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THE WAVERLEY NOVELS AND THE WRITING OF MEMORY

by

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Thesis presented to the Faculty of Arts,
Department of English, University of Ottawa,
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the Doctor of Philosophy Degree

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ABSTRACT

The Waverley Novels understand the past both as it was experienced by participants and in relation to the present. The ability of Walter Scott to recover this double sense of the past—its "pastness" and its presence—is largely dependent upon his understanding of memory and its narrative implications. Scott understands memory as both a passive register of experience and an active agent, which, in conjunction with reason and imagination, allows people to understand and order their experience.

For Scott, student of the Scottish Enlightenment, individuals and societies are always in transition from an old world to a new. He sees this transition as necessary but as charged with inevitable losses, and his novels generate in various ways his sense of the necessary tension between the two worlds. As they dramatize the historical process in its effects on individuals and cultures, the Waverley Novels manifest various tensions: a belief in and distrust of progress; a historian's sense that individuals are shaped by history and the uniformitarian view that human nature is always fundamentally the same; a fascination with and regret for the past, as well as a commitment to the present and the values of the new order. Throughout, the novels reflect
Scott's acute sense of the ambiguity involved in acknowledging the inevitable gains and losses that are part of moving forward. For Scott, an orientation towards the past is fatal, but moving forward is always a difficult and deliberate choice which carries with it a lingering sense of the losses it entails. Making this choice involves not so much avoiding the claims of the old world as being engaged by them and then choosing to forsake them. Memory is vital as a way to carry something of the past forward into the future, but also as a way to leave the past behind.

In *Waverley*, subject of Chapter One, both Edward Waverley and the readers of the novel learn how to use their memories to understand and honour the past and yet to define themselves against it. If Edward has always had his sense of the past mediated by imaginative narrative constructions, the readers of the novel have generally known history only in terms of official texts. By activating memory, Scott takes both his hero and his readers beyond this textual understanding to experience history as it was experienced by participants, but he then distances both once again by invoking the power of imagination. What is required is a use of imagination in conjunction with memory that will produce a new sense of the past to enrich but not control the present.

Both imagination and memory have their dangers as separate poles, and Chapter Two moves to a study of Scott's
fascination with the abuses of both. Conventionally for his place and time, Scott aligns each abuse with a historical stage of consciousness: the enlightened consciousness is prone to forsake memory and rely too heavily on its imaginative and rational powers, whereas the primitive consciousness is prone to the opposite error, a privileging of memory to the extent that an orientation to the past dominates all other faculties. The Bride of Lammermoor and Rob Roy are the main texts here.

Chapter Three considers Scott's understanding of place, ranging over various novels from Ivanhoe to The Fair Maid of Perth. His sense of place is vital to his sense of history. Scott's recreation of a place involves an activity of memory and imagination analogous to his understanding of how the past must be approached. He uses imagination to reconstruct places out of impressive remembered scenes, so that he achieves his own balance of association with the past through memory and dissociation from the past through imagination.

The balancing of association and dissociation has a generic application, the subject of Chapter Four. Using memory to establish one's identity in relation to the past entails acknowledging one's resemblance to the past and one's difference from it. In Scott's Gothic world, exemplified in St. Ronan's Well, the antihero tries to establish his identity and that of society by separating himself absolutely and, in effect, trying to curtail the process of continuity by
perpetuating himself. *Redgauntlet* shows Scott's exemplary romance hero facing the same threat to his identity. Darsie Latimer, hero of this novel, must use his memory to establish his identity as both continuous with the past and independent from it.

Chapter Five considers the narrative implications of memory for Scott more explicitly. Throughout his novelistic career, Scott is engaged in his own ongoing struggle to define his identity in relation to the past. Because this self-definition is undertaken through his narrative, the struggle is dramatized as a struggle with his material and his readers. As a novelist, Scott tries to honour the claims of the past by reviving the voices of storytellers and yet to make the past comprehensible to readers of the new world by submitting these voices to the form of written narrative. By reanimating the voices of storytellers in his novels, he tries to maintain the sense of telling and listening that is essential to his sense of the past.
for my parents
Memory, tho a secondary, is the soul of time
& life, the principal but its shadow---

John Clare.
Natural History Prose Writings
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

In the absence of a standard scholarly edition of Scott's novels, there is no common method of citation. All quotations are drawn from the Border Edition (48 vols. Ed. Andrew Lang. London, 1892-94). To facilitate reference, I cite the chapters as consecutively numbered in most modern editions, followed by page number. All citations are incorporated parenthetically in the text.
INTRODUCTION

In his seminal study of the historical novel, Georg Lukács argued that Walter Scott was the exemplary historical novelist because his novels not only reanimate the past in its own terms but also present it as the "prehistory of the present" (53). Scott's ability to convey this double sense of the past depends on his understanding of the complex nature of memory and of its narrative implications. In various ways, the Waverley Novels grow out of and explore the relationship of memory and narrative, and that relationship is the focus of this study of Scott's fiction.

Scott's sense of the integral relationship of memory and narrative originates with his early exposure to oral tradition. When he was sent as a child from his home in Edinburgh to live with relatives in the border country, he found himself in another world at once continuous with the world he knew and completely removed from it. Here he began to hear stories of yet another world, the Scottish past of traditional history and legend, told to him by impressive persons who were conversant both with him and with a mysterious, remote world. As he listened to these stories, the young Walter Scott became a part of the chain of oral tradition whereby stories are drawn from the memory of the teller and transmitted to the memory of the listener. It was
through these stories that Scott received his deepest impression of history, an impression which came to him in this profoundly personal and imaginatively coloured way via words that gave voice to memories. And from this early impression emerge, in a sense, the historical novels as narrative acts, for they are written not so much to convey history as to recreate a sense of the past and to keep alive the tradition of storytelling and transmission, thereby maintaining the sense of continuity between past and present.

Scott's early sense of history and understanding of memory were strengthened and lent a certain intellectual structure in adolescence through his exposure to the Enlightenment view of history, human nature, and society by teachers at the University of Edinburgh such as Dugald Stewart and Alexander Fraser Tytler. A central tenet of the Scottish Enlightenment was that societies developed through time according to a series of predictable stages, always moving towards a higher level of civilization but also always struggling against the ever more sophisticated forms of moral degeneracy that accompanied that very progress. The paradoxes and tensions of this model would enter into the Waverley Novels, as would the Enlightenment sense that individual identity is rooted in social identity, that self and society are interdependent and mutually established in the context of one's understanding of one's personal and social past. Scott's novels dramatize the historical process as it
affects individuals and cultures caught up in its inexorable movement, negotiating the conflicting claims of the old world and the new and constantly struggling to maintain the tension between the two. As has often been noted, his fiction turns on tension and on what Scott liked to call "contrast." This contrast is usually a matter of contest as the novels deploy opposing principles and views: a belief in and distrust of progress; a historicist sense that individuals are shaped by history and a uniformitarian belief that human nature is always fundamentally the same; a fascination with and regret for the past, as well as a commitment to the present and the values of the new order. As a whole, the Waverley Novels reflect Scott's acute sense of the ambiguity involved in acknowledging the inevitable gains and losses that are part of moving forward. For him, an orientation towards the past is fatal, but moving forward is always a difficult and deliberate choice which carries with it a lingering sense of the losses it entails. Making this choice always involves an engagement with the claims of the old world and then a decision to forsake them. In the difficult process of negotiating the claims of past, present, and future, memory is vital as a way to carry something of the past forward into the future, but also as a way to leave the past behind.

In both the traditional and the modern world of Scott's experience, memory is central to one's ability to live. For the traditional culture that is oriented towards the past,
memory is the source of knowledge and the means whereby it is retained and passed on. In her landmark study of the history of memory, Frances Yates demonstrates how the emergence of scientific rationalism in the seventeenth century and the movement away from the traditional understanding of the world brought with them an important change in the understanding of memory. At this point, she argues, memory gave way to reason as an agent of cognition and began to be seen more as an aid to knowledge than as its source (Yates 368–9). Yates’s analysis also demonstrates, however, that despite this fundamental shift there is a remarkable consistency in the understanding of memory from the old world to the new. Two major characteristics of memory continue to be acknowledged throughout the ages and both are important to the Waverley Novels: One is the physical, visual orientation that makes memory the faculty that mediates between the sensuous and the intellectual, using concrete shapes to retain and order more abstract ideas. The other is its dual nature as both a passive register of experience and an active agent that can be trained and deployed to order and evaluate experience.

While the importance of memory to traditional, oral societies is apparent and has received a great deal of recent attention, its significance for modern, literate, and rationalist societies has been less discussed. To the Scottish Enlightenment in particular, with its empirical and Lockean roots, memory is crucial. For both Locke and Hume,
memory is, as Hume puts it, "the source of personal identity" because it discloses "that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person" (Hume IV.vi; cf. Locke II.27). To empirical philosophers who believe in progress, memory has an added importance because it records the impressions that allow one to compare one's present self and circumstances to one's past, and it registers one's experience: only as the memory records experience and notes how one's present experience resembles and differs from one's past experience is a person able to understand and respond to the effects of moving through time and thereby gain a sense of one's progress. Dugald Stewart, whose lectures on moral philosophy Scott followed, takes the importance of memory as a basic tenet for his Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind: memory, he writes, is "obviously the great foundation of all intellectual improvement, and without which no advantage could be derived from the most enlarged experience" (213). Stewart and his Enlightenment sources also explicitly distinguished between the passive and active faculty of memory. In the celebrated Institutes of Moral Philosophy, for example, Adam Ferguson distinguishes between the "casual" faculty of memory, whereby things "by any connection of their own, recur to the mind" and the "intentional" faculty of memory, whereby "the mind, from design, recalls any subject or thought" (59). In a similar vein, Dugald Stewart discusses the memory as both involuntary and "willed" (213). For both Ferguson and
Stewart, there are two kinds of memory: a non-rational memory dependent on the intuitive association of ideas; and a rational memory dependent on conscious attention. Both kinds are fundamental attributes of the human mind because attention and the association of ideas, as Stewart states, are "two principles of our nature" (215).

For Walter Scott, student of the Scottish philosophers and champion of traditional culture, memory is the most important and intriguing faculty, and his novels work with both the traditional role of memory as primary source of knowledge and the more modern view of its constructing and ordering power. Giving Scott access to the world and mind of the more vital past, memory is part of that world and its way of thinking and living. At the same time, it stands as a rational faculty in the present through which one registers continuity and discontinuity and hence works out a relationship to the past. On the one hand, Scott understands memory as what Chrystal Croftangry of Chronicles of the Canongate calls a "storehouse" where the empirical, sensuous data of experience are recorded "involuntarily." On the other hand, memory also has for Scott what Ferguson calls an "intentional" faculty whereby the recorded data become activated by a "voluntary" process. As this term suggests, voluntary memory involves the will as well as its attendant faculties: reason, understanding, and imagination.

Activating this second, rational faculty of memory is a
sign of one's movement away from the old world, both in the sense that one is thereby taking active, rational control of one's impression of the past and in the sense that this voluntary faculty is unavailable to the primitive consciousness. Scott's narrative recovery of the past entails creating an impression of the old world, so that the world where the involuntary memory is the predominant faculty makes a vivid impression on the involuntary memories of readers. But his "poetic awakening" (Lukacs 42) of the past age also involves activating the voluntary memories of readers to show how one can arrive at a rational as well as sympathetic understanding of the past. The Waverley Novels demonstrate how one can at once associate with the past, affirming its continuity with the present, and dissociate oneself from the past, declaring one's freedom from it in the present. The process of working out this relationship involves, not abandoning the storehouse of memory, but activating it by the coordinated effort of reason and imagination.

My study begins with Scott's first novel, Waverley. Its young hero, in whom imagination is the "predominant faculty" (4:27), is taken out of his private romance world into the public and real world where history is being made. In the process of working out his relationship to both public and private worlds, Edward Waverley must work out a relationship to time, a relationship in which memory (in both its voluntary and involuntary modes) is central. Prompted by his
involuntary memory, Waverley learns to realize his experience by learning to activate his voluntary memory, first to reflect upon and gain perspective on his personal experience so that it is ordered, not by imagination, but by reason in conjunction with memory, and then to gain a rational understanding of the public, social events in which he has been involved. As Scott’s hero becomes caught up in history and then uses his memory to order and understand his recent past experience and its historical context, so his readers in an analogous fashion learn to use their memories, first to participate in the past that Waverley is living and then to order and understand history with a sympathetic and rational understanding. Both Waverley and the readers of the novel begin as spectators of history equipped only with a textual, narrative understanding of it; become engaged in it by a process that simulates the accumulating work of the involuntary memory and allows them to invest their narrative understanding with a sense of real experience; and finally come to activate the voluntary memory which, in conjunction with reason and imagination, allows them a perspective from which to relate to the past. Scott allows Waverley to take up his place as a responsible private citizen of the new world by learning to balance the power of his imagination with the rational exercise of his memory. Both he and his readers are taught to use their memories to narrate their experience of history in a way that invests it with a sense of significance.
But such a balancing is not always permitted in Scott's novels. On the one hand lies the danger of the excessive predominance of the imagination from which Edward Waverley is saved; on the other, there lies the opposite danger of the excessive predominance of the memory to which characters of the old world (notably Fergus and Flora MacIvor in Waverley) fall victim. These two extremes are the source of unending fascination for Scott, and he explores their implications throughout his career. Out of this exploration emerges a vivid sense of Scott's view of the two modes of consciousness that characterize membership in the two worlds: the primitive consciousness of the old world and the enlightened consciousness of the new. Far from seeing these as a simple dualism, the Waverley Novels work with a complex sense of their interaction both within and between different cultures and within and between individuals. Chapter Two then looks at these two worlds and the forces at work within them. Edgar Ravenswood of The Bride of Lammermoor is Scott's exemplary tragic hero, assaulted from without by conflicting forces pulling him at once towards the old feudal world of his father and the new world of the petty bourgeoisie. Even more important, he is besieged from within by conflicting attractions to both these worlds so that his own feelings and faculties, internally divided, help to sabotage him. In the primitive consciousness, as exemplified in Ravenswood, the involuntary memory, which works outside the jurisdiction of
the rational faculties, is predominant. The primitive mind sees time as a cyclic process working according to a pattern of repetition and recurrence that is dependent upon memory as the storehouse of the past. The past is the ideal world, and the present is meant to imitate it. The involuntary memory is the crucial agent for replaying the past and, in a curious way, turning the future back to the past. But at the same time that he feels and accedes to the primitive power of involuntary memory, Ravenswood is trying to join the enlightened world in which time moves forward and history is an ongoing process by which individuals exercise their rational faculties to shape the future according to a new pattern not fixed by the past. Ravenswood suffers a tragic death because, unable to free himself from the past, he is overwhelmed by this historical process.

The enlightened consciousness is embattled in its own way, as Scott dramatizes in an exemplary man of the Enlightenment, Frank Osbaldistone, hero of Rob Roy. Like Edward Waverley, Frank as a young man is in the thrall of imagination, and he has to be led to use his memory in order to come to a rational understanding of his personal life and of his family and social heritage. While Frank does move from an irresponsibly romantic and aesthetic view of the world to a more rationally responsible stance, however, his memory never comes fully under the control of his reason. Instead it continues to replay past horrors and mysteries that remain
stored in his subconscious. These latent fears are readily activated by the chaotic, anarchic power generated by a conspiracy of memory and imagination. Despite Frank's enlightened view, his memory does replay his experiences, and the future does revert to the past. Frank's experience suggests that achieving the rational balance of intellectual faculties that Waverley was permitted is an ongoing struggle involving a complex and ambiguous achievement of as many losses as gains. For both the primitive and the enlightened consciousness, memory is a faculty whose power must constantly be held in check.

The primitive and enlightened modes of consciousness involve not only different views of time but also different views of place, and place is the subject of Chapter Three of the study. For the primitive mentality, the impression received from a landscape is itself the dominant power that determines the shape of one's world in the present and in the future: place controls time. But this weakness of the primitive mind is matched by an equally dangerous weakness of the enlightened mind, which can override the impression of a landscape and reshape it according to an idea that is a mental construct for the future rather than an ideal that derives from the past. The enlightened consciousness can destroy the world in the name of progress if the onslaught of time is allowed absolute control over place. But it is possible, Scott suggests, both to receive the impression of a place
without allowing it to take control of one's perception and to reshape the impression in a way that does not destroy the place and may even restore it. While acknowledging the necessity of progress, Scott also advocates the kind of cultivation that responds to, rather than simply imposes upon, the land and the world. In an analogous fashion, his narratives recover but also reshape the places where the past was lived, so that they do not simply repeat the past or take an impression from it but rather interpret it and transform it into a shape that gives way to and thereby lives within the present and the future.

The failure to perform this kind of rational, imaginative exercise is the downfall of the old world, which is dominated by the cyclic patterns of repetition and recurrence. It is also the haunting fear of the enlightened world, whose privileging of rationality has invested the forces of irrationality with a peculiar fascination. Chapter Four looks at how Scott further explores the implications of the primitive view and its opposite by dramatizing the generic opposition of romance and the Gothic. In this struggle, it is the shape of social and individual identity that is at stake. The Gothic world is dominated by the regressive, anarchic energy of self-perpetuation that resists the natural process by which the old give way to the young. The Gothic spirit subverts this process in both the cyclic form it takes in the old world and the linear form it takes in the new. It twists
the traditional view of the world into an insidious obsession with repetition of the self. Far from accepting an impression of the world, the Gothic spirit attempts to absorb the world into itself so that the world becomes nothing but a projection of itself. Rather than thinking in terms of transforming the world either according to an ideal of the old world or an idea of the new world, the Gothic mind remakes the world in its own private image. It seeks to suspend the natural processes of life and thereby to stop time, and, refusing the perspective either of memory or of prospect, it tries to perpetuate a timeless present. Rather than seeking either to model the world according to the past or to make a new world derived from, but independent of, that world, the Gothic hero seeks to make a world that is completely identical with himself. In other words, he wants to make his mental world replace the real world, a perversion that results when imagination holds absolute sway and memory, the faculty that assumes a distinction between oneself and the world, is replaced by the Gothic vision of perpetual self-repetition and the identification of world and self.

In *St. Ronan's Well* Scott dramatizes the mutual destruction of self and society that is the consequence of the Gothic view of the world. *Redgauntlet*, by contrast, typifies Scott's romance world, where memory helps to regulate the relationship between the self and the world and to ensure that it is not one of identification. It is possible to see the
resemblance between oneself and the old order, and between oneself and potential rivals and yet to choose neither to repeat the old order nor merely to perpetuate oneself. In exemplary fashion, the two heros of *Redgauntlet* defer to one another, and in the process they take the novel beyond both the Gothic and the romance genres to signal the regenerative newness of a progressing society and a progressive genre.

As Scott's novels dramatize in these various ways the processes by which individuals and cultures negotiate the claims of the old world and the new, they establish the centrality of memory in producing a synthesis of the two worlds. Chapter Five explores the narrative implications of memory more explicitly, concentrating on the narrative frames and analyzing the synthesis that Scott's own narrative endeavours achieve. Scott's frames (and the Waverley Novels as a whole) turn on the tension between the oral and the written, and Scott's kind of historical novel can be understood as an attempt to mediate the modes of memory characteristic of each of these forms of recording experience. This tension between the oral and the written is dramatized in a generic struggle between the ancient, traditional form of story and the modern, conventional form of novel, a drama characteristically enacted by the Waverley Novels as a complex opposition between the novel proper and the framing structure. Typically, the narrative frames are filled with voices contesting the formal resolution of the narrative. Through
these frames. Scott tries to keep alive the voices of the past that are the source of his stories; at the same time, his novels try to contain and order these voices in the form of narrative. Scott's own endeavour here is thus analogous to the working of memory explored in his novels, and he dramatizes his authorial struggle by bringing his oral source material to fictional life, allowing it to demonstrate through its own liveliness the impossibility of ever really submitting it to written, ordered form. By consciously containing most of his novels in narrative frames that remind readers of the enforced ordering of the material, he keeps alive its pre-narrated life. Moreover, the frames themselves, as the chapter illustrates, form a narrative of Scott's struggle as a writer to negotiate the claims of the old world and the new. In a self-conscious dialogue with his readers, the Author of Waverley both decries the duplicitous business of novel-writing and declares the necessity for just such a narration of stories.

Late in his career, Scott turns to the genre of chronicle and achieves in it a certain resolution to the narrative questions he has been posing. His move to chronicle in the Chronicles of the Canongate has not received much critical notice, but it is definitive of the task his historical novel has set itself. As a genre, chronicle is peculiarly suited to a fiction that is always trying at once to write and to "unwrite" history in order to disclose its pre-narrative
voice. A discontinuous form, chronicle resists the closure and containment of history as a form of writing, and Scott exploits its discontinuities to transcribe the stories of cultural loss in his * Chronicles*. Representing the clash between the official, written version of history and the unofficial, spoken version of traditional culture, the chronicle as used by Scott effects the resolution of these opposing modes of memory because it tells of the transition of an oral into a written culture, of story into history.
CHAPTER ONE

The Education of Memory: Waverley

Beginning in Waverley, Scott the novelist sets himself "the task of tracing the evanescent manners" of the traditional culture of Scotland, for "there is no European nation which, within the course of half a century or little more, has undergone so complete a change as the little kingdom of Scotland" (72:363). Conscious of the completeness of this change, he wants readers to be "aware of the progress we have made" but also of the loss that this progress has entailed; and his novel is meant to help focus this change for the "we" who "fix our eye on the now distant point from which we have been drifted" (72:364). Scott does not try simply to memorialize the difference of the ancient culture or figuratively to bring this "distant point" closer by enhancing the affinities between past and present. Instead he compels his hero and challenges his readers to become active in the process by which "we have been drifted"—passive for all our progress—by the movement of time.

In Waverley Scott sets his notoriously passive hero to work out his relationship to time: he must learn to set his
private time according to the public time of history. Simultaneously, Scott sets his readers the congruent task of working out a relationship to time through their reading of Waverley and of its hero. Although the history that is the novel's subject is past history for the reader and contemporary history for Waverley, both character and reader confront this history as public time, a sphere that is distinct from, yet related to, the private time of individual experience. While for Edward Waverley, individual, private time is reset according to the public time of history, for the readers of his story the adjustment works in the opposite direction, a resetting of the sense of the public time of history according to the private time of individuals. While Waverley moves from his experience to an understanding of history and of his place in history, readers move from their accustomed perception of history as inscribed event (or text) to an understanding of the experiences out of which history has emerged. For both Waverley and the reader, this changed perspective is accomplished in the process by which memory changes the relationship between self and time.

Underlying Scott's understanding of the process of memory are two related distinctions: a distinction between two kinds of memory (voluntary versus involuntary) and a distinction between two kinds of time (real versus narrative). Although the two kinds of memory are not actually differentiated until Chronicles of the Canongate (1827) and the two kinds of time
are never explicitly differentiated. Both distinctions are implicit from the beginning of the Waverley Novels. In Waverley the hero comes to understand what Scott in this novel calls "real time" and learns to distinguish it from what I will call "narrative time." Waverley's ability to make this distinction is linked to his learning to respond to his involuntary memory and to recognize its distinction from his voluntary memory. It is the latter that may then be activated to narrate his time.

Scott introduces the concept of "real time" very late in the novel as a rather transparent gloss on the hero's realistic chastening. In Chapter 70 readers are informed that "considerably more than two months" of "real time" elapsed before Waverley's wedding, a delaying of the conventionally romantic conclusion of his story. This "real time" obstructs by virtue of being "occupied" by "law proceedings" and the tedious inconveniences of travel (70:348). Real time modifies the romantic passion and the romantic resolution, reflecting the overall movement of the novel towards moderation and compromise. By its very existence, real time intrudes between the hero's desire and its satisfaction, disrupting their conventionally romantic congruence. If the "important matters" that delay the marriage are not important enough to delay the narrative, the narrator reminds us that they are, nevertheless, unavoidable in real time, indifferent to "all the urgency which Waverley could use." "These important
matters," the narrator notes, "may be briefly told in narrative" (70:348), and they are so told, occupying little narrative time. But Scott refuses to allow the narrative time they may take to replace or obscure the real time they do take. For the eager bridegroom, the fact that the delay may be so briefly told provides no consolation as he endures the real time of waiting. For readers, the negative correlation of our reading time and Waverley's real time is a reminder that what is narrative time to us is unrelenting real time to him. Scott's deliberate drawing of attention here to the two kinds of time, a conventional technique of eighteenth-century novels, takes on a special pertinence in a historical novel which necessarily confronts more literally the problem of the transformation of experiential time into narration. And since readers of Waverley have been made aware of themselves as historical beings, located in time as historical change, the disjunction here between real time and narrative time implicitly locates the reader's own real time within potentially narrative time and suggests that our "important matters" may also turn out to be simply dead time for narrative.

For both Waverley and the reader, Scott implies, time is available in real terms and in narrative terms. Like Waverley, the reader lives real time, fraught as it is with the rigours and the tedious of mortality. Simply by virtue of consciousness, however, human beings not only live but also
tell real time. To narrate one's time—to turn real time into narrative time—one invokes the memory and the imagination: memory because narrating requires the perspective that makes present experience past, and imagination because narrating entails the ordering that turns experience into a verbal structure. Narrative time is the medium in which experience takes the form of a story, necessarily of the past and necessarily fictional. And it is in terms of narrative time that one "reads" the public time of history and the private time of memory and then incorporates the two.

In discussing the narration of history, Hayden White states that it is in historiography that "our desire for the imaginary, the possible, must contest with the imperatives of the real, the actual." Because "narrative becomes a problem only when we wish to give to real events the form of a story," he says, historiography best exemplifies the process in which "narration and narrativity [function] as the instruments by which the conflicting claims of the imaginary and the real are mediated, arbitrated, or resolved in a discourse" (White 8). One might further contend that since individual, private time is always to some extent contingent upon public time and because the individual does take a narrative stance towards his or her experience, the individual produces a "discourse" of his or her time by a parallel process of narration. This personal narrative mediates, arbitrates, or resolves the conflicting claims of one's own imagination and reality.
One's personal narrative also negotiates, however, the conflicting claims whose negotiation produces one's understanding of the official story that is read as history. This text of public, social narrative time provides the context for private, individual narrative time.

Although inherently fictional, narrative time—public and private—can be authentic or false depending on its relation to real time. Insofar as narrative time takes real time into account, it achieves consequentiality by at once substantiating its own narrative structure and ordering the otherwise amorphous material of experience (real time). At both a public and a private level, achieving consequential narrative time involves activating and properly coordinating the faculties of consciousness, a process that Waverley undergoes in the course of the novel. Scott makes this process quite explicit towards the end of his career in the very self-conscious narrator of the Chronicles of the Canongate. Here the archetypal storyteller Chrystal Croftangry describes the gradual awakening of consciousness that allows him to narrate his time, time that had been lost because it had been unpossessed and therefore inconsequential. Croftangry writes that, prompted by the sight of foreign lands, he turned "inwards, and ransacked the neglected stores which my memory had involuntarily recorded." What had been experienced only in terms of real, unconscious time and seen only "with the eyes indeed of my body," now becomes "visible
before the eyes of my imagination... [and] my understanding." His involuntary memory, "when excited," is converted into the voluntary activity that employs the understanding and the imagination "to collect and to complete" the otherwise amorphous and dormant data of real-time experience to produce a consequential narrative time (2:26). At both a public and a private level, this process can be impeded or aborted in two major ways, opposite in kind but curiously similar in effect. As is so well exemplified in Chrystal Croftangry, self-styled prodigal son, the sheer empirical, sensuous material of experience can have power enough to dull the workings of imagination and understanding. Edward Waverley exemplifies the opposite error that produces a like inconsequence: his imaginative powers are so highly developed that real time is falsified and the understanding is subverted. In the course of the novel, he must learn not only how to appreciate real time but also how to narrate his time authentically, that is, in a way that takes real time into account.

II

Waverley may be seen as a characteristically realist hero who must undergo "the demystification, or education of illusions," as Edward Said puts it (61). But Scott takes pains in the early chapters of the novel to make clear that Waverley is peculiarly handicapped in undergoing this ordeal.
As a child his experience of real time is fragmented by his being subject to "a sort of tacit compromise" by which his time is divided between the two diametrically opposed worlds of his father and his uncle. Because his education is "regulated alternately by the taste and opinions of his uncle and of his father" (2:17). Waverley's experience is rendered curiously insubstantial, as the real time spent in one household is systematically negated in the other. Under these circumstances, the boy not only learns but also virtually imbibes a radical sort of neutrality of spirit which deprives him of a footing—a point of view—from which to narrate his time. Thus divided between two worlds and accountable to neither, with neither accountable for him, Waverley undergoes an education that is notably misguided or unguided because of the "relaxation of authority" which characterizes his upbringing (3:19). And, as a consequence of the "desultory style of his studies," he emerges without "any fixed political opinion to place in opposition" to the emotional forces he later confronts (4:25).

In his studies, Waverley follows the pattern that he learns in his life, moving at will from one work to another in order to avoid effort and engagement. Although his faulty education serves as a kind of metonymy for his faulty upbringing, Scott makes clear that it also has a substantial significance of its own. "Alas!" sighs the narrator in Chapter 5.
while he was thus permitted to read only for the
gratification of his amusement, he foresaw not that he
was losing forever the opportunity of acquiring habits
of firm and assiduous application, of gaining the art of
controlling, directing, and concentrating the powers of
his mind for earnest investigation,—an art far more
essential than even that intimate acquaintance with
classical learning which is the primary object of study.
(3:20)

Because he does not learn to read well, Waverley is without
the habits of mind which would enable him to read or interpret
his experience wisely and to narrate his time appropriately.
This disability manifests itself, not surprisingly, in a
confusion between life and literature and in inappropriate
modes of narration. A romantic youth naturally has a penchant
for "romantic literature," and his imagination, predictably,
constitutes "the predominant faculty of his mind." But
Waverley is also betrayed by the dangerous confusion that
results from the intermingling of memory and imagination. His
imagination is fed not only by his own "memory of uncommon
tenacity" but also by his uncle's memory of "family tradition
and genealogical history" and his aunt's romantic nostalgia
for family glory (3:23,4:27). Vaguely remembered family
"legends" excite "fancies" that call for clandestine re-
enactment in an "ideal world" (4:29,30). We are told in this
chapter that Waverley reads French memoirs that can be taken for romances and romances that can be taken for memoirs. Such texts both literally foster and metaphorically underline Waverley's more profound generic confusion of memory and imagination. With imagination predominant and memory giving to it an ostensible seal of reality, the hero stands in need of the realist "demystification of illusions." But, the narrator quickly warns, Waverley is no Don Quixote; rather, he is subject to "that more common aberration from sound judgement which apprehends occurrences indeed in their reality, but communicates to them a tincture of its own romantic tone and colouring" (5:32).

Waverley emerges from his upbringing and education without having learned the use and significance of time. On the one hand, his experiential, real time is falsified by his unaccountability: because he never has to account to any authority for his time, it is not subject to the "imperatives of the real" and it is therefore not itself real. On the other hand, the time that is for him subject to narration is the time spent in the "ideal world," time which the imagination narrates in terms of romance. His time never achieves the consequentiality that results from struggling to reconcile the conflicting claims of imaginative desire and a given reality because reality is never imperative to him and there is therefore no conflict. Desire, without any real imperatives to define it, dictates a false, inconsequential
narrative. And, separated like this, both kinds of time are unreal. Waverley ventures into the world, then, without ever having been faced with that "problem" that Hayden White identifies as commensurate with a wish "to give to real events the form of story." And he is further handicapped in learning to narrate real time by the resemblance of the "real world" into which he ventures to the "ideal world" of his imagination. In one world, as in the other, real events seem to take the form of story on their own, producing a false congruence of real time and narrative time that further militates against their being properly related.

The dangers of Waverley's irresponsible education become manifest when he sets out from home, in that the geographical and epistemological journey he then begins follows the pattern established by his course of reading. Quickly becoming disenchanted with a military role that requires him to "judge of distance or space" (7:57) in the real world instead of sponsoring his fancied heroism in that ideal world of his imagination, Waverley moves on to the more promising terrain of more isolated parts of Scotland. Taking one generational step back, he first visits a friend of his uncle's youth. Here he moves, as he did at home, from his uncle's memories into the land of legends. In Rose Bradwardine, Waverley is astonished to find himself talking with someone whose experience in real time corresponds to his experience in the purely narrative time of "day-dreams" and "ancient times."
Instead of appreciating Rose's experiences in terms of real
time, however, Waverley can see them only in terms of the
narrative time they tell to him. He responds like a reader of
romance with "the impulse of curiosity, and that slight sense
of danger which only serves to heighten its interest"
(15:136). Because "it seemed like a dream to Waverley"
(15:137) that the violence of the Highland clans should occupy
real rather than narrative time, he becomes involved like one
in a dream, and only gradually awakens to the sobering truth
that mistaking real time for narrative time can be a matter of
life and death.

Like one in a dream, Waverley is drawn deeper and deeper
into an unknown world as he moves farther and farther into the
Highlands. Journeys within journeys enact his deepening
entanglement in circumstances and events beyond his control.
All his comings and goings serve merely to reinforce his
helpless immobility, and all the activity merely to ratify his
neutrality of spirit into a confirmed passivity. This
passivity that has the air of activity is dramatized
forcefully when his injury places him in very much a dream-
like state: wounded, blind, and unconscious, he is carried
about in an unknown place by unknown beings, who could be
enemies disguised as friends or friends disguised as enemies.
This incident could serve as a metaphor for the paradox that
defines Waverley's situation: any action he takes is negated
or inverted by his ignorance of or removal from its context.
Because he is torn between conflicting loyalties and has no real understanding of the issues on either side, the paradox of his situation undercuts his every action: he is arrested as a traitor when he is on his way back to his post, and he is rescued by those from whom he is trying to escape. All his actions are ineffectual because they are always untimely and ill-informed. He is victimized by time both as the monolithic force of official history, in whose hands he is a pawn, and as the random medium of mundane social life, as when he suffers because of delayed and waylaid letters and newspapers. His ignorance and absence then allow for interpretations that condemn as treachery what really is simply bad timing.

But it is only when the time and space that separate an action and its context (or consequences) are used to produce a false interpretation that Waverley begins to appreciate the difference between real time and narrative time. And only then, when he finds himself falsely written into the narratives of others—characterized as a traitor and a parricide in letters and newspaper articles, for example—does he begin to feel impelled to narrate his own time. But to become the narrator of one's own story at this late date—and, more important, in the middle of an ongoing story—proves impossible. There is no such thing as a simple personal narrative, Waverley learns, as even his own narratives betray him. Written as they are from a false position, his letters renouncing his commission, sent under Fergus MacIvor's
auspices and delivered by his messenger, are an impetuous expression of a sense of personal outrage, and they serve merely to ratify a false position. Even more incriminating, his stolen seal is being used to authorize the false narratives of others. Then he is arrested on his way to correct false reports, and his story becomes the subject of the two conflicting interpretations of the stern Major 10 Melville and the more sympathetic Mr. Morton. He is complicit in this ambiguity since he still sees himself as a hero in a romantic narrative, a self-betrayal that is ironically represented in his being incriminated by Flora's poem about the romantic hero Wogan, which he sentimentally carries with him. All these narratives underline Waverley's naive inability to interpret his experience, as he is overcome under Melville's scrutiny by seeing "circumstances of truth" become the context for "gross falsehoods" and himself "become involuntarily the confidant, at least, if not the accomplice" of plans which he would never voluntarily support (31:20.27:253).

Significantly, Waverley cannot recognize and begin to rectify the falseness of his position until he materially inhabits it and finds himself literally clothed in a garb that is not his own. Once more carried passively back into the Highland ranks and then "personally solicited for assistance" by a prince who "answered his ideas of a hero of romance," Waverley is virtually compelled by circumstances (and
certainly by Scott) to enact the role he must ultimately reject (40:85). Once again, real time and narrative time seem to converge as real events take the form of story. Face to face with a prince and caught up in the emotion of the moment, Waverley is again without the perspective required to narrate real time. As real time and narrative time are compressed together in this single climactic moment, experience and story become as one for him. "The time," says the narrator, "admitted of no deliberation" (40:86). There is no time for choice when there is no differentiation between time-as-experienced (real time) and time-as-told (narrative time).

In this moment when Waverley meets the Prince and commits himself to his cause, the public time of history and the private time of Waverley's personal life also converge. A real historical prince becomes a figure in his personal life, and for the first time, Waverley begins dimly to sense the historical reality in which he is involved. Although this moment disallows reflection, it is only once he has used this moment to take a side in the conflict (and thus make his real time count) that he gains a foothold that allows him the perspective necessary to have a choice. In choosing a side, Waverley gains the point of view that he needs in order to narrate his time. Significantly, it is only when he is "on side" that he begins to gain some understanding of his experience. This process starts in the very next chapter, "The Mystery Begins to be Cleared Up", when Fergus explains
Waverley's time with Donald Bean Lean. With this narrative, Waverley begins to gain the understanding necessary for him to begin to narrate his own time.

Even as Scott carefully dramatizes the conspiracy of time and circumstances that undermines Waverley's ability to make a significant choice, he dramatizes just as carefully the contrary reality that Waverley does make a choice—and a choice of momentous consequences. Only when he makes this choice—to the point of being fully clothed in it—does the physical impression of its incongruity provoke a change. The two battles of the campaign mark the two crises that propel Waverley out of what has become his untenable position as a follower of the rebel cause and back to the world from which he came, but with a new sense of its historical context and of his own place in history. The working of both voluntary and involuntary memory is crucial here, as Scott dramatizes what he will later analyze more explicitly in Chronicles of the Canongate. On the eve of the battle of Preston, Waverley's memory of his home is spark plug by an encounter with a man from his troop who addresses him with the "common phrase" by which Waverley had been known at home (45:132). Like Chrystal Croftangry, Waverley finds that the contrast between an alien setting and a familiar impression (initially auditory for Waverley and later visual, like Croftangry's) stirs his involuntary memory, susceptible as it is to sensuous promptings. The sound of Houghton's voice "now thrilled to
his heart with the thousand recollections which the well-known
accents of his native country had already contributed to
awaken." The remembered sound, together with the explanation
the dying man brings, "forced many unavailing and painful
12 reflections upon Waverley's mind" (45:132,134). Shortly
thereafter, Waverley's memory prompts another revelation. As
the English troops approach for battle,

Waverley could plainly recognize the standard of the
troop he had formerly commanded, and hear the trumpets'
and kettledrums sound the signal of advance, which he had
so often obeyed. He could hear, too, the well-known
words given in the English dialect, by the equally well-
distinguished voice of the commanding officer, for whom
he had once felt so much respect. It was at that
instant, that, looking around him, he saw the wild dress
and appearance of his Highland associates, heard their
whispers in an uncouth and unknown language, looked upon
his own dress, so unlike that which he had worn from his
infancy, and wished to awake from what seemed at the
moment a dream, strange, horrible, and unnatural
(46:139-40).

Memory draws much of its power, in both these incidents, from
the sensuous impressions which concretize the past in the same
way that Waverley's Highland dress concretizes his present
incongruous position. Drawn by the familiar sights and sounds
(which he has set himself against) and repelled by the unfamiliar sights and sounds (which now command his allegiance) Waverley is overcome by a sense of discontinuity with his very self, as memory delineates a jarring contrast between past and present. In both these incidents, memory registers the falsity of Waverley's position by allowing him to step back from his immediate experience in order to view it from a different perspective. In other words, with memory comes a separation between the percipient and the event which allows for the possibility of seeing in two ways and therefore for the possibility of choice. In a kind of epiphany during the battle, memory illuminates for Waverley his own nature and the absolutely alien nature of the world he has joined, a world so different as to be "unnatural" to him. What has been until now involuntarily summoned to consciousness, prompted primarily by an emotional response to sensuous impressions, now becomes the material for the working of the voluntary memory, which demands a rational, moral, and volitional response. The opportunity for choice is posited but still not offered to Waverley in the climax of this incident when one of his associates takes aim at Colonel Gardiner, and "ere [Waverley] could say 'Hold!'" another choice is made for him (46:140). Here, prompted by memory's forcing the incongruity of his position upon him, Waverley is able to imagine himself an "unnatural" parricide and, in revulsion from that image, to make a gesture towards a fully conscious voluntary response.
He is still allowed only to see the choice he would make, however, rather than to choose. Nevertheless, combined with Colonel Talbot's report of the negative effects of his actions on his family, these incidents at Preston begin to provide Waverley with a context and a perspective which radically alter the narrative of his experiences that he had composed.

The culmination of this change comes with the skirmish at Clifton when the Highland army is in retreat, and Waverley makes his own retreat from the stage of history. Circumstances again act for him. Darkness and "obscurity," suggestive of the ignorance and helplessness that characterize his position, cause him to lose his place with the Highland troop (59:245). Lost in this way, he begins to find another self, and this process is underlined when he is mistaken for another Edward: "Edward, is't thou man?" (60:250). He is indeed in the process of becoming another Edward, one who will take up the narrative of his own time instead of merely acting out the parts assigned to him in the narratives of others. When "a tremendous fall of snow" forces him to remain for "more than ten days" in the "lonely and secluded situation" in which he now finds himself, the conspiracy of time and circumstance to render him inactive and reflective is complete. Thus withdrawn from active experience Waverley reads of public events in the narrated form of newspaper reports brought by "the rarely occurring post" (60:254,55). This time the separation in time and space from the events of
which he reads provides a safe and necessary distance that affords a perspective for understanding.

Waverley makes use of the "more than ten days" he is given here for the "deliberation" that time had not "admitted" before. He reflects not only upon the public events as he hears and reads of them but also upon his own personal history as it has intersected with public history. What takes more than ten days of Waverley's real time occupies very little of the novel's narrative time because of the minimum of action and event with which Waverley is filling it. Instead he fills it with reflection: a mental repetition of the preceding action of the novel. Waverley is reviewing his experience from the perspective of his new understanding in order to realize it in a way that he had not done at the time of experiencing. In other words, he is exercising his memory in order to transform his experience in real time, which has been narrated only in the terms of others or in terms of romance, into his own narrative time. He is engaged in the struggle identified by White as that between his "desire for the imaginary, the possible" and "the imperatives of the real, the actual" which will produce a narrative of his real time. As Waverley activates his memory to narrate his experience, he learns what his programme of random and passive reading could not teach him, and he acquires "a more complete mastery of spirit tamed by adversity than his former experience had given him" (60:256). Experience itself—real time—is not enough to
shape a spirit: only in the process by which one narrates real
time, negotiating what White calls "the conflicting claims of
the imaginary and the real" until they are "mediated,
arbitrated or resolved in a discourse" does one account for
one's time and oneself. At this point, Waverley negotiates
these opposing claims by resolving to denounce the claims of
the imaginary and to embrace those of the real: "he felt
himself entitled to say firmly, though perhaps with a sigh,
that the romance of his life was ended, and that its real
history had now commenced" (60:256). But the sigh is telling,
of course, and Waverley never has to forsake his ideal world
completely. Instead, by learning to re-order the relation
between memory and imagination so that imagination serves
memory, he achieves a reconciliation of the imaginary and the
real that is more salutary than either romance or real
history.

These ten days, as Jane Millgate has pointed out, are a
crucial turning point for Waverley in a number of ways (Walter
Scott 53-4). When he activates his voluntary memory to review
his experience, he for the first time realizes (in an active
sense) the real time that makes up history, the real lives
that are lost. This recognition is driven home indelibly by
the death of Houghton, a death for which Waverley feels sorely
accountable, his ignorance and naivete notwithstanding. At
this time he also learns to use his memory to narrate his
experience: to contain, order, and tell it in a way that is
palatable and can be incorporated as narrative time into the real present and future. In a sense, Waverley is also here refusing to accept the received narrative of official history, which does not take real time into account, and instead taking up the responsibility of negotiating the opposing claims of public and private life, as well as those of real time and narrative, to produce a consequential discourse. Because it works narratively, mediating experience through a kind of discourse, voluntary memory by necessity changes experiences, translating action and event into word with the help of imagination. Although Waverley learns that imagination cannot be the "predominant faculty" of his mind, then, he learns that it is a necessary and salutary adjunct of his memory.

Imaginative capacity, in fact, distinguishes the members of the community of survivors at the end of the novel. Fergus and Flora lack this imaginative capacity, and they are excluded from this community—from life and from the future—because of their insistence on a kind of literal remembering which would replicate the lost past. They are unable to separate values and beliefs from a particular mode of representation (the Stuart claim), and they lose their lives (in one way or another) rather than accept an alternative embodiment of the ideals by which they define themselves. The Baron, by contrast, is the consummate survivor because he can separate ideals from particular embodiments. This means that he can have friends among the enemy—a pragmatic warrant for
survival—but, more important, that he can accept symbols as 
substitutes for the realities that cannot subsist in the 
present in any but symbolic form. As absurd and extreme as 
these symbols may be—like the ceremony of drawing off the 
prince's boot—they are not as absurd and extreme as the 
tragic stance that eschews symbols and clings instead to 
impossible literal embodiments.

Waverley, too, survives because he accepts substitutes—a 
barren aunt and uncle as surrogate parents, a domestic Rose 
for the archetypal Flora, and, of course, a "substitute" King. 
For him, accepting substitutes is also a matter of accepting 
words as a substitute for deeds—a substitution that for Scott 
typifies the modern world and will be requisite for all his 
survivor heroes. The execution of Fergus, who has been a kind 
of romantic alter ego for Waverley, represents the death of 
the possibility of heroic action. The text stresses that 
Waverley's alternative is words when it focuses on his 
transforming the event of Fergus's death into narrative in 
letters to Rose. Waverley's technique here signifies the way 
in which he will survive by framing his memories in 
imaginative terms. The "impression of horror" which he 
receives from Fergus's death is "softened by degrees into 
melancholy—a gradation which was accelerated by the painful, 
yet soothing task of writing to Rose." Disregarding his own 
feelings, he changes the impression of the event for her, 
endeavouring "to place it in a light which might grieve her
without shocking her imagination." His tendency to romanticize has been overcome by his sense of the shocking reality, and that sense, in turn, has been subordinated to his concern for Rose. The concern for Rose, in its turn, then motivates a different exercise of his imagination from the kind in which he had indulged at the beginning of his adventures. This process of narration is salutary for them both, as if the very act of narrating the impression is an experience that creates another impression with an effect of its own. The result of Waverley's narrative efforts is that the "picture he drew for her benefit he gradually familiarised to his own mind," and he is able to turn his mind cheerfully to the future. When Waverley returns home, "the imagination of the baronet and his sister" comes into play to enable them to rank their nephew—despite a notably chequered career—with "the vaunted heroes of their line" (70:345). Imagination also prevails when a returning soldier tries in vain "to expound the real circumstances" of Houghton's death to people who refuse to believe that he "fell otherwise than fighting by the young squire's side." The young squire's household will not accept a rendition of experience that would have "tarnished" his image (70:345,348).

But although survival in Waverley necessitates imaginative adaptations of the past, memory persists, resisting a complete remodelling of the past. Amid the solace of "Dulce Domum," Waverley retains the memory of a grim
experience. Once again, memory is stirred and sharpened by contrast, this time between current opulence and domestic peace, depicted in the "verdant, populous, and highly cultivated country," and the "scenes of waste desolation, or of solitary and melancholy grandeur" that have been the places of romance and strife (70:344). Here the familiar scene of home is enhanced by the contrast, and Waverley's appreciation of it focusses the change that has occurred in him since leaving home.

Scott draws attention to the persistence of memory and the inadequacy of imagination by heightening the sense of temporality in the last stages of the novel when Waverley is entering upon a new life. This sense of time is largely translated into spatial movement; just as Waverley has journeyed into the public world of romance and history, so he has to travel back into the private world of mundane domestic life. These return journeys, however, are noteworthy for their uneventfulness and their pedestrian but salutary motivations. During the journey from Carlisle (scene of Fergus's execution) to Waverley Honour, for example, Waverley adjusts to his friend's death. The gradual adjustment and the time it takes are measured in geographical terms (terms which, since he is journeying from a hero's death homeward, are also metaphorical): "Yet though his first horrible sensations had sunk into melancholy (with his letters to Rose). Edward had reached his native country before he could, as usual on former
occasions, look round for enjoyment upon the face of nature" (70:344). This is but one stage of Waverley's return from the land of dreams, a return which involves a long and complicated series of journeys—to London, to Tully Veolan, to Carlisle, to Waverley Honour, back to London, back to Tully Veolan. All these journeys do lead to the conventionally comic conclusion of hero and heroine's marriage, an event to which Sir Everard and Mrs. Rachel "looked forward as if to the renewal of their own youth" (70:346). But Scott makes clear by the very time it takes to achieve this end that Waverley is learning to value real time. For all his "urgency," real time—represented in the real space Waverley must traverse—cannot be hastened or curtailed. Waverley also learns, however, to narrate this time with the help of memory and imagination in a way that allows him to move forward into the future, a future that is chastened and enhanced by the sense of the past that he carries with him.

III

The reader of Waverley sets out on his or her own novelistic journey knowing history in terms of narrative and public time. Scott employs various tactics in order to break down the reader's sense of narrative time so that he or she might know the past in terms of its existence as real time. In the closing paragraph of the introductory chapters, just
before Waverley is about to set out on his journey from home. Scott invokes the conventional metaphor of reading as a journey. This geographical image makes the reader's situation comparable to Waverley's, of course, but it also converts the temporality of reading into spatial terms. While engaging "to get as soon as possible into a more picturesque and romantic country," the narrator warns readers that they will make the journey, not in "a flying chariot," but in "a humble English post-chaise." The latter vehicle, he notes, is subject to all the "terrestrial retardations" that will later delay Waverley's "romantic" journey (5:42-43). "My plan," the narrator says, "requires that I should explain the motives on which the action proceeded: and these motives necessarily arose from the feelings, prejudices, and parties of the times" (5:42). In conventional realist fashion, Scott refuses to narrate the time of the novel in romantic terms that do not take the real time of character and reader into account. Even as the reader's romantic desires must defer to the exigencies of terrestrial grounding, the character's actions and motives will be seen to be functions of his social and historical context. Scott is here making a double epistemological and generic claim. On the one hand, he is claiming fidelity to historical reality; on the other, fidelity to a truth achieved by what he calls in a late chapter the "narrative" of "events," as opposed to the "duller medium of direct description" of characters in abstract and static terms.
(70:347). It is by such a concrete, dynamic, and circumstantial narrative that Scott tries to take real time into account.

For the reader, of course, the actions and events of the novel and of history are purely narrative and do not constitute his or her real time. But while Waverley learns to use his memory and imagination to compose a consequential narrative of his time, the reader, who has begun the novel with a sense of history as purely narrative time, gains from its unfolding a sense of the real time of the past. Primarily by their sharing Waverley's narrative journey, the readers' sense of narrative time becomes reconstituted, incorporating a sense of the private real time of individuals. Scott's aim, we recall, was that he and his contemporaries "fix our eye on the now distant point from which we have been drifted."

Another way of putting this is to say that he asks his readers to experience history as real time. Scott's main tactic in this strategy involves our being introduced to Waverley in a way that encourages us to associate with him. The "earlier events" of the novel are "studiously dwelt upon" (70:347) so that "we fix our eye" on him and then begin with him to see his world. But although readers are informed of "the feelings, prejudices, and parties of the times" (5:42) as these impinge upon the Waverley family, they also accompany Edward in an upbringing and education which seem designed to decontextualize him in "real time" and allow him to fabricate
for himself a purely narrative context in the "ideal world" of romance. Even as Scott is busy at the seemingly conflicting but actually dialectical tasks of historicizing and dehistoricizing Waverley's context, he is at work on the congruent task of historicizing and dehistoricizing his readers. Partly in order to make credible Waverley's ahistorical perspective (especially incredible for a period like 1745 and for his contemporary readers), Scott begins in the very title of the novel to simulate for the reader a sense of this dehistoricized context. Wishing to activate readers' "preconceived associations" as little as possible (1:1), Scott self-consciously entitles the novel with as neutral a name as possible and proceeds to catalogue the literary genres to which it does not conform. His sub-title acts in a parallel way to neutralize readers' expectations for a work of 19 history. Unlike the charged "1745," which would provoke an automatic and even perhaps violent response in most of his readers. "'Tis Sixty Years Since" disarms them by assuming a connection between them and a past time that is at once accessible and remote, datable and indefinable. "'Tis Sixty Years Since" renders the narrative time of official history in terms of the real time of personal memory. The crucial "since" both establishes the pastness of the past and places it in what Lukacs calls a "felt relationship to the present" (53). It also implies that the writer and his readers are products of this time and able to perceive it only in a way
that is inevitably backward and contingent.

This mutual position of writer and reader becomes all the more ambiguous when it is seen to be contingent upon the "fixing" of a date that is itself entirely contingent. When Scott resumed the writing of Waverley after a hiatus of some nine years, he chose to retain the present of his initial writing, declaring to his readers of 1814 that he is writing from "this present 1st November, 1805" (1:3). This undoubtedly preserves the poetry that would have been spoiled by a prosaic "'Tis Sixty-Nine Years Since" and bespeaks an equally poetic reluctance to tamper with what is written. But this redefinition of the readers' present may also suggest a bid (however playful) to disorient readers in an effort to prevent their automatic "fixing" on unwanted historical associations that would mitigate the novelty of first impressions. Of course, the consequent disorientation is only temporary, as even the most naive of readers, then and now, is led to the realization of that historical date, 1745. At the same time, in maintaining the discrepancy between the writing present and the reading present, Scott is writing into his narrative the evanescence of the "now" that will inevitably be written into it by time. Scott's historical subject certainly is a particular, identifiable one for which "the '45" can serve as a kind of metonymy, but the blatant varying of the ostensibly fixed time of the story brings into focus the more abstract underlying subject of the relative or
proportionate distance between the readers/writer of the tale and its "actors." "Sixty Years Since," in its highly fictionalized truth, becomes a metaphor for the ideal time for memory's knowing of the past, the time during which memory is converting real time into narrative time, experience into history.

This tactic of withholding the crucial date of the action and playing with the date of the writing and reading present has the effect of demythologizing history and drawing the reader into an unusually intimate relationship with the past. That relationship is in large part a function of Scott's attempt to break down the reader's conventional categories of order, of his deliberate disorientation of his readers as well as of his hero. Like Waverley, readers are deprived of the crucial names, dates, places, and circumstances that would provide the historical context and significance of events. Without the privileged understanding that comes with historical perspective, the reader has only Waverley's experience to go on. As Waverley is being carried about by unidentified persons or lying disabled without being permitted a look at his captors, the reader, also blind and in the hands of an unknown narrative, shares his experience. Bereft of their sense of history and perspective and usual categories of time and place, friend and enemy, the readers of Waverley come to know the past in a new way. Along with its hero, readers learn only retrospectively through the activity of memory.
where they have been and what they have been involved in.

Scott further breaks down the reader's sense of history (experience known as narrative time--1745) into real time (experience that comes within the range of memory--sixty years since) by disrupting the conventional categories of time. Throughout the novel he strives to open up the closed book of history—to challenge the reader's perception of history as finished and irrecoverable, like time already narrated—by recovering the sense of the potentiality of time as it is experienced. He enriches the reader's understanding of historical time in both the national and personal sense by re-investing time with a sense of latent possibility that makes any event or action at once decisive, in that it determines what follows it, and arbitrary, in that it is one of a multitude of might-have-beens. The narrator makes clear, for example, that it is because of a fatal timing that Fergus MacIvor exemplifies a tragic heroism that establishes his status as a historical figure: "Had Fergus MacIvor lived sixty years sooner than he did," he would have lacked the sophistication that makes him such an unusual chieftain: "had he lived sixty years later," his world would not have afforded the circumstances for his remarkable powers of leadership (19:175). Only at that particular moment do time and circumstances intersect to produce his fatal character, just as they have intersected to make Waverley what he is.

Throughout the novel, readers are reminded that history
is only a temporal configuration: only the unaccountable play of time and circumstance makes history out of moments. One such moment occurs at the beginning of the novel when Sir Everard comes close to changing his will and signing over his heritage to the family’s traditional enemies. "Had Lawyer Clippurser... arrived but an hour earlier," the narrator says. Sir Everard would have done the deed, spurred on by the impulse of the moment. But "an hour of cool reflection" allows him to go beyond the immediate situation, to employ the larger perspective of memory and of future prospect. Even so, his decision is finally determined non-rationally and by misinterpretation when he reads reproach in the lawyer’s innocent action of producing materials for writing and then himself looks up to see the sun lighting up the family crest. His legacy remains in the family and eventually, through a combination of other such circumstantial moments, falls to Waverley. "All this was the effect of the glimpse of a sunbeam," the narrator wryly comments. "Just sufficient to light Lawyer Clippurse to mend his pen" (2:11-12). Thus in a moment of what is later called "real time," so slight as to hold the mending of a pen, history is made. In the novel, Waverley and the reader come to see history as always consisting of "real time" and "real time" as always consisting of potential history. It is only with the narrative prospect afforded by memory that one can understand the conjunction of real time and narrative time.
The point is made especially clear in Scott's next novel, *Guy Mannering*, where the young hero, Harry Bertram, returns home after an absence of seventeen years. The novel dramatizes his return as a recovery of lost time, a filling in of what he experiences as a "blank" (50:249) and the narrator describes as a "gap" and a "space" (11:99). Easily covered in narrative time, these seventeen years remain abstract: because they have not been concretized in real time, the seventeen years (lived under false pretences) in real terms have not happened. The attempt of the simple Dominie, whose understanding is concrete, to "resume" the past ("to take up Harry pretty nearly where he had left him" [51:259]) focusses the irrecoverable loss of this time. But the narrator shows how narrating the time can recover, though never replace, that time. As in *Waverley*, space fills in time. Scott's epigraph for Chapter Eleven of *Guy Mannering* is a quotation from *A Winter's Tale* in which Time expresses his role in terms of space: "I slide/ O'er sixteen years, and leave the growth untried/ Of that wide gap." The narrator immediately echoes the epigraph and, in the echo, suggests again that the completed literary text mediates between space and time: "Our narration is now about to make a large stride, and omit a space of nearly seventeen years" (11:99). This position assumes both the privileges of "narrative time," striding over "real time," and the liabilities entailed in omitting growth and change. But the narrator suggests that the "gap" can be
filled (that is, that narrative time can be realized) if the reader draws from his own experience. As in Waverley, a comparison between the character's "real time" and the reader's reading time discloses the potential for narrative in real time and the substance of real time in narrative. "The gap is a wide one:" the narrator says. "yet, if the reader's experience in life enables him to look back on so many years, the space will scarce appear longer in his recollection than the time consumed in turning these pages" (11:99). Real time is at once both substantial and ephemeral enough that it can be "consumed." if only by reading; narrative time, on the other hand, is so insubstantial and abstract that, isolated from real time, it can itself be only a gap. Memory brings real time and narrative time together by negotiating their mutual claims. While involuntary memory stores the sensuous data of real-time experience, voluntary memory narrates this material, collecting and completing it (as Chrystal Croftangry finds) so that it is both preserved and benevolently changed. When memory brings the two kinds of time together, narrative time converts real time into something abstract enough to be called "space." In the conjunction of real time and narrative time a space is made which memory fills by its "recollection." Memory converts time into something comparable to reading time in which a whole world unfolds during the course of a few hours and, conversely, a few hours expand to encompass a world of experience.
CHAPTER TWO

Language, Consciousness, and Memory:
The Bride of Lammermoor and Rob Roy

Waverley's written narration for Rose of the execution of Fergus "softened," as we saw, the "impression of horror" left on his own mind by the experience (70:344). This moment in Waverley is emblematic of Scott's general sense that the imagination must soften the impressions that memory gains so as to allow one to incorporate the past into the present and move forward into the future. What is, strictly speaking, a falsifying of the past is for Scott requisite for the growth of individuals and societies. And if it is practised for the good of the other (as with Waverley for Rose), it is a merely literal lie for the sake of a larger truth. But Scott never ceases to contemplate the cost of moving forward and the equally problematic cost of refusing to do so. What sets his novels apart, as Harry Shaw has appreciated, is the "intensity with which they imagine both the losses and the gains that result from progress" (Forms 152).

That sense of progress as both loss and gain is characteristic of the sociology and historiography of the
Scottish Enlightenment whose model of social evolution through a regular series of distinct stages was absorbed by Scott and \(^1\) underlies his fiction. As fiction, the Waverley Novels are \(^2\) as much concerned with individual as with social stages. and for Scott there is a clear analogy between them: even as societies move from "primitive" to "enlightened," so individuals move from a "primitive," intuitive consciousness towards an "enlightened," rationalist one. Fascinated on both the individual and social levels with transition and contrast, the Waverley Novels typically concentrate on moments of stress in the shift from a traditional to a modern view of the world. The individual memory is an obvious locus for exploring the dialectic of these two views of the world, one oriented towards the past and the other towards the future. And, for Scott, to contemplate the implications of resisting the movement towards the future is to contemplate those individuals for whom memory is essentially problematic because, in their dealings with social and personal history, their memories cannot or will not easily make the political pact with imagination that effected Waverley's survival.

To the primitive mind, retaining a literal memory of the past is the only way to remain faithful to it, and remaining faithful to the past is its primary motivation. The primitive mind is characterized by a tendency to see everything—every act, every word, every object—as a concrete manifestation of a transcendent and permanent reality. And because to such a
mind everything that ever was still is. memory is its predominant faculty. a primitive culture is a violent culture because memory serves as a register for wrongs that must be requited if the past is to be honoured. the legacy passed from parent to child is a programme for perpetual violence, outlined according to the rigorous literalism of a memory that takes the past as a blueprint for the future. what begins as wilful violence becomes self-perpetuating and, as it were, natural because each act brings with it the expectation of the reaction of vengeance, so that eventually the chain cannot be broken by will. each succeeding generation bred up in violence has less choice in the matter of its continuance. reason can no more prevail against it than can will: it becomes impossible to distinguish between causes and effects since every effect quickly becomes a cause. individuals and societies caught up in such a pattern ultimately reach a point where no choice for change can overrule prior choices for violence. the memory of violence overrides any present will for peace. in natural terms, the momentum of cumulative violence has established one in a direction that cannot easily be changed by latter-day second thoughts; in supernatural terms, fate or providence is answering violent cause with just effect. although further removed from the original cause of the violence, children partake of its spirit and even increase its depth because for them the accumulated weight is all the greater. they are raised on memories and replicas of the
original cause that reinforce the habit of violence. Over time, memory and habit replace reason and will as motivating forces for action. By their nature, memory and habit are self-perpetuating, and every new violence provides further sustenance for them. In an exemplary instance in Scott, the legacy of violence is passed from one novel to another when the curse issued by a dying MacGregor in A Legend of Montrose is still wreaking its revenge generations later through Rob Roy's wife, Helen MacGregor. Refusing to forget, she lives on a memory that is nothing but a registry of "constantly accumulating masses of crime and sorrow" (Rob Roy 31:211). Completely in the grip of the past, with every action an impossible attempt to secure a perverse kind of justice by adding to the masses of injustice, she nurses her sons on this memory. "All may be forgotten," she believes, "all—but the sense of dishonour, and the desire of vengeance" (35:283).

Because of its belief in a permanent reality and its sense that everything is determined by what has gone before, the primitive mind sees the future as implicit in the past. A superstitious belief in the power of the past and the precedence of the community's traditions prevents any individual from acting freely in the present to change the predetermined pattern. For the primitive mind, time works according to the cyclic model by which present action merely repeats and confirms the pattern established in the past. According to the superstitious view of the world, everything
is primarily an emblematic remnant of some pre-existent reality. Fundamental to superstition are the same tendencies that fuel the pursuit of revenge—the tendency to confuse cause and effects and to give memory precedence over reason and will. Hobbie Elliot of The Black Dwarf nicely exemplifies the primitive view of the world when we first encounter him, walking alone one evening across an "extensive waste":

This dreary common was called Mucklestane Moor, from a huge column of unhewn granite, which raised its massy head on a knoll near the centre of the heath, perhaps to tell of the mighty dead who slept beneath, or to preserve the memory of some bloody skirmish. The real cause of its existence had, however, passed away; and tradition, which is as frequently an inventor of fiction as a preserver of truth, had supplied its place with a supplementary legend of her own, which now came full upon Hobbie's memory (2:199).

This stone has gone from being a monument of a past event (now forgotten but presumed to Have existed) to being itself the locus of other meanings. It has become evidence for invented fictions and the basis upon which superstitions are built, as upon an empirical, concrete foundation. In a peculiarly literal sense, the stone grounds the fancies it breeds, giving them a tangible substance. From being an effect of an unknown cause, it becomes a cause, a beginning for stories and a whole
mythology. Upon this rock is founded, for example, the myth of the "gradual degeneracy of mankind" (2:200). The stone has also gone from testifying to what has happened to foretelling what will happen, as the superstitious mind sees in it the cause for whatever "acts of mischief" the future might bring (2:199).

This process is paradigmatic of the way the primitive consciousness works as it finds objective evidence and cause for its subjective experience, thus lending to the subjective an objective reality. The primitive mind gives to imagined ideas the force of remembered impressions. When an object like the stone is taken as a sign, things imagined are taken to be things remembered. This confusion of memory and imagination becomes a virtual identification of the two (as it is for Hobbie) when the memory is the storehouse of the "fearful lore" of legends that engender and activate the process which turns imagined into remembered things. Like tradition, a memory such as this is "as frequently an inventor of fiction as a preserver of truth" (Black Dwarf 2:199). The relationship between memory and imagination, in fact, points to the subtle and essential difference between the primitive and the enlightened consciousness. For the primitive mind, the distinction itself is irrelevant or false because such a mind does not hold distinctions between present and past, the natural and the supernatural, and memory and imagination. The rationalist consciousness, on the other hand, functions in
terms of these distinctions: it subordinates the past to the present and the supernatural to the natural, and it orders the relationship between memory and imagination (as Waverley learns to do) so that the two faculties can together serve the interests of reason.

In the primitive consciousness, memory dominates the imagination largely by appropriating the chimerical figures of imagination and lending them empirical substance. Memory is the predominant faculty of the primitive mind because it is the retainer of the past that predetermines the future and provides the motive for perpetual vengeance. More essential still, it is the very touchstone of reality in that, like the stone of Mucklestone Moor, it lends empirical substance to subjective experience. Memory is vital in all three capacities because the primitive consciousness is referential in its orientation: what is real is empirically real. Sensuous impressions, rather than abstract ideas, constitute reality, and time does not diminish but rather establishes their reality. In keeping with this, the primitive consciousness breaks down the distinction between words and their referent: words partake of the reality of the thing they describe, signalling a referent that awaits only substantiation in the present. Rather than seeing the primary function of words as that of describing the world, the primitive mind, with its tendency to confuse cause and effect and to see the future in the past, sees words as effecting and
embodying the things they describe. Words are real and cannot be gainsaid. One of the hallmarks of the rationalist consciousness, by contrast, is its ability to use words not only to describe an independent reality but also to substitute for that reality.

The difference between the primitive and the rationalist view of the world emerges sharply in a different attitude to words. A different approach to apprehending and expressing meaning. Symbols and words are important to both mentalities, but in entirely different ways. For the primitive mind, the word or symbol can signify only as it partakes of the reality of the referent that it signifies. It derives significance from its once having been joined or combined with the thing that it now represents, but only insofar as it promises a future return of the original referent. (In this curious way it reflects the primitive view that the future is implicit in the past). For the rationalist mind, the word or symbol also derives its original significance from a past reality, but it then sustains its present significance as a substitute for the referent, which remains in the past and has no present reality other than symbolically. The function of symbols and words according to this view of the world is both to retain the past and to prevent it from intruding into the present. They serve, then, as indices of loss and survival.
II

Two Waverley heroes stand as especially pertinent examples of these generalizations: Edgar Ravenswood in *The Bride of Lammermoor* and Frank Osbaldistone in *Rob Roy*. Through their stories Scott probes the losses entailed in progress and the role played by personal memory in the development of individual consciousness. Enacting the same paradigmatic struggle between passion and reason in the form of a struggle to come to terms with his social and individual past, each hero suffers irrecoverable losses because it is necessary to dissociate himself from the past. The more primitive Ravenswood, unable to engage in the necessary dissociation, privileges his association with the past at the cost of his life. Frank Osbaldistone exemplifies the ascendancy of both the modern world and the enlightened consciousness. But this only highlights the sense of ambivalence that pervades his memoirs, which record his efforts to dissociate himself from the past while at the same time trying to write a "faithful transcript" of it (1:2). In both of these novels, memory speaks of a death that is not readily converted into any imaginative terms that would speak of life. The two heroes demonstrate—Ravenswood by his death and Osbaldistone by his ambiguous life—that a literal memory can mean death, but, at the same time, that a memory served by imagination can mean a betrayal of the past and a death of the
Ravenswood. Scott's exemplary tragic hero, is torn between the traditional and the modern world. At a conscious level, he tries to enter into the new world in which reason and will are the predominant faculties and time is valued as change, ever moving towards an open future. But he is drawn back to the old world of the primitive consciousness in which memory and habit are the predominant faculties and time is valued for the continuity it brings with the past, the locus of reality. Ravenswood's susceptibility to the primitive perception of the world debilitates him so that he is unable to change with the times and is finally changed by them in death.

Ravenswood declares his allegiance to the old world when, consigning his father's body to the "realms of forgetfulness" (2:29), he devotes himself to remembering what Helen MacGregor calls "the sense of dishonour, and the desire of vengeance." Having spoken his curse on the Ashtons, he is henceforth bound, according to the primitive view of the world, not only by his natural, inalienable, and primary loyalty to the past and the memory of his father but also by the word which has the substance of a fiat, awaiting only accomplishment. This word, earliest and thus most real, cannot be gainsaid by any later word. Moreover, this word comes in the context of another word of equal power in the primitive world—the legend that prophesies the defeat of any attempt to reconcile the
hostile houses of Ravenswood and Ashton. The novel dramatizes Ravenswood's attempt to override the fate predetermined in these primitive words. But even as he struggles to overcome his violent passion and the forces of superstition by exercising the "enlightened" faculties of reason and will, he is sabotaged by his own best intentions. When he goes so far in resisting the power of superstition as to entertain an attraction for the daughter of the hostile family, this romantic passion, exploited by her "wily" father (3:36), undermines his attempts at rational and right action. Indeed it is his very "strength of moral feeling and rectitude of purpose" in trying to resist the primitive instinct towards vengeance that empowers what proves to be his self-destructive movement towards Lucy Ashton. And a treacherous memory conspires to idealize the picture of her that "he summoned up in his imagination" (8:116), so that they pursue an attachment that is unreasonable and soon even undesirable to them both.

Of course this is a classic Scott instance of the dangerous power of the romantic imagination as we see it at work, for example, in Edward Waverley's response to Flora MacIvor and in Minna Troil's response to the pirate Cleveland. But only in the Gothic context of the primitive world does the tragedy fulfill its promise. As the mutinous conspiracy of Ravenswood's very faculties attests, one's perception can make one fatally susceptible to a tragic view of the world, a susceptibility which, in turn, generates the tragedy it
perceives.

Ravenswood is so rational that he "despised" the primitive view of the world and defies superstition, but he is so superstitious that he "naturally" responds with "superstitious feelings" to circumstances which seem to confirm the old legend about his house (23:35:30). Despise them as he may, Ravenswood is still susceptible to the "prejudices" of the primitive view of the world, which are grounded in the empirical orientation that is prone "to grace with a legendary tale a spot in itself interesting" and then to turn that spot into self-referential evidence for the truth which "tradition" has invented about it, creating an impression that overrides any rational idea (23:35:5:63). One manifestation of the primitive power of impressions occurs when Ravenswood, in the grip of his passion for Lucy, revisits his ancestral home, now the Ashton's domain. Here he is overcome by an instinctive response to the portraits of his ancestors, a physical impression whose power is enhanced by the painful juxtaposition between past and present that memory prompts. Reinforced as it is by a tangible emblem that gains rather than loses force with time, this experience engenders a power whose effect is only temporarily "cleared" by the present sensuous impression of Lucy Ashton (18:248). Eventually the older impressions that the portraits represent reassert their primacy in his imagination. Though reason gives way to passion, passion finally gives way to the more
powerful force of memory.

Ravenswood most strikingly demonstrates his susceptibility to the force of such impressions when he seals his troth with Lucy Ashton (and at the same time seals his endorsement of the Gothic import of the fatal scene) in an "emblematic ceremony... of which the vulgar still preserve some traces" (20:267). But the impression created by this ceremony is not strong enough to eradicate the older and deeper impression of the earlier oath. equally empirical to the primitive mind because of its sense of the substantive power of words. The most irresistible impression of all is described by Ravenswood himself as such when he sees near the fatal fountain a figure that seems to fulfill the doom foretold by tradition. Following "his immediate impression" that it is Lucy, he yields to "the strong and terrific impression that the being which he had seen was not of this world" (23:26,27). Feeling betrayed by his senses, he resolves, "I will not brook imposition even from my own eyes" (23:28). But for the primitive mind, the physical evidence of the senses is the final authority, and "the vision... had impressed his mind with a superstitious feeling which he in vain endeavoured to shake off" (23:35). It is a short step then to being implicated in effecting the tragic downfall of his lover as the legend has foretold it.

To be torn between two worlds is also, for Ravenswood, to be torn between two views of time. Although he tries to
believe in and act upon the new world's doctrine that time moves forward and brings change, his experience confirms the ancient notion that time merely brings back the past and memory unfolds the future. The new world is in transition from feudal to bourgeois society. It is dominated by time-servers, who, because in a changing world nothing is unchanging but the certainty of "the change of times and of property" (3:47), must themselves change just to retain their places. Ravenswood, by contrast, is the heir of an ancient family that is used to being served by time, in a world of fixed hierarchy where the inherited "privilege of nobility" (22:7) is not subject to time but rather established and enshrined by time. The ancient society works according to the same principle as the primitive imagination which inhabits it, ascribing greatest privilege and substance to those who have made the earliest impression upon the world and whose memory in the world is longest. Because he cannot really believe in change and because he must (unconsciously perhaps) resist the force that would demolish his privilege, Ravenswood cannot act effectively in the new world. He cannot act, as the new men do, either to earn his place (which in the old world he assumes by right) or to produce change (which he cannot want since it would mean the end of his world). Consequently, he can act only against himself, so that his action consists, curiously, in resistance to action.

Ravenswood is at a loss to effect what constitutes action
in the new world and find it satisfying. He is divided between the primitive view, which finds action in keeping with the ancient code meaningful for its own sake, and the modern view, which converts action into mere social procedures. Two vignettes best dramatize Ravenswood's dilemma. The hunt scene, archetypal setting for the traditional mode of action, highlights Ravenswood's inability to coordinate the two views of the world in terms of his inability to coordinate his actions and his thoughts. Instead of being able to enact his thoughts and think through his actions, he vacillates between "contemplative inactivity" and "a spirit of forcible and violent progression" suggestive of "an inherent passion in our nature" (9:129). The second of these dramatic incidents occurs when, having admitted his traditional enemy and his charming daughter as guests, he acts out his confusion and frustration by pacing the hall "with a disordered and rapid pace," violently opening and shutting the windows, like a caged animal with an instinctive aversion to poisonous air (14:200). Ravenswood's ability to act is constrained at once by the decorum of the old world, which dictates that a gentleman "could not but" act in certain ways, and by the naivete and pride that sometimes prevent him from engaging in the expediency of merely social and political gestures and sometimes prevent him from recognizing such posturing. When Ashton "kept fast hold of the Master's passive hand," he "made it impossible" for the latter "to return any other than an
acquiescent reply" (14:200). Ravenswood is doomed to passivity because his personal time, dominated by memory and oriented towards the past, is in opposition to the social and historical time according to which the new world operates. The primitive imagination can survive only by resisting the "change of times" and ensuring, by giving precedence to memory, that the chronological future is not an advance on the past but a re-enactment of it.

In the new world time moves forward, and the individual, by the exercise of reason and will, may advance with the times. Effective action in this world is the political action of which Ravenswood is incapable. A "wily statesman" like Ashton may gain a position by purchasing property through adept "machinations" and maintaining it by attending to what Ravenswood scorns as "miserable minutiae of the buttery, and the larder, and the very hen coop" (3:36:15:212:21:275). To Ravenswood, this world is unreal on two counts: it is founded on ideas and words, rather than impressions and actions, and it places final value on material things. Ravenswood is as unable to use the words of the new world as he is to act effectively there because its words are its exemplary form of action. Rather than deriving their reality from their reference to action, as they do for the primitive consciousness, words in the modern mind take the place of action. Quintessential citizen of the new world, Ashton is respected as "a veteran statesman" because "he could talk."
from his own knowledge, of men and events, in a way which failed not to win attention" nor to persuade the hearer without "a word which committed himself" (14:194.195). For Ravenswood, to whom every word is a commitment, this modern verbal currency, like the legal proceedings it purports to explain, is a "nondescript and entangled mixture" (16:216). Ashton can employ it "to stun and confuse Ravenswood's ideas" because the primitive mind cannot understand words that refer only to other words (16:215). Ravenswood's discomfort with words is nicely captured in a conversation with Alice, an old family retainer who warns against his entanglement with the Ashtons. In assuring her that he has no intention of involving himself with Lucy, Ravenswood stumbles: "I give you mine honour—I mean, I assure you" (19:255). His mistake betrays not only his real interest in Lucy but also his instinctive literal use of words and his effort to adopt the new metaphorical (and false) approach to them. An effort that is prompted by the very liaison he is trying to deny.

The modern verbal currency is further depreciated by its reference being ultimately to purely material things whose value is supposed by that world to be absolute. For the primitive and the feudal mentality, always referential and always validated by memory, property is valued insofar as it points back in time to the merit of "remote ancestors" who "were granted" their property "for services done with the sword" (16:216). That is, property is valued as the sign of
the worth of its possessor, proven by honourable disinterested action in the service of his lord, rather than for any material value of its own. Things are valuable because they bear the memory of the merit of their possessor. They are emblems of honours derived from past action, rather than self-referential emblems, as they are in the modern world, of a status derived from material property gained by the insubstantial actions represented by the manipulation of words.

Caleb, the exemplary feudal vassal, takes the primitive privileging of memory to absurd lengths. On the strength of "the credit o' the family" (in old world terms), he uses up the credit of the family in the material terms of the new world (8:113:25:71). When the property is gone, its memory (for which things are but signs) is sufficient for him. In the old world, though "things maun crack and wear out, and be consumed by time," Caleb says, "a'gude offcome" that is founded on memory can only be enhanced by time and "may serve a nobleman—and his family. Lord kens how lang!" (26:72). In the new world, shamelessly material in orientation, memories belong to the past, and things constitute reality. It is as impossible to survive on memory as it is to make "a description of a dinner" one once ate substitute for the thing itself. Such words can indeed, as Caleb says, make a "fu' man hungry," and they can also mock a hungry man with their inability to satisfy him (11:161). Ravenswood, caught between
the old world and the new, is mocked by his memory of the
things he once had, and by the contrast memory prompts between
the lost world of the past and the contemptible new world.
which he must enter if he is to survive. In order to live, he
must forsake memory and break the continuity with the past.

But such a break is death to the primitive mind, whose
world is constituted of the past and dominated by memory.
Scott represents the world of the primitive consciousness by
giving symbolic shape to Ravenswood's story, which is told in
the pictures that form the impressions that constitute
Ravenswood's view of the world. All around him he sees
symbols (like the bull, the portrait of his vengeful ancestor,
the fallen tree, the fire that destroys Ravenswood tower)
pointing to inevitable doom. And he does not know the words
that could transform the symbols into ideas that would refute
the pictured doom. This struggle between words and pictures
as alternate ways to conceive the world represents not only
the struggle between the old world and the new as it is
reflected in Ravenswood's embattled consciousness, but also
the generic opposition that defines the shape of the novel.
The opposition is personified in the dialogue between a
champion of pictures and a champion of words that frames the
story. The painter believes that the narrative will approach
most closely to the reality of the story by coming as closely
as possible to being a picture of it. From seeing a picture,
the artist says, one receives "that instant and vivid flash of
conviction... which gathers... not only the history of the past lives of the personages represented, and the nature of the business on which they are immediately engaged, but lifts even the veil of futurity, and affords a shrewd guess at their future fortunes." The sceptical writer argues that it is "absolutely necessary to be informed of the subject" and even then to be resigned to incomplete knowledge (1:18,17).

As a result of this dialogue, the writer agrees to tell the tale with as much reliance on description (the writer's picture words) and as little reliance on dialogue (words that refer to more words) as possible. His narrative is a combination of a landscape and a history piece. The background for Ravenswood's story is a narrative of historical and social realism that provides a context and attempts an explanation for the tragedy. In it the narrative moves forward in accordance with the time of the new world it describes. Superimposed on this is the symbolic landscape in which Ravenswood's tragedy unfolds, not moving forward with time so much as emerging as the pictures that have constituted this world from the beginning gradually disclose their implicit meaning. In this landscape, his personal time moves against the historical time of the narrative of social realism, going backward or standing still to await the end that was known from the beginning. According to the modern, rationalist consciousness reflected in the narrative of historical realism, time is the ultimate reality, and
characters moving with time determine the shape of their world. According to the traditional, primitive consciousness reflected in the symbolic landscape, place is the ultimate reality, and the shape of their world determines character. Ravenswood, caught between two worlds and these two ways of narrating his story, succumbs to the old way because he is unable to dissociate himself from the world that seems to be his very self. The continuity with the past that memory affirms becomes for him an identification of himself with the past. Unable to dissociate himself from the world of the past, he is ultimately displaced with that world by the rising tide of time.

Reality, for the primitive imagination, is concrete and subjective. Although Ravenswood perceives the world as a symbolic reflection of his inner landscape, he does not understand its elements as symbols; rather, they are concrete embodiments of himself. When he sees the falling tower, for example, he does not see an emblem of himself; he sees himself. The primitive consciousness collapses the symbol into the referent, and the symbol is valid only insofar as it discloses and finally gives way to the referent. Similarly, the primitive mind collapses the subjective and the objective, for although in one sense the objective world reflects the subjective world, the subjective world also reflects the objective world. The primitive consciousness, unable to dissociate the two and identify cause and effect, finds its
fate written in the world it sees. When Ravenswood sees the falling tower, the idea of his own ruin becomes an impression with all the force of empirical reality, and he is compelled to give substance to the symbol. The falling tower, like the stone of Mucklestone Moor, provides objective warrant for a subjective reality.

The primitive mind accepts symbols, then, but only as a temporary substitute for the referent which is always pending substantiation. Ravenswood cannot dissociate the past from the present or the symbol from its referent, and those who move forward into the new world must accomplish such a dissociation. Like the survivors at the end of Waverley, they must use symbols as a means to retain the past and maintain continuity with it and at the same time as a means to keep the past at bay and prevent its intrusion into the present. Waverley achieves a healthy balance between associating himself with and dissociating himself from the past when he moves from a complete association, which he recognizes is wrong, to the kind of combination of association and dissociation that memory and imagination can offer. He retains a memory of the past but, with the help of imagination, contains it in a formal shape (like the portrait of himself and Fergus) and composes it in a narrative order (like the letter to Rose) that traces the boundary between past and present and keeps him moving outside of himself and into the future. In contrast, Ravenswood's mentality is like
Hobie Elliot's as he contemplates the stone of Mucklestane Moor: beginning with a remnant of the past, his imagination controls his memory, creating a role for him in a tale of Gothic horror. Unlike Waverley, he becomes increasingly subjective and his memory compels him increasingly to associate and finally to identify himself with the past.

Lucy Ashton's madness and Ravenswood's death are chilling testimony to the terrible power of the mind. They die because of their superstitious belief in the primitive power of words, a belief grimly dramatized when Lucy so recoils at the idea of writing a cancellation of her vow that she picks up a dry pen. They cannot employ words as the interchangeable counters they represent to the modern, narrative consciousness; instead they sacramentalize words as substantial and permanent emblems that cannot be gainsaid. By contrast, Lady Ashton, whose "implacability" is the cause of their demise, is the consummate survivor, implacable to the meaning of things or words. She is commemorated in a "splendid marble monument," splendid in its solid, unnarratable testimony to her "name, titles, and virtues, while her victims remain undistinguished by tomb or epigraph" (35:163)—picture or word. But, in typical Scott fashion, the last word comes in the Introduction. Here Scott reviews the history of the many conflicting versions of the tragic story, noteworthy for being "inaccurate" and "inconsistent" in content (xxx.xxxi) and dubious in tone and quality. Acknowledging the inadequacy of
words, however, Scott himself is nonetheless bound to use them. And because words to the rationalist consciousness are not things, not made of stone, he can use them to add another different version. Even by acknowledging their corruptibility, his words disclose (though never explain) the story, confessing the mystery to be finally inexplicable. Rather than preserving a lie, as does Lady Ashton's marble monument, his words preserve the truth by including in themselves the changeability that allows words and people to stay alive. In preserving the story, Scott does for Ravenswood what he could not do for himself, unable as he was to accept the process of change and hence life itself.

III

Ravenswood's tragedy exemplifies the force of the primitive spirit, which operates prior to and under the surface of the conscious operations of reason and will at the level of memory and habit. In the primitive mind, all other faculties serve the memory, and the power of Ravenswood's memory is made virtually insuperable when it is endorsed by his imagination. By contrast, the rationalist consciousness is defined by its subjection of the memory to other faculties, primarily those of reason and will. The more salient opposition to its rational tendency comes, not from memory, but from imagination, the faculty that is ruled by desire and
unconstrained by reality, past, or present. The power of imagination can be modified and grounded by the memory (as it is for Waverley), but the memory can also complicate and intensify imagination's power. In Frank Osbaldistone, son of the Enlightenment, memory and imagination become embroiled in a complex and intense power struggle that ends in an equally complex and uneasy alliance which leaves him no peace, even in the writing of his memoirs.

The society of the Enlightenment, as depicted in Rob Roy, is emerging out of a struggle with its feudal ancestor. It must disavow primitive impulses of violence in favour of the reasoned courses of law and commerce. The enlightened society replaces the relatively simple transaction between impulse and action that characterizes the primitive society with the complex transaction that involves mediation between impulse and action. Such mediation is effected in modern society in two primary ways: in the form of law, which uses words as its counters, and in the form of commerce, which uses numbers. As a young man Frank struggles with his father over his choice of counter, as it were, in the sense that he prefers the words of a poetic course to the numbers of a mercantile one. He finally accedes partly to the wishes of his father but equally to the persuasions of his lady love, who refuses to be romanticized and demands practical, reasonable action and filial loyalty from him. But even as an old man, he finds himself still engaged in a struggle with
words. this time in trying to find words that establish the rational balance between imagination and memory characteristic of the enlightened consciousness.

In both his life and his narration of it, Frank struggles to find a way to use words that will be both socially acceptable and personally satisfying. As a young man, his struggle is initially over whether he will use words to write poetry (as he would like) or use words in conjunction with numbers in the business world (as his father would like him to do). As he acts out his rebellion against his father, this struggle broadens in scope, both in the sense that he has to go beyond his father to confront his ancestral and then his social heritage, and in the sense that words become emblematic of the larger struggle (in him and in his world) between the primitive and the enlightened consciousness. As an older man writing his memoirs, Frank is still engaged in the struggle, so that it becomes clear that both for an individual and for society the process of becoming "enlightened" is not a simple movement towards maturity but a complex dialectic of gains and losses, progress and decline.

Frank Osbaldistone's memoir recounts his youthful rebellion against his father and the ensuing journey and adventures that eventually lead to a reconciliation between them. The young Frank, in whom romantic imagination holds sway, is sent by his practical, rational father on an expedition that is like Waverley's in being geographically
northward and temporally backwards. In effect, the senior Osmaldistone is combatting his son's excessive romanticism, not by compelling him to be reasonable (a post in the family counting-house having failed to enforce that injunction), but by challenging him to remember from whence he came. When he decides to disown his son and replace him with a son of his brother, he is imitating his own father, who had disowned him and named his younger brother his heir. At the same time, the act which is a gesture of disinheritance towards his own son, Frank, is a gesture of reconciliation towards his own heritage and, in effect, towards his own dead father. (It could, of course, be seen as a gesture of triumph over his father, except that he does not seem to know the ruined state of his brother's affairs). Just as paradoxical is Frank's role, in that he is the agent for this reconciliation which will effect his own dispossession, his compliance with his father's will being his way of ratifying his rebellion.

At once freed from and bound to his father, then, he finds himself setting off to "the abode of my fathers" for the peculiarly ambiguous purpose "of assisting in the adoption of a successor to myself in my father's house and favour, and, for aught I knew, eventually in his future also" (5:55;2:30). Some fortuitous combination of romantic imagination, apprehension, and youthful hope allows him to view this expedition as a journey of enchantment designed by an ultimately benevolent father to be "but a trial of my
disposition." He is certain that through this ordeal he will earn his right "to be reinstated in my full rights of filiation" (3:32.33). But as Frank fantasizes about making terms with his father involving an "easy penalty" of "ostensible compliances" (3:33), he forgets the ominous precedent set by his grandfather. In a sense, the narrative does vindicate Frank's sanguine attitude: reconciliation with his father is effected with his having to make only a gesture of compliance (by agreeing to enter the family business) before inheritance of his uncle's estate vindicates him by making him the gentleman he had wanted to be and allowing him to restore his father's rightful heritage. By deploying even gestures of rebellion for the purpose of reconciliation, the narrative affirms the ostensibly contrary romantic impulses to rebel against one's father and to align oneself with one's grandfather. Whereas Ravenswood's failure to rebel against his father ensured his own downfall, as well as signalling the downfall of the primitive culture, Frank's rebellion against his father ensures the progress and continuity of society.

After journeying back to the seat of his fathers in northern England, Frank journeys further back to a Highland culture which represents his own society at a primitive stage. He stops on the way at the transitional border metropolis of Glasgow, which is sponsoring its emergence as a modern commercial centre by paying its dues to tribal chieftains like Rob Roy, robber baron. This three-stage journey back in time.
comparable in general terms to Waverley's sketches the
evolution of modern society and. implicit in this. the
evolution of the modern individual. In departing from his
father's house. Frank is dismayed to find that sudden
independence feels more like being cast "adrift... driving
without a compass. on the ocean of human life." He is
daunted. rather than energized. by the "unexpected ease" with
which his father breaks the social tie "usually esteemed the
strongest" (3:31). Bereft of what he has taken for granted as
his inalienable social identity. Frank experiences a sensation
of "degradation"—"now a prince. and now a fisher's son"
(3:31)—which is both fairy-tale like and a kind of mythic
preview of what he is about to undergo. Away from his
acclimated social context. he is stripped of privileges and
qualities that had formed part of his identity. and he
discovers how "mortifying" is the recognition of one's
"unimportance" when divested of the "accessories" of
prosperity which one had assumed to be "pertaining and
belonging" to one's self (3:32). This comment both sums up
the experience Frank undergoes in the course of the narrative
and suggests its social implications: the signs of social
progress are mere "accessories" covering a native
primitivism.

Frank's journey northward dramatizes a kind of devolution
as he discovers that "the abode of my fathers" has been
invaded, as it were. by a rude society devoid of the
accumulated cultivation of his London and continental world. But he is more mortified still to find himself exposed there in all his base and original degeneracy. Prompted by jealousy and encouraged by "the excessive hospitality" of the rude society, Frank gets inebriated: "wine and passion," he says, "lowered my intellects" (12:169.167). His lower instincts released, Frank becomes quarrelsome and at length violent enough to strike his villainous cousin, Rashleigh, thereby initiating the most primitive struggle for vengeance. Frank's "elegant accomplishments" are on trial from the moment he enters the domain of his rough cousins, meeting them, significantly enough, in a hunting scene that recalls the wild splendour of a feudal Lord. But the most rigorous challenge to his sophisticated accomplishments comes, not from his cousins, but from his uncle's redoubtable niece, Diana. It is Diana who exposes all the sophisticated manners Frank has acquired in society (the exemplary civilization of France) as mere "accessories." To Frank, Diana is distinguished from the refined ladies of his acquaintance by her almost brash candour and her demand of candour from him. Her challenge that he be himself (Frank) focusses in her demand that he be frank: she refuses to credit flattery, the linguistic currency of a bankrupt society. Her distrust of words is warranted by the nature of Rashleigh's villainy: he is distinguished by a facility with words and is dangerous because of the fascination his conversation holds. Diana fears the eloquent
dissimulation of Rashleigh, despises the unlettered barbarism of her rude cousins, and scorns both the flattery and the poetizing of Frank. She maintains what is to Frank a position of breathtaking integrity so delicately balanced and unconventional that she seems mannish in her intensely sexual attractiveness.

Diana's self-conscious debunking of her femaleness serves several narrative purposes. Primarily, it translates her sexuality into a form that is safe both for her and for Frank: her mannish posturing is a thinly veiled proclamation of a sexuality that is not permitted a frank expression in a woman of society unprotected by "that degree of defence which arises from the forms with which the sex are approached in civilized life" (13:181). An expression of sexuality is particularly forbidden a candidate for a convent and a lone female in an essentially brutal male culture. It is her disavowal of the conventional female "accessories" and her determination to meet Frank as an equal (man to man) that allow them to develop a relationship that is relatively unrestrained by the conventional social modes of conduct that may militate against genuine contact, especially between young, sexual, romantically inclined persons of the opposite sex. In part this overthrow of the sexual barrier is Scott's playful bid for authenticity and his challenge to the artificiality of social norms—he uses a similar ploy in Redgauntlet when he dresses Darsie Latimer as a woman—but it is also, as in
Redgauntlet, an index to a seriously disordered social and family structure. To become a man is primarily the defence of a woman without the necessary protection afforded by a responsible father or husband: once Diana's father emerges, she becomes almost as extremely submissive as she has seemed extremely independent. Even more suggestive is the fact that it is the villainous Rashleigh who encouraged Diana "in setting at nought and despising the forms and ceremonial habits which are drawn round females in modern society" (13:189).

As compelling as it is, Diana's unconventionality is itself an appeal to convention, an appeal which finally addresses itself to her father. His authority is exaggerated in response to her exaggerated independence, which seems now to have been the expression of an extreme need. It is Diana, whose duty to her father is primary, who reminds Frank of his duty to secure that "knot, usually esteemed the strongest, which binds society together" by going to his father's rescue. In effect, Frank's experience in the abode of his fathers shows him, on the one hand, the essentially primitive origins and tendencies of society, and, on the other, its extraneous accessories and affectations. Moreover, this experience makes him alive to his own implication in the primitive past and more moderate in the use of his imagination, thereby preparing him to be more sympathetic in his response to the Highland culture.
Working out a rational balance in his response to his social and individual past is an ongoing process, however, which Frank undergoes not only as a young man when he delves into the Scottish Highlands but also as an old man when he delves into his past. Frank's problem is the opposite of that of Ravenswood, whose traditional view of the world meant that he was absorbed by his memory of the past. For the modern mind, the temptation is to define oneself by dissociation from the past. Schooled by his experience at Osbaldistone Hall, Frank cannot effect such a facile dissociation from the past; but he must still, while acknowledging his association with the past, seek to shape a present self that is independent of it.

It is characteristic of the rationalist mind that it use language to strike the balance between association with the world and dissociation from it. Language becomes an index for the responsible self, and Frank's assumption of a more responsible filial attitude entails forsaking his preferred course of poetry in favour of attending to his father's business affairs. In the modern world, action is typically mediated, and the dominant forms of mediation, as the Waverley Novels illustrate, are the words of law and the numbers of commerce. They serve as the necessary substitutes for direct action and the violence that accompanies it. Necessary as they are, however, these mediators, as Scott is well aware, also bring with them the possibility of falseness and
bankruptcy. When he begins to write his memoir, Frank evince a self-conscious awareness of the duplicity of his medium, particularly "when we ourselves are the heroes of the events which we tell" (1:3). Endeavouring as he is to produce "a faithful transcript of my thoughts and feelings, of my virtues and my failings" (1:2), he is nonetheless aware that, especially when the reader is "a dear and intimate friend," a writer like himself may succumb to "the seductive love of narrative" (1:2.3). He knows that the sense of "power" over the reader and the allure of "self-importance" (1:3) may interfere with the writer's desire to be "faithful." At the same time, Frank is aware that to use words in this endeavour is also to submit himself to the judgement of his reader. The fact that this reader is an intimate friend means that Frank can trust his judgement, but the same relationship, Frank knows, also means that he is entirely at the mercy of his chosen judge. From such a person, the "kind construction and forgiveness" Frank seeks are not only desirable but essential (1:2).

Even as Frank's self-consciousness about and preoccupation with the implications of his writing are symptomatic of his uneasiness about his past and his need for forgiveness, they also underline his enlightened sense of the ambiguous quality of experience and the determining power of words. Frank is aware that his narration and his reader's "construction" will define the quality of his past life.
Unlike the literalist, primitive mind, the rationalist mind sees truth as fluid and remembering as a process in which memories are shaped, rather than just repeated, as they are told and heard. And while the primitive mind privileges the past over the present and allows memory to reduce experience to dualities of right and wrong, true and false, the modern mind can view the past—both social and personal—only with ambivalence. Self-consciousness entails knowing that one must define oneself both with and against the past. Frank's memory of his time at Osbaldistone Hall does not allow a simple contrast between the barbarism of his cousins and his own cultivation; instead it recalls his own regression and his "shame and degradation" (12:167) at being unable to dissociate himself from their uncultivated ways. With even more ambivalence, Frank describes his rebellion against his father. Here his latent sympathy for his father and his mature self-criticism war with, rather than replace, his lingering sympathy for "the follies and headstrong impetuosity of my youth" (1:2). Frank finds himself still, as an old man, couching his confession of wrongdoing in terms of extenuating circumstances, offering as "some palliative" for his resistance to his father's authority the fact that "I did not fully understand" (1:11). Further complicating matters is the revelation that he still does not understand. Frank admits not only that "I thought at the time there was something unkind" in his father's treatment of him but also that "I
Think that my father's conduct was injudicious" (2:29). Just as Frank comes to view the ancient culture of the Highlands and Rob Roy himself as worthy of both censure and sympathy, so he comes to view his own personal past as also filled with, to recall the words of Andrew Fairservice, "many things ower bad for blessing, and ower gude for banning" (39:342). Perhaps best representing Frank's curious confession is the most equivocal statement of all, a statement appropriately formulated as a rhetorical question: "Who can judge of their own heart?" (2:29). This is either the most humble or the most proud self-assessment.

The ambivalence with which Frank views his own past as he looks back on his relationship with his father and with his fathers takes a different form as he describes his journey northward away from Glasgow, the last bastion of civilized society. While he is aware of his surroundings becoming increasingly foreign as he moves further away from his own world, he responds to this sense of increasing alienation by an increasing exercise of his enlightened powers of observation. As he penetrates further northward and further into the unknown past, the world becomes progressively "more dreary" and more alien as "hopeless barrenness" and "absolute sterility" make "these wastes" uninhabitable, except to "a few straggling sheep of a strange diversity of colours" and a few brave birds of foreign denomination (27:135). Frank's sense of the alien nature of the environment expresses itself in his
alienation from it: but does he respond to the alien world by expressing alienation from it, or does his alienation from it make the world alien? This is the question for the rationalist consciousness, whose sense of the distinction between subject and object, percipient and perceived, makes it impossible to see the world except as something "other."

Although Frank is overcome by "dejection" in this alien world, he persists in expecting "exercise" for his imagination (10:136) and "interest" (10:137;11:143.144). Instead of finding that moonlight makes this bleak and unknown world more frightening, he reports that "under her rays, the ground over which we passed assumed a more interesting appearance than during the broad daylight, which discovered the extent of its wasteness" (11:143). While Frank's rationalist mind notes and articulates the various features that make this land seem uninhabitable to him, it also has categories with which it can define and control, and thus distance itself from, this potentially fearful environment. The rationalist mind capitalizes on its inability to inhabit this wasteland by transforming it into an aesthetically habitable landscape.

While Frank's aestheticizing perception effectively distances him from the potentially overwhelming environment, his companion on the journey, Bailie Nicole Jarvie, a seasoned traveller in this waste land but a true citizen of Glasgow, responds in a quite different way that emphasizes Frank's distance from all he sees. In a typically rationalist
fashion, the young man of words seeks from Bailie Jarvie the "names and positions of these remarkable mountains." such categories being essential for him to define his relationship to the world. The older man can or will offer "no information" on a subject for which he has no words or categories, only feelings. "They're the Hieland hills, the Hieland hills," he tells Frank. "I douna know at them: I never see them but they are gar me grew [make me shudder]. It's no for fear, no for fear, but just for grief for the puir blinded, half-starved creatures that inhabit them—"

(10:137). Like Frank, Bailie Jarvie does not allow fear to dominate his response to this ominous land, but whereas the young man's is the fearlessness of ignorance and self-centeredness, the older man's is a fearlessness borne of knowledge of this land and compassion for its people. His fear has been overcome, not by abstract "interest," but by genuine sympathy for the human creatures that try to inhabit the uninhabitable. Of course, Bailie Jarvie's interest and motivation are commercial, but his response to the Highlanders belies Frank's confident assertion that his companion considered "commercial transactions the most important objects of human life" (27:133).

While Bailie Jarvie's sympathy and respect for the Highland world leave him at a loss for words, Frank's facility with words seems to increase in direct proportion to the uncertainty of their situation. After they are involved in a
brawl with several Highlanders and Lowlanders in an alehouse where they stop for the night and then almost arrested by suspicious soldiers. Frank greets the new day with the naive insouciance of a mere observer of the dangers of the previous night. Emerging from their virtual imprisonment, Frank experiences a "delightful sensation" at exchanging "the dark, smoky, smothering atmosphere of the Highland hut" for the "refreshing fragrance of the morning air" (30:180). What is interesting here is the ease with which the young man is able to dissociate himself from the dark oppressive Highland world and join the new day of the enlightened society. As yet further testimony to his imperviousness to the actual darkness of the surrounding world and definition of his own world in terms of light, this awakening to light ironically occurs as they are about to be virtually swallowed up by the darkness of the primitive MacGregors. Like an antidote to the encroaching darkness, Frank's response to the scene is the entirely aesthetic one of a self-styled poet and enlightened observer. He sees "a scene of natural romance and beauty as had never before greeted my eyes" (30:180). His eyes, indeed, seem to dispel the potential darkness, and his language here reflects this rationalist ability to transform the world into an inhabitable place. Interestingly, he describes this scene around the Forth in strikingly anthropomorphic terms (personifying the wandering Forth, the "garland of woods," the lake "lightly curled into tiny waves by the breath of the
morning breeze), reflecting in his language the "life and vivacity" which he says the scene derives from the "waving" forests (30:180-1). But as the natural world comes to seem more animate, more human, to him, "man alone seemed to be placed in a state of inferiority, in a scene where all the ordinary features of the nature were raised and exalted" (30:181). In other words, the more non-human the world becomes, the more human is the language the rationalist consciousness must employ in order to name and thereby to tame the hostile environment.

The alternative is strikingly imaged here by the roofs of the human inhabitants, which "approached the ground so nearly" that they might almost be a part of nature, absorbed by a world from which they cannot distance themselves (30:181). The horrifying consequences of identifying with nature are dramatized when Frank finally meets the MacGregor clan in all its wild splendour. He finds interest enough for any imagination in the impressive figure of Helen MacGregor and the savage revenge she takes on Morris, who, to Frank's "sickening horror," is weighted with a stone and hurled into a lake to his doom. But Frank's terms, as he comments that the "unit" of Morris's life was "for ever withdrawn from the sum of human existence" (31:213,212), betray both the older narrator's commercial perspective and his ability to see this horror in terms of the counters provided by language.

Even the barbaric clan can be tamed by language, and
Frank, the man of sensibility, appreciates the "eloquence" of the savage expression of feeling and the "natural taste" which is "unfettered by system and affectation" (35:279.280). His commentary, containing his rather paradoxical intellectual appreciation of feeling, underlines the interpretation in which he is constantly engaged in order to have a contact with the Highlanders that is (necessarily) both mediated and on his terms. Frank goes on to comment on the Highlanders' need to use different languages for different situations. His description of the intricate uses of language and the Highlanders' recourse to three different languages also highlights their displacement as an ancient culture in the modern world, and emphasizes the complex procedures of mediation that have replaced the simple transaction between feeling or impulse and action or word. The Highlanders, Frank comments, use the Lowland Scottish dialect when they are "familiar and facetious," the idiom of their native language when "serious and impassioned," and expressions which sound "wild, elevated, and poetical" when forced to convey such feelings in English (35:282). Generalizing further, Frank observes that "the language of passion is almost always pure as well as vehement" (35:282). In the context of the intricate complex of discourses he has just outlined, this comment draws attention to the dichotomy both between language and feeling and between the primitive consciousness, so confounded by language, and the enlightened consciousness.
equally confounded by feeling.

As he and Bailie Jarvie journey back towards the world of enlightened society, Frank leaves the darkness of the ancient, violent culture behind. However much he is "moved by [the] horrid spectacle" (31:211) of Morris's murder (or perhaps because he is so moved), he continues to find imaginative and romantic interest in the Highlands. As he and Bailie Jarvie go back to Glasgow, Frank is gradually more able to appreciate the grandeur of the scenery. We know that he has finally put a safe distance between himself and the events he has witnessed when he is able to see Loch Lomond as the subject for romantic "speculations" that match Jarvie's commercial ones (36:287).

But although distancing is possible for the conscious rational mind, the unconscious feeds on irrational and primitive fears of identification. Morris's cries, Frank writes, "haunted my sleep for years afterwards" (31:211). "And in dream, Frank's unconscious replaces Helen MacGregor's victim with himself and Diana, awaiting execution at the order of her father. This dream points to the curious way in which, throughout the narrative, Frank consistently recalls Diana in the context of guilt. In part, this association of Diana with guilt is symptomatic of the attitude with which Frank writes his memoir, in that it underlines the fact that Rob Roy is, implicitly if not overtly, the confession of a guilty soul. From the moment he leaves London, "degradation" and "shame" are Frank's habitual feelings.
plays robber and then feels that "every person will take it for granted that I am accessory to a crime which I despise and detest" (11:150). but this pretense allows him to express real feelings of guilt. Having broken his own code of conduct by becoming inebriated, he emerges next day "like a criminal to receive sentence" (12:167). Shortly thereafter, in reporting how he retired to the library with Diana for her sentencing, he draws attention to his own repeated figure of speech, but nevertheless employs it: "I followed—like a criminal. I was going to say, to execution; but, as I bethink me, I have used the simile once, if not twice before. Without any simile at all then, I followed" (12:174). To follow "without any simile at all" comes close to identifying himself as a criminal rather than comparing himself to one. Curiously, it would seem that drawing attention to the use of a figure of speech does not diminish its effect but rather makes its effect seem less figurative, as when Frank expresses his sympathy for Diana's plight by saying "it is scarce metaphorical to say that my heart bled for her" (13:181).

Frank's self-conscious use of simile and metaphor here highlights a key feature of the rationalist mind, which employs figurative language as a way of both figuring the feelings it has and distancing itself from the concrete object (the criminal or blood, for example) which has been transformed into an image described by a word. While Frank's conscious mind uses language to provide this distance,
however, his unconscious mind subverts the rationalist strategy. The subversive power of his unconscious is most clear in his dream about Morris's murder, which his unconscious mind reconstructs into a horrifying nightmare by deploying the non-rational processes of association to exploit his feelings of fear and guilt. In a curious way, Frank's romantic dreams about Diana become a Gothic nightmare when her father appears. The fact that Frank mistakes him for Diana's lover serves only to heighten the Gothic overtones. Soon after the murder of Morris, Frank and Diana bid what they think is their last farewell—"forever!" as she says. Her metaphor—"There is a gulf between us,—a gulf of absolute perdition" (33:243)—merges in Frank's unconscious with the gulf into which Morris had been hurled, so that in dream "for years afterwards" he experiences this horrifying fate.

Frank's unconscious mind effects the kind of identification that the conscious rationalist mind uses language to avoid, producing "a strange agony" (39:329). His unconscious works like the primitive mind, repeating a situation whose symbolic force increases with every repetition, while his conscious mind habitually and self-consciously employs the safer figures of simile and metaphor. The most suggestive use of such language occurs in the same farewell scene, when Frank describes his effort to respond to Diana's farewell. "The word, though it rose to my tongue," he writes, "seemed to choke in my throat, like the fatal guilty, which the delinquent who
makes it his plea knows must be followed by the doom of death" (33:243). As romantic as is the sense of this comparison, its terms are remarkably morbid ones for a writer to choose to describe his feelings as a lover. The association of love and guilt is strangely suggestive of a Gothic undercurrent. But even more striking is the use of the simile: Frank says that he chokes on a word (farewell) that was like another word (guilty), a comparison that suggests that his words have come to replace the substance they describe and, perhaps for that reason, are themselves guilt-ridden.

Frank's self-conscious use of language highlights another key feature of the rationalist mind. Whereas the primitive mind uses words and symbols that temporarily replace their referents, the rationalist mind uses words to substitute for a referent which belongs to the past. Characteristically, the rationalist mind eschews symbols, which are at once self-contained and representative of a signified reality, and employs instead similes and metaphors, which are intrinsically linguistic figures that preserve the relationship and thus the distinction between the two things being compared. By thus making clear that what is going on is an act of comparison or mediation by a percipient, such figures also define the relationship and distinction between the percipient and the perceived.

In his narration, Frank draws attention to his language in a way that demonstrates his awareness of the necessity for
the mediation it provides and his new sense of the use of figurative language. As a young man, he had used such figurative language in his poetry as a substitute for the mature, responsible language of a gainful profession. As an older man, he uses figurative language to describe his experience and his perception in a way that signals a new understanding of his relation to the world. His self-conscious use of similes and metaphors draws attention to an ability of which the linguistic skill is symptomatic: the ability to accept substitutes. Whereas for the primitive mind symbols derive their substance from their referent, for the rationalist mind symbolic representations—the most current of which are words—replace the referent. In effect, then, the most powerful words to the rationalist mind are those which are used as similes and metaphors, because these give an otherwise abstract idea a concrete substance. Ironically, whereas for the primitive mind the word provides an abstract expression for a concrete impression which has primary reality, for the rationalist mind the word purports to provide the concrete impression otherwise entirely lacking in an abstract idea. Similes and metaphors are vital to the enlightened vocabulary because they provide a concrete substance for the abstractions of real life. That is, when there is no longer a direct relation between passion and action, and action takes the form of verbal exercises of "the mere clerk and accountant" (to use Adam Ferguson's words).
language assumes a new role as the focus of human activity.

This new sense of language emerges in Frank's retrospective descriptions of his father's profession, in which he uses metaphors from the life of a gambler, a sailor, and an adventurer, thereby demonstrating his better understanding both of his father and of language. He now understands the constraints that require the displacement of energies into appropriate channels and the use of abstract ciphers like words and numbers to express desires that cannot assume concrete shape: "trade has all the fascination of gambling," Frank writes, "without its moral guilt" (1:5). Similarly, the metaphors of guilt and prison which abound in his descriptions of his youth do not have a specific concrete referent. Rather, they extend his experience to account in imaginative and concrete terms for his sense of inadequacy and implication in "masses of crime and sorrow" that cannot be expiated.

Ambivalence pervades Frank's words, which seem at times to hide more than they disclose. When he is again reunited with Diana, she appears in her father's presence "with diminished beauty and sunk spirits," and he is left feeling "stunned and chilled" and "almost offended" by her manner (38:324; 39:326). Following this meeting, Frank dreams of his father's officiating at the "ceremony" by which he and Diana are "about to be precipitated from a rock into the lake" (39:329). The "strange agony" of this dream tells more than
his words of the crisis of his feelings. So "lively" is its "impression," writes Frank, that "I could paint even at this moment" the scene before his mind's eye (39:329). Narrate as he may, then, the memory of the abyss this dream discloses is never healed. The impression of the dream is never safely abstracted into language, try as Frank might "forcibly to abstract my mind from the singular circumstances" (39:328).

In a different way, his reunion with his father is also beyond the scope of words: his reader "can well imagine what I should find it impossible to describe" (36:291). But the reunion is as impossible for the reader to imagine as it is for Frank to describe, because his response to his father, as recorded in the memoir, is still ambivalent. Similarly, Frank relies on his reader's knowledge of his wife and of his relationship with her to supply an impression of his sense of loss at her death: "You know," he writes, "how long and happily I lived with Diana. You know how I lamented her. But you do not, cannot, know how much she deserved her husband's sorrow" (39:341). The reader cannot know. not because he has not experienced her desert, however, but because Frank is finally so ambivalent about it.

The futility of trying to write a "faithful transcript" of one's life seems to be the final confession of the editor, who states that "the original manuscript ends somewhat abruptly." When he concludes by saying, "I have reason to think that what followed related to private affairs" (39:342).
we have reason to think that the private life of Frank Osbaldistone remains undisclosed, perhaps even to himself. In a sense, Frank's narrative demonstrates the bankruptcy and duplicity of words that the editor of Ravenswood's story finds demonstrated in its multiple versions. But, like the editor of that story, the editor of Rob Roy produces Frank's narrative, knowing that for all their limitations, words are the revealing acts of the modern world. Even as the narrator's story in The Bride of Lammermoor undermines Lady Ashton's stone memorial to her own virtues, so Frank's inability to fix anything in stone and his awareness of his need for "kind construction" become a memorial to his integrity.
CHAPTER THREE

Inhabiting the Wilderness:
Place from Ivanhoe to The Fair Maid of Perth

Edgar Ravenswood and Frank Osbaldistone manifest their respective stages of consciousness in their different responses to the landscape as they struggle to achieve a fruitful balance between association with and dissociation from nature. While the basic struggle is, for Scott, an ongoing one (the abyss that swallows up the primitive mind still haunts the rationalist unconscious), the response of particular individuals and societies to the natural landscape functions as a sign of their stage of development. Recreating a historical period, as readers of the Waverley novels well know, means animating a place for its emergence. Scott does not employ setting merely as background for his narrative; rather, as James Reed notes, his landscapes "reproduce an organic and vital context for human activity" (16). For Scott, place helps to make history and individuals what they are. If, as the opening chapter of Ivanhoe has it, "human figures" complete the landscape, the landscape also completes the human figures (1:5). "Scott's sense of history was based
on his sense of place," as Harry Shaw puts it, because a place both bears the imprint of the history it has witnessed and is itself a shaping force of that history (Forms 151). Moreover, Scott's sense of history was grounded in particular places which had witnessed and shaped not only the course of national history but also the development of his personal memory.

It is clear that Scott's understanding of history depends upon his "sense of place" and upon his use of memory to relate, place and time in a way that enlivens history. A. O. J. Cockshut argues that Scott's method was "truly historical" and that he was at his best only within the range of his own personal knowledge and feeling, a range that coincided with the reach of oral tradition (Cockshut 104). David Daiches takes this further when he points out that "Scott's first and most deeply felt encounter with history was oral tradition associated with topography." Most readers would agree with Daiches's view that Scott's most successful novels gain their power from an "encounter" with history as it is related to him in "places he could see with his own eyes, imagining the acting out of those old heroic deeds on the very scenes before him" ("Scott and History" 460). Both comments suggest two largely unexplored corollaries. One is the notion that it is the story of the historical event, rather than the event itself, that was central to Scott's concern and vital to his imagination, and this forms the subject of Chapter Five. The other, subject of the present chapter, is that, although Scott
depended on seeing "with his own eyes." His imagination actually worked better when he was physically removed from the significant places so that he was "seeing" them under the joint auspices of memory and imagination. He did not write well about places that did not capture his imagination and become enlivened with a "sense of place": such places remained dead landscapes. But the "sense of place" that Scott needed in order to enliven a landscape depended upon his investing an otherwise dead landscape with a consequentiality analogous to the consequentiality with which Waverley had to invest his time. And this kind of activity is not a matter of present empirical perception but of imagination and memory. Indeed, Scott's powers of composition were strongest, as F. A. Pottle argues, "in the mode of memory." Because it was there "where the workings of the imagination were unconscious that his mind was most completely at one with itself" (Pottle 253).

In his essay "The Power of Memory in Boswell and Scott," Pottle tries to characterize the working of Scott's memory as distinct from both the more typically eighteenth-century kind of memory, as represented by Boswell, and the more typically Romantic kind of memory, as represented by Wordsworth. In this (as in so many areas) Scott is a "bridge figure": Pottle argues that while he demonstrates the eighteenth-century "power to admire the average" and to value factual details, he is relatively free of the fear of "the dangerous prevalence of the imagination" that usually informed the eighteenth-century
attention to actuality. Even as Scott's is the eighteenth-century kind of memory in which "the imagination was made to work within the limits of literal circumstances," at the same time his imagination is not bound, but actually liberated, by the grounding provided by this "circumstantial memory." Still, imagination never becomes for him (as it does for some of the Romantics) "revelatory of truth." Pottle then concludes that Scott's power of memory depends upon a division of his consciousness: "while his perception is rooted firmly in the eighteenth century, his imagination in the mode of fiction has freed itself completely from the restrictions which that century imposed" (252-3).

This combination of accurate perception and the free play of imagination characterizes Scott's view of landscape and is basic to his understanding of history. The importance of this combination is suggested in Daiches's notion that Scott must literally see places in order to imagine history's glories, and it informs Cockshut's notion that Scott's imagination is fed by that special combination of personal and secondary knowledge that is the nature of oral tradition. Scott's first eight novels all exemplify in different ways the power of his imagination when exercised upon stories he could hear about events enacted in places he could see. But it is the difficulties he encounters when he moves outside this range that illuminate the particular nature of his imagination and the power of his memory, making clear not only that Scott's
sense of history is dependent upon his sense of place but that
his sense of place is dependent upon a knowledge that has
been, rather than is, empirical and immediate. Scott's
perception works best when it is displaced in time and space
so that he must actively invest a place with
consequentiality—a sense of place—by the efforts of memory
and imagination. His imaginative inhabiting and recreating of
a landscape requires distance as well as familiarity.
Scott signals his move outside the range Cockshut
identifies with a transitional novel, A Legend of Montrose.
Generically a legend authenticated by letters, rather than a
story told or a history documented, this short novel is
nevertheless still firmly grounded in the familiar and
striking landscapes of the Highlands. It is only with his
next novel, Ivanhoe, that Scott moves both to a time beyond
the reach of storytellers' memories and to a place that does
not inspire the kind of imaginative re-enacting of past
glories that Daiches describes. Characteristically, Scott
responds to anticipated criticisms of this venture outside his
usual terrain by allowing the Reverend Dryasdust, F. A. S., to
level them at the Author through the medium of Laurence
Templeton's "Dedicatory Epistle." Templeton tells us that the
Antiquarian has two main objections to the Author's turning
his attention to medieval England, one regarding sources and
the other regarding the landscape. With the first of these
objections, the author confronts the difficulty of being
outside the range of oral tradition. But when the antiquarian questions the circumstantial accuracy of tales based on "mysty records and chronicles" that leave out "all interesting details," Templeton contends that any representation of the past requires its being imaginatively "translated" (xliv, xlvii). Thus he answers charges about perception and memory by appealing to imagination and interpretation.

Although Templeton is readily able to meet this objection to the use of texts rather than tradition, however, he is less able to counter the other objection, that regarding the landscape. This second objection does not express doubt about the accuracy of the description but about its imaginative appeal: when it comes to the landscape of medieval England, the problem is, not that it is too remote, but that it is not remote enough to be interesting. Templeton articulates the anticipated difficulty: while the reader of Scottish tales is likely to give credence to the primitive culture they present because "he has either never seen those remote districts at all or he has wandered through those desolate regions," the English landscape affords an author no such aid. In response, Templeton contends that although "the scenery of the south be less romantic and sublime than that of the northern mountains, it must be allowed to possess in the same proportion superior softness and beauty" (xliii). Templeton argues in vain, however: soft and beautiful as it may be, the English countryside lacks the dramatic extremes that would make
readers "fully prepared," as they are, with the Scottish landscape, to believe that it was once inhabited by primitive ancestors (xlili). Scott here reiterates the point made in the Postscript of Waverley: that the Scotland of his own day has the unique distinction of having experienced within living memory (here it is "these thirty years") what he calls "an infinite change." As he noted in Waverley, the present Scots are consequently "as different from their grandfathers as the existing English are from those of Queen Elizabeth's time" (Postscript 364). For both nations, landscape is emblematic of the kind of change each society has experienced: the drama of the change in Scottish history is reflected in the dramatic Highland landscape, while the comparative subtlety of the change in English civilization is reflected in its more mellow landscape. The Scottish landscape provides the ideal context for Scott's dramatization of Scottish history because it is both familiar and strange, the site both of one's own present experience and of one's ancestors' past adventures as recalled or imagined. This landscape serves as a medium between past and present and between strange and familiar worlds for Scott and for his readers, lending credibility, or at least plausibility, to the scenes it locates; conversely, the English landscape diminishes the authenticity and power of a more ancient and equally romantic age. For Scott at least, the English countryside is not as interesting as the Scottish because, as Templeton observes, "in England, civilisation has
been so long complete," that it does not bear in its landscape the memory of the strife and disorder that produced it (xliv). Likewise, it bears no personal associations as the scene of recollected tales.

The difficulties Scott has in experiencing a "sense of history" outside the range of oral tradition are rooted in the difficulty he has with experiencing the "sense of place" in the English landscape. The opening paragraphs of *Ivanhoe*, his first medieval novel, exemplify the integrally related temporal and topographical problems he has tried to anticipate in the "Dedicatory Epistle." *Ivanhoe* is not a great historical novel primarily because Scott tries to overcompensate for the remoteness of its era by "translating" its unfamiliarity to the point of innocuous banality. This failure of imagination is not only reflected in but in part caused by his inability to invest its landscape with the "sense of place" that is vital to his sense of history.

*Ivanhoe* opens with a rather perfunctory, formulaic description of the topographical setting, a conventional evocation which suggests that it will serve as a backdrop rather than as a vital context for action. "In that pleasant district of merry England which is watered by the river Don," we are told, "there extended in ancient times a large forest, covering the greater part of the beautiful hills and valleys which lie between Sheffield and the pleasant town of Doncaster. The remains of this extensive wood are still to be
seen" (1:1). Here, then, is a landscape that is recognizable, for the contours of the land and the remains of the forest make it both a place that is familiar and a sign of a continuity between the nation's past and the reader's present: Here, too, is a landscape in benign—and banal—form. There are no "romantic and sublime" mountains, just "beautiful hills and valleys." It is a "pleasant" district, and as the repetition of "pleasant" underlines, we have a clearly conventional description of a stereotypical "merry England." The conventionality of the scene is reinforced by its description as the site of romantic exploits: "Here haunted of yore the fabulous Dragon of Wantley; here were fought many of the most desperate battles during the Civil War of the Roses; and here also flourished in ancient times those bands of gallant outlaws, whose deeds have been rendered so popular in English song." The unabashed abundance of cliches here represents the scene in ready-made terms: whether they take the form of fable, history, or traditional ballad and legend, the stories suggested by this beautiful scene are already formulated in conventional literary terms. This landscape, together with these stories, also suggests a certain conventionalizing of the past that is intrinsic to the English understanding of history: the serenity of the beautiful scene and the formulaic narratives facilitate a mythologizing of the past in the interests of peace. As Judith Wilt points out, the "secret leaves" of this forest serve as the necessary hiding place for
the dispossessed son and King, who figures in the mythology not only of the Waverley novels but also of English nationhood (Secret Leaves 19). The forest also serves as a kind of cover for English history in that it camouflages the strife (especially the civil and familial conflicts) and the compromises that underlie the apparent peace of the landscape. Serving a contrasting but equally political purpose, the rugged and dramatic Scottish landscape keeps alive the memory of heroic struggle and defeat that is essential to the sense of dignity of a subdued nation.

Because it is so unrepresentative, the description of the setting of Ivanhoe brings to light at least five distinctive features of Scott's landscapes. First, in a way that rather reflects its textual sources, the landscape of Ivanhoe is described in the highly generalized, stock vocabulary of a legendary tale rather than in the specific, particular vocabulary of Scott's characteristic historical narratives. At the same time, the setting of Ivanhoe is an actual, particular one (described by means of a comparison between its present and past features), rather than his usual blend of specific, particular features from a number of impressive scenes. That is, Scott usually constructs a landscape out of several impressive memories of different places. Related to this is the third distinctive feature absent from the Ivanhoe setting. The landscapes in the earlier novels usually are charged with personal associations, bear the traces and
promptings of memory that activate Scott's imagination. Also absent are those features identified in eighteenth-century aesthetic terms as "sublime" and typically generative for Scott. Ivanhoe features instead the category of the beautiful—"soft and beautiful" and "pleasant"—to which Scott was not notably drawn. Finally, the scene illuminates the necessity for Scott's "sense of place" of the presence in the landscape of the memory of past conflict and loss in order to contrast and enrich, and even authenticate, the present experience of peace and surety. In order for Scott to experience and reproduce a sense of place, a landscape must "intimate the presence" (Quentin Durward 11) of what has gone before.

Nothing suggests so clearly how vital to Scott's sense of history was his sense of place as the interrelated lack of both in Ivanhoe. And nothing suggests so strongly how personal were these two senses for Scott so much as his need to begin writing another, more characteristic—and Scottish—novel before Ivanhoe was finished. Lockhart reports the "relief" that Scott felt upon beginning The Monastery at being able "to interlay the scenery most familiar to me, with the strange world for which I had to draw so much on imagination" (Life 422). This image of interlaying strange and familiar worlds points to the overlapping of the two worlds in these novels and to the kind of combination of strangeness and familiarity that enlivens Scott's
characteristic landscapes. And it is no accident that he acknowledges his discomfort with the landscape of Ivanhoe by using the 1830 Introduction to The Monastery, as well as the novel itself, to articulate much of what his sense of place entails.

The Introduction begins by drawing attention to the difference between the scenes of these two novels. Scott is unable to explain why he should make every effort "to remove" the earlier novel "to a distance from his own country" and then take pains to set the later novel "in the immediate neighbourhood of his own residence," but his attention to the move suggests its importance (xxi). He goes on to say that Melrose provided a suitable setting for the story not only because "the celebrated ruins... form a splendid theatre for any tragic incident" but also because "the vicinity of the fine river... is rich with so many recollections of former times." To these memories of a romantic past, the scene adds "circumstances of romantic locality" that "fill up the idea which one would form in imagination for a scene that Oberon and Queen Mab might love to revel in" (xxi-xxiii). Because the Melrose countryside is "connected with so many associations of a fanciful nature, in which the imagination takes delight," it would recommend itself as the setting of a romantic narrative, he claims, even to "one even less attached to the spot than the author" (xxiv). As well as lending itself to imaginative, historical, and literary associations (as does the setting of
Ivanhoe, then, this more characteristic setting for the
Author of Waverley is charged with personal as well as
cultural associations. The most significant feature of the
scene, even more central than the ruins, is the lake "from
which eyes that yet look on the light are said to have seen
the water-bull ascend" (xxiii). What enlivens this scene for
Scott, and hence for his readers, are the secondary
associations of oral tradition that make it part of living
memory. Unlike the landscape of Ivanhoe, the landscape of The
Monastery is described in terms of its personal significance,
a significance involving the kind of interaction of
perception, memory, and imagination that evokes that sense of
place so crucial to Scott's historical novel.

The landscape described in The Monastery is typical of
Scott and different from that of Ivanhoe in other significant
respects. Whereas Scott describes the English landscape of
the medieval novel in a way that is quite faithful to the
actual scene (though in general, conventional terms) he tends
to compose his more characteristic Scottish landscapes out of
the features of different scenes. Rather than being "copied
from nature," he explains in the 1830 Introduction, the
setting of The Monastery is "a piece of composition, in which
a real scene, with which [the author] is familiar, had
afforded him some leading outlines" (xxiv). Just as he
composes his narratives by using his imagination to shape and
inform the outlines of remembered incidents, so he composes
their settings, so that they become contexts for these compositions rather than mere backdrops. What is interesting here is that while in order to promote the authenticity of Ivanhoe he describes the landscape in realistic terms (though framed in the generic context of legend), he freely composes the setting of The Monastery without feeling obliged to "copy" nature. He is so convinced of the authenticity of the scene that he can make it the subject of "imaginative construction," as Pottle calls it (243). As a result, the scene of The Monastery, though not a duplication of the scene he knew, is invested with a sense of place that derives partly from his perception and memory of actual scenes and partly from his personalizing of the constructed scene by the process of selection and composition. Rather than being within sight or at a remote distance, the Melrose scene is typical for Scott in that he describes it as "lying almost under the immediate eye of the author" (xxi).

In Chapter Two of the novel, Scott devotes a number of paragraphs to establishing its sense of place. The description is striking and memorable, its immediacy and authenticity effected largely by the alternation of past and present tense. "The site [of Glendearg tower] was a beautiful green knoll," writes Scott, to reach which "it was necessary" to take a circuitous route described in such detail as to suggest personal experience. This sense of the author's presence in the very place is heightened with the change to
present tense in the next sentence as he describes hills "which ascend... are very steep, and rise" and "the sides of the glen [which] are impracticable for horse." The alternation of tenses gives readers both a sense that the scene is there to be seen, even as it was in the past, and a sense that the writer is there as he writes, recording what he sees. This is particularly interesting, given that, having once seen and mentally recorded, Scott was in fact in part remembering and in part imaginatively constructing.

Scott is aware of composing this landscape in another sense as well. When he notes that the locale of Glendearg "could neither be strictly termed sublime or beautiful, and scarcely even picturesque or striking," he pauses to admit that "at the time..., the picturesque, the beautiful, the sublime, and all their intermediate shades, were ideas absolutely unknown to the inhabitants" (2:11). The inhabitants, however, had categories of their own, and they "attached to the scene feelings fitting the time," in this case "a mysterious terror" rooted in superstition (2:12). Here Scott is not only acknowledging that cultural predispositions order one's perception but also attempting the kind of translation from the cultural terms of one age to another that he outlines in the "Dedicatory Epistle" to Ivanhoe. In his study of the idea of landscape and the sense of place in the eighteenth century, John Barrel notes that in the later eighteenth century the "principles of composition"
(the beautiful, sublime, picturesque, and so on) were so prevalent that "it became impossible for anyone with an aesthetic interest in landscape to look at the landscape without applying them, whether he knew he was doing so or not" (Barrell 6). In light of this and of Scott's own obvious awareness of these principles, it becomes all the more noteworthy that he incorporates and exceeds this kind of perception. Taking these cultural terms of perception into account, he describes in his own terms a scene which, he says, fits none of the categories. Rather than being sublime or beautiful or picturesque or striking, he writes, "its extreme solitude pressed upon the heart; the traveller felt that uncertainty whither he was going, or in what so wild a path was to terminate, which, at times, strikes more on the imagination than the grand features of a show scene, when you know the exact distance of the inn where your dinner is bespoke, and at the moment preparing" (2:11). This description 'enlivens the scene because it translates into narrative and personal terms the sense of place that Scott at once experienced and helped to create by employing his own terms of perception. The description of the traveller's feeling about the place both humanizes and constructs the landscape, evoking a particular sense of place by appealing to a general human response to the natural landscape. The scene is a metaphorical version of the dramatized, narrative meditation on this situation that opens Guy Mannering and that
suggests that novel's mythic overtones of quest and return. As such, this scene of the lone traveller in an unknown land is obviously an image and a situation that haunted Scott's imagination and assumed the kind of symbolic import that turns a mere landscape into a consequential place. Like the other passages from *The Monastery*, this one makes explicit what is implicit throughout Scott's novels: his sense that as a writer but also as a percipient, he is constructing the world he sees, turning a landscape into a significant place, according to personal and cultural predispositions.

Scott's characteristic way of composing a landscape discloses the complex activity he undergoes in investing a landscape with a sense of place. In one sense the process entails personalizing the scene: responding to associations drawn from memory and imagination, composing a scene out of personally suggestive features of known landscapes, and consciously drawing upon and personalizing conventional aesthetic categories of perception. But in another sense each of these steps is also a kind of depersonalizing. The associations, whether of memory or imagination, are already composed into some form of story, so that they are associations once-removed from the personal: Scott remembers a story of an event rather than an experience. Both composing the scene out of a number of actual scenes and filtering the scene through categories of perception are acts of aesthetic distancing. What we see, then, is Scott's own effort to
balance association with and dissociation from an experience (represented here in terms of landscape) as he takes authorial possession of a scene, using his sense of place to recover and enliven a past time. Like Waverley in writing to Rose, the author is always struggling for that nice balance where he and his readers can associate closely enough with the past to grieve for the losses inscribed on the landscape without associating with it so much that their imaginations are shocked. For Scott, as for Waverley, the most fruitful kinds of associations are narratively mediated.

Imaginatively inhabiting a landscape is an essential step in the process whereby Scott reclaims the past for narrative purposes. Here his task as a writer is analogous to the process whereby Waverley, in reviewing his experience, invests his time with consequentiality. In order to make the past consequential to himself and his readers, Scott not only builds on his associations with a landscape but also composes and orders its features, effecting a complementary dissociation by aesthetic and narrative framing. As his imagination inhabits and yet controls the landscape, the imagination of his readers is invited to inhabit the past without being overwhelmed by it and losing their footing in the necessary present. In the process of viewing the landscape in a way that reclaims the past, Scott also strikes another nice balance. At the same time that he is "taming" the landscape in order to make the past accessible in the
present, he is also highlighting in his descriptions the "untamed" sublimity of the landscape. This technique reminds members of the present civilized society of the geographical and political wilderness out of which their civilization has emerged. The effect is both to dramatize the ongoing process by which wildernesses must be civilized and to maintain the memory of past wildernesses, a memory which to Scott is necessary in order to lend consequentiality to the present state of civilization. For Scott, a landscape achieves consequentiality and evokes a sense of place and a sense of history when it bears the memory of the strife and loss that have been composed into present peace.

The relation of wilderness and civilization is crucial to Scott, and Ronald Paulson's discussion of landscape in his book *Literary Landscapes* is helpful here because it points to a central structure of the Waverley novels. Paulson argues that "the most basic cultural interpretation of a landscape is to relate the wilderness to that which is not wilderness." A culture can relate these two polarities of its experience, he states, by adding some "human trace" to the natural scene, a structure which has "some reference to the city." What Paulson calls "the humanizing of a landscape" is necessary for the growth of individuals and societies in Scott's world, and it can be accomplished in a positive and healthy way only insofar as there is a vital relationship between "the wilderness and that which is not wilderness" (Paulson 21).
Sustaining the opposition between them, instead of allowing one to destroy or absorb the other, is essential to the "humanizing" of society.

Many of Scott's novels dramatize the risks and losses involved in trying to maintain this inherently unstable balance. *Old Mortality* with its hero so painfully divided in his loyalties as to be defined by the inevitability of his losing, is perhaps the most poignant and disturbing in probing this problem. Appropriately, the novel features two bridges that are the scenes of mortal battles over which side will define the wilderness and the civilization and so determine and enforce the basic cultural interpretation of their relation. Bothwell Bridge is the emblematic scene of the social struggle between the Royalists and the Covenanters, the bridge signifying the necessary relation between wilderness and civilization and the crucial difference between the two sides in terms of the way each would define society. Victory for one side means defining its own as the social structure which will house civilization by defining the conquered enemy's as the social structure that would signal the downfall of civilization. What happens at a social level on Bothwell Bridge happens on a personal level at Burley's oak tree bridge where Morton and Burley engage in an analogous mortal struggle by which Morton forsakes the Covenanters' "wilderness" mentality in favour of the conciliatory attitude that allows him to join the moderates. In making this choice, Morton is
endorsing and personalizing the dominant cultural
interpretation of the wilderness and of its relation to that
which is not wilderness.

Paulson identifies building a bridge as one of the human
traces by which "the wilderness may be turned into a garden"
(21). And in a sense, the struggles in Old Mortality do
produce Scott's version of a garden, an idyllic pastoral
scene. Morton returns home from exile in Holland to "the
little scene of rural peace and comfort" represented in
Cuddie's home (37:192). This scene is described in the "soft
and beautiful" terms that characterize the description of the
very non-sublime setting of Ivanhoe, terms which are in
pointed juxtaposition to the wildly romantic and sublime ones
used later to describe the wilderness retreat of Burley. But
Scott's depiction of this garden, like the resolution of the
novel itself, is shot through with ambiguity. Not only is the
idyllic pastoral scene described in obviously stylized terms
and in obvious contrast to the equally stylized terms of
Burley's Gothic cave, but it is also situated within sight of
the former "scene of slaughter and conflict, now... as placid
and quiet as the surface of a summer lake" (37:191). This
situation casts a shadow on the present peace, by suggesting
that "the wilderness and that which is not wilderness" have
not really been related so much as kept at bay, one from
another. The manifest holiness of Morton's victorious
return—"as if from the grave" (44:296)—reinforces the sense
of failure and loss that is written on the landscape. And on his way from the pastoral scene to the wilderness scene, he contemplates the evident ruin the ostensible progress of civilization has wreaked upon the landscape. Heading towards Elizabeth MacLure's cottage, he journeys through what "once had been a wood, but was now a ravine divested of trees," a devastation that testifies to the ambiguous effects of civilization. What few trees remain "only served to indicate what the landscape had once been" (41:255). The sense of ambiguity is further heightened by the narrator's implied comparison of this scene and the pastoral one. In contrast to the tranquil fountain of the earlier scene, the mountain stream alone gives "life and animation" to "the barest and most savage scenes," a quality "which the inhabitants of such a country miss when gazing even upon the tranquil winding of a majestic stream through plains of fertility, and beside palaces of splendour" (41:255). Unlike the pastoral scene and its Gothic counterpart, this scene is described in individualized rather than conventional terms, so that, although the landscape reflects loss and destruction, the sense of its history endows it with a sense of place and consequentiality.

Paulson's idea of a garden allows for just this ambiguity, in that one may turn a wilderness into a garden "by defining it as a scene in which something significant has taken place—perhaps in history or perhaps only in some private, domestic sense—or in which something significant is
taking place at the moment" (21). The significant events Paulson uses as illustrations—"the shooting of a stag, the building of a bridge, or the acting out of a myth" (21)—are not events that would define a conventional garden. They are, however (and coincidentally), the kinds of events that turn Scott's wildernesses into metaphorical gardens, into places of consequence. Paulson's terms help to illuminate the pattern of relating "the wilderness to that which is not wilderness" underlying the Waverley novels. They also show that for Scott turning a wilderness into a garden does not necessarily involve any particular kind of event or even any cultivation; rather, the transformation involves maintaining the tension between the two extremes, cultivating a garden in the midst of the wilderness. Out of this ongoing process emerges the sense of significance or consequentiality that "humanizes" the landscape.

Defining scenes in terms of significant events and then composing landscapes out of them are essential to the process whereby Scott creates the world of his novels. It is also a way of describing part of the process whereby societies and individuals "create" their worlds, composing a myth that charges the landscape and their habitation of it with significance. In a sense, to interpret the landscape in these terms is to interpret one's history in terms of myth, that is, to invest time with a consequentiality that derives from one's understanding of place. In most of his novels, Scott takes
the hero and the reader back in time by taking them to a landscape charged with significance. This constructed landscape helps readers to reconstruct official history in terms of personal significance. Using the analogy of landscape, with its unchanged contours and shifting features, he uncovers the patterns that underly the processes of history and the development of human nature, suggesting thereby the mythic underpinnings of cultural and personal identity.

II

Ivanhoe lacks a strong sense of place because Scott does not interpret its landscape in terms of the sense of significance inherent in the tension between "the wilderness and that which is not wilderness." Because the memory of the wilderness is absent from his interpretation of the landscape, the story remains within the genre of legend and hence without the mythic dimension that emerges from the intersection of personal and historical concerns with universal patterns. Scott has better success in producing a historical novel of the Middle Ages with The Talisman. In this novel he uses the landscape to render the medieval past as both accessible and mysterious, comprehensible to and yet not assimilated by the present. By locating the novel in the East, Scott capitalizes on the distance between the medieval setting and the contemporary world. He composes a landscape that highlights
the remoteness of this world and reflects the tension between the wilderness and that which is not wilderness. The novel does not dramatize this struggle in the predictable simplistic terms of East against West or heathen against Christian. Instead the opposing forces are primarily rendered in terms of personal struggles between and within the representatives of Western Christianity. The landscape dramatizes the struggle to humanize personal, individual wildernesses, and this drama is played out in mythic terms that bring the remote world alive with personal and universal significance. More pointedly than any other of Scott’s novels, The Talisman devotes several opening pages to establishing its topographical setting. Given his dependence on a sure sense of place, Scott needs time to conjure up this remote and foreign landscape in his own imagination and that of his readers. What emerges is a landscape both strange and familiar, invested with a significance that arises from two cultural paradigms: the conflict between man and nature, and the Biblical myth of a lost paradise, notably its medieval British expression in the Crusade quest for the Holy Grail.

The Talisman opens with its ostensible hero, the Crusader knight whom we later know as Sir Kenneth of Scotland. “Pacing slowly along the sandy deserts which lie in the vicinity of the Dead Sea.” This site, whose ancient significance has lent it mythic proportions, is the real hero of the novel (1:1). Before he introduces his human adversary, Saladin, Scott
spends several pages situating the knight in relation to the actual and mythic landscape, describing it in terms of infidel wilderness and Edenic garden. He identifies the landscape as the location of the infamous Sodom and Gomorrah, describing a state of desolate infertility that affords "awful testimony to the truth of the Mosaic history" (1:2). The "warlike pilgrim" contemplates the landscape in terms of his recollections of its Biblical history; in that context, he sees the Crusades as a holy mission whose purpose is to regain that "fair and fertile" Paradise that is alluded to in the epigraph from Paradise Regained. "They, too, retired/ To the wilderness." the epigraph has it, introducing the wilderness and garden of Eden opposition that controls the whole passage. "Once well watered, even as the Garden of the Lord," the traditional Christian homeland has been "converted into an arid and dismal wilderness... a parched and blighted waste, condemned to eternal sterility" (1:1). Interestingly, Sir Kenneth finds that, prompted by the landscape, his immediate personal history is "forgotten" as he remembers the social, public history that not only took place on this landscape but also transformed it into a place whose sole purpose and significance derive from its function as "testimony": the bearer of the memory of a displaced people and a lost paradise. We have here the archetypal Scott landscape, not least in terms of the Crusader's personal response. Although Sir Kenneth's memory is, of course, of a Biblical story rather
than of a story of more personal origin, he is drawn to respond as if to a personal memory because of his faith and his sense of personal implication. He sees himself, as well as the history of all humankind, implicated in the landscape.

While the description of the Dead Sea landscape is set out in terms of the conventional Biblical metaphor of the tension between the wilderness and the garden, the terms of the conflict are complicated as the description pursues the implications of the metaphor in the broader context of the conflict between nature and humankind. In fighting with the Infidel to regain the promised land, the Christian Crusader has to fight what has been transformed into a hostile and cursed land. The Dead Sea is an unnatural "inland sea," which "sends not, like other lakes, a tribute to the ocean"; the land as well "might be termed dead, as producing nothing having resemblance to vegetation"; and "the very air" is "entirely devoid of its ordinary winged inhabitants" (1:2). In "this scene of desolation the sun shone with almost intolerable splendour, and all living nature seemed to have hidden itself from the rays." Far from hiding or trying to merge with this landscape, however, the Crusader rides "singly and alone" as "the sole breathing thing" in the Dead world which he is charged to restore. Dressed in a way that is "peculiarly unfit" for this climate, "the Northern Crusaders seemed to set at defiance the nature of the climate and country" (1:2-4). But the relationship between these men and
nature is complex. The champions of the Paradisal Garden are out of their element in the wilderness, but their very displacement there is symptomatic of their redemptive mission. While they deliberately defy nature, at the same time the endurance of "fatigue and deprivations of every kind" strengthens their own natures, until habit makes endurance "a second nature" (1:4). While the Infidel is characterized by his alignment with the wilderness which he has made his home, then, the Crusader is defined by his resistance to the wilderness, a resistance that has produced a "second nature" by which he is aligned with nature in a different way. Rather than retreating from the wilderness or being absorbed by it, the Crusader sustains in himself the tension between the wilderness and that which is not wilderness. He is defined by his struggle to restore a landscape that has been made unnatural by the infidelity of men, by his Crusade to regain a promised land that is defined by its being lost.

Once he has constructed the landscape of _The Talisman_ according to its paradigmatic significance, Scott proceeds almost literally to undermine it. The actual enemy who confronts Sir Kenneth on this landscape cannot be made to fit the archetypal shape; his preeminent sense of honour during and following their combat suggests his superior chivalric standards, something the narrative will bear out. Interestingly, Scott adumbrates this ambiguous and unsettling reality by suggesting the unreliability of one's perception of
the landscape. In describing ice to the Saracen, Sir Kenneth explains: "Heat, in this climate, converts the soil into something about as unstable as water; and in my land cold often converts water itself into a substance as hard as rock" (2:15). Although the significance of the landscape is there to be read, it is determined by a personal and cultural interpretation that can be distorted or even betrayed by one's limited understanding of the natural elements. What one thinks of as "natural" is seen to be an imposition of one's culture. And although the Biblical significance of this landscape motivates the Crusades, even as it opens the novel, what the landscape finally reflects is the lostness of the promised land. Scott presents the medieval world of the Crusades in terms of its relation to the ancient Biblical world so that both the reader and the Crusaders are seen to be imposing the same cultural interpretation on the world. At the same time, because they interpret what they see in terms of the Biblical myth that underlies Western Christianity, Scott's readers, along with Sir Kenneth, see themselves implicated in the landscape.

While Scott's focus is almost always public history and the necessity for the individual to translate it into personal and universal terms, an essential part of this process of translation is always a reclaiming of one's personal history. This part of the process also involves and is imaged by one's habitation of the landscape. To realize the significance of
one's personal history is to inhabit the landscape of one's origin. Guy Mannering, one of Scott's novels of "private life," most fully dramatizes the struggle of an individual to work out his personal history by inhabiting the landscape. As he acts out a myth of dispossession and return, Harry Bertram's private life takes on significance in a way that dramatizes the integral relation of space and time. The novel dramatizes how place gives concrete shape to the abstract notions of time and personal identity by accumulating the associations that are vital to one's sense of one's "place" in the world. When the Ellangowan family are dispossessed of their home, the "paltry and wretched appearance" of the furniture, no longer "properly and decently arranged" in its place, reflects the state of people without a place that time has bound them to (13:123). For the displaced, the landscape itself assumes an alien appearance as when snow, which may "abstractedly... be called beautiful." blights a formerly familiar scene "both from the association of cold and barrenness" it brings and from the associations of familiar objects it removes (33:36-39). These images suggest that the loss of one's place turns the landscape into a snow-covered waste with no trace of the concrete things that would turn it into a significant place. Without the concrete landmarks in space that associations represent, time becomes a tractless wilderness like the Waste of Cumberland that Harry Bertram must turn into a garden (23:205). The narrative
takes Harry, the archetypal hero of unknown origins and misconstrued identity, on a ritual journey by which he repossesses the landscape. As landscape activates memory and gains associations, memory turns the landscape into a significant place—wilderness into garden—and this transforming of place in turn lends consequentiality to the lost time. Through his relationship with the landscape, Harry changes his relationship to time, using (as it were) the spatial continuum of his experience to restore the temporal continuum.

The basic movement of a character's return to the past informs the structure of almost all of Scott's novels. While Henry Morton never really charts the wilderness of his experience, Harry Bertram is able to reclaim the landscape and thus to redeem the time in a way that restores him to his lost place. Old Mortality suggests that the kind of restoration that Scott accomplishes in Guy Mannering by translating the paradigmatic conflict of individual against time, man against nature, into mythic terms is not accomplished in any such clear terms in actuality. In Old Mortality Scott presents not only the blight that is the real effect of human efforts at cultivation but also the enormity of the wilderness in contrast to these paltry efforts. Early in the novel, when Morton is on his way to the battle of Drumclog, he travels over a huge "desolate region." The narrator comments on how such a reach of waste land impresses "the mind of the
spectator with a sense of the omnipotence of Nature and the comparative inefficacy of the boasted means of amelioration which man is capable of opposing to the disadvantage of climate and soil" (15:211-212). Scott always looked upon landscape with this kind of realistic and pragmatic eye. But while he knew and deplored the devastation humankind had wrought and the proportionate futility of even genuine efforts at amelioration, he placed enough hope in the possibility of the land being restored and the relationship between nature and its human cultivators being readjusted to take an active interest in plans for reforestation and landscape gardening.

In 1827 and 1828 Scott produced two articles for the Quarterly Review that express his positive and practical view that society can correct the errors it has made in its misguided attempts to relate "the wilderness and that which is not wilderness." The first of these articles, "On Planting Wastelands," is a review of Robert Menteath's The Forester's Guide and Profitable Planter, whose author proposes a plan of joint reforestation and cultivation. In recommending this system, Scott discloses two related assumptions: that it is possible and just to restore the landscape to the natural state that preceded man's encroachment; and that nature and humankind can live together upon reciprocally beneficial terms. The resulting harmony would represent "the scene most delightful to the eye—an intermixture of pastoral and silvan scenery where Ceres, without usurping the land, finds also
spots fit for cultivation" (MPW 21:73). A scene reminiscent of the pastoral idyll of Old Mortality. In the other essay, "On Landscape Gardening," Scott makes clear that the harmony between humankind and nature depends on human control: the aim is "a triumph of human art over the elements." A triumph accomplished by applying something that is "in the highest degree artificial" in a way that produces a "symmetry and harmony" that make it seem "natural." This control is beneficent, however, because it requires receiving "from nature the impression of what the place ought to be" so that civilization's reshaping of the landscape will be a response to nature rather than an imposition on it (MPW 21:80).

These essays represent Scott's efforts to find practical ways to reconcile nature and civilization by peopling "the wild deserts [with] a hardy and moral population" for the benefit of both. They argue that it is possible to restore the losses incurred in the progress of civilization. But while Scott is able to imagine such a restoration fully enough to conceive a practical plan for its execution, he is at the same time—and just as fully—able to conceive the finality of the losses. Perhaps the most powerful of his novels derive their force from the tension that results when he imagines with equal intensity both gains and losses, as in Old Mortality. But this tension is always at work in Scott because he is always, though usually in separate works, imagining gains and commensurate losses. These Quarterly
essays are a case in point. By restoring the losses incurred by progress, he concludes in "On Planting Wastelands," "the melancholy maxim of the poet would be confounded, and the race of bold peasantry, whom want and devastation had driven from these vast wilds, would be restored to their native country" (MPW 21:74). Ironically, however, in expressing his belief in the possibility of such a restoration, he is confounding not only the poet of "The Deserted Village" but also the Author of Waverley, for whom restoration can be given credence only in metaphorical form.

Still, even metaphorical restoration is crucial, just because it incorporates the losses of which Scott the novelist never lost sight. Perhaps, indeed, the most substantial claim to credibility for him was to be "one that hath had loss," as the displaced Scot who narrates Quentin Durward describes himself (xxiii). The archetypal "one that hath had loss" is the prodigal son, and it is a self-styled prodigal son. Chrystal Croftangry of Chronicles of the Canongate, who best exemplifies Scott's sense that individuals and societies work out their relationship with their world not so much in terms of gains/losses or wilderness/that which is not wilderness as in terms of both of these poles at once.

In the same year that he produces the landscape essays that speak so sanguinely of restoration of losses, Scott also creates Chrystal Croftangry, a character who accomplishes personal restoration in the much more ambiguous sense of
metaphor. Like Harry Bertram, Chrystal Croftangry changes his relationship to his personal history by changing his relationship to the landscape. And like Harry, Chrystal learns to render his time significant when his memory encounters the landscape in a new way. But unlike Harry, Chrystal has incurred the loss of his place of origin by his own prodigality, which has meant not only a material but also a spiritual loss of his place: just as he squandered his material property, so he squandered its immaterial value by failing to realize its significance. Although he does experience a spiritual recovery of his place, it is a decidedly metaphorical one. Once misfortune leads the prodigal as an older and wiser man to long for a home that is no longer his to possess, his memory is activated, as was Harry Bertram's, by the discovery of what he calls "a natural taste" for "the beauties of nature which had once surrounded me in the home of my forefathers" (2:26). Although he had formed in his youth no "associations of a sentimental kind," he now finds that even the "ideas" of his past pleasures "recalled by degrees pictures of which I had since learned to appreciate the merit" (25). Even though they are "seen" only through memory, these scenes now emerge with a latent significance. In fact, Chrystal is able to recall the landscape because of the significance with which he had unconsciously invested it in the way that Paulson describes. Chrystal begins to have "recollections" of scenes where he had
in the past fished, hunted, trained colts, and revelled. And he can now recognize a significance that he was unconscious of at the time in scenes of "silent loneliness" and natural beauty (25). Other places he remembers, he finds, because of the associations prompted by stories, traditions, and legends (25-26). Unknown to his conscious mind, Chrystal had been investing the landscapes of his youth with a consequentiality that memory could later discover. He explains his latent appreciation of these landscapes by saying that as a young man he had "looked upon" them "with the eyes indeed of my body, but without those of my understanding." These scenes, he says, had been retained as the dormant "neglected stores which my memory had involuntarily recorded," and these stores are there to be "ransacked" years later by his rediscovered "natural taste." "When excited," he comments, the memory becomes a voluntary activity that "exerted herself to collect and complete" the scenes made available to it "piece by piece." Out of these now significant individual scenes, the voluntary memory constructs "finished landscapes," which only then become "visible before the eyes of my imagination" (26).

While he can restore these landscapes of the past by retroactively investing them with significance, however, actually reclaiming the landscapes of the present is another matter. Because of the very associations that enliven the landscape with reminders of the losses his prodigality has
incurred. Chrystal is not able to recover and inhabit his property, even as he cannot really recover his wasted time. The ruins of Castle Treddles reflect a destruction that cannot be "composed." He finally abandons his attempt to restore the ruins when the family servant withholds the forgiveness he needs and advises him not to try to redeem himself with those who remember the past but to live instead among people who "dinna ken the evil of his former days" (4:53). Realizing then that he has been acting "as if it had been possible to escape from my own recollections," Chrystal "totally abandoned the idea of redeeming any part of my paternal property" (55–56). The only way Chrystal can effect some redemption of the past is to distance himself from it, and he does this in two ways. First, he voluntarily moves back to the place in which he had lived as an imprisoned debtor; having redeemed that debt, he is free to redeem that place. This is a move from the estate of his forefathers to the city, and so it is literally "fræ the field to the habited place," as his landlady says (5:64). But it is also a transforming of his personal wilderness to a garden. His new home is inside the city boundaries but within sight of the wilderness, so that the memory of the past is always there to chaste his experience of the present. Chrystal's second strategy for distancing himself from the past is also a way of inhabiting it in a different, safer way: he uses narrative as a way of allowing the imagination to compose the past into a palatable
shape. By becoming the Chronicler of the Canongate, Crystal
displaces his sense of loss onto a cultural and national myth,
retracing his own past in the archives of a communal memory
and diverting his own grief into a response to a shared
tragedy.

This metaphorical recovery of his place is dramatized in
the Introduction to one of the Chronicles, "My Aunt Margaret's
Mirror." Chrystal describes here his customary walk to visit
his aged aunt across a piece of land which once belonged to
his family and is now the object of a "threatened
devastation." "I regret the alteration of the ground," he
says, "only because it destroys associations," and even
painful associations are valuable to him because of their
significance as traces of the past (251). This significant
place is so integral to him that he finds that looking at it
is like looking at his old self. and comparing "the thing I
was and that which I now am... almost induces me to doubt my
own identity" (252). In his relationship to the landscape,
Chrystal finds himself the arena for the dialectic between the
gains and losses of time, between the wilderness and that
which is not wilderness. Unlike Wordsworth, who contemplates
the landscape in terms of his self and emerges with a sense of
what Abrams calls "a felicity that incorporates the memory of
what it was to have lacked it," Chrystal contemplates himself
in terms of the landscape and is almost overwhelmed by the
sense of irrecoverable loss (Abrams 116). But he is not
overwhelmed, mainly because of what awaits him at the end of his habitual journey—his storytelling Aunt Margaret: "one being on whom time seems to have made little impression" (253). Unlike the landscape that reflects back the losses incurred over time. Aunt Margaret’s stories are like a mirror through which Chrystal can "look back to the past and forget [his] present fallen fortunes" (254). For Chrystal, as for Scott, the losses metaphorically written in the landscape are metaphorically redeemed by narrative.

Although most of Chrystal’s narrative ventures take him into Scott’s most comfortable narrative world—the domain of oral tradition—Scott also leads the Chronicler into the more challenging territory of written historical records, and from these emerges Scott’s most accomplished medieval novel, *The Fair Maid of Perth*. One reason for the success of this novel may be that its action occurs more than two hundred years later than that of any of the other medieval novels, but the most obvious and salient reason for its success is a matter, not of time, but of place. Scott is able to bring to life this remote time—"the last years of the fourteenth century" (1:20)—because of the present reality and significance of the landscape in which the story is set. The "Introductory" chapter suggests the way that Scott will use landscape in the novel to establish the balance between association and dissociation that will allow himself and his readers to engage in what Lukacs calls a "felt relationship" with the past
without sacrificing "historical faithfulness" (Lukacs 53.59).

To introduce this novel of a remote time, Scott begins by establishing, as a secondary setting for the storytelling, Holy Rood Castle, a place rife with associations from Scottish history. Himself the agent of Scott's necessary narrative dissociation, the "knight of Croftangry" acts here as the veritable champion of associations when he intervenes to save the bloodstains from Rizzio's body from eradication at the hands of the eager—and English—salesman of an "Infallible Detergent Elixir" (7.5). Having prevented the "dreadful deed," Chrystal takes pains to explain to the insensitive Londoner, who profits from cleansing the present from the stains of the past, "that there were such things in the world as stains which ought to remain indelible, on account of the associations with which they are connected" (4.5). Later, Chrystal's cousin, Mrs. Baliol, herself a remnant of a lost world, encourages him to capitalize on the power of such associations and on the privilege that being sensitive to them has earned him by spending time in Holy Rood Castle "merely to improve the imagination." She wonders: "Who knows what dreams might be produced by a night spent in a mansion of so many memories!" (10). When Chrystal demurs, saying that he cannot compete with writers like the historian William Robertson, his cousin argues that he is not a historian, one who carries "a lamp to illuminate the dark events of antiquity," but rather "a romantic historian," one who uses "a
magic lantern to raise up wonders which never existed" (12).

Mrs. Baliol sees the job of a romantic historian like Chrystal as charting by means of narrative all the "wildernesses" which are too remote for the "actual survey" of a historian. "Imperfect tradition," she says, "fills up with wonders and with legends the periods in which no real events are recognized to have taken place," and this is the territory for the romantic historian's magic lantern (13). Mrs. Baliol's final phrase ("periods in which no real events are recognized to have taken place") recalls Paulson's definition of wilderness as a landscape without significance to the viewer. In a sense, Chrystal's fictional entry into a wilderness is an attempt to endow it with significance, to turn wonders and legends into "real events." Mrs. Baliol is also using "wildernesses" as a metaphor, seeing time in terms of place, thereby anticipating Chrystal Croftangry's own pattern in the novel where he moves into the metaphorical wilderness of "a remote period of history," and turns it into a Paulsonian garden of significance by imaginatively inhabiting the actual landscape of a familiar place and drawing upon the associations arising from its personal significance for a personally unknown time.

Having established in this introductory section a sense of the novel's generic context, as well as a vicarious sense of historical associations, Scott can then use the first chapter of the novel to establish a vicarious landscape and a
sense of personal associations. At the end of the introductory section, Chrystal says that the setting of the novel—Perth and its environs—is "removed from [his] natural sphere," but the vividness of the description of the setting that occupies the first chapter of the novel makes clear that however "removed" the scene might be from his and Scott's present empirical perception, it is very close and alive to the eye of imagination and memory (13). It seems to lie, indeed, "almost under the immediate eye" of the observer. Employing the aesthetic categories of his day, Chrystal Croftangry describes the scene's features as "most interesting," "most picturesque," "most romantic." The scene exhibits the admired "variety" of the combination of "the vegetation of a happier climate and soil" with "the magnificent characteristics of mountain scenery" and lush woodland. "What the poet Gray, or someone else, has termed, Beauty in the lap of Terror." Chrystal notes, is to be found here in abundance. Moreover, it is the scene of events of "historical importance," as well as of those "recorded in popular tradition alone" (1:16). Even more vital to its status as a significant place, however, are the personal associations with which this scene is charged. In describing a certain view of Perth and its surrounding countryside—"one of the most beautiful points of view which Britain, or perhaps the world, can afford"—Chrystal regrets that the approach which afforded this view is no longer available simply by
means of the roadway. One must now seek it out, and this means that one has already been deprived of "the exquisite charm which surprise gives to pleasure, when so splendid a view arises when least expected or hoped for"—as it did for a young Chrystal Croftangry (18). Of course, such a view of the spot will never arise again for Chrystal Croftangry, either, and so the reader joins him in reconstructing a landscape that, like the world of the novel, is available only to the memory with the help of the imagination.

Croftangry finds that even after more than fifty years, "the recollection of that inimitable landscape has possessed the strongest influence over my mind, and retained its place as a memorable thing, when much that was influential on my own fortunes has fled from my recollection." As a testimony to the strength of the "impression" made by the scenery of the environs of Perth on his youthful imagination, the novel transforms the wilderness of the remote period in which it is set into a significant place where real events come alive. The fact is especially remarkable when we recognize that The Fair Maid of Perth is very much a story of the title city and of bourgeois city life in general, rather than a novel of rural life and landscape. What this suggests is that the landscape is important less as the setting for the narrative than as the setting for Scott's imagination, an imagination most profoundly stirred when grounded in a remembered place.
CHAPTER FOUR

Repetition, Reversal, and the Gothic:
The Pirate, St. Ronan's Well, and Redgauntlet

As Chrystal Croftangry takes up geographical residence in a border territory—within the city and within sight of the "hill and crags of the King's Park" (5:65)—he also takes a metaphorical residence within imaginative sight of his own wilderness. Chrystal's situation is emblematic of Scott's need to imagine simultaneously the wilderness and that which is not wilderness and to dramatize the tension between them. The same tension between two opposing poles animates many of Scott's characters, caught up in a pattern of doubling and repetition that prompts a struggle to choose between alternatives. But what fascinates Scott is the possibility of reversal: all of his novels dramatize the tension generated by the potential inversion of an essentially good entity or structure into its opposite. The sense of dynamically opposed alternatives charges Scott's characters and his narratives with a sense of ambiguity and potentiality that finds analogous generic expression in a tension between romance and Gothic. The real fascination and danger for Scott lie in the
similarity between the two and the ease with which the rational beneficence of romance can be inverted to become the irrational malignancy of its Gothic alternative. In all of his novels the romance world is challenged to define itself by resisting its Gothic adversary and assimilating and converting its negative energy.

This struggle is all the more interesting and complex because the relationship between the two genres is one of sympathy as well as opposition. Their affinity and their rivalry are natural in that they originate in a common matrix, like identical twins who pursue opposite courses. The basic principle of both the romance and the Gothic world, Judith Wilt has shown, is duality. But duality, she argues, is an inherently unstable principle, and both these genres move towards oneness, though in very different ways. Whereas the Gothic world "seeks collapse into oneness," the romance world "seeks... to marshall itself into unity" by generating "a third term" (Ghosts of the Gothic 23). The oneness of the Gothic is thus achieved when one constituent term of the duality has absorbed or overpowered its opposite, while the oneness of romance is achieved when the two terms create a third term that unites them. The oneness of the Gothic is that of dominance; the oneness of romance is that of interrelationship. The Gothic oneness establishes the self at the expense of the other, but it does so by negating or destroying the possibility for continuance; the oneness of
romance, on the other hand, compromises the self, but in a way that establishes it as part of a continuing society.

The primary duality of the traditional society is between parents and child, who work out a delicate balance, with one generation always in decline and the other in ascendancy. The stability of the society depends upon the child deferring to the parents until it is time for the parents to defer to the child. In the Gothic world, one of these three is always contesting and subverting this process and working to destabilize society and establish its own power. In the romance world, the ongoing process whereby the duality of man and woman generates a child enacts the creative instability that establishes the traditional hierarchical order of inheritance.

At issue in both fictional modes—and at the centre of the Waverley Novels—is the question of the origin and basis of authority. The mere possibility of doubleness or repetition, whether of a parent in a child or of a substance in an image, raises the question of authority. J. Hillis Miller suggests some of the implications of doubleness for social and literary structures in his study of *Fiction and Repetition* when he invokes Gilles Deleuze's distinction between Platonic and Nietzschean repetition. "What Deleuze calls 'Platonic' repetition," Miller states, "is grounded in a solid archetypal model which is untouched by the effects of repetition." It produces "copies," whose "validity is
established by [their] truth of correspondence" to that model (Miller 6). This "Platonic" kind of doubleness is essentially hierarchical and mimetic: it affirms the substantial and original reality of the archetype from which copies derive their reflected and contingent substance. This kind of doubleness underlies the authority structure of the traditional society and family, whose king or father derives his authority by divine right and whose first-born, legitimate son is heir to that authority because he is seen to "repeat" his father most closely. Romance works with this Platonic model, which depends on an affirmation of what Miller calls "a third thing, . . . a principle of identity which precedes" the copies (Miller 9). Nietzschean doubling, by contrast, affirms no such pre-established authority. Looking at the same world, it too sees resemblances but as evidence that the world is "based on difference" (Miller 6). Implicit in this characteristically Gothic kind of doubling is the subversion of hierarchy, the negation of a single absolute authority, and, ultimately, the denial of a referent or substance. What results from this second view are not "copies" of an original (as in the Platonic model) but "underground doublings which arise from differential interrelations among elements which are all on the same plane." Whereas the Platonic "grounding in some paradigm or archetype" produces a "firmly anchored" sort of repetition, Miller notes, the lack of such grounding makes the Nietzschean kind of repetition "ghostly" by
comparison (6). In a sense, in this second model resemblance can only resemble resemblance, and similarity represent the lack of identity or correspondence.

According to the Platonic model structuring the romance world, however, resemblance implies a relationship based on a shared correspondence with an authoritative third thing that establishes a hierarchy of relations. The duality of romance is always part of a triad that establishes the relationship between the doubles. It never gives way, as in the Gothic, to mere doubleness, whereby without an authoritative third thing to define the relationship between them, doubles can only reflect one another. Insofar as parent and child see their authority in Platonic terms as derived from and contingent upon their repetition of a preceding order, doubleness becomes the regenerating duality of romance. As soon as parents or children want to assert themselves as the archetype, they resist regenerative doubling and activate Nietszchean repetition whereby doubleness is merely arbitrary repetition and always subject to one's double absorbing or unmaking the other. In the Gothic world, authority is never given as the "natural" consequence of one's place in an established hierarchy; it has always been usurped and is therefore always at risk of being taken away. In this situation, a "double" is always a threat because of his resemblance to oneself: he may easily displace one's self and declare himself the true heir and oneself a mere imitation.
"In Scott", George Levine says, almost everything "leads a double life" (Levine 93). The Waverley Novels are full of doubled characters, and the existence of doubles always indicates a disorder that is symptomatic of the existence of a Nietzschean threat to the traditional hierarchical structure of society. The Pirate is paradigmatic. For all its realist detail and earthiness, it is structured archetypically. Its temporal setting at the turn of a century (1700) locates the action at one of those inherently significant epochs when, as Frank Kermode argues, history discloses apocalyptic moments. And its geographical setting—the isolated island of Zetland, which knows about the modern world of chronological historical time but lives its real life according to the elementary forces of nature and its ancient cyclic time—helps to locate the novel's concerns in an archetypal order. The main characters are all implicated together in a pattern of "underground doublings" that is an index to the Nietzschean order that underlies this world—itself a disorder that resembles order. In classic Gothic fashion, the order of the novel's world is eventually disclosed to have been undermined by a Nietzschean choice made two generations earlier when two brothers clashed in a "discord" over property rights. According to Ulla Troil (Norna), daughter of the younger brother, who recounts the fraternal dispute to Minna and Brenda Troil, granddaughters of the other brother, her father blames their father for what he considers an unfair division
of the family property (19:297). The younger brother symbolically seals this challenge to the traditional order when he engages in forbidden occult practices, and his daughter extends his rebellion when she first follows her father in occult matters and then, ironically, rebels against him in choosing a forbidden stranger in favour of her father's chosen suitor. Her rebellion, in turn, is symbolized by her supposed parricide, a murder that seems to fulfill an occult saying predicting that she will earn supernatural powers over the natural order.

This is the secret past which reaches forward into the novel's present in which the four main characters are caught up in a pattern of Gothic doublings in a number of ways. The two young men—Cleveland, the pirate, and Mordaunt, the resident hero—are half-brothers, both sons of the original stranger (the senior Mordaunt, alias Vaughan), who repeat the fraternal discord of the past. Their rivalry over a woman dramatizes the classic Gothic struggle between two brothers, each of whom feels he must make himself by unmaking his counterpart. Cleveland and Minna (daughter of his mother's rejected suitor, Magnus Troil) also repeat the pattern by which an earlier woman, Cleveland's mother, Ulla Troil (Norna), fell in love with a stranger. The Nietszchean energy of doubleness shows its most explicit and intense power in the minds of Cleveland and his mother, both of whom are plagued by double selves. Norna manifests what Scott calls in a note the
"sort of double character" that is evidence of a certain kind of insanity, while her son feels himself to be "two different characters" (Note V, 341: 22:31). Just as Cleveland and Norna renounce the "demons" of their alternative: rebellious selves, Scott, as it were, casts out the demon of doublenness and restores the principle of Platonic repetition in the world of the novel.

The narrator describes the restoration of order in spiritual terms and dramatizes it primarily in the "conversions" of Cleveland and Norna, conversions which are largely credited to the "angel" Minna (22:41). But the narrator's obvious reservations about the credibility of these conversions (and his almost besotted adoration of the Angel) tend to deflate their narrative force. The effective narrative force for the restoring of order comes from yet another doubling—a Platonic pattern of duality that overcomes or resolves the Gothic spirit of mere doubleness. The present generation of The Pirate is required to live out the consequences of the choices of their parents, but these children are able to break the spell of doubleness just because there are four of them: Minna and Cleveland are prevented from repeating their parents' unhappy fate because of their relationship with Brenda and Mordaunt. The original parental pattern was a result of a twisted, Gothic vision of the significance of resemblance and difference. For the Gothic younger brother, his resemblance to his brother was a
problem that compelled him to assert his differentness. To
the rebelling child, the resemblance of the chosen suitor was
a problem that compelled the choosing of another, whose
difference from the father would assert her own difference.
The young generation of The Pirate must reaffirm the positive
balance between resemblance and difference essential to the
establishing of the traditional society, and the process by
which they do this is dramatized in highly charged symbolic
terms because it represents a ritualistic undoing of the
Gothic spell, as their converse choices reverse those of their
parents and establish instead the basis for conventionally
positive relationships.

At the most obvious level, Mordaunt and Brenda counteract
the potentially Nietzschean choice of Minna and Cleveland when
each of them chooses in one another a kindred mate rather than
a stranger. Scott emphasizes the significance and power
latent in what would otherwise be taken as a conventional
romance choice when he analyzes the complex interplay of will
and desire and circumstance that underlies it. The narrator
analyzes the crisis that occurs with the advent of Cleveland
in a way that disclose the primitive dynamics that are at
work. Until the rival male (Cleveland) appears, the resident
male (Mordaunt) is satisfied "to treat [the two females] as an
affectionate and attached brother might have treated two
sisters" (3:34). The sisters are "equally dear" to him, but
this affection is defined by an essentially asexual, child's
sense of kinship. So tenuous is the young male's hold on this impartial regard for the two females, so tenuous is his residence in what the narrator calls "the dubious neutral ground between love and friendship." that a "breath" would have wafted him to one side or the other (16:252: 3:34). This breath is provided by the attention bestowed on the females by an intruding male. Choosing to recognize the "authority" of love over that of friendship and the authority of woman over that of sister transforms the male from a friend into a lover, from a child into a man (16:252). A similar choice by the female also transforms her from a sister/friend into a lover, from a child into a woman.

Cleveland's arrival equally precipitates a crisis in the relationship between the two sisters, who experience their first conflict over their responses to the two men. Until the intruding stranger arrives, Minna and Brenda have been complementary halves of a single whole, defined and valued in relation to one another and according to the judgement of two men in their lives—their father and sometime brother.

Mordaunt. The kinship between the sisters has been figured so as to suggest an archetypal ordering—they are Night and Day. The change in their relationship is dramatized when Minna, responding to her lover's voice, must break away from the sister sleeping in her arms "in the attitude of a child... in the arms of its nurse." after having "sobbed herself asleep, like a child, upon her mother's bosom" (23:46,44). This scene
suggests a ritual movement whereby the women must cease to be
mother and child and even sister to one another and make their
relationship to a man—an other—primary and definitive.

When Mordaunt and Brenda choose one another, they choose
someone who is like themselves (not a stranger) but not too
like (not of the same sex or blood). Mordaunt's choice of
Brenda is interesting in that he first chooses Minna because
his rival has chosen her and she has rejected Mordaunt in
favour of him, but he then overrides this essentially negative
reactive choice by an equally reactive but essentially
positive choice of the lover who has chosen to love him. In
making a choice prompted by the positive impulse of love,
rather than the negative impulse of power, and making a choice
to transform a potential sibling (rather than a stranger) into
a lover, Mordaunt and Brenda are re-establishing the Platonic
model that is central to the traditional order of inheritance.

While both the men and the women must define themselves
apart from their double, Scott represents symbolically their
mutual implication, primarily in the curious interdependence
of Mordaunt and Cleveland. Although they are rivals and their
feelings towards one another reflect that basic antipathy, the
action which defines their relationship is Mordaunt's rescue
of his rival—a gesture of selflessness and deference to the
other made "not without a struggle for his own life" (7:112).
Cleveland later rescues Mordaunt, an action which, despite his
feeling of taking his revenge by it, confirms their basic
relationship. Again, when Minna breaks from her sister (and her sister-self) in response to her lover's call, she looks out to see the two men in a rather ambiguous posture of rescue. She sees "a shadow... the substance of which must have been in the act of turning a corner" (3:49). One man carries the other—"his fatal burden"—but "which of the unhappy men had fallen," which is the rescuer, which the rescued, remains an open question (3:49.55). The indeterminacy of this image reinforces the sense of mutual implication that characterizes the relationship between the brothers. Because they rescue one another even as they threaten one another, they must always define themselves with, as well as against, one another in a mutually sustaining balance between resemblance and difference. The world of The Pirate, where archetypal characters play out symbolic scenes, is modelled according to mythic patterns, rather than those of realist narrative, and the restoration of the Platonic order is achieved symbolically rather than substantially, as Scott imposes a spiritual resolution upon the ethical disorder and a symbolic resolution upon the generic one.

II

In St. Ronan's Well, by contrast, Scott pursues the logic of the Nietzschean spirit of repetition to its destructive conclusion. Doubleness, rather than duality, is the ordering
principle of the spa and of the novel that bears its name. "Thither come the saunterer." Scott comments wryly in his Introduction, "anxious to get rid of that wearisome attendant himself, and thither come both males and females, who, upon a different principle, desire to make themselves double" (xviii). While these activities are the stock-in-trade of a satiric comedy of "the shifting manners of our own time" (xvii) and provide scope for some of Scott's sharpest wit and most bitter irony, they also describe the more insidious activities that constitute the tale of Gothic horror that is the underside of the comedy. Like the gambling that is its prevailing vice, the world of the spa is "founded entirely on the cold-blooded calculation of the most exclusive selfishness" (xxi). Its self-interest is manifested in the form of the petty vanities, hypocrisies and rivalries typical of the world of satire, but a cruel and bitter edge discloses the dark Gothic origins of the comedy: these vices are but farcical versions of the deadly crimes of deceit and betrayal that have poisoned relations among the main characters and undermined the aristocratic family structure that is the foundation of traditional order.

The novel's central family conflict over a woman and her property is the scene for a more fundamental conflict of identity. As in The Pirate, the conflict is between two half-brothers who are part of a symbolic pattern of doubles, and, as usual in the Gothic world, the sins of the fathers are
visited upon the children. The two brothers—Valentine Bulmer (current Lord Etherington) and Francis Tyrrel—arrive at St. Ronan's at the same time and immediately resume an ongoing conflict not only between themselves but between themselves and their dead father. Bulmer, Scott's most brazenly self-conscious antihero, carries on with his brother the conflict that their father had initiated, a conflict which is essentially a struggle "to keep himself fixed and immortal." (Ghosts 12).

Lord Etherington (deranged and now deceased) disrupted the normal social and family structure in a doubly Gothic fashion by committing bigamy, an expression of his insidious desire to sabotage the natural continuity of the generations by engendering in his two wives and two sons a perpetual conflict that would indefinitely establish his own authority and precedence. His bigamy has unleashed the force of Nietzschean repetition, producing two sons who resemble one another and equally resemble their father. With each equally entitled to declare his own precedence over the other as the son more like the father and consequently the heir, the two brothers are engaged in a life and death struggle, for their father's bigamy has undermined the social structure that provides the standards for distinguishing between the true heir and the pretender. Bigamy sabotages these standards by creating ambiguity. Because precedence is at issue, Bulmer must make his brother's identity relative to his own, lest his
own identity become relative to that of his brother. Identity has become relative and authority arbitrary because their father, in taking two wives, has violated the hierarchical structure and undermined the principle by which the one (the elder, legitimate heir) takes precedence over the other. With his arbitrary conferring and withholding of legitimacy, the father asserts his own authority against that of society. He also struggles against the natural order: by suspending power between his sons, he is in fact keeping it to himself. Blocking the natural course by which one generation cedes its life to the next. He struggles against his son, not by trying to kill him, but by producing another son who poses a threat to the very being of his brother. Their mortal conflict effectively stops time, suspends generation, and perpetuates the life of the father.

As a bigamist, Lord Etherington violates marriage, which is to Scott "at once the institution of civil society most favourable to religion and good order, and that which, in its consequences, forms the most marked distinction between man and the lower animals" ("Robert Bage," Lives 287). The decadence of the society at St. Ronan's is a consequence of Etherington's social sin. With a kind of ironic justice, the progeny of his double marriage meet their tragic fates in the form of a double marriage of a different kind, repeating with a difference the choices of the previous generation, as did the younger generation of The Pirate. Although Bulmer is
distinguished by the remarkable self-will and duplicity with which he perpetuates the error of his father, he is also right to see himself as caught up with his brother, in spite of themselves, "in one of the strangest and most entangled mazes that [Fortune] ever wove" (25:90). In peculiarly Gothic fashion, Bulmer is bound not only to act out the confusion his father engendered in trying to be husband of two wives but also to further it wilfully in a way that makes the sin his own. The confusion of the second generation resembles and inverts that of the first in that the tragedy of the sons is to be two husbands to one wife.

When the senior Lord Etherington undermines the family structure and invites the anarchic rule of arbitrary authority, he introduces the possibility that resemblance will be taken for identification. He asserts the identification and virtual interchangeability of his sons when he brings Tyrrel (son of his first wife) into the household of his second, thus effecting what his second son calls an "unseemly conjunction of the legitimate and illegitimate" (25:88). Like Cain and Abel, these brothers must be "always at hazard. each to each" (Ghosts 12). In a letter to his friend Jekyll in which he is rehearsing the family history, Bulmer expresses his sense of their desperate struggle; he sees his very being as dependent upon denying his brother's identity in order to assert—or perhaps create—his own. Edmund-like, Bulmer tells Jekyll: "I do not hate him more than the first born of Egypt
are in general hated by those whom they exclude from entailed estates, and so forth—not one landed man of twenty of us that is not hated by his younger brothers, to the extent of wishing him quiet in his grave, as an abominable stumbling-block to their path of life" (26:106). Bulmer's identity depends upon his asserting the difference between himself and his brother; the resemblance of his "double" is a threat to his position, his rights, his name. To assure his own identity Bulmer must invert his brother's. Consequently, he questions their relation ("How am I to know that this plaguy fellow is actually related to me?"); Tyrrel's origin ("Of this union is said to have sprung [for I am determined not to be certain on that point]..."'); and his name ("Francis Tyrrel, as he calls himself") (25:85-87).

But although he struggles to separate himself from his brother, Bulmer feels an opposing force binding them together. He feels the paradoxical attraction and repulsion of brothers, who must simultaneously affirm similarity and difference. While he felt his brother's "fortunes" to be "in direct opposition to my own," he writes, his father insisted that they be "coupled up like two pointers in a dog-cart" (25:91,90). Their very names symbolize their father's power in asserting their identification. Though their father calls them cousins and advises his second son to go by his maternal grandfather's name of Valentine Bulmer, he gives the two sons the same first name of Francis in an attempt to make it
impossible to distinguish between them and thus ever to identify the heir to whom he would have to defer. As the father merges the sons together in one name, so one sibling attempts to absorb the other by calling himself Francis Valentine Bulmer Tyrrel, thus absorbing his brother's name into his own.

Bulmer capitalizes on the likeness between himself and his brother in another way by displacing Francis in the duality that he attempts to form with Clara Morbray. - Like his father, who "spoke of the marriage like a land-surveyor, but of the estate of Nettlewood like an impassioned lover." Bulmer sees the prospective wife as nothing but property (25:98). In an insidious perversion of the romantic convention and of the comic convention of mistaken identities and exchanged brides, the two come together in a ceremony that establishes indeed the identity of the man (as the true husband surrenders his right to his name and his wife) but undermines that of the woman, who is compared to Ophelia in her consequent disintegration. The tragic fates of the lovers is assured, however, less by the duplicity of the other self than by their own complicity in the duplicity and inversion that he imposes upon them. In not simply allowing his brother to take precedence over him but giving him that precedence (actually in inheritance and effectively in marriage). Tyrrel—the true legitimate elder son—participates in the inversion of the natural order that his father and brother have engineered.
And he and Clara ratify the duplicity of the false self by accepting the form and appearance of marriage as the thing itself and identifying the acting out of the ceremony as an actual marriage. The false ceremony mistaken as the true casts what Clara feels as a kind of "spell" over them, preventing the real union of the true husband and wife from ever taking place (11:175). This spell blights their minds and spirits, so that the mature Francis and Clara of the novel's present "meet as shadows in the land of dreams" (9:136 [Epigraph]). For both of them, mistaking that reflected other for the true self has turned them into shadowy reflections of their true selves.

Unlike the four young people of The Pirate, the young generation of St. Ronan's Well does not have the will or ability to distinguish and affirm the true heir, the true self, over the false pretender, because its parents have undermined the social structure that would provide the requisite standards. Unlike Cleveland, Bulmer can pursue his villainy without the inhibition of social or spiritual restraints. And whereas the innocence of Mordaunt, Brenda, and Minna was safeguarded, the innocence of Clara and Tyrrel, without a social context to validate and protect it, is entirely at the mercy of the evil Gothic spirit. The attempt to form a false duality constitutes a betrayal of society and of the individual. The spirit of betrayal and the consequent disintegration are farcically manifest in the society at the
Well and tragically manifest in the mind of Clara Mowbray. When Clara rejects the available social context because of its falsity, her consequent mental deterioration testifies, ironically enough, to her need for a social context. Social "forms and restraints" are needful, the narrator asserts, "less in respect to others than to ourselves" (7:113).

Clara's desperate sense of her need for a social identity drives her to try to re-form a lost duality, the innocent one of sister and brother. Labouring under an unaccountable guilt, Clara feels herself "under a potent charm that prevents me alike from shedding tears and from confessing my crimes" (11:175). What Clara feels here is the charm of the past and the weight of crimes that are and are not her own. The guilt she feels is the anguish of loss and betrayal that is in a sense endemic to passing from childhood to adulthood but becomes the peculiar burden of a child whose maturation has somehow been thwarted by the parent. To Clara in her fragile state, maturity itself is her crime. Bewildered by her suffering, she feels that she and Tyrrel must be to blame simply for wanting to grow up: "You and I would, you know, become men and women, while we were yet scarcely more than children" (9:143). The only way to expiate or at least quiet this guilt and recover innocence, she feels, is to revert to the pre-adult, asexual duality she had with her brother, John. Unfortunately, it is John who most wants her to betray herself into a false duality by marrying Etherington, the
false double. The fact that John's besetting vice is gambling is symptomatic of that "most exclusive selfishness" that overrides any responsibility or care for another and prevents him from providing the true social context that Clara needs. And this failure to defer to the other is symptomatic of the Nietszchean malaise that leads to Clara's death and to the "demolition" of St. Ronan's (39:317).

In Scott's Gothic world the antihero subverts the principle of Platonic repetition by substituting mere doubleness for the duality that is the foundation not only of romance but of the traditional social order. The Gothic vision betrays the duality by fabricating false dualities based on the doubling of the self, and Scott symbolizes this betrayal in two opposite but similar perversions, incest and bigamy. For Scott, these two most attractive and most repulsive of sins define the boundaries between romance and Gothic, the natural and the unnatural, order and chaos. Throughout the Waverley Novels, the duality of romance must define itself in its struggle with the Gothic alternatives symbolized in these two sins. In The Pirate, Mordaunt and Minna and Brenda are involved in a relationship in which they are protected from incest by the existence of a "third term." While Mordaunt is not the actual brother of the women, of course, the fact that he treats them as if he were both allows for the innocent involvement of the three and suspends their maturation. Their almost simultaneous movement beyond this
relationship is a movement towards sexuality, a sexuality which is immediately defined, with the arrival of Cleveland, as heterosexual and non-incestuous. In other words, Minna has served as a symbolic "third term" to prevent Brenda and Mordaunt from forming the kind of closed, Gothic doubling of incest. When they are old enough to be brother and sister no longer, Minna steps aside (to form her own duality) and makes way for the third term of a forthcoming generation. Mordaunt and Brenda are then able to form a duality (based on their continual openness to the "third term" represented in the next generation) rather than an incestuous doubling. Their duality both re-establishes the traditional social order and establishes the novel in the genre of romance. In *St. Ronan's Well* the absence of a normalizing third term (represented in John's inveterate selfishness and the breakdown of the possibility of duality) makes an innocent brother-sister duality impossible. Clara and the world of St. Ronan's must die. In this novel bigamy is the more symbolic sin, representative of the attempt by the Gothic antihero to replace duality with a triad by which he can multiply himself without being threatened.

III

Scott had not finished writing *St. Ronan's Well* when he began writing *Redgauntlet*, the antithetical "double" of its
Gothic predecessor. The two novels are, as Joan Elbers puts it, "reverse images of each other" (155), with the later novel vindicating the possibilities for freedom in the midst of constraint and stability in the midst of change that the earlier novel had, with grim determinism, undercut. Put another way, these novels are doubles that reflect not only reverse images of each other but also alternate images of the same world. Where Scott uses doubles in *St. Ronan's Well* to dramatize the subversion of the positive relationship between resemblance and difference, in *Redgauntlet* he uses doubles to restore the proper balance between the two and to establish that such balancing is the source of the sustaining duality of romance. Struggling with its Gothic alternative, the novel achieves at the generic level its own salutary balance between resemblance and difference as it assimilates and remakes instead of merely repeats, the pattern of its predecessor. Both novels assume the mutual implication of the self and society, but whereas in *St. Ronan's Well* this leads to their mutual demise, in *Redgauntlet* it is the basis for the establishing of individual and social identity. In the earlier, Gothic novel the inherent instability of duality makes it vulnerable to being reduced to a destabilizing doubleness. *Redgauntlet*, by contrast, dramatizes how doubleness is turned to account for the establishing of duality. In it Scott remakes the Gothic shapes of incest and bigamy by using the same triad of doubled heroes and a heroine
to restore the integrity of romance.

Redgauntlet offers a whole pattern of doublings, a pattern most obvious in its heroes. Instead of a hero who is in conflict with an antihero, this novel features two heroes—Darsie Latimer and Alan Fairford—who in a literal and metaphorical sense are in correspondence with one another. Scott makes of them one composite hero, two selves who complete, rather than compete with, one another. Unlike Francis Tyrrel, who is nothing but a threat to the resident brother whose household he joins, Darsie Latimer becomes like a brother to Alan Fairford when he is taken into the Fairford home. Their "true sense of friendship" (Letter 1:2) develops just because they are not brothers and can therefore more readily find a happy balance between resemblance and difference. In their letters back and forth they rehearse the differences of personality, status, and circumstances which preclude the kind of fatal fraternal resemblance that terrorizes the Gothic son. At the same time, although they playfully define themselves against one another in their letters, their actions show how they actually define themselves in conjunction with one another. Darsie and Alan are alternate but complementary selves. Their obvious differences serve to protect them from the necessity of making their own identities by unmaking that of their friend. But at the same time, the narrator proceeds to complicate the difference between the conventionally romantic and
aristocratic Darsie and the conventionally pragmatic and bourgeois Alan. Although Alan mocks the "high and heroic character" of Darsie's dreams and his pretensions to a destiny "inexpressibly and inconceivably brilliant," he shows his "romantic" bent when in Quixotic fashion he abandons his practical course and filial duty to try to rescue his friend (Letter 2:21). Similarly, Darsie (of the "teeming fancy") evidences a pragmatic side when he judges the ostensibly romantic Jacobitism of his uncle as impracticable (Letter 2:23). Rather than being one or the other—romantic or pragmatic, heroic or pedestrian—the young heroes are alike in being both. In this novel, generic and social and sexual oppositions, which are crucial to the patterns of the Gothic novel and the old world it portrays, break down. Darsie and Alan are central to this process, doubles who defer to one another in a way that is essential to the establishing of a duality that is the foundation of a new kind of society. In a sense, Darsie and Alan form a new kind of duality as each, in deferring to the other, betrays the stereotypical generic and social model to which he is expected to conform—Darsie the romance model of the noble hero, Alan the realist model of the bourgeois hero. Instead of following these roles, Darsie and Alan together become a hero that at once recalls ancient, mythic models and looks forward to modern, existentialist ones.

Like the heroes of St Ronan's Well. Darsie and Alan are
engaged in a struggle to establish their identities, but each establishes his own identity, not by unmaking, but by making that of the other. Their correspondence (in both senses) represents this mutual struggle. While Alan's immediate object is establishing his professional identity, this goal gives place to his concern for Darsie: his very choice to risk his professional name in the name of friendship is self-defining. It also sets Alan on a quest for his own identity that is, as Graham McMaster has detailed, parallel to Darsie's and of equally heroic dimension. Because their quests are so obviously parallel and in a conventional sense ineffectual, the pattern itself and the mutual dependency of the two heroes becomes the real focus. Their double quest, McMaster observes, draws the narrative into the archetypal order, transforming it into a myth of a universal struggle. Darsie's quest, in which Alan is implicated, is presented in terms that make clear that it is an ontological one; he is one of those literary characters whom Edward Said describes as engaged in a struggle for their very being. Like the classic hero of folk and fairy tale, Darsie is cut off from his origin and cut loose from his family connections: "a lone thing in the world," as he says. As if by a magic spell he is at once forbidden by mysterious stipulations from returning to his native England and drawn with proportional enchantment to that land (Letter 3:29). Like Moses, to whose paradoxical fate Darsie compares his own, Darsie sees himself as cursed with
the ability or compulsion to gaze upon the forbidden object of desire. Unlike Moses, Darsie does enter his promised land, but only insofar as it is represented in England itself. In a deeper sense, Darsie's quest is for the inherently unreachable land of a past time, a land which is always a promise.

That quest is established in highly charged symbolic terms early in the novel when he narrowly escapes being drowned in the waters that form the boundary that separates him from his homeland. Looking across Solway Firth, he is mysteriously drawn towards the "forbidden precincts" and must then be rescued by someone whose "sudden appearance" is as "wild and ominous" as the surroundings, lest he sink on the "fatal sands" into a dream from which he might wake, only "in the next world" (Letter 4:37). Darsie's helpless enchantment is such that he must be "raised" by this "magician Atlantes on his hippogriff." As the moon throws the eerie "huge shadow of the animal, with its double burden, on the wild and bare ground," the mystery of the burden is doubly suggested, especially when the sea responds to the rescue with "the roar of some immense monster defrauded of its prey" (Letter 4:41). The peculiar resonance of this vignette is explained in part when we come to know the legend of the Redgauntlet family: in rescuing his nephew in this way, Hugh Redgauntlet is, in spite of himself, enacting a redemption of the past, undoing the curse earned for the family by his ancestor who accidentally killed his son with his horse. The symbolic
force of the rescue is then reinforced by its double enactment, for Hugh Redgauntlet rescues Darsie once more in the narrative. Whereas the first time Herries/Redgauntlet rescues Darsie without knowing his identity or the implications of the rescue for the family (and this ignorance is necessary for the redemption of the curse), the second rescue occurs after he has taken his nephew into his custody. The second rescue is both a confirmation and a kind of repudiation of the first in that it raises the question of whether rescue by his uncle is life or death for Darsie.

The description of the second rescue reinforces the sense that what is being dramatized here is Darsie’s achievement of maturity and independence. Again, but this time in even more highly wrought terms—both emotionally and symbolically—Darsie feels enchanted by the attraction of his “native land,” which lies over what he sees as the “black line” of the shore. This line separates him from another world, the forbidden territory of the unknown homeland, the promised land of memory and desire. “That furlong, which an infant would have raced over in a minute, was yet a barrier effectual to divide me for ever from England and from life,” he complains in bewilderment and frustration. “I soon not only heard the roar of this dreadful torrent, but saw, by the fitful moonlight, the foaming crests of the devouring waves, as they advanced with the speed and fury of a pack of hungry wolves” (4:268–9). Darsie’s terms here heighten the mythic overtones of his
struggle and suggest the paradox not only of his own but also of a more general situation: what a child could reach is to the adult both out of reach and fatal to his self. With mature consciousness comes the loss of that preconscious place of origin, and mature consciousness depends upon being able to forget and forsake what Said calls the "anonymity of pure negation" which is one's "real origin" (51). As Darsie's consciousness reaches back over the "black line," trying to embrace the preconscious essence that must by definition remain outside the grasp of consciousness, he loses consciousness: paradoxically, it is only in a state of unconsciousness that one can know (and thus not know) that place. "I chattered and howled," he says, "to the howling and roaring sea." In a state of delirium, his sense of self is abolished as he feels himself merge with the anonymity of sheer existence (4:269).

When Darsie's uncle seizes him here, his identity is as fragile as that of "a child six months old" (4:269). This diminution to the state of childhood is only the first step in a whole process by which, in his "rescuer's" custody, Darsie is systematically divested of all that constitutes his sense of self. As if under a spell, he feels himself helpless and indeed complicit in this process: the loss of personal liberty and physical health is a relatively minor problem compared to his loss of will, the dulling of sensual and mental consciousness, and his sense that sanity itself is an
arbitrary endowment which he can be deemed to have lost (4:273; 5:283). As Alan will be later. Darsie must be divested of his faith in justice: Both heroes come to doubt whether not only the Justice but justice itself "was anything more than an ass" (6:288). Darsie's plight is dramatized in the makeshift court of the unjust Justice where justice cannot be exercised in the absence of a self to whom it can be administered: "How can you render the young man justice unless you know who he is?" (6:291).

As he has done symbolically and primitively on the shores of the Forth, Darsie moves back in this court, this time in legal terms, towards the origin of his being. Here the question of his identity focusses on the origin of his name. As he is challenged to remember when and where he first bore his name. Darsie's memory takes him back to the age of three, but without his being able to ascertain his name at that time. "In vain," he says, he "rummaged [his] memory for the means of replying." confessing in his utter vulnerability the inadequacy of personal memory as a link to the past and one's self. Bereft even of his own memory to support his sense of identity, he yet affirms of his name: "I did not take it, sir; it was given to me" (6:290). Against all arguments of reason and justice, on the basis of a deeper but unverifiable knowledge. Darsie asserts two things here: that his identity and his being have not been usurped but bestowed upon him rightfully and that at the origin of his identity and his
being there was an other.

This scene dramatizes the fundamentally social nature of identity for Scott. And this implication of the idea of the other in the very conception of the self is embodied in Darsie's need for narrative and in the novel's sense of narrative. From the first page of the novel, Darsie's own letters proclaim his identity as fundamentally corresponding and fundamentally narrative. Essential to his sense of himself are both a correspondent (Alan) and the act of narrative by which that correspondent is engaged. "Before I knew thee I knew nothing," he writes to Alan (Letter 1:4), and he finds narration to be similarly essential to him. For Darsie, "writing history (one's self being the subject) is as amusing as reading that of foreign countries" (Letter 7:109). It is also as amusing to him as living the history that provides the narrative for his writing. When he is confined by his uncle, what has seemed an amusement becomes a necessity, as he feels in his imprisonment what he calls a "rage of narration" (3:258). Darsie's imprisonment dramatizes the struggle for freedom that his quest enacts. And narration becomes the assertion of freedom and control and identity that life otherwise denies him. In his imprisonment he suffers from a fever which "lay like a spell upon my tongue," disrupting his sense of time and place and preventing him from telling his story to the doctor who attends him because he does not know his own role in it: he does not know where to
begin (4:273). When he finds himself not only outside of society's control but also outside of the control of his own reason and senses and even his tongue, it is his letters that are the one remaining vestige of his sense of liberty and identity. Writing his history to Alan imposes a sense of order and significance on events which he does not experience in his life. His helplessness is rather emphasized than mitigated, however, when he proposes as "the first step to my deliverance" the anti-climactic and vain resolution "to have my letters sent to the post-house" (5:278). But this futile gesture serves to emphasize the importance of the very act of narrating, for even without effecting his physical liberty (and without even being read) Darsie's narration does represent the assertion of an independent spirit that no imprisonment can suppress. As he says of his journal writing, "I never lay it down but I rise stronger in resolution, more ardent in hope" (9:41). In narrating his life, he enacts his refusal to accept a given narrative in which his identity and role are pre-established.

By becoming an author, in short, Darsie authorizes his own life. But his similarity to Richardson's imprisoned epistolary heroines, reinforcing as it does the female role he plays in his various guises throughout the novel, suggests an interrogation of the conventional ideas of authorship and of authority, a questioning implicit in the very structure of the novel. Although all of Scott's novels employ a variety of
narrative modes. *Redgauntlet* is unique in being such an elaborate composite. In a way that is parallel to and just as complex as the dynamic between Alan and Darse, realistic and romantic modes inform and mediate one another. The elaborately conventional realistic narrative frame consists of letters and journal entries, which are joined together and supplemented by chapters of narrative written by a narrator who is overseeing but not omniscient. These realistic modes frame and struggle to contain the contesting voices of other narrative traditions, as represented, for example, by the legend of the Redgauntlet family, Wandering Willie's tale, and the traditional songs through which Darse and Willie communicate. With such an abundance of authors, and even the narrator unable to be authoritative, the heterogeneous form of the novel suggests the potential for anarchy that compels a response from Darse that will both incorporate the narrations of others and use them as a context for an interpretation of his own.

In the course of his pursuit of his origins, he is confronted by various versions of his history which he must assimilate in order to proceed. In refusing to accept any or all of them as determinative, he not only reinterprets them but becomes involved in determining for himself the meaning and course of his life story. When he literally writes his own story, he is only more explicitly enacting the salutary ability to read old stories and rewrite them in terms of his
own life. His life consists of alternate readings—in effect a redeeming—of each of these stories, all of which are composed in the end in his own intertextual narration. Wandering Willie's tale, with its combination of narrative and dream logic, represents an oblique promise of the resolution of Darsie's story. As Francis Hart has pointed out, Steenie's trial is analogous to Darsie's, and his courage and prudence and good fortune in pursuing the origin of his problem and effecting its resolution offer a guide for both Darsie and Alan (Scott's Novels 57-60). The tale is subject to different "constructions" (Letter 11:170). and Willie's reading of it as ultimately unfortunate is corrected by Darsie's interpretation of its fortunate result. But, more important, the new master and servant amend the old reading by enacting the redemption of the relationship between their ancestors. Later the text is further enriched when this tale and Darsie's glimpse of the Redgauntlet horseshoe on his uncle's forehead mutually interpret one another, quickening his memory as they force upon Darsie a recognition of his uncle and himself. "This tale, when told, awakened a dreadful vision of infancy," he writes of it in retrospect, "which the withering and blighting look now fixed on me again forced on my recollection, but with much more vivacity." Through the narrative frame of Willie's tale, Darsie is able to recall in his uncle's look "a frightful vision" of the past (6:295-6). This complex superimposing of different media upon one another, reflecting
as it does the generic mix the reader finds in the novel, reinforces the sense of mediation or narration as intrinsic to the nature of experience. When later Darsie is able through the literal reflection of a mirror to recognize himself in resemblance to his uncle, this moment gathers almost mythic force, gathering into one image the various ways in which the narrative has suggested that one's view of oneself is mediated both through an image of oneself and through another who resembles oneself.

The most pointed of these media, the mirror suggests the way that Darsie is able to turn doublessness to account, as he recognizes the potential for doubling his uncle but realizes at the same time that the resemblance is subject to his will and interpretation. Darsie is rescued from having to repeat the unfortunate fate of his ancestors as it is presented in the family legend and reproduced in his uncle's intransigent commitment to the unfortunate Stuarts by his ability to affirm his identity as part of an alternate duality. This is part of his response to yet another narrative, his sister Lilias's account of the family history. This narrative, in the context of the other narratives he has incorporated, finally discloses his origin. Lilias says that their uncle deplores the "effeminacy" that is theirs by virtue of their being "but half Redgauntletts" and the children of an Hanoverian mother (11:203). In Darsie his uncle hopes to find a son of his own and an heir for the house of Redgauntlet as he represents it:
"I have sought for thee, and mourned for thee," he tells Darsie, "as a mother for an only child" (13:239). Lilias's account of her kidnapping out of her mother's orchard reinforces the image of Hugh Redgauntlet as the Gothic younger brother who wants to usurp his brother's place as husband and father and first-born. Without a wife and child of his own and with his Jacobite commitment, Herries embodies the kind of regressive, sterile, antisocial spirit of Nietzschean doubling, the spirit which has had Darsie and his family under a "spell." Darsie breaks the spell by forming an alternative duality with Alan, a duality that is regenerative because it gives way to a "third term." Their correspondence (in both senses) exemplifies their ability to distinguish between a thing and its image or interpretation, and to define relations between two similar things (including themselves) in terms other than identity. It creates a medium between them which represents a third term, a principle or standard that precedes them both and provides a context for them.

The woman in their lives is another manifestation of the regenerative dynamic that is at work. The rivalry between Darsie and Alan is defused when Lilias is found to be Darsie's sister. But before they know that, each man defers to the other, thereby making the crucial gesture of choosing what is good for the other over what seems good for the self. Again, Darsie's choice against incest symbolizes the restoration of social order and the regenerative duality of romance. But the
restoring of the duality is enabled by the interrelation of the three, a dynamic that is dramatized late in the novel in a curious ritual.

When Darsie and Alan and Lilias finally come together in the same room, Alan takes up the dress that Hugh Redgauntlet had made Darsie wear earlier in the novel in order to use it as a barrier behind which he and Lilias can overcome other barriers that come between a man and a woman. Here, what Hugh Redgauntlet intended as an obstruction becomes a medium. In effect, Darsie becomes a medium for the lovers, a third term through which Alan and Lilias are united. The relationship that was a barrier between Darsie and Lilias becomes a medium for Alan. Alan, in becoming Lilias's husband, becomes Darsie's brother, and thus in his way a medium for brother and sister, just as Lilias is the medium that transforms the friends into brothers. Darsie, in providing the barrier that separates the lovers from him, is also enabling them to form a separate duality. In this action he is becoming as a father both to his sister and to his sometime brother and enacting in symbolic form the necessity for the parent to see the child, not as a barrier to, but as a medium for the establishment of the self.

In *St. Ronan's Well* the Gothic double uses a disguise to cast a spell over Clara Mowbray and sabotage her marriage to his brother. Darsie has felt himself unmanned by a comparable spell of doublessness. The use of Darsie's disguise (the dress)
here dramatizes the restoration of marriage by a counter-ritual designed to undo the forbidden alliances represented in incest and bigamy. He breaks the spell when he converts the Gothic energy of doubleness by embracing the female disguise and using it, not to establish, but to jeopardize his own identity. Alan expresses a similar willingness when he, too, takes up the female dress. Their willingness to go so far as to become women constitutes the crucial deference to the other that turns the vulnerability of the duality of romance into its strength. This deference represents the ultimate act of selflessness, inversion of one's self for the sake of the other. It is through Lilias—sister and lover—that they finally become in legal and social terms the brothers they have been in natural terms from the beginning. The unity of the three transcends by its outreaching energy the sexual and class barriers by which the Gothic world tries to protect and enshrine the vulnerable purity of the self. By dramatizing their interrelations symbolically in this counter-ritual, however, Scott charges their new ordering of things with the memory of past orders, thereby retaining the mystery of the old world while at the same time rescuing the new world from its dark power.
CHAPTER FIVE

Forms of Memory: Voices and Text in the Narrative Frames and the Chronicles of the Canongate

Darsie Latimer's use of narrative in Redgauntlet to invest significance in and to take authority for his private, individual experience is analogous to Scott's own use of narrative to realize and to authorize the public, social drama of history. And like Darsie's narration, Scott's narration is not a declaration of authority but an interrogation of the traditional model of authority, an interrogation that is dramatized throughout his novelistic career in an interrogation of narrative itself. Scott's narration always incorporates into itself a questioning of its own authority, a self-questioning nicely caught in Darsie's almost-oxymoron "rage of narration"—rage and narration being defined by their effort to overcome one another. While narration is an ordering power, rage is a disrupting force. Indeed, Scott's novels are characterized by struggle: as the novelist in him fights to narrate the story, the storyteller in him is disrupting the narrative order by giving voice to the lives that rage against order, refusing to be narrated.
At issue here is the distinction between novel and story, a distinction that is not absolute but that characterizes two tendencies in narrative: the novel tends towards form, and the story tends away from form. For Scott, this distinction is primarily a distinction between written text and oral story. While the written novel conforms (however unconventionally) to the conventions established by a largely urban readership, an oral story belongs to the ancient tradition of oral cultures maintained by a largely rural, non-literate class. Scott's novels are distinguished by his conscious attempt to employ the conventions of the novel to keep alive in his narrative the sense of oral storytelling. Scott's generic awareness is particularly evident in the narrative frames that are so definitive of his novels. They are the scenes of an ongoing discussion about the nature of his narrative endeavours and an ongoing struggle between Scott the novelist, who is trying to impose form, and Scott the storyteller, who is trying to retain the life of the material. Late in his career, this generic struggle finally results in his producing narrative in the form of chronicle, a genre that keeps alive the telling of the story in its writing.

Beginning in the framing Introductory chapter of Waverley, Scott is preparing his readers to accept a different kind of novel, as he tries to negotiate the claims of novelist and storyteller in an effort to create a novel form and a novelist as yet unknown. In this Introductory chapter, he
presents himself before the readers of his first and anonymous novel in the image of "a maiden knight with his white shield" (1:1). To save his novel from as much "unnecessary opposition to preconceived associations as possible," he gives his hero an intentionally neutral name, and he spends most of this chapter dismantling conventional generic expectations by cataloguing all the things his tale is not. In a further bid for novelty, he gives his tale a sub-title, "Sixty Years Since," that removes it from the realm of history and places it in the realm of memory, though of a memory tempered by the "once-upon-a-time" resonance of imagination. Moreover, in the first of many disclaimers of his authority, he claims as his source "the great book of Nature" from which he has "venturously essayed to read a chapter" (1:5-6), thereby subordinating his role as writer to his role as reader.

Having used this Introductory chapter to unsettle the novelistic expectations of his readers and to displace his own novelistic authority, the authorial voice then uses a concluding chapter to displace his authority yet further and to point his readers to an unconventional source for the novel's authority. Towards the end of the novel proper, Waverley writes a narrative of his experience, thus giving his experience a containing and ordering form. But the Author then affixes a Postscript to his own novel in which he opens up the story that Waverley's written narrative had closed, pointing readers beyond the form of the story to the real life whence
it originated. Scott entitles it "The Postscript That Should Have Been a Preface," but it is, in fact, properly placed, because it identifies the final authority for the text and in so doing opens it up in a way that raises the question of its authority. Here the Author reminds readers that he had as a child "received from those who were actors in them" accounts of the incidents in his novel. The authority for his tale rests on a combination of, first, his own observation as one who "witnessed some remnants" of the characters he describes; second, what he "gathered from tradition"; and, third, "the narrative of intelligent eye-witnesses," whose accounts he has "corrected" from historical records (365).

By disrupting the form of the novel—opening it up in the Postscript and distributing its authority, while at the same time grounding its authority in the rather fluid substance of childhood memories of grandfathers' stories—Scott manifests his distrust of the authorial role and of narrative form itself. This distrust finds more overt expression in the next two novels that complete the original "series" of the Author of Waverley, as he now calls himself. Acknowledging their rather loose form, he writes in the Advertisement to his third novel, The Antiquary, that he has been "more solicitous to describe manners minutely than to arrange ... an artificial and combined narrative." And he confesses his regret at his inability "to unite these two Requisites of a good novel" (vii–viii). In these two early novels, Guy Mannering and The
Antiquary, the Author is more storyteller than novelist, for his chief aim is to give voice, rather than narrative form, to the "lower orders" of Scottish society, whose language (echoing Wordsworth) he finds to be more direct and forceful, remarkable for an "antique force and simplicity" (vii). Charmed by these characters and their language, he finds himself giving voice to multiple and individual stories. These contesting voices prevent his turning a novelizing hand to the composition of the plot, which they ought, according to the rules of narrative form, to serve. His authority as storyteller, as well as his downfall as novelist, derives from these voices.

In the next series of novels, as if to confess his inadequacy for the role of novelist, the Author of Waverley—who has, after all, been more of a listener and transcriber than a writer—turns his task over to an editor, who can manifestly rest his authority on not being an author. In donning this yet more elaborate mask, as the editor of Tales of My Landlord, Scott is making another bid for the guise of an anonymous knight who meets a public free of preconceptions that he introduced in Waverley: "I have changed my publisher," he writes in a letter at this time, "and come forth like a maiden knight's white shield" (Letters, 4:288). The knight is still on a quest for an identity as author and for a way to compose real events in the form of a story without violating either the reality or the form. When this new author takes up
his shield, he gathers his material from further back in history. This means that instead of listening to voices that are clamouring to be heard, he is reading texts. As a result, the Tales of My Landlord—a group consisting of The Black Dwarf, Old Mortality (First Series, 1816), The Heart of Midlothian (Second Series, 1818), The Bride of Lammermoor and A Legend of Montrose (Third Series, 1819) and Count Robert of Paris and Castle Dangerous (Fourth Series, 1832)—are more formally composed than previous narratives. In most of these novels, the narrative is given in a self-contained and self-validating novel form. But these narratives are framed by introductory and concluding material that both encloses them and opens them up for interrogation.

The sources for the Tales of My Landlord are local traditions and legends and historical records—a combination of the oral and written narratives that comprise unofficial history. Whereas the Author of Waverley heard his stories from people who had been involved in or had witnessed the events and himself supplemented and corrected these stories by historical accounts, this second teller finds his primary source in historical records. The distance between the action of the story and its tellers renders the material more amenable to the ordering and structuring that narrative form requires: the same distance militates against the realizing of the material. Scott tackles the problem by using the framing device to sustain the opposition between the material and its
form: he imposes on the story proper a relatively clear
narrative form—both in historical and in literary terms—and
retains in the framework the sense of "unnarratable" life.

This opposition is dramatized in the authorial team he
creates, a pair of characters who act not only as foils for
one another but also, together, as a foil for their author.
While Scott himself is now gathering material from written
historical texts, he creates as his writer a man who is first
of all a listener to tales and legends, rather than a reader
of texts. The writer, Peter Pattieson, himself has to contend
with an antiquarian editor and patron—Jedediah Cleishbotham—who
resists the narration both of Pattieson and of Scott. The
other essential voice here is that of tradition, which in this
first series is represented primarily by an old Covenanter
called "Old Mortality," who performs his "tribute to the
memory of the deceased" Covenanters by "deepening" and
"renewing" the gravestone inscriptions that record their
sufferings (1:7.9) and by telling their stories in a way that
similarly deepens and renews the sufferings of the past. He
is Pattieson's primary source for the Covenanters' side of the
story, a side that he then endeavours "to correct or verify...
from the most authentic sources afforded by the
representatives of either party" (1:14).

The framing structures of the Tales comprise in
themselves a story about the emergence of narrative out of the
struggle between editor and writer, and between antiquarian
and novelist. In these frameworks, many of the issues that plagued Scott as he wrote are raised and left unresolved, while the novels themselves represent, in their very existence, a kind of resolution. The actual stories which the novels tell are mediated by a series of hands and voices, and this mediation opens questions of the authenticity of the story and the authority of tellers who are so confessedly interested in their productions. And because Pattieson, the compiler and writer of these tales, is dead and has entrusted his work and his memory to Cleishbotham's fidelity, the editor's power and authority are virtually unlimited. Egotistical and self-interested—but ingenuously so—Cleishbotham presents himself as the sine qua non of the tales should they succeed, and as their mere recorder should they fail. Naively, or ironically, he offers as his credentials a life of "constant domestic enquiry" (in the "navel" of the world, Gandercleugh), varied with "foreign travel" (a few visits to "the famous cities of Edinburgh and Glasgow"). Having shown that "I could have written them if I would." he then confesses, or boasts, that he is "NOT the writer, redactor, or compiler" of the Tales of My Landlord: "nor am I, in one single iota, answerable for their contents, more or less" (xii,xvii,xiii).

Cleishbotham is a literalist and deplores the liberty taken by a writer with poetic pretensions: "in arranging these Tales for the press, Pattieson hath more consulted his own fancy than the accuracy of the narrative," he complains. "nay
hath sometimes blended two or three stories together for the mere grace of the plots." But the editor is consistent, in that he repays such "infidelity" (xvii) on the part of the writer with his own fidelity to the writer's words, undercutting them all the while. Pattieson himself confirms what his editor calls a lack of "accuracy" when, in crediting his sources, he confesses to "embodying into one compressed narrative many of the anecdotes" he has received from them (1:14). But his composition of the tales represents a pragmatic compromise in the interest of form—both the literary form of narrative and the political form of peace. And although he literally writes this "one compressed narrative." Pattieson sees himself, not first of all as a writer, but as an editor or transcriber of the tales of others. What Cleishbotham sees as "infidelity," Pattieson sees as a sacrifice of literal accuracy in the interest of fidelity to a whole truth. Pattieson composes partial tales into one "unbiassed" narrative (1:15), not by telling or recounting separate events, but by relating these separate events as part of a larger story. He is both writer and editor, in that his systematic narration of "anecdotes" derived from Old Mortality and corrected or verified from other traditional sources of both parties at once preserves the story and changes it. This emendation is in part the inevitable and conscious consequence of the writer/historian's distance, which, together with his desire for disinterest,
allows a perspective not afforded to the actors themselves or to biassed observers. But crucial to the distinct perspective of the writer/editor is the difference between the oral anecdote and the written text. And what we see again in the writer of the *Tales of My Landlord*, as in the Author of *Waverley*, is the privileging of the oral source as the authentic voice.

Scott's acute sensitivity to the difference between the spoken and the written word cannot be overstated. The more he relies on written historical texts, the more he needs to found his authority as author on the oral experience of a teller who is above all a listener and only then a narrator. As part of this, however, he also need to validate his authority by engaging in active opposition to the antiquarian scholar, who reveres the pure text of history. In the earnest antiquarian historian, whom Scott always presents in an ironic but sympathetic light, we find yet another of Scott's alter egos. Cleishbotham's literalism is unfavourably contrasted with Pattieson's more imaginative rendering of the material, but it is this very literalism which, paradoxically enough, preserves the non-literal narrative of the writer.

Still, it is Pattieson's imaginative reception and rendition of the oral material that allow it to enter the realm of official history. Both in hearing tales that are part of oral tradition and in reading texts of history, Pattieson responds with a non-literal imagination that
outrages the literalism of both the purveyors of tradition, like Old Mortality, and the purveyor of history, Jedediah Cleishbotham. Just as Cleishbotham argues for the preservation of the pure text of historical accounts, so Old Mortality tries to preserve the pure text of the gravestone inscriptions. But even Pattieson's reading of these inscriptions betrays his non-literal imagination. He is a "decipherer," who reads a general truth without being deterred by indecipherable particularities. In fact, to him the variety of ways in which an inscription may be read ("Dns. Johan---de Hamel---or Johan---de Lamel---," for example) only enhances the interest of the history the letters suggest. That these stones shadow forth, rather than denote, "the history of those who sleep beneath them" is for Pattieson their attraction (1:4). By contrast, Old Mortality lives only to perpetuate the particularities of the past: by "renewing... the half-defaced inscriptions" (1:8-9), he seeks to render these words absolute and immortal. In retracing these letters, Old Mortality is trying to turn an oral tradition into a historical text--to fix and stabilize forever a story which is defined by fluidity and plurality. Pattieson, instead of reading a particular inscribed text, insists on listening to Old Mortality and other purveyors of tradition, so that what he then writes is not a single, partial truth but a whole, impartial one, whose general fidelity to the past redeems its particular inaccuracies. The non-literal
narrative imagination distances itself from the particular concrete impressions of the past, transforming them into abstract ideas that can be "blended" (as Pattieson blends his stories) for the sake of the continuation of the "plot" of history—if not with "grace" at least with more peace than would otherwise be possible.

The framing conclusion of *Old Mortality* is a jarring reminder of the fictionality of the narrative endeavours of Peter Pattieson. Here, as in the Postscript of his first novel, the Author reopens his narrative to reveal its sources. This time, however, emphasis falls, not on actual tellers, but on a representative novel reader, Mrs. Buskbody, who fulfills what Wilt calls the Author's "deepest guiltiest wishes" by requiring that "The Tale never be concluded" (*Secret Leaves*, 193). If he deploys fiction rather than autobiography in this postscript, the Author once more makes a gesture towards the oral, presenting a reader who, in conversation with the writer, helps to shape the text that we read.

The strength and virtue of oral tradition are its fluidity and dynamism, represented in its living tellers, each of whom changes the form of a story to suit his or her own interests and those of the audience, but preserves the essential centre or reality. Changeability ensures continuity. Unlike written narrative, which, as Walter Ong says, commits words to space as represented in the material of paper, oral narrative commits words to time, subjecting them
to its continuous flow and giving them a share in its oddly changeable kind of permanence (Ong 7). But oral tradition can defeat itself when it fails to discern the essence of an event and instead privileges a partisan view as truth. This tendency towards immortalizing the mortal is represented in its effort to textualize voices, to give permanence to the most evanescent thing of all—sound. The next step, of course, is to embellish the preserved story in order to authorize it as truth.

Between the First and Second Series of the Tales, the Author of Waverley reappears, as if to investigate the hazards of written narrative, as the Editor of Rob Roy. Unlike Jedediah, he gives himself such a free hand that this work "may in a great measure be said to be new written." The Author of Waverley is clearly enjoying the ruse, but Scott also seems to continue to need the freedom not only of an anonymous other self but of a divided other self—an editor who is complicit in but not responsible for the writer's work. Simply in being a memoir, Rob Roy raises more explicitly than any other Waverley Novel the issue of private history and the bearing the act of writing has on it. In Old Mortality Pattieson, though presented by his editor as a whimsically romantic poet, avoided the temptation to what the narrator of Rob Roy calls "self-importance" (1:3) by composing the stories of others, rather than creating his own. Because he acts as a kind of representative voice for a culture, his writing is a
transcribing, rather than an inscribing. And partly just because Rob Roy is a memoir. Frank Osbaldistone falls prey to all the vices that beset one engaged in writing as a private act. Although he describes what he is writing as "a faithful transcript" (1:2), Frank would like his memoir to be an inscription for posterity of the official version of his own history:

Frank is self-conscious about the act of writing. He cautions his reader-friend not to expect written narratives to be like spoken ones: "you must remember," he tells him, "that the tale told by one friend, and listened to by another, loses half its charms when committed to paper; and that the narratives to which you have attended with interest, as heard from the voice of him to whom they occurred, will appear less deserving of attention when perused in the seclusion of your study" (1:2). The privacy of the writing and reading experience is underlined by this being a personal memoir to an intimate friend and, even more, by the fact that this work is sealed in a final way as well by the death of its writer. Written narrative faces the hazard of self-deception that oral narrative avoids by virtue of the community of participating listeners, who help shape the tale and share responsibility for it, and who also modify the impulse towards absolutism by requiring that their perspective be listened to and taken into account. A written, private narrative like Frank Osbaldistone's tends to inscribe a single, partial perspective
as definite, whole truth.

Frank is aware of "the foible of self-importance" that plagues a writer of memoirs, and he knows that he has his reader "in [his] power." The power of the writer, because of his assumption of authorship (whence authority), is immeasurably greater than the power of the teller, who must depend on his listener. Yet the writer also knows he is, in turn, under the power of "the seductive love of narrative. When we ourselves are the heroes of the events we tell" (1:3). Frank compares himself to Sully, whose self-importance was such that he had four gentlemen compile his Memoirs and recite them to him, not in the first or third person, but in the second person. In this way, "being himself the auditor, as he was also the hero, and probably the author" (1:3-4), Sully constructed the ultimate inscription of his own perception as truth. Although Frank sees his own situation as "not quite so ludicrous" as this (1:4), he also sees the parallel, in that he is writing not only of himself but to himself, using the illusion of communication to facilitate self-expression.

Frank has always felt the attraction of written self-expression, an attraction which in his youth took the form of poetry. The dangers of the attitude fostered by this aesthetic habit of mind are dramatized in the young Frank's tendency to appreciate even the most tragic incidents as a potential literary event. Such scenes are for Scott, too, a literary and linguistic, as well as a tragic, event of the
kind that the Author of Waverley claims in the Advertisement to The Antiquary it was his wish to capture in narrative. But in that novel one such scene (the death of Steenie Mucklebait and his family’s grief) becomes more than a literary event because of the chastising that its observer, Oldbuck, receives from the grieving father: Scott acknowledges in this that the tendency to aestheticize and condescend to the grief of the poor is a deplorable and inescapable component of the sophisticated capacity to narrate—to write about—it. Apparently oblivious to the hazards of narrative, as Scott has signalled them in the earlier novel, Frank takes the safe narrative stance, but his ability to narrate the experience is subverted by his own subconscious fear of the chaos that, at a conscious level, he is writing into order. His dreams, as a young man and as an old man, reveal the unnarratable experience that his writing purports to render into language, when the only suitable language—a language beyond the range of narrative—is the rage of pure passion that belongs to the "singly primitive" (1:1). This discrepancy between Frank’s conscious and unconscious kind of narration suggests more of its hazards, for his unconscious seems to provide an interpretation of his experience which his conscious mind avoids making. When he claims to be "registering" his past in a "faithful transcript of my thoughts and feelings, of my virtues and of my failings" (1:1.2), the curious naivete of this assertion, together with the peculiarly literal way that
he often records his mixture of feelings without interpreting them. suggests that he hopes the transcription will effect an inscription of a permanent version of his past life. In a sense, Frank's self-narration means that his self is so deeply implicated in the story he writes that he must write it with a literal fidelity (which Jedediah and Old Mortality would respect) for fear he lose himself in the abyss that opens between the lines.

In the image of the solitary old man transcribing his memoirs, the Author of Waverley presents writing as an intensely private and inevitably falsifying act. The kind of self-enclosure his writing enacts is broken through by the Ganderclough framework of the next Series of Tales, The Heart of Midlothian. Here the hazards of authorship and of the written word are the subject of Jedediah Cleishbotham's "Prolegomenon." Like the Editor of Rob Roy, whose material is a copious "bundle of papers" of whose material existence their author is so aware (Advertisement xxvi), Jedediah's material and his proof of authority are the "precious manuscripts" of his writer, Peter Pattieson (Prolegomenon xxxiv). And while the Editor of Rob Roy admits to having freely "new written" these papers, Jedediah, though he scorns to tamper with their writing, takes his full share in their success. Once posterity has accorded the writer of the First Series the status of a bona fide author and has accorded their editor the prosperity of "a new house and a new coat" (xxxiii–iv).
Cleishbotham is ready to favour the public with a Second Series. Much encouraged by his writer's reception, he creates here his own tradition—the legend of Peter Pattieson—as attested to by his now "precious manuscripts." For much more pragmatic and comic reasons than those of the Editor of Rob Roy, the vicariously prosperous editor of the Tales is so willing to identify himself with the successful writer that he virtually claims authorship: "These cavillers have not only doubted mine identity," he fumes, "but they have impeached my veracity and the authenticity of my historical narratives!" (xxxv). In an odd kind of literary turn, Pattieson's narratives themselves become touchstones of history: like Old Mortality's stones they no longer simply tell but are a historical truth.

From both sides, then—from the tradition from which he derives his narratives and from the editor and would-be mentor who publicizes them—the writer has to contend with a tendency to turn his stories into absolute truth. Although just by composing a written narrative Pattieson does turn the stories he is told into a definitive narrative, he incorporates into his writing a resistance to absolutism by transcribing the varying narratives of others and refusing to inscribe and authorize an "official story." He composes narratives that introduce perspective and thereby relativity through the distance that narrative order requires and the plurality of voices that must be harmonized. Oral tradition, just
because it depends on living human voices, is naturally characterized by a similar plurality and relativity, as well as by an adaptability to changing circumstances. Contributing to this is the political element: because, historically, oral tradition in modern culture is the preserve of losing sides and submerged cultures, it is by definition not making an imperialist bid to impose an official version of history. Ironically, Old Mortality himself represents the movement away from this traditional culture. The movement towards writing is a movement towards inscribing a Truth rather than telling stories. Pattieson is aware that writing must mean a change—and writing may even help to effect the change—but he shows that writing does not have to mean inscribing. Into his writing he tries to incorporate the changeability that ensures the continuation of what is true and universal by resisting the impulse to render absolute the relative and to inscribe forever the evanescent.

Pattieson is still struggling to write without inscribing when we next encounter him, in the Introductory chapter of The Bride of Lammermoor, which begins the Third Series of the Tales. Scott uses the frame of this novel to give the story a sense at once of closure and a sense of openness. This time the writer, Peter Pattieson, is engaged in a dialogue with a painter, Dick Tinto, rather than an editor. Tinto, a believer in the power and reality of the image, challenges the authority of the word and its writer. By using words to
inscribe the circumstances of a story, the painter argues, a writer limits and falsifies it. He challenges Pattieson to narrate the tale of the Bride in a way that will reveal its essence while leaving particular circumstances to the interpretation of readers. In response, Pattieson tries to write a kind of impressionistic narrative in which word pictures and symbols tell the story with as little help from connecting and interpreting narrative as possible. Where the narrator does offer explanation, it is out of a need to impress on the modern reader an otherwise incomprehensible picture, and even then the narrator’s interpretation is given as merely one possible way of seeing. The narrative voice, in thus representing a plurality of voices and an openness of interpretation, simulates the fluidity of circumstance and interpretation and the continuity of substance that characterize oral narrative. The narrative voice in The Bride of Lammermoor, by becoming that of a storyteller who delineates the non-essential variations of the story and suggests their infinite adaptability, heightens the sense of pervasive tragedy at its centre. Refusing to privilege the voice of narrative reason (to use Ortega y Gasset’s term), the novel at once vindicates and defies Pattieson’s contention that narration is necessary. Narration is seen to be necessary, but not sufficient, for knowing the truth in any final or absolute terms. Scott acknowledges these limitations to even his own narrative capabilities when in the 1830
Introduction he discloses the various sources, both written and oral, of the Bride’s tale. Different accounts of the story corroborate some facts and contradict others; and different authors take the tale differently, as a subject "for buffoonery and ribaldry," for example, or for "highly scurrilous and abusive verses" or for "mournful" elegy (xxx-xxxiii). In adding his own to a long list of interpretations and modes, Scott is numbering himself within a tradition that sustains the story while modulating its narration.

In the novel proper, words take on a symbolic significance, representing the lovers' entrapment in the inscribed fate to which oaths and legends, affirmed by their own literalism, condemn them. In the climactic scene of Lucy’s betrothal to Bucklaw and Ravenswood's confrontation of her, the written word symbolically seals their fate. Lucy is just barely able to sign her name to the second betrothal, an act that signifies to her the impossible and fatal unwriting of the first. But her own handwriting condemns her, as Ravenswood produces her written cancellation of their vows. The treachery of written words—only literally true—is symbolized in her inability to speak: she cannot speak the words of betrayal, which are in fact words that others have dictated and forced her to write. Again symbolically, the cancellation of the betrothal is authorized by an appeal to the Bible, which in its literally interpreted words is a warrant for cruel tyranny. Lucy is described more than once as
being immobilized—"stiffened to stone" (33:126). And the virtues of her mother, who has induced this spiritual death, are, in the final sentence of the novel, said to have been memorialized in "a splendid marble monument.... while her victims remain undistinguished by tomb or epitaph" (33:163). In a very subtle way, then, the novel affiliates the inscription of truth with death and falsity. And it attempts to subvert this inscription by incorporating into the story a fluidity and changeability that will ensure the permanence of its essential truth.

Scott completes the Third Series of the Tales with A Legend of Montrose, a novel that takes him for the first time outside of the range of the human voice. All his previous narratives have been enlivened by the voices of living characters who could tell him part of the story. The Third Series ends fittingly with a legend told to Pattieson by one of Scott's archetypal figures, the storytelling old soldier, and so it continues the tradition whereby, having invented himself, the Author of Waverley goes on to invent almost as many storytellers as there are novels. Pattieson advises readers not to credit as true "that measure of the wild and wonderful" with which the storyteller embellishes the tale (xli). This disclaimer of the authenticity of the tale is accompanied by another in a later edition when a descendant of the hero writes a letter refuting the novel's version of his ancestor's character. Although an authentic document, this
letter is the kind of pseudo-document that the Author of Waverley might well have invented.

For Scott, the inclusion of disparaging or discrediting voices, far from threatening or compromising the reality of the narrative, enhances it. In all of these early novels, he introduces rebellious or raging elements whose subduing is seen to be expedient and temporary. He is always attempting in this way to break down any fixed categories of genre, levels of discourse or truth-value. He aims to restore the sense of texture to a text, the sense of differences having been reconciled and voices harmonized in order for the apparently stable text to be produced. These background voices have a double import in that while they speak of discontinuities, their very existence bespeaks the continuity that allows the story to be passed on and understood. The letter that frames the Legend is emblematic of its transitional narrative role, in that a letter is a kind of intermediary between voice and text, and this short novel effects a transition into Scott's next—"textual"—phase.

II

When, with his next novel, Ivanhoe, the Author of Waverley turns his attention to remote ages completely outside of the range of memory, he continues to people the frames of the novels with living voices. In these novels of Medieval
and Renaissance times. However, he needs these voices to compensate for the absence of voices in the texts which are his source. For this purpose he invents a whole community of antiquarians. The first of these is Laurence Templeton, who dedicates *Ivanhoe* to his fellow scholar, Dr. Dryasdust, anticipating as he does so antiquarian objections to a novel about "Old England" (Dedicatorial Epistle xliii). Templeton argues that the problems facing a novelist who wishes to recreate the remote period of Medieval England are quite different from the problems of a novelist of Scotland, and his metaphors here are suggestive, giving fuller shape to Scott's sense of the nature of his task of "embodying and reviving the traditions of the past." Templeton compares the traditions of a still-remembered Scotland to "a body whose limbs had recently quivered with existence, and whose throat had but just uttered the last note of agony." This recently dead body of Scottish traditions is "capable of being reanimated" by the "resuscitation" accomplished by the "potent magic" of the "Scottish magician" (xliv). In other words, this material is still "embodied" in a familiar human form; it is already composed and needs only to be enlivened by the writer's breath of life.

By contrast, the English author, far from being "less of a conjuror," has to be more of one. He can "only have the liberty of selecting his subject amidst the dust of antiquity, where nothing was to be found but dry, sapless, mouldering,"
and disjointed bones, such as those which filled the valley of Jehosaphat" (xliv). The task of the English author is first to recompose these articulated bones into a body and only then to enliven it. Templeton argues that something "like a true picture of old English manners could be drawn" if the separated bones—the relics of the past—are compounded by "intermingling fiction with truth" (xlvi-xlvii). Such a "true picture" involves preserving those aspects of the past that are essential to the character of the age and "translating" into an equivalent, "formalized" modern form those aspects of the past which would be incomprehensible or misunderstood in their literal form. Composing such a picture of the remote past also entails assuming the existence of an "extensive neutral ground" where lies the "large proportion... of manners and sentiments which are common to us and to our ancestors"(xlviii). On the basis of this common nature, the writer can fill in the details of the story of the past, or—to continue the metaphor—cover the bones with flesh and blood.

But Templeton's most telling illustration comes, appropriately enough, from language. He argues that only a tenth of the words of the language would be foreign to a succeeding or preceding age, the bulk constituting "that extensive neutral ground" of common cultural understanding. Their difference, in fact, is largely a matter of the form of expression: "by reading aloud.... or by reducing the ordinary
words to the modern orthography," Templeton argues. One
overcomes the sense of foreignness and asserts continuity
(xlix). Adhering to the form of the written words amounts to
the kind of literalism that preserves "the dry, sapless,
mouldering bones." By contrast, giving voice to the words,
because it compels a translation into contemporary terms,
asserts a narrative structure that composes the fragments into
a living body. Templeton further distinguishes between a
language as a whole and its individual words, arguing again
for a general, rather than a literal, understanding.

In a way that is analogous to Peter Pattieson's response
to the individual letters on Old Mortality's gravestones.
Templeton uses a non-literal imagination here to discover a
general truth and to assert the continuity between past and
present. This allows the real events of the past to be given
the form of a story for a contemporary audience. To their
decidedly textual authority, antiquarians like Templeton and
Dryasdust add their personal voices, turning written and read
history into heard stories, first of all by their very
garrulousness and then by their assertion of the non-literal
nature of communicable truth.

Beginning with his next novel, The Monastery, Scott
brings the Author into the frame of subsequent novels, to
correspond or converse with an array of antiquarians.
Although these appearances are partly for the practical
purpose of exposing the impostors who have begun to produce
"pseudo Tales of My Landlord" (lxxxv. Note 1), they also represent Scott's continuing need to interrogate the conventional notions of authorial authority and to defuse the high seriousness of novel-writing by playful self-mockery. In the Introductory frame of The Monastery, another trio of tale-bearers challenge and undercut each other's status. Here Captain Clutterbuck, another antiquarian, receives from a mysterious Benedictine monk "a large bundle of papers." Claiming them to be "genuine memoirs of the sixteenth century," the monk goes on to say that they were not in fact written at that time: rather, "they were compiled from authentic materials of that period, but written in the taste and language of the present day" by the monk's uncle and the monk himself (lxix.lxx). The monk deflates Clutterbuck's pretensions to antiquarian expertise when, to the Captain's disgust, he presumes "to correct" with the "truth" of historical records the "vague tales" the Captain has "adopted on loose and vulgar traditions" (lili.liv). Clutterbuck turns the papers over to the Author of Waverley, asking him to act as Editor of them and making clear all the while his disdain for "fictional composition" (xli).

Like his colleague Jedediah Cleishbotham, Captain Clutterbuck entertains an almost religious respect for the "precious manuscript." At the same time, as a purveyor of legend and romance, his sense of truth is confessedly fluid, and historical truth is not privileged: "that which was
history yesterday becomes fable to-day," he says. "and the truth of to-day is hatched into a lie by to-morrow" (liv). His disdain for novels notwithstanding, in sending the manuscript to the Author, he shows that it is to fictional plotting that he gives privileged status. After responding somewhat ungraciously by unmasking the Captain as an addict of the "productions... of the fairy-land of delusive fiction" (lxxviii), the Author makes some amends several novels later when he makes a personal though visionary appearance to Captain Clutterbuck. The Captain writes of this event in a letter to Dr. Dryasdust that serves as the Introductory Epistle of The Fortunes of Nigel. Here it is clear that the awe Clutterbuck feels in the presence of the Word pales in comparison to the "holy horror" he entertains at the prospect of being in the presence of the Author (xxxv). But the Author, though the object of this horror, seems bent upon desecrating his own image. Rather than agreeing to collaborate in and facilitate the production of the narratives, he plays Devil's Advocate, confessing himself the Author's worst enemy. He still has the problem that thwarts his efforts to become a novelist: he "cannot form a plot" (xlv). He confesses that his fascination with his material still outweighs his novelistic pretensions, such that in his writing "Characters expand under my hand: incidents are multiplied; the story lingers, while the materials increase; my regular mansion turns out a Gothic anomaly, and the work is
closed long before I have attained the point I proposed" (xlv). The Author thinks he is "bewitched" by his characters into allowing them to live at the expense of an ordered plot that runs from beginning to end (xlv). As he has from the outset of his quest, the Author once again finds himself unable to give to real events and characters the form of a story.

Framing the very next novel, Peveril of the Peak, is Dr. Dryasduast's reply to Captain Clutterbuck's account of his privileged tête-à-tête with the Author. In a demonstration of antiquarian oneupmanship, Dryasduast answers his colleague's visit from the Author with an authorial audience of his own. But the Author appears to this more purist antiquarian in order to answer for a weakness that is the opposite of the previous one. This time he stands accused of "adulterating the pure sources of historical knowledge" (lxiv). His plot is too well-formed. Dr. Dryasduast charges: the reality of the historical material is violated and compromised for the sake of meré form.

So the debate over the authenticity of the material, the authority of the author, and the status of the novel rages on as these antiquarians dispute not only with the Author but with one another. The ongoing debate reaches a clamorous crescendo at a meeting of potential shareholders in the Waverley Novel Company, a meeting whose minutes constitute the Introduction to the Tales of the Crusaders. In this meeting,
"held in the Waterloo Tavern, Regent's Bridge, Edinburgh" and presided over by the "image of the Author." all the "hands" that have contributed in the production of the Waverley Novels come together to consider the motion that they apply to the Legislature for an Act of Parliament "to associate us into a corporate body" with the right to prosecute imposter novelists (xxix-xxx). Here the struggle between form and material to which the multitude of antiquarians in debate with the Author has given voice becomes a full-scale revolt. The "general clamour" (xxxviii) of this meeting dramatizes Scott's acute sense of the violent antagonism between his material and a containing structure. But the mere fact that all of these incorporeal bodies should clamour to be incorporated is comic testimony to their corporeal, and corporate, life as lively and "unnarratable" material. And, typically, the Author is hard put to get on with the business at hand.

As the meeting begins, the shareholding antiquarians and their President Author seem to be of like mind in their understanding that the essence of novels is in their material, and that the novelistic form, with its structure and conventions, is merely an artificial enabling device. The Author goes so far as to propose for consideration a suggestion made by the swindler Dousterswivel (the villain of The Antiquary) for a "little mechanism" that operates by steam to be used to structure the narrative. "It is to be premised," says the Author, "that this mechanical operation
can only apply to those parts of the narrative which are— at present composed out of commonplaces. such as the love—speeches of the hero, the description of the heroine's person, the moral observations of all sorts, and the distribution of happiness at the conclusion of the piece." For all the assembled gathering, the conventions of a novel are "commonplaces"—artificial, mechanical, and interchangeable. And it is agreed that "by placing the words and phrases technically employed on these subjects in a sort of framework... and changing them by such a mechanical process as that by which weavers of damask alter their patterns, many new and happy combinations cannot fail to occur, while the author, tired of pumping his own brains, may have an agreeable relaxation in the use of his fingers" (xxxii).

But the debate must inevitably become personal, of course, since the antiquarians are themselves part of the Author's material, try as they might to reverse their roles. The Author and the antiquarian shareholders finally reach the inevitable crisis of their respective identities as each side struggles to assert its own control over the other. Although the shareholders need the Author to compose their materials into narrated form, they fear his tyranny enough to rebel against the forming of a joint stock company. Here they themselves (products of the Author as they are, after all) represent the unnarratable material which the Author is trying to compose and enliven. Enlivening them proves all too easy—
they are lively enough to rebel against his authority—but composing them is another matter. The meeting dissolves "in much-admired disorder" shortly after the Author himself rebels against his own antiquarian tyrants, declaring: "I will lay my foundations better than on quicksands—I will rear my structure of better materials than printed cards; in a word, I will write History!" (xl). This "History"—a history that was to appear the following year as Walter Scott's *Life of Napoleon Bonaparte*—will, the Author notes here, be based on "reollections with which the ears of this generation once tingled, and which shall be read by our children with an admiration approaching to incredulity." So, as he "discards" the antiquarians and turns to History, the Author is not following a new course. Instead, as always, he is locating his authority as the Author of history in the same living voices that were the authenticating source of his first novel.

Interestingly, the same year that sees Scott publishing a work that is history in a more conventional sense than heretofore also sees him disclosing his identity and beginning to write in his own name. Although the Authorial masks which he has worn from the beginning of his novelistic career have been for much of the twelve years since *Waverley* (and for an increasing number of readers) a transparent device, Scott sustained the illusion of anonymity in order to effect his fictional endeavours. The unruly gathering of shareholders that introduces the *Tales of the Crusaders* is an appropriate
emblem for Scott's undertaking in the Waverley novels: while he is composing historical novels on the one hand, on the other he is simultaneously decomposing these novels into their constituent voices. Voices are an apt metaphor for his fiction, in that the oral component is crucial to it, representing both the individual perspective that resists the ordering power of narration and the kind of changeability that ensures continuity, in contrast to the literalism that engenders decay. Like Peter Pattieson, Scott sees himself as transcribing rather than inscribing. When he removes his masks, he immediately begins the work of disclosing the real authorities behind his presumption of authorship. Walter Scott, as editor of his own novels, typically informs readers of his sources in his introductions and notes, which refer readers back to the actual incidents from which he derived his narratives. But these incidents themselves, as he makes clear, exist only as stories. The Author takes off his mask, then, to reveal that he is simply a storyteller after all, one whose authority lies in other storytellers.

III

Equally significant, however, is the fact that, even as this "second edition," openly authored and edited by Scott, is being produced, he is donning his most elaborate and most transparent mask of all so that the storytelling may continue.
In Chrystal Croftangry, the chronicler of the Canongate, Scott creates another Pattieson-like writer to gather from oral tradition and to transcribe stories which he can then, in the manner of Jedediah Cleishbotham, compose into a saga whose main character is the writer. Ironically, once the "Great Unknown" stands revealed as but a "Small Known" (Chronicles, xlvii), he finds that "the audacity which a sense of incognito bestowed" is, not less, but more necessary because he begins now to disclose not only the sources of his tales but their original generic patterns and their personal roots. Like the Tales of My Landlord, the Chronicles form an ongoing narrative, but they represent an even more radically disruptive generic form. The First Series consists of two fine Highland tales and prototypical short stories ("The Highland Widow" and "The Two Drovers") and one less successful longer story of India ("The Surgeon's Daughter"). Three "detached" stories were added later after being rejected for the Second Series and first seeing publication in an annual called "The Keepsake" (xv): the two conventional ghost stories, "My Aunt Margaret's Mirror" and "The Tapestried Chamber," and the story which Andrew Lang calls "a mere anecdote," "The Death of the Laird's Jock" (x). For the actual Second Series of the Chronicles, Scott moved back into his more comfortable and popular mode with the novel The Fair Maid of Perth. Clearly, these chronicles are a motley collection of stories, both in subject and in genre. But the
evident diversity of this material is contained and ordered within a frame that is itself like a novel. In a sense, the Chronicles reverse the previous situation in that the "unnarratable" material is now represented in the stories, while the frame narrates a more conventional plot.

As in all of Scott's framed narratives, the opposition here between the frame and the story it encloses authenticates and enlivens the narrative; and in these chronicles this dialectic, far from breaking down narrative, results in the displacement of the conventional narrative of history and novel by more traditional patterns. All the chronicles are transcribed from oral stories, and all but one of these are, also traditional stories. Unlike Pattieson, Croftangry does not attempt to "blend" them into one composed narrative. Instead, he preserves their discrete existence, stopping short even of composing the individual stories into any form more finished than it had in its original telling. All but one of the stories retain their original brokenness—either in the sense of unrelieved tragedy (as in the three Highland tales) or in the sense of unresolved mystery (as in the two ghost stories). And in the other story, "The Surgeon's Daughter," Scott cultivates a brokenness that is not there in the original story by compounding the tragedy, as Shakespeare did for his version of Lear. Unlike earlier works, then, these chronicles are deliberately deprived of the formal resolution afforded by the perspective and distancing of conventional
narrative, so that they remain disturbingly unresolved.

Both the two finest Chronicles, "The Highland Widow" and "The Two Drovers," take as their theme the downfall of the Highland culture and the tragedy of its resistance to the inevitable triumph of English culture and law. Partly because of their juxtaposition and partly because of explicit allusion in the first Chronicle, the two stories seem to reach back to the world of myth, echoing the themes of classical tragedy and epic. In both these stories the clash of English and Highland culture leads a Highlander to crimes which are understood (by the narrator of "The Highland Widow" and by the narrator and the judge of "The Two Drovers") to be committed "less out of the malevolence of the heart than the error of the understanding" ("Drovers" 2:235; cf. "Widow" 181). Both are similarly seen to have "failed in [their] ignorance, and from mistaken notions of honour" ("Drovers" 240) and both are thwarted by conflicting notions of time.

Time works against Hamish Bean, the son of the Highland Widow, when, in order to prevent his joining forces with the conquering English culture, his mother induces in him a spell that prevents his keeping an appointment with the English commander. The archetypal clash of cultures of which Hamish is here the ground and victim is worked out in the person of his two allegiances. On one side stands his mother, who anticipates the future "from recollections of the past" and her son’s life in terms of his father’s (3:132). Rehearsing
ancient traditions and stories from "legendary history," she sees power and honour in the old terms of the sword and violence (4.145). On the other side stands the English commanding officer to whom Hamish tries to ally himself in opposition to his mother (and the memory of his father). He is the exponent of the dominant English culture, where power and honour are seen in terms of the law and civil order. For his mother, Elspat, Hamish's surrender to the dominant authority is a betrayal of the real and ever-present world of the heroic Highland culture, of the "national heroic past" of epic as described by Bakhtin: a world of fathers and of founders of families, a world of "firsts" and "bests" (Bakhtin 15). Recalling old genres, the tragic irony of the story bears the marks of Greek tragedy, and it is these terms that define the Highlanders' perspective on the figure they call "the Woman of the Tree" (1:113). The narrator makes the allusion explicit when he says that just as the Greeks saw Orestes and Oedipus as "less the voluntary perpetrators of their crimes than as the passive instruments by which the terrible decrees of Destiny had been accomplished," so the Highlanders see the widow and her son as unwittingly caught up in a tragic drama whose author is Fate (1:113). In putting her son to sleep, Elspat symbolically consigns him to death at the hands of the powers she is trying to subvert. As she misguidedly tries to keep her son in the darkness of a lost world, she "studied to exclude the light... in order to detain
amid its wants and wretchedness the being on whom, if the world itself had been at her disposal, she would have joyfully conferred it" (5:153). Ironically, Hamish's desertion merits his execution at the hands of English law, and Elspat becomes the classic tragic figure of a mother who feels "she has murdered her only child" in her efforts to save him (5:191).

In the second Chronicle, "The Two Drovers." a clash of cultures similarly leads to an ironic tragedy when an Englishman and a Scotsman get into a dispute over the use of a piece of land: a dispute that is a sign of the underlying political conflict. The two friends cannot speak each other's language—a linguistic emblem of the cultural clash—and their dispute becomes a dispute over the form the fight will take. The hand-to-hand combat that is the English way amounts to the Highlander to being "peaten like a dog" (2:224); likewise his choice of broadsword is laughable to the Englishman. Not only are their cultural forms of defending their honour different, but their interpretations of these different forms of combat also conflict. There is a literally deadly significance to these conflicting interpretations: in the English world, Robin McCombich's plea as a "gentlemans" is laughed to scorn (2:224), and what is a point of honour to the Scot is murder to the Englishman and his law. Because the English is the dominating culture and the culture of the future, its interpretation of events is authoritative. To heighten the almost archetypal proportions of this conflict, Robin
interprets his killing of Harry Wakefield as the fulfillment of a prophecy made by "an auld Highland witch," who warned that blood would come of his venture into England (1:207). Emblematically, Robin fulfills the prophetic word of his ancient culture, which sees the future as written in the past and violates the legal text of English law, which views time in a different way. The English judge decrees that although the law could have exercised mercy if the crime had been a passionate crime of the moment, Robin is condemned by the two hours that intervened between his incurring the insult and implementing revenge. Time is the jurisdiction of the law and of narrative reason and history. In both stories, it is time that works against the Highlander and his culture.

Although not their theme, the same sense of a lost primitive culture is the enabling mode of the two ghost stories. For the telling and hearing of her story, Aunt Margaret cultivates and recommends "a sense of superstition," which not only, as she says, "separates me from this age, and links me with that to which I am hastening" but also links teller and listener "naturally" to the past (254.256). "To enjoy a ghost story," an inhabitant of the present age must "occasionally prefer the twilight of illusion to the steady light of reason" (258). Along with this fostering of a superstitious attitude is the simulation of the oral experience, the medium that releases what the narrator of "The Tapestried Chamber" calls "the power of narrative in private
conversation," a power of which written narrative can give only "a much more feeble impression" (302.301).

Scott frames his Chronicles in a way that simulates and attempts to sustain the "power" of oral narrative and concurrently attempts to recover and yet control the power of the lost culture of which oral tradition is a remnant. Like Aunt Margaret's storytelling, these frames dramatize the conscious fostering of a tension between the world of the past—as lived in the "imagination"—and the world of the present—the domain of "reason and conduct" ("Mirror" 256). Scott uses Chrystal Croftangry to dramatize the meeting of these two worlds and the transmission of the heritage of the oral culture to the age of written narrative. Croftangry is a medium between the two cultures, but in mediating cultural and social reconciliation he also reconciles his own past and present lives, thereby rendering personal the cultural recovery. Neither Chrystal's personal past nor the Highland past is ever actually recovered, of course, but for both individual and culture the storytelling experience enables a kind of metaphorical recovery "in sentiment and feeling only" in the midst of actual loss (256).

It is suggestive that, having disclosed his identity and begun to disclose his sources, Scott should choose at this juncture to tell his stories in the form of chronicles and to tell, at the same time, the story of the chronicling. The chronicle could serve as a generic emblem for Scott as a
writer of historical fiction who is in a sense always trying simultaneously to "unwrite" history, to disclose its pre-narrative voice. The chronicle form represents a genre that both mingles history and fiction and breaks down both these forms of narrative into the stories from which they originated. Scott is, after all, a "history-teller," as Walter Benjamin calls the chronicler (95). And because of its resemblance to and difference from both story and history the chronicle is a suitable mode for one who wishes to tell, but must instead write, history. A chronicle is like a story, as Hayden White says, in that it "aspires to narrativity" (9). But although it is by definition written, it is also open and resistant to closure like an unfinished story—or like an oral story. By using the chronicle form, Scott continues his effort to transcribe rather than inscribe the "unnarratable" source material. When he describes "My Aunt Margaret's Mirror" as "a mere transcript" (Introduction 246), he is not, as might be expected, acknowledging that it is an inferior piece of writing but, rather, that it is an inferior piece of telling. In a similar way, the chronicle's being like and unlike history serves his unconventional purposes, for a chronicle is also not a history. It is like a history in that, as White says, it takes real events as its subject and has a "social centre" and interest (9). But it is unlike a history (and like oral tradition) in that its social centre and interest are too limited to allow it to become part of
"official history." It presents a fragmentary and unfinished record of events rather than a narrative that places these events in a context and thereby in the text of official history. Whereas "the historian is bound to explain," as Benjamin puts it, the chronicler is bound to tell events in a way that compels "interpretation" (96). In terms of history, as well as in terms of story, the chronicle's "failure to achieve narrative closure" is symptomatic, in that it lacks the authority in itself to impose closure (White 9). A chronicle is a chronological record that lacks the perspective and the authoritative inscribing of history, and Scott employs the form, as he has used the frames in other novels, to recover the voices that are otherwise silenced by its official text.

In a sense, all of Scott's novels are about the clash between the official written version of history—typically, the English version—and the unofficial spoken version that is comprised of the legends and traditions of submerged cultures. A chronicle is an appropriate genre in which to write of this cultural clash because it tells of the transition of an oral into a written culture; it records events that have yet to become history, words that have yet to become narrative. In his Chronicles, Scott dramatizes how stories become texts, how chronicles become a historical novel. His chronicler learns to recover the past in a metaphorical way that nonetheless enables him to live amid the brokenness of his present
experience. The process involves his working out a relationship with the written and the spoken word. Croftangry first tries to recover his personal identity and history in almost literal terms by trying to undo his own past. As a first step, he reads his family history, but he finds written there—not only in the words and between the lines but in the very handwriting of his ancestor—his condemnation as betrayer. Croftangry finds himself in this written record in the character of prodigal son, but he takes some consolation in being able to read in the writer's "neat but crowded and constrained small hand" a character that betrays its own limitations even as it judges his. The writing style, too, which places great stock in quotations, argues the writer's "pedantry"; and the embellishment of the letters and repeated inclusion of the family name "express forcibly the pride and sense of importance with which the author undertook and accomplished his task" (23–24). So, although his ancestor's writings expose Croftangry's betrayal of his heritage, they also in their written form betray their own writer. And what Croftangry learns from this reading is not only a sober understanding of himself but also a distrust of the written word, even his own.

There are two related aspects to this realization. For one thing, the kind of literal (word for word) recovery of the past that his ancestor attempted is doomed to failure and misunderstanding: not only that, but the written record is
betrayed by its own inscription. Chrystal responds to both these problems when he writes his chronicles. First, rather than a literal recovery of his own past, he attempts a metaphorical recovery of his experience through a narrative recovery of a cultural past in which his own is imbedded. Second, his writing goes even further than that of Peter Pattieson in trying to transcribe the stories of tellers rather than to inscribe an official text. Chrystal tries to write these chronicles in a deliberately interlocutory style; he tests them as oral stories by reading them aloud to his housekeeper, Janet, a survivor of the old oral world.

The frame chapters, which feature Chrystal and tell the story of his becoming a storyteller and then the story of his primary sources, are at least as important to the Chronicles as are the stories he chronicles. This focus on the tellers and on the process of transmission locates in the telling itself, rather than in the event it tells, the source of interest and reality. The Chronicles dramatize what has been implied throughout Scott's career: his aim is to preserve and transmit, not historical events or persons themselves, but the spirit of storytelling. That is, his interest lies in the possibility of maintaining the kind of tradition of telling and listening that is characteristic of oral cultures. In drawing a (rather extreme) distinction between storytelling and the written novel, Benjamin says that storytelling "does not aim to convey the pure essence of the thing, like
information or a report. It sinks the thing into the life of the storyteller, in order to bring it out of him again." Scott's aim (rather paradoxical in Benjamin's terms) is to write a novel that bears the "traces of the storyteller" (91-92).

Benjamin sees novel and story as descended from epic and in epic he discerns two kinds of memory: "perpetuating remembrance," which characterizes the novel, and "short-lived reminiscences," the hallmark of the story. "Perpetuating remembrance" is the kind of memory that places particular events in their larger historical context and identifies their place in an overall pattern, while reminiscence constitutes the kind of memory by which a story passes from generation to generation and one story generates another. Mrs. Baliol, Chrystal's primary source and the quintessential storyteller in Chronicles, supplies reminiscence rather than remembrance. She is part of what Benjamin calls the "chain of tradition which passes a happening on from generation to generation" (7:98), and it is her very role as link in this chain that constitutes her authority. "I... cannot boast any personal knowledge of the great personages you inquire about." she tells Croftangry, "yet I have seen and heard those who knew them well, and who have given me as distinct an account of them as I could give you myself...and...I have heard so much of the years which immediately succeeded the Revolution that I sometimes am apt to confuse the vivid descriptions
fixed on my memory by the frequent and animated recitation of others, for things which I myself have actually witnessed" (7:92–93). Mrs. Bariol's inability to "remember personally" (7:92) actually enhances her ability to remember well. She has told and finally transcribed ("in her own handwriting" but without inscribing herself in them) tales she has heard, mainly from one Highlander, Donald MacLeish. Her authority rests upon the essentially fluid ground of memory and oral transmission, and the chain itself is far more authoritative than any "personal knowledge." Upon her death, the "packet" of her "anecdotes" is "transmitted" (7:98) to the listener-turned-chronicler. Chrystal Croftangry, a process that is a close approximation of the chain of tradition. Her reminiscences then find perpetuating remembrance in the written form of his novel. In a sense (at least in Benjamin's terms). Scott's Chronicles is an attempt to re-unify the reminiscence and remembrance that comprised the original epic form. The death of Mrs. Bariol in a way signifies the death of the storyteller and the birth of the novelist, the death of memory and the birth of history. But although he must write, rather than remember and tell, Croftangry can preserve the memory (and the remembering and telling) of the storyteller by producing a novel that bears the traces of the storyteller, both the tellers he invokes and himself.

The chronicle—as the genre in which history is told rather than written—raises not only the narrative but also
the political questions in which Scott is interested. It is in the form of the chronicle that he confronts the problem that narrative becomes when, as White puts it, "we wish to give to real events the form of a story" (8). Here is the definitive problem for Scott and for historical fiction. Narrative demands order and meaning. categories imposed on real experience rather than deriving from it. And because order and meaning are inevitably ideologically defined, historical narrative always reinforces the ideology of a culture and thereby establishes the prevailing authority by providing the "official text" of history. Because the prevailing authority must be upheld, the official text narrates what has happened in history (events that have led to the triumph of the prevailing authority) as inevitable and right (White 16). The meaning and authority of such an official text of history are challenged by the cultures which have been subsumed by the writers of history. Their voices, asking why things are ordered this way, pose a threat to the closure that the historical text enforces. And their voices refuse the written "explanation" of history in favour of the telling "interprétation" of chronicle (to recall Benjamin's distinction).

Like the culture they represent, Scott's Chronicles suffer the enforced closure of history: they are uncomfortable with the alien form of text. Scott of course endorses the established text of history where his own nation and culture
are concerned. But at the same time he sympathizes with and partakes in the tendency of "many an old Jacobite" who, like his fictive Mrs. Baliol, is "contented to be somewhat inconsistent on the subject, comforting herself that now everything stood as it ought to do, and that there was no use in looking back narrowly on the right or wrong of the matter half a century ago" (94). The Chronicles exemplify this ambivalence or dual perspective more strikingly than any other of Scott's works: even their refusal to submit to the form of the novel gives generic shape to the life of the Highland culture that exceeds the bounds of English order and law. Scott's Chronicles are his effort to tell the stories that are not heard in the official text of history. He attempts to retain their oral sense as stories through his intricate tale of the transmission from Donald MacLeish to Mrs. Baliol to Chrystal Croftangry as they become gradually textualized. Moreover, the stories are distinguished by a lack of closure that marks them as chronicles of a marginal culture, opening up the closed text of history.

The final Chronicle, "Death of the Laird's Jock," is emblematic both thematically and generically. It tells of the death of the Laird of the Armstrong clan, who earned the name of Laird's Jock (or son) because of the achievements with which he distinguished the name before his father's death (328). This laird dies three days after the death of his own son in valiant combat with an English champion. But for this
grieving parent. "the death of his son had no part in his 
sorrow"; rather, his heart has "broken" because of the loss of 
honour, for honour constituted his "only tie to life" (331). 
The Laird's Jock is representative of the Highland culture: 
just as his name memorializes a past glory, so his "wasted 
frame" houses the "ruins" of a strength and a glory that are 
mocked by present weakness. For him and for the traditional 
culture, honour is confined to memory because they define 
honour by victory and life, and their experience is defined by 
defeat and death. At the death of his son, the laird cries 
out "in the extremity of furious despair" with a sound that 
"resembled the cry of a dying lion more than a human sound" 
(331). This "one strong moment of agonizing passion" is the 
focus of the Author's interest in the story, which he has 
written in response to a request from the Editor of "The 
Keepsake" for "a subject for the pencil" (325). This request 
suggests an interesting generic analogy. In a comment 
recalling the dialogue between the writer and the painter that 
introduces The Bride of Lammermoor, the Author notes that in a 
picture "the single now is all which [the artist] can present" 
(326). But the Author is apologizing here, not for the 
limitations of painting, but for the limitations of writing, 
which in narrating the "single now" both captures and defeats 
the unnarratable life of the moment. In these Highland 
Chronicles, the Author is attempting to record the "one strong 
moment" of the traditional culture in a way that retains its
like life. Like the laird's cry, these stories signal both the
glory and the defeat of the ancient culture, and it is their
voices that make Scott's narratives speak.
NOTES

Notes to Introduction

1 For Scott's childhood experiences of listening to storytelling, see Edgar Johnson (Part One).

2 Scott also knew Adam Ferguson the elder, last of the original group associated with the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment, with whose son he went to school. Another connection with the original group was through David Hume, nephew of the philosopher, whose lectures on Scots Law impressed the young Scott. For the influence of his teachers at Edinburgh University, see Edgar Johnson I: 72-76 and Peter D. Garside. "Scott and the 'Philosophical Historians.'"

Scott's intellectual debt to the Scottish Enlightenment in his novels has been much discussed. See in particular David Brown, Avrom Fleishman (The English Historical Novel), and Graham McMaster.

3 A classic example of this tradition is Adam Ferguson's An Essay on the History of Civil Society.

4 The opening chapter of Waverley ends by noting "favourable opportunities of contrast" offered by the state of society in eighteenth-century Scotland. From Scott's contemporaries on, readers of the Waverley Novels have remarked on their reliance on opposition and tension (in various senses). Coleridge provides a notable early example of a reading that sees contrast as central to the novels. In a
letter to Thomas Allsop (8 April 1820). Coleridge writes that he sees at work in Scott's novels a "contest between the two great moving principles of social humanity: religious adherence to the past and the ancient, the desire and the admiration of permanence, on the one hand; and the passion for increase of knowledge, for truth, as the offspring of reason—in short, the mighty instincts of progression and free agency, on the other" (Hayden 180). Among modern students of Scott, the analysis of David Daiches in "Scott's Achievement as a Novelist" has probably been the most influential in establishing the sense of the struggle between alternatives as a generative principle of Scott's fiction.

5 Yates's historical analysis reveals these features as characteristic of the way memory is understood from the time of the ancient Greeks. Both Plato and Aristotle, for example, conceive of memory as a visual faculty. For Plato, the soul contains a block of wax whose source is memory. This sense of memory as a passive register for the active recording of experience is made more explicit when Aristotle distinguishes between memory and reminiscence or recollection, the latter denoting the deliberate exercise of the memory. For his part, Cicero speaks of memory as a kind of mental space wherein one can "store" images of things that will promote one's remembering of things so pictured. Along with this visual and passive quality of memory, he understands an active quality that underlies his promotion of the "art" of memory. (Yates
For an influential recent discussion of the importance of memory to oral cultures, see Walter Ong.

Notes to Chapter One

1 In her 1981 edition of Waverley, Claire Lamont draws attention to the fact that in the manuscript Scott originally wrote "we set out," changing it to "we have been drifted" for the published text (417).

2 For an analysis of the implied reader in Waverley, see Wolfgang Iser.

3 Richard Waswo shows that Scott's "literary activity" projects in fiction "a vision of the past the basis of whose creation is enacted in the continual present of every reader" (326).

4 Harry Shaw identifies the underlying pattern whereby readers, along with Edward Waverley, "move from spectatorship to an unsettling engagement with the past, but they make a crucial retreat back to spectatorship again" (Forms 185).

5 For a discussion of the realist disenchantment plot of Waverley, see in particular George Levine, Realistic Imagination, Ch. 4.

6 Jane Millgate notes that having completed his education, Edward is "almost totally lacking in historical awareness, or, for that matter, in any very adequate means for proceeding from the particular to a more general
understanding of what he observes" (Walter Scott 37).

Levine notes that Waverley "is hardly mistaken in thinking the world corresponds to his dreams... the narrator seems almost to sanction the romantic dream while making us aware of its absurdity" (Realistic Imagination 83). Levine's analysis of the novel as a whole stresses the way in which it "transforms action into dream, drives a wedge between narrative and desire, between language and action" (84).

In The Hero of the Waverley Novels, Alexander Welsh notes the prevalence of dream in romance, but points out the ambiguous nature of the dream and Scott's use of the motif. "Though the total action of the romance may be construed as a wish-dream," notes Welsh, "the incidents affecting the hero are usually fearsome or unpleasant." The experiences of the Waverley hero, he argues, "are more like fragments of a nightmare than logical constructions of a hopeful dream." For Welsh these nightmarish experiences are symptomatic of the anxiety characteristic of the Scott hero, who "propitiates authority and represses all unacceptable passions" (151.174).

See Welsh, Hero, for a full exploration of Scott's passive hero.

Waswo cites this incident as an example of "the inexorable importance of reputation, the conferring of identity and value by social interpretation" in the Waverley Novels (316). See also Judith Wilt's provocative discussion of Waverley's loss of identity and reputation (Secret Leaves..."
Welsh comments that "dress figures in Waverley as a symbol of a romantic adventure that may be put on or off—thus confirming the excursion by which the hero can experience the world of romantic action without actually performing any" (Hero 161).

In Scott and Society, Graham McMaster identifies this as one of "two or three strongly marked scenes in which the reader is clearly asked to make moral judgements" (13).

In her study of realism and perspective, Elizabeth Ernath notes that "the mnemonic act of recovery is crucial for perceiving the patterns in events." By the act of remembering, Ernath argues, perceived discontinuities eventually give way to a "hidden order," and realistic fiction promises that "given enough time, enough distance, one can fit any anomaly into its proper place in the system" (514-5).

Commenting on this scene, Welsh notes: "The romance, of course, is not over. By 'romance' Waverley means the romantic episode, which...is characteristically finite. By 'history' he signifies an equally imaginary construction of infinite future time—a part of the reality by which the hero conceives himself to be supported" (147-8). Levine agrees, commenting that in the novel "Scott turns the romantic past into a comprehensible and recognizable experience and yet sustains romance to the end" (94).

David Brown argues that these survivors have two
things in common: "the ability to compromise with the inevitable" and "the ability to forget" (23). I would contend that more crucial is their ability to remember in a new way, a way that involves compromising and forgetting but is still a remembering.

For a discussion of Waverley and Fergus as doubles, see Kiely (145ff.).

In The Civilized Imagination, Daniel Cottom notes: "Perspective, memory, and writing all serve to tame sensations and events: they are all civilizing tools that withdraw one from the dangers of immediacy as they withdraw one from action: they are supposed to put an end to disorder." While affirming such civilizing tools, however, the Waverley Novels, Cottom points out, "concentrate on exciting in the reader "the very dangers [the tools] are designed to eliminate" (143).

On this point see Millgate, who argues that the novel does not so much reject as transcend "youthful romanticism" and that Scott, far from rejecting the imagination, affirms it as the source of knowledge and wisdom (Walter Scott 55-57).

For recent analyses of the subtitle, see Millgate (Walter Scott 37) and Wilt (Leaves 27).

This is a point frequently made in Scott criticism. A. O. J. Cockshut, for example, argues that Scott is at his best when he is working within the range of memory, "within about 100 years of his own boyhood" (104). Wilt comments: "each man's own 'now' is romance time inevitably, as is his great-grandfather's
time. His father's time is 'real' time, not 'my story' but 'history'" (Secret Leaves 28).

Notes to Chapter Two

1. Avrom Fleishman lays particular stress on the loss and gain model of history developed by the Scottish Enlightenment in The English Historical Novel. See also Note #2 to the Introduction for discussions of the relationship of the Waverley Novels and the Scottish Enlightenment.

2. The notion that historical stages in society's development correspond to like stages in individual development is suggested by William Robertson, the classic historian of the Scottish school, in his history of Scotland: "Nations, as well as men, arrive at maturity by degrees" (199).

3. Scott's understanding of the development of societies from "primitive" to civilized and his interest in transitional stages and in the contrast between two stages are evident throughout his novels. In the Introduction to Rob Roy, for instance, a novel in which this contrast is a central subject, he describes certain incidents in the MacGregor clan's involvement with the citizens of Edinburgh. The story, he says, forms "an interesting chapter, not on Highland manners alone, but on every stage of society in which the people of a primitive and half-civilized tribe are brought into close
contact with a nation in which civilisation and polity has attained a complete superiority" (lxxxix).

Fleishman sums up the different mentalities of the old world and the new: "The values of the past are those of the folk," he writes, "of ritualized religion and nuclear family ties, of the absolute ethics of relatively primitive societies, and of personal motivation by inherited mores--for the individual has not yet differentiated himself clearly from the group." In contrast, the values of modern life are "rational freedom, liberation from the dead weight of the past both intellectually and politically, a new world abuilding for the fulfillment of all members of society" (English Historical Novel 38–39).

Scott's description of the history of the clan Gregor in the Introduction to Rob Roy illustrates the general character I am outlining here. Its members were "united together for right or wrong, and menacing with the general vengeance of their race whomsoever committed aggressions against any individual of their number" (xxxviii).

Thomas Reid, moral philosopher of the Common-sense school, states that "Memory is always accompanied with the belief of that which we remember." He argues that taking things imagined as things remembered is symptomatic of immaturity or mental deficiency: "Perhaps in infancy, or in a disorder of mind, things remembered may be confounded with those which are merely imagined:..." (207).
The definition of symbol in the *Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics* is especially illuminating since it employs an analogy which Ravenswood and Lucy use: "The word 'symbol' derives from the Gr. verb *symballein*, meaning "to put together," and the related noun, *symbolon*, meaning 'mark,' 'token,' or 'sign.' in the sense of the half-coin carried away by each of the two parties of an agreement as a pledge. Hence, it means basically a joining or combination, and, consequently, something once so joined or combined as standing for or representing in itself, when seen alone, the entire complex."

Harry Shaw sees a "radical ambivalence" as central to the novel and concentrated in Ravenswood; so intense is this ambivalence in him. Shaw argues, that Lucy comes to embody it (Forms 216).

Donald Cameron comments that "the love that one would expect to flame through the centre of the book is replaced by Edgar's subconscious pursuit of the final tragic consummation of his sense of himself" (202).

In his *Essay on the History of Civil Societies*, Adam Ferguson states that the problem with the "ordinary establishments" of society is that, rather than promote virtue and strength of character, "they lead mankind to rely on their arts, instead of their virtues, and to mistake for an improvement of human nature, a mere accession of accommodation, or of riches." Corruption and moral
degeneracy. Ferguson argues, are attendant upon cultivation. People substitute selfish, petty concerns for the real, social ones of former ages. "In this condition, mankind generally flatter their own imbecility under the name of politeness" (224.256).

Ravenswood is frequently described, not as doing something, but as not avoiding doing something: for example, "he could not but observe" Lucy's attention (14:195): "it became impossible" not to invite them in (9:139-40): "he could not avoid catching" Lucy (5:66-7).

While congratulating ourselves on having progressed away from violence, Ferguson states, we must regret that we "come to employ, instead of the statesman and warrior, the mere clerk and accountant" (Civil Society 225).

Although Shaw calls Frank a "disjunctive" hero, he seems to me to fit Shaw's definition of a "conjunctive" hero, one of those whose "careers comment on the shape of the historical process" (Forms 205.176).

Frank's "right to property," remarks Alexander Welsh, is "thoroughly reaffirmed"—morally, legally, and magically (Hero, 186).

Compare with Ferguson's comments on the supposed "improvement of human nature" as "a mere accession of accommodation" (Civil Society, 224).

Welsh calls Diana "forbidden fruit," comparing her with Eve. "It is hard to say," he comments, "which is more
enticing, her mysterious dedication to the cloister or her availability as a 'man'" (Hero 187,188).

See Daniel Cottom, Chapter 9, for a discussion of the positive value of violence compared with the ambiguities of law in Scott. "The problem of law is that the sublimation of violence is accompanied by a sublimation of the human spirit and that the process tends to subvert the former" (173).

For the anxieties and guilt characteristic of the Waverley hero, see Welsh, Hero (Ch. 6).

Shaw has demonstrated Scott's preference for simile over metaphor or symbol, noting that this preference was one of the characteristics that allowed John Leycester Adolphus to uncover the identity of the Author of Waverley in 1822. Shaw remarks: "unlike most of his Romantic contemporaries, Scott does not reach for mystical or symbolic unities or for any sort of consubstantiality between symbol and thing symbolized." Rob Roy, in particular, supports Shaw's view that when Scott "compares things, he likes to let you know he's doing so, and so he uses similes" ("Scott and George Eliot: the Lure of the Symbolic," 400).

Notes to Chapter Three

John Barrell begins his book The Idea of Landscape and the Sense of Place by acknowledging the difficulty involved in using the word "landscape": "There is no word in English which denotes a tract of land, of whatever extent, which is
apprehended *visually* but not necessarily, *pictorially*.... The word we do use, of course, is 'landscape': we can speak of the 'landscape' of a county, but in doing so we introduce, whether we want to or not, notions of value and form which relate, not just to seeing the land, but to seeing it in a certain way—pictorially" (1). With the help of the OED, Barrell traces the development of the word and sums up the stages thus: "from first denoting only a picture of rural scenery, it comes to denote also a piece of scenery apprehended, as it would be in a picture, in prospect, and finally, it denotes as well land 'considered with regard to its natural configuration'" (2). These latter meanings apparently came into use in the mid-eighteenth century.

Because of Scott's highly visual sense and his explicit reference to scenes in terms of their potential representation. I use "landscape" as the general term, including in it the range of meanings outlined by Barrell, and "sense of place" as a more specific term, connoting what Wordsworth called the "spirit of a place": this latter term suggests an apprehension of the particular identity of a particular place, an apprehension that highlights emotional and personal, rather than simply intellectual or aesthetic, perception. In *The Prelude*, Wordsworth distinguishes between the perception of a place in terms of the current aesthetic categories ("a strong infection of the age") and the perception that attends "to the moods/ Of time or season, to
the moral power./ The affection. and the spirit of the place"
(XII:113.118-20).

Cockshut defines the boundaries within which Scott worked best as going back to "within about a hundred years of his own boyhood," the date of Old Mortality representing "about the furthest reach of a process which relied largely on oral tradition" (104).

In his 1823 essay on Clara Reeve, Scott comments on the difficulties involved in writing of a remote age in a way that makes it comprehensible to the modern reader and yet retains the sense of remoteness. A writer can avoid all the possible "inconsistency," he writes, "by adopting the style of our grandfather and great-grandfathers, sufficiently antiquated to accord with the antiquated character of the narrative, yet copious enough to express all that is necessary to its interest. and to supply that deficiency of colouring which the more ancient times do not afford" (Lives 209). It is suggestive that such a strategy would keep a writer within the range Cockshut identifies as Scott's most fruitful.

Ironically, of course, The Monastery, despite its potent landscape, disappoints most readers, largely because of Scott's failure to translate crucial features of the novel (the Euphuist, the White Lady) into contemporary terms. While it is the lack of a strong sense of place that makes the world of Ivanhoe insurmountably remote, it is the strong sense of place of The Monastery that betrays Scott into thinking its
world accessible.

Dugald Stewart, Scott's teacher, characterized the skill of description by distinguishing between "perception" and "conception." Employing terms also used by Scott, Stewart writes that the talent for description "depends chiefly on the degree in which the describer possesses the power of conception." Conception presents us "with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived" but also combines parts of different ones together into "new wholes," a process involving abstraction, judgement, and taste. It might be assumed, he comments, that a "happier description" might be given through conception than perception. Good description is not a matter of "minute specification of circumstances," but rather of "judicious selection." Such selection entails attending to the "particulars that make the deepest impression on our own minds. When the object is actually before us, it is extremely difficult to compare the impressions which different circumstances produce; and the very thought of writing a description would prevent the impression which would otherwise take place." Our conception of the object then consists of an "outline... made up of those circumstances, which really struck us most at the moment, while others of less importance are obliterated" (Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind 74).

Marcia Allentuck notes that Scott "would not dissociate visual or pictorial elements from anthropomorphic ones in
contemplating a scene" because he was "less concerned with abstract categories of form than he was with man's response" (191).

For stimulating discussions of this problematic novel, see Welsh, Hero, and Shaw, Forms.

Shaw finds in Morton a deep desire to belong to what he knows is a "fundamentally inhospitable" society. Morton's sense of human insignificance," comments Shaw. "almost amounts to a sense of existential homelessness" (Forms 203).

Morton's return is often seen as a parody of the heroic return of Odysseus. See, for example, Cullinan.

Judith Wilt argues that this novel expresses Scott's sense that "the profoundest experience of the citizens of the kingdom of belief is the experience of that kingdom's hidden proximity after its tangible loss" (Secret Leaves 184).

Graham McMaster does an insightful reading of the novel as a myth of the "redemptive power of society" (161).

Chrystal's terms here are reminiscent of the distinctions Coleridge draws between the fancy, which deals with "fixities and definites" and can only aggregate by the power of association, and the imagination, which synthesizes, orders, unifies, and enlivens. Coleridge's "mechanical memory" is comparable to Chrystal's "involuntary memory," which merely provides the data for the imaginative work of the voluntary memory (Biographia Literaria 167,60).

Although Chrystal's experience is comparable to the
romantic return and his imagination does transform his experience, his imagination does not have the power to redeem the loss in the way that the imagination celebrated by the Romantics does. Millgate makes a similar point in relation to Frank Osbaldistone in *Rob Roy* (Walter Scott 141).

Notes to Chapter Four

1 In his study of the Scottish novel, Francis Hart defines the Gothic mode in terms of this ambivalence and potential for inversion, identifying as central to it "a mutual fascination between fatalistic innocence and sublimely willful evil." These two poles are, he comments, "archetypally--some would say incestuously--akin." and it is this relationship that is the fascination of Gothic fiction. (*The Scottish Novel* 20).

2 Julia Briggs comments that with progress and urban life in the nineteenth century came the loss of the traditional sense of the supernatural element in nature and an accompanying sense of alienation from others and from nature. "Out of an alienation, to which the decay of supernatural beliefs contributed," she writes, "there emerged the figure of the double, neither the self nor another, a powerful symbol of unresolved inner conflict" (19).

3 Kermode claims that "fundamentally arbitrary chronological divisions" like the turn of a century are "made
to bear the weight" of the anxieties and hopes that we "project...onto history" (Sense of an Ending 11).

Judith Wilt draws attention to the "disclaimers" that characterize Scott's description of Norna's conversion: his language here abounds with "seemed" and "appeared" (Secret Leaves 123). Scott's idealized picture of the angelic Minna and her apparent relief at Cleveland's death are also curious.

For a provocative discussion of Scott's paradigm of the dark and light heroines, see Welsh. Hero 70-82.

The act of rescue is central to Scott's romance; as Robert Caserio demonstrates in Plot, Story and the Novel. Caserio argues that rescue represents Scott's narrative endeavour to find ways for meaningful action in the new world: Waverley's rescue of Talbot, for example, is "a re-enactment of the active heroism of the fading past" (285). This rescue of Talbot is part of a series of rescues in the novel and a fictional version of the true story of rescue that Scott narrates in the Introduction to The Chronicles of the Canongate, xxiv.

This essay was published in 1824, the same year as St. Ronan's Well.

In the published text, Clara's guilt is out of proportion to her real crimes, while in the original version it is reasonable, given existing social mores. But the fact that Scott left the disproportion intact suggests, I think, that it in itself became part of Clara's tragedy for him. In
this novel. Scott dramatizes the psychological effects of inherited crimes as most terrible at their unconscious levels.

Many readers have noticed this pattern. Harry Shaw, for example, sees in Redgauntlet "a wealth of metaphorical doublings" (Forms, 208). See also Graham McMaster and Brian Nellist.

McMaster sees the novel as dramatizing characters not only working out their relationships to society but also taking part in myths that give shape to that struggle. See especially 42-46.

This scene and its image of doubleness recalls Minna's glimpse in The Pirate of the shadowy double image projected by Cleveland and Mordaunt, one of whom is the "fatal burden" carried by the other (23:49). Both scenes resonate with Scott's sense of the complexity of the reciprocal gains and losses involved in the act of rescue.

Nellist comments that the "fictional voice" of the narrative "records how a romance character contributes to the triumph of the novelistic—commonsense of his nephew, and hence to the undoing of the family blight. Yet the detail itself ironically confirms the narrative point of view." This is one instance when "the romance that dies lives to the memory, and the novel that triumphs is reminded of its partial blindness" (66.69).

Richard Waswo argues that Scott gives "primary importance to the social nexus of human identity and to the
acts of interpretation on which this depends" (305). Harry Shaw makes a similar point, arguing persuasively that for Scott personality "seems to reside in the network of human relations which become embodied in political institutions, and not in an individual center of self" (Forme 140).

Scott himself often expresses the dangers of introspection, most directly in his essay on Byron: "He who shall mine long and deeply for materials in his own bosom will encounter abysses at the depths of which he must necessarily tremble" (MPW 27:359). He suggests a similar view in his note on the character of Norna in The Pirate, where he describes her "double character," comprised of her "natural self" (the one "seen to exist by other people") and the other self, the product of a "distempered imagination" (Volume 2, 341). Scott's position is consistent with that of the Scottish Enlightenment. Adam Ferguson is representative, arguing that from society are derived "not only the force, but the very existence of [a person's] happiest emotions: not only the better part, but almost the whole of his rational character"

(Essay on the History of Civil Society, 1767 19).

Nellist argues that the act of interpretation is "the fundamental subject" of Redgauntlet. For him, this novel dramatizes the triumph of interpretation over event (66).
Notes to Chapter Five

1 In his seminal article "The Storyteller," Walter Benjamin draws a similar distinction between the story as oral and the novel as written, basing the distinction on different kinds of memory.

2 The frames have recently begun to receive more critical attention. Judith Wilt devotes the final chapter of Secret Leaves to a discussion of Scott's frames, arguing that in them he gives dramatic shape to his conflicting feelings about writing novels. Jane Millgate's reading of the first eight Waverley Novels in Walter Scott as part of Scott's ongoing dialogue with himself and with his first readers about his new subgenre also throws the frames into prominence.

3 Nellist comments that "memory, the act of fidelity to the past...is the real basis of the fictional viewpoint in Scott" (64).

4 Both the claim and the metaphor were, of course, standard by Scott's time as a sign of realist intent. Fielding, whom Scott deliberately echoes in Chapter One, uses similar language in Joseph Andrews and Tom Jones.

5 In "The Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse," Mikhail Bakhtin describes the novel in terms that accord with Scott's sense of his narrative form. "All essentially novelistic images," writes Bakhtin, "are internally dialogized images—of the language, styles, world views of another." Bakhtin
describes the novel as a discourse orchestrated by the author who "participates in the novel (he is omnipresent in it) with almost no direct language of his own. The language of the novel is a system of languages that mutually and ideologically interanimate each other" (46-47).

6 Millgate comments that "the Ganderclough framework allows Scott the privilege of a dialogue with himself about authorship without requiring that he come down on any one side of the argument" (110).

7 For a recent discussion of transmission in the Waverley Novels, see Joseph Kestner.

8 Millgate draws attention to the problematic nature of Frank's narration. "Though the novel is filled with voices and people who love to talk," she notes, "it is, in fact, the silences that reverberate in the reader's mind... those still places in the narration when the clear opportunity for retrospective amplification remains unexploited." Millgate argues that Frank's "analytical and interpretative restraint" is a clue to a deliberate (if subconscious) avoidance. She concludes that "Rob Roy demonstrates the inability of narrative alone to release the meaning of past experience or to provide a bridge between past and present selves" (136,148).

9 Bakhtin suggests the inherent limitations of the memoir form and its kind of memory. Its sort of memory is "memory of one's own contemporaneity and of one's own self."
he writes. "It is a de-heroizing memory: there is an element of the mechanical in it, of mere transcription (non-monumental). What results is personal memory without pre-existing chronological pattern, bounded by the termini of a single personal life" (24. note 2).

Elizabeth Ernath points to the ambiguity of the individual consciousness and memory: "The reflective consciousness of any single person, that awareness structured by memory, at once unifies and isolates individual consciousness" in a way that "deepens the privacy of an event" (516).

At least one important theorist of the novel stresses the importance of distance in generating the peculiar power and language of the genre. See Bakhtin. The Dialogic Imagination.

Harry Shaw argues that the debate between Pattieson and Tinto "enables Scott to pass off as a technical experiment suggested by someone else his creation in The Bride of Lammermoor of the immediate, overwhelming imaginative moments he elsewhere uses narrative to diffuse" (Forms 217).

"History as a System" in the volume of the same name.

Millgate stresses the continuity between the first group of novels and Ivanhoe and later novels because of the "established pattern" of the framing dialogue between Scott and his readers. "The sequence of novels became its own flexible but coherent category," she argues, "for which the
complex and continuing relationship between the Author and his readers provided a controlling context" (Walter Scott x-xi).

15 In her study of the English ghost story, Julia Briggs notes that "ghost stories are as old and older than literature, and in many pre-literate societies all over the world ghosts act as the protectors and guardians of social values and traditional wisdom" (25).

16 Frank Jordan offers an especially interesting analysis of Mrs. Balfour's character and presentation in "Chrysal Croftangry, Scott's Last and Best Mask."

17 Bakhtin comments on a basic difference between traditional and modern cultures (and between ancient forms of literature and the novel) in terms of the different understanding of memory and knowledge. "In ancient literature it is memory, and not knowledge, that serves as the source and power for the creative impulse," writes Bakhtin: "the tradition of the past is sacred." The novel, by contrast, is "determined by experience, knowledge and practice" (15). Benjamin draws a similar distinction.
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