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Word and World: The Validity and Limitations of a Heideggerian Perspective on the Poetry and Poetics of Gerard Manley Hopkins

by

Anne M. Le Dressay

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, University of Ottawa, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

October, 1987

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the particular relevance of a Heideggerian perspective on the poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins. The first two chapters compare the thought of Heidegger and Hopkins, Chapter One providing an overview while Chapter Two compares their theories of language and poetry. These chapters reveal close affinities between the two but also a basic difference of emphasis related to the central concept of each—Being in Heidegger, the Incarnation in Hopkins. Heidegger emphasizes Being while Hopkins emphasizes beings.

This difference of emphasis underlies the difference in thought which emerges in the analysis of the four poems upon which the final four chapters focus. This analysis has two parts: a comparison of Hopkins’ thought with Heidegger’s, followed by an examination of the language of the poems. Whereas the thought expressed in the various poems varies in its closeness or distance from Heidegger’s thought, Hopkins’ language consistently emphasizes the immediate, the particular, the individual as opposed to the ultimate and general which Heidegger emphasizes.

In Chapter Three, a look at the theme of language in "The Wreck of the Deutschland" reveals a similarity of thought between Hopkins and Heidegger, but that similarity proves to be undercut by the language of the poem itself. Chapter Four examines "God’s Grandeur" and discovers a surprising distance between Hopkins and
Heidegger in their attitudes to the natural world. Chapter Five examines in "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" the themes of interpretation and of human refusal to selve, upon which Hopkins and Heidegger are in close accord. Chapter Six, taking up the theme of Being in "That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the comfort of the Resurrection," shows Hopkins' language achieving a unity of word and world which transcends what Heidegger considers possible.

Ultimately, Heidegger is shown to share with Hopkins a close enough general similarity in thought on such subjects as interpretation, the nature of art, and the place of man in the world that his views provide an illuminating perspective on Hopkins. However, Heidegger's theories of language prove inadequate to explain Hopkins' poetic practice, which can finally be explained only by his view of the Incarnation. In sum, Heidegger emerges as something of an anti-realist while Hopkins is firmly grounded in the real world.
Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE: One Only Thought

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction: Origins</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Hopkins</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Incarnation</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Self</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Heidegger</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Being</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Man</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Meditative Thought</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Inscape and Instress</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Conclusion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER TWO: The House of Being

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Language</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Hopkins</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Heidegger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Poetry</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Hopkins</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Heidegger</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Interpretation</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Conclusion</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER THREE: Past Telling of Tongue: "The Wreck of the Deutschland"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The Poem</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Words and the Word</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Language</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Conclusion</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER FOUR: The Dearest Freshness: "God's Grandeur"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction: Hopkins, Heidegger, and Nature</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The Poem</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Nature, Man, and God: The Octave</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Resolution: The Sestet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Conclusion</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER FIVE: Our Tale, O Our Oracle: "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves"

I. Introduction: The Human Self in Hopkins and Heidegger 188
II. The Poem
   1. Introduction: The Saner Attitude 191
   2. What the Title Says 195
   3. Lines 1-7a: The Text 197
   4. Lines 7b-14: The Interpretation 202
   5. The Spell of Language 210
III. Conclusion 217

CHAPTER SIX: Immortal Diamond: "That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the comfort of the Resurrection"

1. Introduction: Yes and Is 224
2. Lines 1-9: Nature's Bonfire 230
3. Lines 10-16: Her Clearest-Selvèd Spark 235
4. The Turn: Enough! 237
5. The Final Codă: Being and the Word 240
6. Conclusion 245

CONCLUSION: What I Do Is Me

1. Introduction 250
2. World 252
3. Man 256
4. Word 259
5. Conclusion 265

BIBLIOGRAPHY 271
Abbreviations

Martin Heidegger

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Trans.</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1979</td>
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Gerard Manley Hopkins

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<th>Title</th>
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"Every thinker thinks one only thought," says Martin Heidegger (WICT, p. 50). Similarly, "Every great poet creates his poetry out of one single poetic statement only" (OWTL, p. 160). Moreover, the concerns of thinker and poet are closely related. If we consider the particular thinker Martin Heidegger and the particular poet Gerard Manley Hopkins, we discover that the one only thought of the former is Being, while the one single poetic statement of the latter is the Incarnation. To consider Hopkins' one single poetic statement alongside Heidegger's one only thought is to bring to light remarkable affinities between the two in regard to their basic attitudes to reality—to the world, to nature, to language and poetry, and especially to the place of man in the world. Such affinities provide a new way of understanding the broader aspects of Hopkins' thought and poetry. At the same time, the language of the poems themselves—the living out of Hopkins' understanding of the Incarnation—highlights the ultimate difference implicit in the connotations of the words "Being" (bodiless, non-personal, insubstantial) and "Incarnation" (the taking on of flesh, hence body, personhood, concreteness). The exploration of similarity and difference outlined here and given substance in the present study casts new light upon the poetic theory and practice of Hopkins, especially upon what has usually been regarded as the most characteristic feature of his poetic language—its "solidity," the
impression it gives of being part of the physical world.

Heidegger's theories of language and poetry have had considerable influence upon literary criticism and theory of language in recent decades. This influence, however, has been but little felt in Hopkins criticism. Of the studies which spring in any way from Heidegger's thought, J. Hillis Miller's The Disappearance of God represents Geneva criticism, while Michael Sprinker's "A Counterpoint of Dissonance" represents deconstruction. These are the only two major studies of Hopkins in which Heidegger's thought contributes to the shaping of the specific critical theory which determines the approach taken to the poetry, and in each case his contribution is limited.

Of more interest to the present study are those studies of Hopkins which show Heidegger's influence in more subtle and suggestive ways implying an affinity between the two writers extending beyond the simple application of a theory to a work of art. On the most superficial level, a number of recent articles show a distinct preference for Heidegger's favorite word "Being" in lieu of the more specifically theological terms which Hopkins himself usually prefers. While such a preference does not argue Heidegger's influence, it does suggest that a Heideggerian vocabulary can be useful in discussing Hopkins. Further, some critics of either Hopkins or Heidegger imply an affinity by quoting one to illustrate a point about the other, as James Finn Cotter does in discussing Hopkins and Nathan Scott in discussing Heidegger. Others explicitly draw notice to some resemblance between them, as George Steiner does,
or, in greater detail combining statement and quotation, Walter Ong. Marylou Motto's "Mined With a Motion" reveals a more consistent Heideggerian influence, though again in a way that is more suggestive than specific, although she does acknowledge Heidegger in her bibliography. The approach which Motto takes to Hopkins' poetry is shaped in part by Heidegger's view of art. Moreover, her work provides a transition to another group of studies providing a link of sorts between Hopkins and Heidegger in that she sees Hopkins' view of reality in terms that can be considered broadly phenomenological.

Strictly speaking, phenomenology refers to the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, who believes that philosophy must begin with "the phenomena and problems themselves; all study of theories, however significant, must take second place." His most influential insight is "that an act of consciousness and its object are inseparable or... they are but the subjective and objective aspects of the same thing." The phenomenologist attempts to observe and describe things as they reveal themselves to consciousness, in the hope that in such observation and description the essence of things, their being, will manifest itself.

By his own admission, Heidegger is not a phenomenologist in the Husserlian sense. It seems to be fairly generally accepted, however, that, at least at the time of Being and Time, he was a phenomenologist "in an enlarged sense." As to his later phase, with which the present study is primarily concerned, his status as a phenomenologist remains "an open question." There is, however, considerable critical support for the idea that Heidegger remains
in some sense, a phenomenologist throughout his career—or at least that his thought is rooted in phenomenology. Hence, though Heidegger is not a strict phenomenologist, he can be considered a phenomenologist in the broader sense.\textsuperscript{14}

So too, it seems, can Hopkins. Such is Robert Hill's position in his article "A Phenomenological Approach to Hopkins and Yeats," in which he argues that "Hopkins' poetry is solidly based on a phenomenological appreciation of things."\textsuperscript{15} Hill's allegiance is to Husserl rather than to Heidegger, but, because of Heidegger's own debt to Husserl's thought, Hill's discussion nevertheless supports a link between Hopkins and Heidegger. So too do those studies which discuss Hopkins in light of the nineteenth-century fascination with the particular, a fascination about which Ong remarks, "In close observation and exact verbal description of interior states of mind they were well on the way to depth psychology and present-day phenomenology."\textsuperscript{16} Such studies of Hopkins include Carol Christ's The Finer Optic, Alison Solloway's Gerard Manley Hopkins and the Victorian Temper, and Patricia Ball's The Science of Aspects.\textsuperscript{17} Phenomenology thus provides another suggestive link between Hopkins and Heidegger.

None of the studies noted above pursue to any depth the suggestion implicit in their terminology or approach—that there exists between Hopkins and Heidegger an affinity the exploration of which could be fruitful for the understanding of both. Only Ronald Marken in his article "'Each Tucked String Tells': Hopkins and the Word" explicitly recognizes "the remarkable coincidence of aims in the two writers." He sees in both an attempt "to come to
terms with many similar problems related to Being, language, and poetry" and suggests that "their affection for word and world are so similar that to look at Hopkins through Heidegger can bring into extraordinary focus some of Hopkins' fundamental poetic theories and practices."\(^{18}\)

The present study does not propose precisely to "look at Hopkins through Heidegger." What it proposes to do, as we have suggested earlier, is to read Hopkins and Heidegger together, with a view to casting new light upon the origin of Hopkins' peculiarly physical poetic language. With this view in mind, the study has two main objectives. The first is an exploration of the affinities between Hopkins and Heidegger in their attitudes to the world, to man, and to what sustains man and the world in being—God for Hopkins, Being for Heidegger. The theories of language and poetry emerging from these basic attitudes are also remarkably similar. So strong are the affinities, in fact, that they provide a clear justification for the use of Heideggerian vocabulary in discussing the major concerns of Hopkins' poetry as well as in illuminating his theories of language and poetry. The advantage of such a vocabulary is its greater accessibility to the present-day reader than Hopkins' own Christian terminology. Heidegger, then, provides a means of "translating" Hopkins into language accessible to readers who are puzzled, thwarted, or even offended by the unabashedly Christian terminology of Hopkins himself. In the light of Heidegger, the best of Hopkins' poems emerge as of more universal relevance than his language might at first suggest.
At the same time, while such "translation" permits easier access into the themes and theories of Hopkins' poetry, it does not explain the quality of solidarity which distinguishes his poetic language—the impression it creates of being as tangibly real as the things it talks about. Consequently, this study proposes as a second aim, within the framework of comparison already established, the close study of selected poems of Hopkins with a particular regard to his use of language. Such a study is consistent with Hopkins' own emphasis on particularity and, as we shall see, it reveals an ultimate and telling disparity between Hopkins and Heidegger—a disparity which reveals itself first as a simple difference of emphasis, but which close reading shows to be a fundamental difference of attitude towards the real, a difference rooted in Hopkins' particular view of the Incarnation. In contrast to Heidegger, whose longing for Being leads him always to transcend the immediate world, Hopkins is firmly grounded in that world by means of the Incarnation. Ironically, then, despite the tendency to think of "religious" writers as other-worldly, we shall find that Hopkins is far more this-worldly than the agnostic Heidegger.

In sum, Heidegger provides a very useful means of entry into the perspective and world-view of Hopkins. His broad view of reality and even of language and poetry resembles Hopkins' closely enough that his vocabulary provides a fresh perspective on the central concerns of Hopkins' poetry and a fresh way of discussing them. However, the closer one gets to Hopkins' poetic practice, the more one needs to return to Hopkins' own vocabulary in order to understand his use of language. Heidegger is useful in a broad and
general sense, but his usefulness vanishes for discussion of the specific.

In its dual aim, the present study places itself within existing Hopkins criticism in two ways. First, it supports the use of Heideggerian vocabulary and the application of Heideggerian views of art in the discussion of Hopkins' poetry. Secondly, it provides a perspective from which to assess recent criticism which either attempts to "translate" Hopkins into more modern terms (as Miller and Sprinker do) or which views Hopkins from a stance which can be considered broadly Heideggerian but which does not take into account the ultimate parting of the ways between Hopkins and Heidegger (as Cotter does). The three studies here mentioned are worth examining in some detail because they are of sufficient stature and influence and because they provide a background against which the present study more clearly defines itself.

Among the most influential—and least challenged—discussions of Hopkins occurs in the final chapter of Miller's enthusiastic and highly readable The Disappearance of God. At the time of the writing of this book, Miller aligned himself with the Geneva critics, whose phenomenological approach is influenced in part by the early Heidegger but mostly by Husserl. The problems with Miller's discussion of Hopkins in The Disappearance of God spring from his unselfcritical application of the Geneva approach, from his apparent ignorance of basic Christian doctrine, and from his occasional misreading of Hopkins.
Miller claims that his presentation of Hopkins' thought "is not so much chronological as dialectical" (p. 16). He sets up a "dialogue" between various aspects of Hopkins' thought, and this with an apparent assurance that the resulting "portrait" is true to Hopkins' experience. It is, of course, impossible to reconstruct the movement of another's mind with any assurance of accuracy. Moreover, the experience of reading necessarily gives a sense of chronology, and the resulting portrait is a distorted one in which Hopkins comes across as something of a manic-depressive. The dialectical method is also hazardous in other ways. It allows Miller to present different aspects of Hopkins' thought as isolated, separate elements which Miller never adequately brings together. His method also makes it impossible to distinguish between his own voice and that of his fictionalized Hopkins. It is therefore difficult to accuse him of contradicting himself, since he could claim that the contradiction is in Hopkins. Nonetheless, there are basic and unresolved contradictions in Miller's attitude to various aspects of Hopkins' thought, notably the poet's sense of self. Miller first presents this sense of self as one of painful isolation which must be overcome at all costs (pp. 270-71), but he later calls it "the delightful selftaste" (p. 339) and still elsewhere observes that "Hopkins does not want to melt into the totality, to expand into vagueness, or to lose the sharp taste of himself in a possession of the 'all'" (p. 286). Hopkins' "self" changes aspect as it suits Miller's purpose.

Miller is further handicapped in his understanding of Hopkins by his apparent ignorance of basic Christian beliefs. The doctrine
of the Fall, for instance, is so basic to a Christian understanding of the world that it can be taken for granted that Hopkins believes it. While it could be possible for a believer to be unaware of the effects of the Fall on the natural world, no Christian (at least in Hopkins' time) denies that man is fallen. Nonetheless, according to Miller, the "precarious unity" of Hopkins' world is destroyed by recognition of the Fall in both man and nature. Moreover, "the effects of the fall are visible first in nature" (p. 324). Such an interpretation, I suggest, does violence to both the chronology and the spirit of Hopkins. To say that Hopkins sees the effects of the fall first in nature is a wilful misreading of such poems as "God's Grandeur" and "The Sea and the Skylark," to name but two. To suggest that Hopkins ever saw the world as actually Edenic and man unfallen is to deny Hopkins' consistent affirmation of basic Christian doctrine. Such an unfounded interpretation seriously undermines Miller's entire argument.

The argument is further crippled by Miller's frequent misreading—or very selective reading—of Hopkins. He begins his study with a discussion of Hopkins' sense of self, a discussion based on Hopkins' retreat notes of August, 1880. Quoting Hopkins, Miller writes, "And this [my isolation] is much more true when we consider the mind" (S, p. 123) (Miller's brackets). He interprets Hopkins' "selftaste" as "isolation," remarking that "No one has expressed more eloquently the pathos of each man's imprisonment within the bounds of his own selfhood" than has Hopkins (p. 271). Hopkins himself does not use the word "isolation" in the passage Miller cites. Nor does he use any word which is at all synonymous.
His discussion of selftaste occurs in a meditation on creation.

For Hopkins, the surest indication of God's existence is the intense and unique sense of self which each person experiences. Nor is there in Hopkins any pathos or any sense of imprisonment. The passage cited by Miller conveys rather a sense of wonder. 21

Moreover, Miller's editorial interpolation, his explanation of the pronoun "this" as referring to "isolation" is seriously misleading and entirely groundless in the context of the whole passage. "This" does not refer to anything which could be interpreted as "isolation," but rather to the fact that such a strong sense of self directs one to God as the only possible source. The sentence preceding that with which Miller begins reads:

For human nature, being more highly pitched, selved, and distinctive than anything in the world, can have been developed, evolved, condensed, from the vastness of the world not yhow or by the working of common powers but only by one of finer or higher pitch and determination than itself and certainly than any that elsewhere we see, for this power had to force forward the starting or stubborn elements to the one pitch required. And this is much more true ... (S, pp. 122-23) (italics mine).

In Hopkins, the passage does not, as Miller claims, express man's isolation but, on the contrary, his direct link with God. Such a radical misreading in the very first of Miller's twenty-seven sections not only seriously weakens his argument from the very beginning, but also casts reasonable doubt upon his every subsequent interpretation of Hopkins.

In the light of such a beginning, it is not surprising that Miller ultimately misinterprets other important concepts in Hopkins, including that of selving and that of the great sacrifice. Miller
fails to distinguish between the selving which is expressive of one's own being or truth and the "instressing of his own inscape" by which Lucifer fell (S, p. 201)\(^{22}\)--an instressing which is turned back upon the self rather than outward to God (pp. 338-39). Similarly, Miller interprets man's imitation of Christ in the Great Sacrifice as a renouncing of his distinctive selfhood (pp. 335, 339)--something which is in fact impossible--rather than as the giving of oneself to what one most truly is, and therefore a total fulfilling of the self. These misinterpretations are consistent with Miller's presupposition of negativity in Hopkins, a presupposition expressed elsewhere in his use of the word "escape" both to describe Hopkins' conversion (p. 312) and to explain his last words "I am so happy" (p. 357).

Miller's major underlying presupposition emerges only in his conclusion, in which he states as a "fact" what appears to be his own credo:

The sad alternatives of nihilism and escape beyond the world could be evaded if man would only reject twenty-five hundred years of belief in the dualism of heaven and earth. If man could do this he might come to see that being and value lie in this world, in what is immediate, tangible, present to man. (p. 359)

Miller's own bias leads him to consider Hopkins mistaken from the first and blinds him to Hopkins' deep rootedness in and celebration of "what is immediate, tangible, present to man."

In the end, Miller is carried away by his own enthusiasm and his desire to fit Hopkins into an already established pattern. His incipiently deconstructive study is not so much literary
criticism as it is fiction—an imaginative dramatization of how Hopkins might have perceived his own life and thought had he had Miller's twentieth-century perspective and Miller's insights into reality. Miller does not in the end manage to "translate" Hopkins at all, but rather to fictionalize him.

Michael Sprinker's "A Counterpoint of Dissonance" is written from a more thoroughly deconstructive perspective and indeed perceives Hopkins as something of a protodeconstructionist. Implicit in Sprinker's critical stance is a positing of a universe so radically different from Hopkins' that the validity of his interpretation of the poet's universe is necessarily limited. The reality posited by the deconstructionist is a severely reduced reality defined primarily in terms of language—and language in a narrow and restricted sense. To a deconstructionist, language is primarily writing. In fact, "In Derrida's terms, all language, even speech, is always already writing" (p. 72). Moreover, language operates in isolation from everything but itself. Sprinker speaks of "the incapacity of language to represent anything other than itself" (p. 11, note 9). Language has no relation to the natural world or to the human world but only to itself. Such a restricted view of language allows Sprinker to interpret the word "literal" very narrowly and on that basis to present the following startling (to a traditional reader) reading of "The Windhover":

But in what sense can the poem be said to represent the flight of the windhover? Obviously, the bird is not physically present on the page, nor can the reader actually behold its flight. What the reader perceives
are the words of the poet, which are themselves already figural. . . . Whatever perceptual experience might have preceded the writing of the poem, the poem itself presents only language; the tropes and figures of the first eight lines are taken from language, not from nature. If a poem has a literal meaning it is simply this: "I am a poem" (p. 7).

Sprinker takes a starkly literal view of the word "literal." Indeed, one observes here that such a deconstructionist is interested strictly in the letter of literature, to paraphrase St. Paul, and not at all in the spirit; in fact he denies that spirit exists.

This reductionist approach governs all of Sprinker's analysis of Hopkins. By extension, if language has no reference outside itself, then neither does poetry. As all language is about language, so all poetry is about poetry—or, as Sprinker says of "The Windhover," "it is about "the poet's own struggle with language in writing poetry" (p. 12). Indeed for all the poems that Sprinker discusses ("Carrion Comfort," "The Windhover," "To R.B.," "The Wreck of the Deutschland," "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves"), he finds that "the true subject of the poem is the poet's inner battle, represented and realized in the poem itself, to become a poet" (p. 131). Sprinker can come to such a conclusion only by denying a fundamental shaping force in Hopkins—his view of the Incarnation, by which word and world interpenetrate each other. The word is in some sense world and the world in some sense word, both finding their origin and model in Christ, the Word of God.

The isolationist element in deconstruction reveals itself further in Sprinker's interpretation of selving—a concept which in Hopkins encompasses saying, doing, and being, and hence
emphasizes the unity-of-word and world. Sprinker states that a poem is a self, claiming in conclusion that "each poem says no more than 'I am a poem, this poem'" (p. 8). To claim this is to ignore the doing of a poem, which, for Hopkins, includes but is not limited to or primarily concerned with the statement of its being as poem. The doing of a poem's being includes representation of world, God, and the poet's own self, as well as of the poem's own unique and individual existence.

Sprinker's view of the poet's selving is similarly isolationist and reductive. He discusses Hopkins' life and writing as if the only "self" which Hopkins possesses is that of poet. This is to deny the multi-faceted nature of human life and identity. It is to define Hopkins solely in his relationship to language, ignoring or dismissing his relationship to nature, to other people, and to God. In Sprinker's view of selving—as indeed in his view of language—deconstruction reveals itself in addition as solipsistic. As language refers only to itself, so in the end does the human self. Sprinker's presuppositions blind him to Hopkins' consistent reference of himself to what is external to him—the world and God.

Thus blinded, Sprinker follows Miller in failing to distinguish between Hopkins' concept of selving and his condemnation of Lucifer for "instressing his own inscape" (S, p. 201). The selving described in the "Kingfishers" sonnet is an outwardly-directed self-fulfilment. It is the doing of what is one's truest, profoundest being. In this light, the selving of a poet as poet is his practice of his poetic gift as a song of praise directed outside himself to God. Satan's "instressing of his own inscape" is
a solipsistic act, a turning back upon himself and admiring and praising himself instead of God. Because Sprinker sees self-expression as the aim of poetry, he incorrectly assumes that Hopkins' own "aim in poetry was to achieve 'an instressing of his own inscape'" (p. 88). For Hopkins, however, the evident aim of poetry is truth.

The solipsistic, reductionist world of the deconstructionist cannot accommodate the spiritual dimension which shapes and permeates Hopkins' view of reality. While Sprinker, unlike Miller, respects Hopkins' faith enough not to distort it, he does not understand that faith. If he did, he could not ask about "The Windhover," "And is there not more than a little presumption in addressing Christ as 'my dear'" (p. 9). There is no presumption for one who is "in love with" Christ (L, p. 66) and who considers him a close personal friend. Nor would Sprinker easily suggest that to distinguish between "Hopkins's Catholicism and Mallarmé's less orthodox but no less demanding or profoundly felt religious feeling for art" is to be "arbitrary" (pp. 44-45). Hopkins' religious feeling is not for art, nor is his feeling for art religious. Sprinker ultimately interprets the divine in Hopkins' life and poetry as his own creativity, that in him which is in the image of God as creator (pp. 82-83). To do so is again to reveal the solipsism of the deconstructionist perspective. Everything refers back to itself; there is no external world from which to draw definition or meaning.

Sprinker's method and approach are not without value in discussing Hopkins. The close attention to language required by a theory which sees language as primary and self-sufficient leads to
interesting and valuable insights into the language of individual poems, as well as into the strategy and meaning of those poems which deal with the themes of language and interpretation. But such value is limited and does not extend to the explanation of the underlying theories and attitudes which shape the poetic vision and practice of Hopkins.

It is not surprising, however, that Hopkins should attract the attention of one who sees language as concerned primarily with itself. Hopkins' poetry emphatically does draw attention to language as language, but it does not stop there; its aim and purpose lie not in the self-reference of language but in its participation in the thingly quality of the world and ultimately in the incarnate nature of Christ. It is explained therefore not by such a narrow view as Sprinker's but by a more comprehensive view of reality like Heidegger's and ultimately by Hopkins' own profoundly held belief in the Incarnation. Both Hopkins and Heidegger work within the "logocentric" tradition which deconstruction opposes and which John R. Searle explains as "the concern with truth, rationality, logic, and 'the word' that marks the Western philosophical tradition." The present study places itself in the same tradition on the assumption that such a position is necessary to a valid interpretation of those aspects of the thought of both Hopkins and Heidegger with which the present study is concerned.

James Finn Cotter, in his book Inscape, reveals a greater understanding of Hopkins' vision of reality than does either Miller or Sprinker. Moreover, though Cotter mentions Heidegger only in
his introduction, his entire study has a strong flavor of Heidegger's thought. This is especially true in Cotter's interpretation of inscape, which closely resembles Heidegger's description of Being. Such a description skews the discussion of Hopkins in two ways: it places an inordinate emphasis upon inscape in the whole of Hopkins' thought, and it de-emphasizes Hopkins' interest in the world of the immediate and the concrete—an interest which, we shall see, is fundamental. Cotter's perspective shapes such a characteristic remark as, "The whole of being as an object of thought and attainment absorbed him. Nature and man in all their variety and individuality drew him only as facets of totality."26 According to Cotter, inscape can then be defined as "the One 'in the midst' that generates and shapes the whole and each of its measureless, finite convolutions."27 Inscape is associated not with particularity but with totality. The question is one of emphasis, but, as we shall see, what begins as the same difference of emphasis between Hopkins and Heidegger is ultimately revealed as a crucial difference and the key to Hopkins' poetic practice.

The three studies described above exhibit in different ways a similar inadequacy in their description of Hopkins' poetry and poetics: they do not take into sufficient account Hopkins' profound love of the created world in all its particularity and variety as that love shapes his view of language and his poetic practice. Both Miller and Cotter see Hopkins as seeking always to transcend the immediate and particular. Sprinker ignores Hopkins' love of the world not by denying the particular but by denying the world
and limiting himself—and Hopkins—to language in isolation from the world. It is in a close and careful study of Hopkins' poetic language within the context of his entire vision of reality that the importance of his attention to particulars becomes clear. Hopkins feels no need to escape or transcend the immediate because through the Incarnation God is always and everywhere present—not behind or beneath the immediate as Heidegger's quest for Being suggests, nor beyond and apart from the immediate as the stereotype of Christianity too often suggests, but within the immediate as its source, its sustenance, its purpose, and its meaning.

Such a study as the present one necessarily leaves aside much that is valid and useful in a study of Hopkins' poetry. We do not mention, first of all, the much-discussed conflict between the poet and the priest in Hopkins, not only because it has been more than adequately discussed, 28 but also because it is, in fact, irrelevant and distracting. Nor do we discuss the Ignatian influence upon Hopkins' poetry. This too has been well-documented in such varied studies as David A. Downes' Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Study of his Ignatian Spirit, and from a different perspective, Louis Martz' The Poetry of Meditation. 29 On the more technical level, the present study proposes no detailed examination of Hopkins' sprung rhythm as such, both because such an examination is more strictly technical than the focus of the study warrants, and because it has been examined, analyzed, and illustrated by critics more technically competent to do so than we. 30
The two aims of the present study are reflected in its structure. The first two chapters establish the comparison and contrast between Hopkins and Heidegger upon which the subsequent analysis of the poetry is based. In the next four chapters, the similarities in thought and theory discerned in the initial two chapters mesh with a close study of the language of Hopkins' poetry. The analysis of the language and the thought in conjunction forcibly brings out both the validity and the limitations of a Heideggerian perspective upon the poetry and poetics of Hopkins.

The discussion of Hopkins is based not only upon his poetry but also upon his prose writings, especially the journals and the devotional writings. With respect to Heidegger, the present study is based primarily upon the later writings in which his interest in language and poetry is most clearly articulated. The specific works which are particularly relevant are Existence and Being, Discourse on Thinking, What Is Called Thinking?, Poetry, Language, Thought, and On the Way to Language. Some reference will be made to Being and Time, specifically in the attempt to define what Heidegger means by Being, but the early work plays a minor role in the present study.
Notes

1 Both Hopkins and Heidegger use "man" in the generic sense. To do otherwise in the discussion of their thought would unnecessarily complicate the language of the present study and detract from its intelligibility. For this reason, terms such as "man," as used in this study, are understood to include "woman."


Marylou Motto, "Mined With a Motion" (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1984).

Lauer, p. 17; see also Robert R. Magliola, *Phenomenology and Literature* (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue Univ. Press, 1977), p. 4; Spiegelberg, p. 93. The latter points out that "The early phases of phenomenology involve equal emphasis on both the subjective and objective aspects of experience in their essential correlation. The development of pure phenomenology leads again to a preponderance of the subjective as the source of all objectivities" (p. 70). Later phenomenology, then, is idealistic rather than realistic.

It seems, however, that the earlier phase has been more influential, certainly on literary criticism (Magliola, p. 4). For a more detailed look at Husserlian phenomenology, see Spiegelberg, pp. 69-163.


Spiegelberg, p. 407.


16 Ong, p. 18. Ong also applies the term "phenomenological" to Hopkins' spiritual writings (p. 97) and to his treatment of the relationship of the human self and the human body (p. 40).


18 Ronald Marken, "'Each Tucked String Tells': Hopkins and the Word," Mosaic, 9, No. 3 (1976), 43.

19 Miller, The Disappearance of God. All further references to this book will be to this edition and will appear in parentheses in the text.

20 Magliola, pp. 25, 29. For an explanation of the basic approach of Geneva criticism, see Miller's introduction, p. 16, and Magliola, pp. 19-56.

21 As Miller himself implies elsewhere (pp. 286, 339).

Sprinker, pp. 20-21, 24, 72. All further references to this book will be to this edition and will appear in parentheses in the text.


Cotter, p. 3.

Cotter, p. 18.

Beginning with John Pick, Gerard Manley Hopkins: Priest and Poet, 2nd. ed. (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1966), and continuing through to such critics as Miller and Sprinker.

David A. Downes, Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Study of his Ignatian Spirit (New York: Bookman Associates, 1959); Alfred Thomas, S.J., Hopkins the Jesuit (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969); Louis L. Martz, The Poetry of Meditation (1954; rpt. New Haven & London: Yale Univ. Press, 1962). While Martz' study suggests the possibility of a fruitful comparison of Ignatian meditation with Heidegger's concept of meditative thought, such a comparison would be a tangent to the present study. Given Heidegger's early Jesuit training, the Ignatian aspect of Hopkins could also help explain some of the affinities between Hopkins and Heidegger, but once again to pursue it here is at best peripheral to the concerns of this study.

Robert R. Boyle, S.J., Metaphor in Hopkins (Chapel Hill: The Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1961); Wendell Stacy Johnson,

31 There is considerable debate about Heidegger's "reversal" in thought, which is variously dated from "immediately after the publication of 'Being and Time'," to 1936 (Brock, p. 119).

Richardson identifies the turn as one from "There-being to Being itself" (p. 238), a view shared by John Macquarrie (Martin Heidegger [Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1968], pp. 41-42), Magliola (p. 64), and Palmer (p. 141). Despite recognition of the reversal, the general opinion seems to be that there is nonetheless a unity in Heidegger's thought (Richardson, p. 245; Palmer, pp. 140-141; Anderson, p. 20). Hence, what reference is made to Being and Time in the present study is based on the assumption that there is no radical break between the early and the late Heidegger and that therefore the early Heidegger helps to an understanding of the late Heidegger.
Chapter One
One Only Thought

I. Introduction: Origins

Although Heidegger's "one only thought" differs in important respects from Hopkins', it is nonetheless significantly parallel, and there is ultimately a distinct affinity in the way the two thinkers perceive reality. Direct influence is of course impossible.\(^1\) Influence of another kind, however, is suggested by their common interest in two earlier philosophers--Parmenides and Duns Scotus. Hopkins' notes on Parmenides (J, pp. 127-30), which we will consider in greater detail later, are central to an understanding of his key terms "inscape" and "instress," as well as to his views of language. Similarly, Heidegger's discussion of Parmenides figures largely in his exposition of the nature of thinking (WICT, pp. 168ff), a concept as important to Heidegger as inscape and instress are to Hopkins and, moreover, one which has distinct affinities with the view of reality expressed in the Hopkinsian terms.

The key term in Parmenides is Being. For him, "the only significant thought or statement is that a thing is."\(^2\) For Heidegger too, what is always most significant is that things are, that there is something instead of nothing. Hopkins' commentary on Parmenides' "great text" suggests the centrality of Being to his own thought. He says that "nothing is so pregnant and straightforward to the truth as simple yes and in" (J, p. 127). Hopkins and Heidegger
meet in the "one, only thought" of Parmenides—"Being is." Moreover, the thought of Parmenides is in its central concern like that of Scotus, for whom "the primary and adequate object of the intellect... was being, simply that, ene in quantum ene." For Scotus too, what matters most and what should be the beginning of human thought is the simple primary fact that things are.

The role of Scotus in the thought of Hopkins is well-known, particularly in the shaping of the poet’s view of the Incarnation, his concepts of inscape and instress, and his theory of perception. What is less well-known is that Scotus also figures largely in Heidegger’s background. In 1916, Heidegger published "a study of a medieval text on the nature of metaphysical language, the so-called Grammatica speculativa (once attributed to Duns Scotus but actually the work of Thomas of Erfurt)." Heidegger of course attributed the work to Scotus and his discussion of it delves into Scotus’ other works, revealing a deep knowledge of and profound interest in the thirteenth century Franciscan in whom Hopkins was also interested. Heidegger, a Roman Catholic by upbringing, encountered Scotus in the course of theological studies he undertook at a Jesuit seminary before deciding to study philosophy. These studies, Florent Gaboriau suggests, involved an immersion in scholastic philosophy "où celui qui a donné le ton... c'est Duns Scot et non pas Thomas d'Aquin." If Scotus set the tone of Heidegger’s early studies, it remains relatively unimportant that the scholastic work upon which Heidegger based his discussion of Scotus is now attributed to another writer.

Although Heidegger abandoned theology early in his career, his
early studies in the field had a profound influence upon the shape and direction of his thought—an influence which he himself acknowledges. "Without this theological background," he notes, "I should never have come upon the path of thinking" (OWTL, p. 10)—and "thinking" is crucial to Heidegger's understanding of man in the world. Moreover, Heidegger's background in theology helps explain the religious tone of much of his thought and language—a tone which George Steiner cautions against interpreting too freely, suggesting that while Heidegger's language does not justify a religious interpretation of his thought, nonetheless, "The philosophy, the sociology, the poetics and, at some opaque level, the politics of Heidegger embody and articulate an 'after-' or 'post-theology.'" Heidegger may write and even think like a theologian, but what he sets forth is not a theology so much as a "post-theology," a theology for a world without God.

Karsten Harries provides perhaps the best explanation of the place of theology in Heidegger's life and thought. He notes that Heidegger "sees his later philosophic concern as a metamorphosis of [his] early interest" in the relationship between Scripture and theological thought. The basic concern remains the same, but the realm in which it operates is different. According to Harries, Heidegger himself "stressed the analogy obtaining between his undertaking and that of the theologian." The word "analogy" is important. Heidegger's concern is in some ways like, in other ways unlike, that of a theologian. But a knowledge of the concerns of theology will illuminate Heidegger's own concerns. Indeed, Harries suggests, "even if the answer given by revelation no longer suffices,
the concern which has led Heidegger to theology remains.¹¹ That is, his questions remain the same as those of the theologian, but they derive from a shifted ground of presupposition, so that his answers inevitably differ from those we associate with the theologian.

The common theological interest shared by Hopkins and Heidegger is thus a ground of both similarity and difference between the two. Hopkins is firmly rooted and grounded in his Christian faith, which provides him not only with his concept of reality, but also with a long-established vocabulary to describe it. Heidegger has his roots in the same ground and asks the same questions, but he lives his search within the modern context of alienation and uncertainty, and his answers remain tentative and exploratory. He refuses, for instance, to declare himself upon the question of the existence of God.¹² Accordingly, although the formulations offered by Hopkins and Heidegger differ, in practice their line of questioning and approach are similar, and the vision of reality from which the questions arise is remarkably similar.

It is difficult to isolate any one specific aspect of the "one only thought" of either Hopkins or Heidegger because all aspects are so closely related that to isolate one is somewhat to misrepresent. This is perhaps more true of Heidegger than of Hopkins, because Heidegger is establishing a new vocabulary and because his concern is so emphatically with the Being within which all beings are gathered that everything in his thought points to the idea of Being and is involved in it. In the case of Hopkins, the problem is less acute because although his thought is no less a whole, it
is firmly rooted in a centuries-old tradition in which the terms
and concepts have been more thoroughly defined. There is therefore
less uncertainty in Hopkins' views and certainly less vagueness in
his expression of them. This does not mean that Hopkins' vision
of reality can be entirely explained by calling it Christian or
even Roman Catholic. Nor does it mean that his ideas are any easier
to grasp than Heidegger's. On the contrary, because he works within
a long-established tradition in which he can take much for granted,
Hopkins is able to be more subtle and considerably more exact than
Heidegger, both in the honing of his ideas and in his expression of
them, as becomes clear in his discussion of the Incarnation.

II. Hopkins

1. Incarnation

In his retreat notes of 1889, Hopkins writes, "All that hap-
pens in Christendom and so in the whole world [is] affected, marked,
as a great seal, ... by the Incarnation." Applying the general
statement to himself as a priest, he adds, "And my life is deter-
mined by the Incarnation down to most of the details of the day"
(S, p. 263). The Incarnation is clearly far more to him than an in-
tellectual belief or a historical event. It touches him personally
in every aspect of his life. It shapes his view of man; of nature,
and of the relationship between nature, man, and God, as well as his
view of language and poetry. Indeed, Hopkins' particular concept
of the Incarnation, which differs somewhat from the orthodox concept,
gives to his thought and his poetry its peculiarly vital quality.

The mainstream of traditional Christian thought understands
the Incarnation as God's answer to the fall of Adam. Christ became a man and died on the cross in order to provide the perfect sinless sacrifice which would redeem mankind from the consequences of the Fall. Hopkins does not question that Christ died to redeem mankind, but he does not believe that Redemption was the sole or primary purpose of the Incarnation. With Duns Scotus, Hopkins holds the doctrine of "the absolute primacy of Christ as the primary purpose of the Incarnation, and the Redemption of mankind as its secondary purpose." The main consequence of this doctrine is the idea that Christ would have become man even if there had been no Fall—an idea fraught with implications for Hopkins' view of both man and nature.

According to the doctrine shared by Scotus and Hopkins, Christ is "the first intention . . . of God outside himself or, as they say, ad extra, outwards, the first outstress of God's power" (S, p. 197). Christ's created nature, his incarnate being, is God's first thought, not only in the temporal but also in the hierarchical sense. Although sacrifice is understood differently in Hopkins' concept of the Incarnation than in the traditional view, the purpose of the Incarnation remains "To give God glory and that by sacrifice" (S, p. 197). Had there been no Fall, "The sacrifice might have been unbloody; by the Fall it became a bloody one" (S, p. 257). Hopkins explains the nature of that sacrifice by saying that Christ "emptied or exhausted himself so far as that was possible, of godhead and behaved only as God's slave" (L, p. 175). Such total submission is Christ's acting out of his essential being and therefore his self-fulfilment. It is at once sacrificial and ecstatic. Indeed for
Hopkins the two cannot be separated. The idea of joy which modern usage associates with the word "ecstasy" is inherent in the idea of sacrifice. The great sacrifice of the Incarnation is associated with "the blissful agony or stress of selving in God," and at the same time with "the festival of the 'peaceful Trinity'" (S, p. 197), which are simply two aspects of the same thing. The very agony involved is blissful.

The first important implication of Hopkins' view of the Incarnation is therefore that the sacrifice of the Divine Being in condescending to human suffering is a joyful one whose celebratory character is not lost, thought it may be obscured, because of the Fall. Related to this view of sacrifice as "blissful agony" is a perspective upon creation which sees it as more directly linked with God than it appears in the orthodox view. As Christopher Devlin explains, Hopkins "saw creation as dependent upon the decree of the Incarnation, and not the other way round. The worlds of angels and of men were created as fields for Christ in which to exercise his adoration of the Father, fields for him to sow and work and harvest." 15 Christ in his created nature goes forth from the godhead; all created nature flows from him and exists for him. Everything created joins in the one purpose of glorifying God. All of creation therefore shares in some way in the nature of the Incarnate Christ and, through him, in the nature of God.

Hopkins expresses something of the wonder of this close connection in an enigmatic and evocative passage earlier quoted in part:

It is as if the blissful agony or stress of selving in God had forced out drops of sweat or blood, which drops were the world, or as
if the lights lit at the festival of the
'peaceful Trinity' through some little cran
ny striking out lit up into being one 'cleave'
out of the world of possible creatures.
(S, p. 197)

"Selving" in Hopkins can be defined as "acting out one's being or
inner nature." God's selving gives rise first to Christ—God the
Son taking on a created nature in order to glorify the Father—and
then to the worlds of angels, men, and nature. Creatures are not
God, but they come from God and retain some identity with him.
Creation shares in both the bliss and the agony of God's selving.
It is like drops of blood from the agony but also like the light
from the festival.

Hopkins summarizes the entire relationship of God, Christ and
creation in a succinct and beautiful passage:

God's utterance of himself in himself is God
the Word, outside himself is this world. This
world then is word, expression, news of God.
Therefore its end, its purpose, its purport,
its meaning, is God and its life or work to
name and praise him (S, p. 129).

God's utterance of himself, his "selving" within his own divine be-
ing, is the Word, Christ. But that same utterance, selving, when
directed outside himself is the created world. Like Christ, the
world utters God, speaks and tells of him. Nature is one in pur-
pose and meaning with Christ as Word of God. It is in some sense a
secondary word, a lesser word. Unlike Christ, it is not God as well
as creature. It is only creature, but because Christ shares in that
creaturally status, nature is glorified by its likeness to Christ,
who is the meeting-place of God and material being. Because of the
Incarnation, nature is always more than simply its own material self.
The meaning of nature is God, Hopkins states. Nature by its very being is "word of God." Nature is what God says of himself outside himself. Its "work" is to "name and praise him." It is Hopkins' sense of the vitality of that being and purpose which allows him to say, "All things therefore are charged with love, are charged with God and if we know how to touch them give off sparks and take fire, yield drops and flow, ring and tell of him" (S, p. 195). For Hopkins, "the very core of the Incarnation is to see everywhere in the reality of concrete and seemingly trivial objects and actions the instressed presence and activity of Christ." The Incarnation provides a close and direct link between nature and God, between man and God.17

2. The Self

The Incarnation has a different and special meaning for man than for other creatures, not simply because Christ died to redeem man but also because it is human flesh which Christ assumed. Man therefore shares more intimately in Christ's nature than do other creatures. For Hopkins, man gives God glory "even by his being, beyond all visible creatures" (S, p. 239). Man is the high point of creation and therefore his very existence glorifies God more than that of any other creature. The implications of Hopkins' particular view of the Incarnation for his view of man can best be understood through his concept of "selving."

Like Scotus, Hopkins is fascinated by individuation. For Scotus, "individuality . . . is the ultimate perfection of things: it enables them to receive in themselves the act of existence. Only
thus they become real in the full sense of the term.\textsuperscript{18} Only individuals exist; only individuals are real. A key element in Scotus' view of individuals is that the essence of the self is incommunicable.\textsuperscript{19} It is impossible to know another self. Every individual is a mystery to every other. Hopkins' view of the self incorporates Scotus' emphasis on the individual as well as his view that the essence of selfhood is incommunicable. Hopkins, however, adds another distinctive element.

For Hopkins, selfhood is not static but dynamic. He turns the noun into a verb: a self selves. All individual creatures are selves and therefore participate in the action of selving. Even God selves; divine selving is what created the world. Sister Mary Zoghby explains selving as an equation of "the essence of things with their actions."\textsuperscript{20} What a thing is, is what it does. Hopkins' own most explicit exposition of what he means by selving occurs in his "Kingfishers" sonnet:

\begin{quote}
Each mortal thing does one thing and the same:
Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;
Selves--goes its self; myself it speaks and spells,
Crying \textit{What I do is me: for that I came.}\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

The self is that incommunicable "being indoors each one dwells," the essence of a creature, that which makes it unique and individual. The self is "indoors," but the creature "goes its self," that is, expresses that inner being, "deals it out" so that it speaks in the world. The incommunicable self is thus in some sense communicated --although, as we shall see in a later discussion of inscape and in-stress, only those with eyes to see can decipher the inner being of creatures which they reveal in their action of selving. The doing
reveals the being: "What I do is me."

Being, doing, and saying fuse in Hopkins' concept of selving, as, in a passage quoted earlier, God's "utterance" is also his creative action (S, p. 129). The action is both the being itself and the speaking of that being. Each creature is a word of God and was created "to give him praise, reverence, and service; to give him glory" (S, p. 238). All creatures other than man glorify God simply by fulfilling their inner natures, doing what they are, each in its unique and particular way. And "what they can they always do" (S, p. 239). To selve is, in essence, to act out what one truly is and thereby to glorify God.

As man participates more fully in the Incarnation than do other creatures, so too he participates more fully in selfhood. Man is the only creature who is consciously a self, who can recognize his own uniqueness and "blank unlikeness" (S, p. 123) from all other creatures and indeed from all other human selves. Hopkins vividly captures the sense of the self in both its uniqueness and its incommunicability:

When I consider my selfbeing, my consciousness and feeling of myself, that taste of myself, of I and me above and in all things, which is more distinctive than the taste of ale or alum, more distinctive than the smell of walnutleaf or camphor, and is incommunicable by any means to another man (as when I was a child I used to ask myself: What must it be to be someone else?). Nothing else in nature comes near this unspeakable stress of pitch, distinctiveness, and selving, this selfbeing of my own. Nothing explains it or resembles it, except so far as this, that other men to themselves have the same feeling. But this only multiplies the phenomena to be explained so far as the cases are like and do resemble. But to me there is no resemblance: searching nature I taste self but at one tankard, that of my own being.
The development, refinement, condensation of nothing shews any sign of being able to match this to me or give me another taste of it, a taste even resembling it (S, p. 123).

For Hopkins, this concentrated sense of self is the strongest argument for the existence of God—an argument which Donald Walhout refers to as "an argument from radical uniqueness of self."22 Beginning with his own sense of himself as "more distinctive and higher pitched than anything else I see" (S, p. 122), Hopkins posits the existence of God the Creator. He summarizes his argument thus:

And when I ask where does all this throng and stack of being, so rich, so distinctive, so important, come from / nothing I see can answer me. And this whether I speak of human nature or of my individuality, my selfbeing. For human nature, being more highly pitched, selved, and distinctive than anything in the world, can have been developed, evolved, condensed, from the vastness of the world not anyhow or by the working of common powers but only by one of finer or higher pitch and determination than itself and certainly than any that elsewhere we see (S, pp. 122-23).

Man is the peak of creation, but man himself can only be explained by assuming the existence and action of a being yet higher and greater than man. For Hopkins, all that exists does so because of the Incarnation, but knowledge of the Incarnation can only come about by knowledge of the self. The first step to knowledge of God is "knowledge of one's own self-being."23

As the human self differs from other selves, so too does human selving differ from the selving of other creatures, although "Man, like purely natural beings, truly selves when he fulfills the destiny of his nature, when he becomes completely that being which God, in his providence, had predestined for him."24 Man selves by being himself, by acting out the being within him. But man is far more
complex than other creatures. As Hopkins says, "man can know God, can mean to give him glory. This then was why he was made, to give God glory and to mean to give it; to praise God freely, willingly to reverence him, gladly to serve him" (S, p. 239). Man shares with Christ not only the material being which all created things share with him, not only the human being which Christ assumed when he became a creature, but also and most importantly the power to choose, the free will by which God the Son chose to take on material being in order to glorify God in the great sacrifice. Man can consent to God's plan for him and become "the ideal self envisioned in the mind of God."25 Or he can refuse and go his own way.

Man, like other creatures, is created to glorify God. The call to do so, says Hopkins, is "a call into being" (S, p. 200). The consent of the elect to God's will is a "correspondence with grace and seconding of God's designs [which] is like a taking part in their own creation, the creation of their best selves. And again the wicked and the lost are like halfcreations and have but a half-being" (S, p. 197). To disobey God's call is to choose a kind of non-existence. It is a refusal to selve, to fulfil one's inner being.

By contrast, to choose to respond to the "call into being" is in some sense to become Christ. As Hopkins expresses it in the "Kingfishers" sonnet:

I say more: the just man justices;
Keeps grace: that keeps all his goings graces;
Acts in God's eye what in God's eye he is--
Christ--for Christ plays in ten thousand places,
Lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his
To the Father through the features of men's faces.
Nature is lower-case word of God, but man is more than that. If he fully selves, consents to what God calls him to, he is Christ himself. There is an absolute identity of the just man and Christ. The action of God's grace in the consenting Christian, because it is done through Christ, "is Christ in his member on the one side, his member in Christ on the other. It is as if a man said: That is Christ playing at me and me playing at Christ, only that it is no play but truth; That is Christ being me and me being Christ" (S, p. 154). And because there are many such just men, "Christ plays in ten thousand places,/Lovely in limbs and lovely in eyes not his/To the Father through the features of men's faces." As Hopkins says elsewhere, "Christ was himself but one and lived and died but once; but the Holy Ghost makes every Christian another Christ, an After-Christ; lives a million lives in every age" (S, p. 100). At the same time, by becoming most fully Christ, a human being becomes most fully his unique individual self. As Hopkins explains, full conformity with Christ "best brings out the nature of the man himself, as the lettering on a sail or device upon a flag are best seen when it fills" (S, p. 195). As Christ himself expressed his being most fully in the great sacrifice of the Incarnation, so man expresses his own being most fully in imitation of Christ. To lose one's self, in this context, is to find one's self.26

A crucial element in human selving, then, is choice, consent, which, Hopkins suggests, "implies no degree, it is a pure Yes or No" (S, p. 145). He explains such consent as expressed by the auxiliary do, "which when we employ or emphasise, as 'he said it, he did say it', we do not mean that the fact is any more a fact, but that we
the more state it." Consent then means "the doing be, the doing choose," where being and choice are emphasized by that consent. Thus, "Where there was no question of will it would become mere fact; where there is will it is free action, moral action" (S, p. 151). The selving of other creatures, because there is no consent, no freedom, is simply the acting out of what they are. Human selving is "the doing be" because it is consent to such acting out.

Man's freedom in relation to God extends to his relationship with nature, for which, in his privileged position, he is in some sense responsible. Man "is the median between God and nature" a position which affects him in several ways. Hopkins himself says, "All the things we see are made and provided for us . . . . Search the whole world and you will find it a million-million fold contrivance of providence planned for our use and patterned for our admiration" (S, p. 90). The words "use" and "admiration" are both significant. Although man constantly "uses" nature, he does so blindly and obtusely, oblivious to the fact that "the reason for the natural creation is that it may help men to know and to love God." Nature is word of God. Man is responsible both to hear that word and to speak it, to be "Earth's eye, tongue, or heart" (P, 58). Moreover, he is responsible to preserve the natural beauty through which God speaks, to "admire" in an active as well as a passive sense. Human being—selving—involves responsibility at once to the created world and, through it, to its creator.
III. Heidegger

1. Being

In Heidegger, it is the concept of Being which assumes the central and controlling position taken by the Incarnation in Hopkins’ thought. Heidegger’s concern with Being determines his view of man, the world, language, and poetry. Because of the centrality of Being to his view of reality and because of the religious tone of his language and the theological shape of his thought, there is a tendency among certain critics to translate "Being" as "God." Heidegger himself, however, would not do so. He defines Being as "that which determines entities as entities" (BT, p. 25) and adds, "The Being of entities 'is' not itself an entity" (BT, p. 26). Since God is an entity, Being is not God, but "that ultimate condition which allows all beings, God as well, to exist at all." Being is that which underlies and sustains all things and allows them to be.

If Being is not a thing, neither is it an abstraction. Nathan Scott calls it "primal energy," while Rudolph Gerber qualifies it as a "condition," a "principle," a "light," a "process." These various ways of explaining Being point to one of its defining characteristics, elusiveness. Heidegger observes that any attempt to define Being "has nothing to hold onto. All our ideas slip away and dissolve in vagueness" (WICT, p. 225). Being is outside the categories of rational thought. It eludes all definition and can be grasped at all only through beings, which by the fact of their being allow Being to shine forth. The elusiveness of Being, the impossibility of ever grasping it other than briefly and partially, together with its undoubted reality, evoke in Heidegger an attitude of awe and reverence.
before the very fact of Being as it is revealed in beings. According to Steiner, for Heidegger, "It is the unique and specific business of philosophy . . . to be incessantly astonished at and focused on the fact that all things are." Being is a mystery whose reality evokes (or ought to evoke) astonishment in all people.

Because Being is mystery, it is the Holy, a term which Scott explains as "that power and form wherewith a thing is what it is--whose penumbra of mystery naturally evokes an attitude of awe and astonishment." Holiness is not an attribute of Being, it is identical with Being. It is Being in its aspect of mystery. Being is the Holy because it is elusive, ungraspable, mysterious, and yet always and everywhere present in all that is. Being encompasses everything. Moreover, Being is dynamic. The word "Being" is a participle, that is, a word which takes "part in both the nominal and the verbal meaning" (WICT, p. 220). It expresses "the act whereby the totality of that which is reveals itself in and through consciousness." Being, moreover, is "the participle which gathers all other possible participles into itself" (WICT, p. 221). The act of Being is prior to and encompasses all other acts. Such a concept of Being is reminiscent of Hopkins' concept of selving, in which being and act are also one, but the two cases differ in that Heidegger gives a distinct priority to Being, while Hopkins, in his love of particular selves, is equally if not more concerned with the doing that reveals the being.

Heidegger insists on the distinction between Being and beings, the ontological difference. Being is revealed only in beings, which in turn exist only as they are upheld by Being. Being and beings
are inextricably interrelated, but they are not the same. Says Heidegger, "The duality of individual beings and Being must firstly lie before us openly, be taken to heart and there kept safely, before it can be conceived and dealt with in the sense of participation of the one, a particular being, in the other, Being" (WICT, p. 223). The distinction between Being and beings must remain clear, or the danger remains of such a misunderstanding as assuming that Being is a being among beings instead of something beyond and above all beings. Gerber describes the ontological difference as that between product (beings) and process (Being)35—a distinction which will reappear with interesting implications in a later discussion of inscape and instress.

It is clear that Heidegger's concept of Being cannot be exactly identified with Hopkins' concept of the Incarnation. Nor can the two be said to be quite parallel. Being is more abstract and impersonal than the Incarnate Christ, though it is not an abstraction, nor does it lack all attributes of personality; it has, for instance, creative power and, it would seem, purpose. Hopkins describes the Incarnation in far more exact and immediate terms than those in which Heidegger describes Being.

What matters, however, for the purposes of this study, is that the concept of Being plays a very similar role in Heidegger's view of reality to that which the Incarnation plays in Hopkins'. An observation by Gerber about Being helps to illustrate the parallel. Having first said that Being is transcendence, Gerber adds,

Yet ... Being is not a radical transcendence irrevocably distant and separate from the world of beings. ... Being must therefore be the abiding presence which keeps things temporally
present as being. Insofar as it keeps them going through Time, Being is that "presence" in all beings which is their most fundamental and most common character . . . . Neither pure immanence nor pure transcendence, Being is that presence which is in beings while yet being apart from them. 36

With only slight variations, this passage could be translated as a description of Hopkins’ view of the way in which creatures relate to Christ. As Being is apart from and yet present in all beings, so too for Hopkins Christ is apart from and yet present in all creatures. It is his presence which gives them being and sustains them in it. They participate in his being by virtue of the fact that Christ by his Incarnation took on material being, thereby glorifying all matter. At the same time, they are not Christ. By the fact of their existence, however, they point to Christ, just as by their existence beings point to Being.

2. Man

Heidegger lacks the fascination with individuals which characterizes Hopkins. If Heidegger is awed by the fact that things are, Hopkins is awed by the fact that things are. The difference is consistent throughout their thought. At the same time, Heidegger, like Hopkins, is profoundly interested in the human self, in human being and its meaning, position, and responsibility as these relate to Being, but also to itself and to other beings, with the emphasis always on Being. Where the human self is concerned, Hopkins and Heidegger define its meaning and purpose in very similar terms, though they do so, of course, within different frames of reference.

For Heidegger, man’s being is always defined with reference to
Being, just as in Hopkins man is always defined ultimately in relation to Christ. "Man," Heidegger says, "is the being who is in that he points toward 'Being,' and who can be himself only as he always and everywhere refers himself to what is" (WICT, p. 149). Man's mission is to point toward Being. Heidegger calls man "the persona, the mask, of Being" (WICT, p. 62), that behind which and within which Being lives. It is given to man to show forth Being in a way that it is given to no other being.

Indeed, so close is the connection that "Each of the two members of the relationship between man's nature and Being already implies the relation itself. To speak to the heart of the matter: there is no such thing here as members of the relation, nor the relation as such" (WICT, p. 79). To think of Being is to imply human being and vice versa. As Vincent Vycinas explains, "It would be wrong to think of Being and man as two separate beings who have as their properties certain interrelations with each other. It is also wrong to think of them as one identical Being." Man and Being are so deeply involved in each other that neither can be "thought" without the other.

We have seen in Hopkins a relationship between the just man and Christ which is in some sense similar to that in Heidegger between Being and man. For Hopkins, if man fulfils his destiny, he becomes Christ in what is in effect an absolute identity (S, p. 154). However, despite the absolute identity, Christ and the individual do not melt into each other as Being and man seem to do in Heidegger. The just man, identified with Christ, remains nonetheless distinct from Christ. The difference may have more to do with the greater
precision and exactness of Hopkins' language and with the fact that he writes within a context where he can take much for granted than with a major difference in thought between him and Heidegger.

For Heidegger, man cannot but participate in Being, not only because he is a being, but because he is the only being who knows himself to be. As Heidegger explains, "Man is the animal that confronts face-to-face. A mere animal, such as a dog, never confronts anything, it can never confront anything to its face; to do so, the animal would have to perceive itself" (WICT, p. 61). It is man's awareness of his own existence which gives him his peculiar relationship to Being. Man is the only being who can recognize Being not only in himself but in other beings as well. Man then has both a privilege and a responsibility which other beings do not have.

Human responsibility to other beings involves seeing them not as objects to manipulate and control but as beings, that is, sites for the revelation of Being. 38 "Our nature's safety," Heidegger says, "demands the rescue of things from mere objectness" (PLT, p. 130). Man rescues things from objectness by relinquishing the illusion of mastery over them and allowing them to be what they are. Such an attitude does not imply passive indifference, but "a concern with, a caring for, an answerability to, the presentness and mystery of Being itself, of Being as it transfigures beings." 39 Man fulfills his nature by allowing beings to reveal their own participation in Being.

In his explanation of "saving the earth," Heidegger sums up (mostly negatively) human responsibility to beings: "To save really means to set something free into its own presenting. To save the
earth is more than to exploit it or even wear it out. Saving the earth does not master the earth and does not subjugate it, which is merely one step from spoliation" (PLT, p. 150). Science and technology exemplify the negative in Heidegger's explanation. As to the positive, as it relates to natural objects such as a tree in bloom, what matters is that "the tree and we are" (WICT, p. 41).

The important thing is to let the tree be what it is without trying to analyze or explain it. As it relates to utensils, the required attitude "does not debase what is being used--on the contrary, use is determined and defined by leaving the used thing in its essential nature ... To use something is to let it enter into its essential nature, to keep it safe in its essence" (WICT, p. 187).

For Hopkins too man has a responsibility to allow things to be what they are. In his context, that means allowing them to realize their own being and thereby to glorify God. Creatures are words of God and if man allows them to "selve," he reads in them the power and presence of the Incarnate Christ. However, for Hopkins as for Heidegger, man but rarely fulfills his responsibility to creatures. He uses, abuses, and destroys. He is blind and deaf to what he is called to be (P, 31, 35, 43).

IV. Meditative Thought

Heidegger's view of what it is to be fully human is illustrated in his concept of meditative thought—a concept which encompasses his whole attitude to Being, beings, and man. Heidegger's meditative thinker is very like Hopkins' just man, and the relationship of man, beings, and Being to which the thinker is called provides a
parallel to Hopkins' view of that relationship as it emerges in his concepts of inscape and instress, to be considered later.

Heidegger believes that "man today is in flight from thinking" (DT, p. 45). The kind of thinking he has in mind has been put aside in favor of scientific or "calculative" thinking. Moreover, "the involvement with thought is in itself a rare thing, reserved for few people" (WICT, p. 126). For these reasons, Heidegger defines meditative thinking partly in terms of what it can not do:

1. Thinking does not bring knowledge as do the sciences.
2. Thinking does not produce usable practical wisdom.
3. Thinking solves no cosmic riddles.
4. Thinking does not endow us directly with the power to act (WICT, p. 159).

Calculative thinking has a goal in mind. It seeks facts and practical knowledge. It "objectifies and breaks up the whole. It is directed toward the handling and mastery of the things within the world. It is, of course, a thinking that is concerned with beings, not with Being."\(^{40}\) As such, calculative thinking works in ignorance of its own foundation, to which only meditative thinking has access because meditative thinking is concerned with the whole. This concern with the whole means also that meditative thinking cares not about facts, but about meaning (DT, p. 46).

Meditative thinking acknowledges man's prior participation in all that is, and the impossibility of objectivity and therefore of control. Heidegger observes that "every way of thinking takes its way already within the total relation of Being and man's nature, or else it is not thinking at all" (WICT, p. 80). True thinking occurs always within the primary relationship of Being and man, and true
thinking accepts the circularity of all interpretation within that relationship. "We ourselves are in the text and texture of the question" (WICT, p. 116). Only involvement in thinking can tell us anything about what thinking is: "Only the leap into the river tells us what is called swimming" (WICT, p. 21).

In its own way, meditative thinking is as demanding as calculative thinking. As Heidegger says, "At times it requires a greater effort. It demands more practice. It is in need of even more delicate care than any other genuine craft" (DT, p. 47). The skills required, however, are less easily defined than those required for calculative thinking. Meditative thinking demands a relinquishing of prejudice and polemic (WICT, p. 13), of questioning (OWTL, p. 71), and of single-mindedness (DT, p. 53), all of which involve some assumption of human "mastery" over what is thought. By contrast to such assumption of mastery, meditative thinking requires one to abandon the security of certainty (or the illusion thereof) and enter the realm of ambiguity and multiplicity. Says Heidegger, "All true thought remains open to more than one interpretation" (WICT, p. 71), and "Everything that lies before us is ambiguous" (WICT, p. 201). There is no final and conclusive word about anything, no definitive interpretation. As Vucinas says, "True thinking constantly starts over and over again." There is no basis for ever believing that it is done, concluded, finished.

Thinking requires first and always an attitude of openness like that with which Heidegger faces the tree in bloom. To think is to take up a position of subservience. Heidegger states, "To think is before all else to listen, to let ourselves be told something"
All true thinking is directed to the Being of beings. A thinker "thinks what is, in what respect it is, and in what way it is. He thinks that which is, particular beings in their Being. The thinkers' thinking would thus be the relatedness to the Being of beings" (WICT, p. 86). To think is to be open to Being by allowing beings to reveal themselves as what they are. It is to assume one's essential human nature as "the being who is insofar as he thinks" (WICT, p. 31).

Heidegger waxes mystical as he pursues the nature of thinking, by means of etymology, to memory and thanking. Memory, he says, "means as much as devotion: a constant concentrated abiding with something—not just with something that has passed, but in the same way with what is present and with what may come" (WICT, p. 140). Thanc is closely related; it is "man's inmost mind, the heart, the heart's core, that innermost essence of man which reaches outward most fully and to the outermost limits, and so decisively that, rightly considered, the idea of an inner and an outer world does not arise" (WICT, p. 144). The thanc, from which we derive "thanking," is man's essence prior to subject and object. Man is thanking. His inmost essence, "the thanc unfolds in memory," the concentrated abiding with what is (WICT, p. 145). Thinking is the abiding of man's inmost self, the essence of his being, in the presence of Being. Thinking is thanking. "Original thinking is the thanks owed for being" (WICT, p. 141). To think well is therefore the best possible way to give thanks, the best possible way to live up to and fulfil the essence of human nature.

The call to thinking is thus a call to a way of life which is
in essence not unlike that to a religious way of life. Heidegger himself suggests such a connection by his equation of memory with devotion. It is clear in the continuation of that passage that by devotion he means religious devotion. He remarks that the word memory "possesses the special tone of the pious and piety, and designates the devotion of prayer, only because it denotes the all-comprehensive relation of concentration upon the holy and gracious" (WICT, p. 145). Although the words "piety," "prayer," and "holy" do not mean the same in Heidegger as they do in Hopkins, it is impossible to escape their religious connotations, and their presence in this context justifies the analogy of the call to thought to a religious vocation. Indeed, the call to thought is not unlike the way Hopkins would probably perceive his own call to the priesthood. It is not something he chooses, but something which chooses him. He is free to accept or deny that call, but only if he accepts it is he truly himself, does he truly fulfill his potential.

Like a priest or perhaps a mystic the thinker does not choose his destiny. Heidegger says of Nietzsche that he "neither made nor chose his way himself, no more than any other thinker ever did. He is sent on his way" (WICT, p. 46). Thought does not arise from human initiative. It is "a response on our part to a call which issues from the nature of things, from Being itself."42 The presence of beings "is the hail, the salutation which Being addresses to us."43 In the beings around us we encounter the call of Being into our own being, into the thoughtful, thankful living that makes us truly human. Says Heidegger:

Thinking is perhaps, after all, an unavoidable
path, which refuses to be a path of salvation and brings no new wisdom. The path is at most a field path, a path across fields, which does not just speak of renunciation but already has renounced, namely, renounced the claim to a binding doctrine and a valid cultural achievement or a deed of the spirit (PLT, p. 185).

If man is to be fully himself, the path of thinking is unavoidable. At the same time, it is a way which promises nothing except its own difficulty, which certainly promises no success as we normally understand success. To think is to accept to live without certainty and without safety in proximity to Being.

Meditative thought, as thanking, is very like the just man's imitation of Christ—the surrendering of the self in "the great sacrifice." Indeed, in an early essay, "What Is Metaphysics?" (1929), Heidegger equates thanking with sacrifice in a way strongly reminiscent of Hopkins: "In sacrifice there is expressed that hidden thanking which alone does homage to the grace wherewith Being has endowed the nature of man" (EB, p. 358). In Hopkins, the just man is the one who "becomes Christ" by consenting to fulfill his being by "selvesacrifice to God" (S, p. 154). The just man chooses to relinquish control and submit his life to God in the same way as the thinker chooses to "listen" to the call of Being and submit his life to Being by abiding in its presence. The just man gives God glory in the same way the thinker thanks. Both give being back to God (S, p. 129) by this act of devotion. And both become fully themselves—by acquiescence, that is, by saying yes to a call which comes from outside them and which they have not chosen.
V. Inscape and Instress

Meditative thought involves an extraordinary way of seeing in which the meaning as well as the mere fact of beings comes to light. The same is true of Hopkins' dual concept of inscape and instress. Interestingly, in his use of the terms "inscape" and "instress," Hopkins comes close to Heidegger in another way: it is here that he most closely approaches Heidegger's use of language, in which terms melt into one another and refuse to remain distinct. This uncharacteristic vagueness in Hopkins is probably related to the newness of the terms, as is perhaps also true of Heidegger—to be the first to use a word at all (Hopkins) or to use it in a new and specialized way (Heidegger) is necessarily to sacrifice precision, if not in one's own mind, certainly in the minds of one's readers.

Hopkins coined the words "inscape" and "instress" for his own use and therefore felt little need to define them. What definition he provides of inscape occurs in the context of literary discussion in his letters. Instress is also briefly defined in this context, but also (and differently) in his private spiritual writings. The minimal definition he provides of the two terms does not cover his varied uses in his journals, his spiritual writings, and (in the case of instress) his poems. Nor does it indicate the connotations of the words. Hopkins' uses of the words frequently illuminate the concepts beyond the bare definitions and reveal a certain overlap between the terms which, while it complicates a clear understanding, indicates the closeness and complexity of their relationship.

The only direct explanations of inscape which Hopkins provides occur in letters to his literary friends. In a letter to Patmore,
he defines inscape as "species or individually-distinctive beauty of style" (FL, p. 373). The only other definition occurs in a letter to Bridges, in which he explains inscape as "design, pattern" (L, p. 66). The two definitions are not mutually exclusive and indeed several critics combine the two, as John Pick does in referring inscape to "some particular thing of beauty which is distinctive and patterned." The concept of inscape reflects Hopkins' fascination with individual selves, whose particular identity is made visible in and through distinctive design or pattern. In relation to natural objects, he tends to emphasize the species-distinctive, that is, that which makes bluebells bluebells or oak trees oak trees, but when he is concerned with man or works of art, it is the distinctiveness of the single individual that concerns him.

The in of "inscape", indicates that outer form, while it is the immediate means of access to an object's real self and cannot be dismissed as unimportant, is not of primary importance. Hopkins' note on a horse illustrates this aspect of inscape:

... caught that inscape in the horse that you see in the pediment especially and other bas-reliefs of the Parthenon and even which Sophocles had felt and expresses in two choruses of the Oedipus Coloneus, running on the likeness of a horse to a breaker, a wave of the sea curling over. I looked at the groin or the flank and saw how the set of hair symmetrically flowed outwards from it to all parts of the body, so that, following that one may inscape the whole beast very simply (J, pp. 241-42).

This passage brings out the fact that not every sight of a horse grants the observer this particular inscape or indeed any inscape at all. Inscape is clearly then not the immediately perceptible, obvious pattern, but another and deeper design which must be
"caught." It is elusive. It is also clear that Hopkins considers this particular inscape valid for all horses (since it is an inscape which occurs in the Parthenon and in Sophocles). In this case, inscape has to do with the species-distinctive, the inner essence or nature which makes any horse a horse.

Moreover, perception of inscape does not come easily or to everyone, and one must work to develop and maintain the capacity to see it. Remarkling upon his perception of inscape in a barn, Hopkins adds, "I thought how sadly beauty of inscape was unknown and buried away from simple people and yet how near at hand it was if they had eyes to see it and it could be called out everywhere again" (J, p. 221). Inscape is present in the everyday world, but most people are blind to it, do not have "eyes to see it." It has to be "called out" by an observant eye and a receptive mind—a receptivity which must, moreover, be consciously maintained: "Unless you refresh the mind from time to time you cannot always remember or believe how deep the inscape in things is" (J, p. 205). One can also train the eye to see more clearly, so that perception of inscape comes more easily and pierces more deeply into the underlying reality: "I saw the inscape though freshly, as if my eye were still growing, though with a companion the eye and the ear are for the most part shut and ins-stress cannot come" (J, p. 228). Perception of inscape occurs most often in solitude because the presence of a companion does not allow for the attentiveness normally required to "catch" inscape.

Hopkins is constantly watching for the inner design or pattern which defines individual things or groups of things, whether in the world of nature or in that of art. Inscape is what is "caught" when
things open up to reveal their inner nature, their truth, their being. If man is attentive to the selving of creatures, what he perceives is their inscape. The opening of things to reveal their selves can occur at any time and through any aspect of the created world:

All the world is full of inscape and chance left free to act falls into an order as well as purpose: looking out of my window I caught it in the random clods and broken heaps of snow made by the cast of a broom. The same of the path trenched by footsteps in ankle deep snow across the fields (J, p. 230).

The superficial appearances of the natural world conceal a truth or reality which is not immediately apparent and which to some people is never apparent at all. To the observer with eyes to see, the world reveals order, purpose, design, pattern, which unifies the created world and makes it a whole. This underlying design is inscape, which is itself a sign or pointer to the power which energizes, upholds, and sustains it.

Hopkins' concept of inscape is suggestive of the vision of reality which emerges in Heidegger's discussion of meditative thought. Once again, however, the consistent difference of emphasis between Hopkins and Heidegger emerges. Inscape reveals a fascination with "God's grandeur in the flesh and the world" which differs from the thinker's focus upon Being. Nonetheless, the thinker responding to the call of Being as "heard" in the presence of beings is very like the man who cultivates an awareness of creatures which will allow their essential being, their inscape to "flame out" (P, 31). But, as it is difficult to speak of beings without reference to Being, so too is it difficult to speak of inscape without reference to
instress. Being underlies beings as instress underlies inscape.

In his letters Hopkins provides only the briefest indication of what he means by instress. In a letter to Patmore, he refers to "instress or feeling" (FL, p. 320). In his spiritual writings, he refers to "energy or instress" (S, p. 137). Instress then is energy or feeling—two terms which may at first seem incompatible. However, it is clear from the contexts in which the word appears that instress occurs in both the perceiver and the object perceived. Thomas Zaniello distinguishes the two as cause and effect: instress "is an inherent force in nature... by which the inscape remains an entity, or instress as cause, and it is the bridge or 'stem of stress between us and things,' or instress as effect." As cause, instress is energy; as effect, it is feeling.

It is in the spiritual writings rather than in the journals that Hopkins' use of instress most clearly reveals both its dual aspect and its elusiveness. In his sermon on "The Kingdom of Christ," Hopkins associates instress with both sovereign and subject. The instress of the sovereign is that of the lawsayer while that of the subject is obedience (S, p. 167). Instress can be seen as the subject's response to the shaping power of the sovereign, or, translated into Christian terms, man's obedience to God's will. Instress originates in God, who makes his will and purpose felt in man, whose obedience thereto is also instress. Instress is clearly associated with choice and free will. When I make a decision, Hopkins says, "I instress my will to so-and-so" (S, p. 150). It is therefore a free response for or against God's will: In the spiritual writings, instress in the subject is far more than feeling. Indeed, it moves
in a quite different realm from that of feeling. The latter term implies simple emotion, while Hopkins' use of instress suggests conscious, rational decision.

Clearly too, as instress in the perceiver is more complex than simple emotional response, instress in the perceived is more complex than the simple presence of a sustaining energy. Hopkins does associate instress with the life principle. He refers to "all that energy or instress with which the soul animates and otherwise acts in the body" (S, p. 137). But the presence of instress is a presence which demands response and requires more than a simple seeing. It requires acquiescence and submission.

Inscape and instress are as inextricably interrelated as Being and man or Being and beings. Di Cicco describes the relationship as "product and process, shape and shaping force"—a description which we have earlier seen applied to the distinction between Being and beings.\(^49\) As Gerber applies it, Being is the process which produces beings; as Di Cicco does, instress is the process which produces inscape. The interrelationship of inscape and instress is superficially less all-encompassing than Heidegger's vision, but, like the concept of meditative thought in Heidegger, it gathers into itself every aspect of Hopkins' thought. Inscape is what makes a thing itself; it is its truth, its essence, its reality. It is in the selving of creatures that their inscape is revealed. As we recall, for Hopkins selving is the acting out, the living out of one's being, and that being participates in the Incarnation. Every creature is a word of God in which God's presence and truth can be read. Hopkins makes this explicit in a note upon a bluebell: "I do not think I
have ever seen anything more beautiful than the bluebell I have been looking at. I know the beauty of our Lord by it. It[s inscape] is [mixed of] strength and grace, like an ash [tree]" (J, p. 199) (Hopkins' brackets). Perception of the bluebell's inscape is a hearing of the word of God, a recognition of the underlying presence of Christ in all creation.

Man is called to glorify God by relinquishing his own will and consenting to God's will for him, very much as in Heidegger he is called to be open to what beings tell him and to respond to the call of Being by recognition of its presence and mystery and by thankfulness for the gift of being. In Hopkins, man is fully himself only when he "becomes Christ"--a process which includes awareness of inscape and a response of acquiescence to the call which underlies inscape. Christ and man meet in the notion of instress as both the call of God and the response of man. Inscape is the means by which that call is heard. Similarly, Being and man meet in the concept of the thinker, who is man responding to the call of Being as perceived in the presence of beings.

A closer look at Hopkins' notes on Parmenides supports the connection between Hopkins' and Heidegger's views of Being and reality. Hopkins first states what the main concern of Parmenides is and then interprets it in his own terms:

His great text, which he repeats with religious conviction, is that Being is and Not-Being is not--which perhaps one can say, a little over-defining his meaning, means that all things are upheld by instress and are meaningless without it (J, p. 127).

Instress seems to be associated with Being, that which upholds all
things and gives them meaning. Individual beings are not Being, but they have being and to the extent that such being is perceivable, meaning is also perceivable in things. What Hopkins means is further explained towards the end of the notes:

For the phenomenal world . . . is the brink, limbus, lapping, run-and-mingle / of two principles which meet in the scope of everything—probably Being, under its modification or siding of particular oneness or Being, and Not-Being, under its siding of the Many. . . . The inscape will be the proportion of the mixture (J, p. 130).

All things are a mixture of Being and Not-Being, the one and the many. It is "the proportion of the mixture" which gives a being its particular individuality, its peculiar selfhood, its inscape. Man, for instance, would have a greater proportion of Being to Not-Being because he is the most clearly selved of all creatures. As Marjorie Coogan suggests, then, "inscape is ontological, the never-to-be-repeated 'bead of being'".50 It has to do with the ultimate ground of reality.

The heart of Hopkins' notes on Parmenides is his remark about the yes and is of truth. The remark follows upon Hopkins' translation of the central expression in Parmenides, which he says

may roughly be expressed by things are or there is truth. . . . But indeed I have often felt when I have been in this mood and felt the depth of an instress or how fast the inscape holds a thing that nothing is so pregnant and straightforward to the truth as simple yes and is (J, p. 127).

The mood he refers to is obviously that state in which he can perceive inscape, "catch" it and acknowledge it, instress it by acquiescence to the simple fact of its truth. At its simplest, inscape is the is, instress the yes which together have more to do with
truth than anything else does. Inscape is being, instress is both
the presence of Being in that being and acquiescence to that pres-
ence, as well as all that such acquiescence involves in terms of
human destiny and responsibility. When one perceives the inscape
in beings, when one sees them as beings in and through which Being
reveals itself, there is nothing to be said but yes and is. For
Hopkins as for Heidegger, nothing is more true than that things are.

VI. Conclusion

A comparison of Hopkins' "one only thought" with Heidegger's
reveals a remarkable similarity in the broad outlines of their
thought. Both define man and the natural world in relation to a
reality above and beyond the immediate world, and both arrive at
what knowledge is possible of ultimate reality through experience
of immediate reality. Both perceive man as the highest of beings
because he alone is able to relate to ultimate reality and because
he alone can contribute to his own "creation." Both also see man's
privileged position as involving responsibility to all that is—a
responsibility which man too often shirks. The affinity between
Hopkins and Heidegger justifies the use of Heideggerian terminology
to "translate" some of the poems into language more accessible to
present-day readers than is Hopkins' own unabashedly theist language
—a "translation" which will in turn illuminate Hopkins' own termi-
nology so as to allow for a deeper understanding of the ultimate
differences between him and Heidegger. These differences emerge
first in a telling and ultimately crucial difference of emphasis
whose full significance will be seen only in a close study of the
language of Hopkins' poems. While both Hopkins and Heidegger are concerned with Being as it is perceived in and through beings, for Heidegger the primary emphasis is upon Being, while for Hopkins beings in their uniqueness and particularity never lose their fascination. Because Hopkins sees "Being" as participating in the visible and tangible through the Incarnation, he is more in love with the immediate world of the visible and tangible than is Heidegger, whose love is finally less for the world than for that idea of Being which is its abstraction. Hopkins' love for the world finds its fullest expression in his careful shaping of language to capture in poetry the beauty and reality of that world.
Notes

1. Heidegger was born in Germany in 1889, the year Hopkins died in Ireland. It is doubtful that Heidegger ever heard of Hopkins or, if he did, cared. His interest is always in the German poets (Ronald Marken, "'Each Tucked String Tells': Hopkins and the Word," Mosaic, 9, No. 3 (1976), 43).


4. It is now generally acknowledged that Hopkins "was a Scotist before he was aware of it; he practised Scotism, so to say, before he knew the system of Scotus" (W.A.M. Peters, S.J., Gerard Manley Hopkins ([London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1948], p. 24). See also Marjorie D. Coogan, "Inscape and Instress," PMLA, 65 (1950), 73-74; Alan Heuser, The Shaping Vision of Gerard Manley Hopkins (U.S.A.: Archon Books, 1968), pp. 31-32, 36-37; Sister Mary Zoghby, R.S.M., "The Cosmic Christ in Hopkins, Teilhard, and Scotus," Renascence, 24 (1971), 36.

5. Nathan A. Scott, Jr., "Heidegger's Path--Towards the Recovery


10 Harries, p. 170.

11 Harries, p. 170.


17 Because Hopkins sees God in nature, he is sometimes seen as verging on pantheism. Kathleen Raine, for instance, remarks, "If Hopkins could not permit himself to think as a pantheist he could not prevent himself from feeling as one" ("Hopkins, Nature, and Human Nature," Sewanee Review, 81 [1973], 214). As Di Cicco explains, however,

For Hopkins the Incarnation is . . . a mysterious incorporation of Christ into earthly reality that preserves the transcendence of his divine nature and yet makes of the world more than a mere analogical mirror of the Lord's beauty. His involvement is, in other words, considerably less than pantheism and considerably more than mere exemplarism (p. 150).


20 Zoghby, p. 45.

21 Gerard Manley Hopkins, ed. Catherine Phillips (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), p. 129. We have chosen in the case of this one poem to use Phillips' version rather than that of Gardner and Mackenzie because of a slight but telling difference in line 7. Where Gardner and Mackenzie have "Selves--goes itself," Phillips has, "Selves--goes its self" (italics mine)--a version which emphasizes Hopkins' constant concern with the self as a distinct individual.

22 Walhout, p. 176; Devlin points out that Scotus too proves the existence of God from that of one's self (p. 283).

23 Cotter, p. 111.


25 Walhout, p. 171.

26 Hopkins explains the unity of self-sacrifice and self-fulfilment by saying,

Man was created to praise, honour, and serve God, thus fulfilling God's desire in bringing him into being, and by so doing to save his soul, thus fulfilling his own desire, the desire of everything that has being. He was created
to give God glory and by so doing to win himself glory (S, p. 59).


29 David White, for example, speaks quite freely of "a deity (or deities)" in his discussion of the Holy, and Robert R. Magliola states that Being is identified "with God, or the 'Most Joyous'" in the essay "Remembrance of the Poet" (David A. White, Heidegger and the Language of Poetry [Lincoln & London: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1978], pp. 121-26; Robert R. Magliola, Phenomenology and Literature [West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue Univ. Press, 1977], p. 74). Most critics, however, are wary of such easy identification. See, for example, Steiner, pp. 147-48; Macquarrie, p. 57.


31 Scott, Poetics of Belief, p. 156; Gerber, pp. 205, 209, 214.

32 Steiner, p. 32.

33 Scott, Poetics of Belief, p. 162.


35 Gerbér, p. 214.
36 Gerber, pp. 208-209.


39 Steiner, p. 97.

40 Macquarie, p. 46.

41 Vyclicas, p. 82.


43 Scott, Poetics of Belief, pp. 156-57.


45 In the sonnet on Purcell, however, Hopkins is interested in both Purcell's individual inscape and in the inscape of human nature which emerges in his music (headnote, P, 45).


47 Johnson, p. 42.

48 Zaniello, p. 18. For related explanations, see Jerome Bump, Gerard Manley Hopkins (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1982), p. 38; Coogan, p. 69; Emmons, p. 38; Heuser, p. 27; Kitchen, p. 127; Robinson, p. 34; Ruggles, p. 138.

49 Di Cicco, p. 33; see Gerber, p. 214.

50 Coogan, p. 68.
Chapter Two
The House of Being

Some of the key concepts encountered in the previous chapter figure once again in the discussion of language and poetry in the present chapter, since for both Hopkins and Heidegger these views are inextricably linked with their overall concept of reality. Such key concepts include Incarnation and inscape for Hopkins, Being and meditative thought for Heidegger. In Heidegger's case, it will be important to consider also his understanding of Saying and of logos in order to place his views, especially those on poetry, in context. The discussion of language and poetry is not exhaustive for either Hopkins or Heidegger; that is, it does not cover every aspect of their theories but restricts itself to those aspects which are particularly relevant to the present study.

I. Language
1. Hopkins

It has long been recognized as a peculiarity of Hopkins' poetry that words as he uses them have an almost physical quality. Indeed the adjective perhaps most frequently applied to his poetry is "incarnational." His language has substance and in turn gives substance, body, "flesh" to the things or ideas he describes. This incarnational language finds its origin in Hopkins' view of the Incarnation. For Hopkins, as for all orthodox Christians,
Christ is the Logos, the Word of God. The central Christian text upon this matter is the prologue to the Gospel of John:

In the beginning was the Word: the Word was with God and the Word was God. He was with God in the beginning. Through him all things came to be, not one thing had its being but through him. . . . The Word was made flesh, he lived among us, and we saw his glory, the glory that is his as the only Son of the Father, full of grace and truth (Jn 1:1-3, 14).

God's Word existed before all things and indeed is the means by which all things came to be. Christ is the Word that God spoke when he made the world. By him, all that we know as physical reality came into existence. The Word then is active, dynamic, creative. Moreover, the message of John's Gospel is that this same Word was itself "made flesh," became part of its own visible, tangible creation. The Word of God, which is the model for the human word, both gives a solid dimension to things and itself participates in the solidity of that dimension. It is not surprising that a view of language based on such a view of origins should see words as sharing in both the incarnate and the incarnational aspects of the Word, that is, the Word's own solid existence and its ability to impart solid existence.

Hopkins' concept of selving encapsulates his view of the relationship between word and world. To selve is to act out what one is. In the "selving" sonnet, being, doing, and saying merge into one:

Each mortal thing does one thing and the same: Deals out that being-indoors each one dwells; Selves—goes its self; myself it speaks and spells, Crying What I do is me: for that I came. (P2, p. 129)
What a creature does is what it is. Being is dynamic. And what a creature does is speak. By doing what it is, a creature speaks its being and by speaking its being, it speaks and names God because it is a word of God. The kingfisher's fire is as much a word as the ringing of the bell. One not only hears words, one sees them. Being, doing, and saying are only different faces of the same thing.

In view of this merging of word, world, and act in Hopkins, it is not surprising that words as he uses them should appear active, dynamic, creative. Nor is it surprising that they should share in the solidity and vitality not only of objects, but of living creatures. If the Word has physical existence, then so, in some sense, do words. And if things are in some sense words, then perhaps the reverse is also true and words are in some sense things. Hopkins certainly speaks about words as if they participate in the nature of objects, saying, "We may think of words as heavy bodies, as indoor or out of door objects of nature or man's art" (J., p. 269). He does not go so far as to claim that words are objects, but he does suggest that thinking of them as objects helps to understand what they are and how they work.

Hopkins' view of language, founded upon his view of the Incarnation, is elaborated in the etymological speculations in his journal, in his "Notes: Feb. 9, 1868," and in his notes on Parmenides. The etymological speculations reflect a belief in an onomatopoetic theory of language, that is, a theory by which the sounds of words are related to their meanings. In a representative passage, having listed a number of words beginning with gr and cr, he continues:

Gruff, with a sound as of two things rubbing
together. I believe these words to be onomatopoetic. Or common to them all representing a particular sound. In fact I think the onomatopoetic theory has not had a fair chance. Cf. Crack, creak, croak, crake, graculus, crackle. These must be onomatopoetic (I, p. 5).

One can conclude from such a passage as this that Hopkins "believed that a similarity of sound in a group of words suggests a common origin and a similarity of meaning."1 The relationship between sound and meaning is not arbitrary. Hopkins' conviction that the sound of words in some way reflects their meaning is related to his belief that things themselves have meaning in a way normally attributed only to language. All things refer to God, point to God, mean God in the same way that a word points to and means a thing in the world. As things participate in the nature of God but nonetheless are not God, so it would make sense for words to participate in the nature of the things they name, though they are not themselves things.

Hopkins' notes of February, 1868 indicate that for him there are two kinds of words, those that mean things, that is, nouns, and those that mean relations of things. He seems to consider the former as having an added dimension, being more fully words than the latter, and his ensuing discussion is concerned only with the former --a lead which we follow here. To every word, Hopkins says, "belongs a passion or prepossession or enthusiasm which it has the power of suggesting or producing but not always or in everyone" (J, p. 125). This added dimension he calls (cautiously) "the form," adding that "it bears a valuable analogy to the soul" (J, p. 125). Keeping in mind Hopkins' qualifications of these remarks, his
discussion is nonetheless highly suggestive. In traditional philosophy, form is contrasted with matter, form being the essential nature of a thing, which manifests itself outwardly in matter. In Hopkins' own terms, form is inscape, the self of a thing. If words have form in any sense at all, then they have a relationship with matter in some sense like that of objects. The analogy to the soul is also a suggestive one, since only living creatures have souls. Words, then, are in some sense like not only material beings, but living material beings. They are animated by something akin to the life principle.

Hopkins' elaboration of his view provides yet a closer link between word and world. A word, he says, is "the expression, uttering of the idea in the mind" (J, p. 125). It is what takes place in the mind when that mind "translates" perceptions into language. The idea uttered in the mind has two terms, "the image ... which is in fact physical and a refined energy accenting the nerves, ... and secondly the conception." The idea has a physical and an intellectual component. The physical component is "a word to oneself, an inchoate word" (J, p. 125), a word which has not come to its full being. When the physical and intellectual component come together in the "uttering of the idea in the mind," a word becomes fully a word. It rises into full being from its inchoate state as a form of physical energy. By means of the physical element in the idea which the word utters, the word retains some share, however remote, in physical reality.

Hopkins' notes on words lead him easily and without awkwardness to a discussion of thinking and from that to a discussion of
art and its interpretation, which in turn leads him back to his explanation of what words are. The ease with which his mind follows this path suggests the close connection he sees between language, thought, art, and interpretation. Hopkins distinguishes between a "saner" and a "less sane" attitude toward the interpretation of art. The saner attitude is "the act of contemplation as contemplating that which really is expressed in the object" (J, p. 126). It is to let the object be what it is, to be absorbed by the single thought which it expresses rather than to analyze it in a detached manner. The less sane attitude is that by which "the prepossession and the definition, uttering, are distinguished and unwound" (J, p. 126). Art, like words, has prepossession and definition. What Hopkins says about the interpretation of art can then also be applied to the interpretation of words. It is as true of words as it is of works of art that to divide the prepossession from the definition is the less sane attitude. To consider a word without its connotations, its emotional load, is to leave out part of its meaning. A word must be considered as a whole in order to grasp what it means. It is always more than simply its definition.

Language and thought merge even more fully in Hopkins' notes on Parmenides than in his notes of February, 1868. It is in the notes on Parmenides that he emerges at his most "mystical" and it is here that in some respects his thought most closely resembles Heidegger's. Hopkins' discussion of Parmenides' "great text . . . that Being is and Not-Being is not" (J, p. 127) shows a connection with his distinction between the two kinds of interpretation. As Hopkins interprets Parmenides, "Not-Being is . . . want
of oneness" (J, p. 129). If this is so, then Being is oneness, unity. Contemplative thinking, because it is concerned with unity, with the whole instead of the parts, is ultimately concerned with Being. Indeed, Hopkins pushes the connection yet further: "To be and to know or Being and thought are the same" (J, p. 129). For Hopkins language is barely if at all distinguishable from thought.

In order to understand the connection Hopkins makes between language and Being, it is necessary to return to a passage considered in a different context in Chapter One. Hopkins translates Parmenides' central thought as "things are or there is truth" and continues:

> But indeed I have often felt when I have been in this mood and felt the depth of an inscape or how fast the inscape holds a thing that nothing is so pregnant and straightforward to the truth as simple yes and is (J, p. 127).

The later passage equating Being and thought connects the yes and is to language:

> To be and to know or Being and thought are the same. The truth in thought is Being, stress, and each word is one way of acknowledging Being and each sentence by its copula is (or its equivalent) the utterance and assertion of it. (J, p. 129)

A word, by pointing to a thing in the world, says yes to the fact of that thing's existence. It acknowledges and affirms the reality of the thing it points to and thereby acknowledges Being. Every sentence, by the fact that it makes a statement about what is, utters Being. As Being (or, in Hopkins' usual terms, God) is the truth, the inscape, in creatures, so too is Being the truth in language.
In Hopkins, thought and Being merge as thought and language have earlier merged. Language therefore is by extension Being. This is not surprising in light of what we have seen of the way Hopkins' view of the Incarnation shapes his view of language. Christ is Being and he is also the Word. What is and what is said therefore participate in each other. Without the action of the Word, there would be no beings; likewise, without the existence of beings, there can be no words. For Hopkins, words do in some sense participate in material reality. Because they, like the Word, link man, God, and world, they share something of the nature and reality of each.

2. Heidegger

Heidegger's discussion of language forcibly brings out at once his tendency to idealism and the tendency of his terms to melt into one another. When Heidegger talks about language, it is the essence of language he refers to, its "ontological basis" or "parlance," rather than language in its everyday use. Hopkins, by contrast, is interested in words as we use them. Moreover, in Heidegger's discussion the difference is not always clear between "language," "Saying," and "logos"—though it appears to be a hierarchical difference. What Heidegger says of one is often interchangeable with what he says of another.

Language is, moreover, part of the ultimately inextricable complex of Being, beings, and man. In fact, "what prevails in and bears up the relation of human nature to the two-fold is language" (OWTL, p. 30). Language, in fact, defines man. It "is the
foundation of human being" (OWTL, p. 112). As closely as language is linked to man, it is linked as well both to Being and beings. Says Heidegger, "Language is the house of Being," a statement which he explains by saying that "the being of anything that is resides in the word" (OWTL, p. 63). Being reveals itself in beings, but beings are beings only through language: "Only where the word for the thing has been found is the thing a thing" (OWTL, p. 62). Until a thing has a name, it cannot appear to us as what it is. Man can relate to beings only through language: "It is because language is the house of Being, that we reach what is by constantly going through this house" (PLT, p. 132). Without language, there would be no relation between man and beings and therefore no relation between man and Being. Language sustains that relation because Being resides in the word. Man, in turn, is "a lodger" in the house of Being. Language belongs to Being, but man lives in language and by means of it he perceives the Being of beings.

Heidegger's discussion of language already suggests what becomes explicit in his discussion of logos—that language and Being, if not identical, are nonetheless essentially alike. This likeness emerges, for instance, in man's relationship to the two. As man does not choose to be but finds himself always already involved in Being, so too he does not invent or control language but finds himself "within language and with language before all else" (OWTL, p. 134). Because man when he becomes aware of himself is always already within Being and within language, he remains always in some sense subordinate to both.

Language is like Being also in that it is elusive. It cannot
be approached by means of rational thought, which assumes that what is studied is an object outside the subject and from which the subject remains separate. One can no more step outside language to observe it than one can step outside Being. One needs words to talk about words. The only way one can hope to arrive at an understanding of the nature of language is "by entering into and submitting to it" (OWTL, p. 57). In other words, the only attitude which does justice to language is the thinker's attitude to Being—a recognition of man's prior involvement and a relinquishment of all that savor of "mastery."

For the purposes of the present study, the crucial similarity between Being and language in Heidegger's thought is that neither language nor Being is a being among beings. A word gives being but is not itself a being. As Heidegger says, "We may never say of the word that it is, but rather that it gives . . . The word gives Being." A word is "the giver which itself is never given" (OWTL, p. 88). Language in its essence is beyond the reach of language and cannot therefore be given being. If words in their essence are not things, then neither are words in their everyday use.

There is in Heidegger's view of language and Being at once a parallel and a contrast with Hopkins' view of words and the Word. The underlying and sustaining concept in the thought of both Hopkins and Heidegger shapes both their view of language and their use of it. Hopkins' view of the Incarnation—the Word made flesh—allows him to see words as partaking of material being. The density of his language reflects its participation and rootedness in the objective material world. By contrast, Heidegger's view of
Being as not itself a being leads to a view of language in which words are not in any sense things. For him, language is not part of material reality, and his use of it is more suggestive than solid, more otherworldly than this-worldly. His language gropes towards the ultimate which will not lend itself to full expression, whereas Hopkins' language seeks to open to the ultimate through the precision of the immediate and more readily accessible world of created things.

Despite this basic difference in their views of language—a difference whose importance cannot be overstressed—there are none-theless important parallels between Heidegger's view of language and Hopkins'. These parallels can best be brought out by considering Heidegger's discussions of "Saying" and especially of logos. For Heidegger, language is most fully itself in "the two kinds of utterance par excellence, poetry and thinking" (OWTL, p. 81). Thought and poetry are language in its highest and truest human expression. They live in the same "neighborhood" (OWTL, p. 81) and move in the same element, which Heidegger calls "Saying," which is "the essential nature of language" (OWTL, p. 93). Saying, essential language, is prior to the appearance of things. Saying is what brings to pass that appearance. Saying gives Being, allows beings to appear in their being. It is what holds reality together and makes it intelligible.

Having linked poetry and thinking together within the element of Saying, Heidegger links Being and Saying together as logos. Now logos is not for Heidegger what it is for Hopkins—the Johannine Word of God. Heidegger goes further back for his
definition of *logos*—to the pre-Socratic philosophers. Nevertheless, his explanation of it is remarkably similar in essence to the prologue of John’s Gospel:

The oldest word for ... Saying, is *logos*: Saying which, in showing, lets beings appear in their "it is."

The same word, however, the word for Saying, is also the word for Being, that is, for the presencing of beings. Saying and Being, word and thing, belong to each other in a veiled way, a way which has hardly been thought and is not to be thought out to the end.

All essential Saying hearkens back to this veiled mutual belonging of Saying and Being, word and thing (OWTL, p. 155).

Heidegger does not say that *logos* existed "in the beginning" as John does. But if Saying is the speaking that brings beings to appearance and allows them to be, then Saying is prior to all beings. Like the Word of God, therefore, Heidegger's *logos* existed before all things and in this sense "through him all things came to be, not one thing had its being but through him" (Jn 1:3).

Moreover, a consideration of the "veiled mutual belonging of Saying and Being, word and thing" corroborates Marken's suggestion that Heidegger's *logos* "encounters the Incarnation in a near and radical (that is, 'going to the root') fashion." What the Incarnation means is that "the Word was made flesh" (Jn 1:14). Saying and Being are one. For Heidegger too, "language . . . is identical with Being itself." How this can be, however, is a mystery beyond human understanding, something which "is not to be thought out to the end" (OWTL, p. 155). For Heidegger as for Hopkins, the *logos* underlies the relation of word and thing in the world. A word is not an arbitrary label attached to a thing. The relationship is a
far closer one; it is the word which allows the thing to appear as it is. The thing depends upon the word for its appearance.

For Heidegger, however, the word is always distinct from the thing. The word gives being but is not itself a being. For Hopkins, the word participates to some degree in the nature of the thing it names, including its material being. Hopkins sees a closer relationship between word and world than does Heidegger, a relationship based upon the Incarnation, by means of which word, world, and act all participate in and reflect the same reality—God.

It is in his concept of logos that Heidegger's thought about language most closely parallels Hopkins' understanding of language in its relation to the Incarnation. Heidegger's view of essential language, however, parallels Hopkins' concept of the Incarnation in another way as well. In Heidegger's scheme of things, language plays a mediatory and salvific role very like that of Christ in traditional Christian thought. According to Heidegger, because it is only in language that man encounters Being, "the return from the realm of objects and their representation into the innermost region of the heart's space can be accomplished, if anywhere, only in this precinct" (that is, in language) (PLT, p. 132). If man is to return to his essential being, he can do so only within language. His access to Being must proceed through the mediation of language. Likewise in Christian thought man has access to God only through his Word, Christ, and only through Christ can man be redeemed from fallenness and returned to his true nature.

As in other instances, however, the parallel between the thought of Heidegger and that of Hopkins only emphasizes the
difference. For Heidegger, "salvation" comes through something which is not part of the world which man experiences most directly. The emphasis remains on Being, that which transcends the world of beings even while sustaining it. For Hopkins, salvation comes through the mediation of one who enters into the world of immediate concrete reality and becomes part of it and who, moreover, is at once Being and Word. Language, as much as created things, is part of the material world.

II. Poetry

The consistent difference of emphasis between Hopkins and Heidegger—Heidegger's on the ultimate, Hopkins' on the immediate—is clearly reflected in their theories of poetry. Heidegger's tendency to think in terms of ultimates leads him to theorize about Poetry and Poets in an ideal sense rather than about poetry and poets in the everyday world. It is of course true that for him all true poets participate in the nature of the Poet and all true poetry in the nature of Poetry. Otherwise he could not, as he does, illustrate some of his points by means of actual poetry. Heidegger, however, is not himself a poet. By contrast, Hopkins is a practicing poet who must deal with poetry at its most basic level in its often recalcitrant material, language. Much of what he writes about poetry is very technical and will not be considered here. However, true to the pattern we have noted, even in his discussion of poetry in a broader sense, Hopkins remains more specific, particular, exact in his theorizing than Heidegger.

Both Hopkins and Heidegger refer to other arts besides poetry,
and much of what they say in that regard is relevant to a discussion of poetry. Heidegger, in fact, explicitly states that "All art...is...essentially poetry" (PLT, p. 72). Hopkins is not so explicit, but it is clear from some of his remarks upon music and visual art that the central tenets of his theory of poetry are central to his view of art in general. In the following discussion, therefore, references to the other arts are, where applicable, used to illuminate the poetic theories of both Hopkins and Heidegger.

1. Hopkins

Hopkins explains his theory of poetry mainly by means of his concept of inscape. Inscape has the same general meaning in relation to art as it does in relation to natural objects such as bluebells; that is, inscape is the true nature, the true self of a creature, which is not always or immediately perceptible, but reveals itself in and through the outward pattern. It is the truth at the heart of things, which, for Hopkins, is always God. In relation to art, inscape is rather more complex than it is in relation to nature because art is more complex. A work of art is, in a sense, at two—or perhaps three—removes from a natural object: first of all it is made from already existing materials, and secondly it is man-made; that is, it is made by a creature who has not made himself. To put it crudely, art is both made from and made by natural objects. Thirdly, to further complicate matters, a work of art is also about the natural world. Therefore, whereas inscape in a natural object operates at only one level—that
of the object itself—inscape in a work of art operates at four levels: that of its maker (by), its materials (from), its subject (about), and its self. Hopkins deals with all four, but since the fourth encompasses the other three, the emphasis remains always upon the work as work.

Hopkins' definitions of inscape occur within discussions of art with his literary correspondents. He writes to Bridges, "But as air, melody, is what strikes me most of all in music and design in painting, so design, pattern or what I am in the habit of calling 'inscape' is what I above all aim at in poetry. Now it is the virtue of design, pattern, or inscape to be distinctive" (L, p. 66). To Coventry Patmore, he criticizes the poetry of Sir Samuel Ferguson, saying that despite its many virtues, it is poetry with "the essential and only lasting thing left out—what I call inscape, that is species or individually-distinctive beauty of style" (FL, p. 373). To Dixon, he says, "I agree to Whistler's striking genius--feeling for what I call inscape (the very soul of art)" (C, p. 135). Two main points emerge from these three comments: inscape is essential to art, and inscape is distinctive. In relation to man or to works of art, inscape is individually-distinctive, as opposed to species-distinctive. Each person is unique, a highly-individualized self; so too is each work of art.

The uniqueness of man is especially emphasized in Hopkins' discussion of the poet, who is even more highly selved than other men. Hopkins remarks that "every true poet . . . must be original and originality a condition of poetic genius; so that each poet is like a species in nature . . . and can never recur" (FL, p. 370).
A poet is a most distinctive self and in the process of doing what he is, selving, he reveals that self. As Alan Heuser says, for Hopkins, "The artist was necessarily though accidentally in his art." It is not the aim of art to express the artist's inscape, but it is a fact of art that it does so.

At the same time, a work of art reflects the inscape of the materials from which it is made. In the case of poetry this means language, and indeed for Hopkins it means spoken language. It must be remembered that for Hopkins the meaning of a word inheres in its sound as well as its denotation. He writes to Bridges of "The Loss of the Eurydice," "Take breath and read it with the ears, as I always wish to be read, and my verse becomes all right" (L, p. 79). Poetry is defined in Hopkins with considerable more emphasis on sound than is the case in most poets. Indeed, he writes to Patmore that "such verse as I do compose is oral, made away from paper, and I put it down with repugnance" (FL, p. 379).

Hopkins' emphasis on the sound of words is reflected in his distinction between poetry and verse. Poetry has two elements, meaning and sound. Verse is associated with the latter. It is "inscape of spoken sound, not spoken words" (J, p. 289). It emphasizes sound over meaning—or at least over such meaning as transcends that carried by sound alone. Verse then means that aspect of poetry which is not primarily concerned with meaning. It is the pattern and shape of sound upon which poetry is based and within which poetry occurs. It is the technical—or perhaps one could say "physical"—aspect of poetry. Poetry is distinguished from verse in that it is meant to be understood as well as heard. At
the same time, since poetry necessarily includes verse, and since sound is not entirely unrelated to meaning, it is impossible to separate the two entirely. Indeed, for Hopkins the best poetry is "thought and expression indistinguishable" (J, p. 110), that is, poetry in which sound and meaning are one.

Hopkins describes poetry as "speech only employed to carry the inscape of speech for the inscape's sake" (J, p. 289). Based on his discussion of words in his notes of February, 1868, we can assume that the inscape of speech is its prepossession, the feeling it conveys, its emotional burden. Hopkins sees poetry as originating in feeling. He says, "Feeling, love in particular, is the great moving power and spring of verse" (L, p. 66). He also attributes to poetry the quality of "fervour" (C, p. 95). Although it remains one element among several, the emotional element in poetry is clearly very important to Hopkins. At the same time, a word is never only prepossession: denotation and reference necessarily accompany prepossession. Therefore, even if poetry emphasizes prepossession over the other terms of speech, it still always "means."

Poetry as Hopkins here defines it accentuates words as words. Verse, by imposing a pattern upon the sounds of words, draws particular attention to those sounds, and indeed, in Hopkins' scheme of things, to words as objects. By Hopkins' description words become "visible palpable bodies" with bulk, shape, color, and weight (J, p. 269). By imposing a design upon the qualities in words which emphasize their likeness to physical objects, Hopkins highlights those qualities so that what Carol Christ says about his metaphors applies to his use of words in general; they "become
objects in their own right." Hopkins prefers poetry which makes the reader aware of language. He admires Dryden because "his style and his rhythms lay the strongest stress of all our literature on the naked thew and sinew of the English language" (L, pp. 267-68). The best poetry is that which best brings out the selfhood of language.

While poetry reflects the inscape of the poet and the inscape of language, it also is always about something outside itself. It is concerned with the inscapes of the world. For Hopkins, words participate to some extent in the nature of what they point to. Like the Word upon which they are modeled, they both give body to, and share in the body of, what they speak about. This is true of all language, but it is especially true of poetic language, which "shd. be the current language heightened" (L, p. 89). Poetic language concentrates the qualities of everyday language. Poetry is for Hopkins what it is for Heidegger—"utterance par excellence" (CWTL, p. 81). In poetry language is most fully itself and does most thoroughly what all language does to some degree. And what language does is incarnate reality. Poetry is therefore the most incarnational form of language. The poet chooses the words which will best capture the inscape of his subject. And, because inscape is not only external pattern, but also and especially inner truth, these words must capture not only outward appearance but also and especially that essential truth.

For Hopkins the notion of truth or reality in art has other facets than that of capturing the inscapes of the world. Reality also has to do with the artist's attitude to his work as that
appears in the work itself. He writes that "a kind of touchstone of the highest or most elevating art is seriousness; not gravity but the being in earnest with your subject—reality" (L, p. 225). Indeed, unreality is "the worst fault a thing can have" (L, p. 216). The poet's attitude to his subject is reflected in his choice of language, and Hopkins speaks against the use of archaism in poetry because "it destroys earnest: we do not speak that way; therefore if a man speaks that way he is not serious" (L, p. 218). So too he explains his preference for sprung rhythm by saying that it is "the native and natural rhythm of speech" (L, p. 46). It is Hopkins' emphasis on reality in art which lies behind his conviction that "the poetical language of an age shd. be the current language heightened, to any degree heightened and unlike itself, but not . . . an obsolete one" (L, p. 89). Poetic language is heightened language, concentrated language, but it is always a heightening and concentration of current language, the language that is natural to the poet. It is tied to the here and now, to the immediate world of present experience, though it also transcends and transforms that world.

Ultimately, by capturing in language the inscapes of the world, the poet captures in his work the final underlying truth beneath all inscapes—Christ—and his own work becomes what all things and all words ultimately are—word of God. As Marken explains, "If God, the Word, is present in physical nature as logos, and if the poet captures, with care, in his own words, the inscape and essence of physical nature, then the words of his poetry are charged with the logos." The concern of poetry to capture
inscape is finally a concern to capture in language the word of
God which all truth is. Christ underlies all that is. Each thing
speaks Christ, each word echoes him. Poetry by its truth to reality
speaks and echoes Christ in a heightened, concentrated way. Even
more than ordinary language, it is word of God.

Encompassing the various aspects of a work of art discussed
above is the central fact that, as an object in its own right, a
work of art has its own self, its own inscape. In Ball's words,
"The poem stands as a 'thing which is.'... It sustains an ins-
cape to be perceived like any other. What it says cannot be sep-
arated from what it is."\(^12\) For Hopkins, a central characteristic
of a work of art is that it is unique. He writes that "poetry must
have, down to its least separable part, an individualising touch"
(FL, p. 302). It must have its own inscape, its own inner truth
and reality which can be perceived through its external form. The
inscape of a work of art as in itself a thing encompasses the ins-
scapes of its maker, material, and subject. Maker, material, and
subject are thereby present in the work of art. Because the work
draws attention to itself as a unique self, it focuses upon the ins-
scapes of maker, material, and subject a more concentrated atten-
tion than they receive in the everyday world. In this sense, art
mediates truth in the world. It "opens the eyes of the blind" to
the underlying truth in all things.

2. Heidegger

As we have noted, Heidegger is more interested in Poetry and
Poets in the ideal sense than in the poetry and poets we encounter
in daily life. Such ideal poetry, however, remains "the foundation of poetry in the conventional sense," and Heidegger's discussion of poetry, though more exalted than Hopkins', nonetheless parallels the latter's view in important ways. At the same time, Heidegger, in his tendency to idealize, assigns to the poet a far higher position than Hopkins does. Within the context of their discussions of art, it is in their view of the poet that Hopkins and Heidegger differ most widely.

For Heidegger, "a poet is the peak of 'man-ness'." He stands "between gods and men" (EB, p. 288) and mediates between them, carrying to man the divine message. The poet's privileged position endows him in Heidegger's eyes with an aura of the divine, and the language which Heidegger applies to him is highly charged and religiously suggestive. "Poets," he says, "are the mortals who, singing earnestly of the wine-god, sense the trace of the fugitive gods, stay on the gods' tracks, and so trace for their kindred mortals the way toward the turning" (PLT, p. 94). The poet pursues the gods as the mystic pursues God. And, like the prophet, he speaks to other men the words that will direct them to the truth.

As he has assigned to language the mediatory and salvific role which Christian tradition assigns to Christ, so Heidegger assigns to the poet, in his privileged relation to language, a similar mediatory role. By contrast, for Hopkins the poet is not exalted above other men. Only as the poet is also a just man does he reach "the peak of man-ness," a peak which in Hopkins' view can be reached by any just man, poet or not. As to the role of interpreting the
word of God to man, it is to the priest and not the poet that Hopkins assigns it. True, the poet, by speaking what is, speaks God's word, but he does so in a less exalted capacity than in Heidegger. The poet, as any man is called to do, takes Christ as his model and attempts to be in his limited capacity "another Christ," but he does so within the realm of the immediate rather than in the ultimate. Heidegger emphasizes what a poet is, while Hopkins emphasizes what he does (keeping in mind that for Hopkins doing reveals being).

Despite the exalted position which Heidegger assigns to the poet, he grants minimal importance to the presence of the artist in his work. For him, "the artist remains inconsequential as compared with the work" (PLT, p. 40). The work is more important because it is in the work that Being is revealed. While Hopkins does not exalt self-expression as a goal of art, his love for particular selves causes him to recognize the artist's presence in the work as an important and inevitable aspect of its inscape. The difference is one of emphasis consistent with the general tendencies of Hopkins and Heidegger.

Although Hopkins and Heidegger see the artist in somewhat different terms, their attitudes to the material and subject of the work and to the self of the work as object are very similar. For both, art has to do with truth and beauty, which for both mean very much the same thing. As we have seen, for Hopkins truth and beauty meet in the concept of inscape. Heidegger's concept of truth also includes beauty. "The beautiful," he says, "is not what pleases, but what falls within that fateful gift of truth" (WICT,
p. 19). As Michael Gelven explains, "To see a thing as beautiful is to see what it means, or to see it in the light of its meaning. . . . For beauty speaks the meaning of being." Beauty is the revelation of things as they are. It is truth. It must be kept in mind, however, that truth is not the same thing to Heidegger as it is to Hopkins. To Hopkins, truth is always ultimately God. To Heidegger, it is "the coming-forth or unveiling of Being in beings." It occurs when beings reveal themselves as they are and thereby show forth Being. Heidegger's understanding of truth parallels Hopkins', but it is not identical with it.

In relation to art, Heidegger's idea of truth is like Hopkins' idea of inscape. The truth that happens in a work of art is the truth of its materials and its subject as well as the truth of its own individual being, just as for Hopkins the inscape of a work of art means the inscape of its material and subject as well as its own particular inscape. Similarly, just as for Hopkins in poetry words become most fully themselves, so too for Heidegger poets use words "in such a way that the word only now becomes and remains truly a word" (PLT, p. 48). Only in poetry does language come fully into its being. And, for Heidegger, the same is true of all the arts. In the work, "the rock comes to bear and rest and so first becomes rock; metals come to glitter and shimmer, colors to glow, tones to sing, the word to speak" (PLT, p. 46). In the work of art, the essence of the material as material is "unhidden," emerges into human awareness.

At the same time, the work reveals the essential being of its subject. What this means emerges in Heidegger's discussion of a
painting by Van Gogh: "Van Gogh's painting is the disclosure of what the equipment, the pair of peasant shoes, is in truth. This entity emerges into the unconcealedness of its being" (PLT, p. 36). Through the work, the pair of shoes emerges out of its everyday context so that what it is appears as it never does otherwise. In some sense, "in a work of art all that exists becomes more truly existent." It comes into its own. The focussing of attention upon the peasant shoes in themselves allows the observer to see what he does not see in daily life. The truth of the work of art does not lie in its faithful reproduction of the likeness of a thing; indeed it is true only as it reproduces "the thing's general essence" (PLT, p. 37). Likewise, for Hopkins a work which fails to reproduce the inscape of its subject fails as art.

As it does for Hopkins, for Heidegger a work of art exists in its own right. Art brings forth "a being such as never was before and will never come to be again" (PLT, p. 62). Its own unique and unrepeatable being reveals Being more clearly than do things that are not art. The more original the work of art, "the more luminous becomes the uniqueness of the fact that it is rather than is not. The more essentially this thrust comes into the Open, the stronger and more solitary the work becomes" (PLT, pp. 65-66). Originality is essential to great art, which, because it is so obviously and strikingly a "made thing," reverberates more strongly with the mystery of Being than, say, a tree in bloom.

For Hopkins, a work of art, in its uniqueness, is more fully a word of God than are other beings. Any work of art is in some sense a linguistic being and it is this quality which defines its
artistic being. Similarly, for Heidegger it is the linguistic aspect of art which defines it as art. Says Heidegger, "All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, essentially poetry" (PLT, p. 72). Poetry proper is the highest of the arts because it names things. Names "are words by which what already is and is believed to be is made so concrete and full of being that it henceforth shines and blooms and thus reigns as the beautiful everywhere in the land" (OWTL, p. 144). Names do more than call into being; they, as it were, redouble being, make a thing more real than ordinary words do. Language in itself says; poetry says more—and so, in its kinship to poetry, does all art.

This is why Hans Jaeger can say that for Heidegger, "In the work of art truth is embodied."20 Truth is given body, flesh, being. A poem, more fully than other works of art, both is and says. It participates in both Being and Saying and is therefore logos as nothing else in the world is. As such, it is "the reflection of the primary logos to which the logos of the poet primarily belongs."21 Poetry participates in the logos more fully than any other thing in the world. Likewise, for Hopkins, because poetic language is both more fully word and more fully thing than ordinary language, it participates in the nature of Christ both as material being and as Word of God.

III. Interpretation

The interpretive approach taken in the present study is largely based upon assumptions about language, poetry, and interpretation with which both Hopkins and Heidegger are in basic accord.
Heidegger, who has had considerable influence upon literary theory and criticism, goes into some detail about various aspects of interpretation. Hopkins, by contrast, has relatively little to say about interpretation as such. However, what he does say is often in sympathy with Heidegger's precepts. The following discussion therefore is largely focussed upon Heidegger with reference to Hopkins where appropriate.

Already implicit—and sometimes explicit—in what we have seen in Hopkins' and Heidegger's views of language and poetry are particular attitudes towards interpretation. For instance, Hopkins' discussion of words (J, pp. 125-26) leads him so naturally to a discussion of art and its interpretation that it is difficult to unravel the separate threads. Discussion of the nature of language seems necessarily to involve discussion of interpretation. That this is so reflects a basic truth about language which is at the same time a basic difficulty about interpretation. In Paul Ricoeur's words, "Interpretation is interpretation by language before being interpretation of language." Language first interprets reality; a text is itself an interpretation. Indeed anything linguistic, even the most "objective" exposition, is interpretation simply by the fact of using language. To use language at all is necessarily to interpret. To be closely concerned with language and poetry as both Hopkins and Heidegger are, is to be closely concerned with the problem of interpretation.

Further complicating the difficulties of interpretation is the fact that meaning resides not so much in individual words as in the relations of words (J, p. 129; WICT, p. 233). Ricoeur explains
this aspect of language in some detail. Meaning, he says, resides not in the word so much as in the sentence and ultimately in discourse, that is, the context in which words occur and in which they relate to each other. Says Ricoeur, "A sentence is a whole irreducible to the sum of its parts." To take a sentence apart and explain each word is not to explain the sentence as a whole. The meaning of the whole arises from the relation of the parts. Meaning then, so far as language can capture it at all, is expressed in what happens when certain words are put together in a certain way. This is even more true of poetry than of everyday language because poetry is "maximal speech." It is therefore important in discussing poetry to consider not only the impact of individual words, images, or metaphors, but also their relationships, the light they cast upon each other in the poem as a whole.

In its concentration of language, poetry has for both Hopkins and Heidegger the power to reveal truths beyond the reach of ordinary language. Implicit in this power is a point which Ricoeur makes about metaphor: "Tension metaphors are not translatable because they create their meaning. This is not to say that they cannot be paraphrased, just that such a paraphrase is infinite and incapable of exhausting the innovative meaning." A poem says what it says in the only way it can possibly be said. Ordinary language, even at great length, cannot grasp the full meaning of what is expressed in the poem. And, says Ricoeur, "The non-translatability of poetic language is ... an essential trait of the poetic." Because poetry pays particular attention to the meaning that arises from the relations of words, any change in those relations—
substitution, transposition—effects a change, however slight or subtle, in the poem's essential meaning. The poem says what it says because it is what it is.

A text, however, is not fully itself until it finds an interpreter. On this topic, Jaeger says that for Heidegger, "a work of art can only be an event in which truth 'happens' if the work of art finds those who enter into and linger in the truth revealed by it."27 Because a work of art finds its being only in relationship, what it says depends upon who interprets it. This is not to say that interpretation is pure subjectivity. Interpretation involves interaction between reader and text. Neither reader nor text is in full control. What the text says is determined in part by what is captured within the words of the text, in part by what readers themselves bring to the reading. As Ricoeur suggests, the meaning of a text "is not something hidden behind the text. Rather it is a requirement addressed to the reader."28 The meaning of the text is fulfilled only in dialogue with the reader. Hopkins too shows an awareness of the incompleteness of the work of art in itself when he says that "almost, all works of art imply knowledge of things external to themselves in the mind of the critic— in fact all do" (J, p. 97).

If a text addresses the reader, the reader is called upon to respond. Such response, however, occurs always "within a horizon of already granted meanings and intentions."29 Readers always interpret from within their own lives and experience—a fact recognized by both Hopkins and Heidegger. Hopkins acknowledges the strength of selfhood in criticism as in all human activity in his
comment that "The way men judge in particular is determined for each by his own inscape" (J, p. 129). Judgment is shaped by the individuality, the self of the person. Magliola suggests that for Heidegger, without such presuppositions as the reader brings to the text, "Interpretation of any kind is impossible."

However, despite the impossibility of approaching the text without presuppositions, the interpreter must, as far as possible, take a decisive 'step back' from mere analysis and explanation to the achievement of thinking dialogue with what appears in the text. To understand becomes a matter not only of questioning which is willing to be open and undogmatic but also of learning how to wait and how to find the place (Ort) out of which the being of the text will show itself. The interpreter of a text takes the position of Heidegger's thinker and "listens" to what Being says through the text. Alvin Rosenfeld makes the parallel explicit in his remark, "Just as, in Heidegger's view, thinking is listening, so proper reading, interpreting, and understanding are parallel ways of being creatively open to what manifests itself in the poem." Indeed, for Heidegger interpretation is more than dialogue. It is first of all a penetration of what is interpreted. He says, "Every interpretation must first of all have entered into what is said, into the subject matter it expresses" (WICT, p. 174). As the thinker listens to Being, in which he is already involved, and allows it to reveal itself in him, so the interpreter enters into the text and allows it to shape his interpretation, that is, allows what it says to come to light in his own interpretation of it.

Of further interest to the question of interpretation are two
points which Heidegger makes in his explanation of what it takes to hear a thinker's thought:

To hear it is in no case easy. Hearing it presupposes that we meet a certain requirement... We must acknowledge and respect it. To acknowledge and respect consists in letting every thinker's thought come to us as something in each case unique, never to be repeated, inexhaustible—and being shaken to the depths by what is unthought in his thought (WICT, p. 76).

Heidegger is speaking here of thinking, but what he says holds for poetry as well. Every work of art is unique; indeed, this is part of what makes it art. One can only understand it as itself. The work itself partly determines the way in which it can be interpreted. As another part of the same point, a work of art is inexhaustible. Heidegger means that it is inexhaustible "not only for posterity and the changing forms of comprehension to which posterity gives rise; it is inexhaustible of itself, by its nature" (WICT, p. 72). Not only is every interpretation over time different, or even every interpretation from reader to reader, but no interpreter can ever see or explain all there is in a work of art. As the paraphrase of a metaphor is "without end," so the meaning of a work of art is inexhaustible.

Two related consequences follow from the apparent inexhaustibility of a work of art: (1) there are no absolute and final answers, and (2) a single work of art can provoke many different but equally valid interpretations. As regards the first, Heidegger warns, "We must be careful not to force the vibration of the poetic saying into the rigid groove of a univocal statement, and so destroy it" (OWTL, p. 64). We must never assume that a work of art
means or says only one thing. However, if no one interpretation is absolutely valid, it is also true that many different interpretations can be true. Every valid interpretation adds to the understanding of the truth revealed in the work, but no interpretation is itself complete. Nor is a work of art entirely explained by the total of all interpretations. There is always more to be said.

To return to the quotation from Heidegger, if the first important point is that a work of art is unique and inexhaustible; the second is the notion of "what is unthought in his 'the thinker's' thought" (WICT, p. 76). The idea of the unthought or the unspoken is one that Heidegger applies to the poet as well as to the thinker:

> Every great poet creates his poetry out of one single poetic statement only. . . . The poet's statement remains unspoken. None of his individual poems, nor their totality, says it all. Nonetheless, every poem speaks from the whole of the one single statement, and in each instance says that statement (OWTI, p. 160).

The only way to hear the poet's single statement is to try to "point to it by means of what the individual poems speak. But to do so, each poem will itself be in need of clarification" (OWTI, p. 160). Each individual poem, though unique, reveals something of the poet's single statement because each poem emerges from the whole which is that underlying statement. It is through what the poems say that the unsaid comes to light, much as it is through individual beings that Being comes to light.

Such a view of poetry emphasizes the need for the interpreter to listen to and enter into a work. Otherwise he will deal only with the surface of the poem, and it is not at the surface that one
encounters what the poem truly says. To interpret truly is to go "behind the text to ask what the author did not and could not say, yet which in the text comes to light as its innermost dynamic." The unspoken does not contradict what is actually spoken but is present in it "in mysterious, submerged fashion."

A parallel to Heidegger's concept of the unspoken occurs in a letter of Hopkins' to Baillie:

My thought is that in any lyric passage of the tragic poets . . . there are--usually; I will not say always, it is not likely--two strains of thought running together and like counter-pointed; the overthought that which everybody, editors, see . . . ; the other, the underthought, conveyed chiefly in the choice of metaphors etc used and often only half realised by the poet himself, not necessarily having any connection with the subject in hand but usually having a connection and suggested by some circumstance of the scene or of the story (FL, p. 252).

What is immediately apparent is that Hopkins is far more cautious than Heidegger. For one thing, he limits the observation to a particular kind of poetry and adds that what he says is not always true of even that kind. Clearly too for him the underthought, while interesting, never takes precedence over the other, as the unspoken takes precedence over the spoken for Heidegger. What is important, however, is that Hopkins recognizes the presence in poetry of a "saying" which takes place beneath the surface, which complicates the surface "saying," and which is not entirely in the control of the poet, but which may indeed occur without his awareness.

Before closing this section, it is well to consider Heidegger's view of the relationship of the poet and the thinker. As we have seen, poet and thinker are alike in many ways and it is often difficult to make any distinction at all (OWTL, pp. 83, 136). At the
same time, they are not identical. They move in the same element, but they do so in different ways. Poetry begins in thought; it "wells up only from devoted thought thinking back, recollecting" (WICT, p. 11). Poetry can come only from thought; the poet is therefore necessarily a thinker. But the thinker is not necessarily a poet, though all true thought is poetic. The poet is closer to ultimate truth, Being, because he has access to the logos, the relation of word and thing, as the thinker does not. Heidegger explains their basic relation as follows:

The discussion of the poetic statement is a thinking dialogue with poetry. It neither expounds a poet's outlook on the word, nor does it take inventory of his workshop. Above all, the discussion of the poetic statement can never be a substitute for or even guide to our listening to the poem. Thinking discussion can at best make our listening thought-provoking and, under the most favorable circumstances, more reflective (OWTL, p. 161).

Thinking is clearly not strict analysis of a poem, but it is criticism in some form. The thinker is intermediate between the poet and other people. The poet interprets the gods and the thinker interprets the poet.

The priority which Heidegger gives to poetry over thinking emerges in the warnings with which he hedges his statements about interpretation. He cautions, "Only a poetic dialogue with a poet's poetic statement is a true dialogue—the poetic conversation between poets" (OWTL, p. 160). By contrast, "A thinking dialogue with poetry can serve the poetic statement only indirectly. Thus it is always in danger of interfering with the saying of the statement instead of allowing it to sing from within its own inner.
"peace" (OWTIL, p. 161). Only a poet can do justice to a poet's message. A thinker "translates" that message and makes it accessible to others, but he can all too easily distort or obscure the "saying" of the poet.

What Hopkins has to say about criticism is roughly parallel to what emerges from Heidegger's discussion of the relation of poet and thinker. For Hopkins too the best critic is a poet. "A poet is a public in himself" (L, p. 59), he tells Bridges. That is, it is better to be read by another poet than by anyone else. But, failing a poet, the best critic is a contemplative thinker, contemplative thought being that "in which the mind is absorbed (as far as that may be), taken up by, dwells upon, enjoys, a single thought" (J, pp. 125-26). Hopkins' contemplative thinker, like Heidegger's meditative thinker, is concerned with a work of art as a whole—a position with which Ricoeur is also in accord, saying that "to construe the verbal meaning of a text is to construe it as a whole." It is in the unity of a work that its meaning comes to light.

IV. Conclusion

In their views of language and poetry, as in their basic vision of reality, there are between Hopkins and Heidegger both significant parallels and telling differences. For both, language is incarnational and poetry is heightened language whose central purpose is the revelation of the truth of what is. Such truth is concerned not primarily with external detail but with the meaning of things, with the truth which their being reveals and which Hopkins calls "inscape." Moreover, it is a multiple truth—that of its subject
(for example, a pair of peasant shoes, a windhover, an inner experience of spiritual desolation), its material (language), and its self as a thing in the world which in its uniqueness points more clearly to ultimate truth than natural objects do. To use a term from Heidegger, poetry "names." It "redoubles the being" so that what is so named is more fully and visibly itself than in ordinary seeing and ordinary language.

Underlying the basic accord between Hopkins and Heidegger about the nature of art is a basic difference about the nature of language. While for both language is incarnational, for Hopkins it is also incarnate, while for Heidegger it is not. Because for Heidegger language does not have being, it does not participate in the nature of things in the world. It follows that those whose calling is to speak language (as opposed to merely using it) (WICT, p. 128) transcend the world of beings and partake of the divine.

By contrast, Hopkins' view of the Incarnation gives him a basis for a view of language--and therefore of poetry--as participating in the tangible and solid. In his relation to language, the Hopkinsian poet is no more required to transcend the world of everyday experience than are other people. Because the Word of God is a person, all persons partake of the divine; and because the Word of God is incarnate, so too are all words. Heidegger, then, has a far greater tendency than Hopkins to idealize language, poetry, and poets--a tendency which confirms his preference for the otherworldly over the this-worldly. In some sense Heidegger is an anti-realist; in a profound sense Hopkins is a super-realist.

Despite the consistent difference of emphasis, Hopkins is in
sympathy with much of what Heidegger believes about language, poetry, and interpretation. It is in the light of the similarities between them that the difference tells most clearly and emphatically. And it is only in the actual reading of and "thinking dialogue" with Hopkins' poems that the significance of both the similarities and differences between Hopkins and Heidegger emerge.
Notes


4 Ronald Marken, "'Each Tucked String Tells': Hopkins and the Word," Mosaic, 9, No. 3 (1976), p. 44.


6 Modern art is sometimes not about anything outside itself, but since this is not the case in Hopkins, it will not be considered here.

7 Alan Heuser, The Shaping Vision of Gerard Manley Hopkins

However, Walter J. Ong states that despite Hopkins' own beliefs about his writing, his poems "are not oral compositions but texts to be retrojected into the oral world" (Hopkins, the Self, and God [Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1986], p. 141).


As Robinson points out, in the case of Hopkins' own poetry, the current language is not necessarily that of the average contemporary of Hopkins, but Hopkins' own natural language (p. 67).

Marken, pp. 41-42. Rachel Salmon explains the same phenomenon in terms more nearly Heideggerian, saying, "To the degree that poetry enables the reader to perceive the inscape of things, it places him in the presence of 'Being'" ("Prayers of Praise and Prayers of Petition: Simultaneity in the Sonnet World of Gerard Manley Hopkins," Victorian Poetry, 22 [1984], 391).
13 V cynas, p. 274.
14 V cynas, p. 280.
16 Robert R. Magliola points out that Heidegger's actual criticism belies the belief here expressed, since Heidegger refers to biography to help illuminate the poetry (Phenomenology and Literature, West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 73-74.
19 Jaeger, p. 423.
20 Jaeger, p. 423.
21 V cynas, p. 274.


30. Magliola, p. 177.


32. Rosenfeld, p. 200.

33. Ricoeur, *Rule of Metaphor*, p. 188.

34. Palmer, p. 147.

35. Richardson, p. 489.

Chapter Three

Past Telling of Tongue: "The Wreck of the Deutschland"

I. Introduction

In his introduction to the second edition of the poems of Hopkins, Charles Williams lists three elements central to the poet's work: "a passionate emotion . . . , a passionate intellect . . . and a passionate sense of the details of the world without and the world within, a passionate consciousness of all kinds of experience." In other words, he sees Hopkins' poetry as reflecting an energetic unity of vision which begins in human experience as lived and takes account of its every mode of knowledge—heart, mind, and senses. Hopkins bends his own heart, mind and senses not only upon the world of concrete things but also upon language, which for him is felt sensibly and emotionally as well as intellectually. The relation of word and world in the poetry emerging from such a vision of reality is not, accordingly, a simple one.

Hopkins' poetry always begins from a firm basis in the sensible world. He strives to render the individual as accurately as possible, not simply for the sake of the thing as thing, but for the sake of the thing as meaning. For Hopkins, each thing is also a word which names God. The goal of his vivid presentation of the things of the world is the revelation of what it is in essence and in truth. Such revelation is ultimately revelation of Christ. In Hopkins, however, the movement from the physical to its spiritual meaning never leaves
the physical behind. Rather, "the spiritual and material elements are so much a part of each other as to be inseparable."² The physical is not a step towards the spiritual, but rather the radiant manifestation of the spiritual: it is word of the Word.

If for Hopkins things participate in the "meaning" quality of words, words also participate in the thingly quality of things. For him, language is a relation which participates in the nature of the elements it relates and, while it is never fully a thing, is always partly so. As the Word of God is both God and man, spirit and flesh, so the human word is both meaning and thing, "spirit" and "flesh." Hopkins can say that "Being and thought are the same" (J, p. 129) because they are united by language, which participates in both. Hopkins' view of language allows him, by concentrating the "physical" qualities of words, by using "all the devices of poetry to their maximum,"³ not only to make his poems highly concentrated language, dense in meaning and embodying the truth of the world he describes, but also to make them felt as objects in their own right. Hopkins' words convey meaning by their "bodies" as well as by their abstract content. They are "rendered sensational":⁴ they are felt, seen, apprehended by the senses as well as by the intellect.

In light of Hopkins' views of poetry, it is not surprising that he finds the writing of it "slow and laborious" (L, p. 136). Such poetry as he envisions demands a far more rigorous attention to the physical properties of language than is true for most poets. The poetry itself, not surprisingly, is dense. The patterns of sound and rhythm and their relationship with meaning are often so
complex that it is difficult to disentangle them and impossible to analyze the effect of any single device in isolation from the poem as a whole.\textsuperscript{5} It is an indication of the success of Hopkins at his best that the various poetic devices do not draw attention to themselves, but are so much a part of what is said that they vanish, as it were, into the structure of the whole.\textsuperscript{6} James Milroy points out, for instance, that "It is possible to read a Hopkins poem many times and fail to notice particular instances of end-rhyme."\textsuperscript{7} The same could be said of internal rhyme, alliteration, assonance, and any other of Hopkins' many devices for making his language concrete. What he aims at is the creation of an organic whole which captures the physical, emotional, and spiritual truth of what he writes about.

In effect, what Hopkins does in his detailed presentation of things is "name" them in the Heideggerian sense. By presenting them in language which renders them vivid and causes the reader to see them afresh, he "redoubles their being," focussing attention upon them so that they stand out in their essential truth. As Joaquin Kuhn expresses it, "He wants to teach us how to see by first keeping his own vision pure and then directing us to what he perceives."\textsuperscript{8} In Kuhn's explanation, Hopkins combines the Heideggerian roles of thinker and poet. He "keeps his own vision pure" by adopting the open, receptive stance of the meditative thinker—a stance which allows things to reveal themselves as they are. His directing the reader to what he sees is the "naming" by which the poet speaks the truth of what is, making the things of the world appear more fully themselves. Hopkins' poetry thus illustrates Heidegger's view that "Poetry wells up only from devoted thought
thinking back, recollecting" (WICT, p. 11).

Such poetry is, of course, more than simply presentation; it is also interpretation—though that interpretation frequently occurs in the presentation itself. Even in those poems which are most clearly statements (p. 31, 37)—intellectual interpretations of the sensually perceived—elaboration of those statements occurs through vivid images from concrete reality. For a poet to whom things in themselves mean, such an approach to interpretation of the world is natural. The naming which occurs in a Hopkins poem is therefore not simply a naming of the thing as thing, but at the same time the naming of it as meaning, the indication not only of itself as sign, but of that to which as sign it points—its deeper referent.

All the poems considered in the present study ultimately attempt such naming. They begin in the world of human experience, which they not only render in its vivid material reality, but which they also interpret. This interpretation is achieved partly by means of statement but more often by more subtle means related to the sound patterns and "prepossessions" of the language—the "physical" and emotional qualities of words by which the very interpretation of the world is made part of the substance of that world. Paradoxically, in the very "solidity" of Hopkins' language, the things of the world appear as more than merely material; they are "radiant and flourishing in their being" (OWTL, pp. 86-87).

II. The Poem

1. Introduction

"The Wreck of the Deutschland," the first poem of Hopkins'
maturity, is also his most ambitious and in some ways his most
daunting work. It "combines latently all the later poetry, both
the poetry of nature and the poetry of the self." Moreover, the
themes which recur in the later poetry are here subordinated to a
greater and far more complex theme—the problem of natural evil in a
world created and sustained by a loving God. How is it that nature,
which is word of God, can be death-dealing as well as life-giving?
What Hopkins attempts in this poem far exceeds what he attempts any-
where else. He does not merely attempt to capture the inscape of a
single object and by naming that object to reveal its truth, God.
Rather, he attempts to capture the inscape of God himself, to name
God.

In Heidegger's view, such an attempt cannot succeed. Indeed,
his view on the naming of God provides a helpful background
against which to read "The Wreck of the Deutschland." Two aspects
of Heidegger's thought are relevant to the question: his discussions
of the nature of language and of the role of the poet. As we have
seen in Chapter Two, language in its essence (the parlance) plays
a very similar role in Heidegger's thought to that of Christ in
Hopkins'. However, for Heidegger, "the essential nature of language
flatly refuses to express itself in words" (OWTL, p. 81). That is,
the parlance cannot be "named." There is no word for the Word which
mediates between gods and men.

Heidegger's discussion of the poet's role in relation to the
gods is considerably more enigmatic than his discussion of language.
It is, in fact, highly suggestive. In an essay on Holderlin, he says:
To name poetically means: to cause the High One himself to appear in words, not merely to tell of his dwelling-place, the Serene, the holy, not merely to name him with reference to his dwelling-place. But the naming of him himself, the very sorrowing joy itself will not suffice, even though it sojourns in fitting proximity to the High One (EB, p. 263).

It is the poet's work to name God, but it is a work which is doomed to failure. The poet can only approximate the naming to which he is called. But he can approximate it. By means of the poetic use of language, "the god surprises us. In this strangeness he proclaims his unfaltering nearness" (PLT, p. 226). Poetry brings God near, and in that sense achieves a kind of echo or shadow or "sake" (to borrow a term from Hopkins) of the actual name of God. In other words, although poetry cannot name God as such, it can yet capture a "trace" (PLT, p. 94) of his name and presence.

It would seem, then, that Heidegger would approve of Hopkins' goal in "The Wreck of the Deutschland," though he would consider it only partially and elusively attainable. It should be noted that part of the reason for Heidegger's pessimism about naming God is that for him the present age is an age in which God is absent. It is "the No-more of the gods that have fled and the Not-yet of the god that is coming" (EB, p. 289). Hopkins labors under no such sense of absence. For him, God is, and God is present. Hopkins can therefore approach the poetic task defined by Heidegger with an assurance impossible to a Heideggerian poet. Hopkins' task is further simplified in that in his view God and the Word are one in Christ. Hopkins' attempt to name God is at the same time an attempt to name the essence of language—a venture which for Heidegger is not even partially attainable.
The principal interest of "The Wreck of the Deutschland" to the present study lies in the unity of God and Word in Christ. In its concern with naming God (with emphasis on both words), the poem deals more explicitly than any other of Hopkins' poems with the theme of language, in conjunction with the attendant problem of interpretation. While the theme of language is not overtly the central concern of the poem, it can be considered its "underthought" (FL, p. 252), a thought running parallel to, and contributing to the development of, the central theme, but remaining to some extent submerged. To follow such a theme through the poem is to illuminate the central concern from, as it were, a side angle which, while necessarily leaving out important aspects, nonetheless contributes to a vision of the whole.

On the most literal level, "The Wreck of the Deutschland" is about the death of five Franciscan nuns in a shipwreck. On a deeper level, it is about the nature of God. However, in the felt impact, emotional and intellectual, it is far more immediately about the poet's own experience, his "fabulous journey to contact God." The literal and the deeper level meet in the poet's struggle to make sense of the event, to reconcile the death of the nuns with the nature of God; or, to put it another way, to enter into the natural event and, by understanding it from within, to understand the nature of God, of whom the event is a word. The poet's imaginative "entering into" the nun's experience fulfils the Heideggerian principle that "Every interpretation must first of all have entered into what is said" (WICT, p. 174). True interpretation comes only from such submission of the whole being to what is to be interpreted.
Complicating the interpretation of the wreck—and thereby complicating the attempt to name God—is the fact that the poet is already involved in what he seeks to name. As Paul Mariani points out, in "The Wreck of the Deutschland," "the larger framework is God Himself, the first word ('Thou') and the last word ('Lord') of the poem, the alpha and the omega." The interpretation and the naming take place within what must be interpreted and named. Even within this framework, interpretation remains complex and circular. Not only does the nun's experience parallel the poet's, but, because of his imaginative entering into her experience, it overlaps with his. Both nun and poet read the event and respond through language. The nun reads the storm, interprets it, and responds with a cry. The poet reads the whole event, including her cry, and responds with the poem, which is thus an interpretation of an interpretation. The poem is then not simply a record of an event, or a conclusion drawn from the event, but an experience of the very process of interpretation in regard to that event. The reader experiences with the poet the struggle to make sense of the wreck, to read God's activity in and through it, and so to name God.

2. Words and the Word

As a human attempt to penetrate the mystery of God, "The Wreck of the Deutschland" begins in the human heart. We have seen in Chapter One how central is the heart to Heidegger's concept of the meditative thinker. For Heidegger, "man's heart . . . means not merely the sensitive and emotive side of human consciousness, but the essential being of all human nature" (WICT, p. 148). It is
associated with meditative thinking because such thinking is man
being most truly himself. Moreover, for Heidegger the "intention"
of the heart is "the inclination with which the inmost meditation
of the heart turns toward all that is in being—the inclination
that is not within its own control" (WICT, p. 141). The heart
turns naturally to what is and therefore to Being. The heart in-
clines man to the truth. Further, poetry, in its concern for
truth, is "the 'work of the heart'" (PLT, p. 138).

"The Wreck of the Deutschland" reveals a similar view of the
human heart in Hopkins. The poem sets forth a consistent relation-
ship between the heart and truth and therefore by extension be-
tween the heart and poetic language. In stanza 18, addressed to
the poet's heart, the connection between the heart and truth
emerges clearly:

Ah, touched in your bower of bone,
Are you! turned for an exquisite smart,
Have you! make words break from me here all alone,
Do you!--mother of being in me, heart.
O unteachably after evil, but uttering truth.

The heart is "mother of being." As we have seen, for Hopkins only
the just man has full being, is fully himself, only the man who
seeks to conform his life to Christ's (S, p. 197). The heart then
is that in man which draws him to fullness of being, to the ful-
filment of his potential. Because man is fallen, the heart is "unteachably after evil," but nonetheless it knows and utters truth.
It is "the primary agent in man of instinctive truth."17 The
heart draws man home, that is, to the place where he by nature
belongs, to God.18
For Hopkins as for Heidegger, the heart as the source of truth in man is closely connected with language, especially the language of poetry as the speaking of truth. The heart knows and "utters truth" (st. 29). In "The Wreck of the Deutschland," the connection between the heart's knowledge of the truth and the speaking of it is clear in the poet's initial experience in Part the First, in the nun's experience of the storm, and in the poet's further experience of the nun's experience. God makes his pressure felt upon the heart, which then responds in words. This movement is clear in the experience described at the beginning of the poem:

I did say yes
O at lightning and lashed rod;
Thou hearest me truer than tongue confess
Thy terror, O Christ, O God;
Thou knowest the walls, altar and hour and night:
The swoon of a heart that the sweep and the hurl of thee trod
Hard down with a horror of height:
And the midriff astring with leaning of, laced with fire of stress.

(st. 2)

The "fire of stress" upon the poet's heart presses from him a "yes" to the power of God, an acknowledgment and affirmation lived out in his own word and life.

Similarly, God's stress upon the nun's heart through the physical violence of the storm causes her to respond with the cry "O Christ, Christ, come quickly" (st. 24), "wording" (st. 29) the storm, giving expression to its being through the name of Christ. In turn, the response of the poet's heart to the nun's cry is through language. His heart, recognizing the truth in that cry, "make[s]words break" (st. 18) from the poet, that is, causes him to write the
poem which "words" not only the nun's experience, but his own, and attempts thereby to "word" the Word which underlies the entirety. The heart is not only the source of truth but the source of the language that speaks the truth, the language of poetry.

"The Wreck of the Deutschland" both celebrates the possibilities of language and recognizes its limitations. Because the poetic attempt to name God pushes language to its breaking point, that attempt throws vivid light upon two apparently contradictory aspects of language: it reveals the ability of language—specifically poetic language—to reach beyond the simply referential and the simply utilitarian which are its focus in ordinary use, the ability to say more, to speak truths inaccessible to ordinary language; at the same time, by its very inability to articulate ultimate truth fully or with any precision, it reveals the ever-present gap between words and what they refer to.

The problem articulated in "The Wreck of the Deutschland" is constant throughout Hopkins' work because of the basic assumptions of his vision of reality. As Philip Endean explains,

The belief that a feature of the created world is in some radical sense one with the Creator resists clear linguistic expression. The claim that bread and wine, or the azurous hung hills, are, truly speaking, Christ, must involve a collapsing of categories of space and time and a suspension of normal criteria of identity. Even though we may wish to refer to the world in which we live here and now, our belief under-mines the empirical basis of linguistic reference. Thus, the verbal expression tends to imply a projection of our insight onto some sort of shadowy "other" world from which ours is separated.19

Human language is necessarily based upon the immediate, the here
and now, of human experience. The only language available to express the ultimate meaning of immediate human experience is this language of the here and now—language which, as metaphor, goes beyond itself even as it necessarily (because it is still the language of the here and now) trips itself up. It is with this problem that "The Wreck of the Deutschland," insofar as it deals with language, is concerned.

The whole drama of God and the human heart, even to the action of God upon the heart, is enacted within the immediate world, the here and now:

Not out of his bliss
Springs the stress felt
Nor first from heaven . . .
Swings the stroke dealt--
Stroke and a stress that stars and storms deliver,
(st. 6)

The call does not come from the "other world" which human language inevitably suggests, but from "stars and storms," ordinary human experience. God has entered time through the Incarnation, and the here and now is therefore charged with divine significance. As Elisabeth Schneider notes, commenting upon the line "it rides time like riding a river" (st. 6), "The Incarnation rides the whole course of time . . .; it is not confined to the historical life of Jesus . . ., is not a moment in the stream of time but rides that current from beginning to end."20 It is the heart which recognizes the truth of the immediate presence of God in the world, and it is the heart that directs man to respond.

The response, occurring like the call in the here and now, takes linguistic form:
... only the heart, being hard at bay,

Is out with it! Oh,
We lash with the best or worst
Word last! How a lush-kept plush-capped sloe
Will, mouthed to flesh-burst,
Gush!--flush the man, the being with it, sour or sweet,
Brim, in a flash, full!

(st. 7-8)

It is with a word, whether best or worst, that man responds, and the result of that response is to fill the whole being with "sour or sweet," that is, to determine whether that individual does or does not fulfill his being. Philip Martin suggests, "To the call of God's love the best word is 'Yes', and the worst is 'No'; when the time of decision comes, it is a man's 'Yes' which causes a sweetness, and it is his 'No' which floods his whole life with sourness."21

The best or worst word here is the response of the whole being, the assent to or refusal of God by the whole self. To "say yes," as the poet does in stanza 2, is also to "live the yes," to assent not simply by word but by action to God's presence in the world. To say is to do: the word itself is act.

The nun's "word," the call with which she responds to the storm, is the central linguistic act described in the poem. The poem itself, the poet's attempt to articulate the meaning of her call, is a parallel linguistic act whose climax coincides with the climax of the nun's experience—the attempt to translate vision into language.

In simply human terms, the experience of the storm is incomprehensible, incoherent. But the nun, with her "heart right" and "single eye" (st. 29), triumphs over that incoherence, "breasting the babble" (st. 17) of typical human response and seeing the truth in the storm. In effect, she says with Hopkins:
Thou art lightning and love, I found it, a
winter and warm;
Father and fondler of heart thou hast wrung:
Hast thy dark descending and most art merciful then.
(st. 9)

God's greatest mercy occurs in his "dark descending." As Keating
remarks, for both the poet and the nun, "God's justice is his mercy,
his chastisements are his blessings." 22 What appears as contradic-
tion, when read by a heart which says yes, is revealed as a whole-
ness of love. Whether God's selving is experienced as light or dark-
ness, ultimately it reveals a single essential truth, his love. Be-
cause the nun can read that essential truth, her call "To the men
in the tops and the tackle rode over the storm's brawling" (st. 19).
Her call "rides over" the storm not only in the literal sense that
the men hear it despite the noise of the storm, but also in the
spiritual sense that it represents her victory over apparent de-
struction.

With her call, "O Christ, Christ, come quickly," the nun
"christens her wild-worst Best" (st. 24). That is, she recognizes
that what appears to be the wildest and worst experience of her life
is actually the best. She gives that experience a name, christens
it—a word which implies, along with the giving of a name, the
transforming of the named into Christ. Her naming of the storm in
this way brings about its transformation. She "'names' her wild-
worst best, and 'supernaturalizes' it." 23 The storm becomes what
it is from God's perspective: "in thy sight/Storm flakes were
scroll-leaved flowers, lily showers" (st. 21). 24

The nun's word is possible because her heart is right and she
consents to what is. The word originates in God's action upon her
life; it comes from God and goes back to him:

    Ah! there was a heart right!
    There was single eye!
    Read the unshapeable shock night
    And knew the who and the why;
    Wording it how but by him that present and past,
    Heaven and earth are word of, worded by?

(st. 29),

The nun's yes is assent to conform her life to Christ's. She "becomes Christ" and he her (S, p. 154). Her word, her interpretation of the storm, is achieved, in fact, by Christ, comes from him—just as "present and past, Heaven and earth," everything that exists is both "word of" and "worded by" Christ. That is, the world names him but at the same time he is the creative Word by whom all things are named in order to exist. Of all created things, only man can choose to say "no," to not-name God, to not-selve. The nun's recognition of Christ in the storm is her full-selving, her naming of God.

In Heidegger's terms, the nun is a meditative thinker, one who submits to what is, to Being, rather than seeking mastery over the beings through which Being makes its presence felt. Such submission is "thanking," the giving of oneself to a reality outside oneself and greater than oneself—Being. Heidegger says, "The speechless answer of his [man's] thanking through sacrifice is the source of the human word, which is the prime cause of language as the enunciation of the Word in words" (EB, p. 358). For Heidegger too, the relationship between man and language is circular: language originates in Being but finds its own truth in man's true response to what is. The nun's word becomes the fullest possible response to Being, and in speaking that word she herself achieves her fullest human potential.
The nun's word is like the Word itself, active and creative. Her heartfelt response to Christ brings him bodily into the storm with the other sufferers, not in Schneider's sense of a literal apparition, but in the sense that she herself becomes Christ by her identity with him in his suffering. The poet can therefore hope that her obedience could put such pressure upon the hearts of her fellow passengers as the storm has put upon hers, that she could "be a bell to, ring of it, and Startle the poor sheep back!" (st. 31), press from them the "yes" of acknowledgment. To say yes to God is to affect the lives of others, to become the means by which they in turn can affirm Christ. Christ is "new born to the world" (st. 34) in every such affirmation.

The poet's experience parallels the nun's. Just as she must read and interpret an event which is superficially dark and unreadable, so he in turn must read and interpret her words, which appear equally dark and ambiguous. He is able to enter into her experience and, as it were, interpret it from within because, like her, he has experienced storm and suffering in the course of which he has said yes to what is. His identity with the nun is confirmed by the tears with which he responds to her crisis (st. 18). Her suffering finds an echo in his own. Similarly, his response to her suffering echoes her response. His word, the poem, echoes hers. The poem attempts to name Christ as the nun has named him, and does so by repeating her experience on several levels—the nun's own, the poet's (both in his earlier parallel experience and in his response to her experience), and, by means of the poem itself, the reader's. 26

In the poet's interpretation of the nun's cry, the two aspects
of language earlier mentioned come together: its possibilities and its limitations. As the nun has named the storm by her cry, so the poet attempts to name her cry and to explain its meaning:

    But how shall I . . . make me room there:
    Reach me a . . . Fancy, come faster—
    Strike you the sight of it? look at it loom there,
    Thing that she . . . There then! the Master,
    Ipse, the only one, Christ, King, Head:
    He was to cure the extremity where he had cast her;
    (st. 28)

Endean, whom we have earlier quoted in reference to the difficulty of expressing ultimates in the language of the here and now, uses these lines from the poem to illustrate that difficulty:

    The meaning of this stanza . . . must be that the situation as it is, given that all things are in Christ, is itself recognised as shot through with his presence. The primary suggestion of the language, however, is that Christ steps in from outside the picture, as it were, and cures, abolishes, transforms, brings her back home to the centre from the extremity. 27

Christ is present in the storm from the beginning and the storm itself is an expression of him. There is no need for him to step in from anywhere else. The nun's cry, then, is not a call in the sense of a summons to someone absent, but rather a recognition of a presence and therefore a recognition of present cure within and through the very extremity that seems to deny that presence.

J. Hillis Miller interprets Hopkins' attempt to name God in "The Wreck of the Deutschland" as a "recognition of the ultimate failure of poetic language." 28 More specifically in reference to the stanza quoted above, he remarks that the only way to talk about the mystery of the nun's experience of Christ is "in a cascade of metaphors whose proliferation confesses to the fact that there is
no literal word for the Word.” 29 David A. Downes expresses a similar idea in a more positive way:

Stanza 28 is Hopkins’ affirmation of the limits of poetry. In the identity of religious consciousness he felt between Christ, himself, and the tall nun, that is, in the vivid sense of Christ’s Presence in time, in nature, in himself, in the tall nun, he was a poet at a loss for words. All he could do was dramatize his unwordedness. Man (poet) cannot word God’s presence directly. 30

Downes talks about the "limits" of poetic language, where Miller talks about its "failure." One could consider, with Miller, that the inability of poetic language to name God is indeed a failure, but it is truer to the poem as a whole and to Hopkins’ vision of reality to consider it simply a limitation. Poetry can go so far and no further.

The limitations of language are acknowledged throughout the poem. Every truly spiritual experience defeats language. What the poet knows of God is "Beyond saying sweet, past telling of tongue" (st. 9). His yes is "truer than tongue" (st. 2). It is a saying of the whole being, a saying which is also doing. So too is the nun’s yes, whose literal words can be interpreted in several ways. The poet’s question, "what did she mean?" (st. 25), as well as his presentation and rejection of several possibilities (st. 25-27), testifies to his awareness of the limitations of language in dealing with spiritual truth. Indeed, in its very limitations, in its inability to name God, language speaks of God, if only by indirectness and metaphor:

I admire thee, master of the tides,
Of the Yore-flood, of the year’s fall;
The recumb and the recovery of the gulf’s sides,
The girth of it and the wharf of it and the wall:
Stanching, quenching ocean of a motionable mind;
Ground of being, and granite of it: past all
Grasp God, throned behind
Death with a sovereignty that heeds but hides, bodes but abides;

(st. 32)

Here again is a proliferation of metaphors which illustrates that God is "past all/Grasp" of human understanding or language, because all human experience is "framed by" God, occurs within his domain. Human words only echo the divine Word, they can never transcend it and can therefore never grasp it. Nonetheless, the poet is compelled to try. As Heidegger puts it, "The poet is obliged to speak by a [certain] distress. This distress conceals itself in the withheld coming-to-presence of the godly" (translator's brackets).31 The poet's heart intuits God and must therefore seek to name him. Language, in its very limitations, points to reality beyond itself and beyond the here and now.

The view of language and poetry expressed in "The Wreck of the Deutschland" reveals a distinct similarity with Heidegger's view. Indeed, in its focus on the heart as the source of truth and language, in its attempt to name God, and in its final inability to do so directly, the poem illustrates Heidegger's basic position about the relationship of man, the Holy, and poetic language.

Such, however, is not the final word upon "The Wreck of the Deutschland." A close look at the actual language of the poem—the way Hopkins puts into practice his theories of language and poetry—reveals a significant difference. For Heidegger, the poet can grasp only a "trace" (FLT, p. 94) of the gods. Poetry can do no more than suggest by absence the withheld presence. By contrast,
Hopkins' view of language as partaking of both material and spiritual reality provides a basis for a linguistic incarnation of human experience in which spiritual truth is also incarnated. The presence of God is therefore stronger in "The Wreck of the Deutschland" than Heidegger would consider possible. In short, the theme of language as it appears in the poem suggests a strong affinity with Heidegger, but the language reveals a difference. If the poem says that the nature of language is such that the poet cannot name God directly, at the same time the poem enacts in its shaping of language a new presence of God in the world. In its fullest solving in the hands of a poet, language is both act and meaning. Man's "yes" to God—to the truth of what is—is dynamic. In the uttering of the "yes," the Word comes again into the world. In this reading, then, "The Wreck of the Deutschland" is itself a new incarnation, a word of God in the world.

3. The Language

In Hopkins, as we have noted, poetry begins in the actual world, in concrete human experience because it is through that experience that man first encounters meaning. Even a poem as spiritual in its aim as "The Wreck of the Deutschland" is enacted almost entirely in and through the concrete detail of the material world. Not only must poetry be, for Hopkins, firmly grounded in the material world, but it must be so grounded as that world is lived. It is a tenet of his that "the life must be conveyed into the work and be displayed there, not suggested as having been in the artist's mind" (C, p. 133). The poem must not merely relate an experience,
it must make of that relation itself a direct experience lived in
the fullness of thought and feeling that characterizes actual human
experience. As Robert Hill remarks, "Hopkins is neither an abstract
theologian nor simply a describer. He is an experience-giver, a
phenomenological [sic] recreator-of-consciousness." His problem
in "The Wreck of the Deutschland" is to render what is in effect al-
ready a vicarious experience—the poet's experience of the nun's ex-
perience—in such a way that the reader also feels it as a direct
experience.

Hopkins employs numerous devices to create a sense of immediacy
in the poem. Among these are the conventions of the Pindaric ode,
which celebrates "a personal meaning discerned in the event." Hopkins himself says of "The Wreck of the Deutschland" that "It is
an ode and not primarily a narrative. There is some narrative in
Pindar but the principal business is lyrical" (L, p. 49). Because
the poem is a lyric, the poet is necessarily himself involved in it,
indeed in this case dynamically present. The poem recreates the
movements of the poet's mind in his struggle to make sense of the
event of the wreck. The reader is drawn by the force of the lan-
guage into the poet's very mind, and lives with him the process by
which he attempts to name God.

Hopkins of course employs numerous linguistic and prosodic
devices to achieve the desired effect of lived experience, but we
will focus on two which are characteristic of his poetry in general
and which are particularly relevant to the approach taken in this
study—the use of the present tense and the emphasis on verbs and
nouns over other parts of speech. Of Hopkins' use of the present
tense, Milroy remarks, "It is not surprising that Hopkins favours the simple present in his poetry, since instantaneous action/perception, or being, or behaving, are the essence of inscape." In
scape is caught when creatures selve, when they act out their true nature. The doing which is also being is always happening now. In order to convey the expérience truthfully, Hopkins attempts to con-
vey it as a present one in which the reader is also involved.

At the core of "The Wreck of the Deutschland" is the narrative of the wreck. It is not surprising then that a good part of the poem is in the past tense. Nonetheless, the opening stanza estab-
lishes the poem as a present experience, a reflection upon two past events—the poet's own spiritual shipwreck and the physical ship-
wreck of the nuns. Part the First is a reflection upon the poet's own past experience, an event in some sense like the actual wreck in that God has "almost unmade, what with dread,/[His] doing" (st. 1), even as he has unmade the physical being of the victims of the wreck. The conclusion of the stanza reverts from reflection on the past to a question and statement in the present: "dost thou touch me afresh?/Over again I feel thy finger and find thee." The news of the wreck reminds the poet of his own earlier experience. God's touch now is like God's touch then. By implication, the narrative of the poet's own past experience forms a background against which is played his struggle to understand the present event. The poet's experience is also to some extent a key to understanding the wreck, since it is an experience which has already been lived, resolved, and so far distanced that the poet has drawn from it conclusions about God which now shape his reflections on the wreck. The use of
the past tense in the narrative of the poet's past experience emphasizes its role as background or foundation for the rest of the poem.

The movement of Part the Second, which deals directly with the wreck, is more complex. Unlike Part the First, it is not a reflection upon past events which have been resolved, but the very process of resolving a puzzle arising from past events which are nevertheless felt as present. The shift of tenses in this section reflects the greater complexity and immediacy of the events, reverting from past to present and back again, depending on the immediacy of the poet's sense of involvement in what happens. The narrative of the wreck (st. 12-17) leading up to the nun's first appearance is told almost entirely in the past, but from the moment of her appearance, the narrative is disrupted by the poet's present struggle to make sense of the event.

The very thought of the nun forces from the poet a very personal address to his own heart—a series of exclamations and questions which themselves constitute the "breaking of words" which they mention:

Ah, touched in your bower of bone,
Are you! turned for an exquisite smart,
Have you! make words break from me here all alone,
Do you!--mother of being in me, heart.
O unteachably after evil, but uttering truth,
Why, tears! is it? tears; such a melting, a madrigal start!
Never-eldering revel and river of youth,
What can it be, this glee? the good you have there of your own?

(st. 18)

The effect is of powerful, indeed uncontrollable, emotion—an effect heightened by the triple enjambement in the first four lines and
the broken, interrupted lines throughout. The poet is in the storm with the nun, his response to her experience is immediate and overwhelming, and the reader is drawn into the immediacy of that response by means of its verbal dramatization.

The poet's response echoes the nun's experience. He shares with her the moment of her "breasting the babble" (st. 17), and that moment is therefore rendered in the present. It is drawn out of the action and violence of the storm and, as it were, stilled for the greater part of eleven stanzas (st. 18-28) while the poet works out the meaning of her reading of the storm. The use of the present tense for this moment highlights it against the background of the narrative past and focusses particular attention upon it as the central event not only of Part the Second, but of the whole poem. Even within a single stanza, the contrast between present and past is maintained. The sister "rears herself to divine/Ears," but in the very same sentence, her call "rode over the storm's brawling" (st. 19). This change of tense within a single sentence suggests that the nun's call transcends time, that it is an act which, if not itself eternal, has eternal significance in a way not unlike the Incarnation, which "rides time like riding a river" (st. 6). Her call occurs within time and its effect upon her fellow passengers is past, but in itself it is in some sense an eternal act whose effect will continue to be felt for as long as it moves anyone as it does the poet—and ultimately for as long as the poem is read.

A similar change of tense with similar effect occurs in stanza 24. The poet has reflected upon details of the nun's background so as to bring out their significance to his present reflections upon
the wreck. His thoughts about her background identify her with Christ through her suffering for her faith, through the mystical significance of the number five, and through her association with St. Francis (st. 20-23). With these thoughts in the background, her call reverberates with deeper significance when the poet returns to it. While the poet himself was "under a roof" and "at rest," the nun

\[\text{Was calling,} \quad \text{'O Christ, Christ, come quickly':}\]

\[\text{The cross to her she calls Christ to her, christens her wild-worst Best.}\]

(st. 24)

Again the nun's call is both within time and outside time. The past tense heightens the contrast between her life and the poet's at the moment of her vision. The shift to the present both identifies the poet with her at that critical moment, despite the contrast, and at the same time indicates that her act of identifying the storm with Christ is an eternal act.

The poet's question "what did she mean?" draws the reader into the conflict, and with the poet the reader considers and rejects several possibilities before the climactic stanza 28, which dramatizes the moment of vision, the moment when at last the poet sees what the nun sees:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{But how shall I . . . make me room there:} \\
\text{Reach me a . . . Fancy, come faster--} \\
\text{Strike you the sight of it? look at it loom there,} \\
\text{Thing that she . . . There then! the Master,} \\
\text{Ipse, the only one, Christ, King, Head:} \\
\text{He was to cure the extremity where he had cast her;} \\
\text{Do, deal, lord it with living and dead;} \\
\text{Let him ride, her pride, in his triumph, despatch and have done with his doom there.} \\
\end{align*}\]

(Hopkins' italics)

What the nun sees eludes linguistic expression, overwhelms. Within
the possibilities of language, there is no "room" for her vision; it "looms" too large for human language—a problem dramatized in the breathless fragments of the first four lines, which grope towards an expression they can never achieve. This stanza recreates "Hopkins' futile search for corollaries for the nun's discovery of the infinite in the finite, the presence of God in the storm." Following his breathless attempts to express the inexpressible—attempts which the reader lives through with him—the poet's only option is to multiply terms, none of which is in itself adequate, but all of which together reveal something of what both poet and nun have seen.

The reader lives with the poet the puzzles, the uncertainty, the reverses of thought which are the process by which the poet arrives at an understanding of the wreck, not only as it affects the nun who is the chief protagonist, but as it affects her fellow passengers (st. 31). The reader's sense of sharing the process by which the poet arrives at understanding draws him forcefully into the moment of illumination as well. Ultimately, the poet's skilful incarnation of his process of thought makes the reading of "The Wreck of the Deutschland" a direct experience not only of the poet's own questioning of the event, but also, through his identity with the nun, of her experience of the storm. The poem is therefore a triply direct experience—the nun's, the poet's, the reader's own.

The sense of immediacy in "The Wreck of the Deutschland," as in other poems, is achieved not only by such skilful shifts of tense as described above, but also by a number of more strictly technical devices, among which a central one is what Milroy refers to as
Hopkins' notorious freedom in the "manipulation of the traditional parts of speech," especially in regard to nouns and verbs. In his introduction to the poems, Gardner observes that Hopkins "always prefers the concrete to the abstract, the active to the static word, and with a Shakespearean boldness will increase the sense of dynamic reality by using the bare verb as a noun or the noun with verbal force." Hopkins' preference for the concrete and the active is consistent with his view of selving as the doing which reveals being—a doing which is also a saying. Noun and verb are more or less transposable because being and doing are aspects of the same reality.

Gardner's comment points out Hopkins' preference for nouns and verbs over other parts of speech, but does not indicate the complexity of the working out of that preference. Hopkins frequently does use nouns as verbs ("Let him easter in us," st. 35) or verbs as nouns ("the hurtle of hell," st. 3), but this simple transposition is the least complex and perhaps also the least frequent of his techniques for emphasizing or combining the concreteness of nouns and the dynamism of verbs in his poetry. More common are his use of verbals and his use of compounds which combine the qualities of various parts of speech in a single compact word.

The dynamism of Hopkins' poetry is well-recognized. The sense of action in his poetry resides partly in the frequent choice of verbs which are to some extent mimetic of the actions they describe: "flash" (st. 3), "swings" (st. 6), "gush" (st. 8), "spins" (st. 13), "glides" (st. 33). The same sense of the word doing what it says occurs in Hopkins' verbal adjectives, which greatly heighten the sense of the storm's violence. Those who climbed to the shrouds
"shook in the hurling and horrible airs" (st. 15). The nun is blinded by "The rash smart sloggering brine" (st. 19), a coinage of which Milroy remarks, "Complex associations suggest the meaning: 'dashing (against the ship) repeatedly and drawing back with a sucking gurgling noise'." Other more common participles convey a similar sense of action: "wafting" (st. 5), "diddled" (st. 16), "swirling" (st. 19). The many such adjectives in "The Wreck of the Deutschland" contribute greatly both to the sense of the power and immediacy of the storm and to the sense of urgency in the poet's struggle to make sense of it. The storm is not only the external one of the nun's experience, but also the internal one of the poet's and therefore of the reader's attempt to discover its meaning.

Hopkins' verbal nouns are equally effective. Often they take the form of commonly used gerunds: "Thy doing" (st. 1), "The woman's wailing, the crying of child" (st. 17). More often, however, Hopkins uses gerunds in constructions which draw particular attention to their verbal quality: "And the midriff astrain with leaning of, laced with fire of stress" (st. 2). One expects a simple noun and encounters instead a verbal noun. The same effect occurs in "Hast thy dark descending and most art merciful then" (st. 9). In both cases, the sense of action dominates, but at the same time there is an inescapable is quality in the simple fact that the words are nouns. A similar effect is achieved in stanza 27, where the multiplication of such gerunds emphasizes at once their verbal and nominal qualities: "The jading and jar of the cart, Time's tasking, it is fathers that asking for ease"—an emphasis further underlined by the rhyme of "tasking" and "asking." Even such a simple phrase
as "his going" acquires a peculiar dynamism in its context: "It
dates from day/Of his going in Galilee" (st. 7). Hopkins avoids
the abstraction and the static quality of such a word as "life" and
creates instead an impression of Christ's active life. It is not
simply his presence that matters, but the way that presence mani-
ests itself in act. As Milroy remarks, "Motion and act are nor-
mally in the verb rather than the noun. The poet tries to override
this difference and suggest the qualities of both verb and noun in
the same word or phrase."43 The poet seeks to capture the selving
of things, the unity of act and being. Words which are both con-
crete and dynamic are most appropriate for his purpose.

Hopkins' language combines the qualities of nouns and verbs in
more simple ways as well. Often he uses nouns which can be verbs
in a different context: "a fling of the heart" (st. 3), "Stroke
and a stress" (st. 6), the "buck and flood of the wave" (st. 16);
or, conversely, he uses verbs which can be nouns: "storms bugle
his fame" (st. 11), "vault them" (st. 12). Such words, while they
have a single function as either noun or verb, nonetheless retain
something, if no more than a shadow, of the properties of the other
part of speech. Such a shadow, however, acquires substance when
upon occasion Hopkins makes a noun from a verb which is rarely, if
ever, so used: "The swoon of a heart that the sweep and the hurl
of thee trod" (st. 2), "I am soft sift" (st. 4), "a smother of sand"
(st. 14). This technique heightens the effect of the noun-verb com-
bination and makes the word stand out as both noun and verb.

It is worth noting that most of the examples quoted above are,
as Hopkins uses them in "The Wreck of the Deutschland," nouns.
Milroy suggests that "when single words are transferred from one class to another, there is again a tendency for Hopkins to nominalize other parts of speech rather than make verbs out of nouns" (Milroy's italics). Despite the overwhelming sense of action in Hopkins' poetry, he is actually more noun-centered than verb-centered—a preference consistent with his view of language, according to which it is words that mean things, that is, nouns, which have prepossession or inscape and therefore are more fully words (J, p. 125). Nouns have more body than do other words, are more physical, more incarnational. The more of his language Hopkins can nominalize, the more he succeeds in capturing inscape. Hopkins does not hesitate to make nouns from any part of speech: "her wild-worst" (st. 24), "the who and the why" (st. 29), "The all of water," or "the past-prayer" (st. 33). But he prefers to nominalize verbs over other parts of speech because it is verbs which embody the doing which is central to selving and therefore to the capturing of inscape.

It is in Hopkins' compound adjectives that the power as well as the complexity of his "notorious freedom" with parts of speech emerges. His participles are complex enough, imparting the qualities of the verb to the adjective, but his compounds are more complex yet. In the particular nature of their complexity, they reflect tendencies in Hopkins pointed out above: the combination of verbal and nominal qualities and the overall preference for nouns even over verbs. Many of the compounds add to the dynamic qualities of participles the concrete qualities of nouns, so that the resulting adjective is, as it were, a new part of speech which is noun-verb-adjective.
Of those compounds which combine only two of the three elements, a certain number are built upon verbs: "Warm-laid grave" (st. 7), "lush-kept" (st. 8), "a lingering-out sweet skill" (st. 10), "blue-beating" (st. 26). But more often, it is the noun which is at the centre: "flint-flake" (st. 13), "all-fire" (st. 23), "moth-soft" (st. 26), "The-last-breath penitent spirits" (st. 33). If the compound retains an element of the verb, it is often in such weakened form as the simple "-ed" ending of a past participle or in the use of a noun which can double as a verb: "dowewing" (st. 3), "black-backed" (st. 13), "down-dugged" (st. 26), "endragonèd" (st. 27), "fall-gold" (st. 23), "hoary-glow" (st. 26).

The most complex of the compounds impart to the adjective both the concreteness of nouns and the dynamism of verbs. For example, in the description of the storm, the "whirlwind-swivellèd snow/Spins to the widow-making unhilding unfathering deeps" (st. 13). The dynamism of the italicized compounds is heightened by the noun at the centre. The action is narrowed, made more specific and concrete. "Whirlwind-swivellèd" is further complicated by the fact that "whirlwind" is itself a compound of verb and noun, so that there is in fact a doubling of the sense of action in the adjective. The verb "spins," of which the "whirlwind-swivellèd snow" is the subject, is yet another synonym for the "whirl" and "swivell" of the adjective. The effect is of bewildering motion, but motion which is also concrete and tangible. It is the very motion involved in selving, the unity of being and act.

Hopkins' preference for nouns, verbs, and combinations thereof --whether simply of the two or in yet another part of speech--
combined with his preference for the present tense, creates a poetry which is unusually concrete, dynamic, and immediate in its effect. Both preferences reflect his concern with capturing and naming the selving of the world around him—a selving whose perception is always in the present, though its incarnation in language is not. By creating the impression of present experience, Hopkins draws the reader into the poem so that the reader lives with the poet the movement to, and the moment of, revelation.

III. Conclusion

"The Wreck of the Deutschland" is an attempt to name God by entering into and reading an event which does not seem compatible with a loving God. The project of naming God is one upon which Heidegger has expressed himself in his discussion of the poet: it is a project to which the poet is called but which he can never achieve except fleetingly and partially. To trace the theme of language through "The Wreck of the Deutschland" is to find in Hopkins a remarkably similar view of the problem. The nun's naming of Christ remains an enigmatic and ambiguous naming. Likewise, the poet's own naming by means of the poem fails to find a word which adequately names Christ, who is the Word. Even at this level, however, there is a difference between Hopkins and Heidegger: for Hopkins God and the Word are one while for Heidegger they are not. If Hopkins can succeed in naming God, he succeeds at the same time in naming language, giving it the being which Heidegger says language does not and cannot have.

It is in fact in the actual language of the poem—language
grounded in Hopkins' belief in the Incarnation—that the poet reveals his difference from Heidegger. If the conclusion to which the poem comes is that the human word can do no more than echo the Word of God, the enacting which takes place at the "physical" level of the language achieves a new incarnation—a naming of God through the naming of the shipwreck and of the emotional, intellectual, and spiritual struggle to interpret the wreck. By its particularly concrete and immediate rendering of the poet's experience of/and the nun's experience, the poem incarnates what it cannot directly name. By naming the world which in turn names and means God, the poet achieves a new "presence" of God in the world. If he cannot find the one word which adequately names God, he can nonetheless name God by a kind of indirection—a submission of his being to the truth of what is.
Notes


5 Milroy, for example, remarks that "It has in fact been difficult to find examples from Hopkins's poems that are simple alliterations" (p. 47). See also his remark on the complexity of the sloe image in "The Wreck of the Deutschland" (pp. 47-48). A More generally, Gardner says, "In Hopkins the various elements of style are more strictly integrated than in most other poets" (I, 142). Some of the stylistic complexity he attributes to the influence of Welsh cynghaneddd, which he discusses at some length (II, 145-54).

6 Where Hopkins falls short of his ideal, the failure is all the more glaring for the brilliance of his successes as well as for the complexity of his work as a whole. It is, however, fascinating that, apart from certain poems such as "The Bugler's First Communion," there is little critical agreement about which lines, images, or whole poems are "intolerably violent and artificial" (L, p. 263--Hopkins' anticipation of Bridges' response to the rhythm of "Harry Floughman"). Robert Lowell chooses "Messes of mortals" from "The

Milroy, p. 133. As a particularly apt illustration of this phenomenon, see George Pace's analysis of the double rhyme scheme of the octave of "The Windhover" ("On the Octave Rhymes of 'The Windhover'," English Language Notes, 2 [1965], 285-86).
8 Kuhn, p. 16; see also Ball, p. 141; Carol T. Christ, The Finer Optic (New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1975), p. 136; Marylou Motto, "Mined With a Motion" (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 21-22. It is noteworthy that these are all critics whom we have earlier cited as in some way suggesting a closeness between Hopkins and Heidegger. See introduction.

9 Ball, p. 113.


11 It must be kept in mind that Heidegger nowhere talks about God in the strict sense in which Hopkins does. We use the word here for convenience.


13 Of this word, Hopkins says, "I mean by it the being a thing has outside itself, as a voice by its echo, a face by its reflection, a body by its shadow, a man by his name, fame, or memory, and also that in the thing by virtue of which especially it has this being abroad, and that is something distinctive, marked" (L, p. 83). In the present context, the implication would be that something of the being of the name of God, though not the very name itself, can be captured in poetry.


17 Robinson, p. 50; see also Boyle, Metaphor in Hopkins, p. 78.

18 Robinson suggests that Hopkins found justification for this view in Scotus (p. 115). See also Christopher Devlin, S.J., ed., The Sermons and Devotional Writings of Gerard Manley Hopkins (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959), p. 284. It is possible that Heidegger's view of the heart also finds its origins in Scotus.


20 Schneider, p. 23.


23 Keating, The Wreck of the Deutschland, p. 89. For slightly

24 Although the storm is transformed, it still remains a real storm, violent and destructive. This is consistent with Hopkins' usual strategy by which a thing remains solidly itself even as its transcendent meaning is revealed. Robinson takes a different view, arguing that "in the final third (or more) . . . Hopkins has lost the sense of a wreck" (p. 119). Keating, by contrast, suggests that, for example, the nun's "cries may be professions of faith, but they are also cries of terror" (The Wreck of the Deutschland, p. 28). The world of actual experience is never rejected.


26 For various expressions of this complex linguistic relationship, see Miller, "The Linguistic Moment in 'The Wreck of the


30 David Anthony Downes, The Great Sacrifice (Lanham, New York, London: Univ. Press of America, 1983), pp. 99-100; see also Mariani, "'O Christ, Christ, Come Quickly!','" pp. 39-40. Boyle provides another perspective on the stanza in his suggestion that the failure of Hopkins' language is "owing to his turning from his heart to his brain" ("'Man Jack the Man Is'"," p. 111).


It is only by profound respect for the actual, and therefore strict adherence to literal truth, that deeper truth emerges.

33 Salmon articulates this problem, p. 94.


35 Milroy, p. 225; see also Motto, p. 26.

36 Downes, Hopkins' Sanctifying Imagination, p. 49.

37 Unless otherwise indicated, all italics for the remainder of this chapter are mine.


39 Milroy, p. 58.


Miles, unlike most critics, sees Hopkins as primarily adjective-centered. Her interpretation of participles and compounds (pp. 64-65), whose effect is discussed below, differs considerably from that in the present study. See "The Sweet and Lovely Language," in Gerard Manley Hopkins, by the Kenyon Critics (Norfolk, Connecticut: New Directions Books, 1945), pp. 55-71.

42 Milroy, pp. 245-46.
43 Milroy, p. 224.
44 Milroy, p. 221.
Chapter Four

The Dearest Freshness: "God's Grandeur"

I. Introduction: Hopkins, Heidegger, and Nature

In our study of "The Wreck of the Deutschland," we have observed in Hopkins an apparent agreement with Heidegger's theories of language and of the possibility of naming God. We have also seen how the actual language of the poem undermines that apparent agreement by enacting on the "physical" level a "naming" of God which consists of the linguistic incarnation of the world—an indirect naming but nonetheless an achievement of what Heidegger considers impossible. There is even less agreement between Hopkins' view of nature and Heidegger's, as is clear from a careful consideration both of the expression of their beliefs about the natural world and of the language of a representative nature poem, "God's Grandeur." It is in fact in the language of the poem—the practice which casts light upon the theory from which it springs—that Hopkins' difference from Heidegger most clearly emerges.

In the more theoretical expression of what nature is and what part it plays in the complex of nature-man-God (or beings-man-Being), there is no immediately striking difference between Hopkins and Heidegger. Hopkins' most vivid summary of his view of the natural world reads, "All things therefore are charged with love, are charged with God and if we know how to touch them give off sparks and take fire, yield drops and flow, ring and tell of him" (S, p. 195). In
spirit, the statement does not seem far from Heidegger’s belief that it is in submission to the truth of beings that man encounters Being. Indeed, Heidegger can appear as rooted in the natural world as Hopkins: "Thinking transcends the particular being, in the direction of its Being, not in order to leave behind and abandon the particular being, but so that by this ascent, this transcendence, it may represent the particular being in that which it, as a being, is" (WICT, p. 223). Both Hopkins and Heidegger see the natural world as radiant with the supernatural: beings provide access to Being and therefore they demand respect and reverence in themselves.

However, Hopkins is always interested in things in their particularity, their unique and individual being. He sees God in "the bluebell I have been looking at" (J, p. 199)—the emphasis on that particular bluebell and his own personal encounter with it. A similar personal encounter is at the heart of "The Windhover": "I caught this morning morning’s minion." The poem is not (or at least does not present itself as) a generalization based on numerous sightings of falcons, but rather as the incarnation of a particular sighting of a particular bird at a particular time. Hopkins begins in the world as it is, with the concrete and specific, and if he makes generalizations, he does so from that basis.

By contrast, Heidegger rarely mentions specific things at all. If he does, it is to illustrate a point rather than from any interest in the thing as thing. His discussion of a tree in bloom (WICT, pp. 41-44) has nothing to do with any particular tree. It is a tree as opposed to the bluebell Hopkins mentions. As such, the tree is an abstraction and not a real tree. It appears not for its own sake
but for the sake of argument. In Heidegger, beings never appear in their particularity as individual beings. They are always subordinate to the general truth they illustrate. Hopkins, however, "is interested in beings, not in concepts, in reality as it is in itself, not in reality as it is in the mind." Although he does draw general truths from observations of particular beings and even writes whole poems composed of general statements, he never subordinates the particular to the general but states the general in terms of the particular.

Only in the most general sense, then, do Hopkins and Heidegger have a similar perspective on the natural world: for each it is "news" of an ultimate truth beyond and greater than itself, a truth which can be reached only by means of the world as we experience it. Heidegger, however, emphasizes ultimate truth at the expense of the particulars that reveal it. Hopkins, without losing sight of the question of ultimate truth, emphasizes the particulars. For him, each individual speaks uniquely of what underlies and sustains it and is therefore valuable in its uniqueness. Ultimately, since Heidegger's concern is always with Being, he is not much interested in the natural world other than as a means of access to Being. Failure to recognize this leads to such misleading explications as Nathan Scott's. He is perhaps justified in quoting from "God's Grandeur" to support a very general point about Heidegger. However, when he states that for Heidegger, "the distinctive office of the poet [is] to make us look at the various concrete realities of experience with the kind of wakeful attentiveness that will permit their being disclosed in the radical specificity of what they are," he is
allowing his perception of Hopkins to color his interpretation of
Heidegger. The latter is not concerned with "radical specificity"
extcept as it points beyond itself. Thus, although a study of
Hopkins' nature poems may seem to invite an affinity between him and
Heidegger, it is necessary to recognize that such affinity is limited
and must be carefully drawn.

As in "The Wreck of the Deutschland," in the nature poems
Hopkins attempts a naming. It is not, however, so complex a naming
as that of the earlier poem or of the later poems of the human self.
In the latter, the naming is complicated by the fact that it is ac-
complished from within what is named, whereas what is named in the
nature poems is external to the poet. In "The Wreck of the Deutsch-
land," the naming attempted is that of God himself. Insofar as that
is possible, it is achieved by naming the things of the world—imme-
diate, physical, sensible—which themselves name God because they
are words of God. What Hopkins has achieved in "The Wreck of the
Deutschland" is what he aims at in the nature poems—the naming of
the things of the world so that they appear in the fullness of their
individual being. As such, they name God but without sacrificing
their individuality to do so.

Hopkins' nature poems, then, though their immediate focus is the
natural world, retain their concern with God. And, because it is im-
possible to isolate one element of the complex of nature—man—God,
they are also concerned with man. Man appears in the nature poems
in two ways—which are perhaps merely two different aspects of the
same phenomenon. First, Hopkins contrasts human response to God
with nature's response. Nature is "pure," while man has "lost that
cheer and charm of earth's past prime" (P, 35). Nature, by its consistent full selving, shames man, who is neither consistent nor fully selving. At the same time, man's refusal to do what he is called to do affects the natural world. His activity, indeed, counteracts: "Only ten or twelve/Strokes of havoc unselved/The sweet especial scene" (P, 43). Nature's selving is thus thwarted by man's action.

Both aspects of the man-nature relationship reflect Hopkins' view of man as fallen. Man is "life's pride and cared-for crown" (P, 35) with a responsibility to both God and nature. Created free and conscious, man is "Earth's eye, tongue, or heart" (P, 58), who is intended to see the truth of the natural world, to speak it, and to join his own life in full selving to the chorus of praise which nature gives to God. Indeed, the selving of nature is complete only when it encounters a "beholder" (P, 38), one with "eyes to see" (J, p. 221) beyond the surface of things to their essential truth. Because of human blindness and destructiveness, however, such vision occurs only to such as are willing to cultivate the seeing eye and the knowing touch. In his nature poems, Hopkins seeks to provoke such vision, to name the things around him so that others see them newly.

In his view of human responsibility to the natural world, as well as in his view that man falls short of that responsibility, Heidegger is in accord with Hopkins, though he expresses his views differently. Heidegger argues that man makes the world into an object which he can manipulate and thereby abdicates his responsibility towards it (DT, p. 50). At the same time, "our nature's safety demands the rescue of things from mere objectness" (PLT, p. 130). Man is called to "save the earth," and, continues Heidegger, "To save the earth
is more than to exploit it or even wear it out. Saving the earth
does not master the earth and does not subjugate it, which is merely
one step from spoliation" (PLT, p. 150). What Heidegger says man
should not be towards the world sounds very much like Hopkins' own
view as expressed in such poems as "God's Grandeur," "Binsey Poplars,"
and "Ribblesdale." And what man ought to be is the meditative
thinker, the one with "eyes to see," who submits himself to what is
and thereby allows beings to reveal Being.

In the broad outlines of the complex relationship of nature, man,
and God, Hopkins' nature poems reveal basic affinities with Heidegger's
view of beings, man, and Being. However, the more closely one con-
siders their views, the more it becomes evident that the difference
of emphasis noted earlier--Hopkins' on beings, Heidegger's on Being--
is a crucial difference, one which finds its most striking illustra-
tion in the nature poems.

II. The Poem

1. Introduction

"God's Grandeur" provides a particularly useful example of
Hopkins' methods in the nature poems. Unlike most of the other na-
ture poems, which name particular individuals or particular aspects
of the natural world, "God's Grandeur" names the natural world it-
self. One would expect it therefore to be somewhat abstract. How-
ever, despite the fact that it is actually a series of general state-
ments, it is felt first as emotion and description rather than as
meaning. Regardless of its intellectual core, the total impression
afforded by the poem is one of immediacy and particularity--so much
so that it is possible to read the poem without being aware of how thoroughly it is an interpretation, rather than a presentation of the immediate and particular. Moreover, in its emotional and descriptive power, the poem makes itself felt as language. Hopkins' words, while they carry considerably more meaning than words in ordinary use (or perhaps because they do), also draw attention to themselves as words. The total impression of the poem is not of abstraction or of an intellectual statement, but of involvement both physical and emotional in the world named by the poem—an involvement achieved through language. One must remember that for Hopkins a word is fully itself only as it includes its "prepossession" and its referent, which are as much a part of its being as its intellectual content (J, p. 125).

To do justice to the language of the poem therefore requires attention to both its emotional force and its "physical" elements. The analysis in this chapter attempts to illuminate the theme of the poem by close examination of two aspects of the language: (1) the sound patterns as they both reinforce and render "physical" the poem's statement, and (2) the diction. The latter includes a look at primary and secondary (and sometimes etymological) meanings of words, as well as their connotations, not only in isolation but especially in their relationship to one another in the context of the poem as a whole.

Such an analysis finds justification in both Heidegger and Hopkins, though mostly in Hopkins. We have already noted that Hopkins considers words emotional and physical as well as intellectual (an opinion which Heidegger does not share). Moreover, for Hopkins, "'Meaning' is not purely referential; it consists partly
of the relationships contracted between items in a language." The relationships between words affect not only their meaning but also their contribution to the poem as poem, that is, as a work of art which aims at beauty and truth. Hopkins writes to Patmore that "on these mutual bearings of words in a passage the beauty of diction depends" (FL, p. 313). We have also noted in Chapter One Hopkins' interest in etymology—an interest which suggests that he was often aware of the history of the words he used and indeed may have chosen words because of their history.  

There are parallels in Heidegger for Hopkins' views on the importance of context in determining meaning, as well as for Hopkins' interest in etymology. According to Heidegger, Being speaks "before all else in every conjunction of words" (WICT, p. 233). Meaning emerges from the way words relate to one another. As to etymology, Heidegger too etymologizes, justifying it by saying, "Etymology has the standing mandate first to give thought to the essential content involved in what dictionary words, as words, denote by implication" (PLT, p. 175). The essence of a word is in its history. Words, then, are not simply terms; they are vital, vivid, and elusive. For both Hopkins and Heidegger, they are composed of their history and their interrelationships, and, for Hopkins, they have physical and emotional being as well.

Analysis of "God's Grandeur" at the level of the language elucidates some of the reasons for the poem's peculiar power and vitality—a power and vitality which Hopkins links thematically to the power of the Holy Ghost, who is at the heart of the poem as the sustaining energy of God in the world:
God's Grandeur

The world is charged with the grandeur of God.
It will flame out, like shining from shook foil;
It gathers to a greatness, like the ooze of oil
Crushed. Why do men then now not reck his rod?
Generations have trod, have trod, have trod;
And all is seared with trade; bled, smeared
with toil;
And wears man's smudge and shares man's smell:
the soil
Is bare now, nor can foot feel, being shod.

And for all this, nature is never spent;
There lives the dearest freshness deep down things;
And though the last lights off the black West went
Oh, morning, at the brown brink eastward, springs—
Because the Holy Ghost over the bent
World broods with warm breast and with ah!
bright wings.

The Holy Ghost appears more explicitly in Hopkins' commentary on
"Contemplation for Obtaining Love," with the conclusion of which
the editors of both the sermons and the poems link the opening lines
of "God's Grandeur." The final paragraph of the commentary deals
specifically with the Holy Ghost, that most subtle and mysterious
member of the Trinity. While the Father and Son are described mostly
in human terms, the Holy Ghost is described in terms which suggest
the fluid, the dynamic, the ungraspable invisible presence nonetheless felt. At his most abstract, Hopkins defines the Holy Ghost in
relational terms: he is communication, communion, bond, love—a
love which is "shewn 'in operibus', the works of God's finger." It
is the presence of the Holy Ghost, divine love, within all created
things which so "charges" them with energy that "if we know how to
touch them [they] give off sparks and take fire, yield drops and
flow, ring and tell of him" (S, p. 195). The images in this passage
are far from abstract, and in their suggestion of explosive power
and inexhaustible energy, they communicate far more vividly than do
the abstract concepts the way the poet sees God's power in the world. The Holy Ghost is, says Hopkins, "fons vivus, ignis," a living fountain, a fire (S, p. 195)—images which suggest both power and elusiveness. Neither fire nor fountain can be grasped or shaped.

The imagery of the opening lines of "God's Grandeur" is clearly echoed in the conclusion of the commentary: "All things therefore are charged with love, are charged with God and if we know how to touch them give off sparks and take fire, yield drops and flow, ring and tell of him" (S, p. 195). The first part of the conclusion is a clear paraphrase of "The world is charged with the grandeur of God." The images of fire and flowing with which Hopkins expands his statement in the prose passage parallel the images in lines 2-3 of the poem. God's grandeur "will flame out" in the same way that things "give off sparks and take fire" when touched with a knowing hand (or eye or mind). While the image of "the ooze of oil/Crushed" which "gathers to a greatness" is considerably slower and more ponderous than that of fons vivus, a living spring or fountain, Hopkins' own statement that things "yield drops and flow" provides a transition of sorts between the idea of the spring and that of "the ooze of oil." While the word "flow" looks back to the irrepressible bubbling of a spring, "yield" suggests a certain resistance and therefore is more closely related to the "ooze" which occurs only by the application of external pressure. A fountain normally suggests water, but the transition to oil in Hopkins' mind can easily be explained by the close association of fire and oil in traditional Christian symbolism for the Holy Ghost. Moreover, Hopkins could easily have had in mind the Old Testament story of the widow's cruse of oil in
I Kings 17, the inexhaustibility of that cruse suggesting the same quality in a fountain or spring.

Such a close parallel between Hopkins' commentary and the opening of "God's Grandeur" suggests that the Holy Ghost is present in the poem from the beginning, though he does not emerge explicitly till the end. 9 Indeed in the poem the Holy Ghost emerges to explicit presence much as the grandeur of God "gathers to a greatness" in the objects of the natural world. The action of the Holy Ghost thus shapes the whole sonnet, and indeed the movement of the sonnet itself mimes that action in the world. Stated baldly then, "God's Grandeur" is about the inexhaustibly renewed power of the Holy Ghost within the world. It is about the Being which manifests itself in all beings and can be there perceived by the person who maintains towards those things the thoughtful, thankful attitude of the meditative thinker.


In "God's Grandeur," Hopkins does not name an individual creature but the natural world itself. The poem summarizes his view of nature. In other words, with particular emphasis on nature, it summarizes his view of the relationship of nature, man, and God. Nature is created both for God and for man. It is meant to give God glory, and at the same time "all the things we see are made and provided for us" (S, p. 90). Both nature and man find their origin and their goal in God. Appropriately enough, then, even as "The Wreck of the Deutschland" begins and ends with God, so "God's Grandeur" "begins and ends with God reaching into the world." 10 Once again, God
"frames" the entire action of the poem.

However, God does not simply frame the sonnet, but his presence permeates it in its entirety, in the same way that, in Hopkins' view, his presence permeates creation. And, as in "The Wreck of the Deutschland," the incarnation of his presence is achieved through close attention to and presentation, through language which does what it says, of the sensuous details of the natural world. From the beginning, the poem is more than simple statement. Even the opening line, which is the most general and the most abstract in the poem, is felt as well as understood. Particularly responsible for the emotional power of the line are the words "grandeur" and "charged," whose meanings color not only the opening line but the poem as a whole. "Grandeur" suggests power and magnificence. It is not the love which Hopkins associates with the Holy Ghost in his commentary, and which emerges later in the poem, implicit in the image of the brooding dove. For the moment Hopkins is concerned not so much with love as with power—an emphasis underscored by the word "charged." The primary association of this word is with electricity, the effects of which are usually experienced as beneficent, but which is also dangerous and sometimes destructive. It demands respect. But the word has secondary associations which add to its force in the line itself and in what follows. It can imply responsibility. In its selving, the world returns to God the being he has given it and in so doing fulfils its responsibility, its charge. Moreover, "charged" can have the connotation of "brim-full," ready to overflow at a touch. In this latter sense, it anticipates the image in line 2.

The opening statement is followed by two specific and contrasting
images suggesting two different ways in which God's grandeur is manifested in the world. First, "It will flame out, like shining from shook foil"—an image of blinding glory manifesting itself suddenly and without warning. Hopkins has spared us much critical debate by explaining this image to Bridges, who was the first to have trouble with it:

I mean foil in its sense of leaf or tinsel, and no other word whatever will give the effect I want. Shaken goldfoil gives off broad glares like sheet lightning and also, and this is true of nothing else, owing to its zigzag dints and creasings and network of small many cornered facets, a sort of fork lightning too (L, p. 169).

Hopkins remarks that the "sonnet might have been written expressly for the image's sake" (L, p. 168). Fire is, in fact, a favorite image of Hopkins' for "the divine vital principle in all creatures," which we have earlier seen associated with the Holy Ghost.13

The second image—"It gathers to a greatness, like the ooze of oil/Crushed"—provides a further connection to the Holy Ghost as well as a link with the preceding image.14 In the light of this connection, the oil is olive oil, whose further biblical associations are also important for the sonnet. Olive oil is "the oil of man's nourishment, the oil of anointment and consecration."15 It is associated with abundance and well-being, as well as with a particularly close relationship with God. Olive oil is holy oil and therefore appropriate as an image of God's creative and sustaining power in the world.

Both images are at first startling because they are unexpected in the context. Gold foil seems an artificial image, and the ooze of oil a mundane one for God's grandeur. However, though unusual,
the images are also appropriate. It is precisely in the apparently mundane that the sense of God's grandeur builds up until the mundane is itself transformed. Moreover, "the strangeness of the images involves you as fully in their actual visualization, their physical perception, as in the intellectual perception of their meaning." The images draw attention to the actual world as much as to the idea expressed in them. They concretize intellectual perception.

The final line of the first quatrains provides a transition in tone from the positive assertions of the opening. The word "Crushed," with which these assertions end, is startling, especially in its emphatic position at the beginning of a line. As Nancy Wicker observes, "Its suggested negative implications become explicitly stated in the lines that follow." The word anticipates man's destructive action upon God's world. The question which closes the quatrains—"Why do men then now not reck his rod?"—compels close attention. It can only be read slowly, the words "men then now not" standing out as necessarily separate entities, so that it is impossible not to linger over each of them. At the same time, the line is very tightly connected by means of the alliterative n of "now not" and r of "reck his rod" which overlap with the assonance of "men," "then," "reck," and "now," "not," "rod." The somewhat archaic "reck his rod" also draws attention to itself, so that the question as a whole stands out and demands attention.

The emphasis on the word "men" suggests that men are an anomaly in the world. They do not respond as nature does; or, in other words, the natural consequence of the situation as given is thwarted. "Then" means "in consequence of this," that is, in
consequence of what the poet has earlier stated with such confidence. It should follow from the manifestation of God's grandeur in the world that men should acknowledge him and "reck his rod." "Then" also has the connotation of time, of then as opposed to now, so that the juxtaposition of "then now"—especially with the clash of the final and initial n—creates a tension in the line, suggesting that neither then nor now do men consider God, but also holding in the background the suggestion that there is a contrast between then and now, that there has been a progressive alienation from God. It is emphatically clear in the poem that men now do not regard God, but in the second quatrains, both implications of the "then now" juxtaposition—that of consequence and that of time—are developed.

The rod is "the sceptre or staff of divine authority." However, it also has the connotation implied in the proverb "Spare the rod and spoil the child": it is the rod of discipline. In this sense it continues Hopkins' initial presentation of God as power and contains within it the vague threat that continued rejection of God's authority will lead to chastisement. According to the OED, "reck" means "to take heed or have a care of something (or person), so as to be alarmed or troubled thereby, or to modify one's conduct or purpose on that account," but it can also mean "to take care... with desire or favour towards." To "reck God's rod," then, can mean to submit to his authority out of either fear or love. But, as the poem says, man does neither.

The second quatrains is the most highly wrought and mimetically powerful part of the octave. Sound echoes and embodies sense, and
language acts out its meaning. The quatrain contrasts man's activity in the world with God's. Man's activity, neither "flames out" nor "gathers to a greatness," though what it does is nonetheless a feeble echo of these activities—or perhaps one could say a parody. Several critics have remarked upon the mimetic quality of line 5, of which Robinson, for example, says:

"Generations" (a long, ruminative word, evocative of the weight of ages' habitual grossness) 'have trod, have trod, have trod' in the heavy marked footfalls which are at once the deadening, regular pounding of tramping feet and the repetition of such pounding through the years.

The connotations of the word "tread" add weight to the meaning conveyed in the sound of the line. "Tread" can mean simply to walk, but its more common meaning is "to step or walk with pressure on something esp. so as to crush, beat down, injure or destroy it." It implies wilful destruction.

The negative influence of man upon the world, already suggested in line 5, is elaborated in lines 6-8, which emphasize the pervasive nature of that influence:

And all is seared with trade; blearèd, smeared with toil;
And wears man's smudge and shares man's smell:
Is bare now, nor can foot feel, being shed.

(my italics)

—a passage particularly tightly knit by both sound and meaning. The word "trade" looks back to the treading of the previous line not only in sound but in etymology. The present meaning of "trade" evolved from its Middle English meaning of "to tread a path" or "traverse the sea"—a connection which has two effects upon the word in the context of the poem. First, "the etymological identity of
the verb **tread** and the noun **trade** infuse a more concrete sense of treading, walking to and fro, into the paler, more abstract (and ultimately metaphorical) idea of **commerce.** The word is enlivened by its history. Secondly, "trade," whatever it means today, carries within it the negative connotation of destructiveness—a connotation encouraged by association with other words with similar implicit or explicit meanings. For instance, "trade" is linked with "toil" both by alliteration and by equivalent positions in parallel constructions. The connotation of "toil" is of hard and unrewarding work—a connotation which casts its shadow back upon "trade," doubt is thereby subtly cast upon the value of trade.

The link between "trade" and "toil" is further emphasized by the participles that introduce them. "Seared," "bleared," and "smeared" are linked by rhyme and by position in parallel constructions. The link is further consolidated by the alliteration of the first and last words of the triplet. The line forms a tight unit of both sound and meaning. The three rhyming participles all have negative connotations. "To sear" means "to cause to wither, to blight," or alternatively, "to burn, scorch." The world is not only worn bare by man's repetitive treading, but also blighted and burned by his trade, which ultimately brings not profit but loss. The **OED** offers a related figurative meaning for "sear"—"to render the conscience incapable of feeling." If "seared" is taken in this sense, the phrase "seared with trade" suggests that man's involvement in trade deadens his conscience, his awareness of God—a meaning compatible with the tone of the quatrains. "Seared," connected as it is with burning, recalls the flame of God's grandeur encountered
in the first quatrains, but in man's hands fire causes death instead of life.  

"Smeared" means "dirtied or soiled by smearing" and "to smear" means "to spread, daub, cover thickly or in patches with some unctuous, greasy, sticky, or dirty substance" or "to rub out with a smear or smudge." Man's toil dirties the world and thereby "rubs out" or at least dims its beauty. The action of smearing is connected not only with dirtiness, but specifically with dirtiness by the spreading of a greasy or oily substance. Once again man's activity parodies God's. But whereas the oil which shows God's grandeur "gathers to a greatness," that which man works with merely soils the world.

"Bleared," framed by "seared" and "smeared," serves a slightly different purpose, though all three describe the effect of man's actions upon the world. "Seared" and "smeared," slightly more closely joined by the initial s than either is to "bleared," both parody the action of the Holy Ghost. Both are more closely connected spatially to the agents of the effect they described. "Bleared," in its middle position, takes up the separate but related meanings of "seared" and "smeared" and describes their ultimate effect. It means "dim, misty, indistinct in outline." Literally it is related to eyesight and means "dim from water or other superficial affection." Bleared eyes see things in a blur. Man's trade and toil sear the world, cause it to wither, and also smear it with oily dirt. As a result God's glory inherent in the world is dimmed, more difficult to see.

Line 7 reverses the movement of line 6, describing not what man has detracted from the world, but what he has added—his smudge and
smell. What he adds, however, only increases his negative effect upon the world. Man dims God's mark and adds his own, so that God's mark is further obscured. Once again, sound patterns reinforce the meaning, connecting line 7 with the previous line through the alliteration of "smudge" and "smell" with "smeared," and binding the line itself into a unit by the pattern of alliteration and rhyme.

The sense as well as the sound of line 6 is picked up in line 7. A smudge is the result of smearing. To smudge is "to soil, stain." Man's smudge is his mark upon the world and that mark is a stain. "Smell" is linked to "smudge" by alliteration and by position in constructions which are not only parallel but almost identical, so that the two phrases are like part of a litany. "Smudge" and "smell" become almost part of the possessive, the final s of "man's" blurring into the initial s of "smudge" and "smell," so that these qualities are, as it were, subsumed into "man's." Man and his smudge and smell smear together as the words themselves do. 25 "Smell," in this context, takes on the negative connotation of unpleasant odor which it does not always have. It also suggests man's lower nature, his animal nature, since it is with animals and not man that we normally associate a distinctive smell. Man's smell is of course another way in which he puts his mark upon the world. As it is stained by him, so too does it smell of him.

A colon follows "And wears man's smudge and shares man's smell," indicating that what follows is a summary or an explanation of what has come before. And indeed Hopkins sums up the present condition of the world which results from plodding generations of trade and toil: "the soil/Is bare now, nor can foot feel, being shod." "Soil"
here refers to earth, and, as a noun, which the presence of the
article immediately indicates, that is its primary meaning. However,
coming as it does after a series of images of staining and dirtying,
it cannot but suggest the verb "to soil," meaning "to make unclean,"
with its additional meaning of "to stain or defile morally." This
particular reverberation of the word is encouraged by its position
at the end of the line, so that the continuation of the thought is
not immediately apparent.

The bareness of the soil is the result of generations of man's
treading and trade, words which imply the wearing down or crushing
of something, in this case the evidence of God's grandeur in the
world. There is also in these words the idea of deliberate or at
least semi-deliberate destruction. When one treads on a beetle with
the intention of crushing it, the action is wilful and deliberate.
When a path is trodden bare, those who tread it do not do so with
the express intention of destroying the vegetation, but the action
is wilful in that they choose to have a path precisely there and the
inevitable result is to kill the vegetation. It is in this second
sense that man's action wilfully destroys the earth: he chooses a
course whose inevitable result is destructive, though he does not
necessarily choose directly to destroy.

Not only is the earth worn bare, but man can no longer feel it,
"being shod." He has not only dimmed and distorted the evidence of
God's presence in the world, but he has also artificially separated
himself from that world, putting shoes on his feet so that he is no
longer in direct contact with the earth. Mackenzie provides an in-
sightful comment upon this image, saying, "The unshod feet of those"
who trod the presses brought an enriching flow, while the shod feet of later generations (not merely those of the Industrial Revolution) only crushed down the natural vegetation." The "ooze of oil" which "gathers to a greatness" as God's grandeur does in the world was produced by a generation in closer contact with the earth than the present one, or indeed than many previous generations.

Hopkins seems to imply a progressive alienation from God through the ages. It is interesting that while none of the images of the second quatrain are taken directly from industry, the general impression of dirt and stain is easily associated with the Industrial Revolution. The word "toil," for instance, suggests repetitive, strenuous, unrewarding labor such as might be the lot of factory workers or miners. "Seared," "smeared" and "smudge" are words which suggest the kind of scarring of the earth, and the sooty, oily pollution associated with industry. Nonetheless, the specifically modern world is only implied, not explicitly described in these lines. Trade has been part of human life for centuries and the baring of the soil is the work of generations. In this sense then, Hopkins is concerned not only with the destructiveness of modern man, but with the destructiveness of mankind from the beginning.

At the same time there is a suggestion that man was once closer to a direct apprehension of the presence of God in the world than he is now. When man went barefoot, every step reminded him of his necessary relation to the earth. By extension, men "have insulated their sensibilities against the Divine presence as a shod foot is insulated against contact with earth and green grass." Man's seared or deadened conscience is a natural corollary to his searing
of the world. Moreover, man's action has, like God's, a cumulative
effect. In the same way that evidence of God's grandeur "gathers
to a greatness," man's work smears and bleeds that evidence, so that
in effect man puts himself at an ever greater distance from God.

Lines 5-8 vividly evoke human self-involvement and materialism
and thereby answer the question of line 4. Man is blinded by his
own busyness with trade and toil, occupations which distract him
from his main purpose of glorifying God and submitting to his
authority, and which, moreover, are ultimately counter-productive.
Roger Slakey explains the second quatrains as a description of man's
"immersion in himself as man, rational animal. Because everywhere
he sees only the manifestation of man, he cannot recognize the
manifestation of God." 28 What man sees when he looks at the world
is his own mark, his "smudge." What he encounters most vividly,
immediately, and intimately is his own "smell." He makes himself
therefore the measure of reality and it takes particular effort for
him to see past the sign of his own activity to the more fundamental
signs of God's activity.

The octave of the sonnet sets up an effective and explicit con-
trast between God's activity and man's, as well as an implicit con-
trast between nature's activity and man's. It creates in the process
a sense of conflict, opposition, or at least strain between the two
activities. Man is at cross-purposes with both God and nature.
This sense of strain is sustained by the "violent overtones" which
Donald Ruckin points out as present in the verbs and adjectives of
the octave. 29 The underlying sense of restrained violence is sup-
ported by Hopkins' emphasis, in this part of the sonnet, on the
manifestation of God as power and authority rather than as love. The phrase "reck his rod" is particularly relevant, implying as it does both authority and chastisement. The description of man's destructive activity, following close upon the stark question—"Why do men then now not reck his rod?"—(whose very form states that man does not live as he ought in relation to God), increases the sense that he lives under a constant threat. The threat never becomes more explicit than in the phrase "reck his rod," but it nonetheless colors the picture of man's existence in the world, a picture already darkened by the images of staining and soiling.

3. Resolution: The Sestet

The relaxing of the tension created in the octave begins with the first word of the sestet, the "And" which Rackin characterizes as "deceptively simple." Following the buildup of tension in the second quatrains, one would expect the "But" of contrast instead of the "And" of coordination. The "And" suggests that what is described in the sestet takes place at the same time as what is described in the octave. Or, as Rackin explains, "'And' indicates that the dearest freshness, the loving Holy Ghost who broods over man's smeared, seared earth—these agents of redemption have somehow been contained in and prepared for by the octave." The second quatrains present the surface truth about the world: man has worn and wasted and crippled the natural world. But the sestet goes beneath the surface, presenting the essential truth within that world.

Once that truth is perceived, all of man's influence is reduced to the simple "all this." Whatever man does cannot touch nature's
self at any fundamental level. "Nature is never spent": it is constantly renewed, like a fountain or spring whose waters well up from an inexhaustible source, or like the widow's cruse of oil, constantly and miraculously replenished. Unlike man's ultimately unprofitable trade, brought to mind by the monetary affiliations of "spent," nature is never completely used up or exhausted. A final echo of the image of trade occurs in line 10, in the secondary meaning of "dearest" as implying "rarity and expensiveness." However, in the sestet the financial connotations are subsumed in the natural and spiritual reference, thus reversing the situation of the second quatrain, where trade blurs the evidence of God in nature.

In the sestet it is nature as evidence of God which dominates over nature as marked and marred by man. Hopkins captures the essence of this view of nature in one of the most evocative lines in his poetry: "There lives the dearest freshness deep down things." Despite its essentially general nature, the line succinctly captures not only the idea but the sensual apprehension of the irrepressible vitality of the natural world. The choice of the word "lives" is of course central: nature's powers of renewal spring not from an inert presence but from the living fountain that is the Holy Ghost.

The sense of actual life is emphasized by the word "freshness," which in itself counteracts all the images of staining and soiling in the second quatrain. It suggests a vitality which cannot be finally smirched or obscured. Man's activity can have no ultimate or lasting effect upon it because it does not live at the surface where man's influence is felt (though it "flames out" there), but rather "deep down things," in the very core of all beings. In
essence, the line recalls the "gathering to a greatness" of the
drops of oil in the first quatrain and casts new light upon the
word "Crushed." Even man's treading activity, which in spirit runs
counter to God's activity in the world, contributes to the showing
forth of God's grandeur. Though man can dim the evidence of that
grandeur in the world, he cannot finally obscure it.

The very inexhaustibility of the "dearest freshness" reinforces
the idea of love first encountered in submerged form in the phrase
"reel his rod" and now emerging into light in the word "dearest."
"Dearest" means "most highly valued," or, in a more personal sense,
"most cherished, most lovable." The primary meaning here is that
God's presence in nature ought to be loved, is itself lovable, but
there is also the implication that God is lovable because he loves.
The inexhaustibly renewed vitality of nature is a sign of God's
love. Indeed in the first four lines of the sestet, the sense of
love continues to grow until it overwhelms the sense of threat im-
plicit in the awesome power envisaged at the beginning of the poem.
Hopkins recapitulates in a powerful visual image the two movements
of the poem, God's and man's: "And though the last lights off the
black West went/Oh, morning, at the brown brink eastward, springs."
The contrast between God and man, light and darkness, life and
death, is captured in the age-old metaphor of the rising sun. How-
ever darkening and deadly man's activities may be, at their very
darkest they will be blotted out and their effect dispersed by the
irresistible light and life of God.

Robert Boyle suggests that "the dash after 'springs'... is
expressive of the moment of apparent pause before the rim of the
sun bursts over the horizon"--a pause also suggested by the word "brink." If the dash is indeed the pause before the sun breaks over the horizon, the final two lines are the actual breaking of the sun's light—that is, an explicit statement and dramatization (at once a saying and a doing)—of what is implicit in the entire poem, but especially in lines 9-13—that the light of God will always triumph "Because the Holy Ghost over the bent/World broods with warm breast and with ah! bright wings." The renewing power of the Holy Ghost will always exceed—and that incomparably—man's powers of destruction. The Holy Ghost is fons vivus, ignis (S, p. 195)—a living fountain which can neither be sullied nor stopped up, a fire which can neither be dimmed nor extinguished.

Indeed, the final image of the Holy Ghost as a brooding dove looks back to the opening lines and "synthesizes the two actions of the first quatrain—brightness, associated with the flaming, would be sudden, and brooding would be gradual." The image of the dove adds to the images of the first quatrain the idea of love, of a protective, cherishing watchfulness. The fire is transformed into the warmth of the breast—a far more domesticated and less threatening version of the flame of line 2—and the brightness of protective wings, while the slow gathering is transformed to the brooding of the "warm breast." The dimension of love adds immeasurably to the power of the closing lines and indeed to the whole sonnet. It reconciles the tension in the octave, so that man, though "bent" on actions counter to God's purposes, is nonetheless included in the cherishing and renewing action of the Holy Ghost. God's love gains ascendance over his power and authority.
The final image of the dove is tightly bound together by the \textit{b} and \textit{w} sounds, part of the power of which Rackin explains as follows:

In the penultimate line, the first and last words begin with \textit{b}, and in the final line, the double alliteration (of \textit{w} in the first and last words, \textit{br} in the second and penultimate words) graphically enfolds the line as the wings of the dove enfold the world. . . . The rounded egg-ness of the bent world is encircled by the bent wings of the Holy Ghost—these images are thus conveyed with a kind of ocular immediacy.

But the pattern is more complex than Rackin suggests. Beginning with "bent," the final word in line 13, all the words to the end of the poem except "and" and "ah!" begin with \textit{b} or \textit{w}. The \textit{br} words, all positive, look back to the "brown brink" of line 12, also positive, while "bent," with its negative connotations, looks back to the negative "black" of "black West." "Bent/World," as Robinson remarks, "is a visual description of the horizon, but it applies also to the world's moral condition, distorted out of true, and likely to remain so because of the very rigidity which 'bent' connotes." "Bent" can also be a noun—and its position at the end of the line and preceded by an article causes it to be momentarily read as 'one'—and as a noun it means a bare field, suggesting then not only man's moral crookedness, but also the effect of that crookedness upon the world. "Bent/World" is the last negative image in the poem and it is redeemed by the "warm breast" and "bright wings" which take up its two initial letters.

The poem concludes with the inexplicably powerful and completely satisfying "ah! bright wings," an image which somehow finally resolves the tension and the questioning in the poem and brings it to a final consummation in total peace. The "ah!" is the catch of the
breath with which the poet greets the "flaming out" of God's grandeur in the world, the flaming expressed in "bright wings." The language of the poem mimics the movement of its thought and emotion. The octave begins with a more or less intellectual acknowledgment of God's presence in the world and moves to a consideration of man's counterproductive activity dimming the evidence of that presence. The movement of the sestet represents a growing awareness of the nature of God's presence as inexhaustible love and life, a "gathering to a greatness" which finally "flames out" in the final image, which is the poet's "yes" to the "is" of God's presence in the world.

The poem is circular. Nonetheless it does not end where it began. In the course of the movement of thought and image in the poem, the intellectual awareness with which it begins is appropriated, so that the final awareness is not merely intellectual but personal and emotional. This final awareness is conveyed with a striking sensual immediacy, despite the basically intellectual core of the poem. It is a poem full of general statements, but it gives the impression of immediacy and indeed of immersion in concrete detail. The real world comes to vivid life in Hopkins' language, and it is this real world which vitalizes and validates the general statement.

III. Conclusion

What emerges most clearly from the preceding analysis of "God's Grandeur" is Hopkins' love for the particular, a love which in fact emerges on two levels. The first is that of the things of the world. The general statement at the heart of the poem is made vivid, concrete, particular, by being presented in terms of the immediate and
concrete. The second underlies the first and makes possible the concrete presentation of the things of the world. It is Hopkins' love for the particulars of language as language, words as words. As he is fascinated with the details of the world as he sees and touches them, so he is fascinated with the details of individual words— their weight, history, color, dimension, shape. The same love and energy which inspire the loving and extremely detailed descriptions in the journals also inspire the equally loving attention to the poetic shaping of word patterns in which the physical and emotional qualities fuse with the intellectual. The result is highly concentrated language which is apprehended with the heart and the senses as well as with the mind. "God's Grandeur" is an intellectual statement, but it is initially "understood" visually and emotionally, first because it is presented by way of concrete particulars from the real world, and then because those particulars are presented in language which is itself concrete. As a result, "God's Grandeur" is as "charged," as electric with hidden power and vitality, as the world it describes.

Our analysis of "God's Grandeur" reveals Hopkins at a considerably greater distance from Heidegger than was the case in the analysis of "The Wreck of the Deutschland." In the latter, Hopkins deals with themes upon which his thought is remarkably close to Heidegger's, though the language of the poem undercuts that closeness. In its love for the particular and concrete, "God's Grandeur," on the other hand, shows only the most general agreement with Heidegger at the level of theory. The absence at this point of such an agreement between Hopkins and Heidegger leads to an analysis
of Hopkins' language in action as the strongest evidence for his final difference from Heidegger's pattern of thought. More even than Hopkins' love of nature, his use of language reveals his love for the particular, for beings at once in themselves and as radiant with Being. In his hands, words acquire physical presence and, in doing so, become radiant with the actuality of what they describe—just as the world, in being itself, is also word of God. Word and world are one in Hopkins as in fact they never are in Heidegger.

Because they delight in the fact that things are, the nature poems invite more easily than many of Hopkins' poems a comparison with Heidegger. In fact, however, it is in these poems that the crucial parting of the ways between the thought of Hopkins and that of Heidegger is most strongly felt. Hopkins' love of the particular roots him firmly in the world of individual beings which Heidegger seeks constantly to transcend. To study such a poem as "God's Grandeur" in the context of the present study is to reveal the limitations of a Heideggerian perspective upon the poetry of Hopkins. The results of the analysis constitute a reminder that any parallels between Hopkins and Heidegger cannot be too carefully drawn.
Notes


4 Wendell Stacy Johnson, for example, remarks, "One extraordinary fact about this poem on things is that so few things are clearly described in it" (Gerard Manley Hopkins *Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univ. Press, 1968*), p. 130).


6 Walter J. Ong presents the intriguing opinion that "concepts have a way of carrying their etymologies with them forever. The elements out of which a term is originally built usually, and probably always, linger somehow in subsequent meanings, perhaps
obscurely but often powerfully and even irreducibly" (Orality and Literacy, p. 12). Though Hopkins shows no evidence of such a bold view, it is not out of the way to suggest that he is inclined to credit words with a similar kind of life.


8 Boyle, p. 41.


12 Hugh Pendexter, III, suggests that Hopkins refers to the gold foil in a gold-leaf electroscope, an explanation which other critics have accepted but which seems to me, despite the electrical connotations of "charged," an unnecessary complication of Hopkins' own explanation. See "Hopkins' 'God's Grandeur'," The Explicator, 23 (1964), Item 2; also Edward Proffitt, "Hopkins' 'Ooze of Oil/Crushed' Once More," Concerning Poetry, 10, No. 2 (1977), 62.


18 Mackenzie, p. 65.

19 All definitions, unless otherwise specified, are from the OED.

20 Robinson, p. 87. See also Mackenzie, p. 66; Peter Milward,


22 Proffitt, p. 63.

23 Proffitt, p. 63.


26 Mackenzie, p. 65.

27 White, p. 286. For other observations on this line, see Gardner, II, 232; Johnson, p. 129.

28 Slakey, p. 161.


30 Rackin, p. 69.

31 Rackin, p. 69.

32 Motto also suggests a sexual sense for "spent" (p. 89).

33 Terry Eagleton, "Nature and the Fall in Hopkins: A Reading of 'God's Grandeur'," *Essays in Criticism*, 23 (1973), 73; see also White, p. 286.

34 Boyle, p. 42.

35 Slakey, p. 160.

36 Rackin, p. 73, footnote 16.
37 Robinson, p. 88; see also White, p. 286.

38 Thomas L. Watson, "Hopkins' 'God's Grandeur'," The Explicator, 22 (1964), Item 47.
Chapter Five

Our Tale, O our Oracle: "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves"

I. Introduction: The Human Self in Hopkins and Heidegger

To turn from Hopkins' nature poems to his later poems of the human self is to return to a naming in its own way as complex as that of "The Wreck of the Deutschland." It is also to return to a far closer affinity in thought between Hopkins and Heidegger than we have found in the nature poems—an affinity revealed precisely through an examination of the difficulties involved in naming the human self. Human selving is in itself more complex than the selving of nature because it involves self-consciousness and choice.

Man is the only created self who knows he is a self and who can accept or refuse his destiny; that is, he can choose to selve or not to selve, to contribute to the creation of his own being or to be content with a halfbeing (S, p. 197). Moreover, according to Hopkins—and indeed, according to Heidegger—man is a creature who is blind to his ultimate interests and who more often than not chooses half-being. Becoming fully oneself—selving—involves conscious assent. It requires effort and concentration, and it often fails—though it can also approximate success. Heidegger defines the human situation in terms of error, which "dominates man through and through by leading astray. But, by this self-same aberration . . . , error collaborates in the possibility which man has (and can always extract from his ex-sistence) of not allowing himself to be led astray" (EB,
p. 318). Man can sometimes, though rarely, realize his potential. The poems of human selving are therefore poems of conflict, of struggle, of incomplete selving, of groping towards a vision and a being which reflect the deepest and truest nature of man.¹ On the whole, they lack the exuberance and joy of the best of the nature poems because man can but rarely attain to the simple and whole-hearted selving intrinsic to the natural world.

For both Hopkins and Heidegger, man in the fullness of his being can be defined only in relation to that which gives him being. In Hopkins' terms, full selving involves conformity to Christ. The man who fully selves is the "just man" who "Acts in God's eye what in God's eye he is--/Christ" (P2, p. 129). Specifically, such selving involves a yielding up of the self to God, an acquiescence to God's plan, a willingness to join the natural world in its "wording" of God and thereby to "give him back that being he has given" (S, p. 129). God is therefore always part of man's selving.

Similarly, Heidegger defines man in reference to Being. "Man," he says, "is the being who is in that he points toward 'Being,' and who can be himself only as he always and everywhere refers himself to what is" (WICT, p. 149). Man is fully man only if he is what he should be in regard to Being. The man who achieves that goal is the meditative thinker, who, as we have seen in Chapter One, is very much like Hopkins' "just man." As the just man conforms to Christ, so the thinker conforms to Being. Meditative thinking involves the whole being. It is an acknowledgment of the truth of Being, and, like Hopkins' "yes and is" (J, p. 127), "the exercise of thought is one of grateful acquiescence in Being."² To consent to the discipline
of thinking is to contribute to the creation of one's self, one's being. Human selving, whether perceived in Hopkins' terms as imitation of Christ, or in Heidegger's as meditative thinking, is an arduous, difficult, and always uncompleted task, and Hopkins' poems of human selving reflect these qualities.

To complicate these poems further, the selving which they present is an internal process. It is part of the poet in a way that the selving of the natural world is not. His perspective is therefore always to some extent incomplete, distorted, and tentative. This is especially true in the so-called "terrible sonnets" or "sonnets of desolation." In these poems, the poet is focussed upon his individual self rather than upon other men or mankind as a whole. The sonnets of desolation are poems of intense inner conflict. They present the very process of human selving as that process is perceived from within the selving self. Given the nature of human being, it is inevitable that such selving would involve suffering, uncertainty, and blindness. Man is too close to himself to see with any clarity where his choices, his assents and refusals, will take him until he has actually lived them through. The sonnets of desolation are fascinating as experiences of a human attempt at full selving.

However, more interesting and more relevant to the present study are the two poems which are sometimes seen as "a kind of introduction and conclusion to the terrible sonnets" — "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" (P, 61) and "That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the comfort of the Resurrection" (P, 72; hereafter referred to as "Heraclitean Fire"). These poems, while they also reflect the struggle and
conflict of human selving, do so in a more "objective" and universal way than do the sonnets of desolation. Although they too necessarily begin with the poet's particular self, "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" (discussed in this chapter) and "Heraclitean Fire" (discussed in Chapter Six) reach beyond the poet to encompass human selving in general. They are not so intimately concerned with the deeply personal struggle of the poet to "become Christ," but present instead conditions applicable to all human beings. Moreover, unlike the sonnets of desolation, they begin in the natural world and the "beholder" is concerned with interpreting that world in its particular relevance to the human self rather than simply in its own natural selving, as in the nature sonnets. These poems thus reveal more clearly than do either the nature poems or the sonnets of desolation Hopkins' view of the place of man in the three-way relationship between God, nature, and man.

II. The Poem

1. Introduction: The Saner Attitude

"Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" is of particular interest to the present study because it is concerned with interpretation, a question with which Heidegger is also much concerned. Thematically, then, it illuminates the similarities and differences between Hopkins' view of reality and Heidegger's and thus helps define both the relevance and the limitations of Heidegger's theories to the study of Hopkins' poetry. At the same time, in its concern with interpretation and in its enacting of a "reading," the poem calls language itself into question and therefore illuminates Hopkins' theories of language.
From Heidegger's perspective, a poem dealing with man's struggle to be fully man necessarily calls language into question. "Language is the foundation of human being. We are, then, within language and with language before all else" (OWTL, p. 112). Man is involved in language as he is involved in his own existence. Only in and through language can he define himself in his relationship to beings and ultimately to the "Ground of being" (P, 28, st. 32), and it is only in and through language that he selves—that is, contributes to the creation of his own being.

For the reasons explained above, the naming of man is a far more complex matter than the naming of a windhover or even of nature as a whole. The poet is too closely involved in his own being and in that of mankind in general to be able to "catch" either his own inscape or that of mankind with any accuracy. The most he can hope to do is to name different facets of life, or to name mankind from different perspectives, in the hope that such partial naming will convey something of the essence of man. If such naming is successful, it renders more truly existent that which it names and causes the reader to see it in a new way.

"Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" is a naming of human being by indirect and largely negative means. Specifically, it projects to a time and place outside human life, thereby implying a certain objectivity, and from that perspective it names one possible outcome of human choice. In its peculiar density and complexity, it encompasses much of what is presented in greater detail in other poems. Like such earlier poems as "God's Grandeur" (P, 31), "The Sea and the Skylark" (P, 35), and "Binsey Poplars" (P, 43), "Spelt from Sibyl's
Leaves" calls into question man's relationship with nature. However, the focus in the later poem is not on the purity and single-mindedness of nature's selving in contrast to man's. Rather, it is upon man himself. Nature's presence as "word of God" is not, here, the simple praising and glorifying of God which it is in the earlier poems. Instead it is a word which man must interpret and apply to his own life and to the creation of his own self. With the shift of focus, nature becomes ambiguous, its meaning no longer clear and simple. Similarly, such basic concepts as inscape and selving, which, in relation to the natural world, are relatively simple, acquire far greater complexity when applied to human being.

Human interpretation of anything is always to some extent complex and incomplete for the simple reason that man is always involved in what he interprets. Whatever he interprets is part of what Heidegger calls "world," that is, part of a whole of which man is himself a part. Because it is impossible ever to separate fully the part from the whole and because man is himself part of the same whole, "everything that lies before us is ambiguous" (WICT, p. 201). "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" reflects this ambiguity in its tone and language, but at the same time it ventures an interpretation—one which acknowledges, along with its own incompleteness and uncertainty, the necessity for man to attempt such interpretation despite its faulty nature.

According to Heidegger, "Every interpretation must first of all have entered into what is said, into the subject matter it expresses" (WICT, p. 174). Such "entering into" implies acknowledging the impossibility of objectivity and suggests that interpretation must
involve the whole of both the interpreter and the matter interpreted. Interpretation involves not only the mind but the heart and senses as well. For Hopkins too, the truest interpretation is that which takes the interpreted matter as a whole, a unity. He explains such interpretation as an "act of contemplation" (J, p. 126), which he describes as an attitude: "in which the mind is absorbed (as far as that may be), taken up by, dwells upon, enjoys, a single thought" (J, pp. 125-26). This is "the saner attitude." The wholeness of what is interpreted includes not only what can be grasped with the mind, but also what can be grasped with the senses and emotions. The "feeling" of a thing, its emotional burden and impact, its "prepossession" (J, p. 125) is as much a part of its meaning as its intellectual content.

The interpretation that occurs in "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" is emotional and spiritual as well as intellectual. It takes into account not only the visual "text" of the night sky, but also—and one might even say especially—its impact on the interpreter. At the same time, the poem continually casts doubt upon its own powers of interpretation, although never directly. Rather, such doubt is implicit either in the connotations or in secondary denotations of many of the words having to do with interpretation. The resulting poem is emotionally highly charged, the tone of its pronunciation as much a part of its meaning as the content. The poem is, moreover, more of a single piece than any other of Hopkins' poems. All the devices of verse are brought to bear upon the shaping of the language in order to create both the sense of overwhelming awe and terror and at the same time the unrelenting movement which carries
the poem as if inevitably to its dark conclusion. So much of a
unity is the poem that it is difficult to separate the various ele-
ments which contribute to its effect. It is therefore necessary to
take a slightly different approach to the analysis of the poem than
that taken in the previous chapter. Attention will first be given to
the content of the poem, with particular emphasis upon the theme of
interpretation. Only then will we proceed to the analysis of strictly
technical devices—specifically repetition and reiteration—which
contribute to the extraordinary unity of the poem.

2. What the Title Says

Although its full significance cannot be grasped without knowl-
edge of the poem as a whole, the very title of "Spelt from Sibyl's
Leaves" captures the essence of the poem. It establishes both the
tone and the context within which the poem is to be read, foreshad-
ows the nature of the message to follow, and undercuts the seeming
authority of its own pronouncement. The complexity of the title and
of the poem is inherent in the enigmatic character of the Sibyl her-
self. Her name "means 'will of God'" and she is the "prophetic
votress of Apollo."7 She herself represents the will of God: What-
ever message she brings has divine authority. However, this author-
ity is immediately undercut because her message is never clear. As
Norman White explains,

Spelling from leaves was the method of prophesying
normally used by the Cumaean Sibyl. She shuffled
the palm leaves, on each of which was written an
oracle, and then drew some out at random... The
leaves were liable to be scattered in the
draught as the cave door was opened by a visitor
and not rearranged by the Sibyl. They would then not be truly representative of the will of the gods.

The message is indeed divine, but it has been, as it were, scrambled by the processes of nature and is no longer clear.

The various meanings and implications of the verb "to spell" reinforce the elusive, nature of a sibylline message. In one sense, "to spell" means "To read (a book, etc.) letter by letter; to peruse, or make out, slowly or with difficulty." To read the oracle is a slow and difficult process, the uncertainty of which is emphasized by the secondary meaning "To find out, to guess or suspect, by close study or observation." Even in its simplest sense of "to decipher," the word carries a shadow of uncertainty, if only because it implies work and close study and therefore the possibility of error despite its predominantly positive connotations. Certainly it is unwise to put total confidence in one's ability to make out the full and true meaning of the sibylline message. Inherent in the word "to spell" and in the situation is the sense of guessing. Although the message is divine and can be made out by careful study, there is no way of knowing whether the study has been careful enough—or indeed whether the message has been confused before the interpreter even begins his task, and, if so, to what extent.

In addition to establishing the ambiguous authority of the message to follow, the title of the poem foreshadows both the nature and the tone of the message. An oracle from the Sibyl can be expected to be gloomy and forbidding and to present little hope or consolation. Moreover, within Catholic liturgy, the Sibyl has specific sombre associations related to her guiding of Aeneas to the
underworld. She occurs with David in the hymn *Dies Irae* (that is, 'Day of Wrath') in the Burial Mass "as witness to the terror of the day of judgment." The specific Catholic associations prepare for the poem's treatment of Judgment Day, and the general association of the Sibyl with prophecies of doom anticipates the darkest possible interpretation of that final day. Both expectations are borne out in the poem.

The title, then, already says much, not only about the content of the poem but about its direction. The message to follow is a message of doom, a divine warning about the ultimate destiny of man. However, in its passage from God to man, the message is obscured and cannot be interpreted with any accuracy. It is to some extent a guess, an approximation. By spelling from Sibyl's leaves, the poet takes a position which Heidegger assigns to all true poets; he stands "between gods and men" (EB, p. 288). He ventures to decipher the divine message in the leaves disordered by nature, but he does so in full awareness of the hazardous nature of that venture and of the uncertainty of his own conclusion.

3. **Lines 1-7a: The Text**

Hopkins' text in "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" is a natural text, a part of the world which he sees as "word, expression, news of God" (S, p. 129). The leaves are those of a living tree whose outline is perceived against the night sky. Hopkins interprets these leaves in the whole context of the coming on of night. Indeed the leaves themselves do not appear until the second part of the poem, where Hopkins begins his exegesis of the scene he has described in the
first seven and a half lines. These opening lines establish the text, as it were, and they do so within an atmosphere of tension and intense foreboding which anticipates the interpretation occurring in the second part of the poem.

From the enigmatic first line, with its slow, ponderous, but inexorable movement, the nightfall described in the poem is not an ordinary one. The line is extraordinary in a number of ways, not least of which is the fact that it is a series of adjectives whose noun does not appear until the second line. The noun then comes as a surprise, partly because none of the adjectives, except perhaps "vaulty," would normally be associated with an evening sky. All of the adjectives, however, anticipate the further description of evening as well as the ensuing spiritual application.

"Earnest," one of Hopkins' favorite words, means "demanding serious consideration; weight." What is earnest must not be taken lightly. Already in this word is the whole weight of the Sibyl's prophecy of doom. "Earthless," whose sound connects it with "earnest," suggests detachment from the earth, and can, in that detachment, suggest the spiritual or divine values which are later contrasted with those of the earth. The "Equal" and "attuneable" are linked in meaning. As Gary Stonum explains, "There is to be a harmony of things, but as 'equal' suggests, they will be attuned to each other only because they are indistinguishable." Of "Equal," James Milroy comments further, "even, 'equal', and even, 'evening' were believed by early nineteenth-century lexicographers to be of the same origin. The implication that evening was a time of equal balance between day and night would undoubtedly appeal to Hopkins."
Such equality would also anticipate the later reduction of all existence to "two spools"—"black, white; | right, wrong."

The first four adjectives, then, establish evening as an equalizer to be taken very seriously—and one whose ultimate significance is not of the earth. In the second half of the line, the adjectives are progressively awesome and threatening in their meanings and especially in their feeling, so that the evening encountered in line two is extraordinary both in its vastness and its ominousness.

"Vaulty," in its figurative sense, refers simply to "the apparent concave surface formed by the sky." However, a vault is also a burial chamber, so that the word, while referring primarily to the visual sense of size and shape, also has more ominous associations with death—associations which emerge more fully as the poem progresses. "Voluminous" expands upon the feeling of great size in "vaulty," but its associations with books and writing are also relevant to the theme of reading and interpretation. The suggestion is that if the coming of evening is read aright, the interpretation could fill volumes. Follows a pregnant pause indicated by an ellipsis—a pause which gives added force to "stupendous" with its meaning of "Such as to cause stupor or astonishment"—a word which no longer emphasizes the visual qualities of the scene but rather its impact upon the observer. Such an evening as that here described should indeed inspire awe. Line two reinforces the peculiarly ominous quality of the evening by presenting it as striving to engulf all of life in the darkness of night. While this is on one level a particularly awesome version of the simple night at the end of an ordinary day, it is also and, in its intensity even primarily,
the night of time itself, the final end of all things.

The first two lines powerfully establish the feeling of the poem, and the description which takes up the remainder of this first section occurs within an atmosphere of increasing gloom supported by both the movement and the prepossession of the language. The poet describes the loss of daylight and the increasing dominance of the sky over the earth as the earth itself is lost in darkness which obliterates its color and variety. The language of description is at once visually accurate and emotionally consistent with the opening lines. The "yellow hornlight" in the west and the whiter "hoarlight" higher in the sky do not simply fade, they "Waste"—a word whose connotations are of decay leading to death. The light itself is described in terms more negative than positive. The light in the west is "fond," which "in the nineteenth century still retained its original meaning of 'having lost its savour or strength, insipid'." Although the modern reader will likely take the emotional significance of the word in the positive sense of "affectionate," its primary meaning is "Foolishly tender, doting." The implication of the description is that the passing of the light is not to be regretted because the light in itself has lost its value. Similarly, the light higher in the sky is "hoarlight." "Hoar" describes its color as "greyish white," but the associations of "hoar" are with age and decay. The passing of the light is not simply the end of a day but the actual decay and death of earthly light at the end of time.

As earthly light fades, the stars appear, "Fire-featured heaven." That is, as the earth loses its features, its distinctive
characteristics, those of heaven first become visible and then acquire definition. Heaven, moreover, is defined and characterized by fire, which, as we have noted in Chapter Four, is associated in Hopkins with the vital, sustaining power of God. That power has now abandoned the earth, whose "being has unbound" in consequence. The result is a loss of inscape, of self. The distinctive "dapple" visible in the light of day "is at an end." There is no longer anything to distinguish one self from another. Individual selves merge into one another in a confusion in which each is lost—a state perfectly captured in the dialect word "throughther," which both means and exemplifies "each through the other." The sense of inexorable loss of identity is further emphasized by the phrase "self in self steeped and pushed." Each self is soaked, saturated, in other selves, battered and broken into an indistinguishable mass with them. The violence of the imagery leads naturally to the summarizing statement "Disremembering, dismembering all now," which emphasizes that the loss of identity is so thorough that the selves are both totally dissolved and utterly forgotten, as if they had never been. "All" is now engulfed in the blackness of night.

The description of nightfall in the opening lines of "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" is superficially the establishing of a text to be read. It is an evocative and powerful rendering of the gradual coming of darkness and the consequent loss of inscape in the visual world. It is also, however, in itself an interpretation, indeed a particularly powerful illustration of Heidegger's belief that every exposition is also an interpretation (WICT, p. 54). Far more is suggested than is ever stated, or than indeed can be stated in the
vivid interpretation (one which is explicitly interpretation) which follows. As described in these lines, evening is ominous and heavy with a meaning captured mainly in the tone of irremediable doom and the imagery of all-powerful and all-engulfing darkness. The meaning is obviously not entirely in the night itself, but partly in how the poet's mind perceives it. Hopkins' reading of the coming on of night is an "entering into" it in Heidegger's sense, with the whole of one's being. The interpretation which follows upon the already interpretative presentation in the first half of the poem is an attempt to render into language what is felt by the senses and intuited by the heart in these opening lines. It is an attempt to make explicit the application to human selving of the meaning implicit in the poet's particular perception of an event in the natural world.

4. Lines 7b-14: The Interpretation

In the second half of the poem, two elements implicit in the first half become explicit: the meaning of nightfall as it relates to man, and the act of interpretation, which in becoming explicit both illuminates its own process and calls that process into question. In this latter section the poet draws from his experience of the natural world a spiritual meaning applicable to man. In doing so, he employs eight words which in one way or another have to do with interpretation: "round," "tale," "oracle," "reckon," "reck," "mind," "ware," and "tell." The only other such word in the poem is "spelt" in the title. In the transition from the material world to the spiritual, the poet moves from one kind of interpretation to another, from the interpretation inherent in any act of perception.
to the more conscious interpretation which is an intellectual activity. The two cannot of course be fully separated.

For Hopkins, interpretation begins in the heart, so that the opening phrase of the second section, "Heart, you round me right," is both appropriate and significant. It is not the mind but the heart that reads and interprets the oracle. As we have seen in Chapter Three, for both Hopkins and Heidegger the heart is the agent of truth in man. It turns instinctively to essential truth, that is, to God (or, in Heidegger, to Being). The fact, then, that it is the heart that deciphers the oracle speaks for the authority of the message. So too does the poet's assertion that his heart rounds him "right." The double implication of "right" is that the poet's heart is right to "round" him and that the content of that "rounding" is correct. "To round" has two relevant and related meanings: "To turn on (a person) with reproach or rebuke"—a meaning current in Hopkins' time—and the archaic "To address (a person) in a whisper; in later use esp. to take privately to task." The rebuke contained in the word "round" recalls the element of warning in the sibylline oracle and sets the stage for the particular interpretation which the poet's heart gives to his experience of nightfall. The underlying implication of a private communication suggests that the message is not widely recognized or accepted and that it is given specifically to the poet, though its application may be more general.

What the poet's heart tells him is that it is not only the evening of the day, but it is "our evening," the evening of human life, the evening of the world, which is immediately followed by "our night." As the wasting of daylight brings a darkness which engulfs
all color, shape, and distinctive self, so the night of the world threatens man with total destruction, total annihilation, total loss of self and being. The word "whelms" captures the sense of impending doom in its meaning "To engulf, to bear down like a flood, storm, avalanche, etc.; hence, to involve in destruction or ruin." Also implicit in the word is the sense that such destruction, once set in motion, cannot be withstood or avoided.

The specific "leaves" from which the poet reads his oracle of doom are "the beakleaved boughs dragonish" which are all that "damask the tool-smooth bleak light" of the night sky—a complex and threatening image. The boughs are described in terms which suggest cold and rather sinister beasts of prey, reptilian or at least avian, and certainly alien to man. The very light is "bleak," that is, cold and cheerless. All that is left of the visual world is the outline of the leaves "Ever so black" against the night sky—a stark reduction of the beauty and variety of the natural world to black and white. The word "damask" contributes not a little to the stark threat of the sentence. It has associations both with damascene steel and with damascene cloth. As a metal, "damask" suggests the cold, hard, unrelenting quality of a weapon—an association strengthened by "tool-smooth"—and has, moreover, an obscure emotional link with the coldly sinister "beakleaved boughs dragonish." As damascene cloth, one type of which "is woven with a uniformly dark thread against a uniformly lighter background," it both supports the contrast of black tree against light sky, and anticipates the two spools of "black, white; right, wrong" which follow.16

The starkness of black against white is "Our tale, O our
oracle," that is, both the story of man from the beginning and his destiny in the end. 17 What man's life is in essence will be revealed at the end of time, when the features of the earth will dim in the light of those of heaven. When man's "oracle" is fulfilled on the Day of Judgment, the meaning of his "story" will become so clear that it can be unmistakably read by all. As Hopkins expresses it in a sermon, "And when we see our judge ..., then the night of this life will be over, the day of the next world will have come; we shall see things as they are, our judge as he is, the world as it is, ourselves as we are, our good works and our sins as they are" (S, p. 41). Although in "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" Hopkins makes no explicit reference to the Day of Judgment, it is anticipated in the title of the poem and in much of the imagery, and it is implicit in the description of the reduction of earth's variety to the two starkly contrasted colors which are really not colors at all:

Let life, waned, ah, let life wind
Off her once skèined stained vèined varfèty upon,
All on two spools; part, pen, pack
Now her all in two flocks, two folds—black, white; right, wrong.

Beginning with the word "waned," which suggests not only the end of life but its decline and decay and therefore the end of all life, the whole passage builds up to the stark transition from metaphorical to moral in "black, white; right, wrong." "Part, pen, pack" achieve their full impact with the appearance of "two flocks, two folds," which recalls the separation of the sheep from the goats in Matthew 25:31-33—an image of Judgment Day. In the light of the biblical passage, the flocks become human souls which are separated, shut in, and crowded together on the basis of the "right, wrong" of
the choices they have made in their lives. "Pack" can also mean "To send away, dismiss summarily, get rid of" and is therefore a somewhat ominous word, whose threat is indeed fulfilled in the final image of the poem.

In the visual experience of nightfall, the poet reads a vision of the Day of Judgment and then draws from that vision an application to his present life. The final lines spell out that application more explicitly than any other part of the poem. They are at once the specific warning with which the poet's heart "rounds" him, that is, takes him privately to task, and a general warning from the poet to all mankind. The warning associated with the sibylline oracle is insisted upon in the multiplication of words with either connotations or specific denotations of warning: four in the first nine words of the final passage, beginning with "reckon" and continuing in "reck," "mind," and "ware." These words emphasize not only the sense of warning, but also that of calculation and therefore of a kind of keeping of personal accounts in the sense of judging one's own behavior in the light of the final Judgment. "Reckon," indeed, has the primary meaning of "To enumerate" or "to sum up," with a rare secondary meaning of "To take into consideration." "Reck," which we have encountered in "God's Grandeur" (P, 31), is more specifically relevant to the theme of Judgment. It means "To take heed or have a care of some thing (or person), so as to be alarmed or troubled thereby, or to modify one's conduct or purpose on that account." "Mind" means primarily "To bear in mind." Together the three words emphasize the need to remember and to fear the ultimate end of all human life, to judge one's own actions accordingly, and
indeed to change one's behavior in the light of one's ultimate end.

"Ware" takes up all these meanings and gives them a more sinister twist. In the imperative, "Ware" is specifically "a warning cry." It means "To beware of, guard against; to avoid, shun."

Since it is impossible to avoid Judgment Day, the specific warning is to avoid one of the two possible outcomes of that day, the only one the poem describes—hell:

\[
\text{Ware of a world where but these two tell, each off the other; of a rack}
\]

\[
\text{Where, selfwrung, selfstrung sheathe—and shelterless, thoughts against thoughts in groans grind.}
\]

In hell, according to Hopkins, "the main stress or energy of the whole being ... its strain or tendency towards being, towards good, towards God" (S, p. 137) is thrown back upon itself and tortured by thoughts of its own acts, which now appear in their true nature. Only right and wrong count, have any effect. It is in this sense that "but these two tell, each off the other." In hell, the self is held in constant awareness of the reality and the nature of its decisions in life. Moreover, in the world of "black, white; right, wrong," the pain is purely intellectual, unalleviated by physical being, and therefore it is all the more intense. 18

Paul Mariani is right, then, in seeing "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" as "first of all an Ignatian meditation on the state of hell." 19 The imagery of the poem is consistent with that in Hopkins' prose "Meditation on Hell" (S, pp. 135-42). Moreover, in its relentless movement into utter darkness and agony, it fulfills the purpose of such a meditation, "which is by sensible considerations to deter us from sin" (S, p. 136). To put it bluntly, the purpose
of a meditation on hell is to scare one into the Kingdom of God. However, despite its unrelenting movement into death and darkness, the poem is not irredeemably dark.  

There are, after all, "two flocks, two folds," and to one of these, in the relevant passage in Matthew, Christ says, "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world" (Mt 25: 34). Moreover, implicit in the words "reckon," "reck" and "mind" is the possibility of continued choice and therefore of amended life. Although it is couched in terms which Heidegger would never use, the poem is, in effect, a call to meditative thinking, which for Hopkins is a call to true and full selving in conformity to Christ. For Heidegger, the refusal to think, in its narrowness and solipsism, is its own punishment, and a threat of dire consequences in an afterlife is irrelevant. Nonetheless, despite Hopkins' use of the Christian belief in such consequences, the poem is in essence sympathetic to Heidegger's view in that it is an exhortation to saying yes to "what is."

Paradoxically, there is hope also in what the poem says—and enacts—about the limits of interpretation. The very need which Hopkins feels to project to Judgment Day in order to see life as it is reveals the impossibility of authoritative interpretation from within. As long as man is involved in the "skêned stained vêined variety" of life, he cannot see the true and ultimate meaning in that variety. As Hopkins says elsewhere, "This life is night, it is a night, it is a dark time. It is so because the truth of things is either dimly seen or not seen at all" (S, p. 39). Since this is the situation in which all interpretation must take place, the poem
itself, as an interpretation from within, undercuts its own authority. It is, true, a message from without, a divine message, but it is obscured in its passage from God to man, and it is deciphered by one who, though he may be inspired, is nonetheless involved.

Moreover, the very words "tale" and "oracle" by which the poet characterizes his message undercut their own authority. A tale is primarily a narrative, but it can also have the connotations of "A mere story as opp. to a narrative of fact; a fiction, an idle tale." In "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves," although the word is used mainly to mean simply a story, its secondary meaning nonetheless makes its presence felt. The word "oracle" is a little more complex. From its meaning of "divinely inspired," it has come to have the sense of "undeniable truth." However, in its original context, an oracle is "often ambiguous or obscure," as the OED notes, and as we have seen in our earlier discussion of the Sibyl. On the whole, although the emphasis is on the authority of the message, that authority is constantly undercut, sometimes subtly and sometimes more openly.

What emerges, then, is the difficult situation in which it is unwise either to commit oneself fully to an oracle or to dismiss it entirely. Because it is divinely inspired, one must pay heed to it, but always in the awareness that its interpretation remains open to question. In sum, this is the situation of all human interpretation: man must interpret his life and world, but always in the awareness that such interpretation is only partial and always open to revision. As Heidegger says, no interpretation is "non-relative, that is, absolutely valid" (WIC, p. 177). "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" perfectly reflects the situation: it exhorts man to "reckon" the value
of his deeds now, to interpret his life while he lives it, and at the same time, in its projection to the end of life, it acknowledges that it is impossible to see one's life truly until its variety and complexity are reduced to stark and simple "black, white; right, wrong."

"Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" illuminates the difficulty and tentativeness of all human selving. Those very characteristics which make man human—his self-consciousness and his freedom—complicate his achievement of full being. His self-consciousness gives him some sense of the meaning of his life and acts, but his involvement in Being limits and obscures his vision. On the basis of his limited vision, man can and must make decisions whose consequences he can only obscurely intuit. To selve, to live the life a fully human being, is therefore a complex and ever incomplete matter composed of many facets and many movements. "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" names a dark side of human selving, seeking thereby to throw the brighter side into relief. In its very indirection, it is a statement about the ambiguity of all human experience and the impossibility of finally authoritative interpretation.

5. The Spell of Language

As in the earlier poems we have discussed, an analysis of the language of "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" underscores the essential difference between Hopkins' view of language and Heidegger's. Once again, the language reveals itself as part of the world it describes and presents. It enacts what it says. Indeed, in "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves," what the poem does is so much a part of what it
says that the two cannot be separated. Here, however, the difference between Hopkins and Heidegger is not as striking as it is in "God’s Grandeur" because the poem is concerned not with a physical truth so much as with an intellectual and spiritual one. The intense participation of the language in the actual world is therefore less readily perceived. Moreover, in its concern with interpretation, the poem articulates and gives body to a "truth" upon which Hopkins and Heidegger are very much in accord. Thematical, then, "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" reveals in Hopkins a strong affinity with Heidegger. Nonetheless, in its own way, the language of "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" is as firmly grounded in the world of actual human experience as is "God’s Grandeur." The focus, however, is on intellectual and spiritual experience. As fully as "God’s Grandeur" renders the world outside the human self, "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" renders the world within. And, because the process of interpretation which it enacts is a linguistic process, "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" draws particular attention both to language as language and to the power of language to give body to the world.

"Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" illuminates the essential ambiguity of language. We have seen how the key words, in the context of the inherently ambiguous situation of deciphering an oracle, undercut their own authority, so that human being and selving are revealed as essentially complex, obscure, and ambiguous. So too, necessarily, is language, since it is language that defines man and enables him to interpret the world and himself. The process of language in "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" is as complex and fascinating as the process of interpretation it describes. In its very revelation of
the difficulties of interpretation, the poem draws attention to itself as language, and indeed as a thing crafted from language, a work of art in the Heideggerian sense, drawing attention to itself as a made thing and thereby speaking the truth of Being (PLT, pp. 65-66).

Having, in a kind of movement away from message to medium, drawn attention to itself as language, the poem reverses the process and by its very unity as a piece of language underscores and emphasizes the message. The word "unity" is of central importance. "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" is perhaps the most tightly unified of all of Hopkins' poems. Like the fall of night which it describes, it is a single relentless movement into darkness, strangely and powerfully compelling in its singleness.21 Contributing to this irresistible drive are a number of linguistic and poetic devices which are so much a part of the poem's saying that they remain largely invisible to other than close scrutiny, but whose effect is all the more powerful thereafter. Mackenzie draws attention to one of these devices in his comment that "the parts of this sonnet merge into each other, quatrains and tercets melting at the edges and the octave flowing into the sestet in line 7."22 Not only is formal sonnet division ignored, but the "turn" which normally occurs between octave and sestet is here blurred. Although there is a turn from physical fact to spiritual meaning, from text to interpretation, the sense of turning is obscured in the continuity of the tone, which is so powerful that it creates its own unity and renders insignificant many details which could conceivably distract from the unity.

Tone is of course difficult to define and pinpoint. In "Spelt
from Sibyl's Leaves," it is closely connected to sound and rhythm—elements which, in a letter to Bridges, Hopkins emphasizes as particularly important to this poem. He recommends "loud, leisurely, poetical (not rhetorical) recitation, with long rests, long dwells on the rhyme and other marked syllables, and so on. This sonnet [should] be almost sung" (L, p. 246). The effect of such recitation is of a kind of incantation, an effect acknowledged in Mackenzie's description of the poem as "a spell-binding oracle." Echoing in the poem's title and effect is the sense of a magic spell. The poem delivers its message as much in the mesmerizing power of sound and rhythm as in the content of its language.

Contributing much to its incantatory power are the various devices of repetition and parallelism which proliferate in the poem. Hardly anything is said only once, but hardly any repetition is exact. The forward movement is constantly balked and interrupted by reiteration with variations. The effect, interestingly enough, is to make the forward movement seem inevitable and unstoppable. Besides its simplest appearance in alliteration and internal rhyme, the pattern of repetition occurs in words, phrases, clauses, and in complex interminglings of the three. There are also a number of variations in the manner of the repetitions and parallelisms.

The phrase "womb-of-all, home-of-all, hearse-of-all night" illustrates one such variation. The elements are identical parts of speech which are almost identical in sound. Even the varying element in this case is closely connected by sound. At the same time there is a distinct progression in meaning, so that the phrase as a whole captures the entire movement of human life from birth to death.
The language moves even while it stays the same, and the complex balance of stability and change makes the forward movement seem inevitable. The same effect is felt in "her earliest stars, earstars, / stars principal," where the combination of similarity and difference suggests both the gradual appearance of more stars and their essential similarity to each other. So too in "Disremembering, dismembering," in which the almost identical sound suggests almost identical meaning, even though the first word has a psychological and the second a physical meaning. The result is a kind of blurring of the psychological and the physical which mimes the loss of inscape in the world.

In the first part of the poem, which we have identified as the text to be interpreted, the repetitions, though they have their own complexity, remain relatively straightforward and discrete in comparison with those in the second part, where the poet attempts to decipher the meaning of the text. In the later section, the repetitions are varied and intermixed, increasingly so as the poem progresses. There is repetition for emphasis, as in "black,/Ever so black on it," which makes the black seem even blacker. Similarly, the stress on "Our" in lines eight and ten insists on the seriousness of the situation and the need to apply it personally—an effect felt more strongly in line ten, where "Our tale, O our oracle" succinctly and powerfully captures the sense of destiny as well as the sense of essential unity between present life and its end.

It is, however, beginning in line ten with the final interpretation of the oracle that the repetitions and parallelisms become broken, interrupted, and intermixed. From here to the final line—
the by then inevitable outcome of the movements of rephrasing and repeating—no part of the statement is presented only once. Stripped of its hesitations and repetitions, these last four and a half lines say basically, "Let life at its end wind off her once varied spools upon only two, the black and the white; keep only these two in mind and beware of a world where only they count and where you are tormented by your undistracted thoughts." To so strip the lines, however, destroys the power and emotional intensity which inhere as much—indeed, more—in their broken, interrupted movement as in their content.

Repetition begins with "Lêt life, wâned, ah lêt life wind," a phrase similar in its effect of motion in stability to the phrases discussed from the first part. All that distinguishes the parallel phrases is the vowel sound in the last word and the pause between "life" and "wâned." However, the difference between the past participle and the finite verb is the difference between stability and motion. Something has ended, waned, and something must begin, the winding. The reiteration of "lêt life" is a kind of acceptance of the end and a turning towards the beginning—an acceptance emphasized by the "ah" which is itself the turning. At the same time, the similarity in sound emphasizes the continuity. What has ended leads naturally to what follows.

At the end of the clause occurs not a repetition but a reiteration in "upon, áll on two spools." "All" emphasizes that the whole of life's "skêined stained vêined variety" is now to be divided in two. The word "âll" is doubly—or perhaps triply—emphasized: by the stress upon it, by its interruption of the flow of the sentence,
and by its further repetition, again with stress, in line twelve. The same kind of emphasis by stress and repetition is put upon "two," which appears again, and again in conjunction with "all," in "all in two flocks, two folds." The statement turns back upon itself, repeats itself, emphasizes itself, almost as if in disbelief that all the varied inscapes of the world could possibly be reduced to stark black and white.

"Right, wrong" is itself a moral reiteration of the metaphorical "black, white," and therefore in some sense a reiteration of the parting of the flocks. The rhyme of "white" and "right" suggests that the movement from the metaphorical to the moral is a natural and continuous one and that in fact the message has been moral all along. In the moral sphere, the message, it seems, cannot be stated any more directly than in the physical. The moral application begins with a fragment which interrupts and repeats itself, "reckon but, reck but, mind/But these two." As noted earlier, the three imperatives vary the same exhortation. The broken syntax emphasizes each while suggesting that none is entirely adequate, each new beginning seeking the right word to encompass the full meaning of the oracle. Only in the next clause, however, does the language break through to a more direct statement, which still repeats much of the preceding fragment: "wäré of a world where but these | two tell, each off the other." Even this is not clear enough, not direct enough. The last part of the statement is again taken up and rephrased in painfully vivid imagery: "of a rack/Where, selfwrung, selfstrung, sheathe- and shelterless, | thoughts against thoughts in groans grind."
The broken language of this final section, with its constant turning back upon itself and its constant groping for new ways to say the same thing, is at once a statement of the inadequacy of language and an assertion of its incarnational power. The language does not manage a clear interpretation of the oracle. What it does manage, however, is a vivid rendering of the very process of interpretation, which involves, as does the language of the poem as a whole, false starts and revisions, uncertainty and doubt, a groping towards truth rather than a clear statement of it. So thoroughly does the language of the poem enact its message that there is no clear division between medium and message. The very assurance of the language, its irresistible movement from the natural world to its meaning, from metaphorical to moral, is a declaration of the power of language to give body to the truth. Indeed, as vividly as "God's Grandeur" gives body to the physical external world, "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" gives body to the internal world of the human self as that self struggles to make sense of life and to achieve its full potential.

III. Conclusion

Although it makes no specific mention of hell or judgment, "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" is based upon and grows out of Hopkins' belief in these aspects of Christian belief. In this light, the poem is at a great distance from Heidegger's view of reality. In essence, however, "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" reveals a close sympathy between Hopkins' view of the human predicament and Heidegger's. Both see the achievement of full human potential as a demanding
task in which man more often than not "misses the mark." It is a
task which requires submission of one's whole being to a power outside of and greater than the self—a paradoxical yielding up of the
self in order to become fully oneself. Such "selving" is always incomplete, always in process, and inevitably complicated by man's involvement in that to which he is called to submit, whether God or
Being. In the context of Heidegger's beliefs, "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" is a kind of negative call to the life of the meditative
thinker—negative in that it is a warning of the destiny of the man
who refuses to submit to the call of Being and live a thinker's life.
In this sense, "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" reveals Hopkins and
Heidegger as sharing a similar attitude to human responsibility and
to the possibility of achieving full humanity, of becoming fully
oneself.

More specifically, "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" focuses upon a
particular aspect of human being, a particular complication of human
selving, which is of equal concern to Heidegger as to Hopkins—the
problem of interpretation. "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" enacts a
process of interpretation which closely resembles Heidegger's view
of the problem. For both Hopkins and Heidegger, interpretation re-
quires a commitment of one's whole being, an "entering into" the
matter interpreted, an involvement of the heart as well as of the
mind. At the same time, because man is always involved in what he
interprets, there is never a single valid and authoritative inter-
pretation. Rather, all interpretation is partial, tentative, and
always subject to revision. Like "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" itself,
interpretation is always pulled between its vision and its blindness,
its truth and its darkness, and all interpretation must find its way within that tension.

"Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves," then, reveals a closer parallel in thought between Hopkins and Heidegger than do either "The Wreck of the Deutschland" or "God's Grandeur." In the latter, the similarity in thought is so slight as to have no real bearing upon our understanding of the poem, while in the former the apparent parallel is actually undercut by the language of the poem. In "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves," by contrast, the parallel is strong enough that Heidegger's perspective upon human being and upon interpretation provides a particularly useful approach to the poem, one which places the poem in a broader perspective than does an approach limited to Hopkins' own terms. Once again, however, the language of the poem underscores the difference between the views of language of Hopkins and Heidegger. Like that of "The Wreck of the Deutschland" and "God's Grandeur," the language of "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" is deeply rooted in human life as lived. It renders that life in all its dimensions—physical, mental, emotional, spiritual—and in so doing it supports what we have already seen in the analysis of the other two poems—that for Hopkins language not only gives being, but has being as well. Words are selves which, in doing what they say, "selve" as fully as kingfishers or just men.
Notes


4 This conflict is described in various ways by, for example,
Peter Milward, "The Divided Self in Shakespeare and Hopkins," 
*Thought*, 47 (1972), 260; Salmon, "Prayers of Praise," p. 394; David 

Salmon, "Prayers of Praise," p. 393; see also Milward, p. 
253. Elisabeth Schneider sees the two as natural companions. See 
The Dragon at the Gate (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1968), 
pp. 170-71.

For a different and very interesting approach to interpreta-
tion in "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves," see Gary L. Stonum, "The 
Hermeneutics of 'Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves'," *Hopkins Quarterly*, 3 
(1976), 117-29.

W.H. Gardner, *Gerard Manley Hopkins (1844-1889)* (London: 

Norman White, "Hopkins' 'Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves'," *Victorian 

Unless otherwise indicated, all definitions are from the OED.

Robert Boyle, S.J., *Metaphor in Hopkins* (Chapel Hill: The 
Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1961), p. 129; see also Norman H. 
Mackenzie, "The Making of a Hopkins Sonnet: 'Spelt from Sibyl's 
Leaves'," in *A Festschrift for Edgar Ronald Seary* (Toronto: Univ. 
of Toronto Press, 1975), p. 160; Paul L. Mariani, *A Commentary on 
the Complete Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins* (Ithaca and London: 

Mackenzie, p. 164. Stonum suggests that the word looks for-
ward to the darkness in which "the characteristic individuation of
earthly things disappears" (p. 120).

12 Stonum, p. 121.


14 Mackenzie, p. 156.


16 Mariani, p. 203. See also Schneider's observation on the sound patterns and emotional suggestiveness of the line (p. 166).

17 James Finn Cotter suggests that "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" reflects the Passion of Christ and that in that light, "The tale then involves the Biblical story of the fall and redemption, and the oracle refers to the Savior foretold in prophecies" (p. 305). Although his interpretation does no major violence to the poem, the general tone of darkness and doom argue against so specifically redemptive an interpretation. See "'Sornlight Wound to the West': The Inscape of Passion in Hopkins' Poetry," Victorian Poetry, 16 (1978), 305-306.

18 Michael D. Moore, "Newman and the Motif of Intellectual Pain in Hopkins' 'Terrible Sonnets'," Mosaic, 12, No. 4 (1979), 31; see also Mariani, p. 207.

19 Mariani, p. 199.

20 Schneider is of the opinion that "in the tone and direction of the poem there is no hope" (p. 166); see also Moore's comments, p. 31, and Mariani's, p. 209. In contrast, Peter Milward & Raymond V. Schoder see the poem as expressing at least resignation (Landscape and Inscape [London: Paul Elek, 1975], p. 88). Thomas Assad
reads it somewhat perversely as an entirely hopeful and celebratory poem in which the black and white are not the moral choices of right and wrong, but instead physical and spiritual life; in his view, the poem does not deal with judgment and hell, but with joy in the realization that there is an afterlife. See "Hopkins' 'Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves'," Tulane Studies in English, 22 (1977), 103-115.

21 This statement and the analysis which follows may seem to contradict the earlier statement that the poem is not irredeemably dark. The poem is, however, a warning. However relentless the movement of the language as language, there still remains an "if" which allows the possibility of choice. The language enacts the fate of the man who chooses wrongly.


Chapter Six

Immortal Diamond: "That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the comfort of the Resurrection"

1. Introduction: Yes and Is

"That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the comfort of the Resurrection" (hereafter referred to as "Heraclitean Fire") provides a number of interesting parallels with "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves." Both poems begin in the physical world and end in the spiritual. Both interpret man's life in the light of the end of that life. That is, in order to gain a perspective upon life as it is lived, they assume a position outside of life and time. In this sense, "Heraclitean Fire" reinforces that aspect of "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" with which we have been concerned—the difficulty, indeed impossibility, of seeing clearly from within, of achieving any but partial and tentative knowledge of that in which man is involved, and therefore the impossibility of accurate interpretation.

However, the differences between the two poems are more striking than the similarities, especially in terms of structure, tone, and central concern. We have argued that "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" is the most tightly unified of Hopkins' poems. "Heraclitean Fire," by contrast, is a flawed masterpiece—brilliant and completely effective in its conclusion, but inconsistently successful in the earlier sections. And, specifically, the problem is one of achieving a unity between the two elements mentioned in the title. The
transition from physical reality to spiritual truth is weak, so that the poem has a tendency to break in two—a tendency partly compensated for by the totally successful conclusion. However, despite the success with which the poem recovers, the break remains a serious stumble in its movement—a stumble in marked contrast to the impressive continuity of "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves."²

A further significant contrast between "Heraclitean Fire" and "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" is that in mood and tone. Where the latter is relentlessly dark in its feeling and movement, the former is "by contrast, almost throughout . . . marked by triumph and elation."³ The difference in tone reflects more basic differences. While "Heraclitean Fire" follows "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" in being the interpretation of an event in nature whose meaning for man is somewhat lacking in hope, "Heraclitean Fire" transcends such interpretation and effects a triumphant transformation. The poem leaves behind the problem of interpretation by means of the central and shaping element of Hopkins' belief, the Incarnation—here in its aspect of Resurrection. By moving on, "Heraclitean Fire" shifts the focus of its concern to a more fundamental and therefore more obscure and mysterious problem—the relation of language to Being.

The concern with language and Being is of course central to Heidegger's thought. For him, language gives being: "Only where the word for the thing has been found is the thing a thing. Only thus is it. . . . The word alone gives being to the thing" (OWTL, p. 62). Being and language are intimately, inextricably connected, so much so that the two meet in the one word logos, which means both Saying and Being (OWTL, p. 155). How this can be, however,
is beyond human understanding, "is not to be thought out to the end" (OWTL, p. 155). How language and Being relate, how language gives being, is "the word's mystery" (OWTL, p. 151), which can never be fully grasped. Part of this mystery is that "Neither the 'is' nor the word attain to thinghood, to Being, nor does the relation between 'is' and the word" (OWTL, p. 87). Language gives being, is incarnational, but neither language nor Being is incarnate.

Herein lies the crucial difference with Hopkins, who agrees with Heidegger that language is incarnational, but for whom language and Being are both given body in the person of Christ. Just as for Heidegger the Logos as the relation of word and thing is a mystery, so for Hopkins the Incarnation is a mystery, but in the sense of "an incomprehensible certainty" (L, p. 187) rather than in the more nebulous sense implied by Heidegger's use of the word. The specific mystery of the Incarnation, Hopkins explains, is that "Christ is in every sense God and in every sense man, and the interest is in the locked and inseparable combination, or rather it is in the person in whom the combination has its place" (L, p. 188). Christ as God and man is also Word of God, so that language too is part of the mystery. In Christ, man, God, and language are perfectly one. The question of how this oneness—the penetration of man and language by, and their consequent identity with, Being—affects man and language is central to "Heraclitean Fire" as the problem of interpretation is to "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves." "Heraclitean Fire" enacts in and through language a transcendence and a transformation of the natural into the supernatural, but does so in a way that retains the natural within the supernatural—just as, for instance, in "God's Grandeur"
the natural world becomes more fully itself when it is seen as radiant with the truth of Being. In the process of transformation, "Heraclitean Fire" illuminates the difference in Hopkins' view of language from Heidegger's and illustrates how that difference affects the former's use of language.

Hopkins' discussion of language and Being in his notes on Parmenides underlies the strategy and movement of "Heraclitean Fire." In his interpretation of Parmenide's on Being, Hopkins sets forth his own understanding of Being in its relation to language and reality. In a passage now familiar to us, he translates a key phrase in Parmenides as "things are or there is truth," and adds his own commentary on the phrase: "But indeed I have often felt when I have been in this mood and felt the depth of an instress or how fast the inscape holds a thing that nothing is so pregnant and straightforward to the truth as simple yes and is" (J, p. 127). Later in the notes he adds, "To be and to know or Being and thought are the same. The truth in thought is Being, stress, and each word is one way of acknowledging Being and each sentence by its copula is (or its equivalent) the utterance and assertion of it" (J, p. 129). For Hopkins as for Heidegger, Being and language are one. The essence of truth is that things are: language both affirms and confirms this basic fact and is therefore the yes to the is of Being.

As we have seen, acquiescence to the truth of the natural world is relatively straightforward. Man gives his yes to the is of nature by letting it be what it is, by cultivating an attitude of reverent observation which allows for the perception of inscape. The truth thus seen is ultimately God because every creature is in essence
word of God. Recognition of God in things is a call to man to become himself word of God, to selve as fully and completely as does nature. But to say yes to the is of human being is more complex because man is ever in the process of making or unmaking his inscape, his essential self. Acquiescence is a saying which is also a doing, and this doing both expresses and creates the being, the self. Christ is ever at the centre of the process as the model of, and the means to, the fullness of human being.

The naming which Hopkins attempts in "Heraclitean Fire" is the naming of man not as he appears in the natural world but as he is in Christ. Such naming involves a transcendence of both the natural world and the human word, but a transcendence which transforms without obliterating. The world and the word remain world and word despite their transmutation in Christ. "Heraclitean Fire" does in positive what "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" does in negative; that is, where "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" presents the ultimate end of the man who refuses to contribute to the creation of his own being, "Heraclitean Fire" presents the ultimate end of the man who assents to such self-creation, such selving. Interestingly, while the refusal to selve takes man out of the world of inscape into utter darkness, acceptance of selving leaves man in that world, but transformed. Keeping in mind that Heidegger does not posit an afterlife, one could nonetheless express the contrast between the two poems in terms compatible with his expression: in its blindness to Being, life without meditative thought is life without Being, even, one could say, outside Being; meditative thinking represents a fullness of human being both within, and in conscious relation to, Being.
In its concern with language and Being, "Heraclitean Fire" provides a natural close to a discussion beginning with "The Wreck of the Deutschland." As the latter anticipates the major concerns of the later poems, the former recapitulates these concerns. Nature, man, and God meet in both poems, though with a difference in emphasis. "The Wreck of the Deutschland" attempts to name God by seeking him in and through human experience of the natural world. The focus is therefore on God. "Heraclitean Fire," by contrast, seeks to name man as he is when seen in his rightful place both within nature and within God. The focus is therefore on man, but man in the moment of total selving, man at his full potential.

Moreover, like "God's Grandeur," "Heraclitean Fire" names nature in language which, by itself achieving almost bodily existence, recreates the natural world with particular vitality. Like "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves," it uses an experience in nature as a means of interpreting the meaning of man. In its inclusion and transcendence of the concerns of these earlier poems, it confronts the question of language encountered in "The Wreck of the Deutschland," but does so in a more fundamental and ultimately more successful way. "Heraclitean Fire" is a poem in which language both fails and succeeds. It fails in its transition from physical to spiritual but succeeds in its ultimate transformation of the physical. It seems appropriate therefore to look at the language of the earlier sections of the poem both in its success and its failure, but to concentrate on the final section, in which language, in utter simplicity, illumines and transforms from within so that even the earlier and weaker sections are affected.
2. **Lines 1-9: Nature's Bonfire**

"Heraclitean Fire" can be divided into three main sections which can be provisionally labeled "nature," "man," and "God" respectively, according to their primary focus. The first section illustrates the proposition "That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire," the second (which can also be considered a subsection of the first) considers man's position in such a natural world, and the third, by means of "the comfort of the Resurrection," rescues man from the position in which Heraclitus places him. Hopkins' own comment on the poem is a helpful explanation of the relationship between the three sections. He writes to Bridges, "Lately I sent you a sonnet, on the Heraclitean Fire, in which a great deal of early Greek philosophical thought was distilled; but the liquor of the distillation did not taste very Greek, did it?" (L, p. 291). The early Greek thought appears in its purest form in the first two sections, while the final section provides the means for the transformation into something rather less Greek. Indeed, so thorough is the transformation that it casts its effect back upon the earlier sections.

Gardner and Mackenzie provide a summary of the Heraclitean view of nature underlying the first section of the poem. "According to Heraclitus," they note, "all things are in a state of flux, being differentiations produced by strife...of a single mobile principle--fire." For Heraclitus, then, as for Hopkins, fire is at the heart of reality. However, in poems like "God's Grandeur," fire is associated with the creative and sustaining energy of God, whereas in Heraclitus fire is only itself. Nonetheless in the very presence of fire at the heart of things, the presence of Christ awaits the
transforming touch in the final section of the poem.

As we encounter it in the first section, then, nature is only potentially the flame of God's grandeur. It is, nonetheless, a joyous, vibrant nature reminiscent of the earlier poems and especially of "Hurrahing in Harvest" (P, 38), an apparent return to the exuberance of an earlier time. Unlike "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves," with its slow movement and predominantly dark imagery, "Heraclitean Fire" is dominated by light, movement, and change as it describes the rapid obliteration of all signs of a recent storm by the agency of sun and wind. The fire and flux of Heraclitus shape these opening lines, which create an overall impression of irrepressible youth and playfulness, "a windy delight in change," as opposed to the age, weariness, and decay of "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves."

In its verbal presentation of the natural scene, "Heraclitean Fire" is as successful as "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" or "God's Grandeur." By means of sound patterns and vivid, startling imagery, Hopkins conveys not only the appearance of the scene, but its feeling as well. To look at the opening lines in terms of the three dominant impressions they convey—movement, light, change—reveals a careful structuring and intermingling of sound, imagery, and syntax, which in turn achieve a unity of perspective which fuses movement, light, and change into a single experience. The inscape of the windy day is brilliantly captured.

In the opening two lines, it is movement which dominates and that principally by means of the imagery, although the first impression is of pure sound:

    Cloud-puffball, torn tufts, tossed pillows / flaunt forth, then Chevy on an air-
built thoroughfare: heaven-roysterers, in
gay-gangs | they throng; they
| glitter in marches.

The vision of clouds in rapid movement explodes from the imagery, which is at first obscure because idiosyncratic, but which, once deciphered, is charged with power. Words like "flaunt" and "chevy" ("ride in chase") convey rapid movement. So too does the image of an "air-/built thoroughfare," which, as a thoroughfare, suggests busy traffic; and, as an air-built one, suggests space and freedom—two characteristics which reinforce the sense of movement simply by the absence of restriction they imply. A sense of celebration is conveyed in "flaunt," and in the epithets "heaven-roysterers" and "gay-gangs," in whose company the word "throng" brings to mind crowds of people gathering at a festival or a fair. "Roysterers," perhaps in its anticipation of the sound of "boisterous," is particularly vivid. The word "marches" adds to the picture the sense of order: the movement is not random, but in one direction.

The "torn tufts, tossed pillows" of the first half-line evoke the rapidly changing shapes of clouds on a particularly windy day. Similarly, the word "glitter" looks forward to the dominance of light in the description of the play of light and shadow against the walls of buildings in lines 3 and 4:

Down roughcast, down dazzling whitewash, | wherever
| an elm arches,
| Shivelights and shadowtackle in long | lashes lace,
| lance, and pair.

Light is present, unmistakably though not explicitly, in "dazzling whitewash." It emerges explicitly in "shivelights," part of the mysteriously evocative phrase "Shivelights and shadowtackle"—a
phrase which dazzles with sound before its elements of light and shadow, in conjunction with the image of the elm, strike the senses with a vision of the quickly changing patterns of light and shadow created by a combination of irregular cloudiness and sunlight through the branches of a tree on a windy day. The visual impact is strengthened by the image in "long lashes lace, lance, and pair," whose movement and change are like a dance. Lines 3 and 4 represent a shift from the clouds to the visual effect of their movement upon the earth and from an emphasis on movement to one on light. Like the vision of the clouds, however, that of the play of light and shadow combines light with movement and change in order to convey the combined fire and flux of the Heraclitean view.

Line 5 provides a smooth transition from a consideration of visual effect to consideration of another and more profound effect, that of change. The agent of change, the wind, incorporates both the light and the movement of the earlier parts of the scene—light in "bright" and also to some extent in "Delightfully" and "boisterous"; movement in "ropes, wrestles, beats earth bare." The phrase "beats earth bare" introduces the element of change, not only in what is implied in those words alone, but also in that the wind "beats earth bare/Of yestertempest's creases." The wind obliterates all signs of a past storm so that, to all intents and purposes, the storm never was.

The sense of change—and of rapid change—is vividly conveyed by means of a compression of language related to the technique of repetition and reiteration so effectively used in "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves." Although the method is similar, the effect is very
different. For example, in the phrase "squeezed / dough, crust, dust," the entire process of the drying up of mud is compressed into the three nouns, which convey the progressive change in rapid sequence from dough to dust. As in "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves," the language balances stability and change, but in the earlier poem the focus is on stability in change (which paradoxically makes the change seem inevitable), while in "Heraclitean Fire" the focus is on change in stability—to the extent that the stability seems illusory. The verbs "stanches, starches" convey similarly rapid changes. In "stanches," the flow of semi-liquid mud is stopped, while "starches" suggests a progression from the stiffening of damp earth to its actual drying. 7 In a line and a half, the effects of the storm are erased.

Lines 8 and 9 introduce man as the "manmarks / treadmire toil there/ Footfretted" in the mud. The flux of nature first imprints man's mark upon the earth and then wipes it out. The soft "dough" takes the mark, which the "crust" then hardens and confirms, but whose destruction is imminent in the "dust" which is the inevitable continuation of the process. On the purely physical level, man's presence leaves a mark upon the earth, but that mark is ephemeral. At least this is so in the Heraclitean context, in which man is simply a part of the natural world whose "bonfire burns on."

In its presentation of the natural scene, "Heraclitean Fire" witnesses to, and evokes in the reader, the enthrallment with the things of the world which is at the heart of the nature poems, but it does so with a difference. Nature is here presented as the perpetual change of the Heraclitean world rather than specifically as
word of God. It does not "flame out" with evidence of God's presence. Nonetheless, that presence is latent in the "glitter" of the clouds, the "dazzling whitewash" of the walls, and the "brightness" of the wind. While these images are of course suggestive of the fire of Heraclitus, they cannot help but also bring to mind the fire of "God's Grandeur." This first section therefore anticipates, both by its fire imagery and by its joyous tone, the ultimately triumphant conclusion of the poem.

At the same time these first nine lines anticipate the more immediate and very negative interpretation of the natural scene—an interpretation at base as negative as that in "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves," but whose weight is counterbalanced in advance by the predominantly joyful tone of the natural description. However, the scene is not one of unrelieved light, but of light and shadow. While light is associated with the agent of change, it vanishes from the description of the change itself, and the section ends in the heaviness of the earth rather than in the light (and lightness) of the sky. Most significantly, the "manmarks" in the earth exist under the threat of imminent destruction implied in the word "dust." Change, in the Heraclitean context, is in essence threatening to man.

3. Lines 10-16: Her Clearest-Selvèd Spark

Man is an anomaly within nature. He is "her bonniest, dearest to her, her clearest-selvèd spark," the most distinctive, highly individualized of all creatures. He is the peak of nature. But in those very qualities which set him apart lies matter for despair. In natural things, renewal is achieved if the species is renewed.
One elm dies but elms continue. Man is so highly selved, however, that one man cannot replace another. Man dies, therefore, in a way that no other part of nature dies. He is, moreover, self-aware and can therefore lament his death, his loss of self with "pity and indignation!"

The death of each individual human being is like the death of a species in nature, but the life of one man is far shorter than that of most species. Each man's distinctive mark, "his firedint, his mark on mind" is quickly lost and forgotten. The imagery of "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" recurs in "Both are in an unfathomable, all is in an enormous dark/Drowned." The obliteration of distinctive self is the inevitable human lot:

Manshape, that shone  
Sheer off, disseveral, a star  
death blots  
black out; nor mark  
Is any of him at all so stark  
But vastness blurs and time  
beats level.

In the cosmic scheme of things, the duration of a human life is so insignificant as to make no impression at all. Distinctive self becomes its own defeat.

Despite the delight in nature with which the poem opens, nature in "Heraclitean Fire" is not a source of joy and hope for man. The constant renewal of nature is not, as in "God's Grandeur," a sign of the inexhaustible energy of the Holy Ghost, but rather a reminder to man that he is not similarly renewed. In contrast to the "bonfire" of nature, man is a mere "spark." Nonetheless, there is hope in that very imagery of fire which reveals man as very small in comparison with nature. It is nature as a whole that is characterized explicitly as a "bonfire." In the individual parts of nature, the
fire is only suggested. Man, however, is explicitly described in fire imagery. He is a "spark" and "a star" that "shone." His mark in the world is a "firedint." Despite the Heraclitean basis of the poem, the significance of such imagery throughout the poetry of Hopkins suggests that even here man has more of the fire of God in him than does the natural world. In the midst of "pity and indignation," the poem looks forward to the final transformation.

4. The Turn: Enough!

Like so many of Hopkins' poems, "Heraclitean Fire" effects a "turn" from physical reality to its spiritual meaning. In the successful poems, the meaning grows naturally out of the first part of the poem. In "Heraclitean Fire," however, the turn which occurs with "Enough! the Resurrection" is abrupt and startling. To some extent this is justified by the purpose of the poem and anticipates the far more successful equation in the final lines. However, unlike the turn in "God's Grandeur" or "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves," that in "Heraclitean Fire" is insufficiently prepared for by the imagery and movement in the first part of the poem. The effect of the abrupt turn is to break the poem in two rather than to reveal a spiritual truth which is an organic part of the physical truth. The cleanness of the break allows for such a reading as Eugene Nassar's, that "the 'enough' dismisses the natural world with a gesture of absolute separation"; or John Robinson's, that "the movement of the poem is of one experience being supplanted by another: except as a promise, the then does not touch the now." While such criticisms are not the final word on the poem, which manages in its
completely successful conclusion to effect at least a partial and retrospective mending of the break, they do draw attention to the undeniable disunity of the poem.

The break in the poem makes its effect felt both backward and forward. Were the turn entirely successful--growing naturally out of the language, imagery, and thought--the patterns of language and imagery discussed to this point would emerge as skilful anticipations of the triumphant conclusion. Instead, with the break in line 16, the earlier sections are separated from the final one and thrown back upon each other. Upon the central section of the poem, the effect is particularly jarring, especially in regard to emotional truth. The result is what Hopkins himself calls "frigidity," which occurs when "the feeling does not flush and fuse the language" (L, p. 82). The feeling in the central part of "Heraclitean Fire" is stated rather than felt.

Specifically, because of the apparent facility of the turn, the negative interpretation of the human situation does not ring true. It is belied in advance by the tone and imagery of the previous section. In the light of what has come before and of the too easy "Enough!", the conclusion that "all is in an enormous dark/Drowned" seems excessive. Where in "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves," such an interpretation follows as though inevitably from the natural description, in "Heraclitean Fire" it does not. Further, the language of the central section itself works to some extent against its own statement. The fire imagery which we have discussed as anticipating the transformation of man in God is stronger than the imagery of blotting and blurring, so that the despairing view of man is further
undercut. The "pity and indig\n| nation" appear assumed rather than deeply felt.

The apparent ease with which the turn is accomplished weakens the beginning of the final section as it does the central section. Again the feeling does not ring true, broken as it is from the feeling of the earlier section but at the same time affected by that feeling. The sense of excess in "O pity and indig\n| nation" carries over into "Away grief's gasping, | joyless days, dejection," which strikes one as simply too easy. Even the "foundering deck" of line 18 carries no real sense of conflict or of any but momentary uncertainty. Whatever uncertainty exists is more than balanced by "A beacon, an eternal beam," a phrase which suggests stability and absolute certainty.

With a successful transition from the physical to the spiritual, from Heraclitus to Christ, the weaknesses discussed above would not necessarily appear as weaknesses and certainly not as insurmountable weaknesses. Indeed, even as it is the language recovers and by line 19 it no longer limps. Lines 19–20 express a joyous confidence in which it really does not matter what happens to the Heraclitean flux of the physical world: "Flesh fade and mortal trash/Fall to the residuary worm; | world's wildfire, leave but ash." The Heraclitean view, if true, is not the final truth. Hopkins "does not explicitly deny the truth of [the Heraclitean] proposition but rather . . . includes it in a greater truth."10 Heraclitus says nothing about the ultimate destiny of man because the final answer transcends and transforms beyond recognition the truth which Heraclitus sees. And, in "Heraclitean Fire," the final statement of that answer achieves
in its fusion of thought and feeling a triumph which casts its glow back upon what has come before. That triumph effects a transformation not only of the Heraclitean fire, but even of the language in which it is expressed.

5. The Final Coda: Being and the Word

The final three lines of the poem have deservedly attracted the bulk of the critical attention devoted to "Heraclitean Fire." These lines, in their complex simplicity, justify such a comment as David Downes' that "In no poem is spiritual transport more sudden, dramatic, and transfiguring than in the last lines where the poet affirms the Incarnation and its intense, sanctifying effect upon the religious consciousness." In sharp contrast to such opinions as those of Nassar and Robinson, quoted earlier, Downes' comment speaks of the final—though, in the light of the earlier break in the poem, admittedly incomplete—success of "Heraclitean Fire."

The language of the coda is deceptively simple, but in that very simplicity Hopkins achieves a power unsurpassed in his poetry. Nowhere in his work is it more à propos to keep in mind Heidegger's comment that "moving within language ... means moving on shifting ground or, still better, on the billowing waters of an ocean" (WICT, p. 192). The language is so charged with meaning that it is difficult to trace the repercussions of the words within the lines themselves and then upon the poem as a whole. The entire force of Hopkins' concept of the Incarnation moves within the language and both shapes and empowers it, as Christ shapes and empowers the world of nature.
With tremendous simplicity, Hopkins summarizes the effect of
the Incarnation upon human life: "I am all at once what Christ is,
since he was what I am." As we have noted in detail in Chapter
One, Christ, by becoming man, made it possible for men to share in
the divine life. As Hopkins remarks elsewhere, "Christ was himself
but one and lived and died but once; but the Holy Ghost makes of
every Christian another Christ, an AfterChrist" (S, p. 100). The
final coda of "Heraclitean Fire" presents the moment when man
achieves full being, says "yes" with his whole self. This "yes"
makes him one with Christ, who transcends the flux of time. The In-
carnation "rides time like riding a river" (P, 28, st. 6). It is
the eternal in the everyday.

The Incarnation moves the poem into a dimension which transcends
the flux of the purely physical world. Significantly, "verbs of
movement vanish, leaving nothing but am and is, was and am, and is--
becoming at last giving way to being." The moment of identity
with Christ is timeless, eternal, because Christ is himself Being.
He is the "I am" who exists from the beginning and through whom
everything else exists. The poet's own "I am"--when it is said with
his whole being--is in itself identity with Christ.

The simple and very compressed assertion of line 22 is restated,
strengthened, supported by the careful weaving of word and image in
the final two lines, which also recapitulate and recast the entire
preceding matter of the poem. For instance, the catalogue of images
describing man is very complex in both sound and meaning. Much of
the complexity has been illuminated in critical discussion. Haggard,
for instance, notes the pattern of sound and association linking the
first five items of the series, "Jack, joke, poor potsherd, patch, matchwood," and making them all part of the same thing, from which "the last item, 'diamond,' is discontinuous."

Paul Mariani suggests a reason for the discontinuity:

We are given a superb catalogue of worthless fragments which have in common their accidental being. But the catalogue ends with a substance--a self--which is as permanent and immutable as any we know. There is no doubt that man changes constantly, but the essential self abides within the trash.

The catalogue, in effect, refutes the view of man implicit in the Heraclitean perspective. Man is not the worthless creature, easily destroyed and soon forgotten, whose life and mark "death blots black out." At heart and in truth, he is what the fire imagery of the central section suggests, nature's "clearest—selvèd spark," "a star," whose share of the fire at the heart of reality is greater and clearer than that of other creatures.

The "is" which marks the final transformation is a highly charged word. Itself transformed by its working in this poem, it is far more than a simple copula. In its wake, the "accidentals" which form the bulk of the catalogue in line 23 simply vanish. What emerges then is not a simple equation, but, in effect, an affirmation of that in man which is his essential self and a dismissal of the rest. Man is no longer "Jack, joke, etc," but simply immortal diamond." Indeed, even the second "immortal diamond" is not the same as the first: the first is merely one of several aspects of man, a potential; the second, in its affirmation, is confirmation, realized potential. Moreover, "the final 'immortal diamond' reflects its Latin and Greek etymology: it is deathless in
Latin and unconquerably fixed in Greek."\textsuperscript{16} As to the "is" which effects the transformation, in its context in "Heraclitean Fire," it "is made at once not only the most affirmative but also the most dynamic verb of the sonnet."\textsuperscript{17} The "is" which transforms is in fact the "I am" of Christ. In "Heraclitean Fire," language and Being meet in Christ, the Word of God.

The "is" of Christ, which transforms both man and language, also transforms the central image of the poem—fire. As we have noted, fire is Hopkins' favorite image for the presence of God in things. Explicitly present at the heart of the Heraclitean flux, fire is also implicit as the agent of transformation which results in the diamond.\textsuperscript{18} As the agent of such change, fire is identified with Christ. Moreover, the brightness of the diamond suggests the internal fire of Christ. By association, then, the fire implicitly present in the creatures of nature in the first part of the poem is seen as the fire of Christ rather than that of Heraclitus. Although the effect is dimmed by the break in line 16, nature too is redeemed by the Resurrection.

It is worth noting that the aspect of the Incarnation upon which Hopkins focuses is the Resurrection. It is in the Resurrection that the Incarnation most closely parallels the Heraclitean flux. As nature is renewed, so Christ himself, the individual, is renewed, and in their identity with him all men can also know individual renewal. Moreover and more importantly, the Resurrection represents a return to life in the physical world, an immortality in the flesh, rather than a bodiless immortality in another world. As Kathleen Raine remarks, "'The comfort of the resurrection' lies in the promise
that the It is, here so fleeting, will there be made eternal; not another world, but this world experienced after another manner. Indeed, the promise of the Resurrection as the making permanent of the essence of this world is captured in the equation of the last two lines. What is mortal falls away; what is immortal remains and is confirmed by, as it were, passing through the "is" of Christ.

What the "is" means for language is both very simple and very complex. It is by means of language that man interprets both himself and the world. Language is therefore necessary to the process of selving, of achieving full being. Unlike other creatures, man is always in the process of making himself. As he attempts to create himself in the image of Christ, so too must his words conform to the Word; or, as Rachel Salmon puts it, "In order to forge a soul, words must struggle to resume their place within the Word." This is precisely what does not happen in "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves," which deals with the refusal to live thoughtfully. But it does happen in "Heraclitean Fire," in which man achieves his full potential. Although the various words in the poem remain discrete elements, they are at the same time drawn into the vortex of the "is," which underlies all words and gives them their being. In the same way, the man who fully selves is both fully himself and fully Christ. The "it is," Being, underlies all things and all words. Or, as Heidegger says, "ens, being is the participle which gathers all other possible participles into itself" (WICT, p. 221). The dynamism and variety of language are based first and always upon Being.
6. Conclusion

Despite its structural flaw, "Heraclitean Fire" enacts more fully than any other of Hopkins' poems the "yes" required by the "is" of being. It achieves the unity of Being, word, and act which is the essence of selving. In so doing, "Heraclitean Fire," again more fully than any other of Hopkins' poems, illuminates the final difference between Hopkins' view of language and Heidegger's—a difference which can be best brought out in the contrast between "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" and "Heraclitean Fire." The former, in delineating the fate of the man who denies the call of Being, is in many ways closer to Heidegger in thought and spirit than any of the other poems we have considered, despite the distinctly Catholic imagery in which the poem is couched. In essence, Hopkins and Heidegger are in agreement about the negative consequences of refusing to fulfil one's potential. Indeed, they are in essential agreement about the nature of the human predicament and about what is required for man to be fully human, again despite major differences in the expression of their views.

In dealing with the destiny of the man who says "yes" with his whole being, the man who achieves full selfhood, "Heraclitean Fire" shows Hopkins diverging radically from Heidegger in his view of the nature of the experience of full selving. This divergence is rooted in Hopkins' concept of the Incarnation, according to which both "Being" (that is, Christ) and language share in material reality. For Heidegger, as we have seen, "Neither the 'is' nor the word attain to thinghood, to Being" (OWTL, p. 87). Neither language nor Being are in any sense material. In "Heraclitean Fire," both world and word
are transformed by their participation in the Word who was made flesh, and therefore also by their participation in each other which is accomplished in the incarnate Word. Christ is part of word and world as Being never is for Heidegger.

Once again, it is language in act which in "Heraclitean Fire" speaks most powerfully of Hopkins' conviction that language participates in every aspect of reality—physical as well as intellectual, emotional, or spiritual. What we have seen in our analysis of the language of the earlier poems is in "Heraclitean Fire" given both "theoretical" support and final accomplishment. In his shaping of the particulars of language—its "physical" qualities—Hopkins achieves a highly charged incarnation of the world which renders it more vivid and vital than in everyday experience, even as it renders language itself part of the world. Language is both thing and act; it selves. The linguistic experience of "Heraclitean Fire" transcends that we have seen in the earlier poems because what the poem enacts is the very transformation of the natural world and the human word in and through the person of Christ, who is the origin and the model of both world and word. For Hopkins, the "I am" of Christ is the basis of all reality.

2 Whether or not one considers the poem successful depends on whether one focuses upon the break or upon the recovery. The significance of the title differs accordingly. John Robinson, who focuses on the break, sees the "and" in the title as "a sign that in this case we are... dealing with two distinct experiences" (In Extremity [Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978], pp. 124-25). See also Eugene Paul Nassar, "Hopkins, Figura, and Grace: God's Better Beauty," Renaissance, 17 (1965), 136. On the other hand, Rachel Salmon, who considers the recovery more important—who, indeed, does not pay attention to the break—reminds that "the 'and' in the title... abrogates the temporal sequence in which later time replaces earlier, and suggests a composite figure, rather than one that invites choice between alternatives" ("Frozen Fire: The Paradoxical Equation of 'That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the Comfort of the Resurrection'," Hopkins Quarterly, 12 [1985-86], 66). See also James Finn Cotter, Inscape (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1972), p. 234; D.C. Haggo, "Hopkins' 'immortal diamond': A Poetic Use of Science," Hopkins Quarterly, 7 (1980), 91.

3 Elisabeth W. Schneider, The Dragon at the Gate (Berkeley:


5 Schneider, p. 173.


7 James Milroy sees in Hopkins' particular use of the verbs "parches," "stanches," "starches," a tendency towards "noun-like status," which recalls what we have seen in Chapter Three of Hopkins' preference for nouns (The Language of Gerard Manley Hopkins [London: Deutsch, 1977], p. 223).

8 Nassar, p. 136.

9 Robinson, p. 124.

10 Haggo, p. 91.


12 Salmon discusses the poem entirely in terms of the elective and affective will. See pp. 65-79.


14 Haggo, p. 92; see also W.A.M. Peters, S.J., Gerard Manley

Foltz, p. 33.

Mariani, p. 288; see also Grennen, p. 211; Foltz, p. 32.

Haggo, p. 94.


Salmon, "Frozen Fire," p. 74; Ong, p. 43.
Conclusion

What I Do Is Me

1. Introduction

The unity of Being, word, and act which Hopkins enacts in and through the language of "Heraclitean Fire"--a unity arising from and centering upon his view of the Incarnation--emphasizes the unity of perspective from which all of his poems are written. Indeed, as we have seen in our analysis of the poems, Hopkins' "one single poetic statement" (OWTL, p. 160) begins in and always returns to his view of the Incarnation. Ranging in subject matter from shipwreck to the natural world to the difficulty of interpreting a world of which man is himself a part, all the poems reflect a basic vision of man, the world, language, and God which is consistent with the poet's view of Christ as the incarnate source and model of all that is. In his taking on of flesh, Christ glorifies all flesh and the Word is given body.

The poetic expression of Hopkins' "one single poetic statement" is true to Heidegger's perspective in that, basically, his "statement remains unspoken. None of his individual poems, nor their totality, says it all. Nonetheless, every poem speaks from the whole of the one single poetic statement, and in each instance says that statement" (OWTL, p. 160). None of the poems in itself expresses Hopkins' perspective, but to study even four in conjunction reveals the light which the poems cast upon each other and
upon the central belief or statement which underlies them all—a statement which, Heidegger says, can be discussed "only by trying to point to it by means of what the individual poems speak" (OWT, p. 160). Hopkins reveals an awareness of a similar phenomenon in his remark that Aeschylus "is always forgetting he said a thing before. Indeed he never did, but tried to say it two or three times—something rich and profound but not by him distinctly apprehended; so he goes at it again and again like a canary trying to learn the Bluebells of Scotland" (L, p. 271). The unspoken can never be spoken because it is a mystery beyond words, but to some degree it can be felt and understood in what the poet or thinker does bring to language.

For Heidegger, the unspoken is always the supreme mystery of Being. It is in poetry that the unspoken comes closest to being spoken because poetry reveals things as they are in their essence and, in speaking that truth, reveals Being. For Hopkins as for Heidegger, poetry is concerned with revealing the truth of things as they are in order to reveal the ultimate truth within them. That truth in his case is always the Incarnation—a mystery which, as we have seen in Chapter One, occupies a similar place in his thought as does Being in Heidegger's. As mystery, the Incarnation can never be fully articulated. However, as Hopkins' poetic practice illustrates, if the truth of the Incarnation cannot be directly spoken, it can nonetheless be given body in the selving of language—in its doing of what it is, its enacting of the human understanding of experience. Thus, although the Incarnation plays a similar role in Hopkins' perspective as Being does in Heidegger's, the effect of the
Incarnation upon Hopkins' view of language leads to a poetic practice far removed from Heidegger's vision.

The full effect of the difference between Hopkins and Heidegger emerges most explicitly in the "selving" sonnet, "As kingfishers catch fire" (P2, p. 129), whose language and thought underlie and shape the discussion in the previous chapters. In concluding this study, it is therefore helpful to look more closely at this sonnet as a means of recapitulating the insights of the previous chapters and drawing out their significance.

2. World

"As kingfishers catch fire" captures with extraordinary power and purity the essence of Hopkins' attitude towards nature and man. At the same time, because it is a poem centred upon the Incarnate Christ, who is Word of God, it has much to say about language. And, in its double emphasis upon the self and Christ, it reveals the strong link in Hopkins' thought between selving and Christ. Indeed, for him the two cannot be separated. To selve, to be most fully oneself, is to be most fully Christ, whether the selving be human or non-human.

As kingfishers catch fire, dragonflies draw flame;  
As tumbled over 'rim in roundy wells  
Stones ring; like each tucked string tells, each hung bell's  
Bow swung finds tongue to fling out broad its name;  
Each mortal thing does one thing and the same:  
Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;  
Selves—goes its self; myself it speaks and spells,  
Crying What I do is me: for that I came.

I say more: the just man justices;  
Keeps grace: that keeps all his goings graces;
Acts in God's eye what in God's eye he is—
Christ. For Christ plays in ten thousand places,
Lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his
To the Father through the features of men's faces.

The poem divides neatly into an octave dealing with non-human selving and a sestet dealing with human selving. The selving of both finds its origin and its meaning in God, though necessarily in different ways. The created world shares in the nature of Christ because both Christ and the world find their origin in the selving of God himself. As Hopkins explains, "God's utterance of himself in himself is God the Word; outside himself is this world. This world then is word, expression, news of God. Therefore its end, its purpose, its purport, its meaning, is God and its life or work to name and praise him" (S, p. 129). It is significant that the identity between Christ and the world is expressed in terms of language: both Christ and the world are "God's utterance." As Christ is Word, the world is word. It is also significant that act and meaning (and therefore act and word) unite in Hopkins' description of what the world is in relation to God: "purpose" and "end" suggest act, "purport" and "meaning" suggest word. Moreover, the action for which the world is made is linguistic—to "name and praise." Being, doing, and saying are one.

The selving described in "As kingfishers catch fire" is the fulfilment of each creature in doing what it was created to do. Such selving is at once the expression of its essential nature and the expression of God, since in essence a creature is word of God and by expressing its own inscape it expresses God. Or, as Hopkins says, "All things therefore are charged with love, are charged with
God and if we know how to touch them give off sparks and take fire, yield drops and flow, ring and tell of him" (S, p. 195). Sight and sound speak equally: telling takes the form of sparks, drops, or sound. In each case, the telling is a showing forth by action of the essential inner being or truth. Each creature "Deals out that being indoors each one dwells," but if stones, strings and bells "ring and tell," kingfishers and dragonflies "give off sparks and take fire."

The imagery of the first four lines recalls that of "God's Grandeur," in which fire represents the vitalizing power of God sustaining the creature in being and flashing forth its meaning. As we have seen, the essential self is not always or very readily "caught." It is perceived in moments of insight which require an attentive, observant, and reverent attitude. Inscape is the truth of things. When a creature "goes its self," acts out its being, inscape flashes forth, but it does not do so consistently or clearly. If the creature in selving "speaks and spells" itself and "fling[s] out broad its name," man must still interpret that name in order to grasp its meaning--God. And, as we have seen in "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves," interpretation is always a tentative process fraught with difficulty, uncertainty, and failure.

As we have observed in our discussion of "God's Grandeur," Hopkins' view of nature is in the broader perspective very similar to Heidegger's, though the latter expresses it in terms of Being and beings rather than God and the world. Being makes itself known in and through beings. And, as the flash of insight that reveals inscape is a rare occurrence that makes itself felt only to those
who cultivate a receptive attitude, so too beings reveal themselves as more than mere objects only to those who relinquish the will to control, that is, to meditative thinkers. However, despite this very basic and general similarity between Hopkins and Heidegger, their attitudes to the natural world are ultimately widely divergent. The difference of emphasis we have remarked between Hopkins and Heidegger—Hopkins' on beings, Heidegger's on Being—finds its clearest expression in their attitudes to the natural world. Hopkins delights in particulars, in the detailed individuality of creatures, not only as they "speak" God, but also for their own sakes. Heidegger is interested in beings only as they point to Being. The apparent similarity of outlook masks a divergence radical enough that Heidegger's perspective—except by way of contrast—provides little helpful insight into Hopkins' nature poems.

Hopkins' view of nature is relevant to the discussion in yet another way. Because for him each creature is a word of God, the accurate naming of the creatures of the natural world—whether windhover or (to apply "creature" in a broader sense) shipwreck—is in itself a kind of naming of God. This view allows Hopkins, in "The Wreck of the Deutschland," to circumvent his apparent agreement with Heidegger that one cannot name God, and to enact an indirect naming by means of the incarnational power of poetic language. Similarly, in "God's Grandeur," it allows him to give body to what is in effect an abstract generalization in such a way that nature itself is named and is made, in Heideggerian terms, more fully and visibly itself than in either ordinary experience or ordinary language.
3. **Man**

As we have seen in Chapters Five and Six, selving is more complex for man than it is for the non-human world. And indeed in the "I say more" that opens the sestet of "As kingfishers catch fire," Hopkins acknowledges at once the greater complexity and the greater glory of human selving. Creatures can echo Christ, be words to his Word. But man can be Christ. What the Incarnation means for creatures is that all material being is glorified by the fact that God himself takes on material being in Christ. The same effect is intensified for man because Christ takes on human flesh and human nature. Any human being therefore has a greater share in divine life than does a windhover or a tree. Christ, moreover, represents the ideal man, man in the absolute fulfilment of what he is meant to be, man as total self.⁵

Human being shares in the godhead not only because Christ takes on human nature in his Incarnation, but also because man is "made after the image" of God (S, p. 171). For Hopkins, a key aspect of this image is freedom (S, p. 171).⁶ No other creature can help but do what it was made to do. Man alone can choose to selve or not to selve, to contribute to his own creation or to refuse to do so. However, in order to realize this selfhood fully, man must choose to do what other creatures do simply by being: he must glorify God. And he must do so according to the ideal he sees in Christ. In other words, he must become Christ.

In "As kingfishers catch fire," it is the "just man" who becomes Christ. It is clear from Hopkins' other writings that for him justice encompasses all that man is meant to be. He equates
the "cuirass of justice" with "love of virtue" and elaborates, "Breastplate, cuirass of justice—covers nearly whole man and in particular the heart. So justice is the whole duty of man" (S, p. 234). The heart, as we recall, is the agent of truth in man. It is that in him which turns him naturally to God. By protecting the heart, justice preserves it as it is meant to be, that is, keeps it turned towards God. Of more direct purpose to the poem is Hopkins' remark that "to put on Jesus Christ" is to put on "the white robe of justice and God's grace" (S, p. 43). He equates justice with Christ and with God's grace, as he does again in "As kingfishers catch fire." The just man is the one who consents to become what he is meant to be: "He is the person who is truly, justly man: he is the whole, the real, man."7 And the whole, real man, as we have noted, is Christ.

Once again, there is a significant parallel between Hopkins' view of man and Heidegger's. There is also, however, a significant difference, and one more important than that which pertains to their views of nature. For Hopkins, it is of central importance that Christ is a person and that he takes on human being in the Incarnation. The mystery of the Incarnation, he says, is that "Christ is in every sense God and in every sense man, and the interest is in the locked and inseparable combination, or rather it is in the person in whom the combination has its place" (L, p. 188). Being, which occupies a very similar place in Heidegger's thought to that taken by Christ in Hopkins', has neither person nor body. While Christ is both Being and being, God and man, Being is never a being but is instead that condition of Being which allows all things
to be. Paradoxically, Heidegger's vision of reality makes for both a lessened interpenetration of the infinite and the finite and a lessened distinction between them. He insists upon "the ontological difference" between Being and beings, but the two nonetheless have a tendency to flow into each other.

While the importance of such a basic difference must not be minimized, there are at the same time affinities in the view of man in Hopkins and Heidegger which are illuminating for the poetry of Hopkins. First of all, for Heidegger as for Hopkins, man has a greater share in Being than do other beings, both because he knows himself to be and because he has the freedom to choose whether or not to fulfil his being, to be fully man. The man who is what he is meant to be refers his life not to himself or to a world of lifeless objects, but to Being. He is the meditative thinker, a person in many respects similar to Hopkins' "just man."

As we have noted in discussions of "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" and "Heraclitean Fire," man can choose to contribute to his own being or to refuse to do so. The man who refuses cuts himself off from Being and lives in a world devoid of life and meaning. As Hopkins expresses it in "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves," the destiny of such a man is hell. The man who chooses to be what he is meant to be lives in awareness of Being and in submission to it. In Hopkins' terms, as expressed in "Heraclitean Fire," such a man achieves full identity with Christ and becomes the "immortal diamond" which, until he exercises his will in assent to God's plan for him, is only one of his potential destinies.

While "Heraclitean Fire" emphasizes the ultimate transformation
of man and his world by means of the Resurrection, "As kingfishers catch fire" emphasizes that transformation within the day-to-day world. The just man lives his justice. He "Acts in God's eye what in God's eye he is--Christ." Being without doing is incomplete. Hopkins insists upon this: "All moral good, all man's being good, lies in two things--in being right, being in the right, and in doing right; in being on the right side, on the side of good, and on that side of doing good. Neither of these will do by itself" (S, p. 261). There is no way of knowing what a man--or anything else--is until he acts. It is the doing that reveals the being.8

When any man realizes his full potential, he "becomes Christ." Such an identity does not mean, however, the loss of individual selfhood.9 On the contrary, when a man is most fully Christ, he is also most fully himself. As Hopkins expresses it, full conformity with Christ "best brings out the nature of the man himself, as the lettering on a sail or device upon a flag are best seen when it fills" (S, p. 195). In Hopkins, identity with Christ is self-fulfilment and therefore full individuality--a striking contrast to the tendency of Being and beings to merge in Heidegger's thought despite his insistence upon the ontological difference. While "Christ plays in ten thousand places, lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his/To the father through the features of men's faces," he does not obliter ate or dim those features and the limbs and eyes remain "not his."10

4. Word

As we have seen, Hopkins and Heidegger have much in common
in their views of language and poetry, especially the latter. Indeed, if one considers only their theories of art in isolation from the underlying theories of language and from Hopkins' actual poetic practice, there is no very appreciable difference. For both, poetry is concerned with truth, which for both involves far more than faithful attention to outward detail. Poetry attempts to capture truth (or inscape, to use Hopkins' term) on three levels: its subject, its medium, and its self. That is, poetry "names" the beings of the world. It captures their essence and presents them in such a way that they are freshly seen. At the same time, by means of the careful shaping which draws attention to language as language, poetry allows language to be fully itself even as it renders the world with peculiar vividness. Finally, each poem has its own truth, its own being, which draws attention to itself as a thing in the world and especially as a made thing. As such, it reveals being more emphatically than natural beings do.

A poem like "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves," for example, presents an event in the natural world in such a way that it appears both more intensely itself and more intensely meaningful than it does in the natural world. The poem renders the coming of night both as an event in the world and as an event of great portent for humanity. The presentation is at the same time interpretation—an interpretation achieved through the careful choice and patterning of words whose emotional power and whose weight and movement carry as much meaning as their intellectual content. The density of the language and the complex interrelationship of sound and meaning draw attention to the language as language. The poem becomes a "piece of sound"
in which language comes into its own as it does in the work of few poets. At the same time, the poem stands out distinctively as a made thing, an object made with words.

Heidegger's theory of art provides a similarly helpful approach to any successful poem of Hopkins'—perhaps more so than is true of the work of most poets—because Hopkins' view of art accords so closely with Heidegger's. At the same time, Heidegger's theories cannot account for the most characteristic aspect of Hopkins' poetry—it's "solidity," the impression it so often gives of being part of the material world, tangible and visible. Indeed, Hopkins' poetic practice illustrates a fundamental difference between his view of language and Heidegger's. And, since his theory of language necessarily underlies his view of poetry, Hopkins' actual use of poetic language also reveals a fundamental difference between his view of art and Heidegger's.

Simply put, the difference in Hopkins' and Heidegger's views of language lies in the fact that while for both language is incarnational, for Hopkins it is also incarnate, while for Heidegger it is not. This is a central matter which finally determines the limits of the applicability of Heidegger's theories to Hopkins' work. The root of the difference is implicit in what we have seen thus far in our discussion of "As kingfishers catch fire." For Hopkins, all things are in some sense words. They mean and they speak. By doing what they are meant to do, by acting out their being, they name themselves and tell of God. Being, act, and utterance join in a single concept, selving, the model for which is the Incarnate Christ, who is both God and man, matter and spirit,
and at the same time the Word. Because Christ the Word takes on material body, all material things partake in him of the divine and of the linguistic. At the same time, all words partake in him of both the divine and the material.

Except for the difference made by the Incarnation, Hopkins and Heidegger see language in very similar ways. The difference, however, is one upon which Heidegger insists (though without specific reference to the Incarnation). In the light of Hopkins' use of language, even the similarities between his view of language and Heidegger's serve to highlight this difference. Both essentially equate language with Being. In Hopkins, Christ is at once Being and the Word. Heidegger is more cautious of such absolute identity and states rather that Being and Saying "belong to each other in a veiled way" (OWTL, p. 155). They meet in the one word logos, which means both. Heidegger's logos is of course not the logos of the first chapter of John's Gospel, but in its oneness of Being and Saying, it is uncannily similar. The crucial difference is that for Heidegger neither Being nor language has being. They do not and cannot have body. Being underlies all beings and in that very fact cannot itself be a being. Language gives being, but is not itself a being. Words then are not things. Heidegger, in surprisingly sharp contrast to Hopkins, is a kind of anti-realist.

Interestingly, Heidegger assigns to language in its essence (parlance) a mediatory and salvific role very similar to that assigned to Christ in Christian belief. According to Heidegger, man can learn to live to his full potential only through language (PLT, p. 132). He assigns to language a role closely parallel to the role of Christ in "Heraclitean Fire." Fullness of being is
associated with the Word for both Hopkins and Heidegger. However, for Hopkins Christ the Word is not only Word and Being, but also man and therefore material. Salvation for man lies in the unity of God and man in matter which is also word rather than, as in Heidegger, in a non-material unity of Being and word. In Heidegger, therefore, language assumes a more mystical, otherworldly quality than it does in Hopkins. Language never attains to being because the essence of language is beyond the reach of words. As we have seen in our study of "The Wreck of the Deutschland," for Hopkins too the essence of language, Christ the Word, is beyond the reach of language. Hopkins, however, does not despair of capturing the inscape of the Word by means of the incarnational power of the word and the "saying" power of things. And, in "Heraclitean Fire," he does achieve that ultimate transformation of both material reality and human word which has its roots in the Incarnation.

Hopkins' belief in the Incarnation leads naturally to a belief in the participation of language in material reality. He discusses words as if they were somehow physical objects. In his poetry he patterns them so as to intensify awareness of their "physical" qualities—sound and rhythm in particular—and bring these qualities powerfully to bear upon the meaning he intends to convey. Because for Hopkins things as things are themselves words and have meaning, even the physical qualities of words convey meaning. The sound of a word is as much part of its inscape as its intellectual content. His emphasis upon sound and rhythm and his concentration of devices of sound in his poetry create a linguistic density whose impact is physical.
As the poetic analyses of Chapters Three to Six have shown, the specific poetic devices which Hopkins uses are consistent with his underlying view of reality, including his view of language as part of both material and spiritual reality. In Chapter Three, we have seen that his preference for nouns and verbs—and especially for words which combine the qualities of the two—is a natural extension of his concept of selving, and that his preference for the present tense is consistent with his concept of inscape and his desire to capture in poetry the eternal truth underlying temporal reality. In Chapter Four, the sound patterns and diction of "God's Grandeur" reveal the close and guarded connection between sound and meaning in his poetry, as well as the complex power of "prepossession," or connotation, in carefully chosen words. The poem also reveals Hopkins' love of the particular, not only with regard to the natural world, but also with regard to words. The particulars of words—the details of their physical being—play as important a role in his use of language as the particulars of the world do in his view of inscape. In Chapter Five, the careful patterns of repetition and reiteration of sound and sense in "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves" once again illustrate the intimate link between the two and the paradoxical power of language to convey truth even in its lapses and uncertainties. And, in Chapter Six, the focus on the "is," the copula at the heart of "Heraclitean Fire," reveals the transforming power of the Word upon both word and world. Detailed analysis of each device reveals the vital and ultimately unanalyzable complex of which each device is only a small part whose power cannot be isolated without loss, and which therefore ultimately eludes
total explanation. Hopkins' poetry seems emphatically inexhaustible, as Heidegger believes all poetry to be.

Each poem casts light upon the others, and a progressive analysis of the several poems we have considered here reveals with increasing clarity the "one single poetic statement" which underlies and shapes the whole and which finds its most explicit expression in "As kingfishers catch fire." That statement has to do with the impact of the Incarnation upon the world, man, and language in a vision of reality in which spirit and word take material form and inhabit the material world of everyday, ordinary reality.

5. Conclusion

To read Hopkins and Heidegger together is valuable in two ways. First of all, there are strong affinities between their views of reality, especially in regard to the relationship of nature (beings), man, and God (Being). Out of their strikingly similar views of reality emerge theories of language and especially of art which are also very similar. Where the similarities are close enough, even the differences are illuminating, as they are in the study of "The Wreck of the Deutschland" and "Heraclitean Fire." Nor is it possible always to determine easily which poems lend themselves most profitably to being read in the light of Heidegger's theories. For instance, given Heidegger's view that Being reveals itself through beings, one would expect Hopkins' nature poems to be natural choices for a Heideggerian reading. However, as the discussion and analysis in Chapter Four reveal, it is in these very poems that the difference between Hopkins and Heidegger is greatest and therefore to
these poems that Heidegger's perspective has the most limited application. By way of contrast, "Spelt from Sibyl's Leaves," while its concern with interpretation provides a natural parallel with Heidegger's similar concern, appears to diverge radically in its view of man—a view expressed primarily in distinctly Christian terms. However, the view of man is in fact very similar to Heidegger's and the poem therefore the closest to his views of the four we have considered. On the level of theory, then, Heidegger provides an illuminating comparison and contrast with Hopkins, as well as a frame of reference and vocabulary which for many readers provide a readier access to the essential thought of Hopkins than does the poet's own terminology.

Hopkins, however, is a practising poet as Heidegger is not. It is the practice which gives body to the theory. And, in the move from theory to practice, it is contrast and not comparison with Heidegger which is most telling. Hopkins' poetic practice reveals a fundamental difference between himself and Heidegger whose effect is felt throughout their thought. Hopkins' belief in the Incarnation leads him to see words as things, which, as all things do, reveal their being by their doing. The doing of words is the giving body to the world by achieving as close a union as possible between the physical qualities of words and their sense. The poetry of Hopkins has an emphatically physical quality which contrasts sharply with Heidegger's more mystical concept of language. For Hopkins, word and world participate in each other far more intimately than they do for Heidegger. The world is word and the word is a being in the world. The difference here described is consistent
with the difference of emphasis between Hopkins and Heidegger which we have mentioned repeatedly throughout this study: Heidegger's on Being and Hopkins' on beings. Because for Hopkins Being becomes being, his interest remains firmly rooted in the "real" world—that of things, of creatures, of man, of daily living—a world transformed and glorified but never abandoned or entirely transcended by the vital, radiant presence of the Word.
Notes


3 Ong, p. 25.


5 Christopher Devlin associates Hopkins' view of Christ as the
perfection of human genius with a similar view in Scotus, which he explains with the image that "Peter's humanity is a 'broken light' of the ideal species in God's mind, whereas Christ's humanity is the 'unbroken' species as God conceived it" (The Sermons and Devotional Writings of Gerard Manley Hopkins, ed. Christopher Devlin, S.J. [London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959], p. 278).

6 Ong sees this aspect of Hopkins' thought as an anticipation of twentieth-century thought. He remarks, "Hopkins' conviction that freedom manifests the particularity of the self suggests precociously certain existentialist awareness of the twentieth century, such as Heidegger's and Sartre's persuasion that we create ourselves by the choices we make . . . , that we are what we do." He quotes lines 5-8 of "As kingfishers catch fire" in support of his view (p. 46).


9 An opinion expressed in different ways by, for example, Mariani, pp. 180-81; Rachel Salmon, "Frozen Fire: The Paradoxical Equation of 'That Nature is a Heraclitean Fire and of the Comfort of the Resurrection', Hopkins Quarterly, 12 (1985-86), 67.

10 A point made in a slightly different way by Johnson, p. 140.


12 We have not accorded the same attention to the technical
detail of "As kingfishers catch fire" as to the other poems studied, but this poem too is built upon a close association of physical and "spiritual" aspects of language, as various critics have shown. See, for example, W.H. Gardner, Gerard Manley Hopkins (1844-1889) (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969), II, p. 316-17; Johnson, p. 137; Mariani, p. 179; Mackenzie, p. 151.

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