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UJAMAA SOCIALISM IN TANZANIA
A Theological Assessment

by Laurenti Magesa

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Theology of Saint Paul University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degrees of Doctor of Philosophy in Theology and Doctor of Theology

Ottawa, Canada, 1985
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Reverend Professor N. Provencher supervised this project from its conception to its completion. I would like to record my gratitude for his unfailing patience and wise counsel. As well, I would like to thank various members of the Faculty of Theology of St. Paul University, Ottawa, particularly Professor K. Melchin for his assistance in clarifying some political aspects of the thesis and Professor K. Russell for helping to make my English intelligible. The latter scanned the whole manuscript and was most generous with his time.

To Bishop J.J. Rudin, Bishop A. Mayala, my fellow pastoral agents and all Christians of the Diocese of Musoma, and especially of Iramba Parish, the Maryknoll Fathers (Tanzania Region), my family and my friends, and all who made the studies leading to this dissertation possible my thanks are due. Grateful thanks, too, to my North American friends, C. Todman, Jr., J. Schleppe, Mr. and Mrs. J. MacKinnon and Mrs. C. Boulet who in various ways helped me to persevere. The last named very kindly made available to me her typing expertise.

Needless to say, none of the above is in any way responsible for the conclusions reached in this study. That responsibility is mine alone. I dedicate this undertaking to my parents, my late mother Odiria Nyakwesi and my father Cornelli Magoti, in filial love.
CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

Ordained a priest in 1974 for the Diocese of Musoma in Tanzania, Laurenti Magesa obtained his Diploma in Theology the same year from Makerere University (U.A.). In 1978 he received the Master of Arts degree in Theology from the University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, and in 1979 the Licentiate in Theology from Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Ontario. He has taught at Kipalapala Major Seminary in Tabora, Tanzania, and has several years experience of pastoral work in Tanzania and North America.
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INTRODUCTION

A. The Aim and Purpose of the Study

This dissertation is a study of the moral and ethical principles and policies of President Julius K. Nyerere's "Ujamaa" socialist system in Tanzania in the light of the Christian faith. Nyerere is a prolific writer and speaker. His thought covers a very wide range of subjects and issues of current import. He has written or given important addresses on issues in politics, government, economics, ethical philosophy, educational theory and religion. A survey of the bibliography on Nyerere and Tanzania would indicate that there are numerous studies of his thought on each of these issues and themes. Some of these studies are quite extensive. The present study is related to them in terms of sociological data and other

1. Tanzania is officially known as the United Republic of Tanzania. It is a country situated on the east coast of Africa on the Indian Ocean (see Appendix for map). Normally, the name Tanzania refers to the union formed in 1964 between Tanganyika and the offshore islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. For the sake of brevity, Tanzania is generally used throughout this study to designate the mainland and the islands as a unit even before the union except in direct quotations or where the context makes it necessary to distinguish them.

"Ujamaa" designates the socialist system of government Nyerere pursues in Tanzania.
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factual information. But it differs from them in its aim and purpose. Many of the studies on Nyerere's thought and policy statements concern themselves with general sociological, economic or political evaluations. Our aim is narrower and our purpose is more specific. We wish to confine ourselves only to themes in Nyerere's thought which are relevant to an assessment of the Ujamaa system from the perspective of the Christian faith. We shall, therefore, deliberately exclude from our discussion all elements of Nyerere's philosophy which do not have such relevance.

We shall examine the themes we select with the specific intention of isolating the basic principles which form the foundational and supportive structures of the Ujamaa system. How do these principles stand up when considered in the light of Christian belief about man and society? How do the underpinnings of specific Ujamaa policies square with the Christian conception of the human person in the world and in his relationship to God? This is the specific purpose of this study. Briefly, we attempt to build a Christian ethical theology of Ujamaa through a scientific and factual examination and analysis of the relevant substructures and superstructures of the system. In the light of known Christian ethical positions, we attempt to interpret the basic elements of Nyerere's
INTRODUCTION

socio-political and economic thought \textit{theologically}. Theological ethics is the focus of the study.

This focus has been chosen with the hope that at the end we will be able to contribute to some extent to a clarification of the Christian understanding of the continuing action of God in history. What does this divine action mean to the human community and how should it respond to God?

To answer this question it seems to us that the theologian must look at history, at concrete human experiences. He must also take into account the interpretations of these experiences offered by other non-theological disciplines. In the conciliar document \textit{Gaudium et Spes}, for instance, theologians are urged not to lose sight of empirical reality in their work. They are to listen to the findings of the "secular" sciences such as psychology, sociology, economics, literature and the arts. They must not ignore the influence of the physical environment on the total human person. On the contrary, they are to take serious account of it in their assessment of what it means to be a Christian. As the document puts it: "In this way the knowledge of God can be better revealed. Also, the preaching of the gospel can become clearer to man's mind.
INTRODUCTION

and show its relevance to the conditions of human life.  Consequently, we have taken into account the findings of the secular sciences in our study of Ujamaa. Without, however, losing our primary theological focus.

The consideration of the ethical value of Ujamaa in this study may seem to some to be rather advocative and insufficiently "detached". I am aware of this possible objection, but I cannot be any more detached than the facts will allow me. Otherwise my detachment in the name of scientific objectivity will be merely contrived and artificial. Instead of serving scientific objectivity, it will make a mockery of it. For the fact is that I am not a "neutral" observer of the Ujamaa scene in its relationship to the Christian faith. I was born and raised in Tanzania, of Tanzanian parents, and I am a Tanzanian citizen. I have spent all of my adult life in the Ujamaa system and I am committed to it. On the other hand, I was raised a Catholic Christian and am an ordained priest of the Catholic Church to which I am likewise committed. The theological attempt to make the Christian religion incarnate in Africa, and

IN\footnote{The study is written mainly from a Catholic perspective because I am most familiar with the theology and pastoral practice of the Catholic Church. Also, the Catholic Church is the largest of the Christian Churches in the country. J. van Bergen in his Development and Religion in Tanzania, Madras, Christian Literature Society, 1981, pp. 22-39, estimates the membership of the various Christian denominations as approximately four million Roman Catholics, over 750,000 Lutherans, and about 400,000 Anglicans. Because of its size and more centralized organization, the Catholic Church's impact on the nation is more clearly recognizable than that of the other mainline and Independent Christian Churches. Its official position on issues relative to public life is also more easily accessible through the utterances of its bishops.}

specifically in Tanzania, had already started before my ordination in 1974. It has since grown into a full-fledged theological movement. It is known as African Theology and it endeavours to include the African experience of life and faith seriously in its reflections. This study is intended as a contribution to that movement. For this reason, it cannot be as detached as it would have been if it had been written by someone uncommitted to either the Church or Ujamaa.\footnote{But the study is no less objective or scientific for that. The data pertaining to Ujamaa and the Church is factual and documented. It can be checked against the sources indicated or any others available to the reader.}

However, the study is not exclusive of other Christian Churches in Tanzania. Since the relationship between Ujamaa and the Catholic Church is similar to that between Ujamaa and many of the other denominations, much of what is said here applies to them as well.
INTRODUCTION

Needless to say, the theological interpretation and assessment of this data is ours. It is here that many of my presuppositions and biases in favour of the orientation of the principles and policies of Ujamaa in the service of theology and the Church in Tanzania are most apparent. Yet, I do not think that this calls for apologies.

Many theologians, who are also socially committed, express the conviction that Christian theology cannot be done meaningfully in some sort of "vacuum", that is, irrespective of the associated social, economic, political and cultural environment. We have indicated that this derives from the position of the Council. Christian theology, and especially ethical theology, must sometimes make practical decisions and commitments. The idea of a "detached", "neutral", value-free theology appears to these theologians to be no longer tenable. For them, moral theology is, practically by definition, a science concerned with values. It deals with positive values which affirm man and God, or negative values ("non-values") which alienate man in various ways and negate God. In the sense, and to the extent, that one's theology allows any given elements of these values to influence or determine its orientations, many theologians assert, one is not neutral but partial. They argue that it is not possible for anyone to proceed in a scientific
endeavour without any presuppositions at all.

Apropos this question, the Latin American theologian of liberation, J.L. Segundo, has written that partiality is a theological necessity. He says that "we must find, and designate as the word of God, that part of divine revelation which today, in the light of our concrete historical situation, is the most useful for the liberation to which God summons us." Theology cannot define itself as though it has no relation to the human condition which forms the context of divine revelation. The human condition also determines the manner in which divine revelation is transmitted.

To illustrate this, we examine at length in the following pages the contradictory situation created in Tanzania by external and internal social injustice. Our theology will define itself vis-à-vis this situation as either liberative or oppressive. It will be oppressive if it sides with injustice and sanctions it. It will be liberative, on the other hand, by pointing out areas of injustice in society and advocating justice. But to do this effectively, once again, it must be familiar with the

---

prevailing structures of injustice which operate in society. It must make a firm commitment to change and improve the situation by confronting concrete issues in faith.

It is important to underline this argument in the context of this study to distinguish our approach from that usually taken by conservative Western theology. Third World, political and liberation theologians agree that one of the tasks of theology is to challenge all temporal structures. It must always strive to reveal the transcendent God before whom all temporal structures and ideologies are imperfect and tentative. As the political theologian J. B. Metz points out, theology must be more than a mere confirmation of accepted attitudes and strategies. Theology must act as a conscience; it has the prophetic mission of accepting and rejecting, announcing and denouncing ethical

5. We shall see in Chapter Two that the concept of "ideology" can have negative connotations. I am using it here in the positive sense. As suggested by a study group on African Socialism that met in Dakar, Senegal, in 1961, ideology is used here in the sense of "A projection of a system of solutions, coordinated with a value system to which a human community adheres as it faces its destiny and masters its situation." See J.-Y. Calvez, Politics and Society in the Third World, Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1973, p. 292. In this sense, an ideology is a particular conception of life and a particular theory of action. As such, as the sociologists F. Houtart and A. Rousseau argue in The Church and Revolution, Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1971, pp. 333-338, ideology is intertwined with conceptions of religion, the Church and faith. "Pure" faith devoid of ideological content does not exist in reality.
orientations in society according to its vision of the Gospel. This is what this study hopes to accomplish in relation to Ujamaa and the Church in Tanzania.

3. The Rationale of the Study

Why have we undertaken this study? First, because of our personal commitment to both the Church and Ujamaa in Tanzania but, even more because of the call of the time in which we are all living. Metz, for one, notes that the current social contradictions, the oppositions between the rich and the poor, the satiated and the hungry, the dominators and the dominated, are generating a situation in which an apocalypse of a universal magnitude looms large.

6. See J.B. Metz, The Emergent Church, New York, Crossroad, 1981, pp. 9-10. Of mainline North American theology, for example, the black theologian J.H. Cone writes: "It has been basically a theology of the white oppressor, giving religious sanction to the genocide of Indians and the enslavement of black people. From the very beginning to the present day, American white theological thought has been 'patriotic', either by defining the theological task independently of black suffering (the liberal northern approach) or by defining Christianity as compatible with white racism (the conservative southern approach). ...It is little wonder that an increasing number of black religionists are finding it difficult to be black and also to be identified with traditional theological thought forms." See his A Black Theology of Liberation, Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott, 1970, pp. 22-23.

7. See J.B. Metz, The Emergent Church, pp. 9-10.
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Similarly, Gaudium et Spes warns that unless these contradictions are resolved quickly, the world will perish. The Council places its hope for the survival of the world in wise men who can read "the signs of the times". It seems to expect such men to emerge in the Third World. As Gaudium et Spes puts it: "many nations poorer in economic goods, are quite rich in wisdom and able to offer noteworthy advantages to others." This assertion of the Council constitutes another reason why we have undertaken the present study.

8. No. 15, p. 213.

9. The phrase "signs of the times" is fundamental for contemporary theological methodology. Taking it from Mt. 16:4, John XXIII used it in his Apostolic Constitution "Humanae Salutis" to convoke the Council. See J. A. Abbott, ed., The Documents of Vatican II, p. 704. See also Gaudium et Spes, nos. 4-10, pp. 201-209.

10. The term "Third World" is generally used as shorthand to designate collectively the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. It is useful in that respect. But let us point out right away that like the phrases "poor countries", "underdeveloped" or "developing nations" and others of the same kind, it is inadequate as an accurate description of the total conditions existing in these regions of the world. These terms portray a partial, mainly technological, economic and military underdevelopment of the Third World regions compared with the First (Western capitalist) World or the Second (Eastern Communist) World. They do not take into account other "human" actors such as co-operation and sharing. See G. and P. Mische, Toward a Human World Order, New York, Paulist Press, 1977, pp. 170-174.

11. No. 15, p. 213.
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3. The Rationale of the Study

Why have we undertaken this study? First, because of our personal commitment to both the Church and Ujamaa in Tanzania but, even more because of the call of the time in which we are all living. Metz, for one, notes that the current social contradictions, the oppositions between the rich and the poor, the satiated and the hungry, the dominators and the dominated, are generating a situation in which an apocalypse of a universal magnitude looms large.

6. See J.B. Metz, The Emergent Church, New York, Crossroad, 1961, pp. 9-10. Of mainline North American theology, for example, the black theologian J.H. Cone writes: "It has been basically a theology of the white oppressor, giving religious sanction to the genocide of Indians and the enslavement of black people. From the very beginning to the present day, American white theological thought has been 'patriotic', either by defining the theological task independently of black suffering (the liberal northern approach) or by defining Christianity as compatible with white racism (the conservative southern approach). ...It is little wonder that an increasing number of black religionists are finding it difficult to be black and also to be identified with traditional theological thought forms." See his A Black Theology of Liberation, Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott, 1970, pp. 22-23.

7. See J.B. Metz, The Emergent Church, pp. 9-10.
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Similarly, Gaudium et Spes warns that unless these contradictions are resolved quickly, the world will perish. The Council places its hope for the survival of the world in wise men who can read "the signs of the times." It seems to expect such men to emerge in the Third World. As Gaudium et Spes puts it: "many nations poorer in economic goods, are quite rich in wisdom and able to offer noteworthy advantages to others." This assertion of the Council constitutes another reason why we have undertaken the present study.

8. No. 15, p. 213.

9. The phrase "signs of the times" is fundamental for contemporary theological methodology. Taking it from Mt. 16:4, John XXIII used it in his Apostolic Constitution "Humanae Salutis" to convocate the Council. See J. A. Abbott, ed., The Documents of Vatican II, p. 704. See also Gaudium et Spes, nos. 4-10, pp. 201-209.

10. The term "Third World" is generally used as shorthand to designate collectively the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. It is useful in that respect. But let us point out right away that like the phrases "poor countries", "underdeveloped" or "developing nations" and others of the same kind, it is inadequate as an accurate description of the total conditions existing in these regions of the world. These terms portray a partial, mainly technological, economic and military underdevelopment of the Third World regions compared with the First (Western capitalist) World or the Second (Eastern Communist) World. They do not take into account other "human" actors such as co-operation and sharing. See G. and P. Mische, Toward a Human World Order, New York, Paulist Press, 1977, pp. 170-174.

11. No. 15, p. 213.
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Under the leadership and inspiration of President Nyerere, Tanzania has evolved a socio-economic and political system in Újamaa which, to many commentators, promises to contribute significantly to the Council's hope of offering plausible ways towards a resolution of the current degenerating socio-economic and political predicament of the world. Many concede that during the last twenty years or so, Újamaa has succeeded in giving Tanzania a profound experience of dignity and self-respect which is different from the degradation it suffered during generations of colonial rule. The promulgation of Újamaa as the official policy of the country in 1967 underlined the human dignity of all persons and the respect each individual deserves. It helped to expose the conflicting ideological stances that were prevalent in the nation and it proposed ways towards the attainment of a more humanly organized domestic society.

Furthermore, if it is true, as the American theologians H. Sanks and B. Smith suggest, in substantial agreement with what we have been saying, that there is a dialectical relationship between theology and the socio-cultural context, then a study of Újamaa is of paramount importance to theology in Tanzania. Újamaa has been, and

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continues to be, the Tanzanian socio-cultural context that forms the pervasive ambience for religious and ecclesiastical life. It is to be expected, then, that ethical theology in Tanzania will take serious account of Ujamaa. Nyerere, the chief protagonist of Ujamaa and a Catholic himself, sees the policy as having the potential to free the Church from what he considers to be its oppressive Western ideological captivity:

We want to liberate the Church from the "matope" [mess] which she has accumulated over the centuries by being identified with world situations in Europe. If in other countries Catholicism has tampered on progress, human justice and prosperity, in Tanzania we can make her succeed better than elsewhere. I want to give the Church a better chance so that she will not be blamed as in the Catholic countries.13

By trying to understand Ujamaa, this study hopes to indicate its contribution to an appreciation of the social implications of the Christian faith which contribute to the liberation of man and society.

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C. Methodological Considerations

a. The method of Approach and Structure

As a theological assessment of the social theory of Ujamaa, this study begins by taking a look at the Ujamaa system as it is. In other words, the study is grounded in a social analysis of the system. The concrete principles underlying Ujamaa and pragmatic questions affecting the nation under the system are examined in view of the Christian vision of man and society. Even though it is not the purpose of Ujamaa to espouse Christian values, this study explores the system to extract aspects of the Christian vision inherent in it. We ask the question: What insights does Ujamaa offer and what environment does it create for the realization of the values Christians hold to be fundamental to the practice of their faith?

Because of our emphasis on the analysis of the Ujamaa system, this study may not appear at first sight to be very theological. However, this is certainly a wrong impression of the work. The absence of direct and formal "theological" language should not lead the reader to dismiss the inherent theological purpose and value of the study. We are of the opinion that to be able to appreciate the theological or Christian ethical value of Ujamaa, to be able to
assess it in the light of Christian thought, it is necessary to know the system as it is. But our analysis of the Ujamaa system is not merely sociological. Sociological factors which have little or no theological value have not been emphasized in the study. The principles and other elements of Ujamaa which we underline have a profound theological import in themselves. It is this inherent character throughout the study which makes it a distinctly theological endeavour.

The scrutiny of Ujamaa undertaken in this study operates at two levels. The first is mainly descriptive. It consists of an examination of some of the main themes of Ujamaa. Like any other political system, Ujamaa processes demands, seeks to project an image or an ethic, and pursues certain goals of a social, economic and political nature. But it does this within an atmosphere charged with domestic and international constraints. To evaluate Ujamaa theologically, it is, therefore, necessary to be clear on what type of demands it seeks to satisfy, moderate or alter in order to achieve a national ethos. Further, it is equally necessary to be aware of the constraints placed upon the pursuance of these goals by internal influences as well as prevailing exogenous politico-economic circumstances.

The second level is evaluative. The point on
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this level is to determine explicitly if Ujamaa's conception of the themes selected enhances or diminishes the dignity of the human person as seen by the Christian believer. In other words, does Ujamaa offer a more complete sense to the meaning of being human in the world or does it detract from it? Does it contribute towards the shaping of human life together in love and peace? For this is what Christian life means. As the well-known theologian of liberation G. Gutierrez has written: "To be a Christian is to accept and to live - in solidarity, in faith, hope and charity - the meaning that the Word of the Lord and our encounter with him give to the historical becoming of mankind on the way toward total communion." 14

The analytical and evaluative levels of the discussion in this dissertation can be distinguished. However, they should not be separated because they form one coherent structure. This structure follows closely the method used. We show in Chapter One how the slave trade, colonialism and the Christian missionary activity in Tanzania undermined the Tanzanian ethnic cultures, traditions and loyalties and how this began to effect the awareness of

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A significant portion of Tanzanians as an exploited and degraded people. In Chapters Two and Three, we show how the awareness of this degradation prompted Nyerere to look into the traditional cultures of Tanzania to extract principles for a comprehensive socio-economic and political system which would be just, contemporary and suited to the specific needs and attitudes of the Tanzanian people. Nyerere called this system "Ujamaa". In the next two chapters, Chapters Four and Five, we outline some practical policies envisioned by the Ujamaa system domestically and internationally. Chapter Four discusses what Ujamaa understands by the notion of development, especially as outlined in its Magna Carta, The Arusha Declaration, and goes on to apply this understanding to the specific issues of economic planning, village development, education and health. It also discusses the role of the Church in this new understanding of development. In Chapter Five, the stance of Ujamaa in the international community is outlined. Here we discuss the implications of the widespread ideology of national security, Ujamaa's position as regards the present international economic order, the multinational corporations, the United Nations and the question of the permissibility of the use of violence in situations which foreclose any other solutions to the problem of degradation of man by man.
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The rest of the dissertation, that is, Chapters Six and Seven, brings into sharp focus the convergence between Ujamaa and the Christian ethical orientation. Chapter Six discusses and tries to integrate the Christian and Ujamaa's view of the human person in relation to the previously stated principles and foundations of Ujamaa of community, cooperation, freedom, sharing, human dignity and equality. Chapter Seven discusses at great length what the practical ethical behaviour of the Church and Christian believers might be in a nation committed to Ujamaa. We indicate in this chapter how Ujamaa can help the Church to fulfill more faithfully its evangelical mission. Since, however, no human system is perfect, we also indicate in the Conclusion of the dissertation Ujamaa's ambiguities, shortcomings and limitations.

The result of the work on the theoretical level is that it is able to establish that there is an internal, basic bond or link between the thrust of Ujamaa and that of Christian ethical thought. It establishes that the foundational principles of Ujamaa as envisioned by Nyerere are basically in line with a long tradition of Christian ethical teaching. On the practical level, based on the evidence adduced in the study as regards the social and economic perspective of Ujamaa and that of the teaching of the Church, the contribution of the dissertation to
knowledge, and especially to the pastoral ministry of the Church in Tanzania, is that the Church can, not only work in and with Ujamaa, but, what is more, it can take the form of Ujamaa to advantage.

In studying Ujamaa from an ethical perspective, a problem arises concerning the discipline of social ethics itself - and particularly, Christian Social Ethics. It is widely recognized that social ethics today is searching its way methodologically, and that it is certainly pluralistic. There is not one but several approaches within it. There are, for example, social ethicians who approach Social Ethics by studying an author who has authority; others investigate statements of the magisterium of the Church, such as the encyclicals of the popes and the pastoral letters of bishops dealing with social questions; still other ethicians concentrate their attention on the Bible. Further, other ethicians underline the wisdom inherent in the writings of the early Fathers of the Church, and many other sources. Guided by the Judaeo-Christian experience, some approaches in theological Social Ethics insist upon an analysis of the social reality which favours the liberation of the human person. Other approaches emphasize the quality or common good of society, or what we could call in French le projet de société. One can say, therefore, that from
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the point of view of the theoretical approach to social ethics, there are many possibilities.

There are numerous works exemplifying the possibilities just mentioned. However, there are not too many works in Social Ethics studying a contemporary, practical situation, such as a particular political, economic and social system as we do in the present dissertation. This creates a problem. The problem is compounded when the system under study relates to Africa and its social-ethical implications are studied by an African author. The point here is that Africa and Africans do not have a long tradition of writing. With the distinct exception of several South African authors, there is, to my knowledge, no study on Social Ethics in and for Africa such as we have attempted in the present work. European political theology and Latin American liberation theology proved, in the long run, not to be completely compatible companions. For, whereas they usually analyse a general situation of oppression, our study focuses on a concrete socio-economic and political system in one particular country, namely, Tanzania.
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b. Sources and Practical Difficulties

Nyerere's recorded speeches and writings and documents of the Party\textsuperscript{15} on Ujamaa form the primary and chief sources for the descriptive level of this study. Again, these are contained in numerous pamphlets, articles and books. Ujamaa social theory to date tends to be pragmatic in practice and repetitive in exposition. This repetitiveness has enabled us to pinpoint more easily the areas in the Ujamaa system which receive most emphasis and are, therefore, considered important. The selection of themes for this study has, in addition, been guided by the timeliness and general interest of the issue and its pertinence to the evangelical ethical demands of our day.

For the theological assessment of Ujamaa, we have made use of many of the extensive evaluations and critiques of the system. These have helped us to put the system in proper perspective. But we have encountered a number of difficulties here too. The literature on the political,

\textsuperscript{15} On January 21, 1977, the sole political party of mainland Tanzania, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), and that of Zanzibar, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), were merged to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). CCM is now the sole political party in Tanzania. Wherever it appears in this study, the designation "the Party" is used for TANU or CCM.
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economic and sociological insights of Ujamaa is plentiful, as our bibliography indicates. However, as we pointed out earlier, there is precious little literature on the specifically religious, ethical or theological insights of the system. This is because, even today, official Christian circles generally believe that Ujamaa has little to offer theological thought. The idea that the Church possesses the truth of revelation and hardly needs to learn from "secular" realities still persists. But since 1974, there have been brief attempts by theologians to apply the Language of faith to the reality of Ujamaa. In that year, S. Moons, a professor of theology at one of Tanzania's Major seminaries, Kiplapala, published a short study on the meaning of liberation in the Tanzanian context. Two years later, the priest and economist C. Boom, a professor at Kibosho Major Seminary, published his "The Christian in the Politico-Economic Community". This article was an examination of the Ujamaa political economic theory from a Christian perspective and a consideration of the responsibility of Christians within the Ujamaa system. Ujamaa and Christian Communities, a booklet exploring the pastoral vistas made possible by Ujamaa, appeared in the same year. It was edited by C. Mwoleka (nickname the "Ujamaa bishop" because of his enthusiasm for the system) and an American
missionary then working in his diocese, J. Healey. But
the most significant contribution towards a theological
perspective of Ujamaa in 1976 was a brief rationale for a
theology of Ujamaa by a seminarian at Kipalapala, C. Lymo.
In 1977, a professor of Scripture at the same seminary tried
to situate and study the Ujamaa system from the perspective
of the Scriptures in his "Praxis - Marxism - Bible. Pre-
liminary Notes in View of the Tanzanian Praxis". Yet,
the brevity of these attempts did not allow them to offer
an in-depth assessment of what we could call the Christian
vision of the Ujamaa system. The longer works on the
Church and Ujamaa have up to now been largely comparative.


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studies of the two institutions. They do not attempt an intrinsic assessment of the Ujamaa system in the light of Christian thought. Our attempt to do this in this study is thus a venture into a whole new area of the Tanzanian Christian reality.
CHAPTER I

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF UJAMAA

The contemporary social movement in Tanzania, which was initiated by President Julius K. Nyerere in the early 1960's under the name of Ujamaa socialism, has deep roots in the country's past and more recent history. Ujamaa, which guides Tanzania's social, economic, political and cultural life today, is organically connected with certain elements of ideas and events which precede it and have played a major role in its formation and articulation. Some of these elements or historical factors are external; they are forces which, for better or for worse, have brought their influence to bear on the country from outside of its immediate geographical and socio-cultural environment. Others, however, are internal; they are related to, and are a result of, the normal interaction between people and their physical, intellectual and spiritual surroundings.

We shall begin this study by tracing briefly in this chapter the major external historical forces whose influence on Ujamaa is easily perceptible. These are: the slave trade, particularly from the seventeenth to the end of the nineteenth century; formal colonial rule from 1884
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to 1961; and Christian missionary activity during the same colonial period. To these three factors will be added a brief sketch of Nyerere's background and his social vision. Because his intellectual development was partly influenced by forces outside Tanzania, Nyerere's own vision can be considered, in a significant sense, an external factor in the development of contemporary Tanzania.

A. The Slave Trade

By any standards, the trafficking in slaves in Africa during the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries must be considered one of the saddest and cruelest events in recorded history. Its toll in numerical terms alone is staggering even by contemporary standards. The Africanist C. Turnbull¹ reports that the twenty million or so slaves who survived the trans-oceanic journey to the Americas represent but a small part of the total number of men, women and children captured from the African continent. Estimates vary, but all in all at least 150 million people were enslaved.² Most of them perished either in the


². See, for example, estimates in P.E. Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery*, Cambridge, Cambridge University
caravans on the arduous treks from inland to the coast, or in the crowded ships from the African coast to the Americas. The trade was deliberate, coldblooded and ruthlessly brutal. The repercussions of an event of such long duration and enormous magnitude on the subsequent history and general milieus of those affected by it cannot be overemphasized.

In the region of what is now Tanzania, the beginning of the slave trade is hard to determine precisely. Arabs may have been engaged in commerce with the peoples of the eastern littoral of Africa as far back as the dawn of the first millenium. Until the arrival of the Portuguese at the end of the fifteenth century, however, slave trading by Arabs in Tanzania was on a very small scale. The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea (a handbook on the circumnavigation of the Indian Ocean compiled by an anonymous Greek merchant in Egypt in the second century A.D.), and

Bress, 1983, p. 19 (Table 1.1), and R. Dumont, False Start in Africa, New York, Praeger, 1969, p. 36. In any case, numerically, the horror of the African slave trade exceeds by far the two great human holocausts of this century: namely, the starvation of between five and six million Ukrainians by J.V. Stalin in 1932-1933 and the extermination of an equal number of Jews in A. Hitler's Nazi Germany.

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Ptolemy's Geography (also written in Egypt by one Claudius Ptolemaus of Alexandria probably at the beginning of the third century A.D.) are the earliest extant documents mentioning commercial activity by Arabs on the coast and hinterland of Tanzania. But both documents allude to commerce in ivory and gold, not slaves.

With the "golden age" of the growth and expansion of Islam between 800 and 1500, contact between the Arabs and the coast of Tanzania increased. By 975, settlements of traders from the Persian Gulf and Arabia had been established at several points along the coast. The intermingling of the traders in these settlements and the local coastal population was already beginning to produce a language and civilization which were to spread throughout Tanzania and beyond. We are referring to the Kiswahili language and civilization. Today they serve as one of the uniting forces of Tanzania's different ethnic peoples.

The arrival of the Portuguese sailor-explorer, Vasco da Gama, on the East African coast in 1498 signalled the beginning of the influx of Portuguese merchants into this region. From 1500 to 1700, together with the Omani and Swahili Arabs of the coastal settlements, they dominated all commerce in the region. It was at this time that trade in slaves began to rise slightly. Its impact on the native
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societies of the interior, however, was as yet almost negligible.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, French and English merchants began to involve themselves heavily in slave trading in East Africa. They had established plantations of sugar cane, cotton, indigo and cloves in the Comoros, Sainte Marie, Mauritius and the Seychelles archipelago in the Indian Ocean. They needed slaves to work these plantations and they resorted to East Africa to get them. The Arabs and Swahilis also began to establish clove plantations on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. In addition to their shipments of slaves to Arabia and Persia as domestic servants and wives, they now needed slaves specifically for the clove plantations on the islands. Meanwhile, the Portuguese stepped up their export of East African slaves to their colonies in the Americas. For the better part of the nineteenth century, therefore, the trade in slaves in the East African region surged dramatically as French, English, Portuguese, Arab and Swahili merchants vied with each other for the human lucre.

Almost every part of Tanzania was affected by the slave trade. The Ma and Zinza in the West, the Haya in the North-West, the Gogo, Sukuma and Nyanuwezi in the centre, the Sagara, Zaramo and Luguru in the East and the Yao,
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Makonde, Makua, Ngoni and Hehe in the southern parts of the country were either involved directly in or felt the consequences of the trade. The Arabs were the main procurers of slaves inland. They did so either by engaging small chieftains in battle and taking captives, by setting the more powerful local rulers against each other in war and buying slaves of the vanquished, by planning nocturnal forays and kidnappings in out-of-the-way villages or, as among the Yao and Nyamwezi, by simply bribing the local chiefs and elders to raid and hand over their own people to the slavers. From the interior, slave caravans trekked to the coast where slaves were sold at Bagamoyo, Kilwa and Zanzibar. The historian E.A. Alpers notes that by 1810 about 10,000 slaves were being sold annually at Kilwa and Zanzibar. The Zanzibar slave market continued to operate even as late as 1920, fourteen years after slave trading had been officially prohibited there by the Sultan at the insistence of British abolitionists in 1906.

4. The most famous slave trader in the Congo basin and around the Great Lakes was Tippu Tip. See an account of his activities in L. Farrant, Tippu Tip and the East African Slave Trade, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1975.

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The effects of the slave trade in Tanzania were manifold. The frequent raids of slavers and the internecine wars inspired and encouraged by them disrupted the population. The massive displacement and transfer of people from several parts of the region for forced labour elsewhere in the world depleted the number of inhabitants there. Finally, the constant uncertainty and fear for their freedom and life effectively blocked many channels of economic and cultural cohesion and development for the peoples of Tanzania. This was part of the legacy of the slave trade which was to make the birth of Ujamaa necessary. But apart from this rather obvious legacy of the trade on the country and its people, there are other less evident factors of the system which are perhaps more significant in their contribution to the birth and development of Ujamaa. We will concentrate here on two of the most decisive ones: namely, the denial of human dignity inherent in the philosophy and practice of slavery and the trade's disruption of the foundational values of the culture of the people.

a. Slavery as a Denial of the Humanity of Man

It is generally agreed that the social organization that incorporates slavery and the structures of power and powerlessness based upon it inherently deny the humanity of the slave. The dominating group or person
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perceive themselves alone as human. Nyerere notes that to justify their actions upon the slaves, the slavers seek to reduce to a minimum, or even completely eliminate, the humanity and self-esteem of the slaves. Without this psycho-spiritual ploy, the slavers themselves would find their oppression of the slaves intolerable and would have to forgo the whole system.  

The basis of the existence of slavery everywhere, therefore, has historically been the "instrumentalization" of the slave. The phenomenon has specific characteristics. In reference to the slaves uprooted from Africa, the historian P.E. Lovejoy argues that the system was able to survive for so long because of its attitude towards the slaves. The slaves were property at the service of their owner. As such they had no human status. But even where some human status was granted to them, they had no rights nor heritage in the slave territories because they were aliens. And since they were usually purchased commodities or captives of war, they had no right to leisure. They could be used at will in any manner. All their capacities, including their sexual and reproductive capacities, belonged to the master. It is he who could determine their use.

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Thus, male slaves who were taken to Persia, Arabia and Muslim North Africa were invariably castrated. The women became mistresses in the harems of their masters. In no way were they allowed to raise their own families in these Muslim cultures. Even in the Americas, the slave status was usually inherited. Progeny was allowed only to increase the slave population: that is, for economic rather than for humanitarian reasons.\(^7\)

This complete denial of the most fundamental attributes of the human person in the slave, his will, his familial, ethnic and environmental associations, his rights and dignity as a human being, produced both in the uprooted slaves and in the African populations in Tanzania a pervasive psychology of servility. The lack of self-esteem engendered by this psychology of servility and enhanced by the colonial experience,\(^8\) was an affront to the concept of man's universal humanity and a contradiction of the Christian idea of every human being as the image of God. On the level of social organization, it was also an


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effective barrier against good, responsible government.

Ujamaa arose against this background as Tanzania's response to the pervasive feeling and spirit of social inferiority and helplessness among the people. Its primary and most important motive was, from its very beginning, to restore the dignity, worth and well-being of all Tanzanians which had been eroded by the slave trade. Ujamaa was convinced from the outset that in serving the people of Tanzania in this way, it would also be doing a service for all men. For, for Ujamaa, every person carries within him the spark of all humanity. To deny the human dignity of any person in any way, is to deny the dignity of all persons.9

Thus, for Ujamaa, by making others slaves, the slavers were simultaneously debasing their own humanity. Beyond Tanzania, Ujamaa's intention was to let shine abroad its basic and guiding belief that all men are brothers and are equal in dignity, rights and human worth, and that all social, political and economic activity worthy of man should emanate from this belief. This requires, in the practical order of

9. See, for example, J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 4-9. He writes that Ujamaa cannot acquiesce in the abasement or humiliation of any human being anywhere. Rather, it seeks "to uphold human dignity everywhere; and however limited its capacity in this respect, it could never act in such a manner as to be itself responsible for the denial of any man's humanity." Ibid., p. 5.
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things, respect for the identity of every human being and peoples. It requires also respect for culture which is a symbol of that identity. Slavery, however, played havoc with African culture and, consequently, with the African's sense of identity.

b. Slavery as a Disruption of Culture

We have already observed that among the strategies used by the slavers to maintain the slave system were the deliberate promotion of internecine wars, the systematic dispersal of masses of people from their ethnic areas and the strangulation of the sense of family. But territorial integrity, relative peace and tranquility and some form of permanent community are precisely the elements which form the basis of culture. Without them it is hardly possible to conceive of a people or a culture.

It is now generally recognized that the structure and moral legitimation of the African slave trade profoundly disrupted these bases of culture. The wars undermined the sense of society. The massive dispersal of people from their ethnic areas partially undermined their attachment to their ancestral lands and played havoc with their personal, communal and religious identities. When the chiefs and elders handed over their own people to the slave traders, they eroded the people's sense of loyalty to their country.
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By promoting the individual's value in money on the slave market, the trade worked to annihilate the slaves' feeling of self-esteem and human worth.

Hunted, captured and separated from their families and clans; sold like chattel to the highest bidder; forced into unfamiliar circumstances with unfamiliar people, the slaves lost their justification for human existence. They became disoriented and substantially ambivalent in their understanding of man and community. They thus became dubious about the fundamentals of their own culture which revolve around the notion of participatory relationships. Let us explain this fundamental element of African culture a little further.

In traditional African society, current scholarship shows, man is defined in terms of social relationships. Man is man, not primarily because he as an individual is conscious of certain personal abilities and powers, but because he relates and is integrated into society. Man the individual exists because society exists and society exists because the individual does. Without relationships there is neither man the individual nor man as society. Without relationships humanity disintegrates. It is only within the relational context that 'man, his political and economic life, together with the values of equality, dignity, freedom,
fidelity and justice make sense.\(^\text{10}\)

Accordingly, morality has for its purpose social harmony and peace. The collective membership in the family and clan is stressed, not in order to deny the rights of individuals, but rather to underline the fact that a person can only be a human person in society or in community. The individual and his rights receive consideration always within the context of social obligations. Conversely, the integrated family or clan is known by how it takes account of its obligations to its individual members. In this interdependence between the individual and society, the balance of social equality is maintained.

Once again, because of the consequences of the negation of this social perspective by the slave system, Ujamaa arose as an affirmation of values within the African social anthropology and cultural experience of participation. Ujamaa likewise conceives of man within the context of society or community. In its view, it is only in community that man actualizes and demonstrates his humanity. Participation in and for community is the principal difference between man and beast. As in the traditional African concept of man and social organization, Ujamaa is constructed

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upon that wager.

Apart from affirming the values inherent in traditional African culture which had been disrupted by the slave trade and slavery, Ujamaa arose also to counter the negative effects of colonialism and the colonial system which had dominated Tanzania for seventy years.

B. Formal Colonialism

Tanganyika came under effective German colonial control in the early 1890's. It formed part of what was known then as German East Africa. From 1849, German traders had started courting favour with the Arab rulers of Zanzibar with an eye to establishing a foothold inland. Thirty five years later, in 1884, the Society for German Colonization

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(Gesellschaft für deutsche Kolonisation) sent a group of adventurers, among whom was Carl Peters, to found a colony for Germany in East Africa. Peters tricked many inland chiefs into signing treaties with him. By these treaties, they effectively gave over their territories and their power of ruling to Bismarck's Germany.

The cunning of Peters and the military forces of Hermann von Wissmann, who was funded by the Reichstag under the insistence of Bismarck, secured Tanganyika completely as a German colony by 1890. In 1891, Julius von Soden became first governor of German East Africa.

Between 1890 and 1907, however, there was considerable open resistance in various regions of the country against German colonialism. We might mention here as examples the battle of the Hehe against Emil von Zelewski in 1891, the armed struggle of the Chagga against Peters in 1892, and the Nyamwezi clashes with Emin Pasha and Lieutenant Prince in 1893. But all significant resistance against German rule was finally and decisively crushed with the latter's victory in the Maji-Maji war of 1905-1907 in Tanganyika's southern highlands. Faced with growing forced labour on cotton farms and the cruelty of German-appointed taskmasters, the people revolted in 1905. The Germans pursued a scorched-earth policy in the whole region.
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At least seventy thousand Africans perished as a result.

World War I broke out in 1914 and inevitably spread outside Europe to the European colonies overseas. In German East Africa, General Lettow-Vorbeck put up a stout and protracted resistance against the superior forces of the British General Smuts. Overpowered and outmanouvréd, the German forces finally capitulated to the British forces in 1917. German control over Tanganyika was over.

After the war, the British and American governments proposed to the other victorious powers that defeated Germany’s colonies in Africa should come under the authority of the League of Nations. An Allied Supreme Council which included Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United States was set up to decide the administrative future of these territories. The Council decided that German East Africa (that is, Tanganyika, Ruanda and Burundi) which, since the end of the war, had been under the administration of Belgium and Britain, should be mandated to the two powers. Ruanda-Burundi was therefore mandated to Belgium while Tanganyika became a British mandated territory under the League of Nations. Sir Horace Byatt was appointed first Governor of British Tanganyika in 1920.

In September 1939 World War II broke out. Unlike during World War I twenty-five years earlier, Tanganyika
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was not to be an immediate battleground this time. But it was not completely unaffected by the war because it had to contribute money and men to the Imperial war effort. At the end of the war in 1946, Tanganyika was placed under the trusteeship of the newly formed United Nations Organization with Britain, again, as the administrative power. Britain continued in that capacity until Tanganyika acceded to political independence on December 9, 1961. Byatt had therefore been only the first of a stream of British governors in the trusteeship. At independence, the governorship was in the hands of Sir Richard Turnbull.

The reason for this sweeping survey of colonial history is to indicate its effects on the life and culture of the people, particularly in those spheres which influenced the birth and development of Ujamaa. We shall concentrate here on the social and economic aspects of colonialism as factors which contributed to the birth of the Ujamaa system.

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a. The Social Effects of Colonialism

Historians have argued and demonstrated that from the time when the Reichstag accepted German control over the territory acquired by C. Peters and H. von Wissmann until the end of British rule in Tanganyika in 1961, the colonial governments took a number of steps which were to have a profound destabilizing effect on the people and their way of life. For instance, in 1897, the "hut tax" was imposed by the Germans and enforced with ruthless determination. The people were faced with a number of clear but disrupting choices. One alternative was to plant cash crops such as cocopalms, sesame and cotton. This alternative demanded an extensive engagement in commercial dealings with the Germans so as to get the money for the levy. Another alternative was to migrate and work on German-owned plantations as paid labourers. 13 Failing that, the people had to flee their villages or let themselves be arrested to face forced labour or the gallows. 14

13. In 1885, for example, the German East African Company was established by the Society for German Colonization. Having come under the control of the banker Karl von der Heydt, the industrialist Friedrich Krupp and a number of other capitalists, it began to establish several plantations in Tanganyika which needed cheap labour.

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Different kinds of levies on the people continued during both the German and English administrations. Also, both administrations either changed or modified traditional government structures of the various ethnic groups. Chiefs were removed and replaced by others more amenable to the wishes of the colonizers. Otherwise, direct rule, through an administrator appointed by the governor, was established. The chiefs, who had been the social symbols and elements of cohesion among the particular ethnic groups, began to lose their significance as well as some of their people's respect. More and more, they became the "white man's tax collectors" in the eyes of the people. As the historian O.P. Raum puts it, in a short period of time, the chiefs "had to adjust themselves to the wishes and whims of officials, missionaries, farmers, and traders, all with conflicting interests, yet agreed in expecting compliance with the demands of the white man."15

The problems caused by the undercutting of the chiefs' traditional authority were further accentuated by the drainage of the male population from the villages to the plantations and the nascent towns. As with the system of porterage before it, it sapped the villages of many of

15. "German East Africa: Changes", p. 179.
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t heir able bodied, industrious and more intelligent members. This caused not only problems of government and economic development there but also social (and moral) chaos for both the migrant male labourers and especially for the now abandoned female population. The system also made the social status of women, already traditionally low, even lower. They had to become extremely dependent on the reduced male population to survive respectably.

Education came as a mixed blessing in the cultural sphere as well. Herr Barth, the German commissioner for education, established a government school for Africans in Tanga in 1893. As Western education and its influence spread, especially under the efforts of Christian missionaries, the traditional ethnic social structure deteriorated even further. The adoption of European customs, symbols of rank, social differentiation and the spirit of individualism, slowly began to erode the spirit of community and participation which had characterized the cohesiveness of the family, clan and ethnic group in the traditional culture.

According to the view of many historians today, all of these elements during the country's colonial

16. See Section C. infra.
experience compounded the alienating experience of slavery and the slave trade to influence the birth of Ujamaa. In the eyes of the founders of Ujamaa, colonialism itself disrupted further some aspects of traditional socio-economic and political-cultural organization which were beneficial, not only for a human and humane social existence in Tanzania and Africa, but also for the human society in the world at large. According to them, such aspects of traditional life as community and co-operation had, therefore, to be revived and given an added, wider significance within the context of the reality of today's nation-state and the contemporary world.

Historians have also pointed out, however, that paradoxically, and perhaps ironically, some of the most alienating colonial institutions and practices from the traditional cultural perspective were to become catalysts for a new awareness which led to the inception of Ujamaa. For example, they note that the people who had been uprooted from their villages and ethnic surroundings began to form trans-ethnic associations in the town-centres. They did so along professional lines for recreational activities or for mutual support in the new urban environment. In so doing, however, they gradually widened the traditional understanding of community and co-operation
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which had formerly been solely intra-ethnic, intra-clan and intra-family. Similarly, the newly established newspapers such as Habari za Mwezi (of the Universities Mission to Central Africa), Pwani na Bara (of the German Protestant missions), Rafiki Yangu (published by the Catholic missions), the government teachers' Kiongozi (later taken over as a Catholic publication), and Kwetu (the first African independent newspaper), helped to heighten inter-ethnic awareness and co-operation among those who could read and write. Although not intended as such - in fact, the opposite was the case - these publications served as liaisons between the readers in the urban areas and their traditions, roots and identity in the villages as the latter were being commented upon in articles, poems and letters.

Furthermore, historians note in this connection, that ironically, once again, it was the educated civil servants who formed the (Tanganyika) African Association in 1930. These were generally sons of chiefs and favoured elders. They were educated and carefully nurtured at the

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then elite and elitist Tabora School and Makerere College to serve after their fathers in perpetuating the colonial interests. The Association they formed, however, became the nucleus of the politics of independence in Tanzania. Twenty seven years later Nyerere, himself the son of a chief and a graduate of both Tabora and Makerere, would turn the African Association into a full-fledged political party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). It was TANU which fought successfully for the independence of Tanganyika and spearheaded the Ujamaa movement.

b. The Economic Effects of Colonialism

In discussing colonialism in Africa one is often reminded of the beneficial effects of colonial rule. It would be difficult to deny that some economic benefits did, indeed, accrue to Tanzania under colonialism. Historians mention, in this respect, the introduction into Tanganyika of such cash crops as cotton, coffee and sisal by the Germans. They also note the agreeable byproducts of urbanization and colonial education which we have already referred to. Furthermore, they acknowledge the fact that the colonists started the infrastructure of the communications system in the country. In 1912, for instance, the

18. See Section D. infra.
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railway line from Tanga to Moshi was opened. In 1914, the line from Dar es Salaam to Kigoma via Tabora was completed. The British administration added onto it the line from Tabora to Mwanza. These railway lines helped to open up the interior for trade with the outside world through the ports of Dar es Salaam and Tanga. A few small airfields were also constructed under the British administration. All of these contributions had some positive effect on the physical development of the territory.

The more fundamental question that is asked, however, is whether the colonial system was genuinely interested in the economic and human advancement of Africa or whether, by and large, it used Africa primarily as a source of natural resources and cheap human labour. Can the benefits engendered by colonialism justify its almost total disruption of the African societies? Can they justify its oppression and exploitation of the African population? Many scholars and the system's own stated motives seem to paint a different picture.

In his Le Tonkin et la mère patrie (1890), Jules Ferry of France explained the connection between the colonies and industrial Europe. To Ferry, the industrialization of Europe made the colonies necessary. To keep the industries of Europe going and growing, he argued, colonies
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had to be acquired and maintained overseas, not only as sources of raw material, but also as markets for Europe's excess goods. The avoidance of the economic and social bankruptcy of Europe, according to Ferry, depended on its colonial policy. This is how he himself expressed it:

Colonial policy is the daughter of industrial policy. For any state in which capital is abundant and quickly accumulated, in which the manufacturing system is continuously growing and attracting, if not the majority, at least the most alert and dynamic sector of the laboring population, and in which agriculture must industrialize in order to survive, for any such state exportation is an essential element in prosperity and the use of capital, since the demand for labor depends on the extent of the foreign markets. The European consumer can buy no more. New consumer markets must be sought in other parts of the world, or modern society will become bankrupt. 19

It has to be noted that Ferry allows no consideration whatsoever here for the welfare of those external "consumer markets", that is, the colonies. The English entrepreneur and colonist Cecil Rhodes put it even more bluntly: "Empire is a matter of the belly [of England]. If you want to avoid civil war you must become imperialist." 20


20. Ibid. On German and British colonial economic policies in Tanzania, see G. Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, London, Heinemann, 1980, pp. 42-64. See also
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It becomes clear from this that the primary purpose of the colonies was to serve the social and economic development of Europe. From the latter's perspective, the colonies had no autonomous economic existence.

It is now generally recognized in Africa that Europe's economic self-interest in the colonial system stymied the social and economic advancement of the Continent. Economists point out that at independence Tanzania, for example, had little industrial infrastructure. Its people had negligible technical knowhow since even the small agricultural industry and the communications system that the colonizers had established were designed to serve the needs of the English industrial complex.

By the late 1960's, it was becoming more and more obvious to many African independent states that the economic subjugation of Africa was continuing after the end of formal colonial rule in the form of neo-colonialism. In this system, as some political economists explain, the economy of the former colony is still determined and directed for the benefit of the neo-colonialist powers. They argue that its effects in terms of the exploitation

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and underdevelopment of the neo-colonial countries do not differ from those under classical colonialism. Tanzania's experience of both systems seems to have inspired its articulation of the economic purposes and goals of Ujamaa. It will become evident presently that these are diametrically opposed to the purposes and goals of the colonial and neo-colonial systems. They are also opposed to some attitudes of the early Christian missionaries in Tanzania as well.

C. Christian Missionary Activity

Christian missionaries came to Tanzania at the same time as the European commercial settlers and colonialists towards the end of the nineteenth century. The missionaries' proclaimed purpose for coming was different from that of the colonialists: they had not come to rule but to preach the Gospel of love and freedom. Yet, historically, their activity was so much integrated with and

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reliant on the colonists that the two became hardly indistinguishable in the eyes of the people. For many Tanzanians this compounded the alienation of colonialism and overshadowed the contribution of the Christian Churches to freedom and dignity there.

The missionary entrepreneur Johann L. Krapf arrived in Zanzibar and shortly afterwards moved on to Mombasa in 1844. Johann Rebmann joined him at Mombasa in 1846. They were both under the aegis of the English Church Missionary Society (CMS). Their missionary enterprise signalled the beginning of a concerted missionary activity in Tanzania and the adjacent regions. Soon after Krapf and Rebmann, a small band of priests and nuns arrived in Zanzibar from the island of Réunion in 1860. In 1868, the Holy Ghost Fathers opened the first Catholic mission station on the mainland at Bagamoyo. In 1864, the Universities Mission to Central Africa (UMCA) established its headquarters in Zanzibar. By 1879, the White Fathers had traversed the mainland and reached the Kingdom of Buganda to the North-West of Lake Victoria, establishing several mission stations along the way.

22. La Société de Notre Dame d'Afrique, founded by Cardinal Lavigerie and sanctioned by Pius IX in 1868.
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The reports of the explorers David Livingstone and H.M. Stanley from Africa to England helped the anti-slavery campaign. The Holy Ghost Fathers also played a part in this campaign. At Bagamoyo, one of the major slave centres, they bought slaves, catechized them and settled them on various areas of the mission property as free men. In an effort to make the mission station economically self-reliant, they taught these ex-slaves different kinds of handiwork, particularly agriculture. Discipline is said to have been rather harsh and conversion to Catholicism was more or less expected. But life at the mission station was by far more acceptable than having to face the journey to Zanzibar or Kilwa and the inevitable shipment to the plantations overseas. This work of the Holy Ghost Fathers at Bagamoyo is invariably counted as one of the positive contributions of missionary activity in Tanzania.

But there is more. The various missionary organizations were instrumental also in the spread of education and modern medicine. Perhaps most notable, however, was their contribution in the area of language and literary work. Because they wanted to disseminate the Scriptures, Protestant missionaries, particularly, translated the Bible into the vernaculars. For the first time, they reduced many of the local languages to writing. For
example, although there was already an impressive literature in Kiswahili on the East coast before Krapf, he gave it a big leap forward. He first made a complete translation of the New Testament into the language. Then, he started work on a Kiswahili dictionary "with four thousand entries under the first two letters alone". It was the first attempt to compile such a dictionary in the history of East Africa.

Further, in the first part of this century, William Vincent Lucas (Anglican Bishop of Masasi, 1926-1944) showed a deep and sincere sensitivity to the values of African religiousity. His effort has been compared to that of the Jesuit missionaries Matteo Ricci and Robert de Nobili in China and India respectively in the seventeenth century. Lucas attempted a serious inculturation of Christianity into the African culture around Masasi in southern Tanzania, particularly in the area of initiation rites. His effort in authentic Christian incarnation


into the African milieu has hardly been equalled by any other Christian denomination anywhere in the country up to this day.

All of these positive elements of missionary activity in Tanzania were contributing factors to the emergence of Ujamaa. Missionary education had, as a side-effect, the same "conscientizing" and trans-ethnic impact on the African townspeople and the small educated population as colonial education continued to have. But the impact was more far-reaching and pervasive among Christians: The Bible, now readily available in Kiswahili and other vernaculars, deeply influenced the nascent African leaders. They understood it to affirm love, brotherhood, human dignity and the equality of all peoples before God. The efforts of such people as Bishop Lucas and others on a lesser scale, in which many Africans participated, drove this point further home. But in the eyes of these Africans, colonialism and the colonial system clearly denied what the Bible seemed to affirm.

This dichotomy was a source of internal conflict—

1972, pp. 221-251.

25. As they did throughout the early missionary era everywhere in Africa. Lay catechists played a significant role in the planting of Christianity on the continent.
to many African Christians. They saw that both missionaries and the colonial administrators professed the same Christian faith. Both upheld the same goals for their presence: to christianize and civilize the natives. African Christians found it hard to understand, therefore, that the Christian Bible affirmed their dignity at the same time as Christian colonizers blatantly denied it. They could not comprehend nor accept—the argument that "the affirmation came from religion, the denial from the rest of western culture" because their African religious and cultural worldview had no room for such distinctions and divisions. Yet, it is this conflict which helped to prompt many young educated Christians to become protagonists of independence and nationalism.

The ambivalence of many missionaries towards colonialism, and the colonial streak of many missionary organizations, further accentuated the situation. It rendered the Christian enterprise suspect in the eyes of many nationalists. For example, the aim of the UMCA, founded in England in response to the appeals of Livingstone was to establish "centres of Christianity and civilization for the promotion of true religion, agriculture and lawful

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commerce" in Africa. As well, Cardinal Lavigerie, founder of the White Fathers, saw in his organization's activities a precursor of the civilizing mission of France.

This collusion between evangelical and colonialist-imperialist motives in the missionary organizations in Africa was temporary. However, sociological studies of the African Church in general and the Tanzanian Church in particular show that the attitudes it engendered are still extant. They are evident, for example, in the relationship between the native pastoral agents and their missionary counterparts. The natives are considered, and are conditioned to consider themselves, as junior partners in the work of evangelization. They are conditioned to be psycho-socially dependent on the missionaries. A similar situation obtains also in the relationship between the African local Church and the Western Church.

But perhaps the most regrettable legacy of the European missionaries to Africa has been determined to be


28. See ibid., p. 46. Lavigerie wrote: "J'ai pensé qu'il serait avantageux pour la France d'être représentée, dans ces vastes régions encore mystérieuses, non pas seulement pas [sic] des pionniers isolés, mais par une corporation qui pourra donner à son action civilisatrice et scientifique la suite, la durée, l'étendue qui-la rendent puissante."
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their negative attitude toward traditional African values, modes of behaviour and goals of life. Historians show that, generally, missionaries systematically distorted and denigrated African culture in schools and catechism classes. Compounding the slave trade's and colonial erosion of the African's self-identity, they insisted that there was nothing worthwhile in Africa's past. For this reason, the early missionaries cannot escape the burden of history. The historian J.E. Harris has pointed this out. He writes that if the missionaries had refrained from censoring and deliberately destroying African customs and values, if they had tried to understand the religious and socio-cultural wealth contained in Africa's past, if they had not denigrated the African and inculcated white superiority, "all their contributions would have had greater meaning." 29 As he sees it, the Christian religion would have evoked less-ambiguous feelings among the African population.

As it was, however, the great majority of missionaries did support or appeared to support white superiority. Missionaries sometimes acted as liaisons

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between the colonial officers and the people, explaining colonial policy and demanding complete obedience to the colonial government as faithfulness to God. They paid deference to any white person before any African chief or elder. They appeared to enjoy a material culture which their converts found inconceivable. Because of all this, the difference between the missionary and the colonial official became extremely blurred in fact and in the eyes of the people.

Furthermore, the structures of the Christian

30. See, for example, the counsel of E. Maranta, then Archbishop of Dar es Salaam, in his "The Catholic African and the Present Social Evolution in Africa" in AFR, 1:4 (1959), pp. 232-233. But an extreme and bizarre example of this is to be found in the Church of Mozambique in the last few years. At the height of the struggle for independence against Portuguese colonialism in 1961, both the Portuguese bishops and some bishops in Mozambique were saying in pastoral messages that to fight for independence against Portugal was tantamount to fighting against God and the Christian religion! On April 9, 1966, the newspaper Le Hor had this to say about the independence movement in Mozambique and the role of Portugal in Africa: "In this dreadful duel between Christ and Satan, Portugal's role has always been primordial. It is an astonishing sight to see this race of theologians and warriors, after struggling for centuries against the enemies of religion and the fatherland, still keeping its frontiers intact in Africa, thus accomplishing the greatest feat in the history of humanity since the Redemption. ... Since we [the Portuguese] are the right arm of God, we cannot allow barbarism [the African independence movement] to reign over even the smallest portion of our fatherland." See F. Houtart and A. Rousseau, The Church and Revolution, pp. 151-153.
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Churches in Tanzania were imported and little attempt was made to modify and adapt them to prevailing circumstances. For a long time, there was a foreign leadership only at all critical points of Church life. Even when Africans began to fill positions of authority in the Church, foreigners continued to exert decisive influence. Thus, even after independence, many people continued to see the Christian Church as a remnant or extension of the European imperialist-colonialist urge.

But this impression of the Church was not as clear-cut or as totally negative as it might seem at first. For, the nationalist independence movement in Tanzania, while regretting the historical link between the churches and colonialism, itself deeply recognized Christianity's contribution which, at least indirectly and in part, had made the movement possible. We have already referred to the desire among those Tanzanians who heard read, or themselves read, the Bible to make a reality of the equality and dignity which the Scriptures affirmed as universal, but which the colonial system denied. We have also mentioned the beneficial side-effects of colonial and missionary education in awakening pride in, and a deeper and broader appreciation of African culture. All of these were decisive elements in the birth of Ujamaa. Thus, from
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its inception, Ujamaa articulated the hope that the Christian Churches would (and should) disengage themselves from their philosophical and practical entanglement with colonialism and all the negative associations of that alienating system. Also, from the beginning, Ujamaa believed, if implicitly, that, properly implemented, its policy would not be at variance with the ethical demands of the Christian Gospel. J.K. Nyerere, the founder and main protagonist of Ujamaa, has never wavered from that belief. For an adequate understanding of Ujamaa, a brief sketch of the man and his vision is in order.

D. Julius K. Nyerere 31

Ujamaa has its roots in the traditional African social organization. Its conception, articulation and development in its contemporary form in Tanzania, however, is almost exclusively the work of President Julius K.

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Nyerere. W.E. Clark, a student of the political economy of Tanzania since independence, has observed:

Nyerere's views have heretofore been the views of the government, and indeed the country. While it is clear that there has been disagreement within the government about policies, and while it is also clear that among politically articulate Tanzanians there is significant criticism of many of Nyerere's positions, it is nonetheless true that Nyerere's views have generally prevailed, and that his political and intellectual dominance of the country is overwhelming.32

A study of Ujama'a involves also, therefore, a study of Nyerere, his personality and his views of man, society and government. These will become evident during the course of this work. Here we will offer only a more concentrated outline of his formative years and general social vision for Tanzania.

a. The Man

Nyerere's life can well be seen as a microcosm of the macrocosm of Ujama'a. Tanzania's observers note that he epitomizes in his life-history and thought that complex of philosophical elements and historical factors which, in a much wider context, we see in Ujamaa. To begin with,

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Nyerere is a product of two worlds: he has been exposed, with almost equal intensity, to the strictly traditional African vision of society, on the one hand, and to the perspectives and methods represented by slavery and the slave trade, colonialism, missionary proselytism and other foreign activities in Tanzania and Africa, on the other. Through birth and early nurture, he was imbued with traditional culture and its social and ethical presuppositions. By intellectual formation, he was brought into contact with the best and worst of the long and various traditions of Western social theory. At the same time, he observed the philosophy and performance of those societies which based their organization on the social theory of Karl Marx. It is the synthesized critical appreciation of all of these sources that Nyerere brings to his Ujamaa vision of society. Various elements from these sources are blended in his thought to form one consistent and integrated social, political and economic theory. One of the major tasks of Nyerere's biographers will be to determine the process through which he came to this synthesis. But for our purposes, it will suffice to present a sketch of his life in relation to the Ujamaa system.

Julius Kambarage Nyerere was born in 1922 at Butiama, about thirty miles south-east of the town of
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Musoma. Musoma lies on the north-eastern shores of that part of Lake Victoria which is within the borders of Tanzania. His father (né 1860) was Nyerere Burito and his mother, Mugaya. Shortly after the arrival of the Germans in north-eastern Tanganyika, Nyerere Burito became chief of Butiama. This was one of the eight chiefdoms into which the Germans carved the 40,000 or so Wazanaki people of Zanaki area for purposes of taxation. As it is still the case with any self-respecting patriarch in many African societies, Chief Burito was polygamous. At the time of their marriage, Burito was sixty-one, Mugaya fifteen. She was one of the Chief's twenty-two wives and her son, Kambárage, was among his twenty-six children. Together with the other co-wives and the clan in general, Mugaya introduced her son, his brothers and sisters and the other children of the village into the day-to-day customs and values of the clan. She instructed him about the requirements of community life, co-operation in work and recreation, sharing and due respect to people, especially the elders and the ancestors of the clan.

As chief (or omwami), Nyerere Burito governed with the consent of the people. His main responsibility was to see to the general welfare of the clan by maintaining order through the observance of custom. In this task he
was assisted by a council of elders. His upkeep was assured by the community. If he, as an omwami proved to be inefficient, unjust or rapacious, or otherwise failed in his duties, he could be deposed by the general consent of the people expressed in a council meeting.

The younger Nyerere observed these workings of traditional African government at close quarters. Together with his integration into the extended family of the village since his birth, and his participation in the community life of the clan, his observation of the proceedings of government at his home formed the basis of his social vision. In his study of the political development of Nyerere, Hatch notes that since the beginning of his political career, Nyerere has come into contact with institutions with a different outlook on society and social organization than he knew as a boy. Some of these latter have impressed him and left their mark on his personality. But they have not undermined or changed dramatically the foundations laid in his younger days at home. He has only incorporated the significant values of the other social visions into his own without giving up the latter. In the words of Hatch: "The roots of his nature grew from the seeds planted by the Zanaki community in which he was reared, and by a home life within that community. Later
experiences enriched and broadened his perceptions but from a secure, unshakeable base.\textsuperscript{33}

Nyerere took this unshakeable foundation of community, which forms the axis of the traditional African worldview, with him into his schooldays. At the age of twelve, he started primary school at Mwisenge in Musoma. He stayed there for three years. It was at Mwisenge that he first came directly under European influence: the European teaching methods and content, the English language and the Catholic Church. His boyhood friend Marwa prevailed upon him to attend the optional Catholic religious instruction class offered there twice weekly. He has closely affiliated himself with Christian activities ever since.

His academic performance at Mwisenge (he ranked first in the 1936 territorial examinations) assured him of a place at Tabora school. He was admitted there the same year and studied there for six years. During his stay at Tabora, Nyerere showed a distinct dislike for the attitude of privilege and elitism which was being inculcated in the students. As prefect, he worked actively to reduce the privileges which other prefects usually claimed. His spirit of justice and fairness was beginning to show itself.

\textsuperscript{33} Two African Statesmen, p. 2.
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He accepted baptism into the Catholic Church in 1943 at the age of twenty-one, a short time after the death of his father.34

Students of the development of Nyerere's thought have observed that his acceptance of the Christian faith did not mean for him a complete abandonment of the values and positive attitudes he perceived in traditional life and religion and which he had learned to appreciate and cherish. Rather, as Hatch has pointed out, the Christian faith provided for him a framework, a "broad perspective of life's meaning" and a guide for action. Hatch explains that "In this respect his acceptance of Christianity represents simply his choice of one path in a spiritual journey whose frontiers were already established by his childhood learning."35

During his post-secondary education at Makerere (University) College Nyerere, together with his friend A. Tibandebage, founded a "Catholic Action" society for the purpose of arranging and providing various religious activities for interested students. After graduating from

34. The baptism took place on December 23 at Nyegina in Musoma, Father Mathias Koenen (w.p.) officiating. Nyegina was Nyerere's home mission at that time.

35. Two African Statesmen, p. 6.
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Makerere, he chose to teach at the Catholic St. Mary's College at Tabora, turning down the better paying offer by the government to teach at Tabora School. He thereby forfeited his pension for the duration.

In 1949, Nyerere was accepted as a student at Edinburgh University. There he studied Economic History, Social Anthropology, Political Economy, Constitutional Law and Moral Philosophy. He graduated as a Master of Arts in 1952.

At Edinburgh, Nyerere joined and became a member of the executive of the Scottish wing of the "World Church Group". By reason of the strong presence of the Church of Scotland in Central Africa, this group was very interested in the political developments there.

After his return from Edinburgh in 1952, Nyerere, once again, chose to teach at the newly established Catholic Secondary School at Pugu, called St. Francis College. Soon after in 1953, he reluctantly resigned from his teaching post there because Tanganyika's Governor, E. Twining, that year banned civil servants (including teachers) from becoming members of the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) to which Nyerere belonged. On July 7, 1954, under the chairmanship of Nyerere, TAA was constituted as a political party under the name of the Tanganyika
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African National Union (TANU). From that date onwards, Nyerere was to dedicate all his energies to national politics and international affairs.

Between 1955 and 1957, Nyerere travelled to New York three times to address the Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee of the United Nations Organization on behalf of TANU for Tanganyika's independence. In 1957, he was nominated by the Governor to Tanganyika's Legislative Council but resigned a few months afterwards in protest against what he explained as the undemocratic nature and operation of the Council. In Tanganyika's first territorial elections in 1958, he was elected as Member of Parliament. He was re-elected in 1960 and in 1961 he became the first Prime Minister of independent Tanganyika.

Six weeks after the independence celebrations, Nyerere resigned the premiership. The reason he gave to the nation for his resignation was that he wanted to re-organize TANU. But, a year later, with the decision to make Tanganyika a Republic in 1962, he was elected the first President of the Republic. In 1964, when Tanganyika and Zanzibar merged, he was named President of the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, shortly afterwards to

be renamed Tanzania. He was elected President of Tanzania for the first time in 1965 by a huge mandate. He has been re-elected to that office three more times since then. 37

The late T. Mboya of Kenya, a longtime associate of Nyerere in African politics in general, and in the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) in particular, has described Nyerere as a charming unassuming person who likes to identify himself with the "small man". Mboya observes:

He has also a profound and analytical mind. Most people meeting him for the first time are deceived into thinking him superficial in thought, and weak and flexible in action. Many people who made this mistake in the days before Tanganyika's independence, suddenly realized he was in fact strong-willed and, once resolved to do something, determined to carry it out regardless of the consequences. 38

According to many people who have worked with him, Nyerere's "analytical" mind leads him to consider and evaluate the evidence of the case carefully before making decisions or taking on a task. He does not, for instance, approach the African heritage as dogma. Rather he listens


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to learn what each situation might contribute to the development of Tanzania and Africa. He urges and welcomes meaningful change, change which he perceives to be at the service of the life of the nation.

Several writers and social scientists have also observed that his approach to religion is likewise non-dogmatic. However, they point out that his devotion to the Catholic faith is unaffected and sincere. One observer of the Tanzanian scene, G. Fournier, notes about him in this context that he scrupulously fulfills all religious obligations. According to W. Tordoff, Nyerere's humility is also genuine. He has a distaste for the cult of personality - something which he could have cultivated easily with his charismatic personal popularity. Instead he directed, very soon after independence, that roads, buildings, public areas should not be named after him. The title "His Excellency" in reference to him should be reserved only for very formal occasions.


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The ethiclan D. Goulet, in his proposal for A New Moral Order in national and international affairs, describes Nyerere's socio-economic and political vision as a remarkable example of an expression of Christian ethics. Available evidence suggests that Nyerere brings this ethical perception to his day-to-day political decisions. P. Lessing reports that a British official, who had engaged in long and often bitter negotiations with him, remarked that as a politician Nyerere is not Machiavellian. When he is faced with a complicated problem he does not look for the most expedient way out. Rather he looks for and implements what he believes to be the most Christian course of action.

What course of action has Nyerere seen fit to pursue in Tanzania? In other words, what, more precisely, is Ujamaa and what are its goals and objectives?

b. The Vision: Ujamaa Socialism

The immediate history of Ujamaa begins with independence. There was no definitive, generally accepted national statement of policy in Tanzania between 1961 and


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1967. Yet, according to Nyerere, TANU had committed itself and the government to the task of building Tanganyika into a socialist society in 1962, soon after the country became independent. After his resignation from the premiership in that year, Nyerere published a document entitled "Ujamaa – The Basis of African Socialism" in his capacity of President of TANU. The document explained the socialist path of organization and development Tanganyika intended to take. Meanwhile, the Government had been enacting legislations and implementing policies which were socialist in nature since it came into power in 1961. For example, it terminated the colonial-inspired system of private ownership of land and made all land public property. It also socialized the major utility services, instituted a minimum wage level and legislated a graduated tax system. All these were socialist measures, but in the absence of a clear statement of policy, they were misinterpreted and misunderstood. It was clear that only a few well-placed people - people who had replaced the British in the administrative machinery of the State - were benefitting. The masses of the people continued to live untouched and


44. Full text in ibid., pp. 1-12 and in Freedom and Unity, pp. 162-171.
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unchanged by the benefits of the independence for which they had struggled.

Nyerere quickly became convinced beyond doubt that a clear statement of the intentions of the Party and the State to lead the nation within the socialist mode of development was imperative. He began to work on it. The statement finally came as a result of the Party's National Executive Committee's meeting of January 26-29, 1967 at Arusha in north-eastern Tanzania. It was promulgated by the Party on February 5, 1967 as "The Arusha Declaration". The Declaration became the Magna Carta of socialist Tanzania. But what, substantively, is The Arusha Declaration?

Nyerere describes The Arusha Declaration as a "statement of intent". The Declaration describes Ujamaa as an ideal. It is an ideal because, faced with an unjust national and international environment, it envisions a society, at least in Tanzania, in which injustice can be greatly reduced or even eliminated. It is an ideal because it wants to make effective the values of freedom, equality, democracy and human dignity which, even though they are professed in so many ways, they are rarely made concrete.

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It is an ideal, finally, because it proposes to reach its vision of a just, equal and democratic society by means of co-operation and participation among people, means which much of the international political scene today views with cynicism. All these things constitute the political, social and economic programme of Ujamaa, according to The Arusha Declaration. Tanzania wants to realize them. Thus Nyerere calls the document that lays out Tanzania's socialist programme - The Arusha Declaration - a statement of intent. The Declaration, in Nyerere's mind, is, as it were, a map of the path Tanzania wants to pursue.

Yet, Nyerere in The Arusha Declaration describes the Ujamaa programme also as a realistic ideal. The Declaration recognizes the many obstacles along the road towards the realization of the ideal. But it believes that these obstacles can be overcome. Ujamaa sees itself as realistic because the foundations and principles upon which it stands are firmly rooted in traditional African values and practical life; also because it is an expression in the political and social life of the nation of a fundamental and universal human longing for dignity and respect.

What, then, essentially, is Ujamaa? Nyerere describes it as a social, economic and political system or
ideology which is predicated on the belief - or "attitude of mind" - that all human beings are brothers. It believes that all men are created equal and have the same worth and dignity. As a consequence of their equality, all men have a right to enjoy the same rights and freedoms in society. They must also incur the same responsibilities. This is TANU's Creed; it is a Creed upon which The Arusha Declaration and Ujamaa are based.

In practice, Nyerere explains, Ujamaa implies the organization of society in such a way that the rights, freedoms and responsibilities of individuals to society and those of society to its individual members are respected. It means that even though Ujamaa is fundamentally "an attitude of mind", "a belief", "a way of life", the State must make sure that the structures of society lend themselves to the professed way of life. It must enact policies which promote equality and justice and discourage oppression or exploitation. In the words of The Arusha Declaration itself:

46. The word is used in non-pejorative sense here; i.e., as a social, political and economic programme of action. See Chapter II for further explanation.

47. See J.K. Nyerere, Ujamaa - Essays, pp. 1-12.
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A truly socialist state is one in which all people are workers and in which neither capitalism nor feudalism exists. It does not have two classes of people, a lower class composed of people who work for their living, and an upper class of people who live on the work of others. In a really socialist country no person exploits another; everyone who is physically able to work does so; every worker obtains a just return for the labour he performs; and incomes derived from different types of work are not grossly divergent.48

Nyerere presents Ujama'a as a peculiarly Tanzanian and peculiarly African kind of socialism. It is peculiarly Tanzanian because it takes account of the historical and contemporary circumstances of Tanzania. It is also peculiarly African because it has its roots in and draws its inspiration from the traditional African understanding of the significance of the family (jama'a) of which society, the nation and the human race are extensions. Thus Ujama'a, or "Familyhood", and the values that the notion implies in the African context, describe Tanzania's socialism.49 They also provide the foundations upon which Ujama'a stands. What are these foundations? We will now turn to a discussion of them.

48. Ibid., p. 15.
49. See ibid., p. 12.
CHAPTER II

THE FOUNDATIONS OF UJAMAA

In this chapter, we propose to set out the substantive bases upon which Ujamaa is founded. These bases are cultural because traditional African social organization is the source which gives Ujamaa its inspiration and orientation. During the slave trade and colonial rule, as we have indicated, the traditional organization of society was disrupted. At the same time, colonial and missionary education did not completely succeed in replacing it with Western culture. The result of this is seen to have been a widespread cultural uncertainty across every stratum of the population in Tanzania. The ambiguity was compounded after independence in the socio-political sphere. The Westminster model of government had been imposed upon the nationalist freedom movement as a condition for accession to independence. It soon became clear that, not only was its operational structure and logic alien and incomprehensible to the new government, but also it did not suit the socio-cultural conditions of the country. Furthermore, it did not seem to respond favourably to the aspirations and hopes of the greater part of the population.
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It seems that it was Nyerere's early appreciation of this fundamental problem that prompted him to resign as premier soon after independence. His purpose was to devise an outline of social organization that would both respond to the traditional cultural environment of the country so as to restore the basis of the people's disturbed identity and at the same time serve society's contemporary political, economic and social needs. He found the essential structure for the new system in the African understanding of family or "Ujama'a," from the time he wrote his "Ujamaa – The Basis of African Socialism" in 1962, the articulation of the meaning, aims and goals of Ujamaa has steadily grown more precise. Traditional African social organization, however, has remained its foundation. This is evident throughout Nyerere's writings on the system.

Since this fundamental basis of Ujamaa is ideological, it is necessary, for our purposes, to begin by explaining briefly the meaning and significance of the concept of ideology. It does not belong properly to this study to delineate the entire extent of the meanings of the concept, nor the contributions of modern and contemporary studies and critiques on them. It will suffice to indicate here how the concept is used in the context of Ujamaa.
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A. Ujamaa as an Ideology

According to the ethical philosopher Gibson Winter, 1 ideology is that process of reflection which selects symbols and meanings from a people's social and cultural heritage and reinterprets them in terms of society's future. Whereas day-to-day practical reflection contents itself by working within the accepted values and goals of common culture, ideology pushes beyond the self-sufficiency of the cultural heritage to ask questions of the meaning of these values and goals in terms of man's personal and social fulfilment.

This description of the sense of ideology by Winter helps us to understand the ideological character of Ujamaa. As a social enterprise, Ujamaa is a programme of means and goals, values and meanings. Its primary aim is to reorder contemporary Tanzanian society by redistributing socio-economic and political rewards. To do this it has selected elements of its people's traditional cultural expression of life's significance and values and interprets them in relation to its vision of Tanzania's future, in

1. For the understanding of the concept of "ideology" and its interaction with theological and ethical thought, we are indebted to G. Winter's Elements for a Social Ethic, New York, Macmillan, 1968, esp. pp. 57-82.
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terms, that is, of Tanzania's desired social structures and institutions. Therefore, it reformulates the values and meanings contained in common culture, the common heritage of the Tanzanian people, and gives them more precise expression vis-à-vis its social vision. Ujamaa is in this sense an ideology. It reflects a concrete, unified project for the fulfilment of society, a project founded on society's own cultural experience.

In this purely ideological significance Ujamaa, like any other ideological formulation, is limited and limiting. It cannot claim to have a complete and total explanation of reality definitively encapsulated in its view of the world. Any ideology which makes claims of this nature becomes totalitarian and oppressive. Even a flexible, non-dogmatic ideology, which allows for the possibility of new experience in a changing world, is nevertheless conditioned by its own presuppositions. It is always informed and determined by stated or implied values or a hierarchy of values. These allow it properly to make only limited claims. Winter underlines this point in his analysis of the sense and significance of ideology. He points out very clearly that ideological reflection is not identical with ethical reflection and, in a significant sense, falls short of it. He explains that the ideological
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criterion for social fulfilment does not transcend culture; it merely conceives and projects a social vision in terms of basic cultural values. In his own words: "Ideological formulation reconstitutes the future of society in the light of its past." Ethical reflection, on the other hand, is more radical. Its criterion for man's fulfilment transcends the values, goals and meanings of culture. To quote Winter again: "Ethical reflection, particularly theological ethical reflection, poses questions about the future of society in the light of a more adequate grasp of that future." Thus, Christian theology and ethics find the most adequate grasp of the future of man and society in the divine will. This is the point from Winter's analysis that must be kept constantly in mind in our attempt to assess Ujama'a theologically.

The ideology of Ujama'a appears to be fortunate in this regard. For inasmuch as Ujama'a is Nyerere's own vision, it is qualified by a Christian religious horizon that pushes it beyond the limits of mere ideology into the sphere of ethics. One gets the clear impression, reading Nyerere, that traditional African values are not the only decisive elements of the adequacy of Ujama'a. The impression

2. Ibid., p. 67.
3. Ibid.
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is that these traditional goals and meanings are projected against yet another more determinative finality: divine will as articulated in Christian belief. In most cases this element is implicit in Nyerere's writings and recorded speeches. Only in very few instances does he explicitly posit the divine as the ultimate meaning and future of man.

It is not possible to offer a definitive reason for this. One can only speculate on this point. But it would seem that Nyerere believes that a constant attempt to link the ideology of Ujamaa with the ethical principles of justice, freedom, equality and human dignity can serve to extend his vision beyond the realm of mere ideology into the radical area of ethics. Thus the pronounced emphasis in the system to bond together theory and practice, vision and structures. Another reason may be the plurality of religious traditions in Tanzania and the various understandings of the Divinity that this plurality entails.

Nyerere, as a Catholic, has a deep belief in the revolutionary and transcendent character of the Christian tradition. But he believes that other religious traditions in the country have this potential too in their own ways. The God of justice and human dignity is not a monopoly of Christians or even of religious believers. It is not necessary to express explicit belief in Christ or God to espouse the
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ethical vision of Ujamaa and to struggle to achieve it in practice. This position of Nyerere, conditioned by the religious pluralism of Tanzania, will be discussed further later in this study.

However, the linkage of values and praxis, of vision and structures in the ideology of Ujamaa raises inevitable difficulties. Are the vision and values espoused universal or comprehensive enough of the whole society? Is the praxis faithful to the vision and values? Can it be? What is the place in society of those who do not share the vision nor accede to the values proposed? These are the difficulties which relate to the rights and responsibilities of the individual person in relation to society and of society in relation to the individual person. Faced with them and other questions, Ujamaa has been forced to eschew ideological dogmatism and statism. Students of the system note that while not discarding its foundations and principles, in practice it continually re-examines and, where necessary, re-adjusts its correlation of its values and their implementation in the context of prevailing empirical social circumstances. It appears to seek to realize its goals of justice and human equality without dispensing with human rights and human dignity in the process. This ideological non-dogmatism is even acknowledged openly
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and officially in the highest circles of the Party and government.

Nyerere, for example, explains in this regard that Ujamaa does not claim to be the "solution" to the problems of man in society. Rather, he says, it is a search for "the best that man can become". Like any other search for so noble and distant a goal, it is full of pitfalls and frustrations. But the search is not hopeless. As he puts it:

It may be that we shall create a new synthesis of individual liberty and the needs of man in society... There is a need for a new synthesis; we do not know exactly what it will be like, but we have the lessons of the East and the West before us and we have our own traditions to contribute to Man-kind's pool of knowledge. If we can integrate these things into a new pattern of society then the world will have reason to be grateful that we have gained our independence. 4

Nyerere sees Tanzania's historical experience within the context of the contemporary world to be precisely the reason for the hope of Ujamaa to contribute to a synthetic appreciation of the values of the human society. In both its theoretical and operational aspects, Ujamaa has socialist characteristics. However, it incorporates

also the good results of the long tradition of individuality of the West. There are obvious parallels, therefore, between the Ujamaa ideology and the socio-political traditions of the East and the West. The experiences of both the East and the West enrich, but they do not determine, the basic orientation of Ujamaa. The determining influence of Ujamaa is African culture in relation to the ethical principles that comprise the dignity of the human person. Nyerere emphasizes this point.

According to him, this is so because Ujamaa as an ideology is primarily, though not exclusively, for the cohesion and growth of man in Tanzania. He argues that a young nation such as Tanzania stands especially in need of a cohesive idea and ideal for the motivation of its people. This also is the point that the 1961 Dakar Study Group on African Socialism underlined when it noted that, for their integral development and fulfilment, people in newly independent countries must work to actuate shared visions and to realize shared goals. And they can only do this, according to the Study Group, under an ideology "whose fundamentals are not only accepted, but willed, chosen, created."\(^5\) Ujamaa in Tanzania, as Nyerere sees it, is

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intended to provide this direction, with its roots firmly based in the accepted, willed and chosen values of Tanzania's traditional culture, but enriched by other positive human experiences and values as well.

What, then, are the pertinent cultural roots and values that constitute Ujamaa as an ideology? They include a very developed sense of community, participation, co-operation and sharing. They incorporate also a communal understanding and practice of property and ownership. Let us consider them more at length and see how they influence practical societal and religious life in Tanzania.

B. The Cultural Bases of Ujamaa

a. Traditional Culture as the Ideological Axis

The socialist ideology of Ujamaa, as conceived by Nyerere, has traditional African culture as its principal foundation and axis. Within this traditional culture, the main element of Ujamaa's socialist claim is that the basic orientation of traditional social organization, structures, institutions and even thought-forms was communal. Community or, better, "communalism", formed the central reference point for all areas of personal or social life. It stood as the criterion for the norms of order in society. In the recorded history of the African peoples,
as the social scientist J.N. Karioki notes, there is no instance of a counter movement by any group that arose as a challenge against this criterion.6

Thus, various social scientists have argued that through the centuries of slavery and colonial rule, there was perhaps no factor more important in assuring the survival and identity of African culture than its communal spirit. They explain that this spirit found strong expression in the solidarity of the extended family, the clan, and the ethnic group. They contend that it was no accident, therefore, that in the wake of decolonization African socialist ideologies emphasized, perhaps in idealized form, the values of the traditional African community. The sociologist P.F. Nursey-Bray notes, with regard to the axiological importance of the communal spirit in Africa, that:

The body of values drawn from this source represents what can best be categorized as a species of African natural law, standing as a body of values universalised for Africa, and prescriptive in relation to political and existing legal and social norms.7


7. "The Polis, the African Traditional Community,
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These values are incorporated into and form the very content of Ujamaa. Because they have dictated and moulded African existence since time immemorial, it is Nyerere’s central thesis that the communal values of Ujamaa cannot be ambiguous to the majority of the Tanzanian people.

Community. As we have already indicated, the overriding value which defines all others in traditional African culture is seen to be the sense of community. The Africanist C.M. Turnbull observes that “the unity of the family, the communality of the economics, the democracy of government, and the integrative power of religious belief” are at the basis of all traditional African social structures. The focus here is on the social body rather than on the individual apart from it, Turnbull contends. This focus is willed. It is preserved as a result of the ordinary social pedagogy or socialization:

This is learned in the normal way as a member of a biological family that is itself almost invariably a co-operative economic unit. This same family also serves as a model for wider social relationships, ultimately embracing the whole society, be it a band, tribe, or


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nation. This feeling of "kinship" is complemented by a sense of spiritual unity brought about by the focus of ideological attention upon the natural environment, whatever that might be, taking it also as a model from which to fashion social and intellectual order. This all leads to societies that are, while by no means perfect or free of disorder, essentially democratic and essentially egalitarian. 9

The focus in traditional society on community would appear to obscure individual identity. However, in reality the individual is not obliterated. Nyerere argues that traditional African society recognizes that society cannot exist without the individual. What is unique in its social and moral outlook is its conception of the organic bond between society and the individual and between the individual and society. To protect the individual is to protect society and to harm a member of the community is to wrong the whole community. The criterion of the moral life of the individual or group is the protection of the vitality of the community. One is morally culpable when one detracts from this vitality in any way. 10

From this organic or integral bond between the

9. Ibid., p. 203.

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individual and society, there flows an unquestioned acceptance of mutual interdependence. There is a recognition of a basic minimum of everyone's rights and responsibilities in the family and clan. To everyone, society guarantees the basic needs of food and shelter; from everyone, according to ability, society expects some contribution to its welfare. Societal thus conceived involves the acceptance that everyone is everyone else's keeper. According to A.A. Mazrui, a political scientist, it involves the acceptance of an egalitarian rather than libertarian individuality. Here a person is an individual and can assert himself as such in terms of the equality between himself and other individuals rather than in freedom from them.

The sense of community in traditional African culture provides Nyerere with the basic "typology" for Ujamaa. Community, Nyerere says, is in essence "familyhood". It describes Tanzania's socialism. It is a sense of


belonging which today must transcend ethnic loyalties to embrace national solidarity and universal human community. Transcending ethnic loyalties, however, does not mean a denial of ethnic identity. As in traditional Africa's understanding of community, the ethnic group, the nation and the universal human community are integrally related to one another. They are indivisible. Legitimate ethnic identity should not separate one from authentic national solidarity, nor national solidarity from the world community. This is why one of the main tenets of Ujamaa is a belief in the universal brotherhood of the human race,\(^{14}\) on which the constitution of the Party and Nyerere insist.

**Participation.** Community in its active sense implies participation. In his study of the religious significance of African culture, the African theologian P. Akoi\(^{15}\) mentions participation in and communion with society as the elements which define the African's essence and existence. A man's fellowship with his parents, neighbours, the spirits of his ancestors and with God determine his fullness of life. Religious and social values gain significance only within this social reality of

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\(^{15}\) *Religion*, p. 178.
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participation.

To a very remarkable extent, therefore, participation shapes the traditional African view of life in all of its spheres. This is what another African theologian V. Mulago emphasizes when he writes in reference to the African sense of community:

Participation is the element of connection, the element which unites different beings as beings, as substances, without confusing them. It is the pivot of the relationships between members of the same community, the link which binds together individuals and groups, the ultimate meaning, not only of the unity which is personal to each man, but of that unity in multiplicity, that totality, that concentric and harmonic unity of the visible and invisible worlds. 16

Participation is for an African the essence of happiness because it satisfies the psychological need for the communion of body and mind, and of the individual and society. It helps him to overcome what psychologists, such as D.C. Gordon, have called the "subject-object bifurcation" which from birth separates the individual from others in society. 17 In great part, participation also


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determines the substance of religion and the moral orientation of individuals in Africa.

In taking participation as a fundamental element, Ujamaa cannot escape a number of consequences and implications. For instance, restrictive association which would inevitably mean diminished participation would contradict Ujamaa's African foundations. Also, since participation stems from and contributes to a religious rationale in Africa by actuating the unity of the visible and invisible worlds, Ujamaa cannot claim to be atheistic without disassociating itself from its African roots. These consequences will be highlighted in due course in the context of Ujamaa's attitude to human rights.

Co-operation and Sharing. A spirit of co-operation and sharing marks the ethic of traditional African society as an integral element of participation and community. Nyerere has incorporated it in the ideology of Ujamaa. He emphasizes that co-operation and sharing are the characteristics of true humanity. In his view, they alone separate man from beast. If man would survive as a human person, he must co-operate and share. Specifically, the purpose of the production of wealth must be the welfare of every individual in society on the basis of equality and dignity. The primary purpose of wealth must be the fight
against poverty, hunger, ignorance and disease, and the
establishment of an ambience of harmony, peace and mutual
respect. The latter elements of harmony and respect are as
important to the integral humanity of man as are food and
shelter. Nyerere quotes the Scriptural adage in explanation:
"Man does not live by bread alone"; 18 his dignity and
respect are also central to his life as a human person.

Samuel S. Mushi, a Tanzanian social scientist,
explains that in the economic sphere, co-operation in
traditional Africa involves the concept of "ujima". Ujima
implies mutual assistance and reciprocity among villagers.
In the absence of technological knowhow, it is usually
practiced during peak seasons of cultivating, planting and
harvesting, or whenever a certain job needs to be done
quickly. 19 Obviously, ujima is often dictated by necessity.
The point is, however, that it is an established and
accepted principle of behaviour in the appropriate circum-
stances.

In Ujamaa, Nyerere has extended the concept of
ujima to guide the way of life of the whole Tanzanian

18. J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism,
pp. 198-199; (Cf. Mt. 4:4 and Deut. 8:3). See also J.K.
Nyerere, Freedom and Development, Dar es Salaam, Oxford

nation. This way of life is expressed economically through work. Nyerere argues that if human welfare depends on wealth created through work, it follows that work is both a right and a responsibility of every person in society who is able to work. Through work, man realizes his human potentiality by his ability to produce. In this way he actualizes himself. That is why work is a right. It is also a responsibility because through work man contributes to the development and security of the community. To refuse to work amounts to failing oneself and the community all at once. 20

Since the very beginning of the campaign for independence in the 1950's, Nyerere's rallying cry was "Freedom and Work". It was a convenient political slogan. Yet, more important than that, it was a call to self-realization, self-actualization and maturity. In one word, Nyerere saw it as a call to humanization.

Through its emphasis on co-operation and sharing in community, Ujamaa purposes to restrain, reduce and eventually perhaps eliminate exploitation in society. Yet, Nyerere emphasizes that those apparatuses and institutions designed to accomplish the goal of social justice cannot be

allowed to supersede the value of the individual person. For Ujamaa, the purpose of society and all social activity must be man, every man and all men regardless of race, colour, creed or prowess. In short, as Nyerere sees it, the purpose of creation is man. He is its centre and crown.

b. Property and Ownership

Social organization, of which community, participation, co-operation and sharing are elements, presupposes human life. Human life, in turn, presupposes the existence of material resources on which it depends. Consequently, for Ujamaa, the manner of acquisition, distribution and use of material resources condition to a large extent the nature of a society's organization in terms of structures as well as in terms of values. Involved here is the question of the manner of the ownership of property.

In common understanding, the idea of property refers to natural or created wealth or sources of wealth; ownership to the acquisition and distribution of or claim to property. In the legal sense ownership of property involves possession of resources or wealth thereof which is more or less exclusive: such and such property is mine and

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therefore it is not yours or anybody else's. I have a legal right to use, deny use of or to dispose of my property as I choose. When this right is claimed by and granted to an individual or a group of individuals, property owned is called personal or private or corporate. However, if ownership and use of property belongs jointly to the whole society, specifically, the national entity, it is called public, communal or socialized property. Ownership in this latter case is public or communal ownership.

The history of economic organization throughout the world consists mainly of what aspects of ownership of property societies have chosen to emphasize.22 In modern times, the economic systems generally designated as capitalist have stressed private ownership of capital resources. The socialist systems of economics, on the other hand, emphasize joint ownership of the major sources of wealth. In their most dominant manifestations as political systems in the West and East respectively, both appear to Ujamaa to create very serious moral problems.

Ujamaa argues that when applied to resources essential for human life and dignity, the Western capitalist

22. We say "chosen to emphasize" because there are not autonomous economic "methods and laws" apart from the decisions of the people and societies conducting economic activity.
system fails to take into account the communal nature of these resources. The Eastern socialist system, on the other hand, fails to recognize sufficiently the personal aspects of some created wealth. Man works and through work he acquires the right to claim certain property as his own. A significant degree of denial of this right may be tantamount to a denial of the very dignity and self-actualization of the human person.

For Ujamaa, the moral task is to establish a balance between the rights of ownership of property and the human meaning of the resources of the universe; between, that is, private legal rights of ownership and public responsibility for wealth and the sources of wealth. Though socialist in orientation, Ujamaa is careful to preserve the right to personal\textsuperscript{23} ownership of property. It accepts without reserve article 17 of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights to that effect.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item J. Lukacs, "The Problem of Poverty and the Poor in Catholic Social Teaching" in Concilium, (April 1977), p. 68, points out that the concept of "private" property denotes too much the "monopolistic character" of ownership which is overly exclusive of other persons. The better concept is "personal" property which, without being excessively monopolistic in tone, nevertheless indicates sufficiently the less public aspects of some kinds of wealth or sources of wealth.

\item For this document see, among numerous other places, P. Williams, ed., The International Bill of Human Rights, Glen Ellen, Entwhistle Books, 1981, pp. 3-12.
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What Ujamaa sets itself to do is, therefore, to indicate the perimeters within which personal ownership may be exercised without harming that aspect of wealth which pertains to the common good or, in the words of Gaudium et Spes, to "the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfilment".25 According to Nyerere, just as individual freedom must be situated within the perspective of the freedom of the larger social unit - and this for the sake of the greater freedom of the individual - so also must personal ownership. Personal ownership must be considered in relationship with joint ownership of basic resources if the principles of social justice and human dignity are to be upheld concretely.26

The contention of Ujamaa is that the interplay between the individual's right to joint property and his expectation with regard to personal property in case of legitimate need must assure the minimization of economic inequality and the maximization of the human dignity of all. There must be no question of extreme wealth for some and

absolute poverty for others. Attitudes of social arrogance and humiliation which these respective situations foster must be obviated. But this can be achieved only through a proper balance between joint and personal ownership, social cohesion and the struggle against disharmony concomitant with economic inequalities.27

It is important to reiterate here that this perspective of Ujamaa on ownership is also founded on traditional African culture. Anthropologists point out that in traditional African social organization tribute in the form of cattle, grain or labour is paid to the chief and elders in trust for the whole community. It is public property. In time of need everyone has a claim to it. Nyerere makes this point also.28 The political scientist C. Pratt calls it the "communitary" lifestyle of the African: he may receive a wage or exercise other forms of personal property, but when in need his brother expects a share in his property.29 In the traditional African social setting, therefore, property is personal but communal. As

27. See ibid., p. 10.
28. See ibid., pp. 164-165.
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Nyerere explains:

Personal property does ... exist and is accepted. But it takes second place in the order of things. Certainly no member of the family goes short of food or shelter in order that personal property may be acquired by another member. It is family property that matters, both to the family as such and to the individuals in the family. And because it is family property all members have an equal right to a share in its use, and all have a right to participate in the process of sharing - in so far as time has not created its own acceptable divisions. Indeed, so strong is this concept of 'sharing' that even in relation to private property there develops an expectation of use in case of need; the distinction, however, remains. In the case of family property each individual has a right; in the case of private property there may be an expectation but there is no automatic right. 30

There is an obvious scale of priorities in this structure of ownership. It flows from the African understanding of the relationship of the individual and the community which we have previously discussed. Because the individual can only exist as a person in community, his well-being would not be assured apart from the well-being of the community. Consequently, it is in the interest of every individual member of the community that the corporate body should stay healthy and strong. The health and

strength of the corporate body has as its primary purpose the assurance of the welfare of every one of its members.

This structure also forestalls anarchy and preserves order in matters of material resources. Public authorities are charged with the responsibility of making sure that all members of the community have legitimate and fair access to and use of public property. In those things that are considered personal, however, the ethic of the community, which forms part of the lifestyle of all the members, assures that sharing is effected where need be.

For a society as large and as complex as a nation, a clear structural distinction must be made between what kind of property may be owned individually and what only communally; what sources of wealth, in other words, may be left to the control of private individuals and groups and what must be socialized for the sake of the common good. Thus, Ujamaa considers certain resources as strictly public. They may not be privately owned by an individual or group of individuals. They are a gift of God granted to all human beings indiscriminately. Land, for example, as an absolute source of sustenance, may only be held in trust for the present and the future. Society entrusts pieces of it for use to individuals or groups for their own and
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society's well-being and development. By applying intelligence and diligence someone may improve that piece of land and increase its value. This improvement is justifiably personal and compensable. Apart from such strictly personal improvements, Ujamaa prescribes that land may not be considered as private property by any means. This is because otherwise, after a while, there will be two categories of people: the owners of land and the workers of the land.

The owners will live on the sweat of the workers while the workers will seldom get even a fair return for their work. "One group", as Nyerere puts it, "will therefore reap what it did not plant, and the other group will plant but will not reap anything."31 Injustice will prevail. To illustrate this point Nyerere explains:

When a lot of people accept the introduction of a method which will enable a few people to claim ownership of a thing which is actually God's gift to all His people, they are in actual fact, voluntarily accepting slavery. It is not necessary to be bought in order to be someone's slave. You can be a slave of whoever is able to rob you of the product of your labour on the pretext that you are using his land. It is not God's intention that we should use His free gifts to us - land and air and water - by permission of our fellow human beings.32

31. Ibid., p. 56.
32. Ibid.
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Nyerere argues that mere acquisition of land does not improve it nor increase its value. The value of any piece of land depends on those who work on it. Compensation for the value of such piece of land belongs properly, therefore, to the latter. Anybody who claims this compensation by virtue of land acquisition alone unjustly expropriates its rightful owners. Furthermore, to let a piece of land lie fallow on the basis of ownership, while other people have none on which to work for their livelihood, is unjust. The justification for land ownership for Ujamaa is its use.

In accord with this perception in Tanzania, the decision was taken in 1962 to make the State the trustee of all the land of the nation on behalf of the people. The colonially inspired freehold system of land tenure was replaced by the leasehold system which is more in keeping with traditional culture. The import of this is that what is part of the common heritage must be owned by all, managed by all and preserved for all.

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It is not lost upon Nyerere that the form and methods of socialization or communal ownership depend very much on the circumstances obtaining at a given time in society. For example, he explains that it is not possible to determine, without regard to prevailing socio-economic conditions, whether the economy should be organized by the central government or through co-operatives. The one essential thing in all cases of public ownership is that the selfish instinct must be reduced in the same proportion as, or to a greater extent than, effective social incentives. Recklessness and dishonesty in regard to public property are as exploitative and as detrimental to the commonweal as any other form of injustice.

Nyerere makes it quite clear that public ownership must not be used as a means to control persons in society. A State which uses public ownership in this way is fascist or dictatorial, but not socialist. Joint ownership of the major means of production in Tanzania has as its goal to protect the individual from exploitation. It is intended to make it less likely, Nyerere writes, that no one person or group of persons "would be able to hold to ransom either society as a whole, or other individuals; by means of their exclusive control of an instrument which is
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necessary for the increasing well-being of the community."³⁴ As Nyerere sees it, state dictatorship is precluded in true socialization; democratic decision making and equitable sharing of wealth are fostered. The latter are the purpose of Ujamaa.

The most prominent objective or aim of the Ujamaa system is the protection of human dignity through the preservation of the rights of man. Religious belief constitutes a fundamental aspect of human rights. How does Ujamaa view religious belief and institutional religion?

C. Attitude Towards Religious Belief

a. "The Party Has No Religion"

Nyerere has argued that the fundamental ideological stance which constitutes Ujamaa's basic attitude towards religion is that, in a religiously pluralistic society that Tanzania is, the governing bodies of society must not be founded upon, operate under the control of, or advance the principles of any particular religion. The Party has no religion; the State has no religion. These are basically "secular" realities in the sense that their task is confined to the sphere of public order. If the

³⁴. Freedom and Socialism, pp. 7-8.
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Party and the State exercise their power to bring about justice, equality and human dignity, it must be because these are of consequence to public life, not because they are primarily in the interests of certain particular religious principles and beliefs.

This does not mean, Nyerere explains, that the religious beliefs of the members of society are unimportant to the various aspects of the State. Rather, it is principally a recognition that there are areas in the life of the citizens of a State which are basically personal and do not have an immediate nor direct effect on the public welfare of society at large. These are not the primary concern of Ujamaa. Ujamaa does not concern itself with encouraging or discouraging religious belief. In other words, Ujamaa is committed to exercising political impartiality and civil tolerance towards religious convictions and practices which do not disturb public order as articulated in the law of the land. To use the words of the first Prime Minister of Zaire (Formerly Congo Kinshasa), F. Lumumba, in reference to a similar ideological stance, Ujamaa asserts that "Everyone is free to believe or not to believe, to be a Christian or not to be a Christian, to be a catholic, protestant, or atheist. Ethical principles
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recommend absolute tolerance in religious matters. 35

Nyerere clarifies this stance thus:

This necessity for religious toleration arises out of the nature of socialism. For a man's religious beliefs are important to him, and the purpose of socialism is man. Socialism does not seek to serve some abstract thing called 'the people'; it seeks to maximize the benefit of society to all the individuals who are members of it. It is thus the essentially personal nature of religious beliefs which make it necessary for socialism to leave religious questions alone as far as possible - which makes it necessary that socialism should be secular. And being secular involves trying to avoid upsetting deeply held religious beliefs however stupid they may appear to non-believers. ... Always socialism will try to enlarge freedom, and religious freedom is an essential part of man's liberty. 36

From this point of view, Nyerere argues that any socio-political system which does not allow man religious freedom enslaves him even if it is concerned with his material well-being. For there are many aspects which make up the human person and the most fundamental of them must be allowed to find expression if man is to grow to his full stature and dignity. The freedom of religious belief is a

35. "Independence, Autonomy, or Federation?" in G-C. M. Mutiso and S.W. Rohio, eds., Readings, p. 147.

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constitutive part of this dignity as are the freedoms of speech, press, opinion and association. They cannot be violated. Where one of these freedoms is missing, the structure of democracy crumbles. In the absence of religious freedom the State becomes *ipso facto* a totalitarian body of the clerical or anti-religious type; it becomes either monolithically theocratic or intolerantly atheistic. In either case, in a pluralistic society, a situation doing permanent injustice to the political and social rights of a part of a nation's citizens will be created. This argument underlies Ujamaa's attitude to religion.

Ujamaa's ideological stance that the State has no religion articulates an important distinction, therefore, between the political society and the religious communities in society. The political society is often the larger entity within which religious communities exist and operate. Since religious adherents are at the same time citizens of the State and the reverse, it is at the level of the personal religious convictions of the citizens that religious beliefs interact with the State and its institutions. It is at this level too that organized religion, in the form of institutional Churches, interacts with the State.

The level of the interaction of religious belief
and the Church, on the one hand, and the State, on the other, is not obscure and can easily be explained. Ujamaa ideology makes it clear that religious belief in any form is neither the finality of the State nor necessary for it. The State's concerns are man and the public welfare. But man and the public welfare form an essential concern of the religious finality of the believer and of the community of believers, the Church. It follows, obviously, that the Church may, and in fact does interact in various ways with the State concerning the public, social sphere because it pertains to the religious finality of belief. The State also, albeit non-confessional, may, and in fact does, interact with the Church where the public welfare demands it. To give a very clear example, Nyerere argues that it is conceivable that a religious community may physically or otherwise abuse its members in the name of religious finality. Here the State would be competent to intervene for the sake of man's social welfare. Conversely, in the event of the State's total disregard of justice and the human dignity of its citizens, the Church would be required to act to influence a change in the State's attitude.37

37. This question of Church-State relations will be explored further in the following sub-section.
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Nyerere realizes and accepts this interaction between the political society and religious belief. Making a careful distinction between them, he writes:

An individual's social living may, of course, be regulated to some extent by his religious beliefs, but these beliefs are not the purpose of his social living, even if a man regards them as the purpose of his life. The purpose of society is in all cases man, although in some cases the institutions of society will be shaped according to men's beliefs about the requirements of their spiritual development. 38

In sum, for Ujamaa, religious faith or lack thereof involves primarily the individual person. It does not affect the freedom and right of any citizen of Tanzania to participate fully in the life of the nation. 39

38. Freedom and Unity, p. 13. This is not to say, as the Tanzanian theologian C. Nyamiti would argue, that Ujamaa should accept the Christian God "as its ultimate source, foundation, goal, animating principle, and exemplar." See his African Tradition and the Christian God, Eldoret, Gaba Publications, n.d., p. 25. Translated into policy, this would turn Ujamaa into a religious system and Tanzania into a totalitarian theocratic State intolerant of other religious beliefs. This is just as bad as atheistic totalitarianism which is one of the failures of Soviet Russia's socialism. Nyerere cannot accept either of these options for Ujamaa.

39. In an interview with the superiors of the Religious Orders working in Tanzania, Nyerere noted: "Indeed, I have a little disagreement with the bishops—they want me to expel priests from the National Executive. I cannot do this; Tanzania is a free country where every
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Ujamaa considers its principles and the policies which flow from them to be first of all human principles founded on the long community-life experience of the African peoples. But as studies on Society and African religion are making more and more clear, community life in traditional Africa is inseparable from religious belief. It includes the living, the dead, the yet-to-be-born and the divinity. All of these are seen to influence each other. Underpinned thus by religious belief, community is considered sacred and transcendent. Without this religious underpinning, it is liable to disintegrate.

Apropos of this religious orientation of traditional African community L.S. Senghor, the former philosopher-President of Senegal, asserts that if we delved into the African worldview, we would find in it some remarkable similarities with the socialist philosophy:

We would learn that Negro-African philosophy, like socialist philosophy, is existentialist and humanistic, but that it integrates spiritual values. We would learn that, for the Negro-African, the "vital forces" are the texture of

Tanzanian is free to take part in politics. If the Church does not want its priests to take part in politics, that is the Church's affair, not mine! ...Right now [1976] I have on the N.E.C. of TANU one Roman Catholic priest, one Lutheran pastor, and one Anglican clergyman." See his "Interview with Religious Superiors" in AFER, 20:4 (1978), p. 205.
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the world and that the world is animated by a dialectical movement. We would learn that Negro-African society is collectivist or, more exactly, communal, because it is rather a communion of souls rather than an aggregate of individuals. We would learn that we had already achieved socialism before the coming of the European. We would conclude that our duty is to renew it by helping it to regain its spiritual dimensions. 40

Thus, even though today religious beliefs cannot be allowed to rule the affairs of the State, Ujamaa realizes that religious faith is a basic ingredient in the social fabric of the nation. For this reason alone, religious belief cannot be excluded by legislation from the life experience of different members of society without damage both to the dignity of individual believers or communities of believers and to society at large.

But there is another reason which makes religious belief important to Ujamaa. Ujamaa is not only an economic or political programme. As primarily an attitude of mind, it aims to promote a certain character in all of the citizens of Tanzania, a character of truth, honesty, integrity, respect and love. It aims to promote an attitude of human integration with nature rather than merely a depredation

40. Quoted in J.N. Karioki, Tanzania's Human Revolution, p. 45.
of resources. It seeks a form of development consistent with the welfare of all; an equitable distribution of wealth; a democratization of political power; and co-operation instead of competition. This is the National Ethic which is the heart of the Ujamaa movement.

As Nyerere explains it, no society can be sustained without an ethic, an inner character, to which that society generally subscribes. Members of a given society must have a basis upon which to determine right and wrong in their social relations. For Ujamaa, human equality and dignity provide this basis. By referring to it, the government can find the strength of will to refrain from certain actions, or the people the courage to say "no" to certain actions of their government, even though they be constitutional. No constitution is comprehensive enough. It is only the National Ethic that is the ultimate safeguard of a people's rights, freedoms and values.41

Ujamaa's main concern is with the external manifestations of this ethic of justice, equality and human dignity. For Ujamaa it is enough that this attitude, this

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character exists in social relations. It does not ask what its origins or motivations are. As long as justice is done and the human person is respected, it does not make any difference to Ujamaa whether the motivations for it are atheistic, purely humanistic or religious.

Nevertheless, it is not lost upon Ujamaa, due to its cultural foundations which are deeply religious, that religious conviction can be a crucial motivating factor in the formation and sustenance of an ethic of justice for society. It realizes that injustice and oppression flow from a refusal to accept the universal dignity and brotherhood of man. Structures of oppression and exploitation are consequences and externalizations of this pervasive rejection of the unity and dignity of humanity and they serve, in turn, to confirm and legitimate it. Here, religious belief can serve as a revolutionary factor: it can provide the motivation for rejecting structures of injustice by reminding believers of the equality and oneness of all people before God. It can act as a moral partner (or critic) of the State.

For this reason, Nyerere does not hesitate to ask leaders of the Church to "set an example of social consciousness and responsibility". He commends those who do, but says that those who act as if this is not a Christian
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responsibility are shirking their task. They are doing "the equivalent of 'walking by on the other side of the road'."42 As a Christian believer Nyerere contends that the Christian faith actualizes itself by motivating an ethic such as Ujamaa is committed to. He sees this ethic as contained in the Church's mandate to point out the need to be conformed to Christ who is the exemplar of love and justice. In short, Nyerere believes that it is part of religious belief and the Church to have a social consciousness.

b. The Role of the Church in Society

The attitude of Ujamaa towards religion and religious belief opens up the question of the relationship between the Church and politics. In other words, what is the role of the Church in the context of the Tanzanian socialist society today?

Nyerere's reflections on the role of the Church in Tanzania make the point that insofar as it shapes the orientation of society vis-à-vis the common good, the exercise of political power becomes the concern of the Church and of the minister of the Gospel. He argues that

the Church cannot disassociate itself from the concrete modalities by which society is directed for the simple reason that it is part of society. As these modalities are political-ideological options, the Church must either accept or reject them in whole or in part in the light of its contemporary understanding of the word of God on the dignity of man. Even though it is not called to provide an alternative political administrative machine itself, it is surely part of its calling and task to recognize and support those ideologies which approximate the values of the Gospel more closely than others and to oppose those which trample on the dignity of the human person.

What Nyerere proposes is a link between faith and social justice. He sees an essential relation between what faith believes and what faith does. Human dignity and human rights cannot be defended by merely enunciating

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43. Politics involves the acquisition of or the effort to acquire authority or power to govern, to erect and maintain institutions which guide or control collective living. How political power is used in the economic, social and cultural spheres determines political ideologies. It indicates whether a given society is democratic or totalitarian; whether, that is, in a given society human dignity and the common good are respected or not. According to Nyerere, this latter is what must be part of the Church's consciousness, vigilance and mission. For him, it is a fundamental aspect of an authentic Christian Church to be concerned with the respect for the dignity of man who is the temple of God.
principles. To actualize the principles of justice and dignity, it is often necessary to take political options. This way of realizing the social implications of its mission is part of the historical condition which the Church shares with society. But because political options are always imperfect, the Church must remind all political options and all ideologies of their imperfect and provisional nature. At the same time, however, it must collaborate with those social systems or ideologies which aim for a fuller human life.

If Nyerere appeals to the Church to be involved in shaping the development and direction of Ujamaa, then, it seems to be because of his fundamental concern both for the Church and Tanzanian society. He considers it an integral part of the Church's role to care for society's welfare by being the conscience of the nation. He contends that the Church must always remind civil authorities of the practical demands of justice in public life.\(^44\) It must be in the forefront of the rebellion against all conditions which stifle the integral growth of man.\(^45\) Consequently,

\(^44\) But in Tanzania, Nyerere finds it disconcerting that it is the Party which is "trying to persuade the local churches to accept this movement for social justice as part of them". See J. van Bergen, Development and Religion, p. 326.

he does not consider it an infringement of the stance that the State and Party have no religion to ask Church personnel to be involved in the various areas of the activities of the nation. On the contrary, he sees it as their duty to do so. He realizes, however, that the actual methods of the Church's involvement will be determined by the circumstances and needs of the place:

What this [Church involvement] will mean in practice will vary from one country to another, and from one part of a country to another part. Sometimes it will mean helping the people to form and to run their own co-operative villages. Sometimes it will mean helping the people to form their own trade unions — and not Catholic trade unions, but trade unions of workers regardless of religion. Sometimes it will mean the Church leaders involving themselves in nationalist freedom movements and being part of those movements. Sometimes it will mean co-operating with local governments or other authorities; sometimes it will mean working in opposition to established authorities and powers. Always it means the Church being on the side of social justice and helping men to live together and work together for their common good.46

In matters of Church-State relations, this statement could not be more radical. Nyerere's conviction in the Church's potential for good in society is so great that he sees no area of socio-political and economic life from

46. Ibid., pp. 221-222.
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which it should be excluded a priori. It does not shock
Nyerere if the Church involves itself in building water
holes in places where there is no safe drinking water or
in revolution against oppression. The only condition
(which he considers also to be the central mission of the
Church) is that it should be on the side of justice, on
the side of the dignity of man, on the side of fundamental,
inalienable human rights.

Participation in the struggle towards the
achievement of justice and dignity is to Nyerere clearly
an integral part of the Church’s reason for being. But the
motive for this participation on the part of the Church
should not be to oblige men to become Christians; rather,
the struggle for human values in faith is in itself a
process both of the evangelization of humanity in the most
profound sense of the word and of the conversion of the
Church to Christ. Herein lies the core of practical

47. On the possibility of Church personnel in-
volving themselves in freedom movements, Nyerere said to a
group of religious missionaries: "I say, supposing you
were in a country where there is colonial domination. The
people are not organized, they fear. ...I don’t mind a
nun saying to some of these fellows, ... after teaching them
catechism, ... 'what about freedom, you fellows? You are
not organizing yourselves for independence!' ... I say if
a thing is wrong and the Church recognizes that it is wrong,
then we look for what is right." See J. van Bergen,
Development and Religion, p. 326.
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Christian unity. Nyerere points it out to Catholics and to all Christians. As a Christian himself, he warns that, in the practical sphere, Christians have no monopoly of virtue. People of other faiths or of no faith at all can, and in fact, also do work in different ways to promote social justice. The Church, in particular, must not be afraid of this. It must not refuse to co-operate with those who serve humanity on the basis that they do not confess the existence of God or profess his name. For Nyerere, the service of humanity is at the very centre of the service of God. The values of Christianity must be applied inclusively of all people who enhance them. 48

Nyerere urges priests in Tanzania to involve themselves in Ujamaa Villages. 49 He feels that if priests do this, they will be more in touch with the people, with their expectations and with their pains. The priests as leaders will consequently be in a better position to enhance the attitude of integrity and self-understanding among the people, an attitude which is crucial to progress and human dignity. Because priests are among the best


49. For a discussion on Ujamaa Villages, see Chapter Four.
trained and most knowledgeable people in the country, Nyerere sees it as their duty to stimulate and challenge society. The Church itself ought to recognize this duty by heeding the imperatives of its founder from whom it gets its mission. Consequently, once, when asked what specific role the Church in Tanzania should play, Nyerere replied:

It is not for me to tell the Church what its role is! It was given its role centuries ago, from a very high Authority! It is hardly up to me to improve on that! And only the Church itself can adapt its role to the world of today - a world forever in movement. If the Church feels that it can help us, here in Tanzania, in these mundane matters, no one would be more pleased than myself.  

The solicitation of the Church to involve itself more fully into programmes for the integral advancement of society is not peculiar to Nyerere. Another prominent African Christian leader, President K.D. Kaunda of Zambia, also refers with regret to the social aloofness of the Church personnel, especially the clergy, in similar terms. The ministry of the Churches, he says, should not be limited to the Churches themselves but should extend to society at large. The Gospels seem to require this. For the clergy to keep themselves aloof from society and to concern themselves only with intra-ecclesiastical affairs

50. "Interview", pp. 204-205.
is therefore to Kaunda a betrayal of the Gospel. The new African States offer the Christian Churches an unprecedented opportunity to be a moral force for truth and justice and human dignity. But it is tragic, according to Kaunda, that the agents of Christian truth and justice are largely socially unengaged: "their talents and time are turned inwards upon their own life, giving the impression of a Christian Church which is a powerful engine, running at top speed, but driving nothing." 51

On the part of the Tanzanian official Church in general, there is a palpable uneasiness about the idea of clerical integration into village life. M. Singleton, a priest-anthropologist who worked for a long time as a missionary in Tanzania, perceives the reason behind it as being the fear on the part of the bishops "that a certain kind of church - the one to which they are most attached - would disappear were there a massive migration of missionaries, let alone local clergy, to the ujamaa villages." 52


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It is true that some priests are involved with the life of the villages, and in their 1965 document on Rules of Conduct for those engaged in the service of the Church, the Tanzanian bishops counselled priests to involve themselves more in the nation's development programmes. But, as M. Traber observes, there was no doubt that the Tanzanian situation would not be allowed to occasion any profound reassessment of the Church's modus vivendi et operandi and much less of the traditional structures of the priesthood.53

The Church's fear is that a change in the traditional ecclesiastical structures, demanded by such a profound social transformation as Ujamaa, may lead to a loss of identity for the Church. It is feared that change may lead to the Church's loss of its Christian specificity, substance and freedom. Nyerere's thought, however, is quite the opposite. He sees the Church's identity, specificity and substance more sharply defined the more it involves itself in the work of justice and human dignity.

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for the poor and the underprivileged. Such involvement not only reveals the identity of the Church, but is also its internal identification with Jesus Christ. According to Nyerere, it is imperative for the Church to make its presence felt in society's political, social and economic options.

But how about the freedom of the Church to exercise its prophetic criticism of the political and social institutions of the State? Is this freedom not compromised when the Church lends moral or material support to the ideology of the State even if the latter attempts to uphold standards of justice and moral righteousness? Would not the Church serve society better if it were neutral, that is, not opt for any political policy or ideology?

These are important considerations and they are frequently raised in Church circles. We have already pointed out, however, that as a sociological-historical reality, the Church cannot eschew ideological options. Many theologians and social scientists now assert that it is not possible for the Church and theology to adopt a "neutral" stance where important social questions of justice and human dignity are concerned. In such cases even silence is a political option. A-political stances are only nominal and can usually be identified with a specific
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political option.

The theologians and social scientists who hold this view argue that even if it is conceded that the Church's task is only "social education", as the Churches often claim, this also involves a definite political option. People are educated in some specific area, are made aware of certain situations and are encouraged to change and work towards a specific goal. All of these are not neutral or value-free determinations of the world. As Winter specifies, insofar as they involve an understanding of the basic "commonsense world of ordinary language and activity", all the sciences of man make assumptions or options which are not value-free. This is even more true in the case of the social sciences where the assumed values have political import. 54

Thus, the theologians and social scientists who consider the Church's greater involvement in social

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development to be essential propose that in reference to
the Church's commitment to social education in Tanzania,
some of the questions that must be asked are: In and for
what are the people being educated? What kind of society
are they aspiring to? Through which means? These questions
make it evident that the problem of what kind of political
programme or ideology to adopt is inescapable. The Church
has to engage in a process of ideological discernment. In
a situation of grave injustice, this process may involve
the practical, prophetic acts of private or public annun-
ciation or denunciation of institutions, systems or
policies.

That private representation by Church leaders to
public officials has its place in the Church's struggle
for social justice is incontestable. Not every injustice
calls for public denunciation. In fact, in some instances
the former method may be more effective than the latter.
Yet, it is argued that there comes a time when a public
pronouncement by the Church is necessary. This has a three-
fold socio-theological value: (1) it clears the air of any
ambiguity concerning the Church's position towards injustice;
(2) it creates an awareness of the ethical imperatives
involved in the issue denounced thus serving as catechesis;
and (3) it serves to demonstrate the Church's solidarity
with the oppressed and those struggling for justice while also engaging in dialogue with them on the demands of the Gospel. But private or public representations are only tactical questions; the central issue for the Church is that justice must be safeguarded.

J. Kenyatta, the late president of Kenya, articulated clearly what Nyerere and many other African leaders see as the essential moral responsibility of the Church in the public sphere. From a traditional African perspective where life is interrelated in all of its aspects, they consider an absolute dyarchy of Church and State absurd.

To the bishops of Eastern Africa Kenyatta said:

we need the Church and the ordinary Christian in our midst to tell us when we are making a mistake. The Church is the conscience of society, and today society needs a conscience. Do not be afraid to speak. If we go wrong and you keep quiet, one day you may have to answer for our mistake.55

What Kenyatta wanted to impress upon the Church through the bishops is clearly that acquiescence or silence by the Church or by individual Christians in the face of an inhuman ideological option by the State implicates them and makes them accountable for the consequences. In a very

obvious way, he was saying that the political reality is a religious concern.

The argument that the Church cannot marshal the relevant facts to make an educated statement on political praxis is seen by many as unsustainable in the context of Tanzania. For one thing, it has been noted how great human resources the Church has in terms of its priests, religious and laity. Some of these are in responsible public offices. But above all, in matters of justice and human dignity it pertains to the Church to show special theological competence. Its authority is the word of God which impels it to rebel against all human affliction. In Tanzania, Ujamaa is trying to alleviate this human suffering. It is argued, therefore, that Ujamaa itself can supply the Church with the relevant socio-economic data for evaluation in the light of its religious mission. This is why the Church, as Nyerere urges, should not isolate itself from Ujamaa. It should not set up alternative institutions simply to distinguish itself from the rest of society. Rather, it fulfills its social responsibilities better by integrating itself with the wider society, becoming more or less co-extensive with it and challenging it from within. As Father D.W. Robinson pointed out when he was Education Secretary for the nation's Episcopal Conference, only in
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d this way can the Church ensure "the continued existence of policies..... in conformity with Christian social principles." In a similar vein, the Catholic bishops of Tanzania themselves wrote in their 1972 pastoral letter: "Politics is a path-way of Christian commitment because we discover daily that change in the quality of our life is influenced by political action." The letter urges Christians not to be mere "bystanders" in the political life of the nation but to be fully involved in the political community. But if the community of all the faithful is the Church, then the political task pertains not only to Christians as individuals, but also to them as a community, as the Church. Founded on a culture which considers all areas of human life, including the religious and the political as fundamentally integrated and complementary, Ujamaa welcomes the participation of the Church in the integral development of the nation without thereby infringing on its distinctiveness and finality.

From all these considerations, it is easy to see,


58. Ibid.
that the attitude of Ujamaa towards religious belief is facilitated by the system's certainty about its own foundational values. These values also shape its attitude towards the other major contemporary ideologies which are founded upon and espouse different personal and social principles. Let us consider these ideologies in relation to Ujamaa.

D. Attitude Towards Other Ideologies

The contemporary global economic structures transverse particular national or ideological boundaries. The political scientist C. Ake postulates that today the world as an economy is basically capitalist. It constitutes "bourgeois" countries and "proletarian" countries analogous respectively to the entrepreneurial and working classes in any national capitalist economic system. In the global economic structures, Ake argues, the entrepreneurs are the industrialized nations of the North which use technological power as capital. The "developing" nations of the South, without industrial technology, constitute the proletarian countries with only human labour and raw

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materials to offer. The international economic relationships of despoliation of the South by the North is uninhibited by ideological persuasions. There are socialist and capitalist countries on both sides of this economic divide, but the economic relationships just mentioned between and among them largely obtain.

Ujamaa's position with regard to this international economic structure will be discussed later in this study. Here we would like to sketch Ujamaa's stance in relation to the ideologies of capitalism and doctrinaire, or so-called "scientific", socialism as they exist within given nations.

When Nyerere describes the kind of socialism Ujamaa is, he also distinguishes it from capitalism and doctrinaire socialism and defines its attitude towards them. Ujamaa, he writes, or "familyhood", describes Tanzanian socialism:

It is opposed to capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man; and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build a happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man.61

60. See Chapter Five.

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In Nyerere's view, the capitalist and doctrinaire socialist philosophies share a deterministic view of history. For the one, history is determined by market forces; for the other it is determined by materialist dialectics. But such historical predestination does not form part of Ujamaa's epistemology. For the latter, it is human will acting upon the organic environment that creates change and development and shapes history. Ujamaa, more than capitalism or doctrinaire socialism, is sustained by the hope that man and the world can be transformed. It is sustained by the faith that man can transcend himself; he can rise, as it were, from the dead. Ujamaa philosophy believes, to use the words of the Mexican theologian J.P. Miranda, that "man can cease being selfish and merciless and self-serving and can find his greatest fulness in loving his neighbour." 62 It is in this sense that Ujamaa is utopian rather than positivistic.

Economists are agreed that "free enterprise" is the soul of capitalism. In its market system wants are central to economic activity. They constitute the system's power and drive. The essential goal of economics is profit. Capital must take profit; otherwise it is not invested

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notwithstanding the human needs of the moment. In Ujamaa's eyes, to make human wants and profit the motivating force of economic life is to mistake the true purpose of wealth. Wants and the desire for profit are insatiable at any given time, but wealth is limited. Nyerere argues, therefore, that the primary purpose of the creation of wealth should be to satisfy human needs and banish poverty. An economic system which caters to wants before needs has within it the seeds of exploitation, the concentration of all power in the hands of a few and the stratification of society into classes. Ujamaa rejects this type of economic organization because, firstly, it is morally wrong and, secondly, because the people of Tanzania struggled for self-rule with the understanding that they would create an egalitarian society where all would benefit justly from their work. 63

While Ujamaa concurs with doctrinaire socialism on the need for an equal distribution of income and the

cultivation of a classless society, it objects categorically against the latter's alienating "scientism". By claiming to have a definitive answer to the questions of history, it ignores the fluidity of human ideals and the aspirations of particular societies. The task of an authentic scientific socialism is not primarily to decipher and apply Marx's writings, but to determine what social institutions further equality and the dignity of the human person in given historical circumstances. The existence of equality and human dignity are, according to Nyerere, the "hallmark" of true socialism:

When you find them you have found a society which is socialist. When you find some but not others, you have found a society which is partly socialist - or which has the elements of socialism in it. And when you find a deliberate attempt being made to build these values and organizational systems, then you have found a society which is working towards socialism.64

64. Freedom and Socialism, p. 9. Predictably, on this point many Tanzanian doctrinaire socialists oppose Nyerere. See, for example, I. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania, London, Heinemann, 1976 and A.M. Babu, African Socialism. Against Nyerere, Babu argues that "all brands of socialism other than scientific socialism are influenced by bourgeois, Judaic-Christian values; and within the framework of these values, private enterprise and the pursuit of individual selfish ends are sacrosanct[sic]. All brands of socialism other than scientific socialism accept the principle of private wealth, insisting only
Nyerere argues that Ujamaa and European socialism cannot be identical because they are responses to different sets of problems. Ujamaa derives from a recognition of unity and co-operation in the traditional African family and clan. European socialism, on the other hand, was a response to conflict between the feudal lords and the serfs during the Agrarian Revolution, and between the capitalists and the proletariat during the Industrial Revolution. Thus, even though "The destination of all true socialists is probably the same," Nyerere observes, "... the paths will be largely determined by the starting point." The road to socialism in Tanzania must be different than that of Europe, China or of other countries within Africa.

As regards the relationship between the Church and capitalism and socialism, Nyerere perceives the difficulty to be that over the years the Church has shown preference for the capitalist ideology and has identified socialism practically in toto as its principal enemy. In the context of capitalism the Church has been able to

that it be accompanied by 'social justice'. Given this partial outlook, they fail to see the contradiction in their position, namely, that acquisition of private wealth, on however small a scale, is by definition a negation of social justice." Ibid., p. 135.

accomodate itself to and operate in the most autocratic and totalitarian situations. "Yet," Nyerere notes, "it continues to be nervous about states which profess socialism; it involves itself in Party politics in an effort to prevent self-proclaimed socialist parties from attaining political power. I find this odd."

Nyerere argues that sometimes there is a deeper meaning to movements than the labels they bear. The Church must become aware of this. Superficial impressions can obscure the moral values such movements may contain. Often, for example, the Christian words capitalism may employ may not indicate Christian realities. Likewise, the atheistic words of communism may not always indicate un-Christian realities. Nyerere calls for a more profound discernment of the kind expected from the Church and theology. As he explains:

A good does not become an evil if a communist says it is a good; an evil does not become a good if a fascist supports it. Exploiting the poor does not become a right thing to do because communists call it a wrong thing; production for profit rather than meeting human needs does not become more just because communists say it leads to injustice. Organizing the society in such a manner

that people live together and work together for their common good does not become an evil because it is called socialism. A system based on greed and selfishness does not become good because it is called free enterprise. 67

As Nyerere sees it, the Church in Tanzania can make the evils of communism and capitalism redundant not merely by condemning them but by struggling for social justice. The Church must learn to think of Ujamaa in terms of historical and social circumstances in Tanzania rather than elsewhere. Nyerere describes this situation as-

a challenge to traditional (and European-centred) Church thinking, not to Christianity itself. What is required of Church people in socialist states in Africa, is that they should learn a set of secular practices and mechanisms different to a considerable extent from those of Europe, and in the context of which the Church has until now been operating even in Africa. But having learned, church people can without man-made difficulty do their traditional tasks within the African socialist framework. 68

What Nyerere is describing here is the theological concept of the "incarnation" of the Church in the local circumstances in which it finds itself. If the Church is


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to make any impact on society, it cannot do so as a foreign agent. It must do so as "salt" or "leaven", that is, it must transform society from within. A European-model Church may have succeeded in bringing many Africans into its fold; but it has not succeeded too well in appreciating the religious and social value of the African worldview. Nyerere would like to see the Church in Tanzania attend to this second task as well so as to help reverse the undesirable and dehumanizing effects of the system of slavery, colonialism and the misguided early missionary activity. He would like to see it contribute to Tanzania's renewed sense of pride in its own history and culture.

E. A Sense of History and Culture

It was noted in the preceding chapter how the tripartite phalanx of the slave trade, colonialism and missionary activity since the arrival of the Portuguese on the East African coast at the end of the fifteenth century played a major part in disrupting the traditional culture of the peoples of this region. It was also pointed out that the effects of this disruption and alienation in terms of emotional and psychological inferiority were long-lasting and, by and large, they still linger in various subtle forms among the citizens of Tanzania. It is for this reason that
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Ujamaa places great importance on both the history and the culture of the Tanzanian people. This is because both are important elements of identity. Identity is a fundament of dignity. There can be no awareness of one's self-esteem, that is, of one's worth and dignity as a human person in the personal sphere if one has no sense of one's identity. Conversely, the awareness of one's dignity strengthens one's identity. This makes possible, not only the acceptance of others as human persons deserving of dignity and respect, but is also a necessary condition for community, co-operation and sharing. Identity and dignity are a function of each other.

In the social sphere; a homeland, a shared history and culture are the most important foundations of identity and dignity. In some combination or other, geographical location, language, political organization, a shared religious belief, racial similarity, are the elements which constitute the collective social unit, that is, the ethnic or national grouping. These elements are not always stable and fixed, to be sure. They admit many variables and are flexible and shifting. They normally grow and change as they interact with one another and with other external forces. But when the external forces exert a crashing impact upon them, there results a severe crisis
and dislocation of identity and dignity.

The slave trade, colonialism and missionary Christianity had just such an impact on the people of Tanzania. The slave trade played havoc with their sense of identity and dignity. Colonialism took away their homeland and dismissed their history and social organizations. Christian missionary activity derided their religiosity, refuted it and tried at every moment to demonstrate its uselessness in comparison with the Christian religion. All three movements employed fear as a method of subjugating the people. The philosopher-theologian E. Boulaga explains that in the mind and thinking of the missionaries, (and even more so in that of the slave traders and colonialists):

The proper pedagogy for the African ... will be one of "firmness". It will inculcate obedience and gratitude. Firmness is necessary for taming the animal in the African. The African obedience cannot be one that issues from the human "rational will". These creatures are sensitive only to the subjugating values of prestige or fear - for them, literally the beginning of wisdom.69

Ujamaa's recollection of the traditional African social and societal fundamentals of culture - community,

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participation, co-operation and sharing - and Tanzania's history is designed to restore the sense of self-awareness and dignity of the people. Tanzanians, Ujamaa emphasizes, had a homeland before the arrival of the colonialists. They had their own social organization. Tanzania and its people had a history which goes back hundreds of years before the arrival of the slave traders. Ujamaa believes that this sense of their history and culture is essential if the people of Tanzania are to shed their psychological and emotional dependence on others and begin to construct a social, political and economic organization which will enhance, not only their identity, but also their self-confidence and dignity in the world.

F. Conclusion

The African slave trade, early missionary activity and the colonial factors of underdevelopment in Tanzania discussed in Chapter One can be said to have acted as "permissive conditions" for the emergence of a formal socialist ideology thereafter independence. This came under the name of Ujamaa. Informed by the whole pre-independence experience in Africa and Tanzania, Ujamaa emerged as a serious appreciation of traditional African civilization in the context of the modern world. It
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addressed itself principally to this question: What contribution can traditional African civilization make towards the construction and enhancement of a more humane social, political and economic organization in Tanzania and, hopefully, among nations?

It found the source of this contribution in the social and moral values of community, participation, co-operation and shared ownership of wealth which constitute the backbone of traditional African society. Thus, conscious of contemporary social needs and political and economic realities, it, nevertheless, retains its roots in the aspirations articulated by African culture. Its ideology and overall policy, Nyerere explains, seek to intensify and extend those aspirations and expectations towards "a position where each person realizes that his right in society – above the basic needs of every human being – must come second to the overriding need of human dignity for all". 70

Far from being an attempt to imitate European socialism or a result of the cold war between communist East and capitalist West, Ujamaa insists on its ideological originality. It repudiates the overly materialistic

70. Freedom and Unity, p. 17.
emphasis in both Eastern and Western economic organization and underlines its own humanistic character. Unlike capitalist and dogmatic socialist pretensions, it does not claim to have the total answer to the movement of history. It considers the attitude of prejudging history through market forces or materialist dialectics to be restrictive of integral human growth and control of historical development and therefore alienating. On the contrary, Ujamaa perceives itself as a movement of hope: that man can and must grow towards more freedom, more truth, a better future, a full life for all. In theological terms Goulet, for one, would liken it to a movement espousing constant conversion towards God.  

Ujamaa refuses to be a partisan religious movement, but it takes man's spiritual needs seriously. Far from repudiating religious belief, it accepts it as an integral aspect of the whole psychosomatic, psychosocial human scheme. Religion and religious belief, Ujamaa maintains, has an invaluable contribution to offer to man and society.

Economically, the thrust of Ujamaa is against selfishness. It maintains that all resources must first serve the needs of all before the wants of some. Nyerere
understands this to be also the thrust of the Scriptures and of the earliest, most prestigious and resilient tradition of the Church. That is why he is eager for the participation of the Church in the development of Ujamaa. In his view of the Church, he would certainly make his own Gonzalez-Ruiz's observation that:

the Church cannot have the same institutional relationship with a society in which personal gain is the guiding rule of social, economic and political organization as it can with a society that tries to organize the distribution of goods in such a way as to level out differences between rich and poor.72

Ujamaa sees itself to be dedicated to the task of levelling out these differences. It struggles to negate injustice and to affirm human dignity. Equality, freedom, democracy, justice and human dignity constitute the principles upon which its praxis must be based. But what is the significance of these principles as Ujamaa sees them? We turn now to this question.

CHAPTER III

PRINCIPLES OF POLICY

It is important to indicate immediately here the sense and significance which Nyerere attaches to democracy, freedom, justice, equality and human dignity in social and economic organization. These are the principles which direct the policy and praxis of Ujamaa. For Nyerere, these principles are not merely philosophical concepts; they are not in themselves eternal, universal, metaphysical "givens" from which all social behaviour is drawn as if a posteriori in a deductive manner. Rather, for him, these principles are binding ethical norms precisely because, before all else, they have been determined as normative by human social experience - that is to say, by culture or cultures over an indeterminate period of time. Nyerere sees them to be a result of what the ethical philosopher G. Fourez refers to as the (historical) tale of men and women in their interaction with each other, with the universe and with God. From this historical experience, from their birth out of the fact of human living, the ethical principles consolidate themselves into an apparent autogenetic existence. As Fourez explains, they are significant not because
of their seeming autonomy, but because of their interaction with the current life-experience of a people. As norms they embody values whose meaning informs, and is in turn expanded by, man's social living. They are, in other words, interlocutors of culture. Their understanding in practice cannot be fixed and rigid but must always relate to the life and aspirations of a people at any given moment of its history. ¹ According to Nyerere, Ujamaa's refusal to base its ethical orientation on any universalist practices of either the left or the right must be seen in this light. If Ujamaa makes the norms of democracy, justice and human dignity its own, it is because they arise from the life experience of the African people, the Tanzanian tale. And while not loath to learn from the experience of other people (because humanity is one; experiences enrich one another), it must be related properly to the experiences and aspirations of Tanzania. This is Nyerere's argument.

¹ See G. Fourez, "Liberation Ethics and Idealism" in New Blackfriars, 65:763 (1984), pp. 38-39. Fourez' article is a helpful critique of the tendency of some ethicists to attribute to abstract concepts a priori universal absolute value. Much of Vatican social teaching is especially susceptible to this error. But as S. Hauerwas tries to show in his A Community of Character, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, pp. 9-152, Christian ethics especially derives from and informs the experience of the Christian community under the living gospel of Jesus Christ. See also J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, pp. 302-303.
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He points out, further, that because of their very nature, rising as they do out of the whole complex structure of human existence, the norms of democracy, equality and human dignity do not lend themselves very much to arguments of logic. They are much more so moral imperatives. Reason alone may pull us towards personal acquisition of power and dominance, self-interest and immediate personal comfort. The above norms, born of the moral force within us, however, impel us otherwise. Even Adam Smith, himself a principal protagonist of self-interest, wrote about the theory of moral sentiments to the effect that it is the love of what is honorable and noble, that is, the dynamic self-transcendence of the human spirit, that moves us to care, not only for our own selves, but also for our fellow men within and beyond our own geographical and temporal confines. But the question is: What place do these norms or principles occupy within the Ujamaa system? How do they influence its political orientation?

A. Democracy

a. Beyond Opposition Parties

In the life of the nation, Ujamaa recognizes that

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democracy is an important instrument of justice, freedom and human dignity. Nyerere's conception of government and the State is designed to ensure democratic practice in Tanzania. He is well aware that the vision of Ujamaa alone is not enough to guarantee against tyranny over the people by those in power. He concedes that without mechanisms built within the very structures of the nation and the State, Ujamaa's vision can very easily be perverted into a dictatorial, authoritarian ideology. History demonstrates amply the susceptibility to perversion of otherwise humane ideologies, as R. Miliband has pointed out. He warns that to believe differently in the case of ideologies today would simply be evidence of an uninformed political sociology. 3 Nyerere concurs. He is, therefore, very emphatic about the necessity of democracy in government:

Government belongs to all the people as a natural and inalienable

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possession, it is not the private property of a minority, however elite or wealthy or educated and whether uni-racial. Government is properly instituted among men not to secure the material or cultural advantages of the few, but to promote the rights and the welfare of many. Therefore the many must inevitably be genuinely consulted, and the just powers of government derived from them. Government by representatives in whose selection most of the governed have no part is not rule but repression. 4

The ability of the people to periodically determine and choose their own leaders, Nyerere maintains, is an essential characteristic of socialist society. Socialism is about human dignity. A dictatorial or fascist government degrades the dignity of the governed since it allows them no say in deciding the direction of their life as a society. Thus Ujamaa, as indeed any genuine form of socialism, cannot espouse a form of government which is antithetical to political democracy. Socialism which is true to itself is an extension of democracy, Nyerere argues. It is also an intensification of the democratic ideal because it puts the resources of human livelihood under the control of all the people. As Nyerere sees it:

4. J.K. Nyerere, quoted by C. Pratt, The Critical Phase, p. 65. See also J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 91: "Freedom to choose without fear or pressure is the very essence of democracy. It includes the freedom to choose wrongly in the eyes of any particular group, or even in the eyes of history, or of God." Also ibid., pp. 74 and 143-156.
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Socialism... means the extension of political democracy to include economic democracy; it does not exist while either of these aspects is missing. The people cannot say that they control the economic institutions of their country if they do not at the same time control the political institutions through their ability to choose their own leaders. Political control and economic control by the people cannot be separated. 5

To Nyerere, it is quite clear, then, that one cannot speak of the existence of genuine economic democracy in a society where the people are politically repressed. Conversely, one cannot speak of the existence of genuine political democracy in a society which perpetuates gross social or economic inequalities. 6 In either case, economic or political democracy will be more apparent than real. It will be used, even if ever so subtly, for the political and economic advantage of the rich and powerful.

Analysing what he considers the essential


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 constituent elements of government in Africa today, the late President of Kenya, J. Kenyatta, underlines the same thing. He maintains that enlightened government in Africa must be democratic because it is only in a society where political freedom prevails that every person can develop himself most fully to serve his country and his fellow citizens. But political freedom alone is not enough. According to Kenyatta, it needs to go hand in hand with economic freedom and equality: the latter is as much a right and a constitutive element of human dignity as the former. That is why, Kenyatta concludes, government in Africa must be socialist. But, again, he warns, to be authentic, socialism in Africa, whatever forms it takes, must be "African" in the very basic sense that it must grow organically from African roots, from what is indigenous. This does not mean that it will be an exclusivistic ethnocentric ideology. It only means, according to Kenyatta, that "whilst adapting that which is suitable from other cultures from East and West, we must give our people pride and self-respect, building upon all that is good and valid in our traditional society." 7 The point Kenyatta makes here is crucial to Nyerere. Social

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institutions, whatever they are, must be at the service of a given people. Nyerere is adamant on this, to him, fundamental point. He asserts very categorically:

We refuse to adopt [wholesale] the institutions of other countries even when they have served those countries well - because it is our conditions that have to be served by our institutions. We refuse to put ourselves in a straight-jacket of constitutional devices - even of our own making. The constitution of Tanzania must serve the people of Tanzania. We do not intend that the people of Tanzania should serve the constitution.

The democratic institutions of Tanzania must therefore be made to respond to the circumstances and aspirations of Tanzania. They are not absolute; society can and must shape them to serve its legitimate hopes and aspirations. Such is Nyerere's basic approach to government.

This approach has been critical to the formation of structures of democracy in Tanzania. At the centre of these structures (as well as of international contention) is the institution of a one-party State.

Western political science and political practice identify democracy with an organized opposition to the government, that is, with a multi-party political system. Nyerere refuses to accept such an argument. There is no

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organic link, he says, between democracy and multi-party politics. He argues that it is quite possible to have several parties and no democracy as it is to have full democracy in a one-party State. The issue for democracy is really not the party system. The issue, P. Msekwa, a Party official in Tanzania has explained, is whether the people have "a decisive influence and control over the political, social and economic institutions which determine the citizen's way of life"; it is, Nyerere himself insists, whether the essential elements of democracy - discussion, equality and freedom, or government of the people, by the people, for the people - are being honoured; it is whether government attends to the common good or maximum benefit of all by actualizing the rights and duties of persons in society. The real issue for democracy, students of the African socialist systems point out, is one of accountability: it revolves around the question whether or not the leaders are accountable to the people.


11. F.M. Lappe and A. Beccar-Varela, Mozambique and Tanzania: Asking the Big Questions, San Francisco,
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Nyerere sees democracy at work in two ways. One is by the direct participation of the whole community in the decision making process. He calls this Pure Democracy. The Hellenic city-states practiced it as did traditional African communities. According to Nyerere, in traditional Africa the affairs of the community were conducted through discussion until an agreement or consensus was reached. The discussion was free and, as with all free discussion, there was opposition. But the opposition was spontaneous and was designed to contribute to the outcome of the discussion. This was democracy; organized opposition was necessary neither to its concept nor effectiveness.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{12} See J.K. Nyerere,\textit{ Freedom and Unity}, pp. 105 and 195. See \textit{also} J.N. Kariuki,\textit{ Tanzania's Human Revolution}, p. 123. Apropos this, the Secretary General of the United Nations, U. Thant, said in 1962: "The notion that democracy requires the existence of an organized opposition to the government of the day is not valid. Democracy requires only freedom for opposition, not necessarily its organized existence." Quoted by K.A. Busia, "The
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The assertion, such as Nyerere makes, that traditional African communities practiced essentially pure Democracy is often met with open scepticism by people who are unfamiliar with traditional African social organization prior to the colonial period. To what extent, it is asked, can one speak of democracy in a "tribal system" which is based on traditional authority roles? Was not the chief in this system a completely powerful decision maker, actually ruling by fiat? Is not democracy a peculiarly Hellenic discovery based on the extraordinary insight of the truth of the soul (or anthropological truth), of the understanding of the human psyche as the ground for equality? Can one say anything like this about traditional African societies?\(^\text{13}\)

To be sure, there is no evidence of a philosophical articulation of the "concept" of democracy nor the "theory" of government in traditional Africa. It would be a mistake, however, to equate this philosophical absence


13. African traditional organization based the reality of the equality of man, not on the understanding of the human psyche, but on the necessity of human community: the individual person is necessary for the community as the community is for the individual. This African basis for equality is more pragmatic and less philosophical.
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with the lack of the reality of democracy or government structures and institutions there. This existed in a pragmatic way. Scholars of some major African societies today bear out Nyèrere’s contention that democracy in many of its forms is not foreign to Africa. The Ashanti (Ghana) chief, for example, was "enstooled" (enthroned) by popular consent, he ruled through consultation with the council of representative elders, and he could be "destooled" (impeached) for any one of a number of specific reasons. In fact, it is only when the European colonialists disregarded these traditional constitutional safeguards, and unilaterally instituted chiefs beholden to them, that the chieftaincy became autocratic. For, as long as the colonial rulers were happy with him, the chief could now ride roughshod over the people with impunity. This is partly why Nyèrere abolished chieftaincies after independence.

Nyèrere concedes that Pure Democracy, such as was


15. See also fn. 3, supra.
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practiced in traditional African societies, is practicable only for small communities of people. For larger societies such as today's nation-states, another form of democracy is required. He calls this Representative or Parliamentary Democracy. Here the people participate in the decision making process not directly (as in the case of Pure Democracy) but through their freely elected representatives.

Representative Democracy, however, raises serious ethical questions which Nyerere claims are rarely addressed, it being generally assumed in the Western world that multi-party electioneering guarantees fair and adequate representation, justice and protection of human rights. But does it? Nyerere asks. Is the multi-party system in itself sufficient to uphold the common good politically, economically and socially? Conversely, does the one-party system inherently fall short of meeting these essential elements of authentic democracy?  

Again, Nyerere's debate on this issue is with the assumption in the West that only those societies which organize themselves on the basis of a multi-party system can be genuinely democratic. The rationale for this position is very well known and we shall not reiterate it

16. One-party States are generally considered in the West to be dictatorships.
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Here. We present here only Tanzania's arguments in response to Western objections against the possibility and efficacy of democratic government in a one-party system.

Nyerere argues forcefully that, indeed, in some cases, such as Tanzania, "where there is one party, and that party is identified with the nation as a whole, the foundations of democracy are firmer than they can ever be where you have two or more parties, each representing only a section of the community." 17 There are several reasons for this claim.

The first reason is that by its very nature the multi-party system is representative of factions or interest groups or classes within society. Whatever party forms the government will be representing the interests of the winning faction or class. A one-party democracy, on the contrary, has the distinct advantage of being able to form a government which is representative of the total population and which is concerned about the welfare of the nation as a whole. Here, as the Tanzanian politician W.A. Kilera argues, criticism of government policies is likely to be more genuine as it is not expected that freedom of opinion be subordinated to party expediency, or

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national loyalty to party loyalty. On the other hand, it is less likely that government will be caught up in an impasse in decision-making. Where the matter under consideration is crucial to the development of a young nation, such an impasse could prove fatal to expected social and economic progress. 18

Secondly, if multi-party systems provide for periodic selections of alternative styles of government, single-party systems which have several candidates running for election also fulfill this need. To cite Kleruu's argument once again: "In a multi-party system the voter's freedom of choice is, by and large, limited to the choice between political parties; whereas in a one-party system the voters can be given the opportunity of choosing the actual individuals who are to lead them." 19

This choice between individuals, beyond choice between parties only, is important for Nyerere. He maintains that it gives the people more direct control over their representatives and allows them to assess their


representatives' performance in relation to the nation's policy. The people's confidence in him is therefore the determining factor in the election or re-election of a representative. 20

Further, how about the contention, against the single-party system, that it restricts the freedom of political association and ideology? Nyerere argues that even in multi-party systems political parties are limited effectively to two or three. And, what is more important, there is really no fundamental difference of policy between or among them, for, if there were, you would have a divided nation on the verge of or actually engaged in civil war. But, because the differences among political parties are so trite, politics becomes a kind of competitive game to determine a winning team. Nyerere contends that thus room is made available for the strong and well organized interests of even an extreme minority of people with financial and social power to determine and control the nation's policy regardless of the fact that elections take place every so often. 21


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As Nyerere sees it, when the peoples of a nation are in agreement about the major issues confronting them and stand behind a given movement, it is absurd to seek to create an opposition for its own sake.22 It surely cannot be seriously suggested, he exclaims, that democracy is possible only if a government is rejected by a substantial number of the people.23 On the contrary, as one African politician, M. Keita, explains, if the party is a truly national movement, representing the aspirations and interests of the people, there is no reason why the State, realized through such a party cannot be democratic. This


Since its formation in 1954, TANU has had no effective territorial opposition. For all practical purposes it has been the only political movement in the country. So, when the British governor told Nyerere that Tanzania could not be granted independence without there being an opposition party in the country, Nyerere replied, "But, your Excellency, I cannot organize an Opposition to myself." Tanzania became constitutionally a One-Party State on July 5, 1965.


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implies harmony of purpose and goals between the political party and other national non-governmental organizations such as labour, women's, youth and students' organizations. In a developing country (such as Tanzania) it is important for all of these forces to co-operate together so as to achieve independence, unity and rapid economic and social progress. These are the aspirations in which the whole population shares. 24

Nyerere claims that in spite of this unity of purpose, the inner workings of a democratic single-party usually guard against the dictatorship of one or only a few party leaders. Leaders are usually mouthpieces of the party whose decisions are reached after long discussion and by the consent of the majority. Free and open discussion and disagreement on how to do things which it is agreed should be done is essential. Because they appear to have severely curbed this element, Nyerere faults the party-system of the Eastern block countries:

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They have made their policies a creed, and are finding that dogmatism and freedom of discussion do not easily go together. They are as much afraid of the 'other party' as any government in a two-party democracy. In their case the 'other party' is only a phantom, but a phantom can be even more frightening than a living rival! And their fear of this phantom has blinded them to the truth that, in a one-party system, party membership must be open to everybody and freedom of expression allowed to every individual. No party which limits its membership to a clique can ever free itself from fear of overthrow by those it has excluded. It must be constantly on the watch for signs of opposition and must smother 'dangerous' ideas before they have time to spread.25

To make the single party a vanguard party comprising only of select cadres and designed to provide hierarchical leadership, Nyerere warns, is to make the party totalitarian. His argument against a vanguard party, or even a vanguard elite within a mass party rests on his faith in the collective wisdom of the people, not principally in purity of ideology. He stresses that the party must remain responsive and responsible to the people. To him, this depends mainly on how firmly the party is organized at the grassroots, that is, in the villages in districts, and how scrupulously free debate and discussion

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within the party are preserved at all levels of society. Nyerere is quite emphatic on this point. As he puts it: "The best custodians of the people's rights are the people themselves. To expect that such rights would be safeguarded by leaders who are neither elected nor answerable to them is to leave such a crucial issue to chance."26 It is, in his view, to put the seal of death to democracy.

A further reason for the desirability of a one-party system over a multi-party system is that in Tanzania, as in almost all Third World countries, short of a virtual takeover of the economy, and therefore national policy, by foreign multinational corporations, only the State is able to mobilize the capital and manpower resources


In 1965, after its investigations, the Presidential Commission on the establishment of a one-party State in Tanzania reported: "It is sometimes argued that the party should see itself in the new context as an elite group, a minority of ideologically dedicated who provide from above the leadership necessary to activate the inert mass of the community. Whatever practical advantages it may have in terms of dynamic leadership, we decisively reject this view of the Party and its role. We find it at variance with democratic principles and, in particular, with the principle of democracy as understood in traditional African society." Quoted by I.N. Resnick, The Long Transition, p. 44.
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required to orientate the economic institutions towards the provision of goods and services necessary for the population as a whole. If the State is to do this successfully for the benefit of all, the political economist A.W. Seidman explains, the political institution must be such that it does not represent factions but the interests of all — especially the poor and disadvantaged majority.27 Nyerere concurs with this analysis.

Finally, in specific reference to Tanzania, Nyerere sees no positive reasons for institutionalizing a multi-party system. The critics of Tanzania's party-system should note, he argues, that Tanzania never had a class structure of society sharply differentiating people on the basis of economic interests. Ujamaa policy intends to avoid the formation of such structures. The only apparent social nucleus for a multi-party system would be ethnic group interests. But there are over 100 distinct ethnic groups in Tanzania. To sanction political parties along these lines would be to encourage tribalism. This would seriously hamper progress towards national unity and retard participation in the rapid socio-economic development.

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Unity and economic and social progress are the main objectives now if the people of Tanzania are to overcome the physical sub-human conditions which surround them.

Mature ethical considerations about democracy, it is Nyerere's conviction, must go beyond the petty issues of party politics and opposition parties. The fundamental aspect of democratic institutions is the free expression and absolute respect of the collective will of the people. It is upon this collective will of the people that the democratic State rests. Yet, as the country's bishops note in their 1960 pastoral letter, there is no one sole way of expressing this will: "The voters in a democracy do not always choose their leaders in the same way, nor for the same motives, nor do they always give them authority to act in one set way. There are many kinds of democracy." 28

Thus, apart from the use to which it is put, objective observers agree that a one-party or two-party system is neither good nor bad. As the Zimbabwean politician, N. Sithole, has argued, they are both capable of being put to use as instruments of liberation or oppression: "What is the kernel of the matter is the problem of

designing a system which achieves the maximum benefit for the maximum number, rather than a system which achieves the highest good for only a few. Politically, economically, and socially the problem is the same." 29

In other words, at an even more fundamental level than popular will, the idea of democracy involves a moral expression of that will. And, according to Nyerere, only a national ethic of justice and respect for man, a human act of faith in the equal worth of the other, can guarantee that moral element. If democracy is taken in this sense of a political-moral programme which respects the freedom and dignity of every citizen, and promotes the self-realization of all within the national community, H. Schneider writes, then a one-party system can be democratic. It can also incorporate those principles which manifest the Christian understanding of God, man and the world. 30

b. The Practice of Democracy in Tanzania

Universal adult suffrage irrespective of colour, sex or creed, political, economic or social status was one of Nyerere's major political platforms in the struggle for


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independence.\textsuperscript{31} That commitment has held and, by any
standards, it has worked very well under Tanzania's one-
party system.\textsuperscript{32} Beyond the periodic elections, however,
Tanzania seeks to establish structures which give people
more immediate power to determine and decide on issues
which affect their life. Nyerere considers it dangerous
for democracy to take this power completely away from the
people even after the election of a central government.
For, as the bishops of Tanzania warned in 1968, "Freedom
can be greatly endangered in practice, in spite of the
best intentions, when in a system too great power is con-
centrated in the hands of one group of people alone.
Equally it is protected by a balance of powers in society,
so that one can be a check upon another...".\textsuperscript{33}

This was the purpose of the "Decentralization"
moves of 1972. It was intended to encourage mass partici-
pation in socio-economic planning and decision making. It
provided a structure whereby the identification of

\textsuperscript{31} See, for example, among many other places
in his writings, J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, pp. 45-
52 and 75-80.

\textsuperscript{32} See fn. 22, supra for literature which
discusses and substantiates this claim.

\textsuperscript{33} Catholic Bishops of Tanzania, The Church
and Developing Society of Tanzania, Ndanda, Ndanda Mission
socio-economic priorities, successes and failures are
collective and originate from those levels of society most
directly affected. Many of the priorities identified are
conceived and planned in such a way as to be implemented
entirely through local resources, manpower and management.
Others are integrated into common district, regional and
national objectives. Thus, on the national, regional and
district levels the people decide for and govern themselves
through their elected representatives in the Party and
government. On the village and cell levels all the people
directly involved decide for and govern themselves
directly.34

It is quite true, of course, as N. Uphoff and
others have pointed out, that local organization and
administrative decentralization do not always facilitate
participation and self-determination. The structures may
be there but they may be dominated by a local elite which
is prosperous and privileged socially, or they may be
frustrated by popular nonchalance. If used properly,
decentralization is an instrument for greater participation

34. On the Decentralization move and its bearing
on intra-party democracy, see J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and
Development, pp. 344-350. See also I.N. Resnick, The Long
Transition, pp. 235-253 and J.H.J. Maeda, Popular Participa-
tion, Control and Development, Ph.D. 1976, New Haven,
Yale University, pp. 70-382.
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and equity; if misused, it may produce a form of exploitation which is extremely direct and immediate.35

It has been noted in criticism of the actual praxis of decentralization that usurpation of power by a few, manipulation or local indifference at the village, district and regional levels is evident in several areas of the country.36 And while the representative responsibilities of the National Assembly have been curtailed by the Party,37 the nature of the Party as a genuine go-between between the government and the people is yet to be fully realized. The Party is not yet what Nyerere would like to see it—a "two-way all weather road, along which the purposes, plans and problems of the Government can travel to the people, at the same time as the ideas, desires, and misunderstandings of the people can travel direct to the


36. The contradictions emerging during 1967 to 1976 between Party ideology and popular participation in political and economic decision making are an example. They are discussed by I.N. Resnick, The Long Transition, pp. 94-105.

37. See C. Pratt, The Critical Phase, pp. 208-215. According to R. Kawawa, then Second-Vice President, the Party leads the country and initiates and decides policy. The National Assembly merely assists the Government in implementing the Party's policies. (See ibid., p. 214).
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Government. Other scholars argue, however, that such shortcomings are a risk endemic in any democratic experiment. They are of the opinion that taking everything into consideration, Tanzania has in fact fared very well in the area of popular participation in government. Even before the Decentralization move, Potholm noted in 1970: "Sub-group autonomy is reasonably well established in Tanzania, and the political center seems inclined to interfere with their operation only if the institutions or groups in question threaten the system or jeopardize its primary goals. Guidance, not control, is the operational intent."  

In the controversial question of villagization, where a certain amount of coercion was applied to bring about rural change, Nyerere decentralized the responsibility for and the morality of the application of force as well. He reasoned that in this particular instance, the

38. See J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 158. In his Freedom and Development, p. 33, Nyerere emphasizes the point that "only a Party which is rooted in the hearts of the people, which has its devoted workers in the villages and the towns throughout the country - only such a Party can tell the Government what are the people's purposes, and whether these are being carried out effectively. Only the existence of such a Party can ensure that Government and people work together for the people's purposes."


40. See Chapter Four for a discussion of the Villagization Move.
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initiation and administration of coercion from within the community and for the community's benefit would be more productive in terms of the appreciation for its necessity than if it was initiated and administered from the central government. The political scientist C.R. Ingle calls this an unusually original technique. Ingle explains that in communitarian terms, external intervention by the central government is more highly morally ambiguous and democratically hard to justify. Local administration of calculated coercion as self-discipline, however, presents fewer moral questions and infringes upon no democratic principle. Rules, once passed democratically, must be enforced and observed. So also in development schemes: once a community has made a democratic decision to pursue a particular development project, everyone is expected by the same democratic community to co-operate in effecting that decision. The community infringes no democratic principles in penalizing the backsliders. Such was the practice of traditional African societies. Freedom and discipline went hand in hand. For, as Nyerere puts it: "freedom without discipline is anarchy; discipline without

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freedom is tyranny.”

But there is also the very serious question of the Preventive Detention Act, operative in Tanzania since independence, whereby a person who is (seen as) a danger to the State may be detained indefinitely without trial. Nyerere admits that the Act could lead to grave violations of an individual’s personal rights. He argues, however, that there is a conflict of two principles here which are equally valid: the individual’s right to an impartial and fair hearing, on the one hand, against those rights of the nation to exist as a cohesive entity, on the other. At this stage of Tanzania’s development, Nyerere believes that the rights of the nation must be given precedence. However, he is anxious that in time the Act will become redundant. In his own words, the question of administrative or preventive detention (i.e. detention without trial), is an extremely serious matter:

It means that you are imprisoning a man when he has not broken any written law, or when you cannot be sure of proving beyond reasonable doubt that he has done so. You are restricting his liberty, and making him suffer materially and spiritually, for what you think he intends to do, or for what you believe he has done. Few things are more dangerous to the freedom of a society than that.

42. Ibid., pp. 83, 84.
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For freedom is indivisible, and with such an opportunity open to the Government of the day, the freedom of every citizen is reduced. To suspend the Rule of Law under any circumstances is to leave open the possibility of the grossest injustices being perpetuated.43

But to him, the obverse side of the problem, the alternative for a young, politically and economically unstable nation, is equally serious:

Yet ... even on so important and fundamental an issue as this, other principles conflict. Our Union has neither the long tradition of nationhood, nor the strong physical means of national security, which older countries take for granted. While the vast mass of the people give full and active support to their country and to its government, a handful of individuals can still put our nation into jeopardy, and reduce to ashes the effort of millions.44

Many scholars concede that Nyerere's argument about the conflict of principles in this area is obviously valid. Yet, they harbour grave reservations. According to them, it would seem that even in Tanzania, only in very rare cases would an individual or group of individuals present themselves as such a danger to the nation and the State as to forfeit their right to due process. They

43. J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 312.
44. Ibid.
argue that even more serious for Tanzania, the suspension of human rights inherent in the Detention Act frustrates in a very basic way the inculcation and enhancement of a national ethic of justice and the Rule of Law which are some of the fundamental thrusts of the Ujamaa vision. Therefore, they agree with the position of some members of the International Commission of Jurists in a seminar in Dar es Salaam in 1976 that, from the point of view of developing the right, responsible and mature attitude towards human rights and human dignity, preventive detention should be dispensed with as it is "inherently more damaging to society" than the situation it seeks to avoid.  

45. "Summary of Workshop III Discussion" in International Commission of Jurists, Human Rights, p. 108. See also for suggestions of legal and procedural controls to detention, K.L. Jhaveri, "The Principles of Administrative (or Preventive) Detention" in ibid., pp. 60-63, and the seminar's "Conclusions" in ibid., pp. 113-115. Indeed, when there was a public outcry that the sentences handed down by the court to the army mutineers of January 1964 were too light, Nyerere came to the defence of the courts. The government, Nyerere said, would not interfere with the courts' decision because to do so would be "to abrogate the rule of law". "The rule of law," he pointed out, "is the basis on which rests the freedom and equality of our citizens. It must remain the foundation of our state. We must not allow even our disgust with the mutineers to overcome our principles." See Freedom and Unity, p. 299.

It is worth pointing out, however, in the interests of objective discussion, that preventive detention is not restricted to certain countries or ideologies only. On the contrary, it is a feature of a wide range of countries, industrialized and non-industrialized, under
c. Leadership and Leadership Style

Nyerere has pointed out that the survival of democracy in a nation does not depend only on its constitution and institutions. It also depends on the people, on the nation’s ethic. To establish and preserve this ethic the people’s leaders play a crucial role. They themselves must epitomize the democratic ethic of service. Ujamaa emphasizes this in its conception of leadership in Tanzania.

The Principle of Subsidiarity, along which lines the spirit of the Decentralization move in Tanzania is based, offers a basis for critique of the understanding of leadership and styles of leadership both in a Tanzania dedicated to Ujamaa and in the Church in the context of Ujamaa. 46

Communist or capitalist ideologies, with one-party or multi-party systems of government. The (preventive?) detention of some Canadian and American citizens of Japanese ancestry during World War II may be cited as one recent obvious example in the West. In the East the treatment of political dissidence as a crime against the State or as a "psychiatric disease" is a matter of public knowledge.

46. For the meaning and significance of this principle, see Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, AAS., 23:6 (1931), pp. 177-228, trans. in C. Carlen, The Papal Encyclicals 1903-1939, Wilmington, McGrath Publishing Company, 1981, see no. 78-80, pp. 427-428; and John XXIII, Mater et Magistra, AAS., 53:8 (1961), pp. 401-464, trans. in C. Carlen, The Papal Encyclicals 1958-1981, see no. 53, p. 65. All subsequent references to the English translation of the papal encyclicals are to the compilation of Carlen, that is, the four volumes covering the years 1878-1981.
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Nyerere singles out good leadership as one of the most important conditions for the survival of democracy and the success of Ujamaa. His concept and his own manner of leadership can be summarized in the exhortation he gives to civil and religious leaders all over the country: Keep constant touch with the people; be one with them. He advises that as in a family, there must be mutual dependence and reciprocal influence between the leaders and the community. These are important conditions in the dynamics of exercising authority, he says. If they are not fulfilled, the breakup of the family or community becomes inevitable. Leadership and the authority that goes with it must always be seen in the context of service. A leader is not above the people he leads; he is, as it were, only "first among equals". 47

The Catholic bishops of Tanzania think in the same

47. See J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 9 and Freedom and Socialism, pp. 136-142. See also K. Nkrumah, "Freedom First" in G-C. M. Mutiso and S. W. Rohio, eds., Readings, p. 203. Nkrumah, in the fashion of Mao Tse-Tung, similarly urged his party's leaders to:
"Go to the people
Live among them
Learn from them
Love them
Serve them
Plan with them
Start with what they know
Build on what they have."
way as well. True leadership, they explain, is the ability to help people to understand the value of following a particular course of action. When the people act with understanding, as if of their own accord, this is true obedience and a credit to leadership. Apart from this, the bishops point out, authority consists only in different degrees of tyranny and obedience becomes slavery. 48

According to Nyerere, discussion or dialogue must be a central aspect of Ujamaa leadership style. As he explains it, good leadership means explaining, teaching, inspiring, guiding, encouraging, but it also means listening and learning:

For leadership does not mean shouting at people; it does not mean abusing individuals or groups of people you disagree with; even less does it mean ordering people to do this or that. Leadership means talking and discussing with people, explaining and persuading. It means making constructive suggestions, and working with the people to show by actions what it is that you are urging them to do. It means being one with the people and recognizing your equality with them. 49

48. See their Peace and Mutual Understanding, no. 30, pp. 15-16.
49. J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, p. 61. See also p. 9.
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Nyerere is emphatic about personal character as a prerequisite of good leadership and leadership style. Democratic leadership, he points out, cannot demand the sacrifice of one's conscience. If a people's representative, he says, cannot persuade them as to the rightness of his point of view on a fundamental issue, or convince himself that he is wrong, then his duty to himself and to the people is not to sacrifice his own integrity to save his position. Rather, he must do what he believes to be right regardless of the consequences to himself.50

On the other hand, it takes strength of character for a leader to encourage criticism of policies, to recognize and admit his own mistakes as well as those of others, and to participate in the community's efforts to try to rectify them. But this is the sign of mature, confident leadership. In Nyerere's words:

Leaders are not Gods; they are able to be effective, and to serve the people, only on a basis of mutual respect between themselves and those who have entrusted them with responsibility. A person who can admit a fault, and strive to do better, is both more worthy of trust, and more likely to be trusted, than one who pretends to be infallible.

50. J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 95.
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and tries to shift the blame on to others.51

The Party Guidelines (Mwongozo) of 1971 spell out the qualities of character that Nyerere envisages in a leader who believes in the principles of Ujamaa. Paragraph 15 of the Guidelines states in part:

For a Tanzanian leader it must be forbidden to be arrogant, extravagant, contemptuous, and oppressive. The Tanzanian leader has to be a person who respects people, scorns ostentation, and who is not a tyrant. He should epitomize heroism, bravery, and be a champion of justice and equality.52

The theologian R. Pesch53 has suggested that authority in the Church concerns more the form or manner of life there than method of rule. But one must be careful


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not to make too great a distinction between "form of life" in a community and "form of rule or power". The two elements are in reality interconnected and they influence and even condition each other. This is what Nyerere points out in his discussion on leadership in the context of Ujamaa. To ensure respect for human rights, he says, a party consisting only of avant-garde cadres, would have to be a party of angels or saints. The Party in Tanzania is neither. If it is to maintain human rights and work for human dignity, it has to rely on the participation and input of all Tanzanians. We cannot, he illustrates,

lead a country as if it were a Church, with the priests and bishops of politics choosing and rejecting each other as leaders, without the believers having any chance to choose or throw out their leaders. ... Secular leaders of the people must have trust in the people; that is the only way they can be trusted by the people. A system where leaders choose themselves from among themselves rests on a foundation of mutual trust among the leaders; but it shows that the leaders have no trust in the people. 54

54. J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, p. 186. Of the Church, J. Walsh, Evangelization and Justice, Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1982, p. 50, writes: "Most of the power within the Church is concentrated in the hands of an extremely small percentage of the Church's membership. In the present structures this segment of the Church tends to act as an oligarchy, making final decisions as to who will be selected to join the inner circle.
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Nyerere's conviction in the question of leadership is that the power to direct their own lives must firmly remain in the hands of the people themselves. In a representative democracy this means only one thing: that the people must have the last word in the choice and change of their leaders. If the leadership structures are such that a leader cannot be changed in spite of the fact that he has lost the confidence of the people he leads, then those structures do not serve democracy. They become oppressive and aggravate the collective dignity of that society and the human dignity of individuals constituting it.

B. Human Dignity

Human dignity may be described as a qualitative value in individuals and groups of persons resulting from right and adequate relationships in self, society, creation and God. If, then, the life situation of any individual or group is such that their sense of worth as human persons is

In many instances this oligarchy merely duplicates itself by choosing new members who think the same as do those in the oligarchy. As a result, a structural inbreeding common to all oligarchies emerges. A single mind set tends to both prevail and perpetuate itself." Leadership in the Church in Tanzania will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter.
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curtailed, their participation in the life of society is limited, their need to create and recreate is frustrated, and the expression of their cultural feelings is subdued, there results a more or less general breakdown of human respect and integrity. This, in one word, is alienation, a phenomenon indicative of loss or erosion of the dignity of man. 55

As a qualitative value in man as an individual and as society, human dignity is fostered by, and alienation is countered through, the practical respect and enforcement of human rights. These latter are those God-given privileges which are believed to be enjoyed by all human beings, solely by virtue of their being human beings, and to be enjoyed by them equally without distinction of birth, race, class, faith, or any other physical, psychical or spiritual characteristic. Because they are God-given to all men, they may be called "natural" or "moral" rights. They largely presuppose social interaction. Therefore, they entail duties. On that account, they can be incorporated into systems of positive law, that is, expressed in clear terms of norms which regulate interpersonal behaviour. But their validity as "natural" or "moral" rights does not

55. See Australian Church Agencies, Changing Australia, Blackburn, Dove Communications, 1983, pp. 7-8.
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emanate from positive law but radically antecedes it. In other words, human rights do not depend on, and are not determined by, positive law, but, rather, law should be determined by human rights. Positive law builds on "natural" law. It is thus generally agreed that human rights are universal, inviolable and inalienable.

Human rights include civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights. They may pertain principally to the individual (personal rights of life, respect, marriage, family, work and religion), or to society (social, cultural and political rights of employment, education association, citizenship and emigration). These rights are linked and expressed in practice in different ways in different circumstances.

For Tanzania under Ujamaa, Nyerere maintains that the firm belief in the principle of human dignity and human rights entails in the very least the following practical consequences nationally and in Tanzania's international relations:

(1) That Tanzania must accept without reservation the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human rights as the basis for interpersonal and international intercourse. For in this Charter is contained Ujamaa's own belief in universal human brotherhood. This is the
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belief, as Nyerere puts it, that every human being "has an equal right to inherit the earth, to partake of its joys and its sorrows and to contribute to the building of the sort of society which he desires for himself and also for his children." Also in this Charter is contained the only firm basis for international co-operation based on justice. Only such co-operation will result in development and peace for all, without which human rights, and, therefore, human dignity on a world scale, cannot be realized. Tanzania must therefore work constantly for those goals of human brotherhood and co-operation among nations based on justice, respect and their equality as nations.

(2) That Tanzania must oppose discrimination in any form and manner, anywhere, without concession or compromise. Discrimination presupposes a diminution or denial of a person's or a society's humanity, rights and dignity. Colonialism, as has been noted, does just this. Tanzania, therefore, must remain firm in its commitment to help end this institutional form of human alienation. As Nyerere stresses:

There can be no question of colonialism continuing any longer. The colonial peoples cannot be expected to continue to accept it. And no other people who

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claim to believe in the equality of man should support the continuation of colonialism in any part of the world. Attempts to maintain the colonial status for any country can only provoke wars and conflicts in which the suffering would be shared by the colonizer as well as the colonized.57

(3) That Tanzania must continue its commitment to the achievement of African unity as a step forward towards universal human brotherhood, co-operation and peace.58

And (4) That in the ideological war between the East and the West, Tanzania must be non-aligned. The claim to complete truth in the organization of society which underlies the position of each of these sides is both absurd and dangerous. The assumption that absolute truth has been reached in any given field is inimical to man's development. Tanzania's stand is that creativity in all human endeavours is still possible and that peoples and nations can learn from one another.59

On October 22, 1959 Nyerere cast these commitments and endeavours of Tanzania in relation to the

57. Ibid., p. 150.
59. See ibid., pp. 154-155.
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preservation of human rights and dignity as moral aspirations in the following words:

"...we the people of Tanganyika, would like to light a candle and put it on top of Mount Kilimanjaro which would shine beyond our borders giving hope, where there was despair, love where there was hate and dignity where before there was only humiliation. 

...We cannot, unlike other countries, send rockets to the moon, but we can send rockets of love and hope to all our fellow men wherever they may be..."60

It is Nyerere's conviction that to be effective as practical principles of policy, these aspirations need an ethic as well as structures of human equality, social justice and freedom.

a. Man's Common Humanity

To Nyerere, an ethic and structures of equality suppose, first of all, the belief in the shared humanity of man, every man, everywhere. It is the belief that God (or Nature) has endowed every human being, without a single exception, with common essential needs for life. This means, in other words, that God himself creates every man, places him in the world according to his own eternal plan and finally calls him back to himself. From this perspective, there can be no basis for distinction or degrees of

60. Ibid., p. 72.
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the human worth of persons where their origin, fundamental requirements for the sustenance of life and their final vocation are concerned. Whether or not all the elements of this belief are capable of scientific demonstration, Nyerere maintains that it forms the "core and essence" of the principle of human equality and of Ujamaa. It is absolute and unqualifiable. Physical, mental and moral characteristics of different persons may, and actually do, vary. But these variations do not affect the basic assumption that all men share the same origin, purpose and end.

Practical policies inspired by and conforming to this assumption is one of the criteria of Tanzania's commitment to Ujamaa and, indeed, of any socialist society. In the words of Nyerere:

A society is not socialist if, in its organization, or its practices, it discriminates, or allows discrimination between its members because of their parentage, their place of birth, their appearance, their religious beliefs, or any thing other than their behaviour in relation to their fellows. The existence of racialism, tribalism, or of religious intolerance, means that a society is not socialist - regardless of whatever other attributes it may have. A society in which all men are of equal account will probably be socialist, because socialist organization is really the means by which the diversity of mankind is harnessed to the common benefit of all men. Socialism, as a system, is in fact the
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organization of men's inequalities
to serve their equality. Their
equality is socialist belief.61

For Ujamaa, policies emanating from this belief
accord with and find inspiration from the social compact of
traditional Africa. Physical differences between individ-
dual persons, differences in intellectual acumen, and even
variations in moral qualities are all recognized and
appreciated. But they are ideally employed in the context
of the community. This means, as S.M. Molema explains,
that instead of destroying the physical, intellectual and
moral inequalities among the members of a social compact,
the compact substitutes adequately for each and all of them.
Thus, for example, inequalities in strength or intelligence
compensate for each other so that the strength of some
cannot be used for the oppression and exploitation of the
intelligent or the other way around.62

Consequently, the "mutual supplementation" of
the inequalities of human qualities is, in traditional
Africa, the very basic reason and justification for the

62. S.M. Molema, "African Manners and Customs"
in G-C. M. Mutiso and S.W. Rohio, eds., Readings, p. 43.
See also J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 303, and
E. Guerry, The Social Teaching of the Church, London,
existence of society. The African theologian, P. Akoi, explains the social implications of this: "A person in possession of more or less particular aptitude may be more or less intelligent, more or less affable, or more or less attractive." But these personal qualities, outside of the context of relationships, are actually of no consequence. They are geared towards relationships, towards the social compact. "So that in the realm of truth, goodness and beauty, two men with unequal endowments will need mutual co-operation in order to realize their existential ends individually as well as collectively."^63

If this is true, if a person's life finds fulfillment in society, and if society necessarily implies the interdependence of the differences of the members of society and social groups, then Nyerere sees no basis for the often highly arbitrary labels of value attached to certain human qualities. He points out that intellectuals, for instance, are perceived, and sometimes perceive themselves, as being more worthy of dignity than peasants. According to Nyerere, the realities of concrete existence,

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63. P. Akoi, Religion, p. 181. In traditional Africa differences in personal qualities are therefore not considered ontological or absolute but historical and relative. What is absolute is the shared humanity of all in and as community.
however, do not support this assumption and actually may indicate the opposite. For when it comes to acquiring the essentials of existence — food, clothes, shelter — Nyerere argues, the intellectual, not the peasant, may find it hard to do. And certainly, without society, the intellectual will not find much opportunity to use his intellectual abilities.

Nyerere concedes that there are distinctions, which must be recognized, in the types of contribution offered by different people to the community or society. To him, however, these do not warrant distinctions in the human dignity of those people. Thus, he says, comparative labels of value of human qualities are dangerous in that, intrinsically, they tend to proportion human dignity and

64. J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, p. 28. As T. de Chardin has written, the conflict between collectivity and strict individuality of men is not fundamental. Fundamentally, it is "only in appropriate association with his fellows that the individual can hope to attain to the fullness of his personality, his energies, his power of action and his consciousness, more especially since we do not become completely 'reflective' (that is to say, 'men') except by being reflected in each other. Collectivisation and individualization (in the sense of personality, not of social autonomy) are thus not opposed principles. The problem is so to order matters as to ensure that human totalization is brought about, not by the pressure of external forces, but through the internal workings of harmonization and sympathy". Or, in Nyerere's words, through an "attitude of mind". See T. de Chardin, The Future of Man, London, Collins, 1964, pp. 201-202.
human rights on the basis of classes in the economic, political and social realms. But their necessity for human existence and integral social development is the true basis for the value of human qualities. And this is not easily susceptible to gradation. For, once again, inequalities of human qualities find their proper role in the service of human equality and solidarity. This makes for true fraternity and implies reciprocity and mutuality, not master-servant, patron-client relationships between persons or social entities.

In view of the necessity and reality of variations of individual qualities which contribute to the viability of society, equality, almost by definition, cannot be taken to imply uniformity. Nyerere perceives it to mean unity fostered by a firm recognition humanity's one sacred "life-force" and the rights that are proper to it. Every human being and every social entity have an inherent need of this recognition of their humanity and rights even if it may not be clearly articulated. Among other structural inequalities, economic disparity disregards this need and fosters alienation in society by undermining mutuality and encouraging acquisitiveness. Economic disparity is to Nyerere an enemy of human equality:
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By introducing the possibility of hoarding wealth through money, by encouraging the acquisitive instinct in man, and by basing social status on material wealth...[the] economic inequalities between men become so great that man's basic equality is imperceptibly transformed into a merchant and client relationship. It is then impossible for all members of the society to discuss together as equals, with a common interest in the maintenance and development of society. The common interest has been at least partially replaced by two interests, those of the 'haves' and those of the 'have-nots'. The unity of society has been weakened because the equality of its members has been broken.

When the acquisitive instinct is taken as an essential, inviolable quality of man's life in society, Nyerere argues, man's inequality in strength and skill will inevitably be used by some to exercise control over others. One way this can be done is for some to acquire almost absolute control of those resources to which all men must have access so as to realize their humanity. Those excluded from this control have their human dignity diminished, both because their access to even the most essential resources is restricted and controlled by others, and most importantly because their equal participation in the social compact is eliminated. They can only participate according

65. J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, pp. 11, 17. See also Freedom and Socialism, p. 341.
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to the (in human and Christian terms) perverted relationship of slaves and clients, of masters and patrons.

"Faith can move mountains" is, according to Nyerere, a statement of man's power to create, to improve himself and the world, to become more and more like God, his Maker. He contends that this power is a gift given to everyone in different ways and manifestations. It has to be developed and realized through confidence in oneself as a human being, a recognition of other people's equal basic humanity and worth, and a readiness to cooperate with them reciprocally for the sake of personal and social growth.66

"So in choosing to make the essence of man the striving for [individual] possessions," Professor C.B. Macpherson also points out, "we make it impossible for many men to be fully human. By defining man as an infinite appropriator we make it impossible for many men to qualify as men."67

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66. See J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, p. 44. In Freedom and Unity, p. 76, he makes the same point in more pragmatic terms: "As a matter of principle we are opposed, and I hope we shall always be opposed, to one country ordering the affairs of another country against the wishes of the people of that other country. Equally we are opposed of the idea of a small minority in any country appointing itself as masters of an unwilling majority" through political, economic or social power.

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Gaudium et Spee observes that the desire we have previously indicated for social, economic and political equity among individuals and nations, that is, the need for every person to live in dignity as befits the advances of the present century, dictates the thrust of events today. To realize this desire, Ujamaa subordinates the economic order to the political so as to assure the satisfaction of the proper hierarchy of human needs. It says that it endeavours to be a system which organizes society in such a way that the different needs, aspirations and values of all are taken into consideration. It tries to be a system which gives priority to those needs which are most urgent but without disregarding any others. In Tanzania, the most urgent needs are still, as Sirach 21:29 enumerated them so long ago, water and food and clothing and a house for the sake of privacy.

In a sense, Nyerere sees the struggle in Tanzania to be the establishment of the rights emanating from these needs. The fight against disease, ignorance and poverty is at the centre of this struggle. To be able to bring

68. See no. 9, pp. 206-207.
69. J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, pp. 11-12.
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these factors under control where the whole of Tanzanian society is concerned, is to enhance its capacity of being well fed, clothed and housed. It is to enhance its dignity.

As far as Nyerere is concerned, in absolute poverty, debilitating disease or extreme ignorance there is little human dignity. There is no question in his mind about that. But neither is human dignity respected in a society where wealth, knowledge or food are given more importance over the human person they are meant to serve. If, for example, the pursuit of wealth does not serve human equality, then, from the perspective of Nyerere, it is inimical to human dignity. Gaudium et Spes has also made this point. As it puts it, of supreme importance to human dignity are not philosophical or technical advances per se, but these as they serve human equality. What men do "to obtain greater justice, wider brotherhood, and a more humane ordering of social relationships," the Council observes, "has greater worth than technical advances."70

In the proper order of things, human dignity and social equality must be given priority in the process of true integral human progress. To Nyerere this is crucial.

70. Gaudium et Spes, no. 35, p. 233.
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Consequently, what Ujamaa objects to in the strict market economies, at least in the Tanzanian situation, is that they erode the principles of sharing and shared labour, and thus also mutual respect and interdependence, which are the backbone of African cultural ethnic life. They encourage individualism rather than a spirit of community, acquisitiveness instead of sharing, and competition instead of co-operation. Further, these systems tend to take differentials in economic levels in society for granted as correct. But economic differentiations, Nyerere argues,

...lead to social differentiation and attitudes supporting inequality. They encourage the attitude of mind where groups of specialized wage-earners, whose services we need, claim more pay because of the comparative incomes of other specialized groups whose society they aspire to join. It does not seem to happen that anyone compares himself with those at the bottom of the economic level.71

71. J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 17. In a recent encyclical, Laborem Exercens, AAS 73:9 (1981) pp. 577-647, trans. in C. Carlen, The Papal Encyclicals 1958-1981, nos 22-27, pp. 303-304, John-Paul II emphasizes that there is absolutely no moral justification for classifying the human worth of people on the basis of the type of work they do. The human person who performs the work gives it value and dignity and not the other way around. Because man works and injects his humanity into work, it ennobles him and helps him to realize his humanity as co-creator with God, that is, as image of God. The final agent and purpose of work is man as human. See also for a good commentary on this encyclical, G. Baum, The Priority of
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Income differentials beyond a certain point cannot be conducive to any conception of human equality, Nyerere contends. For it means that because they acquire the economic power in society, the few people with special skills can also appropriate to themselves a disproportionate share of society's resources. By this very fact, they usually control the life of the unskilled majority. 72 R. Miliband, the English political scientist we have cited earlier, says of the strict market economic systems that:

Political equality, save in formal terms, is impossible in the conditions of advanced capitalism. Economic life cannot be separated from political life. Unequal economic power, on the scale and of the kind encountered in advanced capitalist societies, inherently produces political inequality, on a more or less commensurate scale, whatever the constitution may say. 73


72. In Tanzania, Nyerere adds, "This happens despite the fact that these skills were acquired as a result of the communal effort of society, when it provided scholarships or built and maintained our own secondary and technical schools and our university." See his Freedom and Unity, p. 17.

73. R. Miliband, The State, p. 237. As we saw above, in Sect. A (a) of this chapter, Nyerere also notes this.
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According to another social scientist, D. Hollenbach, moral priorities and the advancement of human dignity and human rights require that the needs of the poor, the freedom of the oppressed and the political participation of the marginalized should have priority over the wants of the rich, the liberty of the powerful and the preservation of the status quo in any social structures. 74 Similarly, Gaudium et Spes 75 would like to see greatly reduced the prevailing economic inequality between employers and employees, urban and country dwellers, industry and agriculture and rich and poor nations. According to the Council, economic as well as political and social rights are and must be seen as universally valid because human dignity is universal. This is the whole point of Ujamaa and its structures of justice: if the human dignity of some is infringed upon or denied through moral or structural 76 disrespect of their human rights, the

74. See D. Hollenbach, Claims in Conflict, New York, Paulist Press, 1979, p. 204.

75. See no. 63, pp. 271-272.

76. Moral and structural, individual and social rights may be distinguished for philosophical purposes, but they cannot be separated as they are lived. J. Moltmann explains it in this way: "The rights of persons can only be developed in a just society, and a just society can only be developed on the ground of the rights of the person. The freedom of the individual can only be constituted in a free
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human dignity of all is diminished. This follows from the fact of man's shared origin and purpose. Universal personal identity and universal social responsibility are the only grounds for the affirmation of a universal humanity. Many theologians note that when the Christian faith asserts the struggle for and the advent of the fulness of human life, it asserts the same human dignity advanced and protected by the affirmation of human rights. Both in the practical and theological order of things, this is the pathway towards the fulness of life of all human beings.

b. The Crime of Racism

The practical denial of the common humanity of man, resulting in the diminishment of human dignity, finds one of its most radical and sinister expressions in the ideology of racism. Nyerere calls this ideology and its consequent policies the ultimate "crime of the world": the treatment of some people by others as if they were animals and not human beings.??

77. See J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 129.
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Studies on the psychology and sociology of racism indicate that it is based on the assumption that one's race or skin pigmentation determines the human, and therefore the social, economic and political value of a person or a group of persons. A racist assumes that one's race categorizes one as a superior or inferior human being, more human or less human. As a rule, he assumes also that the race categorized as superior has the right of limiting or taking away the freedom of the race categorized as inferior. And so the latter is usually excluded from political power and denied social and economic equality.

To Nyerere, what makes racism more sinister and illogical than even religious or ideological discrimination is that race is not a matter of personal choice. For, whereas the choice of ideology or religion is voluntary and can be changed, no one chooses the colour of his skin, nor can he do anything to change it. A person who is degraded and humiliated because of his race or colour, something which he has received from God and over which he has no control, is actually being humiliated because he exists. To affirm his existence, he may have no option but to fight the oppression with whatever means available to him and with all the strength he can muster. But such struggle, which can be very tragic, prevents all concerned from
living a full life and offering positive contributions for human progress. However, it is a necessary struggle for there can be no true harmony without the acceptance of the principle of the equality of man, regardless of race.\textsuperscript{78}

According to Nyerere:

As long as one community has a monopoly of political power and uses that power not only to prevent the other communities from having any share in political power, but also to keep those other communities in a state of social and economic inferiority, any talk of social and economic advancement of the other communities as a solution of racial conflict is hypocritically and stupid. The solution of the problem of racial conflict must depend upon the acceptance by all the communities concerned of the principle of social, economic, and above all, political equality.\textsuperscript{79}

Of immediate concern for Ujamaa in this matter is the racist "Apartheid" ideology of South Africa. Nyerere is very firm that there can be no compromise with Apartheid, either politically or morally. He argues that the only moral stance for any individual or nation which values the dignity of every human being is to condemn it and to proceed to do everything to defeat it.\textsuperscript{80} For him, the whole

\textsuperscript{78} See \textit{ibid.}, pp. 128 and 228.

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{80} See \textit{ibid.}, pp. 109-113.
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world is implicated in Apartheid: for, the non-white peoples of South Africa are either human beings or they are not. It would be very hard to assert that they are not. But if they are members of the human race, then they have a right to freedom and dignity precisely because the human race claims this right for itself. Conversely, if they do not have the right to freedom and dignity, no one else has.81

Nyerere's stance is that the peoples of South Africa who suffer under the Apartheid ideology cannot be condemned, least of all for infringing Christian principles, for struggling to acquire their freedom and dignity. Rather, the world community has not only the vested interest, but also the moral responsibility to come to their aid so that another forward step can be taken towards the affirmation of humanity.

There can be no reason big enough to justify the crime of racism. On this Nyerere is adamant. When Tanzania broke diplomatic relations with Britain in December 1965 over the question of British inaction concerning the racist policies of its then legal colony, Rhodesia, there were racial feelings against the white people in

81. See J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, pp. 206-211.
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Tanzania. At that time Nyerere warned: "If there were to be even one person among us who used this time as an excuse to indulge in racialism directed against white people residing here, that would be a betrayal of our country and the cause we are fighting for."\(^{82}\) He meant the cause of non-racism and human brotherhood which forms the basis of the Ujamaa system.

Nyerere argues that even in Tanzania's struggle against capitalist organization, any type of racism or discrimination which infringes upon human rights will effectively deny it its claim to socialism. He maintains that Ujamaa concentrates on the value of issues, not the intrinsic worth of people. In fact, the issue of greatest value for Ujamaa is the equal intrinsic worth of all people. Thus, if Ujamaa opposes Apartheid, it is not to deny the human worth of the proponents of that ideology but to affirm it through, and together with, the humanity of all other South Africans (indeed, of all men) by frustrating the racist ideology. Similarly, if Ujamaa opposes capitalist social organization, it is not because capitalists are "devils". To dislike the capitalist system is one thing; to deny capitalists their intrinsic worth.

\(^{82}\) Freedom and Socialism, p. 132.
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as human beings is quite another:

We have to recognize in our words and our actions that capitalists are human beings as much as socialists. They may be wrong; indeed by dedicating ourselves to socialism we are saying that they are. But our task is to make it impossible for capitalism to dominate us. Our task is not to persecute capitalists or make dignified life impossible for those who would be capitalists if they could.83

Nyerere sees it as a major responsibility of any socialist government, and especially the Tanzanian government under Ujamaa, to diffuse any attempt to categorize people for the sake of discrimination. Very early in his political career he pledged to do all he could to make Tanzania into a state which accepts and treats all its citizens on an equal basis. Regardless of colour or race, it is Nyerere's conviction, every Tanzanian citizen deserves all the rights and privileges which are accorded to any other citizen. The determining factor is everyone's humanity and, in this case, their citizenship.84 Thus, in arguing for the ratification of universal adult suffrage regardless of colour, wealth or education in the Legislative Council on December 16, 1959, he declared:

83. Ibid., p. 259.
84. See J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, pp. 37 and 117.
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Our position is based on the belief in the equality of human beings, in their rights and their duties as human beings, and in their equality as citizens. We believe that only a wicked man can make colour the criterion of human rights. Here we intend to build a country in which the colour of a person's skin or the texture of his hair will be as irrelevant to his rights and his duties as a citizen as it is irrelevant to his value in the eyes of God. 85

The belief of Nyerere that God created all men in his own image and likeness means that from this basic origin and similarity all men claim the same dignity and respect. In the socio-economic sphere, he sees this to be actualized through the practice of justice.

85. Ibid., p. 76. He went on to say, addressing the Speaker: "Sir, let it not be said by posterity that we were a bunch of hypocrites. Let not the world point a finger at us and say that we gained our freedom on a moral argument - the argument of the brotherhood of man - and then threw that argument overboard, and began ourselves to discriminate against our brothers on the grounds of colour. I pray, sir, that Almighty God will save us from committing such a sin against His justice. We have set ourselves a goal. We intend to create a society here happy for everybody. ... I repeat, sir, that that responsibility is ours, the responsibility for ensuring that the future is going to be a future of building in this country a society which is based on a moral ethic - an ethic which enables every man and woman in Tanganyika to say 'For us in Tanganyika that will never do,' and I hope, sir, that within that ethic, within the 'dons'ts' of our future society, one of the 'donta's' will be that we don't discriminate on the ground of colour." Ibid., pp. 79-80.
c. The Priority of Justice over "Charity"

Charity and love are, of course, important and necessary human virtues or values. But a certain kind of "charity", "kindness" or "love", which prevails in structural situations of injustice, is antithetical to human dignity. It is a form of charity that kills. By cushioning and absorbing the most drastic consequences of these structures of injustice in terms of their cost in human suffering, such charity leaves them intact and even perpetuates them. For, in many cases, it is those who benefit from the unjust structures who are in the forefront, because in a position, to dispense this charity or "aid". Intentionally or otherwise, much of the charity or aid of many relief organizations, and especially much of what is called "international aid", falls within this category of false aid and perpetuates injustice. Nyerere has frequently voiced this concern.

His belief is that if social structures are unjust, charity cannot restore justice. Injustice primarily calls for the restoration of justice, not charity. It primarily calls for a restructuring of political, social and economic institutions in view of fostering more equal and just relationships. In the present circumstances, it means that there should be created structures which
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facilitate the transfer of resources to the poor without involving them into all forms of psychological slavery and humiliation. As Nyerere put it to the Royal Commonwealth Society in London on November 21, 1975: "it is not right that the vast majority of the world's people should be forced into the position of beggars, without dignity." 86

This, he explained, is the case because of the cause-effect relationship between wealth and poverty: "In One World, as in One State, when I am rich because you are poor, and I am poor because you are rich, the transfer of wealth from the rich to the poor is a matter of right; it is not an appropriate matter of charity." 87

For Nyerere and Ujamaa, therefore, it is not accidental that there are poor people and nations. Poverty is a function of structures in society. The poor exist because society is so (dis-)ordered as to make possible the existence of the rich, and the reverse. The poor are


87. Ibid. In Arusha Declaration - Answers to Questions, Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1967, p. 12. Nyerere explains this point further: "If one man is sitting on top of a pile of maize, while another is grubbing for roots because he doesn't have any, then it would certainly be right to pull some of the maize out from the pile of the first in order that the second may have a decent meal."
made poor. 88 As the American ethician and social scientist D. Goulet explains, in a competitive economic system, poverty and affluence are necessary sides of the same coin. One side depends upon and sustains the other. That is why poverty is maintained domestically even in affluent societies and internationally in an affluent world. The competitive framework requires the existence of both, so that no matter how high the GNP and per capita income are, relative poverty and its attendant problems remain substantially unattended to and therefore unresolved.

Paradoxically, Goulet explains, the system makes

88. See also A. Weston, "Poverty: The Christian Response" in New Blackfriars, 54:640 (1973), p. 390. It is consistently argued by the rich that the poor are "that sort of people" and that "they are always with us". Their own conduct - which may be genetic, environmental or freely chosen - keeps them poor. In each case, there is no moral responsibility on the part of society to compensate the poor for any of these situations. See M. Lipton Why Poor People Stay Poor, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1977, p. 82, for a summary of the argument.

J.K. Galbraith argues, in response, that if it is acceptable that case poverty - that is, the poverty of an isolated individual or individuals can be attributed to disease, mental deficiency or even laziness, it is not acceptable to explain away insular poverty - that is, the poverty of a community within a nation or a nation or group of nations in the world by their alleged inherent deficiencies of some kind or other. The factor at play in this latter case is exploitation. See his The Affluent Society, New York, Mentor Books, 1958, pp. 252-254. See also E. Tamez, Bible of the Oppressed, Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1982, pp. 41-55 and L. M. Paton, ed., Breaking Barriers - Nairobi 1975, London, SPCK, 1976, p. 122 et passim.
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the poor themselves privy to the maintenance of status quo. Domestically, they are unwilling to attack the inherent injustices of the system and change it because they themselves aspire to the affluence of the affluent in their midst. In worldwide terms, they resent and reject the demands of the "underdeveloped" nations for justice because somehow they realize that their own absolute affluence at home depends on these nations remaining sources of cheap raw materials and as markets for their countries' manufactured goods. 89

This is precisely what the former president of the World Bank, E. Black, meant when he said that the purpose of "aid" is to create markets for the goods of the donor countries; to open up investment areas for their companies; and to facilitate the free enterprise system. 90 These were also the thoughts of the American J. F. Dulles in 1958 91 as they were of the United States former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, H. Kissinger. For Kissinger there could only be a "vertical interdependence"


91. See Ibid.
between the poor and the rich. The U.S., he said, can distribute some of its vast wealth through fair trade, but only to the extent that it retains its position as the number one economic power. What this means in actual fact, according to J.B. McGinnis, is that Kissinger could not envisage a genuine international "horizontal relationship", an interdependence among genuinely self-reliant nations. Kissinger's reluctance to redistribute power, which is implied in a genuine redistribution of wealth, means also a reluctance to transform unjust structures and institutions whose operation benefits the wealthy at the expense of the poor.  

92. See J.B. McGinnis, Bread and Justice, New York, Paulist Press, 1979, pp. 301-305. Thus G. Arnold can write, with justification, that in the international sphere, more often than not, "aid is a political game. The aid business continues to grow and even though more aid is given, and transfers of resources grow larger, little or no change takes place in the condition of the recipients. Aid appears less and less to achieve any development breakthroughs: recipients need it to survive; and donors give it to purchase footholds or secure interests. So while the game continues at government level the bulk of the people, for whom the process supposedly exists, are no better off and their economic condition frequently deteriorates. Indeed it may be argued that a good deal of instability results from development inputs. Aid, more than anything else, is breeding new colonial attitudes on the part of the recipients. Moreover, as long as recipients insist that development must mean becoming more like the industrialized donors, this dependence will grow." G. Arnold, Aid in Africa, London, Kogan Page, 1979, p. 24. We will discuss this question further in the following chapter.
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The road to justice, Nyerere claims, requires change of structures of injustice. It demands, as D. Roche, a former Canadian member of Parliament, also points out, adjusting the desires of some to the needs of others. It requires a sharing of the world’s resources to meet the basic needs of all.93 For, according to the moral theologian D. Maguire: "Need is of primatial concern to justice, because meeting the essential needs of persons is the active affirmation of their worth. Denial of essential needs is a negation of human worth. Worth gives need its justice credentials."94 It is in the context of the transformation of structures and transformation of people that authentic charity finds its true expression. Such is Nyerere’s stance:

d. The Authentic Meaning of Charity

P. Freire, the well known educator of the poor and oppressed, defines true generosity as the struggle against the causes and conditions which necessitate "false charity". People must be enabled to work for themselves, to create, to transform their environment. This is true

93. D. Roche, Justice Not Charity, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1976, p. 120.

charity, the charity that endeavours to eliminate the conditions which force individuals or entire peoples to extend trembling hands in supplication.95

True charity, as Freire sees it, liberates unto freedom making individuals and peoples take charge of their own integral development. It seeks to promote the independence and dignity of the recipient, not to turn him into an object of further charity. For Freire: "The important thing is to help men (and nations) help themselves, to place them in consciously critical confrontation with their problems, to make them the agents of their own recuperation."96 This also is the political pedagogy of


"Assistencialism" is used in Latin America "to describe policies of financial or social 'assistance' which attack symptoms, but not causes, of social ills. It has overtones of paternalism, dependency, and a 'hand-out' approach. It contrasts with 'promocionalismo' which, on the contrary, 'promotes' people to a state of vigorous self-capacity to solve their own problems." Compare 'promocionalismo' with Ujamaa's foundational aspect of 'participation' (Chapter Two, supra) or its policy of 'self-reliance' (Chapter Four, infra).

I.W. Moomaw cites the Talmud as saying, quite as
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Nyerere and his conception of genuine help as liberation of the poor. He argues:

The men who are now suffering from poverty, whether they are in the Third World or in the developed world, need to be helped to stretch themselves; they need to be given confidence in their own ability to take control of their own lives. And they need to be helped to take this control, and to use it themselves for their own purposes. They need their uhuru [freedom, liberty], and meaningful uhuru.97

This process of liberation is of profound double practical and theological significance. On the one hand, as Nyerere points out, "until men are in a position to make effective choices, few of them will become Christians in anything but name. Their membership in the Church will be simply another method by which they seek to escape from a consciousness of their misery."98 As he sees it religion, in this case, becomes, in a real sense, an opiate for the people. On the other hand, as the missionary sociologist C. Boom notes, love or charity that helps the recipient to

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Nyerere views it, that "The best charity is to prevent a man from having to accept charity; the best alms are those that enable a man to dispense with alms." See I.W. Moomaw, To Hunger No More, New York, Friendship Press, 1963, p. 56.


98. Ibid.
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take possession of his own life and become one's equal is much more sincere and pure. Charity which puts the recipient under obligation to thank you, to look up to you, runs the risk of dehumanizing both the giver and the recipient. 99

Nyerere proposes that Christian charity or aid must not seek to maintain a social, economic or political system acceptable to the donor. Rather, it must seek to foster an environment of dignity and self-determination. Empathy and co-operation to overcome the causes of poverty are the key elements here. This means that people must share all the gifts of God on the basis that all are children of God and "members of one another". 100 In international relations, especially, Nyerere urges, the most important criterion for genuine aid entitlement must be the human need of the poor. He warns: We all live in

99. C. Boom, "The Christian", p. 56. On the sometimes degrading strategies used by "aid" agencies to collect funds in the donor countries, see L. Hollon, "Selling Human Misery" in The Christian Century, 100:31 (1983), pp. 968-971. By highlighting the obvious and superficial - e.g. "the starving-baby syndrome" - they generate paternalism and reduce human beings to objects of pity. At the same time, they ignore the more important national and international injustices which are the root causes of the situation.

100. J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, p. 221.
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one world; there can be no true international partnership, which is essential for peace on our planet, if the few who are privileged deny the underprivileged a share in the world's prosperity. In a situation of established injustice, violence is inevitable. In Nyerere's view: "The rich nations will either accept the principle of international equality and move in that direction, or they will have to control the poor nations by force." In the final analysis, social justice and authentic charity are in the self interest of all.

Nyerere's conception of Ujamaa is to try to realize the practical demands of justice and human dignity in Tanzania by constructing structures of justice and by fighting those forces which inhibit the growth of the human person. Among the latter are poverty, ignorance and disease.

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e. *The Tanzanian Situation*

The most urgent "war" Ujamaa has set upon itself to wage is against Tanzania's most crucial enemies of poverty, hunger, illiteracy and disease. These are "enemies" not merely in a symbolic sense, but in a very real sense in that in Tanzania they contribute to the needless suffering and death of thousands of people every year. They severely limit the capability of people to actualize themselves as human beings. Because of this, people become absolutely poor. E. Mveng, an African theologian, calls this "anthropological poverty". Human beings are despoiled, he says, "not only of what they have, but of everything that constitutes their being and essence — their identity, history, ethnic roots, language, culture, faith, creativity, dignity, pride, ambitions, right to speak...". 102 As the well-known English playwright and

102. E. Mveng, "Third World Theology - What Theology? What Third World: Evaluation of an African Delegate" in V. Fabella and S. Torres, eds., *Irruption of the Third World: Challenge to Theology*, Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1983, p. 220. A. Barreiro, *Basic Ecclesial Communities: The Evangelization of the Poor*, Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1982, p. 15, notes that "the biblical concept of the poor includes all categories of the unfortunate, neglected people who are suffering and weeping because of their social inferiority; the feeble, weak members of society, who feel and who really are defenceless, helpless, and unprotected; those who have neither a voice nor an opportunity in society."
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essayist B. Shaw put it, the objection to this kind of poverty is not primarily that it causes dissatisfaction and unhappiness but that it dehumanizes man. There is more to the humanity of man than mere happiness, which even an animal can achieve. Man needs a chance to actualize and thus realize himself through creativity. 103

In the Old Testament rash (pauper), čal (lean, weak), ebion (beggar), and most frequently ani/ana (bowed and broken, downtrodden, humiliated) can all describe Jesus's anthropological poverty. Ptochos in the New Testament indicates indigence calling out for help. In the history of Israel, all of these terms acquired a religious significance as well. The poor are not only indigent, they are afflicted before God; the ana'reim are not only bowed, they are those who trust in God, everything notwithstanding. See ibid., pp. 14-20. See also on the Scriptural vocabulary of poverty, E. Tamez, Bible of the Oppressed, pp. 155 and G. Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, pp. 291-299.

103. The Intelligent Woman's Guide, p. 75. Bishop J. Blomjous, formerly of Mwanza, Tanzania, warns that an essential distinction has to be made between the evangelical virtue of poverty and the socio-economic state of poverty. The former is a voluntary response to a call to renounce to whatever extent material goods for the sake of witnessing to the Reign of God. As such it is a theological value to be preserved even in its different expressions in the Church. In fact, the Church as a whole is called to witness this way to God's Reign. So, although the virtue of poverty and the socio-economic state of poverty are distinct, they are interrelated in that one is a negative statement on the other. Divesting oneself of material wealth for the sake of God's Reign is a condemnation of absolute mass poverty and the idolization of money. "Evangelical poverty constitutes the fundamental Christian attitude towards wealth and secular development; hence it is the basis for the fight against human socio-economic poverty and misery." See J. Blomjous, "The Church in a Developing World" in Cross Currents, 20:3 (1970), p. 299.
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Ujamaa pursues the policy of self-reliance as a weapon against this comprehensive poverty in Tanzania. Nyerere explains that "Self-reliance is a positive affirmation that we shall depend upon ourselves for the development of Tanzania, and that we shall use the resources we have for that purpose, not just sit back and complain because there are other things we do not have." Self-reliance means the maximum use of resources available in accordance with the belief in human equality and human dignity.

Equality and dignity involve justice for all in the production of wealth and distribution of income. With the exception of those who are unable to work because of age, sickness or some other necessity, Ujamaa considers work as a right and duty of every human being. Work is an aspect of human fulfilment and growth. Nyerere considers it to be dehumanizing in the long run to deprive oneself or to be deprived of this right and responsibility. That is why he contends that technological or economic progress must always be made to serve this need. It must not be allowed to override it so that man becomes the servant of technology or of the economy. As a basis of progress,

104. Freedom and Socialism, p. 388.
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technology, production, wealth, profit and consumption, apart from the development of the human person through the opportunity to work, result, according to Nyerere, in economic exploitation and human degradation. As John Paul II has also noted, apart from such true human growth, technological and economic progress suffocate the human spirit by subordinating man's need for self-actualization to material gain.

A "worker" in the context of Ujamaa means anyone who, in his own way, contributes to the wellbeing of society. The wage-earner as well as the woman who takes care of her children at home without pay, or the peasant who works in his own garden, are all equally workers. They all contribute to society's welfare. However, Nyerere maintains, it is important that every person who works realizes that his work ultimately benefits him. Otherwise work will be seen as a kind of compulsion, and working as slavery. One's work cannot be a commodity for sale, not even to

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105. See ibid., p. 6.
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one's own community. A person is degraded, in Nyerere's view, when he is forced to sell his labour no matter how high the remuneration. It is a form of slavery. In Tanzania, participation by all concerned in the economic decision making is intended to curtail this danger and to encourage the right attitude towards work and working.

All this means that Ujamaa's principle of policy is to link love and charity in the social sphere with a restructuring of socio-economic and political relations for justice. The argument here is that as long as there is no construction of relations of participation in decision

108. J.K. Nyerere, Crusade for Liberation, Dar es Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 51. From analyses of income distribution and taxation scales, F.M. Lappé and A. Beccar-Varela conclude that Tanzania's tax policy "is among the most progressive in the world." See their Mozambique and Tanzania, p. 61.

109. Although guaranteed by law, women in Tanzania are often denied their equal rights and dignity in society. I. Resnick reports that between 1961 and 1966 practically all non-agricultural jobs went to men: "Women were not wanted, not taken, and consequently represented virtually no part of the expansion of trained people." See his The Long Transition, p. 66. On the other hand, M-L. Swantz notes that "Studies made in Ujamaa villages provide evidence that, if the village becomes a viable economic unit, women will greatly benefit from it. They will have membership in the village and right to hold land, even if they are divorced and living alone, and they will be paid for their daily labour." See her "Church and the Changing Role of Women in Tanzania" in E. Pasholé-Luke et al., eds., Christianity in Independent Africa, p. 148.
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making, for example, so that all concerned are involved, human dignity will not be adequately respected. As long as there is no serious attempt to share power in those areas which pertain to the common good or public interest, then only clique interests will be served. In which case, what might be perceived as love and charity would actually help to perpetuate injustice and structural oppression through the psychological mystification about the "kindness" and "generosity" of the rich.

Here is where the importance of the socio-economic and political milieu, as pointed out by John Paul II in relation to the practice of justice, is evident. The general environment in a country or in the world influences, or even conditions, the extent to which justice will prevail. For instance, in labour relations in the present economic structures, justice will not prevail if the national and international socio-economic environment is not conducive to justice even if the conduct of the immediate employer is just. This insight is important for the Ujamaa programme. For insofar as Ujamaa endeavours

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to establish social, political and economic structures which guarantee participation and interaction based on equality, it contributes to the creation of that environment which is so vital to justice and the genuine respect of the dignity of the human person. It contributes also to another important element of democracy, namely, freedom.

C. Freedom: the Ultimate Purpose

T. Balasuriya, a Sri Lankan theologian, has asserted that all forms of injustice and oppression share dehumanization through enslavement as a common characteristic. In a situation of injustice and oppression, he writes, people are not regarded as free and responsible human beings but as objects to be manipulated and used. Power, in an oppressive paradigm of social relationships, becomes the determinant principle of freedom and human dignity.¹¹¹

Democracy, justice, equality and all other principles of Ujamaa policy have as their ultimate purpose the comprehensive freedom of all persons as members of society. As Nyerere sees it, the advancement of the freedom of man as an individual in society and the freedom

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of man as society is at the centre of Ujamaa, its principles and its policy. No notion, be it that of "State", "nation", or even the notion of Ujamaa itself, can be allowed to supersede the actual development of personal and social freedom. According to Nyerere, Ujamaa stands or falls on that acid test. 112

Nyerere identifies three areas in the process of freedom as being of critical importance to the struggle of Ujamaa in Tanzania now. The first one is free will, or the practical ability to decide, which he perceives to be characteristic of being human. Tanzanians must be enabled to determine what ideology or ideological policies are best for them in their environment and circumstances. They cannot afford to remain perpetually junior partners or ideological clients of somebody else. Another area is the elimination of repression or suppression by external forces: specifically, poverty, ignorance, disease and political domination. As a practical political programme, Ujamaa gives these the most weight. Freedom from hunger,

112. See J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 13 and Freedom and Socialism, p. 8. This is what both the communitarian philosophers, such as A. Utz, and the personalist philosophers, such as J. Maritain, seem to be saying in reference to the relationship between the individual and society or the common good. See, for example, J. Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, London, Geoffrey Bles, 1948.
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ignorance and disease is, in the practical order of things, anterior and gives meaning to other freedoms, such as freedom of speech, association and belief. Even political freedom cannot be fully realized in the absence of the fundamental needs of food, health and education. The third area is what Nyerere calls "self-reliance". This is an ethic of confidence and hard work; a positive sense of "It Can Be Done, Play Your Part" towards community life and human development. Nyerere considers success in these areas of freedom to be not merely a political ideal but a moral imperative upon which Tanzanian society must grow.

As Nyerere sees it, freedom is not given; it is won through an unrelenting struggle to make it ever more realistic in one's life and in the life of society. Furthermore, freedom is indivisible; no one enjoys true freedom if others are enslaved in any way. As long as part of Africa is subjected to colonialism, for example, Africa cannot claim to be truly free. Neither can humanity, because the threat to the dignity of man anywhere in

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the world is a threat to human dignity everywhere.\textsuperscript{114} Freedom, therefore, cannot be allowed to mean the liberty of the rich and powerful to exploit and oppress the poor and powerless. It cannot be allowed to be used as an euphemism for the enslavement and dehumanization of one class by another.\textsuperscript{115} Accordingly, freedom can only be limited proportionately by the interaction of individual rights and social rights and the rule of law.

As a member of society, a person surrenders certain individual rights to obtain other greater rights and freedoms which only society is able to facilitate or provide. But Nyerere stresses that this does not mean that the individual's freedom becomes of secondary account. It does not, because the individual person is the very purpose for the existence of society. It only means that a balance has to be struck between the good of the individual and the good of society so that both can serve and enhance each other.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{114} See J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 144.


\textsuperscript{116} See J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, pp.7-9.
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The rule of law helps to indicate this balance in the practical exercise of freedom. It is an institution which can enhance the individual's dignity and rights because it should be a guardian of human equality and justice. Even though, without an ethic of equality, justice and respect for human rights, the rule of law alone cannot guarantee human dignity in any society. Nyerere describes it as an essential aspect of Ujamaa: "you cannot," he says, "have socialism without it, because it is the expression of man's equality in one facet of social living."117 What is required of the law, he argues, is that it be just in the primary and fundamentally radical sense of defending, in its design and execution, the weak and helpless.118

D. Conclusion

As the theologian A. Fernandes notes, Nicholas Berdyaev pointed out correctly that the promotion of human

117. Ibid., p. 8.

118. Law, apart from this sense, dehumanizes and takes us away from the "knowledge of God". See for a succinct discussion of law in the Scriptures, J.P. Miranda, Marx and the Bible, pp. 137-160. Isaiah 10:1-2 refers also to the damage in terms of oppression and injustice that perverse legislation does.
dignity is of spiritual value. This involves, not merely the utilitarian idea of promoting the greatest good for the greatest number, but, as Nyerere believes, insofar as it is possible, the greatest good for all. It involves the active promotion of a society based on equality and an interaction of individual freedom and social cohesiveness. As Nyerere explains, equality enables co-operation; freedom enables personal and social growth; and unity of purpose advances peace, security and wellbeing. The task of the hour, as T. de Chardin sees it in concurrence with Nyerere, is to define the relationship of the individual person to society whereby, in T. de Chardin's words, mankind is "totalized" without destroying the "incommunicable singularity" of the individual. It is an unfinished and unfinishable task, but it must be continually attended to. In that sense, apart from its principles, Ujamaa rejects a doctrinaire attitude for itself. It wants

120. See J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 8.
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to be open, flexible and reformable. The realization is there that the process from degradation to human dignity, from non-identity to awareness of self-worth before men and God involves change. In theological terms, this is the process of conversion that the theologian B. Mallia speaks about. It is the process of constructing the foundations of the Reign of God. As people truly come to know themselves they come to know God in them. As they grow towards true maturity of love-justice, they grow towards the fulness of Christ. 122

CHAPTER IV

DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY

The two preceding chapters have tried to show the moral bases upon which Ujamaa is founded and the ethical principles from which it operates. In this and the following chapter, we shall discuss Ujamaa's practical application of these principles in the areas of development and international conduct. But it is important to clarify for the purposes of this chapter, first of all, what Ujamaa understands by development and how this understanding relates to a Christian view of human progress.

A. The Meaning of Development

For countries such as Tanzania the concept and reality of development have been difficult to define. Depending on the perspectives of various protagonists, the understanding of development has been subjected to different indices and criteria. Many argue that the best index of development is economic growth demonstrated by the criteria of the volume of per capita income and/or Gross National Product (GNP). Others, however, hold the opinion that development is primarily social, evidenced by the
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quality of life of the members of a given society; that it is also political, evidenced by democratic institutions and procedures of participation in government. Socio-political development of this kind alone, they argue, is able to create and facilitate the revolving wheel of progress which is beneficial to everyone.

To the first group of theorists above, development is principally materialist. It means, above and before all else, an increase in production and in the total wealth of the nation. But its critics argue that development of this type requires a certain amount of industrial sophistication and a type of efficiency which usually culminates in depersonalization, social neglect, extreme forms of environmental exploitation, militarism and imperialism. It is, they say, a kind of development which, to use the description of the social scientist R.L. Heilbroner is "obsessed with material achievements, attuned to highly quantitative modes of thought ... [and] seem[s] dazzlingly rich in every dimension except that of the cultivation of the human person."¹ This view of development is possible in both capitalist and in some pseudo-socialist societies.

¹. An Inquiry, p. 77.
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In contradistinction to this view, the second group of theorists assert that while, over a period of time, the total wealth of a nation may increase, this does not mean necessarily that the nation is moving away from underdevelopment. The GNP may be big, but in the mind of the latter's view of development, the crucial question is: who holds the wealth in the nation and to what use is it put? They contend that the problem with using the total amount of wealth produced as the measurement of a nation's development is that no account whatsoever is taken of intranational wealth distribution. The distinction is not made by this criterion between the very rich and the very poor and the structural relationship between them. A country with few extremely rich people can have a high per capita income and/or GNP. The poor, however, may have a minimal share in this wealth even though they usually have a lot to do with its production. Such lack of equilibrium in the distribution of wealth cannot be conducive to true human development, they contend.

This second position is also the view of Ujamaa. It is true that development means progress from material want towards the acquisition of material goods. But, as Ujamaa understands it, this process cannot be considered apart from the non-material values it should foster. These
values include harmony, justice, equality, democracy and self-confidence and freedom as we outlined them in Chapter Three. The goal of this form of development is the widest possible expansion of economic, social, political and cultural benefits and values among all the people. Creative, dignity and a sense of community become, in this view, the purpose of the production of wealth.

a. **The Arusha Declaration**

This perspective of development was elaborated for Tanzania by The Arusha Declaration. In Chapter One, we have already referred to The Arusha Declaration as the *Magna Carta* of Ujamaa in Tanzania. We explained in that chapter that for about five years after independence, Tanzania operated, both in the Party and in the government, without a clear statement of national policy or ideology. In his capacity as President of TANU, Nyerere had written "Ujamaa - The basis of African Socialism" early in 1962 partly to fulfill that need. But this document remained almost unnoticed and did not have much direct influence on the

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socio-economic orientation of the nation. It was not until 1967, with the adoption of the now famous Arusha Declaration by the National Executive Committee of TANU on January 29, and by the TANU National Conference on February 5, that Tanzania finally had a clear national ideology. The Arusha Declaration confirmed those socialist policies and programmes that had been in effect in Tanzania since 1962. More importantly, it defined the ethical principles of the nation in relation to its future socio-economic and political-cultural development as a whole.

Because The Arusha Declaration is a document which holds a central position in the practical framework of Ujamaa, it is useful to give a synopsis of its main points here.

The basis on which the social, political and economic policy of Tanzania stands is laid down in Part One of the Declaration. This basis is designated as a "Creed" because it is primarily a matter of moral and ethical perspective. This Creed, which is TANU's Creed, contains moral and ethical principles which should direct human transactions. The Principles require personal conviction

or assent tantamount to a belief or a personal attitude, not primarily legislation. Legislation of some of these principles is indeed necessary for society, but it is secondary to the socialist spirit. It is useful only as an aid and explicitation of the prior conviction.

Many of the beliefs and principles that this part of the Declaration enumerates find their origin in the traditional African culture and the ideological principles inspired by it which we have discussed in the previous pages of this study. They include: the equality of all human beings; the right of every human being to dignity, respect, expression, association, movement, religious belief, participation in government, fair wages and adequate property; and the responsibility of the state to ensure the practical enforcement of these rights and the economic well-being of all the citizens through social ownership of the nation's natural resources and major instruments of labour.

Part Two of the Arusha Declaration explains what socialism means and what its practical implications are in the context of a socialist society. It establishes that generally, a socialist society eschews capitalism, feudalism and class differentiations among people. It also eschews exploitation which is inherent in the capitalist, feudal and class social structures. In a socialist society,
work is both a right and a responsibility. Everyone who is able to work must do so and cannot be allowed to live on the sweat of others. Socialism entails the existence of democracy and the just sharing of income and wealth, both of which are essential expressions of the belief in human dignity.

In Part Three, the longest of the Declaration, the general characteristics of socialism are given practical application in the context of Tanzania. This part spells out in detail Ujamaa's development strategy. At independence, Tanzania inherited an understanding of progress in which national development was gauged in terms of industries and consumer goods. This section of the document effectively alters the criteria of development in Tanzania.

It states very clearly, first of all, that Tanzania cannot make money the hinge of its development. If Tanzania is truly to develop, that is, if the people and all the people of Tanzania are to move together "from a state of poverty to a state of prosperity", from a condition

4. For Ujamaa, the criterion of development is what Kofele-Kale has described as the "humanistic élan", or what Paul VI in Populorum Progressio called the progress "of each man and the whole man". In this understanding of development the controlling value is the people, their awareness of their own potential to change and their willingness to do so. Development, from this perspective,
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of being exploited, oppressed, humiliated and disregarded to a condition which fosters dignity and respect, money will not be the effective means for it.

This is because Tanzania has no money. Nor can it depend on external aid in the form of gifts, loans or private investment to get the money necessary for its development. For one thing, the document warns that it is not possible that enough money will be forthcoming from these sources to fulfill Tanzania's requirements. On the contrary, it says, "aid" usually has the effect of eroding a country's resources, undermining a people's dignity and endangering a nation's independence. According to the Declaration, there is no equality, freedom or dignity in dependence for one's means of existence on someone else's good will. And, in any case, the document warns, foreign aid is seldom a matter of good will but of capitalist economics. In this assertion, it reflects Ghana's late president K. Nkrumah's statement that "'Aid' ... to a

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neo-colonial State is merely a revolving credit, paid by the neo-colonial State and returning to the neo-colonial master in the form of increased profits." 5

The Declaration posits "self-reliance" as the only way to true socialist development in Tanzania. Self-reliance, as understood by the Declaration, means the nation's autonomy to make its own plans, to set its own goals, and to try to realize them by using its own resources. Given the fact that Tanzania is a predominantly agricultural society, self-reliance means making full use of the land and the people's strength and creativity. 6

From the perspective of self-reliance, the Declaration posits that development cannot be conceived to rely primarily on transfers of resources and knowhow from elsewhere. It must be seen, as the social scientist A. Mattelart has expressed it, "as a process of mobilization of local resources with a view to satisfying local needs." 7

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The Arusha Declaration, therefore, envisages a strong viable economy for Tanzania built on agriculture, hard work and an intelligent use of local skills. The level of productivity must be raised, but this must be done in such a way that there is social and economic advancement in all sectors of the population.\(^8\)

Only through economic development by means of self-reliance can Ujamaa succeed. Without it the nation

The 1974 Cocoyoc (Mexico) Declaration's understanding of development and self-reliance is similar to that of the Arusha Declaration. Self-reliance, the Cocoyoc Declaration explains, does not mean national economic self-sufficiency; rather, it is a notion which calls for justice and equity in international relations. In the Declaration's own words: "[Self-reliance] implies mutual benefits from trade and cooperation and a fairer redistribution of resources satisfying the basic needs. It does mean self-confidence, reliance primarily on one's own resources, human and natural, and the capacity for autonomous goal-setting and decision-making. It excludes exploitative trade patterns depriving countries of their natural resources for their own development. There is obviously a scope for transfer of technology, but the thrust should be on adaptation and the generation of local technology. It implies decentralization of the world economy, and sometimes also of the national economy to enhance the sense of personal participation. But it also implies increased international cooperation for collective self-reliance. Above all, it means trust in people and nations, reliance on the capacity of people themselves to invent and generate new resources and techniques, to increase their capacity to absorb them, to put them to socially beneficial use, to take a measure of command over the economy, and to generate their own way of life." See ibid., pp. 23-24.

8. See also W.E. Clark, Socialist Development, p. 254.
would lose its self-determination in setting goals and policies which enhance Ujamaa. In other words, it would have to submit to other ideologies inimical to the principles of human dignity and equality. Consequently, it is important, for the success of Ujamaa, that members of the Party hold a firm belief in the principles and goals of socialism in Tanzania and act upon them. This is what Part Four of the Declaration points out.

The critical section of Part Five, which is the Arusha Declaration proper, is what is now generally known as the "Leadership Code". We pointed out in Chapter One that, contrary to the spirit of socialism, during the years immediately following independence, economic benefits accrued largely to those few in the Party and government bureaucracy, leaving the masses of the people untouched. Thus economic classes and acute social differentiations were beginning to form between the people and their leaders. 9 The leadership Code of the Arusha Declaration was designed precisely to arrest this tendency. It said in effect that a leader must, in an obvious and radical manner, be one of and identify with the people. As it puts it in V (a), 1: "Every TANU and Government leader must be either a

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peasant or a worker, and should in no way be associated with the practices of capitalism or feudalism."¹⁰ No part of the Arusha Declaration caused and continues to be a source of as much consternation as this code of ethics. It is especially loathed by those leaders who would want to use their positions of leadership for economic ends.

b. Implications for Development

Since its adoption in 1967, the Arusha Declaration has had profound implications for the actual conception, planning and execution of development and development projects in Tanzania. Under its influence, development is seen as a meeting and mutual interaction of two essential movements: the improvement of the material situation of man, and the total, holistic, almost transcendental existence of man and society. Human fulfilment, which cannot be achieved outside of a degree of selfless relationships or commitment to community and co-operation, is here both the meaning and goal of development.

Economic growth in Tanzania is, therefore, seen to have little significance apart from its social purpose. And the social purpose of economic growth is described

simply as the physical and spiritual well-being of the people. According to Nyerere, proper economic progress cannot be isolated from the totality of human life. To aid in the ever continuing process of human self-realization and fulfillment, economic progress must always be balanced against all aspects of man's historical existence. This means that true economic progress must be considered in terms of its function in the social, political and religious convictions and aspirations of the populace. As Nyerere sees it, the Tanzanian people will have started along the road of authentic development if their economic activity helps them to be well-fed, educated, housed, clothed and attended to medically, even if these human factors of the economy do not appear in GNP or income per capita statistics. 11

Social ethicists believe that the transcendental

11. See J.K. Nyerere; Freedom and Development, pp. 35, 218, 331, 389; Aid and Development, pp. 11-12. See also, A.H. Boerma, "Hunger in the Third World" in IDOC International, 25 (1971), pp. 71-74. In 1972, R. McNamara said as President of the World Bank: "Increases in National income - essential as they are - will not benefit the poor unless they reach the poor. They have not reached the poor to any significant degree in most developing countries in the past, and this in spite of historically unprecedented average rates of growth throughout the sixties." See R. Sandbrook, The Politics of Basic Needs, p. 7.
aspect in the social purpose of wealth or economic activity shows itself when consideration is given to the dignity inherent in man. The needs of food, water, housing, clothing, education and health must be met within the overall context of human dignity if they are to enhance true human fulfilment. It is enough to keep a dog well fed; it is not enough to keep a person well-fed or well-housed or healthy but in a situation of slavery. As important as, or perhaps more important than, food and drink is the person's awareness of himself as a human person, his capacity to interact meaningfully with his milieu so as to effect his own and his society's improvement. 12 In the same vein, no. 28 of the 1971 TANU Guidelines was graphic in its description of essential human transcendence amidst economic activity, even when such activity concerns basic human needs:

For a people who have been slaves or have been oppressed, exploited, and humiliated by colonialism or capitalism, 'development' means 'liberation'.

12. This is what D. Goulet, for instance, calls the "empowerment" or "capacitation" of people "to make demands on their surrounding environments - social, economic, and political - which will also launch them dynamically on a trajectory of improvement of their ... position." See his "Strategies for Meeting Human Needs" in K.E. Jegen and C.K. Wilber, eds., Growth with Equity, New York, Paulist Press, 1979, p. 57, and "Domesticating the Third World" in D. Goulet and M. Hudson, The Myth of Aid, Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1971, pp. 20-21. See also J.B. McGinnis, Bread and Justice, p. 4.
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Any action that gives them more control of their own affairs is an action for development, even if it does not offer them better health or more bread. Any action that reduces their say in determining their own affairs or running their own lives is not development and retards them even if the action brings them a little better health and a little more bread. 13

Ujamaa perceives the moral culture of a society, therefore, to be a very important determinant of that society's level of development whatever its productive capacity or other forms of material culture may be. Happiness, freedom from anxiety, a sense of fraternity and sharing are all qualitative aspects of life. They are the purpose of society under Ujamaa. Of course, they stand in need of material culture to be realistic. The point is, however, that they transcend it. Material culture must be seen, not as master, but as a servant of man's pursuance

13. J.K. Nyerere, "The TANU Guidelines of 1971", p. 548. With regard to this transcendence of the human spirit over, where need be, man's merely material needs, especially when these are divorced from the requirements of his dignity and tend to enslave him, D. Roche writes: "A liberated person is one who has the economic basis and political freedom to develop his true potential as a human person in keeping with the common good. Each person must be allowed to discover his true self and express his own authenticity. The liberation of the human being, then, does indeed have a deeper dimension than economic, but [on the other hand] without access to food, shelter, education, employment, and health care there can be no liberation." See his Justice Not Charity, p. 42.
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of a full and good life. It must be seen as an instrument for humanization. The ordering of the material culture to serve the moral culture of a people, that is, their freedom, dignity and equality, is at the basis of Ujamaa's conception of development. 14

Fundamental to this conception of growth and development for Ujamaa is the element of psychosomatic and social harmony. This is the understanding that the integral survival of the individual as well as the socio-political organism depends on a certain state of balance in the


The Cocomoc Declaration, already referred to, said in this regard: "The world is today not only faced with the anomaly of under-development. We may also talk of over-consumptive types of development that violate the 'inner limits' of man and the 'outer limits' of nature. Seen in this perspective, we are all in need of a redefinition of our goals, of new development strategies, of new life-styles, including more modest patterns of consumption among the rich. Even though the first priority goes to securing the minima we shall be looking for those development strategies that also may help the affluent countries, in their enlightened self-interest, in finding more human patterns of life, less exploitative of nature, of others, of oneself." See A. Mattelart, Transnationals, p. 26. See also D.H. Meadows et al., The Limits of Growth, New York, Signet Books, 1972. Contrast E. Walter, The Immorality of Limiting Growth, Albany, State University of New York, 1981.
relationship of the material-spiritual factors that sustain life. This balance must be guarded carefully because to upset it is to introduce an anomaly in the organism. If the anomaly is allowed to grow unchecked, the ultimate outcome is the disintegration of the organism.

In the socio-political organism, the interests, rights and duties of individuals must, as far as possible, be harmoniously balanced with the interests, rights and duties of the community. The task of political theory and strategy is to strike this balance. 15 At its most mature level, this harmony or balance expresses itself as a social phenomenon where individuals give voluntary preference in their behaviour to the articulated interests of society. This does not mean, as I.N. Resnick explains, that persons are expected to so forget or sublimate themselves as to entertain no individual desires; it only means that they "choose as individuals to seek their own interests through the welfare advances of the community." 16 Likewise, the community chooses to advance through the welfare advances of all of its individual members. For Ujamaa this, above


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all others, seems to be the most authentic and decisive criterion of success in development efforts: the creation of a new man and a new society.

Accordingly, the TANU Guidelines state:

... in considering the development of our nation and in preparing development plans, our main emphasis at all times should be the development of people and not of things. If development is to benefit the people, the people must participate in considering, planning, and implementing their development plans.¹⁷

Thus, according to the Guidelines and Ujamāa in general, co-determination or partnership between management and workers is an element in fostering popular control of development in a non-elitist, non-classist manner. Workers are not merely cogs in the wheel of production, nor simply sellers of labour. They are, in this view, full and equal participants in their own development and that of society.¹⁸


¹⁸. See also H. Wallraff, "Worker Participation in Decision-making and Management" in Concilium, 5:5 (1969), pp. 26-30. Both Pius X and Pius XII were against co-determination or worker partnership in industrial management. See Pius X's Motu Proprio, Pin Dalla Prima, ASS, 36 (1903), pp. 339-345; Pius XII's address to the International Congress of Social Studies on June 3, 1950, AAS, 42:9 (1950), pp. 485-488 and his address to the Congress of Austrian Catholics, AAS, 44:15 (1952), pp. 789-793.
c. Immediate Consequences

The inevitable confrontation between the principles enshrined in The Arusha Declaration and the empirical social and economic situation in Tanzania in the late sixties and throughout the seventies produced several immediate consequences. By far the most dramatic of these was the nationalization or socialization of hitherto privately owned banks as well as other major corporations and firms shortly after the publication of the Declaration. As explained by Nyerere, the need for this decision was intrinsic in the Declaration and in the whole understanding of development by Ujamaa: to effect co-determination and equitable distribution of income, it was first necessary to restructure control over the means of production. Consequently, Nyerere saw much of the outcry against this move to be, at bottom, against the whole thrust of the Declaration. In his assessment of the nationalization move, however, A.W. Bradley, is satisfied that the manner in which the nationalizations were carried out did not infringe any ethical standards or justified international expectations. As he sees it:

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The nationalizations were carried out in pursuance of a policy of socialization approved and implemented by the country's political, administrative and legislative institutions; the nationalizations are not in breach of treaty obligations; the nationalizations do not seem discriminatory against alien interests; and the legislation provided for payment of compensation which does not seem to fall below the internationally accepted minimum standard of compensation.20

In fact, some critics of The Arusha Declaration argue that in strict justice compensation was not called for. They contend that the firms and corporations nationalized had already made and, in the case of those which were foreign-owned, had also repatriated huge profits. Thus, they say, it would have been morally permissible to withhold compensation. This is the position of the critics of the left.

C. Ake, for example, maintains, further, that the compensation in question rendered The Arusha Declaration's bid for self-reliance self-defeating. The compensation both depleted the nation's coffers and necessitated borrowing in order to supply domestic needs and make up for the shortfall in compensation monies. The result in either case was deeper dependence of the Tanzanian economy on

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foreign sources. And so, as another critic of the Declaration, G. Arnold, sees it, the result of the Declaration in terms of national self-confidence and independence from the vagaries of international capital was ambivalent: 21

Also considered by the critics - this time of the right - to be ambivalent in terms of its long-term effect on the economy in general and social equality in particular, was the policy of co-determination or partnership between workers and management in the newly nationalized firms and industries. This policy, though contained in The Arusha Declaration, was made explicit by the 1971 Guidelines.

Referring to political and industrial leaders, the Guidelines frown upon leadership by command and insist on involving people in seeking solutions to their own problems. One of the most powerful paragraphs of the Guidelines instructs that, under the supervision of the Party:

There must be a deliberate effort to build equality between the leaders and those they lead. For a Tanzanian leader it must be forbidden to be arrogant, extravagant, contemptuous, and oppressive. The Tanzanian leader must be a person who respects people, shuns ostentation, and who is not a tyrant. 22


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The consequence of this, the latter critics of The Arusha Declaration and the Guidelines note, was to put the productive machinery, that is, the industries and other firms, under the external control of the Party. But external control of the productive machinery, democratic or authoritarian, they argue, invariably has an adverse effect on the internal functioning of the machinery in terms of economic growth and production. Since now management has a dual responsibility, to the industry or firm, on the one hand, and to the external authority, the Party, on the other, they contend, delays in decision making and effective organization are inevitable. They are also detrimental to production. Moreover, such policy dampens motivation by discouraging industrial competition.23

From the perspective of the humanist position of The Arusha Declaration, however, Nyerere responds to these criticisms by arguing that when industrial efficiency and production conflict with the values of justice, integrity, human dignity and equality, then the latter must be given priority. "I do not believe," he says, "that every human

value is, or need always be, sacrificed to economic interests.”

Yet, some inconsistencies have been noted with regard to Nyerere’s position in this respect. As his critics of the right point out, the almost complete deflation by 1975 of the Guidelines as the charter of the workers’ rights and dignity is an example. During 1972/73 the self-assurance and the politico-economic and social awareness of the workers made phenomenal strides. Armed with the Guidelines, the workers shifted perceptibly from the preoccupation of wage demands and focussed their energies on the issue, spelt out both in The Arusha Declaration and the Guidelines, of workers’ participation in decision-making in industries and firms. They refused to accept managers who abused authority, misused public funds, squandered resources or disregarded clearly articulated national socialist development policies. But in these disputes, even in obvious cases of arrogance or mismanagement, in most cases the government sided with the management. This demoralized and alienated many workers who had taken The Arusha Declaration seriously. It made them uncertain, not

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only about the practical usefulness of the declaration, but concerning other aspects of the Ujamaa policy as well.

Another inconsistency of Nyerere has to do with his dealings with the University students. One of the immediate reasons for The Arusha Declaration, and especially the Leadership Code in it, had been the refusal of the University students in 1966 to engage in "National Service" for two years after graduation at forty percent of their regular employment salary. As a result, almost all of the students were temporarily rusticated. But in 1978, some members of the University student body were again expelled by Nyerere for protesting the proposed forty percent hike of existing salary rates for members of Parliament at a time when the country was experiencing economic difficulties and the peasants' condition was not improving.25

Was The Arusha Declaration, then, and the Ujamaa ideology merely a ploy by Tanzania's "petty bourgeoisie" to maintain both their power over the State and their links with international capitalism and the metropolitan bourgeoisie as C. Ake and I. Shivji charge?26 Most observers


of Tanzanian politics disagree with this charge on the basis that if this were true, both the Leadership Code of The Arusha Declaration and the insistence on co-determination of the 1971 Guidelines, which threaten the very existence of Tanzania's "bureaucratic bourgeoisie", would have been incomprehensible. They maintain that the slow and halting pace of the realization of the Declaration's vision in both the economic and social sphere can be explained by the lack in Tanzania of a firm domestic base of production. This makes it impossible for the country to successfully fend off or absorb the external economic or social elements hostile to it.  

This may explain the slowdown of the implementation of the Guidelines' policy of worker partnership in industrial management, some of Nyerere's critics concede, but how can his behaviour towards the students in 1978 be explained? To this question no satisfactory answer has been forthcoming.

Among the achievements inspired by The Arusha Declaration, however, the following have been noted. Tanzania boasts of the highest adult literacy rate in Africa at seventy-four per cent of the population. It is

also one of the few countries on the continent where the majority of the people (upwards of eighty per cent of the total population) have easy access to safe drinking water. These are credited as results of proper and deliberate development planning.

B. Development Praxis

a. Planning

Planning means the establishment of objectives and the conception of practical programmes or methods to attain them. In Tanzania, since the number of goods and services is not large, Ujamaa planning emphasizes the provision of essential human needs. Priority is given, for example, to food, clothing, education, medical facilities over luxury consumer goods in general. Unspectacular projects, such as cereal mills, water wells, village dispensaries are considered, from this perspective, to be more fundamental to development than highways or huge

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hospitals. As Nyerere sees it, a cereal mill, for example, is more an instrument of dignity and basic freedom for the women of Tanzania than a highway; for the more than ninety per cent of the Tanzanian population which live in villages, village dispensaries that provide basic health care are more valuable than a specialized cardiac hospital located in the city. The appearance and marketability of a product may be important, but to Nyerere, its functional value is even more so. In manufacturing foodstuffs, Nyerere insists, it is the nutritive value, not the packaging for commercial purposes, that should receive primary consideration.

Ujamaa’s industrial strategy, then, as Clark has observed, requires "low capital intensity, location dispersal, high linkages to rural areas, and generally a lower priority in terms of call on resources than agriculture." 29 This is precisely why the First Five-Year Development Plan (1963-1968) has been criticized. It failed to portray the socialist orientation of the country. It has been pointed out that because the Plan was drawn up by a team of experts from capitalist countries (headed by a Frenchman from France’s Bureau de Plan) at a time when the Ujamaa philosophy was still amorphous, it emphasized the construction of

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roads and offices and the establishment of communications media. G. Routh notes that the Second Five-Year Development Plan (1969-1974), coming as it did, after The Arusha Declaration, reflected a more socialist content. 30

For, rather than high technology, Ujamaa planning prefers the more modest but, for Tanzania's perception of development, more appropriate "intermediate technology". Intermediate technology in this case means small-scale, labour-intensive industries which use local resources and supply local needs. It is meant to retain and transform local knowledge and to forestall excessive and unnecessary importation of consumer goods. Preference for this kind of technology follows from the principle that industrialization, as an aspect of development, must be for the benefit of the human person. In practical terms this means the non-displacement of local labour, the enhancement of the education and self-esteem of the people by exercising their creativity, and the provision of the needs of all over the wants of the few. 31 The need of a firm local and appropriate


31. For possibilities of Ujamaa industrial planning, see J. Rweyemamu, Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania, Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 175-198. Tanzania's experiment with a number of highly mechanized State Farms has so far not produced encouraging results.
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industrial base for the realization of Ujamaa development in Tanzania is, once again, seen as a basic requirement.

It is increasingly being argued that the majority of external sources of development plans do little to enhance coherent planning in Tanzania. In fact, some foreign planning perspectives and conditions for monies for development programmes are seen to override the political sovereignty of the people. Sometimes they amount to a disruption of the people-oriented programmes already in place. It is noted in this respect that the World Bank, for example, has tried to impose on Tanzania the capitalist mode of development regardless of the benefits the masses of the people were already enjoying under Ujamaa. As M. von Freyhold reports:

In its report of 1977 on the Tanzanian economy, the World Bank urged the government to ease price controls and import controls, to expose the public enterprises to competition and to give

32. With the possible exception of the People's Republic of China, Tanzanian officials say that conditions by the donors of bilateral and multilateral aid have generally been adverse to Tanzania's internal egalitarian intentions. For concrete illustrations, see I.N. Resnick, The Lone Transition, pp. 131-134. On the destabilizing functioning of the Bretton Woods Corporations (IBRD, IMF, AID) and others, see M. Hudson, "The Political Economy of Foreign Aid" in D. Goulet and M. Hudson, The Myth of Aid, pp. 73-135; D. Goulet, "Domesticating the Third World" in ibid. pp. 13-64.
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more freedom to the managers of para-
statal enterprises to determine policies
and investment plans and to hire or
dismiss workers according to their own
judgement.33

In keeping with the view of development and
development planning enunciated by The Arusha Declaration
and the 1971 Guidelines, Nyerere reacted predictably. He
refused to endorse the World Bank's report, stating:

Tanzania is not prepared to devalue its
currency just because this is the tra-
ditional free market solution to every-
thing and regardless of the merits of
our position. It is not prepared to
surrender its right to restrict imports
by measures designed to ensure that we
import quinine rather than cosmetics, or
buses rather than cars for the elite.

My Government is not prepared to
give up our national endeavour to provide
primary education for every child, and
basic medicines and water for all our
people. Cuts may have to be made in our
national expenditure, but we will decide
whether they fall on the public services
or private expenditure. Nor are we
prepared to deal with inflation and short-
ages by relying only on monetary policy
regardless of its relative effect on the
poorest and less poor.

Our price control may not be the
most effective in the world, but we will
not abandon price control; we will only
strive to make it more efficient. And

33. Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania, New York,
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above all, we shall continue with our endeavours to build a socialist society.\textsuperscript{34}

Nyerere asserts here the sovereignty of Tanzania. He also provides a summary of the orientation of Ujamaa in socio-economic development where the human needs of the masses are given topmost priority and attention.

b. Villages

In the rural areas, Ujamaa's main strategy for the satisfaction of these needs and for effecting development has been the establishment of villages. As early as December 10, 1962, in his presidential inaugural address, Nyerere indicated that it would be one of the priorities of his government to persuade the rural population to live in villages. Scattered all over the country in small bands, he said, it would be almost impossible for the people of Tanzania to reach a high degree of social and economic co-operation that was necessary for them to raise their standard of living. Tanzanians needed to develop and use their land more effectively; they needed schools for all.

their children; they needed basic medical care and clean
drinking water for everybody; and they needed the establish-
ment and wide dissemination of small industries to provide
the basic goods for themselves and to reduce imports. As
Nyerere saw it, all of this could be achieved only by living
together in villages and working together.\textsuperscript{35}

This idea for the settlement of the rural popula-
tion into villages originated with neither Nyerere nor
socialist ideology in Tanzania. It was originally a re-
commendation of a mission of the World Bank to the colonial
administration in 1960. The Mission recommended intensive
agricultural campaigns in settled areas and a "planned and
supervised" settlement policy in sparsely inhabited areas.
"In fact," the recommendation stated, "the Mission judges
that the second of these approaches is in general the more
promising in the present conditions of Tanganyika."\textsuperscript{36}

The recommendation of the U.N. Mission was
adopted by the new government after independence in 1962
and some settlements were established. But as in the case
of other development plans made at this time, when the

\textsuperscript{35} See \textit{Freedom and Unity}, p. 184 and \textit{Freedom
and Development}, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{36} See G. Hyden, \textit{Beyond Ujamaa}, p. 71.
country's policy was extremely amorphous, these settlements were highly mechanized and very dependent on government subsidies. By 1966 it had become clear that villages of this type were not feasible; they induced too much dependence on the government and not nearly enough independence and creativity at the local level. It was decided, then, that whatever capital the government had would be injected into villages as a supplement to the people's own initiatives in the areas of agriculture, water supply and education facilities.37

Before 1966, therefore, the creation of villages was not inspired by socialist ideology but by practical needs for rural development. As I.N. Resnick explains: "it was a technical strategy, in which peasants were regarded as a factor of production, requiring a more rational location in relation to other factors so that output could increase."38 However, with the Arusha Declaration in 1967, "villagization" became clearly a strategy of socialist rural transformation.

For almost five years after Arusha, villagization depended on persuasion. Nyerere insisted during this

37. See *ibid.*, p. 74.
period that the people must decide for themselves whether, where and when to move. There should be no bullying people into villages. And because at this time he perceived all such eventual settlements as ujamaa villages, demanding a commitment to a particular way of life, Nyerere argued that people cannot be forced to lead socialist lives. The decision to join an ujamaa village, he explained, is, by its very nature, personal and cannot be forced upon anyone. To do this would be to defeat a priori the whole meaning and purpose of ujamaa living which is voluntary co-operation. He counselled that leadership in this matter means persuasion, explanation of the benefits of these villages, and direction on how to go about starting or joining one.39

Further, Nyerere pointed out that the establishment of ujamaa villages could not follow a uniform pattern. Customs, political awareness, geographical conditions and local leadership were all factors in determining the manner of their formation and development.40

On November 6, 1973, however, Nyerere declared that villagization was no longer voluntary: it was now an


40. See J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 357.
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order. Consistently he conceded that, since ujamaa villages could be established only by voluntary associations, what he was now ordering would not necessarily be ujamaa villages. But he argued that the establishment of villages in rural areas was necessary for the provision of badly needed social services. They could be seen as "development villages". 41

Whether or not this order by Nyerere was due more to "impatient nationalism" than "coercive socialism", as C. Pratt 42 sees it, some have pointed out that it created considerable difficulties which almost contradicted the stated intentions of the Party and the President. For example, although it was not typical, some force was used in getting the people to relocate. 43 Minimal though it was,


43. Against the accusation that excessive force was used during the Mwe, Nyerere argues: "11 million people could not have been moved by force in Tanzania; we do not have the physical capacity for such forced movement, any more than we have the desire for it. The vast bulk of our people moved on their own, with only persuasion and a little help from TANU and the administration." See A. Coulson, ed., African Socialism, p. 66.

Between 1973 and 1975 most of the rural population had moved into villages. For a listing of these villages, see G. Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa, p. 103. For the difficulties experienced during the move see ibid., pp. 144-145; A. Coulson, Tanzania, pp. 235-262; D.E. McHenry, Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, 1979, esp. pp. 204-227.
observers note, it dealt a serious blow to much of the peasants' trust in the democratic and egalitarian intentions of the Party (just as the deflation of the 1971 Guidelines did to the workers) and it would take a long time to rekindle it. P.M. Lappé and A. Beccar-Varela, quoting Louise Fortmann, confirm this:

The use of force to implement a policy whose major component is co-operation is ... a contradiction in terms. The ... uses of force have primarily succeeded in associating ujamaa in the minds of the villagers with unpleasant experiences which have little to do with the potential of the policy. Coercion ... results in alienation and passivity.44

But would persuasion have worked? Tanzanian government and Party officials have argued that it had been tried since 1962 with little effect. They maintain, as Heilbroner has done, that "Peasants, no matter how impoverished their condition, do not acquiesce gladly in radical rearrangements of traditional ways, nor do they relinquish without protest their tiny properties or their traditional connection with the soil."45.5 Goran Hyden, in his Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, pinpoints this "power" of the peasantry as the main obstacle to a speedy economic development in

44. In Mozambique and Tanzania, p. 103.

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Tanzania and Africa generally. He advocates even more coercion in order to "capture" the peasantry, that is, in order to transform its modes of production "in relation to the macro-development needs" of the modern economy. 46

The merits or otherwise of Hyden's argument are not the issue here. The question for us is: In view of the stated aims, principles and goals of Ujamaa, was the coercion employed in the "Great Move", as the 1973 to 1975 resettlement operation is sometimes referred to, appropriate? I. Resnick is of the opinion that brief and sporadic though it was, it cannot be condoned. 47 But was there any other viable and efficient alternative to Nyerere's order, in view of the efforts at persuasion that had preceded it? No satisfactory answer has been given to this question up to now, more than a decade after the Move.

The Move has been criticized in other respects also. Development and food policy researchers Lappe and Beccar-Varela, 48 for example, suggest that because the move caused disruption and resentment among the peasants, it contributed to the shortages of food in the country

47. The Long Transition, p. 209.
48. Mozambique and Tanzania, p. 54.
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during 1973/75. But G. Hyden\textsuperscript{49} asserts that there was no slackening of effort by the peasants in the production of food or other crops. The decline in production, he argues, was due to the unfavourable weather that hit almost all parts of the country during that period. Professor A. Mascarenhas\textsuperscript{50} also maintains that, villagization or not, some dislocation would have occurred in the course of Tanzania's development efforts. He maintains that the errors made and the degree of suffering incurred cannot justifiably discredit the whole Move, and less so its purpose.

The cumulative purpose of villagization was, for Nyerere, the furtherance of democracy by facilitating the participation of the people in their own government; the curtailing of the problems of rapid urbanization and the breakdown of the ethic of co-operation in the manner of the extended family structure; the promotion of economic and social equality between rural and urban dwellers by providing both with essential services; and the promotion of national self-reliance through economic co-operative

\textsuperscript{49} Beyond Ujamaa, pp. 146-148.

The Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975 was designed to entrench and consolidate village self-government in the law. A registered village of not less than 250 households would have the legal status of a corporation. Its village council, elected by the whole village assembly, would have the legal authority, among other things, of overseeing the social and economic development of the village, its planning, its co-operation with other villages, and even its own security. Where economic co-operation was voluntarily extensive, and the village requested this status, it would be registered as an ujamaa village. The Act was intended to augment the value of participatory democracy in Tanzania which had been set in motion by the 1971 decentralization policy.

The structure of the village is as follows: within the village, the ten-house cells are primary communities beyond the family. Here primary personal relationships, involvement and responsibility strategies are meant to take root. As an aggregate where the sense of community and personal knowledge is formed, it is seen as the foundation of the Party and is crucial to the economic and social

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viability of the village.

Besides the economic benefits, co-operation in development in ujamaa villages is meant to foster equality. Here the members should be jointly responsible to themselves as equals and are not subservient to external sources in matters that are central to their existence. The purpose here is to promote confidence, creativity and human dignity.

M. von Freyhold has shown, however, that district and regional bureaucracies which transgress this code of village self-government have created difficulties in the way of its true realization. In many cases, they have neutralized the efforts of the villages to be agents of their own transformation. Nevertheless, it remains ujamaa policy that the soul of the village is democratic self-determination within the limits of the laws of the land. Decisions affecting the socio-economic life of the village must be made by the members of that village, and only by them, regardless of whether they seem to others to be "right" or "wrong" decisions. Nyerere maintains that what is required of leadership, once again, is direction, explanation and participation, an education of all citizens.

52. See her study, Ujamaa Villages, esp. pp. 125-184.
towards self-awareness, confidence and independence. He urges that formal education in Tanzania must play a principal role in this task.

c. Education

The immediate post-independence, pre-Arusha Declaration period did not see any significant shift in terms of the meaning and purpose of education. Nyerere became worried because, while more and more schools were being built and student intake was steadily growing every year, school curricula, from elementary school onwards, were still patterned on the colonial and missionary model. It worried him that with few exceptions, this model was elitist. Furthermore, he became worried because, whereas it is precisely the rural areas and agriculture which to his mind needed knowledgeable people with expertise if the country was to develop, this model presented the purpose of education as an escape from village life, agriculture and manual work generally. It presented education as the route to the "more respectable" white-collar job opportunities.

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54. In Chapter One, we discussed colonial and missionary education in relation to the birth of Ujamaa.
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An earlier attempt to change this view of education, and replace it with a more appropriate model, had been made in 1952 by the colonial authorities with the publication of the "Provisional Syllabus of Instruction for Middle Schools". The Syllabus provided that education in middle schools should enable pupils:

to play a more useful part in the development of the locality to which they belong. To this end the form and bias of the course at any particular school will, so far as is possible, be related to the needs and reflect the life of the area in which the school is situated. In an agricultural area, for example, the bias will be agricultural, in a pastoral area the bias will be more towards animal husbandry, while in an urban area the bias may be commercial or industrial. In girls' middle schools there will also be, in all cases, a bias towards homecraft. These biases will be of a practical nature and will form a special feature of the middle school course.55

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The experiment failed, but the importance of the idea it broached, that of a relevant, "biased" educational method, resurfaced fifteen years later as the central thesis of Nyerere's policy paper on education, "Education for Self-Reliance", of March 1967.57

In this document, Nyerere described in precise terms what was to be the meaning, purpose and method of education in Tanzania in the context of The Arusha Declaration. For him in this document, the main justification for education in Tanzania is ethical. The overall task of education is to form a conscience which is sensitive to the requirements of human dignity, social equality and economic justice for all. Teaching methods in Tanzanian schools must, therefore, enhance this conscience and foster concomitant behaviour.

Formal and informal education all over the world, Nyerere notes, transmits the values and attitudes of society. But the content and methods of education differ in different societies precisely because values and attitudes differ. The content and methods of an education

56. See ibid., pp. 13-18, for the reasons of the failure.

seeking to inculcate individualism, competitiveness and self-interest will not be the same as those whose main purpose is co-operation and mutual concern.

Nyerere proposes that education in Tanzania must help to form inquisitive minds which are willing and ready to learn and create. Education is not merely a means to "alphabetize" or to transfer knowledge from educator to educatee. Proper education does more than that. It sets in motion man's self-awareness and arouses his potential to transform himself and history. Education must help a person to act, to do something creative and thus to "be". And "being" implies more understanding and integration of self and the environment. Precisely because it limits a person's potential for integration, according to Nyerere, illiteracy impinges upon self-awareness, and so infringes human dignity.

True education is, therefore, liberating education. As Nyerere sees it, it has two components: a clear understanding of what needs to be changed and a knowledge of how to change it.

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Nyerere understands education to be the inculcation of courage in facing issues and honesty in their analysis in search for the truth. Here conformity and refusal to examine afresh traditional ways of thinking and acting are not signs of a worthwhile education. He portrays the truly educated person to be the man who has the moral courage, based on his research, to say that such and such a thing is not so even if a great many people think otherwise. He will refuse to be caught up merely within the prejudices of his ethnic group, nation, race or sex. He will be concerned with the questions of man, for these, ultimately, are the only questions which matter. Teaching which only induces conformity, a slave mentality or impotence violates the mind of man. 59

Nyerere remarks:

[True] education thus incorporates anything that enlarges men's understanding, activates them, helps them to make their own decisions, and to implement those decisions for themselves. It includes training, but is much more than training. It includes what is generally called 'agitation' but is much more than that. It includes organization and mobilization, but it goes beyond them to make them purposeful. 60


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A fundamental purposive factor for education in Tanzania must be its use for the service of the masses. Nyerere points out that Tanzania's education system would be failing Tanzania's human revolution if it encouraged elitism and selfishness. The national education programme must underlie, above all else, Tanzania's values of honesty, dedication and respect for all people. It must underscore the formation of attitudes which exhibit commitment to the enhancement of the development of all in dignity.61

Where, as in Tanzania, a considerable number of people (i.e. about 26 per cent of the population) still suffer from illiteracy, Nyerere can see no moral justification for training elites who are separated from the masses of the people. He maintains that the only ethical alternative for an educated Tanzanian is to act as a leaven, to bring the fruits of his education, to which the community contributed, back into the community. If, on the contrary, he uses his education solely for his own improvement and comfort, with no regard for the welfare of society as a whole, he cannot escape moral culpability. If he fails to appreciate that he has a responsibility to give back more to society than those who do not have a

comparable education, then he must sustain moral censure. If, furthermore, due to his education he becomes an added burden to society, demanding more for his services than society can afford, then the whole education system becomes a liability to society rather than an element for development. 62

Withholding the services of one's education from the society which made that education possible is, for Nyerere, the equivalent of theft. 63 It is a betrayal. As he sees it:

Those who receive this privilege of education have a duty to return the sacrifice which others have made. They are like the man who has been given all the food available in a starving village in order that he might have the strength to bring supplies back from a distant place. If he takes this food and does not bring help to his brothers, he is a traitor. 64

62. See ibid., pp. 184-185.


64. See W.E. Smith, We Must Run, p. 21; J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 182. Very early in his life, Nyerere was conscious of the debt every educated person owed to society. In 1946 he wrote that the educated must act as "lifting levers" for society from the quagmire of poverty, illiteracy and disease towards development. See his letter in J. Listowell, The Making of Tanganyika, pp. 205-207. Also his Freedom and Unity, p. 182.
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It is Nyerere's view that both elementary and higher education in Tanzania must be designed in such a way that it does not separate learning from the concerns of the community. On the contrary, it must help students to become more effective members of the community to uplift it. Tanzania cannot afford to copy educational systems from other countries whose social philosophy is totally different from its own. This does not imply a policy of isolation from the rest of the world. Nyerere believes that crude nationalism impoverishes the human spirit, hardens the heart and narrows the mind. It frustrates human solidarity and sharing. Tanzania is part of the world and Tanzanians constitute part of humanity. They have the right to benefit from the accumulated wisdom of mankind. Relevant education in Tanzania does imply, however, that Tanzanians also have a responsibility, both to themselves and to the world, to contribute to man's knowledge and wisdom. Tanzania's contribution in the area of education, as Nyerere sees it, will be its education system's commitment to the humanistic goals of the nation. 65

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The 1974 "Kusoma Declaration" on education, amplifying Nyerere's "Education for Self-Reliance", directed that, at all levels, education was to be work-oriented. Elementary schools, for instance, had to inculcate the importance and prestige of agriculture. They must spearhead the rural revolution. Higher institutes of learning must also emphasize the applied aspect of knowledge. As Nyerere puts it: "when people are dying because existing knowledge is not applied, when the very basic social and public services are not available to all members of a society, then that society is misusing its resources if it pursues pure learning for its own sake."66 According to him, Tanzania's education policy must promote faculty and student participation in productive work in their own areas of competence.67

Against this effort of marrying education with the practical needs of the nation, Nyerere's critics contend

66. Freedom and Socialism, p. 120.
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that the standard of education in Tanzania has been lowered. However, they do not clarify precisely what this "standard" entails apart from the implication that education in Tanzania must be of the same type and follow the same methods as in Europe. On the contrary, other observers of the Tanzanian scene, such as D. Goulet, describe Tanzania's education policy as "progressive". Goulet notes that "agricultural development is a high education priority because "Tanzania's approach is a modern developmental one which skips the phase of an educational framework isolated from functional developmental needs."^68

The educators P.J. Whaiki and Y.O. Kassam^69 report that Adult Education in Tanzania, which is also work-oriented, has enhanced the masses participation in their own integral development. Not only are they aware of new potentials in agriculture, for example, but they are also more "politicized". This means that they are becoming more familiar with the workings of the ideological machinery and are learning to use and control it in the interests of freedom. Listening to people who had just completed an adult


literacy programme, Kassam had the distinct impression that they had acquired a certain power "to name their world" in a new way. Of these "new literates" he writes:

They have got rid of their former state of marginality, alienation and fear, they feel more self-confident and have begun to be more self-assertive, they have acquired a new awareness of self, they have become politically conscious, they have regained their complete human dignity, they cannot be exploited and humiliated in the same way as before, they have become self-reliant in many ways; they now feel like active subjects rather than manipulable objects, and they have begun to demystify social reality.  

Nyerere's whole thrust of Adult Education in Tanzania has been for this purpose. It is intended to "empower" the people to relate to nature and social forces as subjects rather than objects.  

The principles of equality, mutual respect and sharing are integrated as part and parcel of the education programme because they are the very foundations of Tanzanian society.

Yet, it has been pointed out that the paternalistic

70. Y.O. Kassam, "The Voices", p. 12.

71. Compare P. Freire's similar education method of "conscientization by problematization" or the awakening of critical consciousness (conscientizacao). See P. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed and Education for Critical Consciousness.
and elitist attitude towards the peasants still persists among some technocrats and other leaders as well. Reciprocity or learning together between the peasants and the experts is not yet at its optimum level. The effects of the elitist, colonial type of education have, therefore, still to be reckoned with. Also, there is in the nation an obvious lack of civic responsibility, especially with regard to public property. Whether this is a result of the traditional ownership structure where responsibility was limited to the ethnic group, as M. Boivin suggests, it is one of the immediate problems that Ujamaa must address. 72

d. Health

Another immediate concern of Ujamaa is the struggle against disease. Ujamaa planning and policy consider health to be of the same importance and urgency as education in the struggle for development in Tanzania. As much as illiteracy and ignorance are enemies of the dignity of man, so also is disease. As Ujamaa sees it, a nation cannot develop socially or economically, or even intellectually and spiritually, if most of its citizens are unhealthy and miserable. Good health is a universal value.

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One purpose of general education and Adult Education in Tanzania has been the dissemination of a clear understanding of the most basic requirements of good health and the use of modern preventive and curative medicines. Apparently elementary requirements for health in other nations, such as the purification of drinking water, the construction and use of latrines and discriminating contact with people with communicable disease are, in Tanzania, a result of a concerted education campaign throughout the country under the slogan, coined in 1973, Mtu ni Afya (Man is Health).

As in industrialization, Ujamaa policy in health calls for low capital programmes, location dispersal and high linkages to rural areas where the majority of the population lives. In other words, dispensaries in as many rural areas as possible are given priority over large specialized hospitals in one or two urban centres, and village medical officers and nurses are needed more than highly specialized doctors who require sophisticated medical equipment to function. The emphasis in the health programmes is, therefore, on the general health of the population rather than on the esoteric diseases of a few.

Apart from education, most people acknowledge that it is the health programmes that have shown the most
impressive measurable results since independence in Tanzania. In 1966, for example, for every 1,000 live babies born, 140-240 died before their first birthday. The average life expectancy was about 44 years. Today the life expectancy has increased by more than twelve years and the child mortality rate has been reduced by fifty per cent. By Third World standards, this is an impressive achievement.

C. The Church and Development

With this background, let us now consider the theoretical and practical attitude of the Church in Tanzania towards the development programmes of Ujamaa.

a. The Reaction of the Churches

There has been a wide range of reactions to Tanzania's development programmes and Ujamaa development policy within the Catholic Church in particular and the Christian Churches in general.

Shortly after the publication of the Arusha Declaration, the Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC) issued a pastoral message in commemoration of the centenary of the founding of the Church in Tanzania at Bagamoyo in 1868. In it they strongly endorsed The Arusha Declaration. Not only was the content of the Declaration consonant with the basic
values of African culture, of brotherhood and co-operation, the bishops wrote, but it was also in line with Christian evangelical values. It reflected true principles of human social life, principles which should form the basis of every sound human government. According to the bishops' message:

Nobody should doubt that in the Arusha Declaration we can find clearly stated many of the principles that we need most for the progress and happiness of our society today. No one should doubt that in the Declaration we can find restated in a way that is really practical for men here and now in Tanzania the true principles of human living and human society. We can see very well how closely it agrees with the true spirit of Christ and the Church, which is a spirit of brotherhood, of sharing, of service and of hard work.73

The then chairman of the TEC, Archbishop Mark Mihayo of Tabora, had also voiced the same sentiments. In an interview published on March 15, 1967 he denied that The Arusha Declaration was communist inspired. On the contrary, he said, its orientation was perfectly Christian. In July of the same year, the Major Superiors of religious communities working in Tanzania expressed their "full support" of The Arusha Declaration and their willingness to co-operate.

73. Catholic Bishops of Tanzania, The Church and Developing Society, no. 4.
in its implementation. 74 Similarly, the Protestant Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT), in its 1976 document, "The Recommendation of Church Leaders on Development", recommended Church involvement in enhancing the development policy of The Arusha Declaration as a central part of the Christian ministry in Tanzania. Citing Hebrews 1:1, the CCT's document stated that as Christians:

we have a profound obligation in social welfare to express our concern for our fellowmen and to dare to speak afresh of Christian faith in action in partnership with the government like religious leaders do in the traditional African religion in order to try to solve national problems. 75

Patrick Kunambi, the then chairman of the National Council of the Laity, saw in The Arusha Declaration a great similarity to the concerns expressed by Paul VI's encyclical Populorum Progressio. The language of the two documents might be different, Kunambi declared, but the content is the same. 76

74. See J. van Bergen, Development and Religion, p. 94.

75. See P.A.S. Kijanga, Hjamaa and the Role of the Church, p. 233. The reaction of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania (ELCT) was similar. See J. van Bergen, Religion and Development, p. 95.

76. According to Kunambi: "Populorum Progressio et la Déclaration d'Arusha sont proches; on pourrait presque
But one of the Church leaders who has been most outstanding and consistent in his support for the policy enunciated by the Arusha Declaration is Bishop Christopher Mwoleka of the Diocese of Rulenge in north-western Tanzania. For him, Ujamaa policy, and especially the village policy, is an unparalleled opportunity for the Church in Tanzania to live its Christian vocation in concrete terms as spelled out in 1 Corinthians 13: 4-7. Mwoleka considers Christian participation in village life to be itself a means of evangelization. To him, if Christians are involved in all spheres of village life, they will become the salt in, not beside, the village. In that way they will be able to help to transform the life of the village at all material and spiritual levels. As Mwoleka sees it: "Only those who [have] understood Christianity as consisting in the SHARING OF LIFE in God are capable of appreciating UJAMAA as a God-given golden opportunity for the Church to perfect her mission." 77 Without that essential vision, Mwoleka fears that the opportunity offered by Ujamaa to the Church to live


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the meaning of the life of the Trinity, a life of sharing, will be missed. 78

In Mwoleka's view, the Church's declared support for the Arusha Declaration must be accompanied by concrete actions. It is not enough to announce support and leave the application of the implications to others, he says. Such support would seldom be credible. 79 Mwoleka himself spends some of his time in an ujamaa village to back his words with actions.

If, however, Mwoleka has been steadfast and consistent in his support of Ujamaa, other individuals and groups have prevaricated. In 1970, about two years after the publication of their pastoral message, The Church and Developing Society in Tanzania, in which they praised Ujamaa, the bishops published Pius XI's anti-communist encyclical Divini Redemptoris in Kiswahili. They gave it the title Huu Ndiyo Uhuru (This is Freedom) and used the torch, TANU's official emblem, on the cover. Nyerere interpreted this in only one sense: as an attempt on the part of the bishops


to connect its content negatively with TANU's Ujamaa policies and discredit them. As Nyerere saw it, the readers of the encyclical would not know what to make of the nature and aims of Ujamaa. Nyerere actually wondered aloud if, in the circumstances of Tanzania, it would not have been more appropriate for the bishops to publish and teach *Populorum Progressio*. 80

In an interview in 1974, Cardinal Rugambwa of Dar es Salaam said that the role of the priest is to serve the Christian community wherever the latter may be; and if he finds time to engage in manual work, he should by all means do so. But the Tanzanian-born clergy and religious have shown strong resistance to living among the people in the villages. In 1976, there was not a single African priest of Mwoleka's diocese of Rulenge living full-time in an ujamaa village. All eleven pastoral agents living in the newly established villages in Rulenge at that time were expatriate missionaries. This fact, in a diocese where the bishop encourages priests to go and live in villages among the people, indicates what the situation is in those dioceses whose bishops frown on the idea. Except in those areas where

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the villages are built near or around the Churches, then, there has not been much effort to integrate the physical structure of the parishes and the village structure. 81

Nyerere thinks this to be the result of imitating, without sufficient critical thought, the manner of priestly life introduced by the early European missionaries. If these missionaries built their mission stations away from everybody else, Nyerere argues, that is understandable in terms of the nineteenth century; they were strangers here. But he cannot understand that a Tanzanian priest in the twentieth century, who grew up in a village, should do the same. Perhaps out of frustration with this, to him, elitist attitude of the local diocesan priests, in a meeting with the bishops in 1970, Nyerere suggested that, given the similar socio-economic situation in Tanzania and Latin America, perhaps the bishops should consider contracting

81. See S. Urfer, Socialisme et Eglise, pp. 100-105; J. Rugemalira, "The Priest: A search for a New Image" in APER, 19:3 (1977), pp. 165-171; J. Mullen, "The Apostolate of Development" in Service, 4 (1973), pp. 15-21. Mullen quotes Cardinal Suenens to the effect that "There are situations in which the priest, for the sake of the essential mission itself, should look for further forms of priestly commitment. The priest workers can be mentioned here for whom entering into professional work is an integral part of priestly ministry. Similarly, it may be possible that the mission of the priest will demand that he participate fully in the human condition by working in other fields." Ibid., p. 20.
some priests from there for missionary work in Tanzania's villages. The suggestion, however, seems to have been ignored. Foreign missionaries working in Tanzania are still coming almost exclusively from Europe and America.

Various reasons are sometimes advanced to explain the attitude of many Tanzanian priests towards living in ujamaa villages. One of them is that a priest's "spiritual life" would be endangered there. Against such arguments, Nwoleka is indignant and forthright. It is not, he says, because of safeguarding their spiritual life that priests refuse to live with the people in villages; rather it is because such a move would disrupt their comparatively more comfortable life. According to Nwoleka, they are not yet prepared to share the poverty of the people which life in a village would imply. 82


From his experience in one village J. Van Nieuwenhove notes: "Les idées-force de l'ujamaa et la recherche d'une vie plus communautaire ont une influence profonde sur la mentalité de toute la population de Buhororo. Tous les 'agents pastoraux' constatent des transformations dans les attitudes et les comportements. Sans idéaliser la situation et sans canoniser une population, on peut dire que l'impact des idées de Nyerere se fait sentir, qu'il stimule ou rend possible des manifestations concrètes de fraternité, de partage, de réconciliation, de coresponsabilité. Il est incontestable que l'évangile trouve là une chance de maturation." See his "Présence chrétienne en société socialiste" in S. Urfer, Socialisme et Église, pp. 109-110.
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Priestly training would seem to be at the root of the problem. For J. Rugemalira, contemporary seminary education in Tanzania does not sufficiently take into account the socio-economic and political-cultural environment of the nation. Geographically, materially and intellectually, it isolates the seminarians from the masses of the people and it concentrates on instilling in them Western cultural values. The candidates for the priesthood are, therefore, not prepared to assess Ujamaa and to make the connection between the social system and their own Christian commitment to service. Their prevailing frame of reference is predominantly Greek philosophy as well as a foreign manu-
alist theology. The missionary way of living and working is maintained as if it were an essential part of the priesthood itself. The initiative to try new forms of living is often stifled. In the environment of Ujamaa, the Catholic priesthood stands as a kind of distinctive social class.83

But it is not only the clergy who are caught up in this ambiguity with regard to Ujamaa. In 1969, the national Seminar Study Year's (SSY) general assembly refused

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to pass a motion, proposed by one of its working groups, that the Church in Tanzania should define its structures and its ministries in relation to the idea of Ujamaa. This in spite of the fact that the assembly was made up of a substantial number of lay people. This shows that not even the Tanzania Church at large had at that time a clear vision of its place in Ujamaa. The Church lacked a theological understanding of Ujamaa and its policies. Such an understanding, however, is necessary in the present circumstances of the Church in a socialist environment.

b. A Theological Perspective

Discussion about the Christian faith's relationship to human development in general, or to Ujamaa in particular, ultimately involves the significance of the incarnation and redemption. It involves, in other words, a Christology. In Christ's incarnation humanity has been gratuitously assumed into the divine life and given a task: to actualize this proffered divine life by freeing itself from sin in all its forms. This process of freedom, of liberation, is also a process of salvation; it is an answer

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to the divine call to man to be Christ-like, God-like. Because integrated and integral development contributes to
this process of freedom from sin and its effects, it is part of the process of salvation.

that Paul VI in Populorum Progressio calls the
development "of each man and the whole man" \(^\text{85}\) and salvation, or what the historian and theologian A. Hastings refers to as "secular redemption" and "religious redemption", \(^\text{86}\) are two aspects of one reality. As Hastings puts it, secular redemption is the sacrament of religious redemption.

According to another theologian, J. Fuchs, the grace of God appears in the life and action of man in the world, not in isolation from them. This means that man's life and action are not merely intraworldly and immanent. They are something more than themselves. They are always indicative of acceptance or rejection of divine grace, of salvation, of liberation. \(^\text{87}\) Mwoleka's counsel does not differ from Hastings' and Fuchs's analyses:

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\(^{85}\) Populorum Progressio, no. 14, p. 185.


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We must no longer pay more attention exclusively to the spiritual life to the detriment of bodily life; for the whole integral man must be helped to grow. Attention must be equally paid to his senses, emotions, imagination, intellect, will and his spirit so that the Spirit of God takes up and transforms him into the child of God. 88

As Mwoleka sees it, 89 there is a dualism in much of the Church's practice in Tanzania, inherited from Western Hellenic Stoic theology which has inclined Christians to have a deep distrust towards material creation. They tend to see it as being antagonistic to spiritual values. But Mwoleka argues that the dichotomy is very often false. Jesus has re-established the essential continuum between the human and the divine that was severed by sin. There is no longer an unbridgeable hiatus between the earthly and the heavenly, the secular and the religious. In Mwoleka's view, what the Council 90 calls the "innermost truth" about man is not at odds with his integral development. It is not against the growth of his personality and the awareness of his


90. See Gaudium et Spes, no. 41, pp. 240-241.
dignity. The two converge in true human progress, the kind of progress whose purpose is the liberation of man and society from moral and physical strictures. God is not opposed to material reality but to sin.

Thus, for Mwoleka as for Nyerere, the involvement of the Church in establishing conditions where a more human life is possible is part of the task of preaching the Gospel. It is in this involvement that the Church can be credible as a true witness of the Gospel by giving the salvation of Christ its intended earthly meaning. As Nyerere points out, the Church must be, and must be seen to be on the side of man—of freedom, justice and human dignity.\(^{91}\) It must sharpen man's awareness of himself as a person and of changing alienating situations in which he finds himself. It must help him in the task of shaping the basis of his own existence and of contributing to the welfare of all.

As a programme for Tanzania's development, perhaps The Arusha Declaration's major insight and contribution to doing Christian theology in Tanzania lies in its vivid grasp of the socio-economic conditions of the country and in

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\(^{91}\) See J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Development*, pp. 221-222.
its policy to change these conditions. According to the Declaration, the milieu of poverty, illiteracy and disease are inimical to man, to his self-realization and to his dignity as a human being. It sees the process of change from this condition to a life less afflicted by poverty and disease as a moral requirement. This process consists in political self-determination, a just social and economic organization, economic growth and the participation of the people in planning and executing programmes pertinent to their own progress and fulfillment as persons. At the same time, it requires the practical attitude or behaviour of sharing and co-operation.

Many Christians in Tanzania now regard this insight to be fundamental to their Christian substance and essence. In matters of the Church's participation in development, they perceive it as crucial. Yet, even if the concerns of Ujamaa and of the Church overlap in this area, in that for both development is perceived to pertain to man and not things; that the human being needs and yet transcends the material universe; and that the pursuit of material wealth is not the ultimate goal of man, the Church is still a distinctive reality in the Christian order of things. It alone has the specific charge to witness to God's promise of salvation. This means that it cannot forego its prophetic
function and be reticent in challenging Ujamaa to bring its own vision to fruition towards an ever higher evangelical plane, that of true love of one another. But, on the other hand, in the practical area of development, it can adequately perform this prophetic function through genuine commitment to the values it shares with Ujamaa in constant dialogue with it. This is what Nyerere advocates and Mwoleka upholds.

Nyerere is acutely aware of this necessity of dialogue. He is convinced that the ambiguity inherent in man himself, in life, in the world, in religion and even in development itself makes ongoing dialogue between Ujamaa and the Church essential. R. Laurentin\(^9\) points out, however, that the citation of maxims, principles or values does not suffice to obtain congruent results. This also applies in the case of both Ujamaa and the Church. On the basis of shared convictions, dialogue here implies a true openness to each other. Several examples may be cited to show areas where such openness is important.

We have already noted the ambiguities in Party and government policy, particularly in the method of the

\(^9\) In his *Liberation, Development and Salvation*, p. 134.
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Great move or villagization. Few public utterances against abuses were made by the leaders of the Church at that time, but a quiet approach was used with success in several areas. A pertinent case is that of Mbinga District where the Anglican bishop with his Catholic colleagues in that area managed to convince regional and national government authorities to give a decisive voice to the people on the question of moving from existing villages to others. In this way a lot of hardship for the people was prevented. 93

But Adult Education, political education and education in general are areas whose policy still present equivocal responses among many people. Adult education, for instance, is seen by some as a form of manipulation, an exploitation of human dispositions to bring about conformist behaviour. They see it as an attempt to diminish human freedom. For Nyerere and Ujamaa, however, Adult Education in Tanzania is meant to facilitate self-awareness and self-development; it is intended as a tool for a better understanding of man and the world. As Nyerere sees it, political education is intended as a means for the people to grasp the significance of their freedom, the importance of co-operation.

93. See J. van Bergen, Development and Religion, pp. 175, 245.
and the alienation of injustice. Nyerere would argue, with the 1971 Synod of Bishops, that such education attempts to give the people the means "to take in hand their own destinies and bring about communities which are truly human." But how about the actual educating process, adult and political education's method and content? The critics of the education system in the nation pose many questions which illustrate the presence of ambiguity in this policy. For instance, should access to higher education be provided only on the proviso that public authorities assign to the graduates the tasks to be performed for society, as the education policy in Tanzania seems to imply? How legitimate is Nyerere's contention that those who receive higher education at the expense of the nation invariably enter into a moral contract with the nation to contribute to society what society has given up for them? As we have seen, Nyerere sees this moral obligation to be as binding on the conscience as a legal contractual obligation. But many are not so sure.

Further, both the conciliar Declaration on Christian Education, Gravissimum Educationis, and the TEC instruct that the State should take care, in regard to the

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principle of subsidiarity, not to have a monopoly of schools and education in a nation. For the sake of the rights of man and the growth of culture, they argue, pluralism in education should be maintained. The 1969 Education Act in Tanzania, however, gave to the State a monopoly in the direction of education. The reason given was to enable the State to protect the rights of all in education and to avoid alienation, particularly alienation arising from religious motives. For Nyerere, people who need education in Tanzania should be given the opportunity because they need it, not because they belong to a particular religion. However, he is not unaware of some of the objections of the Christian Churches concerning this:

I know the Church has always been reluctant to associate itself with education which is not directly Christian and under its own control. I am saying that it is urgently necessary for the Church to think again. ...Christians have a positive duty to go out of their way to give all help they can and to give it in a way which is accepted.

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But some ask: In the present circumstances of Tanzania, is this argument valid?

Foreign-funded and/or church-run development projects are often ambiguous as well. The Kilimanjaro Christian Medical Centre (KCMC, Lutheran) and Bugando Hospital (Catholic) were established with money from overseas. Both are extremely specialized referral hospitals which, because of transport, board and lodging costs remain well out of the reach of the general Tanzanian. I. Resnick notes that to keep these two hospitals fully in operation in 1971-1972 alone required about 22 million shillings. This represented the equivalent of 22 per cent of the entire curative services budgeted or seventeen per cent of the whole recurrent budget of the Ministry of Health for the year for the whole country. Again, in view of Ujamaa’s health policy some ask: would village dispensaries not have been more desirable and beneficial?

Despite government policy already in place, Nyerere admits that questions such as this and the ambiguities we have briefly discussed necessitate an ongoing dialogue between the Church and the State in which each

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contributes to the other's understanding of the humanity both are called to serve.

D. Conclusion

Ujamaa's theory of development and its approach to development programmes in the country, which we have discussed in this chapter, indicate the extent to which Tanzania is committed to a socialist model of development. In The Arusha Declaration, Tanzania has defined in precise terms what "development" or "progress" means in the context of the foundations and moral and ethical principles of the Ujamaa system. Development is understood to be primarily an integral and integrated growth of people, of the citizens of Tanzania, and not of things like cities and roads. In other words, development is understood from a human, rather than a material perspective. This means that material growth is not an absolute value in itself in the view of Ujamaa. It is important, valuable and necessary only as a service to the health, dignity, freedom and happiness of man as an individual and as a society. Material development is seen by Ujamaa, through The Arusha Declaration, to be subordinate to human progress. The criterion of development in Tanzania is, therefore, not the volume of the GNP or per capita income, but the freedom, equality, health,
education and harmony of its citizens.

The emphasis on development policy has, consequently, been placed on the eradication of poverty, ignorance and disease, as much as possible, as a necessary step for the realization of more freedom and dignity among the people. Nyerere, as a Christian, sees this step to be important for the Christian religious finality as well. He argues that if man as a whole is the likeness of God, and man's body is the temple of the Holy Spirit, then man's integral improvement is a central Christian concern. He therefore asks the Christian Church to help make Ujamaa's development policy a success. In theory, the Tanzanian Church agrees with Nyerere's and Ujamaa's reasoning. However, there has not been a very significant involvement by the Church in Ujamaa's development policy on the national level. Many see this as a result of the Church's still extensive reliance on a foreign, anti-socialist theology in its analysis of the Ujamaa system. Nyerere also seems to hold this view of the Church in Tanzania.

As it does in its domestic policy, Tanzania claims the same foundations and principles that constitute Ujamaa as guides in its international relations. What are the implications of this claim for the nation and for theological ethics? The next chapter will shed some light on this question.
CHAPTER V

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A nation's relationship with other nations, the attitude it adopts toward international trade, diplomatic contacts or the United Nations Organization (UNO) reflect that nation's internal political ideology and ethical values. This applies to Tanzania as well where the principles of Ujamaa influence and/or determine its foreign policy. We will discuss here Tanzania's stance vis-à-vis several aspects of contemporary world order in the light of its ideological values analyzed in the preceding pages.

A. The Ideology of National Security

Gerald and Patricia Mische distinguish two kinds of world order, one actual and the other possible. They argue that the present world order is based upon a structure of dependent relationships in which the majority of the world's nations, comprising the Third World of the southern hemisphere, relate to the few nations of the northern hemisphere in the manner of fief to feudal lord. Although

1. In Toward a Human world Order, p. 64.
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it is made up of apparently independent sovereignties, the Misches contend, the South is dominated by the North economically, politically and militarily. And more and more, the fact of the South's dependent existence is being brought home very openly through the economic and military actions of the North.

Other observers of the contemporary world order note that the rule of law in international relations counts for very little in crucial areas of North-South relationships. They believe that what matters here is economic, monetary and military power. Yet, the Misches envision a possible world order where international relationships are based on and controlled by law, respect for sovereignties of peoples in their socio-economic and political-cultural organization, and universal justice for all. This order would have as its operative principles the dignity of the human person, his centrality in the political, economic and social spheres, and international co-operation. But this remains a hope. For many students of international affairs, the prevailing world order consists of political, economic and cultural assumptions of oppression and exploitation. They consider its main axis to be the acquisition of power for the purpose of world domination through competition over resources and armaments. They perceive the driving
force behind this conception of world order to be the ideology of national security.

In its contemporary form the ideology of national security is a direct result of the polarization between the East, led by the Soviet Union, and the West, led by the United States of America. The Cold War of the 1950's prompted each power to regard the other as a mortal enemy. Consequently, as a defence against Communism or Capitalism, as the case may be, each side attributed a sacred or absolute status to its system. Between them, they instituted and practically institutionalized a permanent state of antagonism and ideological conflict.

Some scholars believe that as a consequence of this a state of insecurity was created within these nations so that there was fear of a constant and imminent attack from the ideological enemy. It is argued that this was engineered for a purpose; it allowed an intellectual and/or moneyed oligarchy to accumulate and centralize political, economic, military and cultural power into its own hands in the name of the security of the nation. The State, these scholars contend, became a national security State. The people explicitly or implicitly became instruments of the State. They were manipulated or persecuted to accept the system as it was as good and necessary for their very
survival. Even these nations' imperialistic ambitions to bring other peoples under their direct control was interpreted as important for national security and essential for the common good.

The point that the scholars who hold this view make is that under the national security State, emanating from the same ideology, human liberty and human needs are subordinated to "national security" and the power of the State. There is no check, consequently, on arms buildup, internal and external espionage and intrigue, the use of propaganda and coercive machines, and a state of permanent military mobilization. Socio-ethical and religious values such as universal peace, human solidarity, truth, justice and love are rejected as unpatriotic or even treasonable because they do not conform to the structures of the national security ideology.  

We point this out because it is increasingly being demonstrated that many Third World countries are caught up in this power-play. They have annexed themselves ideologically to one or the other great powers and have

applied the logic of a permanent state of hostility against other nations with a different ideology to themselves. In many of these nations, this has led to a suspension of civil liberties and human rights. It has led to the glorification of the State above the people it is supposed to serve. The combatting of "communist aggression" or "capitalist decadence" are the alibis used to justify this deification of the State. Dom H. Camara has noted this tendency. 3

According to the Brazilian General Goldbery, from the perspective of the national security State:

To be a nationalist is to be always ready to give up any doctrine, any theory, any ideology, feelings, passions, ideals and values, as soon as they appear as incompatible with the supreme loyalty which is due to the Nation above everything else. Nationalism is, must be, and cannot possibly be other than an Absolute One in itself, and its purpose is as well an Absolute End - at least as long as the nation continues as such. There is no place, nor should there be, nor could there be place for nationalism as a simple instrument to another purpose that transcends it. 4


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Here, in precise terms, Goldbery exposes the relationship of the individual person or the whole society of citizens to their State from the point of view of national security. To be sure, Goldbery depicts an extreme form of the ideology. But, as the theologian J. Comblin points out, the essential elements are the same in all of its varieties: the legal, ethical and moral supremacy of the State, its absolute claim on the citizens' allegiance and obedience, and its rectitude. Neither man nor God has any claims on it, but it has claims on both.

Ujamaa realizes that Tanzania, like any other Third World nation, has to chart the course for its own international relations in this environment. Its development programmes, fiscal policy, social and political organization, indeed, its very existence as a nation are affected by the contemporary world order we have just outlined. How, then, has Ujamaa shaped Tanzania's policy in this area?

Tanzania's international relations are guided by several factors arising from and comprising its commitment to Ujamaa. The most important of these factors are anti-colonialism, anti-neocolonialism, non-alignment or positive neutrality and international co-operation.
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Tanzania's anti-colonialist and anti-neocolonialist stance, as we have already indicated, derive from Ujamaa's commitment to human dignity and equality. Because of the assumptions of the colonial system, it denies the dignity of the colonized peoples a priori in order to function. It assumes in all spheres that the colonized peoples are not only inferior human beings, but are somehow subhuman; that the colonial mission is therefore to "civilize" the colonies and bring the peoples there to some higher levels of evolution. But it has been pointed out that these assumptions hide the most fundamental motive of colonialism and imperialism: namely, economic gain for the colonial and imperial powers. Consequently, the pragmatic oppression and exploitation of the colonies are concealed by and, in a sense, justified on dubious metaphysical grounds.

Ujamaa is convinced that the same thing applies to neo-colonialism. It argues that since the demise of classical colonialism, neo-colonialist powers have exploited the Third World on the basis of similar classical colonialist assumptions. The alibis for the oppression and exploitation in this case are altruism and the development of the Third World. 5

5. See discussion on the New International
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But, with Ujamaa, human dignity is indivisible. If, therefore, colonialism or neo-colonialism deny it to any people anywhere in the world, but particularly in Africa, they deny to Tanzanians also in the eyes of Ujamaa. And so Ujamaa, based as it is upon the principle of respect and dignity for all, cannot capitulate to colonialism.

As Nyerere sees it, the persistent antagonism between East and West is absurd. This antagonism arises because each side erroneously believes that it alone has evolved the perfect system to organize society and that this should be emulated by everyone else throughout the world. But such a belief makes no allowance for any differences between peoples and environments. It freezes the mental, spiritual and physical capabilities of man to change and develop. It assumes that some given societies have gone as far as humanity can go towards the divine; towards, that is, the human fulfillment of man. It assumes that some given societies have attained the absolute truth about man and society and that there is nothing more to learn. This is what Nyerere calls "absurd". As far as he is concerned:

We in Tanganyika do not believe that mankind has yet discovered ultimate truth - in any field. We do not wish to act as if we did have such a belief.

Economic Order, Section B infra.
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We wish to contribute to Man's development if we can, but we do not claim to have any "solution"; our only claim is that we intend to grope forward in the dark, towards a goal so distant that even the real understanding of it is beyond us - towards, in other words, the best that man can become. 6

To Nyerere, the struggle for universal supremacy between the Western and Eastern ideologies has dire practical consequences for them and for the rest of the world. The constant state of undeclared war between them, the conviction on each side that the other is out to get its opponent, produces a dangerous neurosis, not only among peoples as nations, but also among peoples as individuals. Thinking about the construction of a human society diminishes in the same proportion as thinking about mass destruction increases. Instead of being discussed openly in international forums, human and international relations are prejudged according to the "ultimate ideological truth debate". 7 And the amassing of weapons continues.

Yet, the amassing of weapons for the purpose of national security is, in Nyerere's view, foolish and absurd. As he sees it, it cannot guarantee peace between East and

7. Ibid., pp. 120-121.
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West. Nyerere sees even less likelihood of international peace when the economic exploitation of the South by the North by both superpowers continues. The Brandt Commission has pointed this out as well: international injustice is a source and cause of instability in the world. In the long run, no military might can deter the exploited from avenging their exploitation. Security, according to the Commission, can only be assured by the eradication of absolute poverty through justice and respect among nations. 8

To contribute to a world structure which concerns itself with the struggle against poverty and the fostering of international respect, Tanzania espouses a policy of economic self-reliance and non-alignment or positive neutrality in world affairs. For Tanzania, self-reliance, as we have shown, does not mean autarky or political, social and economic isolationism from the rest of the world. In all these spheres, intercourse with other peoples and nations is essential because of the Ujamaa belief in the oneness of humanity. Self-reliance only means a deliberate refusal on the part of Tanzania to allow itself to be in any way degraded or humiliated for the sake of political, social or

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Likewise, non-alignment does not mean going it alone. It is simply a way for small, militarily insignificant sovereign nations to assert their right to live on this planet in self-determination. It is a conscious exercise of judgement; a way of saying that no people on earth have a right to dominate another by naked force or intrigue. Basically, Ujamaa sees non-alignment as an assertion of human and national dignity and equality and as the only valid axis for civilized relations in the contemporary world.

To the accusation that Tanzania is aligned to the East, Nyerere answers that this is an optical illusion suffered by those who level the charge. They ought to consider the facts of the case. During colonial times, Nyerere argues, Tanzania was ipso facto tied to the West.


10. See J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, p. 161. Due its size and economic poverty, Tanzania cannot, of course, have a decisive influence in world affairs today. Nevertheless, according to Nyerere: "A socialist society would seek to uphold human dignity everywhere; and however limited its capacity in this respect, it could never act in such a manner as to be itself responsible for the denial of any man's humanity." Freedom and Socialism, p. 5.
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After independence, in order to establish its neutrality, it had to move from that point. As Nyerere puts it: "If you start from a point to the West of the meridian line and want to reach that line, then you have to move East! There is no other way of getting there. But that does not mean that you intend to go past it and finish up an equal latitude to the east of it." 11

With Nyerere, non-alignment affords Tanzania the ability to act independently in matters of principle. For instance, it was necessary for Tanzania to forfeit a considerable amount of American aid because of its opposition to the war in Vietnam and its sponsorship of the motion to admit the People's Republic of China to the UNO. In 1964/65, it was also necessary for Tanzania to forgo aid from West Germany because it was tied to the unacceptable "Hallstein Doctrine" condition that Tanzania not establish diplomatic relations with East Germany in order to receive the aid. 12


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Reports on the latter incident point to a curious general double standard which characterizes the industrialized nations' paternalistic attitude to the Third World. For, while the two major ideological blocks maintain commercial and diplomatic relations with each other, they deny the Third World the freedom to maintain relations with whatever side they choose. In this milieu, Tanzania believes that non-alignment will allow it to relate to any nation on an independent basis and thus, perhaps, contribute to international understanding and peace.

Even through its commitment to the policies of self-reliance and non-alignment, Tanzania seeks to foster what may be called a "planetary conscience" both among Tanzanians and in the world at large. Tanzanians are kept aware of their membership, not only in the African family of man through their national anthem but also, beyond that, of their membership in the universal human family by the Party Creed. In the international sphere Tanzania's efforts are therefore directed towards the recognition by all nations of their essential interdependence and the creation of an effective "world community". Tanzania's position on

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these issues is illustrated by its advocacy of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the strengthening of the UNO and its various agencies.

B. A New International Economic Order

a. History

We have noted that in the late 1950's and early 1960's numerous African and Asian countries attained political independence from colonialism. It quickly dawned on these new states that they form the poorest section of the world. They saw that their populations, which collectively amount to more than a billion human beings, face bleak prospects at the very margins of life. They are without education, adequate housing, proper health care and even sufficient food.

This situation, they soon realized, is not primarily due to any innate condition of poverty. On the contrary, they possess a great amount of natural and human resources. It soon became clear to them that what contributes to their economic underdevelopment are the present structures of international trade which favour the rich.

internationalized countries of the North to the detriment of the non-industrialized countries of the South.

They observed many instances of this. For example, Tanzania became aware that the prevailing system of international trade erects high tariffs against manufactured products exported from the South and low tariffs for their raw materials. This means that the South is forced to export more raw materials and to import more manufactured goods from the North. But the price of manufactured goods imported becomes increasingly higher in comparison to the price paid for the raw materials exported. According to Nyerere, in 1965, for example, a tractor cost 5.3 tons of Tanzanian cotton or 17.3 tons of its sisal. By 1972, the cost of the same tractor had jumped to 8 tons and 42 tons respectively. And Tanzania had to bear the freight charges of the tractor besides. Nyerere illustrates here that not only does this assure that industries remain firmly in the hands of the North, it also depletes the primary resources of the South as it has to export more and more raw materials to get the same amount of manufactured goods.

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Thus the poverty of the South worsens and its dependence on the North increases.

The new states became aware, moreover, that loans, grants, private investment and other categories of "aid" from the North, which were supposed to redress the situation in the South, are ineffectual. It has been noted that in 1976, for example, the South received a total of $34.5 billion (U.S.) in various forms of loans and grants. In the same year, however, the North extracted from the South about $55.5 billion in balance of trade deficits, debt servicing payments and profits repatriated by private investors and corporations. The net gain for the North at the expense of the South was, in this instance, $21 billion. In Tanzania, specifically, the total amount of external aid received in 1966 was less than the shortfall in its income caused by the drop in the price of sisal fibres alone on the international market. The aid received did not, therefore, increase Tanzania's investment capital or purchasing power during that fiscal year. In fact, Tanzania would have fared much better without aid had the price of sisal remained

stable at the 1965 level on the world market. 16

The decisive point by the Third World of this growing awareness of their situation was reached in the early 1970's. During 1972-1974 the world experienced a food shortage. There was, therefore, a sharp rise in the price of staples. Also at this time the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 17 took control of the sale of their own oil. They sharply increased the price of crude oil and petroleum products. The brunt of the international fiscal confusion consequent to this fell heavily on the shoulders of the poorer nations of the world just when the UNO agencies such as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) were compiling and disseminating factual information on the sad state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment in these nations.

Thus, at the Non-aligned Nations summit meeting at Algiers, Algeria, in 1973, the issue for a NIEO surfaced


17. OPEC was founded in 1960. Its Arab sector or OAPEC was founded in 1968. For a membership list, see M. Doxey, The World Today, Peterborough, Trent University, mimeo, 1980, p. 65.
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and was discussed. In the same year the question was taken up again during the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) at Arusha by a loose coalition of developing nations known as the Group of Seventy-Seven (G-77).\textsuperscript{18} The Group called for an immediate restructuring of the world economic system and the formation of a new world economic order. Nyerere was one of the most prominent proponents of this view.

At this UNCTAD V conference in Arusha, Nyerere pointed out that the present structure of international commerce does not allow the growth of the internal economic development of the poor, non-industrial nations. To facilitate the growth of the poor economies, he argued, they must cease being merely suppliers of primary commodities and importers of manufactured goods. As much as possible, they must manufacture the essential consumer goods needed for their own development. But no individual Third World country can do this alone at present. So, Nyerere proposed, the South must unite and trade among themselves on mutually acceptable terms. This will help, not only to strengthen the economies of the South, but it will also give the South

\textsuperscript{18} There are more than seventy-seven members in the group. For a complete list, see Ibid., p. 59.
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bargaining power with the North. As he put it: "The truth is that we need power to negotiate.... So far we have been negotiating as noisy and importune supplicants. We need to negotiate from a position of steadily increasing power." 19

However, as A. Roy notes, the struggle of the G-77 for a new economic order immediately encountered opposition from the North. To counter its demands, the Trilateral Commission was formed soon after the Arusha UNCTAD conference. The Commission was made up of a group of the most influential businessmen and politicians of the U.S.A., Western Europe and Japan (hence the name) at the initiative of David Rockefeller of the Chase Manhattan Bank. G. Massiah explains the purpose of the Commission as follows:

To the claim of structural reorganization, ensuring the economic development of the dominated countries, formation of a really pluralist system respecting the options of each country, the Trilateral opposes its

reaffirmation of the excellence of the liberal system, the priority given to the development of the industrialized countries, the refusal of any structural reform in the direction indicated by the Group of 77. Rejecting any idea of pluralism, it proposes, to the countries who can do so, to join its economic order ... Recognizing the importance of the movement for a new world economic order, the commission has decided to divide it and to make it deviate from its objective by providing its core and infiltrating it ideologically.20

Nevertheless, the Sixth Special Session of the UNO General Assembly adopted a declaration on May 1, 1974 calling for the establishment of a new economic order. It called for an immediate correction of the inequalities and injustice perpetrated by the prevailing order so that the gap in economic and social development might be narrowed and peace for present and future generations ensured. The Seventh Special Session of the Assembly (1977) repeated the same plea.21 However, subsequent meetings, notably the summit of leaders from both the North and the South at Cancun, Mexico, in 1981, have not been able to arrive at


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an agreement on an acceptable and just world economic order.

b. **Aim**

As spelt out by Nyerere and by the whole G-77, the demands for a NIEO have as their purpose and goal justice in international commerce. What they ask is some form of equity in prices between primary commodities and manufactured goods exported and imported by the South. Nyerere argues that although such indexation will not eliminate the gap between the North and South, it will at least prevent it from growing wider. It will be a first step towards establishing justice on the world market by not allowing the North to determine all prices unilaterally. As well, tariffs on manufactured exports from the South should be liberalized so as to obtain parity in export-import relationship between the developed and developing nations.

D. Roche explains that in demanding the establishment of a NIEO, the G-77 also wants to have an adequate degree of control over the world monetary system to prevent loans and "aid" or food from being used as a political weapon against them. Like Nyerere, he advises that, meanwhile, an effort must be made in the South itself to industrialize and to form economic associations among its nations. This can help to give it some bargaining power on
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the international scene, limit deleterious competition within its own camp, and control the now awesome power of multinational corporations. 22

Without the transformation of the world economic order along these lines, Nyerere argues, the efforts of Tanzania to create a socialist society will amount to a redistribution of poverty. This is not because of any inherent shortcoming in Ujamaa; rather, it is because the structure of trade among nations is unjust. It is such that it always transfers wealth from the poor to the rich. 23 As Nyerere sees it, the success of the "welfare state" in developed countries, where the working class is assured of


23. See J.K. Nyerere, The Economic Challenge, pp. 7-8; Freedom and Development, pp. 375-376. He argues in the latter: "The poverty of the underdeveloped world is as much a function of the world economic organization as it is of anything else. And that cannot be changed by a developing country's commitment to socialism. Such a country will remain a victim of international capitalist economics, just as much as if its people acquiesced in the grossest inequality within their nation. Their society may become an egalitarian one, but it will be an equality of poverty both absolutely and relatively to the rest of the world. [And then]... the poverty of that socialist country will be used as an argument against socialism itself:"
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a comparatively high standard of living, so that civil unrest against the owners of capital is neutralized, owes much to the workings of this system of trade.

Nyerere considers the concept of "free trade" between North and South to be no longer tenable. He lauded Paul VI's Populorum Progressio when it pointed out that the rule of free trade is able to govern international commercial relations only when the parties involved are not affected by any excessive inequalities of economic power. But when the parties are unequal, Paul noted, not only in economic but also in political and military power, the rule of free trade or liberal market value is a sure means of perpetuating and exacerbating injustice. 24 The restructuring of relationships between nations in matters of production, exchange, control of profits and monetary system, Paul VI emphasized in Octogesima Adveniens, is imperative. It is necessary, he wrote, "to question the models of growth of the rich nations and change people's outlooks, so that they may realize the prior call of international duty, and to renew international organizations so that they

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24. See Paul VI, Populorum Progressio, no. 58, pp. 193-194. After Nyerere read this encyclical he remarked: "I am glad the Pope said those things. If I had said them, everyone would have called me a communist." Private correspondence from Fr. Arthur Wille, January 22, 1983. Fr. Wille is a longtime personal friend of Nyerere.
may increase in effectiveness.\textsuperscript{25}

Just as much as the concept of free trade cannot correct the disparity between North and South, Nyerere argues that the same is true of the "trickle down" economic theory advanced in the North as an answer to the problem of absolute and relative poverty. He notes that since the desire for power and prestige through the acquisition of wealth is insatiable, there can be no question of wealth trickling down to satisfy the needs of the poor. As he puts it:

\begin{quote}
In the rich world people think if you have more and more material goods you become more and more of a human being. Until you change that situation the rich world has no means of helping the poor world because they don't have enough to fulfill the ambitions they set for themselves — which is the possession of material wealth.\textsuperscript{26}
\end{quote}

But even if the trickle down theory were effective, Nyerere holds, it would still be morally and ethically intolerable. To him, the theory basically caters to an economic structure of dependence. In relation to North and

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\textsuperscript{26} In the documentary film, "Five Minutes to Midnight", quoted in D. Roche, \textit{Justice Not Charity}, p. 36.
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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

South, the development and expansion of the South would be subject to and depend on the growth and expansion of the North. The development of the South would, therefore, be a mere reflection of the economic growth and self-sustenance of the North.27 But this is intolerable. For, no one should be forced into a position of having to depend on the "left-overs" of someone else for his existence. Therefore, for Nyerere, there is a moral need for a deliberate, planned transfer or redistribution of wealth from the North to the South. Leaving the historical depredation of the South by the North aside, and prescinding from the fact that in today's world, which has become a "global village", the consumerism of the North affects directly and adversely basic human needs in the South, Nyerere considers the ethical requirement for the transfer of wealth for which he argues to be still valid. He would concur with the words of Pierre Antoine: "an obligation rooted in justice can exist as a consequence of our acts even when no fault of injustice has been committed."28


Consequently, Nyerere advocates a "ceiling" of wealth for nations in the world community as well as for individuals within the national community. According to him, the leaders of the North must educate their people to the realization that they are rich enough. Such education in the North will have a direct impact on the attempt to establish a NIEO as well as on the struggle in the South for integral development. Equally important, such education will help the cause of international peace. Nyerere warns that there is a limit to the tolerance of the poor.


To the objection that it is morally unjust to transfer wealth from the poor of the North to the rich of the South, Mazrui counters that in prevailing international politics, the objection is disgustingly self-serving. "Those who claim that the workers of Detroit should not be forced to subsidize the ruling elite of Kenya or Zaire are, unfortunately, the same ones who would be alarmed by the ruling elites' [sic] of Kenya or Zaire going socialist. Salvador Allende paid with his life not because he was getting too elitist but because he was trying to transcend economic elitism in Chile.

When Third World leaders are elitist or corrupt, we are told that no dockworker of Marseilles should be forced to subsidize them. When Third World leaders are earnest and socialistic, and seek to end elitism and corruption, we are told that they are recklessly interfering with the market - and the dockworkers of Marseilles must not subsidize them either.

It looks as if Third World leaders get it either way. They are either guilty of elitism or socialism. They are either condemned as corrupt or as interfering with the market." See A. Roy, "The Socio-Economic and Political Context", p. 104.
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South. Without a just redistribution of the wealth of the world, he perceives a clash between the North and the South as bound to come sooner than later.

As it has been noted previously, Nyerere does not think that an East-West détente is enough to assure peace. In the present circumstances such détente, from the perspective of the South, merely means the creation of a better political atmosphere in the North for the exploitation of the South. To Nyerere, détente can only be a means to peace in the context of the socio-economic development of the South. The astronomical defence expenditure now occurring in the East and the West must be re-directed to the food, health, educational and economic needs of the South. In Nyerere’s view, only such a transfer of resources can assure a lasting peace.29 Such is his concern also where multinational corporations in the Third World are concerned.

c. The Multinationals and World Hunger

Political economists point out that the primary agents of economic, social and political exploitation of the South today are not the governments of the North

directly intervening in the economic and political affairs of the South but the multi- or trans-national corporations. These are huge conglomerations of economic enterprises which originate in the North but know no-national boundaries in their activities. Outwardly they maintain a semblance of democratic organization by accepting shareholders. In actual fact, however, studies on multinationals show that they are controlled by a cold, impassive, ruthless and largely anonymous oligarchy whose entire dedication is the generation of profit.

Where multinationals are concerned, all pretense to the principle of subsidiarity disappears. Current studies conclude that their inner mechanism demands expansion by the annexation of all subsidiary enterprises into fewer and fewer giant bodies, or by the liquidation of competitors. This leads directly to what Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno described as the international imperialism of money.\(^\text{30}\)

Many Third World economists contend that for the sake of profit the multinationals struggle for economic and covert political control, not only over their own countries of origin, but over the rest of the world as well. They

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30. See Quadragesimo Anno, no. 109, p. 432.
argue that in their quest for monetary gain, multinationals do not let any obstacle, however sacred, stand in their way. They have little regard for national sovereignty or justice. A. Wells, for example, explains that in their activities in the Third World, multinationals are ultimately interested in domains. Their aim is to form a "Grand Alliance" among themselves whereby, either through financial diplomacy or, where need be, by direct military intervention, they can contain socialism and install governments favourable to their exploitative activities. 31

The experience of much of the South is that the multinationals do not generally invest in building local health clinics, developing clean water systems in rural areas, or in improving the production of foodstuffs. On the contrary, multinationals aim to create an infrastructure for their own private profit. So, they develop office buildings, high technology centres and a highly pliable local elite. In this way, as Wells points out, they succeed in introducing an instant atmosphere which includes only a small proportion of a country's population. The local elite, made completely beholden to the corporations, cater

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exclusively to their concerns and come to consider the
domestic needs of the mass of the population obsolete. 32
If the masses cannot take it any more and revolt, they are
ruthlessly put down for the sake of "law and order". In
labour intensive industries, which are shifted more and
more to the South because of the cheap labour there, the
conditions of work may actually be identical to slave
labour. But the multinationals demand that national govern-
ments maintain a "proper political climate" for these in-
vestments. 33

To illustrate the immense economic (and, there-
fore, political) power of the multinational corporations,
especially in the South, it suffices to point out that the
GNP of Tanzania falls far short of the annual sales of
major multinationals such as Exxon, General Motors, IBM,
Bayer, Nestlé, Toyota Motors or Peugeot-Citroen. Exxon's
capital, for example, is larger than the GNP of such
economically well-off countries as Denmark and South Africa. 34
With such financial power, the multinationals are said to

32. See ibid.

33. See A. Roy, "The Socio-Economic and Politici-
cal Context", pp. 93-100; A. Mattelart, Transnationals,
passim.

34. See, for the comparative listing, L.R.
exercize a great deal of control over the governments and policies of the North.

Officials in the Third World are alarmed because the power of the multinationals in the South is currently increased by the fact that not only do they have the backing of the governments of the North due to their economic and political influence there, but also because their policies are now endorsed by the international monetary institutions whose initial purpose was to help the integral development of the developing countries. A case in point here is the Bretton Woods institutions: namely, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank).

These institutions were founded in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944, almost exclusively by the industrialized countries of the North. Today, they are still controlled by the North. Their policies often determine the conditions under which aid or loans may be given to developing countries. But these conditions are

35. As the largest subscriber to the World Bank, and with 23 per cent of the voting power, the U.S.A. alone, for example, controls the policy of that institution. On the adverse impact of the Bretton Woods institutions on the Third World, see J. Torrie, eds., Banking on Poverty, passim.
almost invariably based on models of development of the North, which in turn favour the activity of the multinationals to the detriment of the South. Nyerere has argued that the Bretton Woods institutions have outlived their usefulness for the South and must be replaced by other, more internationally just ones.36

It is now well known that the economic system of the multinationals and the Bretton Woods institutions, which determine how resources are used and for whose benefit, has caused hunger in many areas of the South. Thus, in agriculture, because of their technological and financial prowess, they control more and more of the best land and grow cash crops for export rather than food for domestic consumption. F.M. Lappé and J. Collins have documented, for instance, how, while the people of the African Sahel were starving for lack of food during 1972-1974, multinationals in the region were exporting peanuts and cotton.37


37. For a comprehensive discussion on how even food is used for the profit of a few, see F.M. Lappé and
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But in the midst of a growing need for food in the South, said to be quite often directly or indirectly due to the policies of the multinationals, some people in the North are arguing for what they call "lifeboat ethics" and "triage". Basically, both concepts advocate the abandoning of the populations of the South to death by starvation in the event of a food crisis there. Rich nations must provide for themselves, G. Hardin argues, for the world is like a lifeboat with limited food and population capacity. To preserve the lifeboat that capacity must not be exceeded. Letting the poor and hungry die is the most logical way to preserve the lifeboat-earth.

G. Hardin thinks on the basis of the principle of Lebensraum: let the least fit die off, so as to leave


39. "Triage" is a medical practice whereby, in an emergency, casualties are screened and attention is given only to those who have a chance of survival.

space for the best genetic types to propagate. The implications of this principle in the modern world are extensive. But in reference to international food policy, Hardin's principle is criticized because it fails to consider the fact that there is enough food in the world to provide the entire population of the world with the requirements of an adequate, healthy diet.\textsuperscript{41} R.L. Heilbroner, for example, depicts the food situation in the contemporary world by using the image of a train. The North, he says, with a third of the world's population, rides in immense comfort in first-class coaches, throwing away food, while the South, with two-thirds of the population of the world, are crammed into cattle cars with nothing to eat. To compound the outrage, what little the latter have is often expropriated by the former.\textsuperscript{42}

Nyerere warns that whatever advantage the North may enjoy now at the expense of the South, besides being innately immoral and unethical, is, in the long run, not in the best interest of anybody. Because of the interconnectedness of the world today, he argues, nations


survive or perish together. Famine, epidemics, social unrest or wars can no longer be completely confined within national boundaries. According to Nyerere: "their effects overflow into countries even thousands of miles away. We must tackle the problem of world poverty together. The question for us all is not whether we should do so, but how can we act most effectively". 43

Therefore, he proposes that the only way to prevent hunger is to establish the NIEO previously discussed. To him, a genuine NIEO involves, among other things, true respect by the North of the political and economic sovereignty of the South. This means, as Nyerere sees it, that the South must acquire the power to control the activities of the multinationals with respect to the social, economic and political priorities of each nation. 44 He visualizes this task facilitated by some form of political authority beyond nation-states. He argues that the structural ground-work of such an authority already exists in the form of various regional and international organizations.


44. See J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, p. 36.
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C. A Supranational Planetary Authority

2. Nation-states

Nyerere accepts the contemporary division of the world into nation-states as a reality. Nation-states are the groupings within which human societies today organize themselves socially, economically and politically. Nyerere argues that as long as this world structure exists, the sovereignty and equality of each nation, regardless of size, wealth or power must be respected for the sake of world order and peace. Aggression and exploitation of one state by another must be eschewed. As long as this world structure persists, he says, no one nation can legitimately assume the right to determine the political organization of another. He goes on to say:

Some of us, like Tanzania, may fervently believe in a socialist organization of our society as being both morally right and economically practicable. Others may believe equally fervently in capitalism, or in communism. But none of us could, or should, assume that what we have decided to be right for ourselves must automatically be right for others. For the truth is that it is what a people want for themselves at a particular time which is right for them; no one else is justified in trying to impose a different way of life.45

45. Ibid., p. 9. See also his Freedom and Unity, p. 206.
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For a peaceful co-existence among nations, then, Nyerere contends that the rights of each nation must be recognized in justice. The rich nations have no right to demand of the poor nations to acquiesce in their condition; the powerful nations have no moral right to ask the weak nations to remain weak. To illustrate, Nyerere admits that Tanzania is a militarily ignoble nation. It does not have any nuclear capability and does not intend to acquire it. But, on the principle of the equality of all sovereign nations, he states bluntly that Tanzania opposes the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. According to him, the treaty, as it stands, gives the nuclear powers a monopoly in nuclear armaments while withholding the right to own nuclear arms from other nations. Paradoxically, he says, in promoting inequality in this way, the treaty erodes the chances of a lasting international peace, a peace which means not only the absence of open conflict, but one which is based on justice.46 As M. Ginsberg has shown, nations can be called truly civilized insofar as they relate on mutual terms of justice and respect.47 For Nyerere, then,

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46. Freedom and Unity, p. 41.

sovereignty, respect and justice are the most important factors in international intercourse. He would like to see Tanzania's banner of "socialism" placed within that context. 48

In the present world structure of nation-states, Nyerere says, differences of opinion, misunderstandings or disputes must be dealt with as well on the basis of equal sovereignty and respect. Any other attitude is inimical to peace and international co-operation.

Yet, even though the existence of nation-states is a reality, Nyerere argues that it is absurd for the human race to think that they provide the optimum structure for the present and future collective welfare of man. To avoid disaster of cosmic proportions, nation-states must form some kind of world community. In this technological age, he sees no other alternative for survival in the long run:

The technology of the twentieth century straddles the world and yet we try to operate [international] social relations as if national boundaries created impenetrable barriers between different peoples. It is essential that our concept of society

48. It is significant, therefore, that Tanzania has minimal trade relations with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe despite their mutual "socialist" character. See R.H. Green, "Tanzanian Political Economy Goals", p. 36.
be adapted to the present day; only then will any of our present social groupings really be free to pursue their own policies. Nations are now acting like individuals who have not formed a society; they resist the suggestion because they realize that to form a society means surrendering certain freedoms in order to gain others. Yet year by year the need for organized society become clearer; the question which remains is whether it will be formed before disaster occurs.49

Nyerere sees the existence of absolute nation-states as a macrocosm of an acute form of the individualism one finds in society. In both cases, the situation does not favour co-operation but unmitigated competition and self-interest. He argues that frequently, indeed, in order to achieve cohesion within their own borders, nations sometimes fabricate or exaggerate their separation from other nations. In thus seeking the interest of their own people, they also heighten the possibility of international conflict. Here begins the ominous vicious circle: the threat of conflict is used to justify the need for absolute nation states; absolute nation-states in turn heighten the possibility of international conflict.

Under these conditions it is Nyerere's conviction that there is little to be said for the preservation of

absolute nation-states, even though the State as an administrative political unit may still be necessary.

b. African Unity

Because there is an inherent obsolescence in absolute nation-states, Nyerere sees every open local association, regional commonwealth or territorial unity as a step towards a world community. Thus, in June 1960, at the second Conference of Independent African States, Nyerere argued for the need of an East African Federation of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar. In a paper published later in that year, he was ready to delay Tanganyika's independence so that all four East African countries could accede to independence together as a union. The other East African nationalist leaders did not accept the idea. But shortly after the independence of all the East African countries, due to the self-centredness which is characteristic of every nation-state, the idea of a federation faded into the background. Nyerere had predicted and warned about this possibility in his 1960 paper.

His conviction of the necessity of local, regional, African and ultimately world community, however, did

not fade. He was a founding member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) inaugurated at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May 1963. In April 1964, he engineered the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which is now Tanzania. It has been noted that his belief, like that of Ujamaa, is still based on the first article of the Party's Creed: namely, "I believe in Human Brotherhood and the Unity of Africa (Binadamu wote ni n'dugu zamu na Afrika ni moja)."

African unity is to Nyerere not an illusory idea. It is capable of attainment. For even though he admits that there has generally not been the political will to bring it about, he claims that there has never been any doubt among African leaders as to its desirability. Nyerere describes his approach to this question as "realistic idealism": Africans must take cognisance of the obstacles that lie in the way of unity, work realistically to remove them and never lose sight of the ultimate goal.

It is Nyerere's conviction, however, that there can be no question of trying to bring about African unity

51. The hopes and aspirations raised by the formation of the OAU have largely been unrealized. To E. M'buyinga, for example, the Organization is "bankrupt". See his stinging survey, Pan Africanism or Neo-Colonialism? London, Zed Press, 1982.

52. See J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, pp. 291-300.
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quickly by force, through domination of one country by another. Unity is not uniformity. The social, political, economic and cultural differences unique to each country must be respected. Otherwise, the whole movement towards unity will be counter-productive in more fundamental human terms. His position is that in working for unity properly, it is important to cultivate first the feeling or "emotion" of oneness or of belonging that already exists in Africa. What must be reinforced are such commonly shared characteristics as equality, fraternal solidarity and the common use of resources.53

Nyerere points out that to struggle for African unity in no way implies antagonism to the formation of a world community. On the contrary, he sees it as a service to it. Africa as it is now is fertile ground for international intrigue leading all too often, as he puts it, "to the tragic absurdity of spending money on armaments while our people die for want of medical attention or starve from want of knowledge."54 The unity of the Continent would obviate that absurdity and contribute to human dignity and

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understanding throughout the world. Yet African unity is, to Nyerere, a first step. As we have indicated, for the welfare of the world, he would like to see the existence of an international democratic political authority, the strengthening, for example, of the UNO.

c. The United Nations

As to the possibility of the formation of a strong planetary authority, Nyerere is hopeful but realistic:

At the moment talk of a 'World Government' - which is what world society implies - is day-dreaming. It is very logical dreaming and very necessary. But it is not likely to become a reality soon. Throughout the world nation states have been so successful in creating concepts of an exclusive internal unity that almost all peoples are now terrified by the thought that someone from 'outside' will have power over them; they do not seem able to realize that they will also have power over others.55

To him, therefore, only voluntary international associations such as the Commonwealth, which bonds in equality, friendship, respect and an identical vision nations of different sizes, wealth and ideologies, can help to allay this paranoia and project the formation of a world society

as a possibility. On a universal scale, he places the hope for the cultivation of a lasting friendship and peace in the United Nations Organization.

The UNO is imperfect, he is the first to admit. There are enshrined within its very structures inequalities between its members. It has no independent legal or disciplinary power. Its decisions are often circumvented and even openly transgressed by member states. Its coffers as well as its podiums are frequently used for purposes inimical to its purpose, that is, for political ideological warfare. Nevertheless, he strongly believes that the UNO can grow out of these imperfections; it can be strengthened to do the work of peace and reconciliation which it was established to do.

56. See ibid., p. 118.

57. For example, the power of veto granted to only a few select nations in the Security Council. Also the claim of some members of the Organization that they are at liberty, for instance, to choose which decisions of the International Court of Justice (based in the Hague) they will observe makes a mockery of the raison d'être of the world body.

58. As at present in UNESCO. See, for instance, P. Hebblethwaite, "UNESCO on Trial: Director May Go" in National Catholic Reporter, January 20, 1984, p. 5.

59. See J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 19; Freedom and Socialism, p. 100. See also Gaudium et Spes, no. 82, pp. 295-297; Justice in the World, p. 405; the report of the World Council of Churches, "Towards Justice and
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Nyerere is persuaded that any co-operation among nations (as also among individuals) enlarges the ambiance of freedom and progress. But because it demands the surrender of some small freedoms for the sake of the larger ones, he understands that co-operation also heightens the potential for conflict. He knows that it is difficult for nations to surrender anything, even if they realize that in doing so they stand to gain much more. This is why he argues that, as a second step, to ensure that justice and peace will be maintained in the world, the UNO needs to be strengthened. It needs a system of international law which equally respects every single member nation, big or small; which protects the rights and demands the fulfilment of the responsibilities of each nation; and which is flexible enough to be changed and updated by the equal and free agreement of the nations under it.

But to carry any meaning, international law must also be enforceable. Nyerere considers it imperative, therefore, that in order to be an effective body of international law and order and justice, the UNO must be given the mandate to enforce the law. As it is now, he sees the

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Organization to be extremely handicapped because it lacks actual power to enforce even its own Charter. But Nyerere is convinced that, for its own survival, the world must be led to a point where neither military nor economic hostilities are reserved as national rights. These and other equally critical matters for the continued existence of the human race must be transferred to an international authority in which the collective will takes precedence over individual national sovereignty. As he puts it:

The Challenge of the twentieth century is the conversion of nationalism into internationalism. Our success depends on whether we have the courage to place our trust in world institutions of which we each are such a small part, and whether the leaders of nation states will lead in the direction of unity on the basis of equality.60

Nyerere sees the principles of Ujamaa as placing Tanzania squarely within the ideals of the UNO. Moreover, he admits that poor and militarily weak nations such as Tanzania have a vested interest in the survival and effectiveness of the Organization. Their very existence as distinct entities may well depend upon it.61


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Nyerere is convinced that given a clear understanding of the needs of the world and the political will of nation-states, the UNO can act as a planetary authority. This conviction is not without basis. The social scientist L.R. Brown argues similarly: "Human history is one of shifting loyalty from smaller to larger units. Personal allegiances and loyalties shifted from the clan to the tribe, from tribe to village, village to town, town to city-state; and in recent centuries to the nation-state." There is no reason why, according to Nyerere, these loyalties cannot expand to embrace all of humanity and obviate some of the degradation of man that at times necessitates recourse to lethal violence.

C. Violence

Scholars in the social sciences generally agree that any kind of social organization includes an element of

Tanzania is signatory to and has ratified all Declarations and Covenants of the UNO. As of 1981, however, it had not signed the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights nor formally acceded to Article 41 of the same Covenant both of which provide for a procedure of complaint in the area of infringement of human rights by States or individuals. For the documents of the UNO, see P. Williams, ed., The International Bill of Human Rights.

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coection. Laws which must be obeyed, police forces which enforce them and the justice system that interprets them and punishes violators, all constitute the coercive power of any society large enough to warrant them. Such coercive power is legitimate and moral if it preserves a just social order, that is, when it helps to make human life in a society as equitably human as possible. If, however, the coercive power of the State, any society or group, is used to create, maintain or justify oppression and systematic degradation of some over others, this becomes violence, regardless of whether or not it is perceived as such by either side.

Thus, as Nyerere sees it, a proper understanding of violence must include, of course, what T. Merton, the Trappist monk and theologian, calls "the individual with a revolver":63 the guerrilla fighter, the terrorist, the soldier in combat, but it must not be restricted to this category of people and acts. Those people, institutions, attitudes, behaviour and acts are also violent which, perhaps much more gradually and quietly, but just as surely, destroy man and the human spirit. Structures of slavery, colonialism, discrimination, exploitation, are structures of violence. About this Nyerere is unequivocal.

63. See his Faith and Violence, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1968, pp. 3-8. &
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It is quite clear to him what the ethical philosopher J. Harris points out that violent acts are not usually co-extensive with acts of violence. According to Harris, violent acts are generally clearly perceivable and as a rule draw adverse sentiments. They are in actual fact a "species" of a class of human acts classified as acts of violence. Harris defines this class of acts in this way: "An act of violence occurs when injury or suffering is inflicted upon a person or persons by an agent who knows (or ought reasonably to have known), that his actions would result in the harm in question." The injury or suffering can be mental or physical or both.

Nyerere situates his perspectives on violence in the context of the demands for basic human rights and dignity. Specifically, he concentrates on the questions of colonialism and racial discrimination in Africa. These constitute the main acts of violence in the Continent's most recent and contemporary history. Major incidents of instantaneous or organized violent activity which concern Nyerere are linked to these situations.


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a. First Perspective: Violence as Abhorrent

Nyerere considers war or violent struggle of any kind brutal, horrible and destructive of man in both body and spirit. He argues that anyone who cares about man cannot welcome war and the destruction it brings in its wake. In any protracted violent struggle, the innocent suffer with the guilty. In the process, fear and hate are generated which can endanger the very goal the struggle is supposed to achieve and which can make reconciliation between the opposing groups or individuals in the struggle very difficult indeed. Moreover, the goals for which violent revolutions are usually fought - freedom, equality, dignity, justice, socialism - are not born complete "out of the womb of violence". To think that this is the case is naïve and extremely dangerous. History has demonstrated that fact beyond doubt and Nyerere is unambiguous about it. He warns:

Even the most successful and popular revolution inevitably leaves behind it a legacy of bitterness, suspicion and hostility between members of the society. These are not conducive to the institutions of equality, and of co-operation between the whole people. In particular there is always a fear that those who suffered during the revolution may be looking for an opportunity of revenge; there is the memory of injury and bereavement deliberately inflicted, which poisons the relations between men
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within the society. 66

Nyerere is clearly aware of the fact that the most prominent characteristic of violent acts and movements is their destruction. As he points out, revolutionary violence is quite capable of eliminating institutions and structures of oppression and exploitation in a very short time. It may thus create an environment for introducing more just and equitable social structures and institutions. But, he warns, the process from the first step to the second step is not automatic. In a sense, it is fraught with dangers just as sinister as those which usually obstruct change towards justice. For revolution does not change attitudes born and nurtured during the old order. And it is attitudes which are the fountain of justice, equality, human dignity and co-operation. Therefore, in relation to the socialist social order, Nyerere says: "A violent revolution may make the introduction of socialist institutions easier; it makes more difficult the development of the socialist attitudes which give life to these institutions." 67

Nyerere sees absolutely no virtue in violence as such. He argues that brigands and dictators thrive on it.

66. Freedom and Socialism, p. 23.
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Even in the best of cases, its use is invariably morally ambiguous. There can, therefore, be no question of canonizing it as the a priori answer or solution to every situation of oppression. For Nyerere, it is a moral requirement that every attempt should be made to change structures and institutions of oppression without resorting to armed struggle. According to him, if the door to freedom and human dignity "is shut, attempts should be made to open it; if it is ajar, it should be pushed until it is open wide. In neither case should the door be blown up at the expense of those inside." 68

b. Second Perspective: Necessity of Violence

Abhorrent as armed violence may be, and morally ambiguous as recourse to it always is, Nyerere argues that in some situations it is not the worst evil. When the only possible choice in a given situation is acquiescence to slavery, indignity and injustice and the creation of conditions for freedom and human dignity through armed violence, there comes a point in time when people choose the latter and painfully accept responsibility for the suffering and waste that may ensue. For Nyerere, in given situations the temporary terror and suffering of a violent revolution is

68. Freedom and Development, p. 115.
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actually a lesser evil than the continued dehumanizing violence of perpetual slavery. This is because it is not right for a human being to acquiesce to slavery. And a "peace" which prides itself on such acquiescence is not worthwhile. In any case, it is a dubious peace and usually not long-lived. 69

It must be emphasized, however, that Nyerere insists, as we have seen, that as long as there is even the slightest hope or indication that freedom and justice can be attained peacefully, there can be no moral justification for entertaining armed violence as a means to freedom and justice. But when every avenue of peaceful change from alienation and degradation has been closed, he thinks that no one has any moral right to urge or expect the oppressed not to resort to the only way left to them to assert their humanity. Violence, in this case, is risking one's physical life for the sake of a full and human future for others. In many cases, Nyerere argues, this caution is what guided the struggle in Africa against the colonial system.

He points out that the use of armed violence was not the first option for almost all freedom movements in

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Africa. Where, as in Tanzania, the colonial powers heeded the legitimacy for a people's need for self-government, there was no blood shed. On the contrary, where all doors for peaceful change were closed and bolted, and where, moreover, the freedom movements encountered systemic and systematic repression and brutality, violence erupted. When pronouncing judgement between the freedom movements and the colonial powers, Nyerere warns that this historical fact must be taken into account.

Because of its commitment to the freedom of Africa and of all peoples, Tanzania allies itself with and supports the legitimate demands for freedom and human dignity everywhere. For instance, Tanzania cannot send men or arms to help in the freedom struggle in South Africa. But it will give the freedom fighters its moral support. Knowing that all avenues to peaceful change have been closed by the apartheid racist system, Nyerere says that it would be inconsistent for Tanzania to call for freedom in South Africa while denying all assistance to or opposing those who are struggling to achieve it there.

In the South African situation, with which Nyerere is very concerned, he considers the point when one could weigh the alternatives of violence and non-violence to have passed. He maintains that non-violent methods have
been tried by individuals and groups to make the South African government recognize the dignity of every human being in its socio-economic and political organization regardless of colour. But all attempts have been met by intransigence and further repression of the black majority population. To decry violence absolutely here is to mask complicity with injustice. Nyerere would agree with J.B. Metz when the latter points out that: "where a social status quo is so full of injustice that it might equal that created by a revolutionary movement, then a revolution for the justice and freedom of 'the least of the brethren' cannot be ruled out in the name of love."70 Nyerere sees no moral obligation to cling to non-violence when it is truly perceived that it cannot lead to justice.71

In Nyerere's view, the question in South Africa now is one of discernment of proportionate use of force relative to the goal of freedom. It is a question of


71. "I am not non-violent in the sense of Mohandas Gandhi," Nyerere describes himself. "But I feel violence is an evil with which one cannot become associated unless it is absolutely necessary." See W.E. Smith, We Must Run, p. 34.
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justified or unjustified violence: how to effect the revolution without losing sight of the value of every human being, including the oppressor. For, as C.B. Okolo puts it, the true revolution must be guided by the need for total "redemption" and "reconciliation", the need to turn all persons into subjects.72

To indicate the liberating potential of true revolution, the 1971 TANU Guidelines define revolution and counter-revolution in the following way:

Revolutionary are quick social changes, changes which wrest from the minority the power they exploited for their own benefit... and put it in the hands of the majority so that they can promote their own well-being. The opposite of a revolution is a counter-revolution: that is, quick and sudden changes which wrest power from the majority and hand it over to the minority with the aim of stopping the progress of the masses.73

According to the Guidelines, then, a true revolution which puts power in the hands of the majority does so for the sake of justice, fraternity and equality. It does so also for the sake of freedom, that freedom of thought and action which is a fundamental aspect of a

dignified human existence. The Guidelines realize that a "revolution" that essentially continues the oppression, even of the minority by the majority, is a betrayal of revolution properly so called. Sooner or later, the human spirit will revolt against the injustice unleashing what the Brazilian Bishop H. Camara calls a "spiral of violence". In modern and contemporary history many revolutions have gone awry and have merely signalled the beginning of a spiral of violence because they did not keep this central point in mind. Nyerere wants this fact to be kept constantly in mind in Tanzania to prevent the Ujamaa revolution from following the same fateful path.

D. Conclusion

Fidelity to the practical assertion of human dignity commits Nyerere to the search for conditions and institutions in which human dignity can be achieved. Colonialism and racism, especially in its South African structure of apartheid, are not such institutions. And so, they cannot be tolerated. Where they do not allow for peaceful change, Nyerere does not preclude a priori armed violence. He recognizes the destructive power of violence; but he recognizes just as much that, sometimes, suffering caused by lethal violence must be accepted in order to remove the
permanently suffering caused by injustice.

In a situation of violence perpetrated by injustice, Nyerere sees no sense in arguing that armed struggle against it is always counter-productive. In the first place he thinks the argument is not true, put, as it is, in those absolute terms. Although not perfect, in terms of human dignity, he considers it possible to say that the anti-colonial revolutions were right and proper. Moreover, he would agree with K. D. Kaunda that those who argue so absolutely against violence are not very convincing. They are invariably not of the oppressed classes but usually belong to countries and organizations which, in Kaunda’s words:

... have not only attained economic and political advantages by force but have, in recent history, demonstrated they are prepared to use a decisive amount of violence, with or without the sanction of international law, to protect the good life they enjoy.\(^7\)

From what point of view does one consider violence? Ultimately, this is bound to be the decisive question if one wants to understand the ethical meaning of armed struggle in proper perspective. Nyerere’s perspective is that of the oppressed; it is the perspective of the man

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whose human dignity is institutionally and systemically stymied and his freedom infringed. From this perspective Nyerere sees violent revolution, where everything else is unavailing, to be necessary and justified. If such revolution succeeds in instituting structures of justice, unity and fraternity, it is his conviction, it becomes true revolution. Yet, Nyerere points out that the necessity for violent revolution would be obviated, and the chances for international unity and fraternity greatly increased, if today's extremely autonomous nation-states were willing to surrender part of their autonomy to a strong democratic supranational authority while retaining their identity. He considers this a very important and essential "dream" upon which the future of the world and mankind may well depend. As he sees it, it is not an unrealistic dream either. Given some political will on the part of the world's nations, this "international government" is possible. Where does Nyerere derive this conviction? From his understanding or vision of man, a vision which is influenced by his Christian moral and ethical faith. The following chapter will try to elaborate on this vision of his.
CHAPTER VI

THE THEOLOGICAL-ETHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF UJAMA'A

A. Background to the Anthropology of Ujama'a

We have underlined the axiological importance of community for the Ujama'a system throughout this study. We have noted that Ujama'a's domestic and foreign policies arise from foundations and principles rooted in the traditional African emphasis on community of life, participation, co-operation and sharing. It is this emphasis on community as the central element of its ideology that makes the praxis of the principles of freedom, justice and human dignity an essential part of the system of Ujama'a in Tanzania.

The question that we must consider now involves the basic meanings and values that underlie this axiological "category" of community in the ideology of Ujama'a. In other words, what is the ideology's anthropology? Who is man and why and for what end does he act? In evaluating Ujama'a, this is, in the final analysis, the theological and ethical question. For, the controlling assumptions in the anthropology of Ujama'a will provide an indication of the possibility or non-possibility for the Christian or the Christian Church to work not only in, but also, and more importantly for
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development, with the system. These assumptions are contained in the traditional African conception of man and society. We have already referred to this conception briefly in Chapter Two. Here we would like to examine it a little further from the perspective of its ethical implications for Ujamaa and Christian ethics.

a. The Traditional African View of Man

The most notable pioneer in the systematic study of traditional African thought-forms and world-view, P. Tempels, set forth the basic African understanding of man in his groundbreaking work, *Bantu Philosophy*.¹ Tempels warned that it is misguided to approach the African conception of man and the human person predominantly from the perspective of such European philosophical categories as "soul, mind, will, sentiment" and so on.² The African view


2. Not, of course, that an appreciation of these elements is entirely absent from the African conception. See, for example, K. Gyekye, "The Akan Concept of a Person" or B.E. Oguah, "African and Western Philosophy: A Comparative Study" in R.A. Wright, ed., *African Philosophy*, Lanham, University Press of America, 1984, pp. 199-212 and 213-225. Gyekye and Oguah are, however, overstating their case when they try to "prove" the existence of similarities between the African and Western understanding of man. In other words, they are adopting the apologetical approach which Tempels warns against.

Many more scholars agree with Tempels. Even his critics, such as P.J. Hountondji, in his *African
of man, he explained, especially of man as a moral agent, is not nearly as analytical; and it does not divide man into soul and body. Rather, it is more integrative and relational. It looks at man as an active human person who is in essential relationship with other, equally active and related human persons, on the one hand, and with the divine, on the other. According to Tempels, one can describe man from the African perspective as primarily interactional or, in his words, as a "living force".

In agreement with Tempels, the African philosopher I.A. Menkiti likewise points out that the human person, as the African conceives him, is not constituted primarily by an aggregate of certain given physical or psychological characteristics. "Rather", he writes, in Africa "man is defined by reference to an environing community"; by reference to his relatedness and social interaction. This is what another philosopher, H. Maurier,

Philosophy, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1983, question not so much his basic conclusions relative to the community axiology in the African anthropology, but his philosophical-methodological procedure.


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characterizes as African "subjectivism":

One might agree to designate this properly African conceptual framework by two words: I – WITH; the "I" marking the anthropocentric aspect both subjectivist and vitalist, and the word "WITH" marking the relational, the communitarian attitude essentially and existentially characterizing the "I".

Thus, contrary to the Cartesian model, the African cannot "reason" himself, as it were, into the realization of his existence, much less of his human existence. He can only "grow" or develop into it through participation, co-operation and sharing with others. This is what the African "vitalist" conceptual framework of man means. Man is man only in relation, in community. In the

5. Maurier is careful to distinguish his use of the concept "subject" from its use in the Western context. He explains: "we are not of the opinion that the African subject is drowned in a crushing collectivism, as we too often hear. We can speak of an African subjectivism, but in a very different sense from that of western subjectivism. The latter, having evolved in an individualist and objectivist perspective, looks upon the subject as self-sufficient, autonomous, a consciousness, a free agent, a strong personality, competitive, who should assert himself, master himself in and by the independence he is assumed to have. African subjectivism will have a quite different flavor because it will be developed in a relational setting; the subject will affirm himself (strengthen his personality, [his humanity] not by isolating himself but by cultivating contacts with others, constantly exchanging with others." See his "Do We Have an African Philosophy?" in ibid., p. 35.

6. Ibid.
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succinct expression of J. Mbiti, the most profound expression of the African person's humanity, indeed, his very existence, is always a confession or admission of a radical relatedness: "I am because we are; and since we are, therefore I am". 7

In this view, then, community is a basic element of human existence. Menkiti describes the "we" of African community as a "fused 'we'", an integral and organically integrated collectivity. It is not merely an association or aggregate of principally atomic, self-interested individuals united for the sake of convenience, as Menkiti claims is the view of society in Western philosophy. As he explains it, the understanding of man in African thought moves from society or community to the individual rather than from the individual to society. 8 Yet, even in this movement, which may at first sight seem to put man at the service of society, man is central: society's primary duty is to enhance the well-being of each of its members. In fulfilling this task, it enhances itself through the


further contribution of its members to it. The process is a self-generating circle.

It should be obvious, in view of our previous extensive analysis of Ujamaa, how this anthropological framework influences the system's internal structure and policies. In both perspectives community is central. Individual persons have obligations to it. They not only grow qualitatively as human persons, but also acquire rights which may be called "inalienable" by belonging to the community and, in various ways, fulfilling the obligations and duties they owe to it. If the individual alienates himself from his community and culpably withholds his contribution to it, he endangers, not only the vitality of the community, but also his own quality as a human person which is intimately and organically linked to it. For, ultimately, the community's basic purpose, its life and prosperity are, despite any appearances to the contrary, not for its own sake but for the sake of everyone of its members. Nyerere, as we have seen, especially emphasizes this for Ujamaa. The purpose of all social structures and institutions, he says, is not some abstract ideal such as the nation, the Party or society. The purpose of social organization is man, the concrete flesh-and-blood human being. His welfare constitutes the raison d'être for
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society.

The theological-ethical implications of this view of man and society and their relationship concern the very core of the articulation or self-expression of the individual and social man. They relate to meanings and values that express the immanence and transcéndence of the human person. In other words, they have to do with the social-political and religious-spiritual aspects of man and how these are integrated and managed in the day-to-day life of the social unit. To a considerable extent, the nature of human existence, but especially of human social existence, relies on the orientation of this integration and management.

In sum, political and religious values and systems of values (or symbols) make social existence possible. They enable man to interpret and realize himself by developing structures and institutions for association and survival. They give meaning and a sense of direction to the life of man and to the sociality of society. They prescribe, directly or indirectly, the autonomy and independence of personal individuality and the extent of social cohesiveness. How does the Ujamaa system perceive and handle them?
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b. Conceptions of Religious and Political Truth

As Ujamaa addresses them, both categories of values we have designated as political and religious deal with conceptions and articulations of truth, that is, they attempt to represent truth as they see it in the practical scheme of life. What, then, according to Ujamaa, does the political sphere of truth represent and what the religious? Are the two spheres undifferentiated from one another in the life of the Tanzanian and Tanzanian society or are they completely autonomous? What claims is each sphere allowed to make for itself? We will revert for a brief moment to scholarship and movements in other parts of the world to preface and illuminate Ujamaa's approach.

The analysis of the political philosopher, Eric Voegelin, in his book, The New Science of Politics,9 is helpful in establishing the backdrop for the ethical assumptions and policies of Ujamaa vis-à-vis the religious values of the Tanzanian people. Voegelin, of course, analyses the phenomenology of the problem of truth mainly as it has affected the history of Western thought. In relating his extended analysis to Ujamaa, we necessarily make use only of those elements that are of immediate use.

relevance to the present purpose.

According to Voegelin, there has been a clear development in the conception and presentation of truth and the concomitant articulation of ethical behaviour at different epochs of human history. He explains how every major empire of earlier times conceived its own social existence to be representative of universal existence. The social-political sphere was seen to encapsulate the whole of reality, including transcendent or divine reality. Thus the truth of the empire was also the truth of God and the other way around. Whoever was on the side of the particular empire was on the side of God; whoever was opposed to it was also opposed to the transcendent truth of God. Voegelin calls this the cosmological representation of truth. Here there is no distinction between the political and the religious; the two are one and the same thing and they are represented by the empire. Even though, as Voegelin explains, questions existed concerning which empire's claim to transcendent truth was genuine, these were usually resolved on the battleground. Divine, transcendent and definitive truth belonged, at least temporarily, to whatever side was victorious in battle. Victory served to establish the legitimacy of the claim to transcendent truth.

Similar socio-political and religious views
governing the articulation of truth and the organization of society were extant in the socio-political and religious environment of pre-slavery, and particularly, pre-colonial Tanzania. The ethnic groups, just like the early empires, identified the truth of their social organization with universal, transcendent values. Thus, even though they were rarely despotic, ruling by fiat over their people, as we pointed out earlier, the chiefs and their office incorporated political as well as spiritual authority. The chief was invariably a symbol endowed with "mystical values" for society, as studies of African religions and political organization demonstrate. According to the anthropologists M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard's analysis of traditional government: "The social system is, as it were, removed to a mystical plane, where it figures as a system of social values beyond criticism or revision."

Between 800 and 300 B.C., however, questions about the representation of truth took another dimension.


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Sages and religious prophets in various parts of the world began to question the adequacy of the cosmological truth of the empires itself. Voegelin calls this 500-year period the axial age. 12 He discusses how, in the West, the Greek philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, specifically, distinguished another dimension of truth. He calls this anthropological truth. For Plato, he writes, "A political society in existence will have to be an ordered cosmos, but not at the price of man; it should be not only a microcosmos but also a macroanthropos." 13 By this Voegelin means that the issue for Greek philosophy was that the human soul is the place where transcendent truth can be experienced and known, even if it cannot be grasped fully nor manipulated. Yet through a theory of the human psyche, the demands of transcendence can be understood. Thus a theory of man can give rise to symbols that establish proper criteria for political action. 14

The axial age, therefore, proposed two important points. First, that transcendent truth has its own criteria


13. Ibid., p. 61. Voegelin defines "cosmion" as a self-contained, evolving world of social existence; a structured social entity. See Ibid., p. 27.

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which can be known by the good man (Aristotle's spoudaios) through a theory of the psyche; and second, that these "anthropological" criteria can critique cosmological truth. In other words, they can critique what the emperor happens to think and do. 15

We would like to submit here, on the basis of the analysis of the traditional African anthropology presented in this chapter, that both of these points were not completely absent from the pre-colonial social articulation in Tanzania. To be sure, the truth of man was not analysed in the exact terms of Voegelin's axial age. Anthropological truth was not conceived in terms, for example, of Aristotle's psyche. Because of this, its articulation in terms of a theory criticizing cosmological truth did not develop as much as it did in Greek philosophy. So that, in pre-colonial Tanzania, the cosmological truth overshadowed anthropological truth in ethnic social organization. But the latter was present and was lived, rather than analysed, in the recognition that the traditional social organization of man and his welfare were the purpose of society in all of its spheres.

There was a further development on this question.

15. Ibid., pp. 66-73.
in the West. Voegelin points out that the Christianity of Imperial Rome evolved yet another dimension of the representation of truth. He terms this soteriological truth to distinguish it from the cosmological and anthropological. The most celebrated proponent of soteriological truth Voegelin discusses is Augustine. At the time of Augustine, Imperial Roman civil religion was still compact: its predominant view of truth was still cosmological despite the work of the Greek philosophers. Thus, as Voegelin explains, Augustine was confronted with the question of truth from two fronts. Against the cosmological representation of truth in Roman civil religion, Augustine argued that no civil society can represent the Christian threefold symbolism of the Holy Trinity. After all, the triumvirate had been tried in Rome and ended in chaos. In reference to the Greek philosophers, Augustine maintained that not only does the human soul reach out towards the transcendent, but the transcendent also reaches out towards man. This is to say, transcendence is not known only through a theory of the human psyche, but also, and supremely through the self-revelation of God who discloses himself in friendship to man. The Greek philosophers did not acknowledge the

16. Ibid., pp. 89-90.
17. Ibid., pp. 77-82.
latter. Augustine's claim, as Voegelin shows, was consequently that only the Christian Church is symbolic of God's redemptive action. This is because it alone was established by the revelation of God through Christ. Only the Church represents the transcendent truth of God. Therefore, it can yield criteria for political action.18

Voegelin's analysis of the phenomenology of symbols in a historical context is more extensive and complex than suggested by our resume above. Our only purpose has been to clarify the framework within which the problematic of the relationship between the religious sphere and the political sphere of man lies for Tanzania's Ujamaa and for theological ethics from the perspective of Ujamaa.

c. Three Contemporary Approaches

Before discussing the proper perspective of Ujamaa, however, let us identify three prominent and influential approaches to the problematic of political and religious truth and their relationship. One is Voegelin's, which evolves from his critique of what he calls contemporary gnosticism; another approach is that of political theology; and a third approach, similar but not identical

18. Thus the insistence, then, that the prince, the emperor, be a good Christian so as to represent this truth and that he be crowned by the pope.
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to the second, is that of liberation theology. These are not exhaustive in the sense that they are not the only possible approaches to this fundamental question of society, ethics and theology. There are certainly others, but these are selected because of their value in illuminating the approach of Ujamaa to social ethics.

i. Eric Voegelin. Voegelin contends that political science today is "gnostic". It tends to collapse together the religious and political poles of truth thus giving rise to totalitarian forms of existence. To Voegelin the problem is that political thought today and the political movements that arise from it are cosmological. They fail to distinguish and to maintain the tension that does exist, and must exist, between religious symbolism and political symbolism. But Voegelin contends that the tension between these two dimensions of truth must be maintained. The distinction between them must be guarded. The political sphere, according to Voegelin, must be "de-divinized" in the sense that the political must remain political and the religious, religious, without collapsing them together, even though religion may still yield norms of critique for political action. If they are collapsed together, regardless of whether it is in the left-wing fashion or Marxist and neo-Marxist theories, or in the
right-wing fashion of the various contemporary fascist theories, it will be to the detriment of both. For, in this situation, when the churches fail to control the public order, the public representatives will control them; one will constantly try to supplant the other. But the political theologian J.B. Metz sees the problem differently.

ii. Johannes Baptist Metz. Metz is a good representative of the approach of political theology to the existential and transcendent problematic of truth. Like Voegelin, Metz approaches the subject from a historical-philosophical perspective. But while Voegelin examines the phenomenology of symbol historically to arrive at and illustrate his conclusions, Metz proceeds from a derivation of a Marxist analysis of the market structure as it emerged in the middle ages and flourished in the subsequent centuries. For Metz, the problem today is not, as Voegelin sees it, the collapsing together of the religious and the political but their complete separation. As he sees it, this separation "privatizes" religion and takes it out of the public sphere. Religious truth is thus made impotent


20. Political theology is an almost exclusively Western European phenomenon. Here we use Metz's analysis as presented mainly in his Faith in History and Society, New York, Seabury Press, 1980.
in setting norms for political life. The latter is consequently de-spiritualized, in the sense that religion is no longer perceived as providing it with a critical dimension.\footnote{J.B. Metz, \textit{Faith in History}, p. 45.}

Metz locates the reason for this separation in the pervasive middle-class principle of exchange. In the public sphere, the middle-class conception and definition of value entails exchange value. What has no exchange value loses influence in the economic and political spheres. But religion, Metz notes, does not have this exchange value. Consequently, it tends to become a completely private affair: "It is possible to make use of it to satisfy cultural needs, but it is no longer necessary to have it in order to be a subject."\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 35.} This means that the principle of exchange becomes the only principle applicable to normative thought and action in matters of public interest and concern.

The purpose of political theology for Metz is to make the soteriological truth of Christianity once again "socially and visibly incarnate in the struggle for man and his history."\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 68.} This means that religion must be "de-privatized"; it must be freed and enabled to play its proper
role of inspiring and providing norms for the public sphere. It must challenge social structures and institutions, not so much as a separate entity from history, but from within history and bring to it a clearer (spiritual) dimension of transcendence. The liberation theologian G. Gutierrez is in agreement with this basic conclusion of Metz.

iii. Gustavo Gutierrez. Gutierrez is widely recognized as the "father" of the theology of liberation (or liberation theology) on account of his seminal work, *Teologia de la liberacion, Perspectivas*. As with Metz, and unlike Voegelin, Gutierrez sees today's problem as the separation of the political and the religious. Like Metz, he seeks to make the truth of Christianity socially and visibly incarnate in the public sphere. But unlike Metz, who begins his analysis with a derivative Marxist critique of the structure of the market, Gutierrez proceeds from the perspective of a neo-Marxist economic history. This means that Gutierrez derives his tools for reading history critically and theologically from the point of view of the Marxian analysis of the economies of dependency. He

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24. Translated into English as *A Theology of Liberation* (which is used in this study). Liberation theology has spread rapidly and has gained wide appeal in many parts of the Third World and among the poor of the industrialized world as well.
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transposes this analysis of class struggle to the international sphere and wants religious truth to address this situation and speak within this context. 25

Gutierrez argues that salvation is not given suddenly only at the end of history, at the parousia, but that soteriology underlies the whole mystery of human experience and activity in the world. Soteriological truth can be identified in, even though it cannot be completely identified with, any particular political representation of truth. But as men appropriate freedom, dignity, human rights, to a certain extent they also appropriate the pleroma, the truth to be revealed completely at the eschaton. 26 The struggle in faith for freedom in the public sphere is, for Gutierrez, a process of opening history up

25. This is a presupposition throughout Gutierrez's book. On pp. 9-10 he makes it explicit: "Many agree with Sartre that 'Marxism, as the formal framework of all contemporary philosophical thought, cannot be superseded.' Be that as it may, contemporary theology does in fact find itself in direct and fruitful confrontation with Marxism, and it is to a large extent due to Marxism's influence that theological thought, searching for its own sources, has begun to reflect on the meaning of the transformation of this world and the action of man in history. Further, this confrontation helps theology to perceive what its efforts at understanding the faith receive from the historical praxis of man in history as well as what its own reflection might mean for the transformation of the world."

26. See ibid., pp. 149-250.
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to its transcendent meaning:

Faith in a God who loves us and calls us to the gift of full communion with him and brotherhood among men not only is not foreign to the transformation of the world, it leads necessarily to the building up of that brotherhood and communion in history. Moreover, only by doing this truth will our faith be "veri-fied." in the etymological sense of the word. 27

Because for Gutierrez, as for Metz, both religious and civil societies share the same history, and since eschatological salvation finds partial expression within the unfolding process of this one history, liberation theology speaks of a theological element in the economic, social and political sphere. Conversely, it also speaks of economic and political "biases" in theology. Soteriological truth in the form of faith "adds" or indicates another dimension of political truth. 28

d. Synthesis and Critique

The foregoing resumé of the approaches of Voegelin, Metz and Gutierrez to the question of the relationship between religion and civil society is very brief. It does not express all the nuances and complexities of

27. Ibid., p. 10.

their thought. But that has not been our purpose. Rather, as mentioned earlier, our aim has been to cull from them only those insights which illuminate Ujamaa's own approach to this question. However, before we proceed to an examination of Ujamaa's position, let us synthesize the three approaches above, articulate their differences and indicate their value in understanding Ujamaa's ethical orientation.

Voegelin's work is particularly useful because it offers a clear analysis for distinguishing between the civil and the religious in terms of their symbolic fields. Political symbols, Voegelin points out, relate to the existential sphere and religious symbols relate to the transcendental sphere. Since the discovery of the anthropological truth during the axial age, he says, "the tension between a differentiated truth of the soul and the truth of society cannot be eliminated from historical reality by throwing out the one or the other." 29 Both types of symbols must exist together in more or less conscious tension.

Consequently, for Voegelin, Metz's enterprise of making the "dangerous memory" of Jesus' freedom the all-embracing "political" activity of the Church in the modern

world,\textsuperscript{30} of making God "the subject and meaning of history as a whole",\textsuperscript{31} is a gnostic attempt to eliminate the essential tension between the political and religious spheres and collapse them together. This would also be Voegelin's main criticism against Gutierrez's attempt to read the eschaton partially in the process of history. For Voegelin, therefore, both Metz and Gutierrez simply fail to maintain the distinction between the differentiated symbolic fields of the political sphere and the religious sphere.

On the face of it, therefore, it would seem that there is no continuity at all between the approach of Voegelin and the political and liberation theologies of Metz and Gutierrez. However, we would like to argue here that a link between them exists. It lies in an aspect of the problematic of the representation of truth which Voegelin does not attend to. Metz and Gutierrez carry forward Voegelin's analysis, in my opinion, because they address this aspect of the problematic directly.

As we have seen, Voegelin establishes the distinction and the essential tension between politics and religion. He insists that this distinction and tension

\textsuperscript{30} See J.B. Metz, \textit{Faith in History}, p. 89.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 117.
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must be maintained for the sake of the proper autonomy and competence of each sphere. Although religious truth may inform political truth, the line of distinction between them must not be violated. This is a point well taken and Metz and Gutierrez do not dispute it. But the crucial question that Voegelin neglects to ask and answer, and which the political and liberation theologians take up, each school in its own way, is: How can religious truth inform political truth without collapsing the two spheres? How can religion and politics relate while maintaining their proper autonomy and competence? In seeking for an answer to this question, we believe that Metz and Gutierrez tackle and advance an aspect of the problematic already present in Voegelin's analysis.

Political and liberation theology's acute insight here has to do with the existential nature of civil society and religion. What they have integrated into their thinking is the sincere and serious admission of the historicity of the Church. The Church, too, is part of history, and even though the truth it represents may be transcendental and eschatological, it is still subject to the constraints of history and the wider political society. It may not identify itself completely with history or with any form of the political articulation of society, but its own articulation
in the world cannot ignore those other realities. In their effort to suggest what they consider a Christian balance between religion and politics in history, the political and liberation theologies illuminate our particular area of concern: that is, political and religious representation in the ethics of Ujamaa.

B. The Approach of Ujamaa

As it was pointed out in Chapter Two, one of the most fundamental claims of Ujamaa is that it has no religion. It does not concern itself with salvation in the religious sense of man's ultimate and complete communion with God. Ujamaa describes itself as a system whose immediate concerns are temporal. To the extent that Tanzanians are helped to realize their dignity and rights as human persons by being set free from the shackles of ignorance, poverty and disease, to the same extent does Ujamaa rest content that it has achieved its purpose. This largely justifies Ujamaa. The provision of education, medical facilities, proper housing and hygienic drinking water constitutes the validity of its existence in its own eyes. Direct religious questions such as the existence or non-existence of God, forms and manner of worship or the existence or otherwise of a personal after-life are not part of its political agenda. Apart from
the requirement that it places upon itself to respect the freedom of everyone to adhere or not to adhere to any religious organization which does not break the law of the land. Ujamaa maintains its "secular" character. Nyerere writes apropos this stance:

Socialism is concerned about man's life in this society. A man's relationship with his God is a personal matter for him and him alone; his beliefs about the hereafter are his own affair. ...

Socialism's concern about the organization of life on earth does not involve any supposition about life elsewhere, or about man's soul, or the procedures for fulfilling the will of God or Gods. Socialism is secular. 32

It is obvious from this that, in its purely political dimension, Ujamaa's conception of the function of political society is similar to Voegelin's rather than to that of Metz or Gutierrez. In fact, considering this aspect alone, the political and liberation theologians would dismiss Nyerere for propounding a "secularist" political theory where the "dangerous memory" of Christ is not foundational. And up to a point the criticism would be justified. But there is a deeper sense in which Ujamaa's approach to politics and religion resembles more that of Metz and Gutierrez than Voegelin's. This is precisely because, like Metz and

Gutierrez, and unlike Voegelin, in Ujamaa Nyerere tackles the question of the relationship between the two spheres of the representation of truth. His angle of approach to the question, however, differs from Metz's and Gutierrez's because he is faced with different data and is conditioned by different socio-religious traditions.

The social substructure which underlies the attempt on the part of both political and liberation theology to strike a balance between the religious and the political spheres is pervasively Christian. To be sure, it may be "Catholic" or "Protestant" or even "atheistic" or "agnostic" Christianity, but it is basically Christian. In Latin American liberation theology, particularly, this basic substructure is assumed without question. Thus, Metz and Gutierrez can put forward proposals founded on the Christian tradition.

In Tanzania, however, one pervasive religious-cultural tradition does not underlie the social context of the entire population. Of a population of approximately twenty million people, a third is Christian, a third Moslem, and a third professes various forms of traditional African ethnic religions and Hinduism. Thus, even though Nyerere himself is an avowed Catholic Christian, he cannot (democratically) make Ujamaa appropriate wholesale Christian
symbols and imagery. Yet, he understands the importance and necessity of the influence of the religious and, specifically, Christian symbols for the gradual and proper growth of the Ujamaa programme. 33

Nyerere, therefore, proposes in Ujamaa a political theory which he thinks is intelligible not only to the political scientist, to the atheist and agnostic, and to any religious person, but also, and from his Christian perspective, especially, to the Christian. He argues:

[Socialism] ... rests on the assumption of the equality of man, but people can reach this conclusion by many routes. People can accept the equality of man because they believe that all men were created by God, they can believe it because they feel that scientific evidence supports such a conclusion, or they can accept it simply because they believe it is the only basis on which life in society can be organized without injustice. ... What matters in socialism and to socialists is that you should care about a particular kind

33. There are not two worlds or two histories corresponding to the secular and the religious. For Nyerere, as for Metz and Gutierrez, history is one. Civil society concerns itself with the empirical aspect of this history. But because of the pervasiveness of the religious aspect in African culture, on which Ujamaa is founded, Nyerere knows that the organization of life on this earth does not exhaust the entire truth of reality, nor even always grasp correctly the empirical aspect of it. Nyerere, therefore, sees religious truth as an essential dimension of the truth of reality which helps to expand the horizon of political organization.
of social relationship on this earth. Why you care is your own affair. There is nothing incompatible between socialism and Christianity, Islam, or any other religion which accepts the equality of man on earth.\(^{34}\)

We will explicate Ujamaa's Christian relevance further below. But it is important to point out here that Nyerere is in the same line as Voegelin, Metz, and Gutierrez in seeing religion as the only adequate symbol of transcendence. But his political-religious approach is novel in that, for him, Christianity is important as a force, which does not determine, but can contribute towards a clearer definition of basic values enshrined in a political theory (Ujamaa) which is open to more than one set of religious symbols or images.

Thus, Nyerere's characterization of Ujamaa as "secular" involves an attempt to distinguish the symbolic field proper to it. It does not mean that Ujamaa is anti-religious or secularist, in the sense that Metz gives to the word. For Nyerere, being secular does not mean eliminating religion from the life of the people nor its influence from civil society; it means protecting it. As he puts it, "being secular involves trying to avoid upsetting

\(^{34}\). Freedom and Socialism, p. 13.
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depth held religious beliefs however stupid they may
appear to non-believers." The personal nature of religion,
about which Nyerere speaks, is also meant to assure the
basic freedom of religious belief and practice. Again, it
does not mean, for Nyerere, that religion must be totally
divorced from public life. Such total divorce is impossible
anyway if religious believers constitute the public. The
personal nature of religion means simply that each indivi-
dual is free to seek the transcendent reality according to
his own conviction. But the transcendent is not intrins-
ically tangential to social life. It affects the national
 ethic profoundly in that believers find the criteria for
this ethic, an ethic of making man the best that he can
become, at that ideal, ultimate level.

Briefly put, the achievement of Nyerere in
Tanzania's religiously heterogenous society seems to be his
grasp and respect of the symbols of the different religious

35. Ibid., p. 14. To illustrate his point:
Nyerere writes: "The wearing of long hair, the erection of
statues to the religious heroes or saints, the pouring of
libations, the ban on music and dancing—all these things
appear at best irrelevant to those who do not follow the
religion concerned, but they are important to those who do.
And because they are important to these believers a
socialist society will not interfere." Ibid. On the
contrary, it will strive to protect the freedom and liberty
of the believers concerned to fulfill their religious be-
liefs as long as the freedoms and liberties of other
citizens are not harmed.
traditions, on the one hand, and the distinction and interlacing of the religious and political symbolic fields, on the other. Nyerere recognizes that religion and Ujamaa work in different symbolic fields and on different symbolic levels. But they are interlaced in their common subject (i.e. man) and object (i.e. man's welfare). One set of symbols, therefore, must receive, inform and redeem the other without either one reducing the other to its own level or absorbing it into its own sphere. This must constantly be kept in mind in the discussion of the interaction of Ujamaa and Christian ethics in Tanzania.

C. Ujamaa and Christian Ethics: Points of Contact

If, as we have just shown, Ujamaa anthropology allows religious belief in the transcendent to influence its political ethics, what has that influence been? Are there any points of contact between the Christian view of man and the purpose of his life and actions and the ethical orientation of the Ujamaa system? To reiterate the problematic as we posed it at the beginning of this chapter: Can a Christian work not only in, but also with Ujamaa? This problematic is confronted best by pointing out the convergence of the ethical assumptions or presuppositions of Christian theology and Ujamaa anthropology.
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It is important to mention before we attempt to note this convergence, however, that biblical scholars now generally agree that the Bible does not provide a detailed and precise "doctrine" of man. As in many other issues, it gives orientations which pertain to the establishment and nurturing of communion among men and between men and God. Many of these orientations are not fuzzy but are quite unmistakable as regards the perspectives they indicate. The vocation of Christians is to determine their actions and attitude according to these perspectives, while always remaining mindful that their understanding and appreciation of their demands may increase. This is what Vatican II called the Christian responsibility to read the "signs of the times and to interpret them in the light of the gospel."36

a. Man's Common Origin and Dignity

The most basic orientation in the Bible is that every human being is related to God through creation. The Bible calls man a "son", "likeness" or "image" of God to depict this relationship. As the theologian H.D. McDonald explains it, this "likeness" of man to God in the mind of the Bible is not a mere similarity or resemblance. It is more profound and incorporates the multifacetedness of

36. See Gaudium et Spes, no. 4, pp. 201-202.
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both God and man. It implies the holiness of man's body, the transcendence of his spirit, the divinity of his power to mould the world, the sanctity of communion between the sexes for reproduction, the aspiration of man's whole being towards God.\(^{37}\)

According to the Bible, then, man's relationship to God is an organic one, an essential and not an incidental likeness. In the words of the Psalmist, man is, indeed, little less than a god.\(^{38}\)

This organic relationship between God and man also seals the organic unity among men. In the New Covenant, this seal is explicated and perfected through the incarnation and cross of Jesus.\(^{39}\) Jesus, Son of God, became man and died on the cross to take up all men and the whole of creation to himself and, through his resurrection and ascension, to God. In the words of Paul, after the Christ-event distinctions among men matter no more. The distinctions of creation (of sex and race), and those of human


\(^{38}\) Ps. 8:3-8.

making (of economic or social standing) are of little consequence. All humanity is one in Christ.\textsuperscript{40}

This profoundly theological biblical view of man goes beyond any naturalistic, sociological, psychological or existential basis for the unity of the human race such as the Ujamaa ideology exhibits. Yet, we argue here that, at a deeper level, Ujamaa betrays an unmistakable influence of the Christian anthropology of the origin and dignity of man in the emphasis it places on human dignity as one of its principles of policy. Obviously, the plurality of religious beliefs in the nation make it impossible for Ujamaa to explicitly acknowledge this influence. Instead, it adduces natural and sociological reasons for the Party's basic belief in the universal brotherhood and unity of man. The influence of Christianity is clear, however, when you consider that an authentic and longlasting conviction in the universal brotherhood and dignity of man cannot be sustained on sociological evidence alone: the empirical divergences between individuals and groups are too great for that. An ethic, such as Ujamaa claims for itself, which takes as its basis the equal worth and dignity of everyone, not only in the eyes of the law, but first as an "attitude

\textsuperscript{40} 1 Cor. 12:13; Gal. 3:28.
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of mind" has to have a religious foundation. Given Nyerere's
conspicuously profound Christian faith and his intelligent
trust in the Church, one may safely assume that the
Christian anthropology provides this foundation.

b. The Ethic of Equality and Justice

Ujamaa's specific ethic of equality and justice,
elaborated in the previous chapters, also betrays elements
of the Christian belief in the shared origin, dignity and
destiny of every human person. If all men are made in the
likeness of God, and all are one in Christ through his incar-
nation and redemptive work, they are intended to live as one
community. This can be the only logical purpose of the
fundamental nature they share. But there can be no community,
in the strict, theological sense of the word, where there is
inequality resulting from injustice and exploitation. True
community, in Christianity and in Ujamaa implies co-operation,
sharing and mutual help. In biblical phraseology, this is
called being one another's keeper, "bearing each other's
burdens". 41 One can see here a Christian theological inspira-
tion for Nyerere's socialization Act of 1967 following The
Arusha Declaration and his order for the Great (Villagization)

41. Gen. 4:9-10; Gal. 6:2.
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Move in 1973. Despite their shortcomings, both of these had the inculcation of community as their motive. But the pragmatic and theological-ethical fact that true community cannot be legislated did not escape Nyerere at these moments of nationalistic impatience and fervour. As regards the villages, he distinguished between ujamaa villages, analogous to community in the real sense, and development villages. The latter did not meet the criteria for Ujamaa, for community, because of the element of coercion involved in their establishment. Nyerere's only excuse for them was that they were necessary for the provision of social services and the facilitation of popular self-government, that is, for purely sociological and political reasons. However, looked at from another way, it is possible to see even the establishment of development villages as the creation of an ambiance for "familyhood", for community, born of Nyerere's deep-rooted, even if intellectually unacknowledged, urge for a oneness which sustains equality and justice. Could the development villages be seen as a "sacrament" of and for


community? The Christian anthropologist, M. Wilson, for one, interprets The Arusha Declaration, which incorporates the ethic for the development villages, as an effort on the part of Nyerere "to mould the institutions of an expanding society in terms of Christian values."  

44  
c. Love: the Ethic of Sharing and Co-operation  

In the new dispensation, Christ makes love the centrepiece of the new community, that is, the Christian community. 45 Love is what describes best the motive for Christ's incarnation, suffering and death. 46 It is what characterized his ministry. 47 Love is what identifies the true followers of Christ. 48 And love not as merely an emotion, as an ethereal feeling, but as empathy, compassion, or an actual suffering with the other person. In other words, love as an ethic of participation, sharing and co-operation in community. 49 That is the kind of love that

46. Jn. 3:13-17; Phil. 2:1-11.  
47. Lk. 4:16-22.  
48. 1 Jn. 4:7-21.  
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concretizes faith and hope, builds the Reign of God here on earth, and ultimately saves. 50

This Christian understanding of love in community necessarily implies self-denial. Over the ages this aspect has been interpreted solipsistically and negatively as self-mortification. But in its scriptural meaning, love as self-denial is a positive, outgoing force. It means self-giving, self-emptying for the sake of the other who is materially or spiritually disadvantaged. It is this positive force that Ujamaa has captured in its ideology. The wealth and other resources of the world are limited. Their equitable distribution and use for the sustenance of a decent quality of life for everybody requires some degree of proportionality. This proportionality implies the forbearance of the acquisitiveness which concentrates resources and power disproportionately in society, in the world or even in a particular time. For Ujamaa, this is a moral obligation. And so Nyerere advocates the establishment of a New International Economic and Information Order for that reason. But there is also a practical ethical purpose of global consequence. Only through the proportioning of the earth's resources of life and power in an equitable way throughout

50. Jm. 2.
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the world, Nyerere believes, can world peace be maintained. We owe the maintenance of peace and the survival of the world to ourselves. Beyond that, the resources of the world must be proportioned in view of future generations. The world is in our hands in trust for them too.

The education policy in Tanzania takes into account this theological-ethical aspect of self-denial as self-giving. The policy insists that it is unethical and immoral for a teacher or doctor, for example, to claim privileges beyond the means of the people as a condition for providing services in an environment of absolute ignorance, poverty and disease such as Tanzania's. An educated person is a traitor (the political equivalent of moral culpability) if he uses the power education gives him to use other people as objects for his own ends. For Nyerere, education is properly used when one participates in the endeavour for the social and moral uplift of all.

d. Participation as the Ethic of Freedom

In participating in the endeavour to improve the conditions of life for all, one contributes also to the ambiance of freedom. We have seen that Nyerere considers

freedom as indivisible: no one is really free until everyone is free. Nyerere does not confine such freedom only to the parameters of politics and economics; one can infer from his insistence on the formation of inner personal attitudes of sharing, co-operation and participation that he takes moral and spiritual freedom to be equally important.

There is no need to dwell on the validity of Nyerere's political and economic claims in this area. In Africa, for example, it is quite obvious that the situation in South Africa threatens the stability and security of the whole continent. In national security states, dictatorships or colonies not even those in power experience freedom because they always have to be on the alert for real or imagined opposition or revolt against their power. Economically and socially, the pattern is the same. That the rich and the educated generally are afraid of the poor and ignorant is an established sociological fact. It is confirmed in the ghettos of all the major cities of the world, on the one hand, and by the economic and social hiatus that obtains between the city and the country, on the other. But Nyerere believes that no matter how far apart different categories and classes of people may be, none can enjoy true freedom unless all participate in the establishment of equitable conditions of life and the removal of the artificial
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barriers between them. For there are realities in life which respect no boundaries. This is becoming increasingly clear today. As an instance, epidemics caused by lack of proper sanitation among the poor may quickly spread to the seemingly protected enclaves of the rich and play as much havoc there as elsewhere. The only real security, the only road to real freedom in this case is to make sure, through community effort, that proper sanitation is available to all so as to curtail the rise of epidemics in the first place.

The Old Testament depicts more clearly Nyerere's political and social concerns of freedom and the New Testament his moral and spiritual perspective. Freedom or liberty in the Old Testament has an empirical connotation. For an individual person, it means not to be possessed by someone else as a slave; for a nation, it means not to be under the domination of a foreign ruler. The primary understanding of freedom for Ujamaa is similar. Ujamaa regards this extent of freedom as the minimum required for the human dignity of

52. A current example is the rapid spread of the disease AIDS (Acquired Immunity Deficiency Syndrome) and the loss of life it has caused throughout the world. Even though we are not suggesting that the emergence of the disease has anything to do with social or economic classes, it has not respected any of these barriers. This is the point Nyerere tries to get across.
every person or nation. From here it becomes possible for an individual or a nation to cultivate an atmosphere conducive to deeper experiences of freedom. As was outlined in Chapter One, it was precisely the legacy of slavery and the existence of colonial domination that partly created the conditions which made the emergence of the Ujamaa system possible.

The sociological and political aspects of liberty are not pronounced in the New Testament. It is more concerned with the theological sense of freedom. This principally means being in Christ, that is, following his Gospel and living and acting according to his Spirit. Slavery, according to the New Testament, is bondage to sin. It is to live and act contrary to the Gospel of Christ and his Spirit.

If we stop at this level of New Testament hermeneutics, there is apparently little convergence between the Christian understanding of liberty in the New Testament and the ethic of Ujamaa. But one important consideration will indicate that this is not so. The question is: what, indeed, is the Gospel of Christ and what does his Spirit demand of Christians? What is sin and what does slavery to it mean?

Although it is difficult to find a definitive, unanimous answer to this question, many biblical scholars
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and theologians contend that the Gospel of Christ has to do with a historical endeavour to create a community of human beings where all experience the love of God through each other. The Spirit of Christ demands of Christians that they understand, teach and live all that he himself was in his teaching and life. It demands that they enhance the spirit of union and unity in the world. Sin, from this perspective, is the disruption of this union and unity through bondage to selfishness, greed, pride, hate, laziness, theft and all those negative attitudes that create disharmony, mistrust and chaos. To ask for the meaning of the Gospel of Christ is, therefore, to try to elicit its ethic. The similarities between this ethic and Ujamaa's insistence on the ethic of participation in and for community become clearer at this point. As the biblical theologian and exegete, J.L. McKenzie writes, despite its hermeneutical opacity:

The principle of Christian freedom ... as enunciated in the N.T., contains the principle of social and political freedom; for within the Christian community all have secured equal freedom through baptism, whatever their social status (1 Co. 12:13). All are equally free in Christ, so that within the Christian community national, social, or racial distinctions are of no validity (Gal 3:28; Col 3:11). 53

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McKenzie postulates that this principle does have social and political consequences. If all have equal freedom in Christ, even beyond the boundaries of nationality, race and creed, all are entitled and obliged by that same freedom to build communities, or a human community, in which it thrives. This is an ongoing task. It requires commitment and creativity. For, the creative activity which is committed to the realization of liberty for all is also a sign of personal freedom and uniqueness. It is a sign of one's likeness to the Supreme Creator. But creativity always involves risk. It must, nevertheless, be undertaken in faith and hope for a positive purpose.

Nyerere is no wide-eyed idealist. His idealism is realistic. He does not advocate Ujamaa as a panacea to all social ills. He advances it as a contribution towards a more integral growth of the human race. He is quite aware of the risks involved even in the ideology of Ujamaa itself. He has acknowledged that the Ujamaa programme can be crushed or manipulated for purposes contradictory to freedom and the construction of a genuine human community in Tanzania. But the responsibility, the hopes and aspirations implied in

the Ujamaa movement, in Nyerere's view, outweigh by far any other option. These include caring for one another, conserving creation not only for ourselves but for the future, and, generally, the assurance of the survival of the earth. All of these are also elements of a properly Christian anthropology and ethic, as O'Grady notes.\textsuperscript{54} The Christian ethic and the Ujamaa ethic converge here as well.

e. The Rule of Law and the Reality of Sin

We have just noted that Nyerere's conception of Ujamaa as a creative movement is not naïve. Nyerere does not discount the reality of evil in man and in the world, which in Christian theology is called sin. The theology of the biblical aetiological story of the Fall, for example, is simply that to be human is to be possessed of sinful tendencies: presumptuousness, mistrust, folly and, generally, a departure from the ways intended for us by God. The pull toward waywardness is great. But the mission of Jesus Christ is to proclaim the Rule or Reign of God. It is to show by his life, death and resurrection that sin and its disruptive effects can be overcome. Death, the power of sin, need not terrorize man; life can be achieved by the destruction of

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sin, as Christ did. Christians see the complete destruction of sin in the eschaton as a matter of hope. But theirs is an active hope in the sense that they are already working toward that final goal. When they confess belief in the "forgiveness of sin", they assert the need for conversion, for a change of direction, from the ways of selfishness and rebellion against their fellow-man and against God to the ways of co-operation with God through their fellow-man.

Congruent with this Christian vision, Nyerere urges inner change. He believes that man can transcend his selfishness up to a certain point and co-operate with others. But man needs help in this lifetime task. Thus, not only does Ujamaa advocate the formation of an attitude of mind conducive to community, but it also emphasizes the rule of law. The valid law of the land in itself cannot form community, it cannot induce genuine participation in it. As law, it is subsidiary to the attitude favouring community and is at its service. Yet, the law is necessary, if only to curb the more disruptive tendencies in man. As Nyerere sees it, the law can serve to orientate individual persons and societies to their calling as co-operators, as beings of a common origin and destiny, regardless of whether these are seen as natural and temporal or divine and transcendental.
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D. The Relevance of Ujamaa to Christian Faith

Ujamaa, as a pursuit of values through action guided by certain specific principles, seeks to create a specific social order through specific means. As such it is important to Christian faith. For, faith itself is the growth in maturity by the implementation of certain values. Faith demands a conscientious fulfillment of the will of God as revealed through Christ in history. Because the empirical-historical data is the same for the faith as for civil society, faith must take this data into account if it is to have any significance. In the social sphere, as A. A. Boesak puts it, authentic "Faith continually tests programs by the criteria of the gospel of Jesus Christ, discerning where they serve liberation, justice, and the wholeness of life within every situation." According to Gaudium et Spes, Christian faith also envisions a social order which is based on truth, justice and love. But since social orders and ideologies are "secular", in Nyerere's sense of the word, faith has a dual responsibility.


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First, it must discern, in each historical epoch, which ideologies project and actualize best the practical demands of the transcendental truth. Then, it must constantly call these ideologies to ever higher levels of perfection through the life, the preaching and, if need be, the practical involvement of the Church in the social process. In other words, Christian faith has to discern, on the basis of revelation, which social symbols favour an authentically human plan of development and criticize those which do not. 57

Nyerere sees this as the task of the Christian faith and the Church in Tanzania. As a Christian, he would like to see what theologians I. Alszeghy and M. Flick say in reference to the Christian discernment of ideologies in general applied to Ujamaa. According to Alszeghy and Flick:

... an ideology can be judged authentically Christian if it produces fruits of Christian life. If today's ideology, which spurs men to commitment to earthly development, were to become a spirituality in which men might intensify their theological life, manifested in commitment prompting them to sacrifice their own interests for the individual and collective interests of others; and if this involvement, far from prayer life, makes easier (perhaps in new forms) union with the living Christ and joyously accepted immersion in the paschal mystery of cross

57. See Redemptor Hominis, nos. 43-58, pp. 245-273.
and resurrection, then the present ideology will itself become the 'norma normata norms' of theology. A theology incapable of explaining, establishing and promoting, an ideology experienced in life, would be a theology perhaps true, but abstract and hopelessly irrelevant. 58

In many of his conversations with Christians and Christian leaders, Nyerere poses virtually the same questions to the Church in its relationship with Ujamaa: Is the Ujamaa ideology's commitment to temporal progress conducive to the development of an authentic Christian vision of life, a Christian spirituality? Does it clarify, or perhaps facilitate for Christians, the practical meaning of the cross and resurrection of their faith? If it does, Nyerere reminds the Church that it has a responsibility to help in its own way to enhance it. On the other hand, if it does not, he asks the Church leaders to point out its shortcomings. 59

Nyerere is aware of the traditional theological


59. This is a constant theme of Nyerere in almost all of his major speeches to religious leaders. See, for example, "The Church and Society" in his Freedom and Development, pp. 213-228; Ujamaa wa Tanzania na Dini, Dar es Salaam, KIUTA, 1970, passim; "Interview"; and "The Church and Socio-Economic Development". See also D.W. Robinson, "The Church in Tanganyika", p. 260.
and practical separation between the temporal liberation of man and his eschatological salvation, but he thinks that it is now passé. The temporal and eschatological spheres must, of course, remain distinct, but the Church "must be involved with the human society if it is properly to serve people as individuals who have souls to be saved." 60 In Africa, the stage has been reached where the State and the Church can co-operate fruitfully in shared areas of concern such as the enhancement of freedom, justice and human dignity:

And I suggest that the Church should want this co-operation. For the Church cannot isolate itself from what is going on around it if it is to be true to its commitment to spread the message of love among mankind. And what is going on around it depends to a considerable extent on what the State or the world economic forces are doing. 61

A significant aspect of the mission of the Church, in this view of Nyerere, is to interpret the present data of history eschatologically, on the one hand, and, on the other, to interpret itself and its eschatological vision historically. As E. Schillebeeckx has put it, history must not be reduced to its merely socio-political components; it


61. Ibid., p. 223.
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must also be seen as the locus of the power of the grace and
goodness of God. And so, for the Church, as F.S. Fiorenza
explains, the more its ministry is integrated in the actual
historical demands for transcendence, the more it is able to
fulfill its mission of evangelization. 62

E. Conclusion

The anthropology of Ujamaa, rooted as it is in the
traditional African view of man as an organic part of socie-
ty, leads to a better appreciation of the system's founda-
tions and principles of policy discussed in Chapters Two
and Three above. These are its insistence on community,
participation, co-operation and sharing, justice, equality,
freedom and human dignity. They comprise Ujamaa's values
and regulate Tanzania's domestic and international ethic.
In other words, they mould Tanzania's attitudes and beha-
viour and, therefore, its self-articulation as a nation.
Yet, these are not only socio-political values. Insofar as
they influence man's self-realization as man, they are also

62. See E. Schillebeeckx, "Eager to Spread the
Fiorenza, "The Church's Religious Identity and Its Social
and Political Mission" in Theological Studies, 43:2 (1982),
p. 225. See also L. and C. Boff, Salvation and Liberation,
Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1984; V. Cosmao, Changing the World,
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profoundly religious or spiritual values. The question that Ujamaa has had to deal with since the beginning, in view of its self-description as a "secular" ideology, is how to relate the dual secular-religious or temporal-transcendental signification of the truth of and about man in contemporary Tanzania.

An examination of several contemporary political and theological approaches to this universal problematic in comparison with Ujamaa's own approach shows that each approaches the question in a distinctive way despite their important similarities. Theologically, the unique insight of the approach of Ujamaa, as distinct from that of political or liberation theology, for example, derives from the fact of Tanzania's religiously pluralistic society. Tanzania does not have one religious culture. This means that Christianity cannot impose its values there as a basis for the temporal social order or personal transcendental aspirations. Thus Ujamaa's secular option. As a socio-political and economic ideology it chooses to concern itself with the empirical aspect of human life: how to best organize society so that freedom, equality and human dignity will be safeguarded. However, it admits that in doing so, it leaves another whole aspect of the truth about man unexplored, that is, the religious-theological aspect. But that aspect is
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outside its competence. It belongs to religion, religious belief and the Churches to investigate it and enrich Ujamaa by their transcendental perspectives. Therefore, Ujamaa welcomes the participation of the Churches and religious believers as partners and critics in the empirical-social task of building a free, just and prosperous nation and world.

Is this partnership possible for the Christian Church in Tanzania? It could be if there are any points of contact between the Church and Ujamaa which could serve as a springboard, that is, if the fundamental mission of the Church and the objectives of Ujamaa are not diametrically opposed. Although it was not our intention to suggest that they are identical, our brief analysis has shown that they converge on the fundamental moral and ethical issue of the meaning of man's temporal existence. The following chapter will investigate the practical and strategic tasks of theology and the Church in relation to these convergences and existential divergencies.
CHAPTER VII

THE PRACTICAL THEOLOGICAL-ETHICAL TASKS OF THE CHURCH IN TANZANIA

Nyerere has expressed the concern that the Church will fail to seize the opportunity provided by Ujamaa to interpret its eschatological mission in Tanzania's historical context for the sake of evangelization. But he believes, as we have already shown, that the Church has an indispensable contribution to make towards the gradual realization of Ujamaa's principles of justice, freedom, equality and human dignity. He counsels that it would be a grave mistake for the Church in Tanzania to relegate the defence of these principles only to non-believers. In the conflict between justice and injustice, he sees the Church called to stand solidly on the side of justice. Various traditions of the Church have spoken about the practical requirements of these principles. What are the convergences and divergences between their assertions and the practice of Ujamaa?

1. See J.K. Nyerere, Ujamaa wa Tanzania, pp. 31-33.
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A. Justice and Human Dignity

a. The Traditions of the Church

There is certainly more involved in the question of justice and human dignity than economic considerations, but where the relationship between Ujamaa and the Church is concerned, property and ownership are two of the most significant and practical aspects of the question.

The Early Church. The oldest and most prestigious Christian reflections on social justice bear on these aspects of economic life. To the early Fathers of the Church, every human being is born with rights to those things God has provided in the world for the sustenance of human life. These are land, water, air, light and food. They are res communes, that is, communal gifts and are intended for common use. Joint human proprietorship and care, and not their private ownership, is what constitutes their "natural", that is, in this case, their divinely ordained intent. To take, therefore, for oneself alone what "by nature", through God's providence, belongs to all, the Fathers variously characterize as unnatural, theft, sloth, injustice, spoliation, idolatry, and even murder. For the Fathers, nature or divine providence is the source of the common ownership
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of life's essential resources. Private acquisition of these resources is a result of human arrangement. 2

Both Basil the Great and John Chrysostom, for instance, refuse to accept the proposition that the wealthy achieve their private possessions without injury to the commonwealth, that is, in accordance with justice. They insist that there is a direct causal relationship between the wealth of some and the poverty of others. If individuals appropriated only those things which suffice for their needs, Basil maintains, and did not hold on to an excess, the gap between rich and poor would be eliminated. In his own words: "no one would be rich, no one poor." 3 And Jerome, commenting on Jesus' logion in Luke 16:9, 11, writes:

And wisely he [Jesus] said 'with unjust money', for all riches derive from injustice, and unless one loses the other cannot gain. Therefore it is clear to


3. See C. Avila, Ownership, p. 49 and passim.
me that the familiar proverb is eminently true: 'The rich is either unjust, or heir of one unjust'.

Even if they do not spell it out in so many words, Jerome and the other Fathers are alluding here to the dynamics of the production and acquisition of wealth. Only labour produces wealth, not capital as such. Any individual or group of individuals has a limited labour capacity which can only produce more wealth than others by employing other people's labour directly or indirectly. And so, excessive differentiating wealth is seen to be a result of the exploitation of the labour of others for the sake of one's own or one's group's profit. The Fathers call this injustice and theft, its legality in positive law notwithstanding.

In the social thought of Clement of Alexandria, the right of ownership is determined by the purpose of wealth. This is the satisfaction of personal and community needs. Ownership finds its moral justification within and in accordance with this purpose. In the sixth century, Gregory the Great made the same point very forcefully. Like the other Fathers, he asserts first that all riches are drawn


5. See C. Avila, Ownership, pp. 45-46.
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from the earth which is "common to all human beings"; and
so, properly, riches must be used to satisfy the essential
needs of all before they can be claimed as private:

Those are wrong who protest their innocence when they take over for
their private use the gift that God made for all. If they do not give
alms out of the goods they have received, they become guilty of the
death of their fellow human beings. Insofar as they avariciously with-
hold necessities from the poor who are dying of hunger, they let them
perish. When we supply necessities to fill their needs, we are not
indulging in personal generosity; we are giving them back what belongs
to them. We are fulfilling a duty of justice rather than performing an
act of charity. 6

The question of "almsgiving", which Gregory mentions, con-
stitutes a whole separate discussion in itself in the
writings of the Fathers. It is enough to underline here
that they invariably situate it in the context of justice.

Thomas Aquinas is often advanced as the authorita-
tive defender of private ownership. It has been suggested
that this may be a result of a partial reading of Aquinas.

6. Regulæ Pastoralis Liber, 3, XXI, 66, PL, 77,
p. 87. This trans, is from V. Cosmao, Changing the world,
Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1984, p. 76.

7. For example, by J.P. Miranda, Marx and the
Bible, p. 1.
Aquinas's social thought is contained in his commentary on Aristotle's Politics, in his De Regimine Principium and in the Summa Theologica. Pertinent to the question of property and ownership is Aquinas's treatise on justice and, specifically, the discussion on poverty in Summa Theologica, IIa IIae, Question 66, Article 2. Here Aquinas maintains that "it is lawful for a man to possess a thing as his own", but he uses the terms procurare et dispensare to depict his understanding of private possession. For him, such ownership means the caring for and the apportioning of wealth, not the hoarding (cumulare) or the exclusive use of it. Private possession is, as Aquinas sees it, for purposes of human accountability, efficiency and good order. It is not a matter of natural law, Aquinas concedes; rather it is a result of a human arrangement or positive law.

Saint Thomas Aquinas and the Fathers echo the Scriptural tradition on the question of justice. The Old Testament, and especially the prophetic tradition within it, focusses repeatedly on the theme of justice. The New Testament does not ignore the question of possessions. The economist and theologian J.P. Miranda has studied how the

Scriptures speak about wealth and poverty and he concludes that, while the Church and the post-patristic theologians have concentrated principally on the elucidation of the "doctrinal" aspects of the Bible, they have neglected and even misconstrued its social thought. Some translators, for instance, blunt the cutting edge of the social implications of Lk. 16:9, 11 by rendering the crucial phrase τοῦ μαμονά adikias to mean "worldly wealth" or "wealth of this world". In doing this they misconstrue the sense of the logic to deprecate material wealth as such. Miranda, however, maintains that this is not the sense of adikia and its derivatives. According to him, adikia is used in the New Testament to mean wrongdoing, injustice, unrighteousness, iniquity, or offence. In other words, it is seen in the context of the dynamics of social relationships.⁹

R. Mullin¹⁰ exposes some of the historical contradictions within the Church which muffled Scriptural and Patristic social thought throughout the Middle Ages. These contradictions make the original Christian understanding of

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the social implications of wealth very hard to unravel and appreciate even today. In modern times, however, the magisterial arm of the Church has once again attempted to recapture the spirit of the social thought of the early Church. The Vatican, the World Council of Churches (WCC) and various episcopal conferences and individual bishops have issued statements that bear on the practical aspects of justice and human dignity. We will concentrate here on the orientation of some of the major Vatican magisterial statements.11

Magisterial Thought. The movement to recapture the spirit of Scriptural and Patristic thought on social justice in the context of the modern world began with Rerum Novarum, Leo XIII's encyclical letter of 1891.12 Leo was concerned about the exploitation and the inhuman treatment of the workers by the commercial-industrial complex all-over


Europe. His letter was a protest against this exploitation of the industrial worker. According to D. Dorr, *Rerum Novarum* was not novel because it opposed the treatment of human labour as a commodity on the basis that this degraded the dignity of man; what was shocking to some was the encyclical's appeal to the principle of human dignity in defense of the overworked and underpaid working classes.\(^{13}\) With this approach, Leo was attacking the very basis of the existence of the capitalist industrial system, that is, the profit motive. He saw it as the duty of the State to intervene to protect the rights of the poor, but he categorically rejected communism and socialism as solutions to the plight of the poor and the working classes.

In 1931, Pius XI issued the encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*\(^ {14}\) in commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of *Rerum Novarum*. Pius's encyclical was in basic continuation with the themes and arguments broached in Leo XIII's earlier encyclical. It defended the rights of the poor, condemned communism and socialism and, like *Rerum Novarum*, remained ambivalent about the capitalist social system. In one

\(^{13}\) See D. Dorr, *Option for the Poor*, p. 14.

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important respect, however, it represented an advance beyond its predecessor. Noting that economic wealth means power, and that such power is often used to oppress, Quadragesimo Anno broaches the idea of change in the structures of the economic system:

... the institutions themselves of peoples and, particularly those of all social life, ought to be penetrated with ... justice, and it is most necessary that it be truly effective, that is, establish a juridical and social order which will, as it were, give form and shape to all economic life.15

For the encyclical, it is the responsibility of the public authority, that is, of the State, to ensure that justice prevails in the economic order.

In his Pentecost message of June 1, 1941, Pius XII underlined a point, already touched upon by both Leo XIII and Pius XI, that to every human being belongs the right to use material goods for a decent human life. As the Fathers before him had insisted, Pius XII asserts that this right precedes all others in the economic life of a society. That is to say that it precedes and supercedes even the right of private ownership. John XXIII, in Mater et Magistra (1961)

15. Ibid., no. 88, p. 429.
and in *Pacem in Terris* (1963), 16 did not move the Vatican magisterial position significantly beyond this point. In *Mater et Magistra* he re-emphasized Pius XII's Pentecost message 17 and in *Pacem in Terris* he insisted, not only on man's right to employment, but also that the conditions of work must be human and the remuneration just. "The amount a worker receives," *Pacem in Terris* says, "must be sufficient ... to allow him and his family a standard of living consistent with human dignity." 18

The originality of John XXIII and his particular contribution to Catholic social thought lie in his perspective of the world. His awareness of the phenomenon of "socialization" in the modern world, where, because of rapid and extensive communications people are able to form trans-regional associations, made him go beyond the purely European-American concerns that had largely occupied his predecessors. In so doing, his perspective of world economic systems also shifted significantly. He is not as strident

17. See *Mater et Magistra*, no. 43, pp. 63-64.
as his predecessors in his rejection of socialism, nor as ambivalent in his treatment of capitalism. In his enunciation of the principles of justice and human dignity, he appears, more than Leo XIII and Pius XI did, to have concrete situations in mind. It is this perspective of John XXIII which greatly influenced Vatican II's view of social justice, especially in the document on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes.

Concerning the use of material wealth Gaudium et Spes echoes the very words of the early Fathers. It states: "God intended the earth and all that it contains for the use of every human being and people. Thus, as all men follow justice and unite in charity, created goods should abound for them on a reasonable basis." This is the primary theological presupposition and general context within which the document discusses the question of ownership and property.

19. See Pacem in Terris, nos. 62 and 65, p. 114. In the latter, in what Dorr terms as "a shift to the left" in Vatican magisterial pronouncements, the Pope writes: "The common welfare ... demands that in their efforts to co-ordinate and protect, and their efforts to promote, the rights of citizens, the civil authorities preserve a delicate balance." What the Pope is doing here, according to Dorr, is eliminating "a good deal of the suspicion of State control and State initiatives, a suspicion which had been a central feature of the Catholic social outlook." See D. Dorr, Option for the Poor, p. 113.

20. No. 69, p. 278.
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The document, as H. Vorgrimler and O. von Nell-Breuning note, celebrates with enthusiasm the growth and expansion of the contemporary economy. But it offers no significant advance beyond *Mater et Magistra* and *Pacem in Terris* of John XXIII on the question of the restructuring of the international economic system so that it may effect a more just distribution of wealth. On the contrary, *Gaudium et Spes* still treats the aspect of justice in international ownership of wealth in terms of almsgiving, charity or "aid" to the disadvantaged from what is superfluous to one's own needs. 21 This is surprising in view of the explicit reference to the need of what is tantamount to a "New Economic Order" made by Pius XI three decades earlier in his encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*. It has been suggested that this omission was probably due to the lack of influence the Third World bishops had in the Council's deliberations and conclusions. It is argued that the Council was mainly a First World Council; it dealt principally with First World problems and concerns. Not until the 1971 Synod of Bishops would a Third World perspective have an obvious influence on a magisterial pronouncement of universal significance.

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The 1971 synodal statement, *Justice in the World*, however, was preceded by Paul VI's encyclical, *Populorum Progressio*, and his apostolic letter, *Octogesima Adveniens*, written to commemorate the eightieth anniversary of *Rerum Novarum*. Paul VI's principal theme in these documents is the question of "development", so prevalent in the 1960's and early 1970's. The particular merit of Paul VI in this respect is that he effectively shifted the meaning of the concept of development from its earlier preoccupation with the merely economic to the more comprehensive understanding of development as the progress of "every man and the whole man". To Paul, development means the growth of man materially, culturally and spiritually. Noticeably influenced by his journeys to different parts of the poor and rich worlds, his approach is also much more encompassing, that is, it is less restricted merely by the concerns of the North. Oswald von Nell-Breuning points out, however, that in *Populorum Progressio* "distributive measures still clearly predominate. Development policy here clearly retains the character of development 'aid', i.e. of alms from rich

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22. For references: *Populorum Progressio*, see Ch. IV, fn. 4; *Octogesima Adveniens*, see Ch. V, fn. 25.

nations to poor ones (though inculcated as strictly obligatory)."  

The radical nature of Justice in the World lies in the fact that it does not content itself with the "aid" solution to the problem of the maldistribution of wealth. On the contrary, it speaks of the empowerment of the weak, the oppressed and marginalized. According to the Synod, structures of injustice are at the core of the problem of poverty. These structures are perpetuated because the poor are excluded from participating in the determination of their own destiny; that is, the problem is precisely that the marginalized - individuals, groups or nations - are excluded from economic and political power. As Justice in the World sees it, therefore, the marginalized, the powerless and the voiceless must be liberated from this situation. They must be helped to be subjects of history, masters of their own destiny. In so many words, the document asserts that Jesus' Gospel mandates the Church to participate in this process of the liberation of man:


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Action on behalf of justice and partici-
pation in the transformation of the world
fully appear to us as a constitutive
dimension of preaching the Gospel, or, in
other words, of the Church's mission for
the redemption of the human race and its
liberation from every oppressive situation.27

The controversy raised by this assertion of the
Synod, especially in the rich world, prompted Paul VI to is-
sue his apostolic exhortation, Evangelii Nuntiandi in 1976.28
The theme many found objectionable in the synodal document
was the liberation of the poor. In Evangelii Nuntiandi,
Paul does not shy away from it. On the contrary, in a
brilliant theological act of balance, he accepts it and gives
it respectability, being careful to warn against the excesses
to which it can lead.29

27. Ibid., p. 391. The words of A. Camus are very
pertinent here: "The world expects of Christians that they
will raise their voices so loudly and clearly and so formu-
late their protest that not even the simplest man can have
the slightest doubt about what they are saying. Further, the
world expects of Christians that they will eschew all fuzzy
abstractions and plant themselves squarely in front of the
bloody face of history. We stand in need of folk who have
determined to speak directly and unmistakably and, come what
may, to stand by what they have said." Quoted by W.E.

28. AAS, 68:1 (1976), pp. 5-76, trans. as On
Evangelization in the Modern World, Boston, Daughters of St.
Paul, n.d.

29. Ibid., e.g., nos. 30-39, pp. 18-22.
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John Paul II, in his innumerable speeches around the world, and especially in his encyclical *Laborem Exercens* of 1981,\(^{30}\) has been careful to preserve this insight of Paul VI. John Paul II's style in the encyclical is deeply philosophical and analytical. But, like the Fathers, many of his predecessors and the Council, he maintains without equivocation that the goods of the earth are meant for everyone, and that the right to private ownership of property is only legitimate in the context of the right of all humanity to a materially human existence.\(^{31}\)

b. Convergence and Divergence with Ujamaa

The outstanding question for us at this point is: Where do the early orientation of the Church, the Vatican magisterial statements and the Ujamaa ideology on the ethical issues of social justice in the contemporary world converge or diverge?

On the basis of the analysis of the foundations and principles of Ujamaa in Chapters Two and Three above, and the basic thrust of the traditions of the Church just sketched in this chapter, one can see a fundamental convergence

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31. See *ibid.*, nos. 63-71, pp. 312-314.
between the Church's and Ujamaa's perspectives on property and ownership. Nyerere's exhortation to those who owned property in the early days of his career incorporates much of the most significant moral and ethical implications of the social thought of the Fathers and the social encyclicals of the popes since Leo XIII:

Those of you who have capital or who own property, do not try to use your wealth as a weapon with which to oppress your brothers; but use it instead like a trust fund in helping to build a prosperous Tanganyika in which there will be no more wide gaps between rich and poor, but in which the wealth of the nation will be 'family property' - the property of every member of our family.32

This is what John Paul II, for example, infers when he speaks about the meaning of true socialization. He points out that authentic socialization involves the preservation of the "subject character" of every individual and society. Each person, on the basis of his work, must be "fully entitled to consider himself as part owner of the great workbench at which he is working with every one else."33

The bishops of Tanzania, in their message on the occasion of the centenary of the founding of the Church there, endorsed

33. Laborem Exercens, no. 69, pp. 313-314.
Ujamaa's policy of socializing the major means of production. They perceived this as one of the ways of enabling the workers to be masters of their own destiny or, in the words of John Paul II, of preserving their character as "subjects" in their work and in history. 34

Although the fundamental purpose and use of wealth in the traditional thought of the Church and that of Ujamaa converge, there is a serious divergence between them in drawing the practical implications or in conceiving the practical strategies for implementing the theoretical positions.

Ujamaa refuses to accept a class structure of society as a principle of social organization. It argues that God did not create some people to be perpetually masters and others to be perpetually "hewers of wood and drawers of water". As Ujamaa sees it, this is what a class social structure more or less means in fact. Such a system is seen by Ujamaa to incorporate political, economic and social disparities which militate against justice, equality and human dignity. For the sake of the preservation of these values, Ujamaa makes it a point of fundamental importance

34. See Catholic Bishops of Tanzania, The Church and Developing Society, no. 10.
not to allow the stratification of classes in Tanzanian society on any basis whatever. As Nyerere puts it:

We cannot allow the growth of first and second class citizenship. Each ... citizen must accept all the duties, and receive all the rights, which our citizenship implies. All must be governed by the same laws, must receive the same respect from his fellows, and have the same opportunities to earn a living and to serve the nation of which he is a member.35

Leo XIII, Pius XII, and even John XXIII, on the contrary, defend social and economic stratification as reasonable and natural. In one of his earlier encyclicals, Ad Petri Cathedram,36 John XXIII indicated that to question the validity of the existence of social classes is to try to contradict "the very laws of nature".37 He was elaborating on Leo XIII who, sixty-eight years previously, wrote in Rerum Novarum to the effect that structural change for the


37. See ibid., no. 38, p. 9. In Tanzania, Archbishop E. Maranta of Dar es Salaam wrote in the same year to the effect that social classes were of divine ordination. Just as in the Church there are clerics and laity, the archbishop illustrated, it is also proper that in the wider society there should be classes of owners and workers, rulers and ruled. See his "The Catholic African", pp. 226-231.
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purpose of diminishing or eliminating class stratification
in society, which was currently being suggested by socialist
theory, was against nature and contrary to the plan of God.
To him, differences in individual personal qualities, which,
as we have seen, Nyerere would perceive as instruments of
social equality, justify the social stratification of
economic classes. Leo's encyclical declares:

It must first of all be recognized that
the condition of things inherent in
human affairs must be borne with, for
it is impossible to reduce civil society
to one dead level [i.e. to equality].
Socialists may in that intent do their
utmost, but all striving against
nature is in vain. There naturally
exist among mankind manifold differences
of the most important kind ... and un-
equal fortune is a necessary result of
unequal condition.38

Leo XIII urges the workers and the poor "fully and
faithfully to perform the work which has been freely and
equitably agreed upon", and in matters concerning the struc-
turing of society, never to listen to socialists.39 This is

38. Rerum Novarum, no. 17, p. 245. The Latin
original reads: "Illud itaque statuatur primo loco, feren-
dam esse conditionem humanam: ima summis paria fieri in
civili societate non posse. Agitant id quidem Socialistae:
sed omnis est contra rerum naturam vana contentio. Sunt enim
in hominibus maximeae plurimaequae natura dissimilitudines ... 
quarum rerum necessarium discriminem sua sponte sequitur fortuna
dispar."

39. See ibid., no. 20, pp. 245-246. Emphasis added.
to say that according to Leo XIII, the workers and the poor should accept the class structure as it is and not try to change it. To do the latter, Leo XIII argues, will cause only disharmony and bitterness. What is demanded is that the rich be honest, pay their employees a fair wage and impose on them only such work as they can humanly deal with.

Ujamaa, however, finds it hard to speak of a "free" and "equitable" work contract in a class social structure. Need on the part of the worker may nullify his freedom in this matter and incline him to accept inequitable remuneration from the employer. It is important to note here that Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno and John XXIII in Mater et Magistra point this out. They also refer to the responsibility of the civil authorities to protect the workers and the poor in circumstances of gross inequality. In such circumstances also, J.P. Miranda argues, as Ujamaa would, that the notion of the "fair wage" as the protector of contractual justice usually clouds the real issue. Miranda maintains that a wage is fair or just only if it does not allow for differentiating income between employer and employee. A wage that is designed to leave huge profits to

the employer is unfair and unjust no matter how generous and contractually acceptable it may be to the workers. There is involved in such inequitable contracts, be it by design or otherwise, an element of constraint or imposition on labour which makes them innately invalid. 41

Ujamaa envisions two elements in the process of achieving a credible social justice today: the transformation of hearts, which it refers to as an attitude of mind or a national ethic, and the transformation of structures. The two are corollaries. A socialist attitude of mind must lead inevitably to the construction of structures of justice. Otherwise it is not valid. Conversely, the existence of socialist structures indicates, at the very least, the existence of a socialist will. 42

Another significant divergence between Ujamaa and


42. According to G. Gutierrez: "The view that a structural transformation will automatically produce different human beings is no more and no less 'mechanistic' than the view that a 'personal change of heart' will automatically lead to a transformation of society. Any such mechanistic views are naive and unrealistic." See his "Liberation Praxis and Christian Faith" in R. Gibellini, ed., Frontiers of Theology in Latin America, Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1979, p. 11.
papal social thought is evidenced in the assertion of *Rerum Novarum* that there is no obligation to share with others what is necessary for maintaining one's standard of life. No one, the encyclical states, is commanded to divest himself of "what is reasonably required to keep up becomingly his condition in life, 'for no one ought to live other than becomingly'". The divergence here relates to the criteria of what the encyclical refers to as a becoming life. For, whereas Ujamaa takes the injunction that "no one ought to live other than becomingly" in an absolute sense, *Rerum Novarum*, and much of the magisterial statements before the Council, use it in a relative sense. For Ujamaa, man's humanity constitutes his absolute claim and right to a becoming life; papal thought, however, considers social status - one's "condition in life" - to be the determining factor. Consequently, *Rerum Novarum* instructs that only when the requirements of one's social status have been fulfilled does it become an obligation to give the remainder to the poor. In other words, the encyclical's call is to be charitable to the indigent: "'Of that which remaineth, give alms'."

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44. See *Rerum Novarum*, no. 22, p. 247.
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In the social sphere Ujamaa does not see this as justice. It does not see it as conducive to respect of the human dignity of the poor. Here it is in agreement with Gaudium et Spes and Populorum Progressio.45 These documents, like Ujamaa, count the economic right of "every human being and people" to a decent human life as having precedence over concern for individual or group social status. Many moral theologians and ethicists are also of this view. D.C. Maguire, for instance, speaks for many of them when he says that human "Worth is ... ontologically and logically prior to merit and contractual obligation. It is because of what persons are worth that contracts and merits must be honored."46

c. The Theological Task

In his important study on the social thought of Vatican II, R. Charles points out the importance of the link between justice and love in Christian ethics. The Christian view of the social order makes justice and love complementary. In the practice of justice, love cannot be neglected because, if it is, justice will be "harsh and penal". Writes Charles: "The community that thinks charity can be neglected will be

45. Gaudium et Spes, no. 69, pp. 278-279; Populorum Progressio, nos. 22 and 23, p. 187.

inhuman in its administration of justice. 

Ujamaa's reference to this other quality of justice, namely love, is scant or non-existent. Obviously, this is because of its consciousness of the limitations of its symbolic field. Love's articulation requires symbols which go beyond those of political representation. The symbols of love are religious symbols. They pertain to the religious sphere.

Yet, in the socio-political sphere stress on justice may be at the service of love. There, as Maguire stresses, justice is primatial as "the only form that love takes". He points out that in the socio-political sphere, the danger is that talk of love and friendship usually refers to the very elements, such as "charity" and "aid", that may obstruct the necessary construction of the structures of justice. But justice is the basic manifestation of authentic love. It is also the basic expression of morality, of the acceptance of the others as human persons. 

We noted earlier that action on behalf of justice

47. R. Charles, *The Social Teaching*, p. 89.

is referred to by the 1971 Synod of Bishops as a constitutive dimension (ratio constitutiva) of the preaching of the Gospel. This indicates the fundamental importance of justice to the understanding of Christ's good news of love. The Symposium of Episcopal Conferences of Africa and Madagascar (SECAM) states that one cannot say that the Gospel and the Church have been fully established among a people if they do not call forth works of justice. And for Bishop C. Mwoleka, the only sure sign that God reigns among Christians is their practice of justice and the manifestation of its fruits of love and peace. Justice mandates a vigorous struggle against both the attitudes and institutions of injustice. Justice is founded on the love of God. In his summary of the Scriptures – the Law and the


50. See C. Mwoleka, "Small Christian Communities", p. 29. In his A Theology of Liberation, pp. 175-176, G. Gutierrez writes: "Sin is evident in oppressive structures, in the exploitation of man by man, in the domination and slavery of peoples, races and social classes. Sin appears, therefore, as the fundamental alienation, the root situation of injustice and exploitation. It cannot be encountered in itself, but only in concrete instances, in particular alienations. It is impossible to understand the concrete manifestations without understanding the underlying basis and vice versa. Sin demands a radical liberation, which in turn necessarily implies a political liberation."
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Prophets - Jesus confirms the inalienable dignity of the human person by linking it with the dignity of God himself. He makes them inseparable. In Mt. 22:39, for example, Jesus asserts that the love of God and man is one. In ethical responsibility, the self, the other, and God are bound together. Authentic love of God requires love of the other person. Conversely, to love and serve the other person in sincerity is to love and serve God. But where the love of man is denied through injustice, there cannot be divine love, as 1 Jn. 4, for one, indicates. 51 The Church, as the sacrament of Christ's salvation on earth, must consider the denunciation of injustice as one of its primary responsibilities. 52 "A Message to the People of the Third World by Fifteen Bishops" explains the practical meaning of this responsibility as follows:

The moment a [socio-politico-economic] system fails to provide for the common good and shows favoritism to a particular few, the Church has the duty not only to denounce the injustice, but also to cut free from that unjust system, seeking to collaborate with some other

51. See also 1 Jn. 2:7-11; 3:11-24; Jn. 2:14-26; 5:1-6 and the other Pastoral Epistles, passim.

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system more just and likely to meet the necessity of the times. 53

Ujamaa seeks this collaboration of the Church in its policies for justice and human dignity. It suggests concrete solutions to particular socio-political and economic problems and invites the Church to critique and/or support them on the basis of its faith. Thus, even though inviting collaboration, Ujamaa takes care that the religious and political spheres remain distinct; as they should. 54

However, with only a few exceptions, there has been an overwhelming hesitation on the part of the Church to collaborate with Ujamaa on the practical level.

53. H. Camara, et al., "A Message to the People of the Third World by Fifteen Bishops" in Catholic Mind, 66:1219 (1968), no. 8, p. 40. Consider also this statement by the bishops of Peru cited by G. Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, p. 113: "When governments arise which are trying to implant more just and human societies in their countries, we propose that the Church commit itself to giving them its backing; contributing to the elimination of prejudice; recognizing the aspirations they hold; and encouraging the search for their own road toward a socialist society."

54. The 1971 Synod of Bishops disclaims the hierarchy's competence to offer concrete solutions to social problems. So also do the revised code of Canon Law and SECAM. But these documents disclaim such competence only in terms of seeking after administrative political power at such, and not in terms of co-operating with a given political administration to promote justice. See Justice in the World, p. 399; The Code of Canon Law, London, Collins, 1983, Can. 287, no. 2, p. 49; SECAM, Seeking Gospel Justice, p. 22.
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B. Violence and Freedom

a. Historical Considerations

On June 21, 1974, during the height of the liberation struggle in neighbouring Mozambique, five members of the Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC)\(^\text{55}\) said in a press conference that although the Church wanted the political freedom of all peoples, it was opposed to the use of violence as a means to achieve it. Four days later, however, on June 25, the TEC secretariat issued a statement on behalf of the whole Conference "clarifying" this position. According to this latter statement, when non-violent means to correct a gross situation of injustice and degradation of human dignity prove ineffective or even counter-productive, it may be justifiable to use violent means to achieve freedom. Patrick Kunambi, the then Chairman of the National Council of the Laity, was more definite. He saw in the Old Testament history of Israel theological proof that God does not oppose even the violent struggle of an oppressed people to gain liberation from slavery. On December 1 of the previous year, a group of fifty-two diocesan and

\(^{55}\) The five bishops were: Joseph Sipendi (Moshi Diocese), Marko Mihayo (Tabora Archdiocese), Christopher Mwoleka (Rulenge Diocese), Mathias Isuja (Dodoma Diocese), and Alphonse Nsabi (Kigoma Diocese).
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religious priests from different parts of the country at a study seminar in Kipalapala Seminary had issued a joint statement in support of the armed liberation struggle in Mozambique and Angola. In the statement they petitioned the bishops all over the world to ask Pope Paul VI to abrogate the 1940 Concordat between Portugal and the Vatican. The priests objected, particularly to the terms of the Concordat which, it seemed to them, used the Church for, Portugal's colonial ends. 56

These statements are an indication as well as a summary of the varying outlooks of the Church and of Christians on the question of violence through the ages. The very sources of Christianity themselves are ambivalent on the issue. To many, much of the Old Testament reads like a "war story" which gets quite bizarre in places. Of course, the Israelites had a cosmic outlook on history before the exile. But even the post-exilic Old Testament literature is not quite free of attitudes of violence. Students of the Old Testament admit, therefore, that whatever theological message it bears, violence forms one

56. See for the texts of these statements, S. Urfer, Socialisme et Eglise, pp. 94-97.
of its main symbols. 57

The Early Church. As regards the New Testament, there are scholars who maintain that it positively forbids violence in favour of passive resistance against oppression. According to R.J. Sider, for example, "... Jesus' teaching excludes lethal violence as an acceptable option for Christians." 58 H.A. Past analyses the most significant references to the issue in the Gospels and arrives at the same conclusion. 59 Other scholars, however, particularly those who read the New Testament from the point of view of the oppressed, do not agree. 60 J. L. Segundo calls the presentation of Jesus as a completely non-violent figure


an "idealistie oversimplification". For A. Nolan, there is no evidence in the Gospels that Jesus was a pacifist "in principle" and that he prohibited recourse to violence absolutely. Nolan writes: "All we can be sure of is that Jesus decided that in his circumstances and in his time the use of force ... would be harmful to man and therefore contrary to the will of God."  

If the Scriptures and biblical interpreters have conflicting attitudes towards violence, it is generally agreed that, at least in the first three centuries, Christians were totally opposed to it. They not only did not sanction war, but they would not engage in military service or any kind of conflict involving bloodshed. Until the end of the second century, soldiers were usually required to leave the army in order to join the Church. The Didaskalia (ca. 250 A.D.) prohibits even the acceptance of money for Church use from soldiers or anyone else connected with the coercive machinery of the State. For Lactantius, writing during the first quarter of the fourth century, Christians are "those who are ignorant of wars". They were considered

61. Liberation of Theology, p. 165.
to be only soldiers of Christ, a heavenly army of the living God (*militia Christi, caelestis militia, militia Dei vivi*). Their service was one of love and forgiveness.\(^{63}\) The argument that this absolute "pacifism" of the early Christians was due to their eschatological expectations may be true in some few cases. Cadoux argues, however, that most of the Fathers of the early Church were free of millenarianist influences in their thought on violence.\(^{64}\)

The watershed between the attitude of the early Church and the later theological and practical toleration and justification of violence came early in the fourth century. In 323 A.D. Constantine defeated and executed Licinius to become the sole emperor of the Roman Empire. Shortly afterwards, he made Christianity the official religion of the empire. With the Empire constantly threatened by invasions, Augustine, for example, the most notable theologian of the day, began to teach, in the words of


S. Windass, that "a man could be a Christian and a Roman soldier." By 416, the law prohibited non-Christians to join the military. Service in the army had become an exclusive preserve of Christians:

It was in this exclusive preserve and "privilege" that Christians revelled during the Crusades, the holy wars against the "infidel" Turks or the whole Moslem world (1096-1291). St. Bernard of Clairvaux exhorted the crusaders to kill the infidel without compunction: "A soldier of Christ ... slayeth with more honor for himself, and dieth with more merit. When he dieth himself is benefitted; when he slayeth he benefiteth Christ." 66

Taking its cue from Augustine, medieval theology developed a very elaborate theory and theology of a just war: the right to go to war (jus ad bellum) and the right


66. Cited by E. McDonagh, Church and Politics, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1980, p. 66. A similar cry was heard during the 1914-1918 war, this time from the Anglican Bishop A.F. Winnington-Ingram of London. He charged every brave person: "to kill Germans, to kill them not for the sake of killing, but to save the world, to kill the young as well as the old... lest civilization itself be killed." Cited in ibid., p. 62.
conduct in war (jus in bello). It enumerated the criteria for a just war: (a) a just cause to go to war; (b) the declaration of war by a competent and legitimate authority; (c) the right intention in waging war and the announcement of that intention; (d) the waging of war as a last resort when all else has failed; (e) the use of means proportionate to the end envisioned with a reasonable hope of success; and (f) the adherence to proper conduct in war. There are now great misgivings concerning the appropriateness of these criteria for war in a nuclear age, but that does not concern us here. What is important is that the Church has never, since Constantine, outlawed violence and war as impermissible at all times in its official theology.

b. Practical Considerations

The foregoing resumé is meant to indicate that the dual stand Nyerere adopts towards violence and war is instanced in much of the history of the Church. As we saw


68. For this see, for example, the different perspectives in T.A. Shannon, ed., War or Peace? Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1982.
in Chapter Five, Nyerere does not condone violence. He has said that as long as there is any hope that a peaceful solution can be reached in any conflict situation, violence cannot be morally justified. He has maintained this position with regards to the freedom struggle in Africa. But if, as he believes is the case in South Africa today, all avenues for a peaceful solution to a conflict have been closed by those in power, then human dignity demands that the oppressed use any means, including lethal violence, to obtain their freedom. 69 At this point, Nyerere says, the oppressed who are struggling for their freedom deserve support:

We cannot ask the peoples of Southern Africa to acquiesce in their humiliation, and their misery. We cannot fail to support them. For the deliberate attempt to deny the humanity of non-white peoples, which is what apartheid means, is an affront to every person in Africa. And because humanity is in fact one and indivisible, it is also an affront to every free man, regardless of colour. 70

It is Nyerere's opinion that the Church also has a moral responsibility to educate people for freedom and,

70. Ibid., p. 211.
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where their human dignity is denied them, to encourage them
to organize for their rights. According to him, "the Church
should seek to increase the numbers and the power of those
who refuse to acquiesce in established injustices."71
Nyerere denies that this is asking the Church to surrender
its own sphere of truth and engage in politics:

On the contrary, what I am saying amounts
to a demand that it should stop allowing
itself to be identified with unjust poli-
tical and economic power groups. For the
Church should want to be identified with
the pursuit of social justice. ... The
poor and oppressed should come ... [to the
Church] not for alms, but for support
against injustice.72

Nyerere faults the Church for not living up to
this responsibility during the colonial struggle in Africa
and in other parts of the Third World. But its message of
love should propel it to help men to rebel against all con-
ditions and institutions which contribute to the persistence
of "physical and spiritual slums", without counting the
cost to itself or to its members.73

Reading the history of the Church with regard

71. Ibid., p. 226.
72. Ibid., p. 223.
73. See ibid., pp. 220-223.
to this problem, the moral theologian J. Macquarrie finds little point in being taken aback by claims such as Nyerere makes that the Church should support rebellion against oppression. And for Metz, when the status quo is as violent as, or more violent than, a prospective revolutionary struggle to restore freedom and human dignity, then the latter would probably be the more loving course of action to take. If the love of God and that of the neighbour are inseparable, Metz argues, then the Church, as the community of those who love God in man, cannot acquiesce in injustice and oppression. When man is degraded, the Christian may have no choice but to use violence to create an ambiance whereby freedom and peace can be pursued in a non-violent way.

74. See J. Macquarrie, The Concept of Peace, London, SCM Press, 1973, p. 37. He writes in illustration: "As Christians and as human beings we have to take the risk of moral action amid the ambiguities of life. It is impossible to say unequivocally that there was no better way than the one Bonhoeffer took or that his action can be totally justified. But it does seem clear that what would have been wrong on his part would have been to refuse the ambiguous decision and do what so many of his fellow-citizens and fellow-churchmen were doing - that is to say, nothing at all in the face of what was happening. As against their non-action, Bonhoeffer's action is justified a thousand times over." Ibid., p. 61. See also E. McDonagh, Church and Politics, pp. 56–78; Doing the Truth, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1979, pp. 138–152; Gift and Call, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1975, pp. 138–156.

75. See J.B. Metz, Theology of the World, New
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Nyerere is not oblivious to the ambiguities inherent in violence, even when it is undertaken in the name of freedom and human dignity. He takes note, as we have seen, of the suffering, misery and other difficulties that it may temporarily create. He also understands that revolution does not always lead to freedom and equality. For him, revolution in view of freedom and dignity is always a calculated risk, "a regrettable necessity". When the human spirit reaches a point of saturation with degradation, and no other road to freedom avails, then violence becomes a necessity.\(^{76}\) The recent history of Africa indicates, Nyerere believes, that it certainly has not been foolhardy to entertain the thought that violent struggle can bring about freedom from the degradation of colonialism. The liberation of the Portuguese colonies in Africa can be cited as an example.\(^ {77}\) In this moral question of human freedom

York, Seabury Press, 1973, p. 120, and The Emergent Church, pp. 97-98.

\(^{76}\) See J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, pp. 23-26. Although revolution does not always lead to an atmosphere of relative freedom, it must be noted that neither does it necessitate a spiral of violence. Some of the democratic nations of the world today (e.g. France and U.S.A.) were born in violent revolutions.

\(^{77}\) See J.K. Nyerere, Crusade for Liberation, pp. 15, 20.
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and self-determination, it is a responsibility for Tanzania, as Nyerere 'sees' it, to provide its moral and material support to those who need it anywhere in the world - to the Vietnamese during the Vietnam War and to the Palestinians as they struggle for their homeland. This is because, once again, freedom, justice and human dignity are indivisible.

c. Similarities and Differences

In his attitude towards revolutionary violence, Nyerere takes into account what many theologians today call structural or institutional violence. The 1970 Baden (Austria) consultation of the Committee on Society, Development and Peace (SODEPAX) describes institutional violence as those structures, institutions and conditions which foster the exploitation and oppression of the poor, dispossess them of their dignity and generally relegate them to the periphery of history. In such a situation, there may be "order" but not peace. This is because it is a violent situation oppressing the poor. Thus Nyerere would concur with J. Diez-Allegria's opinion that neither justice nor love


EXCLUDES A PRIORI THE NECESSITY OF CHANGING STRUCTURES WHICH PERPETUATE THIS VIOLENT SITUATION, AND THAT TO DO SO REQUIRES THE USE OF COUNTER-VIOLENCE IF IT IS THE ONLY WAY AVAILABLE. 80

But in *Quod Apostolici Muneris* (1878), Leo XIII called any resistance against authority, even an unjust authority, sinful. In situations of oppression, he counselled the oppressed to remain patient and tolerant. He held up Christ as an example of such patience. Leo XIII wrote in this encyclical on socialism:

> And if at any time it happen that the power of the State is rashly and tyrannically wielded by princes, the teaching of the Catholic Church does not allow an insurrection on private authority against them, lest public order be only the more disturbed, and lest society take greater hurt therefrom. And when affairs come to such a pass that there is no other hope of safety, she teaches that relief may be hastened by the merits of Christian patience and by earnest prayers to God. 81

This is also the position of one of the foremost

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ethic tranquilizers on violence in the West, J. Ellul. The Christian, Ellul says, may not engage in violence or condone it, even if it is in defence of the poor and oppressed. According to him, for the Christian there is no such thing as the use of violence as a "last resort" for freedom and justice. The Christian may use only the spiritual "violence of love", which is antithetical to any kind of lethal violence. He may engage only in the "fight of faith", whose last resort is to God in prayer. 82

According to Leo XIII, only when the State commands anything against "divine or natural law" is the Christian allowed to resist. 83 It is not clear what form of resistance Leo XIII envisages since in the previous sentences he has counselled patience and prayer as a response to tyranny. Yet, he points out an important element of institutional violence upon which Nyerere insists, that is, the more subtle and often less visible violence against natural (and therefore divine) law. For Nyerere, oppression and the degradation of the dignity of man, racial,


83. Quod Apostolici Muneris, no. 7, p. 13.
sexual and religious discrimination are all violations against natural law. If resistance is envisaged in any circumstances, it is supremely envisaged against these violations. And because of its mission to present and represent unequivocally the law of God, the Church, as Nyerere sees it, should be in the forefront of this resistance. 84

Surveying the social thought of the Catholic Church on liberation, C.E. Gudorf notes that on several occasions Pius XII supported the 1956 Hungarian revolt against Soviet Russia in none too veiled terms. 85 Indeed, he did it because of the communist threat represented by Russia. Nevertheless, he does not counsel only patience and prayer, but, at least in the Hungarian situation, appreciates the "regrettable necessity", to use Nyerere's expression, of lethal violence in defence of freedom and justice. He urges public prayer to assure a favourable outcome of the struggle of the people of Hungary. Prayer, here, is


not substituted for the struggle, but is seen as part and parcel of it.

Again, since Third World bishops did not have too much influence on Vatican II, as we have noted, issues relating to freedom, justice and peace, and violence are treated by Gaudium et Spes, for instance, from a predominantly First World perspective. As D. Dorr notes, Gaudium et Spes discusses such concerns as total war, national defence and conscientious objection but barely touches upon the wars of liberation prevalent in the Third World, or the unjust international economic structures. If the poor and oppressed have a legitimate right to take from the rich "what is necessary", as the document asserts, what methods should be used? If wars of defence between states can be justifiable (cf. theory of the just war^{88}), how about wars of liberation against colonial, neo-colonial or domestic oppression and tyranny in the Third World? To these and many other similar questions of profound interest to the

86. See his Option for the Poor, pp. 131-138.

87. Gaudium et Spes, no. 69, pp. 278-279.

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Third World, Dorr notes, Vatican II neither gives answers, nor provides guidelines to help oppressed peoples work out answers for themselves.

d. A Plausible Perspective

Paul VI and John Paul II continue to reject the violence of liberation pertinent to most situations in the Third World while tolerating the possibility of violence between the superpowers. But in *Populorum Progressio*, Paul made a concession which is often referred to as the "great exception". Violence is evil and must be condemned unequivocally, the Pontiff wrote, "except where there is manifest, longstanding tyranny which would do great damage to fundamental personal rights and dangerous harm to the common good of the country". If one were looking for a

89. See, on the one hand, Paul VI, *Evangelii Nuntiandi*, no. 37, p. 21, and, on the other, on behalf of John Paul II, A. Casaroli, "The Vatican's Position on Issues of War and Peace" in *Origins*, 12:6 (1982), pp. 81, 83-87.

J. Moltmann has said that, morally, it is not "easy to declare that nonviolence should be the principle of others, while at the same time expressing the belief that military service is a possibility for Christians." And, quoting H. Gollwitzer: "Anyone who uses pacifist arguments on the question of revolution but not on the question of the army reveals his argument as the ideology of the ruling class." J. Moltmann, *The Experiment Hope*, Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1975, p. 136.

90. *Populorum Progressio*, no. 31, p. 188.
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comprehensive summary of Nyerere's and Ujamaa's philosophy and outlook on violence, oppression and freedom, one would find it in this great exception of Paul VI. Involved here is the rebellion of the oppressed against their oppression. The Church can well be part of this "rebellion". As Nyerere sees it, it is imperative that it does:

At a given and decisive point in history men decide to act against those conditions which restrict their freedom as men. I am suggesting that, unless we participate actively in the rebellion against those social structures and economic organizations which condemn men to poverty, humiliation and degradation, then the Church will become irrelevant to man and the Christian religion will degenerate into a set of superstitions accepted by the fearful. 91

The Church, according to Nyerere, must lead the protest against any attitude or institution which negates authentic love by negating the dignity of man. It must support practical efforts aimed at affirming love by affirming justice, freedom and the dignity of man. 92 The Church throughout the world, and specifically in Tanzania, has historically generally affirmed the principles of justice and freedom, but has avoided involvement in the action required to

92. See ibid., pp. 216-228.
realize them in social praxis. Nyerere thinks that Ujamaa offers the Church in Tanzania the opportunity to involve itself practically and positively in the struggle for them.

c. The Practice of Democracy

a. Democracy as Guardian of Human Rights

The Arusha Declaration makes democracy the cornerstone of a truly socialist society. It is only the practice of democracy, it says, which can assure that freedom, respect for the human rights of persons, and human dignity and equality in the political, economic and social spheres of life prevail in any society. Without democracy, there can neither be a genuine socialization of economic power nor popular control of political power. Without democracy, The Declaration asserts, government cannot but be oppressive.93 Freedom, according to Nyerere, is the "cardinal thing" in democracy. In practical terms it means the freedom of the people to choose and change their own leaders, and thus their government.94

b. Authority in the Church

Although various forms of democracy and democratic leadership were part of the organization of various communities in the early Church, it forms no part of the life of the Church today. The literature on the nature and method of leadership and authority in the Church is vast. We cannot do justice to it here, and a lengthy discussion of it is not required for the purposes of this study. One common denominator in all the literature about Christian leadership, however, may be noted. It is agreed that leadership in the Church is a ministry. Its authority is at the service of the Church, that is, of all the faithful. Leadership and authority in the Church are meant to promote growth in freedom towards communion. True Christian authority must promote the dignity of every individual believer while preserving the unity of faith. Authority in the Church is a moral force imparted basically by preaching the Gospel and by

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living example.

c. Democracy and the Church in Tanzania

Nyerere considers the success of the process of the practice of democracy in Tanzania to be too important a factor for the Church to ignore:

Church people can help the ignorant and the fearful to use the machinery of the state to get their wrongs righted. If the machinery does not exist, or does not work properly, then Christians can and should participate in the task of getting the necessary systems established or cleansed. This is not a matter of a "Church-sponsored campaign"; it is a matter for Christians, fortified by the moral support of their Church, and acting either as individuals or through the secular institutions which exist.96

Nyerere means that the Church or Church people have a responsibility, in keeping with their evangelical mission, to engage seriously in the task of educating people in their human and civil rights. The people must be helped to recognize and counter the manipulative efforts of those among them whose only interest is their own welfare. Confidence that if they believe that egalitarianism and democracy are desirable goals, they can direct their collective effort to achieve them must be instilled in the people.

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It is possible for this pastoral training to be carried out
in the basic or small communities which Christians are
forming all over Tanzania today.

In this matter, the Church can be guided by the
Principle of Subsidiarity. Subsidiarity, as enunciated by
Pius XI, and again by John XXIII, emphasizes the freedom of
the human person in solidarity with society. To be a force
of liberation, the moral theologian B. Haring has said,
"subsidiarity starts 'from below' and encourages, fosters,
and, where needed, coordinates 'from above' while gradually
blurring the lines of 'below' and 'above', at least as
regards useless privileges." 97 This is what is called de-
centralization in the development policy of Ujamaa.

d. The Practice of Leadership

Nyerere has referred to the practice of the
priests and bishops choosing and rejecting each other as
leaders, with the great majority of believers having no say
in the process, as epitomizing a distrust of the people by
their leaders. As we noted earlier, when speaking of
leadership per se, Nyerere remarked: "A system where

97. B. Haring, A Theology of Protest, New York,
leaders choose themselves from among themselves rests on a foundation of mutual trust among the leaders; but it shows that the leaders have no trust in the people." In a similar vein, the Dutch theologian E. Schillebeeckx asserts that it is wrong to envisage authority and leadership in the Church in terms of gradation of rank, privileges and honour, or class. "Hierarchy" in this sense is neither expressive of, nor conducive to, a liberating solidarity or true communion among the faithful, leaders and led, according to Schillebeeckx. It is oppressive and, therefore, contrary to the evangelical spirit of leadership and authority. This is not to say that leadership, understood as a service, is not required in the Church. Nor is it to suggest that the idea of a Church hierarchy is altogether wrong. Schillebeeckx protests only against its prevalent "feudalistic" connotation.

In *Pacem in Terris*, John XXIII writes in reference

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to civil leadership that the idea that its authority comes from God is valid. But the Pope warns that this does not mean that the people can be excluded from choosing the leaders and the form of government they want. According to him, the people are the final arbiters of the extent and limits of the exercise of authority. He affirms that the ultimate divine origin of authority is not in conflict with any democratic procedure of leadership and government.\footnote{100}

This description of leadership and authority is the same as that portrayed by The Arusha Declaration and the 1971 TANU Guidelines.

If, however, the divine origin of authority can be consonant with democracy and the democratic process in the civil sphere, it is hard to see why some form of democratic leadership and process in the Church should be at odds with the divine origin of ecclesiastical "hierarchical" authority. On the contrary, some authors suggest that the faithful's ability to participate in making decisions which affect their spiritual and moral life is both an expression of their growth in maturity of faith and a sign of respect for their human and Christian dignity as persons who hear,\footnote{100. See Pacem in Terris, no. 52, p. 113.}
understand and freely assent to the call of God. This is the *sensus fidelium*, so much emphasized in the early tradition of the Church and required for authentic doctrine. Ultimately, this is what "corresponsibility", endorsed by Vatican II, is understood by many theologians to mean.

The biblical theologian, R.J. Echeverria, for instance, argues that collegiality and corresponsibility remain mere words in situations in Tanzania where the priest handpicks the parish lay leaders; where the episcopal conference "insists on strict alignment with Rome's policies" regardless of their relevance; and where religious communities jealously guard their own financial power. But in Pauline ecclesiology, Echeverria points out, the whole community is in charge of its own affairs. Thus Paul addresses his letters to communities rather than to individuals, does not issue orders but exhorts (cf. the verb *parakaleo*) fellow believers, and even sometimes submits his own opinion to the judgement of the community (as in 1 Cor. 14:37). 101 After the Church has been established, Paul gives the Christian communities the equivalent of a

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democratic self-government, with ministries arising and being called forth according to charism and need.

As Nyerere sees it, a completely just party in Tanzania would have to be a party of angels. From his remarks about the model of leadership in the Church, it is clear that he thinks that a hierarchy in the Church, which excludes the participation of the other members of the Church from the mechanisms of decision making and still hopes to be completely faithful to the Gospel, would have to be a hierarchy of saints. But the Church, as well as any other organization, is composed of and led by human beings. Theologians, therefore, argue that insofar as the Church is a human institution, it incorporates elements of injustice and oppression. It is thus by no means a perfect reflection of the divine order. For this reason, its structures cannot present themselves as immutable. Without opening themselves up to questioning by the faithful for the purpose of growth towards greater justice, they may be in danger of canonizing the injustice and oppression in them as the will of God. In that case, they would become impervious to the continual infusion of grace by the Holy Spirit.

This danger is real. Many have pointed out with concern the apparent relish of Church leaders for pomp and
ceremony, authoritarianism and bureaucracy, and for clericalism. Before these things, the laity appear as third-class citizens in the Church. Congar warns in this connection that it is impossible for the leaders of the Church to enjoy these privileges without letting them affect their essential ministry of service. It is hardly possible, as he puts it, to be surrounded by thurifers without acquiring "a liking for incense". As a Christian, Nyerere finds this pomp and ceremony in the Church unnecessary and sometimes offensive. As a leader, he finds it corrupting.

The 1971 Synod states:

While the Church is bound to give witness to justice, she recognizes that everyone who ventures to speak to people about justice must first be just in their eyes. Hence we must undertake an examination of the modes of acting and of possessions and life style found within the Church herself.

This call to self-examination by the Church


103. See His Power and Poverty, p. 112.

104. See Justice in the World, p. 400.
pertains also to its government. If the Church is to be a moral force for freedom and justice, which Ujamaa also struggles for in Tanzania, if it is to be the latter's conscience in matters of equality and human dignity before God, it seems that it must re-examine its process and method of leadership. Compared to the Ujamaa and the New Testament visions of leadership and ministry, these seem to infringe the dignity of man. For, as L. Boff writes, when structures promote greater participation and brotherhood among people, they signify to the eyes of faith the presence of God's grace. When, however, they generate oppression and degradation of man by man, they indicate the presence of sin. 105 Structures and institutions must therefore be constantly examined and purified. This applies not only to Ujamaa but also to the Church.

D. Development

What, then, should be the attitude of the Church and its approach to development and development strategies in Tanzania today? This is an area that calls for the

attention of the Church as it now commands the attention of Ujamaa. For, in its widest significance, development can be said to incorporate the major moral and ethical struggles of the Ujamaa system that we have addressed in this study. As well, it incorporates the major moral and ethical issues that face the Church. These are the same both for Ujamaa and for the Church. They include concerns about community, freedom, justice, equality, human rights and human dignity.

A study of the Church's magisterial statements and much of contemporary progressive theology shows that there is a great deal of convergence between their understanding of the essential meaning of true development or progress and the understanding of Ujamaa.

a. Congruence in Definition

The 1971 TANU Guidelines define development as liberation. As we saw earlier, the document calls the efforts which help people to become self-confident and self-reliant "forces of liberation". Those actions and attitudes, however, which foster dependence among the people are regressive. The document condemns them as forces of oppression. Paragraph 28 of the Guidelines, in putting forward its understanding of development, says among other things:

To us development means both the elimination of oppression, exploitation,
enslavement, and humiliation, and the promotion of our independence and human dignity. Therefore, in considering the development of our nation and in preparing development plans, our main emphasis at all times should be the development of people and not things. 106

The "development of people and not things"—this is the insight propelling the thrust of the Ujamaa ideology of development. Many of the major magisterial statements on the subject of development are also of a similar mind. 107

According to John XXIII in Mater et Magistra, for example, the economic prosperity of a nation is morally and ethically bankrupt if no account is given to its equitable division and distribution. For John XXIII writes, "This it is which guarantees the personal development of the members of society, which is the true goal of a nation's economy." 108 In Pacem in Terris he insists, as also John Paul II does more theologically in Redemptor Hominis and Laborem Exercens, that the purpose of human work and its rewards is only one:


107. See John XXIII, Mater et Magistra and Pacem in Terris; Paul VI, Populorum Progressio and Evangelii Nuntiandi; John Paul II, Redemptor Hominis and Laborem Exercens; Vatican II's Gaudium et Spes; the 1971 Synod's Justice in the World; and the Tanzanian Bishops' pastoral statement, The Church and Developing Society.

108. Mater et Magistra, no. 74, p. 68.
"to allow him [man] and his family a standard of living consistent with human dignity."109 John Paul II writes more pointedly:

What is in question is the advancement of persons, not just the multiplying of things that people can use. It is a matter ... not so much of "having more" as of "being more". Man ... cannot become the slave of things, the slave of economic systems, the slave of production, the slave of his own products.110

We have already noted that Nyerere also complains about the attitude of those who think that "having more" is "being more". With John Paul II this complaint is pervasive. His emphasis on the subjectivity of man is clear throughout Laborem Exercens and in many of his major speeches all over the world on human culture and economic and political activity.

But it was Paul VI, as we saw, who defined development inimitably as the growth "of each man and of the whole man".111 Some of the implications of this concept of development had already been outlined prior to Populorum

110. Redemptor Hominis, no. 50, pp. 257-258.
111. Populorum Progressio, no. 14, p. 185.
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Progressio in Gaudium et Spes. It must be noted, in this connection, that neither these documents nor Ujamia plays down the importance of "having more" - that is, material goods - in development. Both are merely asserting that things must serve man. They must be used as instruments of humanization.

b. Humanization as the Mission of the Church

It has been noted that in Nyerere's mind it is an important responsibility of the Church to play a part in development, in this humanization of man. The Church has to remind the wider society at all times that the purpose of socio-political and economic activity is man. Nyerere charges that since, after all, it is the Church that believes and proclaims that man is the image of God, it should live out the ultimate meaning of this belief and proclamation. For its logic is ineluctable. Nyerere the Christian points it out:

We say man was created in the image of God. I refuse to imagine a God who is poor, ignorant, superstitious, fearful, oppressed, wretched - which is the lot

112. See nos. 64-72, pp. 272-282.

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of the majority of those He created in his own image. 114

Clearly, then, the Church's belief in man's divine likeness implies "divine discontent" with the lot of the sick, the poor, the ignorant, according to Nyerere. It demands a "determination for change". Especially from the perspective of faith in Christ, the situation cannot be allowed to continue unabated. The Church must struggle to ensure that social, political and economic justice prevails. This also is its mission of evangelization, of humanization, of liberation and salvation. It may be true that the Church cannot uplift man in a direct economic and political manner, but, as Nyerere sees it, it can "help to provide the conditions and opportunity for him to co-operate with his fellows to uplift himself." 115

Theologian D. Dorr has also noted this responsibility of the Church. He points out that in the current, most comprehensive ecclesiology, service and mission mesh. The service of the Church is not limited only to the temporal and material needs of man as it was conceived of in an earlier ecclesiological model; nor is mission restricted to

115. Ibid., p. 219.
the transcendental spiritual task popularly described as "saving souls". For the Church in the modern world, service and mission intertwine: one is an aspect of the other. 116

c. The Church and Development

How has the Church approached these two aspects of its humanizing or evangelizing objective in Tanzania? Chapter One of this study outlined at some length the Church's contribution to education, health and economic activity during the colonial period. The Church built schools and established the infrastructure of medical facilities. It started and managed several newspapers. It also, through some of its earlier missionaries, introduced some new crops and especially new methods of agriculture into the country. This was mainly the case, initially, at the slave centres, such as Bagamoyo. Here ransomed slaves were settled into Christian or catechumenate villages and taught to grow their own food. But soon, the successful farming methods used in these places spread to other parts of the country as well. As we pointed out in Chapter One, many of these missionary activities took on a life of their own. They produced some unforeseen and unintended results.

116. See D. Dorr, Spirituality and Justice, pp. 204-216.
Christian missionary schools, for example, produced leaders, such as Nyerere, who would organize the people for independence. Also, the translation of the Bible into the vernaculars, mainly by Protestant missionaries, would enable the people to see the discrepancy between the ideals of human dignity and human fraternity expressed there and claimed as divine by missionaries and colonial officers alike, and the actual degrading behaviour of these latter towards Africans generally. The newspapers, designed and intended to foster missionary and colonial intentions, would help to keep Africans in touch with each other and with their culture. They thus became instruments of national consciousness by integrating people of the different ethnic groups in the country. And so, while it is possible and necessary to question the motives of pre-independence missionary social work in Tanzania, it is not possible to deny that some aspects of this work were humanizing.

Yet, for the Church, it matters why it does what it does. The motive for its mission of service is important. Nyerere proposes that the reason for the humanizing activity of the Church, its participation in the integral development of humanity, should be divine discontent with any and all oppressive and alienating aspects of life in the world.
inequality, injustice, racism, sexism, discrimination, colonialism and so on. Nyerere does not use the term in reference to these alienating aspects of human existence, but it is clear that he identifies these and all other aspects which dehumanize man as sin. Theologians today make a very necessary and useful distinction, which does not, however, imply an absolute separation, between structural and personal sin. To judge from his statements, Nyerere regards the structural sins of social, economic and political oppression, which Ujamaa tries to address, to be as inimical to the true following of Christ as the personal sins of, for example, murder, adultery and theft.

Clearly, missionary socio-political and economic activity did not take into account sufficiently the reality of structural sin. It did not take the theological element of divine discontent against structural sin as the motive for its social services. Thus, by and large, missionaries approved of, and psychologically prepared the way for the colonial enterprise. Or, where they arrived in the wake of the colonialists, they justified the colonial system in the name of God. We have already discussed the alienating consequences of this. The most immediate problem now concerns the attitude of the Church vis-à-vis Ujamaa, given their shared views of the moral and ethical significance of
Nyerere has suggested, as we noted previously, that the Church can co-operate with Ujamaa in the struggle against structural sin. Domestically, it can act as a committed critic, supporting Ujamaa in a practical way where the latter promotes human liberation and criticizing it where it alienates man. Internationally, it can raise its voice against the international structures that alienate whole nations and publicly disassociate itself from them. This co-operation between the Church and the civil sphere of society, Nyerere argues, should be easy and mutually beneficial in independent Tanzania. After all, the Church is more established now than it was during the colonial era and most of the leadership of the Church is local. It should be familiar with the profound integration between religion and life in traditional Africa. However, the evidence we have adduced in the last four chapters indicates that the Church's practical stand does not coincide with the verbal support it has given to the Ujamaa effort. With only a few exceptions, Tanzanian Church leaders are hesitant about taking up the challenge of Ujamaa, and are active neither in reforming the Church's unjust internal structures nor in co-operating with Ujamaa in creating civil structures of
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justice. To use Dorr's phrase, theirs is still a predominantly "fortress ecclesiology". They see the Church as separate from the world with the division of history between sacred and profane history concomitant with this view. In a word, the Church's public words of agreement with the goals of Ujamaa have not been followed by public actions of support to achieve those goals. For example, there has not been any significant involvement of Church personnel in the villages, wards, districts and regions where the struggle against "structural sin" in Tanzania can most effectively be engaged.

One does not need to look far into Nyerere's addresses to Church leaders and religious groups to detect his frustration and anger about this attitude of the Church leadership. As a Christian, he feels that the Church is abdicating its responsibility. He fears that in Tanzania, the Church is letting a golden opportunity slip by which Ujamaa offers to it to fulfill its mission of contributing to the integral development of man. Whether or not this attitude of the Church in Tanzania will change remains to be seen.

117. See ibid., pp. 198-200.
E. Conclusion

In the practical sense, the theological and ethical tasks of the Church in Tanzania are made explicit by Ujamaa, and especially by Nyerere as a Christian believer. They relate to issues of justice and human dignity, democracy and freedom, development and equality. To be sure, these tasks are not only peculiar to the Church in Tanzania; they are of universal concern. But it seems that in Tanzania, the ethical concerns of the Church happen to coincide, very explicitly on the level of ideology and policy, with the ethical concerns of the government and the State. This is what Nyerere, as a Christian, sees as an unprecedented opportunity for the Church to fulfill its objective of humanization. It saddens Nyerere to see that the Church may let this opportunity pass by.
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In the section dealing with the nature of contemporary society in the Apostolic Letter Octogesima Adveniens, Paul VI warns Christians against the false lure of ideologies. He refers specifically to bureaucratic socialism and technocratic capitalism. The pope warns that Christians should be aware that behind the front of the struggle for equality which doctrinaire or Marxist socialism projects, there lurk very sinister elements of atheism, materialism, the canonization of violence and the denial of individual freedom and human transcendence. These elements invariably mutilate man. They radically contradict Christian anthropology. Likewise, according to the pope, behind the façade of protecting individual freedom and autonomy and the promotion of economic efficiency, liberal capitalism may, in fact, be catering to and promoting extreme selfishness, undue concentration of power in the hands of a few and an attitude gradually destructive of authentic communion between people. Paul VI goes on to say:


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Is there need to stress the possible ambiguity of every social ideology? Sometimes it leads political or social activity to be simply the application of an abstract, purely theoretical idea; at other times it is thought which becomes a mere instrument at the service of activity as a simple means of a strategy. In both cases is it not man that risks finding himself alienated? The Christian faith is above and is sometimes opposed to the ideologies, in that it recognizes God, who is transcendent and the Creator, and who, through all levels of creation, calls on man as endowed with responsibility and freedom.3

This caution of the pope provides a context in which to situate our concluding remarks on the ethics of Ujamaa socialism from a Christian theological point of view. First of all, we shall try to address the concerns that Octogesima Adveniens raises in the passage just quoted: Is the Ujamaa policy simply the application of an abstract, purely theoretical idea or is it an activity which simply uses thought as an instrument, as a simple means of strategy? Beneath the surface, does Ujamaa basically alienate man? Secondly, we shall attempt to indicate what appears to us to be the major contribution of the Ujamaa system to Christian theological ethics - especially in the areas of "praxis" and spirituality in Tanzania. Finally, since we realize that

3. Ibid., no. 27, pp. 366-367.
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every social ideology is subject to the ambiguities Paul VI refers to in Octogesima Adveniens, we shall point out some important limitations of the Ujamaa system that have the potential to mutilate human dignity.

A. The Nature of Ujamaa

In his writings and speeches, Nyerere does not present the history of Tanzania and the cultural foundations of Ujamaa as pristine criteria for the social development of the nation. As we have seen, he shows the primary concern of Ujamaa to be not with the past as such but with the present and future. In this concern, the history and the traditional culture of Tanzania serve the important function of remembrance. The traditional culture provides a model of the Tanzanian African way of being together and the slave and colonial history demonstrates how the disruption of the principles and values of this model threw the Tanzanian peoples into a state of confusion. This said, Ujamaa aims to transform Tanzania into a modern nation where its people are self-respecting, confident and self-reliant.

The Arusha Declaration spells out how this transformation should be achieved. Politically, genuine democratic structures and institutions must be established and
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maintained. The principles which guide all political activity must be justice, the rule of law and a respect for human rights, especially as they are enunciated by the Universal Declaration of the United Nations Organization. In the economic sphere, Ujamaa must seek to safeguard the well-being of all the citizens of the nation. Approaches to the economic structures will differ depending on the times and circumstances. But, fundamentally, Ujamaa must see to it that the major means of production and distribution of wealth are under the control of the people, that no one is exploited for the benefit of another, and that all who are able to contribute to society through work do so. Thus, socially, the State must create opportunities for the employment of all its citizens. It must take steps to discourage the formation of classes. Indeed, it must promote an ethic in which individual inequalities serve the human equality of all. This ethic must be objectified, promoted and safeguarded through positive law whenever necessary.

The same principles of justice, freedom and human dignity must guide Tanzania's international relations. Tanzania is an economically poor and militarily weak nation. However, it believes that all nations deserve respect. This respect does not flow from economic and military might, but from the fact that each nation is constituted of people who
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deserve respect. Where its people are concerned, therefore, Tanzania considers its dignity among nations to be equal to that of the most powerful or to the weakest and poorest nation on earth. Tanzania, under Ujamaa, believes that the universal solidarity of man, based on mutual respect, cooperation and sharing is necessary for the human destiny of the world.

This belief in the universal solidarity of man is based on Ujamaa's conviction of the divine origin of all men. And it recognizes that for most Tanzanians, this is ultimately a fundamentally religious conviction. Nyerere sees it as a Christian conviction whose transcendent values the Church can help to reveal and fortify. Therefore, he invites the Church to do this in Tanzania as a practical aspect of its apostolate. According to him, substantial progress in the Church's witness of faith will be made to the degree that the Church participates in the struggle for justice, equality, freedom and human dignity.

To those who say that Tanzania should change course and abandon Ujamaa, Nyerere says:

When you have pushed a load a little way up a hill it is no use relaxing. You have got to go on. Otherwise the load may well fall back to its original position - and perhaps crush
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the people in the process. 4

In Nyerere's estimation, Ujamaa has already con-
tributed considerably to the integral progress of the
Tanzanian nation. As he sees it, this indicates that the
system is pragmatically viable. To change course now would
risk crushing the progress already achieved in education and
health and in the self-awareness, self-confidence and free-
dom of the Tanzanian people.

This orientation or modus operandi that Ujamaa
claims to follow is neither simply an application of an
abstract, purely theoretical idea to political and social
activity, nor the subjugation of thought as a mere instru-
ment of strategy. The system's operation appears to be a
correlation of activity and thought and thought and activity.
It begins by accepting the values of the traditional social
organization as its foundation. But these are brought into
contact with the reality and practical demands of the con-
temporary world. They are critiqued, complemented and
brought up to date in the context of explicit moral princi-
pies to constitute renewed values. The latter do not remain
abstract: they are put into practice by legislation, social
policy and moral conviction (National Ethic). The results

of this social policy in terms of humanization indicate whether it is ethical and practicable. If it is, it is retained and enforced; if it is not, it is rejected. In any case, the process of interacting thought and action is, according to Ujamaa, continuous. We have here what we might call a socio-political hermeneutic circle which seems to minimize the "dictatorship over minds, the worst kind of all" which Paul VI warns about in relation to the ambiguity of ideologies in his letter. At the same time Ujamaa avoids the danger of being a mere "utopia" in the negative sense of a facile fantasy which abdicates responsibility by avoiding concrete tasks.

But this orientation does not rid Ujamaa of all moral ambiguity. As we have seen already, Nyerere is quick to admit that Ujamaa is not the solution to all human problems in Tanzania or in the world; it is only a limited contribution to the solution of some of those problems. He is not ashamed to present Ujamaa as a flexible, non-dogmatic system which is ready to change in the face of evidence without compromising principles. As is most often the case

5. Octogesima Adveniens, no. 25, p. 366.
7. Nyerere rejects the simplistic interpretation that flexibility in Ujamaa means the abandonment of the
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in politics, the ambiguities of Ujamaa surface mostly in its practical policies. We shall see this below when we discuss its limitations.

The survey of Ujamaa presented in this study, therefore, seems to indicate a number of points concerning the relationship between the absolute and relative values of man and society which show that it is not basically and fundamentally alienating or anti-Christian.

First of all, Ujamaa does not claim to possess a complete and self-sufficient anthropology. It readily admits that its vision of the reality that is man is limited to his temporal personal and social needs. It recognizes that man is also a transcendent reality, but that it is not capable of dealing with this aspect. It concedes that this is a religious sphere. Yet, it asserts that, since the political and the religious are both an integral part of man in Tanzania, they can and must work together to uplift the whole person in community, with the transcendental religious

socialist principles of justice and equality in socio-economic policy and a move toward capitalism. As he sees it, as long as the principles of justice, equality and freedom are not compromised, social and economic organization can and must be flexible at different times, in different circumstances. He considers this to be the true meaning of "scientific socialism", a socialist programme which takes into account all the relevant facts of time and place, society and culture.
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faith serving both as an affirmation and critic of political ideology. Put in other words, the absolute of transcendence is, according to Ujamaa, the conscience of the temporal. This seems to be congruent with what Paul VI proposes concerning Christian discernment: "Going beyond every system, without however failing to commit himself concretely to serving his brothers, he [the Christian] will assert, in the very midst of his options, the specific character of the Christian contribution for a positive transformation of society." 8

Secondly, the Ujamaa ideology is fundamentally a generous aspiration seeking for a more just society. 9 In fact, Ujamaa is criticized at the level of ideology not because it distorts the view of man by denigration, but because it allegedly idealizes his potential to grow in goodness and virtue. However, as we saw earlier, it recognizes and takes into account the human penchant for evil, for individualism, selfishness and injustice. Yet, it believes that, given the conducive environment, men can significantly overcome this penchant and grow in communion, co-operation, sharing and justice. This ideal is no more wide-eyed than the beatitudes

9. See ibid., no. 31, p. 368.
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themselves, no matter how they are interpreted. It ignores "the facts of human nature" no less than the very serious injunction of the Gospel according to Matthew concerning the moral life of the Christian: "You must be perfect just as your heavenly Father is perfect."11

Finally, as a democratic and secular historical movement with a political organization and aim, Ujamaa seeks to include all citizens of Tanzania. In its political ethics, its accent is on the common core of the African experience of social-organizational principles and values and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations. Beyond Tanzania, it respects the sovereignty of every nation, big and small and demands the same respect for Tanzania and its citizens in international relations. However, it does not perceive absolute sovereignty in the form of absolute nation-states as the best organization of the world today. According to Ujamaa, absolute nation-states create a situation which is conducive to competition, antagonism and war. To prevent the total annihilation of the world through war (something which is now quite possible)

10. Mt. 5-7.
11. Mt. 5:48.
12. See Octogesima Adveniens, no. 31, p. 368.
it proposes the voluntary establishment of a planetary political authority. Many Church bodies in different parts of the world would not object to this idea.

It is possible to conclude, from these three fundamental points that the basic ideological orientation of the Ujamaa system itself is not inimical to the integral growth of man and human dignity. It can be seen as a system of ethical politics, that is, a system of politics directed by moral principles.

B. Ujamaa's Contribution to Theological Method and Christian Spirituality

In the previous chapters we have seen how, on several occasions, Nyerere has urged the Church and individual Christians to co-operate with others (non-Christians) to build a just and loving society in Tanzania. He perceives the construction of a just and equitable society to be a matter of fundamental human morality where all people of faith or of none can co-operate. As he says, Christians have no monopoly of virtue and they, above all, should be ready to work together with anybody of goodwill to establish the various manifestations of the Reign of God on earth. This is because of their belief that the Spirit of God "breathes wherever he wills". Nyerere is aware of the
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distinctive symbols, concepts or sources of wisdom and the various transcendental motivations that different people or groups will bring to this task and to its rational analysis. Yet he maintains that the moral imperative remains one and the goal the same.

This contention of Nyerere and Ujamaa's whole approach to Church-State, religion-politics relations seem to us to offer a significant contribution to a contemporary theological methodology and a vibrant and practical spirituality in Tanzania. Nyerere in Ujamaa approaches the Christian imperative to social ethics as theology has done in many places in the wake of Vatican II. But this approach does not seem to have taken root in the Church in Tanzania. Apart from one or two cases we have already discussed, it does not seem to have influenced the thinking of the Church leaders there as yet.

According to the American moral theologian C. Curtin, Vatican II helped to change the methodological perspective of theology as regards social questions. Briefly, Gaudium et Spes attempted to relate the absolute to the relative, the ecclesiastical to the political, the religious

to the secular. Curran explains that prior to the Council these had been seen to be not only distinct but separate. From the Church's point of view, these realities had existed in the form of tiers, with the absolute, religious and ecclesiastical forming the upper tier. Theology was mainly concerned with this "higher" tier in the older view. But after that initial step mainly by *Gaudium et Spes*, Curran explains, theological methodology began to interrelate, interpenetrate or interface the realities of Gospel and life and Church and politics. He describes this change of methodology as influencing the post-Vatican II Church's theological understanding of its uniqueness and its social mission.

Curran maintains that theology now sees the uniqueness and distinctiveness of Christianity more in terms of the concepts, symbols and sources of wisdom that it brings to the ethical reflection (for example, the Reign of God, the cross and the Scriptures) than in terms of a morality that is different from the common human morality of all people. According to Curran's analysis of the orientation of post-Vatican II theology, the Christian and the fully human are co-extensive; Christian morality and fully human morality are the same.

This understanding of the relationship between Christian morality and human morality means that there are not two
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different moralities for life in this world — that we Christians are called to do one thing whereas non-Christians are called to do other things. There is only one history and one moral order. In principle there is no necessary opposition or difference between Christians and others in terms of social morality or life together in the world.14

What does this understanding of morality imply for the Church's appropriation of its social mission? Curran spells it out as follows:

Christians are called to work with all others to bring about a more just world — more in conformity with the one moral order. The Christian church in this view cannot be a sect which withdraws from the world and from others living in isolation lest it be contaminated by the world. However, ... Christians must prophetically point out the existence of sin and try to overcome the sin that exists in the world....15

The approach of Ujamaa to politics, economics, culture, education, work and recreation is, as we have shown throughout this study, essentially consistent with Curran's analysis of the post-conciliar orientation of social ethics. A spirituality develops from this approach which is equally an interfacing or interaction of activity and contemplation, of daily life and prayer. As D. Jorr puts it, this is what

15. Ibid.
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A balanced or integrated spirituality must do. It is "rooted not in just one or two aspects of conversion but in ... three - the 'religious', the 'moral' and the 'political': 16 faith, love and justice". 17 The structure and orientation of Ujamaa makes it easier for Christians and the Church to realize this spirituality, in Nyerere's estimation, than any other contemporary socio-political system. It makes easier "the building up of the human city, one that is ... peaceful, just and fraternal and acceptable as an offering to God", in the phraseology of Paul VI. 18 The pope insists here, quoting Gaudium et Spes, that faith in the eschaton impels Christians to construct a just worldly order. This is also the position of Nyerere and, essentially, that of Ujamaa.

C. Some Limitations of the Ujamaa System

Nyerere is much aware of the criticism made against the Ujamaa system and he welcomes it. He realizes, as we have noted, that as a social system Ujamaa does not, and cannot, incorporate the whole truth. It needs to be redeemed

17. See Micah 6:8.
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...and complemented particularly by religious truth. He believes that this is possible as long as politics and religion retain their own distinctive finalities. This is why he meets frequently with various religious groups, demonstrates to them that Ujamaa is not atheistic and urges them to participate in the integral development of man in Tanzania by promoting the vision and goals of their religions in the context of Ujamaa. He does not believe that it is good for Ujamaa, nor that it can survive as a liberating system, if it is closed and exclusivist. Ujamaa must be open and ready to learn from the accumulated wisdom of the human race and to contribute to it. The automatic rejection of worthwhile ideas and practices just because they are "communist" or "capitalist", he explains, would be a very "stupid" attitude:

We in Tanzania are part of mankind. We have to take our place in the world. We would be stupid to reject everything or everyone coming out of the West because that is the home of capitalism; we would be stupid to reject everything the communists do. We are trying to build ujamaa - socialism - which is neither of these things. We can learn from both - and from other political systems - without trying to copy or seeking their approval. Our task is to look first at our own position and our own needs, and then to consider other experience and other suggestions in the light of our requirements.19

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Ujamaa is not a perfect system, Nyerere declares from time to time, nor is Tanzania a socialist country. The most Tanzania can claim is that it is trying to build socialism. No one can predict accurately when this goal will be achieved given Tanzania's history of slavery, colonialism, disease, ignorance and poverty. "We are describing a society," says Nyerere, "that is the opposite of what we have inherited and it is going to take us a long time before we can reach that society."\(^{20}\) The goal of establishing a society of freedom, dignity, equality and sharing is firm. Any mistakes will be in the area of the tactical application of policy. These will have to be recognized and corrected.

So, what is it in the system that is conducive to these mistakes? What are Ujamaa's internal limitations? One that is often mentioned is that Ujamaa is too idealistic. It does not take into account the facts of human nature, the hard facts of the real world. The principles of mutual respect, concern and sharing are too utopian, impracticable and are bound to fail.

We have already addressed this point, but it is useful to revert to it here.—Nyerere calls the insistence

\(^{20}\) See P.A.S. Kijanga, Ujamaa and the Role of the Church, p. 107; J.K. Nyerere, "Interview", p. 207.
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upon this limitation by the critics of Ujamaa "nonsensical":

Social principles are, by definition, ideals at which to strive and by which to exercise self-criticism. The question to ask is not whether they are capable of achievement, which is absurd, but whether a society of free men can do without them. Like democracy, they are easier to approximate to in smaller societies than in large ones. But like democracy, they remain equally valid for both small and large societies — for both traditional and modern Africa.21

Nyerere argues that ideals cannot be ruled out of court just because they are ideals. Man is also called to continually create or realize himself. This is a lifetime task. It is, like the tenets of Christian belief, an ideal:

The ideal has never yet been attained; it may never be. But the fact that murders continue in every society does not prevent every society trying to eliminate them, to reduce their causes and discourage the expression of man's violent instincts. So in regard to the wider purposes of society, we have to organize our institutions and build attitudes which promote universal human dignity and social equality.22

As the philosopher R.B. Ashmore sees it, to disregard all ideals or all attempts to redirect human behaviour towards the creation of a better "real" world

22. Ibid., p. 16.
which is not dominated by competition and selfishness, but by co-operation and sharing, as impracticable and impossible is merely cynical. It is not necessary, he says, that people should be selfish; it is not wise nor human to decide how things should be on the basis of descriptions of how things now are. This is fallacious reasoning and, if adhered to, leads to disaster. For Nyerere, attitudes of selflessness and sharing can and must be promoted for the sake of the survival of man and the world; for the same reason, attitudes of selfishness and competition can and must be discouraged.

Another limitation of the Ujamaa system that is often cited is that it does not provide personal incentives due to its encouragement of co-operation. Because of this, it is argued, people are not motivated to work. This argument assumes a theory of human behaviour that presupposes that only material rewards motivate. According to Nyerere, it is not possible for Ujamaa to accept this theory completely. It is true that material remuneration for one's work is expected. This is a right and it cannot be discounted. However, for Ujamaa, which is principally an attitude of


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mind, an ethic, there can be other motivations to work besides personal material gain. One such motivation is service to one's fellow human beings. Nyerere maintains that when circumstances require it, people can, and do, forgo all material rewards and even give up their own lives for their country, their faith, their freedom, honour and so on. The institutions of Ujamaa, he argues, are intended to help to "produce" men and women whose primary focus is solidarity and communion among the members of the human race and not the surrender of these values.

For the Christian, self-giving and self-sacrifice for the sake of others is the central tenet of his faith. Love is the core of the whole of the Scriptures. And, as we hear in the Gospel of John and in Paul's letter to the Corinthians, the greatest love is reached, not in merely giving up one's life, but in doing so for humanity. Nyerere quotes Teilhard de Chardin with approval in reference to this kind of self-giving love: "A Christian can joyfully suffer persecution in order that the world may grow greater. He can no longer accept death on the charge that he is blocking mankind's road." 26

25. See Jn. 15:13; 1 Cor. 13.

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The early Christians put this self-giving love into practice as regards property and failed. But, as Miranda argues, their failure did not deprive self-giving love of its normative moral character in the Christian faith. Likewise, it may be argued that if Ujamaa is not, and perhaps cannot be totally successful in inculcating the attitude of sharing and co-operation, it cannot, therefore, be concluded that it is an erroneous system.

On the practical side, it is argued that the power of the State is such that it limits the freedom of its citizens. The Great Move and the Preventive Detention Act are quoted as examples. These are serious flaws in the system, as we have already indicated. To say that no government is free from the use of similar coercive measures for some (purported) greater good, does not justify them. But the most effective check against abuses of power is an effective democratic process. The people must be able to express their dissatisfaction with their leaders by removing them from power democratically. Ujamaa tries to preserve the democratic process in the nation. Democracy is one of its paramount

principles.

Faced with a clear resistance of the majority of the people to a given policy, Ujamaa modifies its institutions to accommodate the will of the people. To many doctrinaire socialists, this is a serious limitation of the system. It means to them that Ujamaa has no clear ideology. Nyerere disclaims this kind of "dogmatism" for Ujamaa.

There are principles without which there can be no socialist society, but there is no one universal model of socialism for all to copy. Circumstances and times influence the application of socialist principles. Each people in each place must determine their application in the context of local conditions. Each people must construct institutions which, given the local conditions, pursue the socialist ideal. 29 When Ujamaa modifies some of its institutions, Nyerere maintains, it does not mean that the ideal of cooperation and sharing is discarded. On the contrary, the modifications are intended to make the ideal more realizable. The political-economist R.H. Green writes that Tanzania's track record in pursuing the ideal are notable:

Broad changes have been achieved; low short-run dislocation losses have been rapidly counterbalanced by longer-term

gains. Strategic structural changes have been frequent. Institutional, technical, and personnel capacity has risen rapidly, though the growth of the demands placed upon this capacity sometimes obscures this rise and the improved total performance. \(^{30}\)

Nevertheless, Nyerere admits that Ujamaa is still in the desert on its journey towards the "new Jerusalem". But he describes himself as "a long term optimist". Eventually, he says, the humanity of man will triumph over his inhumanity. \(^{31}\)

How about Ujamaa's relationship with the Church? Is there a built-in antagonism between it and the Church? Nyerere does not believe so. If anything, he thinks that, due to its experience elsewhere, the Church in Tanzania has inherited an unhealthy, irrational and dangerous distrust of Ujamaa. This inhibits it from unleashing the full force of the creative social-revolutionary values which are imbedded in its message and doctrines and which it shares with Ujamaa. Ujamaa respects the Church's transhistorical finality; but it also suggests that it should not cut its bond with history. As Nyerere sees it, the moral authority of the leaders

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\(^{30}\) R.H. Green, "Tanzanian Political Economy Goals", p. 42.

CONCLUSION

of the Church is especially important in the process of forming a national ethic which is socially and religiously responsible. According to him, the bishops' and priests' commitment to justice, human dignity and freedom is crucial if Tanzania's ongoing revolution is to retain its human face. They must constantly remind it of that dimension of truth which they represent but which is beyond Ujamaa's immediate concern.32

All of the limitations outlined here are real. To Nyerere, it is important that Ujamaa recognizes them as such and makes a constant effort to surmount them. This, to him, constitutes the process of ideological progress.

Tanzania is showing no signs of reversing its ideals of development as spelled out and embodied in Ujamaa. It maintains that Ujamaa is the only moral and ethical way to organize contemporary society in the land. Nyerere sees it also as a pivotal Christian way. In many of their statements, the bishops of Tanzania concur with Nyerere's view.

32 Thus, the social scientist D. Westerlund asks: "...can the representatives of the small minority of highly educated people, to which priests no doubt belong, join forces with the majority of poor peasants and workers in a struggle for socialism and self-reliance or ...is the social and cultural cleavage too wide and are the interests too different?" See his "Christianity and Socialism in Tanzania" in Journal of Religion in Africa, 11:1 (1980), p. 52.
Moreover, a survey of the Scriptures and the earliest tradition of the Church, the thought of the magisterium on the "social question" in this century and the writings of a great many contemporary theologians suggests nothing that fundamentally contradicts the Ujamaa ideal. On the contrary, it seems to lend theological support to the Ujamaa orientation. But there are many domestic and international pressures against Ujamaa as a socio-political and economic policy. It is not certain that it will be able to withstand them. It may yet fail. However, Nyerere seems to maintain that if Ujamaa fails, it will not mean that it was wrong as a human and Christian social orientation, but that the forces of selfishness and injustice triumphed. Like the first apostolic ideal of sharing and co-operation, it will not have lost its normative character as the Christian moral and ethical conscience.
APPENDIX I

Structure of Democracy
TANZANIA: Structure of Democracy and Participation:
Link between the Party and the Government.

B. CIVIL ADMINISTRATIVE AREAS
AND MAJOR TOWNS

C. ECCLESIASTICAL PROVINCES ("DIOCESES")
AND EPISCOPAL SEES

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