropolitan Sheptytsky's emphasis on obedience in this case should not be mistaken for an advocacy of total submission since, as we have seen in the previous section, he viewed Christian submission to the civil authority as conditional rather than absolute. And though the Metropolitan was perhaps less inclined to be critical of ecclesiastical than of civil authority, the reference here was to the continued situation of ecclesiastical schism which, to Sheptytsky, indicated a spirit of rebellion and egoism rather than commitment to unity within the Church.

97 Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro myloserdia" ("Tsile dilo..."), June, 1942, LAeU LV:7-8 (L'viv, July-August, 1942); reprinted in 02-69, p. 171 para 23. All quotations given here refer to the text in 02-69.

98 Ibid., p. 172 para 24.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid., p. 172 para 26.

101 Ibid., p. 171 para 24.


103 Ibid., p. 172 para 26.

104 Ibid., p. 173 para 28.

105 Ibid., p. 173 para 27.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 172 para 25: "The poor will always be with us, but in our time their numbers have grown in an extraordinary way. For /now/ the poor are not only those who are unable to subsist in the unforeseen circumstances of illness and old age; among them there are also many young people who cannot support themselves and their families with /the income from/ their work - either because they cannot find work, or because the pay is such that, even with the best intentions and the most earnest work, they cannot support themselves and their families." And again: "In our times and in the circumstances of the present moment there is the difficulty that few have plenty of anything, but many are in dire straits, are hungry and even starving to death." (Ibid., p. 175 para 34).

Ibid., p. 175 para 35.

Ibid., p. 173 para 29.

Ibid., p. 174 para 29.

Ibid., p. 172 para 25.


Ibid., p. 174 para 29.

Ibid., p. 178 para 45.

Ibid., p. 165 para 3.

Sheptytsky, "Z voli... zachalasia...," 1 July, 1941, in Pan’kivs’kyi, Vid Derzhavy, pp. 112-113.
There exists another version of the same pastoral, the text of which does not include the controversial passage. See Pan'kivs'kyi, *Vid derzhavy*, p. 116. It is interesting that neither version was included in the Soviet collection, *PPU*.

Sheptytsky, "Z voli... pochynaiet'sia...," 5 July, 1941, in Pan'kivs'kyi, *Vid derzhavy*, p. 120. The importance of this non-discrimination condition lies in the foresight that it showed. For almost a full year before the final goal of Nazi policy (especially toward Jews) became evident to all in Galicia, the Germans enacted a variety of measures designed to isolate and segregate Jews from the rest of the population. As was the case in other Nazi-occupied countries, this was but a preliminary step toward mass deportation and extermination. Since this linkage was not publicly known in Galicia until the second half of 1942, it is all the more remarkable that as early as July, 1941, Metropolitan Sheptytsky should have singled out non-discrimination as a precondition for the Church's loyalty to the state.

Ibid.


Mykhailo Khomiak cited three actions by the German authorities that eroded the hopes Ukrainians had placed on Germany: the arrest of Yaroslav Stets'ko (on July 8), the annexation of Galicia into the Generalgouvernement (on August 1) and the harsh policy toward Ukrainians in Volhynia. See his "Dial'nist' Mytropolyta Kyr Andreia pid nimets'koiu okupatsiieiu,"
Lohos VI:3 (Yorkton, Sask., July-September, 1955), pp. 221-222.

123

124

125
Memorandum of the Ukrainian Central Rada to the German government, 14 August, 1941, in PPU, p. 312, Document N°200.

126
According to the statement, the annexation of Galicia into the Generalgouvernement undermined "Ukrainian hopes for the eventual unification of this territory with the Ukrainian mainland ("z ukrains'kyym materykom")" "Brief an Hitler," in Ilnytskyj, Deutschland, 1958, p. 277. A Ukrainian translation of the document is "Lyst ukrains'koi natsional'noi Rady do Adol'fa Hitleri," in Ukrains'ka suspil'no-politychna dumka v 20 stolitti, eds. Taras Hunczak and Roman Solchanyk Vol. 3 (New York-Munich: Suchasnist', 1983), pp. 44-47. Ilnytskyj suggests February, 1942 as the date of the letter, but Hunczak and Solchanyk cite an archival reference (Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, Microcopy No. T-454, Roll No.92, Doc. EAP 99/434) and give the precise date: 14 January, 1942.

The letter went on to criticize German policy in Eastern Ukraine: "The Ukrainian public was gripped by great anxiety when, in regions that were liberated from the Bolsheviks, there occurred events which we are witnessing today.... Ukrainians have been deprived of any possibility of
cultural and national development, there is interference in the patriotic press, the activities of traditional cultural and educational associations are being prohibited, schools are being shut down, academic institutions are not allowed to do research, and the professorial ranks, the brains of the nation, are left without any means of subsistence, much less any chance to carry on their work. Such a state of affairs evokes great disquiet in Ukrainian society regarding the future of the national culture.

The hated Bolshevik system has been pushed out of Ukraine but, on the other hand, the right to private property not yet been renewed although the Ukrainian people struggled for it with persistence and at the cost of great sacrifices. Collective farms, those Bolshevik tools of the subjugation of the Ukrainian peasantry, have been maintained. Such a situation evokes public feelings that do nothing at all to promote either productivity or the organization of work." Ilnytzkyj, Deutschland, pp. 276-277.


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letter was forwarded from Himmler's office to the Chief of Police (SD) in L'viv, Alfred Kolf. Kolf showed the letter to Pan'kivs'kyi. Kurt Lewin, a Jewish survivor of the Holocaust who was sheltered in the St. George's cathedral complex and who worked in the Metropolitan's archives in 1943-1944, also saw a copy of Sheptytsky's letter to Himmler. Kurt I. Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas Sheptytsky and the Jewish Community in Galicia during the Second World War," Unitas XII:2 (Garrison, New York, summer, 1960), p. 138 n. 6. Archimandrite Johannes Peters, a German priest who joined the Ukrainian Catholic Church, claimed that he drafted the letter for Metropolitan Sheptytsky and personally delivered it to Berlin. Hansjakob Stehle, "Der Lemberger Metropolit Septyckyj und die nationalsozialistische Politik in der Ukraine," Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 34:3 (Munich, 1986) p. 415 n. 39. However, in spite of these independent accounts, there is no record of the full text of the letter or of its whereabouts.

Another source corroborates Sheptytsky's complaints about the way the Ukrainian police was being used. According to Rabbi Kahana, the Metropolitan had said: "These young Ukrainians volunteered to fight Communists, but instead of deploying them at the front, the Nazis are forcing them to participate in massacres of helpless Jews." Leo Heiman, "The Rabbi who may make a Saint: the forgotten epic of Count Sheptytsky," Jewish Digest (Houston, January, 1963), p. 9.


Metropolitan Sheptytsky's letter to Pope Pius XII, 8 May, 1943, in ADSS-2, p. 791.

Letter of 19 July, 1941, from the German Agricultural Commission to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, TsDIA f.201, op.4-b, spr.2665, ark.28-29. Reprinted in PPU, Document N°147, pp. 304-305.


In the abovementioned introduction to the appeal of the German agricultural commission, Metropolitan Sheptytsky wrote: "We must obviously help the German army as much as possible, for it is to it that we owe our liberation from the Bolshevik yoke. For our own good, and for the good of our state, we must submit to the just requirements and dictates (zhadanniam i prvkazam) of the German military authority." PPU, Ibid.


Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky's letter to Mgr. Petro Werhun, 17 Febru

139 Metropolitan Sheptytsky's letter to Pope Pius XII, 29-31 August, 1942, in ADSS-2, pp. 627-628. The excommunication measure was mentioned in "Promyloserd'ia" (On Christian charity), 02-69, p. 160 para 50. In a letter of 3 September, 1942 to Cardinal Tisserant, Metropolitan Sheptytsky repeated that he had tried to dissuade the Ukrainian youth from joining German police and militia units. See Eugène Tisserant, L'Eglise militante, (Paris: Bloud & Gay: 1950), p. 14. It appears that the reference may have been to the pastoral "Pro orhanizatsiu parohhi i hromady" of 10 July, 1941. See n. 140 below.


142 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro myloserd'ia," 02-69, p. 181 para 53. A somewhat similar statement, attributed to Sheptytsky by Rabbi David Kahana, apparently included the following passage: "...unfortunately, some Ukrainian communities contain a number of sinful people whose hands are covered with innocent Jewish blood. These people are not representative of the Ukrainian nation. They are criminals without any nation. They are doomed to suffer in hell for eternity." Heiman, "They saved," p. 327. Such
a document, however, is neither known nor discussed in the literature to date and, but for the specific date which Kahana attached to it (19 August, 1942), it seems that Kahana may have been paraphrasing the pastoral of June, 1942 on the basis of his personal recollection. Kahana knew, moreover, that under the Nazi occupation such statements could only be made without any specific mention of the Jews; despite that, "the people understood the message in its entirety." Heiman, Ibid.

That the regime had no intention of changing its policy was evident from the "rude rebuff" which the Metropolitan reportedly received in reply to his protests. Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas," p. 138 n. 6.; Pan'kius'kyi, Roky, p. 30; and Stehle, "Der Lemberger Metropolit," p. 416.

Nor were militia recruits sought exclusively among Ukrainians. According to one contemporary observer, a Jewish militia unit was also formed to assist in the round-up of people for labor: "The Jewish Council (Judenrat) was given powers that in reality were a destructive burden. Immediately in August /1941/, when /the Generalgouvernment/ disbanded the Ukrainian militia, it formed a militia of the Jewish Council and gave it the most disagreeable task, which had previously been forced upon the Ukrainian militia—namely, to fulfill the requirements of all sorts of German military, police and civilian stations. First and foremost, it was a matter of /providing/ labor. The militiaman was required to deliver a quota of workers and, in order to do so, he would go from house to house and drag people out by force." See Pan'kius'kyi, Roky, p. 64.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's letter to Pope Pius XII, 29-31 August, 1942, in ADSS-2, document N*406, p. 627.


147 Edward Prus, “Cerkiew Greckokatolicka w okresie Wojny i okupacji Hitlerowskiej,” Slaskie Studia Historyczne I (Katowice, 1975), p. 82 n. 100.


150 Weiss, "Jewish-Ukrainian relations," MS pp. 6-7; see also Heiman, "They saved Jews," p. 326.


152 Weiss, "Jewish-Ukrainian relations," p. 7 n. 38.


Weiss, "Jewish-Ukrainian relations," MS p. 7. See also Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas Sheptytsky and the Jewish community," p. 139.

The estimates are given in Weiss, "Jewish-Ukrainian relations," MS p. 1. See also n. 23 above.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s pastoral of 1 July, 1941, to the Ukrainian people "Z voli vsemohuchoho i vsemystyvoho Boha v Troitsi..." in *Pan’kiivs’kyi, Vid derzhavy*, p. 112.


Weiss, "Jewish-Ukrainian relations," MS p. 5.


Metropolitan Sheptytsky's letter to Pius XII, 29-31 August, 1942 in ADSS-2, Document N°406, p. 625.

Sheptytsky's letter to Tisserant, 28 December, 1942, p. 1.

According to Itzhak (Kurt) Lewin cited in Friedman, Their Brothers' Keepers, p. 135, this followed his father's, Rabbi Ezechiel Lewin's, visit to Sheptytsky. According to Kurt Lewin, "the Metropolitan now embarked on a positive campaign to save and shelter individual Jews; those whom he knew, and total strangers, adults and children, in fact any Jew whom he could help." Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas Sheptytsky and the Jewish community," pp. 138-139.

Redlich, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews during World War II," in Life and Times, p. 156. One such case was Rabbi Kahana, who escaped from the Janowski camp in the winter of 1942-1943 and was hidden in the Metropolitan's residence. On this, see Kahana's account in Heiman, "They saved Jews," p. 330.

Rabbi Kahana cited in Heiman, "They saved Jews," p. 328. Fifteen children and several Jewish adults were hidden at Sheptytsky's residence. On these and other Jews who were saved, see Luzhnyts'kyi, Ukrains'ka Tserkva, p. 688 n. 384; and Friedman, Their Brothers' Keepers, p. 134.

"Ne Ubyj," p. 224.


The acceptance by Jewish scholars and Holocaust survivors that "Ne Ubyj" implicitly referred to the massacres of Jews is significant: it lends strong support to the view that this was how the document was understood in
1942, when it first appeared. Lewin describes the pastoral as self-evidently referring to the situation of the Jews and as exhorting Ukrainians to avoid even an indirect role in the exterminations ("Archbishop Andreas Sheptytsky and the Jewish community," p. 137). Weiss agrees, saying it was clear that the pastoral was directed at the crimes being perpetrated against the Jews ("Jewish-Ukrainian relations," p. 9). Redlich points out that, although the document contains no explicit mention of the Jews, "it is quite clear that Sheptytsky/ intended to warn Ukrainians not to participate in Nazi anti-Jewish activity" ("Sheptytsky and the Jews," Jerusalem Post Magazine, Jerusalem, 13 December, 1985); the same author has observed "The fact that Sheptytsky gave a copy of this letter to Rabbi Kahana in 1943, when the latter was hiding in the Metropolitan's quarters, indicates that Sheptytsky himself considered it also as a Jewish-related appeal." Redlich, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews during World War II," in Life and Times, p. 155.

It has been suggested that this may be deduced from the timing of the letter: that since in 1942 Ukrainian-Polish fratricidal acts had not yet reached the widespread proportions which they did later, in 1943, and since the mass murder of Jews was already in full swing in 1942, the pastoral "Ne Ubyj" could only have been directed at this earlier phenomenon, without however naming it specifically, since the threats of confiscation, censorship and reprisals were very real. Torzecki cited in Redlich, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews during World War II," p. 161, n. 52.

Nor was the pastoral's critical import overlooked by the Germans. The Gestapo held the document for months before allowing it to be printed; later, it was again seized and censored. See Stehle, "Der Lemberger Metropolit," p. 420 n. 55.


"Groups of Jews, mostly men who could not hide in Ukrainian convents, were guided by Ukrainian monks from monastery to monastery. They then crossed the mountains by a secret path winding its way among unguarded ridges, and contacted representatives of Jewish underground movements."

Rabbi Kahana, quoted in Heiman, "They saved Jews," p. 329. According to Kahana, prior to the summer of 1944, there were no massacres of Jews in Hungary, and so that country was considered a haven in 1942 and 1943. An alternative escape route was into Romania.


In this activity, leading roles were played by the Studite Superior Josepha and the Basilian Superior Monika. Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas Sheptytsky and the Jewish community," p. 141.

Rev. Omelian Kouch, pastor in Peremyshliany, was convicted of that offence. He was incarcerated for almost a year in the Lontsky Gestapo prison in L'viv, and then was transferred to Auschwitz, whence he never returned. "Testimony by Dr. Volodymyr Bemko," in Ukrainians and Jews: a Symposium, (New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1966), p. 124. Rev. Kouch's activity and fate did not pass unnoticed by pro-Soviet circles. On this, see the text of a leaflet, c. April, 1944, of the partisan group "Vyzvolennia Vitchyzny," in PPU, Document N°244 p. 362: "We do not affirm that all priests are like those we have mentioned. There are also those, though they are far less numerous, who did not commit such indecencies. The priest of Peremyshl', Omelian Kouch, may be mentioned as an example.... Rev. Kovch was imprisoned and later sent to a death camp, where he has been close to death for over a year, for having tried to help save /Jewish/ people by baptizing them."


Bachyns'kyi, pastor at Berezhany, who issued baptism certificates to Jewish children ("Testimony by Dr. Volodymyr Bemko," in Ukrainians and Jews: a Symposium, (New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1966), p. 124). Similarly, "In the basement of a shoe shop in L'viv run by the Studites, Brother Theodosii took care of 16 Jews whom the Metropolitan was hiding," Turchyn, "The Ukrainian Catholic Church," p. 66; the pastor of Rivne in Volhynia, Rev. Hawryluk, who was hanged in 1943 by the Gestapo for having aided Jews, is mentioned in "Testimony by Dr. Volodymyr Bemko," p. 126. See also the references to Rev. Kovch in n. 179, above.

182
"U vazhkii khvyl']ni..." 10 August, 1943 para 9.

183
Ivan Solovey, a Ukrainian farmer, hid an entire Jewish family in his barn. Heiman, "They saved Jews," p. 332; other Ukrainians in charge of the city's sewer-pipe network hid four Jewish families in the sewers, supplying them with food stolen from the market (Ibid.); Omelian Masliak, director of the L'viv municipal library, hid eight Jews in the library and later in his home (Ibid., 331); and in the Peremyshliany area, forest rangers cooperated with the monks of a nearby monastery to hide a reported 1700 Jews. Weiss, "Jewish-Ukrainian relations," MS p. 10 n. 52. In L'viv, Vasyl' Diakiv, a notary, was shot for issuing a /false identity/ certificate to a Jew, and the Ukrainian Committee (Ukrains'kyi Kraievyi Komitet) also issued Ukrainian-identity documents to Jews. Pan'kivs'kyi, Roky, p. 73.

184
Rabbi Kahana's wife continued as a contact between the Jewish community and the Church for another year. Heiman, "They saved Jews," p. 328.

185
Luzhnyts'kyi, Ukrains'ka Tserkva, p. 688 n. 384.

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The estimates range from hundreds to thousands. Petro Mirchuk suggested thousands (cited in Redlich, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews During World War II," MS p. 5 n. 12); an estimate of several hundred is given in Walter Dushnyk, "Soviet attack on Judaism," in Ukrainians and Jews: a Symposium, (New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1966), p. 158, and in Luzhnytsky, Ukrain's'ka Tserkva, p. 688 n. 384. Statistics on clerical deaths during the Nazi period are scant and we do not have indications as to how many of those who helped to save Jews were caught. According to Kurt Lewin, however, all the Jews who were sheltered by Metropolitan Sheptytsky survived the war. Lewin, "Archbishop Andreas Sheptytsky and the Jewish community," p. 141. More detailed research into the history of the Holocaust in Galicia is required before definitive answers to these important questions may be given.

G. Conclusion

1 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro yednist'," (1943), in 06-84, p. 270.

2 Sheptytsky, "Pro yednist'," (1943), in 06-84, p. 266.

3 Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro bezbozhnykiv i ziedyennia tserkov," ("Shchoby unyknuty vsiakoho neporozuminnia..."), 17.IV.1940, M.O. No. 82, in 01-61, pp. 59-60.


5 The symbol of Sheptytsky as an anti-Polish Ukrainian nationalist has been advanced by prominent Polish scholars who, for lack of substantive supporting evidence, cite a passage from Bishop Hryhorii Khomshyn of Stanyslaviv in which he spoke of the Greek Catholic Church as the representative of only one of the many rites in the Universal Church; this, they allege, was very different from Sheptytsky's desire that the Church be a national Church. See Mirosława Papierzyńska-Turek, Sprawa ukraińska w drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, 1922-1926, (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1979), pp. 94-96; and Andrzei Chojnowski, Koncepcje Polityki Narodowościowej Rządów Polskich w latach 1921-1939, (Wroclaw: Zakład Narodowy imienia Ossolińskich, 1979), p. 188. Surprisingly, this tendentious, nationalist interpretation has found its way into Ukrainian appraisals as well. See Life and Times, p. 54 n. 41.

Those interpretations fail to take account of the Metropolitan's
strongly stated reservations about the idea of a national Church and his equally firm commitment to the principle of the Church's universality (discussed in chapter one). He reiterated those views on a number of occasions: "The Church is an institution that collects and organizes completely unrelated peoples from all the nations of the world into one great, divine family." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Do ukrains'koj molodi zorhani-zovanoj v K.A.U.M.—i," "U den' mozhkh imenyn..."), (15.XII.1934), in 05-83 p. 49; "the Church encompasses all peoples of the world.... National churches that are independent of the Pope cannot be recognized as the Church that was established by Christ." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pro Tserkvy," "U den' u yakomu..."), (I.1936), in 05-83, pp. 254, 258; and "Is there any need to explain that the Catholic Church stands above rites? Neither the Latin, the Greek, the Slavic, the Armenian, the Coptic, nor the Syrian rite belongs to its essence. The Church employs them all, permits them all, without tying itself to any one of those rites with any permanent bonds." Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Poslannia pro yednist' Tserkvy," (Kozhnoї maizhe dnyhu..."), (I.1938), in 95-83, p. 344.

6 A succinct expression of this notion of a socially and politically involved Church, from an Eastern perspective, was given by the nineteenth century Russian philosopher Vladimir Soloviev: "...le dogme et le culte, ce n'est pas le christianisme tout entier: il reste encore l'action sociale et politique de la vraie religion, l'organisation des forces collectives de la chrétienté pour régénérer le monde — il reste encore l'Eglise militante.... Jésus-Christ a vaincu le monde dans son principe et dans son centre, et... l'Eglise militante doit affirmer et appliquer cette victoire absolue dans toutes les sphères relatives de l'existence humaine." Vladimir Soloviev, "Saint Vladimir et l'État Chrétien," (1888), in Vladimir Soloviev, Una

Sheptytsky's critique of tsarist Russian caesaropapism shows similarity to some of the views of Vladimir Soloviev, who also criticized national exclusivism and chauvinism, and whose ideal notion of temporal government was that of a supranational Christian theocracy.
B I B L I O G R A P H Y

The core of the following bibliography is a chronological list of primary sources: the published writings of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, 1899-1944 and a select list of correspondence. To date, only two attempts have been made to provide a comprehensive list of Sheptytsky's writings. An early study, which outlined sixty of the Metropolitan's pastoral letters from 1899 to 1918, was Episkop Yosyp Botsian, "Pastyrs'ki lysty Mytropolyta Andreia. Literaturnyi ohiad," Bohoslovija IV:1-4 (Lviv, 1926), pp. 95-149. Four decades later, another excellent bibliographic source on Sheptytsky's writings was published: Anatol' Maria Bazylevych, "Vvedennia u Tvory Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'koho," in 01-65, pp. B/9-B/237.

This bibliography tries to take those reference tools a step further by providing a comprehensive, chronological listing of information on all the known published works of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi (numbering close to four hundred items), with many additional references to reprints, translations, and literature discussing the individual documents. Locations of rare brochures and books are also given.

Although some of the primary sources listed here exceed the scope of the present study of Sheptytsky's ethical reflection on social issues, the list as a whole gives a good overview of the Metropolitan's written work: the personal intellectual journey, as it were, within which the Metropolitan worked out his social thought. A comprehensive list may indeed be more appropriate than a specialized one, since Sheptytsky's responses to social issues were very often ad hoc statements: contextual, but also tentative. Considering also that the Metropolitan typically took an Eastern, ascetical approach to Christian ethics as a way of being a Christian (as opposed to a more systematic, casuistic approach characteristic of
the Western tradition of moral thought), the question of isolating a "sub-
corpus" of Sheptytsky's social writings is problematical.

As the first comprehensive listing of its kind, the primary source
list also has its limitations: until the key Ukrainian Catholic periodicals
_Nyuva_, _Meta_ and especially _L'viv's'ki Arkhiieparkhiial'ni Vidomosti_ have been
scanned in their entirety (either in Poland or in the Ukrainian S.S.R.),
and until the recently opened Fond No. 201 of the Central Historical State
Archives in L'viv (the collection of the Greek Catholic Archeparchy) has
been consulted, with special attention to the years 1918-1929, no such
bibliography can pretend to be exhaustive. Nevertheless, it is the most
complete bibliography on the subject to date and, as such, to the current
knowledge of the writings of Metropolitan Sheptytsky it will add much that
had been either forgotten or thought lost. In that way, it should serve as
a basic tool for future research in the area.

A few particular clarifications about titles, chronology and calendar
dates are in order.

**Titles**

Many documents in the Sheptytsky corpus were originally designated
only by a generic title (e.g., "Pastoral letter to the clergy"). Since such
information is not helpful in distinguishing one particular document from
another, it is used here only as secondary information specifying the
nature of the document. In cases where no other title besides the generic
one is given, the first words of the document are given here as the title.
Where the title is available, the first words are also given to assist in
identifying documents. (In a number of instances, different pastoral
letters were issued at different times under identical titles). New titles,
which were sometimes given to documents that were translated or reprinted,
appear in parentheses after the reference to the translation or reprint.

**Chronology**

Since timing is a crucial, and indeed sometimes vital, factor entering into the interpretation of Sheptytsky's responses to social issues, special attention has been given towards reconstructing the original chronology of the writings as accurately as possible. Documents published in the same year are listed chronologically according to the date of issue/writing, where that information is given. In the absence of such information, the date of publication (for example, in a serial) has been used to determine the chronological position of an entry.

Some items were published a considerable time after they had been written. Where both dates are available, a document's chronological place has been set according to the date of issue rather than the date of publication.

**Calendar dates**

Complicating the task of chronologically organizing this corpus is the fact that one is often dealing with two liturgical calendar systems: the Julian and the Gregorian. For the sake of simplicity and with a view toward facilitating comparisons with contemporary secular sources, events and dates, only Gregorian calendar dates are used here. Accordingly, whereas a document's date of issue may have been given according to both the Julian and the Gregorian dates, only the latter is used in this bibliography. When a date of issue was given as a feast day on the Julian calendar, the corresponding Gregorian date has been calculated as follows: for immovable feasts, 13 days are added to the Julian date; for dates of moveable feasts
or Sundays of the Paschal cycle, the calculation is made with reference to the chart of Julian calendar Easter dates given in Isydor Dol'nyts'kyi's Typik, (L'viv, 1899) p. 573.

Thus, while all feast days refer to the traditional, Eastern liturgical calendar, the actual dates of such feasts are expressed here in the conventional, Gregorian calendar dates. For example, in the Eastern liturgical year 1901, the Archeparchy of L'viv celebrated Easter on April 13th, 1901 and Christmas on January 7th, 1902.

Finally, all books or pamphlets are in 8", unless otherwise indicated.

This bibliography is organized as follows:
I. Abbreviations

A. Libraries, archives and collections

B. Documentary sources

1. The Collected Works of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky

2. Other documentary and reference sources

C. Other abbreviations

II. Primary Sources: a Chronological Listing

A. The Published Works, 1899-1944

B. Selected Correspondence

III. Secondary Sources

A. General Works covering more than one period

1. Surveys

2. Studies focussing on Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky

   a. monographs

   b. collections of essays

   c. articles and brochures

B. Studies focussing on the specific periods

1. 1899-1914

2. 1914-1923

3. 1923-1939

4. 1939-1941

5. 1941-1944
I. ABBREVIATIONS

A. Libraries, archives and collections

BJ  Biblioteka Jagiellońska (Cracow)
BSB  Bayerische Staatsbibliothek (Munich)
C-Urbana  Library of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Slavic and East European Division
IOR  Library of the Istituto Orientale (Rome)
JKS  private collection of Jan Kazimierz Szeptycki (Warsaw)
KUL  Library of the Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski (Lublin)
LODA  L'viv Oblast State Archives (L'viv)
ONB  Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (Vienna)
OSBM-M  Library of the Ukrainian Basilian Fathers (Mundare, Alberta)
OSBM-R  Library of the Ukrainian Basilian Fathers (Rome)
PAC-BAZ  Anatoli' M. Bazylewycz Collection, MG31 - D149, Public Archives of Canada (Ottawa)
PAC-ZHUK  Andrij Zhuk Collection, MG30 - C167, Public Archives of Canada (Ottawa)
Robarts  Robarts Library, University of Toronto
Stamford  Library of St. Basil Ukrainian Catholic College, Stamford, Connecticut
TsDIA  Central State Historical Archives, L'viv (N.B.: Fond 201 contains documents and materials pertaining to the history of the Ukrainian Catholic Archeparchy of L'viv up to 1944).
UCS-O  Library of the Ukrainian Catholic Seminary, Ottawa
UCU  Library of St. Clement's Ukrainian Catholic University (Rome)
UVAN  Archives of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences (New York)
ZNIO  Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich (Wrocław)
B. Documentary sources

1. The Collected Works of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky

**PDV-35**

*Pastyr's'ki Poslannia do Dukhovenstva i Virnykh Stanyaslavius'koi Eparkhii. Opera Graeco-Catho-
licae Academiae Theologicae. L'viv: Academia Theologica, 1935. 252 pp. (A copy of this rare book is held at IOR).*

**01-61**


**02-65**


**03-69**


**04-78**

*Ivory (asketychno-moral'ni). Pratsi Hreko-
Katolyts'koi Bohoslovs'koi Akademii, Vol. XLV-XLVII. Rome: Vydannia Ukrains'koho Katolyts'-
493 pp.


b. Other documentary and reference sources

ADSS


Baran (1947)

BARAN, Stepan. Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi. Zhyttia i Diial'nist'. Munich: Vemyhora,
1947.

**Bazylevych (1965)**

BAZYLEVYCH, Anatol' Maria. "Uvedennia u tvory Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'koho." In **02-65. pp. B/9 - B/237.**

**Bodnaruk (1949)**


**Botsian**


**D.Vasilii (1966)**


**Danylenko (1970)**


**Dmytruk (1973)**


**Doroshenko (1958)**

Dzerovych (1916)  

Ereignisse  
Ereignisse in der Ukraine, 1914-1922, deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergrunde.

Hryniokh (1961)  

Husar (1972)  

Ilnytskij (1958)  

Korolevskij (1964)  
KOROLEVSKIJ, Cyrille. Métropolite André Szeptyckyj, 1865-1944. Pratsi Ukraïns'koho Bohoslovs'koho Naukowego Tovarystva, Vol. XVI-
Krawcheniuk (1963)


Life and Times


Ostroverkha (1960)


Pan'kiiv's'kyi (1957)


Pan'kiiv's'kyi (1965)


PPU

Prokoptschuk (1955)  

Prokoptschuk (1967)  

Prus (1985)  

Suïtył'nyk Istyny  

Tsars'kyi Uiazen'  

UCE  
C. Other abbreviations

D discussion (including polemical responses to specific documents).

ed. editor or edition.

LAeV L'vivs'ki Arkhiparkhiial'ni Vidomosti (L'viv, 1888-1944).
The official organ of the Ukrainian (Greek Catholic) Archeparchy of L'viv.

M.O. Mytropolychyi Ordynariat. Designates documents issued from the Archeeparchial chancery office; usually followed by a number indicating their chronological order.

n.d. no date.

n.p. no place of publication, or no name of publisher given.

OSBM Basilian Fathers (Eastern-rite). Also used to abbreviate "Drukarnia (i Pechatnia) Ottsiv Vasyliianiv," the publishing house of the Ukrainian Basilian Fathers.

PL pastoral letter; if collectively issued by several bishops, marked "Collective" and followed by a number in parentheses indicating number of signatories.

publ. year of publication (i.e., when different from year of writing).

R reprint.

Ref reference; source of information.

Tr translation; followed by language of translation in parentheses.

Z Zhovkva.
II. Primary Sources: a Chronological Listing

A. The Published Works of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, 1899-1944
a. KHRYSIIAN'SKA ROBOTQA ("Isus Khrystos, vruchaiych...").

PL to the faithful of Stanyslaviw, on the feast of the prophet Elijah, 2.VIII.1899.

OSBM-R
Kolomyia: Cherenkamy i nakladom M. Bilousa, 1899. 29 pp. in 16".

OSBM-R, IOR
Z: OSBM, 1900. 31 pp.

ZNIO, KUL
Tr (Polish): "Jezus Christus, poruczajc..." Kraków: Drukarnia "Czasu," 1899. 9 pp. in 4".

R: 02-68, pp. 1-19. (Title: "Pershe Slovo Pastyria").

A programmatic statement to all social groups in the eparchy of Stanyslaviw on various issues (eg., material goods, patriotism, etc.).

D: Botsian, pp. 97-98.

b. NASHA PROHRAMA ("Uzhe vid samoho pochatku...").

PL to the clergy of Stanyslaviw, 2.VIII.1899.

KUL, ZNIO
Tr (Polish): "Od samego poczatku..." Kraków: Drukarnia "Czasu," 1899. 4 pp. in 4".

R: 02-68, pp. 20-28.

On the duties of the Greek Catholic clergy in response to political radicalism.

D: Botsian, pp. 99-100.

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a. KHRYSIIAN'SKA RODYNA ("Ne davno tomu...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful of Stanyslaviw, 2.III.1900.

IOR
Z: OSBM, 1900. 32 pp.

KUL
/Z: OSBM, 1900. 9 pp. in 4".

JKS
Tr (Polish): "Nie davno temu..." Kraków: Drukarnia
"Czasu," 1900. 10 pp. in 4". Issued "w dzień Ofierowania N.M.P." /4.XII.1900/.

R: PDV-35, Document No. 3.
R: 02-65, pp. 29-49.

On the Christian principles pertaining to marriage and the family.

D: Botsian, p. 100.

b. O VIRI ("U maiu seho roku...").

PL to the Ruthenians of Bukovyna, on the eve of the feast of St. Michael the Archangel /20.XI/, 1900.

KUL
Z: OSBM, 1900. 12 pp. in 4".

OSBM-R, IOR,

KUL, UCS-D
R: PDV-35, Document No. 4.
R: 02-65, pp. 50-77. (Title: "Praudyva Vira").
R (excerpt): "Pamiątki i ślidy pershykh khrystian v Rymy. (Spomyn zi sviatoho roku 1900)," Holos Khrysta Choloviko-
liubtsia XXVII:6 (Louvain, 1974), pp. 35-36.

On the Catholic faith and the Catholic Church.


c. NAPIMNENIA I NAUKY (USIM VOZLIUBLENYM MOIM HUTSULAM)
("Pereľkhavshy vashi krasni hory...").

PL to the faithful of the Kosiv deanery, on the feast day of St. Michael the Archangel, /21.XI./ 1900.

OSBM-R, IOR,
Z: OSBM, 1901. 44 pp.

KUL, ZNI0,
UCS-D
R: PDV-35, Document No. 5.
R: 02-65, pp 78-107. (Title: "Do Moľkh Liubykh Hutsuliv").

On a variety of issues, including adultery, alcoholism, hygiene, etc.

d. "DeviatnaiTsiate stolittia mynaie..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful of Stanyslawiv, on the day of the prophet Nahum /1.XII/, 1900.

KUL Z: OSBM, 1900. 6 pp. in 4".
R: 02-65, pp. 108-121. (Title: "Na Hrani Dvokh Vikiv").

Remarks on the occasion of the Christian jubilee year.

D: Botsian, pp. 101-102.

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- 1901 -
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a. O LIUBVI ("Taka bula poslidna molytva...").

PL to the faithful of Stanyslawiv, 17.1.1901.

KUL Z: OSBM, 1901. 14 pp. in 4".
KUL

R: 02-65, pp. 122-156. (Title: "Naibil'sha Zapovid'").

On the Christian understanding and the practice of the virtue of love.

D: Botsian, pp. 102-103.

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b. O TSERKVI ("Vozliubleni! Koly uzhe z voli..."

PL to the faithful of the Archeparchy of L'viv, 27.1.1901.

KUL Z: OSBM, 1901. 10 pp. in 4".
KUL, UCS-O


On the notion of "Church." (Metropolitan Sheptytsky's first pastoral letter as Metropolitan of the L'viv Archeparchy).

D: Botsian, p. 103.

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c. O DOSTOINSTVI I OBOVIAZKAKH SVIASHCHENYKIV
("Po trytsiaty litakh...").

PL to the clergy of the Archeparchy of L'viv, 9.II.1901.

KUL
Z: OSBM, 1901. 9 pp. in 4º.

OSBM-R, IOR,
KUL
Z: OSBM, 1901. 29 pp.

KUL, JKS
Tr (Polish): "Po trzydziestu latach..." Z: OSBM, 1901. 10 pp. in 4º. (*Pisano w Krechowie*).

KUL

R: 02-65, pp. 174-189.

On the duties of priests, and the personal qualities required of them.

D: Botsian, pp. 103-104.

d. DO RUSKOI INTELIGENTSII (O PROVOZI KHRYSTOVIM)
("V lysti pastyrskim...").

PL to the Ruthenian intelligentsia, 9.II.1901.

KUL
Z: OSBM, 1901. 14 pp. in 4º.

OSBM-R, IOR,
KUL, ROBARTS
Z: OSBM, 1901. 48 pp.

R: 02-65, pp. 190-214. (Title: "Do UKrains'koj Inteligent-
tsii").

On the four elements of the general notion of leadership: authority, law, doctrine, personal influence and the Christian understanding of leadership.

D: Botsian, pp. 104-106.

e. O POKAIANIU ("Koly ya, misiats' tomu...").

PL to the faithful, 3.III.1901.

IOR, KUL
Z: OSBM, 1901. 50 pp.


Pastoral letter at the beginning of the Lenten period—on sin, repentance and the sacrament of penance.

D: Botsian, p. 106.
f. O VYUYLEIU ("Vzhe vid persho ho maia...").

PL /to the entire archeparchy/, 21.VI.1901.

KUL 2: OSBM, 1901. 10 pp. in 4".

IOR, KUL 2: OSBM, 1901. 35 pp.

R: 02-65, pp. 242-258.

On the grace bestowed during the jubilee year of Christianity and on the ways of becoming worthy of it.


g. RUSYNA M OSYLM U KANADI ("Vzhe vid dvokh lit...").

PL to the Ruthenians in Canada, 7.IX.1901.

OSBM-M (Ref: 02-65, p. 259n).

R: 02-65, pp. 259-266;

A call to steadfastness in the faith, in the face of a shortage of Greek Catholic priests in Canada.

D: Botsian, p. 107.

h. PAMIATKA POSVIAHCHENNIA TSEKQY (POIASNENNIA OBRADIIV) ("U selakh, de luchaiesia...").

KUL, UCS-O

Booklet explaining the rite of consecration of a church.

D: Botsian, pp. 107-108.
i. USECHESTNIIISHOMU NASTOIATELSTVU I VOZLIUBLENYM PYATOMTSIAM DUKHOWNOHO
SEMNIARIA U LVUJI ("Obnaiusy prestol nityropolychii...").

PL to the L’viv Seminary, "v nachalo Indykta roku Bozhoho 1901." /14.IX/.

KUL
Z: OSEBM, 1901. 11 pp. in 4°.

OSEBM-R, KUL, ZNIO, JKS
Tr (Polish): Do przełożenia i klerików Seminarium duchownego we Luwiiie. ("Objawszy Stolice Metropoli-
talną..."). Z: OSEBM, 1902. 30 pp.

On the aim of the seminary and suggested reforms subsequent to the Metropolitan’s visits to the seminary in March and April 1901.


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j. "Zibrani na zahal’ni zbory..."

PL to the clergy, 14.IX.1901.

KUL
Z: OSEBM, 1901. 4 pp. in 4°.

On the need for generosity with regard to the fund for widows and orphans. The document is followed by two administrative directives, (1901-K and 1901-I, below), bearing Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s signature, on the need to preserve items of religious art and on benefits.

D: Botsian, p. 108.

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k. "Khto lyshen’ zvertaiu uvalhu...

Appeal to the clergy, 14.IX.1901.

KUL,
PAC-BAZ
L’viv, 1901, M.O. No. 298, 2 pp.
Vol.2 f.6

On the importance of preserving items of religious art.

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l. "Dlia skorshoho obsadzhuvanina..."

Administrative directive, 14.IX.1901.

KUL
L’viv, 1901, M.O. No. 299, 1 p.

On benefits: an attempt to standardize the transfer of priests from one parish to another.
a. **NASHA VIRA** ("Khto lyshen' khoche...").

Pamphlet, on the eve of the Epiphany, 1902.

KUL, UCS-Ο

A catechism outlining the fundamental principles of Catholic doctrine.

b. **O SUPRUVHESTVI I RODYNI** ("Nastav chas Velykoho Postu...").

PL to the faithful of the L'viv and Kamenets eparchy, 1.III.1902.

KUL

On Christian marriage and the family.

D: Botsian, pp. 110-111.

c. "Poruchaltsia vsechestnym dushpastyriam..."

Administrative notice to the clergy, 28.VII.1902.

R: PPU, Document No. 75 p. 120.

An exhortation that the agrarian strike be conducted without violence.

d. **O MISIIAKH I DUHKOUNYKH VPRAVAKH** ("Kozhdyi sviaschchyn'k...").

PL to the clergy, 28.VII.1902.

OSBM-R, IOR   Z: OSBM, 1902. 41 pp. ("Pysano v Prylbychakh").
KUL, ZN10

On home missions and spiritual retreats.

D: Botsian, pp. 112-113.
e. O KANONICHE VIHZTATIJI ("Kanonichna vizytatsia...").

PL to the clergy, 8.VIII.1902.

KUL

Pastoral remarks after a canonical visitation to various deaneries.

D: Botsian, pp. 111-112.

f. "V poslidnikh chasakh..."

PL to the clergy, 20.VIII.1902.

KUL

Z: OSBM, 1902. 6 pp. in 4*.


On the relations between the Ruthenian Catholic Church and Rome.

D: Unija v Amerysii. Prychynok do Vidnosyn Ruskoj Tserkvy. Vidpovidi'
Andreevy hr. Sheptytskomu, mytropolytyov l’vivskomu hr. Kat. obriadi na yeho poslane z 20 avusta 1902, "Vydav-
ytstvo T/ovarystva/ R/uskoi/ Ts/erkvy v/ A/merytsi/" No. 1.
New York: Nakladom Fondu Narodnoho, 1902. 73 pp. A critique of the PL by American Ruthenians, who felt that Metropolitan Sheptytsky did not understand their situation and was not really committed to establishing a Ruthenian episcopate there.

Botsian, pp. 113-114.

g. PRAVDY VIHY" ("Na usyl’ni vashi pros’by...")

PL for Canadian Ruthenians, issued on the day after the Dormition of the Holy Theotokos, /29.VIII./1902.

IOR

Z: OSBM, 1902. 117 pp. ("Pysano v Unevi, 29.VIII. 1902").

IOR, OSBM-R, Z: OSBM, 1902. 2nd ed. 105 pp. ("Shcho roku...").

UCS-O

An outline of the Catholic catechism for the use of Ukrainians in Canada.


D: Botsian, p. 114.
h. VIDOZVA ("Episkopat ruskii nashoi provintsii...").

30.VIII.1902.

KUL

Z: OSEBM, 1902. 4 pp. in 4°.
Univ: Nakladom Mytr/opolychoho/ Ordynariata, 1902.

Announcement of a pilgrimage to Rome in October 1902, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the papacy of Leo XIII.

i. O PAPSKIM IUULIEIU ("Dnia 20 liutoho 1878 р...").

AN to the clergy and the faithful, 15.IX.1902.
KUL

In anticipation of the 25th anniversary of the pontificate of Leo XIII. A brief review of his teachings and activity, with special attention to the secular and socialist movements of the time.


- 1903 -

a. "Shchoby nashi trudy..."

Notice to the clergy and the faithful, 18.III.1903.


On the appointment of Rev. Andrei Bilets'kyi as Vicar General.

b. Letter to the Jewish community, 3.VII.1903.


A letter responding to the Jewish community's request for assistance.
a. O POSTAVLENIU D. DR.-A. HRYHORIIA KHOMYSHyna YEPYSKOPOM
("Koly ia pered trona...").

PL to the faithful, 8.V.1904.


On the occasion of the appointment of Rev. Khomyshyn as bishop of the
eparchy of Stanyslawiv, a statement on the episcopacy.

D: Botsian, pp. 118-119.

b. O PRENEPOROCHNIм ZACHATIU BOHORODYTSI ("Piadesiat lit mynaie...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 16.V.1904.

KUL

OSBM-R, KUL, Tr (Polish): O Nienokażanem Poczęciu Najświętszej Panny

Tr (English): in John Sianchuk, The Writings of Metropolitan
Andrei Sheptycky on the Immaculate Conception, M.A. Dis-

An explanation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, on the 50-th
anniversary of its promulgation.

D: Botsian, pp. 115-116.

John Sianchuk, The Writings of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptycky on the
Immaculate Conception, M.A. Dissertation. Rome: Istituto
Orientale, 1981.

c. OD POLAKow OBRZADKU GRECKO-KATOLICKIEGO ("Między wiernymi...").

PL to Polish Greek Catholics, 16.V.1904.

KUL

R (excerpt, to p. 9 of original): Komunikaty Towarzystwa
Basic Christian teachings and remarks on the importance of preserving the Eastern rite. The separateness of pastoral and political work.

D: Botsian, pp. 116-117.

d. 0 KVESTII SOTSIALNI ("Demokratychni rukh...").

PL to the clergy, 21.V.1904.

IOR, KUL

OSBM-R, ZNIO
KUL

Catholic social teaching applied to the situation in Galicia.


Botsian, pp. 117-118.


e. PROTEST MITROPOLITA ANDREIA SHEPITSKAGO DO DOSTOKHVALNOGO OSBHCHESTVA "GALITSKO-RUSKAI XA MATIITSA" U LUVIYI ("Ponezhe dosi Obshchestva...").

Letter, 16.XI.1904.

IOR

Metropolitan Sheptytsky's letter of protest to the literary society "Galitso-russkaia Matitsa" in which he objects to its constitutional amendment of 24 May, 1900 whereby the Metropolitan of L'viv would no longer be an ex officio patron of the society.
a. "Uzhe kil'ka raziv..."

PL to the clergy, 19.II.1905.

IOR /2: OSBM, 1905./ 16 pp.

A reminder to priests that their pastoral duties include the teaching of catechism to children.

D: Botsian, p. 119.

b. O SOLIDARNOSTY ("V chasakh tiazhkykh...").

Collective (3) PL to the clergy, 13.II.1905.


A call to solidarity among priests as a check against politically partisan divisions within the Church.

D: Botsian, p. 120.

c. O TSEKR'OVNIK BRATSTVI ("Chas vel'koho posta yest'...").

PL to the faithful, Sunday of the Publican and the Pharisee /19.II./, 1905.


KUL

On the need for closely-knit co-operation of the laity with their parish priest in his pastoral work. See related PL to the clergy, bearing the same title, 1905-d.

D: Botsian, p. 121.

d. O TSEKR'OVNIK BRATSTVI ("Iduchy za davnym zvychajem...").

PL to the clergy, Meat-Fare Saturday /4.III./, 1905.


KUL

On parish-based lay brotherhoods, with advice on how to strike a practicable balance between excessive autonomy of such organizations and
unnecessary interference on the part of priests.
See related PL to the faithful, bearing the same title, 1905-c.

D: Botsian, pp. 121-122.

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- 1906 -

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a. "Rik mynaie vid khvyli..."

   Collective (3) PL to the faithful, 11.1.1906.

KUL


On the participation of priests in civil affairs, developing further on
the topic of Solidarność

D: Botsian, p. 122.

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b-f: RISHENIE L'UVUSKOHO EPARKHIAL'NOHO SOBORA VIDBUOTOHO 28 I 29 HRUDNIA
1905.

   Documents from the sobor of December, 1905. 14.1.1906.

OSBM-R, IOR,  Z: OSBM, 1906. 75 pp.: 
ROBARTS

b. PL to the clergy ("Za laskoiu Vsevyshn'oho..."), pp. 3-13;
c. decisions of the sobor, pp. 14-64;
d. "Besida Mytropolyta pry zakincheniu Sobora eparkhial'noho" ("Bohu
   blahodarenie..."), pp. 64-70;
e. proclamation of the sobor dedicating the eparchy to the Immaculate
   Conception, pp. 70-74;
f. ratification and approbation of the sobor decisions, pp. 74-75.

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g. "Die nächste politische Zukunft..."

   Speech before the House of Representatives, 1,7.11.1906.

BSB

Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses
der Abgeordneten Österreichischen Reichsrates. Vienna,
1906. 1.III.: 372 Sitzung der XVII Session, pp. 33702-33704;
7.11: 375 Sitzung, p. 33919.

On the pension law.

h. "Die Punkte 1, 2 und 4..."

Speech before the House of Representatives, 8.II.1906.

ONB

Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten österreicherischen Reichsrates. Vienna, 8.II.1906. 376 Sitzung der XVII Session, pp. 33984-33985.

On the Hopfenprovenienzgesetz.

i. "Donoshu vam..."

PL to the faithful, 6.III.1906.

IOR


A call to protest against a proposed divorce law.

D: Botsian, p. 123.

j. VELYKOPOSNA NAUKA VIHNYM ("Yak shcho roku..."").

PL to the faithful, on the third Sunday of Lent /17.III./, 1906.

IOR, KUL


k. SESTRAM SLUZHERNYTSIAM PRECHYSTOI DIVY ("Khotiai desiat' lit...").

PL to the Sisters Servants of Mary Immaculate, 3.IV.1906.

IOR


D: Botsian, pp. 124-125.
1. "Mnyuvshoho roku v serpny..."

   PL to the clergy and the faithful, Sunday of St. Thomas /22.IV./, 1906.


   About Jerusalem, where Sheptytsky had travelled in August 1905.

   D: Botsian, pp. 125-126.

m. PRO POCHYTANIIA PRESVIAZHO SERETSHA.
   ("Udiechnist' zhliadom Isusa Khrysta...").

   PL to the clergy, on the feast day of St. James the Apostle /13.V./, 1906.

   KUL, STAMFORD

   On the cult of the Sacred Heart.

   D: Botsian, pp. 126-127.

n. "Ordynariat poruchai..."


   OSBM-R, IOR  Z: OSBM, 1906. 6 pp. /"Vid Ordynariatu z spil'nykh
   narad halytskoho ruskoho Yepyskopatu"/.

   Attached to pastoral letter "Rik mynaie vid khvyli..." Directive from
   the Metropolitan's Chancery office convoking local conferences of
   priests to work out specific forms of solidarity in view of the upcoming
   elections.

   - 1907 -

a. O VYBORAKH DO PARLIAMENTU ("U nezvychayno vazhnu...").

   Collective (3) PL to the faithful, January, 1907.

   KUL, PAC-ZHUK,
   UCS-O

   On the upcoming parliamentary elections, the Christian duties of
   citizens, patriotism, etc.
D: Botsian, pp. 128-129.

b. **USTAV SESTRAM SLUZHEBNYTSIAM** ("Mynuvshoho roku my zapovily...").
   Regulations for the Sisters Servants, 2.II.1907.
   IOR
   Convocation of a capitula, nacherk of regulations and the promulgation
   of new regulations.

c. "Zistaushy epyskopom..."
   PL to the faithful, Meat-Fare Sunday /10.III./, 1907.
   KUL
   On the bishop as preacher of the Word of God.
   D: Botsian, pp. 127-128.

d. "Zblyzhaiut' sia chasy..."
   PL to the clergy, 26.XI.1907.
   KUL, STAMFORD
   On ecumenism and the unification of the Eastern Churches.
   D: Botsian, pp. 129-130.

e. "Khotiais pered poslidnimy...
   Collective (3) PL to the clergy, December, 1907.
   KUL
   On the need for clerical solidarity and Christian values in public life.
   D: Botsian, pp. 130-131.
- 1908 -

a. Sermon, Good Friday (24.IV.1908).

Nyua V:5 (L'viv, May 1, 1908), pp. 285-287.
Dilo XXIX:92 (L'viv, 1908), pp. 3-4.

Tr (Polish): Przeglad 97 (L'viv, 26.IV.1908).

A condemnation of the murder of viceroy Andrzej Potocki.

Ryszard Torzecki, "Sheptyts'kyi and Polish Society," Life and Times, p. 79.

b. "My vzhe neraz..."

Collective (3) PL to the faithful, 1.V.1908.

KUL


Political sins, the dangers of engaging in politics "without God." More specifically, in reference to the assassination of viceroy Andrzej Potocki by the student Myroslav Sichyns'kyi.

D: Botsian, pp. 131-132.
Dobrians'kyi, "Potots'kyi i Bobzhyns'kyi," Ibid.

c. "Poklykuichys' na torzhcestvennu..."

Administrative notice, 8.VIII.1908.

LaeU XX:8 (L'viv, 8 August, 1908).


A prohibition against clerical interference in the internal affairs of parishes other than their own.

D: "Ad maiorem Poloniae gloriari." Ibid. A critique of Sheptytsky's alleged attempts to denationalize the Greek Catholic
clergy.


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d. "U tim rontsi..."

Collective (3) PL to the clergy and the faithful, 28. IX. 1908.

KUL

The 50th anniversary of priesthood of Pius X.
D: Botsian, p. 132.

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e. O TSISARSKIM YUVYLEIU ("Dnia 2 hruudnia obkhodyt'...").

Collective (3) PL to the clergy and the faithful, 2. XI. 1908.

KUL

On the 60th anniversary of the coronation of Emperor Franz Joseph I.
D: Botsian, pp. 132-133.

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- 1909 -

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a. "De proximo conventu Velehradensi." ("Ex decreto...").

IOR Slavorum litterae theologicae V:1 (Prague, 1909), p. 64.
       Tr (Russian): ("Soglasno postanovlenie..."), Ibid.

A general invitation to the Second congress at Velehrad. Co-signed by Aurelius Palmieri, OSA.

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b. "Oratio Excellentissimi Praesidis." ("Electionem, qua me...").

A salutation to the assembly of the second Velehrad Congress.

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c. O VIDDANIU SIA LIUBVI I MYLOSERDIU KHRYSTOVOMU  
("Dnia 11 cheruńia...").

PL to the clergy, 19.IV.1909.

KUL

D: Botsian, p. 135.

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d. O CHASTIM SVIATIM/ PRYCHASTIU ("Vid davna uzhe ya...").

Collective (3) PL to the faithful, 1.V.1909.

KUL, UCS-0

On the sacrament of the Eucharist.
See separate PL on the same subject to the clergy, 1909-e, below.

D: Botsian, p. 134.

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e. O CHASTIM SVIATIM/ PRYCHASTIU ("Vid davna na tsilii...").

Collective (3) PL to the clergy, 2.V.1909.

KUL

On the sacrament of the Eucharist.
See separate PL on the same subject to the faithful, 1909-d, above.

D: Botsian, pp. 133-134.

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f. O VIDDANIU SIA KHRYSTOVII LIUBOVY ("U khyli, koly...").

Collective (3) PL to the faithful, 11.VI.1909.

KUL

On the Eucharist, Christ and salvation.

D: Botsian, p. 136.
g-h: Nacherk Konstytutsii Zhens'kykh Monastyriv Ch/ylna/ S/viatoho V/asy-
lia/ V/elyko/ Halytskoi Provintsii


KUL

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PL introducing the new constitution.

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h. draft constitution in six sections: rada (zahal'na i monastyrs'ka),
   Ihumenia, Doradnytsi, Namistnytsia, Magistra novychok, Novitsiat,
   pp. 7-22.

The outline of a new constitution for the Basilian Sisters, issued
23.VII.1909.

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i-j: Vytiakh z Prawyl Sv. Ottsia Nashoho Vasylia Velykoho Ulozenyi dlia
   Inokyn' iodnym Veliamynom Rutskym Mytropolatom Vsei Rusy. Konstyt-
   tubtsii Zhens'kykh Monastyriv Ch.S.V.V. Halytskoi Provintsii /ed.
   Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi/.


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i. Prepodobnym u Khrystih Inokyniam Ch.S.V.V. ("Rozvii Vashoho Chyna...").


   An introduction to the monastic regulations contained in the book.

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j. "Besida Sv/intoho/ Ottsia Nashoho Vasylia Velykoho o askezi" (pp. 15-
   19), "Vytiakh z pravyl Sv/intoho/ Ottsia Nashoho Vasylia
   Velykoho" (pp. 21-73), "Konstytutsii zhens'kykh monastyriv
   Chyna Swiatoho Vasylia Velykoho halytsko/ provintsii" (pp.
   75-95), "Monashi konstytutsii" (pp. 97-103), and "Shist-
   desiat dukhovnykh sententsii monashykh potribnykh i znamen-
   nykh" (pp. 105-108).

A collection of regulations and other constitutional materials for
the Basilian nuns.
a. Z PRAVYL SV/IA TOHO OTTSIA NASHOHO VASYLIIA VELYKOHO


Excerpts from the Rule of St. Basil the Great, translated by Metropolitan Sheptytsky. On the aim of the monastic life: poverty, chastity and obedience, community life, councils, the hegumen, the novitiate and the rejection of the world.

b. PIAT' BESID ASKETYCHNYKH SV/IA TOHO OTTSIA NASHOHO VASYLIIA VELYKOHO


Five ascetic tracts by Basil the Great, translated by Metropolitan Sheptytsky, with his critical opinion, dated 24.III.1910, on the question of the authenticity of the last two documents, pp. 46-48.

c. O MOLYTVI I TSERKOUNIM PRAVILI ("Zhytie khrystian'ske yest'...").

PL to the clergy, 20.III.1910.

KUL

On prayer and grace in the Christian life.
D: Botsian, pp. 136-137.

d. "Bud' te hotovi..."

PL to the faithful, 21.III.1910.

KUL, STAMFORD, UCS-O

On sin, death and sanctifying grace.
D: Botsian, p. 137.
e. "Skhyzmatytska agitatsia..."


OSBM-R

On the opponents of the Catholic faith and the Church.

f. "Z dušpastyrs'koho oboviazku..." 

PL to the faithful, 31.III.1910.

OSBM-R, KUL
UCS-O

A teaching on peace and unity.
D: Botsian, p. 138.

g-h: TYPIKON STUDYTSTKOI LAVRY SVIATOH ANTONIIA PECHERSKOGO V SKNYLOVI
    PID L'VOVOM. /ed. Metropolitan Sheptytsky/.

OSBM-R, IOR

g. "Monashe zhyttie, Brattia..."

PL to the Studites (signed "Mnogohrishnyi Bozhyi rad
monakh Andrei, ihumen sknylivskoi Lavry"), pp. 1-33.

h. The Studite Monastic Constitution, issued 5.VI.1906, with sections on:
monastic poverty, angelic chastity, fasting, monastic obedience, clothing, daily schedule, prayer, silence, humility, work, etc. pp. 35-47.

Typikon and constitution for the Studite monastery at Sknyliv, near L'viv.

i. "Hohes Haus! Wenn ich in der Budgetdebatte..."

Speech to the Austrian House of Lords.
Stenographische Protokolle des Herrenhauses des
Österreichisches Reichsrates. Vienna, 28.VI.1910. 11
Sitzung der XX Session, pp. 286-288.
R: Krawcheniuk (1963), pp. 112-117. (Title: "Die Notwendigkeit einer ruthenischen Universität in Lemberg").

Tr (Ukrainian): "Koly zabyrau holos..." in Krawcheniuk (1963), pp. 117-121. (Title: "Potreba ukrajns'koho universytetu u L'vovi").

On the importance of and the need for a Ruthenian University in L'viv.

- 1911 -

a. KANADIJSKYM RUSYNAM ("Ya obitsiau...").

Booklet for Ruthenians in Canada, February 1911.

OSBM-R, STAMFORD,
UCS-O


Catholic teachings for Ukrainians in Canada.

D: Botsian, p. 140.

b. O MOLYTVI ("Yak shcho roku v chasi...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 12.11.1911.

KUL, UCS-O

On prayer.

D: Botsian, pp. 140-141.

c. PRAVYLA DLIA MONAKHIU SVIATOHO OTTSIA NASHOHO VASYLIIA UELYKOHO.


Regulations for the Basilian monks, translated and with a preface by Metropolitan Sheptytsky, pp. 3-26.
d. ADDRESS ON THE RUTHENIAN QUESTION TO THEIR LORDSHIPS THE ARCHBISHOPS AND BISHOPS OF CANADA ("The Canadian episcopate decided...").

Memorandum to the Canadian episcopate, 18.III.1911.


Memorandum on the need for a Ukrainian Catholic bishop in Canada.


Vasyl' Markus', "Introduction" in Two Documents, pp. iii-x.

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e. "Zblyzhaiut'sia wybory..."

Collective (3) PL to the clergy, 10.V.1911.


A reminder to observe Christian solidarity in view of the upcoming elections.

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f. V SPRAVI OPIKY NAD EMIGRANTAMY ("Nynishna emigratsia...").

LAeV XXIII:7 (L'viv, 6.VI.1911), M.O. No. 37, pp. 80-84.

A plan to address various threats faced by Galician emigrés (eg., slavery, prostitution, sectarian proselytizing).
--- 1912 ---

a. **PRAVYLA SVIATOHO OTTSIA N/ASHHO/ VASYLYIIA V/ELYKOHO/ DLI LIUDYI MIRSKYKH.**

OSBM-R


Rules and regulations for lay brotherhoods of St. Basil. (Such groups were usually mixed and composed of not less than ten members per chapter). An oath of obedience to the Catholic Church, is also included.

--- 1913 ---

a. **BOZHA SIIBA** ("Uyishov siuach siiaty...").


KUL

A handbook for Christians containing teachings on a variety of topics. Includes "Molytva za rukyi narid" (pp. 129-131).

b. **"La mesure que vient de prendre..."**

Letter to Latin-rite bishops in Belgium, France and Switzerland, 23.III.1913.


A brief introduction to the religious tradition of Eastern-rite Catholic emigre workers, prepared for the information of Roman Catholic bishops.

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c. O YUVYLEIU SVOJOSKI TSEPKY ('I prystupili Isus...').

Collective (3) PL to the clergy and the faithful, 12.V.1913.

KUL

On the occasion of the 1600th anniversary of Constantine's Edict of Toleration, followed by a Ukrainian translation of a statement of 8 March, 1913 by Pius XII on the same subject, ("Spominaemo veliku shchaslyvu podiiu...").

D: Botsian, p. 142.

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d. NASHA VIRA I NASHI OBYCHAI.

Brochure for the faithful, 26.V.1913.


A short catechism, presented in point form.

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e. O REFORMI UVYBORNoho PRAVA ('Nazaly vazhni chasy...').

Collective (3) PL, 29.V.1913.


On the desired changes to the electoral law.

D: Botsian, pp. 142-143.

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f. Z ISTORII I PROBLEM NASHOI SHTUKY ('Pamiatnyky shtuky i kul'tury...').

Dilo XXIV (L'viv, XII.1913): No. 279 (11.XII), pp. 1-2; No. 280 (16.XII), pp. 1-2; No. 281 (17.XII), pp. 1-2.

Speech delivered at the opening of the National Museum in L'viv, 13 December, 1913.

- 1914 -

a. "PAMIATKY DLIA RUSKYKH ROBITNYKIV V ANHLII, ARGENTYNI, BRAZYLII, DANII, KANADI, NIMECHCHYNI, ZIJDENENYKH DERZHAWKH AMERYKY, FRANTSII, SHVAIITSII I SHVETSII ("Yidete v neznanyi...")."


A revision of the 1912 book.
D: Botsian, p. 143

b. "My chuly zaiavy..."


Speech to Polish and Ukrainian party representatives from the Galician Diet with proposals for a mutual agreement on electoral reform and an independent Ukrainian university.

c. "Z ankety polsko-ruskiej 'Przeg³¹d powszechnego'."
("Bez w³atpienia...").

Letter of May, 1914 to the editor of Przeg³¹d Powszechny.


Sheptytsky's reply to the survey question: "beyond the disputed Polish-Ruthenian question, what matters are common to both ethnic groups?" Christian patriotism as the solution to the Polish-Ruthenian question.
e. "Pro memoria.\" (\"Sobald eine siegreiche österreichische Armee...\")

Memorandum to the Austrian Government (Consul Jrbas), 15.VIII.1914. 5 pp. MS.

R: Ereignisse I (1966), Document No. 4 pp. 8-11.

Tr (Ukrainian): PPU, Document No. 87 pp. 138-140.

Memorandum with proposals for the military, judicial and ecclesiastical reorganization of Eastern Ukrainian lands after their anticipated takeover by Austria.

Krawcheniuk (1963), p. 40 mentions that a copy of the memorandum, along with other archival materials, was confiscated by invading Russian forces in 1914. On Sheptytsky's release from Russian exile in 1917, V.L. Burtsev, editor of the paper Obshcheie Diele, published the document in support of his argument that the ovations which Sheptytsky had enjoyed in St. Petersburg were unwarranted. This would have been the first publication of the document.

The original document is located in the Austrian State Archives in Vienna under the reference Haus-Hof und Staatsarkiv, Politische Abteilung 523, Liasse XLVII/11.

D: Isajiw, "Memorandum,\" (1968), pp. 30-76.

f. "Prevazhna - dorohi - khvilia..."

PL to the faithful, 21.VIII.1914.

Tr (German): "Wir befinden uns..." Freignisse II (1967), pp. 424-426.

As Russian forces advanced into Galicia, this call to the people urged them not to yield to pressure to betray the Emperor and the Church.

D: Botsian, pp. 143-144.

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g. "Ziishlysia my, moi Vozliublenni..."

Sermon, Sunday 6.IX.1914.

R: Isans'kyi Viazen' (1918), pp. 7-8.
R: Suityl'nyk Istyny II (1976), pp. 133-134.


Tr (German): (*"Wir haben uns hier versammelt..."*), in Frokoptschuk (1955), pp. 109-111; and Prokoptschuk (1967), pp. 138-139.


The Metropolitan's sermon at the Church of the Dormition, in which he distinguished between two Orthodoxies: the Ukrainian one (ecclesiastical) and the Russian one (civil).

a. Statement to the revolutionary government in Russia.

Petrograd, 1917.

Tr. (Ukrainian): "Vid Petra Velykoho..." in Tsars'kyi Viazen', p. 54.

A proposal for the legalization of the Greek Catholic Church in post-tsarist Russia.

b. "Postanovlenii eparkhiial'nogo sobora Greko-Kafolicheskoi Tserkvi, sostoiashegosia v Petrograde ot 29-31 maia 1917 g. pod predsedatelei'-
stvom Vysokopreovsiashchenishago Andreia Mitropolita Galitskogo."

Petrograd, 31 May, 1917.

R: Tvory Kyr Yosyfa Verkhounoho Arkhvieypskopa i Kardynala
Johannes Choma and Georgius Fedoriw, comps., Vol. III-IV
(Rome: Ukraints'kyi Katolyts'kyi Universytet im. Sv. Klymenta
Papy, 1970), pp. 75-83.

The document was signed by Metropolitan Andrei and by Exarch Leonid
Fedorov.

D: Yosyf Slipyi, "Petrohrods'kyi Synod 1917 r..." Bohoslovia IX
(L'iviv, 1931), pp. 289-292.
Ivan Muzyczka, "Ekumenichna dial'nist' Mytropolyta Andreia
Sheptyts'koho v Rosii v 1914-1917 rokakh," Boho-

c. Interview for Journal de Genève ("J'attribue ma libération...").

Fribourg, 13.VIII.1917.


d. Statement to Ukrainians in Vienna (1) ("My usi perenesly...").

Vienna, 26.VIII.1917.

R (excerpts): Tsars'kyi Viazen', p. 91.
e. Statement to Ukrainians in Vienna (2) ("Vy nacherknukly...").

Vienna, 30.VIII.1917.


f. Statement to Ukrainians in Gmünd, Austria.
("Ne biitesia, ditochky...").


g. Speech to Ukrainians in L'viv.
("Veli yesy Hospody...").

L'viv, 10.IX.1917.


h. Homily in St. George's Cathedral.
("Koly ya tomu try roky...").

L'viv, 10.IX.1917.

R: Kost' Levyts'kyi, Istoryia uzyvol'nykh zmahan' halyts'-
kykh Ukraintsiv z chasu svitoval viiny, 1914-1918, Vol. II:
1917-1918, (L'viv: Drukarnia oo. Vasyliian u Zhoukvi, 1928),
pp. 595-596.
R: Tsars'kyi Vizaen', p. 76.

- 1918 -

a. "Hlyboki i tiazhki..."

Collective (3) PL to the clergy and the faithful,
21.II.1918.

KUL

On the effects of the war.
b. Speech before the Austrian House of Lords (Herrenhaus)
("Es ist die Frage aufgeworfen...").

Vienna, 28.II.1918.

Stenographische Protokolle Über die Sitzungen des
Herrenhauses des Österreichisches Reichrates. Vienna,
28.II.1918. 28 Sitzung der XXII Session, pp. 809-812.

R: Krawcheniuk (1963) pp. 127-132;
R: "Brest-Litowsker Friede," Ukraine in Vergangenheit und

Tr (Ukrainian): in Levyts'kyi, Istoriiia vyzvol'nykh
zmahan' halyts'kykh Ukrainstiu, (1928), pp. 760-764;
Tr (Ukrainian): "Bulo vydvyhnu to pytannia,..." in

Baran (1947) pp. 80-82 gives a synopsis, paraphrasing the salient points.

c. O VYKHOVANIU PYATOMTSIV I YEVPANHEL'KYKH RADAHK
("Kandydaty dukhnogo stanu...").

LAEO XXX:5 (L'viv, 31.X.1918).

R: Pliaton Martyniuk, OSBM, Nepodil'ne sertse Sviashche-
nyka v službi Boha i Tserkvy, (Zhoukva: Drukarnia oo.
Vasyliian, 1935), pp. 204-209.

The Metropolitan's decision to reserve, for a period of twelve years,
one half of the places in the L'viv Seminary for candidates to the
celibate priesthood.


-1919-

a. "Podobalo sia Vseyvshniumu..."

Collective (3) PL to the clergy and the faithful,
26.VIII.1919.

KUL

On the post-war occupation of Eastern Galicia.
a. "Pys'mo Sviatiishoho Ottsia do Ukraïns'koho narodu."
("Vid 1914 r. ya ne buv u Rym...").

Rome, 28.II.1921. 4 pp.


Introduction and follow-up comments to a letter of Pope Benedict XV to Metropolitan Sheptytsky on behalf of the Ukrainian people, "Il dolore che Noi provammo...", LaeU XXXIV:2 (L'viv, 20.IV.1921), pp. 2-5.

b. "La Mission du monachisme dans la cause de l'union des Eglises."

Rome, 18.XII.1921.

Bulletin des Missions (Bénédictines Belges) VI (Abbaye de St-André par Lophen, Bruges, 1921), pp. 181-189.

R: Stoudion - Bulletin des Eglises de Rite Byzantin I (Rome, 1923), No. 1 pp. 10-12; No. 2, pp. 33-40.

- 1922 -

a. "Uzhe druhyi rik..."

Letter to the Ukrainian people, 21.III.1922.


(Written in transit from New York City to Brazil).

b-c:

b. Address of Archbishop Andrew Szeptycki about the Catholic Missionary Work in what once formed the Russian Empire
("With the fall of the Tsar...").


An edited, polished version of the talk given at St. Augustine's Seminary in Toronto (1922-c, q.v.).
c. Address at St. Augustine's Seminary, Toronto.
("I will first speak...").

Toronto, 26.VIII.1922.


- 1923 -

a. "Le rôle des occidentaux dans l’œuvre de l’union des églises."
("Parmi tous les chrétiens...").

Rome, 18.II.1923.


Tr (Dutch): "Onder alle niet-katholieke christenen...,"
De Rol van de Westerlingen in het Apostolaat van de Here-


Conference delivered in Rome on 18.II.1923.

b. "La restauration du Monachisme Slave."
("Depuis la Révolution russe...").

Bulletin des Missions (Bénédictines Béloges) VI (Abbaye de St-André par Lophen, Bruges, 1923), pp. 491-499.

(Offprint): Mgr. André Szeptycky, La restauration du mona-

c. Pastoral letter ("Before returning to L'iviv...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful, on the feast day of Sts.
Peter and Paul (29.VI.), 1923.


Tr (French): "Lettre pastorale de Mgr. André Szeptycki,
Archevêque de Léopol," ("Avant de rentrer à Léopol...").
In Beatificationis et Canonisationis Servi Dei Andraea
Szeptyckyj Archiepiscopi Leopoliensis Ukrainorum Metrop-
politae Haliciensis, Vol. XVII: "Scripta Unionistica et Alia

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d. "Pro 300-litnii Yuivilei muchenyts'koľ smerty Sv. Yosafata Arkhiiepyskopa
Polots'koho." ("Laskavyi i mylosernyi Boh...").

Collective (6) PL to the clergy and the faithful, on the
feast of the Most Holy Theotokos the Protectress /14.X./
1923.

KUL, BJ

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- 1925 -

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a. "Zakon o poperedzhauchii tsenzuri knyh." ("Ponezhe oboviaziuchi...").

Collective (4) directive, 9.IV.1925.

LAeU XXXVIII:2 (L’uv, 15.IV.1925).

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b. "La psychologie de l’Union." ("Parmi toutes les questions..."").

La Revue Catholique des Idées et des Faits V:31
(Brussels, 23.X.1925), pp. 5-10.

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c. "Discours de Clôture." ("Après l’exposé lumineux...").

La Revue Catholique des Idées et des Faits V:33
(Brussels, 6.XI.1925), pp. 7-9.

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- 1926 -

a. "Deux mentalités; Orthodoxe et Catholique."
("Plus on rencontre...").

L’uiv, on the feast day of the Holy Prophet Job "ó poly-
thlhos", (19.V.), 1926.

Irénikon 1:5 (Prieuré d’Amay s/Meuse, Belgium, VIII.1926), pp. 229-238; 1:6 (IX.1926), pp. 261-266.


Michael Hrynychskyh, "Za pohybiennia ekklesiolohi! Ukraïns’kof Katolyts’-

("Spomynaiuchy pomershykh pravednykiv...").


Eulogy for the late Bishop Botsian.
- 1927 -

a. "Russkii katolicheskii ekzarkhii v Rossii." ("Mnogochislenny puti...").


Tr (German): "Das russische katholische Exarchat," ("Mannigfaltig sind...") Ex Oriente, (1927), pp. 78-89.

b. "Pro poborivannia vorozhoi Tserkvi propaganda." ("Chas Velykodnoi Spovidy...").

PL to the clergy, V.1927.

LAeV XL:5 (L'viv, 25.V.1927), M.O. No. 17, pp. 1-5.


c. "Spravedlyvyyi dopust..."

Collective (4) PL to the clergy and the faithful, 1/IV.1927/.

KUL


A discussion of the spiritual dangers of apostasy and loss of faith in the midst of sectarian proselytising among Ukrainians.

d. "Per tres dies..."


Closing remarks to the fifth unionistic congress at Velehrad.
- 1929 -

a. Inaugural document for the establishment of the L'viv Theological Academy. ("Nebesnyi nash Spasytel'...").

L'viv, 22.II.1929. M.O. No. 114.

R: in Vasyl' Lencyk, "Bohoslovs'ka Akademii u L'vovi,"

b. "Koly tomu dva roky..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful, on the feast of St. Oleksii (30.III.), 1929.

LAeV XLII:4 (L'viv, IV.1929).

On almsgiving.


L'viv, 1.VI.1929.


The Metropolitan's proposals for the codification of Eastern canon law, especially with regard to marriage.


("Kolyby my buły obkodyly..."

L'viv, 6.X.1929.


Speech at the opening of the Greek Catholic Theological Academy in L'viv.
e. "Einleitung." ("Das alte russische Kaiserreich...").

L'iviv, X.1929.

in Die Kirche und das östliche Christentum: Ukraine und die kirchliche Union, (Berlin: Die katholische Emigrantenför-sorge, 1930), pp. 8-10.

f. "Post novem dierum...."

Rome, 29.X.1929.


Speech at a papal audience in Rome, after the conclusion of the Ukrainian Catholic Episcopal conference (21-29.X.1929).

g. "Uvedennia." ("Shchoby zrozumity velyku vahu...").


The Metropolitan's introduction to his translation of the "Opera Ascetica" of St. Basil the Great. A study of the significance of St. Basil's ascetic works in his own time and their impact on later Christian thought.


- 1930 -

a. "Diliusia z Vamy...."

PL to the clergy and the faithful, II. 1930.


On the appointment of Ivan Buchko as auxiliary Bishop.
b. "Zariadzhennia torzhestvennogo Bohosluzhennia nadolozhennia za znevahy Boha i sviatotatstva bol'shevyzmu ta vsi zhertvy peresliduvannia Khryztiians'koi viry v Radians'kii Ukraini, Bilorusy i Rosii v tsily uproshennia zakinchnennia tykh peresliduvun'."
("Sviatotats'ka borot'ba na Radianshchyni...").

LaEv XLIII:2 (L'viv, 25.II.1930), M.O. No. 12, pp. 14-16.

c. "Moï spohady pro predmet Muzeinykh Zbirok."
("V znamenytii povisti pro Leonarda da Vinchi...").


Tr (German): "Metropolit Andreas Scheptytskyj über die Ikonen-Malerei," in Prokopschuk (1955), pp. 265-270; and in Ukraine in die Vergangenheit und Gegenwart IV:2-3 (Munich, 1955), pp. 73-78.

d. "Rozmova z Vysokopresviashchenym Mytropolytom Andreiem."


Interview with the Metropolitan after his meetings with Polish government officials in Warsaw about the pacification campaign.


e. "Khrystova Tserkva, shcho stoft' na storozhi..."

Collective (7) PL to the clergy and the faithful, 13.X.1930.


Tr (German): "Die Kirche Christi...," Katholische Kirchenzeitung 48 (Salzburg, 1930), p. 420. Full text.
A protest against the pacification campaign.

f. "Píd odyn prapor." ("Vazhki chasy i nablyzhaiuchisia...").

L’iviv, 22.X.1930.


A call to organize Catholic Union. (This issue of Nyva marked "after confiscation, second printing").
See 1930-d, above.

g. "Interv’iuvVysokopreosviashchennoho Mytropolyta."


Clarifications about the nature and purpose of Catholic Union.

- 1931 -

a. "U virmiš’ tradytsii." ("U preharno vidnovlenim Khrami...").

Nyva XXVI:3 (L’iviv, III.1931), pp. 81-85.
R: 05-83, pp. 93-97.

Speech on the occasion of the three hundredth anniversary of the consecration of the Church of the Dormition of the Blessed Virgin in L’iviv.

b. "Pro Obriadovu Spravy." ("Dvi prevazhni pođif...").

PL to the clergy, 13.IV.1931.

R: 05-83, pp. 97-104.

On the appointment of Nicholas Charnetsky as Apostolic Visitor for the Eastern Catholic rite in Poland; Rome on the Eastern rite outside Galicia.

a. "Slovo Mytropolyta do Ukrains'koj Molodi."
   ("Moi oboviazy suproty Vas...").


Tr (Polish): "Słowo do młodzię ukraińskiej," ("Obowiązki moje..."), Sprawy Narodowościowe VI:4-5 (Warsaw, VII-
IX.1932), pp. 467-470.
R: 05-83, pp. 104-108.

b. "I stalosia odnoho dnia...".

PL to the clergy and the faithful, V.1932.

R: 05-83, pp. 3-5.

c. "U khvyl, koly..."

PL to the faithful, VI.1932.

R: 05-83, pp. 9-16.

d. "Symvolny Isusa Khrysta: Zhertvennyk."
   ("Zahal'no Vidomo, shcho Tserkva...").

Nyva XXVII:6 (L'viv, VI.1932), pp. 201-203.

On liturgical symbols.
See also 1933-b, o.v.

e. "Bozha Mudrist'." ("Vsi ukraïntsyi wysoko tsiniat'...").

LaeV XLV (L'viv, 1932): No. 10, pp. 1-12; No. 11, pp. 1-41;
No. 12, pp. 1-33; XLVI (1933): No. 1, pp. 1-26; No. 2, pp.
37-40.
R: 03-78, pp. 3-126.
On divine wisdom.


f. "Z vykladiv pro asketyku." ("Zmahannia pratsi ta borot'by...").


- 1933 -

a. "Rozmowa z J.E. Metropolitą Szeptyckim."

_Bunt Mlodych_ 39 (Warsaw, 2.IV.1933).


b. "Liturgichni symvoli Khrysta: Nerukotvorena Ikona Khrysta." ("Do liturgichnykh symboliv Isusa...").

_Nyva_ XXVIII:5 (L'viv, V.1933), pp. 172-175.

c. "Hramotoiu z dnia ô travnia ts/eho/ r/oku/..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 14.VII.1933.

_LAeV_ XLVI:7 (L'viv, 15.VII.1933), pp. 102-103.

Nomination of members of the Council of Catholic Action of Ukrainian Youth: the president, Andrii Mel'nyk; eight members; and a chaplain, Rev. Roman Chaikov's'kyi.
See also 1934-h, q.v.
d. "Ukraine v peredsmertnykh sudorohakh..."

Collective (7) PL, feast of St. Olga (24.VII.) 1933.

R: Dil’o 194 (L’viv, 27.VII.1933).
R: Nyua XXVII:8 (L’viv, VIII.1933), pp. 281-282.

R: in Riatunkova Aktsiia dla Velykoi Ukrainy, Andrii Zhuk, comp., (L’viv, Nakladom Ukrain’s’koho Hromads’koho Komitetu Riatunku Ukrainy u Lvovyi, 1933), Document No. 5, pp. 50-51.


Tr (English): Pax XXIII:144 (Caldew Abbey, Gloucester, X.1933), pp. 165-166.


D: Nueva XXVII:8 (L’viv, VIII.1933), pp. 282-284;
Riatunkova Aktsiia dla Velykoi Ukrainy, A. Zhuk, comp., (1933).
See also the related document, 1933-f, below.

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e. "Trylitnyi Katekhetychnyi kurs." ("Konferentsiia vsikh nas/ykh...").

Laeu XLVI:8 (L’viv, 15.VIII.1933), pp. 126-127.
R: 05-83, pp. 17-18.

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f. "Protestuiuchy nedavno..."

Collective (6) PL to the clergy and the faithful, 17.X.1933.

Laeu XLVI:10 (L’viv, 15.X.1933), pp. 1-4.
R: Riatunkova Aktsiia dlja Veliko"i Ukrainy, A. Zhuk, comp., (1933), Document No. 15, pp. 76-79.

See also 1933-d, q.v.

g. "Dukhovna Semynaria tse symvol Tserkvy (Slovo v den' 150-litnogo yuvy-leiu Dukhovnoi Seminarii.)"
("U torzhhestvennyi den'...").


- 1934 -

a. Ze wspomnień o Bracie Albercie.


b. "Richnytsia vyboru i koronatsiî Sv. Ottsia Piiia XI."
("Dnia 12 liutoho...").

L'viv, 18.1.1934.


R: 05-83, pp. 19-20.

c. "Khrystos zachynav..."

PL to the faithful, 1.1.1934.

LAeU XLVII:1 (L'viv, 15.1.1934), pp. 2-10.

R: 05-83, pp. 105-118.

On three "particularly dangerous" sins: suicide, concubinage and the loss of faith.

d. "Osnuvannia General'noho Instytutu Katolyts'koi Aktsii."
("Dlia uspishnoho provedennia...").

LAeU XLVII:1 (L'viv, I.1934), M.O. No. 7, p. 11.
e. "Eukharystiinyi tyzhden'..." ("U chasi tsiloho Yuvilleinoho Roku...").
   L'viv, Cheese-Fare Sunday, 1934.
   R: 05-83, pp. 20-23.

f. "Uvahy dla Spovidnykiv." ("U dopovenni poslannia...").
   LAeV XLVII:2 (L'viv, 15.II.1934), pp. 26-33.
   R: 05-83, pp. 116-122.

g. "Do neduzhykh." ("Ne maiuchy spromohy stanuty...").
   PL to the sick, 1.III.1934.
   LAeV XLVII:3 (L'viv, 15.III.1934), pp. 52-62.
   R: 05-83, pp. 155-163.
On the Christian understanding of suffering.

h. "Hramotoiu z dnia 6 traunia 1933 roku..."
   PL to the clergy and the faithful, 1.III.1934.
Nomination of a president (Ksenia Yanovych), 7 members, and a chaplain
(Rev. Osyp Ostashevs'kyi) to the Women's Council of the Catholic Action of
Ukrainian Youth.
See also 1933-c, q.v.

i. "Shukaiemo pomichnykiv." ("Ne v spromozii...").
   PL to the faithful, III. 1934.
   LAeV XLVII:3 (L'viv, 15.III.1934), pp. 50-52.
   R: 05-83, pp. 23-25.
j. "Khto vynen?" ("Koly v ostannikh misiatiakh...").

PL to the clergy, III-VII.1934.

LAeU XLVII (L'viv, 1934): No. 3, pp. 45-50; No. 5, pp. 108-115; No. 6, pp. 131-147; No. 7, pp. 157-165.

k. "Bratstvo Sv. Tain i Khrystiians'koj Nauky."
("Kozhnomu dushpastyrevi...").

PL to the clergy, Sunday of the Cross, 1934.

R: 05-83, pp. 163-170.


L'viv, 5.VII.1934.

LAeU XLVII:7 (L'viv, 15.VII.1934), pp. 154-156.

m. "Bohosluzhennia dla svits'kykh tsilei." ("Buvaie, shcho liudy...").

Administrative directive, 25.VII.1934.

R: 05-83, p. 29.


n. "Z nahody vbyustva bl. p. dyr. I. Babiia."
("Dyrektor Babii upav zhertvoi...").

Pidliuty, on the feast of St. Elijah the prophet (2.VIII.), 1934.
Diol LV:205 (L’viv, 5.VIII.1934), p. 3.
LaEVLXLVII:8 (L’viv, 15.VIII.1934), pp. 170-171.
R: 05-83, pp. 30-31.


o. "Nauka katekhyzmu." ("Ne mozhna sobi dostatochno z’iasuvaty..."").
LaEVLXLVII:8 (L’viv, 15.VIII.1934), pp. 172-176.
R: 05-83, pp. 171-175.

See also 1937-b, q.v.

p. "Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne spovidalsia i Sv. Prychastia ne pryinialy." ("Ne znaiu, yak vas...").
L’viv, 10.VIII.1934.
LaEVLXLVII:8 (L’viv, 15.VII.1934), pp. 177-179.
R: 05-83, pp. 31-33.

q. "Pomozhim bezrobitnim." ("Distaiuchy neraz pys’ma...").
PL to the clergy, on the eve of the Dormition of the Theotokos, 1934.
R: 05-83, pp. 33-37.

r. "Sviatyi Otets’ otvoryv dveri..."
PL to the clergy and the faithful, 17.IX.1934.
LaEVLXLVII:10 (L’viv, 15.X.1934), pp. 199-200.
R: 05-83, p. 38.
s. "Uriad Spovidnyka." ("Yak do propovidannia Bozhoho slova..."

LaeV XLVII:8 (L’viv, 15.X.1934), pp. 206-213; XLVIII:1
(15.I.1935), pp. 5-7.
R: 05-83, pp. 175-192.

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t. "Donoshu Vam radisnu vistku..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 21.X.1934.
LaeV XLVII:11 (L’viv, 15.XI.1934), pp. 219-220.
R: 05-83, p. 45.

Announcement of an apostolic visit by Rev. Ivan Hudechko.

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u. "Natsional’na richnytsia." ("Kozhna vazhnisha podiia...")

PL to the clergy and the faithful, XI.1934.
LaeV XLVII:11 (L’viv, 15.XI.1934), pp. 220-221.
R: 05-83, pp. 46-47.

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v. "Pro Praznyk Tsaria-Khrysta." ("Ostannia nedilia zhovtnia...")

PL to the clergy and the faithful, on the feast day of St.
Lonhyn, hieromartyr (29.X.), 1934.
LaeV XLVII:11 (L’viv, 15.XI.1934), pp. 221-235.
R: 05-83, pp. 193-205.

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w. "Poslannia pro liturhichne zhyttia." ("Tse maizhe ochevydne...")

PL to the clergy, XII.1934.
LaeV XLVII:12 (L’viv, 15.XII.1934), pp. 247-254.
R: 05-83, pp. 208-214.

On the essence of the Liturgy.

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x. "Podiaka za zhelannia v den' sv. Andreia." ("V'yu buly dobri...").

Statement to the clergy, 18.XII.1934.

LaeV XLVII:12 (L'viv, 15.XII.1934), pp. 254-256.
R: 05-83, p. 48.

y. "Do ukrains'koj molodi zorhanizovanoj v K.A.U.M-i." 
("U den' mol'kh imenyn...").

L'viv, 18.XII.1934.

LaeV XLVII:12 (L'viv, 15.XII.1934).
R: 05-83, pp. 48-49.

z. "Promova ikh Ekstselets'i! Vysokopreosviashchenoho Mytropolyta Kyr Andreia." ("Tishusia takym chysel'nym...")

Speech, 26.XII.1934.


- 1935 -

a. Interview for 'Tygodnik Ilustrowany.'


b. "J. E. Ks. Metropolita Andrzej Szeptycki o 'Biuletyni Polsko-Ukraiń-skim.'"

c. "U den', u yakomu nasha Tserkva obkhodyt' pamyat'ku..."

PL to the clergy, 27.I.1935.

R: 05-83, pp. 49-53.

On the 13-th anniversary of the coronation of Pius XI.
N.B.: not be confused with 1936-b, q.v., a PL to the clergy and the faithful, with similar opening words.

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d. "Posliannia do dukhovenstva na Velykyi Pist 1935 r."
("Zblyzhiat'sia nedelia Mytaria...").

PL to the clergy, on the eve of the feast day of the three Hierarchs (29.I.), 1935.

LAEA XLVIII:2 <L'viv, 15.II.1935>, pp. 25-46.
R: 05-83, pp. 214-234.

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e. "Podaiuchy do vidoma..."

Statement to the clergy, on the feast of the forty martyrs (22.III.), 1935.

LAEA XLVIII:3 <L'viv, 15.III.1935>, pp. 59-60.
R: 05-83, pp. 57-58.

Comments to Pius XI's motu proprio of 21.XII.1935 on the Commission "Pro Russia."

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f. Obituary for Exarch Leonid Fedorov. ("Dnia 7 bereznia...").

L'viv, 22.III.1935.

LAEA XLVIII:3 <L'viv, 15.III.1935>, p. 61.
R: 05-83, pp. 59-60.

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g. "Do vidoma kandydatam dukhovnogo stanu."
("Z ohliadu na te, shcho v Seminarii...").

L'viv, 10.VI. 1935.
h. "Khrystiians'ka Pраведност'." ("Dushpastyr maie pratsiuvať...").

LAEV XLVIII:3-12 (L'viv, 111-XII.1935).
R: 04-78, pp. 129-413; and 05-83, pp. 234-236.

A theological treatise on Christian righteousness. Ten sections: 1) original sin; 2) justification; 3) faith; 4) fear of God; 5) hope; 6) the sacrament of repentance; 7) the charism of reason and the charism of knowledge; 8) love; 9) the moral virtues; and 10) the virtue of wisdom-in-life ("zhyt'tiieva mudrist'").


i. "Instruktsiiia dla dushpastyriuv pro postupuvannia z sekantamy, shcho khochut' navernutysia do katedaltyts'koj vry i Tserkvy." ("U vidpovid' na chasi...").
L'viv, 20.V.1935.

05-83, pp. 237-239.

j. "Z filosofi' kul'tury." ("Zhadauiuchy vid mene...").

k. "Podiaka za pobazhnania." (*Na 29 lypnia...*).

Pidliuty, on the feast day of the great Prophet Elijah (2.VIII.), 1935.


R: 05-83, pp. 239-243.

1. Introduction.

Pidliuty, 18.VIII.1935.

to: Hryhorii Duorianyn, Nauka Sekantiv i Katolyts'koho Tserkva, (L'viv: "RusalKa," 1935), 4 pp., unpaginated.

An introduction to the book, discussing Protestantism with a view toward preventing Greek Catholic apostasy in Galicia.

m. "Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne spovidalysia."
("Rik tomu, ya duzhe zaproshuvav...").

PL to those who did not confess their sins before Easter,


R: 05-83, pp. 247-252.

- 1936 -

a. Christmas message.

To Ukrainians of the Dnipro region. /L'viv, 6.I.1936/.


A message broadcast on the radio to Eastern Ukraine.
See 1937-a, q.v.

b. "Pro Tserkvu. (Z nahody richnytsi Koronuvannia Sviatishoho Ottsia Papy Pilia XI)." (*U den' y yakomu nashe Tserkva obkhodyt' praznyky...*).

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 29.I.1936.

LaeV XLIX:1 (L'viv, I.1936), pp. 1-10.
R: 05-83, pp. 252-260.

N.B.: not be confused with 1935-c, a shorter PL to the clergy, with similar first words.

c. "Podiaka Sviashchenyкам i Virnym." ("Khoch ya na bahato lystiv..."").

L'viv, on the feast of St. Anthony, (30.1.), 1936.


R: 05-83, pp. 244-247.

d. "Poslannia na Velykyi Pist." ("Zatrubit' u truby, storozhi!..."").

PL to the clergy and the faithful, Saturday of Cheese-Fare Sunday, 1936.


R: 05-83, pp. 260-269.

e. "Chasto v rotsi prikhodyt'sia Vam..."

PL to the faithful, Saturday of Sunday of the Cross, (8.III.) 1936.


R: 05-83, pp. 269-274.

f. "Molytvoslov i Sv. Pys'mo." ("Dosvid konkursovykh ispytiv..."").

PL to the clergy, V.1936.

LAEU XLIX:5 (L'viv, V.1936), pp. 50-53.

R: 05-83, pp. 65-68.

g. "Ekonomichni Rady." ("Ratsional'na hospodarka...").

LAEU XLIX:5 (L'viv, V.1936), pp. 54-56.
h. "Congressus /sic/ Velehradenses iam habent..."

L’iviv, 14.VI.I.1936.


Opening remarks for the 7th Congress at Velehrad (in Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s absence, they were read by Rev. Josyf Silipyj).

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i. Ostoroha pered zahrozoiu komunizmu.
("Nebezpeka teperishnii khvili...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful, on the day after the feast of St. Elijah the Prophet (3.VIII.), 1936.

Stamford

R: Laev XLIX:7-9 (L’iviv, VII-VIII.1936), pp. 81-98.
R: 05-83, pp. 274-289.

Tr (German): Pressedienst 65 (Essen, 27.VIII.1936).


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j. "Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne pryshashchaly sia."
("Po zakinchenomu chasi...").

Pidliuty, on the feast of Sts. Adrian and Natalie (8.IX.), 1936.


R: 05-83, pp. 290-306.

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k. "Z voli i ustanovy..."

Collective (3) PL to the clergy and the faithful, on the feast day of St. Andrew (13.XII.), 1936.

LAEU XLIX:12 (Lviv, XII.1936), pp. 137-143.

R: 05-83, pp. 467-473.

On Catholic Action.

i. "Obkhodymo 300-litnii yuvelle smerny Mytropolyta Ruts'koho..."

Lviv, 23.XII.1936.


Keynote address at the unionistic congress in Lviv (22-25.XII.1936).

- 1937 -

a. Christmas message.

To Ukrainians of the Dnipro region. /Lviv, 6.I.1937/.


A message broadcast on the radio to Eastern Ukraine.
See also 1936-a, q.v.

b. "Richnytsia Koronatsii Sviatoho Ottsia Piia XI."
("V praznyk Triokh Sviatyteliv, sebto...").

Lviv, on the feast of St. Timothy (6.III.), 1937.


R: 05-83, pp. 69-70.

("Praznyk Triokh Sviatyteliv mozhna...").

LAEU L:1 (Lviv, I.1937), pp. 2-4.
R: 05-83, pp. 70-72.

d. "Yuvilei Mytropolyta Ruts'koho." ("Dnia 7 liutoho...").
   
   LaeV L:1 (L'viv, I.1937), pp. 4-5.
   R: 05-83, pp. 72-73.

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e. "Na Pist propokaiannia." ("Zbyzhaiet'sia Velykyi Pist...").
   
   PL to the clergy and the faithful, after (sic) the Sunday of the Publican and the Pharisee, 1935.
   
   LaeV L:2 (L'viv, II.1937), pp. 17-22.
   R: 05-83, pp. 307-311.

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f. "Molytvy pro dobyrkh Nastoiateliiv (do tykh, shcho zhvut' po yevanhel'-
s'kykh radakh, ta do vsikh virnykh)."
   ("Na pershyi tyzhden'...").
   
   LaeV L:3 (L'viv, III.1937), pp. 25-27.
   R: 05-83, pp. 74-76.

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g. "Pro znannia katekhizmu." ("Po nasykh selakh buvaie...").
   
   PL to the faithful, on the Thursday before Palm Sunday, 1937.
   
   LaeV L:4 (L'viv, IV.1937).
   R: 05-83, pp. 312-316.

See also 1934-m, q.v.

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h. Dar P'iatdesiatnytsi. ("Z soshestviem Sviatoho Dukha...").
   
   LaeV, L:5-10 (L'viv, V-X.1937).
   R: 04-78, pp. 417-456.

A theological reflection on the significance of Pentecost for the Christian life, in 14 sections: 1) the school of the Church; 2) the school of Christ;
3) the school of the Holy Spirit; 4) why a school of the Church? 5) the
gift of infallibility; 6) the need of inspiration by the Holy Spirit; 7)
theology and the laws of human understanding; 8) Kerygmatic, or prophetic
("vishcha") theology; 9) Kerygmatic Christianity; 10) creative theology;
11) charisms; 12) theology of the Christian life; 13) theology of love; 14)
creative and prophetic theology of the Holy Spirit.

D: Petro Kostiuk, Dono della Pentecoste: analisi dell'opera del Metropolita
A. Szeptyckij, M.A. dissertation, Pontificia Università
Urbaniana (Rome), 1980.

i. "Promova na Mariis'kii Akademi 10 chervnia, 1937."
("Mynulo 300 lit...").

L'iviv, 10.VI.1937.

PAC-BAZ Visnyk Mariis'kykh Tovarystv III:5 (L'iviv, VII-VIII.1937),
Vol. 2 p. 8.
File 6

A speech to the Marian association in L'iviv.

j. "Nadzvychaini proiavy u Khristians'komu Zhytti."
("Use Khristians'ke zhyttia tse nenache...").

L'iviv, on the feast day of St. Elijah the Prophet (2.VIII.),
1937.

LAEV L:8 (L'iviv, VIII.1937), pp. 119-125.

Tr (English): "Extraordinary Phenomena in Christian Life," in Andriy Freishyn-Chirovsky, "True and false mysticism in
the writings of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky," M.A.
Thesis, University of St. Michael's College, Toronto School
of Theology, 1981, pp. 81-96.

The official position of the Church on mystical experiences (visions,
ecstasies, stigmatization).

On this subject, see also 1942-t and 1942-w.
k. "Pro tykh i do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne prystupyly do sv. Prychastia i ne spovidalsia."
   ("L'vivs'kyi Provintsional'nyi Synod z 1891 r...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful, on the feast of our Venerable Father Ilarion (3. IX.), 1937.


R: 05-83, 317-339.

Includes the following sections: "Do virnykh, shcho zhyvut' u Bozhii bahodati;" Do tykh, shcho spovidalsia na Paskhu, ale cherez tiazhkyi hrikh stratyly Bozhu blahodat';" and "Do tykh, shcho na Paskhu ne spovidalsia."

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   ("Espliia buia...").


PAC-BAZ R: Pastyrs'ke Poslannia Espans'kykh Episkopiv pro podi!
Vol. 2 v Espliia, (L'viv: Nakladom General'noho Instytutu Katol.
File 2 l'ysts'koI AktsiI, 1938), pp. 3-4.

The Metropolitan's introduction to the Ukrainian translation of a pastoral of the Spanish Bishops' Conference on the war in Spain.

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- 1938 -

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a. "Bozhe Provydinnia, shcho vede..."

L'viv, 1938.

Statement, probably for Easter, bearing Metropolitan Sheptytsky's signature.

Ref: unidentified (possibly Meta or Nedilia) newspaper clipping, PAC-HKo, File: "newspaper clippings, 1938-1942."

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b. "Poslannia pro Yednist' Tserkvy." ("kozhnoI maizhe dnyny...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful, on the feast of St. Sylvester (15.I), 1938.

LAEV LI:1 (L'viv, I.1938), pp. 2-16.
c. "Zaklyk do pokiaianna u Velykyi Pist." ("Su. Apostol Paulo...").

L'viiv, on the feast of the forty martyrs (22.III.), 1938.


R: 05-83, pp. 354-376.

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d. "Krystians'ka shkola dla ukraihns'kof molodi."
("Nablyzhaiet'sia Khvilyna...").

L'viiv, Palm Sunday, 1938.


R: 05-83, pp. 78-82.

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e. Radio message on the day after the feast of Pentecost.

To Ukrainians of the Dnipro region, 13.VI.1938.


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f. /950-littia Khreshchennia Rusy-Ukрайny/.
("Usvyshnii Boh, Sotvoretyl' vselennoj...").

Collective (7) PL to the faithful, on the feast day of Sts. Peter and Paul (29.VI.), 1938.

LAeV LI:6-7 (L'viiv, VI-VII.1938), pp. 81-86.


On the need of social unity.

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g. "Potriesaiuchu podii..."

L'viiv, on the feast of St. Elijah the Prophet (2.VIII.), 1938.


R: *Sviył'nyk Istyny* II (1976), pp. 139-141.


On the persecution of Orthodoxy in the Kholm region.


*Sviył'nyk Istyny* II (1976), p. 141.

h. "Poklyk Mytropolyta." ("Podi!, shcho my...").

*L'viv*, 3.XI.1938.


A call to peace and order.

i. "Podiaka za pobazhannya." ("Vsim, shcho pro mene...").

*L'viv*, 29.XII.1938.

*LaE* LII:1 (L'viv, 1.1939), pp. 5-9.


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- 1939 -

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a. "Khrystos Razhdaiet'sia!" ("U sam Praznyk Rizdva...").

PL to the faithful, 7.I.1939.


A Christmas message.
b. "Propovid' na Novyi Rik 1939 vyholoshena do radiia dnia 14 sichnia, 1939." ("I koly spovnylosia...").

L'viv, 14.I.1939.


New Year's homily, broadcast on radio.

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c. "U den' Koronatsi! Sv. Ottsia." ("U den' 12 liutnia za n. st. ...").

L'viv, 30.I.1939.


R: 05-83, p. 83.

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d. "Slovo Mytropolyta Andreia v praznyk Triokh Sviatyteiiv." ("Praznyk Triokh Sviatyteiiv tse symvol...").

LaeV LII:1 (L'viv, I.1939), pp. 2-5.


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e. "Poslannia na Piat." ("V serpni mynulo 1938 roku...").

L'viv, on the Sunday of the Prodigal Son (5.II.), 1939.

LaeV LII:2 (L'viv, II.1939), pp. 25-102.

05-83, pp. 384-455.

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f. "Pro chaste Prychastia." ("Praktyka chastishoho...").

L'viv, Sunday of the Prodigal Son (5.II.), 1939.

LaeV LII:2 (L'viv, II.1939), pp. 102-107.

R: 04-78, pp. 464-469.

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g. "V dua dni pered Khvylnoiu..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful, on the feast of the three Hierarchs (12.II.), 1939.
On the late Pius XI.

h. "U chasi sv. Chotyrodesiatnytsi..."

PL to the faithful, III.1939.


i. "Khrystos Voskres!" ("Voskresennia Rozpiatoho...").


Easter message.

j. "Slovo Mytropolyta - Yuvelyiata vyholoshene u L'vovi dnia 18.VI.1939 u 40-litnia Svoho epyskopstva."
("Dozvol'te meni zrobyty probu...").

L'viv, 18.VI.1939.


K. "Spil'ne Pastyrs'ke Poslannia Epyskopatu Halyts'koi Provintsii z nahody 500-litniiho yuvyleiu fiorentiis'koho ziedynienia."
("U tu 500-litnii richnytsiu...").

Collective (?) PL to the clergy and the faithful, 16.VII.1939.

1. "Einführung" ("Zweck dieser Zeilen ist...").

in Der Christliche Osten: Geist und Gestalt, (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1939), pp. 11-16.


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m. "Povtoriumchy slova..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful, III.1939.

LAeV LII:3 (L'viv, III.1939), pp. 115-117.

Habemus papam.

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n. "Chas Velykoho Postu..."


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o. "Velykodnie Slovo" ("Tsym paskhal'nym pryvitom...").

L'viv, Easter, 1939.


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p. Statement to the Ukrainian people.

L'viv, IX.1939.


In the wake of Galician manifestations of opposition to the Hungarian takeover of Carpatho-Ukraine, a joint statement by the Metropolitan and the President of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation, Vasyl' Mudryj, discounting rumours of anti-Polish activities by Ukrainians and exhorting Ukrainians to keep the peace.
q. "Obernulasia kartka istorii..."

PL to the clergy, on the feast day of St. John the Theologian (9.X.), 1939.

LAeV LII:9-10 (Lviv, IX-X.1939), M.O. No.1, p. 1.

R: 01-61, pp. 1-2.

The program of action for the Church under the new situation of Soviet occupation: respect for civil authority, catechism for the faithful.

r. DO UKRAINS’KOI MOLODI ("Hornetesia do vsiakoho rodu...").

PL to the Ukrainian youth.

LAeV LII:9-10 (Lviv, IX-X.1939), pp. 7-8.

UCU

R: Malyi ShKoliar. OdnodniuKa UKRAINS’KOI Narodnoi Shkoly
im. Mytr. A. Sheptyts’Koho u Regensburgu, (Regensburg: n.p.,
14.II.1948), pp. 3-4.

R: 01-61, pp. 6-8.

On prayer, the sacraments and adherence to the Church.

s. DO MONAKHIU I MONAKHYN’ TA VSIKH, SHCHO ZHYVUT’ PO YEVANHEL’SKYM RADAM
("Rozsvaiuchy vas po sviti...").

LAeV LII:9-10 (Lviv, IX-X.1939), M.O. No. 3.

R: 01-61, pp. 2-3.

Under the Soviet occupation, Sheptytsky allows monks and nuns with permanent vows to live outside the monasteries (now closed) and to wear civilian clothes. ("It is not robes that make a monk, but a spirit of humility, prayer, self-giving love...").

t. "Naivazhnisha sprava dla Tserkvy..."

PL to the faithful.

LAeV LII:11 (Lviv, XI.1939), M.O. No. 4.

R: 01-61, pp. 3-5.
On the importance of catechism for children.

- 1940 -

a. PRO NEBEZPEKU ZANEDBANNIA POTRIBNOI PRATSI
   ("Khoch shchoino nedavno...").

   PL to the faithful, Meat-Fare Sunday, 1940.

   LAeV LIII:2 (L'viv, II.1940), M.O. No. 48, pp. 6-8.
   R: 01-61, pp. 25-28.

The importance and dignity of work, even in the uncertainties of war.

b. "Zvertausia do vas, Dorohi Brattia..."

   PL to the faithful, on the feast of the presentation of
   Christ at the Temple (2.II.), 1940.

   LAeV LIII:2 (L'viv, II.1940), M.O. No. 25.

On the abuse of alcohol.

c. PRYCHASTIA NEZIEDYNENYKH DITEI ("Buvaie, shcho maty prynosyt'...").

   PL /to the clergy/.

   LAeV LIII:2 (L'viv, II.1940), M.O. No. 37.
   R: 01-61, pp. 19-20.

On administering the Eucharist to Orthodox infants.

d. PRO SOVIST' NEZIEDYNENYKH
   ("Pytaiat': Koly pravoslauni prystupaiut'...").

   LAeV LIII:2 (L'viv, II.1940), M.O. No. 39.
   R: 01-61, pp. 21-23.

On the need for confession of Orthodox Christians by Greek Catholic
priests in certain exceptional circumstances.
e. **DO SPOVIDNYYI** ("Zvertainu uvaahu usikh oo. spovidnykiv...").
   PL to the Fathers confessors.
   **Laev** LIII:2 (Lviv, II.1940), M.O. No. 52.
   **R:** 01-61, p. 29.
On prayer and Confession as ways of counteracting atheist indoctrination.

f. **PRO MYLOSTYNI** ("Polozhennia mnovykh vdvovyts’...").
   PL to the clergy and the faithful, Tuesday of Cheese-Fare Week, 1940.
   **Laev** LIII:2 (Lviv, II.1940), M.O. No. 53.
   **R:** 01-61, p. 30-31.
On alms for those in need.

g. "Vid lit bzhav ya...
   PL to the faithful, 13.III.1940.
   **Laev** LIII:3 (Lviv, III.1940), M.O. No. 59.
   **R:** 01-61, pp. 33-36.
   **R:** 06-84, pp. 2-5.
Notice of preparations for an archeparchial sobor, its purpose and procedures.

h. **DO US/ECHESNISHYKH/ I VPR. O/TTSIU/ VERKHOUNYKH NASTOJATELIV MONASYKHCH
CHNYLV: - YEROM/ONAKHA/ VITALIA, PROTOHUMENA C/H/YNA/ S/VIATOHO/
V/ASYLIA/ V/ELYKOHO, YEROM/ONAKHA/ YOSYFA, NAMISNYKA PROTOSA CH/YNA/
S/VIATOHO/ IZBAVYTIELA I YEROMONAKHA KLYMENTIA, IHUMENA USPEN/S/KOKI/
LAURY STUDIIS/KOHO USTAVA V UNEVI
("V Svitlyi Chetver...").
   PL to the superiors of the male monastic communities, on
the first Saturday of Lent, 1940.
   **Laev** LIII:3 (Lviv, III.1940), M.O. No. 59-1.
Invitation to superiors of three Eastern-rite monastic communities to participate in the upcoming sobor. Also, a protest against the forcible closures of monasteries and the expropriation of monastic lands by the occupying Soviet forces.

i. DO SESTER INOKYNY I ZAKONNYKH USIHK MONASHYKH I TSEKOVNYKH ZHROMADZHEN CHYNY SV/IATOHVO/ V/ASYLIA/ V/ELYKOHO/ - STUD/YS/KOHO/ USTAVU - SESTER SLUZHENYTS I USIHK INSHYKH KONHREGATSII YAKYKH PRAWYLA DOSI NE YE DEFINITYVNO ODDBRENI EPARKHIALY NOIV VLADOIU
("Aktom yaskravoi nespravedlivosti...").

PL to the female monastic communities, on Tuesday of the Second Week of Lent, 1940.

LAEV LI:3 (L'viv, III.1940), M.O. No. 64.

R: 01-61, pp. 39-40.

A protest against the closures of convents, words of encouragement and a reminder of the importance of prayer.

j. "Rozsylaiuchy apostoliv..."

PL to the faithful, on Tuesday of the Third Week of Lent, 1940.

LAEV LI:3 (L'viv, 1940), M.O. No. 66.

R: 01-61, pp. 41-44.

On effective preaching.

k. PROTEST PROTY NASYL'STVA NAD SOVIESTIU DITEI
("Deiakiv yypadky nasyl'stva...").

Letter to Comrade Zharchenko, Head of the District Department of Public Education.

R: LAEV LII:3 (L'viv, III.1940), M.O. No. 68.
R: 01-61, pp. 44-46.

A protest against atheist propaganda in the schools.
1. **PRO PUCHYTDNIA SV/IAZOTOH/ KHRESTA**
   ("Nedavno zaokhochuvav ya vas...").

   PL to the faithful, Tuesday of the Third Week of Lent (Sunday of the Veneration of the Holy Cross), 1940.

   *Laev* LIII (Lviv, 1940), M.O. No. 71.

   R: 01-61, pp. 49-52.

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m. **PRO BEZBOZHNYSTVO** ("Pravdyve zaperecheninia isnuvannia...").

   PL to the faithful, 1.IV.1940.

   *Laev* LIII (Lviv, 1940), M.O. No. 72.

   R: 01-61, pp. 53-54.

On atheism.


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n. "Pytain’sia sviashchenky..."

   PL to the clergy, 15.IV.1940.

   *Laev* LIII (Lviv, 1940), M.O. No. 80.

   R: 01-61, pp. 56-59.
   R: 06-84, pp. 14-17.

On reforming old parish brotherhoods and establishing new ones.

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o. **PRO BEZBOZHNYKIV I ZIEDYNENNIA TSERKOV**
   ("Shchoby unyknuty vsiakoho neporozuminnia...").

   PL to the clergy, 17.IV.1940.

   *Laev* LIII (Lviv, 1940), M.O. No. 82.

   R: 01-61, pp. 59-61.

On atheism and the unity of the churches, partly in response to the article "Hlava Uniatov" in *Bezbozhnyk* N°11 (11.IV.1940).
p. "U vazhnu khvylju zhyyttia..."

Keynote address at the Sobor in L'viv in 1940, 2.V.1940.

R: 01-61, pp. 62-66. Title: "Slovo Yikh Vysokopreosu/ia-shchenstva/ a/tsia/ Myropolyta na otvorennia L'vivs'koho Arkhiieparkhial'noho Soboru."
R: 06-84, pp. 17-21.

q. Decree of the Sobor of 1940: "Kul't Khrystovo'i Liubovy"  
("Vprodovzh mahizhe 20 stolit'...").

R: 03-69, pp. 130-148.
R: 06-84, pp. 104-122.

r-s:

r. Decree of the Sobor of 1940: "Pro tykh, shcho zhyvit' po Yevanhel's'kym Radam" ("Aep. Sobor protestuje rishuko...").

R: 03-69, pp. 376-388.
R: 06-84, pp. 247-257.

See the four regulations, dated 31.X.1940 and relating to this decree, 
Ibid., pp. 388-389, and in 06-84, pp. 257-258. Another set of ten regulations, including the above four, is given in 06-84, pp. 38-40.

For other regulations of the Sobor of 1940, see "Pravyla," from the unpublished manuscript "Akty, dekretyna pravyla L'vivs'koho Aeparkhiial'noho Soboru 1940 r.," in 06-84, pp. 33-42. The 72 regulations are grouped as follows: (1-14) "Pro Katolyts'ku Viru;" (15-17) "Pro Oboronu i poshyrennia Viry;" (18-23) "Pratsia nad Ziedyenniam Tserkov;" (24-31) "Pratsia v Dochornykh Tserkakh;" (32-35) "Umouyny uspishnogo proswichuvannia svitlom Viry v Parohi;" (36-38) "Oboviazky suproty Vseyshnioho;" (39-41) to the decree "Kul't Bozhoj Mudrosti;" (42-44) "Kul't Sviatooho Dukha;" (45-46) "Utrymanna Dukhovenstva;" (47-56) "Pro tykh, shcho zhyvit' za Yevanhel's'Kymy Radamy;" (57-62) "Molytvy Khrystians'koj Rodny;" (63-69) "Kul't Khrystovo'i Liubovy;" (70-71) "Kul't Khrysta v Yoho Symvolakh;" and
(72) "Soborovi rezervaty."

A further fourteen decrees and thirty-five regulations of the Sobor of 1940 are found in "Dekrety i Pravyla Aeparkhiial’noho Soboru 1940 roku," in 06-84, pp. 65-88. The decrees are: 1) "Vyznannia viry slovamy i dilamy;" 2) "Pysannia Ottsiv Tserkvy;" 3) "Paps’ki pys’mi;" 4) "Nauka bohoslovii;" 5) "Nauka sv. Pys’mi;" 6) "Chytannia Psaltyri;" 7) "Poshyrennia znannia sv. Pys’mi;" 8) "Propovidi;" 9) "Oborona i poshyrennia viry v parokhid;" 10) "Pratsia nad ziedynenniam tserkov;" 11) "Nauka viry v selakh, de nemae sviashchenyka;" 12) "Katykhzyatsiia;" 13) "Vykhovannia katykhystiv;" 14) "Umovyny uspishnoho prosnychuvannia svitlon viry parokhid."

For an explanation of the differences between these two sets of documents, see 1942-e, q.v.

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s. Appendix to the Decree of the Sobor of 1940, "Pro tykh, shcho zhyiut’ po Yevanhel’s’kym Radam: "Obouv’iazky spovidny’kiv zakonny’ts’" (<"Sviashcheny’k kotromu porucheno...">).

R: 06-84, pp. 258-260.

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t. "Blyz’ko dva misiatsi..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful, May-June, 1940.

Laeu LIII (L’viv, 1940), M.O. No. 88.

R: 01-61, pp. 67-68.
R: 06-84, pp. 22-23.

On the aims of the sobor.

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u. "Ubohyi chloevik..."

Speech after a session at the Sobor in L’viv in 1940, 12.IX.1940.

R: 01-61, pp. 77-80. Title: "Slovo Yikh Vysokopreossvia-shchenstva/ o’ttsia/ Mytropolyta pislia soborovoi sesii."
v. "Sered nezvychaino vazhkykh..."

Speech at the end of the Sobor in L'viv in 1940.

R: 01-61, pp. 68-71. Title: "Promova Yikh Vysokopreosv. iashchenstva/ o'ttsia/ Mytropolyta na zakinchenia Soboru z 1940 r."

w. DO DEKANIV ("Pratsi A/rkhieparkhial'noho/ Soboru postupaiut'...").

To the Reverend Deans, 31.X.1940.

LAEV LIII (L'viv, 1940), M.O. No. 89.

R: 01-61, pp. 71-72.

On local sobors in the deaneries.

x. "Podaiu do vidoma..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 31.X.1940.

LAEV LIII (L'viv, 1940), M.O. No. 90.

R: 00-61, pp. 72-73.

A warning about the threat of atheism faced by those who are on military duty.

y. "Mnozhat'sia vypadky..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 6.XI.1940.

LAEV LIII (L'viv, 1940), M.O. No. 92.

R: 01-61, pp. 73-74.

The form of an act of contrition in case of death and in the absence of a priest.
z. "Prymiiniuiuchy do poodynokyh..."

PL to the clergy, 9.XII.1940.

LAev LIII (L'viv, 1940), M.O. No. 95.

R: 01-61, pp. 75-76.

On the upcoming elections (15.XII.) and a renewed call to priests to abstain from partisan involvement.

See also the reminder to priests to refrain from engaging in political activities: the regulation of the Sobor of 1940, "A/rkhieparkhialnyi/ Sobor poruchaije usyl'no...," in 01-61, p. 73.

- 1941 -

a. "Pro Obriadcy." ("Zi samoho poniattia obriadovoho prava...").

PL, 19.V.1941.

LAev LV:6 (L'viv, VI.1942), M.O. No. 6, pp. 119-128.

R: 03-69, pp. 149-161.

Read on 21.V. at a session of the Sobor of 1942.

b. "Do ukrains'koho narodu."
("Z voli Usemohucoho i Vsemylostyvoho Boha v Troitsi...").

L'viv, 1.VII.1941.

R (excerpt): Ukrains'ka Diisnist' II:12 (Berlin, 1.VIII.1941), p. 3.
R: Pan'Kius'kyi (1957), pp. 112-113.
R (including photo reproduction): Danylenko (1970), pp. 210-211.

c. "Slovo Mytropolyta."
   ("2 voli Vsemohuchoho i Vsemolostyvoho Boha pochnaiet' - sia...").

   PL to the clergy and the faithful, S.VII.1941.

   **LaeV LIV:7** (L'viv, VII.1941), M.O. No. 63.

   R: **Ukrains'ki Shchodenni Visti** 1 (L'viv, S.VII.1941).
   R: **Kraikus'ki Visti** 157 (Cracow, 10.VII.1941).
   R: Pan'kivs'kyi (1957), p. 120.
   R: PPU (1968), Document No. 193, pp. 300-301.

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d. "Pro orhanizatsiiv parokhiyi i hromady." ("Vid Khvyl...").

   PL to the clergy, 10.VII.1941.

   **LaeV LIV:7** (L'viv, VII.1941).

   R: **Kraikus'ki Visti** II:172 (Cracow, 7.VIII.1941).

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e. Introductory statement to an appeal of the German Agricultural Commission to the Ukrainian people.
   ("Komanda nimes'koj armii...").

   **Ukrains'ki Shchodenni Visti** (L'viv, 27.VII.1941).

f. "Slovo Mytropolyta Andreia pro Bol'shevyz." 
("Metaiou derzhavy ye zapevnyty...").

L'viv, 6.X.1941.


An introduction to the book.

g. Obituary notice for Kost' Levyts'kyi. 
("Diliusia z ukraïns'kym hromadianstvom...").

L'viv, 12.XI.1941.

R: Pan'kivs'kyi (1957), p. 28.

The Metropolitan signed this as President of the Ukrainian National Council (Rada).

h. Decree of the Sobor of 1941: "Pochytannia Sviatykh." 
("Do predmetu triokh...").

R: 03-69, pp. 182-201.
R: 06-84, pp. 153-172.

On the veneration of saints: 1) the saints in general; 2) the Blessed Virgin; 3) the angels; 4) St. Joseph; 5) the Apostles; 6) the martyrs; 7) the Hierarchs; 8) Ukrainian saints; 9) the cult of the righteous.

For the regulations of the Sobor of 1941, see also "Pravyla Arkhieparchiy-Khiial'noho Soboru 1941 roku," 03-69, pp. 106-117, and 06-84, pp. 93-104.

The 116 regulations are grouped according to the decrees of the 1941 Sobor to which they correspond: (1-10) to the decree "Pro Kul't Neporochnoho Zachattia Presu. Bohorodytsi;" (11-14) to the decree "Pro zakon;" (15-29) to the decree "Dohmatychni osnovy morali;" (30-35) to the decree "Pro Dekaloh;" (36-47) to the decree "Pro try pershi Bozhi zapovidi;" (48-63) to the decree "Pro pochytannia Sviatykh;" (64-74) to the decree "Ikono- hrafia;" (75-87) to the decree "Chetverta Zapovid' Bozha;" (88-104) to the
decree "Pro poslukh dlia Tserkvy;" (105-116) to the decree "Poza uselen. Tserkvoiu nema spasinnia." The texts of most of these decrees are unavailable.

i. Decree of the Sobor of 1942.
   ("Idealom nashoho natsional'noho zhyttia...").

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L'viv, XII. 1941.

R: "Za yednist' sv. Viry, Tserkvy i Natsii!" Lohoš I:4
(Yorkton, 1950), pp. 241-248; II:2 (1951), pp. 81-87; II:3,

D: Vasyl' Markus', "Velykyi Mytropolyt - derzhavnyk (u desiatu richnytsiu
smerty Hrafa Andreia Sheptyts'kooho Mytropolyta Halyts'kooho i
Arkhyepyskopa L'ivus'kooho," Ukrains'kyi Samostiinyk V:45
(Munich, 7.XI.1954), p. 3; and Hryniokh (1961), pp. 35-56.

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"Mii lyst do vsikh Vysokopreosviashchenykh Arkhiierei u Ukraini i na
Ukraïns'kykh Zemliakh."
   ("Do osiahnennia nasykh natsional'nykh idealiv...").
   L'viv, 30.XII.1941.
   - see 1942-j -

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- 1942 -

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a. "Poslannia do Dukhovenstva triikh kanonichno ziedynenykh eparkhii:
   L'ivus'ko, Halyts'ko i Kamianets'ko."
   ("Z Bozhoi blahodattiu vidbuly...").

   PL to the clergy, on the feast-day of the Prophet Malachi
   (16.I.), 1942.

   R: 03-69, pp. 2-5.
   R: 06-84, pp. 30-33.
b. "Tyzhden' Ziedyennia Tserkov" ("16 sichnia st. st. ... ").

L'viv, 17.I.1942.


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c. "U spravi opiky nad polonenymy UKraïntsiamy"
("U taborakh polonenykh...").

PL to the clergy, on the eve of the feast of the Epiphany, 1942.


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d. "Richnytsia Koronatsii Sv. Ottsia Pia XII"
("Dnia 12 bereznia prypadae...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful, on the feast day of St. Gregory of Nyssa (23.I.), 1942.

LaeV LV:2 (L'viv, II.1942).

R: 03-62, pp. 30-33.

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e. "Poslannia na Pist. (Zaklyk do pokaiannia)"
("Chotyrdesiatnytsia - to chas... ").

PL to the faithful, Sunday of the Publican and the Pharisee (25.I.), 1942.

R: 03-62, pp. 34-38.

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f. "Do Reguliaminu Soboru" (Richnytsia, yaka zaisnuvala...").


R: 03-62, pp. 87-88.

R: 06-84, pp. 88-90.

An explanation concerning corrections to the text of the regulations of the Sobor of 1940.
g. Decree of the Sobor of 1942: "Pro Sviatkuvannia Nedili" ("Bozhyi zakon, shcho prypysuvav...").

/L'viiv/, 7.II.1942.

R: 03-69, pp. 43-55.
R: 06-84, pp. 45-56.

See also the regulations, dated 9.II.1942 and corresponding to this decree, in 03-69, pp. 55-56; and 06-84, pp. 56-57.

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h. - l. "U spravi porozuminnia" (A collection of documents).

h. "Vstupne slovo" ("Na moi vidkryti pys'ma...").


R: 03-69, pp. 333-339.

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i. "Yoho Vysokopreosviashchentuv Kyr Ilarionovi, Arkhiiepiskopovi Kholms'komu" ("U den' Sv. Ilarionova Velykoho...").

L'viiv, on the feast day of St. Ilarion the Great (3.XI.), 1941.

R: Svityl'nyk Istyny II (1976), pp. 142-143.

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j. "Mii lyst do usikh Vysokopreosviashchenykh Arkhiieren v Ukraini i na Ukrains'kykh Zemiah"
("Do osiahnennia nashykh natsional'nykh idealiu...").

L'viiv, 30.XII.1941.

R: 03-69, pp. 239-340.
R: Svityl'nyk Istyny II (1976), pp. 143-144.


See also the Metropolitan's letter of 28.I.1942 to M. Rybachuk, q.v.
k. "Mii lyst do Ukraïns'koï viriuiuchoi Pravosluhoj Intelligentsii"  
("Svoiho lysta do pravoslavnukh...").  
L'viv, 3.III.1942.  
R: Svityl'nyk Istyny II (1976), pp. 144-146.

l. "Mafi vidpovidi" ("Na vashoho vidkrytoho lysta...").  
/L'viv/, n.d.  
R (excerpts): 03-62, pp. 349-359; 401-408.

m. "Poslannia do Virnykh (Arkhypastyrs'ki pobachannia)"  
("Pyshu tse v Strasnu Seredu...").  
PL to the faithful, 1.IV.1942.  
LAEV LV:3-4 (L'viv, III-IV.1942).  
R: 03-62, pp. 40-41.

n. Decree of the Sobor of 1942: "Pro Liberal'nu Sovist'"  
("Do nezhydnukh z tserkovnym zakonom liberalizmiv...").  
L'viv, 9.IV.1942.  
R: 03-62, pp. 310-326.  
Read at the Sobor on 30.IV.1942.  
See also the regulations, dated 11.VI. and 8.X.1943, corresponding to this  

o. "Mariia - Maty" ("Koly sered naitrudnishyk...").  
PL, 14-15.IV.1942.  
R: 03-62, pp. 92-100.
p. "Епископськи Йувилий Папа" ("Дня 13 травня т. р. припадає...").
   PL, 17.IV.1942.
   LaeU LV:5 (L'viv, V.1942).
   R: 03-69, pp. 90-92.

q. "Пролошенні рішення епархіального синоду" ("Нема жодної можлиності...").
   R: 03-69, pp. 41-43; 103-105.
   R: 06-84, pp. 43-45; 90-92.

r. "До тих, хто не повідомляє." ("Закінчив навчання, по першому...").
   LaeU LV:5 (L'viv, V.1942), pp. 79-82.

s. "Видали нову службенку" ("Коли перед роком писав я...").
   L'viv, 25.V.1942.
   LaeU LV:6 (L'viv, VI.1942), pp. 100-105.
   R: 03-69, pp. 122-130.

t. "Про Псевдопророків" ("Дивні пророки...").
   LaeU LV:6 (L'viv, VI.1942), M.O. No. 107/42, pp. 128-129.
   R: 03-69, pp. 161-163.
   On this subject, see also 1937-j and 1942-w, q.v.

u. "Про милосердя" ("Тись деякого зусиль..."").
   PL to the clergy and the faithful, VI.1942.
   LaeU LV:7-8 (L'viv, VII-VIII.1942).
v. "Zariadzhennia i opovistky: V spravi pil'nykh robít u nedili i sviata
ta viddachi kontyngentu" ("Na vypadok, koly...").

L'viv, 1.VIII.1942.

R: 03-69, pp. 210-211.

w. "Shche pro mistychni chy spirtystychni proiavy"
("Rizni dvyni proiavy...").

L'viv, IX.1942.

R: 03-69, pp. 270-283.

Tr (English): More on mystical and spiritualist phenomena,
in Freishyn-Chirovsky, "True and false mysticism in the

On mystical and spiritual manifestations.
On this subject, see also: 1937-j and 1942-t, q.v.

x. "Do Sester Sluzhebnyts' (Na ruky S. Heneral'noi, nastoiatel'ky u
L'vovi" ("Obkhodyte tsioho roku...").

PL to the Sisters Servants of Mary Immaculate in L'viv, on
the eve of the Transfiguration, 1942.

LaeV LV:9-10 (L'viv, IX-X.1942), M.O. No. 721/42.

R: 03-69, pp. 214-217.

y. "Pro vidpravliuvannya Sluzhby Bozhoi" ("Nemaie sviatishoho...").

PL to the clergy, 1942.

z. "Khrystos skazav: 'Nikhto, khto...'

PL to the clergy, 1942.

za. "U spravi Vdovycho-Syrotyns'koho Fondu"
("Shchob u takyh prykrykh...").

Directive to the Rev. deans, 15.IX.1942.
R: 03-69, p. 221.

zb. Decree of the Sobor of 1942: "Pro vykhovannia /molodi/"
("'Arkhieparchhial'nyi Sobor zvertaiet'sia...").

L'viv, 24.X.1942.
R: 03-69, pp. 231-255.

See also the regulations, dated 19.XII.1942 and corresponding to this
decree, in 03-69, pp. 255-257, and in 06-84, pp. 210-213.

zc. "Ne Ubyi" ("Khrystova Tserkva ne perestaie...").

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 21.XI.1942.

LaeV LV:11 (L'viv, XI.1942).
R: 03-69, pp. 222-231.
R: 06-84, pp. 178-187.

80-83.

On homicide: political assassination, infanticide, suicide and fratricide.
The same subject was discussed at the Sobor of 1942, and a decree was
issued. Although that decree is not available, the regulations appended to
it are; see "Pravyly do dekretu 'Pro p'iatu zapovid'," 03-69, pp. 257-258,
and 06-84, pp. 213-214.

zd. Decree of the Sobor of 1942: "Pro dukhove chloviokoubyvstvo sebto
soblazn" ("Khrystos skazav: 'Khto soblaznyt'...'/

L'viv, 3.XII.1942

R: 03-69, pp. 303-310.
R: 04-84, pp. 219-225.

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Ze. "Propaganda Vidstupstva" ("Shchob osiahnutu natsional'nu yednist'...").
L'viv, 8.XII.1942.
R: 03-69, pp. 283-287.

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L'viv, 14.XII.1942.
LAeV LV:12 (L'viv, XII.1942).
R: 03-69, pp. 260-265.

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Zg. "Naimohutnishyi Orudnyk Dushpastyrs'koj Pratsi" ("V poslanniakh sv. A. Paula...").
PL, on the feast of the Immaculate Conception (22.XII.), 1942.
R: 03-69, pp. 287-294.

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Zh. "Do tykh, shcho vylzhzhaiut' na Roboty do Raikhu" ("Vylzhzhaiete v dalekyi...").
PL to the faithful, 22.XII.1942.
R: 03-69, pp. 265-270.

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- 1943 -

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A. "Poklyk do pokaiannya" ("Sv. Yevanheliie opovidaie...").
PL to the clergy and the faithful, the week of the Publican, 1943.

b. "Dosvid triokh lit pokazav..."

PL to the clergy, 26.II.1943.

_LaeU_ LVI:3-4 (L'viv, III-IV.1943).

R: 03-69, pp. 329-333.
R: 06-84, pp. 242-247.

c. Easter greetings to _Krakius'ki Visti_

("Redaktsiia Krakius'kykh Vistei prosylia...").

L'viv, 2.IV.1943.

_Krakius'ki Visti_ 17 (Cracow, IV.1943).

R: 03-69, pp. 372-376.

d. "Pobazhannia do robitynikiv u Praznyk Khrystovoho Voskresennia"

("Do Vas moie slovo...").


R: 03-69, pp. 368-372.

e. Easter greetings to _L'uius'ki Visti_

("Proste mene pro stattiu...").

L'viv, 21.IV.1943.

_L'uius'ki Visti_ 91 (L'viv, IV.1943).

R: 03-69, pp. 376-378.

Includes a greeting to the readers of _Ridna Zemlia_.

f. "Poslannia pro pochytannia i posviatu sebe Prechystof Bohorodytsi"

("U nashomu obriadi uiddaie...").

L'viv, 2-3.V.1943.

L'viv, 1943.

LAeV LVI:6-7 (L'viv, VI-VII.1943).

R: 03-69, pp. 393-397.
R: 06-84, pp. 261-264.

This keynote address was likely delivered some time before 10.VI, the date of the decree "Pro yednist" (1943-i).

h. "Poslannia do tykh, shcho na Velykodni Sviata ne prychashchalyia"
("Kozhnyi khrystiianyn znaie...").

PL to those who did not receive communion at Easter, issued on the Saturday after the Ascension, /5.VI./, 1943.

R: 03-69, pp. 397-401.

i. Decree of the Sobor of 1943: "Pro yednist"
("Yak metu Khrystovo1 smerty...").

L'viv, 10.VI.1943.

R: 03-69, pp. 408-413.
R: 06-84, pp. 265-270.

j. "U vazhkii khvylynii zvertaiusia do Vas..."

PL to the clergy and the faithful, 10.VIII.1943.


JKS


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k. "U spravi vidpraviuvannia duokh Sluzhb Bozhykh u odnomu dni"
("Potreba narodu...").

PL to the clergy, 24.VIII.1943.

R: 03-69, pp. 448-449.

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l. "U vazhkomu lykholitti..."

Collective (10) PL to the clergy and the faithful, XI.1943.

R: 03-69, pp. 417-425.

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m. "Promova ìkh V. Preosviashchenstva Mytropolyta Kyr Andreia na zakin-
chennia IV Aep. Soboru, dnia 11.XI.1943"
("Vsev. Bohovi Khvala...").

L’iviv, 11.XI.1943.

LÆEUV LVII:1-3 (L’iviv, I-III,1944), pp. 16-17.

R: 03-69, pp. 440-443.
R: 06-84, pp. 278-281.

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- 1944 -

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a. "Rozdumuiuchy nad Kalendarem" ("Na shchyti odnoho...").

b. "Pro ubyvannia sviaschynikiv" ("V imeni Khrestovo\' Tserkvy..."").

PL to the clergy and the faithful, n.d.

R: 03-69, pp. 431-432.

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c. "Pam\'iaty o Dymytrii Dyonizii Tkachuka, Protoarkhimadryta oo.
Vasiliian." ("Dnia 24.I. pomer v Rymi...").

L\'viv, II.1944.

R: 03-69, pp. 444-448.

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d. "Na ostannii sviatochnii sesii..."

PL to all participants of the archeparchial sobors, on the
Wednesday of the first week of Great Lent (8.III.), 1944.


R: 03-69, pp. 426-430.
R: 06-84, pp. 273-278.

Convocation of the Sobor of 1944.

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e. Statement to the clergy.

L\'viv, 14.X.1944.

Tr (Polish, excerpt): "Jednym z g\'ownych obow\'iazkow...," in
Edward Prus, "\'Ukra\'i\'skie si\'y zbrojne\' w walce z ZSRR i
Polakami. List metropoliy hr. Szeptyckiego do Stalin,"
Cites archival Ref: TsDIA, f.201, op.4-b, spr.2742, ark.6.


A call to every parish to collect funds for the Red Cross to care for the
sick and wounded of the Red Army.

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B. Selected correspondence and other private writings

- 1888 -

23.V: prayer ("Pered Tvoim khrestom...").


Tr (German): "Vor Deinem Kreuz..." in Prokoptschuk (1955), p. 66; and Prokoptschuk (1967), pp. 94-95.

- 1907 -

27.VI: to Rev. Alexei Zerchaninov ("Usledstvie...").


1.VII: to Bishop Antonii of Zhitomir ("Prostite, Vashe...").


1.VII: to Bishop Petr of Smolensk ("Gospod' nash...").


1.VII: to Bishop Innokentii of the Old Believers ("Do moego svedeniiia...").


- 1909 -

8.XI: to Arsenii Morozou ("Tot komu Vy...").

after 15.XI: to V.E. Makarov ("Vy sami ne mozhete...").

The text of Makarov's letter, to which this was a reply, is

--- 1913 ---

22.XII: to Cardinal Merry del Val

Tr (Russian): D. Vasiliy (1966), pp. 217-235. ("Ia ochen'
priznatelen...").

--- 1914 ---

31.VIII: to the Austrian High Command ("Ich erlaube mir...").

Documents rutheno-ukrainsk (Paris, May, 1919), p. 9A.
(Photo of the original letter, handwritten in German).

Tr (French): ("Je me permet..."), in Documents rutheno-

Tr (Ukrainian): ("Dozvoliu sobi..."), in PPU (1966), Docu-
ment N°66, p. 137. Cités archival Ref: LODA, f.1, op.52,
spr.10, ark. 48.

A covering letter introducing a study titled "The Russo-
philism of Galician Poles," written by Ukrainian publicists
and examining anti-Austrian attitudes among Poles.
N.B.: PPU neglects to mention the title of this article and,
quoting selectively, presents it instead as "a notice of
Galician bourgeois-nationalist activists' support for the
Austro-Hungarian government in its war with Russia."

18.IX: to Rev. Bilets'kyi ("O. ofitsialovy Bilets'komu...").

R: Tsars'kyi Visitzen', p. 19.

A hasty-written note of farewell before being exiled in
Russia.
24.IV: to Ukrainians (National Council) in St. Petersburg
("Velykoiu radostii perepovnena...").

R: Bodnaruk (1949), p. 89.
R: Oleksander Lotots'kyi, "Povorot mytr. Andreia
Sheptyts'koho z zaslannia," in his Storinky Mynuloho, Pratsi
Ukrains'koho Naukovoho Instytutu, Vol. XXI, Seriia Memuariv,

c. 15.VII (Stockholm): to Kaiser Karl of Austria
("Von Schwedens...").


21.VIII: to Graf Ottokar Czernin, Austrian Minister of External Affairs
("Trotzdem ich mit aller Sorgfalt...").


- 1918 -

2.IV: to Graf Ottokar Czernin, Austrian Minister of External Affairs
("Angesichts der Religionsfreiheit...").

R: "Offizielle Bekanntgabe an das k.u.k. Ministerium des
Aussern über die Restituirung der Cholmer gr.-Kath.
354-355.

13.VI: to Archduke Wilhelm Habsburg.

Tr (French): "J'apprends qu'une partie...," in Documents
ruthéno-ukrainiennes (Paris, Bureau polonais des publica-

Tr (Ukrainian): Nova Hromada (Prague, 1.1924).
Tr (Ukrainian): Lonhyn Tsehels'kyi, Vid Lehend do Praudy.
Spuvyny pro podii u Ukraini zviazani z pershym lystopadom
Tr (Ukrainian): "Ya diznawsia...," PPU (1968), Document No.
94, pp. 147-148.

See also the letter of 18.III.1918 from Wilhelm Habsburg to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, PPU (1968), Document No. 92, pp. 145-146.

18.VIII: to Graf Ottokar Czernin, Austrian Minister of External Affairs ("Wiederholt kommen zu mir...").


8.VIII: to Bishop Yosafat Kotsilovs'Kyi of Peremyshl' ("Na tsinnyi dopys...").

R: PPU (1968), Document No. 96, p. 150. Cites archival Ref: TsDIA, f.201, op.4-b, spr.1815, ark.11.

------------------------------- 1919 -------------------------------

4.I: to General Tadeusz Rozwadowski.

Tr (Polish, marked "translated from the original"): "Wczoraj oddano mi list..." (In ZNI0, Papiery Bolesława i Marii Wysłouchów, Sygn. 7195 II).


23.XII: to Senator Antin Horbacheus'Kyi ("Proshu pryniaty vyrazy...").


------------------------------- 1921 -------------------------------


5.IV (New York): Unpublished, to Felix Warburg, Joint Distribution Committee of the American Funds for Jewish War Sufferers ("I would feel very grateful...").

New York, Joint (Distribution Committee) Archives, File No. 468, "Ukrainian Provinces Diocesan Relief Fund, 1922."

12.II: Unpublished, to Giovanni Gennochi, apostolic visitor to Galicia ("J’accepte avec grande reconnaissance...").


27.VII: to Leopold Prečan, Archbishop of Olomuc ("Unionisti ci Congressus Velehradensis habent...").

in Acta IV Conventus Velehradensis, (Olomuc: Sumptibus
Archiepiscopi Olomucensis, 1925. pp. 188-190;
R (excerpt): Jos. Drozd, "Memento mortuorum: Andreas
Septyckyj, Metropolita Leopoliensis, Praeses Academiae Vele-
hradensis, 1910-1939," in Acta Academiae Velehradensis XVIII

- 1929 -

28.IX: Unpublished, to Viacheslav Lypynsky
("Perevovsim diakuiu Vam za dovirie...").
Beatificationis et Canonizationis Servi Dei Andreae
Szeptyckyj Archiepiscopi Leopoliensis Ukrajinorum Metropo-
litae Haliciensis, Vol. 2: "Variæ Epistolae et Rela-

- 1932 -

31.V: to the President of the Apostolate of Sts. Cyril and Methodius
("Accipio humanissimam invitationem...").
in "Ad Praesidem Apostolatus Ss. Cyrilli et Methodii."

- 1933 -

29.III: to Vasyl' Mudryj, editor of Dilo
("Oderzhuiu...").
R: "B. het'man P. Skoropads'kyi ne ye masonom," Dilo LIV:85
(L'viv, 5.IV.1933), p. 2.

- 1935 -

28.XII: to Vasyl' Mastsiukh, Apostolic Administrator of the Lemkian region
("Duzhe serdechno diakuiu...").
R: Przemyskie Zapiski Historyczne III (Peremyshl', 1985),
pp. 201-205.
26.XII: to Cardinal Eugène Tisserant ("Agr??ez mes remerciements...").


7.VII: to Andrii Mel'nyk, leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists ("Tsile ukra?ns'ke hromadianstvo...").


13.VII: to Vasyl' Hlibovyts'kyi ("Distav dua lysty...").

R: Pan'kivs'kyi (1957), pp. 51, 131.

22.VII: (protest) to Adolf Hitler ("Auf die Ger?chte...").


See also the protest telegram of the Ukrainian National Council to Rosenberg and Ribbentrop, "Der Ukrainische Nationalrat zu Lemberg...", in Ilnyts'kyi, Vol. 2, (1958), p. 214. The telegram was signed by all the members of the National Council.

And see the message of the Ukrainian Council of Senators to the German government, "Der Ukrainische Seniorenrat in Lemberg...", /Nahurs'kyi/, "Die Trag?die," (1952), p. 10. The message was signed by 17 members of the Council of Senators.

30.VIII: to Monsignor Angelo Rotta, nuncio in Budapest ("Les autorités allemandes...").

R: ADSS I, pp. 437-442.
7.XI: to Monsignor Angelo Rotta ("Je reçois la lettre dans laquelle...").

R: ADSS I, pp. 491-493.

28.1: to Col M. Rybachuk, head of the Church Council in Kiev
(Pozwoliu sobi pereslaty...").

n.106.


24.III: to Cardinal Tisserant ("Permettez-moi, Eminence...").

R: ADSS II, pp. 552-556.

29-31.VIII: to Pope Pius XII ("Je n'ai pas écrit...").

R: ADSS II, pp. 625-629.

Tr (Polish, excerpts): Mauryca Prozor, "Stare i nowe w polskiej legendzie o Metropolicie A. Szeptyckim," ("Nie pisa-
Tr (Ukrainian): "Ya ne pysav..." in Bohoslovia 51 (Rome,

3.IX: to Cardinal Eugène Tisserant.

R (excerpt): Eugène Tisserant, L'Eglise militante (Paris:

14.IX: to Pope Pius XII ("Je reçois la lettre si pleine...").


15.X: to Oleksander Ohloblyn ("Vash lyst z 29.IX...").

R: Oleksander Ohloblyn, "Velykii i Svitlii Pamiati Metrop-
olyta Andrei Sheptyts'koho," in C2-61, p. 65. (N.B.: the same article reprints two other short notes from the Metropolitan to Ohloblyn, dated 27.XII.1943 and 11.III.1944.
Ibid., pp. 67-69).

- 1943 -

17.II: to Petro Werhun, apostolic visitator for Germany (**"Tutesthni namets'kyi uriad..."**).


8.V: to Cardinal Tisserant (**"Aujourd'hui nous est parvenue..."**).

R: ADSS II, pp. 790-791.

12.VI: to Cardinal Maglione (**"Dominus Malvezzi..."**).

R: ADSS II, pp. 811.

14.VIII: Unpublished, to Cardinal Eugène Tisserant: **"Exarchat de Russie Blanche"** (**"Après de longs mois..."**).


- 1944 -

18.III: Unpublished, to Cardinal Eugène Tisserant: Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (**"Pardonnez-moi de vous incommoder..."**).

The Mykola Lebed Collection, Archives of the General Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, Ukrains'ka Holovna Vyzvol'na Rada (Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council), Yonkers, New York.


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X: to Joseph Stalin.


N.B.: Soviet sources such as PPU, Dmytruk and Danylenko make no mention of this document.
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