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INDIVIDUATION AND THE ABSOLUTE:
HEGEL, JUNG,
AND THE PATH TOWARD
COMPLEX HOLISM

by

Sean M. Kelly

Thesis submitted to the University of Ottawa in compliance with the requirements of the program leading to a Ph.D. in Religious Studies

Ottawa, Ontario

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It may well be that the future of the world, and thus the sense of the present and the significance of the past, will depend in the last analysis on contemporary interpretations of Hegel's work.

Alexandre Kojève

When enough individuals are carriers of the 'consciousness of wholeness,' the world itself will become whole....[Such are] the outlines of a new myth which I believe is emerging from the life and work of Jung.

Edward Edinger
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I would also like to thank the following people who, in various kinds and degrees, have helped me along the way: Stephen Anderson, David Carr, James Di Censo, Rosalind Kelly, Suzanne Kelly, Roger Lapointe, Philip Merklinger, Colin O’Connel, Catherine Roach, Diane Roach, Joseph Roach, Tim Sanderson, Dale Schlitt, and Kevin Sullivan.
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Introduction

The overarching concern of this study is to provide an example of a way of thinking which refuses to comply with the widespread and deep-seated tendency of the human intellect toward simplification, reductionism, and fragmentation. While this tendency continues to be the subject of harsh criticism from exponents of various kinds of holistic thinking, the latter often lack a sufficiently complex grasp of the conceptual and methodological issues at stake, and so risk lapsing into an equally simplificatory and reductionistic stance dominated by an abstract concept of the whole. To avoid both varieties of simplification and reductionism, it is necessary to cultivate an understanding of what I shall call the principle of complex holism. The major claim of this study is that a dialogue between Hegel and Jung will contribute significantly to such a cultivation.

The principle of complex holism, which received its foundational articulation in Hegel's concept of the Absolute, recognizes that such terms as nature and spirit, the finite and the infinite, the universal and the particular, the individual and the collectivity, are dialectically related or mutually implicative. Any position which maintains the absolute
priority of either term is necessarily abstract, and, therefore, ultimately false.

Now while Hegel is unquestionably a holist, he explicitly affirms that the universal is actual only in and through its particular instantiations, that the Absolute as Spirit lives and breathes only in real, incarnate, individual human beings. Conversely, while Jung argues for the unique individual as the exclusive bearer of existential value and meaning, his understanding of the archetypal basis of individuation recognizes the symbolic coincidence in depth of the individual (Self) with the Absolute (as God-image). Individuation and the Absolute, therefore, are correlative concepts, the dialogical synthesis of which will constitute the major task of this study.

With myself as moderator, the two interlocutors (Hegel and Jung) agree to explore the implications of their respective views as they unfold around the central concept of complex holism. The argument of the text, or the texture of the dialogue, consists in an interweaving of two complementary approaches--the speculative with the empirical, or the philosophical with the psychological--around the guiding pattern of the central concept. Though the methodological stance of this study is non-aligned with either of the two approaches, neither does it assume the fallacy of "scientific"
objectivity and impartiality. Its methodological bias, along with its organizational structure, is determined by the central concept itself which, as I demonstrate in the Conclusion, is fully consistent with the leading formulations of the emerging paradigm of the New Science (as evidenced in such figures as David Bohm, Ken Wilber, and Edgar Morin).

As to previous work on Hegel and Jung, the case of Walter Kaufmann is typical. In his last book, Discovering the Mind, which has a section on Hegel in the first volume and one on Jung in the third, Kaufmann fails to see that both thinkers could have anything to say to one another.¹ Among the Jungians, Edward Edinger and John Dourley have each noted areas of essential agreement—Edinger even implies the need for some kind of synthesis—but this (understandably, given the context) in the space of a few paragraphs.² To date I have found only one article which treats of Hegel and Jung in an explicit and relatively detailed manner: Seifert's "Ideendialektik und Lebensdialktik."³ The principal aim of the article is to argue

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the priority of the dialectic as lived—and as described empirically by Jung—over the dialectic as a mere procession of ideas as described by Hegel. Apart from not being quite fair to Hegel, the article offers a (not unexpectedly) limited picture of the extensity of the correspondences, and does not sufficiently appreciate the complementarity of the differences, between Hegel and Jung. The present study, by contrast, avoids these shortcomings by centering the dialogue around the principle of complex holism.

Apart from my own preliminary reflections on "Hegel, Jung, and the Spirit of History" (the substance of which appears, re-edited, as section two of Chapter Eight) I know of only two more recent articles dealing with the relation between Hegel and Jung. Barbara Eckman's brief article on "Jung, Hegel, and the Subjective Universe," unfortunately, is too superficial, especially with regard to the complexities of Hegel's philosophical position. Her attempt to draw a parallel between Jung's theory of the archetype and Hegel's understanding of the World Soul and the cosmic nous of the ancients as analogous formulations of a "subjectivity which is external to human persons" is unintelligible on both sides of the analogy (as neither Hegel nor Jung ever concerned

4 In De Philosophia: '84 (Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa) pp. 1-19.

themselves with such a notion of subjectivity). Wolfgang Giegerich's response to Eckman's article, by contrast, displays a much finer philosophical acumen (particularly, as we shall see in Chapter One, with regard to Jung's problematical relation to Kant). Giegerich recognizes that, "...despite the rejection of him by Jung himself, Hegel nevertheless seems to be the only one who could provide to Jung's psychology the kind of logic with which alone it could comprehend and say what it has to say." Because of his allegiance to James Hillman's revisioning of Jung's psychology, however, Giegerich is blind to what must be the focal point of any serious dialogue between Hegel and Jung: namely, the concept of the Self as complex whole.7

historical excursus

Though Jung claims not to have been influenced by Hegel, nor to have studied him properly, he admits in the same letter that there exists "a remarkable coincidence between certain tenets of Hegelian philosophy and my findings concerning the


7Hillman rejects Jung's concept of the Self as an unnecessary and even pathological holdover from Judaeo-Christian monotheism. Whatever the merits of Hillman's approach, his rejection of the concept of the Self leaves his psychology theoretically truncated and so unable to provide an adequate account of the nature of the psyche in its wholeness and complexity.
collective unconscious." That there is no question of direct influence is confirmed indirectly in Jung's autobiography, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, in the chapter where Jung runs through the figures which had a major impact on his thinking during his formative years. The closest contact Jung seems to have made with classical Hegelianism is the theology of Alois Biedermann (a qualified "right" Hegelian), whose Christliche Dogmatik Jung found in his father's library. This was the period of Jung's inwardly turbulent adolescence, fraught with increasing tensions between, on the one hand, his intense personal religious experiences—in the form of moods, dreams, visions, and fantasies—along with a precociously meditative, and blatantly heretical theological bent, and on the other, a growing alienation from the contemporary Christian spirit (represented by his father, a Protestant minister). Searching for some kind of confirmation of his personal insights, Jung made several forays into Biedermann's "weighty tome on dogmatics" which, however, he finally condemned as "nothing but fancy drivel." What Jung found most objectionable was the attempt to articulate the meaning of God in terms of "a


10Memories, Dreams, Reflections (Glasgow: Collins Fount, 1982) p.75.
personality to be conceived after the analogy of the human ego: the unique, utterly supramundane ego who embraces the entire cosmos." "I felt the strongest resistance," he continues, "to imagining God by analogy with my own ego. That seemed to me boundlessly arrogant, if not downright blasphemous." 11 A strange criticism, this, considering Jung's own highly questionable musings on the "dark side" of God with which he was then struggling, and which would continue to dominate his mature reflection. What seems to have irked him most, however, was not so much the link drawn between the nature of God and human personality, as the pretension to being able to give an exhaustive account, in purely rational terms, of the mystery of the divine.

Some little time after his contact with Biedermann, Jung read through (at least two) compendia of philosophy, 12 evincing the same emotional reaction to all rationalistic attempts at grasping the nature of God and of reality as a whole. The Schoolmen, he says, "left me cold." Of the nineteenth-century philosophers, he continues, "Hegel put me off by his language, as arrogant as it was laborious; I regarded him with downright mistrust. He seemed like a man who was caged in the edifice of

11Ibid.

12One of them by Hegel's contemporary critic, W.T. Krug (the book in question being the General Dictionary of the Philosophical Sciences, second edition, 1832). See Memories, p.79.
his own words and was pompously gesticulating in his prison." 13 This rather harsh judgment is elaborated in a section of Jung's late essay, "On the Nature of the Psyche," which represents his official, if brief, assessment of Hegel's significance in the history of modern Western thought. "The victory of Hegel over Kant," he writes,

dealt the gravest blow to reason and the further development of the German and, ultimately, of the European mind, all the more dangerous as Hegel was a psychologist in disguise who projected great truths out of the subjective sphere into a cosmos he himself had created.... A philosophy like Hegel's is a self-revelation of the psychic background and, philosophically, a presumption. The peculiar high-flown language Hegel uses bears out this view: it is reminiscent of the megalomaniac language of schizophrenics, who use terrific spell-binding words to reduce the transcendent to subjective form, to give banalities the charm of novelty, or pass off the commonplace as searching wisdom. So bombastic a terminology is a symptom of weakness, ineptitude, and lack of substance. 14

Given Jung's later admission of the "striking coincidence" between his own theoretical position and that of Hegel, along with the strong emotional tone of the preceding negative judgments, one might conjecture that Hegel's image elicited the projection of Jung's inner shadow figure. 15 Thus if Hegel is a

13Ibid., pp.87-88.


15The shadow, as we shall see in Chapter Four, is Jung's term for the unconscious, "inferior," and generally repressed, side of the personality.
"psychologist in disguise," Jung, for his part, is just as much a philosopher in disguise. Jung's repeated claims to being a strict empiricist, and no metaphysician, fly in the face of his many philosophical pronouncements on everything from God and evil to the meaning of history and the ground of being. This, of course, in no way invalidates his credibility as a psychologist. What this does mean is that philosophy and psychology, as Jung himself puts it, "are linked by indissoluble bonds." The link between both disciplines "consists in this, that both are systems of opinion about objects which cannot be...adequately comprehended by a purely empirical approach. Both fields of study thus encourage speculation." Neither discipline, Jung asserts, "can do without the other, and the one invariably furnishes the unspoken--and generally unconscious--assumptions of the other."\(^{16}\)

Despite Jung's recognition that Hegel's philosophy contains "great truths" concerning the "psychic background" (i.e., the unconscious), his aversion to Hegel's perceived rationalistic excess explains why, however unjustly, he styles Hegel as an adversary of the tradition to which he, as a depth psychologist, feels himself aligned. The tradition in question has its roots in the Romantic protest against Enlightenment rationalism. In this tradition, the light of reason is either

\(^{16}\text{CW 8:659.}\)
subordinated to, grounded in, or relativized by, the notion of the unconscious. Although, as we shall see in Chapters Two and Three, the notion of the unconscious plays a significant, albeit generally overlooked, role in Hegel's mature system, Jung traces its history back to Schelling and Schopenhauer (both of whom, incidentally, became, along with Kierkegaard, Hegel's greatest opponents) through C.G. Carus, E. von Hartmann, and Nietzsche. But for Schelling and Kierkegaard, the major works of all these figures were familiar to Jung during his intellectually formative years. Through Schopenhauer, Jung discovered Kant, whose theory of a priori categories and the limits of reason, though not expressed in terms of unconscious processes, Jung found highly congenial to his way of thinking. While von Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious, which Jung read "assiduously," attempts to reconcile Schopenhauer and Hegel, there is no indication that Jung picked up on the Hegelian components of the work. Above all others, it is perhaps Nietzsche who struck the most resounding chord in Jung's inquiring mind (the former's dynamic conception of personality and his critique of Christianity, in particular, seem to have found their way into

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17 Memories, p.122.
Jung's mature thought). With Nietzsche, however, there is no question of a direct link with Hegel.\textsuperscript{18}

Toward the end of his student years, Jung came into contact with another manifestation of the counter-current to Enlightenment rationalism—namely, the spiritualist movement of the late nineteenth century. One of Jung's female cousins was known locally as a medium and became the subject of his doctoral thesis, \textit{On the Psychology and Pathology of so-called Occult Phenomena} (1902).\textsuperscript{19} Though he maintained a life-long interest in the occult, his attention during the early psychiatric phase of his career turned to the related question of somnambulistic states (dreams, hypnotism) and the dissociative phenomena associated with hysteria and the schizophrenias (or dementia praecox, as it was then called). It was at this time that Jung first made contact with Freud (through his writings, as early as 1900, then personally in 1907).

\textsuperscript{18}I stress the word direct because Nietzsche, who in many ways is Hegel's antipode, is closer to his predecessor than might immediately be apparent ("les extrêmes se touchent," as the saying goes). Or to use another metaphor, one could say that Hegel and Nietzsche stand to one another as two great arches on the path of modernity—beginning and end, or end and new beginning—and that their apparently opposed perspectives, from the proper vantage point, can be seen to converge along the same path.

\textsuperscript{19}See \textit{CW} 1.
Jung quickly became Freud's first champion, recognizing him as a fellow pioneer in the exploration of the unconscious. Despite their shared concerns, however, the profound differences in fundamental outlooks, which were held in check at first through Jung's enthusiasm for Freud's obvious genius, eventually surfaced and drove the two men apart. In his autobiography, Jung notes that he had "grown up in the intensely historical atmosphere of Basel at the end of the nineteenth century, and had acquired, thanks to reading the old philosophers, some knowledge of the history of psychology." By contrast, Jung had the impression that "Freud's intellectual history began with Bücher, Moleschott, Du Bois Raymond, and Darwin." Freud's uncompromising allegiance to nineteenth century positivism and rationalistic naturalism was clearly at odds with Jung's general philosophical mind-set. At a deeper level, Jung wondered why Freud never asked himself why he was compelled to talk continually of sex, why this idea had taken such possession of him. He remained unaware that his "monotony of interpretation" expressed a flight from himself, or from that other side of him which might perhaps be called mystical. So long as he refused to acknowledge that side, he could never be reconciled with himself. He was blind towards the paradox and ambiguity of the contents of the unconscious, and did not know that everything which arises out the

\[^{20}\text{Memories, p.184.}\]

\[^{21}\text{Ibid.}\]
unconscious has a top and a bottom, an inside and an outside.\textsuperscript{22}

Jung, for his part, had always been open to the other, "mystical" side of the unconscious (in true Romantic fashion), and the paradoxical quality of the depths of the psyche gradually became the focal point of his psychological investigations (culminating with his last major work on alchemy, \textit{Mysterium Coniunctionis}).\textsuperscript{23} Far from being, as some have thought, a "woolly-minded mystic," Jung maintained an equal respect for reason and the scientific attitude. Both sides were not, he felt, incompatible, and indeed demanded to be articulated with one another.

Given the essential correspondences between Hegel and Jung—a correspondence which, as I have claimed, is grounded in the principle of complex holism that informs the thinking of both men—it is significant to note that Hegel's intellectual stance can be understood, analogously to Jung's, in terms of a desire to mediate between two complementary, though potentially antagonistic, cultural trends. In his last book, \textit{Discovering the Mind}, Walter Kaufmann sees these two trends as embodied in

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., pp.175-176. There are, of course, other (mostly psychoanalytical) accounts which focus on more personal or biographical considerations. These accounts, however, do not affect Jung's basic argument, concerned as it is with primarily theoretical differences. Cf., for instance, Peter Homans, \textit{Jung in Context: Modernity and the Making of a Psychology} (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

\textsuperscript{23}See \textit{CW} 14.
the figures of Goethe vs Kant--creative poet and pseudo-scientist, respectively. In his Hegel, Charles Taylor proposes a more elaborate, though very similar, thesis concerning "the fundamental problems and aspirations which Hegel's philosophy was addressed to." Taylor suggests that

we can best see these in the light of the yearning of his time to find a way of life and thought which would unite two powerful aspirations, which were both connected yet opposed. One is to that unity with nature, with other men and himself which man demands as an expressive being; the other is the radical moral autonomy which reached paradigm expression in Kant and Fichte. 

Hegel's attempt to mediate the conflicting demands of the Enlightenment ideal of rational autonomy and Romantic expressivism is analogous to, and continuous with, Jung's desire to reconcile the "mystical" and speculative with the scientific and empirical. For both men, as we shall see, the key to this mediation or reconciliation lay in a conception of human personality as complex whole.

The "young Hegelian" Bruno Bauer claimed that it would require a "history of the Self" to demonstrate the existential meaning of Hegel's speculative insights. In the same vein, Feuerbach looked forward to a "better time" when philosophy "no longer leaves empiricism outside of itself, but penetrates and

vindicates it." 25 Jung's findings in the field of depth psychology herald the advent of this "better time." But if Jung's psychology can serve as a counterpoint (both confirmatory and corrective) to Hegel's speculative insights, it is equally true that the metaphysical implications of the former demand articulation in more systematic and philosophical form. As we shall see in the chapters that follow, it is the principle of complex holism which will allow for these two complementary movements to take place.

prospectus

Part One provides a speculative depth-analysis of the concept of personality in relation to the theory of the unconscious. The first chapter establishes the conceptual and terminological groundwork for the dialogue between Hegel and Jung through a consideration of the ontological and metapsychological structure and dynamics of the personality as Self or complex whole, which constitutes the middle term between the correlative concepts of the Absolute and individuation. The rest of Part One examines the relation of individual personality to, and its emergence out of, its naturally and socially determinate ground or matrix.

Part Two traces the development of individual personality towards self-consciousness through the dialectic of three constitutive polar relations: ego and other, subject and object, knowing and doing. In each instance the telos of development is articulated around the concept of the Self as complex whole, a whole which both includes and transcends the bounds of individual personality as ordinarily conceived.

Part Three pursues the trans-individual implications of the concept of the Self through a consideration of the relation between the individual and the Absolute as the Whole, first in terms of an analysis of the nature of religion and the concept of God, and secondly, through an inquiry into the meaning and end of history.
PART ONE

PERSONALITY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

The cardinal discovery of transpersonal psychology is that the collective psyche, the deepest layer of the unconscious, is the living ground current from which is derived everything to do with a particularized ego possessing consciousness: upon this it is based, by this it is nourished, and without this it cannot exist.

Eric Neumann
Chapter One

LOGICAL CATEGORIES AND ARCHETYPES

The "concrete existence of the Concept," writes Hegel in the Science of Logic, "is individual personality."

The unpacking of this central claim will establish the conceptual and terminological framework for the succeeding chapters. Just what Hegel means by the Concept (der Begriff) will become more evident as we go along. By way of anticipation, however, one could say that the Concept—which might better be translated as "comprehension"—can be described as the cognitive form through which the Whole or the Absolute is apprehended and discursively articulated. In non metaphysical terms, the Concept can be described as Hegel's term for the cognitive or methodological stance informed by the principle of complex holism. That Hegel should characterize the "concrete existence" of the Concept as "individual personality" argues strongly for a dialogical articulation of the categories of the Logic with Jung's findings in the area of depth psychology. Though primarily a scientist and by no means a systematic thinker, Jung did elaborate a metapsychology of which he himself, as we shall see, recognized the philosophical, and

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more specifically metaphysical, implications. Just as the Logic—which can be said to provide the deep structures of the Science of Wisdom—demands, to be fully intelligible, articulation with a sufficiently complex depth psychology, so Jung's metapsychological musings call out to be set on a firm, speculative/philosophical basis. It is with both these sides of the dialogical task in mind that we will proceed, in this first chapter, with an investigation into the relation between Hegel's logical categories and Jung's archetypes.

Speaking metaphorically, Hegel at one point says of the Logic that it entails "the presentation of God ... as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and finite spirit."² In properly philosophical terms, one might say that the Logic is concerned with the concept of the Absolute ("God") as infinite potential ("before the creation" etc.). The Logic itself consists in a movement of dialectically related categories, arranged in order of conceptual complexity and concreteness. These categories are meant to describe the entire range of cognitive experience; and more than this, they are also to be understood as the very categories of being. According to Hegel, the principles of logic are to be sought "in a system of thought-types or fundamental categories (Denkbestimmungen), in which the opposition between subjective

²Ibid., p.50; Werke 5, p.44.
and objective, in its usual sense, vanishes."³ Or again, in stronger terms: "Logic therefore coincides with Metaphysics, the science of things set and held in thoughts—thoughts accredited able to express the essential reality of things."⁴ As Hegel states in the Introduction to the Science of Logic, the justification for the standpoint of Logic is to be found in the argument of the Phenomenology of Spirit, which exhibits "consciousness (in its movement onwards from the first immediate) opposition of itself and the object to absolute knowing."⁵

"The activity of thought," states Hegel in the second Preface to the Science of Logic, "which is at work in all our ideas, purposes, interests and actions is ... unconsciously busy (natural logic)."⁶ The content of "natural logic" consists in these same fundamental categories or thought-types, but in the form of unconscious "impulses" (Trieb) or

³Hegel's Logic (Part I of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 1830) tr. W. Wallace (Oxford University Press, 1975); Werke 8, section 24, Zusatz (addition): hereafter referred to as E. Logic. For the main text of the E. Logic, I have sometimes used the translation of Theodore Geraets (unpublished). Both translations, however, have occasionally been modified for the sake of terminological consistency.

⁴Ibid..

⁵S. Logic, pp. 48-49; Werke 5, pp. 42-43. The first part of the Phenomenology—"Consciousness"—is treated in Chapters Four and Five, the path to absolute knowing in Chapters Seven and Eight.

⁶Ibid., p. 36/26 (of Werke), my emphasis.
instincts whose "basis is the soul (Seele) itself." As we shall see in the following chapter, Hegel's concept of the soul is a clear anticipation of Jung's concept of the collective unconscious. For the moment it is sufficient to note the connection Hegel himself draws between logical categories and the notion of unconscious processes.

Jung chose the Kantian (and Platonic) term archetype to designate the so-called dominants of the collective unconscious. Jung's reinterpretation of the notion of archetypes arose out of his personal experience—mostly in the form of dreams—then later the experience of his patients at the Burghölzli sanitorium in Zürich, of images or motifs which were found to have parallels throughout the world's literature. These suggested the existence of universal, a priori dominants, capable of producing similar images or motifs anywhere at any time. Although Jung's understanding of the archetype underwent considerable development from the time of its first formulation, the essential features remained constant. In his early essay "Instinct and the Unconscious" (1919), Jung described the archetypes as

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7Ibid., p.37/27.

8See Memories, pp. 37f., 185, 197, 248, 289, 359, 380, 411f.; and CW 5:149f..
the necessary a priori determinants of all psychic processes. Just as the instincts compel man to a specifically human mode of existence, so the archetypes force his ways of perception and apprehension into specifically human patterns. The instincts and the archetypes together form the "collective unconscious."\(^9\)

In a later essay (1938), Jung states that

the archetype in itself is empty and purely formal, nothing but a faculta praeformandi, a possibility of representation which is given a priori. The representations themselves are not inherited, only the forms, and in that respect they correspond in every way to the instincts, which also are determined in form only. The existence of the instincts can no more be proved than the existence of the archetypes, so long as they do not manifest themselves concretely.\(^10\)

One might say that the theory of archetypes is concerned, in Hegel's terms, with the sphere of natural logic, with "Seelenbestimmungen" rather than Denkbestimmungen. In contrast with the Logic proper, whose methodological stance is "speculative," and whose element is the self-consciousness of "pure thought," depth psychology adopts the methodological stance of empiric-analytic science. Accordingly, in place of the self-consciousness of pure thought, depth psychology postulates the concept of the collective unconscious as the hypothetical ground of empirical consciousness. "Through the

\(^9\)CW 8:270.
\(^10\)CW 91:155.
act of cognition," writes Jung, "we 'posit' the reality of the archetypes, or more precisely, we postulate the existence of such contents on a cognitive basis."

As we saw in the Introduction, however, Jung himself recognized the abstract character of the distinction between the speculative and the empiric-analytic as cognitive modes. And indeed, Jung's later reflections on the nature of the archetype are clearly speculative in tone, if not in substance. In his essay "On the Nature of Psyche," for instance, Jung speculates concerning the essential unity of matter and psyche.

Since psyche and matter are contained in the same world, and moreover are in continuous contact with one another and ultimately rest on irreprezentable, transcendental factors, it is not only possible but fairly probable, even, that psyche and matter are two different aspects of one and the same thing.\textsuperscript{12}

A little earlier, Jung speaks of the archetype as being both spirit and anti-spirit, depending upon the attitude of the human mind (that is, according to the onesidedness of the conscious orientation, which determines the attitude of the unconscious).\textsuperscript{13} Anti-spirit is here synonymous with

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{CW} 7:158.
\textsuperscript{12} \textit{CW} 8:418.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 406.
instinct—the psychological correlate to the body's physiological processes (of which we shall have more to say later on). It is implied, therefore, that the archetype might be conceived as the middle term between mind (or psyche) and matter. In another later essay, Jung came to the conclusion that the nature of the archetype "contains very much more than can be included in a psychological explanation." It points "to the sphere of the unus mundus, the unitary world, towards which the psychologist and the atomic physicist are converging along separate paths...."14 Jung is more explicit on this point in the following passage from his last major work, Mysterium Coniunctionis.

The common background of micro-physics and depth-psychology is as much physical as psychical and therefore neither, but rather a third thing, a neutral nature which can at most be grasped in hints since its essence is transcendental.

The background of our empirical world thus appears to be in fact a unus mundus...the transcendental psychophysical background corresponds to a "potential world" in so far as all those conditions which determine the form of empirical phenomena are inherent in it.15

Finally, we can note that, while Jung claims to have exercised great caution in his approach to "the further metaphysical

14CW 10:852.
15CW 14:768-69.
significance that may possibly underlie archetypal statements," he admits in the next sentence that there is "nothing to stop their ultimate ramifications from penetrating to the ultimate ground of the universe."\textsuperscript{16}

These passages clearly show that, despite Jung's stated allegiance to Kantian phenomenalism, archetypes are not to be conceived as mere cognitive categories or "modes of apprehension," but simultaneously as the deep structures of being itself.

While Jung may be said to have provided an account of what Hegel refers to as natural logic, given the interface between the cognitive and the ontological in the concept of the archetype, the Logic proper can, in turn, be said to provide us with a speculative anatomy of the collective unconscious. The principal divisions of the Logic are determined according to the developmental or processional structure of the "Idea" itself--that is, according to the final category--which, because the True, as Hegel says, "is the process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal,"\textsuperscript{17} informs the movement of the whole. The pattern which best

\textsuperscript{16}CW 11:295.

typifies this movement consists of three steps or phases: the in-itself, or immediacy—the "doctrine of Being"; the for-itself, or mediation (or more precisely, intermediation)—the "doctrine of Essence"; and the in-and-for-itself, or intramediation—the "doctrine of the concept."

In his brief but perceptive article on Jung’s relation to Kant and Hegel, Giegerich writes that "an accurate description of the logical locus of Jung’s position would have to go beyond the simple linear succession of three parts of Hegel’s logic and introduce internal differentiations...." If such were made, "...it would be possible to show that Jung’s theoretical stance does not simply belong to the first part (being). Rather, it is to be located in the second part (that of Wesen)...."¹⁸ As we shall see, however, there is no reason to stop with essence; for individual personality, as Hegel says, is the concrete existence of the Concept.

I

The doctrine of Being begins with the antinomy being/nothing. As the most abstract category, being—pure being—is equivalent to absolute immediacy or "pure indeterminateness and emptiness."¹⁹ Being is not this or that


¹⁹S. Logic, p. 82/82.
particular being. It is, in fact, no thing at all. Being, therefore; as the "indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing." 20 The dialectic of being and nothing elucidates Jung's otherwise cryptic statement that the psychological condition of any unconscious content "is one of potential reality, characterized by the polar opposites 'being and non-being'...." 21 Though unconscious contents do, in some sense, have being--an inductive claim based upon inference from the observation of such phenomena as memory, dreams, hypnotic states, etc.--from the point of view of the conscious ego, they are as nothing. Prior to their manifestation in consciousness, their being can only be inferred or postulated as potentially existent. "By virtue of its indefinite extension," writes Jung,

the unconscious might be compared to the sea, while consciousness is like an island rising out of its midst. This comparison, however, must not be pushed too far; for the relation of conscious to unconscious is essentially different from that of an island to the sea. It is not in any sense a stable relationship, but a ceaseless welling-up, a constant shifting of content; for, like the conscious, the unconscious is never at rest, never stagnant. It lives and works in a state of perpetual interaction with the conscious. Conscious contents that have lost their intensity, or their actuality, sink into the unconscious, and this we call forgetting. Conversely, out of the unconscious there rise up new

20 Ibid., p.82/83.

21 CW 12:557.
ideas and tendencies which, as they emerge into consciousness, are known to us as fantasies and impulses. The unconscious is the matrix out of which consciousness grows.\textsuperscript{22}

The truth of the antinomy being/nothing, as the root determination of unconscious contents, therefore, is the movement of their own becoming, which Jung describes in terms of the "constant shifting" and "perpetual interaction" between the conscious and the unconscious. As Hegel puts it, the truth of the antinomy is "this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other: becoming..."\textsuperscript{23} The concept of becoming is the determination of the psyche as process, the specific character of which will, as we shall see, find more adequate expression in the notion of development as individuation or the coming-to-be of the Self.\textsuperscript{24}

As "the first concrete thought, and therefore the first concept,"\textsuperscript{25} however, becoming does not result in the abstract negativity of mere indeterminate change. The sublation\textsuperscript{26} of

\textsuperscript{22}CW 17:102.

\textsuperscript{23}S Logic, 83/83.

\textsuperscript{24}For a corresponding demonstration of the particular relevance of the categories of being, nothing, and becoming to contemporary natural science (especially physics), cf. Erol Harris's brilliant book, Formal, Transcendental, and Dialectical Thinking: Logic and Reality (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987) pp. 173f..

\textsuperscript{25}E Logic, section 88 Z.

\textsuperscript{26}See note 48 of Chapter Two.
the antinomy being/nothing unfolds into the categories of
determinate being—quality and quantity—which find their
identity in the concept of measure (das Mass). Measure implies
the notions of proportion, harmony, and equilibrium. Purely
quantitative change, when pushed beyond a certain limit,
results in a qualitative leap. Any determinate entity is what
it is only to the extent that it does not overstep the limits
of its proper measure. The concept of measure applies to all
organized systems, to matter (substance) as well as psyche
(subject). "The unconscious processes that compensate the
conscious ego," writes Jung, "contain all the elements that are
necessary for the self-regulation of the psyche as a whole."27
The regulation process is grounded in the nature of the
archetype which, "because of its power to unite opposites,
mediates between the unconscious substratum and the conscious
mind."28 It is, as we shall see, the polar or antinominal
structure of the archetype which constitutes the dynamic
potential of the psyche as a self-regulating system.

II

As the truth of the dialectic of becoming, the category of
measure signals the transition from the sphere of Being and

27 CW 7:275.

28 CW 91:293.
its immediacy to the sphere of essence. To grasp the proper measure of something is to know its determinate being—that is, to know what makes something what it is, and not something else. To grasp the measure of something, in other words, is to distinguish between the essential and the non-essential in what constitutes the thing. The sphere of Essence, we have said, is governed by the principle of inter-mediation. "In the sphere of Being," writes Hegel, "the reference of one term to another is only implicit [an sich]; in Essence, on the contrary, it is explicit [gesezt]. And this in general is the distinction between the forms of Being and Essence: in Being everything is immediate, in Essence everything is relative."  

The concept of Essence, as distinct from that of Being, involves the element of reflection—i.e., the explicit reference to the activity of consciousness (the thinking ego). The principles of reflection, which were implicitly at work in the dialectic of becoming and the concept of measure, are identity, difference, and ground. Consciousness is always

29 E Logic, section 111 Z.

30 In the Phenomenology of the Encyclopaedia, Hegel defines consciousness as "Spirit at the stage of reflection or relationship, that is, as appearance" (section 413). This is Petry's translation in Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, 3 vols. (D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979). I have generally, though not always, used Petry for material from the Subjective Spirit of the Encyclopaedia. For the Philosophy of Spirit as a whole, I have used, apart from Petry, Wallace and Miller's Hegel's Philosophy of Mind (Oxford University Press, 1978), especially when referring to the additions (Zusätze).
consciousness of something. All conscious contents are, in the first place, determined by the principle of identity (A=A). The something which consciousness intends is recognized as a something. It appears in consciousness as an entity—i.e., it possesses the quality of being or self-subsistence. But precisely because it is recognized as a something, and not something else, it is negatively determined by the principle of difference (A is not equal to B).

The inter-mediation of the (abstract) principles of identity and difference becomes explicit with the polar opposition (Entgegensetzung) of positive and negative in the concept of "essential difference." In essential difference, the different is not confronted by any other but by its other. That is, each of these two [positive and negative] has its own determination only in its relation to the other: the one is only reflected in itself as it is reflected in the other. And so with the other. Each in this way is the other's own other. 31

We have seen how the self-regulation of the psyche proceeds from the dynamic structure of the archetype. Archetypes, writes Jung, "are always bi-polar: they have both a positive and a negative side." 32 In the language of the Logic, the

31E Logic, section 119.
32CW 10:461.
archetypes are the ground of all polar oppositions. Hegel defines the concept of the ground as "the unity of identity and difference, the truth of what identity and difference have turned out to be--the reflection-into-self, which is equally a reflection-into-other. It is Essence put explicitly as a totality."\(^{33}\)

In the *Science of Logic*, the doctrine of Essence begins with the opposition of essence and "appearance" (*Schein*). Essence here is not the explicit "totality" which has emerged with the concept of the ground. Taken as one element in the polar relation, it is simply the reflection-into-self of Being, as contrasted with the reflection-into-other of appearance. Jung makes an analogous distinction with regard to the archetype. Because of his allegiance to Kant and the empiricism of modern science, however, Jung lapses into the Kantian dualism of phenomena and noumena. "The archetypal representations," Jung claims, "should not be confused with the archetype as such. They are very varied structures which all point back to one essentially 'irrepresentable' [unanschaulich] basic form."\(^{34}\) Recalling Kant's thing-in-itself, the archetypes, "like the psyche itself, or matter, are unknowable as such."\(^{35}\)

\(^{33}\) *Logic*, section 121.

\(^{34}\) *CW* 8:417; cf. also 8:440.

\(^{35}\) *CW* 11:555.
In her article on Jung and Kant, Stephanie de Voogd correctly notes that, while Jung believed he was being true to Kant in adopting this distinction, this in fact is not the case, for "Jung's archetypal psychology implies an epistemological stance which renders the whole noumena-phenomena distinction wholly unnecessary." The implicit stance to which de Voogd refers arises from Jung's conviction that all reality is essentially psychical. "The psyche creates reality every day," says Jung.

What indeed is reality if it is not a reality in ourselves, an esse in anima. Living reality is the product neither of the actual, objective behaviour of things nor of the formulated idea exclusively, but rather of the combination of both in the living psychological process, through esse in anima.

Jung even asserts that "the psyche is the world's pivot...the one great condition for the existence of the world at all...." It is in the light of such statements that one may question Jung's desire to reintroduce the Kantian split within the psyche itself. De Voogd believes that the superior stance that Jung adopts when championing the reality of the

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37 CW 6:77.

38 CW 8:423.
psyche is evidence that he "dissolved rather than developed" the Kantian dualism. While this amounts to a very strong, and highly questionable, claim, it is arguable that the main thrust of Jung's psychology militates against his alleged Kantianism. This should already be evident from our consideration of the nature of the archetype as ground of all polar oppositions.

In a similar vein, Giegerich argues that Jung's alleged Kantianism can be seen as a defense against the full implications of Kant's critique. While Jung "thought he had based his psychology on Kant he had in fact relapsed to the pre-Kantian metaphysical level."

The very mode by which he hoped to meet Kant's critique is what makes his ideas subject to his critique: Jung's asserting his findings to be of a strictly empirical and his theories to be of a merely hypothetical nature. Kant has shown beyond any doubt that precisely if such realities as the ones Jung discovered are considered part of the 'phenomenal' (positive-factual, we could also say 'literal') world, we have succumbed to metaphysics, i.e., daemons and Gods [along with all numinous and paraoxical manifestations of the unconscious] as empirical literal realities, as (to use Jung's phrase) "archetypes in themselves." As long as Jung clings to his label 'empiricist first and last,' Kant would show him that he has no right to posit, for example, a psychoid archetype level in which the subject-object dichotomy would be overcome.39

To return to de Voogd's claim about Jung, if anyone can truly be said to have dissolved the Kantian dualism (or attempted to do so), surely it is Hegel, who was perhaps Kant's greatest critic. To say that knowledge cannot transcend the realm of the phenomenal is one thing, but to say that the mind cannot, in principle, know things-in-themselves is, Hegel argues, logically untenable. To begin with, Kant is clearly dealing with the ancient distinction between appearance and reality. Knowledge can rest on mere appearance, or rise to the higher level of truth which conceives of things as they "really" are. If one denies the possibility of such a higher form of knowledge, then the distinction between things as they really are and things as they appear clearly makes no sense. But if Kant wishes to maintain the distinction, then he is forced to admit that the very notion of things-in-themselves, even without any further specification, nevertheless constitutes a form of knowledge. Put somewhat differently, the distinction between things as they appear and things-in-themselves is in any case a distinction within thought. To Hegel, Kant's understanding of the noumenal amounts to "utter abstraction" and "total emptiness." It is easy to see, he says, "that this caput mortuum is still only a product of thought, such as accrues when thought is carried on to

40De Voogd's article, though it illuminates somewhat Jung's relation to Kant, does not so much as mention Hegel in this connection.
abstraction unalloyed: that it is the work of the empty 'Ego' which makes an object of this empty self-identity of its own."41 Because Kant's notion of the noumenal involves an act of knowing—a knowing, moreover, of the poorest and most abstract kind—Hegel concludes that "one can only read with surprise the perpetual remark that we do not know the Thing-in-itself. On the contrary, there is nothing we can know so easily."42.

In Hegel's opinion, to conceive of things as they are in themselves implies a desire to know things as they are "in truth." For this to be possible, however, requires that knowledge rise from the level of pure abstraction to the conceptual concreteness proper to the truth.

Thus the man, by or in himself, is the child. And what the child has to do is to rise out of this abstract and undeveloped "in-himself," and become "for himself" what he is at first only "in himself"—a free and responsible being.... In the same sense the germ may be called the plant in-itself.43

In the argument of the Logic proper, this conception of the relation of necessary reciprocity between the in-itself

41 *Logic*, section 44.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., section 124 Z.
and the for-itself is elaborated in Hegel's treatment of the correlative categories of essence and appearance. "The Essence," writes Hegel, "must appear or shine forth." Hegel had already argued this point quite convincingly in the Phenomenology.

The inner world, or supersensible beyond, has...come into being: it comes from the world of appearance which has mediated it; in other words, appearance is its essence and, in fact, its filling. The supersensible is the sensuous and the perceived posited as it is in truth; but the truth of the sensuous and the perceived is to be appearance. The supersensible is therefore appearance qua appearance.45

Appearance here is not mere "show" (Schein). It is no longer a question of the phenomenal in the Kantian sense. Hegel's understanding of appearance is, as Taylor remarks, "the exact opposite of Kant's. Instead of pointing by contrast to the essential hiddenness of the transcendental real, it rather expresses the essential manifest-ness of all reality."46 Implicit in the dialectic of appearance is a richer, more concrete expression of the truth toward which speculative thought is drawn. This truth is "actuality" (Wirklichkeit) itself.

44Ibid., section 131.
45Phen. Sp., 147/92.
Actuality is the unity, become immediate, of essence with existence, or of the internal and the external. The externalization of the actual is the actual itself: so that the actual remains just as essential in this [externalization] and only is essential, in so far as it is in immediate external existence. 47

This dialectical resolution of the Kantian dualism can justifiably be applied to Jung's theory of the archetype. The notion of an unknowable archetype is, as with Kant's noumenon, unacceptable on purely logical grounds. To begin with, the distinction between the archetype as such and its particular manifestations is a distinction within thought. Put somewhat differently, to say that the archetype in-itself, or as such, is unknowable, is nevertheless a knowledge claim. Jung makes the mistake of attributing ontological status to the notion of the archetype in isolation from its particular manifestations. The actuality of the archetype, on the contrary, must embrace the particular within the universal, appearance within essence. Jung himself admits that archetypes "can only be recognized from the effects they produce." 48 We can know nothing of the archetypes "so long as they do not manifest themselves concretely." 49 Such an understanding of the actuality of the archetype would be more consistent with the principle of

47E Logic, section 142.
48CW 11:222n..
49CW 9i: 155.
complex holism which informs the main thrust of Jung's thought.

III

The actuality of the archetype, then, consists in the dialectical relation between the in-itself and the for-itself, or more generally between the unconscious and the conscious. In the language of the Science of Logic, this is the "Absolute Relation," whose culminating category is reciprocity (die Wechselwirkung), which Hegel defines in terms of the polarity of action and reaction. The category of reciprocity finds its correlate in Jung's understanding of the principle of compensation. "Experience in analytic psychology," writes Jung,

has amply shown that the conscious and the unconscious seldom agree as to their contents and tendencies. This lack of parallelism is not just accidental or purposeless, but is due to the fact that the unconscious behaves in a compensatory manner towards the conscious. We can also put it the other way round and say that the conscious behaves in a complementary manner towards the unconscious. 50

The principle of compensation is grounded in the actuality of the archetype. Recalling the category of measure, the

50 CW 8:132.
reciprocal action of the conscious and the unconscious points to the nature of the psyche as a self-regulating system. Jung describes the principle of compensation as

functional adjustment in general, an inherent self-regulation of the psychic apparatus....As a rule, the unconscious compensation does not run counter to consciousness, but is rather a balancing or supplementing of the conscious orientation.\textsuperscript{51}

The process of self-regulation, while implicit in the concept of the archetype generally, is attributed by Jung to the archetype of the Self.

The Self can be defined as the psyche in its totality, as the union of the conscious and the unconscious. As such, the Self is the fullest expression of the actuality of the archetype. "The beginnings of our whole psychic life," writes Jung, "seem to be inextricably rooted in this point, and all our highest and ultimate purposes seem to be striving towards it."\textsuperscript{52} The Self has somewhat the character of a result, of a goal attained, something that has come to pass gradually and with much travail. So too the Self is our life's goal, for it is the completest expression of that fat\-ful combination we call individuality....\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{51}CW 6:694.
\textsuperscript{52}CW 7:399.
\textsuperscript{53}Ibid., 404.
These passages are a clear echo of Hegel's description of the True in the *Phenomenology* as "the process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only by being worked out to its end, is it actual."\(^{54}\) A little later we read that the Self "is like that immediacy and simplicity of the beginning, because it is the result, that which has returned into itself, the later being similarly just the Self."\(^{55}\) In the *Logic*, however, Hegel does not speak in terms of the Self, but of the Concept (*der Begriff*).

The doctrine of the Concept constitutes the third and final part of the *Logic*. The Concept is "the truth of Being and Essence."\(^{56}\) Because "each of its moments is the whole that it is, and is posited as inseparable unity with it, the Concept is totality; thus in its identity with itself it is what is in-and-for-itself determinate."\(^{57}\) Corresponding to the principles of identity, difference, and ground, and the categories of essence, appearance, and actuality in the sphere of Essence, the three moments of the Concept are: the

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\(^{54}\) *Phen. Sp.*, 18/21.

\(^{55}\) Ibid., 22/23.

\(^{56}\) *Logic*, section 159.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., section 160.
universal, the particular, and the individual. Each of these categories, as Hegel says, is the whole which the Concept is, in the sense that, as moment, each is informed by the movement of the whole. The Concept, therefore, is a complex whole—that is, a dialectically self-articulating totality, which manifests itself through the differentiation or particularization of its universal or self-identical essence into the actual individual which is its ground. The Concept, we read in the Science of Logic, "when it has developed into a concrete existence that is itself free, is none other than the I or pure self-consciousness."

But the I is, first, this pure self-related unity, and it is so not immediately but only as making abstraction from all determinateness and content and withdrawing into the freedom of unrestricted equality with itself. As such it is universality; a unity that is unity with itself only through its negative attitude, which appears as a process of abstraction, and that consequently contains all determinateness dissolved in it. Secondly, the I as self-related negativity is no less immediately individuality or is absolutely determined, opposing itself to all that is other and excluding it—individual personality.58

The concrete existence of the Concept is individual personality. Hegel's understanding of the nature of personality as such—its genesis and development—will be treated separately in connection with his philosophy of subjective Spirit (anthropology, phenomenology, and

58 Science of Logic, p.583/253 (of Werke 6).
psychology).\(^{59}\) For the moment it is sufficient that we recall that the form of individual personality is the Self (Hegel's "I" or "pure self-consciousness"). As the psyche in its totality, the Self is the dialectical unity of conscious and unconscious, of ego and archetype, or in terms of the moments of the Concept, of particularity and universality. "The essence of conscious processes," as Jung says, "is adaptation, which takes place in a series of particulars. The [collective] unconscious, on the other hand, is universal: it not only binds individuals together into a nation or race, but unites them with the men of the past and their psychology."\(^{60}\)

As complex whole, the Self is not to be conceived as a static entity, but, as we have seen, as process and becoming. The development of the Self, its explicit unfolding into individual personality, is what Jung understands by the term individuation. Corresponding to the category of individuality (Einzelnheit) as the concrete differentiation or particularization of the abstract universal, individuation "is a process of differentiation, having for its goal the development of the individual personality."\(^{61}\) While the Self is the goal of individuation, it "exists from the beginning,

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\(^{59}\)See Chapters Two, Four, and Five, respectively.

\(^{60}\)\textit{CW} 5:258.

\(^{61}\)\textit{CW} 6:757.
but is latent, that is unconscious."\textsuperscript{62} Individuality has "an a priori unconscious existence, but it exists consciously only in so far as a consciousness of its peculiar nature is present, i.e., in so far as there exists a conscious distinctiveness from other individuals."\textsuperscript{63} Individuation appears, on the one hand, "as the synthesis of a new unity," and on the other, "as the revelation of something which existed before the ego and is in fact its father and creator and also its totality."\textsuperscript{64} Similarly, Hegel states of the Concept that it "embraces the contradiction of simplicity and difference, and therefore its own restless nature impels it to actualize itself, to unfold into actuality....that whole, of which to begin with it contained only the possibility."\textsuperscript{65}

As Self, the Concept is the truth of subjectivity. As concrete universal, however, its subjectivity is "overarching" (übergreifende)\textsuperscript{66} --which is to say that subject and object, as normally conceived, are both comprehended (begreiffen) as abstract moments of the Concept's concrete totality. The larger portion of the doctrine of the Concept is devoted to a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{62} \textit{CW} 12:104n..
\item \textsuperscript{63} \textit{CW} 6:755.
\item \textsuperscript{64} \textit{CW} 11:400.
\item \textsuperscript{65} \textit{Phil. Sp.}, section 397 Z.
\item \textsuperscript{66} See \textit{E Logic}, section 215.
\end{itemize}
development of both moments into the forms of the judgement and the syllogism (subjective Concept), on the one hand, and the notions of mechanism, chemism, and teleology (objective Concept), on the other. The result of the development is the explicit positing—in the sense of the full comprehension—of the Concept as the dialectical unity of subject and object, of thought and being, and indeed of all conceivable polar oppositions. This full comprehension, which is nothing other than the content of the Logic itself grasped as complex whole or dialectically self-articulating totality, is what Hegel understands by the Idea.

The Idea is essentially process, because its identity is only the absolute and free identity of the Concept insofar as it is absolute negativity and hence dialectical. The Idea is the development [consisting in the fact] that the Concept, as the universality that is individuality, determines itself to objectivity and to opposition against this objectivity, and that this outwardness that the Concept has with regard to its substance, leads itself back, through its immanent dialectic, into subjectivity. 67

As the truth of the immanent dialectic of the Concept, the Idea is the absolute category, or the category of the Absolute. The concrete existence of the Concept, as we have seen, is individual personality in the form of the Self. While the Idea is the absolute content of the Concept, the

67 K. Logic, section 215.
conceptual form of the Absolute remains that of the Self. The Absolute and individual personality, therefore, are correlative concepts, with the Self as middle term. The Absolute is the Self. Not, to be sure, a particular self in opposition to other selves, but the Self,\textsuperscript{68} in the sense that, as Concept or complex whole, the Self is the form of the Absolute as the Whole.

According to Jung, the Self is a "transcendental postulate" which, "although justified empirically, does not allow of scientific proof."\textsuperscript{69} "This step beyond science," he continues, "is an unconditional requirement of the psychological development I have sought to depict, because without this postulate I could give no adequate formulation of the psychic processes that occur empirically."\textsuperscript{70} Though he does not make the explicit metaphysical claim that the Self is the Absolute, Jung's investigations into the phenomenology of

\textsuperscript{68} "The Absolute," as Josiah Royce puts it, "is essentially a Self—not any one individual self, but a completely self-determined being, of whom our varied individuality is an expression." \textit{Lectures on Modern Idealism} (Yale University Press, 1964) p. 226. Or in Stanley Rosen's formulation: "The Absolute manifests itself in individual form; this is one of the crucial points in Hegel's logic. The Absolute is the process of individuation. Consequently, the Absolute is not separate from but identical with itself as the differentiated individuals." G.W.F. Hegel: \textit{an Introduction to the Science of Wisdom} (Yale University Press, 1974) p. 62.

\textsuperscript{69} CW 7:405.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid..
the Self—in particular, his discovery that symbols of the Deity are empirically indistinguishable from symbols of the Self—clearly point in this direction.

In its most succinct formulation, the Self can be defined as a *complexio oppositorum*. As the psyche in its totality, the Self "can only be described in antinomial terms." It is "both ego and non-ego, subjective and objective, individual and collective. It is the 'uniting symbol' which epitomizes the total union of opposites." Similarly, Hegel says of the Idea that it can be grasped as "the subject-object, as the unity of the ideal and the real, of the finite and the infinite, of the soul and the body, as the possibility which has its actuality in its own right, as that whose nature can be comprehended only as existing, and so forth." 

Hegel's treatment of the Idea falls into three moments—life, cognition, and the absolute Idea—the first two of which constitute the last main polarity of the Logic. As strictly logical determinations, life and cognition correspond

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71See Chapter Seven below.


73CW 9ii:115.

74CW 16:474.

75F. Logic, section 214.
to Jung's understanding of the instinct/spirit antithesis as a fundamental expression of the bipolarity of the archetype.

Life is the Idea in the form of immediacy.\textsuperscript{76} It is the principle of nature as animate totality. The nature of life is epitomized in the bodily processes of the organism, the vitality of which is naturally determined as instinct. According to Jung, instincts are "typical modes of action."\textsuperscript{77} More specifically, instinct is "man's animal nature,"\textsuperscript{78} which manifests itself in regularly occurring, unconsciously motivated compulsions to act. James Hillman sums up the concept of instinct as follows.

By "instinct I mean native impulsion....I consider instinct to refer to congenitally given...affectively charged psychic events in which "the body" is a paramount referent. (We imagine the body to be either the locus of instinct or its significance---[manifested in such things as] hunger, reproduction, defense, etc....\textsuperscript{79}

The concept of instinct is central to Hegel's understanding of the life of the organism, which he describes with the now somewhat outmoded notions of sensibility,

\textsuperscript{76}Cf. ibid., section 216.

\textsuperscript{77}\textit{CW} 8:273.

\textsuperscript{78}\textit{CW} 7:35.

\textsuperscript{79}\textit{Revisioning Psychology} (Harper and Row Publishers, 1977), pp. 244-5.
irritability, and reproduction. His extremely condensed discussion of these notions, however, is still valuable for the light it throws on the relation between two of the most fundamental instincts—hunger and sex. Both of these are seen in fact to be manifestations of a common instinct—which is defined negatively as a "defect" or "want" (Mangel)—which works to nullify the contradiction or resistance the organism senses between itself and the environment. The organism cannot yet comprehend its essential oneness with the objectivity that confronts it. It is as yet only immediately Idea. Accordingly, it is driven to realize this unity in the most immediate manner—through eating and sexual union.

The organism, then, strives to overcome its inherent particularity, to achieve the universality which it implicitly is. The goal of this striving, Hegel tells us, "is first achieved in spirit which, just by winning this victory, distinguishes itself from nature...." The logical form of spirit is cognition. While nature as life is the Idea in the form of immediacy, spirit as cognition is the mediate Idea—that is, the Idea returned from its otherness, or reflected into itself: "Every activity of spirit is nothing but a distinct mode of reducing what is external to the inwardness

80 We will return to this aspect of instinct in Chapter Four.
81 Phil. Sp., section 381 Z.
which spirit itself is, and it is only by this reduction, by this idealization or assimilation of what is external that it becomes and is spirit." 82

Jung, for his part, associates the concept of spirit with the process of reflection and the freedom from natural compulsion which this implies. Reflection, he writes,

reenacts the process of excitation [of instinctive discharges] and carries the stimulus over into a series of images which, if the impetus is strong enough, are reproduced in some form of expression. This may take place directly, for instance in speech, or may appear in the form of abstract thought, dramatic representation, or ethical conduct, or again, in scientific achievement or a work of art. 83

Two of these expressions of spirit—abstract thought and ethical conduct—correspond to the two forms of cognition (the theoretical and the practical, respectively) discussed by Hegel. The former is described as the "drive [or instinct—Trieb] of knowing after truth," and the latter as "the drive of the Good towards its own accomplishment." 84

82 Ibid.

83 CW 8:241.

84 E. Logic, section 225. This, perhaps initially surprising, characterization of cognition as "drive" is consonant with Jung's attribution of the manifestations of spirit to the so-called "reflective instinct" (Cf. CW 8241-3, and 406).
The drive of cognition is rooted in the life of the Idea. The tension or contradiction in the life-process between the organism and its environment, between the natural universality of the genus-process (i.e., reproduction) and the organism's finite particularity, is played out at a higher level in the dialectic of subject and object in the process of cognition. The resolution of the tension, the overcoming of the contradiction, is achieved only through a re-cognition of the true and the good in the Idea as "concrete totality"\textsuperscript{85} or complex whole. This re-cognition, which amounts to a second order reflection or negation of negation (the first negation being the emergence of cognition as the reflection of life), is the Absolute Idea, which "alone is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and is all truth."\textsuperscript{86}

The Absolute Idea, then, is the intelligible ground of nature and spirit, which are "in general modes of presenting its [the Absolute Idea's] existence...."\textsuperscript{87} Implicitly, as Hegel says in the \textit{Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion}, nature and spirit "are identical in the one Idea." They are both "only the mirror of one and the same and have their one

\textsuperscript{85}Logic, pp.829-30/555-6 (of Werke 6).
\textsuperscript{86}Ibid., p.825/549.
\textsuperscript{87}Ibid..
root in the Idea." 88 Now although spirit as cognition arises out of nature or life as instinct, since it is only as a cognitive (or re-cognitive) act that the truth of life's striving is grasped as the concrete universality of the Absolute Idea--cognition overarches life, spirit overarches nature. 89 This conceptual overarching effects a speculative inversion of the relation of priority between the elements (nature and spirit) constituting the Whole. "For us," writes Hegel,

spirit has nature as its presupposition. It is the truth of nature, and, therefore, its absolute prius. Nature has vanished in this truth, and spirit has yielded itself as the Idea which has attained to its being-for-self, the object of which, to the same extent as its subject, is the Concept. This identity is absolute negativity, for the Concept has its complete external objectivity in nature, and has become identical with itself in that this its externalization has been sublated. 90


89 Cf. L.P.R., I, p.325: "Spirit is spirit and nature. It is on the one hand one side of the union, and on the other hand what also overreaches the other side; hence it is the unity of itself and an other."

90 Phil. Sp., section 381. Stanley Rosen's caveat is worth quoting here, "In order to avoid any misunderstanding on this sensitive point, I again emphasize that, in this process [the speculative inversion], externality or nature is not 'annulled' in the 'sense of being turned into 'mere thought'. Instead, externality is understood. Spiritual life is a higher, more comprehensive, stage than natural life, but it contains nature as its exterior dimension." Op. cit., p.240, my emphasis.
At first glance, Hegel's speculative concept of spirit would seem to outstrip Jung's use of the term as the polar opposite of instinct. In fact, however, Jung often uses the term in a manner essentially consonant with Hegel's understanding of spirit. This is especially true in the context of Jung's discussions of the Christian Trinity, of which we shall have more to say in Chapter Seven. For the present, we are concerned with the notion of spirit as it pertains to the archetype. In this connection, one statement of Jung's is particularly relevant: "In spite or perhaps because of its affinity with instinct, the archetype represents the authentic element of spirit, but a spirit which is not to be identified with the human intellect, since it is the latter's spiritus rector."\textsuperscript{91} The archetype, as we have seen, is conceived by Jung as a dynamic of potential which encompasses all possible polar oppositions, one of the most significant of these being the antithesis instinct/spirit. Now although it is true that spirit must first oppose itself to instinct—or as Hegel would say, "distinguish itself from nature"—to achieve the degree of autonomy necessary for the process of cognition, if cognition is not to end in mere abstract intellection, it must overcome the tendency to impose

\textsuperscript{91} CW 8:406, my emphasis. In commenting on a poem of Hölderlin's, Jung at one point describes spirit as "the totality of primary forms from which the archetypal images come." CW 5:641.
absolute distinctions and deal in fixed oppositions. As Jung remarks: "Although the first step in the cognitive process is to discriminate and divide, in the second step it will unite what has been divided, and will be satisfactory only when it achieves a synthesis." 92 It is through this type of higher cognition that the true nature of the archetype is grasped. At the same time, a new form of spirit, or more precisely, the "authentic element of spirit," is born. This Spirit—which, from this point forward, will be distinguished from the use of the term as the polar opposite of instinct by a capital "S"—is the authentic Spirit because it is the truth of, or implicit in, the nature of the archetype itself. The archetype, as Jung says (and this is particularly true of the archetype or the Self), "is a spiritual goal toward which the whole nature of man strives."93

We can perhaps clarify the question of the relation of priority between nature and Spirit through a distinction which, while preserving the insight of Hegel's speculative position, gives sufficient weight to the empiric-analytic view of modern science (ambivalently represented by Jung). Granting the speculative or logical priority of Spirit over nature, one would simultaneously recognize the eco-logical

92 CW 10:852.
93 CW 8:415; cf. also 11:277.
priority of nature over spirit. 94 Although it is true that the grasping of nature as nature—that is, as something other than the reflecting consciousness that arises out of it—is itself a cognitive act, and therefore a moment of Spirit as the Whole, it is nevertheless true that, without this nature, without this embodied life, spirit (Geist) is nothing more than a ghost. 95

94 For ecologized thinking, writes Morin, "there can be no description or explanation of phenomena outside the double inscription and double implication at the heart of a complex dialogic which associates, in a complementary fashion, both competitively and antagonistically, the autonomous and internal logics proper to the phenomenon, on the one hand, and the ecologies of its environment, on the other." La Vie de la Vie (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1980) p.87.

95 "Life and spirit," as Jung says, "are two powers or necessities between which man is placed. Spirit gives meaning to his life, and the possibility of its greatest development. But life is essential to spirit, since its truth is nothing if it cannot live." CW 8:648.
Chapter Two

THE LIFE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

Although the movement of reflection and idealization implicit in nature and life becomes actual as spirit in the form of human subjectivity, the awakening of spirit, as we have seen, does not constitute an absolute break with the natural order. Human subjectivity, though conceived as the crown, apex, or as Hegel phrases it, the truth of the natural order, nevertheless remains grounded in that order. Spirit and nature—or mind and matter—are in fact mediated by a common term, which Hegel calls soul.¹

Wherever there is Nature, the soul is its universal immaterialism, its simple "ideal" life. Soul is the substance or "absolute" basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of spirit: it is in the soul that spirit finds the material of its determination, and the soul remains the pervading, identical reality of it all.²

Hegel's consideration of the nature of soul constitutes the first and largest portion of the philosophy of subjective Spirit. As Findlay indicates with the subtitle to his

¹We have already encountered the notion of soul in connection with our discussion of the Idea in the form of immediacy. There it was described as "the concept of life": "As soul the Concept is realized in a body of whose externality the soul is the immediate self-relating universality."E. Logic, section 216.

²Phil. Sp., section 389.
commentary to this part of the system, Hegel's notion of subjective Spirit encompasses what we would call psychology. The part which deals with the nature of soul Hegel heads with the term Anthropology, for its subject-matter is "the basis of man," a basis which he describes as "spirit which is still in the grip of nature and connected with corporeity, spirit which is not yet in communion with itself." From the perspective of depth psychology, the section on Anthropology is remarkable for its abundance of empirical detail, and for the light it sheds on Hegel's understanding of unconscious processes.

According to Hegel, the soul is "an immediate unconscious totality." It is "the sleep of Spirit...which is potentially all things." This description recalls Jung's claim that "the psychological condition of any unconscious content is one of potential reality." As the realm of psychic potential, the unconscious encompasses all possible oppositions. It is, as we have seen, a store-house of latent polarities. As long as any content remains unconscious, it is subject to mutual

\[\text{3Cf. J.N. Findlay, Hegel: a Re-Examination (Humanities Press, 1958).} \]

\[\text{4Ibid., section 387 Z.}\]

\[\text{5Ibid.}\]

\[\text{6Ibid., section 440 Z.}\]

\[\text{7Ibid., section 389.}\]

\[\text{8CW 12:557. Cf. above, n. 21 of Chapter One.}\]
contamination by other unconscious contents. As Hegel puts it, "in soul difference," by which he means the ability to differentiate or make rational distinctions, "is shrouded in the form of undifferentiatedness and therefore of unconsciousness." 9

Although it lacks the element of differentiation proper to the sphere of consciousness, the soul does possess its own determinateness or specificity. At its deepest, pre-individual level, the soul is identical with the living unity or immediate concrete universality of the cosmos. As such, it is the World Soul (anima mundi). But this World Soul, says Hegel, "has its actual truth only as individuality, as subjectivity." 10 It is through the soul that each individual participates in the life of the cosmos. When contrasted with the "macrocosm of nature," the soul can be described as "the microcosm into which the former is compressed...." 11 As microcosm, the individual soul is a monad: "it is itself the posited totality of its particular world, which is included in it and constitutes its filling...." 12 Elsewhere, Hegel speaks of the individual soul as "a world of concrete content with an infinite periphery...."

9Phil. Sp., section 389 Z.
10Ibid., section 391.
11Ibid., Z.
12Ibid., section 403.
...we have within us a countless host of relationships and connections which are always in us even if they do not enter into our sensation and ideation and which, no matter how much these relationships can alter, even without our knowledge, nonetheless belong to the concrete content of the human soul, so that the latter, on account of the infinite wealth of its content, may be described as the soul of a world, as the individually determined world-soul.¹³

Hegel's understanding of the individually determined world-soul is a clear anticipation of Jung's notion of the collective unconscious: "The collective unconscious contains, or is, an historical mirror-image of the world. It too is a world, but a world of images."¹⁴ These images are grounded in the archetypes, the so-called "dominants" of the collective unconscious, which stand as the middle term between the individual (microcosm) and the natural order (macrocosm). From the point of view of the individual, the link between the archetypes and the natural order can be understood, to begin with, in terms of psychic projection. "The starry vault of heaven," writes Jung—which is the root image of the experience of cosmos (order) and the inspirer of primal religious awe—"is in truth the open book of cosmic projection, in which are reflected the mythologems, i.e., the archetypes."¹⁵ "It is

¹³Ibid., section 402 z.
¹⁴CW 7:507; cf. also 300, and 6:281.
¹⁵CW 8:392.
not enough for the primitive to see the sun rise and set," Jung
remarks elsewhere,

this external observation must at the same time be a
psychic happening: the sun in its course must
represent the fate of a god or hero who, in the last
analysis, dwells nowhere except in the soul of man.
All the mythologized processes of nature, such as
summer and winter, the phases of the moon, the rainy
seasons and so forth, are in no sense allegories of
these objective occurrences; rather they are symbolic
expressions of the inner, unconscious drama of the
psyche which becomes accessible to man's
consciousness by way of projection— that is, mirrored
in the events of nature.  

Since, from the psychogenetic point of view, the archetype "can
be conceived as a mnemonic deposit...which has arisen through the
condensation of countless processes of similar kind," the
notion of projection must be complemented with that of
introjection.

At the same time, however, it is a mistake to
conceive of this imprinting or introjection in the manner of
Semon's "engrams." For, as Jung points out, those archetypes
which seem most intimately bound up with such natural processes
as the course of the sun or the changing of the seasons do not
simply reproduce those processes in the fashion of the camera
obscura. Rather, such processes serve as symbolic expressions
of the analogical relation that obtains between the individual
and the cosmos. The archetype, therefore, "is related just

16CW 9i:7.
17CW 6:748.
18Cf. CW 9i:54.
19Cf. CW 8:325f.
as much to certain palpable, self-perpetuating, and continually operative natural processes as it is to certain inner determinants of psychic life and of life in general.\textsuperscript{20}

While Hegel recognizes that the soul or psyche "takes part in the general planetary life, feels the differences of climates, the changes of the seasons, and the periods of the day, etc,"\textsuperscript{21} he does not, like Jung, show an appreciation for the symbolic and mythopoetic value of this participation. "This life of nature," says Hegel, "for the main shows itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone."\textsuperscript{22} Hegel's apparent blindness to the deeper significance of natural sympathy is in keeping with his marked preference for concepts (Begriff) over representation (Vorstellung). As we shall see in Chapters Six—and Seven, Jung's insights can serve as a corrective in this respect.

For both Hegel and Jung, the outer reaches of the World-Soul or collective unconscious, respectively, ramify into less inclusive collectivities corresponding to differences in race. Hegel explains this ramification as follows.

\textsuperscript{20}CW 6:748.

\textsuperscript{21}Phil. Sp., section 392.

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid.
The universal planetary life of the natural spirit particularizes itself into the concrete differences of the Earth and separates the particular natural spirits. On the whole, these express the nature of the geographical continents, and constitute racial variety.23

Similarly, Jung recognizes that inasmuch "as there are differentiations corresponding to race, tribe, and even family, there is also a collective psyche limited to race, tribe, and family over and above the 'universal' collective psyche."24 The charge of racism sometimes levelled at Jung's notion of a racial unconscious is quite unfounded; for the notion is not valuative or discriminatory. On the contrary, it provides a psychological basis for respecting differences of culture. Besides, it must be remembered that, despite such differences, all share a common ground or heritage—the basis for a mutual sympathy—at the level of the "universal" collective unconscious.

The psyche, we have said, is an inwardly reflected image of the cosmos. The inherent order of the cosmos manifests itself in the regularity of its motions—in the paths of the heavenly bodies and the pattern of the seasons. The psyche too has its seasons—childhood, youth, adulthood, and old age—or perhaps more appropriately, its life-cycle. While Jung's understanding of these four stages is more detailed and

23Ibid., section 393.

24CW 7:235.
psychologically informed than Hegel's, both agree, for the most part, on the essential characteristics of each stage. According to Hegel, the different stages in the "process of development of the natural individual" arise out of the "different relationship of the individual to the genus....These differences represent the differences of the Concept."25 The three moments of the Concept, as we have seen, are universality (corresponding to "genus" above), particularity, and individuality. The moment of universality corresponds to the stage of childhood, in which we see "mind wrapped up in itself."26 Childhood is "the time of natural harmony, of the peace of the individual with himself and with the world; the beginning which contains no opposition."27 The child is its own universe. However, the merely natural universality of the child is not concrete in Hegel's sense, but a purely abstract universality. Hegel's natural or abstract universality corresponds to Jung's notion of the unconscious Self as a developmental category. Edinger calls this the phase of ego-Self identity.28 According to Eric Neumann, any discussion from the standpoint of analytical psychology of the development of the personality

25Phil. Sp., section 396 Z.
26Ibid., section 396.
27Ibid., Z.
--and especially of the child's personality--must start from the assumption that the unconscious comes first and that consciousness follows. The total personality and its directing centre, the Self, exist before the ego takes form and develops into the centre of consciousness; the laws governing the development of the ego and consciousness are dependent on the unconscious and on the total personality, which is represented by the Self. 29

In the embryonic phase, writes Neumann, "the mother's body is the world in which the child lives, not yet endowed with a controlling and perceiving consciousness and not yet ego-centered." 30 This stage of spirit, as Hegel puts it, "is the stage of its darkness: its determinations are not yet developed to conscious and understandable content." 31 The condition of the child in its mother's womb, he continues, is "a relationship exclusive neither to corporeality nor to spirituality, for it is psychic--a relationship of the soul." 32

In the addition to this section Hegel states that "the Self of the child is utterly incapable as yet of resisting the Self of the mother, but it is completely open to the influence of the mother's soul." 33 This state of affairs is more or less continued into infancy. To be sure, as compared to the embryonic child, the infant is now a distinct individual with a


30 Ibid., p. 10.

31 *Phil. Sp.*, section 404.

32 Ibid., section 405.

33 Ibid.
developing ego. This ego, however, is still very weak and, consequently, still submerged in or encompassed by the sphere of the mother and the child's own unconscious Self, which at this stage exist in a kind of participation mystique. "For the child in this phase," says Neumann, "the mother is neither outside nor inside; it does not experience her breasts as alien and outside, or its body as its own. As in the uterine phase, child and mother are still so intermeshed as to be one." 

The unconscious participation between mother and child, what Neumann calls the "primal relationship," is gradually replaced by the more differentiated relationality of childhood proper. With the strengthening of the ego comes a greater mobility within the environmental periphery determined by the parents.

The second main stage in the life-cycle--youth--begins around puberty. Hegel describes the period of youth as the stage of

the developed opposition of the tension between the ideals, imaginings, reformings, hopes, etc. of a universality which is itself still subjective, and immediate individuality; on the one side there is the world which is inadequate to the yearnings, on the other the attitude to this world of an individual whose existence is still lacking in independence and maturity. 

\[34\] Neumann (1976) p.12.

\[35\] Phil. Sp., section 396.
This is the stage of the "fully developed antithesis" because the ego is now a relatively autonomous complex, the focal point in the individual's field of consciousness. In recognizing itself as a self, the individual distinguishes itself from the other. Jung, similarly, sees the period of youth as being dominated by "an awareness of the divided, or dualistic, state."\(^{36}\) In terms of Hegel's understanding of the Concept, this state typifies the moment of particularity or difference. Hegel sees the main division in the "strain and struggle" of subjective ideals against what he calls the "immediate individuality" of the world (its inherent limitations) and the youth's own immaturity. According to Jung, these ideals often take the form of "illusions that are contrary to reality," illusions which reveal a "more or less potent clinging to the childhood level of consciousness," accompanied by a "resistance to the fateful forces in and around us which would involve us in the world."\(^{37}\) Despite the struggle and resistance, however, youth is nevertheless a period of growth and expansion. What is resisted, says Jung, is the impulse to a "widening of the horizon of life."\(^{38}\) Hegel says much the same thing with respect to the youthful ideal: "In this subjectivity of the substantial content of such an ideal there is involved

\(^{36}\)CW 8:758.

\(^{37}\)Ibid., 764.

\(^{38}\)Ibid., 765.
its opposition to the existing world, but also the urge to remove this opposition by realizing the ideal.\textsuperscript{39}

Taking into hand the realization of ideals, with the full consciousness of practical limitations, constitutes the transition to adulthood. In this stage, according to Hegel, the man attains to the true relationship; he recognizes the objective necessity and rationality of the implemented world with which he is confronted, and by obtaining a confirmation of and a place for his activity in the being-in-and-for self with which the works of this world are accomplished, the individual becomes somebody, an actual presence with an objective value.\textsuperscript{40}

The individual is an adult to the extent that he or she successfully adapts to the tensions that beset the youth, tensions arising from the seeming irreconcilability of the ideal and the real, of disposition and circumstance. As adults, Jung says, "we are forced to limit ourselves to the attainable, and differentiate particular aptitudes in order to become socially effective individuals."\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{39}Phil. Sp., section 396 Z.

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., section 396.

\textsuperscript{41}CW 8:768. This is my translation of "welche das eigentliche Wesen des sozial leistungsfähigen Individuums ist" (lit: "which constitutes the essence of the socially effective individual). The official translation of the Collected Works reads "in which the socially effective individual discovers his true self". This is a misleading translation, as the German does not refer to the Self (Selbst) or to a "true self" at all.
At this point Jung's understanding of the typical course of the life-cycle differs considerably from Hegel's. As a practicing psychiatrist, Jung had much clinical experience with the problems peculiar to adults. The most common forms of adult neurosis, especially the so-called "mid-life crisis," he saw to be either, on the one hand, the result of some kind of long term neglect or evasion or, on the other hand, the consequence of a previously appropriate adaptive strategy. To become a socially effective individual, one must sacrifice certain inner potentialities. Those which are activated to meet the demands of social adaptation maintain their dominance or superiority at the cost of neglected, underdeveloped portions of the total personality.

To illustrate why previously adaptive strategies begin to lose their effectiveness, Jung likens the life-cycle to the course of the sun. Ideally, the period of adulthood enjoys the fruits of youthful endeavour. This is the sun at its zenith. But the adult must also acknowledge the beginning of the sun's decline. "The significance of the morning," writes Jung,
sense? Whoever carries over into the afternoon the law of the morning, or the natural aim, must pay for it with damage to his soul, just as surely as a growing youth who tries to carry over his childish egotism into adult life must pay for this mistake with social failure.42

The natural rhythm of the psychophysical organism reaches a peak around mid-life. The subsequent decline brings with it a gradual reversal of inner dominants, "a revaluation of the earlier values."43 Jung draws particular attention to the subtle sexual changes, both hormonal and attitudinal, which normally accompany the transition to the second half of life.44 This transition may become problematic to the extent that the individual has led a one-sided existence, neglecting the opportunity to cultivate the full range of his or her psychic potential. Since adaptation entails differentiation, and thus onesidedness, the gradual reversal of dominants accompanying the onset of middle age does not represent a simple decline, but a natural impetus toward the actualization of the psychophysical organism's tendency to wholeness.

In the last phase of the life-cycle--old age--the individual must come to terms with the ever approaching inevitability of death. With the reversal of dominants comes

42Ibid., 787.
43CW 7:115.
44Cf. CW 8:780-83.
the irretrievable loss of the power and potentialities of life. Turning again to Hegel, the resiliency and adaptability of youth and adulthood pass over, he writes, into "the inactivity of deadening habit." On the positive side, however, old age brings with it a calming of the tensions which formerly beset the individual. In this way, the individual "gains freedom from the limited interests and entanglements of the outward present." The conceptual meaning of the movement toward death is "the in-forming of the genus within the individuality," or of the universal within the particular. Realizing and accepting this "in-forming" constitutes the wisdom of old age. Such wisdom is sensitive to the relative truth of all seemingly absolute oppositions. In terms very reminiscent of Hegel, Jung writes that the reversal that sets in at mid-life should not mean "conversion into the opposite but conservation of previous values together with the recognition of their opposites." 

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45 Phil. Sp., section 396.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., Z.
48 CW 7:116. This, of course, is a clear evocation of Hegel's notion of sublation (aufheben). Apparently unaware of this central Hegelian notion, Jung laments that "our Western mind...has never yet devised a concept, nor even a name, for the union of opposites through the middle path, that most fundamental item of human experience." CW 7:327; see also 116, and infra, pp. 166 f.
For both Hegel and Jung, therefore, the sublation of opposites is the ultimate goal of the individuation process. Identity, differentiation, sublation: these are the three moments in the rhythm of life. Though all three are effective, to varying degrees, in every phase of the life-cycle, the moment of differentiation tends to dominate the first half of life (childhood and youth), and the moment of sublation the second (adulthood and old age). As we have seen, the moment of identity or universality corresponds to Jung's notion of the unconscious, while differentiation or particularity corresponds to the ego. As we saw in the previous chapter, "individuality" (Einzelnheit), as the dynamic unity, or sublation, of the first two moments, can be understood as a description of the ideal, because concrete, goal of what Jung terms individuation.

The transition from the moment of identity or universality to that of difference or particularity around the mid-point in the life-cycle is mirrored, on the diurnal plane, in the alternation between sleeping and waking. "Sleep," says Hegel, "is the state in which the soul is immersed in differenceless unity. Waking, on the other hand, is the state in which the soul has entered into opposition to this simple unity."\(^{49}\) Hegel stresses the essential unity of both states in what can be termed the dynamic integrity of the Self.

\(^{49}\)Phil. Sp., section 398 Z.
It is not merely for us, or externally, that waking is distinguished from sleep; it is itself the judgement [Urteil: primary partition] of the individual soul, the being-for-self of which is, for it, the relation of this its determination to its being, the distinguishing of itself from its still undifferentiated universality.\textsuperscript{50}

In terms of Jung's model of the psyche, the alternation of sleeping and waking is conceived in terms of the depotentiation and repotentiation of the ego. In sleep, unconscious processes dominate the psychic economy. The ego complex is not obliterated, but merely depotentiated. One sees this most clearly in the act of dreaming, in which the ego, though still the recognizable centre of personal identity, is circumscribed by the world of the dream, which pursues its autonomous course.

As to the nature of the dream itself, Hegel's view of the matter is decidedly less satisfying than Jung's. Hegel's main point about dreams is that they operate in a pre-logical, purely subjective psychical mode. The dream is not "governed by the categories of intellect."\textsuperscript{51} Consequently, in the world of the dream, "it is only our picture-thinking, not our conceptual thinking, whose interest is aroused."\textsuperscript{52} Hegel does not, as does Jung, attribute a compensatory function to dreams

\textsuperscript{50}Ibid., section 398.

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid., section 398 Z.

\textsuperscript{52}Ibid.
(compensatory, that is, to the standpoint of consciousness). Nor does he draw particular attention to what Jung calls "big," or archetypal, dreams. Given the formal correspondence between the archetype of the Self and the logical Idea, it is surprising that Hegel failed to discover the presence of the latter in the dream, albeit in the symbolic form of representation. Hegel, of course, did not have Jung's experience, both personal and clinical, with literally thousands of critically examined dreams. Also, Hegel's understanding of the dream as irrational or pre-logical might have prejudiced him against an approach to the Idea through symbol and image.

The state of unconscious identity or immediate universality characteristic of the soul in sleep finds a parallel in two groups of phenomena described by Hegel under the heading of "the feeling soul in its immediacy." The key notion in Hegel's explanation of the first group is that of "the genius," which involves "the selfhood and totality of spirit in so far as it exists for itself and constitutes the subjective substantiality of another which is only posited externally as an individual, and which has only a formal being-for-self." In the ordinary course of nature, says Hegel, "this is the condition of the child in its mother's womb," a

53 Ibid., section 405.
condition which, as we have seen, is "exclusive neither to corporeality nor to spirituality, for it is psychic--a relationship of the soul."\textsuperscript{54} The fetus, it will be recalled, possesses only the rudiments of an autonomously differentiated ego-consciousness. Just as the body of the fetus shares the mother's oxygen and nutrients through the umbilical cord, so the fetal psyche participates directly in the mother's psychic life. Hegel uses the conception of a sharing of souls to explain the possible effects the mother's constitution can have on that of the child. These can include "its predisposition to illness, as well as its further endowments in respect of bodily shape, temper, character, talent, idiosyncrasies, etc."\textsuperscript{55} The mother is thus the "genius" of the child. The primal relation of mother and child is the prototype for the state of participation mystique.\textsuperscript{56} This state, however, is viewed by Jung as only one manifestation of the more fundamental state of psychic identity, which is defined in general terms as unconscious conformity.\textsuperscript{57}

Hegel also speaks of the relation of the mature individual to his or her genius. By genius, in this instance, Hegel

\textsuperscript{54}Ibid..

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid..

\textsuperscript{56}Cf. CW 6:781.

\textsuperscript{57}Cf. ibid., 741-42; and 11:817 & n.
understands "the particular nature of a man which, in every situation and circumstance, decides his action and destiny."\textsuperscript{58} The genius "forms the objective element which asserts itself from out of the inwardness of the individual's character."\textsuperscript{59} These descriptions correspond to what Jung first called his "number two personality."\textsuperscript{60} In terms of his later model of the psyche, Hegel's notion of the genius is a clear representation of the autonomous unconscious or the Self as ruling archetype.

The second group of phenomena which exhibit the state of unconscious identity characteristic of sleep comprises "magnetic somnambulism [i.e., hypnotism] and cognate states."\textsuperscript{61} Because these states involve a more or less unnatural relinquishing of the fully conscious and rational state, Hegel looks upon them as forms of "disease." The individual in such a morbid state "relates itself without mediation to the concrete content of itself"—that is, to the contents of the unconscious—"and retains its self-possessed consciousness of what pertains to it and of the understandable connectedness of the world, as a distinct state...."\textsuperscript{62} Hegel attributes this

\textsuperscript{58}Phil. Sp., section 405 Z.

\textsuperscript{59}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{60}Cf. Memories, pp. 49-50.

\textsuperscript{61}Phil. Sp., section 406.

\textsuperscript{62}Ibid.
immediate contact with the unconscious to a regression (Herabsunken) to the level of the feeling subjectivity. As in the state of sleep, the regression in somnambulism brings about a depotentiation of the ego, which is the seat of consciousness and directed thinking (Hegel's "judgement through which consciousness...takes its content to be an external objectivity"). Hegel describes the state of ego-depotentiation in the following terms:

Since it is the developed, adult, cultured consciousness, which is degraded to this state of feeling, it retains along with its content the formal factor of its being-for-self. Yet this formal intuiting and knowing does not progress to the judgement through which consciousness, when it is healthy and awake, takes its content to be an external objectivity. The individual is therefore the monad which knows inwardly of its actuality, the self-intuiting of the genius.\(^63\)

Hegel does not accord much value to the contents brought to light by the somnambulistic regression. The significance of such contents does not extend beyond the somnambulist's "individually determined world of particular interests and narrow relationships."\(^64\) What is revealed, in Jung's terminology, is merely the personal unconscious. As we saw to be the case with regard to the dream, Hegel here fails to recognize the existence of archetypal contents, despite the

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\(^{63}\) Ibid.

\(^{64}\) Ibid.
fact that he is willing to admit a kind of collective unconscious.

Hegel devotes a paragraph to the phenomenon of the rapport, otherwise known as the transference, between the somnambulist and the "magnetizer" (that is, the hypnotist). Again, the phenomenon is explained by the notion of the genius, in this case recalling the psychical bond between mother and fetus. In his discussion of the rapport, Hegel shows an appreciation for the secondary phenomenon of suggestion, warning that it is often impossible to determine which elements of the trance originate with the somnambulist and which with the hypnotist.

Hegel's "cognate states" comprise what is currently referred to as occult or parapsychological phenomena. Hegel refers specifically to the so-called diviners (water or metal), to the ability of sleep-walkers to see with closed eyes, and most importantly, to the phenomenon of clairvoyance. Hegel does not question the authenticity of such phenomena, but neither does he fall back upon the notion of the supernatural as an explanatory principle.

This is likewise the case with Jung, whose life-long interest in the occult led him to the formulation of the notion
of synchronicity, which he defines as "an a-causal connecting principle." The synchronous factor merely stipulates the existence of an intellectually necessary principle which could be added as a fourth to the recognized triad of space, time, and causality. These factors are necessary but not absolute—most psychic contents are non-spatial, time and causality are psychically relative—and in the same way the synchronous factor proves to be only conditionally valid. But unlike causality, which reigns despotsically over the whole picture of the macrophysical world and whose universal rule is shattered only in certain lower orders of magnitude, synchronicity is a phenomenon that seems to be primarily connected with psychic conditions, that is to say with processes in the unconscious.65

Though Jung links synchronicity with unconscious processes, all genuine synchronistic phenomena must involve a perceived correspondence between internal and external events. Synchronicity thus "consists of two factors: a) An unconscious image comes into consciousness either directly...or indirectly...in the form of a dream, idea, or premonition. b) An objective situation coincides with this content."66 Correspondences of this kind will, as a rule, be perceived as highly meaningful, which is why Jung sometimes describes synchronicity as "meaningful coincidence."67

65CW 8:958.
66Ibid., 858.
67Cf. ibid., 849; 10:593; and 14:662.
Hegel warns that to comprehend the nature of such coincidences "is impossible, so long as we assume independent personalities, independent of one another and of the objective world which is their content—so long as we assume spatial and material juxtaposition to be generally absolute." Hegel, of course, makes no such assumption. And neither does Jung, though he recognizes that the tendency to do so is absolutely necessary if we are to gain reliable knowledge of our world, but philosophically it has the disadvantage of breaking up, or obscuring, the universal interrelationship of events so that a recognition of the greater relationship, i.e. of the unity of the world, becomes more and more difficult. Everything that happens, however, happens in the same "one world" and is part of it....the synchronistic principle...suggests that there is an interconnection or unity of causally unrelated events, and thus postulates a unitary aspect of being which can very well be described as the unus mundus.

For Jung, the ground of this "one world" is the "psychoid" archetype. Just as Hegel's logical categories are at the same time ontological categories, so the archetypes, as we have seen, represent the structures common to both mind and matter, experience and being.

Though Hegel does not propose an explanatory concept analogous to the principle of synchronicity, his understanding

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68Phil. Sp., section 406.
69CW 14:662.
of how synchronistic phenomena come about is quite congenial to Jung's view of the matter. According to Hegel, such phenomena occur as the result of a particularly profound regression, when the life of consciousness, "its external world and its relationship with it" is "enshrouded, and the soul is sunk in sleep...."\textsuperscript{70} Hegel seems to have some sort of trance state in mind. In such a state, "the individual's immanent actuality remains the same substantial totality, although it is now a life of feeling which sees and knows inwardly."\textsuperscript{71} This inward vision and consciousness can result in various forms of immediate knowledge.

Characteristic of this knowledge is...that consciousness in this immanence should have immediate knowledge, since it can view the same content as that which for the healthy consciousness is objective as an understandable actuality, and if it is to be known self-possessedly involves the whole real extent of its understandable mediation. This intuiting is a clairvoyance in so far as it knows through the undivided substantiality of the genius and finds itself within the essence of the connectedness. It is therefore not bound to the series of mediating, mutually external conditions which has to be traversed by self-possessed consciousness....\textsuperscript{72}

The sphere of ego-consciousness is circumscribed and determined by the categories of space, time, and causality. These categories, however, lose their influence with the

\textsuperscript{70}Phil. Sp., section 406.
\textsuperscript{71}Ibid..
\textsuperscript{72}Ibid..
depotentiation of the ego in the process of regression. In certain instances, this process brings the residual ego into immediate contact with the deeper levels of the "feeling soul"—to the point of intersection with the unus mundus or collective unconscious—releasing or stimulating contents which, from the point of view of the waking consciousness, seem occult or parapsychological in nature or effect.

In terms of Jung's model of the psyche, it is not strictly necessary that such a regression occur to produce synchronistic phenomena. The essential point is the activation of the archetype and the corresponding apprehension of the previously unconscious content. When it is not a question of regression, however, one must at least assume that the affective tone of the individual's consciousness was of such a quality or intensity as to provoke or at least facilitate the ingress of the unconscious content. "Every emotional state," as Jung remarks, produces an alteration of consciousness...that is to say there is a certain narrowing of consciousness and a corresponding strengthening of the unconscious which, particularly in the case of strong affects, is noticeable even to the layman. The tone of the unconscious is heightened, thereby creating a gradient for the unconscious to flow toward the conscious. The conscious then comes under the influence of unconscious instinctual impulses and contents. These are as a rule, complexes whose ultimate basis is the archetype....73

73CW 8:856.
Synchronistic phenomena, the somnambulistic or hypnotic trance, the phenomenon of the genius, and the process of dreaming, each presuppose a state of identity between the ego and the unconscious (that is, one of its contents). Though Hegel speaks of the various manifestations of this identity as forms of "the feeling soul in its immediacy," he also makes a distinction between the "normal" or healthy forms (dreaming and the genius) and the "morbid" or pathological ("somnambulism and the cognate states"). The latter are considered pathological because they involve a separation or regression from the level of autonomous rational consciousness. According to Hegel, the life of feeling, considered as a "state" or "form" of the "self-conscious, cultured, self-possessed person," is a "disease."\textsuperscript{74} Such disease, however, still does not violate the organic unity of the psyche. The somnambulist or medium may be subject to the tide of regression or the spontaneous influx of unconscious contents, but his or her psychic integrity remains intact. Where this is not the case, we have, according to Hegel, insanity or derangement (\textit{Verücktheit}). It is in this state, according to Hegel,

\textit{Phil. Sp.}, section 406.
contradiction with the objective consciousness, thereby becoming a purely formal, empty, abstract subjectivity....\textsuperscript{75}

In the paragraph which corresponds to this passage from the additions, Hegel proposes the following definition of insanity or mental derangement: "...the subject...finds itself involved in a contradiction between the totality systematized in its consciousness and the particular determinateness which is not fluidified and is given its rank and place within it."\textsuperscript{76}

These formulations clearly anticipate the notion of dissociation which was to assume a central position in the dynamic psychologies of Janet, Freud, and Jung.\textsuperscript{77} "By dissociation," writes Jung,

the French school meant a weakening of consciousness due to the splitting off of one or more sequences of ideas; they separate themselves from the hierarchy of ego-consciousness and begin to lead a more or less independent existence of their own. The Breuer-Freud theory of hysteria grew up on this basis. According to the more recent formulations of Janet,

\textsuperscript{75}Ibid., section 408 Z.

\textsuperscript{76}Ibid., section 408.

\textsuperscript{77}In his \textit{Discovery of the Unconscious} (New York: Basic Books, 1970) Ellenberger attributes the introduction of the notion of the \textit{idée fixe} to Janet and Charcot (cf. pp. 102, 373). More than half a century earlier, however, Hegel spoke of a besondere or \textit{verseinzelten Vorstellung}. In his \textit{Psyche} (1846), C.G. Carus proposes that "The concept of illness means that another principle, a foreign idea, asserts itself in the organism alongside the life idea." \textit{Psyche: On the Development of the Soul} (New York: Spring Publications, 1970) p. 68. Jung was a great fan of Carus's.
dissociation is the result of the abaissement du niveau mental, which destroys the hierarchy and promotes, or actually creates, the formation of automatisms.\textsuperscript{78}

Jung himself identified Janet's idée fixe with Ziehen's Komplex, taking up the latter term, with certain modifications, into his own psychology.\textsuperscript{79}

The nineteenth century came to distinguish between two primary forms of "mental derangement or insanity"—neurosis and psychosis. The most common form of psychosis was first labelled dementia praecox, but later renamed schizophrenia by Bleuler. "Neurosis is self division," writes Jung.\textsuperscript{80} The fundamental difference between neurosis and schizophrenia lies in the maintenance of the potential unity of the personality. Despite the fact that consciousness can be split up into several personal consciousnesses, the unity of all the dissociated fragments is not only visible to the professional eye but can be reestablished by means of hypnosis. This is not the case with schizophrenia....in a schizophrenic patient the connection between ego and some of the complexes is more or less completely lost.\textsuperscript{81}

For Hegel, the psychical dissociation characteristic of insanity manifests itself in a contradiction or lack of

\textsuperscript{78} CW 3:55.
\textsuperscript{79} Cf. Ellenberger, p.692.
\textsuperscript{80} CW 7:18.
\textsuperscript{81} CW 3:506; cf. also 18:1155.
correspondence between subjective presentations and the world of objective facts. The insane person "believes his merely subjective idea to be objectively present to him and clings to it in face of the actual objectivity which contradicts it."\textsuperscript{82} A particular idea can be called insane, or delusional as we would now say, "if the madman regards an empty abstraction and a mere possibility as something concrete and actual."\textsuperscript{83} Janet later described this condition as a loss of the fonction du réel (Freud's function of "reality testing"). "As we know," writes Jung, "the commonest form of insanity, dementia praecox or schizophrenia, consists essentially in the fact that the unconscious...usurps the reality function and substitutes its own reality."\textsuperscript{84} As Hegel puts it, "in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits."\textsuperscript{85}

In contrast with the purely symptom-determined nosological divisions devised by the great clinical psychologists of the second half of the nineteenth century (notably Kraepelin), Hegel attempts to classify the principal forms of mental illness according to the different moments of the concept of insanity, whose main characteristic, as we have seen, is

\textsuperscript{82}Phil. Sp., section 408 Z.
\textsuperscript{83}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{84}CW 7:469.
\textsuperscript{85}Phil. Sp., section 408.
dissociation (Zerrissenheit, literally "tornness," though Hegel, thus far, has used only such words as \textit{Entgegensetzen}—"opposition" and \textit{Widerspruch}—"contradiction").

The first moment is the "quite indeterminate state of self-absorption."\textsuperscript{86} Hegel gives three graded clinical pictures corresponding to this moment. The first—"Idiocy"—includes the most severe, and often congenital, forms of mental impairment (cretinism, for instance). But Hegel also mentions such symptoms as catalepsy and general stupor, suggesting catatonic schizophrenia or hysteria (if the symptoms are transient). The second clinical picture is that of "the distracted mind," which consists generally in a "non-awareness of the immediate present."\textsuperscript{87} The distracted person "confuses his true situation in a particular case with a false one, apprehends external circumstances in a one-sided manner, not in the totality of their relationships."\textsuperscript{88} As the humorous illustrations Hegel provides conform to the image of the absent-minded professor, the distracted mind would be more properly defined as a character type (Jung's introverted thinking type comes to mind) than a truly pathological state.\textsuperscript{89} The third clinical picture is the flip-side or complement to

\textsuperscript{86}Ibid., Z.
\textsuperscript{87}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{88}Ibid.
the distracted mind—namely the "rambling mind." The rambling mind "interests itself in everything. This springs from an inability to fix one's attention on anything definite, and consists in the malady of stumbling from one object to another."\(^{89}\) The rambling mind manifests itself in senseless chattering and general hyperactivity. In severe cases, the individual indulges in seemingly irrational disruptive actions—Hegel gives the example of a patient overturning furniture and uprooting house-plants. In general, this and the preceding clinical pictures may be said to correspond to Bleuler's distinction between the schizoid and syntonic character types, whose pathological manifestations are, respectively, the schizophrenias and manic-depressive illness.\(^{90}\)

The second main form of insanity—"madness proper"—"occurs when the natural mind...acquires a definite content and this content becomes a fixed idea...."\(^{91}\) As illustrations, Hegel mentions "lunatics who, for example, take themselves to be God, or Christ, or a King," or those who "imagine themselves to be a grain of barley, or a dog, or to

\(^{89}\)Ibid.


\(^{91}\)Phil. Sp., section 408 Z.
have a carriage in their stomach."\textsuperscript{92} Here, Hegel clearly has the delusions of paranoid schizophrenics in mind.\textsuperscript{93}

The third and last main form of insanity is "mania or frenzy." In contrast with the preceding, the maniac or frenzied individual is painfully conscious of the contradiction between his delusion or fixed idea and the objective world, "and yet cannot rid himself of this idea but is fully intent on making it an actuality or on destroying what is actual."\textsuperscript{94} The element of dissociation implicit in all forms of insanity here becomes explicit. The individual suffers from an "inner tornness" (inneren Zerrissenheit).\textsuperscript{95} A consequence of this dissociation is that "the dark, infernal powers of the heart are set free."\textsuperscript{96} Hegel remarks that such individuals commonly manifest a jealous, suspicious, resentful, and generally mischievous disposition, which not infrequently will work itself into a murderous rage. Here again, we see the clear indications of paranoid schizophrenia. Current

\textsuperscript{92}Ibid..

\textsuperscript{93}Included in the treatment of "madness proper" is a passage on melancholy as related to the general feeling of "disgust with life." Though interesting in its own right, it does not seem to fit into this clinical picture, but would perhaps have been more at home in the section on the distracted mind.

\textsuperscript{94}Ibid..

\textsuperscript{95}Ibid..

\textsuperscript{96}Ibid..
classifications, however, do not recognize the distinctive feature of Hegel's presentation of this clinical picture—namely, that the individual is fully conscious of his or her torn and contradictory existence.

Beyond the recognition of constitutional factors, it is only with this last form of insanity that Hegel ventures to speculate on a possible dynamic aetiology. The schizophrenic dissociation "can be brought about especially by a stroke of misfortune, by a derangement of the person's individual world, or by the violent upheaval and putting out of joint of the general state of the world...."97 Hegel points to the French Revolution as an example of the latter eventuality. The implication is that the integrity of the personality is intimately linked with the character of the collective consciousness. When dominant cultural and social values collapse or suffer an unusually rapid transformation, individual wholeness is correspondingly imperiled.98 "Without being aware of it, " as Jung remarks, "the neurotic participates in the dominant currents of his age and reflects them in his own conflict."99 Neurosis, therefore, can be said

97Ibid..
98This theme is taken up in greater detail in Chapter Eight.
99CW 7:17.
to represent "an unsuccessful attempt on the part of the individual to solve the general problem in his own person." 100

In keeping with his view on the value of dreams and revelations originating in the trance state, Hegel refuses to grant any deeper, universal significance to the delusions of the insane.

The spiritual content liberated in this natural state consists of the self-seeking determinations of the heart, of vanity, pride, and the rest of the passions, and of the imaginings, hopes, love and hate of the subject. This earthiness becomes rampant once what is natural is no longer completely subject and subservient to the power of self-possession, of what is universal, of theoretical moral principles; for since the heart in its immediacy is natural and selfish, this evil is implicitly present within it. 101

Hegel is much closer to Freud than to Jung in this respect. But this limiting of the unconscious to the merely personal is contrary to Hegel's conception of the universal ideality of soul (which, as we have seen, corresponds to Jung's collective unconscious). While, to Hegel, the lunatic's delusion that he is God, Christ, or a King, is an indication of the merely selfish passions that govern the insane, to Jung they are symbols of the self--images of whole and self-possessed

100 Ibid., 18.
101 Phil. Sp., section 408.
personhood—which function as compensatory presentations to the individual in his or her dissociated state.

Hegel does, however, lay great stress on the insane person's "better self,"\(^{102}\) to which the therapist must endeavour to gain access: "The right psychical treatment...keeps in view the truth that insanity is not an abstract loss of reason...but only derangement, only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason."\(^{103}\) It should be recalled that "reason," along with the correlative notion of ideality, here refers to the essential identity-in-difference of the personality (rather than to the intellect, or understanding [Verstand], as the faculty of ratiocination).

Hegel concludes the Anthropology with the concept of the actual soul (die Wirkliche Seele). In contrast with the abstract universality or immediate identity of the natural soul (the collective unconscious as naturally determined), on the one hand, and the inwardly torn or dissociated states of the feeling soul, on the other, the actual soul "has developed forth from this separation into mediated unity with its

\(^{102}\)Ibid., Z.

\(^{103}\)Ibid.
naturality...which, in its corporeity, is for itself in a concrete manner."\textsuperscript{104}

The logical category of actuality, it will be recalled, emerges as the dialectical unity of essence and appearance, or more generally, of inner and outer. The concept of the actual soul, accordingly, describes the psychophysical isomorphism that obtains in the well-adjusted individual. This manifests itself in the free translation into appropriate behaviour of the individual's inner psychic disposition. The actual soul is the condition wherein the body is recognized as "the likeness of its [the soul's] identity and freedom."\textsuperscript{105} In this ideality and freedom, the actual soul is the ground which sustains and out of which emerges the complex centre of personal identity—the ego of individual self-consciousness. "Soul," writes Hegel, "which posits its being over against itself, having sublated and determined it as its own [through habit], has lost the significance of being soul, the immediacy of Spirit." The actual soul,

in its habitual sentience and concrete self-awareness, being inwardly recollected and infinitely

\textsuperscript{104}Ibid., section 411 Z. The transition from the feeling to the actual soul is effected through the concept of habit (die Gewohnheit), which is the process of "building up the particular or corporeal determinations of feeling into the being of the soul" as its "second nature." Ibid., section 410. Habit is the state of "being-at-home-with-oneself" (bei-sich-selber-sein). Ibid., section 410 Z.

\textsuperscript{105}Ibid., section 412 Z.
self-related in its externality, is implicitly the being-for-self of the reality of its determinatenesses. In so far as the soul has being for abstract universality, this being-for-self of free universality is its higher awakening as ego, or abstract universality.\footnote{Ibid., section 412.}
Chapter Three

THE PSYCHO-SOCIAL MATRIX

The previous chapter concluded with the notion of the emergence of the ego as the centre of personal identity. Before taking up the nature and development of individual consciousness as such, we must consider its psycho-social matrix in the life of the family, along with the set of fundamental archetypes constellated by this matrix.

According to Hegel, the individual is a vital member of his or her society through participation in its ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Ethical life might be described as the cultural life-blood of a people--the substantial actuality of the Volksgeist. Ethical life consists generally in the unreflected customs, beliefs, and values--in short, the ethoi--of a particular people. Such ethoi find their objective embodiment in the various laws and institutions of a nation.

As a spiritual totality, ethical life is characterized by a constitutive dynamic, an inner differentiation into opposed, yet complementary elements. Hegel describes these in terms of two laws--the human and the divine--which correspond to two spheres: the community or nation and the family. In psychological terms, these two spheres correspond to a certain
extent with the collective consciousness and the collective unconscious, respectively. "Ego-consciousness," writes Jung, "seems to be dependent on two factors: firstly, on the conditions of the collective, i.e., the social consciousness; and secondly on the archetypes, or dominants, of the collective unconscious."¹ The human law or collective consciousness, as Hegel says, is "the known law, and the prevailing custom;" it is the spirit of the community or "the nation as a whole" in "the form of a reality that is conscious of itself."² The collective consciousness or "publicly manifest spirit," however, "has the root of its power in the nether world"—i.e., the collective unconscious. Hegel amplifies the suggestive image of the nether world by saying that the "self-certainty and self-assurance of a nation possesses the truth of its oath, which binds all into one, solely in the mute unconscious substance of all, in the waters of forgetfulness."³ The living source of these waters, from which proceeds not the human, but the divine law, is the family as "the unconscious, still inner concept [of the ethical order]...."⁴ Neither of the two laws, Hegel stresses, "is by itself absolutely valid."

¹CW 3:423.
³Ibid., par. 474/267-68.
⁴Ibid., par. 450/252, modified.
proceeds in its living process from the divine, the law valid on earth from that of the nether world, the conscious from the unconscious, mediation from immediacy—and equally returns from whence it came. The power of the nether world, on the other hand, has its actual existence on earth; through consciousness, it becomes existence and activity.\(^5\)

This passage shows profound psychological insight. Written almost a full century before the emergence of depth psychology, Hegel not only recognizes the collective unconscious as logically and developmentally prior to the collective consciousness, but he sees as well, in clear anticipation of Jung, the dialectical relation that obtains between both realms.

Hegel also anticipates Freud and Jung in recognizing the significance of the family as the matrix or generative \textit{habitus} of the unconscious deep structures which determine the organization of social life. The common, everyday relations within the family, writes Jung, "which are eternally repeated, create the mightiest archetypes of all...."\(^6\) The cumulative deposit of the collective human experience of family relations, "of father, mother, child, husband and wife..., has exalted this group of archetypes into the supreme regulating principles of religious and even political life, in unconscious

\(^5\)Ibid., par. 460/258-9.

\(^6\textit{CW} \ 8:336.$
recognition of their tremendous psychic power." The family, then, is the psycho-social matrix for the constellation of fundamental archetypes.

The first in importance, as the parents of those which follow, are the archetypes of the mother and the father. According to Jung, considered as archetypal image, the mother is the symbol of the collective unconscious as a whole. As such, she is the Great Mother (alma mater). The collective unconscious is the matrix of individual personality, the womb of the cumulative experience of the human race from the time of its beginnings. It is, as Hegel says, the nether world of departed souls. Now while the symbolic link which Jung draws between the image of the mother and the collective unconscious as the matrix of individual personality is immediately intelligible on the grounds of analogy, the corresponding generalization that the unconscious as such is "feminine" is much less so. The confusion, it seems, lies in a failure to distinguish between the unconscious as a developmental, vs. the unconscious as a functional, category. Developmentally, the unconscious "gives birth" to consciousness, and in this sense

7Ibid., 337.

8Cf. CW 12:92; and 5:393.

is "feminine." Functionally, however, the unconscious is strictly neither masculine nor feminine, or it is both, since, as we shall see momentarily, the unconscious life of the individual is typically personified (in the dream, for instance) by the figure of the inner contrasexual.10

The archetypal father, by contrast, is symbolically associated with the collective consciousness.11 As the "other" who, through his claims upon the mother, at the same time intrudes upon and complexifies the primal relationship between mother and child--in the process constellating the nuclear family--the father comes to be associated with the principle of differentiation and the wider sphere of social life. Phylogenetically, the archetypal significance of the father-image is grounded in the structure of what Edgar Morin terms the "arkhe-society," by which he means the type or "matrix" of early sapient social organization. "The affective intimacy and proximity between man and woman," writes Morin,

bring together man and child. Long before the recognition of genetic paternity, the lineaments of psychological paternity are already defined. The

10 As Demaris Wehr remarks in her book, Jung and Feminism: Liberating Archetypes (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), there is one sense in which the characterization of the unconscious as "feminine" can be taken as generally valid: "Since the major social institutions and modes of knowing all reflect a masculine consciousness, what has gone underground for everyone are women's perceptions, and thus the unconscious is feminine." (p.117)

11 Cf. CW 12:92.
latter emerges once the protective and possessive authority of the masculine class individualizes itself and becomes more intimately related to the child; once, that is, alongside the woman appears a familiar and intimate man. \ldots\n
Sooner or later, after sapiens, \ldots the paternalized brother becomes uncle, the uncle-spouse becomes father, and his paternity is definitively established once he is recognized as genitor.

In this way the nuclear family is first constituted. Paternity widens the mother-child nucleus by introducing the man, and at the same time introduces the principle of masculine hierarchy into the new nucleus of father-mother-child. The phenomenon which hominization initiates, and which sapiens accomplishes, is not the "murder" of the father, but the "birth" of the father.

This foundational event has—at least one element in common with the mythic Freudian "murder of the father": for the child, it spells ambiguity. The father is at once protector and usurpator (who takes away part of the maternal affection); he is at once support and enemy (whose authority represses infantile desires). Thus the ambiguous significance of the father is rendered sociologically intelligible: the father introduces complexity, that is, the contradiction internal to the micro-structure which is created: the family. ¹²

It is doubtless because of his particular role (both phylogenetically, and, to the extent that this situation is recapitulated anew in the early life of the child, ontogenetically) in the constitutive dynamics of the nuclear family that the image of the father, as Stevens notes, continues to possess "a centrifugal orientation (i.e. towards

society and the outer world) in contrast... to mother's centripetal concern (i.e. with home and family)....

Social constructionists, and feminists in particular, might object at this point, questioning the legitimacy of attributing such symbolic associations to archetypal factors, which has the effect of lending an eternal sanction to what in fact may be nothing more than the cherished stereotypes of patriarchal society. Such an objection raises issues of extreme complexity: such as the relation between nature and nurture, the individual and the species, and freedom and determinism, a detailed consideration of which is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, as a corrective to Jung's platonizing (and, as we have seen, his kantian) tendency, it must be emphasized that the archetypes are not eternally fixed, but, like everything human, and indeed the universe as a whole, are the product of evolution, and so subject to on-going transformation. But even recognizing as much, short of simply rejecting the theory of archetypes as completely groundless, it is difficult to see how the traditional symbolic significance of the images of mother and father can be entirely reduced to the status of arbitrary social conventions or cultural stereotypes. There is, of course, no a priori reason why a man should not be a home-maker and take an active role in the

rearing of children, or a woman the "bread-winner"—a situation which, in fact, is increasingly common in contemporary post-industrial society. But it is equally foolish to deny that the deep structures of something so constitutively human as the family are, if not the product, then at least organically, continuous with, the cumulative history (and pre-history) of our common socio-biological evolution, which, as far as the nuclear family is concerned, stretches back at least some 90,000 years prior to the historical period. The fundamental archetypes constellated by the family are the vital deposits of this evolution, and it is arguable that, until such time as human beings as a species no longer issue from the womb of the mother, the power of these archetypes will endure.\textsuperscript{14} As we shall see shortly, however, a much stronger case can, and indeed must, be made for the social constructionist and feminist positions with regard to Hegel's and Jung's blatantly androcentric views on gender roles outside the archetypal context of the family.

\textsuperscript{14}Even if such a Brave New World were to come to pass, one might predict that the power of the fundamental archetypes, which appear to possess a kind of half-life, would persist indefinitely. "Even in the rare cases where the infant's primary caretaker is a man," writes Wehr, "the infant has spent nine months in the womb. This still gives the mother a certain primacy, although such an infant would be more likely than most children to project the 'primary caretaker image'...on the father." Op. cit., p.118.
While Freud looks to the myth of Oedipus as the symbolic prototype which most exemplifies the psycho-social dynamics determined by the deep structures of the family—in this case, the relation of the son to the parents—Hegel focuses on the story of Antigone, the daughter of Oedipus, and the tragic character of her unconditional love for her brother, Polynices. According to Hegel, the relationship between brother and sister is the most spiritual—that is, the most expressive of that concrete freedom which is the essence of Spirit—because they are of "the same blood which has, however, in them reached a state of rest and equilibrium." Consequently, "they do not desire one another, nor have they given to, nor received from, one another this independent being-for-self; on the contrary, they are free individualities in regard to each other." In the brother-sister relation, "the moment of the individual self, recognizing and being recognized, can here assert its right, because it is linked to the equilibrium of the blood and is a relation devoid of desire."\textsuperscript{15}

We will take up the relation between desire and mutual recognition in the following chapter. For the moment, we may note that Hegel is evidently at great pains to stress the purity of the bond between brother and sister. Antigone and Polynices, however, are themselves the issue of an incestuous

\textsuperscript{15}Phen. Sp., par. 457/257.
union, and the sin of their parents remains an implicit sous-
entendu. The deeper significance of the love between brother
and sister lies in the archetypal image of the hieros gamos,
which in the esoteric tradition (Egyptian religion,
Hermeticism, Alchemy, and mysticism generally) as in the world
of the dream, is often symbolized by the image of brother-
sister incest. "Although the union of close blood-relatives is
everywhere taboo," writes Jung, "it is yet the prerogative of
kings (witness the incestuous marriages of the Pharaohs etc.)."

Incest symbolizes union with one's own being, it
means individuation or becoming a Self, and, because
this is so vitally important, it exerts an unholy
fascination—not, perhaps, as a crude reality, but
certainly as a psychic process controlled by the
unconscious, a fact well known to anybody who is
familiar with psychopathology. It is for this reason,
and not because of occasional cases of human incest,
that the first gods were believed to propagate their
kind incestuously. Incest is simply the union of like
with like, which is the next stage in the development
of the primitive idea of self-fertilization.16

Hegel's insistence on the lack of sexual desire in the love
between brother and sister, therefore, underscores the symbolic
or archetypal character of the relation. The communality (or
"equilibrium") of blood, which allows for the assertion of "the
moment of the individual self," points to the notion of
individuation as "union with one's own being."

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16 CW 16:419.
The constitutive dynamics of the Self as complex whole are, as we have seen, played out in terms of the relation between ego and unconscious. Although, in terms of the fundamental archetypes, the collective unconscious is symbolized by the image of the Great Mother, from the point of view of the sexually differentiated ego, the unconscious characteristically manifests itself in the form of the inner contrasexual—the "anima" for men and the "animus" for women (L. anima, soul). As Samuels remarks, "a man will, quite naturally, image what is 'other' to him in the symbolic form of a woman--a being with an-other's anatomy. A woman will symbolize what is foreign or mysterious to her in terms of the kind of body she does not herself have." Together, anima and animus constitute what Jung calls the syzygy, a Gnostic term referring to the twin emanations or pairs of subordinate deities which issue from the Godhead. Anima and animus are as sister and brother, the twin birth of the collective unconscious (the matrix of the fundamental archetypes). More specifically, the archetypes of anima and animus, writes Jung, "represent functions which filter the contents of the collective unconscious to the conscious mind." As Goldenberg, Hillman, 

17 Cf. CW 6:797-811; 7:296f.; and 9ii:20f.


20 CW 9ii:40.
and Wehr (among others) have demonstrated, there are serious problems with Jung's anima/animus theory, along with his general views on male/female differences (which, as I said, suffer from an insufficiently critical androcentric bias). What is significant for the present argument, however, is that the conscious/unconscious dynamic which Hegel maps onto the brother/sister relation is complexified by Jung through the recognition that both individuals (i.e., "brother" and "sister", or male and female) must each be considered from the point of view of the distinction between consciousness and the unconscious.

That Hegel chooses to couch his discussion of the brother-sister relation in the context of the myth of Antigone is another indication that we have to do here not merely with the literal or empirical family as such, but with the archetypal structures underlying it. However, though he describes brother and sister as being "free individualities in regard to each other," Hegel's corresponding pronouncements on the respective social roles determined by the essential differences between "man" and "woman" are clearly biased in favour of typical patriarchal values, and so hardly conducive to the freedom and mutual recognition which he sees as the goal of psycho-social

and political development. In the Philosophy of Right, for instance, Hegel sums up the psychosocial differences between the sexes as follows:

Thus one sex is Spirit in its self-diremption into explicit personal self-subsistence and the knowledge and volition of free universality, i.e. the self-consciousness of conceptual thought and the volition of objective final end. The other sex is Spirit maintaining itself in unity as knowledge and volition of the substantive, but knowledge and volition in the form of concrete individuality and feeling. In relation to externality, the former is powerful and active, the latter passive and subjective. It follows that man has his actual substantive life in the state, in learning, and so forth, as well as in labour and struggle with the external world and with himself so that it is only out of his diremption that he fights his way to self-subsistent unity with himself. In the family he has a tranquil intuition of this unity, and there he lives a subjective ethical life on the plane of feeling. Woman, on the other hand, has her substantive destiny in the family, and to be imbued with family piety is her ethical frame of mind.

Jung, for his part, is guilty of perpetuating the same stereotypes, as one can see, for example, in the following description of the difference between the conscious attitudes of men and women:

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23 Hegel's Philosophy of Right, tr. T.M. Knox (Oxford University Press, 1976), Werke 7, par. 166: hereafter referred to as Phil. Right.
The conscious attitude of woman is in general far more exclusively personal than that of a man. Her world is made up of fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, husbands and children. The rest of the world consists likewise of families, who nod to each other but are, in the main, interested essentially in themselves. The man's world is the nation, business concerns, etc. His family is simply a means to an end, one of the foundations of the state, and his wife is not necessarily the woman for him (at any rate not as the woman means it when she says "my man"). The general means more to him than the personal; his world consists of a multitude of co-ordinated factors, whereas her world, outside her husband, terminates in a kind of cosmic mist.  

We have seen how the respective roles of man and woman in the constitution of the nuclear family give to the mother-image a typically "centripetal," and to that of the father, a "centrifugal," orientation. Both Hegel and Jung, however, unjustifiably restrict the general scope of gender roles to their archetypal significance within the matrix of the nuclear family. Hegel's association of "woman" with feeling, intuition, and the substantiality which binds the family together, on the one hand, and of "man" with thinking and extraverted engagement with the world at large, on the other, is echoed in Jung's equating of the masculine principle with the concept of Logos and the feminine with that of Eros. By Logos, writes Jung, one is to understand "discrimination, judgement, insight," and by Eros "the capacity to relate."  

\[24^{\text{CW}}\, 7:338.\]
\[25^{\text{CW}}\, 14:224.\]
The animus corresponds to the paternal Logos just as the anima corresponds to the maternal Eros. But I do not wish to give these intuitive concepts too specific a definition. I use Eros and Logos merely as conceptual aids to describe the fact that woman's consciousness is characterized more by the connective quality of Eros than by the discrimination and cognition associated with Logos.26

Insofar as the concept of Logos stands for the politically effective domain of communicative exchange, it is no doubt the case that, within the context of patriarchal society, Logos is a predominantly masculine affair.27 By linking the concept of Logos with the archetypal notion of the animus, however, Jung legitimizes the traditional exclusion of women from the public realm. This does not mean, however, that there is no deeper truth to some such characterization of fundamental male/female differences. While the Eros/Logos distinction may be suspect, the essential qualities of relatedness and continuity vs. discrimination and discontinuity may very well rest upon a deeper, psycho-biological, or archetypal, "nature" which precedes (both logically and historically) the emergence of patriarchal society. Mary O'Brien, for instance, argues that male reproductive consciousness

26CW 9ii:29.

27There is no question, writes Ken Wilber, "but that historically the major sphere of consciousness denied access to the feminine principle by the newly emergent patriarchy was that of socio-cultural communication; i.e., free mental exchange, free access to heaven, free ideation." Up From Eden (Boulder: Shambhala, 1981) p. 232.
is splintered and discontinuous, and cannot be mediated within reproductive process. Female reproductive consciousness is continuous and integrative, for it is mediated within reproductive process. . . . The value which is produced by reproductive labour might be called "synthetic" value. It represents the unity of sentient beings with natural process and the integrity and the continuity of the race. These are what men lose in the alienation of the seed, and, in a very real sense, nature is unjust to men. She includes and excludes at the same moment. It is an injustice, however, which male praxis might reasonably be said to have overcorrected.28

At any rate, Jungians themselves are the first to admit that, even within the constraints of patriarchal society, where men as a class are granted privileged access to the Logos principle, it is by no means the case that individual men are always and necessarily deep thinkers, truly insightful, or particularly discriminating, or that individual women are less capable of possessing these qualities. In fact, to the extent that men or women identify exclusively with the Logos principle, the contrary will inevitably result. For it is Eros which gives depth to thought, substance to insight, and grounding to discrimination. By the same token, while women do not have a monopoly on relationship, Eros without Logos, similarly, leads to indiscriminate loyalties and confused or misguided alliances. In other words, regardless of whether they are archetypally based or socially constructed (which in any case is a false opposition to begin with), the essential point

is that Logos and Eros are complementary principles, which is
to say that each is a necessary element, or moment, as Hegel
would say, of a more inclusive, complex whole. While Hegel
recognizes this much, he makes the mistake of identifying these
principles with the notions of "man" and "woman" in toto.
Although Jung's understanding of the bisexual constitution of
the human psyche represents a definite advance over Hegel's
ego- and gender-bound view of personality, the former's
panpsychism (along with his Platonic and Kantian bias) tends to
underestimate the determinative influence of the socio-
historical context on the delimitation of gender roles. As we
have seen, Hegel, for his part, shows an equal lack of
sensitivity to gender-role stereotypes, in flagrant opposition
to his otherwise fine sense of the socio-historical factor.

According to Hegel, the harmony of ethical life rests upon
the "immediate interpenetration" of the human and the divine
laws—that is, in the natural dialectic between the conscious
and the unconscious. This dialectic is symbolized in the union
of "man" and "woman"—or in Jungian terms, of Logos and Eros
(with the preceding qualifications in mind)—which "constitutes
the active middle term of the whole and the element which
sunders itself into these extremes of human and divine law."29
However, that Hegel singles out the woman as the "middle term"

29 *Phen. Sp.*, par. 463/316.
through which "the unconscious Spirit rises out of its unreality into actual existence," betrays the fact that he has generalized the dynamics of his own, masculine, psychology to characterize the structure of a more complex whole. For in the case of the woman, as we have seen, it is the animus which, as projected onto the male partner, constitutes the symbolic link between the conscious and the unconscious. Like the anima, the animus, as Jung notes, "is a psychopomp, a mediator between the conscious and the unconscious and a personification of the latter."\textsuperscript{30} To complete the picture, therefore, we have to double the gamic relation, or link the conscious union of husband and wife with the unconscious union of the syzygy (symbolized by the image of brother and sister) in a crosswise fashion. This results in the image of the marriage quaternio which, writes Jung, "expresses on the one hand the structure of the individual, i.e., a male or female ego in conjunction with the contrasexual unconscious, and on the other hand the ego's relation to the other sex, without which the psychological individual remains incomplete."\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{30}\textit{CW} 911:33.

\textsuperscript{31}\textit{CW} 14:613.
Jung and Layard, moreover, have shown that the marriage quaternio "provides a schema not only for the Self but also for the structure of archaic society with its cross-cousin marriage, marriage classes, and division of settlements into quarters."\textsuperscript{32} The original function of this schema was to mediate between the contradictory pulls of endogamous and exogamous libido.\textsuperscript{33} We have already considered the general psychological significance of incest. In the socio-biological sphere, the desire for incest can be taken as the purest expression of the Eros which works to keep the family unit intact. In this context, the function of the incest taboo, as Odajnik remarks, was "not to prevent incest, but to forestall the danger to the survival of the species originally embodied in the matriarchal clan."\textsuperscript{34} While the clan provided internal support for its members, interaction between clans was primarily of a competitive nature. As the human population increased, so did the need to establish wider, more complex, social affiliations for the sake of cooperation and mutual

\textsuperscript{32}\textit{CW} 9ii:42.

\textsuperscript{33}Cf. "The Psychology of the Transference," in \textit{CW} 16:424f..

\textsuperscript{34}Volodymyr Walter Odajnik, \textit{Jung and Politics} (Harper and Row, 1976) p. 152.
defense (exogamous libido).35 Out of this need arose the practice of cross-cousin marriage.

Although the ancient Greek society which serves Hegel as model for his concept of ethical life obviously represents a more complex form of social organization than that of the marriage classes which superseded the archaic clan, the same dynamics are clearly at work. The balancing of exogamous and endogamous libido corresponds to Hegel's notion of the "equilibrium" of blood between brother and sister, and more generally to the harmony of the human and divine laws. The "beautiful harmony" of ethical life, however, exists only as a transitional phase. Its dissolution is rendered inevitable by the preponderance of exogamous libido in the service of increasingly more complex forms of social organization. The interests of the city-state take precedence over those of the family. The tragedy of the conflict is expressed by the fate of Antigone who, in accordance with her symbolic role as sister and guardian of the divine law, must defy Creon by sprinkling dust over her brother's unburied body. Through such a deed, "the ethical essence has split itself into two laws, and consciousness, as an undivided attitude towards law, is assigned only to one."36 Because the deed has the effect of

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35 This process of complexification, as Morin notes, "is closely linked to the extension and deepening of the power of the masculine class." Morin (1973) p. 174.

36 Phen. Sp., par. 468/263.
breaking or splitting up the immediate totality of ethical life, it is considered a crime (Verbrechen) and is accompanied by the sense of guilt. "The doer," writes Hegel, "cannot deny the crime or his guilt:"

the significance of the deed is that what was unmoved has been set in motion, and what was locked up in mere possibility has been brought out into the open, hence to link together the unconscious with the conscious, non-being with being. In this truth, therefore, the deed is brought out into the light of day, as something in which the conscious is bound up with the unconscious, what is one's own with what is alien to it, as an entity divided within itself, whose other aspect consciousness experiences and also finds to be its own, but as the power it has violated and roused to hostility.37

In the breaking up of ethical life, the deed becomes "the negative moment, or the eternal necessity, of a dreadful fate which engulfs in the abyss of its single nature divine and human law alike...--and for us passes over into the absolute being-for-self of the pure individual self-consciousness."38

In terms of the stages of the individuation process, what Hegel is here describing is the differentiation of the personal ego out of the state of identity with the (relatively unconscious) collective psyche.39

37Ibid., par. 469/265.

38Ibid., par. 464/261.

39Ken Wilber's transpersonal or consciousness-spectrum analysis of human evolution would seem to support Hegel's placing the emergence of the personal ego within the context of early Greek tragedy. "The low egoic period," writes Wilber, "was a time of transition; the breakdown of the membership structure,
the emergence of the egoic structure; the resulting rearrangement of society, philosophy, religion and politics. This early period continued until sometime during the first millennium [B.C.], when an unmistakably 'modern ego' tentatively emerged. Gebser marks this point... with the appearance of the Iliad, Jaynes with the Odyssey, others might like to mark Solon of Greece as most outstanding... At any rate, from the sixth century B.C., the world was never the same--this middle egoic period lasted until around 1500 A.D., with the Renaissance, and shortly after, Galileo and Kepler, and then Newton...," which marks the transition to the modern, "high egoic" period. Wilber (1981) pp.180-181.
PART TWO

FROM THE EGO TO THE SELF

The immanence in the individual mind of the principle of wholeness generates, from this consciousness of self and other, a conception of a more adequate and complete realization of that universal principle—in other words, of a better state of the self and its world. The universal nisus towards this wholeness is thus, in the self, the nisus toward self-fulfilment.

Erol E. Harris
Chapter Four

THE INDIVIDUATING EGO AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Hegel's account of the development of self-consciousness begins with a treatment of immediate or implicit self-consciousness in the form of desire, and of Life as the mirror of consciousness. According to Hegel, the "simple substance of Life" is the splitting-up of itself into shapes and at the same time the dissolution of these existent differences; and the dissolution of the splitting-up is just as much a splitting-up and forming of members. With this, the two sides of the whole movement which before were distinguished, viz. the passive separateness of the shapes in the general medium of independence, and the processes of Life, collapse into one another.¹

Life, from this description, is synonymous with the notion of Nature as vital whole, as self-organizing totality. In its most succinct formulation, life is "the self-developing whole which dissolves its development and in this movement simply preserves itself."² As vital whole—and more specifically, as immediate (because unconscious) self-differentiating or self-

¹I am referring here to the sections of the Phenomenology entitled "The Truth of Self-Certainty" and "Lordship and Bondage," along with the corresponding paragraphs of the Phenomenology of the Encyclopaedia.

²Phen. Sp., par. 171/111.

³Ibid.
articulating totality—Life is the natural or eco-logical presupposition of Spirit as Self.

The life of nature, or the nature of life, is epitomized in the physical organism, whose substantial unity is maintained through the self-articulation of its constituent members or parts. In the sphere of Logic, the inner processes of the organism constitute the first of three moments which characterize the concept of the living being.\textsuperscript{4} The organic unity of the living being itself consists of an internal mediation of the universal and the particular. This mediation is characterized by Hegel as "the urge of each single, specific moment to produce itself, and equally to raise its particularity to universality, sublate the other moments external to it and produce itself at their expense, but no less to sublate itself and make itself a means for the others."\textsuperscript{5} This description echoes, in the categories of the Concept, the earlier description of Life in the \textit{Phenomenology}.

Because the organism is finite, having its being or reality in space and time, its inner determinateness or

\textsuperscript{4}In the \textit{Science of Logic}, Hegel deals with this moment under the heading: "The living Individual." In the Logic of the \textit{Encyclopaedia}, no separate headings appear. Instead, Hegel simply refers, in the paragraph itself, to "the living being inside itself." \textit{E Logic}, section 218.

\textsuperscript{5}I. \textit{Logic}, p. 767/476 (of \textit{Werke} 6).
particularity manifests itself as a necessary relation to an external other--its environment in general. This relation constitutes the second moment in the concept of the living being. Here the same movement of mediation--which, internally, describes the organic unity of the living being--takes the form of "the urge to posit this other world as its own, as similar to itself, to sublate it and to objectify itself."\textsuperscript{6} Hegel characterizes the inner perception of this urge with the notions of want or "need" and "pain."\textsuperscript{7} In assimilating this other--with the ingestion of food, for instance--the living being actualizes the concrete universality of its organic unity and shows itself to be implicitly or "in-itself Species" (\textit{an-sich Gattung}).\textsuperscript{8}

The species relation, however, is explicitly played out through the dynamics of sexual differentiation (\textit{die Geschlechtsdifferenz}). The species relation is the third moment in the concept of the living being, "the truth of life in so far as this is still confined within its sphere."

This sphere is the self-related process of the individual, where externality is its immanent moment; secondly, this externality is itself, as living, a totality, an objectivity that for the individual is

\textsuperscript{6}Ibid., p.770/481.

\textsuperscript{7}This is very close to Freud's understanding of the nature of instinct and its relation to the pleasure principle.

\textsuperscript{8}\textit{E. Logic}, section 220.
its own self, an objectivity in which, not as sublated but as persisting, the individual has the certainty of itself.\textsuperscript{9}

Because the individual achieves the certainty of self-feeling through physical union with an other whose substantial individuality nevertheless persists, the species relation involves an inherent contradiction. Thus, says Hegel, "the living being is again an urge."\textsuperscript{10} Though one could make a distinction between the urges of the second and third moments in terms of the hunger instinct and the sex instinct, respectively, there is in fact but one urge, the constant goal of which is to maintain the self-identity or organic unity of the living being through a sustained relation to an other.

Turning from the Logic back to the Phenomenology, we do not find the same articulation of the concept of the living being,\textsuperscript{11} but instead, the more general treatment of the concept of Life in terms of a movement from immediate unity through differentiation ("the moments of formation and of process") to a higher or mediated unity.\textsuperscript{12} As in the Logic, however, the

\textsuperscript{9}Logic, p. 773/484.

\textsuperscript{10}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{11}At least not in the connection with the section on Life. Much of the content, however, does appear in the section on the observation of nature with reference to organic teleology. Phen. Sp., pars. 255-94/152-73.

\textsuperscript{12}Phen. Sp., par. 172/111.
movement of Life culminates with the concept of the species (but with no explicit reference to the notion of sexual differentiation). This movement, as we have seen, can be characterized negatively as the urge towards the abolition of otherness, which the organism senses as want and pain. Because the species-process can only achieve an immediate and fleeting abolition of the contradiction inherent in the life of the organism, the life-urge, in the categories of the Logic, seeks its truth in the sphere of Cognition. In the Phenomenology, similarly, "Life points to something other than itself, viz. to consciousness...."¹³ Life, in fact, can be described as the mirror of consciousness, and consciousness as the inward reflection of the organic unity of Life.

In the Phenomenology of the Encyclopaedia, Hegel defines consciousness as "Spirit at the stage of reflection or relationship, that is, as appearance."

Although ego is Spirit's infinite-self-relation, it is so in that it is subjective/self-certainty, the immediate identity of the natural soul being raised to the pure and ideal nature of this self-identity, for which its content is reflection which is for itself, i.e. a general object. The being-for self of pure and abstract freedom lets its determinateness, the natural life of the soul, go forth from itself as being equally free, as independent object, and in that it first knows of this object as being external to it, ego is consciousness....It is one aspect of the relationship and the whole relationship, the light which manifests another as well as itself.¹⁴

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Phil. Sp., section 413.
The key terms in this characterization of consciousness are ego, relationship, appearance, and knowing.

In essential agreement with Hegel, Jung defines consciousness as "the relation of psychic contents to the ego."\(^{15}\) The ego forms the "the centre of the field of consciousness."\(^{16}\) This field consists of everything which "appears" to the ego, "for no content can be conscious unless it is represented to a subject."\(^{17}\) Consciousness, moreover, is knowing. The appearance of psychic contents to the ego forms the basis of the knowledge relation.

According to Hegel, the ego, as the "subjective reflection-in self" of Spirit, now relates to the immediate identity of the natural soul as to "that which is dark and beyond it."\(^{18}\) As we saw in Chapter Two in our consideration of Hegel's concept of soul, the dark beyond of consciousness, the general other of the ego, corresponds to the unconscious life of the psyche. The reflection-in-self of Spirit describes the differentiation of the ego from the unconscious. This reading

\(^{15}\text{CW 6:700.}\)
\(^{16}\text{CW 911:1.}\)
\(^{17}\text{Ibid.}\)
\(^{18}\text{Phil. Sp., section 414.}\)
of Hegel's characterization of the nature of consciousness finds support in the text of Hegel's 1825 lectures on Phenomenology and Psychology. There we read that consciousness is "burdened with an object."

i.e. consciousness consists of relation to an object which is also a beyond for knowledge, a non-ego,...We have knowledge, certainty and object, and in this opposition the object is what is unconscious (das Bewusstlose). We have a moment of consciousness as such, and another moment consisting of the unconscious (die Bewusstlosigkeit) opposed to consciousness. 19

The notion of the differentiation of the ego from the unconscious is expressed by Hegel with reference to the soul "having drawn itself forth from corporeity, having separated off and expelled from itself feeling, finding, etc." 20

To summarize, we can say, with Edinger, that the experience of consciousness "is made up of two factors, 'knowing' and 'withness', i.e., knowing in the presence of an 'other', in a setting of twoness." 21 This other, in its simplest determination, corresponds to the notion of the unconscious. The actualization of consciousness, then--insofar as this entails a recognition of the unconscious--requires that

19Petry, III, p. 283, modified.
20Ibid., p.285.
the ego come to see itself in that which confronts it as other. Such recognition, as we shall see, gives rise to the more concrete grasp of subjectivity as complex whole or dialectically self-articulating totality—that is, as Self or Spirit.

Life, we have said, is the mirror of consciousness. For Hegel, the triadic structure of the concept of the organism is reflected in consciousness as the movement from desire through the struggle for recognition to universal consciousness (Reason or Spirit).\(^{22}\) The urge (Trieb) of the organism to abolish the contradiction between itself and its environment is reflected in consciousness as desire (Begierde). Immediate self-consciousness, writes Hegel, is "certain of itself only by superseding this other that presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life; self-consciousness is Desire."\(^{23}\) Though Hegel speaks of self-certainty in the satisfaction of desire, it is clear that "immediate" self-consciousness is not yet self-consciousness at all. This is made evident in the corresponding section of the Encyclopaedia where Hegel tells us that, to begin with, desire "still has no further determination than that of a drive."\(^{24}\)

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\(^{22}\) This is the order in the Encyclopaedia. In the Phenomenology the section on "The Freedom of Self-consciousness" mediates between the struggle for recognition and universal self-consciousness.

\(^{23}\) Phen. Sp., par. 174/111.

\(^{24}\) Phil. Sp., section 426 Z.
immediate self-consciousness (Hegel's "pure" or "simple I") is implicit merely—what Neumann and Edinger refer to as the egg-germ (or germinal ego)—and exists in a state of complete identification with the unconscious life of the instincts.

Implicit in Hegel's treatment of immediate self-consciousness is the proposition that, as long as desire (or "drive") is more or less satisfied, no development of consciousness can take place. Immediate self-consciousness "remains within the monotonously self-perpetuating alternation of desire and its satisfaction, i.e. it remains involved in subjectivity which is constantly relapsing into itself out of its objectification." The transition from immediate to developing self-consciousness is, in fact, mediated through the frustration of desire. A break in the immediate gratification of instinctual demands is required to initiate the differentiation of the germinal ego. Though this differentiation is implicit in the nature of the psyche as latent possibility, it would appear that the movement of differentiation itself is triggered by what Jung refers to as repeated "collisions" between "the somatic factor and the environment." These collisions allow for the reflection of instinctual energies to quicken, as it were, the germinal ego,

25 Ibid., section 429 2.
26 CW 911:6.
initiating its proper differentiation. This initial differentiation establishes the core of individual subjectivity as what Jung refers to as the ego-complex. "The product of this process," as Hegel puts it, "is the ego's self-integration (das Ich sich mit sich selbst zusammenschliesst)."\(^{27}\)

Despite this initial integration, however, the ego, to begin with, is still dominated by the life of the instincts. "Desire," writes Hegel, "is therefore generally destructive in its satisfaction, just as it is self-seeking in respect of its content...."\(^{28}\) The further development of consciousness at this stage is subject to the requirements of adaptation. The process of socialization beginning with life in the family imposes limits on the individual's instinctive demands, which he or she must gradually learn to master. This kind of learning, which the individual accomplishes (in Freudian terms) by means of repression and sublimation, constitutes the rudimentary determination of consciousness as a form of knowing.

As knowing, consciousness involves the negation or the positing of difference (between ego and other, right and wrong, etc.). In the course of adaptation to environmental

\(^{27}\) Phil. Sp., section 428; cf. also Neumann, 1973, pp.332-4.

\(^{28}\) Phil. Sp., section 428.
limitations, developing consciousness is differentiated in such a way that it selects (in the sense of favouring) certain personality potentials over others. Those potentials which stand opposed to the differentiated standpoint of consciousness remain unconscious (whether passively through neglect or actively through repression). The sum of these unconscious potentials Jung calls the shadow. "By shadow," writes Jung, "I mean the 'negative' side of personality, the sum of all those unpleasant qualities we like to hide, together with the insufficiently developed functions and contents of the personal unconscious."\textsuperscript{29}

Jung’s notion of the shadow can be described as the symbol of negation. The emergence of consciousness is the positing of difference between ego and other, or the negation of their former unconscious identity. Now the archetypal image of consciousness is light. As the focal point of determinate consciousness, the ego is related to its other as light to its shadow. For, as Hegel says, "just as light is manifestation of itself and its other, that which is dark, and can only reveal itself by revealing that other, so too with the ego, which is only revealed to itself in so far as its other is revealed to it in the shape of something independent of it."\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{CW} \textsuperscript{103n.}

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Phil. Sp.}, section 413 Z.
According to Jung, as that part of the total personality which is determined as the other of the ego, the shadow can appear immediately as a content of consciousness only in projected form. Projection, in Marie-Louise von Franz's paraphrase of Jung's view, "is an involuntary transposition of something unconscious in ourselves into an outer object."\textsuperscript{31} Because the shadow is cast by the ego, it necessarily appears as another ego. The constitutive dynamics of individual self-consciousness, therefore, can only be played out in relation to another self-consciousness.

Hegel arrives at the same conclusion through the dialectical explication of the concept of desire. As immediate self-consciousness, desire is the implicit certainty of the ego that the other which confronts it is its other, that it exists for the ego. For this implicit certainty to become explicit, the other must be capable of mirroring the ego in its certainty. This is possible only if the other is also an ego. "Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness."\textsuperscript{32} Edinger effects a very similar transition based upon the concept of consciousness as "knowing with":

\textsuperscript{31}C.G. Jung: His Myth in Our Time (Hodder and Stoughton, 1975) p.77.

\textsuperscript{32}Phen. Sp., par. 175/125.
The experience of knowing with can be understood to mean the ability to participate in a knowing process simultaneously as subject and object, the knower and the known. This is only possible within a relationship to an object that can also be a subject.\(^{33}\)

Hegel describes the immediate character of intersubjectivity as a struggle for recognition. This is the second, and central, stage in the development of self-consciousness. At this point, Hegel's perspective diverges from Jung's, though they remain parallel to one another. While Hegel focuses on the outer dynamics of intersubjectivity, Jung keeps to the inner, properly psychological dynamics of the same. Taken together both perspectives allow for a more complex understanding of the nature and development of self-consciousness.

According to Hegel, when an individual self-consciousness is confronted with another self-consciousness, its immediate self-certainty suffers an inner tension or contradiction. For although, as we have seen, the truth of self-consciousness demands that the ego come to see itself in the other, initially, the experience of the other has the mere effect of challenging the immediate self-certainty of the ego. Through the felt contradiction, "self-consciousness acquires the drive

to display itself as a free self, and to be there as such for the other." A struggle for recognition ensues which, because each individual seeks the unconditional negation of the other's claim to self-certainty, ends either in the death of one or both, or in the complete submission of one to the domination of the other. In the latter case we arrive at the relationship of master to slave.

While the master is recognized by the slave as an autonomous and independent self-consciousness, the slave is simply treated as a means to the satisfaction of the master's desires. The master's autonomy, however, is abstract or onesided: Despite the granted recognition, the master in fact comes to depend materially on the labour of the slave. The slave, moreover, cannot adequately mirror the self-certainty of the master because the slave himself is not fully recognized as an autonomous self-consciousness.

"Self-consciousness," writes Hegel, "is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come out of itself (es ist ausser sich gekommen). From the perspective of the psychodynamics of intersubjectivity, this points to the role of the unconscious other and the mechanism of projection. The shadow,

\[34\textit{Phil. Sp.},\textit{ section 430.}\]
\[35\textit{Phen. Sp.},\textit{ par. 179/114; Cf. Rosen, op. cit., p. 159.}\]
as we have seen, is the symbolic figure of the inner other which is excluded from the field of consciousness as a result of the differentiation of the ego. Because the shadow "personifies everything that the subject refuses to acknowledge about himself,"\(^{36}\) it appears as projected onto "inferior" personalities. In relation to Hegel's characterization of the struggle for recognition, therefore, the ego stands to the shadow as the master to the slave.

As a relation between two self-conscious individuals, however, there are in fact two projections involved. For, as Hegel puts it, though the movement of self-consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness has been "represented as the action of one self-consciousness,...the action of the one has itself the double significance of being both its own action and the action of the other as well."\(^{37}\) The relation between the two individuals, then, can be represented as a quaternity bound by a double-projection.

\[^{36}\text{CW 9i:513.}\]

\[^{37}\text{Phen. Sp., par. 182/114.}\]
According to Hegel, the further development of self-consciousness proceeds from the side of the slave. Though unrecognized as an autonomous individual, the slave—motivated by "the fear of the Lord"—"works off the singularity and egoism of his will in the service of the master...."\(^{38}\) This marks the transition to the third and final stage—universal self-consciousness.

From the psychological perspective, the transition to universal self-consciousness is effected through the withdrawal of projections. This can occur, however, only to the extent that the individual succeeds in relativizing the absolute claims of the ego. Without such a relativization, the ego remains blind to the presence and determinate qualities of the inner other (i.e. the shadow) which persists in appearing to the ego as something external and alien. The transition occurs on the side of the slave precisely because, as Hegel says, he "works off the singularity and egoism of his will in the service of the master." Though, to begin with, the ego of both individuals is intrapsychically dominant, the onesided result of the struggle for recognition means that the slave must assume the role of his own shadow towards the master. However, as the ego of the slave is now determined by the master as other, the shadow of the slave takes on the positive potential

\(^{38}\)Phil. Sp., section 435.
of the master. It is a positive potential because the figure of the master is recognized as an autonomous self-consciousness. The relativization of the ego on the part of the slave allows this positive potential to surface, which the slave now recognizes as its other. In the long run, writes Kojève, "all slavish work realizes not the master's will, but the will--at the first unconscious--of the slave."39 The withdrawal of the projected shadow results in self-consciousness finding its truth in consciousness of the Self—the complex whole of ego and unconscious.

The former slave-consciousness has developed to the point where, as consciousness of the Self, mastery and slavery are recognized as essentially inner determinations. But what of the master-consciousness? As long as the master refuses to abnegate the absolute claims of the ego, he will continue to project his shadow onto the "slave" who, in consequence, cannot be recognized as an autonomous self-consciousness. Without such recognition, the slave—despite the inner transformation of consciousness—remains a slave.

The full actualization of self-consciousness, therefore, demands that recognition be mutual. Both individuals, says Hegel, must "recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one

another." But this, as we have seen, is impossible without the mutual withdrawal of projections.

Mutual recognition is the foundation of universal self-consciousness, which Hegel describes as "the affirmative knowing of one's self in the other self." In the Phenomenology, this marks the first appearance of Spirit—"this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'." 42

At this point Jung's perspective reconverges with that of Hegel. The concepts of Spirit and Self each describe the truth of subjectivity as complex whole or dialectically self-articulating totality, the constitutive dynamics of which are played out in the dialectic between ego and other. The withdrawal of projections in mutual recognition effects a shift in the psychic economy from the ego to the Self, from oppositional interaction to authentic intersubjectivity. The process of individuation—which Jung defines as "the coming-to-be of the Self"—leads "to more intense and broader collective

40 Phen. Sp., par. 184/115.

41 Phil. Sp., section 436.

42 Phen. Sp., par. 177/113.
relationships and not isolation."43 Echoing Hegel's characterization of Spirit as the "'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'," the Self, writes Jung, "comprises infinitely more than a mere ego," for it "is as much one's self, and all other selves, as the ego. Individuation does not shut one out from the world, but gathers the world to oneself."44

43 CW 6:758; cf. also 16:554f.
44 CW 8:432.
Chapter Five

THE DIALECTIC OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT

Central to Jung's understanding of the dynamics of the psyche is the view that there exist two fundamental attitudes--introversion and extraversion--which characterize the intentional flow of consciousness. Introversion means "an inward-turning of libido, in the sense of a negative relation of subject to object. Interest does not move towards the object but withdraws from it into the subject."\(^1\) Extraversion, conversely, denotes "a positive movement of subjective interest towards the object."\(^2\) The two attitudes function as a kind of bias which determines the relative importance of the subjective and objective poles in the field of consciousness. Though, as Jung says, both attitudes "are one-sided and of limited validity, so that each needs the influence of the other,"\(^3\) individuals tend to favour one of the two. Which of the two predominates will depend upon the combined influence of disposition and circumstance (initially, the family constellation).\(^4\)

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\(^1\)\textit{CW} 6:769.

\(^2\)Ibid., 710.

\(^3\)Ibid., 582.

\(^4\)Cf. ibid., 560-1.
The concepts of introversion and extraversion form the basis of Jung's theory of psychological types. Jung also distinguishes between four basic functions of consciousness—thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition. As I shall demonstrate shortly, two of these functions—sensation and thinking—play a determinative role in Hegel's account of the development of consciousness.

Jung's interest in the notion of psychological types arose out of his desire to account for the problematic situation that, to an impartial observer, the phenomenon of neurosis could be explained from two radically different perspectives—in this instance, those of Freud and Adler. Though individual cases of neurosis might be better treated from one perspective or the other, the theoretical problem of the divergence in perspectives remained. Gradually, it became clear to Jung that the theoretical divergence was a manifestation of two opposed, yet complementary, attitudes to experience as a whole. Freud's position, with its emphasis on the object, was extraverted, while Adler's was introverted. 5 Jung's extensive researches into the history of Western thought

5"Certainly," writes Jung, "both investigators see the subject in relation to the object; but how differently this relation is seen! With Adler the emphasis is placed on a subject who, no matter what the object, seeks his own security and supremacy; with Freud the emphasis is placed wholly upon objects, which according to their specific character, either promote or hinder the subject's desire for pleasure." CW 7:59.
led him to the conclusion that many of the great religious and philosophical controversies could also be cast in terms of the conflict between the perspectives of introversion and extraversion: Gnosticism versus orthodox Christianity, realism versus nominalism, idealism versus materialism, etc.

More significant for our purposes is the fact that Jung draws attention to William James, Nietzsche, and Schiller, as three examples of modern philosophers who have proposed typologies in some way analogous to his own. It would appear, however, that J.G. Fichte was the first philosopher of modern times to propose, in terms very similar to Jung's notions of introversion and extraversion, that there exist two possible perspectives from which to view the truth of experience. "A finite rational being," writes Fichte, "has nothing beyond experience; it is this that comprises the entire staple of his thought."

But he is able to abstract; that is, he can separate what is conjoined in experience through the freedom of thought. The thing, which must be determined independently of our freedom and to which our knowledge must conform, and the intelligence, which must know, are in experience inseparably connected. The philosopher can leave one of the two out of consideration, and he has abstracted from experience and raised himself above it. If he leaves out the former, he retains an intelligence in itself...as a basis for explaining experience; if he leaves out the latter, he retains a thing-in-itself...as a similar
basis of explanation. The first method of experience is called **idealism**, the second **dogmatism**.⁶

Like Jung, Fichte attributes the continuing conflict between these two philosophical options to the existence of "two major types of man."⁷ The philosophy one chooses depends "on what sort of man one is; for a philosophical system is not a dead piece of furniture that we can reject or accept as we wish; it is rather a thing animated by the soul of the person who holds it."⁸ That Fichte labels the extraverted option "dogmatism" leaves no doubt as to which camp he belongs. Despite the recognition of the determinative influence of type, Fichte is an idealist precisely because--so he argues--it is only from this perspective that the facts of experience, which include not only the data of sense, but the fact of the knowing subject, can be rendered fully intelligible. We will not, however, follow Fichte in his deduction of the categories of experience from the principle of the Absolute Ego, for it is not our task to defend (or refute) his variety of idealism.

In his early Fichtean phase, Schelling adopted the same distinction between the two fundamental philosophical

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⁷Ibid., p.15.

⁸Ibid., p.16.
attitudes, opposing dogmatism (the main exponent being Spinoza) to "criticism" (by which he meant Fichte's, and his own, idealist position). As Copleston remarks, however, one sees even in this early work that Schelling saw the positions of both as essentially one-sided. For "Spinoza is depicted as absolutizing the object and Fichte as absolutizing the subject. And the implication is that the Absolute must transcend the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity and between subject and object in identity."\(^9\)

Schelling's philosophy of identity marks the first articulation of absolute idealism. According to Hegel, however, the principle of identity as articulated by Schelling, with its bare formalism of "A=A," merely plunges cognition into "the night in which all cows are black."\(^{10}\) By contrast, the purpose of the Phenomenology, as the "Science of the Experience of Consciousness," was to provide a "ladder" to the standpoint of the Absolute. Though Hegel does not explicitly refer to the distinction between what Jung termed the introverted and extraverted attitudes to the truth of experience, the dialectic of subject and object which underlies this distinction is clearly evident throughout the system. This is particularly


\(^{10}\) Phen. Sp., par. 16/20.
true of the first part of the Phenomenology, entitled "Consciousness." As we shall see, the result of the dialectic of subject and object coincides with the result of the dialectic of ego and other. Both movements transcend the initial opposition in a grasp of subjectivity as complex whole.

Hegel's account of consciousness begins with a consideration of "sense-certainty"--the "poorest," most immediate form of knowing. This is knowledge of "what simply is." Because of the undifferentiated richness of its content, sense-certainty "appears to be the truest knowledge; for it has not yet omitted anything from the object, but has the object before it in its entirety." Here we have what might be described as consciousness in the form of immediate or pre-reflective extraversion. At this stage the ego is relatively unconscious of its determinative role as subject in the knowledge relation.

\[1^{11}\] I have chosen to reverse Hegel's order in my treatment of the development of consciousness. For, though Hegel begins the Phenomenology (along with the Phenomenology of the Encyclopaedia) with "Consciousness," it is clear that, from a psychogenetic or developmental perspective, the contents of "Self-Consciousness"--which were treated in the preceding chapter--ought to come first. Why Hegel chose to begin the Phenomenology with the abstract epistemological section on "Consciousness," rather than with the more immediate and fundamental account of the emergence of self-consciousness through desire, might be attributed to Hegel's notion of logical concreteness. On the other hand, it might also be evidence of Hegel working himself free from the epistemological framework which he inherited from Fichte and Schelling.

\[1^{12}\] Ibid., par. 91/65.
One of the terms is posited in sense-certainty in the form of a simple, immediate being, or as essence, the object; the other, however, is posited as what is unessential and mediated, something which in sense-certainty is not in itself but through [the mediation] of another, the 'I', a knowing which knows the object only because the object is, while the knowing may or may not be.\textsuperscript{13}

The immediate extraversion of sense-certainty constitutes the experiential standpoint of naïve realism. The inadequacy of this standpoint, however, becomes apparent as soon as the knowing subject tries to articulate the content of its experience. The object which sense-certainty points to as self-evidently existent or true is simply "this," or that which exists "here" and "now." But everything is a "this." And when I say "here," that to which I refer becomes a "there" as soon as I change positions. Similarly, the "now" which I utter immediately becomes a "then." The words "this," "here," and "now" are in fact purely abstract determinations which stand above the flux of sense-data to which they refer. The true object of sense-certainty, therefore, is no particular and abiding sensuous content, but the abstract universal of thought itself.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., par. 93/66. This state of sense-certainty corresponds to desire in the sphere of self-consciousness. But whereas in desire, the subject (the ego's feeling of self-certainty) is the focal point of consciousness, here it is the other as object.
The reflective articulation of the content of sense-certainty has the effect of reversing the initial relation of consciousness to its object from an attitude of immediate extraversion to that of an equally immediate introversion.\[14\] The truth of self-certainty, as Hegel says, "lies now in the 'I', in the immediacy of my seeing, hearing and so on; the vanishing of the single Now and Here that we mean [or intend, meinen] is prevented by the fact that I hold them fast."\[15\] In contrast with the preceding position of naive realism, we now have a kind of subjective phenomenализm.\[16\] But introverted sense-certainty is as incapable of maintaining its claim to immediate truth as is its extraverted counterpart. For that which I hear and see is in some way different from what you, and every one else, hears and sees. The only constant is the "I" itself which, as with "here" and "now," is no immediate particular of sensuous consciousness, but an abstract universal (and hence a mediation).

The claim of the position of sense-certainty to grasp the immediate and the particular is thus ungrounded (in that it cannot be stated without falling into contradiction). Any

\[14\]Ibid., par. 100/68.

\[15\]Ibid., par. 101/68.

articulation of the particulars of sensuous consciousness reveals the determinative presence of the universal. The standpoint of consciousness which takes the sensuous particular as it is in truth—that is, as necessarily grounded in the universality of thought-determinations—is "perception" (wahrnehmen—literally, "to take truly").

The standpoint of perception is characterized by the attitude of reflective extraversion—reflective, because consciousness now articulates its sensuous contents with the help of the universal thought-determinations of the subject/object relation. In terms of the functions of consciousness, sensation now enlists the powers of thinking as auxiliary. Perception is extraverted, because it persists in considering the perceived object as what is essential, while the act of perceiving is regarded as secondary or unessential. For perception, "the object, defined as the simple [entity], is the essence regardless of whether it is perceived or not; but the act of perceiving, as a movement, is the unessential moment, the unstable factor which can be as well as not be."\(^{18}\)

\(^{17}\)"The term thinking," writes Jung, "should, in my view, be confined to the linking of ideas (Vorstellungen) by means of a concept (Begriff), in other words, to an act of judgement, no matter whether this act is intentional or not." CW 6:830.

\(^{18}\)Phen. Sp., par.111/73.
In perception, the object of consciousness is no longer merely "this," but the "thing" characterized by a set of universals or properties. A salt crystal, for instance, is white, cubical, and so on. Although these properties constitute the particularity of the salt crystal as a member in the class of things, they are, in themselves, universal determinations (i.e., they are present in the different configurations of other things, or they themselves each constitute a class—white things, cubical things, etc.). The characteristic set of properties is attributed to the exclusive unity of the thing, which is conceived as the substance or universal medium of the properties.

The reflective movement of perceptual consciousness, however, soon reveals a series of contradictions in the experience of the Thing. "It is impossible," as Findlay remarks:

to reconcile the unity and exclusive character of the Thing of Perception with the presence in it of several mutually distinct sense-qualities, which are likewise present in other similar Things. If the distinctness and universality of the properties be stressed, the Thing's unity and separateness become shadowy....But if, on the other, the unity and separateness of the Thing are emphasized, the mutual distinctness of the properties, as well as their genuine universality, falls into jeopardy. 19

In attempting to resolve the contradictions implicit in its experience of the Thing, perceptual consciousness may adopt the same strategy employed by sense-certainty in its cognitive crisis and effect a qualified reversal of attitudes. Hegel describes this introversion of perception as "the aspect of consciousness being driven back into itself." Though the object is still regarded as the true, the knowing subject is granted a determinative role in the experience of the Thing. Either the exclusive unity of the Thing is deemed primary, in which case the sensuous multiplicity of distinct properties is attributed to the act of perceiving (multiplicity exists only in consciousness), or if the element of sensuous multiplicity is deemed primary, the exclusive unity is regarded as a function of the synthetic activity which the perceiving subject imposes on its experience of the Thing. In neither case, however, is the contradiction resolved. Perceptual consciousness therefore renounces its qualified introversion and resorts to the view that the Thing is essentially one and self-identical, its apparent multiplicity being the product of its interaction with other Things. But this last distinction is equally unsuccessful in avoiding the contradictions of perceptual consciousness, which must continually describe its experience of the Thing ambiguously with such qualifiers as "also" and "in so far as."

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20 Phen. Sp., par. 118/78.
The contradictions arising out of reflection upon the data of sense-perception cannot be resolved on a merely sensuous plane. Consciousness therefore passes from perception to the mode of apprehension characteristic of the scientific understanding (Verstand). In terms of the functions of consciousness, the movement of reflection in the development from sense-certainty through perception to the understanding reveals a progressive differentiation of thinking from sensation, the contents of which the understanding now characterizes as "appearance" (Erscheinung) which in turn finds its truth in a supersensible realm of explanatory entities (such as the concept of force, or better the principle of law governing the play of forces). Though the function of sensation is no longer dominant, the thinking of the understanding still clings to the extraverted attitude typical of sense-certainty and perception--the supersensible realm of explanatory entities "is still just an object for it." 21

The cognitive split in the thinking of the understanding is perhaps most apparent in Kant's critical philosophy which, however, in contrast with the scientific and metaphysical bias

21 Ibid., par. 132/84.
of the period, is radically introverted. 22 This radical introversion finds its articulation in Kant's doctrine of the transcendental ego and the categories of the understanding, the a priori forms which constitute the rational intelligibility of experience. 23 The reflective introversion of Kant's position, however, is just as one-sided as the varieties of the scientific understanding which it attempts to supersede. Despite the recognition of the logical priority of the subjective factor, Kant's position is burdened with the notion of an objective noumenon, the unknowable thing-in-itself. "In spite of positively convulsive efforts to ensure the superiority of the ego," writes Jung, for the introverted thinking type, "the object comes to exert an overwhelming

22 Hegel's position with regard to the understanding presupposes the radical shift of attitudes represented by the critical philosophy of Kant. The shift is usually accounted for in terms of the history of ideas with reference to the crisis in thought arising out of the Humean skepticism. Hegel's own account (in the transition from Culture to Morality in the Phenomenology) is much broader in scope, concerned as it is with the dynamics of the revolutionary Zeitgeist rather than with the interaction of abstract ideas. The one-sidedness of the revolutionary ideology of absolute freedom, which culminates in the Reign of Terror, effects a radical introversion of the collective consciousness which, writes Hegel, "is drawn together out of the whole expanse of existence or manifested aims and judgements and concentrated into the simple self... Into its conscious will all objectivity, the whole world, has withdrawn. It is absolutely free in that it knows its freedom, and just this knowledge is its substance and purpose and its sole content." Phen. Sp., pars. 594/332 and 598/335.

23 "Just as we might take Darwin as an example of the normal extraverted thinking type," writes Jung, "the normal introverted thinking type could be represented by Kant.... Darwin ranges over the wide field of objective reality. Kant restricts himself to a critique of knowledge." CW 6:632.
influence. As a result of the ego’s unadapted relation to the object... a compensatory relation arises in the unconscious which makes itself felt as an absolute and irrepressible tie to the object."²⁴ The contradiction between the constitutive claims of the transcendental ego and the notion of the thing-in-itself is the focal point of Hegel's critique of the Kantian understanding. We have already considered the substance of this critique in our treatment of the relation between the notions of logical category and archetype. All we need add, as Hyppolite remarks, is that for Hegel

this beyond of the phenomenon is a kind of optical illusion. Understanding hypostatizes its own reflection, it does not reflect it back on itself, and it fails to see in nature the self-knowledge that is implicit in it. Knowledge of the phenomenon is a self-knowledge and, as such, it has a truth that is no longer located in the beyond. But in order to reach such an idealism, reflection, which Kant uses in his critical philosophy, must reflect itself.²⁵

In other words, what is required is a second-order reflection on the abstract position of the understanding. Only then does it become possible to circumvent the oscillation between the equally one-sided introverted and extraverted attitudes to the truth of experience. In place of the opposition between the knowing subject and the beyond of the

²⁴ CW 6:626.
phenomenon, the truth of the knowledge relation must be grasped dialectically as "the syllogism which has for its extremes the inner being of Things and the Understanding, and for its middle term appearance."26 The two extremes of this syllogism, writes Hegel,

have now coincided, and just as they, qua extremes, have vanished, so too the middle term, as something other than these extremes, has also vanished. This curtain [of appearance] hanging before the inner world is therefore drawn away, and we have the inner being [the 'I'] gazing into the inner world—the vision of the undifferentiated selfsame being, which repels itself from itself, posits itself as an inner being containing different moments but for which equally these moments are immediately not different—self-consciousness.27

As we saw in the preceding chapter, this "inner being" of self-consciousness is consciousness of the Self as complex whole. The dialectic of subject and object recapitulates, in the sphere of cognition, the same movement which is played out in the relation between ego and other in the dynamics of intersubjectivity. The treatment of the development of self-consciousness, it will be recalled, concluded with the concept of mutual recognition as the truest expression of consciousness of the Self. In the more abstract sphere of cognition, similarly, the oscillation between the equally onesided

26Phen. Sp., par.145/91. We shall return to the contrast between the positions of the understanding and syllogistic thinking in the next chapter.

27Ibid., par.165/105.
attitudes of introversion and extraversion in the movement from sense-certainty to the understanding resolves itself through a second-order reflection on the contradictions generated by reflective consciousness in the differentiation of the thinking function. This second-order reflection constitutes a third attitude which, in contrast with the ego-bound attitudes of introversion and extraversion, is the attitude proper to the development of the Self. In terms of the syllogistic structure of the knowledge-relation, this attitude is directed exclusively neither to the subject nor to the object, but to the middle term which overarches both. The Self, it will be recalled, can be conceived simultaneously as the centre and circumference of the psyche in its totality. Following Neumann, we can describe the attitude proper to the Self as centroverted. Centroversion, writes Neumann,

may derive its contents from outside and inside equally, and is fed by introversion as much as by extraversion. Its centre of gravity, however, lies not in objects and objective dealings, irrespective of whether the objects be external or internal, but in self-formation; that is to say, in the building up and filling out of a personality which, as the nucleus of all life's activities uses the objects of the inner and outer worlds as building material for its own wholeness.  

If the contradiction between introversion and extraversion arises out of the abstract position of the understanding

28Neumann (1973) p.35.
(Verstand), its dialectical sublation in the concept of centroversion must be attributed to the activity of reason (Vernunft), the hidden presence of which, of course, has determined the development of the argument throughout. "The truth constituted by reason," writes Hegel,

is in and for itself, the simple identity of the subjectivity of the Concept with its objectivity and universality. Consequently, to the extent that the universality of reason signifies the object, which is merely given as such in consciousness, but which, since it is itself universal, now pervades and encompasses the ego, it also signifies the pure ego, the pure form which includes and encompasses the object within itself.\(^{29}\)

The objective universality of reason encompasses or overarches (übergreifen) the abstract subjectivity of the ego. The ego, in turn, becomes the object of a supraordinate totality—Hegel's "pure ego" or Self. Though Hegel is not very clear on this point, it is, as we have seen, essential to make a critical distinction between the ego and the Self. For the ego, writes Jung, stands to the Self "as the moved to the mover, or as the object to the subject, because the determining factors which radiate out from the Self surround the ego on all sides and are therefore supraordinate to it."\(^{30}\)

\(^{29}\) Phil. Sp., section 438.

\(^{30}\) CW 11:391.
Chapter Six

THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE SELF AS KNOWING AND DOING

We have traced the development of consciousness through a consideration of the dynamics of two constitutive oppositions. The first--ego and other--found its sublation in the concept of mutual recognition as the withdrawal of projections. The second--subject and object--found its sublation at a higher level of abstraction in the concept of reason as the process of centroversion. In both cases the telos of development was the concept of Spirit or the Self as complex whole (or dialectically self-articulating totality). This chapter will pursue the actualization of the Self in the complementary and more concrete modes of knowing and doing (which correspond to the moments of theoretical and practical Spirit in Hegel's "psychology").

Psychology, according to Hegel, is the science of subjective Spirit, which "has determined itself as the truth of the simple immediate totality of the soul and consciousness."¹ Findlay remarks that the section on psychology "is an independent treatment which might have followed on straight from the anthropological section," and that the section on phenomenology "was probably put in to obtain a threefold

¹Phil. Sp., section 440.
scheme..."2 If Findlay had been sufficiently aware of Jung's concept of the Self, however, he might have thought otherwise. For the Self, as we have seen, is to be understood as the psyche in its totality, that is, as the dialectical unity of ego (Hegel's "consciousness") and unconscious (Hegel's "soul"). Whereas soul, writes Hegel, "was truth only as an immediate unconscious totality, and whereas in consciousness, on the contrary, this totality was divided into the ego and the object external to it, free Spirit is to be recognized as self-knowing truth."3 The subject of psychology, then, is free Spirit or the Self as "immanent developed totality" (als bestimmt in sich unterschiedene Totalität).4 In contrast with sense-perception or the abstract understanding which, as determined by the subject/object split, confronts its contents as something alien, psychology recognizes the contents of consciousness as products of the Self's own activity. As we have said, there are two modes of this activity: theoretical and practical Spirit, or knowing and doing.5

3Phil. Sp., section 440 Z.
4Ibid. Cf. the first paragraph of the Fragment on the Philosophy of Spirit where Hegel writes that the philosophy of Spirit has as its general object "Spirit as our inner Self" (den Geist als unser innere Selbst). Petry, I, p.91.
5For Hegel, the practical Spirit of psychology is "not yet deed and action"(Phil. Sp., section 444), but only the activity of the rational will. Because the realm of objective Spirit will not be receiving separate treatment, I have chosen to integrate the section on practical Spirit with the relevant parts of the
Hegel distinguishes between three moments of theoretical Spirit: intuition, representation, and thinking. Intuition is the most immediate form of knowing. It is the "subdued internal stirring" of Spirit which "possesses the whole material of its knowledge."\(^6\) Intuition is immediate knowledge of "a totality, a connected profusion of determinations."\(^7\) Intuition, however, is not yet "cognitive knowledge," since it "confines itself to apprehending the unexplicated substance, which is still enclosed within the secondary essentiality of what is external and contingent."\(^8\)

According to Jung, as I have said, intuition is one of the four orienting functions.\(^9\) It can be characterized as perception via the unconscious. It is, as Jung puts it, "the function that mediates perceptions in an unconscious way."\(^{10}\)

\(^6\)Ibid., section 446.
\(^7\)Ibid., section 449 Z.
\(^8\)Ibid.
\(^9\)We have already considered sensation and (in a preliminary fashion) thinking in the previous chapter.
\(^{10}\)\textit{CW} 6:770.
Echoing Hegel's description, Jung writes that in intuition, "a content presents itself whole and complete, without our being able to explain or discover how this content came into existence."\(^{11}\) Along with sensation, intuition is "the matrix out of which thinking and feeling develop as rational functions."\(^{12}\)

As the function which allows for the apprehension of wholes, intuition is the foundation of spiritual cognition. Because of its immediacy, however, the contents of intuition—whether the simple Gestalt, gut feelings, or flashes of insight—are, by themselves, relatively inarticulate. "In immediate intuition," writes Hegel, "I certainly have the whole matter before me, but it is only in cognition returning into the form of simple intuition unfolded in all its aspects that the matter stands before my spirituality as an inwardly articulated, systemic totality."\(^{13}\) The theoretical activity of Spirit or the Self, accordingly, proceeds through a progressive inwardizing—a kind of internal processing—of the contents immediately given in intuition. This it accomplishes, to begin with, through the mediating power of representation (Vorstellung).

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\(^{11}\)Ibid. \\
\(^{12}\)Ibid., 772. \\
\(^{13}\)Phil. Sp., section 449 Z.
The first moment of representation is recollection (Erinnerung), which is the process wherein the contents of intuition in their sensuous immediacy are appropriated by "the universality of the ego."\textsuperscript{14} Through recollection one is able to call something to mind, to represent a content which, though not immediately present as perception, is internally apperceived as a determinate image.\textsuperscript{15} Although, to begin with, the recollection of an image is triggered by an immediate sensuous perception (or intuition) to which the image corresponds, in time the image by itself can be recollected more or less at will.\textsuperscript{16} This abstraction of the image from the particularity of sensuous intuition gives rise to general representations. The fact that the mind can re-cognize anything at all presupposes the prior existence, in potential form, of such general representations. The mind, therefore, is not only "the consciousness and determinate being, but as such the subject and implicitness of its own determinations; recollected within it, the image is no longer existent, but is preserved unconsiously."\textsuperscript{17} Hegel stresses that, in one

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., section 452.

\textsuperscript{15}The image, writes Jung, "can always be distinguished from sensuous reality by the fact that it is an 'inner' image."\textsuperscript{CW} 6:743.

\textsuperscript{16}Cf. Phil. Sp., section 454 Z.

\textsuperscript{17}Phil. Sp., section 453, my emphasis.
respect, "to grasp intelligence as this night-like abyss [nächtlichen Schacht] within which a world of infinitely numerous images and representations is preserved without being in consciousness, is the general and universal need to grasp the concept in its concreteness." In other words, the mind, as the concrete existence of the Concept, must be grasped as the dialectical unity of conscious and unconscious (i.e., as the Self), and not simply as the activity of the conscious ego.

The dialectic of ego and unconscious is most evident in the third moment of representation: the imagination (Einbildungskraft) and particularly in phantasy, which Hegel describes as "the symbolizing, allegorizing or poetical power of the imagination."\(^{18}\) It is through the products of phantasy that the mind first apprehends, or apperceives, the concrete universal.

Phantasy is the central point in which the universal and being, one's own and what is appropriated, inner and outer being, are given the completeness of a unit. Although the preceding syntheses of intuition, recollection, etc. are unifications of the same moments, they are syntheses, whereas in phantasy intelligence has being, for the first time, not as the indeterminate abyss and universal, but as individuality, i.e. as concrete subjectivity, in which the self-relation is determined in respect of being as well as universality.\(^{19}\)

\(^{18}\)Ibid., section 456.
\(^{19}\)Ibid., section 457.
The currency of phantasy is the symbol.\textsuperscript{20} It is in the medium of symbolic expression that phantasy achieves the unification of inner and outer, of thought and being. In giving expression to general representations, phantasy "selects only that sensuous material which has independent significance corresponding to the specific content of the universal to be imagined."\textsuperscript{21} The one is linked to the other through the bond of analogy. The symbol as such, writes Hegel,

\begin{quote}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[] is an external existent given or immediately present to contemplation, which yet is to be understood not simply as it confronts us immediately on its own account, but in a wider and more universal sense. Thus at once there are two distinctions to make in the symbol: (i) the meaning, and (ii) the expression thereof. The first is a [general] representation or topic [Gegenstand], no matter what its content, the second is a sensuous existent or an image of some kind or other.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{enumerate}
\end{quote}

Initially, however, the symbolic unity of inner and outer, of meaning and image, is purely immediate. Because the two sides of the relation have not yet been explicitly posited as

\textsuperscript{20}The word symbol (Gr. symbolon) means literally "that which has been thrown together." "In original Greek usage," writes Edinger, "symbols referred to the two halves of an object such as a stick or a coin which two parties broke between them as a pledge and to prove later the identity of the presenter of one part to the holder of the other." Edinger (1974) p.130.

\textsuperscript{21}Phil. Sp., section 457 Z.

distinct, "there is strictly no question of a difference between inner and outer, meaning and shape [Gestalt]. . . . If therefore we speak here of meaning, this is our reflection which proceeds for us from the need to regard the [external] form (which affords [to others] a [mere direct] intuition of the spiritual and inward) as in general something external. . . ."23 In other words, the component of meaning—or more precisely, the latent general representation which, when verbally articulated, is apperceived as meaning—is unconscious.24

This view is in full agreement with Jung's general understanding of the symbol. A symbol, he writes, "always presupposes that the chosen expression is the best possible description or formulation of a relatively unknown [i.e., unconscious] fact, which is none the less known to exist or is posited as existing."25 Symbols are "produced out of the unconscious by way of revelation or intuition."26 More specifically, symbols

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23 Ibid., p. 324/419.
24 As Hegel himself recognizes. The section of the Aesthetics from which the preceding passages are taken is entitled "Unconscious Symbolism."
26 CW 8:92.
are always grounded in the unconscious archetype, but their manifest forms are molded by the ideas acquired by the conscious mind. The archetypes are the numinous, structural elements of the psyche and possess a certain autonomy and specific energy which enables them to attract, out of the conscious mind, those contents which are best suited to themselves.27

The role of the archetype here corresponds to that of the general representation in Hegel's understanding of the symbol. We will have more to say about the archetype shortly.

Jung emphasizes the need to distinguish the concept of the symbol from that of the sign. A sign is "an analogue or an abbreviated designation for a known thing:"28 for instance, the white flag in war time. Hegel makes much the same distinction. Though the symbol is "prima facie a sign," he writes, in a mere sign, "the connection which meaning and expression have with one another is only a purely arbitrary linkage."29 Nevertheless, in Hegel's account of the development of theoretical Spirit, the symbol is superseded by the sign which, precisely because of this "purely arbitrary linkage," is better suited as a vehicle for the full articulation of the universal meaning that the symbol can only image forth. Because, in the sign, the general representation is "liberated from the content

27 CW 5:344.
28 CW 6:815.
29 Aesthetics, I, p.304/394.
of the image," "it makes itself into something intuitable within an external material voluntarily selected by itself...."  

The systematic articulation of verbal signs constitutes language. Like the symbol, the verbal sign (i.e. the word) has both an outer and an inner aspect—tone and meaning. In the word, however, the analogical bond governing the immediate fusion, in the symbol, of sensuous particularity and intelligible universality is replaced by the digital relation of signification—this (particular word) stands for, or means, that (general representation). In verbal communication, the mind re-members the signification of a word—i.e., it links the sign to its proper meaning. The linguistic memory (Gedächtnis), in Hegel's opinion, is the most differentiated function of representation.  

The ability, through language, to recognize meaning in a system of more or less arbitrarily chosen signs, to understand something without immediate reference to its representative image, constitutes the nature of thinking in general: the third and last moment of the theoretical Spirit. Hegel's discussion of thinking in the Psychology complements the treatment it

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30Phil. Sp., section 457 Z, modified.
31Cf. ibid., sections 461-4.
receives in the Phenomenology. There, as we saw in the previous chapter, it was a question of the differentiation of thinking from sensation in the context of the subject/object split of abstract cognition (the understanding of the thinking ego). Here, on the other hand, thinking is differentiated from intuition which, as the function of immediate holistic cognition, is, as we have seen, the matrix of the theoretical activity of subjective Spirit or the Self. "Thinking," writes Hegel,

is the third and last main stage in the development of intelligence, for it is within it that the immediate, implicit unity of subjective and objective present in intuition is reconstituted, out of the subsequent opposition of the two aspects in representation, as a unity which is in and for itself through its being enriched by this opposition.\footnote{Ibid., section 465 Z, modified.}

The three moments of thinking are understanding, judgement, and syllogism or reason. The moment of understanding consists in the process of abstracting from the manifold of recollected representations the rules or universal categories (genera, species, laws, etc.) through which the contents of consciousness can be classified. It is the formal power which arranges, more or less externally, the contents of consciousness by means of the abstract universal. As we saw in the preceding chapter, the understanding constitutes a first-order reflection—in this case, a reflection of the
general representation mediated by linguistic signs. Judgement is really the transition between the moments of understanding and reason. It is the activity of thought whereby the immediate totality of representation is split or severed (hence ur-teilen) into the abstract opposition of universal and particular, subject and predicate, etc. At the same time, however, since judgement (A=B) also relates the opposed terms, it, along with the activity of the understanding, become moments of the syllogistic thinking of speculative reason. In syllogistic thinking, "it is the understanding itself that determines the content by sublating this difference of form [in the judgement], and with insight into necessity, there is the disappearance of the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought."33 In this third and culminating moment of thinking, "the universal is cognized as self-particularizing and as gathering itself out of the particularizing into individuality, which is as much as to say that the particular is reduced from the state of independence to being a moment of the Concept."34 Thus, in contrast with the thinking of the understanding, reason or syllogistic thinking constitutes a second-order reflection on the contents and relations which the understanding itself has posited.

33Ibid., section 467.
34Ibid., Z, modified.
The Self, it will be recalled, is the form of the Concept, whose concrete existence is individual personality. As we saw in the previous chapter, the movement from the understanding to reason entails a shift in the psychic economy from the ego to the Self. According to Jung, the cognitive process accompanying this shift involves the operation of what he calls "the transcendent function." In general terms, the transcendent function "arises from the union of conscious and unconscious contents." By "transcendent" Jung does not wish to imply any metaphysical quality, "but merely the fact that this function facilitates a transition from one attitude to another." The need for such a transition arises when the ego finds itself trapped between two seemingly irreconcilable positions—for instance, between the promptings of intuition or feeling and the so-called dictates of reason, or between the security of long-cherished values and the lure of innovative change, etc. In any such conflict situation, the individual can either choose one of the alternatives, or purposely maintain the conflict until a creative and unforeseen solution presents itself. In this case, the confrontation of the two positions "generates a tension charged with energy and creates a living, third thing—not a logical stillbirth in accordance with the principle tertium non datur but a movement out of the

35 CW 8:131.
36 CW 6:828.
suspension between opposites, a living birth that leads to a new level of being, a new situation."\textsuperscript{37} Elsewhere Jung writes that "there now emerges a new content, constellated by thesis and antithesis in equal measure and standing in a compensatory relation to both. It thus forms the middle ground on which the opposites can be united."\textsuperscript{38}

This middle term and "living, third thing" is the symbol, or more precisely the "living symbol."\textsuperscript{39} We have just seen how both Hegel and Jung conceive of the symbol as a synthesis of opposites. In contrast with Hegel, however, for whom the immediate synthesis of opposites in the symbol is merely a prefiguration of the fully articulated synthesis finally achieved conceptually in the form of syllogistic thinking, for Jung "the mediating position between the opposites can be reached only by the symbol."\textsuperscript{40} Far from being a merely rational product or "logical stillbirth," the "profoundity and pregnant significance of the symbol appeal just as strongly to thinking as to feeling, while its peculiar plastic imagery, when shaped into sensuous form, stimulates sensation as much as

\textsuperscript{37}CW 8:189.

\textsuperscript{38}CW 6:825.

\textsuperscript{39}Cf. ibid., 814-29.

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., 178, my emphasis.
intuition." It must be said, however, that the kind of thinking Jung has in mind is the thinking of the understanding and not that of speculative reason, the possibility of which he did not seem to recognize. "Unfortunately," Jung laments in another essay, "our Western mind, lacking all culture in this respect, has never yet devised a concept, nor even a name, for the union of opposites through the middle path, that most fundamental item of inward experience which could be respectably set against the Chinese concept of Tao." Here we must conclude that Jung was ignorant of Hegel's concept of aufheben which, as the negation of negation, is just such a "middle path."

Jung's position raises the issue of which has priority: concept or symbol. The issue revolves around how one defines what is meant by "meaning." In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel gives a twofold answer to this important question. If we begin with a representation—for instance,

41Ibid., 823. At one point Hegel himself seems to grant the same importance to representation in general as Jung does to the symbol. "Representation," he writes, "is the middle term in the syllogism in the elevation of intelligence, it is the linking of the dual significance of self-relation, of the being and universality which are determined in consciousness as object and subject." Phil. Sp., section 455.

42CW 7:327; cf. also 116. Jung makes the same claim in his essay on the Trinity: "Consciousness certainly possesses no conceptual category for anything of this kind, for such a union is simply inconceivable except as a violent collision in which the two sides cancel each other out. This would mean their mutual annihilation." CW 11:277.
with the symbol of God as Trinity--and ask what the meaning of this representation is, what we want to know "is the Absolute, the Idea, the conceptualized nature of God grasped in thought, or the logical essence of the same. This is one meaning of 'meaning'."\textsuperscript{43} When, on the other hand, "we start from pure categories of thought and not from representation," what is required is "an intuition or representation of the thought-category, an example or an accompaniment of the content that so far has only been given in thought."\textsuperscript{44} A complex understanding of meaning, therefore, demands that we recognize the dynamic complementarity of concept and symbol, of thinking and intuition, that the fullness of meaning arises out of the mutual or reciprocal determination of both forms or modalities of the theoretical activity of Spirit or the Self. This twofold meaning of meaning, as Hegel says, "points us to the Idea"--that is, to the principle of complex holism--"as the inner concept or pure thought, which, however, likewise proceeds to its externalization and furnishes itself with examples of itself, and in doing so remains the essential and yet becomes for itself the example of itself."\textsuperscript{45} This position is in harmony with Jung's understanding of the transcendent function. For, although Jung wishes to safeguard the autonomy

\textsuperscript{43}\textit{LPR}, I, p.118.
\textsuperscript{44}\textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 118, n.13.
of the living symbol as bearer of transformative meaning, he himself recognizes that, as a synthesis of functions, the meaning of the living symbol can also be grasped, though not exhaustively, in thought.\footnote{Although any reflection on the significance of a symbol constitutes an "interpretation," and therefore a translation into the form of thought, the meaning of a living symbol is never exhausted in this way. For if it were, the symbol would cease being a symbol and become a mere sign. "The symbol is alive," writes Jung, "only so long as it is pregnant with meaning. But once its meaning has been born out of it, once that expression is found which formulates the thing sought, expected, or divined even better than the hitherto accepted symbol, then the symbol is dead, i.e., it possesses only an historical significance." \textit{CW} 6:816.} \textquotedblright One tendency,\textquotedblright he concludes, seems to be the regulating principle of the other; both are bound together in a compensatory relationship....So far as it is possible at this stage to draw more general conclusions, we could say that aesthetic formulation needs understanding of the meaning \textit{(in thought)}, and understanding needs aesthetic formulation. The two supplement each other to form the transcendent function.\footnote{\textit{CW} 8:177.}

Although the notion of the complementarity of the symbolic and the conceptual modes of grasping meaning might seem to go against Hegel's repeated claim that the form of the Concept supersedes that of representation, this is so only from the point of view of the abstract reflection of the understanding. The true significance of the preservation of the moment of representation in the sublation of the Concept becomes fully apparent when we consider that the Concept is concrete or
actual only as Spirit, which, as Hegel himself recognizes, "itself is a representation." Because it "comes to be for itself in representation," Spirit is the living symbol par excellence. Though the rational articulation of its content is fully achieved only in the syllogistic thinking of speculative reason, the concrete meaning of this articulation is intelligible only in the context of the representational "synthesis" which precedes it, and to which, consequently, it must refer itself. One can think here of Hegel's description of the Science of Wisdom as the "circle of circles" in conjunction with his characterization of the True as "the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning." The truth of Spirit is the movement of this circle, a movement wherein the rational articulation of representation as the Concept culminates in the re-presentation of its own becoming as Spirit. Spiritual cognition,

48 LPR I, p. 401, my emphasis.
49 Ibid., p. 140.
50 "Spirit that can be translated into a definite concept," writes Jung, "is a psychic complex lying within the orbit of our ego-consciousness. It will not bring forth, nor will it achieve anything more than we have put into it. But spirit that demands a symbol for its expression is a psychic complex that contains the seeds of incalculable possibilities." CW 8:644.
51 Cf. LPR, I, pp. 142-43: "Spirit is in the most concrete sense. The absolute or highest mode of being belongs to it. But Spirit is, and this belongs to it, only insofar as it is for itself, i.e., insofar as it posits itself or brings itself forth; for it is only as activity... Spirit comes to itself; this is a movement, an activity, a mediation of itself with itself. It involves distinctions and directions; and this succession of
therefore, is only possible, as an ongoing dialectic of thinking and intuition, of concept and symbol. True satisfaction, as Hegel says,

is afforded only by an intuiting pervaded by understanding and Spirit, by rational representation, by productions of phantasy etc. pervaded by reason, exhibiting ideas, that is to say, by cognitive intuiting, representing etc. The verity ascribed to such satisfaction lies in the intuiting, the representing etc. being not isolated, but present only as a moment of the totality, of cognizing itself.52

Thinking in terms of the Concept involves a return "into the form of simple intuition unfolded in all its aspects...."53 The recursivity54 of spiritual cognition, the truth of knowing as the movement of the circle of circles, suggests the image of the mandala55 which, as Jung's researches have shown, is a
directed movements is the path by which Spirit comes to itself, for Spirit itself is the goal. The absolute goal is to recognize itself, to be for itself."

52Phil. Sp., section 445, my emphasis.

53Ibid., section 449 Z.


55Mandala is a Sanskrit word meaning "circle." It refers to a wide-spread motif in religious iconography—most notably in the devotional paintings of Tibetan Buddhism—which is used to symbolize various "spheres" of being or consciousness, and even
favoured symbol of the Self as archetype of wholeness. In keeping with our earlier characterization of reason as the process of centrenversion, and in full recognition of the preservation of intuition and the symbol in the sublation of conceptual thinking, spiritual cognition might therefore be described as the activity of mandalic reason. The centre of the mandala is the speculum—the point which reflects the nature of the whole. In contrast with the onesided thinking of the understanding, mandalic reason is speculative in that it keeps to this centre.

In his prefatory remarks to the "Transcendent Function," Jung warns that "the meaning and value of these fantasies"—that is, the fantasies that arise in the course of the dialogue with the unconscious—"are revealed only through the totality of existence itself (e.g. the Tibetan "Wheel of Life").

According to Ken Wilber, who counts both Hegel and Jung among his most formative influences, mandalic reason is the "mind's attempt to put into mental symbols that which is finally trans-mental, and the result is always eventually paradoxical." The Sociable God: Towards a New Understanding of Religion (New Science Library, 1984), p. 113. It is the mode of cognition which comes into play when "the mind attempts to reason about the absolute." Eye to Eye: the Quest for the New Paradigm. (Anchor Books, 1983), p. 175.

In medieval philosophy the mind was considered to be the speculum (Lat. mirror) of nature and God.
their integration into the personality as a whole—that is to say, at the moment when one is confronted not only with what they mean but also with their moral demands." In other words, the transformative power of the transcendent function cannot be fully actualized if the process ends in mere aesthetic contemplation of the living symbol or with an intellectually satisfying "interpretation." The integration of meaning into the personality as a whole, the carrying through to its practical implications, demands that theoretical insight be translated into concrete action. Thus knowing passes over into doing. It is in the transition from knowing to doing that the "moral demands" to which Jung refers come into play.

For Hegel, the transition to practical Spirit is effected through the fact that, in the syllogistic thinking of speculative reason, Spirit achieves the theoretical realization that the world of which it is conscious, objectivity in general, is not some alien other, but is determined in and through the concrete universality of Spirit itself. "Intelligence," he writes, "knowing itself to be the determinant of the content, which is determined as its own no less than as being, is will." As will, Spirit "knows itself as deciding in itself, and fulfilling itself from out of

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58 CW 8, p. 68.
59 Phil. Sp., section 468.
The will's activity "consists in annulling the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity and giving its aims an objective...character, while at the same time remaining by itself even in objectivity." The goal of the will's activity is freedom as "self-determining universality"—that is, not the "free will" as such, but the "absolutely" free will, which "is not mere potentiality, capacity, potency (potentia), but the infinite in actuality (infinitum actu)...." For only in freedom of this kind is the will by itself without qualification, because then it is related to nothing except itself and so is released from every tie of dependence on anything else. The will is then true, or rather truth itself, because its self-determination consists in a correspondence between what it is in its existence (i.e., what it is as objective to itself) and its concept, or in other words, the pure concept of the will has the intuition of itself for its goal and its reality.

Whereas the theoretical activity of subjective Spirit (or the psyche) has its beginning in the immediacy of simple intuition, practical Spirit is rooted in feeling (das Gefühl). Though practical Spirit, as will, determines its own content,
it is not, to begin with, conscious of the fact. To the extent that a given content conforms immediately to the needs and desires of the individual, it is determined by "the wholly subjective and superficial feeling of what is pleasant or unpleasant." 65

The feeling will consist therefore of the comparing of its immediate determinedness, which comes to it from without, with that of its determinedness which is posited through its own nature. Since the latter has the significance of that which ought to be, will demands of the affection that it should agree with it. This agreement is what is pleasant; disagreement is unpleasant. 66

This is very close to Jung's general understanding of feeling. According to Jung, feeling—which he counts among the four basic psychological functions—"is primarily a process that takes place between the ego and a given content, a process, moreover, that imparts to the content a definite value in the sense of acceptance or rejection ('like' or 'dislike')." 67

Like thinking, feeling is a rational function, "since values in general are assigned according to the laws of reason...." 68

65Phil. Sp., section 472.
66Ibid., Z.
67CW 6:724.
68Ibid., 727.
Whereas the subjective side of the valuative activity of feeling is the particular sensation of like or dislike, pleasant or unpleasant, the objective side manifests itself as the formal "Ought." This Ought is the expression of the perceived tension or lack of correspondence between a given content of consciousness and the specific needs or desires of the individual to which the content corresponds. One would like things to be a certain way, but they are not—or the reverse. Because of this tension, the individual is driven to act. The will, therefore, is not simple feeling, but impulse or inclination (Trieb, Neigung). Impulses or inclinations, however, vary according to the often conflicting needs and desires upon which they are based. To preserve its sense of autonomy, accordingly, the will reflects itself in thought, and in this way seeks to arrive at a more or less rational choice. While Jung opposes feeling to thinking, it would seem, therefore, that the valuative activity of feeling arises out of the dialectic with thinking, and only in this sense can feeling be considered a "rational" function. "In that it is thinking and implicitly free," as Hegel says, "the will distinguishes itself from the particularity of the impulses, and places itself above their multiple content as the simple subjectivity of thought." It is as "reflecting will" that Spirit assumes

69Cf. Phil. Sp., section 473.
the standpoint of choosing between inclinations and constitutes willfulness [or free choice--Willkühr].

The compulsion of instinct or inclination, however, does not cease with the making of a rational choice. Moreover, though the will as reflected in thought may possess the sense of its own autonomy, it must renounce it anew with every particular choice, for to choose one interest among many is still to act out of interest. "As the contradiction of actualizing itself within a particularity which is at the same time a nullity for it," writes Hegel,

and of possessing in this particularity a satisfaction which it at the same time has emerged from, will is initially the unending process of diversion, of sublating one inclination or enjoyment by means of another, and of being as satisfied as it is dissatisfied by further satisfaction.

To escape this "unending process of diversion," the will must establish some kind of long-term standard or generalized principle to determine the appropriateness of particular choices. This leads the will to the notion of a universal satisfaction--in the lecture notes Hegel refers specifically to the system of eudaemonism--"in which impulses in their particularity are posited as being negative, and as having to be either wholly or partially sacrificed partly to one another

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70 Ibid., sections 476, 477; cf. also Phil. Right, sectin 20.
71 Ibid., section 478.
and partly directly, on behalf of this purpose."\(^{72}\) This universal satisfaction is "happiness" [Glückseligkeit] or self-interest. But the eudaemonistic ethic suffers from the same inner contradiction. Its notion of universal happiness is an abstract ideal. For, despite the reflective arbitration of the rational will, "since happiness has affirmative content only in impulses, it is they that arbitrate, and subjective feeling and whim that have to decide where happiness is to be placed."\(^{73}\)

The contradiction in the rational will cannot be resolved as long as the autonomy for which the will strives is determined according to the abstract universal of the understanding. A second-order reflection is required—a grounding of the will in the concrete universality of reason, the concept of which, as we have seen, emerged as the truth of theoretical Spirit. Rational action is only possible in the context of rational cognition. It is "only as thinking intelligence," writes Hegel, "that the will is genuinely free."\(^{74}\) While knowing must actualize itself in doing, right doing, in turn, must be informed by right knowing. Only in the complex relationship of the mutual determination of

\(^{72}\)Ibid., section 479.

\(^{73}\)Ibid.

\(^{74}\)Phil. Right, section 21.
theoretical and practical Spirit does the will find true freedom:

Will which is actually free is the unity of theoretical and practical Spirit; it is the free will which, in that the formalism, contingency and limitedness of the preceding practical content has sublated itself, has being for itself as free will. Through the sublation of the mediation involved in this content, it is immediate, self-positing individuality, which is however to the same extent purified into the universal determination of freedom itself. It is only in that it thinks itself, knows this determination to be its concept, is the will as free intelligence, that the will has this universal determination as its general object and purpose. 75

Though Jung has not provided us with such a systematic account of the dialectic of the Self's practical activity, his view of the nature of psychological freedom confirms the validity of Hegel's conclusions. For Jung, as for Hegel, true freedom does not consist in the abstract claim of the ego to absolute autonomy. As we have seen, individuation—or the unfolding of individual personality—can only proceed through the mediation of opposites in the transcendent function, where thinking and feeling, sensation and intuition, and more generally ego and unconscious, enter into creative dialogue. The abstract, and therefore ultimately illusory, autonomy of the ego finds its truth in the concrete freedom of the Self:

75Phil. Sp., section 481, modified.
Psychology therefore culminates of necessity in a developmental process which is peculiar to the psyche and consists in integrating the unconscious contents into consciousness....Once these unconscious components are made conscious, it results not only in their assimilation to the already existing ego-personality, but in a transformation of the latter....Although it is able to preserve its structure, the ego is ousted from its central and dominating position and thus finds itself in the role of a passive observer who lacks the power to assert his will under all circumstances, not so much because it has been weakened in any way, as because certain considerations give it pause. That is, the ego cannot help discovering that the afflux of unconscious contents has vitalized the personality, enriched it and created a figure that somehow dwarfs the ego in scope and intensity. This experience paralyzes an over-egocentric will and convinces the ego that in spite of all difficulties it is better to be taken down a peg than to get involved in a hopeless struggle in which one is invariably handed the dirty end of the stick. In this way the will, as disposable energy, gradually subordinates itself to the stronger factor, namely to the new totality figure I call the Self.\textsuperscript{76}

As far as the practical activity of the Self is concerned, the unconscious contents which must be integrated for individuation to proceed are the instinctual components of the psyche—the impulses and inclinations which bind us to the world around us.\textsuperscript{77} This integration cannot take place as long as the individual continues to identify his or her personality as a whole with the conscious ego which, as a rule, tends to regard

\textsuperscript{76} CW 8:430; cf. also 9ii:9-11.

\textsuperscript{77} "This integration of the instincts is a prerequisite for individuation." CW 9i:660.
all irrational, unconscious promptings—and even the body itself—as something fundamentally other and alien.

The modern prototype for the moral standpoint of the abstract ego is the practical philosophy of Kant. Hegel's holistic ethic, in fact, can be seen in large measure as a critical response to Kant's moral ideal.78 Though Jung nowhere pronounces judgement on Kant in this respect, the Kantian morality is clearly incompatible with his understanding of individuation as the coming-to-be of the Self.

For Kant, human action is moral only to the extent that it is guided by the dictates of reason in the form of the categorical imperative. This imperative is the voice of duty.

Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and consequently the maxim that I should follow the law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations.79

78 Hegel makes a critical distinction between morality (Moralität) and ethical life (Sittlichkeit): "Morality is the form of the will in general in its subjective side. Ethical life is more than the subjective form and self-determination of the will; in addition it has as its content the concept of the will, namely freedom." Phil. of Right, section 141 Z.

Later on Kant states that the inclinations themselves, "being sources of want, are so far from having an absolute worth for which they should be desired that, on the contrary, it must be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them."  

Psychologically, the Kantian morality is not only unrealistic--it is also dangerous. To advocate such a radical split between consciousness and the instinctual life (duty and inclination) can only lead to a pathological dissociation. Consciousness must be grounded in instinct, otherwise it is powerless to act, for all action requires the impulsion of instinct. "Impulse and passion," as Hegel says, "constitute nothing other than the liveliness of the subject...in accordance with which it is itself involved in its purpose and in the carrying out of the same."  

"Nothing great," he asserts flatly, "has been, nor can it be accomplished without

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80Ibid., p.330.

81Though Freud has been heralded as the great liberator of the instincts, his dualistic model of the psyche, which is fully consistent with his general allegiance to the mechanistic Newtonian paradigm, is incapable, by itself, of informing a holistic ethic. Kant's abstract opposition of reason and passion reappears in Freud's concepts of the (super)ego and the id. Just as Hegel's concept of Spirit as complex whole overcomes the dichotomy within the Kantian morality, so does Jung's concept of the Self with respect to Freud's dualistic model of the psyche.

82Phil. Sp., section 475.
Hegel, therefore, regards Kant's position as one of unwitting self-deception. Moral consciousness asserts that its purpose is pure, is independent of inclinations and impulses, which implies it has eliminated within itself sensuous purposes. But this alleged elimination of the element of sense it dissembles... It acts, brings its purpose into actual existence, and the self-conscious sense-nature which is supposed to be eliminated is precisely this middle term or mediating element between pure consciousness and actual existence—it is the instrument or organ of the former for its realization, and what is called impulse, inclination. Moral consciousness is not, therefore, in earnest with the elimination of inclinations and impulses, for it is just these that are the self-realizing self-consciousness... for moral action is nothing but consciousness realizing itself, thus giving itself the shape of an impulse, i.e. it is immediately the present harmony of impulse and morality.\(^84\)

The good Kantian, however, is blind to this "present harmony." Hegel shows profound psychological insight in recognizing the necessary presence of "inclination" in all action, no matter how "pure" the motive.

We saw in Chapter Four how, given the dynamics of the psyche, unconscious desire is projected externally. Thus the immediate consequence of the moral agent's unconsciousness of the co-presence of instinct and reason in ethical behaviour is a postulated harmony beyond time and this world. This

\(^{83}\)Ibid., section 474.

\(^{84}\)Phen. Sp., par. 622/346.
compensatory projection is buttressed with the notion of a transcendent divine legislator who will ensure the postulated harmony.

The Kantian morality, based as it is on a radical split between consciousness and instinct, is caught in a hopeless contradiction. The section in the Phenomenology that follows upon Hegel's critique of this contradiction is concerned with two equally one-sided stances which arise from the Kantian position— the man of conscience and the "Beautiful Soul." For the man of conscience, duty

is no longer the universal that stands over against the Self; on the contrary, it is known to have no validity when thus separated. It is now the law that exists for the sake of the Self, not the self that exists for the sake of the law.\textsuperscript{85}

The man of conscience (Gewissen) is certain (gewiss) of his duty. He acts spontaneously without bothering about the purity of his motives. Action is intuitive rather than rational, instinctive rather than reflective. This immediacy of conscientious action, however, cannot claim true universality. There are as many moralities as there are individual consciences.

\textsuperscript{85}Ibid., par. 639/355.
The figure of the Beautiful Soul, by contrast, is extremely conscious of the purity of his intentions; so conscious, in fact, that it pains him to sully his intentions by transforming them into the inevitable imperfection of concrete action. The Beautiful Soul, in consequence,

lacks the power to externalize itself, the power to make itself into a Thing, and to endure [mere] being. It lives in dread of besmirching the splendour of its inner being by action and existence.\textsuperscript{86}

The Beautiful Soul, however, is not afraid to speak its morality. Unhesitatingly, it will pronounce judgement on the purportedly "conscientious" man of action. But the figure of the Beautiful Soul is just as guilty as the one he criticizes, for to judge is also to act. Thus the radical split in the Kantian position can only result in the burden of guilt.

Hegel finds a solution to this moral impasse in the Christian notion of the mutual forgiveness of sins. Just as the man of action "has to surrender its onesided, unacknowledged existence of its particular being-for-self," so too must the Beautiful Soul "set aside its onesided, unacknowledged judgement."\textsuperscript{87} The principle underlying the forgiveness of sins is the reconciliation of opposites which,

\textsuperscript{86}Ibid., par. 658/366.

\textsuperscript{87}Ibid., par. 669/373.
as we have seen, is the principle of individuation as understood by Jung. The fundamental psychical opposition is that between the ego and the unconscious. This corresponds to the opposition between reason and inclination, or reflection and action, at the heart of the Kantian morality. The dialogue between ego and unconscious, however, cannot occur without a certain tolerance or forebearence toward that side of the personality toward which one is most apt to be impatient and critical—i.e., the shadow. The more one lends an ear to the shadow, the less recalcitrant and objectionable does it become. This works to compensate the onesided orientation of consciousness and leads to an increased wholeness of being. Gradually, the centre of gravity shifts from the ego to the Self. Here we have a recapitulation of the movement in self-consciousness toward mutual recognition as the withdrawal of projection.

In the Phenomenology, the mutual forgiveness of sins signals the first appearance of absolute Spirit.

The word of reconciliation is the objectively existent Spirit, which beholds the pure knowledge of itself qua universal essence, in its opposite, in the pure knowledge of itself qua absolutely self-contained and exclusive individuality—a reciprocal recognition which is absolute Spirit. 88

88Ibid., par. 670/373.
Hegel's terminology coincides with Jung's at this point. In the transitional passage from morality to absolute Spirit, Hegel speaks of an inner dialectic which gives rise to the "Self" (Selbst) or "actual 'I'" (das wirkliche Ich).

Through this externalization, this knowledge which in its existence is self-discordant returns into the unity of the Self. It is the actual 'I', the universal knowledge of itself in its absolute opposite, in the knowledge which remains internal... The reconciling Yea, in which the two 'I's let go their antithetical existence, is the existence of the 'I' which has expanded into a duality, and therein remains identical with itself....

This Self must not be conceived in static terms. Its unity or identity is a unity-in-discord, an identity-in-difference. The dialectic is its very soul. Hegel is clearest on this point in the latter part of the Logic in his descriptions of the Idea. As we saw in Chapter One, the Idea is the supreme logical category, the truth of the whole preceding dialectic. It is the logical equivalent of what, in the Phenomenology, is called Self or absolute Spirit.

The Idea itself is the dialectic which forever divides and distinguishes the self-identical from the differentiated, the subjective from the objective, the finite from the infinite, soul from body. Only on these terms is it an eternal creation, eternal vitality, and eternal spirit....the Idea is the eternal vision of itself in the other.90

89 Ibid., par. 671/374.
90 E Logic, section 214.
Although the Idea is the truth of the whole procession of logical categories, within the context of the Doctrine of the Concept, it will be recalled, it arises as the unity of "life" and "cognition." The emergence of the logical Idea, therefore, parallels the resolution of the conflict between inclination and reason in the Phenomenology. In both instances the split in the Kantian morality has been overcome.

A corollary to this reconciliation is a new, complex vision of the relation between the is and the ought, the coincidence of which, to Kant, could only be postulated in an infinitely remote "beyond." For Hegel, by contrast, the Good, "the absolutely Good, is eternally accomplishing itself in the world: and the result is that it need not wait upon us, but is already by implication, as well as in full actuality, accomplished." 91 The unconditional character of Kant's "ought" marks it as an abstract universal. It stands completely over and against the "is" of finite human endeavour. Consequently, any attempt to approximate this ought is doomed to an infinite progression—which means, of course, no real progress at all. Hegel, on the other hand, realizes that it is only through conditioned, finite action that the good, as concrete universal, can actualize itself. The finite world of human

91 Ibid., section 212 Z.
endeavour, therefore, is the good.\textsuperscript{92} This is the practical significance of Hegel's (in)famous phrase, the actual is the rational, and the rational is the actual.\textsuperscript{93}

It must, however, be emphasized that, as concrete universal, the good is only as process. The harmony between the is and the ought, as Hegel puts it, "is not torpid and rigidly stationary. Good, the final end of the world, has being only while it constantly produces itself."\textsuperscript{94} In psychological terms, individuation, or the approximation of the ego to the Self, writes Jung, "must be a never ending process."\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{92} Cf. ibid., section 234 Z.

\textsuperscript{93} Cf. Phil. Right, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{94} E. Logic, section 234 Z.

\textsuperscript{95} CW 9ii:44.
PART THREE

INDIVIDUATION AND THE ABSOLUTE

The Absolute manifests itself in individual form: this is one of the crucial points in Hegel’s logic. The Absolute is the process of individuation. Consequently, the Absolute is not separate from but identical with itself as the differentiated individuals.

Stanley Rosen
In Part Two we traced the development of consciousness from its genesis in the life of desire to its full actualization as Spirit, from the ego of personal identity to the Self as the form of concrete individuality. Spirit or the Self has revealed itself as a mediation of opposites--ego and other, subject and object, knowing and doing, the ideal and the real. The notions of integration as mutual recognition, of reason as centrosion, of freedom and reconciliation which have emerged as the truth of these oppositions, each entailed a progressive widening and deepening of the concept of individuality to the point where the concept of Spirit or the Self, as complex whole, calls for further articulation in terms of the Absolute as the Whole. The question of the relation of the individual to the Whole is, to begin with, the special concern of religion. Out of the story of this relation, out of the story (mythos) of the manifestation of the Eternal in time, comes the consciousness of history as humanity's recollected account of its collective development and destiny. The consummation of this consciousness marks the beginning of the Science of Wisdom, whose central informing principle, as we shall see in the Conclusion, also constitutes the wisdom of the new science.
Chapter Seven

RELIGION AND THE INCARNATION OF THE SELF

With religion, the problem of the relation between the individual and the Absolute, and so the transpersonal implications of the principle of complex holism, first become the explicit focal point of our investigation.

I

"Religion can exist without philosophy," writes Hegel, "but philosophy cannot exist without religion. For it encompasses religion."\(^1\) Despite the priority given to religion, Hegel indicates elsewhere that, in terms of content at least, philosophy and religion are essentially identical activities. "The object of religion, like that of philosophy, is the eternal truth, God and nothing but God and the explication of God."\(^2\) Philosophy, therefore, "is only explicating itself when it explicates religion, and when it explicates itself it is explicating religion."\(^3\) As Hegel sees it, religion recognizes that "God is the beginning of all things and the end of all things."\(^4\) God is "the sacred center,

\(^1\) Preface to the Second Edition of the Encyclopaedia.
\(^2\) LPR, I, pp. 152-3.
\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) Ibid., p. 84.
which animates and inspires all things."\textsuperscript{5} In religion, "human beings place themselves in relationship to this center, in which all other relationships coalesce...."\textsuperscript{6}

Religion and philosophy, however, though identical in content, are distinct in form. What in religion is apprehended as representation (\textit{Vorstellung}), philosophy grasps as concept (\textit{Begriff}). In seeking to express his or her relation to God, the religious person will, to begin with, proceed analogically. God relates to humanity like a father to his children. The world arises from God as his creation, etc. Religious representation will, therefore, make use of sensuous "pictures" (\textit{Bilder}) or "images" (in the widest sense of the term). To the extent, however, that all such analogical expressions are meant to describe a reality which transcends the merely human, religious representation will always include an element of intentionality which points beyond the representational sphere as such. Representation, as Hegel puts it, "is the image elevated into the form of universality or thought...."\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{5}Ibid., p. 150.
\textsuperscript{6}Ibid., p. 84.
\textsuperscript{7}Ibid., p. 239.
in order to be itself. ... Moreover, the universal of which representation is conscious is only the abstract universality of its object, only its indeterminate essence. ... In order to define the essence, it again requires the determinacy that belongs to the sensible, the figurative, but assigns the latter, as sensible, the position of being something distinct from what it signifies, and treats it as a point at which it is not possible to remain. ...  

In characterizing the intentional "beyond" as the universal, Hegel has left the realm of representation as such and transfigured its content into the form of the Concept. In purely conceptual (i.e. philosophical) terms, religious representation has to do with the relation of the finite to the infinite. Its true content, in Hegel's terminology, is the Absolute—which can be conceived as the identity-in-difference of the finite and the infinite. ⁹ The logical category of the Absolute, as we have seen, is the Idea—which can in general be defined as the dialectical unity of opposites (complexio oppositorum).

As we saw in the previous chapter, despite Hegel's insistence on the superiority of conceptual over representational thinking, the Absolute itself, grasped as

⁸Ibid., p.241.

⁹This is my proposal for a synthetic formulation of the meaning of the Absolute. Cf. The Difference between the Fichtean and Schellingian Systems of Philosophy, tr. by Jere Paul Surber (Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1978), pp.73 and 87.
Spirit, is a representation—or to be more precise, it is the dialectic of concept and representation. Similarly, though Jung regards the living symbol as the exclusive bearer of transformative meaning, he nevertheless recognizes that, as thinking beings, we are driven to reflect upon the implications of this meaning. This is especially true of the great religious symbols, which for increasingly large portions of the population are, if not dead, then increasingly moribund. "Faith," writes Jung, "is a charisma for those who possess it, but it is no way for those who need to understand before they can believe." 10

Instead of insisting so glibly on the necessity of faith, the theologians, it seems to me, should see what can be done to make this faith possible. But that means placing symbolic truth on a new foundation—a foundation which appeals not only to sentiment, but to reason. And this can only be achieved by reflecting how it came about in the first place that humanity needed the improbability of religious statements, and what it signifies when a totally different spiritual reality is superimposed on the sensuous and tangible actuality of this world. 11

Jung hoped that psychology (his own variety of depth psychology, that is) would contribute to the laying of such a foundation. The same, of course, is true of Hegel and speculative philosophy. The foundation as a whole, if its

10 CW 5:342.

11 Ibid., 336.
structure is to be consistent with the principle of complex holism which informs the thought of both men, will obviously have to recognize the complementarity, and work toward a dialogical synthesis, of both methodological approaches.

We have seen how, in Jung's view, symbols are grounded in the unconscious archetype. The archetypes are "the numinous, structural elements of the psyche and possess a certain autonomy and specific energy which enables them to attract, out of the conscious mind, those contents which are best suited to themselves."\textsuperscript{12} At this point Jung's understanding of the symbol coincides with his general view of religion, which he defines as "a scrupulous observation...of the \textit{numinosum}."\textsuperscript{13} The \textit{numinosum}--a term which Jung adopted from Otto's \textit{Idea of the Holy}--refers in general to certain dynamic factors that are conceived as 'powers': spirits, daemons, gods, laws, ideals, or whatever name man has given to such factors in his world as he has found powerful, dangerous, or helpful enough to be taken into careful consideration, or grand, beautiful, and meaningful enough to be devoutly worshipped and loved.\textsuperscript{14}

The religious symbol is the link between consciousness and the numinous powers of the unconscious. For Hegel, similarly,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12}Ibid., 344.
\item \textsuperscript{13}\textit{CW} 11:6.
\item \textsuperscript{14}Ibid., 8.
\end{itemize}
religious representation makes use of sensuous "images" to indicate a relation to a transcendent beyond—most characteristically, the "Infinite." Understood psychologically, this "beyond" corresponds to the notion of the unconscious, the contents of which find their material analogues in the form of symbols. Likewise for Hegel, as Fackenheim stresses, the religious relation "requires a symbol which points to the divine Infinity while being itself finite. It thus mediates between the Divine and the human, at once relating them and keeping them apart."15

Jung, as we have seen, lays great stress on the mediating function of the symbol.16 Because the symbol "is born of man's highest spiritual aspirations and must at the same time spring from the deepest roots of his being, it cannot be a onesided product of the most highly differentiated mental functions but must derive equally from the lowest and most primitive functions of the psyche."17 Referring to the four orienting functions, Jung notes that the "profundity and pregnant


16It would seem that Schiller had a profound influence in this respect. This is particularly true of Schiller's notion of "living form" as the mediated unity of the two fundamental instincts—i.e. the sensuous and the formal. Cf. The Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, tr. by Reginald Snell (New York: Frederick Unger Publishing Co., 1981). For Jung's psychological commentary on this work, see Psychological Types, C.W. 6:101 f.

17CW 6:824.
significance of the symbol appeal just as strongly to thinking as to feeling, while its peculiar plastic imagery, when shaped into sensuous form, stimulates sensation as much as intuition."¹⁸ We have already seen how Hegel attributes a copresence of thought and the sensuous in religious representation. This would correspond to thinking and perception (or intuition) in Jung's model of the psyche. For Jung, however, the opposite of thinking is feeling. It might seem that Jung's notion of symbol—which unites thinking and feeling as well as sensation and intuition—is more inclusive or comprehensive than the notion of representation as understood by Hegel. In fact, however, Hegel's extensive treatment of the element of feeling in the religious relation¹⁹ suggests a closer approximation to Jung's position with regard to the religious function of the symbol.²⁰

To attain its maximum efficacy, however, the truth of the religious symbol as mediator between the human and the divine must not only be felt or represented, but acted out. This is accomplished in worship or cultus, whose principal form is

¹⁸Ibid., 823.

¹⁹Cf. LPR, I, pp. 268-81.

²⁰As Fackenheim remarks: "Just as feeling must be inwardly bound up with representation to be religious, so representation must be bound up with feeling to be religious....The required aspects of religious representation all unite in the religious symbol." Op. cit., p.122.
ritual enactment. In worship, writes Hegel, "God is on one side, I am on the other, and the determination is the including, within my own self, of myself with God, the knowing of myself within God and of God within me." The union with God as the goal of worship "is to be attained by me and in me, and that toward which the action...tends is just this surrender of myself, with me no longer clinging possessively to the self as personal property existing on its own account."

The cultus thus contains a negative moment, but in such a way that it is practical activity of the subject upon itself, [namely] to surrender and let go its subjectivity. This moment of renunciation occurs concretely in positive religion in the shape of sacrifices; admittedly the negation is more concerned with externals here, but there is an essential reference to the inner life, as the inner life comes increasingly to the fore in confession, purification, repentance, and so on.

Clearly, a key element in Hegel's understanding of worship is the renunciation of the ego as a sacrificial act. Jung has thrown considerable light on the psychology of ritual sacrifice in his essay "Transformation Symbolism in the Mass," in which he amplifies the archetypal content of the mass through comparison with gnostic and alchemical parallels. What is most significant for our purposes is the manner in which he

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21LPR, I, p. 443.  
22Ibid., p. 349.  
23Ibid., p. 350.
characterizes and accounts for the paradoxical nature of the sacrifice. The paradox involves the co-existence, in the symbolic mode of representation, of two perspectives—the human and the divine—from which the sacrifice can be viewed. Speaking of the mass, Jung remarks that, from the human point of view, "gifts are offered to God at the altar, signifying at the same time the self-obliteration of the priest and the congregation."24 The ritual act "commemorates and represents the Last Supper..., the whole Incarnation, Passion, Death, and Resurrection of Christ."25 From the divine point of view, however, "this anthropomorphic action is only the outer shell or husk in which what is really happening is not a human action at all but a divine event."26

For an instant the life of Christ, eternally existent outside time, becomes visible and is unfolded in temporal succession, but in condensed form, in the sacred action....In the utterance of the words of consecration the Godhead intervenes, Itself acting and truly present, and thus proclaims that the central event in the Mass is Its act of grace, in which the priest has only the significance of a minister....The presence of the Godhead binds all parts of the sacrificial act into a mystical unity, so that it is God Himself who offers himself as a sacrifice in the substances, in the priest, and in the congregation, and who, in the human form of the Son, offers himself as an atonement to the Father.27

24 CW 11:378.
25 Ibid...
26 Ibid...
27 Ibid...
To make psychological sense of the paradoxical identification of sacrifier and sacrificed, it is evident that the distinction between ego and unconscious, by itself, will not suffice. To the psychologyst, the symbolic statement that God sacrifices himself to himself points to the concept of the Self as complex whole or dialectically self-articulating totality:

The ego stands to the Self as the moved to the mover, or as the object to the subject, because the determining factors which radiate out from the Self surround the ego from all sides and are therefore supraordinate to it.\(^{28}\)

Jung's concept of the Self enables him to formulate the psychological significance of the sacrifice in the following terms:

What I sacrifice is my own selfish claim, and by doing this I give up myself. Every sacrifice is therefore, to a greater or lesser degree, a self-sacrifice....Hence it is the Self that causes me to make the sacrifice; nay, more, it compels me to make it. The Self is the sacrifier, and I am the sacrificed gift, the human sacrifice.\(^{29}\)

\(^{28}\)Ibid., 391.

\(^{29}\)Ibid., 397.
The paradoxical identification of sacrificer and sacrificed is rendered psychologically intelligible with the recognition that the individual subject stands to the Godhead as the ego to the Self. In Hegel's terminology, in worship

the subject knows the absolute substance into which it has to sublate itself to be at the same time its essence, its substance, in which, therefore, self-consciousness is implicitly conserved. It is the unity, reconciliation, restoration of the subject and its self-consciousness, the positive feeling of sharing and partaking in this absolute and actualizing one's unity with it—in this sublation of the cleavage—which constitutes the sphere of worship.\textsuperscript{30}

The concept of the Absolute as the identity-in-difference of the finite and the infinite formulates the truth of the religious relation. Similarly, the concept of the Self—Jung's "absolute" psychological category—encompasses the (finite) ego and the (infinite) unconscious.\textsuperscript{31} The religious consciousness, however, cannot by itself grasp the conceptual truth of the religious relation. In Hegel's terminology, though it may at times feel or act out its unity with the divine, it will nevertheless continue to represent the divine as fundamentally other. From the psychological point of view, as we have seen,

\textsuperscript{30}LPR, I, pp. 189-90.

\textsuperscript{31}See CW 18:1672 (where Jung says of the unconscious that it "has no known limits") and 11:390. In the Differenzschrift, the Absolute is characterized by Hegel as "the identity of the conscious and the unconscious." Op. cit., p. 32.
this is inevitable. The experience of the numinous contents of the unconscious is mediated in the form of symbolic images. Insofar as these images originate from beyond the sphere of ego-consciousness, they naturally possess the quality of autonomy:

The God-image thrown up by a spontaneous act of creation is a living figure, a being that exists in its own right and therefore confronts its ostensible creator autonomously. As proof of this it may be mentioned that the relation between the created and the creator is a dialectical one, and that, as experience shows, man has often been the person who is addressed. From this the naive-minded person concludes, rightly or wrongly, that the figure produced exists in and for itself, and he is inclined to assume that it was not he who fashioned it, but that it fashioned itself in him. As it is a natural process, it cannot be decided whether the God-image is created or whether it creates itself.\(^32\)

The natural autonomy of the God-image corresponds to the element of transcendence in the God-concept. The psychologist is not explicitly concerned with the possible existence of a transcendent referent in any metaphysical sense. It is enough to recognize that the God-image confronts the ego as something other. Considered simply as a psychological fact, Jung writes that, "as the highest value and supreme dominant in the psychic hierarchy the God-image is immediately related to, or identical with, the Self...."\(^33\)

\(^{32}\textit{CW} 5:95.\)

\(^{33}\textit{CW} 911:170; \textit{cf. also } 11:282, \text{ and } 14:778.\)
Hegel and Jung both find the truth of the relation between the human subject and the God-image in the internal dialectic of the central concept itself—that is, in the concept of Spirit or the Self as complex whole. The triadic pattern of this concept—immediate unity, differentiation, mediate unity—serves Hegel as the framework for his speculative reconstruction of the history of religions. "When we consider the sequence of the determinate religions under the guidance of the Concept," he writes,

...the sequence of the historical religions emerges for us from it, and thus we have the history of religions before us at the same time. For what is necessary through the Concept must have existed, and the religions, as they followed one another, have not arisen in a contingent manner.34

The three principal divisions of "determinate" religion are: 1) the religion of nature, 2) the religion of spiritual individuality, and 3) the "consummate" or "revelatory" (vollendete, offenbare) religion. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide even a summary of Hegel's treatment of the great religions under these three headings. Instead, we will focus on the "consummate" or "revelatory" religion—i.e.,

34_LPR, I, p. 146.
Christianity—whose central dogmatic symbol—the Trinity—is seen by Hegel as the perfect expression, in the form of representation, of the true content of religion as such.

The Trinity holds a place of equal—though, as we shall see, more ambivalent—significance in Jung's thought. The most important Text in this connection is his "A Psychological Approach to the Dogma of the Trinity,"³⁵ in which Jung tries to uncover the archetypal foundation of "the most sacred of all dogmatic symbols."³⁶ The first part of the essay is devoted to a consideration of pre-Christian parallels from Babylonia, Egypt, and Greece.³⁷ Jung sees a definite evolution throughout the various instances of "divine triads, culminating in the Christian Trinity—"the most perfect form of the archetype in question."³⁸

³⁵In his book, Imago Dei (Associated University Press, 1979), James Heisig notes "the striking resemblance" between the three "worlds" in Jung's essay on the Trinity and the "three ages of the Spirit" in Hegel's Phenomenology. Heisig thinks it not unlikely that Jung "had met these ideas in his brief and frustrating encounter with Hegel." p. 171. There is, however, no solid evidence to support such a conjecture.

³⁶CW 11:171.

³⁷In his consideration of pre-Christian parallels to the Trinity, Hegel finds fault with the Pythagorean and Platonic number speculation in that it is limited to "abstract categories of thought." LPR, III: The Consummate Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson (University of California Press, 1985) p. 287. Similarly, Jung remarks that the triadic formulas in the Timaeus are "two-dimensional" and confined to the level of "abstract thought."CW 11:182.

³⁸CW 11:281.
Hegel, for his part, structures his treatment of the consummate religion according to the concept of the Trinity. First we have the Kingdom of the Father, or the Idea "in and for itself." This is the realm of the pre-existent Trinity, or "God in his eternity before the creation of the world and outside the world." 39 This is God in "the element of thought," "within the abstract element of thinking in general." 40 These descriptions immediately bring to mind the sphere of the Logic, whose categories, as we saw in Chapter One, are the philosophical counterparts to Jung's archetypes.

The Kingdom of the Father, therefore, corresponds in general to the notion of the collective unconscious. 41 As understood by Hegel, however, the determinate content of the Kingdom of the Father--the Idea in and for itself, which in the sphere of representation is symbolized by the pre-existent

40Ibid., p. 275.

41It will be recalled that, in Chapter Three, the image of the mother was seen to symbolize the collective unconscious, whereas that of the father symbolized the collective consciousness. Here, the father usurps the role of the mother, simply because, as Jung says, "the doctrine of the Trinity originally corresponded to a patriarchal society." CW 11:223. In contrast with the later "orthodox" dogmatic formulations, the speculations of the Gnostics--who refer to the Godhead as the "Mother-Father," or as the feminine "Depth" or "Silence"--arise out of a more immediate contact with the archetypal life of the collective unconscious. See my Psychology of the Gnostic Phenomenon, op. cit.
Trinity—would not correspond to the collective unconscious as such, but rather to its absolute dominant—the archetype of the Self. We must, however, make an important distinction here. Though the Self is conceived as the psyche in its totality—encompassing both ego and unconscious—from a developmental perspective, the archetype of the Self, to begin with, is this totality only as latent possibility, not as individuated personality. It is in this sense that Jung relates the image of the father to "the earlier state of consciousness when one was still a child...a passive, unreflecting condition...without intellectual or moral judgement."42

As Hegel says in the Phenomenology, however, Spirit or the Self "that is expressed in the element of pure thought is itself essentially this, to be not merely in this element, but to be actual Spirit, for in its Concept lies otherness itself, i.e. the suppression of the pure Concept that is only thought."43 Thus "the merely eternal or abstract Spirit becomes an 'other' to itself, or enters into existence..."44 The passage from the state of abstract universality, of immediate and unconscious identity, to the emergence of the

42CW 11:270.

43Phen. Sn., par. 772/424.

44Ibid., par. 774/424.
"other," signals the transition to the Kingdom of the Son—which is the moment of differentiation or particularization as such. That which is differentiated is "nature, the world as a whole, and spirit that is related to it, the natural spirit."\textsuperscript{45} In Christianity this differentiation is represented by the doctrine of Creation.

Jung too recognizes that "the One has to be supplemented by the Other, with the result that the world of the Father is fundamentally altered and is superseded by the world of the Son."\textsuperscript{46} The passage from Father to Son involves "conscious differentiation," "knowledge of one's own individuality," and "moral discrimination."\textsuperscript{47} The Christianity symbolized by the Son "forces the individual to discriminate and to reflect...."\textsuperscript{48} In developmental terms, the Son symbolizes the individuating ego. The self-conscious individual perceives him or herself, forms an image or idea of him or herself, as distinct from the other—whether this other be his or her body, the world in general, or another individual. The ability to discriminate and reflect is a "spiritual act,"\textsuperscript{49} associated

\textsuperscript{45}LPR, III, p. 274.
\textsuperscript{46}CW 11:201.
\textsuperscript{47}Ibid., and 271.
\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., 271.
\textsuperscript{49}Ibid., 235 n..
with a redirecting or "bending back" (reflexio) of instinctual energies from their natural, unconscious gradient. This view is the psychological correlate to Hegel's metaphysical conception of the emergence of nature and finite spirit as both sides of the differentiated other.

Along with the discrimination between ego and other, nature and spirit, comes the consciousness of the moral opposites of good and evil. For Hegel, the principle of evil is inherent in consciousness itself, "for knowledge or consciousness is the only act through which separation is posited at all—negation, evil, and cleavage, the more specific categories involved in being-for-self as such."50 This view of evil is implicit in the Biblical account of the Fall. Adam and Eve disobey the divine injunction, eat from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and as a result become conscious of themselves as individually distinct, sexual beings. In the Christian mythos, the fall from paradise is prefigured by the revolt of Lucifer (the "bearer of light") in Heaven. As Jung notes, however, it is not until the advent of Christianity that the principle of evil, symbolized by the devil, truly comes into its own. In his Answer to Job, Jung shows how the Old Testament Yahweh betrays every indication of being an unreflective, contradictory, and therefore relatively

50 IPR, III, p. 206.
unconscious God.\textsuperscript{51} In the \textit{Book of Job}, Satan is numbered among the Sons of Heaven, and is still on good enough terms with Yahweh to gain admittance to the heavenly court and make a highly dubious wager with the Lord. The real devil, writes Jung, "first appears as the adversary of Christ, and with him we gaze for the first time into the luminous realm of divinity on the one hand and into the abyss of hell on the other."\textsuperscript{52}

For Hegel, the self-othering of the Idea in Nature and finite spirit culminates with the Incarnation—the advent of the Son in history. In the person of Jesus, the absolute essence has acquired "natural existence and self-like actuality."\textsuperscript{53} At the same time, however, Jesus as the Christ represents the truth that the separation between God and humanity, between transcendent universality and isolated particularity, is implicitly overcome. "I and the Father are one," says Christ. This truth becomes actual with the death of Christ—which Hegel describes as "the focal point of reconciliation" and the "midpoint upon which consciousness turns."\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{51}Cf. \textit{CW} 11: pp. 357f..
\textsuperscript{52}Ibid., par. 254.
\textsuperscript{53}\textit{Phen. Sp.}, par. 779/428.
\textsuperscript{54}\textit{LPR}, III, pp. 325 and 321.
The identity of the divine and the human means that God is at home with himself in humanity, in the finite, and in [its] death this finitude is itself a determination of God. Through death God has reconciled the world and reconciles himself eternally with himself. This coming back again is his return to himself, and through it he is Spirit.55

The resurrection of Christ symbolizes the truth of his death as "the negation of negation."56 This double negation, in turn, marks the transition from the Kingdom of the Son to the Kingdom of the Spirit.

Jung too accords a dual, transitional significance to the life and death of Christ as Son of God. The stage of the Son is a conflict situation par excellence: the choice of possible ways is menaced by just as many possibilities of error. "Freedom from the law" brings a sharpening of opposites, in particular of the moral opposites. Christ crucified between two thieves is an eloquent symbol of this fact. The exemplary life of Christ is in itself a "transitus" and amounts therefore to a bridge leading over to the third stage, where the initial stage of the Father is, as it were, recovered.57

The image of Christ crucified, though expressive of the tension of opposites associated with the differentiation of consciousness, also represents, as we have seen, the moment of

55Ibid., p. 220.
56Ibid.
57CW 11:272.
the absolute interpenetration of the human and divine natures. At this level, therefore, the crucifixion becomes a symbol of the actualization of the Self. "In the course of being crucified," as Edinger puts it, "Jesus as ego and Christ as Self merge."58 The sacrificial character of Christ's death involves a relativization of the ego, the dynamics of which have already been considered in our treatment of worship.

Jung, however, sees a problem with Christ as a symbol of the Self. Granted, as the God-Man, Christ unites the finite (ego) and the infinite (unconscious). Nevertheless, as we have seen, the advent of the Son in history entailed a radical splitting of the moral opposites. In this sense, at least, the Christ-figure cannot symbolize the Self as psychic totality. "In the empirical Self," writes Jung,

light and shadow form--a paradoxical unity. In the Christian concept, on the other hand, the archetype is hopelessly split into two irreconcilable halves, leading, ultimately to a metaphysical dualism--the final separation of the kingdom of heaven from the fiery world of the damned.59

The Christ-figure "lacks the nocturnal side of the psyche's nature, the darkness of the spirit, and is also without sin."60

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59 CW 9ii:76.
60 CW 11:232.
Jung hints on several occasions that Christianity's onesided emphasis on the light and the spiritual—which are identified with the good—can be understood as a compensation for a corresponding onesidedness in the collective values and general way of life that prevailed throughout the Roman Empire. Without this historically necessary compensation, "human consciousness," he writes, "could hardly have progressed so far as it has towards mental and spiritual differentiation." 61 Two thousand years later, however, the motive for compensation has shifted to the other extreme, with the result that Christianity no longer speaks to the world with the voice of wholeness. To express the true nature of the Self, Christianity must integrate its shadow side, must incorporate those elements of existence which have come to be associated with evil: the chthonic, the instinctual, the feminine.

The mature Hegel, however, does not share Jung's reservations concerning the completeness of the Christ-figure and the role of traditional Christian values in modern times. Nevertheless, the principles of wholeness and the dialectical unity of opposites which inform Jung's critique are quite consonant with Hegel's general position.

61 Ibid., 259.
We have seen how Christ's death and resurrection mark the transition from the Kingdom of the Son to that of the Spirit, which in terms of the processional schema of the central concept is the transition to the third, and final, stage of mediate unity or concrete universality. In psychological terms, this third stage corresponds to the concept of the Self as the complex unity of ego (the Son) and unconscious (the Father). In what is perhaps the earliest formulation of his speculative concept of the Trinity, Hegel adopts a quasi psychological perspective which is quite consonant with Jung's view of the matter. "The culmination of faith," writes Hegel in the Spirit of Christianity,

the return to the Godhead whence man is born, closes the circle of man's development. Everything lives in the Godhead, every living thing is its child, but the child carries the unity, the connection, the concord with the entire harmony, undisturbed though undeveloped, in itself. It begins with faith in gods outside itself, with fear, until through its actions it has [isolated and] separated itself more and more; but then it returns through associations to the original unity which now is developed, self-produced, and sensed as a unity. The child now knows God, i.e., the spirit of God is present in the child, issues from its restrictions, annuls the modification, and restores the whole. God, the Son, the Holy Spirit! 62

In his mature philosophy of religion, however, and in keeping with the concept of Spirit as intersubjectivity, Hegel identifies the Kingdom of the Spirit with the church or spiritual community.

In the subsisting community the church is, by and large, the institution whereby [its] subjects come to the truth, appropriate the truth to themselves, so that the Holy Spirit becomes real, actual, and present within them and has its abode in them.... 63

The notion of the indwelling of the Spirit in the body of the faithful originated with Jesus' farewell promise that he would send an "Advocate" (Paraclete) "who will be with you forever--the Spirit of truth" (John 14:16-17).

Jung too accords great significance to the doctrine of the Paraclete, which implies that "the Self of man enters into a relationship of unity with the substance of God." 64 Psychologically, the truth of the Paraclete corresponds to the general significance of the third stage, which involves "articulating one's ego-consciousness with a supraordinate totality" 65--i.e. the Self. As we saw in Chapters Four and Six, the dialectic of intersubjectivity constitutes an

63 LPR, III, p. 333; cf. also p. 233.
64 CW 11:289.
65 Ibid., 276.
essential moment in the coming to consciousness of the Self. The function of the spiritual community is to provide a suitable container for this consciousness. The spiritual community consists of those individuals who, by virtue of the gift of the Holy Spirit, are mutually recognized as one in the "body" of Christ (i.e. the Self).

III

The continued existence of the Spiritual Community, however, depends upon the efficacy of its central symbols. According to Jung, the problem with the symbol of Christ—the lack of any positive relation to the dark, chthonic side of human nature—is equally evident with the symbol of the Trinity, which is all male (except for the Holy Spirit, which is neuter), all light, and, as the chosen image of the summum bonum itself, all perfect and good. It can be argued, however, that, if with the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the body of the faithful, humanity as such participates in the life of the Trinity, then the nature of God must also include those elements which have come to be associated with the principle of evil. But in "the age of Christianity," writes Jung,

and in the domain of trinitarian thinking such an idea is simply out of the question, because the conflict is too violent for evil to be assigned any logical relation to the Trinity than that of an absolute opposition.66

66Ibid., 258.
Hegel, for his part, sees the problem as lying within the characteristic mode of the religious consciousness itself.

Representation takes...evil, to be a happening alien to the divine Being; to grasp it in the divine Being itself as the wrath of God, this demands from representation, struggling against its limitations, its supreme and most strenuous effort, an effort which, since it lacks the Concept, remains fruitless.\(^{67}\)

The religious consciousness of the Spiritual Community is in full possession of the true content of Absolute Spirit, "but all its moments, when placed in the medium of representation, have the character of being uncomprehended, of appearing as completely independent sides, which are externally connected with each other."\(^{68}\) In the form of the Concept, by contrast, the principle of evil is identified with the element of exclusive being-for-self in the moment of difference or separation in the rhythm of the Idea. As a result, Hegel succeeds in grounding the principle of evil in the life of the Trinity itself.

Jung effects an analogous reconciliation of the Trinity with the principle of evil through the concept of the Self.

\(^{67}\) Phen. Sp., par. 777/427.

\(^{68}\) Ibid., par. 765/421.
But at this point Jung parts company with Hegel in proposing that the "unspeakable conflict posited by duality resolves itself in a fourth principle, which restores the unity of the first in its full development. The rhythm is built up in three steps, but the resultant symbol is a quaternity."\(^{69}\) Jung, however, is guilty here of confusing the concept of the Self as process with the phenomenology of the Self as symbol of psychic totality. That the quaternity is a favoured symbol of the Self—a significant observation that Jung gleaned from extensive clinical observation and historical forays into the life of the unconscious—does not alter the fact that the reconciliation of conflicting opposites occurs with the last of the "three steps,"\(^{70}\) which Jung himself recognizes elsewhere in the same essay.

Jung's empirical findings concerning the symbol of the quaternity do, however, suggest that the limitations inherent in the religious mode of representation do not preclude the possibility of adaptive developments within the representational sphere itself. According to Jung, the symbolism of alchemy, along with the promulgation of the Assumptio Mariae in our century, stand as conclusive evidence

\(^{69}\text{CW 11:258.}\)

\(^{70}\)Jung's notion of the transcendent function as the mediating process which produces the "living" or "uniting" symbol fully supports this view.
that such developments do indeed occur. (We shall return to this issue shortly.) Jung is quite right in pointing out that the bodily assumption of Mary into heaven compensates the exclusively male and ouranic Trinity, transforming the latter into a quaternity. \textsuperscript{71} Hegel's quick rejection, in the \textit{Phenomenology}, of the notion of a divine quaternity as "useless" number play\textsuperscript{72} can be attributed to his view of the priority of concept over symbol (a view which, as we saw in Chapter Two, prevented him from perceiving symbols of the Self in dreams or the delusions of the insane).

This counterperspective, moreover, is present as an integral moment of Hegel's own development. As the research of H.S. Harris has shown,\textsuperscript{73} the concept of the quaternity occupied a position of equal importance to that of the Trinity in Hegel's first system. Although the Trinity is still the central speculative symbol, the system as a whole is ordered according to the schema 3+1 (Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Philosophy of finite Spirit: speculative Christianity) the last term being "the resumption of the Whole into One." The symbolism of the quaternity, as Jung has repeatedly

\textsuperscript{71}See the frontispiece to \textit{Psychology and Religion}, CW 11.

\textsuperscript{72}\textit{Phen. Sp.}, par. 776/426.

\textsuperscript{73}Cf. H.S. Harris, \textit{Hegel's Development: Night Thoughts} (Jena, 1801-1806) (Oxford University Press, 1983).
demonstrated, often appears in the form of 3+1.\textsuperscript{74} In this case, the 3 can be taken as representing the reflective articulation (by means of the three differentiated functions) of the original One (the primal Self) which, as natural totality, is symbolized by a quaternity.\textsuperscript{75} The +1, on the other hand, stands for the same One, but as the alienated substance of consciousness (which becomes the unconscious).\textsuperscript{76} The reintegration of the missing fourth in the process of individuation produces a second quaternity, which, though grounded in the first, is supraordinate to it—the actual Self.\textsuperscript{77} In terms of Hegel's first system, the first quaternity (of the original One and the 1 as missing fourth) would correspond to Hegel's "Kingdom of the Son,"\textsuperscript{78} while the second would correspond to Hegel's "Resting Square."\textsuperscript{79} Thinking representationally, the Resting Square can be viewed as a pyramid, the quaternity of the natural totality forming the

\textsuperscript{74}Cf., for instance, CW 91:611; 911:305, 351, 355, 396, 398; 11:180; 12:192, 210 and n., 313, 320; and 18:1603-4.

\textsuperscript{75}The four rivers in the garden of Eden, for instance.

\textsuperscript{76}The Timeaen "missing fourth."

\textsuperscript{77}This sequence is a possible interpretation of the alchemical saying of Maria Prophetissa: "One becomes two. Two becomes three. And out of the third comes the One as the fourth." Cf. CW 12:26, 31; 14:68, 269, 278, 574, 619, 656.

\textsuperscript{78}Cf. the doubled triangle of Harris's figure three.

\textsuperscript{79}Cf. Harris 's figure six.
base, and that of the Resumption of the Whole into One, the apex.\textsuperscript{80}

Given the role of the quaternity in Hegel's first system, it is not surprising to find that Mary is granted special speculative significance. "In all his versions of the 'mythology of Reason,'" writes Harris, "--the earliest was probably the one in the 'System Fragment' of 1800--Hegel gives the 'Mother of God' almost equal prominence with the Persons of the Trinity."\textsuperscript{81}

The bond of love between mother and child is the most primitive natural feeling. Thus Mary as the symbol that 'God is Love' stands at the beginning of an exposition of the Incarnation; and she forms the link between the exposition of the Infinite as the Triune Idea, and the exposition of the finite as Nature, Spirit, and the "resumption of the whole." Hence we find her appended to the Trinity in Rosenkranz's account of the lectures, but placed first in the

\textsuperscript{80}At the centre of the figure Harris places "Man." This is consistent with the symbolism of the \textit{teleios anthropos} and \textit{filius macrocosmi} associated with Christ.

\textsuperscript{81}Feuerbach also includes the Mother of God in his discussion of the Trinity. The "Virgin Mary," he writes, "fits in perfectly with the relations of the Trinity, since she conceives without man the son whom the Father begets without woman; so that thus the Holy Virgin is a necessary, inherently requisite antithesis to the Father in the bosom of the Trinity....Why did God become man only through woman?...For what other reason than because the Son is the yearning after the Mother, because his womanly, tender heart found a corresponding expression only in a feminine body?...Love is in and by itself essentially feminine in its nature. The belief in the love of God is the belief in the feminine principle as divine." Op. cit., pp.70-71.
later phenomenological 'history of God' of which one fragment survives.\textsuperscript{82}

We have already seen how the image of the circle which Hegel uses to characterize his Science of Wisdom suggests the symbol of the mandala. The mandala, moreover, is typically associated with the quaternity (the squared circle of Pythagorean speculation, the alchemical rotundum, the Tibetan tanka, etc.). Concerning the relation between the trinity and the mandala, Edinger notes that, in general, quaternity and mandala symbols "distinctly emphasize the theme of containment."

Add to this the fact that even numbers are traditionally considered feminine while odd numbers are thought of as male. This suggests that the quaternity may be predominantly an expression of the mother archetype or feminine principle with emphasis on static support and containment, whereas the trinity is a manifestation of the father archetype or masculine principle, which emphasizes movement, activity, initiative.\textsuperscript{83}

Insofar as the trinitarian concept itself implies the "totality of the cycle of growth and dynamic change--conflict and resolution and renewed conflict," one can argue that "the thesis three and the antithesis four must be resolved in a new synthesis."\textsuperscript{84} Such a synthesis would not merely involve a

\textsuperscript{82}H.S. Harris, op. cit., p. 156.

\textsuperscript{83}Edinger (1973) p.189.

\textsuperscript{84}Ibid., p. 188.
mediation between the moments of formal process and substantial stasis which constitute a truly complex whole—a mediation which is already the explicit concern of Hegel's notion of Aufhebung and, implicitly at least, of Jung's transcendent function—but equally significantly, between the conceptual and symbolic modes of cognizing this whole. That such a mediation is compatible with Hegel's mature philosophical position has already been established in the section of the preceding chapter dealing with the notion of spiritual cognition. It would appear, therefore, that the dialogue between Hegel and Jung could constitute a basis for a rearticulation of the new "mythology of reason" which was announced in the "Earliest System-Program of German Idealism." "Until we make the Ideas aesthetic," Hegel proclaimed,

that is mythological, they have no interest for the people [Volk], and conversely until mythology is rational, the philosopher must be ashamed of it....--A higher spirit sent from Heaven must found this religion, it will be the last, greatest work of mankind. 85

While Hegel sought the creation of a new mythology of Reason, its central symbols and informing principle would remain fundamentally Christian. "And although Hegel eventually abandoned the position of the "Earliest System Program" for his

mature view that the form of the Concept, or speculative philosophy, supersedes the symbolic modality of religious consciousness, he nevertheless maintained the view of Christianity as the "absolute religion." For Jung, likewise, Christianity remains the most complete revelation to date of the individuation process. "The Christ symbol," as Jung says, "is of the greatest importance for psychology in so far as it is perhaps the most highly developed and differentiated symbol of the Self, apart from the figure of the Buddha."

We can see this from the scope and substance of all the pronouncements that have been made about Christ: they agree with the psychological phenomenology of the Spirit in unusually high degree, although they do not include all aspects of this archetype. The almost limitless range of the Self might be deemed a disadvantage as compared with the definiteness of a religious figure....[However,] not only is the Self indefinite but--paradoxically enough--it also includes the quality of definiteness and even of uniqueness.... The inclusion in a religion of a unique personality --especially when conjoined to an indeterminable divine nature--is consistent with the absolute individuality of the Self, which combines uniqueness with the eternal and the individual with the universal. The Self is a union of opposites par excellence, and this is where it differs essentially from the Christ-symbo]. The androgyne of Christ is the utmost concession the Church has made to the problem of opposites. The opposition between the light and good on the one hand and darkness and evil on the other is left in a state of open conflict, since Christ simply represents good, and his counterpart the devil, evil. This opposition is the real world problem, which at present is still unsolved. The Self, however, is absolutely paradoxical in that it represents in every respect thesis and antithesis, and at the same time synthesis.86

86CW 12:22.
Like Hegel's mythology of Reason, Jung's psychology of religion is informed by those religious symbols which most reveal the nature of the Self as complex whole. In contrast with Hegel, however, Jung is not averse to the possibility of a radical reformation of the Christian mythos itself. He points, in particular, to Gnosticism and Alchemy as traditions which, as the shadow side of orthodox Christianity, contain the seeds of potential renewal for a religion which has ceased to speak with the voice of wholeness.87

While Jung's psychology could serve as the basis for the translation of the esoteric language and symbols of Alchemy into a widely intelligible discourse, it is admittedly difficult to see how any of the major Christian denominations could graft the alchemical vision onto the life and teachings of Jesus which constitute the common core of the Christian faith. This is not the case, however, with regard to the Gnostic tradition. To begin with, there is a convincing case to be made for the claim that certain Gnostic scriptures--the

87"Not only do I leave the door open for the Christian message," says Jung in his autobiography, "but I consider it of central importance for Western man. It needs, however, to be seen in a new light, in accordance with the changes wrought by the contemporary Spirit. Otherwise, it stands apart from the times, and has no effect on man's wholeness." MDR, p. 236.
Gospel of Truth and the Gospel of Philip,\textsuperscript{88} for instance—are equally revelatory as, say, the letters of Paul or the Apocalypse. There is even strong evidence to suggest that the Gospel of Thomas represents a collection of sayings of Jesus—some of which, at least, are doubtless authentic—comparable to the hypothetical "Q" document which New Testament scholars speculate was a primary source for many of the canonical sayings.

Though we cannot enter here into a detailed treatment of the Gnostic tradition, a few words are in order concerning the major elements of that tradition which could lend themselves to the possible reformation of the Christian mythos we are considering. First, there is the Valentinian Pleromatology. The "originativé Tetrad" of Depth-Silence (the androgynous ground) and Mind-Truth (the first syzygy or twin emanation) could be taken as the pleromatic prototype for the symbol of the quaternity. The quintessential centre of this quaternity would correspond to the concept of Spirit as the middle term between the androgynous ground and the first syzygy (Father and Son in orthodox trinitarian terms). As to the precise number and names of the succeeding emanations within the Pleroma, this would be a matter for future theologians to decide.

The second element concerns the importance of the feminine in the divine mythos. The Valentinians in particular must be credited with having granted a central role to the figure of Sophia (Wisdom) as matrix of the created order as well as the mediatrix of the spiritual principle in the cosmos. The mystical doctrine of the bridal chamber, symbolized by the eschatological vision of the hieros gamos of Christ and Sophia in the Pleroma, finds its earthly counterpart in the special relation between Jesus and Mary Magdalene.\(^89\) In the Gospel of Mary, Levi says to Peter, "Surely the Saviour knows her very well. That is why the Saviour loved her more than us."\(^90\) Or again in the Gospel of Philip, we read that "Christ [loved] her more than [all] the disciples [and used to] kiss her [often] on her [mouth]. The rest of [the disciples were offended] by it [and expressed disapproval]."\(^91\) Such passages clearly suggest that the special relation between Jesus and Mary might have included the (to the traditional Christian mind, unthinkable) fact of sexual intimacy. There is, of course, no way of proving the historical validity of any account of Jesus' life and ministry. For this very reason, therefore, Christians are free to endorse that account which best reflects the

\(^{89}\)Which, incidentally, constitutes another quaternity.

\(^{90}\)Nag Ham. Lib., p. 473.

\(^{91}\)Ibid., p. 138.
speculative significance of the central symbol (i.e., the Incarnation).

The third element concerns the very concept of gnosis itself, which is radically opposed to the orthodox insistence on the primacy of faith (pistis) in the literal truth of its account of Jesus' life and teachings—in particular, the dominant view that the Kingdom of God is a kind of place external to the life of the individual—along with the consequent absolutizing of the institutional hierarchy as the sole mediator of this truth. The essential import of gnosis, by contrast, is the absolute identity of the human and the divine, an identity which can only be grasped in the depths of the individual. "Beware that no one lead you astray," warns Jesus in the Gospel of Mary,

"saying, 'Lo here!' or 'Lo there!' For the Son of Man is within you. Follow after him. Those who seek him will find him. Go then and preach the gospel of the Kingdom. Do not lay down any rules beyond what I have appointed for you, and do not give a law like the lawgiver lest you be constrained by it."92

Or again in the Book of Thomas the Contender, Jesus says: "...he who has not known himself has known nothing, but he who has known himself has at the same time already achieved knowledge about the Depth of the All."93

92Ibid., p. 472.
93Ibid., p. 189.
It must be stressed, however, that a critical reappropriation of the Gnostic tradition would have to reject those elements that run counter to the speculative canon of the reformation in question—namely, the principle of complex holism. In particular, the Gnostic tendency to devalue the natural order (i.e., the body, and matter generally) would give way to the more tempered orthodox view of creation as divinely ordained (and blessed). Similarly, the exclusivist and isolating character of gnosis would find a healthy complement in the orthodox ideals of agape and communitas.

We have seen how the truth of Spirit as the coming-to-be of the Self has its concrete actuality in the life of the spiritual community as the "body of Christ." "Spirit," as Hegel says,

is the infinite return into itself, infinite subjectivity, not represented but actual divinity, the presence of God....The Spirit is...what is subjectively present and actual; and it is only through this mediation [in the community] that it itself is subjectively present as the divestment into the objective union of love and its infinite anguish. This [is] the Spirit of God, or God as the present, actual Spirit, God dwelling in his community.94

94 LPR, III, p. 140.
Though Hegel elsewhere stresses the singularity and uniqueness of the Incarnation as a historical event, the preceding passage clearly points to the speculative truth of the Incarnation as an on-going process which encompasses humanity (and nature) as a whole.\textsuperscript{95} This is in full agreement with Jung's view of the matter. The "continuing, direct operation of the Holy Spirit on those who are called to be God's children," he writes, "implies, in fact, a broadening process of incarnation."\textsuperscript{96} From the promise of the Paraclete, moreover, "we can conclude that God wants to become wholly man; in other words, to reproduce himself in his own dark creature...."\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{95}D.F. Strauss was the first to adopt this interpretation of Hegel's concept of incarnation: "If reality (Realität) is ascribed to the idea of the unity of the divine and human natures, is this equivalent to the admission that this unity must actually have once been manifested, as it never had been, and never more will be, in one individual (in einem Individuum)? This is indeed not the mode in which the Idea realizes itself (die Idee sich realisirt); it is not wont to lavish all its fullness on one exemplar (in ein Exemplar), and be niggardly towards all others: it rather loves to distribute its richness among a multiplicity of exemplars which reciprocally complete each other--[in the alternate positing and sublating of individuums (im Wechsel sich setzender und wieder aufhebender Individuen)]. And is this not the true realization of the Idea (Wirklichkeit der Idee)? Is not the idea of the unity of the divine and human natures a real one in a far higher sense, when I regard the whole race of mankind as its [actualization (Verwirklichung)], than when I single out one man as such a realization? Is not an incarnation of God from eternity, a truer one than an incarnation limited to a particular point of time?" The Young Hegelians, ed. L.S. Stepelevich (Cambridge University Press, 1983) p.48.

\textsuperscript{96}CW 11:658.

\textsuperscript{97}Ibid., 741.
The darkness to which Jung refers, as we have seen, is the symbol for that which the dominant interpretation of the Christian mythos has excluded from its vision of the meaning of Christ--the body, the feminine, nature in general--its unconscious shadow, in other words. That such an exclusion is contrary to the truth of the Spirit is implicit in the central concept of incarnation itself. The essential meaning of this concept is the absolute or complex unity of God and humanity, the infinite and the finite, eternity and time. The speculative truth of the Incarnation, therefore, gives the lie to any concept or representation of the divine--i.e., of that which is accorded absolute value--as radically other than the human, to any notion of transcendence which is not grounded in the immanent transformative potential of the here and now. So understood, the myth of incarnation is indeed the saving myth, the story that makes whole. It is, in fact, the story of stories, and, as such, the moving force of history itself.

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98 "Without the world," as Hegel says, "God is not God." LPR, I, p. 308.
Chapter Eight

THE MEANING AND END OF HISTORY

I

The concept of history, as the story or account which humans give of their collective experience as beings in time, is genetically affiliated to the archaic structure of myth (mythos, story, account). The relation between myth and history is extremely complex, and we can only hint at some of the factors involved. In its purest form, myth is equivalent to sacred narrative. It has its origins in pre-literate society prior to the emergence of the city-state. The concept of history, on the other hand, first arises only after the emergence of the city-state and the first written accounts of a people's origins (often mythical) and military or cultural accomplishments (often legendary). History too is a form of narrative but, as opposed to myth, it is profane narrative: the proper sphere of history is the human world, not the divine. Myth and history can also be distinguished with respect to time-consciousness. Mythic time-consciousness is a-historical, aionological, oriented to the remote past or the time of the beginning. The present derives its meaning from the cyclical reenactment of eternal archetypal patterns—the turning of the seasons, the revolutions of the stars, the cycle of generation.
Historical time-consciousness, by contrast, is linear and chronological, oriented to the future and some end or goal.¹

In terms of Hegel's analysis of the Greek Sittlichkeit, mythic time-consciousness clearly pertains to the period characterized by the "beautiful harmony" of the human and divine laws. In psychological terms, as we have seen, this refers to the psychosocial equilibrium between the collective consciousness and the realm of the archetypes (the collective unconscious) which precedes the emergence of the personal ego. Historical time-consciousness, on the other hand, presupposes the prior splitting up of the natural harmony of Sittlichkeit, the dissociation of the human and the divine laws, and the consequent differentiation of ego-consciousness out of the mythic identity of the collective psyche.²

¹"Until the invention of writing," writes Panikkar, "Man could not project all his creations into the future; the past had the most powerful grip on him. Tradition was paramount. Time comes from a beginning. Mythos.


²In his discussion of the transition from mythos to rational discourse, Darby notes that "through an increasing awareness of self [i.e., the ego] there is also an increased awareness of the difference between man and God, and thus between knowledge of things human and things divine." Tom Darby, The Feast: Meditations on Politics and Time (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982) pp. 133-34. Cf. also Panikkar: "The World of prehistorical Man, his environment (circumstantia, Umwelt) is the theocosmos: the divinized universe....Man shares the world with
The relation between myth and history, along with the two forms of time-consciousness, becomes more complex with the advent of the historical religions—notably Judaism and Christianity—whose founding myths are intimately linked to the political drama of the first world-historical states (Egypt, Persia, Greece, and Rome). In Judaism, history itself, or historical time-consciousness, is mythologized. Not only is history—in particular, the history of the Jews—sacralized through the notion of the Covenant, but with Judaism the narrative structure of myth (beginning, middle, and end) is mapped onto the threefold structure of historical time-consciousness (past, present, and future) itself. The result is the universalization of historical time-consciousness in toto, and the absolute displacement of mythic cyclism by egoic linearity.

While Judaism and Christianity are often treated as though they constituted a monolithic structure (the "Judaic-Christian tradition"), the advent of Christianity in fact marks a radical transformation of the Jewish view of history and of human time—

the Gods... Harmony is the supreme principle.... Historical Man, unlike prehistoric Man who stands in a greater or lesser harmony with Nature, believes himself to be in dialectical opposition to Nature. The civilized Man is the non-natural (cultural) human being. Both the belief in a future eternity and the belief in an eternal future belong to the same need that historical consciousness feels, namely, to transcend temporality." Op. cit., pp. 96 and 99.
consciousness in general. In Christianity, the dichotomy of the divine and the human, which in Judaism reaches its utmost pitch in the consciousness of the absolute difference between God and the created order, is symbolically overcome with the belief in the Incarnation. So too is the abstract opposition between mythic cyclism and egoic linearity. For at the centre of the Christian view of history is the story of Christ's miraculous birth, death, and resurrection—the actualization in historical time of the archetypal myth of the dying and rising god. In this way the Christian mythos completes the religious development of historical time-consciousness inaugurated by Judaism.

Critical reflection on the world-historical significance of the central Christian symbols takes the initial form of a theodicy or theology of history (Augustine, Joachim of Flora). The speculative truth of these symbols, however, could not become fully intelligible—that is, conceptually transparent—until the World Spirit had come to consciousness of its own autonomy through the political revolution in France and the subsequent conceptual revolution in Germany. "As the thought of the world," writes Hegel,
appears over against the real and the ideal apprehends this same real world in its substance and builds it up for itself into the shape of an intellectual realm.\(^3\)

Arising as a second-order reflection on the universal significance of the Christian mythos as the story of stories, Hegel's speculative standpoint becomes the mirror of world history—the philosophical reflection of its meaning and end.\(^4\)

In its most succinct formulation, "Universal" or "World-History," writes Hegel, "is the progress in the consciousness of freedom."\(^5\)

...the final aim of the world at large, we allege to be the consciousness of its own freedom on the part of Spirit, and ipso facto, the actuality of that freedom...freedom as such [in ihr selbst]...is to be displayed as the coming to consciousness of itself (for freedom, according to its concept, is self-knowledge) and thereby bringing itself to actuality: it is itself the aim of its own achievement, and the only aim of Spirit....This final aim is what God wills with the world; but God is the "Most Perfect" and can, therefore, will nothing other than

\(^{3}\)Phil. Rght, Preface.

\(^{4}\)"The consciousness of world-history," writes Cieszkowski, "is only awakened with the Christian era....The truth which emerged with the Christian era in the immediate form of religious representation was now led up through speculation to the summit of thought, which acknowledges this as its unique and full content. Finally, consciousness has worked up to its apogee and, as has been said, thought has established itself as the dominant principle of world synthesis." The Young Hegelians, p. 82.

himself--his own Will. The nature of His Will—that is, His Nature itself—is what here, grasping religious representation as thoughts, we call the Idea of Freedom.  

The determinate content of the Idea of Freedom has as its representational presupposition the symbol of the Incarnation and the trinitarian unfolding of Spirit. The figure of Jesus as the Christ—this individual in and through whom God becomes human and humanity divine—is the revelation of the absolute value of the individual. "Freedom can exist," as Hegel says, "only where individuality is recognized as having its positive and real existence in the Divine Being." Conversely, the figure of Jesus as the Christ is the revelation that the truth of God is actual only as incarnate in living, self-conscious individuals. In philosophical terms, this means that "the Idea advances to infinite antithesis; that, viz., between the Idea in its free, universal form [allgemeine Weise] wherein it abides by itself—and the contrasted form of pure, abstract reflection-in-self, the ego, formal freedom, which befits Spirit alone." In other words, the Idea, as the concept of the Whole, is actual only in the process of its own individuation. The process itself culminates in the self-consciousness on the part of the individual of his or her

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6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., p. 50/70.
8 Ibid., p. 26/41.
dialectical identity in and as the Whole. This self-consciousness, as we have seen, is equivalent to consciousness of the Self, which, as complex whole, is the form both of individual personality and the Absolute as the Whole.

As a speculative philosopher, Hegel's grasp of history is grounded in the concept of the Absolute. As an empirical psychologist, by contrast, Jung grounds his reflections in the concept of the empirical individual. But given the recursive interdetermination of both concepts, a truly holistic understanding of history—an understanding, that is, which is fully consistent with the principle of complex holism—would have to incorporate both approaches in a dialogical synthesis.

Hegel, for his part, was wary of the psychological approach to history. This is quite understandable given the choice between the rational or empirical (faculty) psychologies of his day.\(^9\) The former was too divorced from the particulars of concrete experience while the latter was too hidebound, and so unable to rise to the universal. Empirical psychology, Hegel thought,

takes the individual on the one hand, and the universal on the other, each as a fixed, independent

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\(^9\) Hegel laments that "scarcely any philosophical science is so neglected and so ill-off as the theory of mind, usually called 'psychology'." *Phil. Right*, section 4.
category, it also holds the particular forms into which it analyses mind to be fixed in their limitation; so that mind is converted into a mere aggregate of independent forces, each of which stands only in reciprocal relation with the others, hence is only externally connected with them....and still less does it recognize as necessary and rational the particularization to which the Concept of mind, its intrinsic unity, progresses.¹⁰

What Hegel misses in the psychologies of his day, then, is 1) an organic and dynamic conception of mind (or psyche)--i.e., a conception which will account for development while maintaining the essential integrity of mind--and 2) a conception of mind which unites the universal and the particular, the individual with society and the world at large.

Not until the advent of modern depth or dynamic psychology has there been an opportunity to meet these two demands. Although, despite the constraints of the newtonian paradigm which informs its theoretical presuppositions, the classical psychoanalytic model of the psyche can perhaps satisfy the first of them, it is less successful with the second. A psychology which, as Hegel remarks when considering the "so-called 'psychological' view" of history, "contrives...to refer all actions to the heart--to bring them under such a subjective aspect--...under the impulse of some passion, mean or grand--some morbid craving,"¹¹ is not fully adequate to the

¹⁰Phil. Sp., section 387 Z.

¹¹Phil. Hist., p. 31/47.
task of rendering intelligible the movement of Universal History. The model of the psyche proposed by Jung, on the other hand, while not ignoring the importance of the personal and pathological, is not dominated by these two spheres. Jung's concept of the archetype—in particular the central archetype of the Self—transcends the limitations of the Freudian view (along with the psychologies of Hegel's day) in such a way that psychology, for the first time, can meet the demands of speculative philosophy and, therefore, legitimately concern itself with the problem of Universal History.¹²

A confirmation of this legitimacy is evident in the light thrown by Jung's psychology on the archetypal basis of the triadic pattern or schema of Hegel's philosophy of History and of his system as a whole. This pattern, as we have seen, can be characterized by the phases: immediate unity—opposition or differentiation—mediate unity, or in the language of the Logic, universal—particular—individual. Universal History, writes Hegel,

¹²"In history," writes Cassirer, "man constantly returns to himself; he attempts to recollect and actualize the whole of his past experience. But the historical Self is not a mere individual self. It is anthropomorphic but it is not egocentric. Stated in the form of a paradox, we may say that history strives after an 'objective anthropomorphism'. By making us cognizant of the polymorphism of human existence it frees us from the freaks and prejudices of a special and single moment. It is this enrichment and enlargement, not the effacement of the Self, of our knowing and feeling ego, which is the aim of historical knowledge." Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1953) p. 242.
exhibits the **gradation** in the development of that principle whose substantial **purport** is the consciousness of Freedom....the first step in the process presents that immersion of Spirit in Nature....the second shows it as advancing to the consciousness of its freedom....the third step is the elevation of the soul from the still limited and special form of freedom to its pure universal form; that state in which the spiritual essence attains the consciousness and feeling of itself. These grades are the ground principles of the general process....

Some fifty pages later, however, Hegel outlines the **four** phases of Universal History, which he correlates with the four stages of life. These consist of: 1) the East, "Unreflected consciousness—substantial, objective, spiritual existence...." This phase is described as the childhood of history. 2) The second phase begins with the Greek world, which "may then be compared with the period of adolescence, for here we have individualities forming themselves." 3) The third phase "is the realm of abstract Universality (in which the social aim absorbs all individual aims): it is the Roman State, the severe labours of the Manhood of History." 4) "The German world appears at this point of development—the fourth phase of World-History. This would answer in the comparison with the periods of human life to its Old Age. The Old Age of Nature is weakness, but that of Spirit is its perfect maturity and strength, in which it returns to unity with itself, but in its

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13 *Phil. Hist.*, p. 56/77.
fully developed character as Spirit."\(^{14}\) This seeming contradiction of the triadic structure of the System can be explained by the fact that Hegel had to distinguish between the Greek and Roman contributions to the spirit of antiquity. As we shall see, however, what is clear from Hegel's treatment of the ancient world is that the Greek and Roman together form the bridge between the predominantly "natural" and substantive empires of the East, on the one hand, and, on the other, the modern Germanic (i.e., European) states in which the principle of freedom is explicitly bent on the task of its actualization. The Greek and Roman worlds, therefore, together constitute the phase of opposition or difference.

Echoing Hegel's characterization of the East, Jung describes the first phase as the world of "man in his childhood state," a world "characterized by a pristine oneness with the whole of Nature...."\(^{15}\) The second phase comes with the advent of reflective consciousness, and betokens "a split in the original unity."\(^ {16}\) As we saw in the preceding chapter, the first phase corresponds to the very beginnings of psychic development dominated by the life of the unconscious. The second phase corresponds to the emergence of a distinct centre

\(^{14}\)Ibid., pp. 105-110/133-141.

\(^{15}\)\textit{CW} 11:20.

\(^{16}\)Ibid..
of consciousness--i.e., a differentiated ego. The third phase represents an ongoing dialectic between ego and unconscious. From the point of view of the ego, "the advance to the third stage means something like a recognition of the unconscious, if not actual subordination to it."¹⁷ "This third stage," writes Jung further on, "means articulating one's ego-consciousness with a supraordinate totality"¹⁸--i.e., the Self.

According to Jung, individuation, or the coming-to-be of the Self, "is practically the same as the development of consciousness out of the original state of [unconscious] identity."¹⁹ The development of consciousness consists in an unfolding of the archetypal potentials of the psyche toward the actualization of that wholeness which is implicit from the beginning. In strikingly similar terms, Hegel claims that the history of the world begins with its general aim--that the concept of Spirit will be satisfied--only in an implicit form [an sich], that is, as Nature; a hidden, most profoundly hidden, unconscious instinct; and the whole process of History...is directed to rendering this unconscious instinct a conscious one.²⁰

¹⁷Ibid., 273.
¹⁸Ibid., 276.
¹⁹CW 6:762.
²⁰Phil. Hist., p. 25/39.
This process is synonymous with the self-actualization of Spirit as the "progress of the consciousness of freedom." As we have seen, this freedom "is none other than self-consciousness," which is to say consciousness of the Self.

II

History begins in the East, says Hegel. By this, however, he does not mean the simple fact that our earliest continuous records of distinct cultures are those of the near-Eastern civilizations of Sumer and Egypt. Rather, history begins with these cultures because it is they that manifest the first forms of political life— which life is the matrix for the actualization of Spirit as the principle of freedom.

The East, according to Hegel, is characterized by "immediate consciousness" and "substantial spirituality:" "Since Spirit has not yet attained inwardness, it wears in general the appearance of natural spirituality." In terms of Jung's psychology, this description indicates a form of existence dominated by the life of the unconscious, or as Hegel

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21 Ibid., p. 111/142.
22 Ibid., p. 105/135.
23 Ibid., p. 112/142-43.
expresses it, "the dull incubation of Spirit." 24 Prior to the
generalized emergence of an autonomous ego, the individual
seeks its identity through participation in, or conformity
with, a preexisting order, which, in the first instance, is the
order of "Nature." In China, the political embodiment of the
natural order is seen in the elevation of the familial
patriarch to the position of Emperor. He is the sole
individual. He alone is "free": 25 "All that we call
subjectivity is concentrated in the supreme head of the State,
who, in all his legislation has an eye to the health, wealth,
and benefit of the whole." 26 In China, the archetype of the
father and the family constellation reign supreme.

The social and political life of India, similarly, though
not dominated by a patriarchal despot, is just as firmly
entrenched in the natural order:

...the essential advance is made in India, viz.: that
independent members ramify from the unity of despotic
power. Yet the distinctions which these imply are
referred to Nature. Instead of stimulating the
activity of a soul as their centre of union, and
spontaneously realizing that soul...they petrify and
become rigid, and by their stereotyped character
condemn the Indian people to the most degrading
spiritual servitude. The distinctions in question are
the Castes. 27

24 Ibid., p. 175/217.
25 For this reason, of course, the Emperor's is a false freedom.
26 Ibid., p. 113/144.
27 Ibid., p. 141/180-81.
Psychologically, what is most significant in Hegel's treatment of India are his views on the general character of the Indian mind and, more specifically, on the Indian religion. These manifest "the character of dreaming Spirit." 28 Jung too speaks of the "dreamlike world of India." 29 The dream state is one in which the ego is depotentiated and given over to the life of the unconscious. As the unconscious, to Jung, is the source of the experience of the numinous, it is therefore not surprising that the dream of the Indian spirit beholds all as divine. "The Indian view of things," as Hegel says, is a Universal Pantheism.... It is One substance, and all individualizations are directly vitalized and animated into particular Powers.... Everything, therefore—Sun, Moon, Stars, the Ganges, the Indus, Beasts, Flowers—everything is a God to it. And while, in this deification, the finite loses its consistency and substantiality, all understanding vanishes too. 30

Hegel might well lament the impossibility of "understanding" India's "dream." The conscious ego is at a loss when confronted with a vision arising out of the mutual & contamination of unconscious contents. "Life in India," as

28 Ibid., p. 140/176.
29 This is the title of one of Jung's essays in Civilization in Transition, C.W. 10:981ff.
30 Ibid., p. 141/176-77.
Jung remarks, "has not yet withdrawn into the capsule of the head. No wonder the European feels [the experience of India to be] dreamlike: the complete life of India is something of which he merely dreams." In another essay, Jung makes the contrast that "the European seeks to raise himself above this world, while the Indian likes to turn back into the maternal depths of Nature."

Persia represents the transition from the first phase of immediate or unreflective unity with Nature (i.e., the unconscious) to the second phase of opposition or difference. The Persians are the first world-historical people because theirs is the first Empire to pass away. In Persia "first arises that light which shines itself, and illuminates others; for Zoroaster's 'Light' belongs to the World of Consciousness--to Spirit as relation to others." Hegel takes the Zoroastrian image of the divine sun and its light as the symbol of the Persian spirit. The purity of this light throws all distinctions into bold relief. The Persian monarch reigns in a spirit of tolerance. "We see in the Persian world a pure exalted Unity, as the substance which leaves the special

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31 CW 10:988.
32 CW 11:936.
33 Phil. Hist., p. 173/215.
34 Ibid..
existsences that inhere in it, free." The pure light of the Persians holds a position of antithesis to Darkness, and this antithetical relation holds out the principle of activity and life. The principle of development begins with the history of Persia. This therefore constitutes strictly the beginning of World-History; for the grand interest of Spirit in History, is to attain an infinite immanence of subjectivity—by an absolute antithesis to attain reconciliation.  

In the Persian religious and political organization we see a movement toward spiritual differentiation and autonomy. The unconditional character of this differentiation, however, is an indication that consciousness still finds itself in dangerous proximity to the unconscious life of the instincts. The individual ego as such has not yet gained the autonomy which, as yet, it can but behold in the concrete embodiment of the monarch or the sensuous image of the sun.

The Jewish people have advanced beyond the sensuous universal of the Persians to a conception of the Absolute as "the pure product of thought." With the Jews, spirit succeeds in totally differentiating itself from instinct. The

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35Ibid.  
36Ibid., p. 174/216.  
idea of Light has at this stage advanced to that of 'Jehovah'—the purely One." 38

This forms the point of separation between the East and the West: Spirit descends into the depths of its own being, and recognizes the abstract fundamental principle as the Spiritual. Nature—which in the East is the primary and fundamental existence—is now depressed to the condition of a mere creature; and Spirit now occupies the first place. 39

Psychologically, however, the individual is still unconscious of his or her own autonomy. While ego-consciousness has gained a certain freedom from the power of the instinctual life, it has accomplished this through submitting to the unconditional dominance of the father archetype in the form of Lord Jehovah.

The transitional nature of the Egyptian world is even more evident than that of the Persians. Hegel focuses on the Sphinx as the central symbol of the Egyptian spirit.

The human head looking out from the brute body, exhibits Spirit as it begins to emerge from the merely Natural—to tear itself loose therefrom and already to look more freely around; without, however, entirely freeing itself from the fetters Nature had imposed. The innumerable edifices of the Egyptians are half below the ground, and half rise above it into the air. The whole land is divided into a kingdom of life and a kingdom of death. 40

38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., p. 199/246.
In contrast to the Persian struggle against the darkness of the unconscious, the Egyptian spirit seems to court it. The movement toward spiritual differentiation and the autonomy of consciousness has frozen at mid-point: "Thus we find this heterogeneous duality—the phenomenon of Nature and the spiritual—woven together in one knot."\(^{41}\)

Hegel's treatment of the Greek world really falls into two parts, the second of which marks the full transition to the second phase in the temporal unfolding of the Idea. The first part, at the centre of which is Hegel's famous portrayal of the Greek Sittlichkeit, represents a pristine, though for this reason imperfect, state of existence in which the implicit tensions at the heart of Egyptian life are harmoniously resolved.

Greece presents to us the cheerful aspect of youthful freshness, of Spiritual vitality. It is here first that advancing Spirit makes itself the content of its volition and its knowledge; but in such a way that State, Family, Law, Religion, are at the same time the aims of individuality, while the latter is individuality only in virtue of those aims.\(^{42}\)

\(^{41}\)Ibid., p. 209/258.

\(^{42}\)Ibid., p. 223/275.
In the Phenomenology, as we saw in Chapter Three, it is the conflict between the human and divine laws (i.e., social interest vs. family ties) which disrupts the harmony of Sittlichkeit. In the Philosophy of History, on the other hand, it is "interiority becoming free for itself." "Thought," Hegel continues, "appears here as the principle of decay--decay, viz. of Substantial ethical life; for it introduces an opposition, and asserts essentially rational principles." Hegel attributes the introduction of subjective reflection to the Sophists. It was in Socrates, however, "that the principle of interiority--of the absolute inherent independence of Thought--attained free expression."

In terms of Jung's psychology, the ego has finally attained full autonomy. This occurs along with, or perhaps because of, a differentiation of the thinking function. As Hegel puts it: "The movement of Thought--that which goes on within its sphere [without reference to an extrinsic object]--a

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44 Phil. Hist., p. 267/326.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., p. 253/307-08.
47 Ibid., p. 269/328.
48 This is likewise the outcome of the conflict between the human law (which Hegel describes as "self-conscious spirit") and the divine law ("unconscious spirit") as presented in the Phenomenology.
process which had formerly no interest—acquires attractiveness on its own account." As a result of this differentiation, the opposites which previously were held in unity—instinct (or nature) and spirit, individual and community—fly apart. Jung expresses himself on this point as follows:

The ingrained dichotomy of the Greek mind had now become acute, with the result that the accent shifted significantly to the psychic and spiritual, which was unavoidably split off from the hylic realm of the body. All the highest and ultimate goals lay in man's moral destination, in a spiritual, supramundane end-state, and the separation of the hylic realm broadened into a cleavage between world and spirit. Thus the original, suave wisdom expressed in the Pythagorean pairs of opposites became a passionate moral conflict.

In the political sphere, the new principle of subjectivity manifests itself in the conflict within and between the various city-states. Socrates "corrupts" the youth of Athens. The war with Sparta breaks out. The time is now ripe for the concrete embodiment of subjectivity—a given individual—to assert his power over the warring factions: thus the accession of Philip of Macedon, followed by his son, Alexander, the first great world-historical individual. Alexander's empire, however, is itself subject, after his death, to the same disintegrating forces which had favoured his father's accession. While

49Ibid., p. 268/327.
50CW 6:964.
Alexander's generals and their descendants fight it out among themselves, the power of Rome rises to unprecedented heights.

In the Roman world we see the principle of subjectivity carried to the extreme. The second phase or moment of the Idea—that of opposition, difference, or the particular (over and against the universal)—has come to full expression. In Rome, we find that free universality, that abstract freedom, which on the one hand sets an abstract state, a political constitution and power, over concrete individuality; on the other side creates a personality in opposition to that universality—the freedom of the Ego in itself.... This interiority—this retreating into one's self which we observed as the corruption of the Greek Spirit—becomes here the ground on which a new side of the World's History arises.  

"Personality," as Hegel puts it in the Phenomenology, "has stepped out of the life of the ethical substance. It is the independence of consciousness...." Hegel's analysis is explicitly psychological at this point. Ego-consciousness is "abstract" (an sich). It has undergone a process of differentiation to the point where it no longer maintains a living contact with the unconscious, from which, in fact, it is completely alienated.

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51 Phil. Hist., p. 279/340.

52 Phen. Sp., par. 479/271.
The actuality of the self that did not exist in the ethical world has been won by its return into the "person"; what in the former was harmoniously one now emerges in a developed form, but as alienated from itself.  

This alienated ego finds its external correlate in the notion of the legal person. In Rome, for the first time, all citizens, in principle at least, are equal in the eyes of the law (they all have rights). These, however, take the principal form of rights of possession. The legal person is not valued as an individual in his own right, but only to the extent that he owns property. Even this is no steadfast guarantee of individual recognition, for all rights, and therefore, all properties, are granted or annulled by the will of the emperor—the only true individual.

That Private Right is, therefore, *ipso facto*, a nullity, an ignoring of the personality; and the supposed condition of Right turns out to be an absolute destitution of it. This contradiction is the misery of the Roman World. Each person is, according to the principle of his personality, entitled only to possession, while the Person of Persons lays claim to the possession of all these individuals, so that the right assumed by the social unity is at once abrogated and robbed of its vitality.  

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53 Ibid., 483/274.

54 Phil. Hist., p. 320/387.
The self-alienated Roman psyche as described by Hegel suffers from a pathological dissociation. The collective consciousness of the Roman people—its ethos—has lost touch with those social forms and values which provide a channel to the life-sustaining forces of the unconscious. "Consciousness," says Hegel, "occasions the separation of the Ego, in its boundless freedom as arbitrary choice, from the pure essence of the Will—i.e., from the Good."\textsuperscript{55} While the recognition of individual right represents a definite gain, the abstract character of the legal person has robbed the concrete individual of its soul. Deaf to the voice of the Self, life itself is held of little account. The alienated ego finds a perverse pleasure in death, and makes of it a game.

In place of human suffering in the depths of the soul and spirit, occasioned by the contradictions of life, and which find their solution in Destiny, the Romans institute a cruel reality of corporeal sufferings: blood in streams, the rattle in the throat which signifies death, and the expiring gasp were the scenes that delighted them. This cold negativity of naked murder exhibits at the same time that murder of all spiritual objective aim which had taken place in the soul.\textsuperscript{56}

The Self, as we have seen, is governed by an innate tendency to psychic wholeness. Once the tensions of a given onesidedness reach a certain pitch, a compensatory movement

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid., 321/389.

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., 294/357.
sets in. Such a movement is indeed observable at the time we are considering. "The Roman world," writes Hegel, as it has been described—in its desperate condition and the pain of abandonment by God—came to an open rupture with actuality, and made prominent the general desire for a satisfaction such as can only be attained in "the inner man," the Spirit—thus preparing the ground for a higher Spiritual World. 57

The philosophies of Stoicism, Skepticism, and Epicureanism—which general purport, according to Hegel, was to render "the soul absolutely indifferent to everything which the real world had to offer" 58—are half-way measures which anticipate the main event. Both Hegel and Jung agree that this event is the founding and spread of Christianity.

Jung's understanding of the profound impact which this event had in the mind of late antiquity involves a conception of the nature of the religious figure which comes very close to Hegel's notion of the world-historical individual. "Christ would never have made the impression he did on his followers," writes Jung, "if he had not expressed something that was alive and at work in their unconscious." 59 Jung remarks that at a very early stage

57 Ibid., 318/386.
58 Ibid.
59 CW 11:713.
the real Christ vanished behind the emotions and projections that swarmed about him from far and near; immediately and almost without trace he was absorbed into the surrounding religious systems and molded into their archetypal exponent. He became the collective figure whom the unconscious of his contemporaries expected to appear... 60

Hegel expresses himself in very similar terms. It is not important that he did not have Christ particularly in mind, for there is no question that Christ qualifies as a world-historical individual. The particular aims of such individuals involve those large issues which are the will of the World-Spirit. They may be called Heroes, inasmuch as they have derived their purposes and their vocation... from a concealed fount... from that inner Spirit, still hidden beneath the surface, which, impinging upon the outer world as on a shell, bursts it in pieces.... For that Spirit which had taken this fresh step in history is the inmost soul of all individuals, the unconscious inwardness which the great man in question aroused. Their fellows, therefore, follow these soul-leaders; for they feel the irresistible power of their own inner Spirit embodied. 61

This "inmost soul of all individuals," their common "unconscious inwardness," is a striking evocation of Jung's concept of the collective unconscious. The dominants of the collective unconscious are the archetypes, the most important

60Ibid., 228.
61Phil. Hist., pp. 30-31/46.
of which, as we have seen, is the archetype of the Self. Jesus made such an impression because he spoke with the voice of the Self. He lived the myth of the dying and rising god. His crucifixion symbolized the death which must be embraced before the true life can be won. Psychologically, as we saw in the preceding chapter, the crucifixion symbolizes the self-immolation of the alienated ego. Only through such a crucifixion can the individual be resurrected from the death-in-life of his dissociated existence. Only the negation of the dominant and onesided orientation of ego-consciousness will bring the Self into being. "The terrors of death on the cross," writes Jung, "are an indispensable condition for the transformation."62 Similarly, Hegel recognizes that a "renunciation, a disaccustoming, is the means leading to an absolute basis of existence."63 "Outward suffering," he continues, must "be merged in a sorrow of the inner man. He must feel himself as the negation of himself."64

With the advent of Christianity, according to Hegel, that period of history begins which corresponds to the third and last phase of the temporal unfolding of the Idea. This phase, it will be recalled, is really the truth of the Idea--the

62 CW 11:338.
63 Phil. Hist., p. 320/388.
64 Ibid.,
sublation of the two moments of immediate unity and opposition, the universal and the particular. For Jung it is the truth of the Self as the dialectical unity of unconscious and ego. Both Hegel and Jung recognize in the Christian revelation the truth of Spirit or the Self as the motive force and ideal goal of history. Moreover, both agree that with the advent of Christianity the truth of Spirit or the Self has been realized only in principle. "The next point," as Hegel says, "is the development of this principle; the whole sequel of History is the history of its development."65 This development will also proceed according to the threefold pattern or schema that governs all truly developmental processes.66 The first phase corresponds to the concrete fact of Jesus' life and ministry. The oppositional character of the second phase manifests itself, on the one hand, in a series of conflicts in the political sphere, and on the other, in several splits or dichotomies in the sphere of ideas. In the latter sphere, Jung sees the absolute differentiation of the principles of good and evil—which, previously, had existed side by side in the nature of the Old Testament Jahweh—in the opposition between Christ and the devil.

65 Ibid., p. 328/396.
66 Surprisingly, Hegel does not make this point, though it is implicit in his treatment of the material.
If God reveals his nature and takes on definite form as a man, then the opposites in him must fly apart: here good, there evil. So it was that the opposites latent in the Deity flew apart when the Son was begotten and manifested themselves in the struggle between Christ and the devil, with the Persian Ormuzd-Ahriman antithesis, perhaps, as the underlying model. The world of the Son is the world of moral discord, without which human consciousness could hardly have progressed so far as it has towards mental and spiritual differentiation.\(^{67}\)

Though Jung acknowledges the historical necessity for this absolute differentiation between good and evil, Christ and the Devil, his knowledge of the dynamics of the psyche leads him to suspect a drastic future enantiodromia.\(^{68}\) In fact, Jung, as remarked, sees the subsequent course of history, in the West at least, as governed largely by this split in the Christian psyche.

Jesus was conceived as the incarnation of absolute goodness. With his passing into heaven, therefore, all goodness was felt to have left along with him. Those who remained now had their essence in another world. Jesus was in the Pleroma of the Father for all eternity (or until the Second Coming, at any rate). This earth, in consequence, had become an empty shell. Such is the predicament that Hegel so skillfully portrays in his account of the "Unhappy

\(^{67}\)CW 11:259.

\(^{68}\)A word that Jung took from Heraclitus, meaning a "running toward the opposite." Cf. CW 6:708.
Consciousness," which is "the consciousness of self as a dual-natured, merely contradictory being." Christian consciousness does not recognize the conceptual significance of Jesus as the Christ. Bound to the level of representation (Vorstellung), it pictures the infinite as being completely beyond the created order. God is totaliter aliter. Psychologically, consciousness, at this stage, does not yet grasp the true nature of the Self, and so projects its intuited essence into an absolute "beyond." According to Hegel, one immediate consequence of this state of affairs is the need to establish an intermediary between both worlds. This need "occasions the rise of an Ecclesiastical Kingdom in the Kingdom of God."

Such a distinction is inevitable; but the existence of an authoritative government for the Spiritual, when closely examined, shows that human subjectivity in its proper form has not yet developed itself....the will, as human, is not yet interpenetrated by the Deity; the human will is emancipated only abstractly--not in its concrete actuality--for the whole sequence of History is occupied with the realization of this concrete Freedom. Up to this point, finite Freedom has been only sublated, to make way for infinite Freedom....Subjective Freedom has not yet attained validity as such: Insight does not yet rest on a basis of its own, but is content to inhere in the spirit of an extrinsic authority. That Spiritual [geistig] kingdom has, therefore, assumed the shape of an Ecclesiastical [geistlich] one....

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69 Phen. Sp., par. 206/127.

70 Phil. Hist., pp. 332-33/402.
Pursuing the same dynamic, the transcendent yearning of the Christian consciousness lapses into a onesided, dependent extraversion. This in turn leads to "the Christian community assuming also a definite external position, and becoming the possessor of property of its own."\textsuperscript{71} Christianity has by now become the official Imperial religion. The contradiction in its nature manifests itself in the political sphere with the split between Rome and Constantinople. In the West, Christianity is forced to confront its shadow side in the form of the invading German peoples, who become the new focal point in the movement of history.

Hegel characterizes the primitive German spirit as governed by an immediate, feeling-toned subjectivity. It is a spirit of the "heart" (Gemüth), a sense of "Natural Totality," an "undeveloped, indeterminate totality of Spirit,\textsuperscript{72} in reference to the Will, in which satisfaction of soul is attained in a correspondingly general and indeterminate way."\textsuperscript{72} Jung characterizes this quality of the German spirit as a "creative and intuitive depth of soul."\textsuperscript{73} The conflict with and assimilation of the Christian principle constitutes the

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid..
\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., p. 350/423.
\textsuperscript{73}CW 10:354.
civilizing of the primitive German spirit. "The process of culture they underwent," writes Hegel, consisted in taking up foreign elements and reductively amalgamating them with their own national life. Thus their history presents an introversion—the attraction of alien forms of life and the bringing these to bear upon their own (ein Insichgehen und Beziehen auf sich selbst).74

The natural, introverted attitude of the German spirit forms the antithesis to the spiritual, extraverted attitude of ecclesiastical Christianity. The conflict between both attitudes constitutes the psychical split that runs through, and provides the dynamic throughout, the Middle Ages. Gradually, there occurs an interpenetration of both spirits which leads to a partial reversal of attitudes. The more the Catholic Church persists in its involvement with the affairs of this world, the more it compromises the purity of its spirituality. The natural immediacy of the German world, on the other hand, is slowly purified through the process of culture to the point where it must rise in protest against the corruption of the Catholic Church. Thus the Protestant Reformation, says Jung,

largely did away with the Church as the dispenser of salvation and established once more the personal relation to God. The culminating point in the

74 Phil. Hist., p. 342/413.
objectification of the God-concept had now been passed, and from then on it became more and more subjective.\textsuperscript{75}

This is consistent with Hegel's characterization of Luther as the champion of "the Spirit and the Heart" and the proclamation of "reconciliation in faith and spiritual enjoyment."\textsuperscript{76}

In the secular sphere, by contrast, the unfolding of the contradiction in the Christian psyche manifests itself in a sudden shifting of interests and orientation. The medieval concern with the beyond is transformed into an earnest concern with the here and now. From this point forward, writes Hegel, the spiritual world occupies a position of inferiority to the World-Spirit; the latter has already transcended it, for it has become capable of recognizing the Sensuous as sensuous, the merely outward as merely outward; it has learned to occupy itself with the Finite in a finite way, and in this way to maintain an independent and confident position as a valid and rightful subjectivity.\textsuperscript{77}

Jung expresses a similar view on the meaning of this profound transformation. He sees the shift in dominant orientations as betokening the true beginning of the modern world.

\textsuperscript{75}\textit{CW} 6:433.

\textsuperscript{76}\textit{Phil. Hist.}, p. 415/494.

\textsuperscript{77}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 413/492.
The ideal of spirituality striving for the heights was doomed to clash with the materialistic earth-bound passion to conquer matter and master the world. This change became visible at the time of the "Renaissance." The word means "rebirth," and it referred to the rebirth of the antique spirit. We know today that this spirit was chiefly a mask; it was not the spirit of antiquity that was reborn, but the spirit of medieval Christianity that underwent strange pagan transformations, exchanging the heavenly goal for an earthly one, and the vertical of the Gothic style for a horizontal perspective (voyages of discovery, exploration of the world and of nature).\(^78\)

The shift from the vertical to the horizontal perspective is indicative of the growing emancipation of thought from the authority of the Church. This is the age of the Enlightenment and the development of modern science. The differentiation of the thinking function which we observed in the Greek world continues at an unprecedented rate. The thrust of this differentiation is directed at overcoming the self-alienation of the Christian psyche which, as we saw, projects its essence into an infinite beyond. It is the function of reason, which Hegel defines as "the certainty of consciousness that it is all reality,"\(^79\) to reclaim this essence. The victory of the Enlightenment over the position of faith is symbolized by the deification of Reason in Notre Dame.

\(^{78}\) *CW* 911:78.

\(^{79}\) *Phen. Sp.*, par. 233/139.
The movement toward the radical emancipation of human subjectivity finds its political realization in the French Revolution and its ideology of "absolute freedom." This freedom, however, is abstract. In psychological terms, it is a freedom of the ego merely. The whole of society, as Taylor remarks, "is seen as reposing on human will alone." This state of affairs betokens an extreme inflation of the ego. Accordingly, its conviction that it is possessed of complete rational autonomy is soon shattered by a release of destructive forces from the unconscious. These reach their peak in the "Reign of Terror."

Though the French Revolution must be credited with having introduced the principle of freedom in its distinctively modern form into the political consciousness of Europe, the principle itself receives a more authentic embodiment, according to Hegel, in the constitutional monarchy of the Prussian state, where

Feudal obligations are abolished, for freedom of property and of person have been recognized as fundamental principles. Offices of State are open to every citizen, talent and adaptation being of course the necessary conditions. The government rests with the official world, and the personal decision of the monarch constitutes its apex; for a final decision...is absolutely necessary. 81

80 Taylor, p. 403.
81 Phil. Hist., p. 456/539.
The popular view that Hegel considered the Prussian state to be the terminus of reason in history is, as Taylor says, "the result of lamentable historical ignorance. It overlooks how many features of Hegel's rational state were yet to be achieved in the Prussia of Hegel's day...." The most that can be said is that Hegel saw the Prussian state as the closest approximation to the political actualization of the Idea which the history of the world had yet achieved.

As far as Jung is concerned, the political actualization of the life of the Self was and remains a highly questionable possibility. The differentiation of consciousness originating in the Roman world under the impact of Christianity has proved momentous for the history of the West, and indeed for the world at large. Whatever has been gained, however, has been at the cost of a pathological split which seems far from being resolved.

III

Although it is impossible to say exactly how Hegel would have interpreted the subsequent course of history into "post-

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modern" times, it is possible, continuing to use Jung's more contemporary voice as co-hermeneut in our dialogical exploration of the principle of complex holism, to extend the preceding argument to our own day. The first thing to consider is the notion that, with the advent of Hegel's Science of Wisdom, history itself, in some radical sense, has come to an end. The closest Hegel comes to voicing this notion is in the passage from the Philosophy of Right already quoted in the introduction to this chapter.

As the thought of the world, philosophy appears only when actuality is already cut and dried after its process of formation has been completed. The teaching of the Concept, which is also history's inescapable lesson, is that it is only when actuality is mature that the ideal appears over against the real and the ideal apprehends this same real world in its substance and builds it up for itself into the shape of an intellectual realm.  

If what Hegel says here is true, then the "teaching of the Concept" spells the end of history. Such, at any rate, was the conclusion of Alexandre Kojève in his seminal lectures on the Phenomenology.  

The justification for this conclusion rests upon the truth of two complementary or dialectically related claims: first, Hegel's Science of Wisdom is the realization of

83Phil. Right, Preface.

84Subsequently published as Introduction à la Lecture de Hegel, 1947.
absolute knowledge; and second, "Wisdom" or absolute knowledge "can be realized...only at the end of History."85

The Science of Wisdom is the realization of absolute knowledge because it constitutes the advent of complete speech. It is complete, says Kojève, because it is circular.

To ask any question whatsoever leads sooner or later, after a longer or shorter series of answers-questions, to one of the questions found within the circular Knowledge that the Wise Man possesses. To start with this question and to proceed logically necessarily leads to the starting point. Thus it is clear that all possible question-answers have been exhausted; or in other words, a total answer has been obtained: each part of the circular Knowledge has for its answer the whole of this knowledge, which—being circular, is the entirety of all Knowledge.86

By the "entirety of all Knowledge," one is not to understand a complete inventory of facts or cognitive data. Rather, the "all" here refers to what we have called the principle of complex holism which informs the concept of Spirit or the Absolute as concrete (that is, as dialectically self-articulating) totality. To argue that Hegel's Science of Wisdom does not constitute absolute knowledge amounts, therefore, to a denial of the intelligibility of the principle of complex holism.

85Kojève, p. 95.
86Ibid., p. 94.
To demonstrate the truth of the claim that absolute knowledge is possible only at the end of history would require a recapitulation of Kojève's reading of the *Phenomenology*. Suffice it to say that, according to Kojève, the central lesson of the *Phenomenology* is that "the conception of circularity, like every Hegelian conception, has a double aspect: an ideal or, if you will, abstract aspect; and a real or, if you will, concrete or 'existential' aspect. And it is only the entirety of both aspects that constitutes what Hegel calls the *Begriff* (the concrete concept)."

The real aspect of the "circularity" of Wisdom is the "circular" existence of the Wise Man. In the Wise Man's absolute Knowledge, each question is its own answer, but is so only because he goes through the totality of questions-answers that forms the entirety of the System. Likewise, in his existence, the Wise Man remains in identity with himself because he passes through the totality of others, and he is closed up in himself because he closes up the totality of others in himself. Which (according to the *Phenomenology*) means, quite simply, that the only man who can be Wise is a Citizen of the universal and homogeneous State—that is to say, the State of the Tun Aller und Jeder, in which each man exists only through and for the whole, and the whole exists through and for each man.87

The universal and homogeneous state, which found its first incarnation in the Napoleonic Empire, is "nothing other than the real basis (the 'substructure') of the circularity of the

87Ibid.
absolute System: the Citizen of this state, as active Citizen, realizes the circularity that he reveals, as contemplative Wise Man, through his System."\textsuperscript{88} This circularity finds its "real basis" in the universal and homogeneous state because, like the System which it supports, it is "non-expandible" (universal) and "non-transformable" (homogeneous).\textsuperscript{89} Earlier in the same lecture, Kojève says that, by homogeneous, he means "free from internal contradictions: from class strife, and so on."\textsuperscript{90} Practically, the appearance of such a state at the end of history means "the disappearance of wars and bloody revolutions."\textsuperscript{91}

Given these criteria, it must be conceded that the universal and homogeneous state is not yet a concrete actuality. The movement of world-history from the time of the Napoleonic Empire to the present can hardly be characterized in terms of the "disappearance of wars and bloody revolutions." And for such a state to be truly universal—i.e., "non-expandable"—would it not have to encompass the world as a whole in a single, global state? According to Kojève, Hegel knew full well that "the State was not yet realized in deed (in

\textsuperscript{88}Ibid., pp. 95-6.

\textsuperscript{89}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{90}Ibid., p. 90.

\textsuperscript{91}Ibid., p. 159 n.
all its perfection." What Hegel asserted was that "the germ of this State was present in the World and that all the necessary and sufficient conditions for its growth were in existence." Properly understood, therefore, the end of history, rather than signaling the fall of the curtain on the world stage, is better understood as a program for change which has yet to be acted out. To extend the metaphor: if the drama of world-history is played out in the conflict between nation-states, then the end of history signifies that all the actors now have a common script. So while history may, in principle, have come to an end, it is now, as Nietzsche says, that the tragedy begins.

92 Ibid., p. 97.
93 Ibid.
94 Cf. section 342 of the Gay Science ("Incipit tragoedia"). This section can be read as a parable of the fate of Wisdom in the post-historical age. Zarathustra, the Sage, decides to leave his cave after ten years of contemplative seclusion. "I am sick of my wisdom," he declares, "like a bee that has gathered too much honey... I want to give away and distribute until the wise among men enjoy their folly once again and the poor their riches. For that I must descend to the depths.... Bless the cup that wants to overflow in order that the water may flow from it golden and carry the reflection of your [the sun's] rapture everywhere. Behold, this cup wants to become empty again, and Zarathustra wants to become man again." The Gay Science, tr. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974). The honey of Wisdom is only sweet if eaten. Right knowing, as we have seen, must pass into right doing. The re-incarnation of Zarathustra corresponds to the rise of the new humanism in the wake of the eclipse of the Absolute. And the descent to "the depths" clearly suggests the contemporary discovery of the unconscious.
This view of the post-historical import of the Science of Wisdom has its roots in the shift in emphasis from theory to praxis effected by the so-called left Hegelians. "Hegel," writes Cieszkowski, "is the Phidias of philosophy."

He has thought over the universe in general, and without asserting that nothing more remains to be explored further in the field of speculation, we must confess that the essential is already disclosed. The discovery of the method is the long-yearned-for discovery of the Philosopher's Stone. Thus now it is a question of producing the wonders which lie in the power of this stone.\(^95\)

The actualization of the opus must proceed through "the translation of the truth from thought into act."

...just as the poetry of art stepped over into the prose of thought, so must philosophy descend from the height of theory to the plane of praxis. To be practical philosophy, or (stated more properly) the philosophy of praxis, whose most concrete effect on life and social relations is the development of truth in concrete activity--this is the future fate of philosophy in general.\(^96\)

The shift from theory to praxis is concomitant with a reorganization of the schema of history proposed by Hegel. Instead of looking upon the Germanic world (from Luther to Hegel via the French Revolution) as the third and final period

\(^{95}\) *The Young Hegelians*, p.77.

\(^{96}\) Ibid.
of World History—that of the concrete reconciliation of the ideal and the real—Cieszkowski includes it within the second, Christian period, whose dominant principle is "consciousness" or "abstract subjectivity." The reconciliation of the real and the ideal, which Hegel achieved in thought merely (theory) is the task (praxis) of the new age and "the dominant orientation of the future." 97

In contrast with the "old" left Hegelians (Cieszkowski, Hess, Carové), for the "young" left Hegelians the so-called "negation of philosophy" not only entailed a shift from theory to praxis, but also what might be called an eclipse of the Absolute. This took the form of a "reduction of absolute spirit to human 'species being' or 'species consciousness,' and of speculative metaphysics to cultural history, anthropology, and psychology." 98 Hegel's successors, as Marcuse phrases it, "exalted the 'negation of philosophy' as the 'realization of God' through the deification of man (Feuerbach), as the 'realization of philosophy' (Feuerbach, Marx), and as the fulfillment of the 'universal essence' of man (Feuerbach, Marx)." 99

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97 Ibid., p. 83. Cf. Toews, op. cit., p. 239.
98 Toews, p. 206.
To the extent that they rejected the concept of the Absolute, the various versions of the "negation of philosophy"—including those which fall outside the direct influence of Hegelianism proper—tended to emphasize one of the polar elements (at the expense of its opposite) which together had found their dialectical synthesis in Hegel's System. We have seen how this came about with regard to the relation between theory and praxis. The same is true for the relation between spirit and nature, the trend—observable in Feuerbach and Marx, as in nineteenth century positivism generally—being to reduce the former to the latter. In considering the movement of world history since Hegel's death, one finds the same dynamic at work. Here, the most significant elements to consider are those of the constitutive dynamic of the principle of complex holism itself: individuation and the Absolute, which in the social and political sphere appears under the form of the opposition between the individual and the collectivity.

In the preceding section we saw how the French Revolution introduced the principle of freedom in its distinctively modern form into the political consciousness of Europe. The Enlightenment ideal of rational autonomy to which this principle aspired found its political embodiment in the correlative notions of the rights of the individual, on the one hand, and the sovereign state, on the other. As we have seen, however, the Enlightenment ideal was abstract in character,
arising, as Hegel would say, from the dichotomous thinking of the understanding. The radiance of "absolute freedom," in consequence, went hand in hand with the shadow of the Terror. But just as the "fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom," so generalized terror is often the prelude to a radical restructuring of the social order. The dethroning of traditional power structures can not be accomplished with words alone.

The rationalized and secularized state which emerged from the destruction of the old regime, however, was not immediately able to duplicate the variety of the latter's social organization (aristocracy, clergy, guilds). The "equality" that the new regime sought to impose from above meant a wholesale levelling of the traditional values and privileges, which, however unjust or oppressive these might have been, nevertheless provided for an effective internal differentiation of the social order. As a result, the general population became more susceptible to the phenomenon of what Jung calls "psychological mass-mindedness." "Group formation under the influence of panic," writes Jung, "cannot be called an organization because it is not based on reason and will but on a fundamentally emotional movement."\textsuperscript{100} Under such circumstances,

\textsuperscript{100}CW 18:1313.
it is small wonder that individual judgement grows increasingly uncertain of itself and that responsibility is collectivized as much as possible, i.e., is shuffled off by the individual and delegated to the corporate body. In this way the individual becomes more and more a function of society, which in turn usurps the function of the real life carrier, whereas, in actual fact, society is nothing more than an abstract idea like the State. Both are hypostatized, that is, have become autonomous. The State in particular is turned into a quasi-animate personality from whom everything is expected. In reality it is only a camouflage for those individuals who know how to manipulate it. Thus the constitutional State drifts into the situation of a primitive form of society—the communism of a primitive tribe where everybody is subject to the autocratic rule of a chief or an oligarchy.101

The leader that emerges as the counterpart to the disorganized mass is described by Jung as the "mana-personality." We have seen how the power of the world-historical individual is grounded in the realm of the collective unconscious, the "inmost soul of all individuals," as Hegel puts it. The mana-personality is "the well-known archetype of the mighty man in the form of the hero, chief, magician, medicine-man, saint, the ruler of men and spirits, the friend of God."102 Not all mana-personalities, however, attain to the status of world-historical individuals. For this to come about, the individual in question must be thoroughly interfused with the Spirit of the Age, must become its

101 CW 10:504.
102 CW 7:377.
spokesman and champion. The modern prototype for such an individual, of course, is Napoleon, "the World Spirit on horse-back," as Hegel once described him. "The mana-personality," writes Jung, "is on one side a being of superior wisdom, on the other a being of superior will."¹⁰³ Jung mentions Lao Tzu, the "perfect sage," and Napoleon the "superman" as the ideal figures which, taken together, typify both sides of the mana-personality.¹⁰⁴ A more appropriate figure than Lao Tzu in this instance, however, would be Hegel himself, who, as Kojève puts it, "is somehow Napoleon's Self-Consciousness." The dyad, "formed by Napoleon and Hegel,"

is the perfect Man, fully and definitely "satisfied" by what he is and by what he knows himself to be. This is the realization of the ideal revealed by the myth of Jesus Christ, of the God-Man. And that is why Hegel completes Chapter VI [of the Phenomenology] with these words: "Es ist der erscheinende Gott...": "This is the revealed God," the real, true Christ.¹⁰⁵

The "perfect Man" (teleios anthropos) and the "revealed God" are, as we saw in the previous chapter, typical symbols of the Self. The Self, indeed, is the true force behind the figure of

¹⁰³Ibid., 396.
¹⁰⁴Cf. ibid., 388.
¹⁰⁵Kojève, p.70.
the mana-personality.\textsuperscript{106} As we saw in Chapter Four, the full actualization of self-consciousness is the consciousness of Spirit or the Self in the form of universal recognition: the I that is We and the We that is I. The problem with the dyad Hegel-Napoleon as symbol of Spirit or the Self, however, is this: though Hegel has recognized Napoleon, Napoleon has not recognized Hegel. Thus, as Darby says, "the dyad remains a dyad rather than becoming a single We, a monad."\textsuperscript{107} In world-historical terms, what is lacking "is a recognition that Hegelian science comprises the truth, and this recognition which is absent on the microlevel of Napoleon is also absent on the macrolevel of the universal and homogeneous state which he implies."\textsuperscript{108} In other words, though history has, in principle, come to an end, the political actualization of the Idea of Freedom, the concrete reconciliation of the ideal (theory) and the real (praxis) has yet to be achieved. Nevertheless, the important factor is that "through Napoleon the seed was planted which marked the beginning of the end; this seed allows for the elaboration of the principles of the state, and although the

\textsuperscript{106}Though Jung speaks of the mana-personality as an archetype, it would be more correct to regard it as a particular incarnation of the archetype of the Self. For the incarnation to be complete, wisdom and will, or knowledge and power, would have to be present in equal measure. Until philosophers are kings, etc...

\textsuperscript{107}Op. cit., p.169. Darby's linking of the dyad Hegel-Napoleon with the archetypal figure of the androgyne is fully consistent with the phenomenology of the Self.

\textsuperscript{108}Ibid., p. 170.
essence of the state may not yet be reconciled by those in it, the existence of it, nevertheless, is allowed for."\textsuperscript{109}

For our purposes, the two most significant developments in world-history after the French Revolution are the rise of the modern nation-states and the techno-industrial revolution. Each of these developments affected in a radical way the relation between the individual and the collectivity which we have identified as the central concern in our consideration of world-history since Hegel's death.

Concerning the rise of the modern nation-states: "European nationalism," writes J.M. Roberts, "was given an immense fillip by the Napoleonic era,"

even if governments distrusted it and felt uneasy about employing it. Germans began to think of themselves as more than Westphalians and Bavarians, and Italians began to believe they were more than Romans or Milanese because they discerned a common interest against France. In Spain and Russia the identification of patriotic resistance with resistance to the Revolution was virtually complete. Though the dynasty Napoleon hoped to found and the empire he set up both proved fragile, his work was of great importance because of the processes it allowed to mature. Napoleon unlocked huge reserves of energy in other countries just as the Revolution had unlocked them in France, and afterwards they could never be quite shut up again. He ensured the legacy

\textsuperscript{109}Ibid..
of the Revolution its maximum effect and this was his
greatest achievement.\textsuperscript{110}

Napoleon's effect on the political situation of the West was complex. Along with the new sense of collective identity which arose with the nationalist responses to French expansionism was a deliberate effort on the part of the concerned nations to model the organization of the state along the lines which had proved so successful for their common enemy. Until World War I, as McNeil remarks, "the major agenda for European politicians was to adjust inherited political varieties to the eternal verities newly discovered in France, i.e., to secularize, rationalize, and reform existing institutions in the light of democratic principles."\textsuperscript{111} As had been the case in France, the rationalization and secularization of political life which accompanied the emergence of distinct national identities meant that the former distribution of power among the old estates was gradually replaced by the centralized control of the state. In the process, there arose a widening gap between, on the one hand, the private citizen with his (however ill-defined or practically illusory) individual rights, and, on the other, the governmental structure of the


state. This situation recalls Hegel's analysis of imperial Rome where, as we saw, the abstract legalistic concept of the citizen led to the atomization of the individual, whose nominal freedom contrasted with the absolute autocracy of the emperor.

Proceeding apace with the rationalization and secularization of political life in the nineteenth century was the mechanization of productive activity carried out by the industrial revolution. The impetus to industrialization was intimately linked to the same spirit of liberalism and the Enlightenment ideal of rational autonomy which inspired the French Revolution and the subsequent movements of political reform. Both movements turned their backs on tradition to embrace the secular ideal of material "progress." The shift from an agrarian to an industrial economy saw the creation of a new and historically significant class—the proletariat—whose growing numbers swelled the fast-expanding urban centres.

From the psychological perspective, the new working and living conditions, coupled with the new relation to the centralized power of the state, had the effect of increasing the susceptibility of the general population to the phenomenon of mass-mindedness. "Severed from the Church," writes O'dajnik, "from the communal and economic security of the guilds, and placed in an urban environment composed of masses of atomized
isolated individuals, modern man is especially prone to mass
psychic epidemics."\textsuperscript{112}

We have seen how both the democratic and industrial
revolutions were bound up with the same Enlightenment ideal of
rational autonomy. According to Jung, it is above all else
this ideal, which he characterizes in general terms as
"scientific rationalism," that is ultimately responsible for
the modern phenomenon of mass-mindedness. "Under the influence
of scientific assumptions," writes Jung,

not only the psyche but the individual man and,
indeed, all individual events whatsoever suffer a
levelling down and a process of blurring that
distorts the picture of reality into a conceptual
average. We ought not to underestimate the
psychological effect of the statistical world-
picture: it thrusts aside the individual in favour of
anonymous units that pile up into mass formations.
Instead of the concrete individual, you have the
names of organizations and, at the highest point, the
abstract idea of the State as the principle of
political reality. The moral responsibility of the
individual is then inevitably replaced by the policy
of the state (raison d'\textquotesingle état). Instead of moral and
mental differentiation of the individual, you have
public welfare and the raising of the living
standard. The goal and meaning of individual life
(which is the only real life) no longer lie in
individual development but in the policy of the
State, which is thrust upon the individual from
outside and consists in the execution of an abstract
idea which ultimately tends to attract all life to
itself.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{112}Odaajnik, pp.42-43.

\textsuperscript{113}CW 10:499.
In terms of the individual's relation to the collectivity, there are two factors involved in the dynamics of mass-mindedness. First, there is alienation from the dominants of the collective unconscious, which, according to Jung, fall into two categories: instinctual and archetypal. The link with the former was radically altered by the industrial revolution. The mechanization of productive activity, along with the proliferation of new techniques in transport (steam-power, followed by the internal combustion engine) and communications (the telegraph, followed by the wireless) spelled the end of humanity's former intimacy with the natural environment, which, for all previous history, had set the rhythm for the life of the instincts. As for the archetypal dominants, the rationalization and secularization of political life entailed a dissociation from the symbolic world of the former cultural canon. In particular, the victory of the spirit of the Enlightenment severely weakened the overt influence of the Christian mythos, which, since the Middle Ages, had provided western society with its major link with the archetypes.

The second factor in the dynamics of mass-mindedness concerns the relation of the individual to the contents of the collective consciousness. With the devaluation of the central symbols of the Christian mythos, the individual, as we just noted, was deprived of mediated access to the world of the
archetypes. Instead of symbolic participation in the life of
the collective unconscious, the new cultural canon, dominated
by the idea of "scientific rationalism," offers the individual
only "reasonable" generalities."\textsuperscript{114} In such a situation,
"between collective consciousness and the collective
unconscious there is an almost unbridgeable gulf over which the
subject finds himself suspended."\textsuperscript{115} Since a harkening back to
the outmoded cultural canon is likely to elicit the opprobrium
of the "progressive" elements in society, the temptation is
great for the individual to align him or herself with the
ruling contents of the collective consciousness:

If the subjective consciousness prefers the ideas and
opinions of the collective consciousness and
identifies with them, then the contents of the
collective unconscious are repressed. The repression
has typical consequences: the energy-charge of the
repressed contents adds itself, in some measure, to
that of the repressing factor, whose effectiveness is
increased accordingly. The higher its charge mounts,
the more the repressive attitude acquires a fanatical
character and the nearer it comes to conversion into
its opposite, i.e., an enantiodromia. And the more
highly charged the collective consciousness, the more
the ego forfeits its practical importance. It is, as
it were, absorbed by the opinions and tendencies of
collective consciousness, and the result of that is
the mass man, the ever-ready victim of some wretched
ism."\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{114}CW 8:424.
\textsuperscript{115}Ibid., 423.
\textsuperscript{116}Ibid., 425.
"Our fearsome gods," Jung states elsewhere, "have only changed their names: they now rhyme with -ism."

The new gods, in other words, are abstract ideas, which, as dominants of the collective consciousness, are reified and hypostatized in the form of ideologies.

The "unbridgeable gulf" between collective consciousness and the collective unconscious is symptomatic of the more fundamental split in Spirit or the Self, which, as we have seen, entailed a dissociation (symbolized by the lack of mutual recognition in the dyad Hegel/Napoleon) between wisdom and will or knowledge and power. In terms of the distinction between theoretical and practical Spirit (Chapter Six), this split manifests itself, on the one hand, as abstract knowing, and on the other, as unconscious doing. The knowing is abstract insofar as it remains conditioned by the dichotomous thinking of the understanding, the preferred cognitive mode of empirico-analytic science (Jung's "scientific rationalism").

\[\text{117} \text{CW 7:326.}\]

\[\text{118} \text{Morin comes to the same conclusion: "I have said that the gods exist--not, to be sure, in the manner in which people of faith believe they exist--for they exist as mental entities that take their substance from the fervent faith of the collectivity. So substantialized, they retroact on the community that gives them life, impose themselves upon it, 'possess' it, receive prayers and offerings, demand obedience. Though no longer biomorphic like the ancient gods, and no longer anthropomorphic like the gods of salvation, the great ideologies exist. They possess us as much as we possess them, and their mythic existence is as much a part of our social as our individual lives." Morin (1981) p.79. My translation.}\]
of the attitudes and functions of consciousness (Chapters Five and Six), the understanding is onesidely extraverted (object-oriented) and limits itself to sensate-thinking (excluding feeling and intuition). The theoretical activity of Spirit is thereby channeled into the service of instrumental reason. Logos is reduced to techne. The voice of Wisdom is silenced, and science becomes the slave of technology, whose guiding principle is not the mutual, self-conscious recognition of spiritual cognition, but the unconscious drive of the will to power in the form of the conquest of nature.

In the political sphere, the doing of practical Spirit is similarly unconscious, in the sense that it remains unaware of its deeper motivations. Beneath the rival ideologies of freedom and liberation, of material "progress" or cultural superiority, lies the same drive of the will to power in the form of militant nationalism and imperialism. The conquest of nature as lifeless "other" goes hand in hand with the conquest of other nations.

From the perspective of the "tuning of reason," the split in Spirit or the Self is what accomplishes the differentiation and polarization of the modern nation-states. Once the political and economic tensions generated by nationalistic and imperialistic expansionism have reached their peak, and the appropriate military techniques have been developed, the stage
is set for the outbreak of world war. We are not concerned here with the detailed series of events (whether economic, political, or ideological) leading to World War I, nor with the question of the relation between the latter and World War II. What is of most significance, given the problematic we have been tracing, is the event which brought the last world war to a close: the detonation of two atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

The destructive potential of the nuclear arsenal has made into a real possibility the imminent fulfillment of the early Christian apocalyptic vision. The link between technologically induced and divinely willed annihilation is not fortuitous. The differentiation of consciousness under the impact of the major Christian symbols led, as we have seen, to the emergence of the modern ideal of rational autonomy with its cultivation of the dichotomous thinking of the understanding, the preferred cognitive mode of technological society. With the splitting of the atom, the movement of differentiation running through the Christian aeon reaches a critical turning point. Through what might be called the cunning of technique, the particularist interests of nationalistic expansionism must henceforth be played out in the context of the universalist interests of the global community.
Despite the threat of ecological catastrophe and nuclear annihilation, however, the global community, as it now stands, can be described as a mandala without a centre. From the geopolitical perspective, the world is split from East to West (Communist vs. Capitalist nations) and North to South (developed vs. developing nations). According to Jung, any merely political measures aimed at overcoming this split will remain ultimately ineffectual as long as the underlying psychodynamics are not taken into account. "The fear of universal destruction," he writes,

may spare us the worst, yet the possibility of it will nevertheless hang over us like a dark cloud so long as no bridge is found across the world-wide psychic and political split—a bridge as certain as the hydrogen bomb. If only a world-wide consciousness could arise that all division and all fission are due to the splitting of opposites in the psyche, then we should know where to begin. But if even the smallest and most personal stirrings of the individual psyche—so insignificant in themselves—remain as unconscious and unrecognized as they have hitherto, they will go on accumulating and produce mass groupings and mass movements which cannot be subjected to reasonable control or manipulated to a good end.\footnote{120}{\textit{CW} 10:575.}

The psychic split which Jung sees as the root of political disunity is mirrored at the level of political discourse in the polarization of rival ideologies that crystalize around what

\footnote{119}{With, of course, the major exception of India and Japan in the East, and Latin America (and Cuba) in the West.}
Morin refers to as "master words" (the equivalent of Jung's "isms"). Master words are "verbal giants whose empire extends over the entire political domain: thus, according to the particular optic, democracy/dictatorship, socialism/capitalism, left/right, contest and divide the world."\textsuperscript{121}

We have seen how ideological constructs have usurped the position formerly occupied by the symbol system of the Western Christian tradition. The archetypal dominants that informed this tradition are what lend the master words their absolutist quality and the corresponding ideologies the character of so many mutually exclusive creeds. "Far too little attention," writes Jung,

has been paid to the fact that, for all our irreligiousness, the distinguishing mark of the Christian epoch, its highest achievement, has become the congenital vice of our age: the supremacy of the word, of the Logos, which stands for the central figure of our Christian faith. The word has literally become our god and so it has remained, even if we know Christianity only from hearsay. Words like "Society" and "State" are so concretized that they are almost personified....No one seems to notice that this worship of the word, which was necessary at a certain phase of man's mental development, has a perilous shadow side.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{121}Morin (1981) p.54. My translation.

\textsuperscript{122}CW 10:554.
This "perilous shadow side" is the power complex behind the master word, which, so long as it remains in the shadow—i.e., remains unconscious—is projected onto the "other." We have already considered the dynamics of shadow projection in our reading of the master/slave dialectic and the moral conflict between the "beautiful soul" and the man of action (Chapters Four and Six, respectively). In the political sphere, the withdrawal of projections leading to mutual recognition cannot come about until the rival parties cease identifying in an abstract and One-sided manner with their (apparently) mutually exclusive ideological positions. A major obstacle in this respect is the lack of a common discourse, or metadiscourse, which could allow for the articulation of ideological differences around a central informing principle.

From the perspective of complex holism, the ideological conflict between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.—the leading representatives of "communist" socialism and "capitalist" liberalism, respectively—can be understood in terms of the tension between the individual and the collectivity, which, I have argued, is endemic to the movement of history since the French Revolution. The dialectical character of the conceptual opposition between the individual and the collectivity is mirrored in the actual state of affairs that obtains in the two rival nation-states. While the U.S.A. styles itself as the champion of individual freedom and autonomy, its abstract
ideological self-consciousness is blind to the increasing significance of collectivist elements in its political and economic organization: e.g., "pop" culture, state and military intervention, multinationals. The U.S.S.R., similarly, despite the myth of the rule of the proletariat, maintains its collectivist ideal through the cult of the personality and the constant suppression of individual dissidents. In either case, the ideological rhetoric serves merely to obfuscate the complexity of the actual state of affairs. Unconscious of their own shadows—the contents of which are contaminated by the instinctual (power) and archetypal (myth) dominants of the collective unconscious—the proponents of "capitalist" liberalism and "communist" socialism alike continue to regard one another, as Jung says, as "the very devil."\[^{124}\]

Intersecting the split between East and West, or Left and Right, is the split between North and South. Here, however, instead of the struggle for recognition between two world masters, it is a question of unambiguous or unilateral domination. The Third World exists in a state of economic and technological servitude imposed from above by the unchecked forces of modern techno-industrial expansionism. The Third World, as Morin says,\[^{123}\]

\[^{123}\]The situation has improved, for the time being at least, with Gorbachev's policy of Glasnost.

\[^{124}\]CW 10:544.
exists on the border between life and death. Eighty per cent of humanity leads a life of survival that is fast becoming a life of sub-survival in function of the needs and aspirations held out to it by the image of modern civilization.

The problem is not that of the material scarcity and the climatic constraints that obtain for the remaining archaic societies. Underdevelopment is not merely the heritage of backwardness. It is also the product of the forced implantation of the occidental model of development outside the historical, cultural, and technological conditions proper to the developed nations. This techno-bureaucratic model, which sees only the industrial machine and never the human being, is abstract and imposed from without....the development of underdevelopment--a development that gives rise to shanty towns, to the displacement and deculturalization of millions of Africans, Asians, and South-Americans--is itself the product, both direct and indirect, of the development of the more advanced industrial zones.125

The Third World, therefore, is the living/dying shadow of modern occidental civilization. The under-development of the Third World is not merely indicative of its sub-standard economic and technological status, but of the sub- or unconscious dynamics that have brought this status into being.

I have said that the global community can at present be described as a mandala without a centre. The missing centre is consciousness of Spirit or the Self, the actualization of which is the common telos (end, goal, completion) of speculative philosophy and the process of individuation. Accordingly, I

will close this chapter with a consideration of the relation between absolute knowing and the *gnosis*\textsuperscript{126} of individuation as this touches upon the notion of the end of history.

In the concluding chapter of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel describes absolute knowing as "self-conscious Spirit," whose movement is "the circle that returns to itself, the circle that presupposes its beginning and reaches it only at the end."\textsuperscript{127} We have already considered the image of the circle (mandala) as metaphor of Spirit or the Self (Chapter Six). As the self-consciousness of its own consummation, the Spirit of absolute knowing, Hegel tells us, presupposes that "it [Spirit] has completed itself as World-Spirit," that History, in other words, has come to an end. As the becoming of Spirit, History presents a slow-moving succession of Spirits, a gallery of images, each of which, endowed with all the riches of Spirit, moves thus slowly just because the Self has to penetrate and digest the wealth of its substance. As its fulfillment consists in perfectly knowing what *it is*, in knowing its substance, this knowing is its withdrawal into itself in which it abandons its outer existence and gives its existential shape over to recollection. Thus absorbed in itself, it is sunk in the night of its self-consciousness; but in that night its vanished outer existence is preserved, and this transformed existence—the former one, but now reborn of the Spirit's knowledge—is the new existence, a new world and a new shape of Spirit....This revelation

\textsuperscript{126}By *gnosis* here I mean self-knowledge as knowledge of the Self (or Spirit, as Hegel would say).

\textsuperscript{127}*Phen. Sp.*, par. 802/442.
is... the raising-up of its [the Spirit's] depth, or its extension, the negativity of this withdrawn 'I,' a negativity which is its externalization or its substance; and this revelation is also the Concept's Time, in that this externalization is in its own self in its depth, in the Self. The goal, Absolute Knowing, or Spirit that knows itself as Spirit, has for its path the recollection of the Spirits as they are in themselves and as they accomplish the organization of their realm.128

In psychological terms, the withdrawal on the part of Spirit into "the night of its self-consciousness," where it beholds the various Gestalten of its prior development as an inwardly recollected "gallery of images," suggests the notion of the collective unconscious with its historically determined archetypal dominants. The wisdom of the sage consists in "the raising-up of its [the Spirit's] depth," in-being "reborn of the Spirit's knowledge." This rebirth is coextensive with a widening or "extension" of the field of consciousness, which, in turn, effects a shift in the psychic economy from the ego to the Self. "Self-reflection," writes Jung,

or--what comes to the same thing--the urge to individuation gathers together what is scattered and multifarious, and exalts it to the original form of the One, the Primordial Man. In this way our existence as separate beings, our former ego nature, is abolished, the circle of consciousness is widened, and because the paradoxes have been made conscious the sources of conflict are dried up. This approximation to the Self is a kind of reпрistination or apocatastasis, in so far as the Self has an

128Ibid., 808/446.
"incorruptible" or "eternal" character on account of its being pre-existent to consciousness.\textsuperscript{129}

The process of spiritual recollection which culminates in absolute knowing is structurally and functionally analogous to the "apocatastasis" or "anamnesis" that Jung postulates as the necessary prelude to the emergence of the Self in the process of individuation. Because the Self is grounded in archetypal reality—and indeed, as we have repeatedly seen, may itself be characterized as the ground of archetypal reality—"it reaches beyond the individual in time and space and is therefore not subjected to the corruptibility of one body: the realization of the Self is nearly always connected with the feeling of timelessness, 'eternity,' or immortality."\textsuperscript{130} Thus Hegel says that Spirit "appears in Time just so long as it has not grasped its pure Concept...."\textsuperscript{131} Time is "the outer, intuited pure Self which is not grasped by the Self, the merely intuited Concept; when the latter grasps itself it sublates its Time-form... (hebt er seine Zeitform auf)."\textsuperscript{132}

The sublation of time in absolute knowing is the individual experiential correlate to the speculative notion of

\textsuperscript{129} CW 11:401.
\textsuperscript{130} CW 18:1567.
\textsuperscript{131}Phen. Sp., par. 801/441.
\textsuperscript{132}Ibid.
the end of History. We have said that this end, so far as the political organization of the global community is concerned, remains an end only in principle. Jung, for his part, does not foresee the imminent actualization of an individuated humanity. "The effect on all individuals," he writes,

which one would like to see realized, may not set in for hundreds of years, for the spiritual transformation of mankind follows the slow tread of the centuries and cannot be hurried or held up by any rational process of reflection, let alone brought to fruition in one generation. What does lie within our reach, however, is the change in individuals who have, or create for themselves, an opportunity to influence others of like mind. I do not mean by persuading or preaching—I am thinking, rather, of the well-known fact that anyone who has insight into his own actions, and has thus found access to the unconscious, involuntarily exercises an influence on his environment. 133

The subtle influence of the individuated personality on those around him or her consists, as Jung says, in the fact that he or she remains open to the inner promptings of the unconscious. It is this openness which makes of individuation a "never-ending process." Because the wholeness of the Self is complex in nature, it is not something that can be achieved once and for all. This is as true for the individual as for the collectivity. Even if humanity at large should one day succeed in overcoming the psychosocial and ideopolitical splits that stand in the way of the emergence of a global community along

133 CW 10:583.
complex holistic lines, the continued existence of such a community will depend upon the mindful cultivation of the wisdom that brought it into being.
CONCLUSION

The overarching concern of this study, the pretext of the argument, it will be recalled, was the need and desire to cultivate a way of thinking capable of avoiding the fragmenting effect of reductionism and simplification as dominant modes of understanding ourselves and the world we live in. The preceding chapters have shown how a dialogue between Hegel and Jung around the principle of complex holism can further such a cultivation.

As we saw in the final paragraphs to our analysis of the meaning and end of history, the correlative notions of absolute knowing and the gnosis of individuation each culminate in a recollection (Erinnerung, anamnesis) of the major stages which mark the developmental path. It is only fitting, therefore, that before considering the present standpoint and its prospects, we pause to assess the ground covered thus far.

The argument proper began with the dialectical correlation between the concepts of the Absolute and individual personality—the middle term being the concept of the Self as complex whole. The structure and dynamics of the Self were seen to be constituted by a series of fundamental polarities: conscious and unconscious, spirit and nature, ego and other, subject and object, concept and symbol, knowing and doing, the individual and the collectivity, the human and the divine, time
and eternity. It is the dialectical tension between these polarities which generates the emergence of the Self as complex whole. This generation can be described in terms of a circuitous movement from the concept of the Absolute or the Whole as logical/archetypal possibility, through the differentiation of the latent polarities, to their dialectical sublation in the self-conscious re-cognition of the Absolute as Self (Hegel) and the Self as Absolute, (Jung). Whether from the speculative standpoint of Hegel's Science of Wisdom, or from that of Jung's depth-psychology, the emergence of the Self is a movement of individuation—in the sense of self-actualization—a movement governed by the immanent principle of complex holism.

Through the course of the dialogue, we have had occasion to suggest significant modifications or reformulations of some of the key positions of both Hegel and Jung; whether through the impact of one upon the other, or simply through the guiding critical force of the principle of complex holism. There are two major related points with regard to Jung's position. To begin with, insofar as the archetype of the Self coincides with the onto-logical category of the Idea as concept of the Whole, one cannot follow Jung in his kantian insistence on the essential unknowability and empty form-like quality of the archetype "in-itself." As we saw in Chapter One, the actuality of the archetype must be grasped both in-and-for-itself, as
Hegel would say. Without such a complex grasp of the Self, archetypal theory will remain prone to unwarranted dualism and unnecessary mystification.

Secondly, a coherent account of the actualization of the Self must reject Jung's claim that the meaning of the process of individuation cannot be grasped in terms other than the symbolic productions to which the process gives rise. Jung's own theoretical position transcends the immediacy of such productions, and suggests that these can, and indeed must, be conceptually intelligible and discursively articulable by means of the speculative (dialectical) method. In fact, this method is arguably essential to any discourse on the psyche (psychology) which seeks to understand such symbolic productions through the concepts of Self and individuation. Though Jung is evidently a dialectical thinker, therefore, the occasional inconsistencies in his systematic and methodological formulations call out to be re-articulated along specifically Hegelian lines.

As we saw in Chapters Six and Seven, however, Hegel's position with regard to the sublation in absolute knowing of the symbolic (Vorstellung) into the conceptual (Begriff) must, at least as far as his understanding of the Absolute as Spirit or Self is concerned, be re-interpreted to allow for the equal value and mutual implication of the symbolic and the conceptual
as cognitive modes. By the same token, Hegel's related overvaluation of (rational) ego-consciousness must betempered with the recognition of the irreducible autonomy of the unconscious as the ever-present pre-rational ground of human experience. This is in keeping with the distinction proposed in Chapter One between the logical priority of spirit vs the eco-logical priority of nature. Finally, despite his recognition of individual personality as the "concrete existence of the Concept," and therefore as the living exemplar of the principle of complex holism, Hegel's idealistic bent tends to subordinate the particular to the universal, the individual to the collectivity, and experience to the System. This tendency can be corrected through an appeal to a position such as Jung's which takes the empirical individual and his or her experience as its privileged field of inquiry.

It is clear from the preceding that any further exploration of the manifestations and implications of the principle of complex holism will require a continuing dialogue between the speculative and empirical/experimental modes of inquiry--an alliance, in effect, between Wisdom and science.¹ Hegel's Science of Wisdom remains the first fruit, and arguably the type, of such an alliance. Jung's depth-psychology, for

¹By Wisdom here I mean what is sometimes referred to as the Perennial Philosophy, or what the French refer to simply as la Tradition.
its part, bears witness to a major step in the further evolution of the tradition that begins with Hegel.

This evolution, moreover, continues to this day, and is most evident in the leading representatives of the so-called new science. Among contemporary Hegel scholars, the most significant spokesman for the relevance of Hegel's philosophical position to the New Science is Erol E. Harris, who has recently claimed that it is neither "Wittgenstein nor Russell," but Hegel that "provides the model for a logic adequate to science and rational thinking: that is, a dialectical scale of categories which are themselves the principles of structure and the essential form both of the natural and of the intellectual world." In the concluding section to the same path-breaking book, Harris writes:

If we have been right so far, it should follow that the highest form [in the evolutionary scale] hitherto experienced, human mentality, is the closest analogy to the ultimate nature of the absolute whole. In that case, it must involve something like, yet somehow transcending, self-conscious personality. It must involve and yet transcend some form of organized community. It must be at once a physical, organic, intelligent, moral and spiritual whole, of which we (with all that is implicated in our nature) are integral members.

So regarded, nature cannot be limited to what we discover through the physical and biological sciences. We must add to these the social, psychological, and philosophical sciences, and must reflect on the combined results of them all, if we

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2Erol E. Harris, op. cit., p. 154.
are to arrive at an adequate metaphysical conception.\(^3\)

That human personality plays the central and mediating role in the evolutionary self-actualization of the "absolute whole" implies that psychology enjoys a privileged status in the spectrum of the sciences as these enter into dialogue with Wisdom. The preceding chapters have indeed shown this to be the case. What this also suggests, however, is that a truly speculative psychology— that is, a psychology, such as Jung's, informed by the principle of complex holism—will seek out its imminent connection with, or its systemic or organizational homology to, the rest of the disciplinary spectrum. Jung's creative collaboration with the Nobel physicist Wolfgang Pauli, along with such renowned culturalists as Kerenyi and Wilhelm, stand out as signal contributions to such an inter- and trans-disciplinary endeavour.

At the present time, there is every indication that the dialogue between Wisdom and science is working toward a critical breakthrough equal in moment to the advent of Hegel's Science of Wisdom in the wake of the French Revolution. A far-reaching synthetic and convergent tendency is apparent throughout the disciplinary spectrum. In physics, there is the example of David Bohm, whose holistic theory of the implicate,

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 262.
and more recently, the generative order, is transdisciplinary in scope and open to the voice of Wisdom. 4 In psychology, the leading figure in the dialogue with Wisdom is Ken Wilber (a biologist by training) whose theory of the spectrum of consciousness signals the coming of age of the relatively new field of transpersonal psychology. Wilber's work is directed toward the articulation of the emerging "new paradigm," by which he means "an overall knowledge quest that would include not only the 'hard ware' of physical sciences but also the 'soft ware' of philosophy and psychology and the 'transcendental ware' of mystical-spiritual religion." 5

Perhaps the most formidable of contemporary new scientists, especially with respect to the emergence of a new transdisciplinarity, is Edgar Morin, whose understanding of complexity has contributed in a significant way to the present study in its final form. Morin's sustained effort to cultivate a kind of thinking "that conceives of its objects, whatever they be, in a way that includes its own activity," a kind of thinking based on "the ongoing reflexivity


5 Eye to Eye, p. 1, op. cit.. Cf. also The Atman Project (Wheaton, Ill.: Theosophical Publishing House, 1985); and A Sociable God, op. cit..
science—philosophy," is the youngest and finest fruit of the speculative tradition that begins with Hegel's Science of Wisdom. The concepts of dialogic, holonomy, and recursivity which Morin proposes as the methodological principles of the paradigm of complexity and the essential ingredients of any transdisciplinary discourse, are fully compatible with the principle of complex holism which has been the focal point of the present study.

Science, says Hegel (by which he means the Science of Wisdom), "the crown of a world of Spirit, is not complete in its beginnings. The onset of the new Spirit is the product of a widespread upheaval in various forms of culture, the prize at the end of a complicated, tortuous path and of just as variegated and strenuous effort." As we approach the end of a two-thousand year aeon, the Spirit announced by Hegel has yet to emerge from "the labour of its own transformation." While the work of such new scientists as Harris, Bohm, Wilber, and Morin, stand as so many beacons along the "complicated, tortuous path" on which we still find ourselves, there is yet no sign that the "widespread upheaval" to which Hegel bears

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7Phen. Sp., par. 12/18.

8Ibid..
witness is about to subside. On the contrary, the crisis of the age has reached global proportions, and threatens generalized death and destruction as much as it promises the birth of a new and better order. In any event, given the key role science is to play in the years that lie ahead, it is essential that it not forsake its new alliance with Wisdom. For Wisdom is its con-science, whose deep and urgent promptings it might prove perilous indeed to ignore.
I a) Hegel: Primary Sources.

Unless otherwise indicated, the German edition of Hegel's works is that of the \textit{Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Theorie Werkausgabe} (Suhrkamp Verlag).


\textbf{Hegel's Logic (Part I of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 1830)} tr. W. Wallace (Oxford University Press, 1975): the \textit{Encyclopaedia} takes up vols. 8, 9, and 10 of the \textit{Werke}.


I b) Hegel: Secondary Sources.


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