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THE ORIGINS OF THE DIALECTIC OF MARX'S IDEA OF REVOLUTION

by

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INTRODUCTION

The wealth and complexity of reality, 'man', is not reducible to an all too positive or an all too negative conception that may fit a scientific formula and may, consequently, legitimize the terrorism in whose name democracy is sold at any price: by the sickle or by the dollar. By the same principle, we are led to the consideration that questions are an equivocal point of departure because they presuppose the boundaries within which answers must be provided. We have no such questions to ask in so far that we propose no real answers to the problems that we encounter in the process of a dialogue we try to undertake with Karl Marx's propositions. Always bound to our proper historical truths, we try, nevertheless, to use the very instruments Marx offers us to reach closer into the complexity, contradictions and contemporaneity of his thought. We follow those very questions that emerge of the discourse and, in this sense, we remain within the boundaries that a dialogue reproduces. However, in spite and because of this approach, we hope to come out of the boundaries created by enthusiastic and disillusioned interpretations that the tradition has given us leaving little room for genuine examination.

The origins of the dialectic of Marx's idea of revolution is the principal concern of our research which we will be considering all along our examination of his political and philosophical interrogations. We hope to extract from this discourse the sociological and anthropological theses
which emerge and that subsequently become the basis for Marx's conception of the progress of history - of a new dialectic based on the significance that carries the idea of revolutionary human activity.

A fundamental question guides Marx's itinerary and, therefore already, we may have a glimpse into the path he will follow,

It is not the unity of living and active humanity with the natural, inorganic conditions of their metabolic exchange with nature, which requires explanation or is the result of a historic process, but rather the separation between these inorganic conditions of human existence, a separation which is completely posited only in the relation of wage labour and capital. (1)

In the pages that follow we will try to present how the unity in question is not any simple kind of bond; it expresses, for Marx, the power of incorporealization of human activity, an activity which transforms, at once, the object and the subject. The nature of the separation therefore becomes more complex. How can what 'belongs together' be separated? How does man alienate himself? How does an estranged world emerge? What is the origin of false consciousness, of an inverted world or, of human history? In our attempt to seize answers to these problems we discovered how the questions raised in the process of Marx's interrogations render less and less possible the realization of solutions the more the movement of thought becomes contained by the movement of

the history it interrogates. Consequently, the closer Marx comes to defining the separation which may haunt mankind the further he is thrown from the original unity that his discourse proposes. For, once Marx must tell us how mankind "brings together what belongs together" (2), he may no longer return to the same conception of origins which permits him to argue that bourgeois society is the expression of separation. The unity that must be (re)produced thereafter, it must be based on the very possibility of separation which ought to condition consequently the progress of history.

In our dialogue with Marx's discourse we propose two parts where we will try to embrace the origins of the idea of revolution from different perspectives. In the first part we will be looking at the movement along which Marx's political criticism of bourgeois society becomes the basis for political action - the idea of revolution. Marx's criticism of political democracy that is based on the opposition between private and social interests, between society and the individual leads him to present his proper idea of democracy; an idea which we found to correspond to his conception of positive humanity that we will be examining in the second part of our research. To appreciate Marx's critique of political democracy we will look at his principle premise that man is a political being because he is a social being. On the basis of this premise Marx is able to establish the origin of the

abstract state - the principle of universality - in the oppositions that rule civil society. Against these oppositions that are the foundation of the idea of representation, Marx proposes what he calls the democratic state, the democratic society and what may be called direct representation which embrace the idea of socialized man as the essence of the universal principle.

Marx's idea of true democracy is intrinsically bound to his analysis of the relationship between the abstract state and civil society as we will show by looking at his analysis of universal suffrage. His ideal of true sovereignty of the people being based on the presupposition that democracy is the expression of man's social life - his natural-human condition as a social condition - reveals how the supersession of the oppositions within civil society implies the abolition of political democracy - universal suffrage. We will examine therefore how, for Marx, the supersession of politics is the real condition for human emancipation - the realization of democracy as the unity of the particular and the universal interests of society.

However, if democracy is for Marx a natural-human condition, it is not yet a social condition, therefore, subjective emancipation cannot express the objective emancipation of society. Thus, Marx suggests the necessity for a revolution which will abolish all negativity, and all positivity of negativity making possible human emancipation. The proletarian revolution, as we will present, is the incarnation of this
ideal by emancipating society from itself (impoverishment) and raising it at the level of humanness through the appropriation of the conditions for a human existence. The proletariat, which is the true universal class because of its radical position in bourgeois society, according to Marx, should realize a radical revolution that is free from all the limitations that mark revolutionary activity. As the 'organic unity' between objective and subjective conditions, the proletarian revolution, for Marx, realizes human emancipation because it expresses the development of mankind to social activity and social man through the admission of the social essence of all property - thus, through the abolition of private property.

In the second part of our dialogue with Marx's discourse we will examine closer the major proposition which commands Marx's reflections, namely his postulate of the social essence of human activity. In six equally relevant sections we will look here at the philosophical foundations of Marx's idea of the social activity of socialized man which will permit us to trace the presuppositions or, the origins the dialectic of his idea of revolution.

In the first of these sections we will look at the two principal attributes by which Marx defines man - free consciousness and species-being. The point we want to bring forwards here is Marx's principle that man is a being of social consciousness because he is the social being of social activity. This principle is the basis of the idea of unity, the foundation of the idea of separation and the content of the
idea of revolution. Objectivity is man's essential nature, according to Marx, but he leaves us wandering about the origins of this nature. Human activity as the power of objective being, or as the result of socialized man, leads us to examine the significance that holds for Marx the idea that man must appropriate sensuously his objectivity.

In the second section we will look at objectification as sensuous appropriation which will take us to the enigmatic nature of human activity. Here we find out that man must make the world appear as his product to relate to it humanly and thus to realize both objective and subjective emancipation as the producer of a human world through human production. But, this immense power of man's activity is his very predisposition to be lost - alienated - by erecting an estranged world. We are led to conclude then, that man does not alienate himself because he is a non-objective being but, because he is a non-social being since he has not yet appropriated his relations to nature and to other men. The origin of unity is the impossibility of separation. Man must transform his natural condition into a social condition which may then take the appearance of a human condition. For Marx, therefore, it is either human being or non-being, either nature or consciousness, either individual or society, either consciousness or false consciousness that can be true reality. There is only one mode of objectification that is appropriate to man because its object and the mode of activity are human: industrial activity.
In the third section we look at *industry* as the human production for a human world or as the self-mediated existence of man who has appropriated sensuously his bonds with nature and other men. Developed industry, Marx tells us is the expression of man's realization of *essential powers* which allow him to supersede alienation by the abolition of an estranged world. Thereon, man is freed from production under the guise of *necessity* because he has realized the humanity of nature and the naturalness of need. Through industrial production social and natural sciences are united making the distinction between man and nature superfluous. However, Marx tells us, that industry provides man with the capacity to satisfy his needs humanly only because it is the basis of a *human society* as *socialized humanity* which abolishes alienation through *social production* and *social consumption*.

In the fourth section concerning *sociality* as the reality of possibility, we find out how Marx redisCOVERS the human condition of man (objectivity) as a *natural* condition once sociality ceases to be bred by the powers of human activity to transform and it becomes a simple mode of adaptation to an 'organic totality' - society as nature. The origin of the problem is revealed to be other than the estranged world of non-objective being; it is the power of alienation that non-socialized man disposes menacing the control society has over his destiny. Thus Marx will propose that man's freedom from necessity is realized only once he admits freedom as *social necessity*. The realization of human society as the
process of objectification which permits man to supersede
necessity through the recognition of human production becomes
a non-essential mediation once a perfected unity between man
and nature is made possible through socialized humanity as
positive humanity.

To appreciate how Marx discovers positive humanity, in the
fifth section, we look closer at the origin of the theory of
alienation and the significance of an estranged world that
underlie his conception of man and of the progress of history.
He tells us here that man's powers and needs must be confirmed
as human to satisfy being and knowing. The objectification
of man through the creation of a human world as of human
production permits man to forget the distinction that exists
between society and the individual, man and nature, conscious-
ness and need. Human reality takes the form of positivity
which supersedes determination by becoming independent of
everyone's will, man alienates his powers and the appearance
of freedom from necessity reproduces an estranged world which
man must re-appropriate to serve his needs. Within bourgeois
society positivity is truly negativity - false consciousness.
Marx will conclude therefore that, so long as man remains un-
able of real determination yet, he can act only at the illu-
sion of freedom, he will remain unable to realize human inter-
ests. What is necessary is to get rid of all negativity and
of all positivity of negativity so as to make possible positive-
ity that is truly appropriated necessity. The emancipation
of mankind from an estranged world must be made possible
through the abolition of objectification as sensuous appropriation which is the precondition for positive humanity that is free from pre-history because it is freed from all negativity.

We discover in this way, in the sixth section, Marx's conception of the progress of history from the dialectic of negativity to the negation of negation, which is the incorporation of his reflections on the human condition into an all round conception of progress. Marx believed that he could embrace reality radically by asserting that contradiction is only a moment in the process of the becoming of human activity, of free consciousness and species-being because human history begins with its being - objective man as socialized man. The origins of this history remain as enigmatic as it is ambiguous its objective: the realization of positivity free of negativity. The idea of revolution as the mediation that will accomplish this objective and will abolish itself along with all the conditions that make human activity impossible reveals the content of positive humanity when man or nature as such must become a real determination. Marx recognizes ideology as the flesh of the new history where objective man is the condition for society as the 'organic totality', but the capitalist system, bourgeois society, appear to him as false extremes and this leads him to suggest that capital production is itself a necessary presupposition for human emancipation.

In a tragic manner, if we may say so, Marx's conception of human history comes to embrace the development of our
societies into the civilized 'democratic tyrannies' (Tocqueville) of our epoch as much as, by trying to resolve the contradictions that enhance such progress he provides the ideological reason for modern totalitarian regimes. This movement has its ground on a modern conception which constitutes the substance of ideology: the idea that man's condition of suspension based on the enigmatic power of his activity is resolved with technological development and with the invention of modern societies impregnated by the premises of revolutionary objectivity. Man's illusion as the master of his destiny having found through social and technological 'progress' the apotheosis of human objectivity (determination) has realized the incorporealization of this 'false consciousness' onto the flesh of the history he makes and he lives. Yet, appearance as reality and reality as appearance, have not abolished the means for realizing freedom in spite of the ideology of real determination. It is in this imperfect way, that neither the invention of modern democracy, or the development of the capitalist system, or even that of modern society can ever become an 'organic totality', because human activity is always a menace to the appearance of 'positivity'. Marx refuses to embrace this limited freedom and he seeks to establish that the progress of technology and that of society will be the origin of a truly human freedom. We will examine therefore, the origins of the new world he conceives of at the place of the capitalist system and of political democracy which are expressions of this imperfect freedom of man that stands over
his head like the sword of Democles stabbing him every time he forgets what must be remembered and remembers what must be forgotten — that freedom must be re-invented because it is not absolute.
PART I: FROM POLITICAL CRITICISM TO POLITICAL ACTION

Throughout the years 1843-44 Karl Marx was profoundly involved in a critique of civil society and representative democracy. The two critiques converge into each other since the criticism of the universal principle represented by the modern state is based on the analysis of civil society as the expression of private interests; in turn, the criticism of representative democracy is grounded in the analysis of the abstract state as the expression of political democracy whose ideal of universal representation is made possible only through the 'transubstantiation' of private interests, that is, through the alienation of the individual. The main aspect of Marx’s criticism of bourgeois or political democracy is therefore centered on the opposition between private and social interests – between the individual and society.

By way of his critical analysis of the modern state and civil society Marx discovered the concepts of estrangement and alienation which played a determinate role in his analysis of the capitalist mode of production. The connections which underlie Marx’s political criticism and his conception of political action are therefore of the greatest importance in grasping the origins of the dialectic of his idea of revolution. In this first part of our research we will take a general view of Marx’s political criticism concentrating particularly on the important role played by his political precepts.
in the conceptualization of a positive humanity.

In one of the letters from the Franco-German Yearbooks which contain the correspondence carried between Marx and Arnold Ruge, a central figure of the Young Hegelian movement and editor of the Yearbooks, Marx sums up the character of the new world he foresees emerging:

Man's self esteem, his sense of freedom, must be re-awakened in the breast of these people. This sense vanished from the world with the Greeks, and with Christianity it took up residence in the blue mists of heaven, but only with its aid can society ever again become a community of men that can fulfill their highest needs, a democratic state. (3)

Only man as a free and independent being, who has appropriated his objective relation to both nature and other men, (becoming thereby an individual), can supersede subordination to and dependence on an abstract will. In the Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State Marx explains "'subordination' and 'dependence' are external relationships, running counter to autonomous existence and limiting it...". (4)

Therefore, an inorganic dependence on society produced by "external necessity" (5) could not provide the basis for a democratic state. For Marx, only once subjective freedom is no longer opposed to necessity, (its subjectivity having been realized through the appropriation of objective rela-

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4. Marx, K., 'Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State' (1843), in Early Writings, p. 61

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5. Ibid.
tions), can organic dependence constitute itself as independence. Having brought forward this dialectical conception of the relation between the particular and the universal will held by Marx, we may ask, what society had ever shown the need for a democratic state?

It is certain that Marx could not have had in mind classical Greek democracy since for the ancients the very idea of subjective freedom — individual will — is a contradictio in subiecto. It is not man's will (to try) to determine the consequences of his acts that ensured the presence of freedom in human action for the founders of the polis; on the contrary, it is the fact that the consequences of human action are indeterminate which permits the possibility of superseding reality. We could go even further and argue that the very notion of a democratic state is itself a contradictio in subiecto, if by democracy one is to understand the possibility of each man’s participation in the becoming of a general will; and, if by state one is to understand the opposite that is, the negation of an infinite process and the realization of a general will, a state.

The significance of the notion of a democratic state appears clearer in this superlativa opposition,

...once you have arrived at the animal kingdom of politics there is no reaction that can go further back and no way of progressing beyond it without abandoning its basis and effecting the transition to the human world of democracy. (5)

5. _Letters_, pp. 203-4 (our emphasis)
For Marx, politics is anarchy, difference, private property, non-social being/alien being, the rights of political democracy, particular being, the notion of citizenship/ideal universality. In contradistinction democracy is harmony: here where individual and society relate positively, where particular and general interests have accomplished their organic correspondence; here unity is a product of a relation and not of an identity, because its origin is true universality.

A democratic state, therefore, for Marx, ought to represent the accomplishment of the "sovereignty of the people" as the expression of a "fully developed Idea of democracy". (6)

Nevertheless, what is in question here for Marx is not direct democracy as opposed to representative democracy, but, rather, the possibility of direct representation, so that the state is not conceived as an external mediation which must unite the individuals in the name of an abstract universality.

...the universal interest becomes a particular interest in reality and not merely in thought, in abstraction... only if the particular interest really becomes the universal interest. (7)

What is crucial in the true state is not the fact that every citizen has the chance to devote himself to the universal interest in the shape of a particular class, but the capacity of the universal class to be really universal, i.e. to be the class of every citizen. (8)

The true state for Marx, must represent democracy in action. This means that the distinction between direct and repre-
sentative democracy is superfluous since each individual is the condition of a democratic society.

A democratic society is expressed by the possibility of each man to participate immediately in "the general concern of the state" (9) because his production satisfies social needs. Man, therefore, is not a citizen, a universal being, because he is a political being, but a citizen because he is a social being. The true state is the expression of an 'organic' (10) unity which never acquires an essential existence (determination) outside itself; its origin is in the principle of democracy as 'socialized man'. The immediate correspondence which ought to exist between the interests of society and the general concern of the state is based on the logical deduction that the state ought to represent the universal principle - socialized man.

The problem which troubles Marx is not, as in Hegel, how to free the state from its private determinations but, rather, how to supersede civil society as such. Thus, in his

9. ibid. p. 187

10. The attribute 'organic', as we will see in the second part, represents for Marx, the relational nature of human reality (social, political, economic), which is determined by the power of human activity to transform at once object and subject. This organic nature of human reality does not signify the absence of conflict; yet, it does not exclude its abolition/supersession in so far as it 'brings together what belongs together' and, therefore, it produces the appearance of 'positivity'. The attribute 'organic', viewed from this angle, can suggest the evolutionary - determinate - nature of human reality in contraposition to its revolutionary - indeterminate - nature. Therein rests the kernel of the mystery in Marx's considerations on revolution that we examine all along this research.
pamphlet *On the Jewish Question* Marx declares his concern over modern society which has become the "bellum omnium contra omnes . . . the essence of difference". In this "sphere of egoism", Marx adds, the state, "has become the expression of the separation of man from his community, from himself and from other men, which is what it was originally". (11)

In so far that "civil society has fully brought forth the political state", the state expresses both its confirmation and its negation. The state is at once the arena where modern society can imagine itself as 'socialized humanity' (unity) and, where it can declare itself as the democracy of the rights of private (different) individuals. For Marx, this relationship contains the profound contradiction of bourgeois society and political democracy. This contradiction will lead to their self-destruction and replacement by a socialist society by means of a communist revolution, which is the last representation of political democracy; thereafter, democracy will have become social—human—both theoretically and practically.

The contradiction between civil society and the state, private and social interests, the individual and society, is summed up by Marx in these equivocal terms which prepare the ground for the dialectic of his idea of revolution:

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11. Marx, K., 'On the Jewish Question' (1843), in *Early Writings*, p. 221
12. ibid. p. 239
The perfected political state is by its nature the species-life of man in opposition to his material life. All the presuppositions of his egoistic life continue to exist outside the sphere of the state in civil society, but as qualities of civil society. Where the political state has attained its full degree of development man leads a double life, a life in heaven and a life on earth, not only in his mind, in his consciousness, but in reality. He lives in the political community, where he regards himself as a communal being, and in civil society, where he is active as a private individual, regards other men as means, debases himself to a means and becomes a plaything of alien powers. The relationship of the political state to civil society is just as spiritual as the relationship of heaven to earth. The state stands in the same opposition to civil society and overcomes it the same way as religion overcomes the restriction of the profane world, i.e. it has to acknowledge it again, reinstate it and allow itself to be dominated by it. Man in his immediate reality, in civil society, is a profane being. Here, where he regards himself and is regarded by others as a real individual, he is an illusory phenomenon. In the state, on the other hand, where he is considered to be a species-being, he is the imaginary member of a fictitious sovereignty, he is divested of his real, individual life and filled with an unreal universality.

According to Marx, the most accomplished political state is the one which establishes its universal identity by abstracting from its private interests. This means that man as citizen can only fulfill his duties if he negates his individual existence while, as a bourgeois he negates the rights of other men. However, this opposition appears to contain its own solution since in fact citizenship is only the liberation (emancipation) of private interests so that they may become the interests of society in general. In this way the

13. ibid. p.220
state becomes the spokesman of private interests while private interests take the form of universal interests.

Man as an individual, as a particular being is a limited being. He is dependent upon relations independent of all men, relations which subordinate everyone to an alien will. Man's private activity dissolves in the struggle of each to impoverish the other in order to realize his own private interests. In turn, man as a citizen, as a universal being, is nothing more than the expression of an abstract community—the rights of men as against individual rights. We are presented here with the image of an individual who struggles against the realization of a universal interest in civil society and a citizen who combats private interests in trying to realize his investiture. While at first sight these relations appear indefinite since everything seems to correspond positively to everything else, in reality, man's double life in bourgeois society is grounded in a profound contradiction. Here man can never be recognized as an individual because he can never become a real universal being and, moreover, he can never realize a universal existence without appropriating his objective existence. As a private producer man is one of many such apparently independent producers who are separated because they see in one another the means to the satisfaction of their needs; their products are objects which come to represent purposes alien to their producers. (14) As an individual man's subjecti-
vity is insignificant; in his role as a citizen, a universal being, in so far that he is not objectively emancipated, his subjectivity is his limitation, his determination by private interests, an estranged world towards which he is bound by external necessity.

The deputies of civil society are constituted into an 'assembly' and only in this assembly does the political existence and will of civil society become real. The separation of the political state from civil society takes the form of a separation of the deputies from their electors. Society simply deputes elements of itself to become its political existence. (15)

A twofold contradiction results of this inversion. Firstly, there emerges a "formal contradiction".

The deputies of civil society are a society which is not connected to its electors by any 'instruction' or commission. They have a formal authorization but as soon as this becomes real they cease to be authorized. They should be deputies but they are not. (16)

Secondly, there emerges a "material contradiction".

In respect to actual interests ... we find the converse. They have authority as the representatives of public affairs, whereas in reality they represent particular interests. (17)

Civil society cannot have an immediate political existence because it cannot represent the universal principle. It is the expression of private interests that manage to coexist in the name of a reality that is at once their negation as a particular interest and their confirmation as a

14. Marx, K., 'Excerpts from James Mill's elements of Political Economy' (1844), in Early Writings, p.268
civil right. Thus the separation between civil society and the state is based on this contradiction contained within civil society: as the society of men who are all able to speak and act freely it realizes its civil existence by negating its political existence and it must negate its civil existence to realize a political existence. The deputies may not be, consequently, organically related to civil society for, if they are, they will reveal the contradiction and will make necessary new elections to safeguard society from itself. The deputies are the representatives of electoral interests, but once this representation becomes visible, it may no longer express civil society - the rights of every man; it must become the universal rights of every man - society in the form of the state, the universal principle. At the same time however, the deputies cannot defy their electors absolutely for the only way they may exercise authority is by establishing their public identity in the name of private interests - by transforming private right into a universal right.

The Paris Commune of 1871 was the first "social republic" Marx tells us in The Civil War in France. It was "the positive form of that Republic".

The Commune was formed of the municipal councilors, chosen by universal suffrage in the various wards of the town, responsible and revocable at short terms...

The Commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary body, executive and legislative at the same time...

...universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes, as individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for the workmen and managers of his business. (19)

It is important that Marx's idea of universal suffrage, seen by him as the origin of the imminent downfall of bourgeois society, be appreciated for it plays a fundamental role in his analysis of that very society.

Marx posited universal suffrage in its ideal form — the community — against its real form — bourgeois society — or, we may say, that he posited the bourgeois form against itself which led him to discover a communal form. What impressed him in the Paris Commune was the power of revocability that each man had, actively binding the municipal councillors, and thus making direct representation a reality. The equi-vocal denominator which underlies, however, his interpretation here is the idea of communal interests made possible by the fact that the commune was a working and not a parliamentary body. This meant that all men ought to have common interests making the idea of the division of powers obsolete since no conflict of interests should exist. Thus, Marx makes a 'logical' leap suggesting that within the commune each man's will could be expressed effectively through universal suffrage. The question one must ask here is what is the

10. ibid. pp. 291, 292
significance of universal suffrage if a priori all men have assented to a communal interest? And, if they have not yet assented, what choice rests for them if universal suffrage expresses their communal existence, an existence that realizes itself by delegating itself as individual existence?

Observed from another angle these propositions take us back to the ambiguity of civil society that is unable to be liberated from itself, for this would mean the realization of absolute anarchy or real order, absolute freedom or real equality. Universal suffrage could not present itself as the interest of society, for then the interests of the electorate would cease to be the condition for a universal interest; the right of every man would cease to be a barrier preventing the realization of universal rights.

In _The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte_ Marx embraces this ambiguity of modern society as he writes:

Thus, by now branding as 'socialist' what it had previously celebrated as 'liberal', the bourgeoisie confesses that its own interest requires its deliverance from the peril of its own self government; that to establish peace and quite in the country, its bourgeois parliament must first of all be laid to rest; that its political power must be broken in order to preserve its social power intact; that the individual bourgeois can only continue to exploit the other classes and remain in undisturbed enjoyment of property, family, religion and order on condition that his class is condemned to political insignificance along with the other classes, that in order to save its purse the crown must be struck off its head and the sword which is to protect it must be hung over it like the sword of Democles. (20)
Universal suffrage, Marx tells us, reveals the limits and possibilities of political democracy by demonstrating that if bourgeois right must prevail it must appear in the form of a universal right. Therefore, not to reveal its particular nature - the negation of the right of other men to property - "bourgeois right" must hide behind the panoply of "the sovereign will of the people", allowing another class to dance to its music. In this way it may enjoy its fortune without appearing responsible for its destiny. Yet, Marx argues, the bourgeoisie by giving political power to another class may fall under the rule of interests which menace the very basis of bourgeois society itself.

The bourgeoisie, in hiding its real power by condemning another class with political power, appears to relinquish its privileges while in fact it protects society from identifying itself with/against the interests of the class in power and thus appearing as a 'positive' society. The bourgeoisie protects its rights because the democratic conditions of its rule protect it from becoming a universal class, (from assuming absolute power) and, consequently, protect it from losing its social power along to its political power.

Civil society being the basis of bourgeois democracy renders impossible the identity between the universal principle of the political state and the particular interests.
which the idea of universal suffrage contains. This means that universal suffrage allows each man the right to vote against the possibility of establishing another man's interest as a universal interest. We may then assert, in respect to Marx's premises; that universal suffrage is the revelation of difference and its reduction to an aggregate under the name 'the sovereign will of the people'. This aggregate must now realize itself for itself; it must establish a particular interest as a universal interest as not to negate its being and, yet, in doing so it will be condemned by civil society. For, once individual interest is posited as a universal interest, suffrage ceases to express the right of each man and it must be re-enacted for society to recall its origins. Thus Marx argues in The Class Struggles in France: 1848 to 1850.

Bourgeois rule as the product and result of universal suffrage, as the express act of sovereign will of the people - this is what the bourgeois Constitution means. But does the Constitution still have any meaning the moment that the content of this suffrage, this sovereign will, is no longer bourgeois rule? Is it not the duty of the bourgeois -ie to regulate the franchise so that it demands what is reasonable, its rule? By repeatedly terminating the existing state power and by creating it anew from itself does not universal suffrage destroy all stability; does it not perpetually call all existing powers into question; does it not destroy authority; does it not threaten to elevate anarchy to the level of authority? (21)

It seems clear here that, for Marx, universal suffrage expresses unity—the sovereign will—immediately. This is why it appears to him contradictory that the majority of society that is condemned by bourgeois interests should sustain a Constitution based on political democracy. It is logical that Marx would perceive consequently, an opposition between the principles of the Constitution of political democracy and the will of a class whose interests stand opposed to bourgeois rights. Universal suffrage condemns bourgeois rule but it does so, strikingly enough, because it generates instability, it interrogates power, it prevents absolute rule, and thus constantly reminds society of its origins—the right of every man to speak and act freely—unity in difference. This for Marx represents the principle contradiction of bourgeois society and political democracy. For in not being able to truly realize itself universally both in form and in content, bourgeois democratic right can only be the right of a particular class in power to oppress other classes; it is the freedom to make a particular interest appear as a universal interest. Universal suffrage contains, nevertheless, its opposite or, shall we say, it is the positivity of negativity which, once it has realized its purpose, ought to be abolished in order for mankind to become liberated from the contradictions that brought it about. Marx sums up the matter in these cryptic statements which embody the origins of the idea of revolution but which do not suggest
the need for a revolution.

The vote expresses the real relation of real civil society to the civil society of the legislature, to the representative body. Or, in other words, the vote is the immediate, direct, not merely representative but actually existing relation of civil society to the political state. It is therefore self-evident that the vote must constitute the chief political interest of real civil society. Only when civil society has achieved unrestricted active and passive suffrage has it really raised itself to the point of abstraction from itself, to the political existence which constitutes its true, universal, essential existence. But the perfection of this abstraction is also its transcendence (Aufhebung). By really establishing its political existence as its authentic existence, civil society ensures that its civil existence, in so far as it is distinct from its political existence, is inessential. And with the demise of the one, the other, its opposite, collapses also. Therefore, electoral reform in the abstract political state is the equivalent to a demand for its dissolution (Auflösung) and this in turn implies the dissolution of civil society. (22)

The vote reveals the contradiction between particular interests and universal rights demonstrating that the separation between civil society and the state needs the vote to confirm itself and to be superseded. Real civil society, a class with no political power because its rights have not been declared, must realize that its interest lies in universal suffrage. Once civil society realizes universal suffrage it may negate its particular contents by positing them as universal. This universality is its essential existence since no right should remain out of the reach of any man. Universal suffrage by realizing itself, posits all

22. Critique, p.191
rights as human therefore making nonessential the negation of a particular existence (alienation) for the confirmation of an estranged universal existence. By transcending the separation between its civil existence and its political existence society has made unnecessary the distinction between them and has thus superseded particular right by positing authentically human—universal—rights. The dissolution of particularity implies the dissolution of false universality grounded on particularity, and the realization of true universality without any mediation. Thus the realization of universal suffrage means its abolition.

...when we speak of specific affairs of state, of a single political act, it is again obvious that it cannot be performed by all people individually. If this were not so it would mean that the individual was himself the true society and thus would make society superfluous. The individual would have to do all at once, whereas in fact society has him act for the others, just as it has them act for him. (23)

Men come together because their individual existence is limited. No man however can be identical to society in as much as society is not an expression of particular needs, it is the aggregate of men's needs—social needs. This means that the interest of every man is a human interest because it has emerged from the interconnections between men who proclaimed its humanness. Society is the expression of this humanness as naturalness. An individual man is a dependent being while in his social existence he is a universal-free

23. ibid. p.188
being. Society is his essential existence confirming that he has appropriated his objective existence.

...civil society is the real political society ...(therefore NP) it is senseless to insist on a requirement which stems from the conception of the political state as something apart from civil society, and which has its roots only in the theological conception of the political state. On this assumption the legislature entirely ceases to be important as a representative body. The legislature is representative only in the sense that every function is representative ...a cobbler is my representative in so far as he satisfies a social need, just as every definite form of social activity, because it is a species activity, represents only the species ...it represents a determination of my own being just as every man is representative of other men. In this sense he is a representative not by virtue of another thing which he represents but by virtue of what he is and does. (24)

Civil society is the real political society, claims Marx, because it is the objective-essential existence of man, as an individual being in his estranged species-life.

In civil society man must erect an autonomous political society - an estranged world - because here he must negate his essential existence (social existence) to confirm his alienated individual existence. If we assume then that man's political existence is really separate from his civil existence, law as the immediate expression of man's species-life must become the expression of his alienated particular being as species-being. The legislature decrees in the name of civil society universal rights; but, as its representational body - its phenomenal existence - the legislature is an

24. ibid. pp.189-190
estranged reality opposed to the particular and alien rights contained in civil society. If the legislature would be truly representative then it would have to represent man's particular life; but, if it could represent particular rights then the legislature would cease to be a representative body by means of which society realizes its civil existence. Thus Marx's critique rests on the premise that law should not be the mediation through which individual right becomes a universal right by negating and subordinating man's particular existence; rather, law should be the expression of man's social existence since in fact it is his only authentic existence. From this point of view, Marx may assert, that the legislature should cease to be an external mediation through which man realizes an imaginary sociality. Man, for Marx, can represent society by virtue of the fact that, in spite of himself, he is a social being, a universal being who must appropriate his objectivity to raise himself to the level of humanity.

Political democracy is Christian inasmuch as it regards man - not just one man but all men - as a sovereign and supreme being; but man in his uncultivated, unsocial aspect, man in his contingent existence, man just as he is, man as he has been corrupted, lost to himself, sold, and exposed to the rule of inhuman conditions and elements by the entire organization of our society - in a word, man who is not yet a true species-being. The sovereignty of man - but man as an alien being distinct from actual man - is the fantasy, the dream, the postulate of Christianity, whereas in democracy it is a present and material reality, a secular maxim. (36)
Marx's realism compels him to try to make real the illusion of bourgeois society. The problem of bourgeois society, according to Marx, is not in its ideal of sovereignty but in the impossibility of its ever being able to realize an authentically sovereign will of the people. Political democracy (abstract democracy) is Christian as much as it admits of man as a citizen, a universal being, in his alienated, inhuman existence. This form of democracy and the alien being of civil society are the false consciousness of man who has not yet appropriated his objective existence and is consequently subordinated by an alien will apparently independent of all. Political democracy is man's alienated existence in civil society, his estranged self-consciousness which appears autonomous of real life activity. In this sense, within bourgeois society man cannot be a sovereign not simply because he has not realized an authentic individuality but because he cannot realize such an individual existence before he has appropriated his species existence. The political state is man's estranged existence distinct from his actual being - the separation of man's intellectual from his material existence. Only once man appropriates his relationships to other men will he be able to transform his dependence and relations, to what appears now as an objective reality - externality, into the means of freedom; only then, Marx believed, material and intellectual life should affirm one another because man has become sovereign both
theoretically and practically. The distinction between the universal and the particular right having become superfluous, democracy may truly realize itself as the expression of universal species-being for whom social existence is human existence. Democracy is the expression of man's social life and as such it is the realization of sovereign being. It is the sovereign will of man as a species-being, man who has appropriated his objective existence - species-life.

According to Marx, democracy can be explained in its own terms.

In democracy no moment acquires a meaning other than what is proper to it. Each is really only a moment of the demos as a whole ... Democracy is the generic constitution ... both form and content. (26)

Democracy is the true incarnation of the universal principle. Every man is here a moment of 'socialized humanity' because society has been realized through man's appropriation of their social existence. Democracy does not express man's political life as distinct from his social life; rather, it is their oneness for, in fact, man's political existence is only a reflection of his social life. Therefore, in democracy right may be considered as a truly human right because it is a social right. Democracy expresses the realization of a constitution that does not emanate from the negation of difference as individuality but, from the confirmation of true individuality because it is the affirmation of species-

26. Critique, p. 87
life.

...in democracy the constitution itself appears only as one determining characteristic of the people, and indeed as its self-determination ...we have here NP) the constitution of the people ...Democracy is the solution to the riddle of every constitution. In it we find the constitution founded on its ground: real human beings and the real people; not merely implicitly and in essence, but in existence and in reality. The constitution is thus posited as the people's own creation. The constitution is in appearance what it is in reality: the free creation of man. (27)

The democratic constitution is the people's constitution because it is a confirmation of their social existence. It is the expression of true universality that is not realized through the negation of man's individual existence since now man's political existence is only an admission of his social existence. Hence, the democratic constitution is an authentic expression of man's free will because it does not originate from an external necessity; it is a human necessity, a social need that enables men to render visible their social existence. However, here as opposed to all inhuman constitutions where man is the object, his social existence does not have its origin in a fictitious universality but it is rather the expression of man's essential existence. Viewed this way, the democratic constitution may be perceived as the perfected determination of man, and of his control over his destiny. Yet, Marx explains further on, that the democratic constitution is not man as such but it is only one
facet of socialized man.

But the distinguishing characteristic of democracy is that in it the constitution is only one facet of the people, that the political constitution does not form the state for itself. Hegel proceeds from the state and conceives of man as the subjectivised state; democracy proceeds from man and conceives of the state as objectified man. (28)

The democratic constitution as the political confirmation of man's social existence is not a self-mediated reality, but it is based on the real interconnections of men - their social relations. The constitution is the determination of the infinite transformations that result from the interactions between men making their social existence. Its origin is the appropriation of the social life of men as their possibility for a human reality. The assertion that the democratic constitution is not a mediation is therefore founded on the assumption that it is not the objectification of man from his life in society which renders him worthy of the title of a citizen. Man in democratic society is a political being because he is a priori a social being.

In the same way, democracy is the essence of all political constitutions, socialized man as a particular political constitution; it is related to other forms of constitution as a genus to its various species, only here the genus itself comes into existence and hence manifests itself as a particular species in relation to other species whose existence does not correspond to the generic essence. (29)

All constitutions are the realization of socialized man, of

28. ibid. 29. ibid. p.88.
a moment in the life process of political emancipation. But only with a democratic constitution does political emancipation necessarily imply human emancipation. Since for Marx, man's social existence is not a function of his political existence but it is his essential existence, a democratic constitution should be a particular constitution only in appearance. In reality it is the only human constitution because here necessity (social life) has realized itself as freedom (social being). A democratic constitution is thus the only one in which law is not only the representation of universal rights but it is in fact the practical realization of those rights, for here the abstract opposition between the individual and society has ceased.

Every other political formation is a definite, determinate, particular form of the state. In democracy the formal principle is identical with the substantive principle. For this reason it is the first true unity of the particular and the universal. (30)

The fundamental characteristic of democracy is the true unity of particular and universal interests. Democracy, however, does not bring together what already belongs together; all it may do is proclaim the accomplishment of man's human existence as the appropriation of his social existence. Democracy is the universality that does not rest on the alienation of man's particular life because it is the individuality that is not the estrangement of man's social life. This means that in a democratic society every man will

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30. ibid.
realize his authenticity - particular rights - because his existence is immediately purposive; man may therefore realize himself as a subject because he has incorporated his objectivity. In democracy what appears as a particular is also general for here it is man's substantial existence that determines his formal existence both implicitly and explicitly. Hence with democracy the very distinction between one's substantial and one's formal existence becomes superfluous. True democracy or the true state is the manifestation of this supersession because, thereafter, man no longer requires an autonomous body to declare his social existence as his particular existence since all particular life is a priori social life. Man's social existence is the creation of a democratic society that does not need a mediation to affirm that it is human society.

In democracy the state as particular is only particular, and as universal it is really universal; i.e. it is not something determinate set off against other contents. In modern times the French have understood this to mean that the political state disappears in a true democracy. This is correct in the sense that the political state, the constitution, is no longer equivalent to the whole. (31)

The particular existence of the true state in democracy serves the needs of man as a social being, therefore, it serves social needs. The democratic state as the universal principle is grounded on man's social life as his essential existence. The state here is not a self-mediated reality that is

31. ibid.
detached from society – concrete life activity. It must be consequently always reaffirmed along the development of the social relations binding men to one another. In contradiction, the political state must negate particularity to realize its universal purpose; as an agent of administration its activities are not defined by real human needs but by the external necessity to realize a universal interest through the negation of particular needs. In democracy, since the state is nothing more than man's social existence because particular needs are posited a priori as social needs, the state's political existence – the possibility of declaring particular rights as human – is superseded. Since, for Marx, a democratic society expresses socialized man, then, it is substantially a human society. This does not signify the supersession of the state as such; it only means that there should exist no need to declare human rights by negating the organic relation that binds man's social life to his particular existence because they appear autonomous. In a democratic society the state, like every other moment of human reality, ought to express the movement and the transformations emerging of activities realizing human needs.

Marx sums his argument concerning the state in a democratic society, or what he calls the democratic state, as he suggests that what is necessary is that the constitution becomes "progress" in order for the people to become the principle – the content – of the constitution.
In a democracy the constitution, the law, i.e., the political state, is itself only a self-determination of the people and a determinate content of the people.

(33)

The people, men in a democratic society, refers to the self-mediated existence of man. But, the people are not an indeterminate reality— an abstraction. They are on the contrary a determinate truth which emerges from a definite development in their social existence— definite social relations. Therefore, all the particular expressions of their social existence must correspond to their progress towards universality— freedom. If however this universality were to be realized, then progress would have to cease and democracy would not be an immanent realization of mankind because man is sui generis a social being; rather, democracy would be the realization of socialized humanity as positive humanity.

Having discussed Marx's understanding of democracy as a human condition, we shall now explore the ambiguities born of his premises. Marx asserts that democracy being the expression of man's social existence can be accomplished only once men have been emancipated both objectively and subjectively. This means that human emancipation is possible after men have appropriated their objective existence and have consequently realized an authentic subjectivity. Thus, it follows that, for Marx, democracy is a human condition that must be appropriated as a social condition for man to realize through political emancipation human emancipation.

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32. ibid. p.118
33. ibid. p.89
We may ask however, why man alienates himself by postulating a world independent of his will - an estranged world? Why he posits his social activity as private making private activity social in appearance only? This inversion which is the foundation of bourgeois society, expresses the negation of Marx's fundamental premise, that private activity is not social in appearance but in reality. According to Marx therefore, the contradiction of bourgeois society is precisely that man's activity as private activity must present itself as social activity to find reciprocity. This, in turn, means that man's activity must negate its apparent individuality to realize an arbitrary sociality. Hence, when what is private in reality, appears as social, because what is social in reality, appears as private, reality is no longer rational. Reality is not rational because it has not yet realized its positive nature - the social nature of human activity. Therefore, Marx proposes that what is necessary is for this apparently all too negative reality to reveal its positivity and to be thus emancipated from all negativity.

Marx argues that the problem of bourgeois society is its negativity (alienation, estrangement), because in opposition to it, he posits the positivity of social activity since he believes all human activity to be substantially social. He writes: "Reason has always existed, but not always in a rational form." (34) The truth of bourgeois society can be found within bourgeois society itself. It is revealed by

---34. Yearbooks, p. 200---
the impossibility to realize its ideals.

Hegel should not be blamed for describing the essence of the modern state as it is, but for identifying what is with the essence of the state. That the rational is real is contradicted by the irrational reality which at every point shows itself to be the opposite of what it asserts, and to assert the opposite of what it is. (35)

The separation between state and civil society is an irrational reality because it is negativity (alienation, estrangement). Here, social interest appears as private interest not because all interest is sought to be social in essence but because private interest expresses the naturalization of rights, the transformation of man's position in civil society onto a human condition. When "The rights of man, writes Marx, appear as natural rights, for self-conscious activity is concentrated upon the political act." (36) then man's natural existence - social life - becomes the means to his subordination, determination by interests independent of his will and acting against him.

Man's relation to other men, to the products of his activity and to himself, within bourgeois society, is turned upside-down; the origin of this inversion is socialized man. Man must (re)appropriate his own estranged relations to recognize his objective being. Positive humanity is where both the origin and the principle meet - where democracy determines the whole as 'socialized humanity'. Thus Marx argues

...the democratic element should rather be the real element, which confers a rational form on the organism of the state as a whole.  

Democracy is rational because it is the natural condition of man. It is not a human condition in which man finds himself, but it is a social condition generated by man himself—the confirmation of man's social life as human-natural. However, one may certainly ask why, if the origin of the inversion is socialized man, man's need to realize himself as a social being, a universal-free being that appropriates his bonds to men and nature, is this necessity not an immanent presupposition of society, human activity? Why man must subordinate nature and other men before he truly emancipates himself to realize a human existence? Why private property, private activity precedes and determines social activity and property? Why mankind needed bourgeois society before realizing human society—a socialist society? Why political democracy (universal suffrage) is necessary for true democracy to be realized? Why negativity precedes and determines positivity? In trying to answer these questions we discover the two perspectives which reveal the origins of Marx's idea of revolution: on the one hand, it appears as if the destruction of bourgeois society (negativity) must be realized by the recognition of its inhuman character—by positioning man in his essential existence as

---37. Critique, p.187---
social being; on the other hand, we find that the recognition of man's human existence is only possible once social man has been realized and history begins with democracy as the origin and its principle—a democratic society. There is on one hand, subjective emancipation in which man is the active force that transforms the world to raise it at the level of humanness. On the other hand, there is objective emancipation in which man realizes himself as free being with the development of appropriate conditions for social existence as human existence. These two perspectives cannot but confront each other for in the first instance the driving force is the positivity of nepativity and in the second, it is the positivity free of any nepativity.

The criticism of bourgeois society gives rise to the idea of revolution but this revolution if it must really destroy bourgeois society must supersede itself in order to free mankind of all nepativity. Marx's realism is revealed once again in his 'Critical Notes on the article 'The King of Prussia and Social Reform'.

...the political soul of revolution consists in the tendency of the classes with no political power to put an end to their isolation from the state and from power. Its point of view is that of the state, of an abstract totality which exists only through its separation from real life and which is unthinkable in the absence of an organized antithesis between the universal idea and the individual existence of man. In accordance with the limited and contradictory nature of the political soul a revolution inspired by it organizes a dominant group within society at the cost of society. (38)
It appears that if Marx proposes that the political soul of the state resides in civil society, the struggle between classes which try to sustain their political power by presenting private interests as universal rights and, those classes that are oppressed by the naked power of their rule, can only result in the mere replacement of the actors handling the state apparatus. If the political soul of a revolution is the abstract state as the universal principle, and if the state’s soul is civil society expressed as the right of every man to act and speak freely then it is evident that the idea of revolution has its origin in the idea of modern democracy – political democracy – representation.

Every new class like every new social right that is determined by the limits and the possibilities of political democracy, to emerge as a human right or, to appear as a class with no particular interests, it must affirm itself in opposition to its particular nature; it must present itself as a universal class of universal rights. In doing so it negates other rights and classes not only because its content is not universal in reality but because its particularity is unable to be recognized without assuming a universal existence. No right and no class can acquire a self-identity unless it appropriates its objectivity and presents itself as human because it is social – universal. It can be seen here how the origins of Marx's labor theory of value rest on this very same contradiction which, through the progress of history, must realize its positivity; history
emerges of the concurrent development of social labour and value - universality and particularity. In politics these very same presuppositions inspire Marx to argue that what is in fact necessary is a truly universal class - democracy in origin and in principle that is not limited by any negativity because it is the incarnation of socialized humanity. Therefore, although a revolution is a limited act, it is necessary.

All revolution - the overthrow of the existing ruling power and the dissolution of the old order - is a political act ... without revolution socialism cannot be made possible. It stands in need of this political act just as it stands in need of destruction and dissolution. But as soon as its organizing functions begin its goal, its soul emerges, socialism throws its political mask aside. (39)

The end of socialism is not political, but the means for realizing socialism ought to be a political means. Socialism must destroy the apparent private interests which prevent the realization of an authentically human - universal - interest; in this way socialism dissolves the separation between state (universal principle) and civil society (private interests) which was based on the false distinctions between private and universal right, social and individual existence, substantial and formal existence. In the same process of dissolution - supersession - socialism by means of a political act - the communist revolution (a mediation) - realizes itself both in content and in form as the universal interest of humanity. The point is made more explicitly

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38. Marx, K., 'Critical Notes on the Article 'The King of Prussia and Social Reform' (1844), in Early Writings,' p.419
39. ibid., p.420
in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*:

When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class. (40)

It seems clear that for Marx, the proletariat, as the missionaries of socialism, will have to undertake a transitional period under which it will be carrying out the will of political power. The proletariat, however, must create the conditions for its political revolution to be realized into a social revolution in order to present the universal character of its objective and include mankind to its army. The destruction of all conditions which serve private interests would be then the precondition for the supersession of class distinctions. It is hence, the abolition of the basis for class antagonisms that emancipates society from class differences. But, one must ask, how the proletariat should transform a political revolution into a social revolution without assuming that political emancipation may presuppose

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social emancipation as human emancipation; in other words, how does socialized humanity guarantee positive humanity?

When a particular class, to disclose its social existence, must declare its rights as universal rights, subjective emancipation should not appear as objective emancipation.

This means that the social basis of a political revolution - civil society - must cease to be the basis for political domination. Since the political soul of a revolution is the abstract state, a class with political power represents the universal principle, therefore, ex officio it ceases to represent particular rights.

"Only in the name of the universal rights of society can a particular class lay claim to universal domination", declares Marx in the Introduction to A Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. (41) What is therefore necessary, he explains further on, is,

...a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not a class of civil society, which is the dissolution of all classes, which has a universal character because of its universal suffering and which lays claim to no particular right because the wrong it suffers is not a particular wrong but wrong in general; a sphere of society which can no longer lay claim to a historical title, but merely to a human one, which does not stand in one-sided opposition to the consequences but in all-sided opposition to the premises of the ...political system ... a sphere which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from - and thereby emancipating - all the other spheres of society, which is, in a word, the total loss of humanity and which can, therefore redeem itself only through the total redemption of humanity. This dissolution of society as a particular class is the proletariat. (42)

41. Marx, K., 'A Contribution to Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction' (1843-44), in Early Writings, p. 254
42. ibid. p. 256
It seems that here, for Marx, objective emancipation is the precondition for subjective emancipation, hence, the attribute universal ceases to be a mere formal reality, an appearance. In this case, therefore, civil society may reveal itself as the basis of universal domination because subjective emancipation involves, at once, objective emancipation. Here, domination is not based on particular rights, but it is based on 'wrong in general' expressed by a class which 'transcends' civil society because it has no particular interests to defend. The proletariat is wage labour and capital for labour power is at once destitute and the source of wealth. But, since labour power is objectless — it is free labour — and capital is the independent condition for this possibility to become reality, wage labour by animating capital and becoming itself productive capital separates itself further and further from the means of life activity. It is this constant impoverishment of 'free labour', its proper activity of separating itself from the means of life activity, which is at once the possibility for it to be suspended from the conditions that are the presuppositions of its slavery — the capitalist mode of production. Therefore, the proletariat expresses the supersession of society from class rule because it does not proclaim the emancipation of society from particular wrong, but it proclaims the abolition of civil society as such — class antagonisms — since its existence is the incarnation of the domination of man by
man on which all other forms of domination rest. It expresses in this way, the inevitable emancipation of society from itself, from 'pauperization', which characterizes the conditions of life for the great majority of society.

The proletariat is the subject and the predicate of social emancipation as human emancipation because its own suffering is the premise of political domination that permits upon another really particular class to lay claim to universal domination. This is why Marx suggests that the proletariat must not reflect upon its particular condition of wage labour as the source of its liberation; on the contrary, it must realize that wage labour is an inhuman condition established by its relation to capital - its opposite. The proletariat is thereby the redemption of humanity because it declares the emancipation of society from the opposition between wage labour and capital. In this way, it declares the dissolution of civil society by declaring the universality of its rights both formally (numerically) and substantially (by abolishing through its emancipation the very notion of 'class'). Marx sums up his conception of the emancipation of society from the exploitation of labour power in the closing line of The Poverty of Philosophy.

It is only in an order of things in which there are no more classes and class antagonisms that social revolution will cease to be political revolution. (43)

The proletarian revolution in this sense may be viewed as the act of the supersession of the necessity for social revolutions to be political revolutions.

A political revolution or subjective emancipation is the positivity of negativity that is bound to the limits of its political soul - power - or, to the particular conditions of existence in civil society. A social revolution or, objective emancipation is the positivity free of any negativity because it is the direct expression of human needs. Socialism needs a revolution to declare the condition of the proletariat as a social condition, as the universal impoverishment of humanity. However, once the proletariat reveals the universality of its particularity it must cease to be negativity - the opposite of capital - for its universal character may not be the positivity of negativity (wage labour). The proletarian revolution must express social emancipation as human emancipation - the abolition of its negativity - because it may not supersede itself without the realization of the conditions for human emancipation. This is why we find Marx telling us that its political nature must be radical, it ought to be "the revolution of radical needs" (44) - the subjectivity of objectivity.

The proletariat must destroy the conditions of wage labour - 'the separation of labour from its object' - because

44. Introduction, p.252
they represent a hindrance against human production and consumption. A radical revolution is bound at once to social and political reality because it is not the simple expression of subjective or objective emancipation but, rather, it is human emancipation. Radical needs represent the necessity for man to appropriate his natural and social bonds humanly because they are the basis for man's self-mediated existence. Only once a political and a social revolution constitute a single movement, the reduction of man to his human rights will not express the opposition of his civil rights to his political duties. Therein lies the universal content of the proletarian revolution whose particular form is superseded once it is realized.

All emancipation is reduction of the human world and of relationships to man himself. Political emancipation is the reduction of man on the one hand to the member of civil society, the egoistic, independent individual, and on the other to the citizen, the moral person. Only when real, individual man resumes the abstract citizen into himself and as an individual man has become a species-being in his empirical life, his individual work and his individual relationships, only when man has recognized and organized his forces propres as social forces so that social force is no longer separated from him in the form of political force, only then will human emancipation be completed. (45)

Emancipation is the declaration that any trans-formation has its roots in man as a social—human—natural being of needs and powers. This is why, for Marx, neither objective nor subjective emancipation may express the totality that

45. Jewish Question, p. 234
must constitute human emancipation as the result of man's all-round relations to nature and other men. Within bourgeois society we find out that political emancipation reduces man to the rights of indifferent and dependent 'individuals' who must alienate their particular existence to appear as universal beings - species-beings. Their political rights as the universal rights of subordination and dependence disclose their social relations in civil society which are the product of the rule of private property - arbitrary property; thus the alienation of man and division of labour corresponding to social needs that are the negation of human needs because they express alienated activity. Hence, within bourgeois society, social emancipation may be only the freedom of participation in the domination of man by man that hides in things while political emancipation is the confirmation of this social existence onto a universal - natural - condition of humanity. What is then necessary, according to Marx, is that man recognizes how the separation of his civil and political existence is the negation of his particular activity as social activity. It is the estrangement of his essential being through 'selling' by the alienation of his products for the satisfaction of arbitrary needs. When man comes to recognize that society is his natural and human existence because he is a social being whose essential powers are social powers - the result of the appropriation of his interrelation to nature and his interdependence to other
men, the world of his production will cease to appear as independent and estranged from him. Human emancipation thus signifies, for Marx, the supersession of the distinction between man's social and political existence — his particular and universal existence — as the recognition of the 'organic' relation which would permit any individual need to be satisfied in the midst of social wealth.

Looking once again at Marx's considerations of the Paris Commune we come across the double perspective that contains his theory of revolution. He explains here how a truly radical revolution is one which contains at once subjective and objective emancipation — it is at once a political and a social revolution.

...the Commune intended to abolish that class-property which makes the labour of the many the wealth of the few. It aimed at the expropriation of the expropriators. It wanted to make individual property a truth by transforming the means of production, land and capital, now chiefly the means of enslaving and exploiting labour, into mere instruments of free and associated labour. — But this is Communism, "impossible" Communism! (46)

However, Marx adds immediately,

If co-operative production is not to remain a sham and a snare; if it is to supersede the Capitalist system; if united co-operative societies are to regulate national production upon a common plan, thus taking it under their own control, and putting an end to the constant anarchy and periodical convulsions which are the fatality of Capitalist production — what else, gentlemen, would it be but Communism, "possible" Communism? (47)

The primordial principle of the Commune was the abolition

46. Civil War in France, p. 294 47. ibid.
of private property which alienates human activity through the development of the social division of labour bound to arbitrary distribution, originally determined by mere chance and then by the concentration of wealth. Thus the Commune sought to abolish 'exclusive possession' on which was based the simple but definite reproduction of the conditions which impoverish the major part of society to enrich another. The Commune demonstrated that individual property is true property because it is not based on the exclusion of another man's right to property; it is, on the contrary, the result of the creation of social powers — communal wealth — through social activity. Man must appropriate nature humanly by transforming it in order that it serves his needs; simultaneously, through this process of human labour, he must recognize his interdependence to other men by producing purposefully in order that his products satisfy social needs making possible immediate consumption. In this way man realizes both objective and subjective emancipation by participating actively in social production and consumption because he is a self-mediated man who knows his social existence as his human existence. Man realizes free activity once he has appropriated his dependence on nature by humanizing nature; this human activity is fully realized once man through human-natural interconnections recognizes his natural existence — need — as human. For Marx, the Paris Commune was the practical demonstration of the possibility of human
emancipation once man had recognized his social existence which enabled him to participate actively in the organization of social relations. Since, however, within bourgeois society, man's private existence is the essence of the negation of human emancipation, communism appears impossible.

Nevertheless, Marx suggests as well, that communism is already present within the existing capitalist mode of production; all that is necessary for its practical materialization is the transformation of the organization of production and consumption to satisfy social needs — real human needs. The development of the capitalist productive forces has produced such a concentration of capital and labour that it has created of its own the very conditions which make possible real co-operative—associated labour. It is only a matter of revolutionizing the productive power of society by putting it under the control of the laws of supply and demand coordinated by a perfect correspondence of social production serving immediately social consumption. This ideal form, in opposition to the anarchy and imminent crisis that menaces the capitalist system is possible because communal production functions within the definite limits and possibilities that draw for it 'social necessity'. Thus, for Marx, this is possible communism because it reveals itself with the actualization of the objective conditions for human emancipation. It is therefore within the development of the capitalist mode of production that resides the growth of positivity free of any
negativity because man for the first time is able to satisfy human need in the form of social need freely. Marx's conclusion leaves no room for uncertainty,

The working class did not expect miracles from the Commune. They have no ready-made utopias to introduce par décret du peuple. They know that in order to work out of their own emancipation, and along with it that higher form which present society is irresistibly tending by its own economical agencies, they will have to pass through long struggles, through a series of historic processes, transforming circumstances and men. They have no ideals to realise, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant. (48)

We find here the ideal correspondence which Marx hoped would arise through a union between the working class as a social force and the economic forces of the capitalist mode of production that is collapsing because of its inability to operate a correspondence between supply and demand. This revolution embraces both elements that contain all political revolutions as social and economic forces. In this case however, these forces are really universal because they do not represent any particular interests and, because they are not conditioned by an external necessity that arises independently of the possibilities and needs of society. Its radical nature resides in its power to realize the 'organic' unity of apparently autonomous moments: subjective reality (human powers and needs) and objective possibility (human conditions of life activity). The proletarian revolution is a radical revolution because it brings together what belongs together:

48. ibid., pp. 294-5
man and nature, society and individual, consciousness and need. It realizes a truly human history as the mediation through which human emancipation is accomplished. The essence of this emancipation is the realization of social activity and social man, or the recognition by man that his activity is social and that he is a social being. According to Marx, this sociability is man's humanity, his essential nature, that in bourgeois society is negated by the separation between the producers and their products creating a class that expresses the absolute dehumanization of man. Consequently, the principle that emerges of their suffering is the universal right of every man to property through the abolition of private property - the alienation of man through the alienation of human activity. Nonetheless, the origin of this radical principle rests on a more profound presupposition held by Marx, that human activity is social in essence. Therefore it follows, that if man is the origin of alienated property and activity, then it is man himself who ought to appropriate his essential being - social being - by realizing social essence of property. Therefore, it follows equally, that the proletarian revolution can realize the ideal of political democracy (sovereignty of the people) without realizing democracy - the right of every man to speak and act freely. By asserting the universal principle (social activity and property), the proletarian revolution must realize the conditions that were the presupposition of its becoming - universal suffrage. As a result, social man (species
being) must posit novel conditions for reproducing and maintaining the perfected unity of the particular and the universal as positivity.

Marx's thesis on the social essence of human activity, of man and, therefore, of 'property' is the basis of his conception of true democracy. However, this democracy can be realized only after man has appropriated sociality - once man's bonds are transformed from destitution to human wealth. The progress of history, according to Marx, creates the objective conditions in order for 'socialized man' to appear as the self-mediated 'species-being'. Nevertheless, the same movement reproduces the idea of a democratic society as the expression of emancipated man - objective being - for whom nature and other men must appear as products of his activity; in this way, democracy and objectivity cease to be the basis of freedom and individuality.

In the following pages we will examine how, as a result, the realization of democracy - 'the fully developed Idea of democracy' - and of the capitalist mode of production follows the same path; both inaugurate the emergence of a new man and a different history because 'socialized humanity' excludes individuality since socialized man is intolerant to non-objective reality - non-human reality. The ambiguity of this proposition comprehends the human condition as Marx's own reflections present; and, in so far as he did try to resolve it, therein lies the equivocalness of his itinerary, making his reflections both the catechism and the anathema of our times.
PART II: THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF MARX'S IDEA OF REVOLUTION

In the first stages of human development, Marx writes in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,

...labour, life-activity, productive life itself appears to man only as means for the satisfaction of a need to preserve physical existence. But productive life is a species-life. It is life-producing life. The whole character of a species, its species-character, resides in the nature of its life-activity, and free conscious activity constitutes the species-character of man. Life itself appears as a means of life. (49)

This is the cardinal point in Marx's analyses which will be present throughout his work whether he is looking at man as he ought to be, man as he is under capitalism or, at the universal class of the proletariat dependent on labour power.

What is essential in the above affirmation is not the idea that man through his activity realizes his power to be a conscious being but that man is the expression of social consciousness. This follows logically from the assertion that all consciousness is the result of social activity.

For Marx, man is a conscious being because he is a social being... consequently, the specific relation between society and the individual determines man's possibility of realizing freedom through life activity - the origin of his dependence towards society - or, it expresses man's enslavement by the very fact that he is dependent on society not only physically.

49. Marx, K., 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts' (1844), in Early Writings, p.32
but also intellectually. Man, for Marx, is not simply a being of needs, but he is a being who must satisfy his needs consciously — humanly — therefore, his 'natural' dependence to nature and other men must be humanly appropriated for man to recognize himself in his activity and its products. The problem rests on man's relation to nature and society that is based on natural dependence and that must be transformed into human — social — independence.

We have seen how, from the point of view of Marx's political criticism of bourgeois society, this ambiguity commands his revolutionary discourse. In this respect, we found out how the forces of human emancipation — democracy as the social essence of human activity — are at once independent of and determined by the conditions of human enslavement — the social possibility to act (produce) and speak (participate) freely, in the creation of social relations as human bonds. Next, we will examine more closely the origins of this ambiguity by looking at the relationship between free consciousness and species-being, at objectification as sensuous appropriation, at industry as human production for a human world, at sociality as the expression of possibility as reality, at the origin of the theory of alienation and the significance of an estranged world which lead to Marx's conception of the progress of history from the dialectic of negativity to the negation of negation. We hope in this way to trace the presuppositions on which Marx's idea of revolution is founded and which form the origins of its dialectic.
1. Free Consciousness and Species-Being

Man makes his life activity itself an object of his will and consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life activity directly distinguishes man from animal life activity. Only because of that is he a species-being. Or rather, he is a conscious being, i.e. his own life activity is an object for him, only because he is a species-being. Only because of that is his activity free activity. (50)

The argument appears clear: free consciousness is only possible through the realization of a species-being. Without the actualization of the species character of man, whose source rests on the social nature of human activity, man cannot realize free consciousness. In other words, Marx is suggesting here the logical impossibility of assuming free consciousness and species-being separately. Their interdependence and interrelation represents the becoming of society through history. It is through the participation of each individual, by the activation of his senses and, thereby, the realization of his powers, that human activity, conscious life activity is realized. We could thus argue, along with Marx, that man is a conscious being because he makes history, but man makes history because he is a social being. Man, Marx claims, is a conscious being only because he is a species-being. Are we then to assume that man not only does not emerge with free consciousness because he must become a species-being, but also, that human activity, conscious life activity, is itself a product of History through the becoming

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50. Manuscripts, p.328
of Society? In fact, in *Capital*, Marx asserts that before conscious life activity emerged "primitive ... instinctive forms of labour" predominated which were distinct and opposite of what he calls "exclusively human" labour which characterises a conscious species-being.(51)

The question which must be raised is, how Marx makes a distinction between what is not yet human and what is human labour? An implicit and necessary presupposition manifests itself here: Marx must assume that, for human labour to emerge, the relation between free consciousness and species-being must be independent of the social-historical development of the human species. If primitive man's powers are inferior because they are not yet socially transformed or appropriated senses, they would be unable to create socially, in other words, according to Marx, productively. It appears, therefore, that primitive man's senses should present an obstacle to the becoming of human labour. For Marx, as we will look at, this obstacle can take the form of apparently private labour against really social labour that inhibits the realization of freedom from necessity. Consequently, a distinction appears necessary between real history and the pre-historical epoch of mankind. The effect this presupposition carries may be seen already in the examination of Marx's idea of a universal species being where he suggests a definite relation between the mode of production and social

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relations in order to demonstrate the indivisibility between
free consciousness and species-being.

The practical creation of an objective world, the
fashioning of inorganic nature is proof that man
is a conscious species-being, i.e. a being which
treats the species as its own essential being or
itself as a species-being...(52)

This means, Marx explains at another occasion, that,

Man is a species-being, not only because he prac-
tically and theoretically makes the species - both
his own and that of other things - his object, but
also - and this is simply another way of saying
the same thing - because he looks upon himself as
the present living species ... as a universal and
therefore free being.(53)

Man's universality is his freedom or, more precisely his
superiority from other living species that produce one-sided-
ly, at the measure of nature. Man's freedom presents itself
in man's capacity to produce "universally", to produce,

...even when he is free from physical need and tru-
ly produce in freedom from such need ...to reproduc-
the whole of nature ...to confront his own pro-
duct ...(to produce) according to the standards of
every species ...(to apply) to each object its inher-
ent standards ...(and to ) to produce in accor-
dance to the laws of beauty. (54)

Thus, man is a species-being, a universal free being, becau-
se he is capable of "fashioning of the objective world" wher-
reby "nature appears as his work and his reality." (55)
Marx concludes as he introduces the relation which binds
man to his products and thereby defines his powers.

The object of labour is therefore the objectifica-
tion of the species-life of man: for man repro-
ces himself not only intellectually, in his con-
sciousness, but actively and actually, and he can

52. Manuscripts, pp.328-9  53. ibid. p.327
54. ibid. p.329  55. ibid.
therefore contemplate himself in a world he himself has created. (56)

Man's mastery over natural forces which impose limitations upon the development of man's freedom determines the universality of his object (product) that ought to express his participation in species life. Freedom against limitations appears as the inherent determination of human activity which ought to raise itself above itself and become liberated from necessity to define the path of history; human activity as such becomes conscious life activity because man objectifies (appropriates) his objective relation to nature and to other men.

If man transforms himself in transforming the world there is always an indetermination present which confronts him in his need to appropriate the objective reality which serves as the means of his activity. Man's freedom, his power to be a universal being, is upheld so long as his own "becoming", in the process of objectification, posits novel conditions for the satisfaction of his needs. If, however, man truly produces universally only once he has appropriated the conditions of production, once a human world has been created, the interdependence and interrelation between free consciousness and species-being could not be established "naturally". On the contrary, man's human relations could be realized only after the right conditions for conscious life activity are present - once need(s) cannot any

56. ibid.
longer impose a limitation upon man's freedom. Social interrelations must be then the product of the appropriation of necessity for history to appear as the expression of man's free consciousness. Man's universality, viewed in this way, must predispose one of the moments of human activity — consciousness or need — so that what appears as an opposition does not become an eternal limitation of the human condition.

Marx's argument, however, does not end at this point, he presents another side of man's universality:

The universality of man manifests itself in practice in that universality which makes the whole of his inorganic body, (1) as the direct means of life and (2) as the matter, the object and the tool of his life activity. Nature is man's inorganic body ... to say that man's physical and mental life is linked to nature simply means that nature is linked to itself, for man is part of nature. (52)

What makes man a universal species being explains Marx, is not the power to dominate objective, natural limitations, but rather, his capacity (necessity) to understand this dependence and thus posit the correct requirements upon the objective world, (natural forces, his and those of nature). This does not signify for Marx that man should rest upon what appears possible, but rather, that he must appreciate correctly the relation between reality and possibility, "Man lives from nature, i.e. nature is his body, and he must maintain a continuing dialogue if he is not to die." (58) It is, therefore, neither man nor the natural forces that have a unique power over the determination in the emergence of free consciousness.

57. ibid. p.328 58. ibid.
and species-being. Marx is more explicit in *The German Ideology* where he writes:

...this particular relation of man to nature is determined by the form of society and vice versa. Here, as everywhere, the identity of nature appears in such a way that the restricted relation of men to nature determines their restricted relation to one another, and their restricted relation to one another determines man's restricted relation to nature. (59)

Free consciousness and species-being emerge through their interrelation which men (re)produce by appropriating the interdependence between freedom and necessity. This simply means that conscious life activity is the foundation of species life, and that species life is the basis of conscious life activity. It is therefore neither freedom nor necessity which could represent a positive or a negative condition for man. What we have is a perfect correlation which manifests itself in the axiomatic relations Marx entertains in his conception of the conscious appropriation of the interdependence between individual and society through the human creation of man's interrelation to nature. In the Preface to a *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx resumes this position.

The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. (...) The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of

production - ...one arising from the social conditions of life of the individuals; at the same time the productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of that antagonism. This social formation brings, therefore, the pre-history of human society to a close. (60)

As we will see further on, the problem arises therefrom, for once the 'false' distinction between consciousness and need is erased and, once 'humanness' and 'naturalness' come to mean the same thing, free consciousness and species-being become themselves an obsolete distinction. Then, if we follow correctly Marx's argument, production cannot involve the participation and formation of individuals; it is not the process of activity that shall establish thereafter the relation between free consciousness and species-being, but this relation must determine a priori the form that activity shall take since it should be immanent in the nature of all activity to be social. It is therefore unclear whether Marx's conception of the social-historical nature of the relation between free consciousness and species-being is the expression of a movement towards the accomplishment of true free consciousness and species-being or, it is the continuous development of their interrelation in the form of human interdependence.

In a revealing description of communism Marx, very early, makes quite clear the alternative he has chosen to follow.

Communism differs from all previous movements in that it overturns the basis of all earlier relations of production and intercourse, and for the

---60. Marx, K., 'Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy' (1859), in Selected Works, p.183. (our emphasis)
first time consciously treats the natural premises as the creatures of hitherto existing men, strips them of their natural character and subjugates them to the united individuals. Its organization is, therefore, essentially economic, the material production of the conditions of this unity; it turns existing conditions into conditions of unity. The reality, which communism is creating is precisely the true basis of rendering it impossible that anything should exist independently of individuals, in so far as reality is only a product of the preceding intercourse of individuals themselves. Thus the communists in practice treat the conditions created up to now by production and intercourse as inorganic conditions. (61)

So far we have seen that, according to Marx, all human activity is conscious life activity because it is an expression of species life. This primordial principle running throughout Marx's work led us to the problem of the origin of human activity since, as we have seen, the condition for such conscious life activity (free consciousness and species-being) do not constitute an immanent presupposition of human activity in general. This problem led to the distinction, which must be implicit in Marx's conceptualization of human activity, between a pre-historical period, when the appropriate conditions for human labour were yet absent, and the origin of real History with the emergence of Society.

Then, we saw how man's universality is interdependent to man's species existence which is his natural existence confirming thus, that free consciousness and species-being are inseparable. Man's universality, or freedom, being a power based on the axiomatic relations between those forces which

61. German Ideology, p. 86
form the conditions of human activity (society, nature), call upon an all round correspondence of every constitutive moment of conscious life activity. This correspondence leads us to conclude that what Marx sought to establish was the necessity of a world offering ideal conditions for activity; in this way, he thought that the opposition between necessity and freedom, which underlies the human condition could be superseded or, at least, controlled. We will see how Marx makes explicit this ideal in his description of the indispensability for a human world and human production to realize "objectification as sensuous appropriation". (62)

2. **Objectification as Sensuous Appropriation**

True objectification of the human senses which become in this way powers of the species is made possible,

...only when objective reality universally becomes for man in society the reality of man's essential powers, becomes human reality, and thus the reality of his own essential powers, that all objects for him become the objectification of himself, objects that confirm and realize his individuality, his objects, i.e. he himself becomes the object. (63)

This implies, Marx explains further on, "the complete eman-cipation of all human senses and attributes", their actualization as "human" both "objectively" and "subjectively". Thus, the senses "relate to the thing for its own sake, but the thing itself is an objective human relation to itself and

62. *Manuscripts*, p. 351
63. *ibid.*, pp. 352-3
to man; and vice versa". This is essential because, as Marx explains, "in practice I can only relate myself to a thing in a human way if the thing is related in a human way to man." (64)

The objectification of man can take place only once his senses have been satisfied humanly. This requires that they have superseded their primitive mode of being as the expression of instinctive needs by transforming nature, objective reality, and thus becoming humanly objectified needs. They objectify nature by humanizing it and they, in turn, can be objectified through the recognition of nature's wealth. Senses become in this way essential powers because they can relate immediately to the objective world which now appears as a product of their activity. Man's activity having acquired a definite, purposive expression, manifests man's objective—human—relation to other men and to nature. Thus humanness, according to Marx, should be a historical creation: the product of the humanization of nature as the appropriation of man's essential powers.

Only a world which has been objectified can be sensuously appropriated because it has become a human world. In it man realizes, at once, a double relation: the relation to the object of production as human, objective emancipation and, the relation to himself as the producer of that object, subjective emancipation. Through objective emancipation man creates an immediate relation between himself and external

--- 64. ibid. p.35?
reality which appears as his product; thereafter, estrangement, or the positing of man's own reality as otherness is superseded. Nevertheless, this becomes only possible because in realizing objective emancipation man realizes at once subjective emancipation; he is able to find recognition and posit reciprocity through his production. Man's individuality (difference) emerges effectively through the production of objects which are useful for others. Consequently, Marx will argue, alienation ought to be superseded because true objectification, sensuous appropriation, has taken place. The indispensable unity between nature and man is hence established in the making of a human world through human production, or through the realization of social activity.

Only through the objectively unfolded wealth of human nature, can the wealth of subjective human sensitivity ... senses capable of human gratification - be either cultivated or created (...) the human sense, the humanity of the senses all these come into being only through the existence of their objects, through humanized nature. The cultivation of the five senses is the work of all previous history. Sense which is a prisoner of crude practical need has only a restricted sense. (...) ... the objectification of the human essence, in a theoretical as well as a practical respect, is necessary both in order to make senses human and to create an appropriate human sense for the whole of the wealth of humanity and of nature. (65)

Both the wealth of nature and that of man must be developed through the process of activity. Nevertheless, the enigma of Marx's confirmation is to know what is the origin of sensuous appropriation, true objectification. On the one hand, it appears that the humanization of nature, its

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objectification, ought to be the precondition for the becoming of man's essential powers. On the other hand, without the acquisition of essential powers man is not able to confront the object of his activity appropriately. If in fact Marx tells us that nature's wealth through human activity, must become the wealth of human nature - man - then, he ought to suggest a priority in the objectification process. However, if this is the case, then the relationship that the process of activity establishes by transforming the subject and the object at once and, hence, negating all forms of determination by nature or consciousness as such would be nullified. Through "real" objectification, sensuous appropriation, Marx explains further on,

...all the organs of his (man's NP) individuality, like the organs which are directly communal in form, are in their objective approach, or in their approach to the object the appropriation of that object. This appropriation of human reality, their approach to the object, is the confirmation of human reality. (66)

This then implies that, for Marx, individuality is established through the acquisition of organs - powers - whose objective approach, the appropriate manner of intending towards the object, is determined by their formation in the process of production, their objectification. Man acquires essential powers through the process of working upon objective reality; he objectifies his primitive intention - need - and by having created a human world can thereafter relate to it immediately without mediation. The principle which emerges

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66. ibid. p.351
from this postulate is that man can really objectify nature if simultaneously he can objectify himself in a human world.

Man, as we have seen, ought to be able to emancipate himself objectively and subjectively for subordination or dependence not to become the basis of the immediate relation between man and nature. Thus, for Marx, man relates towards the world humanly or objectively because it is a world of human production; man cannot relate humanly towards a world which is not yet human, that is non-being for him. Moreover, we could say, that man must create a human world before human production can take place and, human production needs a human world as its basis. In other words, the immediate relation becomes possible through the simultaneous and reciprocal development of man and of nature. However, the simultaneous objectification of the powers of nature and man presuppose the existence of their all round correspondence; the presence of a human world and human production. Therefore, so long as the conditions of the objectification of human activity are not immanent to the process of activity itself, the origin of sensuous appropriation remains enigmatic. We must ask then, what is the origin or the possibility of an immediate relation between man and nature which, as we will see further on, represents for Marx the means towards the supersession of estrangement or, the condition which makes otherness a mere appearance.

Man produces man, himself and other men, ...the object, which is the direct activity of his
individuality...his existence for other men, their existence for him. (67)

Man is a universal species-being, because of his power to make everything appear as the product of his activity. Yet, this assertion which expresses man's power, expresses at once his limitation. Everything has an existence for man so long that it is an object of his activity; in this way it is consumed immediately and it cannot acquire an existence independent of its relation to the producer. Through his activity man creates a world around him because human activity needs an object to animate itself, or, by animating the object it becomes real activity. Man gives existence to non-being and, in this way, man's immediate relation to nature is established by the fact that human activity binds everything; it is the origin of life because it cannot be realized without at once reproducing purposive relations between men, men and things. However, man's world is human, according to Marx, because it will not acquire an external existence from the producers. This is only made possible if it is the product of human or social production where the objects of man's activity represent social needs and thus may be consumed immediately. In turn, this implies that the only way the relation between man and nature could be sensuously appropriated, so that in it man feels himself as a universal being, able to objectify himself in objectifying nature, is if he produces humanly, socially. One may assume...

67. ibid. p. 349
then, that the immediate relation between man and nature is
the condition for sensuous appropriation but, also, that
sensuous appropriation, true objectification, is the condition
for the conscious appropriation of the immediate relation.

Human production, Marx writes, can really exist only where,

...both the material of labour and man as subject
are the starting-point as well as the outcome of
the movement ...(where NP) the social character
is the general character of the whole movement;
just as society produces man as man, so it is
produced by him ...(since NP) Activity and con-
sumption, both in their content and in their mo-
de of existence, are social activity and social
consumption. (68).

Couldn't we say that the whole struggle is for man to ap-
propriate his origin, the fact that he is a being with needs,
a limited being dependent on nature and on other men. The
very possibility for such sensuous, historically determined
appropriation, would consequently suggest a certain trans-
formation in man's condition. Henceforth; man's origin
would have to be defined differently,

The human essence of nature exists only for social
man: for only here does nature exist for him as a
bond with other men, as his existence for others
and their existence for him, as the vital element
of human reality; only here does it exist as the
basis of his own human existence. Only here has
his natural existence become his human existence
and nature become man for him. (69)

Man recognizes that his dependence on nature is what joins
him to other men and what gives to his opaque existence—non-
existence clearness, meaning. Man realizes that in fact his
needs are simply human. Thus, Marx concludes,

68. ibid. 69. ibid.
Society is therefore, the perfected unity in essence of man with nature, the true resurrection of nature, the realized naturalism of man and the realized humanism of nature. (70)

Man creates a world between himself and nature which supersedes the enigmatic character of human activity - the fact that man's freedom is conditional. Society is this world between man and nature which expresses the supersession of difference as opposition, the production of an immediate relation that transforms man's dependence from a limitation into an essential power. In this way, man appropriates sensuously his naturalness, and activity stops originating from the opposition between freedom and necessity. So long as freedom against limitations, the conscious activation of man's senses to satisfy needs, does not spring in 'cooperation' (harmony) with man's dependence on nature, so long as this dependence is viewed negatively, Marx argues, limitations become the source of relations of subordination between men. Society expresses the realization of the supersession of this opposition. Primitive labour, following Marx's postulates, would end and a new epoch would begin where a new man emerges for whom needs are no more natural but they are social needs. Thereafter, nature should not represent any more objectivity as negativity but it should present its humanness, its being the source of life activity.

Within communist society, the only society in which the original and free development of individuals ceases to be a mere phrase, this development is

70. ibid. pp.349-50
determined precisely by the connection of individuals, a connection which consists partly in the economic prerequisites and partly in the necessary solidarity of the free development of all, and, finally, in the universal character of the activity of the individuals on the basis of the existing productive forces. Here, therefore, the matter concerns individuals at a definite historical stage of development and by no means merely individuals chosen at random, even disregarding the indispensable communist revolution which itself is a general condition of their development. (71)

Communist society is the first human society because in it men are able to develop freely. This means for Marx, that history only begins with communism; until that stage the notion society was not yet correct for describing human interconnections which sprang independently of men's will. The connections of individuals under communism are determined by their interrelation to nature that is appropriated consciously through human objectification as the creation of a human world; it is also determined by the interdependence between men established through the objectification of their senses into essential—communal—powers; and, finally, by human—social—production corresponding to the wealth of social—human—reality. The conditions for such a development of mankind originate with the recognition that the interdependence and the interrelations between men and men and nature is a natural—human condition. But, these conditions become effective only once the communist revolution rids humanity of the sediments of pre-historical

71. German Ideology, p. 118
limitations created by nature that is not human and by man who is not yet social.

We have traced how objectification as sensuous appropriation signifies the creation of a human world through human production, accomplished only by an immediate relation between man and nature, and made possible once man's senses have been transformed in transforming reality. However, we are still unable to trace why Marx would suppose such objectification immanent. In other words, the realization of sensuous appropriation, the origin of human activity as social activity remains enigmatic; so long as Marx admits that neither nature nor man can predominate over the path of history. If we were to admit along his postulates that the origin of the immediate relation between man and nature, which is the pre-condition for the accomplishment of sensuous appropriation—human activity—is made possible through the realization of society—the bond between men—because activity sui generis is social, we still have no way of knowing why this activity of incorporealization would supersede the opposition between necessity and freedom; or, why Marx assumes all along that this immediate relation between man and nature will be a positive relation between society and the individual.

The bond which human production as social production realizes is the creation of a human world which, for Marx, implies the supersession of necessity; society considered in
this way does not signify destitution but wealth because the
mode of production which produces man's means of life transforms at once the human condition. Society expresses freedom because it is the result of industrial activity - the perfected "unity in essence" of man and nature. Industrial activity represents for Marx the development of the interrelation and the recognition of the interdependence between human and natural powers. In this way everything appears to correspond with everything else. Society as the world between man and nature comes to represent their identification, the positive harmony against the negative conflict which originated it - an activity in need of an object. It appears now that the implicit opposition which underlies Marx's argument is the one between nature and consciousness. And, this opposition seems to be a logical consequence of his conceptualization of conflict as negativity because human activity originates for Marx in relation to limitations - dependence. However, we could not answer following these principles, why man rises from the ashes of history and tries to reinvent liberty every time the world of his own making declares him a slave. This enigma, which does not permit us to reduce activity as the product of reason or non-reason, determination or indetermination, Marx appears to have resolved when he presents industry to be the positive relation between nature and consciousness that produces a human world through human production.
3. **Industry**: Human Production for a Human World

The immediate relation between man and nature, a relation free of an external mediator, is the basis on which free consciousness and species-being are realized reciprocally. This relation emerges through industrial activity, a historically developed mode of production which abolishes the opposition between necessity and freedom by transforming the conditions of activity.

...the history of industry and the objective existence of industry as it has developed is the open book of the essential powers of man, man's psychology in a tangible form. (72)

Industry represents for Marx the immanent development of man's powers which, through the progress of history, are not only realized, but also, they can be identified. Thus, industrial development is the progress of mankind to an epoch where the wall that stands between reality and possibility has fallen; from that moment men should be able to posit such projects as the potentiality - human and natural - for their actualization presents itself. It is "natural science" Marx explains, which "transformed human life all the more practically through industry and has prepared the conditions for human emancipation". (73)

In so far, as the appropriation of natural powers implies at once the purposive, practical development of human powers, nature must be objectified correctly so that man may confirm its humanness in the realization of his naturalness as human.
The development of industry expresses the sensuous appropriation of nature that transforms man's life by liberating him from necessity or, by satisfying productively, as opposed to instinctively, his needs. Consequently, nature provides the basis of a natural science only because conscious life activity appropriates its wealth or, creates real human wealth — industry. In this way, industry can be viewed,

"...as NP) the real historical relationship of nature, and hence of natural science, to man. If it is then conceived as the exoteric revelation of man's essential powers, the human essence of nature or the natural essence of man can also be understood." (74)

As the unity of man and nature produced through the historical development of man's powers industry reveals that the relation of man and nature is a human and natural interrelation. This means that man relates to nature and nature to man, because what is in question is humanized nature which relates immediately to man and can, as it ought to, have an existence only as of this relation.

Nature as it comes into being in human history — in the act of creation of human society — is the true nature of man; hence nature as it comes into being through industry, though in an estranged form, is true anthropological nature. (75)

Anthropological nature or, humanized nature, develops through the realization of an immediate relation between man and nature that industrial activity produces by transforming the conditions of life activity. However, it seems important

--- 74. ibid. 75. ibid.
to observe the precision made by Marx here: he tells us in fact, that not any society, but human society emerges from industrial activity which objectifies nature productively. This precision takes us to the ideal of a positive relation between society and the individual by suggesting that industrial activity has the specific character of establishing a relation which makes possible the realization of conscious life activity, the objective and subjective emancipation of man. The importance of these mutually conditioned modes of emancipation required for man to produce in freedom appears in Marx's identification of the real nature of human passion.

...man's feelings, passions, etc., are not merely anthropological characteristics in the narrower sense, but are truly ontological affirmations of his essence (nature), ...they only really affirm themselves in so far as their object exist sensuously for them. (...) Only through developed industry, i.e. through the mediation of private property, does the ontological essence of human passion come into being both in the totality and in its humanity. (76)

It is not the simple acquisition of an object that could fulfill human needs. As we have seen, man's needs are historical: they are realized effectively through the transformation of objective reality. In turn, the actualization of objective-human conditions of life activity permit man to appropriate his subjective being by realizing an objective, sensuous existence. Man must affirm humanly his needs

76. ibid. p.375
by creating around him a world which reveals naturalness - need - as the product of humanness - conscious life activity. Only as the producer of the objects of life activity man gives to the world the appearance of being his product. By humanizing nature through the transformation of the conditions of life activity from conditions of necessity to conditions of freedom, man not only affirms his needs as human because he has transformed the conditions of life to correspond to his passions; more significantly, his needs are recognized as human because they have been transformed by objective reality reproducing thereby a bond - a sensuous relation between object and subject. This would imply an effective transformation of the human condition because for the first time, and thereafter, man would be able of truly satisfying himself by resolving estrangement (otherness). Man having appropriated nature objectively he is able to supersede estrangement - his external relation to the objects of life activity.

However, it is important not to dismiss that Marx does not tell us that it is through the development of industry, the creation of a human society that man comes to appropriate sensuously his own powers and those of nature; rather, he tells us, developed industry is the condition for conscious life activity that is human because it is social activity. We find out, therefore, that it is not the historically contingent development of the relationship between nature and
consciousness that preoccupies Marx; it is their irreversi-
ble identification made possible, as he argues, "Only when
science starts out from perception in dual form of sensuous
consciousness and sensuous need." (77), because the distinc-
tion between social and natural sciences would be overcome.
Industrial activity produces a human society, an authenti-
cally human world because it is the expression of "real
science". (78) - the product of objectified powers, of hu-
manized nature as the naturalness of man.

The relation which industrial activity creates between
man and nature forms the basis of objective emancipation
which may prevent estrangement but, it does not abolish alie-
nation (dissimilation). Each producer (man) posits the possi-
bility of novel needs which must be transformed in the
struggle to find the appropriate object for their satisfac-
tion. As long as human passion ought to establish anew its
ontological essence to affirm the humanness of needs, needs
appear as relative expressions of man's humanity. Hence
man would posit estrangement as alienation because he holds
no sensuous relation to the objective reality (nature, soci-
ety) which may provide the means for his life activity. As
such man is an alien being - different - whose needs do not
correspond to the natural and social wealth. But, since
every man must sensuously affirm his passions, he must cons-
ciously recognize his drives as human by establishing their

77: ibid. p.355  78. ibid.
The abstract hostility between sense and intellect is inevitable so long as the human sense (Sinn) for nature, the human significance (Sinn) of nature and hence the natural sense of man has not yet been produced by man's own labour. (79)

For Marx, the opposition between consciousness and need expresses the fact that the objects man requires to satisfy his needs - objects of immediate consumption and means of production - are always external to him. Man must therefore realize the necessity to produce socially or, he must recognize the social relations that his activity reproduces to prevent the transformation of such externality into an estranged world which can turn against man himself. This only becomes possible through sensuous, purposive production that bounds men actively with their products because they are objects of social needs. The suspension which contains the relation between man and nature, because of man's external relation to the objects of activity, requires the infinite renewal of the process of objectification by creating novel bonds with men.

A being which does not have its nature outside itself is not a natural being and plays no part in the system of nature. A being which has no object outside itself is not an objective being. A being which is not itself an object for a third being has no being for its object, i.e. it has no objective relationships and its existence is objective. (80)

According to Marx, therefore, man must be an objective being with objective relations, for production to provide immediately the condition and the significance of consumption.

79. ibid. p.364  80. ibid. p.390
The social(ized) nature of consciousness and need are man's destiny which must be appropriated by "dominating" man's "objective essence". Once man appropriates his objec-
tivity by the creation of objective relations, activity be-
comes the "inner necessity" of his being which confirms in this way man's purposive, objective existence. (81)

Since for socialist man the whole of what is called world history is nothing more than the creation of man through human labour, and the development of nature for man, he therefore has palpable and in-
controvertible proof of his self mediated birth, of his process of emergence. Since the essentia-

lity (Wesenhaftigkeit) of man and of nature, man as the existence of nature for man and nature as the existence of man for man, has become practi-
cally and sensuously perceptible, the question of an alien being, a being above nature and man— a question which implies an admission of the unre-
ality of nature and of man—has become impossible in practice. (82)

In other words, according to Marx, the progress of histo-
ry should be the development of human activity as an activity that knows objectified reality as its own product, as the means and the product of its becoming. Industry is able to encompass both moments of the process because it guarantees the creation of a human world through human production. It represents consequently the last mediation necessary for man to appropriate humanness and naturalness. Developed industry is the condition for a human society which transforms the immediate relation of man to nature onto the positive rela-
tion of the individual to society. Human society represents therefore, the supersession of externality because it implies

81. ibid. p.356 82. ibid. p.357
the abolition of alienation. But, it is the possibility of
a positive relation only because it is the product of indus-
trial activity, of man's progressive liberation from neces-
sity. The overcoming of estrangement, externalization, is
thus linked to man's freedom from necessity. This means that
estrangement (otherness) may be truly superseded only with
the aboliton of alienation (difference); in other words,
this would require the abolition of the trans-formation
of humanness and naturalness in the process of satisfying
needs.

Man, Marx argues, posits self-estrangement because the
objects of life activity are external to him; as a result
man's passions (needs) may only be fulfilled negatively.
Marx concludes therefore, that externality must be superse-
ded if man should realize himself as the producer of his
life activity, of objective reality. Externality thus gives
rise to the idea of negativity, of a conflict between nature
and man, since its origin is the limited nature of human ac-
tivity that needs objects to be realized effectively. It ap-
ppears then logical to assert that externality as such ought
to be superseded. A project seemingly made possible by the
appropriation of necessity which may hold two distinct and
opposite meanings: that man's approach to the object is ra-
dicalized through the production of social bonds which per-
mit the supersession of estrangement; that activity itself
is revolutionized because humanness and naturalness have
been accomplished and alienation is a non-essential mediation for conscious life activity. Marx sums up his point of view in the following terms:

...socialism as such no longer needs such mediation. Its starting-point is the theoretically and practically sensuous consciousness of man and of nature as essential beings. It is the positive self-consciousness of man, no longer mediated through the abolition of private property, through communism. Communism is the act of positing as the negation of the negation, and is therefore a real phase, necessary for the next period of historical development, in the emancipation and recovery of mankind. Communism is the necessary form and the dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism is not as such the goal of human development - the form of human society. (83)

Socialism does not need a mediation through which man becomes a species-being. Here reigns the perfect unity between man and nature through the recognition that man himself is nature and that nature exists for man. Man under socialism would realize immediately through his production the satisfaction of his needs because they would be human - sensuous needs that correspond to the wealth provided by a human world. Therefore, man's production does not need to negate objective reality - to objectify powers humanly - as to be able to posit itself as social. Communism is the negation of estrangement - non-objectivity - of man's external relation to the means of life activity (man, nature). In that sense it is a limited phase of human development because it is the mediation through which sensuous appropriation as

83. ibid. pp.357-8
truly social activity is realized. But, since the ultimate negation of estrangement necessitates the abolition of alienation—the objectification of objectification—communism is the last mediation for the development of 'socialized humanity' as positive humanity.

Estrangement and alienation are linked because they express the power of human activity not to rest on nature or consciousness; society as this world between man and nature is a bond that could never embrace at once reality and possibility, it must always be re-invented for externality not to result into a limiting relation of the human condition.

We must ask therefore, what significance could carry man's power of sociality—objectification—should the realization of an immediate relation between man and nature be actualized as a positive relation between society and the individual. In other words, what does a "fully developed" society, and "man who profoundly and abundantly endowed with all the senses"(84) represent for Marx? To examine further this problem we will look next at the specific relationship between society and the individual which Marx draws to describe the significance of man's power of sociality.

4. Sociality: Possibility as Reality

Society, Marx told us, is the product of human activity; it is a world between man and nature that mediates

84. Ibid. p.354.
naturally between them because it is the confirmation of man's naturalness and nature's humanness; it is the sensuous appropriation of the opposition between necessity and freedom. Society does not transform the enigmatic character of activity and it does not end with the suspension that man's external relation to the objects produces; it only transforms the significance of objective reality by creating bonds between men which establish novel conditions for activity. This development, Marx explained, is founded on a historical progress of mankind because human activity is social activity - it is a force of incorporealization; in other words activity produces being from non-being by forming relations between men and things.

Social activity and social consumption by no means exist solely in the form of a directly communal activity and a directly communal consumption, even though communal activity and communal consumption, i.e. activity and consumption that express and confirm themselves directly in real association with other men, occur wherever the direct expression of sociality (Gesellschaftlichkeit) springs from the essential nature of the consumption. (85)

Communality, association, sociality must emerge naturally from the specific nature of an activity which appropriates its objectivity by producing humanly. Human production signifies the creation of objects that represent the needs of society. Production and consumption are therefore reciprocally confirmed in their social nature - as the expressions of the realization of human activity, social activity. However, Marx

85. ibid. p. 350
tells us, that sociality should emerge from social production and consumption and not the other way around. This means that sociality must not become the expression of an activity that needs an object to be realized but, rather, it ought to be the expression of naturalness as humanness, conscious life activity. Free activity or, man produces freely when the supreme need for man has become man himself.

When the origin of man's bond to nature has become human his dependence ceases to represent negativity. Therefore, activity should not spring from the desire to overcome natural limitations but, rather, it must spring from the need to affirm one's individuality as humanness through the recognition of one's labour as the expression of another man's need. In this way, activity expresses the social essence (nature) of man in his participation in the becoming of bonds between men - society. When man's need for association, communality, sociality is not an extrinsic condition of his life activity, but it has become the intrinsic condition of his being, the bond between man and nature is expressed as human through the bonds of men, the creation of society. However, Marx adds a little further,

...it is only when man's object becomes a human object or objective man that man does not lose himself in that object. This is only possible when it becomes a social object for him and when he himself becomes a social being for himself, just as society becomes a being for him in this object. (86)

86. ibid. p. 352
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86. ibid. p. 352
Man produces freely only because he has superseded externality as the condition of human activity. Man's power to prevent the loss of the objects of his production rests on the particular activity which confirms its social foundation in the production of social goods. As a social being man produces for society and society for man thus realizing man's emancipation objectively and subjectively. Human production represents the supersession of necessity since society as the already established unity of man and nature defines the mode of production of social goods which are posited as essential goods for the reproduction of the species. In this manner, the distinction between society and the individual becomes redundant—all that remains is positivity.

...communism is humanism mediated with itself through the supersession of private property. Only when we have superseded this mediation—which is, however, a necessary precondition—will positive humanism, positively originating in itself, come into being.(87)

So far we find ourselves in the description of the conceptualization of a logical correspondence between society and the individual to permit the notion of a positive humanity. However, the process of activity would posit its self-annulment should one truly imagine that nature could become the product of human activity. As we have seen, Marx's premises affirm that being and existence are indivisible, however, man must step out of himself, so to speak, to become the producer of his life activity. Therefore, were the

87. Ibid. p.395
objects of life activity to become immediately and positively human objects, man's power of objectification and self-con-
firmation would become a non-essential attribute. Once the distinction between man and nature, consciousness and need, reality and possibility have been 'superseded' activity, participation, creation become non-essential aff imations of humanness.

We will try to examine closer the world of Marx's predic-
cament of a positive humanity as we look at what he calls in the tenth thesis on Feuerbach "socialized humanity" (88). In this way we hope to trace how, for Marx, the distinction between society and the individual is problematic in so far as it expresses the undeveloped state of humanness. This distinction ought to be superseded and its supersession would represent the perfected unity of man and nature; their inter-
relation recognized as essential without the necessity for a mediation for the appropriation of the interdependence between society and the individual.

My universal consciousness is only the theoretical form of that whose living form is the real community, society, ... the activity of my universal consciousness as activity is my theoretical existence as a social being. (...) The individual is the social being... Man's individual and species life are not two distinct things. (89)

What seems fundamental in this perfect unity that Marx draws for us, is the fact that consciousness is the product of life activity; man's struggle to fulfill his needs.

88. Marx, K., 'Theses on Feuerbach' (1845), in Selected Works, p. 30
89. Manuscripts, p. 350
reproduces society as the union of man and nature. However, it is important to take account of the implications that carries Marx's argument and ask, how could society become naturally, so to speak, the positive relation where man truly produces because he produces free of need. Society as the product of the primordial bond that binds actively man and nature through the appropriation of man's objective being, gives sense to Marx's postulate that all activity is social activity, but it does not tell us why the emergence of society would mean the appropriation of the opposition between necessity and freedom – the actualization of humanness and naturalness.

To declare that individual and social life are undifferentiated is it not a contraposition to Marx's own postulates? If species-life expresses the union of man because they are producers and therefore they must step out of their subjective existence to realize their activity effectively, then their individual existence should not express but this difference which gives sense to species-life, social activity. That man is a social being, that he participates in the world precisely, as Marx told us, due to the fact that his individual existence is unable to fulfill all the needs of his being. Man is a natural being with needs who realizes the appropriation of necessity as freedom only as a species being; he transforms the object (society, nature) and is himself transformed, his needs become human, sensuous needs. Individual life is then itself the condition for species-life as much as, the bond between man and nature is the condition, as Marx
argues, for the bond between society and individual. This should imply moreover, that men associate to realize effectively their needs, where association, as Marx expected, is not founded on necessity. If association should be founded on necessity, estrangement (otherness) as a human condition would have to be viewed negatively since externality must be a limitation. But, if association was the social condition of difference which must realize the recognition of its particularity (individuality), then objectification would be the basis of society in the infinite becoming of history.

When Marx tries to establish the supersession of estrangement (otherness) which is a product of man's non-objective relations by suggesting the supersession of alienation (difference) his own project turns against him. This presupposition rests on Marx's affirmation that nature is nature for man only because it is anthropological nature. Similarly, for Marx, man is an individual only because he has realized a social existence as an objective being with objective relations. And, if we search further we will find that these assertions take us back to the idea that activity can become free activity, therefore, a truly human activity as of the moment it has been recognized as social activity. Man's individuality, his universality is measured by the power of his activity to produce communally, to posit its products as social needs. Man's individual life could then signify the appropriation of his objectivity as natural through his
participation in species life.

Man, however much he may therefore be a particular individual - and it is just this particularity which makes him an individual and a real individual communal being - is just as much the totality, the ideal totality, the subjective existence of thought and experienced society for itself; he also exists in reality as the contemplation and true enjoyment of social existence and as a totality of vital human expression. (90)

The individual as the expression of this "ideal totality" represents the possibility of socialized humanity. But, this humanity is no more the product of an activity in need of an object which binds men with one another positing the participation of each man as the origin of social relations, the creation of society. Socialized humanity as the possibility of a totality posits its own conditions. Thereafter, it is the species nature of life, consciousness, activity, being which becomes the determination, the condition of individual life, consciousness, activity. From this point of view it appears possible to conceptualize Marx's idea that limitations can be transformed as the means for overcoming necessity through the conscious appropriation of dependence. The supersession of necessity can be posited because freedom is defined by social necessity. Thus the unity of consciousness and nature, of social and natural sciences, as the realization of humanness is not an arbitrary condition for actualizing human activity; it ought to be an irreversible novel condition of activity itself. Marx's idea of a

90. ibid. p. 351
perfect correlation between the individual and society expressed by the realization of free activity, or by the supersession of necessity through socialized production and consumption; implies that possibility has become reality, and that, consequently, the forces of its becoming change into non-essential conditions. We may then ask what is the real power of sociality. In other words, is it the expression of the power of activity to transform or, is it simply its power to adapt to the conditions of its environment? The distinction is made because, for Marx, socialized humanity as the relation of society and the individual must represent the creation of positive humanity since for him the unique activity that may be named human is the one made possible through the supersession of necessity, the appropriation of the bond between man and nature. The presupposition is confirmed explicitly by Marx in The Holy Family:

If man draws all his knowledge, sensation, etc., from the world of the senses and the experience gained in it, then what has to be done is to arrange the empirical world in such a way that man experiences and becomes accustomed to what is truly human in it and that he becomes aware of himself as man. If correctly understood, interest is the principle of all morality, man's private interest must be made to coincide with the interest of humanity. If man is unfree in the materialist sense, i.e., is free not through the negative power to avoid this or that, but through the positive power to assert his true individuality, crime must not be punished in the individual, but the anti-social sources of crime must be destroyed and each man must be given scope for the vital manifestation of his being. If man is shaped by environment, his environment must be made human. If man is social by nature, he will
develop his true nature only in society, and the power of his nature must be measured not by the power of separate individuals but by the power of society. (91)

The first principle of the new materialism is that interest or need is the origin of man's existence and, thus, man's powers are formed by the conditions of their life activity. Secondly, we find out that man must be able to satisfy his needs positively, in a reality that presents immediately the means of his life activity because it has been molded at the measure of humanness. Thirdly, we see that man is recognized as an individual being not because he participates in creating a human world but, because his labour is recognized as social labour, capable of satisfying social needs. It is, consequently, logical to assert that not the individual, not private interest (need) would be responsible for any deviation from positive humanity. Nature and individuality are here the perfected products of man's creation of a human world. The paradox can be seen in the relation of the primordial relation between man and nature that becomes indispensable for positive humanity to emerge. The supersession of estrangement, externality, through the abolition of alienation implies that society as the product of the interrelation between man and nature, the expression of the fact that man's need for man is a historical creation, becomes a non-essential reality since now the immediate

relation has become a positive relation. Society as nature becomes non-being, a non-essential reality or, it becomes the true totality.

The dissolution of individuality at the power of society as positive humanity, and the dissolution of man as distinct from nature, a historical being, the idea of the perfect unity between them that industry will accomplish brings Marx back to the origin of his journey: the vulnerability of man's power to transform the world and make it appear as his product while at the same time being himself transformed in the process. The problem is externality as the possibility of an estranged world: man's products can turn against him, society can turn against man, because man's activity goes beyond the conditions of production. Man supersedes his own history as Marx argues, but he only supersedes history because he cannot rest on nature or on consciousness. This ambiguity which embraces the human condition commands Marx's interrogations and finally leads him to look for another positivity free of all negativity. However, the positivity of the new materialism can be realized only through the division of society into the men who act and those who know the correct mode of activity; in this way, necessity and freedom, nature and consciousness could affect one another positively. To appreciate better Marx's itinerary we will have to look more closely at the origin of his theory of alienation and examine the basis of the idea of an estranged
world. We hope thereby to trace how Marx's analysis of alienation as the positivity of negativity and, of an estranged world as negativity are the basis of his conception of man and of the progress of history.

5. The Origin of the Theory of Alienation and the Significance of an Estranged World

In light of Marx's premises concerning the nature of human activity, we saw that man's power to transform the world to satisfy his needs makes nature appear as his product. However, this immanent power of human activity carries at once the interrogation of any positivity that may result of human production.

If man by working on objective reality develops his powers and becomes himself transformed by the process of the activation of his senses the product of his activity could not present nature or consciousness as such. This product is a human product because humanness is transformed through its production; man becomes liberated from dependence by incorporating objective reality, and by realizing his powers and those of nature respectively. Therefore, if man's products are not consumed immediately, they may appear as an external but human reality that holds no purposive relations.

We have seen that each individual represents a different possibility for society and that only because such a possibility presents itself, society itself can appear as a reality, as having a purposive existence. Society could not
be, therefore, the reality of possibility (humanness) as such, it can only be the infinite interrogation of possibility as reality (naturalness), of positive humanity. If, therefore, man's products — society — were to acquire a life independent of the producers, men's own powers could appear to turn against them.

Both estrangement and alienation can be posited as real possibilities for man because they are based on Marx's fundamental postulate that humaness is historical, that man's nature is an essential product of life activity. Consequently, it is only because man is a conscious being for whom the products of his activity to confirm their humaness must present human needs, that he may find himself in an external relation to his objects. A relation may be viewed as independent of man, hence, capable of reproducing other than what man intended only because originally it was an immediate relation, it was man's relation to the object of his needs. Similarly, however, because it is human activity which animates non-being and transforms it onto a human-purposive reality, man can alienate his relation to an objective reality that does not (any more) represent an immediate relation — the satisfaction of his needs. As a result, man 'supersedes' his bondage towards a world that has no purposive relations for him by positing it as alien. As opposed to an estranged world to which man feels a non-sensuous bondage because it does not represent his needs, an alien world is
non-being; it is neither a negative or a positive reality for
man. It is the power of man to 'liberate' himself from the
products of his activity - history - because they cease to
hold a human-sensuous relation towards him which allows him
to produce society anew by inventing humanness and natural-
ness. From this point of view a human world and human pro-
duction are essential expressions of man's need to make
'reality' appear as his product because only in this way he
can be freed from the infinite processions he must attend
in order to bury history. Marx sums up this ambiguity of
the human condition, of the origins of liberty,

Men make their own history, but not of their own
free will; not under circumstances they themselves
have chosen but under the given and inherited cir-
cumstances with which they are directly confron-
ted. The tradition of the dead generations weighs
like a nightmare on the minds of the living. And,
just when they appear to be engaged in the revolu-
tionary transformation of themselves and their ma-
terial surroundings, in the creation of something
which does not yet exist, precisely in such epochs
of revolutionary crisis they timidly conjure up the
spirits of the past to help them; they borrow their
names, slogans and costumes so as to stage the new
world-historical scene in this venerable disguise
and borrowed language. (92)

Now, to trace how Marx arrives at the possibility of the
supersession of an estranged world through the abolition of
alienation, we will look at his conception of man as the
expression of an infinite struggle to resolve the opposing
powers of nature and consciousness which marks the origin
and the progress of human history.

92. Eighteenth Brumaire, p.146
Man is directly a natural being. As a natural and as a living natural being he is on the one hand equipped with natural powers, and vital powers, he is an active natural being; these powers exist in him as dispositions and capacities, as drives. On the other hand, as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a suffering, conditioned and limited being, like animals and plants. That is to say, the objects of his drives exist outside him as objects independent of him; but these objects are objects of his need, essential objects, indispensable to the exercise and confirmation of his essential powers. (93)

Man, Marx argues, is a natural being because he has vital needs that must be satisfied and which present him with the possibility of powers for their satisfaction; he is therefore naturally disposed to an active being. This means that he must come out of his subjective, non-purposive existence, to be able to fulfill his needs, to activate his powers and to satisfy the impulses of his life instincts. Man's naturalness is not a subjective reality in which man can live, on the contrary, he must appropriate the conditions of dependence objectively by humanizing his naturalness. Man must objectify his subjective existence in order that he does not suffer because he is a being of need, in order that he is not conditioned because his needs must be satisfied concretely, in order that he is no more limited because he feels his dependence as something external of himself. Thus, man must appropriate the objective nature of his being for the objects of his needs not to appear as independent; an estranged world, man's products as otherness, is posited by non-objective consciousness.

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93. Manuscripts, pp. 389-390
For Marx, the relation of externality is a characteristic of the human condition, but it only signifies negativeness because man does not recognize objectivity as his essential nature. Man resists admitting his objectivity because life activity is conscious life activity; this means that the passion of survival (need) must come to be confirmed by the passion of reason (consciousness).

To be sensuous, i.e. to be real, is to be an object of sense, a sensuous object, and thus to have sensuous objects outside oneself, objects of one's sense perception. To be sensuous is to suffer (to be subjected to the actions of another).

Man as an objective sensuous being is therefore a suffering being, and because he feels his suffering (Leiden), he is a passionate (leidenschaftlich) being. Passion is man's essential power vigorously striving to attain its object.

But man is not only a natural being; he is a human natural being; i.e. he is a being for himself and hence a species-being, as which he must confirm and realize himself both in his being and in his knowing. (94)

Because man is capable of feeling he must recognize in external reality the means of his life activity; objective reality ought to acquire a direct significance for him as the source satisfying his needs. Man's needs and their objects become reciprocally appropriate for one another through the production of sensuous relations between man and nature. Sensuousness is man's capacity and need to affirm himself as the producer of the means of his life activity.

In this way man gives sense to his needs by objectifying, humanizing, nature, and by recognizing the naturalness of

94. ibid. pp.390-1
of man. The fact that objects cannot satisfy man immediately, that they confront him as externality to which he must submit his will from the moment they appear as essential objects, makes man suffer. The transformation of needs into human powers, the satisfaction of needs into human powers, the becoming of a human world as a result of human activity, is a combat ought to wage; it is the infinite struggle to confirm necessity in freedom, to realize naturalness as humanness.

The opposition which exists between being and knowing is the principle difference which characterizes human life as against all other living nature. Man's instinct is a "conscious instinct". (95) The profound character of this opposition is revealed in the following paragraph, where Marx explains how for man, because he is endowed with conscious life activity,

...human objects are not natural objects as they immediately present themselves nor is human sense, in its immediate and objective existence, human sensibility and human objectivity. Neither objective nor subjective nature is immediately present in the form adequate to the human being. And as everything natural must come into being, so man also has his process of origin in history. But for him history is a conscious process, and hence one which consciously supersedes itself. (96)

Two aspects of the human condition are revealed here: on the one hand, that for man there is nothing natural before it has been transformed by human activity; on the other hand, man's feelings, his sensibility that gives meaning

---95. German Ideology, p.51    96. Manuscripts, p.391
to life activity, are never immediately appropriate to man (humaness) since his essential being emerges along with the production of objects for the satisfaction of his needs. Sensuousness, sensibility are objective characteristics of the human being and, like all other powers, they emerge with the development of an essential human nature. There is nothing that can exist immediately in the form appropriate to man since humaness is constantly emerging in the process of creating a human world. Man's naturalness is an essential product of human activity, however, because this nature is conscious of itself, it could never acquire a relation of identity with the object. Human history supersedes itself because it is neither nature nor consciousness; man transforms at once the subject and the object and in doing so he goes against any form of determination. This impossibility to posit determination and, yet, the necessity to do so for affirming man's needs consciously as human needs, is the opposition which, according to Marx, ought to be appropriated for alienation to be superseded and for the estranged world to be recognized as the product of non-objective being, false consciousness.

Following our discussion on the origins of Marx's theory of alienation, of his conception of man, it is now possible to examine closer the significance of the idea of an estranged world. How does man come to view the products of his life activity as independent and acting in opposition
to him? To put it differently, how does what was once human become inhuman? To explain this contradiction, in tracing certain notions exposed by Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, Marx takes the opportunity to present his proper views concerning consciousness and self-consciousness. The essence of estrangement for Hegel,

...is not the fact that human essence objectifies itself in an inhuman way, in opposition to itself, but that it objectifies itself from and in opposition to abstract thought... (97)

The human essence, in so far as it is the product of human life activity, it could not objectify itself inhumanly since there should be no appropriate mode of objectification which measures to man's needs and powers. If humanness is the product of history, the development of conscious life activity, man's needs and powers cannot turn against him unless he was to posit them independently of this process of activity. A consciousness that posits such autonomy is an abstract consciousness. Marx's criticism of Hegel is precisely that he relativizes the human essence by postulating that abstract consciousness - false consciousness - is part of human consciousness. Hegel argues that man ought to admit abstraction as a moment of his self-emergence or as the "process of his creation". (98) Such an admission for Hegel signifies the supersession of objectification, the resolution of the conflict between necessity and freedom - nature and

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97. ibid. p.384
98. ibid. p.382
consciousness. However, for Marx the problem lies elsewhere, namely in the acceptance of objectification as a non-human, non-sensuous experience. Objectification, according to Marx, must be fully realized for man to recognize how objectivity truly constitutes his essential power - freedom - and that only through its appropriation man can supersede estrangement. The problem therefore is not man's disposition to oppose the forces of necessity and freedom in the process of conscious life activity but, in the fact that man does not admit this moment of the process of activity as the confirmation of his objective being. As a consequence, man becomes unable to objectify himself appropriately in order to realize his powers by satisfying correctly his needs.

Man is capable of conscious life activity, because he is endowed with senses for which the object of their activation must become human. Man's needs, senses, or powers ought to be humanized, objectified, because man is a naturally active being for whom nature must be consciously realized as human. Thus originally there is neither nature nor consciousness; what emerges must come together and in relation. Only in this way man will know that the basis of consciousness is life activity and that consciousness is the foundation of life activity.

The estranged world is the product of an activity that is not yet human because it has not recognized the objective nature of consciousness and need. Only once man recognizes
this objectivity, the immediate (immanent) relation between man and nature becomes a 'positive relation' because dependence is no more considered to be a limitation, negativity. The fact that man emerges from this relation, that the objects of life activity are external to him, gives to estranged reality the particular expression of being, at once, a character of the predisposition of the human condition and the character of activity that is not yet human.

When real, corporeal man establishes his real, objective essential powers as alien objects by externalization (Entässerung) it is not the establishing (Setzen) which is subject; it is the subjectivity of objective essential powers whose action therefore must be an objective one. An objective being acts objectively ...(because NP) objectivity is an inherent part of its essential nature. It creates and establishes only objects because it is established by objects, because it is fundamentally nature. In the act of establishing therefore it does not descend from 'pure activity' to the creation of objects; on the contrary its objective product simply confirms its objective activity, its activity as the activity of an objective natural being. (99)

To consider one's powers and thus one's being as externality, negativity, (because dependence is viewed as a limitation) is an immanent possibility of the human condition; activity-consciousness — has not accented its objective existence.

However, Marx claims, for man not to admit consciously his objectivity does not simply mean the negation of his objective existence; more importantly, it implies the absence of appropriate conditions for objective activity. Marx has maintained all along that human activity is always social

99. ibid. p. 389
activity; it is consequently not the individual who may be responsible for abstract - false consciousness. Subjectivity is the self-consciousness that is non-human because it denies its objective-social existence. It follows that man's abstract/false consciousness is not a real subjective reality but the product of conditions of life which do not correspond to a truly objective existence. Therefore, it does not suffice to say that men must produce humanly, it is as necessary that the appropriate conditions for such production are present. This development consists precisely of the supersession of estrangement through the abolition of alienation; a development conditioned by the appropriation of the interrelation between man and nature through the recognition of the interdependence between society and the individual. We see here how the anthropological perspective interweaves with Marx's historical conception of development leaving us with an all encompassing view of progress.

Man must admit his objective nature to resolve the opposition between nature and consciousness and, yet, if man admitted this objectivity, if man assumed a human society, positive humanity, could he continue to be an objective being for whom objectification, activity, is the means for realizing individuality.

The act of superseding as an objective movement...the appropriation of objective being through the supersession of its alienation, ...is the real objectification of man...the real appropriation of his objective being through the
destruction of the estranged character of the objective world, through the supersession of its estranged mode of existence. ...self-estrangement, alienation of being, loss of objectivity and loss of reality as self-discovery, expression of being, objectification and realization. ...express NP labour — within abstraction — as man's act of self-creation and man's relation to himself as an alien being and the manifestation of himself as an alien being as the emergence of species-consciousness and species-life. (100)

We have confirmed here once again that man's existence in his subjective being is non-being; more significantly however we realize that man's progress towards a 'harmonious' state of things requires that he suffers. Only through a combat against extrinsic conditions that posit dependence and intrinsic capacities that posit limitations can man emerge as a human being. Whether man returns to his predispositions (he may have lost) or whether he realizes his true powers appears irrelevant so long as we always discover a history working at the service of mankind and mankind working at the service of history. Thus, in this respect, we find Marx, in The Theories of Surplus Value, summing up the matter in these terms:

...although at first the development of the capacities of the human species takes place at the cost of the majority of human individuals and even classes, and in the end it breaks through this contradiction and coincides with the development of the individual, the higher development of individuality is thus only achieved by a historical process during which individuals are sacrificed, for the interests of the species in the human kingdom, as in the animal and plant kingdoms, always assert at the cost of the interests of individuals, because these interests of the species.

100. ibid. p.395
coincide only with the interests of certain individuals, and it is this coincidence which constitutes the strength of these privileged individuals. (101)

To supersede estrangement necessitates the abolition of alienation; this implies the admission that man is an objective being, a dependent being. True objectification, human activity is henceforth posited because an estranged world could not arise between man and nature. Objective reality being recognized as the product of human activity, as purposive-sensuous reality, expresses the presence of a human society having emerged of human-social needs. This perfect correlation to which one is always directed tracing Marx's itinerary, establishes the particular significance that hold the notions species-consciousness and species-life. As we have seen already, they are the real guarantee against an estranged world because alienation has become a nonessential mediation for the socialization of man. As of the moment human society has developed from industrial activity, immediacy acquires the sense of positivity. It is not the opposition between necessity and freedom which will thereby define the human condition; it is, rather, their perfected unity that finds its ultimate expression in a unique, novel science for man and nature. Marx embraces the whole movement in these terms which are impregnated by the ideal of 'harmony',

Communism is the positive supersession of private property as human self-estrangement, and hence the true appropriation of the human essence through and

101. Marx, K., Theories of Surplus Value, vlm. II, p.118
for man; it is the complete restoration of man to himself as a social, i.e. human, being, a restoration which has become conscious and which takes place within the entire wealth of previous periods of development. This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature, and between man and man, the true resolution of the conflict between existence and being, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be the solution. (102)

We have seen so far that if man alienates himself it is not simply because the objects of his life activity are external to him but, rather, because this externality acquires a negative significance due to the opposition between consciousness and nature - freedom and necessity. At the same time, however, we saw that this opposition is an essential character of the human condition because man is an objective being for whom objectification, the realization of a human world through human production, the actualization of his powers and those of nature, is an indispensable condition for the destruction of the appearance of an estranged world. This double bind of the human activity, as positivity, alienation as the mode of objectification and as negativity, an estranged world that develops between man and his products because activity does not rest on nature or consciousness, leads Marx to conclude that all negativity and all positivity of negativity ought to be eliminated. The new positivity
he proposes is based on the idea of human activity freed of necessity, thus from alienation, because socialized humanity presents the possibility of positive humanity. To trace some of the major implications which underlie this thesis we will now turn to the conception of history Marx must provide to account for the realization of true positivity. The point which draws our attention here is the fact that with Marx's notion of the progress of history, of alienation becoming a nonessential mediation, the radicalizing power of human activity is banned.

6. The Progress of History: From the Dialectic of Negativity to the Negation of Negation

The peculiar aspect which calls upon our attention as we follow Marx's itinerary onto the labyrinth of 'humanness' is the opposition between nature and consciousness. This conflict as negativity governs the progress of history or, shall we say, imposes a limitation upon the realization of real history. If human activity is not limited, if dependence is the means for true objectification of naturally objective human powers, why speak of opposition, of conflict?

At the beginning of our investigation we asked what could be the origin of human activity and we found out that its condition is sensuous appropriation: objectification through social activity, made possible through industry, the creation of a human world through human production. In addition we
we found out that there were certain novel conditions that arise of this movement which were not immanent to the subject matter or, if they were, once emancipated, man's activity could not present itself any longer as an activity which rested on necessity. In other words, when Marx, maintains that originally there is an opposition between nature and consciousness which registers the powers of humanness, we may assume that history advances on the basis of this opposition superseding itself, doing beyond nature and consciousness as such. But Marx does not stop here. For him the opposition itself must be superseded for true human activity to originate. This means that pre-historical man is not capable of true human activity because his production is determined by necessity and, as a consequence, externality (objectivity) is perceived as negativity.

Human activity is the result of a positive relation between society and the individual which confirms the presence of an immediate relation between man and nature expressing thereby an all-round objectification through human production and a human world. Only once man has admitted objectivity as the ontological nature of his essential being could he receive the true satisfaction of recognizing himself as the producer of nature and society - of a human world. From that moment onwards true human activity becomes possible since now, having established a human world through human production, the object, the means of activity, is an a priori
humanly objectified reality and man himself is no longer affected (transformed) by the process of activity. Man's relation to the means of life activity remains the same all along the process which demonstrates that his product is a truly purposive - sensuous object because it satisfies social needs that are immediately affirmed by the wealth provided from a human world. This appears possible because it is not a relation of necessity which governs the interference between subject and object, but it is a positive - sensuous relation where social production confirms directly social consumption. Man as a species being could then truly imagine himself as a universal, unlimited being, while in fact he would be an insignificant moment of a perfect totality which acts in his name. Conflict ought to be superseded because, the admission of man's objectivity by creating a human world through human production should call for the emergence of a non-objective being - non-alienable being; a man for whom all his rights correspond to his duties to society as much as all his duties - participation - correspond to his rights. This new man cannot allow difference to emerge out of life activity - difference as the necessity to appropriate the means of life activity and, as the consequent objectification of needs, the infinite realization of humanity. In other words, the individual ceases to constitute an objective reality in relation to which conscious life activity
between many such individuals takes place. Thus Marx's ideal society should be characterised by these natural-human configurations which embody all the interrelations and interdependencies he has raised for us to provide the basis of the immanent necessity of socialized humanity as positive humanity.

The immediate, natural, necessary relation of human being to human being is the relationship of man to woman. In this natural species-relationship the relation of man to nature is immediately his relation to man, just as his relation to man is immediately his relation to nature, his own natural condition. Therefore this relationship reveals in a sensuous form, reduced to an observable fact, the extent to which the human essence has become nature for man or nature has become the human essence for man. It is possible to judge from this relationship the entire level of development of mankind. It follows from the character of this relationship how far man as a species-being, as man, has become himself and grasped himself; the relation of man to woman is the most natural relation of human being to human being. It therefore demonstrates the extent to which man's natural behaviour has become human or the extent to which his human essence has become a natural essence for him, the extent to which his human nature has become nature for him. This relationship also demonstrates the extent to which man's needs have become human needs, hence the extent to which the other, as a human being, has become a need for him, the extent to which in his most individual existence he is at the same time a communal being.

(103)

This synthesis which leaves no room for deviation does not only make alienable reality - the human world of human production - impossible, but more importantly in respect to its all-round configurations, it implies that species being, man rich in needs of the fully developed society, is dispossessed of his power of alienation - differentiation as the means to

103. ibid. p.347
independence. For Marx, the only man who may be disposed of the power of alienation is pre-historical man who acts on the precondition of necessity and for whom freedom is the negative power against non-objective, non-human reality. This is because, as we have seen, true objectification is made possible only through the satisfaction of needs that have been transformed in the process of appropriation - of the creation of human-natural powers. Once necessity has been superseded as the condition of human activity, once objectification is realized through the determination of the mode of production appropriate for human-social consumption, once purposive - sensorious needs are satisfied immediately through the presence of a human world, the power of alienation becomes a insignificant mediator for the affirmation of individuality since objectification appears to have become an unnecessary mode of realizing 'humanness' and 'naturalness'.

Marx sought to go beyond a mode of objectification that does not guarantee for man the possibility to rest attached on the world of his creation and thus allows his own powers to acquire an independence and turn against him; as a result, he was led to a conception of human activity that can only be effective as the predominance of nature or of man as such. Therefore, the abolition of alienation, viewed in respect to such a perfect correspondence can only signify a return to the original opposition - the position which holds that there is a separation between nature and consciousness.
However, since now, the pre-determination acts in respect to man's sensuously appropriated needs, human activity has superseded the determination posited by necessity - objectification.

In agreement and appraising the positive achievements made by Hegel, Marx writes,

...the negation of the negation from the aspect of the positive relation contained within it as the true and only positive and from the aspect of the negative relation contained within it as the only true act and self-realizing act of all being...is merely (the) expression of the movement of history. This movement of history is not yet the real history of man as a given subject, it is simply the process of his creation, the history of his emergence. (104)

The negation of the negation represents for Marx what we may call the origin of human history. This origin, however, is not a simple subjective, and therefore arbitrary determination of humanness; it is at once an objective, immanent determination which proves how human history overcomes its impotence - the 'apparent' opposition between nature and consciousness in the process of conscious life activity. Thus, the unique positive relation (alienation) is the supersession of the necessity to supersede negativity (objectification) in the process of activity. The negative relation (estrangement) in turn, is the conscious realization of man's objective existence as the basis of human activity. The negative relation in the progress of history is the activity of abolishing negativity as such, while the positive relation is the

--- 104. ibid. p.382
abolition of the need to supersede negativity, the foundation of a new positivity — a new mode of activity free of necessity.

According to Marx, man's destiny appears to be self-fulfilling, however, it is equally true that for him this apparently immanent realization of positivity comprehends a struggle along which man must realize his capacity to dispose appropriately of his wealth — humanness and naturalness. Therefore, always in accord with Hegel's achievements, he argues that,

...the dialectic of negativity as the moving and producing principle ...self-creation of man as a process, objectification as loss of object (Entgegenständlichung), as alienation and as supersession of this alienation (is contained NP)... in the nature of labour ...objective man — true, because real man — as the result of his own labour. (105)

Man objectifies reality in the struggle to satisfy needs by differentiating himself from objects; thus, the appropriation of objects for life activity is realized negatively. Passions are fulfilled negatively because external reality as potential means for satisfying man's needs is independent of his will. An estranged world and man as alien being reveal how man has not admitted objectivity as his essential being: he opposes consciousness to nature, freedom to necessity because his instinct is conscious and his needs are recognized as human-natural only in relation to another, i.e. nature, men. By positing externality as negativity, by

105. ibid. p.386
allowing the emergence of an estranged world, man alienates himself by negating his objectivity and by positing himself as an alien being, independent and different from the objects which may satisfy his needs. These objects come to act against man since they hold an objective relation towards him that he has not appropriated and which makes him suffer. He can appropriate his objectivity and thus may supersede self-alienation only by recognizing the objective nature of his activity. But, Marx adds this explanation,

The real, active relation of man to himself as a species-being, or the realization of himself as a real species-being, is only possible if he really employs all his species-powers — which again is only possible through the cooperation of mankind and as a result of history — and treats them as objects, which is at first only possible in the form of estrangement. (106)

What is implicit here is that the supersession of alienation is limited because man's activity in transforming objective reality to serve man's needs, it also transforms man himself; man must, therefore, re-establish the ontological essence of his passion by appropriating anew humanness and naturalness. Thus, Marx concludes, that mankind through the creation of a human history must appropriate man's objective existence by realizing his species existence. As a species-being man's objects are expressed in objectified human — reality and thus they should relate directly to him. Consequently, objectification appears to have become an unnecessary mediation for sensuous appropriation, or for the super-

106. ibid.
session of estrangement. The supersession of estrangement signifies
the transformation of the human condition by the creation of
a human world through human production as the all-round
objectification of human-natural powers. We see here how the
dialectic of negativity contains the process of activity, but
it is not itself the expression of human activity; or, how
objectification as alienation through the supersession of
estrangement posits its own abolition.

If I know religion as alienated human self-consciousness, then what I know in it as religion is not my self-consciousness but my alienated self-consciousness confirmed in it. Thus I know that the self-consciousness which belongs to the essence of my own self is confirmed not in religion but in the destruction and supersession of religion. (107)

Here Marx indicates why alienation and therefore an estranged world are non-realities which correspond to non-objective being - non-being. Their respective abolition and supersession by the creation of a human world through human production is immanent because man's instinct is not only conscious but his consciousness must be sensuously satisfied. This means that man cannot alienate his consciousness from a reality which may satisfy his needs. Man knows because he feels and if he ought to appropriate humanly his feelings, his consciousness and needs should emerge together - sensuously - for man not to alienate himself by positing an estranged world. If man knows the world to negate his essence he must naturally destroy and supersede this world.

107. ibid. p.393.
similarly, a man who differentiates himself from the objectiv-
ve world of his life activity must appropriate humanly the
objective essence of his consciousness and needs – his objec-
tive relations – to satisfy at once being and knowing. The-
therefore, Marx explains,

Hegel's positive achievement in his speculative
logic is to present determinate concepts, the uni-
versal fixed thought-forms in their independence
of nature and mind, as a necessary result of the
universal estrangement of human existence, and
thus also of human thought, and to comprehend
them as moments in the process of abstraction.(108)

The universal estrangement of human existence and thought
is a product of false-consciousness – non-objectivity. If
human progress towards the abolition of alienation through
the supersession of estrangement is governed by the neces-
sity to establish harmony between nature and consciousness, be-
ing and knowing, then estrangement is only the expression of
inappropriate conditions (human world) for human objectifi-
cation (human production). Moreover, alienated consciousness
is the product of the estrangement of man's objects which act
against him because he has not objectified reality to corres-
pond to human needs – social needs. Man must produce humanly
-socially- for his objects to acquire an immediate recogni-
tion and to satisfy directly human feelings. As human-social
objects they are immediately consumed because they are pro-
ducts of purposive (productive) activity which contains the
negation of alienation since it represents the supersession.

108. ibid. p.397
of estrangement. The dialectic of negativity creates therefore the conditions of its supersession – the negation of the negation. Marx clarifies the point further,

But the abstraction of which comprehends itself as abstraction knows itself to be nothing; it must relinquish itself, the abstraction, and so arrives at something which is its exact opposite, nature. (109)

The point is reaffirmed: man is capable of knowing a priori his needs and the means for the satisfaction of his essential being; in other words, that humanness and naturalness, that free consciousness and species-being, that sensuous appropriation are all fundamental characteristics of man who supersedes history consciously. Man who knows himself as non-objective being knows himself as non-being; but, non-being is the negation of life since, if we recall, man must step out of his objective subjectivity to become a true human being – an active being who breathes and consumes the wealth of nature as its own wealth. For Marx, man cannot live without objective relations because nature for him is only human as anthropological nature, because man becomes an individual only once he has become a social being and, because his activity is only free activity when it is posited a priori as social activity.

If we look closely at Marx's assertions that alienation is just a product of inappropriate conditions for true objectification we can appreciate better why it is very 'natural'

109. ibid. p.397
for him to postulate that man knows a priori his essential being. We have seen that according to Marx, man experiences true objectification once both his consciousness and his needs are sensuously realized through the process of appropriating human and natural powers. This means that before true objectification is accomplished, all along the process of activating man and animating nature, what we really have are potential consciousness and needs that must realize their corresponding powers to become true knowledge and true feelings appropriate to man. As potential reality the process of life activity posits real activity only once the corresponding objects, or means, for the realization of sensuous consciousness and needs, are present. Therefore, until humanness and naturalness have been realized as the creation of actual powers, the objects of activity are only potential objects themselves. This means that no real relation between man and nature and between men themselves is yet present against which a separation may be posited in the form of alienation. So long as the process of life activity is a process of the objectification of its constituent moments, alienation remains an abstract reality; man cannot posit separation - independence - from objective reality before having recognized his objective relation towards it - before having posited "the existence of essential objects for man, both as objects of activity." (110) Since everything is potential reality and

110. ibid. p.375
a condition for the becoming of essential being, alienation, "thingness" (111) can only represent the reality of non-being; non-objective being is transcended through the appropriation of objective relations making abstraction - false consciousness - a non-human reality. What we discover here are just contradictions based on antitheses between extremes of one essence; extremes bound to meet since they are only "the distinct sides of one essence at the highest point of its development". (112) Man knows his objective existence because it is his only real human existence - his essential existence; as such, self-consciousness is only sensuously objectified consciousness. Objectification, may be then understood as the negation of particular-non-particular being whose particularity is the realization of its generality - species-being - because its general form is only an expression of its species life. Once species life has become the condition of species-being because species-being has become the condition of objectification (the objectification of man's objective existence) then, alienation cannot any more mediate the process since man has recognized a priori his objective being. Man's essential being as species-being is present thereafter in his particular existence which has as its basis socialized humanity.

Marx's idea of the progress of history towards man rich in needs - the social being of social needs - embraces and shall

111. ibid. p.388 112. Critique, p.155
we say, engulfs his conception of man without which it would appear suspended. We cannot ask why, as Marx seems to suggest, man needs to suffer to realize his destiny unless we actually admit along with Marx that consciousness and nature, freedom and necessity, society and individual are "real antitheses" (113); in other words unless we admit conflict to be negativity. This assumption implies that we have a notion of positivity or, we have a conception of a reality in which such "extremes" do not prevail; of course such premises may not be independent of the idea of negativity, nevertheless, they must posit the illusion of autonomy to abolish the memory of origins - conflict. Man therefore suffers because he does not live at the measure of his being but at the measure of another. The Judeo-Christian elements of Marx's presuppositions need not be gone into; yet, this does not permit us to reduce the matter to ideological simplicity. Man lives at the measure of another because he is an objective being which presents itself as of its relations. The impossibility to posit determination is the possibility of an inverted world - appearance becoming reality while reality becomes just an appearance (insignificant). Marx's critique of bourgeois ideology remains a landmarking achievement. Yet, this philosophy slips on its own precepts; if reality appears as positivity while in fact it is full of conflict - oppositions as contradictions and contradictions as oppositions - how the

---113. ibid. p.156
supersession of false consciousness may be accomplished by the recognition of real positivity free of all negativity. This positivity must have nothing to do with the necessity to supersede to be able not to reproduce negativity; however, this positivity independently of its relation to negativity is abstract reality since Marx cannot deny that the basis of positive humanity is social humanity, that man makes his own history in spite of the fact that he may not know the history he makes. We may ask then how does the idea of revolution correspond to the idea of positive humanity, or, as we have already noted, how can man know his essential being (needs, powers) in an a priori manner as to produce humanly where humanness emerges from life activity.

The mystery may be discerned in the very notion of revolutionary human activity as "the confirmation of true being through the negation of apparent being" (114) and as,

...the appropriation of objective being through the supersession of alienation ...the real objectification of man, the real appropriation of his objective being through the destruction of the estranged character of the objective world, through the supersession of its estranged mode of existence ...(115)

This means that positivity as confirmation, appropriation, objectification, are all accomplished through a negative activity, as negation, supersession, destruction. Revolutionary activity is the positivity of negativity; it is not a human-natural activity that is free from alienation and

414. Manuscripts, p.393
115. ibid.p.395
therefore from an estranged world.

The idea of revolution rests on the oppositions (divisions) of bourgeois society; once the latter are destroyed, the limited, particular conception of reality grounded on the positivity of negativity must be superseded as well. Marx's true positivity has a universal perspective because it is progressive: it is greater than the sum total of its essential moments because it is not limited by any one of these moments in particular by representing its interests. The positivity of revolutionary activity is precisely limited because it represents particularity and for that very reason to be able to supersede, to destroy, or to appropriate, it must subordinate all difference and must present itself as the universal particularity — ideology. We can propose therefrom that the idea of positive humanity is the revelation of the idea of revolution and, from this point of view, it is then evident that revolutionary activity should represent a nonessential mediation for human activity once positive humanity shall come about. We cannot fail to ask however, what would be the origin of positive humanity if revolutionary activity should not be its mediation because it ought to be free of any negativity? This leads us back to the problems that raise the idea of objectification as alienation, of society as a non-essential mediation between man and nature which calls for a new conception of history — man.

The supersession of false consciousness, abstraction,
alienation, an estranged world, what in its ossified mode of being will be called ideology, is the condition for the realization of positive humanity. However, Marx presents us with a view of the progress of history where revolutionary activity appears to be a necessary mediation for the destruction of the conditions of false consciousness confirming man's participation. For as long as man needs to make the world appear as his product to realize appropriation as sensuous objectification, false consciousness cannot cease to be a moment of human existence. To paraphrase Marx, we may say that what belongs together - nature and consciousness - is forcibly separated and hence must be violently re-united. The eternal condition of returning to the suspension that indetermination erects may be only abolished through the destruction of the conditions (alienation, an estranged world) which hinder the progress towards positivity. Revolution as the midwife of history affirms the necessity of ideology since man must erect the illusion of mastery over his destiny not because he imagines himself as the subject for itself but, because objectivity appears to have been appropriated and a perfect unity to have been accomplished.

Whether revolutionary activity brings together what belongs together, that is, it realizes human history or, whether it is the unity of what was separated, that is, the re-appropriation of essential being in its social existence, it is always the mediation of extremes, the necessary consequence
of non-human reality. But, if the communist revolution must
destroy the apparent positivity of bourgeois society because
it is the expression of the realization of objective condi-
tions that corresponds to subjective reality, the separation
between purchase and sale and the impoverishment of the pro-
letariat — then it is evident that it needs to establish the
objectification of apparent objectivity — the negation of ap-
parent positivity. Revolutionary activity must reveal the
illusory reality of bourgeois ideology, it must suspend it-
self from the suspension — the fact that it is only the posi-
tivity of negativity. Revolutionary reality must present
itself as the truth of bourgeois reality — its revelation —
but to do this it must fill the eruption that it creates by
postulating truth in the name of objectivity — law whose ori-
gin is every man's right because it expresses no particular
right. Revolutionary ideology is consequently the new posi-
tivity that is now able to appear as the only reality becau-
se it has abolished the presuppositions of its being — nega-
tivity — and may thus present itself as true reality — the
totality for itself.

...however much it may appear as if both extremes
were equally extreme it nevertheless remains true
that only one is an extreme by nature, while the
extremity of the other does not have the signifi-
cance of true reality. ...Christianity or religion
in general is an extreme of philosophy. But in
reality there is no true antithesis between reli-
gion and philosophy. For philosophy comprehends
religion in its illusory reality. In the eyes of
philosophy, religion — inasmuch as it wishes to
become reality - must necessarily disintegrate. There is no real dualism of essences... (116)

Revolutionary truth must know its objectivity, that it is the product of bourgeois reality, of the ideal of the universal principle. The realization of the universal principle is the negation of bourgeois ideology and of revolutionary activity as the mediation for true positivity. Thereon, there is no longer a need for the objectification of objectivity since revolutionary ideology has posited the significance of humanness by abolishing the other extreme (negativity) and thus establishes itself as true reality – essential being as social being – positivity free of any negativity. Ideology as true reality becomes the flesh of reality because it acclaims to be the subjectivity of objectivity. Thus whether it is the progress of history which abolishes false consciousness by realizing humanness or, whether humanness is the result of the necessary abolition of false consciousness, it is indifferent to the consequences which should be the same in each case since the presupposition is always the same – positivity free of any negativity.

If Marx does not want a mediation to establish the realization of positivity free of negativity – social being – he must admit, that the alienation of man through the separation of labour from its objects is only an appearance because social products are never alienable in so far as they are not private in substance; that private property is a false extreme for all.

116. Critique, p.156
property is social by principle since all activity is social; that bourgeoisie ideology is only false consciousness; that the domination of man by man that hides in things is non-reality. However, Marx then may no longer argue that bourgeoisie society is the expression of the separation of what belongs together, because it is the negation of the social nature of activity through surplus production and arbitrary needs, that is, the alienation of activity and of its object.

For Marx, ideology must not reveal itself as the content of the history which proclaims objective man as its origin, a necessary content that gives significance to human activity, an activity which does not rest on consciousness or on nature as such. On the contrary, he wants to get rid of this determination, - false consciousness as a moment of human activity-, the illusion that produces objectification as alienation, an estranged reality; yet, he forgets that this is the unique means through which man defies his objectivity by transforming reality "in spite of the Bible". (117) This simply means that man can alienate his activity and its products precisely because they are not his as such - they are social activity and products. But, since man is not just a social being - universal man, false consciousness - but, at the same time, he is an 'individual' - an insignificant reality that struggles to satisfy being and knowing - (his) freedom is precisely that he may not constitute the totality - society.

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117. *Capital*, I, p.170
as corporeal universality — as much as his determination is
that he must participate in its "organic composition" to sa-
tisfy his needs. It is this ambiguity which, according to
Marx, the development towards a human society or, socialized
humanity as positive humanity must abolish.

Following Marx's presuppositions, society should give bo-
dy to human objectification by positing abstract humanness
onto concrete social humanity and, as a result, should provide a
measure of truth, of rational reason for man. In this way,
society should abolish the alienation of activity and of the
products through the externalization of man's essential being,
because this being is a priori social and, therefore, exter-
nalization should be its confirmation as a human being. This
means in turn, that sociality suspends the suspension — the
objectification of man's subjective, non-human existence —
by making him participate in the reproduction and maintai-
ce of a human world through human production. The progress
of history meets here with the becoming of capital production.

Individuals cannot gain mastery over their own social
interconnections before they have created them. But
it is an insipid notion to conceive of this merely
objective bond as a spontaneous, natural attribute
inherent in individuals and inseparable from their
nature (in antithesis to their conscious knowing and
willing). This bond is their product. It is a his-
toric product. It belongs to a specific phase
of their development. The alien and independent cha-
acter in which it presently exists vis-à-vis indi-
viduals proves only that the latter are still en-
gaged in the creation of the conditions of their social
life, and that they have not yet begun, on the basis
of these conditions, to live it. It is the bond
natural to individuals within specific and limited
relations of production. Universally developed indi-
viduals, whose social relations, as their own
communal (gemeinschaftlich) relations, are hence also subordinated to their own communal control, are no product of nature, but of history. The degree and the universality of the development of wealth where this individuality becomes possible, supposes production on the basis of exchange values as a prior condition, whose universality produces not only the alienation of the individual from himself and from others, but also the universality and comprehensiveness of his relations and capacities. (118)

Men are bound to one another, but their bonds acquire a social objectivity through the appropriation of their inter-relation to nature by creating a human world through human production. It is always men themselves who establish this bond, but they do not emerge with it because sociality is a product of history. As we have seen the process of appropriating this objectivity through the realization of society is the very progress of history which becomes human once men create and enjoy the wealth which eventually places them in bondage. Only once man becomes a social being, because he has admitted the social basis of his activity, his bonds cease to make him suffer, and cease to be an expression of his dependence on nature and on other men. So long as man feels external to his needs, the objects of his activity are alienable creating between men relations of dependence that do not satisfy anyone's need. But, these very same relations that bind independent and indifferent private producers create the conditions for recognizing the social nature of their products; the conditions for the appropriation of their

----11. Grundrisse, p.162
dependence. They are the basis on which surplus labour shall become the wealth of society because every individual satisfies himself with social necessity. Production as immediate consumption produces an all-round dependence based on an all-round correspondence that is the basis of productivity—useful—activity, the expression of the universal character of the productive forces and of the individuals who satisfy themselves through social needs.

The alienation of this objective bond is a result of the absence of appropriate conditions for social production and social consumption. It is only through the realization of the universal wealth of nature's and man's powers, at first made possible through commodity production—private labour as social labour—and, then, capital production—social labour as private labour—that man's needs become human because their naturalness is recognized and nature reveals its humanness. This progress is simply man's appropriation of his communal bonds—the creation of human society through socialized man because communality, association, sociality are man's natural condition which ought to be appropriated humanly. Man rich in needs of the positive humanity, who is able to dispose of his time for the satisfaction of needs free of subordination and dependence, presupposes exchange value that is the condition for the universal development of man and nature, and it is the presupposition for the appropriation of these powers as human because they are social powers. This movement only expresses the totality of the
"labour process" or, the realization of bourgeois society "like — with every organic system ... as a totality" (120)

In the labour process man's will must coincide with the conditions of production, nature must become an organ of man. Man utilizes the forces of nature to serve his purposes but he may realize a human purpose only once he can posit productive consumption: man must transform his powers and those of nature into objectively purposive reality that serves useful labour. In this way man realizes human activity that relates immediately to nature and permits the dissolution of the distinction which characterizes their relation. Nature as one of man's organs may become his determination if the expansion of the objective reality of his activity ceases to serve human purposes. (121) On these same conditions rests the origin of private labour as social, — appearance as reality —, insignificant reality as essential which makes possible alienation and an estranged world; it is also the basis of social labour as private, — reality as appearance —, essential reality as insignificant which makes possible the abolition of alienation and of an estranged world because it realizes the organic correspondence of all conditions of production. Thus all that seems necessary to Marx is bringing this inverted reality that appears as the opposite of its essential being, on its feet, by using its powers humanly. Marx assumes thereby, that while in the capitalist mode of production, productive consumption

120. ibid. p. 278  121. Capital, I, p. 170-180
is capital production, (value without exchange, without an equivalent), in socialist society it will be the means towards the realization of freedom from necessity - the appropriation of the means for the development of man rich in needs - human needs.

The separation of labour from its object is the condition for commodity production - private property - and, it is the presupposition for positing "free labour" - labour as exchange value. This labour is free in appearance and in reality; it is truly free because it is "objectless" but labour without an object is not real activity, for it must animate its material to prove itself as real activity - human, objective activity. (122)

Objectless labour demonstrates that human activity - social labour - is the precondition of all purposive reality (value).

The realization of free labour is the suspension of the separation of labour from its object, because now as a presupposition of production - capital production - labour ceases to be free in appearance and it becomes free in reality. It is not private labour which appears as social, but it is truly social labour whose freedom is the creation of the objective conditions for purposive, useful activity. With capital production social labour, the activity of associated producers, has become a reality which is only in appearance private activity. Labour is free here because it has appropriated its objective conditions by becoming social labour. Thus, "the suspension of the suspension" (123), the realization of the

122. ibid. pp.169-70 & Grundrisse, p.364
123. Grundrisse, p.296
separation of labour from its objects as a presupposition of production, creates the illusion that capital is a necessary condition for social labour; equally, this illusion is the condition that posits the "civilizing" nature of capital as the source of universal emancipation — human emancipation as the expropriation of the expropriators. (124)

Before closing our examination of Marx's reflections on the progress of history, it seems necessary to see how his theory of class struggle may correspond to the idea of revolution and the idea of positive humanity. The proletariat as a moment of the capitalist mode of production — the opposite of capital — is suspended from the process of production — from the separation of labour from its object which is the constituent moment of crisis. Thus, when the separation between purchase and sale becomes operational, the proletariat not having any vested interests in the capitalist mode of production may act radically, not in response to the crisis (pauperization), but in respect to the absence of objectification as sensuous appropriation. In this sense the crisis should reach its limits sweeping away wage labour along with capital. However, if the proletariat views itself as a class, it ceases not to have any vested interests; consequently, the suspension of the suspension cannot take place and produce the negation of the fact that capital is its opposite. As a class the proletariat ought to struggle in relation to the presence of capital as the means of life for wage labour. It is capital alone, according to Marx, which may suspend the

124. ibid. p.409
suspension, for its existence depends on this presupposition that labour is separated from the means of production. (125) Once the proletariat views itself as a class that has particular interests to defend, it becomes a menace to capital by posing its conditions upon the production of surplus profit without exchange. The working class is a revolutionary force — the positivity of negativity — so long as it tries to defend its interests by improving relatively its condition in the production process and thus making the realization of the crisis in the absolute form of pauperization — "surplus labour for surplus value" — impossible. (126) The working class as an essential moment of the 'organic totality' that capital production must realize, to suspend itself from the presupposition of its being, capital, to paraphrase Marx, it would have to 'transubstantiate' itself by negating its individuality and proclaiming abstract universality. The relationship between capital and labour may be then viewed in light of this very revealing description "arx offers concerning commodity production. He writes, "...the unity in difference which underlies the exchange of commodities is based on "contradictory and mutually exclusive conditions". (127) However, the inconsistencies that this process raises, the opposition between use-value and exchange-value that each commodity contains, becomes the "modus vivendi" of commodities, "the way in which real contradictions are reconciled". (128) What

125. ibid. p.364
126. Capital, I, p.511
127. ibid. p.105
128. ibid. p.103
appears therefore, for Marx, the least possible for man as a bourgeois and man as a citizen, reveals itself now the node of being, the relation that binds capital and labour.

Whatever way one chooses to look at the progress of history one thing seems clear for Marx, that the distinction between the revolutionary and evolutionary powers of man and nature is insignificant for it is not a question of detecting the determinations but of understanding the specific relations that constitute an 'organic totality' (129) that every system must realize as it is making its previous phases "appear as merely historical i.e. suspended presuppositions...". Thus, Marx concludes, "contemporary conditions of production likewise appear as engaged in suspending themselves ... for a new state of society." (130)

7. Conclusion: Revolution and/or Evolution; Marx's Idea of Revolutionary Human Activity

In the pages that preceded we tried to trace the origins of Marx's idea of revolution. By looking at various perspectives from which his thought presents itself we hoped to grasp the content of his idea of revolutionary human activity. The idea of revolutionary human activity must be understood in respect to Marx's conception of the relation between free consciousness and species-being that is only possible with objectification as sensuous appropriation. This truly objective human activity is realized with the creation of industry and

129. Grundrisse, pp.107-
130. ibid. p.461
the mode of production that provides the conditions for a human world where sociality will mean the cooperation of the powers of society abolishing the differentiation between possibility and reality. But the perfected unity between consciousness and nature that the progress of history must realize ought to confront the powers and the limitations of alienation and of an estranged world. Thus, Marx discovers that the conflicts which underlie bourgeois society and capital production are only the conditions for realizing human emancipation as the accomplishment of a democratic society — positive humanity. Revolutionary human activity embraces both bourgeois and socialist society, both democracy and totalitarianism because it is the positivity of negativity. To appreciate how revolutionary human activity must accomplish the relation between free consciousness and species-being we are going to rediscover its principle characteristics following the direction that establish Marx's Theses on Feuerbach.

In the first thesis Marx proclaims, "The chief defect of all materialism...is that the thing (Gegenstand), reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object (Objekt) or of contemplation (Anshanung), but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively... (Feuerbach) does not conceive human activity itself as objective (gegenständliche) activity... Hence he does not grasp the significance of "revolutionary", of "practical critical" activity. (131)

What for materialism appear as distinct and separate moments, for Marx actually they signify unity as a relation;

131. Theses, p. 28
the sensuous relation between subject-object. It is the incapacity of both materialism and idealism to grasp the relational power of activity that prevents them from appreciating its revolutionary power. "Man's activity is revolutionary because it objectifies needs by creating the interdependence and the interrelation between individual and society, man and nature."

We have seen how for Marx objectification as sensuous appropriation is the immanent and necessary presupposition for the relation between free consciousness and species-being. It is human production - industrial activity - that provides the basis for a human world that is appropriate to socialized man. But, this wealth is not a product of man's activity but rather, it is the product of objectified, social activity which has appropriated humanness and naturalness. It follows, therefore, that for Marx, human activity actualizes its subjective - sensuous - essence in realizing its objective - revolutionary - existence; by transforming reality to serve himself, man appropriates objectivity and becomes capable of confirming both 'knowing and being'. Human activity creates a relationship where there is no subject (activity) without an object (conditions of life activity) and, such an object only becomes a condition for human activity after having been 'animated' - transformed by human activity into an objectified reality. Therefore, as we have seen, there is nothing that is appropriate to man, and man can only relate humanly.
(positively) towards humanly objectified reality. Marx can suggest, on this basis, that it is in the very process of activity where man's revolutionizing power is realized, because human activity functions as a force of incorporealization. Revolutionary - practical critical - activity may not rest on nature or consciousness because it is the proof that the distinction between object and subject does not reflect human reality (positivity). Marx explains in the second thesis,

The question whether objective (gegenständliche) truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question: In practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this sidedness (Diessertigkeit) of his thinking. (132)

No division can be posited for Marx between consciousness and the conditions of life activity; they belong both to a unique process - activity. Without them activity cannot take place since man needs nature/man to satisfy needs and not any nature/man may become a condition for human activity; they must be first objectified, humanized by man himself. In the very process of objectifying reality to fulfill his needs, man realizes sensuous, purposive needs that appropriate the limits and possibilities of objective-subjective reality - society, nature - and thus realize the humanized powers of man and nature. In other words, man becomes conscious of his freedom to realize necessity or his necessity becomes conscious (social) because he establishes an immediate relation

132 ibid.
with nature which reveals the positivity of his relation to society. Therefore, practice, activity is the only source of objective truth, of the correctness of consciousness. It is the truth of revolutionized-revolutionizing thinking which has proved its reality and power concretely and has posited itself theoretically.

One could argue, in this respect, that for Marx, if consciousness imagines itself independently of the process of activity, it may be only abstract or false consciousness. Only the relations realized within a particular reality, a process of activity, can confirm unconditionally the objective truth of thinking. Therefore, the instance these relations (activity, products) become moments of another process of activity, their truth is bound to be transformed. If real human, revolutionizing activity is to take place, novel relations must be created which correspond to the development of human activity, the development of man. Man must constantly renew his bonds to establish the human significance of nature and of society; or, simply, to realize the ontological essence of his passion as a self-mediated being. Man, according to Marx, is then not able to judge reality a priori, or any such judgment is relative, bound to be falsified. Man must not rest upon the world he creates - society - if he is to live at the measure of his power of activity, and of its frailty - objectivity; he must constantly activate the interrelation between himself and nature not to become bound to society as of
dependence and externality. Therefore, it is essential that
his production serves immediate consumption or that it is pro-
ductive consumption, consumption for further production.
Through objective and subjective emancipation man is able to
prevent the development of an estranged world that has lost
its value (utility) for its producer and is exposed to serve
arbitrary - non-human - interests.

In contradistinction to the materialist ideal that the
transformation of circumstances could proceed that of men,
Marx tells us in the third thesis that, "The coincidence of
the changing of circumstances and of human activity can be
conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionising-
practice." (133)

Marx tells us that, there is no real coincidence, no
real capacity to define the determinations of the relational
forces involved in revolutionising practice since their bond
is realized in the process of activity itself, and it is,
therefore, only within that process that they express a defi-
nite relation satisfying definite purposes. What emerges
through revolutionising practice is not a simple coincidence,
but the creation of something novel which neither the circum-
stance or the mode of activity determine, but, rather, it is
the expression of incorporealization. The term coincidence
may express the coming together of different moments of rea-

lity in progress. However, following Marx's premises, what

133. ibid.
is in question in revolutionizing reality is the creation of a humanly objective essence. Therefore, we could say that, for Marx, revolutionizing-practice ought to be the point of departure and the point of arrival as the process of confirming objectively, humanly, the interdependence between men and the interrelation between men and nature as the sensuous bonds that satisfy both consciousness and need or, that provide the basis for the transformation of necessity onto freedom.

Circumstance (conditions of production) and human activity (a definite mode of production) are only a result, the representation, of a specific relation (objective truth) and once the process of activity is realized it is bound to be utilized as a moment of another process satisfying different purposes. For Marx, revolutionizing practice is always a step ahead of coincidence, apparent identity, stasis, because it is the interrogation of the apparent division between consciousness and need or being and knowing.

In the fourth thesis the importance of the indivisibility between consciousness and being which Marx seeks to establish proves its power or the power of activity,

...the fact that the secular foundation detaches itself from itself and establishes itself in the clouds as an independent realm is really only to be explained by the self-cleavage and self-contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must itself, therefore, first be understood in its contradiction and then by the removal of the contradiction revolutionised in practice. (134)
The contradiction Marx has in mind could not be a product of the conditions of activity or, of the mode of activity since, as we have seen, they do not exist independently of one another so long as the matter concerns revolutionizing practice. In respect to this premise, we would ask, why there would be a contradiction in a process which contains logically its becoming in its being? However, this is precisely what permits Marx to call it a self-contradiction of activity (an abstraction, non-objective reality). What is in question here is the totality of a process that rests on certain preconditions implicit to its becoming and without which a contradiction could not be established. Here, the matter concerns contradiction because it refers to an activity which is not yet human because it is not objectified, social reality; as a result, necessity and freedom, being and knowing may appear to be moments of distinct essences while they are only the extremes of man's essential existence as a sensuous being.

The condition for the realization of human activity as we have seen is the appropriation of potential needs by transforming them onto real social powers of men - society; by objectifying his needs man creates a positive relation between men who recognize in social production and consumption freedom from non-objective needs - external necessity. Production becomes immediately social because it is the result of social relations realized in the appropriation of man's external relation to the means of life activity.
Activity as the secular basis of the secular foundation, consciousness, must understand and remove at once its contradiction: it must become revolutionized in practice so that no division appears between the conditions of life and the mode of activity, a division expressed by a consciousness which separates essence from existence. This contradiction pertains to potential human activity; it is non-reality – an abstraction – for real human activity for which objectivity as sociality is naturalness and humanness. In this sense, we may argue that the contradiction is non-contradiction in reality because it expresses only the supersession of negativity and the realization of true positivity free of necessity.

Marx confirms once again in the fifth thesis the indivisibility that must exist between consciousness and need as he argues against Feuerbach's materialism. Feuerbach fails to grasp the limitations of abstract thinking which reduces human existence to its essentiality forgetting the secular basis (activity) on which consciousness is attached, and, without which essential being could be but a mere imagination of reflective consciousness. For Marx, on the contrary, essence and existence belong together, therefore, the relation between consciousness and need must confirm the relation which binds possibility and reality. This means that nature, society must not have an independent existence as externality, negativity but they must be recognized as the product of objective – social activity. Feuerbach, argues Marx, does not
realize that through contemplation human, revolutionary, practical-critical activity cannot be understood. Since for Marx man's revolutionary power cannot be an intentionality that transforms the world knowing itself for-itself, as he has mentioned in the second and third theses, the understanding of human activity must not represent consciousness for-itself, but it must be the realization of conscious human activity.

"...sensuousness, writes Marx, as practical, human sensuous activity". (135) Human objectification, sensuousness as practical, human sensuous activity is effective, purposive activity. Only through purposive activity consciousness recognizes its secular basis, its truth in practice.

If as we have seen so far, for Marx, human sensuous activity is objectified activity which has transformed needs into powers of the human existence, and, if the objectivity of truth depends on the realization of revolutionizing practice, then man's power of incorporealization, of transforming and being transformed is at once his limitation of positing freedom independently of necessity. It follows, consequently, that the contradiction—non-contradiction in the process of revolutionizing practice is the condition of the becoming of purposive needs, of social powers. Sociality, social being, is the product of necessity because human activity needs an object/man that is external to it to become itself objectified. We could then suggest that, the process of revolutionizing practice is, for Marx, the realization of the immediate

135. ibid.
relation of man and nature, as a positive relation between
the individual and society. Therefore, revolutionizing prac-
tice could not express authentic human activity, positivity,
since its origin is the transform-ation of negativity into
positivity. Activity must objectify the conditions of its
production and because of its dependence on externality, man
and nature, it may not transform reality without being it-
self revolutionized in the process. For Marx this condition
of man appears to present a problem since the mediation that
is necessary—objectification—can posit externality as
negativity, because man is unable to control the consequences
of the process of his activity. In other words, so long as
a human world is in the process of becoming, each man po-
site a menace to society, the transformation of the condi-
tions of life activity and, society in its turn posits socia-
ality as the natural condition of man who must recognize his
objective being as humanness in order not to be alienated.

In the sixth thesis Marx traces the problems that raise
man's inability to act without humanly objectified relations.
Here however, he is not looking at it as a limitation upon
each man, but as the limitation for creating a human society
free of revolutionizing activity, negativity. "...the human
essence, writes Marx, is no abstraction inherent in each sin-
gle individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the so-
cial relations." (136) The human essence, human powers, or

136. ibid.
the human condition, Marx tells us, is not immanent to each man; it is the historical transformation of needs as powers which can only take place through the interrelations between men and nature and interdependence between men themselves that activity creates. Man's interdependence to other men is not, therefore, a natural condition in which man finds himself; it is rather a social condition that activity must appropriate by recognizing its objectivity. Thus, the realization of social relations is what generates social activity, providing the real conditions for sensuous human activity.

The creation of a human world depends on humanized conditions of production and human production - social activity - depends on a human world - industry. A cyclical movement takes us from the idea of revolution as the indeterminate power of transforming that characterizes man to the idea of a necessary development (evolution) where necessity appears as freedom because it is the realization of social needs. We find here how humanness could be accomplished permitting the illusion of rational control over human activity since all forces that may determine it would be already objectified, humanized. The object of production is no more the simple destruction of negativity but, more importantly, the elimination of its reproduction, the transformation of the human conditions which in this way would make revolutionizing practice superfluous.

The two theses that follow re-examine the problem of
contradiction raised in the third and in the fourth theses. Here however, Marx is once again concerned about the social basis of contradiction. It must be understood, Marx affirms in the seventh thesis, "...that the "religious sentiment" is itself a social product, and that the abstract individual...belongs in reality to a particular form of society." (137)

Man's consciousness is social because his activity is objective - social activity. So long as the appropriation of man's objectivity reproduces social bonds that become the conditions of production and consumption consciousness is itself a product of social activity. Society as the product of the realization of social activity and social consciousness can become an objective condition independent of man if he does not realize sensuous appropriation in it. If man cannot confer upon his products (society) the image of human wealth making objective reality now appear as a human product, objectivity as the power of human activity becomes the condition that makes man lose himself in the objective world of his activity. However, Marx argues, it is not man himself who is responsible for false consciousness, abstraction, an estranged world, alienation; it is, rather, the separation of what belongs together in order for man to realize his need to make the world appear as the product of his activity - activity as consciousness for itself that turns against his objective existence. Society is itself responsible for this detachment from the secular basis - life activity - because it is not

137. ibid.
yet the expression of the perfected unity between man and nature that provides such abundance that all human needs will be able to find satisfaction. Such wealth is only possible with the progress of history, the realization of the fully developed powers of nature and man which is the basis for the satisfaction of man rich in needs - freedom from necessity. When society will appear itself as the totality of humanity and nature, because it satisfies all social necessity, false consciousness will disappear as the illusion of difference, otherness.

"Social life is essentially practical" Marx adds in the eighth thesis, therefore, "All mysteries which mislead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice." (138)

Marx's revolutionary perspective seems to realize at this point an evolutionary turn. Because man's life is social and because sociality is nothing more but man's communal, associated activity, leads Marx to suggest, that this progress to a truly developed society that binds all men integrally as of their activities, is inevitable. This progress of history, moreover, will resolve all contradiction - abstraction, false consciousness - since the creation of social bonds based on the all round relations between men will develop social activity to such a degree that difference will cease to be a menace. We see here how sociality which was presented as a

138. ibid.
necessary condition for humanness becomes a reality for itself because the origin of activity is no longer the satisfaction of arbitrary needs but social necessity. It is therefore, not the satisfaction of human needs which marks the path of progress, but freedom from necessity as negativity, determination.

The point is made more explicitly in the next two theses, nine and ten, where Marx writes, "sensuousness as practical activity (is not MP) the contemplation of single individuals in civil society ... but it (MP) is human society or socialized humanity." (139). Marx argues here that it is not abstract consciousness, the individual of bourgeois society, but the truly universal man of the democratic state - society - who experiences sensuous, practical activity. An activity that is the immediate expression of his being and knowing, of his individuality and species existence. Man produces for society as much as society produces for man. Society as the product of sensuous activity is the expression of the wealth of human nature that realizes fully its potentiality and satisfies completely its needs because man has become a species being for whom social activity and social life are the essential expressions of his individuality. Human production as the activity of appropriating the powers of man and nature is now present in the form of a human society (world). This perfected unity is not only the realization of the relation between free consciousness and species being, but it is also.

--- 139, ibid. p.29 ---
more importantly, the supersession of the need for objectification; consequently, the dissolution of revolutionary activity becomes necessary since its negativity—the power to transform—presents itself as an opposition to the positive nature that must contain socialized humanity.

Thus, it seems that all along the first five theses we have a recapitulation of Marx's conception of man, the basis of the dialectic of negativity. Revolutionary activity represents here the limits and the possibilities of man who always must objectify his relations to be free being—free consciousness. But this process of objectification, that transforms both object and subject, seems to present a limitation that conditions the necessity of the progress of history towards positivity; or, it is bound, by its power to transform, towards a positivity that will abolish all uncertainty by the negation of negativity (abolition of alienation and supersession of an estranged world). The progress of history is made possible by the real accomplishment of a human society or simply by the destruction of all conditions that make such a project impossible. One may therefore, interrogate further the significance of revolutionary human activity as the mediation for realizing history. Now, however, having turned against the illusions of a new world, it seems equally significant to interrogate one's position in respect to the critique of the revolutionist conception of the world. From this point of view, the present shares a common project with the past; it
is answering how man steps from revolutionary human activity, the sisyphean condition of an "unhappy consciousness", to socialized humanity - human society - where such activity is both nonessential, because socialized man, objective being is a true reality, and impossible, because as a result, false consciousness itself has been abolished.

In the last thesis "arx declares, that "philosophers have only interpreted the world ... the point is to change it." This statement sums up the inevitable role that must take Marx's perception of man's revolutionary powers and limitations as revolutionary activity is charmed to deliver the wealth of humanity. So long as philosophers interpret the world they will always participate in its illusory reality. Only through the suspension of this relation, that binds objective and subjective truth, philosophy may become the arm of revolutionary critical activity. But if philosophy were to pretend that it could change reality, it would have to be transformed into political ideology. In this new function philosophy must admit its illusions by revealing the subjectivity of its objectivity - universality.

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