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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS REÇUE
THE AESTHETIC ORIGINS OF HEGEL'S DIALECTIC

by

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A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies and Research of the University of Ottawa in partial fulfillment for the requirements of the Master's degree in Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

Traditionally, Hegel scholarship has examined the dialectic from the point of view of either Greek philosophy, or German idealism as represented by Fichte and Schelling. In looking to these influences, we are able to detect anticipations of the dialectic which help explain its genesis, as well as determining the extent to which Hegel read the history of philosophy through the philosophical positions he was in the process of developing—a reading which is itself significant for the formulation of the dialectic. Accordingly, there are many dialectical precursors; appropriately, since, as Hegel would have it, the history of philosophy is the progress of the dialectic in its unfolding and historical actualization.

One historical line of development that has been somewhat neglected in the secondary literature is the influence of the aesthetic doctrines of Kant and Schiller upon the formulation of the dialectic. Hegel acknowledges that in their aesthetic writings Kant and Schiller made significant contributions both to aesthetic theory, and to the development of speculative philosophy; although naturally there was a need for the thoroughgoing completion which Hegel's systematic philosophy furnished.

It has long been acknowledged that the Critique of Judgement constituted a turning point and major influence in the field of aesthetic inquiry. Mediating between preceding philosophies of art which consisted primarily in either empiricist theories of taste, or rationalist cognitive aesthetics, Kant attempted to find a priori principles for the subjective judgement of taste. Although he initially hoped to formulate a Critique
of Taste transcendently consistent with the rest of his system, he soon
saw that this was impossible. Due to the nature of the reflective judgement,
the judgement of taste was much more radically subjective than were the
epistemological formulations of the first two Critiques. For Hegel, reflection
in Kant is never truly objective, but only subjective and empty.
In the third Critique, objectivity is further weakened when Kant posits a
working universality, grounded in heuristic principles of analogy, an "as
if" notion, and an Intellectus archetypus. But it is this result which
constitutes the valuable dialectical insight. For the judgement of taste
is both subjective and objective; it is the "free play" of the cognitive
faculties which creates a unity and harmony of opposed or distinct elements.
It is the principle of mediation with which Kant hoped to unify the Critique
of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason, which at the time of
the writing of the third Critique were in a radical, and unwanted separation.

Friedrich Schiller considered himself a disciple of Kant, one whose
mission was to further develop the insights of the third Critique by
applying them to more secular and historical concerns. He was less
interested in transcendental grounding than he was in determining the
role of the aesthetic in human life, culture, and society. He seized
upon Kant's notion of the aesthetic as the mediator between the subjective
and objective, and employed it as a mediating principle of unity between
the individual's two warring instincts: the rational and the sensuous.
Hence both Kant and Schiller saw the aesthetic impulse as a mediator,
participating in two realms, while belonging exclusively to neither, thus
perpetually involved in a "play" of opposed elements. In addition,
Schiller introduced a cultural and historical element, believing that the
aesthetic impulse was the enobling principle of mankind, and in turn that
of the society as well.

An examination of these two aesthetic doctrines discloses clear anticipations of the Hegelian dialectic. I then attempt to trace and elucidate certain features of the dialectic by demonstrating how they were present in an earlier manifestation in Kant and Schiller. For example, the notions of unity, play, mediation and activity and independence of thought are all found in Kant and Schiller, notions which are subsequently central in the formulation of Hegel's dialectic. In addition, it is not only in the positive aspects of philosophy that an influence is to be detected, but in the negative aspects as well. That is, the Hegelian dialectic consists in both positive and negative determinations and accordingly, not only the notions perceived to be correct by Hegel, but also those he criticized are significant. In evaluating a previous philosophy, the partial understanding is analyzed, worked through, and shown to be defective and thus becomes the cornerstone of the new, more complete Hegelian formulation. In this manner, it is possible to argue that the formulation of the dialectic, in both its positive and negative aspects, is Dialectic itself, and it is this self-contained embeddedness and movement which lies at the heart of Hegelian philosophy.
ABBREVIATIONS

HEGEL


KANT


SCHILLER

INTRODUCTION

If it is not accurate to claim that Hegel single-handedly originated a notion of dialectic, neither did he unquestioningly appropriate previous definitions and formulations. In fact, such is the significance of his contribution to the theory of dialectic, that the term has come to be associated most closely with his name. It has then been the task of scholarly research to uncover and examine previous formulations and to indicate to just what extent they were influential upon Hegel's later development of his own notion of dialectic.

This thesis constitutes another contribution to the branch of inquiry dealing with the development of German idealism, in particular the origins of Hegelian dialectic. I do not mean to suggest that there is no significant research concerning this question; there is, on the contrary, a great deal of excellent material dealing with this problem. Nor is it my intention to negate the value of the previous research; no one line of inquiry, including the present one, excludes the others. Rather, each serves as one version of a complex story where many simultaneous threads of development intertwined to generate Hegel's dialectic.

Such was the close-knit and stimulating intellectual climate of Hegel's time that it is exceedingly difficult to isolate particular insights or formulations, and to attribute them to one thinker rather than another. Intellectual figures such as Hegel, Schelling, Schiller, Fichte, Goethe, and Hölderlin maintained such close contacts and
alliances that it is no surprise that their theories often overlap or contain many similarities. It would hence be difficult, if not wrong-minded, to attempt to isolate one overriding origin of the dialectic. Yet most commentators do focus on two seemingly predominant lines of development: The influence of Platonic and Aristotelian notions of dialectic, stemming from the renewed interest in, or nostalgia (as it has come to be called) for ancient Greece in Hegel's time; and secondly, the influence of the developing systematic idealisms of Fichte and Schelling.¹ Yet another approach falls somewhere between these two in attempting to trace the unfolding of the notion of dialectic through a philological study of the term "dialectic" throughout the history of philosophy. This latter approach is interesting from a philological point of view, but not really relevant to an examination of the origin of Hegel's dialectic, since Hegel clearly was less interested in adopting a particular term than in developing a philosophical vision and methodology which was latent in previous philosophies, but which required the completion he provided.

Of these two main lines of development, the influence of Platonic and Aristotelian notions of dialectic, as well as possible anticipations in pre-Socratic thinkers such as Heraclitus, seems less likely as a direct influence upon Hegel's formulation of his dialectic. Although Hegel does make frequent references to Greek philosophy, and often in terms which tend to portray it as proto-Hegelian, it could be argued that at this point he has firmly grounded his notion of dialectic and historical reason and is merely reading the history of philosophy from within that framework.² Indeed, as Hegel states in a letter to Cousin,
"...Kant tant au dessous de Platon? Les modernes au dessous des anciens? Pour beaucoup de rapports sans doute, mais pour la profondeur et l'étendue des principes, nous sommes en général sur une ligne plus élevée."³

I believe that a more reasonable and accurate account of the origin of Hegel's notion of dialectic is found in the discussion of the influence of Hegel's philosophical and literary contemporaries. An analysis based upon this view generally includes the undeniable influence of Kantian philosophy upon Fichte and Schelling and claims that the related discourses of all three constitutes Hegel's starting point. The influence of German idealism is certainly an important, and arguably, the most crucial and fruitful field for Hegel to cultivate. However, that is not to say that it is the only one. This study will attempt to isolate and trace another thread of development which, to the best of my knowledge, has never been fully explored in the secondary literature. This alternate thread is the unfolding of a dialectical predecessor in the form of a notion of mediation and unity in the aesthetic doctrines of Kant and Schiller.

It is not controversial to claim that Kant's thought was an immediate influence upon Hegel, and not solely mediately through the work of Fichte and Schelling. This is not even new in discussions of the origin of the dialectic, since many commentators have located a systematic precursor of Hegelian dialectic in the Antinomies of the Critique of Pure Reason, notwithstanding that for Hegel, the dialectic of the Antinomies is only at the level of understanding and must be surpassed.⁴ This analysis then proceeds to Fichte's attempt to
eliminate Kantian dualism in the form of an absolute Ego, then Schelling's Absolute—the night in which all cows are black—and the culmination: Hegel's transformation of the empty Absolute into a concrete Absolute, by means of a dialectical principle of reconciliation which does not fall back into empty abstraction.

While an account based upon the CPR is valid enough in certain respects, I will attempt to demonstrate that a later, more developed notion of unity can be discerned in the Critique of Judgement and that this notion is important for Hegel's dialectic. At any rate, it is the third, and not the first Critique which Schiller found the most enlightening, and Hegel's subsequent study of Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, the result of the latter's reflections upon the third Critique, indicate an unmistakable line of influence, though certainly not the only one. In addition, although it could be pointed out that Hegel's references to Kant's and Schiller's other works are more numerous, his comments concerning the Critique of Judgement and the Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man are laced with the methodological viewpoint and terminology generally associated with the dialectic. For this reason I would argue that these references, though few, are extremely significant for an understanding of the early influences on Hegel's thought.

As one of the major figures of modern philosophy, and an almost immediate predecessor, Kant's work was naturally a focus for Hegel's discussion, particularly since he detected certain fundamental problems in Kant which he intended to overcome. Throughout this thesis I maintain the position that the Critique of Judgement, far from being a peculiar
miscellany of the late Kant, is in fact much misunderstood and underrated. Hegel does not neglect it, and in fact credits it with coming closest to true, i.e. Hegelian, philosophy. Certainly any criticisms he formulates concerning Kantian philosophy are not inappropriate for the third Critique since the germane Kantian tenets with which Hegel takes issue are the backbone of the Critique of Judgement as well. Hence the third Critique is consistent with the transcendental philosophy and cannot be excluded from the Kantian system; indeed, as I will attempt to demonstrate, it perhaps constitutes the best standpoint for understanding the whole of Kantian philosophy.

Compared to the extensive discussions of Kant, references to Schiller in Hegelian texts are somewhat limited. It could perhaps be argued that this indicates that Schiller is not so significant in Hegel's development, and it is therefore no accident that the relation of Kant/Fichte/Hegel is more prominent in the secondary literature. Yet it must be noted that Schiller was not primarily a philosopher, and cannot compete in the matter of philosophical texts, either in number or in sophistication. Thus, one way of looking at it could be that if there are fewer texts and fewer references, there is less material from which to argue in support of my position. Yet we must not suppose that fewer references due to less philosophical material bespeaks a lack of real significance for the development of Hegel's dialectic. I wish to argue that while the discussion of Schiller in the Aesthetics and elsewhere is not extensive, it was enough to touch a chord in Hegel's thoughts on dialectic. For not only did Schiller, according to Hegel, take the first step in rectifying the errors of Kant's
philosophy, but in addition his formulation of aesthetic freedom was extremely suggestive for the Hegelian account of the freedom in determination of reason.

Hegel's study of the aesthetic doctrines of Kant and Schiller has not gone unnoticed in the secondary literature, but in general the relevant discussions have focussed on the influence of these doctrines on Hegel's own aesthetic theory. How this examination of art, beauty, and the aesthetic experience may have been instrumental in the formulation of Hegel's dialectic has been, for the most part, ignored. Since the purpose of this thesis is the elaboration of the latter claim, I will not be concerned with a discussion of the development of Hegel's aesthetics. Instead, the exposition will be restricted to the implicitly dialectical elements of the _CJ_ and _AEM_, and Hegel's discussion of these works in view of their historical and epistemological significance. It is clear that art was not an isolated aspect of Hegel's philosophy, but rather occupied a central ontological and epistemological role. Accordingly, Hegel discusses aesthetics within the particular domain of art and art objects, as well as the larger domain of Spirit, and these two domains are naturally fundamentally related. In the same manner, Hegel discusses the aesthetics of Kant and Schiller within the framework of a philosophy of art, and he also discusses them from the point of view of systematic ontology. These two points of view are implicitly related; but I will concentrate on the discussions of aesthetics from the latter perspective in particular.

My particular approach serves, I think, to illuminate another theme implicit in Hegel's philosophy which remains to be adequately
investigated. This is the relation between aesthetics and ontology.

If it is possible to go beyond a mere demonstration of the unfolding of
the dialectic in aesthetics, as in any other realm of inquiry, and to
posit the primacy of the relation of aesthetics and dialectic, then the
aesthetic is dialectical and the dialectic is aesthetic. The inherent
ontological dimension of the dialectic cannot be ignored, and the
stage is thus set for an examination of the relation between aesthetics
and ontology. Schiller's point about the imminent and essential role
of the aesthetic impulse in human ontology and history thus takes on
new meaning on a richer and more systematically conceptual level. This
project is, however, beyond the scope of the present study and as such
I merely wish to mention it as a possible corollary of this present
line of inquiry.

Knowledge of the philosophical tradition is essential not only for
an understanding of Kant's project, but also as a grounding for the
subsequent Hegelian developments which I wish to emphasize in this
study. Accordingly, in Chapter 1, I discuss the philosophical back-
ground of Kant's project, and his point of departure in its relation
to the tradition. The chapter continues with an account of Kant's
philosophy in general, and his thought up to the writing of the C.I.
The chapter concludes with an analysis of the relation of the C.I
to the rest of Kant's philosophy.

Chapter 2 concentrates on a discussion of the C.I in particular.
This account is based upon the second Introduction and the first part
of the C.I, the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement. The third Critique is
divided into two sections: the aesthetic and telological judgements.
This latter section deals with objective judgements regarding whether a given object fulfills a purpose in nature, where the predicate is not a feeling of pleasure but is related to the idea of an end. This theme is naturally not distinct from the discussions in the first part of the CJ, and not insignificant for an analysis of Hegelian dialectic. However, I have restricted my exposition to the aesthetic judgement due to the thematic considerations of my thesis.

Schiller and his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man are examined in Chapter 3. Like Kant, Schiller had written another work on aesthetics, the Kallias Letters. This work is often taken to be more important than the AEM in a discussion of the relation of Kant and Schiller. However, it will be seen below how certain Kantian themes are explicitly incorporated into the AEM and further developed according to Schiller's particular interests. In addition, this point is clearly illustrated in a letter Schiller wrote to Kant where he states that in writing the AEM he sought to invoke the spirit of Kantian philosophy. For these reasons, and the additional consideration that in discussing Schiller's aesthetics, Hegel concentrated upon the AEM, I have restricted my exposition to a discussion of this text.

Chapter 4 addresses the question of Hegel's well-known critique of Kant, in reference to both the CPR and the CJ, and demonstrates how these critiques are fundamentally related. The chapter continues with an account of Hegel's discussion of Schiller's Letters, and how the examinations of both Kant and Schiller were significant for the development of Hegel's dialectic. The chapter concludes with a brief
description of Hegelian dialectic, highlighting the elements which were influenced by earlier anticipations in Kant and Schiller.

Finally, I conclude my thesis with a few closing remarks summarizing the main points of this study in terms of several thematic guidelines.
CHAPTER I

The *Critique of Judgement* within Kant's philosophy

There are two reasons the *Critique of Judgement* is one of Kant's most difficult works. There is first of all the inherent complexity of the Kantian framework and thought which characterizes all of his work. But in addition there is a problem peculiar to the third Critique. As Cassirer states, "What unlocked the gates of understanding for Goethe was regarded on the whole, and particularly for the contemporary way of thinking, as one of the oddest manifestations of Kant's views and mode of presentation."\(^1\) It was thought unusual that Kant should be equally concerned with problems of aesthetics, teleology, and a judgement of taste within the critical philosophy, all woven together in one seemingly consistent text.

This attempt to account for such a variety of problems and themes has traditionally separated the commentators of the third Critique into two camps: those who wish to maintain the primacy of the account of aesthetic judgement, and those who maintain the primacy of the discussion of nature and teleology. Both groups frequently view the rest of the book (as well as the other camp's allegiance) as incidental material. Seeing it as no more than a potpourri of unaddressed or unresolved issues, observations and questions of a borderline interest, or mere social commentary, the conclusion is that these topics are more suited to an Anthropology than to a Critique. In addition, many
commentators agree that there is little relation between the third Critique and the rest of the critical philosophy.

Yet it is not at all clear that the third Critique is an ill-planned miscellany, inconsistent both internally and in relation to the rest of the Kantian corpus. I will attempt to demonstrate that it is not only thematically and structurally coherent with the rest of Kant's work, but also constitutes a valuable contribution to the wholeness of Kant's enterprise.

The subtle and methodical way in which the various sections meld together to form the whole makes not only the whole but also the unravelled threads of a particular component difficult to grasp. Yet it is also fascinating to see how systematic and scrupulous was Kant's thought. Since, as I wish to argue, the third Critique is destined to follow the outlines of the critical philosophy previously elaborated in the first two Critiques, it is necessary to have an understanding of their structure to properly appreciate the contribution of the Critique of Judgement. Hence before embarking upon a discussion of the Critique of Judgement, it would be beneficial to examine Kant's thought prior to its writing, and to attempt to situate the third Critique within this work.

Kant's point of departure is to question whether metaphysics as a science is possible. There is no denying the existence of metaphysics as such, nor its attraction: "That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we, to
avoid inhaling impure air, should prefer to give up breathing alto-
gether." Yet the problem is that this natural disposition has been
dogmatically taken as a justification for metaphysics as a science.

Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one
species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions
which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself,
it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all
its powers, it is also not able to answer. (CPR, preface A,
A vii)

Hume launched one of the first decisive attacks upon metaphysics
when he demonstrated that the principle of causality cannot be
logically or empirically justified as necessary. It is impossible to
deduce a is the cause of b from the concept of a, nor can it be
deduced from experience. That is, causal connection is not a logical
relation. Yet although Kant could agree that necessity could not be
justified on empiricist grounds, he could not accept Hume's psychologi-
cal explanation of association of ideas.

So Kant was caught between two defective philosophies. On the
one hand he could not uncritically accept the claims of traditional
and dogmatic metaphysics (Leibniz-Wolff) which never really justified
the objective validity of concepts. Concepts were derived neither from
experience nor logic, yet were claimed as necessary truths. On the
other hand, there was an empiricism represented by Hume, with a long
overdue attack on metaphysics, but whose ultimate conclusions were
equally inadequate. Formulated differently, the issue is also one
characteristic of the rationalist/empiricist debate. As Kant states,
"In a word, Leibniz intellectualized appearances, just as Locke...
sensualized all concepts of the understanding." (CPR, A271=B327)
Yet for Kant there is no denying that we do possess synthetic a priori judgements, even if empiricism fails to account adequately for them. The question is then how something as unquestionable as the sum of an addition comes to be incorporated into our stores of knowledge. Hence there is no strict disjunction between sense-data and universal relations. Just because sensation does not apprehend necessity is not to negate its character as a constitutive element of our experience.

Instead of seeking in understanding and sensibility two sources of representations which, while quite different, can supply objectively valid judgments of things only in conjunction with each other, each of these great men holds to one only of the two, viewing it as in immediate relation to things in themselves. (CFK, A271 = B327)

If not derived from experience, then, these concepts must be products of the cognitive faculty itself. They are a priori, but not in the sense of knowledge which is present prior to any encounter with experience; these would be innate ideas or mental entities, which Kant rejects.

Synthetic a priori judgements are possible if the underlying concepts can be shown to have reference to objects. Kant's insight is to realize that even if all knowledge begins with experience, it cannot be said to arise out of experience. Concepts are a priori in the sense of undervived from experience, but furnished by cognition upon confrontation with sense-data.

Two questions must now be asked: 1) what are these presuppositions, and 2) can we rely on them in all types of cognition, or are they limited to certain realms of cognition only? In other words,..."
and how much can the understanding and reason know apart from all experience?" (CPR, preface A, A xvii) As Kant states in the preface to edition A of CPR:

It is a call to reason to undertake anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge, and to institute a tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims, and dismiss all groundless pretensions, not by despotic decrees, but in accordance with its own eternal and unalterable laws. This tribunal is no other than the critique of pure reason. (CPR, A xi-xii)

In opposition to an empiricism which denies the independence of the "thinking principle," and affirms the authority of external perception, Kant posits the autonomy and freedom of thought, the capacity of reason to shape experience. In contrast to passive, abstracted rationalism, Kant introduces a dynamic, subjective consciousness of reason. As Hegel states in the Encyclopedia Logic, "The main effect of the Kantian philosophy has been to revive the consciousness of Reason, or the absolute inwardness of thought." (EL, p. 93) Thought in self-conscious freedom is not simply sensation, nor is it abstracted from experience, "it is the active principle which shapes the things of experience." Kant thus brings forth an empirical abstracted, but like the natural sciences, must deal with empirical reality. Ernst Cassirer discusses this point in the context of the early Kantian philosophy:

The original, fundamental orientation of Kant's research and thought is precisely that he has in view from the outset a deeper unity of the empirical and the rational than had heretofore been accomplished or recognized in the struggle between philosophical schools.
Taking this mediating and unifying inclination as a thematic guiding thread will in turn provide insight into the contribution of the Critique of Judgement: both as an example of a theory of dialectic, and as an effort to unify theoretical and practical reason, and in turn facilitate a unity within the whole of Kant's work.

The strong notion of reason in both rationalism and the Enlightenment ensures a primacy of reason in Kant's scheme—the unique grounding for anything which can be known. This autonomy and absolute authority of thought lends reason its freedom; the necessarily pragmatic nature of the empirical sciences lends it a principle of activity and change; the self-consciousness of rationalism gives it its subjectivity of consciousness. When these aspects are unified, the result is a dynamic, free, authoritative reason which is subjective and conceptual—the consciousness of reason ordering the concrete reality. Yet from empiricism Kant retains the doctrine that all we can know is sensible reality. He affirms that all we can know is known through our cognitive faculties, thus grounding epistemology firmly on rationality, instituting a tribunal of pure reason. As Hegel states in the Encyclopedia Logic, "Henceforth the principle of the independence of Reason, or of its absolute self-subsistence, is made a general principle of philosophy, as well as a foregone conclusion of the time." (EL, p. 93)

Yet reason is necessarily limited: there is a distinction between reason as the only means whereby we can know anything, and that which is beyond the capacity of reason to apprehend. This distinction is one which traditional metaphysics fails to make and constitutes one of Kant's major departures from these metaphysics. Reason knows anything
which can be known, but it does not know everything which could be known.

That reason in its speculative application will be limited is due to the inability of the categories to apprehend or think the thing-in-itself. Maintaining that this is possible indicates an unlawful application of the categories to something not given in experience. As will be shown below, Hegel found this position both unsatisfactory from a systematic point of view, as well as paradoxical: for positing the noumenal realm in juxtaposition to the phenomenal is already saying something about the noumenal—namely, that which it is not. This negative determination, however, is not overlooked by Kant; but this still does not constitute a true intuition and Hegel's criticism of this stand motivates one of his major departures from Kantian thought.

Hence already within the very formulation of his principle of reason, Kant is confronted with a dualism. This will generate other dualisms in turn which leads Hegel to criticize the Kantian doctrine as failing to grasp the embeddedness of reason in reality.

Kant begins by establishing that the entire faculty of reason has two realms, both of which are furnished with a priori laws: these are the realms of nature and of freedom. Following this model, reason is thus divisible into the theoretical (nature) and the practical (freedom). The function of prescribing laws by means of a priori concepts of nature is discharged by the understanding, and that of prescribing laws by means of the concept of freedom is accomplished by reason in its practical employment.
The principle of theoretical reason is conformity to law. This faculty is examined in the Critique of Pure Reason, where the problem Kant attempts to resolve is how it is possible to have synthetic a priori judgements of cognition. To reiterate, he attempts to determine the basis of knowledge claims such as causality and mathematical truths which are necessary and universally valid, yet are not derived from experience alone. He does this by isolating several "modes" of knowledge. He proves the a priori character of space and time as the necessary conditions of orderly sensuous perception; then of causality as the necessary presupposition of the scientific organization of the facts of experience; Lastly he grounds all knowledge in the "I think" of the transcendental unity of apperception.

After showing that one set of theoretical presuppositions was able to furnish a certain continuum of knowledge, Kant turned to the practical sphere. Practical reason deals with the realm of morality, and in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant examines the possibility of a priori principles of the will, or desire; how synthetic a priori moral judgements can feasibly provide universal validation of these moral judgements.

Kant claims that both understanding and reason have distinct jurisdictions over one and the same territory of experience, without interfering with the other in the least. (CJ, p. 13) In the theoretical employment of reason, nature is constituted by the understanding using concepts of space and time and causality; these are presuppositions of necessity and law and there is no subjective autonomy involved. On the other hand, in the practical sphere reason
employs self-furnished moral laws: the subject, active and responsible, chooses in total freedom whether or not to comply with the dictates of his/her categorical duty.

It is clear that the two realms are far from infringing upon each other's jurisdictions: the property line has been distinctly drawn between object and subject, nature and freedom.

If this is not apparent enough, Kant assures us that any seeming contradiction due to both faculties coexisting in the same subject was eliminated in the Critique of Pure Reason, where the oppositions were denounced as "dialectical illusion." Hence causality is the most important principle in theoretical knowledge, while the denial of this causality in practical knowledge is imperative in order to ensure human freedom. At the end of the first two critiques, the two formal principles are set in strict opposition.

In yet another justification for two realms rather than one, Kant offers an additional formulation of this dichotomy in his introduction to the Critique of Judgement. The theoretical does not affect the practical; subjective autonomy does not influence objective reality. Kant asks why these two realms do not form one realm, since while they do not limit each other in their legislation, they are limited in their effectiveness in the empirical world. According to Kant, the explanation resides in the fact that in nature, sensible objects and laws of cause and effect are presented in certain intuition, but as mere phenomena, not as things-in-themselves; whereas in the realm of freedom, the Object is noumenal, a thing-in-itself, but not present to human intuition. Thus neither realm is capable of furnishing a theoretical
cognition of the Object as thing-in-itself, or of the supersensible, which is the basis of the possibility of all objects of experience, despite the fact that it can never be an object of cognition itself. For example, the nebulous quality in an object which causes us to perceive it in the aesthetic mode belongs to the unintelligible realm of the thing-in-itself. In that there is some perception of Quality, apart from any cognition or knowledge, the object belongs to the supersensible. However, in that it is still an empirical object in the sensible world, it is phenomenal.

Thus, at the end of the first two Critiques, the sensible concept of nature, and the supersensible concept of freedom are separated by a "great gulf" (CJ, p. 14): the freedom necessarily inherent in the realm of morality is not possible in the phenomenal world, where causal determinism reigns.

Yet Kant appears to believe that there should be, after all, some sort of interplay or interconnection, between the two realms.

...the concept of freedom is meant to actualize in the sensible world the end proposed by its laws; and nature must consequently also be capable of being regarded in such a way that in the conformity to law of its form it at least harmonizes with the possibility of the ends to be effectuated in it according to the laws of freedom. There must, therefore, be a ground of the unity of the supersensible that lies at the basis of nature, with what the concept of freedom contains, in a practical way. (CJ, p. 14)

This unifying ground has no realm of its own, yet will facilitate the transition between the two modes of thought and their principles. One begins to wonder why Kant, contemplating the situation thus far
at the lookout over the chasm, has reason to be so dismayed. He seemed to have been deliberately prying the gap wider and wider apart, only to decide that the scenery would be much more enhanced by the presence of a bridge spanning the distance between the opposing sides.

It is almost as if Kant has found it necessary, if not to radically reformulate his system, to slightly amend his original scheme. In the section dealing with the Critique of Judgement, we shall see how this is true for the judgement of taste in particular; and once his conception of the judgement of taste was modified, the way was open for it to assume much more significance, and in so doing to transform the nature of the entire critical system.

So Kant’s position preceding the writing of the Critique of Judgement was as follows: a seemingly irreconcilable conflict between two major concepts of his transcendental philosophy which, ideally, should interact harmoniously; and the question of another type of judgement, the judgement of taste, remaining to be examined. This last question had been fermenting in the back of Kant’s mind for years; the development of the nature of the question and of his conception of taste can be traced back to the early writings on aesthetics, for example, the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime.

One senses, in the introduction to the Critique of Judgement a vague outline of the process his thought might have undergone: the presentation of the original formulation, the discovery of the inherent problematic conflict, then the solution, found lying before his very eyes, and which, happily enough, will tie in several loose thematic
threads. Also, since dualism as a fundamental problem is most explicit in the relation of the first two Critiques, embodying as they do the core features of Kant's project, the success of their mediation would presumably extend to and resolve the more particular problems, all of which can ultimately be traced to this basic dualism.

Kant's solution is to introduce a faculty which is able to mediate between the other two faculties; therefore, neither will be compromised or overwhelmed, as the new faculty will incorporate what is common to both and constitute a bridge on which they may meet. This faculty is the faculty of judgement. Judgement is the capacity to perceive characteristic form or quality, to subsume given particulars or "representations" under universal concepts, which are not furnished by the judgement itself, but by either the understanding or the reason. It is connected with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and so will provide Kant with the opportunity to examine the judgement of aesthetic taste. He will kill two conceptual birds with one stone by appeasing two questions with one common answer; the very element which will mediate between the two warring realms turns out to be the missing philosophical problem to complete the system—the discussion of the principles of taste and aesthetic judgements.

Thus, "what is shut out of the division of Philosophy may still be admitted as a principal part into the general Critique of our faculty of pure cognition." (CJ, p. 15) Kant is now able to posit a somewhat revised schema. There are three faculties or capacities [Vermögen] of human consciousness: the faculty of cognition (theoretical), the feeling of pleasure and displeasure (judgement), and the
faculty of desire (practical). Assuming for the present that judgement does in fact have a priori principles, and thus the necessary qualifications to be considered a faculty, and to exercise some influence over the other faculties, it is clear that the feeling of pleasure and displeasure is the intermediate term between cognition and desire, as is judgement between understanding and reason. Now that judgement is linked with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, it is also clear that the middle term is to refer to the aesthetic: it is the judgement of taste.

Thus there are judgements of what things are and of what we know, and judgements concerning actions—these judgements and their accompanying a priori principles were examined in the first two Critiques. But there are also judgements of taste—commonplace assertions concerning what we consider beautiful and not beautiful, and simply what we like and dislike. In making a judgement that something is beautiful, there is an implicit assumption that everyone should find it beautiful; that this judgement has acquired some measure of universal validity. Yet there is nothing to be found in concepts or experience to legitimize this assumption. Kant will attempt to demonstrate how a judgement of taste can at the same time legitimately lay claim to universal validity.

Thus, the Critique of Judgement will have a two-fold significance. It will examine two problems hitherto neglected by Kant: the aesthetic judgement and the teleological judgement (or judgement of purpose), while providing a link, by virtue of both its aesthetic and logical nature, between understanding and reason, sensible and
supersensible, nature and freedom, theoretical and practical, cognition and desire, objective and subjective.

Pre-Kantian philosophers had generally limited their discussions on aesthetics to essays on taste or the occasional monograph. Kant devoted the best part of a book to the topic that would play such a pivotal role in his thought. "Aesthetics, as a discipline, begins approximately with Kant's Critique of Judgement...it was Kant who gave a sense of philosophical importance to aesthetics." Thus Kant establishes the aesthetic for the first time, not only as a necessary constituent of human experience, and as an indispensable link in his thought, but also as a domain of study equal to those of the earlier Critiques, and no longer a topic considered inferior in importance to other philosophical problems.

Nor, for the same reasons, should the Critique of Judgement be considered inferior to the other two Critiques. To a large extent it has always been perceived as an afterthought, Kant in his declining years, a hodge-podge of loose ends and miscellaneous items which Kant had always meant to discuss, and now threw together. Against this view one could argue that the existence of earlier miscellaneous writings on various topics, philosophical and non-philosophical alike, indicates that he hardly needed to wait until the time of the third Critique to exercise this inclination.

On the other hand, it could certainly be argued that the Critique of Judgement, if not insignificant, was an afterthought. This view is
supported in part by a letter Kant wrote to Reinhold prior to beginning
the third Critique:

I am now at work on the critique of taste, and I
have discovered a kind of a priori principle different
from those heretofore observed. For there are three
faculties of the mind: the faculty of cognition, the
faculty of feeling pleasure and displeasure, and the
faculty of desire. In the CPR I found a priori principles
for the first of these, and in the Critique of Practical
Reason, a priori principles for the third. I tried to
find them for the second as well, and though I thought
it impossible to find such principles, the systematic
nature of the analysis of the previously mentioned
faculties of the human mind allowed me to discover
them, giving me ample material for the rest of my life,
material at which to marvel and if possible to explore.
So now I recognize three parts of philosophy, each of
which has its a priori principles. 7

The fact that the Critique of Judgement was perhaps an afterthought does
not minimize its importance. It is also possible that Kant had
envisioned this development from the beginning (or at least earlier
than letters and documents indicate). Thus, much in the manner of
Hegel in the Phenomenology, Kant led us through the various manifesta-
tions, approximate truths, and conceptual pitfalls in order that we
(here in the sense of Hegel's phenomenological "we") should undertake
the investigation, think the process, and attain the final result--some
sort of systematic totality, albeit not in the Hegelian sense of
totality.

It has also been suggested 8 that Kant was not forced to recant
completely, but merely to reinterpret and strengthen latent themes
and relations implicit in the previous Critiques, under the new
guidelines furnished by the study of aesthetics. It is likely, however,
that he was pleasantly surprised by the tidy solution, as well as by the importance that aesthetics and the judgement of taste had assumed; an importance perhaps not so evident at the outset of his inquiry. Cassirer notes that the prevailing attitude in the literature concerning the Critique of Judgement has been that Kant was not motivated to write the CJ by an interest in aesthetics, but rather that developing a notion of aesthetic judgement and a doctrine of beauty was a secondary result of the desire to systematically complete his architectonic. In Cassirer's opinion, this position minimizes Kant's contribution to aesthetic theory. He feels that in view of this doctrine, the subsequent effect of the third Critique must seem miraculous. To my mind, Cassirer's refutation does not effectively argue for the primacy of the aesthetic in Kant's motives, nor does a primacy of any element seem relevant to the issue. I have argued above for both sides of this primacy question, and although it is an interesting problem, it is not really important to determine the first motive in order to assess the final contributions of the CJ. Whether the aesthetic question, the systematic question, or both were foremost in Kant's concerns, the CJ is fulfilled not by either element alone, but by the interest in a concerted unfolding of both.

In the final analysis, what is at issue, then, is whether or not the third Critique does furnish a conceptually satisfying solution to the perceived systematic problems. In its methodology, objective, and philosophical orientation it is consistent with the rest of Kant's thought, especially insofar as it adheres to the doctrine of
the unity of reason invoked in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and elsewhere.\(^{11}\) The *CJ* should be seen not as a mistake; but as, at worst, a bold but somewhat unsuccessful attempt to unify an exceedingly complex system, or at best, the culmination of Kant's transcendent enterprise and perhaps the best standpoint from which to approach and understand his system as a whole.\(^{12}\) In addition, the *CJ* revives the problem of the role of aesthetics in philosophical discourse. This problem, neglected for the most part in the tradition prior to Kant, was reappraised and reappropriated by German idealism; and one of the reasons for this renewed interest was undoubtedly the *Critique of Judgement*. 
Chapter II

The Critique of Judgement

I

Urteil and Urteilskraft

In the introduction to the Critique of Judgement Kant explains the relation between the faculty of judgement and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure which provides the grounding for the judgement of taste. Many commentaries on the third Critique merely acknowledge this relation without explicating the analysis by means of which Kant arrives at a judgement of taste. That is, if a commentator is discussing the CJ from the systematic point of view of aesthetic theory, the relation between taste and feeling is well established in the preceding aesthetic tradition by philosophers such as Hutcheson and Hume; hence Kant is merely appropriating a commonly held aesthetic notion. Yet Kant does not follow in the footsteps of the empiricist tradition, either in his work as a whole, or in aesthetics in particular. Thus, although he may take a somewhat empiricist stand in beginning with an aesthetics of feeling, the method by which he arrives at this notion of taste, and how it is subsequently discussed, remain strictly Kantian. His famous formulation stating that though knowledge begins with experience, it cannot be said to arise out of experience, is no less relevant here.

In the Logic, Kant defines judgement in general [Urteil überhaupt] as the "presentation [Vorstellung] of the unity of the consciousness of
several presentations [Vorstellungen], or the presentation of their relation so far as they make up one concept.¹ In terms of relation, judgments are either categorical, hypothetical or disjunctive. That is, "the given presentations in judgments are subordinated, one to another, for the sake of the unity of consciousness."² With this, Kant departs from traditional definitions of judgement in general, which he states he has never been able to accept. (CPR, B 140)

Logicians claim that judgement is the representation of a relation between two concepts. Kant criticizes this definition for two reasons. First, it fails to distinguish between types of relations. Kant maintains that a relation between two concepts applies to categorical judgments only; hypothetical and disjunctive judgments are relations not of concepts, but of judgments. This sets the stage for the Kantian formulation of multiple level judgments. Hence in neglecting to recognize differences in judgments, the traditional definition simply collapses hypothetical and disjunctive into categorical judgments. Secondly, their definition does not elucidate the nature of the relation itself; it "does not determine in what the asserted relation consists." (CPR, B 141)

In the Introduction to the CPR Kant isolates "two stems of human knowledge": sensibility and understanding. (CPR, A 15=B 29) Sensibility is the capacity of receiving representations; understanding is the power of knowing an object through these representations. The functions of these capacities [Vermögen] are not interchangeable: "The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their
union can knowledge arise." (CPR, A 51=B 75) The problem is how to
effect this union.

Since no representation, save when it is an
intuition, is in immediate relation to an object,
no concept is ever related to an object immediately,
but to some other representation of it, be that other
representation an intuition, or itself a concept.
Judgement is therefore the mediate knowledge of an
object, that is, the representation of a representation
of it." (CPR, A 68-B 93)

Kant solves the problem by introducing into his epistemology a logical
function, judgement, which will mediate between sensibility and
understanding. These latter faculties do not have any logical signi-
ficance as such except insofar as they can be understood in terms of
the logical distinction between singular and general presentations. As capacities of receptivity and spontaneity, their explanation is
metaphysical. Hence Kant employs a logical function to elucidate a
traditionally metaphysical problem, and the result is a systematic
transformation of metaphysics, culminating in the discussion of concept,
understanding, and intuition in the Logic.

In the CPR, then, what is needed to mediate between sensibility and
understanding is not faculty of knowledge as such, but a function. In
Latin, functio refers to the act considered in terms of that which is
done in it. That is, as Kant states in the transcendental deduction
(B), a judgement is "nothing but the manner in which given modes of
knowledge are brought to the objective unity of apperception." (CPR,
B 141) What is important to understand is that judgement as function
is not of the same nature as faculties of intuition or understanding.
Kant is notoriously careless at times with terminology, and translators of his work have not always been consistent or accurate. Thus, Urteil and Urteilskraft are not identical, although they are usually both translated as judgement. Similarly, Vermögen and Kraft are not identical, although translators often seem to equate them, and Kant seems to sometimes use them interchangeably. In an ordinary language distinction, Vermögen is intellectual, Kraft is physical and this is an important clue for a correct understanding of Kant and of the third Critique. Kant speaks of Erkenntnisvermögen, but Urteilskraft; one is a capacity, the other a power, and the sense of Kraft is that of an activity, a manner, rather than a mode. Hence although Kant will speak of Urteilskraft as "das Vermögen, das Besondere als enthalten unter dem Allgemeinen zu denken," faculty is not to be understood here in the same sense that it is with reference to the understanding as a faculty. Urteil is the thinking of the particular under the universal, or the representation under the concept which gives the object; the faculty of judgement, (or Urteilskraft, power of judging), is thinking the judging. Kant equated thinking and judging in the Analytic of Concepts in the CPR where he states: "Now we can reduce [zurückführen] all acts of the understanding to judgements, and the understanding may therefore be represented as a capacity to judge [Vermögen zu urteilen--not the faculty of judgement as Kemp Smith translates] for, as stated above, the understanding is a capacity to think [again, Vermögen zu denken]." (CPR, A 69=B 94) I have translated these expressions as "to judge" and "to think" rather than as a "capacity of judging" or
"capacity of judgement" because the latter sound like faculties of judgement, and I believe Kant is trying to maintain the distinction between faculty and capacity at this point. Faculty of judgement is Urteilskraft, not Urteilsvermögen. The faculty of knowledge is Erkenntnisvermögen, not Erkenntniskraft. Understanding is a capacity or faculty in the sense of a mode; judgement is a power or faculty in the sense of a function, or a manner. So the sense of the above quotation is not judgement as a faculty or mode (like understanding) but rather understanding as a capacity like judgement; that is, the primacy here of judgement, of the function, and hence the identity of thinking and judging. Thus the true activity of thought is derived as a principle from judgement, and judgement as a faculty must be understood in this sense of activity and function. This is a significant point for the Critique of Judgement, or more precisely, the Critique of the Power of Judging, since the fundamental element here is the aesthetic judgement as an act of judging which refuses to be hypostatized or made static. Consequently, reason in this employment is completely autonomous and free.

Hence judgement is a mediating, mediate and synthetic function. It is thus the function which mediates not only between sensibility and understanding, but between theoretical and practical reason as well. Its autonomous and free nature is reflected in the aesthetic judgement, where, since no cognition is present, the autonomy of judgement is intensified. The higher level of relation is established already in the first Critique.
Accordingly, all judgements are functions of unity among our representations; instead of an immediate representation, a higher representation, which comprises the immediate representation and various others, is used in knowing the object, and thereby much possible knowledge is collected into one. (CPR, A 69=B 94)

This in turn harks back to the point at the beginning of this section concerning Kant's definition of judgement which attempts to elucidate the relation of judgement. Not only must the relation between concepts be understood as a unifying act, but the concepts themselves are sometimes already judgements, so there are different levels of relations.

2

The Faculty of Judgement

Kant distinguishes between two powers of judgement: determinant and reflective. The determinant or logical judgement is explicated in the doctrine of transcendental schematism (Transcendental Analytic) in the CPR and is characterized by a universal law which is given, and under which judgement subsumes the particular of a sensuous representation. Conversely, if the particular only is given, for which judgement must furnish a universal, the judgement is reflective, or in the language of the first Critique, an "ascending judgement." In other words, the a priori categories of the determinant judgement are already present as necessary grounds without which we could not apprehend the object at all. However, we have no a priori principles for ordering the particular empirical laws. These principes cannot be found a posteriori in
experience; experience furnishes no "ought," but merely multifarious empirical examples, all in search of a higher universal. "Such a transcendental principle, therefore, the reflective judgement can only give as a law from and to itself. It cannot derive it from any other quarter (as it would then be a determinant judgement)." (CJ, p. 19)

Hence reflective judgement has subjective validity only; it does not determine the object (as does the determinant object) but only the manner of reflecting upon it in order to attain its cognition. Hence it is already a different sense of cognition; finding a universal for the particular cannot be methodological, but hypothetical—a working "as if." Thus reflection engages particular representations in an attempt to discern some purposive organization, and thereby furnish a universal.

The Principle of the Formal Finality of Nature

In the effort to formulate this principle of inquiry, reflection can be guided by the example of Nature (Science) as a potentially intelligible unity, despite the apparent contingency of its organization. On the assumption that there is an underlying unity of interconnections, scientists continually aim to introduce newer, more concise, and more accurate groupings of genera and species in a complex system of interrelated laws. "While it seems at the outset unavoidable for our understanding to assume for the specific variety of natural operations a like number of various kinds of causality, yet these may all be reduced to a small number of principles, the quest for which is our business." (CJ, pp. 24-25)
These laws are either a priori conditions of scientific knowledge (as in the CPR), or a posteriori empirical laws, determined by observation. For example, a universal law of nature is that all change has its cause. But there may be causes in an infinite variety of ways. Each cause has an empirical law; there are thus an "endless multiplicity of empirical laws" which are contingent as far as our insight is concerned; that is, they cannot be cognized a priori. Judgement must adopt an a priori principle "that what is for human insight contingent in the particular (empirical) laws of nature contains Nevertheless unity of law in the synthesis of its manifold in an intrinsically possible experience—unfathomable, though still thinkable, as such unity may no doubt, be for us." (CJ, p. 23)

Furthermore, while a priori laws of nature or science have their ground in our understanding, particular empirical laws, undetermined by a universal concept, must be considered:

...according to a unity such as they would have if an understanding (though it be not ours) had supplied them for the benefit of our cognitive faculties, so as to render possible a system of experience according to particular natural laws. (CJ, p. 19)

Such an intellectus archetypus need not be actually assumed, for it is a regulative, not constitutive, principle of the empirical use of the understanding. Reflective judgement employs this principle not for determining, but for reflection, and in this way gives a law to itself and not to nature. Thus reflective judgement contains, "if not a special authority to prescribe laws, still a principle peculiar to
itself upon which laws are sought, although one merely subjective a
priori." (CJ, p. 15) For such an intellectus archetypus, which is
intuitive, there is no contrast between actual and possible being,
contingency and necessity; thinking an object entails its existence,
thinking the part entails its whole. However, for a human understand-
ing, which is discursive not intuitive, there is a gap between
actuality and possibility, contingency and necessity. Hegel, however,
in an effort to overcome what he sees as Kant's radical dualism,
cannot admit the existence of an intellectus archetypus. There is no
gap between thought and reality for Hegel, there are no limitations to
the application of our cognitive faculties, and for this reason the
philosopher is able to attain the standpoint of Absolute Knowing. Human
reason can become the intellectus archetypus.

Hence, reflective judgement must proceed by analogy, just as the
faculty of judgement itself was derived by analogy with the other
faculties. In nature, there are no clear discernible ends, yet it
is as if there were, and in fact the understanding has been able to
discover a priori laws of nature. But in the search for empirical
laws we are confronted with a multiplicity of objects and propositions
and cannot know prior to actual experience whether these will prove
to have inherent connections and laws, or will merely constitute a
miscellany of isolated generalizations. Consequently, if science is
to be possible, it must be assumed that there are certain laws to be
apprehended, and that human understanding is capable of apprehending
these laws:
Accordingly the principle of judgement, in respect of the form of the things of nature under empirical laws generally, is the finality of nature in its multiplicity. In other words, by this concept nature is represented as if [als ob] an understanding contained the ground of the unity of the manifold of its empirical laws. (CJ, pp. 19-20)

This principle is then two-fold. It refers to the adaptation of the data of nature to our cognitive faculties, and the capacity of our understanding to apprehend this data. Secondly, it refers to the assumption of an underlying unity and regularity. This principle is a special a priori concept, originating solely in the reflective judgement.⁸ We make use of this concept in the interests of reflection, hence to hark back to the earlier distinction between mode and manner, it is not an objective principle of determination, but a subjective principle of reflection,⁹ a heuristic method. Thus reflective judgement will not have objective validity, and correspondingly, neither will aesthetic judgement, as a type of reflective judgement.

The principle of the finality of nature is also a transcendental principle of judgement: "For the concept of Objects, regarded as standing under this principle, is only the pure concept of objects of possible empirical cognition generally, and involves nothing empirical." (CJ, p. 21) That is, this principle deals with objects of possible empirical knowledge, while not being empirical itself.

Thus, the purposiveness of nature means that its adaptation to our cognitive faculties is presupposed a priori by judgement; and while understanding objectively considers it contingent, judgement attributes it to nature as transcendental finality—a finality in terms of the
Subject's faculty of cognition. The a priori principle of reflective judgement is hence not a synthetic a priori, but a subjective a priori.

The Association of the Feeling of Pleasure with the Concept of the Finality of Nature

Understanding endeavours to order nature by positing a unity of principle. Since understanding has no jurisdiction over particular laws to prescribe a law, this goal must be carried out by judgement. The attainment of every aim is coupled with a feeling of pleasure. When the attainment is based on an a priori representation, as in the principle for reflective judgement, the feeling of pleasure is then also determined by a ground which is a priori and universally valid, and only by virtue of the reference of the object to our faculty of cognition. Kant adds that since there is no accompanying notion of duty, this finality is not like the practical finality of nature.

No feeling of pleasure occurs when perceptions coincide with universal concepts or categories since understanding is merely carrying out its prescribed functions. However, when a reflective judgement subsumes empirical laws under one principle, its aim is hence fulfilled, and there is a distinct pleasure in this success—the accord of the laws with our cognitive faculty.

The presupposition of finality is so indeterminate in regard to its limitations, that it is indeed possible that at some point we come up against a wall; a multiplicity of laws which no human understanding could ever reduce to a principle. Yet, on the other hand, it could be noted that the more we are able to know about the ordering of nature,
the easier it will be to attribute principles. Thus judgement proceeds on the principle of conformity of nature to our faculty of cognition, in the contingency of its bounds. "For while in respect of the rational employment of our cognitive faculty bounds may be definitely determined, in the empirical field no such determination of bounds is possible."

(CJ, p. 29) On the one hand this contingency can be seen as indicative of the inherently free nature of the reflective judgement. On the other hand, from a Hegelian point of view, it is less free than a determinant judgement—at least the latter is determined in its limitations, while the reflective judgement remains undetermined.

For Hegel, what is determined is more free, although in his philosophy there will be no limits to what is determined. While for Kant cognition in general must have limits to its capacities and application, the reflective judgement in particular must always be considered contingent. We proceed according to a certain principle without knowing how far it will take us (for we can only know the results in experience), or even whether if it has in fact any bounds. We know that reason in general has bounds, but cannot say the same for reflective judgement since such a rule is not given by determinant judgement in this case. Judgement is indeterminate until it comes to an impasse, but the likelihood of such an impasse, if impossible to posit definitely, is conceivable:

Yet this presupposition of judgement is so indeterminate on the question of the extent of the prevalence of that ideal finality of nature for our cognitive faculties, that if we are told that a more searching or enlarged knowledge of nature...must eventually bring us into contact with a multiplicity of laws that no human understanding could reduce to a principle, we can reconcile ourselves to the thought. (CJ, p. 28)
The Judgement of Taste

The aesthetic quality of an object is that which is purely subjective in its representation. If a representation determines an object with a view to cognition, it is logical. In the cognition of sense data both aspects operate conjointly, e.g. space is both a subjective representation, and a constituent of phenomenal knowledge. However, the feeling of pleasure is the subjective side of a representation which cannot be an element of cognition. The finality of an object is not a quality of the object, but an a priori condition to its apprehension; it is completely subjective, involving no element of knowledge. For Hegel of course aesthetics is cognitive; art is a stage of Absolute Spirit.

Thus, the feeling of pleasure—the conformity of the object to the cognitive faculties "brought into play" in the reflective judgement—is another reason this judgement is subjective. Hence the dual motivations discussed above of aesthetics or architectonic both fix subjectivity; the latter from the point of view of the heuristic method of the "as if," the former from the point of view of the aesthetics of feeling which was the prevalent doctrine at the time of the C.J.

Reflective judgement must "compare" the apprehension of forms of the imagination with the faculty of referring intuitions to concepts, even if it does not intend to supply a concept. In other words, imagination and understanding are brought into accord by means of a representation, operating as they would in their normal cognitive function—another level of the "as if." Though the conformity of
the object to the cognitive faculties still occurs, because no concept is to be adduced, the faculties are said to be merely at play, and it is hence a subjective representation. When this takes place, and a feeling of pleasure results, the object must then be considered as final, or purposive, for reflective judgement. It will be shown in the next chapter how suggestive this notion of play was for Schiller.

Consequently, the feeling of pleasure operates dialectically in relation either to the perception of beauty, or to the accord of objects with the cognitive faculties—these are naturally both aspects of the same process.

...this pleasure is also judged to be combined necessarily with the representation of it, and so not merely for the Subject apprehending this form, but for all in general who pass judgement. The object is then called beautiful; and the faculty of judging by means of such a pleasure (and so also with universal validity) is called taste. (Cl, p. 31)

While it seems as if there are two different feelings of pleasure, there is really only one pleasure, manifested in two ways in one act of perception and judging. In a sense, the pleasure afforded by the accord of the cognitive faculties is theoretical, while that resulting from the perception of a beautiful object is the practical. In this way there is yet another grounding for the mediation of the theoretical and practical by the judgement of taste; taste combines features of both without wholly subscribing to either.

Hence, taste is subjective, and involves a feeling of pleasure, but not as sensation only, as characterized by empiricist aesthetics. It is theoretical, but not identical to the theoretical employment of the understanding, since it is without reference to a concept, or to
knowledge of the object. Dialectically speaking, taste is theoretical in a practical sense, and practical in a theoretical sense: universality based on a subjective representation, an a priori based on guidelines for the empirical employment of judgement, and an empirical contingency giving rise to an a priori principle of finality.

To summarize, then, the judgement of taste is a reflective judgement. Beauty is a certain representation of the object, but not a necessary prerequisite for apprehending the object at all. Things are apprehended necessarily as causal, substantial, quantitative, or as qualified, but not as beautiful. Thus taste is not a priori in the sense of the grounding of an object; in this reflective judgement, as with all empirical judgements, there is no objective necessity or a priori validity. Yet as we have seen, in the fine distinction between a priori validity, a priori-like principles, and subjectivity, the reflective judgement is both empirical and subjective, yet is not both empirical and theoretical or subjective and objective, but combines certain characteristics of both.

Although the judgement of taste possesses no universal principles, the act of pronouncing a judgement of taste, of attributing beauty, seemingly imputes a similar opinion to everyone, despite the subjectivity identified with such judgements. We do not state, "I think this is beautiful"; we generally assert that something is beautiful, with the same assumption of universal agreement that we have when making a logical judgement, e.g. "This is a chair."

It is now possible to return to the question that began the
inquiry: are there in fact a priori principles governing taste? We have seen that the judgement of taste possesses a sense of universal validity, without the clear evidence of a priori universals, and certainly not in the sense of universal validity of a logical judgement. At the same time, it is subjective on several levels and cannot be otherwise. Kant must resort to a compromise, where rather than a principle governing questions of taste as a final arbiter, he posits a principle governing instances of questions of taste in purely cognitive terms. The question is whether the elements relate as if they could be subsumed under a definite concept, even though there is no concept available for a judgement of beauty.

Thus taste has a universality which is imputed, not posited. It presupposes an a priori principle, which is a self-furnished and heuristic principle only.

The stage is now set for the Analytic of the Beautiful, where Kant examines the judgement of taste in detail in following the four analytic moments of quality, quantity, relation and modality.

3

The Judgement of Taste

A logical judgement refers a representation to an object as its predicate. However, "to apprehend a regular and appropriate building with one's cognitive faculties...is quite a different thing from being conscious of this representation with an accompanying sensation of delight." (CJ, p. 42) In this case the representation refers to the subject only, and the subject's "feeling of life." (CJ, p. 42).
However, although the ground of this judgement is subjective, something is being stated about the object, viz. that it is beautiful. Since the judgement of taste thus has reference to understanding, it is possible to analyze the beautiful by applying the four moments of the logical forms of judgement. These are the moments considered by the judgement of taste in reflecting upon what is required in order to call an object beautiful and as such each provides a partial definition, or guideline, for the beautiful.

First Moment of the Judgement of Taste: Quality

Taste is the faculty of estimating an object or a mode of representation by means of a delight or aversion apart from any interest; the object of such a delight is called beautiful.

A pure judgement of taste must be disinterested. It is contemplation without cognition or any reference to the desire or appetite. If the pleasure derived from an object is influenced by a desire that it exist, or a desire to possess or use it, the object is not important in itself, but merely in relation to the need of the perceiving Subject. In this case the judgement is interested, and not a pure and free aesthetic judgement. (CJ, p. 43) Kant clarifies his account of the disinterested judgement of taste by contrasting it with the interested judgements of agreeableness and good.

The agreeable, the beautiful, and the good involve three different modes of representation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. The agreeable represents the object only in relation to the senses. It is the feeling of pleasure accompanying the initial sensation, that which pleases immediately, in contrast to the pure judgement of taste.
where the feeling of pleasure results from the reflection and the judging of the object. It is uniquely geared toward the gratification of the senses, and as such must necessarily presuppose the real existence of the object.

The judgement of good is inherently conceptual. Whether referring to good in itself, or to good for something, the concept of an end is implied; again, the existence of the object is an essential feature. To judge that something is good, one must have in mind the intended nature of the object, what it ought to be; that is, one must have a conceptual idea by which to judge it. Delight in the beautiful, on the other hand, rests upon reflection upon an object apart from a concept or definite purpose. Thus in both the good and the agreeable, delight is determined not merely by the representation of the object, but also by the subject’s interest that the object actually exist; it is not only the object, but its existence, that pleases.

The different modes of representation correspond to different levels of being and can be resumed as follows: the agreeable gratifies, the beautiful pleases, and the good is esteemed. To summarize in a passage suggestive of Schiller’s later analysis:

Agreeableness is a significant factor even with irrational animals; beauty has purport and significance only for human beings, i.e. for beings at once animal and rational (but not merely for them as rational—but only for them as at once animal and rational); whereas the good is good for every rational being in general... Of all these three kinds of delight, that of taste in the beautiful may be said to be the one and only disinterested and free delight; for, with it, no interest, whether of sense or reason, extorts approval. (CJ, p. 49)
Thus, with the aesthetic judgement Kant posits a notion of freedom, though not the same sense of freedom as in moral judgements. Only the aesthetic judgement is free from explicit conceptions of purpose or desire. "All interest presupposes a want, or calls one forth; and being a ground determining approval, deprives the judgement on the object of its freedom." (CI, p. 49) From the point of view of aesthetics, there is no original insight so far in the Analytic of the Beautiful; the notion of disinterestedness was a common tenet of aesthetic doctrines, for example those of Hutcheson and Hume. But it was what Kant did with this notion that is significant. First, it was necessary to incorporate it into his doctrine since he had already eliminated any element of cognition or objective validity in the positing of the judgement of taste as reflective judgement. Secondly, he takes the autonomy of reason of the second Critique and develops it even more to what is arguably the most autonomous formulation of reason. Hence in making the freedom of the aesthetic judgement a central concern, Kant moves away from preceding aesthetic doctrines and their static notions of the passivity of aesthetic experience and inner sense where an aesthetically receptive organ waits for external stimuli to provoke a reaction.

Second Moment of the Judgement of Taste: Quantity

The judgement of taste according to quantity defines the beautiful as "that which, apart from a concept, pleases universally." (CI, p. 60) This follows from the preceding notion of the disinterestedness of beauty. If we are conscious of not allowing interest to influence our
judgement of the object, then the object should have the same ground of
delight for everyone. In respect of the delight in the object, we
consider ourselves free from individual inclination, be it desire or
moral precepts, thus it is natural to regard the satisfaction as
emanating from what may be presupposed in every other person, and can
be similarly attributed to everyone. In a sense we speak of the
beautiful object as if beauty were a quality of the object and the
judgement hence logical—but it is only a resemblance to the logical
which occasions a presupposition of universal validity. Since it is an
aesthetic judgement, the universality cannot issue from concepts—thus
the disinterested judgement of taste must have a universal validity
without conceptual grounding, a subjective universality.

Since the agreeable is based on sense alone, it can only claim
private validity; in questions of sense, everyone has their own taste
and does not pretend to impute it to everyone. However, the beautiful
is not a question of sense alone. I do not say that something is
beautiful to me (as something can be agreeable to me); if it were
beautiful for me alone, it would not be called beautiful. When I judge
something beautiful, I am speaking for everyone, and as such demand the
same delight from others. It is not appropriate in this case to assert
that everyone has their own taste; that would be equivalent to saying
that there is no taste, i.e. no aesthetic judgement capable of laying
claim to universal assent.

The judgement of good also lays claim to universal validity; but
it is represented as an object of universal delight by means of a
concept, unlike either the agreeable or the beautiful—both of these being aesthetic judgements (not practical) in terms of the representation of an object and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure.

Thus whereas in respect of the agreeable everyone is allowed to hold their own opinion, and there is no insistence upon agreement, universality is an essential feature of the beautiful, otherwise everything that simply pleased would be called agreeable. "For this universality I use the expression general validity, which denotes the validity of the reference of a representation, not to the cognitive faculties, but to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure for every Subject." (CJ, p. 54)

The question now is how it is possible for the subjective judgement of taste, undetermined by the conceptual categories of the understanding, to claim universal assent.Universal logical judgements possess this general validity on objective grounds—if the judgement is true for everything contained under a given concept, it must have universal agreement from anyone who represents an object by means of this concept, i.e. all who possess cognitive faculties. "But for this very reason the aesthetic universality attributed to a judgement must also be of a special kind, seeing that it does not join the predicate of beauty to the concept of the Object taken in its entire logical sphere, and yet does extend this predicate over the whole sphere of judging Subjects." (CJ, p. 55) All aesthetic judgements of taste are singular, as the object is presented immediately to the feeling of pleasure, without concepts furnishing objective general validity,
e.g. "this rose is beautiful." On the other hand, the judgement of agreeableness (e.g. "this rose is fragrant") is also aesthetic and singular, but is not one of taste, but of sense. Taste claims an "aesthetic quantity of universality," i.e. universal validity, that the judgement of agreeableness does not.

Kant admits that "there can, therefore, be no rule according to which anyone is to be compelled to recognize anything as beautiful." (CJ, p. 56). If we judge something to be beautiful, it is without being influenced by any principle or reason. Thus in the judgement of taste it is only a "universal voice" that is postulated; it is only the possibility of an aesthetic judgement that is universally valid. Unlike the logically universal judgement which can furnish reasons, the judgement of taste can only impute universal agreement. (CJ, p. 56)

The solution to this problem of the nature of an imputed universal validity is, Kant claims, the key to the Critique of Taste.

Were the feeling of pleasure the fundamental concern, we would be dealing with a judgement of agreeableness which would possess private validity only. Thus the important aspect is the universal capacity for the representation of an object with pleasure as the result. It is the objective representation which lends universal significance with which everyone's powers of cognition harmonize, if they are rational beings.

If the determining ground of the judgement in the universal communicability of the representation is subjective, i.e. conceived independently of any concept of the object, "it can be nothing else
than the mental state that presents itself in the mutual relation of the powers of representation so far as they refer a given representation to cognition in general. (CJ, p. 58)

The cognitive powers brought into play by this representation are said by Kant to be engaged in a free play, since no definite concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. This free play of the cognitive faculties admits of universal communication: "...Because cognition, as a definition of the Object with which given representations (in any Subject whatever) are to accord, is the one and only representation which is valid for every one." (CJ, p. 58) It is hence a subjective universal communicability, the mental state present in the free play of the imagination and understanding (insofar as they are in accord, as required by cognition in general).

This subjective judging of the object is prior to the pleasure in it, and is the basis of this pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive faculties. Thus it is the universality of the subjective conditions of judging objects which is the only foundation of the universal subjective validity of the judgement of taste.

**Third Moment of the Judgement of Taste: Relation of the Ends**

Beauty is the form of finality in an object, so far as perceived in it apart from the representation of an end. (CJ, p. 80)

Kant begins by providing the transcendental definition of an end and finality: "An end is the object of a concept so far as this concept is regarded as the cause of the object (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a concept in respect of its Object
is finality." (CJ, p. 61) Thus, where an object itself (not only the cognition of it) is seen as possible only through a concept of it, that object is a purpose, or end. An example of this is the faculty of desire, which is only determined through concepts, which is to say, acting in conformity with the representation of an end.

But an Object, or state of mind, or even an action may, although its possibility does not necessarily presuppose the representation of an end, be called final (or purposive) simply on account of its possibility being only explicable, and intelligible for us by virtue of an assumption on our part of a fundamental causality according to ends, i.e. a will that would have so ordained it according to a certain represented rule. (CJ, pp. 61-62)

Thus it is possible with the notion of "purposiveness without purpose" to reflect upon a finality of form in objects apart from an end, in that the causes of the form of finality cannot be discovered, yet finality serves to make the explanation of its possibility intelligible to us. As Hegel puts it in his analysis of the CJ, "Any natural product, a plant, for example, or an animal, is purposefully organized, and in this purposiveness it is so directly there for us that we have no idea of its purpose explicitly separate and distinct from its present reality. In this way the beautiful too is to appear to us as purposiveness."14

When judging an object we get the impression that it is inherently harmonious, but it is not evident that it serves a purpose as an entity in an empirical world interacting with other objects. Besides, it
could not be directly purposive, for then it would not be disinterested and would be unable to meet the requirements of the first moment.

The next step is to establish the determining ground of the judgement of taste. If an end is a source of delight, the determining ground of the object is bound up with interest, thus this could not be the end (even subjective) of the judgement of taste. On the other hand, the grounding cannot be the representation of an objective end either, as in the principles of a final connection, nor can it involve concepts of the good.

When this cognitive operation takes place, and an object is judged beautiful, there is an accompanying feeling of pleasure (displeasure occurs when the cognitive powers are somehow hindered in their relation to the representation). This pleasure is imputed to everyone, therefore agreeableness can no more furnish the determining ground than could the judgement of the good.

We are thus left with the subjective finality in the representation of an object, exclusive of an end (objective or subjective) —consequently the bare form of finality in the representation whereby an object is given to us, so far as we are conscious of it—as that which is alone capable of constituting the delight which, apart from any concept, we estimate as universally communicable, and so of forming the determining ground of the judgement of taste. (CJ, pp. (62-63)

The object possesses not purpose, but a "form of purpose,"15 The object is harmonious within itself, while at the same time seeming to fulfill a purpose; it seems meant to be understood in a certain
way, as if it could be subsumed under a definite concept, even though there is no definite concept available.

Kant concludes that it is impossible to determine a priori whether or not a representation will furnish a feeling of pleasure or displeasure; such a relation is only cognized empirically and a posteriori. There is no a priori principle to judge whether or not an object will be judged beautiful in the strict sense of the a priori employment of the first Critique where an a priori of causality, for example, would indeed determine a causal relation in experience. Rather, the pleasure in a judgement of taste results from a combination of a priori and empirical; the formal finality in the free play of the cognitive faculties in relation to a representation. This combination results in an objectivity within subjectivity and universal validation for the aesthetic judgement. It is the form of purposiveness which evokes the free harmonious play of the two cognitive faculties. They interact without any specific view to cognition, yet what is given, if not of a cognitive nature, seems designed, but designed for no other reason or purpose than to facilitate our unification of it by the imagination and understanding.

In an aesthetic judgement, the imagination and understanding are interacting as they would for a cognitive judgement, but in this case there is no conceptual groundwork nor pursuit of knowledge, so these faculties are not really working, or engaging in definite acts of cognition, so are said to be "at play." They are taking delight in
the sheer enjoyable harmony of their interacting mental activities, conforming to a necessary law voluntarily, as it were. This pleasure (a higher level pleasure than that of the mere sense perception), is the experience of beauty.

The consciousness of mere formal finality in the play of the cognitive faculties of the Subject attending a representation whereby an object is given, is the pleasure itself, because it involves a determining ground of the Subject's activity in respect of the quickening of its cognitive powers, and thus an internal causality (which is final) in respect of cognition generally, but without being limited to a definite cognition, and consequently a mere form of the subjective finality of a representation in an aesthetic judgement. (CJ, p. 64)

All cognitive beings should be capable of apprehending this harmony, and thus beauty can be communicated universally.

The fundamental prerequisite for taste is not what gratifies in sensation, but what pleases by its form. Thus with the doctrine of form Kant moves beyond the empiricist notion of beauty as the response of an inner or outer sense: form for Kant is a synthesis of theoretical and empirical—a formal appearance. By the same token, it is not the charm of colours nor the agreeable tones of musical notes which please in a pure judgement of taste, but the design or composition inherent in the representation. Contributing to beauty is not on the same level as constituting a delight in the form. "The real meaning rather is that they make this form more clearly, definitely, and completelyintuitible, and besides stimulate
the representation by their charm, as they excite and sustain the
attention directed to the object itself." (CJ, p. 68)

In connection with this, Kant distinguishes between free and
dependent beauty. As might be imagined, free beauty involves no
concept of what the object should be (as in the free beauty of
flowers) while the dependent beauty involves such a concept, and is
attached to objects which fall under the concept of a particular end.
These distinctions correspond to a pure or impure judgement of
taste: in a pure judgement, there is no concept present to restrict
the free play of the imagination in its contemplation.

Kant acknowledges that taste could benefit by a combination of
intellectual, or conceptual delight with the aesthetic, as it would
then be fixed and rules could be prescribed. But in this case the
rules would not be rules of taste, but rules for unifying taste with
reason; taste would become the instrument of reason as its self-
sustaining nature and subjective universal validity would support and
maintain a mode of thought (reason) which, though possessing objective
universal validity, must be preserved by an effort. "The truth is
rather this, when we compare the representation through which an
Object is given to us with the Object...by means of a concept, we
cannot help reviewing it also in respect of the sensation in the
Subject. Hence there results a gain to the entire faculty of our
representative power when harmony prevails between both states of
mind." (CJ, p. 74)
At the beginning of the section Kant had concluded that there can be no definite a priori principle for deciding questions of taste, no universal criterion of the beautiful, as such a principle is inherently contradictory. (CJ, p. 63) This is derived dialectically both from the nature of the judgement of taste itself, and from the empirical realizations, where we find there is always controversy and differing opinions concerning what is beautiful. Kant stated that because of the latter, the former was true; the inevitability of differing taste laid the groundwork for the judgement of taste.

Now Kant asserts the reverse. Because of the subjective formal finality in the judgement of taste, where an object is not thought, but given, where it is a principle governing not questions of taste, but instances of taste, there can be, and are disputes about beauty. Having made the distinction between free and dependent beauty based upon the interested/disinterested, conceptual/subjective (non-cognitive), dichotomies, it is possible, if not to categorically assert whether or not an object is beautiful, to at least settle the dispute by pointing out that in many cases the difference is based upon the free and dependent beauty distinction. Each opinion would be judging according to the free play of the cognitive faculties; but the different results would be due to an orientation toward either free beauty or dependent beauty. The former is making a pure judgement of taste, the latter an impure judgement.

Fourth Moment of the Judgement of Taste: Modality

The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, is cognized
as object of a necessary delight. (CJ, p. 85)

The beautiful necessarily refers to delight; however, the necessity involved is special. It is not a theoretical objective necessity, where we could cognize a priori that everyone will feel a similar delight in an object we have judged beautiful. Nor is it a practical necessity, where, because free agents are furnished with rules by concepts of a pure rational will, they ought absolutely to act in a certain manner, and the delight is merely the necessary outcome of an objective law. In contrast, in an aesthetic judgement, this necessity can only be thought of as exemplary. "In other words it is a necessity of the assent of all to a judgement regarded as exemplifying a universal rule incapable of formulation." (CJ, p. 81)

Aesthetic judgement is neither objective nor cognitive, thus is not derived from definite concepts. Nor can it be inferred from a universality of experience--empirical judgements cannot provide a groundwork for a concept of necessity for aesthetic judgements.

If I describe an object as beautiful, I am at the same time insisting that everyone ought to make the same judgement regarding the object. Yet, because of the subjective nature of a judgement of taste, the necessity must be conditional; I say not must, but ought, based on the premise that we all possess common ground, and thus I am entitled to an assurance of universal agreement on the part of those who have correctly related the object to their cognitive faculties.

Aesthetic judgements possess no objective principles, yet they are not lacking entirely in principles, as would be the case for a
mere subjective sense-perception. Rather, what is involved is a subjective principle, determining what is pleasing or displeasing and based not on concepts, but on feeling, yet possessing universal validity.

This principle is characterized as common sense, and constitutes a necessary presupposition to a judgement of taste. It is not to be confused with common understanding (sensus communis), which deals with concepts, not feelings. It is not an external, conceptual sense, but the effect arising from the free play of the powers of cognition, and it is only with such a presupposition that a judgement of taste is possible.

The question to be raised now is whether we are justified in presupposing such an element of common sense. If cognitions and judgements were not universally communicable, they would be nothing more than the mere subjective play of the powers of representation: self-referential, with no external significance. But if we allow, as we have, that cognitions can be communicated, thus furnishing knowledge, it follows accordingly that our mental state, the way the cognitive powers are geared for cognition, be similarly communicated. Kant maintains that if this mental state of the employment of cognitive faculties, which is the subjective condition of the act of knowing, was not thus universally communicable, knowledge would not occur.

Yet knowledge does occur, when the imagination and understanding cooperate to cognize an object presented to sense-perception. But as
the "disposition" of the cognitive powers differs according to the different Objects that are presented, there are cases where feeling, and not concepts, is the determining factor. Since this disposition is universally communicable, and thus also the feeling involved, Kant concludes that this universal communicability of a feeling presupposes a common sense. This enables Kant to sidestep psychological considerations as we presuppose a necessary condition of the universal communicability of our knowledge.

Thus, because we insist on universal agreement regarding a judgement of taste, despite basing this judgement not on concepts, but on feeling, the result is not a private feeling, but a public sense—a universal subjectivity of feeling, which, based on the element of common sense, is also objective. This common sense is not grounded in experience, because the issue is not that everyone will agree with the judgement, but rather that they ought to do so. Thus a judgement of taste is an example of a judgement of common sense, with exemplary validity. With the latter groundwork, a judgement that agrees with it can be understood as a rule for everyone.

For the principle, while it is only subjective, being yet assumed as subjectively universal (a necessary idea for everyone), could, in what concerns the consensus of different judging Subjects, demand universal assent like an objective principle, provided we were assured of our subsumption under it being correct. *(CJ, pp. 84-85)*

Kant acknowledges that common sense is an ideal and indeterminate element, yet it is presupposed by us, as demonstrated by our tendency
to presume to formulate a judgement of taste.

Kant concludes by asking some questions which will for the moment go unanswered. Is such a common sense a constitutive principle of experience, or is it formed as a regulative principle by a still higher principle of reason, that for higher reasons must engender in us a principle of common sense? In other words, is taste a natural and original faculty, or an acquired one,

... so that a judgement of taste, with its demand for universal assent, is but a requirement of reason for generating such a consensus, and does the "ought," i.e. the objective necessity of the coincidence of the feeling of all with the particular feeling of each, only betoken the possibility of arriving at some sort of unanimity in these matters, and the judgement of 'taste' only adduce an example of the application of this principle? (CI, p. 85)

4

The unity and freedom of the judgement & taste

Since the CI is consistent with the other Critiques and does not deviate from the basic tenets of Kantian thought, it is clear that as aesthetic theory, it will very much be a Kantian aesthetics. Consequently, just as the Kantian philosophy in general constituted a major departure from the empiricist tradition, likewise the particular account of aesthetics in the CI was a departure from the previous empiricist aesthetics of feeling of Hutcheson, Hume and Burke. Although, as indicated above, Kant retains certain elements of traditional aesthetics, taking feeling and disinterestedness as
a point of departure, he develops his aesthetics very differently. As opposed to the empiricists' sense or natural sensibility which, like an organ of some sort, passively receives external stimuli, the judgement of taste, consistent with Kantian epistemology, is an activity of thinking which orders and creates the judgement. In addition, Kant attempts to ground a priori principles of taste in the same way that there were a priori principles of cognition, as opposed to empiricist associations or a posteriori concepts. On the other hand, in denying the possibility of cognition or knowledge in judgements of taste, Kant rejects the rationalist aesthetics of Baumgarten.

It is not my intention in this context to engage in a discussion of the CJ from the point of view of aesthetic theory; but rather to analyze why it is important within the Kantian architectonic, and in turn for the development of Hegel's dialectic. For, suggestive as Kant's formulation of aesthetics and freedom may be for subsequent aestheticians, I believe the primary analysis of the third Critique is judgement as a function of reason, making the analysis of beauty secondary. Certainly both Schiller and Hegel regarded the CJ as a work on aesthetics, and Schiller in particular approached it primarily from the perspective of an artist who sought to philosophize about art. His Letters in turn deal not with a judgement of taste, but with the role of the aesthetic. Yet, as will be seen in the following chapter, Schiller found the CJ especially valuable insofar as it enabled him to grasp the sense of the rest of Kant's philosophy once he
rethought it in terms of the CJ, which as an artist he found easier
to understand than the first two Critiques. Thus Schiller correspondingly does not reduce the CJ to the notion of beauty, but sees it as the aesthetic manifestation of Kantian philosophy; and in his elaboration of what he took to be the primary insights of the third Critique he does not stress the beautiful so much as the aesthetic as a function. Thus commentators who discuss the CJ solely in terms of notions of beauty and genius are, in my opinion, mistaken.16

If theoretical knowledge is independent of sense, moral law of utility, then the judgement of taste is independent of desire, duty, and of knowledge. In this sense it is autonomous and could be said to be the most perfect realization of one of Kant’s aims: the freedom of reason. Or, as Taminiaux puts it, "le jugement n’opère à l’état pur que dans l’ordre esthétique."17 This is not to say that the aesthetic does not have affinities with other elements, but merely that it is not dependent. Perhaps the one thing preventing it from being completely free is the lack of an independent deduction for taste. That is, as it was originally derived per analogiam from the other Critiques, it stands at the end as independent, yet its analogies with the other elements which serve as its justification, do not allow it a true deduction. On the other hand, while Cassirer was concerned that deriving taste per analogiam lessened it somehow, in the final analysis its independence from certain factors is stronger than its dependence (in the sense of affinity or analogy)
and the judgement of taste can hence be considered the most independent of reason's functions.

Just as with the Copernican Revolution reason in general was shown to make an active contribution in cognition, in the third Critique, reason gives a rule to itself, and nature is taken as a purposive whole adapted to our cognitive faculties. This sets the stage for the autonomy of Hegelian reason, which goes even further than did Kant by objecting to the indeterminacy and inadequacy of the Kantian account of self-consciousness, the limits of cognition which Kant imposes, and the externality of the content of Kant's conceptual forms. The truth of speculative philosophy for Hegel is that thought produces its own content out of itself, can attain the standpoint of Absolute Knowledge, and knows itself as such.

The theme of freedom of reason found in Kant is usually thought to be best articulated in the Critique of Practical Reason, but I believe that it is possible to argue that it is found equally, if not more so, in the CJ. The conclusion that in Kant there is hence a primacy of practical reason issues from the view that it is the second Critique which deals with freedom. However, as I have already indicated, there is ample evidence of a stronger sense of self-given freedom for reason in the CJ; in addition, Kant states in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals that practical reason must be grounded in a unity of reason, a unity achieved in the CJ.

...a critique of practical reason, if it is to be complete, requires, on my view, that we should be
able at the same time to show the unity of practical and theoretical reason in a common principle, since in the end there can only be one and the same reason, which must be differentiated solely in its application. 19

Hence rather than a primacy of practical reason, since this primacy is based on the notion of freedom, and this notion is to be found elsewhere than the second Critique, it is perhaps more accurate to speak of a primacy of freedom and unity of reason.

In the first chapter I raised the question of the evolution of the a priori of the reflective judgement. That is, did Kant envisage from the beginning what kind of a priori the reflective judgement would possess, or had he hoped to find a priori principles of judgement of the same nature as those of theoretical reason, (i.e. synthetic a priori), but instead was forced to settle with a subjective a priori. I believe that both of these possibilities are valid, without being contradictory. From the point of view of the judgement of taste (assuming that this was an equal motivation in writing the CJ), every aesthetic theory starts with a fundamental, though futile, desire to universally and objectively ground propositions of taste and beauty. In this way Kant could have hoped for an a priori principle of taste, but in positing the relation of taste and reflective judgement, he was obliged to rethink the a priori, due to the inherently subjective nature of reflective judgement. On the other hand, from a systematic point of view, in recognizing that reflective judgement was the judgement suitable for mediating between theoretical and
practical reason, Kant would have seen that taste must remain subjective, if it were only possible as a reflective judgement. This two-sided view is supported by Kant's letter to Reinhold where, it will be recalled, he states that although he did not think it possible to find a priori principles of feeling, he has in fact discovered a different kind of a priori principle.\textsuperscript{20}

This is not an a priori in the sense of the determinant judgement, but is a priori in the sense that it is not derived from experience and is an a priori presupposition for inquiry. Hence in this "not a priori and yet a priori" there is another manifestation of the "as if." To summarize, the reflective judgement of taste has subjective validity only for two reasons: 1) it does not determine the object but merely the manner of reflecting upon it, and 2) it is a priori only in a heuristic sense. Nevertheless, it also possesses an imputed universality.

Hence it can be claimed that the feature central to all aspects of the judgement of taste (and not usually stressed by commentators) is the "as if." This is the unifying principle, the ground of the Kantian synthesis—a synthesis which is distinct from the Hegelian formulation to be sure, but which is certainly an ancestor. Whether Kant deliberately or inadvertently set up the dichotomy between theoretical and practical reason, it seems clear that the judgement of taste is the unifying element, embodying elements of both in a dialectical interaction in the notion of the play. In addition, the
dichotomy of knower/known is broken down by reflective judgement since it is never able to determine its limit until the limit is reached. The Socratic dictum is applicable in a sense: knowing what cannot be known constitutes more of an Absolute Knowing than the claim to know the totality. Hence, the "as if" as a dialectical relation, more than any other element of Kantian philosophy, can be said to anticipate and inspire the Hegelian dialectic. Instead of considering it in terms of the standard charge of dualism, Kant's whole project can be seen at various stages as an attempt to unify and resolve dualisms. For Hegel, however, Kant's synthesis was not a true dialectical synthesis in the sense of an overcoming and reconciliation. The "as if" is not a true determination and grounding, and Kant's unity never gets beyond an impotent vacillation between two elements of a relation. Nevertheless, this does not mitigate the claim that Kant's philosophy was much less dualistic than Hegel acknowledged, and that Kant understood more by the principle of unity of reason than a disjunction, or an amalgamation of two relata. In addition, Kant's activity of thought is surely a direct inspiration for the movement of Hegel's dialectic.

Before concluding this chapter, I would like to mention briefly two criticisms of Kant and the CI which issue from a Hegelian and phenomenological perspective, and which are crucial to an understanding of the next two chapters.

Hegel believes the CI to be significant for the history of the Geisteswissenschaften: in giving taste independent validity only, and limiting knowledge to theoretical and practical reason, there
was thus no claim to truth for art, and correspondingly not for the human sciences. In discrediting any kind of theoretical knowledge other than that of natural science, it forced the human sciences to rely on the methodology of natural science and in this way formalized experience by neglecting the value of tradition, history and culture. 21

The neglect to account for history is also criticized by phenomenology and critical theory. 22 David Carr states that "transcendental philosophy...makes its mistaken assumption not in believing that there are such structures [of experience and knowledge] but in supposing that at bottom they are unchanging, ahistorical. Furthermore, it supposes that the knower or experiencer who is subject to such concepts or rules is, to that extent, himself unchanging." 23

In addition, from a Husserlian point of view, in Kant there is a presupposed life—world which is unexamined and unjustified; again, this is the scientific model. In failing to recognize the abstractive and interpretative character of science, "that from which scientific abstractions are made, that of which scientific theory is an interpretation, is simply taken for granted as needing no transcendental critique." 34

These two related criticisms are significant for an account of Schiller's and Hegel's relation to the CJ. As will be seen in the next two chapters, both Schiller and Hegel introduce a stronger notion of history and of the truth of art and in so doing point a less abstracted and formalized aesthetics.
Chapter III

Schiller and the Letters on the
Aesthetic Education of Man

1

Although best known as one of the most prominent poets and literary figures of 18th century Germany, Friedrich Schiller was also a student of philosophy. In this period of German intellectual history, the interaction of literature and philosophy was extensive. Philosophers became interested in art and the role of the aesthetic, artists sought to incorporate philosophy into their work, and both shared attitudes characteristic of the Romantic spirit: a nostalgia for ancient Greece, a concern for social and political issues, and an interest in the problem of human nature. Naturally there were varying degrees of participation in the Romantic attitude, and it is probably safe to say that it was more prevalent in the artists than in the philosophers.

While some writers introduced "philosophical" themes into their work, and some philosophers discussed the nature of art, there were some men of letters who were strictly speaking neither philosophers nor writers, but who stood somewhere in between; for example, "les philosophes." Although very much a Romantic poet, and more readily on the side of literature than someone like Voltaire, Schiller was one of these writers of dual orientation. For he did not stop at philosophical artistic creation, but endeavoured to write quasi-philosophical texts dealing with questions of aesthetics, social theory, and even ontology.
In a truer sense than most of his literary contemporaries, Schiller sought to be a philosophical thinker, convinced that the domains of philosophy and art are implicitly connected. As Dieter Henrich puts it: "Schiller was forced into philosophizing by the problem of human nature, the duality of its both sensuous and rational character, and by the problem of the moral standard of human action and the possibility of its perfection. For Schiller the artist, the inner truth, the justification of his poetry depended on whether art, in its own domain of beautiful forms, had any bearing on these problems."¹

My claim is that the texts which issued from Schiller's philosophical meditations, particularly those upon Kant's philosophy, were more than a guide for the layman; but in fact influenced subsequent philosophical developments by elaborating certain themes in a manner that was suggestive for Hegel in the formulation of his notion of dialectic. This is not to suggest that Schiller was the only artist who exerted some sort of influence on philosophy; it could be argued, for example, that the contribution of Hölderlin was in fact much more important. My purpose is merely to trace one possible line of development within a complex nexus of influences, but which is no less important for that reason. In this respect, Schiller's work can be seen as a mediation between Kant and Hegel, and in a way that is significant for Hegel's dialectic.

While the Cl is certainly Schiller's starting point, both his orientation and subsequent philosophical interests took a different direction. As Henrich points out, Schiller had no real interest, for example, in a transcendental grounding for the possibility of knowledge.² Rather, Schiller took what was suggestive for his interests and developed it
accordingly. Thus, just as the systematic issues and problems of Kant's philosophy were not crucial to Schiller's work on aesthetics, neither can a sustained philosophical critique be applied to his work, in terms of consistency, grounding in the tradition, or sophistication of discourse. It is impossible to claim that Hegel found inspiration for his dialectic solely in the Letters, to the exclusion of the work of Fichte and Schelling. Nor does Schiller's work occupy a significant place in the history of philosophy alongside Kant and Hegel. Rather, his Letters are one instance of the many ancestors of Hegel's dialectic; one influence which, along with Kant's Critique of Judgement is generally overlooked by commentators analyzing the origin of Hegel's dialectic.

2

As mentioned above, Schiller's interests lay in the problem of the aesthetic impulse and its relation to history and culture. He felt that reason cannot dogmatically impose itself on the historical natural world; this reassessment of rationality was a popular theme in 18th century literature, finding its historic justification in the French revolution and Reign of Terror. Philosophically, Schiller saw in Kant's thought the evidence that reason is unable to interact with nature without the mediating influence of aesthetics. Although Kant's attempt to posit an effective mediation chose the right mediating element in aesthetics, his endeavour fails ultimately due to its inability to escape formalism, subjectivity, and externality.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Schiller's point of departure from the 3rd Critique is not the judgement of taste but rather what he
draws from the C.J in terms of a notion of Beauty and aesthetic experience. For Kant, aesthetic experience means no more than the apprehension of beauty understood as a certain manner in which the cognitive faculties interact. That is, it is a formalized account of how the reasoning Subject encounters a certain facet of the given world; Beauty itself is nothing apart from any reference to the feeling of the Subject. For Schiller, Beauty and the aesthetic experience must consist of more than a certain modification of cognitive activities—it should have a social and cultural force. If the dichotomy between reason and sense is mirrored culturally and historically in an age of specialization where the individual suffers from one-sidedness and alienation, then art and Beauty must be more than a formalized categorial structure; they must be the cornerstones for a notion of harmonious human nature and civilization.

In a letter written to Kant in 1795, shortly after completing the Letters, Schiller acknowledged his debt to Kant and his desire to follow in the tradition of Kantian thought: "Es sind dies die Früchte, die das Studium Ihrer Schriften bei mir getragen, und wie sehr würde es mir zur Aufmunterung gereichen, wenn ich hoffen könnte, daß Sie den Geist Ihrer Philosophie in dieser Anwendung derselben nicht vermissen." Yet at the same time he felt a need to progress further. He wanted reason to penetrate nature, not simply to order it externally; he wanted art to play a true role in human life and society, believing it could ameliorate the social sphere. That is, as Taminiaux says, Schiller felt that "l'art et le Beau ont un rapport intime avec l'essence de l'homme." What it means to be human is defined by the aesthetic, and as such it must have a more
extensive relevance than as a mere conceptual relation.

It is in this relation of art and the essence of humanity that the influence of ancient philosophy is evident in Schiller's thought. I will do no more than mention this factor here, as there are many studies of this connection, and my purpose is rather to explore Schiller's relation to Kant and Hegel in particular. But it is to be noted that Schiller's sense of education is the Greek sense of ἔκτεινε, a training of all aspects of the person, in all facets of experience; nothing can be understood in isolation from the other elements to which it is implicitly connected. The goal of education is to learn how to live, and to elucidate the human essence; philosophy must engage the whole person.

Schiller's interests in philosophy and culture were thus united in a desire to ground beauty objectively and to elucidate its ontological priority, while legitimating it a priori through reason. As he said in a letter to Körner:

Die Schwierigkeit, einen Begriff der Schönheit objektiv aufzustellen und ihn aus der Natur der Vernunft völlig a priori zu legitimieren, so daß die Erfahrung ihn zwar durchaus bestätigt, aber daß er diesen Ausspruch der Erfahrung zu seiner Gültigkeit gar nicht nötig hat, diese Schwierigkeit ist fast unübersehbar...Du wirst sagen, daß dies etwas viel gefordert sei, aber solan man es nicht dahin bringt, so wird der Geschmack immer empirisch bleiben, so wie Kant es für unvermeidlich hält. Aber eben von dieser Unvermeidlichkeit des Empirischen, von dieser Unmöglichkeit eines objektiven Prinzips für den Geschmack kann ich mich noch nicht überzeugen.

Freedom must not remain on the conceptual level alone, but must be applicable in the practical sphere as well, realized through the aesthetic impulse. Schiller modifies Kant's notion of freedom and defines beauty as freedom in appearance. The Egyptian general logic abstracts
from all content of cognition and considers the concept only in regard to its form (i.e. subjectively); not in terms of how it determines an object, but rather how it can be referred to several objects. The aesthetic judgement, therefore, can only be objective insofar as it is understood in terms of the effect a beautiful object has on the cognitive faculties. For Schiller freedom means self-determination, developing according to an inner necessity and independence. With this he believes that he has formulated an objective principle of beauty, an objective grounding in the subjectivity of the experience of beauty. Henrich correctly points out that Schiller is not speaking of objectivity in the Kantian sense of knowledge of objects and hence he does not really succeed in positing an objective principle of beauty, in the sense in which Kant had demonstrated it to be impossible.7

Schiller's understanding of the objectivity of aesthetic experience involves rather the absorption of consciousness in the object, the object holding consciousness in a certain way. It is not aesthetic experience as the representation in reference to the Subject's feeling of pleasure, the Subject absorbed with itself; it is the intentionality of the Subject projecting itself into the object of beauty and as such objectified.

While for Schiller, then, this experience is an objectified subjectivity, as opposed to what he sees as the subjective subjectivity in Kant, it is also an internalization of the aesthetic experience. Beauty is more than a certain representation; it is an active, vital, force, self-determining and able to hold the Subject and exercise an influence upon the subject and the subject's world. As a necessary constituent and function of human nature, the aesthetic impulse serves to harmonize
not only the opposing forces of sense and reason within the individual, but in turn those within society as well. It is clear how this notion anticipates Hegel's dialectic; Schiller's aesthetic impulse could describe dialectic for Hegel, and in fact it is possible to argue that the aesthetic and the dialectic have close affinities in Hegelian thought, and that the dialectic is best understood within the aesthetic framework.

For Hegel, Schiller's formulation goes beyond the Kantian notion of a "synthetic" unity, by attempting to elude radical subjectivism in the positing of self-determination and a new level of freedom. This relation of freedom and determination prepares the way for the Hegelian notion where the more determined the concept, the freer it is. As Hegel states in the _EL_: "Schiller, and others, have found in the idea of artistic beauty, where thought and sensuous conception have grown together into one, a way of escape from the abstract and separatist understanding."

(_EL_, p. 88)

Schiller's point of departure was the conviction that he was living in a society caught in the midst of cultural chaos:

So we see the spirit of the time fluctuating between perverseness and brutality, between unnaturalness and mere Nature, between superstition and moral unbelief, and it is only the equilibrium of evil that still occasionally sets bonds to it. (_AEM_, p. 37)

This was the manifestation of the Naturstaat, a state that had not been freely chosen, but rather was founded upon moral apathy, conflicting interest, and dependence upon material needs: it was ordained through natural laws rather than the laws of reason.
It follows that the weaknesses of the State are reflected in the individual as well, and it is perhaps to the latter that we must look for the cause of these cultural faults; the same material dependence and lack of choice deprive the individual of any internal impetus, coherence, or totality. In words foreshadowing Marx, Schiller bemoans this disunity so apparent in every facet of society, and in the individual in particular: enjoyment separated from labour, means from ends, effort from reward. Conined to his fragment, man himself becomes a fragment. He neither realizes his full potential, nor develops the harmony of his being, "and instead of imprinting humanity upon his nature, he becomes merely the imprint of his occupation, his science." (AEM, p.40).

This situation is in sharp contrast to the civilization of ancient Greece, which Schiller greatly admired. As Taminiaux points out, at the back of Schiller's inquiry is not only the questions of totality and beauty but also the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns. Greek culture and thought suffered no disunity of sense and spirit, but attempted to establish a harmony of reason and imagination, form and content, which for Schiller signifies aesthetic perfection: "Combining fullness of form with fullness of content, at once philosophic and creative, at the same time tender and energetic, we see them uniting the youthfulness of fantasy with the manliness of reason in a splendid humanity." (AEM, p.38)

The overcoming of the fragmentation of both the individual and the State must be accomplished simultaneously, as the State is merely subjective individuality represented in objective form, a whole composed of many individual parts. The fragmentation of one is irrevocably
linked to the fragmentation of the other. Alone they cannot overcome the repetitive, circular pattern of self-negation, but must seek the solution from within their inter-dependent and interpenetrating relation.

With this we get a first articulation of a part/whole relation and the idea of an interpenetrating connection, going beyond Kant's formulation of judgement as a mere go-between, participating in opposing elements without their true mutual interaction.

The solution to fragmentation is naturally totality, a totality which is maintained in spite of the strong presence of an active, engaged, and integral individual element: "...it must be false that the cultivation of individual powers necessitates the sacrifice of their totality." (AEM, p.45) Reason must abolish the Natural State, and put itself in its place, but this is no simple accomplishment. Contrasting this procedure with that of repairing a clock, Schiller states that whereas in the latter case the repairman can allow the clockworks to run down during the repair, the "living clockwork" of the State must be repaired while in motion: "We must therefore search for some support for the continuation of society, to make it independent of the actual State which we wish to abolish." (AEM, p.30)

This support is found neither in Nature nor Reason; on the level of the particular it is neither in the natural nor rational character of mankind. Neither nature nor reason can dominate; in such circumstances we are faced with either a "savage" who lets his feelings override his principles, or a "barbarian" who allows his principles to trample his emotions underfoot. A third element must be exacted: a mediator related to the other two elements and which will not only effect an interaction
between two opposing forces, but in so doing will harmonise and unify them, providing the synthesis of form and law, unity and multiplicity. As the individual and the State are so necessarily and logically interdependent, they will possess the same mediating element, one that is related to both domains, while facilitating their union. At this point the principle sounds very much like Kant's notion of judgement, but transposed within a historical and cultural context. Yet Schiller maintains a primacy of the individual, to whom the mediating element, art, is primarily accessible. This is obvious since it is the individual who creates, who is the guardian of the artistic génie, and whose unique mode of reflection can designate something as beautiful. Mankind is the underlying principle of art, and in turn art is the underlying principle of mankind. Art makes possible the ennoblement of the character, which in turn entails the positive transformation of the society, for a society of enlightened individuals cannot fail to have a good effect. Schiller thus posits a very Platonic notion of education, progressive citizens striving toward an ideal humanity and society. The fundamental principle of this striving is art, and the thematic question which the series of letters will attempt to answer, then, is this: What precisely is the role of art in human life, culture, and society, and in what way does it accomplish this ennoblement?

While Schiller has obviously followed Kant's argument to a large extent, as stated above he contests the conclusion that the beautiful can ultimately have reference to a subjective conception only. "While the speculative spirit strove after imperishable possessions in the realm of ideas, it had to become a stranger in the material world, and relinquish
matter for the sake of form." (AEM, p.42) Taste recognizes form only and not content; but the answer is not to discard form in turn but rather to seek a true concurrence. "Thus his (Schiller's) letters are able to mark the gap between the end of a theory of taste (as the Kantian approach is characterized) and the beginning of a theory of the aesthetic." Implied in this is an examination of the cultural and historical value of the aesthetic, a question of little interest for Kant.

Schiller begins his analysis of art by delineating the dual impulses of human nature, the sensuous and the rational.

The first insists upon absolute reality: he is to turn everything that is mere form into world, and realize all his potentialities; the second insists upon absolute formality: he is to eradicate in himself everything that is merely world, and produce harmony in all its mutations. (AEM, pp. 63-64)

Schiller fuses this Socratic articulation of the problem with his other philosophical allegiance in a formulation that is some sort of a Kantian Platonism, or vice versa.

The sensuous impulse is empirical reality, occupying time and space and demanding that this dimension be characterized by content and change. The perception of the present is necessarily confined to one manifestation of existence, excluding any others in the spectrum of phenomena. In the exclusive presence of this impulse there is necessarily a high degree of limitation and man is nothing but a unit of magnitude or an occupied moment of time. While enabling the absolute to externalize itself and to actualize its potential in the world of sense phenomena, the sensuous impulse also prevents any subsequent development by binding infinite and
formal spirit to the confines of time and space, here and now. The rational impulse demands unity and permanence, the maintaining of the individual identity throughout the vagaries of his experience; it embraces and transcends time and change rather than being fettered by it. This impulse furnishes laws for judgements pronounced concerning the knowledge provided by the first impulse: "We snatch this condition away from the jurisdiction of time and endow it with reality for all men and all times—that is, with universality and necessity." (AEM, p.66) Feeling and inclination can only be true for one person at one moment. The formal impulse takes a decisive step: "When you acknowledge truth because it is Truth...you have turned a single case into a law for all cases, and treated one moment of your life as eternity." (AEM, p.67)

Because of its limiting nature, the sensuous impulse is the more primitive impulse; it is only with the transition to the formal impulse that man attains the highest form of being. He is no longer bound by time and space, but has subsumed time and the realm of phenomena into his regulating powers and influence. "We are no longer individuals, but species; the judgement of all spirits is expressed by our own, the choice of all hearts is represented by our action." (AEM, p.67) This is the Romantic articulation of the Kantian categorical imperative and the autonomy of the judging Subject, with the additional presentiment of the Hegelian absolute standpoint which acknowledges no barriers to complete knowledge.

Similar to the situation at the beginning of The CJ, these two tendencies appear at first glance to be in mutual opposition, however, a close examination shows this opposition to be less irresolvable than
imagined. They are indeed in contradiction, but not so in the same objects, so the demands each makes are applicable to its own activity only: "things that do not meet cannot come into collision." (AEM, p. 67) The sensuous impulse does demand change, but not that the change should extend to the individual; the formal impulse demands unity and permanence but without requiring that the condition as well as the individual be static. Therefore, as a being with a dual nature, man both lives in a world of sensation continually in flux, and at the same time maintains a changeless soul; a rational being which imposes order on the diversity of sense-impressions. If the sensuous impulse is passive, absorbing as many sense-impressions as possible, and the formal impulse is active, producing laws and affirming man's freedom from restraint, the union of the two will result in independence and freedom with "abundance of life":

...providing the receptive faculty with the most multifarious contacts with the world, and as regards feeling, pushing passivity to its fullest extent; secondly, securing for the determining faculty the fullest independence from the receptive, and as regards reason, pushing activity to its fullest extent. (AEM, p. 69)

The truly human state is achieved when these impulses, instead of being in conflict, are in balance. Man must transcend a purely sensuous existence to attain the all-encompassing rational impulse. However, this transformation does not entail the total annihilation of the sensuous state. What takes place, rather, is the harmonization of these two opposing impulses; not by assimilating or negating one or the other, but by carrying the sensuous nature into the higher level, retaining its necessary and beneficial features in a new synthesis.
Every individual man, it may be said, carries in disposition and determination a pure ideal man within himself, with whose unalterable unity it is the great task of his existence throughout all his vicissitudes, to harmonize. (AEM, p.31)

Each impulse functions cooperatively in accordance with its prescribed role, under the regulating influence of the formal impulse, the higher impulse which orders and prescribes laws.

The reciprocal relation of both impulses provides the definition of ideal humanity, yet Schiller was not idealistic enough to suppose this vision of humanity to be easily attainable, if at all. The complete and perfect fulfillment of this relation is something towards which man will ever strive, without necessarily reaching it. Nonetheless, he will attempt to achieve it to the greatest degree possible, by satisfying the two impulses to the best of his ability, knowing himself as both matter and spirit, both bound in the empirical world and free. This teleological idea of progress toward a goal foreshadows the movement of Hegel's Absolute Spirit in its quest for Absolute Knowledge, the ultimate and perfect synthesis of matter and spirit.

How, then, is this synthesis of two opposing impulses accomplished? Taking each distinct impulse and merely assimilating it into the other is certainly not the answer, as the functioning and development of each is possible only through the activity of the other. They are to be united, yet they are distinct and have different requirements: "The sense impulse requires variation, requires time to have a content; the form impulse requires the extinction of time, and no variation."

(AEM, p.74) The only means of uniting them is through the introduction of a third impulse which comprehends both. Schiller borrows the notion
of play from Kant and entitles this impulse the play impulse (Spieltrieb).

The term play does not mean to suggest that this is a lesser, or more frivolous domain. It simply designates certain characteristics of play which are analogous to the harmony which is effected by Beauty. We play a game according to some rule, some formal principle of order; yet these rules are posited in total freedom, created neither by natural necessity (sensuous instinct) nor moral law (formal instinct). Play is not forced upon us by nature or reason, and yet is not accidental in respect to either. There is a harmony of the sensuous and formal which is generated by the play impulse. Schiller elaborates this further: if the object of the sensuous impulse is life, physical existence, or the material world; and that of the rational impulse is shape, the formal characteristics, then the object of the play impulse is thus "living shape" (Lebensform), all "aesthetic qualities of phenomena" (AEM, p.76), or simply, Beauty. Therefore, Beauty, as the consummation of humanity, is not exclusively life, as maintained by the empiricists; that is, another empirical sense akin to vision or taste. Nor is it exclusively form, rooted in subjectivity, as Kant was forced to conclude. It is living form, the synthetic mediation of both impulses.

When we contemplate Beauty, we are in a state midway between natural and formal instincts, since Beauty combines the characteristics of both; we are free from the constraint of either, while enjoying the essential qualities of both. Man is truly free only when engaged in the aesthetic attitude, and thus engaged, he is truly human; for it is in aesthetic freedom that he is able to unite both impulses, creating a new, harmon-
ized being, which is ideal humanity. "Man plays only when he is in the full sense of the word a man, and he is only wholly Man when he is playing." (AEM, p. 80).

Thus there is not only a progression, but also a dialectic at work here. We arrive at Beauty through freedom; we are truly free only when aesthetic. Only in aesthetic freedom is it possible to harmonize the vicissitudes of our being, and to be truly human; aesthetic freedom is thus the highest realization of freedom. Hegel's reference to Schiller's incorporation of reconciliation is clear; there is a sense of a thesis, antithesis, and synthesis combined with a process and teleology which is characteristic of Hegel's dialectic, although the terms thesis, antithesis and synthesis are used by Fichte, not Hegel.

Schiller modifies Kant's notion of freedom in two ways. First, whereas for Schiller Kant's freedom remains essentially formal, a freedom in cognition, Schiller extends the notion of freedom to include the empirical sphere in its socio-political application. In keeping with a cultural and historical orientation, Schiller formulates freedom not merely as the freedom of reason to make a moral choice without constraint; it also refers to individual freedom within the social structures of the State. Secondly, when speaking of aesthetic freedom in particular, Kant's notion does not escape the subjective perspective. For Schiller, aesthetic freedom has two connotations, both distinct from Kant's formulation. Aesthetic freedom means the freedom to be in an aesthetic mode, to live the artist's life in the sense of the Romantic tradition. It also means the freedom and essential qualities to be found in Beauty: the enlightenment, the realization of a better humanity and a better society,
through the inherent purifying and uplifting effects of the aesthetic state. As before, these two connotations of aesthetic freedom are interdependent.

Although the ideal of beauty is the perfect equilibrium of reality and form, this balance can never be attained in actuality, but remains only an idea. In actuality there will always be a prevalence of one element or the other, and thus beauty in experience is two-fold. Correspondingly, the ideal of humanity is realized with difficulty in experience. Mankind is limited and imperfect; if perfection lies in the harmonious energy of the sensuous and spiritual powers; he falls short of perfection through either a lack of harmony or a lack of energy. It is a Heraclitean condition of "tension or one of relaxation, according as the one-sided activity of isolated powers is disturbing the harmony of his being." (AEM, p.85)

It is beauty which will restore harmony in man and make him whole and complete. With this step, Schiller comes full circle in the dialectical movement between theoretical and practical, reason and nature. The opposing forces in man were reconciled by the aesthetic impulse which strives towards ideal humanity, which is also beauty: this is on a theoretical plane. Practically, beauty attempts to harmonize man's warring instincts by invoking the play impulse. Schiller has passed from the rational stage where the aesthetic impulse was posited a priori as a mediating element, to the realization in the natural world of the role of beauty in producing the aesthetic state (and State) which harmonizes, and overcomes the alienation man feels from his true self, and from his fellow men. This foray into the empirical realm debilitates beauty;
it is not that the speculative idea has been betrayed or exposed as deficient, but rather that in experience it is necessarily restricted and particularized:

So far from determining our conception of her from isolated experiences, as the great mass of critics do, and making her responsible for the deficiencies which Man reveals under her influence, we know, on the contrary, that it is Man who transfers to her the imperfections of his individuality, who by his subjective limitation perpetually stands in the way of her perfection and reduces her absolute ideal to two limited forms of phenomena. (AEM, p. 86)

Schiller appears unable to decide whether he wants to espouse a Platonic realm of Forms which are not affected by the empirical manifestations, or his notion of objectivity which breaks away from Kantian subjectivism. He rejects a formalized Beauty, yet the only way it can be actualized is through mankind, where its perfection and ideality are tarnished by the mundane world—this consequence evokes a Christian despair over the sins of the mundane. Hegel attempts to abandon an overly romanticized approach, while still retaining certain theological overtones. The ideal must be actualized through the real, and this is logical determination, not muddied ideality; the determining necessarily limits.

How, then, does Beauty actually resolve the contradiction between matter and form, spirit and sense? It is indeed the unifying element from a theoretical point of view, but Schiller must still furnish a deduction of the relation. Their synthesis is explicated in a passage which likely contributed a great deal to the development of Hegel's
It is from this opposition that we must start: we must comprehend and recognize it in its whole purity and strictness, so that the two conditions are separated in the most definite way; otherwise we are mixing but not uniting them. Secondly, it is said that Beauty combines these two opposite conditions, and thus removes the opposition. But since both conditions remain eternally opposed to one another, they can only be combined by cancellation [als indem sie aufgehoben werden]. Our second business, then, is to make this combination perfect, to accomplish it so purely and completely that both conditions entirely disappear in a third, and no trace of division remains behind in the whole; otherwise we are isolating but not uniting them. (AEN, pp. 88-89)

Thus it is incorrect to consider Beauty either from the point of view of the whole only (logically), or from the point of view of the individual parts (dynamically); it must be grasped as a combination of both. Such an Idea of Beauty, anticipating a notion of Absolute Spirit, at once grounds reality and is its objectification. Yet this nature is at the same time ontologically prior, while only actualized in experience and historical process. The end is inscribed in the origins; a formulation that both harks back to the third Critique and anticipates Hegelian teleology. "In order to describe a shape in space, we must set limits to infinite space; in order to represent to ourselves an alteration in time, we must divide the totality of time. So we arrive at reality only through limitation, at the positive, or actually established, only through negation or exclusion, at determination only through the surrender of our free determinability." (AEN, p. 91) This activity of the mind is judging
or thinking and its result is thought. With this Schiller again
bridges Kant and Hegel, combining the reflective judgement of taste
with speculative idealism, while reinforcing the connection of thought
and Beauty, philosophy and aesthetics:

The self-dependence with which it [thought] acts
excludes every outside influence; and it is not insofar
as she helps reflection (which contains an obvious
contradiction), but only insofar as she secures for the
intellectual faculties the freedom to express themselves
according to their own laws, that Beauty can become a
means of leading Man from matter to form, from perception
to principles, from a limited to an absolute existence.
(AEM, pp. 92-93)

Schiller proceeds to make another distinction which stands between a
Kantian and Hegelian epistemology: the difference between a finite
and infinite intellect, where the former is able to attain the absolute:
"The finite mind is that which only becomes active through passivity,
only attains the absolute 'by means of limitations, only works and
fashions insofar as it receives material." (AEM, p. 93) In order to
link this with the original problematic, Schiller re-examines the
condition of incompleteness of man's existence. In the state of
warring instincts, one cannot pass directly from sensation to thought:
"He must take a step backward, since only by the removal of one
determination can the contrary one make its appearance." (AEM, p. 98)
Man must momentarily be free from all determination and be in a
temporary state of mere determinability, or some sort of primitive
indeterminacy. In the move from sensation to reason, the determination
of sensation must be preserved, but at the same time, as limitation it
must be removed, to make way for an unlimited determinacy. "His task
is therefore to annihilate and at the same time to preserve the
determination of his condition, a thing which can be done in only one
way—by opposing that determination with another." (AEM, p. 98) The
intellect passes from sensation to thought through a middle condition
in which both sensuousness and reason are simultaneously active; but
for this reason they are mutually cancelling their power of determi-
ation and in this opposition negation is produced.

This middle disposition, in which our nature is
constrained neither physically nor morally and yet is
active in both ways, preeminently deserves to be called
a free disposition; and if we call the condition of
sensuous determination the physical, and that of rational
determination the logical and moral, we must call this
condition of real and active determinacy the aesthetic.
(AEM, p. 99)

It is clear how Schiller's exposition reflects and embodies the very
notion he is attempting to explicate. For his analysis has yet again
come full circle, back to the initial point of departure where he
affirmed that art is the groundwork of humanity and that this humanity
is attained through freedom from constraint, effected by the aesthetic.
Just as Beauty itself, his analysis contains the end in the origin,
but cannot merely unfold it one-dimensionally; since at issue is the
problem of indeterminability and movement, the analysis must be
continually articulating and re-articulating itself, progressing to
higher levels of determination each time, but then coming back to
reappraise and reconstitute the foundation and the starting point. It
is this movement which leads to the final question of the text: Is
this aesthetic condition a desired end, or a transitional phase only,
or something else? The answer by now is self-evident: it is not an end, but not a transition either. It is the movement and state in which true humanity is able to articulate itself. For Beauty as such does not posit this humanity; it possesses no didactic qualities and yields no knowledge. It merely furnishes a freedom and actualizing potential in which to articulate humanity; it must be continually renewed with each new condition encountered. Thus Beauty does not articulate our humanity, but only makes it possible for us to articulate it in whichever way we choose. In this respect Beauty shares the title of creator with Nature, which granted a capacity for humanity, but left the articulation to our will. Thus there are three stages of development in the determination of humanity: "Man in his physical condition is subject to the power of Nature alone; he shakes off this power in the aesthetic, and he controls it in the moral condition." (AEM, p. 113)

Since it is not Schiller's aim to completely annihilate matter and posit a formalized subjectivity, as he found in Kant, his formulation must have significance for the political sphere. Man is part of a community and Schiller intends to facilitate not only the amelioration of man, but that of the society as well; the freedom of the State follows from the individual's freedom:

Though need may drive Man into society, and Reason implant social principles in him, Beauty alone can confer on him a social character. Taste alone brings harmony into society, because it establishes harmony in the individual. (AEM, p. 138)
What Schiller terms the dynamic state is a state existing by force, curbing nature by use of nature. The ethical state restricts the individual's freedom and subjects him to the general will. However, the aesthetic state realizes the will of the whole through the nature of the individual; a state which embodies the qualities of freedom, harmony, and equality.

Since it is the beautiful which facilitates the realization of man's higher, ideal being, it would seem clear that it cannot be discarded once this level has been attained; for it is not merely a stepping-stone but a constitutive element, without which the harmony of reason and sense which constitute man's humanity would not be possible. A continually maintained aesthetic attitude or experience enables the internal harmony and ideality of the individual, and in turn that of the State, by facilitating in both the unity of reason and sense, order and freedom.
Chapter IV

Hegel's Critique of Kant

1

The many commentaries and discussions of Hegel's well-known critique of Kant attest to its singular importance for scholarly research into the tradition surrounding German idealism. In keeping with my claim, discussed in Chapter I, that the Critique of Judgement does not constitute a departure from the Kantian project, but rather incorporates and elaborates its fundamental principles, any general Hegelian critique of Kantian thought is equally applicable to the third Critique. To be sure, Hegel raises specific criticisms (as well as acknowledging points of agreement) concerning particular Critiques, but inasmuch as his most rigorous objections pertain to the general foundations of Kant's project, they are relevant to each Critique.

In this section I will deal with these fundamental analyses of Kant in anticipation of the next section which deals with Hegel's specific treatment of the CJ. Since this latter treatment will include, as indicated above, both the fundamental objections to Kant's system, as well as additional problems peculiar to the CJ, it seems reasonable for the sake of clarity to discuss these two sets of objections separately. This will illuminate three points:

1) It will show how Hegel's general criticisms are modified when applied specifically to the third Critique.

2) Since the foundational principles of Kant's philosophy are
also operative in the *CJ*, it is not possible to exclude the *CJ* from the rest of Kant's system.

3) If (2) is true, it is not accurate to identify Kantian contributions to the notion of dialectic with the third Critique, nor with the other Critiques exclusively. For clearly Hegel was influenced by certain grounding factors of Kant's philosophy that are not reducible to particular works.

As already stated, this study is not an attempt to argue for the primacy of the *CJ* in the development of the Hegelian dialectic, but merely to disclose another source of inspiration which has hitherto been somewhat overlooked. However, I do wish to demonstrate that the third Critique, if not the only influence, is especially interesting and significant for Hegel's dialectic. In Hegel's opinion, the *CJ*, of all Kant's texts, comes closest to realizing the true principle of speculative thought.

According to Hegel, the *Critique of Judgement* both embodies the most flagrant shortcomings of Kant's project, and at the same time endeavours to overcome these faults and in so doing glimpses the real philosophical project of identity in difference. Unfortunately, in Hegel's view Kant does not allow his solution to come to completion, but instead reverts back to his initial problematic subjectivistic position, leaving his project at a stalemate. For Hegel, it will take Kant's insights, combined with Fichte's attempts at grounding and Schiller's understanding of reconciliation and synthesis, to approach true dialectical thought.
It is necessary to specify certain restrictions. Hegel's critique of Kant will be drawn from three texts primarily: The Logic (part I of the Encyclopedia), the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. III., and the Aesthetics, Vol. I. References to the Phénoméne are all but omitted, for two reasons: First, in that the project of the Phenomenology is primarily that of the determination of the absolute standpoint, it is difficult to derive a sustained critique of Kant from references that are not ends in themselves so much as exemplifications of a certain attitude of consciousness; Secondly, because of this first consideration, Kant is usually examined with a larger framework which includes Jacobi, Schelling, and Fichte, and it is not always clear just which particular thinker Hegel has in mind. Since it is my intention to discuss Hegel's theoretical critique from the standpoint of Kant's project as a whole, the more particular criticisms will be omitted; for example, those dealing with the Antinomies or the categorical imperative.

My analysis will concentrate on several key objections to Kant's philosophy, some of which have already been briefly addressed in the course of this study: dualism, formalism, subjectivism, and the failure to come to terms with problems of certainty and absolute grounding. It will argue that while many of Hegel's points are valid, others can be seen as proceeding from incorrect readings of Kant's texts and project. However, this does not detract from the significance that Kant's work has for the development of Hegelian thought.

Hegel's foremost criticism, stated at various intervals in the Encyclopedia Logic, the History of Philosophy, and the Phenomenology
of Spirit, is as fundamental to his critique as a whole, as are the principles he attacks fundamental to Kant's project. Hegel's objection centers on the inherent dualism he perceives in Kantian philosophy. It is inherent because it is built into his system right from the start: one of the first problems Kant tackled rested on his misgivings regarding the capacity of metaphysics to grasp supersensible reality or ultimate truths. It will be shown below how this initial misgiving developed into an entrenched duality between cognition and the essence of the thing.

Naturally, the question of metaphysics is only part of the general problematic of the Critique of Pure Reason, which also deals with the possibility of a priori knowledge or the question of what we can know—clearly these problems are not unrelated. In Kant's opinion, it is necessary to examine the faculties of cognition and the categories in view of their suitability and capacity for attaining knowledge. Hegel refers to this as the first point of Kant's philosophy (EL, p. 67)—thought investigating its own capacity of knowledge—and characterizes it further as the view of cognition as an instrument which we can examine prior to its employment. One of the great weaknesses of traditional metaphysics had been the uncritical appropriation of certain assumptions governing our cognition in its grounding, function and employment. It is no small insight to have perceived the necessity for an examination of our faculty of cognition in terms of its grounding, claims to knowledge, and certainty and truth, if any. Acknowledging the important step Kant has taken with this line of inquiry, Hegel states:
We ought, says Kant, to become acquainted with the instrument, before we undertake the work for which it is to be employed; for if the instrument be insufficient, all our trouble will be spent in vain. The plausibility of this suggestion has won for it general assent and admiration; the result of which has been to withdraw cognition from an interest in its objects and absorption in the study of them, and to direct it back upon itself; and so turn it to a question of form. (EL, p. 14)

There is an implicit reference to a dualism between subject and object. The point is that Hegel's major objection to Kant's system, i.e. the problem of dualism, is not simply the outcome of the critical project of the first critique, but is embedded in his project from the first formulation. However, this is not a point Hegel elaborates in too much detail in the Logic; as will be seen below, the argument concerning the inherent dualism in the view of reason as instrument is developed more explicitly in the Phenomenology.

For the moment, Hegel is content in the Logic and the History of Philosophy to characterize this problem as the "misconception of already knowing before you know." (EL, p. 66). His favourite example is that of Scholasticus, who decided not to go into the water until he had learned how to swim. At issue is the problem of failing to account for our embeddedness in a process we seek to examine, and the difficulty of establishing a true starting point. It also concerns the question of circularity, in that examining an act of knowledge is itself an act of knowledge. "True, indeed, the forms of thought should be subjected to a scrutiny before they are used: yet what is this scrutiny but ipso facto a cognition?" (EL, p. 66) In other words, Hegel claims that we cannot think of reason
as an instrument like other instruments which can be examined independently of their function; for in the case of reason, examination and knowing are the same thing. "Thus, since the investigation of the faculties of knowledge is itself knowing, it cannot in Kant attain to what it aims at because it is that already—it cannot come to itself because it is already with itself." (Hist.Phil., p. 429)

The latter part of the objection pertains to the classical philosophical dilemma concerning the possibility of objectivity, and one that Kant could not have failed to appreciate. Kant's solution to this problem consists in the conviction that our cognition is necessarily limited; in that we cannot in fact stand back and examine our cognitive faculties in a truly objective manner, any knowledge we attain must be seen as provisional, subjective, partial, and without any claim to certainty. It follows from these cognitive limitations that to be consistent, Kant cannot equate reflection and knowledge. We think something, but that does not entail a claim to knowledge, if knowing has an inherent truth value. Or, in another formulation, we may know something in a strictly epistemological sense, but there is no ontological claim to certainty. There is a gap between our knowledge and reality. Thus, the discussion of Kant's position in the Logic is not only the explication of one of Hegel's major criticisms, it is also the implicit articulation of a central tenet of Kantian thought. The question of objectivity will be further taken up in the second half of this section.

The formulation in the Phenomenology of the dualism critique sharpens the problem. Here Hegel concentrates more on the idea of
the instrument, and how as a medium, either active or passive, it will somehow modify reality. A dichotomy is thus established between our cognition and reality.

For, if cognition is the instrument for getting hold of absolute being, it is obvious that the use of an instrument on a thing certainly does not let it be what it is for itself, but rather sets out to reshape and alter it. If, on the other hand, cognition is not an instrument of our activity but a more or less passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us, then again we do not receive the truth as it is in itself, but only as it exists through and in this medium.  

This "empty appearance of knowing," our attempt to externally play epistemological chess, ignores our embeddedness and correspondingly the inherent accompanying activity of thought which no effort to bracket can affect. There is nothing wrong in initiating an investigation of our faculties of cognition; but this must be carried out within the framework of immanent, self-conscious activity of thought. "So that what we want is to combine in our process of inquiry the action of the forms of thought with a criticism of them. The forms of thought must be studied in their essential nature and complete development: they are at once the object of research and the action of that object." (EL, p. 66) This activity of thought, although grounded in the Kantian notion, undergoes a transformation in Hegelian thought. Hegel's position is that a grasp of the truth of totality enables an understanding of the parts through the whole, and vice versa; whereas Kant maintains that since we cannot know the whole, we must be content with our grasp of the part, incomplete though it may be.
The unfolding of Hegel's process of inquiry will of course be the task of the dialectic, as will be demonstrated more fully in a following section.

This, then, is the fundamental objection that Hegel makes to Kant's project, and most of the other theoretical considerations stem in some form from this basic disagreement. I will now briefly discuss two of them: the dichotomies between subjective and objective and between appearance and the thing-in-itself.

Hegel's discussion of the subjective/objective relation has the same point of departure as had the previous discussion of cognition and reality: Kant's examination of the cognitive faculties. This shared starting point should not be surprising as these discussions are not so much distinct as aspects of the same problem. Hegel states, "Kant's examination of the categories suffers from the grave defect of viewing them, not absolutely and for their own sake, but in order to see whether they are subjective or objective." (EL, p. 67) This is connected to the distinction between sense-data and universal/necessary discussed in the previous section. Instead of examining the content of the categories or their interrelation, Kant focuses on their subjective/objective distinction, and in this manner institutes a structural dualism. However, Kant's intention, connected with the unification of rationalism and empiricism discussed in Chapter I, involves grounding cognition objectively in the sense of universal and necessary. Certain categories, such as cause and effect, are clearly not objective in
the ordinary sense of that which is external to us and given in sensation. (EL, p. 67) Rather, since they are not derived from experience (Hence not objective in the ordinary sense), they belong to our thought itself, to the spontaneity of thought and thus are subjective. Yet they will participate in this new sense of objectivity: "...In spite of this, Kant gives the name objective to what is thought, to the universal and necessary, while he describes as subjective whatever is merely felt." (EL, p. 67) This is due to the fact that we are dealing with categories of the understanding, which are shown in the transcendental deduction to be grounded in the transcendental unity of apperception which itself generates the a priori necessity without which we would be unable to apprehend an object. Kant states in the Critique of Pure Reason: "If...we have to deal only with appearances, it is not merely possible, but necessary, that certain a priori concepts should precede empirical knowledge of objects." (CPR, A 129) Consequently the necessary unity of consciousness grounds the categories, and in that they are conditions for knowledge of an object, they have objective validity.

To formulate it in a different fashion: contrary to the popular belief that objects of perception are independent and permanent, and thoughts dependent and fleeting, it is in fact thought which is independent and primary, while perceptions of sense are temporary and dependent. "This being so, Kant gave the title objective to the intellectual factor, to the universal and necessary: and he was quite justified in so doing." (EL, p. 67) Sensation is transient
and can be felt by many in many different ways, but if a person has functional cognitive faculties, they will apprehend an object in the same manner as anyone else. This constitutes hence another facet of objective validity. In that I share the same permanent, functional cognitive faculties with any rational being, there is an element of universality in cognitive acts.

Hegel notes that Kant's distinction has been widely accepted in academic circles. He anticipates the discussion of the third Critique, a crucial text for an understanding of the subjective/objective distinction, by citing the work of art as an example.

Thus the criticism of a work of art ought, it is said, to be not subjective, but objective; in other words, instead of springing from the particular and accidental feeling or temper of the moment, it should keep its eye on those general points of view which the laws of art establish. (EL, p. 67)

Yet, as Hegel rightly observes, "objectivity of thought, in Kant's sense, is again to a certain extent subjective." (EL, p. 67)

At issue is still the fact that they are my cognitive faculties and categories. Although universal and necessary, thoughts are only my thoughts. As Kant has already posited a gulf between my knowledge and the essence of the object, true union with the object cannot be achieved, and thus there is correspondingly no true objective validity, but rather a pseudo-objectivity, a formalized, abstracted objectivity. "The Critical Philosophy" however widened the contrast [between subjective and objective] in such a way, that the subjectivity comes to embrace the ensemble of experience, including both of the
aforesaid elements; and nothing remains on the other side but the 'thing-in-itself'." (EL, p. 66) In contrast to this, Hegel puts forth his view of what constitutes true objectivity: "It means the thought-apprehended essence of the existing thing, in contradistinction from what is merely our thought, and what consequently is still separated from the thing itself, as it exists in independent essence." (EL, p. 68)

Thus in rejecting Kant's notion of objective validity, grounded as it is in subjectivity, Hegel finds Kant guilty of radical subjectivism in the final analysis. This generates additional problems as far as Hegel is concerned: abstraction, a vague conception of self-consciousness and self-determination, and an apparent Kantian turn to psychology.

At one point in the Philosophy of Mind, Hegel describes Kant's philosophy as an account of mind as consciousness and as such can be characterized as a phenomenology, not a philosophy, of mind. In connection with this he discusses psychology, and the importance it has gained since Kant; Hegel claims that calling philosophy what is in fact psychology, "empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consciousness, merely as facts, just as they are given" has succeeded in obscuring the real quest of "essential and actual reality, to get at the notion and the truth." It is interesting to note that Kant was not unaware of this consideration and that the fear of psychology was one of the factors responsible for the rewriting of the transcendental deduction. Accordingly, he began the
second version of the deduction with a direct discussion of apperception, rather than proceeding as he had in the first version, working up to it through its various realizations, which could be mistakenly interpreted as psychological factors. Yet it is the second version, not the first, which is generally preferred by German idealism. This could be either due to the fact that in the first version the psychological elements are less explicit, or because German idealism does not give Kant any credit for avoiding the charge of psychologism in the second version, even granting that he may not have succeeded too well.

The questions of self-determination and self-consciousness are problematic in Kant since he never specified just to what extent they were important. Hyppolite points out that this neglect of self-consciousness helps to account for the limitations of knowledge: "la conscience de l'expérience reste donc phénoménale, parce qu'elle n'est pas encore la conscience de soi dans l'expérience."9

Hegel observes that Fichte first noticed the pseudo-self-determination of Kantian thought, just as he had already criticized the so-called deduction of the categories. Both Fichte and Hegel are frustrated by the lack of an absolute ground in Kant. Since he does not want to posit an absolute ground, he goes only as far as apperception to ground the categories; yet this does not really justify their a priori nature in anything but a formal sense, or as based upon a necessity of apperception that is never itself satisfactorily grounded. In addition, the Kantian ground is not explicitly self-determining, which ultimate grounding demands.
However, for Kant the self cannot determine itself; that is, apperception can only be consciousness, not knowledge of the self. The "I" is no more than the unity of synthesizing and is meaningless without the content of experience; it is the consciousness of the self as ground of this unity and it does not make sense to ask what is the "I" apart from this function, as Hegel does. It is not an object of experience because on the one hand I cannot objectify myself, and on the other hand the "I" cannot fall under the categories—the categories cannot be used to determine the apperception which ground them transcendently. To attempt to ask what the "I" is outside of experience is a category mistake. And furthermore, consciousness cannot be given to itself as consciousness by abstracting from the content of experience; in this case it is nothing. Kant does not believe in a Cartesian independent ego. Hence it is impossible to derive a determinate intuition of myself as determining.

Yet this is not to say that Kant's account of self-consciousness is without problems, but merely that German idealism fails to identify the weaknesses from within the Kantian framework. A more interesting problem is that of the self of the transcendental knower, i.e. the philosopher. This self is not the empirical self because it reflects upon the experience in which the empirical self is given. At the same time it cannot be the transcendental self either, because the philosopher's self is accessible to him/her as the self which has transcendental knowing.

Fichte's alternative to the Kantian formulation involves, according to Hegel, the positing of a sort of self-activated Ego, but the
activating is triggered by an external impulse. Again, this is not true spontaneity, but a reaction to an impulse, even though the result of the reaction is self-consciousness. "And in this manner the 'I' is but the continuous act of self-liberation from this impulse, never gaining a real freedom, because with the surcease of the impulse the 'I', whose being is its action, would also cease to be." (FL, p. 94) Thus, Fichte retains his own thing-in-itself, in the form of this external impulse, unknowable except through a negative formulation, a non-Ego, in much the same sense that Kant formulates his thing-in-itself. From a Hegelian point of view neither has grasped the real nature of self-activating thought.

This brings us to a discussion of the Kantian thing-in-itself. This is a distinction of knower/known which underlies the subject/predicate distinction in logic, and for Hegel constitutes another manifestation of Kant's fundamental dualism. Hegel defines the thing-in-itself as that which "expresses the object when we leave out of sight all that consciousness makes of it, all its emotional aspects, and all specific thoughts of it." ¹⁰ (FL, p. 72) Kant argues that since we can only attain knowledge through the categories, and since the categories are incapable of furnishing the means whereby to think the thing-in-itself, we are unable to know the thing-in-itself. From a Hegelian point of view, this doctrine is extremely problematic: if we can know nothing of the thing-in-itself, how can we know it exists? That is, if we have not got at our disposal the categories to think
the noumenal realm,\textsuperscript{11} why do we seemingly have some sort of category to think its existence? Hegel points out that saying that it exists in juxtaposition to the phenomenal realm is already knowing something of it. Every method which sets limits and restricts itself to these limits thereby goes beyond them. What is it in our faculties of cognition that enables us to draw the line between appearance and reality, phenomenon and noumenon? How do we know that this is not all there is to know?

One possible way of responding is by referring to the previously mentioned problem concerning how to examine reason while embedded in the process. The transcendental deduction of the categories acknowledges that we must just step in and since we cannot hope to achieve true outside-the-activity objectivity, we must defer to our situatedness and accept our cognitive limitations. Hence without true objectivity, we cannot claim to know the true essence of the Thing, but merely its appearance as represented to us. This also explains the formalized subjectivity which must serve as objective validity for Kant. For Hegel, this is subjectivity falsely masquerading as objectivity; for Kant, it is the best we can do under the circumstance.

Hegel affirms the identity of cognition and reality, demonstrating it in its relation in the process of knowing and concludes that just as there is no adequate deduction of the categories, there is no adequate deduction of the Thing-in-itself, and both inadequacies stem from the same source: the insufficient grounding in a transcendental unity of apperception which, due to its subjectivity, cannot furnish truly objective knowledge. Kant's method of characterizing
the thing-in-itself can be seen in two ways, as the positive and negative manner. The negative way borrows the Scholastic notion of negative theology where due to our finite intellect we are unable to intuit the divine essence and can only characterize it through negative determination. Thus Kant abstracts from what we know of the Thing and finds that if we are finite, the thing-in-itself must be infinite; if we are x, it is —x. So from this point of view, the problem of affirming the existence of the in-itself, while at the same time paradoxically denying the possibility the knowledge, becomes somewhat of a non-problem in view of the fact that Kant does not make any positive epistemological claims regarding the in-itself, but merely states what it is not. There is a related notion which tends to cause some confusion, wherein Kant abstracts from all content of experience, leaving time and space untouched. Here we have not the thing-in-itself, but the transcendental object = x, for in this case we are abstracting from the content of experience, not from the notion of a thing. Not surprisingly, Hegel finds this via negativa methodology eminently unsatisfactory. Instead of a positive determination, we have only "utter abstraction, total emptiness, only described still as an 'other-world'--the negative of every image, feeling, and definite thought," (El, p. 72) and "being-in-itself is only the caput mortuum, the dead abstraction of the 'other,' the empty, undetermined Beyond." (Hist.Phil., p. 472)

There are three problems with Hegel's characterization: 1) the thing-in-itself is not undetermined, it is negatively determined—these are not the same thing, 2) Kant does not negate, he abstracts in a
negative determination that must be understood in the logical, and not Hegelian sense of negation, and 3) Hegel's account neglects to consider Kant's positive methodology which is implicitly connected to the negative methodology. Oddly enough, Hegel's description of the "other world" sound like the "two worlds" view which is one way to characterize the positive methodology: it is difficult, though, to determine if Hegel had the same notion in mind. The "two world" view claims that Kant posits a phenomenal world as opposed to a noumenal world, justified in quotations such as the following: "How things may be in themselves, apart from the representing through which they affect us, is entirely outside our sphere of knowledge." (CPR A 190 = B 235) This theory runs along the same lines as that which states that the discussion of an empirical and transcendental self indicates that Kant posits two selves. That is, every time Kant makes a distinction of some sort, he is charged with dualism. This reading is primarily associated with the analytic school of Kant interpretation and is, I believe, mistaken. When Kant makes distinctions like the ones mentioned above, it must be taken in a logical, not ontological sense. He is not positing two selves, or two worlds, merely two modes of self or of world; in the same sense that theoretical and practical reason are not two different reasons, but reason in two different employments. This is not to say that there is no dualism in Kant, or that he did not find it incumbent to formulate the CJ as a mediator between the previous two Critiques, but merely that it is a softer dualism; one between realms of the same reason, modes of the same notion of self,
one world considered in two ways.

Thus a more reasonable interpretation of the positive methodology is the following. If the negative formulation is the *ding an sich*, the positive formulation is the *ding an sich selbst betrachtet*, which presupposes the former. That is, the object considered apart from its relation to a knowing subject is the thing-in-itself. This is pure thinking, the noumenon; what the understanding thinks when it thinks the thing-in-itself. As such the noumenon is not identical with the thing-in-itself, nor is it the other world postulated by the "two worlds" view. It is merely the way of thinking we posit by abstracting from our way of thinking; what thinking is for a non-finite subject. So if we must think in time and space, employing categories and forms of intuition, this intellect can think the thing directly, without categories, being qua being, hence the thing-in-itself. This of course is the notion of an intellectus archetypus or originarius of which, like God, we have no real idea except insofar as it must be what we are not. Hence God has things as they are in themselves, immediately, without the intermediate categories. This doctrine argues against the metaphysics which believes it possible to directly intuit the things-in-themselves.13

The notion of the intellectus archetypus occurs again in the CJ, as has been shown. There it involves the principle of finality, whereas in this present context it deals with the thing-in-itself; but in both cases it is the logical extension of an analysis which presupposes the finitude of our intellect and the fact that the only
thing we can have apodictically is appearance. To posit the notion of a non-finite intellect is merely the other side of the Janus coin of critical philosophy; to go beyond merely positing it and attempt to attribute positive predicates is idle speculation and a philosophical dead end.

2

Hegel's discussion of the CJ and the
Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man

Having dealt with Hegel's general critique of Kant's philosophy in the preceding section, I will now turn to his discussion of the CJ in particular. As stated above, the general criticisms already discussed can be considered applicable to most, if not all of Kant's works, as they are criticisms dealing with the very foundations of Kant's project. As part of my thesis is an appeal for understanding the third Critique not as an extraneous text, but as crucial for a complete grasp of Kant's thought, the criticisms of the previous section are equally applicable to the CJ. Because this paper explores the relation of texts on aesthetics to Hegel's development of the notion of dialectic in his philosophy, clearly his particular analyses of the third Critique must be examined, while bearing in mind these aforementioned general criticisms.

In the Introduction to the Aesthetics, Hegel states the need for a unity of the opposition and contradiction between "the abstractly self-concentrated spirit and nature."14 Realizing this unity depends upon the recognition that the beauty of art is one of the means of dissolving and unifying this opposition.15 It is only when philosophy
has understood how to overcome this opposition, that it succeeds in grasping its own essence and that of nature and art. In order to grasp the concept of art in its inner necessity, and to lay the necessary foundations, the history of this transition to unity must be examined, and Hegel turns to a discussion of Kantian philosophy.

Hegel states that "It is the Kantian philosophy which has not only felt the need for this point of union, but has also clearly recognized it and brought it before our minds." Although Kant must be acknowledged as having constituted a turning-point in philosophy with his recognition of the absoluteness of reason in itself (by which Hegel means the independence or activity of reason, not its infinite application) his philosophy is ultimately inadequate since it falls back into fixed oppositions. Kant does attempt to formulate a unity prior to the CJ, in a notion of intuitive understanding, yet it is merely an abstract and subjective reconciliation. What Hegel is referring to by intuitive understanding is what I have referred to as the intellectus archetypus. From Kant's point of view, this intellect is hypothetical and does not constitute a notion of unity; unity prior to the CJ is grounded primarily in the transcendental unity of apperception. However, from Hegel's point of view, true unity consists of the dissolution of opposition between thought and reality, thus insofar as the intellectus archetypus is capable of this, it constitutes Kant's only true unity. Yet as it is formulated in relation to our intellect, its determination remains subjective. In terms of addressing the problem of a notion of true unity, Hegel states that the CJ is instructive and remarkable.
...there is still left for us to consider the third side in Kant's philosophy, the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, in which the demand for the concrete comes in, the demand that the Idea of unity spoken of before should be established not as a Beyond, but as present; and this side is of special importance. (Hist.Phil., p. 464)

Hegel sees the reflective power of judgment as possessing the function of an intuitive Understanding, as inner adaptation, in that it gives a law to itself, furnishing itself with a universal. That is, in a sense it is not in need of categories as it furnishes one to itself. But the point is still that eventually it needs a category, in order to judge. However, for the first time there is a sense of concrete unity—a concrete universal instead of a universal concrete—and Hegel feels that with this Kant comes closest to the principle of speculative philosophy. The reflective judgement embodies a necessity which is at the same time free, or a freedom which is directly one with its content (Hist.Phil., p. 466); and for Hegel philosophy must realize the identity of thought and content, determining itself inwardly in a freedom which is the essence of the rational. In the practical reason, Hegel states, the end does not extend beyond a mere ought, but rather in the purposiveness or teleology of the reflective judgement, "the concept, the universal, contains the particular too, and, as an end, it determines the particular and external...not from without but from within and in such a way that the particular corresponds to the end of its own accord."18

Unfortunately, this formulation does not live up to its early promise, but falls back into subjectivity. The objective nature of the object is not known; the unity proceeds neither from concepts nor
from sensation but from the free play of understanding and reason where the relation is that of object to subject, based upon a subjective feeling of pleasure.

Yet in the notion of the beautiful Kant posits an inseparability of what was previously distinct: there is an interpenetration of universal and particular, end and means, concept and object. As such, "the capital feature in Kant's Criticism of the Judgement is, that in it he gave a representation and a name, if not even an intellectual expression, to the Idea." (EL, p. 88)

It is not surprising that Hegel would find the CJ suggestive, with its veiled anticipations of the Hegelian Absolute in the form of an intellectus archetypus and finality of nature. The difference is that Kant merely points an ideal or divine intellect; Hegel attempts to actualize it philosophically.

But in the postulated harmony of nature (or necessity) and free purpose—in the final purpose of the world conceived as realized, Kant has put before us the Idea, comprehensive even in its content. Yet what may be called the laziness of thought, when dealing with the supreme Idea, finds a too easy mode of evasion in the 'ought to be': instead of the actual realization of the ultimate end, it clings hard to the disjunction of the notion from reality. Yet if thought will not think the ideal realized, the senses and the intuition can at any rate see it in the present reality of living organisms and of the beautiful in art. And consequently Kant's remarks on these objects were well adapted to lead the mind on to grasp and think the concrete Idea. (EL, p. 88)

We thus conceive a different relation between the universal of understanding and the particular of perception, than that of the first two Critiques.
Unfortunately, according to Hegel, Kant does not go far enough in understanding that this new relation is genuine and the truth. "Instead of that, the unity (of universal with particular) is accepted only as it exists in finite phenomena, and is adduced only as a fact of experience." (EL, p. 89)

While Kant formulates the notion of an End or final cause, he does not allow the idea of external teleology, but maintains that the End is immanent. Consequently, the previous relations between opposed elements, such as subjectivity and objectivity, are radically changed by this unifying. But still, even with this unification, the End is explained as a subjective cause: "i.e. as our idea only: and teleology is accordingly explained to be only a principle of criticism, purely personal to our understanding." (EL, pp. 89-90) Hegel maintains that with this notion of inner adaptation, it would have been possible, even within the restrictions imposed by phenomenal knowledge only, to conceive of "an animated nature between two equally subjective modes of thought." (EL, p. 90) That is, even if Kant's objective validity must collapse into a subjectivity, there could have been a more complex subjective inter-relation. Hegel claims that in the case of natural productions, there is no obligation to confine knowledge to the formal categories of the understanding such as quality, cause and effect. The formal principle now being inner adaptation or design could have led to a higher method of observing nature, one that approaches the Hegelian viewpoint. "The universality moulded by Reason, and described as the absolute and final end or the Good, would be
realized in the world, and realized moreover by means of a third
thing, the power which proposes this End as well as realizes it—that
is, God." (EL, p. 90) The Good is my thought, but there is a demand
that it be realized universally in the world, but subjective reason is
unable to accomplish this. We need a third party, God, to help.

Now, as Kant stated at the beginning of the third Critique,
theoretical reason has no direct relation to the Good, yet Reason also
desires some sort of interrelation. So in the Critique of Judgement
Kant elaborates a notion of finality, final cause, and this is also the
Good. But in practical reason we saw how the Good is our Good; in
establishing a need to give a law to ourselves, Kant's project was
doomed from the start to collapse into subjectivity. "This being
so, the unity in question goes no further than make the state of the
world and the course of its events harmonize with our moral standards."
(EL, p. 90) One way or another, the result is always a subjective
formalism, as long as Kant insists on maintaining mutually exclusive
elements, then attempting to unify them. Even the principle of
finality, which in his formulation seemed the ideal mediator, turns
out to be hopelessly self-contradictory, and also, as Hegel adds,
as vaguely abstract as was Duty. (EL, pp. 90-91) Kant's sole
recourse is to posit a power which is at once good in itself, and a
power over nature-God; but this of course robs the unity of its
concreteness. And a further problem consists in the difficulty of
proving God's existence; thus everything ultimately rests on faith.

Hence Hegel concludes that Kant's problem stems from his insistence
on dualism, while containing two terms which are unsatisfactory and
are perceived to need interrelating; but it is not possible to effect this unity while remaining true to the belief in dualism. "In every dualistic system, and especially in that of Kant, the fundamental defect makes itself visible in the inconsistency of unifying at one moment what a moment before had been explained to be independent and therefore incapable of unification." (EL, p. 91) Yet the legacy of Kant is not completely without import; it is more than an exercise in critique. Kant revived the independence of Reason as self-subsistent, and the absolute inwardness of thought, and this principle is taken as a foregone conclusion of the time henceforth. In addition, the CJ constitutes the starting point for the true comprehension of the beauty of art, "yet only by overcoming Kant's deficiencies could this comprehension assert itself as the higher grasp of the true unity of necessity and freedom, particular and universal, sense and reason."¹⁹ This testifies to the implicit relation of art and philosophy for Hegel, and how this relation is articulated in the dialectic. For Kant synthesis is categorial synthesis; from a Hegelian point of view, this is not sufficient for the higher level synthesis his philosophy requires, where concepts are derived dialectically and objectively, not subjectively. The artistic sense of a philosophic mind demands totality and reconciliation, as against the "abstract endlessness of ratiocination, that duty for duty's sake, that formless intellectualism, which apprehends nature and actuality, sense and feeling, as just a barrier, just contradicting it and hostile."²⁰

In this respect, it is Schiller who according to Hegel "must be given great credit for breaking through the Kantian subjectivity and
abstraction of thinking and for venturing on an attempt to get beyond this by intellectually grasping the unity and reconciliation as the truth and by actualizing them in artistic production. It is significant that in reference to Schiller's work Hegel employs terminology generally associated with his dialectic; in fact, in a letter to Schelling, he remarks that he has just read some early installments of the Letters and considers them a masterpiece. Hegel sees Schiller's methodology as proto-dialectical: he starts from art and integrates it with philosophical principles, only to succeed with the aid of these principles in penetrating to the deeper nature and concept of the beautiful.

If Hegel glimpsed some anticipation of the Idea in the CJ, it is manifested even more clearly in the Letters. Hegel takes the chief point of the latter to be Schillerian human condition: every individual bears within himself the capacity for ideal manhood, that is, man in the Idea. Reason demands unity, nature multiplicity; In the conflict of these opposed elements, "aesthetic education is precisely to actualize the demand for their mediation and reconciliation." This achievement is due to the development of inclination, sensuousness, impulse, and heart such that they become rational in themselves. In this way reason, freedom, and spirituality "emerge from their abstraction and, united with the natural element, now rationalized, acquire flesh and blood in it." Hence the contribution of Schiller's work is to attempt to actualize the Idea, to conceive of a higher level unity in reconciliation: "This unity of universal and particular,
freedom and necessity, spirit and nature...has now, as the Idea itself, been made the principle of knowledge and existence.25

Hence Hegel sees in both the CJ and Schiller's Letters the foundation upon which to build (although he is much more critical systematically of Kant). There are thus early anticipations of a notion of dialectic which was to be further nurtured and developed. At the same time, from a later standpoint, Hegel reads the history of philosophy as various attempts to articulate the true essence of philosophy, the Idea in development. That Hegel reads the history of philosophy as the anticipations of his own system is not unusual considering that the history of philosophy consists of the unfolding of the Absolute historically.

Before moving to a discussion of Hegel's dialectic in particular, I would like to conclude this section by recalling and developing another theme of this study mentioned earlier. That is, if as I maintain Hegel derived considerable inspiration for his notion of dialectic from his reading of texts on aesthetics, what then is the relation between aesthetics and dialectic, or more precisely, aesthetics and philosophy? It is already clear that aesthetics is very important in philosophy, or at least in the actualization of the Absolute, which is the essence of philosophy, it is one of the realms of Absolute Spirit. But an early writing, entitled the "Earliest System-Programme of German Idealism" (Berne, 1797)26 yields added insight. Although an early statement, and arguably one that was
later much amended, there are some points which could serve to illuminate later statements about aesthetics and in particular the role of the aesthetic in dialectic. Accordingly, it will be helpful to quote one section at some length:

Last of all the Idea that unites all the rest, the Idea of beauty taking the word in its higher Platonic sense. I am now convinced that the highest act of reason, the one through which it encompasses all Ideas, is an aesthetic act, and that truth and goodness only become sisters in beauty--the philosopher must possess just as much aesthetic power as the poet...The philosophy of the spirit is an aesthetic philosophy. One cannot be creative in any way, even about history one cannot argue creatively--without aesthetic sense...Poetry gains thereby a higher dignity, she becomes at the end once more, what she was in the beginning--the teacher of mankind. \textsuperscript{27}

This is not the only place where Hegel describes philosophy in analogy with the Aesthetic. In the \textit{Differenzschrift} he discusses the rise of philosophical reason from mere contingency to universality in the following way: "The true peculiarity of philosophy lies in the interesting individuality which is the organic shape that Reason has built for itself out of the materials of a particular age...Every philosophy is complete in itself, and like an authentic work of art, carries the totality within itself.\textsuperscript{28} Here the reference is to the process of emergence. Philosophical reason emerges in the interplay between knower and known (and here we can clearly see the influence of the \textit{CJ} and the \textit{Letters}) and the concept is the grasp of this emergence, which is the process of intelligibility. The creation of an art work is also a process of emergence, a universal made intelligible, moving from particular raw materials to a finished totality and completeness. The
work of art, like the philosophical concept, is dynamic form or immanent universal. In addition, in its concreteness, art reminds philosophy of its obligation to remain free of abstracted thought, which is not true thinking. It was the aesthetic in Kant and Schiller which enabled them to move away from abstraction and toward the actual and the real, although they only managed to begin a process which it was Hegel's task to complete.

There thus appears to be an implicit relation of aesthetics and philosophy, as suggested by the references above as well as by the role which aesthetics has to play in the development of the dialectic. This in turn bespeaks a relation between aesthetics and ontology, aesthetic reflection and philosophical reflection, and how these two can serve to mutually elucidate the natures of each, while perhaps providing insight into other related issues, such as the problem of self-consciousness. However, the exploration of such a connection is a far too extensive undertaking in the context of the present study, so I will conclude with this as a proposal for a future line of inquiry.

3

Hegel's Dialectic

In this section I will attempt to lay out a general yet concise account of the Hegelian dialectic. This is no simple task; most commentators agree that while one may have an intuitive understanding of what Hegel means by dialectic, it is somewhat difficult to articulate it clearly. It is seemingly an effort to hyphostatize
what in its very essence refuses to be hypostatized. This endeavour receives no assistance from Hegel, whose direct references to the dialectic are far from numerous. The best way to get a sense of the nature of the dialectic, is simply to read Hegel and to follow the movement and progress of the dialectic throughout its various epistemological and historical stages. The necessity of this sort of approach precludes the approach which seeks to formalize the dialectic in syntactical logic. As Flay points out, this approach fails to recognize that the dialectic is a logic of discovery, not of proof.

It is not the purpose of this study to thoroughly discuss Hegel's dialectic in all its manifestations, but rather to trace several anticipations of the dialectic in Kant and Schiller. Hence, for my purposes, a general account of the dialectic will suffice and examples of the dialectic in action will be restricted to the formulation of Being/Nothing/Becoming which constitutes the beginning of the Logic. Nor will I attempt an interpretation of the dialectic within a framework of problems such as concepts/propositions, triplexity/triadic, or the question of methodology. Again, the concern of this thesis is not explicitly the Hegelian dialectic, but rather its origins in the aesthetics of Kant and Schiller.

If it does not go too much against the Hegelian grain to attempt to discuss the dialectic in terms of several key features (though not claiming to break the dialectic down into elements as such), I propose
to examine it within a framework of several elements which are particularly relevant for the aesthetic sources of the dialectic: mediation, embeddedness, negation, and activity of thought. These elements are all united by an independence of Reason and freedom, anticipated in Kant and Schiller and which in Hegel could be said to be represented by the notion of Becoming.

In a letter to Duboc, Hegel suggests that the idea of Becoming can be developed out of insights in the third Critique. I feel that it is helpful to quote part of this letter at some length:

Was in seiner Kritik der Urteilskraft von dem Gedanken eines anschauenden Verstandes, des Selbstzwecks, der zugleich auf eine natürliche Weise—in den organischen Dingen—existiert, (gesagt ist,) kann sehr gut als Einleitung für die weiten Ansichten dienen. Der dortige Standpunkt, daß dergleichen Ideen nur als eine subjektive Maxime der Betrachtung genommen werden, muß freilich abgezogen werden.—Ich knüpfe hieran sogleich an, was Sie in Ihrem Briefe anführen, daß ich die Idee als Werden, als Einheit des Seins und Nichts bestimme.33

Becoming is the movement of thought: something that is not, but just was, and is soon to be. In Heideggerian terms, a still-not-established presence. And this is the Dialectic: "...We call dialectic the higher movement of reason in which such seemingly utterly separate terms pass over into each other spontaneously, through that which they are, a movement in which the presupposition sublates itself."34 As movement, play, mediator, it evokes the free play and the play impulse of Kant and Schiller. But in Kant the
aesthetic, or the movement, never gets beyond a vacillation between two elements. It does not synthesize them, but merely acts as a go-between in a one-dimensional, and for Hegel, empty and dualistic union. Schiller at least recognizes the principle of reconciliation, but fails to develop it adequately. For Hegel, the type of reasoning which clings to "false presuppositions of the absolute separateness" of being and non-being, is not dialectic, but sophistry—in other words, the Kantian "synthesis" which can never be a true synthesis in a Hegelian sense because of the refusal to posit the identity of cognition and reality. Kant's unity is a categorial, not actualized synthesis, and hence subjective. This dualistic inclination is represented in Hegel by the level of understanding, where concepts are separated and held in opposition. It takes itself to be negation, but it is only an impotent contradiction, and must be surpassed by reason, which embodies true negation and the thought of the whole.

Like Kant, Hegel realizes that reason is finite, but in a much different sense. Whereas for Kant the finitude of human reason means that we cannot think the whole, the thing-in-itself, for Hegel it means that complete cognition is not attained in one step. Paradoxically, however, it is immediate. That is to say, on the one hand reason must progress through different stages of actualization. The Phenomenology of Spirit is the story of the quest for absolute certainty. Each level imagines itself to be certainty, but its deficiency is exposed, thus negating it, and it is seen that this
particular stage of reason was partial only, and wrong in taking itself for the whole. "But by Dialectic is meant the in-dwelling tendency outwards by which the one-sidedness and limitations of the predicate of understanding is seen in its true light, and shown to be the negative of them." (PL, p. 116) But it is not that we are wrong to strive for completion in thought; merely that at this stage we were premature in announcing the victory of certainty and the absolute standpoint. The movement of the dialectic proceeds thus from the more abstract to the less abstract. And this is where the paradox is present. For while reason must move through various stages, the absolute standpoint is always implicitly present from the beginning. The end is in the origin. As Flay points out, the Phenomenology must demonstrate to natural consciousness that the absolute standpoint is already within the structure of natural consciousness, albeit undetermined, while at the same time it must be shown how the natural self-certainty of natural consciousness is present in the absolute standpoint of philosophy. The prior stage constitutes the foundation for the next stage; reason is thus historical. But at the same time all levels and realizations of reason are immediately present.

In the demonstration of certainty, other positions must be worked through. Hence it is natural for Hegel to work through the origins of the dialectic as he perceived them in Kant and Schiller. In working through a stage, the stage is automatically transcended; that is, it is negated. This harks back to Hegel's point about the Kantian thing-in-itself as already posited in its limiting. Thus,
negation lies at the heart of thought, and as we have seen, thought is inherently dialectical: "To see that thought in its very nature is dialectical, and that, as understanding, it must fall into contradiction—the negative of itself—will form one of the main lessons of logic." (EL, p. 15) Thought is continually restless and dissatisfied. Kant's activity of thought is transformed into a perpetually unfilled quest; instead of being resigned to its limitations, it is now 'antagonistic' and not willing to accept conditions and limits. It turns away from what is the known, the sensible, toward the unknown, nonsensible:"...Thinking is always the negation of what we have immediately before us." (EL, p. 17)

In the last chapter it was seen how Kant's use of the via negativa to characterize the supersensible was dismissed by Hegel as furnishing an empty concept only. Hegel's concept is concrete, a totality, and it is not by abstracting from something that we think it, but by negating what it is not, then positively thinking the unity. The scholastic negative methodology is given a new twist; in the immediate relation of cognition to reality (and not their distinction, as Kant held) contradiction in thinking is determinate negation. Reflection thinks through the apparent dualism. In a sense, this retains Kant's notion of knowing something because of what it is not; the difference is that Kant means consciousness of it, Hegel means knowing it in its truth. In a somewhat Husserlian formulation, Hegel states that negation is implicit in thought because in thinking something, we must negate: immediate sense-data, or what we are not
thinking about, or the prior level of certainty. Thus, if Hegel were to answer Derrida today he would maintain that we must negate in order to think; for there to be presence, there must be absence, and if this is repression, then it is indeed a broad notion of repression.

At this point it will be beneficial to discuss briefly the relation of Being/Nothing/Becoming to illustrate this negation in logical form.

Being qua Being is the notion implicit only; it is pure thought and pure immediacy, and as such empty thinking since nothing is intuited or thought in it. And it is thus that Nothing is disclosed implicitly in Being: "Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing."36 Thus Nothing is complete emptiness, absence of all determination and content, undifferentiated in itself: "Nothing is, therefore, the same determination, or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as, pure being."37 To say what Being is is to also say what it is not. Hegel indicates that this formulation is derived from Kant: "In fact this definition is implied in saying that the thing-in-itself is the indeterminate, utterly without form and so without content." (EL, p. 127) For Kant, negation means indetermination, and for Hegel it is a determinate negation; yet indetermination for Kant means simply that we cannot know the form or content, not that it has no form or content. For Hegel, our not knowing it is
the same as saying it has no form or content.

So these two beginnings are both empty abstractions. Their real truth is in their unity, which is Becoming. While distinct, Being and Nothing are the same—they pass over into one another—and each immediately vanishes into its opposite. "Their truth is, therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself." There are several significant factors to be noted here. One is the importance of the notion of unity, one found in Kant in both the unity of reason in general, and the unity of the Critiques which the CJ provides; it is also found in Schiller on the level of the individual's attempt to unify his warring aspects, as well as a working harmony between individual and State. Secondly, there is a factor of mediation. Becoming mediates between Being and Nothing, just as the judgement of taste in Kant and the aesthetic impulse in Schiller are principles of mediation. The nature of the mediator is the same: it participates in both without belonging exclusively to either, and it is enucleated in movement. The primacy of movement in the dialectic is what I take to be the key factor, as the aforementioned aspects fall under it as well as the additional characteristics of freedom and independence. Movement is the notion that unites them all. Movement embodies the character of dialectic as never static, at once positive and negative. Similar to a phenomenological notion, the "here" is never strictly here, but gone by the time we have
articulated it. By the time we turn to "a thinking," it is past, hence it has negated itself.

Burbidge refers to this in terms of a distinction between transition and reflection. Werden is identified because subsequent thought has noticed its having passed over from one term to its contrary—but it is not noticed in the immediacy of this passing. That transition is recognized later involves reflection on the process, using operations which can only be explicated in the logic of essence, not of being. Thus reflection must synthesize the starting point and the result, and in so doing cancels transition. But since that which differentiates the starting point from the result is contrary to their unity in the synthesis, each term as distinct is also considered negatively. Thus reflection employs a positive synthesis to examine what is shown to it, which is not what is immediately present, but the negation of that. Reflection takes a negative approach to its content by considering the transitions differently than they present themselves. In other words, "This double character of reflection as both explicitly negative and implicitly positive contrasts with transition which, as immediate, is explicitly positive but, as passing over to something else, is implicitly negative."39 In this respect, reflection realizes that its own operation is inherent neither in the immediate transition or in the presupposed relation. In other words, "as external to that upon which it reflects it is not inherently determined by it."40

This has important consequences for Hegelian philosophy. On the one hand, there is the possibility of self-consciousness, the ability
to step back and evaluate the process of thinking, which Kant was unable to posit, due to the inescapable circularity of his system. On the other hand, Hegel speaks of philosophy as the circle within the circle; yet he retains immediacy, embeddedness, self-reference and self-consciousness in the dialectic. He is thus able to posit a unity of objective and subjective, and not in a merely superficial sense, as he saw the Kantian principle of mediation. Rather, it is a fundamental sense of unity, with elements that are both positive and negative, continually in transition—no sooner is one level achieved than its deficiency is revealed and that level is cancelled as thought moves on to a higher level. In cancelling a level the previous elements are not annihilated but are retained in a higher synthésis: a sublation, or Aufhebung. And at the same time, Hegel has the self-consciousness of Reason, the realization at the highest level that it is Absolute Knowing, without the positing of a dualism between this reflection and the immediate thinking. In a sense Kant both realized the embeddedness of reason, yet did not. He denied the possibility of stepping back, of true self-consciousness of the thinking self as thinking self, of the examination of reason apart from its employment. But while Kant did realize how reason is embeddedness, he did not see how it is an embeddedness which is not one-dimensional, not the serpent biting its own tail, but rather a rich immanence which is still distinct, identity in difference: "This is that action of thought, which will hereafter be specially considered under the name of Dialectic, and regarding which we need only at the outset observe that, instead of being brought to bear upon the categories from without, it is immanent
in their own action." (EL, p. 66). This harks back to a previously mentioned point: Hegel derives the content for his categories from within, not without, and this grounds the immanence of content, the identity of subjective and objective in the true synthesis that Kant was unable to achieve.

Consistent with the principle of the dialectic, Hegel's thought is determined dialectically not only by the positive appropriation of certain notions, but in the negation of them as well. Hence he incorporates the freedom of thought which in the CJ was the freedom of the judgement of taste, mediating between theoretical and practical, retaining its independence in the "as if" formulation, yet not determining. Hegel, on the other hand, does not feel that freedom and movement need be restricted to a heuristic principle or a hypothesis, but can be concrete determination: the transforming of the in-itself into the for-itself. Yet the notion of the "as if" is retained in the fleeting character of thought, as always surpassing, neither accidental nor arbitrary in its movement. The independence of thought progresses from Kant's self-giving law to Schiller's wider application in the objective world, to culminate in Hegel's absolute self-consciousness of Reason in its unlimited capacities and applications. "The real nature of the object is brought to light in reflection; but it is no less true that this exertion of thought is my act. If this be so, the real nature is a product of my mind, in its character of thinking subject—generated by me in my simple universality, self-collected and removed from extraneous influences—in one word, in my Freedom." (EL, p. 35).

The activity of thought in Kant becomes, through a mediation in Schiller's cultural notion of freedom, the Freedom of the Subject; not free because
it cannot determine, as in Kant, but a Freedom in determining. As previously stated, the more determined a concept in Hegelian philosophy, the freer it is.

So while on the one hand Hegel acknowledged that Kant introduced the principle of the independence of Reason, Kant posited it in a formal sense only. For, according to Hegel, Kant holds "that what we think is false, because it is we who think it" (EL, p. 94), and that we cannot know what Hegel terms the "other world". For Hegel, true independence of Reason means that we can attain truth, and that entails the truth of the object, knowledge of the "other world." In addition, the finitude of our categories, which for Kant constituted a barrier to knowledge, is in Hegel what creates the possibility for knowledge. "...The finite, as implicitly other than what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite." (EL, p. 118.)

If Hegel interprets the history of philosophy as the story of the progress of the dialectic, then it follows that not only is the discussion of the relation of Kant, Schiller, and Hegel an examination of the unfolding of the notion of dialectic, but the discussion itself is dialectical. This brings us back to the initial point of this section: the inherent difficulty in discussing the dialectic is that the dialectic is inherent. That is, as Hegel says, "everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic" (EL, p. 118). As such, every formulation is the dialectic instantiated and especially a formulation of the dialectic itself. The aesthetic enables freedom and constitutes a high level of determination in Absolute Spirit. As freedom in determination is what characterizes both the dialectic and
the aesthetic, the synthesis is the identity of dialectic and aesthetic: The dialectic is aesthetic, and the aesthetic is dialectical. As such, the aesthetic implicitly and fundamentally grounds the dialectic, and this relation can be said to posit an essential primacy of the aesthetic in Hegelian philosophy.
NOTES

Introduction

1 The view that Hegel's dialectic was at least in part influenced by Greek philosophy is held by authors such as Findlay, Taminiaux, Janicaud, Gadamer, Planty-Bonjour. Advocates of the influence of German idealism prior to Hegel include Pippin, Weil, and Harris.

2 In Chapter 4 I discuss the ambiguous relationship between the acknowledgement by Hegel of an influence upon his thought in its development, and on the other hand, the fact that he may be merely reading what he wants into the earlier philosophy from his later, established, standpoint.

3 G.W.F. Hegel, Briefe, vol. 3 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1961), Hegel an Cousin, Berlin, 3 March 1828, p. 223: This is, granted, a later letter, but not invalid for that reason; there is plenty of evidence to suggest that Hegel had held this view for most of his mature period, if not from the beginning of his career.


6 For example, Harris, Janicaud and Taminiaux, to name a few, discuss this issue.
Kant had written an earlier work entitled, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (1763), where he renounces the possibility of a critique of taste in view of the fact that aesthetic judgements are empirical, and not rational or capable of being judged according to rational precepts.


See below, Chapter 3.
NOTES

Chapter I


3 I prefer to term this an interiority of thought, as inwardness of thought gives the impression of an inward directedness. It is not so much an inward directedness, as a subjective foundation; hence it is interiority as opposed to the exteriority of both rationalism and empiricism.


5 Cassirer, Kant's Life and Thought, p. 48.


9 This view issues from Kant's use of analogy to posit the faculty of judgement as a middle term in the Introduction to CJ (p. 15). According to Kant's Logic, "Analogy concludes from partial similarity of two things to total similarity according to the principle of specification: Things of one genus which we know to agree in much, also agree in the remainder as we know it in some of the genus but do not perceive it in others." General Doctrine of Elements, § 84, pp. 136-37. Hence it is possible to claim that because judgement is derived from analogy with Kant's architectonic, his concerns are primarily systematic. Yet the fact remains that this judgement was then characterized as
aesthetic judgement, so whether the concern was initially systematic or aesthetic, the aesthetic came to play a significant part. Taminiaux likewise refers to this problem of determining the motive: "Enfin les analyses de la Critique du Jugement trahissent une tension permanente entre l'attachement au cadre systématique et la fidélité phénoménologique au mode d'être du Beau et à l'attitude qui y accède." Jacques Taminiaux, La Nostalgie de la Grèce à l'aube de l'idéalisme allemand (La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), p. 37.

10 Cassirer, Kant's Life and Thought, pp. 272-73.

11 In a letter to Garve, Kant stated, "For I believe I can demonstrate formally that not a single truly metaphysical proposition, torn out of the whole system, can be proved except by showing its relation to the sources of all our pure rational knowledge and, therefore, that it would have to be derived from the concept of the possible system of such cognitions." Letter to Christian Garve, 7 August 1783 in Kant: Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99, p. 103.

12 I hesitate to go as far as Cassirer does in appraising the contribution of the CJ. He sees it as so crucial that it is not exaggerating to say that "...It [the CJ], more than any other work of Kant's, launched a whole new movement of thought, which determined the direction of the entire post-Kantian philosophy." Cassirer, p. 273. This is a strong claim, especially in view of the importance of the CPR, not to mention the well-known doctrine of the primacy of practical reason. However, to challenge and perhaps soften his claim is not to deny that the CJ constituted a considerable contribution and influence upon subsequent philosophical developments.
NOTES

Chapter 2


2 Ibid., § 23, p. 110.

3 Ibid., introduction, p. 96.

4 Ibid., introduction, p. 40.


6 Kant, Logic, § 82, p. 136.


8 This notion was already briefly discussed in the Critique of Pure Reason. See the Paralogisms of Pure Reason (B), B 425.

9 Körner compares this principle to the justifications of induction, where nature either does or does not conform to discoverable inductive generalizations. If it does not, our empirical conclusions are in vain; if it does, there will be progress. Because of the great contingency involved, we can only hope to find nature conforming to our theories in order to advance. S. Körner, Kant (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1955), p. 179.

10 For Kant, even the "objective" quality of knowledge is subjective; it is objective only insofar as it furnishes knowledge of objects of sense. The completely objective aspect of the object—the thing-in-itself—is never known.

11 It will be clear presently how Kant is justified in applying these logical forms.
When Kant speaks of a pure judgement, pure does not have exactly the same sense it has in the CPR where it means a priori, characterized by necessity and universality and containing no element of sensation. A judgement of taste is not a priori according to any of these factors: it is not independent of experience (yet does not rely on sensation only), is not a necessary condition of experience, and is not universal in the strict sense of the first Critique. Rather, the pure judgement of taste will bear a significant resemblance to an a priori, an "as if" principle serving as a mode for reflection.

In the Meredith translation, *Zweckmässigkeit* is translated as finality; but I will use "purposiveness" at times (as this is the most common term for this notion), though retaining the significance of finality, which is linked to the discussion of finality of nature in the preceding section on the faculty of judgement.


For example, Gadamer and Taminiaux.


Kant, *GMM*, p. 59.

Chapter 1.


NOTES

Chapter 3


2 Ibid., p. 243.

3 Friedrich Schiller, Briefe (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag), Jena, 1 March 1795, p. 329.


5 For example, Taminiaux, Miller, Janicaud.


7 Henrich, p. 246.

8 For example, "Art, Philosophy and Concreteness in Hegel" by William Desmond (unpublished).

9 Taminiaux, pp. 94-95.

10 In Eros and Civilization, Marcuse politicizes and rethinks Schiller's analysis in terms of 20th century issues. He sees the aesthetic function as demonstrative of the principles of a non-repressive society, and as the foundation for a reworking of civilization. Eros and Civilization (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).


12 In so doing, Schiller is vague concerning the relation between aesthetic experience and Beauty. It is only later that this connection will be clarified.

13 Schelling takes up this notion as well.
Chapter 4

1 Neither does Hegel himself manage to completely evade this issue; the question of the "we" in the Phenomenology remains problematic.

2 Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 46.

3 Ibid., p. 48.

4 Deduction in this context does not mean to deduce the categories, as this was already done in the metaphysical deduction. It refers to their justification, in terms of their application.

5 In Truth and Method, Gadamer, who owes more of a debt to Hegel than he would like to admit, also charges Kant with subjectivism, for many of the same reasons. Truth and Method (New York: Continuum, 1975).


7 Ibid., p. 186.

8 Ibid., p. 187.

9 Jean Hyppolite, "La critique hégélienne de la réflexion kantienne," Kantstudien, 45 (1953-1954), p. 92. This article is interesting in that Hyppolite also elaborates a unity which is found within the transcendental deduction itself.


11 The Thing-in-itself and the noumenal are not equivalent; however, for the purposes of this section I shall treat them as much the same.

12 For example, Bennet, Walsh, Wilkerson, and Strawson.
Pippin agrees with this interpretation, but points out a major weakness: how does this account for the notion of things-in-themselves as ground for appearances? In response I would question whether Kant really intended such a Platonist view of the things-in-themselves. See Robert Pippin, *Kant's Theory of Form* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982).


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 57.


Ibid., p. 61.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 62-63.


Ibid., p. 511. Harris wonders if this insight came not from Kant and Schiller but from Hölderlin. He concludes that it is possible, but not certain; at any rate, although Hölderlin had the idea first, Harris believes his inspiration had to come from the *CJ* and *APM*, and "anyone who shared his aims and ideals, as Hegel did, could have arrived at the idea by the very same route." Harris, p. 253.

29 Here I am following William Desmond who, in an unpublished paper entitled "Art, Philosophy and Concreteness in Hegel" discusses the relation of art and philosophy as inherently self-referential.


32 The question of method consists in whether Hegel uses a method to generate the categories or whether because of the "compelling nature of Reason" (as Stace puts it) it proceeds on its own. Stace and Findlay maintain that there is a dialectical method, Maker says there is not, and Flay claims that it is impossible to determine if there is a method.


35 Flay, p. 17.

36 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 82.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., p. 83.


40 Ibid., p. 117.
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