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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RÉCEVE
TWO STUDIES RELATED TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS' COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE'S *DE SENSU ET SENSATO*, TOGETHER WITH AN EDITION OF PETER OF AUVERGNE'S *QUAESTIONES SUPER PARVA NATURALIA*

by Kevin White

A dissertation presented to the School of Graduate Studies of the University of Ottawa as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

1986

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation consists of two studies in thirteenth-century philosophy (Volume I, Parts One and Two) and an edition of a thirteenth-century philosophical text (Volume II).

**Volume I.** St. Thomas Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle's *De sensu et sensato* (a critical edition of which has recently been published by the Leonine Commission) provides the common point of departure—though not the direct object—of the two studies presented in Volume I. Part One, a study of the development in St. Thomas' reflections on the specific character of the human body, shows the way in which the subject-matter of the *De sensu et sensato*, as defined by St. Thomas in his introduction to this work, had already been treated in his theological writings before he wrote his commentary on the *De sensu*; and Part Two, a study of the influence of St. Thomas on Peter of Auvergne's *Quaestiones super Parva naturalia*, examines a notable instance of the early influence of St. Thomas' *De sensu* commentary in the Parisian faculty of arts.

**Volume I, Part One.** St. Thomas' developing reflections on the question of the specific character of the human body may be divided into an earlier and a later stage; accordingly, the presentation of this development is divided into two chapters, each of which focuses on two principal texts. Chapter I analyzes *In II Sententiarum*, d.1, q.2, a.5 (which provides an occasion to discuss the literary context, theological background and philosophical sources of the question) and *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, 90; it is argued that the crucial element of these early texts is the
Avicennian view of the human body as a perfectly harmonious composition of the four elements of Greek cosmology, and that St. Thomas' early approach to the question is consequently both subject to the limitations of his scientific views and inconsistent with his own emphasis on the substantial unity of the human composite. However, as Chapter II shows; *Summa Theologiae*, I, Q.76, a.5 reveals a new approach to the question in which the body's substantial unity with the soul in a teleologically subordinated relationship of matter to form is kept steadily in view by means of the axiom *materia est propter formam*. Since the human body exists "for the sake of" a soul whose specific operation of abstractive intellection requires the co-operation of appropriate organic sense-powers, it must be a body which is perfectly adapted to the operation of sensation. The observation of Aristotle's *De anima* that man has the most perfect sense of touch is presented by St. Thomas as a confirmation of the human body's general perfection as a sense-organ, since touch, according to a scholastic principle, is the "foundation" (*fundamentum*) of sensitive life as a whole. In this new approach to the question, the teleological view of the body as a perfect sense-organ subserving an intellective soul reduces the significance of the Avicennian emphasis on the body's material composition, and thus both diminishes the importance of St. Thomas' scientific limitations and makes room for alternative scientific accounts of the body's material composition. In his final treatment of the question
(Quaestiones de anima, Q.8) St. Thomas argues that the other specific features of the human body (notably, its proportionally large brain, uprightness, hands and organs of speech) also show it to be teleologically subordinated to the requirements of an incarnate intellect; in this same text he also raises the question of the naturalness of human death, a point which calls for theological considerations of man's original immortality. In general, these later texts represent an increasingly authoritative and original use of Aristotelian sources (particulary the Physics and De anima) to present the specific character of the human body in terms of the body's unity with and subordination to an intellective soul.

Volume I, Part Two. The examination of St. Thomas' influence on Peter of Auvergne's Quaestiones super Parva naturalia is based on the edition of this text presented in Volume II. After a sketch of the tradition of commentary on the Parva naturalia available to Peter (Introduction), it is shown that he draws on various Thomistic texts in constructing the introduction and early quaestiones of his De sensu commentary (Chapters I and II). Two atypical passages of this commentary are then discussed: one in which he digresses from the text of Aristotle's De sensu to introduce a discussion of intensive magnitudes, and one in which, in a rare divergence from St. Thomas' guidance, he directly opposes St. Thomas' position on the question of the soul's quantitative parts (Chapter III). Finally, the influence of St. Thomas in Peter's commentary on the De memoria is discussed.
(Chapter IV). This examination of Peter's *quaestiones* shows the influence of St. Thomas to be pervasive and complex: although he never mentions St. Thomas by name, and appears to be simply explicating Aristotle's text, Peter relies heavily on St. Thomas' *De sensu* and *De memoria* commentaries (often drawing on St. Thomas' own digressions rather than his literal exposition of Aristotle), as well as on other Thomistic texts, notably the *Summa Theologiae*.

**Volume II.** The edition of Peter of Auvergne's *Quaestiones super Parva naturalia* (which comprises *quaestiones* on the *De sensu et sensato*, *De memoria et reminiscencia* and *De somno et vigilia*) is based on two manuscripts, one containing all three series of *quaestiones* and one containing a second version of the *quaestiones* on the *De memoria*. An historical introduction discusses the manuscripts, the two copies of the *De memoria* commentary and questions of date and authorship. The text of the *quaestiones* is presented with an apparatus indicating sources and corrections. The two versions of the *quaestiones* on the *De memoria* are presented together in parallel columns.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Special thanks are due to the following: to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for its financial support, in the form of a Doctoral Fellowship, while this thesis was being prepared; to my parents, Joseph and Eileen White, for their constant and loving encouragement; and to my thesis director, Bernardo Carlos Bazán, for his lessons in paleography, his patient and careful guidance of my research, and his scholarly example.

K.W.
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VOLUME II

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   1. Quæstiones super De sensu et sensato ................................ 1
   2. Quæstiones super De memoria et reminiscencia ...................... 113
   3. Quæstiones super De somno et vigilia ............................. 203
The recent critical edition of St. Thomas Aquinas' *Sentencia libri de sensu et sensato* by the Leonine Commission has served to draw attention to this little-studied work by St. Thomas. Besides providing a critical text both of the commentary itself and of the Latin translation of the Aristotelian text which St. Thomas used (the *nova translatio*), the edition also contains an exhaustive historical introduction which assesses the evidence concerning St. Thomas' text and the scholarly resources at his disposal. The important influence of Alexander of Aphrodisias on the commentary is discussed, as well as the less significant influence of Averroes, St. Albert and others. The brief conclusion to the introduction collects the internal evidence for dating the commentary after *Summa contra gentiles III*, *Summa Theologiae I*, and *Sentencia libri de anima* (the last of which was shown in the Leonine Commission's edition of it to have been completed in Italy in 1263), and before the *De unitate intellectus* of 1270. This evidence, together with the fact that the manuscript tradition of the *De sensu* commentary is entirely derived from a Parisian university exemplar, indicates that the *Sentencia libri de sensu et sensato* was completed and first published at Paris in 1269, as the last of a series of "psychological" writings — including the *De anima* commentary, the *Quaestiones Disputatae De anima* and the *Quaestiones Disputatae De spiritualibus creaturis* — which were composed at the same time as the "psychological" questions 75 to 89 of the *prima pars* of the *Summa Theologiae*. Such a conclusion, which confirms the "natural hypothesis" that St. Thomas commented on the *De sensu et sensato* immediately after commenting on the *De anima*, locates the *De sensu* commentary in St. Thomas' career with much greater precision.
than was hitherto possible, namely, early in his second Arian
sojourn. 2

The two studies brought together here both originated in
reflection on the historical circumstances of St. Thomas' De sensu
 commentary: the first examines a topic which had been discussed in
St. Thomas' theological writings prior to the De sensu commentary of
1267, but which is closely related to the subject-matter of the
De sensu as defined by St. Thomas in the introduction to his commentary,
and the second, an investigation of the influence of St. Thomas
Felix of Auvergne's quaestiones super harva naturalia, shows the use
to which St. Thomas' commentary was put during the decades immediately
following its publication. Let us briefly explain each of these points.

With the recent availability of a critical edition of St.
Thomas' De sensu commentary, it seems appropriate to raise the question
of the "place" of this work among St. Thomas' writings, that is, of
its relationship to his thought as a whole. This in turn, however,
points to the more general question of the role of St. Thomas as an
Aristotelian commentator. In contrast to an older view according to
which St. Thomas' Aristotelian commentaries are simply philosophical
works, 3 recent discussions of them have tended to emphasize the unitary
theological intention underlying St. Thomas' career, and thus the
theological significance of the commentaries themselves. In the
commentaries, it is said, "Aquinas continues his dedication to the
work of theological wisdom" and "continues to change what was water in
the other sciences into the wine of theology", while at the same time
seeking philosophical guidance from Aristotle for his own theological
work. 4 In light of these discussions, one is led, in turning to the
De sensu commentary in particular, to look for a significant point of contact between this work and St. Thomas' properly theological writings. Is such a point of contact to be found?

One way of responding to this question is to note that St. Thomas' introduction to the commentary focuses on a theme which is also present in his theological works. Following his usual practice, St. Thomas introduces his exposition of Aristotle's text with a brief proem in which he defines the subject-matter of the De sensu and determines the place of this text among the writings of Aristotle. Since all of the powers of the soul, with the exception of the intellect, are acts of certain parts of the body, he argues, there must, after the "abstract" consideration of the soul in the De anima, be a subsequent consideration of those corporeal powers with respect to their "application" to the body (secundum quandam conceptionem sive applicationem ad corpus; Pr., 42-43), that is, from the point of view of the body itself (ex parte corporis; Pr., 145), in order that the bodily dispositions required for the operations common to soul and body might be known (ut sciatur qualis dispositio corporum ad huiusmodi operationes uel passiones requiritur; Pr., 168-170). The De sensu et sensato is one of a number of books dealing with this subsequent consideration, but it is the immediate sequel to the De anima because its subject-matter - the act of the sense-power - pertains more to the soul than to the body (ipsum sentire pars ad animam quam ad corpus pertinet; Pr., 119-120). According to St. Thomas, then, the purpose of the De sensu is to complement the "abstract" psychology of the De anima with a consideration of the physiology of the act of sensation. Given the fact that St. Thomas
devoted a commentary to the *de sensu*, together with the suggestion of a significant relationship between his Aristotelian commentaries and his theological works, one is led to ask whether the subject of the *de sensu*, as defined in the introduction to his commentary, was of any interest to him as a theologian.

One important difference between Aristotle’s *de anima* and St. Thomas’ various discussions of the soul is that while the philosopher treats of souls in general, the theologian is above all concerned with the human soul. Even with this qualification, however, it seems, at first glance, that the theologian has little interest in any "application" of soul to body. As St. Thomas says at the beginning of his treatment of *Soul* in the *Summa Theologiae*, the theologian considers man from the point of view of the soul, and not from the point of view of the body, except with respect to the relationship that the body has to the soul:

> naturam autem hominis considerare pertinent ad theologiam ex parte animae, non autem ex parte corporis, nisi secundum habitudinem quam habet corpus ad animam. (ST, I, xvi, intro.)

Note, however, that St. Thomas’ discussion of the human soul’s essence in the *prima pars* considers the soul first in itself (4.75), and then with respect to its union with the body (4.76):

> Circa primum duplex occurrit consideration: quaeum primam est de ipsa anima secundum se; secundum, de unione eius ad corpus. (Ibid.)

Thus questions 75 and 76 of the *prima pars* are related to one another in precisely the way that the *de anima* and *de sensu*, according to St. Thomas, are related to one another: an "abstract" consideration of the soul in itself is immediately followed by an "application" of the soul to the body. Note also that article five of 4.76 deals with the
specific character of the body to which the human soul is united, a point which is discussed in terms of the physiology of human sensation. It would seem, then, that the subject-matter of the De sensu, as St. Thomas understood it, was of direct relevance to a point dealt with in his theological work.

The question of the human body's specific character is one to which St. Thomas repeatedly returned in his theological writings, from his Sentences commentary onwards. The first of the studies presented here examines his various discussions of this question, and traces a significant development in his thinking on this point which does not seem to have been noted before. St. Thomas' account of the human body's specific character, it will be argued, was at first influenced by Avicenna's view of the question, but gradually developed into a more original, scientifically acceptable and philosophically profound explanation. Since St. Thomas' mature position on this question was developed by the time of his Quaestiones de anima (1268), that is, before he came to write his commentary on the De sensu, we shall not be much concerned with this latter text in presenting the development in St. Thomas' views (but cf. pp.126-127). It should be kept in mind, however, that the introduction to the De sensu commentary points in the direction of the theological texts we shall be examining.

If our first study is thus only tenuously related to St. Thomas' De sensu commentary, the second is more directly concerned with this work, since it deals with its immediate influence in the Parisian faculty of arts. The special relationship which developed between the masters of arts and St. Thomas during the latter's second Parisian sojourn (1269-72) seems to have some bearing on the question
of the nature of St. Thomas' Aristotelian commentaries, for, as J. A. Weisheipl has suggested, the commentaries may have been written specifically for these men:

The plight of young masters who had to teach Aristotle in the schools and who were always subject to being led astray into heresy, especially by Averroes, could not have been ignored. For this reason Thomas considered it his duty to young men in arts to supply them with commentaries that would be true to Aristotle, even when the latter's teaching had to be rejected, and free from error in philosophy.... In my opinion Thomas commented on Aristotle because he felt an apostolic need to help young masters in arts to understand Aristotelian philosophy correctly in harmony with the actual text and the 'Guideline of Faith', where necessary.

With respect to St. Thomas' De sensu and De memoria commentaries in particular, our study of Peter of Averno's questiones on the Parva naturalia establishes that Peter did indeed turn to these works for guidance in discussing Aristotle's text; furthermore, while there seems to be no danger of heresy in Averroes' commentary on the Parva naturalia, Peter does seem to have compared the commentaries of Averroes and of St. Thomas at least once in composing these questiones. This, of course, does not prove that Weisheipl's hypothesis concerning the intended audience of St. Thomas' commentaries is correct. It does, however, indicate that even St. Thomas' commentaries on Aristotle's minor works were attentively studied in the faculty of arts.

Our immediate point of departure here has been the preparation of an edition of Peter's questiones super Parva naturalia, which is presented as an appendix (Volume II). The study itself details Peter's use of Thomistic sources in these questiones, as well as St. Thomas' Parva naturalia commentaries, these sources include a number of other works, notably certain articles of the Summa theologicae,
which Peter (like many modern philosophers) uses for their philosophical content. Peter draws on St. Thomas to such an extent in those quaestiones that his supposedly Aristotelian commentaries are frequently more concerned with the thought of St. Thomas than with that of Aristotle, though he never mentions St. Thomas by name.

St. Thomas' recently-edited commentary on the De sensu et sensato, then, provides the occasion, though not the direct object, of both parts of the following work. Taken together, these two parts suggest a historical context for St. Thomas' publication of the commentary at Paris in 1269: Part One traces the way in which the subject-matter of the De sensu, as defined by St. Thomas himself, had already been treated in his theological writings of 1252 to 1260, and Part Two indicates the use to which the commentary was put in the Parisian faculty of arts during the decades following its publication. Since St. Thomas' De sensu commentary serves merely as a common point of departure, however, we should emphasize that our purpose in what follows is twofold: to contribute to an understanding of St. Thomas' thought by examining a point of development in his theological writings, and to add to the growing knowledge of the work of Peter of Auvergne by presenting and discussing his previously unedited quaestiones super Parva naturalia.
Sancti Thomae de Aquino. Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII edita. Tomus XIV. 2. Sententia libri De sensu et sensato, cuius secundum tractatus est de memoria et reminiscencia, cura et studio fratrum Praedicatorum. Roma: Commissio Leonina et Farisum, A. Yrin, 1955. Except where otherwise noted, all references to St. Thomas' commentary are made according to the treatises, chapters and lines of this edition. As its title indicates, this edition brings together St. Thomas' commentaries on the De sensu et sensato and the De memoria et reminiscencia as the first and second treatises of a single work. However, while referring to the edition for both commentaries, we shall follow the traditional practice of speaking of two distinct commentaries by St. Thomas, one on the De sensu and one on the De memoria.

Ibid., pp. 127-128.

Ibid., pp. 129-130.

Ibid., pp. 131-132.

Ibid., pp. 133-134.

Ibid., pp. 135-136.
PART ONE

CORPUS TALE: A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS' ACCOUNT OF THE SPECIFIC CHARACTER OF THE HUMAN BODY

Cognitis principiis ex quibus constituitur essentia rei, necesse est rem illam cognoscere et cognitam animam rationali et corpore tali cognoscitur homo. (Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 65)
INTRODUCTION

When, in the late summer of 1252, the young Thomas Aquinas arrived at the University of Paris to lecture on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard as a bachelor in theology, he took his place in an intellectual tradition whose points of reference were fixed by the complex network of topics, questions and arguments which had been built up by the masters in theology of the preceding decades. The written commentary which resulted from St. Thomas' four years of lecturing on the *Sentences* represents his first encounter with the many problems which were to preoccupy him during the course of his career as a theologian. St. Thomas brought a striking originality to the practice of *Sentences* commentaries which was evident in the "new arrangements of subject-matter, new methods of proof, new arguments adduced for the conclusions" noted by his early biographer Bernard Gui. Moreover, as J. A. Weisheipl remarks in his *Friar Thomas d'Aquino*, all of St. Thomas' principal theological and metaphysical conclusions were already established in this, his earliest major work. As Weisheipl goes on to add, however:

> Nevertheless, Thomas did not reach full maturity of his speculative thought in the *Sentences*. There are many points on which Thomas later abandoned earlier opinions, resulting in some discrepancy between the teaching of the *Sentences* and the teaching of the *Summa Theologicae*.

The purpose of the present study is to undertake a historical examination of one of these "many points" on which St. Thomas was first invited to reflect as a young *sententiarius*, but to which he returned in his later works with a revised and matured approach. This point concerns the specific character of the body to which the human soul is united as a substantial form. Let us begin by indicating the evidence for a development in St. Thomas' thinking on this point.
In *In II Sententiarum*, d.1, q.2, a.5, having discussed the union between the rational soul and a body in article four, St. Thomas goes on to ask whether the rational soul should be united to "this kind" of body (*tali corpori*). In his response to this question, he first states that the rational soul should be united to a "well-complexioned" body (*corpori bene complexionato*), and then goes on to establish this point on the basis of an argument which he attributes to Avicenna. According to this argument, the body to which the rational soul is united should be that which most closely resembles the body of the heavens (*similimum caelo*), and it must achieve this resemblance by being brought to a perfect state of balance in its elemental composition (*maximam aequalitatem mixtionis*). Passing over the details of this strange argument, let us simply note that St. Thomas presents it as a restatement of the Avicennian argument to which he refers.

In 1268, over ten years after completing his *Sentences* commentary, St. Thomas returned to this Avicennian argument in his *Quaestiones de anima*, q.8, a text which is also concerned with the specific character of the human body (*utrum anima rationalis tali corpori debet uniri quae est corpus humanum*). In this latter text, however, Avicenna has been demoted from the role of principal authority to that of opponent:

> Ad secundum dicendum quod anima rationalis unitur corpori tali, non quia est simile caelo, sed quia est aequalis complexionis; sed ad hoc sequitur aliqua similitudo ad caelum per elongationem a contrariis. Sed tamen secundum opinionem Avicennae unitur tali corpori propter similitudinem caeli.... (*Quaestiones de anima*, q.8, ad 2)

While the main conclusion of St. Thomas' earlier text — the "balanced composition" (*aequalis commixtionis*) of the human body — is here
maintained, the Avicennian basis for this conclusion has been removed. Whatever resemblance there may be between the human body and the body of the heavens, St. Thomas now says, it is not because of such a resemblance (non quia est similis caelo) that the rational soul is united to the human body. These remarks are not only directed against Avicenna, but also, it would seem, against St. Thomas' own earlier adoption of the Avicennian argument in his Sentences commentary. It is clear, then, that St. Thomas' approach to the question of the human body's specific character underwent a certain development which involved, among other things, the abandonment of what he took to be Avicenna's position on this point. Why did St. Thomas take up this Avicennian argument in his Sentences commentary? Why did he come to find it unsatisfactory? With what did he eventually replace it? And what is the philosophical significance of his mature account of the human body's specific character? Such are the questions with which we shall be concerned in the following study.

In general, scholarly presentations of St. Thomas' views on human nature have tended to overlook his relatively few texts on the human body, and to concentrate on his more ample discussions of the human soul. This would seem to be in keeping with his own remark, in the Summa Theologiae, that it is proper to the theologian to consider the nature of man from the point of view of the soul, and not that of the body, except with respect to the relationship that the body has to the soul. Nevertheless, the question of the human body's specific character is discussed in all of his major texts on the human soul, and thus appears to be a fixed and important feature of his reflections on the soul itself. In focusing on his developing
response to this question, then, we are proposing to examine an important but neglected aspect of his treatment of the human soul and, more generally, of the nature of man. Since, however, the particular question with which we are concerned presupposes a wider view of human nature as a composite of soul and body in which the soul is of primary importance, let us briefly sketch the theoretical background of this question.

As historical studies have shown, the fundamental issue in the thirteenth-century debates concerning the nature of man was the conflict between the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the form of the body and the theological doctrine of the soul's immortality. By so closely associating soul and body, Aristotle's definition seemed on the one hand to safeguard the unity of human nature, but on the other hand to call into question the doctrine of immortality, which requires that the soul have an independent subsistence of its own. Wishing to defend both the unity of man and the immortality of the soul, thirteenth-century thinkers before St. Thomas adopted Aristotle's definition, but at the same time compromised it by admitting a plurality of substantial forms in human nature, the highest of which, the rational soul, was described as both a form (or, as some preferred to say, a perfectio) and a substance in its own right. That is, they did not regard the human composite as an immediate union between the
rational soul and prime matter, but introduced one or more other substantial forms between the soul and matter, as if to protect the soul from a too-immediate contact with the body. All of these thinkers spoke of at least one such additional form, namely, the "form of corporeity", so that the effect of their interpretation of Aristotle was to make of human nature a composition of two distinct substances: a body, which was itself a composition between the form of corporeity and prime matter; and a rational soul, whose substantiality had always been assumed in Christian thought, but whose role as form was being given new emphasis in light of the increasing influence of Aristotle's De anima. In this interpretation of Aristotle, then, the independent subsistence of the soul was maintained, but the unity of human nature was left unaccounted for. In fact, despite their Aristotelian terminology, St. Thomas' predecessors perpetuated the dualistic and Platonic view of man which had been predominant in Christian thought since the time of St. Augustine.
The originality of St. Thomas' account of man's nature lies in his efforts to defend both the subsistence of the soul and the substantial unity of human nature as a whole. This he does by focusing on man's intellectual operation, which, on the one hand, transcends the conditions of matter, and therefore points to an immaterial mode of being for the soul, but, on the other hand, depends on corporeal sense-organisms for the reception of its object, and therefore indicates that the soul's nature is incomplete unless it is united to the body as a substantial form.⁷ St. Thomas' consideration of the human intellect's manner of operation thus suggests that the being of the human composite is rooted in the spiritual soul spoken of by Christian doctrine, while man's nature must be understood as the union of soul and body analyzed in Aristotelē's De anima. Furthermore, in contrast to his predecessors, St. Thomas insists on the substantial unity resulting from the composition of form and matter in general, and of the human soul and its body in particular. This means that the intellectual soul is the one and only substantial form of the human composite, and that all of the specific perfections which belong to human nature derive from it.⁸ Moreover, as the highest form of matter, the human soul virtually contains the generic determinations of all lower souls and forms. Thus, it is the same intellectual soul which causes human nature to be intellectual, and also sensitive, living
and even corporeal. As regards this last point, St. Thomas explicitly states that the intellective soul is the form of corporeity in man, and that the soul is the nature of the body itself. It would seem to be inexact, therefore, to say that human nature is a composite of soul and body, since the human body already presupposes the informing presence of the soul. If, like St. Thomas' predecessors, one hold that besides the intellective soul, there is at least one other form in man - the form of corporeity, giving an independent subsistence to the body - then one could appropriately describe human nature as just such a union of soul and body. Following St. Thomas' own doctrine of the unicity of the substantial form of man, however, it seems necessary to say that the intellective soul is immediately united to the pure potentiality of prime matter, and that man's possession of a body, and of a particular kind of body, are but effects of this fundamental union. In this study, we shall be considering human nature from the point of view of these effects.

St. Thomas' account of human nature, then, is truly and radically a hylemorphism, that is, a presentation of the human composite as an immediate and substantial union between a form and matter, with no attempt to mitigate this union by interposing a further substantial form between the two components. We should note at once, however, that while such seems to be St. Thomas' meaning, his writings regularly speak of a union of soul and body in man, rather than one of soul and matter. Is this way of speaking at odds with St. Thomas' own doctrine, or does it have an intelligible meaning in his works? This question is particularly urgent for our own considerations, for the issue with which St. Thomas is concerned in
the texts we shall be examining is whether the rational soul is appropriately united to the human body, and all of these texts presuppose, rather than explain, this opposition between soul and body. Before turning to these texts, then, it will be useful to consider an early work in which St. Thomas does clarify this opposition, namely, the De ente et essentia.

In the second chapter of this work, St. Thomas begins by arguing that the term "essence", when applied to composite substances, signifies neither the form nor the matter alone, but the composite of matter and form. The matter which belongs to the essence, however, is not the "designated" matter which is the principle of individuation, but rather the "undesignated" matter which is part of the species, and which can be defined, but not "shown" or "pointed to". Furthermore, just as the individual and the species differ as "designated" and "undesignated" respectively, so do the species and the genus, though in the latter case the manner of designation is different: while the designation of the individual with respect to the species occurs by means of matter determined in its dimensions, the designation of the species with respect to the genus occurs by means of the constitutive difference taken from the form. St. Thomas adds that this designation of the species with respect to the genus does not occur by means of something which is present in the specific essence, but not at all present in the generic essence; rather, he says, whatever is present in the species is also present in the genus, but as undetermined.

In order to explain this last point, St. Thomas goes on to show that the meaning of the term "body" differs insofar as it is taken to refer to an integral part of an animal or to a genus. With respect
to the first meaning, he points out that a thing which has one perfection may also have a further perfection, just as man has a sensitive nature, but also an intellectual nature; and just as something may have three dimensions, but also the further perfection of "life". This possibility of distinguishing among different perfections of the same thing allows for the mental operation which St. Thomas calls *precisio*, that is, the type of abstraction "in which the abstracted notion rigorously excludes from itself all the rest of the thing from which it was abstracted". Accordingly, the term "body" can signify, in an exclusive way (*cum precisione*), that which has such a form that three dimensions can be designated in it, so that any further perfection which might belong to the thing is left outside of the meaning of the word "body". In this sense a "body" is an integral and material part of an animal, exclusive of the animal's soul, and the animal will thus be considered as constituted from soul and body as though from two distinct parts. Understood without the operation of precise abstraction, however, the term "body" signifies not a part, but a genus, that is, what has such a form that three dimensions can be determined in it, whatever the form may be, and whether or not any further perfections follow from this form. In this sense, "body" is the genus of animal, for there is nothing in the notion "animal" which is not implicitly contained in the notion "body". Furthermore, "body" so understood is not exclusive of soul, since a soul is one of the many forms by means of which three dimensions can be determined in a thing. Here, then, soul and body are not opposed as component parts, but soul is included as a part, and as the actualizing principle, of the body, considered as an undetermined and substantial whole.
This kind of distinction of meaning in relation to the term "body" may also be made with respect to the term "animal": Understood by means of precise abstraction (cum precisione), the term "animal" describes what has such a perfection as to be capable of sensation and movement, to the exclusion of any possible further perfection, which would thus be related to "animal" as a co-part. In this sense of the word, "animal" is not a genus, but a part, and man is regarded as a composition of an "animal" part and a "rational" part. Taken as a genus, however, "animal" signifies what has a form from which sensation and movement can proceed, whatever that form is, whether it is a merely sensitive soul, or one that is simultaneously sensitive and rational. In this sense "animal" is the genus of man, implicitly containing the difference "rational" rather than excluding it.  

In calling man the "rational animal", St. Thomas suggests, we are non-precisively using the term "animal" to refer to the genus which, in man, is determined by the difference "rational". In saying that man is composed of soul and body, on the other hand, we are using the term "body" precisely, since we thus suggest that soul and body are two distinct things which make up the third thing "man". The point to be considered here is the significance of the term "body", precisely understood, in the context of the human composite. Is the opposition between body and soul in man simply an opposition between that which is capable of three dimensions and the further perfection of life? Such an explanation omits any reference to the even further perfections of sensitivity and rationality in man. Furthermore, it fails to capture the sense of St. Thomas' own distinction between the human soul and its body.
In the texts which we shall be considering, St. Thomas regularly speaks of the union between the rational soul and its body. In opposing soul and body as component parts, then, he seems to associate man's specific difference of rationality with the soul, leaving everything else in human nature on the side of the body. But this "everything else" would seem to be nothing other than man's "animal" nature, understood precisely to the exclusion of the further perfection of rationality. In opposing soul and body, St. Thomas is certainly using the term "body" precisely. Nevertheless, he means by "body" something more than that whose form makes it capable of three dimensions. Precise abstraction, it seems, can be made to include and exclude any number of the hierarchy of perfections which a form possesses. In the case of human nature, a precise abstraction may exclude everything but man's corporeity, or, at a higher level, include everything but man's rationality. Now it is certainly at this higher level that St. Thomas regularly speaks, with precision, of the human "body", which thus signifies human nature to the exclusion of its rationality. When St. Thomas speaks of the human body in this way, he means not only a body capable of three dimensions, but also a living body, and, most importantly, an animal body.

As we have seen, St. Thomas' hylemorphic analysis of man's nature resolves the human composite into two component parts: on the one hand, a spiritual soul which is the source of man's being, as well as of all the specific and generic determinations which are proper to his nature, namely, rationality, sensitivity, life, corporeity and substantiality; and on the other hand, prime matter, the pure potentiality which receives and is actuated by its specific form, the
human soul. The human "body" - understood as a genus, rather than precisely - does not enter into this hylemorphic composition as a part, but rather is the composition itself. At this fundamental level, then, it is inexact to speak of a union of soul and body in man, since the soul itself is one of the parts of the body. If, however, one turns from an analysis of human nature into its real co-principles to a consideration of it as a whole, one can then, by precise abstraction, make a distinction between soul and body "as" integral parts, taking "body" to mean human nature to the exclusion of man's rational power, and "soul" to mean the soul as the source of man's rationality alone. The passages in which St. Thomas speaks of a union of soul and body in human nature seem to tacitly rely upon this precise sense of the term "body".

The opposition between soul and body, then, has a perfectly intelligible meaning in St. Thomas' writings, a meaning which is distinct from, but does not conflict with, the view of human nature as a union between a single substantial form and prime matter. To be sure, St. Thomas' custom of speaking of the union of soul and body has the disadvantage of obscuring the distinction between his own emphasis on the substantial unity of human nature and the dualistic view of man held by his predecessors. On the other hand, his own distinction between soul and body allows him to speak in continuity with the long tradition of Christian asceticism. More importantly, for our purposes, this distinction provided him with a framework for the question with which we are concerned, namely, the question of the kind of body to which the human soul is united.

As this question occurs in St. Thomas' works, it seems to presuppose that the analysis of man's nature into form and matter is
complete. Human nature is understood as the union of a spiritual soul with prime matter, and the result of this union is seen to be a body - but also something more than a body, namely, man's incorporeal intellectual power. The distinction between man's corporeal body and his immaterial intellect is readily expressed in an opposition between "body", precisely understood as human nature to the exclusion of the intellect, and "soul", taken as the source of intellectual activity alone. Moreover, this abstraction of the "body" from human nature focuses attention on an important fact about that nature, one which is evident to common sense and of deep interest to science, namely, the specific difference of the human body.

There is nothing particularly original in St. Thomas' decision to examine this point in his Sentences commentary, since it was one of a number of current topics of debate among theologians at Paris. Nevertheless, as the foregoing discussion may suggest, the question of the human body's specific character is given an important new context in St. Thomas' account of the substantial unity of the human composite. Furthermore, the fact that he repeatedly returned to this question in his later writings, gradually refining his own response to it, suggests that he himself attached some importance to it. As has already been indicated, our purpose in what follows is to trace his developing account of this point through his various writings.

As far as I have been able to determine, there are five texts in which, with variations in the question's formulation, St. Thomas formally addresses the issue of the human body's specific character. In order of composition, these are:

1. In II Sententiarum, d.1, q.2, a.5 (1252-56): utrum anima rationalis tali corpori debuerit uniri
2. Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 90 (1259-64): utrum alicui alteri corpori aliqua substantia intellectualis uniatur

3. Summa Theologiae, I, q.76, a.5 (1265-68): utrum anima intellectiva convenienter tali corpori uniatur

4. Summa Theologiae, I, q.91, a.3 (1265-68): utrum corpus hominis haberit convenienciam dispositionem

5. quaestiones de anima, q.8 (1268): utrum anima rationalis tali corpori deberet uniri quale est corpus humanum

Despite these different ways in which the question is posed, St. Thomas' constant concern in these texts is to show that the human body, in its specific character, is that kind of body (tale corpus) to which the human or rational soul is appropriately united. Now a reading of these texts in chronological order indicates that there are two main stages in the development of St. Thomas' explanation of this point: in the first two of these texts, the focal point for his explanation of the body's specific character is the soul's "hobility" as a form of matter; in the last three texts, on the other hand, he develops a more original and more philosophically profound approach to the question which is based on the principle that "matter is for the sake of form" (materia est propter formam). Accordingly, our study will be divided into two chapters, one on each of these two stages. Particular attention will be given to the first of the above-mentioned texts, since it provides an occasion to consider the historical background of the question as St. Thomas first encountered it, as well as to the last of these texts, which represents St. Thomas' final treatment of the question.

It should be noted from the outset that certain details in these texts involve medieval scientific views which, in the light of modern science, have been rendered obsolete. On the other hand, the
subject of these texts, the human body, is one to which the phenomenological movement has, in recent decades, drawn attention as an important theme of philosophical reflection. However, while our study may thus be said to have both a merely historical and a topical aspect, our main concern in what follows is with those features of St. Thomas' reflections on the human body which have some claim to permanent interest.
CHAPTER I. ST. THOMAS' EARLY TEATS ON THE SPECIFIC CHARACTER OF THE HUMAN BODY

1. In II Sententiarum, d.1, q.2, a.5

We shall begin by examining the article in St. Thomas' early Sentences commentary in which he discusses the question of the human body's specific character for the first time. Before turning to the argument of this article, however, we shall first consider its immediate literary context, its theological background and its philosophical sources.

1) The Context of the Discussion: Article Four

The article with which we are concerned occurs in St. Thomas' commentary on the second book of Peter Lombard's Sentences, the text on which he lectured as a bachelor in theology at the University of Paris from 1252 to 1256. According to St. Thomas' divisio textus of this work, Book II of the Sentences, whose subject is creation, opens with an introductory section on creatures in general (de creaturis in communi), which is divided into a first part on the going forth of creatures from their origin (de creaturis secundum exitum earum a principio) and a second part on the ordering of them to a final end (de eis secundum ordinem eorum in ultimum finem).¹ In this second part - still following St. Thomas' division - Lombard shows, first of all, the final end of creatures (finem ultimum creaturarum), and then the ordering to an end of the spiritual creature, of the corporeal creature, and finally of man, who is a union of the spiritual and the corporeal (coniuncti ex utroque).² Since it is this very last section - Lombard's account of the ordering of man to a final end - which provides the occasion for St. Thomas' article on the human body, let us briefly consider this passage.³
Lombard begins his discussion of man with the following question: since the soul would seem to have been of greater dignity (majoris dignitatis) if it had remained without a body, why then was it united to a body? First of all, he says in response, one can say that it is simply because God so willed it. One can add, however, that He willed it as a sign (exemplum) of the union between Himself and the rational creature. Lombard discusses this second point at length: the union of soul and body exemplifies the future society between the Creator and the rational creature because of the extreme contrast between a superior and an inferior in either case. In order to express the lowliness of the body and the soul's humiliation in being united with it, Lombard repeatedly refers to the body's "earthy" (terrenae) character: God made man from a twofold substance, he says, in an obvious echo of Genesis, II, 7, forming a body from the earth and a soul out of nothing. Souls were united to bodies, he concludes, in order that they might hunger for God while being in them, and thus merit a greater reward.

St. Thomas' commentary on the second book of the Sentences raises two questions in relation to this passage:

a.4 propter quid homo ex anima et corpore constitutus sit
a.5 utrum tali corpori anima ejus uniri debuerit

Following an orderly progression from the general to the particular, St. Thomas thus proposes to discuss, first the rational soul's union with a body, and then its union with a particular kind (tali) of body. In keeping with this procedure, let us begin by considering his general account of the union of soul and body in article four.

In the corpus of this article, St. Thomas argues that Lombard's text sufficiently explains the final cause of the soul's union with a
body, since it gives three reasons for the union, which correspond to the different ways in which an end (finis) can be considered. From the point of view of the agent, namely God; the end of the union is His own goodness, which He wills to communicate to things; and this, says St. Thomas, is the first reason which Lombard gives. From the point of view of the work (ex parte operis), namely man, the intended end of the union is the achievement of some resemblance to the divine blessedness. This resemblance may be considered with reference to the being of man (secundum esse ejus), insofar as the union of soul and body is a certain likeness of the divine blessedness, in which the spirit is joined to God; and this is the second reason given by Lombard. Or it may be considered with reference to the operation of man (secundum operationem), insofar as the soul, by means of the works which it performs in the body, approaches the divine blessedness through merit; and this is the third reason which Lombard gives.\footnote{4} In the corpus of article four, then, St. Thomas offers an interpretation of Lombard's discussion of man by sharply dividing the text into three "reasons" and introducing an analysis of final causality. In the replies to objections of this article; however, where he is less concerned with Lombard's text, St. Thomas presents his own philosophical account of the union of soul and body in man. The focal point of this account is the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the form of the body, which St. Thomas introduces in his response to the third objection.

This objection argues that, since soul and body differ so greatly (maxime distant), as Lombard's text emphasizes, they cannot be united in a relation of form and matter, which is the closest
possible union (maximam unionem). St. Thomas replies that this
objection was what had led Plato to think that the soul is in the body
not as a form is present in matter, but as a mover is present in its
moveable (sicur motor in mobile), and that man is not something made
up of soul and body, but a soul making use of a body (anima utens
corpore). However, St. Thomas continues, this view seems to require
a unifying medium between soul and body, and Aristotle has shown all
tries to find such a medium to be absurd. Therefore, the essence
of the soul must, as Aristotle's De anima says, be immediately united
to the body as form is to matter, or as a figure is to wax. The
agreement (convenientia) between soul and body with which the objection
is concerned may, says St. Thomas, be considered in two ways: with
respect to their natural properties (secundum proprietates naturae),
soul and body, it is true, differ greatly; but with respect to the
proportion of potentiality to actuality (secundum proportionem potentiae
ad actum), they agree most closely (maxime convenient), and this
agreement requires that one be immediately united to the other as its
form. 5

The Aristotelian text to which St. Thomas here refers occurs in
the general discussion of the soul at the beginning of De anima, II,
which itself is based on the view of "nature" developed in the first
two books of the Physics. According to this view, the coming into
being of any natural substance must be understood as a composition
between an underlying subject or matter of the process and the form
which matter acquires. Though in one sense merely a privation of form,
matter in itself is a permanent potentiality with a desire for form.
Defining nature as "an inherent principle of movement and rest", 

Aristotle says that while matter is usually regarded as "nature", this term is more properly used of form, since a thing is more properly said to be what it is in actuality than in potentiality; furthermore, the form is the end or the "that for the sake of which" in any natural process, while matter is something relative to an end, so that to each form there corresponds a different matter. Against this background, then, the De anima describes the living body as a subject or matter of which the soul is the form and actuality. The soul, says Aristotle, is the form or "first actuality" of a natural body potentially possessing life, that is, of an organic body. Thus soul and body make up a unity, just as do wax and an impression on it, or in general the matter of anything and that of which it is the matter. (This is the point to which St. Thomas refers in article four.) Since the soul is united with the living body in a relationship of actuality to potentiality, Aristotle continues, the soul cannot be without the body, though it is not itself a body. As something belonging to a body, he says, the soul is present in a body, and in a body of a particular kind. The kind of body in which it is present must be specified, since no given subject is receptive of just any form; rather, actuality naturally occurs in that which is in potentiality to it, that is, in its proper matter.

St. Thomas' full acceptance of Aristotle's definition of the soul as the form of the body was an important innovation in thirteenth-century theology. While St. Albert and St. Bonaventure also affirmed this definition, they resisted its implications, since they thought that by so closely associating the soul with the body, it endangered the Christian doctrine of the soul's immortality. St. Thomas, on the
other hand, makes it possible to affirm that the soul is both immortal and a form of matter by means of his account of the soul's act of being. Unlike other forms of matter, whose act of being is given in their union with matter, the soul, he says in an earlier article of his _sentences_ commentary, is a "simple form", that is, one which receives the act of being in itself (in se), and is thus capable of subsisting apart from matter. This explanation of the soul's independent act of being, however, seems to give rise to the difficulty which the second objection of article four presents. That which has its own subsisting being (per se esse subsistens), it is argued, can only accidentally be united to something else, since whatever is added to a complete being (esse completum) is an accident, but the soul is something subsistent in itself (quiddam in esse suo subsistens), as is indicated by its immortality; therefore it cannot be united to a body in such a way that from it and the body an essential unity (unum essentiae) is made. In short, the soul's independent possession of the act of being seems to be at odds with the substantial unity of man as a composite of soul and body. In response to this objection, St. Thomas agrees that there can be only one essential act of being (esse essentiale) of one thing, and that any further act of being which is added to it will be accidental; however, in being added to the soul, he continues, the body is brought into partnership in the same act of being, by which the soul is enabled to subsist: _transitum in consortium illius esse a quo anima subsistere potest._

According to St. Thomas, then, the soul possesses an act of being which it shares with the body in informing the latter. The point to be considered now is the reason for the soul's union with a
body. If the soul possesses the act of being by itself, why should it communicate this act to a body which is both mortal and, as the first objection in article four points out, something of a hindrance to the soul's highest operations? In his reply to this objection, St. Thomas suggests that since it is the soul's nature to be united to a body, it can best approach the divine goodness which is its end by being so united. This response, however, does not explain what the soul's nature is, or why this nature is such as to benefit from union with a body. The second counter-objection of article four, on the other hand, does suggest an answer to these questions: the possible intellect, according to Aristotle's De anima, is like a tablet on which nothing has been written; but it can only be perfected or "written on" by species received from the sense-powers; therefore, it must be united to a body which is organic and sensitive. The soul gives being to and informs the body, then, because of its need of species which only the organic sense-powers can provide. From this point of view, further exploration of the relations of soul and body will have to involve a closer consideration of the soul's complex act of knowledge, which involves both intellectual and sensitive powers. It is clear already, however, that for St. Thomas the significant aspect of the body which receives its being from the rational soul is its contribution to the act of sensation.

While maintaining the distinction between soul and body and the immortality of the soul in article four, then, St. Thomas is primarily concerned with explaining the unity of soul and body in the act of being, in the relation of form and matter, and in the operation of knowledge. His reply to the fourth objection, however, introduces
a somewhat different emphasis by drawing attention to the superiority of the soul to the body. We should note his treatment of this point, since it sets the scene for his discussion of the human body's specific character in article five.

The fourth objection argues as follows: the powers of the soul cannot be simpler than its essence, which is the principle from which they are derived; thus, since some of these powers, such as the intellect and the will, are not acts of the body, it seems that neither should the essence of the rational soul be the act of a body. The soul's possession of immaterial powers, then, appears to imply an essence which is correspondingly free of matter rather than one which is united to matter as a form. St. Thomas begins his reply to this objection by saying that there are degrees of nobility (radus nobilitatis) among forms, and that the nobler a form is, the more it dominates (praedominatur) its matter. Since the rational soul is the noblest of all forms, he continues, it dominates its matter most completely. Now everything which is united to another as conquering and dominating it (vincens et dominans) is operative (habet effectum) not only in terms of its union with the other, but also independently (per se absolute), insofar as it does not depend on that to which it is united. Thus certain of the soul's powers are acts of the body, while others are detached from bodily organs; for the essence of the soul is united to the body as a form, but not as a material form (forma materialis) — not, that is, as the kind of form which is incapable of subsisting in its own act of being. St. Thomas thinks, then, that the soul's possession of immaterial powers is not a hindrance to its being a form of matter, but an indication of its
degree of nobility as a form; as the form of a body the soul has certain powers which are exercised within the body; but as the noblest of forms, having an act of being of its own, it also has certain powers of its own, capable of being exercised apart from the body.

St. Thomas' remark that the soul is the "noblest" of forms thus refers to the way in which the soul's independence of being is reflected in the independence of certain of its powers of operation. In the following article he will argue that the soul's distinctive nobility also explains the distinctive character of the body which it informs.

To Aristotle's description of the soul as the form of the body, then, we must add the qualification that the human soul is the noblest of forms, with all that this implies, namely, that the soul possesses its own independent act of being and powers of operation, and that it communicates its being to the body for the sake of perfecting its intellectual power. Having established this much concerning the relations of soul and body in article four, St. Thomas then turns his attention to the particular kind of body to which the human soul is united.

2) The Theological Background

The precise question with which St. Thomas is concerned in article five is whether the rational soul should be united to "this kind" of body (tali corpori). In light of the preceding article, this question seems to call for an explanation of the reason why the rational soul communicates its being to and informs the human body in particular. But the question also implies that a definite view of the distinctive character of the human body has already been achieved.
In fact, St. Thomas seems to suggest in article five that there are two views of the body which have some bearing on the question: in the corpus of the article, which invokes the authority of Aristotle and Avicenna, he presents what may be described as a philosophical account of the human body's distinctive character; in the sed contra which precedes this discussion, however, he quotes from Genesis, II, 7 - the text echoed in Peter Lombard's discussion of man - thereby suggesting that there is a specifically biblical view of the body which is to be assumed before the philosophical discussion is undertaken. Although it is St. Thomas' philosophical account of the body which both predominates in article five and is of direct concern to us, an appreciation of his own approach to the question seems to demand a preliminary consideration of the significance of his scriptural reference. Now for St. Thomas and his audience, the meaning of Genesis, II, 7 would be bound up with a long tradition of religious meditation on this text. In order to situate St. Thomas' discussion of the body in its theological context, then, we shall briefly outline this tradition.

The Book of Genesis presents two accounts of man's origin "in the beginning": the first states that God created man in His image (I, 27), while the second says that He formed man from the earth and breathed into him the breath of life, thus making man a living soul (II, 7). (A later scriptural passage, Ecclesiasticus, XVII, 1, conflates these two accounts.) As St. Thomas' quotation of it in article five indicates, it is the second account of man's creation, and in particular its reference to man's formation from the earth, which seems to have some bearing on the way in which the human body is to
be understood. In its juxtaposition with a divine element, the "earthy" part of man's being apparently signifies, first of all, a certain lowliness. Later in the Old Testament, the theme of man's "earthiness" also becomes emblematic of the mortality which he shares with the other animals. And in the New Testament, St. Paul further develops this theme in a discussion of the resurrection which deliberately echoes the text of Genesis, II, 7; according to this passage, the "earthy" body of the first Adam was corruptible, ignoble, weak and "animal", in contrast to the incorruptible and "spiritual" body of the second Adam (I Cor., XV, 35-49). In the context of scripture as a whole, then, the assertion that God formed man from the earth seems to refer to the weakness, animality and mortality of the human body. As created by God, as part of man the divine image, and as something whose formation by God is explicitly mentioned in Genesis, II, 7, the body is undoubtedly good; but its earthy composition signifies all of the respects in which it is man's lesser part.15

The interest of the church fathers in the opening chapters of Genesis, which they read in the light of their classical learning, led them to intense reflection on the world of nature in general and on the human body in particular.16 Typical of their approach is a passage in St. Augustine's De Civitate Dei which praises the intricacies of the human body and its usefulness to the rational soul as manifestations of the goodness and providence of the Creator.17 From the point of view of the thirteenth century, however, the authoritative interpretation of Genesis, II, 7 was to be found in St. Augustine's De Genesi ad litteram.18 Augustine's discussion of man's formation from the earth in Book VI of this work is divided into three
points. The first of these concerns the elevated status of man as a creature, to which the particular mention of man's formation by God seems to draw attention. The difference between man and the other creatures, Augustine says, does not consist in the fact that whereas the others were made (facta sunt) by means of the divine word, God Himself formed (ipse fecit) man with His own hands, for all creatures were similarly formed by means of the divine word, that is, through the wisdom and power of God. Nor is man distinguished by the formation of his body from the earth, for the same is true of the bodies of the other animals. Rather, man's creaturely uniqueness is his creation in God's image, which does not refer to anything bodily, but to the understanding of the human mind (intellectus mentis). Nevertheless, Augustine continues, man also has a certain uniqueness (proprietatem) with respect to his body, namely, his upright posture (statura erecta); in contrast to the prone animals, who seek their pleasure from the earth, man has a body which, in allowing him to look upwards, befits (conruuit) his rational soul, which should analogously be directed to the things which are "above" in its own sphere. In thus introducing the theme of homo erectus - a classical and patristic commonplace - at this point, Augustine indicates that the significant feature of the human body is not the material from which it is formed, but its distinctive figure, and the symbolic power which this figure gives to the human sense of sight.

Proceeding to his second point, Augustine then asks how man was formed from the earth, that is, whether his body was at once produced fully formed (repente in aetate perfecte) or gradually developed through different stages (per aetates augendo) as the human
body is formed in the process of generation. This question leads to a long discussion of the "causal reasons" (rationes causales) by which God instituted natural processes in creation and which could, Augustine argues, allow for either possibility. Without deciding the question, Augustine indicates that he himself inclines to the common view that Adam was immediately formed in full manhood (sicut est credibilium iam perfectae virilitatis).

Augustine's final point concerns the original immortality of Adam's body, which, according to Genesis, was lost through sin. Since St. Paul states that Adam, the earthly man, had an "animal" and not a "spiritual" body, the problem arises of how to reconcile Adam's animality with his original immortality. Augustine does so by saying that prior to sin Adam's body was mortal for one reason and immortal for another (et mortale secundum aliam et inmortale secundum aliam causam): it was mortal insofar as it was capable of dying and immortal insofar as it was capable of not dying (mortale, quia poterat mori, inmortale-quia poterat non mori). Its actual immortality, however, was not due to anything in its nature (non de constitutione naturae); rather, it was mortal by reason of its animality, but made immortal by a gift of its Creator (Mortalis ergo erat conditio corporis animale, inmortale autem beneficio conditoris). For St. Augustine, then, man's formation from the earth primarily signifies his possession of an "animal", and therefore a naturally mortal body.

These Augustinian themes are taken up in the discussion of man's creation in the second book of Peter Lombard's Sentences. As we have already seen, the opening section of Book II, which provides the occasion for St. Thomas' discussion of the body, treats of
creatures in general. Following this introductory section, Lombard turns to a more particular consideration of angels (dd.2-11), of corporeal creatures (dd.12-15), and finally of man, who is considered first of all with respect to his creation by God (dd.16-20). Lombard's arrangement of subject-matter thus makes for two separate discussions of man's origin, namely, the passage in the opening section which we have discussed above (d.1) and the later account of man's creation (dd.16-20). The significant difference between these two discussions seems to be that while the earlier passage presents the union of soul and body in very general and abstract terms, the later one treats of man's origin explicitly in relation to the biblical account of the first man's creation and the interpretation of this account in Augustine's De Genesi ad litteram, VI. Thus, in distinctio 17, which deals with the text of Genesis, II, 7, Lombard recapitulates Augustine's discussion of the creation of Adam in full manhood.

For the thirteenth-century theological audience, then, the text from Genesis quoted by St. Thomas in the sed contra of article five was a locus classicus for Christian reflection on the body, carrying religious, philosophical and moral overtones from the writings of St. Paul, St. Augustine and Peter Lombard. However, as the Sentences commentary of Thomas' teacher St. Albert (1242-49) shows, this theological tradition of reflection on the body had taken on a new aspect shortly before St. Thomas himself began to lecture on the Sentences. When, in his commentary, St. Albert reaches Lombard's summary of the Augustinian passage on the creation of Adam in full manhood in distinctio 17, he suggests that it is customary at this point to ask whether the human soul should have the kind of body
which is composed of "the contraries": Quaerunt enim hic quidam, Utrum animae debeat corpus tale quod sit compositum ex contrariis?.

Since this question is nearly identical to, and would seem to be the immediate precedent for, the question from St. Thomas' commentary with which we are concerned (note in particular Albert's use of the expression corpus tale), let us briefly consider the philosophical presuppositions which are here being brought into the theological tradition of reflection on the body.

The "contraries" to which St. Albert's question refers are the four elements of Greek cosmology as presented in the writings of Aristotle. In the De caelo et mundo Aristotle describes these in terms of their natural rectilinear movement: in contrast to the eternal and circular movement of the aether of which the heavenly bodies consist, the simple bodies at the center of the cosmos (that is, at the earth) are distinguished by their heaviness (earth and water) and lightness (air and fire). In the De generatione et corruptione, on the other hand, Aristotle describes the elements in terms of the qualitative interaction by which they combine to form compound bodies. Here he notes that matter, the subject of change according to the Physics, is not something which can be isolated, but is always bound up with the contrary qualities by which the elements are distinguished. These qualities, according to Aristotle, are the primary contrary tangible qualities - the hot, the cold, the moist and the dry - which combine to form the four simple bodies, namely, fire (hot and dry), air (hot and moist), water (cold and moist) and earth (cold and dry). The simple bodies in turn are blended by being brought to a state of balance between their contrary qualities. All of the compound bodies at the
center of the cosmos are composed of all the simple bodies, though the element earth, being in its natural "place", tends to predominate. (This last point might be thought to agree with the reference to the "earthy" human body in Genesis, II, 7.) Against this Aristotelian background, then, the issue raised by St. Albert's question is why the rational soul has a compound body rather than a simple one consisting of aether or just one of the four elements. Stating that the solution to this problem must proceed from principles proper to natural philosophy (ex principiis physicis propriis), St. Albert goes on to argue that the human body must have a variety of parts in order to correspond to its complex form and mover, the rational soul, and that it can only be such a manifold if it is a composite, and not a simple or homogenous body.

The Sentences commentary of St. Albert thus suggests that Peter Lombard's discussion of Genesis, II, 7 in book II, distinctio 17, had become an occasion for the theologian to introduce a "scientific" account of the human body, in which the fundamental consideration was no longer the body's formation from the earth by God, but its composition from the four elements. All this is confirmed by St. Bonaventure's Sentences commentary of a few years later (1250-55). St. Bonaventure's treatment of the body, which we shall discuss in detail below, is at once both more "scientific" and more scriptural than that of St. Albert: on the one hand, it focuses more directly on the nature of the body's elemental composition; on the other hand, it is primarily concerned with the body of Adam in his state of innocence, rather than with the human body as such. St. Bonaventure's central point is that the body befitting the nobility of Adam's soul
would have to be a well-balanced composition (complexio aequalis) of the four elements. This correspondence between the soul's nobility (a notion which we have already encountered in St. Thomas' Sentences commentary) and the body's elemental composition will be a central theme in St. Thomas' own account of the body.

In turning from the Sentences commentaries of St. Thomas' immediate predecessors back to his own, we note that, in what appears to be an innovation, he has removed the question of the human body's specific character from its customary "biblical" context in distinctio 17 to the more "abstract" context of distinctio 1. This "new arrangement of subject-matter" is apparently provoked by St. Thomas' attention to Lombard's emphasis, in distinctio 1, on the kind of body to which the rational soul is united. At the same time, by situating the question in relation to Lombard's general account of man's constitution (d.1) rather than his discussion of Adam's creation "in the beginning", St. Thomas provides a more appropriate context for a philosophical discussion of the body in terms of man's nature. Also, St. Thomas' new order of topics closely associates the question of the specific character of the human body (d.1, q.2, a.5) with the question of the reason for the rational soul's union with a body (d.1, q.2, a.4). 23

3) The Philosophical Sources

The thirteenth-century readers of Aristotle and his interpreters naturally thought that the fundamental Christian distinction between two parts of man's being - a distinction of which Genesis, II, 7 seems to speak - should be reflected in two philosophical considerations of
man, one from the point of view of the soul and one from the point of view of the body. With respect to the first of these considerations, it was generally agreed that Aristotle's De anima is the basic text for the science both of the soul in general and of the human or rational soul in particular. Concerning the human body, however, there was some difference of opinion among Parisian masters of arts during the years 1230 to 1250 as to where a scientific account of it was to be found: some thought that medicine is the science whose object is the body animated by the rational soul; others thought that it was Aristotle's De animalibus which taught the science of the bodies both of man and of the other animals; and a third opinion held that the science of the body animated by the rational soul was to be found in the De anima itself. Confronted with these various suggestions, the theologians apparently had to make their own way in consulting philosophical sources for their discussions of the human body.

St. Thomas' account of the body in the corpus of article five contains explicit references to two philosophical sources. The first of these occurs in his introductory remarks, where he begins by stating his intended conclusion and then turns to an Avicennian text for his initial premise:

\[\text{Respondeo dicendum, quod oportuit talem formam, scilicet animam rationalem, corpori bene complexionato uniri; cujus rationem assignat Avicenna, De intelligentiis, cap.x, part.2, et daeincps, dicens, quod oportet ordinem perfectibilium esse secundum ordinem perfectionem.}\]

Having thus found an authoritative starting-point in the axiom which he attributes to Avicenna (oportet ordinem perfectibilium esse secundum ordinem perfectionum), St. Thomas then goes on to establish his announced conclusion, that the body to which the rational soul is united must be a "well-complexioned" one (corpori bene complexionato).
Finally, he brings the corpus of article five to a close with a brief supplementary discussion which twice refers to the second book of Aristotle's *De anima*.

The reference to a *De intelligentiis* by Avicenna with which St. Thomas begins is something of a puzzle. As A. de Vaux pointed out in 1934, none of St. Thomas' thirteen references to this work—*all* of which occur in his *Sentences* commentary—corresponds to the pseudo-Avicennian text of the same name which was published with Avicenna's philosophical writings in Venice in 1508. De Vaux concludes:

Il est malaisé de déterminer ce que saint Thomas avait en vue. On peut dire seulement que les opinions qu'il rapporte sont bien celles d'Avicenne et se retrouvent exprimées en des termes voisins à différents endroits de la *Méta
aphysique.*

One might hazard a guess that the mysterious *De intelligentiis* to which St. Thomas here refers was a Latin work attributed to Avicenna which today is lost, and that St. Thomas no longer referred to it after composing his *Sentences* commentary because he had learned that it was not in fact by Avicenna. In any case, because we are unable to compare St. Thomas' text with its most important source, it is difficult to say how much of the corpus of article five depends on the "argument" (*rationem*) to which it refers: is the *De intelligentiis* merely the source of the axiom with which St. Thomas begins his argument, or does it provide a model for the whole of the argument, including, perhaps, the supplementary discussion? It is impossible to say. But whatever the content of the passage from the lost *De intelligentiis,* and regardless of the authorship of this work, the whole of the corpus of St. Thomas' article five is, as we shall see marked Avicennian in its account of the human body's specific character. St. Thomas' Avicennian approach to the discussion is not
without precedent, however, since we shall find both St. Albert and St. Bonaventure adopting a similar approach in their own discussions of the body. On the other hand, a basic source for Avicenna's own view of the body is the second philosophical text mentioned by St. Thomas, a passage from Book II of Aristotle's De anima. Behind the corpus of St. Thomas' article five, then, stands a philosophical tradition of reflection on the human body which passes from Aristotle through Avicenna to St. Albert and St. Bonaventure. In order to see the use which St. Thomas makes of this tradition, let us briefly outline its important points.

i. Aristotle

The principal source of this tradition is a brief passage in the second book of Aristotle's De anima which states that man's sense of touch is superior to that of the other animals.²⁶ Apart from a passing reference to the hand as the "organ of organs" in Book III, this seems to be the De anima's only allusion to a specific difference of the human body. By contrast, Aristotle's treatises on animals often refer to the human body, drawing attention to such notable features as its proportionally large brain and its "godlike" upright posture.²⁸ It was perhaps because of its privileged location in the treatise on the soul, however, that the passage on the human sense of touch was to acquire special significance in Avicenna's and St. Thomas' discussions of the body. Before turning to this passage, let us recall Aristotle's account of the sense of touch in general.

The sense of touch, according to Aristotle, is the basic characteristic of animal life; without touch it is impossible for an
animal to be, and the loss of this sense alone means the death of an animal. Touch is the only sense which is common to all animals; while the other senses presuppose its presence, it is found in some animals apart from the other senses. Touch is also "the sense of food", and more generally of pleasure and pain, and it is always accompanied by the power of appetite. Furthermore, touch is closely associated with the "common power" which extends to all of the senses, and by means of which an animal is aware of the operations of each of its other senses. In Aristotle's view, then, touch is a unifying precondition for the sensitive life of an animal as a whole. 29

Aristotle calls the act of the sense-power a certain "affec-
tion" (pathos, passio). He adopts the view that "like is known by like", but interprets this in terms of his distinction between potentiality and actuality. The objects of the senses seem to be, whether directly or indirectly, the elements themselves. For this reason, Empedocles, following the principle that "like is known by like" in a literal way, thought that the soul senses because it is itself composed of the four elements. In opposition to this view, Aristotle argues that the sense-organs are merely potentially like their objects, and that sensation is a process of assimilation in which the organ, acted upon by its object, is transformed into an actual likeness of it. 30 As Aristotle's De sensu et sensato indicates, this requires each organ to have a particular elemental composition which is contrary to, and therefore potentially like, its object. In addition to an organ, each sense-power requires for its operation a medium (since sensation is impossible by direct contact) and an object, which consists of a pair of contraries. Beginning with sight and concluding with the fundamental
sense of touch, Aristotle analyzes the organs, media and objects of
the different senses in *De anima*, II, 7-11, explaining each of these
in terms of the elements and their qualities.

Aristotle introduces his formal account of touch in *De anima*,
II, 11 by raising the question of whether touch is one sense or many;
it seems to have several pairs of contraries for its objects, he notes,
and it is difficult to discern the underlying unity of these objects.
Turning then to the organ of touch, he argues from analogy with the
other senses that all sensation operates through a medium, but that
in the case of touch, the flesh serves as an "attached" medium, while
the organ lies within; because it is attached to the animal body, this
medium cannot be of air or water, like the media of the other senses,
but must be something solid, and therefore composed of earth along
with air and water. With respect to the objects of touch, Aristotle
refers to a passage from the *De generatione et corruptione* which we
have already mentioned, saying that the objects of touch are "the
differences of body as such", that is, the hot, cold, moist and dry,
by means of which the elements are distinguished. Like all other
sense-organs, the organ of touch is potentially like its objects,
being constituted as a "mean" (*mesotes*, *medium*) or balance between
contrary qualities, and therefore capable of discerning the contrary
extremes. In the last two chapters of the *De anima* Aristotle returns
to this point in an argument that the body of an animal must be
composite rather than simple. His general argument is that an animal
requires sensation for its survival, and cannot have any other sense
without the sense of touch, which itself requires a composite organ.
His argument for the compositeness of the organ of touch is as follows:
since the operation of touch, unlike that of the other senses, occurs by means of contact, its organ cannot consist of the elements which constitute the media of the other senses (water and air), but must include earth, presumably for the solidity which contact requires; but since touch is a "mean" between all tangible qualities, its organ cannot consist of earth alone, but must be composed of all the elements. Thus Aristotle suggests that the body of an animal is essentially an organ of touch. Furthermore, he indicates that there is a fundamental correspondence among the sense of touch, composite bodies, and the element earth: the objects of touch are the elemental qualities which are the differences of body as such; a terrestrial body is a composition of all four elements in which these qualities are brought to a state of balance, just as the organ of touch is a "mean" between these qualities; and the element earth both tends to predominate in composite bodies and is the characteristic element of the organ of touch.\(^{32b}\)

It is within the context of this account of the sense of touch, then, that the passage on the human sense of touch in De anima, II, 9 must be understood.\(^{33}\) The first point to note concerning this passage is that it does not occur in the De anima's chapter on touch itself, but as an incidental discussion in the introduction to the chapter on smell. Aristotle begins this chapter by saying that it is difficult to discuss the sense of smell and its objects, because the human sense of smell is much less discriminating (akribe, certum) than that of many of the animals. There does seem to be an analogy between smell and taste, he continues, and a correspondence between their respective objects, but our sense of taste is much more discriminating (akribes-teran, certiorem) than is our sense of smell, because taste is a form,
of touch, and the human sense of touch is most discriminating
(akribestaten, certissimum). With respect to the other senses, man is
inferior to many of the other animals, but his sense of touch is far
more discriminating than that of the others. Therefore (dic, unde),
says Aristotle, man is also the most intelligent (phronimotaton,
prudentissimum) of the animals. A sign of this is that the condition
of being intellectually gifted (euphues, ingeniosos) or not is
directly related to the organ of touch, but not that of any other
sense; for those with hard flesh are poorly endowed with intelligence,
while those of soft flesh are well endowed. With no further explanation
of these surprising remarks, Aristotle then turns at once to his
discussion of the sense of smell. 34

However incidental to the main discussion of De anima, II, 9
this passage may be, its contents (much of which are repeated
elsewhere in Aristotle’s writings) clearly indicate a crucial difference
between man and the other animals. This difference is manifested at
three interrelated levels: native intelligence; the discriminating
power of the sense of touch; and the "softness" of the flesh, which,
as we have seen, Aristotle identifies as the medium of touch.
Aristotle presents the intellectual superiority of man in comparison
to the other animals, and of some men in comparison to others, as a
consequence of the discriminating power of the sense of touch and the
 corresponding material condition of its organ. While this proportion
between touch and intellect is left unexplained in this passage, it
does suggest that touch, the basis of animal life and of the operation
of the other senses, is, in man, simultaneously the foundation of human
life, which is distinguished by its intellective power. Furthermore,
since, as we have seen, touch, for Aristotle, is the essential characteristic of animals, this passage also indicates that the life of the human intellect presupposes the perfection of animal life as such, and that the human body brings to perfection the most typical feature of animal bodies, namely, the organ of touch.

Because of the proportion between touch and intellect, the material conditions for the perfection of the intellectual power are to be found in the constitution of the organ of touch. Two points seem to call for comment in Aristotle's presentation of this theme: the first is that he seems to suggest here that the flesh is the organ of touch, where elsewhere, as we have seen, he says that the flesh is the medium of touch, while the organ lies within; and the second point is Aristotle's specification of relative softness or hardness as the significant quality of the organ of touch as a condition of intellectual ability.

With respect to the first point, it seems that Aristotle here regards the "organ" of touch as a complex of inner organ and attached medium, and makes the flesh - the most evident aspect of this complex - stand for this complex as a whole. His view that the heart is the organ of touch (De sensu et sensato, 439a2-3), together with his suggestion of a correspondence between keenness of sense-power and softness of heart (De partibus animalium, 667a12-14), would seem to confirm that the softness of flesh of which he speaks here is merely the external sign of an inner condition. Furthermore, elsewhere in the De anima, the attached medium of flesh seems to be included in Aristotle's view of the organ of touch as a "mean", or a balanced composition of all the elements.
Since "flesh" seems to stand for the organ of touch as a whole in this passage, it might be asked whether there is any relation between the organ of touch as a composition of all the elements and the condition of "softness" of flesh of which Aristotle speaks here. Such a relation seems to be suggested by a text in the De generatione animalium (744a30-31) which resembles the discussion of touch in De anima, II, 9, but replaces "softness of flesh" by the condition of "good mixture" (eukrasia) as the material condition of man's intellectual superiority. Might this condition of "good mixture" indicate the particular composition of the elements in the human organ of touch, a composition which is also signified by the De anima's reference to "softness of flesh"? Whatever Aristotle's own intention may be on this point, this suggestion points forward to the view of the human body which Avicenna adopts in his interpretation of Aristotle's remarks on the human sense of touch.

The passage from De anima, II, 9, then, is somewhat obscure and problematic. Nevertheless, its clear affirmation of a correspondence among the intellect, the sense of touch and the organ of touch establishes the perspective within which Avicenna's and later St. Thomas' reflections on the human body were to develop. In St. Thomas' writings, in fact, this passage was to become the philosophical counterpart, so to speak, of the text of Genesis, II, 7.

ii. Avicenna

Aristotle's brief discussion of the human sense of touch evidently suggests a fundamental way of distinguishing the human body from the bodies of all other animals. However, its importance for an understanding of the body is somewhat obscured by its location in the
De anima's chapter on the sense of smell, where it has the appearance of a merely incidental digression. In Avicenna's interpretation and development of this passage, by contrast, the doctrine of man's superior sense of touch is integrated into a view of the human body in relation to the world of bodies as a whole. In order to show what Avicenna adds to Aristotle's remarks, we shall first look at the chapter on the sense of touch in Avicenna's own De anima; then, we shall indicate the place which the human body has in Avicenna's systematic view of the cosmos.

Among the many modifications which Avicenna brings to the Aristotelian study of the soul in his De anima, or, as it was known to the scholastics, Sextus liber naturalium, is a reversal of the order in which Aristotle considers the five senses. Thus Avicenna begins with a chapter on the fundamental sense of touch, followed by one on taste and smell, one on hearing, and a full eight chapters on the important sense of sight. In starting with touch, the basic sense of animal life, Avicenna seems to be following the order of nature itself. Drawing on Aristotle's De anima, III,12 and II,11 for his chapter on touch, while adding precisions and supplementary considerations of his own, Avicenna successively discusses touch as basic to animal life, and then the objects and organ of touch. In response to the question with which Aristotle opens his own chapter on touch, Avicenna argues that touch comprises many senses, each of which has for its object one pair of contrary qualities, such as heavy and light or hot and cold. These many senses are thought to be one because they are all equally spread through all the members of the body; furthermore, they all have one common organ.
At the end of Avicenna's chapter on touch is a passage which seems to conflate Aristotle's discussion of the "attached" medium of touch with his remarks on the sense-power itself as a "mean" between contrary qualities. The organ of touch is itself a medium, Avicenna says; as such, it must not contain within itself the quality which it transmits, since a medium must receive and transmit something "new" in order for the passion of sensation to occur. Avicenna goes on to distinguish two kinds of medium: one of them does not participate in the qualities which it transmits at all, while the other does participate in them, but in a balanced way (aequaliter), so that it is neither cold nor hot, for example, but a "well-tempered or balanced medium" (temperaturum aequale medium). Now it would be impossible for the organ of touch to be altogether free of such qualities, since it is composed of them; it must therefore be free of the extremes through its complexion and balance (causa complexionis et aequalitatis), in order to perceive that which is unbalanced. That which, in its composition of tangible qualities, more closely approximates a state of balance (est vicinius aequalitati) has a more subtle sense-power; and because man, of all the animals, approximates such a balance most closely (ex omnibus animalibus propinquior est aequalitati), therefore he has the most subtle sense of touch, which is the first and chief of the senses. In his consultation of Aristotle, Avicenna here turns from Aristotle's discussion of the sense-power as a "mean" in De anima, II, 11 to his remarks on man's superior sense of touch in De anima, II, 9. Avicenna links the themes of these two passages by suggesting that the "mean" which constitutes the organ of touch may be brought to a greater or lesser state of "balance", and that this relative state of balance (like Aristotle's "softness and hardness of flesh") is the
material condition of the "subtlety" of the sense of touch (which seems to correspond to the "discriminating" power mentioned by Aristotle); since the human body approaches a perfect state of balance most closely, man has the most subtle sense of touch.\textsuperscript{36} Avicenna does not go on to discuss the correspondence between touch and intellect in this chapter, since his concern is rather with the material precondition of the perfection of the sense of touch itself. His principal contribution to the discussion is his explicit identification of this condition as the balanced composition of the elemental qualities which is found in the human body.

The view of the human body as a perfectly balanced composition of the elements or elemental qualities seems to have been ancient and widespread. Versions of it can be found as far back as the fragments of Empedocles, as well as in ancient Chinese texts, and it was already common in the Arab world before the time of Avicenna.\textsuperscript{37} Its pervasiveness suggests that, however scientifically objectionable it may be, it points to a fundamental aspect of man's "natural" understanding of his body and its distinctive character. The image of the human body as a perfectly harmonious blend of the elements of the cosmos suggests a number of themes, such as man as a microcosm, or the "well-tempered" condition of human health and moral virtue, or again, man's delicate state of readiness to perceive, and therefore understand, the events in the world around him. In any case, such a view recognizes that man's uniqueness and superiority among the things of the visible world are closely bound up with the concrete conditions of his bodily nature. Whatever the distant origins of this view may be, it is Avicenna's presentation of it, and in particular his application of it to the Aristotelian theme of man's superior sense of touch, which is of
significance for understanding St. Thomas' account of the human body. The Avicennian view of the perfect balance which constitutes the human body will be accepted by St. Thomas as the fundamental "scientific" datum concerning the body.

Because Avicenna was a physician as well as a philosopher, the theme of the specific character of the human body was doubly significant for him. Here let us briefly draw attention to the presence of the theme of the body as a balance of the elements in the opening sections of Avicenna's medical work, the Liber Canonis medicinae. Avicenna introduces this work by establishing that medicine, the knowledge of the various dispositions of the human body and of the means of conserving and restoring health, has both a theoretical and a practical dimension. Turning then to the subject-matter of medicine, he begins with an Aristotelian discussion of the elements, the simple bodies which are the "primary parts" of the human body (as of all other bodies), and whose various combinations correspond to the different species of things. The particular interaction of the elements in a given body produces a certain quality in the body which is called its "complexion" (complexio). There are two basic kinds of complexion, says Avicenna, the "balanced" (aequalis) and the "imbalanced" (inaequalis). In the former, the contrary qualities of the elements are brought to a "mean" (medium) between excess and deficiency. Medicine is concerned with the "balanced complexion" of the human body, though it recognizes that a perfectly balanced complexion cannot be found either in the body as a whole or in any of its members. Furthermore, the balance with which medicine is concerned is not a merely quantitatively equal presence of the elements (cum pondere aequaliter), but their quantitative and qualitative "equity of
distribution" (a justitia in divisione). The human body, Avicenna repeatedly states here, is the most perfect possible such balance of the elements. Moreover, among the members of the body, the flesh is closest to a state of perfect balance, followed by the skin, particularly the skin of the hands and fingers. These references to the flesh (the medium of the sense of touch) and the hand (the "organ of organs") recall Aristotle's remarks on the human body in his *De anima*. In any case, it is clear that the theme of the body's elemental harmony, which Avicenna uses in his *De anima* to explain the Aristotelian doctrine of man's perfect sense of touch, is also fundamental to his understanding of the human body from a medical point of view.

A final point to note concerning Avicenna's understanding of the human body is the way in which this theme of the body as a harmonious composition of the elements enters into his view of the cosmos as a whole. In his important discussion of the emanation of things from the first cause in *Metaphysics*, IX, 4, Avicenna explains that the first and necessary being produces just one effect, a pure intelligence, which in turn produces the soul and body of the first sphere, as well as a second intelligence, which itself produces the soul and body of the second sphere and a third intelligence. This pattern is repeated until the ninth intelligence produces the soul and body of the lunar sphere, as well as a final intelligence, which produces the sublunar forms and the four elements, assigning forms to appropriately prepared combinations of the elements. The particular composition of the human body, then, would seem to be the reason why it is given the human soul as a form. In *De anima*, V, 7, Avicenna
explicitly touches on this point. The extreme contrariety of the elements, he says, prevents them from receiving life. But insofar as this contrariety is overcome and the elements are brought to a state of balance (ad temperantiam quae non habet contrarium), bodies composed of the elements begin to resemble the heavenly bodies, in which there is no contrariety at all. The body which is closest to a state of balance (quo nihil potest esse probinquius temperantiae) - which, we have already seen, is the human body - will receive the substance which most closely resembles the separate substance or pure intelligence (similima substantiae separatae), namely, the human soul. The human body, then, is identified by Avicenna as that composite body which, in its state of elemental balance, resembles the body of the heavens most closely. Note that the material conditions of this resemblance - the harmonious state of balance of the human body - is also the condition which, according to Avicenna, explains the Aristotelian doctrine of man's superior sense of touch. If to this interrelated complex of ideas we add Aristotle's correspondence between touch and intelligence, we find a direct relationship between man's superior intelligence and the supposed resemblance between his body and the body of the heavens. In any case, it is Avicenna's suggestion of a resemblance between the balanced composition of the human body and the noncontrariety of the heavenly body which will appear in the early part of the thirteenth century as the most prominent and significant of the cluster of themes involved in Avicenna's elaboration of Aristotle's brief discussion of man's perfect sense of touch.
iii. St. Albert

Sometime before the middle of the thirteenth century, the 
Avicennian argument that the human body is distinguished by its resemblance to the heavenly body seems to have suggested the even stranger view that the body to which the rational soul is united should itself be the heavenly body. Whether or not this view was ever seriously maintained, St. Albert, St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas all respond to it in their respective discussions of the body. The basic premise for the argument in favour of this view seems to be based on a remark in Aristotle’s *De generatione animalium* to the effect that there is a precise correspondence between the nobility of a body and the nobility of its form. Since, it is argued, the rational soul is the noblest of forms, it would seem that it should be joined to the noblest of bodies, which (as Aristotle suggests) is the heavenly body.

By arguing that the human soul should have a nobler body than it does, this view also implies a radical disorder in the constitution of man’s nature, and perhaps a Platonic view of man’s present body as a degrading prison. The reply to this argument in St. Albert’s *Sentences* commentary states that the rational soul is the noblest of forms by the fact that it carries out all the operations of a soul. Therefore, it does not follow that it should have the noblest body simply speaking, but rather, the noblest in which it is able to carry out these operations. And so it does, St. Albert concludes; for such a body is one with the composition and complexion of the human body: *et hoc verum est, quia hoc est complexionatum et compositum compositione et complexione hominis.* St. Albert’s allusion to a specific composition of the elements in the human body suggests that it is Avicenna’s view
of the body which he has in mind in this defense of the suitability of the human body to the rational soul.

St. Albert more evidently relies on Avicenna's view of the human body in other of his writings. Here we shall focus on the passage in his *De anima* which corresponds to the discussion of the human sense of touch in Aristotle's *De anima*, II, 9. This passage is of particular interest to us, first of all because it is St. Albert's interpretation of this important Aristotelian passage, secondly because it is evidently influenced by Avicenna's account of the human body, and finally because it closely resembles St. Thomas' article on the human body in his *Sentences* commentary, with which St. Albert's *De anima* is nearly contemporary.

St. Albert begins his explanation of Aristotle's remarks on man's inferior sense of smell and superior sense of touch and taste with an Avicennian account of the human body's composition. The tangible qualities, he says, in being mixed make up a "complexion"; the more a complexion is removed from the extreme states of these qualities, the closer it is to a state of balance, and the more, therefore, it resembles the heavenly body, in which there is no contrariety at all. Though Avicenna is not mentioned here, he is clearly the source of this initial consideration. St. Albert's next point, however, is explicitly attributed to Plato: because, according to Plato, forms are assigned according to the "merits" of matter, and because to any given complexion there corresponds a particular form, therefore the most well-balanced complexion should be given the noblest soul, that is, the soul which is intellective. Thus, while closely adhering to the Avicennian view of the body, St. Albert draws
attention to a fundamental Platonic principle underlying this view, namely, that it is the condition or "merits" of matter which determine the kind of form it will receive. We should take particular note of this point, since the account of the human body in the mature writings of St. Thomas will directly invert this Platonic principle, explaining the disposition of matter as a consequence, rather than a precondition, of the form to which it is united.

Turning then to Aristotle's distinction among individual men in terms of the organ of touch, St. Albert explains that some men have a more balanced complexion than others, that is, one further removed from the extremes of the elemental qualities. For this reason, these men have the best sense of touch, and are better disposed with respect to intellectual skill. The complexion of these men, says St. Albert, can be brought to such a state of balance that they seem to be like some "earthly gods" who, as it were, understand all things by themselves. (It is difficult to resist the suspicion that behind this extravagant language St. Albert is thinking of his brilliant student St. Thomas.) In any case, such men are those whom Aristotle characterizes by their "softness of flesh".

With an Avicennian interest in physiological matters, St. Albert goes on to explain what is meant by this "softness of flesh". This condition is one of "softness" (mollities), rather than "slackness" (laxitas), he says, because softness results from the even mixture of the dry and the moist which generates "subtle spirits"; slackness, on the other hand, results from an excess of the moist and the cold, while the flesh should be moderately hot, in order to move the body's spirits evenly, but still cool enough to prevent a confusion of their
operations. Soft nails and fine hair indicate "brieft and subtle spirits of the heart", which, on being carried to the brain, are the best support for the animal powers. From this bodily condition of "softness" come the wisdom and skill (sapientiae et industriae) by which a man is made naturally wise and quick-witted (prudens et ingeniosus), and by which he eventually attains the act of wisdom (actus prudentiae), unless he destroys his natural disposition through inertia. This bodily condition - rather than, as some think, a good imagination - is the true cause of wisdom (prudentiae); for a good imagination results from a cold and dry complexion, which does not make for skill and quick-wittedness (industriam et inveniendum). Finally, recalling the Aristotelian basis of this discussion, St. Albert notes that all of this is meant to establish that we know odors through flavors, since we know flavors better, and taste is a form of touch. Whatever may be the value of this elaboration of Aristotle's brief remarks on the human sense of touch, it unquestionably shows St. Albert to be keenly sensitive to the Aristotelian and Avicennian emphasis on the material conditions of human intelligence.

According to this explanation of the passage from Aristotle's De anima, then, the correspondence between touch and intellect in man is due to the well-balanced complexion which makes for both a good sense of touch and the kind of bodily spirits whose action in the brain disposes a man for the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom. Underlying St. Albert's physiological discussion, however, is the fundamental argument that the most well-balanced complexion should receive the noblest of souls. This argument, as we have seen, rests on the Avicennian point that a well-balanced complexion resembles the
heavenly body, and on the even more basic Platonic view that forms are given to matter on the basis of the "merits" of the latter. It is such fundamental considerations as these, rather than the kind of physiological details which St. Albert provides, which will retain St. Thomas' attention in his own discussions of the human body. In fact, the discussion of the human body's specific character in St. Thomas' *Sentences* commentary is very similar to St. Albert's Avicennian-Platonic account of the body. Since St. Albert's *De anima* and St. Thomas' *Sentences* commentary are roughly contemporary, it is quite possible that one of them influenced the other, or that they both share a common source with respect to this point. It is certainly significant that St. Thomas' first approach to the question of the body's specific character closely resembles that of his teacher. Before returning to St. Thomas' *Sentences* commentary, however, we should note that a modified version of the Avicennian view of the body was adopted by St. Bonaventure.

iv. St. Bonaventure

The discussion of the human body in St. Bonaventure's *Sentences* commentary belongs to a specifically Franciscan tradition of reflection on the body which had already begun with the *Summa de anima* of John of Acre (1235-45). According to John, the soul as form or perfection is immediately united to the body which is in its "ultimate disposition", that is, to the matter which is necessary for the reception of such a form. With respect to the human body in particular, John presents the following Avicennian argument: since "the most perfect perfection" (*perfectissimae perfectionis*) should have
"the most perfect perfectible" (*perfectius perfectibile*); and since the most perfect of the bodies composed or consisting of the elements is the human body, while the rational soul is, among natural forms, "the most perfect perfection"; therefore, only the human body is capable of being united to the rational soul. The human body is the most perfect of bodies, John argues, because all of the lower compositions of the elements — the *mixtio* of mineral bodies, the *complexio* of vegetative bodies, and the *compositio or anorum* of animal bodies — are merely material (*materialis*) with respect to the human body. Furthermore, the soul by nature comprehends the likenesses of all things — of all intelligible things by itself, and of all sensible things by means of the body: the body by means of which it receives the likenesses of all sensible things, then, must itself resemble all bodies, and must therefore be composed of all bodies as "the most composite" (*compositissimum*) of bodies. (Hefe John seems to fall into the Impedoclean error that sensation presupposes an actual likeness between the sense-organ and its object; on the other hand, his emphasis on the highly complex composition of the human body, and on the role of this complexity in human cognition, are points worth noting.) Again, the human soul's variety of operations requires a body differentiated into organs, and therefore one which is composite rather than simple. The soul's nutritive power alone requires for its operations the qualities of all the elements, as well as the presence of the luminous nature of the heavenly body, which resolves the contrariety of the elements into a harmony (*armonía*). John's introduction of "light" as a fifth and harmonizing element seems to be foreign to the Aristotelian tradition, and may have its origin in
some remarks of St. Augustine. In any case, while light is, for John, a crucial factor in the union of any body with its soul, the human body, as "the most fitting harmony" (convenientissima armonia) of the elements, is united to the rational soul by means of the "noblest" kind of light (luce nobilissima).

St. Bonaventure is apparently aware of John's account of the human body, though he does not fully accept it. As has already been mentioned, the three points of St. Bonaventure's discussion of the body in his sentences commentary are concerned with the body of Adam in particular, rather than the human body in general. Referring to the text of Genesis, II, 7, St. Bonaventure begins by arguing that Adam's body, in keeping with the order of creation, had to be "elemental" (that is, composed of the elements), rather than "celestial". This is so, first of all, because both the variety of organs needed for man's sense-powers, and the possibility of death as a punishment for sin, required a body which was elemental; furthermore, man's use of the corporeal creatures as instruments, his inferiority to the purely spiritual creatures, and the lowly state from which he was meant to rise to God, are also reasons why man's place in the order of things called for a body composed of the elements.

St. Bonaventure's second point, which involves a discussion of the way in which the "quintessence" or heavenly body enters into the composition of the human body, would seem to be a reply to John of Rochelle. St. Bonaventure argues that the nature of the heavenly body does not enter into the composition of the human body as an element (sicut elementum), or as a medium (sicut medium) uniting and reconciling the elements. At most one might say that, if "the nature of light or of the heavenly body" is understood in a broad sense,
or by way of similarity (per conformitatem), it does enter into the composition of the human body with respect to its power (secundum virtutem), since the harmony and nobility of the human body make it, of all composite bodies, resemble the heavenly body most closely. 63 Thus, St. Bonaventure seems to choose Avicenna's doctrine of the resemblance between the human body and the body of the heavens over John of Rochester's argument for the presence of the quintessence in the human body.

Having thus established that the body of Adam could neither consist of the nature of the heavenly body, nor include it in its composition, St. Bonaventure proceeds to his final point, which is that Adam's body must have been the noblest or most well-balanced composition of the elements in order to receive the noblest of forms. Following an Avicennian distinction, he also argues that the balance of the elements in Adam's body must have been an "equitable" (a iustitia) rather than a merely quantitative (a pondera) one. He also adds that this state of balance admits of some latitude: in the state of glory, the human body will have a perfect elemental balance, with no actual or possible discordance; in the present state of misery, this balance is present in a diminished state, mixed with discordancy; and in Adam's state of innocence, the human body was in a perfect state of balance, but with the possibility of an imbalance occurring in the event of man's transgression. Thus St. Bonaventure takes pains to integrate the accepted scientific view of the human body into the Christian account of man's original innocence, present fallen condition and future glorification.

The concise chapter on the human body in St. Bonaventure's Praeivloquium (1257) presents a similar combination of Christian
doctrine and Avicennian science, while also adding some points from St. Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram*, VI. After referring to man's formation from the earth as described in *Genesis*, II, 7, this chapter goes on to show how the body of the first man illustrates the power, wisdom and goodness of God in producing His "final and noblest effect", namely, human nature. The power of God, St. Bonaventure says (in a dualistic explanation reminiscent of Peter Lombard), is shown by the union in man of two extremely different natures or substances, one corporeal and the other spiritual. God also showed his wisdom by making the kind of body which would, in its way, be proportioned to its soul: insofar as the soul vivifies it, the body had the "equitably" well-balanced complexion (*ab aequalitate naturalis iustitiae*) which is a predisposition for the noblest way of life; insofar as the soul moves it, the body had a perfect manifold of organs, most notably in the face and in the "organ of organs", the hand; and insofar as the soul tends "upwards" towards heaven, the body had an upright posture, so that man's bodily uprightness might be a sign of his uprightness of mind. And finally, God manifested His goodness in making man innocent, and therefore without the punishment of bodily suffering; the body was capable both of dying and of not dying, St. Bonaventure states, but was kept from the corruption of death in man's state of innocence. 

This final point is clearly taken from St. Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram*, VI, while St. Bonaventure's reference to the hand as the "organ of organs" is drawn from Aristotle's *De anima*. Nevertheless, the fundamental philosophical consideration still seems to be Avicenna's account of the body as a harmonious composition of the elements.
Finally, though we cannot discuss it in detail, we should briefly call attention to one other Franciscan text, namely, the long treatise on the human body in the Summa Theologica attributed to Alexander of Hales. (This treatise may be one of the parts of the Summa written after Alexander's death by other Franciscans.) The first section of this treatise discusses the body of Adam in terms of the four Aristotelian causes, while the second section separately treats of the bodies of the first man and woman. The questions on the "material cause" of the human body and on its "nobility" affirm the Avicennian view of the body as a harmonious composition of the elements, though Algazel, rather than Avicenna himself, is presented as the source of this view. John of Nochelle's characterization of the human body as the "most composite" (compositissimum) of bodies also recurs in these questions. In general, the treatise draws on a wide variety of philosophical and Christian authors for a detailed elaboration of the Franciscan school's philosophical understanding of the biblical view of the body.

It is clear that this Franciscan view of the body, like that of St. Albert, has been directly or indirectly influenced by Avicenna's account of the body as a well-balanced composition of the four elements. Unlike St. Albert, however, and unlike Avicenna himself, the Franciscan school does not link this account with the Aristotelian view of man's superior sense of touch and the bearing this has on human intelligence. In St. Thomas' discussions of the body, on the other hand, these Aristotelian points remain an important element of the discussion.
4) The Argument

Turning, finally, back to the article on the human body in St. Thomas' Sentences commentary, we find that its argument that the rational soul should be united to a "well-complexioned" body (corpori bene complexionate) is yet another version of the "Avicennian" account of the body, which seems to have been generally accepted by theologians at the University of Paris. However, St. Thomas' presentation of this account is of interest to us not, primarily, as a variation on his predecessors' approach to the question, but as the point of departure for his own developing reflections on it. Even his earliest treatment of this point is distinguished from the discussions of St. Albert and St. Bonaventure by a number of features, such as its clarity and conciseness, its use of the pseudo-Avicennian De intelligentiis and, most importantly, its association with St. Thomas' unique account of the soul as the form of the body in the preceding article. As has already been stated, while St. Albert and St. Bonaventure also speak of the soul as the form of the body, their concern with the doctrine of the soul's immortality leads them to qualify this view and to emphasize the soul's detachment from the body as an independent substance. By contrast, St. Thomas' full acceptance of the Aristotelian view of the soul as a form, together with his inclusion of soul and body in a single act of being, give the theological question of the human body's specific character a degree of seriousness which it could not have had before: for, with St. Thomas' emphasis on the unity of the human composite, the specific character of the human body must be more intimately related to the specific nature of man himself than it had been in the thought of St. Thomas' predecessors.
The corpus of St. Thomas' *In II Sent.* d.1, q.2, a.5 presents the Avicennian view of the body in an orderly, quasi-syllogistic fashion: after establishing a "major premise" (that the rational soul should be united to the body which most closely resembles the body of the heavens) and a "minor premise" (that the human body should achieve this resemblance by being brought to a balanced state in its elemental composition), St. Thomas then turns to Aristotle's remark about man's superior sense of touch in order to confirm his conclusion (that the human body is such a balanced composition of the elements). Since we are already familiar with the sources of this argument, here we shall simply indicate the significance which it has for St. Thomas himself.

St. Thomas begins with a principle which he apparently takes directly from the *De intellectualis*, and which states that "the order of perfectibles must follow the order of perfections": opportet ordinem perfectibilium esse secundum ordinem perfectionum. In keeping with this principle, he then argues that, since the noblest of perfections is that which moves the heavenly body, and since, among all other perfections, the rational soul resembles this noblest perfection most closely, therefore, the rational soul should have the body which most closely resembles the heavenly body (*simillimum caelo*). The basis for the discussion, then, is the distinction between an active "perfection" and its passive "perfectible", and the generalization of this distinction into two separate orders of "perfections" and "perfectibles". The human soul is included with the mover of the heavens in the order of perfections, and the human body with the heavenly body in the order of perfections, with a corresponding relation of similarity in each of the two orders:
Since the order of perfectibles, to which the human body belongs, follows and depends upon the order of perfections, it seems to be the soul's status as a perfectio which is the fundamental consideration with respect to the body. Now perfectio is a characteristic Avicennian term for the soul, one which comprehensively describes the soul in all its operations, whether united to or separated from the body; furthermore, the term describes both the souls of plants, animals and men, and the "souls" which, according to Avicenna, animate the heavenly bodies. With respect to this last point, St. Thomas always seems to have been reluctant to accept the Avicennian (and Aristotelian) view that the heavenly body is animated by a soul, though he did accept the view that it has a spiritual and eternal "mover", whether this be God or an angel. Accordingly, his use of the term perfectio here allows him to include both the human soul and the heavenly "mover" in a single genus, while avoiding any confrontation with the Avicennian belief in the "soul" of the heavenly body.

Despite its Avicennian overtones, St. Thomas seems to have understood the principle of correspondence between a perfectio and its perfectibile as an expression of the Aristotelian view that the actuality of form occurs in its proper matter. Thus, as he says later in his commentary on Book II of the Sentences:

...ut Philosophus dicit in II Physic. et in 2 De anima, text 26, actus proprius fit in propria materia; unde oportet perfectionem perfectibilium proportionatum esse.

In St. Thomas' Sentences commentary, then, the correspondence between
perfectio and perfectibiliti seems primarily to refer to the intimate union of form and matter, while also having enough latitude to include the - for St. Thomas - less intimate and less clear relationship between the heavenly bodies and their movers. Thus the reciprocity of the terms perfectio and perfectibile recalls St. Thomas' account of the close union of soul and body in the relation of form and matter in a single act of being. On the other hand, the principle from the De intellectibus dividing perfections and perfectibles into two distinct orders seems to obscure this view of the unity of man's being, and to prepare the way for a consideration of the human body in isolation from the rational soul.

Having established his "major premise" - that the body to which the rational soul is united should be that which most closely resembles the heavenly body - St. Thomas goes on to show the way in which this resemblance must be achieved. His general point here is the familiar one that the body must be a well-balanced composition of the elements. Since the "nobility" of the heavenly body consists in its noncontrariety, he says, any other body will, in the significant respect, resemble it to the extent that it is without contrariety. Now things subject to generation and corruption cannot achieve this resemblance by being completely freed of such contrary qualities as the hot and the cold, but only by being brought to a medium which is neither of the extremes in actuality. That body, therefore, which is brought to the greatest state of balance in its mixture (ad maximam aequalitatem mixtionis) will resemble the heavenly body most closely, and such should be the human body. Thus, whether he is still following the De intelligentiis or is making use of another source, St. Thomas
presents the standard Avicennian argument that the human body should be the most harmonious possible composition of the elements. Unlike St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas does not complicate the discussion with scriptural considerations, or pursue Avicenna's distinction between a quantitative (a pondera) and an "equitable" (a justitia) balance of the elements. His purpose seems to be simply to report the Avicennian argument in its basic outline.

Finally St. Thomas adds that thus it is (et inde est) that Aristotle's De anima says that man has a better sense of touch than do the other animals, and that the better his sense of touch, the better his intellect, since the subtlety of the sense of touch follows from the balance of complexion; for, as the De anima also says, the organ of touch must be in potentiality to its objects as a medium, and not, like the organ of sight, by way of privation. While St. Thomas' presentation of these Aristotelian points appears to be guided by Avicenna, his explicit references to Aristotle's De anima indicate that he has directly consulted the Aristotelian source behind the Avicennian view of the body. Nevertheless, the Aristotelian element of St. Thomas' discussion is clearly subordinate to the Avicennian element. The expression with which St. Thomas introduces his references to Aristotle - et inde est - presents John's superior sense of touch as no more than a confirmation of the Avicennian view of the body. The crucial point about the human body remains its specific elemental composition, and not the distinctive human sense of touch, which is an important, but somewhat secondary, consequence of the body's particular composition.

The four objections with which St. Thomas introduces article five argue that the rational soul should be united to a heavenly body
(obj.1), a simple body (obj.2); or a homogenous body (obj.3), and that fire, because of its subtlety, should predominate in the living body (obj.4). (Most of these objections seem to be modelled on similar objections in St. Albert's and St. Bonaventure's discussions of the body.) In response to the first objection, St. Thomas states that the heavenly body, as Averroes says, is neither generable nor corruptible, and it therefore does not require—as the human body does—a perfection which has sensitive and vegetative powers, but one which moves it locally; whatever this perfection may be (St. Thomas allows that it may be either God or an angel), it is superior to the human soul, and the heavenly body itself is correspondingly superior to the human body (ad 1).73 A simple or elemental body; on the other hand, is too dissimilar to the heavenly body to be appropriate to the human soul (ad 2).74 St. Thomas' reply to the third objection suggests as a general principle that the degree of nobility of a soul corresponds to the organic complexity of its body; thus the human soul, which is simple in its essence, but multiple in its powers and operations, has a body with many organs, and in particular has the distinctively human hands, by means of which man is able to carry out a great variety of operations (ad 3). Responding to the fourth objection, St. Thomas indicates that the combination (adaequatio) of the elements in the human body requires a quantitative predominance of the "more material" element earth, but a qualitative predominance of the "more active" element fire, whose heat is necessary to the operation of the senses (ad 4). This quantitative predominance of earth (suggested by the body's heaviness) may be intended by St. Thomas as a confirmation of the assertion that man was formed from the earth in Genesis, II, 7.
A consideration of St. Thomas' *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.2, a.5 in light of St. Albert's and St. Bonaventure's discussions of the human body suggests that, in spite of St. Thomas' radically new account of the human composite as an immediate union between a single substantial form and matter, he does not, in this early work, seem to have felt the need for a novel approach to the question of the human body's specific character. After his account of the union of soul and body in article four, he decided to add a complementary discussion of the kind of body to which the rational soul should be united, that is, a justification of the soul's union with the human body in particular. Confronted with the possibility of arguments that the rational soul should be united with some other kind of body, and accepting the currently accepted Avicennian view of the human body as a scientific given, he simply integrated this view - which seemed to oppose neither the text of *Genesis* nor his own account of the union of soul and body - into his commentary on the *Sentences*. While he was thus enabled to present an argument that the human body is appropriate to the rational soul, he was also drawn into the peculiar Avicennian view that the body is a harmonious mixture of the elements resembling the heavenly body, and, almost incidentally, into the Aristotelian doctrine of man's superior sense of touch. The predominating Avicennian aspect of St. Thomas' discussion in particular must seem, to the modern reader, to have deprived this account of the body not only of originality, but also of scientific credibility, since the whole neo-arabic cosmology underlying the discussion - with its geocentric worldview, in which the incorruptible heavenly bodies are eternally moved by a spiritual agent, and its theory of the
four elements and their qualities - has collapsed with the advent of modern science. However, a further objection to the discussion might be made on a philosophical level. Since the underlying principle from the *De intelligen tia* with which St. Thomas begins separates soul and body into two distinct orders (of "perfections" and "perfectibles"), the argument as a whole tends to obscure his emphasis on the substantial unity of soul and body in the preceding article; might there not be a more significant account of the human body's specific character than that given by St. Thomas in article five, one which proceeds not from the separation of soul and body, but from recognition of their union in a single nature and a single act of being? As his later texts on the question of the human body's specific character suggest, this question seems to have occurred to St. Thomas himself sometime after composing his *Sentences* commentary.

Apart from these objections, the very fact that St. Thomas accepts from his predecessors (most likely from St. Albert in particular) the question of the human body's specific character as a legitimate and important point for theological discussion is noteworthy. Assuming the union of a spiritual and rational soul with a body as a fact of man's creation and nature, this question calls for a philosophic explanation of the reason why such a soul should be united to such a body (*tali corpori*), that is, to the human body. Although neither the question nor its basic meaning originate with St. Thomas himself, its presence in his first great theological work means that it formed an important part of his reflection on man from the very beginning of his career. Having seen that his initial response to this question is largely dependent on the corresponding discussions of his
predecessors, we now turn to the next work in which he addressed
the question of the human body's specific character, the Summa Contra
Jentiles.

2. Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 90

Following his four years of lecturing on the Sentences, St.
Thomas taught from 1256 to 1259 as regent master in theology at the
University of Paris, and at the same time began to work on his second
major theological work, the Summa Contra Gentiles, which he eventually
completed in Italy in 1264. The discussion of the human body in this
work is found in Book II, whose theme, like that of the second book
of the Sentences commentary, is creation. After an introductory
discussion (cc.1-5), Book II treats first of the production and
distinction of creatures in general (cc.6-45), and then of intellectual
creatures in particular (cc.46-101). This last section in turn opens
with a general discussion of intellectual creatures (cc.46-55), and
then separately considers those intellects which are united to bodies,
or human souls (cc.56-90), and those which are not, or angels (cc.91-
101). The chapter which concerns us here is the very last of those
dealing with the union between an intellect and a body in human nature
(cc.90), where St. Thomas considers the question whether an
intellectual substance may be united as form to a body other than
the human body: utrum alicui alteri corpori aliqua substantia
intellectualis ut forma uniatur.

Let us first of all note a structural parallel between the
discussion of the incorporated intellect in Summa Contra Gentiles, II
and the treatment of man's nature in *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.2. Just as the latter discussion is divided into two parts, one on the rational soul's union with a body (a.4) and one on the kind of body to which it is united (a.5), similarly, the discussion of man's nature in *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II is divided into one long section on the union between an intellect and a body in man (cc.56-89) and a brief concluding chapter on the kind of body to which the intellective soul is united (c.90):

*In II Sent.*, d.1, q.2
propter quid homo ex anima et corpore constitutus sit (a.4)

*Summa Contra Gentiles*, II
de unione intellectus ad corpus (cc.56-89)

utrum tali corpori anima ejus uniri debuerit (a.5)

utrum alicui alteri corpori substantia intellectualis ut forma uniatur (c.90)

The repetition of this two-part structure in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* indicates that St. Thomas' concern with the question of the human body’s specific character is becoming a permanent feature of his reflections on man. While his treatment of it in his *Sentences* commentary might be attributed to the influence of theological discussions at the University of Paris, its presence in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* confirms that he has accepted it as an important point of his own theological thought. The question's closing position in both of these early texts would seem to suggest its subordination to St. Thomas' main concern in these discussions of man's nature, but also its significance as an ultimate consideration in the explanation of the human soul's union with a body. Since the treatment of the question in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, like that in the *Sentences* commentary, follows on and presupposes a more general discussion of the union of soul and body, we shall once again begin by considering the question's philosophical context.
The account of man's nature in *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, 56-89 is an elaboration and refinement of the Aristotelian view of the soul as the form of the body first discussed in St. Thomas' *Sentences* commentary. Here he begins his presentation of this view by discussing and refuting its principal opponents, namely, Plato, who holds that the soul is united to the body as a mover only (cc. 57-58), Averroes, who holds that the intellect is a separate substance to which man is united by means of the phantasms of the imagination (cc. 59-61), and various proponents of the view that the soul is something material (cc. 62-67). In chapter 68, having eliminated these opposing views, St. Thomas presents his own Aristotelian account of the intellect as the form of the body.

For one thing to be the substantial form of another, St. Thomas says, two conditions are required. The first is that it must be the principle of the substantial being (*principium essendi substantialiter*) of that of which it is the form; that is, it must be the formal, and not the productive (*factivum*), principle by which something is and is said to be a "being" (*ens*). From this the second point follows, which is that form and matter must be joined in a single act of being (convenient in uno esse), a union which does not occur between a productive (*effectivum*) principle and that to which it gives being; this act of being is that by means of which a composite substance, one in being though made up of matter and form, subsists. As St. Thomas has already shown in chapter 51, the fact that an intellectual substance is subsistent does not prevent it from being such a formal principle of the being of matter by, as it were, communicating its being to matter (*quasi esse suum communicans materiae*); for it is the
The same act of being in which both the composite and the form subsist, since the composite exists through the form, and neither form nor matter subsists apart from the other. Here St. Thomas seems to be describing the "partnership in being" between soul and body which he had mentioned in his *sentences* commentary: the soul possesses its own act of being which it extends to the body by informing it. The being of the human body, then, is nothing more or less than its participation in the immaterial being of the subsisting soul.

St. Thomas then turns to an objection: someone might say that an intellectual substance cannot communicate its act of being to corporeal matter in such a way that there is one act of being belonging to both, since different genera have different modes of being, and a nobler substance has a nobler being. This objection seems to carry echoes from Peter Lombard's emphasis on the extreme diversity between the spiritual soul and the lowly human body. In any case, it calls for a more precise account of the way in which a single act of being can be shared between an intellect and a body.

In response, St. Thomas conceives that the objection would hold if the act of being belonged to the intellectual substance and to matter in the same way (*codem modo*). But such, he says, is not the case: the being in question belongs to corporeal matter as to a recipient and a subject which is thereby elevated to something higher (*ut recipientis et subjecti ad aliquid altius elevati*), while it belongs to the intellectual substance as to its principle and of its very nature (*ut principii, et secundum propriae naturae con-ruentiam*). Nothing, therefore, prevents an intellectual substance from being the form of the human body. In this way, St. Thomas goes on to say, the
amazing interconnection of things (mirabilis rerum connexio) can be noted. According to a Dionysian principle, the lowest in a higher genus is always found to border on the highest in a lower genus, just as the lowest animals, for example, barely exceed the life of plants. There must, therefore, be something which is highest in the genus of bodies - namely, the "equally complexioned human body" (corpus humanum aequaliter complexionatum) - which borders on the lowest of a higher genus - namely, the human soul, which holds the lowest grade in the genus of intellectual substances, as can be seen from its manner of understanding (ex modo intelliendi). Therefore, the human soul is said to be a certain "horizon" and "boundary", as it were, between corporeal and incorporeal things, being on the one hand an incorporeal substance, but on the other hand the form of the body. St. Thomas adds that the composite of an intellectual substance and matter is no less something one (aliquid unum) than, for example, the composition of the form of fire and its matter, but perhaps even more so, since the more a form masters (vincit) its matter, the greater the unity between them. Thus, while the objection had called into question the unity of being shared by an intellect and a body, St. Thomas, on the contrary, emphasizes this unity. Furthermore, his Dionysian account of the union of soul and body in man seems to reverse the perspective on the human composite suggested by Peter Lombard, since in contrast to Lombard, St. Thomas stresses the dignity of the body (in its perfectly balanced elemental composition) and the lowliness of the soul (in its manner of understanding). St. Thomas does not enlarge on the body's composition or the soul's manner of understanding here, but simply mentions these points in order to indicate that man's nature is a composition of the highest in the lower order of
bodies and the lowest in the higher order of intellects.

Having established the unity in being of form and matter in the human composite, St. Thomas adds a further precision to the relation of soul and body. The single being shared by form and matter does not mean that matter always is commensurate (adnemmat) with its form; rather, the nobler a form is, the more it surpasses (superexcedit) matter in its being. This point may be illustrated by the operations of different forms, by means of which we know their different natures; a form whose operation surpasses the condition of matter will itself surpass matter in the nobility (dignitatem) of its being. St. Thomas then describes a series of five kinds of forms whose operations progressively surpass the dispositions of matter in a gradual approximation to the operations of the heavenly bodies and their movers. (1) The forms of the elements, whose operations are restricted to the effects of the elemental qualities, are completely material and entirely "immersed" (immerse) in matter. (2) The operations of the forms of mixed bodies in general do not exceed those of the forms of the elements, though sometimes, as in the case of the magnet, they operate by means of a power proceeding from the heavenly bodies. (3) Still higher forms have certain operations which transcend the elemental qualities, though these qualities contribute to their operations; these forms are the souls of plants, which, as principles of movement in living and self-moving things, resemble not only the powers of the heavenly bodies, but also the movers of these bodies. (4) Above the souls of plants are certain other forms, namely, the souls of brute animals, which resemble the higher substances not only by moving, but also, in a way, by knowing; these
forms are capable of an operation— the act of sensing—to which the elemental qualities do not directly contribute, although they are necessary for the proper disposition of the organ which is required for this operation. (5) Above all these forms is a form which resembles the movers of the heavenly bodies even in the kind of knowledge which it possesses, namely, intellectual understanding (intelligere), an operation which is not accomplished through any bodily organ. This form—the intellectual soul, the principle by means of which man understands—cannot be entirely encompassed by (comprehensa) or immersed in (immersa) matter, as are other material forms, since it does not communicate with matter in the act of understanding. Nevertheless, the fact that the human soul's act of understanding requires the co-operation of certain other powers, namely, the corporeal and organic powers of sense and imagination, shows that the soul is naturally united to the body for the completion of human nature (ad compleandam speciem humanam).

Thus chapter 68 concludes by presenting the human body as necessary to the fulness of human nature because of its contribution to the human soul's act of understanding. The "partnership of being" which the soul extends to the body is not for the sake of the body, but for the sake of the soul's own act of understanding, whose unique (and inferior) mode of operation requires the co-operation of organic sense-powers. St. Thomas' view of the union between an intellect and a body as a relation of form and matter in a single act of being, then, leads directly to a consideration of the role of the sense-powers in the act of intellective understanding, and consequently to an initial characterization of the human body as a sensitive body which contributes to the operation of an intellect.
This account of the intellectual soul as the form of the human body is the philosophical background against which St. Thomas introduces his discussion of the human body in chapter 90. Before turning to this discussion, we should mention his treatment of the animation of the heavenly bodies in chapter 70, since this point has some bearing on the way in which the discussion of the human body in the Summa Contra gentiles differs from that of the Sentences commentary. The purpose of chapter 70 is to show that the view of Averroes, according to which an intellect is united to the human body not as a form, but by means of the phantasms of the imagination, is contrary to the opinion of Aristotle. St. Thomas quotes from Aristotle's Physics, de caelo et mundo, metaphysics and de anima, arguing that, according to Aristotle, the heavenly bodies are animated by souls which have the intellectual power, but none of the other powers of the soul; since these souls have no sense-powers, there are no phantasms by means of which they could be united to their bodies, so that each of them must be substantially and immediately united to its body as a form. Similarly (sic liter), says St. Thomas, Aristotle holds that an intellectual substance is united to the human body - the noblest of bodies, which, by its balanced complexion (qualitate sue complexionis), most closely resembles the heavenly body - not by means of any phantasms, but as the body's form. St. Thomas then adds that he has not spoken of the animation of the heavens as though asserting it as in agreement to the teaching of the faith, to which the opinion of Aristotle, whether true or false, is irrelevant.

Hoc autem quod dictum est, de animatione caeli, non simile quasi asserendo secundum fidel doctrinam, ne quem nihil pertinent sive dative aliter dictatur.
St. Thomas then closes chapter 70 with a quotation from St. Augustine which similarly leaves the question of the animation of the heavenly bodies in doubt. As we shall see immediately, St. Thomas' hesitation on this point has an important effect on his discussion of the human body in chapter 90.

After exploring the implications of the intellect's union with a body in chapters 71 to 89, St. Thomas concludes his account of the incarnate intellect with a chapter on the kind of body to which such an intellect is appropriately united. Since it has been shown, he says, that a certain intellectual substance, namely, the human soul, is united to a body as its form, it remains to ask whether an intellectual substance should be united to some other body (sc. than the human body) as its form. With respect to the heavenly bodies and the question of their animation by an intellectual soul, it has been shown what Aristotle's opinion on this point was, and that Augustine left the matter in doubt; therefore, says St. Thomas, the present inquiry should be restricted to elemental bodies: *inde praesens inquisitio circa corpora elementaria versari debet.*

The primary purpose of this conclusion seems to be simply to set aside the difficult question of the animation of the heavenly body in the present discussion of the human body. Nevertheless, by eliminating any reference to the heavenly bodies from the discussion, this conclusion also has the effect of removing the basis of the Avicennian view of the human body, namely, the supposed resemblance between the human body and the heavenly body. Indeed, this fundamental change of approach to the question may be the very reason for St. Thomas' introductory remarks in chapter 90. In any case, the present discussion, unlike the
corpus of *In II Sent.*, d.1, q.2, a.5, situates the discussion of the human body in the context of elemental bodies alone.

In order to demonstrate that an intellectual substance is not united as a form to any elemental body other than the human body, St. Thomas proceeds by means of the following alternative: if an intellect were united to some other body, this other body would have to be either mixed or simple. He then presents an argument that an intellect cannot be united to any mixed body other than the human body, followed by a series of arguments that an intellect cannot be united to a simple body at all. It is in the first part of this chapter, the discussion of mixed bodies, that we find St. Thomas' second account of the human body's specific character.

If an intellect were united to a mixed body other than the human body, St. Thomas begins, that body would have to have, within mixed bodies, the most well-balanced complexion (mixture, namely complexionis). For, as may be seen (cum videatur), the more simple bodies are brought to a well-balanced state in their inclined composition (complementum mixtionis), the more inclined to forms which they have. If, then, a mixed body has the noblest possible form, namely, an intellectual substance, it must be so well supported that possible temperamentis. And, as we see now with this very softness of flesh and a good sense of touch, which indicates balanced complexion (etiam per substantiam complementum mixtionis), are also signs of a good intellect. St. Thomas' "major premise", then, is that the body to which an intellect is united as a form must be temperamentis. And, that while the discussion so far with an important availing point about the human body - its equality - follow
elemental composition - St. Thomas does not mention Aviceamus, and in fact is altering Aviceamus's approach to the body, since the possibility of a comparison between the human body and the heavenly body has been removed from the discussion. Accordingly, the broad correspondence between "perfections" and "perfectibles" which provided the basis for St. Thomas' discussion of the body in the Sentences commentary, and which includes both the nature of the heavens and human nature, is here restricted to the correlation between "forms" and "bodies". The Avicennian correspondence between "nobility" of form and harmony of elemental composition is retained, but because the heavenly bodies have been excluded from the discussion, this correspondence now lacks a basis in the "noncontrariety" of the heavenly bodies; in order to explain this correspondence without referring to the heavenly bodies, St. Thomas appeals to experience: it may be seen (videamus), he says, that nobility of form and elemental harmony are correlated. Note, too, that the Aristotelian correspondence between touch and intellect is once again a secondary point, being introduced as a consequence and a sign of the more basic correspondence between nobility of form and harmony of elemental composition.

If an intellect were united to a mixed body other than the human body, then, that body would have to have the most well-balanced complexion possible, but - and here St. Thomas introduces his minor premise - the most well-balanced complexion is that of the human body. St. Thomas simply asserts this point without explanation. Although he has just noted that softness of flesh and a good sense of touch show a well-balanced complexion, he does not mention Aristotle's remark
about man's superior sense of touch to confirm this assertion of the well-tempered condition of the human body, as in the _Sentences_ commentary, the Aristotelian account of man's sense of touch seems to be less important to the discussion than Aviceenna's theory of "complexions". In any case, St. Thomas presents the harmonious complexion of the human body as a simple fact, presumably the most important fact about the body from a scientific point of view.

From these premises it follows that if an intellect is united to any mixed body, such a body will be of the same nature as the human body, and, since its form would also be of the same nature as the human soul, there would be no specific difference between an animal composed of such a form and such a body, and man. In short, there is no mixed body to which an intellect can be united other than the human body. 86 Nor, as St. Thomas shows in the series of arguments which constitutes the remainder of chapter 90, can an intellect be united, whether as form or as mover, to any "simple" body consisting of just one of the elements. 87 It is specifically the well-complexioned human body, then, to which the intellective soul is appropriately united as a substantial form.

The central conclusion of _Summa Contra Gentiles_, II, 90 is thus identical to that of _In II Sent._, d.1, q.2, a.5: the supreme nobility of the human soul as a form of matter requires that it be united to a body in which the elements are combined in a harmonious state of balance. However, as we have pointed out, this correspondence between nobility of form and balance of elemental composition no longer depends, as it did in the article from the _Sentences_ commentary, on an elaborate comparison between the human composite on the one hand, and
the union between the heavenly bodies and their moers on the other.

This removal of any consideration of the heavenly bodies from the
argument might seem to represent a welcome economization of the
discussion; however, lacking any reference to the simultaneous
"nobility" and "noncentrality" of the heavenly bodies, St. Thomas
is now driven to assert the correspondence between nobility of form
and elemental harmony as a fact of experience [e.g., vide supra], and it
might be objected that this assertion, even if in some sense true,
is not as evident as he suggests. Furthermore, even though the
correspondence between "perfections" and "perfectibles" is here
reduced to the correspondence between "forms" and "bodies," there
still remains a suggestion of two distinct and irreducible perfections
in human nature, namely, the "nobilitas" of the soul and the "temperamentum"
of the body. The human soul is said to be united to "such" a body
because of its "place" in the hierarchy of forms, and not by any
intrinsic requirement of its natural operation. The human body, on
the other hand, is placed in a hierarchy of bodies, where the primary
consideration is its specific elemental composition, rather than its
animation by the soul. In short, soul and body are held apart in a
kind of parallelism, rather than related to one another in the unity
of the act of being described by St. Thomas in chapter 6c.

We may conclude, then, that by identifying the human body's
balanced elemental composition as its most significant feature, both
of the texts of St. Thomas which we have examined so far are open to
two objections: on the one hand, they are subject to the limitations
of the scientific views which St. Thomas inherited; and on the other
hand, they fail to address the question of the human body's specific
character in terms of St. Thomas' own insistence on the unity of
being shared by soul and body. These early texts, however, do not
represent St. Thomas' final word on the subject. Some time after
composing the Summa Contra Gentiles, he seems to have become
dissatisfied with the general approach underlying these texts, and
to have cast about for another way of viewing the question of the
human body's specific character.
CHAPTER II. ST. THOMAS' LATER APPROACH TO THE QUESTION
MATERIA EST PROPERT FORAN

After completing the *Summa Contra Gentiles* in 1264, St. Thomas spent "a quiet year of lecturing, research and writing" at Orvieto. In the fall of 1265, he was assigned to establish a Dominican house of studies in Rome, where he stayed until his return to Paris in 1268. Now the period from 1266 to 1268 in St. Thomas' career is noteworthy for its numerous writings dealing with the nature of man and of the human soul, in particular, Q.75-89 of the *Prima Pars*, the *Quaestiones de anima* and the commentary on William of Ockham's *Nova translation* of Aristotle's *De anima*. It is within the context of this emphasis on psychological questions which marked St. Thomas' Roman stay that the development in his reflections on the human body, which forms the subject of this second chapter, must be understood. In the course of carefully studying the new translation of Aristotle's *De anima* and simultaneously refining his own understanding of human nature as a composition of soul and body, St. Thomas hit upon a new and more satisfactory answer to the question of whether the rational soul should be united to "such" a body (tali corpori) as is the human body. This new answer is found in *Summa Theologiae*, I, Q.76, a.5, and again in *Quaestiones de anima*, Q.8. Although these two texts are very similar, the difference between them is significant enough to call for a separate consideration of each. In order to draw attention to the shift in St. Thomas' approach to the question, we shall begin with the briefer text from the *Summa Theologiae*; then, having seen the new foundation on which he sets his answer to the question, we shall turn to the longer and more elaborate version of this answer in the *Quaestiones de anima*. 
In keeping with the procedure of the second book of the Sentences, St. Thomas' discussion of the distinction of creatures in the *prima pars* of the *Summa Theologiae* successively considers the spiritual creature (Qq. 50-64), the corporeal creature (Qq. 65-74), and finally the nature (Qq. 75-89) and origin (Qq. 90-102) of man, who is a composite of the spiritual and the material. Introducing his discussion of man's nature, St. Thomas remarks that it pertains to the theologian to consider man from the point of view of the soul, and not from that of the body, except insofar as the body is related to the soul:

> Naturam autem hominis considerare pertinet ad theologum ex parte animae, non autem ex parte corporis, nisi secundum habituinem quam habet corpus ad animam. 2

With the nature of the soul as his focal point, then, he begins by considering the essence of the soul, first in itself (Q. 75), and then with respect to the soul's union with a body (Q. 76). It is in Q. 76, a. 5 that the question of the kind of body to which the human soul is appropriately united arises.

As the above quotation already suggests, one way of expressing the superiority of St. Thomas' treatment at this point in the *Summa Theologiae* to his earlier discussions of it is to note that in the *Summa* the account of the human body is deepened and simplified by being more thoroughly integrated into St. Thomas' view of the human soul as the single principle of man's being. Because this is so, we do not need—as we did in considering the texts on the body in the *Sentences* commentary and *Summa Contra Gentiles*—to begin by discussing St. Thomas' account of the soul and then turn to the
question of the body's specific character, as if the latter were a secondary and somewhat distinct consideration: rather, as we shall see at once, the article on the body itself directs us to the relevant features of St. Thomas' discussion of the soul. We shall therefore immediately turn to A.75, a.5, where the first point to be considered is the axiomatic principle of which St. Thomas establishes his new approach to the human body's specific character.

1) *Materia est propter formam*

Respondeo. Dicendum: quod cum forma non sit propter materiam, sed potius materia propter formam, ex formâ oportet rationem accipere quâ materia sit talis, at non e contrario. *(Summa Theologiae* I, 1.75, a.5)

In response to the question of whether the intellectual soul should be united to "this kind" of body (tali corpori), St. Thomas begins by stating that since form is not for the sake of matter, but rather matter for the sake of form, the reason why matter is as it is (talis) must be taken from the form, and not the reverse. Thus, in place of the Avicennian principle with which he had opened the discussion of the body in the Sentences commentary - *oportet ordinem perfectibilium esse secundum ordinem perfectionis* - St. Thomas has found a new starting-point in the axiom, *materia est propter formam*. Now although there is a certain resemblance between these two principles, the second is much more particular: instead of the broad notion of "perfection", which, for St. Thomas, includes both forms and movers, it focuses on the more precise notion of "form"; instead of comparing two distinct orders of perfections and perfectibles, it compares the two interdependent co-principles, form and matter; and instead of a relation of mere correspondence (*oportet esse secundum*),
it specifies a relation of finality (*est propter*). Clearly, the
discussion of the body has been set on a new and more precise
foundation. Before turning to the implications which this new point
of departure has for St. Thomas' account of the body, however, we
should first indicate the origin and significance of the principle
itself. And since the formula *materia est propter formam*, which
occurs regularly in St. Thomas' writings, seems to originate in
Averroës' commentary on a passage in Aristotle's *Physics*, we shall
begin by considering this Aristotelian text.

In the second chapter of *Physics*, II, after arguing that the
natural scientist, unlike the mathematician, is concerned with forms
which are present in matter, Aristotle notes the term "nature" refers
to both "form" (the actuality which is the result of change) and
"matter" (the underlying and potential subject of change), so that the
question arises, with which of these two principles is the natural
scientist primarily concerned? In contrast to earlier philosophers,
who seem to have understood nature in terms of matter alone, Aristotle
thinks that, while both matter and form enter into the natural
scientist's consideration, it is form which is primary both in nature
itself and in a proper philosophical understanding of it. Just as
the arts of medicine and building know both the form and matter of their
objects, so natural science studies both the form and matter of
natural things. Furthermore, since nature is an end, or a "that for
the sake of which", knowledge of nature will include both the end and
whatever is for the sake of that end. Aristotle compares this
inclusive knowledge to the art of the ship's captain: like the
shipbuilder, the captain has some knowledge of the material of which
a ship is made; unlike the builder; however, he knows the matter in relation to the form and function of the ship. Similarly, since the end of any natural process is a form (so that "form" is the more proper sense of "nature"), the knowledge of the natural scientist is primarily directed to those forms which are present in matter, but this knowledge includes the matter in which these forms are present. While form is a "that for the sake of which", matter, says Aristotle, is merely "relative to" or "for the sake of" something else (pros ti), so that to a different form there corresponds a different matter.

In his commentary on the Physics, Averroes explains this last point, the relativity of matter, as follows. The natural scientist, he says, must consider form because he considers matter; for matter belongs to the category of relation, since it is spoken of, and exists in relation to, form. Furthermore — and this is the important phrase — matter is for the sake of form (materia est propter formam), and whoever considers something must also consider that for the sake of which it is (de illo propter quod est). Turning then to Aristotle's remark about the correspondence between different forms and different matters, Averroes goes on to note that matter is diversified through the diversity of forms, so that the matter of animals is different from the matter of plants, and "the matter of man" different from the matter of other animal species. In its origin, then, the phrase materia est propter formam seems to be nothing more than Averroes' elaboration of Aristotle's brief remark that matter is something "relative" (pros ti). Nevertheless, Averroes' aphoristic statement skilfully and faithfully captures an essential point not only of the whole Aristotelian passage discussed above, but more generally of the
long treatment of matter and form in the first two Books of the *Physics*. Whether or not St. Thomas recognized the origin of this axiom in Averroes' commentary, his familiarity with both Aristotle and Averroes was increasing in this later part of his career, and he was certainly conscious that the axiom referred to a central feature of the relation of matter and form described by Aristotle in the *Physics*.

The principle *materia est propter formam* is found near the beginning of St. Thomas' own commentary on the *Physics*. Aristotle opens the *Physics* by noting that we think we know something when we know its first principles and first causes, and have gone "as far as" its elements. Explaining "principles" as moving or agent causes, "causes" as formal and final causes, and "elements" as material causes, St. Thomas summarizes Aristotle's introductory remarks by referring to the statement in the *Posterior Analytics* that we think we know something when we know all its causes, "from the first to the last". In keeping with this suggestion of an order of causes, Aristotle says "as far as" the elements (*usque ad elementa*), St. Thomas explains, because matter is that which comes last in knowledge; for matter is for the sake of form (*materia est propter formam*), while form is received from an agent for the sake of an end (*propter finem*), unless it is itself the end. Knowledge of the causes of any natural thing, then, follows the order of finality, beginning with the end and form, and only then turning to the "elements" or matter. With respect to knowledge of the human body in particular, this would seem to imply that knowledge of the body's material structure or elemental constitution cannot be a point of departure, but must be the very last point to be considered, following on and subordinated to a knowledge
of the body's formal and final causes.

In the section of his Physics commentary which treats of the Aristotelian passage discussed above, St. Thomas states that Aristotle's comparison of the arts of the captain and shipbuilder indicates that the art which gives form to something commands the art which disposes the matter, while the art which uses the thing made commands the art which gives form. From this we may infer, says St. Thomas, that matter is related to form as form is related to use, since the use of a thing is its "that for the sake of which" (cuius causa), just as form is "that for the sake of which" in relation to matter. (The complete formula, then, would be, materia est propter formam, forma est propter finem vel usum.) Even though the matter of natural things, unlike that of artificial things, is not produced by us, nevertheless, it is similarly ordered to form (habens ordinem ad formam), being for the sake of form (propter formam). Matter is one of the things which are "for" something else (ad aliquid = pros ti); this is not because matter belongs to the category of relation, St. Thomas says, implicitly correcting Averroes, but because for every form there is determined a particular matter of its own (cuilibet formae determinatur propria materia). 6

For both Averroes and St. Thomas, then, the principle materia est propter formam first of all refers to the relative and subordinate character of matter in Aristotle's account of nature in general. However, this principle also finds a particular application in the discussion of living beings in Aristotle's De anima, where soul and body are said to be related to one another as form and matter. Just as, in the Physics, Aristotle identifies form with both the end and
the moving cause, so, in the De anima, he says that the soul is not only the form (that is, substance in the sense of form) of the living body, but also its "that for the sake of which" and its moving cause. In his commentary on the De anima, St. Thomas briefly explains the soul as the end ("that for the sake of which") of the living body by noting that nature, like the intellect which constructs works of art, acts for the sake of an end (propter finem), ordering and disposing matter for the sake of form (propter formam). Since the soul is the form of the living body, it follows at once, from the discussion in the Physics, that the soul is also the end of the body, and that the body, as matter, is "for the sake of" the soul. In his many quotations of the principle materia est propter formam, St. Thomas usually has in mind this particular application of it to the relationship between soul and body. Such quotations may be found as early as St. Thomas' Sentences commentary and Summa Contra Gentiles, though they become much more common in such later writings as the Summa Theologiae, the disputed questions and the Aristotelian commentaries; Furthermore, it is only in these later works that the principle is pressed into service as a point of departure for St. Thomas' approach to the question of the human body's specific character.

From what we have seen of the meaning of this principle, it is evident that its occurrence in Summa Theologiae, I, Q.76, a.5 indicates that the body is here regarded as a "matter", and therefore in relation to its form and end, the soul. Moreover, since the soul itself is understood by St. Thomas in relation to its own end, namely, its proper operation (recalling the principle forma est propter usum—though the soul's specific operation is immanent and not, as the
term usum may suggest, transitive), the primary consideration with respect to the body will be the ultimate natural end of the human composite, the soul's specific operation of intellect. Clearly, this is a radically different point of departure from which to undertake an explanation of the body than a consideration of its specific elemental composition.

It would seem to be significant that, in the article from the prima pars on the body, St. Thomas does not introduce the formula materia est prōpter formam in a simple and straightforward manner. That is, he does not simply state that matter is for the sake of form and must therefore be understood in relation to it. Rather, as if to draw attention to an important but neglected point, he carefully distinguishes this principle from its opposite: since form is not for the sake of matter, he says, but rather matter for the sake of form, the reason why matter is as it is must be taken from the form, and not the reverse — "the reverse" apparently being the anti-Aristotelian view that form is for the sake of matter, and must therefore be understood from the point of view of matter. St. Thomas' emphatic distinction between these two opposing principles suggests that he is taking pains to correct a prevalent misconception. But where would he have encountered the view that form is for the sake of matter? Such a view might have been suggested to him in reading the passage from St. Albert's De anima which we considered in the previous chapter. There St. Albert establishes the Avicennian correspondence between the balanced-complexion of the human body and the nobility of the rational human soul
on the basis of the principle, ascribed to Plato, that "forms are given according to the merits of matter" (secundum merita materiae, dantur formae). While this principle does not assert that form is for the sake of matter, it does present matter as the focal point of the union between form and matter, and indicates that form is given to matter, rather than matter to form. St. Albert's text suggests that this view of the relation between form and matter is the very foundation of the Avicennian approach to the human body, such that the aptitude of matter to receive form is the primary consideration, explaining the degree of nobility of the form which it receives. Accordingly, the "scientific datum" of the human body's balanced elemental composition explains its possession of the noblest possible form, rather than the reverse. Such a view also seems to be present in St. Thomas' own Avicennian approach to the body in his earlier works. The remark of the Summa Contra Gentiles that bodies have nobler forms insofar as they have a more temperate complexion (videamus tanto corpora mixta nobiliores formas habere quanto magis ad temperamentum mixtioniis pervenient) clearly points to the body's material constitution as the primary point of reference. By explicitly reversing this perspective in Summa Theologiae, I, q.76, a.5, then, St. Thomas is addressing and correcting the commonly accepted Avicennian approach to the question of the human body's specific character, including his own earlier adoption of this approach.

In keeping with St. Thomas' new and more authentically Aristotelian starting point in the article from the Summa, the body is not introduced as a "perfectible" (which connotes the benefit which the body derives from union with the soul), nor simply as a "body"
(which suggests a certain self-sufficiency and independence from the soul), but precisely as a "matter", that is, as something _pros ti_ and _propter formam_. This new perspective means that we cannot, in explaining the specific character of the body, begin with the body's elemental composition, but must first turn to the soul itself.

2) The Reason for the Union of Soul and Body

St. Thomas begins his consideration of the intellective or human soul by recalling a point which he has already established in his earlier discussion of angels (Q. 55, a. 3). According to the order of nature, he says, the intellective soul holds the lowest place among intellectual substances (infinium gradum in substantiis intellectualibus tenet). This, of course, is also a point which we have seen in Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 68, where St. Thomas explains the unity of being between the intellective soul and the human body in terms of the Aristotelian and Dionysian principle that what is lowest in a higher genus borders on what is highest in a lower genus. In St. Thomas' new approach to the body, then, the primary consideration is not the soul's nobility as a form, but rather its lowliness as an intellect. Abstracting from every consideration not only of the body itself, but even from the soul's function as the form of the body, this new point of view from which to consider the body is introduced without any explicit reference to the body whatsoever. (Let us note in passing that this new point of departure is therefore free of the questionable scientific views available to St. Thomas.) Rather, the first point to be considered is the soul itself as an intellectual substance, with the crucial qualification that it is the lowest of such substances.
An intellect, according to St. Thomas, is a knowing being, that is, something distinguished by the fact that it is capable of possessing not only its own form, but also the forms of other things, since knowledge occurs by means of a certain possession of the species or likenesses of things. In contrast to this openness and inclusiveness of knowing beings, the forms of things incapable of knowledge are narrowly confined by their matter. Knowledge, then, strictly corresponds to immateriality, and the manner of knowledge a thing has follows from its kind of immateriality. A particular manner of knowing is in turn proportioned to a certain kind of object; thus a sense-power is the act of a corporeal organ, and its object is a form of corporeal matter as such, that is, an individual; an intellect, however, is a completely immaterial power, so that its object is a form without matter.

The reason why the soul is the lowest of intellectual substances, St. Thomas explains, is that it does not have a knowledge of truth conferred upon it by nature, as do the angels, but must, as Dionysius says, gather such knowledge from divisible things by means of sense-powers (non habet naturaliter sibi inditam notitiam veritatis, sicut angeli, sed oportet quod eam colligat ex rebus divisibilitibus per viam sensus). This distinction between human and angelic knowledge is elaborated in Q.55, a.2, where St. Thomas compares the order of spiritual substances to that of corporeal substances. The highest corporeal substances, he says, have a potentiality which is completely perfected by its form, while the potentiality of matter in lower bodies is not completely perfected by one form, but successively receives different forms; similarly, the angelic nature understands
and is completed by means of species which are not received (acceptae), but connatural to it, while lower intellectual substances, that is, human souls, have an intellectual potentiality which is not complete by nature, but must be completed gradually (successive), in receiving intelligible species from things. In referring to the inferiority of the human intellect, then, St. Thomas has in mind the contrast between the innate and intuitive character of angelic knowledge and the receptive and discursive character of human knowledge. The servile aspect of the human intellect is its dependence on external things and on the passing of time for its gradual perfection in knowledge, that is, its need to gather knowledge of truth by means of sense-powers.

The human intellect relies on co-operating sense-powers for its acquisition of knowledge because of the particular kind of object to which it is proportioned, namely, a quiddity or nature present in individuating matter, not, however, as so present, but rather as universal. Unlike the sense-power, then, which knows an individual and material form as such, the intellect cannot simply receive the form or likeness by which it knows its object, but must abstract it from the individuating conditions of matter. Thus the operation of abstraction must be performed upon the representation of an individual and material form as such, a representation which can only be provided by a sense-power. Therefore, since nature is lacking in nothing which is necessary, St. Thomas says, the intellective soul must have not only the power of intellection, but also the power of sensing. (Natura autem nulli deest in necessariis; unde oportuit quod anima intellectiva non solum haberet virtutem intelligendi, sed etiam virtutem sentiendi.)
The presence of sense-powers in the human soul, then, must be understood as a natural consequence of the human intellect's specific object and manner of operation. The human sense-powers are subordinated to the operation of an intellect, just as the sense-powers of brute animals are directed to strictly biological ends. As A. C. Pegis suggests in the following passage, this means that the sense-powers in human nature, having an intellectual raison d'être, form part of an intellect:

The crux of the matter lies in seeing that, though man has powers in addition to the intellect, he is not more than intellectual. The unity of human nature hinges on this point. If we say that man is spiritual and corporeal, immaterial and material, or that he has intellectual and sensible powers (all of which would in a sense be true of man), we can easily reduce man to a patchwork quilt of two natures. Yet if, though spiritual and material, he has one nature, whole and intelligible, what is the value of the "and" when we say "intellectual and sensible" powers? No, though man is a composite being, we must not make him or his nature a compound being. If all the powers of man are rooted in the soul; if, furthermore, one and the same intellectual soul has within its nature both intellectual and sensible powers, this fact must mean, not that the soul has more powers than the intellect, but that the human intellect is not fully an intellect without the sensible powers. St. Thomas is thus asking us to consider that the intellect and the senses taken together constitute in their togetherness the adequate intellectual power of the human soul as an intellectual substance. Seen in this way, the intellect and the senses in man do not constitute more than an intellect that would be adequate to its work as an intellect; rather, in their togetherness, they constitute a complete intellect, capable of accomplishing through their co-operation a complete intellectual work. 13.

Although the receptive and temporal human intellect is the lowest of intellects, it is, thanks to the presence of sense-powers in its nature, a complete intellect, that is, one capable of the abstraction from sensible forms which is its specific manner of understanding. But if the completeness of the human intellect is thus due to the presence of sense-powers, it ultimately requires the completeness of the sense-powers themselves. This leads us to the crucial point,
that the operations of the sense-powers cannot occur without a bodily organ (Actio autem sensus non fit sine corporeo instrumento).

In contrast to the Platonic and Augustinian view that the sense-power is an immaterial principle belonging to the soul alone, St. Thomas takes it to be evident that that which exercises the act of sensation is a composite of soul and body, since sensation is invariably accompanied by some bodily alteration (immutatio). Thus, although both sense and intellect proceed from the soul as their common principle, their respective "subjects" of operation are not simply identical, for the act of intellection is performed by the soul alone, while the act of sensation is performed by the composite of soul and body. Furthermore, since sensation is an operation belonging to man as such, it is clear that "man" is not the soul alone, but something composed of soul and body. The human body, then, enters on the scene for the sake of the human sense-powers, which themselves exist for the sake of the human intellect. Correspondingly, the human intellect is the form of a body because of the kind of intellect it is, namely, an inferior intellect, one which must abstract the likenesses by means of which it knows, from the particularity of the material form represented to it by the senses. The human body, then, is a sense-organ in the service of an intellect, like the sense-powers whose operations it makes possible, the human body itself has a raison d’être which is ultimately intellectual.

Thus, following the principle that matter is for the sake of form and form for the sake of operation, St. Thomas explains the being of the human body entirely with reference to the soul’s act of intellection. In this way, he also clarifies the "partnership of being"
between soul and body which he had discussed in his *Sentences* commentary, since the reason why a spiritual soul condescends to share its act of being with a body is now seen to be for the sake of the soul's own intellectual operation. Because of the soul's insufficiency as an intellect, it had to be united to a body which might be an "appropriate" (conveniens) sense-organ for it. (*Oportet istur animam intellectivam corpori uniri, quod possit esse conveniens organum sensus*)

As the term conveniens suggests, however, the intellective soul requires a particular kind of sense-organ for its operation. This point reminds us that the question under consideration is that of the specific character of the human body.

3) *Tactus* as *Fundamentum*

In keeping with the principle that the material cause is the last to be known, the discussion of Q. 76, a. 5 has thus far made no reference to the human body's specific elemental composition, a point to which St. Thomas now begins to turn. Rather than immediately taking up the Avicennian doctrine of the human body's perfectly balanced elemental composition, however, he introduces this point via a consideration of the human sense of touch. His procedure here thus reverses that of his earlier discussions, where the body's elemental composition was the basic point to be explained, and the specific human sense of touch was introduced as a consequence of the body's elemental composition. In the teleological perspective of St. Thomas' new approach to the body, the human sense of touch becomes the more significant point, and the body's elemental composition is presented as the consequence, on the level of material causation, of man's perfect sense of touch.
A consideration of the sense of touch follows directly from the preceding discussion of the soul's intellectual inferiority and consequent need of sense-powers, because all of the other senses, as St. Thomas says, are founded on the sense of touch (*Omnes autem alii sensus fundantur supra tactum*). The view of touch as a "foundation" (fundamentum) of sensitive life is already present in the writings of St. Albert, and it seems to be based on Aristotle's remark that touch is the "first" of the senses. Nevertheless, it is something radically new in St. Thomas' account of the human body. In order to clarify the meaning of touch as a fundamentum for St. Thomas, let us turn to his commentary on the passage from Aristotle's *De anima* which speaks of the human sense of touch.

After briefly paraphrasing Aristotle's remarks on the correspondence among aptness of mind, goodness of touch and softness of flesh, St. Thomas raises the following objection. It would seem, he says, that aptness of mind (aptitudo mentis) should correspond to the excellence of the sense of sight rather than excellence of touch, for sight is the most "spiritual" of the senses, and reveals many differences among things. In response to this objection, St. Thomas gives two reasons why aptness of mind corresponds to excellence of the sense of touch. The first is that touch is the foundation (fundamentum) of all the other senses, first of all because it is diffused through the whole of the body, secondly because the organ of any other sense is also an organ of touch, and finally because the sense of touch is that by which *everything* is said to be sensitive. Therefore, by the very fact that anything has a better sense of touch, it has a better sensitive nature simply speaking (simpliciter), and consequently
a better power of understanding \( (\text{melioris intellecutus}) \), since goodness of sense is a disposition to goodness of intellect \( (\text{bonitas sensus est dispositio ad bonitatem intellectus}) \). From the fact that something has a better power of sight or hearing, on the other hand, it does not follow that it has a better sensitive nature simply speaking, but only in a certain respect \( (\text{secundum quid}) \). The second reason why goodness of mind corresponds to goodness of touch is that goodness of touch follows from goodness of complexion \( (\text{bonitatem complexionis sit temperancia}) \). The organ of touch, being composed of the elements, cannot be without the elemental qualities which are its objects, but must be in potentiality to their extremes as a medium; but nobility of soul follows from the good complexion of the body, since every form is proportioned to its matter \( (\text{omnis forma est proportionata sua materie}) \); therefore, those who have a good sense of touch have a nobler soul and a more discerning mind \( (\text{sunt nobilioris anime et perspicacioris mentis}) \).

The two arguments which St. Thomas gives here for the correlation between intellect and touch seem to correspond to his later and his earlier accounts of the human body's specific character respectively. In particular, the principle that form is proportioned to matter, the focus of the second argument, both typifies his earlier "Avicennian" approach to the body and stands in clear contrast to the principle which guides his later approach, that matter is for the sake of form. On the other hand, the view of the condition of the sense-power as a predisposition for the condition of the intellect in the first argument is more characteristic of St. Thomas' later, teleological approach. The fact that both ways of considering the
body are suggested in this passage from St. Thomas' De anima commentary (which is roughly contemporary with the prima pars) indicates that they are not mutually exclusive, and that there is still a place for the Avicennian view of the body in St. Thomas' later writings. Nevertheless, the first of the two arguments, by emphasizing the active co-operation of sense and intellect, rather than merely the union of soul and body, indicates the dominant teleological note in St. Thomas' later discussions of the body. Both in this passage of St. Thomas' De anima commentary and in his account of the human body's specific character in the Summa Theologiae, it is the status of the sense of touch as a fundamentum, rather than the elemental composition of its organ, which is the primary consideration.

In the passage just discussed, St. Thomas indicates a number of reasons for regarding touch as the foundation of sensitive life, namely, its diffusion through the body and its involvement with and priority among the other senses. However, another passage from the De anima commentary suggests that the ultimate reason why touch is a fundamentum lies in its association with the "common sense". Noting with Aristotle that the operation of distinguishing the objects of the different senses must occur by means of some sense-power, St. Thomas adds that this operation seems in particular to occur by means of touch, which is the first of the senses, and in a way the root and foundation of all the senses, as well as that by which an animal is called sensitive; this distinguishing power is assigned to touch, according to St. Thomas, not as a proper sense, but insofar as it is the foundation of the senses, being close to the common sense, which is the principal root of all the senses.
...si per aliquem sensum fit, hoc maxime videtur quod fiat per tactum, qui est primus sensuum et quodam modo radix et fundamentum omnium sensuum et ab hoc animal habet quod dicatur sensitiuim... Attribuitur autem ista discretio tactui non secundum quod tactus est sensus proprius, sed secundum quod est fundamentum omnium sensuum et propinquius se habens ad fontalem radicem omnium sensuum, que est sensus communis. 17

Nevertheless, it is not touch - even in its more extended sense - which ultimately distinguishes the objects of the different senses, but the common sense, which is the source of all the external senses and the common terminus of their operations. St. Thomas seems to view the common sense and touch as acting in concert to distinguish the objects of the different senses, and more generally to provide a basis for the sensorium as a whole. The "proximity" of touch to the common sense is not only functional, but also physical: since the organ of touch is diffused throughout the body, St. Thomas says, it seems that the organ of the common sense must be located at the root of the organ of touch.

The sense of touch is a foundation (fundamentum) of sensitive life because, in being diffused (diffunditur) through the whole of the body, it co-operates with the common sense in unifying and distinguishing the many particular operations of the proper senses. As a fundamentum, then, touch is the network uniting the sensorium and relaying its messages to a common centre. As St. Thomas points out in this passage, however, touch as a fundamentum is to be distinguished from the proper sense of touch. An unpublished dissertation by Thomas M. Feeley usefully explains this distinction by describing St. Thomas' use of "touch" in the broader sense as a synecdoche.
...as fundamental touch is convertible with animal sensitivity and its complex organic structure. Hence, when St. Thomas holds with Aristotle that the perfection of the sense of touch determines, the capacity of the intellect, touch stands for the whole sensory complex, which includes not only the organs of the external senses but especially the internal sensory structure. The whole complex is attributed to touch because its organ is more widespread than that of any other sense and is, in fact, found in the organs of the other senses. A further reason is that the function of touch is the most basic and necessary, and so without this sense there could be no other.... Accordingly, when St. Thomas uses "touch" to stand for the whole sensory complex, he usually qualifies the word with the clause "which is the foundation of all the other senses" or with some similar expression. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that when he uses "touch" in this way, St. Thomas resorts to a synecdoche.18

According to Feeley, it is primarily touch as a fundamentum, rather than as a proper sense, which is operative in St. Thomas' interpretation of the Aristotelian correspondence among intellect, touch and flesh. However, the flesh must be understood as the medium of the proper sense of touch:

The specific senses of touch...do not condition intellectual capacity any more than the other proper senses. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the organs of the proper senses of touch are found, though unequally, over the surface of the whole body, whereas, the organs of the other senses are located in specific places, the excellence of the proper sense of touch is a sign of the perfection of the whole sensitive nature and consequently, of intellectual ability.... Since the flesh, according to Aristotle and St. Thomas, is the medium for the organ of touch, the more perfectly proportioned the flesh is, the better, too, is the sense of touch. Therefore, the quality of a man's specific senses of touch is a sign of his intellectual capacity.19

As a fundamentum, then, touch includes the whole sensitive nature, which is the predisposition for man's intellectual operation; as a proper sense; touch, through the condition of its "attached medium", the flesh, is the most prominent sign of the condition of this sensitive nature, and hence indirectly of intellectual ability. In either case, touch, the comprehensive sense diffused through the whole of the body,
is understandably a focal point in St. Thomas' consideration of
the nature of the incarnate intellect.

Although the human sense of touch, as we have seen, figures
in St. Thomas' earlier accounts of the human body's specific character,
it seems to be present there merely as a proper sense, and simply as
a confirmation of the Avicennian doctrine of the harmonious
composition of the human body. In *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 76, a. 5, on
the other hand, having reflected more deeply on the meaning of
certain Aristotelian texts, St. Thomas gives the sense of touch a
much more prominent role in his discussion of the body by introducing
it as the foundation of sensitive life. Since, as a fundamentum,
touch seems to stand for sensitive life as a whole, it becomes a
crucial feature of the intellective soul and its incorporation, if
the lowest of intellects must, in general, have sense-powers, and
therefore a body, it is above all characterized by its power and
organ of touch.

4) *Habet completissime virtutem, sensitivam*

After noting that all of the other senses are founded on
touch, St. Thomas goes on to recall the point that the organ of touch
is a blend of the elemental qualities which are the objects of touch,
so that the more balanced the complexion of this organ is, the more
discerning will be the sense of touch itself. Then, having
introduced this brief parenthesis on the organ of touch, he returns to
his consideration of the intellective soul.

Thus far St. Thomas has established that the intellective soul,
the lowest of intellectual substances, requires for its operation
a power of sensing and therefore a body. The point to be considered now is that the soul requires a particular kind of power of sensing and therefore a particular kind of body (tale corpus), namely, the human body. In keeping with the view of matter as, on the one hand, for the sake of form, and, on the other hand, the last of the causes to be considered, the specificity of the human sense-powers must be considered before, and as the cause of, the specificity of the human body. What, now, is the distinguishing feature of the intellective soul's power of sensing?

The answer to this question is, according to St. Thomas, a simple one: the intellective soul possesses the power of sensing "most completely" (completissime) because, as Dionysius says, that which belongs to the inferior pre-exists more perfectly in the superior: quod est inferioris praexsistit perfectius in superiori. Thus St. Thomas once again draws on Dionysius' hierarchical vision of the cosmos in order to locate the human soul in relation to other things: just as the soul has the lowest of intellective powers, so it has the highest of sensitive powers. This conjunction of a higher and a lower recalls the Dionysian account of the union of soul and body in Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 68. There, however, St. Thomas was concerned with the union between the intellect and a body; in the present text, the focal point is rather the union between an intellect and a sensitive power. Certainly, the ultimate concern of the present discussion is to determine the specific character of the human body (tale corpus). However, the Avicennian doctrine of the body's harmonious elemental composition no longer sufficiently explains the body's specific character. Rather, this doctrine (or we might add,
any account of the human body's material composition which would replace it must itself be explained with reference to the form and operation for the sake of which the body exists. The nature of the human composite is no longer presented by St. Thomas as merely the juxtaposition of an intellect and a body, but more precisely as a composition of intellectual and sensitive powers, which entails the further composition of sense-powers and organs. St. Thomas' Dionysian view of human nature as a composition between the lowest of a higher order and the highest of a lower order has been given sharper focus by presenting the human composite as a whole in the light of man's intellectual operation.

The intellective soul possesses the sensitive power most fully (completissime) because that which belongs to the lower pre-exists more perfectly in the higher. This remark situates the human soul among other souls which have the power of sensation, and presents it as the most perfect of sensitive or animal souls, presumably because its sense-powers are subordinated to an end which transcends animal life as such, namely, man's intellectual operation. In comparison with the angels, the intellective soul is the lowest of intellectual substances, that is, one which must rely on sense-powers for its operation, and which must therefore animate a body; but among the animals, the intellective soul is distinguished by the superiority of its sense-powers, a superiority which, because the sense-powers are organic, has very specific physiological consequences. This leads us to the main conclusion of Q. 76, a. 5. Having considered the human composite's final cause (its abstractive intellectual operation) and formal cause (its intellective-and-sensitive soul), St. Thomas at last turns to its material cause.
Since the intellective soul possesses the power of sensation most completely, and since the foundation of the sensitive power is the sense of touch, which is more perfect insofar as its organ is a more balanced composition of the elements, the body to which the intellective soul is united, St. Thomas concludes, must be that mixed body which, among all such bodies, has the most balanced complexion (corpus mixtum, inter omnia alia magis reducendum ad equalitatem complexionis). For this reason, he adds, men have a better sense of touch than do the other animals, and those men who have a better sense of touch also have a better power of intellect, a sign of which is that, as Aristotle says, those of soft flesh are cut of mind.

The conclusion of the present discussion thus brings us back to the Avicennian doctrine of the human body's harmonious elemental composition and Aristotle's correspondence between touch and intellect. Here, however, these points have been "demonstrated" in a completely new way, starting from the principle materia est propter formam, and from the nature of the human soul's intellectual operation. In Quaestiones de anima, Q.8, St. Thomas' new approach to the question of the human body's specific character is further refined.
2. Quaestiones de anima, Q.8

In his Quaestiones de anima, which were composed in Italy in 1268, St. Thomas presents a fuller elaboration of some of the important topics discussed in the treatment of man's nature in QQ.75-89 of the prima pars. One of these topics is the question of the human body's specific character, which St. Thomas formally addresses for the last time in Quaestiones de anima, Q.8: utrum anima rationalis tali corpori debet unirì quale est corpus humanum. The sed contra of this question recalls the discussion of the body in St. Thomas' Sentences commentary, since it also quotes a biblical text on man's formation from the earth: Deus de terra creavit hominem et secundum imaginem suam fecit illum (Eccles., XVII, 1). The corpus of this question, on the other hand, is firmly in keeping with the new approach to the body first presented in Summa Theologiae, I, Q.76, a.5. Here, however, St. Thomas does not merely refine his new approach to the body, but also expands the terms of the discussion to include a point which, in the article from the Summa, had been relegated to the replies to objections, namely, the human body's mortality. In order to see how this point is brought into the discussion, and in order to introduce the two-part structure of the corpus of Quaestiones de anima, Q.8, we shall begin by considering a passage on the human body in St. Thomas Quaestiones de malo, Q.5, a.5:

1) Corporis humani conditio dupliciter considerari potest (Quaestiones de malo, Q.5, a.5)

The question with which St. Thomas is concerned in Quaestiones de malo, Q.5, a.5, is whether death and other such defects are natural to man. This question, which recalls the discussion of the body in St. Augustine's De Genesi ad litteram, VI, is one which was frequently
discussed by St. Thomas, and we shall return to it below; since it is also taken up in the corpus of Quaestiones de anima, Q.8. Here, however, we are not directly concerned with St. Thomas' solution to this question, but rather with the way in which Quaestiones de malo, Q. 5, a. 5 introduces the discussion of human mortality with a general consideration of the human body as something natural.

St. Thomas begins by noting that the term "natural" (naturalis) may refer either to what has a nature (id quod habet naturam) or to that which is according to nature (id quod consequitur naturam; secundum naturam existens), and that it is the second sense of the term which is relevant to the present discussion. Since "nature" may signify either form or matter, however, something may be called "natural" either according to form (secundum formam) or according to matter (secundum materiam); that is, natural according to form which is active in a thing, as it is natural to fire to heat; that is natural according to matter which is passive, as it is natural to water to be heated. But since form is more properly called "nature" than is matter, that which is natural according to form is more natural (naturalius) than that which is natural according to matter. These fundamental considerations of nature, form and matter are based on the discussion of nature in Aristotle's Physics, II, 1. 21.

Now that which follows from matter (id quod consequitur materiam), St. Thomas continues, may itself be understood in two ways: insofar as matter agrees with (conruit) form, "what follows from matter" is that aspect of matter which the agent chooses in producing the natural thing; but insofar as "what follows from matter" is opposed to (repurmat) the form and end, and arises from the "necessity" of matter (ex necessitate materiae), it is a condition neither chosen.
nor intended by the agent. The artisan who makes a saw for cutting, for example, uses iron because it is a matter which, on account of its hardness, is appropriate both to the form and the operation of the saw; the same iron, however, has certain qualities, such as a tendency to break and to rust, which are not appropriate to the form or end of the saw, but rather impede its end, and which are not chosen by the maker of the saw, but would be avoided by him if it were possible. Thus Aristotle says in his *De animalibus* that in individual accidents a final cause is not to be sought, but only a material cause, since such accidents proceed from the disposition of matter, and not from the intention of the agent.\(^{22}\)

The notion of the "necessity" of matter and the example of the construction of a saw which St. Thomas here introduces are apparently taken from Aristotle's *Physics*, II, 9. In this chapter Aristotle develops the theme of the subordination of matter to form which, as we have seen, he has already touched on in the first chapter of *Physics*, II. The subject of chapter 9 is "necessity" in nature, by which is meant "matter and its proper movements," and Aristotle's argument is that this necessity is not absolute, but hypothetical. The matter of a natural thing, that is to say, while a *sine qua non* of that thing, is not sufficient to explain it, since matter itself must be explained with reference to an end. Natural science studies both kinds of cause – the matter and the end – but the end is more fully a cause, being a cause of the matter itself.\(^{23}\) The end is the first principle, the hypothesis or supposition with reference to which the matter is both necessary and necessarily the way it is. The end also provides the definition on the basis of which the material aspect
of a thing may be inferred: if the operation or end of a saw (to take an example from among artificial things) is defined as a certain kind of cutting, then the saw requires a certain kind of teeth, and if these teeth are to serve the end of cutting, they must be made of iron. Similarly, then, the disposition of matter in natural things is, according to Aristotle, necessitated not by matter alone, but by the end for the sake of which the matter exists. Nevertheless, Aristotle's reference to the "proper movements" of matter seems to allow that, in a secondary respect, matter introduces a necessity of its own into natural things, one which has no reference to an end, and may even, as St. Thomas suggests, be opposed to the end of a natural thing. Thus, according to St. Thomas' development of Aristotle's illustration, the iron material of the saw must be considered not only with reference to its aptitude for cutting, but also with reference to its susceptibility to breaking and rust. Matter, or "the necessary", then, has two aspects in any natural thing, one which necessarily follows from the supposition of the end of the thing, and one which follows from the necessity of matter itself (ex necessitate materiae).

To summarize St. Thomas' remarks in Quaestiones de malo, 4.5, a.5 thus far, that which is "natural", in the sense of "according to nature", primarily refers to what is "according to form" and secondarily to "what is according to matter"; furthermore, "what is according to matter" may itself refer either to that aspect of matter which subserves the form and end and is chosen by the agent, or to that aspect which follows from the necessity of matter, is a hindrance to the end, and is unintended by the agent. St. Thomas now goes on
to apply these different senses of "the natural" to the case of man. Some things, he says, are natural to man according to his form, such as the operations of understanding and willing; but other things are natural to him according to his matter, that is, according to his body. The condition of the human body, furthermore, can be considered in two ways: in one way with respect to its aptness to the form of man, and in another way with respect to that in which it follows from the necessity of matter alone. That which is natural to man, then, follows either from his soul, or from the subordination of his body to his soul, or from his material body as such.

The remainder of *Quaestiones de malo*, 2, 5, a. 5 goes on to apply this introductory discussion of "the natural" to the question of the naturalness of human death. We shall not pursue this question for the moment, however. The purpose of our consideration of this passage from the *Quaestiones de malo* is to illuminate the structure of *Quaestiones de anima*, Q. 8, c., which is divided into two parts, according to the two meanings of "that which is natural according to matter". The issue under discussion in *Quaestiones de anima*, Q. 8 is whether the rational soul should be united to "such" a body (*tali corpori*). The focus of the discussion, then, is that which is natural according to matter or the body. But since the natural condition of the body must be considered from two points of view, the corpus of Q. 8 is accordingly divided into two parts, one of which considers the body in its subservience to the soul, while the other considers the body simply as material. As the text from the *Quaestiones de malo* indicates, the unifying theme of these two perspectives is the consideration of the body as something natural to man. The growing importance
of this point in St. Thomas' later discussions of the body indicates a deepening Aristotelianism, and in particular an increasing appreciation of Aristotle's *Physics* as the foundation for the *De anima*'s view of the relation of soul and body as a union of form and matter.

2) *Ex parte animae*

St. Thomas begins *Quaestiones de anima*, q. 8, c. with the more significant and intelligible aspect of the human body, namely, its subordination to the soul, reserving his consideration of the body as merely material for the latter part of the discussion. His treatment of this first point, like *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 76, a. 5, is guided by the principle *materia est propter formam*, though, as we shall see, St. Thomas modifies the argument from the *Summa* to a certain extent. More importantly, however, he has added to this argument, dividing his account of the way in which the body is for the sake of the soul into two parts: the first part, which closely resembles the article from the *Summa*, considers the human body in general, while the second part discusses some of the body's particular features.

i. Dispositio corporis in communi

As in *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 76, a. 5, St. Thomas begins by stating that since matter is for the sake of form, and not the reverse, the reason for the kind of (qua)le body to which the soul is united must be taken from the point of view of the soul itself (*ex parte animae*). Unlike the article from the *Summa*, however, the present text goes on to refer to the passage from the *De anima* which states that
the soul is not only the form and mover of the body, but also its end. This is the first of a series of references to the De anima in Quaestiones de anima, Q.6, a text which is both more detailed and more explicitly Aristotelian than the article on the body in the Summa. Then, still following the procedure of Summa Theologiae, I, Q.76, a.5, St. Thomas goes on to argue that the human soul, being the lowest of intellectual substances, needs to gather its knowledge by means of organic sense-powers, and must therefore be united to a body. In the article from the Summa, as we have seen, this argument is based on the much earlier discussion of angels in Q.55, a.2; in Quaestiones de anima, Q.8, however, St. Thomas refers to the immediately preceding questions, and in particular, it seems, to the conclusion of the corpus of Q.7. Let us consider the way in which this latter text presents the ranking of the human soul among intellectual substances.

In Q.7, St. Thomas is concerned to show that the human soul is specifically different from an angel. He does so by refuting, first the position of Origen, who held that the soul is merely a fallen angel, and then the view that both souls and angels are composed of form and matter. Having argued that souls and angels are forms without matter which differ formally, and therefore specifically, St. Thomas adds that it remains to consider the way in which (secundum autem quod) they differ specifically. Now in order to reach a knowledge of intellectual substances, he says, we must consider material substances. Among material substances, different degrees of perfection establish a variety of genera, and, within each genus, a variety of species. Thus nature proceeds by degrees through different species, tending towards a highest species in each genus, namely, fire
among the elements, gold among minerals, certain "perfect" trees among plants, and men among animals; on the other hand, the lowest animals are very close to plants, and the lowest plants very close to inanimate things. This specific variation occurs by means of the addition and subtraction of perfections, which is why Aristotle says that the species of natural things are like numbers, in which the addition or subtraction of units makes for a specific difference.

In a certain respect (quantum ad aliquid), however, this specific variation is different in the case of immaterial and material substances. Wherever there is a variety of degrees, the different degrees must be considered in relation to some one principle (per ordinem ad aliquod principium unum). Among material substances, this first principle is purely potential matter, so that the subsequent species are more perfect than the prior ones, being related to them through the addition of perfections, and thus containing whatever perfections the earlier ones contain, but also something further. Among immaterial substances, however, the order of different specific degrees is not not considered with reference to matter, but with reference to "the first and most perfect agent" (secundum comparationem ad primum agent, quod oportet esse perfectissimum). Here, then, the first species is more perfect than the second, since it has a greater likeness to the supremely perfect first agent, and this perfection is gradually diminished in the second and subsequent species. Now the highest perfection of the first agent consists in this, that it contains every sort of goodness and perfection in a simple unity (in uno simplici habet omnimodam bonitatem et perfectionem). An immaterial substance will be closer to the first agent, therefore, to the extent that it contains a more perfect goodness in a simpler
nature, and has less need of additional indwelling forms for its completion. Thus, "addition" signifies greater perfection in material substances, but greater imperfection in immaterial substances. This increasing need of additional forms in immaterial substances culminates in the human soul, which holds the lowest degree among immaterial substances, as does prime matter in the genus of material substances; the soul does not contain the forms which are its intellectual perfections within its nature, but is merely in potentiality to intelligible objects, just as prime matter is in potentiality to sensible forms. In order to perform its proper operation of understanding, the soul needs to become its intelligible objects in actuality, acquiring them by means of sense-powers from external things. And, since the operation of the sense-power occurs by means of a bodily organ, the soul, by the very condition of its nature (ex ipsa conditione suae naturae), is appropriately united to a body, and is by itself only a part of human nature.  

This, then, is the argument which St. Thomas recapitulates in Q.8 in order to establish that the human soul is appropriately united to a body: since the soul is the lowest of intellectual substances, as matter is lowest in the order of sensible things, the intelligible species by means of which it accomplishes its proper operation of understanding are not innate, as they are in higher intellects; rather, the soul is merely in potentiality to such species, and must gather them from external things by means of organic sense-powers, so that it is necessarily united to a body. This argument is basically a restatement of the one used in Summa Theologiae, I, Q.76, a.5, but with the addition of a number of details, such as
the comparison between the soul and matter, and the explicit mention of the intelligible species by means of which the soul understands. Furthermore, where the *Summa* refers to Dionysius' *De divinis*: *Nominibus* to establish the soul's need of sense-powers, the present text refers to a passage from Aristotle's *De anima* comparing the soul to a merely potential "empty tablet"; this relatively minor change is indicative of the increasingly Aristotelian character of St. Thomas' later reflections on the human body.

With the next step in the argument, the procedure of Q.6 begins to diverge more drastically from that of *Summa Theologiae*, I, 1.76, a.5. In the latter text, as we have seen, St. Thomas at this point in the discussion goes on to argue that all of the other senses are founded on touch, whose acuteness depends on the balance of the elemental composition of its organ; then, on the basis of the Dionysian principle that what belongs to the inferior is present more perfectly in the superior, he states that the intellective soul possesses the sensitive power most fully (*completissime*); and finally, he infers from the foregoing that the body to which the intellective soul is united must have the most balanced composition. Thus, between the discussion of the soul's intellective power and the characterization of the body to which the soul is united, the article from the *Summa* interposes a discussion of the sense of touch and of the intellective soul's distinctive sensitive power, so that the body is introduced only at the end of the discussion, and is described only in terms of its elemental composition. In *Quaestiones de anima*, Q.8, by contrast, St. Thomas turns at once from the preceding discussion of the soul as an intellect to a consideration of the body to which it is united, and
then goes on to present, in a single continuous argument, three successive conclusions about the body. It is interesting to note that the order of these conclusions seems to follow the ordering of causes according to finality suggested by Aristotle's *Physics* (materia est propter formam, forma propter finem), for St. Thomas characterizes the body, first in terms of its end (the soul's intellective operation), then in terms of its form (the soul's sensitive nature), and finally—in keeping with the view that the material cause is the last to be considered—in terms of its elemental composition.

a. Optime dispositum ad sentirendum. He says St. Thomas, the reason why the soul is capable of union with a body is because it needs to receive its intelligible species by means of sense-powers, then the body to which it is united must be such (tale) that it is as well-suited as possible (aptissimum) for receiving the sensible species from which intelligible species are produced for the intellect; thus, the body to which the rational soul is united must, in the first place, be perfectly disposed (optime dispositum) for the act of sensing. Note that this preliminary conclusion follows immediately from the foregoing discussion of the soul's intellective power, and makes no reference to the sense of touch or to the body's elemental composition. Furthermore, where *Summa Theologiae*, I, q.76, a.5 had introduced a Dionysian principle to establish that the intellective soul possesses the sensitive power most fully, the present passage makes no reference to Dionysius, and no mention of the intellective soul's sensitive power. Focusing entirely on the soul as an intellect, it indicates that the deepest explanation for the perfection of the
human sensorium is not man's rank among the animals (as the quotation from Dionysius in the Summa suggests), but rather the intellectual purpose of the human sense-powers and the human body. Because the human body exists in order to receive sensible species for an intellect, St. Thomas reasons, we may at once conclude that it must be characterized by its supreme aptness to receive such species. This preliminary conclusion, in its simplicity and generality, is something new in St. Thomas' reflections on the body, since it is entirely free of any reference to the body's material composition. In terms of its final cause, then, the body is characterized by its perfect adaptation to the operation of sensing.

b. Conveniuntissimum origo sensui tactus. Having established this general point, St. Thomas now goes on to discuss the sense of touch as the foundation of sensitive life. However, whereas in the article from the Summa he had merely asserted that all of the other senses are founded on touch, here he explains this point more fully, stating that touch is the fundamentum "in which the whole sensitive nature is present as in its principle" (in quo principaliter tota natura sensitiva consistit). The focus of the discussion has now moved from the soul's intellectual operation to its "sensitive nature", which is implicitly contained in the sense of touch. How because the intellectual power is completely free of any admixture with the body, it is precisely as sensitive, rather than as intellective, that the intellective soul is the form or act of the human body. It would seem, then, that St. Thomas has shifted attention from the body's final cause to its formal cause. In this new perspective, the point of reference is no longer the soul's intellective operation, but the
foundation or "root" of its sensitive nature, namely, the power of touch. St. Thomas goes on to mention three consequences of the role of touch as a fundamentum, all of them taken from Aristotle's De anima: the first is that it is because of the sense of touch that something is primarily called an "animal"; the second is that the inoperancy of touch, as, for instance, in sleep, involves the inoperancy of the other senses; and the third is that the other senses are destroyed not only by extremes in their own sensible objects, such as brightness or loudness, but also by the extremes of tangible objects, such as heat and cold. Since, therefore, the body to which the rational soul is united must be perfectly adapted to the soul's sensitive nature (optime dispositum ad naturam sensitivam), and since this nature has its root principle in the sense of touch, such a body must therefore be that which is the most fitting organ of the sense of touch (convenientissimum organum sensui tactus). For this reason, St. Thomas continues, Aristotle says in the De anima that our sense of touch is more perfect than that of the other animals, and that it is because of the excellence of this sense that one man is better disposed than another for the operations of the intellect. In terms of its formal cause, then, the human body is characterized as a perfect organ of touch.

c. Maxime reductum ad medium per aequalitatem complexionis. Since the human body is characterized as an organ of touch, the next point to be considered is the distinctive material composition of the organ of touch. Now generally speaking, since a recipient must be empty of that which it receives (recipiens debet esse denudatum a recepto), a sense-organ cannot in actuality contain the contraries
which are its objects, but must be in potentiality to them, in order to be able to receive them. This "emptiness" of the organ, however, is different in the case of touch and in that of the other senses. For while the organs of the other senses must be completely free of (caret omnino) their objects, this cannot be true of the organ of touch, whose objects are the very elemental qualities of which the animal body is composed, namely, the hot and cold, and the moist and dry. Thus, since it is impossible for the organ of touch to be completely free (denudatum) of its objects, it must be in potentiality to them by being brought to a state of balance (reductum ad medium) among them; and therefore, since the body to which the rational soul is united must be as suitable as possible for the sense of touch (convenientissimum ad sensum tactus), it must be brought to the greatest possible state of balance in the evenness of its complexion (maxime reductum ad medium per aequalitatem complexionis). From this, says St. Thomas, it is clear that the operation of the lower part of nature reaches its point of perfection in man; for nature proceeds by degrees, mixing the simple elements until it arrives at the most perfect kind of mixture, which is that of the human body. In general, then, and in terms of its material composition, the disposition of the body to which the rational soul is united must be such that the body has the most well-balanced complexion (temperatissimae complexionis).

Thus St. Thomas' final account of the human body's specific character once again affirms the Avicennian view of the body as a harmonious composition of the elements. Here, however, this view is no longer the only, or even the most fundamental point concerning the body, for it rests on a prior account of the body as a perfect organ
of sensation in general, and of the sense of touch in particular. This preliminary account does not at all involve any particular physiological theory, and would thus seem to transcend the limitations of St. Thomas' scientific views. Furthermore, by deferring his account of the body's elemental composition to the very end of the discussion, St. Thomas not only follows the order of causes indicated in Aristotle's Physics, but also (if unintentionally) makes room for other scientific accounts of the body within the overall presentation of the body as a perfect organ of sensation. Whatever scientific objections might be raised today against the view of the body as a harmonious composition of the four elements, these objections affect only the final part of St. Thomas' argument. They do not affect the general point that the body must be a perfect sense-organ; for this point depends immediately on St. Thomas' account of the soul's intellective operation.

ii. Particulares humani corporis dispositiones (Summa Theologiae, I, 1,91, a.3)

In presenting the human body as a perfect organ of touch and a well-balanced composition of the elements, St. Thomas has been concerned with the general (in communi) character of the body to which the rational soul is united. In a new extension of his view of the human body, he now goes on to add that a consideration of the body's particular features shows that they too are so disposed as to provide man with the most perfect organ of sensation. Three interrelated points concerning the body are mentioned here: the first and most important is man's proportionally large brain, which is a necessary condition for the operation of his inner senses, such as imagination,
memory and the cognitive power; then, for the sake of the freer operation of the brain, man's head is placed above his body, so that he is the distinctively upright animal; and finally, man's heart must have an abundance of heat so that it can produce the supply of "animal spirits" necessary for sustaining his upright posture. Thus, while the general view of the body focused on touch, which is the root of the sensitive nature as a whole, this consideration of the body's particular features focuses on the inner senses, which, in man, have a direct bearing both on the perfection of his sensitive nature and on his intellectual operations. It is apparently the specialized role of the inner senses in preparing the sensible species for abstraction by the intellect that is behind this more detailed account of the body. From this new point of view, the body is not merely a perfect sense-organ, but, more particularly, a perfect organ for the operations of the inner senses. As such, it needs a proportionally large brain, whose free operation requires the body's upright posture, which, in turn, must be supported by an abundance of heat in the heart.

Note that St. Thomas makes three distinct points concerning the body here, proceeding from its function or end (the operation of the inner sense-powers), through its figure (which is closely related to its form), and finally touching on the more material aspect of its "animal spirits". Once again, he seems to be guided by the ordering of causes suggested by Aristotle's Physics. Again, too, it might be mentioned that what seems most objectionable from a modern scientific point of view - the theory of "animal spirits" - is merely a final consideration, rather than the focal point of the discussion. Whatever modern theory might be used to correct St. Thomas' account of the heart and the body's vitality, this would leave his remarks on the
purpose of the human body's large brain and upright posture unaffected. Furthermore, in the context of *Quaestiones de anima*, Q.8 as a whole, it is clear that this purpose is an intellectual one. St. Thomas is suggesting that all of the human body's unique and specific features are the direct effects of the union between an intellect and matter, a union in which matter is disposed for the sake of the intellect's operation. It is the operation of the human intellect (the lowest of intellects) which calls for a body which is perfectly adapted to the act of sensing and has a proportionally large brain and upright posture - and which has, besides, whatever features are implied by these. The human body as a whole, in all its specific distinctiveness, is the visible consequence of an intellect informing matter for the sake of its own intellectual operation. In its being, its constitution and its function, the human body is the instrument of an intellect.

Though St. Thomas does not mention them at this point in the corpus of *Quaestiones de anima*, Q.8, there are certain other "particular features" of the human body which he discusses elsewhere. All of them, it seems, are related to man's upright posture, a topic which is discussed at greater length in *Summa Theologiae*, I, Q.91, a.3; another text which is concerned with the human body's specific character (*utrum corpus humanum habuerit convenientem dispositionem*). Adopting the teleological approach which we have seen in *Summa Theologiae*, I, Q.76, a.5 and in *Quaestiones de anima*, Q.8, the corpus of this article presents the human body's specific character from the point of view of the body's "proximate end", namely, the operation of the intellective soul:
Finis autem humani corporis est anima rationalis et operationes ipsius; materia enim est propter formam, et instrumenta propter actiones agenti. (ST.I, q.91, a.3, c.)

Nevertheless, there is a difference in emphasis between the two articles of the prima pars which discuss the human body's specific character. The first of them (q.76, a.5) occurs in St. Thomas' discussion of man's nature (q.75-89), and its sed contra is appropriately the philosophical definition of the soul in Aristotle's De anima; the second (q.91, a.3), on the other hand, occurs in the more "biblical" context of a discussion of man's origin (q.90-102), and its sed contra is the remark of Ecclesiastes, VII, 30, that "God made man upright" (Deus fecit hominem rectum). This biblical reference would seem to link q.91, a.3 with quaestiones de anima, q.8 and with In II sent., d.1, q.2, a.5, both of which also contain scriptural quotations on the body's specific character. But whereas in the latter two texts, the scriptural quotations refer to the body's "earthly" composition, q.91, a.3 by contrast presents a biblical text on the body's upright posture, the aspect of the body which St. Augustine, following a classical tradition, had emphasized in his commentary on Genesis, II, 7. In his response to the third objection of q.91, a.3, St. Thomas presents his own account of the biblical, classical and Augustinian theme of man's upright posture, enumerating four reasons why such a posture is appropriate to human nature.35

The first point is that the senses were given to man not only for the sake of obtaining the necessities of life (which is why they were given to the other animals), but also for the sake of knowledge (ad cognoscendum). (Thus, while the other animals take pleasure in sensible objects only insofar as these are related to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects as such.
solus homo delectatur in ipsa pulchritudine sensibilium secundum seipsam.) Therefore, because the senses are concentrated in the face, the other animals have faces directed downwards towards the earth, for the purpose of seeking nourishment; man, however, has an upright face, in order that by means of the senses - and in particular by means of sight, which is "more subtle" (subtilior) than the other senses, and which shows many differences among things - he might easily and from every direction know sensible objects, both heavenly and earthly ones, and thus gather intelligible truth from all of them.

These remarks on the human face once again present the body from the point of view of the subordination of the senses to the operation of the human intellect. The main consideration here, however, is not the fundamental sense of touch, which is distributed throughout the body, but the other four outer senses, which are localized in the region of the face. Among these, St. Thomas (following Aristotle) gives precedence to sight, the sense which shows the greatest number of differences among things, extends to the greatest number of objects, and is especially useful for the discovery of truth. Since the human senses do not merely serve for finding the necessities of life, but have the nobler purpose of providing for knowledge of intellectual truth, it was fitting that their operation should be as free as possible, and therefore that they should be placed in an upright body.

The second reason for the body's uprightness is the one already mentioned in *quaestiones de anima*, Q. 8, namely, for the sake of the freer operation of the inner senses, which requires the elevation of
the brain above the rest of the body. The overall correlation between
man's intellectual operation and his upright posture, then, is the
freedom of operation of the senses, both outer and inner, which the
intellect requires and which such a posture provides. Generally
speaking, the body must be a perfect organ of touch (and thus a harmo-
nious composition of the elements), since touch is the foundation of
the sensitive nature as a whole; more particularly, the body must be
a fitting organ of the other outer senses and of the inner senses, a
condition which requires the detachment of the brain and face from the
lowered, earthbound position which they have in the other animals. The
composition and the posture of the human body thus answer respectively
to the general and the particular requirements of an intellect which
must gather knowledge of truth by means of sense-powers, and which
must therefore be united to a body; such a body must be so disposed as
to provide for both the most perfect and the freest operation of the
sense-powers on which the intellect relies.

The human body as we have described it thus far is above all
an instrument of cognition - immediately of sensitive cognition, and
ultimately of intellectual cognition. However, the acquisition of
intellectual knowledge is not the only specific operation of the
incarnate intellect which involves a particular disposition of the
body to which it is united, for there are two important operations
which follow from man's possession of intellectual knowledge, namely,
manufacturing and speech. The last two reasons for the body's
uprightness which St. Thomas gives refer to the bodily features
required for these operations.

The third reason argues that if man were prone, like the
other animals, he would use his hands as forefeet, and would thereby
lose the usefulness of his hands for performing a variety of operations (*utilitas manuum ad diversa opera perficienda cessaret*). The human hands, then, represent another particular adaptation of the human body to the intellective soul - not, however, for the sake of the intellect's own operation, but for the sake of the well-being of man as a composite of soul and body. The co-operation of hands and intellect in man produces the sphere of technology, which accomplishes on a higher and more complex level what is automatically carried out in other animals, namely, the care of the body itself. This point is brought out in *Summa Theologiae*, I, Q.76, a.5, ad 4. In response to the objection that the human body is imperfect, since it lacks the natural coverings (*tegumenta*) and defenses (*arma*) which belong to the other animals, St. Thomas begins by stating that the intellective soul, since it has knowledge of universals, has a power which is directed to an infinity of objects (*habet virtutem ad infinita*; cf. *Quaestiones de anima*, Q.8, ad 20: *est infinitarum conceptionum*). For this reason, man could not be restricted by nature, as are the other animals, to the predetermined judgments of instinct (*determinatae existimationes naturales*), or even to the use of certain determinate instruments (*auxilia*), whether for defense or as coverings. In place of these judgments and instruments, however, man has an intellect (the form of forms, *species specierum*) and a hand (the instrument of instruments, *organum organorum*), by means of which he is capable of providing for himself instruments of an infinite variety and for an infinite number of effects (*instrumenta infinitorum modorum et ad infinitos effectus*). 36 Through the co-operation of his intellect and hands, then, man devises the technology which replaces the natural
defenses of the other animals, on the one hand bringing nature itself under his dominion by shaping it to his purposes, and on the other hand extending his body, as it were, into the world of nature. Whereas the cognitive co-operation of intellect and sense has a purely immaterial and immanent end, namely, the act of intellection, the productive co-operation of intellect and hands, on the contrary, is directed outward to a material effect within the world of nature. As the effect of an intellect on the material world, technology itself seems to prolong and complicate the process begun by the union between an intellective soul and matter. This extended influence of the spiritual over the material requires not only an intellect, for seeing the possibilities of technology, but also the distinctively nimble human hands, for executing the commands of the intellect and disposing matter for human purposes. St. Thomas' point is that the free operation of the hands, like that of the senses, requires the upright posture of the human body.\textsuperscript{37}

The final reason for man's upright posture mentioned in \textit{Summa Theologiae}, I, q.91, a.3, ad 3, refers to a crucial feature of the body to which the intellective soul is united, namely, the organs of speech. If, once again, man were prone and used his hands as forefeet, he would have to take his food with his mouth; this in turn would require an elongation of the mouth and a protective hardening of the lips and tongue, such as may be seen in the other animals. Such a condition, says St. Thomas, would completely prevent the operation of speech, which is the proper work of reason (\textit{locutionem, quae est proprium opus rationis}). Thus man's upright posture, by freeing the hands for gathering food, simultaneously frees the mouth from this
operation, and allows it to develop the delicate structures required in an organ of speech.

By means of the body's organs of speech, the intellective soul is enabled to express its knowledge to, and enter into relationship with, another intellective soul; which, again through the instrumentality of the body, is capable of receiving and comprehending this knowledge. The give and take of human speech thus requires of the body not merely the organs of speech, but also the human sense of hearing, in order for one man to be able to comprehend the speech of another. The sense of hearing, then, is a particularly important feature of the body to which the intellective soul is united, since it enables the soul to come to knowledge of the truth in a specifically human way, namely, through the instruction of others. This point is brought out in a passage from St. Thomas' commentary on Aristotle's De sensu et sensato which contrasts the senses of hearing and sight. The sense of sight, says St. Thomas, is of itself (secundum se) superior to hearing because by means of sight we discern many differences among things. This is so because the object of sight is present in all bodies, and because the so-called "common sensibles" are better known by means of sight. Knowledge by means of hearing, on the other hand, which is cognitive only of differences among sounds, and, in a few animals, of differences of voice, does not of itself (per se) discern as many differences among things as does knowledge by means of sight. Nevertheless, hearing is accidentally (per accidens) better than sight for purposes of intellectual knowledge, because speech (sermo, id est locutio), which is something audible, is a
cause of learning not per se - not, that is, because of differences among sounds as such - but per accidens, insofar as the names of which speech is composed are symbols (symbola) and signs (signa) of intellectual representations (intentionum intellectarum), and consequently of things themselves. Thus a teacher teaches his pupil insofar as he indicates to him the understanding of his intellect by means of speech. Now man can come to know more, St. Thomas says, by learning from others (addiscendo), for which the sense of hearing is useful (even though in an accidental way), than he can by discovering things for himself (de se inveniendo), for which the sense of sight is particularly useful. Thus it is, St. Thomas adds, following Aristotle, that among those deprived from birth of either sense, the blind are wiser than the deaf. Hearing, in man, thus seems to be "the sense of wisdom", excelling even the sense of sight in the acquisition of intellectual knowledge, because of the efficacy of speech in transmitting the truth from one man to another. The organ of hearing would therefore seem to be a particularly important feature of the body to which the intellective soul is united.

The last two features of the human body mentioned in Summa Theologiae, I. 1.91, a.3, ad 3, namely, the hands and the organs of speech, differ from the sense-organs in that they co-operate with the intellect not in the act of intellection itself, but in producing an effect in the outer world. At the same time, these two features are important indications of man's social and political nature, as St. Thomas, following Avicenna, argues in the opening chapter of his treatise De regno. St. Thomas begins this treatise on politics by arguing that man, as an intelligent agent, clearly acts for an end,
and therefore needs something to direct him to this end. But in every man there is naturally placed the light of reason, by means of which he may be directed in his actions to his end. If, then, it were appropriate for man to live alone, as it is for many animals, he would need nothing other than reason to direct him towards his end, and every man would be to himself a kind under God, directing himself in his actions by the light of his reason. However, says St. Thomas, it is natural to man, more than any other animal, to be a social and political animal and to live in a group, 'as is evident from natural necessity.' Three arguments are offered to substantiate this point.

First of all, nature provides other animals with food, coverings and either means of defense or at least speed in flight. Man, however, is provided by nature with none of these, but in place of them he is given reason, through which he can provide for himself by means of the work of his hands (officium manus); nevertheless, one man by himself cannot provide all of the necessities of life. Therefore, concludes St. Thomas, it is natural to man to live in the society of many.
in discovering different things by means of reason.

A third argument points to the fact that it is proper to man to make use of speech (locutione uti), by means of which one man is able to fully (totiusiter) express his understanding to another. It is true that other animals express their passions to one another, says St. Thomas; but man is more completely communicative (maxis communificativus) than any other gregarious animal. The use of speech, then, is a further sign that man is a social and political animal, one whose nature it is to live in a multitude. 43

Having established this absolutely fundamental principle of political thought, St. Thomas goes on to discuss political power and the different kinds of government. We have briefly considered the introductory section of his treatise on politics in order to draw attention to the fact that the last two features of the human body mentioned in Sermo Theologiae, 1, 491, 1.3, ad 3—the human hands and organs of speech—are, for St. Thomas, also among the basic indications of man's social and political nature. It is clear, then, that the social and political aspect of man's nature is as fully incarnate and as much dependent on a particular kind of body, as is his intellectuality.

Let us summarize these various observations by St. Thomas on the human body's "particular features". As a perfect organ of sensation, the body requires a proportionally large brain, for the sake of the operations of the inner senses, and therefore an upright posture, for the freedom of operation of the brain itself, as well as an abundance of heat in the heart, in order to support such a posture
(quaestiones de anima, Q.8). The body's uprightness makes for freedom of operation not only of the inner senses, which are located in the brain, but also of the four outer senses which are located in the head, and particularly of the subtle sense of sight; in addition, an upright posture frees the hands for the work of manufacturing and food-gathering, which in turn frees the mouth to become an organ of speech — manufacturing and speech being two specific operations of an intellect united to a body (Summa Theologiae, I, Q.91, a.3, ad 3).

Furthermore, since speech, the expression of the intellect's knowledge of truth, is an object of hearing, the human sense of hearing has a special role in man's gradual acquisition of truth, and the body's organs of hearing thus take on a specifically human character as instruments in the attainment of wisdom (sententia libri De sensu, I, c.1, 201-303). And finally, the body's hands and organs of speech are also signs of the social and political nature which is proper to an incarnate intellect (De reser., I). All of these particular features of the human body depend upon and are implied in the body's most strikingly distinctive characteristic, its upright posture.

These particular features of the body, together with its general character as a perfect organ of touch, characterize the body from the point of view of its form and end, the intellective soul (ex parte animae). In keeping with the twofold consideration of the body suggested in quaestiones de malo, Q.5, a.5, it remains to consider the body from the point of view of "the necessity of matter".
3) *ex necessitate materiae*

St. Thomas introduces the second part of *quaestiones de anima*, i.e., c. with a brief discussion of the two ways in which matter can be understood: there are some dispositions of matter for the sake of which a certain kind of matter (*talis materia*) is chosen for a particular form; other dispositions, however, follow merely from "the necessity of matter" itself (*ex necessitate materiae*), and have nothing to do with what an artisan would choose in the matter. Making up Aristotle's example, St. Thomas notes that, in making a saw, an artisan chooses iron for its hardness, in order for the saw to be useful for cutting, though it follows from "the necessity of matter" that iron teeth can become dull and rusty. If he could find it, the artisan would prefer a material in which dullness and rusting do not occur; but because he cannot find any material without these imperfections, he does not therefore refrain from making the saw with the most appropriate material available to him. So it is, St. Thomas says, with the human body: the body's possession of the kind of elemental composition and disposition of parts which make it most suitable for the operations of the senses is something intended by man's maker in the material dimension of human nature; but the fact that the body is subject to corruption and fatigue, and has certain other defects, follows "from the necessity of matter", since a body composed of the contrary elements is necessarily subject to such defects. Nor, adds St. Thomas, can it be objected that God could have done otherwise; for, as St. Augustine says, with respect to the origin of nature, it should not be asked what God was capable of doing, but rather what the nature of things was capable of having done to it.
St. Thomas then concludes with a brief theological discussion of the human body's defects. In creating man, God provided a remedy for these defects in the grace of "natural justice," by means of which the body was entirely subject to the soul, and the soul to God, with the result that neither death nor any other bodily defect occurred to man before his soul had become separated from God. However, because of sin, in which the soul withdrew from God, man was deprived of this grace, and was therefore subject to the bodily defects which naturally accompanies anything composed of matter. Like St. Augustine, then, St. Thomas balances the original immortality of the human body (which seems to be implied in the biblical account of Adam's curse) with the natural mortality of a body composed of the elements by indicating that the body's natural condition of mortality was suspended through grace in man's state of innocence, but returned after the fall.

The question of the naturalness of human mortality and suffering, which St. Thomas considers frequently in his writings, is generally discussed by him separately from the question of the kind of body (tale corpus) which is appropriate to the rational soul. The latter point, whose development in St. Thomas' writings we have been tracing, is generally discussed by him in strictly philosophical terms, whether his approach is the Avicennian one of his early view of the question (opertet ordinem perfectibilium esse secundum ordinem perfectionum) or the Averroistic one of his later view (materia est propter formam). The question concerning the body's defects, however, seems to necessarily involve explicitly theological considerations, such as those we have just seen. A purely philosophical consideration of the human body shows that, from the point of view of "the necessity
of matter", the body is naturally subject to death and suffering; since it is composed of the four mutually opposing elements. (This "scientific" explanation of the body's weaknesses would no doubt have to be modified; nevertheless, the fundamental point - the "naturalness" of these weaknesses - remains unaffected by any scientific developments.) Christian theology, however, teaches that these natural weaknesses do not necessarily afflict the body, and that in man's state of innocence a supernatural remedy for them was provided by man's creator.

In Quaestiones de anima, Q.8, c., St. Thomas unites in a single continuous discussion the two hitherto separated topics of the human body's specific character and of the naturalness of human death and suffering. He is enabled to do so because of the "twofold consideration of matter" suggested by Aristotle's Physics (ex parte formae and ex necessitate materiae). But his reason for doing so must be that the theological account of man's mortality and suffering contributes to an understanding of what is specifically unique about the human body. From the point of view of nature alone, mortality and suffering, it is true, are not peculiar to man, but simply consequences of his corporeal existence. From the point of view of revelation, however, mortality and suffering have a significance in human nature which they do not have in the other animals at all, since, even though these defects are "natural", they are evidence of the withdrawal of the grace originally given to man, a grace lost through the guilt of original sin. Thus, whereas in the other animals the suffering and death of the body are simply natural facts, in man they have a moral significance as consequences of man's original fall from grace. The "kind of body" (tale corpus) which is appropriate to the human soul not only subserves
the soul's operation of intellection, but also, in its freedom from or susceptibility to suffering and death, reflects the soul's state of innocence or guilt in relation to its creator. Theology thus introduces a historical aspect into the consideration of the human body which transcends the merely natural dimension. The human body, it seems, cannot be fully understood in terms of nature alone: before the fall, the body was freed, through grace, of the defects which belong to it "by nature"; and after the fall, the body returned to its "natural" condition—but this reversion was a punishment for man's sin. In the state of grace, the body's immortality was due to man's supernaturally elevated nature, while its present mortality is a consequence of man's fallen nature. In neither case is the condition of the body simply something "natural".

One point which St. Thomas does not address in Quaestiones de anima, Q.8 is the reason why the body informed by the rational soul was originally freed by God of its natural defects. This point, however, is discussed in Quaestiones de malo, Q.5, a.5, which we have already partially considered. After noting that the body's corruptibility follows from "the necessity of matter", this latter text goes on to show why this material condition of corruptibility is opposed (habet repugnantiam) to the rational soul which is the form of the human composite. Here St. Thomas begins with the general argument that the corruption of any natural thing is opposed to its form, since form is a principle of being (principium essendi), while corruption is a process towards non-being (via ad non esse); as Aristotle says, corruption is contrary to the nature of any particular thing, though it is in keeping with nature as a whole, according to which matter is
successively actuated by different forms. St. Thomas adds, however, that the corruption which follows from "the necessity of matter" is in a special way inappropriate (preter conuenientiam) to that form which is the intellective soul; for, while other forms are at least accidentally corruptible, the immortal intellective soul is neither of itself nor accidentally corruptible. If, then, a natural body could be found which was incorruptible, such a body would certainly be naturally appropriate to the intellective soul (proculdubio tale corpus esset conueniens anime secundum nature). However, just as the artisan, in making a saw, chooses the best material available, even with its imperfections, similarly, the intellective soul was provided with a body which is organic, even though corruptible. In man's state of innocence, this corruptibility — a "necessity of matter" — was prevented by God from being realized in actuality, and the human body was thus freed of its natural mortality.

Although death and corruption are natural to man according to the necessity of matter (secundum necessitatem materie), immortality would be more appropriate to man by reason of his form (secundum rationem forme). The principles of nature, however, do not suffice to provide this condition of immortality. On the other hand, the human soul does have a natural disposition to provide for the immortality of the human composite as a whole, a disposition which can be realized with supernatural help. Insofar as immortality is natural to us, St. Thomas concludes, death and corruption are, for us, contrary to nature: in quantum immortalitas est nobis naturalis, mors et corruptio est nobis contra naturam. With this last remark, St. Thomas seems to strongly qualify the very notion of the naturalness of man's mortality.
Is the human body mortal by nature? St. Thomas' answer to this question is rather complex: insofar as the intellective soul has sense-powers, it requires a body which is organic, and which is therefore composed of the elements; insofar as the soul is immortal, the most fitting body for it by nature would be an incorruptible one, that is, if a body could be both organic and incorruptible; but since, according to the principles of nature, an organic body is necessarily corruptible, the soul was united to a body suitable for the operation of its sense-powers, even though mortal; and finally, in man's state of innocence, God supplied by means of supernatural grace that which was "naturally" preferable, even though "naturally" impossible, namely, the human body's immortality. St. Thomas seems to suggest that the very status of the body as something "natural" is problematic, since the union between an immortal, intellective soul and matter required of nature something which nature could not provide. Human nature, as a nature, is apparently incomplete without the divine assistance which provides it with a body which is both organic and immortal. Going beyond philosophical considerations, and taking into account St. Thomas' theological perspective, we are led to conclude that an important - though not necessary or inevitable or even "naturally" possible - specific feature of the body to which the rational soul is appropriately united is its supernaturally provided immortality.
3. Summary

Let us briefly recapitulate St. Thomas' later approach to the question of the specific character of the body to which the rational soul is appropriately united. Since soul and body are related as form and matter, and since matter must be understood primarily in relation to form, but also secondarily simply as matter, the human body must, accordingly, be considered from two points of view. 1) From the point of view of its relation to the soul, which is its form and end, the human body must be disposed "for the sake of" the soul's own natural end, the operation of abstractive intellect. Because this immaterial operation depends upon the co-operation of organic sense-powers, the human body is specifically distinguished as the most perfect possible organ of sensation. In general, this means that the body is a perfect organ of touch, which is the foundation of all the other senses; and in order to be a perfect organ of touch, it must be constituted as a perfectly balanced composition of the four elements. The particular distinguishing features of the body - notably its proportionally large brain, which requires an upright posture, and thus an abundance of heat in the heart - also contribute to its status as a perfect organ of sensation. In addition to providing for the free operation of the inner senses and the four outer senses located in the head, the body's upright posture also allows for the development of the specifically human hands and organs of speech, since the incarnate intellect does not merely seek to acquire knowledge, but also to make use of its knowledge in building technology for the body's well-being, and to share its knowledge in communicating with others. 2) From the point of view of matter itself,
the human body, as something composed of the four contrary elements, is also subject to death and certain other imperfections. These defects would not be naturally appropriate to the body of an immortal soul if a body could be both organic and immortal; given the limitations of nature, however, the body is naturally subject to them. As theology teaches, the human body was originally freed of these defects by grace in man's state of innocence.

In sum, the body which is by nature appropriate to the intellective and immortal soul is distinguished from all other bodies, and in particular from all other animal bodies, by its overall perfection as a sense-organ, its proportionally large brain, its upright posture, its hands and its organs of speech, as well as by the immortality which befits it, but which the nature of things, unaided by supernatural grace, cannot provide.

In considering St. Thomas' earlier discussions of the human body, we suggested that two objections might be raised against his first approach to the question of the human body's specific character: that it depended heavily on medieval scientific views which are no longer acceptable; and that it seemed to separate soul and body into two distinct orders, thus obscuring St. Thomas' own insistence on the unifying "partnership of being" between soul and body. In transforming his approach to the question in his later writings, St. Thomas has removed both objections by means of the principle materia est propter formam. It is true that outmoded scientific views are still present in these later texts (in particular, the theory of the four elements, which is used to explain both the organ of touch and the body's mortality); however, the teleological approach of these later texts, in which the final and formal causes precede the material
cause in making the specific character of the body Intelligible, greatly reduces the importance of any discussion of the body in terms of its elemental composition alone. As we have suggested, there is room for an alternative account of the body's specific material composition within St. Thomas' overall explanation of the body as a perfect organ of sensation functioning "for the sake of" the soul's intellective operation. Any objection to this explanation on a purely scientific level, then, would affect certain details of the discussion, but not St. Thomas' general philosophical approach to the question of the human body's specific character.

More importantly, however, St. Thomas' approach to this question in light of the principle *materia est propter formam* gives expression to his own metaphysical account of the unity of being shared by soul and body. St. Thomas' explanation of the unity of the human composite, in which an intellect gives being to and informs a body for the sake of its own intellectual operation, is already firmly established in his earliest writings. But in their treatment of the question of the human body's specific character, these early texts do not clarify the relationship between this unity of being shared by soul and body and the specific character of the body itself. Subsequent reflection, however, led St. Thomas to see the relevance both of his own insistence on the unity of the human composite and of certain Aristotelian principles to the question of the human body's specific character. First of all, since the unity of being between soul and body was, in Aristotelian terms, one of form and matter, the suggestion of the *Physics* that matter is something "relative" (*pros ti, ad aliquid*) had to be taken into account. And secondly, since, as the *Physics*
also suggests, the elemental composition of a material thing is the last and least important of its causes, the most significant distinguishing feature of the human body could not be its particular elemental composition (on which Avicenna had insisted), but its perfection as an organ of touch, which, according to Aristotle's *De anima*, is directly related to man's intellectual superiority. St. Thomas interpreted these two points in terms of two aphorisms which seem to have been current among scholastic thinkers: if the body, as matter, is something relative, this means that it is "for the sake of" the soul and its proper operation of intellection (*materia est propter formam*); and if the human body has the most perfect organ of touch, this is because touch is the "foundation" of the senses as a whole (*tactus est fundamentum aliorum sensuum*), and it is the perfection of the sensitive nature as a whole which is required for the operation of the human intellect. With these two principles, St. Thomas was able to present a new account of the human body's specific character which was simpler, more Aristotelian, and more in keeping with his own view of the unity of soul and body than his earlier approach to the question had been. Throughout the whole of this later account, the unity of being shared by soul and body is kept steadily in view by means of the principle *materia est propter formam*, and all of the body's specific features - its perfection as a sense-organ, its uprightness, its hands and its organs of speech - are derived from the body's subordination to the specific operation of the intellective soul.
CONCLUSION

The final section of the corpus of Quaestiones de anima, q.8, c., as we have seen, raises the question of the naturalness of human mortality. Closely related to this question is the problem of the condition of the immortal and intellective soul after the death of the body: if the soul is naturally joined to a body for the sake of its own intellectual operation, and if the body is naturally subject to death, then what is the natural status of the separated soul, which can no longer perform its specific operation of abstractive intellection, since it is deprived of sense-organs, and hence of the sensible species from which it abstracts the intelligible species by means of which it knows? Like the question of the human body's specific character, this problem is one to which St. Thomas repeatedly returned in his writings, and one in which a development in his thinking can be discerned. In an article on "The Separated Soul and Its Nature in St. Thomas", W. C. Pegis describes this development in terms which may readily be applied to the development which we have noted in St. Thomas' reflections on the human body's specific character.

The difference of ST I, q.89, a.1 from SCG II, c.81 has three aspects, namely, a change in doctrine, a change in St. Thomas' view of the state of the question before him, and the entry of the Aristotelian notion of nature into the discussion of the knowledge of the separated soul. If these differences can be proved from the texts, then it is also permissible to think that SCG II, c.81 belongs to an earlier stage in St. Thomas' views on the separated soul. And if, finally, it is correct to argue that as a summum the SCG had for its immediate purpose the assimilation of Aristotelianism, then it is plausible to believe that St. Thomas' use of Aristotelian teaching was not uniform or complete at the time of the SCG; it was absent, for example, from the problem of the knowledge of the separated soul as compared with the fuller and even more radical application of Aristotelian notions in ST I, q.89, a.1 and Quaestiones de Anima, q.15.1

Each of the three changes mentioned by Pegis with reference to the development in St. Thomas' teaching on the separated soul has its
counterpart in the development in his account of the human body's specific character. Between St. Thomas' discussion of the body in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and his treatment of the same point in the *Summa Theologiae* and *Quaestiones de anima* (the same grouping of texts noted by Pegis in relation to a different question), there is first of all a change in doctrine, insofar as the body's perfection as a sense-organ replaces its particular elemental composition as the focus of St. Thomas' account of its specific character. There is also a change in St. Thomas' view of the state of the question, since his initial attempts to demonstrate the harmony between the intellective soul and the human body, while at the same time separating them into two separate hierarchical orders, is replaced in his later writings by the effort to show how "this kind of body" (tale corpus) is related to the intellective soul in a union of form and matter. Finally, there is, in St. Thomas' later writings, a new emphasis on the human body as something natural, and therefore as subordinated to the soul in a relation of finality (materia est prouter formam), as well as a "fuller and even more radical application of Aristotelian notions", in particular, of Aristotle's observations on the human sense of touch. It would seem, then, that the development in St. Thomas' account of the human body which we have outlined is not a unique case, but rather an instance of an overall development in his reflections on human nature. This development is characterized both by St. Thomas' increasing familiarity with and appreciation of Aristotelian thought, and by the increasing freedom and originality with which he made use of Aristotelian principles for his own philosophical purposes. In the case of our own question, this development enabled him to go beyond the commonly accepted Avicennian explanation of the human body presented by...
St. Albert and St. Bonaventure, as well as by St. Thomas himself in his early writings, and to discover a radically new approach to the question which would account for the specific character of the human body in terms of the substantial unity of the human composite.
NOTES TO PART ONE

Introduction


2 Ibid., p.76.

3 A doctoral dissertation by Sister M. Evangeline Anderson on The Human Body in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (The Catholic University of America, 1953) does address the question with which we are concerned, but makes little reference to the historical context of the question, or to the development in St. Thomas' reflections on the human body.

4 Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, Q.75, prólogue.


7 Cf. Quaestiones de anima, Q.1.

8 Cf. ibid., Q.11.


10 Cf. On Being and Essence, Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Armand Raurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), p.32, n.9: "A thing is said to be designated (designatum, signatum) when it can be shown or pointed to with the finger. This is true of the individual thing, but not of the abstract nature. The latter can be defined; the former can only be pointed to. In this sense, designated is equivalent to the demonstrative article this. A derived meaning of the word is determined or limited. That is said to be undesigned which is undetermined, confused, undifferentiated."


13 Ibid., pp.14-16.

14 Cf. Owens, p.52: "Precise abstraction allows this mental separation to be made at any of the stages in the Porphyrian tree."

15 Ibid., p.51. The foregoing discussion of precise abstraction in the use of the term "body" has drawn from pp.45-53 of Owens' article.

16 The most important text is probably the first section of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945). Both Norbert Luyten, in "The Significance of the Body in a Thomistic Anthropology", *Philosophy Today* 7 (1963), pp.175-193, and Marie-Joseph Nicolas, in "Le corps humain", *Revue Thomiste* 79 (1979), pp.357-387, acknowledge the influence of the phenomenological school in their "Thomistic" studies of the human body. Neither of these authors considers St. Thomas' account of the human body in light of the historical perspective proposed by the present study.
Chapter I


2. Determinato exitu rerum a primo principio, hic prosequitur ordinem eam in ultimum finem; et dividitur in partes tres: in prima ostendit finem ultimum creaturarum; in secunda ex fine ostendit creaturarum diversitatem; in tertia, ex distinctione concludit tractandy ordinem. Secunda dividitur in tres: in prima ostendit ordinem spiritualis naturae in finem; in secunda ordinem corporalis; in tertia ordinem conjuncti ex utroque. Ibid., divisio secundae partis textus (ed. Landonnet-Moos, p. 4).


4. Respondet dicendum quod causa finalis ipsius conjunctionis animae et corporis assignatur in Littera a magistro sufficienter. Finis enim potest sumi vel ex parte agentis, vel ex parte ipsius operis. Ex parte agentis, scilicet Dei, finis est bonitas ejus, secundum quod cadi voluntatis ipsius volentis bonitatem suam in res diffundere: et haec est prima ratio quam magister assignat. Ex parte autem operis, finis intentus est pertingere in assimilationem divinae beatitudinis. Hoc autem est secundum esse eujus, prout ipsa conjunctionis animae et corporis est quaedam similitudo divinae beatitudinis, quae conjungitur spiritus Dei: et haec est secunda ratio quam assignat. Et etiam secundum operationem, prout scilicet anima per operationes suas in corpore exercet, ad divinam beatitudinem accedit merendo: et haec est tertia ratio. (In II Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, c.)

5. Ad tertium dicendum, quod propter hanc objectionem Plato posuit, ut Gregorius Nyssenus, in Hom. de anima, col. 215, t. II., narrat quod anima est in corpore sicut motor in mobili, ut nauta in navi, et homo sicut forma in materia; unde dicebat quod homo non est aliquod ex anima et corpore, sed quod homo est anima utens corpore; et propter hoc etiam quidam quaesierunt quaedam medium inter animam et corpus, ut spiritum corporalem, animam vegetabilarem et sensibilidadem, et lucem, quibus mediantibus anima rationalis corpori unitur; quae omnia absurda sunt secundum philosophiam, et improbata a Philosopho in VIII Metaph., text. 11 et 16. Et ideo dicimus quod essentia animae rationalis immediate unitur corpori sicut forma materiae, et figura cerae, ut in II De anima, text. 7 dicitur. Sciemus ergo quod convenientia potest attendi dupliciter: aut secundum proprietates naturae, et sic anima et corpus multum distant; aut secundum proportionem potentiae ad actum, et sic anima et corpus maxime conveniunt. Et ista convenientia exigitur ad hoc ut aliquid uniatur alteri immediate ut forma; alias nec accidentes subiecto nec aliqua forma materiae uniretur; cum accidentes et subiectum etiam sint in diversis generibus, et materia sit potentia, et forma sit actus. (Ibid., ad 3)
Aristotle, *Physica* I.7-9, II.1-2; in particular, 192a3-33, 193b6-8, 194a27-29, 194b6-9.

7 Aristotle, *De anima* II.1-2; in particular, 412a27-41, 412b6-8, 414a19-27.


9 *In I Sent.*, d.8, q.5, a.2, c.

10 Ad secundum dicendum, quod quidquid adventit rei subsistenti ita quod ex ipsius adventu novum esse constitutur, oportet accidentaliter adventire, quia unius rei non potest esse nisi unum esse essentiale; unde aliud esse superveniens erit accidentale. Sed corpus adveniens animae trahitur in consortium illius esse a quo anima subsistere potest, quamvis aliae formae non possunt subsistere in illo esse, sicut potest anima. (*In II Sent.*, d.1, q.2, a.4, ad 2)

11 Ad primum dicendum, quod si anima non esset corpori unibilis, tunc esset alterius naturae; unde secundum hanc naturam quam habet, non potest melius ad divina bonitatem accedere quam per hoc quod unitur corpori. (Ibid., ad 1)

12 Praeterea, intellectus possibilis, secundum Philosophum, in III *De anima*, text.14, est sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum. Sed non potest per se scribari aliquid in eo nisi per species a sensibus receptas. Ergo oportet quod uniatur corpori organico sensibili. (Ibid., "sed contra")

13 Ad quartum dicendum, quod in formis est quidam gradus nobilitatis; et quanto aliqua forma est nobilior, tanto plus materiae praedominatur; unde forma terrae est magis materialis quam forma aeris vel ignis. Inter autem omnes formas animae rationalis nobilior est, unde maxime praedominatur materiae. Omne autem quod unitur alteri ut vincens et dominans super illud habet effectum non solum secundum conjunctionem sui ad alterum, sed etiam per se absolute, inquantum non dependet ad illud cui unitur; sicut patet in igne (can)delae, cujus lumen extenditur ultra ascensionem vaporis et calefactionem. Unde quaedam vires ab anima provenire possunt quae sunt corporis actu et quaedam sunt ab organis corporalis absolutione; quamvis enim essentia animae corpori uniatur ut forma, non tamen sicut forma materialis non habens esse absolute in quo subsistere potest. (Ibid., ad 4)

14 Cf. above, p.16


16 Cf. "Index Anthropologiae", "Index Physiologiae" and "Index Anatomiae" in *Patrologiae Latinae* (Paris, 1890), V.221.
17 Iam vero in ipso corpore, quamvis nobis sit cum beluis mortalitate commune multisque earum reperiatur infirmius, quanta Dei bonitas, quanta providentia tanti Creatoris apparat! Nonne ita sunt in eo loca sensuum et cetera membra disposita specieisque ipsa ac figura et statura totius corporis ita modificata, ut ad ministerium animae rationalis se indicet factum? Non enim ut animalia rationis expertia prona esse videmus in terram, ita creatus est homo; sed erecta in caelum corporis forma admonet eum quae sursum sunt sapere. Porro mira mobilitas, quae linguae ag manibus attributa est; ad loquendum et scribendum apta atque conveniens et ad opera artium plurimarum officiorumque compleanda, nonne satis ostendit, quali animae ut serviret tale sit corpus adiunctum? De civitate Dei, ed. B. Dombard et A. Kalb (Œuvres de saint Augustin, v.37); Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1960; XXII, 24.


19 St. Albert, In II Sent. (ed. Borget), d.17, a.3.

20 De caelo et mundo, IV, 1-4.

21 De generatione et corruptione, II, 1-3, 7-8.

22 St. Bonaventure, In II Sent. (ed. Quaracchi) d.17, q.2.

23 Note that, besides the article on the human body in distinctio 1, St. Thomas also includes an article which deals with the body in distinctio 17: "Utrum in compositione hominis sit aliquid de natura corporis caelestis" (In II Sent., d.17, q.3, a.1). This latter article, however, is less directly concerned with the specific difference of the human body.


25 Notes et Textes sur l'Avicennisme Latin aux confins des XIIe-XIIIe siècles (Bibliothèque Thomiste, 20), Paris, J. Vrin, 1934, pp.64-65.

26 De anima, II, 9, 421a19-26.

27 Ibid., III, 8, 432a1-2.

28 E.g., De partibus animalium, II, 7, 653a25-30.

29 De anima, III, 13, 435a11-b19; II, 2, 413b4-10; II, 3, 414b1-16; De somno et vigilia, 2, 455a13-b2.

30 De anima, II, 5, 416b32-417a20.

31 De anima, II, 11, 422b17-424a10.

32 De anima, III, 12-13, 434a22-435b3.
32b Cf. De generatione et corruptione, II, 2, 329b7-10; II, 8, 334b31-34; De anima, II, 11, 423b27-29, 424a4-5; III, 1, 425a6-7.

33 The following discussion relies on the study of this passage and its ancient and modern interpreters in the second chapter of Giancarlo Iovia's Due Studi sul "De anima" di Aristotele (Padova, 1974), pp.63-84 ("Tatto e pensiero in un passo del "De anima".")

34 De anima, II, 9, 421a19-26.


36 Omne autem medium oportet non habere in seipso qualitatem quam reddit, ideo ut, cum reciperit et reddiderit, reddat aliquid novum propter quod accidat passio et accidat sentire (passio eternim non accidit nisi ex re nova); similiter etiam instrumentum tangendi. Sed medium, exempli gratia, quod est nunc calidum nec frigidum, est dubus modus: unus eorum est ut nullo modo participet ipsas qualitates; alter ut participet eas, sed aequaliter; ita ut nec sit calidum nec frigidum, sed temperatum vel aequaliter medium. Impossibile autem erat ut instrumentum tangendi esset vacuum ab his qualitatis omnino: ex illis enim compositum est. Oportet ergo esse vacuum ab ultimatis causa complexiosis et aequalitatis, ad sentiendum id quod est distemperatum, quia, quod ex complexionibus tangentibus est vicinus aequalitati, illud est subtilioris sensus et, quia hominum animalibus propriis qualitas est aequalitatis, ideo est subtilioris tactus, qui est primus et caput sensuum. (Ibid., II, 3, pp.141-142)

37 According to Empedocles, the blood, the organ of thought, is 'like' "the whole" or the universe, composed of an equal balance of all four elements (Rfs.28-29, 98, 105). Note also the correspondence between this equal mixture and human intelligence in Theophrastus' summary of Empedocles' doctrine; cf. George Malcolm Stratton, Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology before Aristotle (Amsterdam, 1964, reprint of 1917 ed.), p.168.


39 "The concept of equilibrium, or justice, as the necessary condition for the wedding of the Soul and the mixture of the elements is widespread in Islam and is far from being confined to Ibn Sina." Seyyed Hossein Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984). p.251.

40 Liber Canonis, G. Olms, Hildesheim, 1964 (reprint of Venice, 1507 ed.).

41 Ibid., Liber I, Pen.I, Doctrina I, c.1.

42 Ibid., c.2.
Complexio est qualitas quae ex actione ad invicem et passione contrariarum qualitatum in elementis inventarum, quorum partes ad tantam parvitatem redactae sunt ut cuilibus earum plurimum contingat, plurimum alterius provenit. Cum enim ad invicem agunt et patiuntur suis virtutibus accidit in earum suum qualitas in toto earum similis, quae est complexio. (Ibid., c.3)

It illud quidem est secundum quod oportet per divisionem rationalem cum consideratione absque ulla comparatione ad rem aliquam; et est duobus modis. Quorum unus est ut fit complexio aequalis, ita ut quantitates qualitatum contrariarum in complexionato sint aequales, non superantes, neque superatae; et fit complexio qualitas in medio earum vere. Alter vero modus est ut non fit complexio qualitatum contrariarum media absolute, sed ad una magis declinet extremitatem, aut in contrariedades quae est inter caliditatem et frigiditatem, aut in contrariedades quae est inter humiditatem et siccitatem, aut inter utrasque. (Ibid.)

Debes autem scire quod aequale de quo medici in suis inquisitionibus tractant non est denominatum ab aequalitate in qua aequalitas cum pondere aequaliter existit, sed denominatur a justitia in divisione; et hoc est quod in complexionato in primis attenditur sive sit corpus totum sive sit membrum unum, ut fit in eo de elementis cum suis quantitatiibus et qualitatiibus mensura quam humana natura habere debet secundum meliorem proportionis et divisionis aequalitatem. (Ibid.)

Accidit autem ut haec divisio, cum homo eam habuerit, vere aequalitati quod in primam diximus valde fit propinquus... Cum autem species consideravisimus, inveni mism hominem certe aequalitati propinquorem. (Ibid.) Dico quod Deus cuique animali et cuique membro donavit ex complexionis quod magis meretur et quod eis actionibus et dispositionibus secundum possibilitatem melius existit. Hoc autem certificare philosophi est et non medici. Donavit autem homini complexionem temperationem quam in hoc mundo esse est possibile cum suarum virtutum conveniencia quibus agit et patitur, et unicuique membro donavit de complexione quod meretur. (Ibid., c.4)

In membris vero iam manifestum fuit quod membra principalia non sunt aequalitati certe multum propinquum; immo oportet ut scias quod carissi membra est membrum illi aequalitati magis propinquum quam cetera membra; cuilib tamen carne propinquior est... Quod autem in cute magis existit temperatum est cutis manus; et quod in cute manus temperatus est est cutis vole; et temperatus eius est quod est super digitos; et temperatus eius est quod est super indicem; et quod temperatus eius est quod est in pulpa extremitatis eius. It propter illud est melioris sensibilitatis et quod in cute magis existit temperatum est quod in digitorum extremitatis inventur quapropter extrinitates digitorum alliarum quasi iudices existunt qualitatum nautura tactualium. (Ibid., c.3)

Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus, ed. Van Hiet. Vol.I, p.172: Modus autem intelligendi hoc est quod ultima contrarietas prohibit corpra elementaria recipere vitam. Sed quo minor fuerit contrarietas et magis accesserint ad temperantiam quae non habet contrarium, incipient assimilari caelestibus corporibus, propter quod debent recipere virtutem vivificans et substantia separata re genti. Quod ergo fuerit propinquius temperantiae fiet receptibilis vitae, donec perveniat ad finem quo nihil potest esse propinquius temperantiae, nec remotius ab utrisque extremis contrariis; et tunc recipit substantiam quae est simillima substantiae separatae aliquo modo, sicut substantiae caelestes; et tunc id quod accidet in alium praeter illud a separato, accidat in illud ex ipsa hac substantia recepta, cum qua conniunctur substantia separata.

Cf. the fragment De medicinis cordialibus by Avereheth Iurgianus inserted at the end of Avicenna's De anima, IV, 4, and known to the scholastics (Avicenna, De anima, ed. Van Hiet, Vol.II, p.192):

In compositis vero complexo fregit et debilitat veritatem contrarietas, et operator in eis formam complexionis. Complexio autem est medium inter contraria; medium vero non habet contraria; et ideo aptatur plus ad recipiendum vitam. Unde complexio quo magis accesserit ad medium, complexionatum aptius fiet ad recipiendum augmentum perfectionis vitae.

Cum vero temperatissimum fuerat, ita ut contraria aequalia sint in eo et operentur aequaliter, coaptatur perfectioni vitae rationabilis, similis vitae caelestis.

Hae autem aptitudo est in spiritu humano. Spiritus vero humanus omnino est quiddam quod generatur ex elementis, et efficit virtus ad similitudinem caelestium corporum... On Avicenna's presentation of the human body as a perfect harmony of the four elements which, in its noncontrariety, resembles the heavenly bodies, and therefore receives the form (the rational soul) which most resembles the soul of the heavenly body, see Giorgio Scrimieri, Da gli Studi su Ibn Sina: I. Teoresi Fisica (Bari: Edizioni Levante, 1973), pp.113-114; Anneliese Maier, An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft (Boma, 1952), pp.23-24; and Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), p.195.

St. Albert, In II Sent., d.17, a.3, ad 1-3; St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d.17, a.2, q.1; St. Thomas, In II Sent., d.1, q.2, a.5, ad 1.

De gen. an., II, 3, 736b31-33. //50b De cael., I, 2, 269b15-17.

In II Sent., d.17, a.3, ad 2.


De anima (Alberti Magnus Opera Omnia, T.VII, 1); ed. Clemens Stroick (Aschendorff, 1968), Lib.II, Tr.3, c.23, pp.192-133.

According to J. A. Weisheipl (Albertus Magnus and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays 1980, p.568), St. Albert's De anima was
written while he was prior provincial of Teutonia, between June, 1254 and June, 1257.

55 Causa autem huius est, quia tangibles qualitates mixtione sua complexionem faciunt, quae complexio cum magis ab excellentiis recedit, tunc medietati et aequalitati est vicinior et ideo caelo similior, in quo nulla est omnino contrarietas. Et quia secundum merita materiæ dantur formæ, sicut dixit Plato, et unicuique complexioni propria respondet forma, ideo aequaliōri complexioni debetur anima nobilissima, quae est intellectiva "secundum prudentiam dicto intellectu". (De anima, Lib.II, Tr.3, c.24, p.133, 11.15-24)

56 Inter hominēs autem quicunque aeualiorem habent complexionem habent eam in hoc quaod magis recedunt ab excellentiis; et ideo illi optimum habent tactum et aptiores sunt secundum industrias intellectus, ita quod forte tantum ad aequalitatem reducetur complexion, quod videbuntur esse quidam dii terrestres, omnia quasi per seipsos intelligentes. (Ibid., 11.24-31)

57 Et hi omnēs sunt mollis et non laxae carnis, quoniam mollities provenit ex sicco bene commixto cum umido, et hoc est spumosum subtiles generans spiritus. Laxitas autem carnis provenit ex multo umido frigido, sed caro debet esse terminata temperato calido, quod proportionaliter moveat spiritus et non commisceat operationes, sicut factit superfluum calidum.

Signum autem huius complexionis est tenuitas unguum et subtilitas capillorum; haec enim indicant lucidos et subtiles esse spiritus cordis, qui ad cerebrum venientes optime deserviunt virtutibus animalibus; et inde proveniunt sapientiae et industrias, ex quibus prudentes et ingeniösus efficium homo, quantum est de natura, et ad actum prudentiae deveniet, nisi per inertiam destruat aptitudinem naturæ. Haec igitur est vera causa prudentiae, et non quam quidem errantes dicunt esse bonitatem imaginationis; bonitas enim imaginandi ex frigida et sicca provenit complexione, et haec non facit industriam et ingenium. Haec autem omnis dicta sunt, ut sciatur, quod certificandae sunt a nobis differentias saporum, eo quod sapores melius scimus, cum gustus sit quidam tactus. (Ibid., 11.31-54)

58 John of Rochelle, Summa de anima (ed. Domenichelli), I, c.35: Cum anima rationalis unitatur corpori secundum duplicem modum; unitur enim ut forma suae materiæ, sive ut perfectio suorum perfectibiliti; unitur etiam ei ut suo organo vel instrumento per quod operatur; duplicis est ratio unionis. Secundum primum modum unitur (anima corpori) sine medio; corpori; dico, unitur in ultima dispositione se habenti, secundum quam est in corpore, sicut in materia necessaria ad formæ susceptionem, scilicet animae. Sicut lignum in ultima dispositione se habens calefactionis et siccitatis, cum scilicet est summe calefactum, se habet immediae ad susceptionem formæ igneitatis. Tuxta secundum modum unitur anima per medium, et medium illud est potentia, sive vis (eius).
59 Contra, perfectissimae perfectioni, sive formae, debetur esse perfectius perfectibile; sed inter omnia corpora constituta ex elementis, et etiam ex his elementis, perfectius est corpus humanum; anima vero rationalis est perfectissima perfectio inter omnes (naturales) formas; ergo solum corpus humanum erit unibile animae rationali. (Ibid., c.36)

60 Cf. De Genesi ad litteram, VII, 15.

61 Summa de animâ, I, cc.36-38. Note that John of Rochele's account of the human body is similar to those of Philip the Chancellor (cf. Ex Summa Philippi Cancellarii, Quesitio de Anima, ed. L. W. Keeler (Aschendorff, 1937), Q.10, 10b, II) and of the Summa Duacensis, ed. P. Glorieux (Paris, 1955), "De anima in comparatione ad corpus", q.3, p.61f.

62 In II Sent., d.17, a.2, q.1.

63 Ibid., q.2.

64 Ibid., q.3.

65 Breviloquium (ed. Quaracchi), II, c.10.

66 Summa Theologica (ed. Quaracchi), Prima Pars Secundi Libri, Inquisitio Quarta ("De homine"), Tractatus Secundus ("De corpore humano"): Sectio 1 ("De corpore humano quod fieri"), q.III ("De causa materiali corporis Adae"); Sectio 2 ("De corpore humano quod esse"), Tit.1, III.III ("De dignitate et nobilitate corporis Adae").

67 Respondeo dicendum, quod oportuit talem formam, scilicet animam rationalem, corpori bene complexionato uniri; cujus rationem assignat Avicenna, De intellectui, cap.x, part.2, et deinceps, dicens, quod oportet ordinem perfectibilium esse secundum ordinem perfectionum. Inter omnes autem perfectiones illa est nobilissima quae movet caelum, cui inter omnes alias perfectiones maxime anima rationalis assimilatur: et ideo corpus oportet quod sit simillimum caelo. (In II Sent., d.1, q.2, a.5, c.)

68 Cf. G. Vérèke, "Introduction sur la doctrine psychologique d'Avicenne", in Avicenna, Liber de Anima (ed. Van Hiet), I, p.24: "Parmi tous les prédicats qui s'appliquent à l'âme, Avicenne accorde la préférence à celui de perfection; ce nom est certainement préférable à celui de puissance, de force ou de faculté. Car ce qui procède de l'âme est ou bien du domaine du mouvement ou bien de celui de la connaissance. Dans le premier cas, l'âme se comporte comme un principe actif, alors que dans le second elle est réceptive. Le terme perfection appliqué à l'âme est plus large, plus compréhensif que les autres noms qui ont été proposés; ce terme peut s'employer aussi bien en rapport avec l'activité motrice qu'avec l'activité cognitive, il peut s'appliquer à l'âme unie à la matière comme à celle qui en est séparée. On disant que l'âme est une perfection, Avicenne veut dire
que la physionomie caractéristique et les activités particulières
de l'être vivant lui viennent du principe psychique: celui-ci n'est
pas seulement une source de mouvement ou d'activité cognitive, il est
simultanément les deux et il est à l'origine de ce qui constitue la
structure propre des êtres vivants."

69 Cf. Thomas Litt, Les corps célestes dans l'univers de
saint Thomas d'Aquin (Philosophes médieaux VII); Louvain-Paris,

70 In II Sent., d.30, q.1, a.1, obj.7.

71 De nobilitate autem corporis caelestis est, quod non
habet contrarium; unde quanto plus corpus separatūr a contrarietate,
similis caelo efficitur. Hoc autem non potest esse in generabilibus
et corruptilibus hoc modo quod a contrariis omnimodo absolvantur,
scilicet calido et frigido, sed per hoc quod veniunt ad medium, quia
medium neutrum extremorum est actu; et ideo illud corpus quod venit
ad maximam aequalitatem mixture, est simillimum caelo, et talis
corpus debet esse corpus humanum... (En II Sent., d.1, q.2, a.5, c.)

72...et inde est quod dicitur II De-anima, text.94, quod homo
habet meliorem tactum caeteris animalibus; et quanta est melioris
tactus, tanto est melioris intellectus, quia subtilitas tactus
sequitur aequalitatem complexioris. Instrumentum enim tactus debet
esse in potentia respectu suorum sensibilium sicut medium, et non per
privationem, sicut pupilla est potentia album et nigrum, ut in
eodem libro, text.119, dicitur. (Ibid.)

73 Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod corpus aequalis est nobilis
quam corpus humanum, et perfectio sua est nobilior quam anima humana.
Sed, sicut dicit Commentator, in lib. I De substantia orbis, cap.II,
corpus aequalis non est generabile quod corruptibile sicut corpus
humanum; et ideo non indiget perfectione terminante ipsum sensificando
et vegetando, sed quae moveat ipsum in loco: et quaeque sit virtus
illa, sive Deus sive angelus, est superior in natura quam anima humana
quaes et motor corporis humanis et corporeitas caeli quam corporeitas
corporis humani. (Ibid., ad 1)

74 Ad secundum dicendum, quod corpora simplicia maxime
removentur a similitudine caeli, inquantum in eorum natura est
habeere contrarium cum intentione, ideo corporis tali anima rationalis
uniri non debuit. (Ibid., ad 2)

75 Ad tertium dicendum, quod anima rationalis quamvis sit
simplex in essentia, tamen est multiplex in potentiis et operationibus,
et ideo optet quod corpus suum multa habeat organa ad diversas
operationes aptas: et propter hoc natura dedit homini manus, quibus
plurimae operationes facere potest; et propter hoc etiam quanta anima
est minus nobilis, requirit minorem diversitatem in organis, sicut
patet in plantis et in animalibus annulosis. (Ibid., ad 3)
76 Ad quartum dicendum, quod elementa quanto plus habent de specie et de qualitatibus activis, tanto plus habent de virtute agendi: unde non posset fieri adaequatio, nisi de elemento magis materiali esset plus secundum quantitatem vel materiam. Ideo oportet corpus humanum secundum quantitatem habere plus de terrestri, quamvis non secundum qualitatem, quia in corpore vivo dominatur calidum; unde in libris De anima dicitur quod nihil est substantivum (sic cod. "Sensitivum" in Parma ed.) sine calore, et quod calor ignis est instrumentum animae. Et quia gravitas et levitas, quae sunt principia motus localis, consequuntur quantitatem materiae, ideo motus gravis apparat in corpore humano. (Ibid., ad 4)

77 J. A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquin, pp. 131-132, 144-145.

78 Ad hoc enim quod aliquid sit forma substantialis alterius, dux requiruntur. Quorum unus est, ut forma sit principium essendi substantialis et cuius est forma: principium autem dico, non factivum, sed formale, quod aliquid est et denominatur ens. Unde sequitur alius, scilicet quod forma et materia conveniant in uno esse: quod non contingit de principio effective cum eo cui dat esse. Et hoc esse est in quo subsistit substantia composita, quae est una secundum esse, ex materia et forma constans.

Non autem impeditur substantia intellectualis, per hoc quod est subsistens, ut probatum est (cap. 51), esse formale principium essendi materiae, quasi esse suum communicans materiae. Non est enim inconveniens quod idem sit esse in quo subsistit compositum et forma ipsa: cum compositum non sit nisi per formam, nec seorsum utrumque subsistat. (Summa Contra Gentiles (Marietti ed.), II, 60, n. 1450).

79 Potest autem obiici quod substantia intellectualis esse suum materiae corporali communicare non possit, ut sit unus esse substantiae intellectualis et materiae corporalis: diversum enim generum ex diversis modus essendi: et nobilioris substantiae nobilioris esse. (Ibid., n. 1451)

80 Hoc autem convenienter dicetur si eodem modo illud esse materiae esset sicut est substantiae intellectualis. Non est autem ita: est enim materiae corporalis ut recipientis et subjecti ad aliquid altius elevati: substantiae autem intellectualis ut principii, et secundum propriae naturae congruentiam. Nihil igitur prohibit substantiam intellectualen esse formam corporis humani, quae est anima humana. (Ibid., n. 1452)

humanum aequaliter complexionatum, quod attingit ad infinitum superioris generis, scilicet ad animam humanam, quae tenet ultimum gradum in genere intellectualium substantiarum, ut ex modo intelligendi percipi potest.

It inde est quod anima intellectualis dicitur esse quas quidam horizon et confinium corporeum et incorporeum, inquantum est substantia incorporea, corporis tamen forma.

Non autem minus est alicud unum ex substantia intellectualis et materia corporalis quam ex forma ignis et eius materia, sed forte magis: quia quanto forma magis vincit materiam, ex ea et materia efficitur magis unum. (Ibid., n.1453)

82 Ibid., nn.1454-1458.

83 Super omnes autem has formas invenitur forma similis superioribus substantiis etiam quantum ad genus cognitionis, quod est intelligere: et sic est potens in operationem quae completur absque organo corporali omnino. Ut haec est anima intellectualis, nam intelligere non fit per aliquid organum corporale. Unde oportet quod illud principium quo homo intelligit, quod est anima intellectualis, et excedit conditionem materiae corporalis, non sit totaliter comprehensa a materia aut si immersa, sit aut aliis formae materiales. Quod eius operationi intellectualis ostendit, in quae non communicat materia corporalis.

Quia tamen ipsum intelligere animae humanae indiget potentiis quae per quaedam organa corporalia operatione, scilicet imaginatione et sensu, ex hoc ipso declaratur quod naturaliter unitur corpori ad comprehendam speciem humanam... (Ibid., n.1459)

84 Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 70, n.1478.

85 Quia vero ostensum est (cap.68) substantiam aliquam intellectualis corpori uniri ut formam, scilicet animam humanam, inquirendum restat utrum aliqui alteri corpori aliqua substantia intellectualis ut forma unitatur. Ut quidem de corporibus caelestibus, quod sint anima anima intellectualis, superius (cap.70), est ostensum quid de hoc ARISTOTELES sensorit, et quod AUGUSTINUS hoc sub dubio dereliquit. Unde prae sensu inquisitio circa corpora elementaria versari debet. (Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 90, n.1759)

86 Quod autem nulli corpori elementario substantia intellectualis unitur ut forma nisi humano, evidenter appareat: Si enim alteri corpori unitatur, aut unitur corpori mixto, aut simplici. Non autem potest uniri corpori mixto. Quia oportet illud corpus maxime esse aequalis complexionis, secundum suum genus, inter cetera corpora mixta: cum videamus tanto corpus mixtum nobiliores formas habere quanto magis ad temperamentum mixtionis pervenient; et sic, quod habet formam nobilissimam, utquae substantiam intellectualis, si sit corpus mixtum, oportet esse temperatissimum. Unde etiam videmus quod mollitieis carnis et bonitas tactus, quae aequalitatem complexionis demonstrant, sunt signa boni intellectus. Complexio autem maxime aequalis est complexio corporis humani. Oportet igitur, si substantia intellectualis unitur aliqui corpori mixto, quod illud sit eiusdem naturae cum corpore humano. Forma etiam eius
esset eiusdem naturae cum anima humana, si esset substantia intellectualis. Non igitur esset differentia secundum speciem inter illud animal et hominem. (Ibid., n. 1760)

87. Ibid., nn. 1761-1771.
Chapter II.

1. J. A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino, p. 185.

2. Summa Theologiae, I, 275, prologue.


5. Sic igitur per principia videtur intelligere causas moventes et agentes, in quibus maxime attenditur ordo processus causarum; per causas autem videtur intelligere causas formales et finales, a quibus maxime dependent res secundum suum essent et fieri; per elementa vero proprie primum causas materiales. Utitur autem istis nominibus disjunctis et non copulatis ad designandum quod non omnis scientia per omnes causas demonstratur. Nam mathematica non demonstrat nisi per causam formalem; metaphysica demonstrat per causam formalem et finalem praecipue, et etiam agentem; naturalis autem per omnes causas. Primum autem propositionem rationis inductae probat ex communio opinione, sicut et in libro Poster. quia tunc quilibet opinatur se cognoscere aliquid, cum scit omnes causas eius a primis usque ad ultimas. Nec oportet ut alter accipiamus hic causas et elementa et principia quam supra, ut Commentator vult, sed eodem modo. Dicit autem 'usque ad elementa', quia id quod est ultimum in cognitione est materiam. Nam materiâ est propter formam; forma autem est ab agente propter finem, nisi ipsa sit finis: ut puta dicimur quod propter secare serra habet dentes, et ferreos oportet eos esse ut sint apti ad secandum. (In VIII Physicorum (Leonine ed.), I, lect. i, n. 3.)

6. Sic ergo manifestum est quod ars quae inducit formam, praecipit arti quae facit vel disponit materiam; ars autem quae utitur artificiato iam facto, praecipit arti quae aducit formam. Ex quo possimus accipere quod sic se habet materiâ ad formam, sicut formam ad usum. Sed usus est cuius causa est artificiatum; ergo et forma est cuius causa est materiâ in artificialibus. Et sicut in his quae sunt secundum artem, nos facimus materiâ propter opus artis, quod est ipsum artificiatum; ita in naturalibus materiâ instat natura non a nobis facta, nihilominus eundem habemus ordinem ad formam, scilicet quod est propter formam. Unde sequitur quod eiusdem scientiae naturalis sit considerare materiam et formam.
... corum quae sunt ad aliquid, una est scientia. Sed materia est de numero eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, quia dicitur ad formam. Quod non ideo dicitur quasi ipsa materia sit in genere relationis, sed quod cui libet formae determinatur propria materia; et hoc est quod subdit, quod sub alia forma oportet esse aliam materiam. Unde relinquitur quod eiusdem scientiae naturalis sit considerare formam et materiam. (Ibid., II, lect.4, nn.6-9)

7 De anima, II, 4, 415b10-20.

8 Secundo ibi: manifestum est autem quod etiam cuius praeclaria etc., ostendit quod anima est causa ut finis. It quod sit causa ut finis uiueniun corporum, sic ostendit: sicut enim intellectus operatur propter finem, ita et natura, ut probatur in II Phisicorum; set intellectus in hiis qui fiunt per artem materiam ordinat et disponit propter formam; ergo et natura; cum iigitur anima sit forma uiuentis corporis, sequitur quod sit finis eius. (sententia libri De anima, II, 7, 188-196)

9 In IV Sent., d.49, q.1., a.1, ad 6; Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 22, 88-89; III, 75, 129.

10 cognoscentia a non cognoscentia in hoc distinguuntur, quia non cognoscentia nihil habent nisi formam suam tantum; sed cognoscens natus est habere formam etiam rei alterius, nam species cognitii est in cognoscente. Unde manifestum est quod natura rei non cognoscentis est magis coarctata et limitata; natura autem rerum cognoscentium habet maiorem amplitudinem et extensionem. Propter quod dicit Philosophus, III De an., quod "anima est quodammodo omnia". Coarctatio autem formae est per materiam. Unde et supra diximus quod formae, secundum quod sunt magis immateriaria, secundum hoc magis accedunt ad quandam infinitatem. Patet iigitur quod immaterialis alicuius rei est ratio quid sit cognoscitivum; et secundum modum immaterialitatis est modus cognitionis. (Summa Theologiae, I, 14, a.1, c.)

11 Quaedam enim cognoscitivâ virtus est actus organi corporalis, scilicet sensus. Et ideo obiectum cuiuslibet sensitivae potentiae est forma prout in materia corporali existit. It quia huiusmodi materia est individuationis principium, ideo omnis potentia sensitiva partis est cognoscitivâ particularium tantum. Quaedam autem virtus cognoscitiva est quae negque est actus organi corporalis, negque est aliqua modo corporali materiae coniuncta, sicut intellectus angelicus. Et ideo huius virtutis cognoscitivae obiectum est forma sine materia subsistens.... (Ibid., 4, 65, a.1, c.)

12 Cf. Summa Theologiae, II-II, 1167, a.2: respondendo dicendum quod cognitio sensitiva ordinatur ad duo. Uno enim modo, tam in hominibus quam in ellis animalibus, ordinatur ad corporis sustentationem, quia per huiusmodi cognitionis homines et ellin animalia vitam notiv, et conquirit ea quae sunt necessaria ad corporis sustentationem. Allo modo, specialiter in homine ordinatur ad cognitionem intellectivam, vel speculativam, vel practicam.

Cfr also Joseph de Jancine, Etre et Air, dans la Philosophie de saint Thomas (Je ed.) Nôme, 1965, p.273: "En fait, le chapitre de
la vie sensitive est un des plus délicats qui soient pour une philosophie intellectualiste, c'est-à-dire pour la philosophie tout court. C'est que cette activité est essentiellement subordonnée; nulle part elle ne revêt une valeur finale. Dans l'homme, le psychisme est, partiellement du moins, ordonné à l'acquisition des donées sensibles sur lesquelles l'intellect travaillera; chez l'animal, il n'existe qu'en vue des fins biologiques. L'ordre du sensible ne jouit donc pas d'une autonomie parfaite et ce serait une méthode décevante que de le juger en l'isolant de l'activité du sujet total; la vie sensitive est un entre-deux, qui n'est intelligible que par son rapport aux types d'activité entre lesquels elle se situe."

14 Summa Theologiae, I, Q.75, a.4.
15 Cf. the references in Sentencia libri De anima (Leonine ed.) p.149, n.
16 set uidetur quod aptitudo mentis magis respondeat bonitati uisus quam bonitati tactus, quia uisus est spiritualior sensus et plures differencias rerum demonstrat.
17 set dicendum est quod duplici ex causa bonitas mentis respondet bonitati tactus:
18 Prima ratio est quia tactus est fundamentum aliorum sensuum omnium: manifestum est enim quod organum tactus diffunditur per totum corpus et quolibet instrumentum sensus est etiam instrumentum tactus et id ex quo aliquid dicitur sensitium est sensu tactus; unde ex hoc quod aliquid habet meliorem tactum, sequitur quod simpliciter habeat meliorem sensitiuam naturam et per consequens quod sit melioris intellectus, nam bonitas sensus est dispositio ad bonitatem intellectus. Ex hoc autem quod aliquid habet meliorem uisum uel auditum, non sequitur quod sit melius sensitium simpliciter, set solum secundum quid.
19 Alia ratio est quia bonitas tactus sequitur bonitatem complexionis siue temperanciam: cum enim instrumentum tactus non possit esse denudatum a genero tantilium qualitatum eo quod est ex elementis compositum, operat quod sed sit in potencia ad extremam saltem per hoc quod est medium inter ea; ad bonam autem complexionem corporis sequitur nobilitas anime, quia omnis forma est proportionata sua materia. Unde sequitur quod qui sunt boni tactus, sunt nobilioris anime et perspicacioris mentis. (Sentencia libri De anima. II, cap. xix, 11.55-114)

17 Ibid., cap.xxvii, 11.55-65, 60-65.
18 The Functions of Touch (Laval University, 1964), p.94.
19 Ibid., p.95.
20. Such is the conclusion of A. A. Gauthier (Sentencia liber De anima (Leonine ed.); Introduction, p.269) and of B. C. Bazán ("Le commentaire de S. Thomas d'Aquin sur le Traité de l'âme. Un événement: l'édition critique de la commission léonine", Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 69 (1985), p.532) in opposition to an older view that the Quaestiones de anima is a later Parisian work.

21. Dicendum, quod secundum Philosophum in Iux Phisicorum, naturale dicitur dupliciter: uel id quod habet naturam, sicut diciimus corpora naturalia; uel id quod consequitur naturam, secundum naturam existens, sicut diciimus quod ferri sursum est naturale igni. Et sic loquimur nunc de naturali quod est secundum naturam. Vnde cum natura dicitur dupliciter, sicilicet forma et materia, dupliciter dicitur anliquid naturale, uel secundum formam uel secundum materiam. Secundum formam quidem, sicut naturalis est igni quod calefaciat, nam actio consequitur formam; secundum materiam autem, sicut aquae est naturale quod ab igni calefieri possit. Cumque forma sit magis natura quam materia, naturalius est quod est naturale secundum formam quam quod est naturale secundum materiam. (Quaestiones de malo (Leonine ed.), 4.5, a.5, li.157-173)

22. Sed id quod consequitur materiam dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo secundum quod congruit forme, et hoc est quod agentiens eligit in materia; alio modo non secundum quod congruit forme, immo forte repugnat et forme et fini, set est ex necessitate materiae, et talis conditio non est electa uel intenta ab agente. Sicuit artifex qui facit serram ad secundum, querit ferrum quia est materia apta ad formam serrae et ad finem eius propter suam duritiam. Invenitut tamen, in ferro aliquid conditio secundum quam ferrum non habet aptitudinem nec ad formam nec ad finem, sicut quod est frangibile, uel contrahens rubiginem, uel aliquid huiusmodi, quae sunt impeditiva finis: unde non sunt electa ab agente, set magis ad agente repudiarentur si esset possibile. Vnde etiam Philosophus dicit in XIX De animalibus quod in accidentibus individuidi non est querenda causa finalis, set solum causa materialis: proponunt enim ex dispositione materie, non ex intentione agentis. (Ibid., li.174-194)

23. 200a30-32.
24. 200a32-34.
25. 200b5-8.

26. Sic igitur homini est anliquid naturale secundum suam formam, ut intelligere, uelle, et alia huiusmodi; aliqua uero sunt ei naturalia secundum suam materiam, quod est corpus. Corporis autem humani conditio dupliciter considerari potest: uno modo secundum aptitudinem ad formam, alio modo secundum id quod consequitur in ipso secundum necessitatem materie tantum. (Quaestiones de malo, 4.5, a.5, li.194-203)

It should be noted that the dates of Quaestiones de malo (1270 and 1272, according to the Leonine edition, Preface, p.5) are slightly later than that of Quaestiones de anima (1268).
27. Dicendum quod cum materia sit propter formam et non e contrario, ex parte animae oportet aequiper ratione cuiusque debeat esse corpus cui unitur. Unde in II De anima dicitur quod anima non solum est corporis forma et motor sed etiam finis. (Quaestiones de anima, ed. J. H. Robb, Q.8, c.)

28. Sed quan tum ad aliquid differenter se habet in substantiis immaterialibus et materialibus. Ubicumque enim est, diversitas graduum, oportet quod gradus considerentur per ordinem ad aliquod principium unum. In substantiis igitur materialibus attenduntur diversi gradus specier diversificantes in ordine ad primum principium, quod est materia. Et inde est quod primae species sunt imperfectiores, posteriores vero perfectiores, et per additionem se habentes ad primas; sicut mixta corpora habent speciem perfectiori quam sint species elementorum, utpote habentes in se quicquid habent elementa et adhuc amplius. Unde similis est comparatio plantarum ad corpora mineralia et animalia ad plantas. (Ibid., Q.7, c.)

29. In substantiis vero immaterialibus ordem graduum diversarum specier attenditur, non quidem secundum comparationem ad materiam, quam non habent, sed secundum comparationem ad primum agens, quod oportet esse perfectissimum. Et ideo prima species in eis est perfectior secunda, utpote similior primo agenti, et secunda diminuitur a perfectione primae, et sic deinque usque ad ultimum earum. Summa autem perfectio primi agentis in hoc consistit, quod in uno simplici habet omnimodam bonitatem et perfectionem. Unde quanto aliqua substantia immaterialis fuerit primo agenti propinquior, tanto in sua natura simplici perfectiori habet bonitatem suam et minus indiget inhaerentibus formis ad sui completionem. Et hoc quidem gradatim producit usque ad animam humanam, quae in eis tenet ultimum gradum, sicut materia prima in genere rerum sensibilium. Unde in sua natura non habet perfeciones intelligibiles, sed est in potentia ad intelligibiliti, sicut materia prima ad formas sensibles. Unde ad propriam operationem indiget ut fiat in actu formarum intelligibilium, acquirendo eas per sensitivas potestias a rebus exterioribus. Et cum operatio sensus sit per organum corporale, ex ipsa conditione suae naturae competit ei quod corpori uniatur et quod sit pars speciei humani, non habens in se speciem completam. (Ibid.)

30. Est autem ex superius disputatis quaedamibus manifestum quod omnis ratione est animae humanae corporis unirii quia, cum sit infima in ordine intelligibilium substantiarum sicut materia prima est infima in ordine rerum sensibilium; non habet anima humana intelligibles species sibi naturaliter inditas, quibus in operationem propriam exire possit quae est intelligere, sicut habent superiores substantiae intellectuales, sed est in potentia ad eas, cum sit sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum, ut dicitur in II De anima. Unde oportet quod species intelligibiles a rebus exterioribus accipiat mediantibus potentiis sensitivis, quae sine corporeis organis operationes proprias habere non possunt. Unde et animam humanam necessario est corporis unirii. (Ibid., Q.8, c.)
A comparison of the corresponding sections of the two texts shows the argument of *Quaestiones de anima*, Q.8 to be much more complete and continuous:

St. I, Q.76, a.5

...Oportuit igitur anima intellectiva uniri,

quod possit esse conveniens organum sensus.

Omnès autem alii sensus fundantur supra tactum.

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Prof. B.C. Bazán has mentioned to me that in the Leonine edition of the *Quaestiones de anima* which he is preparing, recipiendum will be replaced by repraesentandum. This emendation is in keeping with St. Thomas' later teleological approach to the human body's specific character: the body is imperfectly adapted, not merely to "receiving" sensible species, but to "re-presenting" them to the intellect for the sake of the intellect's activity of abstraction.

...Unde et animam humanam necessitate est corpori uniri.

Si igitur propter hoc anima humana unibilis est corpori, quia indicet accipere species intelligibilis a rebus mediante sensu, necessarium est quod corpus cui anima rationalis unitur tale sit ut possit esse aptissimum ad recipiendum species sensibles ex quibus intellectui species intelligibles resultent. Sic igitur oportet corpus cui anima rationalis unitur esse optime dispositum ad sentiendum (first conclusion).

Sed cum plures sint sensus, unus tamen est qui fundamentum est allorum, scilicet tactus, in quo principaliter tota natura sensitiva consistit. Unde etiam in II De anima dicitur quod propter hunc sensum prima animal dicitur. Et inde est quod immunitatem hoc sensu, ut in somno accidit, omnès alii sensus immunitantur. Et iterum omnès alii sensus non solum solvuntur ab excellentia propriorum sensibilium, sicut visus a rebus multum fulgidis et auditus a maximissonis, sed etiam ab excellentia sensibilium secundum tactum, ut a forti calore vel frigore.

Cum igitur corpus cui anima rationalis unitur debet esse optime dispositum ad naturam sensitivam, necessarium est ut sit conveniuntissimum organum sensui tactus (second conclusion). Propter quod dicitur in II De anima quod hunc sensum habemus certiores inter omnia animalia, et quod propter bonitatem hujus sensus etiam unus homo alio est habilior ad intellectuales operationes. Molles enim carne, qui sunt boni tactus, aptos mente videamus. Cum autem organum
Ad organum autem tactus requiritur quod sit medium inter contraria quae sunt, calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum, et similia, quorum est tactus apprehensivus;

sic enim est in potentia ad contraria, et potest ea sentire. Unde quanta organum tactus fuerit magis reductum ad aequalitatem complexionis, tanto perceptibilior erit tactus. Anima autem intellectiva habet completissimam virtutem sensitivam; quia quod est inferioris praexistit perfectius in superiori, ut dicit Dionysius in libro De Div. Nom.

Unde oportuit corpus cui unitur anima intellectiva, esse corpus mixtum, inter omnia alia magis reductum ad aequalitatem complexionis.

It propter hoc homo inter omnia animalia melioris est tactus. It inter ipsos homines, qui sunt melioris tactorum, sunt melioris intellectus. Cuius signum est quod "molles carne bene aptos mentem videmus", ut dicitur in II De anima.
32 Cf. above, n. 5.

33 Si quis autem considerare velit etiam particulares humani corporis dispositiones, ad hoc inventum ordinatas ut homō sit optimi sensus. Unde, quia ad boram habitudinem potentiarum sensitivarrum interiorum, puta ut imaginationis et memoriae et cognitivae virtutis, necessaria est bona dispositio cerebrī; factus est enim homo habens majus cerebrum inter omnia animalia secundum proportionem sua quantitatus; et ut liberior sit ejus operatio, habet caput sursum positum; quia solum homo est animal rectum; alia vero animalia curva incedunt. Ut ad hanc rectitudinem habendam et conservandam necessaria fuit abundantia caloris in corde, per quam multi spiritus generarentur, ut per calorem abundantiorum spiritus, corpus possint in directum sustineri; cujus signum est quod in senio incurratur homo cum calor naturaliter debilitatur. Ut ad istum nodum ratio dispositionis humani corporis est assignanda quantum ad singula quae sunt hominis propria. (Questaiones de anima, Q. 8)

34 Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 35, a. 1, c.: Signum autem speciei ex rebus corporis maximè videtur esse figura; videmus enim quod diversorum animalium secundum speciem, sunt diversae figūrae, non autem diversi colors. Unde si depingatur color aliquis rei in pariete, non dicitur esse imago, nisi depingatur figura.

35 Dicendum quod habere staturam rectam conveniens fuit homini propter quatuor. Primo quidem, quia sensus sunt dati homini non solum ad vitæ necessaria procurandà, sicut aliis animalibus, sed etiam ad cognoscendum. Unde cum cetera animalia non destinentur in sensibilitibus nisi per ordinem ad cibos et veremara, solus homo destinentur in ipsa pulvinitudine sensibilium secundum seispam. It ideo quia sensus præcipue vigint in facie, alia animalia habent faciem pronam ad terram, quasi ad cibum quaerendum et providendum sibi de vitub; homo vero habet faciem erectam, ut per sensus, et præcipue per visum, qui est subtillior et plures differentiæ rerum ostendit, libere possit ex omnibus sensibus cognascere, et caelestiae et terrena, ut ex omnibus intelligibilem colligat veritatem. Secundo; ut interiores vires liberiæ suas operationes habeant, dum cerebrum, in quo quodammodo perficiuntur, non est depressum, sed super onisas partes corporis elevatum. Tertio, quia oportet quod si homo haberet pronam staturam, uteretur manibus loco anteriorum pedum. It sic utilitas manuum ad diversa opera perficienda cessaret. Quarto quia, si haberet pronam staturam, et uteretur manibus loco anteriorum pedum, oportet quod cibum caperet ore. Ita haberet os oblongum, et labia dura et grossa, et linguam etiam duram, ne ab exterioribus laederetur, sicut patet in aliis animalibus. It talis dispositio omnino impediret locutionem, quae est proprium opus rationis. (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 91, a. 3, ad 3)

36 Dicendum quod anima intellectiva, quia est universarium comprehensiva, habet virtutem ad infinita. It ideo non poterunt sibi determinari a natura vel determinatae existimationes naturales, vel etiam determinata auxilia vel defensionum vel tegumentorum; sicut aliis animalibus, quorum animae habent apprehensionem et virtutem.
ad aliquam particulariam determinata. Sed loco horum omnium, homo habet naturaliter rationem, et manus, quae sunt organa organorum, quia per ea homo potest sibi praeparare instrumenta infinitorum modorum, et ad infinitos effectus. (Summa Theologiae, I, Q.76, a.5, ad 4)

37 For a detailed discussion of the relationship between the human intellect and the human hands according to St. Thomas, see M. P. Santahdo, "La Inteligencia y las manos según Santo Tomás", in Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo settimo centenario (Atti del convegno internazionale, Roma/Napoli, 17-24 Aprile, 1974), V.7 "L'Uomo", pp. 400-417, which includes a bibliography on the subject (p.417).

38 Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato (Leonine ed.), Tr.I, cap.1, 11.201-293.

39 Deinde uero cum dicit: secundum accidens uero etc., manifestat quod auditus per accidens melior sit ad intellectum: ut dicit quod auditus multum confert ad prudentiam (et accipitur hic prudencia pro qualibet intellectiva cognitione, non solum prout est recta ratio agibilium, ut dicitur in VI Thicorum), set hoc per accidens, quia sermo qui est audibilis est causa addiscendi non per se, id est secundum ipsas sororum differentias, set per accidens, in quantum scilicet nominas ex quibus sermo, id est locutio, compositur, sunt similia, id est signa, intentionum intellectarum et per consequens rerum; et sic doctor docet discipulum in quantum per sermonem significat ei conceptionem sui intellectus. Ut homo potest (plus) cognoscere addiscendo, ad quod est utilis auditus quamuis per accidens, quam de se inueniendo, ad quod precipe est utilis uius; inde est quod inter privatos a nativitate utrolibet sensu, scilicet uisu et auditu, sapientiores sunt ceci, qui carent uisu, mutis et surdis, qui carent auditu. (Ibid., 11.273-293)

40 De rerimine principium ad regem Cypri (Tarietti ed.), I, cap.I, cf. the English translation by Gerald B. Phelan, St. Thomas Aquinas on Kingship to the King of Cyprus (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), pp.3-7. The latter quotes the passage from Avicenna's De anima which seems to be St. Thomas' source (pp.94-95). The view of man as a "political animal" originates in Aristotle's Politics, I, 2, 1253a8. On St. Thomas' description of man as a "social and political animal", see Edgar Scully, "The Place of the State in Society According to Thomas Aquinas", The Thomist 45 (1981), pp.407-429.

41 Aliis enim animalibus natura praeparavit cibum, tegumenta pilorum, defensionem, ut dentes, cornua, ungues, vel saltum velocitatem ad fugam. Homo autem institutus est nullo horum sibi a natura praeparato, sed loco omnium data est ei ratio, per quam sibi haec omnia officio manuum posset praeparare, ad quae omnia praeparanda unus homo non sufficit. Nam unus homo per se sufficienter vitae transigere non posset. Est igitur homini naturale, quod in societate multitum vivat. (De rerimine principium ad regem Cypri, I, cap.I)
42 Amplius: aliis animalibus insita est naturalis industria ad omnia ea, quae sunt eis utilia vel nociva, sicut ovis naturaliter aestimat lupum inimicum. Quaadem etiam animalia ex naturali industria cognoscunt aliquas herbas medicinales et alia eorum vitae necessaria. Homo autem hortum, quae sunt suae vitae necessaria, naturalem cognitionem habet solum in communi, quasi eo per rationem valente ex universalibus principiis ad cognitionem singulorum, quae necessaria sunt humanae vitae, pervenire. Non est autem possibile, quod unus homo ad omnia huiusmodi per suam rationem pertingat. Est igitur necessarium homini, quod in multitudine vivat, ut unus ab alio adiuvetur, et diversi diversis inveniendis per rationem occuparentur, puta una in medecina, alius in hoc, alius in alio. (Ibid.)

43 Hoc etiam evidentissime declaratur per hoc, quod est proprium hominis locutione uti, per quam unus homo alii suum conceptum totaliter potest exprimere. Alia quidem animalia exprimunt mutuo passiones suas in communi, ut canis in latratu iram, et alia animalia passiones suas diversis modis. igitur homo est communicativus alteri quam quodcumque aliud animal, quod gregale videtur, ut grus, formica et apis. Hoc ergo considerans Salomon in Ecclesiaste IV, 9, alt: et alius est esse duos quam unum. Habent enim emolumentum mutuae societatis. (Ibid.)

44 Sed tamen considerandum est quod in his quae sunt ex materia sunt quaedam dispositiones in ipsa materia, propter quae talis materia eligitur ad hanc formam; etiam sunt aliae quae consequuntur ex necessitate materiae, et non ex electione agentis; sicut ad faciendum serram artifex eligit duritiam in ferro, ut sit serra utilis ad secandum; sed quod acies ferri hebetari possit et fieri rujeosa, hoc accidit ex necessitate materiae. igitur enim artifex eligeret materiam ad quam hoc non consequeretur si possit inveniri, sed quia inveniri non potest propter huiusmodi defectus consequentes non praetermitterit ex huiusmodi materia convenienti factre opus. Igitur et in corpore humano continetur: quod enim taliter sit commixtum et secundum partes dispositionem sit conveniendissimum ad operationes sensivas est electum in hac materia a factore hominis. Sed quod hoc corpus sit corruptibile, fatigabile et huiusmodi defectus habeat, consequitur ex necessitate materiae. Necessa est enim quod corpus sit commixtum ex contrariis talibus subjacere defectibus. Nec potest obviar et hoc quod Deus potuit aliter facere; quia in institutione naturae non quaeritur quid Deus facere possit, sed quid habeat rerum natura ut fiat, secundum Augustinum Superior Genesim ad Litteram.

Sciendum tamen est quod in remedium hortum defectuum, Deus homini in sua institutione concludit auxilium justitiae originalis, per quam corpus esset omnino subditum animae quamdiu anima Deo subderetur; ita quod nec mori nec aliqua passio vel defectus homini accideret nisi prius anima separaretur a Deo. Sed per peccatum anima recedente a Deo, homo privatit est hoc beneficium et subjecet defectibus secundum quod natura materiae requirit. (Quesitones de anima, i, c. c.)
Cf. In II Sent., d.19, q.1, a.4; d.30, q.1; In III Sent., d.16, q.1, a.1; In IV Sent., Prol., d.4, q.2, a.1, qa 3; d.36, a.1, ad 2; d.44, q.3, a.1, qa 2; Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, 52; Summa Theologiae, I, q.97, a.1; I-II, q.85, a.6; II-II, q.164, a.1, ad 1; Compendium Theologiae, c.193; Quaestiones de veritate, q.24, a.9; Quaestiones de malo, q.5, a.5; In hom., cap.5, lect.3; In Hebr., cap.9, lect.5.

Vnde corpus congruens, tali anime fuit corpus ex contrariis compositum; quod autem sequitur ex necessitate materie quod sit corruptibile.

Sed secundum hanc conditionem non habet aptitudinem ad formam, set magis repugnantem ad formam. Et quidem omnis corruptio cuiuscumque rei naturalis non est secundum convenientiam ad formam. Nam cum forma sit principium essendi, corruptio, quae est uia ad non esse, opponitur ei; unde Philosophus dicit in II De cele et mundo quod corruptio senium, et omnis defectus, sunt contra naturam particularem huius rei determinata per formam, quamuis sint secundum naturam uniuersalem; cuius uirtute redicitur materia in actum cuisslibet forme ad quam est in potentia, et uno generato necesse est aliud corrupi. Set speciali modo corruptio prouenient ex necessitate materie est preter convenientiam huius forme quae est anima intellectua. Nam alie forme sunt corruptibilis saltem per accidentes, set anima intellectua non est corruptibilis nec per se nec per accidentes. Vnde si (in) natura iuenient potuisset aliquid corpus ex elementis compositum quod esset incorruptibile, proculdubio tale corpus esset conueniens anime secundum naturam. Sicut si posset imueniri ferrum infrangibile et rubiginem non contrahens, esse conuenientissima materia ad serram, et talem artifex quereret; set quia talis annieniri non potest, accipit quem potest, scilicet duram set frangibilem. Ut similiter, quia non potest annieniri corpus ex elementis compositum quod secundum naturam materie sit incorruptibile, aptatur naturaliter anime incorruptibilis corpus organicum licet corruptibile.

Set quia Deus, qui est hominis institutor, hanc necessitatem materie sua omnipotentia potuit prohibere ne in actum prodiret; eius uirtute collatam est homini ante peccatum ut a morte preseruaretur quocumque tali beneficio se reddidit peccando indignum; sicut et faber prestaret ferro ex quo operatur, si posset, quod numquam frangeretur.

Sic igitur mors et corruptio naturalis est homini secundum necessitatem materie, set secundum rationem forme esset ei conueniens immortalitas. Ad quam tamen prestandum natura principia non sufficiunt; set aptitud quidem naturalis ad eam conuenit homini secundum animam, complementum autem eius est ex supernaturali uirtute. Sicut Philosophus dicit in II Ethiconum quod habebus aptitudinem ad uirtutes morales ex natura, set perficiuntur in nobis per consuetudinem. Et in quantum immortalitas est nobis naturalis, mors et corruptio est nobis contra naturam. (Quaestiones de male, q.5, a.5, c., (Leonine ed.), ll.215-270; emphasis added)
Cf. Quaestiones de anima, 2.1, ad 5: Potest tamen aliter dica secundum sententiam fidei quod corpus humanum a principio aliquo modo incorruptibile constitutum est, et per peccatum necessitatem moriendi incurrit a qua iterum in resurrectione liberabitur. Unde per accidens est quod ad immortalitatem animae non pertinuit. (emphasis added)

Conclusion

PART TWO: THE INFLUENCE OF ST. THOMAS ON PETER OF AUVERGNE'S
QUÆSTIONES SUPER PARVA NATURALIA
All references to and quotations from Peter of Auvergne's *Quaestiones super Parva naturalia* in the following study are based on the edited text presented in Volume II. The following abbreviations are used for the three question-commentaries included under this title:

- QDS: *Quaestiones super De sensu et sensato*
- QDSM: *Quaestiones super De memoria et reminiscencia*
- QDSVM: *Quaestiones super De somno et vigilia*

Passages are quoted according to the enumeration of questions and lines in our edition in Volume II; e.g. QDS, q. 38, 12-14 = *quaestiones super De sensu et sensato*, question 38, lines 12 to 14.
INTRODUCTION

During the fifty years since E. Hocedez' pioneering articles on the life and works of Peter of Auvergne appeared, knowledge of Peter's writings and thought has progressed to a significant degree. While most of his works still remain in manuscript form, a number of the more important of them have been studied and, in some cases, partially edited. Apart from his early continuation of St. Thomas' unfinished commentary on the Politics and his later theological works (his quodlibetales), particular attention has been given to Peter's own philosophical writings, notably his question-commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics and Ethics. With respect to this last-mentioned group of works, the thought of Peter has been compared with that of St. Thomas on various points, and the result has been a clarification, as well as a qualification, of Ptolomy of Lucca's description of Peter as St. Thomas' "most faithful disciple". Peter, it seems, was quite familiar with many of St. Thomas' writings, and made use of them in composing his question-commentaries, though there are occasions on which he either disagrees with or misunderstands St. Thomas' teaching on a particular point.

The purpose of our edition of Peter's question-commentaries on the first three books of the Parva naturalia (see below, Volume II) is twofold: to contribute to this growing knowledge of Peter's works by presenting these previously unedited question-commentaries of his; and to document an instance of St. Thomas' influence on the Parisian faculty of arts in general, and on the work of Peter of Auvergne in particular. In the present study we shall examine the way in which these question-commentaries by Peter make use of the work of St. Thomas, and especially St. Thomas' own commentaries on the Parva
naturalia. It has been suggested by J. A. Weisheipl that St. Thomas composed his Aristotelian commentaries specifically for the Parisian masters of arts, who, confronted with the difficult task of teaching the works of Aristotle, needed a guide which would keep their teaching free both of philosophical error and of heresy. However this may be, it is certain, as we shall see, that when Peter of Auvergne came to comment on Aristotle's *De sensu et sensato* and *De memoria et reminiscencia*, he turned to St. Thomas' commentaries on these works for guidance. Peter's dependence on St. Thomas here, however, is somewhat more complicated than Weisheipl's hypothesis would suggest, since these question-commentaries also draw from other writings of St. Thomas, in particular his *Summa Theologiae*. From the point of view of St. Thomas' influence, then, what is interesting about these commentaries is the way in which a discussion of some minor philosophical writings by Aristotle becomes, for Peter, an occasion to present doctrines from St. Thomas' major theological work. The following study of Peter's question-commentaries on the *Parva naturalia* attempts to identify some important features of this complex relationship between Peter's philosophical activity and the thought of St. Thomas.

Let us begin by briefly outlining the historical context within which the *Parva naturalia* commentaries of both St. Thomas and Peter were composed. The rather undescrptive title "*Parva naturalia*," the collective name for the group of nine short writings on physiological topics which follow Aristotle's *De anima*, is said by Sir David Ross to have first been used by Peter of Auvergne's contemporary Giles of Rome "towards the end of the thirteenth century." In fact, the introduction to Peter's *De sensu* commentary, which may
be even earlier than the work of Giles, refers to these writings as *parvi libri naturales*, and again simply as *parvi libri*, phrases which are particularly striking as they do not occur in the passage from St. Thomas’ *De sensu* commentary on which Peter’s introduction heavily depends. The occurrence of the title in our text, then, is among the very first instances of what is today the standard name for this group of Aristotelian works. In the opening lines of the *De sensu et sensato*, Aristotle indicates that this series of treatises form a sequel to the discussion of the soul in the *De anima*, and that their subject is “the things common to soul and body” (16a1-5).

Along with the other writings of Aristotle, these *parvi libri* were transmitted to the Hellenistic and later to the Arabic intellectual worlds. Although their relative brevity and the specialized nature of their subject-matter left them somewhat overshadowed by Aristotle’s major works, they were occasionally the subject of important commentaries, most notably, from the point of view of the thirteenth century, in the *De sensu* commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 AD) and in the Compendium of the *Parva naturalia* (covering the *De sensu et sensato, De memoria et reminiscencia, De somno et vigilia* and *De longitudine et brevitate vitae*) by Averroes (1126-1198). In the Latin world, after a long period during which Aristotle was known only in his logical writings, a first Latin translation of the *Parva naturalia* was included among the Aristotelian translations of the twelfth century.

While the *Parva naturalia*, along with the *metaphysics*, were studied at Oxford from the beginning of the thirteenth century, their study at the University of Paris was hindered for half a century by official resistance to Aristotle’s writings. Although the prohibitions
of 1210, 1215 and 1231 against the reading (sectio) of Aristotle's works were directly aimed at such major works as the De anima, Physics and Metaphysics rather than the less controversial parvi libri naturales, the latter were no doubt affected by the confusion and suspicion arising from the general condemnation of the libri naturales. Nevertheless, we find the Parva naturalia, along with most of the Aristotelian corpus, listed in a plan of study drawn up at Paris around 1240. The Oxonian Roger Bacon, who was teaching in Paris during the 1240s, and who later claimed to have been the first to lecture on Aristotle there, has left a commentary on the De sensu et sensato which may date from this period.

The cloud of suspicion over Aristotle's libri naturales began to lift in 1252, when the English nation of the faculty of arts included the De anima in its official program of study. On March 19, 1255 the whole faculty issued a radically new plan of study comprising all the available writings of Aristotle; this program indicates that the De sensu et sensato was to be covered in six weeks, the De somno et vigilia in five weeks, and the De memoria et reminiscencia in two. The available instruments for study of the Parva naturalia were the vetus translatio, together with the Compendium of Averroes, which had been translated into Latin, perhaps by Michael Scot, in the earlier part of the century.

Between 1254 and 1260 St. Albert the Great was composing his paraphrases of the Parva naturalia, either in Germany or Italy. The young Thomas Aquinas immediately had St. Albert's De somno, and probably his De sensu and De memoria as well, copied out for his own use. During the 1260s new impetus was given to study of the Parva
naturale by William of Moerbeke's nova translation of Aristotle's text and his Latin translation of Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on the De sensu et sensato. These translations provided the basis for St. Thomas' commentaries on the De sensu and De memoria, which were composed at Paris in 1269. Peter of Auvergne's question-commentaries on the Parva naturalia, we have argued, were written over a decade later, sometime between 1272 and 1284. 12

A Peter's commentaries on the De sensu, De memoria and De somno were apparently delivered as magisterial lecture-courses in the Parisian Faculty of Arts. We have argued below that he covered the De sensu in fifteen to twenty teaching-sessions, and the De memoria, which he seems to have taught twice, in four and then six teaching-sessions - each "session" consisting of two to four quaestiones. 13 If he was following the university regulations of 1255, according to which six weeks were to be devoted to the De sensu and two weeks to the De memoria, this means that his teaching sessions were held two or three times a week. The 1255 statutes also indicate that the De somno et vigilia was to be covered in five weeks, apparently a disproportionately long period for a text of approximately the same length as the De memoria. However, the statutes seem to be using the title De somno et vigilia, as does St. Albert in his Aristotelian paraphrases, 14 to refer to all three of Aristotle's books on sleep and dreams - De somno et vigilia, De somniis and De prophetia in sommis. The ten quaestiones of Peter's De somno commentary, on the other hand, more correctly include only the first of these books under this title. Unlike the other two commentaries by Peter, the QDÌV has no introduction and very few indications of a division into lectiones, there is only a
single Aristotelian Lemma, at the beginning of Q.1, and the sole suggestion of a division into more than one teaching session occurs at the beginning of Q.8 (Quaeritur consequenter...). The De somno, then, was probably covered by Peter in two or three brief teaching sessions during the course of a single week.

On the one hand, then, Peter's commentaries have a modest aim, since their purpose is to introduce young students of arts, or beginners in philosophy, to certain minor works of Aristotle. On the other hand, Peter is conscious of joining an illustrious line of commentators on the Parva naturalia, including Alexander of Aphrodisias, Averroes, St. Albert and St. Thomas. However, while Peter refers to the first three of these authorities, his most important source, St. Thomas, is not once mentioned by name. Peter's youthful audience was thus probably unaware of one of the most significant aspects of these commentaries, namely, their "Thomistic" character. In the following pages, by contrast, we shall focus on this aspect of Peter's quaestiones.

Starting with the first and longest of the commentaries, the QDS, we shall first show how Peter draws from various writings of St. Thomas in constructing his introduction (I) and early quaestiones (II), and then consider two atypical passages in which he either digresses from the text of the De sensu or contradicts a Thomistic position (III). Finally, we shall consider the influence of St. Thomas on certain of the quaestiones in QDM (IV). Since St. Thomas wrote no commentary on the De somno, and since his influence is less marked in the last of Peter's commentaries than in the first two, we shall not examine the brief QDSV in any detail.
CHAPTER I. THE INTRODUCTION TO THE DE SENSU ET SENSATO.

The influence of St. Thomas on Peter's commentary on the De sensu et sensato can be detected at once in the introduction with which the QDS begins and which, in contrast to the questio format of the commentary proper, is written in continuous prose. In this chapter we shall show how the introduction is based on certain passages in St. Thomas' works, and in particular on the Introduction to St. Thomas' own commentary on the De sensu et sensato. Let us begin, then, by examining this Thomistic text.

Each of St. Thomas' twelve Aristotelian commentaries is prefaced by a brief introduction or "proem" which presents the work to be discussed to the reader. St. Thomas indicates the methodological distinction between the introduction and the commentary proper, as well as the purpose of the introduction, at the end of the introduction to his commentary on the De generatione et corruptione:

Hisigitur praebibatis ad demonstrandum intentionem
Aristotelis in hoc libro, accedendum est ad
expositionem eius. (Larietti ed., Pr., n.2)

The function of the introduction, then, is to prepare the way for the exposition of the text with some prescriptive considerations in which the intentio - i.e., the purpose or proposed subject-matter - of the book in hand is brought out. But while this identification of the intentio of the Aristotelian text is the central and indispensable feature of St. Thomas' proems, most of them also contain two other distinctive features which respectively introduce and complement the discussion of the intentio. The first of these is an opening epigrammatic statement, introduced by a phrase such as Sicut dictitur Philosophus in..., and taken from
some work of Aristotle other than the one being commented on, since this remark is generally somewhat obscure, it gives St. Thomas the occasion for a brief explanation which he uses to lead into a discussion of the subject of the work under consideration. The other feature which is present in most of the proems is the situation of the text to be discussed in relation to the works of Aristotle which precede or follow it. This procedure is concomitant, and in a sense identical, with the definition of the text's intentio, since it presupposes a precise correlation between the different Aristotelian books and the various sciences, and attempts to arrange these books in terms of their subject-matter in a justified "order of learning".

This procedure is also analogous to the technique of divisio textus within the commentary proper, for it assumes a perfect correspondence between the form and content of Aristotle's work, between its various parts and its different elements of meaning. (The proem as a whole also has its analogue within the commentary proper, since St. Thomas regularly introduces each unit of the text with a brief statement of its intentio.) In general, then, St. Thomas' proems have three characteristic elements: an introductory epigram or lemma which provides a point of departure; a subsequent definition of the intentio or subject-matter of the Aristotelian text to be discussed; and a location of this text in relation to other works of Aristotle. All three of these elements are present in the introduction to St. Thomas' commentary on the De sensu et sensato.

St. Thomas begins his commentary on the De sensu (Pr., 1-3) with a remark from the third book of the De anima (429b21-22): "just as things are separable from matter, so they are related to the
intellect". (sicur separabiles sunt res a materia, sic et que circa intellectum sunt; in his commentary on the De anima (III, 3, 224-225). St. Thomas paraphrases this remark as, sicut res sunt separabiles a materia, ita se habent ad intellectum. He at once goes on to explain this remark by saying that anything is intelligible insofar as it is separable from matter, so that things which are of their nature separate from matter are of themselves intelligible in actuality, while things which are abstracted by us from the conditions of matter are made intelligible in actuality by the light of our agent intellect (Pr. 3-8). The commentary begins, then, by establishing a correspondence between immateriality and intelligibility, and by indicating a distinction between immaterial things, which are intelligible of themselves, and material things, which are made intelligible by abstraction from material conditions. St. Thomas then goes on to argue that this correspondence between immateriality and intelligibility also serves to distinguish the different sciences. Because the habits of any power, he says, are specifically distinguished according to differentiation in the per se object of that power, it is necessary for the sciences, the habits by means of which the intellect is perfected, to be distinguished according to differentiation in that which is separable from matter (Pr., 9-14). In other words, because the object of the intellect, or the intelligible, is the immaterial, the distinction among the habits of the intellect, or the sciences, must correspond to distinctions within the immaterial as such. The correspondence between intelligibility and immateriality, together with the correspondence between habits and objects, thus implies a correspondence between the different sciences and different kinds of
immateriality. Therefore, St. Thomas continues, Aristotle, in the Metaphysics, distinguishes the genera of the sciences according to the different kinds of immateriality: those things which are separated from matter both in their being and in their intelligible nature (rationem) are the concern of the metaphysician; those things which are separated from matter in their intelligible nature, but not in their being, are the concern of the mathematician; and those things which include "sensible matter" in their intelligible nature are the concern of the natural scientist (Pr., 14-22). (By "sensible matter" St. Thomas means matter in general or "common matter", as opposed to the "individual" or "signate" matter which is a principle of individuation, 3 the object of natural science includes matter in its nature in a general way, but is abstracted from the individuating conditions of matter.) Note that this paraphrase of Aristotle reverses the order in which the three sciences are discussed in the Metaphysics (cf.1025b3-1026a32), and thus proceeds from metaphysics, the science whose object is immaterial even in its being, to natural science, whose object includes sensible matter even in its intelligible nature (ratio). This arrangement of the three basic Aristotelian sciences in order of the increasing materiality of their respective objects initiates a survey of the sciences within which St. Thomas will identify the subject-matter of the De sensu et sensato and situate this text among the writings of Aristotle.

St. Thomas now begins to narrow the scope of the discussion. Just as the different genera of the sciences are distinguished according to the fact that things are separable from matter in different ways, he says, so also in the individual sciences,
especially in natural science, the parts of a science are distinguished according to different kinds of separation from and concretion in matter. Now because universals are more separate from matter (universalia sunt magis a materia separata), therefore—in keeping with the progression from the less material to the more material—in natural science one proceeds from the universal to the less universal, as Aristotle says in the Physics. Thus Aristotle begins his teaching of natural science with those things which are most common to all natural things, namely, movement and the principles of movement, and then proceeds in other books, "by way of concretion or application" of the common principles, to certain determinate moveable things, some of which are living bodies (Pr. 23-27). St. Thomas' subdivision of natural science, then, continues the progression from the less material to the more material objects of the sciences, and arrives at "living bodies", the subject-matter which, in one of its aspects, is the concern of the De sensu et sensato.

With respect to living bodies, he continues, Aristotle proceeds in a similar manner—that is, from the immaterial to the material—dividing his consideration of them into three parts: first he considers the soul in itself, in a certain abstraction, as it were; secondly, he considers those things which pertain to the soul according to a certain concretion or application of it to the body; but in general, and thirdly he proceeds by applying all of the above to individual species of animals and plants, and determining what is proper to each species. According to St. Thomas, then, Aristotle's study of the living body proceeds from soul to body, and then from the general to the particular, thus further extending the gradual
progression from the less material to the more material objects of
the different sciences. The first consideration, St. Thomas says,
is contained in the De anima, and the third in Aristotle's works
on animals and plants; the intermediate consideration is contained in
the books which Aristotle wrote about certain matters which pertain
universally either to all animals, or to many genera of them, or even
to all living things. Our present purpose (intentio), St. Thomas
adds, is concerned with these latter books (Pr. 38-54). The De sensu
et sensato, then, is one of the books which consider the living
body not from the point of view of the soul in itself, nor from the
point of view of the different species of living things, but in terms
of some universal or common feature involved in the general
application of soul to body. As we may anticipate, the De sensu's
place among these books will be determined by the degree of materiality
of its subject-matter.

By way of introducing a principle of distinction among these
books, St. Thomas now recalls the four grades of living things which
were distinguished by Aristotle in the De anima—according to the
successive addition of powers of the soul: plants have only the
nutritive power; imperfect animals also have the power of sensation;
perfect animals have, in addition to these, the power of locomotion;
and men have all of these powers, together with the intellectual
power. (Although the appetitive power is a fifth kind of power, St.
Thomas adds, it does not constitute a fifth grade of living things,
because it always accompanies the sensitive power.) Now among these
powers which distinguish grades of living things, St. Thomas says,
the intellect is not the act of any part of the body, as is proved in
Book III of the *De anima*, thus it cannot be considered by means of the concretion or application of it to the body or to any bodily organ, for the greatest "concretion" of it is in the soul; and the greatest "abstraction" of it is in separate substances. All of the other powers mentioned, however, are acts of some part of the body, and therefore there can be a special study of them, by application of them to the body or to bodily organs, besides the study made of them in the *De anima*. Accordingly, St. Thomas distinguishes the books under consideration insofar as they deal with the application to the body of the nutritive, sensitive or locomotive powers: the *De morte et vita*, *De causis longitudinis et brevitatis vitae*, *De sanitate et erritudine* and *De nutritio et nutritiili* deal with the nutritive power, that is, with the living body as living; the *De causis motus animalium* and *De progresso animalium* deal with the power of locomotion; and the sensitive power is discussed in the *De sensu et sensato*, which, St. Thomas says, includes the *De memoria* as well as in the *De somno et vigilia*. With respect to this last group of books, St. Thomas explains that the *De sensu et sensato* deals with the act of the external sense-power; the *De memoria et reminiscencia* with the act of the internal sense-power, and the *De somno et vigilia* with the differentiation in the sense-power caused by sleep and waking (Ps. 55-113). If Thomas has now identified the subject-matter of the *De sensu et sensato*, all that remains is to explain its place among these books dealing with the application of the soul's powers to the body.

The principle of order which he now introduces is that one should proceed through what is more similar to what is dissimilar.
(omitteret per mares aemilia ad dissimilia transire). Within the context of the proem as a whole, this principle seems to indicate that, in keeping with the general ordering of the sciences on the basis of the increasing materiality of their objects, one should proceed gradually, in "applying" the powers of the soul to the body, from those powers which involve the body to a lesser degree to those which involve it to a greater degree. Thus St. Thomas says that the reasonable order of these books seems to be such that immediately after the De anima, in which the soul in itself is discussed, there follows the De sensu et sensato, because the act of sensing itself pertains more to the soul than to the body (esse sentire maius ad animam quam ad corpus pertinet); after this should be placed the De somno et vigilia; since sleep and waking involve the binding and freeing of the sense-power; then follow the books which pertain to the power of locomotion; and at the end are placed the books which pertain to the general consideration of the living being, because this consideration, most of all, involves the disposition of the body (ista consideratio maxime concernit corporis dispositionem). (Pr. 114=127). These books, then, are to be ordered on the basis of the increasing materiality of the sense-power, the locomotive power and the nutritive power; and the De sensu et sensato, which treats of the application to the body of the soul's sense-power, is thus the first of these books, as well as the immediate sequel to the consideration of the soul "in itself" in the De anima. Having introduced the De sensu by explaining its subject-matter and its place among Aristotle's writings, St. Thomas now proceeds to the commentary proper, that is, to the division and exposition of the text itself.
St. Thomas' introduction to the De sensu et sensato, then, proceeds in a single, continuous development from the opening epigram from the De anima to the subject matter of the De sensu and its place among the works of Aristotle. The guiding principle of this development is the correspondence between immateriality and intellibility suggested by the epigram. Applying this correspondence to the different sciences and moving from the less material to the more material objects of the various sciences, St. Thomas proceeds first to the object of natural science, then to the general application of soul to body, and finally to the physiology of the act of the sense-power, a subject whose degree of immateriality places it immediately after the subject of the De anima in an orderly arrangement of the sciences. The striking unity of this passage—what J. Restuclière calls "le ferme dessein de tout ordonner sous un principe unique"—clearly derives from the subordination of the whole discussion to the opening quotation from the De anima. In light of this procedure, it is interesting to compare this proem with the proem of St. Thomas' Physics commentary, a text which covers much the same ground, but takes a somewhat different approach.

St. Thomas does not begin the Physics commentary with an Aristotelian epigram, but instead at once asserts that because the Physics is the first of the books of natural science, one should begin by indicating the "matter and subject" of natural science. With this allusion to the correspondence between the subjects and the ordering of Aristotle's works, he then proceeds to a discussion of the distinction of the sciences. In the De sensu proem, St. Thomas bases his division of the sciences on the single principle
of the correspondence between immateriality and intelligibility. Here, by contrast, he mentions two distinct principles for the division. The first of these is similar to the principle in the De sensu poem: since every science is present in the intellect, and since anything is made intelligible in actuality by being abstracted from matter in some way, things belong to different sciences insofar as they are related to matter in different ways. The second principle, however, which is based on the Posterior Analytica, makes no explicit reference to immateriality or abstraction: since every science is possessed by means of demonstration, and since the middle term of demonstration is a definition, the sciences are differentiated according to different kinds of definition. With these two principles established, St. Thomas proceeds to a division of the sciences.

There are some things, he says, whose being depends on matter and which cannot be defined without matter. Others, however, have their being in "sensible matter", but do not include such matter in their definition. (These first two kinds of things, he explains, differ as do the "vulgar" and the "curved".) A third kind of thing does not depend on matter either in its being or in its intelligible nature (rationem), whether because it is never present in matter (for instance, God and the other separate substances), or because it is not always present in matter (for instance, substance, potentiality, actuality and being itself). Note that in discussing this last kind of thing, St. Thomas substitutes ratio for definitio, indicating that the two terms are equivalent. Metaphysics, then, deals with this last kind of thing, mathematics with things
which depend on sensible matter in their being but not in their intelligible nature, and natural science or physics—things which depend on matter not only in their being, but also in their intelligible nature. With some differences in detail, then, the Physics proem, like the De sensu proem, begins by establishing the threefold division of the sciences taken from Aristotle's Metaphysics.

Having isolated the subject of natural science in a general way, St. Thomas now goes on to describe it more precisely; because everything which contains matter is mobile, he says, the subject of natural philosophy is mobile being (ens mobile); furthermore, natural science deals with natural things; that is, things which have a nature, or an intrinsic principle of movement and rest. The subject of natural science as a whole, then, may be described in three ways: as that which includes matter both in its being and in its definition or intelligible nature; as mobile being; and as that which has an intrinsic principle of movement and rest. In order to define the subject-matter of the Physics in particular, St. Thomas must now show how this general subject is subdivided by the different Aristotelian books or sciences.

As in the De sensu proem, St. Thomas here explains the progression from the Physics to the subsequent books of natural philosophy as a progression from the general to the particular. But whereas in the De sensu proem this progression was presented as a continuation of the overall progression from the immaterial to the material (because universals are "less material" than particulars), here St. Thomas gives a pedagogical reason for the division of the books of natural philosophy. That which is common to the whole of
a subject, he suggests, must be considered first and separately, in order to avoid frequent repetition in treating of its different parts. It is necessary, therefore, for natural science to be introduced by a book which treats of what belongs to mobile being in general (de iis quae consequuntur ens mobile in communi), just as all of the sciences are introduced by first philosophy, which treats of what belongs to being as being in general. The subject of the Physics, then, is "mobile being as such" (ens mobile simpliciter).

In the De sensu proem, St. Thomas states that Aristotle begins natural science with what is common to all natural things, and then proceeds to "certain determinate mobile things, some of which are living bodies". Between the consideration of mobile being in general and the consideration of living beings, however, Aristotle treats of a number of subjects which are noted in greater detail in the Physics proem. After the book which treats of mobile being in general, he says, there follow the other books of natural science, which treat of "the species of mobile things" (de speciebus mobilium): the De caelo deals with that which is mobile according to local movement, which is the first species of movement; the De generatione deals with movement towards form, and also with the primary mobile things, the elements, but with respect to their transmutations in general only; the Meteorologica deals with the transmutations of the elements in particular; the De mineralibus with inanimate mixed mobile things; and the De anima "and subsequent books" with animate things. These last-mentioned books subsequent to the De anima are, of course, the principal concern of the De sensu proem. Instead of the progression from the immaterial to the material which guides the
De sensu proem, then, St. Thomas here seems to follow a principle of increasing complexity, proceeding from the first to the subsequent species of movement, from simple to mixed bodies, and from the inanimate to the animate. With this outline of the books of Aristotle's natural philosophy, St. Thomas concludes the proem to the Physics and turns to his exposition of the text.

The proems of St. Thomas' Physics and De sensu commentaries evidently share a great similarity: both of them begin with the relation between immateriality and intelligibility, then turn to the Aristotelian threefold division of the sciences, and finally proceed to a survey of natural science, distinguishing the Physics from the subsequent books of Aristotle's natural philosophy. On the other hand, while the De sensu proem is characterized by a unity which derives from its continuous development of the correspondence between immateriality and intelligibility, the Physics proem proceeds by introducing additional considerations, such as the need for distinguishing the sciences according to the different kinds of definition, and the need to avoid repetition in the treatment of a subject. From another point of view, however, the two texts are complementary, since in their respective surveys of natural science, only the Physics' proem discusses the books between the Physics and the De anima, while only the De sensu proem discusses the books subsequent to the De anima. In turning now to the introduction to Peter of Auvergne's De sensu commentary, we shall note that Peter has observed and exploited this complementarity between St. Thomas' two proems.
In undertaking to comment on Aristotle's De sensu et sensato, Peter of Auvergne's first step was apparently to consult the corresponding commentary by St. Thomas and to compose an introduction based on St. Thomas' proem. Nevertheless, his introduction does not slavishly follow St. Thomas' proem, but rather improvises upon it. To start with, it reverses the procedure of St. Thomas opening remarks, beginning with the threefold division of the sciences, and only then going on to explain this division. As the Philosopher says in the sixth book of the Metaphysics, Peter says, with a typically Thomistic opening, there are three speculative sciences: divine science is concerned with things abstracted (from matter) according to their being and the consideration of them (considerationem); mathematics is concerned with things abstracted according to their consideration, but "united" (coniunctus) according to their being; and natural science is concerned with things united with sensible matter according to their being and consideration, but abstracted from signate and individual matter (de coniunctis secundum esse et considerationem cum materia sensibilia, abstractis tamen a materia signata et individuali) (Intr., 4-11). Peter's presentation of this division differs from that of St. Thomas in a number of points: he describes metaphysics as "divine science" (divina); instead of the ratio or "intelligible nature" of a thing, he speaks of its consideration; and he explicitly mentions that it is "signate and individual" matter, as opposed to "sensible" matter, from which the object of natural science is abstracted. It seems likely that Peter knows of this distinction between signate or individual matter and common sensible matter from other writings of St. Thomas, perhaps
De ente et essentia, II or summa Theologiae, I, c.8, a.1, ad 2.

In any case, Peter's wide familiarity with the works of St. Thomas will become evident as we proceed through the commentary.

Peter now goes on to state that the reason for this division of sciences is twofold. First of all, a science is like a certain habit and potentiality, he says. Now a potentiality is divided according to its acts, and acts according to their objects. Thus, since the objects of the sciences are "things knowable" (scibilia), the sciences are distinguished according to the diversity of knowable things. But things are knowable insofar as they are intelligible, and as is said in the third book of the De anima, things are intelligible insofar as they are separable from matter. Thus, some things are separate from sensible matter in their being and consideration, some in their consideration but not in their being, and some are separate (even in their consideration) from sensitive and individual matter only, since each of these is understood in a different way, they are objects of different sciences (Intr., 12-26). Thus first reason for the division of sciences, based on the correspondence between habits and objects, as well as the correspondence, taken from the De anima, between immateriality and intelligibility, is clearly based on the opening of St. Thomas' De sensu proem.

The second reason for the division of sciences given by Peter is that, as Aristotle says in the Posterior Analytics, definition is a principle of demonstration, which is the cause of science, so that definition is a principle of science itself. Thus, there are different sciences according to the different kinds of definition: things which are absolutely (simpliciter) separated from matter do
not include matter in their definition; things which are separated from matter only according to their consideration include in their definition "intelligible", but not sensible matter; and things which are separated only from individual and signate matter include common sensible matter in their definition. Because of these different kinds of definition, there are different sciences of each of these kinds of things (Intr., 26-39). In discussing this second reason, Peter seems to have turned to St. Thomas' Physics proem, which also gives as a second principle of the division of sciences the distinction among different kinds of definition. However, Peter explicitly mentions, as the Physics proem does not, that the remark that definition is a principle of demonstration comes from Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Peter, it seems, is very conscious both of St. Thomas' various works and of the Aristotelian sources used by him. Peter's reference to the "intelligible matter" which forms part of the subject of mathematics may be taken either from St. Thomas or from Aristotle himself.

In the same way that these sciences are diversified according to the diversity in abstraction from and concretion in matter, Peter continues, so the parts of natural science are diversified insofar as natural things are diversely related to matter. Now since things which are more universal are more abstract, natural science begins with natural things in general: (de ipsis naturalibus in communi); for, as Aristotle says in the Physics, one should begin with what is more universal. Here Peter is obviously following the procedure of St. Thomas' De sensu proem. In going on to describe the subject of the Physics as "the principles of mobile beings", absolutely
considered (*de principiis entium mobilium absolute*), however, he seems to be drawing once again on St. Thomas' *Physica* poem. Then, apparently turning back to the *De sensu* poem, he adds that after the *Physica* Aristotle proceeds by applying these universal principles to particular mobile beings (Intr., 40-51).

At this point, as we have seen, St. Thomas' *De sensu* poem quickly jumps to Aristotle's biological writings and the consideration of living beings. Peter, clearly wishing to present a more thorough account of the books between the *Physica* and the *De anima*, turns back to the *Physica* poem for a description of these books: the *De caelo*, he says, deals with things mobile with respect to place; the *De generatione* is concerned with things mobile with respect to form, with generation and corruption in general, and with the generation of the primary bodies; and the *meteorologica* treats of mobile things in greater particularity (*mobilia maxis in speciali*). Then, apparently dissatisfied with this somewhat vague description of the subject of the *meteorologica*, Peter turns to the poem of St. Thomas' commentary on the *meteorologica* itself for a brief catalogue of the matters treated in this work: the generation of comets, the galaxy, and "impressions generated on high" (Intr., 51-59). This brief use of yet a third poem from St. Thomas' Aristotelian commentaries underlines the fact that Peter is very familiar with St. Thomas' various writings.

Peter then proceeds to the "application" of the general principles of natural philosophy to living beings, and the discussion of the biological treatises which constitutes the remainder of his introduction seems to be almost entirely based on the corresponding
section of St. Thomas' De sensu proem. In keeping with the progression from the universal to the particular, the De anima considers what is common to all living things, namely, the soul and its powers, while the treatises on animals consider what is proper to individual species. Between these two considerations there is another consideration, which deals with some of the general features of the union of soul and body. It is with this intermediate consideration that Aristotle is concerned in those works which Peter, unlike Thomas, refers to as the parvi libri naturalès. Peter then follows St. Thomas in ordering these books on the basis of the De anima's fourfold division of living beings, and finally makes his own St. Thomas' central point, which is that, within the all-embracing scheme of the speculative sciences governed by the principle of degrees of separation from matter, the subject of Aristotle's De sensu places this work immediately after the De anima, since the act of sensing pertains more to the soul than to the body (sentiente magis consecuitur animam quam corpus). (Intr., 60-126) With a number of minor variations, this latter part of Peter's introduction follows St. Thomas' proem closely, and in places literally.

Towards the end of the introduction, at the point where St. Thomas turns from his próem to his divisio textus, Peter adds a few words on the twofold intention of the De sensu:

Apparet igitur quae est intentio in libro isto, quia hic docet quals instrumenta et qualiter disposita requiruntur ad operationem sentiendi. Item, hic determinatur de unoquoque sensibili secundum se: quid sit color, sapor, etcetera. (Int., 127-32)

The first of these sentences appears to be based on a later passage in the opening chapter of St. Thomas' De sensu commentary, and the second on a passage in chapter 5. Moreover, taken together, they
closely correspond to one of the central divisions of St. Thomas' commentary, which is found in chapter 2. Thus, while remaining dependent on St. Thomas, Peter is not simply following the sequence of St. Thomas' commentary, but demonstrates, besides his knowledge of St. Thomas' other works, an intelligent grasp of St. Thomas' *De sensu* commentary as a whole.

The introduction of Peter's *De sensu* commentary, then, shows a close dependence on the corresponding commentary of St. Thomas, but also a knowledge of other texts of St. Thomas and of the Aristotelian background of the discussion. Without mentioning St. Thomas by name, Peter seems to look to him for constant guidance in composing his own commentary on the *De sensu*. We now turn to Peter's questions on Aristotle's text in order to see how far this initial impression is borne out in the commentary proper.
CHAPTER II. STRUCTURE AND METHOD OF THE QUAESTiones

The body of Peter's commentary on the De senso consists of fifty-six quaestiones. Beginning at 1.3, the text is periodically punctuated by a series of underlined lemmata, each of which indicates the first few words of the section from the De senso on which the following group of quaestiones is to be based. These quotations from the text differ somewhat from the corresponding sections of the nova translatio presented in the Leonine edition of St. Thomas De senso commentary, and they may therefore indicate that Peter is using the older translation. These lemmata, of which there are twelve, thus divide the text into thirteen sections: an opening section consisting of the introduction and the first two quaestiones and twelve lectiones, or sections in which the text of the De senso is discussed. These thirteen sections are of varying length. Qq.31-43, for example, fall under a single lemma, while 4.1-4 seems to constitute a lectio by itself. However, further indications for dividing the commentary, indicating teaching sessions of comparable length, may be found in the prefatory remarks which occasionally introduce a quaestio and link it with the preceding or following quaestiones. While these indications, which are outlined on the following page, do not give a perfectly complete division of the commentary, they do suggest that the following quaestiones were grouped together in single teaching sessions: Qq.24-26, 27-30, 31-33, 34-36, 37-40, 41-43 and 47-48. A single teaching session, then, would normally consist of two to four quaestiones, and the whole series probably took fifteen to twenty sessions. If Peter was following the university regulations of 1255, according to which
1.1 Et sunt quaedam communia quaerenda...

1.4 Quoniam autem de anima secundum seipsum determinatum est... (436a1)

1.9-10 Sed de sensu et sentire quid sit, etc. (436b8-9)

1.13 Secundum est utrum...

1.15 In dubius autem fieri habent corporis instrumenti... (437a19-20)

1.43 Utrum...

1.48 Secundo, utrum... (Q.17)

1.73 Tertio, utrum... (Q.18)

1.78 Quarto, utrum... (Q.19)

1.20 De sensibilibus autem quae sunt, etc. (439a6)

2.4 De aliis autem coloribus... (439b18)

2.27 In qua sunt hic quaerenda.

3.2 Primum est utrum...

3.11 Post,..., utrum... (Q.25)

3.20 Tertio, utrum... (Q.26)

2.34 Primum quaeritur utrum...

2.36 Quarto, quaeritur utrum...

2.38 Quinto, quaeritur utrum...

2.39 Sexto, quaeritur utrum...

2.37 Gratia praedictorum, quaeritur utrum...

3.38 Gratia hujus, quaeritur utrum...

4.41 Circa praecedentia sunt alia quae quaedam quaerenda...

4.44 Consequentem quaeritur de odores.

4.47 Hunc vero modum oportet intelligere de odoribus... (442b27)

4.47 Primo quaeritur utrum...

2.47 Quae autem consequenter de sectione praecedentis.

2.48 Quae autem non respirant... (444b7)

2.49 Utrum...

2.46 Secundum est utrum... (Q.48)

2.49 Coeli est autem arctius eiusque orbis in infinitum... (445b3)

2.51 Adhec de praeecedentibus...

2.54 Est autem objectio quaedam et alia talis... (447a12)

2.55 De prius autem dicta opinion... (448b17)
Six weeks were to be devoted to the *De senectu*; his teaching sessions were probably held two or three times a week.

The method of the question-commentary, which became popular among Parisian masters of arts in the second half of the thirteenth century, must be understood in the context of the development of scholastic teaching methods. The twelfth-century procedure of the lectio, which had involved the reading, division and exposition of an authoritative text, seems to have given rise to the quaestio, in which different views were brought to bear on some doubtful point arising from the text. The quaestio was then gradually separated from the context of the lectio and developed into the independent disputatio, in which a question was proposed for debate and a number of participants carried out an extended exchange of arguments and rebuttals before the master gave his determination of the question. The oral disputatio also served as a model for many purely literary works, such as St. Thomas' *Summa theologica*, each article of which enacts a fictitious disputatio. Then, from sometime in the 1260s, we begin to find question-commentaries, in which the quaestio, now somewhat simplified and returned to the context of the lectio, or reading of a text, either is combined with a literal commentary (*sententiae cum quaestionibus*), or, as in the case of Peter's commentaries, itself becomes the major element of the commentary. In effect, the question-commentary extended the method used by bachelors of theology in commenting on the *book of sentences* to commentaries on other works, particularly the texts of Aristotle; the commentator discussed his text by contriving and resolving a number of questions arising from it. Like the literal
commentary or paraphrase, then, the question-commentary was guided by the text of the author; unlike them, however, it was not compelled to give a continuous and exhaustive account of the text as a whole. The format of "selected questions" seems to have been intended rather to focus attention on the difficult points of the text, though the commentator's freedom to choose his questions also permitted his own philosophical interests to play a determining role in the subject-matter of the discussion. The procedure, then, was a flexible one, allowing the commentator to remain close to his text if he so desired, but also to digress into discussions only tangentially related to Aristotle's text if there were some contemporary issue he wished to address. In the following chapter, we shall see how Peter makes just such a digression in the middle of his De sensu commentary.

The many Aristotelian references in Peter's commentary apparently come from his direct and extensive knowledge of Aristotle rather than from any intermediate source, and the inexactness of some of these references may indicate that he is quoting Aristotle from memory. Apart from the De sensu itself and the frequently mentioned De anima, the following works are referred to at least once: Physics, De generatione et corruptione, Metaphysics and Ethics. Now although Peter's frequent references to Aristotle give the impression that his method is simply to explain the De sensu in the light of Aristotle's other writings, with occasional references to such other authors as Averroes, Alexander of Aphrodisias and St. Albert, this impression is extremely misleading, since Peter's most important authority is not Aristotle at all, but rather St. Thomas.
The introduction to Peter's commentary is followed by two general questions (quaedam generalia: q.1,3), one on a topic arising from the introduction (q.1) and one on the distinctiveness of the science treated in the de sensu (q.2). Here Peter shows a brief independence from St. Thomas, apparently relying on his own knowledge of Aristotle for the solution of these introductory questions. With q.3, however, where the first Aristotelian lemma appears and the discussion of the text begins, Peter returns to St. Thomas' de sensu commentary for guidance, and in making his way through the de sensu from q.3 to q.36, he evidently still has St. Thomas' commentary at his side. His standard practice is to note points of difficulty in Aristotle's text and then turn to St. Thomas' commentary for help in explaining these points, composing his quaestiones with the arguments, and often the very words, of St. Thomas' commentary. To Peter's immediate audience, which was presumably ignorant of St. Thomas' writings, the result would appear to be a direct and original discussion of the Aristotelian text; to us, on the other hand, the commentary often reads like a series of brief excerpts from St. Thomas' de sensu commentary. In fact, the commentary frequently presents the Aristotelian text through the double filter of Peter's selection of difficult points and St. Thomas' explanation of these points. A good illustration of this procedure may be seen in q.3-4, the first of the quaestiones concerned with the precise meaning of the Aristotelian text.

According to St. Thomas' commentary (Pr., 128-160), the de sensu begins with an introduction in which Aristotle first states
his purpose — namely, to consider the powers of the soul from the point of view of the body — and then goes on to show the need for this consideration, with respect to this second point — still according to St. Thomas (Pr., 161-182) — Aristotle first announces that he intends to deal with what is common to soul and body, and then enumerates the things with which he is concerned. Aristotle's list of the things common to soul and body begins as follows:

Sensus et memoria, et ira et desiderium et animo appetitus, et cum his gaudium et tristicia; et enim nescire insipient omnibus animalibus... (A364a8-11)

The things with which Aristotle is concerned, then, include sense, memory, anger, desire, appetite in general, joy, and sorrow; these "in general" (fere), Aristotle adds, are present in all animals. Since this passage contains the first textual difficulty addressed by Peter, and the first occasion for him to consult St. Thomas' exposition, let us consider St. Thomas' account of the passage before turning to Peter's 42.3-4.

St. Thomas treats of this passage with his customary thoroughness (Pr., 162-249), providing a justification and a context for Aristotle's catalogue of the things common to soul and body. First of all, he sets the enumeration within the framework of the different genera of the soul's powers, which he has already discussed in his introduction (Pr., 55-67). Aristotle begins, he says, with the things which pertain to the sensitive power, namely, "sense" (i.e., the external sense-powers) and "memory". Against the background of St. Thomas' own account of the sense-powers (cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q.78, a.3-4), however, this enumeration seems to be incomplete, since there are, besides memory, other internal sense-powers. He
thus goes on to explain this apparent omission, saying that Aristotle makes no mention of the other sense-powers, such as imagination and the estimative power, because these are not distinguished from the external sense-powers from the point of view of the thing known, since their objects are present things, or at least things considered as present; memory, on the other hand, is distinguished from the external sense-powers by the fact that its object is what is past as such.

In the second place, according to St. Thomas, Aristotle proceeds to what pertains to the power of movement. Now the principle of movement in animals, St. Thomas explains, is closely related (proinquum) to the sensitive appetite, which, as the De anima says, is divided into two powers, namely, the irascible and the concupiscible powers. Accordingly, Aristotle mentions "anger" and "desire", two passions which indicate the irascible and concupiscible powers respectively. Then, because there are other passions which pertain to the appetitive power, Aristotle adds "and appetite in general", in order to include everything which pertains to the appetitive power. Furthermore, because, as is said in the Ethics, joy or sorrow follow on all of the passions, whether of the concupiscible or the irascible power, therefore Aristotle adds "joy and sorrow", as if to indicate the ultimate passions. Thus drawing on other Aristotelian texts, St. Thomas introduces an order and context into Aristotle's apparently casual enumeration.

St. Thomas now comes to Aristotle's remark that these things "in general" are present in all animals. This remark clearly calls for some explanation from the commentator, since it suggests that
at least one of the things mentioned belongs
to only some animals, but does not specify which of the things is
meant. St. Thomas obliges with a clarification: Aristotle says
"in general", he explains, because most of the things mentioned,
namely, sense, desire, anger, joy and sorrow, are present in all
animals, the perfect as well as the imperfect; for even imperfect
animals—those which have only the sense of touch—have, in an
indeterminate way, imagination, desire, joy and sorrow, and movement.
Memory and anger, however, are not found in the imperfect animals
at all, but only in the perfect animals. St. Thomas then goes on
to give the reason for this, in a small but important digression from
his literal exposition of Aristotle's text.

In order to explain this difference between perfect and
imperfect animals, St. Thomas begins with a neoplatonic principle,
the so-called "axiom of continuity":

Cuius ratio est quia non omnia quae sunt inferioris generis,
set solum suprema et perfectione pertingunt ad aliquam
participationem similitudinis eius quod est proprium
superiori generis. (Pr., 222-225)

"only the highest of a lower genus achieves some participation of
likeness in that which is proper to a higher genus." This axiom,
which is based on a remark in Dionysius' De Divinis Nominibus, is
very common in St. Thomas' writings, from his Sententiae commentary
onwards. Its application here in the De sensu commentary is to the
two genera, sensitive and intellectual beings. Intellect or
reason, says St. Thomas, is concerned with universals, which are
everywhere and always (ubiue et semper), while the sense-power is
directed to singuliers, which are here and now (hic et nunc). Thus
the sense-power, according to its proper nature, is only cognitive.
of things present, and if there is some power of the sensitive part which extends to things not present, this is due to a participation of likeness (similitudinariam participationem) by the sense-power in reason or intellect. Memory, therefore, which is cognitive of things past, belongs only to the perfect animals, being, as it were, the highest point of sensitive cognition (utbote supremum quiddam in cognitione sensitiva). Similarly, the sensitive appetite which follows from the sense-power is, according to its proper nature, directed to what is pleasurable to the sense-power, and this is proper to the concupiscible power, which is common to all animals. But the fact that an animal may tend, through appetite, towards something laborious, such as fighting, means that it has something resembling the rational appetite, to which it is proper to desire some things for the sake of an end which are not of themselves desirable. Therefore anger, which is the appetite for revenge, belongs only to the perfect animals, because of a certain approximation (approximationem) to the genus of rational beings in them.

Thus both memory among the sense-powers and anger among the sense-appetites are instances of the general principle that the highest of a lower genus participates in a likeness of a higher genus. The resemblance of memory to the intellect, and of anger to the rational appetite, explains why memory and anger are found only in the perfect animals. St. Thomas' explanation of the term fere in Aristotle's text has led him into a Neoplatonic discussion which seems to be far removed from the De Sensu itself. Let us now see how Peter of Auvergne makes use of this discussion.
In his reading of the De sensu, the first difficulty encountered by Peter is apparently the remark in the passage quoted above that the things which are mentioned by Aristotle are "in general" (ānē) present in all animals. Now the question which naturally presents itself to the commentator here is, what is the meaning of ānē, that is, which of the things mentioned are not present in all animals? Confident that St. Thomas solves this question, Peter turns to his commentary, and finds his explanation that memory and anger are the exceptions, as well as his neoplatonic account of the reason why memory and anger are found only in the perfect animals. Then, on the basis of his reading of St. Thomas, Peter formulates his questions, namely, whether memory and anger are present in all animals. Note that in this process the original textual difficulty - the meaning of ānē - has been obscured. In the opinion of Q.3-4, Peter simply affirms that the ānē refers to memory and anger. His real interest in Q.3-4 is not in the Aristotelian text itself, but in St. Thomas' neoplatonic discussion of memory and anger.

Following the lead of St. Thomas, Peter begins the corpus of Q.3-4 by quoting the axiom of continuity and applying it to the distinction between sense and intellect:

Dicendum quod, secundum quod dicit Proclus, non quocunque ordinis inferioris participat similitudinem eius quod est proprium ordinis superioris; sed solum illa quae sunt perfecta in ordine inferiori attingunt ad similitudinem eius quod est proprium ordinis superioris. Dico igitur quod duplex est ordo: ordo naturae intelligibilis et ordo naturae sensibilis, et ista ordo est inferior; et non oportet quod omnia animalia quae sensum participant attingant ad similitudinem intellectus, sed solum animalia perfecta. (Q.3-4, 25-34)

Peter speaks of "orders" rather than of "genera", and is somewhat more explicit than St. Thomas in explaining the two "orders" of
sense and intellect. The most striking difference between this passage and the corresponding section of St. Thomas' commentary is Peter's attribution of the axiom of continuity to Proclus. On the face of it, this reference to Proclus would seem to indicate a text from the *Elementatio Theologiae* as the source of the axiom—a source, furthermore, which St. Thomas does not acknowledge. However, while Proclus' text does contain a version of the axiom of continuity, it is clearly St. Thomas' own formulation of it which Peter is attributing to Proclus. What, then, are we to make of the reference to Proclus? It is possible, of course, that Peter has read the *Elementatio Theologiae* and is conflating the passage from St. Thomas' *De sensu* commentary with a similar passage in Proclus. We should note, however, that St. Thomas himself has already established a link between his own formulation of the axiom and the authority of Proclus.

St. Thomas' standard presentation of the axiom of continuity is as an explanation and generalization of a text from Dionysius: *sabientia divina semper fines priorum conjunxit principiis secundorum* (*De Div. Nom.,* VII, 3). As early as his commentary on the *Sentences,* St. Thomas had indicated a link between the axiom and proposition 19 of the *Liber de causis.* Later, when he came to comment on the *Liber de causis* itself, he presented the axiom under the authority of both Dionysius and Proclus. After quoting proposition 111 of the *Elementatio Theologiae* on the continuity running through the orders of intellects, living beings and bodies, St. Thomas' commentary on proposition 19 of the *Liber de causis* presents the axiom of continuity in terms resembling those of his own *De sensu* commentary.
and, even more strikingly, of Peter's commentary:

Ubicumque autem diversi ordines sub invicem coniunguntur, oportet quod id quod est supremum inferioris ordinis propter propinquitatem ad superiorum ordinem aliquis participet de superioris ordinis perfectionis. 8

 Might this text be the source of Peter's reference to Proclus in Q.3-4? In reading the passage from St. Thomas' De sensu commentary, perhaps he was reminded of this similar text in St. Thomas' commentary on the Liber de causis, a text which links the axiom of continuity with the name of Proclus. Peter's single reference to Proclus shows no particular knowledge of the Elementatio Theologiae, while, on the other hand, his acquaintance with St. Thomas' commentary on the Liber de causis would certainly be in keeping with what we already know of his familiarity with St. Thomas' philosophical commentaries. It may well be, then, that his reference to Proclus points to yet another Thomistic text with which he is familiar. 9

Peter's subsequent discussion of memory and anger is clearly drawn from the corresponding section of St. Thomas' commentary, though he adds certain details not found in the latter, such as the relationship of memory to locomotion (41-48) and a quotation from the Ethics (57-60). The three objections and replies of Q.3-4, on the other hand, have no connection with St. Thomas' commentary, but are apparently based on Peter's own reading of Aristotle. This mixture of sources characterizes Peter's construction of quaestiones in general, particularly in the early part of the commentary; selections from St. Thomas' De sensu commentary provide a basis to which other, generally Aristotelian elements are added. To be sure, there is the occasional quaestio (such as Q.14) which has no relation
to St. Thomas' *De sensu* commentary. Nevertheless, most of the first thirty-five *quaestiones*, which correspond to the first ten chapters of St. Thomas' commentary, have a direct, and often literal parallel in the latter. We should note, however, that Peter also makes use—though to a much lesser extent—of certain texts of St. Thomas' teacher St. Albert.

Although Peter never mentions St. Thomas by name, he explicitly refers to St. Albert twice. The first of these references, which occurs in Q.13, is somewhat puzzling. At this point Peter has reached Aristotle's comparison between sight and hearing (437a1-18). According to Aristotle, both of these senses are present in animals with intelligence for the sake of their well-being. Sight, however, is of itself (*secundum se*) superior to hearing, because it manifests many differences among things, since its object, color, is present in all bodies, while hearing only manifests differences of sound and voice. Accidentally (*secundum accidens*), on the other hand, hearing contributes more to intelligence than does sight, since speech, which is an object of hearing, is a cause of learning. For this reason, Aristotle concludes, of those deprived from birth of either sense, the blind are wiser than the "deaf and dumb" (*mutis et surdis*). A natural question for the commentator at this point is why Aristotle now speaks of the deaf "and dumb", when thus far he has been discussing only the senses of sight and hearing, and has said nothing of muteness. His suggestion that those who are deaf from birth are necessarily mute seems to call for explanation, and this is the point which Peter addresses in Q.13.
The corpus of Q.13 begins by arguing that those who are deaf from birth are necessarily mute, not because an impediment in the organ of hearing necessarily involves an impediment in the organ of speech — although Albert states the contrary (cuius tamen contrarium ponit ALBERTUS), but because those who are deaf from birth are related to human speech as a whole as is someone to a language which he has never heard. Here Peter seems to indicate that Albert holds that an impediment in the organ of hearing does necessarily involve an impediment in the organ of speech. I have been unable to find a text of St. Albert's which does suggest this point. If Peter is referring to the corresponding passage of St. Albert's De sensu et sensato, there Albert simply affirms that those who are deaf from birth are necessarily mute "because they cannot hear voices." On the other hand, the corresponding text from St. Thomas' commentary, which is evidently the main source for Peter's Q.13, does speak of an impedimentum linguæ. St. Thomas' point, however, is that muteness may have causes other than congenital deafness, for instance, an impediment of the tongue:

PETER
Intelligendum quod surus a nativitate est mutus quantum ad idiomam et locutionem communem humano generi. Et non contingit istud eo quo quod si sit impedimentum in instrumento auditus quod sit impedimentum in instrumento linguæ, cuius tamen contrarium ponit ALBERTUS; sed non est sic, sed istud contingit propter hoc quod surus a nativit-

ALBERT
Ideo quando aliqui sunt caeci a nativitate, et alii surdi a nativitate, quod necesse est esse mutos, quia voces non audiunt: sapiientes sunt caeci quam muti et surdi propter cæctam causam: quia plus convenient ad scientiam auditus quam visus, licet per accidens id operetur. (ed. Borghèz, Tr.I, c.2, p.5)

THOMAS
Addit autem "mutis", quia omnis surus a nativitate ex necessitate mutus est; non enim potest adiscere formare sermones significativos quos significat ad placitum, unde similiter se habet ad locutionem tocius humani generis sicut ille qui nuncquam auduit aliquam linguam ad linguam illam; non est autem
Peter's reference to an impedimentum in instrumento linguæ seems to come from St. Thomas rather than St. Albert. Furthermore, while Peter suggests that, according to Albert, the impedimentum linguæ is a consequence of deafness, in St. Thomas' text it is presented as a cause of muteness. This seemingly confused use of St. Thomas' text may indicate that Peter is consulting St. Thomas, somewhat imprecisely, from memory, or again that he is making use of the elements of St. Thomas' commentary for his own purposes. Peter's apparently incorrect reference to St. Albert, on the other hand, may suggest that he has been consulting St. Albert's De sensu as well as the commentary of St. Thomas. That this is in fact the case is confirmed by other passages of Peter's commentary which show the direct influence of St. Albert's De sensu.

The other explicit reference to St. Albert occurs in Q.16, which deals with Aristotle's discussion of the shining which seems to occur when the eye is rubbed in the dark (437a28-52). Peter begins his treatment of this point by invoking St. Albert:

\textit{Albertus dicit quod oculus videt suum fulgorem non ita quod idem penitus sit videns et visum, sed oculus cum celeriter movetur et exit locum ubi prius fuit, remanet fulgor in loco in quo prius erat pupilla. Et ideo pupilla existens in loco secundo videt fulgorem suum existentem in loco primo (Q.16-14-19)}

This brief passage might be a summary of either St. Albert's or St. Thomas' longer explanations of this point, since both authors similarly
explain the phenomenon in question as a sudden removal of the eye from the place where the shining is emitted. Moreover, the occurrence in our text of the terms fulmen and lucescere, terms found at St. Thomas but not in St. Albert, may indicate that Peter is consulting both authors at the same time. On the other hand, the example of the whirling globe of fire, which Peter goes on to discuss was apparently suggested by similar examples in St. Albert's De sensu.

Apart from these two explicit references to St. Albert, there are a number of passages where Peter makes use of St. Albert, as he more frequently does of St. Thomas, without acknowledgement. In q.27 he discusses Aristotle's remark that man has an inferior sense of smell (443b3-444a2) - a point which had already been made in the De anima (421a10-14). Peter's explanation of this point in terms of the coarseness and harshness of man's proportionately large brain seems for the most part to be based on the corresponding passage of St. Thomas' De sensu commentary. However, he introduces a detail not found in St. Thomas, and indeed uncharacteristic of him, namely, the correspondence between man's proportionately large brain and his comparatively long periods of sleep. Now a similar association connecting man's inferior sense of smell, the largeness of his brain and his long periods of sleep is made in St. Albert's commentary on the De anima passage just mentioned, and it seems likely that Peter is echoing St. Albert here, thus simultaneously drawing on both Albert and Thomas without mentioning either.

Another instance in which Peter combines texts from Thomas and Albert, at one in which Albert predominates, occurs in q.33. Following on the discussion of flavours in Q.31-32, which is closely
based on St. Thomas’ commentary, 4.33 asks “whether sweet and bitter arc opposed by way of privation or contrariety”. While St. Thomas briefly explains Aristotle’s remark that the bitter is a privation of the sweet (442a25-27) with a reference to the *Metaphysics* (10, 142-143), Peter more elaborately discusses this point by means of a distinction: from a material point of view (materialitas), the bitter is a privation of “the humid perfectly absorbed by the hot”, which is the “matter” of the sweet; from a formal point of view (formaliter), however, the sweet and the bitter are opposed as contraries. While certain details of 4.33 may be taken from St. Thomas’ commentary, the discussion as a whole is clearly inspired by a similar passage in St. Albert’s *De sensu*.

**Et sicut diximus quod nihil est privatio albi in perspicuo, ita amarus plus et salus minus sunt privatio dulcis; sed cum formae saporis sit passio facta a sidisco in humidum, in amari est privatio materialis principalis saporum, quia in amari humidum complexionale evaporavit et remansit sicut terreum incensum et combustum et quoad hoc privative opponitur dulci. Quia autem effectus calid in sicco combusto est aliqua qualitas,ideo formaliter contrarie opponitur dulci amarum, et materialiter ut privatio et habitus...**

**Dicendum ad hoc quod isti sapores dulce et amarum, possunt considerari dupliciter, vel materialiter vel formaliter. Si materialiter, tunc dico quod opponitur privative materia enim saporis dulcis est humidum perfecte a calido digestum. A materia autem saporis amari est privatio humidis in aliquid corpore perfecte digeriti prout caliditas tempus consumerit. Quantum ergo ad solum sapores, opponitur privative, si tamen nos consideramus sapores formaliter, ut illud quod causatur a calido perfecte digerente humidum et illud quod causatur a calido consumeri humidum, quantum ad hoc opponitur contrarie sicut dulcedo et amaritudo.** (4.33, 13-23)

In 4.33, then, Peter makes use of Albert as he normally does, consulting Albert’s *De sensu* on a difficult point, and then recasting Albert’s arguments in the form of a *questio* without...
Acknowledging his source...

Among the sources of his *quaestiones*, then, Peter seems to have regarded St. Albert's work as a complement to that of St. Thomas. Further evidence of this complementarity may be detected in Peter's *quaestiones* on the *De somno et vigilia*. While St. Thomas had provided Peter with a model for his commentaries on both the *De sensu* and the *De memoria et reminiscencia*, he did not write a commentary on the *De somno*, being left without his usual recourse of consulting St. Thomas for guidance in his commentary on the *De somno*. Peter turned to what he apparently considered the next-best things to a Thomistic commentary, namely, St. Albert's paraphrase of the *De somno* splashed with an introduction, Peter's work begins with three questions on the distinctiveness of the science at hand which seem to be loosely based on tr. i, ch. 2 of Albert's work; the discussion of giants in 14.4-6 seems to originate in the following chapter of Albert's *De somno*, though the division of appetites in 14.9 may be taken from St. Thomas; and finally, 14.9-10 are clearly based on chapters from bk. II of St. Albert's work. Thus St. Albert plays the same persuasive but anonymous role in the *De somno* as does St. Thomas in the *De somno*. In keeping with his reputation as St. Thomas' *fidelissimus discipulus*, Peter seems to have regarded St. Thomas as his primary authority. Nevertheless, he evidently consulted both of the theologians whose colleague Peter of Crabant called praecipui viri in philosophia.
Despite his occasional consultation of St. Thomas' other writings and the works of St. Albert, it is clear that Peter's characteristic procedure in discussing the De sensu is to follow the guidance of St. Thomas' De sensu commentary in addressing certain questions which arise from the reading of Aristotle's text. There are, however, two important exceptions to this pattern: in 4.36-43 Peter undertakes a major digression not only from the guidance of St. Thomas' commentary, but from the text of the De sensu itself; and in 4.55 he uncharacteristically adopts a position in opposition to St. Thomas.

1. The Digression on Intensive Qualities (q4i, 4.36-43)

At the beginning of 4.43 Peter has reached a passage in the De sensu's discussion of odors where Aristotle, having argued that the intermediate flavors result from a mixture of sweet and bitter (just as the intermediate colors result from a mixture of black and white), goes on to suggest a precise correspondence between colors and flavors, enumerating seven principal species of each (442a17-25). This passage seems to be related to Aristotle's earlier remark that the species of sensible objects are finite in number (440b23-25), a point which he explains towards the end of the De sensu by means of the principle that the intermediates between contrary extremes must be finite in number, and by means of the distinction between what is actually sensible and what is only potentially so (445b20-446a20).

Now Aristotle's assertion of a finite number of species of sensible objects seems to be directly contradicted by Averroes, who, in his Compendium of the De sensu, argues that intermediate colors are
infinite in number, and that there are many colors in nature which cannot be produced by artists. This opposition between Aristotle and Averroes is addressed by Peter in 4.34 (utrum species suppositis et coloris sint infinitae), which opens with a reference to this passage from Averroes' _Compendium_. With Aristotle and St. Thomas, Peter argues that the species of sensible objects must be finite in number because the intermediates between finite contraries must themselves be finite in number. However, making use of Aristotle's distinction between the potentially and the actually sensible, Peter reconciles Averroes with Aristotle (and with St. Thomas) by stressing that while the species of sensible objects are not infinite in actuality, they are so in potentiality; Averroes, Peter says, is speaking of an infinite number of colors in potentiality (4.34, 29-30).

In 4.35 (utrum saperit et coloris sint inaequalis determinato), Peter explains the compatibility between the positions of Aristotle and Averroes more fully; if we consider the significant differences (differentiae notabiliae) among colors and flavors, then there are, as Aristotle indicates, just seven determinate species of each; if, on the other hand, we consider flavors and colors according to any kind of mixture of the extremes whatsoever (secundum quaecumque modum mixtionis), then, as Averroes suggests, their number is not limited, for another kind of mixture, and hence another species, can always be found. The phrase secundum quaecumque modum mixtionis, which echoes a remark in Averroes' _Compendium_, leads into the title of 4.36: utrum quilibet modus commixtionis saporum vel colorum faciat diversitatem in specie. In 4.36, however, Peter gives his commentary a new direction: having turned from the text of the _De sensu_ being
commented on to another part of the *De sensu*, and from there to Averroes' *Compendium*, he now uses the averroistic notion of an infinite variety of mixtures to introduce a discussion of intensive magnitudes.

While the origins of the thirteenth-century debate over intensive magnitudes can be traced to isolated remarks in Aristotle's *Categories*, *Physics* and *Hippocratic Ethics* and in St. Augustine's *De Trinitate*, the immediate context of the discussion was the theological topic of the different degrees of the virtue of charity, a theme which was encountered by bachelors of theology in commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, I, d. 17. St. Thomas discussed this question in his own *Sentences* commentary, and again in *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 24, a. 5. In *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 52, he broadened the scope of the discussion from the virtue of charity to habits and forms in general, arguing that intensive variation in a quality does not result from any variation in the form of the quality, but from the varying participation of the subject in that form. Later theologians developed other explanations of the intension and remission of forms, sometimes in opposition to St. Thomas. Henry of Ghent, for example, argued that intension and remission do not occur because of any variable participation by the subject, but rather because of the nature of the forms themselves, which have an essential quantitative "latitude" comprising different degrees or "parts". In contrast to St. Thomas, Henry argued that even substantial forms admit of "more and less"; though of themselves they are fixed and unchanging, their composition with matter determines their nature to a particular degree.
Peter's smooth transition from a topic arising from Averroes' *Compendium* of the *De sensu* to a discussion of intensive magnitudes seems in part due to the fact that the different shades or degrees of whiteness, Aristotle's illustration of qualitative quantity, had become a favorite example in discussions of intensive magnitude from St. Thomas onward. If the debate over intensive magnitudes regularly discussed the example of color, a *De sensu* commentary, conversely, could quite naturally extend itself into a discussion of intensive magnitudes. Thus, in q.36, Peter argues that not every mixture of the extremes results in a specific difference in the sensible object. Not every mixture of black and white, for example, results in a specifically distinct color, since there are also differences of "more and less" within a single color; a thing may be more or less white. Now this difference of "more and less", according to Peter, is not a specific difference, for it results from a varying participation by a subject in a single form, and is, thus, due to the participating subject, not the form itself. This argument, which adopts St. Thomas' position on intensive magnitudes, is developed over the following seven quaestiones.

Peter's digression seems to have been handled in two teaching sessions, represented by Q.37-40 and Q.41-43, which roughly correspond to the first two articles of St. Thomas' *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q.52. Thus, the corpus of q.37, which argues that the notion of "increase" (*augmentum*), though proper to corporeal quantities, may be applied to forms, was apparently based on the opening of St. Thomas' article one:
Intelligendum quod augmentum et diminutio proprie reperiuntur in quantitatibus corporalis.
Unde dicitur "aliquid magnum quia attingit ad perfectionem quantitatis sibi debita; pars autem dicitur quando illud non attingit. Et sic sunt augmentum et diminutio proprie in quantitatibus."

Transitio autem sunt in formis: dicitur forma magna quando perfecte ab aliquo participatur et intense; dicitur autem parva quando imperfecte participatur. (Q.37, 9-16)

Similarly, the Aristotelian argument of Q.38 that substantial forms do not admit of more and less seems to be drawn from a later passage in the same article of St. Thomas:

Substancia autem manent suæ specie non potest variari secundum magis et minus, quod apparat in octavo Metaphysicorum, ubi dicitur, "substantia cum secursum se sortitur speciem, sortitur speciem secundum aliquid indivisible, ita quod illud quod attingit ad illud indivisible est sub illa specie, et quod recedet et non attingit est suæ specie." Ideo dicit PHILosophus ibi quod formae substantiales in eorum sunt sicut numeri. (Q.38, 15-23)

It would appear, then, that Peter is here basing his discussion of intensive magnitudes on St. Thomas' treatment of this point in the Summa, just as he elsewhere draws on St. Thomas' De sensu commentary. Peter's familiarity with this text of the Summa is, of course, not
surprising. Certain details of §36, however, also suggest that Peter is using the arguments of the *Summa* here to attack Henry of Chelten’s position on the intension and remission of forms.

Note first of all that the title of §36 is identical to that of Henry’s *Quodlibet IV*, q.15 (1279–80): *utrum forma substantialis suscipiat magis et minus.* Henry’s position in this question is that while substantial forms of themselves do not admit of more and less, in composition with matter they do:

\[ \text{quemadmodum in numero non est magis et minus, similiter nec in substanti quae est quasi forma, nisi substantia quae est com materi.} \]

In the corpus of §38, Peter seems to directly echo and correct this text of Henry’s. Neither substance as form, he says, nor substance as composite admits of more and less:

\[ \text{licendum quod substantia non suscipiat magis et minus, neque substantia quae est forma, neque substantia quae est compositum. (§38, 12-14)} \]

We might also note that Henry’s text actually refers to the *De sensu et sensato* in the course of making a distinction between subalternate forms, such as the different species of color, and individual (*specialissima*) forms, such as the different shades of whiteness. This distinction, of course, is precisely the one with which Peter had been concerned in §§34–36. Right Henry’s treatment of this point, and in particular his reference to the *De sensu* in this context, have suggested to Peter his own discussion of intensive magnitudes in his *De sensu* commentary? It seems clear, in any case, that Peter is adopting a Thomistic position against Henry on this point: with St. Thomas, and in opposition to Henry, Peter insists that substantial forms in no way admit of more and less.
Having rejected intensive variation in substantial forms, Peter goes on to consider accidental forms, taking them first of all in abstraction. Certain accidental forms, such as blackness and whiteness, are specifically determined of themselves (secundum se), and are thus, like substantial forms, indivisible; others are specifically determined in relation to something else (secundum habitudinem ad aliud), just as health, for instance, is a proportion in relation to an animal body. The latter kind of abstract accidental form does admit of more and less while remaining specifically the same, so that health, for instance, can be greater in one animal than in another, and greater or less in the same animal at different times (Q.39). In the concrete, however, even accidental forms of the first kind admit of more and less, though this diversity, as was already established in Q.36, does not proceed from any variation in the form itself, but from the potentiality of the subject to participate in the same indivisible form more or less perfectly (Q.40). Throughout this discussion of accidental forms, Peter continues to draw on the arguments and examples of St. Thomas' Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q.52, a.1.

In Q.41-43 the discussion focuses on the increased participation in a form by a subject, and in particular on the case of something less white becoming more white. In Q.41, which asks whether intensive increase occurs by means of addition (per additionem), Peter seems to have turned, in his consideration of the question from the Summa, from article one (utrum habitus augeantur) to article two (utrum habitus augeantur per additionem). Thus the oppositum of Q.41 follows the sed contra of St. Thomas' article two in quoting a text
from the Physics. The corpus of 2.41, however, seems to diverge somewhat from St. Thomas' position. Peter argues that while a form such as health is increased in a subject by addition to the form itself, an indivisible form such as whiteness is not increased by means of any such addition, but because of the subject's potentiality to participate in the form to a greater degree. Although this account of increased whiteness is in keeping with St. Thomas' view, Peter's remark that health is increased by means of addition to the form itself contradicts St. Thomas' discussion of health in article two of the question from the Summa. However, since Peter is much more concerned with the case of increased whiteness than with that of increased health in 2.41, this divergence from St. Thomas in 2.41 may be of little significance. In 2.42-43, Peter concludes his discussion on intensive magnitudes by arguing that when something less white becomes more white, the form of whiteness remains specifically the same, though not numerically so, since it is accidentally destroyed and re-generated.

Peter's digression in 2.36-41, then, seems to be a contribution by a master of arts to a controversy over intention and remission among theologians. We should note, however, that certain important features of this controversy - such as the term *latitudo* introduced by Henry of Ghent, the Augustinian distinction between *quantitas solis* and *quantitas virtualis* used by Richard of Middleton, and the extension of the debate into the issue of the metaphysical distinction between *esse* and *essentia* by Siles of Rome - are not mentioned by Peter at all. His main purpose seems to have been simply to present the Thomistic position on qualitative increase found in *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, 2.52.
Finally, we should add that Peter touched on the question of intention and remission on at least two other occasions. The title of Q. 4, 38 recurs in his *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, VIII, 3: *utrum substantia suscipiat maius et minus*. Substance, he says in this latter text, may in an improper sense be said to admit of more and less, inasmuch as natures more and less closely approach the first cause in different degrees of perfection; properly speaking, however, those things are said to admit of more and less which participate in one and the same form in different ways. Of themselves forms do not admit of more and less; rather, this is accidental to them and is to be explained by the varying dispositions of matter. Peter's position here seems to be nearly identical to that of his *De sensu* commentary. 9

Later, in his own quodlibetal questions, and speaking now as a theologian, Peter returned to the subject of intensive magnitudes, and in so doing recanted the Thomistic position of his Aristotelian commentaries:

...hoc aliquando mihi videbatur quod secundum formam aliquid dicitur maius et minus, quia in subjecto est potestas maior vel minor ad ipsam... quod similiter non videtur usque esse rationabile. 10

This *aliquando* presumably refers to Peter's *De sensu* and *Metaphysica* commentaries, whose account of intention and remission in terms of varying participation by a subject in an invariable form no longer seems reasonable to Peter. Instead, Peter's quodlibetal questions describe intention and remission as a "continuous movement" through different degrees of the form itself, of which the higher degrees are virtually contained in the lower. This later position of Peter's seems to have been influenced by Henry of Ghent's and Godfrey of
Fontaine's discussions of intension and remission, and the change in Peter's position between his Aristotelian commentaries and his quodlibetal questions thus apparently reflects the development which his career underwent from the influence of St. Thomas to that of Henry and Godfrey.

2. The Question of the Soul's Quantitative Parts (QDJ, 1.55).

In the section of the commentary which follows the digression on intensive magnitudes, Peter returns to quæstiones which are more directly related to the text of the De sensu (QJ.44-56). This latter part of the commentary, however, is less detailed and elaborate than Peter's treatment of the opening section of Aristotle's text in QQ.3-33: like many teachers, Peter seems to have devoted a disproportionate amount of time to the early part of his material, thus forcing a more hurried discussion of the latter part. These later quæstiones also seem to be less closely dependent on the corresponding sections of St. Thomas' commentary, though the influence of the latter may still be occasionally detected. However, one of these later quæstiones - Q.55 - deserves special consideration, since, in contrast to Peter's usual dependence on St. Thomas, it provides a rare instance of Peter's opposition to a Thomistic position.

The lemma at the beginning of Q.55 indicates that Peter has reached the final section of the De sensu, in which Aristotle attempts to show how more than one sensible object can be perceived simultaneously (448b17ff.). Aristotle first suggests that the sensitive soul may be an indivisible continuum which can perceive different sensible
objects by means of its different parts (448b20-22); as he goes on to argue; however, even if the soul does sense different objects with different parts of itself, these parts must form a unity (448b22-449a12). His own solution is that different sensible objects are simultaneously perceived by a single part of the soul which is divisible not spatially, but in its essence (ratione) (449a13-20). In St. Thomas' commentary on the De sensu this part is identified with the sensus communis, which Aristotle discusses more fully in the De anima.

Aristotle's initial hesitation in this discussion seems to have provoked 1.55 of Peter's commentary (utrum anima sensitiva habeat partes quantitativas), which argues that the sensitive soul does have quantitative parts per accidens. In his oppositum Peter refers to the observation of De anima, I, 5, 411b19-20, that certain animals continue to live when divided, a fact which seems to suggest that the soul has quantitative parts. In the corpus of Q.55 he goes on to assert that the soul has not only "essential" and "potential" but also "quantitative" parts, though "some" deny this:

Solutio. Hae anima habet partes essentiales quae ponuntur in sua definitione; item, habet partes potentialia; scilicet sensitiva; item, in corpore habet partes quantitativas, quamvis oppositum dicat aliqui. (Q.55, 20-23.)

Peter's argument is that the sensitive soul is the substantial perfection both of the body as a whole and of each of its parts; but since it cannot perfect both whole and parts as something indivisible, therefore the sensitive soul as a whole must have quantitative parts per accidens:

Probatio huius. Differt perfectio substantialis et accidentalis. Perfectio substantialis perficit substantialiter, et necesse est quod perfectio substantialis perficiat totum et
Since Peter goes on to add that the soul does not sense different objects by means of these quantitative parts, but rather by means of some one thing taking use of different potential parts, it is clear that he is not questioning Aristotle’s discussion of the phenomenon of synesthesia, but is rather concerned with the nature of the soul as the substantial perfection of a quantitative body. Once again, Peter seems to have been diverted from Aristotle’s text to a side issue by his consultation of St. Thomas.

It seems quite certain that Peter’s opponent here—the spokesman for the alicui who deny that the soul has quantitative parts—is St. Thomas himself. If, in composing 2.55, Peter followed his standard practice of consulting St. Thomas’ De sensu commentary, he no doubt noted that St. Thomas’ explanation of the text with which 2.55 is concerned makes a distinction between the soul’s potential parts and the parts of a continuum.

In reading this passage, Peter, with his wide knowledge of St. Thomas’ writings, may have recalled that St. Thomas makes a similar distinction in commenting on De anima, I. 5, the text to which Peter refers in the oppositum of 2.55:

Quidam enim dicit quod huiusmodi operationes non conueniunt toti anime, sed partibus; dicit enim animam esse partibilem; et
alio intelligit et alio concepiscit. Sicut qui ponabant sensitiam in cerebro, uidificantem in corde, et huiusmodi. Sed huiusmodi opinio est quodam modo vera et quodam modo falsa; quia, si in anima intelligas diversas partes potenciales, sic est uestum quod anima habet diversas partes et uiribus, et alia intelligit, alia sentit; anima enim est quodam totum potencial et pars acipitur uest potencialis respectu tocius potentialeti; si vero intelligatur quod anima sit quodam magnitudo seu quantitas et dividatur in diversas partes quantitativa, sic est falsa. Isti vero philosophi intelligebant uestim esse partibilem secundum hunc modum et adebant plus, quod huiusmodi potencia anime cont ign diversae aetne. (sentencia de anima, I, 14, 58-75).

The fact that St. Thomas here explicitly argues against the opinion that the soul has quantitative parts, that is, the view defended in Peter's 1.55, would seem to indicate that it is St. Thomas whom Peter is opposing in this discussion. However, Peter also seems to have consulted St. Thomas' fuller presentation of the issue in the Summa.

The source of Peter's threelfold distinction of kinds of parts of the soul appears to be Summa Theologicae, I, 1.75, a.3:

Et quod tota sit in qualibet parte eius, hinc considerari potest, quia omnem totum sit quod dividitur in partes, secundum tripliorem divisionem est triplex totalitas. Est enim quodam totum quod dividitur in partes quantitativa, sicut tota linea vel totum corpus. Est etiam quodam totum quod dividitur in partes rationis et essentiae; sicut definitum in partes definitios, et compositum resolvitur in materiam et formam. Tertium autem totum est potentielle, quod dividitur in partes virtutis.

St. Thomas' article goes on to demonstrate that, while the soul is divisible into essential and potential parts, it cannot be divided, whether per se or per accidentem, into quantitative parts:

Primus autem totalitatis modus non convenit formis, nisi forte per accidentem; et illis solis formis, quae habent indifferentem habitudinem ad totum quantitativum et partes eius. Sicut albedo, quantum est de sui ratione, aequaliter se habet ut sit in tota superficie et in qualibet superficie parte; et ideo, diversa superficie, dividitur albedo per accidentem. Sed forma quae requirit diversitatem in partibus, sicut est anima, et praecipue animalium perfectorum, non aequaliter se habet ad totum et partes; unde non dividitur per accidentem scilicet per divisionem quantitatis. Sic ergo totalitas quantitativa non potest attribui animae nec per se nec per accidentem.
Peter's 4.55 appears to be a direct response to this passage: the objection of 4.55 presents the argument of this passage; and Peter's central conclusion—that the soul does have quantitative parts—is the contrary of St. Thomas' point. It is difficult to know what Peter means by the remark that the soul has quantitative parts: "in the body" (in corpore habet sartes quantitativas), does he mean while it is in the body, or to the extent that it is in the body? His position also raises the question of the unity of the human soul, which as sensitive would have quantitative parts, but as intellectual presumably would not. In general, 4.55 is too briefly developed to indicate Peter's understanding of the importance or even the precise meaning of his objection to St. Thomas. However, the argument of 4.55 is to be explained, it seems to give the soul corporeal and even a spatial aspect which it certainly does not have in St. Thomas' thought.

Even Peter's single disagreement with St. Thomas, then, shows him continuing to draw on St. Thomas' writings, and we may add, St. Thomas' De anima commentary and Summa theologica, i, 476, a.2 to the list of Thomistic texts consulted by Peter in composing his questions on the De sensu at sensato.
CHAP. IV. THE \textit{QUAESTIONES} ON THE \textit{DE MEMORIA ET REMINISCENTIA}.

In general, Peter's commentary on the \textit{De memoria et reminiscencia} shows the same method of composition as do the \textit{quaestiones} on the \textit{De sensu}. Peter begins his commentary with an introduction which closely follows the proem of St. Thomas' \textit{De memoria} commentary in arguing that the twofold subject-matter of Aristotle's text reflects the gradual progression of nature from inanimate things to plants and animals, and then from the perfect animals to man; thus, says Peter, with St. Thomas, after the \textit{De sensu}, which deals with something common to all animals, Aristotle, in the present book, treats of memory, which belongs both to the perfect animals and to man, and of recollection, which is proper to man alone. Peter's introduction almost literally reproduces St. Thomas' proem, while inserting a few additional phrases which simply make explicit an unstated theme of St. Thomas' proem, namely, that the progression of nature from the prior to the posterior is a progression from the imperfect to the perfect.

Following his introduction, Peter begins his \textit{quaestiones} with a discussion of the distinctiveness of the science treated in the \textit{De memoria} (II.1); here Peter draws on St. Thomas' \textit{De sensu} commentary (I, 1, 8-9) for the remark that "according to the Greeks" the \textit{De memoria} forms a part of the \textit{De sensu et sensato}. Then, from 1.2 onward, Peter's general procedure, much like that of his \textit{De sensu} commentary, is to discuss difficult points of Aristotle's text with the help of St. Thomas' \textit{De memoria} commentary, whose arguments and very words he recasts into the \textit{quaestio} format. Here Peter also continues his practice of consulting other Thomistic texts, both in developing specific points and in elaborating entire \textit{quaestiones}. In order to
further illustrate Peter's great familiarity with St. Thomas' work as a whole, we shall briefly call attention to a number of quaestiones in which Peter looks beyond St. Thomas' De memoria commentary to his other writings.

As in the ad sensum commentary, a number of the early quaestiones of Peter's De memoria commentary are closely related to those passages in St. Thomas' commentary where St. Thomas steps beyond his explication of the letter of Aristotle's text to develop certain points at greater length. In general, St. Thomas' exoteric "discussions" from his exposition ad litteram (which, in the Leonine edition, are marked off by asterisks) seem to be of greater interest to Peter than his clarification of the immediate meaning of Aristotle's words. Thus, St. Thomas' physiological explanation of the difference between those who are good at remembering and those who are good at recollecting (II, 1, 66-60) provides the basis for Peter's 4.2; and St. Thomas' account of the science of future things (II, 1, 119-135) is a source for 4.3. In 4.3, however, Peter also seems to be drawing from another Thomistic text.

The passage of the De memoria with which Peter is concerned in 4.3 occurs at the beginning of Aristotle's discussion of the objects of memory (memorabilia). Aristotle observes that future things are not objects of memory, being rather objects of opinion and hope; indeed, he adds, there is a certain "science of things hoped for" (scientia esperatia), which some call "divination" (divinatio) (449b10-12). In 4.3 Peter asks whether there is in fact such a
The discussion of this point in St. Thomas' *De memoria* commentary opens with this difficulty: since hope is concerned with future things which can be acquired by man, and since such things are future contingents, concerning which there can be no science, it would seem that there can be no "science of future things hoped for". St. Thomas responds to this objection with a distinction: there can be no science of future contingents considered in themselves (*secundum se consideratibus*), but there can be a science of them considered in their causes (*secundum quod in causis suis considerantur*), that is, insofar as there are sciences which know that there exist certain inclinations to particular effects. Thus there is a science of things subject to generation and corruption; and similarly astrologers can predict certain future events, such as fertility and sterility, because of the disposition of the heavenly bodies to produce such effects (II, 1, 119-135). Now Peter has clearly introduced the elements of this discussion into his 1.3: the second objection, for example, is similar to the difficulty with which St. Thomas begins; St. Thomas' distinction between the consideration of future things "in themselves" and "in their causes" is central to Peter's own argument; and St. Thomas' example of the astrological prediction of fertility and sterility also appears in Peter's discussion. However, Peter begins the corpus of 1.3 with an important discussion of future things which is not found in this passage of St. Thomas' *De memoria* commentary at all.
Peter distinguishes three kinds of future things on the basis of three ways in which effects are related to their causes: some future things, he says, have a present cause which cannot be prevented from realizing its future effect, just as the sun, in its continuous movement, cannot be prevented from at some point being eclipsed by the moon; other future things have a present cause whose effect does not follow always and of necessity, but for the most part (non eveniunt semper et de necessitate, sed frequenter), because such a cause can be hindered from producing its effect; and a third kind of future thing has a present cause whose effect follows neither always nor for the most part, but only rarely (non eveniunt semper nec frequenter, sed raro et in minori parte), since it is the kind of cause which usually fails in its natural operation. Having enumerated these three kinds of future things, Peter then repeats St. Thomas' observation that there can be a science of future things insofar as they are considered not in themselves, but in their causes. Peter adds, however, that he is speaking only of the first and second kinds of future things: an inevitable future effect, such as an eclipse of the sun, can be foreknown with determinacy and certainty (determinate cum certificati-one); a probable future effect can also be foreknown, at least to the extent that an effect is known to follow from a given cause usually and for the most part; but the third kind of future thing—the infrequent event, which proceeds from chance and from an infinite number of causes—cannot be foreknown with any determinacy at all (QDM, Q.3, 013-69=319-81). Peter's threefold division of future things in terms of their causes thus provides a more elaborate context for St. Thomas' brief remark that there can be a science of future things
considered "in their causes". However, Peter has apparently taken this distinction from elsewhere in St. Thomas' works.

The distinction of the different ways in which future things are related to present causes occurs a number of times in St. Thomas' writings. It is present, for example, in the articles of the prima pars on the foreknowledge of the future by angels (2.57, a.3) and by the human intellect (1.86, a.4). In these articles, however, St. Thomas is concerned only with effects which follow from their causes either with necessity or for the most part. On the other hand, he enumerates all three kinds of effects mentioned in Peter's 2.3 in his commentary on the De interpretatione (I, 13, 11), and again in his account of divination in Summa Theologiae, II-II, 1.95, a.1. This last text in particular is close to Peter's discussion in a number of terminological details. If this article from the secunda secundae is in fact the source which Peter is using in 2.3, it may be that Aristotle's mention of a divinatory science (divinatium) in the passage from the De memoria with which Peter is concerned in 2.3 provoked him to turn to St. Thomas' theological account of divination in Summa Theologiae, II-II, 1.95, a.1 (utrum divinatio sit peccatum). Such an association between texts of Aristotle and St. Thomas on the basis of a single word would be characteristic of Peter's simultaneous reading of both authors.

Peter's 2.3, in any case, glosses the De memoria's reference to a divinatory science by taking from St. Thomas' De memoria commentary the explanation that future things may be known in their present causes, and setting this explanation in the context of the distinction, taken from elsewhere in St. Thomas' writings, among three ways in
which future things are related to present causes. Once again, then, Peter's discussion of Aristotle's text provides him with an occasion to exploit his wide knowledge of St. Thomas' works.

Having established that the object of memory is what is past, and that only those animals remember which perceive time, the De memoria turns to a consideration of the part of the soul to which the power of memory belongs. Aristotle begins by referring to the account of imagination (fantasia) in the De anima, where it was noted that there is no act of intellection without an image. Then, after making a comparison between the use of images by the intellect and the role of diagrams in geometry, he adds that there is "another reason" why intellection does not occur without either "the continuous" or time: Propter quam intellectus non continet intelligere nihil sine continuo neque sine ratione temporis, alia ratio. (449b30-450a9). This cryptic reference to an alia ratio evidently calls for some explanation by the commentator.

In turning to St. Thomas' De memoria commentary for clarification of this remark, Peter would find St. Thomas making one of his explanatory digressions from his exposition of the latter of Aristotle's text. Aristotle, St. Thomas explains, is alluding to the fact that man cannot understand anything without an image; for an image necessarily exists along with the continuous and time, since it is a likeness of an individual thing, which is "here and now". The reason why man cannot understand without an image, St. Thomas continues, is easily explained with respect to the initial reception of intelligible species, for these, according to the De anima, are abstracted from images.
but it is also clear from experience, he adds, that even one who has already acquired intelligible knowledge by means of such species cannot actually consider that of which he has knowledge unless some image becomes present (occurrat) to him; thus an injury to the organ of imagination prevents a man not only from understanding something for the first time, but also from considering what he understood before, as is clear in the case of the insane (II, 2, 53-69). St. Thomas, then, takes Aristotle's cryptic remark as an opportunity to discuss the human intellect's need of images, both in acquiring knowledge and in considering the knowledge which it already possesses.

Peter's 2.5 (utrum intellectus intelligat sine fantasmate) seems to arise from this discussion by St. Thomas rather than from the textual difficulty in the De memoria itself. However, Peter has also recognized that St. Thomas' doctrine of the intellect's need for images is developed at greater length in Summa Theologicae I, 2.34, a.7 (utrum intellectus possit actu intelligere per species quas bene se habet non convertendo se ad phantasmata), for his own quaestio is closely modelled on the objections, sed contra, corpus and responses of this article from the Summa. Peter's use of the Summa in a commentary on Aristotle is, of course, not new to us. What is remarkable about 2.5, however, is both its exploitation of a fundamental Thomistic article on the operation of the human intellect and its close adherence to the structure of this article. Let us briefly see how Peter makes use of his model in 2.5.

St. Thomas begins the corpus of article seven by stating that according to the condition of the present life (secundum praesentis vitae statum), in which it is joined to a body, the intellect cannot
understand anything in actuality except by turning itself (convertendo se) to images. This is clear, he says, from two indications. The first of these, which recalls the discussion of his De memoria commentary, is that the intellect cannot actually understand, whether in acquiring knowledge for the first time or in making use of the knowledge which it has already acquired, without an act of the imagination, as is clear from the case of those whose organ of imagination is injured. The second indication is that when anyone wishes to understand something, he forms images for himself; and similarly, when we wish to make another understand something, we propose examples from which he is able to form images. St. Thomas then explains the reason for this need of images. A cognitive power, he says, is proportioned to its object (potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur comoscibili). Thus, the proper object of the discarnate angelic intellect is an immaterial substance, by means of which material things are known; the proper object of the incarnate human intellect, on the other hand, is a quiddity or nature which is present in a material body (quiditas sive natura in materia corporali existens), by means of which the human intellect rises to a knowledge of immaterial things. Now because it is proper to this latter kind of nature to exist in an individual material body, it cannot be fully and truly (complete et vere) known unless it is known as existing in such an individual. And since we apprehend individuals by means of sense and imagination, therefore, in order for our intellect to actually understand its proper object, it must turn itself (convertet se) to images, so that it may discern the universal nature as existing in the individual. This "turning to images" would not be necessary if
the proper object of our intellect were separate forms or if, as the Platonists hold, the forms of sensible things did not subsist in individuals.

The corpus of St. Thomas' article seven, then, first presents two indications of the intellect's need for images, and then explains this need in terms of the proportion between the incarnate human intellect and the material conditions of its proper object. The corpus of Peter's Q.5 follows exactly this pattern. Peter begins by arguing that the intellect's need of images is clear both from the fact that the intellect is actualized by objects of sense and imagination and from experience of the fact that injury to the organ of imagination is a hindrance to understanding; this corresponds to the first of the "indications" in St. Thomas' article seven, though Peter seems to be directly drawing from St. Thomas' De memoria commentary here. However, Peter goes on to take St. Thomas' second "indication" — our inclination to form images when we wish to understand something — directly from the article of the Summa. Peter concludes, like St. Thomas, by locating the reason for the intellect's dependence on images in the necessary proportionality between the intellect and its object. For this last point Peter may once again be borrowing from a passage in St. Thomas' De memoria commentary (II, 2, 104–110). The structure and argumentation of Q.5 as a whole, however, are clearly modeled on the article from the Summa.

This parallel is also present in Peter's oppositum, which follows St. Thomas' sed contra in referring to the De anima, as well as in the three objections and responses of Q.5, which correspond to those of St. Thomas' article. In short, Peter has constructed an
entire quaestio in imitation of St. Thomas' *Summa Theologiae*, I, 2.84, a.7. Unlike St. Thomas, Peter does not add the qualification that the intellect's need of images is restricted to "the condition of the present life"; perhaps he considered this to be a theological point, and therefore unsuitable to a philosophical commentary. It is also interesting to note that Peter does not once mention St. Thomas' metaphoric term *conversio* ("turning") to describe the intellect's relationship to the images which it uses. But although Peter's 4.5 is somewhat less detailed than St. Thomas' article, nevertheless it faithfully represents the overall pattern of St. Thomas' thought. Without being aware of the fact, Peter's audience was presented with a sketch of an important Thomistic article in the midst of a discussion of Aristotle's *De memoria*.

After discussing the intellect's need of images, St. Thomas' *De memoria* commentary proceeds to a further point which caught Peter's attention. "Some one" (aliquis), St. Thomas says, might argue that intelligible species are present in the human intellect only when it is actually understanding, after which they cease to be, just as light disappears with the removal of an illuminating body, so that, if the intellect wishes to understand something again, it must once more turn to images in order to acquire intelligible species. In reply to this argument, St. Thomas first of all notes that it is opposed to Aristotle's *De anima*, which states that once the intellect has become its objects by means of their species, it is then in potentiality to an actual understanding of them. The argument is also opposed to
reason, St. Thomas continues; for intelligible species are received in the possible intellect, according to the mode of the latter, unchangeably (*immobiliter secundum modum eius*). In a sensitive power, the distinction between the reception, and retention or an impression, must be explained in terms of the power's corporeal organ, as Avicenna says. The possible intellect's possession of species when it is not actually understanding, however, must be explained in terms of the different levels of being of intelligible forms; these may exist in pure potentiality, as before the act of learning, or in pure-actuality, as when one is actually understanding, or again in an indeterminate mode between potentiality and actuality, which is a "captual being (esse in habitu)" (II, 2, 70-71). It is in this "intermediate mode" of being that intelligible species, according to St. Thomas, remain in the possible intellect even when it is not actually understanding.

This brief discussion of the intellect's retention of intelligible species forms the background of Peter's §§ 7 and 8. Once again, however, Peter has noted a point of resemblance between St. Thomas' *De memoria* commentary and his *Summa Theologiae*, for these two quaestiones by Peter also draw on *Summa Theologiae*, I, 4.75, a.6 (*utrum memoria sit in parte intellectiva animae*). The corpus of this article divides into two main sections. 1) St. Thomas begins with a preliminary discussion which, like the text of his *De memoria* commentary, but in much greater detail, presents the position of Avicenna (the aliquid mentioned in the *De memoria* commentary), and then shows that this position is opposed both to Aristotle and to reason. 2) Then, having established that intelligible species are preserved in the intellect, St. Thomas addresses the question of
whether memory is present in the intellective part of the soul, which he solves by means of a distinction: if "memory" is taken to mean simply a power which preserves species, then it must be said that there is memory in the intellective part of the soul; but if "memory" refers to that power whose object is something past as such, then there can be no memory in the intellective part of the soul, but only in the sensitive part, since it is only the sensitive part which apprehends particulars, and past things as such are particulars.

The two parts of this article from the Summa respectively correspond to Peter's Q.7 (utrum species remanent ad conservavitur in intellectu) and Q.8 (utrum in intellectu sit virtus memorativa).

Thus Q.7, which argues that intelligible species are preserved in the intellect, borrows heavily from the first part of Summa Theologiae, I, Q.79, a.6, a text which itself parallels the passage in St. Thomas' De memoria commentary. In Q.8, however, which is based on the second part of the article from the Summa, Peter raises a point—the notion of an "intellectual memory"—which St. Thomas refrains from discussing in the passage from his De memoria commentary. Indeed, this point is somewhat at odds with the text of the De memoria, since Aristotle's argument is that memory belongs to the imagination, that is, to the sensitive part of the soul, and that intelligible things are only incidentally objects of memory (449b30-450a25). Once again, having turned from the De memoria to St. Thomas' commentary, and from there to an article of the Summa Theologiae, Peter has been taken far from the text which he is supposedly discussing, and he is clearly more interested in articulating a Thomistic position than in clarifying Aristotle's meaning.
The remainder of Peter's commentary on the De memoria (44.9-16) deals with questions which are more directly pertinent to Aristotle's text. As in the case of the De sensu commentary, however, Peter's treatment of the latter part of Aristotle's text is somewhat hasty: the bulk of the De memoria commentary (42.1-13) concerns Aristotle's discussion of memory (449b4-451a17), while a mere three quaestiones (43.14-16) are devoted to the longer and more complex discussion of recollection (451a18-453b11). Also as in the previous commentary, Peter seems to depend less directly on St. Thomas in this latter part of the commentary, where he explicitly cites such other authorities as Avicenna, Averroes and Plato's Timaeus. For his concluding Q.16, however, which discusses the relation between the sensitive power of recollection and the human intellect, Peter returns to St. Thomas' De memoria commentary as his principal source.
CONCLUSION

Peter of Auvergne’s question-commentaries on the De sensu et sensato and De memoria et reminiscencia show him indeed to be a "faithful disciple" of St. Thomas, at least to the extent that he is as much concerned with St. Thomas' doctrines as he is with Aristotle's. Peter's relationship to St. Thomas in these works begins with his dependence on the corresponding Parva naturalia commentaries by St. Thomas. As we have noted repeatedly, however, Peter exploits these commentaries less for their clarification of Aristotle's immediate meaning than for their more "personal" passages, such as the introductions and explanatory digressions, in which St. Thomas' own views are predominant. The suspicion that Peter is as much interested in St. Thomas as he is in Aristotle, if not more so, is confirmed by his frequent use of other Thomistic texts, among which we have detected other of St. Thomas' commentaries (on the Physics, Meteorologica, and perhaps the Liber de causis), as well as articles from the prima pars, prima secundae and perhaps the secunda secundae of the Summa Theologiae. In certain quaestiones of the QDS, the influence of articles from the summa completely eclipses any direct concern with the meaning of Aristotle's text. Even the two somewhat original passages of the QDS - the digression on intensive magnitudes and the question on the soul's quantitative parts - show a reliance on texts of St. Thomas: the first of these passages seems to be a defense of St. Thomas' position on intensive magnitudes, as expressed in the Summa, against that of Henry of Ghent; and the second, an isolated instance of Peter opposing St. Thomas, similarly makes use of an article from the Summa. St. Thomas' influence in these commentaries is not exclusive: as we have noted, Peter also makes use
of the work of St. Albert, whose authority he seems to regard as complementary to that of St. Thomas, as well as of Averroes' Compendium of the Parva naturalia and various parts of the Aristotelian corpus. Nevertheless, St. Thomas unquestionably predominates among these sources, and his influence operates at two levels, since Peter looks for guidance first to St. Thomas' Parva naturalia commentaries, and then to other Thomistic texts with which he is familiar.

Peter's dependence on St. Thomas' Aristotelian commentaries, especially for his introductions, seems to be characteristic of his question-commentaries in general, for the same reliance on St. Thomas has been noted in the case of his quaestiones on the Metaphysics.

The sections of Peter's Prologue dealing with the characteristics of the subject of the first science and the names of this science show a direct and frequently an almost literal dependence on St. Thomas' Prologue to his Commentary on the Metaphysics.... The justifications given by the two authors for applying these names to the first science are almost identical in substance and literary form....

...it is almost certain that Peter wrote the Quaestiones in Metaphysicam with a copy of St. Thomas' Commentary on the Metaphysics beside him, and that he even seems in some instances to presuppose a knowledge of it.¹

Again, Peter's use of a variety of Thomistic texts (particularly of articles from the Summa) has been noted in his commentaries on the Metaphysics and Ethics,² the latter of which, like our own quaestiones, occasionally combines texts from St. Thomas and St. Albert as sources.

Our study of the influence of St. Thomas on Peter's Parva naturalia commentaries, then, apparently points to typical aspects of Peter's relationship to St. Thomas in his question-commentaries in general.

In a discussion of Peter's question-commentary on the Ethics, R.-A. Gauthier has proposed a modification of Ptolomy of Lucca's characterization of Peter as St. Thomas' "most faithful disciple":
...Ptolémée ne mérite pas qu'on se fie à lui. Mais l'étude des œuvres authentiques de Pierre d'Auvergne nous permet aujourd'hui de nous faire de lui une image, différente de celle que nous suggérait Ptolémée, mais sûre: Pierre d'Auvergne n'a fait nullement profession de thomisme et n'hésite pas à se séparer ouvertement de saint Thomas sur des points importants; mais il a étudié attentivement les œuvres du saint docteur et il s'en tient ordinairement à un aristotelisme modéré qui s'inscrit dans la ligne générale de l'interprétation thomiste.

With respect to Peter's _quaestiones_ on the *Parva naturalia*, this account of Peter's thought should itself perhaps be qualified. It is true that while Peter makes no open profession of "Thomism" in these commentaries, and at least once separates himself from St. Thomas' views, he also gives evidence of having carefully studied St. Thomas' works. However, the suggestion that Peter follows "a moderate Aristotelianism in the general line of the Thomistic interpretation" of Aristotle does not precisely describe Peter's attitude to Aristotle and St. Thomas in our commentaries, since Peter frequently does not seem to be presenting an "Aristotelianism" at all, but rather a "Thomism" for which his concern with Aristotle is merely a pretext. To this extent, then, the commentator on Aristotle does indeed seem to have been a "faithful disciple" of St. Thomas.

The influence of St. Thomas on Peter's _Parva naturalia_ commentaries confirms the view, expressed by D. O. Lottin, that the Parisian masters of arts depended on masters of theology, and particularly on St. Thomas, for their philosophical teaching:

A priori, on eût été porté à croire que, pour les données philosophiques, les théologiens, saint Thomas y compris, se seraient adressés aux professionnels de la philosophie. Or, c'est le contraire que nous avons constaté, du moins en ce qui regarde saint Thomas: et l'analyse littéraire des exposés à montré combien étendue et combien pénétrante fut l'influence du texte thomiste.... (P)our connaître la philosophie.
Whether or not St. Thomas' commentaries on the De sensu and De memoria were written for masters of arts, Peter of Auvergne, at any rate, found in them the guidance which he needed in undertaking his own commentaries on these works. At the same time, Peter also turned to other writings of St. Thomas, in particular the Summa Theologiae, for help in treating philosophical questions which arose from his reading of Aristotle. This association between St. Thomas' relatively minor Parva naturalia commentaries and his theological masterpiece in Peter's question-commentaries on the De sensu and De memoria suggests that St. Thomas' early readers in the faculty of arts regarded his work as a unified whole which they exploited for its philosophical content rather than its theological character.
NOTES TO PART TWO

Introduction

1 "La théologie de Pierre d'Auvergne" (1930); "Les Quaestiones in Metaphysican de Pierre d'Auvergne" (1932); "La Vie et les œuvres de Pierre d'Auvergne" (1933); "Une question inédite de Pierre d'Auvergne sur l'individuation" (1934); "La philosophie des quodlibets de Pierre d'Auvergne" (1935).


3 On Peter's Metaphysics commentary, see the articles by W. Dunphy and A. P. Lonahan listed in our bibliography; on his Ethics commentary, see R.-A. Gauthier's "Les Quaestiones supra librum Ethicorum de Pierre d'Auvergne" (1964) and Anthony J. Celano's Peter of Auvergne's Questions on the Nicomachean Ethics (1978).


6 For the history of the prohibitions against Aristotle at Paris, see F. van Steenberghen, La Philosophie au XIIIe siècle (Louvain-Paris: Publications Universitaires de l'Université de Louvain, 1966), pp.68-100.

7: Ibid., p.123f.


9 Cf. Deinile-Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I, p.246: "...ordinavimus quod omnes et singuli magistri nostrae facultatis imposterum libros quod in festo B. Hæmigii incepserint, temporibus inferius annotatis absolvere, non ante, teneantur...librum de sensu et sensato, in sex septimaniis; librum de somno et vigilia, in quinque septimaniis;...librum de memoria et reminiscencia, in duabus septimaniis...."


11 Cf. St. Thomas, Sententia libri De sensu et sensato... "Préface", pp. 1*-2*, 123*.

12 Cf. infra, Volume II, pp.xv-xvii.
CHAPTER I

1 The near-equivalence of the terms scientia and (Aristotelian) liber may be inferred from a slight variation between the two versions of Peter of Auvergne's QDX, Q.1 (C45-48=K49-51):

Istā tamen scientia secundum Graecos est pars scientiae De sensu et sensato...
Secundum tamen Graecos haec scientia est pars libri De sensu et sensato...

2 Of the introductions to St. Thomas' twelve Aristotelian commentaries, only the introduction to the Physics commentary does not open with an Aristotelian lemma, and only the introductions of the commentaries on the Metaphysics and Politics do not place the texts under consideration in relation to other works of Aristotle.

3 Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q.85, a.1, ad 2: "...dicendum est quod materia est duplex, scilicet communis et signata vel individualis; communis quidem, ut caro et os; individualis autem, ut haec carnes et haec ossa. Intellectus igitur abstrahit speciem rei naturalis a materia sensibili individuali, non autem a materia sensibili communi."

4 St. Thomas attributes the inclusion of the De memoria as a part of the De sensu to the Greeks (ille enim tractatus est pars istius libri secundum Graecos; Tr.I, c.1, 8-9). In fact, however, the grouping of these two works together is based on Averroes' account of the books of the Parva naturalia. Cf. Sententia libri De sensu et sensato..., "Préface", pp.115*-116*.

5 The predominance of the psychic over the merely physical in the act of sensation is stressed later in St. Thomas' commentary: Ipsa autemuisio secundum rei eritatem non est passio corporalis, est principalis eius causa est virtus anime... (Tr.I, c.3, 53-55). This distinction seems to be reflected in the difference between the sense-power's act of reception and its act of judgment: sensus et intellectus non solum recipient formas rerum, sed etiam habent judicium de ipsis... (Tr.I, c.18, 218-219)

6 "La place du 'De anima' dans le système aristotélcien d'après S. Thomas", Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 6 (1931), p.44: "C'est à S. Thomas qu'on est redevable des divisions si nettes ensemble et si poussées qui se lisent en tête des différents traités. Aïen de pareil ne se trouve ni chez les commentateurs grecs, ni chez Averroès, ni même chez Albert Le Grand. Le même génie inspire la classification établie au C. in De sensu et sensato. Qu'il n'y a point là inadvertance mais propos délibéré, c'est ce que prouve, outre la solidité du morceau, le ferme dessein de tout ordonner sous un principe unique, ce fait assuré que la tradition régnante n'imposait pas une telle suite."
Here is a comparative presentation of the two poems by St. Thomas:

Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato, Pr., I-127

In libros Physicorum expositio (Leoneine ed.), I, lect. I, n. I-4

Quia liber Physicorum, cuius expositioni intendimus, est primus liber scientiae naturalis, in eius principiio oportet assignare quid sit materia et subjectum scientiae naturalis.

Sciendum igitur quod, cum omnis scientia sit in intellectu, per hoc autem aliquid fit intelligibile in actu, quod aliqualiter abstrahitur a materia; secundum quod aliqua diversimode se habent ad materiam, ad diversas scientias pertinent.

It quia habitus aliquid potest distinguuntur species secundum differentiam eius; quod est perficitur adsensibilis actu per lumen nostri intellectus agentis.

Et ideo Philosophus in VI Metaphysicis distinguitis generis scientiarum secundum diversum modum separationis a materia: nam ea que sunt separata a materia secundum esse et rationem pertinente ad metaphysicum, que autem sunt separata a materia secundum rationem et non secundum esse pertinente ad mathematicum, que autem in sui ratione concernunt materiam sensibilem pertinent ad naturalum.

Sciendum est igitur quod quaedam sunt quorum esse dependet a materia, nec sine materiae definitione possunt: quaedam vero sunt quae licet esse non possint nisi in materia sensibili, in eorum tamen definitione materiae sensibilis non cadit. Et haec differunt ad invicem sicut curvum et simum. Nam simum est in materia sensibili, et necesse est quod in eius definitione cadat materia sensibilis, est enim simum nasus curvus; et talia sunt omnia naturalia, ut homo, lapis, curvum vero, licet esse non possit nisi in materia sensibili, tamen in eius definitione materia sensibilis
Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato

In libros Physicorum Expositio

non cadit; et talia sunt omnia mathematica, ut numeri, magnitudines et figure. Quaedam vero sunt quae non dependent a materia nec secundum esse nec secundum rationem; vel quia nuncquam sunt in materia, ut Deus et aliae substantiae separatae; vel quia non universaliter sunt in materia, ut substantia, potentia et actus, et ipsum ens.

De huiusmodi igitur est Metaphysica; de his vero quae dependent a materia sensibili secundum esse sed non secundum rationem, est Mathematica; de his vero quae dependent a materia non solum secundum esse sed etiam secundum rationem, est Naturalis, quae Physica dicitur. Et quia omne quod habet materiam mobile est, consequens est quod ens mobile sit subjectum naturalis philosophiæ. Naturalis enim philosophia de naturalibus est; naturalia autem sunt quorum principium est natura; natura autem est principium motus et quies in eo in quo est; de his igitur quae habent in ea principium motus, est scientia naturalis.

Et sicut diversa genera scientiarum distinguuntur secundum hoc quod res sunt diversi modo a materia separabiles, ita etiam et in singulis scientiis et precipue in scientia naturali distinguuntur partes scientiae secundum diversum separationis et concretionis modum.

Et quia universalia sunt magis a materia separata, ideo in scientia naturali ab universalibus ad minus universalium proceditur, sicut Philosophus docet in Libris Physicorum.

Vnde et scientiam naturalen insit tradere ab his quae sunt communissima omnibus naturalibus, quae sunt motus et principia motus; Sed quia ea quea consequuntur aliquid commune, prius et seorsum determinanda sunt, ne oporteat ea multitoties pertractando omnes partes illius communis repetere; necessarium fuit, quod praemittetur in scientia naturali unus liber, in quo tractaretur de is quae consequuntur ens mobile in communi; sicut omnibus scientiis praemittitur
Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato.

et deinde processit per modum concretionis siue applicationis princiorum communium ad quaedam determinata mobilia.

In libros Physicorum expositio

philosophia prima, in qua determinatur de iis quae sunt communia enti inquantum est ens. Hic autem est liber Physicorum sive Naturalis Auditu, quia per modum doctrinae ad audientes traditus fuit; cuius subjectum est ens mobile simpliciter. Non dico autem corpus mobile, quia omne mobile esse corpus probatur in isto libro; nulla autem scientia probat suum subjectum; et ideo statim in principio libri de Caelo, qui sequitur ad istum, incipitur a notificatione corporis.

Sequentur autem ad hunc librum alii libri scientiae naturalis; in quibus tractatur de speciebus mobili:

qua in libro de Caelo de mobili secundum motum locali, qui est prima species motus; in libro autem de Generatione, de motu ad formam et primis mobilibus, scilicet elementis, quantum ad transmutationes eorum in communis; quantum vero ad speciales eorum transmutationes, in libro Meteororum; de mobilibus vero mixtis inanimatis, in libro de Mineralibus;

de animatis vero, in libro de Anima et consequentibus ad ipsum.

Circa que etiam similis modo processit, distinguens hanc considerationem in tres partes: nam primo quidem consideravit de anima secundum se quasi in quaedam abstracctione; secundo vero considerationem factit de his quae sunt anime se consonum quandam concretionem siue applicationem ad corpus, set in generali; tertio considerationem factit applicando omnia hec ad singulas species animalium et plantarum, determinando quid sit proprium unicamente speciei. Prima igitur considerationi continetur in libro De anima;
tercia uero consideratio continetur in libris quos scribit de animalibus et plantis; media uero consideratio continetur in libris quod scribit de quibusdam que pertinent communi ter uel ad omnia animalia uel ad plura genera eorum uel etiam ad omnia uiuencia, circa quod libros est presens intentio. 

Vnde considerandum est quod in II De anima quotuor gradus uiuencium deter-
minavit, quorum primus est eorum que habent solam partem anime nutritiun per quam uiuunt, sicut sunt plantae; quedam autem sunt que cum hoc habent etiam sensum sine motu progressiuo, sicut sunt animalia imperfecta, puta coccilia; quedam uero sunt que habent insuper motum 
localem progressiunum, sicut animalia perfecta ut equus et bov; quedam uero insuper habent in-
tellectum, sicut homines (appetitiun enim, quamuis ponatur quintum genus potenciarum anime, non tamen constituit quintum gradum uiuencium, quia semper consequitur sensitiunum). 

Horum autem intellectus quidem nullius partis corporis actus est, ut probatur in III De anima; unde non potest considerari per concretionem uel applicationem ad corpus uel ad aliquud organum corporeum; maxima enim eius concretio est in anima, summa autem eius abstractio est in substanciis separatis; et ideo preter librum 
De anima Aristotiles non fecit librum de intellectu et intelligibili (uel, si fecisset, non pertineret ad scienciam naturalem, set magis ad methaphisicam, cuius est considerare de substanciis separatis. Alia uero omnia sunt actus alicuius partis corporis et ideo potest eorum esse specialis consideratio per applicationem ad corpus uel organa corporea, preter considera-
tionem que habitat est de ipsis in libro De anima. Oportet ergo huiusmodi considerationem mediam in tres partes distinguui. Quarum una centineat ea que pertinent ad uiuum in quantum est uiuum; et hec continetur in libro quem scribit De morte et uita, in quo etiam determinat De respirazione et expiratione, per que in quibusdam uita con-
seruat, et De iuuentute et senectute, per que diversificatur status uite; similiter autem et in libro qui inscribitur De causis longitudinis et breuitatis uite, et in libro quem fecit De sanitate et egritudine, que etiam pertinent ad dispositionem uite, et in libro etiam quem 
dicitur fecisse De nutrimento et nutribili;
Sententia libri De sensu et sensata

In libros Physicorum Expositio

qui duo libri apud nos nondum habentur. Alii vero pertineat ad motium; quae quidem continetur in duobus libris, scilicet in libro De causa motus animalium et in libro De progressu animalium, in quo determinatur de partibus animalium opportunis ad motum. Tercia vero pertinet ad sensitiuum; circa quod considerari potest et id quod pertinet ad actum interioris uel exteriori sensus, et quantum ad hoc consideranti sensitiuum continetur in hoc libro, qui inscribitur De sensu et sensato, id est De sensitiuuo et sensibili; sub quod etiam continetur tractatus De memoria et reminiscientia; et iterum ad considerationem sensitiuuo pertinet id quod facit differenciam circa sensum in senciendo uel non senciendo, quod fit per somnnum et uigilia, de quo determinatur in libro qui inscribitur De somnno et uigilia.

Set quia oportet per magis similia ad dissimilia transire, talis uidetur rationabiliter esse horum librorum ordine post librum De anima, in quo de anima secundum se determinatur, inmediate sequatur hic liber De sensu et sensato, quia ipsum sentire magis ad animam quam ad corpus pertinet; post quem ordinandum est liber De somnno et uigilia, quae important ligamentum et solutionem sensus; deinde securtur libri qui pertinent ad motium, quod est magis propinquum sensitiuuo; ultimo autem ordinatur liber cui pertinent ad communem considerationem uii, quia ista consideratio maxime concernit corporis dispositionem.

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The Aristotelian division of the three genera of the sciences with which both of these proems begin is frequently treated by St. Thomas, most notably in Q.5-6 of his commentary on Boethius De Trinitate.

Because of the similarity between these two proems, the discussion of the Physics proem in Charles de Koninck, "Abstraction from Matter: Notes on St. Thomas's Prologue to the Physics", Laval Théologique et Philosophique 13 (1957), pp.133-196; 16 (1960), pp. 53-89, 169-188, is also a useful guide to the first part of the De sensu proem.

9 Here Peter seems to be recalling words and phrases from the proem of St. Thomas’ *Meteorologica* commentary.

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Deinde ad mobilia magis in speciali, sicut in libro *Metheororum*, determinat enim ARISTOTELIS ibi de generatione cometae, de galaxia et impressionibus in alto generatis, etcetera. (Intr., 56–59)

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...considerantur enim in hac doctrina ea quae in excelsis generantur; sicut stellae cadentes, stellae cometae, pluviae, nives et alia huiusmodi... ut exemplis... dicens: puta de lacte, id est de lacte circulo qui galaxia dicitur et stellis quae cometae dicitur, et phantasmaticus, id est apparitionibus, ignitis et motis, quae dicitur stellae cadentes. (*In libros Meteorologicae*, Leoniæ ed., n. 1, nn. 4–5)


11 ...ideo oportet post considerationem de anima huiusmodi determinare ut sciatur qualis dispositio corporum ad huiusmodi operationes vel passiones requiritur... (Tr. I, 152–170)

12 Set nunc considerandum est quid sit quodlibet sensibile secundum se ipsum, scilicet quid sit color, quid sensus, quid odor, et similiter de tactu... (Tr. I, c. 5, 22–25).

13 Nunc accedit ad principale propositum in hunc librum, applicando considerationem sensus ad corporalis... Et primo quantum ad organum sensuum; secundo quantum ad sensibilia... (Tr. I, c. 2, 4–8)
CHAPTER II.

1 See above, n. 17.


3 See B. Bazan, "La Quaestio 'Disputata', in Les genres littéraires dans les sources théologiques et philosophiques médiévales Louvain-la-Neuve, 1982, pp. 31-49.


5 "Secundum Dionysium VII cap. De divinis nominibus, divina sabientia conjungit principia secundorum ultimis priorum, quia, ut in libris de causis ostendi, in ordine creatorum opertum, quod consequens praeceperit similiter." (In II Sent., d. 39, q. 3, a. 1, c.)


7 See note 5 above.


9 Note that later, in his sixth quaestio of 1301, Peter attributes the version of the axiom of continuity found in the Liber de causis to Proclus. Cf. Joseph Koehl, "Sind die Pygmäen Menschen?", Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 40 (1931), p. 212: "Proclus etiam dicit 29 conclusione libri sui (Gemeint ist wohl der Liber de causis), quod omnis processus entium per similitudinem secundorum ad prima efficitur."

10 St. Albert, Liber De sensu et senso (ed. Borgen), Tr. I, c. 4, pp. 7-8 and c. 9, pp. 28-29; St. Thomas, Sententia liber De sensu, Tr. I, c. 2, 87-130.

11 Tr. I, c. 4, pp. 7-8 and c. 9, pp. 28-29.

12 Cf. Tr. I, c. 8, 22-66.


2 Ibid., pp.18-19: "...quantumcumque modum mixtionis intendet in eiusmod intrinseca, illum modum extrahet natura."


6 Quodlibeta (Louvain, 1961), Quod IV, Q.15, f.cxxiii.

7 Ibid., f.cxxviii.

8 One detail in Peter's Q.36 might suggest that he was also familiar with Godfrey of Fontaine's position on intensive magnitudes. This is the distinction between a form's essential and unchanging nature and its accidental variability, a distinction which Godfrey discusses at greater length in his Quodlibet II, Q.10 (ed. M. de Wulf and A. Pelzer, pp.145-146). However, the verbal similarity between Peter and Godfrey here is not as marked as that between Peter and Henry just noted. Furthermore, by the time of Godfrey's second quodlibet (Easter 1286 according to John F. Wippel in The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaine (Washington, 1981), p.xxvii), Peter apparently had abandoned his philosophical work in the faculty of arts and begun his studies in theology. See below, Volume II, p.xvi.

Cf. the summary of this quaestio from Peter's Metaphysics commentary in L. Hocedez, "Les Quaestiones in Metaphysicam de Pierre d'Auvergne", p.236:

"VIM. 3. Aulum (substantia) suscipiat magis et minus: uno modo aliqua dicuntur secundum magis et minus impropriam, quia est unum primum ad quod referuntur et diversimode se habent ad illud, quedam autem remotius quedam propinquius, et isto modo substantia et forma recipiunt magis et minus." Selon leur degré de perfection les natures se rapprochent plus ou moins de Dieu.

"Alio modo...illa dicuntur propriam recipere magis et minus que participant formam secundum speciem (uamam) diversimode...et isto modo intendit hic (Philosophus)." Dans ce sens, les formes, en général, en tant que telles, ne comportent pas le plus et le moins. Si donc on rencontre du plus et du moins ce ne peut être que par accident.
(preuves): Encore faut-il comprendre que ce ne peut être que la présence dans la matière d’une disposition contraire qui empêche la forme d’avoir dans cette matière sa perfection. Si nous admettons avec le Philosophe que la substance n’a pas de contraire, il suit que la forme substantielle n’admet pas de plus et moins.


11 Ibid., pp.784-785, nn.28-29:
"Sicut apparat in formis accidentalibus secundum quas habentia ipsae dicuntur magis et minus, et sic in eis est aliquomodo divisio secundum plus et minus perfectum.... Sed hoc non potest competere forme substantiali, quoniam ad omne formam, secundum quam habens ipsam divisibile est secundum magis et minus, potest esse motus continuus quo aliquid est cuius acquiretur.... Sed ad substantialem non potest esse motus continuus." Quodl.IV, q.6.... Et plus loin: "ita quod sicut linea se habet ad maius vel minus extensive secundum quantitatem molis, ita forma accidentalis seu passio ad magis vel minus secundum quantitatem perfectionis."

"Cum et minus tali fit magis tale, minus tale non manet in magis tali simpliciter in actu...minus tale corrumpitur. Nec simpliciter in potentia... Relinquitur manere idem medio modo inter actu et potentiam, sc. virtute." Quodl.III, q.13.... "In minimo gradu participata, virtute continet omnes gradus superiores, non actu simul participata; et superiori gradu continet non actu simpliciter, sed virtute, omnes gradus inferiores; participata autem in aliquo gradu intermedium continet superiores et inferiores, virtute tamen, quamvis diversimodo inferiores et superiores sicut in continuo apparat de linea." Quodl.III, q.6....

12 Peter might have found a similar discussion in St. Thomas’ Quæstiones de anima, Q.10, but his consultation of the Summa Theologiae elsewhere suggests that it was also his source here.
CHAPTER FOUR

1 Peter, QDIX, Intro.; St. Thomas, *Sententia libri De sensu...*, Tr. II, c.1, 1-44.

CONCLUSION


4 Gauthier, p.243.

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VOLUME II

Appendix to Part Two: An Edition of Peter of Auvergne's *Quaestiones super Parva naturalia*
INTRODUCTION

1. The Manuscripts

Our edition of Peter of Auvergne's question-commentaries on the first three books of Aristotle's Parva naturalia is based on the following manuscript sources: ff.205ra-219ra, codex 275, Merton College, Oxford (referred to as "O"); and ff.99ra-99va, codex 549 and ff.105rb-106vb, codex 560 of the Bibliotheca Angelica, Rome (referred to as "A").

The Oxford manuscript has been described by U. Coxe, P. Powicke, P. van Steenbergen and H. V. Schooner, whose results we here summarize. Dating from the thirteenth or fourteenth century, it is written in different English hands on parchment in double columns, and is illuminated with red and blue titles of works at the tops of the folios and with alternating red and blue decorations of the initial letters of each work. Consisting of 238 folios of 20 X 28 cms., it contains the following collection of texts:

1. Thomas Aquinas, Sententia super De anima (ff.4ra-43vb)
2. Idem, Sententia super De sensu et sensato (ff.44ra-60va)
3. Idem, Sententia super De memoria et reminiscetia (ff.60vb-66rb)
4. Anonymous, Quaestiones in Aristotelis libros De anima (ff.67ra-84vb) (ed. P. van Steenbergen, Trois commentaires anonymes sur la traite de l'ame d'Aristote, Louvain, 1971)
5. Anonymous, Quaestiones in librum primum De anima (ff.85ra-98ra)
6. Anonymous, Quaestiones aliae in librum primum De anima (ff.98ra-101ra)
7. Giles of Rome, Tractatus de plurificatione possibilis intellectus (ff.101ra-109rb)
8. Anonymous, Quaestiones in libros I et II De anima (ff.108ra-121va) (ed. N. Giele, Trois commentaires...)
9. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatiae de anima (ff.122ra-154va)
10. Idem, *Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus in communi, de caritate et correctione fraterna, de specie virtutibus cardinalsibus* (ff.154va-199ra)

11. Idem, *De unione verbi incarnati* (ff.199ra-204ra)


13. Idem, *Quaestiones super De memoria et reminiscencia* (ff.213vb-217va)


15. Anonymous, *De modo intelligendi* (ff.218va-219ra)


Thus Peter of Auvergne's *quaestiones* on the first three books of the *Parva naturalia*, items 12 to 14 of this list, are found in a collection composed largely of psychological writings, including a number of commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima*. Of particular interest is the presence of a number of important psychological works by St. Thomas Aquinas, namely, his disputed questions on the soul and his commentaries on the *De anima*, *De sensu et sensato* and *De memoria et reminiscencia*. In this collection of texts showing such thematic unity, then, we find St. Thomas' commentaries on the *Parva naturalia* associated with those of his so-called "most faithful disciple", Peter of Auvergne.

Folios 205-219, which contain Peter's three *Parva naturalia* commentaries and the two anonymous pieces *De modo intelligendi* and *De locis*, form a single *libellum* composed of two fascicules of eight folios each, and are written in a single English hand. The handwriting
is regular and generally legible, the use of abbreviations frequent and regular. Except for QQ.5-10 of the De somno commentary, the question titles of Peter's commentaries are repeated, usually in the hand of the original scribe (manus scriptoris), in the lower margins. The scribe who successively transcribed our three commentaries was rather careless in copying his source, though he immediately noticed and corrected some of his errors in the process of transcription. He is also apparently the corrector of 0, who, both in the margins and in the text itself, has thoroughly corrected most of the remaining errors; perhaps using a different stylus, the scribe seems to have reviewed and corrected his work some time after writing it, evidently taking care to ensure that his manuscript is an accurate text, though some errors still remain. In the De sensu and De memoria commentaries, there are also a smaller number of marginalia which are written in a later hand (alia manu), and which are merely notations rather than corrections of the text. And finally, there is a series of X's in the margins indicating problems in the text which have not always been corrected; these might be notations of the original scribe, of the later annotator, or of yet another reader of 0.

Our description of R relies on discussions by H. Warducci and Jan Einborg. Both codices 549 and 560 of R date from the fifteenth century, are written on papyrus in double columns and have richly decorated first pages. Codex 560, which consists of 120 folios of 35 X. 25.2 cms., contains the following texts:

1. Marsilius ab Ingén, Quaestionès super libros Aristotelis De generatione et corruptione (ff. 1-104, 107-110)

2. Boethius de Dacia, Quaestionès super IVM Methoeorum (f. 105ra; continued from codex 549, ff. 83ra-97vb)


6. Aristotelis, *De proprietatibus elementorum, etc.* (ff.117-120)

Codex 549, consisting of 132 folios of 35 x 25 cm.s., is comprised of the following works:

1. Albertus Magnus, *Quaestiones super librum De animalibus* (ff.1ra-79rb)

2. Gerardus de Brolio, *Quaestiones super De generatione animalium* (ff.79ra-82ra)

3. Boethius de Dacia, *Quaestiones super IVm Meteororum* (ff.83ra-97vb; continued in codex 560, f.105ra)

4. Petrus de Alvernia, *Quaestiones super De memoria et reminiscensia* (ff.98ra-99va; continued from codex 560, ff.105rb-106va)

5. Siger de Brabantia (?), *Quaestiones super De somno et vigilia* (ff.99vb-104va)


7. Anonymous, *Quaestiones super De motu animalium* (ff.112rb-122rb)

8. Heinricus de Alemania (?), *Quaestiones super De iuventute et senectute, De vita et morte* (ff.122rb-128rb)

9. Table of questions in these works (ff.122rb-132vb)

As Pinnborg has shown, and as the above makes clear, both Boethius of Dacia's *Quaestiones super IVm Meteororum* and Peter of Auvergne's *Quaestiones super De memoria et reminiscensia* have been broken into two separated fragments. Folios 105rb-106va contain the first eight of Peter's *quaestiones* and break off in the middle of the ninth quaestio with the following words:

...quia unusquisque sensus particularis apprehendit suum proprium objectum; sensus autem communis apprehendit objectum aliorum sensuum et iudicat inter...
This sentence continues in the same hand at the top of f.98ra of Codex 549 under the name of a perplexed reader, *hic deest principium quaestionum De memoria et reminiscencia*:

...ea differentiam, abeunte autem sensibili non remanet impressio vel pictura sensibilis in sensibus propriis neque in sensu commun... and ff.98ra-99va continues the commentary to the end of q.16. Both fragments of the De memoria commentary, as well as the texts surrounding each, are written in the same regular hand. This text is more carefully written than is 0, and most of the few errors are corrected in the text or margin by the scribe. With many minor differences — most notably, the lack of an introduction — K presents the same sixteen quaestiones on the De memoria as does the corresponding section of 0.

It is clear that neither 0 nor K is an author's autograph or a reportatio of an oral performance: the location of each in a decorated manuscript containing a collection of works by different authors points to the activity of copyists writing at leisure rather than the work of an author or auditor, and the presence of such errors as homoioteleuton, and the misapprehension of individual words in what are evidently faults of reading rather than of hearing, confirms that our texts are the work of scribes copying from written materials. Furthermore, since most of the corrections in both manuscripts were made by the copyists, they evidently do not represent the preparation of the text for publication by the author. The assistance of the author would not be required for these corrections, since they can be explained by a re-consultation of the written sources or by consideration of an error's context, and it would leave
unexplained the errors which still remain. Also, the unacknowledged use of St. Thomas as a major source for our commentaries seems to argue against a work prepared for publication, in which such a source would likely be recognized.

While the manuscripts thus appear to be unofficial copies of written materials, they also bear the following traces of an original oral performance: the regular occurrence of quare (or ergo), etcetera, in place of the conclusion of an argument, where the conclusion is too obvious to be spelled out, whether by the speaker himself or by a hearer taking notes; the frequent reiteration of words in a way which is natural to oral, but not written, style; and perhaps the occurrence of an occasional informal question. Again, the constant but unacknowledged dependence of our author on the writings of St. Thomas also suggests an oral performance rather than a work designed for publication. And finally, the form of the commentaries, which are described as quaestiones disputatiae and were apparently delivered in a series of lectiones, places them in the genre of oral question-commentaries which were common in the Parisian faculty of arts after 1260. The original written sources of our texts, then, are either the fairly complete lecture notes of the master who delivered these quaestiones, or reportationes by certain of his auditors; if they are reportationes, the close verbal correspondence of many passages to the texts of St. Thomas from which the master has drawn, together with the perfectly complete structure of each quaestio, indicate either that the reportationes were very carefully dictated and transcribed, or that they were later corrected, perhaps with the help of the master himself or of his lecture notes. Any of these possibilities would
suggest that our manuscripts are fairly faithful records of an
original oral performance.

One of the marginal notes in Q, apparently added in the
course of the scribe's revision, should be mentioned here, since it
may indicate a link between the scribe and his author. Questions
28-30 of Q2s present a discussion of the substantial forms and
qualities of the elements which appears to be based on a passage of
St. Thomas' \textit{De sensu} commentary. In the left-hand margin of f. 209rb,
just above the title of 4.25 (\textit{utrum qualitates elementorum sint formae
substantiales eorum}), the copyist has written \textit{et a...}, a notation which
has been cut off at the edge of the page. In the lower margin, above
the reiteration of the title of 4.25, this notation appears more fully
as: \textit{et a III de et m...}. (Beside this notation in the lower margin,
another, apparently later, note has been erased: \textit{et sub IIII...}; the
\textit{III} was corrected as \textit{III}, which in turn was corrected as \textit{4m}.) Apparently
this notation refers to a question on the third book of the \textit{De caelo
et mundo}, the latter part of which treats of the distinction and
generation of the elements. Now Peter of Auvergne wrote both a
continuation of St. Thomas' unfinished commentary on the \textit{De caelo
et mundo} and a question-commentary of his own on the same work. Might the notation
refer to the latter, indicating a \textit{quaestio} which resembles or has some
bearing on Q.28? Without having seen the manuscripts of Peter's
unedited \textit{quaestiones super libros De caelo et mundo}, it is impossible
to say. If, however, as seems plausible, these are indeed the
\textit{quaestiones} to which the notation refers, the scribe's relation to
Peter may be stronger than that of a mere copyist, since he has
apparently either heard or read Peter's commentary on the \textit{De caelo}
and has recognized some association between them and Peter's QDS.
The early dating of 0 (thirteenth or fourteenth century) does not
exclude the possibility that the scribe might be a student of Peter's,
though there is no definite evidence to support this conjecture.

While the writer of 0 thus could have had some contact with
Peter of Auvergne, the copy of the QDM in R, which Narducci dates from
the fifteenth century, is evidently farther removed from the original
source. We now turn to the relationship between R and the corresponding
section of 0.

2. The Two Copies of the _Quaestiones super De memoria et reminiscencia_

Although the two copies of the QDM continually differ in many
details, both present the same sixteen _quaestiones_ containing the same
arguments for the corresponding parts of each _quaestio_, thus leaving
no doubt that they are transmitting the same question-commentary of
the same author. The important differences between them are a
significant variation in the way the commentary is divided, many minor
differences in diction and word order, and the presence of an
introduction in 0 but not in R.

The structural differences between the two versions involve
the lemmata indicating the reading of Aristotle's text, and certain
programmatic remarks in which Peter groups a number of _quaestiones_
together. There are only three lemmata in 0 (at the beginnings of
QQ. 5, 10 and 14), and these occur in their appropriate places, that
is, at the beginnings of the questions which discuss the sections of
Aristotle's text that they indicate. In R, on the other hand, these
same lemmata occur in earlier questions (QQ. 4, 7 and 9 respectively),
that is, in advance of the questions which are relevant to them; the questions in which they do occur, however, are generally related to earlier sections of Aristotle's text by means of phrases such as de praecedenti lectione or de praecedentibus. Furthermore, R also contains three additional lemmata (in Q.1, 11 and 14) which are not found in O at all. Again, at the beginning of Q.5, O announces the titles of the following five questions (Q.Q.5-9), apparently indicating a grouping of these together in a single teaching session; R, on the other hand, contains no such passage, but by contrast more continuously indicates groupings of questions together by such terms as deinde, consequenter, primo, secundo and tertio. The two different ways in which the commentary is structured, which are outlined on the following page, suggest that R represents six teaching sessions, each introduced by a lemma and consisting of two or three questions, while O represents four teaching sessions, each (except the first) introduced by a lemma and consisting of three to five questions. It is clear that the two divisions of the commentary are incompatible, since Q.6 is called tertio in R, while in O it is secundo and Q.7 is tertio. Now it seems improbable that either division of the text is the result of a revision of the other, since a reviser of O would be unlikely to deliberately displace the lemmata to their positions in R, while a reviser of R would surely make the groupings of questions more explicit than it is in O. The most reasonable conjecture, then, seems to be that our two copies of the QDM represent two versions of the same course, given once by Peter in four sessions, and another time in six. The awkward placing of the lemmata in R could indicate that he was unused to the six-session framework, and perhaps that R represents the later version of the course.
Q.1 Quaeritur primo...
Q.2
Q.3
Q.4
Q.5 Primum quidem de fantasia, etc. ...
Secundo... (q.6)
Tertio... (q.7)
Quarto... (q.8)
Quinto... (q.9)
Q.6
Q.7
Q.8
Q.9
Q.10 Dubitabit autem aliquis propter quid, etc.
Q.11
Q.12
Q.13 De ipsa autem reminisci, etc.
Quaeritur circa istud primo...
Q.14
Q.15
Q.16

Reliquorum autem, etc. (449b3)
Circa istum librum quaeritur...
Consequenter quaeritur...
Tertio quaeritur...

Quoniam autem de fantasia, etc. (449b30)
De lectione praecedenti unum remansit dubium...
Deinde de praesenti lectione quaeritur...
Tertio quaeritur...

Dubitabit autem, etc. (450a25)
De praecedenti lectione remanserunt quaedam dubia. Et primo quaeritur...
Secundo quaeritur...
De reminiscentia, etc. (451a18)
Adhuc quaeritur de praecedentibus...
Deinde quaeritur...
Tertio quaeritur...
Et in hoc differt reminiscentia, etc. (452a4-5)
Adhuc quaeruntur duo de memoria. Primum est...
Secundo quaeritur...
In quo autem dubitabit... (locus non inventus)
Consequenter quaeritur de reminiscencia primo...
Secundo quaeritur...
Tertio quaeritur...
Assuming that this hypothesis of two lecture-courses is correct, we should pause to consider the striking similarity between the two versions of the commentary. Peter has apparently delivered the same question-commentary at different times, using the same quaestiones and exactly the same arguments for the different parts of each quaestio. Moreover, despite continual differences of detail, he has retained a close and constant verbal similarity from one version of the course to the next, and occasionally, as in the following passage from Q.15, a sustained verbal identity:

quia memoria est acceptio aliquis secundum quod prius sensatum vel intellectum, et hoc per se. Reminiscentia autem non est talis acceptio per se, immo in reminiscencia proceditur ad istam acceptionem memoriae ex aliquo principio in memoria retento. Unde...

Was this passage, together with others, delivered exactly as such by Peter on two separate occasions? If so, he must have been equipped either with a powerful verbal memory, or, as seems more likely, with fairly elaborate lecture notes. It would seem, then, that our two copies of the QDM have a common source in such lecture-notes; or again, that they derive from two extremely carefully dictated and transcribed reportationes; or, finally, that they derive from different reportationes corrected with the help of the same lecture-notes. In any case, our hypothesis of two versions of the same course suggests the importance of written texts as the bases for Peter's oral question-commentaries.

The hypothesis of two lecture-series would also explain the many variations between the two texts. These variations, which are of various degrees of significance, may be classified as follows:

1. The most common but least important are differences of vocabulary, which involve both common words (where O has guare, aut,
quamvis, autem, R usually has ergo, vel, licet and sed respectively) and more technical terms (requiruntur and comprehendit in O become exiguntur and apprehendit in R). Again, while O almost invariably introduces the objections with Quod non (or sic) videtur; R usually begins with Arguitur or Videtur quod non/sic. Although such differences could represent changes in Peter's habitual vocabulary, it seems more probable that they result from different expansions of abbreviated formulæ or technical terms occurring in the lecture-notes or in different reportationes.

2. There are many differences of word order between the two versions. Often, as in the opening sentence of Q.1, this difference takes the form of inverted sentence structure:

O: Quaeritur primo utrum de memoria sit scientia, separata a scientia de anima, supposito quod de illa sit scientia.

Circa istum librum, supposito quod de memoria sit scientia, quaeritur utrum sit separata a scientia de anima.

Sometimes, however, the word order differs more drastically, as in the responses of Q.2:


Ad aliud. Dico quod illi qui tardi sunt non de facili recipient. Et ex hoc contingit quod isti postquam receperint vel intellexerint sunt bene memorativi cum bene illud conservant. Unde non valet illud argumentum.

R: Ad rationem. Dicendum quod illum dictum ARISTOTELES non debet intelligi sicut semper sed sicut frequentior. Non enim semper contingit quod tardi sunt semper bene memorativi, sed potest esse impedimentum in organo memoriae. Non tamen hoc impedimentum fit saepe, sed fit in paucis.

Ad aliud. Dicendum quod ratio non valet. Qui enim tardi sunt non de facili recipient eo quod contingit quod cum receperint quod bene retinent et conservant et ideo sunt bene memorativi.

These differences of word order could result from the revisions of a
copyist, but they might just as well indicate different oral deliveries by Peter on the basis of the same lecture-notes. Were it not for our hypothesis of two different lecture-series, one might also suggest that these verbal differences represent different reconstructions of a single oral delivery by Peter in the reportatio of two auditors.

3. Apart from differences in the choice and order of words, there are also instances, usually minor, in which one manuscript is more complete than the other. Most often, though not always, it is \( \mathfrak{r} \) which presents the more finished version. Thus, while \( \mathfrak{0} \) is often content to indicate the conclusion of an argument with quare, etcetera, \( \mathfrak{r} \) will usually spell out the conclusion in full. In many cases the development of an argument is slightly more complete in one version or the other, and occasionally, as at the end of Q.3, the two vary somewhat more significantly:

\[
...et tunc potest esse scientia de illis ut in pluribus vel frequenter, et sciri potest quod illae causae producunt effectum suum vel sicut semper vel sicut frequenter.
\]

\[
...tunc dico secundum quod dicit ARISTOTELES in libro Posteriorum, quod de illis est scientia quia illae causae si non impediantur semper producunt suos effectus.
\]

Such differences may again show Peter improvising twice on the basis of the same lecture notes, and adding to these notes such details as the reference to the Posterior Analytics in \( \mathfrak{r} \).

The introduction to the QDM, which is present in \( \mathfrak{0} \) but absent from \( \mathfrak{r} \), was either delivered at the beginning of the lecture series presented in \( \mathfrak{0} \) or added later by a scribe. The latter possibility seems to be supported by the fact that the introduction in \( \mathfrak{0} \) is an almost literal copy of St. Thomas' introduction to his own De memoria commentary; \( \mathfrak{0} \) even includes the first few words of St. Thomas'.
divisio textus (Dividitur autem idem liber in partes duas, etcetera), which may reveal a scribe copying directly from St. Thomas and going beyond the limits of his assigned text, particularly since the technique of divisio textus occurs nowhere else in our commentaries. On the other hand, the introduction does contain a few small additions to St. Thomas' text, and the introduction to QDS shows a similar, though less literal, dependence on St. Thomas, a dependence which is also present in the quaestiones of both QDS and QDV. Since the Thomistic introduction to QDV in A is in keeping with the general character of our commentaries, and of the work of Peter of Auvergne as a whole, it does seem to belong to the QDM. Its omission in A, then, is probably due to a copyist rather than to Peter himself.

3. Authorship and Date.

There is no apparent reason to doubt the affirmations by the writer of O in the explicit of QDS and QDV that these commentaries are quaestiones disputationes a magistro Petro de Alvernia. That Peter of Auvergne is also the author of QDM is somewhat less clear, since the explicit of this commentary in both O and A leaves it anonymous, a coincidence which may point to a general uncertainty concerning the authorship of this work. However, the later annotator (alio manus) who wrote secundum Petrum de Alvernia at the beginnings of both QDS and QDM either knew of Peter's authorship of QDM or reasonably conjectured it. First of all, the location of QDM between two similar question-commentaries by Peter of Auvergne certainly suggests him as its author: it is likely that Peter would comment on the De memoria after the De sensu rather than jump directly to the De somno, and
Likely again that a copyist would place Peter's De memoria commentary, if it were available, immediately after his QDS. Moreover, the QDS's dependence on St. Thomas is strikingly similar to that of QDS, and typical of Peter's commentaries in general. Again, a comparison between QDS, Q.3 and QDS, Q.10, both of which are concerned with the same issue (utrum memoria insit omnibus animalibus), offers a further indication of a single author for the two commentaries: in both cases the same objection is presented in almost identical terms, and the same argument offered in response. These considerations, together with the overall stylistic similarity between the QDS and our other two commentaries, and the resemblance of all three commentaries to other commentaries of Peter's, indicate his authorship of all of our texts. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, then, we may confidently affirm that Peter of Auvergne is the author of all three of the commentaries on the Parva naturalia presented here.

Where should our commentaries be located in the chronology of Peter of Auvergne's life and works? Our present knowledge of Peter's career is based on the pioneering work of J. Hocedez, who in turn refers to Prologo di Lucca's remark that Peter was St. Thomas' "most faithful disciple, a master in theology and a great philosopher, and finally bishop of Claremont". In keeping with this remark, Hocedez establishes that Peter became master in theology in 1296, delivered six annual quodlibets from 1296 to 1301, was made bishop of Claremont in 1302, and died in 1304. The earlier part of Peter's career, however, is more difficult to describe with precision. Following W. Grabskann, Hocedez argues that Peter must have known St. Thomas personally during the latter's second Parisian sojourn (1269-72), and
he further suggests that Peter became master of arts shortly after St. Thomas' departure for Italy, which occurred on April 25, 1272. Our author may or may not be the Peter of Auvergne who was made rector of the University of Paris by the papal legate Simon de Brie in 1275. In any case, Peter's activities in the faculty of arts, which are undoubtedly the source of his reputation as a philosopher and a disciple of St. Thomas, must be located between his becoming master of arts in the early 1270s and his inception in theology in 1296.

Hocedez indicates that if Peter followed the usual program in theology, he must have begun his theological studies around 1290. This, however, assumes that the normal length of study in the faculty of theology was six years, when in fact, as P. Glorieux has documented, the curriculum in theology lasted at least twelve years. Since Peter became master of theology in 1296, this means that he began his theological studies no later than 1284. Thus, the period of his work in the arts faculty must be from approximately 1272 to 1284.

Peter's writings in "arts", or his philosophical works, consist mainly of his Aristotelian commentaries, which fall into three categories: apart from the group of question-commentaries which comprise the greater number of these works, and which include our own three commentaries, he also wrote "continuations" of St. Thomas' unfinished commentaries on the De caelo et mundo and Politics, and a number of literal commentaries or sententiae, at least two of which were written at the request of his colleagues. If, as Hocedez suggests, the sententiae and continuations are Peter's very first writings, the period of the question-commentaries would be from approximately 1274
to 1284, a decade during which Peter may have combined teaching activity with administrative duties as rector. This dating of the question-commentaries, we may note, is in keeping with suggested dates for Peter's *quaestiones* on the *Metaphysics* (1274–77) and the *Ethics* (1277–83). Our own three question-commentaries, then, seem to belong to this ten-year period in Peter's career. Furthermore, our earlier suggestion that QDS, Q.38 is a response to Henry of Ghent's *Quodlibet IV*, Q.15 (1279–80) indicates that the *terminus a quo* for the *De sensu* commentary must be 1279. There are apparently no such indications of the dates of our other two commentaries, though the sequence of three commentaries in Q seems to point to a unified series of commentaries on the first three books of the *Parva naturalia*. We may affirm, then, that the QDS, and probably the whole of the *Quaestiones super Parva naturalia*, were composed by Peter sometime between 1279 and 1284.


The general title we have given to our group of commentaries—*Quaestiones super Parva naturalia*—refers neither to a series of commentaries on all the books of the *Parva naturalia* nor to all of Peter of Auvergne's commentaries dealing with books of the *Parva naturalia*; rather, it describes the three commentaries on the *Parva naturalia* which Peter composed using the format of *quaestiones*, namely, *Quaestiones super De sensu et sensato*, *Quaestiones super De memoria et reminiscencia* and *Quaestiones super De somno et vigilia*. It should be noted that Peter also wrote literal commentaries or *sententia* on the *De somno et vigilia*, as well as on many other books of the *Parva naturalia*. 
The text of the commentary is accompanied by an apparatus which is composed of two elements: 1) corrections occurring in the manuscripts and the conjectural corrections of the editor are noted; 2) quotations and paraphrases by Peter are provided with references: if a given reference is doubtful, it is followed by a question-mark, and if a passage has not been found, it is designated as locus non inventus; also in this second part of the apparatus, the passages of St. Thomas' De sensu and De memoria commentaries which appear to be the sources of certain quaestiones are indicated (since our text was prepared before the Leonine edition of St. Thomas' De sensu commentary appeared, these passages are referred to according to the lectio and paragraph numbers of the Marietti edition).

For ease of reading, the rudimentary punctuation of the manuscripts has been completed and modern Latin spelling has been adopted. The medieval orthography of a word is given in the apparatus at its first occurrence. The titles of the commentaries and the numbering of the quaestiones have been supplied by the editor.

The two copies of the QDM, we have suggested, represent two versions of the same course given by Peter at different times. Rather than give precedence to one version or the other, we have decided to present the text of O alongside that of X, thereby allowing a continuous comparison between the two.

In conformity with the recommendations of the Société internationale pour l'étude de la philosophie médiévale, the following signs and abbreviations have been used:

< > additions of the editor, accompanied in the apparatus (except in the case of titles and question numbers) by the abbreviation subpl.
add.: addidit
al.: man.: alia manu
cod.: codex
coni.: conicimus
corr.: correxit
del.: delevit
dub.: dubitanter
eras.: erasit
exp.: expunxit
f.: folio
inf.: inferior
iter.: iteravit
lin.: linea
man.: manu
marg.: margo, in margine
praem.: praemittit
scr.: scripsit
subl.: sublineavit
sup.: supra, superior
suppl.: supplivi (supplied by the editor)
The manuscripts have been studied by means of microfilms kindly provided by the Comissio Leonina, Grottaferrata, Italy.


3 These notations by the later hand are as follows: secundum Petrum de Alvernia at the beginnings of QDS (f.205ra) and QDM (f.213vb); the title of QDS, Q.9-11 (f.206va); the word quaestio at the beginnings of QDS, Q.29 (f.209rb) and Q.39 (f.210va); a picture of a hand pointing to the beginning of the corpus of QDW, Q.9 (f.215va); the title of QDM, Q.4 (f.214va); a fairly lengthy summary of QDW, Q.9 (f.215va); and the correction non sunt added in the margin of QDM, Q.13 (f.216rb).

4 There are fourteen X's in QDS (ff.205rb, 205va, 207vb(2), 208ra(2), 209rb, 210va, 211ra, 211rb, 213ra, 213rb, 213va), one in QDW (f.213vb), and one in QDSF (f.217va).


6 Pinborg, pp.374-375.

7 See, for instance, QDS, Q.6 and QDM(1), Q.8.

8 Angulo, for instance, is written for oculo in QDS, Q.19, and arquo for arduo in QDSV, Q.5.

9 Such, at least, is the kind of argument used by Antonio Marlasca in his edition of *Les Quaestiones Super Librum De Causis de Siger de Brabant* (Louvain-Paris: Publications Universitaires-Beaute Nauwelaerts, 1972), pp.12-13: "Un autre indice semble trahir l'enseignement oral: le silence absolu de l'auteur sur sa source lorsqu'il exploite littéralement certains écrits de saint Thomas. Le professeur n'est pas tenu de citer toutes les sources qu'il a utilisées dans la préparation de son cours; il peut même se permettre de reproduire plus ou moins littéralement certains passages d'écrits peu connus à la Faculté des arts, certains que ses auditeurs ne s'en apercevront pas. Un tel plagiat inavoué serait exclu d'une œuvre destinée à la publication."

Whatever the validity of this argument, it would apply as much to our own text as to that edited by Marlasca.

10 For instance; *eum qui appetit bellum propter bellum eum sequatur horror interfectionis* (QDS, QQ.3-4); Dico quod non oportet quod si illa apparitio sit per receptionem et similibiter videbre, quod
illa apparitio sit visio (QDS, Q.16); ex quo contingit quod cum reperiret quod bene retenit (QDS, Q.2).

11 See QDS, QQ.6, 51.
12 Cf. n.9 above.
13 Tr.I, c.9, 115-157.
15 If the brief lemmata are any indication, it would seem that 0 and 1 are using different translations of the De memoria. The lemmata in QDS and in both versions of QDM differ in part from the corresponding passages of the nova translatio presented in the Lehnine edition of Sententiae libri De sensu et sensato... It may be that even though Peter commented on the De sensu and De memoria after St. Thomas did, he nevertheless used the vetus translatio.
16 Another indication that the introduction in QDM might have been added on as an afterthought is the lack of a transition sentence between the introduction and Q.1 such as is found in QDS: et sunt quaedam communia quaerenda.
17 "La vie et les oeuvres de Pierre d' Auvergne", Gregoriam 14 (1933), pp.14-16.
18 Ibid., pp.9, 13. On the dates of St. Thomas' career, see J. A. Weishäupl, Friar Thomas d' Aquino: His Life, Thought and Works, p.352.
19 Hocedez ("La vie...", p.10) leaves this point unsettled. More recent historians assert quite confidently that the "disciple" of St. Thomas was the Peter of Auvergne named rector in 1275; see P. van Steenberghe, La Philosophie au XIIIe siècle, p.376 and K.-A. Gauthier, "Les Questiones super librum Ethicorum de Pierre d' Auvergne", p.235.
24 Ibid.

26 The possibility, briefly discussed above in Volume I, p. 255, n. 8 that Peter's digression on intensive magnitudes in QDS may show him to be familiar with Godfrey of Fontaine's *Quodlibet II* of 1286 would, of course, alter the dating proposed here. However, since Peter had apparently begun his theological studies by the time of Godfrey's second *quodlibet*, he must have drawn on another source for the details which seem to be taken from Godfrey.


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Q.9 Utrum somnientes facientes opera vigilium sint dormientes

Q.10 Utrum apparitiones et fantasmata quae sunt in alienatis et in his quae avertunt a sensibilibus sint somnia
Sicut dicit PHILOSOPHUS in sexto Metaphysicis, tres sunt scientiae speculativae, scilicet naturalis, mathematica, et divina. Divina est de abstractis secundum esse et secundum considerationem; mathematica autem est de abstractis secundum considerationem, conunctatis tamen secundum esse; naturalis autem est de concreta secundum esse et considerationem cum materia sensibilis abstractis tamen e materia signata et individuali. Ratio autem istius duplex est. Prima est qua scientia est sicut res; quidam est potentia. Potentia autem diversificatur per actus, et actus per scientiam. Quae autem scientiae sunt ipse scilibilium et idem scientia diversificatur secundum diversitatem scilibilium. Nunc autem tres sunt scilibiles sicut sunt intelligibles; autem intelligibles sicut sunt a materia separabiles, sicut dicitur tertio De anima. Quia igitur sunt quaedam separata a materia sensibilii et secundum esse et secundum considerationem;

1-2 QUESTIONES SEPAR LIEBURN. DE SENSI ET SENSATO DISPUTATAS A MAGISTRO PETRO DE ALVERNIA.

et sunt quaedam separata secundum considerationem fiant,
quae tamen sunt in re secundum esse: et quaedam sunt
separata: solum a materia signata et individuali;  23 ista,
cum istis tribus modis possint esse separata, ideo possunt
tribus modis intelligi et esse obiecta scientiarum
diversarum. Alia ratio abstractionis est quia, secundum
Aristotelis in Posterioribus, definitio est principium
demonstrationis; demonstratio autem est syllogismus faciens
scire, et ita definitio est principium scientiae. Propter
50 hoc, secundum diversum modum definiendi rerum sunt scientiae
diversae de rebus. Antia autem quae sunt a materia
separata simpliciter non accipiunt in sua definitione
materiam. Item, entia separata solum secundum
considerationem accipiunt in sua definitione materiam
intelligibilem et non sensibilem. Antia autem separata
solum a materia individuali signata accipiunt in sua
definitione materiam sensibilem communem. Propter ergo
istum diversum modum definiendi sunt diversae scientiae
de his.

35
40

Istae igitur scientiae diversificantur secundum
diversam abstractionem et continuationem ad materiam, et

23 ista: et praem. cod.
26 qua re quae: quare cod.: corr. marg.
34 accipiant:
H118 cod. (fere omnes)
isto modo diversificantur partes scientiae naturalis
secundum quod naturalia diversimode comparantur ad materiam.
Universalia enim magis, magis sunt abstracta, et ideo
scientia de ipsis naturalibus in communi prior est, nam
a communioribus incipiendum est, secundum ARISTOTELES
primo Physicorum. Et istum ordinem servat. Et ideo primo
tradit nobis scientiam de naturali auditu, in quo
determinatur de principiis entium mobilium, absolute.

Deinde processit applicando ista universalia ad mobilia
particularia magis, sicut de mobilibus ad locum, sicut in
libro De caelo et mundo. Deinde ad mobilia secundum
formam, sicut ad generabilia et corruptabilia, sicut in
libro De generatione; ibi enim determinatur de generatione
et corruptione in communi, et de generatione corporum
primorum. Deinde ad mobilia magis in speciali, sicut in
libro Meteorchorum; determinat enim ARISTOTELES ibi de
generatione cometarum, de galaxia et impressionibus in
alto generatis, etcetera.

Deinde applicat ipsa ad viventia, et hoc primo
determinans illud quod est commune omnibus viventibus,
sicut de anima et potentiiis eius; deinde comparando
partes animae ad organa; <deinde> determinando qualia


I Meteor., lect. I, n. 4.
viventia qualia debent habere organa: Prima consideratio

datur (in) libro De anima, secunda in Artiliae libris naturalibus, tertia in libro De animalibus; et ista tres
habet partes: una est De partibus animalium, secunda De
historiae <animalium>, tertia De generatione animalium.
Ille autem consideratio quae est de operationibus animalium
per corpora: ad organum corporum traditur in Artiliae
2.205rd. libris. Unde quo organa et qualiter disposita
requirantur ad exercendum operationem sentiendi determinat
<in> libro De sensu; quae etiam sunt partes pertinentes ad
motum determinat <in> libro De motu animalium; hic
igitur patet qualiter intendendum est hic.

et secundum quod dicit Aristoteles, quatuor sunt
termae viventium. Quae quidem quae habent vegetativum
solum, ut plantae; sunt aliis quae habent sensitivum, non
tamen sunt processiva, ut eponyma maxo, etcetera;
quae autem habent ista simul, sicut animalia perfecta;
et quae autem ultra ista habent intellectivum, sicut homo.
Appetitivum non facit gradum separatum; inno ubi est
sensitivum, et appetitivum, secundum Aristoteles, secundo
De anima. Inter autem istas partes animae quae faciunt

64 quidem: cuinde cod. 65 in: suppl. 68 historiae: hystoriae
cod. // animalium: suppl. 70 corporeum: corporis praeae. cod del.
cod. 71 unde: bene cod., del. et corr. marg. in. 72 sentiendi
determinat: sibi idem cod., del. et corr. marg. 73 in: suppl.
del. 74 in: suppl. 75 sensitivum: ssin cod. 79 sponega: sponega cod.
71 intellectivum: intitl cod. 84 autem: sup.

76 Arist., De anima, II, 2, 413a22-313 83-84 Arist., De anima, II, 3, 414b15-16
Gradus separatum, solum intellectus non habet organum.
Et ideo non potest esse scientia diversa dic intellectu,
ita quod una sit de ipso in se, et alia de ipso in comparatione ad organum. Aliae autem potentiae sunt
organizatae et existentes in organo, et ideo de istis
potest esse duplex consideratione: una in se, alia in
applicatione ad organum corporis.

Et illa quae est de partibus existentibus in organo
tres habet partes. Una continent vivum et ea quae pertinent
ad ipsum secundum quod huiusmodi, et ista datur <in> libro
De morte et vita, sicut de inspiratione et respiratione;
et in eodem traditur De juventute et senectute, et De
nutrimento et nutribili, <et> De sanitate et aeditudine,
quae faciunt diversitatem in ipsis viventibus. Aliae pertinent
ad motum, et illa traditur <in> libro De motibus animalium
et in libro De progressu corundem. Tertia consideratione
pertinet ad sensitivum, et ista traditur <in> libro De
sensu et sensato et De memoria et reminiscencia, etiam
in libro De somno et vigilia. Ista etiam different inter se,
quae <in> libro De sensu considerantur ea quae pertinent
ad actum sensus exterioris, ut de colore et odorabili;
in libro autem De memoria et reminiscencia traditur

93 vivum: unum cod. exp. et corr. mars. 94 in: suppl.
95 morte: motu et praem. sed del. cod. 97 et: suppl.
100 Tertia: alia cod. 101 traditur: pertinet et praem. cod. //
105 exterioris: extº cod. corr. mars.
cognitio eorum quae pertinent ad actu sensus interioris; et in libro de somno et vicilia determinatis de his quae faciunt diversitates in actu sentienti, ut de somno, qui
licet ipsos sensus — est enim sensus ligamentum sensuum secundum ARISTOTELEM —, et ubi determinatur de vicilia, quae non licet sensus. Apparet igitur de quo est intentio in istis: quonia (est) de partibus animae ut ordinantur ad organum corporum.

115 est diocèsum quin sit ordo istorum. Ordo autem istorum librorum naturalium sicut est: verum est quod eorum subalternantur libro de anima. Ibi igitur illum librum de anima implevit sequitur liber de sensu et sensato, quia sentire magis consequitur animam quam corpus. Aliae autem magis sequuntur corpus, et ideo sunt magis ad materiam applicatae. Illa ergo operatio quae magis sequitur animam est sentire, de quo determinatur in libro De sensu et sensato et de memoria et reciniscientia et de morte et vita. Deinde sequitur illa consideratio quae 120 pertinent ad motivum, de motibus animalium; deinde illa quae pertinent ad vivum; quia magis coniuncta est quae materia.

Apparet igitur quae est intentio in libro isto, quia hic docet qualia instrumenta et qualiter disposita

122 in: suppel. 121 applicatae: applicata cod.

111 ARIST., De somno et vicilia, 1, 454b9-11
130 requiruntur ad operationem sentiendi. Item; hic determinatur de unoquoque sensibili secundum se: quid sit color, sapor, etcetera.

<QUÆSTIO 1>

UTRUM UNIVERSALITER INTELLECTUS INTELLIGENDO ABSTRAHAT A MATERIA

Sunt quaedam communia quaerenda. Suppositum est enim quod secundum diversum modum abstractionis sunt scientiae diversae; idem queritur utrum universaliter intellectus intelligendo abstrahat a materia.

Quod sic; probatio. Quia intellectus secundum suam essentiam est separatus ab organo corporeo et materia, f.205va quare illud quod recipitur in ipso erit denudatum.

Omne tale est abstractum. Quare intellectus abstrahit intelligendo.


Intelligendum quod intellectus secundum PHILOSOPHUM est abstractus a materia et ab organo corporeo. Ipsa autem


128-132 hic...etcetera; cf. S. THOMAS, In De sensu, lect. 1, n. 8; lect. 3, n. 33; lect. 6, n. 79. 16 ARIST., De anima, III, 4, 429a24-b5
intellectus recipit cognitionem et intellectum rerum.
Et ideo necesse est quod omnis intellectus rerum, et
omnis cognition, sit abstracta tali modo quod non sit in
organo corporeo. Verumtamen, non oportet quod intellectus
alicuius sit alicuius considerati et abstracti praeter
materiam intelligibilem vel sensibilem, vel materiam
individualis: nam intelligendo rectum intelligimus ipsum
in continuo: item, intelligendo naturalia intelligimus
materiam ut subjectum, hoc in hoc; intelligimus etiam
singulare, sicut docet ARISTOTELES in tertio De anima.
Unde isti intellectus sunt abstracti quia non sunt in
materia vel organo sensibili, tamen non sunt isti intellectus
aliquor abstractorum et consideratorum praeter materiam.
Unde intellectus singulus est intellectus abstractus,
sed non est alicuius considerati et abstracti a materia.

Ad rationem. Dicendum quod intellectus quem recipit
ipse intellectus possibilis est abstractus, cum non sit
in organo; sed non oportet quod sit alicuius abstracti
et considerati absque materiam.

20 cognitio: s praem. sed del. cod. 21 Verumtamen: verumtamen
cod. (fere omnes) 24 individualem: indivisibilem cod. del. et
31 singulius: simil cod. exp. et corr. marg. 32 sed: iter. marg.
33 quod: idem cod. del. et corr. sup. lin.

27 ARIST., De anima, III, 8, 432a3-6
<QUÆSTIO 2>

UTrum de operationibus potentiarum animae dedit esse alia scientia a scientia de anima

Quod non, probatio: quia in libro De anima est determinatum de anima et operationibus eius; unde ibi docet quid est sensus et quid sentire, utrum sit actio vel passio. Quare praeter illam non erit alia scientia de his.

Item,〈In〉 libro De anima non tantum est determinatum de anima, sed etiam de corpore, quia tangere de anima et nihil de susceptibili inconveniens est. Ergo ibi determinat de operationibus totius. Ergo non est alia consideratio de operationibus potentiarum animae.

Ad oppositum est ARISTOTELES, qui tradit nobis istam scientiam de sensu et sensato.

Intelligendum quod inter partes animae solus intellectus non habet organum, et ideo sola consideratio de intellectu est secundum se. Aliae autem partes, ut sensitivum et motivum, habent organum, et ideo de eis duplex potest esse consideratio. Una secundum se, et si in illa consideratione consideretur corpus, hoc non est nisi pro quanto est subjectum eorum: qui enim considerat formam, ille necessario considerat materiam, secundum COMMENTATORUM, secundo PHYSICorum; considerat enim usque ad hoc quod sit subjectum illius

2-3 UTRUM..., ANIMA: iter. marg. inf. 9 In: suppl. 10 etiam: suppl. 11 susceptibili: suppl scri. sed corr. sup. lin. cod. 18-19 sensitivum <et> motivum: motivum sensitivum scr. sed signo mediante intervertit; et suppl.

formae, sed non considerat omnia illa quae consequuntur materiam et quod potest considerari de illa materia; unde cum in scientia de anima consideratur corpus, non consideratur omnia quae possunt considerari de corpore. Et ideo praeter considerationem illam est aliam consideratio de operationibus potentiarum per applicationem ad organa dicendo quae sunt illa et quomodo disposita, quod tamen non docuit prius. Verum est quod dictum est in libro De anima <quae> sunt operationes totius; sed quomodo sunt disposita non docuit.

Ad rationem. Dicendum quod in libro De anima determinatum est de operationibus in se, non tamen quae natura corporea et qualiter disposita exigitur ad exercendum tales operationes.

Ad aliud. Quamvis sit ibi determinatum de corpore tamquam de subiecto animae, non tamen determinatum est quae sunt organa et qualiter disposita ad sentiendum. <Haec> non docet ibi ARISTOTELIS, et ideo haec docet hic.
<QUAESTIO 3>

UTRUM MEMORIA INSIT OMNIBUS VIVENTIBUS

<QUAESTIO 4>

UTRUM IRA INSIT OMNIBUS ANIMALIBUS

"Quoniam autem de anima secundum seipsam
determinatum est...."

Utrum memoria insit omnibus viventibus.
Quod sic, probatio: quia sensus inest omnibus animalibus. Sed memoria causatur ex sensu. Quare,
etcetera.

Oppositum innuit PHILOSOPHUS in littera.
Utrum ira insit omnibus animalibus.
Quod sic, probatio: quia omnibus animalibus inest appetitus concupiscibilis. Ergo eadem ratione appetitus irascibilis.

Item. Natura intendit salutem animalium. Sed si animal debet salvari, non solum oportet quod tendat ad id quod est delectabile secundum sensum, sed oportet quod animal resista contrariis corruptentibus defendendo.

Ergo oportet quod appetitus irascibilis, qui est propugnatrix ipsius concupiscibilis, sicut dicitur in Moralibus, insit omnibus animalibus ut resistat contrariis.

2 UTRUM...VIVENTIBUS: marg. inf. 4 UTRUM...ANIMALIBUS: marg. inf.
5-6 Quoniam...est: subl. 8 omnibus: iter. cod. 17 solum: marg.
20-21 propugnatrix: propugnatrix cod.

QUAESTIONES 3-4: cf. S. THOMAS, In De sensu, lect. 1, nn. 11-12
5-6 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 1, 435a1 11 ibid., 436a10-11
21 locus non inventus
Oppositum dicit littera: "Haec fere omnibus insunt"; et dicit "fere" propter memoriam et iram.

Dicendum quod, secundum quod dicit PROCLUS, non quodcumque ordinis inferioris participat similitudinem eius quod est proprium ordinis superioris; sed solum illa quae sunt perfecta in ordine inferiori attingunt ad simulitudinem eius quod est proprium ordinis superioris.

Dico igitur quod duplex est ordo: <ordo> naturae intelligibilis et ordo naturae sensibilis, et iste ordo est inferior; et non oportet quod omnia animalia quae sensum participant attingant ad simulitudinem intellectus, sed solum animalia perfecta.

Et intelligendum quod sensus est cognoscitivus praesentium, memoria praeteritorum et non praesentium. Et in hoc quod memoria est praeteritorum attingit ad simulitudinem intellectus. Nam intellectus est universalium et semper existentium et absentium; intelligit enim intellectus hominem absentem. Et ideo solum animalia perfecta habent memoriam. Unde solum illa animalia debent habere memoriam quae moverunt ad aliquid distans; quia nisi in eis per memoriam remaneret intentio praecognita per sensum, non possent continuare motum ad finem et usque ad aliquid

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distans, unde ex illa intentione praecipue et retenta
continuavit motum. Animalibus autem imperfectis sufficit
solum apprensio sensibilis et imaginatio apud praeceptam
tantum, quia non habent motum ad aliquid distans.

Item. Appetitus qui est aliquid delectabilis
secundum sensum ipsa est secundum propriam rationem sensus.
Talem autem appetitum habet omnia animalia; appetitum enim
omnia animalia aliquid delectabile secundum sensum. Iste
autem appetitus est concupiscibilis; et ideo omnia habent
appetitum concupiscibilem. Irascibilis autem non est
omnibus, quia appetitus irascibilis est quo aliquis tendit
in aliquid laboriosum; quod quidem non est bonum secundum
se, ut pugna. Bellum enim non est bonum propter se, sed
propter pacem; unde PHILOSTORUS in Moralibus (dicit quod)
eum qui appetit bellum propter bellum sequatur horrorem
interfectionis. Iste igitur appetitus ad aliquid bonum
propter aliud aliquid modo attingit similitudinem intellectus,
qui considerat aliquid propter finem. Et ideo non
omnia habent appetitum irascibilem, sed animalia perfecta
in ordine inferiore.

Ad rationem. Dico quod non omnia animalia habent
illum sensum a quo causatur memoria. Verum tamen est quod

47 imaginatio: imaginatio cod. (omnes)  51 autem: am cod.
56 quidem: quid ser. cod. sed corr. marg.  58 dicit quod: subpl.
59 bellum: eum add. cod.  61 aliud: et add. sed eras. cod.
66 tamen: sup. lin.

58 locus non inventus
in habentibus memoriam causatur ex sensu; sed in non habentibus memoriam non causatur ex sensu. 

Ad rationem alterius quaestionis. Dico quod non est simile, quia appetitus irascibilis similitudinem habet cum intellectu, et appetit bonum quod est propter alium bonum. Non sic autem concupiscibilis attingit similitudinem intellectus.

Ad alium. Verum est quod natura intendit salutem animalium, et propter hoc dedit natura omnibus animalibus sensum tactus. Est tamen intelligendum quod natura salutem quorumdam animalium intendit plus, quorumdam autem minus. Istit autem animalibus quorum natura plus intendit salutem dedit natura plus quam sensum tactus, ut possint discernere quid nocetum et quid non a longae. Istis dedit animalibus appetitum irascibilem, ut ipsa possint resistere contrariis corruptentibus defendendo. Et ideo, cum natura plus et minus intendit salutem animalium, non oportet quod omnibus dedit virtutem irascibilem.
〈QUÆSTIO 5〉

UTRUM ISTAE PASSIONES - IRA, DESIDERIUM, ETCETERA - SINT COMMUNES ANIMÆ ET CORPORI

Quod non, probatio: quia quidam est appetitus intellectualis, ut voluntas, quae non habet organum, sicut nec intellectus. Ergo non omnis appetitus habet organum.

Oppositum. Dicit PHILOSOPHUM quod ira et desiderium et omnino appetitus sunt communes animae et corpori.

Dico quod quidam est appetitus sensitivus et quidam intellectualis. Cuius ratio est quia appetitus sequitur cognitionem. Contingit autem cognoscere aliquid sub ratione qua bonum vel malum, ratiocinando et intelligendo, et istam cognitionem consequitur appetitus intellectualis qui dicitur voluntas, unde voluntas est in solo ratiocinativo, sicut dicitur tertio De anima. Contingit etiam cognoscere bonum vel malum sentiendó per sensum et imaginacionem, istam cognitionem consequitur appetitus sensitivus, sicut aliquis feriens appetit vinum vel appetit refrigerium. Isté appetitus est ex cognitione sensitiva. Isté appetitus dividitur in duo: in concupiscibilem et irascibilem. Concupiscibilis est alicuius delectabilis secundum sensum; irascibilis est appetitus quod aliquis tendit in aliquod laboriosum et quod


7. ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 1, 436a6-10. 15. ARIST., De anima, III, 9, 433a6-8 (??)
nón est bonum propter se, sed propter aliud; secundum quod
aliquis resistit contrariis corrumpentibus defendendo.

Dico igitur quod ARISTOPHANES non facit hic mentionem
dе appetitu intellectuali quia iste non est in organo, sicut
nec intellectus, sed salum loquitur de appetitu "sensitivo".
Ut appetitus iste denominatur a quibus passionibus manifestis,
sicut ab ira et desiderio. Ut quia sunt alia quae pertinent
ad appetitum sensitivum, ut amar, spes, etcetera, ideoque dicit
PHILOSOPHUS quod "ira, desiderium, et omnino appetitus sunt
propria ipsi sensitivo"; et per hoc quod dicit "et omnino
appetitus" intendit alia secundum appetitum sensitivum et
non intellectualem.

"QUAESTIO 6"

INQUISTITUR DEBEAT CONSIDERANDAE SANITATIS ET ASAMAITUDINES

quia non, probatio: quia sanitas et sensitudo sunt
de consideratione medici, quare non naturalis vel qualiter
differunt?

Item. Cuius est cognoscere sanitatem eius est inducere sanatum; cuius ratio videtur esse quia sanitas
per cognitionem inducitur. Sed ipsius naturalis non est
inducere sanatum, quia non est artifex operativus.

Quare, etcetera.

Item. Sanae est a natura et ab arte. Sed naturalis debet considerare omnia quae sunt a natura. Quare, etcetera.

20 Dico quod naturalis debet considerare principia universalia sanitatis et aegritudinis. Cuius ratio duplex est. Una quia naturalis debet considerare proprium subiectum istarum passionum, sicut corpus vivum; et cuius est considerare subiectum eius est considerare passiones. Alia ratio est quod sanitas et aegritudo fiunt a natura; et talia debet naturalis considerare.

Est etiam intelligendum quod sanitas et aegritudo sunt de consideratione medici, sed differenter a naturali, f.206rb quia naturalis considerat principia universalia istorum, medicus tamen, cum sit artifex operat evus, considerat sanitatem et aegritudinem quoad principia particularia. Debet enim medicus, secundum quod practicus et operatius artifex,
cognoscere aegritudinem et causam aegritudinis in hoc sub-
jecto, aut aliter non poterit in eo inducere sanitatem.

35 Item. Medicus est agens secundum artem. Ars autem est adiuvans naturae, et non est agens principaliter ut in-
ducens sanitatem et aegritudinem. Ut ideo medicus sic in-
ducit quod supponit sua principia a naturali, sicut gubern-
nator navis supponit quaedam principia ab astrologe. Quod

40 enim talis herba sanat talia: aegritudinem, hoc scit medicus
per signum aliquod; propter quid autem scit naturalis et in
universalis, quia naturalis habet considerare causas actionis
et passionis in universalis, quare hoc agit in hoc, etcetera.

45 Ideo medicus considerat sanitatem et aegritudinem consideran-
do quaedam dicta in naturali philosophia. Si autem sit ali-
quid quod non sit factum a natura, sed arte, ut domus vel
archa, illud non est de consideratione naturalis, sicut si
aliquid sit solum a natura, et non ab arte, illud non est
de consideratione alium artificis mechanici, nisi solum

50 eo quod alquis artifex utitur his, scilicet naturalibus,
tamquam materia.
QUAESTIO 7
UTRUM SENSITR E SIT COMMUNE ANIMAE ET CORPORI

Quod non, probatio: quia potentia sensitiva videtur esse potentia animae et non potentia corporis. Sed cuius est potentia eiusdem, est actus. Ergo cum potentia sensitiva non sit passio corporis, sentire erit operatio animae et non corporis.

Ad oppositum ARISTOTELES.

Dicendum quod sentire est commune animae et corpori.

Ratione patet hoc, quia sensus immutatur a corpore sensibili; hoc autem non esset nisi sensus esset corporeus et haberet organum. Si enim intellectus transmutatur a corporibus caelestibus, hoc est per accidentem, quia corpora caelestia agunt in inferiora calidum vel frigidum, et ex hoc insurgit sensus, ut imaginatio vel fantasia, et cetera, et tunc intellectus. Sed corpora caelestia agunt in sensum, et ideo oportet quod sit corporeus.

Item, per experimentum: quia turbato aliquo organo impeditur operatio sentiendi, et ablato ipso aufertur tota liter potentia sentiendi. Unde videmus sensibiliter quod visus est in oculo et auditus in auro, ita quod ablato oculo aufertur visus.

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QUAESTIO 7: cf. S. THOMAS, In De sensu, lect. 1, n. 17
8 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 1, 436b6-8
Ad rationem. Dicendum quod potestia sensitiva non est solum animae nisi sicut principii, sed est totius con-
iuncti ex anima et corpore sicut subjici et ideo sentire
similiter.

<QUÆSTIO 8>

UTRUM SENTIÆ IN ANIMA PÆR CORPUS

Quod non, probatio sita in libro De anima dicitur
quod sentire inest corpori per animam; quare non inest
animae per corpus.

Item. Si insit corpori per animam, situr habetur
libro De anima, et inest animae per corpus, tunc idem erit
causa et effectus respectu eiusdem. Hoc non est possibi-
le. Quare, etcetera.

Oppositum dicit ARISTotelis in littera.

Dicendum quod aliquod compositum ipsum est per ma-
teriam et etiam per formam, ita quod forma est causa materi-
æ et e converso. Est enim forma causa materiae situt dans
esse eidem; materia causa est forma sicut subjici et. Simi-
liter dico in proposito: sensus compositus est ex materia
et forma, scilicet ex virtute sensitiva et ex organo. Dico
ergo quod sentire attribuitur corpori per animam sicut per
formam; e converso autem attribuitur animae per corpus ut-

2 UTRU...CORPUS: iter. marg. inf. 3 est: suppl.

3 ARIST., De anima, II, 12, 424a26-28 7 ibid.
10 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, I, 436b6-8
per subiectum et materiam. Unde quod aliquid sit causa et 20 causatum in diverso genere causae non est inveniens, quia ambulatio est causa effectiva sanitatis, sanitas autem causa ambulationis sicut finis.

Sic patet ad rationes.

〈QUAESTIO 9〉

UTRUM SENSUS TACTUS SIT NECESSARIUS OMNI ANIMALI

〈QUAESTIO 10〉

UTRUM GUSTUS SIT NECESSARIUS ANIMALI

f.206va  "Sed de sensu et sentire quid sit, etcetera."

Utrum sensus tactus sit necessarius omni animali.

Quod non, probatio: quia inanimata et plantae cor-

rumpi possunt a tangibilius sicut et animalia. Sed inani-
matis et plantis non inest sensus tactus propter salytem ut 10 salventur a corrumpentibus. Ergo sensus tactus non inerit animalibus propter salutem.

Oppositum....

Utrum gustus sit necessarius.

Quod non, probatio: quia plantae corrumpuntur prop-

15 ter defectum cibi et moriuntur sicut animalia, et tamen plantae non habent sensum gustum. Quare, etcetera.

Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS in littera.
Intelligendum quod sensus tactus est necessary
animali quia animal est animal propter sensum; in hoc enim
quod est sentire vel non sentire determinatum est animal a
non animali.

Item. Sensus tactus est necessary animali propter
finem. Animal enim est compositum mixtum ex calido, frigido,
humido et sicco; et ei necessaria est commensuratio calidi
et frigidi, et excellens calidum vel frigidum corrumpit
animal. Et ideo datus est sensus tactus animali ut co-
noscat per tactum tangibilitia convenientia et nociva.

Similiter dico sensus gustus est necessary animali
quia animal est vivum et nutritile; ei autem secundum
quod vivum et nutritile competit cibus conveniens, et con-
trarium huius corrumpit ipsum vivum. Et ideo animali datus
est sensus gustus ut cognoscat quis cibus sit conveniens et
quis non conveniens. Unde natura, magis intendens salutem
animalium quam planitarum vel inanimatorum, dedit animalibus,
quae sunt in gradu superiori, tactum et gustum, et non
plantis vel inanimatis.

Ad primam rationem. Dicendum - "per hoc quod plan-
tae corrumpuntur, et<æteræ, et tamen non inest eis sensus
tactus" - quia animal in hoc excedit inanimatum et plantam
et quod habet cognitio<æm rerum." Unde magis intendit natura

23. Animal: ali praem. sed del, cod. 29, 30 nutritile: intelii-
gibile scr. cod. sed del. et corr. marg. 31 huius: sup. lin.
32 cognoscat: ut praem. sed del. et exp. cod.
salutem animalis, et ideo dat ei sensum tactus, quam aliis, ut plantis, etcetera.

Ad secundum. Dicendum quod verum est quod plantae non habent sensum gustus; non tamen sequitur quod animal non habeat, quia animal est in gradu excellentiori, et magis intendit natura salutem eius.

<QUÆSTIO 11>
UTRUM SENSUS VISUS MAGIS CONFERAT AD SCIENTIAM QUAM SENSUS AUDITUS

<QUÆSTIO 12>
<UTRUM AUDITUS PER ACCIDENTES MAGIS CONFERAT AD SCIENTIAM>

5 Utrum sensus visus magis conferat ad scientiam quam sensus auditus.

Quod sic, probatio: quia ille sensus qui nobis ostendit plures differentias rerum magis videtur facere ad scientiam. Sensus visus est huiusmodi, secundum quod dicit littera. Quare magis conferat ad scientiam.

Item. Ille sensus qui est certior et discretior magis videtur facere ad scientiam quam alius qui non est ita certus. Sed sensus visus est huiusmodi respectu sensus auditus; est enim certior et discretior. Quare, etcetera.

10 Item. Sensus visus plus facit ad inventionem scientiae quam sensus auditus. Sed non potest esse scientia per

43 secundum: ss scriptae, cod. sed exp. et corr. marg. iter. marg. 4 UTRUM...SCIENTIAM: suppl.

9-10 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 1, 437a5-7.
QUÆSTIONES 11-12: cf. S. THOMAS, In De sensu, lect. 2, nn. 30-31
doctrinam nisi praecedat inventio. Ergo, si visus magis facit ad inventionem, quare magis conferit ad scientiam.

Oppositum. Auditus plus facit ad scientiam, saltem per accidens, secundum litteram.

Et ideo quaeritur utrum auditus per accidens conferat ad scientiam.

Quod non, probatio: quia discipulus audiens doctorem aut ipsum, intelligit et scit quod dicit doctor, et sic nihil addiscit; aut nihil intelligit de his quae doctor dicit, et sic nihil addiscit.

Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS.

Intelligendum ad primum quod scientia dupliciter est: uno modo per inventionem, alio modo per doctrinam.

Visus autem est melior et plus conferit ad scientiam quae est per inventionem; auditus tamen plus perficit ad scientiam per doctrinam quam visus. Et quia illud quod habet unusquisque de scientia per inventionem est modicum, respectu eius quod habet vel habere potest per doctrinam, ideo dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod auditus est melior per accidens ad f. 206vb scientiam quam visus. Unde auditus ad scientiam quae est per doctrinam conferit per accidens. "Auditus enim nobis demonstrat differentias soni et vocis. Vox autem et sonus possunt esse significativi, et secundum quod significativi


20 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 1, 437a11-12

35 ibid.
sunt, non sunt objectum auditus; unde quod sint significativi hoc accidit auditui. Per hoc autem quod sunt significativi magis conferit auditus ad scientiam per doctrinam. Per hoc enim quod sunt significativi contingit nuntiare intellectui omnia, et visibilia et invisibilia. Visus autem ostendit nobis plures differentias rerum quam auditus per se; verumtamen auditus per accidens plures ostendit nobis. Sic igitur plus facit visus ad scientiam per inventionem, auditus tamen plus ad scientiam quae est per doctrinam.

Ad rationem. Dicendum quod verum est quod ille sensus plus facit ad scientiam per se, auditus tamen magis per accidens.

Ad secundum: "Est certior, quae plus facit...", verum est per se; auditus tamen magis facit per accidens, ut dictum est.

Ad tertium. Scientiam quae est per doctrinam praecedet inventio, et ad hoc plus facit visus, sine dubio est hoc verum. Sed quia in isto individuo potuit esse scientia aliter quam per inventionem, ideo plus facit auditus ad scientiam in isto. Ideo dico quod visus simpliciter plus facit ad scientiam, quia non est scientia per doctrinam nisi prius sit per inventionem.

Ad secundum quaestionem. Dico quod auditus plus facit per accidens, quia auditus nuntiat intellectui ejus differentias rerum per hoc quod sermones sunt significativi.
Et intelligendum, propter dissolutionem rationem, quod sciens aliqua deducit ea et ordinat ad aliquam conclusionem quam ignorat. Isto eodem modo doctor ea quae discipulus scit, per se et distinctim ordinat ad aliquam conclusionem; et sic contingit addiscere a doctore. Unde considerandum est quod discipulus nihil potest addiscere nisi praecognoscat quid dicitur per nomen; haec enim est praecognitio universaliter. Secundum est quod doctor non potest docere discipulum nisi per aliqua per se nota. Ipse igitur doctor, accipiens maiorem de qua non dubitat discipulus, accipiens etiam minorem quam non dubitat discipulus, ex hoc concludit, et ordinat ipsa ad invicem; istum autem ordinem ignoravit discipulus. Unde sic doctor proponens ordinate maiorem et minorem facit discipulum attendere ad ea quae sunt ad illam conclusionem.

Ad rationem. Dico quod discipulus praesciebat maiorem et minorem per se quando audivit doctorem; non tamen audiebat de ordine. Et ideo doctor ordinans istas propositiones docet ipsum illam conclusionem, ut dictum est.

72 universaliter: naturaliter scr. cod. sed corr. marg.
74 accipiens: accipis praem. sed del. et exp. cod.
75-76 discipulus: et add.
QUÆSTIO 13

UTRUM SURDI A NATIVITATE SINT MUTI

Secundum est: utrum aliquod idiomà sit nobis a natura.

De primo. Quod non, probatio quia muti, ex nativitate, non sunt surdi; ergo nec surdi ex nativitate debent esse muti. Praemissa apparat quia non oportet quod si sit impedimentum in lingua, quod sit impedimentum in instrumento auditus. Quare, etcetera.

Item. Quamvis ita sit, quod locutio vel idiomà sit per doctrinam, tamen primo fuit per inventionem. Licet igitur ille qui est surdus a nativitate sit mutus quantum ad idiomà et linguam quae est per doctrinam, tamen non oportet quod similiter sit quantum ad idiomà quod fuit per f.207ra inventionem. "It hoc est quod arguitur; sic quia surdi ex nativitate habent imaginacionem et conceptus et instrumenta naturalia, quare videtur quod suos conceptus et imaginations possunt exprimere per aliquam vocem. Igitur qui sunt surdi a nativitate non sunt muti.

Oppositum dicit ARISTOTELIS in littera.

Item, per rationem. Surdus a nativitate sic se habet ad totam locutionem humani generis siquit ille qui nuncquam audivit linguam se habet ad illam. Sed ille qui nuncquam audivit linguam illam mutus est quantum ad illam. Quare, etcetera.

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QUÆSTIO 13: cf. S. THOMAS, In De sensu, lect. 2, n. 32
19 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 1, 437a16-17
Intelligendum quod surdus a nativitate est mutus quantum ad idiomam et locutionem communem humano generi; et non contingit istud eo quod si sit impedimentum in instrumento auditus quod sit impedimentum in instrumento linguae, cujus tamen contrarium ponit ALBERTUS; sed hoc non est sic, sed istud contingit propter hoc quod surdus a nativitate sic se habet ad tbatam locutionem humanam generis sicut homo qui non auduit aliquam linguam se habet ad illam: homo enim qui non auduit linguam determinatam non didicit formationem vocis in illae; sic se habet surdus ad omnem linguam, et ideo ipse non didicit aliquam formationem vocis. Verum tamen nihil prohibet eum qui est surdus a nativitate habere imaginationem et conceptus, et eos exprimere per vocem ita quod alius intelligat eas. Quod tamen habet aliquis per inventionem illud est modicum; et ideo homo non potest inve- 40 venire determinate linguam, sed confuse exprimit suum conceptum.

Ad rationem in oppositum. Dicendum quod verum est: Non habet quod si sit impedimentum in aure, quod in linguæ. Sed propter hoc quod surdus a nativitate sic se habet ad omnem linguam sicut se habet aliquis ad aliquam quam non 45 quam didicit nec audivit, ergo est mutus quantum ad idiomam et locutionem communem humano generi.

33-34 formationem: formam scr. cod. sed subl. et corr. marx. 34 omnem: gem cod. // linguan: quae add. sed exp. cod. 35 formationem: forma coem. scr. sed corr. cod. 38 alijque: eae praem. sed del. cod. 43 lingua: aere praem. sed del. et exp. cod. 46-47 ergo... generi: suppl. 37 eos: eae cod. 29 ALBERTUS, locus non inventus
Ad secundum. Dicendum quod concedendum est quod surdi a nativitate habent imaginationes et conceptus quos exprimunt. Quando tamen dicitur quod sunt muti, hoc est intelligendum quantum ad communem hominum locutionem. Si enim aliquis inventat locutionem, oportet quod sit fiat communis per doctrinam; unde si aliquis inventat quod panis in hoc nomine quod est "panis" inventatur ad significandum panem ante quam hoc sit commune, oportet quod hoc sit per doctrinam quod iste doceat quid vocatur hoc nomine "panis". Unde dico quod quantum ad linguam communem est mutus naturaliter, non tamen quantum ad alia.

QUAESTIO 14

UTRUM SERMO SIT NATURALIS HOMINI

Quod sic, probatio: quia communicatio fit hominibus per sermonem, et homo ex natura sua communicabilis est et civilis. Quare, etcetera.

Item. Bruta animalia habent a natura voces significantes naturaliter. Ergo homo habebit a natura voces significantes naturaliter, aut aliter natura otiose egisset si non dedisset ei vocem ad exprimendum suos conceptus.

Ad oppositum. Quod inest a natura inest omnibus eiusdem speciei. Si ergo sermo sit a natura, homines communicarent in sermone uno. Hoc autem est falsum.
Respondeb ád hoc quod non est alíquis sermo qui in-
sit homínìra natura. Cuius ratio est quia si sic, tunc om-
nès homines, aut saltem, major pars hominum, in uno sermone
communicaret, quia quod est a natura fit modo simile in om-
nibus eisdem speciei. Nunc autem non omnes homines nec
major pars communicat in uno sermone.

Item. Iohus significativus est cum imaginaçione

significandi, secundo De anima. Est igitur significativus
secundum imaginaçionem. Quod autem est secundum imaginaçionem
istud non est idem in diversis, sed oportet quod sit
diversum secundum imaginaçionem diversam in diversis. Et
sic appareat quod lingua alíqua non inest homini a natura,

sed vox est significativa ad glàcitum secundum PHILOSOPHUM.

Est tamen intelligendum quod licet natura non dedit
hominì hunc sermonem vel illum, dedit tamen aliquid nobilius
sermo/ne. Verum est quod natura quibusdam animalibus dedit
arma defensionis, sicut cornua et huiusmodi; homini autem
non haec dedit, sed aliquid nobilius, ut intellectum et
manum, quae est organum organorum, ita quod homo haec habens
potest sibi facere omnia arma. Sic etiam natura dedit ani-
malibus illis voces significativas naturaliter; horum autem
non haec dedit, sed intellectum quò potest addiscere et in-

venire omnem sermonem.
Ad rationem in oppositum. Dicendum quod verum est quod loqui est homini. naturale; sed loqui sic vel sic non est homini. naturale, nec a natura est quod homo sic vel sic loquatur, sed per doctrinam est hoc.

Ad aliud. Quo quod natura non dedit homini sermo- mem aliquod, sed intellectum qui est aliquid nobilium, quo potest omnia invenire et addiscere.

<QUÆSTIO 15>

<UT RUM OCU LUS POSSIT SE VIDE R E>

"In quibus autem fieri habent corporis instrumentis..."

Utrum oculus possit se videre.

5 Quod sic, probatio: quia oculus lenis est et fulgo- rem habet, quare est visibilis. Sed arguo tunc: visibile non potest latere visum: cum ergo oculus sit præsens sibi ipsi, quare non potest se ipsum non videre.

Oppositum arguitur quia videre est in hoc quod visus patitur a visibili. Sed nihil patitur a se ipso. Quare, etcetera.

10 Item. Visus est in potentia ad visibile. Sed nihil est in potentia ad se ipsum. Quare oculus non videt se ipsum.

Intelligendum quod oculus non videt se ipsum ita quod penitus sit idem visibilis e quod videtur. Oportet enim quod

39 per: secundum sor. sed corr. sup. lin. cod. 2 utrum...vide re. suppl. 3 in...instrumentis: subl. 6 tunc: sup. lin. 10 a½: visibili add. sed del. cod.

3 Arist., De sensu et sensato, 2, 439a19-20
QUÆSTIO 15: cf. S. Thomæ, in De sensu, lect. 3, n. 36
omne sensatum sit quodammodo alterum, quia sensus fit patiendo, et nihil patitur a se ipso secundum quod idem, sed secundum quod alterum. Et iterum, illud quod videt est in potentia ad visibile; nihil autem est in potentia ad se ipsum secundum quod idem, sed magis secundum quod alterum. Licet igitur aliquis videat se ipsum in speculo per reflectionem, istud tamen non contingit secundum quod ipsae est idem sibi ipsi, sed alterum. Species enim illa quae est in speculo est quodammodo altera ab ipso vidente, et reflectitur et redit ad videntem tantum ab exteriori. Isto modo potest oculus se ipsum videre et splendorem suum.

Ad rationem. Dico quod sensibile praesens sensui latet ipsum, quia sensibile, quando est penitus idem cum sentiente, latet ipsum, quia secundum PHILOSOΦHUM sensibile non sentitur nisi per medium, quia oportet quod sensibile immutet medium, et medium immutatum ipsum sensum immutat. Unde sensibile postum supra sensum non sentitur. Sensibile tamen proveniens ab exteriori non latet sentientem quia tunc patitur ab ipso. Nihil autem patitur a se ipso, et per consequens nihil latet se ipsum nec se ipsum sentit.

19-20 nihil... ipsum: nihil autem est in potentia ad visibile praem. sed del. cod. 22 secundum: mar. 34 patitur: latet praem. sed del. et exp. cod.

29 ARIST., De anima, II, 11, 423b8
<QUÆSTIO 16>

UTRUM OCULUS POSSIT VIDERE SUUM FULGOREM

Secundo, utrum apparitio rei visibilis in oculo sit ipsum viderë.

Tertio, utrum in videre sit refractio.

Quarto, utrum visus fiat intus suscipiendo vel extramittendo.

Quod oculus non possit videre suum fulgorem, probatio: quia qua ratione oculus motus videret suum fulgorem, et oculus quiescens. Quod non, videmus.

Item: Si sic, tum eadem ratione qua oculus cito motus videt suum splendorem, et oculus lente motus.

Oppositum dicit ARISTOTELIS.

ALBERTUS dicit quod oculus videt suum fulgorem non ita quod idem penitus sit videns et visum; sed oculus cum celeriter movetur et exit locum ubi prius quid, remanet fulgor in loco in quo prius erat pupilla. Et ideo pupilla existens in loco secundo videt fulgorem suum existentem in loco primo.

Et solet poni simile de globo igneo circumvoluto. Si enim celeriter circumvolvatur, videbitur quod totus ille f.207va circulus sit igneus. / Cuius ratio est: cum ille globus est in aliquo loco et celeriter movetur, cum est in loco secundo remanet fulgor eius in loco primo. Et ita videtur

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13 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 2, 437a23-523
quod totus circulus sit igneus, ita quod si globus existens in loco secundo, <per> virtutem visivam vi<detur> ipsum existentem in loco <primo>.

Illum non videtur de intentione PHILOSOPHI, sicut apparebit. Item, exemplum non est conveniens: quod enim globus igneus motus facit quasi circulum igneum, hoc non est quia cum existat in secundo loco remanet fulgor in loco primo; sed hoc est quia adeunte sensibili extra, adhuc remanet in sensu. Et ideo cum globus sit in aliquo loco et celeriter movetur ad alium, sensus adhuc sentit illum igneum in secundo sicut in primo, quia sensibile mænet in sensu sicut prius, sicut appareat de sole.

ALEXANDRI dicit sic, quod pupilla oculi lenis est, et ideo habet fulgorem; et illum fulgorem proicit ad exteriorus. Et ideo si occlus celeriter movetur, ita quod perveniat ad locum in quo proiciebat suum fulgorem ante quam fulgorem disperset; tunc videt fulgorem, et redit fulgorem ad oculum sicut a<liquo exteriori; sicut si aliquis existens in ore tenebroso i<ret ad aerem illumina<um, tunc videt, et tamen prius non vidit. Ex istor apparat quod oculo quiescente non videt oculus splendorem suum, quia oportet quod moveatur velocciter.


ALEXANDER opponit contra istud: motus localis est successivus et in tempore. Argò nulla celeritas motus post-test facere quod oculus veniat ad illum splendorem ante quam illae splendor deficiat, quia splendor apud praesentiam corporis est in <in>stanti, et apud absentiam corporis in illo loco splendor deficit in <in>stanti. Quare celeritas motus non facit ad hoc quod oculus videat se.

ALEXANDER respondit quod pupilla oculi habet partes, et quando movetur usque ad locum in quo est splendor, partes posterioriores illius pupillae adhuc emittunt splendorem suum. Et per istam viam videt oculus splendorem suum, quia quando pars prima exit a loco splendoris, pars posterior est ibi.

Contra: si sic, tunc oculus videt se quando lente movetur; quia si lente movetur, partes posterioriores emittunt fulgorem ad locum in quo attingit pars anterior.

Ideo videtur dicendum, sicut dicit ARISTOTELIS, quod celeritas motus facit ad hoc quod unum videtur duo, scilicet videns et visum, quia quando velociter movetur oculus, una pars pupillae supereminet altera; et si sic, tunc illa pars quae supereminet videtur ab alia parte. Isto modo celeritas motus facit illud quod est unum videri duo; unde si lente movetur, tunc permittit oculum in sua figura.

Per hoc ad rationes appart solutio.


47 ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, in De sensu et sensibili, p.39, 1.12 – p.41, 1.3; cf. S. THOMAS, in De sensu, lect.3, n.39 54 ALEXANDER, p.41, 1.5 – p.42, 1.5; cf. S. THOMAS, loc. cit., nn.39-40 62 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 2, 437b2-10
QUAESTIO 17

UTRUM APPARITIO FORMAE VISIBLES IN OCULO SIT VISIO

Quaeritur utrum apparitio formae visibilis in oculo sit visio.

Quod sic, probatio: quia visio fit per receptionem. Apparitio autem formae visibilis in oculo est per receptio-

nem. Quare, etcetera. Et confirmatur ratio quia videre

fit per receptionem; ergo in videndo aliquid recipitur.

Sed non recipitur nisi forma apparens in oculo. Ergo vide-

tur quod apparitio illius formae sit ipsum videre.

Oppositum dicit et probat ARISTOTELES in littera:

quia idola apparent in alii corporibus, sicut in corpori-
bus pollitis et tarsiis; et tamen illa apparitio non est

visio, quia illa non vident.

Intelligendum quod apparitio formae visibilis in

oculo non est ipsa visio; quia ista apparitio est passio
corporalis quae contingit oculo secundum quod lenis. Visio

f. 207vb autem / non est passio corporalis ita quod proveniat ex dis-

positione corporali, sed magis est passio vel operatio ani-

mae; et non est corporalis, formaliter dico. Unde ista ap-

paritio inest oculo secundum quod oculus lenis est et ter-

minatur in profundo. Unde cum ista apparitio insit alii

corporibus tarsiis et pollitis, non est visio. Unde in illa

2 UTRUX...VISIO: marg. inf. 12 idola: ydola cod. (omnes)
16 passio: passus cod. 17 contingit: in add. sed del. cod.
18 passio: pass° cod.

QUAESTIO 17: cf. S. THOMAS, in De sensu, lect. 4, nn. 48-51
11 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 2, 438a6-12
apparitione sunt duo: receptio formae visibilis, item re-
fractio illius formae ab oculo. Huiusmodi autem forma.
quantum ad suam receptionem non est ipsa visio. Unde illa
forma visibilis quae in oculo apparat non est formaliter
illud quo est ipsa visio, quia illa forma sic apparat in
oculo sicut ex dispositione corporali. Forma autem secundum
quam formaliter est visio est in oculo sicut in habente
virtutem visivam, et non secundum quod lenis. Item, ista
refractio nihil facit penitus ad visionem. Quod enim illa
forma quae est in oculo refrangatur ab oculo vere nihil fa-
cit ad visionem. Illa tunc apparitio quae est in oculo non
est visio formaliter; forte tamen aliquid facit ad visionem.

Ad rationem. Dico quod non oportet, si illa appari-
tio fit per receptionem, et similiter videre, quod illa ap-
paritio sit visio. Unde secundum ARISTOTELEN secundo De
anima non oportet si aliquid patiatur ab odore quod ipsum
sentiat odorem; unde ibi dicit quod aer fetit aliquando, et
ita patitur ab odore et non sentit odorem. Unde ista appa-
ritio in oculo non inest oculo secundum quod habet virtutem
visivam, sed secundum quod lenis.

Ad secundum. Dico quod forma quae apparat in oculo
non est formaliter illud quo est videre vel visio, sed forte
causat videre vel visionem. Unde cognitio visibilis est

27 non: sup. lin. 33 quae: quo scr. cod. sed exp. et corr. marg.
34 tunc: enim scr. sed del. et corr. sup. lin. cod. 36 oportet:
quod add. cod.; X marg. 40 fetit: fetat scr. sed corr. cod.
38-39 ARIST., De anima, II, 12, 424b3-18
ipsa visio, et illa cognitio est in eo secundum quod habet virtutem visivam.

<QUÆSTIO 18>

UTRUM IN APPARITIONE FORMÆ IN OCULO SIT REFRACTIO

quod non, probatio: quia aliqua est refractio ubi non apparent talis forma, sicut ad parietem refringitur species visibilis et ibi non apparent.

Oppositum dicit ARISTOTELIS.

Dico quod in ista apparitione sunt duo, sicut receptio formae visibilis et refractio quaedam. Unde considerandum est quod illa in quibus aliqua apparent per refractionem duplicem habent naturam: ipsa enim sunt lenia, pollita et tersa, ita quod habent secundum se aliquem fulgorem, ut mediante fulgore species ibi manifestetur; item, huiusmodi sunt corpora terminata ita quod forma visibilis perveniens ad illa non possit ulterius transire, sed refiectitur sicut pila a pariete. Istud apparent in speculo: est enim lene et habet fulgorem; item, est terminatum ad interius. Unde in vitro speculi apponitur plumbum ut species non transiret ultra.

Ista duo inventur in oculo: quia est lenis et habet fulgorem, et ideo species ibi recepta potest manifestari.

item, oculus... est terminatus in profundo, cuius signum est quia species rei visibilis ab oculo reflectitur. Unde quia haec duo inveniuntur in oculo, ideo reperitur ibi apparitio formae visibilis. Et in ista apparitione sunt receptio visibilis et refractio ab illo.

Per hoc ad rationem: Verum est quod aliqua forma visibilis reflectitur ab aliqua corpore in quo non apparet, quia illud corpus non habet fulgorem, quia non est tersum et pollutum.

QUAESTIO 19.

UTRUM VIDERÆ FIAT INTUS SUSCIPIENDO VEL EXTRAMITTENDO

f. 208ra. Quod non intus suscipiendo, probatio: quia si sic, visibile faceret se in visum per medium. Quare videtur quod visus deberet videret illud a quo immediate patiatur cum patiatur a specie coloris existente in medio; quare videret speciem in medio. Quod falsum est; sed solum videt speciem in objective.

Item. Si oculus videret intus suscipiendo, cum si mul possit videri album et nigrum, sicut dicit ARISTOTELES inferius, tunc album et nigrum erunt in eadem parte medii et oculi. Quare videre non est intus suscipiendo, sed extramittendo usque ad rem visam.

21 oculus...: marg. (another word is hidden by the binding)
27 aliquo: 150 cod. 2 QUAESTIO: marg. 2 UTRUM...EXTRAMITTENDO: iter. marg. inf. 5-5 cum patiitur: marg.

QUAESTIO 19: cf. S. THOMAS, In De sensu, lect. 4, nn. 55-56, 58 10-11 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 3, 440a31-b16 (?)
Oppositum dicit ARISTOTELIS.

Aliqui dixerunt quod visus fit extramittendo ita quod aliquid exeat ab oculo usque ad astra. Istud nihil est, quia non est exitus nisi corporum, et tunc illud quod exit et medium essent simul, et sic duo corpora simul. Item, illud quod exit ab aliqua debilitatur et tendit in contrarium; sicut flamma quae exit ab igne. Sed videre non fit hoc modo secundum mathematicos, sed basis est in re visa et consus in oculo.

Alii autem dixerunt quod videre fit lumine exeunte ab oculis non usque ad rem visam vel ad astra, sed exit lumen ad exterius donec coniungatur lumini exteriori. Et istud non valet, quia non quodlibet coniungitur cuilibet, sed solum est coniunctio corporum, et lumen non est corpus. Item, si lumen esset corpus, quomodo posset lumen interius coniungi lumini exteriori? Meninga enim interest, scilicet tunica oculi.

Alii dixerunt quod videre non fit extramittendo, sed simile cognoscitur simili; et ideo ponunt quidam quod anima componatur ex omnibus. Hoc non fuit positio PHILOSOPHII; vidit ipse quod nihil de potentia reducitur ad actum.
nisi per receptionem alicuius quod prius non haberet. it
ideo cum sensus fiat de potencia ad actum, dixit quod sen-
tire universaliter est in us suscipiendo, et nihil extra-
mittendo. Unde, cum sentire sit passio, et passio per re-
ceptionem, ideo, etcetera.

Ad rationem: Dicendum quod oculus non videbat omne
illud, a quo movetur, sed tantum videt illud a quo movetur
principaliter. Unde verum est quod oculus movetur ad objec-
to et medio, sed non principaliter ab utroque. Et idem spe-
diem visibilem videt in obiecto. Et dico quod oculus non
videt nisi illud a quo movetur principaliter.

Contra oculus videt illud quod refrangitur a speculo,
et illia est species existens in media quae reflectitur.
Et dicendum quod quando species refrangitur ab alioquo, ipsa
est ut principale movas, quia movet per medium.

Ad aliud. Dicendum quod non est inconveniens et al-
bum et nigrum existant simul in eadem parte medii vel organi:
quia in obiecto album est qualitas perfecta et existit ibi
sub esse naturali, et similiter nigrum, et ideo non sunt
ibi simul; in medio autem sunt imperfecta, et ideo cum sint
ubi sub alia ratione et haec ant esse incompletum coloris et
sint entia in potentia, simul sunt ibi. Unde sicut album
et nigrum in potentia possunt esse simul, sicut in possideto,
similiter album et nigrum possunt esse simul in eadem parte
medii et organi.

55 habeant: hē cod. // incompletum: incōpl' scr. cod. sed corr. manc.
56 sint entia: est ens cod.
<QUAESTIO 20>

<ET VML PERSPICUITAS INSIT OMNIBUS CORPORIBUS>

"De sensibilibus autem quae sunt, etcetera."

Ursum perspicuitas insit omnibus corporibus.

Quod non, probatio: quia perspicuum est, in libro De anima; quod non est visibile secundum colorem, sed secundum actum eius, qui est lumine. Sed non omnia corpora sunt talia, sed quaedam sunt visibilia per colorem proprium.

Item. Perspicuum est per quod contingit visere, 
208ra sicut sors, vocabulum. Sed hoc non insit omnibus.

Opposition dici dicit.

Item. Susceptivum luminis est perspicuum. Sed omnia corpora est lucis susceptivum. Quare...

Intelligendum quod perspicuitas est qualitas per quam aliquid est susceptivum coloris et luminis, vel per quam visibile totum est illud. Omne igitur quod est luminis susceptivum perspicuum est; it ideo dico quod perspicuum secundum triplexem gradum inventur in entibus.

Inveniuntur enim susceptivum lucis sic quod ipsa sunt luce propria ita quod non sunt in potentia ad maiorem lucem, sicut sol. It ex sole contingit descendere ad quaedam alia quae ex se sunt lucida, sicut ad ignita in aliene materia, quia ignis in propria materia non lucest propter parsitatem.

2 UTUI: ...COPIA:IBUS: suppol. 3 De...et etcetera: supol. 6-8: A marv.
indicans textus corruptus: s. et: supol. 15-16 per quarn: supol.
sor.: sed: corr. sup. lin: cod.

QUAESTIO 20: cf. S. THOMAS, In De sensu, lect. 6, nn.63-86
3 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 3, 439a6 5-6 ARIST., De anima, II, 7, 418b4-13 11 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 3, 439a21-25
materiae; item, ad quaedam corpora lucentia de nocte quae
de se non sunt ita lucida. Hoc est primus gradus.

Secundus gradus est eorum quae non habent lumen ex
se, sed lumen recipiunt ex alio principio ita quod non re-
cipiunt lumen in superficie solum, sed in superficie et
profundo, ut in aqua et aere. Et quaedam sunt corpora ex
istis composita, sicut vitrum. Et perspicuum - et diafanum
et transparens, quae omnia sunt idem - perspicuum est illud
per quod contingit videere proprie.

Tertius gradus est eorum quae recipiunt lumen solum
in superficie, et non per totum, sicut terra.

Omnia igitur corpora perspicua sunt, accipiendo per-
spicuum secundum quod est luminis receptivum, non tamen ac-
cipiendo ipsum secundum quod per ipsum contingit videere,
sicut est aqua et aer.

Rationes procedunt suis viis.

<QUAESTIO 21>
UTRUM COLOR SIT EXTREMITAS PERSPICUI

Quod non, probatio: quia dicit ARISTOTELES quod
color non est extremitas, sed in extremitate.

Item. Extremitas videtur esse de genere quantitatis,
cum extremitas sit ipsius corporis. Color non est de natura
vel genere quantitatis. Quare, etcetera.

26 habent: habet scr. cod. sed corr. marg. 31 quae: si autem scr.
cod. sed corr. marg. 2 UTRUM...PERSPICUI: iter. marg. inf.
o Color: calor scr. sed corr. cod. 30 diafanum: diafonum cod.

QUAESTIO.21: cf. S. THOMAS, In De sensu, lect. 6, nn.87-88, 93
3 ARIST.: De sensu et sensato, 3, 439a31-33
Item. si color esset extremitas perspicui, tum
corpora interius non essent colorata. Quod falsum est, quia
cum in corporibus coloratis eadem sit natura interius et
exterius, qua ratione sunt colorata exterius et interius.

Item. Extremitas perspicui est de genere perspicui.
Perspicuum autem est subjectum et materia ad colores. Si
igitur potentia non est actus, tum videtur quod perspicuitas
non est ipse color, cum sit materia et subjectum ad colorem.
Opposatum dicit ARISTOTELES in littera.

Intelligendum quod sic ut corporum finita ad suas ex-
 tremitates sunt, etiam perspicuitas corporis terminatur ad
suam extrematem, unde est extremitas corporis extremitas.

Secundo, intelligendum quod quaedam corpora
 sunt terminata forma visibili, et non terminatur termino
alieno, vel sunt terminata opaco; quaedam autem sunt termi-
nata alieno termino, sicut aer et aqua. Est igitur perspi-
cuum corporis terminati et non terminati, et tam in isto
corpo quam in illo, est accidentale ultimum perspicuitatis.

Color autem est extremitas perspicui in corpore terminato.

Sed considerandum est quod ista extremitas perspicui
non est color formaliter, unde hoc definitio quae dicit
quod "color est extremitas perspicui in corpore terminato"
est definitio materialis in materia et proprium subjectum.
coloris. unde, sicut arguebatur, potentia non est actus, et extremitas perspicui est subjectum et materia ad colores. Ideo secundum istum modum accepiendo, haec est definitio materialis, et non est color formaliter extremitas perspicui, sed est in extremitate perspicui. unde color formaliter non est extremitas perspicui, sed est actus illius extremitatis formaliter. / Actus enim perspicui vel extremitas perspicui est lux vel lumen. Et ideo si ista definitio debet intelligi formaliter, debet sic dari quod "color est extremitas perspicui in corporé terminato". Hoc est dictum quod color est actus extremitatis perspicui in terminato corpore.

Ad rationes. Verum est quod ARISTOTELÉS loquebatur de extremitate corporis cum dicit quod est in extremitate.

Ad secundum. Dicendum quod extremitas corporis est de genere quantitatis.

Ad alium. Dicendum quod corporá interius non sunt colorata actu, sed in potentia. Non in potentia sicut in materia: non enim oportet corpora interius alterari ad hoc quod sint actu colorata; sed sola divisio sufficit ad hoc quod sint actu colorata, quia per divisionem contingit quod ubi non erat extremum, prius, fit actu extremum. Unde, cum color sit motivus lucidi et visibilis secundum naturam suam, illud autem quod est interius non est visibile, ut sic nec est motivus lucidi. Ideo non est interius coloratum nisi in potentia, et haec potentia sola divisione educitur in actum.
Ad eandem. Dicendum quod extremitas perspicui non est formâ eter color, sed actus extremitatis perspicui.

<QUÆSTIO 22>

UTRUM COLOR SIT EXTREMITAS PERSPICUI IN CORPORE TERMINATO

Quod non, videtur: quia corpora quae non sunt terminata ipsa colorantur, sicut aer in aurora et aqua maris.

5 quare, videtur quod color non sit extremitas perspicui in corpore terminato, cum in aliis inventur.

Oppositum ARISTOTELES.

Dicendum: quod corpora colorata ex se sunt terminata.

Unde quicumque absente et quicumque praesente corpus coloratum et terminatum remaneat coloratum quamvis non videatur, quia non videatur sine lumine in actu. Corpus autem non terminatum ipsum non est ex se coloratum, sed ex receptione luminis ab exteriori principio et reflexione eius ipsa videatur colorata. Et quia ista corpora sunt colorata ab exteriori principio, Ideo dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod color est extremitas perspicui in corpore terminato, quia corpus secundum se coloratum est terminatum.

Per hoc ad rationem in oppositum, quia in corporibus non terminatis non est color secundum se.


QUÆSTIO 22: cf. S. THOMAS, In De sensu, lect. 6, n. 90 7 ARISTOTELES: De sensu et sensato, 3, 439b11-12 15 ibid.
<QUAESTIO 23>

UTRUX COLOR SIT DE NATURE LUCIS VEL ESSENTIALITER LUX

Quod non, probatio: quia lux non habet contrarium, sed solum privationem sibi oppositam. Sed color, ut album, habet contrarium sibi, ut nigrum. Quare, etcetera.

Ad oppositum arguitur sic: color essentialiter est actus extremitatis perspicui. Sed actus perspicui est lux, secundum PHILOSOPHUM in littera. Quare, etcetera.

Item. Visus est sensus unus, quare unus habet objectum. Sed color visibilis est ab oculo et etiam lux; quare eadem est natura utriusque. Quare lux est essentialia coloris.

Credo esse dicendum ad istam quastionem quod lux est essentialia coloris, quia actus extremitatis perspicui dicitur esse color, et actus perspicui lux est; et ideo color essentialiter videtur esse lux. Istdud videtur sentire PHILOSOPHUS in littera, quia dicit quod lumen est color perspicui; hoc est dictum quod lumen est actus ipsius perspicui, et huiusmodi lumen sive lux in corpore interinato, cum recipitur a principio extrinseco, lumen est. In terminato corpore videtur esse color.

Item. Hoc appareit ex alio dicto PHILOSOPHI, qui dicit quod album et nigrum sunt in corporibus sicut lumen et tenebra in aere. Praessentia enim corporis luminosi in


24 praesentia: principia scr. cod. sed del. et corr. marx. 25 e	
tremitate: exc.rite scr. cod. sed corr. marg. 27 coloris: caloris	
cod. 28 non: marg. // aliquo: abō cod. 30 quae: quare scr.
cod. sed corr. marg. 32 unde: Ad rationem in oppositum praem. cod.
40 sed: si cod. 44 magis: scr. post via (1.43). cod. sed del. et
corr. marg.
<QUAESTIO 24>

-UTRUM ALIQUIS COLOR SIT INVISIBILIS PROPTER PARVITATEM

"De aliis autem coloribus..."

Triā sunt híc quaerenda.

1 Primum est utrum aliquid color sit invisibilis propter parvitatem.

Secundum est utrum album et nigrum commisceantur aainvicem.

3 Tertium est utrum mediī colorēs fiant ex extremis mixtīs secundum proportionem numerālem.

De primo. Quod sic, probatio: quia nisi sic esset, virtus visiva esset infinita; quod est inconvenientes, cum sit in corpore finito. Probatio communis: quia maior est virtus visiva quae potest considerare aliquid minus; si igitur virtus visiva potest attingere aliquid minus, et illo minus, et sic in infinitum; tunc virtus visiva esset major et maior in infinitum. Quare est ponere aliquem colorēm invisibilem propter sui parvitatem.

Item. Color aliando latet nos in aliqua distantia propter sui parvitatem. Ergo videtur quod sit ponere aliquid invisiblē propter sui parvitatem.

Opposītum. Dicit littera quod omnis magnitudō est visibilis ex aliqua distantia, et per consequíens color in magnitudine.

Intelligendum quod nullus color est invisibilis propter sui parvitatem, quia omnis color, si sit color, visibilis est ex aliqua distantia et aliquo visu. Si enim sit color aliquis qui sit invisibilis ex aliqua magna distantia, ex alia distantia propinquiori erit visibilis. Et iterum, si sit aliquis color invisibilis a visu hominis, erit visibilis visu alterius animalis, vel e converso. Et ratio huius est quia color secundum suam naturam est motivus medii et etiam visus, sicut apparat ex definitione coloris; est enim color motivus Lucidi secundum actum, secundum De anima. Unde, si sic, aliquid habens naturam coloris, illud non dicitur color nisi quia natum (est) movere medium et visum. Ideo dico quod omnis color est visibilis aliquo visu et ex aliqua distantia; et si non sit visibile ex aliqua distantia et aliquo visu, non est color, cum haec sit ratio coloris.

Ad rationem. Non oportet quod virtus visiva sit infinita, quia color, cum sit alicui naturale, non dividitur in infinitum, immo si dividatur corpus coloratum, erit devenire ad alicui ita parvaum quod in minori quantitate non salvaretur natura coloris, sicut vult Aristoteles in hoc.

Libro inferius, ita quod si divideretur, transmutaretur in naturam continentis, sicut una gutta vini infusa mari statim

33 coloris: colorum scr. sed corr. sup. lin. cod. 35 habens: habemus praem. sed del. et exp. cod. 36 quia: qui cod. // est: suppl. 38 aliquo: si add. sed del. cod. 43 ita: et scr. sed exp. et corr. sup. lin. cod. 44 vult: dixit scr. cod. sed corr. mark. 45 transmutaretur: consi. est transmutare scr. cod. sed corr. mark. (partially cut off)
convertitur in naturam aquae. Dico igitur quod non est accipere aliquem colorem invisibilem propter parvitatem, nec erit virtus visiva infinita, quia non est dividere colorum in infinitum.

Ad aliud. Bene verum est quod color ex aliqua distantia invisibilis est a nobis; ille tamen color est visibilis in alia distantia, vel ex visu alterius animalis, aut non haberet naturam et rationem coloris.

〈QUAESTIO 25〉

UTRUM ALBUM ET NIGRUM MISCEANTUR ADINVICEM

Quod non, videtur: quia ea quae miscentur sunt mutuo activa et passiva, per ARISTOTELEM libro De generatione. Sed tali non sunt album et nigrum; verum est quod utrumque agit f.205ra in medium et sensum, sed album in nigrum non / videtur agere destruendo ipsum.

Oppositum dicit littera.

Intelligendum quod album et nigrum per se non commiscetur, per accidens tamen sunt commixta. Corpora enim per suas qualitates activas et passivas, quae sunt calidum, frigidum, humidum et siccum, transmutant se invicem ita quod nihil ibi remanet in permixtum. Ad commixtionem corporum sequitur commixtionis colorum extremorum. Si enim aliqua cor-

51 aliqua: differentia scr. cod. sed del. et corr. marg.
2 UTRUM: ...ADINVICEM: iter. marg. inf. 3 mutuo: coni.: mutua 0 cod.; cf. Q.32, 1.5: 11-12 quae...siccum: scr. cod. post invicem (1.12)

4 ARIST.: De generatione et corruptione, I, 10, 328a18-33
8 ARIST.: De sensu et sensato, 3, 440a31-b23
15 pora commisceantur ad invicem, perspicuum quod resultat ex illa commixtione erit alterius naturae a perspicuo utriusque corporis, et perspicuum facit participari colores. Et ideo secundum istum modum, colores erunt commixti et diversi secundum diversitatem corporum.

20 Ad rationem. Quamvis album et nigrum non sint activitya et passiva secundum se, sunt tamen per qualitates activityas et passivas.

<QUAESTIO 26>

UTRUM MEDII COLORES FIANT EX EXTREMIS SECUNDUM NUMERALEM PROPORIONEM

Quod non, probatio: quia proportio numeralis relatio est, et debet esse inter diversa et distincta. Colores autem extremi non sunt distincti et separati in medio, nec miscibilia in mixto. Quare…

Item. Proportio numeralis est solum in quantitate. Istit autem colores non sunt quantitates. Quare videtur quod non fiunt secundum proportionem numeralem.

Oppositum determinat PHILOSOPHUS in littera.

Intelligendum quod proportio primo reperitur in numeris, secundo in continuis, terto extenditur proportio ad qualitates secundum quod huiusmodi qualitates habent quantitatem vel extensivam vel intensivam.

16 a: ab cod. 21 passiva: visiva scr. cod. sed del. et corr. marg. 2 UTRUM...PROPORSIONEM: iter. marg. inf. 3 guia: re add. sed exp. cod. 4 debet: dub. 17 huiusmodi: h?iu9 scr. sed u9 exp. cod. 10 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 3, 440b18-21
Et omnis numerus omni numerò est proportionalis, quia omnis numerus habet aliquid numerum quo mensuretur secundum unitatem. Et ideo omnes numeri habent unam mensuram, et sic conveniunt in illo indissiibili quod mensurat, et sic sunt proportionales.

Quantitates autem continuae non habent aliquid minimum simpliciter, licet habeant ex institutione, inquantum mensurentur aliqua parva quantitate. Immo quantitas potest aliam quantitatem excilire ita quod nulla quantitas mensurat utramque; sic diameter est incommensurabilis costae. Ideo quaedam quantitates sunt proportionales, quaedam non.

Proprio autem reperitur in <qualitatibus> naturalibus secundum quod huiusmodi qualitates habent quantitatem, vel intensivam vel extensivam: extensivam, sicut illud quod est in maiore superficie maius est et magis extendens: intensivam, secundum quod aliqua forma recipit magis et minus. Qualitas igitur potest habere proportionem numeralem ad aliam secundum quod una plus extenditur vel intenditur quam alia secundum quamcumque proportionem, ut in duplo aut triplo, etcetera.

Ad rationem in oppositum. Dicendum quod verum est quod colores extremi in medio sunt unum, et ideo ibi non habent proportionem numeralem. Isti autem colores ante quam erant mixti habebant istam proportionem et distincti fuerunt.
Et isto modo dicimus habere proportionem numeralem. Aut dicendum quod colores, extremiti in medio et miscibilia in mixto sunt medio modo inter actum et potentiam secundum virtutem, et plus unum quam alterum. Et secundum hoc potest dici quod sunt ibi secundum proportionem numeralem.

Ad aliud. Quamvis non sint quantitatus, habent tamen quantitates vel intensive vel extensive.

**Quaestio 27**

UTRUM NOS HABEMUS PELOREM OLFACTUM CETERIS ANIMALIBUS

"De odore autem et sapore nunc dicendum, etcetera."

Quatuor sunt hic querenda.

Primum est, utrum nos habeamus peiorem olfactum ceteris animalibus.

Post, quia dicit Aristotelis quod ignis non ait nec patitur sed per qualitatem eius. utrum qualitates elementorum sint formas substantiales eorum.

Tertio, utrum in formis elementorum sit aliqua contrarietas.

Oppositum ARISTOTELES in littera.

Quod homo habet peiorem olfactum ceteris animalibus
et ceteris sensibus, hoc est concedendum, quia olfactus est
sicci ignei vel igneus. Cuius ratio est quia odor qui sen-
titur per olfactum est quid siccvm et ignem. Nunc autem
instrumentum olfactus hominis est frigidum et humidum ex
frigiditate et humiditate cerebri, secundum quod dixit PHI-
LOSOPHUS superius: instrumentum olfactus est positum in
texta cerebrum. In homine autem secundum quantitatem sui corporis
est plus de cerebro quam in aliis animalibus. Et hoc ostendit
in aliis animalibus brevitas somni. Et ideo frigiditate cere-
bri instrumentum olfactus est infrigidatum. Et ideo sensus
olfactus in homine est peior. Unde non potest percipere in
homine nisi excellentias odoris.

Ad rationem. Dicendum quod nobiliori animae debetur
alia nobilior potentia. Sed illa nobilior potentia non
est sensus olfactus, sed sensus tactus. Homo enim habet
discretiorem sensum tactus respectu omnium animalium: cuius
signum est quia facilius sentit calidum et frigidum et ex-
cellentias istorum.

15 'ARIST.', De sensu et sensato, 4, 440b31-441a1: 21-22 ibid., 2,
438b25-27, 24-25 ET...somni: cf. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, De anima, Lib.2,
Cap.23 (ed. Stroick, p.132, 11.31-35) (?).
QUAESTIO 28

UTRUM QUALITATES ELEMENTORUM SINT FORMAE SUBSTANTIÆS EORUM.

Quod sit, probatio, quia {}umquodque agit per suam formam substantialiam a qua habet esse. Sed ignis et alia elementa solum videntur asserre per suæ qualitates: Quare, etcetera.

Iten. Libro De generatione determinat PHILOSOPHUS de generatione elementorum, et ibi dicit quod cum generatum est aliquid calidum et siccum, tum est ignis renovatus.

Quare innuit qualitates esse formas elementorum.


Intelligendum quod qualitates elementorum non sunt formas eorum substantiales, sed sunt accidentia eorum, quia id quod est accidens in uno non potest esse substantia in alio. Cum igitur istae qualitates sint accidentia corporum mixtorum, quare non possunt esse formas substantiales aliquius. Unde quaedam sunt quae se ipsis diversificant essentialiam, et quaedam non. Accidentes enim et substantia ipsa sunt quae essentialiam diversificant secundum se ita quod idem in essentia non potest esse substantia et accidentis, ut sit accidentis unius et substantia alterius. Aliqua autem sunt quae

2 UTRUM...donum: iter, maris, inf. super, q... mares (cut off); cf. maris, inf. super q<uestiones> tertii cæli et mundi
5 videntur: videns scr, cod. sed corr. maris. 10 mixtorum: ax-
braem, sed del, et exp, cod.

QUAESTIO 28: cf. S. THOMAS, In De sensu, lect. 10, n. 136
7-8 ARIST., De generatione et corruptione, II, 3, 330b2?
non diversificant essentiam, sed sunt in eadem essentia, successive, ut album et nigrum.

Ad primum. Dicendum quod non agit unumquodque per formam substantiae, sed immediate agit per qualitatem accidentalem, ratione cuius qualitas est contrarietas, sicut dicit ARISTOTELES in littera. Unde cum dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod elementa agunt per suas qualitates, non ex hoc sequitur quod sint formae substantiales elementorum.

Ad aliud. Dicendum quod in libro De generatione determinat de ipsis elementis secundum quod sunt miscibilia et elementa mixtorum. Non sunt autem miscibilia nisi per qualitates, per eas enim agunt et patiuntur. Et ideo dicit, cum generatum est calidum et siccum, generatur ignis, quia ista sunt secundum quod elementum est miscibile.

<QUALITAT 29>

UTRUM IN FORMIS SUBSTANTIALIBUS SIT CONTRARIETAS

Quod sic, videtur: quia in uno quoque genere est una prima contrarietas, et substantia est unus genus. Quare, etcetera.

Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS. Dicit enim quod ignis et terra agunt et patiuntur. In secundum quod ignis et terra, sed secundum quod habent qualitates.
Dicendum quod nos possumus loqui de contrarietate
10 large quantum ad radicem contrarietatis, quae est privatio
et habitus; sic in genere substantiae bene reperitur contra-
rietas, quia ibi est aliquid reperire quod se habet ut pri-
vatio, aliud ut habitus.

Si autem loquamur de contrarietate proprie, secundum
f. 209 va quod contrarietas, est maxima distantia in unoquoque genere,
sic non est contrarietas in genere substantiae, quia maxima
distantia est solum in his quae recipiunt magis et minus,
secundum PHILOSOPHUM in decimo (metaphysicorum), ita quod
in illo genere aliqua distant plus, aliqua minus, aliqua
20 maxime. Substantia autem, sicut supponitur ad praesens, non
suscipit magis et minus, et ideo ibi non est contrarietas.
Quando enim in aliquo genere reperitur maxima distantia, om-
nia alia sunt inter illa, et minus distant, ita quod si fiat
transitio de uno in aliud, fiet per aliquod eorum quae sunt
25 in medio. Istud autem non reperitur in genere substantiae.

Sic patet ad rationem: bene ostendit quod sit ibi
contrarietas, extendendo naturam contrarietatis.

10 contrarietatis: quantitatis praem. sed del. cod. 18 decimo:
22 aliquo: acc cod. 26 bene: unde scr. cod. sed del. et corr. marg.

18 ARIST., Metaph., X, 4, 1055a3-5
QUAESTIO 30

UTRUM ELEMENTA AGANT PER QUALITATES ELEMENTORUM VEL PER FORMAS SUBSTANTIALES

Quod non per accidentales solum, probatio: quia nihil agit supra suam speciem. Istae autem qualitates videntur agere formam substantialem. Ergo cum haec forma substantialis sit supra qualitates, non solum agunt formae accidentales, sed et forma substantialis.

Item, auctoritate ARISTOTELIS in libro De anima.

10 Dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod calor non est causa ipsius augmenti, sed concausa; anima autem est agens principale. Ergo non solum agunt formae accidentales, sed (etiam) formae substantiales, quia eadem est ratio de forma ignis substantiali et de anima, quae est (forma) substantialis alicuius.

15 Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS expresse in littera. Intelligendum quod qualitates elementorum immediate videntur agere et etiam pati, quia istae qualitates secundum se videntur habere contrarietatem, et ideo videntur agere et pati immediate. Unum tamen est advertendum: quod, quia istae qualitates fluunt ab essentia ipsorum elementorum vel aliorum et sunt etiam propinquae in natura illis formis substantialibus, hinc est quod huiusmodi qualitates non agunt solum in virtute propria, ut calefaciendo vel infrigidando, sed inducunt formam substantialem, quia agunt in virtute
formae substantialis et non solum in virtute propria. Agens
tamen immediatum quod immediate transmutat aliquid est ipsa
qualitas quae habet contrarium ad aliam qualitatem; ipsa
tamen non agit in virtute propria, sed in virtute formae
substantialis. Et haec est causa quare PHILOSOPHUS dicit
30 aliquando quod agent formae substantialis, quia qualitates
agent in virtute formae substantialis; aliquando autem dicit
quod ignis secundum quod ignis non agit, sed quod qualitates
elementorum <agent>. Unde isto modo possimus dicere quod
forma substantialis agit, quia qualitas agit in virtute
illius.

Ad rationem. Dicendum quod quia qualitates non so-
lum agent in virtute propria, ideo possunt inducere formam
substantialem.

Ad aliud. Dicendum quod calor non est causa nisi
40 in virtute animae; et ideo dicit quod est agens in virtute
animae.

<QUAESTIO 31>

UTRUM SAPOR DULCIS SIT SAPOR EXTREMUS

"Quemadmodum autem colores...."

Primo quaeritur utrum sapor dulcis sit sapor extremus.

30 aliquando quod: quod aliquando cod. 33 agunt: suppl.
2 UTRUM...EXTREMUS: marq. inf. 3 Quemadmodum...colores: subl.
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29-30 ARIST.: De anima, II, 4, 416a9-18 (?); cf. supra 1.10
31 ARIST.: De sensu et sensato, 4, 441b12-15
QUAESTIO 31: cf. S. THOMAS, In De sensu, lect. 11, n. 148
3 ARIST.: De sensu et sensato, 4, 442a12
Quod non, probatio: quia sapor amarus est sapor extremus. In ipso autem amaro est calidum consumens humidum excellentia caloris. Ergo videtur quod sapor extremus qui opponitur calido saporis amaro debet esse ille in quo est privatio calidi. Talis autem est ponticus et non dulcis, quia in dulci sapore est calidum perfecte digerens humidum. Quare, etcetera.

Oppositum patet per ARISTOTELEM in litterâ.

Dicendum quod sapor dulcis est sapor extremus maxime differentis ab amaro, quia sensus iudicans diversitatem vel differentiam sensibilium iudicat maximâ differentiam in genere saporis inter dulce et amarum. Illa autem sunt extrema et contraria in unoquoque genere quae maxime distant ad invicem; ut dicitur in decimo Metaphysicorum. Et sic f.209vb sapor dulcis et amarus sunt maxime differentes.

Sed intelligendum est quod sapor magis consequitur humidum quam calidum; natura enim saporis videtur esse in humidio alicuius passo a sicco terrestri et a calido. Et ideo extremini saporis et medi magis accipiuntur secundum humidum quam penes calidum, ita quod in sapore dulci est humidum perfecte a calido digestum; in sapore amaro est privatio humidii a calido perfecte digesti, quia ibi humidum consumptum est continuans et conglutinans. Et haec est


12 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 4, 442a12-29
18 ARIST., Metaph., X, 4, 1055a27-28
maxima differentia quae potest esse ex parte humiditatis. Humidum autem, secundum quod se habet medio modo, ita quod non est totaliter digestum nec penitus consumptum, sicut apparat in sapore pontico, acetoso et aliis, facit sapores medios. Unde si sapores medii acciperentur penes calidum, tum sapor dulcis non esset sapor extremus, sed medius; in sapore enim amaro est calidum excellens, in dulci calidum temperatum perfecte digerens. Et ista, secundum hanc rationem, non sunt extrema; sed essent extrema in quo est privatio calidi, si penes calidum sumerentur extrema.

Ad rationem. Dicendum quod tu arguis ac si sapores extremit et medii acciperentur penes calidum, quod non est verum.

<QUAESTIO 32>

UTRUM SAPORES MEII FIANT PER COMMICTIONEM EXTERORUM; SCILICET DULCIS ET AMARI


Oppossum dicit PHILOSOPHUS in littera.

Intelligendum ad hoc quod sapores medii fiunt per commiotionem extremorum, non secundum se, sed secundum

29 modo: marg. 30 totaliter: perfecte praem. sed del. et exp. cod. 31 acetoso: acetoso cod. 1 QUAESTIO: marg. 2 UTRUM...EXTRORUM: iter. marg. inf. 10 extremorum: non secundum se sed secundum commiotionem extremorum add. sed del. cod.

QUAESTIO 32: cf. S. THOMAS, In De sensu, lect. 11, nn. 148, 151 8 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 4, 442a12-13
commixtionem eorum quoad suas causas. Causa autem saporis dulcis est humidum perfecte digestum a calido; causa saporis amari est privatio humidī perfecte digesti, quia consumitur humidum totaliter ibi. Secundum autem commixtionem istarum causarum possunt fieri diversi sapores mediī, quia potest esse humidum non totaliter digestum a calido. Et istud potest esse diversimōde, sicut appareat in sapore pontico, acetoso, stiptico et acuto. In sapore enim pontico est humidum non digestum a calido, unde ibi est defectus caloris, et est ibi humiditas cum multo sicco terrestri. In sapore acetoso est humiditas non digesta a calido, sed est ibi multum de frigiditate, plus quam in pontico. In stiptico autem est humiditas non digesta a calido perfecte, plus tamen est ibi de calore quam in pontico; unde illa quae aliquantulum sunt digesta vidēntī habere saporem stipticum. Sapor acutus multum habet de humiditate et quam plurimum de caliditate; illa tamen humiditas non est perfecte digesta a calido, quia tunc esset sapor dulcis. Sic ergo fiunt sapores mediī.

Ad rationem. Verum est quod dulce et amarum non sunt activa secundum se; ratione tamen suarum causarum sunt mutuo activi et passivi, et ideo possunt commisceri.

QUÆSTIO 33
UTRUM SAPOR DULCIUS ET AMARUS OPPONANTUR PRIVATÉ AUT CONTRARIÉ

Quod contrarie, probatio: quia sensus gustus per-
5 cipit amarum tamquam aliquid positivum. Positivum autem
non opponitur alteri positivo privatiæ, sed magis-con-
trariæ. Quare, etcetera.

Item. ARISTOTELIS dicit quod in sensibilibus in-
10 ventur contrarietas, sicut dulci contrariatur amarum.
Quare opponuntur contrarie.

Opposutum dicit ARISTOTELIS: sicut enim nigrum est
privatio albi in perspicuo, sic et amarum privatio dulcis
in humidum nutrimentali.

Dicendum ad hoc quod isti sapores; dulce et amarum,
possunt considerari dupliciter, vel materialiter vel forma-
15 liter. Si materialiter, tunc dico quod opponuntur privatiæ.
Materia enim saporis dulcis est humidum perfecte a calido
digestum. Materia autem saporis amari est privatio humili
in aliquo corpore perfecte digesti propter caliditatem con-
sumentem. Quantum ergo ad subiectum saporis, opponuntur

privatiæ. — Si tamen nos considererimus sapores formaliter,
ut illud quod causatur a calido perfecte digerente humidad
et illud quod causatur a calido consumente humidad, quantum

2 UTRUM...CONTRARIÆ: iter. marg. inf. 4 Positivum autem: coni.
marg. (partially cut off) 5 positivo: pō scr. cod. sed corr. sup.
lin. 7 sensibilibus: sensibī scr. cod., sed sensilibij corr. marg.
inf. 8 contrariatur: contrariatur scr. sed corr. cod. 15 Si
materialiter: marg. // opponuntur: opponuntur scr. sed corr. cod.

QUÆSTIO 33: cf. ALBERTUS WAGNIS, De sensu et sensato, Tr.II, c.VII
(ed. Borgnet, pp.60-61); S. THOMAS, In De sensu, lect. 11, n. 148
7 ARIST. De sensu et sensato, 4, 442b17-19; 6, 443b24-26
10 ibid., 4, 442a25-27
ad hoc opponuntur contrarie, sicut dulcedo et amaritudo.
Haec sunt causata a praedictis.

Per hoc ad rationes.

(QUAESTIO 34)

UTRUM SPECIES SAPORIS ET COLORIS SINT INFINITAE

Quarto queritur utrum species saporis et coloris sint infinitae.

Quinto queritur utrum sapore et colores sint in numero determinato, ut septenario vel alio.

Sexto, utrum quaelibet commixtio diversificet saporem et colorem.

De primo. Quod colores et sapore sint infiniti,

probatio: quia AVÆRROÆS dicit quod infiniti sunt colores a natura quos pictores vel tinctores non possunt facere.

Item. In quolibet fieri sunt facta infinita. Ergo, in fieri quod est ab albo in nigrum, vel de dulci in amarum, sunt facta infinita. Transmutatio autem potest cessare in quolibet facto.

Oppositum innuit PHILOSOPHUS in littera.

Intelligendum quod non sunt actu sapore aut colores infiniti, quia si extrema in aliquo genere sunt finita,

1 QUAESTIO: marg. 2 UTRUM...INFINITAE: marg. inf. 10 AVÆRROÆS: AVÆRROÆS cod. (omnes) 12 fieri: fci praem. sed exp. cod.

QUAESTIO 34: cf. S. THOMAS, In De sensu, lect. 15, n. 215
10 AVÆRROÆS, Compendium libri Aristotelis de sensu et sensato, 192va, 14-51 16 ARIST...De sensu et sensato, 3, 440b23-25
necessario media inter illa sunt finita. Qui enim ponit
media infinita ipse tollit rationem extremorum, quod apparat
quia si aliquis ponat inter album et nigrum media actu in-
finita, tunc si aliquis debeat transire ab albo in nigrum,
umquam attingat ipsum nigrum. Ergo nigrum ibi non habet
rationem extremi. Dicuntur enim extrema quia ab uno in
alterum contingit transire per medium. Cum igitur in sapor-
ibus et coloribus sint extrema, non erunt mediis coloribus vel
saporens actu infinitis.

Ad rationes in oppositum. Dicendum quod quando
dicit AVÉRRÉS quod sunt infiniti colorens ipse intendit
infiniti in potentia.

Ad aliud. "In quolibet fieri sunt infinita fæcta"
verum est in potentia et non in actu. Et cum dicis "motum
contingit stare in quolibet facto", dico quod non contingit
motum in quolibet facto coniunctim, sed divisim, sicut non
contingit dividere continuum vel lineam secundum unumquod-
que signum coniunctim, sed divisim. Et sic non erunt in-
finitas in actu.

34 divisim: divisibiliter ser. sed corr. cod.
QUÆSTIO 35

UTRUM SAPORES ET COLORES SINT IN NÚMERO DETERMINATO

Cum non sint colors nec saporese infiniti, quaeritur utrum sint in numero determinato, ut in septenario vel alio.

Quod non, probatio quia sicut colors et saporese fiunt per commixtionem extremorum, sic per commixtionem mediorum fiunt alii saporese et colors. Et cum secundum quemlibet modum mixtionis sit sapor alius et color, manifestum est quod non est aliquis numerus determinatus.

Oppositum. Dicit PHILOSOPHUS quod septem sunt species saporum et septem colorum.

Dicendum quod certum est, colors et saporese non sunt actu infiniti. Hoc autem potest esse dupliciter: aut quia determinatus est numerus saporum et colorum; aut quia non est numerus saporum nec colorum determinatus, sed datis saporibus vel coloribus, semper est; ultra accipere, sicut patet in numero, et tamen numerus non est actu infinitus.

Ideo considerandum est utrum / numerus eorum sit determinatus, aut utrum possint esse plures in infinitum.

Et credo esse dicendum quod colors et saporese notabilem diversitatem habentes in generali et communi, sunt solummodo septem, scilicet: dulcis, amarus, salsus, ponticus, acetosus, stipticus et acutus. Istae sunt septem differentiae notabiles; ad istas reducuntur omnes. De coloribus: album et nigrum,
lividiun, puniceus sive rubeus, color citrinus, viridis et caelestis. Ad istas enim differentias omnes alii sapores et colores reducuntur.

Si autem nos consideremus sapores et colores secundum quaeque modum mixtionis, non est tunc determinatus numerus illorum. Et hoc est quod dicit COMMENTATOR, quod colores sunt infiniti a natura quos tintores vel pictores facere non possunt.

Per hoc ad rationem.

QUAESTIO 36

UTRUM QUILIIBET XODUS COMMISSIONIS SAPORUM VEL COLORUM FACIAT DIVERSITATEM IN SPECIE

Quod sic, probatio: est enim diversitas secundum materiam et formam; diversitas secundum formam variat speciem, secundum materiam non. Sed quaelibet commixtio istorum facit diversitatem secundum formam. quare videtur quod talis commixtio facit diversitatem secundum speciem.

Oppositum. Si sic, tune in coloribus et saporibus non esset magis et minus; non enim esset aliquid magis et minus, quia magis et minus, secundum ARISTOTELEM in Politicis, non diversificat speciem. Quare non quaelibet commixtio saporum aut colorum facit diversitatem secundum speciem.

2-3 UTRUM...SPECIE: UTRUM QUILIIBET XODUS COMMISSIONIS FACIAT DIVERSITATEM IN SPECIE FAME... 5 FORMAM: FORMARUM SCR. COD. SED CORR. MARE... 6 COMMISSIO: MIXTIO SCR. SCR. 9. GRAEM. SUP. LIN. COD.
Dicendum, sicut ostendit haece ultima ratio, non quaelibet commixtio facit diversitatem in specie, quia in coloribus et saporibus est magis et minus secundum diversitatem alicuius commixtionis. Magis autem et minus non different secundum speciem, sed different magis et minus per hoc, quod una forma magis et minus participatur ab aliquo subiecto, ita quod illa diversitas provenit ex parte subiecti et non formae. Unde diversitas quae est inter magis et minus non est diversitas secundum formam, sed est inter una forma secundum magis et minus a subiecto participata.

Ad rationem dicendum: ad maiorem, "diversitas secundum formam variat speciem", dico quod diversitas secundum essentiam formae variat speciem, sed diversitas secundum accidentia formae non variat speciem; accidentia formae appello formam unam et eandem ab aliquo subiecto partici pare magis et minus. Ad minorem dicendum: cum dicitur "quaelibet commixtio facit diversitatem secundum formam", dico quod non est verum secundum essentiam formae, sed secundum accidentia formae; et quod illa forma sic vel sic participatur a subiecto provenit ab accidente formae, ut dictum est.

19 aliquo: alico cod.
<QUÆSTITIO 38>

UTRUM FORMA SUBSTANTIALIS SUBSCPIAT MAGIS ET MINUS

Gratia huius, quaeritur utrum forma substantialis suscipiat magis et minus.

Quod sic, probatio: quia elementa miscentur adinvenem.
Probatio: quia nisi recipiērent magis et minus, non possent misceri; aut enim totaliter corrumperentur et remaneret sola materia, aut non, sed remanerent formae eorum in mixto, quod esse non potest. Quare recipiunt magis et minus.

Oppositum habetur in praedictis.

Dicendum quod substantia non suscipit magis et minus, neque substantia quae est forma, neque substantia quae est compositum, quia illud quod suscipit magis et minus, ipsum manente sua specie, variatur secundum magis et minus. Substantia autem manente sua specie non potest variari secundum magis et minus, quod appareat in octavo Metaphysicorum, ubi dicitur, "substantia, cum secundum se sortiatur speciem, sortitur speciem se seque aliquid indivisibile, ita quod il-

20 lud quod attingit ad illud indivisibile est sub illa species, et quod recedit et non attingit est sub alia specie". Ideo dicit PHILOSOPHUS ibi quod formae substantiales rerum sunt sicut numeri. In numero enim non potest fieri additio vel diminutio nisi varietur species, sed statim fit alia species numeri. Sic est in substantia; secundum PHILOSOPHUM, quod secundum aliquid indivisibile sortitur speciem; et quod at-

25 tingit illud est sub specie, quod autem non, non.

Item, hoc appareat sic. Quand o aliquid est ens per formam Substantiales, quicumque advenit illi iam enti in actu

17 Metaphysicorum: Physicorum cod. 20 sub: shā scr. sed a exp. cod. 28 est ens: ens est scr. sed signo mediente invertit cod. 29 in actu: marg.
est accidens. Si igitur forma substantialis recipieret magis et minus, cum aliquid esse in actu secundum illam formam substantialem ita quod illam participaret minus, tunc illud quod adveniret necessario esset accidens. Et ita si reci-
peret magis, illud magis non esset de genere substantiae.

sic ut magis album et minus album sunt de genere qualitatis.

Non igitur magis substantia et minus sunt de genere substantiae.

Ad rationem. Dicendum quod propter mixtiehem ele-
mentorum posuit COMMENTATOR quod formae recipiunt magis et
minus, et quod elementa miscentur secundum formas substanti-
ales et accidentales. Sic non oportet dicere, sed dicendum
quod elementa miscentur quantum ad qualitates per quas agunt
et patiuntur, et non miscentur quantum ad formas substantia-
les ita quod recipiunt magis et minus; immo dicendum quod
formae substantiales elementorum sunt corruptae in mixto et
non manent ibi nisi virtute; sed formae vel qualitates ac-
cidentales sunt ibi admixtae. Et ideo formae substantiales
non suscipiunt magis et minus.

35 qualitatis: q. praem. sed del. cod. 36 Non...minus: Non sic
magis et minus: Non sic
magis et minus: sed corr. cod. X. mars. 46 formae: forma
sc. sed corr. sup. in. cod.

39 AVERROES, In De caelo, III, comm.67 (Venetiis, 1562-74, 227)
ÜTRUM FORMAE IN ABSTRACTO SUSTIPIT MAGIS ET MINUS

Quod non, probat quia forma in abstracto significatur per modum substantiae, et substantia non sustipit magis et minus.

Opposuit Philosophus in quarto Moralium. Dicit enim quod sanitas magis participatur ab uno quam ab alio, et ab uno magis in diversis horis.

Intelligendum quod quaedam sunt quae sortiuntur.

Secundum se, non per habitudinem ad alium, et illa in abstracto secundum se sunt indivisibilia, sicut albedo et nigredo et hisusmodi qualitates. Quae autem non secundum se, sed secundum habitudinem ad alium sortiuntur speciem, sicut sanitas. Commensuratio enim calidi et frigidi quae est sanitas non sortitur speciem nec rationem secundum se. Non enim quaeque commensuratio calidi vel frigidi in isto est sanitas, sed secundum proportionem vel congruentiam illius animalis. Unde alia est commensuratio calidi in hoc animali et alia, et alia commensuratio in uno animali in diversis temporibus. Talia autem anente sua specie possunt varias, secundum magis et minus, ut sanitas magis est in uno quam in alio, et non dico quod solum ipsum animal unum sit magis sanum quam alium, sed ipsa sanitas sustinet magis et minus, quia sanitas non recipit speciem.

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1 QUÆSTIO; marx. al. pan. 2 URRUM, MINUS; iter. marx. inf.
3-4 significatur: s'igitur ser. cod. sed corr. marx. 15 nec;
ut scr. sed corr. cod. 23 unum: bene ser. cod. sed exp. et corr.
marx.

6 ARIST., Eth. Nic. x, 3, 1173a24.
nisi per habitudinem ad aliud secundum congruentiam animalis.

Ad rationem in oppositum: Dicendum quod talis qualitas in hoc habet modum substantiae, quia ut sic significatur in abstracto, et non significatur ut aliis inhaerens, sed ut per se stans, non tamet habet modum substantiae in hoc.

Quod sortitur species secundum ut sit substantia. Sed per habitudinem ad aliud. Et ideo ipsa secundum sit considerata potest recipere magis et minus ita quod talis qualitas non sortitur speciem secundum aliquid indivisibile, sed sortitur speciem per aliquid divisibile secundum magis et minus.

QUAESTIO (40)

UT R U M. CONC R E T U M. POSSET SUSCIPERE MAGIS ET MINUS QUIN IPSUM ABSTRACTUM NON SUSCIPIT?

Quaeritur utrum concretum possit suscipere magis et minus cum ipsum abstractum non suscipiat utrum album suscipiat si albedo non suscipiat.

Quod non, probatio: quia una forma indivisibilis existens et aequalis perfectionis, ut videtur, non potest participari a diversis vel ab uno in diversis temporibus secundum magis et minus, cum sit indivisibilis secundum se et aequalis perfectionis. Sed si qualitas in abstracto non suscipit magis et minus, est indivisibilis secundum se. Ergo illa non potest participari secundum magis et minus. Quare si albedo non suscipit magis et minus, nec album.
Oppositum. Dicit PHILOSOPHUS in Praedicamentis quod albedo non suscipit magis et minus, album tamen suscipit. Dico quod concretum bene potest suscipere magis et minus ab eo quod abstractum recipiat magis et minus; quia aliquid quod est secundum se non divisibile nihil prohibet illud participari ab aliquibus subjectis magis perfecte et minus perfecte, non ita quod diversitas illa proveniat a forma vel ex parte formae, sed magis provenit ex parte subjecti. Cuius probatio est: nam minus album est in potentia magis album, et potentia inest per naturam materiae et subjecti; et ideo ipsum subjectum potest bene participare formam quae est secundum se indivisibilis secundum magis et minus; ita quod diversitas illa provenit ex parte subjecti et non formae. Unde quamvis ita est quod hic sit magis album quam illud, tamen albedo non est in isto magis quam in alio, sed est albedo aequalis perfectionis secundum se in isto et illo; magis tamen perfecte est in uno quum in aliis quae tamen secundum se est indivisibilis. Et dico: "secundum se" quia per aliud potest hoc ei competere.

Ad rationem. Intelligo quod cum ipsa forma non sit divisibilis secundum se, bene tamen potest contingere ut ipsa participetur secundum magis et minus, ita quod ista diversitas non provenit ex parte formae, sed ex parte subjecti vel materiae. Quod enim aliquid participet album vel

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21 et minus perfecte: *marg.*
22 provenit: *marg.*

15 ARIST., Categoriae, 8, 10125-29 (2)
calidum quod in ipsa id hic est potentia ad album, hoc con-
tingit ei per naturam materiae vel subjecti, et non per
naturam albedinis.

QUAEStIC 41

UTAUL IN FORMIS SIT AUGMENTUM PER ADDITIONEM, EST HOC EST UTAUL.
ALBUM AUGMENTATUR PER ADDITIONEM, ALBEdinis AD ALBUM.

Circa praecedentia sunt adhuc quaedam quaerenda.

Quaeritur utrum in formis sit augmentum per aliquam
additionem, utrum augmentur album per additionem albedinis ad
album.

Quod sic, probacio: quia augmentum in formis est
transitive per similitudinem augmenti in quantitatibus cor-
poralibus. Sed in quantitatibus corporalibus fit augmentum
aliquo adveniente: quare, etcetera.

Item. Quando aliquid non album quod est in potentia
album sit actu album, hoc est adveniente aliquo quod prius
non erat, scilicet albedine. Ergo si minus calidum quod est
in potentia magis calidum fiat magis calidum, hoc erit ali-
quo adveniente, ut calidum. Quare formae suscipiunt augmentum
per additionem.

Oppositum. Quarto Physicorum ARISTOTELIS dicit quod
si minus calidum fiat magis calidum, hoc non est quia partes

\[2-3\ UTAUL\ ALBUM: marg. inf. 6 augetur: augete\ corr. cod. sed
corr. marg. 9 per similitudinem: marg. 10 Sed...
\[15\ calidum: si add. cod.

QUAEStIC 41: cf. S. THOMAS, In I De generatione, lect. 14, n. 101
19 ARIST., Phys., IV, 9, 217a33-b2\]
calidae ab extrinseco veniant in materia, nec quia aliquae
partes materiae calefiant cum prius non essent calidae.

Dico quod (quaedam) qualitates secundum se suscipi-
unt magis et minus, sicut sanitas, et in talibus fit aumen-
tum per additionem ad ipsam formam; unde minus sanum effi-
citur magis sanum per additionem ad ipsam sanitatem. quae-
dam autem formae secundum se non suscipiunt magis et minus,

f. 211ra sicut albedo et nigredo, quae sortiuntur speciem secundum
se, et non fit augmentum in istis formis per additionem ad
ipsam formam, ita quod ipsa forma in abstracto considerata

secundum se non recipit additionem; unde considerandum quod
quando minus album fit magis album, non est additio ad ipsam
albedinem ita quod una albedo sit magis albedo quam alia.

Item, minus calidum non fit magis calidum per hoc quod
partes calidae indicantur in materia ab extrinseco; item,

hec per hoc quod aliqua pars materiae calefiant quae prius
non fuit calida. sed minus album fit magis album, et cali-
dum similiter, per hoc quod albedo seu caliditas, existens
forma indivisibilis secundum se, ipsa potest participari a
diversis subjectis secundum magis et minus, secundum poten-
tiam subject. Isto modo ex minus calido fit magis calidum;
et similiter dicendum de albo, ita quod quando minus album
fit magis album, non est in potentia ad magis albedinem, sed
est in potentia ad participandum magis album.

21 essent calidae: esset calida corr. cod. 23 quaedam: suppl.
41 ita: scilicet scr. cod. sed corr. sup. lin.
Ad rationes. Dicendum ad primam: non oportet quod sit omino simile de quantitatibus et formis ita quod sicut quantitates augetur alicui adiveniente ad quantitatem, ita minus album fiat magis alicui sibi adiveniente.

<QUAESTIO 42>

QUANDO MINUS ALBUM FIT MAGIS ALBUM, UTRUM MINUS ALBUM CORRUMPATUR

Quaeritur quando minus album fit magis album, utrum minus album corrupatur, et utrum albedo quae est in minus albo corrupatur.

Quod non, probatio: quia illud quod perficitur non corrupitur, secundum ARISTOTELES in pluribus locis, quia corruppi est pati, perfici autem non est pati. Sed quando minus album fit magis album, tunc perficitur minus album.

Quare, etcetera.

Oppositum. Quando corrupitur alicuius aggregatum; forma illius aggregati corrupitur secundum accidens. Sed quando minus album fit magis album, corrupitur minus album, quia postquam factum est magis album, non amplius est minus album. Quare videtur quod corrupitur illa albedo secundum quam minus album est album.

Item. Quando aliquid transmutatur a termino in terminum, terminus a quo corrupitur. Si igitur aliquid trans-

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47 fiat magis: bis scr. marg. sed primam vicem del. (va-cat)
1 QUÆSTIO: marg. 2 QUANDO...CORRUMPATUR: marg. inf.; quaeritur praem.
7 ARIST., De anima, II, 5, 417b2-18 (?)
mutetur a minus albo in magis album, tunc videtur quod minus album debeat corrumpi.

Item. Illud quod post transmutationem inventur non ens (est) corruptum. Sed minus (album) post transmutationem inventur non ens. Quare, etcetera.

Intelligendum ad hoc quod differt quaerere utrum albedo corrupitur, et minus album, quando minus album fit magis album. Albedo enim manet in minus albo et magis albo, non eadem forte secundum numerum, sed in specie non corrupitur. Hoc ipsum autem quod est minus album, sub illa ratione, ipsum corrupitur; et corruptum est quando factum est magis album. Unde cum factum est magis album, non est verum dicere quod sit minus album; verum tamen est quod in magis albo est albedo, sicut in minus.

Item. Post transmutationem ad magis album, ipsum minus album inventur non ens secundum quod minus album, ita quod albedo in se considerata manet, non tamen sub illa ratione.

Ad rationem. Dicendum quod differt accipere subjectum minus quod est minus album et hoc ipsum quod est minus album, sicut non est idem homo et homo albus. Verum est quod quando ex minus albo fit magis album, subjectum minus albi perficitur, et ipsum non corrupitur. Ipsum tamen minus album non est illud quo perficitur formaliter, sed ipsum.
subiectum. Unde considerandum est quod quando aliquod sub-
jectum est sub alio contrario ita quod participat ipsum,
45 tunc ipsum non perficitur alio modo nisi per corruptionem
f.211rb illius contrarii. Unde si subjectum existens sub minus albo
non perficitur per magis album nisi per corruptionem minus
albi. Cuius probatio est: quia post transmutationem non
inventur minus album, et minus album est contrarium magis-
50 albo; et potest fieri transmutation ab uno in reliquum
secundum ARISTOTELER.

<QUAESTIO 43>

QUANDO MINUS ALBUM FACTUM EST MAGIS ALBUM, UTRUM SIT UNA ALBEDO
IN NUMERO

Quaeritur, quando minus album factum est magis album,
5 utrum sit una albedo in numero.

Quod sic, probatio: quia non videtur esse alia al-
bedo numero nisi quia albedo minus albi corruptitur et al-
bedo magis albi generatur; corruptum autem et generatum non
sunt idem numero. Probatio quod non corruptitur minus al-
10 bum et regeneratum est magis album: quia illud quod est minus
album non est in potentia ad albedinem, sed iam habet ipsam.
Ergo quando minus album fit magis album, non generatur album,
 nec etiam corruptitur, quare est una numero.

Oppositum. Quando minus album fit magis album, tunc
15 minus album corruptitur. Quare albedo quae est forma minus

44 ita: supra scr. sed del. et corr. sup. lin. cod.  45 alio modo:
a° cod.  2,3 QUANDO...NUMERO: marg. inf.  4 factum est: fit
corr. sup. lin. sed eras. cod.  6 alia: aliqua scr. sed corr. cod.
9-10 Probatio...quod est: X marg.  12 fit: sit cod.  15 album:
fit magis album add. sed del. et exp. cod.
51 ARIST., locus non inventus
albi corrupitur per accidens. Postea autem regeneratur
cum regeneratur magis album; sed non est unum simili numero
corruptum et postea regeneratum secundum PHILosophiE. fine
secundi De generatione. Quare, etcetera.

Credo esse dicendum quod, quando minus album factum
est magis album, in magis albo fit alia albedo secundum
numerus. Et huius probatio est quia certum est quod minus
album corruptum est, quia post transmutationem non inventur
minus album; et cum sit corruptum minus album, corrupitur
albedo sub tali esse, saltatem per accidens. Constat autem-
quod quando generatur magis album albedo generatur, saltatem
per accidens. Si igitur illud corruptum est et postea
generatum est non potest esse idem numero, non videtur esse
una albedo numero in minus albo et magis.

Et intelligendum propter dissolutionem rationis quod
aqua est diafana et aer, utrumque est perspicuum; et cum
aqua sit in potentia ad aerem, ipsa per accidens est in po-
tentia ad aeris perspicuitatem. Sic etiam dico in proposito
quod minus album est in potentia magis album, et non potest

generari magis album nisi generetur album per accidens; et
sic minus album est in potentia per accidens ad magis album.

ideo minus album est in potentia per accidens ad albedinum.

Tunc ad formam rationis: cum dicitur, "minus album
non est in potentia ad albedinum, quia ipsum est iam album".

sed eras: cod.  33 in: m° cod.  31 diafana: diafona cod.

18-19 ARIST., De generatione et corruptione, II, 11, 338b14-17
dico quod minus album per se non est in potentia ad albedinem; per accidens tamen potest, ut ad albedinum magis albi.
Unde sicut quando ex aqua generatur aer, et tunc corrupitur aqua, et tunc perspicuum quod est eius accidens, et cum

generatur aer, generatur perspicuum; sic quando ex minus albo fit album magis, tunc generatur magis album per se, et
album per accidens. Et sic per accidens minus album est in potentia ad albedinem.

<QUAESTIO 44>

UTRUM ODOR SIT FUMALIS <EVAPORATIO VEL MULTIPLICAT SE CUM FUMALI>
EVAPORATIONES

Consequenter quaeritur desodorat.

"Hunc vero modum oportet intelligere de odoribus...

Primo quaeritur utrum odor sit fumalis evaporatio

vel multiplicat se cum fumali evaporatione.

Quod sic, probatio qua quae sunt frigida quae non praestant odorem, cum tamen inflamantur prae-

stant odorem. Quare.... Et hoc dixit HERACLITUS: "si omnia

essent fumus, nasus omnia discernret".

Item. Venti imediunt perceptionem odoris. Hoc

non esset nisi odor materialiter se facet in medio; aliter

non removeretur a vento. Quare, etcetera.

2-3 UTRUM...EVAPORATIONE: marg. ini. (cut off) 5 Hunc...odoribus:
subl.; capitulum de odoribus marg. (cut off) 7 multiplicat; ml'et
scr. cod. sed'corr. marg. 8 sunt...sup. lin. 10 HERACLITUS:
ERACLITUS cod.

5 ARIST., De sensu et sensato. 5, 442b27... 10 HERACLITUS, Fr. 7
(Diels) = ARIST., De sensu et sensato. 5, 443a22
Item, frigus et congelatio exterminant odorem.
f. 211va. Hoc autem non videtur esse nisi quia frigus et congelatio
impediat fumalem evaporationem. Ergo odor est evaporatio,
vel saltum multiplicat se cum illa.

Opposatum dicit PHILOSOPHUS:

Dico quod odor non est evaporatio, nee exhalatio
sicca, item, nec utrumque, nec etiam necesse est quod odor
multiplicet se cum fumali evaporatione.

Primum apparat manifeste quia vapor est humidus,
cuius signum est quia ex vapore generatur humiditas et aqua.

Talis autem humiditas non est odor. Non enim est odor in
humido collum, sed in humido et sicco.

Item, odor non est exhalatio sicca. Cuius signum
est quia talis exhalatio non potest fieri in aqua; odor autem
se facit in aqua, quia animalia aquatica odorant intus in
aqua.

Item, odor non est utrumque, scilicet evaporatio
fumalis, quia talis evaporatio fumalis in aqua fieri non
potest.

Item, non oportet quod odor se multiplicet cum fu-
mali evaporatione, quia odor sè extendit ad tantam disstan-
tiam ad quam corpus odoriferum non possit se extendere si
totum se resolveretur in fumalem evaporationem, quia rarita-
tates corporum sunt determinatae. Item, non possit odor se
exterminant: ext iat scr. cod. sed corr. marg. inf. 20 exha-
latio: exhalatio cod. (fere omnes) 35 se extendit: marg.

19 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 5, 443a24-b2.
multiplicare in aqua si cum fumo necessario se multiplicaret.

40 Unde non est fumalis evaporatio. Verum tamen est quod odor
eliquando se multiplicat cum fumo usque ad aliquam distant-
tiam. Unde potest contingere quod fumalis evaporatio et
odor simul egredientur a corpore. Non tamen oportet quod
semper sit simul cum odore fumalis evaporatio, ut patet in
aqua.

Ad primam rationem. Dico quod non concludit quod
odor sit fumalis evaporatio. Quamvis ita sit de aliquidus
corporeus odoriferis, non tamen sic est de omnibus odoriferis. Unde, frigida illa forte non praestat odorem quia

50 ibi non est calidum generare et movere odorem; ideo quando
igniuntur odorant, et potest contingere quod fumus cum illo
odor eegredientur. Non tamen semper est hoc necessae.

Ad aliud. Dicendum quod venti impediant odorem quia
odor magis materialiter immutat medium et sensum quam color,
non quia sit odor cum fumali evaporatione.

Ad tertium. Dicendum quod non est verum quod frigus
et congelatio impediant odorem per hoc quod impediant fumalem
evaporationem. Frigus enim et congelatio impedit orese
per se delectabiles quia natura odoris est cum calido, vel

60 sunt huicmodi odores calidi natura, sicut dicit litera.
Unde frigidum et congelatio hebetant odores, nec tamen oportet
quod odores sint fumalis evaporatio vel cum fumali evaporatione.
<QUÆSTIO 45>

UTRUM ODORES PÆR SE DELECTABILES TEMPLATI HYPERBOLEM CEREBRI.

Queritur utrum odores per se delectabiles temperent hyperbolem cerebri, scilicet excessum humiditatis et frigiditatis.

Quod non probatio: quia frigidum et humidum temperant a calido et sicco. Odor autem non est secundum seu caliditas aut siccitas, sed quaedam alia species ab ipsis quare, etcetera.

Ita. Odor in instrumento olfactorum et in cerebro facit actionem spiritualen, quia facit sui cognitionem, et non naturalen. Ergo videtur quod odor non potest temperare frigiditatem et humiditatem cerebri, quia non potest temperari huiusmodi nisi a aliquo naturali.

Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS in littera.

Intelligendum quod odores ascendunt propter levitatem quam dat eis calor, sicut dicit littera. Unde virtus ipsius odoris, sicut dicit littera, est naturaliter calida, f.211vb. Odor enim a aliquo calido elevatur, et ideo odor naturam calidi habet. Verum est enim quod odor essentialiter non est ipsa caliditas. Credo tamen quod odor in concomitetur caliditas aliqua; cuius signum est quod aere existente frigido non multiplicant se odores per se delectabiles. Et hoc videtur dicere PHILOSOPHUS in littera; dicit enim quod motus
25 odorum ad cerebrum et calor qui est in eis est contemperatus ad hyperbolem frigiditatis et humiditatis ipsius. Dico igitur quod cum odore per se delectabili diffunditur calor igneus, qui perveniens ad cerebrum contemperat frigiditatem et humiditatem eius cum sit temperatus.

30 Ad rationem. Dicendum quod odor non est caliditas aut siccoitas. Cum odore tamen se facit caliditas et siccoitas; cuius signum est quod temporibus frigidis non fit talis odor.

Ad aliud. Quamvis odor secundum se faciat actionem spiritualis, nihil tamen prohibet calidum quod est cum odore agere naturaliter.

<QUAESTIO 46>

UTRUM ALIA ANIMALIA AB HOMINE PERCIPIANT ET SENTIANT ODORES PER SE DELECTABILES

Quod sic, probatio: quia alia animalia fugiunt odores corruptivos et febridos. Quare sentiunt ipsos, quia non fugere gent nisi sentirent.

Item. Alia animalia ab homine habent sensum olfactus. Odorabilis autem est objectum olfactus. Quare alia animalia ab homine percipiunt huiusmodi odorabile, cum sit objectum per se.

Oppositum dicit littera.

Intelligendum secundum PHILOSOPHUM: in littera, hoc genus odoris, scilicet flororum et rosarum, est proprium sensui hominis, et est ex in adiutorium sanitatis, quia homo habet cerebrum maxime frigidum et humidum, plus quam alia animalia. Secundum quantitatem sui corporis, et ideo in adiutorium sanitatis est hoc genus odoris sibi proprium, quia hoc genus odoris sua caloritate temperat hyperbolem frigiditatis et humiditatis cerebri. Alia autem animalia sentiunt solum odorum qui indicat alimentum conveniens vel non conveniens; et illum non percipiant qui est delectabilis secundum se vel fetidus secundum se, et si percipiant, non tantum multum curant de hoc; unde videmus quod animalia non curant esse mixta illud quod habet fetidum odorum. Et ideo dico quod solum curant de illo qui ostendit conveniens alimentum.

Unde magis est natura sollicita in conservando hominem quam alia animalia, et ideo dedit sibi sensum ollactus quo potest sentire et cognoscere odorum ipsius alimenti et odorum per se delectabilem in adiutorium sanitatis; alia autem animalibus dedit cognitionem unius. Unde dicit littera quod alia animalia ab homine sentiunt solum odorum alimenti.
Ad rationem. Dicendum quod alia animalia fugiunt odorem corruptivum non quia ipsum sentiunt, sed quia per sensum tactus sentiunt corruptionem quam facit huiusmodi odor. Sicut enim homines multotiens patiuntur gravisinem capitis per fumum carbonum, sic etiam homines et alia animalia ad fetidis odoribus corrupuntur; non ita quod alia animalia percipient huiusmodi odores, sed quia percipiant corruptionem quam facit odor. It ideo fugiunt odorem corruptivum non per se, sed per accidens.

Ad alium. Dicendum quod alia animalia non habent olfactum quo possint sentire omnia odorabilia; habent enim olfactum quo sentire possunt odorem alimenti, sed non dedit eis natura sensum olfactus que possunt sentire odorem per se delectabile: Et causa dicta est prius.

QUAESTIO 47

UTRUM IN ANIMALIBUS RESPIRANTIBUS ET NON RESPIRANTIBUS SIT IDEM SENSUS ODORIS

Quaeritur consequenter de lectione praecedenti.

"Quae autem non respirant...."

Utrum in animalibus respirantibus et non respirantibus sit idem sensus odoris.

Secundo, utrum aliquod simplex possit esse nutrimentum.


QUAESTIO 47: cf. S. THOMAS, In De sensu, lect.14, n.195 5'ARIST. De sensu et sensato, 5', 444b7
f.212ra

De primo. / Quod non sit idem sensus <odoris> in respirantibus et non respirantibus, probatio: quia sensus diversificatur secundum diversum modum sentiendi et non sentiendi. Sed animalia respirantia et non respirantia diversimo modo patiuntur ab odore et diversimodo sentiunt, quia respirantia sentiunt cum respiratione, non respirantia sine respiratione. Quare diversus est modus sentiendi:

Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS in littera.

Dicendum quod in respirantibus et non respirantibus idem est sensus odoris in genere vel specie; quod appareat quia idem objectum ab istia sensibilibus percepitur, scilicet odorabile; et unum objectum est unius sensus, et sic in animalibus respirantibus et non respirantibus est sensus unus. unde animalia respirantia et non respirantia bohem sensu idem objectum sentiunt, non tamen eodem modo.

Et ideo intelligendum quod duplæx est diversitas in modo sentiendi. Una est diversitas in modo sentiendi per se secundum habitudinem sensus ad sensibile, sicut tactus sentit sensibile coniunctum, et non necessario per medium extrinsecum; visus atque sentit eum sensibile per medium extrinsecum et a longe. et talis diversitas factit diversitatem sensus, et praecipue cum illâ diversitas sit secundum objectum.

odoris: suppl. 12 respirantia respirentia erat sec. corr. sup. lin. cod. 18 odoris: idem cod.

16 AST.: De sensu et sensato, 5, 44915-28
Est autem alia diversitas in modo sentiendi secundum accidens, scilicet quantum ad remotionem prohibentis; isto modo est diversitas in proposito. Animalia enim respirantia habent co operculum super instrumentum olfactorius. Ideo non odorant nisi quando respirant; quando enim respirant, tunc elevatur co operculum et intrat aex, et cum aex odore. Animalia autem non respirantia non habent huiusmodi co operculum superjacens, et ideo ad hoc quod odorant non oportet quod respirent, nec quod co operculum elevetur. Et est simile quod quaedam animalia habent palpebras et non possunt videre nisi elevatis palpebris; quaedam autem sunt animalia duros oculos habentia, non habentia palpebras, et ideo non necesse est quod ad hoc quod videant aperitur. Similiter in proposito.

Ad rationem. Ubi quod non oportet quod quaecumque diversitas secundum quaecumque modum sentiendi concludat sensum diversum, sed secundum diversum modum sentiendi per se.

<QUAESTIO 48>

UT AQUA ALIQUOD SIMPLEX POSSIT ESSE NUTRIMENTUM, UT AQUA

Quod sic, probato, quia simplex potest fieri commixtum; et commixtum potest esse nutrimentum. Ergo simplex potest esse nutrimentum.

34 enim autem cod. 44 aperitur: apperitur cod.
1 QUAESTIO: marg. 2 UTNCA...AQUA: iteri. marg. inf.
Item. In simplici est potentia materiae. Sed potentia materiae est in potentia ad omnes formas. Quare videtur quod ex simplici potest aliquid nutriiri ita quod in substantia nutriendi potest induci forma nutriendi.


Oppositum dicit PHIL.03.

Dicendum quod nutrimentum oportet esse compositum vel mixtum. Quae ratio est quia ipsum animal est compositum ex elementis, et quod deperditur in nutrimento est mixtum et compositum. Nutritio autem est ad restaurandum deperdictum. Cum igitur illud deperditum est sit commixtum, oportet quod restaurans deperditum sit commixtum. Unde illud dicitur esse nutrimentum quod in substantia rei alendae potest converti virtute animae vegetativae. Si enim aliquid habeat potentiam valde remotam ad hoc quod convertatur in substantiam nutriendi, illud non dicitur nutrimentum, sed illum solum quod est in potentia propinquaque et ap uno motore, sicut et a virtute animae vegetativae, potest converti in substantiam alendam. Unde considerandum quod non fit quilibet ex quolibet immediate; non enim generatur homo nisi tantum ex commixto quod est semen hominis, immediate dico.

Similiter dico: quodlibet non potest immediate restaurare deperdictum, sed oportet quod sit commixtum et oportet quod

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6, 7 potentia: substantia cod. (cf. I.37)  11 quare: forma... quare (11.9–11) iter, sed del. cod.  14 animal: ducit nutrimentum cod. cf. 3, THO.A3, in De sensu, lect.14, n.203

12 Arist., De sensu et sensato, 5, 445a17–25
habet humiditatem convenientem rei alendae. Unde illa quae sunt nimirum terrastria, non sunt nutrimentum.

Ad rationem primam. Quamvis simplex possit esse commixtum, et commixtum sit nutrimentum, non tamen oportet quod illud simplex dicatur nutrimentum, quia solum dicitur illud nutrimentum quod ab uno motore, scilicet a virtute animae vegetativa, potest converti in substantiam alendi.

Ad aliud. Dicendum quod in simplici est potentia materiae, sed illa potentia est valde remotæ, et non potest uno motore reduci ad actum.

Ad aliud. Dicendum quod piscum non nutritur aqua pura, sed nutrimentur aliquo mixto, sicut patet in piscibus aqua dulcis.

<QUÆSTIO 49>

UTRUM QUALITAS SENSIBILIS DIVIDATUR IN INFINITUM.

"Obiect autem aliguis si omne corpus in infinitum..."

Utrum qualitas sensitiva dividatur in infinitum.

Quod sic, probatio quia qualitas sensitiva est in continuo et corpore. Sed continuum divisibile est in infinitum. Quare qualitas.

Item. Nisi qualitas dividatur in infinitum, sicut continuum, erit accipere corpus sine sapore, colore etiam insensibile; sequitur etiam quod corpus sensitibile erit.

31 nimis: minus scr. sed corr. marg. 32 esse: sup. line. 40 nutritur: nutritur cod. 41 aliquo: alico cod. 2 UTRUM...INFINITUM: marg. inf. 3 Obiect...infinitum: subl. 6 continuo: quantitate cod. (cf.l.23) 9 accipere: active scr. sed corr. sup. line. cod.


Item. Si corpus sit insensibile, tunc non erit ipsum intelligibile, quia intellectus nihil intelligit nisi cum sensu. Cum ergo huiusmodi corpus non sentiatur, cum sit sine qualitate sensibili, non intelligitur.

Oppositum dicit hic PHILOSOPHUS. Intelligendum quod qualitas sensibilis est in continuo et corpore, et verum est quod continuum illud, secundum quod continuum, est divisibile in infinitum; quantitati enim, secundum quod quantitas, non repugnat divisio in infinitum. Ipsa tamen qualitas non potest dividī in infinitum, immo terminatur eius divisio ad aliquid minimum; quia si divisetur ipsum sensibile, dividetur in aliquid tam parvae virtutis quod illa virtus non poterit resistere continent, sed statim convertetur in continens, sicut sapor minus in usus mari, sicut dicit littera. Virtus enim maior est in majori corpore, et minor in minori. Unde secundum quod corpus sensibile efficitur minus et minus, debilitatur.

12 qualitatem: quantitatem cod. sensibile add. cod.
18 intelligibile: nec etiam

21 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 6, 445b20-23
32 ibid., 446a7-10
virtus, et ideo tandem devenietur ad aliquid tam parvae
virtutis quod non habebit virtutem resistendi: Istud verum
est.

Sed modo quaeret aliquis utrum sensibile possit
dividi in infinitum secundum se, ita quod si non esset
aliquod corrumpens, posset dividi in infinitum.

Videtur esse de intentione PHILOSOPHI quod qualitas
sensibilis secundum se non est divisibilis in infinitum, etiam
si non esset corrumpens. Hoc apparet sic: istae qualitates
sensibles aliquam habent actionem, unde dicuntur esse sen-
sibilia, quia nata sunt movere sensum. Si igitur secundum
se divideretur in infinitum sensibile ita quod esset accipere
aliquid minus, et illo minus, et sic in infinitum, tunc
unumquodque illorum posset sentiri; et tunc sequeretur quod
sensus, esset infinitus secundum superabundantium discreti-
onis, quia sensus ille superabundat in discretione qui po-
test comprehendere aliquid minus. Et tunc sequeretur quod
superabundaret sensus in infinitum discretione, si qualitas
esse divisibilis in infinitum.

Itèm. Qualitas sensibilis a materia habet actionem
et non agit in sensum nisi per medium. Actio autem sua est
va movere sensum. Medium autem determinatum est raritate
et densitate, sicut aqua vel aer; huiusmodi autem medium
non est natum moveri a quocumque sub quacumque quantitate,

45 sunt: suppl. 46 sequeretur: sentiretur scr. sed corr. cod.
49 superabundantium: superhabundantium cod. (omnes) 52 qualitas: suppl.
sed sub determinata, cum sit determinatae rationis et densitatis. Et cetera dicuntur sensibilia quia nata sunt movere sensum, et non possunt movere nisi sub determinata quantitate. Quare non sunt divisibilia in infinitum. Unde actio facit scire formam secundum AVEANDUM, et actio non est a qualitatem determinatam, et istam quantitatem; res naturales habent limitem suae quantitatis et ad maximum et ad minimum.

Ad rationem. Dico quod continuum secundum quod continuum divisibile est, non tamen qualibet.

Ad aliud. Dicendum quod non erit corpus insensible, quia eiusmodi corpus convertatur in naturam continentie. Et tu dicis: ad minus erit corpus sensibile compositum ex insensibilibus. Hic sunt suo dicenda. Unum, quod corpus sensibile minimum, secundum quod sensibile, non est compositum cum sit minimum, sed secundum quod corpus, non autem secundum quod sensibile; et ideo non compositur ex insensibilibus. Aut dicendum quod illud corpus quod tu dicis insensible non est minimum, sed compositum ex partibus existentibus in toto; quaelibet enim pars sensibilis existens in toto est sensibilis in toto. Et non oportet quod si dividatur a toto quod sit sensibilis, quia aliquid convenit parti in toto quod non convenit ei per se.

63 facit: fecit cod. 65 habeant: haeat cod. 66 res: unde praem. cod. 73 sed: secundum scr. sed corr. cod. 79 existens: existentis scr. sed corr. cod.

63 AVERROES. locus non inventus
Aliud. Dicendum quod sensibile est convertitur in naturam, et sic intelligibile.

*QUESTION 50*

Sensus dividitur in infinitum:

Quod sic videtur, quia sensibile natum est movere sensum. Sed quaeritur pars sensibilis existens in toto est sensibilis; est ergo natum movere sensum. Sed in toto sunt partes minores et minores in infinitum, adeo sensus erit infinitus.

Opposuit dicit **PHILOSOPHUS**.

Dicendum quod sensus non dividitur in infinitum. Nesc est infinitus, quia sensus est virtus existens in organo et quantitate determinata. Virtus autem quae est in quantitate determinata est finita, quia major virtus in maior corpore; ergo in finita quantitate, virtus finita. Unde sensibile natum est movere sensum, et non est sensibile divisibile in partes sensibiles separatas in infinitum. Partes enim a toto separatas sunt actu sensibiles, et totum non dividitur in tales partes in infinitum. Partes autem quae sunt in toto sunt sensibiles non in actu, sed in potentia; sicut enim illae partes sunt in potentia in toto et non actu separatae, sic sunt potentia sensibiles. Unde sensus sentit aliquod totum simul, et non totum per partes. Verum **83-84 Ad... intelligibile: marz. (partially cut off)**

**2. UTUR. INFINITUM: iter. marz. inf.: IN suppl.**

**QUESTIO 50**: cf. 3. THOMAS, In De sensu, lect. 15, nn.219-220. 8 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 5. 446a10-12.
est tamen quod aliquando contingit quod sensus sentit aliquid partem totius et non totum, et tunc intelligit illum partem ac si esset divisa a toto. Verumtamen sensus
non potest sentire quamlibet partem continui hoc modo. Unde dicit litterae: decimum millesimum milii latet visum; et
crescit, idest minimum qui est in sono, latet auditum.

Ad rationem. Dico quod non omnes partes que sunt in toto sint sensibiles in actu, sed in potenti. Jicet enim non sunt separatae a toto, sed in potentia in toto,
sic sunt sensibiles in toto in potentia.

<QUALIQUO 51>

UTRUM ODOR FACIAT SE IN MEDIO SUCCESSIVUM VEL SUBITO

Ad hoc de praecedentibus.

Utrum odor faciat se in medio successive vel subito.

Quod subito, probatio: quia lumen in medio efficitur subito et non successive. Quare similiter odor. Veli quare non?

Item. Medium est susceptivum odoris, et non videtur habere contrarietatem ad odorem: urgo videtur quod odor in

toto medio, videlicet usque ad odorantem, faciet se subito.

Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS.

Item. Ille qui est propinquior odorii prius sentit

26 latet: licet praem. sed del. cod. 2 utrum...subito: marg. inf. 6 quare: que serr. cod. sed expr. et corr. marg.

26 ARIST. de sensu et sensato. 6, 445b32-446a4 11 ibid., 446a
Licendum quod si odor se faceret et multiplicaret cum humati evaporatione; tum non faceret se subito in medio, sed successive, eo quod distensis illius fumalis evaporationis, cum sit notus localis, non posset fieri subito. Et ideo si odor se faceret cum sensibili evaporatione, apparatus quod illa multiplicatio successive est. Verumtamen non est necessa quod odor sic fiat semper, sicut apparebat in aqua, quandoigitur odor multiplicatur sine fumo; geste tunc multiplicatio illa subito vel successive?

Dicendum quod odor in medio et fit subito et successive. Ita enim subito quantum ad aliquam partem medii.

25. Cuius ratio est quae dixit alterans alterat aliquod totum simul se alterabili, sicut apparebit; et ideo in toto illa parte quae alteratur tota simul, odor est ibi subito. Non tamen odor in toto medio vel usque ad odorantem factus se subito, sed successive. Cuius ratio est quae quosto dixit est maioris virtutis, tanto se alterabili plus alterat totum simul; corpus autem odoriferum non est tantae virtutis quod totum medium possit simul alterare, sed solum ari quid eius, et illa pars alterata e corpore odorifero alterat aliam partem usque ad aliquam distantiam determinatam, et illa aliam, usque ad odorantem.

Sed statim quaereret aliquis: cum una pars alterata ab odore, quaere est quod in eodem instanti in quo alterata est, pars sequens non est alterata?

Potest dici quod si corpus odoriferum altere alicuam partem totam simul, alterat tamem eam secundum magis et minus ita quod pars magis remota a corpore odoriferó minus habet de odore, sic ut appareat manifesté. Et ideo potest continuer quod pars illa propert debilitatem odoris quam habet non potest statim alterare alteram partem mediú sed oportet quod prius ab altera sit magnis alterata. Et ideo odor susceptible se facit in medio.

Ad rationem. Dico quod non est simile de lumine et odore, quia corpus solís habet virtutem super totum medium, corpus odoriferum non.

Ad alium. Quamvis odor non habet compensandum medium, tamen corpus odoriferum non habet virtutem super totum medium. Unde si haberet hoc, hoc factum. Unde supérito se haberet ad aliquam partem supra quam potest virtus eius.

<QUAESTIO 52>

UTRUM ID QUOD VISUM EST VIDEATUR

Quia dicit ARISTOTELES quod videre et visum esse sunt simul: utrum id quod visum est videatur.

Quod non, probatio: quia quod factum est non fit. Ergo id quod visum est non videatur.


Oppositum. Littera dicit: sentit aliquis simul et sensit.

Dicendum quod sentire non est motus imperfectus:

secundum ARISTOTELI. libro De anima: quamquam videre concomitantur motus visibilis, verumtamen non est cum motu ita quod visus fiat cum motu: unde dicit quod sentire non est motus imperfectus, sed motus perfectus. Unde aliqua facta sunt absque fieri et generatione eorum per se in subiecto proprio,

alia vero non. Illa igitur quae facta sunt et ad quae est fieri et generatione in subiecto proprio, illa prius fiunt quam facta sunt universaliter. Illa autem quae facta sunt absque fieri et generatione eorum per se in subiecto proprio, illa facta sunt et non prius fiunt in subiecto proprio. Unde medium

incipit esse illuminatum absque eo quod motus aliquis fiat in medio, nec movetur medium, nam istud factum esse consequitur ad motum localem corporis illuminantis, et non ad motum medii.

f.213ra Similiter est de ipso videre, / eo quod videre et visum esse idem sunt; visus enim incipit videre cum prius non videret absque eo quod sit transmutatio successiva in ipsō visu. Istud enim sequitur ad motum localem ipsius visibilis, ut si visibile sit a parte posteriori, et deferatur ad partem priorum, statim videntur. Ideo dico quod simul videt aliquis et visum est, et similiter simul audit et audivit.

scrit. cod. sed corr. sup. lin.
Ad rationem in oppositum. Concedantur praemissae, nec sequitur conclusio, quia videre non est fieri. Quod si obiciatur quod ipsum factum praecedet fieri, et visum esse est factum esse, dicendum quod illud idem fieri est fieri corporis visibilis. Ratio autem quare sonus se faciat successive patet in littera.

<QUÆSTIO 53>

UTRUM ALIQUOD TOTUM SIT ALTERATUM

Quaeritur de alteratione, utrum aliquod totum simul sit alteratum.

5 Quod non, probatio: quia secundum ARISTOTELIS sexto Physicorum, illud quod movetur, quando movetur, est in termino a quo secundum aliquid eius, et secundum aliquid in termino ad quem; per hoc probat quod est divisibile. Ergo id quod alteratur secundum aliquid eius est in termino ad quem, et secundum aliquid in termino a quo. Quare videtur quod non sit aliquod totum simul alteratum.

Item, per simile. In motu locali quando aliquid movetur localiter respectu alcius signi, prius per transit illud signum secundum medietatem eius quam secundum totum; quare videtur quod similiter erit in alteratione.


36 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 6, 446b13-17  5-6 ARIST., Phys., VI, 4, 234b10-20
Oppositum. Dicit PHILOSOPHUS in littera quod aliquid totum simul est alteratum.

Dicendum quod illud quod movetur necesse est esse divisibile, sicut ostendit PHILOSOPHUS in sexto Physicorum, sive moveatur localiter sive alteretur, ita quod aliquid totum oportet simul moveri vel esse motum; et illud diversi-mode contingit in alteratione et motu locali. Quando enim aliquid movetur localiter, quando movetur medietas anterior, movetur medietas posterior simul, ita quod cum medietas anterior ingrediatur locum sibi propinquum, medietas posterior ingreditur locum prioris medietatis. Et ideo in motu locali contingit quod mobile prius pertransit aliquid signum secundum medietatem quam secundum totum, et prius medietatem illius medietatis.

Sic autem non est in alteratione, quia ibi totum alterabile est frigidum vel calidum, aut aliqua pars eius. Ponamus quod aliquid totum alterabile sit frigidum; istud non potest alterari ita quod medietas posterior ingrediatur et accipiatur formam medietatis anterioris, quia iam habet illud cum sit frigidum. Et ideo necesse fuit quod in alteratione aliquid totum simul esset alteratum, et non medietas prius, et illius prius suas medietates.

Ad rationem in oppositum. Dicendum ad primum quod ARISTOTELES in sexto Physicorum loquebatur de motu secundum...
40 quod fuit continuus: et cum motus localis sit verus continuus, manifestum est quod de motu locali habet veritatem illa demonstratio. Verum tamen illa demonstratio extenditur quod dammodo ad alterationem secundum quod alteratio participat continuitatem vel aliquum simile sibi. Unde intelligendum quod alterans aliquando est tantae virtutis quod alteratum totum simul alteratur; et tunc in eo quod alteratum est non habet locum demonstratio ARISTOTELIS, quia non est ibi proprie alteratio, sed alteratum esse. Aliquando autem alterans non est tantae virtutis quod totum simul attingit, sed aliquam partem; et tunc alteratur, habitum ab habito, sicut dicit littera: Talis autem alteratio quocummodo continuitatem participat; et secundum hoc vera est demonstratio. ARISTOTELIS quod illud quod alteratur habet unam partem in termino ad quem, aliam in termino a quo.

50 Alia ratio soluta est, quia non est simile de motu locali et de alteratione,

(QUAESTIO 54).

SI ALIQUOD TOTUM SIT SENSIBLE PER SE ET PRIMO, UTRUM QUAE LIBET PAR S EIUS SENSIBILIS

"Est autem objectio quaedam et alia talis...."

5 Quaeritur, si aliquod totum sit sensibile per se et

f.213rb primo, utrum quaelibet pars eius sit sensibilis.

50 et tunc: autem scr. cod. sed del. et corr. marg. * 1 QUAESTIO: marg. 2-3 SI...SENSIBILIS: marg. inf. 4 est...talis: subl. 5 Quaeritur: utrum add. cod. // per se: marg. inf.

50-51 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 7, 447a12 4 ibid., 7, 447a12
Quod non, probatio: quia dicit PHILOSOPHUS septimo
Physicorum: si aliquod totum habeat aliquam operationem,
non oportet quod quaelibet pars habeat operationem illam;
10 ut si tot grana faciunt sonum in aere, non oportet quod
quaelibet per se faciat sonum.

Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS in littera; et habet pro
inconveniendi quod aliquod totum sentiat per partem ita
quod aliqua pars totius sit insensibilis.

... Intelligendum quod partes aliquas totius possunt
intelligi dupliciter: vel secundum quod sunt separatae a
toto, vel secundum quod sunt in toto. Si igitur sit aliquid
primo et per se sensibile, non oportet quod quaelibet pars
eius divisa a toto sit sensibilis, sed erit devenire ad
aliquam partem quae, si dividatur, convertetur in naturam
continentis, secundum PHILOSOPHUS superius. Sic intelligit
PHILOSOPHUS in septimo (Physicorum): si tot grana faciunt
sonum, et cetera, non oportet quod quaelibet pars divisa
faciat sonum.

Si autem partes intelligentur secundum quod sunt in
toto, sic sunt sensibilès, quia quaelibet pars existens in
toto facit ad hoc quod ipsum totum sentiatur. Cuius probat-
tio est quia congregatio partium facit quod ipsum totum
fortius moveat sensum quam si deficeret aliqua pars. Item,
congregatio partium facit quod totum videtur ex maiori dis-
tantia quam si deficeret aliqua pars. Quaelibet igitur pars existens in toto est sensibilis. Et intelligendum quod quaelibet partem existentem in toto non contingit sentire per se et divisim; quia si sic, necesse esset sensum esse infinitum in abundantia discretionis, quia sensus est discretior qui potest percipere minus. Quaelibet tamen pars est sensibilis per hoc quod totum sentitur; totum enim sentitur sicut aliquod unum, et quaelibet pars sentitur per accidentem quando totum sentitur.

Ad rationem. Patet quod si totum sentitur, partes separatas non oportet sentiri.

<QUAESTIO 35>

UTRUM ANIMA SENSITIVA HABEAT PARTES QUANTITATIVAS

"De prius autem dicta opinione...."

Utrum anima sensitiva habeat partes quantitativas.

Quod non, probatio; quia aliqua est perfectio quae aequaliter respicit totum et partes, sicut albedo; unde si-
cut tota superficies perfectibilis est ab ea, sic etiam pars. Talis forma et perfectio habet partes quantitativas et divisibilis est. Alia autem est forma quae perficit totum et non quaelibet partem eius; talis perfectione videtur esse anima, quia per suam definitionem anima est actus

abundantia: habundantia cod. inf. De...opinione: subl.

3 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 7, 448b17
corporis organici. Sed quaelibet pars non est organica; quare est perfectio totius. Talis autem forma non videtur habere partes quantitativas, cum non perficiat quamlibet partem.

Oppositum. Secundum ARISTOTELEM libro De anima, anima sensitiva dividitur secundum divisionem subjecti, sicut patet in animalibus decisis; est enim ibi una anima secundum speciem et plures secundum numerum.

Solutio. Haec anima habet partes essentiales quae ponuntur in sua definitione; item, habet partes potentiales, sicut sensitiva; item, in corpore habet partes quantitativas, quamvis oppositum diciant aliqui.

Probatio huius. Differt perfectio substantialis et accidentalis. Perfectio substantialis perficit substantialiter, et necesse est quod perfectio substantialis perficiat totum et quamlibet partem. Cuius probatio est quia pars est id quod est substantialiter per formam. Aut igitur nihil esset pars substantialiter, aut perficietur perfectione substantiali. Cum igitur pars corporis animata sit aliquid substantialiter, patet quod anima perficit partem substantialiter. Sed totum et partes non perficit uno indivisibili, sed necesse est quod totum habeat partes quantitativas per accidens. Dico igitur quod anima sensitiva habet partes

17 anima: marg. 25-26 substantialiter: sbätū scr. cod. sed corr. marg. 26 perficiat: iter. sed del. cod.

16 ARIST., De anima, I, 5, 411b19-22 23 aliqui: cf. S. THOMAS, In De sensu, lect. 19, n. 287; In I De anima, lect. 14, nn. 204-210; ST, I, Q.76, a.6; Q.D. De anima, Q.10
quantitativas; sed per illas partes non sentit plura, sed
secundum unum et idem per diversas partes potentialiaes.

Ad rationem in oppositum. Dico quod anima sensitiva
perficit totum et partes. Sed pars potest considerari se-
cundum quod in toto vel secundum quod separata. Hoc ultimo
modo anima sensitiva non perficit quamlibet partem nisi in
f.213va animalibus decisi; / perficit tamen in toto. Primo et
principaliter anima est perfectio totius, secundo partium;
et non necesse est quod illud cuius anima est perfectio
secundario sit organicum, sed illud quod primo perficitur
est organicum.

<QUAESTIO 56>

UTRUM SENSUS COMMUNIS SIT UNUS.

Quod non, probatio: quia unus sensus est objectum
unum. Sed sensus communis non est objectum unum, quia ob-
jecta sensuum particularium sunt objecta sensus communis,
quae non sunt unum.

Oppositum. Dicit ARISTOTELIS in littera quod sensus
communis est unus subjecto.

Solutio. Sensus communis sentit differentiam sen-
sibilium adinvicem, ut differentiam inter album et dulce;
et cum hoc sit verum, necesse est quod sentiat omnia sensi-

QUAESTIO 56: cf. S. THOMAS, In De sensu, lect. 19, n. 288
7 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 7, 449a16-18
bilia sensuum particularium. Iste igitur sensus qui sentit
differentiam omnium sensibilium et omnia sensibilia est unus
secundum subjicitum; secundum se est unus sensitivum.

15 Item. Inquantum sentit differentias sensibilium
est aliquid unum in actu, quia differentia sensibilium est
aliquid unum in actu. Differunt tamen in ratione secundum
quod sentit unumquodque sensibile; unde sensus communis
differit a se cum sentit dulce et cum sentit album. Et ideo
sensus communis assimilatur puncto existenti in circulo,
qui est aliquid unum secundum se subjicit, diversus tamen
est ratione secundum quod est terminus unius lineae et
principium alterius. Sic sensus communis est unum subjicit
habens organum unum, differunt tamen in ratione secundum quod
est terminus diversorum; inquantum autem iudicat differenti-
tias diversorum est aliquid unum secundum actum.

Ad rationem in oppositum. Dicendum quod nihil pro-
hibet id quod agit per plura habere objecta plura. Unde cum
sensus communis sentiat per plura, ut per plures sensus
particulares, nihil prohibet objecta particularium esse ob-
jecta illius, quia immutationes particularium terminantur
ad sensum communem. Et dico ad formam rationis, "unius
sensus debet esse unum objectum quod referitur ei immediate":
ista autem diversa sensibilia non offeruntur sensui communii
immediate, sed sensui communis est objectum unum quod ei

13-15 X marg. 17 actu: quia (quod scr. sed corr. marg.) differen-
tia sensibilium est aliquid unum add. cod.; homoteleutetion (?)
19 et cum: etcetera cod. 34 communi: qui scr. cod. sed corr.
marg. 35 sed: ei add. cod.
immediate obicitur, et est differentia sensibilium; hanc enim differentiam non sentiunt sensus particularles.

Est igitur dicendum ad dubitationem ARISTOTELIS quod contingit sentire plura simul secundum aliquid commune et diversa: genere sentiuntur a sensu communi per partes diversas potentiales, et non solum per partes diversas quantitativas. Sensibilia tamen contraria sentiuntur a sensu communi per unum sensum particularlem, ut album et nigrum per oculum; et sensus communis iudicat de utroque.

Ad rationes ARISTOTELIS in littera. Prima est: isti motus aut sunt aequales aut inaequales. Si inaequales, tunc motus minor non sentietur; si autem aequales, obscurabant se invicem quia neuter sentietur, nisi tu dicias quod commiscuntur, quod non contingit cum sint diversorum generum, ut album et dulce.

Dico quod possunt esse tales motus inaequales, quia maior motus sentietur et non minor, ita quod virtus sensitiva intendet ad motum maiorem et non minorem. Potest enim maior motus esse ita fortis quod alius non sentietur. - Poterunt etiam esse aequales isti motus, et etiam tunc sentiuntur in sensu communi, ita quod unus non impediret reliquum, sicut unus extra non impediat reliquum. Si tunc sint aequales, adnunc sentiuntur, quia non se impedient, sicut nec in subjecto.

45 isti: s add. sup. lin. sed eras. cod. 48 nisi: si scr. sed exp. et corr. cod.

38 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 7, 448b17-449a2 45 ibid., 447a14-b6
Et hoc est verum de sensibilibus genere diversis.

Ad secundam rationem, qua est talis est: magis videtur quod possint simul sentiri sensibilia eiusdem generis quam diversorum; sed sensibilia eiusdem generis non possunt simul sentiri, quia plura sensibilia factunt operationes plures, et unius sensus una est operation.

Dico quod unius sensus bene sunt plures operationes simul differentes ratione solum. Sicut aliquid unum sub. f.213vb iecto est album et dulce, sic in eodem subiecto potest esse motus dulcis et albi. Unde sensus albi et dulcis simul sunt, sicut album et dulce. De sensibilibus autem contrariis intelligendum quod quantum ad immutationem in medio et sensu non sunt contrarii.

Ad aliud: contrariorum contrarii sunt motus, quae non possunt uno sensu sentiri. Dicendum quod album et nigrum extra animam in esse reali contraria sunt. Immutationes tamen quae procedunt ab albo et nigro non sunt contrariae, quod probatur quia possunt esse simul in eadem parte medii et in sensu. Unde considerandum quod album et nigrum aliud esse habent in sensu et medio, et aliud in re extra. - Ad formam rationis: contrariorum contraria sunt motus; dico quod contrariorum immutationes spirituales non est necesse esse contrarias; contrariorum tamen motus vel

61 possint: esse add. sed del. et exp. cod.  67 subiecto. sio scr. cod. sed corr. marg.  72 Ibid.  448a1-19
immutationes naturales necessæ est esse contrarias. Sic ad illum rationem est dicendum.

Explicit quæstiones supra De sensu et sensato

S3. disputatae a magistro Petro de Alvernia. Benedictus Deus, Amen.
<QUESTIONES SUPRA LIBRUM DE MEMORIA ET ACIDENTIA DISPUTATAS A LACTANTIO PETRO DE ALVERHIA>

<INTRODUCTIO>

1.213v0 Sicut dicit PHILOLOGUS Sexto de historiis animalium. natura paulatim procedit de inanimatia ad animata ita quod prius invenitur genus inanimatum, et hoc sicut imperfectum prius est perfecto. Deinde invenitur genus plantarum, quod se habet ad animalia sicut inanimatum; ad inanimata autem comparatam, videtur esse animatum. Et sunt prius animatis et posterioris inanimatis sicut imperfectum prius est perfecto. Et hoc facit natura secundum ordinem sequentem. Similiter autem quaeque animalia immobilia sunt et nutrimentum habent ex ipso terrae sicut et plantae, nutrimentum ex terra est, et in hoc conveniunt: different tamens in hoc quod iste sunt sentientia, et aliam non. Et ideo a plantis ad animalia quaeque continum ordinem proceditur natura. Similiter est de istis per comparationem ad animalia perfecta; sunt enim ante haec sicut imperfectum ante perfectum, et communicant utraque in sensu et vita.

20 licet diversimodo, sicut manifestum est.

1-2 QUESTIONES. ALTH. supra. secundum Petrum de Alverhia supra lin. 11. men. 8 animalia; animata cod. 8-9 inanimatum. Sunt.
X mapri 10 inanimatis; animatum cod. / imperfectum; perfectum cod.
12 animalia; animata cod. // sicut et ali edd. sed dein. cod.
15 sentientia; viventia cod.
N.B. INTRODUCTIO. 11. 4-54 deest in R.

4-ARIST. De historiis animalium, VIT. 1, 588b4-5
Eodem modo inventur in progressu istorum animalium, perfectorum sive progressorum, sive ab istoris ad hominem; sunt enim prius secundum generationem, et posterius secundum perfectionem. In isto autem progressu ab animalibus ad hominem, quaedam inventur in quoque aliqua similitudo rationis apparent. Cum enim prudentia sit propria virtus hominis (est enim prudentia recta ratio agibilium, ut dicitur in sexto Ethicorum), inventur quaedam animalia quorum prudentiam participare, non ex eo quod habent rationem, sed ex eo quod instinctum naturae moveantur per apprehensionem sensitivae partis ad quaedam opera faciendae, quae ex ratione operarentur. Pertinet autem ad prudentiam quae ex prudentiis dirigitur in his quae immutantur, sed faciendae ex consideratione non solum praeventium, sed praeteritorum. Unde TULLUS in sua Rhetorica partes prudentiae ponit, non solum providentiam, per quam futurum disponuntur, sed etiam intelligentiam, per quam consideratur praeventia, et memoria, per quam apprehenduntur praeterita. Unde in his animalibus in quibus inventur prudentiam similitudo necessis est ea esse participatio non solum

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28, 1034. Eth. nich. VI, 5. 1140620 55 TULLUS, De inventione rhetorica, 14, 33
sensum praesentium, sed etiam memoria propter illorum.
Et ideo PHILOSPHUS dicit in primo Metaphysicis quod
quiue sua animabus inest memoria ex sensu et propter
hoc prudentia sunt.

45 Sed sicut prudentiam imperfectam habent respectu
hominis, ita etiam memoria. Nam alia animalia memorantur
quiue sua tantum, homines autem memorantur et reminiscuntur et ideo
gradatim M. LUCIUS post librum in quo determinavit de
sensu, qui est communis omnibus animabus, determinat de
50 memoria et reminiscientia, quorum alterum inventit in
solum hominibus, scilicet reminiscientia, alterum autem,
silicet memoria, in hi et in animalibus perfectis et
imaginantibus solut in absentia sensibilis.

Avilitur autem iste liber in partes duas, eaeque,
QUÆSTIO 17

SUPPOSITA QUOD DE MEMORIA SIT SCIENTIA, UTRUM SIT SCIENTIA DE MEMORIA SEPARATA A SCIENTIA DE ANIMA

Queritur primo utrum
5 de memoria sit scientia separata a scientia de anima, supposito quod de illa sit scientia.

Quod non, probatio.
10 Quia cuius est considerare subjectum, eius est considerare accidentia et potentias. Sed ad scientiam de anima pertinet considerare de anima, quae est subjectum memoriae et huiusmodi potentiarum; est enim memoria operatio ipsius animae. Quare, etcetera.

f. 105rb "Reliquorum autem, etcetera."

Circa istum librum, supposito quod de memoria sit scientia, quaeritur utrum sit separata a scientia de anima.

Arguitur quod non.
10 Quia cuius est considerare subjectum, eius est considerare passiones et accidentia per se, ut dicitur in Physicis. Sed ad scientiam de anima pertinet considerare de anima, quae est subjectum potentiarum et accidentium animae. Cum ergo memoria sit quaedam potentialis operatio animae, vis-

20 detur quod scientia de memo-
Oppositum appareat per ARISTOTELES, qui tradit nobis scientiam separatam. Dicendum quod de memoria et reminiscentia est scientia separat a scientia de anima, quia in scientia de anima consideratur de anima secundum se et de potentissimis principalibus et de operationibus secundum quod sunt ipsius animae, et non determinatur ibi omnia quae possunt determinari de istis potentissimis et operationibus. Unde qualis dispositio corporalis exigatur ad operationes animae non docet ARISTOTELES in libro De anima, sed illud docet in Parvis libris naturalibus, sicut dicit PHILOSOPHUS in
De sensu et sensato. Ideo scientia de memoria est separata.

Ista tamen scientia secundum Graecos pars scientiae de sensu et sensato et sub ipsa reponitur, quia memoria est virtus sensitiva, et etiam reminisci ad virtutem sensitivam pertinet. Verum tamen haec scientia potest distinguiri a scientia de sensu in hoc quod in scientia de sensu determinatur de sensu secundum quod est communis omnibus animalibus, perfectis et imperfectis, haec autem non, quia memoria inest omnibus animalibus perfectis solum, reminiscientia solum hominibus.

Secundum tamen Graecos haec scientia est pars libri De sensu et sensato et repertur sub ea, quia memoria est virtus sensitiva, et etiam reminisci ad virtutem sensitivam pertinet, et non ad intellectivam nisi per accidentem, ut postea patebit. Unde haec scientia potest distinguiri a scientia de sensu et sensato, quia in scientia de sensu et sensato determinat de sensu qui communis est omnibus animalibus, perfectis et imperfectis, in hoc tamen libro determinatur de sensu qui communis est.

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50-51 reminisci: memorari cod. 54 reminisci: memorari cod.
53-54 a...sensu: de sensu a scientia 56 intellectivam: ut postea add.
scri: sed signo mediante invertit cod. sed exp. cod.
041-42=R44-45 ARIST., De sensu et sensato, 2, 437a19f.
045-48=R49-52 cf. S. THOMAS, In De sensu, lect. 2, n. 18
64-65 animam considerare: animam est: omni imago. 

65-70 quod... considerare: suppellegitur ad huissusmodi operations. 

70-75 poenas exiguntur ad huissusmodi positions. 

75-80 "quis... consideraret" est: quid est. 

80-85 "et... consideraret" est: quid est. 

85-90 "quod... consideraret" est: quid est. 

90-95 "et... consideraret" est: quid est. 

95-100 "et... consideraret" est: quid est. 

100-105 "et... consideraret" est: quid est. 

105-110 "et... consideraret" est: quid est. 

110-115 "et... consideraret" est: quid est. 

115-120 "et... consideraret" est: quid est.
<QUAESTIO 2>

UTRUM TARDI AD INVENIENDUM VEL DISCENDUM SINT BENE MEMORATIVI

Quod non, probatio. Quia aliqui inveniuntur malae memoriae et tardi ingenii. Ergo qui sunt tardi ad inveniendum non sunt bene memorabiles.

Item. Ad memorandum duo requiruntur, scilicet acceptio et conservatio. Unde non est memoria nisi prius acceptorum. Sed illi qui sunt tardi non de facili recipiunt; quare non bene memorantur, quia ad memorandum requiritur acceptio et

Consequenter quaeritur utrum tardi ad inveniendum vel discendum sint bene et de facili memorativi.

Et arguitur quod non. Quia aliqui reperiuntur tardi ingenii et etiam male memoriae, sicut appareat ad sensum. Ergo illi qui sunt tardi ad inveniendum vel addiscendum non sunt bene memorativi.

Item. Ad memorandum duo requiruntur, scilicet acceptio alicuius et conservatio illius. Unde memoria non est nisi prius acceptorum. Sed illi qui sunt tardi non de facili recipiunt; ergo non de facili memorantur, quia ad memoriam

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QUAESTIO 2: Cf. S. THOMAS, In De memoria, lect. 1, nn. 301-302
conservatio.

Oppositum dicit PHILA-
20 
SOPHUS.

Dico quod tardi ad in-
veniendum aliquid ex se vel ad aliquid descendunt sunt bene memorativi, veloces
25 autem ad inveniendum sunt bene reminisciviti. Cuius ratio est, nam homines diversas habent habitudines ad opera secundum diversas dispositiones corporales.
30 Nos autem videmus quod illa quae in corporalibus de difficili recipiunt aliquid impressionem bene servant eam, sicut lapis. Quae autem non de difficili recipiunt, sed de facili, non bene retinunt, sed de facili amittunt. Ne-
35 requiruntur receptio et conservatio.

Oppositum dicitur in littera.

Dicendum quod tardi ad inveniendum aliquid ex se vel addiscendo ex alio sunt bene memorativi. Cuius ratio est, nam homines diversas habent habitudines et dispositiones ad opera secundum diversam habitudinem corporis. In corporalibus autem videmus quod illa quae cum difficultate aliquid dispositionem recipiunt eam bene retinunt, sicut lapis. Illa autem quae de facili recipiunt non bene retinunt et servant, sed de facili amittunt. Memorari autem nihil aliud est quam
morari autem nihil aliud est quam bene conservare accepta et sensata prius. Unde quando ipsa conservata accipiuntur sub ratione qua prius sensata, tunc memoria tur aliquis f.214r° memoratur. Istit autem qui sunt veloces ad inveniendum sunt bene reminiscitivi, et non bene memorabilis, quia impressionem prius receptam non servant, sed de facili amittunt. Sed quando illa reinveniunt tunc dicitur re miniscientia, ita quod reminiscientia est prius oblitorum. Unde reminiscientia est reinventio prius oblitorum et receptorum. Illi autem qui sunt tardi ad inveniendum vel discendum, quando

60 aliquid impressionem receperint, bene conservant. Alli

50 bene conservare recepta et sensata prius. Unde quando ipsa conservata et retenta accipiuntur sub ratione qua prius sensata, tunc memoria tur aliquis. Illi autem qui sunt veloces ad accipiendum sunt bene reminisci ti vi / et non bene memorabiles, quia impressionem prius acceptam non bene conservant nec retinent, sed eam de facili amittunt. Cum tamen illam impressionem prius acceptam inveniunt, tunc reminiscuntur, ita quod reminiscientia est reinventio in praesenti prius conceptorum vel reinventorum. Qui ergo sunt tardi ad inveniendum vel discendum, quando aliquid impressionem recipiunt,
autem de facili recipiunt
et de facili amittunt, et
ideo sunt reminiscitivi.

65 Ad rationem. Dicendum
quod id quod hic dicit ARISTOTELIS non est intelligendi
dum semper. Non enim con-
tingit quod tardi sunt sem-
per bene memorativi; potest
enim aliquod esse impedimien-
tum in organo memoriae. Sed
intelligendum est ut frequen-
ter.

70 Ad alium. Dico quod illi
qui tardi sunt non de facili
recipiunt. Et ex hoc con-
tingit quod isti postquam
receperint vel intellexerint
sunt bene memorativi cum be-
ne illud conservant. Unde
non valet illud argumentum.

75 bene retinent eam, et ideo
bene sunt memorativi. Illi
autem qui sunt veloces ad
inveniendum vel discendum
non sunt bene memorativi,
sed sunt bene reminiscitivi.

80 Ad rationem. Dicendum
quod illud dictum ARISTOT-
ELIS non debet intelligi si-
cut semper, sed sicut fre-
quenter. Non enim semper
contingit quod tardi sunt
semper bene rememorativi,
sed potest esse impedimentum
in organo memoriae. Non
tamen hoc impedimentum fit
saepe, sed fit in paucis.

85 Ad aliam. Dicendum quod
ratio non valet. Qui enim
tardi sunt non de facili re-
cipiunt, ex quo contingit
quod cum receperint bene re-
tinent et conservant, et
ideo bene sunt rememorativi.

88 receperint: quod add. cod.
UTRUM SCIENTIA POSSIT ESSE SPERATIVA VEL DE FUTURIS

Quod non videtur, quia scientia est de ente, et scientia non est de non ente. Futura autem sunt non entia. Quare, etcetera.

Item. Scientia est eorum quae non possunt aliter se habere. Talia non sunt futura.


Dicendum quod triplinga sunt futura. Quaedam enim sunt futura. Quaedam sunt

UTRUM: Utrum aliqua: possit esse scientia sperativa sive de futuris marg. inf.

2 esse: suppl. 2 UTURUM. FUTURIS: Utrum aliqua: possit esse scientia sperativa sive de futuris marg. inf.

QUAESTIO 3: cf. S. THOMAS, In De memoria: lect. 1, nn. 304-307; 012=R15-18 ARIST., De memoria et reminiscencia, 1, 449b11-13
sunt futura quae causam habent prae- 
senti sive praeuentem, quae 
tamen non potest impediri a 
suo effectu futuro, sicut 
sol, qui movetur continue, 

non potest impediri quin 
ali quando lunae conjungatur. 
Alia sunt futura quae causas 
habent in praesenti ex qui-
bus non eveniunt semper et 
de necessitate, sed frequen-
ter, quia huiusmodi causae 
possunt impediri. Tertio 
modo sunt futura quae cau-
sam habent in praesentibis: 
ex qua non eveniunt semper 
nequque frequenter, sed raro et 
in minori parte. Et isti 
sunt causae agentes ut in 
pluribus cum deficient a na-
turali operatione sua.

14-15 Quaedam... futura marg. 
15 causam: tamen cod., exp. et 
corr. marg. 15-18 habent... 
effectu: imago manus marg.

25 sol: sol cod. 
26 quin: coni. cum 0; q cod.
Dico igitur quod de futuris secundum se consideratis non potest esse scientia, quia ipsa considerata sunt non entia. De futuris tamen in suis causis potest esse scientia, dico de futuris primo modo et secundo. Contingit enim scire determinate cum certitudine quando talis effectus erit qui non potest impediri ex sua causa prae sente, sicut contingit scire quando sol coniungetur lunae et quando eclipsabitur. Contingit etiam scire futura ex causis praesentibus quae ut pluribus ut ut frequenter insunt suum effectum ita quod raro accidit impedimentum. Scire enim contingit quod ex talibus causis praesentibus eveniet talis futurus effectus sicut frequenter. Futura autem tertio modo non

54 ut ubi doc.
possunt sciri determinate
quando erunt quia illa pro-
veniunt a casu vel fortuna,
et tali possunt evenire a
causis infinitis. Et ideo
ex causis praesentibus non
contingit scire quando tali
erunt.

Dico igitur quod bene est
aliqua scientia sperativa quae
est de futuris a nobis spera-
bilibus, nam huiusmodi futura
causas habent ex quibus eveniunt sicut frequenter. Et ideo astrologi ex motibus
stellarum indicant et pronunci-
ciant quosdam effectus futuros, ut sterilitatem terrae
aut ubertatem. Et quamvis
aliquibus videatur quod isti
effectus proveniunt ex causis
raro et in minori parte,
turus sicut frequenter. Fut
utra autem tertio modo non
contingit scire determinate;
non enim possunt sciri de-
termine quando erunt, quia
illa futura a casu et for-
tuna proveniunt; et tali pos-
sunt provenire ex causis
infinitis. Et ideo ex
causis praesentibus non con-
tingit scire quando tali
erunt.

Dicendum quod bene est
aliqua scientia sperativa
de futuris a nobis sperabili-
bus, quia huiusmodi futura
causas habent ex quibus eveniunt sicut frequenter.
Et ideo astrologi ex motibus
stellarum et ex dispositione
corporum caelestium indicant
et pronunciunt quosdam ef-
fecctus futuros, ut sterili-
tatem vel ubertatem. Et
libet quibusdam videatur
quod huiusmodi effectus
verumtamen istud non videtur.  

sicut in minori parte et

provenient a causis suis.

85. astrologis, qui considerabant

raro, hoc tamen non videtur

dispositiones corporis cae-

astrologis, qui cognoscunt

testis.

dispositionem corporum

cælestium.

90. utrum autem sit aliqua

sæculæ sperativa quæ sit

dispositione et signis

sæculæ sperativa quæ sit

corporum caelestium, ut

quæm ex dispositione corporum

gemantia vel nigræmantium;

cælestium non determino ad

non determino ad præsens.

100. quæm ex dispositione corporum
cælestium non determino ad

praesens.

105. Ad rationem in oppositum. Dicendum quod cum

dicitur "de non ènte non est scientia, etcetera",

dico: quamvis illa futura

sunt non entia secundum se,
sunt tamen entia in suis

sunt non entia secundum se,

causis, cum causae suae

sunt.

Ad rationem secundam.

110. Ad primam rationem in oppositum. Dicendum quod licet

sunt non entia in suis

illa futura sint non entia

causis, cum causae suae

secundum se, tamen sunt entia

sunt.

Ad aliud. Dicendum quod

sunt non entia in suis

futura primo modo non possunt

causis; futura tamen

impediri quando provenient

et futura secundo modo

ex suis causis; futura tamén
possunt impediri; et tunc
potest esse scientia de il-
lis ut in pluribus vel fre-
quenter, et sciri potest
quod illae causae producant
effectum suum vel sicut sem-
per vel sicut frequenter.

<QUAESTIC 4>

UTRUM MEMORIA SIT PRAETERITORUM SOLUM

"Quoniam autem de fantas,
tasia, etcetera."

De lectione praecedenti
unum remansit dubium, sci-
licit utrum memoria sit so-
lum praeteritorum.

Quod non, probatio. Quia
non solum contingit esse
memoria hominum qui mortui
sunt vel praeteritorum, sed
etiam hominum qui praesentes


121 quia: de add. sed del. cod.

119-120 ARIST., An. Post., II, 12, 95a10-96a19 (?); cf. I, 30, 87b19-27 1-2 ARIST., De memoria et reminiscen-
tia, 1, 449b30.
sunt. Unde dicit VIRGILIUS, aliquis sui ipsius potest reminisci vel memorari.

Item. Illud quod educit aliquid de potentia ad actum videtur esse prae sens et in actu. Sed memorabile reducit virtutem memoratvvm de potentia ad actum. Ergo memorabile videtur esse prae sens animae memoranti.

Oppositum dicit PHILUS et probat.

Intelligendum quod memoria est solum praeteritorum. Cuius ratio est quia memoria differt a sensu, ab opinione, et a spe. Sensus enim est solum praesentium; memoria igitur non erit praesentium.

sunt, secundum quod dicit. VIRGILIUS quod aliquis sui ipsius potest reminisci et memorari. Ergo memoria non tantum est praeteritorum, sed etiam praesentium.


Oppositum dicit littera et probat.

Intelligendum quod memoria solum praeteritorum est. Et quis ratio est quia memoria differt a sensu, ab opinione, et a spe. Sensus enim est solum praesentium; ergo memoria non erit
Item, opinio potest esse futurorum, unde scientia quaedam sperativa est, sicut dicit littera; cum igitur memoria differat ab opinione, non erit memoria futurorum. Item, spes est futurorum, et memoria differat a spe; quare erit memoria solum praeteritorum.

Sed intelligendum est quod aliqua dicuntur praeterita dupliciter, vel quantum ad rei existentiam, vel quantum ad animae apprehensionem. Memoria enim non est solum praeteritorum quantum ad rei existentiam, immo potest esse praesentium; sed est memoria praeteritorum praesentium. Item, opinio potest esse futurorum, unde et quaedam scientia de futuris sperabilibus sperativa est, ut dicit littera; cum ergo memoria differat ab opinione, non erit memoria futurorum. Item, spes est futurorum, et memoria differat a spe; memoria autem non erit futurorum, neque etiam praesentium, sed solum praeteritorum.

Sed est attendendum quod aliqua possunt dici praeterita dupliciter, scilicet quantum ad rei existentiam et quantum ad animae apprehensionem. Memoria vero non solum est praeteritorum quantum ad rei existentiam, sed potest esse praesentium; quantum tamen

29 scientia: siëtia cod.
36 Sed: si cod.
53 memoria: praeteritorum est add. sed exp. cod.

030-31=R39 ARIST., De memoria et reminiscencia, 1, 449b11-13
quantum ad animae apprehensionem. Unde necesse est quod omnia quorum est memoria sint prius sensata vel intellecta; memoria enim est acceptio aliquorum sub ratione qua prius sensata vel imaginata. Unde dicit littera, omnis memoria post tempus est.

Item. Intelligendum quod ipsum memorabile praesens est animae memoranti cum educit animam memoranti cum educat illam de potentia ad actum. Ipsum tamen praeteritum est quantum ad apprehensionem sensus particularis vel communis, vel fantasiae.

His visis, ad rationes. Dicendum ad primam: verum est quod est memoria hominum praesentium, sed illo-

ad animae apprehensionem, memoria praeteritorum est. Unde necesse est quod ista omnia quorum memoria prius fuerant sensata aut intellecta. Unde et dicit littera: quod omnis memoria post tempus est.

Est etiam intelligendum quod ipsum memorabile praesens est animae memoranti cum educat illam de potentia in actum; et tamen ipsum memorabile praeteritum est quantum ad apprehensionem sensus particularis vel communis, vel fantasiae, vel intellectus.

Ad primam rationem in oppositum. Cum dicitur quod "memoria non solum praeteritorum est, immo etiam prae-

65 est: suppl. 79 immo: ymmo cod. (omnes)
rum non est memoria nisi inquantum sunt praeterita quantum ad apprehensionem sensus aut intellectus.

75 Ad secundum. Concedo quod ipsum memorabile est praesens animae memoranti, sua dico species. Ipsum tamen praeteritum est quantum ad apprehensionem sensus vel intellectus, quia prius acceptum fuit, ut dictum est.

80 sentium, etcetera", dicendum quod verum est, sed illorum non est memoria nisi secundum quod illa sunt praeterita quantum ad apprehensionem sensus vel intellectus.

85 Ad secundum. Dicendum est quod memorabile praesens est animae memoranti; ibi enim, scilicet in anima memoranti, praesens est illa species. Memorabile tamen praeteritum est quantum ad apprehensionem sensus particularis vel communis, vel intellectus.

91 species: s add. cod.
<QUAESTIO 5>

UTRUM INTELLECTUS INTELLIGAT SINE FANTASMATE

Primum quidem de fantasia, etcetera.

Deinde de praesentia quaeque.

Secundo, utrum substantiam quantam possit intellectus intelligere absque quantitate.

Et primo quaeque.

Tertio, utrum species remaneant et conserventur in intellectu.

Quarto, utrum in intellectu sit virtus memorativa.

Quinto, utrum virtus memorativa, aestimativa et fantastica differant a sensu communi.

20. De primo. Arguitur quod intellectus intelligat sine

Et videtur quod sic. Quia si aliqua species sit

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2 UTRUM...FANTASMATI: marg. inf.
3-4 Primum...fantasia: subl.
15 virtus memorativa: memorativa

2 UTRUM...FANTASMATI: marg. inf.
3-4 Primum...fantasia: subl.
15 virtus memorativa: memorativa

QUAESTIO 5: cf. S. THOMAS, In De memoria, lect.2, nn.314-317; ST, I, 1.84, a.7
03-4 Arist., De memoria et reminiscencia, 1, 449b30-31
fantasmate, quia si aliqua species sit in intellectu,  
illa species faciet, ut videtur, illum intellectum esse in actu et intelligere absque fantasmate cum sit ibi. Sed aliqua species est in intellectu secundum PHI-
LOSOPHUM Tertio De anima, cum dicit quod intellectus fit singula; non fit autem singula nisi recipiendo singula. Quare videtur quod sit aliqua species in intellectu, sicut apparat apud scientiam quae est in habitu. Si igitur hoc sit verum, potest illa species movere in-
tellectum absque fantasmate.

Item. Maior esse vide f.214vb tur dependentia imaginatio/nis 25 dependentia imaginationis ad

14 quod: sup. lin. 25 imaginationis cod. (omnes)
13b quod: sup. lin. 25 imaginationis cod. (omnes)
31 cum: sicut scr. sed corr. cod.
32 fit: sit cod. 35 verum: non cod., del. et corr. marg.
36 imaginationis: ymaginationis cod. (omnes)

030=R14 ARIST., De anima, III, 4, 429b6
ad sensum quam intellectus
ad sensum vel fantasmam. f. 106ra fantasmam vel sensum ad

Sed contingit aliquid imaginari sensibilibus abeuntibus, ergo multo fortius contingit aliquid intelligere absque actu virtutis imaginativae; et hoc est intelligere sine fantasmate.

Item. Incorporalium non sunt fantasmatum. Si igitur nihil intelligatur absque fantasmate, tumc incorporalia, quae non habent fantasmatum, non possunt a nobis intelligi.

Oppositum dicit ARISTOTELES hic et (in) libro De anima, quod sine fantasmate non contingit intelligere.

Dicendum quod non contingit aliquid intelligere

52 Incorporalium: incorporabilium
scr. Sed bi exp. cod. 56 non: sup. lin. 60 in: suppl.

060=R42-44 ARIST., De memoria et reminiscencia, 1; 449b31-450a1; De anima, III, 7, 431a16-17
sine fantasmate, neque de novo intelligendo aliquid eorum, neque intelligendo aliquid quorum scientiam prius recipit aliquid.

Quod autem non contingit intelligere de novo satis appareat quia intellectus est in potentia et efficitur in actu ex sensatis et imaginatis.

Secundo etiam modo non potest intellectus intelligere sine fantasmate, quod apparat experimento. Si enim laedatur instrumentum virtutis imaginativae, non potest aliquis intelligere ea quorum scientiam praeaccept, sicut apparat in freneticis. Ex hoc apparat quod intellectus intelligendo dependet ex operatione virtutis imaginatis.
tiae, quia intellectus secundum se non habet organum.

It ideo impeditur intellectus ab intelligendo per impedimentum eius, scilicet organi virtutis imaginativae.

Item. Hoc idem apparent per litteram et experientiam; quando enim volumus intelligere aliquid nobis formatur fantasma rei corporalis et determinatae quantitatis, et in illo fantasmate intelligimus aliquid, ut hominem vel asinum, et ipsum intelligimus non sub ratione qua quantum et continuum.

Et huius ratio est quia intellectus noster est quodammodo alligatus magnitudini, quod intellectus in intelligendo dependet ab operatione virtutis imaginativae, quia secundum se non habet organum. Si ergo a sua operatione impeditatur, et hoc per aliam virtutem, apparat quod ex illa virtute dependat quantum ad suam operationem.

Hoc etiam idem patet per litteram et per experientiam; quia quando volumus aliquid intelligere nobis formamus fantasma rei corporalis et determinatae quantitatis, et ide illo fantasmate intelligimus aliquid, ut hominem vel asinum, et non intelligimus ipsum sub ratione qua quantum vel continuum. Cuius ratio est quia intellectus noster est quodammodo alligatus magnitudini.
et ideo oportet quod objectum eiusmod sit quodammodo si pi proportionale (ita) quod alligetur magnitudini. Et haec est ratio quare intellectus conjunctus magnitudini intelligit quod quid est et universale in fantasmatibus sensibilibus. Unde species intelligit in fantasticis sensibilibus, tertio De anima. Intellectus autem separatorium intelligat aliquod abstracta secundum se quae sunt separata a magnitudine in esse et omnino.

Ad primam rationem. Dicendum quod si in intellectu sit aliqua species, potest ibi esse dupliciter: vel in acto puro, et tunc facit intellectum intelligere illud

110 ita: suppl.
129 puro: ponitur scr. sed corr. cod.

Ad primam. Dicendum quod si in intellectu sit species, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut enim inest in actu puro, et tunc illud cuius est illa species fa-

119 ARIST., De anima, III, 7, 431b2
cuius est illa species; aut
est ibi medio modo inter ac-
tum et potentiam, ut quando
est ibi in habitu, et tunc
non facit illa species in-
tellectum actu intelligere
 nisi cum fantasmate, sicut
declaratum est ratione et
experimento.

140 Ad secundum. Dicendum
quod imaginatio est apud ab-
contiam sensibilium, et huius
ratio est quia motus quem faciunt sensibilia remanet in
virtute fantastica receden-
ibus sensibilibus; et ideo
cum motus remanet est ibi
imaginatio. Intellectus au-
tem, cum sit in magnitudine,
necessario habet intelligere
objectum proprium, sive quod
quid est, in fantasmatisbus
sensibilibus. Et ideo non
cit intellectum actu in-
telligere; aut est in
medio modo inter actum et
potentiam, ut in habitu, et
tunc illa species non facit
intellectum actu intelli-
gere nisi cum fantasmate,
sicut ratione et experimen-
to declaratum est.

145 Ad aliud. Dicendum
quod, cum dicitur quod
"contingit imaginari ali-
quid abeuntibus sensibili-
bus, etcetera", huius ratio
est quia motus quem faciunt
sensibilia in sensum rema-
net in virtute fantastica;
ideo fantasia potest esse
in absentia sensibilium cum
ille motus remaneat. In-
tellectus autem, cum sit
in magnitudine, necessario
habet suum objectum intel-

131 aut: illa add. sed del. et
exp. cod. 134 habitu: h—eu
praem. sed del. et exp. cod.
151 sive: sui scr. sed corr. sup.
lin. cod.
128 etcetera: dicendum quod add. cod.
130-131 remanet: remanent cod.
116 aut est: est autem cod.
est similis comparatio sensus ad imaginationem quals est imaginationis ad intellectum, quia motus sensus manet in imaginatione, et potest ibi motus esse sine sensibilibus, intellectus autem non intelligit sine fantasmate.

Ad aliud. Licet incorporealitæ secundum se non habent fantasmata, tamen ipsa intelligimus vel sub fantasmate alicuius operationis suae aut sub fantasmatisbus alicuius sensibilis alterius.

Ad tertium. Sicendum quod licet incorporealitæ non habent fantasmata, ipsa tamen intelligimus sub aliquibus fantasmatisbus, vel sub fantasmate suarum operationum, vel sub fantasmatisbus alicuius alterius sensibilis.

163-164 incorporalia: iter. marv.
166 vel: al' cod., corr. marv.
DE QUÆSTIONE 6

UTRUM INTELLECTUS SUBSTANTIAM QUANTAM POSSIT INTELLIGERE ABSQUE QUANTITATE?

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Tertio quæretur utrum intellectus intelligat substantiam quantam vel possit intelligere, absque quantitate.

Et videtur quod non. Quia, ut dicit littera, intellectus nihil intelligit sine continuo et ratione temporis, argo substantia quanta et continua non potest intelligi sine quantitate et continuitate.

Oppositum dicit littera, quod formatur fantasma quanta f.106rb continuitate et quantitate non potest intelligi.

Oppositum vult Aristot.: Tamen in littera, dicens quod formatur fantasma quantitate determinata et tamen intelligitur aliquid non secundum quod quantum.

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4-5 absque quantitate: suppl. 8 nihil: nichil cod.
05-6=A7 ARIST., De memoria et reminiscencia, 1, 450a7-9
012=x4-15 ibid., 450a4-5
Considerandum est hic: quibusdam videtur quod non sit intelligere substantiam quantam absque quantitate eo quod non contingit intelligere sine fantasmatis. Fantasma autem est similitudo rei corporalis et quantitatis determinatae. Et ideo isti non distinguentes inter fantasiari et intelligere, inter etiam fantasma et intellectum, dicunt quod non intelligimus substantiam quantam absque quantitate.

Istud non est verum. Quamquam enim ita sit quod non contingit intelligere absque fantasmate, ipsum tamen intellectum est quid aliud ab ipsó fantasmate secundum quod docet ARISTOTELIS in tertio De anima. Dicit enim quod quod quid est est

039=41-42 ARIST., De anima, III, 8, 432a12-14
objectum intellectus. Sed substantiam esse quantam non est substantiam esse quod quid est. Ergo cum intellectus intelligat quod quid est, intelligit ipsam substantiam et non substantiam quantam. Quod autem ita intelligat declaratio est: constat quod ipsa substantia est aliquid prius quantitate, qualitate, et sic de aliis praedicamentis. Posteriora autem non videntur esse de ratione prioris. Igitur quantum et quale et huiusmodi non sunt de ratione substantiae. Ipsum autem prius intelligere contingit absolvendo per intellectum ab his quae non sunt de sua ratione. Quare per intellectum contingit inter-

45-46 quod...intelligit: marg.
49 declaratio: declaratum scr., corr. sup. lin. et marg. cod.

44 quid est: quidem cod.
ligere substantiam quae quanta est absque quantitate.

Iten. Intellectus bene considerat substantiam ut est aliquid a quantitate. Hoc autem non posset facere nisi intelligeret unum istorum per se. Ut istud plane dicit Aristoteles in littera: dicit enim quod formatur fantasma quantitatis determinatae et tamen intelligitur aliquid non secundum quod quantum. Sicut enim est sibi accidentale quod sit quantum, sic intelligere aliquid ut quantum est intellectus accidentalis et non essentialis rei.

quantum, quale, et cetera non sunt de ratione substantiae. Ergo contingit substantiam intelligere sine his.

Et huius etiam declarationis est quia intellectus considerat substantiam absque quantitate. Hoc autem non posset facere nisi per se alterum intelligeret, et hoc plane dicit littera, secundum quod formatur fantasma determinatae quantitatis et rei corporalis, et tamen intelligitur aliquid non cum quantum. Sicut enim aliquid esse quantum est aliquid accidentale, sic etiam intelligere rem aliquid ut quantum est accidentale ipsi rei.

65 est: sub. lin.
71 his: hiis cod.

072-73=R78-79 Arist., De memoria et reminiscentia, 1, 450a4-5
Ad rationem in oppositum. Dicendum quod haec: propositio, "Nihil contingit intelligere absque continuo et tempore", est sic intelligenda: quia non contingit intelligere sine fantasmate, et fantasma est in continuo et cum tempore, ideo non contingit aliquid intelligere sine continuo et tempore; verumtamen istud quantum et continuum non intelligitur, sed est in fantasia. Et quia aliqui non distinguunt inter fantasiari et intelligere dicunt quod non intelligitur aliquid nisi fantasmate; quod tamen falsa est et inconveniens, ut ostensum est per praedicta.

QUESTIO? 

UTRUM SPECIES REMANENT ET CONSERVANTUR IN INTELLECTU.

Quaerit utrum species remaneant et conservantur in intellectu.

Quod non, probatio. 

Quia quod est in intellectu est ibi intelligibiliter, non est ibi sensibiliter. Sed quod intelligibiliter est in intellectu ipsum actu intelligitur et facit intellectum esse in actu. Quare videtur quod nulla species est in intellectu nisi quando intelligitur illud cuius est species.

14 actum: actum scr. sed corr. cod. 
19 sicut: suppl.

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1-2 AXIST., De memoria et reminiscence, 1, 430a25

QUESTIO?: cf. S. THOMAS, In De memoria, Lect. 2, nn. 315-316; SE, i. Q. 79, a.6
ita quod, sicut deficit lumen in medio remoto corpore luminoso, sic etiam videtur quod, cum cessat intellectus ab intelligere, desinunt species esse in intellectu.

Item. Si species conservarentur in intellectu, tum videtur quod intellectus posset intelligere illud cujus est species sine fantasmatisbus. Hoc autem falsum est, ut dicit ARISTOTILES superius. Quare, etcetera.

Ad oppositum. Species remanent in virtute sensitiva absque eo quod actu considerentur. Urso similiter species remanent in intellectu absque eo quod actu considerentur.

Oppositum. Arguitur quod species remanent in virtute sensitiva absque hoc quod considerentur; ergo et in intellectu absque hoc quod considerentur.
Probatio consequentiae: quia sicut virtus sensitiva recipit species, ita et intellectus, cum sit ut virtus passiva; et iterum, cum intellectus sit immobile et intransmutabilis, secundum se, virtus autem sensitiva transmutabilis, magis debet intellectus retinere species quam virtus sensitiva.

Intelligendum quod opinio AVICENNÆ fuit quod in intellectu non conservatur species, immo statim cum desinit aliquid intelligere, statim desinit illa intelligibilis esse in ipso intellectu, sicut lumen desinit esse in medio apud remotionem corporis luminosi.

Visum fuit sibi quod in intellectus praem. sed del. 42 consequentiae: commune cod. et exp. cod.

lectu nihil fuit nisi intelligibiler et in actu, quia intellectus non habet organum, et ideo quidquid est ibi est ibi actualiter et intelligibiler. Virtus autem sensitiva habet organum, et ratione organi potest ibi manere species absque eo quod actu consideretur.

Istud videtur contra PHILOSPHUM tertio De anima ubi dicit quod intellectus quandque est in potentia, quandque in actu; et dicitur intellectus esse in actu quando fit singula. Non fit autem singula nisi per receptionem; et cum ille intellectus iam

luminosi. Visum enim fuit ei quod in intellectu nihil potest esse nisi intelligitur in actu, quia intellectus non habet organum, et ideo quidquid est in eo est ibi actualiter. Virtus autem sensitiva et est receptiva et habet organum, et ratione organi potest retinere species absque actuali consideratione sensibilis.

Istud videtur contra ARISTOTELEM tertio De anima ubi vult quod intellectus quandque est in potentia et quandque in actu; et dicitur esse in actu quando fit singula. Non fit autem singula nisi per receptionem; et cum iam habet singulā

76 fit1,2 sit cod.
78 intellectus: cum add. cod.
71-72 receptiva: sensitiva cod.
factus est singula, adhuc est in potentia ad actualem considerationem, non sicut ante addiscere, sed est sic in potentia quod potest exire in actum cum voluerit nisi aliquid impediat. Ergo est intentio PHLOSOPHI quod, species intelligibiles (in habitu) sunt in intellectu, quia dixit illum intellectum esse in actu, et non est aliquid actu in aliquo nisi id sit in eo. Et hoc videtur sentire ARISTOTELIS, libro Praedicamentorum, qui dicit quod habitus sunt in intellectu.

Item. Si in virtute sensitiva recipitur aliquid et conservatur, eadem ratione.

et est in actu, sic iam adhuc est quodammodo in potentia ad actualem considerationem; non autem sic sicut ante addiscere, sed sic quod potest exire in actum cum voluerit nisi aliquid impediat. Intentio autem ARISTOTELIS videtur quod illae species in habitu sunt in intellectu, quia dixit illum intellectum esse in actu, et non est in actu nisi per illud quod est in eo. Ergo habitus scientiae est in intellectu; et hoc videtur dicere ARISTOTELIS in Praedicamentis.

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82 addiscere: adiscere cod. 87-88 in habitu: subpl. 89-90 quia...esse: subpl.
894=R103-104 ARIST., Categoriae, 8, 6b27-32
100 si aliquid recipitur in virtute intellectiva ibi potest conservari, et multo fortius, quia virtus intellectiva est immobils et intransmutabilis, sensitiva autem est transmutabilis.

Ad primum contra. Dico quod illud quod est in intellectu potest ibi esse tripli-citer: vel in potentia pura; potest etiam aliquid esse in intellectu actualiter, ut quando aliquid actualiter consideratur: potest etiam esse aliquid in intellectu medio modo inter actum et potentiam, non in potentia pura, sicut ante discere vel invenire.

106 autem: suppl.
115 in: suppl.

et conservatur, eadem ratione in intellectu potest aliquid conservari si ibi aliquid recipiatur, et etiam multo fortius, quia intellectus est immobils et intransmutabilis, cum tamen virtus sensitiva sit transmutabilis.

Ad primam. Dicendum quod aliquid potest esse in intellectu dupliciter: vel in potentia pura, et tale non est ibi nisi in potentia; vel actualiter, ut cum aliquid consideratur actualiter. Tertio etiam modo potest ibi esse aliquid medio modo, non in actu puro, ut in actuali consideratione, non in potentia pura, sicut ante addis-
Ad aliud. Solutum fuit superius: quavis species maneat in intellectu, non tamen intelliget illud cuius est illa species nisi inspiciat fantasma; cum intellectus sit alligatus magnitudini, oportet quod videat objectum suum in fantasmatibus.

Ad secundum. Sicendum quod licet ista species in intellectu maneat, non tamen intellectus intelliget illud cuius est species illa nisi inspiciat fantasma, quia cum intellectus sit alligatus magnitudini, oportet quod eius, scilicet intellectus, objectum in fantasmatibus speculetur.

135 secundum: tertium cod.
140 inspiciat: intelligat cod.
142 magnitudini: fantasmat cod.
QUÆSTIO 8

UT RUM IN INTELECTU SIT VIRTUS MEMORATIVA

Secundo quaeritur utrum

in intellectu sit virtus memorativa.

Et videtur quod sic.

Quia in intellectu conservantur species intelligibilis, ut statim apparuit, sed conservatio specierum sensibilium pertinet ad virtutem memorativam (sensitivam). Ergo videtur quod conservatio specierum intelligibilium pertinebit ad virtutem memorativam intellectus.

Item. Sicut nos accipimus aliquid sub ratione qua prius sensatum, sic etiam accipimus aliquid sub ratione qua prius intellectum.

Comprehendere

294b...MEMORATIVA: marg. inf. 10-11 sensitivam: suppl. 13 pertinet: participet cod.

QUÆSTIO 8: cf. S. THOMAS, ST. I. Q. 79, a.6: IN ḌE MÉNÉRÍA, lect.2, n.320
Comprehendere autem aliquid sub ratione qua prius intellectum non pertinet ad partem animae sensitivam, sed intellectivam. Quare videtur quod sicut memorativa sensitiva comprehendit aliquid sub ratione qua prius sensatum, ita memorativa intellectiva accept aliquid sub ratione qua prius intellectum.

Opponunt. Dicit A. M.

Stotalis in littera quod memorativa non pertinet ad intellectum nisi per accidentes. Sicut enim quod si per virtutem memorativa nos intelligamus virgulae conservativa specierum, sic dicere quod sicut in parte sensitiva est memorativa, sic in

autem aliquid sub ratione qua prius intellectum non pertinet ad partem animae sensitivam, sed ad intellectivam. Arvo videtur quod sicut memoria sensitiva comprehendit aliquid sub ratione qua prius sensatum, ita memorativa intellectiva comprehendit aliquid sub ratione qua prius intellectum.

Opponunt dicit littera.

intelligendum quod si nos intelligamus per virtutem memorativa nos intelligamus virtutem conservativa specierum, sic dicere quod sicut in parte animae sensitiva est memora-

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22-23 intellectum: intelligit cod.
24 sensitivam: sen--- cod. altivam complevit maga. 29 sensatum:

21 autem: aut cod.
28-31 sensatum... prius: suppel. homoteleuton in textu

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63-34: 33 An. 12... de memoria et reminiscencia, 1, 450a22-25
parte intellectiva, quia utroique species conservantur. Si autem per virtutem memorativam intelligamus virtutem conservativam specierum sub ratione temporis determinato et sub fantasmate determinato, sic virtus memorativa pertinet per se ad partem sensitivam et non intellectivam, quia ipsius intellectus non est comprehendere rationem determinatam temporis nec fantasma determinatum, immo istud proprium est sensui.

Credo tamen quod ipse intellectus bene potest comprehendere rationem temporis determinatam, sed hoc non est objectum eius proprium, ut
dictum est tertio De anima.

65 unde potest contingere quod intellectus accipit aliquid sub ratione qua prius intellectum accipiendpectrum temporis; et

70 potest etiam contingere f.215va quod intellectus accipit sub ratione qua intellectum, et virtus memorativa accipit rationem temporis determinatam.

Ad primum. Apparet solutionem qua virtus conservativa specierit non est memorativa, immo exigitur rationem determinatam temporis.

75 Ad rationem potest solutionis ex dictis; ad primum, quia memorativa non est virtus conservativa specierit, sed requiritur ad hoc quod sit virtus memorativa quod illud sit acceptum sub ratione determinatam temporis.

67-68 intellectum: intelligit 68-69 intellectus: int\textsuperscript{c} cod.
cod. 72 intellectum: intell\textsuperscript{c}
ligit cod. 78 non est: iter. cod.
sec del. cod. 72-73 sensatum: et intellectum add.

064-068 ARIST., De anima, III, 8, 432a22-25
Ad alium. Et si intellectus accipiat aliquid sub ratione determinata, hoc non est proprium eius, immo hoc est virtutis sensitivae; ut praedictum est.

Dicendum quod et intellectus accipiat aliquid sub ratione quae prius intellectum sub ratione determinata temporis, hoc non est proprium intellectui, sed sensui.

QUAESTIO 9

QUAE VIRTUS AESTIMATIVA, AESTIMATIVA ET FANTASTICA DIFFERANT A SENSI COMMUNI

"De reminiscitiva, etc. terae,"

Ad huic quaeritur de praecedentibus utrum virtus memoriae, fantasiae et aestimativa differant a sensu communi.

Et videtur quod non.

Quia dicit ARISTOTELIS quod fantasia et memoria sunt

5-6 et aestimativa differant: differunt et aestimativa cod. 6 aestimativa: extimativa cod. extimativa, extimativa vel existimativa omnes // a: ex praem. sed del. cod. 7 communi. Oppositum arguitur quia sensus communis, fantasias add. sed del. (va-cat) cod.

2-3 marg.: ...totam quaestionem (partially cut off), and summary (al. man.) of Q.9 // UTANUM.

COMMUNI: iter. marg. inf.


R1-2 ARIST., De memoria et reminiscencia, 2, 451a18

05-99 ARIST., De memoria et reminiscencia, 1, 450a9-25
passiones sensus communis.  
Si hic sit verum, tunc videatur quod virtus fantastica 
10 et memorativa non differant a sensu commun.  

Ad oppositum arguitur: 15 quia sensus communis, fantasticae et memorativae sunt 
quia sensus communis, fantasticae et memorativae sunt 
operaciones diversae; ergo et diversae potentiae.  

Prosatio: assumpto quod 20 quod hucus sint diversae operationes earum, pro-
sensus communis immutatur a prosatio quia sensus communis 
praesente sensibili, et non immutatur a praesente sensi-
nat abstente sensibili impressione in sensu; abstente te-
non sensibili remanet impressio in anima in virtute fant-
25 tistica et memorativa sicut pictura quaedam, ut dicit 
in virtute fantastica et 
littera; quare differunt sensi-

sensus communis ab istic.  

6-7 sunt passiones: est passio 10-11 sunt passiones: est passio 
cod. 13 sic: sensus communis cod. 
add. cod. 18 assumpto: 
assumpti cod. 26 pictura: 
pictura cod.
Item. De aestimativa

arguitur quia virtus aestimativa elicit formam insensatam, sicut ovis indicat pastorem amicum et lupum inimicum; amicitia et inimicitia sunt formae insensatae.

Item. Arguitur de aestimativa quia ipsa elicit formam insensatam, ut ovis indicat lupum inimicum et pastorem amicum; sed amicitia et inimicitia sunt formae insensatae.

Jensus autem communis non recipit nisi sensitilia per se. Quare appareat per differentiam objectorum quod differt aestimativa a sensu communi.

Intelligendum quod sensus particulares, communis, fantasia, aestimativa et memorativa sunt diversae animae potentiae, nam unusquisque

32 indicat: indicat cod.

024-25=R32 ARIST., De memoria et reminiscencia, 1, 450a25-32

31 pictura: projectura cod.
33 insensatam: instinctam cod.
43 Sensus autem: forma autem praem. sed exp. cod. 51 fantasia: fantastica praem. sed del. cod.
53 potentiae: operationes cod.

quod appareat ex operationibus diversis. Quia unusque sensus particularis apprehendit suum proprium objectum, et indicat interea differentiam. Autem sensibilibus non remanet impressio vel pictura sensibilibis in sensibus propriis, neque in sensu communi. Expergit tamen quod impressio et figura ipsius sensibilibis manet interius in anima, argo in anima est alia virtus a sensu communi et sensibus particularibus in qua remanet huiusmodi impressio vel pictura. Hic est autem in virtute fantastica et memorativa, sed diversimode, quia virtus fantastica illam picturam comprehendit secundum se, scilicet secundum

70. secundum quod est fantasma absolute, et non secundum quod est fantasma prius visi vel prius intellecti aut auditi, sed secundum se; et ideo sub ista ratione in virtute fantastica conservatur. Istit tamem fantasma vel pictura a virtute memorativa comprehenditur sub ratione qua est alicuius imago sub ratione prius sensati vel intellecti; ex hoc apparet quod huiusmodi fantasma sub alia ratione conservatur in virtute memorativa quam fantastica. Sic igitur appareat quod istae virtutes different ab invicem ratione objectorum:

90. obiectum sensitivae est sensibile; fantasticae fantasmatis absolute; objectum memorativae

79 imago: ymago cod. (omnes)
81 imago: ymago cod. (omnes)
85-86 memorativa: mara
88-89 invicem: et add. cod.
89 obiectorum: et operationum add. cod.
97 obiectorum: et operationum add. cod.
est fantasmà secundum quod \(\text{imago prius sensat\(\text{ae} aut intellecti.}\)

Virtus autem aestimativa differt ab istis
virtutibus operatione et
oblecto. Virtus enim aestimativa comprehendit formam
insulaam, et ex hoc differt
a sensu communi \(\text{et particula-}
laribus, qui non comprehendant
nisi sensibilita. Differt
etiam a fantastica quia fant-
tastica comprehendit fantas-
ta alicuius sensibilis quod
quidem fantastam relinquitur
ex alicuiu sensibili. Et sic
differt aestimativa operatio-
ne et oblecto. Adeo virtus
quod ovis comprehendit amici-

autem fantasticae est fant-
tasma absolute; oblectum
autem memorativae est fant-
tasma secundum quod \(\text{imago prius sensat\(\text{ae} aut intellecti.}\)

Virtus autem aestimativa differt ab istis
virtutibus operatione et
oblecto, quia comprehendid
formam insensatum et eam
elixit; et ex hoc differt
a sensu communi \(\text{et a sens-
ibus particularibus, qui non comprehendant nisi sensibilita. Differt etiam}

autem fantastica quia fantas-
tica comprehendit fantas-
tum alicuius sensibilis quod
ex alicuiu sensibili re-
linquitur. Et sic potest
quod aestimativa differt
ab alicuiu operatione et oblecto.
tiam et inimicitiam, ut patet, et hoc est virtute aëstativae.

Est tamen intelligendum: cum sint diversae potentiae et virtutes animae, nihil prohibet unam earum esse radicem et originem aliarum.

Sicut nutriva, augmentativa et generativa sunt diversae potentiae, tamen nutritiva est origo aliarum: sic in proposito, quamvis istae sint diversae potentiae animae, tamen sensus communis et particularis sunt origo et radix istarum virtutum sic quod fantastica, aëstativa et memorativa præsupponunt apprehensionem sensus communis. Et hoc est causa quare dicit ARISTOTELES quod fantasia et memoria sunt.

Unde ovis apprehendit amicitiam pastoris et inimicitiam lupi, et hoc virtute aëstativae.

Et est intelligendum quod cum sint diversae virtutes et potentiae animae, nihil prohibet unam illarum esse radicem aliarum. Sicut videmus quod nutritiva, augmentativa et generativa sunt diversae potentiae, nutritiva tamen est radix et origo aliarum et eis præsupponitur; sic in proposito, licet istae virtutes animae sint diversae potentiae animae, tamen sensus particularis et communis sunt origo et radix istarum virtutum ita quod fantastica, memorativa et aëstativa præsupponunt apprehensionem sensus.

137 sic: sicut eod.
passiones sensus communis; non enim esset fantasia nec etiam memoria nisi esset apprehensió sensus communis, et eodem modo de aestimatio-ne. Non intendit 140 ergo PHILOSPHUS quod fantastica et sensus communis sint unum et idem sed intendit quod sensus communis est radix illius et alienum, et propter hoc dicit quod sunt passiones illius.

Ex his patet ad radia-

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QUÆSTIO 10

UTRUM MEMORIA INSIT OMNIBUS ANIMALIBUS

O

"Dubitabit autem aliquis propter quid, etcetera."

Utrum memoria insit omnibus animalibus.

Quod sic videtur, quia sensus inest omnibus, et memoria causatur ex sensu; quare, etcetera.

Item. Animalia quae percipiunt tempus habent memoria; sed omnia animalia tempus percipiunt; quare, etcetera. Probatio: quia omnia animalia sentiunt motum; tempus autem sentitur ex hoc quod motus sentitur, ut dicitur quarto Physicorum.

Deinde quaeritur utrum memoria insit omnibus animalibus.

Et videtur quod sic.

Sensus inest omnibus animalibus; memoria autem causatur a sensu; ergo, etcetera.

Item. Animalia quae percipiunt et sentiunt tempus habent memoria, ut dicit ARISTOTELIS.

Sed omnia animalia sunt huiusmodi, quia omnia animalia sentiunt motum, quia habent sensum motus; tempus autem sentitur ex eo quod motus sentitur, ut
30 quantum dist ans sufficientis sunt terre afixae et non
35 animalibus imperfectis quae non intacte
30 quantum nostrorum, quae non intacte
35 non in sensibiliis, unde in sensibiliis
30 quantum nostrorum, quae non intacte
35 non in sensibiliis, unde in sensibiliis
sola preventur ad aliquum sustentat
30 quantum nostrorum, quae non intacte
35 non in sensibiliis, unde in sensibiliis
sola preventur ad aliquum sustentat
30 quantum nostrorum, quae non intacte
35 non in sensibiliis, unde in sensibiliis
sola preventur ad aliquum sustentat
aliquod distant; in his necessitate quod intentio praecursora remaneat in memoria. Notus enim ad aliquod distant est propter intentionem, et nisi illa intentio remaneat in memoria, non continuaret motum usque ad distant.

et intelligendum quod illa animalia quae habent memoriae sentiunt prius et posterius in tempore, quia memoria est acceptio aliquius ratione qua prius sensatum vel imaginatum vel intellectum. Non autem omnes animalia sic perciptit tempus.

et intelligendum quod animalia quae habent memoriae sentiunt prius et posterius in tempore, quia memoria est (acceptio) aliquius sub ratione prius sensati vel intellecti. Sed non omnes animalia percipit sic tempus, quid prius.

quia prius de tempore absens est, et quaedam sunt animalia quae non perciπunt nisi il·lud quod praesens est. Ideo, etcetera.

Ad rationem. Dico quod ex quocumque sensu non causa tur memoria, sed ex sensu animalium habentium memoria.

Ad aliud. Dicendum quod non omnìa animalia sentiunt prius et posterius in tempore, quia illud quod est prius praeteritum est et absens, et tale non perciπitur a quibusdam animalibus. Verum est enim quod omne animal sentit instans, quod praesentialiter est de tempore vel in tempore; unde et sentit motum secundum illud secundum quod de tempore est absens, et quaedam sunt animalia quae non perciπunt nisi praesens sensibile. Ideo non perciπunt tempus praeteritum, quod tamen requiritur ad memoriæ.

Ad primam rationem. Dicendum quod memoria non causatur ex quocumque sensu, sed ex sensu animalium habentium memoria.

Ad aliud. Dicendum quod non omnìa animalia sentiunt prius et posterius in tempore, quia illud quod est prius praeteritum est et absens, et tale a quibusdam animalibus non perciπitur. Verum enim est quod omne animal sentit instans, quod praesentialiter est in tempore; unde et sentit motum secundum illud secundum quod praesentialiter

72 prius: in tempore add. sed del. et exp. cod.
75 quocumque: utroq praem. sed del. cod.
praesentialiter afficitur. Et istud non est cognoscere prius et posteriorius in motu; et ideo nec prius nec posteriorius in tempore.

\[\text{Quantum 11}\]


dicit quod memoria est conservativa actu intercisa. Sed illud cuius conservatio est intercisa

2 STR. 9-10 intercisa: intercisa cod. (fere omnes)

04=R7 AVICENNA, locus non inventus
oblitum est, ut videtur.

argò videtur quod memoria sit alicuius obliti ita quod ad memoriam vel ad actum memorandi requiritur oblivio rei de qua est memoria.

item. Necessè est

15	tempus intercipi inter primam notitiam et memoriam, sicut dicit PHILOSOPHUS in littera pluries. Cum autem sit interpositio temporis, videtur esse oblivio illius notitiae. Quare ad actum memorandi requiritur oblivio rei de qua est memoria.

20 Ad oppositum. Illud

25 cuius pictura et impressio remanet in anima non est oblivium, sed est ibi sicut in

22 memorialem: medium praem. sed del. cod.

10 alicuius: alius scr. cod. sed corr. marg.

18 pluries: plures scr. sed i add: sup. lin. cod.

017-18=R22-24 ArS., De memoria et reminiscentia, 1, 449b24-28, 450a19-22; 2, 451a21-31
habetu. Sed eius cuius fit
moria impressio vel pictura remanet in anima, secundum PHILOSOPHUM, in littera.
Aare non est memoria obliti

Intelligendum est ad hoc quod res illa de qua est memoria fuit necessario prius apprehensa, et veritas est quod tempus intercidit inter primam apprehensionem rei et memoriam; non tamen intercidit rei obvicio. Unde considerandum est quod aliud est aliquid cessare ab actuali consideratione et aliud est aliquid esse obluitum. Cum enim cessat ab actuali consideratione, non est obluitum, immo bene remanet in habitu secundum ARISTOTELE: in secundo De anima. Et ex hoc

scilicet in anima, ut in habitu. Sed eius cuius fit memoria impressio vel figura remanet interius in anima, ut dicit littera.

Ergo, etcetera.

Intelligendum quod illa res de qua est memoria fuit necessario prius apprehensa, et bene verum est quod tempus intercidit inter primam apprehensionem rei et memoriam; non tamen intercidit obvicio rei. Unde considerandum quod aliud est aliquid cessare ab actuali consideratione et aliud est aliquid esse obluitum. Cum enim cessat aliquid obvicio ab actuali consideratione alicuius, illud non est obluitum, sed bene

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35 necessario: actio scr., exp. et corr. maga.

42-43 apprehensa: apprehensio cod.
quod remanet in habitu post est exire in actum cum voluerit. Unde non est simile de eo qui habet habitualem considerationem, qui postest exire in actum cum voluerit, qui tamen est absque actuali consideratione; et de aliquo ante addiscere. In cognitionem autem rei oblitae non exit aliquid in actu vel in cognitionem eius actu cum voluerit, sed illud quod oblivitum est oportet vel reinvenire vel addiscere iterato.

Dico igitur quod fantasma illius sensibilis de quo est memoria conservatur in virtute memorativa sub ratione qua prius sensatum aut intellectum, et non est oblivio illius cum remaneat in habitu.

secundum quod ait: Aret. 51
SOTULUS secundo De anima et ex hoc quod ibi in habitu remanet postest exire in actum cum voluerit. Unde non est simile de eo qui habet scientiam in habitu absque actuali consideratione; et de eo qui est ante addiscere, qui adhibet non didicit scientiam. In cognitionem autem rei oblitae non exit aliquid statim in actu cum voluerat, sed oportet illud oblivitum iterum reinvenire aut addiscere. Dico ergo quod fantasma illius sensibilis de quo est memoria conservatur in virtute memorativa et tenetur ibi habitualiter sub ratione qua prius sensatum vel in intellectum.

Ad rationem in oppositum. f.98va

AVICINNA. Dicendum quod forte loquitur

75 AVICINNA de memoria secundum
quod accipitur pro reminisc
centia quae forte est obli
torium. Vel dicendum quod me
moriam est conservativa actu

80 intercisa, non intercisa
oblivione, sed actuali cons
ideratione.

Ad aliud. Quamvis tempus
interveniat, non sequitur

85 quod sit ibi oblivio, sed
est interventus actualis
considerationis.

AVICINNA. Dicendum quod
forte ipso loquitur ibi

de memoria secundum quod
non differt a reminiscen
tia, et forte reminiscen
tia est alicuius oblii.

Vel dicendum quod memoria
est conservativa actu

90 inter... non oblivione,

Ad secundum. Dicendum

quod legit tempus inter
veniat, non tamen est
oblivio, sed remanet fan
tasma habitualiter illo
tempore.
QUÆSTIO 12

UTRUM PUÆRI SIVE NOVITÆR GENITI SINT IMMORÉS SIVE BENE MEMORABILES

Quaeritur utrum puæri sive noviter geniti sint immores aut bene memorabiles.

Quod bene memorabiles, probatio auctoritate PLATONIS in Timaeo, qui dicit quod pueri bene memorantur eorum quae audierunt in pueritia.

Item. In quibus est motus fortis et impressio illi sunt bene memorabiles; cuius declaratio est quia fortis motus et impressio facit ad receptionem et retentionem.

Sed (in) pueris fit fortis

R

"Et in hoc differt reminiscencia, et cetera."

Adhuc quaeritur duo de memoria.

Primum est utrum puæri vel noviter geniti sint immores vel sint bene memorabiles.

Et videtur quod sint bene memorabiles, et hoc auctoritate PLATONIS in Timaeo, ubi vult quod pueri bene memorantur eorum quae in pueritia viderunt vel audierunt.

Item. Illi sunt bene memorabiles in quibus est fortis motus et fortis impressio; cuius declaratio est quia fortis motus et impressio facit ad receptionem et bonam retentionem.
motus et impressio sensibilium, quia illa quae videntur nova videntur quasi mirabilia; tales autem faciunt fortem motum. Quare cum pueris videntur multa mirabilia, erunt bene memorabiles.


Item, Anima pueri est sicut tabula in qua nihil depingitur. Sed in huiusmodi tabula bene recipitur aliquid et retinetur, quia non impeditur alia picture.

Oppositum. Dicit littera quod noviter geniti non sunt bene memorabiles.

29 nihil: michil cod.
31 bene: sup. lin.

034=242 ARIST., De memoria et reminiscencia, 1, 450b5-7.
Dicendum ad quaestionem quod pueri ratione huius quod sunt in fluxu et motu augmenti non sunt bene memorabiles. Sicut enim in aqua fluente non remanet impressio sigillii, immo statim elabitur, sic etiam impressio facta in puero non conservatur ibi, sed cito effluet illa impressio eo quod pueri, secundum quod tales sunt in motu augmenti et fluxu.

Item. Pueri ratione complexionis non sunt bene memorabiles, quia noviter geniti sunt humidi humiditate intensa. Figura autem impressa in nimis humido non bene conservatur, sed cito dilabitur, sicut etiam de facili ruunt antiqua aedificia. Et quia

Intelligendum quod pueri ratione huius quod sunt in fluxu et motu augmenti non sunt bene memorabiles. Sicut enim in aqua fluente non remanet impressio sigillii, immo statim fluit et elabitur, sic etiam impressio facta in puero non retinetur vel conservatur in eo, sed tam cito effluet et elabitur eo quod pueri, secundum quod pueri sunt in motu et fluxu augmenti.

Item. Pueri noviter geniti non sunt bene memorabiles ratione complexionis, quia pueri noviter geniti sunt humidi humiditate intensa. Forma autem in nimis humido impressa non bene conservatur vel retinetur, sed cito elabitur,
pueri sive noviter geniti
60 sunt in continuo motu augmenti, item, quia maxime sunt
humidi, ideo non sunt bene
memorabiles.

Intelligendum tamen quod
f.216rb pueri multum noviter / geniti
non sunt memorabiles in prin-
cipio, quia propter nimiam
humiditatem et fluxum impres-
sio non remanet in cia. Post-
erius autem, cum aliquantulum
sunt desiccati, memorantur cum
recepterint sensibilia, et po-
test contingere quod in pu-
eris, si fuerit fortis motus

75 et impressio, quod illa re-
manet in anima. Et quia illa
quae sunt nova et admirabilia
fortem impressionem faciunt
in pueris, ideo pueri bene

sic ut et de facili ruunt
antiqua aedificia. et
ideo pueri, tum quia sunt
in fluxu et motu augmenti.
tum quia sunt nimii humidi,
non sunt bene memorabiles.

Intelligendum quod
pueri multum noviter geniti
in principio non sunt bene
memorabiles, quia propter
nimiam humiditatem et fluxum
impressio vel figura non
bene retinetur vel remanet
in eis. Posterior autem,
cum sunt aliquantulum de-
siccati, recipiunt bene
impressionem sensibilium
et memorantur, et potest
contingere quod, si fiat
in eis fortis motus vel
impressio, quod huiusmodi
motus vel impressio remaneat
80 memorantur eorum admirabilium quae audierunt in puiritia.

Ad primam rationem.

Dicendum quod istud non contingit pueris ex eo quod sunt in motu et complexione quod sunt bene memores, sed hoc est propter Fortem impressionem factam in anima illorum.

Ad secundum. Similiter dicendum quod quamquam ita sit quod pueri bene memorantur eorum quae fecerunt fortrem impressionem in ipsis, ex hoc non sequitur quod

90 in eorum anima. Quia illa quae nova sunt et admirabilia faciunt fortrem impressionem et motum in pueris, ideo pueri novorum et admirabilium quae audierunt in puiritia bene memorantur.

Ad rationem primam.

Dicendum quod <istud> non contingit in pueris eo quod sunt in fluxu et motu augmenti, et ex eorum complexione quae est nimis aunda, quia hoc nasis impediat, sed ex eo quod illa, cum sint nova, faciunt fortrem motum in anima.

Ad aliud. Dicendum quod licet ita sit quod pueri bene memorantur eorum quae fortem impressionem faciunt in ipsis, non tamen

100 a8vb sequitur / ex hoc quod

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87 memores: memor<es> cod.
93-94 memorantur: memotz2 cod.
95 ipsis: ipm cod. 97 quod: ratione complexionis in eis add. cod.
96 istud: subbl.
99-100 complexion: compressione cod.
sint bonae memoriae ratione fluxus et complexionis in eis, immo magis oppositum. ut hoc intelligit littera.

Ad tertium. Dicendum quamvis anima puerorum sit sicut tabula nudâ, quia tamen sunt intensae humitatis et fluiditatis, ideo non bene retinent.

ratione suae complexionis et fluxus sint bonae memoriae, sed magis ex hoc impediuntur. ut hoc innuit littera.

Ad aliud. Dicendum quod licet anima puerorum sit sicut tabula nudâ, nihilominus tamen humiditatis fluiditas ideo non bene memorantur, ut dictum est.

115 innuit: avi add. sed exp. cod. 119 nihilominus: nichilominus cod.
QUAESTIO 13

UTRUM TARDI SINT BONAEC MEMORIAE

Quod sic, probatio.

Quia littera dicit quod veloci ingeni non sunt bene memorabiles, tardi autem bene sunt reminiscitivii.

Quare tardi sunt bonae memoriae.

Item. Veloces et tardi opponuntur. Sed homines veloci ingeni non sunt bene memorativi.

Oppositum dicit littera, quia tardi sunt sicci et ita eos non tangit impressio.

2 UTRUM...MEMORIAE: iter. marg. 2 tardi: suppl.
inf. 4 quod: non add. sed del.
cod. 4-5 veloci: velociis cod.

04=N6 ARIST., De memoria et reminiscencia, 1, 44936-8
013=R18-19 ibid., 450b7-11
Dicendum quod qui tardi sunt secundum intentionem ipsi non sunt bona memoriae, quia sic tardi habent excellentem siccitatem et sunt sitci intensa siccitate. In sicco autem excellenti non bene imprimitur impressio vel figura sensibilis. unde aut impressio ipsius sensibilis non attinet sic excellenter siccos, aut si attinet hoc est dupliciter ita quod in eis non potest facere impressionem. Et ideo dico quod tardi excellenter non sunt bona memoriae.

Intelligendum tamen quod aliqui possunt dicere tardi dupliciter: vel excellenter vel per comparationem ad ingensosos. Et illi qui 45 abundant siccitate excell...
sunt tardi excellenter, vix fit in eis impressio et vix potest remanere. Quidam autem sunt tardi per comparisonem ad ingeniocosos, sed sunt mediis inter excellenter tardos et ingeniocosos, et in istis melius conservatur impressio quam in aliquibus alios; ideo sunt bonae memoriae. Unde dicit COMMENTATOR: qui habent cerebrum humiditate intensa non sunt bonae memoriae; item, qui habent cerebrum nimis siccum non habent bonam memoriam; qui autem sunt medio modo sunt bene conservativi.

lenti, et in talibus vix fit impressio et vix potest remanere; vel dicuntur tardi non excellenter, sed per comparisonem ad ingeniocosos et veloces, et tales sunt mediis et inter veloces et excellenter tardos, et in talibus bene fit impressio et bene conservatur et retinetur, melius etiam quam in ingeniocosis sive velocibus. Et hoc est quod dicit COMMENTATOR: hic, quod illi qui habent cerebrum excellenter humidum non sunt bonae memoriae; qui autem habent cerebrum excellenter siccum neque sunt bonae memoriae neque bonae retentionis; qui autem cerebrum habent medio modo bonae memoriae et bonae retentionis sunt.

40-41 per comparisonem: iter, cod. 55 impressio: compressio praem, sed 51 nimis: minus cod. exp. cod. 047=R59 AVERROES, Compendium libri Aristotelis De memoria et reminiscencia, 196b35-48
Ad rationem. Dico quod, loquitor ARISTOTELIS de tardis excellenter.

Ad aliud. Dicendum quod non sequitur, si ingeniosi non sunt bene memorativi, quod tardi excellenter sint bene memorativi, quia alia quae sunt quae consistunt in medio, et illa quae sunt in medio dextrauntur per utrumque extremum. Unde cum bona memoria consistat in medio inter humidum et excellenter siccum, potest destrui bona memoria vel ex intensa humiditate vel intensa siccitate.

0.68 in medio: R 75 aliud: sequitur. sed exp. cod: 76 si: suppl.
78-80 quod...memorativi: suppl. 85 superabundantia: superabundantia cod.
QUÆSTIO 14

UTRUM REMINISCENTIA SIT ITERUM ADDISCERE VEL ITERUM INVENIRE

0

"De ipso autem reminisci, etcetera."

R

"In quo autem dubitabit..."

Consequenter quæritur de reminiscencia utrum sit iterum invenire.

Et videtur quod sic, quia dicit AVICENNA quod memoria est resumptio notitiae alicuius oblii. Illud autem quod oblum est ignotum est.

Sed ignotum sive oblum non potest accipi nisi per inventionem aut per doctrinam: si per doctrinam, tunc est iterum addiscere; si per inventionem, tunc est iterum invenire. Quare, etcetera.

2 UTRUM...INVENIRE: marg. inf.
3-4 De...etcetera: subl.
17 si...doctrinam: marg.
18 addiscere: addiscere cod. (omnes Q. 14)

20 autem: aut cod.
1-2 locus non inventus

3-4 AX F., De memoria et reminiscencia, 2, 451a18
010=RS AVICENNA, locus non inventus
Oppositum dicit littera.

Dicendum quod reminiscencia non est iterum addiscere nec iterum invenire; est tamen resumptio notitiae alicuius praebhili. Unde considerandum quod reminiscencia differt ab iterum invenire et iterum addiscere ex parte principii et finis.

Ex parte finis quia reminiscencia est resumptio alicuius non absolute, sed resumptio notitiae alicuius per doctrinam, sic est iterum addiscere. Ergo videtur quod reminiscencia sit iterum invenire vel iterum addiscere.

Oppositum vult A\(\text{\textsuperscript{\(\text{\footnotesize 187}\)}}\) performbuat in littera.

Intelligendum quod reminiscencia non est iterum invenire vel iterum addiscere; reminiscencia tamen est resumptio notitiae alicuius praebhili. Unde scierendum quod reminiscencia differt ab hoc quod est iterum invenire vel iterum addiscere et ex parte principii et ex parte finis.

Ex parte finis quia reminiscencia est resumptio alicuius non absolute, sed resumptio notitiae alicuius non absolute, sed sub ratione qua

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32 \(\text{\textsuperscript{\(\text{\footnotesize 32}\)}}\) \(\text{\textsuperscript{\(\text{\footnotesize 32}\)}}\) \(\text{\textsuperscript{\(\text{\footnotesize 32}\)}}\) \(\text{\textsuperscript{\(\text{\footnotesize 32}\)}}\)

**021**=26-27 A\(\text{\textsuperscript{\(\text{\footnotesize 187}\)}}\)\(\text{\textsuperscript{\(\text{\footnotesize 187}\)}}\\(\text{\textsuperscript{\(\text{\footnotesize 187}\)}}\), *De memoria et reminiscencia*, 2, 452a4-7.

22, 25 addiscere: addiscere cod.
23 reminiscencia: memoria cod.
41-42 absolute: habiæ cod.
prius sensati aut intellecti; iterum addiscere aut iterum invenire non est resumptio notitiae alicuius sub ratione qua prius sensatum aut intellectum, sed absolute.

Item. Reminiscentia est inquisitio vel investigatio quaedam quae procedit ab aliquo principio in memoria retento. Reminiscentia enim, cum sit respectu alicuius ignoti et inquisitio illius ignoti, debet esse ex quodam principio. Illud principium in reminiscencia est in memoria retentum, ut si aliquis memoretur quoniam hoc est sibi factum et ignorant quis sibi fecit hoc, ex hoc principio procedit ad inquirendum quis sibi fecit

44-45 vel investigatio: marx.
46 aliquo: a Cod.
53 ut: sup. lin.
48 enim: autem cod.
49 sed: reminiscencia est resumptio notitiae alicuius add. cod.
52 aliquo: a Cod.
61 retentum: restatum cod.
Hoc. Hoc est reminiscencia. Iterum autem addiscere procedit a principio tradito a doctore; iterum invenire non procedit ex principio in memoria retento, sed ex novis motibus: ex quibus procedit cognitio rei. Et sic different ex parte principii et finis. in memoria retento procedit ad inquirendum quis fecit sibi illud. Sed iterum invenire et iterum addiscere non procedit sic, quia iterum addiscere procedit ex principio sibi tradito a doctore; iterum autem invenire non procedit ex principio in memoria retento, sed ex novis motibus ad quos consequitur cognitio rei. Et ita appareat quod reminiscencia non est iterum invenire vel addiscere. Quae enim est reminiscencia resumptio cuiuscumque notitiae, sed resumptio aliqua cuius notitiae ut prius sensuti vel intellecti, ex principio in memoria retento.

31 vel: suppl.
Ad rationem in oppositum.

Dicendum quod minor false est cum dicitur "prius ignotum non resumitur, etcetera", quia alicuius oblii potest esse cognitio ex principio tradita a doctori; item, potest similiter hoc esse ex principiis ad quae de novo cogitatur alicuius; item, potest esse cognitio oblii ex principio in memoria retentum, et tunc est reminiscencia. EX hoc apparet quod reminiscencia non est alicuius penitus oblii, quia principium eius remanet in virtute memorativa. Unde anima consuevit ire ex uno motu ad alium, et primus motus remanet in anima, et ex illo procedit ad alium. Et ideo cum remaneat ibi motus in suo principio, non est

Ad rationem. Dicendum quod alicuius oblii potest esse cognitio ex principio tradita a doctori; item, oblii potest esse cognitio ex principiis ad quae vel ex quibus alicuius cogitetur de novo; item, cognitio oblii potest esse ex principio in memoria retensum sub ratione quae prius sensatum vel intellectum. Et sic reminiscitia est alio modo prius oblii quam per inventionem vel doctrinam. Et ex hoc patet verum quod reminiscitia non est alicuius penitus oblii, quia principium eius in virtute memorativa remanet, quia anima ex uno motu consuevit ire in alium motum, et primus remanet in anima, et ex illo contingit ire in alium

104 verum: unum cod. 101 alio modo: alicio cod.
obliment penitus, licet quantum ad suam impressionem hoc sit verum. 

motum. It sic illud non est oblitum, quia remanet in principio, licet sit oblitum quia non remanet ibi propria impressio.

Secundo quæritur utrum reminiscientia differat a memoria.

Et videtur quod non.

Quia reminiscientia est acceptio prius visi vel audiit, similiter et memoria. Cum ergo utriusque sit idem objectum, videtur quod memoria et reminiscientia sint unus et idem.

Oppositum patet per Aristotelis, dicentem in littera quod differunt.

09=313-14 Arist., De memoria et reminiscencia, 1, 449b6-8
veloces ingenio bene inquirunt et sunt bene reminiscitivì, tardi autem e contrario.

Item. Hoc apparat ex tempore, quia reminiscentia antecedit memoriam.

Item. Reminiscentia est solum hominibus, memoria autem inest aliis.

Intelligendum quod non sunt penitus idem, quia memoria est acceptio alicuius secundum quod prius sensatum vel intellectum, et hoc per

quia non sunt idem memorativa et reminiscitiva; immo veloces ingenio sunt bene reminiscitivi et non sunt bene rememorativi, et bene inquirunt ex aliquo principio quod habent in memoria; tardi autem e contrario se habent.

Iterum, ex tempore patet quod differunt, quia reminiscentia antecedit memoriam.

Iterum, quia memoria non solum inest hominibus, sed et aiiis animalibus; reminiscentia vero solum f.99rb inest hominibus, et non aiiis animalibus.

Intelligendum quod memoria et reminiscentia non sunt idem penitus, quia memoria est acceptio alicuius secundum quod prius
se. | Reminiscentia autem non est talis acceptio per se, immo in reminiscentia proceditur ad istam actionem memoriae ex aliquo principio in memoria retento. Unde memoria est acceptio alius sub ratione prius sensati vel intellecti, et reminiscentia est inquisitio memoriae alius prius sensati vel intellecti. Unde sicut differt apprehendere aliquid per se et simpliciter, et apprehendere aliquid per decursum ab uno in aliud, sic differt memoria et reminiscentia. Memoriam enim accipit aliquid simpliciter sub ratione qua sensatum vel intellectum absolute. Reminiscentia autem ab aliqvo in memoria retento discurrir ad sensatum vel intellectum, et hoc per se. Reminiscentia autem non est talis acceptio per se, immo in reminiscentia proceditur ad istam actionem memoriae ex aliquo principio in memoria retento. Unde verum est quod memoria est acceptio alius prius sensati aut intellecti, et hoc per se, et reminispentia est inquisitio memoriae alius sensati prius vel intellecti ex principio quodam. Unde sicut differt apprehendere aliquid per se et simpliciter, et apprehendere aliquid per decursum ab uno in aliud, sic etiam et memoria et reminiscentia differunt. Memoriam enim accipit aliquid simpliciter sub ratione qua sensatum vel intellectum.

31 aliquid: a co cod. 60 enim: autem cod.
32 retento: contento scr. cod., corr. marq. 50 rememorandum: remodi cod.
et reminiscientia, accipit illud ex principio retentum in memoria, retentum ad memorándum illud. Et si pátet quomodó differunt.

Ad rationem. Dicendum quod licet idem sit obiectum, quia tamen ad illud obiectum aliter pervenit memoria et alio modo pervenitur ad ipsum in reminiscientia, idem differt operatio unius ab operacione alterius. Unde bene differt operatio ex modo perveniendi in obiectum, et non ex solo obiecto.
QUÆSTIO 16

UTRUM REMINISCENTIA SIT PASSIO PARTIS INTLECTIVAe VEL SENSITIVAe

0 tertio quægritur utrum reminiscencia sit operation vel-passio sensitivae vel intellectivae.

quod intellectivae, pro-

5 sisto, quia dicit littera quod reminiscencia est sicut syllogismus quidam. Sed syllogismus est actus partis intellectivae et non sensitivae, quare, etcetera.

10 Item. Discurrere ab uno in alium videtur esse solum partis intellectivae et non sensitivae. Sed in reminis-

scentia est discursus a

15 principio in memoria retentio ad alium memorandum. quare, etcetera.

20 Item. Discurrere ab uno in alium videtur esse solius intellectus et non partis sensitivae. Sed remin-

iscencia est discursus a uno in alium ut a principio in memoria retento ad me-

oraendum alium. quare, 

e etcetera.

1 QUÆSTIO: marg. 2 UTRUM... 6 syllogismus: syllogismus cod. (omnes) 10 intellectivae: intellectivae cod.

SERNIPIVAE: iter. marg. inf. 11 sensitivae: syllogismus sensus cod., syllo-

gismus (omnes) corr. marg. 10 Discurrere: discurrere cod.

QUÆSTIO 16: cf. S. THOMAS, In De memoria, lect. 2, nn. 401-403, 405 044 R6-P ARTIF. De memoria et reminiscencia, 2, 453a10.
Item. si reminiscencia esset partis sensitivae solum et non intellectivae, tunc reminiscencia inesset aliis ab homine, sicut et memoria, quia alia animalia ab homine habent virtutem sensitivam. Sicut ergo habent memoriam, ita habebunt reminiscendam.

Ad oppositum. Dicit ARISTOTELES quod reminiscencia est passio in organo et passio corporea.

Dicendum quod reminiscencia est passio corporalis existens in organo corporali. Et huius signum est quia volentibus reminiscens.
sci, cum non inveniant quod quaerunt, accidit eis inqui-
etudo et turbatio ita quod si vellint desistere ab ipso reminisci nihil minus adhuc cogitant. Istud autem contingit quia huiusmodi passio est in organo, et cum organum motum est, non est in potestate nostra ut cesset statim ille motus. Sic autem non est de operatione intellectus, quae non est in organo, quia talis operatio cessat ad imperium voluntatis. Vade sicut motus irae non sedatur statim cum aliquis voluerit, sic etiam nec huiusmodi inquisitio quae est in reminiscencia statim sedatur nec cessat cum aliquis voluerit. Et hoc contingit quia est passio in organo corporali.

45 reminisci, cum non inveniant illud quod quaerunt, accidit inquietudo et turbatio ita quod si ab ipso reminisci vellent desistere nihilominus adhuc cogitant. Istud autem contingit quia huiusmodi passio est in organo, et cum organum motum est, non est in potestate nostra ut statim posse ille motus. Sic autem non est de operatione intellectus, quae cessat talis operatio ad imperium voluntatis. Vade sicut motus irae non statim cessat vel sedatur cum aliquis voluerit, sic etiam nec huiusmodi inquisitio quae est in reminiscencia statim sedatur nec cessat cum aliquis voluerit. Et illud contingit quia est passio in organo corporali.

49 desistere: desistere cod.
50 nihilominus: nihilominus cod.
57 nec: iter, sed del. cod.
63-66 sic...voluerit: add.: homoteleuton in textu (cf. 054-56)
Item, hoc apparat ex alio. In reminiscencia est acceptio alicuius sub ratione particulari, quia ibi est acceptio alicuius sub ratione prius visi aut sensati; hoc autem, scilicet talis acceptio, est sub ratione particulari. Sed acceptio alicuius sub ratione particulari est proprium virtutis sensitivae et non intellectivae. Et ideo reminiscencia est passio virtutis sensitivae et non intellectivae.

Unum tamen considerandum est, quod reminiscencia non est passio cuiuscumque virtutis sensitivae, sed sensitivae coniunctae virtutis intellectivae. Cuius ratio

Ratione prius visi vel auditi

Unum tamen considerandum est, quod reminiscencia non est passio cuiuscumque virtutis sensitivae, sed sensitivae virtutis coniunctae intellectivae.

est: illud quod est in ordine inferiori cum attingit
illud quod est in ordine superiori perfectius est.
Unde virtus sensitiva cum coniuncta est virtuti intellectiva potentior est quam
ipsa absolute considerata.
Unde aliquid aliud convenit virtutii sensitivae hominis quam alterius animalis.
Sicut enim intellectus qui est in homine potest conferre universalia adinvicem et
discurrere ab uno ad alium, sic virtus sensitiva cogitativa quae est in homine
potest conferre adinvicem intentiones individuales et
discurrere ab uno particula
ti in alium. Et ideo dico
quod reminiscencia est pas
sio virtutis sensitivae

Cuius ratio est quia illud quod est in ordine inferiori, cum attingit seu con-
iiunctur ad illud quod est in ordine superiori, ipsum virtus sensitiva coniuncta
intellectivae virtuti potentior est quum prius per
se sensitiva. Unde aliquid convenit virtutii sensitivae
hominis quod non convenit
virtutii sensitivae aliorum
animalium. Sicut enim ratio
universalis sive intellectus
in homine existens potest
conferre universalia ad-
invicem et ab uno in alium
discurrere, sic etiam vir-
tus sensitiva quae est in
homo potest conferre in-
tentiones individuales ad-
invicem et ab uno particula

95-99 cogitativa: narr.
101 individuales: indivisibiles cod.
111 potest: s add. sed del. cod.
secundum quod coniungitur intellectivae.

Ad primum in oppositum. Dicendum quod reminiscencia non est in veritate syllogismus, immo est sicut quidam syllogismus eo quod sicut in syllogismo est discursus a principiis universalibus usque ad conclusionem, sic in reminiscencia est discursus a particulari principio in memoria retendo usque ad aliquid quod prius est visum f.217ra vel auditum. Quamvis igitur syllogizare sit virtutis intellectivae, tamen sic discurrere bene est sensitivae

115 in aliud discurrere. Et ideo dico quod reminiscencia est passio virtutis sensitivae hominis secundum quod virtus sensitiva coniungitur intellectivae. Ad rationem primam. Dicendum ad maiorem quod reminiscencia non est in veritate syllogismus, sed est sicut quidam syllogismus eo quod sicut in syllogismo est discursus a principio universalis ad conclusionem, sic in reminiscencia est discursus a principio particularis in memoria retento ad aliquid visum vel auditum. Licet igitur syllogizare sic universaliter sit actus ipsius intellectus, tamen sic discurrere ab uno particularis principio in aliud bene est actus virtutis.
Ad aliud. Dico quod discurrere ab uno universalis ad alium est actus intellectivae, discurrere tamen a particulari usque ad particularis est actus sensitivae, coniunctae intellectivae.

Ad aliud. Dicendum quod non est idem judicium de virtute hominis sensitiva et aliorum animalium, quia virtus sensitiva hominis coniuncta est intellectivae et potest discurrere ab uno in aliud et operari per modum deliberationis. Hoc autem non potest facere sensitiva aliorum, immo ex quodam instinctu naturae procedunt ab uno in aliud.

129-130 intellectivae; intelligere. cod., corr. marg. 133 coniunctae: marg.
potest ab uno in aliud
discurrere, neque operari
potest, per modum delibe-
rationis, sed ex quodam
instinctu naturali moventur animalia alia ad ope-
randum. Et per hoc patet
solutio ad rationem.

explicit quæstiones
super le memoria et remini-
150 scientia.

explicit quæstiones
super librum le memoria et
reminiscencitum.
3. QUÆSTIONES SUPER LIBRUM DE VOCIBUS ET VISIONIBUS
<QUAESTIONES SUPER LIBRUM DE SOMNO ET VIGILIA
DISPUTATAE A MAGISTRO PETRO DE ALVERNIA>

<QUAESTIO 1>

UTRUM DE SOMNO ET VIGILIA SIT SCIENTIA

f.217ra "De somno autem et vigilia, etcetera."

Quaeritur utrum de somno et vigilia sit scientia.

Quod non de somno, probatio: quia omnis scientia est de ente. Somnus est non ens; probatio: quia somnus est privatio vigiliae, et privatio nihil est. Quare, etcetera.

Oppositum appareat <per ARISTOCREX, qui tradit hanc scientiam.>

Dicendum quod de somno et vigilia potest esse scientia, quia somni et vigiliae est aliqua causa ex qua contingit saepe somnum aliquando inesse animali, aliquando vigiliam. Est enim intelligendum quod causa somni est infrigidatio organorum sentiendi; et iza infrigidatio potest contingere vel ex excessu vigiliae, vel ex evaporatione nutrimenti, vel ex profunda cogitatione. Per excessum vigiliae retrahitur calor ad interiora et debilitatur; similiter, per evaporationem nutrimenti infrigidan-
tur organa; item, per, profundam cogitationem accidit retractio caloris ad interiora. Et ideo de somno per istas causas est scientia.

1-2 QUAESTIONES...ALVERNIA: suppl.; cf. QUAESTIO 10, explicit
4 UTRUM...SCIENTIA: mara. inf. / SCOMO: SCOMO scr. (fere omnes)
5 De...etcetera: subl. 15 somnum: se ipsum scr. cod.; corr. mara.
16 exi: mara. 11-12 per...scientiam: subl.

5 ARIST., De somno et vigilia, 1, 453b11
25 Ad rationem. Potest dici quod somnus non est solum privatio, sed est contrarium vigiliae et est infrigidatio sensuum. Contraria autem aliquid dicuntur privativa.

Aut posito quod sic, nihilominus de eo est scientia. Et cum dicit PHILOSOPHUS, "de non ente non est scientia".

30 Verum est, de non ente quod est falsum non est scientia; unde non continetur scire quod diameter est commensurabilis costae. Privationem autem aliquid inesse subjecto non est falsum.

Item. De eo quod non est nec per se nec per subjectum non est scientia. Sed somnus cum sit privatio est per subjectum; quia verum est dicere quod talis privatio inest subjecto, sicut continetur dicere quod oculus est caecus.

2 QUÆRIT I. 2

UTRUM HABEBAT SOLLVM NATURALIS

Quod non, probatio: quia somnus et vigilia sunt opposita, et naturale et non naturale sunt opposita. Sed si oppositum de opposito, et propositum de proposito. Sed vigilia est naturalis. Quare somnus non erit naturalis.

Item. Somnus causatur ab extrinsecus, ut at evaporatione nutrimenti. Sed quod est extrinsecum non est naturale. Quare, et cetera.

28 nihilominus; nihil habeamus scr., corrig. bis marg.
35 sed; unde cod.
2 UTRUM...NATURALIS; marg. inf. 6 naturalis: non erit add.; sed del. et exp. cod.

29 ARIST., An. Post., I, 2, 71b25-26
Opposatum apparat per PHILOSOPHUM, qui scientiam naturalem tradit de his.

Intelligendum quod de somno est scientia naturalis, quia somnus et vigilia habent causas naturales, sicut infriigitationes organorum sentiendae.

Item: somnus et vigilia sunt passiones naturales, quia in sua ratione includunt materiam sensibilem; est enim somnus passio partis sensitivae, et in definitione passionis debet poni subjectum. Et scientia de rebus naturalibus est naturalis.

Ad primum. Dicendum quod "si oppositum", etcetera, non valet quando accipitur commune illis duobus, ut patet: album et nigrum sunt contraria, et coloratum et non coloratum sunt opposita; ergo "si album est coloratum, ergo nigrum est non coloratum" non velet, quia accipitur ibi aliquod commune.

Ad aliud. Dico quod illud quod fit ab extrinseco non conferente vim passo, illud non est naturale; sed quod est ab extrinseco ita quod hoc non est contra inclinationem passivi, illud est naturale. Unde licet somnus fiat ab extrinseco, hoc non est contra naturam animalis.

20 etcetera: dicendum quod add. cod.
27 conferente: conferet scr. cod., corr. marg.
<QUAESTIO 3> UTRUM DE SOMNO ET VIGILIA SIT UNA SCIENTIA

Utrum sit una scientia de his.
Quod non, probatio: quia non sunt plura unius scientiae nisi quia sunt aliquo modo unum. Sed opposita secundum quod opposita nullo modo sunt unum. Quare, etgetern.

Item. Cognitio unius oppositi distinguetur a cognitione alterius. Quare non pertinent ad unam scientiam.
Oppositum apparret per PHILOSOPHUS, qui tradit nobis simul scientiam istorum.

Dico quod de somno et vigilia est una scientia, non quia intellectus somni sit intellectus vigilium vel e contrario; sed, quia non potest cognosci privatius nisi cognoscatur habitus, hinc est quod cognitio illorum est coniuncta.

Hoc dicit PHILOSOPHUS libro De anima, quod rectum est iudex sui et obliqui.

Ad primum. Dicendum quod opposita sunt aliquo modo unum quia cognitio unius est coniuncta cognitioni alterius.

Ad secundum. Verum est quod intellectus unius non est intellectus alterius; sunt tamen coniuncti eorum intellectus, et ideo, sicut dictum est prius, eorum debet esse scientia una.

5, 6 opposita: composita scr. cod., corr. marg.
14 hinc: dub.; hitu scr. sed u exp. cod.
15 ARIST., De anima, I, 5, 411a5
<QUÆSTIO 4>

UTRUM SOMNUS INSIT PLANTIS

Quod sic, probatio: quorumcumque est aliquod opus secundum naturam, si illa excellerint tempus illius operationis vel illud opus, necesse est ea quiescere ab illâ operatione. Sed plantis inest opus secundum naturam. Ergo necesse est quiescere a tali operatione. Talis autem quies videtur somnus, sicut arguit ARISTÔTÈLÈS in littera.

Item. Somnus videtur causari ex retractione caloris naturalis ad interius; cuius signum est quia in somno extrema inveniuntur frigida. Sed in plantis est retractione caloris ad interiora in hieme. Quare, etcetera.

Item. Plantae videntur alterius dispositionis in hieme et aestâti, cum in hieme non producunt flores, in aestate producunt; dispositio autem earum quam hâbent in hieme videtur somnus.


Dicendum quod aliqui dixerunt somnum et vigiliam inesse plantis; unde in hieme cum non producunt flores dicunt quod somniunt, in aestate non. Contra: somnus et vigilia sunt passiones quae praesupponunt partem sensitivam; unde somnus est immobilitatio organorum sentiendi ex evaporatione nutrimenti. Sed in plantis non est sensitiva. Quare, etcetera.

2 UTRUM...PLANTIS: iter. marc. inf. 4' excellerint: excellant sèr. cod.: corr. marc. 12 hieme: yème cod. (omnes)

8 ARIST., De somno et vigilia, I, 454a26-29
Item. Somnus est immobilitatis quaestio. Aude
somnus autem non immobilitatur anima vegetativa, sed
valemensia operatur, quod est propter retrahitionem
caloris ad interiora; unde vegetativa anima est, componem
non reest sensu in su actione.Ideo apparebit quod in
somno non est immobilitatis pars vegetativa.

Ad primum. Dicendum quod anima vegetativa, secundum
COMMENTARIUM secundo de anima, semper est in perfectione;
unde ipsa existente non cessat in operatione
sua. Unae ipsae existente non est tempus a consequentur illa
operationis; immo magnis conservatur anima vegetativa
ex hoc quod est semper in sua postrema perfectione, quae
si cessaret. Dico igitur, ad formam qui est necessarium quod
omnes hane operatiposum cessari aliquando
ab ulla, quae quaeque sunt quae sunt semper in illa operatipone.
Contrarium hujus accidit de sensitive. - Secundo
dicendum; posito quod planitas cessent a suo operae, non
saepe operet quod illa cesserit sit sensus. Somnus anim
non est ex quacumque cessatione, sed ex. cessione operationis
entiendi propter evaporations nutrimenti.

Ad secundum. Dicendum quod somnus non cessatur ex
retractione caloris naturalis ad interiora in quacumque,
sed in habente partem sensitivam.

27 immobilitatus; inventit scr. cod., del. et corr. marc.
28 operatur; acciditur scr. cod., del. et corr. marc. 31 aqat:
egent scr. cod., del. et corr. marc. 31 vegetativa; sensitiva
scr. cod., del. et corr. marc. 35 tempus; opus cod.
36 conservatur; hensee add. cod.

33 AVER2025: Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima librum
secundum, 5. 11. 46-47
Ad tertium. Dicendum quod sunt alterius dispositi-
onis plantae in hieme et aestate quia in hieme regreditur
calor ad interiora propter frigus exterius, in aestate non.
Hoc tamen non concludit somnum <inesse plantis.>

<QUÆSTIO 5>

UTRUM IN PLANTIS SIT APPETITUS VEL CONCUPISCENTIA

Quod sic, probatio: in his quae utuntur nutrimento
necesso est esse appetitum alimenti. Sed plantae utuntur
alimento. Maior patet quia quae utuntur alimento non pos-
sunt salvari et esse sine alimento; et cum unumquodque
appetit salvari et esse, quod non contingit sine alimento,
patet quod appetunt alimentum.

Item. Illud quod utitur nutrimento, cum ei deficit
nutrimentum, illud appetit necessario, quia aliter salvari
non potest. Sed plantis aliquando deficit alimentum.

Oppositum dicit littera.

Dicendum quod quidam est appetitus naturalis, et
quidam est appetitus animalis; et ille duplex: quidam in-
telligibilis, quidam sensitivus. Intelligibilis dicitur
voluntas, et iste solum est in ratocinatio. Appetitus
sensitivus duplex <est>, scilicet concupiscibilis et ira-
scibilis; concupiscibilis est ad aliqouod bonum vel apparent
bonum, irascibilis ad resistendum <pro> bono et arduo.

11 potest: patet scr. sed corr. cod. 13 quidam est: marz.
19 pro: suppl. // arduo: arguo cod., x marz.
12 AXIST., De somno et vigilia, 1. 454b29-32
Icigitur quod nullus iorum appetitum nec intelligibilis, nec concupiscibilis, nec irascibilis inest plantis, quia isti appetitus necessario sequuntur cognitionem rei sub ratione qua delectabilis; in plantis autem non est virtus cognoscentiva, ideo nec quod sequitur ad illam. Verumtamen in plantis est appetitus naturalis de quae dicitur secundo insicorum, "materiam appetit formam". Appetitus naturalis est inclinatio ad aliquid instinctu naturae et non ex cognitione; appetitus aquisibilis est inclinatio ad aliquid cum cognitione. Hoc erit quod in plantis est appetitus naturalis, si ad esse et conservari et ad alimetum convenient.

Pur hoc ad rationem,

(\textit{Castrum} 6)

QUOD SIC, PRO BTIO:quia delectabilis causatur ex unico conveniensi; cum conveniensi. Sic, aliquod est nutrimentum unitum plantaee et conveniens; quia aut in sis delectatio.

\textit{(Opposatum) dicit littera.}

Acendum quod \textit{(in) plantis non est delectatio aut}


26 \textit{AXIST.}, Phys. 1, 9, 192a20-22
7 \textit{AXIST.}, De somno et vigilia, 1, 434b29-32
tristitia quia istae sunt passiones quae consequuntur ipsum sentire vel intelligere. Unde cum aliquid sentit sensibile quod est sibi delectabile ex hoc accidit delectatio si sibi uniatur; ex hoc autem quod sentit tristabile, si sibi uniatur, causat tristitia. Unde delectatio et tristitia praesupponunt virtutem cognoscitivam, quam non est in plantis. Et ideo, etcetera. Quamvis enim in plantis sit alimentum conveniens, illud tanem non consulet tristitiam aut delectationem, quia tristitia et delectatio praesupponunt virtutem cognoscitivam.

Ad rationem. Digendum quod maio nullis est — "ex unione, etcetera" — praesupposita cognitio et apprehensione quae est sub ratione quae est delectabile, istud autem non contingit in plantis.

QUÆSTIO 7

UTRUM IN VOLUNTATI ET POTESTATE NOSTRA SIT DOMINUS


10 cognoscitivam: 9g suam scr. cod., corr. marz.
15 cognoscitivam: 9g suam scr. cod., corr. marz.
Oppositum arguitur. Illud quod est necessarium si deseat animal salvari non videtur esse in voluntate nostra ut fiat vel non fiat quando volumus. Sed dormire necessarium est animali si deseat salvari. Quare...

Intelligo ad hoc quod somnus non est totaliter in potestate nostra. Huius ratio est quia somnus causatur in noxia ex aliqua operatione naturali quae non subditur imperio nostrae voluntatis. Causatur enim somnus ex retractione caloris ad interiora vel ex evaporatione alimenti; cum autem alimentum receptum est, non est in voluntate nostra ut evaporet vel non. Et ideo, cum somnus causatur ex evaporatione alimenti et retractione caloris ad interioris propter excessum vigilandi, quod non est in potestate nostra, totaliter, patet quod non est in potestate nostra.

Intellignendum tamen quod somnus potest impediri voluntarie. Alquis enim citius posset dormire quam dormit si velit, et ideo vigiliae ex voluntate aliquantulum potest prolongari et somnis impediri, non tamen totaliter si deseat animal salvari, et ideo dico quod non est totaliter in potestate nostra.

ad rationem contra: Dico quod non laudatur nec vituperatur aliquis secundum continentiam vel incontinentiam nisi propter hoc quod habet appetitum ordinatum vel inordinatum.
tum in illas operationes. Unde secundum PHILOSOPHUM non
35 est iustus qui facit iusta nec in iustus qui facit iniusta
nisi faciat ea volens, hoc est per appetitum. Et ideo dico
quod laudatur aliquid in continentia vel vituperatur propter
incontinentiam propter appetitum, et non propter operationes
vegetativa.

<QUÆSTIO 8>

<UTRUM SOMNUS SIT PASSIO CORDIS>

quaeritur consequenter utrum somnus sit passio cordis.
Quod non, probatio: quia somnus est infirrigatio. Sed
5 cor non potest infirrigari quia eius infirrigatio mors est.
Quare, etcetera.

Item. In somno est maior caliditas in corde quam in
vigilia, quia quod somnum congregatur calor in corde. Quare,
etcetera.

10 Oppositum dicit littera.

Dico quod somnus est passio cordis principaliter,
secundario organorum sentienti. Ratio huius est quia somnus
est passio primi sensitivi quo existentii in potentia aliqua
insunt in potentia. Primum autem sensitivum est cor, quod
15 est principium vitae, etiam motus et sensus, secundum PHI-
LOSOPHUM hic. Apud enim somnum cor est impotens ad mittendum

35 iustus: virtus scr. cod. corr. marg. 35 est: et praem. sed.
exp. cod. 7 maior: na praem. sed exp. et del. cod. 8 congrega-
gatur: 9 giat scr. cod. corr. marg. 8 quare: quae scr. cod.
13 primi sensitivi: praesenti scr. cod. del. et corr. marg. (partial-
ly cut off) 14 Primum: a' add. sed del. cod. 16 hic: marg.

34 ARIST. Eth. Nic. V, 8, 1135a16-19 10 ARIST. De somno et
vigilia, 2, 455b34-456a24 15-16 ibid., 456a5-6
calorem et spiritum ad exteriora, sine quibus non sit sensus; et ideo somnum est principaliter passio cordis, secundarii organorum sentiendi. Per hoc enim quod cor non potest immittere calorem et spiritum ad organa exteriora, contingit quod non possunt exteriora sentire. Unde, secundum quod videtur ARISTOTELES innuere in De morte et vita, sensus communis est in corde, et PHILOSOPHUS prius declaravit quod somnum est passio sensitiv communis.

Secundo, utrum autem praeter sensitivum primum quod est in corde sit sensitivum commune quod est in epate, sicut posuit AVICENNA, dubitatio est.

Ad rationem. Dico quod somnum non est infrigidatio cordis, sed apud somnum infrigidantur organa exteriora, quia cor est impotens ad immittendum calorem et spiritum. unde somnum est convertus calor is inrindicus et reciprocatio 1.21erae naturalis propter evaporationem et nutri mentum.

Ad aliud. Verum est quod in somno est maior calor in corde, quia tune ibi congregatur et redit calor ad exterioribus usque ad cor in somno. unde somnum est infrigidatio sensum exteriorum. non dico somnum esse infrigdatione illius cuius est passio et cui primo inest, sed est convertus calor is naturalis et reciprocatio, otoetra.

20-21 exteriora: per hoc add. cod. 33 maior: sub. lin.
22-23 ARIST., De morte et vita, 3, 469a10-12 24 ARIST., De somno et vigilia, 2, 455a12-22 27 AVICENNA, locus non inventus
QUÆSTIO <9>

<STUM. SOMNIENTES FACIENTES OPERA VIGILIUM. SINT DORMIENTES.>

Quaeritur utrum somnientes facientes opera vigilium sint dormientes.

Quod non, probatio: quia illi qui moventur processive
siue et faciunt opera vigilium et loquentur et uident non
dormiant, quia ex operibus vigilium dicimus aliquos vigilare.
Sed isti somnientes sunt quibusmodi, quia moventur processive, etcetera. Quare, etcetera.

Oppositorum. Secundum PHILOSOPH. inferius, somnium
est passio dormientis, et non inest nisi dormienti. Si
igitur hacc operantibus sint somnientes, tunc sunt simpliciter
dormientes.

Item. Isti non memorantur operum vigilium quae
fecerunt. Si tamen vigilaret, possent sentire huiusmodi
operationes et memorari illorum. Hoc autem falsum est:
quare, etcetera.

Intelligendum quod omnia animalia contingit dormire
et vigilare. Contingit autem vigilare simpliciter et dormire
quatenus vel secundum quid, et e converso. Dicuntur vigilare
simpliciter et dormire quatenus qui nodicum sentiant sensibi-
ilia. Dormire autem simpliciter et vigilare quatenus dicun-
tur qui dormiunt, quibus fiunt simulacra sensibilium, <et> in
quibus organa motuum dissolvuntur; illi tamen vigilant quatenus
eo quod faciunt opera vigilium et moventur processive. Istud

1 QUÆSTIO: marci. 3 somnientes: somnientes cod. (sive omnes) //
vigilium: vigiliu cod. corr. marci. 9 somnium: somnus cod. 13
vigilium: vigilium cod. 23 dissolvuntur: et quae etiam faciunt opera
vigilium add. 22 et: suppol.

9 ARIST., De insomniis, 3, 462a16
autem non fit sine aliquo sensu, non dico extrinseco, sed intrinseco; unde videtur somniendi quod aliqua videat et aliqua audiat, et sic de aliis. Isti autem non ducuntur sensu exteriori, quod patet quia multotiens periclitantur, quod non contingere si ducerentur sensu exteriori. Et ex hoc appareat quod isti non sunt vigilantes simpliciter, sed dormientes simpliciter, quia vigilantes simpliciter dicitur sentientes sensu exteriori, ut dicit littera. Istud autem potest contingere ex calore febri, vel ira, vel concupiscentia, quod calor se facit ad exteriorum; et cum imaginativa percepit motum, illa animalia moventur. Et contingit quod ista animalia rememorantur suorum somniorum, et non memorantur quod fecerunt illa opera, quia illa non senserunt sensu exteriori, et ideo illa non cognoverunt; ideo illa non rememorantur. <Sed> animalia sensu interiori re memorantur fantasticum et apparitionem.

Per hoc ad rationes, quia ducuntur tales formae simpliciter, vigilare autem secundum quid.

23 aliquo, alico cod. 27 et aliqua: marg. 30 quod, quia cod.
33 ira: irascibili scr. sed corr. cod. // vel2: sub. lin.
40 Sed...rememorantur: marg (partially cut off)

32 A.:IST.; De somno et vigilia, 1, 454a2-5
<QUÆSTIO 10>

UTAM, APPARITIONES ET FANTASMATA QUAE SUNT IN ALIENATIS ET IN HIS QUAE AVERNUNTUR A SENSIBILIBUS SINT SOMNIA.

Quod sic videtur: quia somnium nihil aliud est quam simulacrum aliquid sensibilis. Istis autem quae avertuntur a sensibilibus, vel ex alienatione vel profunda cogitatione, accidit simulacrum aliquid apparitionis. Quare, etcetera.

Oppositum: Somnium est passio dormientis. Isti autem non dormiunt. Quare, etcetera.

Dicendum quod potest contingere quod aliqui profunde cogitant de divinis et separatis, et ex hoc contingit quod calor naturalis redit ad interiora et quod organa sentiendi exteriora non possunt sentire; et propter hoc isti, non impediti motibus exterioribus, multa vident de substantiis separatis. Eis autem apparent fantasiae et apparitiones, quia mens eorum ad illa erat intenta. Unde passio somni-
Per hoc ad rationem in oppositum. Quamvis sit ibi simulacrum aliquius sensibilis, non tamen est aliquius dormientis, et ideo non est somnium.

Et intelligendum quod istae apparitiones non causantur a substantia separata praeclaram ad motum. Niniam novum causatur a substantia separata immediata, sed omnia nova causantur a substantiis separatis mediante motu. Et istae apparitiones accidunt aliquibus ex hoc quod non est attenta ad illa.

35 Item. Intelligendum quod istae apparitiones seu visiones maxime accidunt mulieribus et non is quae viri, quia ex humiditate complexionis et fluiditate fluant de facili in illud quod intendunt. Et ideo cum intendunt ad substantias separatas venosenter fluant in illas. Quamvis tamen de facili fluant in illud quod intendunt, cito tamen revertuntur.

40 Item. Inter viros istae visiones maxime accidunt melancholicis, quia isti maxime incidunt a fantasmatibus, ut dictum in De memoria et reminiscencia. Unde in his fantasmatibus fortiter imprimitur, et ex hoc continuat quod revertuntur ad fantasmatam illam et sunt quasi portae. Et dicunt melancholicis quod vident mirabilia de divinis et aliis, cum tamen non sint nisi fantasmatas et apparitiones, in multis dico.


35-41 cf. S. ALBERTUS, De somno et vigilia, Lib. I, Pr. II, c. VI
44 ARIST., De memoria et reminiscencia, 2, 453a18-19
Et intellige quod mulieribus et viris contingit istud propter oppositas causas: mulieribus contingit propter humiditatem et complexionem humidam, melancholicis propter vehementiam fantasmatum.

Item. Intelligendum quod quatuor sunt causas somni, duae ex parte animae: prima profunda cogitatione, secunda excessus vigiliae. Per profundam enim cogitationem trahitur calor ad interiora, et tunc fit evaporatio et humiditas ascendit sursum. Item, somnis causatur ex excessu vigiliae; contingit enim quod excessum vigiliae aliquid facit in auditando sonos delectabiles; et tunc propter excessum retrahitur calor ad interiora, et fit evaporatio. Item, duae sunt causae ex parte corporis: evaporatio nutrimenti, et labor qui est fatigativus. Et causa tamen propinqua videtur esse evaporatio nutrimenti, etcetera.

Expliciunt quaestiones de somno et vigiliae disputatric

a Magistro Petro de Alvernia. Benedictus Deus. Amen.

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51 melancholicis: melâcolici