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HEIDEGGER AT MARBURG:
THE PROJECT OF A SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY,
AT THE TIME OF SEIN UND ZEIT

by

Richard Hudson

A thesis presented to the School of
Graduate Studies, University of Ottawa,
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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Heidegger at Marburg: The Project of a Scientific Philosophy at the Time of Sein und Zeit

by Richard Hudson

Résumé

In this thesis, I attempt to establish that while Heidegger was at the University of Marburg (1923-28), he understood himself as being engaged in founding a scientific philosophy. The thesis shows concretely and in detail what Heidegger meant by the term "scientific philosophy" and explains how Sein und Zeit can be viewed as an attempt to put philosophy on a scientific footing.

Interpreting the Marburg writings as aiming at establishing a scientific philosophy gives us a new reading of Heidegger's main work Sein und Zeit. It also provides us with the possibility of a new way of seeing the development of Heidegger's thought. In addition, it sheds light on the general question of the relation of philosophy to science.

Until recent years, Heidegger has been viewed in most of the secondary literature as being anti-scientific. The immediate reaction to Sein und Zeit tended to interpret this work as interested primarily in such existential themes as death, guilt, anxiety, and solitary resolute authentic existence. Later Heidegger comments about
the danger of technology and the inability of science to think have reinforced this interpretation of Heidegger.

In this thesis it becomes clear that we have to view Heidegger differently. I rely on a careful reading of the Marburg lecture courses to establish Heidegger's interest in scientific philosophy. These courses started to appear only in 1975. So far half of the 10 courses have been published.

Heidegger's main aim at Marburg was to establish the question of being at the center of the philosophic problematic. Heidegger correctly thought that the question had been forgotten and was being neglected. His position was that the being-question was the most central, radical, and universal question man can raise. Answers to this question are presupposed in all human knowledge. Heidegger recommends the question be dealt with explicitly in order to permit us to arrive at an adequate understanding of our most basic concepts.

Heidegger believed that posing the being-question correctly would make philosophy scientific. Scientific philosophy is simply philosophy (and thus ontology, for Heidegger) which takes on the form of science. The thesis examines Heidegger's view of the structure of science. Science is founded in the act of objectification. Philo-
sophy will become scientific by objectifying being.

Objectification consists of explicitly projecting a given of everyday experience upon the horizon given along with it. Being is given in everyday experience indirectly—it is given as a horizon. One of the main difficulties in objectifying being is that the horizon for the understanding of being is not immediately evident.

The fundamental ontology of Sein und Zeit can be viewed as an attempt to find the horizon for the understanding of being, so as to permit the objectification of being. Once being is objectified, philosophy will be scientific.

The later Heidegger strenuously denies that it is possible to objectify being. In the thesis, however, I am able to show through an examination of the Marburg texts that the earlier Heidegger thought philosophy could do precisely this. In the conclusion to the thesis I point to difficulties with the Marburg view of the possibility of scientific philosophy. These difficulties may indicate what led to Heidegger's later development. The main contribution of this thesis, however, is that it establishes that the Marburg Heidegger's writings, including Sein und Zeit, must be viewed as an attempt to found a scientific philosophy.
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

0.1 Aim of thesis

The aim of the following is to present a new interpretation of Martin Heidegger's writings during the period he was at the University of Marburg (1923-28). Heidegger's Marburg period encompasses the time leading up to and immediately following the publication of his main work, Sein und Zeit. My interpretation of the writings of this period will show that the project enunciated in Sein und Zeit—the project of working out the question of the meaning of being by showing that time is the horizon of any understanding of being—can be understood as an attempt to

1See Sz. 1. (Heidegger's works will be referred to by use of abbreviations. For a list of these abbreviations see the bibliography, below.)
make philosophy scientific. Heidegger himself understood the project in this way: in the Marburg period he himself claims to be doing scientific philosophy.

The goal of making philosophy scientific has often been expressed in the 2500 year history of Western thought. The problem of how to make philosophy scientific has come particularly to the fore in the period since Descartes. The precise meaning of the call for scientific philosophy, however, varies with one's view of the natures of science and philosophy and of the relation between them. Heidegger's views on these questions were clearly heavily influenced by Husserl,\(^1\) although his readings of Aristotle, Kant, and, to a lesser extent, Plato and Leibniz were also quite important. Even Heidegger's study of certain minor nineteenth and early twentieth century writers was important. To a certain extent, Heidegger's view of scientific philosophy sounds somewhat like the view he attributes to some of these thinkers, particularly in regard to his views, on the structure and object of scientific philosophy and on the relation of philosophy to the other sciences.\(^2\)

\(^1\)See George Ghanotakis, "Heidegger's Fundamental Phenomenology," *Man and World* 14 (1981), 251-267. Ghanotakis links Heidegger's SZ and GP to Husserl's *Idea of Phenomenology*. Ghanotakis claims (p. 256): "Both the expression [sic] idea of phenomenology (reminiscent of Husserl's 1907 lectures) and the identification of phenomenology with the concept of scientific philosophy are revealing of this Husserlian climate under which the young Heidegger works."

\(^2\)See PGZ, 13-23, and particularly 22.
For Heidegger, philosophy is scientific only if it takes on the same structure as the other sciences. Heidegger believes that all sciences, from physics to theology, do share a certain structure. He attempts to explain the nature of this structure and how philosophy can be structured so as to become scientific.

Philosophy as a science will have a field of investigation proper to it. Philosophy will continue to be the study of being, which, in Heidegger's view is what it always has been. It will also develop its own methods, chosen so as to be appropriate to its own special object.

Scientific philosophy, as the study of what is most basic (namely, being), will prepare the ground for all other sciences. It will be the most basic science: the science which is most radical and most universal because it studies what is most central.

The aim of this thesis is to concretely work out the details of Heidegger's views of philosophy and science and to show how Heidegger's "universal phenomenological ontology" presents a scientific philosophy in Heidegger's terms.

¹Sz, 38.
0.2 Method of thesis

In order to establish my thesis, I shall examine Heidegger's writings during the Marburg period, occasionally referring as well to later comments by Heidegger about his work at Marburg.¹ The thesis will proceed by presenting Heidegger's views on scientific philosophy and by showing how Heidegger's own philosophy is scientific in the way he understands this term. The thesis will thus be largely expository rather than critical. Its aim is to present a new way of looking at Heidegger's writings of this period—particularly Sein und Zeit—in order to facilitate the understanding of both Heidegger's Marburg period and the direction his thought later took. Because the thesis aims at an interpretation of Heidegger's thought, the adequacy of, say, his views on the nature of science—which are rather sketchy—will not be dealt with. Nor will I go into the originality of Heidegger's thought. The question of the obvious influence of Husserl on Heidegger's recollections or his interpretations of Sein und Zeit and the other Marburg writings because the recollections are not always accurate and Heidegger's "violent" interpretations are justly famous. However, occasionally some of his later writings do shed light on the earlier period, and, if used with care, can be useful.

¹Care must be taken in using either Heidegger's recollections or his interpretations of Sein und Zeit and the other Marburg writings because the recollections are not always accurate and Heidegger's "violent" interpretations are justly famous. However, occasionally some of his later writings do shed light on the earlier period, and, if used with care, can be useful.
Heidegger's views of science and scientific philosophy is not strictly relevant to determining how Heidegger himself understood his project in Sein und Zeit. I will rely instead on Heidegger's own account of his views, mainly as presented in the Marburg writings.

Until recently, Heidegger's Marburg writings have not been easily available. Only Sein und Zeit was published while Heidegger was still at Marburg (it was published in 1927, one year before Heidegger went to Freiburg). The article "Phänomenologie und Theologie," written in 1927-28, was not published until 1969.¹ Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, of which Heidegger reports the essential was prepared at Marburg in 1925-26, was published in 1929.²

The most important Marburg writings for an understanding of the project of scientific philosophy are the texts of the lecture courses Heidegger gave at the University of Marburg. Publication of these courses in the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe started in 1975, only one year before Hei-

¹See PT, 7. Perhaps since Heidegger rarely published a text immediately following its completion, he usually gives information on the dates of composition in notes at the beginning or end of his books. For the determination of the date of writing, both here and in the bibliography, I am relying on the accuracy of these "Hinweise."

²KPM, 7.
degger's death. To date, five courses have appeared: publication of five more is projected. Many commentators have noted that the Marburg courses are particularly clear. In them, Heidegger uses a language which is drawn from phenomenology and traditional philosophy, and the neologisms and special technical terms of *Sein und Zeit* are used much less than in that work. The lecture courses

1. *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* (1925 course, published 1979);
2. *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit* (1925-26 course, published 1976);
3. *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (1927 course, published 1975);
4. *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1927-28 course, published 1977); and

2. Projected to appear are: 1. *Der Beginn der neuzeitlichen Philosophie* (1923-24 course);
2. *Aristoteles: Rhetorik* (1924 course);
3. *Platon: Sophistes* (1924-25 course);
4. *Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie* (1926 course); and

make particularly clear Heidegger's understanding of his own work as scientific philosophy, and they show what Heidegger means by this term.

Although it is clear in the lecture courses that Heidegger believes he is doing scientific philosophy, none of the Marburg writings is primarily a metaphilosophical treatise on the nature of science or philosophy, or on the importance of philosophy's becoming scientific. Although a philosophy of science may underlie Heidegger's view of what he is doing, none of the works of the 1920s is primarily concerned with the philosophy of science or the mapping out of the structure of science.¹ Heidegger does not present in any one text the argument I am making here, namely, that science has a certain structure which philosophy should adopt while, however, continuing to study its own object with its own methods, thereby enabling philosophy to take its proper place among the sciences as the

¹Hans Seigfried in "Heidegger's Longest Day: Being and Time and the Sciences," Philosophy Today 22 (1978), 319-331, has a different view. He claims (p. 319) "that Heidegger's Being and Time has to be recognized and discussed as a treatise on the philosophy of science in a strict, though not parochial, sense, a philosophy of science which resembles in many ways the so-called 'new' philosophy of science advanced by Feyerabend, Polanyi, Hanson, Kuhn, and others." Seigfried's view is one extreme, the opposite of which is represented in William J. Richardson, "Heidegger's Critique of Science," The New Scholasticism 42 (1968), 511-536, where Richardson states (p. 511): "On the longest day he ever lived, Heidegger could never be called a philosopher of science."
most universal and radical science.

This is not to say, however, that Heidegger is
quiet either on the need or the meaning of scientific
philosophy. All the Marburg writings make clear that
Heidegger, who during this period sees philosophy as con-
sisting of the application of the phenomenological method
to the question of being, thinks of philosophy as being
a science.¹ All—including Sein und Zeit—explicitly link
Heidegger's philosophic efforts to science and to the need
to ground and unify knowledge.² Often the discussion of
the nature of science goes on for several pages.³ Often

¹References to the scientific nature of phenomenol-
ogy, ontology, and philosophy abound: only one will be
noted here. In GP, 3, Heidegger notes: "... eine der
Hauptabsichten der Vorlesung [i.e., the GP] ist zu zeigen,
dass die phänomenologische Forschung, in ihrer Grundten-
denz begriffen, nichts anderes darstellen kann als das
ausdrücklichere und radikalere Verständnis der Idee der
wissenschaftlichen Philosophie, wie sie in ihrer Verwirk-
lichung seit der Antike bis zu Hegel in immer neuen und
in sich einheitlich zusammenhängenden Bemühungen angestrebt
wird."

²See SZ, 9–11, particularly p. 11: "Die Seinsfrage
zielt ... auf eine apriorische Bedingung der Möglichkeit
nicht nur der Wissenschaften, ... sondern auf die Bedingung
der Möglichkeit der vor den ontischen Wissenschaften liegen-
den und sie fundierenden Ontologien selbst." See also,
PGZ, 3: "Phänomenologie hat so die Aufgabe, die Sachge-
biete vor der wissenschaftlichen Bearbeitung verständlich
tzu machen und auf diesem Grunde erst diese selbst."

³Among the longer discussions of science are PT,
which comes closest of all the Marburg writings to being
a text in philosophy of science, K, 17–39, and PGZ, 1–6.
the attack on "philosophies" which fail to live up to Heidegger's view of a science of being is lengthy.\footnote{For example, see L, 31-89, for an attack on logical psychologism, and GP, 5-14, for an attack on Weltanschauungsphilosophie.} In many places, Heidegger states he wants to construct a scientific philosophy. In many others, he states he is recommending certain steps in order to make philosophy scientific. The evidence that Heidegger saw himself as doing scientific philosophy is so overwhelming (and, even, repetitious) that no one reading the Marburg texts could have any doubts about the question.

The scattered and fragmentary nature of Heidegger's remarks on scientific philosophy are due to the fact that he is more interested in arriving at a scientific philosophy than in talking about it. Thus, to make Heidegger's views on the meaning of scientific philosophy explicit, it will be necessary to first see what Heidegger's project is, i.e., to see what Heidegger thinks philosophy is. Then it will be necessary to examine Heidegger's idea of science. Finally, we will be able to see in what way philosophy as Heidegger understands it can take on the structures of a science.
0.3 Review of the literature

The secondary literature on Heidegger generally does not present him as having attempted to construct a scientific philosophy in his writings of the Marburg period. There are probably three reasons why the interpretation I am presenting has not been presented before.

First is that *Sein und Zeit* was initially received as an existentialist treatise in philosophical anthropology whose main points were, as Pöggeler puts it, "Sorge, Praxis, Gewissen, Angst, Tod, Geschichtlichkeit, Situation."¹ This misinterpretation of Heidegger's aims dominated the interpretation of Heidegger for over 20 years, until the publication of his "Brief Über den Humanismus" in 1947.² Even after the Humanismusbrief, however, many writers on Heidegger saw *Sein und Zeit* as being primarily existentialist in intention. That the main aim of this book was to construct a rigorous science of being, which could then


²The "Brief Über den Humanismus," written in 1946 to Jean Beaufret, was first published as an appendix to "Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit" by A. Francke, Bern, 1947 (see WM, "Nachweise").
serve as the foundation of all other sciences, did not occur to those interested in prescriptions for authentic resolute existence.

A second reason why the literature on Heidegger did not understand his project is the history of the publication of Heidegger texts. Although Heidegger had published some earlier works,\(^1\) it was with *Sein und Zeit* in 1927 that he became well known. *Sein und Zeit*, which was only a fragment and was published hurriedly,\(^2\) received, as we have seen, an existentialist interpretation. Between the publication of *Sein und Zeit* and the beginning of the Nazi period, Heidegger published little, and after the arrival of the Nazis to power, Heidegger published virtually nothing. In the postwar period, Heidegger started publishing again, but, as Pöggeler notes, his publications seem to have been chosen rather haphazardly. The postwar publications are a combination of recently given lectures and earlier work from the 1930s and 1940s which had been held back while the Nazis were in power. Pöggeler

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\(^1\) The three main early works (*Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus*, *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus*, and *Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft*) were reissued together as *Frühe Schriften* in 1972.

\(^2\) See Heidegger's "Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie" in *ZSfD*, 87-88, on how *Sein und Zeit* came to be published.
claims that some important texts were held back while some
very minor articles were released.\footnote{See "Heidegger heute," p. 15: "... Heideggers Werk [is] nur in ganz fragmentarischer und zufällig-willkürlich Weise publiziert worden." In Denkweg, Pöggeler uses some unpublished texts, particularly the Beiträge zur Philosophie, which he felt were of particular importance.}

This history of the publication of Heidegger's texts affected the interpretation of his work as a whole.\footnote{For the interpretation of Heidegger's work by the secondary literature see two articles by Pöggeler: "Heidegger heute" and "Neue Wege mit Heidegger?" (the latter article is in Philosophische Rundschau 29 (1982), 39-71). See also Parvis Emad, "Über den gegenwärtigen Stand der Interpretation des Denkens Heideggers in englischer Sprache," Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 27 (1973), 284-300; and James M. Robinson, "The German Discussion of the Later Heidegger" in James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. (eds), The Later Heidegger and Theology (New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row, 1963), 3-76.}

Much attention was focused on the more recent texts during the 1950s and 1960s, partly because they were more recent and partly because they seemed strange. A major effort was made to relate these postwar publications to Sein und Zeit, from which they seemed to differ to such an extent that in the secondary literature there was talk about Heidegger I and Heidegger II.\footnote{The first to attach numbers to Heidegger was William J. Richardson in his 1963 book Through Phenomenology to Thought, Phaenomenologica #13, 3rd edition (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974). Krell ("Work Sessions with Martin Heidegger," Philosophy Today 26 (1982), 126-139) reports of Heidegger's dismay with this interpretation, which he referred to as the American interpretation. See Krell, p. 133.} Little attention was paid...
to the period leading to Sein und Zeit, partly due to the unavailability of texts of this period. Instead, to the extent an attempt was made to interpret Heidegger's thought as a whole, Sein und Zeit was interpreted from the point of view of the later Heidegger. In some respects, this may have led to a better interpretation since the later texts made clear Heidegger was not an existentialist, but was instead interested in the question of being. However, to the extent that the later Heidegger was seen as anti-scientific, this led to a misinterpretation of the earlier work which sought precisely to make philosophy scientific.

The third reason the secondary literature has not interpreted Heidegger's aim in Sein und Zeit as that of constructing a scientific philosophy has to do with the way Heidegger expressed himself, both in Sein und Zeit and in later texts.¹ Although Sein und Zeit clearly states

¹Pöggeler notes that some of the misunderstanding of Heidegger may well have come from Heidegger himself and the way he chose to express himself. See, for example, Philosophie und Politik bei Heidegger, p. 16: "'(Sein und Zeit)—ein Werk, das nach den Möglichkeiten von Philosophie überhaupt zu fragen suchte—wurde bei seinem Erscheinen im Jahre 1927 allenthalben verstanden als ein Aufruf an den Einzelnen, sich in einer Zeit des Niedergangs auf sich selbst zu stellen. Dieses Verständnis mag ein Missverständnis gewesen sein; immerhin zitiert Heidegger programmatische Sätze des Grafen Yorck von Wartenburg, in denen z.B. dargelegt wird, es gebe eigentlich kein öffentliches Gewissen, nur Einzelgewissen."
that one of its aims is to ground the sciences in order to enable them to clarify their basic concepts thus overcoming the crises into which they had fallen,\(^1\) it also treats sciences as derived ways of knowing.\(^2\) In postwar texts, science is even accused of being unable to think,\(^3\) and science and technology are presented as dangers from which we must be saved.\(^4\) Later Heidegger texts cite favorably certain mystics\(^5\) and can lend themselves to interpretation as anti-rational, anti-logic, and anti-science.\(^6\)

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\(^1\)See \textit{SZ}, 9-10, and \textit{PGZ}, 3, on the crises in science.

\(^2\)See \textit{SZ}, 61, on knowledge as a deficient mode of being-in-the-world.

\(^3\)WhD, 4.

\(^4\)See \textit{FT} and \textit{TK}. See also John Loscerbo, \textit{Being and Technology} (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981). Also Heidegger’s \textit{Spiegel-Gespräch} ("Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten") is relevant in this regard.

\(^5\)The main mystics cited are Meister Eckhart and Angelicus Silesius, although comments favorable to Zen Buddhism are made. For Heidegger and mysticism see John D. Caputo, \textit{The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought} (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1978). Early Heidegger texts also favorably cite mystics, leading Julius Kraft to say as early as 1932, \textit{Von Husserl zu Heidegger. Kritik der phänomenologischen Philosophie} (Leipzig: Hans Buske Verlag, 1932), 91: "Bei Heidegger wird der wissenschaftliche Ausgangspunkt Husserls völlig verleugnet und der Sprung in die Mystik hinein-vollzogen."

\(^6\)For an example of this misinterpretation of Heidegger, see \textit{Laszlo Verséyni, Heidegger, Being, and Truth} (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965).
Reading *Sein und Zeit* as existentialist, or reading later Heidegger comments about technology back into *Sein und Zeit*, could lead one to misinterpreting this work as being either hostile or indifferent to science and the ideal of scientific philosophy.\(^1\) Indeed, the standard interpretation of Heidegger until about 10 years ago held that he was anti-scientific. This was the case even though some commentators, many of whom had access to Heidegger or to his early lecture courses, recognized as soon as *Sein und Zeit* was published that Heidegger's aim was to construct a scientific philosophy.\(^2\) Yet others, such as Pöggeler, were able to see this later, in the 1960s and early 1970s, despite all of the misinterpretations in the

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\(^{1}\)See, for example, Richardson, "Heidegger's Critique of Science."

literature. However, it was only with the publication of early Heidegger texts in the 1970s that Heidegger's views of the relation of philosophy to science have come to be recognized, mainly in articles in English examining the texts leading to *Sein und Zeit*.

The earliest Heidegger texts were clearly interested in problems of logic and science, and discussion of these texts following their re-publication as *Frühe Schriften* in 1972 drew attention to this interest. T. Kisiel wrote that the young Dr. Heidegger was interested in the philosophy of science; J. Caputo stated that at the time of his Habilitationsschrift Heidegger was interested "in the problems of the foundations of mathematics and logic;" D. F. Krell noted that Heidegger's criticism of Jaspers

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1See Pöggeler, *Denkweg*, p. 70: "Wie für Husserl, so ist auch für den jungen Heidegger Phänomenologie Ursprungs wissenschaft, Wissenschaft mit einer ›radikalen‹ Tendenz." See also Pöggeler's *Philosophie und Politik bei Heidegger*, p. 73: "«Sein und Zeit» sollte dann eine «Wissenschaft vom ‚Sein als solchem, seinen Möglichkeiten und Abwandlungen» wenn nicht geben, so doch vorbereiten. (SuZ, 230)."

2See p. 4-5, above.


in the early 1920s was based on what Heidegger saw as a lack of rigorous method in Jaspers;¹ H. Seigfried has claimed that "Heidegger, like Husserl, argues in Being and Time that philosophy has to give up random speculation and become a rigorous science;"² and several texts have noted the influence of Husserl on the early Heidegger and have attempted to understand the early texts in terms of this influence.³ Once the Gesamtausgabe started appearing,


with the lecture courses and some other texts from the 1920s, the impression that Heidegger was favorably interested in science increased. Some have even attempted to link Heidegger to more recent philosophy of science, with not always very convincing results.¹ It has become no longer particularly surprising to state that the young Heidegger wanted to construct a scientific philosophy.

Several articles in the last few years have noted Heidegger's favorable views in the 1920s towards scientific philosophy. None, however, has yet assembled the various texts and attempted to state concretely what Heidegger thought a scientific philosophy would look like. No one has attempted to explain Heidegger's moves in Sein und Zeit and other texts in relation to his desire to make philosophy scientific. One reason for this lack is the scope of the task and the fact that not all relevant texts have yet been published. Another is the well-founded suspicion that there are problems with Heidegger's view of scientific philosophy. It is not the aim of this thesis

¹See Seigfried's comment (in note 1, page 7, above) on Heidegger and Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, etc. Joseph Rouse also attempts to link Heidegger with Kuhn. See Rouse's "Kuhn, Heidegger, and Scientific Realism," Man and World 14 (1981), 269-290.
go deeply into these problems. Instead, the aim is to show concretely how Heidegger thought a science of being could be constructed through the use of the phenomenological method.

0.4 Outline of the thesis

The first step in determining how Heidegger's project in *Sein und Zeit* and the other Marburg works can fit into the framework of scientific philosophy is to see what that project is.

Chapter 1, therefore, deals with Heidegger's conception of philosophy. For Heidegger, philosophy is ontology, the study of being. This is true both historically and thematically. Ontology is possible only if the ontological difference (the difference between being and beings) is recognized. Ontology, however, has ontic roots: it is grounded in a particular being, namely man (or "Dasein"). Ontology must study Dasein, because it is in Dasein's understanding of being that ontology's object (namely, being) is given. Being is given as the horizon of understanding of all beings, and Dasein's understanding of being is the condition of possibility of all Dasein's behavior. The study of Dasein aims at discovering what makes possible the being of this being. This study concludes that temporality is what makes a being such as Dasein possible.
Since temporality makes Dasein possible, and Dasein is essentially an understanding of being, time (although not time as ordinarily understood) must be the horizon for any understanding of being. Ontology, then, has as its task the working out of the temporal structure of being and of the various modifications and derivations of being.

The problem examined after Chapter 1 is how this project can be handled scientifically. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 deal with the nature of science and the relation of scientific philosophy to other disciplines.

Chapter 2 examines Heidegger's view of science. The interesting question to ask about science, in Heidegger's opinion, is the question as to how science originates. Science, for Heidegger, is a human activity, however, science is not the kind of activity that man ordinarily engages in. Man ("Dasein") is ordinarily completely engrossed in his projects and in the objects of the world. Science, on the other hand, consists of a disengaged viewing of the world and of an attempt to construct concepts and theories based on this disengaged viewing. To move from man's ordinary experience of the world to scientific research and knowledge requires a change in man's relation to the world. Things must be viewed as merely present (vorhanden) rather than as handy (zu-
handen). But, more importantly, the things thus viewed must become objects for research through a particular action taken by man, namely, through "objectification."

In objectification, a being already given in everyday experience is explicitly projected upon the horizon from which it is already understood. This horizon, which Heidegger maintains is itself already present in ordinary experience, is the being of the being. Once the nature of the object dealt with by the science is determined, that object (actually more a class of objects) can become the theme for research. Scientists then investigate the object using a method derived from the nature of the object of that particular science.

In Chapter 3, scientific philosophy is distinguished from other disciplines. Scientific philosophy will be like other sciences in that it will be constituted through an act of objectification. But because its object is different, it will differ radically from all other sciences. All other sciences (which Heidegger calls "positive sciences") posit, or presuppose, the existence of their objects, while philosophy does not presuppose anything. Heidegger also distinguishes scientific philosophy from other disciplines which might be passed off as philosophy. All of these supposed philosophies—Weltanschau-
ungssphilosophie, psychologism in logic, and even Husserlian phenomenology—make the basic mistake of turning philosophy into a positive science. While for Heidegger, philosophy must become scientific, it must do so in such a way that it retains its philosophic nature as the science of being.

Chapter 4 discusses the need for scientific philosophy. In part this is the need to ground and unify all scientific knowledge. Each positive science discusses a region of being. Positive sciences, however, are neither self-grounding nor can they explain how the disparate knowledge they reveal fits together. Historically philosophy has performed the role of grounding and unifying knowledge. Grounding individual sciences through regional ontologies, however, presupposes a general ontology which asks the question of the meaning of being. Even more important than philosophy's role in grounding and unifying knowledge is its own task of working out the meaning of being. Man is essentially his understanding of being, and the being-question itself is thus, as Kant indicated, located in man's very nature. For Heidegger, there is no activity more worthwhile and more human than raising the question of being. But raising the question is difficult. There is a constant danger of philosophy's falling into sophism.
If the being-question is to be properly raised, it must be raised in a scientific way.

The last two chapters discuss the object and method of scientific philosophy.

Chapter 5 shows how Heidegger hopes to make being the object for science. As was shown in Chapter 2, for Heidegger a science constitutes itself in the act of objectification. Something previously given is explicitly projected upon the horizon in which it is given. For beings, this means projecting them upon their being. However, the objectification of being itself poses special difficulties. Being is given in everyday experience, but not explicitly. Instead it is given indirectly as the horizon of the experiences we have. Because being is given indirectly, it is particularly hard to discover the horizon within which it is given. It would seem one way to attempt to discover this horizon would be to find a direct giving of being and then to seek the horizon. Heidegger attempts this in part. In anxiety before death, as Dasein sees the nothingness of the world, being is revealed to it. By examining the Dasein which is authentically resolute, Heidegger discovers that temporality is the horizon in which the articulated care-structure (i.e., Dasein's being) is intelligible. Time is thus the horizon for the under-
standing of being. With this discovery, the way to objectify being is clear. Being itself, its modifications and derivations must be explicitly projected upon time. The work around Sein und Zeit attempts, then, to perform the first basic act to make philosophy scientific. It attempts to objectify being. Once being is objectified, philosophic research can proceed. This research will consist of showing the temporal nature of the various aspects of being.

Chapter 6 deals with the method of scientific philosophy. For Heidegger, the method of a science must be derived from its object: the method must be appropriate to its object. The appropriate method for ontology is phenomenology. Phenomenology can best be understood by looking at the Greek roots of the term. These show that phenomenology is a term which indicates a descriptive method which lets phenomena show themselves from themselves. There is one object which is particularly appropriate for this way of treating things. Phenomenology should make what is hidden, yet present everywhere unthematically, show itself. Only what is fundamentally hidden really requires the phenomenological method. Phenomenology thus will be the description of being since it is being which, by serving as the horizon of all understanding of beings, is always given and yet hidden. Being must be made visible.
This requires that the ontological difference be recognized. Heidegger calls the recognition of this difference, the looking away from being and look towards being, the "phenomenological reduction." The reduction, however, is merely a step to the two central parts of the phenomenological method. Phenomenological construction will reveal the structures of being and being's relation to time. Phenomenological destruction will ensure that phenomenological concepts have the proper clarity by de-structuring the unrecognized prejudices we have built into our conception of being.

In the final section of the thesis, the Conclusion, the results of the investigation into Heidegger's idea of scientific philosophy will be resumed and an assessment will be made of the problems with this position. The main problem with the position is the possibility of an equivocation in the use of the term "science." If science has the structure Heidegger attributes to it, and if philosophy becomes scientific by taking on this structure, then the object of philosophy must be capable of being "objectified." However, it is not clear if a horizon--being--is capable of being explicitly viewed. Heidegger himself doubts this and later denies philosophy is scientific. Positive science and philosophy are radically different.
In the Marburg period, this means their objects are different. Later, it means their structures are different.
CHAPTER 1: PHILOSOPHY

1.1 Philosophy as ontology

The first step in understanding Heidegger's attempt to create a scientific philosophy in the Marburg period is to examine his idea of philosophy at that time.

Philosophy for Heidegger is ontology—the study of being. Heidegger claims that this is historically simply a fact. All great philosophers since the time of the Greeks have understood the central question of philosophy as the question of being. However, even if this were

1See GP, 15: "Wir behaupten nun: Das Sein ist das echte und einzige Thema der Philosophie. Das ist keine Erfindung von uns, sondern diese Themenstellung wird mit dem Anfang der Philosophie in der Antike lebendig und wirkt sich in der grandiosesten Form in der Hegelschen Logik aus." See also GP, 16: "Dass sich im Grunde alle grossen Philo-
not an historical fact, Heidegger believes that there is
a being-question which is central for human knowledge.
He often quotes Aristotle that there is a science which
asks about being qua being, and which Aristotle calls first
philosophy.¹ Heidegger wants to identify philosophy with
this question about the meaning of being.

Heidegger admits that this question may seem un-
important, vague, too general and lost in the fog.² He
even indicates that some may claim with justification that
philosophy has run out of questions if this is what it

¹ See MAL, 12. Heidegger also likes another quote
from Aristotle which states that the question asked from
long ago and which is ever posed anew is the question of
being (see GP, 19). Pöggeler notes (Denkweg, 17) that
"Das Denken Martin Heideggers entzündet sich an einer Frage,
die in einer einzigartigen und ausschliesslichen Weise
die Leitfrage der abendländischen Metaphysik ist, an der
Frage μίας φύσις; Was ist das Seiende, das Seiende in seinem
Sein? Das Seiende als Seiendes, es in seinem Sein zu fas-
sen, das ist die Aufgabe der »ersten Wissenschaft«, der
Metaphysik. Für diese gilt der Satz des Aristoteles:
»Das Seiende wird in mehrfacher Weise gesagt.«" See also
F.-W. von Herrmann, Subjekt und Dasein (Frankfurt: Vit-

² See SZ, 9, PGZ, 186, and GP, 21.
wants to talk about. However, such criticisms are rejected. In Sein und Zeit they are referred to as prejudices. The three central prejudices are that being is the most general concept, is undefinable; and is self-evident. Heidegger admits the first two while denying the third. However, in his admission he points to the importance of the being-question as the question about what is most general and what lies behind everything which is (and thus is incapable of definition by reference to something higher or more general). Being, as what lies beyond any particular existing thing, is what is most in need of investigation.

Heidegger claims that the necessary prerequisite for the investigation of being is the recognition of what he refers to as the "ontological difference." The ontological difference is the recognition that being is not a concept that can be defined in terms of something else. It is the fundamental difference between the world and the world of concepts. This recognition is necessary because it is the only way to approach the question of being in a meaningful way.

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2 See SZ, 2-4. In GP, 18-19, Heidegger speaks of dogma rather than prejudice. He says "dass sich ein bis heute unbestrittenenes Dogma in der Philosophie breit machen konnte: Sein ist der einfachste und selbstverständlichteste Begriff; er ist einer Bestimmung weder fähig noch bedürfnisig."

3 See GP, 322: "Mit der Möglichkeit eines hinreichend klaren Vollzuges dieser Unterscheidung von Sein und Seienden und demnach mit der Möglichkeit des Vollzuges
logical difference is the difference between being (Sein) and beings (Seienden).

Beings (Seienden) are anything of which we can say, in one way or another, "it is." Rocks, plants and animals, tables and chairs are all beings. Sounds are beings. Artworks are beings. Geometric figures and numbers are beings. Ideas are beings.² The term "being" (Seiendes) appears to be used to indicate what, in phenomenological terms, would be called the intentum of an intentional act, i.e., what intentional acts are directed towards. Thus beings do not have to actually exist in order to be called beings. Even hallucinations count as beings.³

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¹See PGZ, 195: "Seiendes oder seiend nennen wir vieles und vieles in verschiedenem Sinne. Seiend ist in gewissem Sinne alles, wovon wir reden, was wir meinen, wozu wir uns verhalten, und wenn auch nur als zu einem Unzugänglichen, alles, wozu wir beziehungsmässig sind und alles das, was und wie wir selbst sind."

²See GP, 18, for one of Heidegger's lists' of beings.

³Heidegger discusses the perception of hallucinations in his analyses of the phenomenological concept of intentionality. See PGZ, 38-40, and GP, 84-85.
Being itself, however, is not a Being. But although being is not a thing or a concept, it is not nothing at all. Being manifests itself, i.e., man experiences being and has an understanding of being. The problem with arriving at a clear concept of being is not that being is nothing, nor that it is something simple and elementary. Being manifests itself in so many ways—as ground, as existence and essence, as truth; as different regions—that it is difficult to understand what gives unity to these multiple

1See SZ, 6: "Das Sein des Seienden »ist« nicht selbst ein Seiendes. Der erste philosophische Schritt im Verständnis des Seinsproblems besteht darin, nicht μονοθέτιναι, »keine Geschichte erzählen«, d.h. Seiendes als Seiendes nicht durch Rückführung auf ein anderes Seiendes in seiner Herkunft zu bestimmen, gleich als hätte Sein den Charakter eines möglichen Seiendes." See also GP, 109.


3See GP, 318: "Der Begriff des Seins ist ganz und gar nicht einfach und ebensowenig selbstverständlich. Der Sinn von Sein ist der verwickelste, und der Grund des Seins ist dunkel." See also PGZ, 406, and MAL, 192.

4At MAL, 193–194, Heidegger states: "Der allgemeine Titel 'Sein' umschliesst diese vier Grundprobleme: 1. die ontologische Differenz, 2. die Grundartikulation des Seins, 3. der veritablen Charakter des Seins, 4. die Regionalität des Seins und die Einheit der Idee des Seins." See also GP, 321, which contains basically the same list.
manifestations.¹

Heidegger emphasizes that being (Sein) is always the being of a being (Sein eines Seienden). Being (Sein), however, in its various manifestations, appears as what is earlier than beings: being is the apriori.² Being is earlier than beings in the nature of things, not because it is known earlier.³ It is earlier because it serves as the ground of beings, or as what makes the appearance

¹The problem of the unity of being in the face of its manifold manifestations was one of Heidegger’s earliest concerns. See "Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie," in ZSD, 81. See also Pöggeler, Denkweg, p. 46: "Am Anfang des Denkweges von Heidegger steht die Leitfrage der Metaphysik: Was ist das Seiende? Wie ist das Seiende in seinem Sein zu fassen? Wenn das Seiende in seinem Sein in mannigfacher Weise sagbar ist, wie ist dann die Einheit der mannigfachen Bedeutungen von »Sein« zu denken?" See also GP, 247, where Heidegger talks of "... das lei-
tende Problem der Frage nach der Mannigfaltigkeit der Seins-
weisen und der Einheit des Seinsbegriffes" (italics re-
moved). See also GP, 170.

²See GP, 27: "Schon früh in der Antike sah man, dass das Sein und seine Bestimmtheiten dem Seienden in gewisser Weise zugrundeliegen, ihm vorangehen, ein ἀρχή, ein Früheres sind. Die terminologische Bezeichnung für diesen Charakter der Vorgängigkeit des Seins vor dem Sei-
enden ist der Ausdruck apriori, Apriorität, das Früher. Das Sein ist als Apriori früher als das Seiende."

³See MAL, 185: "Das Sein ist ἀρχή nicht als ἀρχή ἑαυτῆς, nicht in dem Sinne, dass es als solches von uns früher erkannt wird als das Seiende. ... In der Ordnung des Erfasstwerdens ist ... das Sein nicht das Früher, sondern das Späteste. Und doch ist es ein Früher ὑπό ... es ist von sich her früher."
of beings possible.¹ Philosophic knowledge is apriori knowledge because in philosophy the apriori, the ground of what is or the condition of possibility of things being as they are, is studied.

Philosophy, then, is the study of being, where being (Sein) itself must be understood not as a being (Seiendes), but rather as what grounds beings and makes their appearance possible. Philosophy is the study of being in a double sense. It is the study of what unites the manifold manifestations of being as well as the study of the modifications and derivations of this central meaning of being.²

¹Heidegger notes that as in Kant, for himself (GP, 461): "Apriori heisst ... das, was Seiendes als Seiendes in dem, was und wie es ist möglich macht."

²See SZ, 35, where Heidegger says that for him phenomenology studies "das Sein des Seienden, seinen Sinn, seine Modifikationen und Derivate." See also GP, 24, where Heidegger speaks of the "Problem der möglichen Modifikation des Seins und die Einheit seiner Vielfältig-keit" (italics removed); SZ, 230, where he talks of "einer Wissenschaft vom Sein als solchen, seinen Möglichkeiten und Abwandlungen ..."; GP, 170, where Heidegger speaks of "Die Frage nach der möglichen Mannigfaltigkeit des Seins und damit zugleich die nach der Einheit des Begriffs von Sein überhaupt ..."; and GP, 247, which speaks of "... das leitende Problem der Frage nach der Mannigfaltigkeit der Seinsweisen und der Einheit des Seinsbegriffes ..."
1.2 Priority of the subject

Heidegger notes that throughout the history of philosophy, the study of being has pushed one particular being—man—into the center of the investigation. ¹ This concentration on the subject was present even in the ancient period, prior to the importance given to consciousness since the time of Descartes. ² Heidegger approves of this concentration, ³ although, as we shall see, he believes that an essential point has been missed in philosophy's dealing with the subject.

The study of being (Sein) is, according to Heidegger, always referred to beings (Seienden) because being is always

¹See GP, 103-104: "Alle Philosophie, wie immer sie das 'Subjekt' auffasst und ins Zentrum der phänomenologischen Untersuchung stellt, rekurriert bei der Aufklärung der ontologischen Grundphänomene auf Seele, Geist, Bewusstsein, Subjekt, Ich ..." See also MAL, 19.

²See GP, 171, where Heidegger says "dass in der antiken Ontologie, die zwar primär am Vorhandenen orientiert ist, doch ὑπόκατον, νοήμα, λόγος, ζωή, θέλεις, Seele, Vernunft, Leben im weitesten Sinne, bekannt sind." See also GP, 318-319: "Wir sahen im Verlauf der Betrachtungen, dass durchgängig in der Philosophie, auch da, wo sie scheinbar primär und einzig Ontologie der Natur ist, der Rückgang auf den νοημα, den Geist, die ψυχή, die Seele, den λόγος, die Vernunft, die res cogitans, das Bewusstsein, das Ich, den Geist vollzogen wird,—dass sich an diesem Seienden alle Aufklärung des Seins in irgendeinem Sinne orientiert."

³He says (GP, 220) that in it lies "eine echter Impetus philosophischen Fragens." At MAL, 19, he says that "der Sachgehalt des Grundproblems selbst und einzig fordert diesen Kampfplatz, macht das menschliche Dasein selbst zu diesem ausgezeichneten Feld."
the being of a being (Sein eines Seienden). Thus if we are to investigate the meaning of being we must examine some particular being in regard to its being. Being (Sein) itself can be approached only through this examination of a particular being.¹ Heidegger believes that there is one particular being which has a priority over all others as the most appropriate to investigate. This being is man. Man necessarily falls into the being-question for three reasons.

First, man has an ontic priority over all other beings. This priority comes from the way man is. Man "exists." Existence means that man has an understanding of being and is concerned about his own being.² If we are searching for a particular being to investigate in order to arrive at the meaning of being, we should choose that being which

¹Robert Brisart, "Présence et Être," claims that for Heidegger (p. 56): "le retour à la subjectivité du sujet n'a d'autre exigence que celle du détourn par le chemin qui mène à la question de l'être; ce chemin ... est celui de la tradition ..." He then links the analysis of man (Dasein) in Sein und Zeit to Heidegger's call for a destruction (de-construction) of the philosophical tradition. However, as we shall see (in Chapter 6), this is not correct. For Heidegger in the Marburg period, the analysis of the subject is required if access is to be gained to being.

²See SZ, 12-13.
understands being and is interested in the question.

Second, man has an ontological priority over all other beings. 1 Man is himself ontological. He understands being and asks about it. If philosophy consists of working out the meaning of being, then it is necessary to determine how the question of being arises. This amounts to asking how being is given since the being-question presupposes that being is given. 2 Being, however, is given to man and the being-question is a question asked by man. It is thus necessary for ontology to examine man if we are to understand the nature of the being-question itself.

Third, man has a priority in the being-question because he is the ontic-ontological condition of the possibility of all ontologies. 3 Being is given to man alone, and it is man who asks the question of being. Being "is"

1 See SZ, 12-13, and CP, 318-319.

2 See PGZ, 193: "Die Seinsfrage fragt nach dem Sein. Was heisst Sein? Die Antwort lautet formal: Sein besagt das und das. Die Frage sucht eine Antwort, die etwas im Fragen selbst schon irgendwie mit Vorgegebenes bestimmt. Die Frage ist eine sogenannte Bestimmungsfrage. Nicht gefragt ist, ob es so etwas wie Sein überhaupt gibt, sondern gefragt ist, was damit gemeint ist, was darunter verstanden ist, nämlich unter 'Sein': Wenn so nach dem Sinn von Sein gefragt wird, wird Sein, das zu bestimmen ist, in gewisser Weise schon verstanden, in gewisser Weise, d.h. hier im Sinne eines ganz unbestimmten Vorverständnisses . . . ."

3 See SZ, 13: "Das Dasein hat ... den dritten Vorrang als ontisch-ontologische Bedingung der Möglichkeit aller Ontologien."
only so long as man is. But man, as long as he exists, understands not only his own being but also the being of all non-human beings. Man thus is the condition of possibility of all ontologies—not just the general study of being but also the study of the various regions of being.

1.3 Dasein

According to Heidegger, then, philosophy is ontology and ontology must necessarily study man. But in the Marburg period, Heidegger attempts to avoid using the term "man." Instead, when referring to human beings, he says "Dasein" (existence).

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2 See Sz, 13.

3 In the lecture courses the term "män" (Mensch) is used much more freely than in Sein und Zeit. Von Herrmann notes a certain ambiguity in the term "Dasein" (see Subjekt und Dasein, 21-22). "Dasein," he notes, refers both to human beings (a Seiendes) and to the human way of being (as a "reiner Seinsausdruck"). This ambiguity should not, however, affect the discussion which follows.
The term "Dasein" (translated by Fr. Richardson as "There-being," but generally left untranslated)\(^1\) is chosen to emphasize man's relation to being. Man is related to being in his very essence through his understanding of being. The understanding of being defines Dasein.\(^2\) The relation between Dasein and being is not, however, one-sided. Being is given only to Dasein and only as long as Dasein is.

Being is given in Dasein's understanding of being (Seinsverständnis). This understanding is not thematic or explicit, and for this reason is called "pre-ontological." For the most part Dasein is not at all aware of its understanding of being, and it tends to completely overlook the being-question.

Dasein is occupied primarily with beings. Beings are always available to Dasein,\(^3\) because, as phenomenology has shown, man is essentially characterized by intention-

\(^{1}\text{See Richardson, Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 34-35, note 17.}\)

\(^{2}\text{See MAL, 20: "Das Verstehen von Sein ist nicht eine Ausstattung unter anderen, sondern die Grundbedingung der Möglichkeit des Daseins als solchen."}\)

\(^{3}\text{At MAL, 213, Heidegger notes that: "Sofern Dasein existiert, sind ihm immer auch schon Objekte zugänglich geworden.\ldots" See also GP, 18: "Seiendes vermögen wir uns jederzeit und leicht aus irgendeinem Gebiet vorzugeben und vorzustellen."}\)
ality. Dasein does not first exist and then interact with objects. Instead, Dasein is always constantly directed towards objects, and this directedness makes Dasein what it is.

In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger does not use the term "intentionality," but instead says that Dasein's being is essentially a being-in-the-world. The world is already there for Dasein, objects are always already given, because Dasein is always outside itself and occupied with objects. Several expressions are given to this structure of Dasein's being outside itself, including the use of the term "existence" (Existenz) as Dasein's way to be: the "ex-" in "existence" indicating the outside-of-itself structure.

1 See GP, 90: "... wir verstehen das Seiende, dem die intentionalen Verhältnissen zugehören, als Dasein, und zwar so, dass wir mit Hilfe des recht verstandenen intentionalen Verhaltens gerade das Sein des Daseins, eine seiner Grundverfassungen, angemessen zu charakterisieren. Die Verhältnisse des Daseins sind intentional, besagt die Seinsart einer selbst, des Daseins, ist seinem Wesen nach so, dass dieses Seiende, sofern es ist, ja schon bei einem Vorhändenen sich aufhält."

2 Actually being-in-the-world is a broader concept than intentionality, as we shall see below.

3 Heidegger admits that speaking of Dasein's being outside itself is not a particularly good way of expressing what he wants to say because (MAL, 213): "das 'schon draussen' setzt voraus, es wäre doch irgendet einmal drinnen."
For Heidegger, the concept of intentionality, properly understood, dissolves the false problems of solipsism, of the reality of the external world, and of the subject-object relation in general.\(^1\) Determining that the subject is a directedness means that objects and world are already given in the very structure of the subject. Dasein does not have to go outside itself to find a world—as intentional, it is already outside.\(^2\)

Since Dasein is constantly directed outside itself, it is transcendent. This means Dasein goes beyond the subjective domain to encounter things different from it.\(^3\) The

\(^1\)See GP, 91, on the mistakes of objectifying and of subjectifying intentionality. See also MAL, 168.

\(^2\)J. N. Mohanty, "Consciousness and Existence: Remarks on the Relation Between Husserl and Heidegger," in defending Husserl against Heideggerian attacks, states (p. 327): "A truly and radically worked out intentionality thesis with regard to consciousness no more sustains and no less undercuts the realism-idealism dispute than does an existential Daseinanalytik." In GP, Heidegger clearly agrees that if the concept of intentionality is correctly understood, it will do as Mohanty claims, however, he accuses Husserl of not having radically grasped the real meaning of intentionality.

\(^3\)See GP, 425: "Das Dasein selbst ist in seinem Sein überschreitend und somit gerade nicht das Immanente. ... Transzendenz besagt: sich aus einer Welt verstehen. Das Dasein ist als solches über sich hinaus."

As Robert Brisart ("Présence et Être") says (p. 42): "L'importance centrale accordée par Heidegger à l'intentionalité tient en ceci qu'elle pose de manière générale la question de la transcendance, c'est-à-dire des conditions de possibibilité de l'ouverture au domaine de toute présence."
basic condition for Dasein's transcendence, and thus what makes all of Dasein's behavior\(^1\) possible, is Dasein's understanding of being.\(^2\)

Heidegger maintains that in order for Dasein to understand beings as what they are, it must first understand their being.\(^3\) Dasein can encounter things as what they are because it projects them upon a horizon of un-

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\(^1\) Rather than talking of "acts of consciousness," Heidegger talks of the behavior or comportment (Verhalten) of Dasein. See Timothy J. Stapleton, "Husserlian Themes in Heidegger. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology." Stapleton notes (p. 5): "That to which 'comportment' refers (for example, perceiving, representing, judging, thinking, loving, etc.) are the same phenomena which Husserl designates as conscious acts." Although Stapleton is referring to the 1927 text, the GP, the earlier (1925) course, PGZ, makes this same point. See PGZ, 47: "Die Verhaltungen des Lebens nennt man auch Akte: Wahrnehmung, Urteil, Liebe, Hass ..."

\(^2\) See GP, 462-463: "... Alles Verhalten zu Seiendem versteht schon Sein, nicht beiläufig, sondern dergleich muss notwendig vorgängig (vor-läufig) verstanden sein. Die Möglichkeit des Verhaltens zu Seiendem verlangt ein vorgängiges Seinsverständnis ..." See also K, 23.

\(^3\) See GP, 100-101: "Zur Intentionalität der Wahrnehmung gehören nicht nur intentio und intentum, sondern weiterhin das Verständnis der Seinsart des im intentum Intendierten."

Brisart notes ("Présence et Être," p. 45): "La possibilité même de la transcendance intentionnelle comme mouvement d'un Wozu à un Worauf est donc désignée par le sens de la direction (Richtungssinn) qui n'est rien d'autre que la compréhension d'une présence originairement signifiée comme l'être-en-présence, comme mode d'être de la présence."
derstanding.\(^1\) The horizon serves as the condition of possibility of things appearing. The horizon is presupposed in any human behavior: it comes, in a certain way, before beings. Intentionality, the directedness towards beings, requires not just the direction and a being, but a horizon of understanding which permits the being to present itself as what it is.\(^2\) The horizon of understanding of beings is their being: being makes possible the giving of beings.\(^3\)

Beings are made possible in many different ways

\(^1\)Dasein's understanding is characterized by what Heidegger calls the hermeneutic as-structure, which is essentially (SZ, 159): "... das Phänomen des »etwas als etwas«. Gemäß dieser Struktur wird etwas auf etwas hin verstanden."

\(^2\)As Stapleton notes ("Husserlian Themes in Heidegger"), this move by Heidegger means that (p. 6): "there is a component of intentionality which transcends the noetic-noematic scheme" and thus "an essential incompleteness haunts the Husserlian concept of intentionality."

\(^3\)Petra Jaeger, in Heideggers Ansatz zur Verwendung der Metaphysik in der Epoche von 'Sein und Zeit', Europäische Hochschulschriften, Reihe XX, Philosophie, Band 20 (Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang; Bern: Herbert Lang; 1976), states that (p. 149): "In den Werken im Umkreis von 'Sein und Zeit' ist das Sein der all-umfassender Horizont alles Seienden, das transcendenten schlechthin" and she notes that (p. 161): "Sein als transcendens, das überalle Bestimmungen des Seienden Hinausgehende, ist so in seinem Sinn der transcendentalen Horizont. Der transcendente Horizont, oder wie wir auch sagen können, der Sinn von Sein oder die Einheit der mannigfaltigen Bedeutung des Seins, ist die Zeit."
depending upon how and what they are. For example, a tool can be encountered as a tool because we project it upon the horizon of tool-ness (Zeughhaftigkeit), its being. In general, individual beings can be encountered as the beings they are only to the extent that they are projected on the horizon of being.

Dasein's intentional structure makes it difficult to pose the question of being. Dasein's activity is directed towards beings, towards what is presented within the horizon, and not towards being itself, not towards the horizon. However, in making possible the presentation of beings, the horizon itself is given. It is given along with beings as the background out of which they present themselves as what they are. As a background, it is not explicitly viewed.

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1See SZ, 151: "Der Möglichkeitscharakter entspricht jeweils der Seinsart des verstandenen Seienden. Das innerweltlich Seiende überhaupt ist auf Welt hin entworfen, das heisst auf ein Ganzes von Bedeutsamkeit ..."

2See GP, 402: "Das Verstehen muss selbst das, woraufhin es entwirft, als Enthülltes irgendwie sehen." (Heidegger refers often to the horizon as the "Woraufhin" of projection.)

3See Don Ihde, "Phenomenology and the Later Heidegger," Philosophy Today 18 (1974), 19-31. Ihde sees Heidegger's later works as being primarily concerned with the (p. 20-21): "presencing of what may be called horizons-phenomena," which Ihde himself sees as the source of "most of the crucial issues for a phenomenological philosophy." The difficulty with examining horizons is, as Ihde notes (p. 25-26): "The horizon is that which escapes note, is farthest from our attention; is the most latent and implicit within experience..."
thematically.\textsuperscript{1}

While Dasein's intentionality may seem to present problems for the posing of the question of being, the question can be posed only on the basis of intentionality. Although comportment to beings requires an understanding of being, the understanding of being itself requires that Dasein have a relationship to beings.\textsuperscript{2}

The double-sided nature of the relation of man and being is evidence of the ontic roots of ontology. If the meaning of being is to be attained, it will be necessary to study these ontic roots to see what permits the being-question to be asked. Otherwise there is a danger of either missing the ground of the possibility of ontology or of missing the ontological ground

\textsuperscript{1}For the unthematic nature of the giving of the horizon, see Sz, 145: "Der Entwurfscharakter des Verstehens besagt ferner, dass dieses das, woraufhin es entwirft ... selbst nicht thematisch erfasst."

In talking of Kant (KFM, 114-115), Heidegger also mentions that horizons cannot be thematically grasped: "Wenn nun aber das in der ontologischen Erkenntnis erkannte \( x \) seinem Wesen nach Horizont ist, dann muss dies Erkennen auch so sein, dass es diesem Horizont in seinem Horizontcharakter offenhält. Dann aber darf dieses Etwas gerade nicht als direkt und einzig Gemeintes im Thema eines Erfassens stehen. Der Horizont muss unthematisch, aber gleichwohl im Blick sein."

\textsuperscript{2}See GP, 466: "Kein Verhalten zu Seiendem existiert, das nicht Sein verstünde. Kein Seinsverständnis ist möglich, das nicht in einem Verhalten zu Seiendem wurzelte."
of ontic knowledge.¹

1.4 Dasein vs. consciousness

Placing the subject at the center of the being-question may make Heidegger appear to be following the idealist tradition. However, he denies this. He points out that Dasein is not what, since Descartes, has been called consciousness.² The difference between Heidegger's notion of Dasein and what he feels is the traditional notion can be seen most clearly in three points where Heidegger (implicitly for the most part) criticizes the traditional notions of consciousness as fundament, as self-contained, and as absolute.

Consciousness, according to Heidegger, traditionally serves philosophy as a "fundamentum inconcussum," i.e., the ground of all being.³ Although, as we shall see below (section 1.5), Heidegger speaks of fundamental ontology

¹See GP, 466, where Heidegger notes there is a double danger in philosophy, namely that "Entweder wird alles Ontische in das Ontologische aufgelöst (Hegel) ohne Einblick in den Grund der Möglichkeit der Ontologie selbst; oder aber das Ontologische wird überhaupt verkannt und ontisch weglässt, ohne Verständnis der ontologischen Voraussetzungen, die jede ontische Erklärung als solche schon in sich birgt."

²See Einl., 202: "Weder tritt nur das Wort 'Dasein' an die Stelle des Wortes 'Bewusstsein', noch tritt die 'Dasein'-genannte Sache an die Stelle dessen, was man beim Namen 'Bewusstsein' vorstellt." See also Q IV, 317: "Dans Être et Temps, il n'est plus question de la conscience. ... À la place de Bewusstsein (conscience), nous lisons Dasein."

³Q IV, 320.
which starts with the analysis of Dasein, as Guzzoni says: "Das Fundament der Fundamenta-ontologie ... [is] kein fund-amentum inconnussum,"\(^1\) i.e., Heidegger's analysis of Dasein is not to serve as an absolute foundation.

Although Dasein is not to serve as the ground of all being, Heidegger does say that being "is" only as long as Dasein is, and that were there to be no Dasein there would "be" no being.\(^2\) However, this does not make Dasein the ground of being, even if it does make Dasein the ground of ontology. Dasein is not the ground of being because although being, in a way, depends upon Dasein, Dasein depends upon being. Dasein's very structure includes an understanding of being. If being were not given to Dasein, there would be no Dasein.

Dasein is not the ground of individual beings either. If there were no Dasein, there would be no being, but individual beings would be unaffected.\(^3\) They would no longer be revealed, however, they would still be there.

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\(^1\) Alfredo Guzzoni, "Protokoll zu einem Seminar über den Vortrag »Zeit und Sein«," in Heidegger's ZSD, 27-60. See p. 34.

\(^2\) See note 1, page 37, above.

Heidegger has no doubts that the earth and the sun, dinosaurs, etc., were already there prior to Dasein's emergence, nor does he doubt that the universe will continue when Dasein is gone.¹

That Dasein is not the foundation of being means that things are outside Dasein. According to Heidegger, in the traditional notion of consciousness, all things become present within consciousness, and everything which is is within consciousness. For Heidegger, on the other hand: "L'être ... doit sauvegarder un 'au-dehors'"—i.e., things are not within Dasein; they are what they are and where they are.²

As we have seen, this "outside" character of Dasein comes from Dasein's constitution as being-in-the-world. Dasein, because of its intentionality, is constantly outside of the purely subjective realm and alongside beings.

The idea of immanence is criticized in part because it turns consciousness into the ground of being. Besides the objections noted above to the idea of taking the subject as the ground of being, Heidegger objects that no individual being can serve as the ground of all others.

¹See MAL, 216: "Der Kosmos kann sein, ohne dass Menschen eine Erde bewohnen, und vermutlich war der Kosmos längst bevor je Menschen existierten."

²Q IV, 321. See also Q IV, 321: "Au contraire de l'immanence à la conscience que disait 'être' dans Be-wusst-sein, 'être' dans Da-sein dit l'être-hors-de ..."
Being (Sein) is the ground of individual beings, but being is not itself a being: it is not consciousness, not God, and not any other being. Interpreting being as an individual being is the failure to recognize the ontological difference.

Consciousness, Heidegger believes, is used not only as the ground of beings: it is an absolute ground. Dasein, however, is not absolute. It is finite. One of the main points stressed in the analysis of Dasein in the Marburg period is Dasein's finitude, which is linked most closely to the fact that Dasein comes to an end, i.e., it dies.¹

Dasein's finitude permeates its entire structure.² Dasein is born into a particular society, with a particular language, culture, and tradition which it must assume. Like Kant, Heidegger notes that Dasein's finitude

¹See Richardson, Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 76: "... Being-into-death in There-being means for Heidegger that the limit is not simply the term of the process but permeates every part of it and makes the potentiality, which There-being is, limited through and through—thoroughly and irretrievably finite." See also James. M. Demske, Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1970), p. 4: "In Heidegger's initial phase, death is the existential ontological basis of the finitude of man ..."; and L. M. Vail, Heidegger and the Ontological Difference (University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1972), p. 58: "The ability to die remains the final and unmistakeable mark of man's finitude."

²Henri-Charles Tauxe, La notion de finitude dans la philosophie de Martin Heidegger (Lausanne: Éditions L'Age d'Homme, 1971), remarks that it is in (p. 54): "l'Endlichkeit, où l'humanité de l'homme trouve son origine."
means that Dasein does not create the objects it knows: finitude is another reason for rejecting the idea of Dasein as the ground of what is.\footnote{See L, 115-117.}

Although Dasein cannot act as the absolute ground of being, it is still in the center of the being-question. Dasein is central, not because it grounds being, but because it grounds ontology. Being is given to Dasein, and if we are to ask about being, we must ask what makes this givenness of being possible, i.e., we must examine Dasein.

\subsection*{1.5 Fundamental ontology}

In the Marburg period, Heidegger speaks of a fundamental ontology which studies the foundation upon which all ontology rests. This foundation is the giving of being to Dasein. Being is given in Dasein's understanding of being. Fundamental ontology thus studies the conditions of possibility of Dasein's understanding of being in order to arrive at the conditions of possibility of the giving of being.

The first step for fundamental ontology is to study the being of Dasein.\footnote{See MAL, 20: "... mit Rücksicht auf das leitende Problem des Seins muss dasjenige Seiende, das wesenhaft der Problemgrund und -boden ist, das menschliche Dasein, zuvor hinreichend in seinem spezifischen Sein bestimmt werden." See also KPM, 13: "Fundamentalontology heisst diejenige ontologische Analytik des endlichen Menschenwesens, die das Fundament für die zur 'Natur des Menschen gehörige' Metaphysik bereiten soll."} Heidegger states that the main lack
in previous philosophies was the failure to study the being of the subject.\textsuperscript{1} Instead, the subject was assumed to exist in the same way as things in the world. Heidegger criticizes particularly Husserl in this regard, because he believes that Husserl, with the studies of intentionality and the reductions, was close to being able to ask the question of being.\textsuperscript{2}

Dasein, as we have seen, does not exist in the same way as other beings because it is characterized by an understanding of being. The analysis of the being of Dasein aims at clarifying what makes this understanding of being possible.\textsuperscript{3} This clarification is necessary for the being-question because our only access to being is through Dasein's understanding of being.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{1}See, for example, SZ, 46.

\textsuperscript{2}See FGZ, 158-159: "So sehen wir in der Tat, die phänomenologische Forschung bewegt sich in ihrer Ausbildungstendenz und erst recht schon in ihrem Durchbruch in einem fundamentalen Versäumnis, und zwar im Hinblick auf die phänomenologische Befragung und Bestimmung dessen, was ihr Thema sein soll: das intentionale Verhalten und alles mit ihm Gegebene. Zwei fundamentale Versäumnisse hinsichtlich der Seinsfrage können festgestellt werden: Einmal ist die Frage nach dem Sein dieses spezifisch Seienden, der Akte, versäumt: zum anderen haben wir die Versäumnis der Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein selbst."

\textsuperscript{3}See GP, 106: "Nur wenn wir die ontologische Grundverfassung des Daseins verstehen, können wir uns klar machen, wie in ihm Verständnis von Sein möglich ist."

\textsuperscript{4}See GP, 319: "Wenn wir das Grundproblem der Philo-
The overall aim of fundamental ontology is to prepare a response to the basic question of ontology: the question of the meaning of being in general.¹ For Heidegger, the meaning (Sinn) of something is what makes the thing understandable as what it is. Meaning is the horizon upon which the thing is projected in order to be understood, or, as Heidegger says, meaning is the "Woraufhin des Entwurfs."²

The question of the meaning of being asks for the horizon in terms of which being is understood. The horizon,

¹See the beginning of Sein und Zeit, where Heidegger says (SZ, 1): "Die konkrete Ausarbeitung der Frage nach dem Sinn von »Sein« ist die Absicht der folgenden Abhandlung." See also GP, 21, where Heidegger states that the "Fundamentalfrage aller Wissenschaft vom Sein" is "die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein überhaupt."

²Later the question of meaning (Sinn) becomes the question of truth, and still later it becomes the topology of being. See Q IV, 278-279.

²See Sz., 151: "Sinn ist das, worin sich Verständlichkeit von etwas hält. Was im verstehenden Erschlossen artikulierbar ist, nennen wir Sinn. Der Begriff des Sinnes umfasst das formale Gerüst dessen was notwendig zu dem gehört, was verstehende Auslegung artikuliert. Sinn ist das durch Vorhabe, Vorsicht- und Vorgriff strukturierte Woraufhins des Entwurfs, aus dem her etwas als etwas verständlich wird."

See also Jaeger (Heidegger's Ansatz zur Verwendung der Metaphysik in der Epoche von 'Sein und Zeit'), p. 295, note 33: "Gegenüber Hüsers erhält der Horizontbegriff eine erweiterte Bedeutung, insofern er Sinnfunktion erhält, als das Woraufhin des Entwurfs, aus dem her etwas als etwas verständlich werden kann."
as we have seen is what makes possible the giving of the objects which are understood in terms of this horizon. The being-question, as a question about the horizon of understanding of being, asks about what makes being possible: what allows being to be what it is.¹

Heidegger admits that posing the question of being in this way may make him appear to be founding being on the subject. However, although being is projected upon a horizon to be understood, this projection is not a human performance.² Rather, it comes from the very structure of Dasein. Being is already understood: Dasein is constituted by its understanding of being. Dasein does

¹Ghanotakis ("Heidegger's Fundamental Phenomenology," p. 260) notes the Kantian-style question: "Heidegger's argument is here [in Sein und Zeit] transcendental in the Kantian sense of the term. It is based on considerations of the a priori or conditions of possibility. The Meaning, Truth or Topos of the Being of entities, is the a priori condition of possibility of every ontological disclosure."

²See Q IV, 267: "Sinn se comprénd à partir de Entwurf qui s'explique par Verstehen. L'inconvénient de cet angle d'attaque c'est qu'il laisse trop ouverte la possibilité d'entendre le projet (Entwurf) comme une performance humaine; dès lors il n'y a plus qu'à voir le projet comme structure de la subjectivité--ce qui fait Sartre s'appuyant sur Descartes (chez qui l'αἰσθησία n'est pas présente en tant qu'αἰθήμα)." See also SG, 146, where Heidegger accuses Nicolai Hartmann of having interpreted Sein und Zeit as a subjectivist account of being, where being is taken as a representation for a subject.
not create the horizon for the understanding of being but rather this horizon is given along with the giving of being.

The question of the meaning of being in general thus is the question of the horizon which makes being intelligible. As such it is also the question of what makes the understanding of being possible.\(^1\) But this is the question of what makes Dasein's existence possible. Thus, as we have already noted, ontology has an ontic foundation: it is grounded on an individual being, namely, on Dasein.\(^2\)

Fundamental ontology is fundamental in part because it studies the ontic fundament for all ontology and in part because it provides the fundament for further ontological research.\(^3\)

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\(^1\)Heidegger sees the being-question in the following terms (GP, 19): "Wenn Philosophie die Wissenschaft vom Sein ist, dann ergibt sich als Anfangs-, End- und Grundfrage der Philosophie: was bedeutet Sein? Von wo aus ist dergleichen wie Sein überhaupt zu verstehen? Wie ist Seinsverständnis überhaupt möglich?"

\(^2\)See GP, 26: "Die Ontologie hat zur Fundamentaldisziplin die Daseins-Analytik. Darin liegt zugleich: Die Ontologie lässt sich selbst nicht rein ontologisch begründen. Ihre eigene Ermöglichung wird auf ein Seiendes, d.h. Ontisches zurückverwiesen: das Dasein."

\(^3\)See SZ, 13, where Heidegger notes that it is "die Fundamentalontologie, aus der alle anderen erst entspringen können ..."
theory discipline. It seeks to exhibit the horizon for any understanding of being.\(^1\) Ontology in general, however, requires not just the horizon for the understanding of being: ontology consists of the detailed study of being, its modifications and derivations. It thus is necessary that the various structures of being as well as the regions of being be explained in terms of the horizon exhibited in fundamental ontology.

1.6 Time

The horizon for the understanding of being which Heidegger attempts to exhibit in the Marburg period is time. As is noted at the beginning of Sein und Zeit, the aim of that work is "die Interpretation der Zeit als des möglichen Horizontes eines jeden Seinsverständnisses überhaupt ..."\(^2\)

The works of the Marburg period begin with the conviction that all understanding of being is in temporal terms. There is some evidence given for this view. Hei-

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\(^2\)SZ, 1.
degger points out the terms used to talk about being have always been based on time: being as the apriori (what is earlier); being as presence (Anwesenheit, Vorhandenheit, and sometimes Präsenz); being as duration (Bestand); being as temporal (Zeitliches, Überzeitliches, Ausserzeitliches); being as the eternal (αἰώνιον). ¹

This historical evidence is not, however, Heidegger's main argument for the need to interpret being temporally. It is secondary to his "basic insight" that being reveals itself in a temporal horizon. ² Such Marburg writings as

¹See MAL, 182-187, on being as "was αἰώνιον, was immer ist" (183); as "ständiges Dauern" (183); as "Gegenwart" (184); as οὐνομα, where "Οὐνομα ist oft nur eine Verkürzung für παρουσία, Anwesenheit" (184); as "Beständigkeit und Anwesenheit" (184); as the πρῶτον or Apriori (184); as what is remembered because it is already known—Plato's view of "Ανάμνησις. Sein ist das, woran wir uns wieder erinnern ..." (186-187). See also L, 191-199, where Heidegger states that (193): "Sein verstehen als Anwesenheit aus der Gegenwart heisst Sein verstehen aus der Zeit" and (199): "Sein bedeutet Anwesenheit: Wahrheit bedeutet Gegenwart. Anwesenheit und Gegenwart als Charaktere der Präsenz sind Modi der Zeit."

²See MAL, 177-178. Heidegger says it is not because Bergson and Spengler, Husserl, Kierkegaard or Dilthey dealt with time that he deals with it. He states (178): "Die Analytik des Daseins als Zeitlichkeit im Hinblick auf die Enthüllung der inneren Möglichkeit des Seinsverständnisses ist vielmehr von nichts anderem als dem Sachverhalt dieses Grundproblems der Metaphysik bestimmt, genauer: von der Grundeinsicht, dass das Seinsverständnis in einem ursprünglichen, aber zunächst völlig dunklen und rätselhaften Zusammenhang mit der Zeit steht."
Sein und Zeit and the Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs start with the mere statement of this insight. Justification of it is left to acceptance of the value of the analyses derived from it.

The aim of the analysis of Dasein is to show how and why time serves as the horizon for the understanding of being. The existential analysis of Dasein shows that Dasein's being is "care." Care is a complex structure with many segments. Heidegger attempts to show that the organization of the care structure is made possible by Dasein's temporality (Zeitlichkeit). Temporality, as what makes possible the existence of Dasein, is thus the meaning of the being of Dasein. Being is given in temporal terms; being is understood from the horizon of time.

Although Heidegger uses the term "time" (Zeit) to refer to the horizon for the understanding of being, he makes clear that time must be understood differently from the vulgar everyday way the term is ordinarily used. Philosophy as ontology will thus have to clarify what time is, how time makes possible the giving of being in the various ways being is given, and what the relationship is between being and time.  

1 See MAL, 182: "Sein wird verstanden aus einem Zeitbezug, aber das Problem dieses Bezuges von Sein und Zeit ist das 'und'"
1.7 Universal phenomenological ontology

Heidegger's formal definition of philosophy in Sein und Zeit is that

Philosophie ist universale phänomenologische Ontologie, ausgehend von der Hermeneutik des Daseins, die als Analytik der Existenz das Ende des Leitfadens alles philosophischen Fragens dort festgemacht hat, woraus es entspringt und wohin es zurückschlägt.¹

Philosophy is universal ontology because it seeks the meaning of being in general. The meaning of being is time. As universal ontology, philosophy exhibits how time functions as the horizon for any understanding of being. It thus deals with what enables being to show itself in various ways and as various regions of being.²

Philosophy is phenomenological because the object of philosophy (i.e., being itself) can be treated appropriately only through the phenomenological method.³ It is the nature of the object itself which requires that philosophy be phenomenology, and not merely the discoveries that phenomenologists have made.

Philosophy starts with the hermeneutic (interpretation) of Dasein because being is given to Dasein and our only way of access to being itself is through Dasein.

¹SZ, 38, quoted in Sein und Zeit on S2, 436.
³See Chapter 6 (below) on Heidegger's view of the phenomenological method.
By starting with an analysis of human existence, philosophy deals with the origin of all philosophical questioning as well as with the subject-matter of philosophical questioning. In other words, philosophy, the study of the meaning of being, starts with human experience and returns to this experience by providing an analysis of what makes it possible.

1.8 Conclusion

Heidegger's view of philosophy as universal phenomenological ontology is a starting point for the Marburg writings. It is presented not so much as the result of Heidegger's investigations as it is presupposed as the point from which to begin. To the extent it can be said that Heidegger argues for this position, the argument consists mainly of the exhibition of what universal phenomenological does.

The main aim of Heidegger in the Marburg period is to establish his ontological question as the center of philosophical questioning. To do so, he attempts to link his question to the philosophic tradition and he attempts to pose his question in the best way possible.

In the Marburg period, Heidegger believes that the best way of proceeding is the scientific way. Scientific philosophy is better and more believable than non-
scientific philosophy. At this time, "scientific philosophy" for Heidegger merely indicated that philosophy was to take on the same structure as other sciences. I want now to examine views Heidegger held at Marburg on the nature of this structure.
CHAPTER 2: SCIENCE

2.1 Definition of science

For philosophy to become scientific, it must take on the general structure of a science. For Heidegger, the determination of the characteristics of science must first look at the question of the nature of human knowledge in general. Philosophy of science is not a special discipline within philosophy which examines particular sciences which already exist. Instead, the questions Heidegger wants to ask are: what is knowledge? and what are the conditions which make knowledge possible?¹

In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger states as his own view

¹See Sz, 357: "Nach der ontologischen Genesis der theoretischen Verhältnungen, fragen wir: welches sind die in der Seinsverfassung des Daseins liegenden, existenzial notwendigen Bedingungen der Möglichkeit dafür, dass das Dasein in der Weise wissenschaftlicher Forschung existieren kann? Diese Fragestellung zielt auf einen existenzialen Begriff der Wissenschaft."
a fairly Husserlian notion of science:

Wissenschaft überhaupt kann als das Ganze eines Begründungszusammenhanges wahrer Sätze bestimmt werden.¹

However, in the 1920s (as later), Heidegger is suspicious of the validity of "propositional truth" (Satzwahrheit).² Instead he is interested in how these true propositions arise, i.e., in how things (states-of-affairs, etc.) come to be revealed (enthüllt) or uncovered (entdeckt) for man.

Another formal definition of science given in the 1920s, but which is expressed in more Heideggerian language, is the following:

Wissenschaft ist die begründende Enthüllung eines je in sich geschlossenen Gebietes des Seienden, bzw. des Seins, um der Enthülltheit selbst willen.³

Science, thus, is not just any revealing or uncovering of beings, but is a particular way in which beings are

¹SZ, 11. This is very close to Heidegger's view of Husserl's notion of theory in the Logische Untersuchungen as being (L, 44): "... die Einheit eines in sich geschlossenen Begründungszusammenhanges wahrer Sätze." As Kisiel notes ("Science, Phenomenology, and the Thinking of Being") p. 168: "The Husserlian approach to science is strikingly evident in the early pages of Being and Time." Heidegger's treatment of science in Sein und Zeit is (p. 168): "characteristic of the Logical Investigations" of Husserl. Kisiel translates the above quote from Sein und Zeit as stating that science is (p. 168): "the coherent totality of proofs which ground true propositions."

²See L and MAL. See also the somewhat later essay "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit."

³PT, 14.
revealed. Science is a kind of knowledge. It is knowledge for its own sake.\(^1\)

In order to understand what science is, it is necessary to distinguish it from other forms of knowledge. This involves an investigation of man, since knowing is a human activity.\(^2\) Scientific knowledge, however, is a mediate form of knowledge. It is not immediately given to man but is arrived at through a process. Thus to understand science, it is necessary not only to see the conditions of possibility of human knowledge in general, but also to see what permits man to create sciences.

2.2 Dasein and knowledge

As we have noted above (Chapter 1), Heidegger uses the term "Dasein" to refer to man. Dasein is a particular being: the being which has an understanding of being. Dasein is intentional. It is constantly related to the

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\(^1\)See GP, 455: "Wissenschaft ist eine Art von Erkennen unwil der Enthülltheit als solcher." See K, 18, for a similar definition.

\(^2\)See K, 18: "Erkenntnis aber nehmen wir nicht im Sinne des Erkannten, sondern als erkennendes Verhalten. Dieses ist kein sogenannter psychischer Vorgang im Innern einer sogenannten Seele, sondern es ist als Verhalten des Menschen eine bestimmte ihm mögliche Weise zu sein." See also SZ, 11: "Wissenschaften haben als Verhaltungen des Menschen die Seinsart dieses Seienden (Mensch)." PGZ, 6, makes the same point: "... die Wissenschaften selbst [are] nichts anderes als konkrete Möglichkeiten des menschlichen Daseins selbst, sich über seine Welt, in der es ist, und über sich selbst auszusprechen."
beings in the world around it. Of all beings, only Da-
sein is characterized by being-in-the-world. Other beings,
such as stones, are simply there. They are innerworldly,
but are not themselves related to the world.\(^1\) Dasein,
however, is related to the world and has an awareness of
innerworldly beings.

Dasein is also characterized by freedom. Dasein
exists in such a way that it is concerned about its own
existence. Dasein chooses how it will be from among the
possibilities open to it. The most fundamental choice,
according to Heidegger, is to choose to be itself or to
choose to understand itself in terms of the beings with
which it has to do within the world.

Because Dasein is a relation to other beings and
to being, and because it is free to choose among several
possible projects, Dasein can uncover beings or leave them
hidden. Dasein is basically open (erschlossen) and is
capable of knowing things as they are if it chooses to
do so.

\(^1\)See K, 20. See also GP, 90: "Ein unterscheidender
Charakter zwischen Existierendem und Vorhandenem liegt
gerade in der Intentionalität. Dasein existiert, heisst
unter anderem, es ist so, dass es seien zu Vorhandenem
sich verhält, zu Vorhandenem nicht als einem Subjektiven.
Ein Fenster, ein Stuhl, überhaupt irgendein Vorhandenes
im weitesten Sinne, existiert nie, weil es sich nicht zu
Vorhandenem in der Weise des intentionalen Sichrichtens
darauf verstehen kann."
2.3 Pre-scientific knowledge

All of Dasein's activities evidence a kind of knowledge of beings in the world, however Dasein's knowledge is not primarily scientific. Science is neither man's primary activity nor is it the main way he knows the world. Scientific activity requires a struggle on the part of man: man is capable of science, but for the most part does not engage in it. Most men never even do any science at all.

Heidegger refers to Dasein's primary way of existing in the world as everydayness. Everydayness is not just statistically primary, i.e., it is not just the way Dasein exists most often. Instead, it is the basic way man exists, so that other ways of existing are

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1 See K, 21: "Der alltägliche Umgang mit dem innerwelten Seienden ist die primäre Art--und für viele oft die einzige Art--des Entdeckens der Welt." See also SZ, 11: "Wissenschaftliche Forschung ist nicht die einzige und nicht die nächste mögliche Seinsart dieses Seienden [Dasein]."

2 See K, 21: "Jedoch ist das Verhalten zum innerwelten Seienden zuerst und zunächst nicht das erken-
nende, gar im Sinne der wissenschaftlichen Erforschung des Seienden." Science requires struggle--e.g., L, 15: "Die Sachlichkeit wissenschaftlichen Fragens und die Prä-
zision begrifflichen Bestimmens wächst aus der zunehmenden Vertrautheit mit dem Sachgebiet der jeweiligen Wissenschaft. Und solche Vertrautheit wiederum ist nur da positiv mög-
lisch, wo der Einzelne im Kern seines Daseins--aus innerer Wahl und durchgreifendem Kampf oder unbegreiflicher innerer Berufung ein Grundverhältnis zu diesen Sachen gewonnen hat." See also S, 222, on the struggle involved for Dasein in arriving at the truth: "Die Wahrheit (Entdeck-
heit) muss dem Seienden immer erst abgerungen werden. Das Seiende wird der Verborgenheit entrissen. Die jewei-
lige faktische Entdecktheit ist gleichsam immer ein Raub."
modifications of everydayness. Even when Dasein takes on activities not characteristic of everydayness—such as scientific activities—it has a tendency to fall back into an everyday mode of existence.

Everydayness is characterized by a certain kind of knowledge which is not scientific, but which is untheoretical. In everydayness, beings become present to Dasein not as objects for science, but rather as things Dasein can take care of and use for its own concerns and projects. Dasein's relation to these beings is not that of science; instead it is a relation of concern (Besorgen) or "taking care of."

The beings with which Dasein concerns itself are presented to Dasein as tools (Zeuge). Tools exist in the mode of the handy (Zuhandenheit).

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1 "Atheoretical" in the sense of not using theories. Heidegger claims, however, that there is a kind of "sight," which he calls "Umsicht" (circumspection) proper to everyday existence. See SZ, 69: "Das »praktische« Verhalten ist nicht »atheoretisch« im Sinne der Sichtlosigkeit, und sein Unterschied gegen das theoretische Verhalten liegt nicht nur darin, dass hier betrachtet und dort gehandelt wird, und dass das Handeln um nicht blind zu bleiben, theoretisches Erkennen anwendet, sondern das Betrachten ist so ursprünglich ein Besorgen, wie das Handeln seine Sicht hat."

2 See SZ, 69: "Die Seinsart von Zeug, in der es sich von ihm selbst her offenbart, nennen wir die Zuhandenheit."

In what follows I shall translate "Zuhandenheit" as "handy" and "Vorhandenheit" as "merely present."
The primary way Dasein knows beings is as tools. Knowledge of tools comes in their use. Use, thus, becomes the main kind of knowledge Dasein has.\(^1\) Different tools can, of course, be used in many different ways, and Heidegger notes several different usages.\(^2\)

The reason Dasein can encounter beings as tools, is that it has a prior understanding of what a tool is.\(^3\) As we saw in Chapter 1, all of Dasein's behavior—i.e., Dasein's directedness towards beings in the world—is made possible through Dasein's understanding of being.\(^4\) Dasein

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\(^1\) See K, 21: "... das Gebrauchen als solches ist die Art des primären Kennenlernens, eine primäre und eigene Weise der Entdeckung des innerweltlich Seienden."

\(^2\) See K, 21, where Heidegger uses such terms as "Verwenden," "Gebrauchen," "Bewerkstelligen," "Herstellen" to talk of Dasein's everyday relation to innerworldly beings. See also Sz, 56-57, where Heidegger talks of "zuzutun haben mit etwas, herstellen von etwas, aufgeben und in Verlust geraten lassen von etwas, unternehmen, durchsetzen, erkunden, befragen, betrachten, besprechen, bestimmen ..."

\(^3\) See K, 22: "Dieses Verstehen, was Zeug heisst, öffnet uns zuvor schon den Horizont, damit wir uns zu einem bestimmten Zeug, es gebrauchend, verhalten können."

\(^4\) See K, 23, where Heidegger says that "... alles Verhalten zu Seiendem ein Verstehen der Seinsart und Seinsverfassung des betreffenden Seienden in sich birgt." See also GP, 390: "In allem Verhalten zu Seiendem, sei es spezifisch Erkennen, was man meist als theoretisch bezeichnet, sei es praktisch-technisch, liegt schon ein Verständnis von Sein. Denn nur im Lichte des Seinsverständnisses kann uns Seiendes als Seiendes begegnen."
can encounter tools, nature, and other Dasein only by understanding them within the horizon of their being. The understanding of being operant in everydayness is, of course, not explicit.\footnote{See K, 22-23: "Dieses Verstehen der Zeughaftigkeit und Mächtigkeit ist uns verborgen, ist unthematisch, ungegenständlich, vorbegrifflich." See also K, 23: "Das Verstehen des Seins ist noch nicht der λόγος des ἔν, kein ontologisches Begreifen, aber doch eben ein Verstehen des Seins des Seienden."} Everydayness consists of use, not of reflection upon what is.

Science, however, does consist of explicit and thematic conceptualization. If human comportment towards things depends upon a general understanding of the being of those things, we can expect that in science, this understanding must be more explicit than in everydayness. Furthermore, we can expect the understanding of being present in science to be different. In everydayness, Dasein understands things as being handy—ready for use. Science will require things to be present in a different way. Things will be present not for use but for research.

### 2.4 Mere presence

Heidegger refers to the way things must be for science as "mere presence" (Vorhandenheit).

Mere presence is a deficient mode of being. For the most part things are handy. Tools in the workshop
are revealed as being useful for certain activities. For something to be a tool, it must be revealed as related to something else. It is related to all other tools and to a human project. Mere presence consists of the breaking of these relations. In mere presence, beings are viewed without reference to their usefulness for a project.

Within the workshop it is possible for things to become merely present. Heidegger notes that disturbances can occur in the relation of a particular tool to the totality of the workshop. There are several ways such disturbances can occur. Tools can break, be in the way, be missing, be inappropriate for the task at hand, etc. When such disturbances occur, what was previously handy becomes merely present. Mere presence is a deficient mode of being; it requires that something ordinarily there be missing, i.e., that relationships be broken. Science is possible only if beings take on this deficient mode of being.

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1See Sz, 74: on a "Störung der Verweisung."

2See Sz, 74: "Die Modi der Auffälligkeit, Aufrichtigkeit und Aufsässigkeit haben die Funktion, am Zuhanden den Charakter der Vorhandenheit zum Vorschein zu bringen."

For the most part, after beings become merely present in the workshop, they quickly fall back into the mode of the handy and are used in other projects. Even a broken hammer can be used in some way. However, although a particular thing may remain merely present this is no guarantee of scientific activity.

Mere presence is a necessary condition for science, but not a sufficient condition. To the extent that we cease our ordinary intercourse with things in order to look them over so as to determine what to do next, our activity is still that of everyday intercourse with things. However, we do not arrive at science by completely withdrawing from ordinary intercourse with things and merely contemplating them. In fact, scientific activity often takes place in workshops (laboratories) where scientists use several tools in order to carry out research. Scientific activity is not characterized by mere contemplation. Instead, science is very active and occurs only when Dasein

\[1\] See K., 25: "Auch dann ist unser Verhalten noch kein wissenschaftliches, wenn wir von jeglichem praktischen, besser: technischen Verhalten zu dem Seienden Abstand nehmen und lediglich betrachtend, beschaulich, kontemplativ beim vorhandenen Seienden verweilen. Mit dem Ausbleiben der technischen Hantierung, d.h. durch das Fehlen von etwas, ist nicht auch schon positiv eine neue Verhaltung und gar die wissenschaftliche da."
has decided to pursue scientific knowledge.¹

The basic difference between scientific and pre-scientific behavior is that in science knowledge is obtained for its own sake and not for the use it may have in some human project. Both scientific and pre-scientific knowledge proceed by revealing what was previously hidden.² Pre-scientific, everyday knowledge, however, reveals only in order to use the knowledge thus gained to fulfill some human aim.

Dasein is capable of going beyond everyday knowledge by freely choosing to investigate beings without any view to the use to which the investigation may lead.³ Since no view is taken of human aims in such revelation, the scientist is effectively deciding to let the being show itself as it is. In fact, letting the being show itself as it is means not looking at the being for its

¹See Sz, 358.

²See K, 26: "Beides, das wissenschaftliche wie das vorwissenschaftliche Verhalten, ist ein Erkennen im Sinne des Enthüllens des vormalen Verhüllten, des Entdeckens des zuvor Verdeckten, des Erschliessens des bislang Verschlossenen."

³Heidegger talks of a "frei gewählte Aufgabe" (K, 26), of revealing beings for the sake of the revelation and of an "Aufgabe der Existenz" (K, 26) of so doing. See also GP, 455: "Wissenschaft ... ist eine Möglichkeit des Exstierens im Sinne einer frei ergreifbaren und frei ausbildbaren Aufgabe."
usefulness.¹

2.5 Objectification

The basic act through which sciences are constituted is called "objectification."² In this act, beings which are already given to Dasein are explicitly projected upon their being.³ This explicit projection upon the horizon

¹Heidegger claims (K, 26) that by letting the being lead the investigation: "Damit fallen alle Abzweckungen des Verhaltens fort, die auf Verwendung des Enthüllten und Erkannten zielen...."

²See K, 26: "Welches ist der Grundakt, durch den sich die Umstellung des vorwissenschaftlichen Verhaltens zum wissenschaftlichen vollziehen? Wir nennen das Verhalten, dadurch sich wissenschaftliches Verhalten als solches konstituiert, die Vergegenständlichung."

³In Sein und Zeit, this same act is called "thematization." See SZ, 363: "Das Ganze dieses Entwerfens, zu dem die Artikulation des Seinsverständnisses, die von ihm geleitete Umgrenzung des Sachgebietes und die Vorzeichnung der dem Seienden angemessenen Begrifflichkeit gehören, nennen wir die Thematisierung. ... Die Thematisierung objektiviert. Sie ›setzt‹ nicht erst das Selende, sondern gibt es ‚frei, dass es ›objektiv‹ befragbar und bestimmbar wird."

The discussion which follows is expressed in terms appropriate to positive sciences but not always to philosophy. Chapter 5 will discuss the objectification performed to establish the science of philosophy. Since Heidegger's idea of science is derived from the actually existing positive sciences, it is perhaps not unjustified to examine the notion of objectification in the terms one would use for these sciences.
of their intelligibility is possible because, as we have seen (Chapter 1), the horizon is itself given in everydayness along with the beings for which it serves as horizon.

In everydayness, the horizon, although given, is given unthematically. Everyday Dasein, for example, can use tools only because it understands tool-ness. It is not, however, at all aware that it has this understanding of the being of a tool.

Since scientific knowledge is discursive,¹ a more explicit understanding of the being of the objects of science is required than what is required for everyday knowledge of innerworldly beings. Objectification thus consists in part of an elaboration of the being of the object of a science.² Through the elaboration of the nature of the horizon, it becomes possible to explicitly project the particular being upon the horizon of its intelligibility and to understand the being in terms of the structure of its horizon.

¹Heidegger states that when a being becomes an object for science (K, 27): "Es [soll] für das erkennende Befragen Rede stehen."

²See K, 28: "Das Wesen der Vergegenständlichkeit liegt im ausdrücklichen Vollzug des Seinsverständnisses, in dem die Grundverfassung des Seienden verständlich wird, das Gegenstand werden soll."
Objectification is not a creation of beings, but of objects.\textsuperscript{1} Beings are always already given to Dasein since Dasein's basic structure is intentional, i.e., Dasein exists as being-in-the-world. In objectification, the being of some of these already given beings, or of a region of these beings, is explicitly determined.

Although objectification consists in turning the pre-reflective givens of everyday experience into objects, it really just lets the givens be what they already are. Working out, even though only roughly, the structure (or the being) of these pre-reflective givens does not consist of imposing an external framework of understanding upon them. Instead, in objectification, the horizon which is already given in everydayness is merely made more explicit. Thus objectification does not change what these givens are: it merely makes our understanding of them clearer.

Since beings are in many different ways, i.e., since there are many regions of being, there can be many sciences.\textsuperscript{2} Each particular science, however, will start with the objectification of the being which it investi-

\footnote{See K, 27: "Vergegenständlichung heisst: etwas zum Gegenstand machen."}

\footnote{As we shall see below in Chapter 4. See K, 27: "Viele und ganz verschiedene Bezirke des Seienden können Gegenstand der wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung werden."}
gates, i.e., each individual science will start with the explicitation of the being of what it investigates. Since the particular sciences each deal with only parts or aspects of what is given in our pre-reflective experience, each is limited.\(^1\)

The limitations which occur in objectification allow us to have several sciences which investigate the various given givens of experience. Where a particular given is projected upon its horizon, it is revealed as belonging to a particular region. As has been long noted in philosophy, determination is negation: developing concepts which express what a particular thing is make clear its differences from others.\(^2\) In the act of objectification, the explicit projection of a being upon its being occurs through the development of the basic concepts used to understand the particular being.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) See Sz., 362, where Heidegger talks of an "Entschränkung der Umwelt" in science which is at the same time an "Umgrenzung der Region" des Vorhandenen."

\(^2\) See K, 27: "In dieser Enthüllung des Seienden wird es durch die Bestimmtheiten umgrenzt, umgriffen, begriffen."

\(^3\) See K, 28: "In der Ausbildung dieses Seinsverständnisses erwachsen die Begriffe, die das eingrenzen, was z.B. geschichtliche Wirklichkeit als solche, was Seiendes als Lebenses im Grunde charakterisiert, d.h. die Grundbegriffe der betreffenden Wissenschaft."
2.6 Research

Heidegger is more interested in the foundation of science than in what sciences actually do. This is perhaps to be expected from someone who sees himself as founding a new science—a science of philosophy. Founding science means for Heidegger:

1. Erstens der Grundlegung ihrer Genesis aus der vortheoretischen Erfahrung, 2. zweitens der Herausstellung der Art ihres Zuganges zur vorgegebenen Wirklichkeit und 3. drittens der Bestimmung der in solcher Forschung erwachsenden Begriffsbildung.¹

Objectification is the basic act man must accomplish in order to do science. It is the explanation of how scientific activity can arise from man's everyday experience of the world.² Objectification is simply the projection of previously given beings upon a previously given, but unthematic, understanding of their being.

Once an object is created through objectification, it can then become a thema for research.³ Most of what

¹PGZ, 2.
²Heidegger speaks of objectification in terms of the beginning of science. See K, 28: "Die Genesis einer Wissenschaft vollzieht sich in der Vergegenständlichung eines Gebietes des Seienden, und das sagt: in der Ausbildung des Verständnisses der Seinsverfassung des betreffenden Seienden." As we shall see below (Chapter 4), work on the basic concepts of a science is also important for progress in that science.
³See K, 28-29: "Was so durch die Vergegenständlichung als Gebiet sich ausgrenzt, kann nun als Gegenstand Thema werden, der gegenständliche Zusammenhang kann 'in verschiedenen Hinsichten befragt und als Untersuchungsgegenstand festgesetzt werden."
science does consist of research.

Research always has as its aim the exhibition of the object as it itself is. However, the nature of the object determines how research will proceed. The method used, i.e., the approach to the object, the investigation of the object, the construction of concepts and the kind of proof all may differ with different objects.\footnote{See K, 27: "Je nach dem, was das Seiende seiner Sachhaltigkeit nach ist, sind die Zugänge zu ihm, seine Durchforschung und entsprechend die Begriffsbildung und Beweisart verschieden." See also PT, 14: "Jedes Gegenstandsgebiet hat gemäss dem Sachcharakter und der Seinsart seiner Gegenstände eine eigene Art der möglichen Entfaltung, Ausweisung, Begründung, und begriffliche Prägung der so sich bildenden Erkenntnis." At L, 16, Heidegger notes there are different "...Weisen der begrifflichen Ausformung (exakte Begriffe der Physik haben 'eine andere Struktur als morphologische Begriffe der Botanik oder historische Begriffe der Philologie')."} The historian, for example, will not look at the same objects nor use the same methods and techniques as the physicist, nor will he give the same kind of evidence, and the kind of truth we ascribe to his statements will not necessarily be the same.

Heidegger has a very "objective" view of research. Once the being of the region under investigation is determined, all research should lead to the same results. The act of objectification, in determining the basic structure of the object, determines what the appropriate method of the science will be, and thus how the science should approach its object and how it will formulate concepts.
Individual scientists working in the same discipline should get the same results if they have the same facts before them, since they are simply applying the same methods to those givens.

If the understanding of the being of the region investigated changes, research will also change. Methods and techniques flow from the nature of the object. If this nature changes, so may all activities pursued within the science.

Although Heidegger claims to have a high opinion of research—e.g., he praises phenomenology as introducing the possibility of research into philosophy—and he calls science itself "Forschung nach,"¹ in truth he denigrates the importance of research activities. Because the basic act of objectification determines all future results, the results themselves lose importance, and the only interesting aspect of a science is how its basic concepts are formed.

2.7 Foundation of modern physics

Heidegger does not give many examples of how sciences are founded through the projection of givens upon an understanding of their being. However, he does seem to believe that one of the clearest examples of this procedure occurred

¹ FGZ, 104.
in the foundation of modern physics.¹

Physics is the study of material nature.² Nature is always already given to Dasein in one way or another,³ and thus fulfills the first condition necessary for science, viz., that the being to be objectified be somehow already given.

For Heidegger, modern physics is radically different from the physics of the ancient or medieval period. He attempts to show that other attempts to account for this difference are insufficient. The explanation that modern physics is an inductive science starting with facts will not explain any difference, since both medieval and

¹See Sz, 362: "Das klassische Beispiel für die geschichtliche Entwicklung einer Wissenschaft, zugleich aber auch für die ontologische Genesis, ist die Entstehung der mathematischen Physik." See also GP, 457.


³As Heidegger notes, K, 29, the object of physics is "das Ganze der physisch-materiellen Natur."

³See K, 29: "Natur ist für existierendes Dasein immer schon in gewisser Weise enthüllt und begegnet zunächst als Naturgewalt und Naturerzeugnis."
ancient physics used facts.\footnote{See K, 30. Heidegger does not feel that an accumulation of facts is very important, probably because for him what is important is the determination of the basic concepts of the science. Once these are determined, everything else, including the facts to be discovered, is also determined. Science may uncover facts, but facts do not make science; concepts do. Thus he says K, 30: "... eine reichere oder gar unübersehbare Anhäufung von Tatsachen macht eine weniger umfangreiche Kenntnis von Tatsachen nicht schon zur Wissenschaft."} The claim that modern physics is characterized by experiments will not serve to explain any difference since, once again, both medieval and ancient physics used experiments.\footnote{See K, 30.} The claim that modern physics calculates and measures and in this is different also will not hold, since earlier physics had also calculated and measured.\footnote{See K, 30.} None of these three explanations can show what distinguishes modern physics from its predecessors.\footnote{See K, 30: "Die aufgeführte Momente--Tatsachenbeobachtung, Experiment, Rechnung--treffen, selbst wenn man sie zusammennimmt, nicht das Entscheidende in der Genesis der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft."}

Instead, Heidegger sees the move to modern physics as consisting in Galileo's asking what nature must be like so that natural facts could become available.\footnote{Heidegger claims that Husserl shows (L, 97): "dass Galilei nur dadurch Begründer der modernen Naturwissenschaft wurde, dass er als Physiker Philosoph war."}
Heidegger sees in Galileo is that the beings which physics investigates must be projected onto the mathematical constitution of nature.\(^1\) In other words, the structure of nature, as mathematical, must first be determined in order for research in physics to occur. Heidegger states:

Die Grundleistung von Galilei und Kepler war der ausdrückliche Vollzug des mathematischen Entwurfes der Natur.\(^2\)

This, of course, is nothing other than the determination of the constitution of the being of nature. In this determination, the science of nature is constituted.\(^3\)

Heidegger’s point in insisting on the importance of the determination of the general structure of the beings investigated by a science is that there are no pure facts.\(^4\) All facts are interpretations of what is. Interpretation works by understanding out of a context (or from a horizon).

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See also K, 31: "Die Natur muss auf ihre mathematische Verfassung hin zuvor entworfen werden."

\(^2\) See K, 31.

\(^3\) See K, 32: "Im mathematischen Entwurf der Natur vollzieht sich die primäre Vergegenständlichung dieses Seienden, und in dieser Vergegenständlichung der Natur konstituiert sich die Erkenntnis der Natur als wissenchaftliche Erkenntnis."

\(^4\) See SZ, 362: "Die »Begründung« der »Tatsachenwissenschaft« wurde nur dadurch möglich, dass die Forscher verstanden: es gibt grundsätzlich keine »blassen Tatsachen«."
In science, the basic step is to construct the context (or horizon). In this construction, the science takes on form, and only once this has occurred can research within the science proceed.¹

2.8 Conclusion

Heidegger's view of science does not come through an examination of what particular sciences do. The vagueness of his statements on science, the rather hackneyed nature of his only real example of the creation of a science² (the example of mathematical physics) and the lack of concrete analyses may make it appear that his views are of little value.

Heidegger's view, however, is that the important question to ask about science is the question of how science originates. Science, as a human activity, originates out of man's pre-reflective everyday experience. Central to Heidegger's view of science is his view of man. Man is taken to be primarily unreflective. Thus science becomes, in a way, a secondary activity whose emergence from man's ordinary unreflective activities must be explained.

¹See K, 32: "Durch die Vergegenständlichung, d.h. den Entwurf der Seinsverfassung, gewinnt die Wissenschaft allererst Grund und Boden und umgrenzt zugleich ihr Forschungsgebiet."

²He gives another example in PT where he talks of the science of Christian theology.
In examining how science arises out of everyday experience, Heidegger seeks a general structure which he can apply to all sciences. He realizes that there will be several elements to this structure. Somehow he will have to account for different methods, and even techniques, in the different sciences. He will have to account for the differing truth value to apply to sciences of experience and mathematical-apriori sciences. He will have to be able to deal with different ways of constructing concepts in the various sciences.

Heidegger's structure for science is, however, fairly simple. By far the most important element is the act of objectification. This explains the emergence of science from everyday experience. Science is constituted simply by taking one of the givens of that experience and projecting it upon the horizon given along with it in everydayness.

All other elements in the structure of science derive from objectification. Each science has a method. Methods differ from science to science. However, methods are chosen so as to be appropriate to the object--the object as "objectified" (projected upon its being). Each science consists mostly of research. Research is important. However, it consists merely of applying the method to the
object.

Although Heidegger's view of the structure of science does not seem to arise from a detailed examination of actually existing sciences, it does seem to arise from a particular paradigm. It arises from Heidegger's view of how modern physics was constituted.

The structure derived from this paradigm is supposed to apply to all sciences. It is also supposed to apply to philosophy. Scientific philosophy is simply ontology which takes on the structure of science. In arguing that philosophy can become scientific, Heidegger is stating that philosophy, as a kind of knowledge, is like other kinds of knowledge (namely, sciences). He wants, however, also to say that there is a radical difference between philosophy and other sciences.
CHAPTER 3: PHILOSOPHY VERSUS OTHER DISCIPLINES

3.1 Two kinds of science

All sciences, according to Heidegger, have the structure outlined in Chapter 2. All science proceeds by first taking one of the givens of everyday experience and projecting it explicitly upon the horizon in terms of which it is given. All science then continues by conducting research on the objectified given, using a method appropriate to the object.

Heidegger, however, claims that although all sciences have the same structure, there are two radically different kinds of science. As with the distinctions others have made between a priori sciences (such as mathematics) and empirical sciences, or between natural and social sciences
(Geisteswissenschaften), the distinction Heidegger draws between his two kinds of science is based upon the nature of the object each respective science handles.

These two kinds of science are positive (ontic) science and philosophy (philosophical or ontological science).¹ Positive sciences study beings or regions of being. Philosophy, on the other hand, studies being itself. Since, as we know from the discussion of the ontological difference, being is not itself a being, the difference between philosophy and positive science is absolute.²

There are many different positive sciences because being shows itself in many different ways, i.e., there are many possible regions of being. There is, however, only one philosophy: philosophy is simply the study of


²See PT, 14: "Jede positive Wissenschaft ... ist von der Philosophie nicht relativ, sondern absolut verschieden." See also GP, 28: "Die Unterschiedsgröße zwischen positiven Wissenschaften, zu denen Mathematik und Philologie gehören, und Philosophie lässt sich überhaupt nicht quantitativ abschätzen."
being.

In this chapter, we shall first look at what constitutes the positivity of a positive science. We shall then examine Heidegger's criticism of three "philosophies" (Weltanschauungsphilosophie, logical psychologism, and Husserlian phenomenology) which he believes are untrue to the object of philosophy because they would turn philosophy into a positive science.

3.2 Positive sciences

The principal difference between the ontological science and the various ontic sciences is that the ontic sciences, since they deal with beings (Seienden), presuppose the existence of their objects while philosophy makes no such presupposition.¹

Positive sciences are said to make presuppositions because they depend upon certain basic concepts which they

¹See Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Heidegger on the Essential Difference and Necessary Relationship Between Philosophy and Science," in Joseph J. Kockelmans and Theodore J. Kisiel (eds), Phenomenology and the Natural Sciences: Essays and Translations (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 147-166. Kockelmans, referring to the later text Was heisst Denken?, notes that for Heidegger (p. 149): "When the scientist begins his scientific investigations he always presupposes a certain realm of meaning which is 'already there,' whereas philosophy's major concern consists precisely in the radical questions immediately connected with the Total-Meaningfulness to which Heidegger usually refers with the term Being itself."
are incapable of examining. It is due to their basic
type as sciences of beings (Seienden) that positive
sciences are not free of presuppositions.

Positive sciences are sciences which take as their
objects individual beings or regions of being. Heidegger
states that what makes a science positive is that the
science require: first, that a being be given in every-
day experience; second, that man have a pre-theoretical
comportment towards this being; and, third, that this com-
portment be led by a vague understanding of the being of
this being or region. The positive science then proceeds

1See Jaeger, Heideggers Ansatz zur Verwendung der
Metaphysik in der Epoche von 'Sein und Zeit', p. 27:
"Wissenschaft ohne Ausnahme befragt nicht ihre Voraus-
setzungen, und kann sie wahrscheinlich nicht befragen,
denn das würde eine metaphysische Besinnung verlangen,
eine Denkungsart, die derjenigen in den Wissenschaften
diametral entgegensteht." It is to note that although
Jaeger is writing of the Sein und Zeit period, she does
not recognize that Heidegger at this time thought of philo-
sophy as a science.

2See GP, 17: "Positive Wissenschaften handeln
vom Seienden, d.h. je von bestimmten Gebieten, z.B. der
Natur."

3See PT, 16: "Zur Positivität einer Wissenschaft
gehört: 1. dass überhaupt ein irgendwie schon enthülltes
Seiendes in einem gewissen Umfange vorfindlich ist als
mögliches Thema theoretischer Vergegenständlichung und
Befragung. 2. dass dieses vorliegende Positum vorfind-
lich ist in einer bestimmten vorwissenschaftlichen Zu-
und Umgangsart mit dem Seienden, in welcher Umgangsart
sich schon die spezifische Sachhaltigkeit dieses Gebietes
by making explicit the everyday projection of the individual being upon its being.

By proceeding in this way, the positive science is making a presupposition. This is the presupposition of the existence of its object: the same presupposition as is made in the "natural attitude."¹ A positive science, in objectifying its object, is merely following through with the pre-scientific attitude towards the object, making the foundations of this attitude more explicit, but not questioning them.²

Heidegger gives a few examples of what is presup-

und die Seinsart des betreffenden Seienden zeigt, also vor aller theoretischen Erfassung, wenn auch unausdrücklich und ungewusst enthüllt ist. 3. gehört zur Positivität, dass auch dieses vorwissenschaftliche Verhalten zu den vorliegenden Seienden (Natur, Geschichte, Wirtschaft, Raum, Zahl) schon erleuchtet und geführt ist von einem, wenn- gleich noch unbegrifflichen Seinsverständnis. Die Posi-
tivität nun kann, entsprechend der Sachhaltigkeit des Sei-
enden, entsprechend seiner Seinsart und entsprechend der Weise der vorwissenschaftlichen Enthülltheit des betref-
fenden Seienden und der Art der Zugehörigkeit dieser Ent-
hülltheit zum Vorliegenden, variieren."

¹See GP, 92, on the "natürliche Auffassung der Dinge."

²See PT, 14: "Die ontischen Wissenschaften machen zum Thema je ein vorliegendes Seiendes, das immer schon in einer gewissen Weise vor der wissenschaftlichen Ent-
hüllung enthüllt ist. Wissenschaften von einem vorlie-
genden Seienden, einem Positum, nennen wir positive Wissen-
schaften. Ihr Charakteristikum liegt darin, dass sie die Richtung der Vergegenständlichung dessen, was sie zum Thema machen, geradezu auf das Seiende zugeht als 'eine Fort-
führung der schon existierenden vorwissenschaftlichen Einstellung zu diesem Seienden.'
posed in positive science, physics presupposes the mathematical structure of naturé ("mathematische Entwurf der Natur," K, 31); biology presupposes life ("Leben," K, 34); historical science, history ("Geschichte," K, 34); Christian theology, faith ("Christlichkeit," PT, 18), which Heidegger links to "Glaube," see PT, 21.

The positivity of positive science consists of the presupposition of these basic concepts, i.e., in the taking as given of the basic structure of the individual objects which are then investigated. All positive sciences, whether empirical or apriori-mathematical, make such presuppositions. What is presupposed is the being of the object. Every positive science depends upon an understanding of the being of its object, even when we are not

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1 See GP, 74: "Wenn sogar apriorische Wissenschaften wie die Geometrie, die nie und nimmer von empirischen Tatsachen handeln, noch etwas voraussetzen, was ihnen unzugänglich ist, die Seinsverfassung ihres thematischen Gebietes, dann gilt das erst recht für alle Tatsachenwissenschaften ...." See also K, 32: "In jeder vermeintlich reinen Tatsachenforschung liegen immer schon Vorräume über die Bestimmtheit des Gebietes, innerhalb dessen sie aufgefunden werden, und die Tatsachen für sich vermag die Seinsverfassung als solche nicht aufzuheben."

2 See K, 28: "In der Ausbildung dieses Seinsverständnisses erwachsen die Begriffe, die das einmalten, was z.B. geschichtliche Wirklichkeit als solche, was Seiendes als Lebendes im Grunde charakterisiert, d.h., die Grundbegriffe der betreffenden Wissenschaft."
aware of such an understanding.\textsuperscript{1} Since the presupposition of the basic structure of the objects to be investigated is, for the most part, done unthematically, these structures are left in need of clarification.\textsuperscript{2}

The scope of the positive sciences is limited by these presuppositions in two ways.

The first way is that each positive science is limited to the investigation of the type of object it presupposes.\textsuperscript{3} The validity of the statements emanating from each individual positive science is limited to a particular region of beings. Although interdisciplinary studies are clearly possible, it is not possible for practitioners of any one positive science to make useful statements about all types of objects, or all regions of being. Only philosophical

\textsuperscript{1}See GP, 72: "Alle positive Setzung von Seiendem schliesst eine apriorische Erkenntnis und ein apriorisches Verständniss des Seins dieses Seienden in sich, wenngleich die positive Erfahrung von Seiendem von diesem Verständniss nichts weiss und das darin Verstandene nicht auf den Begriff zu bringen vermag."

\textsuperscript{2}See SZ, 9: "Wissenschaftliche Forschung vollzieht die Hebung und erste Fixierung der Sachgebiete naiv und roh." See also K, 29: "Die Ausbildung der Vergegenständlichung des Gebietes, d.h. die Ausbildung des Seinsverständnisses und die Gewinnung der Grundbegriffe, vollzieht sich zunächst und zumeist naiv und ohne eigentliches Wissen um das, was hierbei vor sich geht." See also K, 34, on the unclarities of the basic concepts of sciences, and L, 97.

\textsuperscript{3}See K, 28: "Mit der Ausbildung der Grundbegriffe umgrenzt sich der jeweilige Grund und Boden der bestimmten Wissenschaft und ihr Gebiet."
sophy, which investigates being itself, can lay claim to being universal.

Positive sciences are limited in a second way in that, within the science, no questions may be raised about the basic presupposed framework on which the science depends. Methods used by the science cannot be used to investigate the framework because the framework is not itself the kind of object which it defines. This is true in the trivial sense that the particular techniques used by a science cannot be applied to the basic concepts of

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1. See GP, 72: "Die Seinsverfassung ihres [psychology's] Gebietes, die die Psychologie wie jede andere positive Wissenschaft, Physik, Chemie, Biologie im engeren Sinne, aber auch Philologie, Kunstgeschichte unausgesprochen voraussetzt, ist selbst ihrem Sinne nach der positiven Wissenschaft unzugänglich . . . Die Seinsverfassung von Selendem ist nur einer total anderen Wissenschaft, der Philosophie als Wissenschaft vom Sein zugänglich." See also K, 32: "Diese Begründung der von der Wissenschaft selbst vollzogenen Entwürfe der Seinsverfassung ihres Gebietes kann ihrem Wesen nach von den Wissenschaften selbst nicht geleistet werden." See also L, 96–97, where Heidegger notes that no matter how much knowledge a science like psychology piles up, it can never answer the question about its basic concepts—viz., "sie wird nie zur Beantwortung der Frage, was denn das Psychische sei . . ." As Jaeger notes (Heideggers Ansatz zur Verwendung der Metaphysik in der Epoche von 'Sein und Zeit'), p. 28: "Die Frage, was eine Wissenschaft sei, ist schon keine wissenschaftliche Frage mehr, sondern eine philosophische."

2. See K, 34. See Kisiel, "Science, Phenomenology, and the Thinking of Being." Kisiel notes that (p. 170): " . . . physics itself is not a possible object of a physical experiment, and biology as a science cannot be examined under the microscope as if it were a biological object. It is possible to speak biologically about fish and frogs, bees and beetles, but one cannot approach biology in a biological way."
that science. For example, if historical research generally uses the techniques of looking in old books and examining archeological evidence, then it would be impossible for historians using such techniques to discover what history itself is. It is also true more generally. For example, if physics is the examination of matter in motion, all statements in physics depend upon views about the nature of time (since time is presupposed in the definition of motion and in the measurement of matter in motion). However, no matter what technique the physicist used, he could not investigate time itself within the science since all his techniques and all his concepts already contain notions about the nature of time.¹

3.3. Philosophy vs positive science

Philosophy differs from positive science in that it does not make presuppositions which it cannot investigate. The reason for this difference between philosophy and positive sciences has to do with the nature of the respective objects of these two kinds of sciences.

Philosophy does not posit the existence of any particular being (Seiendes). Positive sciences do. This limits their scope while, since there are many different

¹See K, 33-34: "Der Physiker fragt nicht nach dem Wesen der Zeit, sondern er gebraucht sie als das, mit Rücksicht worauf er die Bewegung misst."
manifestations of being, increasing their number. Although positive sciences can make valid statements about beings lying within their respective regions they depend on philosophic research to clarify and define the regions of being which they investigate.¹

Philosophy does not posit the existence of any particular being because it is the study of being itself (Sein) and not of beings (Seienden). Philosophy is not limited in its study.² It studies what lies at the ground of all being. This makes philosophy the most universal and radical discipline: radical, since it studies what lies behind any particular being or region of being; universal, since it studies what grounds all knowledge. Philosophy also studies its own roots. By starting with fundamental ontology, philosophy studies what allows the being-question to arise. There is no fundamental question which philosophy leaves to another discipline for an answer.

¹See K, 36: "In jeder Wissenschaft von einem Gebiet des Seienden liegt schon latent eine ihr zugehörige, von ihr selbst aber nie, und zwar grundsätzlich nie ausbildbare regionale Ontologie."

Heidegger strongly criticizes any attempt to give up the presuppositionless character of philosophy, since such attempts essentially would turn philosophy into a positive science. In what follows we shall look at Heidegger's criticism of three such attempts: Weltanschauungsphilosophie, psychologism in logic, and Husserlian phenomenology.

3.4 Weltanschauungsphilosophie

Heidegger attacks unmercifully Weltanschauungsphilosophie as being one of the most serious adversaries of scientific philosophy.¹ The severity of his attack may be due to the closeness of his own views to those of Jaspers and others of this school. As was noted above (in the Introduction), the immediate reception of Sein und Zeit took Heidegger to be an existentialist. He was certainly seen as closer to those wanting to build a philosophic Weltanschauung than to those interested in the scientific nature of philosophy.

Weltanschauungsphilosophie is the position that the aim of philosophy is to construct a philosophic Welt-

¹For example, Heidegger says that (MAL, 230): "Weltanschauungsphilosophie ist überhaupt ein widersinniger Titel ..."
anschauung. Heidegger believes this is false. The aim of philosophy is to work out the meaning of being, not to develop a general view of life. While people who engage in philosophy may have a different Weltanschauung than other individuals, such side-effects of philosophic research are irrelevant.

Heidegger takes his understanding of the term "Weltanschauung" from Jaspers, although he discusses the use of the term from the 18th century onwards. Jaspers is quoted as saying

wenn wir von Weltanschauungen sprechen so meinen wir Ideen, das Letzte und das Totale des Menschen, sowohl subjektiv als Erlebnis und Kraft und Gesinnung, wie objektiv als gegenständlich gestaltete Welt.  

Heidegger claims that Weltanschauungen differ from scientific knowledge. Science requires man to take a neutral view of objects, letting beings be what they are,

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1 Heidegger states that for Weltanschauungphilosophie (GP, 8): "Diese Weltanschauung ist nicht ein Nebenprodukt der Philosophie, sondern ihre Ausbildung das eigentliche Ziel und Wesen der Philosophie selbst." See also GP, 4-5, where Heidegger says that in the conception of philosophy current in Weltanschauungsphilosophie, philosophy should: "nicht nur und nicht in erster Linie eine theoretische Wissenschaft sein, sondern praktisch die Auffassung der Dinge und ihres Zusammenhanges und die Stellungnahme zu ihnen lenken und die Deutung des Daseins und seines Sinnes regeln und leiten. Philosophie ist Welt- und Lebensweisheit oder, wie man mit einem heute geläufigen Ausdruck sagt, Philosophie soll eine Weltanschauung geben. So lässt sich die wissenschaftliche Philosophie gegen die Weltanschauungsphilosophie unterscheiden."

2 GP, 8, quoted from Karl Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (Berlin: 1925), 1.
rather than looking at them in terms of their usefulness. The construction of Weltanschauungen, however, aims at usefulness. Weltanschauungen help man situate himself in the world and in his life. They are not the type of knowledge engaged in for its own sake. The construction of a Weltanschauung involves arriving at a conviction which one can firmly believe, rather than arriving at knowledge.¹

Weltanschauungen are unscientific in another way. They need not be scientifically constructed, and for the most part are not. A Weltanschauung can just as well be constructed on the basis of superstition and prejudice as on the basis of science.²

Heidegger admits that the practitioners of Weltanschauungspolitik believe that a philosophic Welt-

¹See GP, 7: "Die Weltanschauung ist nicht Sache eines theoretischen Wissens, weder hinsichtlich ihres Ursprungs noch bezüglich ihres Gebrauchs. Sie wird nicht einfach wie ein Wissensgut im Gedächtnis behalten, sondern sie ist Sache einer zusammenhaltenden Überzeugung, die mehr oder minder ausdrücklich und direkt Handel und Wandel bestimmt."

²See GP, 7: "Ob die Weltanschauung durch Aberglauben und Vorurteile bestimmt oder ob sie sich rein auf wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis und Erfahrung stützt oder gar, was die Regel ist, ob sie aus Aberglauben und Wissen, aus Vorurteil und Besinnung sich mischt, das gilt gleichviel, ändert an ihrem Wesen nichts."
anschauung would be scientific.¹ A philosophic Weltanschauung differs from others—say, artistic or religious²—in that it is based on philosophy. It would thus be produced on the basis of philosophy's questioning of what is most general and universal, and on the responses to the ultimate problems of existence, world, and life. To the extent that philosophy is scientific, a philosophic Weltanschauung should itself be scientific. This means that a philosophic Weltanschauung would be based on the most recent discoveries in the various sciences as well as on the current state of development of scientific philosophy.

Although philosophy can give rise to a Weltanschauung,³ this does not mean that the aim of philosophy is to develop a Weltanschauung.⁴

¹See GP, 9.
²See GP, 8
³Heidegger equivocates a bit on whether there is a philosophic Weltanschauung. At MAL, 22, he says: "Es gibt in der Tat eine philosophische Weltanschauung ..." But later he says (MAL, 230): "Philosophie selbst gibt nie eine Weltanschauung und hat auch nicht die Aufgabe eine solche zu geben, im Gegenteil: Sie ist eine mögliche Existenzform, die gerade in sich, der Idee nach, noch keiner Weltanschauung bedarf, weil sie sich in den Möglichkeiten derselben bewegt."
⁴See MAL, 22: "Wir philosophieren nicht, um Philosophen zu werden, aber ebensowenig, um uns und anderen
Producing Weltanschauungen cannot be the aim of philosophy because of the way they arise. Weltanschauungen always come from the factual situation in which men find themselves. This is the reason they differ with different peoples and with different historical periods. As the situation man finds himself in changes, his general view of the world and of life changes. A philosophic Weltanschauung, based on the current position of philosophy and of science, would thus change as new discoveries were made. A philosophic Weltanschauung, like any other, is relative to a concrete factual situation of particular men.

Since Weltanschauungphilosophie arises from such

1See GP, 12-13: "Weil zum Wesen der Weltanschauung und damit der Weltanschauungsbildung überhaupt diese Positivität gehört, d.h. die Bezogenheit auf Seiendes, seiende Welt; seielendes Dasein, deshalb kann Weltanschauungsbildung gerade nicht Aufgabe der Philosophie sein, was nicht aus-, sondern einschliesst, dass Philosophie selbst eine ausgezeichnete Urform der Weltanschauung ist."

2See GP, 12: "Die Weltanschauung erwächst ... je aus einem faktischen Dasein gemäss seinen faktischen Möglichkeiten und ist, was sie ist, je für dieses bestimmte Dasein ...Alle Welt- und Lebensanschauung ist setzend, d.h. auf Seiendes seielend bezogen. Sie setzt Seiendes, sie ist positiv."
concrete situations; it is positive: it posits (i.e., it depends on, or it presupposes) the existence of particular beings—particular men in particular situations. Weltanschauungsphilosophie, to the extent it could claim to be scientific, gives rise to a positive science. Philosophy, however, is radically different from positive science. Philosophy is the study of being itself and not of individual beings. Weltanschauungsphilosophie, since it is positive, can not lay claim to being philosophical.

3.5 Logical psychologism

Logical psychologism is, in a way, a more thorough-going attempt to arrive at a scientific philosophy than is Weltanschauungsphilosophie, since logical psychologism can more easily lay claim to being scientific.

Heidegger goes through Husserl's criticism of logical psychologism in the first volume of the Logische Untersuchungen, and adds his own criticism as well.

As Husserl had noted, logical psychologism is the view that logic is a subdiscipline of psychology. Logic is the study of correct thinking. Thinking, however, is a psychological process—it takes place within the psyche. Psychology is the study of the psyche, therefore logic

\[1\] Which Heidegger doubts, since Weltanschauungsphilosophie aims at the useful rather than at knowledge for its own sake.

\[2\] See L, 31-89.
falls under psychology. Logic is merely a subdiscipline of psychology because it studies only some of the processes of the mind.

Since psychology is an empirical science based on the observation of psychic events, logic also is such an empirical science. Logical laws, such as the principle of contradiction, then, are generalizations based on observation of how human minds work.¹ The principle of contradiction, for example, really says that our minds are such that we cannot both affirm and deny the same proposition at the same time.

Heidegger thoroughly approves of Husserl's two criticisms of this position in the first volume of the Logische Untersuchungen: namely, that logical psychology is a form of sceptical relativism and thus self-contradictory, and that it is based on the failure to recognize the difference between ideal and real being.²

Husserl's second criticism is the more important for Heidegger. Essentially this criticism is that logical psychology's error is ontological: a failure to

¹See L, 37-38, and 39.

²Roderick M. Stewart ("The Problem of Logical Psychology for Husserl and the Early Heidegger") notes that Heidegger had made a similar analysis in his Habilitationsschrift of 1916. See Stewart, particularly p. 188.
recognize that things exist in different ways.¹ Heidegger notes that for Husserl, logical psychologism ends up natur- alizing consciousness and turning logic (and thus philo-
sophy) into a positive science. Logic, however, is not
an empirical science of observed facts (Tatsachenwissen-
schaft). Instead, it is an ideal science dealing with
ideal, eternal truths. Logical psychologism fails to re-
cognize this distinction in being, recognized since Plato.
It fails to see the Leibnizian distinction of vérités de
raison (as in logic) and vérités de fait (as in physics).²

Heidegger agrees with Husserl that logical psychologism, in attempting to make logic an empirical science, has falsified the nature of philosophy. Philosophy is
not an empirical, positive science, and it is ridiculous
to attempt to ground philosophy on a positive science.³

¹See L, 46-47: "Der Grundfehler des Psychologismus liegt demnach darin: dass er den Satz vom Widerspruch
auslegt als eine Aussage über reale psychische Vorkomm-
nisse und blind ist gegenüber dem eigentlichen Sinn dieses
Satzes, dass er etwas aussagt über ideales Sein, das Zu-
sammen- und Nichtzusammenhängen von Wahrheiten."

²See L, 50: "Die Grundverfehlung des Psychologismus
liegt letztlich in der Verkennung des Unterschieds einer
Grundverschiedenheit im Sein des Seienden." See also
L, 45.

³See GP, 76: "Anthropologie im Sinne der Psycho-
logie als einer positiven Wissenschaft zur Grundlage der
Philosophie, z.B. der Logik zu machen, ist grundsätzlich
noch widersinniger, als wenn jemand versuchen wollte, mit
Hilfe von Chemie und Physik der körperlichen Dinge die
Geometrie zu begründen."
However, philosophy is not an ideal, positive science either. As we shall see below, Heidegger carries over the Husserlian criticism of logical psychologism to Husserlian phenomenology itself. As with his criticism of Weltanschauungsphilosophie and logical psychologism, Heidegger's criticism of Husserl is that philosophy cannot be a positive science.

3.6 Husserlian phenomenology

Although Heidegger is clearly heavily influenced by Husserl, and although he calls himself a phenomenologist, he is very critical of Husserl and other phenomenologists in the Marburg lecture courses.¹ This criticism is that Husserl and others have not correctly determined the essence of phenomenology: they have not looked at phenomenology itself in a phenomenological way.² Instead, they

¹See PGZ, 124, where Heidegger says Husserl's and Scheler's research should be examined and "Sodann machen wir aus dieser Forschung selbst heraus deutlich, dass in ihr ein fundamentales Problem ungestellt bleibt und ungestellt bleiben muss, und warum es das muss, welche Bedingungen zu erfüllen sind, um es zu stellen, und wie sich daraus die Aufgabe der phänomenologischen Forschung radikaler bestimmt. Dieses Problem ist als phänomenologische Grundfrage nach dem Sinn von Sein ... Durch die immanente Kritik des Zuges der phänomenologischen Forschung selbst entspringt die Frage nach dem Sein ..."

²See PGZ, 178: "Die kritische Überlegung ergibt: Auch die phänomenologische Forschung steht unter dem Bann einer alten Tradition und zwar gerade da, wo es um die ursprünglichste Bestimmung ihres eigensten Themas--die Intentionalität--geht. Die Phänomenologie bestimmt gegen
have taken over traditional views of the nature of philosophy and have attempted to do phenomenological research within the limits imposed by those views.¹

The talk of phenomenology as a possibility and the refusal to attempt to arrive at the essence of phenomenology out of an examination of what phenomenologists actually do is evidence of this critical attitude.² Heidegger even claims that for arriving at a definition of

1 See PGZ, 147: "Die Herausarbeitung des reinen Bewusstseins als thematisches Feld der Phänomenologie ist nicht phänomenologisch im Rückgang auf die Sachen selbst gewonnen, sondern im Rückgang auf eine traditionelle Idee der Philosophie. Deshalb sind alle bestimten Charaktere, die als Seinsbestimmungen der Erlebnisse auftreten, keine ursprünglichen."

² See GP, 1: "... Wir wollen nicht historisch kennenlernen, was es mit der modernen Richtung in der Philosophie, genannt Phänomenologie, für eine Bewandtnis hat. Wir handeln nicht von der Phänomenologie, sondern von dem wovon sie selbst handelt." See also L, 32: "Über die Phänomenologie selbst will ich hier nicht, wie viele Anhänger der Phänomenologie sie auffassen, eine besondere Richtung der Philosophie, das Wesentliche ist auch nicht, dass eine sog. Schule existiert, sondern das Entscheidende ist das Prinzip der Arbeit, das als das phänomenologische bezeichnet wird." The principle is expressed in the maxim: Zu den Sachen selbst.
phenomenology it is of virtually no value to examine what phenomenologists do.\(^1\) Even if phenomenologists were able to agree on a statement of principles for phenomenology,\(^2\) this would not necessarily tell us anything about the essence of this discipline. To understand the nature of phenomenology we would have to first show

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\text{dass die phänomenologische Forschung das Zentrum der philosophischen Problematik gewonnen und aus deren Möglichkeiten ihr eigenes Wesen bestimmt hat.}\(^3\)
\]

For Heidegger this has not occurred. Husserl failed to grasp the central philosophical problem—the problem of being. The aim of the Marburg writings is to relate phenomenology to this central problem\(^4\) and to show that phenomenological research, correctly understood, presents a

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\(^1\)Although Heidegger admits (GP, 2) that this is what one ordinarily would do, and it is what Heidegger himself does in several of the lecture courses, particularly PGZ and L.

\(^2\)Essentially this is what Spiegelberg attempts in the Phenomenological Movement: he takes the masthead from Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung as a statement of principles.

\(^3\)GP, 3.

\(^4\)Heidegger attempts to show that (PGZ, 184): "Das phänomenologische Fragen führt seinem innersten Zuge nach selbst zur Frage nach dem Sein des Intentionale und vor allem vor die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins überhaupt."
more radical and explicit idea of scientific philosophy than has been actualized in the history of western thought.¹

Husserl's error is similar to those of logical psychologism and Weltanschauungspessimismus. It is an ontological error: it is the failure to recognize the ontological difference. Only through recognizing the ontological difference can philosophy be constructed as a non-positive science. As long as philosophy posits the existence of a being, even if this being is ideal, philosophy is as positive as any other science.

Husserl's main mistake was the failure to ask the being-question, and particularly the failure to ask about the being of the subject. Heidegger attributes this failure to Husserl's use of the reduction.² The reduction brackets.

¹See GP, 3: "... eine der Hauptabsichten der Vorlesung [the GP] ist zu zeigen, dass die phänomenologische Forschung in ihrer Grundtendenz begriffen, nichts anderes darstellen kann als das ausdrücklichere und radikalere Verständnis der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie, wie sie in ihrer Verwirklichung seit der Antike bis zu Hegel in immer neuen und in sich einheitliche zusammenhängenden Bemühungen angestrebt wurde."

out being and makes it impossible to raise the question of being. Although as we will see (in Chapter 6), Heidegger has his own version of the reduction, Husserl was correct in believing that the Husserlian reduction was absent in Heidegger.

This mistake can be seen in Husserl's treatment of logical psychologism. Husserl criticized this position for trying to turn philosophy into a positive empirical science. He, however, failed to realize that ideal sciences can also be positive: even mathematics, as Plato recognized, posits the existence of a certain kind of being.

The difference between philosophy and other sciences is ontological, as Husserl said. However, the difference between these two kinds of science is founded on the ontological difference of being and beings. The object of philosophy cannot, for Heidegger, be a particular being. Consciousness, thus, cannot serve as the object for philosophical research. Heidegger claims that if Husserl had posed the question of the being of consciousness, rather than simply taking over Brentano's characterization of

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1See GP, 73, where Heidegger, speaking favorably of Plato, notes that even ideal sciences like geometry presuppose beings and thus are unlike philosophy. Heidegger states that like Kant: "Gleichwohl sagt Plato: Obzwar die Geometrie apriorische Erkenntnis ist, unterscheidet sie sich noch grundsätzlich von der Philosophie, die a priori erkenntnis und das Apriori zum Thema hat. Die Geometrie hat ein bestimmtes Seiendes von bestimmten Wagnahalt, den reinen Raum, zum Gegenstand, der zwar nicht vorhanden ist, wie ein physisches materialiges Ding, der auch nicht ist wie ein Lebendiges, das Leben, sondern der ist in der Weise des Bestehens:"
it, then he would have been led to the question of being in general. Husserl, however, by failing to do so, continues the same error as the Logical psychologists: he makes philosophy a positive science.

3.7 Conclusion

In Heidegger's view, scientific philosophy is ontology, i.e., the study of being. Ontology depends upon the distinction of being and beings. Ontology asks the question of being in general--it asks about what makes possible the manifold ways in which things are. Fundamental ontology seeks to respond to the being-question by seeking the horizon for the understanding of being which we find in Dasein.

Many other scientific endeavors are possible, since beings exist in many ways. In positive science, a region of being is investigated. Certain basic structures or basic concepts are presupposed and research in engaged in. Positive sciences, though limited in scope, are capable of bringing us knowledge of the various regions of being.

Heidegger sees a danger in confusing philosophy with positive science. In Weltanschauungsphilosophie, an attempt is made to produce a useful philosophy which will help us get through everyday life, through an an-
alysis of our current situation. In logical psychologism, an attempt is made to ground philosophy in an empirical positive science: psychology. In Husserlian phenomenology, an attempt is made to construct a scientific philosophy on the basis of a particular being: consciousness. In all three cases, philosophy is interpreted as ultimately being a positive science: the ontological difference of being and beings is not recognized.

Heidegger's own attempt to construct a scientific philosophy thus must take care not to commit this same mistake. Somehow being must become the object for a science, without itself being treated as a particular being (Seiendes). If Heidegger were unable to maintain the status of being as something other than an existing thing, then he would have to give up the attempt to make philosophy scientific.

Heidegger's view during the Marburg period is that he can construct a scientific philosophy. Heidegger's universal phenomenological ontology will be philosophic because it will recognize the ontological difference. It will be scientific because it will take on the structure of a science.

Prior to looking at how philosophy is to take on the scientific structure, I want to look at why one would want philosophy to be scientific. The question to ask
at this point is: What types of problems is scientific philosophy supposed to solve? What is the need for scientific philosophy?
CHAPTER 4: NEED FOR SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY

4.1 Two-fold need

The need for scientific philosophy can be seen from two points of view. On the one hand, the individual positive sciences need philosophy for the solution of certain problems which cannot be solved within these sciences. Heidegger believes that if philosophy is to properly fulfill this function of serving the sciences, it must itself be scientific. On the other hand, philosophy itself, apart from any service it might render to the sciences, needs to be scientific if it is to accomplish its own task: to arrive at the meaning of being.

4.2 Grounding positive sciences

Although positive science and philosophy are radically
different, both as to object and method, they are both scientific: they both possess the structure of science discussed above (Chapter 2).

As we have seen, the relation of positive sciences to philosophy is one of dependence. Positive sciences depend upon philosophy for the clarification and grounding of their basic concepts. This dependence can be seen both historically and thematically.

Heidegger summarizes his view of the history of the development of the various branches of knowledge as follows:

In der Frühzeit der Antike bedeutet \( \phiιλοσοφία \) soviel wie Wissenschaft überhaupt. Später lösen sich einzelne Philosophien, d.h. einzelne Wissenschaften, so etwa Medizin und Mathematik, aus der Philosophie los. Die Bezeichnung \( \phiιλοσοφία \) bleibt jetzt einer Wissenschaft, die allen anderen besonderen Wissenschaften zugrundeliegt und sie umgreift. Die Philosophie wird die Wissenschaft schlechthin. Sie findet sich mehr und mehr als erste und höchste Wissenschaft oder, wie man zur Zeit des deutschen Idealismus sagte, als absolute Wissenschaft.¹

This view of the development of the sciences out of a previously undifferentiated body of human knowledge and the subsequent questioning of the place of philosophy in more recent times is one which remains with Heidegger throughout

¹GP, 4.

Heidegger believes that this historical development points to the dependence of positive science on philosophy. Positive sciences, for Heidegger, are special studies within philosophy. Philosophy is the study of being in general; positive sciences study particular regions of being. As these studies became more developed, they were detached from philosophy. However, even when they thus gained a relative independence from philosophy, they remained referred back to philosophy, both for the general idea of being which underlies all knowledge, and for the clarification of the being of the various regions of beings.\footnote{2}{See K, 37-38, where Heidegger states it is a fact "dass sich gerade die Wissenschaften aus der Philosophie entwickelt haben, und dass man in der Antike die einzelnen Wissenschaften einzelne Philosophen nannte. Hier offenbart sich ein wenn auch noch dunkles Wissen darum, dass die Besinnung über Seiendes, alle Wissenschaft, schon Sein versteht und hinsichtlich ihrer Möglichkeit von der Stufe der Ausbildung dieses Seinsverständnisses abhängt."}
Since all sciences started in philosophy and remain referred back to philosophy, all science can be said to be latently and basically philosophy.¹

Heidegger does not rely, however, on this historical argument for the determination of the dependency of positive science on philosophy. Instead he looks at how scientific knowledge can be grounded.

When philosophy was the only science, the problem of grounding knowledge was the problem of grounding philosophy. This is a properly philosophic problem. Philosophy studies its own ground: the ground for philosophic knowledge is one of the central philosophical problems. As we have seen above (Chapter 3), philosophy, as the study of being, is capable of studying its own ground because it is both universal and radical. Philosophy studies what is most central: it studies what gives the foundations of knowledge.²

Individual positive sciences, on the other hand,

¹See K, 38: "Alle Wissenschaft ist latent und im Grunde Philosophie."

²See MAL, 194: "Das Problem des Seins ist ... als zentrales, universales und radikales deutlich gemacht." See also MAL, 22, where philosophy is called "radikalste universaliste strengste begriffliche Erkenntnis."
do not study the foundations of knowledge. They study neither the general foundations of knowledge, nor that of the knowledge which they themselves produce, i.e., they do not study their own basic concepts.

Positive sciences study individual beings or regions of being. They proceed by projecting their objects explicitly upon the horizon in which that object is given. The horizon of understanding for a particular being is the being of that being. Positive science, thus, requires an understanding of the being of the region of beings which it investigates. For the most part, however, the understanding of the being of the region present in positive science will be vague and non-thematic.

Positive sciences can continue to operate for long periods using the vague everyday understanding of the being of the region under investigation. However, eventually they arrive at a point where this vague determination of the being of the region causes difficulty and clarification.

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1 See, for example, FGZ, 149: "... der Mathematiker kann das mathematische Feld, den gesamten Bereich dessen, was Gegenstandmathematischer Betrachtung und Frage ist, umgrenzen; er kann eine gewisse Definition des Gegenstandes der Mathematik geben, ohne dass er dabei notwendig die Frage nach der Seinsart der mathematischen Gegenstände je stellt."
is required.\(^1\) Heidegger refers to such a situation as a crisis in the foundations (Grundlagenkrise) of a science. He states that in the 1920s many sciences had come into such crises and that researchers in these disciplines seemed incapable of finding solutions to them.\(^2\)

The reason for the incapacities of scientists to solve the crises lay in the limitations caused by the positivity of the individual sciences.\(^3\) These sciences are not constructed in such a way as to investigate their basic concepts. Instead the concepts are merely presupposed. Statements within the science can be justified by referring eventually back to the basic concepts, but these concepts themselves cannot be grounded in the same way.\(^4\)

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\(^1\)Heidegger states that this happens rarely and for only short periods of time. See GP, 75: "Die Geschichte aller positiven Wissenschaften zeigt, dass sie nur momentweise aus den Träumen erwachen und die Augen aufschlagen nach dem Sein des Seienden, das sie erfor-
schen ..."  

\(^2\)See SZ, 9-10, where Heidegger discusses Grund-
lagenkrise of mathematics, physics, biology, historical Geisteswissenschaften, and theology. See also PGZ, 3-6, for essentially the same discussion. At GP, 75, Heidegger indicates that there are currently (1927) several sciences in crisis.

\(^3\)See Chapter 3, above.

\(^4\)See SZ, 10. See also Theodore Kisiel, "Science, Phenomenology, and the Thinking of Being," p. 169: "The field in which a science moves is never grounded by that science, but is only taken up and confirmed by it. Every
The incapability of positive sciences to investigate their basic concepts means that they are incapable of progressing. Heidegger maintains that progress in science comes only in a revision of these basic concepts.¹ Sciences do not progress by collecting facts, but rather by revising concepts.² However, such revision can occur only outside the science. Naturally, the people who make the revisions may themselves be leading scientists, however, these revisions themselves consist of redefining regions of beings, i.e., the revisions are a part of ontological

¹See SZ, 9: "Die eigentliche »Bewegung« der Wissenschaften spielt sich ab in der mehr oder minder radikalen und ihr selbst durchsichtigen Revisions der Grundbegriffe." See also L, 97, where Heidegger says that a science only gets moving: "wenn eine solche Wissenschaft immer wieder es versteht, die philosophische Bewegung zu machen, d.h. nach ihrem Feld erneut zu fragen und die Grundbegriffe zu revidieren."

²See K, 34, where Heidegger maintains: "dass die eigentliche Entwicklung und Geschichte einer Wissenschaft sich nicht in der Entdeckung neuer Tatsachen vollzieht, sondern in der Umbildung ihrer Grundbegriffe, d.h. in der Wandlung des Verständnisses der Seinsverfassung des betreffenden Gebietes." See also L, 16-17: "Eine Wissenschaft entwickelt sich nicht dadurch, dass irgendein Gelehrter in einem bestimmten Fall etwas Neues findet, sondern der Ruck, in dem eine Wissenschaft vorwärts kommt, liegt jeweils in der Revision der Grundbegriffe, d.h. in der von da einsetzenden Umlegung der bisher vorhandenen Sätze und Begriffsbestände auf neue Fundamente."
or philosophical research.\footnote{1}

Positive sciences thus find themselves referred to philosophy for the clarification and grounding of their basic concepts.\footnote{2} Since positive sciences study regions of being, they require that regional ontologies be constructed.

Heidegger occasionally refers to the use of philosophy to clarify the basic concepts of positive sciences as "productive logic."\footnote{3} Productive logic is distinguished by the fact that it precedes scientific investigation rather than just coming after science, clarifying concepts.

\footnote{1}{See PT, 33. See also L, 97-98, where Heidegger states "dass Galilei nur dadurch Begründer der modernen Naturwissenschaft wurde, dass er als Physiker Philosoph war ..."}

\footnote{2}{In Heidegger's view, positive sciences are always operating within a philosophical framework, even when they are not aware of it. A positive science makes discoveries about the being it investigates. As Heidegger states (PT, 28): "... jedes Seiende enthält sich nur auf dem Grunde eines vorgängigen, wenngleich nicht gewussten vorbegrifflichen Verständnisses dessen, was dieses betreffende Seiende ist und wie es ist. Alle ontische Auslegung bewegt sich auf einem zunächst und zumeist verborgenen Grunde einer Ontologie."}

\footnote{3}{See SZ, 10-11. Heidegger talks of philosophy as being (SZ, 10): "... produktive Logik in dem Sinne, dass sie in ein bestimmtes Seinsgebiet gleichsam vorspringt, es in seiner Seinsverfassung allererst erschliesst und die gewonnenen Strukturen den positiven Wissenschaften als durchsichtige Anwesungen des Fragens verfügbar macht." On productive logic see also PGZ, 2-3.}
already being used.

The dependence of positive science on philosophy
does not mean that individual scientists will hold up
their researches until philosophers settle certain ques-
tions.¹ Nor is the corrective brought to science by pro-
ductive logic the main task of philosophy.² Heidegger
recognizes that science can and does continue even when
there is great unclarity about the meaning of basic con-
cepts. He also believes that philosophy, as the study
of being, can be what it is without performing any services
to the ontic, positive sciences.

¹See K, 38-39.

²See PT, 32, where Heidegger notes in relation
to a particular science (theology): "Die Philosophie ist
das mögliche, formal anzeigende ontologische Korrektiv des
ontischen, und zwar vorchristlichen Gehaltes der theolo-
gischen Grundbegriffe. Philosophie kann aber sein, was
sie ist, ohne dass sie als dieses Korrektiv faktisch fun-
giert." (Italics removed.)

Hans Seigfried claims ("Heidegger's Longest Day," p. 327) that: "...there can be no doubt (1) that the
prime purpose of the elaboration of the being question in
Being and Time is the radical and ultimate foundation
of the sciences (Grundlegung der Wissenschaften) through
the foundation of those regional ontologies which provide
their foundations (BT, 11), and (2) that the existential
analytic of Dasein is nothing but a means to that end...."
My argument is that Heidegger's belief is that philosophy
can serve to ground science, but the real aim of Sein und
Zeit is what Heidegger says it is: to work out the meaning
of being (see SZ, 1). Grounding the sciences is one reason
to work out the meaning of being, but the main reason is
that the being-question is in itself the most important
question to examine, regardless of the effects this ex-
amination may have.
The dependence of positive science on philosophy essentially just means that the ultimate justification and clarification of the basic concepts of positive science and of all knowledge at all come in philosophy. If, however, this is the case then there is a need for philosophy itself to be put on a firm footing—for philosophy to become scientific.

4.3 Unity of knowledge

A second problem where the individual sciences need help from philosophy is the problem of the unity of knowledge.

If there were only one science, then there would be no problem of the unity of human knowledge. However, the number of sciences which Heidegger sees as having developed their independence from philosophy is fairly large. Heidegger, writing in German in the 1920s, sees perhaps more sciences than an English-speaker would see in the 1980s. He uses the term "science" to refer to almost any organized body of knowledge, or, indeed, any discipline strong enough to acquire departmental status at university. ¹ Thus while mathematics and natural sciences such

¹ See Heidegger's Rektoratsrede (Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität). Heidegger was concerned about overspecialization and lack of communication among faculties. He believed it was important that the unity of human know-
as physics, chemistry, and biology are certainly sciences, so are both applied disciplines such as medical science, and social sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) such as psychology and anthropology. Heidegger refers to even such studies as literary history, art history, and theology as sciences.¹ Philosophy, of course, is often called a science.

When positive sciences came to be erected independently of philosophy, the problem as to the unity of human knowledge arose. For the Greeks of the earliest period, when ἔφησε and φιλοσοφεῖα were not separable, there was no problem of the unity of knowledge. It is only when there are many sciences, each purporting to refer to the same reality, that one can ask what unifies the statements made by these different sciences.

¹For lists of sciences see GP, 72: "... Psychologie,..., Physik, Chemie, Biologie,..., Philologie, Kunstgeschichte..."; GP, 74: "Geometrie,..., Psychologie,..., Anthropologie,..."; GP, 28: "... Mathematik,..., Philologie,..."; GP, 4: "... Medizin,..., Mathematik,..."; SZ, 9-10, and PGZ 4-6; have essentially the same list: "Mathematik,..., Physik,..., Biologie,..., historischen Geisteswissenschaften,..., Literaturgeschichte,..., Theologie,..."
For Heidegger, the history of the development of the sciences out of philosophy shows us the way to handle the question of the unity of knowledge. In the earliest period—prior even to the division of philosophy into logic, ethics, and physics—philosophy provided the unity to knowledge. Philosophy is the study of what is most universal since it is the study of being itself. As we have seen, each positive science, as a study of a region of beings, depends on an understanding of being, and thus on philosophy. However, to a certain extent, a positive science requires a knowledge only of the being of the region with which it deals. Knowledge of this region will be provided by philosophy through a regional ontology.

1See L, 2-3.

2Heidegger's discussion of what Aristotle felt philosophy was not about shows his view of what individual sciences do. See MAL, 12: "Diese Charakteristik der Philosophie erscheint reichlich abstrakt und leer: die Erforschung des Seienden als Seienden. Gemeint ist: die Untersuchung nicht dieses oder jenes Seienden, dieses Dinges, dieses Steines, dieses Baumes und dieses Tieres, dieses Menschen; auch nicht die Untersuchung aller materiellen Körper, aller Pflanzen, Tiere, Menschen—das wäre je eine Erforschung je eines bestimmten Bezirkes dessen, was ist, des Seienden. Aristoteles sagt aber auch nicht, die Philosophie sei die Erforschung alles Seienden zusammen, all dieser Gebiete in einer Zusammenfassung. Sondern: erforscht werden soll τὸ ἄνευ ἱδρυματος—das Seiende, sofern es Seiendes ist, d.h. einzig im Hinblick auf das was das Seiende zum Seienden, das es ist, macht: das Sein. Wissenschaft in erster Linie, d.h. Wissenschaft vom ἐρυθή, ist Wissenschaft vom Sein."
We saw above (section 4.2) the dependence of positive science upon regional ontologies.

Regional ontologies, however, themselves require a more general ontology. Without a clarification of the meaning of being in general, regional ontologies are blind.¹

Philosophy can properly ground the basic concepts of the sciences only by fulfilling its own task, namely, by working out the meaning of being in general. This, however, will simultaneously provide an explanation of the unity of human knowledge, since being—as what is universal and radical—grounds and makes possible all knowledge.

4.4 Importance of philosophy

That philosophy be required in order to ground and unify human knowledge as presented in the positive sciences makes it important that philosophy be correctly constructed. However, Heidegger gives a greater impor-

¹See SZ, 11: "Die Seinsfrage zielt ... auf eine apriorische Bedingung der Möglichkeit nicht nur der Wissenschaften, die Seiendes als so und so Seiendes durchforschen und sich dabei je schon in einem Seinsverständniss bewegen, sondern auf die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der vor den ontischen Wissenschaften liegenden und sie fundierenden Ontologien selbst. Alle Ontologie, mag sie über ein noch reiches und festverklemmertes Kategoriensystem verfügen, bleibt im Grunde blind und eine Verkehrung ihrer eigensten Absicht, wenn sie nicht zuvor den Sinn von Sein zureichend geklärt und diese Klärung als ihre Fundamentalaufgabe begriffen hat."
tance to philosophy than this mere support role would indicate. In fact, he tends to indicate the support role is of secondary importance to philosophy.¹

Philosophy is important because it is the most essentially human activity.² Philosophy comes from man's very nature: human existence is essentially a philosophizing.³

Human existence is this because man is essentially the being which understands being and is capable of raising the being-question.⁴ Of course, not all men, and not even

¹See note 2, p. 118, above. At KPM, 21, Heidegger makes clear his view "dass die Ontologie primär überhaupt nicht auf die Grundlegung der positiven Wissenschaften bezogen ist."

²At K, 1, Heidegger claims that: "Philosophie gehört zu den ursprünglichsten menschlichen Bemühungen," but, as we shall see, he believes philosophy is not just one of several primordial human activities, but is the most essentially human activity.

³See MAL, 274: "... die Metaphysik gehört zur Natur des Menschen. Und deshalb hat das menschliche Dasein seinem Wesen nach eine Vor-liebe zur Metaphysik. Wir können auch sagen: alles Existieren ist schon ein Philosophieren. ... die Philosophie wesentlich zur Selbstheit des Daseins gehört."

⁴See, for example, SZ, 12: "Die ontische Auszeichnung des Daseins liegt darin, dass es ontologisch ist." See also MAL, 20 (quoted above, Chapter 1): "Das Verstehen von Sein ist nicht eine Ausstattung unter anderen, sondern die Grundbedingung der Möglichkeit des Daseins als solchen."
very many men, do raise the question of being. However, since man's essence is his understanding of being, all men have latent in them the possibility of philosophizing.\(^1\)

The question of being arises from the nature of man, and, as we have seen above (Section 1.2), quickly becomes the question about man. Philosophy, the explicit raising of the question of being, is thus rooted in the human essence: it derives from man and turns on man.\(^2\) It consists merely of the radicalization of man's pre-ontological understanding of being.\(^3\)

The attempt to construct philosophy has a certain necessity to it because of this rootedness in man's very being.\(^4\) Philosophy is essentially a science, according

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\(^1\)See MAL, 23: "... die Philosophie [liegt] latent in jeder menschlichen Existenz."

\(^2\)See MAL, 20: "Weil zur Wesensverfassung des Menschen gehört, Sein zu verstehen, ist die Frage nach dem Sein in der genannten Weise eine, ja die Frage nach dem Menschen selbst. Das menschliche Dasein trägt in sich selbst, in seiner eigenen Geschichte das Schicksal der Philosophie bei sich; es allein gibt dieses Schicksal weiter und überantwortet es wiederum menschlichen Möglichkeiten."

\(^3\)See SZ, 15: "Die Seinsfrage ist ... nichts anderes als die Radikalisierung einer zum Dasein selbst gehörigen wesenhaften Seinstendenz, des vorontologischen Seinsverständnisses."

\(^4\)See MAL, 18: "... weil die Frage nach dem Sein keine beliebige ist und nicht von aussen dem Menschen zu-
to Heidegger. Thus the attempt to construct a scientific philosophy is necessarily going to occur. Those who make this attempt do so as a free choice; the attempt itself, however, has a necessity because it is rooted in the human essence.¹

Although scientific philosophy is grounded in the essence of man, Heidegger notes that as long as philosophy has existed there has been pseudo-philosophy, or sophism.² There has been a constant struggle between true and false philosophy going on throughout the history of Western thought.

¹See GP, 455: "Wir versuchen ... zu zeigen, dass die Philosophie als Wissenschaft keine beliebige Laune des Daseins ist, sondern dass ihre freie Möglichkeit, d.h. ihre existenzielle Notwendigkeit im Wesen des Daseins begründet ist."

²See MAL, 15: "Alles Wesentliche aber, was ohne hervorzutreten entscheidende Bedeutung besitzt, hat immer solches im Gefolge, was nur so aussieht wie das Eigentliche und Echte, den Schein. Daher muss zu jeder Zeit die Philosophie in ihrer Gefolgschaft haben, was so aussieht wie Philosophie und es ihr im Gehabe nachtut, ja sogar sie übertrifft—und im Grunde doch eine Verlegenheit darstellt. Der Schein des Ἀλόγωφος ist der σοφιστής; er bemüht sich nicht um ein eigentliches Verstehen, er hat keinen langen Willen, sondern er nascht an Allem, und immer nur am Neuesten und meist sogar an dem, was in der Tat wertvoll ist, aber er nascht nur und verführt zur blossen Neugier und Prahlerei."
The struggle continues in our own time. Heidegger sees the struggle as being between those who make the effort to construct a scientific philosophy and those who give up on the possibility of making philosophy scientific.

The danger of pseudo-philosophy is particularly great because the question of philosophy—the question of being—is one which concerns man and which ultimately turns on man. Because the question of being is so difficult and requires such strenuous effort if one is to understand it, there is a particularly great danger that men will settle for mere opinions about the meaning of

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1See Chapter 3, above, for Heidegger's attacks on what he considers pseudo-philosophies. Although his attacks on Husserl are fairly severe, he would probably use the term "sophism" only for (GP, 467): "... was heute die Philosophie aus allen Bezirken des geistigen Lebens her mehr denn je bedroht: Weltanschauungs-Bildung, Magie und die ihrer eigenen Grenzen vergessenden positiven Wissenschaften." Heidegger's concern with sophism and non-scientific philosophy was also evident in his earlier work. David Couzens Hoy ("History, Historicity, and Historiography in Being and Time," in Michael Murray (ed), Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, 329-353) notes that (p. 332): "The rejection of relativism and historicism in Being and Time depends upon the success of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. Earlier writings also show, however, that Heidegger is concerned with refuting these positions."

2At MAL, 5, Heidegger condemns "die innere Auffahmung gegen die Wissenschaft, der Sklavenaufstand gegen die Rationalität und der Kampf gegen den Intellektualismus" which he sees as characteristic of the time he was living in. At PGZ, 3, Heidegger indicates that part of the crisis in science is that to a certain extent "der heutige Mensch—und vor allem die Jugend—ein ursprüngliches Verhältnis zu den Wissenschaften verloren zu haben glaubt."
life, as if this were what philosophy had to offer.\textsuperscript{1}

The difference between scientific philosophy and sophistry is seen by Heidegger in the seriousness and conceptual rigor of philosophy.\textsuperscript{2} For Heidegger:

Die Philosophie ist in ihrem innersten Grund radikalste, universalste und strengste begriffliche Erkenntnis ...\textsuperscript{3}

It is because philosophy is the most radical, universal, and rigorously conceptual knowledge that it can provide the unity and justification for all other scientific knowledge. If philosophy, however, were to be less than this, if it were to be sophistry, then it could not fulfill either its own purpose of responding to the question of being nor the purpose of providing grounding and unity for the positive sciences.

The menace posed by non-scientific "philosophies"

\textsuperscript{1}See MAL, 21, where Heidegger says that the basic problem of philosophy, the question of being, is "...ständig durch die Sophistik bedroht. Was ist leichter, als den Menschen in einer bequemen und interessanten Weise für den Menschen zu interessieren, ihm seine Komplexe, Vermögen, Standpunkte, Einseitigkeiten und Halbheiten vorzurechnen, und zu sagen, das sei der Philosophie."

\textsuperscript{2}See MAL, 15: "Von der \phiιλοσοφία unterscheidet sich die \phiιλοσοφία: του \betaίου της προσιτοποίησις ..., durch das Im vorhin- ein-ergriffenenhaben der Existenz, durch den 'Ernst'. Der Philosoph hat den Ernst des Begriffs, der grundsätzlichen Fragen auf sich genommen."

\textsuperscript{3}MAL, 22.
is, like philosophy itself, rooted in the human essence. Although man is essentially an understanding of being, he is primarily concerned with beings. The recognition of the ontological difference—the look away from beings toward being—is difficult, and, once performed, is difficult to maintain. Because of man's concern and involvement with beings and the world, there is a natural tendency to avoid or overlook the question of being.

It is this natural attitude which overlooks the ontological difference, as well as the extreme difficulty of philosophical research due to the nature of the object of philosophy, that menace the possibility of scientific philosophy. Scientific philosophy, Heidegger states, is constantly in danger of error. The most serious error for scientific philosophy is to give up philosophy's nature as the science of being and to turn philosophy into a positive science.

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1 See GP, 459: "Die Geschichte der Philosophie belegt es, wie alle ontologische Interpretation mit Rückblick auf den für sie notwendigen Horizont und dessen Sicherung eher einem Herumtapfen gleich als einem eindeutig methodischen Fragen. Schon der Grundakt der Konstitution der Ontologie, d.h. der Philosophie, die Vergegenständlichung des Seins, d.h. der Entwurf des Seins auf den Horizont seiner Verstehbarkeit, und gerade dieser Grundakt, ist der Unsicherheit überantwortet und steht ständig in der Gefahr einer Verkehrung, weil diese Vergegenständlichung des Seins sich notwendig in einer Entwurfsrichtung bewegen muss, die dem alltäglichen Verhalten zu Seiendem zwiderläuft."
4.5 Conclusion

Heidegger's view of the need for scientific philosophy depends very much on his view of science. Heidegger accepts the view that mathematical physics and other existing sciences are extremely effective ways of understanding the world. He wants philosophy to have the qualities of physics that cause this science to be accepted so generally.

The dependence of positive science on philosophy derives directly from Heidegger's view that positive sciences study regions of being and philosophy studies being itself. Positive sciences thus need justification and an account must be made of what can unify knowledge. Only philosophy can fulfill these functions.

The importance of philosophy in its own right derives directly from Heidegger's view of man. Man as Dasein is essentially an understanding of being. Therefore the most central study—the study which comes from man's essence—is the study of being. The study of being is, as Heidegger notes, essentially the study of man.

It is one thing to attempt to show that positive science needs philosophy and that philosophy is the most human discipline. It is something else to show that philosophy must take on a certain form to fulfill its mandate.
Heidegger assumes or presupposes that philosophy should be scientific. But he never shows it in a convincing way. He believes that philosophy can be made into a science, but if it cannot, it is not clear what happens to philosophy's tasks. There is no intrinsic reason why sciences must be grounded and unified by something which is itself a science. And it could be that man's reflections on being and on himself need not be done scientifically. Philosophy needs to be scientific only if we accept the view that all non-scientific "knowledge" is pseudo-knowledge, i.e., only if we think science is the locus of truth.

Despite the fact that Heidegger does not show that philosophy must become scientific, he clearly believes it must. For philosophy to become scientific, it must take on the structure of a science. As we shall see, this poses certain difficulties.
5.1 Objectification

The first step in constituting a science is to perform the act of objectification. If philosophy is to take on the form of a science, it must first succeed in objectifying being.

Since philosophy is fundamentally different from positive science, although both have the form of science, it might be expected that there would be some difference in the process of objectification. Because philosophy's object is not given in the same way as the objects of the positive sciences, and because the horizon upon which philosophy's object is to be projected is not the same
as the horizon for the objects of positive sciences, there are special problems in objectifying being.

5.2 Givenness of being

Positive sciences study beings which are given to Dasein in its everyday intercourse with the world. For Heidegger, everything which man knows is given, in one way or another, in everyday experience. The givenness of everydayness are given in a vague, unthematic and atheoretical way. They are not objects for science until they are objectified by being explicitly projected upon their horizons. However, the first requirement for objectification to take place is simply that something be given.

Philosophy's object—being—is itself given in everyday experience as the horizon of understanding of beings. It is given to everyday Dasein in Dasein's understanding of being. However, the givenness of being differs from the givenness of beings.¹

Heidegger claims that beings are given Dasein in an exemplary way, a way which has a certain primacy.²

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¹See GP, 398: "Die Art der Vorgabe von Sein ist grundverschieden von der Art der Vorgabe von Seiendem, wohl aber können beide Gegenstand werden."

²See GP, 456: "Das vorgegebene Seiende ist im faktischen Dasein direkt in der Zugrichtung seines exis-
Beings are given directly to Dasein: beings are what everyday Dasein is constantly occupied with. Everyday Dasein is primarily aware of the beings which it finds before it, to such an extent that it "forgets" being. Positive science has merely to take these everyday givens with which Dasein is, due to its nature, occupied and pre-occupied, and to project them upon the horizon from which they are ordinarily understood. In this way, positive science consists of the objectification of the direct givens of everyday experience.¹

Being, on the contrary, is given indirectly to everyday Dasein.² It is given as the horizon for the understanding of the beings which Dasein encounters. Being in general, by serving as the horizon of understanding of beings, is what makes the giving of beings possible.

Everyday Dasein, however, is aware of beings, 

¹See GP, 456: "In der Vergegenständlichung des Seienden, die sich in der Zugrichtung des alltäglichen direkten Auffassens hält, konstituieren sich die positiven Wissenschaften."

²See GP, 456: "Das Sein ist zwar im Seinsverständnis auch schon enthält, gleichwohl verhält sich das Dasein als existierendes nicht zum Sein als solchem direkt."
but not of being itself. Being is given and is known, but Dasein is not aware of it.¹ Heidegger states that Dasein for the most part is disoriented in relation to being.² To the extent that Dasein tries to interpret being, i.e., to the extent Dasein tries to explain what makes experience possible, it tends to interpret being itself as an individual being.³ This is man's natural attitude: to fail to carry through the ontological difference, and instead to interpret being itself as merely an individual existing thing.

As long as being is somehow given in ordinary ex-

¹See GP, 457: "Das Sein ist' zwar auch bekannt und sonach irgendwie vorgegeben, aber nicht vorfindlich in der Zugrichtung des alltäglich-faktischen Existierens als des Verhaltens zu Seienden."

See also Jaeger, Heideggers Ansatz zur Verwendung der Metaphysik in der Epoche von 'Sein und Zeit', p. 148: "Horizont ist immer Horizont für etwas, das in ihm sichtbar wird, so allerdings, dass der Horizont selbst sich zurückzieht, er nicht erkannt wird."

²See GP, 458: "In der faktischen Existenz des Daseins, sei es in der wissenschaftlichen oder vorwissenschaftlichen, ist Sein bekannt, aber das faktische Dasein ist bezüglich des Seins desorientiert."

³See GP, 453: "... zunächst wird sogar das Sein selbst wie ein Seiendes genommen und mit Hilfe von Bestimmungen des Seienden erklärt, so zu Beginn der antiken Philosophie. Wenn Thales auf die Frage, was das Seiende sei, antwortet: Wasser, so erklärt er hier das Seiende aus einem Seienden, obzwar er im Grunde sucht, was das Seiende als Seiendes sei. In der Frage versteht er so etwas wie Sein, in der Antwort interpretiert er aber Sein als Seiendes."
perience, it should, in Heidegger's view, be possible to objectify this given and create a science of being. However, the fact that being is given in a way differently from beings—the fact that being is given indirectly as a horizon rather than directly as an object of concern—creates special problems in the objectification of being.

5.3 Difficulty of objectifying being

The main difficulty in objectifying being comes in the identification of the horizon within which being is understood.

For philosophy to become scientific, its object—being—must be explicitly referred to what always already (in Dasein's everydayness) serves as the horizon from which that object if understood. Being, of course, is always

1See GP, 458: "Grundsätzlich ist die Vergegenständlichung des Seins immer möglich, sofern Sein irgendeinen entschließt ist."

already understood by everyday Dasein: Dasein is essentially an understanding of being. If being is understood, it must have been projected onto a horizon of understanding.\(^1\) However, the horizon of understanding of being cannot be the same as the horizon of understanding of beings. Being must be projected upon what renders it intelligible,\(^2\) but this something is not itself. The objectification of being thus differs from the objectification of individual beings since the horizon is different.

When speaking of determining the horizon for the understanding of individual beings, Heidegger talks of "categorical intuition."\(^3\) Individual beings are given directly and can be viewed directly in intuition.\(^4\)

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1Heidegger states that in being-in-the-world (GP, 396): "liegt ein Verstehen, das als Entwurf nicht nur das Seiende aus dem Sein her versteht, sondern, sofern Sein selbst verstanden wird, auch das Sein als solches irgendwie entworfen hat." See also GP, 396: "Wir verstehen Seiendes nur, sofern wir es auf Sein entwerfen; das Sein selbst muss dabei in gewisser Weise verstanden werden, d.h. Sein seinerseits muss auf etwas hin entworfen sein."

2Heidegger identifies (GP, 459): "der Grundakt der Konstitution der Ontologie, d.h. der Philosophie" with "die Vergegenständlichung des Seins, d.h. der Entwurf des Seins auf den Horizont seiner Verstehbarkeit" (italics removed).

3See PGZ, 64-98.

4See PGZ, 64: "Anschauung besagt: schlichtes Erfassen des leibhaftig Vorgefundenen selbst, so wie es sich zeigt."
tion, however, is not devoid of concepts and categories: in Heidegger's terms, beings are experienced in terms of (or within the horizon of) their being. Even our most direct perceptions of things are interpretations, i.e., contain an element of expression. The general categories which allow a particular being to present itself as what it is are thus present in the presentation of those beings. But this merely means the being of particular beings is given in the giving of those particular beings. Since the categories are given, even if only unthematically and implicitly, they can be made explicit.

1. See PGZ, 65: "Wir werden sehen, dass durchgängig unsere Verhaltungen, Erlebnisse im weitesten Sinne gesprochen, ausgedrückte Erlebnisse sind, wenn auch nicht in Worten ausgesprochen, so doch in bestimmter Artikulation durch ein Verständnis, das ich von ihnen habe, indem ich in ihnen schlicht lebe, ohne dass ich sie thematisch betrachte."

2. See PGZ, 75: "Faktisch ist es auch so, dass unsere schlichtesten Wahrnehmungen und Verfassungen schon ausgedrückte, mehr noch, in bestimmter Weise interpretierte sind."

3. See PGZ, 90-91: "Die Akte der allgemeinen Anschauung gaben das, was man zunächst und schlicht an den Sachen sieht. Wenn ich schlicht wahrnehme, mich in meiner Umwelt bewege, so sehe ich, wenn ich Häuser sehe, nicht Häuser zunächst und primär und ausdrücklich in ihrer Ver- einzelung, Unterschiedenheit, sondern ich sehe zunächst allgemein: das ist ein Haus. Dieses Als-was, der allgemeine Charakter von Haus, ist selbst nicht ausdrücklich in dem, was er ist, erfasst, aber schon in der schlichten Anschauung miterfasst als das, was hier gewissermassen das Vorgegebene aufklärt. Die Ideation ist diejenige Art der gebenden Anschauung, die die Spezies, d.h. das Allgemeine von Vereinzelungen gibt."
these categories are made explicit is called by Heidegger the act of ideation. In this act, a new object is given.¹ This object is the category.² The term "category" here refers to what Heidegger in his own terms calls the being of a being. In categorial intuition, the being of a being is directly viewed.

Categorial intuitions are founded acts: founded on the basis of the direct perception (i.e., the direct giving) of an individual being.³ Categorial intuitions are possible only because the categories (the horizon of understanding) are given along with the direct giving of beings. The importance of categorial intuitions is that they present the possibility of arriving at a direct viewing of the being of beings. This enables us to directly describe this being, thus making clear that being

¹See PGZ, 95: "Die Akte der Ideation beruhen zwar auf individueller Anschauung, meinen aber gerade nicht das darin Angeschaute als solches. Die Ideation konstituiert eine neue Gegenständlichkeit: Generalität."

²See PGZ, 90: "Diese Akte der Ideation, der Anschauung des Allgemeinen, sind als kategoriale Akte Gegenstand gebende Akte. Was sie geben, bezeichnet man als Idee, ιδέα, species."

³See PGZ, 94: "Kategoriale Akte sind fundierte Akte, d.h. alles Kategorialberuht letztlich auf sinnliche Anschauung."
is not a human construct, but is a given of experience.¹

Categorial intuition depends upon the direct giving of the thing for which the categories are to be determined. Being, however, is not given in everyday experience in the same way beings are given. It is given indirectly. While the horizon of understanding of beings can be found through categorial intuition, it is not immediately clear what the horizon of understanding of being itself is.²

If being is to be objectified, this horizon must be found. The problem is that, because being is given indirectly, the horizon of its intelligibility is at first hidden.

¹Heidegger states that (PGZ, 97): "Das Entscheidende der Entdeckung der kategorialen Anschauung ist: Es gibt Akte, in denen ideale Bestände sich an ihnen selbst zeigen, die nicht Gemächte dieser Akte, Funktionen des Denkens, des Subjektes sind. Ferner: Die Möglichkeit dieser aufgewiesenen Anschauungsart und des in dieser Anschauung sich Präsentierenden gibt den Boden für die Hebung der Strukturen dieser idealen Gegenstände, d.h. für die Ausarbeitung der Kategorien."

²See GP, 396: "... Das Sein ist nur verstanden, insofern es seinerseits auf etwas hin entworfen ist. Woraufhin, das bleibt vorerst noch dunkel." See also GP, 458, where Heidegger notes: "... fraglich, unbestimmt und unsicher ist die Richtung des möglichen Entwurfs des Seins als solchen, um es aus diesem Entwurf her eigens als Gegenstand in den Griff zu bekommen."
5.4 Question of the horizon of being

The question of the horizon for the understanding of being is a question which asks beyond being itself.¹ Since being serves as the horizon for the understanding of beings and as this horizon is what makes the giving of beings possible, this question seeks what makes any understanding and any giving of being at all possible. It seeks the condition of possibility of all knowledge.² Heidegger believes, that although it is difficult, it is possible to deal with this question. Being is understood, although unclearly, unthinketically. If it is understood, it must be understood in relation to something which serves as its horizon, and this horizon itself must somehow be visible.³

There would seem to be two ways for this horizon to be made visible.

The first way would depend on a direct giving of being. The horizon of understanding of individual beings

¹Heidegger notes it goes (GP, 399): "... Über das Sein hinaus nach dem zu fragen woraufhin es selbst als Sein entworfen ist" (italics removed).

²Heidegger relates his question to Plato's sun analogy in the Republic. He claims that like Plato (GP, 404): "Was wir suchen, ist das ἐπίστευµα τῆς οὐσίας. Für Plato ist diese ἐπίστευµa die Bedingung der Möglichkeit für alle Erkenntnis."

³See GP, 402: "Das Verstehen muss selbst das, woraufhin es entwirft, als Enthülltes irgenwie sehen."
can be discovered because these beings are directly given. If being itself were directly given in a particular experience, then it should be possible to discover the horizon which allows this direct giving. Heidegger claims that it is possible for being (or, as he says, the "a priori") to be given directly to man in an original intuition.¹ If we could find this intuition, discovering the horizon for the understanding of being should present no more problems than discovering the horizons for the understanding of the various individual beings.

The second way is to look at what a horizon does. The horizon is the condition of possibility of the thing being given as it is. Being serves as the horizon for the understanding of beings, and, as this horizon, being is what makes possible the giving of beings. The horizon for being would, then, be what makes the giving of being possible. But, as we have noted, being is given to Dasein

¹See PGZ, 102, where Heidegger says that the a priori is "an ihm selbst aufweisbar. Es wird nicht indirekt erschlossen ..., hypothetisch berechnet ... Das Apriori ist an ihm selbst vielmehr direkt erfassbar." It is graspsable in a (PGZ, 102-103) "schlichtes Erfassen" which Heidegger calls "originäre Anschauung." When Heidegger refers to the a priori he is, of course, referring to being (see Chapter 1, above). As he notes (PGZ, 101), the term "a priori" does not refer to knowledge, but rather it is the case "dass Apriori im phänomenologischen Verstande kein Titel des Verhaltens, sondern ein Titel des Seins ist."
alone, and Dasein is essentially an understanding of being. Therefore if we discover what makes a being such as Dasein possible, we will discover what makes the giving of being possible, and thus what serves as the horizon of understanding of being.¹

Heidegger pursues both of these ways simultaneously. He discovers a direct giving of being in attempting to find what makes Dasein possible, and it is only through discovering this direct giving of being that he can come to the conclusion that temporality is the meaning of the

¹Heidegger repeats this argument in several places. See, for example, SZ, 231: "Die Freilegung des Horizontes aber, in dem so etwas wie Sein überhaupt verständlich wird, kommt gleich der Aufklärung der Möglichkeit des Seinsverständnisses überhaupt." See also GP, 397: "Wenn Dasein in sich selbst Seinsverständnis birgt, die Zeitlichkeit aber das Dasein in seiner Seinsverfassung möglich macht, also muss auch die Zeitlichkeit die Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Seinsverständnisses und damit des Entwurfs des Seins auf die Zeit sein:" GP, 21: "Dergleichen wie Sein gibt sich uns im Seinsverständnis, im Verstehen von Sein, das jedem Verhalten zu Seiendem zugrunde liegt. Verhaltungen zu Seiendem eignen ihrerseits einem bestimmten Seienden, das wir selbst sind, dem menschlichen Dasein. Zu diesem gehört das jede Verhaltung zu Seiendem allererst ermöglichte Verstehen von Sein. Das Verstehen von Sein hat selbst die Seinsart des menschlichen Daseins. Je ursprünglicher und angemessener wir dieses Seiende hinsichtlich seiner Seinsstruktur ontologisch bestimmen, um so sicherer werden wir instand gesetzt werden das zum Dasein gehörende Seinsverständnis in seiner Struktur zu begreifen, um so eindeutiger lässt sich dann die Frage stellen: Was ist es, was dieses Verstehen von Sein überhaupt möglich macht? Von wo aus, das heisst: aus welchem vorgegebenen Horizont her verstehen wir dergleichen wie Sein?"
being of Dasein, and time is the meaning of being in general.

5.5 A primordial analysis of Dasein

Everything given to Dasein is given in Dasein's everydayness, but Dasein can exist in other than an everyday mode. Dasein has the freedom to choose itself or to exist in its natural everyday attitude. For the most part Dasein does exist inauthentically: it is preoccupied with its projects and with the things in its world, and it interprets its own self in terms of these projects and things. Inauthenticity is Dasein's natural state, the state Dasein tends to fall into. It is not, however, the only way Dasein can exist. Dasein can exist authentically.

Fundamental ontology consists of the study of Dasein's being in an attempt to arrive at the horizon for all understanding of being. Fundamental ontology starts with the analysis of everyday inauthentic Dasein because everything which is given is given first in everydayness. Being is given in Dasein's everyday pre-ontological understanding of being, and Dasein's being (which Heidegger calls "care") can be determined through an interpretation of how Dasein exists in everydayness.
Although a study of everydayness is necessary to begin the analysis of existence, this study is incomplete and insufficiently radical: Heidegger says that it lacks primordiality.\(^1\) The study of everydayness, which comprises Division 1 of Sein und Zeit and can be found scattered around the lecture courses,\(^2\) does not manage to arrive at what is sought in fundamental ontology. It does not manage to show that time is the horizon for any understanding of being whatsoever.\(^3\)

\(^1\) After completing the study of everydayness in Division 1 of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger says (SZ, 233): "Eines ist unverkennbar geworden: die bisherige existenziale Analyse des Daseins kann der Anspruch auf Ursprünglichkeit nicht erheben."

\(^2\) Particularly FGZ, which repeats, using somewhat different language, much of the published sections of Sein und Zeit.

\(^3\) See SZ, 231, where Heidegger notes the results of the study of everydayness in Division 1 of Sein und Zeit: "Gefunden haben wir die Grundverfassung des thematischen Seienden, das In-der-Welt-sein, dessen wesenhafte Strukturen in der Erschlossenheit zentrieren. Die Ganzheit dieses Strukturen enthielt sich als Sorge. In ihr liegt das Sein des Daseins beschlossen. Die Analyse dieses Seins nahm zum Leitfaden, was vorgreifend als das Wesen des Daseins bestimmt wurde, die Existenz. Der Titel besagt in formaler Anzeige: das Dasein ist als verstehendes Seinkönnen, dem es in seinem Sein um dieses selbst geht. Das Seiende, dargestalt seiend, bin ich je selbst. Die Herausarbeitung des Phänomens der Sorge verschaffte einen Einblick in die konkrete Verfassung der Existenz, das heißt in ihren gleichursprünglichen Zusammenhang mit der Faktizität und dem Verfallen des Daseins." Although this was found: "Gesucht wird die Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein überhaupt und vordem die Möglichkeit einer radikalen Ausarbeitung dieser Grundfrage aller Ontologie."
A primordial analysis of Dasein is necessary if the task of fundamental ontology is to be accomplished. In a primordial analysis, Dasein will be studied as it is in its totality and authenticity, and not just as it is in its everyday inauthenticity.¹

The primordial analysis of Dasein aims at showing that time is the horizon for all understanding of being.² To accomplish this task, the analysis seeks a direct giving of being. Being is given indirectly in Dasein's everyday pre-ontological understanding of being. However, if Dasein can exist authentically as well as inauthentically, then it may be possible for being to be given directly to authentic Dasein. Although everything which is given is given to everyday Dasein, it is clear that these same givens could be given in a different way to authentic Dasein.

The primordial analysis also seeks to show that the meaning of the being of Dasein is temporality. It thus requires that the being of Dasein be viewed in its

¹See SZ, 233: "Soll die Interpretation des Seins des Daseins als Fundament der Ausschüttung der ontologischen Grundfrage ursprünglich werden, dann muss sie das Sein des Daseins zuvor in seiner möglichen Eigentlichkeit und Ganzheit existenzial ans Licht gebracht haben."

²See SZ, 231.
totality and authenticity as well as its inauthenticity. Heidegger attempts, then, to show that the structures thus revealed are temporal—that they are grounded in temporality. Heidegger's argument is that if Dasein's being is temporal, and Dasein is essentially an understanding of being, then being itself must be understood in terms of time.

5.6 Death

To arrive at a primordial interpretation of Dasein in its totality and authenticity, Heidegger starts with an analysis of death. Death's importance for Heidegger lies in its place in the existential analysis of Dasein. If Dasein is to be grasped in its totality, from birth to death, the problem of death must be dealt

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with. This problem is that the structure of care (the being of Dasein) may make it impossible to ever grasp Dasein in its totality. Dasein's existence is characterized by a being-ahead-of-itself, by a projection on possibilities. Death, however, is precisely the possibility which nullifies all the rest and thus destroys the very essence of Dasein (i.e., destroys Dasein's existence).

Heidegger deals with the problem of death by treating death as being-towards-death, i.e., as a way for Dasein to be. Death is thus one of Dasein's possibilities, but as the possibility of the end, it is a special possibility: Heidegger calls it the "eigenste, unbezügliche, unüberholbare Möglichkeit." Death is the ownmost

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1 James Damske (Being, Man, and Death: a Key to Heidegger) says (p. 71): "The discussion of death serves the specific purpose of guaranteeing the completeness of the existential analysis of Dasein." See also Albert Chapelle (L'ontologie phénoménologique de Heidegger. Un commentaire de «Sein und Zeit», Paris: Éditions universitaires, 1962), p. 105: "Cette analyse existentielle [of death] n'a d'autre sens que cette mise en évidence ontologique du pouvoir-être-en totalité du Dasein ... " (Unlike Chapelle, I feel there are other reasons for the death analysis.)

2 See Sz, 245: "Der Tod ist eine Weise zu sein, die das Dasein übernimmt sobald es ist." See also Damske (Being, Man and Death: a Key to Heidegger), p. 7: "Death is not an event which puts an end to life, but an existential-ontological determination of existence; as such, it is a part of life itself."

3 Sz, 250 (italics removed).
possibility because it is the possibility which can end Dasein's essence (existence); death is the non-relational possibility because it is the possibility which can end Dasein's relations to others, to the world, and to being itself; death is the unsurpassable possibility because it is the outermost possibility beyond which can be no possibilities at all.

In everydayness, Dasein is aware of death but covers up what death actually is. Everyday Dasein sees death as an event, rather than an ever-present possibility: an event which will occur eventually, but which does not currently affect Dasein. As an ever-present indeterminate possibility, however, death is of constant interest to everyday Dasein, even though it flees from death's real meaning. The analysis of everyday inauthentic flight from death leads to the full existential-ontological con-

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1 See SZ, 253, where Heidegger says everyday Dasein's view of death is that "man stirbt am Ende auch einmal, aber zunächst bleibt man selbst unbetroffen." See also SZ, 255: "... man stirbt auch einmal, aber vorläufig noch nicht."

concept of death as the ownmost, nonrelational, certain and unsurpassable possibility of Dasein.¹

Death, as Dasein's ownmost (eigenste) possibility, reveals the possibility of authentic (eigentliche) existence.² For the analysis of Dasein it is essential that the authentic being to death be exhibited.³

An authentic being to death must secure death's character as a possibility. Death must be seen not as something to be actualized, but rather as something whose

¹See SZ, 258-259: "Der Tod als Ende des Daseins ist die eigenste, unbezügliche, gewisse und als solche unbestimmte, unüberholbare Möglichkeit des Daseins. Der Tod ist als Ende des Daseins im Sein dieses Seienden zu seinem Ende."

²Tauxe remarks (La notion de la finitude dans la philosophie de Martin Heidegger, p. 54) that: "En considérant la mort comme le sceau de l'existence authentique, Heidegger rejette sans aucun doute l'une des attitudes les plus marquantes de la sensibilité moderne, dont témoignent, en dehors de la philosophie, les oeuvres de Malraux, Hemingway ou Faulkner."

³See also Michael Gelven, A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time: A Section-by-Section Interpretation (New York, Evanston, London: Harper & Row, 1970). Gelven notes (p. 141): "Because death focuses upon our own existence rather than upon the inauthentic they-self (for the they-self does not die), it becomes the ground for authentic existence. Death, then, becomes the important phenomenon which can expose the authentic and ontological basis of human existence."

³See SZ, 260: "Solange dieses eigentliche Sein zum Tode nicht herausgestellt und ontologisch bestimmt ist, haftet an der existenzialen Interpretation des Seins zum Ende ein wesentlicher Mangel."
very nature is to be a constant possibility. Holding on to a possibility in its character as a possibility is called "anticipation" by Heidegger. In anticipation, the possibility of death becomes what it is—namely, a possibility. ¹ By making our ownmost outermost possibility what it is, anticipation offers us the possibility of authentic existence. ²

Authentic understanding of death comes in anticipation. Every understanding is accompanied by a disposition (Befindlichkeit). The disposition which accompanies the authentic understanding of death is anxiety (Angst). ³ Heidegger's claim is that authentic being to death consists in relating to death in such a way that death's character of being the ever-present possibility is secured. This occurs in the disposition of anxiety, for here Dasein is brought before death as its own possibility which it must constantly be. This frees Dasein

¹ See SZ, 262: "Das Sein zum Tode als Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit ermöglicht allererst diese Möglichkeit und macht sie als solche frei."

² See SZ, 263: "Das Vorlaufen erweist sich als Möglichkeit des Verstehens des eigensten Gegensteins, das heißt als Möglichkeit eigentlicher Existenz."

³ See SZ, 265-266: "Die Befindlichkeit aber, welche die ständige und schlechthinige, aus dem eigensten vereinzelten Sein des Daseins aufsteigende Bedrohung seiner selbst offen zu halten vermag ist die Angst. In ihr befindet sich das Dasein vor dem Nichts der möglichen Unmöglichkeit seiner Existenz."
from its lost state in "das Man" and brings it back to be itself.¹

In anxious anticipation of death Dasein is brought back to itself. This self is essentially an understanding of being. Death brings Dasein back to itself in part because in the anxious anticipation of death, being itself is revealed.

Death reveals being to Dasein by revealing Dasein's own potential non-being to it. Death removes Dasein's concerns with the beings in the world and brings it face to face with the problem of being at all.² In anxiety, the nothingness of existence is revealed,³ thus revealing being itself.⁴ Anxious anticipation of death, by revealing

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¹See S. 266: "Das Vorlaufen enthält dem Dasein die Verlorenheit in das Man-selbst und bringt es vor die Möglichkeit, auf die besorgende Fürsorge primär ungestützt, es selbst zu sein, selbst aber in der leidenschaftlichen, von den Illusionen des Man gelösten, faktischen, ihrer selbst gewissenen und sich ängstenden Freiheit zum Tode" (italics removed).

²See Gelven (A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, p. 157): "Since the existential to-be-going-to-die means the awareness of the ability of man not-to-be, this existential deals directly with the awareness of being."

³See, for example, PGZ, 401: "... das Wovor der Angst ist das Nichts ..." (italics removed).

⁴See D. (Being, Man, and Death: a Key to Heidegger, p. 73): "Thus the analysis of death directs
the nothing and thus being itself, also reveals the ontological difference: the difference between being and beings. In authentic being to death, beings are still present, but their meaning (being) is nullified, thus showing the ontological difference.

Authentic being to death, then, leads us directly to being. In the disposition of anxiety, being is given directly to Dasein. The direct giving of being is what our view toward nonbeing, which in turn opens up the prospect of being itself. The death analysis thereby takes the first step toward the question of being, precisely by making a detour through the land of nonbeing.

1See Alberto Rosales, Transzendentz und Differenz. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der ontologischen Differenz beim frühen Heidegger, Phaenomenologica 33, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970. Rosales states that (p. 177): "... im Vorlaufen und in der zu ihm gehörigen Befindlichkeit der eigentliche Vollzug der ontologischen Differenz [lies]." See also Tauxe (La notion de la finitude, dans la philosophie de Martin Heidegger, p. 62): "... la mort est ce qui ... instaure la rupture du Dasein avec l'étant et l'ouvre au 'non-étant', à l'être. ... Au niveau de Sein und Zeit, l'épreuve du néant dans l'être-pour-la-mort est la condition de l'ouverture à l'être."

2See PGZ, 431: "Die Herausarbeitung des Todes als eines Daseinsphänomens, die Bestimmung seiner in strenger Anmessung an die Seinsstrukturen des Seienden, das wir zum Thema haben, führt eo ipso vor das Sein des Seienden selbst ..."

3See PGZ, 403: "... Descartes sagt, wir hätten eigentlich keine Affektion vom Sein als solchem. Es gibt diese Affektion vom Sein als solchen ... Die Angst ist nichts anderes als die schlechthinige Erfahrung des Seins im Sinne des In-der-Welt-seins. Diese Erfahrung kann, sie muss nicht--wie ja alle Seinsmöglichkeiten unter einem
makes an authentic being of Dasein possible. In the direct giving of being, Dasein is called out of its everydayness and becomes itself.

5.7 Authenticity and temporality

In death comes a direct giving of being and the revelation of the possibility of an authentic existence for Dasein. Authentic Dasein, as the being to which being is given directly, is the being to examine if the meaning of being (the horizon of understanding of being) is to be discovered. The question to ask of authentic Dasein is what makes possible the being of this being: i.e., what makes possible the complex structure of care, or, upon what must the care structure be projected if it is to be intelligible.\(^1\)

\[\text{kann' stehen--sich in einem ausgezeichneten Sinne im Tode einstellen, genauer: im Sterben... }\]

\[\text{Es besteht so die Möglichkeit, gerade in dem Moment des Aus-der-Welt-gehens, wo die Welt einem nichts mehr zu sagen hat und auch jeder Andere nichts mehr zu sagen hat, dass sich darin das In-ihr-sein und die Welt schlechthin zeigen.}\]

\(^1\)See SZ, 324: "Das Woraufhin dieses Entworfenen [the Entworfenen here is the Sein des Dasein], des erschlossenen, so konstituierten Seins, ist das, was diese Konstitution des Seins als Sorge selbst ermöglicht. Mit der Frage nach dem Sinn der Sorge ist gefragt: was ermöglicht die Ganzheit des gegliederten Strukturanz der Sorge in der Einheit ihrer ausgefalteten Gliederung?"
In #65 of *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger takes the triple structure of authentic care and examines what makes each of these structures possible.¹ This examination reveals that Dasein's being towards its ownmost capacity for being is possible only because Dasein can come to itself, and Heidegger interprets this "Zukommen" as "Zukunft" (future), a temporal term. Dasein's taking over its being guilty similarly can only be understood on the basis of Dasein's having been--i.e., it can only be understood in the horizon of Gewesenheit, another temporal term. Finally Dasein's disclosure of its current situation is only possible on the basis of a Gegenwärtigen, i.e., it too is only understandable in temporal terms. Heidegger concludes on the basis of this type of argumentation that the care structure is temporal, i.e., that it is based on Dasein's temporality. Temporality is thus the meaning of the being.

¹In #68 of *Sein und Zeit*, the analysis is repeated in more detailed fashion, adding the structures of inauthenticity.
of Dasein.¹

As the meaning of the being of Dasein, temporality is the condition of possibility of Dasein,² and thus—since Dasein is essentially an understanding of being—the condition of possibility of there being a giving of being. As what makes a giving of being possible, time is the horizon of any understanding of being. With the discovery of temporality as the meaning of the being of Dasein, fundamental ontology has discovered the horizon for any understanding of being. This discovery permits, then, the objectification of being: the explicit reference of being to its horizon. The objectification of being is the necessary first step of scientific philosophy. Philosophy becomes scientific with the explicit projection of being itself on the horizon of time.

¹See SZ, 326: "Nur sofern das Dasein als Zeitlichkeit bestimmt ist, ermöglicht es ihm selbst das gekennzeichnete eigentliche Ganzseinkönnen der vorlaufenden Entschlossenheit. Zeitlichkeit enthüllt sich als der Sinn der eigentlichen Sorge."

²See SZ, 350: "Die ekstatische Einheit der Zeitlichkeit, das heisst die Einheit des 'Ausser-sich' in den Ertrückungen von Zukunft, Gewesenheit und Gegenwart, ist die Bedingung der Möglichkeit dafür, dass ein Seiendes sein kann, das als sein 'Da' existiert;" GP, 452: "Die Zeitlichkeit ist als ekstatisch-horizontale Einheit der Zeitlichkeit die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Transzendenz und somit auch die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der in der Transzendenz fundierten Intentionalität;" GP, 428: "Der ekstatische Charakter der Zeit ermöglicht den spezifischen Überschrittscharakter des Daseins, die Transzendenz und damit auch die Welt" (italics removed).
5.8 Philosophic research

Projecting being upon time is merely the first step in scientific philosophy. As in positive science, the science of philosophy must conduct research into its object. In this research, being will always be projected upon time. Scientific philosophy will consist of the study of the temporality of being (Temporalität des Seins).

Research into the temporality of being will attempt to show how the various manifestations of being—the ontological difference, the basic articulation of being, the truth-character of being, and the regionality of being within the unity of the idea of being—are made possible and intelligible by time. Each of these manifestations of being will be explicitly viewed in terms of time and its temporal structure will be determined.

Philosophic research will not be limited to the object of philosophy. Positive sciences, as we have seen, conduct their research by projecting their objects upon their horizons of intelligibility. They are, however, incapable of investigating the horizons themselves. Philosophy is different. Philosophy can and must investigate its horizon. Although the horizon, exhibited in fundamental ontology is time, it is not time as ordinarily understood. Philosophy must thus not only discover the horizon for
the understanding of its object, it must study that horizon.

Heidegger rejects the view of time as a series of "now-points" and concentrates instead on what he calls the ecstatic nature of temporality as seen in temporality's horizontal schemata.

For Heidegger, temporality is ecstatic, i.e., it is a movement outside itself.¹ The three "ecstasies" of temporality are roughly the three temporal dimensions of past, present, and future. The "ecstatic" character of these three dimensions grounds their essential unity: no one of the ecstasies can ever occur alone--there are no points in time but only durations--and in any stretch of time all three ecstasies are present.²

Temporality functions as what Heidegger calls a "horizontal schematism." "Schematism" is a term Heidegger takes from Kant's attempt in the first Critique to explain

¹See SZ, 329, where Heidegger says temporality "ist nicht vorder ein Seiendes, das erst aus sich heraustritt, sondern ihr Wesen ist Zeitigung in der Einheit der Ekstasen. ... Zeitlichkeit ist das ursprünglich 'Ausser-sich' an und für sich selbst." For Heidegger, temporality is "das ἐκστατικόν schlechthin."

how the pure intuition of time was made sensible. In Heidegger's view of Kant, the schematism served the purpose of giving a finite being a view of the condition of possibility of encountering objects. Similarly, the Heideggerian horizontal schemata are ways in which the ecstasies give themselves a horizon to let things be present.

Each of the various ecstasies of time has its own horizontal schema. The ecstasies and the schema belong together and cannot exist separately, but are not exactly

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1See KPM, 88: "Die reine Versinnlichung geschieht als ein 'Schematismus'. Die reine Einbildungskraft gibt Schema-bildend in vorhinein den Anblick ('Bild') des Horizonts der Transzendenz," where, for Kant, "Versinnlichung heisst allgemein die Weise, in der ein endliches Wesen sich etwas anschaulich machen, d.h. von etwas sich einen Anblick (Bild) verschaffen kann."

2See L, 363: "Bei der Versinnlichung von Begriffen fungiert das Darzustellende, nämlich der Begriff, als Regeln einer allgemeinen 'Vorzeichnung', die nicht eingeschränkt sein soll auf das, was die Zeichnung nun gerade darstellt, was sie an Sichtbarem gibt. ... Und diese Regel der anschaulichen Darstellung eines Begriffs, die vom Begriffsgehalt selbst vorgeschrieben wird, diese Regel des Verfahrens der Versinnlichung eines Begriffes nennt Kant Schema."

3On schema as the building of a horizon see N I, 573: "Die Schemata übernehmen die Ausbildung des Horizontes," and KPM, 180: "Was den Horizont der Transzendenz bildet, sind die reinen Schemata als transzendentale Zeitbestimmungen." See also KPM, 117.

4See S2, 365: "Der ekstatische Horizont ist in jeder der drei Ekstasen verschieden."
the same. They can, however, be examined separately.

Temporality, as ecstatic, provides the 'outside of itself' which is the ground for the possibility of Dasein's existence and being in the world, and, as horizon or horizontal schema, it provides the possibility of a horizon, upon which Dasein projects what it encounters. Thus temporality is what allows there to be a Dasein, and, inasmuch as Dasein is essentially an understanding of being, it allows there to be a giving of being to Dasein.

For Heidegger the working out of the ecstatic-horizontal temporality brings to an end the question of the horizon (or "Woraufhin") of understanding. With the

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1 See GP, 429: "Jede Ekstase als Entrückung zu... hat in sich zugleich und ihr zugehörig eine Vorzeichnung der formalen Struktur des Wozu der Entrückung. Wir bezeichnet dieses Wohin der Ekstase als den Horizont oder genauer das horizontale Schema der Ekstase." See also SZ, 365: "Die Ekstasen sind nicht einfach Entrückungen zu... Vielmehr gehört zur Ekstase ein 'Wohin' der Entrückung. Dieses Wohin der Ekstase nennen wir das horizontale Schema."

2 See GP, 436: "Die Schemata der Ekstasen sind von diesen struktural nicht ablöszen, wohl aber kann die verstehende Orientierung dem Schema als solchem primär zugewendet sein."

3 See GP, 437-438: "Weil die ekstatisch-horizontale Einheit der Zeitlichkeit in sich der Selbstentwurf schlecht- hin ist, als ekstatische das Entwerfen auf... Überhaupt ermöglicht und mit dem zur Ekstase gehörigen Horizont die Bedingung der Möglichkeit eines Woraufhin, Wozu-hinaus. Überhaupt darstellt, kann gar nicht mehr gefragt werden, woraufhin die Schemata ihrerseits entworfen seien und so in infinitum. Die früher erwähnte Folge der einander gleich- sam vorgeschalteten Entwürfe: Verstehen von Seiendem, Entwurf auf Sein, Verstehen von Sein, Entwurf auf die Zeit,
horizon for the understanding of being finally determined, philosophic research can begin. Temporality, its ecstasies and horizontal schemata\(^1\) are then the subject-matter for philosophical investigation, and philosophy will consist of research into the temporal nature of being.

5.9 Conclusion

The project in \textit{Sein und Zeit} of arriving at the meaning of being through an analysis of Dasein can clearly be understood as an attempt to make philosophy scientific.

For philosophy to become scientific in Heidegger's sense, being must be projected upon its horizon. But this is difficult because being is given indirectly as a horizon and its own horizon is not clear. The analysis of Dasein in \textit{Sein und Zeit} is the attempt to exhibit the horizon of being. A direct experience of being is sought in anxiety. And the horizon of being is sought in the attempt to discover what makes the giving of being (i.e., what makes Dasein's \textit{Seinsverständnis}) possible.

\(^1\)At one point (GP, 378), Heidegger refers to these as "die offene Weite."
The discovery of time as the horizon of any understanding of being enables us to objectify being thus establishing philosophy on a scientific footing. However, this discovery also raises certain questions.

One set of questions involves how we can view horizons. The move from Dasein's care-structure to the temporal horizon which makes this structure intelligible is not clear. This might make us wonder how horizons are discovered in other sciences. Supposedly in positive science, we have merely to look to see what the horizon of a particular given is. But the look towards the horizon is not self-evident, and would seem to require some method. The example Heidegger gives of finding a horizon in science is that of Galileo's projecting of natural objects upon a mathematical horizon of understanding. Exactly how Galileo came to do this, however, is not revealed by Heidegger.

Another set of questions involves the direct viewing of being. Heidegger finds a direct giving of being in the mood of anxiety. He moves from this direct viewing of being to the discovery of temporality as the meaning of Dasein's being and then to time as the horizon of being itself. It seems from Heidegger's argument, that a direct viewing of being is important if being is to be ob-
jectified. However, it is not too clear what gets revealed in this "Affektion vom Sein als solchem," and the move from it to temporality is somewhat indirect. As we shall see below there are yet other problems with a direct viewing of being.

Despite these difficulties, however, it can be said that the fundamental ontology of Sein und Zeit attempts to objectify being by discovering the horizon upon which it is to be projected. The objectification of being through its projection upon time is the first step in establishing philosophy as science. Philosophic research, however, will require a method. As we shall see, method in philosophy, although derivative of the object of this science, plays a more important role than does method in positive sciences.
CHAPTER 6: METHOD OF SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY

6.1 Method in philosophy

Scientific research has two principal aspects. One is the construction of the field to be investigated. This is accomplished through the act of objectification. The other aspect is the construction of the way to treat objects. This is the question of method.¹

Positive sciences start with the objectification of a given of everyday experience through the explicit projection of that given on the horizon in terms of which

¹See PGZ, 103: "... Das Prinzip der Forschung ist das Prinzip der Sachfeldgewinnung, das Prinzip der Schöpfung der Hinsicht, aus der die Sache erforscht wird, und das Prinzip der Ausbildung der Behandlungsart, der Methode."
it is given. As we have seen, the act of objectification in positive science lies outside of the science itself. It constitutes the science but is not performed by the science. A positive science is constituted by merely taking over (or presupposing) the horizon of understanding of its object—a horizon, which is already itself given in everydayness.

Research in positive science begins only once the act of objectification has taken place. Research requires a method, i.e., a way of treating its object, a way of access to its object, a determination of the type of evidence sought and the kind of truth at which the science aims. In Heidegger's view, the method of a science derives from its object. Mathematical objects, for example, require a certain way of access (e.g., we do not look for numbers in the empirical world), and receive a certain kind of evidence which is appropriate to the kind of truth (apodicticity) at which mathematical research arrives.

Heidegger's view of the priority of the object in the determination of the method of a science comes from his view that the object is determined first. The act of objectification precedes the research done in the science. Since the object is determined first, and since
it is determined outside the science not using the method of that science, the method is derived from the nature of the object.

Heidegger gives philosophy's object the same priority in the determination of the method for scientific philosophy. He does this although method plays a much more central role in philosophy than in positive science.

Method is more important for philosophy because scientific philosophy performs a task not performed by the positive sciences: it seeks its own ground. The first task of scientific philosophy is to discover the horizon of understanding of its object. Philosophy itself performs the act of objectifying its object.

Since this is the first task of philosophy, philosophy requires a method prior even to the objectification of being. Despite this prior need, however, Heidegger maintains that the method of philosophy derives from its object. Heidegger recommends the use of a particular method, the phenomenological method, arguing that it is the method which is singularly appropriate for treating philosophy's object (being).\footnote{See SZ, 38: "Ontologie und Phänomenologie sind nicht zwei verschiedene Disziplinen neben anderen zur Philosophie gehörigen. Die beiden Titel charakterisieren die Philosophie selbst nach Gegenstand und Behandlungsart."}
"Phenomenology," the method of scientific philosophy, is, of course, the term used by Husserl and his followers (including Heidegger) to refer to their own work. Heidegger's understanding of this term comes from his involvement in the phenomenological movement and his contact with Husserl, Scheler, and others. Although in the lecture courses there is, at times, an attempt to determine the nature of phenomenology by an examination of the themes treated by phenomenologists,¹ Heidegger is quite critical of what phenomenologists have actually done (see Chapter 3, above). Therefore, rather than determine the meaning of "phenomenology" from what phenomenologists do, Heidegger, in the one major published work of the Marburg period,² looks at the Greek roots of the term in order to specify what phenomenology means for him.

¹See, for example, FGZ, 34-110, and the treatment of the three "fundamental discoveries of phenomenology" (intentionality, categorial intuition, and the apriori). For a lengthy discussion of the treatment of phenomenology in the Marburg texts see Walter Biemel, "Heideggers Stellung zur Phänomenologie in der Marburger Zeit" in Ernst Wolfgang Orth (ed), Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger in der Sicht neuer Quellen (Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 1978), 141-223.

²See SZ, section 7.
6.2 Greek roots of "phenomenology"

Heidegger notes that the term "phenomenology" is built out of two Greek words, "φαίνεται" and "λόγος," even though this construction is modern and was never made by the Greeks.

The Greek term "φαίνεται" is equated by Heidegger with what shows itself, appears, or emerges (das Sich-zeigende). Heidegger claims that for the Greeks, phenomena simply comprised everything which is, i.e., all beings. However, for Heidegger, instead of comprising all beings, the term "phenomenon" indicates a particular way in which we can encounter things. It does not indicate what these things are—it does not say even whether the phenomena are beings or something else—instead, what is essential is that a "phenomenon" is what shows itself.

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1 See Sz, 28: "... φαίνεται besagt ...: das, was sich zeigt, das Sichzeigende, das Offenbare." See also PGZ, 111: "... φαίνεται ist also das, was sich zeigt."

2 See Sz, 28: "Die φαίνεται, »Phänomene«, sind dann die Gesamtheit dessen, was am Tage liegt oder ans Licht gebracht werden kann, was die Griechen zuweilen einfach mit τὰ σήματα (das Seiende) identifizieren." See also PGZ, 111, where Heidegger makes essentially the same statement.

3 See Sz, 31: "Phänomen--das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigen--bedeutet eine ausgezeichnete Begegnisart von etwas." See also PGZ, 112: "Phänomen meint ... eine Begegnisart des Seienden an ihm selbst, sich selbst zu zei-
gen."
The second root of "phenomenology" is the Greek term λόγος. Heidegger translates λόγος as discourse (Rede). Discourse (λόγος) in the sense it is used in the term "phenomenology" (science of the phenomenon) has the function of ἀποφαντικός: to let what is under discussion be seen from itself.¹ Naturally not all discourse has this function: ἀποφαντικός refers only to theoretical discourse which attempts to communicate something, and does not refer to exclamations, requests, prayers, etc.²

Combining the two Greek roots gives Heidegger a

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¹See PGZ, 116, on λόγος as λόγος ἀποφαντικός "in all den Verbindungen wie Theologie, Biologie, usw" even in "der Verbindung 'Phänomenologie' ..."

Heidegger claims that what this theoretical discourse does is, SZ, 32: "Der λόγος lässt etwas sehen (φανεροθαι), nämlich das, worüber die Rede ist und zwar für den Redenden (Medium), bzw. für die miteinander Redenden. Die Rede »lässt sehen« ἀποφαντικός ... von dem selbst her, wonach die Rede ist. In der Rede (ἀποφαντικός) soll, wöbern sie echt ist, das was geredet ist, aus dem, worüber geredet wird, geschöpft sein, so dass die redende Mitteilung in ihrem Gesagten das, worüber sie redet; offenbar und so dem anderen zugänglich macht." See also PGZ, 115-116.

²See PGZ, 116: "Das ἀποφαντικός, das Sehen-lassen des Gesprochenen an ihm selbst, ist eine bestimmte Bedeutung der Rede. Nicht jeder Satz ist ein theoretischer Satz, eine Aussage über etwas, sondern irgendein Ausruf, eine Bitte, ein Wunsch, ein Gebet ist kein λόγος ἀποφαντικός, in dem etwas mitgeteilt wird, wohl aber σημαντικός, er bedeutet etwas, wobei das Bedeuten aber nicht den Sinn des theoretischen Erfassens von etwas hat." See also SZ, 32.
formal definition of phenomenology, namely:

Phänomenologie sagt dann: ἀφαίρεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα: Das was sich zeigt, so wie es sich von ihm selbst her zeigt, von ihm selbst her sehen lassen.¹

This, he maintains, is simply what is expressed in the maxim of phenomenology: "Zu den Sachen selbst!"²

This formal definition of phenomenology, however, seems rather vague, empty, and self-evident. To a certain extent it might seem that phenomenology is merely a warning against free-floating constructions, random discoveries, concepts which are merely seemingly proven, and false problems.³ But this is patently self-evident and would seem to hold for any science and not just for the

¹SZ, 34. At PGZ, 117, Heidegger expresses the meaning of phenomenology as follows: "Phänomenologie ist ΛΕΞΕΙΝ τὰ φαινόμενα = ἀφαίρεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα--das an ihm selbst Offenbare von ihm selbst her sehen lassen."

²See SZ, 34, and PGZ, 117.

³See SZ, 27-28: "Der Titel »Phänomenologie« drückt eine Maxime aus, die also formuliert werden kann: »zu den Sachen selbst!«--entgegen allen freischwebenden Konstruktionen, zufälligen Funden, entgegen der Übernahme von nur scheinbar ausgewiesenen Begriffen, entgegen den Scheinfragen, die sich oft Generationen hindurch als »Probleme« breitmachen." See also PGZ, 104: "Die phänomenologische Maxime lautet: »zu den Sachen selbst«, gesprochen gegenüber Konstruktionen und frei-schwebendem Fragen in traditionellen, d.h. immer bodenlos gewordenen Begriffen."
science of philosophy. All sciences, not just philosophy, should try to get to the things themselves, and avoid reading falsehoods into the data.

Heidegger believes that there is more to phenomenology than this warning. Phenomenology may seem vague because while it recommends we get to the "things themselves," it does not say what those things are. But phenomenology, for Heidegger, is a concept of method, not of object. The term "phenomenology" does not say anything immediately about the object of this science.

The phenomenological method, for Heidegger, is one of description. Phenomenology proceeds by directly

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1. Heidegger states (SZ, 28): "Diese Maxime ist ... reichlich selbstverständlich und überdies ein Ausdruck des Prinzips jeder wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis." Hans Seigfried believes that Heidegger's idea of the method for scientific philosophy is his idea of scientific method in general. See "Descriptive Phenomenology and Constructivism," particularly p. 256-259. Seigfried claims that (p. 258): "all kinds of philosophic and scientific research are and have to be phenomenological if they are not to degenerate into free-floating speculation and arbitrary constructivism." But, as we shall see below, although this may be the case for the merely formal idea of phenomenology, the fully worked out method of scientific philosophy is radically different from that of positive science because the object of scientific philosophy is being itself and not an individual being.

2. See SZ, 27: "Der Ausdruck »Phänomenologie« bedeutet primär einen Methodenbegriff. Er charakterisiert nicht das sachhaltige Was der Gegenstände der philosophischen Forschung, sondern das Wie dieser." See also PGZ, 117.
showing or directly exhibiting objects.\footnote{See SZ, 35: "Wissenschaft »von« den Phänomenen besagt: eine solche Erfassung ihrer Gegenstände, dass alles, was über sie zur Erörterung steht, in direkter Aufweisung und direkter Ausweisung abgehandelt werden muss."} Things are taken as they show themselves and are described within the limits in which they show themselves. By so proceeding, phenomenology avoids any determinations that do not come through direct exhibition.\footnote{See SZ, 35: "... Der Titel [of phenomenology] hat wieder einen prohibitiven Sinn: Fernhaltung alles nicht-ausweisenden Bestimmens."} However, it is not yet clear from this formal definition of phenomenology what the character of the descriptions arrived at through this method is. If there were some particular object which had an outstanding claim to be the most appropriate object of phenomenology, then we would have a clearer idea of the descriptive method, since the descriptions in phenomenology take their lead from the nature of the object described.\footnote{See SZ, 35: "Der Charakter der Deskription selbst, der spezifische Sinn des ἄρχης, kann allерерст aus der »Sachheit« dessen fixiert werden, was »beschrieben«, d.h. in der Begegnisart von Phänomen zu wissenschaftlicher Bestimmtheit gebracht werden soll."} Heidegger's examination of the Greek roots of
"phenomenology" thus at first reveals phenomenology merely as a general method of describing what shows itself. As such a method, it is not clear whether there is any particular object which is properly phenomenological or whether phenomenology could simply be applied to just any object. Nor is it clear why phenomenology should be singled out as the method of scientific philosophy.

6.3 Object of description

Even though the formal definition of phenomenology may not provide any information as to the most appropriate object of phenomenological research, there is, Heidegger believes, a particular object which requires a phenomenological treatment.

What most requires phenomenological description is what is given in everyday experience in such a way that leaves it at first hidden. That which belongs to what does show itself in everyday experience as its ground and meaning, but which does not itself show itself for the most part is what needs explicit description more than anything else.¹

¹See Sz, 35: "Was ist seinem Wesen nach notwendig Thema einer ausdrücklichen Aufweisung? Offenbar solches, was sich zunächst und zumeist gerade nicht zeigt, was gegenüber dem, was sich zunächst und zumeist zeigt, verborgen ist, aber zugleich etwas ist, was wesenhaft zu dem, was sich zunächst und zumeist zeigt, gehört, so zwar, dass es seinen Sinn und Grund ausmacht."

Seigfried notes that ("Descriptive Phenomenology
According to Heidegger, this object is being itself. Being is given indirectly to everyday Dasein in Dasein's understanding of being. It thus functions as the horizon of understanding of all giving of beings. As this horizon, being is given, but it is not viewed directly. Being, thus, is in particular need of description: it must be made directly visible and exhibited.

Beings, since they are given directly to everyday Dasein, are not in any particular need of description. Dasein has merely to directly observe beings: they are lying open before Dasein. Phenomenology, the description of what shows itself as it shows itself, is thus not really necessary for positive science.

The phenomenon of phenomenology is thus not any and Constructivism," p. 252): "if there is something else besides what shows itself in itself which does not show itself, but which necessarily has to be 'described' thematically whenever we explicitly exhibit something which shows itself in itself, i.e., whenever we try to elaborate an understanding of what shows itself in itself which is critical and transparent to itself and which is not merely a naive, 'immediate,' and thoughtless 'beholding,' then there would be a need for a special and distinctive 'science of phenomena.'"

1See SZ, 35: "Was aber in einem ausnehmenden Sinne verborgen bleibt oder wieder in die Verdeckung zurückfällt oder nur 'verstellt' sich zeigt, ist nicht dieses oder jenes Seiende, sondern, wie die voranstehenden Betrachtungen gezeigt haben, das Sein des Seienden."
individual being, but is being itself, its meaning, its modifications and derivations. Phenomenology will consist of the description of being. However, being is at first hidden. It is not immediately clear how we can describe something which is hidden. In phenomenology, somehow being must be brought to show itself. Being is brought to show itself through the kind of description practiced by phenomenology. Heidegger calls this kind of description "interpretation" or "hermeneutics."

1See Sz, 35: "Der phänomenologische Begriff von Phänomen meint als das Sichzeigende das Sein des Seienden, seinen Sinn, seine Modifikationen und Derivate." Heidegger says something seemingly different in PGZ. There he claims (PGZ, 117-118): "Phänomenologie ... handelt von der Intentionalität in ihrem Apriori. Die Strukturen der Intentionalität in ihrem Apriori sind die Phänomene, d.h. die Strukturen der Intentionalität in ihrem Apriori umgrenzen die Gegenstände, die in dieser Forschung an ihnen selbst präsent gemacht und in dieser Präsenz expliziert werden wollen." This is only seemingly different from the statement from Sein und Zeit because the apriori, the earliest, is being itself (see Chapter 1, above).

2See Sz, 36: "Die Begegnisart des Seins und der Seinsstrukturen im Modus des Phänomens muss den Gegenständen der Phänomenologie allererst abgewonnen werden."

3See Sz, 37: "... der methodische Sinn der phänomenologischen Deskription ist Auslegung. ... Phänomenologie des Daseins ist Hermeneutik in der ursprünglichen Bedeutung des Wortes, wonach es das Geschäft der Auslegung bezeichnet." See also Don Ihde, "Phenomenology and the Later Heidegger." Ihde states there is a unity in
Phenomenology, then, is the method of ontology. The object of ontology can only be treated through the descriptive (hermeneutic) method provided by phenomenology. Ontology is thus possible only as phenomenology, and the phenomenological method is most appropriately applied to the object of ontology.¹

6.4 Reduction-Construction-Destruction

Heidegger claims that the phenomenological method contains three essential moments: reduction, construction, and destruction.

The phenomenological reduction is, according to Heidegger, the first step in the method, and is the step which distinguishes the method of philosophy from those of all other sciences. In Heidegger's view the reduction is the look away from beings and toward their being (Sein).

¹See Sz, 35: "Ontologie ist nur als Phänomenologie möglich" (italics removed). See also GP, 3: "Die Aufklärung der Idee der Phänomenologie ist gleichbedeutend mit der Exposition des Begriffs der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie."
It is the recognition of the ontological difference. ¹
Only philosophy carries through a reduction because only
philosophy deals with being—all other sciences deal with
beings. ²

Heidegger is well aware of the fact that this view--
that the reduction is the recognition of the ontological
difference—is not at all Husserl’s view. ³ However, where

¹See GP, 20-29: "Das Erfassen des Seins, d.h.
die ontologische Untersuchung geht zwar zunächst und not-
wendig ja auf Seiendes zu, wird aber dann von dem Seienden
in bestimmter Weise weg- und zurückführt auf dessen Sein.
Das Grundstück der phänomenologischen Methode im Sinne
der Rückführung des untersuchenden Blicks vom naiv erfass-
ten Seienden zum Sein bezeichnen wir als phänomenologische
Reduktion."

²See GP, 26: "Die Methode der Ontologie, d.h.
der Philosophie Oberhaupt ist insofern ausgezeichnet, als
sie mit keiner Methode irgendeiner anderen Wissenschaft,
die alle als positive Wissenschaften vom Seienden handeln,
etwas gemein hat." See also PT, 32-33: "Phänomenologie
ist immer nur die Bezeichnung für das Verfahren der Onto-
logie, das sich wesenhaft von dem aller anderen positiven
Wissenschaften unterscheidet." The reason for this dif-
ference is the difference in objects: philosophy needs
a method which will enable it to look away from beings
and towards being.

³See GP, 29: "Für Husserl ist die phänomenolo-
gische Reduktion, die er zum erstenmal ausdrücklich in
den »Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänoméno-
logischen Philosophie« (1913) herausgearbeitet hat, die
Methode der Rückführung des phänomenologischen Blickes
von der natürlichen Einstellung des in die Welt der Dinge
und Personen hineinlebenden Menschen auf das transzen-
dentale Bewusstseinsleben und dessen noetisch-noematische
Erlebnisse, in denen sich die Objekte als Bewusstseins-
korrelate konstituieren. Für uns bedeutet die phänomeno-
logische Reduktion die Rückführung des phänomenologischen
are certain elements in common in these two views. For Heidegger, as for Husserl, the reduction serves to lead away from the natural attitude and towards the object of philosophical investigation. 1 Where Heidegger disagrees with Husserl is on the determination of what this object is. But the determination of the object affects what the reduction is. 2 Heidegger believes that Husserl's phenomenological reduction prevents the raising of philosophy's central question (the being-question) whereas Husserl criticized Heidegger for not understanding the reduction. 3

1See PGZ, 150: "Vergegenwärtigen wir uns den Sinn und die methodische Aufgabe der phänomenologischen Reduktion [for Husserl]: Aus dem in der natürlichen Einstellung gegebenen faktischen, realen Bewusstsein ist das reine Bewusstsein zu gewinnen." In Heidegger's view, Husserl felt the pure consciousness was the object of philosophy, whereas Heidegger sees being (Sein) as this object.

2Seeburger (Francis F. Seeburger, "Heidegger and the Phenomenological Reduction," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (1975-76), 212-221) notes that, in the correspondence between Heidegger and Husserl over Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica article (p. 213-214): "The disagreement between Heidegger and Husserl does not, at this point, concern the possibility or even the 'necessity' of the phenomenological reduction, but concerns the meaning of the reduction."

3It is notable that although Heidegger talks of Husserl's phenomenological reduction at several points, and mentions Husserl's transcendental and eidetic reductions (see PGZ, 137), he refers only to the "phenomenological" reduction in talking of his own view: for Heidegger there seem to be no other reductions.
For Heidegger, the reduction, though a part of the phenomenological method, is of secondary importance.\(^1\) It is necessary in order for ontology to start, however the main task of ontology is to work out the meaning of being and then the structures of being.

This main task is accomplished in what Heidegger calls phenomenological construction. Phenomenological construction is necessary because being is at first hidden and action is required to bring it forward.\(^2\) Construction proceeds through phenomenological description, which is the interpretation or hermeneutic of the apriori structures which lie at the ground of our experience and which provide the condition of possibility of this experience.\(^3\)

\(^1\) See GP, 29: "Die phänomenologische Reduktion als die Rückführung des Blickes vom Seienden zum Sein ist aber nicht das einzige, ja nicht einmal das zentrale Grundstück der phänomenologischen Methode."

\(^2\) See GP, 29-30: "Das Sein wird nicht so zugänglich wie Seiendes, wir finden es nicht einfach vor, sondern es muss, wie zu zeigen sein wird, jeweils in einem freien Entwurf in den Blick gebracht werden. Dieses Entwerfen des vorgegebenen Seienden auf sein Sein und dessen Strukturen bezeichnen wir als phänomenologische Konstruktion."

\(^3\) On constructivism in Sein und Zeit see Seigfried, "Descriptive Phenomenology and Constructivism," particularly p. 254-256. Seigfried notes (p. 254) that in Being and Time: "The analysis starts out with a descriptive
As we have seen, ontology starts with fundamental ontology, i.e., with the hermeneutic of Dasein. Dasein is described in its everydayness and then in its authenticity in an attempt to construct the being of Dasein and eventually to discover what makes this being possible.

With the discovery of temporality as the meaning of the being of Dasein and time as the meaning of being in general, philosophy arrives at the task of detailing, or constructing, the structures of being itself in terms of the temporal horizon which makes them possible.

The descriptive method of phenomenology thus overcomes the immediate hiddenness of being by examining the given with a view towards constructing the apriori structures which enable the given to be as it is.¹

¹Heidegger insists on the necessity of method, as opposed to a mere naive viewing. See Sz, 36-37: "Die Begegnisart des Seins und der Seinsstrukturen im Modus..."
The hiddenness of being, however, is due to more than the facts that being is given indirectly as a horizon and that Dasein has a natural tendency to concentrate on beings alone. This hiddenness comes also from the fact that our very language—which is itself a historical creation—has in the past covered up the meaning of being. If being is to become the phenomenon of phenomenology, it must first be brought forward by tearing down the sedimented meanings present in our language which cover it up.¹ This means that philosophy must deal with the history of thought: philosophy cannot be a construction of concepts based on a mere description of what is present today, because what presents itself today is full of meanings which have been constructed over time. For Heidegger, philosophic questions have a dual aspect—historical and systematic—and throughout his career, there is an emphasis on the historical nature of philosophic prob-

¹See PGZ, 118: "Was Phänomen der Möglichkeit nach ist, ist gerade nicht als Phänomen gegeben, sondern erst zu geben. Die Phänomenologie ist gerade als Forschung die Arbeit des freilegenden Sehenlasses im Sinne des methodisch geleiteten Abbauens der Verdeckungen."
lems and the impossibility of treating problems of philosophy without dealing with the history of these problems.¹

In the Marburg period, Heidegger used the terms construction (Konstruktion) and destruction (Destruktion) to refer to the dual aspect of philosophic questioning.² At times he seems to think these aspects are two separate tasks, however, he always acknowledges that the two are

¹In "Heidegger heute," Pöggeler, who doubts the usefulness of Heidegger's interpretation of the tradition and who claims that if we are to learn something from Heidegger we must forget the Seinsgeschichte (see Philosophie und Politik bei Heidegger, p. 62, and elsewhere), notes that Heidegger's attempt to respond to the contemporary need always refers him to history ("Heidegger heute," p. 26): "In welcher Weise auch immer Heidegger nach Seinswahrheit und Welt fragt, es kann kein Zweifel sein, dass als massgeblicher Leitfaden seines Fragens die Geschichte und die Geschichtlichkeit fungiert, so dass deshalb auch von Geschichtlichkeit des Seinsversteheß, von Seinsgeschichte, von Wahrheit und Welt als Ereignis die Rede sein kann."

²Although the term "destruction" received much attention, it dies out after the 1920s. See, for example, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, "Sein und Cogitationes. Zu Heideggers Descartes-Kritik" in Vittorio Klostermann (ed), Durchblüte. Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburtstag (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970), 235-254. Von Herrmann notes (p. 235-236) the change in vocabulary from "destruction" in the 1920s to talk of "overcoming" or "getting over" metaphysics in later works. In the 1920s Heidegger also uses the terms "systematic" and "historical" to refer to the two-sided nature of philosophy. See Pöggeler, Denkweg, p. 75; "Heidegger heute," p. 41; or Eckhard Heftrich, "Nietzsche im Denken Heideggers" in V. Klostermann, Durchblüte, 331-349, particularly p. 337.
equally necessary.¹

Heidegger claims that the construction of responses to philosophical problems is possible only if there is a simultaneous destruction (or de-structuring, i.e., analysis) of the history of the treatment of those problems.² The aim of the destruction is to break up the layers of sedimented meanings covering up the original experiences which were expressed in the writings of the

¹In Sein und Zeit there is talk about two tasks (SZ, 9): "Die Ausarbeitung der Seinsfrage gabelt sich so in zwei Aufgaben: ihnen entspricht die Gliederung der Abhandlung in zwei Teile: Erster Teil: die Interpretation des Daseins auf die Zeitlichkeit und die Explikation der Zeit als des transzendentalen Horizontes der Frage nach dem Sein. Zweiter Teil: Grundzüge einer phänomenologischen Destruktion der Geschichte der Ontologie am Leitfaden der Problemak der Temporalität."

²Pöggeler, who thinks that in Sein und Zeit, construction and destruction were separate, notes ("Heidegger heute," p. 41) that after Sein und Zeit: "System und Geschichte, phänomenologische Konstruktion und Destruktion sind überhaupt nicht mehr zu trennen."

Already in the GP (1927), Heidegger had noted that the construction requires the destruction. See GP, 31: "Konstruktion der Philosophie ist notwendig Destruktion... Weil zur Konstruktion die Destruktion gehört, ist philosophische Erkenntnis ihrem Wesen nach zugleich in einem bestimmten Sinne historische Erkenntnis." And in SZ, 26, Heidegger says: "Erst in der Durchführung der Destruktion der ontologischen Überlieferung gewinnt die Seinsfrage ihre wahrhafte Konkretion."

See also Pöggeler, Politik, p. 86, and von Herrmann, "Sein und Cognitiones," p. 236, on the relation of the interpretation of the past to the working out of the question of being.
past. Heidegger emphasizes the positive nature of this task: the destruction does not attempt to do away with the thoughts of past thinkers, rather it aims to appropriate them to today's situation.

6.5 Conclusion

Heidegger's discussion of methodological questions in the Marburg period are brief and infrequent. Compared to Husserl's writings on method, Heidegger's seem to be

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1 Heidegger says (SZ, 22): "Soll für die Seinsfrage selbst die Durchsichtigkeit ihrer eigenen Geschichte gewonnen werden, dann bedarf es der Auflockerung der verhärterten Tradition und der Ablösung der durch sie gezeitigten Verdeckungen. Diese Aufgabe verstehen wir als die am Leitfaden der Seinsfrage sich vollziehende Destruktion des überliefernten Bestandes der antiken Ontologie auf die ursprünglichen Erfahrungen, in denen die ersten und forten leitenden Bestimmungen des Seins gewonnen werden."

Kisiel, in his introduction to Werner Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition, translated by Theodore Kisiel and Murray Greene (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), says (p. xx–xxi): "This is the positive aim of what Heidegger calls 'destruction,' which de-structures the hardened sedimentation of tradition in order to explicitly 'retrieve' the original experiences concealed in it. Because of the situated character of human existence, the retrieve (Wiederholung) is never a simple re-iteration of something past but is also a revision and adaptation which explicates the possibilities that are relevant to the new situation."

See also Pöggeler, Denkweg, p. 166, and Odette Laffoucrière, Le destin de la pensée et la "mort de Dieu" selon Heidegger, Phaenomenologica 24, La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968; p. 11.
practically non-existent.\footnote{Robert J. Dostal, "The Problem of Indifferenz in Sein und Zeit," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (1982), 43-58, says that Heidegger (p. 54) "is silent about method," which is not quite accurate but does correctly reflect the sparsity of texts on method in the Marburg period.} However, as we have seen, Heidegger does have views about the proper method of scientific philosophy--views which he applies in his own work.

Fundamental ontology, as the analysis of Dasein, consists of a description of Dasein, with an attempt to arrive at, or construct, Dasein's being. Because fundamental ontology seeks the apriori, it performs Heidegger's phenomenological reduction. It looks away from the individual being under examination (in this case Dasein) towards the apriori structures which make this being possible. This reduction implies that the description taking place in fundamental ontology is an interpretation. It is an interpretation, or hermeneutic, of what must, apriori, lie at the ground of Dasein if there is to be a Dasein. Heidegger argues that the construction of Dasein's being through the hermeneutic of its existence should at the same time be a destruction of traditional notions of Dasein's being: he mentions often that the view of Dasein as a rational animal must be destroyed (i.e., reinterpreted). It is through the destructive construction of Dasein's
being, that the horizon for the understanding of this being
is to be exhibited, thus leading to the exhibition of the
horizon for any understanding of being at all.

In Heidegger's view, this method of interpretative
description which seeks the apriori structures of what
is under investigation while attempting to avoid presup-
positions (through a destruction of them) is phenomeno-
logy. Phenomenology thus understood is the method of
scientific philosophy.)

Heidegger's use of phenomenology, understood in
this way, is very evident in *Sein und Zeit* and the other
Marburg writings. It can be argued (as we noted that
D. Ihde does) that even the later Heidegger is a phenomeno-
logist. The published part of *Sein und Zeit*, like the
later work, is really just an interpretative description.
It is not an argument, an explanation, or a metaphysical
speculation.

The reason Heidegger gives for using a descriptive
method is that the object of philosophy requires it. Methods
derive from objects. Heidegger believes this is generally
true for science, although the reason it might be true
for other sciences (i.e., because the object is determined
first) does not hold for philosophy. Being, as the horizon
of all understanding, can only be described: it cannot
be treated adequately in any other way.

Scientific philosophy in the Marburg period consists, then, of the description of being itself. This description is not a mere naive pointing out what is there, but is a phenomenological description which performs the reduction, construction, and destruction. The application of the phenomenological method to being will enable us to objectify being, i.e., to find its horizon and project it upon this horizon, and then to do research on the temporal nature of being itself as well as of its modifications and derivations. Philosophy, having thus discovered its proper object and method, will take on its proper form, and will become as scientific as physics.
CONCLUSION

7.1 Heidegger at Marburg

Heidegger went to Marburg in 1923 at the age of 34 and left in 1928, 39 years old. The period around Sein und Zeit is often referred to as his early period, yet he was already fairly well established and his ideas were fairly well determined by the time he got to Marburg. In the lecture courses, there are some vocabulary changes and some inconsistencies, but generally he seems to have firm ideas on what he is doing.

The aim of this thesis has been to establish Heidegger's views during the Marburg period on the relation of philosophy to science. These views have been misinter-
preted or overlooked by the secondary literature to date. Yet, when taken into account, they provide a new way to read Sein und Zeit and the other Marburg writings. They help both to explain what Heidegger thought he was trying to do at Marburg, and they can be used to understand what led to Heidegger's later development. They also can shed some light on the general question of the nature of philosophy and the relation of philosophy to science.

The most important thing Heidegger attempts to accomplish in the Marburg writings is to establish the question of being at the center of the philosophic problematic. Despite his statements that the being-question is what philosophy is about and what it has always been about, it is clear this is simply false. Heidegger's attacks on Husserl for missing the being-question are a more accurate indication that this question was not in the center of philosophy as it was practiced, and that this question really had been "forgotten" by contemporary philosophers.

Heidegger equivocates on the reason the being-question should be explicitly raised. In part he makes a romantic appeal to the exalted nature of the question itself as something deriving from the essence of man. In part he says the question should be raised because it
is the task of every western people to raise it. Although he does not want to indicate in any way that philosophy might be useful, he does allow that a response to the being-question might be essential for science: that all science already presupposes a response to this question but that these presuppositions may be inadequate because they are vague, non-thematic; and unexamined.

Linking the being-question to questions of science and knowledge make it seem that Heidegger is interested in epistemology. And it is clearly true that he has major epistemological interests. Although he criticizes the "erkennnistheoretische" interpretation of Kant, and claims Kant is doing metaphysics not epistemology (and certainly not ethics), the difference between epistemological and ontological interests is not that great. Any theory of reality¹ presupposes we have some knowledge of it, and any theory of knowledge presupposes what we know is real in some sense.

Because of this relation of metaphysics to epistemology, and probably because of the modern belief that science represents a hugely successful human enterprise, 

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¹Heidegger used the term "reality" (Wirklichkeit) in the 1910s prior to switching to talk about "being" (Sein).
Heidegger wants philosophy to become scientific. This is not a particularly original thing to want to do. Husserl spoke at length of philosophy becoming scientific, and Kant—who was much discussed at Marburg, the center of the neo-Kantian school—too talked of putting philosophy (metaphysics) on the secure road of a science.

Philosophy's becoming scientific is really a secondary theme in Heidegger. He is primarily interested in making the question of being the center of philosophic discussion. However, at Marburg, as later, Heidegger was concerned about the status of philosophy. And, throughout his career, he understood the question of the status of philosophy as involving the relation of philosophy to science. In his very last article in 1964, he talks about philosophy's ending. The end of philosophy is the point where philosophy has nothing left to do. It is the point where everything philosophy talks about is discussed by some positive science—and the positive science does a better job. Heidegger then attempts to find whether there is a task for thought that is not handled by science.

At Marburg, Heidegger still firmly held to the Husserlian view of philosophy as the basic science—the science which grounds all others. Although his main aim

1"Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens."
was to raise the question of being, he believed the correct way of doing so was in accord with the ideal of scientific philosophy. And, as I have tried to show, the way Heidegger goes about treating the being-question is fully consistent with his view of the structure of scientific philosophy.

7.2 Problems with Heidegger's scientific philosophy

This thesis has concentrated on presenting a careful exposition of Heidegger's views on scientific philosophy in the Marburg period. It has not been my aim to determine whether these views are adequate. I have concentrated instead on correcting the record and establishing what Heidegger's views were on this question. However it is clear there are severe difficulties with Heidegger's views—difficulties of which he may have been aware,¹ and which affected the future development of his thought.

Heidegger's view of scientific philosophy is very structural. Philosophy becomes scientific when it takes on the structure of a science (while, of course, remaining philosophic by continuing to study philosophy's object).

¹Krell notes that in a 1975 conversation with Heidegger, the aged philosopher said that he started having doubts about the feasibility of the project of Sein und Zeit around 1924-25. However Krell admits he is not sure he heard Heidegger correctly. See Krell's "Work Sessions with Martin Heidegger," p. 133. By the 1928 lecture course MAL, as we shall see below, Heidegger definitely had doubts about the project of Sein und Zeit.
The structure of science is, however, rather vaguely sketched out in the lecture courses. Like many of Heidegger's more fundamental notions, this structure seems to be merely presupposed. It does not seem to come from an actual examination of what sciences do, and it seems to depend too much upon a rather superficial (and borrowed) analysis of the breakthrough of modern physics.

There are a number of problems with the scientific structure Heidegger maps out. One of the most self-evident is that it does not seem to permit us to distinguish what we might want to call true science from pseudo-science. Heidegger's attempt, for example, to distinguish philosophy from pseudo-philosophy (sophism) through the "Ernst" of philosophy's conceptualizations is hard to take seriously. In part, this is because the most serious people on the earth may be those who believe in astrology, Velikovsky, and "scientific creationism." Similarly, any attempt to separate true from false science on the basis of structure alone is liable to have difficulties. Astrologists constantly project the givens of experience on the horizon of understanding which somehow manages to be given to them.

If, though, we were to accept Heidegger's views on the structure of science, two major problems still re-
main. Both have to do with questions involving horizons.

One is that Heidegger's scientific structure depends on a horizon of understanding being given along with objects. The problem is that since being is temporal, these horizons change over time. Although for Galileo, physical objects were understood in mathematical terms, this was not always the case. At one time in human history all physical objects may have been understood within a mythological-religious horizon, and it is not clear within what horizon they will be understood tomorrow.

The problem of how horizons are given is one of the hardest for Heidegger and one which he never satisfactorily resolves. Heidegger's many studies in the history of philosophy can be viewed as an attempt to discover how horizons have been given in the past.

The second problem dealing with horizons is more serious for the ideal of scientific philosophy. It points to an equivocation in the use of "science" when this term is applied to both positive science and philosophy. The radical difference between these two kinds of science may be so radical that they cannot both be referred to with the same term. In fact, Heidegger stops talk of scientific philosophy at just about the time he leaves Marburg in 1928.
This problem is whether philosophy's object can be treated in the same kind of way that sciences treat their objects. Sciences objectify by projecting their objects upon the horizon of understanding which is already given. But the objects of positive sciences are given directly. Philosophy's object is given indirectly: it is a horizon. If being were to be given directly—if we really have a direct experience of being, which Heidegger says we have and which he seeks in such moods as anxiety and boredom—then it would not be a horizon any more. But if it is not a horizon, and if we experience it directly, it must then be a being (Seiendes)—the correlate of an intentional act.

In the very last course at Marburg, Heidegger seems to be grappling with the problem of how being is to be viewed directly.¹ Instead of something difficult to ac-

¹See MAL, 234-235: "Die Schau, auf die hier alles zurückgeht, hat zum Korrelat einen bestimmten, ganz einseitigen Seinsbegriff, und der in ἐναί, θεωμα, intuitus und Wesensschau angezeigte Rekurs auf ein schauendes Bewusstsein ist so wenig geeignet, das Transzendenzproblem zu lösen, dass er nicht einmal ermöglicht, das Transzendentenzphänomen zu sehen." See also MAL, 236-237: "Das eigentliche Transzendenzphänomen lässt sich nicht in einer bestimmten Verhaltung unterbringen, sei sie theoretisch, praktisch, ästhetisch. Sie alle sind als Verhaltungen zu Seiendem nur auf dem Grunde der Transzendenz selbst möglich."
complish, the direct viewing of being becomes impossible.¹

If being cannot be brought directly into view, then objectification of being cannot occur. Ontology then would no longer have the structure of a science. Philosophy could still ground sciences, but it would not be the fundamental science because it would not be a science at all. Philosophy could still be the study of being and use the phenomenological method of description. However, as a study of horizons, it would be radically different from the sciences, all of which would be studies of particular beings.

¹See MAL, 269: "Horizont—darunter verstehen wir den Umkreis des Blickfeldes. Aber Horizont, von $\delta\phi\zeta\iota\nu\gamma$, ist gar nicht primär auf Blicken und Anschauen bezogen, sondern besagt einfach an sich das Eingrenzende, Umschließende, den Umschluss."
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2. Frühe Schriften. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972. (1914-17)


11. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. 3. unveränderte Auflage. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1965. (1928)


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23. "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" in Holzwege, 7–68. See #22. (1936)


28. "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'" in Holzwege, 193-247. See #22. (1943)


30. "Der Spruch des Anaximander" in Holzwege, 296-343. See #22. (1944)


34. "Einleitung zu Was ist Metaphysik?" in Wegmarken, 195-211. See #12. (1949)


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47. "Hölderlins Erde und Himmel" in Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung, 4., erweiterte Auflage (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1971), 152-181. (1959)


52. "Das Problem eines nichtobjektivierenden Denkens und Sprechens in der heutigen Theologie" in Phänomenologie und Theologie, 37-46. See #8. (1964)
53. "Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens"
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