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Philosophy and Musical Criticism

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Thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
and Research of the University of Ottawa
in partial fulfillment of the
M.A. degree in Philosophy

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Introduction

The major theme of this thesis can be approached by considering two definitions of music. The first is by Igor Stravinsky:

For the phenomenon of music is nothing other than a phenomenon of speculation. There is nothing in this definition that should frighten you. It simply presupposes that the basis of musical creation is a preliminary feeling out, a will moving first in an abstract realm with the object of giving shape to something concrete. The elements at which this speculation necessarily aims are those of sound and time.(1)

Contrast this definition of music as an accoustical entity with L.B. Meyer's view that emotional response is an essential quality of musical experience. "Value", he writes, "has something to do with the activation of a musical impulse having tendencies towards a more or less definite goal..."(2)

These two views appear to be based on the opposing polarity 'Formalism/Expressionism'. However, they share the same semiotic conception. Signs, on this account, have fixed relationships in music. Consequently, musical structure is taken in isolation from a system of interpretations and musical meaning is founded on the belief that we hear only systematic events and not audible facts. Music is organized sound. Noise can never be music since it is not intergrated into any systematically ordered context.

However, systems are more like abstractions that have a role to play in our methodology. Such structures do not exist in themselves as if they constituted inexorable laws of a syntactical system. Forgetting this fact, I suggest, has consequences for our critical analysis of music and, perhaps, something interesting to say about the problematic relationship between reader and text. What constrains an interpretation and identifies a text?
In our first quotation, Stravinsky appears to take a distinct realm of unstructured facts about music that are manifested in but exist prior to the structured musical event. This sphere includes internal laws of musical construction, polarities, musical forms and formal relationships of 'higher mathematics' of speculation. Whatever is conceived as having a function in ordering and regulating the musical event, exists prior to that event. But why is the determination of this realm is not subject to an act of interpretation?

Similarly, Meyer explains the structure of music as a function of emotional tension as if emotional tension was not as dependent on interpretation as is musical structure. But why is this realm of an inate psychological structure not itself subject to an interpretation?(3)

If systems are abstractions, then perhaps 'musical structure' is also an interpretative moment in our analysis. The difficulty shared by both of these views rests with the conception of the musical sign as a relationship between some term or 'signifier' and that of which it is about or some 'signified'. The notion that systems are abstractions is overlooked in a semiotic conception that isolates structure from event in this way. Thus, on this view, a sign is a sign of some object for some interpreter. Or a musical piece is an ordered sequence of sound for a 'well tuned ear'. At first glance, this view does suggest a tripartite conception of the semiotic situation-event, structure and interpreter. But the addition of the interpreter tends only to invert the relation event/structure, message/code, giving priority to the controlling presence of the interpreter and the constitution of the message. The constraints to a proper interpretation are shifted from the text or code to the reader. Structure is still isolated from the event but,
now, the site of the reader dominates and re-establishes the meaning of the musical piece.

This, then, is the general line of inquiry of this thesis, from which two conclusions follow. First, though reference is made to 'time', it is not to a metaphysics of time. Music is conceived as a narrative sequencing based on the listener's experience which is, of course, in time. Secondly, philosophy can be a critical reading without being just another kind of writing, since the polarity that generates the distinction, 'art/philosophy', has itself been transformed through changing social and conceptual conditions.

Two final points need clarification, that is the notions of analogy and paradox. The analogy that I wish to draw lies between the discussion in musicology of musical structure or form and its temporal process, and a conception of philosophy as 'making sense' outside its institutional boundaries. The protocols of philosophy to determine validity in understanding must be accepted. But how can it engage the apparently irrational behavior of unlimited interpretations that is possible outside those same boundaries? The conception of form in music, as essentially connected to the temporal process of human experience, suggests a conception of judgement or comprehension that does not impose an external or 'a-temporal' set of standards.

Secondly, the use of the term 'paradox', in this thesis, is not meant to signal the ultimate futility of thinking as it attempts to comprehend something that is 'incomprehensible'. However, I would like to attempt, as far as it goes, not to arbitrate some opposition within a mediatory process. I think a description of the co-existence of opposing conceptions might be more fruitful. The result of this descriptive process is a picture of philosophy as standing midway between its instituted behavior and that peculiar discussion beyond the borders of the institution.
Chapter 1

The Aesthetic Attitude and the Institutional
Conventions of Art Objects

Section A) Differentiation of an art object by means of an attitude.

Theories of the aesthetic attitude do not represent one cohesive systematic doctrine but a common approach or orientation to the problem of defining features that are relevant to the appreciation and criticism of the aesthetic object. Nonetheless, the motivation is always to determine the differentia through which an attitude can be called 'aesthetic'. We will briefly outline such problems and issues that concern the establishment of such a particular, limited or conceptual space. This chapter then deals with the dialogue between the uniqueness of an attitude and the conventional parameters of an instituted space as a means of defining an artwork in contradistinction to any non-artwork.

In the case of the aesthetic attitude we have two related arguments. The first attempts to provide, through the denial of any mediation of structure, a definition of the 'disinterested' attitude. Logically, this has the usual problems associated with negative definitions brought out in Dickie's criticism to which we will return shortly. The second position, however, argues for the immediate character of an aesthetic structure itself.
However, it is my belief that both of these arguments imply the necessity of a purposeful and mediating presuppositional structure that hinders the theoretical possibility of positioning oneself within a 'proper attitude'.

Jerome Stolnitz, in his book *Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art Criticism*, defines the aesthetic attitude as "disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake". (1) This position supports the obvious advantage of securing the necessity of the aesthetic dimension of any object by placing that object's aesthetic integrity within the structure or functionally related features of a contemplative approach. Since such structures are interested in terms of their specific function, the status of the object does not appear to be constituted at an epistemological distance. The mediating role of this system tends to be overlooked. The spectator is rather faced with the indubitable, phenomenological presence of an object.

This contradiction can sometimes be mitigated by the notion of an immediate structure. However, this immediacy has both a positive and negative function that recalls the original contradiction between an attitude effected by an interested structure that is to constitute a lack of interest. Negatively, the structure inhibits critical and practical judgement as unsympathetic, while encouraging a specific aesthetic response. In terms of its positive function, the object is abstracted from its cognitive matrix, thereby securing a contemplative relationship to the object for its own sake alone. Any mediating structure that as such, has a distancing or representational value distracts consciousness from the object by displacing the focus onto practical interests. By blocking the reception of aesthetic qualities, the intrinsic value of the object cannot be disclosed. Is representation, then, of practical or externally motivated interest? It is quite possible that
representation is based on a foundation or shifting or displacing interests and motivations. Indeed this is precisely Dickie's contentions:

"Disinterestedness" is a term which is used to make clear that an action has certain kinds of motives...Attending to an object has its motives, but the attending itself is not interested or disinterested according to whether its motives are of the kind which motivate interested or disinterested action...(2)

Thus, Dickie contends that interest in these external mediating structures themselves is not a special case of interested attention, as Stolnitz claims, but simply a kind of inattention to the artwork. The reason for Stolnitz's confusion over this point is that he fails to make clear just what exactly the difference is between a disinterested attitude and an interested one. Given an impresario, a playwright, an art critic and an average viewer each with the different interest of performance of the play, what accounts for the supposed aesthetic interest of the viewer is not a lack of an ulterior purpose or rather 'dis-interest', but the character of the motivation or interest. The aesthetic quality of the attention of the differing motives is the same. To accept this argument would admit failure to specify 'disinterestedness' in terms of an absence of interest. But it seems to leave open our second alternative - the possibility of arguing for the necessity of an interested structure but a non-mediating one. What then are the appropriate features of an 'interested' structure?

The organizing feature, for Stolnitz is 'selectivity', a discriminatory ability or canvass our environment and single out aspects for our attention in accordance with present interests.

Thus an attitude or, as it is sometimes called, a "set", guides our attention in those directions relevant to our purposes(...). It prepares us to respond to what we perceive, to act in a way we think will be most effective for achieving our goals.(3)
This statement clarifies that implied reasoning behind Stolnitz's reluctance to accept a structural organization for the artwork. If we can select our mode of interested awareness, then we can control our response. But, if our attitude 'directs awareness of the world' and thereby prepares us to respond effectively in accordance with a desired goal while hindering those inappropriate responses with respect to the aesthetic object, then the attitude, on this view, can never appear as a pre-determined response. However, if interests and purposes are embedded in the conventions of language and guide our attention, then our attitude is given already constituted as a response for us. If the reader is in this way 'pre-figured in the text', then the 'differentia' as a definition of an aesthetic representation cannot be established, as Stolnitz claims, on the basis of a self-conscious selection of interests functioning as a criteria.

The problem for Stolnitz is that sense-data are never apprehended without significance, formalized in an interpretation. This process describes perception as fundamentally purposeful, interested and presuppositional. But in what way and by what means experience is thereby structured in a representation has often been overlooked, for interested activity suggests presuppositions or bias and aesthetic response or meaning as not necessarily a neutral option.

In avoiding this last line of inquiry, Tomas(4) attempts to provide a purely descriptive phenomenology of art in terms of an account of the presence of aesthetic phenomena but in which the 'givenness' of a representation is irrelevant to an aesthetic concern. Ordinarily, in our everyday experience we deal with objects in terms of their conceptual image acting as a sign indicating what it signifies. In aesthetic seeing we pay 'close attention to',
we dwell upon the presented appearance. Tomas makes the distinction between this phenomenological object and an ontological object; that object by which the percipient is being visually stimulated. This distinction guarantees the identification of 1) appearance with the phenomenological object, and 2) of realistic and practical concerns with 'ontological awareness'. This pattern functions as the differentia between the aesthetic and non-aesthetic. Our position will develop Dickie's argument as follows: If the identification of realistic concerns with the ontological object is not necessary, the distinction is not justified, and the differentia can not be maintained.

Now, in aesthetic perception, Tomas claims, we are concerned with the quality of the appearance rather than the representational value of the sign. Representational function and practical interest are irrelevant. In dwelling upon the appearance, perception is focused not on the picture, mirror or window, etc., the ontological object, but the way in which the 'pictured appeared', the phenomenological object. What is aesthetically irrelevant on Tomas' view is the ontological vehicle, the status of the object's reality. Thus to say the question of reality does not arise means for Tomas that the "...consideration of two different stimulus objects appearing in the same way is irrelevant. (...) What actual object presents the appearance does not arise." (5) Therefore, the reality of the object is not purposefully excluded from perception, but neither are we aware of the object 'as an appearance' or a sign that signifies.

The question then is this: Is it possible to be presented with an appearance without seeing it as significant, that is, as related to some purpose that brings the 'object' into focus? Recall that only if Tomas' 'appearance' is possible, is the distinction tenable since we would not be aware of the real status of the object. However, our first impression would
be to answer no, for some framework that organizes data into significant relations must be presupposed, otherwise the 'thing' would indeed be unnoticeable even as Tomas' phenomenological object. But granting that Tomas' view would allow a minimal framework, what account then can be given in terms of its significance? If another account can be given, then the identification of reality with the ontological object is not necessary.

Peter Kivy(6) claims that Tomas is subject to a 'misuse of language' criticism when he takes a specific linguistic routine or operation as the commonly accepted one. It is a mistake to take the identification of 'reality' with the stimulus object as justification for saying that anyone not dealing with one is not dealing with the other. The reason is that in ordinary linguistic usage, that is the common routine used when speaking about art, we do not refer to such complicated behavior.

The distinction is due to different contexts of spacial relations. To say the stimulus object presents the appearance is to say a smooth orange surface is presented in reality by the close proximity of the separate colors red and yellow. But it is also true that relative to the stimulus object defined as a microscopic viewpoint of the pigment as 'grey matter of colored flecks', a completely different context, the appearance is the colors red and yellow. Kivy maintains that it is the former case that adequately describes the common viewing routine, but in viewing and describing painting, there is no reason why we could not have an interest in both positions. In fact, 'we enjoy the very act of stepping back and watching our perceptions transform'(7)

We have argued that the identification of realistic concerns with the ontological object, as Tomas has done, is not necessary since the term 'reality' can be used in various linguistic routines and therefore appearances
are always in some respect significant or signified by some practical concern or constituting use of the term 'reality'.

Can aesthetic perception, after all, be explained in terms isolated from language usage, cultural assumptions or human behavior in general, that is to say, from systems of signification and understanding? If not, then an artistic representation will be explained in terms of a presuppositional account in which interested, formal cognitive structures are employed. This would effectively undermine the idea of a 'presuppositionless object' that appears necessary for an aesthetic attitude theory. This leads us to a brief examination of the nature of the presuppositional system of the Artworld. Is such a preconceived and preconceptual structure an a-historical synchronic one?

Section B) The Institutional Nature of Art

The Institutional Theory is an argument for the necessity of a public/social context of presentation as a structure through which an object can be exchanged. In his latest book The Art Circle, Dickie argues that a certain contextual circularity is necessary, given the standard form in which we learn about the concept 'artwork' - a framework in which each feature of the definition presupposes and supports the other. There are five points to the definition.

1) An artist is a person who participates with understanding in the making of a work of art.

2) A work of art is an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public.
3) A public is a set of persons the members of which are prepared in some degree to understand an object which is presented to them.

4) The artworld is the totality of all artworld systems.

5) An artworld system is a framework for the presentation of a work of art by an artist to an artworld public. (8)

The circularity of the definition has presented certain problems. R. Stecker, in an article entitled "The End of an Institutional Definition of Art" (9), has claimed that for this reason Dickie has failed to distinguish artworks from other artifacts. The institutional definition is informative in that it gives the structural synchronic features of an economic system— as a formal theory of a logic of production based on intrinsic human features, i.e., a producer of a commodity presented to a consumer for consumption. This fails, however, to distinguish the artworld system from other presentational systems and tells us nothing about the nature of art, and therefore the institutional facts are not sufficient for something being art. Stecker seems to suggest that only some principled method can account for the difference between artworks and non-artworks. But we will inquire whether this can be achieved without a diachronic dimension that introduces a logic of history and historical consciousness as essentially dynamic and 'deliberately unconscious'.

On Steckers' view, such an arbitrary distinction leads us to a second criticism, namely, that this new version of the Institutional Theory favors the impossibility of defining the nature of art. Even given the arbitrary distinction, the account will be circular but still not defective. However, it is uninformative, for since the artworld public possesses a common ability to
recognize some objects as art, the definition does not informatively differentiate artworks from non-artworks. Thus, for Stecker, Dickie's modest commitment to merely a statement of the 'inflected nature' of the concept of art is reduced to the 'anti-definitionist' open-concept, since we already have a feeling for the classification of such objects and a definition is not forthcoming.

A third issue raised by by Stecker, and lately by Catherine Lord(10), concerns Dickie's claim that the institutional framework is a necessary and sufficient condition. Lord claims that the institutional framework is but a necessary condition. 'Sufficiency' would require an indicating gesture or pointing. If there are no essential or 'crucial similarities', then the boundaries of an arbitrary collection of artworks are specific to 'this particular artworld since the meaning of the artworld is possible through acceptable presentation. Lord writes:

'Again, our works of art are (...) a hodgepodge, and were there any similarities, the institutional theory would not be needed. It is the arbitrariness, the reference without substantial sense, that calls for indexicality.(11)

This claim of indexicality is a criticism of the institutional theory as it reduces the latter to an absurd proposition. Would objects intended for systems other than the artworld be successfully presented in 'this', our artworld? Can an individual, not part of our artworld, accept something as art? Since the artworld is a rigorously closed system, such counterfactual questioning does not produce an intelligible answer. The reason is simple. Since one term or condition is defined merely by a 'reference' to another condition which amounts to an ostensible pointing that organizes and writes the object into the index of a particular system, the institutional theory must preclude designating a substantial or 'proper sense' or definite description
without which we can only believe that something is art by reference to our system. However, the claim that the institutional theory must be circular or indexical is essentially Dickie's response: an artworld system is a practice understood as "... a historically developed cultural system of a particular time and place". (12) In the following discussion we will consider this definition and the above set of criticisms carefully.

There are, then, according to the Institutional view, two conditions that must be met in our recognition of an object as an art object. The first is the 'artifactual condition', and the second is that the object be the sort of thing that is presented to an artworld public. I claim that if is sufficient for a definition of art that a particular social context or practice will presuppose a particular existent for appreciation and no reference to an artifact, as a separate condition, is necessary in the acknowledgement of art. For this reason we will return to the artifactual condition towards the end of this section.

It is the second condition of an object 'of the kind to be presented to an artworld public', that is most problematic. This requires some clarification, but I do not believe that Dickie must specify 'kind' independently of the work of art because interest in the Institutional view is due precisely to the value of its circular or contextual form of reasoning. However, I do accept the need to question the legitimacy of Dickie's use of 'public'. Not every work needs to be or was ever intended for a public. When an artworld public has an understanding at hand ready to accept an existent object previously understood as, for example, a religious, or utilitarian object, then a presentation group has been constituted through which the object changes its status. Public merely indicates the space of that 'perceptual field the hopeful artwork might fall'.
This might be an answer to Stecker's claim that the words 'kind' and 'public' are so vague as to make this condition unworkable. He asks, 'What is excluded by this public?' Since the artwork/non-artwork distinction is arbitrary, the term 'artworld' is no more informative than simply 'public'. Further, if the intention to present the object to a public, which determines the 'kind' of object, is not necessary, then it need not be present at all. Stecker writes:

If being a kind that is created to be presented is a consequence of being an artifact and if there is no non-arbitrary distinction between artworld systems and non-artworld systems, Dickie's definition of a work of art tells us only that such words are artifacts. Even if the definition tells us a bit more than this, the fact that Dickie gives no way of distinguishing between artworld and non-artworld systems guarantees that the definition fails to distinguish art from other artifacts. (13)

Both of these criticisms could be handled by showing that intention can be occasionally relevant just because 'systems' differentiate and discriminate objects. To prove this we need to develop Dickie's position on the specific functioning of the artworld system as a social practice. Stecker's claim that a system is a basically neutral structure in which a purpose must then be worked out is untenable or at least cannot be described without assuming, as even Stecker has done, a social/cultural model. This would show that the institutional framework, as a system of presuppositions, can be explained as a cultural matrix that can specify certain acts and forms of attention as artistic and therefore necessary in the production of art.

To say an artwork is embedded in an essential framework is to say it exists as an achievement, the product of a certain interrelated structure. The framework is in part, the art-historical background that is presupposed in our dealings with artworks. It is an inevitable conceptual pattern or cognitive structure through which recognition of an object as art is possible
Though it may be implicit and unconscious in our rapport with the work, it must still in some sense be grasped.

Art occurs in the context of persons fulfilling their roles according to an established practice of the artworld. Thus it is not the case, as it was in Dickie's earlier book *Art and the Aesthetic*, that the making of art is conferred upon an object by persons acting on behalf of the social institution. This initial view has been revised in *The Art Circle*: "What I now mean by the institutional approach is the view that a work of art is art because of the position it occupies within a cultural practice..."(14) In other words, art exists on account of certain relevant persons, the artist, the public, having relevant thoughts. They share, "an understanding in some degree of the concept of art"(15). This understanding is due to previous experience with artworks, knowledge of technique, general intuitions about art. It is that relevant cognitive structure into which an object is imbedded in order that it be recognized as art. Such relevant thoughts are about art itself, and operate generally at an unconscious level as the framework conditioning the achievement or production of art. This, I think, is part of Dickie's claim that both the artist and public participate in a common understanding. Such understanding is vindicated in the structure of accreditation in which the artist elects some object for consideration and appreciation. A successful work of art is then achieved by means of an agreement over the conceptual structure, interrelation of roles and consequent acceptance of the object as art. Though the art object is possible in and through the system, the definition is still fluid enough to accept different cultural or historical conditions in its determination of art.

With this common experience as a background, a dual role is created in which the artist and public participate in a mutually conditioning relation.
To quote Dickie: "The institutional theory sets works of art in a complex framework in which an artist in creating art fulfills a historically developed cultural role for a more or less prepared public."(16) The artist through this historical dimension is related to the past and enmeshed in a cultural milieu. The artistic intention thus presupposes a public. Though the presentation for one reason or another, may not always be successful, it is the possibility of the presentation that defines the role. By the same token, the public receives the work on the basis of its own set of expectations. In fulfilling its role, the viewer anticipates the work according to his or her common ability to understand or recognize the work.

That art has an essential and necessary framework means then, that it is impossible for it to occur independently of this framework. "Art (...) must exist in a cultural matrix, as the product of someone fulfilling a cultural role."(17) But also for Dickie, the framework is a-historical, it 'persists through time'. The synchronic and syntactic features will not yield historical qualities of an occurrence of art. Thus Stecker objects that the distinction (artworld/non-artworld) is arbitrary because nothing in the synchronic dimension of the system yields artistically identifiable characteristics. But the Institutional Theory, in our view, can be made to allow for the possibility that such properties be subject to their historical or diachronic aspects if we accept that the character of the existent itself is also so determined. Thus the definition is open in a way that can account for differences in both appreciation and critical disagreement.

The problem now lies with this newly introduces synchronic/diachronic distinction that was meant as a reply to Stecker's criticism of Dickie's distinction as arbitrary. Such a move is not present in Dickie's formulation of the Institutional Theory. Admittedly, to 'round out' the Institutional view in
this way is to add a historical, semantic dimension to the theory. In Dickie's description of the institutional framework the subject matter, the referential semantic import, if indeed there is one, cannot be established. So much is clear for Dickie when he says of Danto's claim that the semantic feature is a necessary condition of art: "While it is true that many artworks are about something...it seems that some works are just not about anything...I conclude that Danto's claim about art is false."(18) Dickie's reason for arguing this point is simply that he cannot locate a subject matter for non-objective painting in particular, and music in general. Such works of art tend to undermine interpretation by not providing,"...any reason to think that it is about anything at all."(19)

The institutional theory is not, as in Danto's view, a linguistic one, hence the artwork has no statemental value. No considerations of the art object as 'being about something' are relevant. In place of this condition, Dickie advances the artifactual condition; that something has been crafted by means of some sort of material medium and thereby designated, is jointly sufficient along with the 'object of the kind' condition to ensure that the achieved object is art. But this thesis will argue that if the framework functions as a syntactical pattern or schema whose very order and structural relations are subject to cultural assumptions and historical determination, then nothing more is fundamentally necessary. This is possible since, as will be argued, such assumptions determine the type of existent or artistic reality that is possible insofar as we interpret the identity of an object through those very assumptions and conventions. But I would hesitate to match this view with that of Danto which tends towards a perscriptivistic and legislative function of criticism. Our theory argues the inseparability of the syntactic and semantic structures - that the semantic component is, in a way, a function of its syntax. Rather than defining the semantic feature as
presupposing a 'distance' or a contrast between representation and existence or reality, such a framework will be seen as a mechanism for the generation of meaning itself, of a controlled subject matter. Thus we cannot judge the value of the work according to the value of its reference.

The fact that a representation is a function of the system of communication, of the social practice, is enough to suggest however, that Dickie's description of the nature of the institution itself is not sufficient. For now it can be seen that the institution, by the very means through which it is constituted or constitués the 'sort of thing' the object will have to be in being presented to an artworld public, can systematically exclude some objects as art. Or more precisely, a representation can be subverted by the cognitive structure or social practice. A description of an institutional framework is not a sufficient guarantee of the object qualifying as art without a description of the exclusive force of an institution working according to definite interests protected from the historical and temporal dimensions of life and thereby controlling the production of art. The constituted ideal space of the institution conceals the effects of the spatial/temporal matrix and thereby serves the function of ratifying or instituting, as an eternal value, an otherwise arbitrary sensibility. This in turn, legitimates and promotes the status of a specific set of social and artistic values claimed by that specific sensibility, i.e. a particular type of existent. This of course does not concern the overt exercise of political power. 'Exclusiveness' is embedded in the framework itself and is not just the perrogative of certain members of the accreditation group but the presentation group itself, i.e. persons whose role entails decision making powers.

In point of fact, Dickie nowhere claims that a description of an institutional framework is sufficient for an object's being art. It is, of course,
one of two necessary conditions, the other being the 'artifactual condition'. This condition, we have seen, does not add anything to an institutional account. Dickie argues only for its necessity on the basis of a description of how we recognize what in fact we already take to be art. The principle can be stated in this form: A minimal action must have been performed on some object, if it is to be identified as art. Now the principle of artifactuality is developed in a context in which the artifactual 'condition is cited as an argument against a definable essence in art. In this context, Dickie is looking for an essential definition in the artistic framework. Thus 'artifactuality' does not depend on the agreed acceptance framework or cognitive structure of the institutional argument whose purpose, it would follow, is to show how artifactuality is, in fact, achieved. Accreditation affects the form and content of the work, for presentation involves the work in its totality. An existent entity is always presented through the institution. It is the linguistic usage argument that claims the relevance of 'artifactuality' in the definition of art and not the institutional approach.

Thus the idea of crafting defines a limit for Dickie, that is the minimal condition of medium manipulation that is necessary in any definition of art. Dickie's Institutional Theory, however, does not strictly imply any one particular suggestion of limitation. The question then becomes: what sort of artifactuality is directly implied in the institutional nature of art? I believe it is much close to Binkley's thesis that the institutional view does not favor any particular limit in any particular respect. But let us notice that the disagreement is nonetheless, over what acceptable limiting condition will count as 'crafting'; what 'medium' can mean in the institutional context and not whether these two features are relevant or not.
Chapter 2

The Contemporaneity of Aesthetic Theory

Section a) The Relevance of Interpretation for Theory

In chapter 1 the suggestion was made that our critical approach towards a work of art is in some sense already given for us insofar as the object is accredited within the presentation group according to certain historical and institutional conventions. If the aesthetic difference amounts to certain motivations, purposes, rather than a consciously selected attitude, then what is the nature of the philosophical apparatus or structure (i.e., semantic, syntactic relations etc.) that defines a presentation group functioning within an institution? Are these structures cognitive or translatable and universal functions of language-use as such, or are they mythic and coded messages specific to and a function of a particular categorization of the 'world' by one historically situated linguistic system? How is an artifact specifically presented? And what features would the artworld system share with the construction of more rational or theoretical argumentation? In this chapter we will examine some of these issues - in particular the ontological import of concepts of identity and interpretation, and the strategies that characterize reference or the predication of aesthetic terms within a symbol system. Further, if the aesthetic quality is a function of the artwork's historical identity, then access to that history, or rather determination thereof, is only possible through a pre-condition that will be defined as the
'contemporaneity of theory' - by this I mean the perpetual reflexivity of theory.

In *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (1) Arthur Danto argues two relevant claims; 1 - that the objects in the 'world' are intentional or meaningful for a representation (in particular artistic ones) necessitates an interpretation, and 2 - that a certain criteria is needed to distinguish aesthetic from non-aesthetic interpretations. The strategy is essentially a linguistic one in which a representation is an interpretation. We will explore both these claims to show that an ontological distinction as Danto has described it is not only necessary but has a particular strategic function that suggests that Danto's historical intentionalism may not be necessary.

It is Danto's belief that the predication of aesthetic terms and 'arthood' itself is embedded in the language of art. This is in effect an ontological problem that deals with a system required for the ordering and classification of the objects in our experience as well as their status and identification. Through an analysis of the logic of artistic identification, Danto hopes to establish the necessity of the linguistic constitution of art objects, in terms of a predication within the linguistic boundary of the artworld. This involves something more than a mere description of an object.

This 'something more' is not defined in terms of a substantial or material entity, nor as a phenomenal aspect of traditional ontology. Rather, Danto is interested in drawing our attention to the historical presuppositions of art production that are elucidated through an interpretive narration of a definitive structure. The reason is simple: "To see the painting in these terms, if one had not so seen it before, works to transform the entire composition, to pull it into a different shape and hence to constitute it a different work than it would have been without benefit of interpretation."(2)
Interpretation involves two features that identify an object a art. First, the structure of the painting is a function of identifying an organizing centre. This identification is dependent upon the interpretative and conceptual information needed to identify 'significant' elements. The second feature involves the structural relations of the interpretation. The elements are read together and integrated at once in terms of contrasting connections and structured relations. As an artwork, therefore, the object will be necessarily structured in some way. To identify its significance will be to interpret it. The interpretation has a semantic function insofar as a narrative structure is presupposed in the interpretation of the elements. This, I believe, is what Danto has in mind when he speaks of a theoretical implication in a work of art: "To interpret a work is to offer of theory as to what the work is about, what its subject is."(3)

Further, the artistic theory must be consistent with what was historically and culturally possible in order for a work to have a semantic meaning, to be about something. These historical conditions will govern what a work can be legitimately and conceivably about in terms of what artistic theory could have been possible at that time. Thus a limit on a theory is also prescribed here: The cognitive of philosophical apparatus available to interpret a work should conform as closely as possible to this historical condition.

The subject, or that concerning which the work is about is never arbitrarily chosen and consequently represents a system of values. In Danto's analysis of Brughel's painting The Fall of Icarus, for example, interpretation is a transforming function and therefore is so theory-laden that a neutral description is impossible. "And the structure of the work,
the system of artistic identifications, undergoes transformation in accordance with differences in interpretation."(4)

A description assumes a system of interpretation, a narrative structure, that organizes elements and their interrelations. The interpretation functions as a theoretical model which constitutes the work in a description that identifies the text. The work is achieved immediately or mediately, in representational or non-representational works, by means of its interpretation. The status of the work is conceptual or cognitive precisely because of the necessity of knowing, as an antecedent feature of our responsiveness, that the object is art. The art-historical presuppositions are the determining factors of the theory and necessitates a value-laden description, for the work is differentiated according to its authorial and historical context. "To seek a neutral description is to see the work as a thing and hence not as an artwork: it is analytic to the concept of an artwork that there has to be an interpretation."(5) This difference is ontological in that the identity is constituted linguistically or cognitively and not sufficiently by means of a text alone.

It is important for further discussion to clarify at this point the two functions that have been dealt with rather loosely. First, the narrative structure, through integrating and identifying the elements, tells us what the work is about. It does not tell us that 'x is a work of art'. The semantic function operates at this level. Secondly, to say interpretation must be consistent with the art-historical presuppositions for a possible artistic theory, is to identify 'x as a work of art'. This is the identification function. Since the narrative must be consistent with the possibility suggested by the atmosphere of artistic theory, the semantic function presupposes the fulfillment of the identification function. In other words, the
concept of art is not only made available, but has in fact achieved its goal in order that an object be seen as instantaneously and artistically significant, as subject to an artistic interpretation. This, I believe, is what Danto had in mind when he wrote with reference to Hogarth's engravings, "...So they have the power of texts. But so has any picture or for that matter artistic work which we may in fact think we are looking at rather than reading. In such cases, we read as we look because we interpret as we see."(6)

Granting that a description is value-laden and the subject is not arbitrarily chosen, Danto still does not appear to consider that whatever theory organizing a concept of art is available, the very significance of art historical presuppositions is presented through it as it narrates the work. Not only does this determine the concept of art for future practice, but the identification function, which cannot be guaranteed and through which the concept of art informs our selection, influences the semantic function by determining the significance of specific objects from contemporary concerns. In other words, there are no art-historical presuppositions without a theory since the representational quality of the work is identified through its contemporary presentation.

Interpretation is governed by historical/theoretical limits of a particular culture. Complications arise when the narrative or semantic value is subject to the interpreter's philosophical limits or presentation of an argument. To set the interpretive limits of the work according to the knowledge and belief outlined in those original historical concerns, is to fail to consider the historical and cultural conditions of the reader's narrative as a distorting or developing function of those initial interests. Thus interpretation is
necessary in the constitution of a theory, not as Danto thinks, but rather as a continuous displacement of fact by theory.

It is a logic of artistic identification and its linguistic stability that is fundamentally at issue here. Danto claims the 'is' of artistic identification is to be understood in terms of its use according to certain constraints on identify and classification. Of two indiscernible predicative sentences, one is a tautology and one is an artworld statement of identity according to a variety of contextual factors, i.e. an artworld atmosphere of artistic theories and art-history. Even the olefactory artist, the 'physicalist of pigment', has made an artistic identification, for his denial of theory is itself relative to an artistic presupposition.

This suggests that the ontological difference is fundamentally embodied in language insofar as there is an 'internal connection' between object status a its identifying language," inasmuch as nothing is an artwork without an interpretation that constitutes it as such."(7) The particularity of an art theory, then, as a limiting factor to interpretation, raises objects into a world of interpreted things'. And more to the point Danto writes: "But it is plain that there could not be an artworld without theory, for the artworld is logically dependent upon theory."(8) But even accepting the concept of linguistic stability over cultural and historical divergence in principle, we would still require a separate argument to support bridging that gap between contemporary theoretical interest and the determination of once operative socio-cultural conditions.

Why accept Danto's historical intentionalism when the identity of the artwork is presented through a constituting theory? How do we know the relevant art-historical presuppositions except through various artifacts and our interpretive structure? How can the artist's possible world view serve
us as a constraint on our interpretation when the conception of what was possible is itself an interpretation, governed by the interpreter's agreement or belief, by a context closed off in contemporary concerns? This circularity must be encompassed in any explanation for its subverts any attempt at a descriptive process outside this system. For this reason, a straightforward cognitive account (i.e. non-institutional) based on an analysis of the logic of the art language, if meant to supply a definition of art, must include this process of circular description – a situation that Dickie approaches with his 'inflected' definition of the art institution as that arching-space of system and event. Danto almost exclusively defines art in terms of understanding its historical context. He does not consider the effect of the present discourse, nor any future projection as a responsibility of art.

The second claim of Danto's semantic or linguistic theory concerns two perceptually indiscernible counterparts. Take any two objects which possess a perceptual resemblance and identical content and material. What makes one a work of art and the other a mere real thing? The difference is not one of content in the sense of possessing perceptually discernible properties, but the way the "...content's presented in relation to the content itself."(9) When a medium is used artistically to make a point about the way the content is presented in relation to that content itself, the content of the work is not thereby 'expressed', but a point is made in showing something about that content. The idiom of representation is used in such a way that whatever the representation is about, it is not exhausted in this function. Danto generalizes this thesis:

The thesis is that works of art, in categorical contrast with mere representations, use the means of representation in a way that is not exhaustively specified when one has exhaustively specified what is being represented.(10)
In summary: for Danto, the ontological difference is constituted through language whose constraints are the appropriate historical presuppositions of a possible world view. The transforming power of aesthetic predication peculiar to the linguistic system of the artworld means 1) that representation is necessarily a theoretical interpretation and 2) that artistic representation is aesthetic predication of terms whose logic dictates a reference not to content or matter but the work itself by expressing something that content—a particular coloration of reality is expressed in the work. A style through which the artist beheld the world is presented for us.

Now the identification of an artwork is made possible by the ontological difference effected through the linguistic system of the artworld. That the differentiation presupposes a theory of interpretation, seems to argue for the necessity of a theory in which art is ontological possible, i.e., its intelligibility is possible only in terms of a theory of classification and ordering of its elements. This circularity of the definition is one of the reasons why B.R. Tilghman has argued against an ontology as the constituting means of art objects. As Tilghman does not have an interest in a theoretical deductive or inductive argument for a definition of art, he does not believe that an ontological argument can be justified. For him, the issue concerning the making and appreciation of art is a purely practical one.

Tilghman's philosophical concern is with the individuation of the text. Danto argued that a text is individuated and identified through a description. This implies that there are as many texts as descriptions. Tilghman believes the text is identified with itself but variously described through different interpretations. The problem, then, for Tilghman, is to gather evidence for textual identity that is not itself already a description. In his
book But is it Art?(11), Tilghman does not so much argue for this position as that the artworld is a non-cognitive undertaking since there are no theoretical presuppositions that are constitutive of the text and that serve to individuate it in a description. The artworld is the familiar background against which the work is described and evaluated. This, then, is Tilghman's view and the argument is roughly as follows.

Danto's notion of the 'ontological difference' lacks sense as it does not take into account the circumstances and contexts, the different uses of 'art', that give sense to the question. It does not specify a use for the word 'art' as distinct from a real thing. Equally, 'real thing' has no unequivocal descriptive force. It is a technical term in Danto's philosophy of art and cannot rely on a well established linguistic usage. Nor does Danto give clear instructions on the place this expression occupies in his work. Tilghman points out that being perceptually indistinguishable can only serve as a criterion if we grant the assumption that the controversial cases are works of art. In fact, the ontological question itself arises only because Danto assumes that conceptual art is indeed art. Similarly, as Tilghman can find no relevant historical information or logical reason to grant this status, the ontological question cannot arise.

In searching for a meaning for a 'mere real thing', Tilghman ties this notion to similar ideas that function in the same way Danto's philosophy; that is, as a way of misunderstanding works of art, of using the term inappropriately. Tilghman's interest in this issue is primarily concerned with the possibility of a neutral description, a 'mere real thing' being one of those things that differ from artworks by being a theory-free description underlining an interpretation.
The thesis that all artistically relevant descriptions are interpretations requires that there is something that is interpreted and is identified under a description that differs from the interpretation.\(^{(12)}\)

It is unintelligible to define the 'real thing' in a representational painting as the dab of paint which in the case of Breugel's *The Fall of Icarus*, can be interpreted as Icarus' legs. There was never any question of ambiguity over that neutral object. But it is doubtful that this objection undermines Danto's view that interpretations are value laden and thereby proving the impossibility of an ontological solution. It does, however, point to the fact that an account of a representation theory is sufficient without recourse to the concept of 'real thing'. In order to impute sense to a word, to signify something, it may not be necessary to relate an interpretation to a value neutral description. It is sufficient that other interpretive systems, or signification process in which signs are linked, be available as constraints to a particular type of representation. It may be that artistic representations function uniquely as against non-aesthetic representations.

A related issue on Tilghman's view is that Danto has not specified a context that will make sense of the ontological question. Instead, taking the artwork as a context-independent subject generates a problem concerning the identity of the art object the solution of which is then sought in a definition or theory. The suggestion that our puzzlement over a work of art can be relieved by theoretical considerations assumes the intelligibility of those theories and definitions, and therefore misconstrues the nature of the problem which is in fact a practical one. These practical difficulties make the ontological question appear as a legitimate concern.

Tilghman's argument revolves around his general assessment of Danto's view.
Danto is then asking us to imagine a world in which all our notions about art, and I think, perforce, all our notions about everything else, are turned upside down and I frankly submit we have no notion of what we are being asked to imagine.(13)

While Tilghman admits the possibility of the emergence of a novel contingency without an established contextual grammar, we could not sort our a correct use of the relevant linguistic term in a description. An introduction of a "...new set of moves into the language game,..."(14) would be forthcoming. The real problem, however, appears to be simply that certain non-aesthetic 'works of art' do to and cannot conform to our expectations because the aesthetic tradition has been challenged and declared irrelevant. Because of this denial, Duchamps' Fountain for example, cannot be assumed to be art, it must prove itself or show in what relevant way it can be appreciated. This burden of proof, however, seems to be misplaced. Appreciation on Tilghman's view is possible only in terms of a set of historically pre-determined aesthetic qualities. A successful proof will meet such a test, but there is no clear suggestion concerning what is to be done with those cases where the predication of the term 'art' to objects challenges the accepted predication of the term 'aesthetic'. Danto is surely right to say before we approach a work of art, the concept of art has been made available.

We need to understand the brief miniaturist expressionist pieces of Anton Webern as art before we can understand or relate them to the traditional material of musical composition. The fact that Webern does deal with the perennial question of dissonance, no matter how unconventional, his approach and resolution to dissonant clashes through wide linear leaps can only be appreciated if we first accept the work as musical art. Appreciation is predicated on a boundless frontier and is preceded by an equally boundless concept of art.
Unless some room is made for these cases, not accepting an object as art, under these conditions, seems an arbitrary move to restrict the concept. Some provision must be made to include a dynamic play between these two concepts which is not possible in terms of expectations. In fact, Tilghman's theoretical viewpoint appears not to allow puzzles, originating from a genuine artistic experience, to arise. It is not a question of proof but a acceptance, then the way is open to the conclusion that an art object is simply done or specified according to what is acceptable within cultural conventions.

A contextually dependent object on Tilghman's view is so embedded in circumstance, familiarity and acquaintance that in thinking about the object the grammar of our conceptual thought has already given it a certain concreteness. We implicitly treat the object in a defining way and hence identify it according to the interests and needs of a particular context; according to the use for which or for whom the words are put. It is because only certain questions will arise and others will be excluded, that Tilghman believes that 'a priori' a transfiguration cannot take place. Stated simply, certain conditions will project and resolve certain concerns. An accident and an illusion are not involved in any perceptually indistinguishable question but their difference is sufficiently explained by uncovering that grammar of the identifying term. The identity of the mark is understood by its use in context. The difference between [4'33" and any other] 4'33" of silence, while not perceptually distinguishable, can nonetheless be explained by simply 'looking' harder at the relevant part of language that is being used, at that grammar which is sufficient to account for a difference embedded in context. An inquiry into how the term is being used in this context will determine the difference in our knowledge of these two events. The
surroundings determine the character of the action in that instance, that
gives sense to them.

The ontological question arises only when we ignore the conditions of
application of the word art, the context in which the thing or property
figures. They are determined contextually by seeking to discover in the
context the reason for the significance of the determination. Its relevance is
its human purpose. The treat 'x' as an object in a certain way is to specify
conditions for the application of that term through the use or treatment in a
certain context.

The relevant question for Tilghman is a practical one: What must be
done to appreciate the particular work? What historical or cultural con-
nections, what reactions are relevant to an aesthetic judgement or criticism?
Artistic identification involves the practical problem of positioning oneself in
a proper context to understand, criticize and appreciate the work in appro-
priate ways. This can only be achieved in term of an aesthetic character
with which we have been well acquainted through our aesthetic experience.
We do in fact accept a wide field of characteristics of art. A problem arises
when we are informed by the artworld that the 'aesthetic character' is irrele-
vant. In such cases we cannot locate on the basis of past experience any
aesthetic property different from those of real things.

Now Tilghman argued that this contextual character is necessary to give
sense to our use of the term 'artwork'. He also claims that only a minimal
theory is necessary and sufficient to support this previous claim - a general
direction to specify context rather than a set of necessary conditions. If
so, then, what is this 'aesthetic' character and how do we know that it is at
all relevant to the predication of 'arthood' without a theory accounting for
the relation of the two concepts, artistic and aesthetic? Lacking an answer
to this question, we need not accept that the concept of art is exhausted through the predication of aesthetic attributes and that the latter is not a historically or culturally rooted identification of art. If the range of what counts as art objects is also historically and culturally determined, then the art object need not be monopolized by the predication of any one set of aesthetic properties. As noted above, it seems reasonable to suggest a historical play between these two elements.

Danto is merely responding to this conceptual shift in a genuinely artistic way, by attempting to think about art in terms of the frame of reference of modern art. But this is not necessarily to assume that conceptual art is art. He writes: "It is not just that appreciation is a function of the cognitive location of the aesthetic, but that the aesthetic qualities of the work are a function of their own historical identity."(15) But again, at this point, we reach the dislocating effect of the contemporaneity of our theory, of a positive accounting of a previous history when such an account is already effected by such a history.

Section B) Reference as Strategic Myth or Cognitive Structure?

Does this notion of the contemporaneity of theory present only a practical challenge on the issue of historical identity, or is it a symptom of a deeper problem? In this section we explore this issue as a theoretical challenge to identity itself or the association of labels and their reference.

To the question: 'Is the art object to be identified with the physical object?' Nelson Goodman answers that the same physical object can perform different functions in different situations. On the one hand this is an objection to Danto's Ontological argument in that there is no need to
distinguish a difference in the status between the aesthetic object and the physical object in terms of an interpretation. Goodman can then bypass the complications of a non-arbitrary historical limit to interpretation and the distance between a theory and its reference since the identity of an artwork can be sought in a present predication of a term in a symbolic system. Any event can be described within a system. By beginning with this referential act, Goodman avoids the issue of an interpretation within a description. However, on the other hand, Goodman differs in every way from Tilghman insofar as Goodman's argument against a distinction is based on his ingenious concept of 'Reference', which is used to maintain the cognitive status of the arts by supporting the notion of symbolic function.

What is appealing in Goodman's argument is that he accomplishes this evaluative task without relying upon pre-established assumptions and absolutes concerning aesthetic merit. He would accept, therefore, a separation of the aesthetic predicate and the concept of art and maintain a through-going cultural and historical pluralism concerning the cognitive import of these two ideas. Here he differs from Tilghman by accepting the validity of conceptual or modern art, while at the same time taking a position still different from Danto by arguing that 'Ontology' and an interpretation theory lack precision.

Goodman begins his work by grounding a conceptual network on the fundamental notion of a referential function of symbolic systems, and arguing that this function is not exhausted through denotation. He then presents a general theory of representation that is not just about art but the way the world is described, depicted, etc. In this framework representation is a form of reference.
Now the fundamental category of reference is composed of two sub-classes. The first is denotation: A semantic relation between a symbol and its actual object. A predicate denotes, applies to or refers to its subject matter. Goodman draws our attention to the similarity of a relation between verbal description, in which a label or predicate is applied to an event, and depiction, in which a picture stands for whatever it expresses. This distinction is a generic relation stressing important affinities as well as differences among its members, verbal description and depiction or pictorial representation.

The second sub-class is the converse of denotation and the key term there is 'Exemplification'. This term has as its chief intention to enable non-representational works of art to function referentially while accepting their evident lack of denotative capacity. In Languages of Art(16), exemplification is introduced to make sense of the peculiar symbolic or referential cognitive habits of expression. While denotation has a reference, the metaphorical expression of a certain property possessed by the work of art does not refer to anything.

Exemplification is a mode of symbolization and functions like a sample in 'showing forth' certain of its properties that it both has and refers to a tailor's swatch of cloth, for example, functions as a sample of only those properties relevant to the circumstances of concern. The swatch instantiates a number of predicates from wool-textured to rectangular-shaped, but only some are relevant, given a concern to purchase a suit of clothing. Only under such conditions is a relevant property distinguished by a sample. Margolis(17) argued that either such a context is sufficient, proving a work possesses or instantiates a property without exemplification or exemplification is a necessary feature. Accepting that exemplification is a form of reference
and that an object exemplifies some of its properties, Margolis urges Goodman to provide an argument as to why on this account exemplification is only a common feature. "Why does an object construed as a work of art exemplify properties that it possesses?"(18) A simpler solution presupposed in Goodman's own definition is, "...the intentional concern of a viewer to use or treat the object, with whatever properties it possesses, in some further 'external' respect (properly so characterized) - as for instance as a teaching critic."(19) Only possession is on this view necessary.

Goodman replies that relevant aesthetic properties are distinguished by reference to them and, "...reference to a literally possessed property constitutes exemplification."(20) Rhythmic structure, melodic contour, for example, are properties a musical work has in a way different than the time and place of its performance. It literally possesses the former and refers to them.

On Goodman's view an object may function as a work of art at certain times and not others since theory and practice are mutually revisionary. Goodman maintains that not everything that functions symbolically is art. Rather than being concerned with criteria for knowing what art is, aesthetic symbolic functioning is characterized according to 'when' certain symptoms of the aesthetic, that amount to density, significance or repleteness, by means of complex or multiple reference are relevant to an understanding.

This suggests that it is possible to mark the distinction between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic in terms that leave the future unconstrained by necessary and sufficient conditions, by describing a common feature rather than a universal one. Exemplification (and not denotation) is a symptom because, in a most interesting way, it differentiates literary from non-literary writing. An artwork that exemplifies will show those properties
in a significant way. Again rhythmic structure, metric pulse and melodic contour, matter in a work of art in ways that are irrelevant in practical experience. Thus while being a inexhaustible statement of symptoms, in that no one item need always be present in the aesthetic, exemplification still pertains directly to what works of art do or are like.

Exemplification is a relation between a sample and a label. Labels can be predicates in a linguistic system or symbols in a different non-linguistic system. Predicates are exemplified but exemplification does not depend on language, since labels are characteristically verbal only within a linguistic symbolization system. Being a sample or exemplification is a species of reference; a symbolic relation between the picture and certain of its properties. Non-representational works are therefore referential. Though they do not depict, they stand for those properties that they exemplify.

I will quote Goodman at length from Languages of Art where he clearly distinguishes exemplification from denotation.

The difference amounts to this: for a word, say, to denote red things requires nothing more than letting it refer them; but for my green sweater to exemplify a predicate, letting the sweater refer to that predicate is not enough. The sweater must also be denoted by that predicate; that is, I must also let the predicate refer to the sweater. The constraint upon exemplification as compared to denotation derives from the status of exemplification as a subrelation of the converse of denotation, from the fact that denotation implies reference between two elements in one direction while exemplification implies reference between the two in both directions. (21)

For the predicate green to refer to the sweater we must have some sort of agreement on the application of predicate to sweater, it must rightly fit the sweater. Such a relation, if not exemplification itself, is semantically strong in a way that denotation is not for, as Goodman has pointed out, any
label can denote anything but only a relevant property can be a relevant sample.

It is through the concept of 'labelling' that we can grasp this notion of a change in the direction of orientation. We have said that to denote is to apply or refer a predicate to an occurrence in a description. Predicates are labels which depend for their orientation on the system of symbolization. The direction of predication for these labels is from label to labelled event. Exemplification is also essentially of labels, both verbal and non-verbal, but while being referential it is non-denotational. While the orientation of certain kinds of predicate labels is determined by correlation with language, in the case of non-verbal labels, gestures and signs, as characters in a non-linguistic symbolic system, a difference in direction between denotation and exemplification can be noted. The type of orientation of label and event is more of a duality, a rhythmic vacillation, a reference between two terms in both directions. Exemplification uses labels selectively, writes Goodman in Of Minds and Other Matters, "...obtaining only between the symbol and some but not other of the labels denoting it or properties possessed by it. Exemplification is not mere possession of a feature but requires also reference to that feature; such reference is what distinguishes the exemplified from the merely possessed features."(22)

In reversing the direction of denotation, that to which the label applies, refers back to the label. We said that the tailor's swatch instantiates different predicates, but it is only a sample of some of them and it is this reversal of direction that accounts for the difference. What is the nature of the relation between the swatch and those possessed features of which it stands as a sample?
Catherine Elgin, in her recent work *With Reference to Reference* answers that a sample is a symbol for a label it instantiates. "If it refers to that label and thereby acts as a representation of the stuff to which the label applies."(23) The swatch, then, is a sample of any label it both instantiates and refers to. The swatch instantiates wool-textured and rectangular-shaped, but it is a sample only of the former, since it refers only to 'wool-textured', given, our relevant concern to purchase a suit (the field, or stuff, in which the predicate applies) and the consequent function of the swatch sample in this symbol system. Thus, "Exemplification is possession plus reference"(24) means exemplification refers to and instantiates that label. In *Ways of Worldmaking* Goodman elaborates that relevant properties "...are those that the picture makes manifest, selects, focuses upon, exhibits, heightens in our consciousness – those that it shows forth – in short, those properties that it does not merely possess but exemplifies, stands as a sample of."(25)

It appears, then, that references is a fundamental category that need not be defined. To say it functions in all cases of standing for, requires some clarification in terms of the concept of 'cognition'. On Goodman's view, cognition is guaranteed through the reference of an 'a to b' in a symbol system. Reference, then, is the fundamental concept in aesthetic awareness in order that the arts can maintain their status as cognitive, understood rather than appreciated. Since a symbolic function can fulfill the intelligibility requirements of reference, there is no need to distinguish the physical object from the aesthetic object – no ontological difference is needed – in order to explain the identity of art.

But it is the undefinable nature of the concept of reference that leads to a more fundamental philosophical puzzle: What evidence is there to
suggest that a model theory-a has successfully captured a distinct event-b? By this I mean something similar to P. Ricoeur's criticism that there is still a hint of those very verificationist presuppositions that Goodman has otherwise so ingeniously avoided.

Ricoeur understands Goodman to be suggesting that the question of the truth of categorical systems is itself excluded as a question of their own justification or meaning. Rather, such appraisals involve criteria of 'rightness or fitness' (a sense of appropriateness previous to predication) concerning what sort of work the system can perform and in this sense the referential function by including non-verbal versions encompasses denotation. Just as truth, then, is a species of rightness predicated upon the acceptance of the systems, statements belonging to a linguistic system are only part of the criteria of rightness. They are true when they fit with our experience that is always and already but non-reflectively understood through a symbol system.

The problem, in Ricoeur's own words, is that the duality of rightness—truth seem, "...to be a residue of the philosophy that the author condemns, i.e. the reduction to denotation and to statements," and further, "...does he (Goodman) not remain captive of a verificationist (or falsificationist) prejudice that his whole philosophy of symbolic forms denies?"(26) Ricoeur raises a question that I would like to pursue, that is: why limit the meaning of 'true' to a denotational function?

On Ricoeur's part, he claims to have uncovered a dimension which can account for the thrust of Goodman's work. "What then compels Goodman to preserve reference at all costs, if not a dimension of experience entailed in the term 'world' that he has not considered?"(27) That dimension is a phenomenological sense of the world or 'world-view', an otherness that is
associated with "...the intentionality constitutive of the referentiality of symbols."(28) There is a sort of opacity, a sense of inexhaustibility of the world - a world-horizon that suggests versions - that accounts for attempts by artists to continually re-make or create versions of the world 'again and again'. Ricoeur is quick to point out that his view is not an absolute one positing a neutral but unknown object apart from all versions. What I take from this discussion is the challenge to bridge this separation between label and occurrence, or theory-a and event-b. How can this be done?

Essentially, it is the obvious 'matter-of-factness' associated with the 'fitness' of event-b that must be questioned. As Fuller has pointed out (29), having constructed a model-a of b or determined a set of authorial or cultural intentions, the explanatory adequacy of model-a is dependent on the methods at hand. There is no guarantee in any of this that we have non-interpreted evidence that properly selects those intentions.

Just as in the presentation of a theory, a proof or construction of b or -b can be determined by an ingenious arbitration of the facts, so with the identity of the text in which, "...virtually any interpretation can be shown to be valid simply by a careful adjudication of which passages are more 'significant' in accordance with which the rest of the text is most 'fruitfully' read".(30)

There are simply too many arbitrary ad hoc features, to many figures, literary devices, whose effect cannot be diminished, through which the 'cognitive apparatus' seeks to gain a foothold on the legitimation and propriety of truth or rightness itself. There are too many accidents to accept that cognition is such an ordered and therefore valuable and neutral enterprise by a speaker in control of rationality and linguistic use - that grasps what is the case without a valorization of a fact co-incidental with its
statement in a system. To be sure, Goodman has always sought to clarify the notion of self misunderstanding in scientific inquiry. That is, the ways and means in which a proposed explanatory theory, once confronted with counter-theory evidence, is then deeply re-assessed in order to accept what was originally unacceptable, and in so doing posits counterfactual conditions to satisfy that theory. Thus, not only do we offer an interpretation or theory-a to account for fact-b, or label-a for reference-b, but we interpret the response itself according to ad hoc or post hoc procedures, narrative construction, etc., thereby actually subordinating one interpretation-a to another interpretation-b. It is our belief that such a reflexive relationship undermines the concept of 'reference'.

Fuller claims it would be a tautology or an obvious trivialization of a text to reduce it to its relation to the historical and cultural conventions on writing operative at the time. Equally a reading of the text concerned with the idealized world of the counterfactual conditionals, of the ways in which a text is revised to square with the intuition, would lack determinate meaning. "Instead", writes Fuller, "the text's significance lies in how the contrary pulls of triviality and meaninglessness are rhetorically negotiated by the author, as reflected in his style of writing, which ideally gets the reader to conclude that he has read something (...) that is significantly different from, and more illuminating that other texts (...) that he might compare with it."(31)

The point here is that if we cannot accept a literal or non-literal referential system, the concept of cognition seems to be left without a solid grounding. Our alternative is to like at the particular justificatory strategy through which an interpretation is presented, whether scientific or aesthetic. Such a strategy would clarify the function of this fundamental referential category as well as the mode of presentation that characterizes a theory. I
am inclined to agree with Fuller's position that this category functions more properly as a language-bound myth rather than a 'universal cognition'. Myths are those controlling features of language that negotiate the potential for falsification by banning such contradictions to the periphery of the experiment in an unconscious but deliberate manner. Thus the received theory, through implicit agreement, is accepted as authoritative insofar as it appears to selectively issue and valorize experimental directives on the one hand without permitting alternatives as rational considerations on the other. By these means the interpretation or identity of the representation can be foreclosed. A mediated resolution to a conflict masks this confrontation between intuition and accepted aesthetic conventions, and is rather productive of myth than genuine cognition.

Lastly, Fuller sums up his position:

A successful theory is a myth in that it gives the scientist the false impression that he has more cognitive control over the world than he really has, while a successful work of art is a myth in that it gives the reader the false impression that the artist has more freedom of expression than he actually has. Thus the myth by successfully falsifying its own history thereby suppresses these 'points of conflict'.(32)

Labels are a useful shorthand version of the world but they do not always reasonably capture the event that eludes them through the reflexive activity of recovery. And in an interesting way, perhaps we need not have recourse to 'reality' at all. Understanding need not have a basis in 'reality' as long as the two parties believe they are speaking to the same issue. The interruption of the system of discourse would force such a realization and a conceptual restructuring as a way back to communication. In this sense the failure of discourse constitutes our contact with 'reality', whereas resolution restores the myth of communication.
To conclude, a representation is rather more like a presentational myth - the parameters of acceptability - in its inability to guarantee any context while obscuring the conflict. In the same way Danto's justification for his claim of a historical limit to interpretation by means of a theory, appears to be an ad hoc procedure that cannot guarantee that the interpretive function captures the historical event, given the dislocation of contemporary theory. On the other hand, to accept Tilghman's view that grammar or linguistic use is sufficient, overlooks Goodman's suggestion, that practice is always informed, as it is the symbol system that provides the context for grammatical form, for that version of the world in which words are used.

But our more pressing concern that will be developed in the following chapter, is that reference appears to be undermined by an underlying strategy that implies an equal reversal in the direction of predication of labels, or of theory to event. Aesthetic predicates, then, are fluid and ambiguous, partly subject to the formulation of a contemporary approach that itself is a development predicated upon the previous attribution of such predicates.
Chapter 3

Immanence and Absence of Meaning:
A Musical Analogy

Section A) The Logic and Structure of Musical Terms

From the previous chapter we conclude that the attempt to establish the concept of reference as a fundamental category and its accompanying definition of an artwork as a physical object subject to a specific symbolic function, is replaced, in theoretical as well as critical argumentation, by the circular notion of a justificatory strategy. Interpretation is thus faced with this strategy, of the contemporaneity of theoretical viewpoints as already effected by its own preceding history. We noticed as well that a certain dislocation of our understanding with respect to its original event occurs. In this present chapter we will consider an explanation of this position of dislocation in terms of the conceptual relations involved within our framework. This will eventually intrude upon the semiotic discussion concerning the inseparability of semantic and syntactic structures. For, since we accepted the necessity of theory within interpretation, we cannot accept an 'uninterpreted sign'. We will therefore advance a semiotic theory in support of our position on interpretation. The notion of an 'uninterpreted sign'
promotes the priority of syntax over semantics that, as such, does not organize an interpretation - i.e., effect the semantic import through a foreclosure. This, of course, has implications for the notion of reference, the naming-function of language, and the constitution of a transcendental subjectivity that formalizes time.

With particular reference to music, we want to show in what way temporality is implied in the linguistic function of 'retro-diction', that is a reading backwards, a summation that embodies meaning. How can we account for simultaneous relations of succeeding events in an account of musical meaning as a passage through time?

Insofar as meaning is interested and purposeful, a conception of musical meaning as an innate logic of 'audible terms' in natural progression, independent of an attitude-response, would not be possible. Fredrick Taylor (1) has challenged the former assumption of a conditioned response, contending that "...meaning and value in music are greatly determined by certain universal and necessary properties..."(2), that these properties are necessary in any appreciation and comprehension of a musical work and that only through an "...examination of the logic of music..."(3) can we properly gain an adequate understanding of this musical fact. How, then, does a succession of abstract tones become meaningful in itself?

Musical logic is stipulated as a set of rule-governed relations between terms in which meaning is generated according to these relations. Two rules of inference are given, 1) affective resolution of expectation, and 2) similarity of structure or sound segment, in which the consequent as a derivation of the antecedent accounts for meaning in music. 'General' and 'particular' axioms are defined as a sound segment which is not a derivation, and applies to either general stylistic conventions or textual material of the
particular musical work. Taylor claims that similarity rules of inference based on particular axioms have a priority over other modes of derivation, thereby proving the context independent nature of similarity derivations.

The argument for this position is the claim that consistency and ambiguity, two essential properties of music, can only be experienced as unifying on the grounds of the similarity relation. Derivations by expectation can never unify a random collection of musical segments, or that which is not in itself logically unified. Repeated hearings would produce a tensionless and musically meaningless succession of sounds whose only unifying order would be the product of the process of memorization. Expectation would either be non-existent or immediately resolved. In either case it would be meaningless. "This leads us to conclude that a sufficient number of derivations by similarity is necessary for consistency."(4) The necessity of a sufficiently strong logic will also guarantee an interpretive openness in which "...the content or interpretation of a work's sound segments may vary among listeners, the relation between these sound segments will not."(5)

Ambiguity, then, as a relation between sound segments can be adequately explained in terms of musical logic and similarity of derivation. In order to question the significance of a passage, an underlying and sustaining logical retention of the original event must be maintained. A constant relating of the past to the present is implied, otherwise a 'deviation' would become a simple directionless alteration.

Derivations by similarity are essential as they provide for the logical and comprehensible relations which ambiguous segments must retain. We must thus conclude that not only consistency but ambiguity demands derivations by similarity and that because these derivations are obviously not something learned, understanding music is always more than acquiring the right habits or being appropriately conditioned.(6)
It is difficult to accept Taylor's position. How, without a theory or at least knowledge of general axioms and consequent lack of derivations of expectation, can a work be unified on the basis of audible similarity derivations inferred from its particular axiom on the grounds that "... derivations by similarity are innately perceived,..."(7)? When a similarity is posited between two terms, it is done so by reference to a third relational term. A triadic relationship is assumed in which 'A' is similar to 'B' with respect to a significantly constituted middle term 'C'. If the problem was simply to draw our attention to this middle term, Taylor would indeed succeed insofar as he has explicitly defined the limits of this third term as a similarity of rhythmic, thematic or harmonic material. Taylor understands this third term as a logical substratum. However, the interesting problem is to explain the structure of a similarity in which diverse thematic material, for example, can be recognized as participating in a common identity. The recognition of similarity is possible in the context of some theoretical conjunction relating and signifying relevant sequential events, since the positional logic of analysis is posited within a polarity of identity and difference. Further, such structural polarity is subject to historical transformation. All of this is missed unless our model includes some structural features functioning as principles of conceptual organization and not as axioms and inferences of a musical logic. This would explain the fact that the significance of the middle term could be constituted differently according to a different cognitive framework. Thus we conclude that such a complex term could not be 'intrinsically perceived' and possess a fundamental priority.

It is clear that Taylor is arguing against a certain model of a socio-psychological conditioned response developed by L.B. Meyer. In his book, Emotion and Meaning in Music(8), Meyer argues from a psychology of musical
perception which can account for affective experience in terms of a musical syntax. Musical language as a complex 'style system' is the product of learned social behaviour determining perception, and mental laws of psychological life that determine musical syntax. Through the fusion of the social and psychological aspects, musical syntax can be embedded with emotional significance. Such innate laws would in fact not only constitute Meyer's equivalent to Taylor's logic but would also enable an explanation of this 'logical fact' in terms of its genesis. Meyer's conclusion that music typifies 'embodied meaning' will be examined below.

In arguing that musical meaning is, in part at least, the habitual yet designated or rather purposeful affective response, Meyer opposes a static Schenkerian analysis: "Theories of music which imply that melodic similarity results in musical unity of necessity adopt a more or less mechanistic conception of what constitutes aesthetic unity."(9) Unity in music can only be captured in an analysis that concerns itself with the dynamics of the evolving meaning presented in the work. Nonetheless, the perception of musical movement imply directed tendencies conditioned by past experience.

The phrase "past experience" (...) refers to those past experiences which constitute our sense and knowledge of style. The phrase also comprehends the dispositions and beliefs which the listener brings to the musical experience as well as the laws of mental behaviour which govern his organization of stimuli into patterns and the expectations aroused on the basis of those patterns. (10)

Meyer is advocating a tripartite division of aesthetic experience into 1) an aesthetic attitude, 2) laws of mental behaviour, and 3) a style system. The first component, what Meyer refers to as a 'preparatory set' has already been discussed in chapter 1, where it was suggested that an aesthetic belief in the affective and cognitive significance of the presented appearance is not
a precondition to a positive intention to search for relationships in the work and to be available to a further understanding. Rather such openness is a feature of the appropriating structure of the attitude-response in which the work is presented. Indeed, it was suggested the determined meaning is in fact an exclusion. Nonetheless, I share with Meyer the belief that the availability of some sort of ordered or ordering system of beliefs in which two terms are mutually relevant is necessary.

It is the second and third elements, the psycho-stylistic conditions, that possess an interesting property. Meyer is here making a dual claim. First, psychological processes are innate, constant ways of thinking about and organizing experience. Secondly, culturally conditioned meaning is a function of the relative probability of the occurrence of an expected event. The theory is that both of these principles are unified in the experience of listening to music. For example, the mind expects 'structural gaps' (i.e. a leap of a minor or major third interval) to be filled in. But what counts as a 'gap', will vary according to the relevant style system.

The problem is that there are two self-sufficient explanations, both of which appear to account for the same phenomena and therefore seem gratuitous. Now the phenomenon to be explained is the experience of musical meaning in terms of emotional and intellectual satisfaction. Is the felt-completeness and direction of a harmonic progression, the continuity and continuation of melody, are these features achieved by the mind or a style system or 'language'? In terms of a psychological explanation, the harmonic progression is a function of the innate natural tendency to resolve, and such appropriate mental processes are seen as universal structural principles of music which would qualify as a fundamental account of the experience of harmony. The cultural style system or 'language' would be secondary and, possibly, irrelevant. In terms of a social explanation, if the harmonic
progression is a function of the style system, then harmonic acceptability is culturally conditioned and this would be the 'fundamentum' used in explaining the felt-resolution of harmony.

Meyer would argue that a classical diatonic harmony or a pentatonic modal harmony are simply different musical codes expressing and resolving the mental process of 'filling-in' in different ways according to their own internal probabilistic nature. However, with respect to the issue of completeness, without the psychological tendency there would be no issue, and without a style system or language in which to conceive of and determine this relation, there would again be no issue. Both elements occupy integral and self-sufficient positions with separate theories accounting for separate functions that identify a dynamic phenomenon by promoting different features of musical structure. They are not necessarily exclusive, but this does suggest that Meyer's position can be read in two alternate ways. It is difficult to decide between the two.

A difficult question arises then: Is musical culture a function of psychological forces or vice versa? This peculiar impasse has been reached for two reasons. First, Meyer has a prior commitment in certain structural features of the human mind as innate and culturally and historically invariable. But it would appear that an account in terms of something like a style system can be sufficient. Why posit a special psychological 'force' as a necessity in any account when the evidence does not lead us beyond a surface?

The second reason is related to Meyer's interest in aesthetic experience as the locus of meaning. B.R. Tilghman(11) gives a brief account of the historical development of this line of thought in which the artwork is either made accessible or constituted through such a psychological response. This has the unfortunate consequence of seeking a definition of art in a postulat-
ed 'aesthetic object', as the object of an 'aesthetic experience'.

To avoid this reification of the artwork, meaning in music, though significantly emotional, must be located less in a psychological reaction, than in the 'language' used in understanding that experience. In order to account for the systematic nature of significance, a theory would have to account for some structure other than that of a simple social conditioning, or the language of the culturally conditioned agent. What would a disposition be without a mechanism, without a language that articulates, organizes, and forms the description? I would like to entertain the possibility that this structure is a fundamentally linguistic one, and that it is equally retrodictive as well as predictive. That is to say, the continuity and meaning of a sequential structure is possible insofar as an event qualifies as the 'beginning' with respect to an 'ending'.

Any formal system is limited to its original parameters. A formal explanation provides only the functional relations that would fit these given parameters or known 'empirical data', since it is possible to analyze the system, a story for example, without prior knowledge of what that story means. The system does not guarantee the validity of the functions by means of a historical, causal or genetic account. To state the problem in musical terms: Does a syntax of musical data reveal only the coherence of given musical data, the code, not the semantic information, not the status of the message being sent? R. Austerlitz, in an article entitled "Meaning in Music: Is Music Like Language and if so, How?" (12) suggests that what is being conveyed in a language-encoded text are in fact statements about the world and not items in that world - about the 'musical world of the text'. His concern is primarily with the ontological meaning of the work, predicting and analyzing those possibilities as the work is being heard, with the nature of the musical substance as a possibility for prediction and conveyance.
Austerlitz offers a model based on a linguistic structure. Such a syntax is explained in basically three parts. First, musical substance is signalled through the text by means of prediction. "The musical text dictates reference to the future in that it challenges the listener to predict the shape of the musical substance to come in the immediately impending future..."(13) The listener is challenged to imagine the selection permitted by this particular codified text. Judgements are then formed concerning the probability of its occurrence and these possibilities are then ordered accordingly. This is done by means of a perceptual storage base for prediction of musical character. The force of the textual suggestions is not constant but varies in intensity and results in "...waves of opacity/translucency". (14) Failure to satisfy a prediction would argue the impropriety of the 'beginning'.

Two further features facilitate this linguistic challenge: 1) personal memory, the store of particular information concerning this musical piece gathered by repeated hearings, and 2) cultural memory which is a heritage of a broader scope concerning other stylistically similar music.

I think we should note a few points here. Austerlitz initiates his theory by focusing upon the act of 'musical analyzing' rather than pure syntactical analysis. But it appears to evolve into an account of a psychical process in which the syntax explains the quality of aesthetic experience in terms of the rhythm, degree and rate of successful and failed prediction. Because these operations are compressed in time, the listener can often be left in a state of exhaustion and anguish following a performance. (15) Perhaps we need to separate the account of the syntax of signification from an account of 'aesthetic experience'. What theory of signification would then be appropriate?

The answer to this question might be suggested in a second query.
What is being offered here is a mechanism to support a view of identity that is an alternative to the 'logical substratum' variety. The coherence of item to item assumed by the challenge to predict the musical substance is explained through the syntactic structure. Thus Austerlitz gives an account of how music is meaningful or coherent as an ontological account of a type of experience. But how is the future event or second term related to the first? Austerlitz would answer that the nature of the relation can be established through its syntactical structure. But the question is asking for a specific answer about the nature of the accepted or agreed upon tied-relation itself and not just the coherence of its formal relations. We need to explain how events can interlock to create a sense of plotting continuity. The event would not be recognized as a completion if not for appropriate 'fitness' based on identity understood in terms of, and generated by the ending. We know what the musical phrase means through the presuppositions of completeness or 'fitness'. If Taylor's logical analysis of musical form requires the interpretation of some middle term within a logical or polar relation of identity and difference, then Taylor's theory cannot avoid the strategy of counterfactual reasoning that can make sense of a text under any reading the forecloses on a historically related sequence. But Austerlitz has a similar problem in explaining how the certainty of meaning is achieved through this sense of closure.

Austerlitz does indeed claim that a statement bears a semantic component when as a cultural complex, it functions as a sign in expressing or communicating meaning. The musical syntax is a coded system of signs to be expressed or communicated in a message or event by musical means. Knowing the code of a cultural complex, allows prediction by ordering the selections of possibilities engendered by the code. A cultural system of
assumptions can convey a set of meanings because its codification is established through associative conventions and these associations are then ordered through differentiation. But Austerlitz does not think this 'associative convention' is enough to establish the semantic feature of music in a purely syntactical system of structural interrelations and organizations as those structures, except in rare cases, have no extra-musical association in themselves. They are not signs of anything in the conventional sense.

Our concern, however, is not with these extra-musical associations, or lack of them. It is the conventional forms of social practice and informational exchange – from contractual obligation and economic relations to purposeful actions – that pattern an arrangement of meaning and that subsequently organize the temporal progress of a sequential structure according to a syntax of social performance and customary procedure. We need to ask 'what x means' not only in terms of 'what it will mean' as the future oriented predictable meaning of x, but also, since the future audible sound is not a meaningful event separated from it past, we ask 'how it will mean' in terms of its previous passage through time – of its temporality. To understand this sense of sound as a formal 'passage through time' in which event is not distinct from structure, we return to Meyer's discussion of embodied musical meaning.

We have seen the role that 'past experience' plays in Meyer's theory. Though we cannot accept the 'conditioned model' that Meyer has offered, he does argue that meaning in music is to be understood in the wider context of an epistemology in which meaning is not exhausted in a symbolic or designative description. In Meyer's epistemology, a key role is played by 'indication' in which a term has meaning, "...only in so far as they point to, indicate, or imply something beyond themselves."(16) It is also maintained that meaning inheres in the relationship between the stimulus and the thing
indicated. Now a stimulus may indicate an event either different or similar in kind. The former has a designated reference, the latter is applicable to music. The term used for this latter case is 'embodied meaning'. This defines a situation of musical meaning in which a tone has no intrinsic meaning in itself, but receives its meaning insofar as it indicates, that is, causes an expectation of other impending musical phenomena.

Embodied musical meaning is, in short, a product of expectation. If, on the basis of past experience, a present stimulus leads us to expect a more or less definite consequent musical event, then that stimulus has meaning.(17)

Again, on the basis of a past experience, as including on Meyer's view both a language code and an aesthetic attitude, a context is provided in which a sound stimulus gains significance. However, does a sound stimulus really indicate anything other than itself? Is the impending musical event sufficiently distinct from the antecedent as to satisfy the criteria of indicative meaning as 'pointing to something beyond itself'? If not, embodied meaning is a limitless articulation arbitrarily restricted or halted. It is not clear that the overpowering 'similarity' function of retrodiction is not sufficient to identify any two sequential items.

A sound stimulus thus indicates itself in future oriented terms, that is, with respect to its own future. It is, of course, the syntax of the language code upon which self-referential meaning is based. By implication, then, meaning is open to exclusion in that the given syntax governs the consequent meaning which is accepted and foreclosed by practical agreement over social conventions.
Section B) Code, Event and the Temporalization of the Sign

To this point, in this chapter, we have attempted to establish the claim that the significance of the event is immanent in the mechanism of signification, understood as a predictive syntax and a retrodictive reading. This second factor implies that the signification function is independent of the function of the speaker but not of interest and purpose. This automatic mechanism, to realize the function of signification independently, as the essential feature of a sign, would also be a characteristic of music as a sign system.

In this section, we are advocating a view of the independence of the signifier and individual and collective subjectivity. To say it is independent of individual subjectivity is to argue against a reference to a new event and against a code/message distinction. Though the concept of an intersubjective collectivity is appealing insofar as it leads naturally to the notion of an ostensible cognitive assumption as both agreement and exclusion as well as a mechanism that is productive of knowledge, it still accepts a sense of subjectivity that cannot be assumed. We cannot, at this point in the discussion, discount the possibility that only a theory of semantic independence would enable us to understand how language can encourage or inhibit certain configurations of experience.

Prediction of an event, tied as it is to the action of an agent, seems to be faced with a major obstacle in the independent signifier and the signification function. Derrida has claimed that the significance of event-a is deferred through a temporalization process. In understanding his conception of significance as a temporal process, it is useful to begin with the difficult notion of 'Differance'.

'Differance' is defined as the conjunction of 1) the idea of a conceptual
opposition of terms in a linguistic system, or 'difference' characteristic of Saussure's linguistic theory, and 2) the production of these distinctions is fundamentally a temporal process or 'deferment'. On this view, the adequate presence of an object to a consciousness, the full presence of the signified to the signifier, is not possible as a foundation of meaning, as this presence is mediated by a temporalization process. If the significance of a word is an operation whose conceptual articulation is mediated through the code or linguistic system itself, then the meaning of the sign is perpetually deferred, and further, the signifier can never attain the necessary immediacy with the signified.

The temporal process has priority over the conceptual in that the latter is an effect of the former. 'Langue' as a structure is equally dependent on the actual historical/temporal event of 'parole'. The rule of the signified cannot simply be replaced by the law of the signifier. In other words, the conceptual relations and distinctions of structure are dependent upon the temporal process of the event. In analyzing 'objectives structures', the tendency of thought is to re-figure its original critical point by re-introducing a grounded foundation - to turn towards the deciphering of foundation or 'order of things'. The intention to accept these structures is undermined as an empty totalization or completion of experience. Derrida has claimed that the intention of a speaker is accountable in terms of an essential absence of immediate intuition through the universal applicability of an utterance. The meaning of the sentence is part of the 'sentence' rather than any particular or unique perception.

Difficult to define exactly, Derrida's alternative process might be understood through a conception of 'play' as a self-perpetuation polysemy, non-genetic and a-historical. If there is no originating intuition of a pres-
ence within language, and no totalization of the phenomena through the inevitable reduction to a foundation, then thought moves according to an affirmative, non-directional 'play'.

It is precisely the conventional notion of a 'temporality' as a process constituted by a transcendental subjectivity in which x is an event in time with an origin and destiny that is at issue here. The temporalization process means that the construction or linkage of signifiers, in its priority over the signified, creates a temporal continuity over experience—a function previously allocated to a constituting subjectivity posited to account for the temporal continuity of articulation. In these terms, 'differance' lacks all determination of genesis, destiny, and functional rule. To conceive of 'langue' or code as an independent conceptual or linguistic system is to miss this point. It is to forget 'differance' and abstract event from structure.

Deferment suggests the possibility of a 'signifier without a signified'. On our proposed theory, to understand an even as an articulation, musical meaning requires 1) than a event-a be taken as a signifier and the consequent meaning of event-b, and 2) in an almost paradoxical sense, 'A signifies the meaning of B' means that a preceeding event is read as a signal of its deferred meaning in the succeeding event. In saying this, just as we are concerned with how the domain of reference is articulated before us without assuming the subject controls its articulation for itself, we are also concerned with the interpretive causality of theory as opposed to a functional, genetic, teleological account.

That a syntax system can signify anything is certainly not the conventional view concerning the function of syntax and can only be used at this point rather metaphorically. In musical terms, syntax provides for ambiguity. Frits Stall, in an article "The Search for Meaning: Mathematics, Music and Ritual", argues that the most significant feature of ritual is structure
rather than substance or even interpretation. His purpose, in musical terms, is to understand in what way music can be regarded as meaningful, and to prove that significance in music is really 'anecdotal' and diverts attention away from the formal structures.

Stall defines meaning in music as 'structural meaning':

Notes possess structural meaning when their occurrence can be explained because it contributes to the formation of dissonances or their resolution into consonances. Since some dissonant intervals have different resolutions, notes may have multiple meaning. In other words, there is functional ambiguity.

This strategy is taken because it is assumed to be evident that the conveyance of meaning requires 1) three systems, the syntactic, the semantic and the phonetic, and 2) a subjectivity in which structures are presented. This systematic, unambiguous conveyance of meaning is assumed to be the province of what a particular verbal language does best. As music lacks the semantic feature, its meaning is limited to the syntactic approach.

The suggestion appears to be this. The structural meaning of an element is equivalent to the position it occupies within that structure; the function of a note, for example, with respect to consonance and dissonance. But the structural meaning of the entire structure is that structure itself. This suggests, however, that the meaning of the event depends on what view of the context is taken. The ambiguity of meaning, of note, of phrase, and ultimately of the work, is a function of the interpretation of the larger appropriate structure. But it would seem, then, that functional ambiguity is due primarily to the fact that the interpretation of the syntactical structure is ultimately open, and only secondarily to the fact that music lacks a semantic feature.

The assumption of an invariant syntactic structure which can be interpreted by a meaning constituting subjectivity is closely related to a second
assumption. Stall has argued that a musical phrase or note, has no meaning because it lacks the self-certain and determined meaning of a natural language and, therefore, can be provided with any number of meanings or interpretation. A synchronic approach that pre-supposes an invariant structure, is ideally suited to this initial treatment of a notion of self-contained meaning that is assumed for language, on the grounds of its semantic system and then applied to music in terms of a syntactic system. However, what Stall means to restrict to a natural language infiltrates the sphere of music. For it may not necessarily be the semantic system that is the unique feature of a natural language which alone can account for a determinate meaning. The possibility can be maintained that it is the system of signification that is more characteristic - that is, the recurring feature of what we may now understand as both 'languages', but which, however, keeps being obscured in a process or a linguistic theory that accepts or rationalizes the difference between the two. Thus it is still possible that a temporal synthesis can account for the distinction and differences of the musical event, in the same sense of the conceptual dependence upon a temporal process rather than a transcendental subjectivity.

If a syntax is understood as an implicit process of signification based on the cognitive assumptions that govern intersubjectivity, then a prediction of a musical event is possible as an account of meaning in music. But if a previous musical or tonal event must be identified with a subsequent tonal event - the former being an 'answer' in a temporalization synthesis - then prediction seem strangely out of place in ignoring its synthetic ground, the patterning or schema of 'cognitive' priorities. This means that identity-and unity are subject to this synthesis which is therefore productive of meaning. 'A sign signifies itself' meets the required absence implied in 'universal
application' necessary for deferment, and yet is 'present' for identity constituted in any theoretical reading. But what sort of 'presence' is implied here, if not of signifier to signified? How can we refer to the pure dynamic coherence of tone to tone, heard in listening to music, without assuming the presence of an original intuition?

Secondly, an undermining or polysemous ambiguity would then appear to be a more appropriate characterization of musical meaning. This differs from Stall's account of a structural variance that allows a multiplicity or polysemous meaning. There are no positive terms through which a semantic matrix can be separated from a differential syntax; no extra-linguistic references. Our suggested structure/event, rather than the ideality presented in a subjectivity, can by preserving contextual invariance, prevent the loss of identity in the dissemination of meaning in countless number of occasions.

In what sense, then, are the semantic and syntactic systems inseparable? To answer this question, we need only claim a contextual dependence of syntax. To view syntax as a structure of interrelations and organizations contrasted with the interpretive semantic operator is certainly the conventional view. For example, T.K. Seung voices this view, in criticizing Derrida's syntactic account of the undecidability of a proposition.

The interpretation of a formal system is to give its primitive signs some semantic content. Prior to its semantic interpretation, a formal system can be called a syntactic system because it is composed of uninterpreted primitive signs and the syntactic rules for their combination and transformation. (19)

Thus on this point of view, the primacy of syntax to interpretation is guaranteed by this notion of an 'uninterpreted sign'. But this is to assume an interpretive relation of parts that recalls an earlier point of departure. We cannot take a formalist program as primary without a retrodictive
interpretation of that structure and now the reason is clear: The syntax is
given as an ordered priority of terms, functions, procedures, etc. The
question, now, is whether these rules as interpretations are based on some
sort of assumptions, cognitive or otherwise.

This question has gone unanswered but almost assumed in this chapter.
What is the relation of 'rules' to cognitive assumptions? The problem is that
if these rules, as interpretations, are based on assumptions, then we have a
rational foundation for calling these assumptions cognitive, insofar as
reasoning implies rule-governed behavior grounded on organizing and
ordering assumptions. But if the relation is reversed, these assumptions are
derived from what can be called the syntactic rules of our social performance
through which posts are occupied or allocated according to relational priority
in the circulation and exchange of information. This is certainly suggested
by the idea of a temporal mechanism of differentiation that generates a
conceptual system undermining a straight naming-function and the subse-
quently lack of a constitutive subjectivity. As such, these assumptions must
surely be irrational in their arbitrariness. Here we refer again to our
earlier problem of the interpretation of art discussed in chapter 2. We
asked not only 'how does interpretation identify the work?' but whether this
was a cognitive process or something else, perhaps more appropriately
defined as mythical.

To return to the issue at hand, to deny the question is to assume, at
the minimum, that a structure functions in a certain way as neutral or
'uninterpreted' and in this way excludes the relevance of 'that of which'
musical structure is intended to interpret. It excludes the question of the
meaning constitution, of a foreclosure of syntactic rules. My tentative sug-
gestion that will be examined in the following chapter is that this 'that of
which, the meaning of syntactic rules, is time itself or some configuration of it.
Chapter 4

The Temporal Process in Music and Narrative

Section A) The Possibility of a Presentational Symbolism

In this chapter, we shall deal with the question of coherence and its achievement by means of a temporal process within our symbol system. Susanne Langer differentiates and polarizes ontologically different kinds of temporal order: the linear sequences of strict mathematical or scientific reasoning versus the artistic realization of the quality of 'inner life'. But in this way narrative structure becomes identified with a sequential coherence, a linear or formal sense of time as opposed to the unique subjective feeling for time and its cyclical repetitions or dynamic dimension. Thus the former operates as a historical narrative of change and movement through which coherence is ordered, while the latter, as we shall see, undermines its own argument for coherence through perception or intuition in the musical phenomena. Further, we will also develop the claim of a translocation of forms (of image without origin) suggested by Langer's own insight into the connection between time and musical phenomena.

Langer offers a semantic account of significance in music based on the notion of Symbol: all symbolism is presentational - it makes present what it is about or it refers to its content. This theory is a variation of the expression theory based on an analogy of the semantic function between music and language rather than any recognition of the formal effect of a syntactic structure.
But expression on this account, is not the self-expression of emotive theories. It is clear, however, that an artwork can function as a sign to indicate a historical/authorial fact by means of an associated signal. But primarily, when an artwork functions symbolically, it 'expresses an idea', meaning the articulation and presentation of a concept clearly and objectively, bringing before us, for our contemplation, an instantaneous coherence by conceiving the work as that which is presented in the symbol. Thus, when Langer writes, "A symbol is understood when we conceive the idea it presents."(1), its simplicity conceals a theory designed to account for the way in which coherence is brought about before us.

With this suggestion of the 'expressed idea', a problem is reached, namely that the symbol and the symbolized must share a common logical form. For Langer, the patterning of sound is the means by which music can participate in a formal analogy with the forms of human feeling, conflict, resolution, excitement, calm, growth and decay, etc.. These are some of the logical (that is, the presentation for conception and not self-expression) forms of sentience that are articulated in music through its form by means of measured sound and tonal structures.

The logical form is a means of explaining resemblance by logical relation - or similar formal properties - between the dynamic pattern of 'inner life' and musical structure. It presents 'a logical picture of sentient life'. Conceivability as the semantic function of symbolism, is primarily a connotative relationship that requires a similarity of logical form but not a fixed or assigned connotation without which a vocabulary cannot be constituted. Hence, music cannot qualify as a language and the logical for is neither abstractable nor translatable but ineffable. Its meaning is to articulate vital sentient experience rather than to signify by means of an indicative function.
Language, though it presents what is absent by means of a symbolic function, differs from the symbolic function of music in that the former is a discursive practice while the latter is not. A word is an associative symbol with a reference or denotation fixed by assigned association. Once meanings are assigned in terms of structure of separable terms referring to a particularized and object-filled universe, and once the grammatical forms and syntactic rules are accepted, meaning is articulated as emergent propositions. In ordinary language, through a sub-category of symbolic function, 'logical expression' refers to the formal correspondence of relations between object and articulate form, and meaning is the denotation of this complex bearing the same articulate form as the symbol.

The logical expression of music as an articulate form is another sub-category of symbolic function. The lack of a conventional connotation prevents its acceptance as a language and renders the musical symbol ambiguous. Nonetheless, music articulation is a semantic in that its form applies to something. Where language expresses the idea of the event, music expresses the idea of feeling.

The specific difference between these two expressions is the unconsummated symbolic relationship of the musical symbol. "A significant form without convention signification."(2) Now, if meaning in its full sense requires a conventional reference, and if this assignment is never a matter of convention in music, then what we are dealing with is not properly a question of meaning articulated in a sentence by indirect, mediated knowledge, but rather an 'import' of the pattern of sentient life that is felt or directly known. And it is a 'vital' import as it expresses they dynamism of inner subjective experience; of the felt quality of that experience.
The basic concept is the articulate but non-discursive form having import without conventional reference, and therefore presenting itself not as a symbol in the ordinary sense, but as a 'significant form', in which the factor of significance is not logically discriminated, but felt as a quality rather than recognized as a function. (3)

To summarize; Langer's semantic account begins with the fundamental category of a semantics of language explained in terms of a symbolic function. Thus, logical expression or presentation of an idea is appropriate to both sub-categories - of music in terms of non-discursive form, and linguistic meaning in terms of its discursive form. We are presented then with the same function but a properly different logical form for each case. On the one hand, we are given a semantics of presentation and articulation of meaning whose discursive form allows the conception of a message indirectly by means of a fixed and universal reference or vocabulary and through the mediation of a symbol system. On the other hand, we see a semantics of vital import as the presentation and articulation of the form of sentient life that is directly felt, that is non-discursive and 'allows the conceivable of feeling, the envisaging of emotive life to the understanding.

Musical meaning or vital import is just this process of articulation. Music reveals the nature of feeling by presenting a process of articulation of our particular emotive life for contemplation and understanding rather than for conceptualization and explanation as an 'objective' feeling. Such ambivalence allows a filling-in of musical form with the personal, unique or subjective experience, "... unconventionalized, unverbalized freedom of thought." (4) Thus, as no explicit assignment of possible meaning can ever made, the significance of music is its form rather than any particular content. Its significance is that of a symbol, an articulate audible object expressing the form of inner experience by means of its essentially dynamic structure.
The connection of sentient life, of the feeling for life as it is lived, with presentation in an articulate, non-discursive symbol, is attempted through the artistic function of semblance. The essence of music is the motion of forms that are "illusory"; a sheer appearance given only for perception and having nothing to do with actual physical displacement. Its primary function is to create a 'semblance' of actual time by means of an illusion of virtual time, an order in which sonorous form move in relation to one another to create a self-sufficient microcosm of 'organic movement' detached from the real world of practical interest.

Just as these musical elements express a virtual movement within a diatonic harmony, the realm in which they move is a non-actual phenomena or duration. It is that sphere in which tonal forms move and yield a semblance of 'lived' or subjective time.

Musical duration is an image of what may be termed 'lived' or 'experienced' time - the passage of life that we feel as expectations become 'now', and 'now' turns into unalterable fact. Such passage is measurable only in terms of sensibilities, tensions, and emotions; and it has not merely a different measure, but an altogether different structure from practical or scientific time. (5)

This order of virtual time is opposed to measured clock time of scientific discourse whose coordinating function is to organize 'inchoat temporal data' into a uni-directional or linear succession of discrete particular moments, abstracted from our sense of subjective time for which change is problematic.

This sense of inner life is felt through change or through its passage from one configuration of emotional states to another. It is that sense of transience and constant voluminousness - the growth, emergence and dissolution as tension and resolution pattern the 'inner life' into unities of varying lengths of lesser and greater tension, and give quality rather than
form to our perception of the passage of time. This direct experience of time is that which is imaginatively presented in music.

There we have its image, completely articulated and pure; every kind of tension transformed into musical tension, every qualitative content into musical quality, every extraneous factor replaced by musical elements. The primary illusion of music is the sonorous image of passage, abstracted from actuality to become free and plastic and entirely perceptible.(6)

A few questions can be raised. First, the notion of isomorphism between musical form and the form of sentient life, does not provide a sufficient condition for being a piece of music since the most commonplace audible event can be articulated by some sort of sound structure or expressive form. Since any event on this view can stand as an image of time, such isomorphism cannot be a sufficient condition of art. One could argue here that Langer only requires some open system of non-exhaustive symptoms. In Philosophy in a New Key, Langer writes: "Sheer self-expression requires no articulate form."(7) A random occurrence, lacking an articulate form, is no musical piece.

Similarly, Timothy Binkley(8) asks whether isomorphism or the formal analogy can be a necessary condition of 'significant form'. First, some music possesses rhythm in a trivial sense that does not suggest an 'organic movement' as an audible symbol of the symbolized (i.e. feeling), as an image of a vital import. Secondly, since inner coherence is not necessarily organic, as we often discern in music as a resemblance to something else in the extra-musical world, we cannot conclude that all music can be classified under the language of emotive predicates.

Now, to defeat Langer's necessary condition of art, Binkley offers a more complex argument. If music is a symbol whose function is logical expression, then it enables the abstraction of forms of feeling to be handled
from their sources in feeling and music. Binkley understands formal articulation in music as logical expression exhibiting a relation of parts. Now, if a logic of music refers to tonality, rhythmic and harmonic arrangement, then it is the performer who expresses these features. Neither can it be claimed that expressed logical forms are like forms of feeling as they are build upon those musical materials, for it is impossible to divorce logical form in this way, from its embodiment in musical expression. There is no meaning conveyed or referred to by the work beyond its presentation.

Therefore, if we accept Binkley's view that logical structures are formal abstracted relations, independent of a particular embodiment, then Langer's position appears confused in claiming that logical relationships can only be expressed in just those terms in which they are given. Either they are translatable or they are ineffable. This leads Binkley to see a paradox in Langer's view between the integrity of the work as a perceptual quality and the function as a logical expression in which a value bestowing logical form can be isolated apart from the work.

Does Langer's theory imply such a strict mathematical conception of logical form or expression as a symbol? Langer's later writings occasionally makes this suggestion of an impersonal form abstracted for our cognition or comprehension and this lends credence to Binkley's view as referring to something that stands apart from the symbol.(9) However, Langer formulates a conception of the 'prime office' of the art symbol or, as she now prefers, 'expressive form': "But that usual definition overlooks the greatest intellectual value and, I think, the prime office of symbols - their power of formulating experience and presenting it objectively for contemplation, logical intuition, recognition, understanding, that is, articulation or logical expression."

(10) On that interpretation, Binkley, to paraphrase Langer,
takes the formal similarity as the nature of meaning itself and then applied to music rather than as a feature specific to musical symbols. Logical expression is taken as a fundamental or irreducible category and the sense of logical meaning of the sub-category of linguistic expression is then imported to the sub-category of musical expression.

Our suggestion was that a symbol functions as standing for something with or without connotative reference in which the artwork or proposition are both 'expressive' (i.e. formulation of ideas for conception in which 'logical' is contrasted with 'self-expression'). Language as a discursive practice, presents the logical form as an expression of ideas and is abstractable. The musical symbol, as essentially a non-discursive form, presents through an embodiment of a particular idea in a particular instance. Therefore, though both sub-categories fall under the one category of a symbolic semantic function implying a logical form, the determination of this form, through articulation and presentation, is different in both cases while both still remain a presentation by virtue of their symbolic function.

However, this minimal conceptual framework does little to resolve the key issue for Langer - the possibility of coherence. If we place the abstractability of the logical form at the level of the linguistic expression, we would have achieved unity as the 'embodiment' of expressive form in musical presentation. But such embodiment and its filial association with notions like decoration, ornamentation, etc., as Aschenbrenner has point out(11), leads us back to a form of Platonic Ontology in which 'content' is only superficially enclosed in a dispensable form.

If the question for aesthetic theory posed by our modern era faced with the dissolution of mimetic representation, is one of coherence and continuity of the artwork, then Langer can be read as anticipating this issue but from
within a representational theory itself. If we bring Langer's insight on the virtual image of time (to be discussed below) to bear less on ontological considerations and more on presentation itself, then perhaps we might be approaching the same concerns of the more contemporary concept of narrative analysis. And coherence, temporalized as Langer has suggested, is explainable as an image without origin or in terms of a translocation of a formal, continuous, narrative sequence.

However, does this translocation, on Langer's view, amount to some transformational, rule-governed procedure? Only if we identify coherence with the self-sufficient and sustaining activity of the virtual image as a perceptual quality or object. This is precisely the view taken by Hanson (12) as it is not without interesting difficulties.

On Hanson's account the aesthetic object, as a compound of musical elements, is an image created only for perception. This position leads naturally to the conclusion that to see is to perceive an image. In this transformation processes, the recognition of the image affects judgements of value and of what the 'pictured' is thought to be. In this way, abstract, balanced forms and shapes are perceived as images. But is this Langer's position in view of the fact that semblance, the distancing and configuration of the object, is something that is given from the side of the work itself and not as a result of a type of perceptual act? Only if we read Langer's transformational process as recognition of the already familiar, do we need the concept of perception.

In such a close identification of recognized image and artwork, certain problems arise for Hanson. When he writes, "The image is thus an essential part of the aesthetic object; in fact, when one includes the background as part of the image, the image is the aesthetic object." (13), he seems to be
construing Langer's theory exclusively in terms of an analogy with painting, i.e., we hear a feeling or a feeling-semblance in a piece of music as we see the 'hidden man' in the painting. Further, just as not all painting is representational, so not all music is feeling-semblance. To this Hanson would respond, "But only where there is presented a feeling-semblance can a work of art have possibilities for being highly valued. In fact, only with such a semblance is there, strictly speaking, a work of art." (14) If I understand Hanson correctly, he seems to be saying: the more the work of art is an image, a feeling-semblance, the better or highly valued it will be. The problem is that certain evaluative criteria are being implicitly built into a definition of art, and consequently we are lead to conclude that if the work is not good, then it is not art.

Our concern here is not to show that an object must first be known in order to be evaluated, for we precisely accept an interplay between these two concepts. However, if we begin with this circulatrity and attempt an explanation that is without apology circular, then such circularity, as suggesting an image without an origin, could yield our much sought after 'instantaneous coherence'. In this case, 'translocation' can be achieved without the notions of transformation, familiarization and recognition of one previously constituted field through the presence of another - the artwork.

Section B) The Symbol as Temporal Image

In the preceding discussion, emphasis was placed on the formal analysis of feeling and the coherence of its presentation in music. The significance of time, its articulating significance for narrative and virtual image,
however, was only suggested. Can we then construct a bridge between the discussion of time and the doctrine of feeling? This separation into two distance themes has been advanced by Samuel Bufford(15) and it is one we will pursue here.

Each theory leads us to emphasize or concentrate attention on different aspects of the artwork and therefore to perceive them differently. As the reasons for accepting one and not the other are different, this confusion has theoretical as well as practical implications. The 'Perceivability Theory' (or, in Langer's terminology, 'Conceivability' Theory) makes aspects of human experience and world perceivable and the illusion doctrine, as part of this context, shows us how artworks differ from things; how virtual time-objects differ from actual time-objects. The 'Expression Theory', on the other hand, accounts for a difference also, this time between insight and emotional response, or symbol and sign, or virtual time and subjective time. Our suggestion is, then, that these two separate ways of accounting for a difference, which may not have equal plausibility in any case, can be conflated, the result being that the illusion doctrine, as part of the Conceivability Theory, which makes us take notice of how time appears (virtual understood in relation to actual) is subsumed into the context of the Expression Theory which deals with the relation of subjective intention and its virtual manifestation. As well, this concentration on perception leads to emphasize the form of feeling and its projection underlining the symbolic function of the work, i.e. the Expression Theory. But the illusion doctrine which highlights the fact that the work is a virtual object, does so to emphasize aspects of human experience for the purpose of classifying and unifying the arts, and this is not part of the Expression Theory that is concerned with
the virtual/subjective distinction. Keeping them apart will give more definition to temporal perception.

Our suggestion is that the conceivability theory can be developed consistently, first of all, with our minimal schematic framework in which abstractability of logical form belongs to a discursive practice and not the presentation of a symbol. Secondly, taking this dimension of virtual/real time, we can extrapolate the germ of a translocation of form. What, then, are the specific theoretical problems that arise from the conflation of the two theories? And, how can limiting virtuality to the conceivability theory dissolve the issue?

We might resolve this question by citing a particular argument by Alperson(16) designed to show that Langer must fail in her attempt to prove an ontologically different order for music—a virtual time as opposed to a subjective time. Alperson explores the ontological difference between virtual and actual time in terms of a difference between virtual and subjective time. Let us accept that there is a difference in perception between change as succession of distinguishable states and passage as rhythmic wave, but that there is no distinction to be marked. In this case, if literal or successive time is not fundamental or original, then an understanding of time as a metaphor, as a suggestion for re-viewing our perceptual activities, becomes the only possibility as there is no longer a viable opposition.

Alperson does not accept any postulate of an intrinsic ideal realm of time peculiar to musical perception. He maintains that Langer establishes only that a time-consciousness can be directed to temporal relations of music or non-musical events because as events that are part of temporal organization and ordering, both are durational, insofar as judgements are made using the same mental functions and intellection, and both are conceivably
dynamic ordered patterns or movement in time. Referring to Kant's concept of aperception, he writes, "The assimilation of impressions into a distinct intellectual order, would seem to be essential characteristic of all human conception." (17) Dynamic features of 'change through time' and kinetic interaction between parts would not differentiate specifically musical phenomena as this is also the case with any non-musical occurrence.

Alperson believes that a composer, in manipulating a sound medium, exploits certain features of temporal organization in conventional ways, and while these are genuinely aesthetic possibilities that distinguish musical phenomena from non-musical, "...the point, here, is rather that the experience of the temporality of specifically musical phenomena does not appear to be sui generis." (18) Something more would be necessary otherwise we have a distinction without a difference.

He begins his examination of Langer's assorted 'times' by accepting that the ontological difference is applicable between virtual and clock or actual time. Whereas the latter, as a derivation from temporal data, is an abstraction or consistent and one-dimensional, the former is perceptible to the sense of hearing and multi-dimensional. By affecting a change from a discussion of virtual/actual time to virtual/subjective time, Alperson is able to focus on what he takes to be a decisive criticism. "If resemblance between model (subjective felt, experience) and image is so complete, wherein lies the difference?" (19)

Alperson, however, pivoting on the notion of the image or symbol, shifts the discussion from virtual/actual time to virtual/subjective time. He then attempts to comprehend the ontological difference (virtual/actual) in terms of the virtual/subjective in which the difference between symbolic presentation of an image of time and a feeling for time as it is experienced,
is thought to be a difference of actual, measured or spacialized time and the symbolic image. Thus whatever differences there may be, they do not amount to any significant ontological claim. First, the difference in the range of phenomena proves only that music is another case of intuitive immediate experience of temporal events and not a difference in 'times'. Secondly, the created illusions and subjective time are both emergent qualities that surface through the perception of a series of tension and resolution. Thirdly, there is a difference to be marked between a negotiable medium and subjective time, but this is relevant only to "...the manner of production of events and to a difference in degree of subtlety of discrimination typically elicited by those events rather than to a difference in kind of temporal experience."(20)

However, in his conclusion, Alperson reverts back to the ontological problem proper, the virtual/actual difference and summarizes two points he takes to weigh against an ontological difference. 1) As an event occurring in time, musical phenomena are subject to the same features that determine non-musical events, i.e. duration, temporal order, faculties of attention and memory, etc., and the interpretation of a successive series into a unified and ordered whole by a process that might be called aperception. The same faculties are employed in any temporal relations. 2) Music is, on the other hand, an 'art of time' in the formal sense in which an artist can engage in a temporal transaction and exploit time as a formal element of music for the sake of creating an artifact. Music makes duration a direct object of attention.

Thus Alperson claims that virtual time is not different from any other sort of temporal relation of experience, that is, subjective time but intends that this conclusion should prove a decisive argument against the ontological
difference, i.e. that virtual time cannot be distinguished from actual time. Musical time is then an instance of time in general.

To subtract the Doctrine of Expressivity in this discussion would clarify the issue, I believe, by focusing attention away from the notion of 'subjectivity' or this 'inner experience of time'. The semblance of time, said to correspond to inner experience, is now understood as time insofar as it is conceived - an image without origin or source.

Specifically, it is the concept of perception that is the root cause of the problem. Langer tends to assume a certain semantic function and Alperson shows that this concept cannot handle a virtual-actual distinction since our comprehension of time is through a singular perspective of temporal relations.

A few questions can now be raised. How can Langer distinguish subjective time from actual if time is located through or in perception? Virtual time-objects and real time-objects could only be different 'forms of perception' if there is a difference to be marked in temporal transactions. But if we can deal with objects in such a way that their very identity is rather an interpretation through a temporal process or transaction, then, objective constitution will depend on the fluidity of the temporalization process - on our transaction in time and not an essential perceptual process and false historicism disguising the disruptive effects of time and change. By adjudicating the mediatory, 'outwardly' directed intention of logical form to the discursive practice of symbolism, a presentational symbolism can accept new constructive paradigms, thus avoiding a logical form that conceals the effects of time and change in an eternal abstractability. And such a 'process' we understand to be a less logical, more discontinuous but immediate translocation of a formal narrative sequence.
A musical artwork, then, rather than dealing in 'virtual' time, can recall for us the nature of our essential temporality, a suggestion for interpretation for viewing, an occasion for change. In this way music can be understood as a metaphor for time as either 1) a representation of time that affects a change in conceptualization, or 2) an occasion to articulate our own historical continuity in a narrative. And to anticipate Section C of this chapter, if time is determined in the narrative of a sequence of events – by its image –, then how does the image determine our transaction with time? Perhaps this 'hermeneutical circle', as an explanation of time, has to do with self-understanding rather than with the inner experience of time.

But our more pressing concern in constructing more 'aesthetic' paradigms for the meaning situation, is to understand how time-objects (that is, experience temporally configured for us) are arranged through the structural features and interrelations of the musical materials. How, then, is time presented in a distinctively musical phenomenon?

Like any other external accoustical phenomenon, pitch is an event. But a tone, is a distinctively musical event in that it exhibits dynamic state with which no physical or material process can be coordinated. (21) The difference accrues to a pitch by virtue of the position it occupies in a diatonic system in which the dynamic state rest/change is immanently available.

The system of music is a fundamentally unstable phenomenon. The equilibrium is disturbed by the appearance of a leading tone pointing beyond itself in the direction of a resolution. The tonic tone dictates direction and draws the leading tone to itself, creating a state of equilibrium. Relaxation follows dissatisfaction which exists for the sake of a resolution. Other human activity may share the same feeling structure, i.e. dissatisfaction
resolved in relaxation and vice versa. But tonal phenomena, in being mediated by the musical system, exhibit something more - a dynamic quality, the deliberate striving of a tone towards its opposite within its specific structure, the mutual attraction and relation of tone to tone.

Equally, however, it appears that through the act of indicating, the tonal gesture or musical form is immanently significant. The musical phenomenon draws itself to the listener's attention, as a sign signifying only its own dynamic movement.

What is at issue, is this translation of experience into tonal elements rather than the referential claims of the musical medium. The question in dealing with a musical paradigm of the meaning situation shifts from epistemology and cognitive import to the ontological function of discourse in shaping and organizing experience - from the sign/signified relation to the intuitive or constructive situation of subject/object. In the auditory field, subject and object are interdependent, the perceiver being mobilized to participate by means of attention, expectation, an absorbing response, etc., as the sound announces an event.

Meaning as shown in the musical situation, is not a reference of sound-image to its source as if gesture can be abstracted from its reference. It is a situation itself in which something happens between subject and object - a feeling or sense that something has been said. The tonal medium is 'syntactically absolute' insofar as a tone is given a concrete sense through a system of interconnections, interrelating structures and ordering laws; by the functional means of directing, encouraging and obstructing resolutions, etc. Thus the sound event is a meaning-effect of the work itself.

The autonomous character of immanence, is the self-sufficient discourse of a language that informs the listener of nothing but itself. The work is
autonomous therefore since, instead of translating experience into a medium at a distance from the external world, the musical work transforms and isolates experience, making the transaction between subject and object sufficient. As meaning is a product of these inherent structural relations, it is also abstract, non-temporal, separated from any particular concrete tone.

The above description of musical dynamism(22) in which tones acquire their meaning according to their function in the overall process, as the specific character of classical diatonic harmonic system, leads to the peculiarity of an a-historical account of meaning in a situation that is ostensibly temporally oriented. True, Schoenberg's surreal realism structure or technique, for example, with its equalitarianism of all pitches, distributes meaning according to its own procedural rules. But it does so in a way completely antithetical to a diatonic system. In an equalitarian system, dynamism can operate as a directionless play of forces rather than the goal directed activity of a hierarchical diatonic system. Since such a polarity exists, then a question arises concerning the systematic function of meaning as a dynamic form, that cannot be easily answered through any syntactic/semantic or synchronic/diachronic distinction. How can this defined dynamism be generalized as a paradigmatic explanation of meaning or signification when it is too closely identified with the effect of one system, the classical tonal system?

Invariably, however, such historical influence over the semantic import would undermine the determining relationship between discourse itself and musical language that Carpenter seems to want: "Discourse might be more broadly conceived in musical, as it has been in verbal language, as time taken to shape, rather than recount experience; self and work speak first to one another. In this sense, any language (...) is the articulation of being."(23) This notion of articulation as passive acceptance of the
interplay between self and world, focuses strongly on an important sense of discourse in which the speaker becomes the voice for the formulation of thought. But this suggestion, however, only raises a further query over the origin of meaning and articulation in the structure of system rather than a situation, of the reduction of the semantic import to syntax. When Carpenter claims that, "... the musical language shapes the musical idea as experience itself takes shape, in the act of articulating ..."(24), she means that musical meaning is a fundamental act, one that simultaneously acquires the voices knowledge about the world. But does this 'taking shape' have a certain import that accepts an originating design at work? What vital role would this play when the thought appears in the articulation through convention means?

Can we propose an interesting solution to these questions by differentiating meaning in the musical situation from that of language, while still retaining the validity of immanence in music?

If musical meaning inhere in the system and each tone finds its meaning as a function of its position then, in itself, tone is a dynamic symbol insofar as this pointing gesture, inhere in the phenomenon itself rather than a relation between sign and thing. Zuckerkandl articulates this position: "Music and language, then, have one thing in common - that tones, like words, have meaning and that the 'being in' of the meaning in the work, like that of musical significance in the tone, is of a non-material nature."(25). But unlike language, and unlike Carpenter's formulation, musical meaning inhere in the event, the tonal occurrence, which exhibits the dynamic striving.(26) Unlike a sign, tone and its significance, are identical. The acoustical and structured event is the musical meaning. Tone itself is part of a dynamic symbolism which presents active systematic
forces that transcend the material data — a distinctly musical fact.

But this attempt to preserve immanence appears contradictory. If the dynamic quality is a function of the musical system, then musical meaning only inheres in the tone by virtue of the position it occupies in the system. On the other hand, if meaning is a function of the place in the structure, then how can meaning inhere in the tonal event itself?

In formulating the notion of a symbol as against a sign, both Zuckerkandl and Langer appear to overlook the work of structure in mediating or determining meaning for a symbol. Zuckerkandl, however, proceeds further than Langer in his analysis of the structure of musical phenomena prior to the cultural determinations of meter and rhythm, into the force/counterforce pressuring the solitary tone towards a critical point of action/inaction.

The inner swell in the first tone is nothing but the generation of the first metric wave; is, as it were, the primary material out of which the succession of tones and rests will now model the specific metric wave of the composition; time becomes perceptible — one might almost say, becomes tangible, plastic. In the musical tone as such, then, even before any meter, even before any rhythm, time attains direct manifestation taken as a dynamic process. (27)

This 'metric wave' is the pulsating effect of time. It is neither rhythm nor metre but a cumulative intensifying wave, the driving of musical phenomena to no particular point. In an ingenious attempt to account for a dynamic process, the pure kinetic quality of a changeless and directionless form, Zuckerkandl relies on the 'metric wave' as that force, that gesture of indication.

But what is this active force? For Zuckerkandl it is time, not as a formality of perception but an active immaterial force — an image without the expressive distance of an illusion. "The hearing of tone is already a
perceiving of time."(28) Unlike other sensations, tone exhibits duration itself as an element in the sensation. Duration cannot be an abstracted formal ground for perception predicated of a particular object, since (audible) sense perception is not a temporal process in which a subjectivity informs 'a phenomenon. Time allows us to hear duration unmediated, a non-sensuous sensation.

To justify this use of 'image' as an active force, Zuckerkandl convincingly argues that even with the spatial image of the visual arts, something more is achieved than the shaping of space in the material. Bernini's Piazza before St. Peter's in Rome, is offered as an example. The encircling collonade informs the empty space of the plaza. Likewise, with an architectural work, space is enclosed and shaped by active material form. The immensity of the enclosed space of St. Peter's Basilica is the product of a proportioning of formal materials which confounds our accepted sense of perspective. The 'near' and the 'far' appear equidistant. The interior seems to shift as we move within, while our sense of movement seems strangely inadequate to explain such dynamism. Similarly, what we perceive in the musical work is a shaped and organized time - an image of time for us. Zuckerkandl offers, finally, a definition of musical phenomena, "Music is a temporal art because, shaping the stuff of time, it creates an image of time."(29)

Zuckerkandl's insight on the unity of sensation and (time) objects, even given its resistance to the perceptual formalism and a constituting subjectivity, still relies on perception and leads to the conclusion of an unidirectional system of predication. We perceive a time or space organized in terms of a specific time or space image. We can accept this as far as it
goes and it appears to be based upon the notion of a single referential grammar.

In a following chapter, we will question this assumption and propose, as an alternative, a paradoxical account of a mutual relationship and determination between the specific space image and the imagined space, or rather a spatial-temporal configuration by an eclipsing outside 'other'. But our present concern still lies with the unresolved matter of the coherence of a musical work. Having explored the ontological basis for the claim that music is a temporal image, we now return to the question of an image without source or origin. How does such an image, lacking a unitary source, cohere? Is the attribution of stability necessary, or even possible in revealing or interpreting a text? How can a mere successive series in itself, the linear replacement of the 'leading' tone by a 'tonic' one, result in a unity? Unity is an achievement in which tones are intentionally interpreted, one as tending towards the other. Yet, what structure is also presupposed underlying this intention insofar as the completing tone is 'meant' or identified in the antecedent?

Section C) The Time of Narrative

In this section, the issue before us will be to explain how and whether the dynamic continuity of elements is achieved in a thoroughgoing temporalization process that accepts the fundamental paradox previously encountered. A subjective identity assuming a continuous consciousness identifies the work, or stabilizes the text. But the work is identified in the 'telling' by means of a transparent inhuman voice rather than a present individual speaker. Therefore, insofar as the work emerges, so does the
recipient for whom the work appears and vice versa. Roughly, a consciousness does not exist, cannot be extended or possess continuity until the work or image is there as the matter of continuity. But is this a genuine incomprehensible paradox or a dialectical opposition?

Our view is that this represents a contradiction inherent in our comprehension of time. On the one hand, time is imagined or symbolized through the needs and sensibilities of an interested consciousness. On the other hand, such interests are outlined by the manner in which time is symbolized for us. Thus we have the double function of the time image through the creation of which we articulate aspects of our experience, but at the same time, the image is shaping and organizing that experience itself.

I read Paul Ricoeur as suggesting that we accept this hermeneutical circle for what it is. He asserts this circularity or reciprocity between temporality and narrativity: "The common feature of human experience, that which is marked, organized and clarified by the act of storytelling in all its forms, is its temporal character."(30) In uncovering this relationship, Ricoeur relies on a related paradox of linear time. This paradox of discretion/intention is introduced by the narrative but the recitation also mediates these dialectical opposites, rendering the situation paradoxical yet "...productive in the activity of discourse".(31)

The plot is a narrative structure that mediates event and story, that reflects and resolves the paradox of time. "This mediating roja may be read in both ways; a story is made out of events to the extent that plot makes events into a story."(32) As opposed to Carpenter who sees the musical event as a singular gesture or happening, this view maintains that the event receives its meaning and definition in terms of the plot development. The plot is that basic narrative unity that organizes distinct heterogenous events
into an intelligible totality. This construction or grasping together of a significant whole out of diversity of elements, Ricoeur terms a 'configurational act' - one of two temporal dimensions reflected by the activity Ricoeur calls 'emplotting', the other being that episodic character of a story made out of events. In the poetic act, these two dimensions are mediated.

The recounting of the 'act of emplotment' is an operational structuring or synthesis of events into the defined or completed teleological sequence of a plot. The conclusion is revealed as suitable as expectation is fulfilled through a summation of the episodic elements as a dynamism or direction that appears as necessary in relation to this 'ending'. This terminal/initial situation is precisely the reflection of human reality.

The activity of 'following the story' is a poetical mode of understanding which accounts for this composing or ordering of a discourse into a text. The episodic dimension presents an open-ended irreversible order in a linear structure and the configurational dimension of the poetic act exhibits a temporal arrangement through which episodic succession is transformed into a particular significant whole and the 'fitness' of the ending from which the reader views the story is imposed on the succession. "To follow the story is less to envisage the surprises of discoveries within the recognition of the meaning of the story as a whole than to apprehend the well-known end as implied in the well-known episodes as leading to this end."(33)

The dialectical nature of the relationship between the temporal experience and the recollection of retelling the story must be preserved and a strict division between a chaotic discordant temporality and the superimposition of a shaping and organizing structure is unacceptable. The style of intelligibility brought about by the 'act of emplotting' speaks of a 'calculated deformation' or balanced relation between narrative structure and imagination.
that is effected within the parameters of a cultural heritage, i.e. through the images that serve as rules and 'paradigm modes of emplotment' bestowed by a tradition; a two-fold structure of invention and sedimentation.

By preserving the autonomy of the conflict, Ricoeur attempts to maintain genuine opposites that are mediated in a dialectical act. However, the structural function of mediation would not be recognized as such without recognizing a tendency on the part of the event towards that end, some two-way identifying feature between event and story. On this account, would not the event, in some degree, possess an autonomy of its own, a dynamism through which we may account for the directional or structural feature?

It is not simply a paradigm that is bestowed but a temporal (and spatial) image that constitutes a real shaping of our own experience of time in which such intelligibility is then possible. True, Ricoeur points out that just as such intelligibility is not a simple descriptive rationality, concordance is always qualified. Emplotment is culturally bound within a correlation of 'productive imagination', and narrative structures. And, similarly, he has even shown that the 'fitness of the ending' is not a conclusion from a logical premise but the sense of the story achieved in a retrospective retelling. Nevertheless, if we ask, 'Why does invention appear as a moment in the dialectic?', we want to know how are invention and sedimentation 'equally implied in the constitution of traditions'. What account can be given of its source and origin?

Further, paradigms provide rules for experience in retelling the story insofar as they proceed from the sedimentation process of 'the work of the productive imagination'(34). But in this vision of the dialectical discordance/concordance structure of our time experience, what force acts
against this resistance? The act of emplotting correlates the elements of the
time paradox, distention (the breaking up of order into episodic series)
intention (restoration of ordered continuity) at the level of the poetic 'act'.
While this position solves the paradox in terms of a 'calculated deformation'
at the level of lived experience, it can only do so by avoiding the two
extremes of an intended systematic deviance and an unquestioning acceptance
of rules. Since the systematic deviance, as a unified distinctive force,
pre-dates the sedimental forms, the process of comprehending the narrative
is a secondary process.

Our intention here is to understand the sense of process, as primary or
secondary; in other words, the sense of 'origin'. For example, on Ricoeur's
view, if experience takes a narrative form, it is because it possesses an
'incipient story' which narrative functions to clarify. At the same time,
however, our only access to the temporal process of human experience is
through such stories. This circularity is pervasive and necessary. "Are we
not inclined to look at periods or episodes of our life as untold stories;
stories that have still to be told but that offer clues for telling them?"(35)
On this account, then, telling the story appears to be an addition, a continu-
uation of an 'entangled pre-history' that relates the story to a matrix of
other stories. As told, a story is an emergent entity out of this back-
ground, but if the "one involved emerges too,"(36), then, how can the
'telling be a secondary process, the process of the story being known', as
against the primacy of a constituting consciousness? And, therefore, how
can the inventive force pre-date its own act against the resistance of the
conventional paradigm? If the story has been in some sense written
'secretely' and now remains to be read, then telling is a secondary process,
and a prior force is possible. But since clues to the telling are already
significantly interpreted as answering an untold concern, a narrative structuring is at play in our directed searching, but an untold concern is only found out in the clue and the intelligibility of our human life and experience is given form with the telling. Possibly, as experience is transformed into a narrative picture (through the telling), perhaps 'man' is made into a subject.

The notion of secrecy just alluded to, as a simultaneous disclosure and concealment of meaning in the text, does not help in resolving this dilemma. For it is precisely its character as excluding interpretations that points to the fact that interpretations undermine that text. While the text is both underdetermined and an inexhaustible source of meaning, it cannot function in providing a continuity between the (waiting-to-be-told) background story of our life and the telling without having already interpreted the 'untold' story as just that which is told. Ricoeur writes that narratives possesses a formative function by means of different paradigms:

Paradigms keep being generated by the very process of tradition forming that I have ascribed to the power of schematization proper to the productive imagination. 'Concordance' thus follows the fate of the paradigmatic order of plot structures. Even the defiance of any paradigm, (...) belongs to the paradoxical history of 'concordance'(...) (T)The formal notion of narrative order is capable of infinite variations, including the ironic denial of all inherited paradigms.(37)

If concordance and continuity is such a paradoxical notion, including as it does, every attempted negation of its own possibility, i.e. the paradigm, then what supports such coherence or accounts for this paradox? Our view is that such coherence is not ultimately a solution to an incomprehensible paradox but a restatement of the problem. To approach the issue of coherence, we might open our comprehension on the paradoxical nature of our concept of time and seek alternatives to the foreclosure of the concept of
mediation. One such alternative is to see 'experience' as given form by a narrative sequence, not in a poetic mode of understanding that formalizes and thereby negates the paradox, but in a translocation of temporal organization that accepts the discontinuity of opposites without the imposition of a formal system and its own self-legitimating demand for the accountability of origin. These positions, in the present context, are merely policy statements. They remain to be examined in some detail and in the following chapters, we hope to do just that. Chapter 5 will deal with this structure of translocation that we suggest is both metaphorical and paradoxical. Chapter 6 will examine the role of mediation in philosophy's own narrative of legitimation.

In the present case of the coherence and significance of elements in a musical narrative, the temporal process is ultimately the only constituent in the continuity between the untold story and the telling. Indeed, the autonomy of the dynamic event suggests that, as an image of time, time is articulated for us. On the one hand, we fill in time with our interests and the image is mediated through a symbol system that is already those concerns interpreted. Narrative is then seen as the self-conscious clarity of a responsible project at the surface level of the story. But on the other hand, time can also be given for us in the image which functions to articulate time for us and therefore configure our experience in such a way that only certain constructions are possible. On this showing, narrative is a transparent site in which an authoritative voice writes out its obligatory demands.

Ricoeur's solution to this paradox in the untold story, that is the hidden ground of continuity to the telling, certainly answers to the first element of this paradox. But the paradoxical notion of a 'productive reference' is only another expression of the issue, rather than a theoretical
solution, since the propriety of mediation is assumed without which the 
opposition would remain discontinuous. The 'referent' cannot be compre-
hended without that previously interpreted set of interests that direct the 
unfolding of the untold story.

If Ricoeur's resolution to the paradox is not accepted, narrative is 
simply the telling of the story itself, and what we can make of it. The 
problem of unbounded interpretations is not solved (nor is this view meant 
to do so) but appears as another expression of the temporal paradox itself. 
Therefore, the work of art, on the one hand, is the occasion for the articu-
lation of subjective feeling, desire and motivation that delimit the critic and 
criticism itself and release the artwork beyond the grasp of the institution; 
and on the other, the equally valid critical and philosophical moment that 
commands identification through the presentation of the work according to 
the conventions of its original historical and cultural epoch.
Chapter 5

The Paradoxical Nature of the Sign as a Metaphor for Time

Section A) The Metaphorical Process

'To think A by means of B', this is the logical form of metaphor. The suggestion is that a semantic field 'A' is visualized or imagined according to schematic pattern of field 'B'. Only by means of this operative synthesis is 'A' thought at all. This thinking as an organizing and classifying activity, is productive, 'A' being distinct from its conditions before this transformation. Can a metaphor then, be identified with this general theory of transformational process? Does it require a particular postulate of reference?

Being an operational synthesis, underlining the logical form of metaphor, appears to ground metaphor in a network of identity and difference. Though an 'anagogic' metaphor of the shape 'A is B' is straightforwardly simple in form, it hides a complex cognitive relation between A and B that raises serious questions about the literary or philosophic figure, and challenges the classical view of metaphor as an embellishment on an already established literal language.

Nietzsche was the first to point out the grounding assumption of this doctrine toward an unequivocal foundation for literal meaning, for the integrity of the field itself, that shapes the metaphorical process into a literary problem of metaphoric attribution. We have only living metaphors and those who through common usage pass unnoticed into ordinary discourse.

Nietzsche does not accept metaphor as an embellishment on an internally
consistent literal language that would assume an unequivocal foundation for literal meaning. In *The Genealogy of Morals* (1), dealing with the radically historical nature and the continuity of the concepts of metaphor and literal, Nietzsche's aim is to show how moral and spiritual interests are developed from basic material needs with the intent to undermine a simple opposition of values, of the autonomy of the sign. To say modern notions of symbolic expression are completely foreign to 'primeval speech', seems to opt for a foundation of some descriptive detail. The claim that it is in relation to economic life, the market place, that a moral sense is developed through the presuppositions and structures of equality and exchange, of measure and value in which "one person first encountered another person"(2), is open to several interpretations. It is possible as a description of the 'amoral' foundations of contemporary 'moral' society. But equally the claim accords an originating status to a material basis, whose actions need no interpretation. The problem is, of course, that this view is itself a metaphorical interpretation. Such anthropological research into originary states of consciousness out of which have evolved, or, for Nietzsche, de-volved, the present self-understanding was a contemporary methodological imperative of this nascent empirical science. Thus Nietzsche is involved in the same perpetual filtering of experience, history, etc., through the contemporary modes of symbolic expression.

Now, assuming Nietzsche is aware of this deeply problematic situation with respect to metaphorical process, how can we explain this inadvertent contradiction that occurs with the blurring of the distinguishing literal/figurative distinction? Can we account for this contradiction between, 1) the reduction to a single explanatory socio-economic model, and 2) the multi-dimensional originating source of metaphor?
Nietzsche's argument has its own 'logic' - a parallel conceptual structure that is opposed in its direction. He admits the first moment of this paradox as an etymological consideration designed to show the literal nature of the case underlying knowledge and here metaphor is undervalued. On the other hand, he also accepts the second moment to undermine and discourage the literalism of values and therefore metaphor is valuable.

To come to terms with this contradiction, let us reformulate it as follows. Taking the first feature as part of a given conventional system of signification, and the second as the re-surfacing of an open figurative space, then we may understand this as the familiar and apparently irresolvable temporal paradox between an experience configured for us through an ordering of time by convention, and the articulation of experience, a filling-in of time by invitation into a figurative space. Thus metaphor as an attempt to solve this contradiction can never succeed, for the paradox originates in our temporal experience. Metaphor, lacking the stability of mediation, appears then as the 'taking of a trick', or jest. It creates the appearance of a bridge between the paradoxical moments for the purpose of a necessary intellectual play, or in general 'human movement' - for the purpose of presenting a novel idea, thought, feeling etc., - the search for instabilities in the conventional speech.

Nietzsche's view of a metaphorical force amounts to an interpretative violence: The rendering of meaning of one system or term in relation to the dominating other, either through undermining one term by grounding it in the other's perspective, or as one systems attempt to establish itself as the ultimate foundation for the other. The difficulty of Nietzsche's latent literalism surfaces here. Is interpretation necessarily forcing a mold, subordinating an idea to a system, where no previous system or hierarchy of
meaning existed? Can there be a violent dislocation of meaning where no 'proper place' as a function of symbolic interpretation, has not originally been assigned?

The force of Nietzsche's suggestion rather lies in the challenge it raises concerning teleological development in a metaphorical thought process. The a priori, or rational order of reason, 'the truth of philosophy', conceals the fact that ideas are ranked as subordinate and ordered after the ascendency of the acclaimed, and 'only then' established idea. The usual relation of cause, effect, purpose of an object, is inverted. But once again we meet Nietzsche's problematic of a literalism based on a utility or description, of a re-interpretation based on a metaphorical subordination of one idea to another. This contradiction, that in articulating a theory uncovering the arbitrary nature of the 'proper place' one must presuppose a certain stability, does not disprove Nietzsche's theory. What we require is a more figurative paradigm for the argument that can account for the conceptual human movement of the metaphorical process in which concept, figure, and narrative equally play a role. In this sense, we can construe the meaning of the 'is' of metaphor as a narrative tale, articulated according to different historical and temporal configurations.

Patricia Parker, in an article entitled 'The Metaphorical Plot'(3), has done something similar. She speaks of a dynamic interpretation of metaphor as movement and takes the complex relations between A and B as different systems of plots - a controlled plotting of movement.

In the transportation or translocation of a term from one semantic field to another, the linear development of conceptual thinking and configuration of time is challenged. In this way, metaphor configures time in a variety of ways. It conlates time and relations and disorients before we can
accommodate it logically and chronologically. On the other hand, identity is spread out or 'spaced' through the metaphor, and on the other, the forcing together of evidently unacceptable events into one incident, into unbearably condensed relations.

At the same time, however, metaphor announces a certain 'exile from identity' - an estrangement from a proper place, an exile from the decorum of propriety through a transgression over civil boundaries - as well as an 'exile from return' to its original preserved identity in the apocalyptic dream of a return by reversing this initial errancy, a language cleansed of this violating feature.

In the act of retreating another sense of metaphor is founded and one more closely associated with the modern epoch; a delay of movement of the signifier towards the signified, in which the reader is invited to participate in a creative space in which a 'space of the figure' replaces the classical proper place. This hesitancy subverts the linear, chronological direction of predicative thinking completely. This direct link to reference, the normal descriptive reference, is suspended and once foreign ideas are conjoined in a 'rapprochment'. Raul Ricoeur's conception of a metaphor, as will be argued below, while replacing the classical 'proper place' of the substitution view of metaphor with the space of encounter, simultaneously retains the sense of 'placing as a context for errancy, a comprehensive limit for deviation within an encompassing plot. This conception with its basis in a teleological movement, prohibits a consideration of a more radical discontinuity, a dual aspect of metaphor. This duality of retreat in the metaphorical plot intends to do justice to the temporality of signification, to the temporal nature of a convention patterning of syntax. Translation and transportation as conceptions of metaphor, reflect the temporal difference by undermining the linear form
of reference including the possibility of errancy within the figurative space. This discontinuity and retreat from reference suggests almost a conspiracy or compulsion to undermine it authoritative attribution to the 'world'.

Parker invites us to consider this dual aspect of openness and concealment:

Metaphors are 'arresting'; they compel as well as invite us to enter their figurative ground in order to 'grasp' them. But it is often difficult, in this process of 'play', for the reader to perceive the he himself has been 'grasped' or 'occupied'(...). Metaphor both opens up and forecloses.(4)

The metaphorical plot is the tale of the conjunction of A and B, of the narrative history of the 'is'. We might say that the duality as the structure of metaphor, runs in both directions simultaneously and allows metaphor to act as a transference system between the moments of the temporal paradox without anticipating the teleological return to a proper place that functions in mediation. This teleological supposition is what allows a logical development that guides a process of interpretation as a plot towards a definite end. The problem, as Parker points out, is that this 'sense of an ending' could be no more than a function of accepting the metaphor, pre-determining the course of the story as already appropriate.

This notion of discontinuity and incongruity is also an essential feature of David Miall's position of understanding metaphor as a thought process(5). More than this, however, Miall suggests that metaphorical attribution, the play of concealment and openness, is a transformation of thought itself and not a transaction between isolated linguistic entities. He integrates metaphor into a more comprehensive view of thinking as an ongoing dynamic process in which the cognitive function of metaphor is understood as a psychological process or rather justified as a psychological account. Though our interest
in the cognitive function is limited, it is Miall's suggestion of an 'imageless thought' that is of interest.

Because the metaphorical interaction takes place between concepts rather than words or signs, a metaphor can be productive or meaning only if understood as a thought process. The organized and synthetic nature of the contative resources of the modifier interacts with the principle subject and suggests a parallel unconscious ordering within these resources that directs conscious thought. To become aware of this influence is to explore and force upon us certain presuppositions that often reveal 'major systems of thought' within us. This raises the interesting question whether the connotations need be expressed consciously before they can be used in a metaphor.

Further experiments reveal that 'formal intuition occurs at the pre-verbal level. The notion of 'imageless thought', that concepts can be developed without conscious awareness of the user, may be an apparent terminological or semantic problem that is clarified in the following statement by Miall: "These structures of thought pre-exist the encounter with the metaphor that activates them, certainly, but they cannot be described in advance, nor can their role in a metaphor be calculated or determined."(6) Miall is clearly articulating the aspect of concealment in terms of a psychological process, which accounts for the use of a rather abstract conception of thinking as 'isolated thought' rather than, say, reasoning itself. This would not only be more concrete but also a thoroughly dynamic process - the way in which an argument is presented as a narrative distinct from its more typically logical patterns. Reading the passage in this light suggests: 1) that metaphor articulates or encapsulates an image a pre-verbal thought, and
2) a conscious use of an image that we intuitively sense 'fits' some sort of unverbalized idea.

But even so, to speak of such an ephemeral idea, appears to be a function of a psychological or epistemological need to locate a governing reason and order, since it would be simpler to accept the presentation structure of thinking in which the image recounts a narrative for us. Further, even accepting the possibility of this intuition, why would a figuative form be more appropriate than a literal one? And how are we to know the nature of this unconscious voice? It could be an obsessive one, in which case something more must be meant in the metaphor. Miall's conception of metaphor as a psychological process allows for some fragmentation of the logical relationship between word and a literal reference. Nonetheless, the distinction between word and thought or sign and signified, defines insight as the result of the defamiliarization of the object, through the transference of concrete meaning to the latter while the former retains its stability. And therefore Miall can write: "Poetry does not primarily alter language - but it may very well revolutionize thought."(7)

There appears to be something arbitrary in this last quotation that stipulates the permanence of the meaning of certain terms in the sense that one would like to know how to account for this 'fact' given the rigorous dynamic function of the thought process. But this leads to a further query. If metaphor is construed as a dynamic process, as a transformation in thought itself, does it necessarily follow that the sign/signified relation should be so discontinuous? Or does the suggestion that metaphorical statements, like scientific theories, have a cognitive function in ordering and comprehending the world, imply that a transformation in thought affects only concepts rather than words? Again, are thoughts not indicated by their own
sign insofar as the signified concept is the meaning of the sign term in- 
specifically determined instances? Our contention is that the relation is 
discontinuous due to a lack of propriety attaching to words themselves.

Miall relies on an analogy with scientific reasoning in a way that is 
reminiscent of the invitation offered by the 'figurative space' created 
through the suspension of literal reference and the subject modifier tension:

Just as, with a theory, a tension in thought is set up which 
invites further exploration and experimental testing, so with 
metaphor the new perspective opened up invites us to explore our 
own experience and thought. Metaphor does not undertake to 
establish a truth, but it suggests where we may begin to seek one 
in thought. (8)

This classical sense of metaphoric 'place', however, must be challenged 
precisely because there is no propriety appropriate to words to guarantee a 
'proper place', that at the level of the dynamic permanence and stability 'are 
possible. But 'imageless thought' and the realization of intuitions are prob-
lematic. Perhaps they could be explained in an alternative way. The mean-
ing of the image that is articulated for us, tends to appear - to be taken -
as a previously intuited meaning that now governs the figure and the in-
verted relationship then appears as justified through the very linguistic 
behavior of looking-at or seeing-as, of assuming the relationship as such.

Perhaps the issue of 'imageless thought' and consequent implications for 
signification, could be further explained by relating Miall's notion of the 
dynamic effect of connotative resources to a more established and founda-
tional account. As Miall does contrast his view with Max Black's 
Interactionist Theory, this would be a proper point to pursue in the follow-
ing section.
Section B) Can a Metaphor be Paraphrased?

The explanation of metaphor, then, requires a more fluid conception of the relation between one term and another; a narrative of emplotment allows us to handle or make sense of the paradox, whereas understanding this relation in terms of logical axioms or categories leads to notions of trespass and irrationality that is itself an imposition of a system of thought on another seen as a potential threat to decorum and civility. How far can this position be taken? Can a metaphor be paraphrased? What does translation mean in this context?

According to Max Black's theory 'The Interaction Theory of Metaphor', a metaphor that is still lively and emphatic consists of the 'thinking together' of the primary subject and a secondary one. Consider the metaphor: 'Man is a wolf'. The primary subject, 'man', is effectively understood or thought in terms of a wolf-system of "...associated commonplaces."(9) That is a system of related ideas, "...governed by syntactical and semantic rules, whose violation would produce non-sense."(10) These characteristics of the 'implicative context' of the secondary subject need not be actual properties of the subject as such but the received opinion of the speech community.

Unconventional subsidiary systems are indeed possible, even though they deviate somewhat from the accepted semantic rules. In this case, the utterer provides the novel context, the specifically constructed systems of implications in which the transference is successful.

The system of related ideas is applied to 'man' by inciting the hearer to select the emphasize some features of the secondary subject while suppressing others. This organization produces new implications for this principle subject, "...not quite its meaning in literal uses, nor quite the
meaning which any literal substitute would have."(11) And further, the secondary or focal word is reciprocally re-defined in its own implications by being deflected by the resultant implications of the principle term. Hence the pivoting nature of the Interaction Theory, the 'shift of meaning'. Black writes: "It would be more illuminating in some case to say that the metaphor correlates the simultaneity than to say that it formulates some similarity antecedently-existing."(12) Black suggests that in the interaction of the simultaneous relationship between subjects, a strong metaphor can embody insight or generate new knowledge inexpressible in a literal paraphrase. I think Black can meet Charleton's objection.

Charleton(13) challenges the assumption of a 'shift of meaning' or production of meaning and claims that similarity or resemblance, while not exhaustive, is sufficient. What Black does is to confuse two genuine questions on the definition of metaphor and how it takes effect into the pseudo-question about the meaning of words or phrases in particular uses, in this case a metaphorical use. On Charleton's view, words can be used in different senses, extended and even inapplicable senses. When used in the latter sense, which does not transform but retain an intelligible linguistic use, a word is used metaphorically. Thus, he claims, "A metaphorical sense is a sense in which the semantics of a language permits us to use a word. A living metaphor gets its force from being a use which is not permitted (...) It lives because the words retain their usual meanings."(14)

A word can be used in one of its already established senses within the context determining the probability of the meaning. Not only is the sense extended, but a word is transferred from its proper application in reference to one thing to a quite different one, and therefore used in an inapplicable or mis-applied sense. Because Charleton wants to preserve the notion of
resemblance and the stability of the concept of literal or original use, he maintains the end towards which the word is put is determinative and tends to encompass metaphorical use.

In this way resemblance of the application would be guaranteed only if the stability of literal meaning is accepted and, as Black noted, this involved Charleton in an arbitrary presupposition of a 'literal truth paradigm' as an unproblematic standard which takes as 'a priori' certain contextual arrangements as impossibly true. But if Charleton believes that Black succeeds as an account of the effect of metaphor, this is to say that the purpose of transference is to bring two ideas into interaction. Self-identity of the meaning of the words is maintained by reference to some established use based on a meaning or entity to be used. In itself such a use creates a disparity between terms that suggests only a conventional semantic or syntactic relation. No reason for a metaphorical function is made available here that proceeds in the opposite direction of 'exile' from established permitted use, that forces two dissimilar terms into an inapplicable conjunction, thus producing a new orientation in the world. Our suggestion is that a contradicting parallel structure, equally a part of metaphor, must operate in which the 'space of exile' is no longer just that but understood, accepted, anticipated as return, as identity. What Charleton does in defining a 'fruitful interaction' in terms of locating good and sufficient reasons for the transference, is to avoid addressing the issues of whether and how the idea of two things are or can be simultaneously already related and disparate.

Black does indeed recognize the work of syntactical and semantic rules in the generation of metaphor. However, the semantic rules do not exhaustively define a subject without a movement formed through the suggested similarity of the metaphor. I will quote him at length:
But the set of literal statements so obtained will not have the same power to inform and enlighten as the original. For one thing the implications previously left for a suitable reader to deduce for himself with a nice feeling for their relative priorities and degree of importance are now presented explicitly as though having equal weight. The literal paraphrase invariably says too much and with the wrong emphasis. One of the points I most wish to stress is that the loss in such cases is a loss in cognitive content; the relevant weakness of the literal paraphrase is not that it may be tiresomely prolix or boringly explicit, or different in qualities of style; it fails to be a translation because it fails to give the insight that the metaphor did. (15)

A living metaphor acts as an instrument inviting the reader's cooperation in revealing or producing a significant and meaningful relation between 'analogous structural patterns of two unrelated fields'. The cognitive content of metaphorical assertions is disclosed rather than translated, and therefore judgements of correctness/incorrectness are appropriate. A metaphor is similar to those representational devices such as charts, maps, etc., that depict or show 'how things are' rather than literal statements representing facts. But to ask for truth value is to treat metaphors as expendable or translatable.

If metaphors are completely or only partially capable of being paraphrased, then metaphors are not so much productive of knowledge as they are reducible to the adequacy of positive knowledge and its operators of quantification and analytical measure. Their effect as a dynamic element in a thought process would be undermined. On the other hand, what is the content of positive knowledge, when the ability to translate from one semantic field to another is seriously challenged. We would claim that this polarity hinders our conceiving of the effect of metaphor as a dynamic element in a thought process. What alternatives are there?

In a recent article (16), Alan Tormey proposes such an alternative and situates metaphor within the context of the discussion on counterfactuals, thereby re-locating the concept of paraphrase and re-interpreting metaphor
as a form of suppositional reasoning in terms of the issues and concerns in the philosophy of language. The force of the recommendation for metaphors as elliptical, counterfactual conditionals is to be found in its didactic power to illuminate. On this strategy, then, the metaphor 'man is a wolf' becomes the conditional, 'If man were an animal, he would be a wolf'.

Violating any reasonable set of expectations within the limits of plausible background information concerning the concept 'man', the metaphor is clearly implausible. But since such plausibility also violates the intelligible 'facts of the case', a distinction is needed between plausible and implausible counterfactual reasoning. For example, a serious possibility would be considered consistent with normative background assumptions. But a metaphor is often a hypothetical possibility in which the possibility of the antecedent cannot be seriously supposed, given what we would normally accept concerning the concepts 'man' and 'wolf'. Thus, a metaphor is defined as, "...and elliptical, implausible, counterfactual conditional offering us an antecedent supposition that cannot be literally and seriously entertained." (17)

If, then, plausibility is reasonably supported by a casual relationship, what sustains metaphors as apt, or fitting. Is metaphor mere a case of suppositional reasoning from accepted background assumptions? One would suspect that this would only re-literalize the metaphor. Metaphors on Tormey's view are sustained through an account of their grounding that is different than strict logical necessity of the causal laws of a literal interpretation. In other words, the latter is not necessary in understanding a metaphor. Further, when a metaphor is understood as apt, it is not literally paraphrased so much as explained in terms of the familiar conditions that are cited as holding. An explanatory paraphrase, therefore, is actually not a
direct translation, but simply a procedure through which a supportive
grounding and argument, referring to shared analogical features is offered
for its appropriateness. The intention to supply a casual explanation is
seriously misdirected and the metaphorical insight or meaning is inexpressible
in a literal paraphrase because metaphors do not mean through the
grounding conventions of positive knowledge.

But even Tormey's alternative in pursuing the idea that a metaphor
cannot be translated into a literal paraphrase and therefore true or false,
leads us to appreciate the force of concepts of 'cognitive content', or
'original insight'. Let us summarize this in the following way. If an object
of knowledge is capable of being asserted, it is capable of being true or
false. There is, therefore, no good reason why we cannot stipulate the
truth conditions of a metaphor and judge the appropriateness of a literal
paraphrase. Martin Warner(18) has made this argument for a strict
parallelism between a literal and a metaphorical assertion or statement to the
effect that, given the same truth conditions, then they have the same cogni-
tive content. If a paraphrase says 'too much' or reveals a loss of cognitive
content, then either we have refused to specify exactly the truth conditions
of the metaphor, or the paraphrase is true while the metaphor fails to hold.
Both of these alternatives suggest the open-textured metaphor will entail
more assertions than we have realized and is therefore inexhaustable. But it
does not imply that the missed implication is not in principle paraphrasable,
_i.e._ that there exists truths expressible only in metaphor.

This argument works, I believe, only if we accept 'cognitive content' as
a somewhat abstract 'possible object of knowledge'. That insight is neces-
sarily reducible to cognitive content and therefore is true or false, only
shows us that the conventional standardizing and quantifying procedures of
one system is dominating the other through a mediating teleological demand. Further, it would be difficult to maintain, as Warner does, that metaphor still possesses a didactic and enlightening function since it is unclear in what significant way the distinctive metaphorical force can be construed as suggestive when the metaphor is reducible to the criteria of a constantive utterance. For example, Warner claims that metaphor, though not productive of insight, is still cognitively useful in leading us to see, articulate and analyze what we have never noticed before. But what is it that does in fact direct and lead if not the force of insight to discriminate our experience or articulate a meaning for us in advance of some sort of 'proper' theoretical analysis? Finally, the justification of the insight of metaphor is a pragmatic one and, therefore, fundamentally irrelevant in the interest of the 'straight-forward' analysis of theoretical discourse.

A number of these subsequent issues might be cleared up if we seek a genuine alternative to the autonomy of distinct fields that require not only the impossibility of translocation but also the conception of this problem in terms of that very polarity itself. In order to adequately conceive of metaphor as a thought process, we need to accept that relevant conceptual structures are transformed along with the object itself. What prohibits the conception of metaphor as a translation is the persistence of translation's 'other' - positive knowledge, or, more precisely, its self-constituted autonomy leaves no room for transportation over discontinuous parallel structures. Even if metaphor functions dialectically in opposition to positive knowledge, it can still be construed as either weak or strong: Weak as in Warner's case as functioning through an illocutionary force, and strong as productive of knowledge, as Max Black believes. In neither case has our conception moved beyond this dominating polarity nor has metaphor been
rendered truly 'transportational', i.e., as a transformation of both structure and event.

This necessity can be demonstrated in terms of the interaction Theory. Black shows how metaphor works in producing similarity relations. In order to argue for a distinctive cognitive content as well, he must show the significance of the metaphorical form of production by establishing it in the context of a non-literalist view of production which can account for the principle subject as a 'possible object of knowledge' in the first place. But how can this be achieved without transforming those very conceptual structures through which the object itself is thought and, thereby, undermining the polarity 'figurative/literal' that Black still depends upon. Only without this restriction could we pursue the concept of metaphorical translation in terms of a transformational process.

Black has not considered the construction of new meaning but relies on established constructed meaning. As Paul Ricoeur asks: How are we to conceive of the novel creation of metaphors, of 'specifically constructed systems', without assimilating this process to the syntactic and semantic rule-governed nature of language? By not taking into account the effect of cultural rules, Black's Interaction Theory, then, reduces to the Substitution Theory in which established systems are substituted rather than particular words or phrases.

Section C) The Figure in the Text

Must any transformation, by definition, be grounded on a pre-determined system or structure of resemblance? Is such a theory to be defined
only in terms of the substitutionist view with its thesis of 1st order reference?

Paul Ricoeur addresses these concerns in terms of an account of the production of sense. Since metonymic transportation at the semiotic level can only account for a deviance in denotation, an adequate theory of metaphor is only possible as a semantic theory. This semantic function suggests that words have actual meanings only in the sentential event of discourse, and that lexical entities exist potentially only for the sake of a sentential use. The metaphor is thus, "... a sense that emerges as the result of certain contextual action."(19) The move in this direction is completed by an account of the semiotic function in terms of the imagination and its accompanying psychology as it contributes to an understanding of the notion of resemblance. How then does resemblance and imagination work in the production of meaning?

Metaphorical meaning is a response to the tension created by the disruptive movement of an expression between two semantic fields; a denotative literal reference and an indirectly designating figurative one. This semantic impertinence establishes a new congruence, a 'semantic innovation' that saves the sentence from a self-defeating contradiction. Metaphor as an enigmatic solution is a novel production, a word-meaning occurring as the event of a novel context.

The response is defined as that mediation constituted through the engagement of the two semantic fields which are interpreted as, and made possible, by the concept of resemblance. This duality is evident in Ricoeur's formulation, "Resemblance(...) is the rapprochement which reveals a generic kinship between two heterogenous ideas."(20) The homogeneous final point is inevitable as the 'telos' of the two heterogenous fields tends to
a conversion. This is achieved by replacing the classical notion of imagination as weak perceptual residue of things already perceived with the schematizing synthetic operation of Kant's productive imagination interpreted within an understanding of linguistic construction. This involves three factors:

Imagination does not merely schematize the predicative assimilation between terms by its synthetic insight, nor does it merely picture the sense-thanks to the display of images aroused and controlled by the cognitive process. Rather it contributes to the 'epoche' of ordinary reference and to the projection of new possibilities of redescribing the world. (21)

Let us formulate the interrelation of these three factors in the following way:

1) The schematic function through predicative assimilation. The intuitive insight is immediate insofar as it has already synthesized the predicate through the schema. Thus thinking is an instantaneous 'grasping together' that is a generalized linguistic act, that of assimilation. The introduction of the notion of seeing-as establishes resemblance as a mediation from inside language.

2) On the second function of depiction, Ricoeur writes, "In the same way, therefore, that the schema is the matrix of the category, the icon is the matrix of new semantic pertinence that is born out of the dismantling of semantic networks caused by the shock of contradiction." (22)

The icon is the imaginary moment whereby the intended thought is presented under a concrete aspect according to a method or formula for the construction of images. Since the iconic presentation is the result of the intuitive grasp, then we cannot view predicative assimilation as a process
external to the schematization of the productive imagination and representation as a weak mental replacement.

The production or display of images is the medium in which and through which we see similarities. The image points towards these original resemblances through a parallel elaboration of an incomplete set of images at the base of metaphorical expression with an antecedent incomplete set of images in the world. "To imagine, then, is not to have a mental picture of something but to display relations in a depicting mode."(23)

Thus the metaphorical expression serves the antecedent while simultaneously anticipating the antecedent as material for its completion, since these are grasped together through similarities that bring together since the two semantic fields. The resemblance relationship is a mediating structure insofar as the end is intended in the response.

3) The function of the 'epoche' - to suspend the referent - is meant to account for the fact that the function of metaphorical reference (to describe immediately that state of affairs which actually exists) is opposed to the metaphorical sense (to suggest on reflection that such a state of affairs cannot actually be referred). The mediation of this opposition is in fact a complex strategy of a 'split-reference' concerning the suspension of ordinary reference and at the same time the preservation of reference. This essential affirmation/denial complex is a dynamic process, noticeably different from the concealment/openness aspect of metaphorical attribution in that meaning is made to cohere by a single operative structure resolving the opposition at the sentential level. Discourse is seen as the achievement of a mediation legitimated by its own inevitability.

The image in the final analysis is both an absence and a fiction, as mediation is both negation and preservation. This is the precise function of
a heuristic system, to re-create through production and projection. A metaphorical fiction concretizes and completes the structure of split-reference by suspending the everyday manipulative existence in the literal world insofar as it can recall those 'potentialities of meaning' or reality that have been made absent in that everyday mode.

The nodal point of this split-reference lies in the nature of the verbal tension, the paradoxical 'is/is not', employed for the sake of revealing new meaning, to 'delixicalize' accepted meanings. The power of the metaphor is its ability to re-describe reality in a non-literal fashion while still maintaining its ties to reality. And it does so through the imposition of organizational forms on reality.

The question of this achievement is a formidable one. To do this, Ricoeur needs to develop a general theory of reference which can encompass a mode beyond denotation and connotation. Thus in maintaining the validity of the sense/reference distinction, how does Ricoeur allow that truth is possible only given a reality, existing independently of language, to which truth can be said to refer or describe? Given that Ricoeur's revision is founded on a radical consideration of thought-process itself as metaphoric, can he maintain any meaning for the referential function of language?

One could question the status of this extra-linguistic reality, claiming that the paradoxical tension of the 'is/is not' structure, in undermining literal interpretation, suggests the literal description was only an effect and the referent of the metaphor was always non-existent. But this would be to stress the negativity of the 'is not' component and interpret the metaphorical force of the 'is' as a rather strict resemblance or identity according to the procedural rules of a positive single referential grammar instead of the dynamic process that it is.
Gary Madison, I believe, has taken this view (24). The difficulty here is that this theory does not adequately consider Ricoeur's claim that metaphorical attribution, as a heuristic fiction, is a foundation for re-description in that it functions to weaken the proposed literal meaning. The 'intended equivocation' of metaphorical attribution is the schema (formula, method) of the synthesis of identity and difference (of 'is and is not'). The imaginative schema is in a way, a useful tool for disclosing dimensions of reality. The tension created by the heuristic fiction or model can be overcome by a change in perspective, by disclosing a figurative second order reference, i.e., new possibilities for meaning. Metaphorical reference concerns semantic networks whose derived product can be formalized as a univocal statement or discrete essence at the lexical level of language.

But the question that Madison is raising might be understood as follows. Can Ricoeur's tension prevent the collapse of reference into the 'sense' of our dwelling in the world?

Thus, for example, Madison writes, "The referent of language would be inseparable from the language itself or sense." (25) The referent, the actual world, since it is constituted by the manner in which it is linguistically referred to, is related to language as a function of its sense. Our lived-experience is the non-linguistic source whose surplus of meaning is expressed in languages in the destruction of literal interpretation.

Ricoeur argues that as a semantic phenomenon, metaphor can only be adequately accounted for as a productive synthesis. The image is schematized by thought, homogeneous with thinking itself as the mediation of two semantic fields achieving a new postulate of reference through the operative function of suspension. However, the process is still cognitive, relying on the semantic level and its eventful production to control and
order the reference. Since the paradox of intended equivocation is not sustained but mediated, it is difficult to see how the exile/return structure of metaphorical attribution can be preserved. The paradoxical 'is/is not' falls short of metaphor's discontinuous parallel structure and its necessary strategy of articulating this structure through a narrative form. A transposition of such formal sequence accounts for a temporal and dynamic process that is, at once linguistic and historical, and that prevents a teleological or mediated return to the 'identical' or 'proper sense'. Ricoeur, while replacing the classical sense of 'proper place' with a complex strategy of creative involvement of the reader, has preserved the sense of inevitability and propriety in the dynamic itself at the sentential level. Has he succeeded, however, only in re-locating, yet preserving, the univocal presumption of resemblance and its identity/difference polarity? How is this new location possible given the acceptance of the non-mediated creative impulse of lived-experience and its surplus of meaning?

Thus we are brought to ask a question concerning a sense/reference distinction as if ultimately this very opposition, or possible sets of oppositions (figurative/literal), are at stake. Our understanding of this issue appears to be limited by a new implication between philosophy and metaphor, a circularity or reversal in which our philosophical apparatus for understanding metaphor, is itself metaphorical. Madison's question then might be understood as asking whether the concept of resemblance is itself not constituted by a metaphorics, a surplus of meaning, and whether metaphor, as unspoken, can appear adequately in the field of consciousness in order to be defined. A further discussion must uncover the transposition of a theoretical model, not as an indicative function or reasoned description, but as a
teleological movement - as a means towards a certain end - that would be pragmatic, intentional, etc.

Derrida's essay, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy", accounts for this circular project of philosophy under the heading of metaphor. The wearing away of the proper sense of a word is that same process or movement of thought in which the sensible is raised into the intelligible - the ascending formation of concepts. This conjunction of the hidden philosophical resource and the unstated metaphor is best explained by identifying this metaphorical function with the concept of 'usure', a linguistic/economic effect denoting surplus, consumption, usury, etc. In doing so, Derrida attends to a pair of thematic considerations: 1) The efficacy of eroded or dead metaphors in philosophical exchange, and 2) the demonstration of this first consideration in terms of a metaphorical unity and transposition of visible to intelligible being. We begin, then, with the 'metaphor of the usure of metaphor' - an irreducible double effect of profit and loss.

This 'double effacement' is composed of the wearing-away of the original scene, of the metaphorical in the initial meaning, a primary displacement of a once proper meaning. The second displacement occurs in this Hegelian notion of 'raising', which amounts to applying this concept to the process in order to legitimate this spiritualized vacant meaning as the proper philosophical sense. Thus the process of idealization is complete and is, in fact, a movement of metaphorization; the production of a concept that erases evidence of its trace insofar as the metaphorical nature of philosophical discourse attempts to comprehend the discourse on metaphor. What is effacing is this very exchange of philosophical discourse itself, since the genealogy of the 'philosophemes', of 'eidos', 'logos', etc., that as such define the field
of metaphorical philosophy is comprehended as a metaphorical act in which
the fading-away of metaphor gives rise to the philosophical concept.

However, to stress this wearing-away, effacement and loss of propriety
and property, is to overlook another equally significant aspect of usure - its
profit taking:

The word itself is not pronounced, but one may decipher the
double import of usure: erasure by rubbing, exhaustion,
crumbling away, certainly; but also the supplementary product of
capital, the exchange which, far from loosing the original invest-
ment, would fructify its initial wealth, would increase its return in
the form of revenue, additional interest, linguistic surplus value,
the histories of the meaning of the word remain indistinguish-
able.(26)

The linguistic surplus value is tied to that of economic value as part of
the same semantic network. The latter deals with the accumulation of a
labour value, as a surplus to the labourer's effort valued as wage, that
accrues to those who control the means of production. Thus the machinery
of capital investment ultimately alienates labour from the worker by placing it
in a transcendent sphere of surplus value. Similarly, metaphor is a linguis-
tic surplus value in that, operating behind the scene, the metaphorical
function is unknown and unrecognized by the speaker.

Thus Derrida speaks of the impossibility of deciphering metaphor as a
surplus of meaning, in a philosophical text, the conditions for this impos-
sibility being that, "...metaphor remains, in all its essential characteristics,
a classical philosopheme, a metaphorical concept. Metaphor has been issued
from a network of philosophemes which themselves correspond to tropes or to
figures, and these philosophemes are contemporaneous to, or in systematic
solidarity with these tropes or figures. This stratum of 'tutelary tropes',
the layer of primary philosophemes(...) cannot be dominated."(27)
At least one metaphor would always remain exterior an incapable of dominating the system: "The metaphor(...) without which the concept of metaphor could not be constructed..."(28) This state of affairs is due primarily to what Derrida calls the 'Law of Tropic Supplementarity'. Supplementarity might be understood as a 'necessary reversible relation' between the outside/inside, exterior/interior, preface/book. Necessary in that the preface is an essential preceding synopsis of the book, but reversible as an essential preliminary orientation. Being already and always in the midst of the text, the boundaries are obscured. Thus the preface effaces itself, as introduction, crosses the dividing line between preface and book proper by already having become the text. The metaphor of metaphor, that extra metaphor, would remain an essential parasite, outside any classification of the metaphorical possibilities of philosophy, outside the very field it allows to be conceived, for there can be no discourse on metaphor outside a metaphorically engendered semantic network.

The constitution of the fundamental oppositions of the metaphorology (sensible/intelligible, space/time, signifier/signified etc.) has occurred by means of the history of a metaphorical language, or rather by means of tropic movements which, no longer capable of being called by a philosophical name - i.e. metaphors - nevertheless, and for the same reason, do not make up a 'proper' language.(29)

Conceptual networks are metaphorically engendered insofar as the philosophical 'raising' of the concept, as the fundamental philosophical gesture, is equally the process of 'usure', of the wearing away effect of sensible appropriation.

The second consideration, to demonstrate the efficacy of eroded metaphors through the transposition of sensible to intelligible being, Derrida proceeds via a historical justification. It was the Aristotelian conception and
identification of metaphor with the nominalizable, wit the noun, that speaks of the metaphorical unity of sensible/intelligible being. Analogical resemblance, if based on this metaphorical unity of sensible/intelligible being, would be articulated through an ontology - a catagoremic transport or unity of substance and being - in which a theory of names or nouns is articulated in and through an ontology. The duality 'meaning(sense)/reference are interrelated in terms of the 'possibility of signifying by means of a noun' and an 'independent being identified with itself'. The Aristotelian ontology mutually relates various terms or values, of logos, mimesis, discourse, signifier, etc., in a metaphorical chain which are indivisibly associated with the value of metaphor, to the possibility of meaning and truth in discourse by teleological determination, - to the possibility of exercising constraints on our conception by means of this systematic chain.

This naturalness is founded on a deep unity of noun and verb - a catagoremic unity that excludes any word not capable of independent signification, i.e., intelligible in itself. Further, the proper itself is identified through the possibility of the 'logos' which, as productive of sense, is only natural to human speech. The referential movement of the visible to the invisible is thus rendered 'natural' by an un-stated metaphysical movement that labels as 'resemblance' the non-neutral, non-inevitable transference, as a primary movement, of the sensible and empirical to the proper place of intelligibility. The missing term of the analogy is supplemented by the the constraints of the signifying system rather than any natural resemblance, or constituted in a rapprochement or bringing together of two distance semantic fields.

In order to conceive of the possibility of metaphor, the Aristotelian text introduces the illustrative metaphor of the Heliotrope. This trope, in
supplementing the difficult to exhibit first term of the analogical square, discloses by engendering that characteristic paradigm of 'essential indissociability' in the movement of thought - capable of both transforming the sun into a metaphor and turning philosophical thinking towards the sun - constituting philosophy in general by this idealizing metaphor. Derrida writes: "Each time that there is a metaphor, there is doubtless a sun somewhere; but each time there is sun, metaphor has begun." (30) And metaphor is that, "... enigma, a secret narrative, composed of several metaphors, a powerful asyndeton or dissimulated conjunction, whose essential characteristic is to 'describe a fact as in impossible combination of words'." (31)

Derrida, in claiming that all analogical terms are caught up in this mutual influence, in this 'bottomless overdeterminability' of the metaphorical relation, thus undermines the oppositional logic of the figurative/literal, sense/reference, etc., distinctions, and replaces this with the notion of inscription, of an announcement through the entire signification system.

If the sun can 'sow', its name is inscribed in a system of relations that constitute it. This name is no longer the proper name of a unique thing which metaphor would overtake; it already has begun to say the multiple divided origin of all seed of the eye, of invisibility, death, the father, the 'proper' name, etc. If Aristotle does not concern himself with the consequence of this theory, it is doubtless because it contradicts the philosophical value of 'aletheia', the proper appearing of the propriety of what is, the entire system of concepts which invests the philosopheme 'metaphor', burden it in delimiting it. (32)

Consequently, metaphor itself becomes unnamable as an efficacious defining trope 'effecting' the various philosophemes as such, or as a troping movement that is as much 'defining as defined' - a movement articulated through the tropic system of the analogy of invisible/intelligible - as
'idealization'. An elliptical homeward reappropriating movement of the infinite turning of reflection figures the entire philosophical discourse on metaphor. Philosophical movement on the conceptual level, then involves pragmatic effects; the rectification of one outmoded tropic-concept by a more refined one, whose appropriateness is determined by the present phase of comprehension of the given field. The troping effect of that 'other' which allows the field to be conceived, nonetheless remains a dominating foreign force, external to that direct consciousness of philosophy - at best a stratification of internal levels.

Ricoeur's argument against the 'metaphoricity' of metaphor is in fact the preceding discussion of the Tension Theory of Metaphor and the concept of resemblance. His semantic analogy has shown that worn-out dead metaphors, rather than being efficacious, are no longer metaphors but merely extended the polysemy of literal meaning. Ricoeur raises a number of interesting questions.

First, Ricoeur concedes that as a metaphor is brought into lexicalization, its function as a heuristic fiction disappears. The metaphor becomes entrenched as a proper meaning and brings that lexicalized value into discourse. But by stressing the denominational function of language, Derrida, first of all, overemphasizes the unstated effectiveness of dead metaphors and obscures the real problem of a metaphorics, that is semantic impertinence, and secondly, tends to exaggerate the foundation of the difference of the figurative/literal opposition.

A second point of contention concerns the collusion of metaphor and metaphysics - i.e., the notion of 'raising' in the Hegelian concept of 'Aufgehoben'. Where Derrida understands this concept as a process of
idealization or usage. Ricoeur sees a successive pair of distinctive operations in which the accumulation of meaning is primarily a loss. The first, the properly metaphorical transference itself of a proper sensuous meaning into a spiritualized sense, the phenomena of wearing-away, is the pre-condition or ground for the second operation, (of suppression/preservation) the 'Aufgehen' proper, in which a proper identifying, abstract meaning is created.

Because these questions of metaphor are similar to a concept and its schema through which the former is a product but not reducible to the latter and the process of conversion of the 'wearing-away' is distinct from the effacing itself, Ricoeur believes the wearing-away of sensible meaning does not yield an improper but a proper sense at the conceptual level. But this distinction between the process of wearing-away and its conversion into a thought process is precisely at issue, which tends to undermine Ricoeur's subsequent claim that even Derrida's conception as well as philosophy itself depends on this act. It does indeed depend on an 'act', but how do we define it?

Thus, when he writes, "Speaking metaphorically metaphor is not at all circular, since the act of positing the concept proceeds dialectically from the metaphor itself."(33), Ricoeur means to undermine the metaphoricity of the definition of metaphor by claiming that the metaphors for metaphor (including Aristotle's definition of metaphor as Epiphora) obeys this dual operation as well through the heuristic function produced by living metaphors or the rejuvenation of worn-out metaphors. In either case, the concept (epiphora, for example) is only symbolized by way of its schema in the semantic network of intersignification of primary concepts - 'logos, 'eidos', etc.
which thus constitutes the metaphorical definition as a proper meaning
distance from its metaphorical status.

Far from admitting the concept of metaphor to be only the he
idealization of its own worn-out metaphor, the rejuvenation of all
dead metaphors and the invention of new living metaphors that
redescribe metaphor allow a new conceptual production to be
grafted onto the metaphorical production itself.(34)

A few questions can be raised concerning Ricoeur's notion of a suc-
cession of operations. First, is this notion a theoretical model, or a
construct? What non-figurative principle is operative here? And if none,
how can such an infinite regression of figure upon figure be avoided? Is
not Ricoeur metaphorically applying the Kantian concept of the productive
imagination in an attempt to comprehend the previously unknown - the
metaphorical act itself? Ricoeur would argue that this involves merely ex-
panding the epistemological field through theoretical discourse, and that this
is essentially different from metaphorical attribution. But this is precisely
the issue insofar as our theory would hold that this expansion is always and
already figurative. It might be considered a point in Derrida's favor if, in
addressing the question of metaphor, we necessarily rely on the legitimacy of
metaphorical application of such assumed concepts or rather 'tropic-concept'.

Both Tormey, using the notion of supposition reasoning and Miall, the notion
of scientific reasoning, rely on the assumed validity of a 'metaphorical
transference' of one concept onto a different field.

Secondly, and more importantly, Ricoeur does no achieve or express the
intended dynamism of Hegel's concept. Positing is one with the act, in that,
in the reflective act a concept is seen 'to have already been thought' as a
condition of this reflection. The infinity of this reflection needs to be
articulated in a concept not unlike Derrida's 'Abyme' which can also account
for the metaphorical use in such temporal terms without masking the
temporalization process in terms of a linear or narrative sequence, or as a
simple claim of 'grafting' - as if this act was in some way basic or neutral
and not an assumption of a rightful legitimacy.

To be more precise, the temporalization of the signification process
displays a break-up in time, a radical discontinuity in which a simulacrum
replaces strict repetition that is altered through mediation. As a genuine
dynamic element of the thought process viewed philosophically in terms of
signification, rather than psychologically as suggested by the notion of
production, metaphor can be seen as a discontinuous parallel structure. On
the one hand, a metaphor in presenting an image as a meaning for us, pre-
sents a particular configuration of time with a systematic tie to a profit of
surplus meaning. On the other, we maintain and construct time, or rather
human time, by articulating a plot through a 'figurative space', by the open
possibility of underdetermined plots - hence metaphors underdetermination
and loss of meaning. In this situation in which metaphor takes time, a
temporal dynamism is displayed in the act of bridging, while the articulation
of the dynamic itself is possible only in terms of a system of signs.

If the discontinuity is radical, then the opposition cannot be mediated
in thought without excluding that very temporal phenomenon we want to
capture in our definition. Metaphor then, can be or must be conceived as a
kind of thinking, a simultaneous two-way bridging act; one 'movement of
thought' conditioning the other but escaping any final move towards
mediation understood as inevitable and neutral. Metaphor forces the conven-
tional to be available to further meaning - allows the conventional to be
explained in novel terms and thereby creating only the appearance of
progress and development at the conceptual level, rather than the mediated naturalness of production.

Even given Ricoeur's notion of 'sentential impertinence' - its resolution through a new postulate of reference and the creation of a new generic kinship in and through resemblance - we must still ask what guarantees or legitimates the validity of the median position, that sense of inevitability and naturalness through which we state or arrive at this position. From whence comes the justification for the hierarchy and its semantic grafting? What necessity is there to interpret what would otherwise be a 'unique' possibility of meaning as rightfully fitting, matching or proceeding from the lexicalized or conventional use? Conversely, how does the conventional signification system open a space, make room for this novel possibility without an interpretation that matches these positions but cannot, finally, be justified? It is through the concept of mediation at the theoretical level that such a 'bringing-together', rapprochement, resemblance, 'predicative assimilation', etc., takes place. This is our concern in the concluding chapter.

To speak of music as a metaphor of time is to withdraw any claim concerning the expression of a form of mind, a cognitive function, formal depiction, or an emotional release. It is to capture that sense that our understanding of time and ourselves is both restricted to an image, controlled by linguistic convention and signification systems, and the possibility for opening up a space in these conventions for new meaning. Music organizes time for us and invites participation in a figurative space, thereby exhibiting the fundamental paradox of time.
Chapter 6

Reading as Philosophical Inquiry

Section A) The Efficacious Mediation

The relevance of the temporal paradox for criticism or reading can be understood in terms of the possible separation of roles between artist, critic and reader and the consequent identity of art objects. For this raises a concern about the conceptual relation and the nature of the 'syntactic structure' through which distinction, identification and evaluation are made, between the concept of a discrete autonomous art object with immanent meaning and the notion of normative standards or set of criteria used in forming a judgement. This question does not necessarily involve practical issues of justifying the validity of reasons already selected as relevant. For if it were, if we set out to prove the propriety of certain reasons themselves and in general the justification for applying a critical preference to the work, we would be assuming 1) a methodological imperative - the validity of both an autonomous aesthetic experience or attitude prior to statements about it, and 2) a view of aesthetic appreciation in which the identity of an object as art amounts to difference in type or mode of appreciation rather than another alternative; say some sort of emergent structure.

A more fundamental question deals with the possibility of the selection of that information that is deemed relevant when considering reasons and evidence and the conceptual process through which a critical procedure is legitimated. In this final chapter, we want to explore some of the implica-
tions of Derrida's metaphor of domination operating behind the scene of the definition for the task of philosophy.

Is a critical approach to the social artifact or valorizing theory only legitimated within the configuration of philosophy as the science of epistemology or methodology? In this way aesthetic experience has been constituted through an interrogative search of a self-constituting rationality for the conditions of the possibility of the experience of its object - the experience of art? The transformation that philosophy has undergone, the move from an epistemological need to define first principles to the notion of 'eventual' meaning, suggests that the combative, agonistic relation of art and philosophy must be re-thought in terms that reflects the end of a 'metaphysical' form of philosophy. 1) But in supporting the new ontology, is the privileged position or ground of the critical analysis of knowledge as separate fields of experience, is this undermined? Our claim here is that, due precisely to the challenge of art to philosophy, of the resonance and dominance of interpretive procedures, the task of philosophy is criticism or critical reading and criticism, then, is not only justified on the basis of an epistemological configuration of philosophy but transformed as well.

The problem with formal criticism in the modern context is that, in taking itself as its own object, the ungrounded acceptance of this dialectical activity as defining rationality, was held of necessity. Mediation justified criticism and guaranteed that the assumption of inevitability, that is, the 'telos' of mediation, would remain the unquestioned movement of rationality, of the figure in philosophy's own narrative. The 'that for the sake of which', as the teleological import of mediation, legitimates the argument. The challenge for philosophy in this new configuration or situation is that, as a critical discourse, it would become continuous with the language of its object.
We will attempt to justify the discontinuity of modernist thinking in this new context by questioning the secondary assumption of mediation, which has functioned to legitimate the distinction between philosophy and its self-as-object implied in formal criticism. In this way, the mediating relationship between a set of criteria and the unique artifact is one of judgement whose propriety was grounded on the movement of a narrative of either emancipation through political/economic action or the speculative totality of a system through which a subject becomes informed and self-conscious. As this legitimating move becomes incredulous and discredited, a discourse is then seen as a pragmatic move in an agonistic game through which an opponent accepts one's applicable rules as valid. (2) Our position is that this view is still based on the potential of mediation in the narrative of philosophy that overlooks the threatening and paradoxical undecidability by marginalizing this position.

To question the assumed identity of the concept of rationality and the concept of mediation, is to open the issue of paradox, rather than paralogy. It is to set in competition the uniqueness of an artifact or the revolutionary movement of an experiment against the normative criteria of accepted tradition and background conventions or theoretical framework. In an attempt at suspending the teleological import, we will investigate the conceptual pattern leading from the artistic challenge to philosophy, to the conception of philosophy's own role.

By bracketing the notion of mediation, questions of the propriety and ethico-political movement of thought arise. Is information arbitrarily selected as evidence by a tacit, passive assumption excluding other information? What guides the selection of relevant information? Are evaluative judgements subject to a certain indeterminacy? What lends validity to a reason for
accepting normative standards? How can a critical interpretation be justified? Is there an ideological free position. Is the 'artifactuality' of the art object, the making of its distinct extra-territorial sphere and of its particular aesthetic value - is this already a commitment to a particular aesthetic theory, and thereby a justification for the imposition of one-interpretation or the limitation of interpretive procedure by one dominant signifying group? All these questions have a bearing on the effective role of mediation in the interpretative process of critical thinking. And finally, if the operative medium of the 'metaphor of domination' can be revealed through these questions, philosophy as a critical discourse would not be continuous with the language of its object, since a critical question would not have a determining or mediating role.

The narrative of mediation might be cast in terms of Balakian's comparative approach (3) which assumes a constant and inevitable common ground between the moral code of the critic and the art object defined in terms of the artistic intention that allows a 'recasting' of one system or set of interests in terms of another. It seems to acknowledge a difference in rules, motivation, purpose and structure, etc., and yet legitimate that process as an intentional or fulfilling mediation between absolutely separate spheres of activity (artistic and critical) instead of a valorization and identification of an object through the imposition of one system on another. The result is to produce a self-sustaining work with an immanent and intrinsic meaning which the critic reveals to the non-artistic public.

However, Balakian sees the artificial imposition of the interpretive tools of the human sciences - the infringement of the absolute integrity of the artistic creative process by a usurping criticism - as symptomatic of the modernist trend to de-value creator, recipient and critic. However, by
rejecting this possibility of an 'a priori' value system, the aesthetic difference and all its necessary distinct spheres of activity have been eliminated unless one can draw a distinction between identifying the work under an 'a priori' moral code and the imposition of a model and method of the human sciences.

Balakian would justify this difference by means of the inevitability and propriety of a third or median position between the heterogeneity of relativism and the homogeneity of an immanent code. (4)

However, if there can be no third mediating position between positions 1 and 2 that does not itself introduce a newly formed interested position, then it may be fruitful to inquire into this duality implied in the critical task from both directions simultaneously. This introduces the notion of reading as the movement of risk in the temporal continuity of coherence of meaning – the undecidability and fluctuations between both positions or of what would appear as paradoxical without the propriety of the median position. Insofar as reading is, on the one hand, controlled by the system of signification, and on the other, interpretive and resistant to a foreign code of values, it functions according to the incompatibilities of the temporal paradox – time as organized and articulated for us through a narrative convention versus the configuration of time as reflecting personal sensibilities.

To deny mediation its import of inevitability is both to affirm a 'distorting efficaciousness' in the theoretical application, and to uncover the possibility and the third position directs attention away from the original paradox rather than serving as evidence of a proper resolution. In other words, the concept of reading developed here, suggests that the work is always at risk in its reading since no non-interpretive guarantee is available
to stand against the necessary externality (after-the-factness) of interpretation. Mediation is problematized by a careful attention to the act of reading.

Consider for a moment a methodological difficulty associated with predating the concept 'unique' (one term in our paradox) of an aesthetic object claimed to elude classification. Here a similar problem arises concerning the method or controlling features of theoretical presuppositions implied in a conventionally accepted system to mediate the discussion between the polarity 'unique and criteria'. What presuppositions govern these opposing positions in a particular 'context?'

Our option is to consider as closely as possible that duality of the temporal paradox implied in criticism through which the different critical roles are linked. However, even on this account, we would cite, against the relativist, the relevance of descriptive assertions - the question is how relevance is construed in practice. The suggestion is that what makes a feature relevant is its inclusion or selection alongside or according to a commitment to a normative standard plus a tacit semantic theory through which the notion of criteria is relevant. In other words, if we fail to make the argument for a commonplace understanding, to predicate uniqueness is still a generalized description. It is to determine from a broad field of information certain facts about the object or reasons as relevant to an evaluative verdict on the basis of a critical normative canon. In this way a fact is made descriptively true, when construed in terms of a normative statement and to cite a perceptual quality as a reason for high aesthetic appraisal reflects an already effected determination of information through critical standards. Reference, then, to such standards seems to lack any mediation as a rational or non-arbitrary basis in decisions of critical disputes, for here we are dealing with a process of translation or the interpretive nature of
'reading' that already specifies the field of information in bringing into play different systems or critical contexts with signifying relevance.

If reading is understood as translation or transcription, one might try to limit interpretation through a mediation as a production and classification of knowledge in terms of the social relation, as the pragmatic issue of the means to appropriate certain linguistic procedures, by participants in the art institution - that shows us what to look for or "... how to go on in such a discussion or argument." (5).

The distinction between merely reading-in and handling the text in such a way that makes an interpretation answerable to some sort of 'objective constraint', can be maintained while accepting that the quality of the work cannot be justified as a matter of direct perception. A perceptual judgement would be an agreement to accept a certain quality of a work symbolized through 'exemplars' or models which direct us to the concreteness of meaning, to the constancy of an actual practice.

But how to construe the force of 'objective constraints'? The question remains unanswered and we might agree with Graham McFee when he asks on the basis of just what conceptual tools is the text or artwork to be taken or seen in just that way? If translation can be standardized through pragmatics, then reading becomes a cognitive process or an indirect perceptual process, with its implications of order and classification. However, objective constraints are weak, since the problem of legitimation concerns determining the relevance of a cognitive stock that is an external ensemble of concepts: Why this selection of information rather than another?

Even if this last question is rhetorical, and no criteria of selection apart from the interest the reader has in the information is relevant, we may still define interest in the 'gesture' of the argument as philosophical. And
this indeed is finally the issue of this chapter. What construction of philosophy is possible when looking for an alternative to the concept of polarity (of uniqueness/criteria)? Is even this situation desirable? How do we justify it? Our proposal in this context, is to delimit a space for philosophical activity as an interest with how the argument 'moves' and the direction it does so move – towards 'indeterminacy!' By this I mean how the argument proceeds to legitimate itself through it's presentation by assuming the propriety of mediation as a deflection of the question of reading-in.

However, how do we show that a text moves towards indeterminacy? We can make a tentative argument. Since every text amounts to a theoretically plausible interpretation, then there is no immanent meaning in the text and at least indeterminacy is a possibility. It is at this point where we are met with an argument positing the strongest identity between rationality and the inevitability of mediation. That is, a set of criteria are exclusive and sufficient to bind any rational speaker and justified on purely rational grounds as reflecting a specific human trait, i.e. intellecction. I take this to be Beardsley's proposal: An analysis of critical concepts legitimated by empirical observation of critical practice through which one can deduce an operative set of critical canons to act as relevant reasons for judgements of aesthetic merit.

In "Testability of Art Interpretation" (6), Beardsley tries to establish a procedural rule for interpretation of artistic merit that grounds the deductive act. The suggestive or connotative force of terms can be used as evidence guiding the regional meaning. Interpretation would be a rule-governed procedure, and consequently, either true or false. In other words, no two interpretative statements could have equal legitimacy and the strict logical incompatibility between two interpretations requires one to be
rejected. Further, it is a mistake to claim that there is no way of deciding concerning various interpretations and no rational grounds for preferring one at the exclusion of all others.

But the intellectual trait of deduction that mediates critical practice and operative canon relies on a particular version of the Illocutionary/Perlocutionary Theory of meaning, for its explanation and identify. The potential of a sentence is its use to perform or offer suggestions for action, according to accepted rules of the linguistic community. The meaning of a word, then, its connotative or suggestive force, is its potential contribution to the illocutionary act potential of sentences.

Thus the semantic status of an entity or event is exhausted in terms of of the illocutionary act of the sentence. However, if the speaker can represent, take responsibility for, the same set of conditions as holding through two different sentences, then one might object that a difference between the two relevant terms is a difference between connotation or assertion that is subjective and particular. To counter this proposal, Beardsley claims that the existence of subjective meaning does not prove a difference in internal meaning, but association brought about by a particular context in which the sentence is performed. The objection attributes the lack of semantic difference between two apparently different sentences to the suggestive power of personal ingenuity. Beardsley claims that a real difference in sentential meaning is possible through secondary or compounding illocutionary acts.

In this way the distinction is now made between different uses of a text in a reading, i.e., the imposition of a pre-determined system of thought versus a genuine interpretation based on a close reading of what is internal to the text itself. Only if the connotative resources of the language were entirely subjective in nature, would interpretation be a superimposition. But
on what grounds can we base this distinction, or commitment to tolerate a wide variety of uses, as opposed to interpretations? What is the difference between this self-promotion, superimposition and 'exercising sensitivity and ingenuity' in a novel reading since both are based on differences in semantic theories that are meant to account for the concept of art? Is the rule of artistic merit dependent upon a certain manner of construing meaning and the ontological status of an event?

Can we claim that interpretations are neither true nor false but only plausible? Beardsley's reply, "Plausibility is at least an appearance of truth based upon some relevant evidence" (7) implies that plausibility must, in principle, tend towards a true/false opposition as its natural fulfillment. Thus, to accept 'reasonableness' on these grounds, is to admit that an interpretation is of the same logical kind as to produce truth-making reasons for its being a superior alternative. In fact, Beardsley's main contention in that article is "to show that public semantic facts, the connotation and suggestion in poems, are the stubborn data with which the interpreter must come to terms, even in his most elaborate, imaginative, and daring proposal." (8)

But if the difference between plausibility and incompatibility is ultimately one of theories of meaning, we might have a very different answer for what is meant as 'public semantic fact'. For the cultural epistemic background is constantly emerging as well as the entities produced. The 'connotative resources of the language' that Beardsley takes as factual enough to restrict arbitrary interpretations is itself subject to various kinds of transformations as well as the regional meanings of the text. This would preclude a true or false decision concerning interpretative statements of regional meanings as the relation between normative standards and
interpretation would be contingent rather than necessary and, therefore, too logically weak to allow a reasonableness stronger than plausibility.

Plausibility is one of the essential features of Margolis' "Robust Relativist" (9) the other being the rejection of skepticism as concerns a set of non-relativistic judgements guaranteeing the validity, in principle, appropriate to the truth of such relativistic judgements. 'Aptness' as a criterion would replace truth or falsity and is compatible with incongruence in aesthetic judgements.

The intention here is to show that Beardsley's claim is 'inherently indecisive', and that the aesthetic judgements require a more relativistic construction. There are other types of judgements that require a relativistic point of view, which Margolis terms 'comparative judgements'. That is, judgements that call for supportive reasons, but which depend on personal preference and, therefore, do not achieve the necessity of truth-value statements that are binding in any rational speaker. Further, Beardsley's principle of autonomy, i.e., that art works are self-sufficient entities whose properties can be appealed to as the final authority confuses a theory for individuating works of art with a commitment to a relativist demarcation. Margolis maintains these issues are separate but grants that the autonomy principle could be defended by a numerical identity theory plus a theory concerning the properties of artworks. As Beardsley fails to produce the latter, he fails to consider a distinction between 'genuine interpretations' and superimpositions where the latter may in fact be needed precisely because the ambiguity created by the lack of a definite line of demarcation may be significant for some person's particular aesthetic appreciation.

Is there a rule of procedure to which interpretative acts conform? The problem in answering this question lies in the uniqueness/standardization
dichotomy and the consequent indeterminacy between the relativist and immanentist positions. Each position presupposes a difference in semantic construction. Following Margolis, this query constitutes an observation on an inadequacy within 'critical rationality' itself, i.e., the apparent self-sufficiency, internal to any system, that a personal investment can be elevated into a critical canon. The result is a field of relativist theories for critical consumption. However, the problem now is that this nihilistic trend originating in this unsettling of critical standards as such, now returns as a self-criticism of the relativist position for, it appears, one theory is disman-tled through the presuppositions of another with its own pretense of self-sufficiency. It is in this sense that we now wish to pursue indeterminacy of meaning as the genuine undecidability between to positions at the philo-sophical level. We are forced again to move even further away from relativ-ism as a theoretical account of a historical or cultural condition of meaning, to the interpositioning of texts in a non-teleological conversation about the 'work of art'. This forms the basis for the final indeterminancy of the meaning of a text.

Each position in this debate is a complex argument of implicit theories and tacit readings, one set seeking the limits of the other. The indeter-minancy that lies between this polarity, is that space of the conversation that sustains the tradition. The issue for us, then, revolves around this figurative space and the sort of function, critical or otherwise, if might perform.

Even such a commitment to indeterminancy seems to be tempered by the acceptance of the teleological import of mediation. Our contention, here, has been that mediation, the intellectual negotiating of this space, always creates
a virtually new third position that challenges the legitimation of criteria for selection of evaluative rules by means of the figure of the 'telos'.

Even in achieving a consensus, within a tradition, the efficacity of mediation, that is productive of the consensus, is taken as fair, inevitable and, properly, reasonable. Such a consensus theory (10) evolves in the same philosophical context of value and the legitimation of criteria and normative standard that conditions the unique/systematic issue. Mediation is taken explicitly as establishing a value for a work within the tradition in a theory that accepts, therefore, that rule-making or rule-governing critical behaviour is a post hoc procedure following upon creativity.

The complex consensus theory is meant to solve this legitimation dilemma, i.e., the decision as to whether the work is to be judged in terms of rules it transgressed since transgression does not necessarily imply failed aesthetic effect. It is the acceptance of the work in a performative repertoire or in a system of critical consensus between relevant practitioners of the arts, that lends the work its value as opposed to any set of criteria that would validate a judgement.

However, there is a problem with the consensus theory that might be understood in the following terms. The tradition is a consensus of interpretation conformity with which qualifies a critic's interpretation and therefore tradition might be seen as determining a signification system through which a value is presented for us. Secondly, the validity of the consensus theory is provided by argumentation. Therefore, the consensus that validates is not self-validating but is itself at risk to further re-formulation, to further acceptance, by any innovative interpretation that uncovers the 'unspoken or concealed' features in a consensus, i.e., re-writes the relevant history in order to value, to 'place' the work appropriately in terms of that new
historical account. Since it is not self-validating, but in need of an argument to support its interpretation, a consensus can only be a possible standard governing the quality of a work; agreement with which would suggest the propriety of an interpretation. Therefore, a new interpretive or evaluative judgement can be offered of the received tradition if and only if the consensus itself can be construed with some degree of necessity or inevitability. Failing that, to evaluate a particular work is to re-interpret or translate the tacit reasoning behind the consensus - to yield a new reading of the relevant history. We will return to this discussion below in Section B.

In summary fashion, then, the complex consensus theory relies on the addition of a reciprocal relationship in which individual judgements by a 'qualified' critic determines the consensus, while at the same time the verdict of the consensus exercises systematic and valorizing control over the individual judgement and justifies the 'quality' of the critical judgement. This presents us with a circular position: Understanding that necessarily precedes evaluative judgement requires reference to, and is determined or configured by, the value giving verdict of the consensus in order to validate its evaluation.

Section B) Criticism, Resistance, and Philosophical Responsibility

Our alternative is to pursue a radical dis-association of a set of criteria and uniqueness - a teleological suspension of normative rules - that suggests a theoretical construction to account for the 'possible', rather than necessary, status of evaluative presuppositions. The difficulty with the Complex Consensus Theory may only be its insistence on the necessity of normative
standards. If such standards are in any way imposed under the name of 'mediation', no real resolution of two opposing views is effected, but rather creates an original and innovative position seeking either the interests of one of the preceding positions or a completely new system of interests. The situation, then, remains paradoxical and meaning is therefore indeterminate insofar as it is incapable of rational resolution in terms of a non-distorting mediation. The actual presentation or determination of meaning is made by other non-philosophical (i.e., psycho-social) interests.

Can we provide an alternative, a systematic articulation of these two critical position, and their respective philosophical tasks without mediation? In broad outlines, it would appear as follows.

The existent art institution exerts its influence by means of excluding certain possibilities of interpretation. The theoretical reason lies in the nature of the signification in which the signifier is separated from the signified by a temporalization process, meaning that the connection between the signifier and the signified is synchronic in nature but not inevitable, momentarily consolidated according to a historical epoch and an interpretative theory. Such a process, however, is fundamentally paradoxical insofar as two contradictory views are possible over the efficacy of the temporal image through which signifier and signified are linked. 1) The image is the 'figurative space' in which the reader articulates a story, a self understanding in a linear time sequence through a narrative reconstruction of a series of events. 2) The image is the conventional configuration of time for us, of meaning and value basic to our self-understanding. The task of philosophy is to keep this space between these two positions open and not foreclose on further possibilities of explaining rationality.
In the first case where the image is seen as a figurative space through which we articulate time, the text is inexhaustible and the meaning under-determined. Subsequently, each reading undermines the text and the readers' interests and viewpoint are adequate in any interpretation. Insofar as the reader's response influences and determines the text, the work is seen as a unique instance incapable of a description under formal aesthetic categories or a set of evaluative criteria. In such a case the critic's role is to construct a model of interpretation for the viewer. It is subjective, suggestive and positive.

In the second case, where the temporal image is articulated for us through a conventional symbolism, the given language provides access to the world as a text. The adequacy of an interpretation is measured by a set of criteria for evaluative judgements of works of art and the critical role, then, is primarily negative; to control interpretation by revealing the historical, cultural relevance of the work in a convention.

We are here really asking two questions. 1) If our self-understanding is controlled by linguistic, social or institutional conventions and signification systems, if the meaning and value of our experience is given 'for us' and, hence, our understanding is restricted to the presented image, then what is the task of philosophy? 2) If, in understanding a work, we (the reader) articulate a narrative, thereby humanizing time in a linear progression by making sense of our experience for ourselves, then we rule the meaning of the image. What, then, is the task and responsibility of philosophy?

From the point of view of the first question, the existence of a universal program or set of criteria justifies philosophy as an intelligible social critique, for these structures guide the institution and provide an intelligible matrix for reasonably grounded assertions reflected in the institutional
values. But criticism as such a 'self-critique' has a mainly negative function in that it excludes, not other interpretations, but other criteria for validity in critical work itself, i.e., that criticism is continuous with the 'critiqued'. Other competing views based on similar critical conventions seem to be allowed, even through raging disagreement. Without such diversity, criticism would not be possible—much less an issue to be debated.

In the second instance, no appeal to an overriding or external concern or evaluative criteria is possible, given the subjective, indeterminate text. Hence, each work of art is seen as 'unique' and without parallel. Such singular attribution also permits a diversity of interpretation. It is then a positive form of criticism, not in a sense opposed to the negativity of the previous instance which allows differences in the critical task but necessitates unity of evaluative criteria— but only insofar as it does not exercise force in restricting the critical work—restricting the field of information on which the interpretation can be based.

One possibility remains that these two positions can be related through a strategy of criticism that is straightforwardly interpretive. A reading of a text in this sense would see a mediation as an interposition of texts, conversations, etc. This process of apprehending a text as a metaphorical appropriation through various other readings, re-forms a text, sets it in motion, recalls the figure worked through the text but perhaps without necessarily dismantling the center. The concern here is not whether the notion of paradox preserves the center but to examine the suggestion of interference, and whether the figure in the text warrants the collapse of the self-identity of the philosophical text into its literary figure. If it does not, philosophy would define and be defined by that critical space of reading—a responsibility to the preservation of a radical openness.
An obvious reading of the text is not necessarily one that would preclude the equivocal richness of the text. The co-presence of the 'other' obscure reading as inextricably bound, a 'doubleness' that is part of the identity of the text. J. Hillis Miller (11) refers to this relation as a 'reciprocal obligation of parasite and host' that speaks of an inherent ambiguity through the reversal of this relation. The reader is simultaneously directed by the text to its opposite reading, an obvious fragment is seen to possess a richness of meaning through its intertextual resonance. The univocacy of a single referential grammar is founded equally on the self-justifying privileged texts of its tradition as being parasitical on weaker obscure readings that are excluded in the discourse. By means of this supplemental character of parasite/host, criticism itself is not a separate coherent discourse on the language of the text or its speech, but a simulacrum resulting from the asymmetrical relation of a critical text continuous with the language and structure of the artwork.

The idea that the critical reading of the text is not identical to the text itself, suggests that the relation between positions in this structure cannot be that of mediated opposition, of cancellation/preservation by means of a dialectical synthesis with its implication of a principle or teleological development, of origin and final point. Rather a system of figurative thought and concept are linked in a delinearized development around which turns the play between opposite readings. The meaning of the text resonates out of the inherence of oppositives that is set in motion by encompassing contexts of reading. What renders the meaning of the text indeterminate, is the openness of the undecidability of this moment between positions and the necessary generation of new positions as links in this chain. The meaning of
each term is being brought into focus, refers to an earlier position. Univo-
cacy and richness require each other.

Is it possible to construe the text as an interpretation without a com-
mmitment to a process of mediation or dialectical synthesis? How can we
comprehend the reasons for any relation between two positions without
thereby providing a grounding for a rational certainty of an unequivocal
interpretation— that i.e.,'in the name of which' we seek a relation?

The two previous systematic articulations of critical positions of figura-
tive thought would remain undecidable if one generated the other, and
therefore, forbade a final definitive interpretation. But to preserve the
paradoxical relation, the concept of a critical reading must be centered about
this paradox—and this must mean undermining any and all relation even
inherence, that supplies any linkage to previous systems. Absolute disconti-
uuity precludes any homogeneous relation, and insofar as a mediation, even
if a reversal of the polarity of relevant terms, is present, that presence
would constitute a mediation. Such discontinuity would be a matter of
formulating the question of interpretation in terms of the appropriateness of
some normative standard, rather than answering the role of criticism. Thus,
our original question concerning the positioning of indeterminancy between
the heterogeneous unique and the homogeneous standard becomes: How can
Miller guarantee that this dismantling strategy would not stabilize into a
theoretical presupposition? Or, is this 'problematization' of the referential
structure sufficient to achieve a figurative space? If not, what sort of
ground will suffice for these two positions to co-exist? Is even this notion
(of 'for the sake of what') in virtue of which these two positions exists,
valid? In brief, what sort of movement is possible when all direction is
foregone?
One possible answer is the necessity of a somewhat 'frivolous' intellectual movement without direction that would preclude the concept of 'for the sake of truth'. This has the advantage of preserving that discontinuity between the uniqueness of interpretation and the system of signification: a discontinuity based on the paradoxical concept of a temporal image. A philosophical text could be preserved as the text in a particular set of texts that encourage the question of the ground of meaning - a recounting of the relation between text and reading. By what right, or how is it possible, that we are ever meant to comprehend the final character of the text - as if it is capable of a final solution? By means of this opening onto the indeterminancy of the space of the figure, onto a kind of freedom, philosophy, then, would be a discourse of meaning, a separate language that in negotiating a momentary bridge of passage, for the sake of a necessary movement between these two positions, creates a new position. As a new set of critical interests, without concern for a mediation understood even as a reversal of the relation, philosophy would assume no determinate meaning. Such an unmediated bridge passage could only be understood as a non-repeatable simulacrum of preceding position.

In this case we are dealing with the role, nature and import of a set of interests in determining a discourse by excluding information. In closing this paper, we will explore the possibility of a critical philosophy that is not a critique: A position that is not subject to the theoretical or methodological presuppositions which undermine its criticism, understood as the inevitability of mediation and its potential to figure the truth of the argument in terms of a narrative. In raising this question, both Jaques Atalli and K.M. Newton present an ideological criticism of art as social/cultural phenomenon.
Atalli's *The Political Economy of Music* (12) is an example of the risk to the consensus theory: a re-reading of music history that is simultaneously an articulation of the concept of a musical phenomenon or rather its meaning, its ontological status. Music history is not simply an autonomous chronology of events. Rather to comprehend the past is, in effect, to understand present social practice. The concept or consensus that informs a reading of history simultaneously presents the meaning of musical phenomena. The consensus understood in terms of the received performance practice, composition procedures and critical evaluations, etc., must avoid the recognition of the conflict of interests at this point of origin. This conflict has generated its own theory and practice which in turn takes itself for granted as universal and necessary. Its privileged text and history are only inevitable when the paradoxical origin or point of contrasts between narrative structure and private interest is suppressed. Only after ideological structures are in place and accepted with the belief in their permanent value, does theoretical analysis arise with the apparent justification of a theory that works.

In particular, the modern comprehension of the propriety of theory takes the musical sign as a mathematical relation of tones described formally with no relation to social function or human emotional import. Inaccessible works are then evaluated against this background information that is understood as relevant and inclusive and that produces musical phenomena as subject to normative descriptions. The initial task or responsibility of a philosophical or resistant reading is to uncover this moment by disclosing the means through which music can reflect the ideological practice of a society to exercise power in channelling and marginalizing 'noise' or criticism; to reveal
the tacit agreement through which a 'history of music' is conflated with the musical phenomena.

Finding no theoretical necessity in that function variously defined as mediatory, since 1) history tends to be re-written, and 2) intellectual activity is efficacious - has a cumulative effect, we look to the institution and its ability to delimit a discourse. Therefore, can we generalize this analysis to encompass the art institution that governs conventions? Can control of a discourse or theory be legitimated? Is the institution justified, on rational grounds, in exercising a role in determining the discourse? If not, can it be justified by other means, political, social, etc.?

If the operation of 'rationality' includes the function of the institution to impose limits, then our conception of philosophical criticism would be undermined since its theoretical indeterminacy is predicated upon an imperative of pluralism. This would be seriously challenged if some controlling interest were justified, in the name of reason, in governing interpretation. However, there appears to be nothing in the language of the text, the controlling subject matter, 'connotation' or even Black's 'system of associated commonplaces', that can limit the extent of associations possible or differentiate valid from arbitrary interpretations. If the signifier is separated from and has priority over the signified, it is because an entire set of texts, readings, conversions, etc., consistently interpose themselves on the part of author, critic and reading public. Each interpositioning translates into a re-reading of history, simultaneously selecting its own evaluative criteria.

This challenges the notion of propriety, of self-constituted immediacy of meaning in the text. But it is also to engage in a questioning of a different order that requires a pluralistic account, a justification of the appropriateness of one's own theory of meaning which cannot be settled by
re-articulating the received theoretical position since this is precisely what
needs to be discussed. This determination of one context by another might
be conceived of as a descriptive resolution that proceeds by translation of
the very question within a new context. The solution, in being transcribed,
is postponed.

Therefore, since there is no coincidence between the determinate mean-
ing of the text and that genuine possibility of philosophical questioning (that
is effected without the privileged texts), the determination is made without
rational justification. It would appear that at this pivoting point of justice
and reason, that for the sake of which the argument is presented, the
critical position of philosophy is not necessarily an imposition of one system
upon another. But are there other grounds for imposing limits?

While accepting that the language of the text imposes no limits on
interpretation due to its arbitrarily chosen ground, K.M. Newton nonethe-
less attempts to prove, "... the existence of an authority, inevitably with
its basis in ideology, that will impose limits on interpretation by judging
certain interests(...) to be improper and unacceptable." (13) This justifica-
tion in the name of reason, seeks to bring together our two conceptual
figures: The necessity to adopt a fixed position that delivers access to an
immanent textual meaning through the closure of interpretation, or a fixed
relation of signifier to signified, and the openness of interpretation - its
fragmentation among private concerns - brought about by the priority of the
signifier unprecedented by a signified.

If there is no theoretical argument for the validity of some interpreta-
tion governing interests based on a reasonable restriction, then we might
opt, as Newton does, for the argument from practical necessity based on a
forceful but passive exclusion of certain interests by a dominant ideology
operative in the literary institution. By presenting a rational argument for a practical necessity, we would also deflect any claim that this behaviour was irrational. And the question now becomes: how to justify the right and existence of an authority to act by moral or political force?

The situation with respect to an institutional authority and its right to act by force in limiting acceptable interpretations appears to be twofold: 1) subject to social conditions or acceptance that must be maintained for the sake of the institution's legitimacy and, therefore, exercises a force to limit interpretations. 2) It can and must sanction interpretations that a change in social practice validates in order to maintain its social acceptability and relevance. The second point returns us to an ambiguity in the notion of 'self-defence' defined as the imposition of limitation for the sake of which certain interpretations are then labelled as marginal. In this sense the situation is reversed and the notion of institutional defence can itself be dismantled by showing its aggressively censorial role based on a particular theoretical model taken as justified, against which an imaginative and unique interpretation must 'defend' itself by raising the question of the archaic nature of outdated institutional rules in relation to contemporary concerns. How does, in fact, an essentially conservative force of the institution sanction new interpretations? What necessity is there in the statement that the literary or in general the art institution must base its claim to legitimacy on the need to accept a practice only if validated by social interests? What guarantees can the latter claim?

A related question concerns the repression of the institution's own arbitrary origin in interpretation that encourages a mystification over the issue of self-justification. The institution justifies its position by elevating its own interested texts to a privileged status. Authorization is, then, a
matter of disavowing knowledge of the contingency of its origin by enforcing an interpretation consistent with its sanctioned texts. Is not this use of power irrational, a matter of suppressing an unacceptable bit of knowledge? The literary institution acknowledges this contingency but claims a pragmatic or social necessity, and not a theoretical one, in construing validity of interpretation and, therefore, a right to limit interpretations.

Thus one would suspect that Attali is right: that the movement of thought is done not for the sake of truth but perhaps for fairness and justice, that is, when freed from the 'telos' of mediation that has guaranteed 'truth'. If limiting procedures and criteria are based on investments, interests and motivations, then restriction of the discourse cannot be justified. That interpretations are limited and only granted acceptability is no doubt true. But such a determination of meaning is presented by means other than philosophical, when 'philosophical' is conceived without the notion of mediation, as simply the open space of questioning. In this sense, a critical or resistant approach to a text is not always merely the expression of a modern narrative.

In developing the notion of a temporal paradox, it maybe possible to explain why such an antinomy, as that mentioned in this text, should exist between the immediacy of absolute self-presence and any of a variety of forms of mediation. And at least the argument of linguistic continuity between text and citation or commentary in philosophical discourse does not disprove a uniquely philosophical enterprise. Alternatively, a philosophical or critical reading occurs in the open space of the figure, a point of contact between uniqueness of interpretation and normative application of a system of signs. This space is not, however, a rational mediation, for the paradox, as such, generates internally consistent but mutually exclusive articulations
whose grounding lies in our relation to time or the duality of our concept of
time. No final determination or decision is immanent as the work is pro-
foundly ambivalent, indeterminate or uninterpretable since its unity lies
outside itself, or its point of origin is 'off the scale' – it cannot be measured
by a measure it has generated.

A text retains its problematic nature as a philosophical text, since its
meaning is resolved once we approach it with an interrogative question that
opens upon a conceptual 'noise', a new figurative space – the complex position
or question of meaning centered around the text. Because the concept of
rational position cannot be determined by the concept of mediation, philoso-
phy is a critical questioning or reading without the uncritical assumption of
its origin, of imposing its own order on another field.
Conclusion

This thesis has dealt with the construction and coherence of an 'aesthetics' of meaning. An artifact is 'presented' by an individual or on behalf of an interested group with a particular set of interests. We have tried to show that a presentation is effected through diverse yet partly systematic means through which such an investment can be stabilized or protected. Rational 'thinking' under the concept of mediation, extends its influence as an element in the larger encompassing narrative of philosophy. This 'story of philosophy' is what legitimates or lends propriety to the mediation of oppositions. Equally, the necessity for conceptual clarity and the achievement of the 'self-critique' of its own position must be preserved as the distinguishing character of philosophical writing.

That a system retains its controlling influence and how this is possible, is first encountered through an analysis of the particular dynamic quality of musical phenomena. If we accept that music is a metaphor for time, an interesting feature with a certain explanatory power is suggested. 'Meaning' may be more often a 'trumped' or deviating activity, than the controlled and rationally ordered process we have assumed, in which plotting the course of deviation is of more critical interest and significance than charting lines of direct communication.

Exemplified in musical and narrative construction, is the necessity of a signification system as it conceives of time. A paradox resides in this fact, that while embodying time in this way, a consciousness subject to a private and unique set of interests equally articulates time for itself. We note, further, that the open space of the figure or metaphor invites and encourages this sort of imaginative participation, but equally structures our
experience through its image. A surprising aspect of metaphor, as a temporal and spatial figure, is this controlling authority, the 'other', an 'imageless thought', the temporal figure that in being occupied or defined, simultaneously or ambiguously occupies the site of the reader, undermining a strict univocal and determinate, naming-function on the part of language.

The continuity between the uniqueness of the work and the normative standards is prohibited on purely rational grounds. The conception of this difference as a distinction between event and structure, signifier and signified, is challenged. As the reader mediates this distinction, he/she interprets the situation in accord with a set of interests, that is to say, sees the event in terms of a structure only because the structure is seen as yielding this event.

In the final analysis, no claim is made to determine the task of criticism. The point of the paper is to re-cast the question, to problematize the obvious. The suggestion is made, however, that if philosophy is identified with a resistant or critical inquiry, instead of a self-constituting resolution to certain pre-conceived definite problems, it would retain its own responsibility to that activity as distinct from that of which it is about. It could be a linguistically separate discourse on meaning.
Endnotes

Introduction

1 Stravinsky, I., Poetics of Music, in the Form of Six Lessons, trans. A. Knodel and I., Dhal (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982) 27. Stravinsky originally composed this text in French. It was, subsequently, translated into English in close consultation with Roland Manuel and delivered at Harvard University. A question remains over the exact attribution to Stravinsky of some doctrines expounded in this subsequent text.


3 See John Stopford, "Structuralism, Semiotics and Musicology," British Journal of Aesthetics 24 (1984): 129-137. Similar arguments are made concerning musical analysis as a consequence of a misconception over the nature of 'system'.
Endnotes

Chapter 1


10 Lord, C. "Indexicality, Not Circularity: Dickie's New Definition of Art,"

11 Ibid. 232.


13 Stecker, Ibid. 127.

14 Dickie, Art Circle 52.

15 Ibid. 53.

16 Ibid. 65.

17 Ibid. 55.

18 Ibid. 25.

19 Ibid. 24.

Endnotes

Chapter 2


4 *Ibid.* 120.


12 Ibid. 113.

13 Ibid. 111.

14 Ibid. 111.

15 Danto, Transfiguration 111.


18 Ibid. 267.

19 Ibid. 267.


21 Goodman, Languages of Art 59.


24 Goodman, Languages of Art 53.


27 Ibid. 117.

28 Ibid. 116.


30 Ibid. 3.

31 Ibid. 9.

32 Ibid. 11.
Endnotes:

Chapter 3


2 Ibid. 214.

3 Ibid. 214.

4 Ibid. 220.

5 Ibid. 221.

6 Ibid. 224-225.

7 Ibid. 228.


9 Ibid. 53-54.

10 Ibid. 36.


13. Ibid. 4.

14. Ibid. 5.

15. Ibid. 6.


17. Ibid. 35.


Endnotes

Chapter 4


2 Langer S., Philosophy in a New Key (New York: Mentor Books, 1951) 204.

3 Langer, Form 32.

4 Langer, Philosophy 206.

5 Langer, Form 109.

6 ibid. 113.

7 Langer, Philosophy 184.


9 See Langer, S., Problems of Art (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1957) where she defines the sense of logical expression appropriate to art as, "... expression in the logical sense, presenting the fabric of sensibility, emotion and strains of more concerted cerebration, for our impersonal cognition – that is in abstractio. This sort of symbolization is the prime office of
works of art, by virtue of which I call a work of art an expressive form."

120.

10 Ibid. 132-133.


13 Ibid. 168.

14 Ibid. 168.


17 Ibid. 411.

18 Ibid. 412.
19 Ibid. 413.

20 Ibid. 414.

21 It is this distinction between virtual image and temporal transaction that Zuckerkandl has in mind when he writes: "The dynamic event leaves no trace in the physical process. When we hear a melody, we hear things that have no counterpart in physical nature." Sound and Symbol, trans. W.R. Trask (New York: Princeton University Press, 1956) 23.


23 Ibid. 303.

24 Ibid. 303.

25 Zuckerkandl 64.

26 Zuckerkandl on defining musical meaning: "The meaning of a tone, however, lies not in what it points to but in the pointing itself: more precisely, in the different way, or the individual gesture, with which each tone points towards the same place. The meaning is not the thing indicated but the manner of indicating." 68.
27 Ibid. 250.

28 Ibid. 253.

29 Ibid. 259.


32 Ibid. 152.

33 Ibid. 154.

34 Ricoeur writes: "Thus they change under pressure of new inventions, since they proceed from this ongoing process of emplotting, but they change slowly and even resist change since they are sedimental forms of this process." 156.


36 Ibid. 158.

37 Ibid. 156-157.
Endnotes

Chapter 5


2 Ibid. 506.


4 Ibid. 154-155.


6 Ibid. 26.

7 Ibid. 27.

8 Ibid. 27-28.


10 Ibid. 74.
11 Ibid. 73.

12 Ibid. 72.


14 Ibid. 174.

15 Black, "Metaphor", 79.


17 Ibid. 240.


20 Ibid. 233.

21 Ibid. 241.


25. Ibid. 426.


27. Ibid. 219.

28. Ibid. 220.

29. Ibid. 228-229.

30. Ibid. 251.

31. Ibid. 243.

32. Ibid. 244.

33. Ricoeur, Rule 293.
ibid. 294.
Endnotes

Chapter 6


3 Balkian, A., "Relativism in the Arts and the Road to the Absolute". In Relativism in the Arts, ed. B.J. Craige (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1983) - for the comparative approach see 76.

4 Balakian attempts a middle course between the heterogeneity and homogeneity of a text: "The mediator has a valid basis for evaluating the quality of the work of art - not in terms of its current relevance to the relativistic poetic, any more than in terms of a teleological preestablished code of values, but according to his ability to be consistent in the manipulation of inconsistencies intentionally implanted in the artifact." 91.


7 Ibid. 373.

8 Ibid. 382.


Bibliography


