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CRIME, TERRORISM and IDEOLOGY:
an analysis of Ronald Reagan's discourse on terrorism
from 1981 through 1986

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ABSTRACT

The author undertakes an analysis of former United States President Ronald Reagan’s discourse on the subject of terrorism between 1981 and 1986, with a focus on the ideological themes used to describe terrorism and terrorists. After outlining the Reagan administration’s response to major terrorist events and some of its key policy developments over the study period, the author discusses the nature of ideology and some of the ways that it is signified.

It is observed that "terrorism" undergoes a number of both complementary and contradictory thematic transformations in Reagan’s discourse, involving notions of warfare, criminal justice, democracy and Western civilisation, among others. It is further observed that the former president made continued eclectic use of these themes in his discussion of terrorism, and that changes in the levels of application of certain themes often coincided with major events. More generally, Reagan’s signification of "terrorism" is found to resemble the form that the signification of a "moral panic" assumes, as has been discussed by Stanley Cohen, but only provides a limited basis for the suggestion that a "crisis or order" is being signified in the sense that Stuart Hall and his colleagues discussed that concept in their work, Policing the Crisis.

These observations are seen to emphasise the need for research addressing the relationship between policy makers and their audiences, and specifically, tackling the questions of why certain control options are resorted to at specific junctures and why politicians say what they do, when they do.
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INTRODUCTION

Terrorism has been an important issue in the liberal democracies for at least the last fifteen years. In the United States, the issue's political profile increased substantially with the election of Ronald Reagan as President in 1980. President Reagan's election took place at a time when governments considered conservative and essentially like-minded had been or would be returned in Great Britain, West Germany and Canada. Alexander Haig, President Reagan's first Secretary of State, emphasised in January 1981 that the new administration's main foreign policy concern was to be combating "international terrorism", whereas in his view that of the previous Carter administration had been human rights.

Terrorism is also an issue that receives a great deal of media attention stemming primarily from its political dimension and its violent, sensational nature. One may therefore be assured that if top-level politicians make terrorism their cause celebre the mass media will give the topic a good deal of notice. As the head of what is still the most powerful and influential nation in the world, President Reagan was one of the most vocal and politically significant sources of discourse on the topic of terrorism.
This thesis set off to examine President Reagan's terrorism discourse from 1981 through 1986, with a focus on the nature of ideology and its political significance. A concrete baseline against which one may evaluate Reagan's discourse is furnished in Chapter I, in the form of an historical sketch of major terrorist incidents, issues and policy shifts in the six years being discussed. The theoretical foundation for the analysis is developed in Chapter II, in a review of several important works on ideology and its expression in liberal-democratic politics.

Chapter III details the method of analysis. Here, a means of classifying the variable linguistic transformations that the subject of "terrorism" undergoes in Reagan's statements is afforded. This sets the agenda for the analysis of Reagan's discourse.

There have been a number of notable analyses of the themes and conceptual models used in public discourse, both generally (e.g. Cohen, 1980; Hall et al., 1978) and specific to the topic of terrorism (e.g. Crenstien, 1987a; Crenstien, 1987c; Rubenstein, 1987), all of which stress the importance of understanding the conceptual machinery that justifies state response to deviant activity. Ideas of "democracy", of "crime and justice", or of "warfare" in discussions of terrorism therefore represent models to be used in the pursuit of social and political control. The use of themes such as these by President Reagan and other
politicians in their discourse creates images of the deviants, be they "terrorists" or "robbers" or "communists", which, quite expectedly, are consistent with the state's desire to combat legitimately the threat posed by the deviants to the political and economic interests of the nation-state.

The dissection and analysis of Reagan's statements is undertaken in Chapter IV, and has four strands: a discussion of the source of the data and its quantitative characteristics; an inspection of the themes Reagan uses and their political implications; an examination of conceptual overlap and contradiction between these themes; and finally, a look at the qualities of the general treatment Reagan gives "terrorism". In this last sense, Reagan's terrorism discourse will be compared with that characterising a "crisis of order" and "moral panic", as described by Hall et al. (1978) and Cohen (1980), respectively.

The concluding Chapter resumes the material and explores its implications for further research.

The importance of ideology and morality in both national and international politics has been recognised for some time. The French philosopher Henri Saint Simon predicted in the nineteenth century that if the burgeoning industrialist order of Europe was to survive, it would need to develop an international moral order similar to that earlier provided to feudalism by the Holy Roman Catholic
Church. In a similar fashion, Reagan's discourse on terrorism may be viewed as a part of a moral campaign designed to promote American hegemony and interests in the world system, and to aid in the maintenance of order in the American state.

If this is so then terrorism, as a phenomenon projected in American policy, is essentially an ideological "reality". In this view, "terrorism" is being selectively defined by that country's executive. This selective and ideological definition helps the American state deal legitimately with the challenges to its dominance and authority represented by "terrorism", as well as helping it respond to political criticisms and the demands imposed by crisis situations.

When President Reagan speaks of terrorism, his remarks are almost entirely restricted to its "international" variant. The label "international", or its sister term "transnational", is used because the "terrorists" of which Reagan speaks are alleged to engage in or support activity that crosses national boundaries. From the perspective of the United States, this form of terrorism is a worldwide phenomenon held together by a complex web of state and substate alliances and sponsorships. It is not the same as terrorism practiced within a nation by indigenous groups seeking to address the domestic political condition. Instead, it is terrorism with its origins outside the target nation. The American government has been primarily concerned with
this "international" or "transnational" variety of terrorism over the last decade. In this connection, prominent American journalists have recently commented that domestic terrorism is almost a moot issue in modern American politics (Buckelew, 1984).

While addressing the Heritage Foundation on the 22nd of April, 1986, President Reagan stated, "Ideas do have consequences, rhetoric is policy, and words are action". Indeed, the President could not have been more accurate — words are not only "action", but they are ideology in action. Political discourse on topics such as terrorism represents part of the ideological component of social, political and economic developments. Concepts and models used in discourse have an impact here, where ideas are translated and materialised as political practice. Yet conjunctural analyses of the political, economic and ideological determinants behind the issue of terrorism are lacking in the literature.

Most terrorism research is polemic and bogged down in the definitional debate, based almost entirely on media generated material, or descriptive in terms of trends in "terrorist" activity. Questions are usually asked along the lines of, "What do we do about terrorism and how?", instead of "Why the issue of terrorism, and why the issue as it is defined at the current juncture?". Max Weber brought our attention to this point in his seminal article, "Objectivity in the Social Sciences and Social Policy", originally
published in 1904. There, he states,

"It is self-evident that one of the most important
tasks of every science of cultural life is to arrive at
a rational understanding of [the] ideas for which men
either really or allegedly struggle" (1949: 53-54).

By tracing the thematic developments in Reagan’s discourse
and commenting on its overall character, this thesis will
detail one segment of the ideological dimension of modern
American and world politics, i.e. of the realm of ideas and
the concepts used in the politics surrounding the control of
"terrorism". Before proceeding in this direction, it is
helpful to understand the nature of terrorism and how the
American state has reacted to it. These are the topics
addressed in the next chapter.
I

TERRORISM, AND THE AMERICAN RESPONSE

The Nature of Terrorism

There are many forms of terrorism, and broad disagreement exists in secular and academic literature concerning the scope and nature of the "right definition". For their part, institutions of social control tend to define terrorism as a reflection of their own mandate: police agencies define terrorism as a form of criminal extremism, intelligence organisations as a type of violent subversion, and military establishments as a class of insurgent warfare. Alex Schmid, an acknowledged expert in the area of definition, has recently written that there is likely no "true or correct definition" (1983:110). Similarly, Yonah Alexander has stated that terrorism is "... difficult - and probably pointless - to define..." (1979: 59). The definition of an issue as politically sensitive as terrorism is understandably problematic, with the level of difficulty being reflected by the intensely pejorative nature of the term. Terrorism is a label one applies to the activities of one's foes. In spite of such gloomy prognoses, some conceptual boundaries may be traced.

A basic conceptual dichotomy which helps one to classify terrorism is that between "agitational" and
"enforcement" terrorism (Thornton, 1964:72). Thornton briefly describes these two forms as "enforcement (or counter) terror launched by those in power and agitational terror to describe terroristic acts committed by those aspiring to power" (Ibid). Here, the phrase "counter terror" being equated with enforcement terror implies that the relatively powerful only react to agitational terrorism. Walter (1969) has shown that this is not necessarily the case: as we see today in some Central and South American states, government may be based upon the systematic, not reactionary, use of terror (cf. Herman, 1985; Chomsky and Herman, 1979).

The writer offers the following definition of terrorism. Terrorism is a form of violent political conflict characterised by a triadic relationship between the terrorist, the targets of violence, and the targets of political communication. It requires the use or threat of direct physical violence upon symbolic (and sometimes also strategic) targets; the physical violence/threat, with its symbolic character, communicates with wider audiences; this communication is the result of the psychological violence flowing from the direct physical violence; and this psychological violence is the distinguishing feature and objective of an act of terrorism. From the psychological violence come the reactions of the targets of political
communication. This definition may be diagrammatically represented in the manner below.

Figure 1

THE TRIAD OF TERRORISM*

1) Act/Threat of Violence

Terrorist

Target(s) of Violence

Target(s) of Political Communication

2) Mass Communication of 1)

3) Response

*This triadic concept originates from Schmid's "Triangle of Insurgent Terrorism" (1983: 91).

As a means of political communication, terrorism is engineered to compel "allegiance or compliance" (Crenstien, 1987:6). Crenshaw-Hutchinson (1972:387) suggests that terrorism is usually used when the terrorist lacks the "legitimate" power to achieve its goals. Thus, when a political entity uses terrorism, be it a state or a small group of individuals, it must try to forecast the "psychological and political response" of the targets of political communication (Ibid: 397). Since prediction in the area of human behaviour is always an uncertain venture, the use of terrorism involves risks. Anything may result
from terroristic acts. The terrorist may increase his constituency by effectively communicating his point of view and/or he may coerce compliance with respect to the issues he seeks to address. Conversely, the terrorist may alienate potential allies due to a perceived excess in the use of violence, and therefore reduce his political constituency. Terrorists need to generate moral support for these reasons. In struggles for power and dominance every party and group makes claims to moral superiority in order to increase its political legitimacy.

The importance of ideology in social and political conflict, and of its social-psychological effect of generating consent or agreement in perspective among the masses, are tied in here. As a socially disseminated entity, dominant ideology affects individual perception on a mass scale, and thus legitimizes the actions of the state by cloaking political issues with morality. A population needs to be actively convinced of the legitimacy of the state. Thus, culturally specific notions of morality, legality, or of legitimacy and illegitimacy in general, are central features in the process of social and political conflict. The introduction of such notions into the political arena is a fundamental means by which state activity is justified and made to appear in the popular interest (cf. Hall et al., 1978; Gramsci, 1973). In the practical terms of everyday politics, there is a variety of modes of control which the state may
draw upon in response to the terrorist threat, such as law enforcement agencies, intelligence services or the military. We shall see that Reagan makes use of a number of themes and control concepts in his ideological transformation of those whom he and his administration choose to define "terrorist" into legitimate objects of state control efforts.

Responding to Terrorism - Nixon to Carter

The dominant conception of "terrorism" in the United States has changed over time, although it has always confined itself to the insurgent or agitational variety. In the 1960s and early 1970s, during the period of the Cultural Revolution and the war in Vietnam, Americans experienced a good deal of domestic political violence. The primary sources of this violence were radical groups such as the Weather Underground, the Black Panthers, and the Symbionese Liberation Army. Other liberal democracies had similar problems around this time. Referring to political disruptions in Greece and Portugal, the critical political theorist Nicos Poulantzas labelled the period the "crisis of the dictatorships" (1976).

America's northern neighbour, Canada, had the nationalist-separatist group the Front de liberation du Quebec raising concerns in the government and terrorizing a good portion of the population in the Province of Quebec. This case culminated in the peacetime application of the War Measures act in October of 1970. In France, the government
was nearly overthrown in 1968 by student revolutionaries, and was only restored when political compromise narrowly averted full scale anarchy. One may locate the origin of recent and contemporary "Euroterrorism", practiced by groups such as the German Red Army Faction and Action Directe in France, in this tumultuous period. In response to the bombings, kidnappings, and other (often non-violent) activities of such groups, notable actions of the American state included the 1970 political trial of nine radical leaders in Chicago, and the tragic wounding and killing of student demonstrators by National Guardsmen that same year at Kent State University.

In 1972 Richard Nixon was elected President on a platform promising stringent measures against domestic terrorism and political radicalism, and the restoration of internal order. Eventually, during the 1974 Watergate scandal, it was discovered that his administration had created vast domestic intelligence services to monitor potential threats and to secure the arrest of known activists. Measures undertaken by federal agents were found to have gone beyond the constitutional limits of their parent agencies (e.g. the F.B.I. or the C.I.A.); this was a major factor discrediting Nixon before his near impeachment and subsequent resignation.

With respect to international terrorism, the Nixon administration's first important act came in response to the September, 1972, Munich Olympic crisis where a Palestine
Liberation Organization faction ("Black September") killed nine Israeli athletes. Nixon introduced the "no-concessions policy" at that time, which to this date has been formally maintained (with exceptions in practice). In addition to this policy, a Presidential Memorandum signed on the 25th of September led to the formation of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. The Committee met only once, on October 2nd, 1972. The real work in the American counter terrorism program was done by the Interagency Workgroup on Terrorism, which held biweekly meetings. It provided a forum for the formation of counter terrorism policy and a means of liaising with other governments.

Ford was tested in the area of foreign policy soon after he took over the administration from Nixon. The recently formed communist government in Cambodia seized an American merchant ship and crew, claiming its territorial waters had been violated. Consistent with his predecessor's no concession policy, Ford responded to this action by ordering a military assault, which resulted in the ship and crew being released. The Vietnamese war was over when Ford took office, and domestic political tensions had eased considerably. Ford was therefore able to dismantle the domestic intelligence structures erected under the Nixon administration. In a number of instances, both in Ford's and later Carter's administration, a no-concessions policy was adhered to, and resulted in the deaths of several U.S.
diplomats that had been taken hostage in Central and South American nations (Buckelew, 1984:16-18). American intransigence was met with grim response in these cases. No significant changes in counter-terrorism policy occurred during Ford's term in office.

Carter's administration was characterised by a further formalising and centralising of the federal response structure for terrorism. The Special Coordination Committee, under the National Security Council and chaired at the time by Zbigniew Brezinski, topped a hierarchy of support committees designed to develop policy and deal with specific terrorist incidents. The Committee took over the role formerly filled by the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. Representatives on the Special Committee came from various departments or Agencies (e.g. Departments of Justice, State, or Defense, and the F.B.I. and the C.I.A.), and were each given specific mandates concerning their body's role in counter-terrorist activities. The Working Group on Terrorism continued to meet through Carter's term, as it does to the present day.

The crisis for the Carter administration came with the 1979-81 Teheran hostage-taking incident in which Americans were held by the new Khomeni regime which sought the return of assets frozen by the U.S. The Khomeni regime replaced that of the Shah of Iran, a former U.S. ally. The political fate of the Carter administration was probably sealed late in
1979 when eight American soldiers lost their lives in a failed attempt to rescue the hostages (Celmer, 1987: 23). Although Carter never actually breached the no-concessions policy in the Teheran case, the entire incident reflected negatively on the administration and implied a certain impotence. The Republican candidate, Ronald Reagan, was quick to capitalise on this; the release of the hostages shortly after then-President Reagan was sworn into office confirmed the impression of Carter's impotence, and Reagan's resolve to take a firm stand against terrorism.

Responding to Terrorism: The Reagan Administration

As did Nixon, Reagan came into office on a conservative, law and order style campaign. This was also the case for Reagan in his election as governor of the state of California in 1969, when he highlighted the need for order in the face of open riots in Watts and other areas of the city of Los Angeles. In his election as President, the focus had shifted from domestic to external foes; specifically, to "international terrorism" in its various forms (cf. Buckelew, 1984: Ch.2; Celmer, 1987: 24). One explanation for the decline in importance of both the issue and practice of domestic terrorism in America is that popular political "backlash", in reaction to the violence of domestic terrorism as it was experienced by the Americans in the late 1960s and early 1970s, effectively removed the potential for
insurgents realising a significant political constituency (Ross and Gurr, 1987:12).

Reagan, as had his predecessors, emphasised an executive/Cabinet response to terrorism by having working groups report directly to the president, but the focus was unquestionably on "international terrorism". This new focus has included legislation targeting "international" terrorism being introduced by the White House and passed by both Houses of Congress (e.g. the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism). Contrasting the pre-Nixon and Nixon era, the focus is now on the "outlaw states" involved in "sponsoring criminal terrorists" who "wage a war on humanity", as Reagan would put it.

When his administration's foreign policy agenda was finalised in early 1982, Reagan directed that the mandate of the Special Coordination Committee be given to the Senior Interagency Workgroup for Foreign Policy, which is chaired by the Secretary of State (initially Alexander Haig, and finally George Schultz). Also important in the Reagan counter terrorism program is the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism. The IGT replaced the Executive Committee on Terrorism, with the addition of members from the Office of the Vice-President and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

President Reagan and his administration have been accused of lacking an understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism, and of failing to respond in an efficient,
responsible manner to terrorist incidents. The bold front presented by Reagan and his supporters in his presidential campaign and during his first year in office may be contrasted with an essentially passive response to terrorism by the American government through 1984; correspondingly, the American bombing of Libya in April of 1986 contradicts the negotiations and arms dealings American agents entered into later that year with the "terrorist" government of Iran to secure the release of hostages in Lebanon. Such contradictions suggest, as Kellett politely puts it, a certain "ambivalence" in the American counter terrorism program (1988: 38). Celmer is more critical, and accuses the Reagan administration of taking a "disjointed and ad hoc approach" (1987: 27). Livingstone and Arnold concur generally on this point, stating that

"...it is fair to suggest that there is an improvised, even jerry-built, quality to the strategies that have evolved to date in Western democracies for combating terrorism" (1986).

We shall attempt in Chapter IV to determine if Reagan's terrorism discourse reflects these observations.

A good way to illustrate Reagan's response to terrorism is to point out the major terrorism-related issues he faced from 1981 to 1986 and some of the major developments in his counter terrorism policy. This also provides a real-life baseline against which one may evaluate Reagan's discourse in later chapters. Six incidents have been selected as "major". The first five were focal points in Reagan's discourse, and
the sixth was an issue relating to the American fight against terrorism which brought the legitimacy of the Reagan administration's counter terrorism operations into question.

Chronologically, the incidents are as follows: 1) the release of American hostages which had been held by the Khomeni Regime for 444 days at the United States embassy in Teheran, from November, 1979 to January, 1981; 2) the suicide attack of late October, 1983, by Shiite "terrorists" upon the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon; 3) the hijacking of Trans World Airline's flight 847 over the Mediterranean in June of 1985; 4) the October, 1985, hijacking of the Italian cruiseship, Achille Lauro, upon which were a large number of American passengers; 5) an American response to "terrorism", the bombing of the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi by U.S. military forces in mid-April of 1986; and 6) the Iran-Contragate scandal, where it has been alleged that President Reagan or his administration broke the "no-concessions policy" and sold arms to a government supporting terrorists (Iran), and then diverted the proceeds from this sale to Nicaraguan Contras in violation of the dictates of Congress.

The 52 Americans being held hostage in Teheran had been captives for 444 days until their release on January 21, 1981 (the day prior to Reagan's inauguration). The release was aided by the mediation of Algerian Muslims, who had a good deal of influence with the Iranians. Before the release, the fate of the hostages was in the hands of the newly formed
Iranian Majlis (parliament), and their return to America was bogged down by this institution's inability to operate smoothly, which itself reflected the unstable political situation in Iran. There also existed the complex problems of determining how to deal with the assets of the recently deposed Shah and with suits filed by the United States in the International Court against Iran. At the same time, it needed to be determined whether the new Iranian government would ensure the payment of monies owed American banks. Any release of the hostages was complicated by the need to resolve not only these difficult issues, but also by the unstable political environment in Iran.

The presence of the hostages in Iran during the consolidation period of the Islamic revolution likely provided a set of politically useful hate-objects for the incumbent Khomeini regime. The impression that Carter was incapable of handling the crisis was probably magnified when eight soldiers lost their lives in a helicopter crash during a failed attempt at rescuing the hostages, as previously discussed. Back in the United States, the group of hostages seemed to personify America, as seen in the nightly television coverage on ABC, entitled "America Held Hostage". Eventually, Algerian influence combined with the pressure generated by economic sanctions imposed by the U.S., Japan, and the nine E.E.C. nations led to a bargain being struck and the hostages being released. Until the 1983 bombing in
Beirut, relative calm ensued.

The American and French forces stationed in Lebanon at the time of the bombing of the Marine barracks were there on a "peace keeping" mission, trying to provide stability for the recently formed Gemeyal government, which, at best, had a tenuous hold on the reins of power in Lebanon. The bombing occurred on October 23rd, 1985. Even though almost three hundred American and French soldiers combined were killed, the bombing did not capture the attention of the American public for long. Only two days after the slaughter in Lebanon, the United States launched its successful invasion of the island of Grenada, which, according to American intelligence reports, was controlled by an ultra-leftist pro-Cuban faction of the recently formed government. The writer's review of Time, Newsweek and the Washington Post showed that the coverage of the Beirut bombing all but disappeared when the Grenada case surfaced. Based on this, the common sense conclusion is that the Grenada invasion, a "victory for democracy over communist expansionism", deflected attention from the bitter defeat in Lebanon. As one analyst put it, Reagan "is an intuitive politician, and his intuitions were clearly on target in the decision to launch the Grenada operation at the time of the marine casualties in Lebanon" (Bell, 1985:505). While the Americans made no attempt at retribution for the Lebanon massacre, French forces bombed the Lebanese city of Baalbek a few days
later in retaliation for their losses (about 50 soldiers).

On December 4th, 1981, Reagan had issued Executive Order number 12333, which started the process of defining and directing the American response to "international terrorism" and, more specifically, the activities of American intelligence services in foreign arenas. This superceded Executive Order number 12036 issued by past-President Carter. Part of E.O. 12333 deals with differentiating between "counter intelligence" operations and "special activities". The former includes information gathering to protect against foreign sponsored activities, espionage and similar actions hostile to American interests: this, then, is an essentially reactive or passive approach. What are defined in the order as "special activities", on the other hand, are aggressive attempts at waging foreign policy, colloquially called "covert actions". These actions are designed for plausible denial by the American government. On April 3rd, 1984, almost thirty months after the pronouncement of E.O. 12333, came the signing of the National Security Decision Directive number 138 (NSDD 138). The Directive reiterated and underscored American commitment in principle to active measures in the battle against "international terrorism".

Consistent with this statement of principle, NSDD 138 emphasises the use of "self help" actions, including special activities, economic sanctions against nations sponsoring terrorists, and military operations to "prevent and/or deter
possible terrorist actions or to rescue Americans being held hostage" (Celmer, 1987: 3). The Directive also underlines the administration's commitment to pursue these unilateral measures in conjunction with bilateral agreements, the former being favoured in principle over the latter, and the latter being favoured over multilateral efforts. The June 25th, 1985, signing of the bilateral Supplementary Extradition Treaty by the United States and the United Kingdom was consistent with the directions outlined in NSDD 138. It should be noted that the Reagan administration chose to actively support preexisting multilateral arrangements, such as those respecting civil aviation negotiated in the late sixties and early seventies (e.g. the 1970 Convention drafted in Montreal, Canada).

Up until the signing of the Supplemental Treaty with the United Kingdom, the Americans had a policy of following the international tradition of refusing to extradite persons to a nation in which they were wanted for "politically motivated" offenses. The 1985 treaty stipulates that both nations will now regard many acts common to "terrorists", such as hijacking, kidnapping, the use of explosives in the commission of a criminal offence, or murder, as simple criminal acts regardless of the motivation of the offending individual. This agreement, as does the process of extradition in general, involves mixed models of control. Politics is a very important element as the final authority
to make extradition decisions ultimately resides with the President and the Prime Minister (cf. Pyle, 1986). At the same time, the extradition process is engaged to facilitate the use of the domestic criminal justice system. One therefore has diplomacy and criminal justice as overlapping solutions in the process of extradition.

The successful negotiation of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom was as important politically for Reagan as it was a potentially practical instrument. When, on September 20th, 1984, the United States became the victim of another terrorist bombing in Lebanon, the third in a seventeen month period¹, the American media began to criticise Reagan for his response to terrorism, or his lack of the same. The Philadelphia Enquirer, for example, carried a story in its October 2nd edition that stated, "...this is, in the most direct and practical sense, an administration that neither heeds the mistakes it makes or knows how to learn from them." The situation was no better in May of 1985, when the CIA was linked to a Lebanese counter terrorist unit that exploded a car-bomb in Beirut. Even though top CIA officials and the President denied supporting

¹ The first bomb exploded in April of 1983, outside the United States Embassy in Beirut; 63 people were killed, 17 of them American. The second bombing was the massive explosion at the Beirut Marine barracks in October of that year, as previously discussed. The incident in September involved a second bombing of the United States Embassy annex; approximately eighty people, this time eighteen of them Americans, were killed or injured.
the action, it was clear that the group was trained and funded by the Agency.

One again began to find the now almost familiar accusation that Reagan and his administration were not capable of an effective and coordinated response to the "terrorist" problem. A Cleveland newspaper, The Plain Dealer, stated simply, "It is obvious... that this administration is not clear at the moment on how this growing menace should be met" (May 16, 1985). As well as coming in the wake of these developments, the Extradition Treaty was signed as the hijacking of Trans World Airlines flight 847 was coming to a close. Reagan seemed be exercising his "intuition" as he had in deciding to launch the Grenada invasion a few short days after the Beirut Marine barracks disaster.

The TWA incident, as we shall see, had important effects respecting how the American public perceived terrorism. It was almost two years after the massacre at the Marine barracks in Lebanon, and now nearly four years after the hostage drama in Iran when the world witnessed the TWA hijacking. Flight 847 was en route from Athens, and was hijacked by Shiite "terrorists" who forced the plane to land in Beirut. Most of the passengers were American tourists. While in Beirut, the Shiites made known their demands: that Israel release hundreds of PLO members being held as "prisoners of war", that Arab nations stop supplying the West with oil, and that the international community formally
condemn American and Israeli activities in the Middle East.

To prove they were serious, the hijackers shot and killed a young Navy special forces diver who was on board the plane. The incident continued for weeks, the first few days of which were spent hopping across the North rim of Africa in the plane, making stops to refuel and to allow the "terrorists" a chance to reformulate demands. A handful of passengers had been released in Beirut, but when the aircraft returned to that city, the majority found themselves taken to the southern suburbs and hidden away from Western eyes. They were now in the hands of moderates, who, under the influence of the Syrian government, had wrested control from the original hijackers. Syrian officials proved to be instrumental in facilitating the release of the hostages on June 30th.

As one journalist observed, this incident captured the attention of Americans as nothing had before, because it "showed that Islamic terrorism was not just an aberration that harmed diplomats and Marines half a world away" (Levin, 1985:27). Terrorism was no longer something one only talked and read about; it became something that "everyday" Americans could legitimately start to worry about. The mass media role in forming such perceptions is central to this hegemonic process. It will be interesting to see if the discussion of the victimisation of private citizens is a strong current in Reagan's terrorism discourse.
Following on the heels of the T.W.A. incident was another shocking case - the October 1985 hijacking by Palestinian "terrorists" of an Italian cruiseship, the Achille Lauro. Again, a good portion of the passengers were American. This hijacking was not a planned event, only developing when a crew member happened upon the "terrorists" while they were checking their weapons in their cabin. Thus forced into the hijacking situation, the culprits looked for a way out of the situation they had created; their first choice, Syria, denied the ship entry to its ports. In reaction to this denial, another life was taken - that of Leon Klinghoffer - an elderly man confined to a wheelchair. Four days after the hijacking first occurred, the ship made its way back to Egypt where that nation's government arranged for the "terrorists" to be taken from Egypt on an Egypt Air jetliner, presumably to someplace that would accept them. The getaway plane was quickly intercepted by U.S. F-14 fighters and forced to land at an Italian airbase on Sicily.

The perception at the moment was that America had finally won one against "terrorism". President Reagan stated, "You can run, but you can't hide". It seemed the United States could finally ensure that "terrorists are prosecuted and punished for their crimes", as Reagan vowed during a press conference celebrating the apprehension of the terrorists (October 11th, 1985). Shortly after, while it still appeared the Americans had captured their prey and had
only to wait for their extradition, the United States Department of State announced the offering of rewards of up to $250,000 for information leading to the arrest of persons connected to either the TWA hijacking or the hijacking on December 4th, 1984, of Kuwaiti Airlines flight 221 to Teheran, where two Americans were murdered.

However, as the world saw, American attempts at extraditing the offenders and their ringleader (Abul Abbas), who had joined them on the plane in Egypt, were unsuccessful. The Italian Prime Minister, Bettino Craxi, maintained that Italian courts had jurisdiction. And only two days after the "terrorists" were in Italy, Abbas, the individual who the Americans most wanted for extradition, was allowed to slip away on a Yugoslav jetliner. Craxi, who resigned in the wake of his handling of this incident, apparently feared reprisals and/or the cut-off of oil supplies from Arab nations if he had acted otherwise. In the end, what first appeared to be a victory for the United States became a futile attempt at bringing "terrorists" to trial for "acts of piracy and murder". Reagan was, by now, having great difficulty in avoiding the impression of impotence that afflicted the Carter administration in its handling of the Iran hostage crisis. Reagan’s negotiation of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty with Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain represented an attempt at circumventing the political difficulties associated with extradition, such as
those encountered in the Achille Lauro affair.

The Reagan administration had to be embarrassed with its continuing defeats; criticism for talking big and putting out little pervaded the media at home. *Newsweek* reporter Angus Deming's comment that "so far there is no big stick behind his tough talk" was typical (1985:16). Even earlier, political commentators had made what were perhaps more damning criticisms. Bell, for example, noted the sharp discrepancy between stated intention and policy moves:

My point is merely the disparity between the declaratory signal: "This is interpreted by us as a vital interest", and the operational message that the U.S. can ultimately sail away with (1985: 499).

The direct implication here was not only that Reagan was failing to meet his rhetoric in practice, but more importantly that he could not realistically have hoped to do so.

With criticisms mounting, the United States finally responded to the "terrorist" problem, and in a dramatic fashion. On April 15th, 1986, U.S. Navy F-14 fighter-bombers struck the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. The attack spanned the brief period of eleven and one half minutes. Before the bombings, Reagan had declared Libyan leader Moammar Khaddafii to be the conductor of the "international terrorist" symphony, and Libya to be the key "state-sponsor". In the demonology of Reagan's terrorism discourse, Khaddafii was evil personified. Then-Secretary of State
Schultz's comment that the American forces were attacking the "nerve center" of terrorism was consistent with the American depiction of Khaddafi as the mastermind behind "international", and especially anti-American "terrorism".

The bombing of Libya was not supported in the international community, with the exceptions of Britain (from where the planes which hit Tripoli originated), Israel and Canada. The attacks destroyed both military and civilian property, left hundreds dead (including Khaddafi's daughter) and an indeterminate number injured. Regardless of the moral and political repercussions the raid generated, Reagan's bold and threatening rhetoric was now matched with concrete response. The basis for such action had been in place at least since April, 1984, with the signing of NSDD 138. To recapitulate: the Achille Lauro, T.W.A. and Kuwaiti Airlines hijackers had all escaped sanction, and up until the Libyan raid, Reagan's promised policy of "swift and effective retribution" (January 27th, 1981), made shortly after the closure of the Iran hostage crisis, and his commitment to "deal justice" to those responsible for the 1983 bombing in Beirut, had been left unsatisfied (cf. Chaze, 1985:19).

Whether or not America had actually struck out at the source of anti-U.S. terrorism, and many suggested and are still suggesting that Syria or Iran would have been a better selection (e.g. Chomsky, 1987:117), the symbolic act undoubtedly cleared the conscience of those in the Reagan
administration. Perhaps it also made the American public feel less helpless in the face of the "terrorist menace" of which they had heard and read so much. In this connection, the raid on Libya was strongly supported by the American people. A poll presented in *Time* on April 28th showed that 71% of Americans favoured the action, 20% were opposed, and 9% uncertain (Church, 1986:22). Even though Libya was a "soft target", Reagan's administration showed a willingness to do something about "terrorism". The same can be said with respect to the Grenada invasion, where "no one doubted the U.S. capability" to act (Bell, 1985: 505). The victory in both cases was found in the government's decision to take action, even though the opponents were hardly worthy.

The Reagan administration justified the raid in Libya under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, as a response to the bombing of a West German bar which was frequented by American military personnel. Article 51 allows for self defense "if an armed attack occurs upon a member" (in Goodrich, et al., 1969), i.e. if an act of war is undertaken against a state. Given this justification, the Libyan episode appeared to be an act of limited warfare in response to an act of war (although no attack occurred against the American state, *per se*). The United States bridged the symbolic void of terrorism (between the Target of Violence and the Target of Political Communication) by equating the bombing in West Germany to an attack on the United States.
However convincing this justification was initially, the support generated by the Libyan raid was to be shaken when the Iran-Contra affair put the legitimacy of the actions of Reagan and his administration into question.

In November of 1986, the American media picked up on a story run in the Lebanese press that reported on the (would-be) clandestine dealings of agents of the United States with the government of Iran. The negotiations sought to secure that nation's influence in achieving the release of Americans held hostage in Lebanon, and involved the diversion to Nicaraguan Contras of the profits from a covert multi-million dollar sale of arms to Iran. Dealing with Iran, one of the governments Reagan described on July 8th, 1985, as part of "this network of terrorist states ... this confederation of criminal governments", unquestionably violated the spirit of the "no concessions policy" introduced by Nixon and reaffirmed by Reagan and past presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter.\(^2\) As well, Congress had recently refused to

\(^2\) In his speech to the American Bar Association on 8 July 1985, Reagan identified the governments of Iran, Libya, Nicaragua, North Korea and Cuba as those guilty of "state terrorism", i.e. of sponsoring "international terrorists". Many observers noted the conspicuous absence of Syria, which had long been represented by the Reagan administration as one of the chief sponsors of terrorism. Some suggested at the time that Syria's aid in extricating the TWA hostages only a week before produced this omission, as a form of concession to Syria in return for her cooperation and assistance. In an October 21st, 1985, news conference as well as in his "Five Nations" speech of July 8th, Reagan accused the Soviet Union of supporting terrorist organisations and states supporting "international terrorism".
allow further funding of the Contras; the routing of profits from the sale of arms therefore appeared also to be unconstitutional.

After the conclusions of the Joint Committee of the Senate and Congress which inquired into the matter were made public, it was still not certain if Reagan knew of or controlled the affair. The majority of the blame has been placed on the shoulders of high ranking underlings, such as the late William Casey, former C.I.A. director, and Marine Lt.- Colonel Oliver North, the key operative in the affair.

**Terrorism as an Ideological Construct**

Terrorism is enigmatic as a concept. As well as posing the more academic problem of definition, it presents difficulties respecting what ideological scheme(s) should be applied to aid in its control. It is indeed difficult, given the generally unexpected nature of insurgent terrorist violence (a hallmark of terrorism in general) for a state to label the behaviour as a concerted political campaign aimed at overthrowing the state or altering the balance of power in the world system. This problem is exacerbated by difficulties in determining who is responsible for a given act, as false claims are often made, or no claims at all. At the same time, it is difficult for the state to see terrorism as simply some sort of crime wherein lawless individuals can be caught and dealt with in a criminal justice system which
is structured to process individual offenders for having committed specific acts in a theoretically apolitical manner. The criminal justice system does not, in the Anglo-American tradition, indict a group or a class of people, nor does it generally convict persons for holding certain political values.

Terrorism confronts this process with a character which is most often clearly political, by representing challenges to the legitimacy of a socio-political order, and also collectively based, e.g. Palestine Liberation Organization terrorist activity. It is no coincidence that France has long been regarded as a "safe-haven" for terrorists, as that nation has been extremely reluctant to extradite political offenders/terrorists. The French or Continental system of justice makes room for a consideration of political motivation in sentencing. A criminal justice strategy for controlling terrorists may not be very useful in a state with such legal traditions. The international tradition is to deny requests for the extradition of "political" offenders (which many "terrorists" claim to be) to prevent show trials or political prosecutions in the home state. As noted in the previous section, actions such as those taken by Thatcher and Reagan in June of 1985 are strategic attempts at circumventing this type of tradition.

Whatever strategy(ies) politicians and policy makers choose to use, perceptions tend to be consistent with
ideological lines. If one were to poll the public, one would undoubtedly find more of a consensus that the 1970s represented what Claire Sterling (1981) has called the "Fright Decade" due to the persistent threat of international terrorism, than what Amnesty International labelled the "Decade of Torture" due to terrorist actions of various states (Buckelew, 1984:2; Quainton, 1983:52). The popular "world view", to borrow from Gramsci (1973) for a moment, is largely one that is assimilated from the "trusted" political leadership, via disseminating institutions such as the media and educational apparatus. In spite of undeniable evidence that state terrorism (by torture, executions, and disappearances, for example) claims many times the number of lives than does international terrorism, when someone speaks of terrorism it is the latter variety which comes to mind most often (Herman, 1986: cf. Crelinsten, 1987a:7,8). Crelinsten (1988) has reviewed the literature examining political, media and academic discourse on terrorism. He concludes that the material conforms to a dominant "ideological frame". Predictably, this frame is consistent with the conception of terrorism advanced by Sterling (anti-western, insurgent, and usually with a Middle-Eastern base).

The specifics of the roles played by the media and other institutions such as the police and the courts in this social process are important considerations, but they are beyond the scope of this thesis. It is sufficient to say, as
maintained by Sumner (1979), that these institutions are more powerfully and regularly exposed to (and disseminate) dominant ideologies which reinforce conditions of domination than they are to subordinate ideologies. The media itself relies on government sources for "legitimate" material (Crellisten, 1987c: especially pp. 421-422; Hall, et al., 1978: 58). Having made this observation, one now needs to confront the questions of what exactly ideology is, how it is expressed in day to day politics, and how it connects to notions of political legitimacy.
II

IDEOLOGY AND ITS SIGNIFICATION

In the *German Ideology*, Marx writes that

...the state and the nation...must assert itself in its foreign relations as nationality, and inwardly must organize itself as the State (1973).

In spite of Marx's apparent desire to bifurcate the study of politics into the study of the "state and the nation", the state (in general) is at once an international and domestic entity. The organisation Marx refers to involves, *inter alia*, the presentation of state activity as being in the national interest. In this sense, Hall *et al.* note Gramsci's emphasis on the "organisational and connective" quality of state activity (1978:202). As will be shown, President Reagan's depiction of terrorism falls within this process. He deals with the issue of "terrorism" ideologically by signifying it in a diverse manner and portraying it as the embodiment of a number of evils.

The notion of terrorism as an ideological construct is common in the recent literature on terrorism (e.g. O'Sullivan, 1986; Nef, 1986; Said, 1986). However, most studies analyse media generated material and prefer descriptive rather than theoretical approaches (cf. Ross, 1988). One of the ways that President Reagan might signify terrorism is to transform conceptions of
terrorism in his discourse, and effectively project the "nationality" of the American nation inward by creating an external adversary in terrorists and the states which sponsor "international terrorism". At the same time, he might assert the state's nationhood in an outward manner, reflecting the American state's role as an international entity competing in the global context. An inward expression of nationality is not peculiar to terrorism in the 1980s. In times of war, this expression is explicit: e.g. "Uncle Sam Wants You". The state is assumed to represent a national interest, and people are mobilised to protect the integrity of the state. In this sense, it is interesting, and perhaps not surprising, that Brian Jenkins (1974) has labelled international terrorism "surrogate warfare".

Most analyses of ideology and its role in politics relate their observations to a closed national system. With the increasingly complex and developed international economy, it would seem logical that indigenously based international capital and other powerful interests would seek the protection of the nation-state in their extranational endeavours as well. Accepting this as self-evident, it is clear that the ideological construction of "terrorism" in President Reagan's statements serves political purposes, whether its design is as a response to political events, or one engineered to justify future policy
directions. Part of the need for legitimising state activity arises from the fact that the state must engage its repressive apparatuses to control terrorism.

_Ideology - Its Nature and Political Roles:_

Ideology is an important element of social and political life, it is the stuff through which our values and belief systems are expressed. It is therefore properly conceived (working from Hegel's distinction) as being separate and distinct from social consciousness, with ideology being the structural components of thought, and consciousness being "general modes" (Sumner, 1979: 19). Sumner also notes that ideologies are "sentiments, illusion, [specific] modes of thought, views of life, principles, ideas, and categories" (Ibid: 12). In this most basic sense, it is being maintained that ideology is structured social consciousness, which manifests itself in political practice. This practice is both the producer and product of social consciousness, being part of a dialectical process.

Spontaneous and philosophical consciousness are the two general modes. They differ in that philosophical consciousness is characterised by meditative or reflective thought, and spontaneous consciousness involves common-sense or practical thought related to an individual's day to day needs and
experiences. In contradistinction to either mode of consciousness, ideology comprises the specifics of subjectivity by creating organised thought. In combination over time, specific political, religious, legal or other ideological forms (i.e. forms as materialised in social and political practice) help to create general modes of consciousness (Sumner, 1979: 15). In sum, the two types of social consciousness "are general modes of subjective being, [and] ideologies are specific elements or moments of social consciousness" (Ibid: 19).

Complementing this concept of ideology is the notion of an "ideological formation", which is "any form of social consciousness which is a complex admixture, serialization or systematization of ideologies" (Sumner, 1979: 19). For a specific ideology, there is the internal characteristic of a "sign": "ideology is a signification" (Ibid: 21). As social practice, it designates the "real" world into the subjective, internal reality of individual consciousness, which results in patterns of identification and recognition with respect to observed phenomena.

An ideological signifier may take many forms. It may be a word, the image produced by a motion picture or television, a sound, or any concrete form (the printed word terrorist, the word terrorist as heard over the radio, or the images of a terrorist
in a film, for example). Any signifier produces a "signified image, a concept, or an emotional impression" (Sumner, 1979: 21). As noted previously, this impression is not inconsequential; by forming perceptions, it guides our actions as social agents actively constructing a social world. Every signification is related to an independently constituted ideology. The relationship between the signifier (e.g. the word terrorist) and a signification (the images it produces in one's mind) emerges from the history of which it is a part. So an ideology is a sign, and an ideological formation a group of signs; the relationship between signs reflects past or present conditions of existence or situations. Taken in this view, one would expect state discourse to exhibit ideological adaptations which are situationally specific and crafted to meet the needs of the incident or period at hand. We shall examine Reagan's discourse on terrorism to see if this is so.

Denotative signs, as those in language, are not self supporting entities comprising pure meaning and somehow separated from the context in which they are used. Words and concepts such as "terrorism" tend to have such accepted meanings and affective qualities that it is often hard to realise that this is the case. Every word we use has risen from social practices and interaction, as a means of organising social relations, and to
facilitate effective social transactions (Sumner, 1979: 19-20). This observation is consistent with Antonio Gramsci's view that language contains a "conception of the world" which helps to guide social and political activity (1973: 35-36).

Sumner uses the following illustration to explain the subjective effect of signified ideology:

You look at a map and it tells you that after 15 miles you will reach Manchester. After 15 miles you see a sign post which says "City of Manchester" and you conclude that you are now in Manchester. You do not question the validity of the map, you do not raise cynical doubts about the sincerity of the sign post and you do not start asking passing pedestrians whether this is really Manchester. It is and that's a fact (1979: 287).

The same could be said for a person reading the daily newspaper: s/he picks up the paper, begins to read about Contra "terrorism" in Nicaragua, and has no doubt that s/he is reading about a case of terrorism. All the negative stigma and images associated with "terrorism" are imported into the reader's consciousness through this activity. As a result, dominant ideology produces a consistency in perception in the context within which it is disseminated. It makes one's environment "obviously" recognisable and sensible. This quality is crucial to understanding ideology and its role in the process of achieving political legitimacy and reproducing basic social relations (Ibid).

When someone talks or writes about terrorism, most people have a pretty good idea what is meant; a great degree of
intersubjective consistency exists due to ideological domination. The notion of ideological domination connects to Gramsci's (1973) concept of hegemony. With each, the engendered effect of state activity is one of consensus, or of agreed perception, or, minimally, of an inability to conceive in opposition to dominant ideology.

Within this view, ideologies cannot logically be conceived to exist in one's consciousness alone, but must also be seen in practice, i.e. they are signified in social practice. Various disseminating institutions impose dominant philosophies and ideologies upon the population. These disseminators, such as the media, political figures like Ronald Reagan, or perhaps the Church, are more regularly and powerfully exposed to, or produce directly, the official ideologies of the state than they do less influential, subordinate ideologies. Thus, as a matter of normal course, discourse flows along politically biased perspectives. For example, Epstein (1977) illustrates how a politically biased use of the word "terrorism" occurs in the media, with images of the phenomenon conforming to government conceptions and competing conceptions being absent. The image of terrorism in other discourse is similarly biased, as discussed in chapter I (see Chapter I, pp. 33-35).

As the signification of events fits what is actually
happening on a day to day basis, in some degree, most people can accept the validity of the ideological propositions contained in state and media discourse. Consent is therefore almost guaranteed, and the reproduction of social relations in their already constituted form continues. Linguistic forms structure our perceptions: "words are not just words", as Sumner puts it (1979: 22). Along these lines, terrorism has a distinctly socio-cultural character and meaning, a meaning which, in large part, guides responses to the phenomenon, or at least ensures a lack of dissent to state responses.

The creation of a new ideology or pattern of signification in a society is almost never completely original, but simply the use of signification by individuals in social positions with definite social relationships. There is a "ready-made stock" of labels and images available to the state in the process of defining the legitimate objects of control (Cohen, 1980: 74). Politicians therefore choose various strategic forms of signification, such as the images of "terrorism" contained in Reagan's discourse. Since the state and ideology (primarily originating from the state), are "first order determinants...of the modern social order" (Sumner, 1983:126), it is important to study political discourse.
Crises of Order and Moral Panics:

The form that the process of signifying ideology takes may vary. Hall et al. discuss the difference between discrete moral panics (single issue crises) and the process of convergence which accompanies a crisis of order (1978: 221-227). Convergence occurs when a number of moral panics about disconnected issues "run on the heels of each other" and are mapped together to "produce a general panic about social order" (Ibid: 222). This notion of mapping is interesting, and relates to Sumner's statement that "ideology maps the geography of the mind". The process of convergence is complex and requires extended signification over long periods, sometimes taking the form of a "signification spiral". This convergence or mapping of issues makes the management of consent and control of active dissent easier for the state, in so much as a need for control responses comes to be perceived by the masses.

As one method of signifying events, the signification spiral makes the events being signified appear more ominous in terms of their "threat-potential" for society (Hall et al., 1978: 225). The nature of the events themselves are not distorted. However, through the combination of convergence with other issues, calls for state action, and prophecies of doom in the case of inaction, the events take on greater significance than they realistically
represent (Ibid: 223).

According to Hall and his colleagues, convergence occurs when single-issue groups broaden their aims, when those thought of as individual deviants begin to take collective action, or when movements adopt a particularly political character where none seemed to exist before (Ibid: 224). Thus perceived, events involving these individuals or groups are signified in their most violent form, and presented as legitimate objects of social control. A consequence of this signification is that political activity is depoliticised and criminalised at the same moment. When the perception of a threat is sufficiently inculcated in the population and the need for control is widely perceived, the state may take action. In fact, state mobilisation may predate deviant behaviour, as did the activity of the British police before the 1972-73 mugging crisis (Hall et al., 1978).

The signification spiral, to be effective, must be based on not entirely imaginary relationships; there is usually an essential core of accuracy in the significations applied within the spiral. Its most profound service to social reproduction lies in the manner in which the process "amplifies" the perception of threat. By making these connections between discrete phenomena, the phenomena are no longer isolated; the threat potential of a given incident is amplified with this
amplification making control responses appear to be more clearly in the "public interest". Hall et al. (1978: 224) cite an example in illustration: the linking of student political protest and hooliganism into student - hooliganism. This is a case of "an exaggeration whose credibility ... no doubt depend[s] on its kernel of truth" (1978: 224). While some students undoubtedly engaged in violent activities in the pursuit of political goals, the implication that there is a direct correspondence between the two issues is false and misleading. We shall see if similar examples occur in Reagan's discourse on terrorism.

The process of convergence also involves a step-wise signification across three thresholds which delineate the boundaries of social acceptance: Permissiveness, Legality, and Violence (Hall et al., 1978:225). There is an evolution from moral issues and the violation of traditional mores (e.g. issues regarding sexuality), to the signification of events which violate the law and thus raise the issue of social order, to events of overt violence that implicitly represent threats to the social order because the state has the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (Ibid). This pattern of signification involves projecting the activities of various groups "across" all three thresholds (Ibid:226). The progressive and cumulative character of the signification process gives the signification spiral its
threat amplification power. Again, we shall look for similar processes in Reagan's terrorism discourse.

Just as convergence amplifies the threat of target groups and behaviours, the identification of specific folk devils and the accompanying moral panics produces what Cohen calls "a circular amplification" of perceived threat (1980: 24). Public perception, media treatment and official response mutually reinforce each other, and a group's significance becomes widely overblown.

Cohen does not develop a concept of ideological signification, but he nonetheless makes a number of important observations applying to the mechanism of labelling deviance/deviants and how this process relates to the control responses of the state. The mapping of issues characteristic of convergence does not apply in cases of discrete moral panics. Instead, one issue is signified across a number of themes. The themes may include a variety of notions from issues of morality and tradition, to those of legality and social order. For example, part of Hall et al's analysis of the creation of the 1972 mugging crisis in Britain involves illustrating how images of crime, race, and youth were applied to produce the dominant perception of the mugger (a violent male black youth) (1978: viii).
Of primary interest here is Cohen's work on the "Opinion and Attitude Themes" used to portray the Mods and Rockers in Britain during the 1960s (1980: Chapter 3). He lists three classes of themes: orientation, images and causation. An orientation theme identifies the mode of thought through which the deviance is being understood, eg. the "natural disaster analog". The images are a collection of "auxiliary status traits" that are "spurious and misleading" as to the real nature of the deviants; this causes overestimation of the threat represented by the target group (an overestimation of "threat potential" in Hall et al's formulation). Causation themes propose rational-logical explanations for the deviance, such as "it's like a disease" (Ibid: 68).

The cumulative effect of these qualitative ascriptions is to sensitise people to an issue, most often as the result of a notably violent event, say a demonstration turned violent or an airplane hijacking. The issue's significance is then overestimated and its threat extended or "diffused" from the local level to include the entire nation (Cohen, 1980: 86). Terrorism becomes a problem for America and Americans, not only for diplomats or military personnel (this process, as already shown, was found in the TWA case). By this time, the control culture is responding to public and media perception; the
responses create a further amplification and distortion of significance. Public reaction and official response feed off each other and the perception of the significance of the folk devil is made more and more threatening. This amplification is accompanied by what Cohen calls the "escalation" of control responses. The state mobilises a broad scope of control apparatuses with a high intensity, i.e., more state agencies target the "folk devil" with increased resources (Ibid).

The multi-faceted character of state response characterising moral panics mirrors their essential character, which "depend[s] on the generation of diffuse normative concerns" (Cohen, 1980: 61). As has been previously discussed, this is also the case with a crisis of order, where a number of issues are signified across tolerance thresholds and implicit threats to moral and social order are presented. The folk devils, be they mods and rockers, muggers or terrorists, are the focal point of the moral panic. They are signified as the antithesis to a number of commonly held values. It is because the terrorist/drug trafficker/homosexual is perceived to be in violation of these values that the amplification of threat is possible. Due to effective ideological domination, most people share basic conceptions of right and wrong, and the presentation of folk devils in opposition to these
conceptions create the psychological space for the state to "appeal" to the common conscience (Ibid: 75).

A knee-jerk reaction occurs across society during periods of moral panic, with the reflexive response of the state being to engage in control activity. As suggested above, this activity may take many forms depending on how the folk devil is signified. If portrayed as a group of sick or socially underprivileged persons, the mental health or social welfare agencies may be activated; if shown as violent and lazy the police and the courts are the most likely institutions to be used; and if shown as a group of gun-toting subversives bent on overthrowing the government through force, the military is called in. Hall et al correctly point out that there are a number of "thresholds" which delineate the limits of social tolerance, and direct the state to certain avenues of control (1978: 226). Terrorism, as already shown, presents a problem in this regard (see Chapter I, pp. 32-33). It is seen as having the characteristics of criminal activity, political protest and warfare, among others. And as Crelinsten (1987a; 1987c) points out, the control activity of the state takes different forms according to how the controlled activity is signified.
Achieving Political Legitimacy:

Ideological domination is never perfectly top-down or one hundred percent successful. Counter-hegemonies and competing ideology bubble up from dominated classes and groups within a nation, and from other nations and insurgent groups internationally: political legitimacy and domination must be won, they must be worked at and struggled for. The signification of a moral panic or crisis of order does not guarantee the production of consent. In fact, the appearance of moral panics or crises of order usually signals a turning point in hegemony or reflects uneven developments and structural contradictions within a sociopolitical system.

Up to this point, the tone of the discussion (chiefly derived from the work of Hall et al., and to a lesser degree from Sumner) has been one that supports what may be called an "instrumentalist" interpretation of discourse as signified ideology. That is, an interpretation which suggests political figures are able to tailor the content of their discourse to manipulate public perception. An equally plausible explanation is that politicians assume a reactive role, with events and public opinion, instead of some machiavellian design to produce consent, driving the production and content of discourse. Both of these interpretations are present in the terrorism literature.
The instrumentalist interpretation is found in work such as Chomsky (1987), Herman (1985), and Chomsky and Herman (1979). These authors view the issue of terrorism as one serving an "ideological function" for the United States, a function designed to justify American imperialism and geopolitical goals. In this view, statements on the issue of terrorism made by past-President Reagan are essentially falsehoods designed to promote public support for government policy. Chomsky, for example, goes to some length to illustrate that the Reagan administration's campaign against Libyan terrorism was knowingly entered into on false grounds, specifically: a) that Libya was a major player in "international terrorism" and, b) that Libya/Moammar Khadaffi was responsible for the bombings at the Rome and Vienna airports in December of 1985 (1987). Yet Chomsky's analysis may also be viewed as reactive, with the campaign against Libya resulting from earlier political pressures or failures in the counter terrorism arena.

Other criticisms of Reagan's handling of the "terrorist problem", such as those enunciated by Kellett (1988), Celmer (1987), as well as the more general comments by Livingstone and Arnold (1986), are such that they imply Reagan and his administration were not manipulating events, but were instead responding to pressures generated by a number of crisis
situations and public criticism (see Chapter I, pp. 16-17). The clearest example is Celmer's criticism that the Reagan administration's response to terrorism was carried out on a "disjointed and ad hoc" basis. Likewise, the high political profile of the Iran ContraGate affair, continuing to the present with the recent conviction of Lt. Col. Oliver North on three criminal charges, including lying to the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and Congress, illustrates the degree to which the American government must account to its public. The furor created by the disclosure of the activities of the government has led to an ongoing exercise in damage limitation, one with which the present administration under Mr. Bush may still have to deal.

Probably, neither the instrumentalist or reactive interpretation of events is entirely correct. In the course of political life there are both instrumental and reactive uses of discourse. In either case, be it proactive issue-creation or reactive damage limitation, there is a design of maintaining consent and legitimating state activity. Essentially advancing a conception of the liberal democratic state in operation, Gramsci holds that the process of manufacturing consent (maintaining hegemony) involves accommodation just as much as it does domination and exploitation (1973). State structures thus articulate both long and short term strategy, and are required to
react in order to adapt to external political pressures.

It is useful to understand that there are a number of potential interpretations concerning the role of ideology and political discourse. It must however be emphasised that the present analysis does not speak to the question of theoretical approach. The present purpose is to identify the images and themes Reagan uses in his depiction of terrorism, and thus to highlight some of the key concepts respecting the control of the "terrorist" problem.

Given political processes characterised by degrees of pluralism, one finds that liberal-democratic, capitalist systems accommodate a wide assortment of competing ideology. In order to be effective, the dominant ideologies are regularly patterned along lines which minimise differences by incorporating general notions such as race, sex, age, nationality, and religion (Sumner, 1979:53). We have seen that convergence operates in this manner by obscuring differences between discrete issues and promoting perceptions of a general crisis in morality and social order. In the case of a single-issue moral panic, a number of themes transform perceptions and the folk devil is signified in opposition to a number of "legitimate" values. The logical result in either case (and a crisis of order, vis à vis convergence, is built upon a number of moral panics being mapped together) is
that a broader base is constructed for social recognition and identification.

The signification of ideology in any form, whether it is in political discourse or popular art, is in some way related to sociopolitical relations and existing power structures. Ideologies are produced by, and generally reproduce, the dynamics of these relations and structures. The acquisition of legitimacy underlying the reproduction of basic power relations is partly dependent upon the degree to which signified ideology can successfully create a hegemonic condition and win over the masses (whether it is disseminated in an instrumental or reactive fashion). Diverse political and social questions are transformed into issues of morality, legality, social order and national enterprise through the objective process of ideological signification.

One may therefore state that signified appearances in discourse conform to ideological positions. Two authors suggest that implied messages are along the lines that "the pluralist state is flexible enough to adapt its legal system to changing moral values and that crime and violence are unnecessary and counterproductive." (Hastings and Saunders, 1987: 144). If the boundaries of legitimacy are successfully sketched out, the dominant groups within a society, and those groups and nations
dominant internationally, are more likely to enjoy continued dominance (cf. Sumner, 1979: 288-9). However, if legitimacy is minimal, people may use different ideological maps to interpret reality and force politicians into a reactive stance. The challenge for state actors such as President Reagan is to use a potentially infinite repertoire of signifiers in a fashion which will maintain a condition of consent and justify the control responses that the state seeks to impose on the target group(s).

As we will see in the analysis of Mr. Reagan's "terrorism" discourse, the phenomenon is signified in opposition to a number of tolerance "thresholds" and "normative boundaries", with a number of discrete themes being introduced into the discussion.
III

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

One is faced with a number of methodological options when discourse is the object of analysis. Clearly, the choice of any particular method rests upon the goals of the research. Here, we are looking for a means to measure the ideological qualities and political implications of Reagan's signification of "terrorism". Before exploring the alternatives, it should be noted that the terms discourse and ideology are closely related, since discourse is a mode of signifying ideology. As is discussed below, the options in discourse analysis may be classed according to "level" or "unit" of analysis (from a narrow and specific focus on the intonation in discourse to an abstract and broad thematic level). This thesis focuses on the ideological themes and associated transformations in Reagan's discourse, as is explained presently.

Levels and Methods of Analysis:

A discussion of the thematic or ideological level of discourse analysis is aided by a refocusing on the notion of ideology and its signification. This also helps ground the
concept of transformation (defined in the following section) around which will revolve the analysis of President Reagan's pronouncements. As has been argued previously, one must perceive discourse as an "active element in social relations, being part of a constitutive process in the objective production of social meanings" (Connell and Miles, 1985:41). In its role as a signifier of ideology, discourse becomes a component of social control in a social formation, facilitating the reproduction of relations of domination and subordination through the management of consent.

Through an understanding of the social character of ideology, one can appreciate how politically socialised human agents customarily come to define and recognise a given objective phenomenon, imbuing it with qualities which are largely derived from the authority figures which disseminate discourse. In recognising the social character of discourse, one must consider several central factors: 1) who is speaking and to whom? (here, President Reagan is speaking to audiences that include highschool students, the British House of Commons and the international community); 2) what is said (both denotatively and connotatively specific to the text); and 3) what is the overall meaning of the discourse or group of discourses relative to the context in which it was
delivered (Davis, 1985:55). With "political" discourse, such as that which is being dealt with here, the question of who is speaking is very important. The perceived authority of the source of political discourse is a central consideration in matters of legitimacy.

Very generally, one may say that discourse/signified ideology forms "logical relations between starting points (observable phenomena) and end products" (the images of a phenomenon contained in discourse as projected into the mind of its audiences) (Trew, 1985:111). As was shown in Chapter II, signified ideology forms categories and images, making mental and/or emotional impressions upon individual minds, in a collective (social) fashion. The use of themes and metaphors functions in this sense. They make implicit connections and form conceptual relations, drawing a complex "reality" into a coherent whole which then becomes recognisable and customary. Again, it is in this sense that we can say that thematic and metaphorical developments "transform" the object of discussion.

Following this point, one must accept that a great deal of ideological content is implicit, and the analysis of content requires an informed and critical interpretation which seeks to uncover social meanings (cf. Fowler and Kress,
1979:196). One is not able to determine from text alone whether the definitions of a phenomenon such as terrorism are effectively inculcated. One may, as is done in the following chapter, examine the signification of an issue and identify the objective linguistic transformations that occur.

Concerning the direct examination of texts, there exist a number of levels and units of analysis which one might choose to use in discourse analysis. One may differentiate between surface or understructures of language and global or superstructures (Van Dijk, 1983:23). Concerned with the study of surface structures are the sub-disciplines of phonology, morphology, and lexiconic and syntactic analyses. All of these approaches relate to the "local" sites of the discourse, i.e. its specific linguistic and grammatical characteristics. Phonological examination discerns the way "sound patterns define particular words", and extends primary attention to the control of intonation by a speaker (Brazil, 1985). Morphology deals with the smallest units of language, dividing words into their constituent parts (e.g. likeable becomes like-able); trends in usage are then traced to define general characteristics of a given discourse. This definition may be made locally (internal to the discourse structure) or globally (thetically and relative to the
context in which the discourse was delivered. An interrogation of lexicon (word-use) within discourse involves the derivation of meaning of pieces of a text, in the local sense; generally, a scheme for classifying these words is constructed to aid in making more coherent conclusions (Petofi; 1985).

With the lexiconical, morphological, and phonological examination one finds the traditional structural-descriptive linguistic approaches, which simply try to "explicate the sentences of a language" (Grimes, 1975:288). As mentioned previously, the methodological restriction of investigating syntactic and linguistic structure makes these analyses limited in terms of applying the techniques to a social analysis of discourse. To reemphasise, these styles of analysis tend to concentrate on a surface-structural or linguistic dissection of texts or speech acts, rather than trying to determine the overall meaning or macro structures (thematic and metaphorical ascriptions) that are expressed.

This thesis, to restate, deals with the "macro structures" of themes and metaphors which give Reagan's discourse on "terrorism" global coherence over time. Connell and Miles call these formations the "immanent structures" of text, the analysis of which is imperative if the social
relevance of discourse is to be understood (1985:31). The result is that one understands how concepts in a discourse are related as a system; they are "part of a theory or ideology, that is, a system of conceptual representations and images which are a way of seeing and grasping things, and of interpreting what is seen or heard" (Trew, 1979:95 emphasis added). The researcher must determine how the source of discourse brought its (or his or her) own particular world knowledge and experience to form significations or models of the phenomenon which is being discussed. These communicative expressions, written or spoken, are indicative of general ideological positions, and function to reproduce these conceptions in society (cf. Van Dijk, 1985a:106).

Surface-structures are the signifiers of the ideological categories and metaphorical formations of text. Therefore, an analysis of surface-structure alone is limited in the sense that it is restricted to the text itself. It ignores the social relevance of discourse and the cognitive representations and images which it elicits as a means of signifying ideology.

One popular method of analysing discourse is "content analysis". While this term can be applied to any analysis of discourse, it most often refers to a method which relies on
quantification. The basic approach is the counting of "key words" (such as "terrorism" or "criminal"). The method's complete reliance on the objectification of data is clearly a construction designed to legitimise its unstated reliance on the idiosyncratic interpretations of the data by the researcher. The form and level of analysis which is being adopted here (as described above) takes a much less mechanical view of communication, recognising the political role of language and the importance of the context of its use. As we are most interested in the ideological and therefore qualitative aspects of Reagan's discourse, this approach is not useful.

Sociolinguistics is a field which flowered in the 1960s and 70s. Sociolinguists seek to find correlations between styles of speech and "social groupings" in a population (e.g. by social class or ethnicity/race). They argue that a speaker's world view is the subjective product of his/her relationship to the social structure and social institutions. While this link is developed by sociolinguists, no discussion as to the broader social function(s) of language is entered upon. The stage is set for a contextual examination, but explanation is neglected concerning the political implications of the speech styles and concepts. Where
linguists engage in a structural-descriptive investigation, socio-linguists involve themselves with a cultural-descriptive accounting of stylistic variations in language.

Another means of reading text or discourse is "exegesis", wherein the reader dismantles a text or speech act with the goal of determining how the content relates to the perspectives of groups which had a hand in its construction (Grimes, 1975:18). In its identification of content with social groups, this style of reading texts (usually older historical sources) has some resemblance to sociolinguistics. In terms of analytical power, exegesis, sociolinguistics, structural linguistic approaches, and content analysis are all essentially descriptive methods.

A relatively new brand of analysis in Marxism, which Sumner (1979:80) calls "Speculative Criticism", resembles literary criticism in some respects. Texts are read spontaneously, and the content is unsystematically (speculatively) labelled as ideology, prima facie. Sumner's basic contention is that intent on the part of the source is assumed and not demonstrated. To Sumner, this type of method is "purely imaginative" and dislocated from social practice. Therefore, these analyses are restricted to "political
polemic" (Ibid).¹ Connell and Miles see the same texts as improperly considering discourse as a product entirely manufactured in the mind of its writer, being "semantically transparent", and directly expressed in language (1985:31). In this sense, Sumner labels such work as "subjectivist", as it is almost entirely concerned with the "forms of appearance of ideology", and neglects its material, contextual grounding in political and socio-cultural practices which serve as sources for signified ideology (1979:95). Stated more simply, these analyses imply an instrumentalist interpretation (see Chapter II, pp. 51-54).

Sumner's own solution is to develop an "historical materialist" method, wherein the forms of appearance of ideology and the concrete conditions under which they arose can be understood as mutual determinants of the content of discourse. The process is initiated by an intuitive or spontaneous reading of text, where the researcher can "logically" make connections between concepts contained in

¹ Sumner cites the following texts:

discourse and the social structure; step two involves the construction or adoption of a theory which relates to social structure and socio-political context; the "third approximation" requires that the ideological formation(s) being studied be situated with a sense of historical specificity; finally, "discourse can now be read in all its rich complexity as an embodiment of ideology, structure and context" (1979:240-243). While the focus of this thesis is in fact on the "forms of appearance" of ideology, one will avoid being "subjectivist" by restricting one's comments to the characteristics of the text and, in a general rather than a causal sense, how that text relates to real-life events and the politics of "terrorism" in Reagan's administration.

**Linguistic Transformation in Discourse:**

One observer suggests that with "political" discourse, "in ideologically sensitive" areas such as is being evaluated here, "attempts are made to close off possible ambiguities", and a clear picture of the situation is painted (Davis, 1985:55). The means of facilitating this closure is by linguistic "transformation" (Fowler and Kress, 1979:207; Grimes, 1975:31; Lerman, 1985:197). The concept of transformation serves a useful purpose by supplying a
yardstick with which to measure the qualitative aspects of a discourse or set of discourses. We will differentiate here between specific thematic transformations and general Transformations. In either case, T(t)ransformation occurs when the subject of a discourse is explained linguistically in a manner which defines its abstract qualities, to the exclusion of other possible qualitative ascriptions (save those supplied by the orator/writer). The ascription of abstract qualities connects to the subjective imprints made by ideology as signified in discourse. Linguistic transformation, then, is a form of signification of ideology. Let us turn first to the idea of specific transformation.

When Reagan uses certain systematic means of describing "terrorism" and "terrorists", he engages in ideological transformations of the phenomenon of terrorism, whatever the original conception of that phenomenon may have been. Utilising the understructure of words, the source of discourse "creates" a number of linguistic transformations that are based on metaphorical and thematic developments. As stated above (p. 64), these transformations are also assumed to be based on ideological positions.

Former President Richard Nixon, commenting on his situation during the Watergate Scandal, impersonalised
(transformed) ideas of "charges of illegal activities...(and) cover-up" into the "excesses of others" (Lerman, 1985: 197). This impersonalisation transformation presents a conception of the subject matter as "fact" to the audience; Nixon wished it to be accepted as fact that he was not personally responsible for the illegal activities of his associates. The degree to which this version of "fact" is accepted as accurate depends largely upon who is speaking and to whom, i.e. upon the legitimate authority which the speaker or writer brings into the communicative situation, with legitimacy being a function of the political context. Thus, in the political environment during the Watergate Scandal, Richard Nixon's presentation of the "facts" may not have been accepted as truth by a large majority of the population. Looking to Reagan's terms as president, it was not until the "Iran-Contragate" scandal that Reagan would have been patently viewed as a liar. Therefore, when Reagan brings his administration's "world knowledge" and "expertise" to the podium, as well as the legitimacy of the presidency, the likelihood that his version of the "facts" of "terrorism" will be accepted would seem to be great.

Linguistic transformation is brought about by a variety of means. Van Dijk (1983:34-35) lists the processes of
ideological deletion, i.e. the censure of ideologically "irrelevant" material; generalization (the construction of overall meaning through extended discursive discussion); and the use of systematic categorization as several types of transformation. Fowler and Kress (1979: 207) introduce the idea of "nominalization"; this refers to a uniform typing of subjects in discourse, and thereby resembles Van Dijk’s concept of categorization. As previously noted respecting Richard Nixon’s statements, Lerman illustrates the use of an "impersonalisation" transformation.

Although not using the transformation concept, Hall et al. discuss the concurrent transformation techniques of depoliticisation and créminalisation which play a part in the evolution of law and order campaigns (1978: 224). Their point is that the object of signification (the grammatical subject) must be made to appear as the legitimate object of social control (criminalised) and robbed of any political legitimacy (depolitcised) for law and order campaigns to be popularly accepted.

Whatever specific transformation is entered into, the process tends to objectify discussion (by presenting the "facts" as they "obviously" are), and it attenuates impression in language to that end. This, as already shown,
is the effect of ideology as it "maps the geography of the mind", to use Sumner’s metaphor.

The process of transformation may be represented by the following figure, which summarises the process used to analyse Reagan’s discourse*:

**Figure 2**

**ANALYSING LINGUISTIC TRANSFORMATION***

| Reagan’s Signification ----> Identification of Metaphors ----> transformation of "Terrorism" | Discussion of and Themes | Effects (n = x) |

*The schematic represents the process whereby real events and political issues are signified in discourse, subjected to thematic descriptions in that process of signification, and thereby have their abstract qualities defined, or transformed. The number of these ideological transformations, and there may be many concerning one subject, is indicated by "x".

Riots, for example, may become the subject of discussion in the media; the riots are subject to descriptions that emphasise either their real or alleged political character; and finally, the signified events (riots) become politicised within the boundaries of the discussion as a result of the thematic ascriptions. If the rioters are students, and if the discourse transformation is accepted by the audience, student unrest becomes a "political" issue. The process of
politicisation, of course, usually requires extended periods of signification, and most especially so if the issue is contentious. To reemphasise, the concept of transformation deals with the cognitive or affective impressions which signified ideology may make on one's consciousness (see p.39-41, Chapter II).

General transformation, which is hereafter designated by the use of an upper case "T", as in Transformation, is built upon the specific transformations of a discourse or a number of discourses directed at the same subject. With an individual transformation, a certain constellation of terms is applied to the subject. This forms a collection of metaphors and images consistent with one another, a theme, and attributes abstract qualities to the object of discussion. The larger process of Transformation involves something more. It may be discussed with reference to an entire discourse, or, as in this thesis, a set of discourses directed at a certain subject. In this greater process, a number \((n = x)\) of individual transformations are analysed together in order to understand the broader scope and political implications of the discourse set.

Material is not discussed in terms of specific classes or categories of images, but in terms of how classes or
categories relate to each other and form the foundation for the process of Transformation. Two examples of general Transformation have been described in Chapter II in the examination of moral panics and of convergence as a part of law and order crises. In these cases, discrete issues are transformed into moral panics, or a number of issues are transformed into a crisis of order through the process of convergence. Hall et al. are therefore able to define a moral panic as the sum of "ideological displacement [read transformation]" contained in media, judicial, police and political discourse on the topic of mugging (1978:29).

Proceeding along these lines, Reagan's discourse will be interrogated in form and in content. The specific transformations he applies to the subject of terrorism will be dealt with individually, and their relation to major terrorist incidents and Reagan's counter terrorism policy will be examined. Finally, taken as a whole, the discourse set represents a general ideological Transformation of the phenomenon of terrorism. The structure of this larger process of signification will be discussed in consideration of the work of Hall et al. (1978) and Cohen (1980) that was introduced in Chapter II.
**Assumptions and Limitations:**

The examination of President Reagan's statements is not concerned with what audience he specifically addresses. When a political figure as prominent as the President of the United States of America makes addresses, gives press conferences or otherwise communicates, many people listen intently. As well, the analysis is not attempting to infer intention on the part of the President. Any determination in this direction would always be speculative in nature. There is no means beyond reasoned inference by which one may attempt to understand "why" Reagan said what he did, when he did.

Further, and very importantly, it is not possible from the examination of the signification process alone to determine the degree of effectiveness of ideological domination across the audiences that are exposed to Reagan's discourse. This would require extensive survey investigation of individual attitudes, which might then be generalisable into group or aggregate data after being analysed with attention to a variety of variables. Alternately, one might survey a wide scope of media and state discourse, as was done by Cohen (1980) and Hall *et al.* (1978), and use that
discourse as indicators of public perception. This last approach suffers from two problems. First, hegemony in assumed and not demonstrated because a direct measure of public attitude is not undertaken. Further to this, there are important internal institutional dynamics within, for example, the media; these may affect the nature of the material to which the "public" is exposed (see Ericson, et al., 1987). Both of these methodological inadequacies may lead to what Sumnor calls "speculative criticism".

Practically speaking, the efficacy of ideological domination would be expected to vary across history generally and between classes and groups. And while educated guesses may be made in these directions, no precise statements may be constructed from an examination of text alone. This thesis, to restate, examines the general structure and specific thematic content of Reagan's signification of terrorism, not its legitimation effect or lack thereof.

One must also recognise that President Reagan is only one of many sources of discourse on the subject of terrorism in the United States, albeit a politically significant one. Therefore, Reagan's discourse may not be assumed to be entirely representative of either his administration's position or of the discourse being disseminated more widely
Throughout America.

It is understood and entirely self-evident that President Reagan's statements were in response to situations deemed problematic and threatening by the American government, and that Reagan signified these events in a manner which attempted to generate a condition of legitimate government in the American state. For the most part, this is obviously a question of purely practical politics. More abstractly, the signification involves an inward projection of nationality, not dissimilar to the process engaged in when a nation mobilises to go to war. Terrorists, as Reagan defines them, are an external challenge to the American state.

It is ironic that in seeking to understand signification of ideology using the transformation concept, one participates in a process which is almost identical to that in which the state engages when it defines the features of deviant social groups. In the latter case, a simplification of multifarious issues occurs, with social and political relations being put into dichotomous, black and white terms. We have then the customary distinctions between "good and bad", the contradistinction made between that which is "political" and that which is merely "social", and the
opposition of the "legal" and the "criminal" (cf. Hall et al., 1978: 224). Similarly, in making these types of distinctions and applying labels to transformation effects, there is always an element of subjective interpretation. The analysis may therefore appear to be somewhat idiosyncratic. In view of this, the overlaps and contradictions of the themes President Reagan uses in his discourse are discussed in Chapter V, after each theme and its specific transformation effect have been identified.

Reagan's signification of the issue of "terrorism" into American and world politics was not an isolated event. It was one component of the intersections of political context, economic structure and ideological struggle. His statements, then, must be viewed as part of the ideological forum. If one wishes to explicate the full significance of Reagan's discourse one must attempt a full blown political economy and situate Reagan's discourse within the sum total of discourse on terrorism in America. The present purpose is to define the transformations which the subject of "terrorism" undergoes and to examine the form of Reagan's terrorism discourse as a whole, 1981 through 1986.
IV
REAGAN'S TERRORISM DISCOURSE

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section summarises the data in terms of its source and general characteristics across the six year period. Following this, the specific ideological themes and metaphors that Reagan uses in his signification of "terrorism" are identified and discussed with respect to their transformation effects. The third section examines theme interactions and contradictions within the President’s discourse. The final segment of the chapter deals with the discourse set as a whole, comparing Reagan’s signification of terrorism with the signification of moral panics and crises of order.

Data: Source and General Characteristics:

The sources for President Reagan’s statements are the volumes of Public Papers of the Presidents from 1981 through 1986, which are based on weekly releases from the Department of State. The volumes themselves are published and indexed annually by the United States Office of the Federal Register. The subject matter of this thesis is determined by the indexes, using the discourse listed under "Terrorism" and its subheadings, such as "President’s views on" or "antiterrorist measures". To its advantage, this choice of data has an element of consistency, with the same comprehensive source
being consulted over the study period. At the same time, it must be noted that the indexing process is not open to the researcher's scrutiny. There may be shifts in emphasis or classification criteria, possibly based in policy changes within the Federal Register itself or trickling down from other bodies. The index does not offer any way of determining if such factors intervened in the study period. A recent work on the subject of index formation has suggested that internal decision making is very much affected by external ideological pressures, and that this affects what type of material is included under a certain heading and what headings are included in an index (Crelinsten, 1988: 32). While being unable to account for these factors is a limitation, it is assumed that the material selected broadly represents Reagan's signification of terrorism.

In consideration of the above, it is interesting to note some anomalies and inconsistencies within the data. There are eight sources to which the index directs the reader where the word "terrorism" or a form of the word does not appear in the text. The first discourse, a statement issued on May 13, 1981, dealt with the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II. The next two cases, an informal statement made on October 6th, 1981, and then a reissuance of the same text as a proclamation on the following day, also deal with the issue of assassination - this time with the death of former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat at the hands of fundamentalist
muslims. On December 7th, 1981, the President responded to a question that dealt with his sense of personal security in light of reports that Moammar Khadaffi had ordered "hit squads" into America to assassinate the President.

The next case, on January 3rd, 1985, is a statement where the President discusses a wave of bombings targeting abortion clinics in America. This case is significant because it is one of domestic political violence, as opposed to the phenomenon of "international terrorism" to which all other sources direct themselves. The bombings are not described as terrorism, but as "violent, anarchist activities". The next year, on June 13th, 1986, a statement released by the White House regarding a hostage-taking overseas (which fits under the "international" rubric) did not contain the word terrorism. The last two cases both involve press conferences where the person asking the question provides the parameters of discussion by mentioning terrorism and/or a specific terrorist incident. The dates here are June 23, 1986, and the 29th of October, 1986. On the last occasion, the President referred the reporter to statements made earlier on the subject by then - Secretary of State, Mr. Schultz.

There are also cases where terrorism is mentioned in a text and the discourse was not indexed. A good example is the now famous promise of "swift and effective retribution" made by Reagan in his "South Lawn" speech when he welcomed home the hostages from Iran (January 27, 1981). In another
situation, a discourse delivered by Reagan on September 27th, 1984 referred to two other statements regarding terrorism which were made by the President, neither of which were included in the index. This was the only circumstance of this kind that came to the writer's attention. Since there were few examples of these problems and in order to remain faithful to the indexes, these discourses were not included in the data.

These inconsistencies in the indexes show that the volumes of Public Papers are not perfect information sources, and that the indexers come to the indexing process with their own conceptions about what constitutes "terrorism".

To appreciate Reagan's discourse as it relates to the practical concerns of his administration, it is helpful to have a general understanding of the discourse set's relation to the six terrorism-related events outlined in Chapter II. As discussed in Chapter III, the signification of an issue in political discourse is not an isolated event, with context being an important consideration. To review, these incidents were:

1) the release of American hostages who had been held by the Khomeni Regime for 444 days at the U.S. embassy in Teheran, Iran, from November 1979 to January 1981;
2) the suicide attack of late October 1983, by Shiite "terrorists" upon the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut; 3) the hijacking of Trans World Airline's flight 847 over
the Mediterranean in June of 1985;
4) the October 1985 hijacking of the Italian
    cruiseship, Achille Lauro, upon which were a large
    number of American passengers;
5) an American response to "terrorism", the bombing of
    the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Benghazi by U.S.
    military forces in mid-April of 1986;
6) the Iran-Contra scandal, where it has been
    alleged that President Reagan or his administration
    broke the "no-concessions policy" and sold arms to a
    government supporting terrorists (Iran) and then
    diverted funds to Nicaraguan Contras, in violation of
    the dictates of Congress.

One should also keep in mind the signing of National Security
Decision Directive 138 on April 3rd, 1984, and the signing of
the Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom,

Table I displays the number of discourses on terrorism
to which the index referred its users. Table II lists the
number of times Reagan used the word terrorism or a form of
the word in these discourses (terrorism*)1. Figures 3 and 4
depict this data graphically. The numbers one through six
appear at the bottom of each of these figures and tables,
indicating the rough historical position of the events

1 For the purpose of brevity, terrorism* is used
hereafter to indicate the primary signifiers: terrorism,
terrorist, terrorists and terroristic.
numbered above. As stated in Chapter I, the designation of these issues/events as major is justifiable in that numbers one to five were focal points in Reagan's discourse; number six was a major political event in the United States that brought the validity of Reagan's and his administration's counter terrorism campaign into public debate.

The data is segmented into four month periods, January to April, May to August, and September to December. This division projects the data across eighteen points. As shown in Table I and its corresponding Figure, there is a definite increase in the number of discourses that discussed terrorism over the six years (excluding the last third of 1986). Paralleling this is an increased frequency in major incidents toward the end of the period. The TWA, Achille Lauro, and the Libyan episodes occurred in a ten month span. Thus, the increased number of discourses makes sense as there was simply more to talk about. From both a common sense and a theoretical point of view, it is important to recognise that historical events have an impact on the quality and quantity of discourse, as signification both produces and is the product of history. Each theme that Reagan develops has its individual fluctuations in this regard, and these are dealt with in the next section.

Table II and its companion Figure illustrate the intensity of the use of the word terrorism*. Intensity is defined as the average number of uses of terrorism* per
discourse, in thirds of a year. There is a definite amplification effect occurring here. Reagan is not only discussing "terrorism" more often (i.e. with more discourses), but also more intensely. The repetitive use of the primary signifiers tends to focus audience attention on the subject matter. In short, the increase in signification of terrorism within individual discourses makes thinking about terrorism easier.

There are a number of peaks of intensity that command attention. Most generally, we see that the levels in the first two and two thirds years of Reagan's Presidency are strikingly lower than those beginning in the last third of 1983 and through to the end of 1986. The high in the first period was an intensity of 1.5, and in the later period there are peaks of 6.3 (in the last part of 1983), 6.4, 9.6 and 6.1 uses per discourse. The period starting at Reagan's inauguration in 1981 and ending in August, 1983, is one in which the Reagan administration was neither strongly criticised regarding its counter-terrorism efforts or required to respond to politically significant "terrorist" incidents. The increased intensity, beginning in the last third of 1983 and continuing through to the end of 1986, originated in the aftermath of the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon. It continued through the signing of NSDD 138 in April of 1984, the criticisms of Reagan's failures in the counter-terrorism area later that year, the
political disturbances created in 1985 when CIA support of a Lebanese counter terrorist group became politically problematic, and the tragic TWA and Achille Lauro cases. Here, we see a relation being demonstrated between terrorist events and political context on the one hand, and the intensity of signification of the primary signifiers on the other.
TABLE I
NUMBER OF DISCOURSES*

YEAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data is grouped into four month periods, or thirds of a year (January to April, May to August, and September to December).

FIGURE 3

NUMBER OF TERRORISM DISCOURSES
BY PRESIDENT REAGAN
1981-1986
TABLE II

INTENSITY IN THE USE OF TERRORISM* BY THIRDS OF A YEAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.33</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>9.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Terrorism* refers to the group of primary signifiers, terrorism, terrorist, terrorists, and terroristic. Intensity if defined as the average number of uses of these signifiers per discourse, over each four month period into which the six years have been divided.

FIGURE 4

INTENSITY IN THE USE OF TERRORISM*
Ideological Themes and transformations:

[T]he primary label ... evokes secondary images, some of which are purely descriptive, some of which contain explicit moral judgements and some of which contain prescriptions about how to handle the behaviour (Cohen, 1980: 74).

Seven themes were identified in Reagan’s discourse:
Negativisms, Democracy/Civilisation, Narco-Terrorism, Victimisation, Internationalisation, Crime and Justice, and War. The identification of themes was based on a reading of President Reagan’s statements through which metaphorical applications to the subject of "terrorism" were identified and categorised into general themes. There were no predetermined categories. If Reagan used, for example, the phrases "criminal terrorists" and "lawless terrorist states", these metaphorical ascriptions would be included under the Crime and Justice theme. In defining the themes in Reagan’s terrorism discourse, one summarises the abstract qualities that he introduced into the signification of terrorism, qualities which produce linguistic transformations. In accordance with Cohen’s observations, above, each theme will analysed for its own prescriptive and moral transformation effects. And following both Cohen’s (1980) and Hall et al.’s observations concerning moral panics and crises of order, each theme will also be analysed for its threat amplification effect.

As the data in Table III illustrates, there are a number of interesting developments in Reagan’s use of themes. The
words and phrases constituting the Presidents transformations are listed by date in Appendix A. The data in Table III, as with Tables I and II, is represented across eighteen points based on the temporal division of the study period into four month segments. The most obvious feature of the findings is that a complex and often contradictory composition of the qualitative ascriptions is displayed. Reagan applies his seven themes liberally in his depiction of "terrorism".

All of the themes are used by the end of 1986, and their levels of use relative to each other is generally consistent, with some exceptions that are examined shortly. The Negativisms and Internationalisation themes predominate, having the highest total numbers of applications (158 and 119), with the Crime and Justice (95), Democracy/Civilisation (68), Victimisation (38) and War (24) themes having middle level use. The Narco-Terrorism theme is only used five times. The reader will notice that each theme has a sharp increase in its number of applications in the middle third of 1985, with the exception of the Narco-Terrorism category. A large part of this increase may be attributed to Reagan's speech to the American Bar Association on July 8th, 1985, which is quite long and replete with a variegated collection of colorful metaphors. (This is the speech in which Mr. Reagan identified the five "terrorist states" of Iran, Libya, Nicaragua, North Korea and Cuba.)

Beyond these fairly general observations, a theme by
theme approach will be used to identify the specific features of the transformations entered into by President Reagan. For the purpose of analysis, each theme has been defined, in part, in terms of the abstract transformation which it applies to the primary signifiers, terrorism*. This is necessary if the internal characteristics of the discourse are to be understood. While important, this action creates difficulties for the analyst, already discussed in Chapter IV. To review, these difficulties relate to the conceptual truncation which results when labels are applied. A complex object of analysis is summarised under a one or two labels and drawn into a simplified whole. In recognition of this problem, the next section analyses the contradictions and conceptual overlaps between each discrete theme.

The President does not have anything flattering to say about terrorism or terrorists, and all of the ideological themes and their transformations share the common denominator of placing the self-defined topics of discussion in a negative light. With this in mind, the first "category" of transformation is comprised of descriptions that deprecate the moral character of terrorism*.

a) Negativisms: The use of the Negativisms theme involves the application of pejorative terms in the signification of terrorism. Their use is an attempt at imputing the subjects of discussion with negative qualities, thereby making them legitimate objects of state attention.
The transformation, then, is one of moral delegitimation. The stigmatising effect of signifying terrorists as this or that or one of a hundred other culturally undesirable things makes terrorism morally and culturally offensive, and therefore a more legitimate target of control efforts. The process of delegitimation is not identified with a control response, but does connect up occasionally with notions of threat, as in the following phrases: "... countering the insidious threat terrorism poses..." (October 19th, 1984), or "... we're combatting the deadly menace of international terror..." (October 26th, 1985).

In order to be a "legitimate" object of social control, that object must be perceived as having a number of "illegitimate" qualities, and negativisms function in this manner. For example, terrorists are not simply engaging in acts of war, which is illegitimate by itself, but they are also "making war by cowardly attacks on 3rd parties" (Reagan, April 23, 1986: emphasis added).

The most often used category, Negativisms are applied liberally and widely throughout the discourse. They are found in combination with every type of theme, exhibiting creativity and diversity in their specific form. Reagan's labelling of terrorism as the "ugly spectre ... of state sponsored terrorism" (January 25th, 1984), and of terrorists as the "perpetrators of inhumane acts" (June 21, 1985) are further examples of Negativisms and moral delegitimation,
with "ugly" and "inhumane" being the key pejoratives.

b) Democracy/Civilisation: This theme involves coupling ideas of civilisation and democracy, as the title suggests. Terrorism and terrorists are defined as uncivilised and as "the antithesis" to democracy, as Reagan stated in a letter to Napoleon Duarte dated August 29th, 1985. The subject is being shown as a threat to the dominant values of peace, freedom and liberty upon which Western civilisation is assumed to be founded. An increase in threat potential is signified by extended the threat generally to include all liberal democracies and all of Western civilisation. The union of concepts of government ("democracy") with broader notions of civilisation makes the threat amplification particularly noteworthy. This is a case of what Sumner would call an "ideological formation" or grouping of ideological signs within the greater sum of transformations in Reagan's discourse.

Reagan's use of the Democracy/Civilisation (d/c) theme represents a thematic politicisation of the phenomenon of terrorism. This is not an entirely inaccurate transformation, as a great deal of international terrorism, especially in its "Marxist" variants, directs itself at those considered to be global imperialist oppressors. The United States usually epitomises the evils of "capitalist imperialism" in the minds of many in the international terrorist conclave. Groups fitting this mould are the German Red Army Faction or the
many factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization, such as Abu Nidal Group. Goren provides an excellent exposition on the international connections and aims of "anti-democratic" and "anti-Western" terrorist groups and sponsor states, with a focus on the role of the Soviet Union (1984: 95-193).

In reviewing the data, the writer was tempted to categorise the two elements of the d/c theme separately. However, the inspection of texts showed that the two notions of democracy and civilisation are often used side by side, and if not in this manner, presented in such a way that a conceptual link is created within the text. The two concepts were represented as a single theme for these reasons. The coupling and linguistically complex mixing of these elements is demonstrated in the following passage taken from an address Reagan delivered on April 26th, 1984,

There is no role in civilized society for indiscriminate threatening, intimidation, detention, or ... violence to undermine democratic governments.

The d/c theme politicises the phenomenon of terrorism by injecting notions of democracy and civilisation into the discussions of "terrorism", and by portraying "terrorists" as a threat to democratic nations and Western civilisation. Although the d/c theme does not have a generally high level of use, except in mid-1985, it is applied consistently, perhaps the most consistently of all the themes. This suggests that a politicisation of the issue of "terrorism" is important to the Reagan administration. The implied control
prescription is that of diplomacy. The call is for all "democratic" states with a membership in the "community of civilized nations" to cooperate in the fight against "international terrorism".

c) Narco-Terrorism: This specimen occurs quite infrequently, but it is noteworthy as it involves the direct linking of two notions: international narcotics trade and the trade in violence represented by "international terrorism". Reagan calls these two phenomena "the twin killers of narcotics and terrorism" (address to Congress, February 6th, 1986). The Narco-Terrorism category is an example of what Hall and his colleagues describe as a convergence. Two discrete issues are explicitly linked to become a new issue. By proceeding in this manner Reagan makes the phenomenon of terrorism appear larger than it is; as Hall et al. note, a convergence of issues increases the perceived threat potential of events/issues by fabricating an ominous general crisis through the creation of linkages. In terms of transformation, the appropriate label is convergence.

As well as increasing the perceived threat of terrorism, a criminal justice prescription is implied, with illicit narcotics trade being the customary object of law enforcement agencies in the United States. The Reagan administration's "War on Drugs" and the associated creation of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, as well as the placement of a member from the D.E.A. on the Interdepartmental Group on
Terrorism (see Chapter I, p. 16), are developments in Reagan's policies that are consistent with this convergence transformation. To be sure, the narco-terrorism linkage has its advocates in the academic community, such as Ehrenfeld and Kahan, who suggest that narco-terrorism is "a unique phenomenon ... and must be dealt with in a unique way" (1987: 252).

Similar to the Democracy/Civilisation theme, this development provides an interesting layering of ideological effect in the discourse. It is a case of convergence within the larger process of Transformation in Reagan's discourse set that groups the ideological signs of "terrorism" with those of the fight against the "drug problem" in the United States.

d) Victimisation: This theme focuses and develops audience impression to consider the victims of "terrorist" activity. It broadens the scope of what "terrorism" means to include the human injuries which flow from this kind of sociopolitical violence. An explicit moral judgement is contained here, emphasising the point that "innocent civilians are the victims of violence" (address, July 8th, 1985). At the same time, this theme amplifies perceived threat by making the possibility of personal victimisation appear more realistic and immediate. The threat amplification of the victimisation transformation may be contrasted with that of the democracy/civilisation theme. In the latter case
threat is generalised to include democratic nations and Western civilisation; with the current theme, threat is individualised, and therefore more focused, yet still extended across the entire spectrum of individuals in America. In this connection, Delli Carpini and Williams have shown that the victimisation of private citizens is heavily overcovered in the American television medium (1987: 59).

The victimisation theme first appears in the last third of 1983, and reaches its highest levels of use after the T.W.A. and Achille Lauro hijackings made terrorism a personal concern for the American public. In these incidents America and the world saw a young Navy diver on vacation and an elderly crippled male murdered in cold blood. It is worth noting that the victimisation theme has a minimal drop in usage over the last two-thirds of 1986. It seems to have survived the Iran-Contragate problem. Logically, it should have, as it is a very passive theme in the sense that it does not direct one to a structured set of control responses. Reagan could, and did use such an ideological approach safely. One is hard pressed to dispute the injustice and tragedy accompanying the violence of terrorism when it is directed at civilian targets.

When it is situated historically, Reagan's use of the victimisation theme gives rise to another basic point -i.e. ideology can be the product of history. The increase in signification of victimisation ideology appears to have a
temporal relation to the two "terrorist" events that preceded it (the T.W.A. and Achille Lauro hijackings), both of which involved cold-blooded killings of "innocent" victims.

Finally, although the victimisation theme/transformation makes it clear that something should be done in defense of the "innocent victims" of "terrorism", no clear prescriptive dimension may be found.

e) **Internationalisation:** This theme is the most fundamental transformation of the set of discourses being examined; the theme provides basic conceptual parameters. Cohen (1980) would label this an "orientation theme" (see Chapter II, p. 48). In the process of defining "terrorism", the phenomenon is transformed into an almost entirely new entity, "international terrorism". This newly defined phenomenon now requires a consideration of a "network" of "terrorist" states and organisations and individuals, acting both within states and across national boundaries. An archetypal example of the internationalisation theme is given to us by Reagan in his news conference of October 21st, 1985, where he discusses the U.S.S.R.'s "policy of support for terrorist organizations and states". The use of the internationalisation theme amplifies threat potential intensely, with "terrorism" now conceived of as an organised political campaign on a mass scale. Indeed, the theme stops just short of effecting a distinct polarisation in international affairs: the "us" (democracies and our allies)
against "them" (terrorists and those allied in their cause) mentality lurks ominously.

Further to the above, audience perception is directed to consider only insurgent, anti-western terrorism, leaving unexamined terrorism by states against the citizenry, what Thornton (1964) calls "enforcement terrorism". The transformation here matches van Dijk's notion of "ideological deletion" (1983: 34-35). Any concept of terrorism that is not of interest to the state in maintaining order and promoting its legitimacy is absent from the discourse, as one would expect.

Similar to the victimisation theme, internationalisation is used relatively heavily late in 1986. As noted above, the deletion transformation is fundamental: it avoids conceptual contradictions by excluding competing definitions. Although one knows the theme is truncated and self-serving, focusing only upon anti-U.S. terrorism, it is used effectively, with public perception and popular discourse tending to conform to the ideological definition (see Chapter I, pp. 33-34). It would have been surprising to have seen Reagan discard such a useful tool, the principles of which he and others in his administration may have internalised and learned faithfully to obey. This theme and the crime and justice theme were the only ones of the seven used by Reagan that rose in number of applications during the last two thirds of 1986. Here, as
with the victimisation theme, no clear control prescription is made.

f) Crime and Justice:

They're criminals committing the worst and most despicable [n.b. the negativism] kind of crime ...[and] you have the same problem you have with crime (Reagan, January 26th, 1985).

The prescriptive dimension is clear with the crime and justice theme. All of the customary concepts of justice, culpability, deterrence, and the rule of law are introduced. The establishment of an international legal framework and the use of domestic and international legal, enforcement and intelligence apparatus to aid in the detection, apprehension and punishment of terrorists are focal points, as well as generally labelling "terrorism" and "terrorists" as a form of crime/criminal. Another example of the crime theme is in a prepared statement where the White House commented on the assassination of the Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles, in January of 1982. Support was pledged in the form of engaging "law enforcement agencies to ... bring the criminal or these criminals to trial so justice can be done" (January 28th, 1982).

As Hall et al. pointed out in their analysis of "tolerance thresholds" (see Chapter II, p. 46), the use of crime and justice concepts in the process of signification implicitly amplifies the threat potential of an issue. Crime implies violence, and therefore a threat to social and political order. While this may be true if one's point of
departure is from a situation of order, the use of a law and order model may imply that the threat potential of the problem population has decreased if internal war or martial law have been the state of rule up to that point. The "crime model" or "crime metaphor" in such a situation might effectively deny the deviants political legitimacy and the related claims to a mass constituency which they had hitherto been able to make, and by implication produce the perception of a normalisation of relations. In this more normal operation of order maintenance in a state, the use of criminal justice sanctions functions to atomise or individualise the problem at hand, with the implicit message being that the "problem" is with aberrant individuals, not the current government or social relations.

Thus, we find that the Anglo-American tradition is to try and detract from the legitimacy of political claims made by deviant groups by signifying issues at the level of legality and labelling the offending individuals "criminal" (Allen, 1977: 30,31; Hall et al., 1978: 222; Hastings and Saunders, 1987: 143; Crelinsten, 1987c). This process was identified by Hall et al. concerning student protest in the late sixties and early seventies in Great Britain (1978:224). Another example is the 1970 trial of the "Chicago Eight" in the United States District Court presided over by Judge J. Hoffman. The accused in this case represented the broad spectrum of American radicalism at the time, from the Black
Panthers to intellectual dissidence, and the trial was an example of applying criminal sanctions and procedure to an essentially political matter (Daneelski, 1970). Still another example is the Supplemental Extradition Agreement of 1985 between the United States and the United Kingdom. As has we have seen, this Treaty invalidates claims to political status respecting a number of acts commonly carried out by "international terrorists" and labels the activity "criminal".

There is, in this writer's opinion, not much promise that "law abiding nations threatened by terrorist attacks" (news conference, September 22, 1986) will be protected by the rule of law in the international context. No coherent set of control institutions capable of effectively enforcing legal principles in the global forum seems to exist. The fact that many nations harbour, fund and train "international terrorists" makes this especially difficult (cf. Goren, 1984: 142-183).

g) War: The metaphors used in this category depict "terrorism" as a type of warfare, with the control prescription, as obvious here as it is with the Crime and Justice theme, being one of military response. In late December, 1985, baggage from Israeli EL AL airline flights exploded at the Rome and Vienna airports and killed scores of innocent bystanders. Focusing on the Vienna incident, Reagan applied the war metaphor and labelled the act "literally an
act of war against Austria (January 10th, 1986). Understanding of notions such as prisoners of war, acts of aggression against a state, combat zones, and the use of organised and uniformed military personnel are included. As a control-oriented theme, options of retaliation with military forces are a primary consideration.

The war theme makes a relatively late appearance, and not coincidentally, just in time to set the stage for the Libya bombing, which, it is remembered, was labelled an act of self-defense in response to an attack on the American state, and justified by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. It is not possible to conclude that Reagan did or did not make instrumental use of war ideology to justify the raid in Libya before it was attempted, or if these attitudes precipitated the raid. It is valid, however, to note that there is some relation of the increase in signification of the War theme to the temporal position of the Libyan raid. The application of war imagery is the perfect (if not prerequisite) justification for U.S. military action against terrorists. If this justification was effectively inculcated, the population at large would support any such action, as terrorism would be perceived as a mode of warfare. The poll undertaken by Time referred to in Chapter I (p. 29) would support this position, with seven of ten Americans favouring the United States action in Libya.

In the case of the war theme, it is not easy to define
the transformation effect and apply an appropriate title. The best alternative is militarisation, although terrorist organisations usually lack the internal organisation of military establishments. They characteristically operate in loose cell structures with minimal to major intra group cleavages (Schiller, 1987; Crelinsten, 1987b: 61).

The central points concerning the war theme are that the militarisation transformation represents the phenomenon of "terrorism" in a way which justifies a military response, and which may credit the "terrorist" with a political credibility that he may or may not genuinely claim. Thus, to go once again to Reagan's landmark speech of July 8th, 1985, we find discourse such as that below, where Reagan righteously declares that "The American people are not ... going to tolerate outright acts of war against this nation and its people." From the point of view of the insurgent, the militarisation transformation opens up the political forum and makes room for the debate of whether or not the current regime actually does represent "the people", as well as providing the opportunity to battle over the constituency of "the people" (Rubenstein, 1987:24,29). The scope of the constituency may be intracommunal or local, regional, national, or international, depending on the case at hand.
and the total number of applications over the six years.
The seven categories of themes within each of these periods,
the numbers represent the number of applications of each of
January to April, May to August, and September to December.
* Data is grouped in four months periods, or thirds of a year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Narcos-Terrorism</th>
<th>War</th>
<th>Victimization</th>
<th>Civilization</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Crime and Justice</th>
<th>Internationalization</th>
<th>Negativisms</th>
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</table>

* *Theme used by one third years*

Table III
Theme Interaction and Contradiction:

In the last section the discussion of each theme revolved around its transformation effects, which are listed below in point of reference:

TABLE IV
Themes and transformation Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Effect</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negativisms</td>
<td>moral delegitimation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy/Civilisation</td>
<td>politicisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narco-Terrorism</td>
<td>convergence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Victimisation</td>
<td>victimisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalisation</td>
<td>ideological deletion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime and Justice</td>
<td>criminalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>militarisation</td>
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</table>

One must now return momentarily to the issue of applying labels. It is clear that each theme adds up to something more than the transformation label suggests, and that a degree of conceptual overlap and contradiction is expressed in Reagan's application of themes.

The most obvious and general example of transformation overlap is found with the case of Negativisms, which were shown to transform the subject matter by engaging moral delegitimation. However, every theme could be said to participate in this process. It is certainly morally illegitimate to commit crime, to victimise innocent persons, or to subvert democratic civilisation through violence. In the broadest and most simple sense, the whole of Reagan's discourse is a means of delegitimising "terrorism" and justifying his administration's response to it.
A more direct comparison may be made between the Crime and Justice and Narco Terrorism themes. The Crime and Justice theme has criminalisation as its transformation effect. As clear as this effect is, the Narco-Terrorism theme also carries criminal justice prescriptions as part of its convergence transformation; does it therefore not also criminalise the object of discussion? The answer is not yes or no, but a question of emphasis within each discrete theme.

To continue along these lines, one sees that there is a striking contradiction in the use of the Crime and Justice theme and the Democracy /Civilisation theme. These two themes and their transformations are entirely opposed at the conceptual level and in terms of their respective transformations. Terrorism is being both politicised through the d/c theme and depoliticised by Reagan through his use of the Crime and Justice theme. A criminal justice approach to deviance implicitly depoliticises/individualises the "problem" and thereby makes control efforts appear to be part of the normal process of maintaining order (see pp. 98-100, this Chapter). Diametrically, the d/c theme politicises/generalises the signified threat of the issue of "terrorism".

As further examples of theme interaction and overlap in transformation effects, one may maintain that the war and internationalisation themes politicise the issue of terrorism. War intrinsically involves challenges and defenses of state power, whether it is between nations or within a
nation. Is politics, as Lenin put it, simply the continuation of war by other means, or vice versa? The internationalisation theme makes consistent reference to a conspiracy of "terrorist states" sponsoring terrorism. Both of these themes import political implications and thereby politicise the issue of terrorism to some extent; this politicisation may not be as obvious as it is with the d/c theme, but it is nonetheless apparent. To restate, it is a question of emphasis within the theme itself that determined what labels were applied.

The previous analysis of Reagan's discourse has shown how "terrorism" is politicised, criminalised, militarised, victimised, magnified in terms of its threat due to convergence, subject to moral delegitimation, and selectively defined as the object of ideological deletion. As discussed above, some of these transformations are complementary but some are clearly contradictory. Contradictions are most noticeable when one is discussing control responses, i.e. with the use of the War, Crime and Justice, and Democracy/Civilisation themes (this is examined in greater detail below). Reagan has used all three of the dominant "models of control" (politics, crime and war) that are applied to terrorism (Crelinsten, 1987a: 8-12). To put it another way, all three of the "thresholds" identified by Hall et al. have been crossed in Reagan's signification, i.e. the thresholds of morality, legality, and explicitly political
violence (1978:226). The subject of "terrorism" was assigned a number of diverse yet singularly damning qualities.

Of course, this style of ideological contradiction is not peculiar to Reagan's terrorism discourse. There has been a longstanding debate over the validity of a concept of "political crime", and with regard to the problems of "objectively" defining such a concept. We are therefore left with the sensitive issue of extradition in international relations, and the mixing of the politics and justice models extradition implies. In Nuremberg at the War Trials conjured up to deal with Nazi Germany's atrocities committed against the Slavs, intellectuals and Jews, there was a great deal of debate regarding the contradictory overlap of concepts of war and crime that formed a hitherto non-existent reality: "war crimes". Situational adaptation seems to be characteristic, with political entities applying labels as is convenient, and in a self-serving manner. With the issue of terrorism, such a process is occurring today in Israel, where Israelis and their supporters label raids into Lebanon as "counter-terrorism". Critics of the Israelis claim Israel is the "terrorist", and PLO or Shiite activities to be those of a "national liberation" movement or "jihad". Each side, firmly committed to its own ideology in the pursuit of its interests, finds it very difficult to see things as otherwise and ideological mudslinging continues (cf. Lilienthal, 1986; Chomsky, 1987).
It is not difficult, however, for a political observer to understand that lacking a coherent, dependable, and stable order internationally, the American state attempts to keep all potential avenues of control or response open. In a social formation where the state has a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, signifying and mapping "unrelated" phenomena as parts of a general crisis of law and order during periods of hegemonic crisis is difficult enough, as Hall et al. (1978) demonstrate. With the difficulties of international negotiations (for example, the refusal of Italy to extradite the Achille Lauro hijackers in 1985), and the reality of ideological rifts such as those between Soviet bloc nations and N.A.T.O. states, predictability in international affairs is even more unlikely. Each nation state clings zealously to its "legitimate" jurisdiction, and, at least, resents alien efforts at exercising authority within that jurisdiction. Control efforts by a state in the international system are therefore extremely difficult to effect, even if the state is dealing with an ally. Further, as the generally bipolar (West/East or democratic-capitalist/ state-socialist) character of modern international politics indicates, there is no widely agreed upon set of normative boundaries in the international states system. Eclecticism becomes the (logical) solution, and in the case examined here, ideological clustering is the mechanism of legitimation. Whether or not that legitimation is effective or not is another matter.
A fresh look at some of Reagan's statements and reactions to political events will help illustrate how the themes he developed were used side-by-side and in a serialised form.

Reagan's response to the Marine barracks Lebanon disaster in 1983 was as brief as that in the media (see Chapter I, p. 20). As discussed in the first section of this Chapter, Reagan only made three statements concerning the "terrorist" perpetrators. Because of this, it is difficult for one to determine how Reagan perceived the bombing of the Marine barracks, although one may state that he does not project images of terrorism as warfare at this point. In the following statement, he comments on the status of an American military officer, Lieutenant Goodman, being held hostage by Shiites in Lebanon. The Shiites labelled Goodman a prisoner of war: "I don't know how you have a prisoner of war when there is no war declared between nations [December 20th, 1983]." We may contrast this position with that enunciated by Reagan two years later, in the Summer of 1985.

Significant development in Reagan's depiction of "terrorism" occurs in this period. He projects a mixed image of "terrorism" as warfare, crime, and as an international conspiracy which threatens civilised societies. The following passage, taken from his famous speech to the American Bar Association of July 8th, 1985, illustrates this
well:

The community of nations must act against the criminal menace of terrorism with the full weight of the law... These terrorist states are now engaged in Acts of War against the Government and people of the United States. And under international law any state which is the victim of acts of war has the right to defend itself... Past lawyers have helped when civilization was threatened by law-breakers and now is the time to do so again.

This mixing of ideological themes makes it difficult to determine exactly how one is intended to view terrorism. Here, Reagan has come full circle from 1983, when he denied the legitimacy of applying war concepts to the U.S. fight against "international terrorism". He has also introduced other contradictory themes, such as crime and justice and democracy-civilisation. One is still left pondering the question of terrorism's proper status: politics, or crime, or war, or perhaps some peculiar hybrid. If President Reagan can get away with using terms so loosely and with such apparent contradiction, one is also left to wonder what the practical significance is of the labels one applies to terrorism. This significance must reside in how the phenomenon is responded to.

Concerning the control of "terrorism", it is interesting that the United States engaged in its military raid on Libya in April of 1986 only four months after the December, 1985, United Nations unanimous resolution which defined all terrorism as a form of international criminal activity. A
Canadian newspaper commented around the same time that the "rule of law impedes [the] war on terrorism" (Montreal Gazette. December 3rd, 1985, p. B3). The author of that article, editor David Shipley, noted that the recent hijacking of an Egypt Air jetliner on the 24th of November was both an act of war and a crime, and further, that the use of Egyptian commandos to extricate the hostages was evidence of "the futility of judicial process as a deterrent and the riskiness of military force as a defence against terrorism". More than fifty people lost their lives in the rescue attempt.

While military action might be the most "practical" alternative, in the interest of reducing human casualties and maintaining law and order in the international system, states usually pursue diplomatic channels and negotiate solutions to crisis scenarios. Military response, it would seem, is a response of last resort for at least two reasons: 1) it may imply political legitimacy in the "terrorist" cause; 2) grievous loss of human life is likely to result, and this imposes a moral constraint on the controller.

But perhaps advocates of military reprisal and preemptive deterrence such as Secretary of State George Schultz are correct in their estimation of the terrorist threat. The principles of extradition expressed in the United States - United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty, specifically that of depoliticising terrorist actions
to facilitate extradition and criminal trial, did not operate in the Achille Lauro affair where the Italian government allowed Abul Abbas safe passage to Yugoslavia, and thereby to escape the United States government. Here, due to the mixing of models of control implied in extradition, the politics of the situation overwhelmed an attempt at employing criminal justice sanctions. Just as ineffective as the American extradition attempt in this case was the offer of rewards up to $250,000 made by the State Department in connection with the TWA and Kuwaiti Airlines hijackings. It is ironic that in seeking to impose order internationally the United States used a technique which is reminiscent of the "wild West", indirectly alluding to the lawlessness and lack of order that characterised nineteenth century Western America and the contemporary international system. Still, there have been successes. The trial of Fawaz Yunis began on February 27th, 1989; he is the first person accused of violating a 1984 federal law that makes it a crime to commit hijacking overseas if Americans are victims. He was the leader in a short-lived hijacking by five Amal militia members of a Royal Air Jordanian jetliner on 11 June 1985, in Beirut, Lebanon. Three Americans were aboard, and while the plane was destroyed by the terrorists, none of the Americans or the other passengers were injured. In 1987, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Yunis after luring him off his Cyprus-bound ship and aboard an American vessel.
An objective opinion must count Reagan's failures in the counter terrorism field and conclude, as has Celmer (1987), that the Reagan administration failed to provide an effective and coherent response to the "international terrorist" problem. In the midst of Reagan's Contragate trauma in 1986, a Canadian journalist predicted that "when the dust from the arms-for-Iran affair settles, Reagan will count himself lucky if he emerges as a lazy, absentee, and basically honest president - if not an especially capable one" (Toronto Star, December 28th, 1986: B1). To be fair, one must also note Rubenstein's observation that "no government - not even that of Israel, which negotiated for the release of its soldiers held hostage in Lebanon - has been able to develop and maintain a consistent counterterrorist strategy." (1987:229). The phenomenon of terrorism imposes severe pressure on governments; every "terrorist" group and every movement springs from specific historical-political conditions, and a broad repertoire of tactics is available to the would-be terrorist. There can be no single, unitary response to a phenomenon as diverse as modern-day terrorism. One may therefore venture the point that the contradictory quality of Reagan's signification of "terrorism" reflects the nature of terrorism as much as it defines it.

Even if Reagan did manage to escape the flames of criticism and salvage his administration's political image, his discourse on terrorism toned down considerably in the
last two thirds of 1986. It lacked the vigour and flamboyance it had very recently displayed. The discussion of "terrorism" relied on comparatively bland pleas to consider the "innocent victims of terrorism", and the "threat" of the "state sponsors of terrorism". The statement below is typical of the period.

My policy [is] to oppose terrorism throughout the world, to punish those who support it, and to make common cause with those who suppress it (December 2nd, 1986).

There is no sign here of the inflammatory appeals to combat what Reagan had described as "acts of war" and "criminal atrocities" that were the foundation of Reagan’s terrorism discourse less than seven months before.

It is difficult for a critically minded observer to hold on to both Reagan’s definition of terrorism as war and as crime, unless some sort of Orwellian "doublethink" is entered into. On many occasions the President asks his audience to hold more than one conception of "terrorism". As was suggested earlier, these contradictions are especially notable when one considers state responses to terrorism. Images of the military rounding up common thieves creates cognitive dissonance for the writer (unless one has a situation of martial law), as do the variable ascriptions applied to terrorism in Reagan’s discourse. Such dissonance would seemed to have been behind the criticisms of former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau for his October, 1970 imposition of the War Measures Act in response to the
terroristic activities of the Front de Liberation du Quebec. The imposition of the Act, among other aspects, recruited the military in aid of civil power, and gave police the power of arrest without warrant and the right to hold individuals incommunicado for extended periods. The peacetime application of the Act was tenuous outside a demonstrable situation of war or of apprehended insurrection, which the government maintained there was. On the other hand, there is nothing inherently violatory in the use of the military as the instrument of law and order. Properly trained soldiers could perform the law and order function just as well as police officers. Convention, not anything intrinsic, determines our acceptance or rejection of authority.

As was shown in the last section, an important quality of the war metaphor is its implication that the "terrorist" has gained a political constituency, and therefore that he is worthy of exceptional attention. The crime model implicitly denies any claim to political or other special status. "[T]he criminal justice system is usually an effective tool for stripping violent acts of their potential meaning, reducing them to idiosyncratic actions of isolated individuals,..."; the military metaphor, on the other hand, must succeed in identifying the deviants as "enemies" and a threat to national security (Crelinsten, 1987c: 442-43). This was exactly the process into which the government of Canada entered with its imposition of the War Measures Act in
October of 1970; having failed to deny the political legitimacy of the FLQ with the use of the crime metaphor, the use of the "war model" produced the perception that the level of threat represented by the movement was worthy of exceptional measures.

The escalation from "normal" law and order solutions to deviance, to more repressive military or other approaches, may suggest that the state has failed in some degree to fulfill its role of maintaining order. This type of resort to "exceptional" means may therefore discredit the state, and further the insurgent cause in consequence. We can see this type of progression or escalation in the interaction of themes in Reagan's signification of "terrorism".

From 1981 to September, 1983, Reagan relied on Negativisms, i.e. on the moral delegitimation of "terrorists". As political criticism and terrorist incidents mounted in 1984 through to the end of 1985, Reagan began to increase his significations of the Crime and Justice and Internationalisation themes to the point where they and the Negativisms theme had the same proximate levels of use. Then, with the spectre of Libyan terrorism (under the direction of the "mad dog" Moammar Khaddafí) being fully constructed in Reagan's discourse, the use of the War theme was increased in the last third of 1985, and the first two thirds of 1986. This increase came at the same time that the three (still) predominant themes of Internationalisation, Negativisms and
Crime and Justice were decreasing in their number of significations.

To conclude this section, we may note that there appears always to be inherent contradiction in control attempts when the state extends itself internationally. International "law" is needed to justify responses to acts of "war", as Reagan did in the Libya case. "Political" cooperation is required if a state wishes to successfully apprehend international "terrorist criminals", as American effort in the Achille Lauro case and the negotiation of the 1985 Extradition Treaty with Britain showed. One does not need to discuss intention on the part of Reagan, or more abstractly, his administration. As shown in Chapter III, any statements in this regard are entirely speculative. Instead, one may focus on Reagan's signification of terrorism and investigate the larger process of Transformation, a process which presupposes the use of contradictory themes.

The Process of Transformation:

It is in the overall serialisation of transformations that the most interesting aspects of the ideological formation applied to the issue of "terrorism" reside. As has been illustrated, one has a complex constellation of signifiers forming a dynamic and fluid ideological formation. Presented in the signifying units of language, the many colours of the themes used by President Reagan in his
discourse are blended and coupled in different manners, resulting in the production of an historically evolving ideological mosaic. This ideological Transformation has a nature which may be compared with the signification processes characterising a crisis of order as described by Hall et al. (1978) and a moral panic as discussed by Cohen (1980).

As previously demonstrated in Chapter II, the convergence of issues during a crisis of order entails the linking of a variety of (usually) unrelated phenomena to the point where a general crisis of order is perceived by the population at large. This depiction of a crime wave and/or the creation of a crisis of order displays phenomena in their most violent form, thereby amplifying their perceived "threat potential" for society. The process of ideological signification legitimises control efforts of the state, and displaces attention from structural problems, such as exploitation and underemployment. The targets of resulting law and order campaigns are the relatively powerless in the system (the working classes, young persons, etc.). Campaigns are seldom undertaken against the powerful (eg. against white collar crime or crimes at the workplace).

When a single-issue moral panic is in process, public attention is drawn to elements of style and fashion which make the deviants readily identifiable and distinguishes them from the population at large. For the deviants themselves,
these styles or modes of behaviour are both symbolic and practical means of expressing and adapting to one's social position (Cohen, 1980: 179). The now familiar image of Palestinian "terrorists" with their patterned scarves ("khafkas") wrapped about their neck or head is an example regarding "terrorism". The patterns on the material represent Palestinian nationalism, and they are worn about the face to conceal the identity of the wearer from Israeli security forces. Broad structural dynamics, such as working class membership, or, in the case of international insurgent political violence, a history of imperialist or "foreign" subjugation, are generally not accounted for in popular portrayals of the deviants. Signified ideology thereby mystifies social and political relations, clouding reality with morality.

The key feature of convergence is that it maps together a number of distinct issues through the process of signification. That process is described as a spiral which is "self-amplifying within the area of signification" in terms of the potential threat of the events and issues being signified. In the case of "terrorism" as defined in Reagan's discourse, audience attention is focused on a specific problem due to the operation of ideological deletion - i.e. the problem of "international terrorism". Audiences do not hear of the state terrorism practiced by third world regimes and other nations, many of which have strong political ties
to the United States and are economically dependant (cf. Chomsky and Herman, 1979). The deletion transformation represented by the internationalisation theme is central in this displacement process by limiting conceptions of terrorism to its insurgent, anti-Western form. As noted in Chapter III, the efficacy of this transformation is expected to vary across history, generally, and between specific audiences.

There is a major difference between the process of convergence and the structure of signification exhibited in Reagan's discourse. We have seen in Reagan's discourse that a variety of issues are not linked to cause a number of distinct issues to be perceived as part of a broader crisis of order or morality. The Narco-Terrorism theme is an exception. By linking international narcotics trade with international terrorism the significance of the threat of terrorism, as well as the "drug problem" in America, are magnified. This development is a small exception internal to the larger process of Transformation in which Reagan engages. Within the greater scope, terrorism is the issue. It is the image presented by the ideological mosaic, the culmination of all the specific transformations that add up to the larger Transformation of the events being discussed. The technique in this case is not, then, convergence relating to a crisis of the international or domestic order.

Reagan's discussion of terrorism more closely
approximates the signification structure characterising moral panics. A variety of themes are clustered together and used to signify a single issue. This signification, if widely and effectively disseminated, becomes the popular conception of terrorism. While a crisis is still being presented (some might say fabricated) the nature of its presentation is different from that typifying a crisis of order.

When the process of convergence is in operation, a number of issues are mapped together, much like one would do a connect-the-dot diagram. The final image is created from a signification process that structures perception along ideological lines, much like the artist creates a recognisable form by connecting lines to specific points on a page. To the contrary, the process in discrete moral panics takes a single, identifiable issue (such as Reagan did with the issue of terrorism) and signifies that issue in a number of ways, using a number of themes to produce transformations. The issue becomes the receptacle for all the evils which the definer/disseminator of ideology wishes to apply. With a crisis of order, then, the devil is amorphous but manifests itself in a number of forms (such as drug dealers, hooligans, punk rockers and ethnic groups). The panic is not issue-specific but general. In the case of moral panic and the associated clustering of themes around the "folk devil", the problem is a known quantity. This identifiable quantity then becomes the antithesis to any number of commonly held values
(e.g. democracy, law and order, peace).

Moral panic depends on the linking of ideas with a focus on a specific adversary, and often forms part of convergence, where there is a linking of concrete phenomena already identified as "folk devils" into a general crisis of order. After having examined the thematic content of Reagan's statements in some detail and reviewed his administration's response to terrorism, one may reflect on the following passage taken from Cohen (1972: 28), in which the nature of a folk devil and a moral panic are summarised:

Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, an episode, person or persons emerge to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests;... ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to;... Sometimes the panic is passed over and forgotten ... at other times it has more serious and long-standing repercussions and might produce such changes in legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself.

Reagan's discourse and his responses to terrorism are consistent with Cohen's description, at least from 1984 through the first two thirds of 1986 when he spoke on the subject with some regularity. The condition is "terrorism", the episodes are many, the signified threat is intense and diverse, and the person who best represented the threat in Reagan's discourse was Libyan leader Moammar Khaddafi.

Reagan also introduced a number of control options in his discourse, presented terrorism as a challenge to democratic values, and, possibly, he made Americans perceive themselves in a special way by making implicit appeals to
nationalism in his identification of the threat terrorism posed to America and its allies. As is characteristic of moral panics, one finds Reagan ascribing contradictory qualities in his signification of terrorism, and the escalation of state response to the problem at hand: from moral condemnation, to diplomatic and law and order solutions, to military reprisal and preemptive deterrence. Although the linking of "terrorism" with other issues that would have suggested the signification of a crisis of order did not occur, the progression from issues of morality, to legality, and finally to those of extreme violence was quite clear; this progression was reflected in control responses culminating with the bombing of Libya in 1986. Reagan, as already shown, progressed from a signification of terrorism as a morally illegitimate enterprise, to the phenomenon as an international conspiracy committing criminal acts against the United States and its allies, and finally to all of the above plus acts of War against the people of America. The panic over "terrorism", at least in terms of the level of signification of the issue in Reagan's discourse, declined considerably beginning in the middle third of 1986.

It is noteworthy that Reagan denied the legitimacy of responding to "terrorism" with terrorism on a number of occasions. Given the pejorative nature of the term itself, one would not expect a politician to advocate publicly the use of the technique. During a press conference on June 18th,
1985, the President was pressed to explain what his administration's response to the terrorist threat was going to be; he stated, "if you just aim in the general direction ... then you're a terrorist." The President was not able entirely to escape the perception that he had used terrorism. After the extent of civilian injury and number of deaths resulting from the Libyan bombing became clear, former United States Attorney General, Ramsey Clark, vilified Reagan, stating simply, "Ronald Reagan understands the use of terrorism" (1986: 972).

Insurgents often desire to lure the state into using extreme violence and repression, therefore to show its "real character" and facilitate the conversion of persons to the terrorist cause. The political and moral condemnation of Reagan and his administration in the aftermath of the Libyan bombing illustrated that the "big stick" approach is not always politically saleable (although Reagan's Libyan adventure met with favour domestically, in spite of comments such as those by Mr. Clark, above).

While the control themes Reagan uses are conceptually contradictory, the practical fact may be that an eclectic policy is the only route open to government, because, as has been argued, control models overlap in international affairs and are therefore undependable. A flexible and eclectic policy towards terrorism is not the singular domain of the United States. A recently published Canadian government
report regarding terrorism states, "International agreements are only one weapon... and are certainly not the strongest or most effective weapon in Canada's fight against terrorism" (Canada, 1987: 29). It is hard to negotiate with a nation that coddles those who you define as terrorists because the nation views the "terrorists" as heroic national liberation fighters and your nation as an oppressive imperialist entity serving capital. The protracted cold war between East and West, the debate over the legitimacy of the Israeli state, and similar issues, testify to the destabilising effect of ideological differences in the international context.

Ideological differences in the liberal democracies are usually resolved through the institutions of political and civil society. Internationally, institutions capable of such effective compromise and resolution do not seem to exist, although the United Nations, the Commonwealth and similar political institutions represent attempts at creating an institutional forum.

Even if efforts to control "international terrorism" are stymied by contextual and political factors, there is no necessary loss of legitimacy for the American state. Nationality is projected inward by depicting "terrorism" as a potential threat to Americans, to the democratic traditions which they hold dear, and to the international order of which America is a part. If legitimation is successful, the battle against "international terrorism" becomes part of the
perceived national interest. It may, at certain points, even take on a messianic or paranoid quality. For instance, President Reagan has accused the Soviets and their international terrorist cohorts of wanting to transform the United States from "an open democracy into a closed fortress" (December 27th, 1983). The internationalisation theme comes very close to defining the "terrorist" problem as part of a greater global conspiracy. This is still, however, thinly veiled and implied only.

As signified in Ronald Reagan’s discourse, "terrorism" is a threat to a civilised and democratic way of life, acts of a cowardly covenant victimising innocent bystanders, an internationally orchestrated campaign undermining American interests worldwide, the same thing as international narcotics trade, and acts of war against the United States of America. Reagan may now, as he did, state that America can legitimately mobilise to combat the "threat of terrorism diplomatically, economically, legally, and when necessary, militarily" (Reagan, speaking with regard to the passage of the Omnibus Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986; on August 27th, 1986). While proceeding in this manner, Reagan defines the phenomenon of terrorism in a mixed and contradictory way, showing it to be in violation of a variety of normative boundaries and prescribing a number of control options.

It is clear that the ideological signification of terrorism Transforms the phenomenon into an object which is
open to the "legitimate" wrath of the American state. Just as criminals within a nation are subject to judicial processing if apprehended, terrorists will be subject to a variety of control options ranging from the polite talk of diplomats to the reckless violence of war. The primary implication of an analysis of Reagan's discourse is that a wide scope of control options will remain politically viable for the American state due to the use of the technique of applying variable ideological themes in his discourse.
"Terrorism" is a thorny problem. The sponsorship of terrorist groups by many states makes it a politically sensitive issue, and there seems to be profound difficulty in deciding what mode of control to apply to the terrorist enigma. As Rubenstein argues,

The chief defect of the terrorism-as-crime metaphor [is] its failure to admit the possibility of a continuum linking terrorism to an armed struggle and mass violence. The chief defect of terrorism-as-warfare is its failure to admit the continuum has frequently been frozen or reversed, condemning small-group fighters to martyrdom, either heroic or absurd, depending on one's point of view (1997: 33).

At many points, we seem to be faced with the choices of pursuing a law and order response, one that ignores the political implications of terrorist activity, or pursuing a military response, one which may give the terrorist undue attention and irritate the political situation. To ignore the political dimension and to attempt to impose a law and order solution internationally is, at least, a naive approach and assumes a degree of control in the international context that the United States simply does not command. To engage in extensive, or even limited preemptive military action against "terrorists", and then to attempt to consolidate and expand geopolitical interests is probably politically foolhardy, as the intensely negative international reaction to the Libya bombing must have shown the United States.

The choice, if there is one to be made, is difficult
indeed. Many observers would agree with Celmer, who argues "that there are no solutions[,] the best that can be achieved is damage control..." (1987: 116). Noting how widespread the use of terrorism as a method of practicing politics has become, Rubenstein reaches a similar conclusion, seeing "no effective response" within the confines of contemporary liberal and conservative political philosophies; he continues, "Patient coping leaves the problem untouched and counter terrorism worsens it" (1987: 234).

In spite of these less than hopeful speculations, terrorism is perhaps the ideal antagonist, affording as it does a number of benefits to the state as a target of official attention. These benefits relate to appeals respecting terrorism which promote perceptions of a national cause and a national interest. In Reagan's discourse, the sometimes implied and usually express messages are in this form: "We must act against this challenge to our democratic values, the very basis of our society. The international terror network is engaged in the commission of heinous crimes and acts of war against the people of the United States, targeting innocent civilians". From the perspective of government, the greatest potential gain concerning the issue of "terrorism" may be an ability to rally nationalist sentiment and increase support for activities in other spheres.

A number of government aligned analysts have demonstrated that "international terrorists" are very much engaged in, or a
part of, challenges to the political and economic interests of the American state and the Western alliance system, either directly or by implication (Laqueur, 1987; Goren, 1984; Dror, 1983; Quainton, 1983; Sterling, 1981). The degree of conspiracy, cooperation and sponsorship between "terrorist" groups and states is a subject open to considerable debate. Many have suggested that this dimension is overstated in discourse such as former President Reagan's, and that the core intention of depicting terrorism in this manner is to justify American geopolitical ambitions and capitalist expansionism (e.g. Herman, 1985; Chomsky and Herman, 1979). This position is supported by the fact that an intimate link developed between Reagan's foreign and counter-terrorism policies during his two terms as president.

Reagan's discourse contained diverse ideological propositions, with these being based in the specific thematic transformations of the subject of "terrorism". As one might expect, some of the transformations carried implications concerning how the phenomenon of terrorism might be responded to: politically through increased diplomacy and appeals to entities such as the United Nations, using a crime and justice model through the imposition of international and domestic law and the pursuit of extradition, or militarily using the tools of modern warfare. The dominant models used in the signification of social and political issues have important ramifications on how the deviants are dealt with, or not. The
combination of transformations and the depiction of terrorists as a type of global folk devil for the "community of civilized nations" left a wide scope of control options open to Reagan and his administration. And as was shown, Mr. Reagan used or attempted to use a number of these options in the fight against terrorism, from negotiating extradition agreements to bombing raids.

At several points, major political and/or terrorist events coincided with sometimes subtle and sometimes marked changes in the levels of application of certain themes. This prompts the question of whether Reagan's discourse is instrumental in design, or reactivity oriented. While it is a question that the present study cannot address, the observation suggests further investigation along two fronts. First, difficult as it is to do post facto analyses of public perception, available data concerning American public perception of Reagan's counter terrorism policies needs to be analysed with respect to changing context. Secondly, a precise analysis of the policy process is needed to determine the attitudes of the policy makers that inform policy decisions, as well as those of the policy consumers.

The most general, and perhaps the most significant finding of the analysis, was that Mr. Reagan made eclectic use of concepts, and thus approached the issue of terrorism in an implicitly pragmatic manner. This observation supports either an instrumentalist or a reactive interpretation of events. It
also reflects the enigmatic character of the "terrorist" problem (crime, or war, or politics?), and the political flux characterising the capitalist world system and modern liberal-democracies.

The implied comparison of Reagan's "terrorists" with Cohen's (1980) concept of the "folk devil" is ostensibly correct, but there is no "moral panic" over the issue of terrorism in the sense that Cohen develops these concepts. "Terrorism" is a challenge from outside the United States, not from within, as were Cohen's "Mods and Rockers" and Hall et al.'s "muggers" in Great Britain. It may, however, be stated that the form of Reagan's discourse is consistent with the process of signification characterising a moral panic: the focus on a specific issue, the clustering of themes, violation of a number of normative boundaries, and the amplification of threat.

The analysis only provides minimal basis for the suggestion that a general crisis of either (or both) the international or domestic order is being signified through a convergence of issues. The basis is contained in Reagan's five applications of the Narco-Terrorism theme. Concerning this dimension, future efforts should examine presidential and other terrorism discourse to see if a mapping of issues is occurring. Possible directions here would be the increase in the signification of the Narco-Terrorism linkage, or perhaps of a terrorist-world communist or terrorist-Islamic jihad
conspiracy. Any convergence would be aided by the internationalisation theme, which, as already noted, provides a basis for linking "terrorism" with other issues. The effectiveness of a convergence, it is remembered, depends on its basic core of truth and applicability to the current situation; its falsehood lies in its overestimation of threat potential.

If linkages do occur, one may postulate that the United States would assume a more aggressive stance internationally. This is probable if a number of prominent observers are correct, and the United States are in decline and currently experiencing a loss of hegemony and economic power vis à vis the other liberal democracies and third world nations (Wallerstein, 1979: 31-33, 95-96; Celmer, 1987: 1; Calleo, 1987). In experiencing a crisis of hegemony in the world system, the American state may engage in, as Hall et al. put it in their analysis of the domestic crisis of hegemony suffered by the British state, a change in "the operation of the state away from consent towards the pole of coercion" (1978:217).

Similarly, Noam Chomsky has made the prediction that the United States will attempt to "discipline" the international order through its activities at the United Nations (in Dieterich, 1985: 107). American antagonism toward the United Nations was seen in December 1988, when the United States refused to allow PLO leader Yassar Arafat into America to
participate in United Nations discussions regarding a Palestinian homeland in Israel. The refusal was based on Arafat's connection with a "terrorist" organisation. Due to the position adopted by the Americans, special arrangements were made and the discussions carried out in Switzerland.

These observations lead one back to some final, more general comments. In addition to essentially descriptive efforts that study terrorism as a set of behaviours or investigate the groups which constitute the terrorist complex, terrorism research requires solid conjunctural analyses focusing on the issue of terrorism and the political, economic and ideological functions it serves in modern liberal democratic and world politics. With funding for terrorism research coming primarily from government, most research is directed toward narrow policy or control-related issues ("What do we do about terrorism and how?"). A great deal can be learned from analyses focusing on why certain control activity is resorted to under specific circumstances and how that activity is justified. Reagan's terrorism discourse, with its elaborate serialisation of themes and images, shows that the process of justification can be complex and open to a number of interpretations.
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APPENDIX A

RONALD REAGAN’S STATEMENTS
This appendix lists, by date, the themes and metaphors (identified in chapter V) applied to the group of primary signifiers: terrorism, terrorist, terrorists, and terroristic. The legend below lists the seven themes and their respective designators.

**LEGEND**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
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<tr>
<td>Negativisms</td>
<td>(n)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internationalisation</td>
<td>(i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy/Civilisation</td>
<td>(dc)</td>
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<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>(w)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crime and Justice</td>
<td>(cj)</td>
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<td>Victimisation</td>
<td>(v)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Narco-Terrorism</td>
<td>(nt)</td>
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</table>
January 29th
anyone who violates our rights (cj)

March 17th
Those who sow fear and terror (n)

April 2nd
stability of Turkish democracy (dc)

April 30th
the act of terrorism here and there, scattered throughout the world and not quite large enough in dimension for us to rally as we did in that war [WWII] (w)

May 13th
terrible act of violence (n)

July 20th
international terrorism (i)
anti-terrorist conventions (cj)

September 4th
violence and terror... constitutes a grave threat to the fabric of society (dc)

October 6th
an act of infamy, cowardly infamy, fills us with horror (n)

October 7th
an act of infamy, cowardly infamy, fills us with horror (n)

October 18th
The forces of violence, madness, and hatred (n) enemies of peace, the enemies of humanity (n)

December 4th
international terrorists, who present another important area of concern (i)

December 4th
protect against ... international terrorist activities (i) detection and countering of international terrorist activities (i)
international terrorism (i)
1982

January 18th
The great senseless cruelty and tragedy of it is simply to create terror by making people generally feel unsafe (n)

January 28th
vicious act (n)
murder (n)
the criminal or those criminals...to trial so justice can be done (cj)

February 18th
cowardly acts (n)
a crime against mankind (n, cj)

May 5th
cowardly assassination (n)

June 7th
threat which international terrorism represents to the free world (i, dc)

June 8th
reign of terror over their own citizens (n)

June 10th
acts of international terrorism (i)
flagrant violation of human dignity and are a threat to the conduct of normal international relations (dc)
scurge (n)

October 19th
the scourge of terrorism (n)
Terrorism threatens the fabric of society by indiscriminately aiming violence at the innocent (dc, v)
December 15th
terrorist attacks are sponsored by a government (i)
outrages (n)
civilized world (dc)

December 20th
preying on civilians (n, v)

December 27th
fundamentally new phenomenon of state-supported
terrorism (i)
ugly manifestation (n)
senseless murder (n)
an open democracy into a closed fortress (dc)
civilized countries (dc)
terrorists ... possessed by a fanatical intensity that
individuals of a democratic society can barely
comprehend (dc)
terrorism has some tacit encouragement from various
political groups and even from some states (i)
January 18th
despicable assassins (n)

January 25th
state-sponsored terrorism (i)
ugly spectre (n)

February 2nd
dastardly deeds (n)

February 21st
cowardly murder (n)
challenge to all of us and everything we believe in (dc)
enemies of peace (n)

March 13th
terrorism, whether by government or by individuals, is
repulsive (i, n)

April 17th
lawlessness that rules the behaviour of terrorist groups
(cj)
states have adopted these lawless acts (i, cj)
international terrorism (i)
right of any legitimate government to resist the use of
terrorism ... by all legal means available (cj)
threatened democracies (dc)
international terrorism (i)

April 26th
pressing and urgent problem of international terrorism
(i)
murder (n)
menace (n)
growing threat to our way of life (dc)
alarming new kind of terrorism has developed: the direct
use of instruments of terror by foreign states. This
"state terrorism"... (i)
terrorist murders and assassinations (n)
perpetrators ... brought to justice (c)
states practicing or supporting terrorism (i)
scourge (n)
threat that terrorism poses for all mankind (dc)
no role in civilized society for indiscriminate
threatening, intimidation (dc)
detention or murder of innocent people (n, v)
vilence to undermine democratic governments (dc)
war against terrorism (w)
international terrorism (i)
... gap in the law sends a false signal to terrorists (cj)
the problem of terrorism as a crime against the international community (cj)

June 4th
the pitiless, indiscriminate nature of terrorist violence, a violence evil to its core and contemptible in all its forms (n)
crude, cowardly violence of terrorism (n)
problem of international terrorism (i)
terrorism had developed other techniques, sometimes in association with traffic in drugs (nt)
increasing involvement of states and governments in terrorism (i)
states supporting terrorism (i)
a problem which affects all civilized states (dc)

June 18th
menace of those who seek to impose their will by force and terror (n)
to eradicate terrorism will be a major challenge to those of us who believe in the democratic process (dc)
Human liberty will prevail and civilization will triumph over this cowardly form of barbarism (dc, n)

September 20th
worldwide terrorist movement (i)
this threatens our people ... because these terrorist groups ... are opposed to everything that we stand for (dc)

September 20th
cowardly acts of terrorism (n)

September 20th
cowardly act of terrorism (n)

September 20th
international terrorist problem (i)

September 27th
strengthen our legal instruments for dealing with terrorists (cj)
take legal preventive action to thwart terrorist attacks (cj)
international terrorism (i)
brutality of terrorism (n)
October 10th
terrorism, is all over the world (i)
these cowardly acts ... tragedies ... some government or
governments inspiring and supporting these terrorist
activities (n, i)

October 19th
countering the insidious threat terrorism poses to those
who cherish freedom and democracy (n, dc)
international terrorism is a growing problem for all of
us in the Western World .... Western democracies are the
most often the targets, terrorist attacks are becoming
increasingly violent and indiscriminate (i, dc)
cowardly attempts at intimidation (n)
pervasive threat of international terrorism (i)
this menace to mankind (n, dc)

October 19th
Terrorism poses an insidious challenge to the principles
of freedom (n, dc)
attempt to strike at the very heart of Western
democratic values (dc)
cowardly attempts at intimidation (n)
pervasive and insidious threat (n)
innocent victims (v)
indiscriminate brutality (n)
senseless terror (n)
free people ... will not be deterred from our purpose by
threats of terrorism (dc)
victims of terrorism throughout the world (v)
sacrifices that have been made in the pursuit of peace
and freedom (dc)

October 31st
menace to humanity (n)
values of democratic nations (dc)
senseless murder (n)

November 27th
governments apparently supporting terrorism (i)
... kill innocent people ... then you're as bad as the
terrorist (v)
military action will be called for to ... conquer this
problem (w)
January 3rd
violent, anarchist activities (n)
assure that the guilty are brought to justice (cj)

January 26th
Iran has backed and supported terrorist activities (i)
treat with those criminals the way we treat with other
criminals, by way of Interpol (cj)
I referred to them as criminals a while ago. They are
criminals.... they’re criminals committing the worst and
most despicable kind of crime.... Now, you have the same
problem you have with crime (cj, cj, n, cj)
You can try to prevent their crimes (cj)
killing innocent people (v)
like the policeman warning the killers he is on his way
(cj)

February 7th
people who perpetrated the first crime (cj)
some terrorists do actually have national support and
backing (i)

March 11th
Terrorism in a new form of warfare and all we can do is
... find out where retaliation can take place (w)
There are some sovereign governments who are backing
this terrorism (i)

March 27th
International terrorism is indeed a new form of warfare
(i, w)
combat this ugly form of warfare (w, n)
stand against terrorism ... the allies will win the war
against this insidious disease (w, n)

March 29th
the fight against international terrorism (i)

April 1st
terrorists ... are actually emissaries of sovereign
governments (i)
track down a few terrorist individuals for some crime
(cj)
it’s a new form of warfare (w)

April 25th
a serious threat to democracy (dc)
international terrorism must be stopped (i)
June 18th
murder (n)
The US is being attacked by international terrorists who wantonly kill and who seize our innocents as their prisoners (i, n, v)
atrocity (n)
assassins (n)
bloody ransom all civilized nations must pay (dc)
terrorism is a stain (n)
the fear and scourge of terrorism (n)
it's the same as kidnapping crimes in our country (cj)
punished ... the guilty (cj)
you're sentencing someone else (cj)
cowardly crime (n, cj)
carbombs and hijacking and this kind of crime (cj)
committed a crime (cj)

June 20th
senseless terrorism ... this atrocity (n, n)
the war which terrorists are waging is a war against all of civilized society (w, dc)
this is a war which (w)
those who have little regard for human life and the values we cherish ... [and] our democratic institutions (dc)
terrorism ... will weaken our resolve to revitalize democracy (dc)
increasingly violent and indiscriminate but purposeful affront to humanity (n)
those who do not wish to abide by the norms of civilized society (dc)
Criminal acts (cj)
those who are responsible for such lawlessness (cj)

June 21st
the criminal threat to civilization is no mere domestic problem (cj, dc)
gunned down (n)
killers ... other perpetrators of inhumane acts (n)
terrorism ... these murders, hijackings and abductions, an attack on Western civilization by uncivilized barbarians (dc, n)

June 26th
Iran ... policy of supporting terrorism (i)
this scourge (n)

June 28th
kidnapped by thugs, murderers and barbarians (n)

June 28th
outrage of international terrorism (n, i)
when terrorism strikes civilization itself is under attack (dc)
a cancer, eating away at civilized societies (n, dc)
those who support it [terrorism] are barbarians (i, n)
great but diffuse evil (n)
vicious attacks (n)
Terrorists and those who support them must and will be
held to account (i)

June 30th
murderers ... must be held accountable; those
responsible for terrorist acts ... must be taken on by
civilized nations; the international community ... must
unite against terrorism and nations that sponsor
terrorism and give safe harbour to terrorists (n, dc, i)
fragile are the freedoms and the standards of decency of
civilized society.... Freedom, democracy and peace have
enemies; (dc)
lawless terrorists (cj)
ugly vicious evil of terrorism (n)

July 8th
as lawyers, you are also concerned with the rule of law
and the danger posed to it by criminals of both a
domestic and international variety (cj, i)
outrages (n)
an even larger and darker terrorist menace (n)
small group of fanatics (n)
attacks on America ... and other democratic nations ...
form a pattern of terrorism that has strategic
implications and political goals (dc)
vicious attacks (n)
innocent civilians are the victim of violence (v)
unless civilized nations act together to end this
assault on humanity (dc)
Quaddafi’s rages against civilized conduct (n)
gunning down (n)
state-approved assassination and terrorism (i)
three other governments supporting a campaign of
international terrorism against the US and her allies
(i)
murdered (n)
international terrorist network (i)
Castro ... sponsoring terrorism (i)
international terrorists ... murder (i, n)
most vicious terrorist groups (n)
gang (n)
terrorist network (i)
outlaw governments (cj)
terrorist networks (i)
growth in terrorism ... including the involvement of
these states in terrorism ... a confederation of
terrorist states (i)
kidnapping and murdering (n)
controlled by a core group of radical and totalitarian
governments, a new, international version of Murder
Incorporated (i, cj)
terrorism sponsored by these states (i)
purpose ... is to cause us to retreat and become
Fortress America (dc)
terrorist nations are arming, training and supporting
terrorist attacks against this nation (i)
these terrorist states are now engaged in acts of war
against the government and people of the United States.
And under international law, any state which is the
victim of acts of war has the right to defend itself (w,
w, cj)
outlaw governments who are sponsoring international
terrorism (i, cj)
we will always stand ready to sacrifice for that freedom
(dc)
The American people are not going to tolerate outright
acts of war against this nation and its people ...
especially not from outlaw states run by the strangest
collection of misfits, looney-tunes, and squalid
criminals since the advent of the Third Reich (w, cj, n,
cj)
this network of terrorist states... this confederation
of criminal governments (i, cj)
Soviet support for terrorist organizations (i)
brutally kidnapped (n)
viciously beaten (n)
stomped and shot to death (n)
the community of civilized nations ... must act against
the criminal menace of terrorism with the full weight of
the law (dc, n, cj)
countries which sponsor such acts or fail to take action
against terrorist criminals, the civilized world needs
to ... (i, cj, dc)
it’s upon the law that terrorists trample (cj)
lead us to a better domestic and international legal
framework for dealing with terrorism (cj)
past lawyers have helped when civilization was
threatened by lawbreakers, and now is the time to do so
again (dc, cj)
threat of international terrorism (i)
international terrorism (i)
the cruelty and viciousness of their tactics (n)
international terrorist network (i)
Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, Nicaragua over the short
term may be better organized than the democracies (i, dc)

August 29th
murder (n)
brutal raid (n)
Terrorism is the antithesis of democracy. By brutal acts
against innocent persons, terrorists seek to exaggerate
their strength (dc, n, v)
terrorism makes war on the common man, repudiating in bloody terms the concept of government by the people (w, dc)
scourge of terrorism (n)
Terrorists merit only swift justice under the rule of law (cj)

October 10th
vengeance instead of justice (cj)
the crime (cj)
... one sovereign nation to have jurisdiction (cj)
a crime had been committed (cj)

October 10th
the terror and the crime (cj)
murder (n)
fanatic terrorist (n)

October 10th
subject to the due process of law (cj)
combatting international terrorism (i)
terrorists would be brought to justice (cj)
international scourge of terrorism can only be stomped out if each member of the community of civilized nations meets its responsibility squarely (i, n, dc)
there can be no asylum for terrorism or terrorists (cj)
punish and prosecute terrorists (cj)
dastardly deeds (n)

October 11th
all civilized peoples welcome the apprehension of the terrorists (dc)
brutal murder (n)
terrorists are prosecuted and punished for their crimes (cj)
shall be subject to the full process of law (cj)
terrible tragedy (n)
attacking may innocent people (v)
piracy (n)
perpetrated their crime (cj)

October 21st
murders (n)
[USSR’s] policy of support for terrorist organizations and states (i)

October 23rd
the problem of terrorism has become an international concern (i)
terrorism continues to claim many innocent lives (v)
those responsible be brought to justice (cj)
defending our cherished ideals of freedom and peace (dc)
unprovoked and contemptible acts of violence (n)
October 26th
we’re combatting the deadly menace of international
terror. Our action ... to apprehend the Palestinian
hijackers was not our last (n, i)
create an united front against terrorism ... fighting
international narcotics trafficking poisoning our youth
(nt)

October 29th
murdered a man (n)
need to bring terrorists to justice (cj)
gone back to anarchy (n)
all the innocent people he also kills (v)
killing so many innocent people (v)

November 9th
We must join forces against terrorism. There is no place
in a civilized world for assassinations, terrorist
bombings, and other mindless violence. I strongly urge
you and your government to join us in combatting
terrorism and ensuring that no country will offer
sucour to terrorists (dc, n, i)

December 4th
the victims of terrorism (v)
1986

January 2nd

... subversion of democratic neighbors ... the link between such governments Cuba and North Korea and international narcotics trafficking and terrorism is becoming increasingly clear. These twin evils represent the most insidious and dangerous threats to the hemisphere today (dc, i, nt, nt, n) the cradle of democracy ... resort to subversion and support for terrorism ... malevolent activities (dc, i, n)

January 7th

the emergency situation created by international terrorism (i)
Libya ... its use and support of terrorism against the US, other countries and innocent persons violates international law and minimum standards of human behaviour (i, v, cj)
Libyan use of and support for terrorism also constitutes a threat to the ... states dedicated to international peace and security (i)
1979 ... Libya designated under US law as a country that has repeatedly supported acts of international terrorism (cj, i)
Libya ... support[s] acts of international terrorism (i)

January 7th

series of atrocities that have shocked the conscience of the world (n) murderers (n) crimes (cj) brutal terrorist acts (n) notorious terrorist groups (n) criminal outrages by an outlaw regime (cj) Terrorists and those who harbour them must be denied (i) international terrorism (i) Civilized nations cannot... (dc) murder of innocents (n, v) bloody raids (n) join us in denying it the normal economic and diplomatic privileges of the civilized world (dc) training camps for terrorists (i) bombing ... slaughter, suicide attacks (n) kill innocent people (v) a barbarian (n)

January 8th

terrorism ... uncivilized behaviour (dc) bring terrorists to justice (cj) international terrorism (i)
January 8th
international outlaws (cj)
bring back into the fold of civilized countries these
outlaws that are perpetrating terrorist deeds (dc, cj)

January 10th
outlaw among ... (cj)
the evil (n)
literally an act of war against Austria (w)

February 6th
the twin killers of narcotics and terrorism (nt)
increased targeting of innocents (v)
this scourge (n)
the brutal, savage, terrorist attacks on innocent people
(n, v)
Treaty with the UK to allow the return of international
terrorists for trial (cj, i)

April 3rd
barbaric action (n)
international terrorism (i)
bring to justice those who perpetrate and support such
actions (cj, i)

April 5th
apprehend and prosecute ... those who perpetrate these
types of incidents (cj)
these individuals, groups or nations, in some cases, who
sponsor terrorism (i)

April 9th
Quadaffi ... supported terrorist acts - a kind of
warfare, as he called it (w)
that kind of warfare (w)
attack on innocent civilians (v)
slaughter of the innocents (n, v)
dastardly attack in West Berlin (n)
he’s [Quadaffi] declared it [war], we just haven’t
recognized the declaration yet, nor will we (w)

April 10th
this very cowardly but cruel and damaging practice (n)

April 15th
our forces ... spoke to the outlaw regime in the only
language it seems to understand (cj)
free and decent people of this world unite and eradicate
the scourge of terrorism from the modern world (dc, n)
Terrorism is the preferred weapon of weak and evil men
(n)
murdered (n)

the brutality of the evil man, but Colonel Quadaffi
ought not to underestimate the capacity or legitimate anger of a free people (n)

April 22nd
certain terrorist states ... we would not tolerate what amounted to acts of war against the American people (i, w)
terrorist network (i)
terrorist states (i)
international terror network (i)
international terrorists (i)
vicious terrorist groups (n)

April 22nd
ey they have called it a war (w)
international problem (i)

April 23rd
vicious cowardly attacks (n)
terrorism undeterred will deflect the winds of freedom (dc)
those who condone making war by cowardly attacks on third parties (w, n, v)
endure savage terrorist attacks ... this scourge on civilization (n, n)
cowardly terrorist attacks. Government sponsored terrorism, in particular, cannot continue without gravely threatening the social fabric of free societies (n, i, dc)
innocent citizens are murdered (v, n)
innocent victims (v)
cowardly act (n)

April 24th
Our preemptive mission against terrorist-related targets was an act of self-defence fully consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (w)
the legal and moral basis of our actions (cj)

May 4th
death of innocent people at the hands of terrorists (v)
a threat to liberty and the well being of all free people (dc)
state-sponsored terrorism (i)
the enemies of civilization (dc)

May 5th
international terrorism (i)
counter measures against terrorism and those who support it (i)
international terrorism (i)

We have decided to apply these measures within the
framework of international law (cj)
states which sponsor or support terrorism (i)
states which sponsor or support terrorism (i)
fight against international terrorism in any of its
forms (i)

May 6th
Libyan-supported state terrorism (i)

May 7th
scourge of international terrorism (n, i)
murder and maiming of innocent civilians (n, v)
terrorists who murder and maim innocent people in the
pursuit of some political goal (n, v)
those who practice terrorism and the states who back or
support it (i)
support terrorism (i)
maim innocent people (v)
base criminals (n, cj)

May 7th
unarmed citizens have been murdered, victimized by
cowardly attacks ... threaten the very fabric of our
free societies and the flow of free trade (n, v, dc)
... in this war against terrorism, we're committed to
winning this war and wiping this scourge from the face
of the earth (w, n)

May 31st
plague of terrorism (n)
violent, inhumane acts (n)
those who deliberately slaughter innocent people (v)
vicious and cowardly attacks upon unarmed victims (n, v)
terrorists intentionally kill and maim unarmed civilians
(v)
Terrorists are always the enemy of democracy (dc)
eradicate this evil (n)
killed (n)
vile acts (n)
this evil (n)

August 7th
Libyan terrorism (i)
fight terrorism ... threatens all civilized nations (dc)

August 27th
international terrorism (i)
victims of terrorism (v)
victims of terrorism (v)
confront this criminal threat ... diplomatically,
economically, legally, and when necessary, militarily
(cj, w)

September 19th
counter the scourge of international terrorism (n, i) victims of terrorism and their families (v) confront this criminal behaviour in every way possible, diplomatically, economically, and when necessary with force (cj) the challenge international terrorism poses to democracy ... freedom loving people of every nation must reject these criminal acts (i, dc, cj) this outlaw behaviour (cj)

September 22nd
Terrorism is heinous and intolerable (n) cowards, who prey on the helpless and innocent (n, v) counter terrorism directly, particularly state-sponsored terrorism (i) sponsors of terrorism (i) law-abiding nations threatened by terrorist attacks (cj) the war on terrorism (w)

October 22nd
international terrorism (i) onslaught of terrorism against civilized societies (dc) criminal behaviour (cj) victims of terrorism (v) defenders of peace and freedom lost their lives (dc) victims, ... victims (v) victims of terrorism (v)

November 12th
eliminate state-sponsored terrorism (i) Iran must oppose all forms of international terrorism (i) no end of Iranian complicity in acts of terrorism against the US (i) Iran's past sponsorship of international terrorism (i) terrorists and radicals (n) terrorist acts ... this scourge (n)

November 14th
support for international terrorism (i) state sponsors of terrorism (i) terrorist support capabilities of Syria (i) support for terrorism (i) support for terrorism (i) state support of terrorism will not be tolerated by the civilized world (i, dc) Syrian supported terrorism (i) terrorism is an instrument of its foreign policy (i)

December 2nd
my policy is to oppose terrorism throughout the world, to punish those who support it, and to make common cause with those who suppress it (i)