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HEGELIAN AND HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGIES OF LANGUAGE

A thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy
in candidacy for the degree of Master of Arts
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by
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For Anne
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Citation of Texts

All citations to primary or secondary sources will be made in the body of the text. The editions and translations employed are provided in the Bibliography.

Primary sources (i.e., texts written by Hegel or Husserl) will be cited according to initials or shortened forms of titles. The following forms are used in this thesis:

Hegel:

BP The Berlin Phenomenology (from pt. 3 of Encyclopedia)
ETW Early Theological Writings
EL Hegel's Logic (pt. 1 of Encyclopedia)
JR Jenaer Reallphilosophie (1805-06)
PhS Phenomenology of Spirit
Husserl:

CM Cartesian Meditations
Crisis The Crisis of European Sciences...
EJ Experience and Judgment
FTL Formal and Transcendental Logic
Ideas Ideas
LI Logical Investigations
OG "The Origin of Geometry"

In citing secondary sources, where a cited author is represented more than once in the bibliography, the citation will include the publication date of the relevant text. E.g., Hyppolite 1974, p. 472.

Where I have cited passages from the French or German editions of works, the translations are my own, unless specified to the contrary.
I - Introduction

"[Hegel's] stated aims are fully congruent with those of modern phenomenology." (Rauch, p. 328)

"Certainly, no two phenomenological systems could be further apart in content [than are those of Hegel and Husserl]." (Rauch, p. 329)

These two quotations from a recent article by Leo Rauch encapsulate a central problem facing anyone attempting to discuss the phenomenologies of G.W.F. Hegel and Edmund Husserl in the same context. Despite some very general similarities between the two phenomenological programmes, the details of these phenomenologies as actually practiced could scarcely be more different. Rauch's summary of their relationship as similar with respect to aims and divergent with respect to
content, however, is perhaps overly simplistic (as the excellent analyses in his own article clearly demonstrate), and might lead to misunderstanding. The relationship between Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenology is a complex web of similarities and differences. As I shall attempt to show in Part II, the congruences go beyond aims, also involving methodologies (such as presuppositionless description) and content (e.g. intentionality and intersubjectivity). Moreover, some of their aims differ markedly (e.g., the relation between phenomenology and philosophy).

Nevertheless, it is true to say that broad points of contact can be established between the phenomenologies of Hegel and Husserl, points which must be significantly considered by any analysis of the two systems. Yet despite these striking similarities, equally striking differences are readily apparent. Hegel proceeds in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* to spin out a dazzling array of observations concerning fields as diverse as epistemology, scientific observation, art, ethics, politics and religion; whereas Husserl methodically develops a set of foundation-laying, primarily epistemological observations. The present thesis argues that the differing styles and contents which mark the two forms of phenomenology can be explained, in large part, by their divergent conceptions of the role played by language in the most fundamental operations of human consciousness.
Insofar as what follows is an attempt to centre a discussion of the phenomenologies of Hegel and Husserl on an examination of their approaches to language, this thesis reflects two evident trends in philosophical research. First, it is apparent that a growing number of studies (such as Rauch's paper) are devoted to the interpretation of Hegel's *Phenomenology* in light of the phenomenological movement launched in this century by Husserl. This tendency to examine the past through the concepts and understandings available in the present is not unusual, nor is it perhaps avoidable. Notwithstanding the dangers pointed out by thinkers, such as Heidegger, many philosophers make use of contemporary manners of thought in order to shed light on past thinkers, to examine their thought in a new way. In view of the fact that Hegel developed a "phenomenology" approximately one hundred years before Husserl "founded" the discipline in virtual ignorance of the details of Hegel's project, it should not be surprising to find contemporary phenomenologists returning to Hegel and Husserl in order to see whether they can be read in the same spirit. Conversely, we should not be surprised to find contemporary Hegelians turning to the works of Husserl, in an endeavour to determine to what extent their concerns were parallel. Second, although language was never the central theme for either Husserl or Hegel, the linguistic
preoccupations of contemporary philosophy have sparked a considerable amount of examination of the problem of language in their philosophies. Many of these studies will be cited in the body of the present thesis. However, to my knowledge no commentator has attempted to discuss in the same work the question of language as it arises for Hegel and Husserl. This thesis, then, unites the expanding interest in Hegel qua phenomenologist with the contemporary concern about the role of language in the structures of consciousness.

While I attempt to show the pertinence of the role of language in the two phenomenologies to an examination of these phenomenologies per se, it is not my intention to argue that the sole reason for the differing characteristics of Hegelian and Husserlian thought is the contrast between their phenomenologies of language. Rather, my intentions are: a), to provide a textually-supported explication of the role of language in consciousness according to Hegel and Husserl; and b), to establish the relevance of these divergent notions of language to any attempt to explain some of the severe differences which mark the two phenomenological systems. In particular, I shall suggest that the cultural and historical fields examined by Hegel are available to him by virtue of his linguistically-situated version of transcendental subjectivity. To employ the terminology employed by T. Kisiel
(1), the Hegelian view of fundamental consciousness is "thick", infused with the concreteness of linguistic understandings. For Husserl, the cultural-historical sphere causes ample difficulty for phenomenological analysis largely because of his insistent claim that the fundamental layer of experience is a "thin", prelinguistic stratum from which all meaning arises.

The point of departure for our confrontation between the treatments of language by Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenology will be the "Sense-certainty" chapter of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. This chapter's explanation of how consciousness encounters universality in experience will be contrasted with Husserl's discussion of the same issue in *Ideas*. It will be seen from the comparison of these accounts that the key point at which they differ is the role of language in the recognition of the universal. After exploring in greater depth their contrasting phenomenologies of language, I shall indicate how their approaches to language help to determine the divergent characters of their phenomenologies as such, paying particular attention to their "thick" versus "thin" immediates, their treatments of intersubjectivity, and their approaches to the stability or instability of experience. Finally, having shown that their phenomenologies of language carry fundamental implications for
Phenomenology as a project of thought, I shall raise a concluding question: what sort of evidence could adjudicate the conflict between the conception of language held by Hegel and that to which Husserl subscribes?

Before we embark upon the detailed examination of the Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenologies of language, perhaps some justification ought to be provided for the fact that this examination is being undertaken at all. For the systems of thought represented by Hegel's Phenomenology, on the one hand, and Husserl's phenomenological works on the other, appear on the surface to be extremely disparate. In order to provide such a justification, let us commence our inquiry with a brief discussion of the basic points at which the aims and orientations of Hegel and Husserl as phenomenologists converge.
II - Points of Contact Between the Phenomenologies

In Part II, I intend to justify my treatment of Hegelian phenomenology alongside the phenomenology of Husserl. A general justification of this procedure is required in view of the oft-noted dissimilarities between Hegelian and Husserlian thought.

Systematic comparative discussions of Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenology have rarely been undertaken, particularly in the English language. One recent attempt by Quentin Lauer (1977) treats the topic in a rather superficial and hence unprofitable fashion. A subsequent article by Leo Rauch is a more sophisticated examination of the general
relationship between the two phenomenologies. The work of Eugen Fink, the collection edited by Planty-Bonjour and the article by Sözer appear to constitute evidence of a growing interest in this field of inquiry on the European continent.

Instead of systematic discussion, it is more common to see an author who is in the process of commenting on the work of one or the other philosopher casually take up the question of their relationship, and then drop the question quickly. Examples of this approach can be found in Derrida's work on Husserl (p. 67), and in Westphal's work on Hegel (p. 28). Such parenthetical remarks as these, while they often contain illuminating insights, are often frustrating because of their brevity and lack of textual support or detailed argumentation.

Whether an author writes about Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenology in the context of a work devoted to the topic or in a short passage, the discussion tends to adopt one of two orientations. Some commentators, such as Derrida (p. 67), stress the "profound convergence" of Hegel and Husserl; while others, such as Schmidt (p. 41) who claims that it is an "intellectual sin" to confuse the two phenomenologies, stress their divergence.
Given these two tendencies, I imagine that the present thesis will reflect both. In this section I hope to draw out enough methodological, thematic, and historic points of contact between the phenomenologies of Hegel and Husserl to justify their discussion together, and to set the stage for the subsequent confrontation, to be centered on the issue of language, between the two phenomenologies. This approach recognizes that while differences between Hegel and Husserl are extensive and significant, they are especially meaningful insofar as they are divergences between two thinkers attempting a strikingly similar enterprise — the science of the experience of consciousness. Furthermore, the differences between them, particularly those arising from their phenomenologies of language, are crucial for contemporary thinkers engaged in a similar phenomenological task.

Consequently, in the following discussion of the points of contact between Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenology, I want to avoid doing an injustice to either thinker by conflating their approaches. Rather, my intention is to examine the conceptual overlap and historical convergence which permit the emergence of a fundamental relation between the phenomenologies of Hegel and Husserl. For it is only through an understanding of the relation that underlies the disrelation that the disrelation can be fully grasped.
The discussion of the points of contact will be undertaken in four parts. First, the significance of the common term "phenomenology" will be explored. Second, I shall examine the extent to which the broad methodological impulses of the phenomenologies are similar, insofar as they represent descriptive sciences which are presuppositionless, yet which are accomplished from a prephenomenologically achieved vantage point. Third, I shall examine the common field of Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenological inquiry — namely, the related realms of transcendental subjectivity and consciousness, with particular attention given to the intentionality operative within this field. Last, I shall summarize aspects of the historical convergence of Hegelian and Husserlian strains in post-Husserlian continental philosophy.

- a - "Phenomenology"

The fact that both Hegel and Husserl employ the same word — phenomenology — is a more immediately obvious similarity than any methodological or thematic resemblance. Is it significant that both thinkers use the same term to denote an important philosophical enterprise? Or is the term merely a
homonym describing two fundamentally different forms of philosophy?

By the time Hegel settled on the title of his Phänomenologie des Geistes, phenomenology had already been a term of some importance to Kantian philosophers, referring to a certain field of study. Phänomenologie was for these philosophers a prolegomenon, based on the description of the phenomenal realm, to logic and metaphysics. As Solomon explains (p. 158), for Kant phenomenology thus understood was preliminary to the examination of the noumenal realm of God, freedom and immortality.

For Hegel, too, phenomenology retains an introductory character, as the Preface to the Phenomenology makes abundantly clear (e.g., pars. 37-38). To allude to a celebrated Hegelian image, phenomenology is the ladder which leads the reader to the level of self-understanding which must be reached in order for logic to commence. The point from which logic can begin — spirit which knows itself as substance — initially is not immediately available to consciousness. One must accede to the stage of absolute knowledge. The gaining of this understanding by consciousness is the point of the Phenomenology of Spirit.
However, phenomenology is introductory to philosophical reflection in a different sense for Hegel than it was for the Kantians. Solomon notes:

"... [Hegel] had learned from Fichte and Schelling that there could be no "thing in itself", no "noumenon", and that therefore the whole of metaphysics too, even "God, freedom and immortality", would have to be carried out as phenomenology, the study of the structures of experience."
(p. 158)

Phenomenology now occupies the entire range of conscious activity, from epistemology to morality to religion, with virtually everything in between included as well. While systematic philosophy will recapitulate these moments from the perspective of pure thought, phenomenology examines these regions from the point of view of consciousness engaged in the phenomenal realm.

Hence, while Hegel retains from Kantian philosophy the notion of phenomenology as an introductory examination of phenomena, he broadens its scope such that it embraces the breadth of philosophy itself.
Husserl appropriated the term "phenomenology" at a time when he was not particularly sensitive to the history of philosophy. In particular, German Idealism was in disrepute in the philosophical world, and Husserl's opinion of Hegel (as I shall elaborate later) was essentially negative. Nevertheless, "phenomenology" suited Husserl's purposes to perfection. It was an apt representation of the foundational enterprise he desired to erect, a science which exposes the experiential foundations of knowledge by means of a descriptive examination of the way in which phenomena arise in consciousness.

Both Hegel and Husserl, then, adopted as their own a word which well represented the descriptive task they aimed to undertake, and subsequently redefined the term's meaning to suit their individual purposes. A key difference between their respective uses of the term would appear to lie in their conceptions of the introductory nature of phenomenology. For Hegel phenomenology was preparatory to systematic philosophy, whereas for Husserl phenomenology was the heart of his life's work in philosophy. Yet even here, notwithstanding the obvious contrast, one might discern a similarity. Although Husserl devoted virtually all of his philosophical energies to phenomenology, he occasionally intimated that phenomenological descriptions were, in a sense, introductory. Merleau-Ponty
raises this point when he notes that phenomenological
descriptions "are often considered preparatory, and Husserl
himself always distinguished 'phenomenological investigations'
in the broad sense from the 'philosophy' which was supposed to
crown them" (p. 89).

I would not presume to deny that Hegel and Husserl
developed what they termed their phenomenologies in divergent
ways. Indeed, this thesis will will provide ample evidence,
will attempt an explanation, for their divergence.
Nonetheless, we might see in the foregoing preliminary
considerations that the common choice of term is not without
significance. Both philosophers employ "phenomenology" to
denote a basic science, in some sense introductory or
preparatory, aiming to discern the structures of the
phenomenal realm.

Armed with this preliminary point of contact, let us now
look more closely at the notion, which guided both Hegel and
Husserl, of phenomenology as descriptive, presuppositionless,
and scientific.
- b - Phenomenology as science of pure description

Both genres of philosophy function in related senses as sciences of the presuppositionless description of phenomena. That is to say, both Hegel and Husserl interpret phenomenology as a "pure seeing".

Hegel most clearly acknowledges the aspect of presuppositionless description in the Introduction to the Phenomenology. Here he tells us that in phenomenology

... we do not need to import criteria, or to make use of bright ideas and thoughts during the course of the inquiry; it is precisely when we leave these aside that we succeed in contemplating the matter in hand [i.e., consciousness] in and for itself. (2) (par. 84)

Because for Hegelian phenomenology consciousness provides its own criteria of knowledge and its own conceptions of its relation to its object, writes Hegel, "all that is left for us to do is simply to look on" (par. 85). The Hegelian phenomenologist can thereby describe experience's own movement, in consciousness' own terms.

Husserl also regards pure description to be a key to transcendental phenomenology. He makes this evident in many passages, but perhaps nowhere more evident than in paragraph 15 of Cartesian Meditations. Here Husserl tells us that the
phenomenologist must achieve a phenomenological "splitting of the ego", an operation which provides the vantage point of the "disinterested onlooker", above the naively interested ego. The Ego's sole remaining interest being to see and to describe adequately what he sees, purely as seen, as what is seen and in such and such a manner" (p. 35). On this, Husserl continues, depends "the absolute 'unprejudicedness' of the description" (p. 36).

Clearly, the task of pure seeing or presuppositionless description is an important component of phenomenology for both Hegel and Husserl. Nevertheless, neither is so naive as to claim that one can simply sit down and start describing phenomena ex nihilo. The phenomenologist in both cases contributes something, a way of seeing, which initiates and informs the descriptive process.

For Husserl of course, the phenomenological standpoint is reached through the epochê, the procedure outlined in the passage just quoted from Cartesian Meditations. Elsewhere, in the Crisis Husserl writes that through the epochê "I stand above the world, which has now become for me, in a quite peculiar sense, a phenomenon" (p. 152). "This is not a 'view', an 'interpretation' bestowed on the world" by the phenomenologist, Husserl adds, but is rather the standpoint from which one can examine the ground of all world-views and world-interpretations (p. 152).
Likewise for Hegel a phenomenological standpoint must be reached prior to engaging in phenomenological description. Again we turn to the Phenomenology's Introduction for guidance. Here Hegel explains the nature of what we might call the prephenomenological understanding which is assumed in the body of the work. According to my reading of a key paragraph, paragraph 87, the phenomenologist must adopt a way of understanding experience in order to describe adequately the journey of consciousness. Experience for Hegel is the dialectical movement in which consciousness shifts from one conception of the world to another. More importantly, within experience each successive conception, or shape of consciousness, is a result—a reversal—of that which has gone before. Hegel admits that "this way of looking at the matter is something contributed by us" (par. 87); i.e., it is something brought to phenomenology by the phenomenologist.

At first glance it might appear that the pre-understandings brought by Hegel and Husserl to their respective phenomenologies involve more difference than similarity. It would seem that the Hegelian pre-understanding of experience involves more interpretation of its subject matter than does the Husserlian reduction. While not denying that there is a significant difference between the two prephenomenological standpoints, I believe that it is possible
to narrow the distance between them by means of a renewed examination of a), the role of Hegel's use of "we" in the opening chapters of the *Phenomenology*, and b), the sense in which Husserl's phenomenological starting point constitutes more of an interpretive framework than Husserl is willing to admit.

The controversy surrounding Hegel's use of "we" reflects an ongoing concern about the amount of interpretation contributed by the Hegelian phenomenologist to the description of consciousness. Werner Marx is a commentator who is particularly sensitive to this issue; in fact, he considers the consistency of the narrator's role in the development of the *Phenomenology* to be one of the aspects which provide continuity to this often seemingly discontinuous work. Marx claims that five distinct functions of the "we" can be isolated. The "we" is the agent who:

- "takes" phenomenal knowledge "along" the road
- is "the initiator of the movement of the history of experience"
- "surveys the dialectical movement of experience" and presents the necessity of the transitions between its moments
- sees the syntheses arising from the movement
- guides phenomenal knowledge along the "highway of despair" which is its experience

(Marx, pp. 91-92)
As we can see, Marx's five functions of the "we" incorporate a mixture of narrative-contemplative and dynamic-active functions.

However, according to our above reading of paragraph 87 of the Introduction, Hegel himself regarded the narrative-contemplative functions as primary. The phenomenologist does not really initiate the process of experience, or move consciousness along. Rather, "we" look on as consciousness provides its own impetus and takes on its successive shapes. One must therefore avoid the temptation to overplay the active functions of the "we". With Westphal, I would claim that this narrative device plays a primarily pedagogical role, urging the reader to see the phenomena as Hegel sees them.

This carries no implication, as is often charged, that one must already be in the realm of Absolute Knowledge to follow Hegel's argument. It only supposes that like the slaveboy in the Henk, the reader can see for himself what is there to be seen and does not need to take anything on Hegel's authority.
(Westphal, p. 9)

While it might be granted that Hegel's prephenomenological understanding of the experience to be described is more interpretive than Husserl's, it is misleading to overestimate its dynamic/active aspect.
By the same token, it is perhaps equally misleading to accept at face value Husserl's claim to achieve a standpoint completely devoid of interpretive prejudice. Gadamer, in *Truth and Method*, goes to some lengths to support the claim that the Enlightenment-inspired aim to free the understanding from all prejudice is a misplaced objective which is itself a prejudice (pp. 235-245). He writes, "the fundamental prejudice of the enlightenment is the prejudice against prejudice itself, which deprives tradition of its power" (pp. 239-240). Drawing on Heidegger's discussion of fore-understanding, Gadamer argues that "the prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being" (p. 245). Following Gadamer we might claim that Husserl's attempt to set aside interpretive prejudice is itself a fore-understanding inherited from the Enlightenment, a fore-understanding from which he approaches, and which influences, his account of experience.

We might further ask whether more specific, unstated prejudices operate as factors in Husserl's description of consciousness. For example, his claim to eidetic intuition, or immediate insight into essences, could be such a presupposition affecting his methodology. Also, it is debatable whether some of the basic ideas which govern his
phenomenology - e.g. intentionality - are results of phenomenological description. I believe a case could be made for the claim that they are presuppositions which guide his descriptions, although to make that case fully would take the present thesis too far afield.

In summary, I would grant that there is a sense in which it is justifiable to assert that Hegelian phenomenology provides a more interpretive description of experience than its Husserlian counterpart. Yet the difference between the two on this score is less pronounced than is commonly believed. Given a minimal interpretation of the role of Hegel's "we", and given the argument that despite Husserl's denial of prejudice, he still brings significant pre-understandings to his descriptive efforts, the two approaches may be closer together in their broad methodological orientations than might initially be thought. Viewed in this way, both Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenologies stand as attempts to describe phenomena in as pure a fashion as possible, but yet from an achieved pre-phenomenological standpoint which provides a "way of seeing" what is described.

As a final point with regard to what might loosely be termed methodological points of contact, let us briefly allude
to the sense in which phenomenology is a science for both Hegel and Husserl.

Souches-Dagues points out that both Hegel and Husserl inherit the heuristic goal of philosophy as a rigorous science and apply this goal to phenomenology (p. 25). Ironically, however, both phenomenologies constitute reactions against rigorous method in science. The see-describe paradigm favoured by both phenomenologists precludes any subversion of phenomenological method to a preordained formula for gathering and analyzing data. As a result, Hegel and Husserl both generally oppose the wholesale application to all phenomena of the deductive, causal explanations which characterize the natural sciences.

More specifically, Husserl and Hegel reject the validity of natural-scientific method to the study of the mental life. Consequently, both take a critical view of psychology, claiming that psychology alone does not provide a sufficient or adequate explanation of the the structures of consciousness. Since psychology is the science which might have the most natural claim to be the science of mental phenomena, we can perhaps best appreciate the way in which Hegel and Husserl relate the "science" of phenomenology to the other sciences by examining their views concerning its relation to psychology.
M. J. Petry, in the introduction to his translation of the "Phenomenology" section of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia*, provides documentary evidence that, for Hegel, psychological explanation was insufficient for phenomenology.

In an advertisement which appeared at the time (ca. 1807) in several periodicals and which was almost certainly written by Hegel himself, the significance of the work [i.e., the Phenomenology of Spirit] was summarized as follows: "This book demonstrates how knowledge arises. Psychological explanation, as well as the more abstract expositions of what is basic to knowledge, should be replaced by the phenomenology of spirit. . ." (Hegel, BP, p. xvi)

And although Husserl allowed for the possibility of a phenomenological psychology, he claimed that such a discipline would be based on phenomenological principles. Phenomenology itself avoids the pitfalls of studying phenomena as "psychological facts, consequently with all the subjective conditions which accompany them in their formation" (Ricoeur 1967, p. 5). Hence both phenomenologies, while adopting the scientific mission of rigour and descriptive accuracy, still assume descriptive standpoints which precede the perspective adopted by scientific investigation (in the usual contemporary sense of science).

In the foregoing section, I have attempted to show some broad methodological points of contact linking Hegelian and
Husserlian phenomenology. For both, phenomenology is a science, adopting a position more fundamental than those of existing sciences studying the same realm. It is presuppositionless, while still describing phenomena from a prephenomenologically achieved standpoint which affords a way of seeing experience.

The reader may have noticed that to this point I have skirted the question of the nature of the realm analyzed by phenomenology. Let us then turn to some points of contact more closely related to the fields of transcendental subjectivity and consciousness — fields upon which both Hegel and Husserl fix their phenomenological descriptions.
Transcendental subjectivity

As sciences of the phenomenal realm, both phenomenologies constitute explorations of that which is given to us as subjects. For phenomena are the data as they appear, not things in themselves abstracted from subjective awareness. In this way we may speak of subjectivity as the field of phenomenological investigation. Grieder, noting that Husserl and Hegel regard subjectivity as the overarching structural unity of experience, concludes that the key similarity between the two thinkers is that their philosophies are philosophies of transcendental subjectivity (p. 268). Rosen makes the similar point that both philosophers allow the subject to provide the ground and explanation of experience (p. 28).

The Husserlian notion of "constitution", or the structuring of the way the world presents itself by the transcendental subject, is not without significance here. Ricoeur discusses at length the relationship between the Husserlian notion of constitution and Hegel's description of Geist as apprehended through consciousness (1981, pp. 9-11). Making a similar point with respect to Hegel by drawing a parallel to Sartrean thought, Solomon comments that the Phenomenology is Hegel's interpretation of "the new humanism; 'it is a human world', or, in Sartre's now famous if nominally sexist formulation, 'Man makes himself'" (p. 159). (3)
As philosophers writing in the aftermath of Kant, both Hegel and Husserl claim that phenomena present themselves as they do by virtue of the structures of the transcendental subject. Hence the phenomenologies assume the validity of tracing the subjective structuring of experience through a first person approach to knowledge. (4)

— d — Consciousness

The specific field which largely dominates the descriptive efforts of each phenomenology is consciousness. To be sure, there are significant differences in the details of the conceptions of consciousness adopted by Hegel and by Husserl, differences which I shall later highlight from the perspective of their treatment of language. For the present, the following similarities with respect to intentionality and intersubjectivity will establish a conceptual overlap sufficient to justify my practice of discussing, together the role of language in consciousness according to the two forms of phenomenology.

One striking similarity lies in the notion of consciousness as directed toward an object, or as intentional.
Intentionality is a notion widely associated with Husserl's thought, but is no less present in the Phenomenology of Spirit.

Those familiar with the works of Husserl need not be reminded of the fundamental importance of intentionality to his conception of consciousness. Indeed, for him it is the very nature of consciousness to be object-directed.

Conscious processes are also called intentional; but then the word intentionality signifies nothing less than this fundamental property of consciousness; to be consciousness of something; as a cogito, to bear within itself its cogitatum.

(CM, p. 33)

Hegel is not as thematically explicit as Husserl with regard to intentionality. Nevertheless his phenomenology employs the notion throughout the journey of consciousness described in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The importance of the object-directed structure of consciousness is signaled in the Introduction to the Phenomenology, where we read:

Consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and at the same time relates itself to it, or, as it is said, this something exists for consciousness.

(par. 82)

The development of consciousness needs the intentional moment, requires the presence of an object of consciousness. Consciousness and its intentional object assume a dialectical relationship which is traced throughout the Phenomenology.
The intentionality of Hegelian consciousness is most evident in the "Consciousness" chapter which begins the Phenomenology, and in which consciousness explicitly adopts varying attitudes toward the object it perceives (e.g., being in "Sense-certainty", a thing with properties in "Perception"). Yet the intentional structure is maintained throughout the work. As Solomon notes, in "Religion", the final chapter before "Absolute Knowledge", feeling is described in terms of its orientation toward an object (p. 595). Consciousness only becomes non-intentional when it reaches the stage of Absolute Knowledge (Ricoeur 1981, p. 8); prior to that elevated stage there is a vast array of intentional shapes of consciousness to be described. Furthermore, as Flay remarks,

The concern of the Phenomenology is to prepare us for this immediate beginning in the Logic by liberating thought from the opposition, contained in consciousness, between itself and its certainty on the one hand, and between objects of knowledge and their truth on the other. (p. 49)

Clearly, consciousness is intentional for Hegel as well as for Husserl. The former may, unlike the latter, ultimately surmount philosophically the necessity of this object-directedness. Still, insofar as he is a phenomenologist, Hegel clings, as does Husserl, to the intentional structure of consciousness.
Moreover, both phenomenologies represent consciousness as necessarily existing in an intersubjective community, i.e., as a subject in a world inhabited by other subjects. Husserl introduces intersubjectivity as a necessary component of consciousness, for example, in the fifth Cartesian Meditation. In this often discussed meditation, Husserl’s description of consciousness concludes with the necessary awareness of others in a “community of monads” (CM, par. 55). Hegel’s Phenomenology also depicts consciousness as necessarily existing in a social realm. For, as the celebrated dialectic of Lordship and Bondage shows, self-consciousness is possible only through the recognition of my selfhood by other selves. Drawing Husserl and Hegel together on this issue, Ricoeur suggestively comments that the Fifth Meditation is a phenomenology of consciousness which issues in a phenomenology of objective spirit, while the latter chapters of the Phenomenology (notably VI, “Spirit”), constitute a phenomenology of objective spirit retaining the element of consciousness (1981, pp. 6-7).

In fact, this point of contact grows more significant when Husserl’s later works are considered. As Grieder suggests, later in his career Husserl appeared to sense that phenomenology could not progress until it investigated the socio-historical aspects of our communal experience (p. 255).
As important as this issue is to the Hegel-Husserl relationship, I shall postpone further discussion of intersubjectivity until a subsequent part of this thesis. At that point I shall attempt to show that Hegel and Husserl operate with very different notions of intersubjectivity, and that the difference between these notions is largely attributable to the roles that the two philosophers ascribe to language in their respective conceptions of consciousness.

Finally, although consciousness is the focal point of the two forms of phenomenology, the consciousness held up for examination is not "natural consciousness", or the "natural attitude" - the attitude adopted in everyday life. To be more precise, phenomenology confronts the natural attitude. Natural consciousness is examined, but on phenomenology's terms, not on its own.

This is admittedly a very tricky point. Commentators who take up this issue sometimes downplay the significance of their apparently similar approaches to the natural attitude. Consider, for example, this passage:

What Husserl means by transcending the natural standpoint in order to philosophize is very different from what Hegel means by transcending natural consciousness for the sake of philosophy. (Westphal, p. 23)
To be sure, Westphal is correct to the degree that Hegel transcends natural consciousness by showing that it actually transcends itself while refusing to admit it (see "Sense-certainty"), while Husserl brackets the self-understandings and world-views of the natural attitude in order to facilitate a presuppositionless approach to the phenomena at hand.

The fact remains, though, that both phenomenologies reject the ultimate validity of the appeal to "common sense" (5). Phenomenology must go beyond the standard understandings of natural consciousness. And it does so for both Hegel and Husserl on the basis of what I have earlier termed their prephenomenological standpoints. Hegel's view of experience as dialectic allows him to see that the positions assumed by natural consciousness become transcended in subsequent moments; while Husserl's *epoché* allows him to suspend the positions of the natural attitude. The fact that in both approaches phenomenology confronts the natural attitude, and does so by virtue of its very prephenomenological standpoint, I find to be a significant point of contact between Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenology.

We have just described some methodological and thematic points of contact at which the phenomenologies of Hegel and
Husserl intersect. Beyond their common use of the term "phenomenology", we found that both aim to engage in a science of the pure description of phenomena, a science departing from an articulated prephenomenological standpoint, and which, while going beyond the self-understandings of natural consciousness, attempts to describe the structures of transcendental subjectivity on the basis of the experience of consciousness.

Beyond these methodological and thematic considerations, however, post-Husserlian continental philosophy has been the scene of a historical convergence of Hegelian and Husserlian concerns. The following section will briefly examine this phenomenon.
- e - Historical convergence

Had he been alive to witness it, Husserl himself would probably have been dismayed by the post-Husserlian rediscovery of Hegel. The founder of contemporary phenomenology had no use for Hegelian phenomenology, and his scattered references to Hegel are usually negative in tone. Why?

One relevant factor is surely the general disrepute into which Hegel's thought had fallen in Husserl's era. It should be noted that Husserl thematically treated the history of philosophy relatively late in his career, particularly in the *Crisis*. But even in this work his references to Hegel are few, and those few are generally uncomplimentary. Husserl's reading of the history of modern philosophy in the *Crisis* is quite traditional for the time, focusing as it does on rationalism, empiricism and Kant. He reserves only scattered remarks for post-Kantian German Idealism, a philosophical school generally thought at the time to have collapsed.

One must also consider the attitude of the man who was arguably the most profound influence on Husserl, Franz Brentano. Brentano harbored a dislike for Hegelian thought, a dislike which doubtless passed itself on to Husserl (Solomon, p. 595). Elsewhere Solomon conjectures:
Husserl's own view of Hegel is largely unlearned and a wholly unjustified prejudice. Perhaps this is due to the fact that he saw Hegel through Dilthey's eyes, as a historical relativist of sorts, but nevertheless his sometimes harsh dismissals are ill-considered, considering the often striking connections between the two phenomenologies. (p. 9)

In any event, it seems clear that Husserl regarded German Idealism, including Hegel, as a movement influenced more by obscure metaphysical notions than by the need to philosophize from a ground. Had Husserl lived in a climate more receptive to a careful consideration of Hegel, he might have been more likely to observe the "often striking connections" between Hegel's phenomenological programme and his own.

Despite Husserl's predominantly negative view of Hegel, post-Husserlian philosophy branched out into many directions, some of which involved a recovery of Hegelian themes and approaches. Dumming summarizes these developments:

Though so miscellaneous that there is little prospect of regarding them as a philosophical movement . . . what structuralists, poststructuralists, and hermeneutic phenomenologists tend to share more or less in common for our purposes is a denial of Husserl's phenomenological presumption of the eventual accessibility of immediately given experience - or (as most would prefer to put it) of the accessibility of prelinguistic meanings. With this denial (and with their debt to Hegel) their method, or, rather, methods, tend to approximate versions of a dialectic. (pp. 552-553)

For our purposes it is noteworthy that the post-Husserlian
rediscovery of Hegel is tied with a rejection of Husserl's view of the role of language in experience.

Yet despite this rejection of Husserl's phenomenology of language, many of these philosophers desired to retain the spirit and thrust of the phenomenological task as conceived by Husserl. Among this group of thinkers are Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, two philosophers who saw much to admire in both the phenomenological movement commenced by Husserl and the dialectical urgency of Hegelian phenomenology. Along much the same line, Schmidt speaks of a "third generation phenomenology" (p. 43). This approach, borrowing from the phenomenologies of Hegel and Husserl and exemplified by the work of Eugen Fink, recognizes that "immediate and fundamental thought is guided by these always completed phenomena of social interpretation" (Schmidt, p. 41). Again it is worthy of note that "these phenomena of social interpretation" would involve, in an important way, linguistic phenomena. As if to give credence to the argument that Hegel and Husserl were involved in tasks which share many aspects in common, then, much of contemporary phenomenology has attempted to bring the broad historical concerns and dialectical power of Hegel's thought together with the rigour and insight of Husserl.
The post-Husserlian convergence of Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenological themes thereby provides a further, indeed perhaps the most compelling, justification for the possibility and indeed the desirability of discussing the two systems of phenomenology in the same context. And we have already begun to glimpse reasons for centering such a confrontation on the issue of the role of language in consciousness. The points of contact which I have just discussed conceal, to be sure, some significant differences, to some of which I have already alluded. The following sections, as they hold the two phenomenologies together in order to discuss them as phenomenologies, will attempt to explain that these differences arise largely from their divergent phenomenologies of language.
III - Language, "Sense-certainty", and Universality

It has often been remarked that language is the central issue of twentieth century philosophy. As noted just above, many continental philosophers have distinguished themselves by concentrating on questions relating to language. In addition, the growth of post-Wittgensteinian Anglo-American philosophy around the philosophy of language is common knowledge.

Not only is language a crucial issue to philosophy at large - phenomenology also needs to grapple with this concern. In principle, a fully developed "science of the experience of consciousness" ought to determine the role played by language in the fundamental structures of transcendental subjectivity.
In the context of our present confrontation between Husserlian and Hegelian phenomenology, the examination of their respective theories of language should provide a useful point on which to centre the discussion.

Part III will begin the scrutiny of the two phenomenologies of language by examining the opening chapter of Hegel's Phenomenology, "Sense-certainty". In these pages Hegel depicts phenomenology's movement beyond a naive, natural-attitude epistemology with the aid of an understanding of language's role in fundamental consciousness. Language appears almost at the very outset of this chapter, and is a significant element in the initial phase of the dialectic of awareness. While subsequent chapters of the Phenomenology reveal much about the importance of language in the social, cultural and religious spheres, "Sense-certainty" interests us at this point for two reasons. First, the mention of language in the opening chapter suggests language's importance to the most basic stratum of awareness. Second, the epistemological orientation of "Sense-certainty" readily lends itself to comparison with the primarily epistemological concerns of Hegelian phenomenology.

The discussion of Husserl's phenomenology in light of "Sense-certainty" is additionally pertinent if some suggestive
comments in a recent article by Souche-Dagues are taken into account. In this provocative essay she remarks that Husserl's "immediate 'totalization' of the particular and the universal" reflects a desire on his part to remain at the level of Sense-certainty, "which does not want to leave itself" (p. 29). She adds that Hegel, on the other hand, moves phenomenology beyond Sense-certainty by negating the particular with the universal. Taking these comments as our point of departure we might ask: Can Husserl's conception of consciousness be identified with Sense-certainty? To what extent can Husserl be considered as vulnerable to Hegel's language-based arguments against Sense-certainty? And what notion of language might Husserl offer as a counter to the Hegelian perspective?

With these questions in the background I intend to examine Husserl's description of consciousness in light of the concerns raised by Hegel in "Sense-certainty". Ultimately, a paradox will emerge. Consciousness according to Husserl clearly goes beyond Sense-certainty, and does not "immediately totalize" the particular and universal. Yet Husserl's foundational methodological thrust leads him to posit the experience of particularity as the ground of the universal. The paradox lies in the fact that Husserlian phenomenology retains some of the principal traits of Sense-certainty,
despite the fact that Husserlian consciousness appears to transcend them. And central to these aspects of Sense-certainty retained by Husserl's phenomenology is his rejection of the thesis that language plays a role in the coming-to-presence of the universal and hence in the generation of meaning.

- a - The basic positions held by Sense-certainty

Sense-certainty, the first "shape of consciousness" presented in the Phenomenology of Spirit, advances the position that the truth of experience is that which we receive through our senses. At this stage consciousness assumes that individual sense data originate from particulars in a world outside us, a world which our sense represent truly.

The question of to whom, if anyone, this position is supposed to be attributed has provoked diverse responses. According to Hyppolite, Hegel in this chapter is reprising a Platonic dialectic from the Theaetatus, with further references to Parmenides', Protagoras and Zeno (1974, pp. 83, 89). Simon claims that the target is Kant and the Kantian reduction of the Cartesian cogito to a sensuous certainty, "a pure 'I' determined through pure sense" (p. 21). Other
authors have pointed out the extent to which Hume and the empiricist tradition might be linked with Sense-certainty. In fact, Lamb has shown that the twentieth century empiricist Bertrand Russell would be eminently comfortable with the sense-certain outlook (p. 286). However, all of these views as to the target of "Sense-certainty" could be true. As Westphal suggests, "there is probably more philosophy going on in the first three chapters called Consciousness than the reader can possibly dream of in a single reading" (p. 59). The density of textual references to which Westphal is drawing our attention is particularly apparent in the chapter under discussion.

Notwithstanding the intrinsic historical interest of the discussions concerning the philosopher or movement behind the persona of Sense-certainty, for the purposes of our phenomenological reading of Hegel it might be a misunderstanding to read the chapter solely as a philosophical critique of empiricism. It will be more fruitful for us to interpret Sense-certainty as representing natural, prephilosophical consciousness' tendency to affirm that the particulars received through sensation possess an undeniable truth value. For Sense-certainty is not only a position commonly adopted by empiricist epistemologists; it is also a "natural" point of view concerning the world and our relation...
to it. (6) In keeping with our phenomenological interpretation of the Phenomenology of Spirit we shall therefore examine "Sense-certainty" as the stage of the transcendence of the natural, prephilosophical attitude.

Let us now examine five principal elements of the attitude toward the world assumed by Sense-certainty.

Immediate intuition: The position with which Sense-certainty starts and which it always attempts to retain is that, through sensation, we have immediate knowledge of the world, "a knowledge of the immediate or of what simply is" (PhS, par. 90). This is a claim to intuition, to apprehension without comprehension (par. 90), which allows us to receive the object as it gives itself.

Passivity of consciousness: In Sense-certainty's immediate knowledge the subject is passive or receptive (par. 90). Sense-certainty assumes in its pure passivity that it alters nothing of the object (par. 90). The object is self-sufficient; it does not require consciousness. "The thing is, and it is, merely because it is" (par. 91) in its independent state of being.
Ineffability of knowledge: With particular importance to the present thesis is consciousness' insistence upon the ineffability of what it knows through its senses. This is the case by virtue of the preconceptual nature of this form of awareness. In Sense-certainty thought and expression are not required because the senses directly take in the being of the object. (7) Any attempt to talk about or think about the object would of course add something to it, and would consequently detract from its unique truth.

Primordiality of the particular: Sense-certainty affirms the ultimate nature of the particular - the "this", the "now", and the "here". That is to say, we have direct knowledge of particular objects, in particular moments in time and points in space.

Solipsism: A corollary of the insistence on the particularity of the object is the affirmation of the specificity of the particular "I" which is sensing. This is not, strictly speaking, a position with which Sense-certainty starts, but one to which it is pushed in its attempt to justify the immediacy and particularity of what it knows. (8) Sense-certainty can be certain only of its particular sense impressions. The foundation of knowledge is in this way conceived by consciousness as the apprehension of particular objects by the particular self.
In summary, Sense-certainty claims that the foundation of knowledge is my immediate, preconceptual and prelinguistic reception of particular sense data emanating from individual objects.

-b- Language and the transcendence of Sense-certainty

Hegel regards the above-described position as unsatisfactorily one-sided. The immediacy and particularity intended by sense-certain consciousness are abstract, lacking the recognition played by universals in the experience of objects. We cannot know the sensuous "this" without relating it to other "thises"; we cannot experience the spatial "here" in abstraction from other "heres"; and so forth. The universal is just this dynamic range of the particular, and is that which makes sense of the particular for us. It is not until Perception, the shape of consciousness following Sense-certainty, that consciousness takes the object truly as a thing with properties, and thus admits the implication of the universal in our awareness of the world around us.
As we now examine Hegel's description of Sense-certainty's encounter with universality, we shall notice that language is the principal bearer of the universal in experience.

Hegel asks a hypothetical representative of Sense-certainty to perform a simple experiment designed to test whether or not the particular, momentary sense-experience is actually the truth of experience. Hegel supposes that we ask, "What is "now"?"; to which Sense-certainty replies, "'Now' is night." We ask that this truth be written down, on the grounds that "a truth can lose nothing by being written down, any more than it can lose anything by preserving it" (PhS, par. 95). If at noon the following day we examine the alleged truth, it will have gone stale. "Now" is no longer night, but noon. Sense-certain consciousness may stubbornly counter with the proposition that the truth is not this particular now, but rather any now which it might experience. In making this admission, however, the hypothetical advocate plays directly into Hegel's hands. Having used language to describe experience has forced Sense-certainty to concede that the true now is a dynamic range, a universal which could include any content of sense experienced at a given moment.
Should Sense-certainty protest that it means to express the particular even though language can only use universals, Hegel has an answer. He provocatively states that language is the more truthful in that it refutes our meaning. (9)

Since the universal is the true [content] of sense certainty and language expresses this true [content] alone, it is just not possible for us ever to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that we mean. (par. 97)

Even the attempt by Sense-certainty to authenticate its experience by appealing to its own authority as an individual ego collapses because of the presence of the universal carried by language.

Similarly [to the cases of the "here" and the "now"], when I say "I", this singular "I", I say in general all "Is"; everyone is what I say, everyone is "I", this singular "I". (par. 102)

In this way language introduces universality not only into our knowledge of the object, but into subjective self-awareness as well. An essential intersubjectivity is here alluded to for the first time in the Phenomenology. Even at this initial stage we can glimpse, thanks to language and the universal, a shadowy prefiguration of Geist in its intersubjective nature. The coming to presence of the object in a linguistic setting thus represents, in Simon's words, an "encroachment of the 'we' upon the subject-object relation" made possible by the public character of linguistic expression (p. 24).
The universal's entry into experience, then, cannot be a function of mere sensation. For sensation as Sense-certainty conceives it is only of particulars. Contrary to the affirmation of Sense-certainty, Hegel's message is that humans never experience a pure reception of particulars. The experience of particularity always takes place in the context of universality. "And this universality is never sensuously represented, but expressed, thus contributed to experience by language-using consciousness."

Indeed, it is not absolutely essential that the expression of the universal be linguistic. Even primitive attempts at expressing objects, such as pointing out with a gesture, reveal the presence of a spatio-temporal range within which the intended particular is situated. If I point out a "now", the "now" that I point out is not the same as the "now" I originally meant. Because of the flux of time, the present passes even as it is indicated. Consciousness is therefore forced to develop a composite, universal "now" - a minute composed of seconds, an hour composed of minutes, a day composed of hours, etc. "The pointing-out is the experience that the Now is a universal" (par. 107). Consequently, for Hegel neither showing nor saying as modes of expression are able to reach the particularity that Sense-certainty claims to be the truth of experience.
Language, however, in its capacity as the most fully human expressive manifestation of the universal, is the key to consciousness' move beyond Sense-certainty. The omnipresence of language in this chapter is aptly recognized in the following passage:

The description of sense-certainty represents language as an almost flamboyant dialectical tool. Every claim made by consciousness that it is certain of its "here", "now", and "I" is immediately reversed. Language is so central in this description that it can be asserted that, in a very real sense, language grounds the dialectic. (Debrock, p. 294)

Nonetheless, "Sense-certainty" is a somewhat enigmatic chapter. The linguistic character of sense-perception is suggested rather than systematically elaborated. A more detailed account of this issue can be found in Hegel's Jena lectures of 1803-1804 and 1805-1806. Delivered in the years immediately prior to the preparation of the Phenomenology of Spirit, these lectures have been explored by several commentators attempting to situate the discussions of language in the Phenomenology as well as in the mature system. (10)

Along with labour and social interaction, language was for the Jena lectures one of the three categories of Spirit which mediate subject and object. (11) Here Hegel claims that the naming power of language establishes the mastery of consciousness over its image of the object.
Thus it is through the name that the ego gives birth to the object, as the thing that it is. This is the first creative power which Spirit exercises. Adam gave all things names. This is the creation of nature out of Spirit. Logos is reason, the essence of things and speech, of telling and what is told. In short, reason is category. Man speaks to things as to his own and lives in a spiritual nature, in his own world, and this is the being of the object. (JR, p. 183; trans. Westphal, p. 82).

Shortly after the passage just cited, Hegel continues:

The world, nature, is no longer a world of images, inwardly aufgehen, which have no being, but rather a realm of names. The realm of images is the dreaming spirit, which has to do with a content that has no reality, no existence. Its awakening is the realm of names. Only then do these sense images come to possess truth. (JR, p. 184)

The Jena lectures stress that which is suggested in "Sense-certainty" - sense data are experienced by us as guided and informed by the penetration into experience of the universal by means of our linguistic activity. In the words of Hyppolite, "The name doesn't refer us to the sensible, but the sensible to the name, to the universe of expressed and expressible meanings" (1961, p. 39).

We can now appreciate that Hegelian phenomenology goes beyond the "natural" understandings of consciousness largely by virtue of the necessary interposition of language's universality into the particularity of sense. Language's role in this description is crucial; it provides the setting for
our encounter with objects by furnishing the universals through which we come to know these objects.

In this sense, language becomes the occasion of the transcendence of "sense-certainty" and thereby sets in motion the dialectical movement. (Simon, p. 22)

I shall have more to say about Hegel’s phenomenology of language in later sections of the thesis, particularly with regard to the intersubjective aspects thereof. Pausing at this point in the analysis, however, will allow us to set up a useful groundwork for comparing Hegel’s language-oriented critique of Sense-certainty with Husserl’s description of the presence of the universal in sense perception, and particularly with the role of language in that description.

- c - Husserl on consciousness and "the general"

The points raised by the analysis of Sense-certainty afford an interesting and useful point of departure for a comparison with Husserl’s treatment of similar concerns. In this vein, Souche-Dagues maintains that Husserl claims for Sense-certainty its own, undeniable truth. Husserl, she argues, desires to retain the immediacy of Sense-certainty, "which becomes the transcendental condition of all negation in general." Whereas for Hegel the universal appears to negate the particularity which is so dear to Sense-certainty, in
Husserl the universal is immediately encountered "as that in which particularity maintains itself as particularity" and as the immediate foundation of experience (Souche-Daguès, p. 27). In light of these assertions we might well ask: How does Husserl in fact describe consciousness' encounter with universality?

Turning to one of Husserl's primary philosophical texts, *Ideas*, we discover that he describes, in a manner reminiscent of Hegel, a process by which consciousness raises its attention from the particular to the general via the act of expression. In the passage which we will consider (pp. 319-320) Husserl outlines the operation of a two-layered intentional scheme which generates the expressive act and structures the encounter with the universal. The two layers are: the act of referring through the use of an expression; and an intentional sublayer containing the ultimate referent of the expression.

As an example of the way in which an expression arises from the sublayer, Husserl analyzes the genesis of a simple expression, "This is white". He writes that to make it possible for us to use this expression meaningfully we must assume that we have had a prior experience of "an object with a definite meaning".
At this prior level, the sublayer, we begin to pick out characteristics of the object by seeing relations and discriminations involving it. These initial intentions are still vague and implicit, "following some such scheme as 'This is white'" (p. 319). We might best grasp the thrust of this description by placing it in the context of a distinction Husserl makes between two types of meaning. He distinguishes between Sinn - meaning in the broad sense, "meaning simpliciter" (p. 319) - and Bedeutung - conceptual, logical, linguistic meaning. Applying this distinction to the two layers of the expressive act, we may say that the sublayer possesses a general sense, a Sinn of a white object, and that this Sinn subsequently develops into a Bedeutung at the level of expression.

Continuing his analysis, Husserl describes how the vague intentions of the sublayer are taken up into the expressive layer. In an expression, implicit determinations are raised to a higher stratum of experience. In taking the step of expressing "This is white" we express a Bedeutung, thereby lifting up the previously vague intention "to the realm of the 'Logos', of the conceptual, and therewith of the 'general'" (p. 320).
On the surface it might appear that Husserl is performing a similar phenomenological analysis to that performed by Hegel in "Sense-certainty". Both philosophers describe consciousness moving from the particular to the universal, and both tie this movement to the universality imposed by consciousness' attempt to express its experience. Yet two significant points of difference are worthy of being stressed. First, in Husserl's analysis the entry of the universal at the level of the concept, or of Bedeutung, is founded upon, or generated from, the pre-expressive sublayer; whereas for Hegel we saw that the universal makes possible any encounter whatever with the object. Second, for Husserl language is irrelevant to the act of expression and its universalizing impact; whereas for Hegel language is an essential moment of the process. Let us examine these two points of demarcation in greater depth.

Clearly, the Bedeutung is generated by the more basic, pre-expressive stratum according to Husserl. He makes this clear when in Ideas he claims that the expressive layer "is not productive . . . its productivity, its noematic service, exhausts itself in expressing, and in the form of the conceptual which first comes with the expressing" (p. 321). The prior layer, then, is more genuinely productive. The meaning of the expression is actually produced out of the
vague intentionality of the sublayer. In other words, the "thesis" of the higher, more expressive layer is the same as that of the pre-expressive level.

The implications of the founding-founded relation between the strata are grasped by De Boer. After posing the question "whether categorical constitution served as a model for perceptual constitution" (p. 169), he concludes that this would be impossible according to Husserl's conception of consciousness. Indeed the reverse is the case, for sensory perception is the basic act of consciousness. . . . Husserl always wanted to return to the final, founding groundwork of our knowledge — from "judgment" one must go back to "experience". (De Boer, p. 170)

Husserl thus accords primacy to a representative, perceptually-based encounter with particular objects, out of which our expressions and concepts arise, and to which our expressions and concepts are to be traced by phenomenology. This founding-founded scheme is a central notion guiding Husserl's thought from the Logical Investigations through to Experience and Judgment.

What further demarcates Husserl from Hegel concerning consciousness' encounter with the universal is Husserl's contention that language has no role to play in the genesis of the expressive act.
According to Husserl language does not necessarily belong to the expressive layer. An expression is an expression whether it is stated or thought. As he did earlier in the *Logical Investigations* (vol. I, p. 279), Husserl in *Ideas* maintains that we can think, i.e. express to ourselves, without resorting of necessity to language. Meaning, generated from intentional functions, makes an act an expression. And the acts which generate meaning operate independently of language.

The verbal sound can be referred to as an expression only because the meaning which belongs to it expresses; it is in that that the expressing originally lies. (*Ideas*, p. 320)

Elsewhere in *Ideas* Husserl makes a point of stressing the contingency of language to an analysis of the process of expression:

Let us start from the familiar distinction, between the sensory, the so to speak bodily aspect of expression, and its non-sensory "mental" aspect. There is no need for us to enter more closely into the discussion of the first aspect, nor upon the way of uniting the two aspects, though we clearly have title-headings here for phenomenological problems that are not unimportant. (p. 319)

Husserl here affirms the utter unimportance of language to the encounter of expressing consciousness with universality. The meaning-bestowing act performed by consciousness is indeed an
act of expression, but takes place prelinguistically. Husserlian phenomenology thus understood always questions back to this prelinguistic yet expressive establishment of meaning "prior to statements or uttered meanings" (Ricoeur 1970, p. 383). In turn, the expressive act can be traced to the primal experience of particular objects at the level of the prelinguistic sublayer.

By no means did Husserl abandon this general scheme in his later work. The realm of Sinn which is the foundation of conceptual meaning is, for the later Husserl, our prepredicative experience of the lifeworld. The lifeworld is a predominant, perhaps the key concept in the Crisis. As Cunningham summarizes, for the Crisis the foundation for all meaning is now the experienced lived-world. This fundamental "raw" experience of the individual object Husserl calls "pre-predicative". It is essentially the experience of the individual object before any subsuming under general classes takes place. (p. 72)

The notion of a primal experience of particulars, an experience which generates universals in a prelinguistic fashion, was consistently held by Husserl, albeit in different forms, even toward the end of his life.
- d - Husserl, Hegel and Sense-certainty

In light of the foregoing discussion it is now possible to draw the outlines of a comparison between Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenology on the basis of their relationship to the positions advanced by Sense-certainty in the opening chapter of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Husserl grants that the conceptual consciousness, in actively recognizing universality in experience, goes beyond the raw data which it passively receives from the world. However, the Husserlian recognition of the universal differs in two significant ways from the Hegelian. First, for Husserl universals are always traceable to our experience of particular objects in the pre-expressive sublayer of lifeworld; whereas for Hegel the notion of a pre-expressive sublayer which generates universality would be an anathema. Hegelian phenomenology from the start gives prime importance to the universal and the conceptual, and would regard the notion of a realm of pure lived experience abstracted from conceptual consciousness as a myth. Second, Husserl regards the universal as something which is recognized prelinguistically by consciousness. For Hegel, language must initially be recognized as the principal bearer of the universal which fundamentally penetrates our experience.
Can we say that Husserl’s conception of fundamental consciousness is identifiable with Sense-certainty, and consequently susceptible to Hegel’s arguments against it? At the risk of appearing too dialectically cute, we must answer: yes and no. To be sure, Husserl accords great significance to the conceptual and universal, indeed to the *logos* through which man makes sense of the vagueness and flowing temporality of the lifeworld. And in this sense he is close to Hegel. Yet the omnipresent Husserlian drive to seek experiential foundations of the conceptual realm, combined with the view that language is contingent to both the foundational and expressive strata, sharply demarcates Husserl’s approach from Hegel’s, and indeed invites comparison with Sense-certainty.

The Husserlian phenomenologist goes back to a world, not unlike the world of "the dreaming spirit" described in the Jena lectures, of particular objects intuited passively and preconceptually by the particular ego. This retrogression yields a fundamental layer of consciousness which uncomfortably recalls characteristics which we described earlier as associated with Sense-certainty. Yet, Husserl proceeds to describe a functioning consciousness which goes beyond this initial phase by recognizing universality. It would perhaps be overly simplistic, but not far off the mark, to say that Husserlian consciousness goes beyond the immediacy of Sense-certainty, while Husserlian phenomenology tends turn back toward sense-certain positions.
Hegel as a phenomenologist would probably not see the point in, nor the experiential warrant for, the retrogression to a pregiven, foundational layer of experience. As Hyppolite notes, from a Hegelian perspective "pure lived experience means nothing" (1961, p. 21). Nor would Hegel agree with the claim that language is contingent to the recognition of universality in experience. I would argue that these two Hegelian objections to Husserl's phenomenological programme can be collapsed into one, centred on the problem of language. For Hegel, there are no raw, preconceptual foundations of experience precisely because language penetrates the immediate, bringing universality to it. Language in this way is part and parcel of any human experience, even at the most fundamental level of sensation, according to Hegel's phenomenology.

Obviously, Husserl and Hegel are operating under very different assumptions concerning the nature of language. Some of the differences have been touched on in the above discussion. The subsequent section will proceed to treat thematically the question of language and consciousness in Husserl and Hegel, with a view to understanding how their essentially competing phenomenologies of language help to determine the basic characters of their phenomenologies as such.
IV - Language and consciousness

- a - The later Husserl on language

In the course of our earlier discussion of Husserl and Hegel on the basis of the points raised by Hegel in "Sense-certainty", it became evident that, for Hegel, the recognition of universals in perception is linked to the role of language in experience; while Husserl had argued in Ideas that language is not directly relevant to the process of recognizing universals. Husserl's apparent dismissal of language might lead one to conclude that he does not recognize the penetration of experience by language. A closer examination of the matter, however, suggests that Husserl
cannot be accused of blindness to the importance of language in human life.

Husserl's later writings reveal a growing awareness on his part of the significance of the linguistic dimension of experience.

Now human thinking is normally done in language, and all the activities of reason are as good as bound up with speech. (FTL, p.19)

... [on the one hand] men as men, fellow men, world - the world of which men, of which we, always talk and can talk - and, on the other hand, language, are inseparably intertwined; and one is always certain of their inseparable relational unity, though usually only implicitly, in the manner of a horizon. (OH, p. 359)

In these passages Husserl appears to be granting the type of linguistic setting of human experience pointed to by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit.

Husserl's increased acknowledgment of language calls for further investigation. Does he, in a way similar to Hegel, come to allow that linguistic understandings infiltrate experience at even the most fundamental layer of transcendental subjectivity? In order to answer this question I shall examine a central later text treating the issue of language's role in experience, "The Origin of Geometry". It
will become clear that Husserl and Hegel as phenomenologists cannot be connected too closely on this question. While "The Origin of Geometry" recognizes the indispensability of language for public expression and communication, it argues that language use causes us to lose sight of the originary meanings generated at the level of the lifeworld — Sinne which, as we have seen, it is the task of phenomenology to recover. Drawing on the example of geometry, Husserl claims that language arises in order to communicate a prior meaning, that language sediments the meaning it intends to convey, and that the linguistic layer must be set aside in order to bring back to presence, at the level of the lifeworld, the transcendental origin of linguistic meaning. Let us follow some salient points of Husserl's discussion of this question in "The Origin of Geometry".

Geometry like other disciplines possesses a well developed theoretical structure consisting of a network of concepts, formulae, etc. It is therefore often seen as divorced from experience, with no obvious relation to the lifeworld. How can such an abstract conceptual framework possibly be derived from the world of lived experience? Husserl answers that "some undiscoverable Thales of Geometry" — a hypothetical inventor of the discipline — must have been originally confronted with a pre-geometrical world (p. 369).
This world in turn must have given rise to the geometrical vision.

Language's role is to express publicly the attribution of geometrical features to the world. As Carr explains,

Through the medium of language, the geometer makes publicly available what he has grasped privately, as it were, beforehand.
(p. 203)

Thanks to language the sense of one's experience is communicable, is objectified so that this sense can be reactivated by other subjects. Language as a vehicle of communication becomes the basis of shared knowledge. Raggiunti stresses this communicative aspect of Husserl's theory of language as contained in "The Origin of Geometry":

Communication, the intersubjective exchange of ideas and cognitive contents assumes a primary function in the process of objectifying meanings. A cognitive content becomes an objective and an ideal entity only insofar as it is the content of intersubjective knowledge, and intersubjective knowledge is possible only through the communicative function of the linguistic sign.
(p. 247)

Hence language's function is to communicate a prelinguistic experience with a definite meaning. Language allows for the public availability of the sense of the original experience, so that this sense can be reactivated as linguistic meaning by other minds.
Eventually, language and its concomitant meanings become sedimented in human culture. For everyday consciousness, these sedimented meanings which are brought to experience by language can even influence the way the world is perceived. Ordinary language, argues Husserl, too often obscures and trivializes the richness of experience. People tend to become fascinated with the mere trading and association of words, failing to look beyond them to the truly meaningful aspects of experience. Husserl calls this phenomenon the "seduction of language".

It is easy to see that even in [ordinary] human life, and first of all in every individual life from childhood to maturity, the originally intuitive life which creates its own originally self-evident structures through activities on the basis of sense-experience very quickly and in increasing measure falls victim to the seduction of language. Greater and greater segments of this life lapse into a kind of talking and reading that is dominated purely by association; and often enough, in respect to the validities arrived at in this way, it is disappointed by subsequent experience. (06, p. 362)

Language's penetration of everyday experience is thus acknowledged by Husserl, but in a way that signifies a certain danger—namely, a seduction away from originary lifeworld experiences.
Unlike the Hegelian phenomenologist, Husserl views the penetration of experience by language as a clue that underneath the linguistic level there lies a prelinguistic generation of meaning. Words and propositions claim "to be sedimentations of a truth-meaning that can be made originally self-evident; whereas it is by no means necessary that they actually have such a meaning" (OG, p. 367). The phenomenologist inquires back from the linguistically expressed meaning to the prelinguistically generated and experienced sense.

By adding the statements in "The Origin of Geometry" concerning the role of language in consciousness to the previously discussed description in Ideas of the encounter with the universal, it is now possible to attempt a summary of the Husserlian conception of language. At the risk of oversimplification, here is a reconstruction of language's relation to experience according to Husserlian phenomenology. First, in prepredicative experience at the level of the lifeworld we experience objects which possess a certain sense. Second, this sense is represented conceptually through the act of expression. Third, the conceptual representation is idealized, made publicly available and communicable, by language. The fundamental referent of linguistic meaning can only be grasped if one returns to the primal lifeworld.
evidences which give rise to the meanings which ultimately become sedimented in language. Hence the Sinn of any linguistic sign resides in the prelinguistic field of the lifeworld.

While Husserl recognizes that language can influence our perception of the object at the level of everyday consciousness, this seductive influence, he argues, can be effectively bracketed by the phenomenologist. Language does not affect the phenomenologist's intuition of lifeworld structures because language does not have any effect upon these structures. Even in his later work, then, Husserl held to a prelinguistic "stem" of transcendental subjectivity. The extent to which this position differs from that of Hegel can be clarified through discussing both Hegel and Husserl in light of Feuerbach's influential critique of Hegel's treatment of language in "Sense-certainty".

- b - Feuerbach, Hegel and Husserl on language

Many critiques of Hegel's "Sense-certainty" have been formulated since the appearance of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Among the foremost of these is that of Ludwig Feuerbach. His objections, influential in their own right,
have also formed the basis of many subsequent critiques of the opening chapter of the Phenomenology. (12) For our purposes Feuerbach is relevant because of his concentration on what he regards as Hegel's unjustifiable view of language. Furthermore, the assumptions behind Feuerbach's objections might be shared, with certain modifications, by Husserl's conception of language. Hence an examination of Feuerbach's celebrated critique of "Sense-certainty" might cast further light on the divergence between the Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenologies of language.

Feuerbach grants with Hegel that language expresses the universal and that sensation is only of particulars. But for Feuerbach this truth only points out the limits of language. If language cannot reach the wealth of particularity revealed by our senses, then it is language, not sensation, that is shown to be lacking. Language is only a sign, writes Feuerbach, a means of communication which we employ in order to communicate the objects of our experience to others; it is not an active participant in the process of sense-perception (Feuerbach, vol. II, p. 185). (13)

Husserl would largely agree with Feuerbach, minus the realist epistemology inherent in the latter's emphasis on sensation. The structures of transcendental subjectivity at
the most fundamental level operate independently of language according to Husserl's phenomenology. Language is generated in order to represent objects of experience with a certain meaning. For Husserl as for Feuerbach, language arises as a sign utilized for the purposes of communication, thereby making one's experience available for others. While Husserl grants that ordinary experience can become language-bound, he proceeds to claim that linguistic meaning can be traced back to a foundational, prelinguistic level of transcendental subjectivity.

Husserl thus maintains that a prelinguistic stem of experience is isolable, and that this stem is the truth of language - in agreement with Feuerbach. Whereas the latter would argue that this stem is sensation, for Husserl the stem is the lifeworld (at least for the Husserl of the Crisis). Still, insofar as the two philosophers agree that language is a communicative, signitive representation of a more fundamental prelinguistic realm, there exists a noteworthy connection between Husserl and Feuerbach.

Reading Husserl's phenomenology of language in light of Feuerbach's critique of "Sense-certainty" therefore helps to sharpen the differences between the Hegelian and Husserlian conceptions of language. For Hegel, a prelinguistic stem
cannot be isolated from human experience, for transcendental subjectivity is always informed by linguistic understandings. Whereas for Husserl the fundamental sense of linguistic meaning lies at a layer of experience beneath language, for Hegel the universals brought to experience by language must always, even in the "simplest" acts of sense-perception, "immediately mediate" consciousness and world.
V - The Phenomenological Implications of the Hegelian and Husserlian Conceptions of Language

Earlier I suggested that the different conceptions of language offered by Hegel and Husserl could help to explain the fundamental divergence of their phenomenological approaches. Three points at which this divergence is particularly evident, and to whose explanation the issue of language is pertinent, will be discussed in Part V. The points are: the inclusiveness of the "given", or the starting point of phenomenology; the nature of intersubjectivity; and the relative stability of the phenomena which serve as the data of phenomenology.
"Thick" vs. "thin" immediates

A natural point of departure for our discussion of the way in which the two notions of language affect the Hegelian and Husserlian approaches to phenomenology might be a consideration of the "immediates" with which phenomenology begins. What is the minimal conception of consciousness required by phenomenology as a starting point of its analysis?

In his article "Hegel and Hermeneutics", Kiesel examines what he terms the "thickness", or inclusiveness, of the immediates posited by Hegel on the one hand, and hermeneutics as represented by Heidegger and especially伽末er on the other. Although Kiesel sees many similarities between the approaches of Hegel and hermeneutics, he claims that a key difference between them lies in the relative inclusiveness of their respective starting points. Hermeneutics begins with the "thick immediate of the comprehensive linguistic situation" — the "already-there" of language (p. 203). Hegel, in contrast, begins with the thin immediates of sense and being. While Kiesel grants that Hegel is aware of the determining powers of language, he maintains that Hegel requires an absolute beginning which does not include the "linguistically situated experience" of hermeneutics (p. 207).
At least with respect to the Phenomenology of Spirit, there are reasons to dispute Kisiel's reading of Hegel. As we have interpreted "Sense-certainty", Hegel expressly denies that one can begin with the thin immediate of sense and being. The opening chapter of the Phenomenology constitutes an express rejection of the attempt to abstract sense and being from their linguistic setting.

Insofar as Hegel sees language as immediately mediating sense and being, he provides for an immediate which is more concrete and linguistically situated than Kisiel seems to believe. Language as the setting of the experience of consciousness assumes the function of thickening the realm of the given described by Hegelian phenomenology. Indeed, Husserl's foundational approach, which posits a founding prelinguistic experience, is more characteristic of a thin immediate using an absolute starting point. In comparison with Husserl, Hegel's claim that language necessarily mediates the receptivity of sense-certain consciousness provides for a more linguistically situated vision of the transcendental subject. Consequently language's necessary implication in human experience according to Hegel allows him, unlike Husserl, to place transcendental subjectivity in the concrete context of linguistic understandings.
- The intersubjective dimension of phenomenology

As we saw in our discussion of "Sense-certainty", the social nature of language permits Hegel to use language in order to allow phenomenology to accede to the intersubjective realm. Yet during our examination of the points of contact between the two phenomenologies we remarked that both Hegel and Husserl regard intersubjectivity as a necessary structure of consciousness. Having described the role language plays in consciousness for Husserl and Hegel we are now prepared to examine in greater detail the question of intersubjectivity in the two phenomenologies, particularly as it relates to language. How does Husserl's conception of intersubjectivity differ from Hegel's? Is this divergence in any way attributable to the contrasting phenomenologies of language discussed in previous pages?

- Intersubjectivity and Husserl

The problem of intersubjectivity in Husserl's phenomenology is complex, and has aroused considerable controversy among Husserl's scholars. It would be impossible to do justice to the issue in this thesis. Yet its relation to the phenomenology of language requires that we at least touch
on the question of intersubjectivity in the context of our present discussion.

In the Crisis Husserl distinguishes between the Cartesian approach to phenomenology, represented most notably by his Cartesian Meditations, and the approach to phenomenology adopted in the Crisis. The latter approach describes the structures of the transcendental ego by means of an examination of the lifeworld (Crisis, par. 43). Because the Cartesian way consisted of reflections undertaken by the individual phenomenologist, a self-reflection into the absolutely certain aspects of his own mental life, the Cartesian Meditations gives the appearance of struggling to derive from this private starting point the domain of intersubjectivity which must be attained in order that the cultural and social fields of experience can be examined by phenomenology.

Husserl's difficulties in reaching the intersubjective domain by the Cartesian way are evidenced by the fifth Cartesian Meditation. Having outlined in previous meditations the essential structures of consciousness through phenomenological reflection, Husserl proceeds in the Fifth Meditation to show that the presence of other subjects, as analogs of ourselves, is also a necessary aspect of
experience. Thus intersubjectivity is attained, it seems, on the basis of the prior investigations of the individual phenomenologist. Intersubjectivity, while significant for Husserl, appears in the *Cartesian Meditations* to be a secondary domain derived from the monadic, individual ego.

However, with the advent of the lifeworld approach to phenomenology adopted in the *Crisis*, transcendental subjectivity is at once shown to be intersubjective.

Thus in general the world exists not only for isolated men but for the community of men; and this is due to the fact that even what is straightforwardly perceptual is communalized. (p. 163)

Through a process of "reciprocal correction", even the perceptual realm becomes subject to the understandings of the community of subjects. We come to recognize the veritable structure of the world by reconciling our perceptions with those of others.

All this takes place in such a way that in the consciousness of each individual, and in the overarching community consciousness which has grown up through social contact, one and the same world achieves and continuously maintains constant validity... it is the world as the universal horizon, common to all men, of actually existing things. (pp. 163-164)
Yet if we are to consider the points made in "The Origin of Geometry", which can essentially be regarded as a companion piece to the Crisis, even the intersubjective nature of the lifeworld has no relation to the operations of language. Intersubjectivity is one of the universal horizons of the lifeworld, and is therefore part of the prelinguistic foundational experience of the world to which language's meanings can be traced by transcendental phenomenology.

- b2 - Intersubjectivity and Hegel

In contrast, for Hegel language introduces the intersubjective dimension, as we saw in our analysis of "Sense-certainty". This treatment of language partakes in a predominant current of Hegel's intellectual environment. Herder and von Humboldt were prominent among the writers who stressed the intimate connection between reason, language and community. For Herder, language was an intrinsic part of the natural process of the growth of consciousness, indeed of all human solidarity, which rests on communication between men; for to be fully human is to think, and to think is to communicate; society and man are equally inconceivable without one another. Hence, "mere intelligence without the expression of language is on earth a mere utopia". (Berlin, p.66)
In the spirit of Herder's influential ideas, Hegel in "Sense-certainty" dared consciousness to abstract sense experience from the social setting of language - dared it "to disregard human culture" (Lamb, p. 298). Sense-certainty could not perform this abstraction and was forced to use language, thus admitting the encroachment of the intersubjective upon its supposedly private experience. Because the experience of the universal is conditioned by the public structures of linguistic expression each human action is a social action; each individual experience implicates a broader intersubjective experience of the world. (14) Language not only mediates subject and object; it also mediates subject and community. As the protagonist of "Sense-certainty" needed to resort to linguistic understandings in order to provide a setting for his experience of the object, in the process he also recognized his essential relation to other "Is", other minds. The recognition of the communal aspect of experience is thus linked for Hegel to the penetration of experience by discourse.
At this point it is crucial to stress that for Hegel language is more than a public communal structure; it is also a concrete socio-historical product. This does not deny that language possesses certain formal characteristics. As we have already observed, it expresses the universal, provides the setting for human experience, and expresses the social context of the "I". But the structure of language is also dependent upon socio-historical circumstance. As Koyré writes, "Language embodies spirit. But there is no 'language', only languages. And it expresses not simply spirit, but the spirit of a people" (p. 200).

The inseparability of the concept of language and actual, historical languages is a concern of Hegel's earlier writings. The young Hegel particularly stressed the spiritual importance of the language of a people. This extract from an 1805 letter to J.H. Voss expresses this concern: (15)

Luther has made the Bible speak German; you, Homer, the greatest present that can be given to a people; for a people is barbarous, and does not consider the excellent things that it knows as its own property until it gets to know them in its own language; if you would forget these two examples, I should like to say of my own aspirations that I shall try to teach philosophy to speak German.
(cited by Burbridge, p. 24)

If language only exists as language of a people, the implications of this state of affairs for our topic,
intersubjectivity and the role of language in consciousness, are clear. Since self and community are linguistically mediated, the nature of the intersubjective horizon will differ according to which socio-historical variant of language is performing these mediating functions. For linguistic mediation will always be performed by a concrete language which is subject to history.

To what extent are these reflections on the concreteness of language relevant to the treatment of intersubjectivity in Hegel's phenomenology? The sections of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* which treat language do not partake directly in the young Hegel's stress on national language. But they do reflect the concern that language is always a concrete, particular variation of language, responding to given historical situations. The concreteness of language is particularly evident in the passages related to language in Section VI B, "Self-alienated Spirit - Culture". Here, concrete types of discourse become the prime elements of cultural life and the principal manifestations of the world view held by each cultural form. The relation of noble to monarch is established through the language of flattery (PhS, pars. 505-512); the selfishness and nihilistic alienation which subsequently run rampant in culture are encapsulated in the language of diremption (Zerrissenheit) in which language
supports all manner of contradiction (pars. 520-523). (16)
In these sections language goes beyond the function it
possessed in "Sense-certainty" of situating the perceptual
encounter with objects. In "Culture", concrete language, as
"the real existence of the 'I'" (par. 508), becomes the
setting of social relations in history. (17)

In Section VI C of the Phenomenology, "Spirit which is
certain of itself - Morality", Hegel provides further evidence
of the necessity of concrete language to the intersubjective
sphere. Here he focuses on the language of moral discourse
(pars. 652-654). Carrying forward the theme of recognition
introduced in the dialectic of Lordship and Bondage, Hegel
here points out that moral convictions require linguistic
embodiment in order to be considered as existent. Otherwise
these convictions could not be recognized by other subjects.
Language, as "the existence of Spirit" (par. 652), is an
essential moment in this process of the intersubjective
recognition of subjects as moral beings.

These later sections of the Phenomenology flesh out, as
it were, the essential relation of language to the
intersubjective dimension of consciousness, a relation which
was already present in a shadowy form in "Sense-certainty".
In "Culture" and "Morality" we see not only that language is
essential to the public sphere, but also that different historical types of language (flattery, direrption, moral discourse) structure the intersubjective horizon in unique and concrete ways.

In speaking of Husserl's phenomenology, particularly the lifeworld approach adopted in the Crisis, it would not be correct to say that his insistence on a prelinguistic layer of transcendental subjectivity leads to a disregard of intersubjectivity. Yet because the lifeworld is essentially prelinguistic, the intersubjective horizon of the lifeworld is not necessarily related to language. In contrast, for Hegel intersubjectivity always involves itself in all aspects of experience largely because of the linguistic setting of consciousness. Although Husserl and Hegel agree that our perception always implicates the understandings of the community, Husserl regards this implication as a structure of the essentially prelinguistic lifeworld; whereas Hegel would claim that consciousness' linguistic nature renders the lifeworld, as Husserl conceives it, impossible.
It is therefore evident that, although Husserl attains the intersubjective realm, he does so without invoking a necessary connection between language and the community of subjects. The Husserlian community thereby gained differs markedly from the intersubjectivity of the concretely cultural and historical communities described in Hegel's phenomenology.

While Husserl grants in the Crisis that intersubjectivity is an irreducible structure of the lifeworld, he thereby provides us with an essentially epistemological community. My perception of the object depends on the perceptions of other subjects inhabiting the same world. The concrete features of different historical communities do not appear to exert a determining influence on perception, according to this conception of intersubjectivity.

Hegel's Phenomenology, on the other hand, examines consciousness as it functions in a variety of specific types of communities. Of particular interest to us is the extent to which the necessary penetration of experience by language helps to open up this realm to Hegelian phenomenology. Language is not bracketed; rather, it is a fundamental guiding element in the intersubjective horizon of transcendental subjectivity. Because language is always a specific language, a public structure which develops and changes historically,
its involvement in experience implies a penetration of human life by the concrete social understandings carried by that language. In this way, human discourse opens the door to the phenomenological description of different historical societies and types of social phenomena; through language, intersubjectivity becomes subject to history.

In summary, Hegel's linguistically mediated intersubjectivity, permits the examination of concretely historical types of communities, in contrast to the formally perceptual intersubjectivity which belongs to the prelinguistic structure of the lifeworld in Husserl's Crisis.

- c - The dialectical nature of the given

Finally, it is something of a commonplace to observe that Hegel's phenomenology, unlike Husserl's, is dialectical. The question of language's mediation of experience is also relevant to an explanation of this disparity between the two approaches to phenomenology.

For Husserl, the phenomena which serve as the data of phenomenology are purely given self-evidences possessing virtually absolute status. Their evidential nature cannot be
revoked by subsequent data. As Stanley Rosen writes,

If I may so put it, each essence is an absolute expression of the Absolute, and not a dialectical element in the gradually to be completed self-exhibition of a totally visible Absolute. (p. 27).

After the initial radicality of the epoché, Husserl's phenomenology is characterized by systematic discovery—termed "peaceful, calmly didactic" by de Renville (p. 23)—of transcendental structures possessing irrevocable, stable evidential value.

As we earlier remarked when discussing the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit, the dialectical character of Hegel's phenomenology consists in the instability of the individual shapes of consciousness. The Phenomenology presents us with a succession of shapes, each a result of contradictions that are inherent in what has gone before. A phenomenon is an unstable moment, aufgehoben by a subsequent stage containing the truth of the former.

Part of the reason for the dialectical nature of the given according to Hegelian phenomenology can be found in the necessary mediation of consciousness and world by language. The concrete vocabularies that perform this mediation, as Rorty emphasizes, are themselves shifting and inconstant:
Hegel left Kant’s ideal of philosophy-as-science a shambles, but he did ... create a new literary genre, a genre which exhibited the relativity of significance to choice of vocabulary, the bewildering variety of vocabularies from which we can choose, and the intrinsic instability of each. (p. 164)

The instability of language helps Hegel to point to the absence of absolute essence in experience. If experience necessarily unfolds in a linguistic setting, it is evident that the character of that experience must alter as changes occur to the vocabularies employed. Evidences and intuitions are thus revoked in Hegel because of the mediation of self and world by language.

Grieder notes that Hegel employs a "conceptual-discursive" approach, as opposed to Husserl’s "intuitive-descriptive" phenomenological method (p. 268). To be sure, this contrast is largely due to the different pre-understandings held by the two thinkers concerning the nature of the phenomenological enterprise. However, the intimacy of language and transcendental subjectivity makes Hegel’s conceptual-discursive approach possible. His phenomenology of language contributes in large measure to the explanation of the instability of experience—an instability which is at the core of the dialectic of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Conversely, Husserl’s eidetic intuitions can remain absolute and irrevocable because they are untouched by the unsteadiness of language.
VI - Concluding Remarks

- a - Recapitulation

Our confrontation between Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenology has revealed similarities between them with regard to the field of subjectivity which they examine and their respective methodologies. We also saw a historical convergence of Hegel and Husserl in post-Husserlian continental thought. However, Husserl and Hegel developed fundamentally different conceptions of the role of language in consciousness, conceptions with far-reaching implications for their phenomenologies as such.
With respect to the all important subject-object relation, both phenomenologies transcend naive sense realism, claiming that the universal and the conceptual are necessary to experience. Nevertheless, they provide contrasting descriptions of how consciousness comes to recognize the universal. For Husserl the universal arises from a meaningful prelinguistic experience of objects, whereas Hegel ties the conceptual realm to the necessary mediation of experience by language. While Husserl grants that "everyday" experience can be language-bound, his phenomenology always inquires back to the prelinguistic encounter with sense which generates linguistic meaning. Hegel would deny the possibility of such a prelinguistic stem of experience.

Their phenomenologies of language carry implications for their approaches to intersubjectivity. For Husserl, intersubjectivity is part of the prelinguistic structure of the lifeworld. In contrast, for Hegel intersubjectivity, as does the subject-object relation, evolves within a linguistic setting. This immediate presence of language helps to open up the cultural-historical aspects of experience to Hegelian phenomenology. The relevance of intersubjectivity to Husserl, however, appears to be primarily epistemological and perceptual, and the realms of culture and history cause enormous difficulties for his phenomenology.
Finally, the instability of the given, a result of the linguistic penetration of experience, allows Hegel to portray experience as thoroughly dialectical. Husserl is permitted to construe phenomenology as a science of the intuition and description of stable, essential transcendental structures largely because he holds apart language and the most fundamental stratum of transcendental subjectivity.

All of these considerations disclose the effect of the phenomenology of language on the character of the phenomenological enterprise. Is language, or is it not, a determinant of the structures of transcendental subjectivity? A "language choice" is evident. How one answers this question will help to determine the sort of phenomenology one carries out.

Given the competing Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenologies of language and the crucial importance for phenomenology of this issue, we would now seem to be confronted by problems of evidence. Is their support for either the Hegelian or the Husserlian conception of language's role in human awareness?
- b - Problems of evidence

Assuredly, evidences arrived at through the phenomenological descriptions of both Hegel and Husserl are often memorable and impressive. Hegel's dialectic of Lordship and Bondage and Husserl's exploration of the protentive-retentive structure of time consciousness are in their own ways tours de force of phenomenological description. Yet it is remarkable that neither philosopher provides us with comparable descriptions of linguistic phenomena — descriptions which would support their respective views concerning the role of language in consciousness.

In "Sense-certainty", Hegel dares, the hypothetical spokesman of sense-certain consciousness to indicate its truth without expressing it. The protagonist cannot do so, and is consequently forced to admit the irreducibility of the universals carried by language. Despite the importance of language to the argument of the chapter, however, the topic receives little sustained examination. The pervasiveness of language seems granted with only a frustratingly small amount of phenomenological warrant.

Similarly, Husserl's phenomenological descriptions devoted to language strike one as scanty. In the Logical
Investigations, for example, he argues that language is not necessary for the performance of mental acts, on the grounds that it is possible to perform an inner monologue in which we represent thoughts to ourselves without having to resort to language in order to indicate those thoughts.

Shall we say that in soliloquy one speaks to oneself, and employs words as signs, i.e. as indications, of one's own inner experience? I cannot think that such a view is possible. (vol. I, p. 279)

Husserl's assumption that inner experiences are in no way conditioned by linguistic understandings seems just that, an assumption. He does not appear to speak to the Hegelian point that all mental life takes place in a linguistic setting, even if language is not thematically employed by consciousness at all times (for example, in perception).

Both thinkers lack satisfactory, sustained analysis of language in their phenomenologies; despite what we now can see as the crucial significance of the issue. It is therefore perhaps misleading to call their efforts to deal with linguistic phenomena "phenomenologies of language". They are perhaps rather "prephenomenologies of language", positions taken with regard to the role of language in consciousness which supply a background for subsequent phenomenological description. Maybe we have to turn to other phenomenologists,
philosophers, and perhaps even psychologists who treat language more precisely in its own right, in order to gain evidential support for either side of the language choice.

A phenomenologist who is particularly sensitive to the need to treat language thematically is Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Indeed, insofar as Merleau-Ponty unites his concern for language with methodological debts to both Hegel and Husserl, the type of reflection undertaken in this present thesis inexorably leads to a recognition of the importance of his work. Particularly significant as a phenomenological description of an experience with language is his essay, "On the Phenomenology of Language". In this study Merleau-Ponty describes the "linguistic gesture" (pp. 83-87), drawing the conclusion that using language teaches us our thought. For Merleau-Ponty the linguistic gesture reveals "the common act of the signifying and the signified" (p. 87), a conclusion tending to support the Hegelian interpretation of language as the setting of thought. (18).

In his later works, the Crisis and the posthumously edited Experience and Judgment, Husserl attempts to formulate the relation between the originary realm of sense that is the lifeworld and the cultural, historical world in which we live.
However, to the end he urges the retrogression to the prelinguistic realm which founds the cultural and social world. The abruptness of this move, his seeming request to turn back to a lifeworld which is no longer the world of everyday life, has plagued phenomenology since Husserl. Philosophers rejecting the total reduction, e.g. Merleau-Ponty, developed "impure" phenomenological forms, reflecting a view of language closer to Hegel than to Husserl.

Could it be that language’s closeness to experience forces any attempt to return to prelinguistic experience to be an overly abrupt break with human life? Would such a total reduction leave us with something we could no longer call human experience? If so, this could constitute indirect support for the Hegelian view that language necessarily mediates experience. For such a perspective is required in order to describe the way in which the concrete social horizon acts as a "hermeneutical a priori", to use the expression of G. Schmidt (pp. 42-43), with respect to the given. The heuristic value of such a descriptive potential leads us toward the Hegelian incorporation of language into the most fundamental layer of transcendental subjectivity, and away from the Husserlian approach of inquiring back to prelinguistic foundational realms.
1. See the discussion of Kisiel's article on pp. 73-74 of the thesis.

2. Note the way Hegel speaks of "leaving aside" prior ideas. One is reminded of Husserl's description of the phenomenological reduction as a "bracketing" or a "setting aside".

3. Less colourfully than Solomon, Rauch makes the same point. "What Hegel and Husserl offer (each in his own way), is the systematic knowledge of how the world can come to be the creation of spirit." (p. 334)

4. As we shall later discover in the context of discussing intersubjectivity, a first person approach does not necessarily limit phenomenology to the first person singular.

5. "Both thinkers ask us to reject the ordinary cognitive attitude while they admit the indubitability of ordinary experiential content". (Rauch, p. 331)

6. See the discussions in Markova, p. 117; Solomon, p. 323.

7. Lauer 1976, p. 45 discusses this point in some depth.

8. See the discussions in Lamb, pp. 292-296; Hyppolite 1974, pp. 94-96.

9. The theme of linguistic universality versus meaning is also found in the Encyclopaedia: "Now language is the work
of thought: and hence all that is expressed in language must be universal. What I only mean or suppose is mine: it belongs to me—this particular individual. But language expresses nothing but universality; and so I cannot say what I merely mean. And the unutterable—feeling or sensation—far from being the highest truth, is the most unimportant and untrue" (EL, par. 20). Note also the attack on the abstraction of the particular "I" in both this passage from the Encyclopaedia and in "Sense-Certainty".

10. E.g., Westphal, pp. 81-83; Quillian, pp. 151-154; Burbridge, p. 27.

11. Discussions of these themes can be found in Habermas, pp. 142 ff.; Cook, pp. 35-39.

12. An example can be found in Loewenberg, pp. 35-39.

13. For a good discussion of the points made by Feuerbach, see de Nys, pp. 446-450.

14. "It emerges that the subject is not just passive but also and primarily active, and that it is not individual but social. Thus the categories of human thought have to be seen as a social product. We might reasonably add, I think, especially on the strength of the 'Sense-certainty' section, that their social character is closely linked with their being encapsulated in language" (Norman, p. 112).

15. Also: "A nation cannot be deemed civilized if it cannot express all the treasures of science in its own language" (ETW, p. 322). Furthermore, the 1803-1804 Jena lectures stress that language only exists as the language of a people (Quillian, p. 153).


17. "Not only is language prephenomenological, but also prehistoric (in the sense of a genetic primacy, and not of a chronological precedence)" (Gauthier, p. 32).

18. With caution it might also be possible to bring psychological research to bear on this question. For example, I. Markova's Paradigms, Thought, and Language argues that current experimental research in the psychology of language is starting to work within a paradigm consistent with Hegel's conception of language. On the other side of the issue, Gurwitsch (pp. 392-394) enlists psychological research which he claims shows the need for a Husserlian prepredicative experience.
Bibliography

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